

THE SELECTION OF NATIONAL
PARTY LEADERS IN CANADA

PARTY DEMOCRACY AND THE SELECTION
OF
NATIONAL PARTY LEADERS IN CANADA

by

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the nature of internal decision-making in the two major political parties in Canada as it relates to leadership selection. The thesis argues that, as essentially electoral-competitive (cadre-style) organizations, the Liberals and Conservatives do not rigidly adhere to democratic principles in the selection of their leaders.

To support this contention, an examination of the representativeness, openness and the extent of membership control in the leadership selection process is undertaken in order to determine what factors facilitate and restrict intra-party democracy. The thesis also offers an analysis of motivational factors affecting delegate preference in order to test the validity of the winnability thesis, i.e., that the candidate perceived as the best vote-getter for the party is selected as leader regardless of his experience or loyalty to the party organization.

In conclusion, it is argued that the Liberals and Conservatives, although primarily oriented towards electoral activity, should be understood as more than mere electoral machines unconcerned with internal democracy. Rather, the parties have displayed a steady, though as yet incomplete, movement towards a more open and democratic leadership selection process involving grassroots participation.

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I

INTRODUCTION

The importance attributed to the norm of intra-party democracy in the Canadian political system has found expression in the constitutions of both the Liberal and Conservative parties.¹ Yet, constitutional provisions for the democratic participation of party members are often imperfect indicators of the effectiveness of membership control. Most statutes prescribe greater membership influence in leadership selection and greater control by the party rank-and-file over its leadership than is found to exist in fact. Therefore, despite the development of institutional mechanisms for mass party participation, "leadership politics has continued to be a process which primarily involves people at the apex of the party."²

The classic example of this structural typology of internal party processes--the contrast between the norm of internal democracy and organizational practise--is Michels' (1959, originally published in 1911) "iron law of oligarchy."³ Michels was concerned with European working class organizations in general, and the German Social Democratic Party in particular--organizations which emphasized the norm of internal democracy but who, according to Michels, failed to practise it.

The failure of these organizations to implement and extend internal democracy in practise lead Michels to question its attainability.

Michels argues that political parties tend to develop a well-integrated, centralized bureaucratic structure, hierarchically organized and inevitably resulting in the concentration of power at the top. This development of an oligarchy, the control of the organizational structure by those at the apex, is an intrinsic part of bureaucracy or large-scale organization and incompatible with democracy:

It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the manadators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization says oligarchy. 4

Thus, the inevitable presence of organizational elites seriously limits the extent to which any political party can be controlled by its membership no matter how democratic the party's origins or ideology.

Duverger (1954), in a broader comparative analysis of political parties, argues that because parties operate within the framework of a democratic state they must,

. . . take the greatest care to provide themselves with leadership that is democratic in appearance. . . Democratic principles demand that leadership at all levels be elective, that it be frequently renewed, collective in character, weak in authority. 5

However, "practical efficiency," Duverger notes, drives parties "in the opposite direction." 6 Therefore, the

leadership of political parties "is democratic in appearance and oligarchic in reality." ⁷

That the party is a hierarchy is generally not disputed. Certainly some members of Canadian political parties, particularly those belonging to the parliamentary group, possess more power and experience than the ordinary rank-and-file members. ⁸ If the party is in power, cabinet ministers will exert greater influence than back-bench members. However, this does not necessarily result in the party structure being as anti-democratic as Michels suggests. Numerous variations exist in the extent and nature of oligarchical leadership. Active involvement by the party membership, for example, can be a powerful counteracting force to oligarchical rule.

Democracy and oligarchy therefore are questions of degree. ⁹ Michels notes: "Consequently the question we have to discuss is not whether ideal democracy is realizable, but rather to what point and in what degree democracy is desirable, possible, and realizable at a given moment." ¹⁰ The extent to which any party is democratic or oligarchic can be generally expressed in terms of the portion of individuals within the party who influence decisions.

Eldersveld (1964), feeling Michels' assumption that control of the party structure is inexorably concentrated in a single leadership corps inappropriate for the analysis of American parties, articulated a stratarchy model (a term

borrowed from Lasswell and Kaplan).¹¹ The stratarchy involves limited organizational integration and control: "The general characteristics of stratarchy are the proliferation of the ruling group and the diffusion of power prerogatives and power exercise."¹² Therefore, power is fragmented and dispersed rather than ordered and hierarchical; different groups ranging from the grassroots to the national level influence the party according to their size and importance within the party structure. The party in this view is more than its elite analyzed in isolation.

What factors, then, facilitate and restrict internal democracy in political parties? To answer this question would entail an extensive research effort into all aspects of party organization. Such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is possible to isolate one internal function ascribed political parties--the selection of party leaders--in order to determine the degree of constraint that norms of intra-party democracy place on the major Canadian parties. Such an approach allows us to examine the participatory arrangements implemented by each party in the selection of their leaders and to determine their effectiveness.

In Canada the party convention serves as the institutional mechanism for the selection of party leaders. Indeed, Canada is the only country in the British parliamentary tradition whose major parties use national conventions for

leadership selection. Before proceeding it is necessary to determine why the leadership convention is utilized over other devices.

At the time of Confederation many Liberal and Conservative leaders were suspicious of democratic principles.¹³ Subsequently, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries party leaders in Canada were formally selected by the parliamentary caucus (if in opposition) or by the Governor General (if in power).¹⁴ In reality, "The key to the leadership of a party obviously lay with the opinions and decisions of its most prominent and influential figures."¹⁵ Such a process was both expedient and practical. However, this tradition ceased in 1919 when, for the first time, a party convention was charged with the responsibility of selecting a party leader. The Liberal convention of 1919 formally ended the exclusive right of the parliamentary caucus to name the party leader marking the beginning of full participation by the extra-parliamentary party in the task of leadership selection.

A combination of intra-party developments were responsible for the Liberals adopting a convention format in 1919. Liberal party leader Sir Wilfred Laurier had announced in November of 1918 that a national party convention would be convened to examine party policy and organization in an effort to re-unite a party deeply divided by the conscription issue and the 1917 general election.¹⁶ However,

Laurier's death in February of 1919 fundamentally altered the purpose of the convention.

Normally caucus would have chosen Laurier's replacement. Circumstances, however, were not normal. The Conservatives and Unionist Liberals remained coalesced as the government, but the coalition's future was uncertain. Because of their status as pre-dominately French-speaking members from Quebec,¹⁷ the Laurier Liberals believed their only chance for electoral success was to unite behind an English-speaking leader (preferably a Protestant not from Quebec). The problem was that no obvious successor on those terms was then a member of the opposition parliamentary party. Of the four most frequently mentioned individuals as Laurier's successor (G.P. Graham, Mackenzie King, W.M. Martin and W.S. Fielding), only Fielding had a seat in parliament. The logical solution to this problem was to utilize the national party convention already scheduled for Ottawa.¹⁸

The national leadership convention was thus established through "pragmatic responses to pressing circumstances."¹⁹ Several other factors identified by Courtney (1973) help explain why the convention format of leadership selection became quickly legitimized.²⁰ First, the fact that caucus was prepared to consider a successor who was not then a member of the parliamentary party lent credibility to the notion that the extra-parliamentary

membership should have a voice in leadership selection.²¹ Second, the extra-parliamentary membership (i.e., constituency delegates and provincial Liberal parties) would hardly reject the opportunity to participate in the selection of a new leader. Third, the idea of a national party convention selecting the party leader was not new in 1919. National nominating conventions were already well established in American politics, and in Canada several provincial party leaders had been selected by convention.²² From the turn of the century until 1919, provincial leadership conventions of one form or another had been held in every province except Quebec although they remained the exception, not the rule. Finally, the convention method helped compensate for regional representational imbalances and weaknesses in caucus.

It became clear with the completion of the Conservative's first leadership convention in 1927²³ that the party convention would become a permanent feature of Canadian politics.²⁴ The overt elitism of the traditional method of leadership selection has been diminished by the implementation of a more democratic system of leadership choice. Quinn (1951) notes that, "the practice of holding party gatherings in which the "grass roots" of the party participate is undoubtedly a step towards the democratization of the party structure."²⁵

While the convention format may be philosophically justified on the grounds that it is more "representative"

and "participatory" than caucus selection, the prime consideration for the parliamentary parties might well be the (electoral) benefits derived from leadership conventions.

The convention process allows the party selecting a leader to become the focus of party politics, at least temporarily.

Furthermore, the convention frequently has the effect of consolidating, rejuvenating and unifying factions within the parties by contributing to party stability and confidence. Dawson (1970) notes that the national party convention is "efficacious as a publicity device, vote-getter and rouser of enthusiasm."²⁶ The fact that the first two leadership conventions (1919 and 1927) were held when the Liberals and Conservatives were in opposition, but were then quickly followed by electoral success makes it understandable why the convention system became legitimized.

Based on this view, Schwartz (1972)²⁷ agrees with Duverger's observation that political parties frequently operate "behind the formulas and facades of democracy."²⁸ While Canadian parties "continually pride themselves on their complete identification with democratic procedures,"²⁹ Schwartz argues that the Liberals and Conservatives are more interested in the benefits of appearing, rather than actually being democratic: "For the two major parties conventions have been viewed from the pragmatic perspective of their usefulness, and not from an ideological commitment to their democratizing function."³⁰

Both the Liberal and Conservative parties are compelled to display a commitment to democratic procedures corresponding to the widespread expectation in Canadian society that political parties will operate by democratic means. Since its emergence, the leadership convention has been depicted as a democratic institution suggesting strong positive values are associated with such a characterization. Parties anticipate favourable public reaction and membership response, as Courtney notes, when they refer to their proceedings in this manner. ³¹

A party which is obviously undemocratic is vulnerable to criticism from its rivals, membership and the public. Dawson argues:

The practise of making selections by the convention method is not likely to be repudiated in the foreseeable future; for to do so would be to show an open preference for a restricted method of choice rather than one based on the representative and (so it is believed) the democratic principle. No party will willingly expose itself to the reproach that it is afraid to trust the judgement of its own representative convention. ³²

Wearing (1967) agrees: "The ostensibly democratic practice of electing leaders at mass conventions. . . is too ingrained for Canadians to allow this power to pass back to even an enlarged parliamentary caucus." ³³

Inter-party competition has also rendered a measure of organizational democracy desirable. Party conventions, periodic leadership review mechanisms, policy conferences and guaranteed representation for youth and women members are

typical features of this type of inter-party competition. "From the Liberals' perspective," McMenemy, Redekop and Winn (1976) note, "to acquire greater membership participation may be a means of demonstrating the party's ideological superiority over the allegedly more old-fashioned and authoritarian Conservatives." ³⁴ Conversely, the Conservatives "must partake in the democratic exercise even though some of the traditions and loyalties felt more keenly by a Conservative are, in and of themselves, not fully compatible with the democratic ethic." ³⁵

Democracy, however, is not guaranteed by mere opportunities for participation; rather, it requires political activism through free choice. Lele, Perlin and Thorburn (1979) argue that despite the existence of institutional mechanisms (e.g., secret ballot voting) providing the appearance of democratic leadership selection, rules (e.g., ex officio representation) continue to afford a position of advantage to party elites. ³⁶ Opportunities for widespread manipulation exist and are availed upon. Delegates remain pre-dominately representative of the most privileged segments of Canadian society. Thus, the authors conclude that the selection of party leaders is largely determined by party notables regardless of how much party norms may support claims of the membership organization to influence or control the leadership selection process.

Elite manipulation of the leadership selection process has been more prevalent in the Liberal party which has dominated as the governing party in this century. Elite groups have more power when the party is in government. No Conservative leader since 1927 has been selected when the party was in power. Subsequently, Sandwell (1948) argues that "in the case of the Liberal party the use of the convention method does not make very much difference; the man whom the 'insiders' approve gets chosen as leader." ³⁷ More specifically, Whitaker (1977) argues that in the Liberal leadership convention of 1948:

The evidence clearly indicates that the convention format was manipulated throughout to ensure that King's chosen successor should receive as little opposition as possible. On the other hand, the necessary democratic legitimization seemed to demand that St. Laurent receive some token opposition. Both imperatives were carried out in a remarkable example of stage-management conflict, in which the two genuine opponents of St. Laurent were effectively utilized for maximum public effect and minimum internal impact. Even in the case of the selection of the party leader, then, the "democratic" mandate become highly questionable, and the domination of the party by the parliamentary leadership is seen to be decisive. ³⁸

Similarly, Engelmann and Schwartz (1975) observe that the selection of Liberal leaders St. Laurent, Pearson (1958), and Trudeau (1968), "came close to appointment by the predecessor." ³⁹ Therefore, as Whitaker concludes, "The Liberal party was certainly no training ground for participatory democracy, however loosely that phrase might

be defined." ⁴⁰

In contrast, some political scientists (e.g., Smiley, 1968, LeDuc, 1971) ⁴¹ point to the 1967 Conservative and 1968 Liberal leadership conventions as representing "an important step towards participatory democracy in the leadership selection process." ⁴² Changes witnessed at these conventions including intense candidate competition, lengthier pre-convention campaigns, and increased constituency representation and participation, suggest to Smiley, "profound change in the structure and functioning of major Canadian parties:"

Canadian political parties, in selecting their leaders in the foreseeable future will not only have to work within the framework of the convention system as it was established in 1919 and 1927 but also according to the new traditions of "openness." It will likely be politically impossible, for example, to hold conventions to anoint the choice of outgoing party leaders as happened with the Conservatives in 1942 and the Liberals in 1948 and 1958. ⁴³

Thus, Smiley argues that established patterns of influence were drastically altered, diminishing the power of party elites to influence the leadership selection process.

The question, then, is whether political parties should be concerned with internal democracy or should their electoral function dominate? In other words, are Canadian parties genuinely committed to operating in an internally democratic manner or do they only present the appearance of organizational democracy to the extent that it conforms

to societal and membership expectations and is rendered necessary by inter-party competition?

While the literature on political parties yields a variety of party typologies, Wright (1971) formulated two polar-opposite theoretical party models which encompass elements from a variety of party typologies.⁴⁴ Although all political parties want to be successful, they differ in how they measure success and the steps necessary to achieve it. Thus both party models offer conflicting answers to a basic question of democratic theory: whether in a democratic system all subsystems (i.e., parties) must be democratic.

Briefly summarized, the Rational-Efficient party has exclusively competitive-electoral functions and is pragmatically pre-occupied with winning elections. Proponents of this model (e.g., Wilson, 1962, Epstein, 1967)⁴⁵ question the desirability and feasibility of intra-party democracy. They tend to posit the view that political parties contribute to democracy in their competitive struggle with opposing parties; they need not be internally democratic to do so.⁴⁶

Indeed, most Rational-Efficient theorists are critical of the notion of intra-party democracy and of efforts by party members and activists to influence the decision-making process. Wilson, for example, states that parties function only to "recruit candidates, mobilize voters, and

assimilate power within the formal government." ⁴⁷ He goes on to claim that, "If the party is to be a competitor for votes, then requirements of that competition will be, in most cases, the opposite of party democracy." ⁴⁸ This is not to deny that parties have other basic goals and functions. However, Epstein forwards the view that although parties may perform other functions, these are to be subordinated to the party's electoral function:

Organization in one degree or another always exists for this electoral purpose. It may have other purposes as well and still be regarded as that of a party, provided that the electoral purpose is prominent, if not dominant. ⁴⁹

Finally, Wright puts it rather succinctly: "It is not how you play the game that counts, but whether you win or lose that is all important." ⁵⁰ Thus, any principle is secondary to the immediate requirement of maximizing electoral gains; parties are essentially election-contesting associations whose ultimate purpose is the achievement of office.

Conversely, the Party Democracy party is more ideological and policy-oriented, concerned with operating in an internally democratic manner involving rank-and-file member participation. From this perspective (e.g., Neumann, 1956, Duverger) ⁵¹ parties are viewed as focal institutions of democracy, the internal functioning of which is critically related to the functioning of the political system. The party is understood as a polity, a miniature political system

and is expected to practise internal democracy thereby serving as an exemplary model of democratic values and practises for the larger political system.⁵² In Neumann's view, the party "is the great intermediary which links social forces and ideologies to the official governmental institutions and relates them to political action in the larger political community."⁵³

Ideally, then, party outputs are not the result of arbitrary decisions of an oligarchic ruling group, but through open, deliberative processes involving rank-and-file membership participation. The party organization is structured to allow for this. Wright observes that in this view, "a political party must be more than merely an electoral machine; it must have a visible and democratic structure which provides the primary channel of political participation for interested citizens."⁵⁴

Because the distribution of authority is related to the notion of intra-party democracy, a strong grassroots organization is essential, not only for the performance of electoral tasks but also to provide democratic legitimacy for the party. Wilson notes: "In order to insure that party leaders are responsive to the rank-and-file, the parties would be internally democratic, with party members choosing party leaders and holding them accountable."⁵⁵ Therefore, in order for members to exert effective influence upon their

leaders, leadership selection must be democratic.

