AN ANALYSIS OF METAPHOR
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By

JOHN WARD, B.A.

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The aim of this thesis is to develop an analysis of metaphor which is consistent with the claim that the meaning of many metaphors cannot be expressed in any other form of words. In order to confirm this claim the analysis offered treats metaphor as a whole sentence taken within a context, not as a particular way of using a word or words. In CHAPTER'S ONE, TWO AND THREE, I discuss the nature of the elements of a metaphor, and their relation to each other, I show that the predicate element of a metaphor is itself complex. The relation between predicate and subject in a metaphor is shown to depend upon the manner in which we think metaphorically. An analysis of metaphorical meaning must characterize metaphorical thought, and we attempt this with the help of Wittgenstein's notion of seeing-as. CHAPTER FOUR supplements our analysis by raising the question "How is the meaning of metaphor affected by the beliefs and belief systems of the language user?" A discussion of this question helps us to distinguish metaphor from various other forms of language and to show that the meaning of some metaphors is, in an important sense, relative to the beliefs we hold.
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This thesis attempts to provide an account of the nature of metaphor. The theory offered here takes as its central claim "the irreducibility thesis", that is, the claim that the meaning of many metaphors cannot be given in another non-figurative form of words. Metaphor is not reducible to a set of literal statements. The theory developed in this thesis is compared with two other types of theory (the "Controversion" theory and the "Seeing-as" theory) which also adopt the "irreducibility thesis". In order to defend this central claim I have adopted a semantic approach, one that attempts to define the reference and predication of verbal signs and the relation which they bear to things. I offer some considerations to show that a purely syntactical approach, one that is concerned with formal and grammatical features of language, is inadequate.

There are two possible ways to attempt a philosophical analysis of metaphor and each has certain limitations. We could treat a metaphor as a puzzling combination of words which requires interpretation in order to be understood. Examples of metaphor taken from poetry lend themselves well to this approach and a theory of metaphor forms an important part of any general theory of aesthetics. Examples of Poetic Metaphor are:

"When will you ever, Peace, Wild woodlove, shy wings shut, Your round me roaming end, and under be my boughs?"
(G.M. Hopkins)
"He was fermenting over with frothy circumstance"  
(Shakespeare)

"Those are the pearls that were his eyes"  
(Eliot)

"The palm at the end of the mind  
Beyond the last thought, rises  
In the bronze decor . . ."  
(Wallace Stevens)

These examples require interpretation and elucidation, and the interpretation of metaphors is part of interpreting a whole poem. An attempted philosophical contribution to the work of interpretation should show the logical form of a metaphor and discern what elements it contains. In such a way we can discover what legitimate considerations form part of an explanation of the meaning of metaphor. This method of analysis is attempted in CHAPTER ONE, part one, and in CHAPTER TWO.

An alternative to this approach is to treat metaphor as a mode of communication which requires a special effort of thought on the part of both its author and a reader or listener. We could say that "I am the vine you are my branches" requires such an effort. Similarly in these cases:

"The mind is a ghost in a machine" (Ryle)  
"The world is will" (Nietzsche)  
"All the world is a stage"  
"The barge she sat in, like a burnished throne, burn'd on the water" (Shakespeare)

Although these metaphors are susceptible of interpretation, that is, we can find some other form of words to
say approximately what is said by them, they can be understood without being overtly interpreted. We can grasp their meaning in a single thought, that is we can come to an understanding of it without consciously translating them into another form of words. Theories that adopt this approach emphasize that metaphor expresses a special kind of experience. As Richards has said, philosophers should work towards a definition of metaphorical thought, not of metaphorical sentences or phrases.

Clearly these two methods of approach are not incompatible. A slight bias in the choice of examples may help to make the distinction a little clearer. However, both approaches can help us to offer some account of all types of metaphor, and there is not incompatibility between saying that a metaphor can be elucidated by means of an interpretation (by "interpretation" I mean any other form of words which attempts to express the meaning of a metaphor), and that it can be understood in a single act of thought or through a single experience.


Richards himself is not entirely consistent in this approach however.
In CHAPTER ONE I attempt to reconcile these two methods of approach. The first approach can account for what sort of "concept" is presented in a metaphor, while the second approach helps us to see how a concept gains "application" to reality. (The notions of "application" and "concept" will be defined shortly). That these two approaches have been seen as mutually exclusive is evidenced by the fact that they have been pursued independently by proponents of the "Controversion theory" and of the "Seeing-as theory". CHAPTERS TWO and THREE attempt an exposition and evaluation of these two theories. In the course of these chapters, we elucidate the important notions of the "connotation" of a word, and of creativity as it is present in a metaphor.

In CHAPTER FOUR I broaden the perspective of the thesis in an attempt to show the significance of metaphor for a more general theory of language, and to deal with the relation between metaphor and our beliefs about the world. To this end it is helpful to discuss examples of metaphor which might occur in everyday discourse, for it is these metaphors which seem to affect our view of the world in the greatest degree. Examples are:

"Tomorrow's the big day!"
"Their thoughts were poisoned at the source!"
"Richard is a lion!"
"The eager spearpoint."
"Time stood still."

In order to facilitate exposition of theories which accept the irreducibility thesis (or are, at least, compatible
with it), it will be useful to have a brief account of the theory to which they are opposed. This theory is the traditional one, and (perhaps for that reason) has an obvious appeal for common sense. Aristotle was the first exponent of this theory.

Aristotle's definition characterizes a type of word. Metaphor is

A word with some other meaning which is transferred from species to genus, or from genus to species, or species to species, or used by analogy.

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That this transference of a word depends upon some similarity between the thing named by that word and the things mentioned by its new context is suggested by the classification of metaphors here, and by the following statement:

The greatest thing by far is to be master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and also a sign of genius since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity of dissimilars.

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Aristotle thinks that the meaning of metaphor can

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3 Ibid., 1459a., pp. 1477.
always be made explicit by stating the principle upon which its transference is based. Thus we can explain "He is at the sunset of his life" by "His old age is to his life as the sunset is to the day." We make explicit the comparison made in a metaphor by using the words "like" or "as".

We cannot do justice here to Aristotle's account by "analogy", the relation embodied in the above example. As Owens has pointed out Aristotle's account of this relation allows him to use analogy to discover relations that occur "in the nature of things". Analogy is a philosophical principle for Aristotle who invented the formula "A is to B as C is to D" to explain it.

Criticism of Aristotle's theory of metaphor and of the analogy type of metaphor (which Aristotle took to be the most important type) is usually directed against the concept of similarity. Such criticism is either linguistic, metaphysical or both. That is, it claims that language cannot express similarities adequately or that there are no similarities "in the nature of things". Such criticisms are discussed in CHAPTER TWO and CHAPTER THREE.

A paraphrase or literal interpretation of a metaphor for Aristotle is some statement which explicitly states

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a similarity between two things. Aristotle holds that such a paraphrase captures the meaning of a metaphor, but that metaphor may be valued for conciseness, for its strangeness which produces surprise and pleasure. It can be used to add force to an argument (in rhetoric) or to evoke poetic appreciation.

We will make objections to Aristotle's account in what follows. The aim of this thesis is to develop a theory which can account for all the uses of metaphor, both in rhetoric and in poetry, as Aristotle's does. It must be an account which adopts both of the approaches mentioned above. But I hope also to lay emphasis on a virtue of metaphor which Aristotle does not mention, namely originality. Most modern critics of Aristotle stress the imaginative power of metaphor. It requires, in some of its modes of employment, the capacity to go beyond what is ordinary. I hope to satisfy these critics.
I

A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF METAPHOR

PART ONE

The approach of PART ONE is to analyse metaphor as an object of interpretation. I am concerned here with the type of concept which a metaphor presents. "Concept" here means, that which enables us to understand the meaning of a sentence or phrase. In order to describe the sort of concept that is involved in metaphors, I examine in turn the reference and predication of a metaphor and the necessary conditions of reaching an interpretation of a metaphor. The central claim here supports the irreducibility thesis. It is that metaphor presents an "open-ended" concept, that is, it is always possible to add to any interpretation of the meaning of a metaphor. For most metaphors are susceptible of more than one interpretation and two interpretations are not necessarily incompatible, although they may be.

Literal Sentences

To understand reference and predication in a metaphor we need to understand these things as they occur in non-figurative or 'literal' sentences. We will then be able to
provide a definition of metaphor by contrast with literal sentences. Although there are many types of literal sentence it will be most convenient to contrast metaphor with sentences whose sole function is to convey information about objects of experience. We will concentrate on descriptive literal sentences. (I do not attempt a definition of "literalness" but would emphasize that we are concerned with a property of sentences, not of the use of individual words. I do not think that a single criterion can be found to distinguish literal from metaphorical sentences). A sentence such as "the chair is brown" conveys a fact about the world. And a person who understands the meaning of the sentence knows under what circumstances it is true and when it is false. To understand such a sentence does not require knowledge of any special vocabulary nor anything beyond knowledge of the English language.

Such sentences convey information, or state facts through the referring function of their elements, the subject and predicate. In order to identify these two verbal components of a sentence, we must identify the things to which they refer, and there are several ways of doing this. I adopt

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1 As Strawson points out in his *Individuals*, (London: Methuen, 1959), Chapter IV.
the method of studying the "style of introduction" of a term into a sentence. We examine the role that a word or phrase plays within a sentence (for example, whether it says something of something or names something) and the relation it bears to some real thing (the general term for this relation is "reference", although it is probably more correct to speak of the reference of a whole sentence than of its components). These two aspects of the components of a sentence contribute to the meaning of the word or phrase when it occurs within that sentence.

The subject of a sentence is determined by asking what the sentence is about. In "the table is brown", "the table" is the subject and in order to fully understand the sentence, one must know which table is referred to. In an everyday use of this sentence we could guess which table was meant from the context of use. But the sense of these words also partially determines what their reference is. We know what sort of thing a table is. The sense of two expressions can be different, while they refer to the same object, as in Frege's example "the morning star" has the same reference as "the evening star". We can define the sense of an expression as the "manner in which we determine its reference"; the sense

2 The account offered here is similar to that of Frege; G. Frege, Translations, Geach and Black, eds., (Oxford: 1952).
of "the evening star" is, the star that can be seen at six p.m. in such and such a position.

The role of the subject, then, is to identify the principle object of reference of a sentence. This is made possible by the conventionally accepted sense of the word or phrase in question. The relation it bears to its object of reference is a simple one, similar in many respects to the relation between a proper name and a person.

The predicate of a sentence can be identified as that part of the sentence which cannot stand on its own; "...is red" requires completion if it is to be meaningful. Predicate is a relational concept, a predicate is always a predicate of...something. The role of a predicate is always to say something of something or to be "applied" to some thing. A predicate does not gain application to a subject simply in virtue of some existing relation between two things. We can best study the "application of a predicate to a subject" by treating it as a rule of language, or a convention recognized by language users. "John is a person" is meaningful, and "John is a bottle" is meaningless, in virtue of the relation between subject and predicate in these sentences. It is a rule that "is a bottle" and "John" are not of the correct types of expression to be fitted together. But, or course, this rule has its basis in some real feature of bottles and of John.
A predicate expression bears some relation to reality, but not a relation of the simple naming sort. It will be convenient to say that a predicate expression refers to, or designates, a concept, although it must be realized that "concepts" are not existents. "Concept" is a way of signifying; that which makes possible both the meaning and the application of a predicate. Any predicate can be said to have a range of possible subjects or, to put this another way, any concept has a limited set of things which can be said to fall under it.

Let us now see if this brief and unargued account of the subject-predicate distinction can be applied to metaphor.

Metaphors

In the foregoing I have argued that the words which occur in a sentence have a conventionally determined sense and a single object of reference. The sense of a word can be found out from a dictionary, and to know the object of reference one must know the sense of the words, be familiar with the language and appreciate the point of its use within some context. In studying metaphor we cannot make these assumptions. In "all the world's a stage", the sense of "stage" seems to be subtly
different from its ordinary accepted sense. This in turn casts doubt upon the idea that the word refers solely to the concept of a stage. Is that concept the ordinary one, or is it a concept which is in some way extended from our ordinary notion of a stage? Similarly, the phrase "all the world" does not seem to have a definite object of reference. In this case we have to rely very heavily on the context of the sentence to determine the sense and reference of its components words (and, in the speech subsequent to this example, Shakespeare amplifies and illustrates the meaning of this metaphor).

However, given these qualifications, I shall argue that the question of reference is relevant to determining the meaning of a metaphor. And, our main problem is to show how a metaphor can have meaning and can be understood, when we are uncertain about the sense of some of its constituent words (as they occur within the metaphor). Now, in order to clear the ground for the study of metaphorical meaning we must first of all examine an argument which claims to show that "everything which can be said can be said clearly". "Said

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3 In this example "stage" does not seem to have exactly the same meaning as any of the synonyms offered in the Oxford English dictionary.

clearly" here means "can be expressed in a sentence whose constituents refer to one thing only and whose logical structure mirrors that of the world." Here reference is conceived as a simple one-to-one relation (univocity) and the logical structure of a sentence is governed by the rules that govern the combination of subject and predicate. These rules are thought to depend upon what combinations of things are possible in the world. It is evident that the thesis that the meaning of all sentences can be expressed in such 'clear' sentences, is incompatible with the claim that metaphor is "open-ended".

