Freedom: Contesting a Concept's Content?
FREEDOM: CONTESTING A CONCEPT'S CONTENT?

By

CHRISTOPHER JOHN NOCK, B.A.

A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University
May 1984
MASTER OF ARTS (1984)  
(Political Science)  
MOMASTER UNIVERSITY  
Hamilton, Ontario  

TITLE: Freedom: Contesting a Concept's Content?  
AUTHOR: Christopher John Nock, B.A. (University of East Anglia)  
SUPERVISOR: Professor J. W. Seaman  
NUMBER OF PAGES: 1, 126.
Abstract

The liberal notion of freedom, that the individual has a right to pursue his own self-ascribed interests in his own way, is an intuitively appealing account of political freedom. On a theoretical level, however, this notion of freedom has traditionally been linked with justifications of capitalist market relations. These relations have themselves persistently been criticised by humanist theorists who have argued that they entail coercion and are "dehumanising". In their turn, humanist positions have consistently been criticised by liberals for opening up the possibility of coercion in the name of freedom. This raises the immediate question of whether liberals and humanists appeal to similar or substantially different notions of freedom in their arguments for and against capitalism.

In addressing this question this thesis raises a number of important theoretical issues. Through an examination of Lockean liberalism it is argued that there is, in fact, no necessary link between the liberal notion of freedom and the justification of capitalist appropriation. Indeed, it is argued that this notion of freedom could be used as a foundation for arguing in support of and justifying other forms of appropriation. Via a consideration of Marx's critique of capitalism it is argued that the concept of freedom that can be drawn out from this can be understood to be compatible with the liberal concept. By considering Marcuse's critique of advanced industrial society it is argued that it is only under certain conditions that humanist positions tend to justify coercion in the name of freedom.

Through a consideration of the compatibility between the liberal
notion of freedom and that which is drawn out of Marx's critique of the capitalist mode of production, it is suggested that it would be possible to launch a critique of contemporary capitalism from the foundation provided by the liberal premise that the individual has a right to pursue his own self-ascribed interests in his own way. Finally, pointers are provided to the form that such a critique could take.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Professor J. W. Seaman for his invaluable comments, constructive criticisms and for coercing me for my own good. I would also thank Professor M. Goldstein and Professor D. Novak for their help in raising concerns that have aided the focusing of this work.
# Table of Contents

1. Introduction 1
2. Liberal Freedom 14
3. Humanist Freedom 54
4. Comparing the Candidates 90
5. Conclusion 118
Selected Bibliography 123
Chapter One: Introduction

The concept of freedom has secured a central role in western political thought. In contemporary liberal democracies much skilful rhetoric is aimed at realising certain socio-economic policies by claiming that they will enhance, or at least maintain, existing political freedom. Such appeals are invariably made to a dominant "liberal" notion of freedom which considers the individual to have a right to pursue his own good in his own way. In much contemporary political theory there has tended to be a consistent link between this notion of freedom and justifications of capitalist market relations. Many contemporary "liberal" theorists have maintained that the "free" market, by allowing economic organisation without coercion, is an essential ingredient in the attainment of freedom per se.¹

In response to the liberal tradition there has developed extensive bodies of literature which have sought to show that capitalist market relations are, in fact, both coercive and "inhuman". The most sustained contemporary critiques of this type have their roots, at least in part, in Marx's critique of liberal political economy. However, the development of capitalism, with the apparent disappearance of a potentially revolutionary proletariat, has lead many contemporary critics to play down Marx's insistence that capitalism must, of necessity, collapse. Indeed, in recent years there has been a growing tendancy to re-emphasise the humanism of Marx's early works. Generally, the critiques of capitalism that have arisen from this have sought to show that this mode of production is inimical to men's freedom since it denies them the fulfilment of their essential humanity.

¹
Such critiques are invariably underpinned by a concept of human nature which allows the theorist to identify certain interests as representing men's "real", "authentic" or "human" interests. Through an examination of capitalist market relations the theorist is then drawn to the conclusion that these are not conducive to the realisation of such interests. In their turn, humanist arguments of this type are continually criticised by liberal theorists for opening up the possibility of coercion in the name of "freedom". It is argued that a group successful in attaining political power could see itself justified in pursuing socio-economic policies that go against the express wishes of the majority, nevertheless believing themselves to be acting in men's "real" interests.

In the conflict between liberals and humanists constant appeal is made to the notion of "freedom". Liberals consistently appeal to the notion that the individual has a right to pursue his own good in his own way. Humanist positions have tended to embrace such notions as "autonomy", "self-mastery" or "individual sponteneity". At first sight, the idea that the individual has a right to govern his own life in his own way and the notion of being one's own master or of being autonomous seem merely two ways of saying the same thing. However, in contemporary political theory the first has tended to give rise to one concept of freedom which claims that freedom consists in the individual pursuing his own self-ascribed interests in his own way, whilst the second has tended to give rise to a different concept which claims freedom consists in man living in accordance with his "real" interests.

The following chapters will seek to explore the apparent common basis between these two concepts and to consider why, in contemporary literature, liberalism and humanism have come to embrace divergent concepts of freedom.
The aim will be to show that in their classical statements the concept of freedom underpinning the liberal justification of capitalism and that underpinning Marx's critique of capitalism were, in fact, compatible. Beyond this, the aim will be to consider why this compatibility has disappeared in contemporary political theory.

Chapter two will focus upon the notion of freedom that has traditionally been employed in liberal justifications of capitalism. This will be carried out, initially, through an examination of the contentions concerning property that appear in Locke's Second Treatise. Whilst, in recent years, there has been some doubt cast upon the view that Locke intended his argument as a justification of nascent capitalism, it remains true that his position does present arguments which seek to establish that men have a right to privately appropriate unlimited amounts of land and other means of production. Such a right is an essential cornerstone of the capitalist mode of production.

In his contentions Locke argued from an initial premise that men have a natural equal right to govern their own lives in their own way. He then argued that this right would have given men, in a state of nature, an original equal claim to land and other natural materials. Locke then sought to argue that this equality of right and claim could be extended into a right of unlimited private appropriation. The aim of chapter two's analysis of Locke will be to consider whether he adequately showed that there was a compatibility between the equality of right premise and the right of unlimited private appropriation which, if acted upon, could lead to a situation where a minority who had come to own all land and other means of production could coerce the non-owning majority.
It will be argued that the legitimacy of such property relations, within the Lockean framework, would be possible if and only if it could be shown that men do, or at least it can be reasonably assumed that they would consent to unlimited private appropriation. This will lead to an examination of a number of arguments that can be drawn out of the Second Treatise in which Locke appears to have claimed that the right of unlimited private appropriation could be seen to be compatible with his equality of right premise. It will be suggested that these arguments can be seen to divide into two catagories.

The first of these catagories, it will be suggested, is made up of two explicit arguments which seek to show that men do consent to unlimited private appropriation and an implicit argument which seeks to show that men, given their empirically verifiable interests, would consent. The second catagory consists of an implicit argument in which Locke appears to claim that men should consent to unlimited private appropriation. In examining these arguments the aim will be to show that Locke's contentions reveal themselves to be underpinned by an assertion, if rudimentary and underdefined, that men exhibit bourgeois inclinations, that is, they are desirers of increasing amounts of material well-being. It will be suggested that Locke contended that men do/would consent to unlimited private appropriation because this promotes greater productivity within society. It will be suggested further that, at points, his argument also appears to contain the normative assertion that men should consent to unlimited private appropriation in light of these benefits.

It will be argued that these two distinct types of claim, firstly, the empirical claim that men do/would consent to unlimited private appropriation, and secondly, the normative claim that men should consent, allow
two concepts of freedom to be drawn out from Locke's contentions. Both of these concepts are founded upon the equality of right premise. Further, both contain—at least, rudimentary—assertions that men have bourgeois inclinations. In the first concept of freedom, the claim that men have bourgeois inclinations is founded upon the empirical claims that appear in the arguments that seek to show that men do/would consent to unlimited private appropriation. This will be called the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" content of the concept of freedom. The second content of the concept of freedom links the equality of right premise to the normative claim that men should be bourgeois. This will be labelled the "liberal-bourgeois-normative" content of the concept of freedom.

In the process of identifying these contents of the concept of freedom the further task will be to consider which provides the most convincing account of the compatibility between the equality of right premise and the right of unlimited private appropriation. It will be argued that the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" content could be used, under certain conditions, to show such compatibility exists. However, the arguments that appear in the Second Treatise by which Locke seems to have claimed this compatibility existed since men do/would consent are unconvincing. It will be argued further that the "liberal-bourgeois-normative" content would involve the Lockean position in an irresolvable contradiction. Since the equality of right premise demands that the individual be left to define his own interests, the claim that men "should" act in a certain way would have to be disqualified as illegitimate.

In light of this consideration of Locke it will be argued that to justify unlimited private appropriation and hence capitalism, on the basis
of the equality of right premise, the Lockean liberal would be required to show that men do or at least, given their empirically verifiable interests would consent to it. Having shown the inadequacies of Locke's arguments that can be drawn out of the *Second-Treatise* by which he seems to have claimed that men do/would consent, this perspective—that the Lockean liberal must show that men do/would consent—will be used to examine a contemporary Lockean liberal position which seeks to launch a defence of capitalism on the basis of the equality of right premise.

This position will be drawn out from Nozick's *Anarchy, State and Utopia*. This work has been extremely influential since its publication and is of particular importance since it addresses many of the problems that will have been highlighted in Locke's attempt to extend the equality of right premise into a right of unlimited private appropriation. It will be argued that Nozick's argument is ambiguous at an essential point and this leaves his position open to two lines of interpretation. On the first of these, it is to be suggested, Nozick's position could be taken as offering an adequate Lockean liberal justification of capitalism. On the second line of interpretation, his position would be open to attack for weakening the very foundation of Lockean liberalism.

In the concluding section of this chapter it will be noted that there are a number of potential weaknesses that attend the link between the liberal equality of right premise with a right of unlimited private appropriation. It will be suggested that to sustain this link the liberal would be required to show either that the individual does consent to capitalist appropriation—that the individual can withdraw his "consent"—or that the individual expresses an interest which the capitalist mode of production best satisfies from
which it may be inferred that he would consent.

In chapter three the aim will be to examine the general form of the two concepts of freedom that will be drawn out from a consideration of two humanist critiques of capitalism that are to be examined. The two humanist positions to be examined both embrace the notion that men have interests that are not met in the capitalist mode of production. The point of reference for this analysis will be to consider whether such positions necessarily result in the view that men must be forced to be free, which I shall call the "freedom is coercion" paradox. Since the most sustained contemporary humanist literature has appeared in the Marxist-humanist tradition which has its roots in Marx's use of the concept of alienation that appears in the *Early Writings*, initial consideration will be given to the arguments that appear in this collection of Marx's early works.

It will be suggested that there are, in fact, two levels of critique of capitalism that appear in these works. It will be argued that in his direct critique of Smith's political economy, Marx based his contentions solely upon premises which can be seen to be compatible with those that Smith, himself, had employed. Because of this, it is to be suggested, Marx was able to show that the capitalist mode of production was coercive and not conducive to self-directed activity, without having to appeal to a notion of "real" interests. This will lead into a consideration of the second level of critique that appears in the *Early Writings*. This appears in Marx's use of the concept of alienation. It will be noted that Marx identified four aspects of alienation that he considered to be inherent in the capitalist mode of production.

Through an examination of these four aspects of alienation it will be argued that the first two—man's alienation from the products of labour and
his alienation from the productive process—reveal a concern with the lack of men's ability to control their own activity in the capitalist mode of production. This, it is to be suggested, is a concern it would be legitimate to raise within the liberal framework unless it could be shown that men do/ would consent to give control over their own activity. The second two aspects of alienation—man's alienation from his species-being and his alienation from other men—it will be argued, reveal that Marx was committed to a concept of human nature which implied a distinction between men's "perceived" and "real" interests.

This will lead into a consideration of whether Marx's position does, in fact, fall into the "freedom is coercion" paradox. It will be argued, in light of contentions that appear in Marx's latter works, that he considered it to be an empirical fact that the increasing complexity of industrial production was demanding increased socialization of the productive process. Further, it will be argued that he considered this to be giving rise to increased working class solidarity. Thus, he considered it to be an empirical fact that the capitalist mode of production was generating a development of man's social nature. It will be argued further that, for Marx, the development of a communist mode of production would be a necessary consequence of the internal contradictions of capitalism.

In light of this, it will be suggested that Marx was not seeking to tell men that they "should" act in accordance with their social nature, but was informing men that the necessary development of capitalism would dictate that they would have to. Thus, it will be argued that the concept of freedom that can be drawn out of the works that appear in the *Early Writings*—which reappears throughout Marx's works—is not incompatible with the liberal
equality of right premise. If men come to act as "associated producers" of their own accord, even if it is the circumstances of material life that dictates this, then in liberal terminology, this would be because they consider this to be in their self-ascribed interests. Since the equality of right premise demands that men have a right to pursue their own good in their own way, it will be argued that a choice to act as "associated producers" would have to be allowed in the liberal framework. Thus it will be suggested that Marx's position embraces a notion of freedom which has an underlying liberal concern with men's ability to direct their own activities which is linked to empirical claims that men are developing and will continue to develop interests beyond those that they have in capitalism. This I shall call the "liberal-development-empirical" content of the concept of freedom.

Attention will then be shifted to the analysis of a contemporary Marxist-humanist position which has sought to deal directly with the problems that appear in the Marxist framework with the apparent disappearance of a potentially revolutionary proletariat in advanced industrial societies. Marcuse's works have been chosen for this analysis since his contentions are specifically directed at these problems. It will be argued that in attempting to overcome these problems Marcuse was forced to argue that men "should" act in their "real" interests and must be forced to be free. It will be argued that since Marcuse's position does fall into the "freedom is coercion" paradox, it is open to the standard liberal critique of humanist positions. Thus, whilst many of Marcuse's arguments reveal a concern with men's inability to be self-directed in the capitalist mode of production—essentially a liberal concern—his normative assertion that men "should" act in accordance with their "real" interests makes his position incompatible with the liberal
equality of right premise. It will be suggested that Marcuse's position embraces a "liberal-developmental-normative" content of the concept of freedom.

In the concluding section of this chapter a comparison of the essential features of Marx's and Marcuse's positions will be offered. This will seek to show why Marcuse's position falls into the "freedom is coercion" paradox whilst Marx's does not.

Chapter four will seek to analyse the areas of similarity and divergence between the four contents of the concept of freedom developed in the previous chapters. Initially, Berlin's distinction between "negative" and "positive" liberty will be considered. This, it will be argued, is inadequate to the task of providing a meaningful account of the four contents that have been identified. It will be suggested that Berlin's division accounts for only two of the four possible candidates for the concept of freedom developed. This will lead into the development of a more suitable framework for comparison.

This framework will be drawn out from a consideration of the claim put forward by Steven Lukes among others that concepts such as "freedom" are "essentially contested". It will be argued that, on Lukes' general understanding of essential contestability, all four notions of freedom identified must be considered to be possible candidates for the same concept. It will be argued that this is an unconvincing claim. It will be suggested that, in fact, the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" content and the "liberal-developmental-empirical" can be considered to compete for one general concept of freedom whilst, the "liberal-bourgeois-normative" and the "liberal-developmental-normative" can be considered to be competitors for a second general concept.
The first pairing, it is to be suggested, contest for a general concept which considers freedom to be living in accordance with one's self-ascribed interests. The second pairing, it will be suggested, can be seen to contest for a general concept which considers freedom to be living in accordance with one's "real" interests.

It will then be argued that the second of these general concepts is a politically dangerous concept since it opens up the possibility of coercion in the name of freedom. This being the case, it is the first general framework that offers the most attractive account of political freedom. It will be argued that the employment of this general concept limits the range of claims concerning men's interests that it is legitimate for theorists concerned with political freedom to make in their arguments for and against capitalism. In using the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" content of this concept to argue in support of capitalism, it would be necessary to show that men do/would consent to this mode of production since they consider the benefits that accrue from it to accord with their own self-ascribed interests. In employing the "liberal-developmental-empirical" content of this concept to criticise this mode of production, the theorist would be required to show that the interests he claims men have—whose non-satisfaction leads him to criticise capitalism—accord with men's self-ascribed interests, or at least are interests that men are developing and whose development will lead men to come to consider capitalism to be inimical to their self-ascribed interests.

It will then be suggested that the specific employment of the "liberal" equality of right premise in the development of a critique of contemporary capitalism would enable the critic to side-step the the potentially politically dangerous implications of the claim that men "should" act in their "real"
interests which are apparent in many contemporary humanist positions. To develop a legitimate critique on the basis of this premise, the critic would need to address the express or emerging interests men have in actuality and not to a supposed set of "real" interests that the theorist claims that men "should" seek to realise. Finally, this chapter will offer some pointers to the form that a "liberal" critique of contemporary capitalism might take.

In the concluding chapter the main themes of the work will be drawn together. It will be suggested that the development of a critique of contemporary capitalism, based on the equality of right premise, would require the undertaking of empirical research into the interests—actual or emerging—that men express in actuality. Further, it will be suggested that it would require the development of a well articulated alternative to contemporary capitalism in which the aim would be to show how express interests could be better satisfied with restructuring of their productive endeavours. Finally, it will be suggested that the development of such a critique would aid in the articulation of an alternative which would bear more relevance to the lives of those men whose action/support is sought to alter the process of production than is often apparent in those positions which talk in terms of men's "real" interests.
Notes


3. See ibid., pp. 237-238. Berlin notes this common basis but, as will be seen later, directs his analysis to the divergent development of what he calls the "positive" and "negative" concepts of freedom.

Chapter Two: Liberal Freedom

I Introduction

It is the purpose of this chapter to consider the two concepts of freedom that can be drawn out from Locke's justification of the right of unlimited private appropriation and a contemporary Lockean position which seeks to defend capitalism. To this end, initial consideration will be given to the contentions concerning property that appear in Locke's Second Treatise. The essential point of reference for this analysis will be Locke's founding premise that men have a natural equal right to live their lives free from the arbitrary wills of others. The aim will be to consider whether Locke adequately showed there to be a compatibility between this premise and a right of unlimited private appropriation which, if acted upon, could lead to a situation where a minority, who had come to own all land and other means of production, could be in a position to coerce the non-owning majority. It will be argued that, within the Lockean framework, such unequal socio-economic relations would be legitimate if and only if men do or would consent to them.