The basic organizational form of the two party models is the cadre party (Rational-Efficient model) and the mass-membership party (Party Democracy model). These terms, common in the literature of political parties, are derived from Duverger who based his party typology on the basic organizational unit.⁵⁶ The cadre party (e.g., major American parties) is a committee-style of organization which lacks formal members, is decentralized and loosely integrated. It is oriented primarily toward electoral activity. The mass-membership party (e.g., European socialist parties) consists of large numbers of formally enrolled, active members who are "the very substance of the party, the stuff of its activity."⁵⁷ It is well organized and structurally integrated on the basis of branches. This distinction is also related to one made by Neumann in which he contrasts the party of representation (the cadre party) with the party of integration (the mass party).⁵⁸

Commonly, Canada's major parties are said to fit the model of the cadre party.⁵⁹ As such, the Liberal and Conservative parties are understood as essentially election-contesting organizations who are not pre-occupied with internal democracy. In the Liberal case, Whitaker argues, "The domination of the extra-parliamentary by the parliamentary party was an inevitable feature of a cadre-ministerialist party in a federal political system."⁶⁰ Smiley, however, takes

issue with this classification.⁶¹ He argues that there is an enormous increase in party activity when party leaders and candidates are selected in which the Liberals and Conservatives become more characteristic of a mass-membership party. In terms of other party activities including election campaigns both parties tend to revert to many of the characteristics of cadre parties.

Both of these models, as Wright notes, represent end points of a continuum along which political parties range. The degree to which the major Canadian political parties approximate one or the other type in the selection of their leaders constitutes the focus of this thesis. While it is not possible to fully test the appropriateness of these models, they can be used as instruments to organize the information collected and to provide insight into the patterns which emerge from our investigation.

It is worth pausing to emphasize that this thesis does not represent a comprehensive examination of the leadership selection process in Canada. Rather, it is an inquiry into the functioning of intra-party democracy by means of a study of the leadership selection process. While there are a variety of yardsticks to measure intra-party democracy, for the purpose of our analysis a party will be said to be democratic to the degree that it:

- 1) grants representation to the various segments and

- interests reflected in the party;
- 2) permits participants (candidates and delegates) to engage meaningfully in an open selection process;
 - 3) allows for some measure of membership control over its leadership.

These three components form the basis for Chapters II, III, and IV.

One structural attribute which visibly differentiates the two party models is that of leadership recruitment. Differing structural requirements in the two party models entail different leadership career patterns. The leadership selection process in the Rational-Efficient model tends to be more open and fluid, concerned with maximizing chances for electoral success.⁶² Subsequently, party leaders are frequently recruited from outside the party organization, an attribute, Duverger notes, peculiar to cadre parties. The dominant consideration is the voter appeal or winnability of the candidate, not organizational service or loyalty. Conversely, in the Party Democracy model career patterns are highly institutionalized and leaders tend to be recruited from within the organization.⁶³ Loyalty and service to the party organization are important considerations. Leaders must therefore gain and retain the loyalty of the membership as well as appeal to the electorate as a representative of the party.

Chapter V then analyzes some variables involved in

leadership selection to determine whether leaders are recruited from outside the party organization or from within. It also seeks to determine whether the prospective leader's voter appeal is the primary consideration in the selection process or whether loyalty and service to the party organization pre-dominate. The evidence suggests the former in both cases: leaders are frequently recruited from outside the party and political experience and party loyalty are no longer important factors in the selection of party leaders, a tendency more pronounced when the party involved is out of power.

In sum, our analytical focus is threefold: party organization, political participation and leadership recruitment. The basic argument underlying this work is that because the Liberal and Conservative parties are largely dominated by their office-seeking drives they do not always rigidly adhere to democratic principles in the selection of their leaders. However, to suggest that these two cadre parties are merely electoral machines operating behind a democratic facade is clearly overstating the case. Rather, both parties have displayed a steady movement towards greater grassroots participation and control although, as we shall see, there remains some distance to go.

Finally, a justification of the parties to be examined is in order. Our analysis is restricted to the two major parties for three reasons. First, the Liberals and Conservatives

have monopolized the government and opposition roles in Canadian federal politics since Confederation. This provides an opportunity to compare the two parties when they are in power and out of power. Second, both parties utilize almost identical procedures for the selection of their leaders. Third, both parties may be classified as cadre-style parties whereas the New Democratic party is more characteristic of a mass membership party.

Because of the greater frequency of leadership conventions in the Conservative party (eight compared to five in the Liberal party) our discussion will be weighted in favour of the Conservative party. More specifically, our concentration will be on the 1983 Conservative leadership campaign and convention which occurred during the period in which the research was conducted. Nonetheless, because both parties have strikingly similar procedures for leadership selection, some generalizations and hypotheses may be formulated which apply to each.

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

¹The Liberal party constitution states that the party "strives to provide a flexible and democratic structure whereby all Canadians can obtain. . . information, participate in. . . assessment and militate for. . . reform through open communications, free dialogue and participatory action both electoral and nonelectoral." Liberal Party of Canada, Constitution (as amended November 7, 1982), preamble. Similarly, the Conservative party constitution states that its purpose "is to provide for procedures and practises which are democratic and efficient to the end that all Progressive Conservatives may participate meaningfully and effectively in the deliberations and activities of the Party." Progressive Conservative Association of Canada, Constitution (as amended January 29, 1983), article 2.

²George Perlin, The Tory Syndrome: Leadership Politics in the Progressive Conservative Party, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1980), p. 133.

³See Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, Eden and Cedar Paul trans., (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

⁴Ibid., p. 365.

⁵Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, Barbara and Robert North trans., (London: Methuen, 1964), p. 134.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., p. 133.

⁸Party elites normally consist of cabinet ministers, shadow cabinet members, influential backbenchers, senators, party officials, fundraisers, special advisors and provincial leaders. Sixty-three per cent of the Conservative leadership convention delegates surveyed in 1983 believed there was an establishment in the party; an elite group which has a great deal of influence in the running of the party. Patrick Martin, Allan Gregg and George Perlin, Contenders: The Tory Quest for Power, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1983), p. 9.

⁹This point is noted by several social scientists including William Wright and Samuel Barnes. See Wright ed.,

A Comparative Study of Party Organization, (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing, 1971), p. 449; and Barnes, Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 2-3.

¹⁰Michels, op. cit., p. 366.

¹¹See Samuel Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 98-117.

¹²Ibid., p. 9.

¹³John McMenemy, John Redekop and Conrad Winn, "Party Structures and Decision-making," in Political Parties in Canada, Winn and McMenemy eds., (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976), p. 178.

¹⁴For a discussion of leadership selection in the early post-Confederation period see Margaret A. Banks, "The Change in Liberal Party Leadership, 1887," Canadian Historical Review, 38 (June 1957), 109-128; Lovell C. Clark, "Macdonald's Conservative Successors, 1891-1896," in Character and Circumstance: Essays in Honour of Donald Grant Creighton, John S. Moir ed., (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 143-162; and John Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders in Canada, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 31-58.

¹⁵Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 55.

¹⁶Laurier's decision was partially based on his successful experience with a national party convention in 1893 which had served to unite and strengthen the party. That convention, formally called by Laurier and approved by the Liberal caucus had done much to bolster party morale in general and the parliamentary leadership in particular. After suffering four successive electoral defeats the party was anxious to discover and to display publicly their strength and unity. For a discussion of the 1893 convention see John W. Lederle, "The Liberal Convention of 1893," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 16 (February 1950), 42-52; and Official Report of the Liberal Convention, (Toronto: Budget Printing and Publishing, 1893).

¹⁷Following the 1917 general election, sixty-two of the eighty-two members of the opposition Liberal caucus came from Quebec.

¹⁸For a discussion of the 1919 Liberal convention see John W. Lederle, "The Liberal Convention of 1919 and the Selection of Mackenzie King," Dalhousie Review, 27 (April 1947), 85-92.

¹⁹Donald Smiley, "The National Party Leadership Convention in Canada: A Preliminary Analysis," in The Canadian Political Process (revised ed.), Orest M. Kruhlak, Richard Schultz and Sidney I. Pobihushchy eds., (Toronto Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 175.

²⁰Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 67.

²¹Ernest Lapointe, a prominent Liberal at the 1919 leadership convention, is reported as stating, "that Sir Wilfred Laurier had been leader of a democratic party and it was therefore fitting that his successor should be chosen not by a coterie of politicians but by a great democratic convention." Lederle, "The Liberal Convention of 1919," 86.

²²Just prior to the 1919 Liberal convention, the Ontario Liberals choose their new leader, H. N. Dewort, in a convention attended by over 300 delegates.

²³The Conservatives did not immediately follow the Liberal precedent of 1919. In 1920, the party selected Arthur Meighen as its new leader by virtue of a caucus poll. However, this process was widely criticized and the Conservatives adopted the convention format in 1927. The 1927 convention was preceded by the establishment of a national association to represent the party rank-and-file. However, it failed to develop a strong base although its formation represented a symbolic move toward the recognition of the right of the extra-parliamentary membership to participate in the decisions of the party. Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, p. 22.

²⁴There is one exception. In 1941, Arthur Meighen had the leadership of the party conferred upon him by a special conference of 150 members of the Dominion Conservative Association (which later became the National Association). It was not until the following year when Meighen resigned that the national convention was finally established as the permanent procedure for leadership selection in the Conservative party. The constitution of the Conservative National Association gave formal legitimacy to this procedure in 1943. For a discussion of Meighen's selection in 1941 see John R. Williams, "The Selection of Arthur Meighen as Conservative Party Leader in 1941,"

Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 17 (May 1951), 234-237.

²⁵Herbert F. Quinn, "The Third National Convention of the Liberal Party," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 17 (May 1951), 233.

²⁶R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, (5th ed.), revised by Norman Ward, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 463.

²⁷See Mildred A. Schwartz, "American Influences on the Conduct of Canadian Politics," in The Influence of the United States on Canadian Development, Richard A. Preston ed., (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1972).

²⁸Duverger, op. cit., p. 135.

²⁹Schwartz, op. cit., p. 108.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 95.

³²Dawson, op. cit., pp. 463-464.

³³Joseph Wearing, "Party Leadership and the 1966 Conventions," Journal of Canadian Studies, 2 (February 1967), 26.

³⁴McMenemy et al., op. cit., p. 178.

³⁵Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 102.

³⁶See J. Lele, George Perlin and Hugh Thorburn, "The National Party Convention," in Party Politics in Canada, (4th ed.), Hugh Thorburn ed., (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp. 77-88.

³⁷B. K. Sandwell, "The Convention System in Politics," Queen's Quarterly, 15 (Autumn 1948), 345.

³⁸Reginald Whitaker, The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Liberal Party of Canada, 1930-58, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), pp. 412-413.

³⁹Fredrick C. Englemann and Mildred A. Schwartz, Canadian Political Parties: Origin, Character, Impact, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 241. The authors base their argument on the fact that all three of these Liberal leaders owed their cabinet appointment from "outside"

to the previous leader.

⁴⁰Whitaker, op. cit., p. 413.

⁴¹See Smiley, op. cit., pp. 177-179; and Lawrence LeDuc, "Party Decision-making: Some Empirical Observations on the Leadership Selection Process," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 4 (March 1971), 97-118.

⁴²LeDuc, op. cit., 117.

⁴³Smiley, op. cit., p. 179.

⁴⁴William Wright, "Comparative Party Models: Rational-Efficient and Party Democracy," in A Comparative Study of Party Organization, Wright ed., (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), pp. 17-54.

⁴⁵See James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962); and Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967).

⁴⁶Wright, "Comparative Party Models," p. 30.

⁴⁷Wilson, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 347.

⁴⁹Epstein, op. cit., p. 98.

⁵⁰Wright, "Comparative Party Models," p. 53.

⁵¹See Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics, Neumann ed., (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 395-421.

⁵²Wright, "Comparative Party Models," p. 30.

⁵³Neumann, op. cit., p. 396.

⁵⁴Wright, "Comparative Party Models," p. 42.

⁵⁵Wilson, op. cit., p. 341.

⁵⁶See Duverger, op. cit., pp. 61-132.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 63.

⁵⁸Neumann, op. cit., pp. 403-405.

⁵⁹See Englemann and Schwartz, op. cit., p. 176; and Richard J. Van Loon and Michael S. Whittington, The Canadian Political System: Environment, Structure, and Process, (2nd ed.), (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976), p. 235. Whitaker argues: "There is no doubt that the Liberal party was a cadre party in many of the senses that Duverger uses the term: parliamentary in origin, small in membership, deriving support from local notables, etc." Whitaker, op. cit., p. 406.

⁶⁰Whitaker, op. cit., p. 410.

⁶¹Smiley, op. cit., p. 199.

⁶²Wright, "Comparative Party Models," p. 44.

⁶³Ibid., p. 45.

higher education income

II

REPRESENTATION

Leadership conventions in Canada are readily associated with representativeness, and the frequent repetition of this association has generally led to its acceptance by the electorate. ¹ J. R. Mallory (1971) comments that:

The leadership convention has now become an important element in democratic politics. It is the summoning of an unusually large and representative 'parliament' of the party to ensure that the leader is the choice of the party as a whole. ²

Indeed, Courtney notes: "The biggest single claim made in defence of conventions in Canada is that they are representative bodies." ³

Yet, there is considerable doubt whether this praise is warranted. The composition of the leadership convention in both the Liberal and Conservative parties is based on a form of indirect representation. Party leaders are not elected by the collective party membership directly, but by delegates who are themselves elected or appointed. While the majority of delegates are elected by the constituency associations, they tend to be unrepresentative of the general population, and more importantly, party members and identifiers.

A significant minority of delegates are automatically granted delegate status ex officio.

Duverger, in particular, is critical of this form of leadership selection in which delegates are the dominant participants: "The election of the leaders of a party by a small group of delegates is not the same in character as their election by the mass of members."⁴ "Every additional stage of delegation," he continues, "increases a little the gap between the will of the base and the decision of the apex."⁵ Indirect representation, therefore, "is an admirable means of banishing democracy while pretending to apply it."⁶

Duverger's argument has some validity; delegates to Canadian leadership conventions are under no obligation to vote as directed by their constituency association or any other body. In fact, instructions to delegates are of questionable value given the secrecy of convention voting. Although many delegates seek election as committed supporters of a particular candidate, in some cases constituency associations do not discuss the leadership campaign at all as in the case of the Lisgar Liberal Association in 1968. Delegates may also be instructed not to reveal their candidate preferences publicly as was done by the St. Boniface Liberal Association in 1968.⁷

Before turning to a more detailed discussion of the representativeness of the delegate body, it is necessary to first undertake a brief survey of the formal party

representation granted for leadership conventions.

i) Types of Delegates

Leadership conventions in Canada are designed to represent all segments of the party organization. Therefore, while both the Liberals and Conservatives differ somewhat in their estimation of acceptable delegate categories, the system of apportionment in both parties distributes the majority of delegate representation to the constituency organizations. However, the balance between constituency and official party (i.e., ex officio and at-large delegates) representation has varied considerably from one convention to another (see tables 1 and 2 below).

Each party has always had constituency delegates from each federal riding. The Liberals have varied the number from three to seven (1984) per constituency and the Conservatives from three to six (1983) per constituency, both without regard for the percentage of popular vote given to the party in the previous general election. The composition of the leadership convention is thus clearly weighted in favour of constituency and therefore rank-and-file representation. ⁸

A significant minority of delegates in both parties are automatically granted delegate status ex officio, thereby guaranteeing representation to the official wing of the parties. This category includes privy councillors, members

Table 1Delegate Allotment by Category: Liberal Conventions (1919-1984).*

<u>Category</u>	<u>Year</u>				
	<u>1919</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1984</u>
Potential Number of Delegates	1135	1302	1534	2472	3589
Constituency Delegates (%)	62	56	52	64	55
Number per Constituency	3	3	3	6	7
Ex Officio Delegates (%) (including university delegates)	38	44	49	36	45

*John Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders in Canada, pp. 109, 117 (updated).

Table 2Delegate Allotment by Category: Conservative Conventions (1927-1983).*

<u>Category</u>	<u>Year</u>							
	<u>1927</u>	<u>1938</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1983</u>
Potential Number of Delegates	1620	1764	1258	1312	1472	2411	2582	3131
Constituency Delegates (%)	61	56	58	58	54	55	61	54
Number per Constituency	4	4	3	3	3	5	6	6
At-Large and Ex Officio Delegates (including university delegates)	39	44	42	42	46	45	39	46

*John Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders in Canada, pp. 111, 117 (updated).

of parliament, senators, defeated candidates, newly elected candidates, provincial party leaders and various national party executive officers. Liberal and Conservative university associations have also been entitled to select delegates since 1948. The number of ex officio delegates does depend, to some extent, on the number of members the party has in the federal and provincial parliaments.

Although both parties are quite similar in terms of delegate apportionment, some important differences exist.

a) Liberal Delegates

Liberal delegates for the 1984 leadership convention were apportioned under the following formula: ⁹

1. Constituency Delegates:

Seven delegates from each federal electoral district, at least two of whom shall be women, and at least two of whom shall be youths (under thirty years of age).