No simple argument can be formulated for the former thesis, but it is defended on the ground that reference must be a simple relation if it is to be the founding notion within a whole philosophy of language. And, since language can be used successfully to inform us about the world, it must be isomorphic with the world (that is, its elements must bear a similar relation to each other to the corresponding relation between real things.)

There are two possible accounts of metaphor if this thesis is accepted, or adopted as a working principle. 1) A sentence such as "all the world's a stage" could be a mistaken combination of words, or a "category mistake". It violates the generally accepted rules by which subjects are combined with
predicates. These rules are complex and vary considerably from case to case, as can be seen in the following example:

Apparently I can say "The chair is brown" and "the surface of the chair is brown". But if I replace "brown" by "heavy" then I can sensibly say only the first sentence and not the second. That proves that the word "brown" too, had different meanings. (W.Wk. 46)

A sentence commits a category mistake if we can identify some category difference which has been ignored. We would identify the difference in a similar way to that in which the two senses of "brown" were discovered. Thus a metaphor is similar to the sentence "the surface of the table is heavy"; it is a particular type of non-sense.

However, metaphor does not fulfil another important condition for being a category mistake. To say that someone has made a category mistake entails that he has some mistaken belief about things. But in order to employ metaphor successfully one does not need to be deluded. Furthermore, it is commonly accepted that metaphors have meaning and are not non-sense (that is, metaphor is not completely unintelligible). If metaphor violates the ordinary rules of language, this shows only that those rules do not apply to metaphor, that we cannot explain metaphorical meaning by means of them. It does not justify applying the term "mistake" to metaphor.

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2) The alternative to this view given our premise, is to say that metaphor contains an ellipsis. An ellipsis is a meaningful sentence but has one or two words missing which the reader may supply for himself. Aristotle apparently believed that metaphor was an elliptical way of expressing the relation of similarity.

I think the strongest objection to analyzing metaphor as an ellipsis is that metaphor derives part of its meaning from a contradiction. To fill in the missing element of the metaphor would remove that contradiction. Perhaps no great loss of meaning is involved in saying "All the world is like a stage", but it would be much more difficult to fill out a metaphor such as:

Wailing wall night!
Carved in you are the psalms of silence.

or "living death" (the latter is an oxymoron or direct contradiction). Here a tension between subject (psalms) and the attributing word (of silence) seems to contribute to the meaning of the phrase.

If these accounts are rejected we must find some alternative. Most metaphors appear to have a subject and a predicate just like literal sentences. The role of the subject word or term does not seem to be different from that of the

subject of a literal statement, it refers to something. However, it is more difficult to individuate the thing referred to in a metaphor for two reasons. Firstly, in an ordinary statement we identify the subject by means of the conventional meaning (or sense) of the grammatical subject of the sentence, and from an understanding of the predicate. In "the table is brown" we know that the thing referred to is a table and that it is the sort of thing that can be brown. In a metaphor we do not have the latter criterion. The predicate does not help us to identify the subject. In "now sleeps the crimson petal", we know the conventionally accepted meaning of "crimson petal", but petals are not the sort of thing that sleep. Secondly, metaphors very often take as subjects things which are beyond experience. "All the world", "time", "love", are abstract ideas, which are the sort of thing best suited for metaphorical expression. We must return to this point.

The role of the predicate word or term does seem to be quite different to that in a literal sentence. It seems to be essentially ambiguous, to have two or more meanings. A simple example can illustrate this: "He is puffed up" would generally be taken to mean "he is conceited". For there is a contradiction between the meaning of "he" and of "puffed up" which indicates that the sentence is not meant literally. So here "is puffed up" means "is conceited". It also retains something of its ordinary meaning, however, for this meaning
both contributes to the contradiction inherent in the metaphor and allows the metaphor to be susceptible of further interpretation ("puffed up" might suggest that he is insecure, that is, he is easily deflated or relieved of his conceit).

I.A. Richards introduced the terms "tenor" and "vehicle" to indicate each of the elements of an ambiguous metaphor. "Vehicle" is the ordinary or conventionally accepted meaning of the predicate word or phrase, in this case "puffed up". "Tenor" is the predicate's other meaning, which can be said to be implicit in the metaphor. We arrive at this meaning by interpreting the metaphor. In this case the tenor is "is concealed". (It would be difficult, but not impossible, to find the tenor of a more complex example such as the Shakespeare quotation, page ii).

The manner of reference and the manner of predication of a metaphorical predicate are correspondingly more complex than that of a literal sentence. However, we identify the metaphorical predicate in much the same way as in a literal sentence, by grammatical and syntactical features of the sentence. "Is puffed up" is an incomplete expression just like "is brown".

How does the predicate acquire its two meanings? The vehicle of a metaphor is just the ordinary meaning of the words and can be discovered in a dictionary. But the

vehicle is in contradiction with the subject and consequently cannot say anything of it. The reader is obliged to look for or to construct the tenor, which does say something of the subject (which behaves like an ordinary predicate). He can do this by thinking of the connotation of the word or phrase that expresses the predicate. This is simply to say that he associates ideas with that word or with the ordinary object of reference of that word. It may be that a word has a conventionally accepted range of connotation, that is, a set of associated ideas, which any person who knows the language could be expected to hit upon. But very often a metaphorical use of a word calls upon some idea which could conceivably be associated with the word but which goes well beyond the common run. Thus in "The mind has mountains" (Hopkins), "psychological block" is not an everyday connotation of the word mountain yet the metaphor may take this as its tenor. It may mean (among other things) "The mind is subject to psychological blocks". We certainly could not give an exhaustive specification of the connotation of a word but a large number of possible connotations will be ruled out by the context in which the metaphor occurs. But, more than this, the possible connotations which could make up the tenor is limited by the subject. The tenor must include only things that can be meaning-

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8 Psychological block occurs when a person fails to remember or do something owing to some cause unknown to him.
fully said of the subject.

It seems to me that in a large number of cases it will not be possible to say exactly what the tenor of the metaphor is. This is not to say that there is an infinity of possible interpretations of the metaphor, but that we can find no criterion to determine when the possibilities of interpretation have been exhausted. And in fact the attempt to impose a limit on interpretation always constitutes nothing more than a challenge to the ingenuity of the reader. This point supports the thesis that metaphor is open-ended.

But now we seem to have moved from the position of saying that metaphorical predicates have two meanings (tenor and vehicle) to the position that they have an indefinite number of meanings governed only by the range of connotation of the word or phrase. However, it seems to me that in interpreting a metaphor a reader may not know what the tenor is, but he generally assumes that there is one and that it can be determined. Difficult metaphors such as those in Hopkins are read as if they were simple ones like "Richard is a lion" whose tenor can be determined. If this were not the case then metaphor could not be used to communicate meaning and since it is so used, there must be some common ground upon which interpretation is based.  

9 We return to this on page 20.
If it is accepted that there are two reasonably well-defined elements of meaning in a metaphorical predicate what relation do these elements bear to reference and predication? Clearly the vehicle does not predicate anything of the subject, since it is in contradiction with it. Strictly speaking, then, it does not have a reference but is merely the conventionally accepted sense of words, a sense which has become fixed through previous uses of the word. However, it may be suggested that in order to know the connotation of a word and so to be able to arrive at the tenor, one must not simply associate ideas with the word but with the thing to which the word refers. To interpret "The mind has mountains" one must "bring to mind" some real mountains. We must emphasize then that the sense of the vehicle is not distinct from its possible objects of reference.

The tenor does predicate something of the subject and can be said to refer to a concept. Such a concept will, in many cases, be an open-ended one since, as we have seen, we cannot fully specify the tenor. It will be a concept for which the range of things which fall under it has not been fully determined. I think it would be more correct to say that the whole predicate refers to such a concept since such a concept is not possible except by the interrelation of vehicle and tenor. It seems to me that a predicate word cannot be said to draw attention to its implicit connotation unless it also retains its
ordinary meaning. Thus the tenor is not possible without the vehicle, and these two meanings together constitute the concept which is the referent of the metaphorical predicate.

We can characterize this concept more fully by examining the relation between the vehicle and the rest of the metaphor, and by attempting to show how "context" contributes to metaphorical meaning.

The "Vehicle" and the Poetic Character of Metaphor

Several accounts of the role of the vehicle and its relation to the tenor and the subject have been offered and we shall examine some in CHAPTER TWO. The vehicle carries the peculiarly poetic characteristics of the apparent contradiction between the subject and vehicle, and it is thought to express something through its relation to the rest of the metaphor, that could not be expressed in any other way. And it has been said that this something can only be intuitively grasped. Metaphors have an expressive or emotive meaning which transcends the meaning of the words and their referential function.

I suggest that we can only account for this type of meaning by studying the mode of cognition of the metaphor. This is attempted in PART TWO. However, two suggestions can be made on the present level of analysis: The first has been made

by Kaplan whose analysis of metaphor is similar to the one offered above.

The central thesis of Kaplan's paper is that when an artist uses material that is ordinarily employed in a referential way (such as, words or representative devices; in painting) they retain that referential use in the work of art that is produced (novel, poem or painting). Such material has an expressive meaning which is distinctive to the art work, but which depends, in some way, upon the referential meaning. Kaplan believes that it is illegitimate to deny that poetic uses of words, for example, have reference, simply on the ground that they are not used primarily to convey information nor have the external form of literal sentences. I agree with this claim.

Kaplan suggests that the expressive, poetic meaning of a metaphor is constituted by the relation between vehicle and tenor. He points out that the tenor is only implicit in the metaphor. But evidently a sentence such as "Richard is a lion" does mean that Richard is courageous and strong, so it would seem that "is a lion" should stand for, or signify, being courageous. Kaplan calls this relation between vehicle and tenor, "embodiment". The vehicle embodies the tenor by signifying certain properties which are connoted by the

vehicle. Kaplan says that this is to make the predicate of a metaphor "a sign by signifying its own characters." He says that,

This is the kind of expressiveness essential to the art object, and perhaps explains why Morris describes the aesthetic sign as iconic. It is to direct attention to this distinctive mode of signifying that the tenor was said to be expressed by the vehicle rather than by the (whole) metaphor itself. 12

Kaplan later says that this 'special kind of signifying cannot be abstracted from the process of interpreting the metaphor. It is therefore not the ordinary type of signifying present in a literal sentence. Although this account does not explain poetic meaning, it does suggest that the referential meaning of the predicate cannot be divorced from its expressive or poetic meaning. The vehicle signifies in a way similar to, but not the same as, ordinary reference.

A second suggestion is that the vehicle can be a symbol of the subject. A thing can be a symbol either by a conventional relation as the stars and stripes is a symbol of the U.S.A., or by some complex relation in thought. The important thing about symbols in poetry is that they recur and thus provide clues for an interpretation of a whole poem or novel (or any other kind of text). If a symbol occurs as the

12 Ibid., pp. 471.
predicate of a metaphor this conditions our interpretation of it. In the movie *Cabaret*, the symbol of a cabaret is a recurrent theme or idea in the story and thus we know quite well what to make of the metaphor "Life is a cabaret". A metaphor can also serve to inaugurate a symbol as in this case the metaphor is the opening line of the movie.

The Context of a Metaphor

One way in which context can contribute to metaphorical meaning is to emphasize this symbolic character of the predicate. If it is symbolic then we must interpret the metaphor in such a way that it concurs with the symbolic meaning of that word throughout the rest of the text. We have seen that context also contributes to determining the subject's reference and that of the predicate. However, it seems to me to be impossible to give a general definition of context which will determine what is relevant to the meaning of any given metaphor. It seems to me that the contribution of context to metaphorical meaning varies from case to case.

However, we can distinguish two important types of context and two ways in which context may be relevant. When the context affects the meaning of the predicate it does so

only by ruling out certain connotations of the words as irrelevant. They cannot be part of the meaning of the tenor.

(1) The apparent purpose of the use of the metaphor may be relevant. If a poem is a lullaby, or a eulogy, or the metaphor occurs in a manifesto, or in a textbook or religious tract. Metaphors may be used as parts of many sorts of discourse and its meaning within such contexts is different from the meaning one might suggest given only the metaphor in isolation. For example, in "I am the vine", "vine" cannot connote grapes and wine since Christ was saying something about his relation to his disciples namely that they were dependent upon Him. We know this from the whole speech in which the metaphor occurs.

(2) The culture or way of life of both author and reader may affect a metaphor's meaning if this culture depends upon certain commonly accepted beliefs. A tribe which believes in the influence of spirits will not be able to appreciate that in "the mind is a ghost", "ghost" connotes erratic behaviour, unpredictability. For them the metaphor might have a different meaning, or they might not be able to appreciate it as a metaphor at all, but might take it for a literal statement. The beliefs that people hold affect their capacity to interpret a metaphor.

That we must examine the context of use of a metaphor, and that the author's and our own beliefs contribute to the context shows that metaphor does not gain meaning only through ordinary reference and predication. In this respect, it is quite different from literal statement. Metaphorical meaning cannot be grasped except within a context. Literal meaning is still relatively unambiguous when removed from context.

Problems of Interpretation

We can see that there are two main problems in interpreting a metaphor, and two main reasons why interpretation can never be wholly successful in many cases of metaphor.