From this perspective, it will be possible to examine a contemporary Lockean liberal position which seeks to launch a defence of capitalism on the basis of the equality of right premise. This will be drawn from Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia which has been widely influential since its publication. Nozick addresses many of the difficulties that will have been noted in Locke's attempt to extend the equality of right premise into a right of unlimited private appropriation. It will be argued, however, that Nozick's
attempt to launch a defence of capitalism on Lockean principles is ambiguous at an essential point. This leaves his position open to two lines of interpretation. On the first of these, it will be argued, Nozick's position could under certain conditions be taken as offering an adequate Lockean liberal defence of capitalism. On the second line of interpretation his position, it is to be argued, would be open to attack for weakening the very foundation of Lockean liberalism.

The concluding section of the chapter will offer a brief summary of the two concepts of freedom that will have been drawn out from the positions considered and the difficulties that attend either of these being used to defend capitalism.

II  Locke

In the following analysis of Locke's contentions concerning property the aim will be to examine the consistency of his justification of the right of unlimited private appropriation with reference to the requirements set by his initial premise of an equality of right. By highlighting the requirements set by this premise it will be possible to draw out the connections Locke appears to have made or, at least would have been required to make, to show the compatibility between it and the right of unlimited private appropriation. At points this will involve the development of certain connections which Locke seems not to have made explicitly. At these points, the connections that are made will be formulated with reference to the textual evidence.

In recent years there has been much debate between theorists concerning the reasons that lay behind the writing of Locke's Two Treatises. Contemporary literature provides what appears, at first sight, to be two differing strains
of interpretation. Put simply, the first of these, by concentrating upon Locke's contentions concerning property, has tended to present these works and, especially the Second Treatise, as the pinnacle of bourgeois thought generated in nascent capitalism. The second, by concentrating upon Locke's contentions concerning civil government, has argued that the Two Treatises represent a concerted critique of Filmer's attempt to formulate a patriarchal justification of the absolute rights of monarchs. Whilst these two strains of interpretation differ in emphasis they do not necessarily represent competing interpretations.

Indeed, Locke's contentions concerning property must be understood as a major part of his critique of Filmer. Filmer had argued that property rights could only exist within society and were, therefore, to be subject to the absolute rights of the monarch. Locke sought to contest this assertion by showing that property rights could have developed in a state of nature and were, therefore, to be understood to be logically prior to the institution of government.

The contentions of the Second Treatise are underpinned by an initial premise that men have a natural equal right to be free from the arbitrary wills of others. On the basis of this premise Locke argued that the only legitimate way in which one man could become subject to the will of another was through his own freely given consent. Locke argued that this equality of right would originally, in a state of nature, have meant that one man's claim to land and other natural materials would have been as good—or no better—than the claim of another.

However, Locke argued further that there was a legitimate means by which men, in a state of nature, could have fixed exclusive property rights
in limited amounts of land without the express consent of others. He went on to argue that this right of limited private appropriation could be extended into a legitimate right of unlimited private appropriation. It is the purpose of the following analysis to consider if Locke was, in fact, able to show that the right of unlimited private appropriation could be understood to be consistent with his initial equality of right premise.

This will involve the analysis of a number of arguments that appear either explicitly or implicitly in the Second Treatise by which Locke appears to have sought to show the compatibility between the equality of right premise and the right of unlimited private appropriation. It will be suggested that these argument provide evidence to support the view that Locke was aware that a right of unlimited private appropriation would lead to a situation in which some men would have to sell their labour and, thus become subject to the wills of others, in order to provide themselves with the necessities of life. Further, it is also to be suggested that these arguments provide evidence which suggests that Locke had a conception of men as desirers of increasing amounts of material well-being which he considered to be supplied by a system of unlimited private appropriation. That is to say, Locke's arguments which are to be seen as attempting to provide a justification of unlimited private appropriation reveal elements—if implicit and underdefined—of a concept of bourgeois man.

It will be suggested that these arguments divide into two catagories. The first catagory is made up of two explicit arguments that seek to show that men do consent to unlimited private appropriation and an implicit argument which suggests that men would consent to such appropriation because of their bourgeois inclinations. The second catagory consists of an implicit argument
which suggests that Locke considered that men "should" consent to a system of unlimited private appropriation.

It will then be argued that these two categories of argument allow two possible candidates for the concept of freedom to be drawn out from Locke's contentions. Both of these candidates are founded upon the equality of right premise. Further, both contain—at least rudimentary—assertions that men have bourgeois inclinations. In the first candidate, the claim that men have bourgeois inclinations is founded upon the empirical assertions found in the empirical category of arguments mentioned above. This will be called the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" candidate. In the second candidate the equality of right premise seems to have been linked to the notion of bourgeois man by the normative assertion that men "should" be bourgeois. This will be labelled the "liberal-bourgeois-normative" candidate.

In the process of identifying these candidates the further task will be to consider which provides the most convincing account of the compatibility between the equality of right premise and the right of unlimited private appropriation. It will be argued that the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" candidate could be used, under certain conditions, to show such compatibility exists. It will be argued further that the "liberal-bourgeois-normative" candidate would involve the Lockean position in a contradiction. This being the case, it will be suggested that it is the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" candidate which must bear the weight of a Lockean liberal justification of a right of unlimited private appropriation and hence—since such a right is an essential cornerstone of the capitalist mode of production—a Lockean liberal justification of capitalism.

In the early sections of the Second Treatise there appear three claims
by which Locke seems to have sought to establish the equality of right premise. Firstly, he claimed that men's natural equality is self-evident, there being "nothing more evident, than that Creatures of the same species and rank being promiscuously born...should be equal one amongst that other...."  
Secondly, there appears a religious argument that claims that all men must be considered equal unless God, through "evident and clear appointment...." had shown that one should be set above another. Finally, there is a prudential argument which arises in a quote taken from Hooker. This claims that it is prudent to treat others as equals since, "if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should shew greater measure of love to me, than they have by me, shewed unto them...." It is not essential to the contentions of this chapter to establish which of these Locke considered to bear the weight of his founding premise. What is important is that Locke considered himself to have provided adequate grounds for the establishment of that premise.

...[W]e must consider what State all Men are naturally in, and that is, a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and Dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man....  

For Locke, then, men had a natural equal right to be free from the arbitrary wills of others. The only legitimate means by which they could be "put out of this Estate" was through their own freely given consent or by forfeiting their claim to freedom by invading the equal right of others to the same. Insofar as the individual respected the equal right of others, he had a right to pursue his own interests in his own way. This principle has become central to liberal theory—note the similarity with Mill's classic definition of freedom in On Liberty—and its implications are essential to
understanding Locke's justification of the right of unlimited private appropriation.

For Locke, man's natural condition set a need for him to labour, "the Condition of Humane life...requires Labour and Material to work on". Locke argued that the satisfaction of this need resulted necessarily in private appropriation. The equality of right premise provided the basis of a right to appropriate. Equality of right gave rise to an original equal claim to those things that were provided by God that were to serve as the means to men's preservation: "natural Reason...tells us, that Men, being once born, have a right to their Preservation, and consequently to Meat and Drink...".

However, before the materials provided by God could be of any use to any particular man, "there must of necessity be a means to appropriate". Thus, whilst Locke considered these materials to be originally subject to an equal claim by all, he considered it both implausible and impractical that individuals, in a state of nature, would require the express consent of others before appropriating any of these materials for their own use:

> By making an explicit consent of every Commoner, necessary...Children or Servants could not cut the Meat which their Father or Master had provided in common, without assigning to every one his peculiar part.

Locke argued that the equality of claim to materials could be transformed into a natural exclusive property right through an expenditure of the individual's labour:

> Though the Earth,...be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no body has a Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.
In short, to provide themselves with the things necessary for subsistence and the "Conveniences of Life", men have a natural need to privately appropriate. Through an expenditure of labour, considered to be the individual's private property, men in a state of nature, would be naturally entitled to fix exclusive private property rights in those things originally subject to an equal claim by all.

This appropriation was, for Locke, bounded by two provisos. Firstly, private appropriation could be regarded as legitimate insofar as it left enough and as good of the materials in common for others. Secondly, it was valid provided that the things appropriated were not allowed to spoil. The first proviso is to be understood in terms of Locke's concern with maintaining the equality of claim to natural materials which issued from the equality of right premise. The main concern in this chapter's examination of Locke is to consider his justification of a right of unlimited private appropriation—which, if acted upon, could lead to a situation where there would not be enough and as good left in common—and, therefore, the spoilage constraint is not of especial concern here. However, it should be noted that Locke's handling of the spoilage constraint does hint at some of the covert assumptions he made about the differences between men. Locke claimed that a man may appropriate "[a]s much as one can make use of to any advantage of life". Thus the individual is left to judge what counts as an "advantage of life"—which would be demanded by the equality of right premise—and whether to expend his labour in pursuing it. Here, as in other passages concerning property, Locke suggests that some men would seek greater conveniences of life than others. An individual who sought more than the average would be legitimate in doing so provided that his appropriation did not violate the
enough and as good constraint or lead to spoilage.

However, up to this stage in Locke's argument there would be little point in the individual striving to appropriate much in excess of his own immediate needs. Locke imagined that originally there would have been enough land for all men to labour in their own right. In such a situation, no man would be dependent upon the products of others for his subsistence and conveniences of life. Whilst men may have sought to barter their own excess of a specific product, there would have been no guaranteed market on which to dispose of surplus production. There would have been a great chance of spoilage and the time spent in producing the excess would have been wasted. The spoilage of products would violate Locke's proviso and the waste of effort would, for Locke, have been irrational: "[a]nd indeed it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he could make use of".20

Thus Locke seems to have considered that where all men could labour in their own right, rational men would produce no more than was necessary for their own immediate needs:

This is certain, That in the begining, before the desire of having more than Men needed, had altered the intrinsick value of things...though Men had a Right to appropriate, by their Labour, each one to himself, as much of the things of Nature, as he could use: Yet this could not be much, nor to the Prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still left.... 21

This passage suggests that Locke realised that there would be little room for economic growth where each man was able to labour in his own right. Further, it shows that he also considered men had developed a desire for having more than petite-bourgeois production would allow. Locke considered that it was the introduction of money that allowed production beyond these natural limits to occur and enabled men to satisfy their desire for more than needed.
Money, for Locke, was a human invention that had altered the "intrinsick" value of things. For example, prior to the introduction of money, the value of a piece of land could be measured by its ability to furnish a man with his means to subsistence and the conveniences of life. After the introduction of money, however, any products over and above the individual's immediate needs could be sold and stored in the money form. Locke claimed that this would have stimulated men to increase their possession of land: "Find out something that hath the Use and Value of Money amongst his Neighbours, you shall see the same Man will begin presently to enlarge his Possessions".

Locke left it unclear whether it was the introduction of money that had stimulated the "desire for having more than Men needed" or whether it was this desire that had prompted men to find a way that "a Man might fairly possess more than he himself can use the product of", that is, money. Yet implicit in the textual evidence there appears to be an assertion that Locke considered it rational for men to appropriate unlimitedly after the introduction of money:

What reason could any one have...to enlarge his Possessions beyond the use of his Family...? Where there is not something both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there Men will not be apt to enlarge their Possession of Land... By implication then, once money had been introduced, Locke seems to have seen a reason for men to appropriate unlimitedly.

The introduction of money had altered, for Locke, the limits of private appropriation. However, since he wished to show that private property rights could be understood to be logically prior to the institution of government, he still needed to show that men had a natural right to appro-
priate unlimitedly. To this end, Locke appears to have argued that the right of unlimited private appropriation was a natural progression from the right of limited private appropriation which he had already shown could be considered to be natural. His argument rests on the claim that men, in a state of nature, consented to unlimited private appropriation:

This I dare boldly affirm, That the same Rule of Propriety, (viz.) that every Man should have as much as he could make use of, would still hold in the World, without straitening any body, since there is Land enough in the World to suffice double the Inhabitants had not the Invention of Money, and the tacit Agreement of Men to put a value on it, introduced (by Consent) larger Possessions, and a Right to them; which, how it has done, I shall, by and by, shew more at large. 26

Thus Locke realised that, at least in some parts of the world, the same "Rule of Propriety" no longer applied. He also realised that large scale private appropriation of land placed some men into dependency relations, that is, a situation where they would have to sell—or "alienate"—their labour:

...a Freeman makes himself a Servant to another, by selling him a certain time, the Services he undertakes to do, in exchange for Wages he is to receive...commonly puts him into the family of his Master, and under the ordinary Discipline thereof.... 27

Such a situation could be construed as violating Locke’s equality of right premise which considers the individual to have a right to be free from the arbitrary wills of others and also gives him an original equal claim to the materials provided by God. In order that the unequal socio-economic relations, prompted by the use of money, could be seen to be consistent with the equality of right premise, Locke would be required to show that consent to these inequalities did, or could reasonably be supposed to, exist.

There are two types of argument that commentators and theorists have seen as either implicit or explicit in the Second Treatise by which Locke
appears to have claimed that unequal socio-economic relations could be seen to be consistent with the equality of right premise. These I shall label "empirical" and "normative". These labels are chosen since, in the first type of argument, Locke can be seen as having claimed that men do or, at least would, consent to a system of unlimited private appropriation; in the second, it appears that he may have made a normative claim that men "should" consent to unlimited private appropriation. It is to be suggested that these two categories of argument allow two possible candidates for the concept of freedom to be drawn out from Locke's contentions.

There are three empirical arguments, two explicit and one implicit, that can be drawn out of the *Second Treatise* which Locke seems to have used to support the view that a right of unlimited private appropriation is consistent with the equality of right premise. Whilst these can be seen to overlap at points they deserve separate consideration since they have differing implications for the coherence of Locke's position. The first of these empirical arguments arises from Locke's claim that men in the quasi-historical state of nature tacitly consented to the use of money. For Locke, the very use of money implied a tacit agreement of men to put a value upon it. The continued use of money would, by implication, presuppose a continued tacit consent. Consent to the use of money would include consent to the effects of its use. From this, Locke seems to have implied that it is an empirical fact that men's use of money shows their consent to the socio-economic relations this generates.

The claim that the use of money implies a tacit agreement to put a value upon it can be taken, in part, to be theoretically correct. Presumably, the use of money as a means of exchange could have originally involved a
tacit agreement implied by the mere fact that the individual accepted metals in return for the products of his labour. As such, consent would not need to be express. However, the next stage in Locke's argument is questionable. Original consent to the use of money does not entail, necessarily, that either men consent to its continued use or the effects of its use. If the use of money—and Locke's argument suggests that he considered this to be the case—did prompt the concentration of land and other means of production, then this could have created a situation where the majority became dependent upon a minority of owners for their very survival. Such a consequence may well have been unforeseen at the time of men's original tacit consent. This development of the concentration of land could be construed as a violation of the equality of right premise unless men had a method of withdrawing their "consent" once they came to consider unlimited private appropriation to be inimical to their self-ascribed interests. In short, if the concentration of land prompted by the use of money made men dependent upon the continued use of money in order to survive, their continued use of money would be incapable of representing any intent or disposition on the part of the user in the way Locke seems to have claimed that it could.

The second argument by which Locke is to be understood as having argued that men do consent to unequal socio-economic relations relies upon the validity of a second empirical claim. Locke appears to have considered it an adequate sign of a person's consent to unequal socio-economic relations if that person accepted the benefits—increased productivity—stimulated by such relations:

The difficulty is, what ought to be Look'd upon as tacit Consent, and how far it binds, i.e. how far one shall be looked on to have consented, where one has made no
Expression of it at all. And to this I say, that every Man, that have Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of any Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent, and is as far forth obliged to Obedience of the Laws of that Government....

The weakness of this argument, as Simmons points out, is that it involves the judgement of an external observer, in this case Locke, in assessing the intentions of the individual who receives the benefits of the socio-economic system in which he happens to reside. If this were allowed, it would lead to the unconvincing view that the individual could give binding consent unintentionally. Whatever reasons an individual might have for accepting those benefits—more often than not, survival—his continued residence could not be taken as expressing unequivocable support unless there were an adequate method of withdrawing consent available.

Thus the first two empirical arguments that can be drawn out of the Second Treatise to support the view that the right of unlimited private appropriation can be considered to be compatible with the equality of right premise require, if they are to be at all convincing, that the individual has a method of withdrawing consent open to him. In fact, Locke did suggest that there was such a means available for those dissatisfied with labouring for wages. He maintained that the free lands of America offered such men the opportunity to labour in their own right. Thus, it could be supposed that those who failed to take up this opportunity could be construed as consenting to the effects of the use of money.

Some theorists, for example, Simmons, have seen the question as being one of whether America could be construed as offering a reasonable means of withdrawing consent. It has been argued that, in fact, the taking of a dangerous boat trip to an often hostile land, leaving behind loved ones,
cannot be construed as being adequate to the task. That is, this method of withdrawing consent must be considered too costly to offer a real means of determining that those who do not take up the opportunity continue to consent to the effects of the use of money.

This criticism does, however, have its own weaknesses. If Locke were to offer a subsidised trip to America that made the cost of withdrawing consent reasonable, then his position could be saved quite readily. This strategy, which was possible in Locke's day, would have made his consent argument more solid. However, there are no longer adequate amounts of free land available in America or elsewhere to make this proposition viable today. Thus, at least until outer space becomes habitable, this strategy is academic. What should not be overlooked, however, is that where men do have an adequate alternative open to them: their continued residence in a society that embraces a system of unlimited private appropriation might be taken as a legitimate sign of their consent.

It should be noted that from the structure of this argument Locke would not have needed to make any assumptions concerning men's interests. Men would be free to consent or not to consent to unlimited private appropriation for whatever reasons they might have. However, to make an argument that men do consent would have involved, presumably, a consideration of why they do. It has already been shown that the textual evidence suggests that Locke had some understanding that a system of unlimited private appropriation stimulated greater productivity than a petite-bourgeois system and, that he considered men to have a desire for more than a system of limited private appropriation would allow. It is these considerations which allow a third empirical argument to be drawn out of the Second Treatise that Locke may have considered to be
adequate to the task of maintaining that a right of unlimited private appropriation was compatible with his equality of right premise.

The third empirical argument takes a different form than the first two. This does not claim that it is an empirical fact that men do consent to unlimited private appropriation but that, given their empirically verifiable interests, they would consent. Locke appears to make such an instrumental argument. He appears to imply that since men have an interest in increasing levels of material well-being, it could be supposed that rational men would consent to the instruments—a system of unlimited private appropriation—that would best enable them to achieve this end.

Locke considered men to have a desire for "more than...needed". Thus, as Seaman has argued, he could have readily assumed that rational men—defined in terms of setting means to ends—would consent to those institutions that would allow them to appropriate beyond the limits of consumption and barter. Even those who ended up without owning land or other means of production could be assumed to consent since the benefits were obvious:

There cannot be any clearer demonstration of anything, than several Nations of the Americans are...rich in Land and poor in all the Comforts of Life...for want of improving it by labour, (they) have not one hundredth part of the Conveniences we enjoy: And a King of a large fruitful Territory there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day Labourer in England. 34

Locke's claim that men, in a state of nature, did consent to the use of money could, then, be seen as a claim about what rational men would consent to given their desire for more than a petite-bourgeois economy would allow.