2. Ex Officio Delegates:

- a) Liberal Privy Councillors, M.P.s, Senators (including retired members of the Senate), defeated candidates in the last election or newly elected candidates.
- b) Provincial and territorial Liberal party leaders.
- c) The National Executive and the executive of the Commission of Young Liberals of Canada and the National Women's Liberal Commission.
- d) Four members of the executive of each member organization.
- e) Two representatives from each of the student Liberal clubs and local Liberal youth clubs (not to exceed in number 10% of the total allowable number of constituency delegates from the province or territory which they represent).
- f) Two representatives from each women's Liberal club and from each provincial or territorial women's Liberal association.
- g) Such members of standing committees as may have been appointed by the national executive.

- h) The president of each federal electoral district Liberal association.
- i) One-fourth of the total membership of each provincial or territorial assembly.

The emphasis in granting ex officio status has been clearly placed on the federated nature of the Liberal party which consists of the ten provincial and two territorial associations.¹⁰ This helps explain why the Liberal party has traditionally recognized the right of provincial party officers to ex officio delegate status. This includes (since 1919) provincial association presidents, and (since 1948) two to four executive officers of the provincial association, the provincial Women's association, the provincial Young Liberals' association and University clubs.¹¹ However, despite this emphasis, Liberal members of provincial legislatures and territorial assemblies have not been automatically named delegates. Since 1919, Liberal members of provincial legislatures, defeated candidates from the last provincial election and newly nominated candidates have been entitled to select, in joint session, a number from their midst equal to one-fourth of the total membership of the provincial legislature. Therefore, a successful provincial party is no more favoured than an unsuccessful one because the only differences between the provinces are in the number of candidates nominated for the last provincial election and the size of the provincial legislature.

Unlike the Conservative party constitution, the

constitution of the Liberal party guarantees constituency representation to women and youth only. There is no provision for the guaranteed representation of men or non-youth members. It is theoretically possible, therefore, that all Liberal constituency delegates could be women under the age of thirty.

b) Conservative Delegates

Conservative delegates for the 1983 leadership convention were apportioned under the following formula: ¹²

1. Constituency Delegates:

Six delegates from each federal electoral district, at least one of whom shall be the constituency association president, one of whom shall be a women (elected by the Women's Association), one of whom shall be a man, and at least two of whom shall be youths (under the age of thirty) elected by the constituency Progressive Conservative Youth organization.

2. Ex Officio Delegates:

- a) Conservative Privy Councillors, M.P.s, Senators, defeated candidates in the last election or newly elected candidates.
- b) All Conservative members of provincial or territorial legislatures and all provincial or territorial Conservative party leaders.
- c) Past federal Conservative leaders and presidents of the Association.
- d) Honorary officers of the Association, not to exceed five in number.
- e) All members of the National Executive of the Association and the presidents in each province and territory of the Conservative associations, Women's organization and Youth organization.
- f) All members of the Board of Directors of PC Canada Fund (not to exceed fifteen in number), ten members of the Policy Advisory Council, fifteen members of the National Committee, and all provincial and territorial fundraising chairmen (not to exceed fifteen in number).

3. Delegates-at-large:

- a) Appointed by the Conservative association of each province equal in number to half the number of federal constituencies in the province provided that: there shall not be less than five such delegates for each province, at least twenty per cent must be under age thirty, one half shall be of each sex.
- b) Two appointed by the Conservative association of the Yukon and two from the Northwest Territories; one each to be appointed by the Conservative constituency associations in the Northwest Territories.
- c) The National Executive of the Youth Federation and the National Conservative Women's Caucus to total not more than ten delegates from each organization.
- d) Two delegates from each Conservative organization in existence for one year and having a membership of over one hundred.

The Conservative party has granted delegate status to no provincial party officers outside of the provincial leader. ¹³ It has, however, entitled all Conservative members of provincial legislatures to become ex officio delegates. This provision has the effect of rewarding those Conservative provincial parties which are successful in provincial elections. In principle this is similar to the system of "bonus" votes common in American political conventions. Bonus votes involve representation based on the actual number of members in a constituency organization. Therefore, areas of organizational strength, which usually correspond with electoral strength are rewarded. ¹⁴

Delegates-at-large have been named to every Conservative party convention. The argument most frequently offered in support of this category is that it grants delegate status to individuals prominent in party affairs

(e.g., fundraisers, substantial contributors, active members without official positions) not otherwise eligible to attend the convention. In addition, such appointments may be used to find positions on the convention floor for key members of candidates' organizations.¹⁵ Indeed, at-large positions are sometimes used by candidates who might otherwise not be eligible to vote at the convention.

Criticism of this method of delegate selection is intense and widespread and focuses not on the existence or recognition of party elites, but on the manner in which they are appointed. Any system of apportionment which allows the appointment of roughly one quarter of the delegates by a small group of individuals provides a natural target for charges of "elitism." Accusations range from delegates being "planted" by national or provincial party leaders to candidates manipulating the selection process by organizing youth associations and campus clubs. In the 1983 leadership campaign, for example, the provincial party executive of the Quebec wing of the Conservative party was controlled by pro-Mulroney forces. All thirty-eight at-large delegate positions were filled with Mulroney supporters including the candidate and his wife.¹⁶

One question which should be addressed is why the Conservatives require an at-large category while the Liberals do not. Courtney offers two possible explanations:¹⁷ what

the Conservatives attempt to accomplish by way of the appointment of at-large delegates is considered unimportant by the Liberals or is compensated for in some way other than by appointments at the discretion of a small elite. The answer would appear to be the latter. There is, according to Courtney, rather significant compensation in the Liberals' ex officio status granted (as in 1968) to four members of the executive of each provincial association, the president and two other officers of each of the provincial organizations of Liberal Women, and of the provincial organizations of Young Liberals, as well as two representatives of each of the University Liberal clubs and of the four regional organizations of the Canadian Liberal Federation.¹⁸ Thus, it appears that the type of individuals who attend a Conservative leadership convention as at-large delegates are selected as ex officio delegates for Liberal conventions.

Having briefly examined the delegate apportionment formulae of both parties, we may now turn to a discussion of the representativeness of the convention body.

ii) Delegates as Representatives

Although leadership conventions are often described as representative bodies, there is no clear consensus as to what they purport to represent. Undoubtedly, constituency delegations mean that conventions are more representative of the social composition of the country than the parliamentary

caucus. Nonetheless, substantial deficiencies remain when delegates are compared to the general population (see table 3 below). Roughly forty per cent of the delegates at the 1967 Conservative and 1968 Liberal leadership conventions had family incomes in excess of \$15,000 annually. Only five per cent of the total Canadian population had an income in this bracket.¹⁹ Courtney sums up the typical (1967 and 1968) delegate in this manner:

He is well above-average in both income and education. The chances of his being a middle-aged manager, or a lawyer (or some other professional), are extremely good, but the chances of his being employed in a clerical position, or as a labourer, or a skilled worker are very slight. He is an activist in community affairs in general and, in common with the small percentage of the total population, in political affairs in particular. He is in fact a party devotee. And this, more than anything else, distinguishes him from the general population.²⁰

Delegates, then, are atypical of Canadian society leading Lele et al. to conclude:

If the openness of these conventions is to be judged by their effectiveness in providing proximate representation to the main body of interests in Canadian society, they were clearly unsuccessful.²¹

The question now becomes whether Canadian political conventions should be judged by their failure to provide proximate representation to the major interests reflected in Canadian society. The answer is no. Rather, leadership conventions should be evaluated in terms of the representation granted to the various factions and interests which compose

Table 3

Income, Occupation and Education of Convention Delegates (1967 and 1968)
Compared to Party Identifiers in the General Electoral and Canadian Population
as a Whole.*

	% Liberal Delegates	% Liberal Identifiers	% Conservative Delegates	% Conservative Identifiers	% Canadian Population
<u>Income</u>					
Over \$15,000	41	5	45	5	5
\$10,000-\$14,999	26	12	24	10	11
\$5,000-\$9,999	23	43	23	37	42
\$4,999 or less	8	36	8	42	37
No response	3	5	--	6	6
<u>Occupation</u>					
Professional	40	8	39	4	7
Owners, Managers	24	11	27	10	11
Sales	12	6	10	4	5
Clerical	5	9	3	8	9
Skilled	5	27	5	19	26
Unskilled	1	12	1	11	12
Farmers	6	6	6	12	8
Widows, Retired	3	12	4	9	13
Military, Protective	1	7	1	9	7
Unclassified	4	2	4	14	2
<u>Education</u>					
One university degree or more	43	7	43	5	7
Post high school but no degree	21	7	20	5	7
High School only	15	19	17	17	17
Less than high school	20	68	20	74	70
No response	2	--	1	--	--

*J. Lele, George Perlin and Hugh Thorburn, "The National Party Convention,"
in Party Politics in Canada (4th ed), p. 80.

the parties. To Liberal Senator C. G. Power (1966) the national party convention is designed to permit "the fullest possible representation of party views." ²²

Do the parties meet this criteria? It is quite clear from collective profiles by Courtney, Lele et al., and Santos (1970) ²³ that convention delegates in both parties tend to be of a higher socio-economic status than party members, identifiers and voters generally. These findings correspond to a well established proposition that socio-economic status correlates positively with political participation generally, and party activity particularly. ²⁴ Generally speaking, political activists (e.g., convention delegates) from the constituency level up, tend to be drawn from the relatively higher socio-economic status groups. Convention delegates, therefore, do not represent an exact microcosm of Canadian political life.

Most constituency delegates are elected as a result of their own efforts and are typically chosen from amongst the local party notables. Delegate status is one way in which party workers may be rewarded for their service to the party. Courtney notes that:

. . . those who choose to work assiduously for a party and who, in doing so, establish something of a reputation in local political circles as a leader, or an organizer, or a fund-raiser, or a campaigner, are turned to as the obvious choices of the selecting body. ²⁵

This factor, combined with ex officio and at-large representation of party officials, guarantees that a substantial contingent of delegates will be individuals of long political experience. In 1968, for example, over eighty per cent of the surveyed delegates reported being active in politics for at least five years with over thirty per cent claiming more than twenty years of political activity.²⁶ The average length of party activity was almost fourteen years and seventy-seven per cent had held some party office, mostly at the constituency level.²⁷ Sixteen per cent had also attended the previous Liberal leadership convention in 1958.²⁸ Only one per cent were members of the Liberal party for less than six months.²⁹

Much the same pattern is evident for the 1983 Conservative leadership convention. Martin, Gregg and Perlin (1983) found that delegates averaged fifteen years of involvement in party affairs.³⁰ Eighty-three per cent had worked in election campaigns and ninety-six per cent reported they planned to do so in the future. Roughly one half had attended the 1983 general meeting in Winnipeg and twenty-nine per cent had attended the 1976 leadership convention.

Delegates, then, tend to be rather specialized actors who represent the active party membership, those members who have served the party for a number of years.³¹

iii) The New Elite

While convention delegates generally possess a high degree of political activism and experience, the representation of youth and university party organizations combined with larger elected constituency representation, has provided an infusion of individuals into the convention process with lesser experience in party affairs. In 1968, Santos found that the greatest number of Liberal delegates (thirty per cent) were between the ages of thirty-six and forty-five.³² In 1967, the greatest number of Conservative delegates (twenty-six per cent) were between the ages of forty-five and fifty-four.³³ However, in the Conservative party, the percentage of convention delegates under the age of thirty has risen from nineteen per cent in 1967, through twenty-five per cent in 1976, to over thirty-five per cent in 1983.³⁴

As a result of organizing efforts by the candidates in 1983 there were 193 youth associations which could send two delegates each to the leadership convention for a total of 797 delegates. Automatic delegate status for the ten member national youth executive and twenty-two provincial youth executive representatives and the requirement that twenty per cent of every province's at-large delegation had to be youths, pushed the youth total for the convention to 1,041. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that youth members could vote for both youth and senior delegates at constituency selection meetings whereas senior male

members could vote for only senior delegates.³⁵

Not surprisingly, the percentage of delegates reporting less than five years experience in political affairs has increased dramatically. Indeed, the percentage of delegates in this category almost tripled from eleven per cent in 1967 to thirty-one per cent in 1976.³⁶ Although those delegates more experienced in party affairs remain the majority, the recent influx of youth delegates has significantly altered the socio-demographic characteristics of the delegate body.

Of greater importance may be the immediate and substantial impact of the youth delegation on convention voting. The evidence suggests that the youth segment of the parties has acquired concrete political influence and may well become the dominant participants in leadership selection politics.

Lele et al. argue that ex officio delegates "enjoy an advantage because of their continuous and intense participation in party affairs."³⁷ Similarly, Dawson argues that ex officio representation to the official section of the parties:

. . . places them because of their experience, broad acquaintance, prestige, familiarity with the issues and candidates, and other factors, in a position where they can exercise a great influence over, if not actually dominate, the convention.³⁸

"The strong official element," he continues, "will inevitably weaken the influence of the ordinary riding delegate." ³⁹

The presence of large number of ex officio delegates, however, does not, in itself, constitute evidence of elite control of the convention outcome. In the last two Conservative leadership conventions (1976 and 1983) it was the youth section of the party which had a great deal of influence in determining the victor. In 1976, eighty-three per cent of Joe Clark's first ballot support came from delegates who had less than the mean level of thirteen years of party experience. ⁴⁰ Clark's delegates averaged only thirty-two years of age and came pre-dominately from the constituency and youth categories. ⁴¹ Similarly, almost one half of Brian Mulroney's first ballot support in 1983 came from youth delegates, a significant factor in his fourth ballot victory. Indeed, Mulroney won the convention despite receiving only thirteen per cent of the ex officio vote on the first ballot, and only thirteen per cent of senior riding support. ⁴²

It can be argued, therefore, that the oversized representation accorded party youth suggests the emergence of a new and powerful force in convention politics. This, in turn, has had the effect of undermining the traditional power of the party establishment. However, it can also be argued that because of their lesser experience in party

affairs, youth delegates are susceptible to manipulation. Indeed, as we shall see, the representativeness of the delegate body is often adversely affected by candidate organizations which seek to elect slates of committed supporters in constituency delegate selection meetings.

Summary

The major findings of our examination of the representativeness of convention delegates may be summarized into several points.

1. The majority of delegate representation is granted to the extra-parliamentary party through constituency representation, although a significant portion of the delegate body remains outside the selection process being appointed ex officio or, in the Conservative party, at-large.

2. The delegate apportionment formula does not effect broad representation of the general population or, to a lesser extent, the general party membership. Delegates are disproportionately drawn from the higher socio-economic status groups corresponding to the proposition that degree of political activism is directly related to socio-economic status.

3. The longer an individual's membership in a political party, the more likely he is to participate in major party decisions including the choice of leader. Constituency delegates are often selected from the local association's

executive as a result of their experience and status and as a reward for their service to the party. Delegates, therefore, are committed political partisans.

4. Both parties guarantee the representation of youth and women members. Corrective measures by the parties to insure youth representation in recent leadership conventions has resulted in an influx of delegates into the selection process with lesser experience in party affairs. It can be argued that the oversized representation afforded youth members has had the effect of undermining the traditional power of party elites (i.e., ex officio delegates).

5. Once selected, delegates are under no formal obligation to vote as directed by their constituency associations or anyone else. In this respect delegates are not truly "representatives." Courtney notes: "In the sense of acting as instructed agents of the delegating body, or as elected officials who will subsequently be held accountable to the group responsible for their election, [they] delegates clearly are not representatives ." ⁴³ However, an increasing number of delegates openly commit their support to a particular candidate during the selection process.

Having identified and examined the participants, the question now becomes how open is the process in which these delegates and the candidates operate?

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

¹Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 105.

²J. R. Mallory, The Structure of Canadian Government, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1971), p. 205 (emphasis added).

³Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 105.

⁴Duverger, op. cit., p. 140.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 108.

⁸Both parties experienced a steady growth in the number of ex officio delegates since their first leadership conventions. There was also a substantial increase in the delegates-at-large category for the Conservatives beginning in 1942. There was also a decrease in the number of constituency delegates in the Conservative party from four to three as part of a intra-party austerity move before the 1942 leadership convention. Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, pp. 117-118.

⁹Liberal Party of Canada, Constitution, articles 10.01-10.10.

¹⁰Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 112.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Progressive Conservative Association of Canada, Constitution, article 3.

¹³The Conservatives, unlike the Liberals, have not allowed their provincial bodies to name delegates as representatives of these bodies.

¹⁴Representation at national NDP conventions is

based largely on this formula. Representation is determined by the actual number of members in a constituency or in the affiliated organizations (e.g., trade unions). For every 50 riding association members, a constituency is entitled to one convention delegate. "Making the Trains Run on Time," Parliamentary Government, 4, 2 (1983), 4.

¹⁵For example, Lowell Murray, Davie Fulton's campaign manager in 1967, was appointed as an at-large delegate from Ontario despite the fact that he was not directly involved with the Ontario party. Lele et al., op. cit., p. 88n.

¹⁶Martin et al., op. cit., pp. 76-77, 81.

¹⁷Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 116.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Lele et al., op. cit., p. 79.

²⁰Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, pp. 125-126.

²¹Lele et al., op. cit., p. 82.

²²C. G. Power, A Party Politician: The Memoirs of Chubby Power, Norman Ward ed., (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966), p. 371 (emphasis added).