Firstly, metaphor presents an open-ended concept. An interpretation must give some account of this concept in literal language, by specifying the tenor or by giving a paraphrase that takes the tenor as its predicate. But the tenor cannot be exhaustively specified since it is constituted by the connotation of a word or phrase. But a would-be interpreter must assume that there is some basis for an understanding of the metaphor, that some measure of agreement could be reached among the many readers of the metaphor about its meaning. This basis may be called the "central meaning". For example, the

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15 Others have called it "tenor" (Richards), "content" (Kaplan) and "literal meaning" (Beardsley).
central meaning of "Those are the pearls that were his eyes" (T.S. Eliot) is probably "His eyes are dead and pearly looking", but more is suggested by the metaphor. The literary critic whose business is partly that of interpreting metaphors, takes as his goal a full statement of the metaphor's meaning. But this goal may never be achieved.

Secondly, the subject of a metaphor is very often something which is beyond experience, like an afterlife, or the world, or it is some very abstract idea like time or life. Furthermore our beliefs about fundamental things may affect our understanding of metaphors such as "the mind is a ghost" or "love is a sickness". Yet we do not need a coherent metaphysical standpoint on the nature of time to understand "time unwinds the ravell'd sleeve of care" (Shakespeare). If I attempt to give a literal interpretation of this, however, I will be making a statement which belongs in metaphysics. "Time makes care fade", unlike the metaphor, implies that time really is an active thing, and at the same time misses the important insight into the nature of time which the metaphor alone can express.

It has been suggested that metaphor is the only medium which can express a certain sort of non-experiential idea. Insofar as the philosopher is concerned with things that transcend experience (what Kant calls "Ideas of Reason"), he should employ
metaphor in full awareness that its meaning is irreducible. The important point here is that metaphors can refer to such things as life, love, time, or death without the implication that such things (properly speaking) exist. That is, metaphor does not hypostatize its objects of reference. Because time only metaphorically unwinds, it is only metaphorically an active thing and not necessarily (literally) active.

However, for the moment I am unsure how much can be gained from such an approach, except to say that this capacity of metaphor quite clearly supports the irreducibility thesis.

PART TWO

The approach of PART TWO is to look at metaphor as a mode of communication. We shall examine the type of experience that is expressed in a metaphor and the manner of thinking which is necessary to having this experience and to being able to understand metaphors. We shall speak of the metaphorical thought here, not of the metaphorical sentence or phrase.

In PART ONE we concluded that the type of concept
expressed in a metaphor, its type of meaning, is complex. The concept is open-ended. How does it gain application to the subject? That is, what is the relation between subject and predicate and what relation holds between thought and real things when a metaphor is understood? I shall claim that the metaphorical predicate can be fruitfully compared to Kant's notion of a symbol. Kant intended "symbol" to explain the relation between an abstract concept and experience (or 'intuition') and in this respect it can help us to explain the application of a concept in a metaphor. Kant laid the foundation of our approach here, but did not point out an important analogy between understanding a metaphor and perceiving something. Metaphor involves a kind of "seeing-as", a phenomenon which is at once an active thought and an experience.

If we can explain the application of the metaphorical concept with the help of the Kantian notion of a symbol and the Wittgensteinian notion of seeing-as, we will also be able 1) to relate metaphorical thought to the general class under which it falls -- imagination. To apprehend a metaphor it is not necessary to have a mental image, as some critics have thought, but images or pictures do bear some relation to meta-

16 The notions of "symbol" here is more complex than the one outlined above.
phor. And 2) we can reach some explanation of the possibility of interpreting metaphor, of reaching some agreement about its central meaning. There are certain rules of thought which govern the application of a concept to a thing, and the literary critics concepts of "symbol", "imagery", "simile" and "metaphor" itself (although these are often ill defined in critics discourse) may serve to indicate how these rules of thought apply and what they are. To classify a metaphor under a particular rule of thought would be to relate it to features of the whole text in question and to say something about the style of the whole passage. Here, "style" does not simply mean the manner in which some meaning is expressed but should be conceived as an important aspect of the meaning of the sentence or phrase itself.

The study of metaphor here is complementary to that of PART ONE and to some extent overlaps with it. The central claim is that metaphor involves a sort of "seeing-as".

In order to study the thought involved in a metaphor, it is not possible simply to postulate certain elements of thought which correspond to the elements of the metaphorical sentence. We have no direct access to elements of thought but must study the criteria for saying that a person has had such and such a thought. One way of studying 'thought' is to recognize that all thought is directed to something outside of
itself. Thought is always thought of.... This feature is called "intentionality" and the thing which any thought is directed to is called the "intentional object" or object of thought. The phrase "object of" does not signify a thing or entity as the word object commonly does. We determine the intentional object of some given thought by giving a description of the thing which the thought is about which is most appropriate to the manner in which that thought apprehends the thing. For example, the intentional object of the thought expressed by "the morning star is in the east" is Venus as she is seen in the morning, a different intentional object to that of a thought about the "evening star".

In the case of the literal sentence it is not necessary to specify the intentional object of thought in order to make the meaning of the sentence clear. For example, in "Peter is angry" it does not matter whether Peter is thought of as the tallest man in town or as the man who runs the general store. All that is necessary is that Peter be thought of as a particular type of thing (a man) and as possessing some identifying feature or other. It is these necessary conditions which make up the application of a concept, carried out in the sentence, to the man, Peter. We could have a concept without knowing how to apply it. We could know what "Peter is angry" means but not know who is meant.
Any philosophical account of a type of concept must show what applications of it are logically possible. We must give a criterion to distinguish what things fall under that concept. In the case of a metaphorical concept, unlike a literal one, such an account of the application must characterize the intentional object. This does not necessarily mean that numerically the same intentional object occurs in every thought of the metaphor, but the same type of intentional object must occur. We justify this with the help of Kant and Wittgenstein.

Kant held that any concept must bear a relation to some possible experience and distinguished three ways in which this relation might be produced; by means of examples, schemata or symbols. Only symbols (in Kant’s sense) interest us here, since a symbol constitutes the application of what Kant calls an aesthetic idea, a type of concept which is open-ended.

As Kant states:

By an aesthetic idea I mean that representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e., concept being adequate to it, and which language can never render completely intelligible.

I think we should modify Kant’s notion slightly, by saying that it is a concept, but an indeterminate one. The function of an

aesthetic idea is to provide a "pendant" for a so-called rational idea, that is an idea of something entirely beyond experience. For the purposes of this exposition, I overlook the distinction rational idea/aesthetic idea and speak of aesthetic concept.

Now, according to Kant, the nature of the application of a concept, the elements of thought which contribute to the application, can be deduced from the concept itself. This concept will itself belong to a more general "category" and the nature of both concept and application can only be found out through a study of the "conditions of possibility" of a particular type of judgement. This study belongs to "transcendental logic". Kant says that the application of a concept depends upon the productive capability of the faculty of the imagination. It is, then, never a matter of empirical fact how a concept is applied, but always an a priori question, since the imagination can only be productive through a priori rules.

Nevertheless, aesthetic ideas and their application do admit of an empirical element and the complex relation between thought and experienced reality is explained in the following passage:

All intuitions by which a priori concepts are given a foothold are, therefore, 'schemata' or 'symbols'. Schemata contain direct, symbols in-
direct presentations of their concept. Schemata
effect this presentation demonstratively, sym-

bols by the aid of an analogy (for which re-
course is had even to empirical intuitions),
in which analogy judgement performs a double fun-
c tion: first in applying the concept to the
object of a sensible intuition and then, second-
ly, in applying the mere rule of its reflection
upon that intuition to quite another object, of
which the former is but the symbol. In this way
a monarchial state is represented as a living body
when it is governed by constitutional laws, but
a mere machine (like a hand-mill) when it is govern-
ed by an individual absolute will; but in both
cases the representation is merely symbolic. For there
is certainly no likeness between a despotic state
and a hand-mill, whereas there surely is between
the rules of reflection upon both and their causal-
ity.

A symbol is said here to be an "intuition" and a
"representation". It is an element of thought. Any sign could
elicit the thought expressed symbolically, any picture of a
hand-mill or the word "hand-mill" itself. It is a small ex-
tension of Kant's account to say that in the (possible) meta-
phor "The state was Napoleon's handmill", "handmill" functions
as a symbol. Both symbol and metaphor express "aesthetic ideas."

Not only is the symbol present in a metaphor but also
the thing symbolized (expressed by the subject) and (implicitly)

18 Ibid., pp. 222.
19 Ibid., pp. 177.
the relation between them. We have said that the application of concepts is constituted by all the necessary conditions for the use of that concept to identify an object. In the case of an aesthetic idea, this application is twofold, of concept to symbol and of concept via symbol to object. If the metaphor contains the relations between symbol and object, then it contains this application and must present, exemplify or embody it, in some way.

If this interpretation of Kant is correct, it helps us by confirming that the application of a concept is an integral part of the meaning of a metaphor. The nature of a given symbol cannot be defined except in its relation to its subject. "Symbol" is a relational concept in two ways. It is defined by its relation to the thing it is a symbol of and by its relation to the imaginative performance of the applications of concepts. But Kant does not give a full account of the imaginative applications of an aesthetic idea except to say that it depends upon "rules of reflection". We can extend Kant's account by giving an analysis of the relation between symbol and subject and by fixing the role of the intentional object.

I suggest that the symbol in a metaphor draws attention to a particular aspect of the subject. An aspect of something is characterized by a "description under which" that thing
falls. This must be a description of some property which could be present to experience. Clearly, "intentional object" and "aspect" are very closely related, for both depend upon a capacity of the mind. There could not be any "aspects" of things if there were no people to notice them.

To apprehend an aspect of an object or to see it as something has been called "intentional seeing". A description of the intentional object in terms of the mode of apprehension of the object is necessary to a description of what was intentionally seen. (I put see for this type of seeing). I contrast it with ordinary seeing wherein there is no attention to an aspect and no effort of thought involved. (As Wittgenstein says "I do not see a fork as a fork." ). A simple example of seeing-as is the apprehension of Jastrow's duck-rabbit as a duck.

An aspect of an object is also apprehended in the understanding of a metaphor. "Those are the pearls that were his eyes" draws attention to an aspect of his eyes. There are three points of analogy between seeing-as and metaphor.

The understanding of a metaphor comes "in a flash" as does the "dawning of an aspect" and is often surprising, a novel

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experience. The appearance of inspiration and spontaneity is one of the poetic qualities of the metaphor. It is not simply a matter of the introduction of a "strange" word into a sentence, but is tied to the necessity of a stretch of thought (an intellectual effort) to see the point of the metaphor.

2). Seeing-as is a distinctive perceptual experience (some philosophers have suggested that seeing-as can explain the phenomenon of mental imagery). Metaphor very often calls upon perceptual experience in order to characterize a thing, hence the practice of characterizing and classifying metaphor as "imagery".

3). The relation between the aspect of an object and the everyday thought of that object is internal or conceptual. "What I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property of the object but an internal relation between it and other objects." This means that a description of the object as it is seen under an aspect bears a necessary relation to some other possible description of the thing of which it is an aspect. Wittgenstein draws attention to the fact that possible ways of seeing something are determined by the possibilities of meaningful discourse or thought, about that thing. What is possible and what is not possible is settled by a conceptual investigation. The only criteria we have to determine whether a person has seen an aspect is his verbal say-so, and his subsequent behaviour.

22 Ibid., pp. 212e.
towards the object, what he compares it with, and how he uses it. Similarly the intentional object of a metaphorical thought and the metaphorical concept are "internally related". The concept determines (within limits) how its object is to be thought.

What is the internal relation between concept and intentional object in a metaphor? I think we can call it picturing or depicting. By this is meant a relation of correspondence between the elements of the concept and the subject. Picturing means roughly the same, here, as Wittgenstein's Tractatus use of the term "logical picture", a simple relation in thought determined by the logical possibility of relating the two things by means of rules. The picturing between concept and object constitutes the aspect of the subject which is present to thought when the metaphor is understood. Something is a logical picture of something if there are rules by which we can relate the thoughts of the two things. And the two thoughts are brought into relation through an aspect of the subject.

This is admittedly a very extended sense of "picture". Many metaphors can be found which do not in any way suggest an image or picture, for example, "Brevity is the soul of wit." The terminology does, nevertheless, suggest both that to comprehend a metaphor requires a grasp of certain rules of thought
and that these rules need not be consciously applied. Just as, when a person listens to Mozart he does not consciously analyze the harmony although his appreciation will be enhanced if he is familiar with the idiom in which Mozart writes (he has an intuitive grasp of the harmony) so our appreciation of "the mind has mountains" will be improved by a grasp of the imagery Hopkins uses and of his style.

Two important objections to this view must be considered:

1). To say that a predicate is a "picture" is contrary to Wittgenstein's use of the term in the *Tractatus*, and may be misleading. A predicate does not have the multiplicity of parts which seems necessary to a picture. Predicates and concepts are usually conceived as simples. However, Wittgenstein himself later pointed out that there could be a use for the idea that pictures are associated with words or phrases. Such a use would involve an explicit or implicit recognition of the "method of projection" of the picture. "Method of projection" means the rule by which the picture is linked with its object. A picture might be used to explain the meaning of a word or phrase, or might be imaginatively conjured up by the word or phrase. V.C. Aldrich has called such uses "image management"; we shall examine his distinction between this and "image-mongering"

in CHAPTER THREE. We have already seen in PART ONE that there is good reason to think that metaphorical predicates are not simple but complex.