Such an argument, if—which the textual evidence suggests—Locke did intend to make it, would have its own weaknesses. Firstly, even if Locke were correct that men do exhibit an overriding interest in promoting productivity,
it does not follow necessarily that a system of unlimited private appropriation would promote the greatest productive forces within a society. Were it able to be shown that a different system of appropriation would promote greater forces, an assertion that men would consent to unlimited private appropriation could be seriously undermined. Secondly, assuming that a system of unlimited private appropriation did promote material benefits in excess of any other system it would still be necessary to show that men do, in actuality, express an overriding interest in increasing wealth above their natural right to enough and as good. Finally, even granting that the Lockean were able to show that men do express an overriding interest in increasing material well-being, it may be the case that men's interests change over time. Unless there were a method of withdrawing consent available which would allow men to reassess their interests at a latter date, the equality of right premise, which demands that the individual be left to define his own interests, would be violated as such a change took place.

The three empirical arguments that can be drawn out of the Second Treatise to support the view that appropriation beyond enough and as good is compatible with the equality of right premise, all embrace a similar candidate for the concept of freedom. This concept is founded upon the equality of right premise which is linked to the empirical claim that men do/would consent to a system of unlimited private appropriation. In each case the reason Locke seems to have given for men consenting is their desire for more than petite-bourgeois production would allow. That is, these arguments seem to be underpinned by a rudimentary concept of bourgeois man. It is this candidate I shall call the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical".

There is however a second type of argument implicit in the Second
Treatise by which Locke may have sought to show that the right of unlimited private appropriation could be considered compatible with the equality of right premise. Locke persistently maintained that the appropriation of land was a reward for men pursuing the rational course of action which was to cultivate the gifts of God. Those who had succeeded in appropriating were, with the introduction of money, able to enlarge their possessions: "[a]nd as different degrees of Industry were apt to give Men Possessions in different Proportions, so this Invention of Money gave them the opportunity to continue to enlarge them!".

With this perspective, Locke could have readily assumed that those who had failed to come to own land—or failed to take up land in America—had only their own lack of rationality and/or moral laxness to blame for the fact that they were now in a situation where they had to sell their labour. Thus, as Macpherson has argued, "[t]he assumption that men are equally capable of shifting for themselves...enabled Locke in good conscience to reconcile the great inequalities he observed in society with the postulated equality of right". Once unlimited private appropriation had accounted for all available land—at least in England—those who failed to take up the opportunity of land in America and remained to sell their labour would not be "in a position to expend their labour improving the gifts of nature". Such men, the labourers in civil society, could not "raise (their) thoughts above" the process of staying alive for they lived "hand to mouth". They could be considered to be "biassed in their Interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it".

It could, therefore, have been easy for Locke to conclude that such men could not be considered to consent to the inequalities generated by the
use of money. It may have been the case that Locke considered such men unable to realise that unlimited private appropriation was, in some sense, in their "real" interests. Locke undoubtedly considered that they benefitted from the increased productivity of unlimited private appropriation: "[a]nd a King of a large fruitful Territory there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day 40 Labourer in England". Perhaps Locke believed that these men could not reason that they benefitted from the inequalities of their situation. However, it could be supposed that if they were to become rational, they would consent.

This is the weakest argument that can be drawn out of the Second Treatise by which Locke may have sought to maintain that the right of unlimited private appropriation was consistent with the equality of right premise. If it was Locke's intention to argue in this way—which might be the case since he considered that only property owners had the right to rebel—it would seem that he would have been guilty of an inconsistency. The equality of right premise demands that the individual be left to define his own interests. Locke would have violated this premise if he did intend to claim that some men are ignorant of their "real" interests.

The implicit assertion that some men are ignorant of their "real" interests allows a second candidate for the concept of freedom to be drawn out from the Second Treatise. This candidate retains the basis of equality of right premise and, as in the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" candidate, also makes the assertion that the benefits of increased productivity—stimulated by unlimited private appropriation—are in men's interests. However, this second candidate does not claim that men do/would consent to unlimited private appropriation, but relies upon the normative assertion that they "should" consent, that is, that they ought to be bourgeois acquisitors. This candidate
I shall call "liberal-bourgeois-normative".

In light of the foregoing analysis of Locke's justification of the right of unlimited private appropriation, the Lockean liberal who argues in support of socio-economic relations that embrace such a right is required to do one of two things if he is to show their compatibility with the equality of right premise. Either he must show that men do consent to such relations or, at least, show convincingly that given their empirically verifiable interests, they would consent. Unless this can be done it could be forcefully argued that unlimited private appropriation violates the equality of right premise. Such appropriation, unless consented to, would be coercive. It would force men either to sell their labour for wages or to devote their energies to the acquisition of those things that would keep them from becoming wage labourers.

As was noted earlier, Locke's argument that America offered those dissatisfied with labouring for wages a method of withdrawing their consent from unlimited private appropriation, might be construed to have been valid. Whilst such an argument could no longer stand in its original form—since there are no longer adequate amounts of free land—if some viable alternative to a system embracing unlimited private appropriation were offered men, then their continued presence in such a system could be taken as an adequate sign of their consent.

To make a convincing case that capitalist market relations—which embrace a right of unlimited private appropriation—are compatible with the equality of right premise, the Lockean liberal would be required to show that men do/would consent to them. To claim that men "should" consent to such relations since they are in their "real" interests would violate the equality of right premise. This being the case, it is the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical"
candidace for the concept of freedom that must bear the weight of a Lockean liberal justification of capitalism. Either it must be shown that men do consent for whatever reasons they may have which, if the benefits of unlimited private appropriation are claimed to be increased productivity, it can be supposed that the Lockean liberal assumes that men have bourgeois inclinations. Or it must be shown that men are, empirically, desirers of increasing amounts of material well-being and that capitalist appropriation best satisfies this desire.

III Nozick

The foregoing analysis of Locke's contentions concerning property will set the parameters for the following examination of Nozick's defence of capitalism which, he claims, is founded upon the basis of the Lockean liberal equality of right premise. In Anarchy, State and Utopia Nozick seeks to extend the Lockean justification of the right of unlimited private appropriation into a defence of capitalist market relations. Whilst a right of unlimited private appropriation is undoubtedly an essential cornerstone of the capitalist mode of production, on the basis of the equality of right premise, it would be legitimate if and only if it could be shown that men do/would consent to it. Thus the aim in examining Nozick's contentions will be to consider whether he provides an adequate argument for maintaining that appropriation beyond enough and as good is compatible and consistent with the equality of right premise.

Initial attention will be focused upon Nozick's contentions concerning the state of nature. It will be noted that, unlike Locke, Nozick appears to draw no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate appropriations in
this state. This, it will be suggested, opens up an immediate difficulty. Any failure to make such a distinction could render some forms of appropriation acceptable in Nozick's framework that would be illegitimate within Locke's. Thus attention will be shifted to a consideration of Nozick's specific contentions concerning those appropriations beyond enough and as good that he claims are legitimate within the Lockean framework.

It will be suggested that Nozick's handling of how the enough and as good constraint might legitimately be circumvented appears to differ significantly from Locke's. Indeed, Nozick appears to fail to make consent an explicit prerequisite in his attempt to justify unlimited private appropriation. Any failure to make consent a necessary requirement in the legitimation of appropriation beyond enough and as good, it is to be suggested, could leave men free to violate the natural rights of others in a way that would not be legitimate in Locke's framework.

This will lead into an assessment of Nozick's concept of compensation. Nozick claims that all rights violations can be remedied through compensation. Indeed, his justification of appropriation beyond enough and as good and hence, his defence of capitalism, rests on the assertion that those denied enough and as good by the appropriations of others are compensated for the violation of their right to enough and as good they suffer due to these appropriations. It will be noted that Nozick draws a distinction between "market" and "full" compensation. Market compensation is decided prior to any actual rights violation taking place. Thus the individual consents to having his rights violated if and only if he considers the compensation offered to be adequate. This type of compensation, it is to be suggested, can therefore be considered to be compatible with the equality of right premise. However, Nozick's hand-
ling of the notion of full compensation, which is payable to those denied their right to enough and as good and is paid after a rights violation has already occurred, is ambiguous. On the one hand, Nozick's statement of the notion of full compensation suggests that he considers that, for this to be a legitimate method of circumventing the enough and as good proviso, those who have had their rights violated must consent to accept the compensation offered. On the other hand, it will be suggested, Nozick's extended argument on full compensation seems to deny that the consent of the violated party is necessary.

It will be argued that if Nozick's use of the notion of full compensation does embrace the requirement of consent then his position might be taken as offering an adequate Lockean defence of capitalism, provided that men continue to consent. However, if consent is not a necessary factor in the assessment of full compensation, then Nozick's position would be open to attack for weakening the very foundation of the Lockean framework.

Nozick opens Anarchy, State and Utopia with a statement of the Lockean equality of right premise. For Nozick, the operation of the equality of right would, in a state of nature, give rise to competing claims to rights and holdings. Nozick's contentions, however, fail to address the question of the legitimacy of such claims. Locke had argued that, in a state of nature, all men had an original equal claim to natural materials and was specific in attaching limits to the securing of exclusive property rights. Men could only appropriate within the bounds set by his provisos unless consent gave them the right to appropriate beyond enough and as good. Nozick, by failing to address the question of legitimacy, appears to leave open the possibility of appropriation beyond enough and as good being considered legitimate with-
Indeed, Nozick's analysis of the development of civil society from the state of nature appears to rest uneasily between the Lockean and Hobbesian versions. Nozick claims that men would develop competing claims to rights and holdings and, since some men would not respect the claims of others, men would be drawn into groups in order to protect their claims. Nozick calls these groups "mutual protective associations". In time, he argues, men would find it to be in their interests to hand over the protection of their claims to specific agencies charged with the protection of those who subscribe to their services. Nozick claims that through an "invisible-hand" process this would eventually lead to one protective agency becoming dominant within a given territory: "the self-interested and rational actions of person in a Lockean state of nature will lead to a single protective agency becoming dominant within a given geographical territory". The existence of this dominant agency marks, for Nozick, the beginning of civil society.

By leaving open the question of legitimacy of rights and holdings—that is, their compatibility with the equality of right premise—Nozick clouds the issue of whether any appropriation beyond enough and as good, which the dominant protective agency might protect, took place with the consent of those denied their natural right to enough and as good within a given geographical territory. Because of this it is necessary to examine Nozick's specific contentions concerning the Lockean enough and as good proviso.

At the outset of his examination of the Lockean enough and as good proviso, Nozick notes that a standard argument against Locke's justification of the right of unlimited private appropriation is that the enough and as good proviso is violated by this type of appropriation. Thus he sees that it
often argued that, since there are no longer any adequate amounts of free land available, Locke's argument can no longer hold. For Nozick, the argument that property rights would have to be forfeited once no more land is available is an implausible account of the intent behind the Lockean enough and as good proviso. He reasons that if it were the case that the acquisition that took the final piece of land had to be considered illegitimate—for denying others their right to enough and as good—then all acquisitions would have to be considered illegitimate. It is this that lies at the heart of Nozick's "zip-back" analysis. If person Y, by appropriating the last piece of land is understood as having denied Z his right to enough and as good, then person X must be seen as having denied Y and Z their right. This would mean that W's appropriation would have to be deemed illegitimate for having denied X, Y and Z and so on, all the way back to A.

This leads Nozick to reconsider the Lockean enough and as good proviso. He maintains that Locke did not intend for all previous legitimate appropriations—those which occurred within the limits set by Locke's provisos—to become illegitimate once all suitable land had been acquired. He claims that the purpose of this proviso was that it was meant to "ensure that the situation of others is not worsened". That is, provided that those denied enough and as good by the appropriations of others are no worse off than they would be were they still able to appropriate in their own right, then all appropriations that have been made can be considered legitimate.

This does, however, seem to be a strange interpretation of the intent behind Locke's enough and as good proviso. Locke considered this proviso as essential to the maintenance of the equality of right premise. He stressed the importance of consent, either actual or supposed, to the legitimation
of appropriation beyond enough and as good. This was a necessary ingredient in the maintenance of the equality of right premise. Unless Nozick could show that consent does, or could be reasonably supposed to exist then, his interpretation of the circumvention of the enough and as good proviso would rob the Lockean account of the legitimacy of unlimited private appropriation of its essential prerequisite.

In this light, Nozick's claim that the enough and as good proviso is meant to "ensure that the situation of others is not worsened" requires further consideration. In fact, Nozick distinguishes between two ways in which the situation of others could be considered to have been made worse by the appropriations of some men: firstly, "by losing the opportunity to improve his situation by a particular appropriation or any one"; secondly, "[b]y no longer being able to use freely (without appropriation) what he previously could".

Nozick's handling of these notions tends to be obscure. However, he seems to be claiming that the first way the situation of some can be considered to have been made worse by the appropriations of others is where, for example, X's appropriation takes the last piece of suitable land, thereby denying Y and Z access to any land at all in their own right. The second way in which X's appropriation could be considered to worsen the situation for Y and Z is because they would now, potentially, be in a situation where they would have to purchase the right to use the land and other means of production privately held by others. However, in this second sense, Y and Z's situation would only be worse if they did have to pay for access to the means of production. If they did not—hence Nozick's use of the term "freely"—then their situation, Nozick appears to be claiming, need not be construed to
have been made worse.

Nozick claims that a stringent enforcement of the enough and as good proviso would make illegitimate those appropriations that worsened the situation for others in the first sense as well as the second. However, since this would result in the "zip-back" effect, Nozick prefers to consider a weaker requirement, in which only those appropriations which worsen the situation for others in the second sense would be deemed illegitimate, to be more in keeping with the spirit of Locke's enough and as good proviso. Thus, he seems to be claiming that, provided those denied access to land in their own right by the appropriations of others, are allowed "free" access to the land and other means of production these others own, then all appropriations can be considered legitimate.

At least this is what is implied by Nozick's statement of the notion of worsening the situation for others. Yet, in his restatement of this requirement for legitimating appropriation beyond enough and as good, Nozick inexplicably drops the term "freely" and claims that the weaker requirement of the enough and as good proviso demands only that, where Y can no longer appropriate in his own right, "there remains some for him to use as before". This weakened weaker requirement could, therefore, be used to justify a situation where the unlimited private appropriations of others have put Y and Z in a situation where they have to purchase the right to use the means of production privately owned by others. Once again, however, this would only be legitimate within the Lockean framework, if it could be shown that men do/ would consent.

In any event, Nozick asserts that private appropriation beyond enough and as good is legitimate within the Lockean framework provided that those
who can no longer appropriate in their own right find themselves in a situation where they are no worse off. In effect, for Nozick, this means that provided that the situation such people find themselves in provides them with benefits that offset the violation of their natural rights they suffer, then the appropriations of others can be considered to be legitimate. Nozick identifies these benefits as the increased productivity he considers to be stimulated by a system allowing appropriation beyond enough and as good. He claims that such appropriation would only "violate the proviso by making the situation worse than their base line situation...the base line for comparison is so low as compared to the productiveness of a society with private appropriation that the question of the Lockean proviso being violated arises only in the case of a catastrophe". In short, those denied enough and as good are compensated for this violation of their rights by the productivity of a system allowing unlimited private appropriation.

This analysis of the circumvention of the enough and as good proviso does not make consent an explicit prerequisite for the legitimation of appropriation beyond this constraint. Such consent is a necessary prerequisite for making this type of appropriation consistent with the Lockean equality of right premise. Nozick's attempt to justify appropriation beyond 'enough and as good could be valid, however, were he able to show that those denied enough and as good did/would consent to receive the compensation offered—the increased productivity of society—in lieu of the rights violation they suffer. On the basis of the equality of right premise it would be legitimate for men to agree to give up their right to enough and as good in lieu of such compensation. However, it would not be legitimate to force men to accept compensation if they expressed a preference to retain their right to enough and as
good above the increased productivity that may be available in a system embracing a right to unlimited private appropriation. In this light, it is necessary to examine Nozick's notion of compensation to consider whether it does embrace the requirement of consent.

In his treatment of compensation, Nozick distinguishes between two types of compensation:

Full compensation is an amount sufficient, but barely so to make a person afterwards say he's glad, not sorry, it happened; and market compensation is the amount that prior negotiations to get his consent would have fixed upon. 58

For Nozick, as for Locke, the individual may consent to give up part of his rights. If he perceives some benefit to accrue he may consent to having his rights violated in lieu of compensation. For example, a farmer may choose to sell his right to land to a development company. He would do this provided he felt the amount offered, the compensation, adequate. The company would decide, in light of projected profits, an amount it would be willing to pay to acquire the land. If the parties came to an agreement, then the company would acquire the right and, the farmer would have agreed to give up his right, through his voluntary consent. This would be an example of market compensation. Undoubtedly, it is quite easy to see how this type of rights violation is compatible with the equality of right premise. The potentially violated party only enters into a contract and accepts the compensation offered if he considers it adequate. Those contracts that are entered into therefore take place with the explicit consent of both parties.

Unfortunately, the violation of men's right to enough and as good, at least in the case of latecomers, takes place without their prior consent. Nozick maintains that rights violations that take place without the damaged
party's prior consent can be remedied by a system of posterior compensation in which the violated party is entitled to "full" compensation. The essential question is whether such a system of compensation embraces a requirement of consent which would have to be a necessary prerequisite if it were to be seen as compatible with the Lockean equality of right premise.

In his statement of the notion of "full" compensation Nozick claims that it is "an amount sufficient, but barely so, to make a person afterwards say he's glad, not sorry, it happened..." This implies that Nozick's system of posterior compensation could be consistent with the equality of right premise. If men are compensated to a degree which makes them indifferent to the fact that they have had their rights violated and, say they are glad, not sorry, it happened, then Nozick would have grounds on which to claim that they consented, albeit after the violation had occurred. Applying this argument to unlimited private appropriation, Nozick would be required to show that men do in actuality accept the benefits generated by a system of unlimited private appropriation—which he cites as increased productivity—as compensation for the violation of their right to enough and as good. The logistics of such an argument remain unclear. Presumably, as with Locke's arguments that sought to show that men do consent to unlimited private appropriation, Nozick would be required to show that men have some alternative open to them.

If men do not have an alternative to unlimited private appropriation open to them then it could be the case that they are coerced into accepting a system of posterior compensation in order to survive. If Nozick were able to show that such a method of withdrawing consent was available then his position might be taken as offering an adequate Lockean liberal justification
of capitalism. However, Nozick fails to make any convincing case that men do or, under his arrangements, would have such a method open to them. Indeed, at points, Nozick himself suggests that the acceptance of posterior compensation may not represent an adequate sign of men's consent:

> The compensation might encompass paying for the costs of devices to lessen the initial pollution effects. In our example, airlines or airports might pay for soundproofing a house when each of the victims of pollution suffers great costs, the usual system of tort liability (with minor modifications) suffices to yield this result. 61

Rights violations rectified through a system of tort may well remain rights violations that are not consented to. Where the individual has no choice but to accept arbitrated compensation such acceptance could not be taken as offering an adequate sign of their consent.