²³See Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, pp. 124-125; Lele et al., op. cit., p. 108; and C. R. Santos, "Some Collective Characteristics of 1968 Liberal Party Convention Delegates," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 3 (June 1970), 299-309.

²⁴Allan Kornberg, for example, computed socio-economic scores for a sample of federal candidates in the years 1945-1962. His data confirmed that parliamentary candidates are drawn from the upper occupational and educational segments of Canadian society. See Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behaviour: A Study of the 25th Parliament, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967).

²⁵Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 126.

²⁶LeDuc, op. cit., 116.

²⁷Robert Krause and Lawrence LeDuc, "Voting Behaviour and Electoral Strategies in the Progressive Conservative Leadership Convention of 1976," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 12 (March 1979), 117.

²⁸Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 125.

²⁹Santos, op. cit., 303.

³⁰Martin et al., op. cit., pp. 126-127

³¹The extent of membership participation in party affairs is generally low; only a small minority, usually about one quarter, are highly active participants. Wright, A Comparative Study of Party Organization, p. 443. According to Mishler, fewer than five per cent of the public are active party members, and many who are members only work sporadically, devoting an average of less than one hour a week to party affairs. William Mishler, "Political Participation and Democracy," Canadian Politics in the 1980s, Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams eds., (Toronto: Methuen, 1981), p. 130.

³²Santos, op. cit., 300.

³³Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 106.

³⁴John Courtney, "The Morning After," Parliamentary Government, 4, 2 (1983), 9.

³⁵Ross Howard, "Tory youth vote likely to swamp leadership contest," Toronto Star (March 31, 1983).

³⁶Courtney, "The Morning After," 9.

³⁷Lele et al., op. cit., p. 83.

³⁸Dawson, op. cit., pp. 464-465.

³⁹Ibid., p. 465.

⁴⁰Krause and LeDuc, op. cit., 124.

⁴¹Ibid., 125.

⁴²Martin et al., op. cit., p. 102.

⁴³Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders,
p. 110.

III OPENNESS

Although a party apparatus may take a democratic form, there is no guarantee that actual party processes will be democratic. Intra-party democracy may be frustrated if, as Lele et al. argue, the leadership selection process is subject to manipulation from party elites. Rather, the selection process should be characterized by a degree of openness which permits both delegates and candidates to participate in a relatively unrestricted manner. This implies unrestricted access for candidates, open meetings for the selection of constituency delegates and autonomous delegate choice at the convention. The evidence indicates that the leadership selection process is manipulated not by party elites so much as the candidates whose organizational tactics and strategies pose the most serious threat to delegate autonomy.

i) Candidate Accessibility

Until the leadership conventions of 1967 and 1968, few restrictions existed as to who could seek the leadership of both parties. Indeed, many candidates waited until the leadership convention had convened before formally announcing their intentions.¹ However, because of the dramatic increase

in the number of candidates in recent conventions (see table 4 below), party organizers have deemed it necessary to implement arbitrary barriers to nomination. Subsequently, the signatures of twenty-five delegates were required for nomination in 1967 with twice as many necessary in 1968. In 1983, Conservative leadership candidates were required to be nominated by at least 100 delegates or alternates (fifty per cent of whom had to be voting delegates at the time of signing). This included five signatures from each region of the country to ensure the candidate had some national basis of support. All candidates for the 1984 Liberal leadership convention required the nomination signatures of at least seventy-five delegates accredited to the convention. ²

Table 4

Number of Candidates of Major Party Conventions (1919-1984).

<u>Convention</u>	<u>Number of Candidates*</u>
1919 Liberal	4
1927 Conservative	6
1938 Conservative	5
1942 Conservative	5
1948 Liberal	3
1948 Conservative	3
1956 Conservative	3
1958 Liberal	3
1967 Conservative	11
1968 Liberal	8
1976 Conservative	11
1983 Conservative	8
1984 Liberal	7

*All candidates receiving first ballot votes are included.

The 1983 Conservative convention committee also imposed some financial barriers to nomination. To obtain certification, candidates were required to deposit \$5,000 by the (May 25) cut-off date which would be refunded if the candidate withdrew before the convention began (June 8) or if the candidate secured a minimum of fifty votes on the first convention ballot. Convention regulations also stipulated that candidates were to purchase a \$1,000,000 insurance policy to cover potential property damage or legal liability stemming from the convention period.³ Party president Peter Elzinga noted during the campaign: "We want to make sure some insincere person doesn't pop up at the last minute who wants only publicity and has no intention of leading the party."⁴

While such requirements are primarily designed to discourage the participation of "nuisance" candidates, it is important to note that the major candidates and convention officials are not always hostile to the presence of one or two fringe candidates. The entry of lesser known candidates into the leadership campaign provides additional credibility to the parties' claims of being open organizations. The parties' images, therefore, more accurately reflect the democratic norm.⁵

Perhaps of more importance is the service nuisance candidates perform for the other contenders given the

convention voting arrangements. With the low-man-out rule ⁶ (first applied at the 1967 and 1968 conventions), the bottom candidate and those receiving less than seventy-five votes are automatically dropped from the convention ballot. The remaining candidates thus gain valuable information from the first ballot result without the risk of facing elimination. In this respect, Mary Walker-Sawka's two votes in 1967, Lloyd Henderson's zero votes in 1968, and Neil Fraser's five votes in 1983 were invaluable to the remaining candidates. They were able to accurately learn both the ranking of the candidates and the absolute vote figures about which they were only previously able to speculate. The remaining candidates were also provided with additional precious time to put this information to use.

A more effective deterrent to the entry of candidates into the leadership campaign is the financial expenditures involved. The increase in candidate activity during the delegate selection process in recent campaigns has resulted in a corresponding escalation in candidate expenditures. Total official campaign spending by all three leadership candidates in 1956 was considerably less than \$100,000. ⁷ By 1967 and 1968, several candidates spent an estimated \$300,000 each. ⁸ The leadership campaigns of 1983 and 1984 were estimated to have cost the eight Conservative and seven Liberal candidates \$5,000,000 and \$6,000,000 respectively. ⁹

Two factors help account for this dramatic increase in expenditures. First, before 1967 and 1968, media coverage was limited and the candidates made no special effort to appear in the ridings.¹⁰ However, in the leadership campaigns of 1967 and 1968 widespread and competitive campaigning became the norm because of the large number of candidates and the lack of consensus favouring one candidate. To be competitive, candidates must at least maintain the appearance of being serious contenders. Former leadership candidate Paul Hellyer (1968 and 1976) notes: "You've got to have enough money to put on a campaign that makes it look at though you're in the race."¹¹ Second, some candidates attempt to have slates of committed delegates elected in constituency meetings. In most cases this involves extensive membership drives and expensive local organizational efforts. As a result, those candidates unable to raise substantial funds, do not possess considerable private resources, or have no access to government resources (e.g., executive jets, assistants) are clearly disadvantaged.

Campaign expenses of leadership candidates have been notoriously difficult to control whenever attempts have been made. Unfortunately, the funding of internal party conventions and the expenses of leadership candidates are excluded from election finance laws. Federal election laws requiring political parties to disclose donations in excess of \$100

do not apply to the financing of leadership campaigns. Under the Canada Elections Act, any amount paid, liability incurred or goods or services donated or provided for the purpose of nominating an individual for the leadership of a registered political party is deemed not to be an election expense.¹²

This places the onus on the parties to control leadership candidate spending. In 1976, rules for the leadership convention required all candidates to submit a statement of revenues and expenditures, and to disclose all contributions of more than \$1,000. However, party officials found themselves virtually powerless to enforce the disclosure rule because the only penalty for non-compliance was confiscation of the candidate's deposit, and the disqualification of the candidate from the party's partial subsidy of campaign deficits. Consequently, most candidates abused or ignored disclosure regulations. Many candidates, for example, received a large number (187) of anonymous donations of exactly \$1,000.¹³ Brian Mulroney's refusal to reveal any details of his campaign finances proved particularly embarrassing for party officials.¹⁴

Based on this experience there were no restrictions on campaign contributions or candidate expenditures in 1983, nor were there rules governing the disclosure of sources of campaign funds. Party president Peter Elzinga did warn:

"In the event that there is an extravagant campaign by a leadership candidate, I'm sure the delegates will exercise their vote accordingly." ¹⁵ Such a statement does have some basis in fact. In the 1976 leadership campaign, Brian Mulroney was criticized for "a slick, moneybags campaign" which undoubtedly cost him support at the convention. ¹⁶ Notes Hellyer: "You can only spend so much without getting into the kind of trouble Mulroney got into last time by appearing to spend too much." ¹⁷ However, to suggest that delegate scrutinization is an adequate check on candidate spending is to skirt the issue.

The Liberal party did not have disclosure regulations in 1968, but rules were in place for the 1984 leadership convention as a result of a new constitutional provision:

The leadership expenses committee shall set up regulations regarding a maximum limit for candidates' spending prior to and at the leadership convention, as well as a procedure to supervise compliance with the limit and a procedure to ensure full and complete disclosure of all contributions to leadership campaigns. All candidates shall agree in writing to comply with the regulations of the committee. ¹⁸

Rules established for the 1984 leadership campaign by the leadership expenses committee set a spending limit of \$1,650,900 per candidate based on campaign costs of \$300 for each of the voting delegates and alternates. Each candidate was also required to reveal the names of contributors giving more than \$500 to a campaign fund. In

order to monitor compliance, each candidate was required to post a \$25,000 bond, and file interim spending reports ten days before the convention opened (June 14), with final reports due within six months. ¹⁹

In an attempt to justify the \$1.6 million limit, Senator Richard Stansbury, co-chairman of the leadership expenses committee, offered this defense: "The problem that people have always feared is that if you set limits too low, the danger is that there is a temptation of non-compliance." ²⁰ However, such a ceiling on campaign spending is almost equivalent to no limit at all, and undermines the credibility of repeated calls for reform within the parties to diminish the influence of substantial contributors.

The solution to this problem may be found in the New Democratic party. In the 1975 N.D.P. leadership campaign, candidates were required to disclose the sources of their finances before the convention voting. If a candidate failed to release this information his name was removed from the ballot. ²¹

Exceedingly expensive leadership campaigns have thus had an unhealthy effect on the democratic nature of leadership contests probably limiting the availability of some candidates. Candidates, if they hope to be successful, must possess considerable personal wealth (e.g., Pierre Trudeau) or receive help from financial backers (individual

or corporate), in which case the candidate is clearly open to pressure from his benefactors. Wearing (1968) notes: ". . . until there is a wholesale reform, leadership contests are for rich men, Cabinet ministers, and provincial premiers only and, when the party is out of power, that means just rich men." ²² Those candidates, then, with the largest expenditures tend to be those regarded as the most serious contenders. The four candidates who ran the costliest campaigns in 1967 received two-thirds of the votes on the first ballot. ²³

ii) Constituency Organization and Delegate Selection

The autonomous constituency organization is the basic unit of mass participation in Canadian parties, and the guarantee of an independent grassroots voice in the leadership selection process is presumed to be afforded by the election of delegate representatives at local riding meetings. Barnes (1967) argues that, "Any structural arrangement that reduces the capacity of unit elites to coerce secondary leaders and rank and file encourages the survival of internal opposition and hence democracy." "The autonomy of constituent units," he continues, "is one such arrangement." ²⁴

Both the Liberals and Conservatives provide procedural guidelines in their party constitutions to help ensure open constituency meetings for the selection of delegates. The

Liberal party constitution, for example, states:

In each federal electoral district a meeting of the Liberal constituency association shall be called and held not later than 35 days prior to the opening of the convention, for the election by a majority of the votes of those present at the meeting of the number of delegates and alternates to which the constituency is entitled. To ensure a representative attendance at each such meeting, sufficient advance notice shall be given by advertisement or otherwise, and the date, hour, place and purpose of meeting shall be mentioned in such notice. 25

Similarly, the Conservative party's national director stipulated that for the 1967 leadership convention, constituency meetings were to be open affairs:

The meetings had to take place within the constituency; they had to provide copies of newspaper ads showing the meeting had been announced properly and was open. They had to waive party membership requirements so that no small groups could control the meetings. 26

The provincial wings of the parties also issue guidelines. The Ontario wing of the Liberal party stipulated, for example, that for the 1984 leadership convention each riding meeting was to be chaired by a individual who was not publicly supporting or directly working for any declared leadership candidate, was not an M.P., Senator, or M.P.P., and was not a current member of the pertinent riding association. It was the responsibility of the meeting chairman to "ensure that meetings are conducted in a fair, orderly and democratic manner." 27

However, despite elaborate provisions by both parties to provide for mass party membership involvement in the constituency delegate selection process, open public meetings have not always materialized. Efforts to provide for mass involvement are often frustrated by the fact that constituency organization is weak. Constituency organizations virtually disappear during inter-election periods. Those which do exist have never been as strong as party officials might hope. Perlin (1980) notes: "There are very few constituencies in which the active continuing membership exceeds the dozen or so persons who comprise the executives of the local association and affiliated bodies." ²⁸

The absence or inactivity of many constituent units has been particularly evident in the Conservative party and is primarily the result of their poor electoral record. The problem has been so serious that for the 1942, 1948, and 1956 leadership conventions, provincial associations in the Conservative party accredited constituency delegates in unorganized ridings where no constituency meetings could be held. ²⁹ Even during the tenure of the Diefenbaker government (1957-1963) some party officials estimate that as many as one quarter of the constituencies did not have active associations. ³⁰ After the 1965 general election in which the Conservatives elected only eight of a possible seventy-five candidates in Quebec, many constituency organizations collapsed.

Conservative party officials in Quebec estimated that only twenty to twenty-five constituency organizations continued to function in Quebec. ³¹

Those constituency organizations which remained organized were often dominated by the local party executives. Wearing (1967) notes:

It is well known that a great many of the constituency organizations are tightly-controlled oligarchies and the patently undemocratic method by which some delegates are chosen seriously weakens the convention's claim to speak for the party. . . ³²

Similarly, Perlin argues that,

As recently as 1967 there were still constituencies, notably in Quebec, where organization was so weak that delegate election meetings were paper events manipulated by a handful of local party members, by provincial-level elites or, occasionally, by candidate organizations. ³³

The sitting member of parliament has also occasionally wielded considerable influence in deciding who would attend the convention from his constituency as Senator Power notes in his memoirs. Those delegates would then "reflect his views and vote as he directs." ³⁴

The ability of the parliamentary party to interfere in the selection of constituency delegates has, however, become substantially diminished. For their leadership conventions in 1967 and 1968, both parties decided constituency delegates were to be selected within the riding

boundaries established by the 1966 redistribution. Smiley argues that "this reorganization undoubtedly undermined the power of some party cliques and destroyed established patterns of influence." Therefore, "most sitting MPs could not have "delivered" the votes of the constituency groups even if they had been willing to incur the risks in local party unity by attempting to do so." ³⁵ Indeed, one candidate organizer remarked in 1967: "If the old chains of command for delivering delegates had ever existed, they were broken now because the old contact men were no longer there." ³⁶

Although the influence of some "party cliques" has diminished, attempts by candidates to manipulate the delegate selection process in order to elect slates of committed delegates has become increasingly evident. In the past, Martin et al. note, "it was always good to wait until the delegates were selected and then go and see them or convince them to support you through your oratorical skills or campaign literature." ³⁷ However, candidate campaign strategies are increasingly based on a simple proposition: it is easier to elect a committed delegate than to spend considerable time, effort and money "winning over" impartial delegates. Subsequently, Martin et al. found that forty per cent of the 1983 convention delegates were part of an elected slate or otherwise pre-pledged to a particular candidate. ³⁸

The selection of delegates at the constituency level has thus become the preliminary battleground for convention support. The 1983 leadership campaign is illustrative of this development. One of Joe Clark's stated organizational targets for the leadership campaign was to use his "organizational strengths to influence the selection of delegates across the country."³⁹ Clark's campaign organization contested delegate selection meetings in seven provinces winning forty-seven per cent of the delegates deciding their first ballot choice before the end of April, five weeks before the convention.⁴⁰

Attempts to control delegate selection in 1983 were concentrated in Quebec primarily because of that province's absence of active local associations. The small number of active Conservative party members in Quebec has meant that the choice of constituency representatives is usually decided by new members. For example, three quarters of the voters selecting delegates in the Quebec riding of Ste. Marie had been members of the Conservative party for a month or less.⁴¹ Indeed, Conservative party membership in Quebec increased from 5,000 in August 1982, through 13,000 in the months leading to the Winnipeg convention (January 1983), to an estimated 20,000 in the 1983 leadership campaign, largely as a result of massive membership drives by Clark and Mulroney organizers.⁴²

Constituency elections are susceptible to candidate manipulation because rules governing membership in constituency associations are virtually non-existent and are determined by the provincial wings of the national parties.⁴³ In most cases, to be eligible to vote for constituency delegates in the Conservative party, an individual need only be a member of the party in good standing (i.e., pay the two dollar membership fee) five working days before the selection meeting, and a resident in the riding or a member of the riding executive. There is no minimum voting age.⁴⁴ Given such loose arrangements, it was not difficult for Clark and Mulroney workers in Quebec to stage massive membership drives, packing many constituency meetings with children as young as nine years, skid-row derelicts, recent immigrants and other "Instant Tories." "The general technique," as an organizer for Hellyer noted in 1968, is "to study the rules and to figure out how to get around them."⁴⁵

Furthermore, during the 1983 campaign Mulroney organizers offered ten dollar incentives in many Quebec ridings to secure new memberships while Clark workers provided a ten dollar commission to supporters for each new member they recruited, and ten dollars to each new member attending a meeting.⁴⁶ Marcel Danis, Clark's chief Quebec campaign organizer, admitted after the convention that both candidates were guilty of recruiting new members with

financial incentives. Danis revealed, for example, that in the Quebec riding of Duvernay, Mulroney supporters spent \$8,000 for 800 new members.⁴⁷

Both candidates were highly successful in their pursuit of securing slates of committed delegates in Quebec, virtually shutting out the other candidates who did not adopt similar strategies. Of the delegates selected at these meetings, forty-seven per cent voted for Clark at the convention and fifty per cent supported Mulroney.⁴⁸

These tactics and the ensuing criticism⁴⁹ lead the Conservative party's credentials committee to conduct closed hearings to investigate formal complaints of irregularities and dirty tricks in the selection of constituency delegates. Eighty-six protests were filed with the committee. This represented approximately thirteen per cent of the selection meetings. The committee found sufficient grounds to order new meetings in only seventeen of these cases, less than three per cent.⁵⁰

Attempts were also made to downplay the significance of allegations of manipulation. Party president Peter Elzinga stated: "What we are seeing is democracy in action and there is going to be some dissent whenever democracy is in action."⁵¹ Clark expressed similar sentiments stating that "democracy isn't a tea party," and "Democracy is never neat, but it is always preferable to control by bosses."⁵² Because the public is

afforded at least a partial glimpse of candidate behaviour during the campaign, it is not surprising that candidates would imply that they are abiding by the rules, and that democratic procedures can create some problems. However, both parties could curtail, if not eliminate, unscrupulous delegate selection practices by adopting stricter conditional requirements regarding age, residency and length of membership of those attending constituency election meetings. In the 1984 Liberal leadership campaign, the Quebec wing of the party closed membership lists two weeks prior to the beginning of constituency elections thereby effectively thwarting attempts to pack meetings with new members.