2). The experience of a mental image is not a necessary condition of understanding language or of appreciating poetry. Furthermore, no sure criterion can be given to determine whether a person has had a mental image except his verbal say-so. But we do have reasonably good criteria to find out if a person has understood a metaphor that occurs within the context of a poem or some other type of text. Now, although metaphorical seeing— as does involve a type of experience, (it is not a purely intellectual matter), it does not necessarily involve the having of images. We can see the point of "The mind has mountains" without visualizing any mountains. What is necessary is some thought of an obstacle which the mind might encounter, that is, some grasp of an aspect of the mind. My claim is that understanding this metaphor is only possible in virtue of the conceptually determined relation of picturing between mountains and mind. What determines this relation is not the structure of some real (mental) picture. The relation is determined by a complex act of rules and conventions which we have called the method of projection. These rules might find expression in a picture which could be constructed and used to explain the metaphor, or might simply be evoked in the im-
agination by the metaphor. But the best indication of these rules is the metaphor itself and its context.

How can we characterize the method of projection? So far we have said that it depends upon rules and compared these rules to rules of harmony in music. Throughout the history of music these rules have been forever broken and changed by composers. If the comparison is valid, we cannot expect to give a basic principle upon which these rules are grounded. For the rules are subject to change and revision. But what is the basis for the comparison?

The rules by which a metaphorical predicate attaches to a subject have been shown to be based in an imaginative mode of thought. To understand the meaning of a metaphor one must be able to see an aspect of its subject and in CHAPTER THREE we will see that this is (in a way) a creative process. But if this understanding is communicated by the metaphor itself then there must be some basis in a common experience of the readers. We have seen that we cannot adequately account for this intersubjective understanding by an account of rules for the ordinary use of words, nor by examining the connotation of words.

Unfortunately, I do not know what these rules are, except to say that not only are they embodied in the practice of literary critics but also in any everyday use of metaphor.
II

THE CONTROVERSION THEORY

In CHAPTER ONE we say that metaphor involves a distinctive type of predication and requires a special kind of imaginative thought. The analysis offered owes a great deal to the "controversion theory" of metaphor expounded by I.A. Richards, M. Black and M. Beardsley, and to the "seeing-as" theory of V.C. Aldrich and M. Hester. The proponents of these two theories have virtually ignored each other, and CHAPTER TWO and CHAPTER THREE attempt a critical exposition and comparison of their views. This may also sheds light on some of the issues discussed in CHAPTER ONE.

The controversion theory attempts to describe the meaning of metaphor as a special feature of language which is radically different to the type of meaning that an ordinary sentence has. The approach is similar to that adopted in CHAPTER ONE, part one. There are certain dangers in this approach, the most important of which is that of drawing too sharp a line between "literal" and "figurative" sentences without recognizing that there are gradations between the two. Philosophers who have been influenced by logical positivism or by Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* have attempted to drive a wedge between
fact stating discourse and emotive or "expressive" discourse and to account for all non-fact stating language on a single model. For example, the emotivists theory of metaphor holds that metaphorical meaning is non-referential and that it depends upon the emotional responses of a reader, a view which is untenable for several reasons: The experience of a particular emotion is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for saying that a metaphor has been understood. We have no sure criterion for identifying such an emotional response, and someone might receive many varied metaphors with exactly the same emotional response yet still be said to have understood them. If an emotion can be shown not to be a condition of understanding a metaphor, then it is clearly not a defining feature of metaphor.

I shall argue in this chapter that proponents of the controversy theory make a similar mistake to that of the emotivists. They have a tendency to adopt a "dualism of language" whereby metaphor is explained as a member of the genus "non-fact stating" discourse. They have not recognized that we cannot give an exhaustive description of metaphor simply by showing

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2 A. Laplan uses this term in his "Referential Meaning in the Arts" _Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism_, 1955.
its points of difference from literal sentences.

It is the broad aim of the controversy theory to explain metaphorical meaning as the outcome of an interaction between two elements of meaning within a sentence. Although different writers have given different accounts of these elements they are roughly the "tenor" and "vehicle" of CHAPTER ONE. Beardsley and Black give different accounts of this interaction. Beardsley thinks that the interaction is similar to ordinary predication. Black believes that it involves an "extension and fusion" of two meanings. A different account of the resultant meaning of the whole metaphor is given by each writer. Beardsley says that metaphor releases a "secondary meaning" and Black holds that interaction produces a novel "created" meaning. I shall argue that Beardsley's account is incomplete in several ways, and that Black's account depends upon a mistaken analysis of the element of creativity in a metaphor. The controversy theory places too much emphasis on the meaning of single words and phrases within a metaphor and consequently cannot give an account of the application of predicate to subject, nor explain "interaction" very fully.

3 Beardsley does not give a definition of "secondary meaning" and it may be that it is intended as an indefinable and publicly inaccessible sort of meaning, similar in that respect to the emotivists "expressive" meaning.
In order to reach a full understanding of the controversy theory it will be useful to examine the account given by I.A. Richards who is one of the first proponents of the theory. Richards also offers several important criticisms of rival theories of metaphor.

According to Richards, metaphor is an interaction of two thoughts; "we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word or phrase". A metaphor is a "transaction of thoughts". Richards points out that a syntactical analysis of metaphor (which would treat it as a transaction of words, not of thoughts) cannot explain how a word can have more than one meaning at one time. The meaning of a metaphor can only be understood by having two ideas in mind at once. Richards coined the terms "tenor" and "vehicle" to stand for these two ideas or thoughts. We have adopted his terms and use them to stand for two elements of the predicate of a metaphor as Richards does for the most part.

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5 Ibid., pp. 94.
6 Ibid., pp. 95.
7 Black points out certain inconsistencies in Richards' use of these terms (cf. M. Black, "Metaphor", P.A.S., 1954, note 23). Richards prefers to speak of two thoughts or ideas because he wishes to avoid discussion of syntax and of the meaning of individual words. We have avoided this, and escaped the vagueness of talking about "ideas" by trying to account for the meaning of a metaphor as the meaning of a unified sentence not a composite of words alone.
He does not offer a clear criterion for distinguishing them, however. The point of introducing the tenor/vehicle distinction is to clarify the view that metaphor presents two ideas and to provide a criterion for identifying metaphors.

Richards holds that the relationship between these two ideas is not dependent upon anything outside of thought and cannot be explained by any general account. The type of relation in question varies from case to case. Most mistakes in philosophical theories about metaphor are due to the misconceived attempt to account for this relation by a single model. In the case of Aristotle, this is the model of "similarity". In the case of Lord Kames the theory that all metaphors involve mental imagery, are attempts to find an account of this relation.

Richards produces a counter example to the Aristotelian view that all metaphors express a similarity between two things; namely the line "steep'd me in poverty to the very lips" (Shakespeare, Othello). Here a connection is made between poverty, which is a lack of something, and being steep'd in something, which means that we have a superfluity of something; How can we say that two such contrary things have similarity?

8 Richards, loc. cit., pp. 132.
9 Kames, The Elements of Criticism.
Richards believes that we can only properly understand the metaphor (which occurs in the course of a speech made by an angry husband who believes himself cuckolded) by recognizing that the speaker himself is "horribly disordered" and likely to jumble up his ideas. For Shakespeare the metaphor was a "dramatic necessity". The counter example is not conclusive but I think Richards is right to say that the dramatic context helps us to understand its significance. To understand this metaphor we do not need to think of an implicit similarity.

We can learn from the supposed refutation of Aristotle's doctrine although it is not conclusive. In general a similarity can be found between two things mentioned in a metaphor. However, as an explanatory model of the nature of metaphor the similarity view is unsatisfactory for two reasons. (1). Similarity is a very general notion. To say that a given metaphor embodies a similarity does not help us very much in understanding the metaphor. (2). Looking for similarities in metaphor may draw attention from the context, which makes an important contribution to the metaphor's meaning.

Richards illustrates the usefulness of his technical terms tenor and vehicle by succinct refutation of Lord Kames' position that mental images are essential to the metaphor. A mental image associated with a metaphor would, most probably,

11 Ibid.; pp. 105.
12 Ibid.; pp. 132.
be an image of 'the vehicle alone while the real meaning of the metaphor is a fusion of vehicle and tenor. A mental image could not then, explain the whole meaning of a metaphor as Kames believes.

The view that a metaphorical predicate introduces a relation between two "ideas" is misleading. Richards does not explain what the relation between these ideas could be. He succeeds only in replacing the Aristotelian account of a similarity between two things with an account of some indeterminate relation between ideas. There is good reason to believe that metaphors do not usually express a relation at all, that metaphor does not have the form A r B, but φA, where φ is a complex predicate and A the subject. Clearly, in many cases, a metaphor could not be said to express a symmetrical relation.

It is plausible to say, for example, that given a suitable context, "those are the pearls that were his eyes" expresses a relation between pearls and his eyes. The eyes look like pearls. But pearls do not look like eyes, and it could need quite a different metaphorical thought to imagine that they do. I can find no other relation between pearls and eyes which is in any way entailed by, or implicit in, this metaphor. A relational predicate

13 The metaphor itself has no converse, but the paraphrase does have one. We are not interested in the different case of some pearls which look like eyes (maybe in an expensive doll).
is usually understood to mean something which could have a converse, but metaphorical predicates do not fulfill this condition.

M. Black's Theory and the "Extension of Meaning"

M. Black's well-known account of metaphor recognizes Richards tenor and vehicle distinction and attempts to clarify it. Black has a positive account of the "interaction" which lays emphasis on the creative and novel element in metaphorical thought. Interaction involves an extension of the meaning of a word or phrase.

Black distinguishes a word or phrase within a metaphor which has a distinctive meaning and calls the word the "focus". In "The poor are the negroes of Europe", "negroes" is the focus. This word has a double meaning. In this context, it is ambiguous. The rest of the words in the metaphor are not used ambiguously and are called "frame". Black later modifies this clear cut distinction slightly by saying that the subject of a metaphor may also have a slightly modified meaning from its ordinary one. In "man is a wolf" both "wolf" and "man"

15 Ibid., pp. 283.
have a modified meaning.

How is the "focus" to be understood? Not as an elliptical simile nor as a "strange" word introduced in order to produce surprise or puzzlement in the reader. The latter view makes metaphor no more than an ornament, the former is too vague to account for the meaning since it depends upon the notion of similarity. The relevant similarity between negroes and the poor of Europe is not specifiable in a precise way. Further, such similarities often do not rest upon an important feature of the two things: some metaphors are far fetched. In these cases, at least, "it would be more illuminating... to say that the metaphor creates the similarity." Certainly a metaphor can make us see a hitherto unnoticed connection but how can the special use of a word be said to create a similarity?

Black explains this by pointing out that comparison between two things can be made by "organising a system of associated commonplaces" of each thing. "All the world is a stage" creates a similarity by bringing to the fore the world's dramatic aspects and juxtaposing them with the realistic or life-like elements of drama. The world and a stage should be conceived of as systems of things, not as things. Of course,

16 ibid., pp. 231.
17 ibid., pp. 231.
18 ibid., pp. 237.
such an explanation is itself metaphorical and ambiguous but 19
Black seems to think that this is inevitable. We cannot readily
describe the mysterious interaction. Black thinks that no simple
account of interaction can be given. Like Richards, he believes
that no simple account will fit all cases.

The idea of a system of associated commonplaces is
related to that of the connotation of a word. And as Black him-
self points out the view that metaphor involves an extension of
the meaning of its words supports the irreducibility thesis. 21
Paraphrase of metaphors involves a "loss of cognitive content".
They "fail to give the insight that the metaphor did". The reason
for this is that a balance between the elements of the "system
of things" operates in a metaphor. This balance is destroyed
in a paraphrase. It is just this balance or organization of
elements that constitutes the irreducible meaning of a metaphor.

Before we accept this support for the irreducibility
thesis, we must attempt to clarify the notion of an extension of
meaning. Firstly, Black does not say whether the new meaning of
the focus of the metaphor is a new sense or a new reference for
the word or phrase. Does "wolf" in "man is a wolf" refer only to

19 Ibid., pp. 290 and 291.
20 Ibid., pp. 292.
21 Ibid., pp. 229.
the concept of a wolf, or does it also designate the special wolf-like qualities of a man that are associated with it, namely "ferocity", "being a scavenger", "hunger" as Kaplan and others would suggest. Berrgren has offered an "interaction" analysis of metaphor which attributes the focus reference to some special area of aesthetic properties.

Black would, I think, wish to avoid the latter approach. When we speak of a predicate referring to a concept we must avoid reifying the concept. *A fortiori*, if we were to speak of the reference of the focus of a metaphor we must avoid reifying its referent as a specific type of property. Moreover, Black does not raise the question of reference. We will offer a better interpretation of his views on the assumption that the focus has an extended meaning or sense, but no special reference.

The notion of a system of associated commonplaces does not fully explain how the sense of a word is extended. For any word in any context might have such a system. In "this is a wolf", "wolf" has the connotations of ferocity and greed. Beardsley has suggested that the contradiction inherent in

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22 Ibid., pp. 225.
23 cf. CHAPTE R ONE, pp. 16-17.
metaphors draws attention to the connotation of the words and in this way extends their meaning.