In his extended analysis of the notion of "full" compensation, Nozick clouds still further the issue of whether he considers consent to be a necessary prerequisite in the legitimation of appropriation beyond enough and as good. This extended analysis takes place within the context of an appraisal of the benefits Nozick contends accrue from a system allowing posterior compensation. As such, the attempt to consider the link between consent and full compensation must be drawn out from arguments that are not directly concerned with Nozick's attempt to circumvent the enough and as good proviso.

Nozick begins his analysis of rights violations by claiming that they fall into two categories. There are both "public" and "private" violations or "wrongs". Public wrongs are those which people fear even if they know that they will be fully compensated for their happening. Such wrongs include murder and assault. Even if the purportor of such wrongs is punished and the victim or his family compensated, people would still fear them happening
to them. Public wrongs, for Nozick, must be prohibited and made punishable. Private wrongs are those for which only the victim needs to be compensated. For example, compensation would be given for the breaking of a leg in an accident. Persons who knew they would be fully compensated if such a misfortune should befall them, would not be in constant fear of their happening. Such wrongs, although not prohibited or punishable in the same way as public wrongs, still demand that the damaged party be compensated.

Private wrongs, for Nozick, can be remedied either through market or full compensation. However, he points out that at times it may be extremely difficult for the individual to identify and negotiate with all potentially violated parties prior to undertaking a course of action. That is, the costs involved in negotiating for prior consent—through the market compensation process—may increase beyond the projected costs of posterior compensation. The market compensation process would involve the potential violator of rights in trying to identify the owners of the rights he can foresee his actions might violate. He would then have to negotiate to gain their consent. Throughout this process he could not be sure that he had identified all those whose rights he might violate, and he might compensate for rights that, in actuality, he does not end up violating. In light of these considerations, Nozick concludes that anyone should be able to perform "an unfearful action without prior consent, provided that the costs of reaching prior agreement are greater, even by a bit, than the costs of the posterior compensation process".

Nozick claims that such an arrangement would "fit the picture of a free society as embodying a presumption in favour of liberty". It would permit men to perform more actions that they perceived to be in their own interests than one which forbade non-negotiated rights violations. Further, Nozick
claims that no individual would be worse off than he would be under an arrangement which forbade such actions since, "[t]here is a trade because each accepts the risk of his boundaries being crossed and is allowed a higher risk in his attempts to achieve his own goals".

The major benefit Nozick identifies to all this is that such an arrangement would stimulate men to undertake more productive activities than any other. Men would enter such activities wherever they considered the benefits that would accrue to outweigh the probable costs of posterior compensation. However, it is not enough for Nozick to claim that men should consent to such an arrangement merely because this would allow him a higher risk in attempting to achieve his own goals. The individual's self-ascribed interests may well set an overriding goal of exercising his own rights—including his right to enough and as good—without interference by others. He may choose to do this in full knowledge that such a course of action may mean his having to forego the benefits of increased productivity that might be available under Nozick's arrangements. Accordingly, in the absence of an alternative to posterior compensation, Nozick would presume too much in claiming that such a system can rectify any rights violation, the individual simply may not think that it does.

Perhaps it was Nozick's intention to argue that men would agree to a system allowing posterior compensation in light of the material benefits he claims such a system generates. Indeed, Nozick continually implies that he considers men to have an overriding interest in increasing levels of production/consumption. This is implicit in his persistent assertion that the benefits of allowing non-negotiated rights violations are to be found in the increased productivity this stimulates. If this were the case, then it
would help clarify Nozick's apparent failure to make consent an explicit prerequisite in the justification of unlimited private appropriation. The assumption that men have an overriding interest in being bourgeois would help explain why Nozick is willing to leave the decision of which type of compensation—market or full—firmly in the hands of the potential violator of rights.

Indeed, the apparent assertion that men have overriding "bourgeois" interests is implicit in Nozick's claim that non-negotiated rights violations are legitimate wherever the potential violator considers the probable costs of posterior compensation to be less than the market compensation process. A person who wished to undertake such an activity would require a fairly accurate assessment of the probable costs of posterior compensation. Without a standardised system of deciding the level of posterior compensation payable—as in the tort system—the calculation of the probable costs of posterior compensation would be wildly inaccurate where each of the violated parties demanded markedly different amounts of compensation. This suggests, once more, that Nozick has some conception that all men are willing to part with their natural rights in lieu of material compensation. Such an assumption, if Nozick has in fact made it, would—at least without empirical evidence to support it—be questionable and, if found to be incorrect, would violate the equality of right premise which demands that the individual be left to define his own interests.

To make the argument that men would consent to capitalist appropriation because of the material benefits this generates, Nozick would be required to substantiate two further propositions. Firstly, that men do, in fact, express an overriding interest in increasing levels of material well-being
and, secondly, that capitalist appropriation best satisfies this overridding interest. Even if it were the case that men did express an overridding interest in increasing production/consumption it does not necessarily follow that capitalist appropriation best satisfies this interest. Were it able to be shown that a different set of socio-economic relations would promote greater productivity then, it could be argued that these are the ones that men would consent to if they were given the choice.

At other point, however, the textual evidence suggests that Nozick considers it to be an empirical fact that men do consent to capitalist market relations. Thus he claims, "[n]o doubt people will not long accept a distribution they believe unjust". This implies that, for Nozick, since people appear indifferent to the fact that a minority own all land and other means of production it can be assumed that they consent to capitalist appropriation. Having continually cited increased productivity as the overridding benefit such a system generates, Nozick may have readily assumed that people do consent because they value these benefits above their natural rights. However, if the unlimited private appropriations of others have come to deny men the ability to withdraw their "consent" from capitalist market relations, then their continued operation in capitalism cannot be taken as an adequate sign of their consent. Nozick cannot legitimately claim that men do consent merely because they accept the benefits he claims such a system generates. In the absence of a viable alternative, men's continued operation within a system embracing unlimited private appropriation has as much chance of signifying their resignation as their active "consent".

The weight of the textual evidence suggests that Nozick does not consider express consent to be a necessary prerequisite for the justification
of unlimited private appropriation. However, he seems to make the assumption that men have an overidding interest in increasing amounts of material well-being and because of this they do/would consent to such appropriation. This being the case, it appears that Nozick's position embraces the "liberalbourgeois-empirical" notion of freedom.

IV Conclusion

Two candidates for the concept of freedom have been drawn out from the consideration of Locke's justification of the right of unlimited private appropriation that appears in the Second Treatise. Firstly, the "liberalbourgeois-empirical" which claims that men do/would consent to this form of appropriation since it helps satisfy their bourgeois inclinations. Secondly, the "liberalbourgeois-normative" which claims that men "should" consent to this form of appropriation, that is, that they ought to be bourgeois. It has been argued that the "liberalbourgeois-normative" candidate would involve the Lockean liberal position in a contradiction. Since the equality of right premise demands that the individual be left to define his own interests, it would be illegitimate to claim that men "should" consent to a specific set of socio-economic relations. Therefore, it has been suggested that it is the "liberalbourgeois-empirical" candidate that must carry the weight of a Lockean liberal justification of capitalism.

This candidate claims that men do, or at least given their empirically verifiable interests would, consent to unlimited private appropriation because of the increased productivity it generates. However, to maintain an argument that men "do" consent the Lockean liberal would be required to show that men have an alternative to capitalist appropriation open to them. Further, in
order to maintain an argument that men "would" consent he is required to show that men do, in actuality, express an overriding interest in increasing levels of material well-being and that capitalist appropriation best satisfies this interest. Unless this can be done, capitalist appropriation could be condemned upon the basis of the liberal equality of right premise since it provides the conditions in which the owning minority can coerce the non-owning majority.

Finally, even granting that the Lockean liberal can show convincingly either that men do or that they would consent, on the basis of the equality of right premise, unlimited private appropriation and hence capitalism would only be legitimate as long as men continued to consent or say that they would consent. This premise demands that men be able to change their self-ascribed interests in light of changing circumstances. As or when men came to consider capitalist appropriation to be inimical to their self-ascribed interests such appropriation could be condemned within the liberal framework.
Notes


5. Ibid., sect. 4.


7. Ibid., sect. 5. Locke's emphases.

8. Ibid., sect. 4. Original emphases.

9. Ibid., sect. 95.


11. Locke, op. cit., sect. 35.

12. Ibid., sect. 25. Original emphasis.


15. Ibid., sect. 27. Original emphases

16. See, idem.

17. See, ibid., sect. 46.

18. Ibid., sect. 31. Emphasis added.

20. Ibid., sect. 46.
21. Ibid., sect. 37.
22. Ibid., sect. 49. Original emphases.
23. Ibid., sect. 37.
24. Ibid., sect. 50.
25. Ibid., sect. 48. Original emphases.
26. Ibid., sect. 36. Original emphases.
27. Ibid., sect. 85.
28. See, ibid., sect. 36.
29. See, ibid., sect. 50.
30. Ibid., sect. 119.
32. See, Locke, op. cit., sect. 48.
34. Locke, op.cit., sect. 41. Original emphases.
35. Ibid., sect. 48. Original emphases.
36. See, Macpherson, op. cit., pp. 244-245.
37. Ibid., p. 238.
38. Idem.
40. Ibid., sect. 48. Original emphasis.
41. See, Macpherson, op. cit., pp. 223-224.
42. See, Seaman, op. cit., Seaman also makes this argument.
43. Nozick does, in fact, have a theory of justice in holdings, acquisition and transfer. However, this applies only after property rights have developed and, does not cover how these rights might legitimately be
be assumed originally in the state of nature.


45. Ibid., p. 12.

46. Idem.

47. Ibid., p. 118.

48. See, idem.

49. See, ibid., pp. 175-176.

50. Ibid., p. 176.

51. Ibid., p. 175.

52. Ibid., p. 176.

53. Idem.

54. See, idem.

55. Idem. Original emphasis.

56. See, ibid., p. 177.

57. Ibid., p. 181.

58. Ibid., p. 68.

59. See, ibid., p. 72.

60. Ibid., p. 68.

61. Ibid., p. 80. Original emphases.

62. See, ibid., p. 67.

63. See, ibid., p. 72.

64. Ibid., p. 73.

65. Ibid., p. 78.

66. Ibid., p. 77.

67. Ibid., p. 158. Original emphasis.
Chapter Three: Humanist Freedom

I Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the general form of the two candidates for the concept of freedom that can be drawn out from humanist critiques of capitalism. Most humanist positions, whilst differing in specific content, have tended to exhibit the same fundamental structure. In general, the theorist is committed to a specific concept of human nature which allows him to formulate a distinction between men's "perceived" and their "real", "authentic" or "human" interests. Through an examination of capitalist market relations, the theorist is then drawn to the conclusion that these relations are not conducive to the realisation of these "real" interests and, must therefore be condemned as "dehumanising". This type of critique is of especial concern here since liberal theorists have tended to be particularly wary of humanist positions which, they have persistently maintained, open up the possibility of coercion in the name of freedom. The essential point of reference for the following examination of humanist positions will be to consider whether this liberal criticism is a valid one.

The most sustained and widely received contemporary humanist literature has developed in the marxist-humanist tradition which has its roots, at least in part, in Marx's use of the concept of alienation that appears in his early works that have come to be known collectively as the Early Writings. Initial attention will be focused upon the contentions that appear in these works. It will be argued that there are, in fact, two levels of critique that appear in these works. The first, which is well represented in Marx's direct critique of Smith, it will be suggested, can be seen to be founded upon premises
which are compatible with the liberal premises that Smith, himself, had employed. The second level of critique appears in Marx's use of the concept of alienation. It will be argued that Marx identified four aspects of alienation which he appears to have considered to be inherent in the capitalist mode of production. Through an examination of these it will be suggested that two of these aspects can be considered to raise issues—concerning the individual's ability to direct his own activities—which it would be legitimate to raise within the liberal framework. It will be suggested, further, that the other two aspects of alienation reveal that Marx appears to have founded part of his criticisms of capitalism upon a concept of human nature which implies that a distinction can be drawn between men's "perceived" and "real" interests.

It will be suggested that there are elements of a candidate for the concept of freedom that can be drawn out of the Early Writings that reappears throughout Marx's works. It will be argued that although this candidate does rely upon a concept of human nature—and, possibly, an attendant distinction between "perceived" and "real" interests—Marx's position is not open to the standard liberal critique of humanist positions. That is, Marx's position does not justify coercion in the name of freedom.

It will then be noted that the apparent lack of a potentially revolutionary proletariat, in advanced industrial societies, does present difficulties for Marx's position. This will lead into an analysis of a contemporary marxist-humanist position which has sought to deal directly with these problems, this will be carried out though a consideration of Marcuse's contentions. It will be argued that Marcuse, in attempting to overcome the problems associated with the apparent disappearance of a potentially revolutionary
proletariat was forced to claim that men "should" act in accordance with their "real" interests and that they must be forced to be free. This, it will be noted, opens Marcuse's position up to the standard liberal critique of humanist positions. It will be suggested that, although many of Marcuse's contentions reveal a concern with the lack of men's ability to direct their own activities—essentially a liberal concern—his normative claim that men "should" act in accordance with their "real" interests results in his position embracing a candidate for the concept of freedom which is incompatible with the liberal equality of right premise and substantially different from that which can be drawn out from Marx's contentions.

In the concluding section of this chapter a summary of the two candidates for the concept of freedom developed will be given. This will be followed by a brief comparison of the essential features of the two positions considered. This will show why Marcuse's position does justify coercion in the name of freedom whilst Marx's does not.

II Marx

There has been much controversy surrounding Marx's use of the concept of alienation that appears in the Early Writings. Some commentators have argued that this concept represents little more than an Hegelian stop-gap in the works of the young Marx which the older Marx came to reject. Others, especially more recently, have argued that, in fact, there is no radical distinction to be drawn between the young and old Marx. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this chapter to argue which side of this debate is correct, it will be suggested that there certain elements of the notion of freedom that can be drawn out of the Early Works which reappear throughout Marx's works.
The preoccupation of theorists with the concept of alienation since the publication of the *Early Writings* has tended to overshadow the fact that there are two levels of criticism of capitalism that appear in this collection of works. The first of these levels is well represented in Marx's direct attack upon Smith's political economy. The second is that which appears in Marx's contentions concerning alienation. Initially, the first of these levels of critique will be examined. I shall contend that, in his analysis of Smith, Marx can be understood as having offered an account of the contradictions between the premises of liberal political economy and the practical workings of capitalism. It will be suggested that in this undertaking, Marx can be understood as having founded his critique of capitalism upon premises that are compatible with those that Smith, himself, had employed. This will lead into an examination of Marx's second level of critique.

The concept of alienation, it is to be suggested, allowed Marx to formulate the real contradictions within the workings of capitalism which he considered gave rise to the contradictions that appear at the first level of critique. This will be followed by an examination of the four aspects of alienation—alienation from the products of labour, from the productive process, from man's species-being, and man's alienation from other men—that Marx considered to be inherent in the capitalist mode of production.

I shall then argue that the first two of these aspects of alienation—alienation from the products of labour and alienation from the productive process—reveal a concern with men's inability to direct their own activities within the capitalist mode of production. It will be suggested that this concern could legitimately be raised within the liberal framework. The second two aspects of alienation—man's alienation from his species-being and his alienation from other men—it is to be argued, highlight the way in which Marx
considered the capitalist mode of production divorced men from their social nature. It will then be possible to give an account of the candidate for the concept of freedom that can be drawn out from Marx's contentions.

I will suggest that this candidate retains the liberal notion that freedom consists—at least in part—in being able to direct one's own activities. However, Marx also considered it essential for the realisation of freedom that men develop interests beyond those that they seek to fulfil in capitalism. That is, Marx contended that to realise freedom in actuality, men would have to come to live in conscious recognition of their interdependence with nature and other men. It will be suggested that these concerns reappear throughout Marx's works.

I shall then argue that Marx considered it to be an empirical fact that the social aspect of man's nature was developing in the capitalist mode of production and that this was being expressed in increasing solidarity between workers. Further, it will be suggested that Marx considered it to be empirically verifiable that the development of capitalism would necessitate a further development of the social aspect of man's nature. Thus, it will be contended that the candidate for the concept of freedom that can be drawn out of Marx's contentions retains a liberal element and embraces the requirement of men developing "new" interests which, empirically, they are doing and will be required to do. It is this candidate that I shall call the "liberal-developmental-empirical".

It will then be argued that Marx considered that the full realisation of this freedom, in actuality, would only be possible after the proletariat had fulfilled its revolutionary role. Further, it is to be suggested that he considered that the proletarian revolution would only occur in response to the real material conditions of life that would be generated by capitalism. As
such, Marx was not seeking to tell men what they "should" do, but was informing them of what the development of capitalism would require them to do. Because of this, it will be argued, the "liberal-developmental-empirical" candidate for the concept of freedom is not incompatible with the liberal equality of right premise. That is, Marx was not advocating that men should be forced to act in accordance with their social nature but that the development of capitalism would require that they come to act in such a way.

Initially the first level of critique offered in the works that have collectively come to be known as the Early Writings is to be considered. Since this is to be approached through a consideration of Marx's direct response to Smith's political economy, it will be necessary to consider some of the main themes that appear in Smith's Wealth of Nations. Smith had argued that in the long run, on a free market, the price of a commodity would tend towards its "natural price". This was considered to be the price which was the "lowest at which (a dealer) is likely to sell...for any considerable time", that is, the price that "the sellers can commonly afford to take, and at the same time continue their business". Smith recognised that, in fact, the price that a commodity would actually reach on the market, the market price, could on any given occasion be above or below the natural price. The market price would be subject to the fluctuations of supply and demand. However, the workings of the market would ensure that commodity prices would, over an extended period of time, constantly gravitate to their natural price. When, for example, supply exceeded demand, the market price would fall below the natural price. This would prompt the least efficient of the producers to cease production of the commodity in question and invest their endeavours in another area. Thus supply would fall and the market price would tend towards the natural price.
On the other hand, if demand outstripped supply, the market price would rise above the natural price. In such cases, profits would be high. This would stimulate more producers to commit stock to the production of the commodity in question. Once more, supply would tend towards demand leading the market price towards the natural price.

The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the price of all commodities are continually gravitating...whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this center of repose and continuance, they are constantly gravitating towards it.