Until 1968, the characteristic constituency meeting was the one "attended by the local party faithful, and few others." ⁵³ While the evidence is insufficient to accurately measure the openness of more recent constituency elections, it is clear, in a number of cases, that the selection of constituency delegates is an ineffective instrument of popular representation, participation and control.

iii) Party Leaders and the Delivery of Votes

Delegate behaviour at American party conventions is commonly explained in terms of brokerage activity politics. Subsequently, American convention delegates are not viewed as independent actors freely exercising their own judgement, but as members of sub-groups (usually state parties) acting

in response to directions from various factional leaders (e.g., governors, state party chairmen). Convention rules which apportion delegates by state and require convention votes to be cast en bloc through a roll-call of state delegations serve to reinforce this situation. Presidential candidates, therefore, must attract the support of powerful party leaders who, in turn, are able to mobilize and direct delegate support. ⁵⁴

Similarly, Liberal Senator Richard Stanbury claims that Liberal party elites were provided a position of advantage at leadership conventions as recently as 1958:

. . . the Party was a Cabinet-run party, with Cabinet Ministers having complete responsibility for organization, policy and finance. Conventions during that period were made up of delegates who were generally named by the leaders or their local agents, so that the results of the convention generally depended upon sub-alliances of leaders at the conventions. ⁵⁵

However, the new Liberal party constitution of 1965 and the formulation of rules for regulating conventions has made the convention substantially more participatory and democratic Stanbury argues. ⁵⁶

Do Canadian convention delegates enjoy relative freedom and autonomy? According to Woolstencroft (1983): "Canadian political conventions are relatively unstructured situations in which delegates are more or less free to do what they want." ⁵⁷ Smiley argues that the Canadian

convention voting structure provides maximum influence to the individual delegate by its system of successive secret ballots. ⁵⁸ Because he retains the ultimate right to vote secretly without any prior commitment to any delegating body, Smiley argues: "The individual delegate in the privacy of the voting cubicle is supreme and he must be deferred to as such." ⁵⁹ While an argument may be made that open voting ensures responsibility, it also increases the exposure of delegates to manipulative pressures.

The fact that the basic unit of delegate apportionment is the constituency and not the province greatly reduces the likelihood of the provincial association and its leader playing roles equivalent to those of American state organizations and their leaders. The inability of provincial leaders to direct their delegates to support a particular candidate can be traced to developments at the 1919 Liberal convention. William Fielding was not only nominated by two provincial premiers, but he also had the known support of at least six of the eight Liberal provincial premiers in attendance. ⁶⁰ However, despite this support, Fielding lost to Mackenzie King on the third ballot by thirty-eight votes.

Since 1919 few provincial leaders have claimed an ability or willingness to deliver votes. Those who have found their influence limited. The prime example of a provincial leader directing his provincial delegates to

support a particular candidate is found in the 1968 Liberal leadership convention. Newfoundland premier Joey Smallwood choose the provincial delegates and promised to deliver ninety-five per cent of his province's support to Pierre Trudeau. While Smallwood's projection fell slightly short, almost ninety per cent of the Newfoundland contingent did support Trudeau on the first ballot.⁶¹ The question remains, however, whether those Newfoundland delegates supporting Trudeau on the first ballot did so as a result of Smallwood's directive. LeDuc's research indicates that over three quarters of the Newfoundland delegates voted their true preference.⁶² If this figure is accurate, then there is reason to believe that the majority of Newfoundland delegates would have supported Trudeau regardless of Smallwood's instructions casting some doubt on his ability to deliver his province's vote.

Provincial parties and leaders, therefore, usually lack the incentives and/or resources to influence the selection of delegates or control delegate voting behaviour. Courtney notes that:

the combined costs of, first attempting to direct his province's delegates within a highly atomistic voting structure to support a particular candidate and, second, risking large-scale identification with a potential electoral liability, prove too great for most provincial leaders to wish to assume.⁶³

The ability of the individual M.P. to influence delegate voting behaviour at the convention has also diminished. New categories of delegates adopted by both parties over the years (e.g., national and provincial executives, university clubs, women's associations and youth clubs), coupled with the skills and resources of candidate organizers, have undermined the relative position and importance of the parliamentarian in leadership selection politics.

Based on these considerations LeDuc notes, in the case of the 1968 leadership convention: "It is important to emphasize that the voting decisions of the convention were basically the decisions of the delegates, and not the decisions of leaders or of blocs."⁶⁴ However, while the secret ballot may protect the autonomy of individual delegate choice, it does not protect the delegate from exposure to manipulative pressures before he casts his vote. Those manipulative pressures come primarily from the direction of candidate organizations which utilize a variety of persuasion techniques in an attempt to secure additional support. Indeed, those candidates approaching the greatest number of delegates both before and at the convention tend to be those with the highest rates of success.

Detailed intelligence reports on individual delegate preference compiled during the campaign are frequently used

Table 5

Percentage of Delegates Approached by Candidates and/or Their Workers in 1983.*

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>% of Delegates Approached</u>	<u>First Ballot Result</u>
Joe Clark	<u>94</u>	<u>1,091</u>
David Crombie	<u>69</u>	<u>116</u>
John Crosbie	<u>85</u>	<u>639</u>
Neil Fraser	<u>15</u>	<u>5</u>
John Gamble	<u>26</u>	<u>17</u>
Brian Mulroney	<u>86</u>	<u>874</u>
Peter Pocklington	<u>40</u>	<u>102</u>
Michael Wilson	<u>76</u>	<u>144</u>

*Martin, Gregg, and Perlin, Contenders, p. 239.

at the convention to identify those delegates wavering in their support of a particular candidate or who remain undecided. Workers for individual candidates then approach these delegates at various times during the voting in an attempt to persuade them to support their candidate on the next ballot. This strategy was utilized primarily by the Clark and Mulroney organizers in 1983. One newspaper account of Clark's convention organization's technique illustrates the sophisticated nature of the approaches employed:

For example, if a Crombie delegate is a woman who has recently separated from her spouse, that delegate will be paired with a Clark worker who also has recently separated. The Clark worker is expected to arrange to meet with the Crombie worker, strike up a conversation about their similar experiences and then get in a plug for Mr. Clark's pension proposals for single women. 65

Similarly, an article in Maclean's describes the Mulroney

organization's strategy:

In the bid to woo supporters of other candidates, the Mulroney camp gave each of its delegates a computer printout with the names of people who would be waiting in the same line to vote. On the printout an "X" appeared beside the name of one other delegate who might be successfully pressured if he was not strongly committed, or was supporting a candidate likely to be eliminated early in the balloting. As well, there were spotters on the convention floor, two organizers watching the convention on television and a communications centre in a trailer behind the stadium. All of the other major candidates had similarly sophisticated operations that transformed the floor into a snake pit of coaxial cables. 66

The strongest influence on delegates, then, would appear to be other delegates, many of whom work actively for the candidate they support.

iv) Bargaining

Another element of uncertainty is the extent to which delegates take their "cues" from eliminated or withdrawn candidates as balloting proceeds. A common belief in leadership convention politics is that eliminated or withdrawn candidates are able to transfer their support virtually intact to one of the front-runners, presumably in exchange for later recognition or cabinet prominence.

In American conventions, delegates supporting a candidate are known and aggregates of delegates may be separated into several sub-groups: the state delegations.

Therefore, various party leaders and/or candidates' supporters are often in a position to exercise control over delegates. The higher degree of organization characteristic of American conventions also increases the likelihood that blocs of delegates can be effectively transferred from one candidate to another, especially to a major opponent of the first ballot leader. ⁶⁷

Past experience in Canadian leadership conventions, however, has shown that drop-out candidates cannot carry all, over even most of their delegates into another camp although candidate organizations frequently adopt strategies which assume that blocs of votes can be controlled and exchanged. Perlin's survey of 1967, and LeDuc's study of 1968 convention delegate behaviour serve to illuminate this factor. ⁶⁸

In 1967, Davie Fulton was the only candidate successful in delivering the majority of his support to another candidate. When Fulton withdrew after the fourth ballot, sixty-four per cent of his support followed him to Robert Stanfield. George Hees, who withdrew after the third ballot, was able to deliver only forty-one per cent of his support to Stanfield. Thirty-five per cent of his support went to Duff Roblin. Wallace McCutcheon was also only able to bring forty-one per cent of his votes to Stanfield on the third ballot. Six candidates who were eliminated or withdrew endorsed no other candidate.

In 1968, only thirty-five per cent of Allan MacEachen's first ballot support went to Pierre Trudeau whom MacEachen endorsed on the second ballot. Forty-five per cent went to Robert Winters. J. J. Greene, who also endorsed Trudeau after the third ballot, saw his support split evenly between Trudeau and Winters. Paul Hellyer was the only candidate who successfully delivered a majority of his support to another candidate. When Hellyer withdrew after the third ballot, sixty-nine per cent of his third ballot support followed him to Winters. However, the slippage was still significant; twenty-four per cent of his third ballot support went to Trudeau. Four candidates who were eliminated or withdrew endorsed no other candidate.

Martin et al. found much the same pattern at the 1983 leadership convention.⁶⁹ When Michael Wilson withdrew after the first ballot and endorsed Brian Mulroney, only forty-nine per cent of his support followed him. Similarly, Peter Pocklington's withdrawal and subsequent support of Mulroney resulted in his support being evenly split between Mulroney and John Crosbie on the second ballot despite the fact that Pocklington was widely considered to be in a position to deliver his support given the ideological nature of his campaign. David Crombie was able to deliver a slight majority of his support after he withdrew from the third ballot. Fifty-

five per cent of his support followed him to Crosbie. While Crosbie endorsed no other candidate after his elimination from the fourth ballot, Martin et al. found that seventy-eight per cent of his supporters claimed that they would support their own second choice rather than follow their candidate to another contender. ⁷⁰

Delegates supporting withdrawn or eliminated candidates who endorse other candidates do not, for the most part, behave in any pattern characteristically different from delegates supporting candidates who make no attempt to transfer their support. Delegates are not always passive pawns who are easily manipulated. It can be concluded, therefore, that the bargaining effectiveness of candidates is largely exaggerated. LeDuc comments:

In proper perspective, candidate decisions should be viewed simply as one of several inputs to the decision-making process by which each delegate will arrive at choices of "true preference," "ballot strategy," and, if necessary, decisions to switch to other candidates on subsequent ballots. ⁷¹

The uncertainty of the situation relating to the relative standing of candidates as voting proceeds and the relative inability of eliminated or withdrawn candidates to deliver their support would seem to preclude effective bargaining amongst candidates except of the most open-ended variety.

This is not to suggest, however, that candidate behaviour at conventions is unimportant. LeDuc argues:

Canadidates [sic] clearly cannot "control" delegate decisions, but the "cues" which their action provide may assume greater importance in the convention atmosphere of pressure and uncertainty in which the political decisions of candidate and delegate alike are made. 72

The expectation that several ballots will be required to select a new leader creates the corresponding expectation amongst candidates that they may need the support of other candidates as successive ballots are taken. John Turner's criticisms of the "power brokers" at the 1968 leadership convention indicates that candidates place some credence in the prospect of the alteration of voting patterns by the bargaining process. 73

Given these differences, important American state and other party leaders understandably enjoy and exercise more political clout in national party conventions than their Canadian counterparts. In this respect the brokerage model of convention politics has only a limited application to our understanding of delegate behaviour in Canadian leadership conventions. The behaviour of most delegates, as Perlin notes, would seem to be better explained in terms of a model of mass politics which emphasizes the autonomy of individual delegate choice and the mobilization of support through techniques of mass persuasion similar to those used in popular elections. 74

Summary

Our analysis of the openness of the leadership

selection process suggests several points.

1. Surprisingly, the presence of nomination requirements and the escalation and uncontrolled costs of financing leadership campaigns does not appear to place limitations on who can seriously seek the parties' leadership. The large number of candidates in recent leadership conventions suggests that the selection process is more open in terms of candidate accessibility than has generally been the case in the past. However, those candidates who spend the most money tend to be those regarded as the most serious contenders.

2. The absence or inactivity of many constituency organizations has often hindered participation by, and representation of the party membership. Other constituency organizations are dominated by their executives. Provincial associations and M.P.s have occasionally appointed constituency delegates at their discretion. However, the redistribution of 1966 undermined the traditional power of party cliques and altered established patterns of influence.

3. Membership requirements for participation in constituency elections are minimal. Paradoxically, this openness to popular participation has brought a greater potential for manipulation. Increasingly, candidate organizations pack constituency selection meetings with new members in an attempt to elect slates of committed delegates. Manipulation of the leadership selection process at the

grassroots level raises serious questions concerning the independence of constituency associations and hence effective mass party participation and representation.

4. Canadian leadership convention politics should not be viewed exclusively in terms of brokerage style politics. For the most part, provincial and other party leaders are reluctant and/or unable to direct delegates to support a particular candidate. Although some candidates may attempt to transfer their support to other contenders they generally meet with limited success. The convention decision is not the result of bargaining between various party leaders but rather, as Perlin suggests, it is better explained in terms of a model of mass politics which stresses the autonomy of individual delegate choice.

5. Delegates, therefore, are relatively on their own. However, candidate organizations frequently utilize sophisticated techniques in an attempt to influence delegate voting behaviour at the convention. It is this development which poses the greatest threat to delegate autonomy.

In order to complete the picture it is now necessary to examine the extent of membership control over its leadership.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

¹John Diefenbaker, for example, placed his name in nomination minutes before the deadline during the 1967 Conservative leadership convention. Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, p. 94.

²In contrast, at the 1948 Liberal leadership convention, only two delegates were required to nominate a candidate (a mover and a seconder). Quinn, op. cit., 231.

³Thomas Walkom, "Tories taking no chance on rowdy convention crowd," Globe and Mail (March 24, 1983).

⁴"Contenders swarm Ontario Tory youth annual meeting in bid to woo leadership," Toronto Star (March 12, 1983).

⁵Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 88.

⁶Rules governing elimination of candidates in Conservative leadership conventions occur in the following cases:

- (a) On the first ballot:
 - i. all candidates who did not receive at least seventy-five (75) votes.
 - ii. where all candidates receive seventy-five (75) votes or more, the candidate or candidates who receive the least number of votes.
- (b) On the second and subsequent ballots:
 - i. all candidates who did not receive at least seventy-five (75) votes.
 - ii. where all candidates receive seventy-five (75) votes or more, the candidate who receives the least number of votes.
 - iii. in the case of a tie for the least number of votes, the candidates who received an equal number of votes will be eligible for the next ballot.

Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, 1983 Leadership Convention Elections Committee Progress Report No. 1, (March 11, 1983; multilith), pp. 2-3 in Terrence J. Levesque, "On the Outcome of the 1983 Conservative Leadership Convention: How They Shot Themselves in the Other Foot," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 16 (December 1983), 780-781.