Another important criticism of Black is that in order that there should be an interaction within the metaphor, it is essential that the words retain precisely their ordinary meaning. The interaction takes place between focus and frame (not between two elements of the focus) but the focus can only be identified by its strangeness or by the contradiction it introduces into the metaphor. If it is to be identified in this way it must retain its ordinary meaning and not become adapted to the rest of the metaphor. But Black has said that the focus must undergo extension of meaning and thus become adapted to the metaphorical frame. Black's reply, I think, would be that the focus must both retain its ordinary meaning and acquire an extended one. Black also attributes this view to Richards:

I take Richards to be saying that for the metaphor...to work, the reader must remain aware of the extension of meaning--must attend to both the old and the new meanings together.

For this reason we should prefer the term "extension of meaning" to "shift of meaning".

This is one important justification of the irreducible


26 This criticism has been made by W. Charlton in "Living and Dead Metaphors", British Journal of Aesthetics, 1975.

bility thesis. No interpretation of the metaphor could make its reader think of the literal meaning of its constituent words and their extended meaning at the same time. To do this is to perform a distinctive act of thought. A sort of "double vision" in thought. Black thinks that this kind of thought must yield a special insight which cannot be given in anything but metaphorical language, although Black does not attempt such an explanation. He says only that metaphor "puts things in a special light" and "filters and transforms" the meaning of its terms.

I also find Black's account of the creativity of metaphor disappoInting. Metaphor may be innovative by cataphresis, that is, it may introduce a familiar word to indicate something for which there is no word in the language. Black recognizes that this is not the main creative function of metaphor. Its creativity comes primarily from the relation between vehicle and tenor, but Black's account of this, in terms of "associated commonplaces" does not show what is novel or innovative. Admittedly the intelligibility of an extended meaning depends upon the possibility of an experience common to a number of people. Metaphor cannot rest upon some private allusion. However,

28 Ibid., pp. 237.
29 Ibid., pp. 236.
30 Ibid., pp. 287.
this is not to say that the connotation of a word depends upon something that is common knowledge or something already familiar to the reader, as Black suggests.

Although metaphor certainly can extend the meaning of a word temporarily, through its connotation and can also do so permanently, its main creative element is not to do with the meaning of words. The metaphor creatively changes our conception of its subject, through its whole meaning as a complete sentence or phrase. But Black does not explain how this is possible.

Black's account is slightly confused by his acceptance of the notion that metaphor presents two ideas. Beardsley's account emphasizes that metaphor is a predication or an adjectival or adverbial attribution. It is always explicitly or implicitly self-contradictory. An example of an implicitly contradictory metaphor are D.H. Lawrence's lines:

You who take the moon as in a sieve and sift Her flake by flake and spread her meaning out.

Here "spread" implies that what is spread is a stuff, but meaning is not a stuff. The contradiction between the "modifier" (the

31: Ibid., pp. 233.
32 As Owen Barfield has pointed out in, Poetic Diction, (Oxford: 1928), chapter three.
predicate or attributive word in a metaphor) and the "subject" (the word for the thing to which it applies) tells the reader that the sentence before him is a metaphor and draws his attention to the connotation of the modifier. The contradiction is used as a "strategy" in language. It allows discourse to "say more than it states, by cancelling the primary meaning to make room for secondary meaning." By "primary meaning" Beardsley means something similar to the meaning of a statement which could be verified or which invites verification. The "secondary meaning" of a sentence does not say something which could be verified.

Beardsley defines "connotation" in an objective way:

The connotation of a word is a potential range of meaning of the word. We cannot as a matter of fact find out what all the connotations of a given word are but in any given case we can determine if some meaningful word expresses a connotation of the original word. We test to see whether some connection between connotation and original could be established, a connection which would be familiar to a body of people, not an esoteric allusion.

In a metaphor certain of the connotations are suppressed certain of them brought to the fore. The interaction between

subject and predicate of a metaphor occurs when "the subject singles out for attention a hitherto unnoticed connotation of the modifier." 

In a later essay, Beardsley recognizes a difficulty with his account of connotation. His theory as it stands cannot accommodate what is novel and creative in a metaphor. In order to remedy this, Beardsley makes a distinction between "staple" and "non-staple" connotation. Staple connotations are part of a range of potential meanings of a word and would be "readily called into play in familiar metaphors." Non-staple connotations are also part of the "potential range" but have never been actualized in any metaphors. Some staple connotations of "tree" are leafiness, shadiness and tallness, non-staple are slimness and having bark. A metaphor is innovative when it calls upon non-staple connotations of a word. By doing so it is surprising and puzzling, but also opens the possibility that at a later date the connotation will become part of the staple class of

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37 Ibid., pp. 144.
39 Ibid., pp. 180.
40 Ibid., pp. 80.
connotations. To understand this type of metaphor (examples are "inconstant moon" or "unruly sun") one must examine the real properties of the objects of reference of the words. Doing so, will enable recognition of the new sense of the words (that is, of the modifier).

This account depends on the distinction between the central meaning of a word and two levels of connotation. It is open to the objection that there may be no necessary conditions governing the meaning of a word. We cannot give a clear-cut definition of the meaning of a word, but only a description of its use within a sentence. If this is the case, we cannot distinguish connotation from the central meaning of a word.

Beardsley admits that the distinctions cannot be sharply defined, but thinks that they are adequate for all practical purposes.

I think Beardsley slightly misinterprets the objection. When we consider a word in isolation from the context of a sentence, we can determine its meaning by a conventional definition or by an ostensive one. The point of the objection lies in the claim that we cannot properly determine the meaning of a word without determining its reference. But a word does not have a reference

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41 Ibid., pp. 37.

42 Ibid., pp. 33.
outside its use within a sentence. Defining a word by convention or extension is only a preparatory measure towards actually using it to refer to something.

Now, there are three alternative accounts of connotation before us; (1). The word's connotation is discovered by finding words for possible properties of the object to which it refers. (2). The word's connotations express a set of ideas that a body of people could be expected to associate with the word. They form a "system of associated commonplaces". (3). A word's connotations express anything at all which might be associated with the word. Beardsley wishes to employ the distinction between (1) and (2) to distinguish a word's complete range of connotation (staple and non-staple) from its staple connotation. If we accept the Fregean doctrine that a word does not have a reference outside a sentence then what properties a word can indicate is not fully determined until the word is used in a sentence. Account (1) could not be a satisfactory account of connotation within a metaphor for this reason:

Frege coined this dictum. This point of view is justified firstly, by considering the conditions for successful reference, which in turn are conditions for successful communication. If I say "sand" I have indicated a type of thing but not said anything of it, nor communicated a whole meaning. Only by employing a whole sentence can I individuate the thing or concept in question and successfully refer to it. Secondly, by an appeal to the way in which we learn words. We do so in using sentences, not by asking for the name of something.
To apply (1) in attempting to discover the connotation of a predicate word we must know exactly what the word refers to. For example, we must know that in "the mind is a ghost", "ghost" refers to the sort of thing which is immaterial, unpredictable, and has human form (it refers, in the terminology of CHAPTER ONE, to the concept of a ghost). We can only know this if we have reached an understanding of the whole sentence, according to Frege. Knowing this we can then find out what other properties are associated with ghosthood, for example, that ghosts are likely to be uncommunicative (maybe this latter is now part of the non-staple connotation of "ghost"). According to Beardsley, this conclusion helps us to understand the metaphorical sentence, according to the Fregean doctrine, it presupposes an understanding of the sentence. (For Frege, the word "ghost" might refer to the concept of communicative ghosts and we might discover this from the context of use of the sentence).

As we have seen, to adopt (2) alone would leave us open to the original objection that the creative element has been ignored, and that metaphorical meaning should not depend solely on commonplaces. I think we should adopt the following account: In order to interpret a metaphor we can fruitfully examine the connotation of its modifier. We shall conceive connotations on model (3) above but recognize that the relevant connotations are limited by the meaning of the whole metaphor and by its context. We cannot hope to explain metaphorical meaning by an
examination of the meaning of its constituent words alone. Nor is interpreting a metaphor to be equated with understanding its meaning.

The other major shortcoming of Beardsley's account is that the notion of "secondary meaning" is not fully explained. This must be a secondary sense, and not a secondary referential meaning since in the book *Aesthetics* where he uses the term "secondary meaning" Beardsley's account of connotation is not referential. The method by which we reach the secondary meaning is described as "selection from a range of connotation." But the principles and rules on which this selection might be based are not explained. Like Black and Richards, he offers no account of the application of the metaphorical predicate to the subject except to say that it occurs on a secondary level.

The introduction of secondary meaning seems to me to draw too sharp a division between metaphor and ordinary language. It is said that metaphors derive their meaning from the ordinary meaning of the words within them, but in order to understand metaphor we must go beyond the ordinary meaning of the words and search for a hidden meaning, or recognize a special type of meaning. This account seems plausible when we consider

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44 As Beardsley points out, the question of connotation raises more problems than can be managed in a limited space.

metaphors which occur in poetry, but on the other hand there
does not seem to be anything esoteric or special about a
rhetorical figure such as "their thoughts were poisoned at the
source" (Sartre) or metaphors which occur in newspaper prose.
We will attempt to show how metaphor is related to ordinary
language in CHAPTER FOUR. Such an attempt must consider the
referential meaning of metaphor, something not dealt with by any
of the Controversion theorists so far discussed.

The Controversion theory also eschews the question
of "application" in metaphor and for this reason cannot explain
the type of thoughts which metaphor provokes. Neither can it
show what is the peculiarly imaginative or creative element
of metaphor, except for the suspect notion of an extension of
meaning.

Furthermore, by laying stress upon the notion of
connotation the controversy theory directs our attention from
the question of the meaning of the whole metaphorical sentence.
It is true that we must examine connotation of the modifier
if we wish to reach a critical understanding of some metaphors.
Clearly the business of giving literal interpretations can only
serve to suggest, not to recover, what was original in the meta-
phor. As Black says they do not give the insight that was in the
metaphor. If we are to give a philosophical account of this insight
and an adequate explanation of creativity we must turn to an account
of imaginative thought.
III
THE SEEING-AS THEORY

The theory I propose to discuss in this chapter is not as well developed as the Controversion theory. The "seeing-as theory" has been developed by V. J. Aldrich and M. Hester. Both writers claim to be expanding upon suggestions made by Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations*. However, we must remember that Wittgenstein was not concerned to give a theory of metaphor. His discussion of seeing-as and the discussion of the apt use of certain types of words which follows it, concentrate on much simpler cases than metaphor. Although Wittgenstein says that it is possible to say a great deal about a fine aesthetic difference he confines his own discussion to questions such as whether "Fat Tuesday" is more apt than "Lean Tuesday". However, there are important similarities between seeing-as and metaphor.

Neither Aldrich nor Hester explain metaphor in terms

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3 Ibid., pp. 214.
of reference and predication. They think of understanding a metaphor as apprehending a unified whole. The technique of understanding a metaphor can be learned (through practice) but one reaches an understanding of a particular metaphor in a simple "intuitive leap" similar to what Wittgenstein called the "dawning of an aspect". "Metaphorical seeing-as is an irreducible accomplishment." I shall argue that by ignoring the question of reference and predication this theory prevents itself from giving a full account of the analogy between seeing-as and metaphor and cannot explain metaphorical meaning. Aldrich accuses both the Controversion theory and the Aristotelian Comparison theory of too narrow an approach. They confine themselves to the "linguistic facts of the case" and fail to consider "what is experienced when in what situations." By ignoring the 'linguistic facts of the case' it seems to me that Aldrich and Hester fail to show exactly how the notion of seeing-as explains metaphorical thinking. They offer an account of the experience of metaphorical seeing-as but do not given an adequate account of the relationship between this experience and the

4 Ibid., pp. 195.


meaning of the metaphor.

It will be useful to review Wittgenstein's account of seeing-as. It is distinguished from ordinary seeing (seeing), by the special kind of interpreting necessary to see-as. Unlike the case of seeing, one can be in full view of the thing seen and not see it, not see it as something. The experience of seeing-as occurs most frequently when a person is seeing something which might aptly be called a "picture-object". Picture objects have one or more "aspects" and when we see-as we apprehend one of these aspect to the exclusion of some of the others.

Wittgenstein makes the point mentioned above that we cannot give a description of an aspect of a thing. Attempting to do so is like describing a different thing to the one that is in view. "Has a small mouth and long ears" is a possible description of Jastrow's duck-rabbit picture, even though it seems incompatible with "has a large mouth and no ears" which also is a description of this picture-object. For, we can use either of these descriptions to induce someone to see the aspects. Wittgenstein wishes to guard against the mistake of supposing that

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3 Ibid., pp. 195.
an aspect is a thing that could be seen.

For this reason he says that the experience of seeing-as reveals an internal relation between objects. The description which indicates the aspect must be a possible description of the object seen.

Aldrich stresses that the dawning of an aspect is very similar to the experience of coming to understand a metaphor. It gives the reader a sense of illumination. It reveals to him something of which he was previously unaware. Aldrich attempts to explain this feature by an account of the "image exhibiting function" of metaphor. Imagistic language, he thinks, is the basis for a number of related language games. Metaphor itself can be used to fulfill a variety of purposes.