This notion of natural price appears to be underpinned by a doctrine similar to the Lockean liberal equality of right premise. The natural price, being the one which the sellers could commonly afford to take whilst remaining in business, could be regarded to be the lowest they would be prepared to accept. Further, it was also the highest price "which can be squeezed out of the buyers, or which, it is supposed, they will consent to give". Thus, provided that the natural price, in the long run, were realised, those transactions entered into could be considered to be non-coerced. Such transactions could, therefore, be seen to be consistent with the liberal equality of right premise.

The validity of this notion of natural price does, however, rely upon certain conditions being met. The buyers of a commodity could be forced to pay in excess of the natural price if the sellers were able to form an effective monopoly. Conversely, the sellers of a commodity could, if they were unable to withdraw from the market for certain reasons, be forced to sell below the natural price, especially where the buyers were able to act in unison. Smith appears to have realised that it was these difficulties which meant that the notion of natural price could not be applied to the wages of labour.
Smith began his enquiry into the wages of labour by noting that,

[the produce of labour constitutes the natural remuneration or wages of labour.]

In the original state of things, which precedes both the appropriation of land and the accumulation of stock, the whole produce belongs to the labourer. He has neither landlord or master to share with him. 11

However, as Smith noted, such conditions no longer prevailed. Land had become privately owned and the landlord demanded a share of "all the produce of which the labourer can either raise or collect from it". Further,

[In all arts and manufactures the greater part of workmen stand in need of a master to advance to them the materials of their work, and their wages till it be completed. He shares in the produce of their labour, or in the value which it adds to the materials upon which it is bestowed; and in this share consists his profit. 13]

In short, the labouring classes were dependent upon the owners of land and other means of production. Whilst the wages of labour were determined by contracts between masters and workers, the masters were in the strongest bargaining position. The owners, being a smaller group were able to form more effective combinations in their efforts to keep wages down than labourers were able to form in their efforts to get them increased. Smith even went so far as to maintain that in disputes between the two groups, the owners could call upon the "assistance of the civil magistrate, and the rigorous execution of those laws which have been enacted with so much severity against combinations of servants, labourers and journeymen".

However, although the wages of labour could not be considered to have a natural price—which allowed other commodity transactions to be considered non-coerced—Smith did claim that there was a natural rate of wages; "[t]here is in every society...an ordinary or average rate of wages...These ordinary or average rates may be called the natural rate of wages...." According to
Smith, this natural rate of wages was that which enabled the worker to subsist at the common level. Any increase in wages above this natural rate could be considered to be a benefit to the worker. This lead Smith to argue that a society increasing in wealth would be best for the labouring classes. Increasing wealth would presuppose a continuous and possibly increasing demand for labour. Further, the competition fostered by a thriving economy would tend to increase wages and decrease prices, both effects being of benefit to the worker. Thus Smith's position came to rest on the argument that a state of increasing wealth was the best for the labouring classes and, since workers made up the greater part of society, was best for society as a whole:

Servants, labourers and workmen of different kinds, make up the far greater part of every great political society...what improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as an inconvenience to the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable.

In the Early Writings Marx's immediate response to Smith was to reemphasise and amplify some of the major observations that had been made in the Wealth of Nations. Marx was able to use Smith's contentions to argue that, in reality, the wages of labour were determined by the struggle between capitalist and worker. The victors in this struggle were invariably the capitalists. This followed from Smith's observation that labourers were dependent upon their industrial earnings and the fact that "[c]ombination among capitalists is usual and effective, whereas combination among workers is proscribed and has painful consequences for them".

Workers, being unable to withdraw from the market, were subject to the whims of the demand for their labour. This dependency was increased by the fact that workers, unlike other commodity producers, were hampered in their attempts
to redirect their commodity when market prices fell in their usual area of employment. The division of labour that underpins a capitalist exchange economy, meant that the worker trained and/or experienced in one area of employment would find it "extremely difficult...to direct his labour to other uses". This subordination of labour to the demands of capital meant that the workers were either condemned to starvation or to "accept every demand which the capitalist makes".

Smith, however, had recognised these difficulties. Indeed, it was his consideration of such problems that had lead him to conclude that a state of increasing wealth was best for the labouring classes. Marx, however, sought to criticise this conclusion. Marx accepted that where the demand for labour exceeded supply, wages could be expected to rise. However, increasing wages would presuppose that adequate profits were being made. Profits would lead to the accumulation of capital and, as Smith had recognised, capital gave its owner "a certain command over labour". Put simply, the accumulation of capital, for Marx, would increase the directive influence of others over the activity of the worker. Further, the competition fostered by a thriving economy, Marx pointed out, would spur the search for innovation in the productive process, thereby increasing the division of labour, which increased the workers dependence upon a particular form of employment. Smith had praised the competition of a thriving economy which he had considered would tend to raise wages and lower prices. However, for Marx, such competition would lead to smaller, less efficient capitalists going out of business, thus there would be a decreasing number of capitalists seeking the services of the labourer. As the number of capitalists decreased, they would find it easier to act in unison to raise prices and decrease wages. Thus, for Marx, Smith's state of increasing opulence
would merely serve to expand the conditions of the labourer's dependence, and would result in a further erosion of the labourer's bargaining position when the economy went into decline.

To launch these criticisms of Smith's political economy, Marx had no need to adopt—nor does he seem to have adopted in the early stages of the argument—a concept of freedom that differed substantially from the liberal doctrine of an equal right to self-governance. In reality, the worker could not be considered to be free and independent as he had been presented to be in liberal political economy. The worker was subject to the arbitrary will of the owning class and their demand for his services. As such, this would amount to a violation of the worker's equality of right since Smith had failed to show convincingly that labourers do/would consent to the inequalities of capitalist market relations.

However, whilst many of Marx's direct criticisms of Smith can be cogently understood as highlighting the contradictions between liberal theory and the practises of capitalism, there is a second level of critique that appears in the Early Writings, which goes further than this. Marx had not denied that wages could rise in the state of increasing wealth. He had not even sought to deny that labourers would perceive this to be in their interests. However, he still sought to criticise the fact that men would have these interests:

Rising wages awake in the worker the same desire for enrichment as in the capitalist, but he can only satisfy it by sacrifice of his body and spirit. Rising wages presuppose, and bring about, the accumulation of capital; thus they increasingly alienate the product of labour from the worker. 27

In order to explore the basis of this critique, it is necessary to examine the concept of alienation used by Marx. There is little doubt that the use of this concept owes more to his studies in the Hegelian tradition than to
his consideration of the mysterious workings of capitalism. However, even prior to the writing of the "1844 Manuscripts", Marx noted that he considered Feuerbach's contentions to have important implications for the study of politics:

I approve of Feuerbach's aphorisms, except for one point: he directs himself too much to nature and too little to politics. But it is politics which happens to be the only link through which contemporary philosophy can become true. 29

Thus, Marx's extended critique of capitalism, that appears in his consideration of alienation, has to be understood in terms of his analysis of Feuerbach.

In The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach had argued that man, in the course of history, had projected his wants upon the imaginary figure "God'. Over time, men had come to believe that God existed in actuality. This resulted in the attributes men had originally aspired to, coming to be seen as divine. Through this process, God's perfection came to be the benchmark for man's baseness. The object "God" that man had posited as the embodiment of his own aspirations had become a subject in the face of whom men were lacking. Men had become alienated from what were, potentially at least, real human attributes. This process had its origin in man's distinctive capacity to be conscious of himself as a member of the human species and not merely of himself as an individual. For Feuerbach, man was a species-being: 'Man is at once I and thou; he can put himself in the place of another; that to him is his species, his essential nature, and not merely individuality is an object of thought'.

Whilst Feuerbach's use of the notion of an "essential (human) essence" appears to be obscure, it seems that he did not consider man's nature to be a
finite entity. Indeed, he seems to have considered men capable of considering an infinite number of potentials they might realise. He saw that it was in "God" that men expressed the infinitude of his potentials:

Man cannot get beyond his true nature...the conditions of his being, the positive final predicates he gives to these other individuals (for example, "God") are always determinations drawn from his own nature—qualities which he in truth only images and projects himself. 33

Feuerbach considered "religious sentiment" to embody the noblest aspirations of the human essence. It was, however, necessary that men came to realise that the infinite love, will and reason that had been posited as attributes of God were, in reality, the projection of man's hopes for himself. Though this realisation men could come to consciously apply the sentiments of religion to the good of the species. In this way, the human attributes alienated in the form of God would return to man himself.

In his "Theses on Feuerbach", Marx criticised this conclusion. Feuerbach's works, wrote Marx,

...consists of the dissolution of the religious world into its secular basis. He overlooks the fact that after completing this work, the chief thing remains to be done. For the fact that the secular foundation detaches itself in the clouds as an independent realm is really only to be explained by the self-cleavage and self-contradiction of this secular basis. The latter must itself, therefore, first be understood in its contradiction and then, by the removal of this contradiction, revolutionised in practise. 35

For Marx, then, Feuerbach had failed to take his analysis of alienation far enough. In order to fully understand alienation, for Marx, it was necessary to analyse the real contradictions in human life that resulted in the objects created by men coming to be their master. These objects, themselves, were produced in response to the actual needs and wants men felt in particular
historical conditions. As such, they arose from the particular contradictions of life that were prevalent in particular historical epochs. It is this that lies behind Marx's further criticism of Feuerbach: "Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the 'religious sentiment' is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs in reality to a particular form of society". For Marx, there was only one aspect of human life that was, necessarily, common to every historical epoch. The process of production "is the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence" and, thus, must be considered common to every social phase.

The essence of production, for Marx, was the conversion of nature into use-values via an interaction with human labour. This was the necessary objectification of all human life: men use their labour to produce objects in order to satisfy their needs and wants. This, linked with Marx's critique of Feuerbach, helps clarify the connection between Marx's direct analysis of Smith and his contentions concerning alienation. In his consideration of Smith, Marx had analysed the contradictions between liberal theory and the practises of capitalism. However, for Marx, to fully understand these contradictions, it was necessary to comprehend the real contradictions within the practises of capitalism: "Social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which mislead theory into mysticism find their rational solution in human practise and in the comprehension of that practise". Marx's use of the concept of alienation is, thus, to be understood as an attempt to formulate the real contradictions within the practises of capitalism that give rise to the labourer being mastered by his own products.

In the Early Writings there appear four aspects of alienation which Marx seems to have considered to be inherent in the capitalist mode of product-
ion; firstly, man's alienation from the products of his labour; secondly, his alienation from the productive process; thirdly, his alienation from his species and being; finally, his alienation from other men.

The first of these seems to represent little more than a restatement of Marx's direct critique of Smith. In the capitalist mode of production, the products of labour do not belong to the worker, that is, the person who used his activity to produce them. Instead these products belong to the owner of the means of production. Thus the more the worker produces—Smith's state of increasing wealth—the greater the amount of products and, hence his activity, he gives up control of;

...it is just the same as in religion. The more of himself man attributes to God the less he has in himself. The worker puts his life into the object, and his life then belongs no longer to himself but to the object. The greater his activity, therefore, the less he possesses... The alienation of the worker in his products means not only that his labour becomes an object, assumes an external existence, but that it exists independently, outside himself, and alien to him and stands opposed to him as an alien autonomous power. 39

This alienation of man from the products of labour meant two things. Firstly, the activity embodied in the creation of the product now no longer belonged to the worker but to the owner of the means of production. Secondly, since it is the products of labour that generate capital accumulation, and hence the directive influence that the owners of capital can exert over the activities of the labourer, the more products of labour that are given up, the more control over future activities is given up. In this light, this first aspect of alienation can be taken as highlighting a concern with the lack of the labourer's ability to carry out his own life activity through his own self-direction. Such a concern could have a founding within the liberal framework which, on the basis of the equality of right premise, would find the
ability of others to control the activities of the individual without his consent disturbing.

The first aspect of alienation was, for Marx, linked directly to the second. He claimed that "if the product of labour is alienation, production itself must be active alienation". Productive activity was, for Marx, the essential feature of all human existence. It was the necessary prerequisite for all other human activity. As such, Marx seems to have considered that the productive act, performed under certain conditions, would be, in and of itself, a fulfilling activity:

Supposing that we had produced in a human manner...
I would have (1) objectified in my production my individuality...enjoyed an individual expression of my life...(realised) that my personality was objective, visible to the senses and thus a power raised beyond all doubt. (2) In your enjoyment of my product I would ...(enjoy) realising that I had both satisfied a human need...and also objectified the human essence...(3) I would have been for you the mediator between you and the species and...thus felt by you as a completion of your own essence and a necessary part of yourself ...(4) In my expression of my life I would have fashioned your expression of your life...My work would be a free expression of my life....

However, in the capitalist mode of production, the workers activity,

...is not the satisfaction of a need, but only a means to satisfying other needs...it is not his own work but work for some one else...Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of human fantasy, of the human brain and heart reacts independently as an alien activity of gods or devils upon the individual, so the activity of the worker is not his own spontaneous activity. It is anothers activity and a loss of his own spontenity.

In the capitalist mode of production, the worker must sell his life activity to the capitalist. This has two main effects within the process of production. Firstly, his activity now belongs to another and is directed towards the needs of this other person. Secondly, the act of labouring—
the essential activity of all human life—becomes, for the worker, merely a means to fulfilling his needs and wants through wages. In effect, the worker is alienated from the very activity which is necessary for the satisfaction of these needs and wants. Labouring presents itself as a necessary evil and not as a necessary activity that is rewarding in its own right. Because of this, the labourer feels his own activity to be something that is directed against him.

As with the first aspect of alienation, this second aspect can be interpreted as highlighting a concern with the lack of ability of the labourer in the capitalist mode of production to direct his own activity. Again, this can be seen as an essentially liberal concern. Unless it could be shown that men do/would consent to such conditions of production then, within the liberal framework, these conditions could be criticised.

Marx, himself, had not denied the fact that men would perceive themselves to have an interest in selling as much of their labour as possible in Smith's state of increasing wealth. However, as has been suggested, he still sought to criticise the fact that men would have such perceived interests. The first two aspects of alienation do not provide adequate grounds for condemning such perceived interests. They merely show that, in pursuing these interests, labourers in the capitalist mode of production inadvertently expand the conditions of their dependence. It is only in the third and fourth aspects of alienation that Marx can be interpreted as having provided an account of why the selling of labour in the capitalist mode of production could be considered to be contrary to men's "real" interests and, therefore, must be condemned.

The third aspect of alienation Marx identified was man's alienation from his species-being. Man's species life, for Marx, "has its physical basis
in the fact that man...lives from inorganic nature". Man's universality—which for Feuerbach had expressed itself in "God"—was, for Marx, expressed in the fact that he could produce beyond his biologically determined needs and, in so doing, could utilise a range of materials far in excess of any other species:

In practice man lives only from these natural products
...The universality of man appears in practice in the universality that makes the whole of nature into his inorganic body (1) as a direct means of life; and equally (2) as the material object of his activity. 44

This dependence upon nature appears in an alienated form in the capitalist mode of production. The private ownership of land and other means of production meant that these could only be used if adequate profit was to be made. Thus, the natural materials, essential to all human life, stand opposed to men who must constantly struggle in order to sell their labour and gain access to them. In this way, these materials present themselves as an autonomous power alien to man.

The alienation of man from nature was, for Marx, intimately linked to the fourth aspect of alienation that man is "alienated from other men". For Marx, not only was man dependent upon nature in his efforts to produce the use-values necessary for the satisfaction of his needs and wants but, within the productive process itself, each man was dependent upon his fellow creatures:

In production, men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections does their action on nature, does production, take place. 46

Capitalism thus masks two essential features of the real conditions of human existence and man's productive endeavours: firstly, the dependence of man upon nature and, secondly, man's dependence upon other members of the species. In
the struggle to gain access to the means of production and the struggles between capitalists and workers, these necessary dependencies become submerged beneath the surface of conflict and competition which appear as necessary motivating forces in the productive endeavours of capitalism.

Thus, Marx's condemnation of the capitalist mode of production as alienating appears to have been based, in part, upon the view that this mode of production, in masking from men the real conditions of their existence, divorces men from the essentially social aspect of their nature. Truly human productive activity, for Marx, consisted in the individual producing in an environment free from the compulsion of his animal needs—for man "only truly produces in freedom from such need"—and in the conscious realisation of his need for other men. These aspects of Marx's notion of freedom reappear throughout his works:

Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature... and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to and worthy of their human nature...

Beyond it begins the development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which however, can blossom forth only with the realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working day is its basic prerequisite. 48

In effect, then, Marx offered men conditions of life that would allow for greater self-direction. This would be possible through a rational reorganisation of the processes of production which would allow for increased free time on the basis of freedom from material need. To achieve this freedom would require man's conscious recognition of his dependence upon nature and other men. Put simply, by coming to live in accordance with the dictates of the nature of their existence—in the terminology of this work, in accordance with their "real" interests—men would be able to achieve a greater level of
freedom than that available within the capitalist mode of production.

However, Marx left it unclear whether he considered these "real" interests to be the empirically verifiable interests of men or whether he relied upon a normative assertion that to act as "associated producers" was in the "real" interests of men. Despite this, there is little doubt that Marx did not seek to claim that men "should" act in their "real" interests. As such, his position did not embrace the notion that men must be coerced in the name of freedom. For Marx, it was an empirical fact that the growing intensification of the need for co-operation in and socialization of the capitalist mode of production was promoting solidarity in the working class. The complex forms of industrial production required increasingly that men's productive activities become "other-directed". The development of other-directed activity and proletarian solidarity was, for Marx, an internal dynamic of the capitalist mode of production:

The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the workers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination due to association. The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, is its own gravediggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.

Since the development of other-directedness and proletarian solidarity was, for Marx, an internal dynamic of the capitalist mode of production, he did not need to seek to urge men to act on their social nature or in accordance with their "real" interests. Indeed, Marx believed that the proletarian revolution could only occur in response to the real material conditions of life that would be generated in capitalism. Accordingly, any new way of life—the life of the "associated producers"—could only develop after the proletariat
had fulfilled its historic role. Ideas and concepts of "new" freedoms would not galvanise the proletariat to act. Nothing but the harsh realities of the conditions of material life could do this. However, the empirical fact that proletarian solidarity was developing and the fact that, with the development of capitalism, "it becomes evident, that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class..." suggested to Marx that the proletarian revolution would, of necessity at some point in history occur.

Thus the candidate for the concept of freedom that can be drawn out of Marx's contentions issues from a concern—essentially a liberal concern—with the lack of self-direction of men over their own activity in the capitalist mode of production. This is linked to the empirical claim that men are developing interests beyond the perceived—essentially bourgeois—interests they have in capitalism and the further empirical claim that, as capitalism develops, the conditions of life it generates will necessitate the proletariat rising up to seek satisfaction of their "real", social interests. This candidate for the concept of freedom I will call the "Liberal-developmental-empirical".