⁷George Perlin, "A Century of Picking Leaders Progressively," Toronto Star (June 9, 1983).

⁸Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 91.

⁹"Leadership race is costing Tories over \$5 million," The Spectator (June 8, 1983); Rick Haliechuk and Diane Francis, "Candidates spend \$6 million chasing the Liberal leadership," Toronto Star (June 10, 1984). Candidates in the 1983 leadership campaign encouraged financial support for their personal campaigns by assuring donors that they could receive federal tax credit receipts of up to \$550. The receipts were arranged by processing the donation through the party's national PC Canada Fund which is entitled to issue tax receipts for the party before passing on the donation (minus 25% the fund keeps for itself) to the candidate. The receipts, up to a maximum of \$550 on a \$1,150 contribution allow the donor to deduct that amount from taxable income in the next tax year. Ross Howard, "Taxpayers subsidize Search for Tory Leader," Toronto Star (June 2, 1983).

¹⁰Perlin, "A Century of Picking Leaders Progressively."

¹¹Geoff White, "Big bucks will vie for ballots in PC leadership race," The Spectator (February 9, 1983).

¹²J. Patrick Boyer, "A Well-Ordered Free-For-All," Parliamentary Government, 4, 2 (1983) 12. For a brief discussion of election expense legislation in Canada see K. Z. Peltiel, "Canadian Election Expense Legislation: Recent Developments," in Party Politics in Canada (4th ed.), Hugh Thorburn ed., (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp. 100-110.

¹³White, "Big bucks will vie for ballots."

¹⁴CP, "Tighten rules for leadership race Tory organizer urges," Toronto Star (February 14, 1983).

¹⁵"Would-be Tory leaders told to deposit \$5,000," Toronto Star (March 13, 1983).

¹⁶Robert McKenzie, "The Mulroney message," Toronto Star (April 24, 1983).

¹⁷White, "Big bucks will vie for ballots."

¹⁸The Liberal Party of Canada, Constitution, Article 14:14.

¹⁹Joel Ruimy, "1.6 million ceiling placed on spending in Liberal campaign," Toronto Star (March 18, 1984).

²⁰Thomas Walkom, "Liberal limit to run race \$1.6 million," Globe and Mail (March 19, 1984).

²¹Editorial, "Who's funding Tory racers?" Toronto Star (March 27, 1983).

²²Joseph Wearing, "The Liberal Choice," Journal of Canadian Studies, 3 (May 1968), 18.

²³Joseph Wearing, "A Convention for Professionals: The PCs in Toronto," Journal of Canadian Studies, 2 (November 1967), 4.

²⁴Barnes, op. cit., p. 252.

²⁵The Liberal Party of Canada, Constitution, Article 13:02.

²⁶James Johnston, The Party's Over, (Don Mills: Longman, 1971), pp. 180-181.

²⁷Liberal Party of Canada (Ontario), Green Guidelines, Articles 1.2-1.4 (emphasis added).

²⁸Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, p. 20.

²⁹Perlin cites three reasons hindering the development of local constituency organizations in the Conservative party. First, the party has had considerable difficulty raising funds for inter-election activity because of its minimal electoral success. Second, the party has had little patronage to offer as an incentive for participation. Third, electoral failure is a deterrent since the Conservative party is committed to the same basic principles as the Liberal party. Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, p. 21.

³⁰Ibid., p. 20.

³¹Roman R. March, The Myth of Parliament, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 91.

³²Wearing, "Party Leadership and the 1966 Conventions," 27.

³³Perlin, "A Century of Picking Leaders Progressively." In a 1976 Conservative leadership survey only 11% of the delegates said they were chosen by constituency meetings attended by 200 or more people. 69% said they were chosen by meetings attended by less than 100 people. Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, pp. 20-21.

³⁴Power, op. cit., p. 371.

³⁵Smiley, op. cit., p. 179.

³⁶Wearing, "A Convention for Professionals," 4.

³⁷Martin et al., op. cit., p. 127.

³⁸Ibid. David Deyer of the Crombie camp noted: "You run as a committed delegate for somebody who's running for leader. Your riding votes for you or other committed delegates. The outcome signals who's the likely winner of the convention." Ross Howard, "Blitz is on in Metro for delegate support," Toronto Star (March 20, 1983).

³⁹Martin et al., op. cit., p. 38.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 45.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 41.

⁴²"Quebec Tories carry convention clout," Globe and Mail (April 4, 1983).

⁴³Conversely, the NDP has more rigid requisite conditions for membership. Applicants for membership must declare that they do not belong to other parties and that they accept and support the "constitution and principles" of the NDP. The NDP also has a complex dues structure. McMenemy et al., op. cit., pp. 176-177.

⁴⁴Guidelines for the selection of constituency delegates in the Ontario wing of the Liberal party stipulated: "Although a riding constitution may permit persons under 16 years of age to be members, mass recruitment of such persons is not approved of or encouraged." Liberal Party of Canada (Ontario), Green Guidelines, Article 7:3.

⁴⁵Lele et al., op. cit., p. 85.

⁴⁶Martin et al., op. cit., p. 80.

⁴⁷"Mulroney, Clark bought votes, organizer admits," Toronto Star (November 26, 1983).

⁴⁸Martin et al., op. cit., p. 43.

⁴⁹For example, an editorial in the Toronto Star (April 16, 1983) stated that, "Canadians are witnessing the most corrupt leadership campaign in our country's modern political history." Criticism of the manipulative tactics employed by Clark and Mulroney organizers in the delegate selection process was so extensive that several leadership candidates including Michael Wilson and David Crombie at one point suggested that former party leader Robert Stanfield should be recruited to lead a special panel to enquire into campaign irregularities. CP, "New PC delegate meetings ordered," Globe and Mail (April 19, 1983).

⁵⁰"Delegate Selection Draws 100,000," PC Journal, 2 (1983), 5.

⁵¹"Dirty Tricks in Tory campaign," Toronto Star (April 12, 1983).

⁵²Martin et al., op. cit., p. 46; Jeff Sallot, "Call for new panel to judge disputes rejected by Clark," Globe and Mail (April 7, 1983).

⁵³Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 93.

⁵⁴For a detailed discussion of American nominating conventions see Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, Presidential Elections: Strategies of American Electoral Politics, (5th ed.), (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980).

⁵⁵Lele et al., op. cit., p. 82

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 83.

⁵⁷Peter Woolstencroft, "Social Choice Theory and the Reconstruction of Elections: A Comment on Levesque's Analysis," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 16 (December 1983), 788.

⁵⁸Smiley, op. cit., pp. 180-181.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 180. The precedent for the secret ballot method of voting was established in 1919. The Liberal party convention committee decided in favour of the individual secret ballot in part to ensure Quebec's continued presence in the party. Had the Quebec delegates, whose M.P.s dominated the parliamentary caucus, voted publicly in large numbers for the losing candidate they may have been pressured to leave the party. Carl Baar and Ellen Baar, "Party and Conventicn Organization and Leadership Selection in Canada and the United States," in Perspectives on Presidential Selection, Donald R. Matthews ed., (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 73.

⁶⁰Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 200.

⁶¹LeDuc, op. cit., 112.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 203.

⁶⁴LeDuc, op. cit., 107.

⁶⁵Jeff Sallot, "Clark teams raise persuasion tactics into a form of art," Globe and Mail (June 11, 1983).

⁶⁶Carol Goar, "The Mulroney Challenge," Maclean's, (June 20, 1983), 11.

⁶⁷Baar and Baar, op. cit., p. 68.

⁶⁸Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, p. 138; LeDuc, op. cit., 107.

⁶⁹Martin et al., op. cit., p. 236.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 95.

⁷¹LeDuc, op. cit., 106

⁷²Ibid., 107.

⁷³Ibid., 104. Turner's remarks were prompted by Mitchell Sharp's withdrawal from the campaign and his public

declaration of support for Pierre Trudeau four days prior to the voting. Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 85n.

⁷⁴Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, p. 149.

IV
CONTROL

No matter how elaborately organized the extra-parliamentary party structure nor how concerned its party membership is with active and meaningful participation, the rank-and-file is usually precluded from having much influence on the parliamentary leadership once the leader is selected. This is particularly true when the party is in power. ¹ Whitaker notes:

Democratic legitimization of the internal processes of decision-making in the [Liberal] party was accepted, but only at the most rarefied and abstract level, that of the mandate of the party leader derived from the majority vote of a democratic party convention at one point in time. ²

The influence of the party rank-and-file, therefore, is generally intermittent given the infrequency and irregularity of leadership conventions. In the Liberal party, for example, Mackenzie King remained party leader from 1919 to 1948.

While King "never gave the lightest indication that he harboured any belief in intra-party democracy," ³ he was quick to argue that he was selected by party convention, the body to which he was ultimately responsible and which is the only legitimate basis of authority for leadership selection and removal. Lederle (1947) observes:

On those rare occasions, when the parliamentary caucus has begun to growl, when the party has been in opposition and the going has been hard, he [King] has more than once silenced the parliamentary wolves by emphasizing that he is the representative and leader of the party as a whole, not merely of the parliamentary group. 4

The party leader, then, is accountable to both wings of the party since he is selected by both. Subsequently, it is reasonable to expect that the rank-and-file membership would be afforded the periodic opportunity to review its leadership thereby providing it with some means of effective control. Although the major parties have selected their leaders in convention for well over half a century, it was not until the mid-1960s that the Liberals and Conservatives adopted provisions in their party constitutions for the periodic review of the leader's performance.

In the Liberal party leadership review has been an effective means of rank-and-file control over its leadership; a safety valve which protects the party from a leader it might not want. In the Conservative party, however, conflicts over the party leadership have been accentuated by the leadership review mechanism.

Traditionally, in both parties, leaders are selected without term (as in Britain), a characteristic of leadership selection which did not change with the switch to national party conventions. This is unlike the American system where

both the Democrats and Republicans automatically hold nominating conventions every four years thereby providing the party membership the periodic opportunity to evaluate its leadership.

Prior to 1966 it was a generally accepted principle of party politics in Canada that a leader who was successful in directing his party would remain as leader for as long as he desired. "Success at the polls and the control of government," Dawson observes, "were usually taken as a sufficient justification and authorization for continued leadership." ⁵ Subsequently, between 1887 and 1948 the Liberals, who dominated as the governing party, had only two leaders (Maurier and King) while the Conservatives had twelve.

Success, then, was generally measured by two criteria: 1) the number of elections won; and more recently 2) the leader's track record in the opinion polls which was more important to a leader in opposition. Until 1966, the leader who was clearly viewed as an electoral liability or who lost the confidence of the parliamentary caucus would, with some urging, voluntarily submit his resignation (e.g., George Brown and Alexander Mackenzie). Thus, the exact timing of a leader's retirement was very substantially a matter of his own personal judgement. This, as we shall see, created problems when the leader was reluctant to relinquish his office.

This situation changed for the Liberal party in 1966 when the party's national meeting approved an amendment to the party constitution:

A resolution calling for a Leadership Convention shall be placed automatically on the Agenda of the Convention next following a Federal General Election. If such resolution is duly adopted by secret ballot the National Executive shall call a leadership convention to take place within one year from the date of the above mentioned secret ballot. 6

Although the party had no tradition of overthrowing its leaders (all had retired of their own volition), twenty-five resolutions from constituency and provincial associations had been presented. They requested an amendment to the constitution providing some mechanism to have the leader renew his mandate at regular intervals. The resolutions generally rested on the premise that a party was not democratic if it failed to provide for a periodic vote on the desirability of calling a leadership convention.⁷ Mark MacGuigan told the convention: "Democracy must be complete. The party must have its checkreins to keep the leader close to the party. Leadership conventions should be a matter of course."⁸

The new constitutional provision was first applied at the party's biennial meeting of November 1970 when by a secret ballot vote the party rejected the resolution calling for a leadership convention within a year (1,064 to 132).⁹ This indicated continued support for Pierre Trudeau's leadership and afforded the party membership a degree of

control over its leadership.

The Conservative party handled the issue of leadership accountability quite differently and in such a manner as to create deep divisions within the party.¹⁰ John Diefenbaker's leadership served as the focal point of the dispute.¹¹

After the Conservative party lost its majority in parliament in the 1962 general election, Diefenbaker's leadership was challenged by five cabinet ministers (George Hees, George Nowlan, Wallace McCutcheon, Pierre Sevigny and Leon Balcer) who asked Diefenbaker to resign to avoid a motion of non-confidence in the House.¹² Diefenbaker refused and Hees and Sevigny resigned from cabinet.

When the Conservative government was defeated in the 1963 general election, Diefenbaker's leadership continued to be supported by a majority of the parliamentary party but dissatisfaction with the leader existed in several quarters outside parliament producing a succession of attempts to force his resignation. At the 1964 general meeting of the Conservative National Association, a motion was made to conduct the normally routine vote of confidence in the leader by secret ballot instead of the traditional standing vote. The motion was defeated by a standing vote and Diefenbaker won a substantial majority. In early 1965, the party's national executive narrowly defeated a motion calling for a leadership convention.¹³

Two months before the 1966 general meeting, Dalton Camp, then the party's national president seeking re-election, spoke publicly of the need to "democratize" the Conservative party and to "re-assess" its leadership.¹⁴ Camp based his campaign on a pledge to hold a leadership convention before the end of 1967. Diefenbaker loyalists countered by running their own candidate, Arthur Maloney. Camp's victory (by a vote of 564 to 502) and the subsequent approval by the meeting of a motion calling for a leadership convention in 1967 (by a vote of 563 to 209) virtually assured Diefenbaker's removal as party leader.

Diefenbaker's electoral defeat marked the first time in Canadian political history that a party leader's position was taken from him by an extra-parliamentary institution. The result made it clear that leadership politics takes place in two different arenas: the parliamentary caucus and the extra-parliamentary party. The leader is accountable to both.

The intra-party conflict over Diefenbaker's leadership failed to resolve the more fundamental question of constitutional procedures for the review of party leadership. The Conservative party constitution did not stipulate under what conditions or by what procedures a leadership convention could be called.

It was not until the general meeting of March 1969

that the Conservative party formally amended its constitution to include the periodic review of leadership by party convention. A party constitution committee recommended the following:

At every General Meeting the following question shall be put, without debate, and voted on by ballot or voting machine:
"Should the Party hold a Leadership Convention within twelve months?" If a majority of registered delegates vote in the affirmative, the Executive Committee shall proceed to call a Convention to be held within twelve months from the taking of such a vote. 15

Opposition to the provision centered on the argument that re-assessment of leadership should consider whether the party leader is prime minister at the time and should occur after an election, not before. The party and its leader could be seriously handicapped entering an election if the leader had been sustained in a convention vote by only a slight margin or had lost the vote. It was also argued that no review was necessary if the party had managed at least a modest increase in its parliamentary support during the previous general election. 16

As a result of these concerns the following amendment was adopted:

When we are the government party no resolution calling for a leadership convention may be put unless the office is then vacant through death or resignation or unless the chairman of caucus shall certify that the leader has lost the support of that body by a regular vote of caucus on the question of confidence.

When we are in opposition the question

shall be put to the first general meeting following an election "Do we wish to have a leadership convention next year?" No such question may be put following any election where the party increased its standing in the House by more than 20 per cent and the leadership office is not presently vacant.

The vote, which shall be taken by ballot or voting machine, shall be announced to the meeting as to result only and not with statistics. 17

However, this provision was further amended in 1974 so that the question "do you wish to have a leadership convention?" is put to the delegates at each general meeting.

The problem with the Conservative's review mechanism was first apparent at the 1981 biennial meeting in Ottawa. The Conservative party had fallen from office after only twenty-seven weeks in power on December 13, 1979. It returned to the opposition benches as a result of the February 18, 1980 election. The 2,123 delegates voted 66.4 per cent against a leadership convention ensuring Clark's continued role as party leader. However, the vote total revealed Clark's vulnerability, and the problem of a leadership review provision: what constitutes a firm vote of confirmation?

While the party constitution stated that only a simple majority (i.e., fifty per cent plus one) was required to defeat the question of a leadership convention, a two-thirds majority was considered more appropriate for a leader to continue in office. The two-thirds threshold was established by various anti-Clark factions which had surfaced

in the party, and by the media which considered Trudeau's support in leadership review votes (i.e., 90 per cent in 1970, 81 per cent in 1975, and 87 per cent in 1980) as the yardstick for measuring Conservative party review votes.¹⁸

Clark's problem was further compounded by his tenuous position in caucus. After the 1981 review vote, Clark was challenged in caucus about his decision not to resign though he was not obligated to do so. To quiet caucus opposition to his leadership, Clark promised to call a leadership convention if his support did not significantly increase in 1983.¹⁹

Organized opposition to Clark's leadership surfaced prior to the January 1983 general meeting in Winnipeg. In the parliamentary party, Elmer MacKay had gathered forty-eight caucus member signatures calling for Clark's resignation although these were never made public.²⁰ MacKay belonged to a secretive committee of anti-Clark M.P.s chaired by former Newfoundland premier Frank Moores. This group "coordinated a campaign to create disruption in caucus, to challenge the leader's authority and to encourage other MPs to make clear their opposition to Clark."²¹ The extra-parliamentary opposition was organized primarily by John Morrison, leader of a Toronto based pre-convention committee.