The connection between images, aspects and sentences is not made very clear by Aldrich. He says that aspect seeing is in some important respects like having a mental image. In both cases the experience is, in some way, private to an individual. We have no way of verifying that someone saw an aspect or "had" a mental image except his own say-so. Again, having images and seeing-as are both to a degree, subject to the will. It is possible to give the order "see the duck aspect"

9 Ibid., pp. 212.
10 Aldrich, op. cit., pp. 102.
11 Ibid., pp. 97.
and "imagine a tree", given suitable conditions.

Aldrich suggests that poetic language fulfills the role of presenting aspects or images. A painter draws attention to aspects of things and attempts to preserve these aspects in paintings. The poet does something similar. His language has a "pictorial meaning" and he engages in and provokes "picture thinking".

What criteria for identifying 'pictorial meaning' does Aldrich offer? 1). It can be distinguished from ordinary meaning and from nonsense by the relation it bears to experience. There is no such fact as that 'the sun is smiling at the moon' but a sentence saying there is would not be nonsense since we can relate it in some way to our ordinary experience of the sun and the moon. For this reason, it is possible to imagine the sun smiling at the moon. On the other hand, an extreme case such as "the stone was talking and meant what it said" (where this is not part of a children's fiction) is so far removed from ordinary experience that it is unintelligible. It is not a possible imaginative thought but an example of "imaging" or "image-mongering".

Aldrich is careful to emphasize that the question

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12 Ibid., pp. 99.
"What can be experienced?" and the related question "What can be imagined?" are not settled by an appeal to experience itself. They are conceptual questions. Any change in what could be imagined would also involve a conceptual readjustment. That Da Vinci was able to imagine a flying machine changed the whole outlook of his era. According to Aldrich, poetic language is not like that of Da Vinci, but it is closer to genuine "imagining" or "image management" than to "image mongering". He would claim that metaphor can be placed in a relation to experience and this relation is made possible by metaphorical "aspect seeing", something very like Wittgenstein's seeing-as.

2). Unlike ordinary sentences those that have 'pictorial meaning' introduce something which is not part of common experience. They present something which would not ordinarily be associated with the context in which they occur. This can be compared to the way in which a painting (say of a ship) presents something "other than the canvas and oil paint of which it consists", namely a ship. As Aldrich states:

14 Ibid, p.54.

The object -as-imaged, or as aspect, is exhibited by the medium of expression, pigment or words. I have called this the image-exhibiting function of the expression whose meaning on this count I call pictorial.

I think that Aldrich's account of pictorial meaning needs to be supplemented. For the connection between 'aspect' and 'image' is not fully explained although Aldrich uses the two words interchangeably. It seems to me correct to say that metaphorical seeing-as is a kind of experience, but wrong to say that it is the experience of having a mental image. The latter view is open to the objection of Richards and excludes from the class of metaphors sentences such as "God is love". Further, there is no good reason to suppose that people who are not capable of producing mental images are unable to understand metaphors. (The experience associated with metaphor is I believe, something like that of 'noticing' or 'suddenly realizing' types of attention). Aldrich also suggests that the poet is engaged in a language game involving pictorial meaning, and that "there are (at least implicit) rules for this language


17 See CHAPTER TWO, pp. 2-4.
His account could be supplemented with an explanation of these rules.

The account of M. Hester is specifically aimed at the nature of poetic metaphor (unlike that of Aldrich who thinks that both poetry and the visual arts are, in a sense, metaphorical). He develops the account of Aldrich into a theory which is similar in many respects to that outlined in CHAPTER ONE. He holds that to read a metaphor ("read" is a technical term for Hester, which we will explain shortly) is to engage in metaphorical seeing-as. This type of reading, which is also a sort of thinking, may be best characterized as an "intuitive experience-act". It is an act because it involves an effort of thought to metaphorically see an aspect. It is an experience because metaphor in some way evokes an experience of the things to which it refers (or which it signifies). Poetic metaphors involve an imaginative experience. Metaphorical seeing-as is "intuitive" indicates that "seeing-as is an irreducible, primitive accomplishment." We cannot through analysis, "reduce"

20 Ibid., pp. 180.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., pp. 131.
metaphorical thinking to some other kind of thought. The literary critic does not attempt such a reduction, nor could he re-state the meaning of a metaphor in other words. A critic should attempt to direct the reader's attention to the metaphor itself and its context and thus help the reader to see-as for himself.

I am in agreement with Hester in all these conclusions. However, there are important areas of disagreement and several points at which his account may be supplemented. Firstly, Hester claims that metaphor is a relation. When we see the duck-rabbit we may first see it as a duck then as a rabbit. The duck and the rabbit aspect both bear a relation to the duck-rabbit picture object and therefore bear a relation to each other. The two aspects may be symbolized by "A" and "C", the picture-object by "B". Seeing-as in this case involves the relation "A B C". Similarly in a metaphor such as "Time is a woman" we have according to Hester, two aspects of something Time (A) and a woman (C) and they are brought into a relation by something which they have in common (B). When we metaphorically see-as, we discover (B). Now, I think the analogy between the duck-rabbit case, and metaphor simply breaks down here. There is not usually a relation in a metaphor but a special kind of predication. In this example we are shown an aspect of time, but not one of a woman.

24 Ibid., pp. 179.
25 This point is argued above pp. 42-3.
Secondly, Hester claims that imagery is "fused with or involved in metaphorical meaning." At least one of the elements of a metaphor must be "image-laden". Here "image" does not signify a mental event, which is experienced at random or at will. A metaphorical image is a private experience, one for which we cannot give publicly observable criteria of its occurrence. But it is an experience which is necessary to, and conditioned by, the metaphorical thought or the "reading of a metaphor". Reading a metaphor for Hester is to apprehend a special "read object" which is more than just the words on the page. It includes any experience (sensual experience) which can be shown to occur in understanding a metaphor. (Any experience which we might say is evoked by the metaphor). Hester thinks that such experiences particularly the experience of "imagery" 1) form an important part of the thinking which enables us to grasp and understand a metaphor, part of the metaphorical seeing-as, and 2) are part of the data to which a critic may appeal when explicating a metaphor.

26 Ibid., pp. 32.
27 Ibid., pp. 117.
23 Ibid.
Regarding 1): Hester argues that the experience of metaphorical seeing-as involves imagery (he claims to be analyzing metaphorical seeing-as itself not the concept of seeing-as and notes this as a divergence from the Wittgensteinian approach) on the ground that metaphor involves a peculiarly aesthetic attitude. To read a metaphor is to forget our everyday beliefs about the natural world and to undergo a peculiarly aesthetic experience. (We will discuss the relevance of beliefs to metaphor in the next chapter).

Now, metaphorical seeing-as according to Hester can explain the meaning of metaphors. I do not deny that good poetic metaphors elicit an aesthetic experience from the reader and that this may involve something akin to a private sense experience. But insofar as we are concerned with the meaning of metaphors (and not their aesthetic qualities even though these may depend on the meaning) I think we can explain metaphorical seeing-as without referring to such experience. In order to do so it is necessary to account for how metaphor is communicative, to explain the intersubjective

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29 Ibid., pp. 178.
30 Ibid., pp. 130-133.
element in metaphor. In CHAPTER ONE I attempted to show that such an account must presuppose that metaphor involves rules of some kind.

Regarding 2) the stronger claim that critical discourse about metaphors may legitimately appeal to a private aesthetic experience I make the following objection: To allow such appeals is to suppose that there could be radical disagreements among critics about the meaning of metaphors which could not be resolved unless critics underwent the same experience in reading the metaphor. Arguments are resolved by an appeal to experience. But critics appear to proceed in a quite systematic and rational manner (not just by "loose and informal reasoning" as Hester suggests). They work on the assumption that a metaphor has a central meaning which is publically accessible.

The major shortcomings of the seeing-as theory, then, are the undue emphasis on the notion of images, and a failure to explain whether metaphor makes a predication. In Aldrich’s view metaphor bears some relation to a possible experience. It pictures something and in doing so says something of it. But Aldrich does not explain this very fully. For Hester, metaphor draws attention to a common aspect between objects

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31 Ibid., pp. 132.
and therefore embodies a relation. Hester does not regard metaphor as a simple predication, but as a relational expression. "Metaphor creates and reveals a relation between two aspects of a thing." Hester gives no account of how a metaphor says something of something, because he thinks that to read a metaphor is to take up a special attitude to the world in which questions about the nature of things are suspended. It is to take up an aesthetic attitude. According to Hester problems about reference and predication are of no importance when considering the meaning of poetic metaphor. The aesthetic experience of a metaphor involves images which are contemplated as "ends in themselves". I have argued that if we are to say that metaphor has meaning we must give an account of its relation to reality. Hester does not offer such an account.

The value of the seeing-as theory is twofold. It enables us to provide some account of the creativity or spontaneity of a metaphor which makes it suitable for the poetic expression of thought, and it explains how metaphor can put something in perspective, draw attention to an aspect. The

33 Ibid., pp. 169.
latter is dealt with in CHAPTER ONE: The metaphor emphasizes an aspect of its subject by constructing an internal relation between the thought of that subject and a particular experience of that subject. By doing this the metaphor provides a link between an abstract concept of a thing and an "intuitive representation" of the thing. Aldrich expressed this by saying that the artist and the poet "augments the condition in which it is as if an image comes into contact with the visual impression." 34 Hester says "seeing-as", the essential element in metaphor, is an experience act in which thought and experience touch."

To say that the seeing-as analysis accounts for creativity in a metaphor is not to say that it says what creativity is. Rather, it shows what is created in a metaphor and what makes this possible. It has often been said that ability to create metaphor is a sign of genius in a person. Genius is the capacity for the highest degree of originality in thought. We cannot give a philosophical account of the nature of genius since it is unpredictable and does not obey

35 Hester, op. cit., pp. 17.
known laws. As Kant says "Genius is a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given." 36

When we say that a metaphor is creative and original, the product of genius, we indicate several things. Firstly, metaphor is "spontaneous". The seeing-as theory helps to explain how metaphor can retain the appearance of novelty and freshness even after having been read many times. Such, at least, is the power of many good poetic metaphors such as "The barge she sat in like a burnished throne, burn'd on the water." A metaphor is not spontaneous simply in virtue of a new use of a word. Spontaneity is retained with familiarity. The seeing-as theory can give an analysis of this quality of spontaneity. It is explained if we accept that seeing-as is a performance, or as Hester says an "experience-act" which must be repeated in every reading of the metaphor. Every time we read the metaphor above, we must make an imaginative effort to see the barge as "burning". (The context of this metaphor indicates that "burning" here does not signify only a conflagration, but has a metaphorical sense). Thus the "dawning of an aspect" comes as a revelation.

36 Kant, op. cit., pp. 168.
on the first occasion of reading the metaphor and the surprise of this "dawning" is recreated on every subsequent re-reading. This idea is implicit in Aldrich's assertion that a poet attempts to "preserve" aspects of things in his work.  

The seeing-as theory also helps to explain what is created in a metaphor. It might seem that there is a contradiction between the claim that metaphor creates something and that it characterizes something (or that it expresses a similarity as Black and Hester suggest). This supposed contradiction depends upon taking "created something" to mean literally "brought something new into existence". This is not the only sense of "creativity" but it is one important sense: Let us see if this apparent contradiction can tell us something about metaphor.

Firstly, metaphor can be said to bring a "rule" into existence. We briefly discussed the relevance of rules to metaphor in CHAPTER ONE. If, as I think, metaphor is a kind

38 See above pp. 44 and pp. 65.
of predication then there must be some "tie" between predicate and subject. This tie can, I think, be explained as a "rule of thought". Clearly, the "rule" will vary from metaphor to metaphor. Shakespeare's metaphor (above) is creative in this sense: A rule is established which enables us to see a linear movement (of the barge) as a "burning". It is this very rule which also allows us to make an aesthetic value judgement about the metaphor. As Kant says "The products of genius must at the same time be models, i.e., be exemplary".  

Secondly, there is no real contradiction between discovery and creativity in a metaphor. According to Hester a metaphor is both innovative and exploratory, ("it is concerned with uncharted areas"). We can explain the seeming contradiction by looking at seeing-as itself. We have said that an aspect is a "description under which" something falls. The underlying claim of the seeing-as theory is that the totality of descriptions under which an object can be

41 Kant, op. cit., pp. 163.
42 Hester, op. cit., pp. 183.
placed is not determinate. If I say "the mind is immaterial" I attribute a property to the mind. If I say "the mind has mountains" I create a property of the mind, namely being related in thought to mountains and I attribute a property to the mind. I can only succeed in doing all this and communicating it, by engaging in metaphorical seeing-as. To see-as is to constitute or create an aspect of a thing. It is to determine an attribute.