It is Marx's identification of an internal dynamic in the capitalist mode of production, which would necessitate a redirection of men's productive activities and enable them to realise their "real" interests as "associated producers", that makes his critique of capitalism consistent with the liberal equality of right premise. The increased self-direction which would be available through a necessary reorganisation and socialization of man's productive endeavours could, for Marx, only occur through a necessary development of capitalism. In liberal terminology, the development of capitalism would necessitate the development of new interests in men. In
effect, for Marx, the development of capitalism would be accompanied by a corresponding development of "new" interests in men. At some point, men would come to consider capitalism to no longer be in their self-ascribed interests. If this were the case then, on the basis of the liberal equality of right premise, which demands that men be allowed to alter their self-ascribed interests in response to changing circumstances, the proletarian revolution could be regarded as legitimate.

As capitalism developed, however, the evidence seemed to fly in the face of Marx's view that the capitalist mode of production would promote proletarian solidarity. As early as Bernstein, theorists were arguing that the factory unit did not, in fact, create a disposition to associated labour. Bernstein, himself, was drawn to the conclusion that far from there having developed the great homogeneous mass predicted in the Communist Manifesto, there had developed, "in the most advanced industries...a whole hierarchy of differentiated workmen...between whose groups only a moderate feeling of solidarity exists". Individual groups of workmen had, through trade union struggle, achieved hard won benefits—increased wages and concessions—that they were not about to give up in the cause of the class struggle. Indeed, the development of capitalism has lead to a fairly general assumption that the proletariat did not and is not about to break through the boundaries of bourgeois property.

The apparent lack of a potentially revolutionary proletariat in advanced industrial societies has lead many theorists to revise certain facets of Marx's position. In many contemporary humanist positions this has been done by playing down Marx's claim that capitalism must, of necessity, at some point collapse. This has given rise to a proliferation of literature that
has sought to articulate the need for socio-economic change on the basis of a concept of human nature. Marcuse's contentions offer a particularly relevant example of this type of position since they are directed specifically at the difficulties raised by the apparent disappearance of a potentially revolutionary proletariat. This chapter will, therefore, now seek to examine Marcuse's position.

III Marcuse

Within the Frankfurt School, Horkheimer and Adorno had noted that in advanced industrial societies there was an apparent lack of a potentially revolutionary proletariat. Marcuse, following Horkheimer and Adorno, saw that capitalism had come to diminish the day to day experience of need and scarcity by the working class. This meant that the political articulation of need and scarcity, which Marx had considered would trigger the proletarian revolution, had also been undermined. Thus, Marcuse confronted the problem of urging the need for liberation from a well functioning and affluent society, wherein the demand for liberation was without mass support and, therefore, politically impotent.

Marcuse sought to do this by arguing that the forces of production that had been generated in capitalism offered potentials which, if realised, would offer men greater freedom. The initial purpose of the following examination will be to expose the concept of human nature which underpinned Marcuse's contentions. It is this concept of human nature which, Marcuse maintained, set a benchmark from which to analyse "society in the light of its used and unused or abused capabilities for improving the human condition...."

It will be argued that by employing this concept of human nature
Marcuse was able to formulate a distinction between men's "perceived" and their "real" interests. It will be argued further that Marcuse considered there to be forces at work within the capitalist mode of production which denied men the ability to realise where their "real" interests lay. This will lead into a consideration of the candidate for the concept of freedom that can be drawn out of Marcuse's contentions.

It will be argued that Marcuse's contentions reveal a concern with men's lack of ability to be "autonomous"—in liberal terms, self-governors—in the capitalist mode of production and, further, that he thought men could become autonomous if they were to act upon their "real" interests. To achieve this higher degree of freedom, however, men would have to develop interests beyond the bourgeois interests they seek to satisfy in advanced industrial society. That is, they would have to come to act in their "real" interests. However, since Marcuse considered men to be unable to recognise their "real" interests on their own, he was lead to claim that they should be forced to be free for their own good. This candidate for the concept of freedom I shall call the "liberal-developmental-normative".

Finally, it will be argued that this candidate for the concept of freedom is incompatible with the liberal equality of right premise. Indeed, the justification of coercion in the name of freedom leaves Marcuse's position open to the standard liberal critique of humanist positions.

In *One-Dimensional Man* Marcuse sought to articulate the potentials he considered to have been generated within the capitalist mode of production that would, under certain conditions, allow for the improvement of the human condition. He claimed that, "[i]f the productive apparatus could be organised and directed toward the satisfaction of the vital needs...." individual autonomy would be rendered possible. However, this opens up an immediate
difficulty. The view that men have some needs that are "vital" involves, by implication, that they have others which are not. Indeed, for Marcuse, the unlimited consumerism of advanced industrial societies was based upon the satisfaction of "false" needs.

The foundation of the distinction between "false" and "real" needs, in Marcuse's thought, was his commitment to a Freudian concept of human nature. Freud had argued that the history of human civilization was the history of the subjugation of human instincts and their deflection to socially useful activities. Men had learned to give up immediate but uncertain satisfactions for the security of delayed and restrained pleasures. Freud had described this process as the transformation from the "pleasure principle" to the "reality principle". Marcuse argued that the repression thus far characteristic of civilization had arisen from the need to master nature in the struggle against scarcity. Thus the repressive organisation of instinctual life, for Marcuse, did not stem from the inherent nature of man's instincts but from the specific historical conditions of life that demanded that men suppress their desire for instinctual satisfaction. The need for repression was, thus, linked to the specific material conditions of life in each historical epoch. The greater the scarcity, the greater the need for instinctual repression.

In advanced industrial societies, Marcuse claimed, many traditional forms of scarcity had been overcome and, thus, repression had increasingly become surplus repression. Surplus repression is that repression in excess of that necessary for the maintenance of civilization. Technological development had reached a point where it could be used to dramatically reduce the repression bound up in toil and the domination of nature. By directing technology to the satisfaction of men's "vital" needs, determined by "standards of
priority...which refer to the optimal...utilisation of...resources" and, thereafter, the reduction of necessary labour time, the individual would be able to satisfy his instinctual desires to a greater degree:

...the prevalent satisfaction of the basic human needs...sexual as well as social: food, housing, clothing, leisure...would be completed by general automatization of labor (and), reduction of labor time to a minimum...it can never be a realm of (complete) freedom and gratification; but it can release time and energy for the free play of human faculties outside the realm of alienated labor. 61

For Marcuse, there was a greater realm of freedom available to men if they were to redirect technology to the progressive alleviation of necessary labour time on the basis of a settled level of material well-being. This would result in a progressive increase in free time available to the individual in which he could satisfy his instinctual—primarily sexual—desire for gratification:

...transformation of the libido would be the result of a societal transformation that released the free play of individual needs and faculties...With the restoration of the primary structure of sexuality, the primacy of the genital function is broken...The organism in its entirety becomes the substratum of sexuality...Thus enlarged, the field and objective of the instinct becomes the life of the organism itself. 63

Thus the progressive alleviation of necessary labour time would enable the individual to fulfil the demands of his natural instincts. Men, for Marcuse, should give up their search for increasing consumption of goods and services and respond to the "real" needs which are to be identified by reference to Marcuse's Freudian concept of human nature.

However, for Marcuse, it was an empirical fact that the majority of men, in advanced industrial societies, were unable to identify these "real" interests. There was no mass organisation seeking to alter the mode of prod-
uction in such a way that technology could be directed towards the progressive alleviation of necessary labour time. Indeed, the majority were seen to be seeking increased consumption. Marcuse claimed that whilst the satisfaction of the "false" needs expressed in consumerism "might be most gratifying for the individual", his happiness "is not something which has to be maintained if it seems to arrest his development". Thus, having claimed that men have certain "real" interests, Marcuse went on to maintain that the majority were ignorant of where these "real" interests lay. It was, therefore, necessary for him to show how it was that men were unable to discern their "real" interests.

It was this that lead Marcuse to argue that technology and, indeed the mode of thought that gave rise to its development, contained an ideological element. Marcuse argued that, through history, as man had developed the "reality principle" there had been an attendant unfolding of "instrumental reason". Instrumental reason had developed in response to man's search for conscious control over the forces of nature. It was this mode of thought that had given rise to the great productive forces of advanced industrial society. For Marcuse, the continued expansion of these forces was driven by the criteria of "rationalisation". Habermas argues that Marcuse, following Weber, viewed this criteria as the starting point for demonstrating that the concept of rationality had specific substantive implications. Weber had considered "rationalisation" to mean two things: firstly, the extension of the area of society subject to rational decision making and, secondly, the extension of the realm of rationalisation in men's lives. This second result had been achieved through the progressive industrialisation of the labour process. The effect of this two fold process, for Weber, was that rational decision making and the rational structuring of socio-economic relations had become the bench-
mark of legitimation for political and economic decisions. Put simply, political and economic decisions made and implemented in the name of "rationalisation" appeared, to the majority, as necessary decisions. For Marcuse, the major ideological success of instrumental reason was that, through the notion of "rationalisation", it had come to define the bounds of what could count as a rational approach to production. The relations of production had come to present themselves as the technically necessary organisation of society. To question them appeared to the majority to be irrational.

With this interpretation it was no longer feasible to expect the relations of production to "burst asunder". The realisation that these forces of production could be redirected towards the progressive alleviation of necessary labour time was blocked from men's consciousness by the criteria of "rationalisation". For Marcuse, there was no mechanism within the dynamics of the capitalist mode of production that would generate a revolution. Indeed, Marcuse was particularly pessimistic about the possibilities of a transformation in the productive organisation of society occurring. In One Dimensional Man he appears to rest his hopes for such a transformation upon a group he considered to exist outside the democratic system:

...underneath the conservative popular base is the substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colors, the unemployed and the unemployable. They exist outside the democratic process...Thus their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not. Their opposition...is an elementary force which violates the rules of the game...When they get together and go out into the streets...they face dogs, stones, and bombs, jail, concentration camps, even death. Their force is behind every political demonstration for the victims of law and order. The fact that they start refusing to play the game may be the fact which marks the beginning of the end of a period. 69

For Marcuse, then, the forces of production that had been generated
by capitalism offered men the potential for achieving greater autonomy, that is, in liberal terminology, self-governance. To achieve these potentials men would have to develop their "real" interests—defined by reference to Marcuse's Freudian concept of human nature—and come to value free time above increasing consumption of goods and services. However, for Marcuse, unlike Marx, there was no internal dynamic within capitalism which was generating the development of "new" interests and, indeed the majority were ignorant of where their "real" interests lay. Thus Marcuse was forced to make the normative assertion that men "should" act in their "real" interests. For these reasons I shall call the candidate for the concept of freedom that can be drawn out of Marcuse's position "liberal-developmental-nonnative".

The normative claim that men "should" act in their "real" interests does not necessarily justify coercion in the name of freedom per se. However, in order for Marcuse's position to be taken seriously as being concerned with political freedom it would have to leave men free to choose at two levels. Firstly, they must be free to choose or not to choose increased free time instead of increased consumerism. Secondly, assuming that they would choose increased free time, they must be left free to fill this time in their own way. Yet, it was the lack of an internal mechanism which would generate "new" interests in men that forced Marcuse to make the normative assertion that men "should" act in their "real" interests and this assertion represents the peak of the slippery slope from which Marcuse's position tends towards the "freedom is coercion" paradox. The lack of an internal dynamic for change meant also that men would not be able to come to act in accordance with their "real" interests of their own accord. Thus, whilst Marcuse recognised the potential political dangers of justifying coercion in the name of freedom, he implied
that since men are unable to act on their "real" interests on their own, he would be willing to accept these dangers; "the only possible excuse ... for 'educational dictatorship' is that the terrible risk it involves may not be more terrible than the risks which the great liberal as well as authoritarian societies are taking now, nor may the costs be much higher".

Such a justification of coercion in the name of freedom would open Marcuse's position up to the standard liberal critique of humanist positions, that is, Marcuse's contentions could be taken as offering a justification of totalitarianism. On the basis of the equality of right premise, the imposition of policies—made in the name of men's "real" interests—that go against men's express self-ascribed interests would represent an unacceptable violation of the individual's freedom to pursue his own interests in his own way. However, even on the basis of the liberal premise, it would have been legitimate for Marcuse to seek to persuade men of the need for change. If Marcuse had merely sought to offer men an alternative which they would then be free to choose or not to choose, then their choice of that alternative could be construed as a sign that they considered Marcuse's proposals to be in their own self-ascribed interests.

Unfortunately, Marcuse's use of a Freudian concept of human nature and the schedule of "real" interests this give rise to—the overriding "real" interest being that of attaining "non-repressive sublimation"—would, it is suggested, have little or no meaning to the men whose action Marcuse would have been required to obtain. That is, for Marcuse's position to overcome the "freedom is coercion" paradox, it would only be legitimate for him to seek to persuade men of the need for change. But his account of why such change is needed is an inadequate tool of persuasion. To ask men to radically restructure
their productive activities with the aim of achieving "non-repressive sublimation" would, it is suggested, lack purchase in galvanising men to act. This is, perhaps, a major contributing factor in the slide Marcuse's position takes towards the "freedom is coercion" paradox.

IV Conclusion

Two candidates for the concept of freedom have been drawn out in the foregoing analysis of Marx's and Marcuse's positions. In Marx, the claim that men could achieve greater self-direction if they were to rationally restructure their productive activities as "associated producers"—that is, develop "new" interests—was linked to two major empirical claims. Firstly, the claim that solidarity between workers was developing in capitalism and, secondly, the claim that the economic conditions of life that would be generated by capitalism would necessarily result in the proletarian revolution. This has been labelled the "liberal-developmental-empirical" candidate. In Marcuse, the view that a restructuring of the productive process would allow men greater autonomy was linked to the normative assertion that men "should" develop and act upon their "real" interests. This was called the "liberal-developmental-normative" candidate.

Marx, as has been stressed, did not seek to claim that men "should" change their schedule of interests but that the necessary development of capitalism would demand such a change. Further, he was not claiming that men "should" reorganise their productive activities in order to realise the social aspect of their nature; but that the necessity of reorganising these activities would enable them to realise this aspect of their nature. In short, for Marx, the internal dynamics of the capitalist mode of production would
necessarily lead to a change in men's self-ascribed interests. It is this that renders Marx's position compatible with the liberal equality of right premise. This premise demands that men be free to alter their self-ascribed interests in light of changing circumstances. Notwithstanding the fact that Marx considered such a change necessary—that men, in reality, would have no choice but to change—the self-generating process he identified would not necessitate coercion in the name of freedom. In effect, since the process of change would be, for Marx, self-generating men could be left free to choose or not to choose—in the liberal sense—to develop their "new" interests.

On the other hand, Marcuse's position does tend towards the "freedom is coercion" paradox. For Marcuse, there was no internal mechanism in capitalism that would necessarily generate the development of "new" interests. Thus, he was forced to claim that men "should" act on their "real" interests. Such a claim does not per se entail the justification of coercion in the name of freedom; however, the lack of an internal dynamic for change—which resulted in this normative assertion—also meant that men are unable to come to act on their "real" interests of their own volition. Thus, the lack of an internal mechanism for change—and the resulting claim that men have false-consciousness—means that Marcuse's position slides into the "freedom is coercion" paradox. Men must be forced to be free. It is this that makes Marcuse's position incompatible with the liberal equality of right premise. To coerce men in the name of their "real" interests would violate this premise which demands that the individual be left to pursue his own self-ascribed interests in his own way.
Notes


2. See, for example, Gajo Petrović, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century (New York: Anchor Books, 1967). Petrović makes the argument that the most widely received interpretations of Marx that appeared between 1932, the year the Early Writings were first published and the mid 1960's were of this type.

3. See, for example, Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967). Avineri argues that there is no radical distinction to be made between the "young" and the "older" Marx.


5. Ibid., p. 61.

6. See, ibid., p. 57.

7. See, ibid., pp. 57-58.

8. Ibid., p. 58.

9. Ibid., p. 61.

10. See, idem.

11. Ibid., p. 64.

12. Ibid., p. 65.


15. Ibid., p. 67.

16. Ibid., p. 55.

17. Ibid., p. 81.

18. See, ibid., pp. 85-86.
20. Ibid., pp. 78-79.
22. Idem.
23. Ibid., p. 70.
25. Adam Smith, quoted by Marx in ibid., p. 85.
26. See, Marx, op. cit., p. 73.
27. Idem.
28. The "1844 Manuscripts" make up the bulk of the works that have come to be known collectively as the Early Writings.
31. Ibid., p. 2.
32. Ibid., p. 7.
33. Ibid., p. 9.
34. Idem.
38. Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, p. 29. Original emphases.
40. Ibid., p. 124.

43. Ibid., p. 126.

44. Idem.

45. Ibid., p. 129. Original emphasis.


47. Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, p. 128.


49. See, Avineri, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-92. Avineri makes the same argument.


51. Ibid., p. 45.


55. Ibid., p. 2.


57. See, Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man*, pp. 3-6.


60. Ibid., p. 6.


64. Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man*, p. 5.

65. See, Connerton, *op. cit.*, p. 29.


68. See, Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man*, pp. 226-227, for example.


71. See, for example, Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, pp. 197-199. Here Marcuse suggests that the major benefit of a reduction of necessary labour time would be the attainment of "non-repressive sublimation".
Chapter Four: Comparing the Candidates

I Introduction

In chapter two, two possible candidates for the concept of freedom were drawn out from a consideration of the Lockean liberal justification of the right of unlimited private—that is, capitalist—appropriation. The first is the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical". This links the liberal equality of right premise, the assertion that the individual has a right to pursue his own self-ascribed interests in his own way, to a number of empirical claims which sought to show that men do/would consent to capitalist appropriation because of their bourgeois inclinations. Secondly, there is the "liberal-bourgeois-normative" candidate which links the equality of right premise to the normative assertion that men "should" consent to capitalist appropriation.

In chapter three, two possible candidates for the concept of freedom were developed from a consideration of marxist-humanist critiques of the capitalist mode of production. It was suggested that these candidates were both underpinned by a concern—a concern essentially similar to the liberal concern with the individual's ability to live his own life in his own way—with the lack of man's ability to be self-directed within the capitalist mode of production. In the "liberal-developmental-empirical" candidate which was drawn out from Marx's critique of capitalism, the view that man could achieve greater self-direction, were he to rationally reorganise his productive endeavours, was linked to two major empirical claims. The first one was that the capitalist mode of production was generating solidarity among the workers which was developing the social aspect of man's nature. The second was that
the necessary development of capitalism would necessarily give rise to a restructuring of the productive process which would provide the conditions for greater human freedom. It was suggested that, for Marx, the internal dynamics of capitalism was giving rise to and would come to necessitate what I have called a change in men's self-ascribed interests. In the "liberal-developmental-normative" candidate, which was drawn out from a consideration of Marcuse, the view that the restructuring of the process of production would allow men greater autonomy was linked to the normative claim that men "should" change their schedule of interests to realise the potentials that Marcuse considered to have been generated by capitalism. However, since Marcuse was unable to identify a mechanism for change inherent within contemporary capitalism, his position slid towards the further claim that men should be forced to be free.

It is the aim of this chapter to explore the areas of similarity and divergence between these four possible candidates for the concept of freedom. Initial attention will be focused upon what was, until recently, one of the most influential examinations of the differences between the use of the concept of freedom in liberal justifications of and humanist critiques of capitalism. This appears in Berlin's "Two Concept of Liberty". The distinction Berlin provides between "negative" and "positive" liberty has become an essential point of reference for any serious analysis of political freedom. Through an examination of this distinction it is to be argued that, in fact, Berlin's division is inadequate to the task of providing a meaningful account of the four possible candidates for the concept of freedom drawn out in previous chapters. This will lead into the development of a more suitable framework for comparison.
This framework will be developed from a consideration of Lukes' claim that concepts such as freedom are "essentially contested". That is, such concepts "inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper use on the part of their users" and that, "to engage in such disputes is itself to engage in politics". It will be suggested that Lukes' general understanding of the notion of essential contestability demands that all the possible candidates developed in the name of a concept are to be seen as possible candidates for the same concept. This, it will be argued, is an unconvincing claim, and Lukes' general use of the notion of essential contestability must be considered inadequate. Indeed, it is to be suggested, for differing contents to be considered as competitors for the same concept, they must compete within a common definitional framework. From this basis, the four possible candidates for the concept of freedom that have been identified will be examined.

It will be suggested that the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" and the "liberal-developmental-empirical" candidates can be considered to be competitors within one general framework of the concept of freedom, whilst the "liberal-bourgeois-normative" and the "liberal-developmental-normative" candidates compete for a second and different general concept. The first pairing, it will be suggested, can be seen to compete for a general concept which considers freedom to be living in accordance with one's self-ascribed interests. The second pairing, it is to be suggested, can be seen to compete for a second general framework which considers freedom to be living in accordance with one's "real" interests. It will be argued that these differing general frameworks cannot be considered to be compatible.

It will then be argued that the second of these general concepts offers a politically dangerous concept of freedom since it opens up the
possibility of coercion in the name of freedom. This being the case, it is
the first general framework that offers the most attractive account of
political freedom. Through a consideration of the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical"
and "liberal-developmental-empirical" candidates for this concept it will be
argued that the employment of this concept limits the range of claims that it
is legitimate to make concerning men's interests in the development of argu-
ments for and against capitalism.

II Berlin

In "Two Concepts of Liberty" Berlin provides a distinction between
what he calls the "negative" and "positive" concepts of liberty. This distinc-
tion has become an essential point of reference for any serious political
analysis of the concept of freedom. Yet, the division between "negative" and
"positive" liberty provides a distinction between two possible notions of
political freedom. In previous chapters it has been argued that there are at
least, four candidates which require consideration. The purpose of the follow-
ing analysis of Berlin's contentions is to show that in making the distinction
between "negative" and "positive" liberty Berlin confuses certain essential
issues which leaves his analysis inadequate to the task of providing a
meaningful distinction between the notions of freedom that I have drawn out
from liberal arguments for and humanist arguments against capitalism.

Berlin identifies his "negative" concept of liberty with the liberal
tradition. He claims that this concept is concerned with identifying the
"area within which the subject...is, or should be left to do or be what he is
able to do or be, without interference by others". The "positive" concept of
liberty—which derives from a desire on the part of the individual to be his
own master—Berlin claims appears in those positions which draw a distinction between men's perceived and their "real" interests. This, for Berlin, seeks to identify "those sources of control that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that". Berlin notes that

[t]he freedom that consists in being one's own master, and freedom which consists in not being prevented from choosing as I do by other men, may on the face of it, seem concepts at no great logical distance from each other—no more than negative and positive ways of saying the same thing. Yet the "positive" and "negative" notions of freedom historically developed in divergent directions not always by logically reputable steps, until, in the end, they came into direct conflict with one another. 5

Thus, for Berlin, the "negative" and "positive" concepts of liberty have been derived from similar—at least, not logically disimilar—concerns. This is a point that has been stressed throughout this work. Indeed, the liberal tradition has, from a premise that the individual has a right to be free from the arbitrary wills of others, consistently argued in support of a right of unlimited private appropriation, which the marxist tradition has consistently argued provides the conditions in which the non-owning majority can be coerced by the owning minority. In both traditions the ability of some men to coerce others has been seen as inimical to political freedom. The major bone of contention has been that one tradition—the liberal—has argued that the private ownership of the means of production does not entail coercion whilst the marxist tradition has argued to the contrary. Berlin implies, once more, that he realises that there is this common area of concern when he claims that his "negative" and "positive" concepts can be compared from one common framework which recognises that "to coerce a man is to deprive him of his freedom". 6

However, Berlin chooses to direct his analysis away from the implications
of this common area of concern. Instead, he examines what he considers to be the results of the divergent development of the "negative" and "positive" concepts of liberty. He maintains that the "negative" concept—which he identifies with the liberal tradition—considers coercion to be "the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act". This stipulation, as Macpherson notes, removes from the realm of coercion relations of dominance which may be unintended, yet necessary, effects of certain arrangements made and enforced by others. Thus, on Berlin's account, the liberal notion of freedom could not be employed, for example, to criticise coercion that is generated by the private ownership of the means of production. Indeed, Berlin contends that, where such coercion is not attributable to intended interference, it cannot even be recognised, let alone condemned, on the basis of "negative" liberty:

It is only because I believe that my inability to get a given thing is due to the fact that other human beings have made arrangements whereby I am, whereas others are not prevented from having enough money to pay for it, that I think myself the victim of coercion or slavery. In other words, this use of the term depends upon a particular social and economic theory about the causes of my poverty and weakness.

This is a patently false assertion. On the basis of the liberal equality of right premise, unequal socio-economic relations are legitimate if and only if it can be shown that men do/would consent to them. If this cannot be adequately demonstrated then unlimited private appropriation of the means of production and, thus, capitalist market relations could be condemned as coercive even within the liberal framework. Consequently, Berlin's account of the implications of the "negative" concept of liberty is inadequate.

Berlin centers his analysis of his "positive" concept of liberty around the assertion that positions that draw a distinction between men's "perceived"
and "real" interests rely upon a notion of freedom that is, put simply, coercion of the majority by those who consider themselves to be fully rational:

The perils of using organic metaphors to justify coercion of some men by others in order to raise them to a "higher" level of freedom have often been pointed out. But what gives such plausibility as it has to this kind of language is that we recognise that it is possible, and at times justifiable, to coerce men in the name of some goal (let us say, justice or public health) which they would, if they were more enlightened, themselves pursue...This renders it easy for me to conceive of myself coercing others for their own sake, in their, not my, interest. I am then claiming that I know what they truly need better than they know it themselves. 11

However, as Macpherson points out, in this concept of "positive" liberty Berlin has confused two distinct notions. The first is the desire for self-mastery, the second, coercion in the name of freedom. Although Berlin's argument suggests otherwise, there is no necessary link between the two. For example, to use Berlin's terminology, Marx seems to have considered that men would be able to achieve a higher degree of self-mastery were they to come to act as "associated producers". However, Marx considered that the necessary development of capitalism would demand that men come to act in this way. Marx, as has been stressed, was not seeking to tell men what they "should" do, but mapping what the development of capitalism would require them to do. As such, Marx's position did not condone or even include the notion that men should be coerced in the name of a "higher" freedom. Consequently, Berlin's account of "positive" liberty is an inadequate account of the candidates of freedom that have been drawn out of the examination of humanist critiques of capitalism.

Since Berlin's division between "negative" and "positive" liberty is inadequate to the task of providing a meaningful account of the four candidates for the concept of freedom that have been drawn out in previous chapters, a
more suitable framework for comparison is to be developed. This framework will be drawn out from a consideration of the notion of essential contestability.

III Essential-Contestability

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of literature which has sought to show that many of the concepts employed in political analysis gain a substantial part of their content from the value-commitments of the theorist who utilises them. One of the prime examples of this type of argument appears in Lukes' *Power: A Radical View*. Lukes' specific contentions are applied to the concept of power. However, his more general contentions are equally applicable to the concept of freedom. Following Gallie, Lukes terms such concepts "essentially contested" and claims that they invariably promote "endless disputes about their proper use on the part of their users". Lukes presents two main theses in support of this claim: firstly, the content of an essentially contested concept, within a given theoretical framework, is informed by the value commitments that underpin that framework; secondly, he implies that this being the case, there is no rational way to decide which content of the concept in question is the best.

This was until recently a standard interpretation of the notion of essential contestability. MacIntyre, for example, in "The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts", argues that the difference between the concepts used in natural science and those used in social science is that the former have a set of "core facts" which the latter lack. These core facts allow certain debates to be settled at least temporarily and provisionally. MacIntyre claims that even natural science concepts are potentially open to debate and are, therefore, "essentially incomplete". However, their temporary and provis-
ional closure means that, unlike social concepts, they are not continually open to question, that is, "essentially contested". Since social concepts are continually open to debate and receive much of their content from the theorist who employs them, MacIntyre concludes that there is no rational means by which to decide which content is the best.

If this interpretation of essential contestability were correct, this would lead to the unconvincing view that one content of a concept, drawn from the basis of one set of assumptions, would have to be considered as contesting another, founded upon a different set of assumptions. It is the implausibility of this conclusion that lies behind Gray's critique of Lukes in "Political Power, Social Theory and Essential Contestability":

The result of my analysis of the Lukes...perspective on power...has been that two incommensurable perspectives on power are left in the field, each (the voluntarist and the structuralist) carrying with it a specific framework of explanation. Given that it is extremely implausible that any purely empirical deliberation might settle the issues between these two perspectives, what kind of deliberations could be decisive? The situation is even worse on reflection...it seems odd to say that they have any common subject-matter: perhaps what we have is indeed meaning-variance rather than competition in the use of shared vocabulary. 21

Gray goes on to suggest that the notion of essential contestability is devoid of any relevance in the analysis of the differences between the contents given to concepts in political theory. He suggests that since differing contents of a concept, drawn from differing frameworks, do not compete for or share common subject-matter, to call the concept "essentially contested" merely serves to obscure the fact that different contents may not compete for the same concept at all. This does, however, seem a hasty conclusion. Gray is undoubtedly correct to point out that contents drawn from differing theoretical frameworks do not share common subject-matter or direct themselves to
similar concerns. Yet there is little doubt that within a given framework essential contests do arise. Indeed, it has been a consistent oversight of the type of interpretation suggested by Lukes and MacIntyre that it was a necessary prerequisite in Gallie's original statement of the notion of essential contestability, that the contestants be "playing the same game".

It is a significant fact that most "new" contents of a concept are developed in response to defects that are found in the one previously in favour. Theorists who propose a "new" content are often seen to go to great lengths to rationally state such defects and justify the need for change. Indeed, it is precisely this that Lukes undertakes to do when he moves on to his specific contentions concerning power. He examines two existing contents of this concept and explains how the defects of one gave rise to the development of the other. He then proposes a "new" content in light of weaknesses he finds in the "newer" one. This takes place inspite of the implications of Lukes' original contentions that there is no rational way of deciding which content is the best.

Even more telling is Lukes' contention that all three of the contents he examines issue from a common perspective. They are "alternative interpretations and applications of one and the same underlying concept of power", this being a concept "according to which A exercises power over B when A affects B... contrary to B's interests". Here Lukes implies something quite different to what was implied by his more general contentions, which was that a content drawn from one theoretical framework could be considered as essentially contesting another content of a concept drawn from a differing theoretical framework. Lukes now implies that the essential contestability of a concept takes place within a general definitional framework. Within such a framework there are many
essential questions that can be raised. To take Lukes' example, what counts as a case of A affecting B? Or, what are B's interests? The specific answers that theorists who adhere to the same general definitional framework—there may well be other such frameworks—give to such questions can be construed as offering contending contents for the same concept. It is this notion of essential contestability, that for differing contents of a concept to be seen as candidates for the same concept they must compete within a common definitional framework, that will form the basis for the following analysis of the four variants of freedom identified.

IV Comparing the Candidates

Through the analysis of Lockean liberal arguments for and marxist-humanist arguments against capitalism offered in previous chapters, it has been suggested that there are four possible candidates for the concept of freedom that require consideration. There are two liberal variants. The first liberal variant is the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical". This claims that it is empirically verifiable that men do/would consent to unlimited private—that is, capitalist—appropriation since this helps them satisfy their bourgeois inclinations. The second liberal variant is the "liberal-bourgeois-normative". This claims that men "should" consent to capitalist appropriation and that they "should" have bourgeois inclinations. There are also two humanist variants that require consideration. The first humanist variant is the "liberal-developmental-empirical". This claims that it is an empirical fact that the capitalist mode of production entails coercion and that men are developing and, will necessarily continue to develop, interests beyond those that they perceive themselves to have in capitalism. The second humanist variant is the
"liberal-developmental-normative". This claims that men "should" develop interests beyond those that they perceive themselves to have in capitalism.

At first sight, these four variants might appear to represent four competing contents for the concept of freedom. However, in light of the foregoing analysis of the notion of essential contestability, I shall suggest that there are, in fact, two different general concepts of freedom which are contested by the four variants identified. It was argued above that it is a necessary prerequisite, if differing variants developed in the name of a concept are to be seen as candidates for the same concept, that they compete within a common definitional framework. That is, that they can be seen to contest the same general concept.

In this light, it appears that it is legitimate to divide the four notions of freedom into two groups in which a liberal and a humanist variant compete for fundamentally different general concepts of freedom. It is suggested that the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" and the "liberal-developmental-empirical" variants can be construed as offering competing accounts of one general concept of freedom, whilst the "liberal-bourgeois-normative" and the "liberal-developmental-normative" can be seen as competitors for a second general concept. The first pairing—"liberal-bourgeois-empirical"/"liberal-developmental-empirical"—are to be considered to compete for a general concept which regards political freedom to reside in men pursuing their own self-ascribed interests. The second pairing—"liberal-bourgeois-normative"/"liberal-developmental-normative"—can be construed as competing for a different general concept of freedom which claims that freedom resides in men living in accordance with their "real" interests.

It is to be argued that the first of these general concepts—this leaves
men free to define their own interests—offers an attractive account of political freedom. However, I shall consider initially the second general concept and, those variants—"liberal-bourgeois-normative"/"liberal-developmental-normative"—that essentially contest for it. Through an examination of the defects of each contestant it will be argued that the general concept that they compete for is a potentially politically dangerous account of freedom. It will be argued that, although the claim that men "should" act in their "real" interests does not involve the claim that men should be coerced in the name of freedom per se, the "freedom is coercion" paradox is imminent in this claim. This being the case, it will be suggested that the notion that men "should" act in their "real" interests must be rejected as a satisfactory account of political freedom.

This will lead into an assessment of the first general framework which leaves men free to define their own interests. This, it will be argued, offers an attractive account of political freedom. Through an examination of the contents—"liberal-bourgeois-empirical"/"liberal-developmental-empirical"—that essentially contest this general concept it will be argued that both contents have weaknesses. This will lead into an assessment of the types of claims it is legitimate for the political theorist to make, on the basis of this concept of freedom, concerning men's interests in the development of arguments for and against capitalism.

Initially, then, the contestants for the concept of freedom which considers freedom to reside in men living in accordance with their "real" interests are to be considered. It was suggested in chapter two that the "liberal-bourgeois-normative" content of this concept has an implicit basis in Lockean liberalism. This variant involves the claim that men "should" consent
to unlimited private appropriation in light of the benefits—increasing levels of material well-being—it generates. Whether or not Locke intended to make such an argument, there is evidence to suggest that, at points, he came close to claiming privileged information concerning men's interests. He claimed, for example, that some men can be considered to be "biassed in their Interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it". However, any assertion that some men are ignorant of their "real" interests would, within the Lockean liberal framework, represent a violation of the equality of right premise. This premise demands that the individual be left to define his own interests. An assertion that some men have privileged information which enables them to claim that the interests they identify are superior to the interests these men ascribe to themselves would be illegitimate. In this light, the "liberal-bourgeois-normative" variant must be considered to be an inadequate account of political freedom. Not only is the claim that men are ignorant of their "real" interests a flagrant violation of the equality of right premise but, as will be suggested in the examination of the "liberal-developmenntal-normative" variant, the "freedom is coercion" paradox is imminent in any claim that men "should" act in their "real" interests.

The "liberal-developmental-normative" variant of the general concept which claims that freedom resides in men living in accordance with their "real" interests highlights that the "freedom is coercion" paradox is imminent in the claim that men "should" act in their "real" interests. Marcuse claimed that men would be able to attain greater "autonomy" if they were to restructure their productive activities with the aim of satisfying their "real" interests. However, for Marcuse, there was no mass popular movement in advanced industrial societies seeking to implement such change. It was the lack of a potentially
revolutionary proletariat which forced Marcuse to claim that men "should" act in their "real" interests. Had he been able to identify such a revolutionary forces—as Marx had—Marcuse would have had no need to make the claim that men "should" act in their "real" interests. Instead, he would have been able to claim that men were in the process of changing their schedule of interests and would continue to do so. As men's self-ascribed interests did change it could be supposed that they would come to demand a change in the mode of production. The reliance on the claim that men "should" act in their "real" interests is, in effect, a confession that the theorist considers men both ignorant of their interests and, therefore unable to change the organisation of their activities of their own accord. It is because of this that positions of the type offered by Marcuse invariably and, almost of necessity, end up in the "freedom is coercion" paradox.

Undoubtedly, such positions could be saved from this paradox were they merely to seek to persuade men of the need for change and leave them free to choose or not to choose the prescribed course of action. However, at least in the case of Marcuse, the account of "real" interests employed is so obscure that it would have little persuasive ability. For example, in seeking to persuade men who live out their lives in a liberal democracy, the idea that they could achieve "non-repressive sublimation" through a restructuring of their productive activities would have little or no meaning. For such men, the dominant liberal tradition informs them that their freedom consists in rights and presents as central the notion of freedom of choice. The goal of "non-repressive sublimation" would offer men little or no means of participating in the socio-economic change advocated by Marcuse:

To be persuasive, oppositional uses of the concept of interests must be rooted at least in some aspect of the
life experience of those for whose identification they are in competition. Otherwise they have no purchase, no relevance to their 'target' actors, and offer no means of active participation in the advocated shift of identity. 25

Given the obscurity of Marcuse's notion of "real" interests it is hardly surprising that he should have found men apparently unwilling to act in order to realise these interests. Indeed, it is not surprising that Marcuse should conclude that men are ignorant of their "real" interests. Since men appeared unable to act in their "real" interests of their own accord, Marcuse's option was to claim that they "should" in which the "freedom is coercion" paradox looms.

In short, the assertion that men "should" act in their "real" interests issues from the view that men are not and, at least in the near future, will not act on the "real" interests that the theorist claims them to have. This represents the peak of the slippery slope from which such positions slide into the "freedom is coercion" paradox. As such, the general concept of freedom which considers freedom to reside in men living in accordance with their "real" interests is potentially and, almost necessarily, a justification of totalitarianism and is to be rejected as a politically dangerous concept of freedom.

On the other hand, the general concept of freedom which leaves men free to define their own interests provides what is, intuitively at least, an attractive account of political freedom. As has been argued, within the context of this work, this general concept can be considered to have two contesting contents. Firstly, from the Lockean tradition, there is the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" candidate which claims that it is empirically verifiable that men do/would consent to unlimited private—read capitalist—appropriation. From the consideration of Marx's critique of capitalism the "liberal-developmental-
empirical" candidate was drawn out. This claimed that it was an empirical fact that capitalist market relations entail coercion and that it is empirically verifiable that men are developing and will continue to develop interests beyond those they perceive themselves to have in the capitalist mode of production. Whilst the general concept of freedom—freedom is living in accordance with one's self-asscribed interests—that these candidates contest offer an attractive account of political freedom, it is to be argued that both of these contestants contain weaknesses.

The "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" candidate relies for its validity upon the empirical assertion that men do/would consent to unlimited private—that is, capitalist-appropriation since this helps them satisfy their bourgeois inclinations. The claim that men "do" consent and the claim that they "would" consent are to be considered separately since this will enable the direct contesting ability of the "liberal-developmental-empirical" candidate to be highlighted. It will be argued that the "liberal-developmental-empirical" variant raises a number of important problems for the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" candidate but that the "liberal-developmental-empirical" variant can also be seen to have its own weaknesses.

Initially, then, the claim that men "do" consent to capitalist appropriation which is an essential ingredient in the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" variant is to be considered. Locke argued that men's consent to unlimited private appropriation could be inferred either from the fact that they used money or from the fact that they accepted the material benefits that were stimulated by this form of appropriation. It could be supposed that they did consent because of their bourgeois "desire for more than...needed". It was argued in chapter two that men's continued use of money could not, in fact,
be taken as an adequate sign of their consent. If the use of money did—and Locke's argument suggests that he considered this to be the case—prompt the concentration of land and other means of production, then this could have prompted a situation where the majority became dependent upon the use of money for their very survival. As such, the continued use of money could not be taken as an adequate sign of men's consent to the effects of its use.

It was also argued that Locke's claim that men's acceptance of the benefits of a system of unlimited private appropriation could be taken as a sign of their consent, is also inadequate. Whatever reasons the individual might have for accepting these benefits—more often than not survival—this acceptance and his continued residence in a system embracing a right of unlimited private appropriation, could not be taken as a sign of his consent unless he had a reasonable method of withdrawing his "consent" available.

In fact, the "liberal-developmental-empirical" candidate can be seen to raise this type of difficulty for the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" variant. In his direct critique of Smith, Marx in effect showed that workers who have no choice but to enter capitalist market relations—that is, they are free to starve or submit to the demands of the capitalist—cannot be said to consent merely because they enter into such relations. Further, if Marx were correct that the necessary development of capitalism would culminate in the proletarian revolution, then in liberal terminology, it could be argued that this would be because men would come to consider capitalism to be inimical to their self-ascribed interests. The equality of right premise demands that men be able to change their self-ascribed interests in light of changing circumstances. As such, as men did come to consider that their interests lie in acting as "associated producers", capitalism could be condemned even upon the
basis of the liberal premise.

The Lockean liberal argument that men "would" consent to a system of unlimited private appropriation also has weaknesses. At points, both Locke and Nozick appear to have assumed that such appropriation provides men with increasing levels of material well-being and that men value this above their natural right to enough and as good. From this, it seems that both may have concluded that men "would" consent to unlimited private appropriation. It was argued in chapter two that for such an argument to be valid, the Lockean liberal would be required to do two things. Firstly he must show that men do, in actuality, express an overriding interest in increasing amounts of material well-being and, secondly, he would be required to show that capitalist appropriation best satisfies this interest.

Even granting that the Lockean liberal would be able to show that men do express an overriding interest in increasing levels of material well-being it does not follow necessarily that capitalist appropriation best satisfies this interest. Marx, for example, appears to have considered that a communist mode of production would be more productive than capitalism. If this were the case then it could be strongly argued that men with an overriding interest in increasing levels of material well-being would choose to consent to such a mode of production were they to be given the choice.

There are, then, a number of weaknesses that attend the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" candidate for the concept of freedom that considers freedom to reside in men living in accordance with their self-ascribed interests. The claim that men "do" consent to capitalist appropriation must be supported by an argument which shows convincingly that men have an alternative open to them. If this cannot be done then men's continued operation in a
system embracing a right of unlimited private appropriation cannot be taken as an adequate sign of their consent. The claim that men "would" consent to unlimited private appropriation must be supported by evidence that men do, in actuality, express an overriding interest in increasing levels of material well-being and that capitalism best satisfies this interest.

The "liberal-developmental-empirical" variant which, as has been seen, can be used to raise certain difficulties for the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" variant, does have weaknesses of its own. The compatibility between these two variants resides essentially in the fact that Marx was able to identify a mechanism for change within the capitalist mode of production. Marx had no need to claim that men "should" act in their "real" interests and thus was able to avoid the "freedom is coercion" paradox that is imminent in such a claim. Indeed, if men come to consider acting as "associated producers" to be in their own self-ascribed interests then, the proletarian revolution itself could be considered to be compatible with the equality of right premise.

However, the "freedom is coercion" paradox does lurk behind Marx's position if it is accepted that the proletariat is unable to carry through a revolution in the mode of production of their own accord. Indeed, the apparent lack of a potentially revolutionary proletariat has given rise to many "marxist" positions which have sought to revise Marx's position to face these problems. These positions have tended towards a justification of totalitarianism. Lenin's vanguard, Stalin's purges and, less dramatically, sociologists continual use of the notion of "false" consciousness, all appear to rely upon some conception of "real" interests that men "should" act upon. If an internal dynamic cannot be identified within capitalism that will necessarily lead to the eventual demise of this mode of production then, as many revisions of Marx
reveal, the "freedom is coercion" paradox looms in the background once more.

Within the framework set by the general concept of freedom that considers freedom to reside in men living in accordance with their self-ascribed interests, it would be quite legitimate for the political theorist to help men articulate their present disatisfactions or express their emerging interests. Indeed, this may be one way of interpreting part of the intent that lay behind some of Marx's more directly political works, for example, the *Communist Manifesto*. However, within this framework, this would be legitimate only if men were left free to choose or not to choose the prescribed course of action. Marx left men free to choose, however, latter revisionists have tended not to. This has lead to liberals and humanists coming to employ incompatible concepts of freedom. Liberals have retained the notion that men must be left free to pursue their own interests in their own way whereas much contemporary humanist literature has tended to rely on the claim that men "should" act in their "real" interests which leads them into the "freedom is coercion" paradox.

One way out of this paradox for the contemporary critic of capitalism would be the explicit use of the liberal equality of right premise as a basis for developing his critique. The employment of this premise would demand that the critic address his contentions to the self-ascribed interests of men and not to a supposed set of "real" interests he claims them to have. This would enable the critic to side-step the "freedom is coercion" paradox and avoid the justification of totalitarianism which is imminent in talk about "real" interests. The final section of this chapter will offer a brief examination of the possible forms that a "liberal" critique of contemporary capitalism might take.
V The Possibilities of a Liberal Critique

Three main areas of weakness in the link between the liberal equality of right premise and the justification of unlimited private—that is, capitalist—appropriation have been highlighted throughout this work. Firstly, the weakness associated with the claim that men "do" consent to this form of appropriation which, to be at all convincing, must be accompanied by an argument that men, in fact, have an alternative to capitalist appropriation open to them. Secondly, the weakness associated with the claim that men "would" consent to unlimited private appropriation. For this claim to be convincing the liberal must show that men do, in fact, express an overriding interest in increasing levels of material well-being and that capitalist appropriation best satisfies this interest. Finally, it has been suggested that the capitalist mode of production could come to violate the equality of right premise as/when men came to consider it to be inimical to their self-ascribed interests. That is, even if it could convincingly be shown that men do/would consent to capitalism at present, it may be the case that they are in the process of developing "new" interests which might prompt them to seek to change the mode of production at some latter date. If this were the case, then it could be argued that the capitalist mode of production violates the equality of right premise as/when men do develop such "new" interests.

I shall address each of these weaknesses in turn and point to how they could be exploited in the development of a "liberal" critique of contemporary capitalism. Within the scope of this work, little more than a sketch of the possibilities offered by each weakness can be given. Whilst each sketch will be given separately, in the development of a "liberal" critique it could prove possible to run the various arguments concurrently.
The claim that men "do" consent to capitalist appropriation requires, it has been argued, if it is to be at all convincing, that men have an alternative to this appropriation open to them. Unless such an alternative can be shown to exist, then the liberal assertion that men's consent can be inferred from their continued operation in a system embracing a right of unlimited private appropriation, could be seriously undermined. This assertion appeared in Locke's arguments that men's consent can be inferred from their use of money and/or their acceptance of the benefits generated by its use. It also appeared in Nozick's claim that "[n]o doubt people will not long accept a distribution they believe unjust". The individual may not wish to consent to unlimited private appropriation but having no alternative open to him must continue to act within the capitalist mode of production. In such a case, his continued operation within capitalism would not represent an adequate sign of consent.

It could be argued, therefore, that a society claiming to be liberal would have to offer men an alternative to capitalist appropriation. Individuals would have to be left free to choose whether they valued the supposed increased goods and services offered by a system of capitalist appropriation above another form of productive organisation in which they could retain greater self-direction over their activities. Indeed, this type of argument has some implicit basis in some contemporary liberal literature, for example, Ackerman's *Social Justice in the Liberal State*. The offer of such an alternative would make it possible for the liberal to claim that those who continued to reside in those areas where capitalist appropriation did exist did indeed consent. This would represent a contemporary solution to the question of consent similar to Locke's argument that offered those dissatisfied with labouring for wages the
opportunity of taking up land in America.

The liberal claim that men "would" consent to capitalist appropriation has also been shown to have weaknesses. To maintain such an argument the Lockean liberal would be required to show that men do, in fact, express an overidding interest in increasing levels of material well-being and that capitalist appropriation best satisfies this interest. Thus, it might be possible to criticise this argument at two levels. Firstly, it might be possible to argue that men do not express such an overidding interest and, even if they do, it may prove possible to argue that a different form of productive organisation than capitalism would promote greater productivity.

To develop the first level of this type of critique much empirical research would need to be undertaken to discover the interests that men express in actuality. However, it might be found to be the case that men, having achieved a certain level of material well-being, would prefer to develop interests beyond increasing levels of consumption of goods and services. They may prefer increasing leisure time over and above a continual search to satisfy "bourgeois" interests. Yet, even if it were the case that men did express an overidding interest in increasing levels of production and consumption, it might still prove possible to criticise the liberal claim that this interest means that they would consent to capitalist appropriation.

Let us suppose that, when asked, some men expressed an interest in decreased labour time upon the basis of a certain level of material well-being whilst others express an interest in increased amounts of goods and services. It might be possible to develop a convincing alternative to the present mode of production which would offer men greater levels of material well-being and/or increased leisure time. That is, for example, it may be
possible to argue that present relations of production are "fettering" the forces of production that have developed within the capitalist mode of production. In light of the potentials offered by micro-chip technology, it is possible that a model of economy could be developed which would be able to show that a different set of socio-economic relations would promote increased production and/or decreased necessary labour time. If such a model were to be developed, then, on a theoretical level, it could be argued that this represents the form of socio-economic relations that men would consent to. Indeed, if men did come to believe a different set of socio-economic relations than those at present in existence would enhance their productive endeavours, then by implication they would consider existing relations to be inimical to their self-ascribed interests. Since the equality of right premise demands that men be left to redefine their interests in light of changing circumstances and capitalist market/property relations are only legitimate if men do/would consent to them, it would be legitimate for men to withdraw their "consent" from existing relations and consent to a different set of relations which they considered to be more conducive to the realisation of their self-ascribed interests.

This opens up the possibility for developing a third form of "liberal" critique of contemporary capitalism. On the basis of the liberal equality of right premise it would be quite legitimate for the theorist to attempt to help men articulate present dissatisfaction and their emerging interests. Provided that he leaves men free to choose or not to choose his prescription for overcoming these dissatisfactions or realising these emerging interests the equality of right premise would not be violated. As such, by addressing himself to the possibly changing dissatisfactions and potential interests men express in actuality, and not to a supposed set of "real" interests, it would be legit-
imate for the theorist to point out potentials within contemporary capitalism and aid men to politically articulate their desire to realise these potentials.

To assess and articulate men's current disatisfactions/emerging interests the theorist would be required to undertake empirical research into the types of disatisfactions and potential interests men express in actuality. Having carried out such an assessment it would then be legitimate for the theorist to present men with a well articulated alternative to the present productive organisation of society. Since the point of reference for the development and articulation of such an alternative would be men's express preferences, there would be a greater chance of it bearing relevance to the life experiences of those whose support/action is required in achieving the change advocated.

In short, the development of a "liberal" critique of contemporary capitalism is possible. On a theoretical level, the weaknesses in the claim that men do/would consent to capitalist appropriation can be exploited. On a practical level, the articulation of an alternative which addresses itself to the express and/or emerging interests of men would minimise the risk of the critic developing a justification of totalitarianism in his attempts to highlight what he considers to be the coercive and "dehumanising" aspects of capitalism. Such a critique would also offer men a greater opportunity for participation in the advocated shift of identity. Finally, the explicit employment of the equality of right premise in the development of a critique of capitalism would help ensure that the theorist addresses the self-ascribed interests of men and help avert the potentially politically dangerous assertion that men "should" act in their "real" interests.
Notes


2. Idem.


4. Idem.

5. Ibid., pp. 237-238.

6. Ibid., p. 231.


15. See, Lukes, ibid., pp. 34-36.

16. See, Lukes, idem. Lukes implies that this is the case. Gallie, from whom Lukes takes the notion of essential contestability, explicitly claims that this is the case. See, Gallie, op. cit., p. 169.


18. Ibid., p. 2.

20. Ibid., pp. 2-3.


27. Ibid.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

Undoubtedly the idea that the liberal equality of right premise could be employed as a basis from which to develop a critique of contemporary capitalism will, at first sight, strike many as a strange notion. After all, this principle has traditionally been used as a foundation for justifying capitalist appropriation. However, the development of such a critique deserves serious consideration in light of the main themes of this work. The equality of right premise does give rise to an intuitively appealing account of political freedom. Indeed, the assertion that freedom consists in the individual pursuing his own good in his own way has an implicit basis in much humanist literature. Whilst humanists have continually derided the liberal notion of "natural" rights, the notion of freedom residing in the individual pursuing his own good in his own way has resurfaced in such humanist terms as "autonomy", "self-mastery" and "individual sponteneity".

Perhaps one of the main reasons why humanists have found the "liberal" principle so unattractive is the lack of a social self in the liberal notion of the individual. However, it is the insistence that man must be treated as a social being that leads many humanist positions towards the "freedom is coercion" paradox. Marx's humanism avoided this paradox since he was able to identify an internal dynamic within the capitalist mode of production that would lead to its necessary demise and man's realisation of his social nature. However, the major problem for contemporary humanism is the apparent lack of such an internal mechanism for change and men's apparent unwillingness to act to change socio-economic relations of their own accord.
This difficulty has given rise to a proliferation of humanist positions that slide all too easily into the "freedom is coercion" paradox by claiming that men "should" act in their "real" interests. Such positions embrace what I have identified as the "liberal-developmental-normative" notion of freedom which is a variant of the potentially politically dangerous concept that considers freedom to reside in men living in accordance with their "real" interests. Contemporary humanists could avert the slide into the "freedom is coercion" paradox through the explicit use of the equality of right premise and by embracing the "liberal-developmental-empirical" variant of the concept of freedom which considers freedom to reside in men living in accordance with their self-ascribed interests.

By addressing themselves to the express interests, disatisfactions and potential interests men have in actuality, it would then be legitimate for the theorist to present men with a well articulated, although not fully defined, alternative to present socio-economic relations. The essential point of reference would be men's express desires. This point of reference could only aid in the development of an alternative which those whose action/support is sought could find appealing and which would offer them a chance to participate in the changes the theorist advocates.

All this can take place without a rejection of Marx's view that capitalism must, at some point in history, collapse. Indeed, it may well be the case that men would not take up the opportunity of an alternative until present socio-economic relations fail to satisfy their interests on a massive scale, preferring the security of what they know to a possible but unknown future. However, in the mean time, the use of the equality of right premise would allow men the freedom to choose or not to choose the path to greater political
Further, the employment of the equality of right premise as the foundation from which to develop a critique of capitalism would go some way to ensure that theorists who argue in support of capitalist appropriation, and those who seek to criticise it, are in fact talking about the same thing when they utilise such terms as "freedom". All too often in contemporary literature those who argue in support of capitalism at least claim to employ a variant of the concept of freedom which considers freedom to reside in men living in accordance with their own self-ascribed interests, whilst those who seek to criticise this mode of production—usually because they are unable to identify a mechanism for change internal to capitalism—tend to rely on a variant of the general concept which considers freedom to reside in men living in accordance with their "real" interests.

Talk of the individual's right to pursue his own good in his own way on one side, and talk about man's "essential humanity" and the "real" interests this gives rise to, on the other, has tended to obscure the fact that liberals and humanists address their contentions to an essentially similar area of concern. For both traditions, the ability of man to lead life in a self-directed manner has been considered to be a paramount ingredient in political freedom.

By contesting directly the "liberal-bourgeois-empirical" contestant for the concept of freedom that considers freedom to reside in the individual living in accordance with his own self-ascribed interests the critic of capitalism would, at least, ensure that those liberals who argue in support of capitalism are required to strengthen the types of weaknesses that are apparent in their arguments and have been highlighted throughout this work. On a practical level, this may help to result in the articulation of an alternative
to present productive relations that those whose action/support is sought for the prescribed change understand and may be willing to act upon.
1. See, Ted Benton, Realism: Power and Objective Interests, in Keith Graham, ed., Contemporary Political Philosophy: Radical Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 7–33. Beneton offers an excellent account of the difficulties that attend the use of notions of "real" interests in criticizing capitalism. He also argues that the use of this type of notion is to be avoided in the development of a persuasive critique of capitalism. He sees the development of a persuasive critique to be an essential ingredient in social democratic tactics.
Selected Bibliography