Clark's position was further undermined by a Gallup poll released a week before the meeting. The survey revealed

that Clark could lose a federal election if John Turner was Liberal leader despite the fact that the Conservatives then held an eighteen point lead in the polls. The poll results indicated that the Liberals under Turner would receive forty-three per cent of the votes in a general election compared to forty per cent for the Conservatives under Clark's leadership. However, the Liberals would receive forty per cent of the votes compared to forty-one per cent by the Conservatives under Ontario premier William Davis, and only thirty-nine per cent of the votes compared to forty-five per cent by the Conservatives under Alberta premier Peter Lougheed. The poll itself was commissioned by a "private Canadian group" according to a press release accompanying the results. Gallup would not reveal any further details of who had commissioned the poll or who had distributed it. ²²

The 1983 general meetings saw 2,406 delegates vote 66.9 per cent against a leadership convention despite Clark's plea for a strong mandate. Although a clear majority of the party remained in favour of continued leadership, Clark informed the meeting that he would resign as party leader and become a candidate in the party leadership convention which would be called to fill the leadership vacancy. Clark stated afterwards: "I tried to make 66 per cent work last time, but I, or any other leader, need more than that if we are to form the government of this country." ²³

While a more detailed analysis of conflict in the Conservative party is beyond the scope of this thesis, our brief examination of leadership review provisions reveals several points relevant to our discussion of intra-party democracy. There has been little opposition to the notion of leadership review. The arguments presented in 1966 were echoed in the period preceding the 1983 meeting. Clark, who supported the control mechanism in 1966, expressed no quarrel with the notion of mandatory leadership review in 1983: "I believe that a review mechanism is necessary. There needs to be a capacity for a party to exercise control over the leader."²⁴ Dalton Camp agrees: "Leadership of a political party, bestowed upon the winner of party conventions, ought not to be considered a life-time contract. Instead, the contract should be periodically reviewed by the party." He continues:

In our system, it is the delegated membership of the political party which decides who shall lead and for how long. It is, or should be, simply another mechanism in the processes of party democracy, one which protects a party from the worst case circumstance--that of having to endure a leader it no longer wants to follow.²⁵

The problem for the Conservative party is that it has historically displayed a penchant for publicly attacking its leadership, a phenomenon Perlin terms the Tory Syndrome.²⁶ Martin et al observe that the Conservative party "has been

fractious and difficult to manage, which has undermined public confidence in its leaders; and as its leaders have failed to deliver electoral victories, the party has forced them out." ²⁷ The source of the problem, then, lies at least partially in the Conservative party's status as an opposition party. Minority parties tend to be disunited, beset by internal disputes and conflict. The central role of leadership in Canadian politics ultimately places the responsibility for party conflict and electoral failure on the leader.

Clearly, the problem of leadership dissatisfaction in the party was intensified by the constitutional provision for periodic leadership review as it existed in January 1983. In the Liberal party, Camp states, leadership review is a "safety valve" in the hands of the party membership, while in the Conservative party it had become a "gun aimed at the leader's head." ²⁸ Conservative M.P. Patrick Nowlan described it as "almost too much democracy." ²⁹ The party, in effect, experienced a leadership campaign every two years, but with only one candidate. The N.D.P. are also prepared for a leadership vote at each annual meeting but only if another candidate declares himself. In the Conservative party, such a practise served to perpetuate discontent and created the public perception of a political party in a constant state

of disunity.

To rectify this situation the Winnipeg general meeting re-structured the constitutional leadership review clause. The new amendment, passed without debate, provides the party leader who is successful in a general election with job security. A leader who does not become Prime Minister would confront a review question only once, at the first national party meeting following a general election:

At the first lawfully convened general meeting of the Association after a federal general election in which the Party did not form the government, and only at such meeting, the voting delegates shall be asked by secret ballot, 'Do you wish to have a leadership convention?' In the event that more than fifty percent (50%) of the votes cast indicate desire for a leadership convention, the Executive Committee shall call a leadership convention at the earliest date. 30

Summary

The main points of the analysis of membership control may be summarized as follows.

1. Traditionally, in both parties, leaders are selected without term.
2. The party leader is theoretically accountable to both wings of the party, not merely the parliamentary party, since he is selected by both wings of the party in convention. In reality, however, the extra-parliamentary party's control over its leadership is intermittent.

3. In both parties, leaders are evaluated in large party by electoral considerations. Formal leadership review votes occur only after a federal general election. In the Conservative party, a leader who successfully leads the party in a general election is no longer subjected to party evaluation by means of a formal vote by party convention.

4. The Conservative party has been fractious and insubordinate to its leadership largely as a consequence of its position as a minority party; this in turn has diminished its appeal as a governing party. Mandatory leadership review in the party every two years served to perpetuate this discontent and was thus considered an electoral liability. The party has shown, by virtue of its new amendment regarding leadership review, its unwillingness to jeopardize party success at the expense of intra-party democracy.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

¹Quinn comments: "Apparently it is very difficult for the rank and file to exercise much control as long as the party is in power." Quinn, op. cit., 233.

²Whitaker, op. cit., p. 418.

³Ibid., p. 171.

⁴Lederle, "The Liberal Convention of 1919," 86.

⁵Dawson, op. cit., p. 436.

⁶The Liberal Party of Canada, Constitution, Article 14.01.

⁷Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 100.

⁸Ibid., pp. 100-101.

⁹Ibid., p. 101.

¹⁰For an account of conflict in the Conservative party see Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, pp. 28-57.

¹¹For an account of the conflict over Diefenbaker's leadership see Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, pp. 61-83; Robert C. Coates, The Night of the Knives, (Fredericton: Brunswick Press, 1969), pp. 9-77; and James Johnston, op. cit.

¹²Social Credit leader Robert Thompson had introduced a motion of non-confidence which would likely have received the support of the Liberals and New Democrats. The five Conservative ministers met with Thompson to see if it was possible to save the government and found that support would only come from Diefenbaker's resignation. As a result the five ministers asked Diefenbaker to resign. Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, pp. 66-67.

¹³The request for a leadership convention came formally to the party's executive in the form of a letter from Leon Balcer, leader of the Quebec caucus of Conservative M.P.s. Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 102.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Progressive Conservative Association of Canada, Report of the Constitution Committee, (March 11, 1969), proposed article XII in Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 103.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 103-104.

¹⁷Progressive Conservative Association of Canada, Constitution (as amended March 1969), article XII in Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 104.

¹⁸Editorial, "A sea of troubles," Globe and Mail (February 4, 1983).

¹⁹Martin et al., op. cit., p. 14.

²⁰Those caucus members calling for Clark's resignation signed letters which read: "As a member of the Progressive Conservative caucus and Parliament of Canada, I sincerely believe that it is in the best interests of our party to hold a leadership convention to clear the air and restore party unity. I therefore respectfully request you to resign to make way for a leadership convention under the terms of Article II, Subsection I of the constitution of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada," Lawrence Martin, "MPs' letters ask Clark to resign for unity's sake," Globe and Mail (January 24, 1983).

²¹Lawrence Martin, "Embassy move drew anti-Clark money," Globe and Mail (February 4, 1984). After the 1983 convention, Australian born businessman Walter Wolf admitted spending \$25,000 to finance the anti-Clark campaign because of the Clark government's proposal to move Canada's embassy in Israel. Mulroney aide Michel Cogger and Frank Moores were given retainer fees of \$3,000 or \$4,000 a month to work against Clark, Wolf claimed. Other undisclosed sources set Wolf's contributions to the anti-Clark campaign at \$250,000. Martin et al., op. cit., p. 77.

²²"Turner would defeat Clark: Poll," Toronto Star (January 20, 1983).

²³Editorial, Globe and Mail (January 31, 1983).

²⁴Carol Goar, "Clark: the Politics of Leadership," Maclean's (January 31, 1983), 17.

²⁵Dalton Camp, "The New Math: When is a majority not a majority," Toronto Star (January 22, 1983).

²⁶See Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, pp. 190-201.

²⁷Martin et al., op. cit., p. xiv. (emphasis added).

²⁸Camp, "The New Math."

²⁹"New PC rule changes formal review process," Globe and Mail (January 31, 1983).

³⁰Progressive Conservative Association of Canada, Constitution, Article 11:03.

LEADERSHIP SELECTION

As essentially election-contesting organizations, it is expected that party leaders in both major parties are frequently recruited from outside the parliamentary party possessing lesser experience in government in particular and party politics in general thereby approximating the Rational-Efficient (cadre-style) party model. The prime motivational force on delegate voting behaviour will be the voter appeal or winnability of the leadership candidate. The new leader, then, will not necessarily be the candidate possessing the greatest political experience and loyalty to the party organization (i.e., Party Democracy model), but the one who the delegates believe represents the best chance for electoral success. In other words, the ideal candidate is not always the best parliamentarian, but the best campaigner.

i) Political Experience

Political experience, both in terms of length of service and positions achieved, should be important criterion whenever questions of party leadership are considered. It is naturally expected that any potential leadership candidate who is seriously seeking the office of party leader would

possess some experience in elective office. However, as had earlier proven to be the case in American politics after the switch from congressional to convention selection of presidential candidates, a major alteration took place in the type of individual selected as party leader when the Canadian parties adopted the leadership convention. Accordingly, the recruitment patterns and career routes of party leaders have been dramatically altered.

Prior to the introduction of leadership conventions Canadian party leaders were typically men of Parliament. Conservative leaders (excluding Sir John A. Macdonald) averaged nearly fourteen years of experience as members of the House of Commons with Liberal leaders possessing an average of ten years experience as M.P.s.¹ Although there were differences between the long term governing and opposition parties, nearly all had served as cabinet ministers. Conservative leaders averaged seven years of parliamentary ministerial experience compared to a little more than a year for Liberal leaders.² Many leaders had also gained experience serving as members of provincial legislatures and cabinets (e.g., John Thompson and Wilfred Laurier) though at the time of their selection the more important consideration was membership in parliament and experience in federal government.³

Since the adoption of the leadership convention,

the mean parliamentary experience of both Conservative and Liberal party leaders has been nearly half of what it was during the pre-convention period (see table 6 below). The mean parliamentary experience of the eight Conservative leaders selected in convention is only six years compared to seven years for the five Liberal party leaders. Indeed, only two Liberal leaders (Lester Pearson and John Turner) had more than ten years experience in the House of Commons. There has also been a sizable drop in prior parliamentary ministerial experience for Conservative leaders, but more than a fourfold increase for Liberal leaders. Twenty-two of the twenty-six Liberal leadership candidates in the convention period have served in cabinet. This pattern is a logical extension of the long periods of Liberal rule. Normally, a minority party must choose from potential leaders of more limited experience especially in federal politics. From Confederation until their first leadership convention in 1927, the Conservatives were in power intermittently for thirty-four of the sixty years in this period. Since 1927, it has been out of office for all but twelve years (excluding its election victory in 1984). Indeed, not one of the last six Conservative leaders has sat in a federal cabinet before his selection.

Not only has the convention system opened the

Table 6

Mean Parliamentary, Legislative and Ministerial Experience of Leaders at the Time of Their Selection (in years).*

<u>Pre-Convention Period</u>	<u>Parliamentary Experience</u>	<u>Parliamentary Ministerial Experience</u>	<u>Provincial Legislative Experience</u>	<u>Provincial Ministerial Experience</u>
Conservative Party (N = 6)	13.5	7.0	4.4	2.0
Liberal Party (N = 3)	10.1	1.3	5.1	.6
<u>Convention Period</u>				
Conservative Party (N = 8)	5.9	1.0	7.0	6.0
Liberal Party (N = 5)	6.9	5.0	0.0	0.0

*Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders in Canada, pp. 142-143 (updated).

selection process to candidates with limited parliamentary and ministerial experience, it has also made it more difficult for those candidates with considerable experience in federal politics to be successful. The candidate possessing substantial political experience is actually disadvantaged as Courtney observes: "the fewer the years a leadership candidate has served in parliament, the greater his chances of being elected a party leader."⁴ Four of the five Liberal leaders chosen by party convention since 1919 (King, St. Laurent, Pearson and Trudeau) have been in both parliament and cabinet for much shorter periods of time than any of their major competitors spending the majority of their earlier careers outside the area of elective politics.⁵ Fielding (1919), Power (1948), Martin (1958), and Winters and Hellyer (1968) far exceeded their successful opponents in parliamentary experience.

The Liberals, therefore, have displayed a general orientation towards the selection of leaders who have not climbed the political ladder. One reason for this is that Liberal ministers tend to be recruited after very short parliamentary apprenticeships. Pierre Trudeau, for example, did not join the Liberal party until 1965 and had served only one year in cabinet before his selection as party leader in 1968. St. Laurent and Pearson were both cabinet ministers

before they were selected to parliament.⁶ Thus, because access to cabinet is directly from the outside and not from party ranks in many cases, Ward (1967) comments that, "one excellent way of ensuring that one will not rise to the top of the Liberal party is to start at the bottom."⁷

A similar pattern is discernible in the Conservative party. Of the eight Conservative leaders selected by convention, all but two (R. J. Manion and John Diefenbaker) defeated several other candidates whose years in the parliamentary party comfortably surpassed their own. In the most extreme case, Brian Mulroney won the party leadership in 1983 over five sitting members of parliament despite the fact that he had never contested a federal election or sat in a legislature of any kind.

The Conservative party has also evidenced a strong predilection for selecting provincial premiers as party leaders, partially because of their records of electoral success. Bracken (1942), Drew (1948), Stanfield (1967), and Roblin (1967) were all provincial premiers at the time they sought the national party leadership, and all but Roblin were successful.⁸ Two others also successful were former provincial party leaders (Bennett, 1927, and Diefenbaker, 1956). Only three of the eight Conservative leaders selected by convention (Bennett, Diefenbaker and Clark) had seats in

parliament when they were chosen. ⁹

Thus the evidence indicates that parliamentary apprenticeships are no longer important prerequisites for party leaders, especially in the Conservative party. One reason for this development is the fact that caucus no longer has the exclusive right to select a party leader from its midst. Lederle notes that, "the riding delegates retain the ultimate power to go outside the parliamentary group for their choice as leader." ¹⁰ Subsequently, candidates lacking political experience can, nonetheless, be considered serious contenders.

What factors serve to overshadow the importance of parliamentary and ministerial experience in the selection of party leaders? The answer lies, at least partially, in the personality, image and vote-getting ability of the potential leader. Let us now turn to a brief examination of delegate voting behaviour as it relates to these factors.

ii) The "Winnability" Factor

In their book Contenders, Martin et al. ask what factors prompted Conservative convention delegates to select Brian Mulroney as party leader in 1983:

How could he, a man who had no national prominence outside his party, indeed a man who even within the party was known mainly for his work in the backrooms, emerge a winner over former ministers and active members of Parliament who were portrayed almost daily in the news media as leading political figures? ¹¹

The answer, according to the authors, is that a party

interested in obtaining political power requires leaders who are capable, or at least seemingly capable, of leading the party to victory in the next general election.

This factor marks a fundamental difference in leadership selection in the two major parties; the Conservatives are pre-occupied with obtaining power, the Liberals with maintaining it. A party out of power or in danger of losing its power may be more willing to select a less experienced (and often younger) candidate who holds the promise of electoral victory as leader. Conversely, parties comfortably entrenched in power are more likely to select a candidate who has some experience, most likely a prominent cabinet minister.

A frequent question, therefore, especially for Conservative convention delegates, is not whether a prospective leader possesses the ability to unify and lead the parliamentary party, but more importantly, how likely is he to lead the party to victory in the next general election? The convention, in turn, can be viewed as a mini-election, an ideal test of electoral potential, "a sort of laboratory test for finding the best politician."¹² Dawson notes: "A man who can carry a convention successfully is also likely to be the kind of man who can carry an election."¹³

This is a somewhat surprising development given the

inter-election function of the leadership convention. However, leadership conventions tend to be held when the parties are in opposition; only in the years 1948, 1968 and 1984 was a new leader selected when the party was in power. Subsequently, as Punnett (1970) argues, in the emotional setting of the convention there may be a tendency for delegates to overlook a tried and tested parliamentary figure, and select a popular yet inexperienced candidate who may later prove to be a disaster as a parliamentary leader but who also holds the promise of electoral victory.¹⁴ Courtney observes:

Some MPs with leadership aspirations apprentice for many years, yet they pay a heavy price for enduring the rigours of parliamentary life when they find that, at the pinnacle of their career, the fresh face of the new comer is too much for most convention delegates to resist.¹⁵

The danger inherent in this development is that a parliamentary party requires more than a good campaigner as its leader. A major consequence of leadership selection in a parliamentary system is the certainty that a party will have to live with its choice of leader for a number of years, whether the party gains power under the new leadership or not.