One of the main limitations of the seeing-as theory is that it can apparently only explain poetic metaphor. In the next chapter we must examine some other kinds of metaphor and find out if our theory can be applied to them.
So far, we have offered an account of metaphor which is not conditioned by the view that there are two distinct elements of language; literal discourse (whose main function is the communication of facts) and non-figurative, 'expressive' or 'emotive' discourse. We have emphasized that the question of reference is relevant to metaphor, and that metaphor communicates a distinct type of thought. In order to develop a theory which sustains the irreducibility thesis we have concentrated attention upon poetic metaphor. We must now turn to non-poetic metaphor and find out if our account can be applied to them. In doing this we shall confirm that no simple distinction can be made between metaphor and other types of language. We will also see that (as is the case with poetic metaphor) these

1 Examples of which are given on page iv.
"everyday metaphors" (as I shall call them) are closely connected with our manner of referring to the world. In this chapter we hope to clarify the relationship between metaphor and other types of language and between metaphor, thought and reality.

One important difference between everyday metaphors and poetic ones is that in order to understand the latter one must be aware that it is a metaphor. Black's version of the controversy theory is explicitly committed to this. He points out that metaphor requires us to keep in mind both the everyday meaning of a word and its extended meaning at the same time. If we do not do this then, for us, the metaphor will not involve a tension of meaning. It will be either a 'dead metaphor' or completely unintelligible. Similarly, our analysis of seeing-as makes the claim that seeing-as involves a mental effort. Just as, it makes no sense to say that we see a fork as a fork, so we could not metaphorically see a table as red. In order to metaphorically

3 Ibid., pp. 236.
see-as in this poem, for example:

The Apparition of these faces in the crowd
Petals on a wet black bough.

(Ezra Pound)

one must make an effort to reach a single intentional object of thought, and be aware that this is the only possible intentional object. Such thinking must surely involve the awareness that the thought is metaphorical. To understand an 'everyday' metaphor it is not necessary to know that it is a metaphor nor consciously to see-as. These metaphors occur in everyday discourse, or in newspapers, speeches or even in science textbooks. It seems likely that they are understood in an unselfconscious way just as are literal sentences.

We can expect two things from a study of the relationship between metaphor and other parts of language. 1). We can hope to show that a simple distinction between metaphor and non-figurative language cannot be made. Metaphor shades off into "literal" language as we can see by an examination of some borderline cases which do not require conscious seeing-as (in the sense above). 2). We can hope to introduce the question of the relationship between metaphor and belief. This should afford some insight into the relationship between metaphor and the more general forms of thought which are exemplified in our beliefs and belief
systems, (primarily, in the way in which we categorize things). The relation between metaphor and belief assumes importance if it can be shown that the meaning of a metaphor is in some way relative to our belief systems. I think that this can be shown; at least in the case of 'everyday' metaphors.

This chapter will (firstly) defend the claim that 'everyday' metaphors involve a kind of seeing-as, albeit, a type of metaphorical thinking which does not require a conscious effort on the part of the reader. This characteristic is sufficient to differentiate 'everyday' metaphors from all kinds of literal sentences. Nevertheless, metaphors, especially those of the 'everyday' type, do have certain similarities to literal sentences, and I think we can clarify the relationship between the two only by examination of the problem of the relevance of belief to the understanding of metaphor. I will (secondly) defend the claim 1), that although metaphors do not assert beliefs (as literal sentences often do) the beliefs we hold in many cases affect our choice of metaphorical expressions on a given subject and 2), that our tendency to use certain metaphors can influence our beliefs. In the case of metaphorical thinking, our beliefs and the forms of language we use, bear a reciprocal relation to each
other.

In order to clarify and defend these claims I will firstly make an important distinction between metaphor and dead metaphor. Some metaphors which do not require a conscious seeing-as (some everyday metaphors) belong to the former class. We will then entertain the claim that all language is metaphorical. In attempting to refute this view, we will be able to show in what respects metaphors and literal sentences are alike and unlike in their relationship to our beliefs. Having shown how everyday metaphors are different from literal sentences, we will be in a position to present evidence to confirm that everyday metaphors involve seeing-as.

Dead metaphors are sentences in which a word or phrase is used in a metaphorical way but which do not have the character of spontaneity. They are familiar expressions such as "The road has a bottleneck", "A tall order", "The body of a car".

In most cases these sentences were at one time unusual and might have been counted as poetic metaphors to which the seeing-as theory would be applicable. According to current usage, however, the 'metaphorical' sense of the words in question are well known and might be found in a dictionary. Not all dead metaphors are examples of catachresis,
where the new word (for example 'body' of a car) is adopted into current usage because there is no other word to fulfil its role. Dead metaphors may be idioms, such as 'did she take the bait?' or pieces of jargon such as "computer software" or "psychological block". In both these types there is a convention among a large or a small number of people about the meaning of the whole sentence or phrase.

To provide an adequate theory of metaphor we should offer a criterion to distinguish 'dead' from 'living' metaphors. For, clearly, dead metaphors can be used to convey a literal meaning (in the sense outlined in CHAPTER ONE). Strictly speaking they are not metaphors at all. In current usage they are simply cases of the use of an ambiguous word whose ambiguity is eliminated by the context of use. 'Body' for example, ambiguously indicates either the outer casing of a car, or the flesh and bones of a person. But to find an adequate criterion for distinguishing dead from live metaphors is made difficult by the existence of numerous borderline cases such as 'Richard is a lion' and 'Tomorrow's the big day'.

I propose to adopt a fairly strict criterion for identifying dead metaphors since as we shall shortly see many phrases and sentences which appear to be dead metaphors
have the all important characteristics of metaphor and may be in one sense live metaphors, Charlton has proposed that dead metaphors be identified by finding out if the meaning of the metaphor's focus has undergone an extension at some point, in the history of its use. (Here 'extension of meaning' and 'focus' have exactly the same sense as that discussed in CHAPTER TWO). In order to apply this criterion a survey of the history of language is necessary. We must also stipulate that a metaphorical use of a word is not 'dead' unless we could specify a convention, accepted by all language users (or in the case of jargon, a definable sub-set of language users), which tells us what the 'metaphorical' meaning of that word is. (This last condition is not mentioned by Charlton, but it has the advantage of yielding a clear decision in most of the borderline cases: "Richard is a lion", for example, is not a dead metaphor, since there is no established convention which tells us that "courageous", "fierce" etc., are part of the meaning of "lion").

There is an important similarity between some living metaphors and some dead ones which could lead us

to forget that the latter depend upon the conventional meaning of words. This similarity also lends strength (as we shall see) to the extreme thesis that all language is metaphorical. There are, I think, certain general categories under which we could classify metaphors. Each category of metaphor can be said to exemplify a general principle of thought which may be shared only by the users of one language (say English) or might be shared by users of several languages. We can classify both living and dead metaphors with these categories.

I suggest that we can find at least three of these principles of thought which will be called "spatialization" "synaesthesia" and "animation". Spatializing metaphors characterize a non-spatial thing such as "time" or the "mind" in terms appropriate to something that exists in space, for example, "Time stood still", "he is broad-minded". Synaesthetic metaphors apply a predicate appropriate to one sensory medium to a subject in another, for example "the crimson sound of a trumpet", "the rugged prose style". Animative metaphors attribute human or animal properties to inanimate things, for example "the eager spearpoint".

These principles of thought are exemplified in dead metaphor,

6 The example is from Aristotle.
(for example, the idiom "smells fishy") or poetic metaphors, but I think we will find that such principles are only of importance in explaining the meaning of those 'everyday' metaphors which are not dead.

Our tendency to employ metaphors of these three types may indicate something about the beliefs we hold, and the systems of beliefs which form part of our view of the world. Frequent use of spatial metaphors in the Western World for example, can be correlated with the Western people's beliefs about the mind and with their methods of measuring things, and measuring time. An explanation of this correlation could take one of two forms. (1). It could be that we have a tendency to use such metaphors as 'the eager spearpoint' because of some property their subject possesses. It is of the nature of tools like spears to be well adapted to human needs and therefore natural for man to apply to them predicates which usually indicate human properties. Similarly it may be that the structure of the mind is spatial. If we knew this, it could not be surprising that we should say "broad-minded" or "in the mind". But beliefs about the mind or about tools may not be explicitly recognized by the users.

of these metaphors and we cannot be certain that they are true beliefs. It may be that these metaphors are not generated solely by our beliefs about things but have their origin in the structure of our language. I think a viable alternative explanation can be found:-(2) It could be that the principles of thought are of linguistic origin. That is, they are principles which have governed the formation of our language and depend upon a relation between the forms of language and our ways of thinking. The forms of language to a certain extent condition our understanding of the world, in these cases our understanding of the subject of the metaphors. This sort of explanation commits us to the view that the structure of the world is in some degree relative to the language we use in describing it.

One general argument for such a relativistic position has been presented by Whorf and by Weissman. Not all the "principles" (in the sense outlined above) which govern "everyday" metaphors and other types of language are shared by more than one language. The Hopi Indians, for example, do not use spatial language to speak about temporal

Ibid., pp. 154-155.

phenomena. And the fact that time is for them a different kind of phenomena to that which we experience, is confirmed by their practices and attitudes regarding temporal phenomena (in their dancing, their sports, and their attitudes to death and so on). In this case, we cannot understand their world view, their beliefs, unless we understand their language. Weissman also argues that divergence between languages supports a relativistic position. He points out that the Italian sentence 'Il cielo grigio' cannot be literally translated into English since the English are not accustomed to thinking of colours as active phenomena.

Now, I think we can show an important difference between the examples of Whorf (which are cases of everyday metaphor) and that of Weissman (which is a literal sentence) by showing how literal sentences and metaphor differ in their relation to our beliefs. We may then be in a position to accept only a partial linguistic relativism not the total relativism for which both authors seem to argue. To reach some understanding of the relationship between literal sentences and everyday metaphors we will consider firstly some arguments for the extreme thesis that all language is metaphratical.

10 Ibid., pp. 144.
The extreme thesis does not claim that every possible sentence in current usage is a metaphor in any generally accepted sense of "metaphor". The claim is that the conceptual scheme which underlies the grammatical forms of our language, and limits the extent of our vocabulary, can be explained in the same way as the thought which gives rise to metaphor. Here, metaphorical thought is conceived as the only way in which original thought can arise. The project of those who defend this thesis is to show that all language is a product of the human imagination and in some sense fundamentally poetic. That language is metaphorical in origin accounts for the frequent occurrence of 'everyday' metaphors and dead metaphors. If this thesis is established it follows that the imagination is also creative of our beliefs since the way we classify things in language accords with the beliefs we hold about those things. A full exposition of this view is made by Cassirer. As a preliminary to discussing this we will consider Muller's argument for the extreme thesis, since Cassirer adapts and develops the views of Muller.

Muller's argument depends upon an historical

hypothesis about the nature of language. He observed that many of the words now used in language to signify abstract ideas were once used only to indicate material objects. Thus "supercilious" meant the raising of the eyebrows, "spirit" meant wind, and "metaphor" itself originally meant to carry over. (These truths are uncovered in the study of etymology). It is hypothesized that metaphor has provided us with a vocabulary to express abstract ideas through catacresis. Thus these words derive their modern meaning. Muller believed that this catacresis occurred at a very early stage of the development of language. As Barfield has pointed out, Muller's theory depends upon the assumption that man first names material things then transfers the names to abstract ideas. This assumption is not tenable either (a) as an historical hypothesis: Evidence shows that primitive languages have sentences as their basic unit, not names, nor (b) as a philosophical account of the foundation of language. Words do not gain meaning through labelling or naming things but by having a use within some context.

13 Ibid., pp. 78ff.

Cassirer objects to Muller's theory on the ground that it gives the wrong account of the relationship between beliefs and language by misrepresenting the relation between metaphorical language and myth. I shall use 'myth' here to indicate any belief about something which could not be proven wrong by an experience. Myths cannot be falsified. They are usually associated with a whole set of beliefs concerning the nature of the world and may be said to depend upon a particular kind of consciousness of the world. We are here concerned with the linguistic expression of a myth which may be exactly the same as that of a metaphorical thought. Thus 'the mind is a ghost' might be interpreted as the expression of a set of beliefs about the mind (as a myth) or as a metaphor, which gives expression only to a particular perspective on the mind. Muller's account makes myth a secondary phenomenon, a result of mistaking the meaning of a metaphor by reading it as if it were a literal sentence. Thus, given that 'spirit' originally named the material object wind, 'the mind is spirit' could be mistakenly interpreted as the expression of the belief


16 Ibid., pp. 87-88.
that the mind is an airy, moving substance. Such a belief might lead a man to a mythical view of the mind. He might, for instance, express the fear that the mind leaves the body when we sneeze. Cassirer objects that mythical beliefs do not arise from mistaking already formulated metaphorical thought. The person who believes a myth, for example, that lightning is the manifestation of the snake god, attributes all the properties and influence of the God to the lightning. In a metaphor the two elements are, or have been, clearly separated in thought.

Cassirer adopts Muller's distinction between myth and metaphor and attempts to give a different account of it. In order to make a metaphor, two things must have been identified and distinguished with the help of a word for each. Myths represent an 'identification' of two things. The myth is not a deviant form of the metaphor as Muller thinks. To say this would be to reduce the relationship between our way of classifying things and our beliefs to a contingent matter. Our mythical beliefs are contingent upon our classificatory schema which are developed in the formation

18 Cassirer, op. cit., pp. 96.
of language. Cassirer claims that there is a logical rela-
19 tionship between the two phenomena. Both metaphorical
language and mythical beliefs are developed together in
man's attempts to think about the world, to form concepts.