It would appear, therefore, that no amount of political experience is sufficient to counter the attractiveness of a relatively new face on the political scene, especially

if that candidate appears to be the most likely to secure electoral success. Courtney argues:

No amount of parliamentary experience can successfully counter the image of the candidate who, being least tarnished from political wars, is best able to appear as the man most in keeping with his times, most likely to solve the pressing problems of the day. 16

The 1983 Conservative leadership convention provides an excellent example of this phenomenon. Martin et al. argue that Mulroney was successful despite his inexperience for one basic reason--the overriding concern of Conservatives with their quest for power. The authors observe: "Above all else in 1983, the Progressive Conservative party was determined to find a leader who could win power and hold on to power." 17 Historian Desmond Morton, writing in the Toronto Star, agrees: "What Brian Mulroney represented was the most instantly marketable political image that the Tories could put before the electorate." 18

At first glance, the available evidence would seem to substantiate these claims. Except for the Clark government's brief nine month term in 1979, the Conservatives had not formed the government since Diefenbaker's tenure as party leader. Perlin (1983) found that seventy-four per cent of the convention delegates surveyed in 1983 acknowledged that the candidate's ability to help the party win the next election was "very

influential" in their choice of leader.¹⁹ No other factor, not even the candidates' views on policy, was so widely described as "very influential." Accordingly, seventy-three per cent of the delegates stated Mulroney's election had improved the party's chances of winning the next general election.²⁰ Thus, Conservative delegates, faced with the phantom of the Turner candidacy, selected a new leader in 1983 on the basis of his perceived (not demonstrated) vote-winning ability. Indeed, Mulroney proclaimed during the leadership campaign: "On June 11 this party must decide who will face Mr. Turner and who can beat John Turner."²¹

Hand in hand with this development has been the recent emphasis on personality and image in leadership selection politics. It is suggested that, at least since television coverage of convention proceedings was first inaugurated in 1958, the personality and image of the individual candidates has become an important feature of leadership campaigns and a dominant factor in delegate preference, although again this is more characteristic of the Conservative party.

Because electoral competition in federal politics tends to stress the personalities of party leaders, there has been a corresponding general disposition to relate to leadership selection politics in terms of personalities and images. After the 1980 general election, for example, a

sample of 2,500 voters were asked whether the party, the leader, or the local candidate was the major factor influencing their vote.²² Thirty-six per cent responded that the leader was the major factor, and of these, close to half said it was the leader's personality rather than the leader's stand on the issues that was the major deciding factor for them. Thus, for almost one out of every five voters surveyed, the personality of the leader was the dominant consideration in determining their vote.

In terms of convention delegates, seventy-seven per cent of those attending the 1967 leadership convention surveyed by Perlin gave explanations for their voting behaviour which emphasized affective responses to the personalities of the candidates.²³ Similarly, fifty-one per cent of the 1983 convention delegates surveyed by Martin *et al.* indicated the personality of the candidate was "very influential" in their voting decision.²⁴

As a result, most major candidates tend to be overly cautious and vague in their approach to policy discussion. Instead, as was the case in 1967, most serious contenders attempt to demonstrate personal qualities: their competence to govern, their leadership style, or their vote-getting ability.²⁵ Policy discussion is important, in many circumstances, only to project an image of competence and

style or to avoid controversy. Candidates thus frequently take an instrumental approach to policy in their appeals for delegate support with policy reference usually designed to fit the thematic emphasis on personal qualities.

Certainly this development does not preclude candidates from offering policy proposals and debating specific issues. However, candidates with a legitimate chance of winning the leadership do not want to alienate potential support and thus, for the most part, studiously avoid controversial issues. The major issues of the 1983 leadership campaign, therefore, may be said to be the personal weaknesses of the three frontrunners--Joe Clark's lack of charisma, John Crosbie's unilingualism and Brian Mulroney's lack of political experience.

This, then, is a fundamental variable of leadership selection operative in both parties. The age and experience of the successful candidate is inter-related with the political fortunes of the parties. In times of comfortable entrenchment the tendency is to select leaders who possess a record of party service particularly in parliament. Conversely, when party fortunes are at a low ebb, the leader selected is more likely to be an outsider, a youthful candidate lacking substantial parliamentary experience but holds the promise of electoral victory. However, to suggest that delegates cast their

ballots solely on the basis of a candidate's vote-getting ability is misleading.

At the 1967 Conservative leadership convention, for example, Perlin found that only forty-four per cent of the surveyed delegates mentioned a candidate's position as the best vote-getter for the party as a reason for their first ballot voting choice.²⁶ Of these, only fifty-six per cent actually voted for one of the candidates they ranked best as a vote-getter. Of the delegates supporting the eventual winner, Robert Stanfield, only twenty-seven per cent mentioned his vote winning ability as a factor in their voting. Indeed, of the eight candidates who were thought to be desirable campaigners, Stanfield was ranked first by only three per cent of the sample, giving him fewer first place rankings than any other candidate. Perlin concludes that the delegates' "motives for choosing Stanfield seem to have little to do with his perceived ability as a vote-winner,"²⁷ despite the fact that the Conservatives were then in opposition.

Asked what factors most motivated them to make the leadership choices they made in 1983, delegates replied, first and foremost, who was the most electable.²⁸ Yet, only thirty-five per cent of the delegates who said that finding a winning candidate was "very influential" actually voted for Mulroney on the first ballot.²⁹ Delegates, then, frequently cast their vote on the basis of a number of other

considerations. In 1967, Perlin found that sixty-eight per cent of the delegates who explained their first ballot choices mentioned at least three reasons, while fifty per cent gave four reasons.³⁰ Intra-party cleavages such as region, ethnicity, ideology or organizational ties are all factors influencing delegate voting behaviour. Each leadership convention, therefore, presents a unique set of motivational forces influencing delegate voting behaviour.³¹

Summary

The main points of our examination of leadership selection in Canadian party conventions may be summarized as follows.

1. In both parties there has been a general shift in the convention period in terms of those selected as party leader from party careerists to political insurgents, from insiders to outsiders.

2. Both parties, therefore, display a general disposition towards the selection of party leaders with lesser experience in federal politics.

3. As a minority party the Conservatives tend to choose leaders on the basis of vote-getting considerations especially in light of the fact that the party has never changed leaders while in office in the convention period. However, while

there "is always the danger that a leadership convention will become nothing more than a popularity contest--or more correctly, a contest for the best vote-getter," ³² winnability is not the sole criteria by which leadership candidates are judged.

Leadership selection is more consistent with the Rational-Efficient party model and its emphasis on electoral functions in the major Canadian parties, particularly in the case of the Conservatives.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

¹Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, pp. 142-143.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 141.

⁴Ibid., p. 80.

⁵Mackenzie King, for example, who was selected leader in 1919, had been a member of parliament for less than three years, and his parliamentary experience had occurred nearly a decade before the 1919 convention. Further, he had spent a considerable amount of the eight years since the first of his two successive electoral defeats (1911, 1917) out of the country. King's three rivals had served as members of parliament for a combined total of thirty-nine years and had been in the party's service for over seventy-five years. King's closest competitor was William Fielding who at the time had been a member of parliament for over sixteen years. Ibid., pp. 145, 148.

⁶Ibid., p. 148.

⁷Norman Ward, "The Liberals in Convention," in Party Politics in Canada, (2nd ed.), Hugh Thorburn ed., (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1967), p. 96. Between 1921 and 1970 at least one third of Liberal ministers were recruited into cabinet having served less than one year in the House of Commons; over half of the Liberal ministers had served fewer than five years in parliament when first appointed to cabinet. Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, pp. 157-158.

⁸Of the eighteen Canadian Prime Ministers, only two provincial premiers, Sir John Thompson and Sir Charles Tupper, have ever made it to the summit of federal power. Despite this record, provincial premiers remain popular candidates in Conservative leadership conventions. Although both declined to enter the 1983 Conservative leadership race, Alberta premier Peter Lougheed and Ontario premier William Davis were widely

courted to declare their candidacies. Media and party attention focused almost exclusively on these two non-candidates until they announced their decisions not to enter the race.

⁹Mulroney successfully won a seat in a by-election in the riding of Central Nova. Stanfield (1967) and Drew (1948) also successfully secured seats in by-elections. Bracken (1942) waited until the 1945 general election before successfully running for parliament. However, when Arthur Meighen was asked to head the party in 1941 he resigned from the Senate to run in a by-election and, against all expectations, was defeated by C.C.F. candidate J. W. Noseworthy.

¹⁰Lederle, "The Liberal Convention of 1919," 92 (emphasis added).

¹¹Martin et al., op. cit., p. 196.

¹²Wearing, "A Convention for Professionals," 9.

¹³Dawson, op. cit., p. 463.

¹⁴R. M. Punnett, "Selection of Party Leaders: A Canadian Example," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 7 (March 1970), 65. Perlin cites three possible motivations accounting for voting on the basis of a candidate's vote-getting potential: 1) the delegate hoped to achieve some policy goal; 2) the delegate sought some patronage reward; 3) the delegate was committed to the party and wanted it to succeed in its organizational purposes. Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, p. 161.

¹⁵Courtney, "The Morning After," 9.

¹⁶Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders, p. 158.

¹⁷Martin et al., op. cit., p. 187.

¹⁸Desmond Morton, "Mulroney's win: Tories imitated the Liberal formula," Toronto Star (June 14, 1983).

¹⁹George Perlin, "Did the Best Candidate Win? A Comment on Levesque's Analysis," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 16 (December 1983), 793n.

²⁰Martin et al., op. cit., p. 207.

²¹"New leader must defeat Turner, Mulroney says," Toronto Star (May 25, 1983).

²²CP, "Canadians want substance in next PM, say analysts," The Spectator (March 13, 1984). Similarly, a 1968 national survey found that when voters were asked what party aspect was the most important factor in their voting choice, forty-two per cent said it was the party leader. Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, pp. 113-114.

²³Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, p. 171.

²⁴Martin et al., op. cit., p. 238.

²⁵Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, p. 96.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 161-163.

²⁷Ibid., p. 163.

²⁸Martin et al., op. cit., p. 203.

²⁹Ibid., p. 248n.

³⁰Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, p. 153.

³¹For a discussion of delegate voting behaviour see, for example, Krause and LeDuc, op. cit.; LeDuc, op. cit.; and Perlin, The Tory Syndrome, pp. 133-189.

³²Wearing, "A Convention for Professionals," 12.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has investigated some of the factors which facilitate and restrict internal party democracy in the leadership selection process of the two major Canadian parties. While many of the conclusions presented herein have already been drawn or implied, it remains necessary to bring these together to provide the reader with a more precise picture.

Our examination of leadership selection in the Liberal and Conservative parties has been guided by two polar-opposite theoretical party models: the Rational-Efficient party which is primarily concerned with its electoral function, and the Party Democracy party which stresses the importance of intra-party democracy. From the perspective of the Rational Efficient model, the Liberals and Conservatives (as cadre-style parties) should be viewed as essentially electoral-competitive organizations who do not always rigidly adhere to democratic principles in the selection of their leaders.

Our analysis revealed several factors which serve to frustrate or restrict internal party democracy in the selection of party leaders. A significant minority of the

convention delegates remain outside the selection process being granted automatic ex officio or at-large delegate status. On the whole, delegates are generally unrepresentative of the party membership and identifiers. Open constituency elections, the foundation of mass party representation and participation have been increasingly threatened by leadership candidates' attempts to pack (and thereby control) selection meetings for the purpose of electing slates of committed delegates. Other constituency organizations are dominated by their executives. More recently, delegate status granted to various youth groups has resulted, arguably, in the creation of a new elite status group in leadership selection politics. In terms of the actual convention balloting, delegates are subjected to manipulation in the form of sophisticated persuasion techniques utilized by the candidates. Beyond the leadership convention, the extra-parliamentary membership's opportunity to evaluate its leadership is infrequent. Thus, glaring problems in terms of openness, representation and control persist in both parties.

In most cases, the net effect of a leadership campaign and convention for the party involved is a substantial increase in opinion poll support. Punnett observes:

The campaign before the Convention, and then the eminently newsworthy Convention itself, focus political interest upon the party and the leadership contenders to a much greater

extent than if the choice were made by a somewhat less flamboyant process. This can provide a boost for the party's electoral prospects. ¹

The convention process, therefore, provides an excellent opportunity for the parties to display their political wares. According to the C.B.C., over fourteen million people heard or saw part of the seven hours of broadcasting of the last day of the 1968 Liberal leadership convention. ² Subsequently, as Smiley notes:

The extensive reportage of the convention and the candidate campaigns preceeding it allow the party almost to monopolize public attention and push its competitors for the moment off the political stage. ³

Because the leader is the parties' most visible electoral commodity, both the Liberals and Conservatives attempt to extract the maximum amount of electoral benefits that a leadership convention can bestow. For example, Ward argues that the 1958 Liberal leadership convention was designed to "look as democratic as possible." ⁴

The importance of electoral considerations is also evident in the type of leaders selected. Delegates place considerable emphasis on the winnability potential of prospective leaders, a factor particularly evident in the Conservative party. Leaders are frequently recruited from outside party parliamentary ranks and are not always required to serve political apprenticeships, at least in federal politics.

To categorically classify the two major Canadian political parties as Rational-Efficient, however, is neither complete nor consistent. While they may not be overly concerned with party democracy, they are not anti-intra-party democracy organizations merely operating behind a democratic facade. This is not to imply rank-and-file control; rather, it indicates that these parties are more than electoral machines. Punnett argues that although leadership conventions may not entirely, "eliminate claims that the party hierarchy manipulates the selection process and imposes a certain candidate upon the party, it does weaken the credibility of such accusations by making it more difficult for this to happen." 5

Our analysis revealed several factors which serve to facilitate intra-party democracy. Larger and more open conventions have widened the circle of political activists involved in leadership selection. The delegate apportionment formula guarantees that the various groups composing the parties (e.g., women, youth) will be accorded representation at the convention. While ex officio and at-large representation grants automatic delegate status to a significant minority of the official party wings, the majority of representation is granted to the individual constituencies. The autonomy of the individual delegate is safeguarded by

secret ballot voting and the relative inability and/or reluctance of provincial and party leaders to deliver blocs of votes. Similarly, candidates who attempt to transfer their ballot support to other candidates as voting proceeds are largely unsuccessful. The large fields of candidates in recent conventions and the corresponding increase in multiple ballots also indicates a degree of openness in the selection process. Finally, the party membership is also provided the periodic opportunity to evaluate its leadership by virtue of constitutional review provisions.

Although the importance of electoral considerations is evident in delegate voting behaviour and should not be understated, winnability is but one of a plethora of factors influencing voting preference. Perlin argues that, in the case of the Conservative party, delegate decisions are influenced by a complex array of factors:

Among these factors are other issues of various kinds, a social cleavage within the party between people who are close to the socio-economic centres of power in Canada and those who feel remote from the centres of power, emotional responses to the personalities of candidates and emotional ties built through networks of personal friendships within the party, regional loyalties and perceptions of regional interest, and the desire to find a leader who can win or who might satisfy delegate aspirations for personal political rewards. 6

Although parliamentarians and other party notables remain very influential in leadership selection politics,

the total picture does not confirm the iron law of oligarchy. The long term pattern of leadership selection has been away from control by caucus and toward selection by a body more inclusive of the many interests which make up the parties, a process made complete during the struggle over Diefenbaker's leadership in the mid-1960's. The large number of candidates, their extensive campaigns for delegate support prior to and at the convention, and the breakup of the old party hierarchies has helped ensure that the process of leadership selection is more democratic. Both parties, however, should consider reforms in organization and modus operandi. The regulation of candidate organizational tactics is imperative.

Thus, the evidence presented suggests that leadership selection in the Liberal and Conservative parties is better understood in terms of complex patterns of mutual (though varying) influence between the government parties and the membership organizations, a situation more attune to Eldersveld's stararchy model. Power, therefore, is dispersed amongst the various elements which make up the parties. The essentially extra-parliamentary nature of leadership selection, as Smiley argues, is more characteristic of a mass membership party. Participation, however, remains intermittent; at other times the parties revert back to cadre-style characteristics.

The general shift to intra-extra-parliamentary co-determination in the selection of party leaders illustrates that some importance is attributed to intra-party democracy, at least in this aspect of internal party organization. Leadership conventions, therefore, should be understood as more than mere theatrical events staged for the electoral benefit of the parliamentary party. Courtney argues:

That conventions provide an opportunity to unite and to enthuse party supporters for campaigning purposes, as well as to generate widespread and positive interest in their particular party, its policies and its leaders, is an extra bonus for which the party organizers and professional politicians are only too thankful. 7

Although operating within a democratic system, political realities make meaningful participation difficult, if not impossible, to always achieve. Nonetheless, parties must allow for active participation in party outputs which will satisfy the membership, a process requiring the sharing of decision-making authority as well as dealing with electoral functions. One system, based on the American model, may be a nationwide system of open primary contests. A series of primaries co-ordinated by province or region would allow more Canadians a meaningful role in the task of leadership selection.

NOTES TO CONCLUSION

¹Punnett, op. cit., 65 (emphasis added).

²Smiley, op. cit., p. 183n.

³Ibid., p. 187.

⁴Ward, op. cit., p. 98.

⁵Punnett, op. cit., 64.

⁶Perlin, "A Century of Picking Leaders Progressively."

⁷Courtney, The Selection of National Party Leaders,
p. 235.

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