I cannot here do full justice to Cassirer's
account of the formation and development of conceptual
thought. Cassirer argues that all conceptual thinking has
its origin in a relation between two things. This relation
is recognized and given expression by man only through
the work of the imagination which is prompted by a dis-
tinctive type of "sensory experience" or "intuition". The
power of the imagination is exercised in the formation of
a linguistic (or non-linguistic) 'symbol' where this term
can be understood in the same sense as was outlined in
CHAPTER ONE, in our exposition of Kant. These consider-
ations taken together justify Cassirer's use of the term
'root metaphor' to indicate the principle of the original
thought which allows the formation of concepts. And 'root

19 Ibid., pp. 83.
20 Ibid., pp. 98.
21 Ibid., pp. 37.
metaphor' is exemplified in the formation of language, its development, and in sophisticated poetic language such as that employed by Beats and Holderin. This last can be understood as a recreation of the original intuitive consciousness and experience which gave rise to the formation of concepts.

I think we can bring the following considerations to bear against Cassirer's attempts to show that all language has its origin in a single type of thought which is akin to poetic metaphor (root metaphor). (This is not intended as a refutation of his view but as a critical comment).

(1). The main point of analogy between poetic metaphor and root metaphor is that both create meaning 'the greatest lyric poets...are men in whom the mythic power of insight breaks forth again in its full intensity and objectifying power.' In mythic consciousness this insight is fettered by a set of mythic beliefs, in poetic consciousness the thought is freed of such beliefs. Now, how can we know that mythic thought and poetic thought, which are both creative of the meaning of symbols, are the same type of thought or have the same origin? What justification is there for saying

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22 Ibid., pp. 99.
23 Ibid., pp. 99.
that they both originate in the same "power of insight"?
The mythical symbol and the primitive linguistic symbol
which are both said to be the outcome of root metaphor
(they are both created by a root metaphorical thought)
are directly connected with man's beliefs. They enable
him to classify things. Poetic symbols do not directly
influence man's beliefs. (Although they may do so indirectly
my making us reconsider our beliefs; Rilke's poem "The
Tiger" for example, might make us review beliefs about caged
animals). If this disanalogy is recognized, it seems to me
that there must be some further justification for applying
the term "metaphor" to these two types of thought.

(2) Cassirer claims that both root metaphor and
poetic metaphor involve the same type of experience and
inner feeling. This claim can only be justified by some
kind of empirical study (a study which would be very diffi-
cult to construct since we have no straightforward way of
describing the creative experience.)

(3) Cassirer compares the mythic, or root meta-
phorical creation of a symbol to the metaphorical principle
of nars are toto 25 . Thus:

24 Ibid., pp.87

25 'A part for the whole', exemplified in this example:
"Ten thousand brave deeds has Odysseus done" See Aristotle,
Poetics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, R. Mckeen ed.,
(New York: 1961), 1459b.
If, for instance, a rain-making ceremony consists of sprinkling water on the ground to attract to rain, or rain-stopping magic is made by pouring water on red-hot stones where it is consumed amid hissing noise, both ceremonies owe their true magical sense to the fact that the rain is not just represented, but is felt to be really present in each drop of water.

The small amount of water stands for the rain in general. A similar principle may be at work, for example, when the sun is metaphorically called "the heavenly flier", where one concentrates only on one aspect of the sun, its dynamic aspect and allows this to stand for all the sun's properties. This argument does strikingly illustrate the supposed analogy between mythic thought and linguistic metaphor, but concentrates only upon one sort of metaphor. There are many metaphors which do not depend upon the principle of pars pro toto. The analogy between all metaphors and mythic or root metaphors is not conclusively established by this argument.

The tendency of these criticisms is to show that although language in its origin and in its growth may be

26 Cassirer, op. cit., pp. 92-3.
27 Ibid., pp. 96.
28 such as, "Wisdom is a woman".
imaginative. The principle of this imaginative thought is not necessarily like the principles which govern metaphorical thinking. An imaginative thought is here classified according to its outcome, the thing which it creates. This is our only source of knowledge of principles of this kind of thought. Metaphorical thinking creates poetic symbols which are not analogous to linguistic symbols produced by the imaginative thought which is at the origin of language. Furthermore, the principles of these types of imaginative thought must be dissimilar since they bear a different relationship to our beliefs (cf. (1)).

We have, in the course of these comments, elucidated certain differences between poetic metaphor and myth. The following two differences are fairly obvious: (a) Poetic metaphors require the reader to notice an explicit or implicit contradiction in order to fully understand them. One feature of many myths is that we cannot find in them any contradiction, they are irreducible. (b) Poetic metaphors are created by one individual, while myths are developed by a community of people who share common interests and experiences. These features of poetic metaphors are not shared by 'every-
day' metaphors (as we saw earlier).

I think, then, that we might be justified in a limited acceptance of Cassirer's claim that metaphor and mythical belief systems bear a logical relation of reciprocity to each other. This claim may be true of 'everyday' metaphors, but not true of poetic metaphors, nor true of many other elements of language including dead metaphors and literal sentences. For 'everyday' metaphors seem to be so closely bound up with belief systems and with principles such as those outlined on pp. 79-83, that they may be doubt about whether to call them myths or metaphors. For example, such doubt may arise in considering the famous example "The mind is a ghost in a machine". Similarly the blind man (in an example of John Locke) who says "the color red must be like the sound of a trumpet" is certainly allowing his beliefs to affect his choice of metaphor (the sentence is strictly a simile but it is very difficult to specify the point of similarity).

Now, everyday metaphors do not assert beliefs in the way that mythical sentences do, nor do they stem from a specifically religious point of view on the world or some kind of mystical experience. This one feature clearly distinguishes 'everyday' metaphors from myths: They do not commit their users to the existence of their subjects nor to
any clearly stated beliefs about them. The myth that lightning contains a snake god involves belief in the existence of that god. A comparable 'everyday' metaphor, for example, the "mind is inside the head" need not commit us to the belief that the mind is substantial. I might use the metaphor in the course of an exposition of such a belief but I might simply use it in passing in a discussion of something else. Similarly if I say "Tomorrow's the big day" I do not commit myself to any theory of our subjective apprehension of time, yet the metaphor would be senseless to someone who did not share our attitude and beliefs about time. It would not be understood by a Hopi Indian, for example.

I think these considerations justify our claim that myth and 'everyday' metaphors have their origin in our beliefs about things. 'Everyday' metaphors are like myths in affecting our beliefs but unlike them in not asserting those beliefs, (they may have been affected by other beliefs we hold which contradict them and thus oblige us to be non-committal about these things).

We can now in conclusion present evidence in favour of the view that 'everyday' metaphors involve seeing-as. They must fulfil three conditions (cf. CHAPTER ONE and CHAPTER THREE). (1). They must not hypostatize their subjects (this
was shown above, pp. 96). (2). They must to some extent conform to intersubjectively agreed rules (we have succeeded in abstracting three such rules of thought: synaesthesia, spatialization and animration). (3). It must be necessary to specify the intentional object of thought when interpreting a metaphor. 'Everyday' metaphors do not require interpretation, but we may be justified in applying this condition to their case for the following reason: Our habitual use of these metaphors may lead us into certain dangers. When using such metaphors we can easily forget that they are both vague and non-committal (pp. 96). We can easily mistake them for literal sentences or myths. If we wish to avoid this danger (as do scientists and philosophers, who have a commitment to clarity of thought) we should inform ourselves of the "description under which" we are thinking about our subject. That is, we should find out what the intentional object of our thought is, and so make ourselves aware that we are speaking metaphorically. In these cases we will often discover that the intentional object is at variance with other descriptions of the thing which we believe to apply to it. Thus although 'everyday' metaphors do not puzzle us they may mislead us. We must make ourselves aware that we are seeing—as in these cases.
In the conclusion, I propose to show what has been achieved in the thesis, what positive account has been given of the meaning of metaphor, and what distinctions have been made in the course of our analysis. I shall also comment on the significance of these results for philosophical enquiry in general.

We opened the thesis with a brief description of metaphor and with three sets of examples; complex poetic metaphors, concise and striking poetic and rhetorical metaphors, and non-poetic metaphors which might occur in everyday discourse. With the help of these examples we have attempted to give a thorough account of metaphorical meaning. We have not isolated one feature of metaphor as a defining feature, neither have we found a simple criterion which could be used in all cases to identify a metaphor. Instead we have tried to show what features are essential to metaphorical meaning by careful descriptions and analysis of cases (following our initial classification of examples) and by contrasting
metaphor with other forms of language.

We found that both complex and concise metaphors (those of our first two sets of examples) have the following characteristics:

1). No exhaustive interpretation of their meaning can be given. They are irreducible, that is, they say something which could not be expressed in any other form of words. One feature which contributes to the irreducibility of metaphor is "open-endedness". This is simply the condition that we cannot set limits to interpretation of these metaphors. There are always possibilities which remain open. The other features of metaphor also contribute to its irreducibility.

2). Metaphors contain a distinctive type of predications which involves a) an implicit contradiction between the subject and predicate of the sentence, such as the contradiction between "pane" and being "glued", or "sealing away" and "time" implicit in this example:

Damp curtains glued against the pane
Sealed time away. (Geoffrey Hill)

b). Two elements of meaning are involved in the predicate, "tenor" and the "vehicle". c). A "metaphorical seeing-as"
is involved in the "application" of the predicate to the subject. This means that metaphorical meaning involves a distinctive type of thought. Seeing-as is a type of thinking which connects the predicate of a metaphor to the subject or "applies it". (Ordinary predication by contrast involves no special thought. An ordinary predication gains application through a rule of language exemplified in many previous cases of the use of that predicate). Metaphorical seeing-as was described by analogy with visual seeing-as a type of seeing which involves a particular perspective or mode of attention to the world.

3). As a consequence of those properties outlined in 1) and 2) metaphor has certain powers of expression not present in other forms of language. a). It does not hypostatize its subject. It is possible to refer to such things as death, time, or the state, in a metaphor without the implication that they have any real nature or existence. b). It has the power to create "symbols" both in a literary work and in other kinds of text. We have not defined "symbol" but discussed Kant's use of the term, and its ordinary meaning. A symbol can be conceived as a sign or entity of some kind which calls up associations relevant to the themes of a whole work, and which may form the focal point in a poem or text of some kind.
Non-poetic metaphors have all the above characteristics with the exception of the last one (concerning symbols), with this important condition: These 'everyday' metaphors do not require their reader to consciously identify the sentence or phrase as a metaphor. This means that the seeing-as which is involved in these metaphors must be evoked only when we reconsider them or analyse them.

In the course of the thesis we have distinguished metaphor from literal language, dead metaphor and mythical language. Metaphor can be distinguished from literal, fact-stating language by the type of reference and predication which it involves. Literal language exemplifies or approaches univocal reference while metaphor tends towards equivocal reference. The equivocation in metaphor is overcome, in a special way, through the relation the metaphor bears to its context, and through seeing-as on the part of the reader. These things ensure that there can be some agreement about the meaning of a particular metaphor, an agreement about its "central meaning".

Metaphor is not readily distinguished from "dead metaphor", the distinction between them is essentially connected with the way in which language develops. Dead metaphors are metaphors which no longer express an imp-
educible meaning. I have argued that dead metaphors involve a convention about the current meaning of a word, living metaphors do not directly involve such a convention.

Metaphor is distinguished from the expression of myth, such as, that a snake god is in the lightning, by the fact that metaphor does not express belief as does the myth.

It can be seen that the essential and distinctive features of metaphor, lend support to our initial claim, that metaphor is irreducible. This claim underlies the whole thesis, and justifies our search for an account other than the Aristotelian one that metaphor is the expression of a similarity between two things. We have brought two major arguments in support of this claim. Firstly, the implicit contradiction in a metaphor is essential to its meaning. It cannot be recreated in any other form of words. Secondly, metaphorical seeing-as constitutes the meaning of a metaphor. We have not found any other form of language in which it is involved. Seeing-as is itself an "irreducible accomplishment" which cannot be assimilated to any other activity of thought. To attempt to paraphrase a metaphor is to disregard the seeing-as, and also in so doing to diminish the creative element contributed by seeing-as.
These results, taken as a whole, are significant in two fields of enquiry, the theory of meaning and philosophical aesthetics. Our contribution to the former is to have shown that metaphor cannot be explained on the same model as any other form of language. We have succeeded in explaining metaphor only by drawing comparisons with other forms of language not by imposing a single model. We have also demonstrated that metaphors have a subject and a predicate. We raised the question of the relation between these two elements of the meaning of a metaphor, and showed that a kind of thought contributes to the formation of this relation. A creative metaphorical seeing—as makes possible the combination of a subject and predicate in a metaphor and so helps to constitute it in relation to the real things to which its elements refer.

Our contribution to philosophical aesthetics is made partly in a discussion of the notions of creativity (in CHAP. III) and partly consists in raising several questions. We have shown the importance of context to metaphorical meaning, and raised the question of the nature of that context. We have shown that there may be no definitive interpretation of a given metaphor and have raised the question "Exactly what area of agreement can there be between critics
in any given case?"

It is hoped that the thesis has provided a foundation for a theory of the meaning of metaphor within the framework of several modern discussions of the topic, and that it has raised some important questions for future research.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography is confined to material cited in the text. There is a good current bibliography in:


See also:


