THE EMERGING POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM IN RUSSIA:
1986-1992
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By

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the emerging political party system in Russia, from the beginnings of pluralism in 1986 through 1992. It does so in the context of the theoretical and methodological implications of the literature on transitions to democracy, and with reference to literature on political party systems. This thesis examines the beginnings of independent group activity, the groups' formation into movements and blocs and their participation in elections, and their evolution into proto-parties as the USSR collapsed and the Russian state gained independence and its own identity.

The literature on transitions to democracy is agency-oriented, in that it places an emphasis on political parties in the transition process. While it is unclear at this point in time whether Russia is indeed undergoing a transition to democracy, proto-parties in Russia have played — and will continue to play — a key role in the transformation of Russia from Communism to post-Communism. The future shape and structure of the Russian multi-party system is, however, difficult to predict, because of the nascent and immature nature of the system in the time period this paper examines.
Acknowledgments

This thesis would not have been possible if it were not for the advice and encouragement of my advisor, Dr. Peter Potichnyj, who, in my second undergraduate year at McMaster, instilled in me a keen interest and a passion for Soviet (and later post-Soviet) politics. Later, in graduate school, Dr. Potichnyj's advice and counsel were invaluable to me, and I owe him my gratitude. I would also like to extend my thanks to Dr. Stefania Miller, for her useful suggestions and to Dr. Michael Stein, whose insightful comments on all matters theoretical and methodological were most appreciated. Without the helpfulness, support and reassurance of my committee, this thesis would not have been completed. Nevertheless, I bear ultimate responsibility for this piece of work and, as such, any errors or faults in it are entirely my own.

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Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to the memory of my dear friend Voyta Prikryl, who passed away suddenly the week before its completion.
Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ iii
Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................... iv
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................... v
List of Appendices ..................................................................................................................... vii
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1
   Prologue
   Introduction

Chapter One: Soviet Politics, Post-Soviet Politics and Beyond ........................................... 5
   Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives
   Critical Review of Literature

Chapter Two: The Beginnings of Independent Political Activity, 1986-1990 ....................... 28
   The Rise of Neformal'nye
   From Informal to Formal Participation in Elections
   Official Reactions
   Analysis and Conclusions

Chapter Three: The Institutional Context for the Emergence of Proto-Parties in Russia, 1989-1990 ................................................................. 54
   Introduction — Theoretical Considerations
   Change in the Legislative System
   Change in the Electoral System
   The Russian Elections and the New RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies
   Article Six and the Communist Party
   Conclusions — Factionalization, Proto-parties and the Nascent Party System

Chapter Four: Pluralism, Factionalism and Polarization — The Parties and the Political Party System, 1986-1992, and Beyond ......................................................... 89
   The Interregional Group of Deputies
   The Withering Away of the Party: Evolution and Dissolution of the CPSU
   Democratic Russia
Democratic Party of Russia
Civic Union
The People's Party of Free Russia
The Social Democratic Party of Russia
The Republican Party of Russia
Constitutional Democrats
The Russian Christian Democratic Movement
United Workers' Front
Socialist Party of Russia
Socialist Party of Working People
Russian Party of Communists
Russian Communist Workers' Party
Russian Unity — The Red Brown Coalition
Communist Party of the Russian Federation
All Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
Communist and Nationalist Right
Liberal Democratic Party
Parliamentary Factions and Blocs
The Party System
Democracy/Authoritarianism versus Left and Right
State Protection of Industry versus the Importance of Social Welfare
Private Property/Public Property versus Planned or Market Economy
National Independence/Federation versus Left and Right
Conclusions and Future Prospects

Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 137

Overview
Analysis and Prognosis
The Last Word

Appendices .................................................................................................................... 147

Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 162
List of Appendices

Appendix
1. Typology of Groups in the USSR and Russia, 1986-1990 .......... 148
2. Political Divisions and Personalities, Summer/Fall 1990 .......... 152
3. Graphs: Ideological and Programmatic Space Occupied by Parties According to Issue ......................................................... 155
5. Election Results for the State Duma — December 1993 .......... 161
Prologue

The tragedy of the Soviet era — socialism, communism, and totalitarianism — gave way in 1991 to renewed hopes for Russia. It was expected that after Boris Yeltsin's heroic defense against the CPSU hardliner's coup attempt in August 1991, Russia's political development would mirror that of many other Eastern European countries by moving slowly but steadily towards democracy and the rule of law.

However, in October 1993, President Boris Yeltsin's decision to dissolve the Russian Supreme Soviet precipitated a standoff at the Russian parliament, the White House. The standoff brought the country to the brink of civil war, and ended with Russian army units storming the building to arrest Aleksandr Rutskoi and Ruslan Khasbulatov, the leaders of a failed parliamentary insurrection. Yeltsin called a referendum on a new constitution and also called the first post-communist election for a new parliament.
On December 12 of the same year, Russian voters went to the polls and narrowly approved the new constitution, with 52 per cent of voters voting yes.¹ This would be Yeltsin and the reformers' only victory. The Liberal Democratic Party and its iconoclastic leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, gained over 22 per cent of the vote, and were awarded the largest number of party-list seats in the new State Duma. Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party was anything but liberal or democratic: the LDP and Zhirinovsky were nationalistic, fascist, and even anti-Semitic. Eleven of the 13 parties contesting the election were, in principle, against substantive economic reform. The principal reformist party, Russia's Choice, under former prime minister Yegor Gaidar, received only 15.3 per cent of the vote to receive 40 party-list seats, though his party did win enough single member district seats to ensure that it was not the Duma's smallest party.

By the winter of 1994, President Yeltsin and his reliance on increasingly hard-line advisors — who were collectively called the Kremlin's "party of war" — resulted in an ill-fated invasion of the breakaway republic of Chechnya. Meanwhile, with Yeltsin's popularity plummeting, the executive branch of government, led by prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin (an old-style apparatchik and former communist) continued to hedge on economic reform while inflation soared, the economy declined and living standards worsened. The new Duma was fractious, and the shaky party system inside it

¹Voters cast three ballots for a new bicameral legislature, the Federal Assembly. The first ballot selected two candidates from their region for the Council of the Federation, a 176-member upper house; the two candidates receiving the most votes in each region would be elected. The second and third ballots would elect members to the State Duma, a 450-member lower house. Half of the 450 seats would be awarded to candidates receiving a plurality of votes, on the second ballot, in 225 single-member constituencies. The other half would be allocated by proportional representation, with a five per cent minimum threshold, to party lists according to the percentage of the vote that each party received on the third ballot. From Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 2, April 1994, p. 3. For a summary of the results, see Appendix Five.
remained separate and distinct from its extra-parliamentary wings outside, although it has surprised skeptical Western observers by failing to collapse.

Why and how had this occurred? Sovietology, as a discipline, had failed to predict the collapse of the USSR and has been equally unable to predict the short-term prospects for Russia; it is unlikely that Sovietology's predictive record will be any better over the long term.

**Introduction**

While many observers saw the Gorbachev era as some sort of democratization process, it is now obvious that what was occurring was the breakdown of a bankrupt system attempting to save itself. When the Soviet Union and the system collapsed in August 1991, after a failed coup attempt by members of the government, the assumption was that Russia would more or less follow the path of other Eastern European countries towards democracy. This has not yet occurred.

Gorbachev's reforms unleashed powerful forces that the government and the CPSU were unable to control. Most notably, independent movements and groups — neformal'nye, the informal groups — were created and within a few short years were able to challenge the previously unquestioned authority of the government. Later, these groups played a key role in organizing protests and, after further organizational evolution, they contested the first nominally free elections to the USSR's Congress of People's Deputies, elections to the RSFSR parliament, and helped secure Yeltsin's election as President of the RSFSR. After the collapse of the USSR, leading
groups outside and within the Russian parliament were instrumental in implementing an agenda of economic and political reform.

To understand transformation from authoritarianism to democracy (or at least liberalization, as is probably the case to this point in Russia), it is important to understand the key role political parties play; political parties are, it has been said, bellwethers of democracy and democratic consolidation.

In the West, the study of political parties is an important sub-discipline of comparative politics. There has been extensive theoretical, descriptive and analytical literature written about parties in the West. However, because the phenomena of pluralism and independent group activity is so new after the collapse of the Soviet empire and Communism, the study of political parties in Eastern Europe is still in its infancy. The goal of this study is to add to this growing body of knowledge.

This is not to suggest that the independent groups, movements and factions in Russia are political parties in the truest sense. Rather, it is only to assert that groups, movements and factions in Russia have indeed played an important part in the political decay of the old order and the current transformation towards a new order (whatever it may be). The objective of this study is to understand and explain the development of these groups, movements and factions, and attempt to make some predictions about future of the parties (or more precisely, proto-parties), the emerging party system, and thus, the prospects for a further transition to democracy.
Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives: Soviet Politics, Post-Soviet Politics and Beyond

"The old order is dying, the new cannot yet be born. In the period between morbid realities assert themselves."

Antonio Gramsci

Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives

The study of post-Soviet politics has been evidenced both by a desire on the part of social scientists to understand and explain recent events, and what might be described as a great deal of introspection and reflection. This latter trend occurred because scholars were able to neither envision nor predict the rapid downfall of the communist-totalitarian system, which collapsed so quickly and took Western observers and scholars by almost complete surprise. Martin Malia termed this failure to anticipate, predict, and ultimately explain the demise of the communist regime a crisis in Sovietology¹, partly because there has not been the same evolutionary transition to democracy as there was in the rest of Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, some have suggested that the collapse of communism may allow the study of post-Soviet politics to enter what might be termed the mainstream of comparative politics and utilize more generally accepted theoretical approaches that have been more or less applicable to the study of politics in the West.² This presupposes, of

course, that the study of Soviet politics (before, say, 1988) was a separate subsection of comparative politics unto itself, characterized in no small part by a lack of an overarching and dominant model of analysis or Weltanschauung.

In order to help understand and make sense of reality, social science employs methodological frameworks or models. Models are constructed to demonstrate relationships between systems — or, indeed, to give context to a system under study — and are not theories. Therefore models contribute towards understanding systems, rather than explaining them, as theories do; models involve the techniques through which it is possible to evaluate theories. With respect to the choice and evaluation of models, Huntington suggests three criteria by which macromodels should be assessed. He notes that models should capture the features of critical importance, offer a basis for comparison with other systems, and account for change. It will be important to keep these criteria in mind.

A word of caution is necessary here. Given the incredible pace of social, political and economic change in Russia, an examination of any part of the transition process must, as Sidney Tarrow so persuasively points out, engage in "aiming at a moving target". To Tarrow, the events in all of Eastern Europe, including Russia, must be partially understood through the concepts of "waves of mobilization" and "collective action as a moving target". More simply put, "mass outbreaks of collective action are best understood as the collective responses of citizens groups and elites to an
expanding structure of political opportunities". Tarrow is arguing for the examination of the very context in which people act, of how they act and, by extension, the vehicles through which they act: political groups, movements and parties.

Which general theory and what models, then, are applicable to the questions at hand, namely, the study of the development of political parties and independent groups in Russia in the period from 1988 to 1991? The most apparent theoretical literature addresses democratic transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe. The Schmitter-O'Donnell-Whitehead series on transitions from authoritarian rule or Dankwart Rustow's classic work on democratization may be of some use in helping to make sense of the changes in Russia. With respect to the issue of comparability — whether it is possible to compare Russia's ostensible democratization with models and theories based on democratic transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe — Russell Bova convincingly argues that social scientists can gain insight from this comparison. He notes that "...[the] concern should be to delimit a universe of potential cases for comparison by identifying characteristics of the transition process common to each." Bova goes on to suggest that the key transformations to look at are those "nonrevolutionary transitions from authoritarian rule in which elements of the old regime play an important role in the initiation and/or direction of political change." Thus, the Soviet, Romanian, Spanish, Portuguese and other cases (from both

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6Tarrow, p. 13
9Bova, p. 116.
Latin America and Europe) would all qualify under this criteria. If the goal of
cross-polity comparative politics is to look for characteristics that recur in a
number of different polities, in order to identify a pattern, then it seems that
it would be a useful endeavour to attempt to understand Russia's
transformation in terms of similar processes elsewhere in the world. 10

Schmitter and O'Donnell's approach to the transition process is best
described as agency-oriented; they choose agency in the structure versus
agency debate. Nancy Bermeo suggests that this perspective's "emphasis on
individual actors has important methodological and political implications,"
which include the predominance of domestic factors in a transition and the
importance of elite decision making in the democratization process. 11

Dankwart Rustow, in his seminal 1970 article on transitions to
democracy, proposes a model has four contingent phases: firstly, a
background condition; this single background condition of national unity
must precede other phases of democratization. Secondly, the preparatory
phase where there is a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle, among
well-entrenched forces regarding issues that are salient. Thirdly, the decision
phase, where the conclusion of the previous phase is marked by "a deliberate
decision by leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that
end, to institutionalize some crucial aspects of democratic procedure" 12; and
finally, the acceptance of the decision to democratize, by political actors and

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10 Others also emphasize the comparability of transition models, and other general comparative political science literature, to the Russian and Eastern European cases. See also Adam Przeworski, The 'East' Becomes the 'South'? The 'Autumn of the People' and the Future of Eastern Europe in Political Science and Politics, v. XXIV, No. 1, March 1991, pp. 20-24.

11 Nancy Bermeo, Rethinking Regime Change (review article) in Comparative Politics, April 1990, pp. 361-362.

elites. It is worth emphasizing that Rustow's approach — like Schmitter-O'Donnell-Linz — is also agency-oriented; elites and political parties are the key actors.

However, these models and theories also have other important implications. Bermeo notes that democratization does not occur in one step; rather, "it is essential to draw an analytic distinction between the disintegration of a dictatorship, the construction of a democratic regime, and the consolidation of democracy." This distinction can help to give context to events, in the spirit of Tarrow's above assertions. For example, whether we are witnessing democratic institution-building or the decay of totalitarian institutions, and how this might affect groups and parties. As will become obvious, we saw — and are seeing — the development of pluralism during the destruction of totalitarianism; it will also become apparent that the phase in which Russia finds itself is currently is probably the beginnings of the construction of democracy. The circumstances in which these groups, movements and parties formed had some effect on them. Perhaps more importantly, this distinction alerts us to the fact that what we have in Russia is only, at best, the beginnings of democracy; we are still witnessing the collapse of totalitarian institutions, practices, and beliefs.

Accordingly, though this literature on transitions to democracy may be insightful and provide some explanation of the dynamics at work, there are two problems. Firstly, that the goal is not to examine the transition or its dynamics, per se, but rather to investigate the emerging party system. This does not, of course, invalidate the understanding we may gain from theories

13Bermeo (fn. 11), p. 368
of transitions to democracy. Secondly, democracy — and hence
democratization — may be only one of the many possible paths that Russian
society might take in the coming years. Accordingly, the use of these
theories is optimistic at best and a case of Sartori's "conceptual stretching" at
worst.

More germane to the topic at hand, nevertheless, is this literature's
emphasis on political parties and their leaders. Above all, democracy requires
the development of broadly inclusive political parties. As such, the literature
on political parties in the West may also yield useful insights about the
development of Russian political movements, parties and groups.

There are many common elements in the differing explanations for
the development of political parties in the West. LaPalombara and Weiner
suggest that it is customary in the West to associate the development of
parties with the rise of parliament — a circumstance that probably applies to
Russia — and the gradual extension of suffrage. Duverger calls these two
developmental tendencies internally-created (cadre parties) and externally-
created parties (mass parties) respectively. Another commonality among
explanations is that the development of parties is related to, or in some sense
dependent upon, liberalism, democratic ideologies and pluralism.

Historically, observers did not always consider the precursors of parties,
factions, as positive or desirable institutions. Whereas Sartori notes that

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17Factions were loose groupings in legislatures of parliamentarians; it was considered to be a pejorative term.
parties are, to Hume, an "unpleasant consequence, hardly as a condition, of free government", we now consider parties to be a necessary precondition of a functioning democracy.\textsuperscript{18} Sartori, too, also points out that there is a "subtle" relationship between a broad degree of pluralism and party pluralism. Perhaps one of the most important, but often overlooked arguments, regarding the genesis of political parties is that the creation and rise of parties requires protracted social or political conflicts, within some sort of representative body like a parliament or legislature. Dankwart Rustow suggests that factions emerged in these representative bodies when these bodies began to take a role in the government of a state (Duverger's internally-created party); and when citizens of a state asserted their rights to help participate in the selection of deputies to these legislatures (an externally-created or mass party).\textsuperscript{19}

Nevertheless, all of the theoretical material on political parties concurs that parties have specific normative functions and roles in developed, liberal-democratic countries; as well as in those countries that are undergoing liberalization or regime transition (as the theoretical literature on transitions notes).\textsuperscript{20} Let us examine some of these functions and roles:

\textit{Linkages/Socio-Economic Bases}

Parties should link the people of a country and their government; historically, internally-created, cadre parties were forced to appeal to the

\textsuperscript{20}The following overview on the roles and functions of political parties is based on Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., eds. \textit{Comparative Politics Today}, 3rd edition, Toronto, Little and Brown, 1984, pp. 78-96.
public for support, and as such began to develop distinct socio-economic bases. An analysis of parties in the Soviet and immediate post-Soviet eras will need to examine whether groups and parties in Russia show signs of developing the requisite social and economic bases.

**Political Socialization**

Before its dissolution, the CPSU played an important role in socializing the population. Perhaps one of the testaments to its lack of success was that it was seemingly unable to convince Russians that it could deliver rising living standards and "real Communism". It remains to be seen whether the new parties or movements in Russia are able to act as agents of socialization, through the recruitment and electioneering activity that mass-based Western parties perform. These activities, that help to provide linkages between institutions and governments on the one hand and the people on the other, also serve to increase the population's sense of political efficacy and confidence in democratic institutions as well as democracy in general.

**Recruitment—Citizen Participation and Elites**

There is a marked contrast between the totalitarian system, where the CPSU essentially controlled all political participation, recruitment and selection of government officials, and a democracy, where there is supposed to be competition amongst parties towards the recruitment of citizens and elites.
Communication

Political parties in a democracy help to communicate their ideas in the free marketplace of political ideas. In the Soviet Union, the CPSU dominated all means of mass communication until glasnost, Gorbachev's nominal liberalization. Though glasnost did not result in Western-style press and media freedom, it was an important element in the general climate of liberalization that allowed Russians, for the first time, to challenge authority and experience some form of freedom of communications on political questions and issues of importance. In turn, this helped to provide the appropriate atmosphere for the eventual formation of political groups and movements, which could then promote their ideas somewhat freely.

Interest Articulation and Aggregation

Political parties in the West encourage their local constituency organizations and groups, as well as interest groups, to help influence and make party policy, in the anticipation of being elected and putting the party program into practice. Interest aggregation refers to the process of brokering the alternative demands and interests, and formulating alternative policies. Aggregation took place in the USSR only within the upper echelons of the CPSU, the bureaucracy and the military, and was seldom public.

Policy Making and Implementation

Political parties in the West help to enact policy if they are in government, or alternately compete with the governing party in formulating policy alternatives. Parties in the West are not involved in policy
implementation, while in the USSR the CPSU oversaw the implementation of public policy through its secretariats.

The picture of the USSR was of a country with a monolithic party that controlled almost all of the political process, while parties in the West perform their roles in a competitive arena. There is obviously a marked contrast between the functions and roles western, liberal-democratic political parties perform, what has been past practice in the USSR, and what the newly emerging parties, groups and movements in present-day Russia are doing. A potential problem is, then, that these groupings and movements do not satisfy the nominal criteria of true political parties, and as such are merely proto-parties, as literature on the development of political parties calls them. For example, in the West, parties require socio-economic bases in order to be considered true political parties. Aleksandr Meerovich remarks that Western literature on political parties stresses the organizational and competitive nature of political parties, while "Soviet literature still stresses their social bases," that is, it utilizes some form of class-based analysis in keeping with Soviet academic legacy. Meerovich argues the pessimism of Soviet observers over "insufficient social grounding of new parties" may be more a "reflection of their own ideological heritage (with its insistence on a class based definition of parties) than of an objective appraisal of the new parties' prospects." Others, however, have suggested that the transition period is an example of newly emerging social classes with very vested interests, and

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22 Meerovich, p. 9
hence the beginnings of the socio-economic bases of political parties in the modern, western sense.\textsuperscript{23}

Literature on party system development in the West may also have some explanatory power. A concept and typology of party systems as posited by Sartori asserts that the number of parties in the system affects how that system works. He notes that "the format [of the party system] is interesting to the extent that it contains mechanical predispositions, that it goes to determine a set of functional properties of the party system first, and of the overall political system as a consequence."\textsuperscript{24} To this end, Sartori's concept of polarized pluralism seems quite applicable to current, and perhaps future, post-Soviet reality. Polarized pluralism requires at least five or six parties; the presence of anti-system parties, which can operate from within the system itself, and provide either ideological or protest opposition; and bilateral oppositions, as Sartori puts it, "oppositions that are mutually exclusive" and thus cannot join together. Furthermore, in polarized pluralism the centre of the political spectrum is occupied by a party (or parties) that face both left and right, and therefore discourage centrality — which is the drive of the political system towards the centre and thus towards moderation. Polarization itself is another characteristic; simply put, "the spectrum of political opinion is highly polarized: its lateral poles are literally two poles apart, and the distance between them covers a maximum spread in opinion." There is low consensus and ideological distance between the parties, and Sartori also notes that "In the long run, a centre positioning is not only a consequence but also a


\textsuperscript{24}See Giovanni Sartori (fn. 18), p. 128.
cause of polarization, for the very fact that the central area is occupied feeds the system with center-fleeing drives and discourages centripetal competition." As a consequence, the centre becomes increasingly weaker as there is the "prevalence of the centrifugal drives over the centripetal ones". Because of the presence of this "large ideological space" in the political spectrum, ideological patterning also occurs, where parties disagree not only on policy issues but also on more fundamental 'polity' issues. Sartori calls these polity issues "principles and fundamentals". The final two characteristics of polarized pluralism are an irresponsible opposition and the "politics of outbidding": The opposition in polarized pluralism are deemed irresponsible because it is unlikely they will ever have to put into practice, through participating in a governing coalition, what they have promised. The "politics of outbidding" refers to this tendency of parties to attempt to be all things to all people, through "overpromising".

There are, however, serious concerns and problems about the adaptability of western notions and theories. For example, there may be no real need for a cadre party as it is easier to organize a mass party with modern means of mass media and communications, which Russia for the most part currently possesses. Herein lies the pervasive theoretical question: is it sound and relevant to utilize theories and methodologies that are applicable to industrialized, Western countries, for the study of post-Soviet politics? Is Russia an industrialized, urbanized, literate country with modern means of

25Hellmut Wollmann distinguishes between policy and polity issues; polity issues refers to fundamental issues, such as the way in which the political and economic systems should be structured or organized, while policy issues are those that refer to specific policy areas. See Hellmut Wollmann, Change and Continuity of Political and Administrative Elites from Communist to Post Communist Russia in Governance—A Journal of Policy and Administration, v. 6, no. 3, July 1993, pp. 325-340.

26See Giovanni Sartori (fn. 18), pp. 131-144.
mass communication such as telecommunications and television, or is the opposite true, in which case Western notions of political pluralism and more generalized theories of comparative politics might not apply. There is, of course, also a difference between the large urban centres like St. Petersburg and Moscow and the countryside, which remains somewhat backward.

Thus, no theoretical perspective can be rigidly applied; while the designation and the use of theories of political party formation — proto-parties — is a concept that fits Russian reality in some cases, it does not apply in every case. As well, we cannot ignore contextual factors that affect the development of political parties, groups and movements, such as the rise of pluralism both inside and outside of the Communist Party, the overall stage of liberalization or transition to democracy (with its contiguous but distinct phases), the role glasnost' played in the liberalization of the political system, and the effects of institutions in the political system.

What is required, then, is an examination of the broad political and social trends that led to the creation of informal groups and movements on one hand, and an examination of parliamentary factions and groupings on the other. Peter Potichnyj, in his analysis of political parties in Ukraine, suggested that observers of new political parties, groups and movements look at tendencies in the political spectrum, for example, by making general

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27 The best term to describe political parties in Russia at this stage in Russia's development is 'proto-parties.' However, in the interests of clarity this paper will refer to all political groupings and proto-parties as political parties, unless it is clear that the group in question is only an extra-parliamentary movement (for example, a national or popular front movement with little or no parliamentary representation) or a relatively unorganized group. Faction will refer to a part of the whole, e.g., a faction of a party or party alliance. 'Bloc' will refer to a group of proto-parties or factions in parliament that have joined together in some form of electoral or legislative alliance.

28 Glasnost can best be translated into English as 'openness'; the concept refers to Gorbachev's liberalization of the mass media and freer access to information. For a more extensive examination of the effects glasnost' had on the political system and pluralism, see Donald R. Kelley, Gorbachev's Reforms and the Factionalization of Soviet Politics in Perestroika-Era Politics, Robert T. Huber and Donald R. Kelley, eds., M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1991. pp. 79-104.
inferences and conclusions about party and party system development. By examining the history of parties and groups, as well as their ideological and programmatic leanings, these tendencies can be examined. Potichnyj's examination uses a two-dimensional graphing on which he plots the parties' various views on a number of salient political, social and cultural and economic issues.29

Each two-dimensional graphing will examine parties' programs and leanings on two sets of related issues, where each set of issues will form the horizontal and vertical axes respectively. The issues that will be examined will include:

- democracy/authoritarianism versus left/right on the political spectrum (regime issue)
- unitary state/federal state versus national/multinational state (polity issue)
- private property/public property versus planned economy/market economy (policy issue)
- planned economy/mixed economy versus a low or high concern for social welfare

In addition to these issues, there are other divisions and differences between the movements and parties that should be investigated. Because many of these groups developed before the demise of the CPSU, their views regarding

the CPSU should be looked at. Central questions of this nature include whether the CPSU is reformable, and if yes then to what extent; and whether or not the new movements should co-operate with the CPSU. Another key division is the "basic political and ideological motivation of a party and its leaders". As parties and movements are organizationally weak, the ideological views of their leaders (due to their ideological and charismatic bases) become increasingly important in an analysis. Western conceptions of "right" and "left" may also not be readily applicable, and thus pose a problem. Furthermore, old ideas such as the Leninist-Stalinist radical Left (the "Old Left") have been institutionalized such that they now appear reactionary when contrasted with emerging liberalism, conservatism and democratic socialism. As the so-called "New Right" shares many reactionary viewpoints (such as racism, xenophobia, extreme nationalism) with the "Old Left", there is no longer a distinction between the two extremes. What follows is a brief overview of different ideological groupings and trends in Russia today, in order to clarify some of these ideological distinctions.

On the right of the political spectrum — in the sense of being reactionary and conservative — is Conservative Nationalist Fundamentalism. This view is predicated on the ancient idea that the Russian nation has been called upon by God for a special mission, and is made up of Slavophiles and the Pochvenniki. The Pochvenniki are against Western-style democracy and Western ideas of all types, and are supportive of the Russian Orthodox religion. Another grouping on the right of the political spectrum, and part of the "New Right", is the National Bolshevik-Orthodox

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30 Meerovich, (fn. 21), p. 12.
31 Meerovich, p. 12.
hybrid. This group's ideology is a combination of reactionary late-Communist ideas and reactionary, religious clerical-nationalist ideas; an example of this group's views is those expressed in the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya. The final group that is part of the "New Right" is right-wing anti-Americanism, that might loosely be termed "Eurasianism". Though Eurasianism used to be predominantly Communist and therefore "left-wing," it can now be termed right-wing as the intellectual elite who form the base of this grouping are strongly anti-American, conservative, and ideological. Geopolitically, as "Eurasians" see the world through bipolarity (e.g., Russia against the United States), they believe in a Russian empire across Europe against the United States. It seems that the common theme in the views of the "New Right" is that the crises Russia faces, whether real or imagined, are due to any combination of Jews, Communists, anti-Communists, Zionists, apparatchiks, Masons, foreigners or liberals. National revival, the idealization of the peasant, Orthodoxy, anti-Semitism and a conspiracy against the Russian people are also prominent beliefs in the New Right's world view of cultural nationalism. It is also important to point out that a milder form of cultural nationalism can also be found in the centre and left of the political spectrum. In contrast to these sometimes extremist viewpoints, there is the democratic mainstream. Most of the newer parties and groups could be classified as Liberals, who are pluralists and are the successors to the former "Westernizers". They advocate western-style parliamentary democracy, engage in national self-criticism and reject isolationism, expansionism and the political or cultural conservatism of the "New Right".

Meerovich, p. 13.
Perhaps the only split among the democratic mainstream is between moderates and radicals. The radical nature of some groups is due to their willingness to condone mass protests, demonstrations and civil disobedience against the then-CPSU dominated Soviet government and institutions. Indeed, the subtle differences between democratically-oriented, liberal movements might be made more apparent through their views on the CPSU, the then-current government, and transformation: Meerovich notes that these opposing views might be termed "confrontational" or "pessimistic" versus "legalistic" or "optimistic".33

Finally, there is a smaller group of parties and movements that form the Russian "New Left". While some in this grouping still believe in class as the key determining factor in political and economic analysis, others believe in a variety of antistatist, libertarian, environmentalist ideologies. Meerovich notes that those of the New Left who continue to believe in the importance of the working class and the CPSU have found common cause with the New Right, who also object to market reforms that ostensibly attack workers; in so doing, both the New Right and these so-called "New Socialists" argue for state and collective property instead of privatization.34

Keeping in mind these ideological and philosophical distinctions will provide this analysis of parties and the party system with part of the necessary social and cultural context in which these parties operate. John Lloyd remarks that "it cannot be expected that the party vessels can simply be filled by programs and strategies formed in a vacuum."35 Indeed, in Russia, a

33Meerovich, p. 13.
35John Lloyd, Democracy in Russia in The Political Quarterly, v. 64, no. 2, April-June 1993, pp. 147-155.
country whose developing political parties are based more on charismatic leaders and ideological factors, it is these beliefs have helped to shape the views of party leaders and hence the programs of the parties they lead.

This paper's approach, therefore, will be three-fold. Firstly, the development of political pluralism and its associated movement, groups, parties and political trends will be examined. Secondly, the larger of these groups and parties will be analyzed and examined in terms of the above issues and framework. Then, parties and the emerging party system will be looked at, according to the general theories of parties and party system development; and finally, some conclusions will be drawn, about the emergence of parties and the post-Soviet multiparty system, and the future of the system.

This chapter examined the theoretical and methodological basis for this study. The next chapter, Chapter Two, will examine and chronicle the rise of the so-called neformal'nye, the informal groups in the USSR that were the precursors to the proto-parties that now exist in post-Soviet Russia. The second chapter will also analyze the political, social and economic changes that gave context to the political activities of the emerging independent groups. Chapter Three will look at the legislative and institutional changes in the USSR, and later Russia proper, that made the emergence of the ne'formalnye and later the nascent political parties possible. The final chapter, Chapter Four, will investigate in detail the different independent groups, factions and proto-parties that make up the pre- and post-Soviet political environment; the more important of these groups will be graphed on two-dimensional axes to make some conclusions about the party system.
Alfred G. Meyer notes that an insightful examination of post-Communist politics must combine institutional analysis with cultural empathy. Too often, political scientists have utilized models of political systems that idealize western practice, history and institutions: Meyer maintains that "when Soviet reality is judged by its failure to come up to Western myths about their own political systems, it is bound to be found wanting." Therefore, evidence and information gained in this study must not be distorted just to fit it into idealized but abstract western models and theories; accordingly, every attempt will be made in this paper to relate the subject matter to the relevant political, cultural and ideological context. Most importantly, politics is not just about abstract theories or party systems — above all, it is about people. This examination, given the aforementioned evidence, and indeed the advice of Meyer, will do well to keep in mind the prescient remarks of Sartori, who states that "what parties are for — that is, what their functions, placement and weight in the political system are — has not been designed by theory but has been determined by a concurrence of events." Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to examine whether the current patterns of the emergent party system in Russia shows promise of helping to produce some form of transition to democracy. Its goal is to classify the current state of the party system, make some predictions about its future, and by doing so make some predictions about the future of the Russian political system.

37 Giovanni Sartori, (fn. 18), p. 18.
Critical Review of Literature

There is, surprisingly, a great deal of literature available on the subject of the pluralism and the emerging party system in Russia, despite the fact that these subjects are relatively recent phenomena in the study of Soviet and post-Soviet politics. In fact, the literature to be used in this paper is, for the most part, current in that the subject of political pluralism in the USSR is a recent one. Older studies about democratization in other parts of the world, and the role of political parties in this process, will also be useful in order to use generally applicable theories. However, studies that draw conclusions from democratization in Latin America, for example, need to be used selectively because the political and social circumstances of post-Soviet Russia are different.

Information about politics and independent movements, groups, factions, and proto-parties falls into four broad categories: older works (pre-1986) of social science on the USSR and Russia; more current (post-1986) social science works that are historical, analytical or descriptive in nature, and include books, monographs and articles; straight news reports from newspapers and periodicals that is either Russian, translated from Russian (Current Digest of the Soviet Press), or in English (such as reports from the New York Times or even the Moscow News); and finally, newer and more current analytical reports, such as Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe research reports.

Pre-Gorbachev works of social science about the USSR focus on historical, political and social developments using different theoretical perspectives; these are usually compiled or written by Western observers and
experts. Examples of these works include Friedrich and Brzezinski's works on totalitarianism, Darrell P. Hammer's 'bureaucratic pluralism' model, Gordon Skilling's *Interest Groups and Communist Politics Revisited* article, and Jerry Hough's *How the Soviet Union is Governed*. Though these works' predictive and analytical shortcomings are now apparent, these works are readily available and will provide the necessary background information and theoretical perspectives that help to put post-Soviet politics in context.

Post-Soviet and Post-Communist works of social science on the subjects being examined are extensively available, either in book or article form. There are also a number of works available that have been written by Russian authors, which provide an important Russian and Soviet perspective. An example of a work by a Russian author is M.A. Babkina's *New Political Parties and Movements in the Soviet Union*. Published in 1991, this is a useful book that includes translations of Russian articles and chapter authors who are party leaders (e.g., Oleg Rumyantsev of the Social Democratic Party and Boris Kagarlitsky of the now-defunct Socialist Party). Its only drawbacks is that it is poorly edited with transliteration problems, and some unexplained abbreviations. Nevertheless, this volume will be an important reference tool for this study. Other works will include those by Western authors, such as Michael McFaul and Sergei Markov's *The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy — People, Parties, Programs*, Wekkin *et. al.*'s *Building Democracy in One-Party Systems*, Mervyn Matthew's *Party State and Citizen in the Soviet Union*, The Road to Post-Communism—Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union 1985-1991, edited by Hosking, Aves

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and Duncan, David Remnick's superb *Lenin's Tomb*, Gill, White and Slider's *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future*, Huber and Kelley's *Perestroika-Era Politics*, and Nancy Bermeo's *Liberalization and Democratization*, among other pieces of literature such as many scholarly or academic journal articles and monographs.

Some of these works contain the programs of parties, interviews with leaders and analyses of this material (McFaul and Markov), some are historical, descriptive with respect to background and analytical (Hosking, Aves and Duncan), and some that are almost purely theoretical and comparative (the volume Bermeo edited, Huber and Kelley, Wekkin *et. al.*), some of these works are unique and invaluable, like the Matthews text which is a compendium of documents that explain how the old Soviet system — and system in transition — actually worked, by including copies of election ballots, decrees, laws, and constitutional revisions. As well, the Remnick book is particularly noteworthy, in that it combines personal observation, narrative and description as well as interviews, explanation and analysis by a journalist that is particularly knowledgeable about the USSR and who lived and worked in the USSR through the last days of the Soviet empire. On balance, most of these books are well-researched and supported and have no major flaws or errors. Thus, there is no shortage of literature that is either theoretical (comparative and dealing with theory) or practical (dealing with the events, people, parties, movements, groups, and programs) in orientation.

To obtain hard facts and description from events, sources such as the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* will be consulted. The CDSP is readily
available and provides English translations of articles that have appeared in the Soviet press. This provides an important Russian dimension in terms of reporting of events, but also means careful reading is required because of the biases and subjectivity of the "official" media. Newer analytical reports, such as the Report on the USSR and, as it is later called, the Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe Research Reports will be invaluable for this study and will be consulted and cited frequently. The RFE/RL weekly reports provide up-to-date, objective analysis that is current, well-researched and concise.

One final note: The works that are usually considered to be primary sources of information — such as translated constitutions and platforms of the groups, or interviews with their leaders — may be less reliable than the secondary sources, such as those books or articles that describe or analyze these groups. This is an important consideration for the purposes of this study because while primary sources may contain the supposed and public leanings of groups, the secondary sources may in fact be more helpful because they will include an analysis and explanation by the author or observer about a particular group. For example, the way a group attempts to be perceived publicly may quite different from its actual ideological inclinations and predispositions.
II

The Beginnings of Independent Political Activity, 1986-1990: The *Neformal'nye* to the 1989 and 1990 Elections

*The Rise of Neformal'nye*

The rise of independent groups and movements in the Soviet Union, and in particular Russia, is important in that these *neformal'nye*, as they were called, were the precursors to today's parties and movements. Moreover, these groups eventually began to challenge the CPSU's heretofore unassailable grip on political power.

A number of institutional, social and political developments were instrumental in allowing the *neformal'nye* to have the opportunity to evolve and mature in the open. Small groups of one form or another had existed for decades, they were essentially clubs and little attention was paid to them, because the authorities wished to deny their existence. Gorbachev's three pillars of change and reform — *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and *demokratizatsiia*, from 1986 onwards — provided the necessary openings for the development of independent groups and movements in 1988 and 1989. While these slogans meant different things to social, cultural, political and economic life in the USSR, and it can be argued that *glasnost* and *perestroika* in particular were means to an end (e.g., the restructuring of the current system, rather than the replacement of it), the concrete changes that they brought to political life in the USSR were indispensable to the development
of the *neformal'nye* and, consequently, to the development of political groupings and parties.

The USSR (and Russia proper) before 1986 was for the most part a totalitarian, single party state. As many commentators and scholars have remarked, this produced less than fertile ground for the development of civil society — those institutions and groups independent of the state and the CPSU. In the 1980s, the USSR and its leadership faced a number of interrelated and complex problems, while the need for innovation and change to ameliorate these problems was limited by the crucial aspects of the Soviet system itself: for example, the impact of the official Marxist-Leninist ideology, the slowing rate of economic growth due to the overcentralized, planned economy, and hence the Soviet state's inability to provide consumer goods and a growing standard of living, the growing instability of Eastern Europe, and finally, perhaps even the apathetic, passive, subject political culture of Soviet society itself.¹

While the period immediately following Brezhnev's death showed no real decrease in the repression that had characterized life in the Soviet Union since Lenin's time, things began to change with the accession of Chernenko and Andropov. Gorbachev's installment brought to power someone who was markedly different than his immediate predecessors. Zbigniew Brzezinski has actually asserted that Gorbachev's emergence was in no way a chance event; Brzezinski remarks, "Gorbachev's emergence was not a freak event. His coming to power represented the surfacing of a new reality in the Soviet Union, both on the objective and the subjective levels. In other

words, if not he then some other reformer would have n all probability emerged as the leader in the mid-1980s."\(^2\)

Gorbachev's liberalization — *glasnost* and *perestroika* — created a window of expanding opportunities in which independent movements and groups were created and flourished. Brzezinski notes that *glasnost* 's outgrowth, *perestroika*, was designed to "energize and streamline the stagnating economic bureaucracy and to revive economic growth. But that also brought to the surface the question of whether genuine reform of the Soviet economy was possible without significantly tampering with the political system and without opening more generally the doors to intellectual freedom."\(^3\) For example, while *glasnost* popularly connoted to Westerners a sort of Western-style freedom of the press and the news media, it more importantly also referred to increased general "openness" in Soviet society. This meant, among other things, the idea of questioning authority and speaking out, actions that before would have been unthinkable. Whereas before 1986 it was impossible to identify with social or interest groups outside of the Party and the nomenklatura system, *glasnost* and *perestroika* resulted in a sort of "socialist pluralism"\(^4\), where even the official ideology of Marxism-Leninism came under assault. What began as reform from above quickly escaped the control of those who set the original process in motion\(^5\).

As Brzezinski prophetically remarked, "[Gorbachev's] direct linkage of institutional economic reforms from above to political democratization

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\(^3\) Brzezinski, p. 43.


generating social pressures from below inescapably posed the danger of
diluting the party's monopoly over the management of social change.\textsuperscript{6}

The year of 1988 saw the emergence of popular fronts and parties in the
republics, which eventually became \textit{de facto} political parties; however, there
was no popular front \textit{per se} in Russia proper. These fronts and parties began
as political clubs and associations that were not legally registered and were
independent from the state, hence their nomenclature as \textit{neformal'nye}
gruppy, "informal groups" or "unofficial groups". The movements began as
groups concerned with a limited number of salient and popular policy areas:
for example, environmental protection, historical monuments' preservation,
and the investigation of Stalin-era crimes. \textit{Glasnost} and \textit{perestroika}, the
banners under which Gorbachev appealed for Soviet citizens to take a more
active and involved role in public life, resulted in the growing political
awareness of the Soviet population, and these informal clubs as a result
turned to political action and causes in mid-1988.\textsuperscript{7}

It may be pragmatic at this point to examine the terminology used to
describe and assess the \textit{neformal'nye}. Whereas club or association will be
used to denote small informal groups of perhaps 10, 20 or 30 individuals,
'association' will be used to connote more organized groups, such as those
with more members or those with a more formal program and goals. As will
become evident in the following analysis, the use of the terms 'popular front'
and 'party' (or, more accurately, 'proto-party', as the category most will fall
into) will refer to mass-based organizations operating at the city, town or

\textsuperscript{6}Brzezinski (fn. 2), p. 63.
regional level. Indeed, the point at which the neformal'nye of a large membership size begin to act like, and be referred to as 'parties' (notwithstanding the fact that they may only be 'proto-parties' according to the literature on the subject, as observed above in Chapter One) marks the stage in the development of the multi-party system in Russia that is a turning point of sorts. It is a turning point because the Gorbachev reform and liberalization process resulted in the flourishing of independent group activity and subsequently the birth (or perhaps more accurately, slow transformation to) of some type of multi-party political system.

Almost without exception, membership in these groups mentioned below consisted of the intelligentsia, broadly defined: teachers, university professors, scientists, students, journalists, and writers. It is important to note, however, that 'membership' usually means those who may support a particular group without necessarily being a full-time activist. As well, the membership of these groups and movements is constantly fluctuating, with many people constantly joining and leaving.8

Surveys in March of 1987 showed a substantial percentage of young people considered themselves to be members of informal groups.9 Official acknowledgment of the existence of these groups came in the Soviet news media. Through 1986, the most common early forms of these groups were those concerned with popular music, sports or literature. However, by 1987

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8In fact, M. Malyutin, a Russian commentator on neformal'nye in Moscow, likens the Moscow Democratic Union, one such large group, to a swimming pool: He suggests there are people 'flowing' into it, the bulk of the membership was periodically "bubbling" in Pushkin Square (no doubt in the form of demonstrations), while some people were flowing out of the group. See M. Malyutin, Who Will Lead the Masses: Moscow's Political Arena in M.A. Babbina, ed., New Political Parties and Movements in the Soviet Union, Nova Science Publishers, Commack, New York, 1991, p. 34.

9The survey was conducted in Moscow in March, 1987. It showed that 52 per cent of young engineering-technical workers, 65.1 per cent of young workers, 71.4 per cent of students, 71.8 per cent of tenth graders, and 89.4 per cent of students at vocational-technical schools considered themselves to be members of informal groups. Cited in Vera Tolz, The USSR's Emerging Multiparty System, Praeger, New York, 1990, p. 7.
attention began to be focused on those groups with more explicit political
goals; it is estimated that in 1988 there were 30,000 such groups and by 1989
the numbers had doubled to 60,000.10 The first of these were groups —
mostly based in Moscow or Leningrad — that were concerned with the
environment and the preservation of historic monuments. By 1987, the
attention of the press became focused on a group ostensibly interested in the
preservation of historic monuments and the environment, called Pamyat
(Memory). Pamyat, founded as a literary and historical society attached to the
USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry, came into prominence after staging
two demonstrations in Moscow in May 1987.11 In the aftermath of this
demonstration it became known that Pamyat's rather benign goals of
historical and environmental preservation were coupled with anti-Semitic,
anti-Western, and nationalistic views. Though it also came to light that some
conservatives in the party and state institutions sympathized with this group,
they have been criticized in the official press.12 However, other liberal groups
opposed to the anti-Semitism and extreme nationalist conservatism of
Pamyat also existed. These included 'Vanguard', an ecological group that
campaigned against a nuclear power station in Gorky13; the 'Baikal Popular
Front' in Irkutsk that grew out of efforts to preserve and protect Lake Baikal14;
and other groups like Spasenie (Salvation), Mir (Peace), and Soviet ekologii
kul'tury (Council of Cultural Ecology).15

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11 Vera Tolz (fn. 9), pp. 13-14.
13 Brovkin (fn. 7), p. 234.
15 Tolz (fn. 9), p. 15. See Appendix One for a brief typology of independent groups and clubs.
Brovkin asserts that a watershed for the politicization of these clubs was the publication in March of a letter to *Sovetskaya Rossiya* by Nina Andreeva, called by *Pravda* on April 5, 1988 a platform of anti-restructuring forces, and widely perceived as an attempt by party hardliners to "roll back the process of reform". To defend reform, informal groups attempted to help like-minded people get elected as delegates to the upcoming 19th Party Conference in June, in order to endorse Gorbachev's reform plans. In the larger cities such as Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, and Yaroslavl', campaigns began against "local mafias [conservatives] who packed delegations to the Party Conference".

The most prevalent type of associations, termed "mainstream" by Brovkin, were liberal, and were concerned with defending restructuring and liberalization, leading to democratization. These groups included the 'Popular Fronts', 'Democratic Restructuring' clubs, 'Alternative' clubs, 'Elections 89' committees in Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov and other large cities, the 'Memorial Society', the informal organization 'Moscow Tribune', and the 'Federation of Socialist Clubs'. All of these groups desired the establishment of the rule of law in the Soviet Union; responsible, accountable and responsive government through free elections in a multi-party system;

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18 See Brovkin, p. 234.

19 Brovkin, p. 235.
and the dismantling of the party's monopoly on power through mechanisms like the nomenklatura system and repression.  

In the spring and summer of 1988, a number of groups that called themselves 'socialist' combined to form the 'Federation of Socialist Clubs' seen by its members as a counterpart to the Komsomol. Interestingly enough, Brovkin notes that the FSC's draft program is an almost verbatim copy of the Mensheviks' 1924 program.  

The 'Popular Fronts' (PF) emerged out of the willingness to defend restructuring and reforms, especially in the wake of the Party Conference. When the authorities' previously ineffective attempts to control the groups and associations failed; in 1988 the authorities decided to tacitly co-operate with the activists in the establishment of popular fronts. First proposed by jurist Boris Kurashvili in April 1988, he suggested that they would act as a movement to unite socially active people in support of perestroika. They would not be an opposition party to the CPSU, but would rather act to monitor and criticize the government and party from a socialist perspective. The front would also give members of the informal groups that made it up the opportunity to express their ideas and criticisms to the authorities. In many ways, however, the establishment of the Popular Fronts was thought by the authorities to be a way of marginalising other more radical opposition movements.
A conference to organise city-based Popular Fronts was held at the end of August, 1988, in Moscow. Representatives included those from 70 local organisations and 40 cities attended; some representatives were actually communists, as well as socialists from the FSC. Though delegates endorsed resolutions on the nationality question and a draft reform of the electoral law, an effort to create an all-Union or Russian popular front failed, notes Brovkin. It is also worth noting that the Popular Fronts established in the Baltic States took on a veritable life of their own, attracting large numbers of members and even the support of the republics' party authorities. However, as this paper focuses on groups in the Russian republic, the success of the Baltic popular fronts is noted only to contrast their success with their less-accomplished counterparts in the RSFSR. Perhaps the most successful Popular Front was the Leningrad Popular Front, which claimed to have almost one million supporters.

A newer and distinct PF organization was formed in October of 1989 at a founding congress in Yaroslavl. The 'Popular Front of the RSFSR', a confederation of different clubs, organizations, and regional popular fronts, perhaps came closest to the official attempts to create a Russian popular front that could fulfill the authorities' goals of supplanting and marginalising the more radical groups and associations.

Another group, the 'Moscow Tribune' club — whose membership consisted of prominent people like Yuri Afanasev, R. Z. Sagdeev, Roy Medvedev, the late Andrei Sakharov and Tatyana Zaslavskaya — has been

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23Brovkin, p. 240.
described as "the closest to what could be called a loyal opposition". It consisted of approximately 100 members at its inception; its goals include democratization of the electoral law, liberalising the rights of nationalities, and "disengagement of the bureaucracy from the planned economy". Members of this group formed the centre of a group of liberal deputies elected to the Congress of People's Deputies in the subsequent election, called the 'Interregional Group of Deputies' (IRG). Another liberal group, the 'Memorial' society had many members who also held memberships in the Popular Fronts, a phenomenon not uncommon in the early history of informal groups, clubs and associations. Founded in January 1989, the chief goal of Memorial was primarily destalinisation and liberalization (like the Popular Fronts, for example). Its members wished to collect and publish information on the past (with special reference to Stalin's victims). The liberalization of glasnost made it possible for Memorial, and other groups, to rethink history, to look for "historical truth". In the same vein, other groups sought to reinstate the old Russian names to their towns, cities, and streets. Other liberal groups were interested in human rights issues such as the Helsinki Human Rights groups and the Vienna Committee; these human rights groups were quite bold in their criticism of the authorities. Their publications, most notably Ekspress Khronika, edited by Aleksandr Podrabinek; and the samizdat journals Glasnost' (edited by Sergei Grigoryants) and Referendum (edited by Lev Timofeev), are "more

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24 Moscow Tribune's inaugural meeting was held on Feb. 4, 1989. It's goal as to discuss salient issues of social and political life in the USSR. See Moscow News, No. 7, Feb. 12, 1989, in RL Daily Report, Feb. 24, 1989. See also Brovkin, p. 240.
25 Brovkin, p. 240. For an interesting and insightful account of one of Moscow Tribune's meetings, see David Remnick (fn. 16), pp. 29-31.
26 Not to be confused with Pamyat (Memory)
27 Brovkin, p. 241
outspoken and uncompromising in their critique than Sakharov before his death, Yeltsin, Medvedev, Zaslavskaya and other prominent figures in 'Moscow Tribune'.

Perhaps the group most critical of the current Soviet system and thus the most liberal group (even when compared to the other liberal informal groups and associations) is Democratic Union (DU). Democratic Union's goals were the establishment of a market economy, private property, the rule of law, and a multi-party political system; in short, nothing less than the end of the current Soviet system. Set up in Moscow in May 1988 by 100 representatives from different cities, DU rejected co-operation with the CPSU and authorities. Democratic Union also categorically condemned the entire Leninist-Stalinist legacy, making no distinction — as Gorbachev's official historical reformers did — between Lenin and Stalin. Prominent members included many samizdat journalists, dissidents and intellectuals, based primarily in Leningrad and Moscow, but at times consisting of a thousand or so members throughout the then-Soviet Union. Democratic Union often sponsored non-violent demonstrations in Moscow in late 1988 and 1989. Some observers have identified five distinct factions in DU: social democratic, constitutional democratic, Christian democratic and communist-democratic. DU was also said to have organizations in approximately 30 cities, run by a representative Central Coordinating Council elected at a general meeting of the DU organization; a number of newspapers were also published by DU. By May of 1990 DU had held four congresses adopting a

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28 Brovkin, p. 242.
29 Brovkin notes that while Gorbachev's official historians said that "only in 1929 did the Stalinists distort the 'Leninist democratic' principles, the Democratic Union uncompromisingly condemns the entire Leninist legacy, from the very first days of the October seizure of power.". See Brovkin, p. 243.
comprehensive program dealing with all aspects of political, social and economic life.

Conservatives have also set up some of their own informal groups to respond to those liberal groups they considered too influential, especially after losses in Spring 1989 elections. Yuri Solov'ev, a loser in the election, set up the 'United Front of Workers,' which was founded in Sverdlovsk at a congress in September, 1989. The congress was attended by 110 delegates from 29 cities, many representing workers' strike committees, along with representatives from Moldova and the Baltic republics. The UFW's platform attacks liberal, democratic informal groups and, after the elections, the liberal-minded Inter-Regional Group of Deputies. Other conservative or nationalist organizations also existed. There was the 'World Anti-Zionist and Anti-Mason Front' (headed by V. Emel'yanov); the 'National Patriotic Front' (led by N. Zherbin, in Leningrad); and various smaller groups like 'Patriots' (Leningrad), Otechestvo — 'Fatherland' (Sverdlovsk), and 'Homeland' (Chelyabinsk). Thus, Russophilic traditions seem to have been strong in the Siberian region, though of course liberal and democratically minded groups were also in existence there. The evidence suggests, nevertheless, that Moscow and Leningrad were the centres for activity of the more liberal and democratically-oriented groups.

The formation of groups, and their publicly expressed intention to register as national political organizations, signaled a new phase in the development of political pluralism in the USSR and hence the multi-party system in general. This phase in development was also marked by "a new

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31V. Levichev, p. 44.
32Brovkin, p. 246.
stage in the relationship between the political clubs and the broader electorate...a stage of competition with the official candidates for popular support." Therefore, to best examine this phase, it is necessary to take a closer look at informal group interaction, on the one hand, and elections, on the other.

*From Informal Interaction to Formal Participation in Elections*

While electoral, institutional and legislative changes will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, this section focuses on the transition from informal group and association activity to electoral participation by these groups.

The elections in 1989 marked an important point in the development of the unofficial groups in particular and the incipient multi-party system in general. Election campaigns to the new Congress of People's Deputies began in January and February for the March 1989 elections, the first modern elections in the USSR where citizens would have some sort of real choice among candidates. Informal groups and organisations participated extensively in the nomination process and in campaigning for candidates. New groups to mobilize electors to support reform-minded candidates were formed, called "Residents' Initiative Groups". The party bureaucracy managed to deny alternative reform candidates nominations in 399 electoral districts, resulting in acclamations for the nomenklatura's chosen candidates. Protests organized by frustrated Leningrad informal groups and clubs ('Alternative', 'Democratic Restructuring' and 'Memorial') resulted when

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33Brovkin, p. 245.
authorities intimidated opposition candidates and their supporters at nomination meetings, and forced some opposition candidates into abandoning their candidacies. To support the electoral activities of reform-minded clubs, the 'Elections 89' committee was formed. 'Elections 89' co-ordinated activities against unopposed Leningrad party candidates, printed literature, and in the end was successful in helping to defeat all of the Leningrad party heads.

In Yaroslavl, the apparat also managed to devote significant efforts towards the manipulation of the nomination process and the election in order to defeat Yaroslavl Popular Front for the Support of Perestroika (YPF for short) candidates. The YPF, in fact, was one of the most active popular fronts in the RSFSR. Later, in the 1990 republic and local elections, the party apparat in Yaroslavl worked more towards "finding ways to win"34, which is to say that they eschewed illegal intimidation and gerrymandering, instead making use of strategy and tactics that suggested actual competition for voter support.

And in Moscow, informal organisations took part in campaigning for leading reformers or in calling for boycotts against the party apparatus' attempts to control the nomination process. The Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists campaigned to boycott unfairly nominated party candidates (in the hopes of limiting turnout to below the 50 per cent threshold and thus forcing new elections), and to vote for Yeltsin, the preferred opposition candidate. Other smaller so-called "Residents' Initiative" groups, like the Anarcho-Syndicalists, worked for boycotts to force new elections when they considered popular reform candidates to be unfairly left off the ballot due to

nomination irregularities. Still other initiative groups campaigned to get voters to vote in run-off elections where anti-establishment candidates had a chance against the party apparatchiki.35

Nevertheless, the election process was still rigged in favour of the CPSU, Komsomol, and other official organizations, all of which were guaranteed hundreds of seats in blocks set out specifically for them. As well, registration procedures still prevented many informal organization and protest candidates from making it onto the ballot. What was more widespread than true independent informal candidates winning election was that prominent conservative CPSU leaders were not elected, as a result of informal campaigns against them in such regions as Leningrad and Kiev. Progressive candidates who were elected included Yuri Afanasev, Ilya Zaslavsky, Andrei Sakharov, and Boris Yeltsin.

McFaul and Markov assert that the 1989 election's completion was not the end of independent political activity and participation by informals and their members. The Moscow Popular Front and Memorial, for example, held huge rallies at the Luzhniki sports stadium attended by 100,000 people, designed to allow citizens the opportunity to receive daily reports from new deputies on the situation in the congress. The threats of a general strike by one such rally convinced the congress to reverse an earlier decision and allow Yeltsin to be elected to the Supreme Soviet.36 It also should be noted that it was at this congress that the Interregional Group of People's Deputies (IRG) was created. The IRG was a small, reform-minded, liberal block of CPD

deputies, which had little influence on proceedings in the large CPD, but still was important as the first real parliamentary opposition.\textsuperscript{37}

What this evidence suggests, above all, is a pattern of growing participation by informals in an increasingly liberalized political structure, and thus a nascent form of political pluralism, however immature or weak. Undoubtedly, to say 'political pluralism' is \textit{not} to suggest a true multi-party system, inasmuch as the groups and associations were not true political parties. But the presence of both parliamentary (e.g., the IRG) and extra-parliamentary groups opposed to the status quo suggested the possibility of evolution into some type of more liberalized, or even multi-party, system.

\textbf{Official Reactions}

By 1989, Popular Front movements had been established in all of the Union republics, though the movement in the RSFSR lacked the political strength and organization of those in, say, the Baltic States or Azerbaijan. Tolz attributes the contrasting success of other republics' popular fronts to the RSFSR's to the fact that union republic popular fronts united on the basis of their republics' "sovereignty and cultural revival"; while in the RSFSR there was a lack of consolidation on this basis, resulting in splits and thus separate popular fronts in different cities.\textsuperscript{38} Moscow and Leningrad were home to the most active liberal, pro-democratic informal groups; the latter city also boasted a popular front that consisted of over one million members. It is

\textsuperscript{37}The IRG was made up of well-known, reform-minded, and liberal legislators in the Congress of People's Deputies from across the USSR such as Yurii Afanasyev, Gavrill Popov, Tselman Gdlyan, Arkadii Murashev, Andrei Sakharov, Anatoliy Sobchak, Sergei Stankevich, Boris Yeltsin, and Ilya Zaslavsky, among others. 

\textsuperscript{38}Tolz (fn. 9), p. 23.
worth stressing that the popular fronts were sanctioned by the authorities, at first, in the hope that they would co-opt less radical organizations and groups toward supporting the reform process while marginalising more radical groups like Democratic Union.

Official reaction to the burgeoning groups remained mixed from 1986 through 1988. Sometimes tolerant during the early part of this period, officials suggested that the groups be channeled towards "positive ends"; and that public groups' efforts were good if they benefited socialism and democracy but bad and "provocative" if, for example, led by "rascals and demagogues...under the flag of jingoism" it led to nationalism or "opposition parties". At other times authorities engaged in short-term imprisonment and harassment of activists. The authorities' varying reactions, and inconsistency across different regions, during this period could be attributed to their sheer lack of knowledge of what to do; it was a problem the apparatchiki had never experienced before. In some cities like Yaroslavl, the PF movements, for example, were received well by the city and communist party authorities, but in others, the obkom secretaries talked about reform and democratization but "actually tried to suppress unsanctioned initiatives from below". Yet in Leningrad, the second secretary of the obkom, Degtyarev, addressed issue of informal associations on 16 September, 1988. He called Democratic Union "an anti-constitutional organisation and accused the [local] PF of sharing some of its objectives. Those groups like Democratic Union

41 Brovkin, p. 236
42 Brovkin, p. 248
that rejected the Soviet system, the CPSU's dominance, or promoted the right of secession for Union republics were usually singled out for harassment or harsh treatment. The police in Moscow, in fact, attempted to ban all activities of the Democratic Union there. In August 1988 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, through a series of decrees, issued specific guidelines for rallies and demonstrations, which were becoming more frequent. Not mentioned in these published guidelines was the creation of new riot police units, clearly not a symbol of tolerance. This was seen as another method of controlling popular front and informal group activities, who organized these demonstrations. Tolz argues that these decrees were in many ways a response to the Democratic Union, who attempted to stage unauthorized rallies in Moscow every week. Nevertheless, these guidelines also presaged increasingly repressive measures used by authorities in late 1988 used to deal with demonstrations and their informal group organizers: for example, the new riot police beat demonstrators to forcibly end rallies in Leningrad held by the Union of Social Democrats on August 28, and by Democratic Union on September 3 and September 5.

Late 1988 was a time of relative permissiveness by the authorities towards the groups, which in part could be attributed to election campaign activity from December 1988 to March 1989. The CPSU's election losses after the March elections seems to have spurred the authorities to adopt stricter measures. The crude attempts to integrate and co-opt the groups towards positive ends (i.e., popular fronts) through 1988 seemed to fail. Interestingly

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44 Tolz (fn. 9), p. 48.
45 Brovkin, p. 246
enough, draft laws dealing with registration and regulation of informal associations were developed by the authorities between 1987 and 1990. Early drafts developed by conservatives were rejected in 1987 and again in 1989 after attacks by the USSR Academy of Science's Institute of State and Law. By early 1990, with some informal organizations arguably already acting as *de facto* proto-parties, it was decided that more work on these laws would be required. Indeed, Article Six of the USSR's constitution, limiting the political system in the USSR to the "guiding role" of the CPSU, was still in force.

Conservative CPSU officials spoke out against the informals: Politburo member Viktor Chebrikov, in February 1989, argued that anti-Socialist groups should be acted against; conservative CPSU Central Committee members Vitalii Vorotnikov and Egor Ligachev, at a meeting in July 1989, also spoke out against the unofficial groups and movements. However, at the same July 1989 Central Committee meeting, Gorbachev spoke in favour of expanding co-operation with the groups.

Later, however, Gorbachev's positive reaction to independent groups changed when on October 13 of the same year he angrily criticized the self-styled opposition group of liberal deputies in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the newly formed Interregional Group of Deputies (referred to earlier as the IRG). Gorbachev called the group a "gangster clique striving for power".

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46 Tolz (fn. 9), pp. 36-37.
47 Tolz, (fn. 9), p. 49.
The power struggle in the top CPSU leadership between hardliners and reformers, with Gorbachev caught in the middle and vacillating towards both sides, seems to have led him to become frustrated from being attacked from both sides. With respect to his comments on the IRG, it seems that he was afraid of the IRG becoming an opposition to the CPSU, supplanting the Party, or precipitating a split in the Party.49

Not surprisingly, by the time of the local and republican elections of March 4, 1990 it was clear that attempts to co-opt, marginalise, or stop the groups had failed, and that the reform process had led to the informals to take on a veritable life of their own. Though a law on organizations was finally passed in 1990, when it was estimated some 60,000 informal groups and organizations existed, the authorities having lost all control over them. Both Gorbachev and the hardliners' fears turned out to have had some truth.

### Analysis and Conclusions

The importance of these independent clubs and groups cannot be understated. If it is true that Soviet society could be described as "atomized", in that there was little or no activity or group independent from the state, then these groups marked the beginning of pluralism. During the initial stages of the formation of these informal groups, the reaction of the authorities ranged from acceptance of the groups' activities to an attempt to keep tight controls on them, and, finally, to outright suppression of their activities.

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49Teague, p. 2.
These early groups, clubs and associations were the precursors to, and eventually evolved into, the proto-parties that may characterise a nascent multi-party system. Their later incarnations as Popular Fronts, the Democratic Union, and especially the IRG, acted as early extra-parliamentary and parliamentary oppositions respectively to the CPSU. In a relatively short period of time, the popular front movements in many republics (such as Azerbaijan and the Baltic states) became powerful enough to rival the local Communist party, though this was less true in the RSFSR. Furthermore, the neformal'nye undermined official control of mass media through their unofficial publications.

One of the reasons that the CPSU authorities lost control of the reform process was their own actions. Vladimir Brovkin asserts,

The paradox of the political development during this time is that the party conservatives contributed more to the growth of informal associations than the reformers. It was their machinations with the elections to the Party conference that gave birth to the protest movement. It was their repression in the autumn of 1988 that radicalised many clubs. It was their manipulations at the Congress elections in the Spring of 1989 that turned political clubs into competitors for public office. And finally it was their failure to improve the economic situation that made the workers become interested in opposition and go on strike.

The sheer proliferation of independent group and movement development is concrete evidence of glasnost and perestroika's success in pluralising Soviet society. The CPSU authorities lost control of the process of

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50 Tolz, (fn. 10), p. 7.
51 Tolz, (fn. 9), p. 84
52 Brovkin, p. 254.
reform, as evidenced by the proliferation of groups and their activism, leading to their participation in elections. In fact, the 1989 Congress of People's Deputies elections were a significant moment, for a number of reasons. Though they were not as transparent and free as Western elections, the elections helped to institutionalize a nominal form — or perhaps the idea — of real democracy, in the country's first multi-candidate elections since 1917. Democratization and the way it comes about places importance and value in symbolic actions and in the institutionalization of democratic norms and values, however trivial they may seem at the moment of their taking place. Hahn and Helf's comments, mentioned earlier, regarding the old elites' tactics are particularly relevant here. In short, Hahn and Helf argued that while in the 1989 elections the old elites tried to find ways to, for example, fix the outcome of the nomination process, and thus attempt to cheat to make their challengers lose, in 1990 the elites "seemed to have turned their attention to finding ways to win. Their success in these efforts suggests they are adapting to the rules of competitive politics." This is another example of how competition and protest by informals has in a way forced the hand of the party elites, and in so doing has helped to institutionalize democracy and political pluralism, and by extension the


54 Dankwart Rustow, in his seminal study of democratic transitions, speaks of the importance of symbolic actions and the acceptance of democratic norms and values. He says, "the very process of democracy institutes a double process of Darwinian selectivity in favour of convinced democrats: one among parties in general elections and the other among politicians vying for leadership within these parties." Thus, initial democratic actions and compromises, however small, engender further compromise. See Dankwart A. Rustow, *Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model* in *Comparative Politics*, April, 1970, pp. 337-363.

55 Hahn and Helf, (fn. 34), p. 529
development of the nascent multi-party system. Indeed, the elections and their aftermath also gave the informals a raison d'être.

From a theoretical perspective, there are two issues that need to be examined, in light of these developments. Firstly, it could be said that the Gorbachev liberalization — i.e., glasnost, perestroika, demokratizatsiia — created change at two levels: at the level of ideas (e.g., those norms and values that glasnost, perestroika, and perhaps the elections helped to propagate) and at the level of institutions. Some explanation of these two related concepts is, then, necessary here. Institutions have clear and obvious effects and roles with respect to change; the effects of a change in, say, a legislature or laws (institutions) are apparent, as are the roles laws or legislatures may play in bringing about changes in individuals. Ideas, however, have more diffuse and less apparent roles. Ideas have an impact on both individuals and institutions. Clearly, neformal'nye and the resultant pluralism were the product of ideas like glasnost, perestroika, and demokratizatsiia. The emergence and existence of groups and movements independent from the state, by their very actions "defied the established tradition that social initiative was derived from and controlled by the party. Their appearance signaled the beginnings...of something that eventually could perhaps become authentic and autonomous political participation, thereby challenging the Communist party's monopoly over all forms of organized political activity."56 This focus on ideas is not merely an elementary or academic exercise; these ideas called into question the infallibility and pervasiveness of the CPSU's power and control over all

56 Brzezinski (fn. 2), p. 73.
aspects of political, social and economic life. Kelley notes that studying only institutions or the policy-making process produces very distorted outcomes; the study of ideas gives context to this analysis. For example, "the underlying and central political question of demokratizatsia was the proper role of the party itself."

Secondly, with respect to transition theory, the development of independent political activity has important implications. As noted earlier in chapter one, theories of transition to democracy emphasize two contiguous phases in a democratic transition: the destructive and constructive phases. If it is true that Russia was in the first (destructive) phase of the transition (and the evidence suggests that it was), then informal groups and movements were key actors in this phase. That is, because they came into being during the decay and breakdown of the totalitarian system (as opposed to being created during the constructive phase, where totalitarian structures and institutions would no longer theoretically exist) they were affected by the state of Soviet political culture and society at the time. It should not be expected that these groups display all of the normative qualities of independent political parties in a true pluralistic society. It is enough that they came into existence, evolved, and helped to bring about the end of one-party dominance and totalitarianism in the USSR and, for the purposes of this study, in Russia proper. Therefore, given our knowledge of transition theory, it could be expected that proto-parties will display different

57 If, as noted in chapter one, the current study of Soviet and post-Soviet politics cannot be divorced from the innumerable social, economic and cultural factors that have shaped and currently affect the post-Soviet polity, then the study of ideas, broadly defined — i.e., factors other than institutional — is important and germane to this analysis. See, for example, Robert T. Huber, The New Soviet Legislature: How Ideas and Institutions Matter, in Robert T. Huber and Donald R. Kelley, eds., Perestroika-Era Politics: The New Soviet Legislature and Gorbachev's Political Reforms, Armonk, N.Y., M.E. Sharpe, 1991, pp. 1-5.
58 Brzezinski (fn. 2), p. 75.
organizational tendencies and actions when the political context changes to the so-called "constructive phase" of building democracy and democratic institutions.

Political parties and the party system should normatively play specific roles in a democracy, as noted in Chapter One. Most importantly, the concept of a 'civil society' requires political parties and thus the party system to act as linkages between the citizenry and the government. At this early point in the decline of the USSR and its totalitarian structures, the associations, groups, and proto-parties failed in attempting to provide direct channels of access for citizens to the government. It could be said, then, that the proto-parties and groups were successful in providing a means of interest articulation and representation, but less successful in interest aggregation. Indeed, there was little evidence of this latter trait in the early history of independent group and movement activity. Nevertheless, this lack of maturity on the part of the groups — and indeed much of the behaviour by groups, movements and even the party elites — may be partially explained by the political context in which these groups developed; e.g., their development in the aforementioned 'destructive phase' of the democratic transition.

The 1990 local and republican elections was when the first semblances of party organization, planning, and coalition-building occurred; the development of the party system had entered a new phase. These events are particularly important for this study as it was these elections in the RSFSR that elected the parliament which, after the August 1991 coup attempt, was the first institutional-legislative (as opposed to extra-parliamentary) basis for
coalition, bloc, and party formation. Thus, by 1990 it was obvious that a *de facto* nascent multi-party system had been born in the USSR, and for the purposes of this study, in the RSFSR.

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59 The USSR's union-wide Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet was dissolved soon after the USSR collapsed, on the heels of the failed August 1991 coup attempt by CPSU hardliners. The corresponding RSFSR institutions became the parliament of record.
The Institutional Context for the Emergence of Proto-Parties in Russia, 1989-1990

"It is said that Stalin himself recorded a favourable vote of more than 100 per cent on one occasion, when voters in neighbouring constituencies insisted on casting their ballot in the Moscow constituency where the 'leader of leaders' was standing."

John Maynard

"It depends on your understanding of democracy"

USSR Central Electoral Commission
Secretary Yurii Ryzhkov on the question of whether the CPSU's nomination of 100 candidates for 100 seats was democratic.

Introduction — Theoretical Considerations

While Chapter Two was primarily about informal organizations and their peculiar history, this chapter is about the institutional changes which helped to bring about the proto-parties, and the tendencies, as it were, of the formation of the parties themselves. This chapter will provide a detailed overview of the emerging proto-parties and party system; the following chapter will examine in detail the actual proto-parties themselves. Thus, this chapter will attempt to provide a social, political and institutional context for this analysis of proto-parties and the emerging political party system in Russia.

2USSR Central Television, Jan. 19, 1989
Theories of neo-institutionalism suggest that it is necessary to look at the intersection of ideas, interests and institutions in order to fully understand policy and politics. Institutions in this context refer to concrete institutions like legislatures and parliaments, as well as more abstract entities like norms, rules, and beliefs. Institutions, therefore, can shape general understandings of policy and politics; and institutions can impose imperatives that will shape and direct policy. These theories may be of some help in understanding an important period in the early development of proto-parties and changing political institutions on one hand and a changing political, cultural and social context on the other. Neo-institutionalism, too, can help avoid those problems that are inherent in focusing too much on policy outcomes and the policy making process, and in so doing give context to this analysis. With these theoretical points in mind, we can examine the institutional and policy changes that helped to bring about the formation of proto-parties in the Russian politics, and in so doing look at the tendencies of the formation of the proto-parties and movements themselves.

Change in the Legislative System

Independent groups, movements and parties developed in the USSR for the most part as extra-parliamentary entities. But inasmuch as the structures of government give context to the political debate, and bearing in mind the assertion that institutions can affect and shape politics in general, this section will briefly examine the salient features of Soviet government and the changes that took place in the system. In the case of the USSR,

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institutions — and their transformation — provided many of the major impulses in the development of the proto-party system.

The Stalin and Brezhnev-era Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities made up the bicameral Supreme Soviet, consisting of 1500 deputies (with 750 deputies per chamber). The deputies served five year terms and were elected by universal suffrage. The elections, however, did not meet Western democratic norms and principles. The Supreme Soviet met only twice per year and functioned as a veritable rubber stamp, approving laws after party and government officials drafted them. For all intents and purposes, it was the Communist Party that ruled the USSR.

Gorbachev began speaking about a far-reaching "democratisation" of Soviet society during a January 1987 CPSU central committee meeting; at this meeting and subsequently he tied other reforms to democratisation, and public debate on reforms followed.  

Gorbachev's first concrete reform proposals were introduced (and later adopted at) the June 1988 19th Party Congress, where he called for fundamental changes to the current system. The proposals' central theme was that the reformed soviets should have full authority and the requisite resources to carry out their new, expanded role. The USSR Supreme Soviet would become a working legislature of 542 deputies (divided equally between the Soviet of the Union and a Soviet of Nationalities), elected from the new and larger Congress of People's Deputies, which would meet annually. The Congress would consist of 2250 deputies:

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750 elected in equal electoral districts, 750 elected by national-territorial
districts, and 750 appointed from nationwide public organizations (including
the CPSU). A Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet would head this
structure, and this person would nominate the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers and chair the new Presidium.6 The old Supreme Soviet approved
these changes on December 1, 1988.7 Union and autonomous republics —
including the RSFSR — adopted structures similar (but not necessarily
identical) to the aforementioned ones; Ukraine, for example, elected not to
have a Congress of People's Deputies.

With respect to the formation of parties and independent groups, this
restructured legislative system had varying but important effects. Though the
Congress was given "full legislative authority," its unwieldy size and
infrequency of meeting (twice per year) meant that it could not be an
"effective legislature."8 Independent groups and movements were more
frequently extra-parliamentary in nature — e.g., the neformal'nye — and the
lack of the new legislature's real effectiveness, to some extent, contributed to
this phenomena. The new Secretariat of the Supreme Soviet provided
administrative services as well as staff support on legislative and policy

6The most important changes, by article: the soviets would be elected for a five-year term (Article 90); no
deputy could serve on more than two soviets at one time (Article 96); the all-Union USSR Congress of People's
Deputies would be elected by both the population (nationally and in national-territorial constituencies) as
well as by public organizations such as the CPSU and trade unions (Article 109); the Congress would elect
the Supreme Soviet and would meet for two sessions per year, in the spring and in the autumn, for three or
four months at a time (Article 112); the new Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet would oversee the work of
state bodies and would be able to issue directives (Article 121); similar changes would also be instituted in
union and autonomous republics (Articles 137-142, 143-144); local soviets would have their own presidia and
chairmen, who were accountable once per year to their soviets and the population (Articles 145-150). See On
Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the USSR (1988) [translated text of
amendments] in Mervyn Matthews, ed., Party, State and Citizen in the Soviet Union, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk,

7Communique on Meetings of the USSR Supreme Soviet in Izvestiya and Pravda, Nov. 30, Dec. 1, Dec. 2, 1988,

8Stuart Goldman, The New Legislative Branch in Robert Huber and Donald Kelley, eds., Perestroika Era
matters to the legislature (including the Congress, Supreme Soviet, Presidium, legislative committees, and all deputies). The command of all staff was centralized, and controlled by the Presidium; though its complement doubled from 400 to 800 after the restructuring, it was still understaffed and lacked experienced personnel. In fact, the staff of the Secretariat were veterans of the old Supreme Soviet and thus were partisan (in that they were all CPSU members) and also accustomed to controlling the work of the legislature. Goldman maintains that the centralization and control of the Secretariat was viewed by legislators as “a major obstacle to the realization of the full democratic and legislative potential of the Supreme Soviet.”

This new Congress, for the most part elected on March 26, 1989 (though later rounds of voting lasted until May 14), was made up of legislators who were predominantly members of the Communist Party (87.6 per cent); they ranged from hard-liners to reform-minded in terms of philosophy. Of course, this total included the CPSU’s guaranteed allotment — as a public organization — of 100 seats. Most tellingly, in many of the 384 districts where the election was essentially rigged to ensure only one candidate’s name on the ballot (usually a CPSU member), Party officials or apparatchiki were defeated when their names were crossed off the ballot by electors.

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9 Though the Secretariat itself was made up of 17 (and later 29) deputies elected by an open vote in Congress, the Secretariat’s staff was still responsible for organizing the work of the Congress. For example, the Secretariat staff would coordinate requests to speak and would pass on these requests to the Presidium; the apparatchik staff were neither efficient nor schooled in running a non-partisan support secretariat for a legislature. See Dawn Mann, *Bringing the Congress of People’s Deputies to Order in Report on the USSR*, v. 2, no. 3, Jan. 19, 1990, pp. 2-3.

10 Goldman (fn. 8), p. 58-59.

11 71.5 per cent of deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet in 1984 were CPSU members. Figures from TASS, April 4, 1989, cited in Dawn Mann and Julia Wishnevsky, *Composition of Congress of People’s Deputies in Report on the USSR*, v. 1, no. 18, May 5, 1989, p. 2. By April 4, 1989, 1,958 of 2,250 deputies were elected (292 seats were still to be decided in run-off elections). At this point, 17.2 per cent of deputies elected were women, 18.6 per cent were workers, and 11.2 per cent were agricultural workers. Figures from TASS, April 4, 1989, as printed in RL Daily Report, April 14, 1989, p. 42.

12 *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya*, April 4, 1989 and *Moskovskie novosti*, No. 12, 1989, as described in Mann and Wishnevsky (fn. 11), p. 2. Dimitrii Golovko, the deputy head of the Soviet Central Electoral Commission,
Furthermore, 94 of 121 military candidates of all ranks were elected, though this included 25 who were appointed by public organizations (3.6 per cent of Congress seats; 1.6 per cent of Supreme Soviet seats); this is in contrast to the fifty-five military deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet in 1984, which was 3.7 per cent of the total seats at that time (and only included military personnel of the rank of general or higher).13

Nevertheless, at the all-Union level three of the four members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo who ran for a seat were elected, while the rest of the Central Committee Politburo members or candidates who were eligible were appointed in the CPSU's allotment of 100 reserved seats.14 Few government officials were elected, as the electoral law barred most from serving as deputies.15 With respect to union republican officials, all of the first and second secretaries of Union republican Party committees were elected, except Estonia's second secretary Georgii Aleshin. A great many other Party republican officials served in congress through appointment to reserved seats guaranteed to public organizations. Seven religious leaders were also elected to this new parliament.16

went on record as saying on March 1, 1989 in TASS that on average two candidates would run for every seat in the upcoming elections, while one in four constituencies would have only one candidate and 80 per cent of approved candidates were Party members. See RL Daily Report, March 10, 1989, p. 52.

13 Mann and Wishnevsky (fn. 11), p. 3-4. See also John W. R. Lepingwell, Military Deputies in the USSR Congress in Report on the USSR, May 18, 1990, pp. 19-22. Many the younger military deputies were in fact in favour of reform.

14 Vladimir Shcherbitsky, Vitalii Vorotnikov, Aleksandr Vlasov, and Yurii Solovev were the four who ran, with the latter, Solovev, the Leningrad City Party Committee first secretary losing. See Mann and Wishnevsky, p. 2.

15 USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Nikolai Ryzhkov, deputy chairmen of Gosstroj Yeltsin and Evgenii Rozanov, and chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee Sergei Manyakin were the only all-Union government officials to be elected; Yeltsin and Rozanov resigned their government positions in order to serve as deputies. As well, four aides to Mikhail Gorbachev — Georgii Shakhnazarov, Anatoli Chernyaev, Sergei Akhromev and Ivan Frolov were elected. These aides serve Gorbachev in his role as general secretary of the CPSU. From Mann and Wishnevsky (fn. 11), p. 2.

16 Five religious leaders were elected initially with two more being elected in the later rounds of voting. These included Aleksei Ridiger, a Holy Synod member of the Russian Orthodox Church; Allahshukyor Pashazade, chairman of the Spiritual Administration of the Transcaucasian Muslims; Vazgen I (Paldshyan), catholicos of all Armenians; Pimen (Sergei Izvekov, patriarch of Moscow and Russia; and Metropolitan Pitirim (Konstantin Nechaev) of Volokolamsk and Yur'ev. Taken from Mann and Wishnevsky (fn. 9), p. 4. The very fact that religious figures were allowed to participate in the election as candidates was remarkable
Conservative deputies in the new Congress were for the most part appointed by the public organizations and thus were not elected by voters. Prominent conservatives who were elected included Viktor Afanasev, the editor of Pravda; Vladimir Karpov, the first secretary of the USSR Writers' Union; and Boris Ugarov, the president of the USSR Academy of Arts. Nevertheless, both conservative intelligentsia and conservative Party officials fared poorly in the elections. It was estimated after the election that as many as 300 to 400 deputies (out of 2,250) sympathetic to reform were elected; however, the Congress was clearly controlled by the 43.7 per cent of deputies who could be described as "workers", and whose leanings were clearly conservative. Perhaps the most accurate description of the elections to the new Congress was by Andrei Sakharov, the most prominent reformer elected: "This was not a democratic election...[I]t was rigged quasi-democracy. The only oases of democracy was where the system was somehow imperfect," Sakharov told David Remnick.

The first session of the new Congress was postponed from late April until May 25, 1989, due to run-off elections that began on April 2 but finished in that the Russian Orthodox Church and the clergy in general were oppressed or harassed for so long under Soviet rule. For an account of the candidacy of the clergy and their participation in the election, see Oxana Antic, Candidates in Cassocks for USSR People's Deputies in Report on the USSR, March 17, 1989, pp. 13-14

17 Mann and Wishnevsky (fn. 11), p. 4
18 For example, Mikhail Lemeshev, an ecologist but a Pamyat supporter, lost to Moscow Popular Front member Sergei Stankovich; Nikolai Skatov, director of Pushkin House, lost to progressive Neva editor Boris Nikolsky in Leningrad; and Yurii Bondarev, the deputy RSPRS Writers' Union chairman who wanted to rename Volgograd Stalingrad', lost in Volgograd. As well, groups of party officials like the entire leadership of the Leningrad city party organization lost. From Mann and Wishnevsky (fn. 11), p. 4.
19 Mann and Wishnevsky, p. 5. See also Dawn Mann, The Opening of the Congress in Report on the USSR, v. 1, no. 23, June 9, 1989, p. 3.
20 This is recounted in David Remnick's book, Lenin's Tomb — The Last Days of the Soviet Empire, Vintage Books, New York, 1994, p. 220. The evidence from the media during and after the elections seems to bear witness to Sakharov's comments. For example, there were reports of local electoral commissions being concerned with private and personal information about nominees, said to be inappropriate by the Central Electoral Commission (Izvestiya, Feb. 5, 1989); electoral commissions also were accused of trickery in attempting to get Party officials elected without winning enough votes (Andrei Nuikin in Moscow News, No. 10, March 10, 1989); there were in fact no punishable violations (e.g., tampering or bribery) of the electoral law as of February, 1989 (Novosti, Feb. 14, 1989). From RL Daily Reports, Feb. 17, March 17, Feb. 24, 1989 respectively.
later than expected on May 14, 1989. The opening session of the Congress gave the Soviet citizens their first taste of nominally open political debate in a legislative forum. Though the Congress could indeed have been described as manipulated by the Presidium and the powerful Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev (as the agenda was determined by the Presidium or the Secretariat), independent-minded deputies still managed to make their dissenting views known on a myriad of issues. Indeed, Gorbachev secured his nomination as Chairman by a less than unanimous vote of 2123 for to 87 against, and this after an inquiry regarding many facets of his past and present activities and policies.

By the Congress of People's Deputies' second session, which began on December 12, 1989, the public was less patient with the Congress after witnessing endless procedural bickering. At this second session, the Congress adopted 185 detailed and important standing orders that outlined and regulated the ways in which the Congress and Supreme Soviet worked, as well as outlining the duties, rights and privileges of people's deputies.

Perhaps the most interesting standing order from the standpoint of parties and groups in the Congress, was Article 26, which stated that deputies could

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22Washington Post reporter David Remnick recounts the story of the deputy from northern Russia, Aleksandr Obolensky, who nominated himself to stand against Gorbachev for chairman; about his candidacy, Obolensky said that "It is not a question of winning. It is a matter of creating a tradition of political opposition and competition." Remnick also recounts the questions and comments directed at Gorbachev during his campaign for chairman. See David Remnick (fn. 20), p. 221-223. The vote results are from White, Gill, and Slider, p. 46.
23Dawn Mann, Bringing the Congress of People's Deputies to Order in RL Report on the USSR, v. 2, no. 3, Jan. 19, 1990, p. 1. See Narodnyi deputat, 1990, no. 2, pp. 84-97, translated in Soviet Law and Government, Summer 1991, v. 30, no. 1, pp. 27-49, for the status of USSR people's deputies. It should be noted, however, that this new law on the status of deputies was quite similar to a 1972 law on the status of people's deputies which gave deputies rights such as the right to consult officials and receive answers to their questions in a short period of time; the new law on the status of people's deputies merely expanded upon these rights. See Dawn Mann, Supreme Soviet Adopts Laws on the Status of People's Deputies in Report on the USSR, v. 2, no. 39, Sept. 28, 1990, pp. 1-4.
join together in groups. Of course, though deputies were guaranteed a myriad of rights and privileges, often, whether by error or by intention, many rights (such as the right to ask questions or pass comments to the Presidium) were ignored by the leadership.

Many deputies in both the first and the second sessions of the Congress continued to be critical of the current leadership: for example, Boris Yeltsin gave an impassioned speech about how power was still monopolized by the CPSU; other deputies criticized the KGB, the economy, the nationalities problems, crime, etc., in short, all of the current and pressing issues of the day. The newly-formed Inter-Regional Group of Deputies, led by Sakharov and Yeltsin, called for the elimination of Article Six of the Soviet constitution, the article that granted the CPSU its leading role in Soviet society and thus allowed the CPSU to virtually monopolize power.

The third and fourth Congresses proved to be no less contentious. The third Congress (March, 1990) authorized a new (and never before seen in the USSR) Presidential system. It was opposed by a small number of deputies, including some from the Inter-Regional Group (IRG), among whom Yuri Afanasev was the most vocal opponent. Nevertheless, deputies voted for

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24 Article 26 stated that "For joint work in electoral districts, labor collectives and public organizations deputies may, in the exercise of their authority, join together in deputy groups on a mutually agreed basis. From Narodnyi deputat (translation — fn. 23), p. 41. Other standing orders allowed groups of twenty or more to request that their materials be distributed at session of the Congress; groups of 100 or more had the right to be represented in Congress organs, the same rights that territorial groups of deputies possessed. Groups had to inform the Presidium as to their aims, membership, and leadership. Deputies had no rights, however, to use Congress as a forum to advertise the existence of their group, deputies were thus responsible for notifying their colleagues about their group; the standing orders suggested, too, that groups of deputies should work closely with the Supreme Soviet, committees, the Presidium, and other groups. Many groups took advantage of these rules: often, groups formed according to occupational or regional divisions, e.g., the agrarian group, the Kiev group, an academicians' group, etc. From Mann (fn. 23), p. 4.

25 Mann (fn. 23), p. 5.


27 This new presidential system was similar to that of the French Fifth Republic, with strong presidency grafted onto an undeveloped and impotent legislature.

28 Yuri Afanasev was a most interesting figure in the liberal intelligentsia. A historian by training, he was a former Komsomol leader and a former editorial board member of the Komsomol journal Kommunist. In 1986
the creation of the presidency with 1817 in favour versus 133 against with 61 abstentions. It was in this third session that Article 6 was eliminated from the constitution.\textsuperscript{29} In its fourth session (Dec. 17-26, 1990), the Congress refined and reorganized the system of presidential government to include a Cabinet of Ministers under the President, and also approved in principle a new union treaty.\textsuperscript{30} The fifth and final Congress met from September 1 to 5, 1991 just after the coup attempt of August 18-21, 1991 collapsed; it established a new inter-republican Supreme Soviet that met only once and dissolved itself on December 26, 1991 in the wake of the collapse of the USSR.\textsuperscript{31}

In almost every respect, the new Soviet parliament — especially the working legislature, the Supreme Soviet — was different than the institution that had preceded it. It was no longer the rubber-stamp parliament of the past: for example, it refused to accede to Gorbachev's request for a 15-month ban on strikes.\textsuperscript{32} Because of most deputies' lack of experience, the work of the legislature ranged from uneven and disorganized at times to chaotic: for example, imperfections in procedure and the imprecise drafting of legislation often resulted in unworkable or contradictory laws.\textsuperscript{33} While often deputies were susceptible to manipulation by the chairman (and later president),

he was appointed Director of the Historical Archives Institute, where he organized public lectures criticizing the Stalin era; as one of founders of the important informal groups Moscow Tribune and Memorial, he began a public campaign to revise history and open up the study of the past and Soviet history. Perhaps most importantly, Afanasyev's 1988 book Inogo ne dano (There Is No Other Way), a collection of essays written by leading liberal intelligentsia of the glasnost era, attempted to propose Memorial's platform of democratization and 'the opening up of history' to the CPSU leadership at the 1988 Nineteenth Party Conference. Interestingly enough, though Afanasyev's attempt failed, Gorbachev's final speech at the conference included a hastily added request to the Party to build a memorial to victim's of the Stalin era, one of Memorial's ideas. Remnick (fn. 20), pp. 113-119. See also RL Daily Report, Dec. 14, 1990, v. 2, no. 51, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{29}White, Gill, Slider, p. 50.

\textsuperscript{30}As well, it was at this Fourth Congress on Dec. 20, 1990 that USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze resigned, warning ominously that "dictatorship is coming". RL Daily Report, Dec. 28, 1990, pp. 27-30.


\textsuperscript{32}Elizabeth Teague, Political Developments in Report on the USSR, Dec. 21, 1989, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{33}Goldman (fn. 8), pp. 66.
Gorbachev, at other times deputies — perhaps in the spirit of glasnost — were not at all afraid to speak their mind on most salient issues of the day. Nevertheless, on matters of substance, Gorbachev's will usually prevailed. Deputies did become more independent when constituents began to pressure them, however, those deputies best able to get results for constituents' problems were usually those best connected to the CPSU and government apparatus. Perhaps, then, this new parliament's greatest weaknesses were the inexperience of the deputies, the disorganization that accompanied its ad-hoc nature and two-tier structure, and its ultimate ineffectiveness. Most evidently, the lack of an effective opposition meant that there was no counterbalance to the CPSU government. This is not to say that the legislation that the parliament passed had no effect: for example, the Law on Land resulted in 32000 leaseholders and 60000 independent farms one year after its passing; there were 8000 registered periodicals after the passing of the Law on the Press.

In its final incarnation — after the third session of the Congress — the USSR's new legislature combined elements of both the presidential and parliamentary systems, along with the influences and structures of the communist system. The two-tiered parliament had "complementary... [and] overlapping" spheres of jurisdiction and responsibility; the new and powerful executive presidency (including the expansion of the role of the

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34Goldman, pp. 66-67. David Remnick's accounts of the Congress sessions are particularly insightful, especially his analysis of Gorbachev's skilled and sometimes insidious control of the sessions as chairman. Writes Remnick, "Gorbachev ruled his Congress with the swiftness and guile of Sam Rayburn in his House of Representatives. When Sakharov's criticism exceeded Gorbachev's tolerance, he [Gorbachev] dropped all pretense of democracy; he switched off the microphone and sent Andrei Dmitriyevich to his seat." Remnick (fn. 20), pp. 220-223.

35White, Gill, Slider (fn. 1), p. 53. In a separate study, Thomas Remington used the Law of the Press as a case study with respect to parliamentary government in the USSR. He concluded that the new USSR parliament failed to meet the nominal criteria for an effective legislature; that is, a legislative branch that is an effective counterweight to the executive branch of government. Thomas F. Remington, Parliamentary Government in the USSR in Huber and Kelley, eds. (fn. 8), pp. 175-204.
Federation Council, the creation of a new Cabinet of Ministers with a prime minister, and the creation of a vice-presidency) showed a trend towards giving the executive branch more power. Yet, these new structures lacked the counterbalance of constructive opposition parties both inside and out of the legislature.\textsuperscript{36}

The public was initially quite pleased with what they saw as the success of the First Congress: between 60 and 90 per cent of the population claimed in opinion polls to be watching the proceedings, and between 79 and 88 per cent thought the Congress was "operating completely or more or less democratically".\textsuperscript{37} However, public support declined dramatically for subsequent Congresses as the deputies turned to less substantive procedural issues.\textsuperscript{38}

As of December of 1990, there were loose groupings or blocs of deputies under a variety of banners, but no real political parties with coherent programs and membership; some deputies even belonged to more than one group. Groups included the Communists (730 deputies), Soyuz hard-liners (562), 'agrarians' (431), workers (400), autonomous republics (239), and the radical Interregional Group, the IRG (229).\textsuperscript{39} These groups did not have any substantial formal organizational links to outside independent groups or movements. It should be noted, however, that the IRG's policy platform became a model for extra-parliamentary independent groups, and many of

\textsuperscript{36}Remington (fn. 35), pp. 178-180.
\textsuperscript{37}White, Gill, Slider, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{39}Deputies were allowed to register with more than one grouping. Vremia, Dec. 24, 1990, cited in Donald R. Kelley, The Factionalization of Soviet Politics in Robert T. Huber and Donald R. Kelley, eds., (fn. 8), p. 98.
the IRG's prominent members went on to lead other independent groups and movements.

If it is true that in multi-party liberal democracies, political parties act as linkages between citizens, their representatives and government, then the absence of effective political parties in the USSR during this time period impeded the development parliamentary government and, thus, true democratization. In turn, the social, political, and economic circumstances of this time period hindered the development of genuine political parties that could take on this role; the most important of these problems included an ineffective legislature.

What is notable is that this new Congress was fundamentally different from previous incarnations, both in composition and in political practice. In many ways, then, the reconstituted Congress and Supreme Soviet was a symbol liberalization process begun by Gorbachev. Be that as it may, it must be kept in mind that this sort of liberalization is still fundamentally imposed from the centre or the top, and as such was not (and could not be) a substitute for the development of real political pluralism and a true civil society.

Change in the Electoral System

The electoral system before Gorbachev's reforms could not be characterized as open, democratic or transparent. Elections in the USSR were used to help to legitimate the totalitarian system and to help to socialize and mobilize the population.40 Whereas the hallmark of elections in democratic

countries was choice among different candidates, elections in the USSR lacked any choice at all; Soviet citizens merely approved the choices made before by the CPSU authorities.\textsuperscript{41} By 1987 — at the beginning of Gorbachev's \textit{glasnost} and \textit{perestroika} — the elections were widely assumed to have lost their ability to mobilize and socialize citizens, and legitimize the CPSU-dominated government structures. Gorbachev also required some sort of mechanism through which he could enlist the assistance and support of the public to help his reforms.

In the context of the overall democratisation program — which included attempts to liberalize the Soviet Union's workplaces and cooperatives — Gorbachev and the Central Committee plenum of January 1987 announced expanded opportunities for citizen participation in elections.\textsuperscript{42} In March of 1987 'experimental' reforms were announced that provided for candidate choice in enlarged local constituencies (e.g., village, \textit{raion}, and city-level soviets); these new constituencies would have contested elections with constituencies that had more than one member of the soviet.\textsuperscript{43} Only about five per cent of constituencies were given this special status, and approximately four per cent of all deputies elected on June 21, 1987, were elected on this basis.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{41}See, for example, \textit{The Voting System (A Dissident Critique)} from \textit{Materialy samizdata} No. 48/83, Dec. 30, 1983, translated by Robert L. Strong in Matthews, ed. (fn. 6), pp. 26-29. See also Roeder, pp. 140-143.


\textsuperscript{43}On Conducting and Experiment in Holding Elections to the RSFSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies from Multi-Seat Election Districts (February 26, 1987 Decree of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet), Article 310, pp. 198-200, translated by Robert L. Strong in Matthews, ed. (fn. 6), pp. 21-23.

\textsuperscript{44}The reforms provided for combined constituencies with more candidates nominated for election than available positions. Philip Roeder notes that on average four candidates stood for three positions in these districts; voters would delete the names from the ballot of those they did not wish to be elected (Article 8 — see fn. 40), and those candidates with the fewest number of negative votes would be declared winners. Losers would serve as reserve deputies who would become deputies if elected deputies were unable to fulfill their duties (Articles 10-11). Roeder (fn. 37), p. 142. See also RSFSR Local Election Results, June 1987 in \textit{Izvestiya}, June 25, 1987, translated in Matthews, ed. (fn. 6), pp. 24-25.
In December, 1988, the USSR Constitution was revised by the USSR Supreme Soviet, after the June CPSU 19th Party Conference adopted directives to that effect. The revisions to the constitution provided for new election laws and new legislative institutions at all levels. The December 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies were held under these new rules. As it is these rules that essentially governed all elections in the USSR, and formed the basis for the 1990 union republic election rules, it may be appropriate at this point to examine the 1988 rules, and the subsequent 1989 amendments, in some detail.

As noted earlier, for the first time in the history of the USSR, this legislation provided for choice in elections — seats would be contested by more than one candidate. However, while permitting ballots containing any number of candidates, single-candidate ballots were still permissible, given past practice and Article 100 of the constitution. In fact, one-quarter of 384 constituencies in the December election had a single candidate, who in most cases was a high-ranking party or government official.

The campaign period was to be extended from two to four months, with carefully structured and circumscribed stages to the campaign. These distinct stages included the setting up of electoral commissions in the first

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month; the nomination of candidates in the second month; the official registration of candidates in the third month; and finally, in the fourth month, campaigning leading to the election itself.48

The new rules stipulated that more bodies would be allowed to nominate candidates. These new groups would include collectives of educational institutions, local meetings of voters, and non-governmental organizations.49 Groups like workers' collectives already had the right to nominate candidates, as enshrined in the old 1977 Brezhnev USSR Constitution; this was to ostensibly show how the USSR was a "worker's state"; however, this practice also led to considerable control by workers (or more specifically, those who manipulated them) over the political process through the inclusion in the spring republican elections of special 'industrial constituencies'.50 Indeed, this practice also stifles the development of parties and the party system and gives a disproportionate voice to groups such as those who purported to speak for workers — in a true multiparty democracy, it is independent political parties that nominate candidates.

Procedures for the nomination of candidates by local communities were also described in the rules. To nominate candidates, local groups required at least 500 voters (who were residents of the constituency in question), at a meeting organized by the local soviet's people's deputies and the local electoral commission. While the idea of officially requiring the nomination and registration of candidates is, in theory, sound, most

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49 Work collectives, public organizations, meetings of voters, and meetings of servicemen had the right to nominate candidates; as well, all-Union and republican public organizations were also allowed to nominate candidates for their own allotment of 750 seats. See Sergei Voronitsyn, *Restructuring of Supreme Organs of State Power* in *Report on the USSR*, Jan. 13, 1989, pp. 16-18. See also Article 100 of the revised electoral law (fn. 43).
50 Danilenko, p. 36.
observers noted that in practice, the nomination and registration process was problematic and open to abuse.\textsuperscript{51} Danilenko observes that while this process could be compared to the U.S. primary process, in fact it lacked basic democratic standards.\textsuperscript{52} The electoral commissions could and did use nomination meetings as a means of controlling candidacies and thus the electoral process.\textsuperscript{53}

The 1989 reforms gave special representation in parliament (750 seats, one-third of the total) to so-called public or social organizations.\textsuperscript{54} Affording these organizations special representation undermined the principle of equality and in effect led to extra votes for members of the organizations in question. The procedures and results of this process were neither democratic, nor fair nor competitive: The rank and file of the organizations were usually left out of the process, those nominated as representatives were usually nomenklatura apparatchiki, and these public organizations for the most part only nominated as many candidates as the number of seats they were allotted.\textsuperscript{55} Other reforms included the right of Soviet citizens working abroad to participate in elections; the denial of voting rights to mental patients found

\textsuperscript{51}See fn. 20.
\textsuperscript{52}Danilenko, p. 38
\textsuperscript{53}It should be noted, however, that only a small proportion of nominations in the 1989 elections took place in this manner. In the spring 1990 republican elections about 7.3 per cent of candidates were nominated in this manner, and in the spring 1990 local soviet elections, 18.2 per cent of candidates were nominated in this manner. See Danilenko (fn. 47), p. 37.
\textsuperscript{54}425 of these 750 seats are reserved for the CPSU and its associated public organizations, which include the Komsomol (75 seats), the All-Union Central Trade-Union Council (100 seats), the Committee of Soviet Women (75 seats), the All-Union Council of War and Labour Veterans (75 seats), and the CPSU itself (100 seats). Izvestiya, Dec. 4, 1988, from Viktor Yasmann, Quotas of Seats in Congress of People's Deputies for Public and Professional Organizations, in Report on the USSR, Jan. 27, 1989, p. 10.
to be mentally incompetent; and the creation of the Central Electoral Commission as the standing body that oversees and adjudicates elections.

The new legislation also gave everyone — including citizens, workers' collectives, and public organizations — the right to campaign for or against a candidate. In fact, the law (Article 44) stipulated that public organizations, enterprise heads and community groups were required to help candidates to organize meetings with the electorate and assist in the distribution of campaign literature and information. The law also provided for up to ten campaign workers to assist officially registered candidates; for the "legally protected right" to put forward a program; the right of immunity from prosecution for candidates without consent of the Central Electoral Commission; and the right to a leave of absence from work in order to act as a full-time candidate, through the use of public funds to pay for average salaries. Unchanged from previous practice, elections were to be financed by the state, which would pay for all election activities, access to the media, transportation, etc. However, in December 1989 donations from private sources (such as public organizations, individual citizens, and enterprises) became permitted, if only in the sense that money for campaign costs could be given to local electoral commissions who would divide the money equally among candidates.

Finally, voting procedures included a balloting procedure that was not just secret in theory — as the 1977 Constitution guaranteed a secret ballot.

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56 Danilenko notes that the distinction between active suffrage and the right to take part in the voting had never been made in legal terms before, thus casting doubt on previous claims of a turn-out of 100 per cent. See Danilenko (fn. 47), p. 40. See also Article 96 of the revised Constitution (fn. 46).
57 Article 113(1) stated that the Central Electoral Commission would be appointed by the Supreme Soviet. From Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution 1988 (fn. 46), p. 371.
58 Danilenko (fn. 47), p. 41.
59 Danilenko, p. 42.
whereby voters deposited an unmarked ballot in a box, but those who entered a booth were obviously voting against the officially sanctioned candidates — but in practice as well, so that all voters would pass through a booth allowing a truly secret ballot. To win, a candidate required an absolute majority of the votes of those voting, with more than 50 per cent of the constituency required to take part to make the election valid. If there was no candidate with a majority, then a run-off election would be held in two weeks between the two candidates with the most votes. In the 1989 elections, three rounds were required in some constituencies due to less than 50 per cent of the voters participating, or due to elections being declared null and void by the electoral commission for some sort of gross violation of the rules.60

In 1990, a discussion of amendments to the previous 1988 election-law changes resulted after protest by the public and the new Congress of People's Deputies legislators that some regulations (under which the March 1989 elections were held) were undemocratic: for example, the reservation of one-third of the seats for representatives of social organizations.61 With this in mind, the newly elected USSR Congress of People's Deputies requested that the Supreme Soviet revise the republican electoral system; at the same time, 

60 In 76 constituencies, second ballots were necessary where candidates failed to obtain 50 per cent of the vote; e.g. these were run-off elections between the top two candidates from the first round, and took place on April 2 or April 9, 1989. However, special new elections were required in 195 territorial and national-territorial constituencies (where candidates still failed to obtain over 50 per cent of votes cast); in five public organizations (totalling 18 seats) where candidates had not obtained the 50 per cent minimum of votes cast; and in three districts in Armenia where the vote was declared invalid and held over due to voter turnout of less than the 50 per cent minimum. These new elections differed from the 76 second-ballot contests as the entire nomination, registration, and campaign procedures were repeated. This new second round of elections resulted in 126 run-off elections, because many local electoral commissions registered all nominees in a constituency (electoral commissions were less likely to allow the registration of all nominees in the first round). See Dawn Mann, The Congress of People's Deputies: The Election Marathon Ends in Report on the USSR, June 2, 1989, pp. 3-5.

republican Supreme Soviets also enacted the necessary changes for republican elections.

When debate began in the newly-elected USSR Congress of People's Deputies on amending the electoral rules, two areas could be singled out as being the most contentious: the reservation of one-third of the seats for public organizations and the nomination procedures. As some republics had already done away with reserved seats for social organizations, and after extensive debate in the Supreme Soviet, the draft rewritten section of the constitution deleted any requirement for representation of social organizations at any level. However, upon seeing this draft the Congress changed the legislation to allow for the representation of social organizations if the republican constitution allowed for it, and in so doing deleted the section that called for social organization representation in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Other changes included the definition of who was allowed to vote and who may be nominated to run as a candidate; the result was more definitive wording on the issue. The amended law also allowed people who were charged with a crime but not yet brought to trial to become elected as a deputy, while still depriving such people of the right to vote.62

The constitution was rife with contradictions after the passage of these numerous new laws. While sections governing the election of representatives from social organizations were deleted from the constitution, Article 109, which stated that the USSR Congress of People's Deputies was made up of 750 deputies from territorial districts, 750 deputies from national-

62Mann (fn. 61), p. 12.
territorial districts, and 750 deputies from all-Union social organizations remained (until, of course, the USSR Congress and Supreme Soviet was dissolved in the wake of the August 1991 coup attempt). As well, laws governing all-Union elections to the Congress of People's Deputies were not changed. Nevertheless, the overall tendency was for the Congress and Supreme Soviet to allow republics to decide these issues for themselves and in so doing essentially cede power from the centre to the republican legislatures.

The Russian Elections and the New RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies

The RSFSR chose to have a two-tiered parliament, in which the elected Congress of People's Deputies selected the standing legislature, the 152-member Supreme Soviet. The RSFSR's new laws on the election included the abolition of electoral commission registration meetings for candidates, the elimination of reserved seats for public organizations, and the institution of stricter campaign laws regarding financing and the conduct of the campaigns. The election under the new laws for the new Congress of People's Deputies in the RSFSR was held on March 4, 1990. 6705 candidates took part in contesting the Congress's 1068 seats (representing 900 territorial and 168 national-territorial districts), and there were as many as 28 candidates in a single constituency; 5447 candidates competed for the territorial seats and

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63 The new laws eliminated the controversial second stage of the campaign process where candidates were screened by local electoral commissions; they also eliminated reserved seats for public organizations (but organizations could still nominate candidates to take part in the general election), and the new laws prohibited candidates from receiving money or free aid, and from using personal funds for the campaign. Dawn Mann, The RSFSR Elections: The Congress of People's Deputies in Report on the USSR, April 13, 1990, p. 11.
1258 competed for the national-territorial seats (the discrepancy may be due to some candidates withdrawing voluntarily from races). In fact, compared to other republican elections, the RSFSR had the second highest index of competition; there was relatively low levels of voter turnout: 77 per cent, which was lower than the December all-Union elections. Due to the rules requiring an absolute majority of votes cast in a constituency to secure election, only 121 seats were filled in the first round of balloting. By March 18, 1990, (after the second round had been conducted) 1026 deputies had been elected. While the largest number of candidates remained CPSU members, a large number of seats also went to managers, clerics, executives, and academics, and the percentage of workers fell from 35.8 per cent to 5.9 percent, and collective farmers elected fell from 14.7 to 4.6 per cent. In general, party and government officials did not do well in this election: for example, only twenty of the RSFSR's seventy-seven regional party committee first secretaries were elected. Most importantly, these elections witnessed a considerable increase in the participation of informal groups, associations and (proto-)parties as compared to the 1989 all-Union Congress elections; these groups were particularly active and well-organized in cities, even though much attention in the RSFSR was focused on politics at the all-Union level in the aftermath of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies elections. Due to regulations stipulating that only public associations, workplace cooperatives,

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65 White, Gill, Slider, p. 31.
66 Mann (fn. 61), p. 11
67 A comparison of deputies elected to the new Congress to the composition of the old RSFSR Supreme Soviet, elected in 1985, shows the proportion of women dropping from 35.8 per cent to 5.4 per cent; deputies employed in scientific, educational, cultural work and journalism increased from 55 in 1985 to 192 in the new Congress. CPSU members elected rose from 66.6 per cent to 86.3 per cent, while Komsomol members fell from 15.7 per cent to 0.5 per cent. Sovetskaya Rossiya, March 28, 1990, Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, Moscow, 1987, TASS, March 13, 1990, from Mann (fn. 61).
68 Mann (fn. 61), p. 12.
registered voters' clubs, and similar organizations could nominate candidates, informal groups actively worked to set up and register new independent voters' clubs and to then nominate candidates. These activities occurred in many of the larger cities through the RSFSR; in the previous all-Union election only Moscow and Leningrad were centres for this sort of activity.69

The creation of an all-Russian united electoral bloc was spearheaded by the Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists and Democratic Perestroika, the Moscow Association of Voters, and MADO, the Inter-Regional Association of Democratic Organisations, in October of 1989.70 At a founding conference in Moscow on January 20 and 21, 1990, participants included the Moscow Party Club, the Moscow Popular Front, Moscow Tribune, Memorial, the Social-Democratic Association, the Union of constitutional Democrats, Aprel' (the democratic writers' association), the socialist trade union Sotsprof, and the Popular Front of the RSFSR. Later, the Anarcho-Syndicalists and the Moscow Association of Voters dropped out; the name of the electoral bloc was changed from 'Elections 90' to 'Democratic Russia'. Democratic Russia adopted a comprehensive program and urged sympathetic candidates in the RSFSR to unite. Among other things, the bloc supported perestroika and called for a new constitution, human rights, the end of CPSU dominance and control, fundamental freedoms, as well as economic reforms.71 Duncan remarks that the economic part of the program did not call for an end to socialism and as such was ambiguous as to what sort of economic system it

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70 The Moscow Association of Voters was in fact closely associated with the USSR Congress of People's Deputies' Inter-Regional Group. See Peter J.S. Duncan, The Rebirth of Politics in Russia in Geoffrey A. Hosking, Jonathan Aves, and Peter J.S. Duncan (eds.) The Road to Post-Communism, Pinter Publishers, New York, 1992, pp. 79-80.
71 Tolz (fn. 69), p. 23.
Members of the Inter-Regional Group of deputies (from the USSR Congress) helped to build Democratic Russia across the RSFSR, while local independent voters' associations were created by local popular front organizations or other local organizations: for example, the Moscow Association of Voters ('MOI') created 'Elections 90' in Moscow and the Leningrad Popular Front formed the 'Democratic Elections 90' group. Similar associations sprung up in the larger population centres; in Khabarovsk and Irkutsk the independent groups formed an alliance with reform-minded Communist Party officials.

Leaders and members of informal groups and movements that were democratically oriented also were nominated as candidates. As well, conservative groups were active in the election. A conservative, Russian, nationalist umbrella organization was formed, called the 'Bloc of Public-Patriotic Movements of Russia'; Duncan remarks that it brought together creative unions, cultural organizations, and informal groups, and was also actively supported by the Armed Forces' General Staff, much of the upper hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church, the conservative parts of the CPSU, and perhaps most importantly, the Union of Writers of the RSFSR and its journal's editorial board, Nash sovremennik.

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72 Duncan (fn. 70), p. 80.
73 Duncan, p. 81.
74 Some notable activists and leaders: Viktor Aksyuchits, the editor of the religious journal Vybor; Mikhail Astafev, leader of the Moscow Popular Front; Leonid Volkov and Pavel Kudyukin, prominent members of the 'Democratic Perestroika' club; 'Social Trade Union' independent trade union organizer Sergei Khramov; Igor Surkov, leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party and member of the Moscow Popular Front; Vitalii Urazhtsev, another Moscow Popular Front activist and co-chairman of 'Shchit' (Shield), described as an unofficial servicemen's trade union; Father Gleb Yakunin, a former political prisoner and organizer of the 'Church and Perestroika' movement; and Aleksandr Verkhovsky, the editor of the unofficial periodical Panorama. Taken from Tolz (fn. 69), p. 25. See Appendix Three
75 Duncan also notes that the Russian Union of Writers (as opposed to those writers' unions in the other republics, who advocated national independence and supported Gorbachev's reforms) was "at the ideological centre of opposition to perestroika", and was originally created in 1957 as a "conservative counterweight" to the more liberal Union of Writers of the USSR. See Duncan (fn. 70), pp. 83-84.
The Bloc of Public-Patriotic Movements of Russia was made up of the umbrella group United Council of Russia, the Fellowship of Russian Artists, the United Workers' Front of Russia, the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Monuments, the Union for the Spiritual Rebirth of the Fatherland, the 'Russia' Club of USSR People's Deputies and Voters, the Public Committee to Save the Volga, as well as numerous other national-religious and cultural organizations, totaling twelve organizations.\(^{76}\)

The conservative-nationalist bloc's program embraced traditional nationalistic, or even Stalinist themes, such as the unity of the Russian people (and by extension the territorial integrity of the USSR, or 'Russian empire'); it attacked politicians and spoke against exploitation of Russia by the west; it defended socialism while denouncing the CPSU for giving in to those who would appease separatists and dismantle the USSR; and it urged the establishment of unique Russian institutions such as the Academy of Sciences (which were absorbed into all-Union institutions) and a Russian Communist Party. Traditional themes, which might have been characterised as Slavophilic, also predominated: the program called for the capital to be moved from Moscow to St. Petersburg (Leningrad) so that Moscow could renew its historical role as the religious and spiritual centre for Russia; the Russian Orthodox Church, too, should aid in redeveloping Russia's "patriotic consciousness".\(^{77}\) This conservative bloc created officially registered voters' clubs; the most prominent of which, called 'Rossiya', were active in Leningrad and Moscow.\(^{78}\)

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\(^{76}\)Duncan (fn. 70), p. 85.

\(^{77}\)Duncan, p. 86.

\(^{78}\)Nominated candidates for the conservative bloc included avowed anti-Semites like Aleksandr Romanenko, the head of the nationalist group 'Patriot', Irina Poluboyarinova, and Mark Lyubomodrov. See Tolz (fn. 69), pp. 25-26.
A majority of all candidates (75 per cent) were nominated by labour collectives. Twenty-one per cent of candidates were nominated by officially registered public organizations, while only four per cent were nominated by schools or residents of electoral districts. The elections this time were different than the previous all-Union Congress of People's Deputies elections, as there were no seats reserved for public organizations and there was no pre-election screening of candidates; as well, the CPSU's era of unchallenged monopoly and perceived invincibility had come to an end when on March 14, in between the two rounds of voting, Article Six of the Soviet Constitution was abolished. Thus, the party was in a weaker position than it had been previously (see below). However, many problems still persisted, including excessively strict interpretation of the election rules (or, alternately, a lack of enforcement of the rules) by local electoral commissions, unfair access to the mass media by the Party, and attempts by Party apparatchiki to invalidate or block the nomination of informal candidates. Be that as it may, no one group or bloc was exceptionally well-organized and both the election campaign and the results reflected this. In many districts, both the democrats and the communists put up more than one candidate; in other districts, the democrats were unable to nominate an associated candidate. Candidates — in their speeches and literature — referred to the organizations in which they were active in order to advertise to voters their affiliation and allegiances. Newspapers also published lists of candidates deemed to be running on an organization or bloc's list: for example, on February 23 Literaturnaia Rossiya

80Mann (fn. 61), pp. 11-17. See also Tolz (fn. 69) for information on the Party's actions and reaction to informal/opposition candidates in the election, pp. 26-27.
81Duncan, p. 87.
published the Russian nationalist bloc's list of 61 candidates for Moscow Russian Congress seats.82

In terms of results, the democratic blocs performed well in Moscow and Leningrad, with many of their leading candidates securing election; while candidates supportive of the 'Bloc of Russian Public-Patriotic Movements' and party officials did not fare well. Only sixteen of seventy candidates for Moscow Congress seats of the nationalist bloc made it to the second round of elections, and of these sixteen, only two won election.83 Fifty-seven of the sixty-five Moscow RSFSR Congress seats were won by candidates endorsed by Democratic Russia, and candidates backed by Democratic Russia's sister group in Leningrad, 'Democratic Elections-90' won twenty-eight of thirty-four Congress seats in Leningrad.84 In Sverdlovsk, Democratic Choice endorsed seven of nine Congress deputies, including Yeltsin. Overall, it was estimated just after the election that approximately 350 deputies in the 1068-seat RSFSR Congress were supportive of the Democratic Russia bloc's program; and democratic blocs also controlled many major city and oblast' soviets, including Moscow, Sakhalin and Leningrad. While 86.3 per cent of deputies elected to the Russian Congress were CPSU members, they were of differing ideological dispositions; nevertheless, the apparatchiki did well in elections in autonomous republic and oblast' soviets, and indeed controlled nearly half of the seats in the Russian Congress.85 Voter turnout of 77 per cent was ten per cent lower than the turnout for the December 1989 all-Union

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82Duncan, p. 87.
84Mann (fn. 61), p. 11.
85Duncan, p. 88.
Congress elections, and turnout dropped to 69 per cent for the runoff elections that were held on March 14, 17, and 18, 1990.  

The period after the elections could be characterised as a time in which the development of true multipartism and pluralism became, in a way, stillborn. Conflicts between and among democrats in city, local, regional and even the Congress and Supreme Soviets certainly slowed the pace of coherent economic and political reform. Indeed, competing levels of government also handicapped the pace of reform and created discord among different factions of elected representatives at all levels — for example, Moscow's 33 raions often balked at carrying out the wishes of the Moscow city Soviet (Mossovet). More often than not, elected democrats failed to make any progress due to the still-powerful state and party authorities. When Democratic Russia deputies to the RSFSR Congress met on April 14, 1990, they were in fact preoccupied with all-Union matters, and they paid special attention to the events surrounding the CPSU.  

Added to this was the recent creation of a new Communist Party of the RSFSR, whose founding congress occurred just after the opening session of the new RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies. See Appendix Two for a summary of Russian political divisions and personalities as of the summer and fall of 1990.

**Article Six and the Communist Party**

The decision to eliminate Article Six from the USSR Constitution — the section that guaranteed the CPSU's leading role in all aspects of Soviet

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86Mann (fn. 61), p. 15.
87Duncan (fn. 70), p. 91.
society — must be understood in the context of the political climate and events in the USSR, and indeed in all of Eastern Europe at that time. In late 1989 the communist regimes that had been imposed by the USSR in Eastern Europe after World War Two collapsed, giving impetus to liberal-minded informal groups and their members to continue to press for changes in Soviet society.

Through 1989 and into early 1990, Gorbachev's reforms entered a new phase as Soviet society became increasingly politicized and polarized. Though political reforms had been somewhat successful — for example, a newly elected USSR Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet — economic reforms were less so; there was a larger and larger gap between political and economic reform. In light of these developments, it was becoming more and more difficult for the central government and party organs of the USSR to exert control over all aspects of soviet society: even the newly elected all-Union Supreme Soviet (of which 85 per cent of the deputies were CPSU members) had on a number of occasions refused to do what Gorbachev, the executive president, had asked it to do.89 

Glasnost, perestroika and demokratizatsiya had undoubtedly been the catalyst for unleashing new social forces — including new, independent movements and groups — as well as the opening up of latent ethnic tensions. Though Gorbachev had to this point attempted to modify and improve the moribund and now mistrusted Party's role, he had stopped short of calling for a

89 For example, the Supreme Soviet refused to allow a 15 month ban on strike action by workers, as requested to by Gorbachev, and it voted to eliminate reserved seats for Party and other public organizations. See Vera Tolz, Political Developments in Report on the USSR, Dec.19, 1989, pp. 4-5.
multiparty system.\textsuperscript{90} Still, his political reforms had indeed thrown the Party into a crisis and eventually precipitated a split.

Both before and during the 1989 and 1990 election campaigns the CPSU itself was also put under considerable pressure to reform, both from within and from the outside. Gorbachev himself mused publicly that he saw "no tragedy in a multiparty system".\textsuperscript{91} Numerous groups within the party — such as the Inter-Club Party Group, the Moscow Party Club (also called the 'Communists for Perestroika') and the Democratic Platform — brought about a split in it between liberal-minded reformers and more conservative hard-liners.\textsuperscript{92} Finally, large demonstrations in favour of democratising the CPSU and the state apparatus, supporting a multi-party democracy, and calling for the abolishment of Article Six took place on February 4, 1990; these demonstrations, consisting of 200,000 people in Moscow and substantial numbers of people in other Russian cities, were organized by a number of liberal informal groups, associations and proto-parties.

The decision to eliminate Article Six from the Soviet constitution was also part of a broader initiative set out by Gorbachev to a special Central Committee plenum in February, 1990. Gorbachev proposed to reduce the power of the CPSU, separate the party from the state, create a new and

\textsuperscript{90}Tolz (fn. 89), p. 5.


\textsuperscript{92}The veritable split in the CPSU was caused when liberal-minded party members expanded on the idea of the Democratic Platform (DemPlatforma), a club of communist intellectuals formed by Igor Chubais and Vladimir Lysenko. Prominent figures like Yeltsin, Nikolai Travkin, Vyacheslav Shostakovsky, Yuri Afanasev and Gavril Popov soon became enamoured with the idea of a liberal wing within the CPSU to promote reform and created the organization at a founding meeting in Moscow attended by over 450 CPSU members. It grew to over two million members within two months of its inception in January 1990. See Michael McFaul and Sergei Markov, The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA, 1993, pp. 9-11. See also Julia Wishnevsky and Elizabeth Teague (fn. 91), pp. 7-9. The split, evolution and eventual dissolution of the CPSU will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four.
powerful executive presidency, and abolish the Politburo, as well as eliminate Article Six.\textsuperscript{93} The constitution was finally amended by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies on March 14, 1990 during the later rounds of voting in the RSFSR election.

\textit{Conclusions — Factionalization, Proto-parties and the Nascent Party System}

With respect to party formation, the Gorbachev liberalization — especially Article Six's elimination from the constitution — gave the nascent parties an opportunity and an opening in which to operate. In retrospect, this opening was not any more important than the other opportunities that were presented by Gorbachev's policies of \textit{glasnost} and \textit{perestroika}. However, the elections to the new USSR Congress of People's Deputies (which in turn elected the standing parliament, the Supreme Soviet) were, despite their defects and flaws, the first nominally free, multi-candidate and open elections in the USSR since 1917. Though there were some elements of independent group activity and co-operation leading to bloc formation, the independent groups, associations and movements were for the most part of a limited scope and therefore ineffective. Yet, their efforts to campaign in the election signified that cracks were beginning to appear in the heretofore monolithic state and government structures of the USSR.

Indeed, in the new all-Union parliament, the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies became the informal parliamentary opposition, and there was also some evidence of the deputies in this parliament belonging to any one of five loosely defined groupings — Communists, Soyuz, agrarians, workers,

\textsuperscript{93}Goldman (fn. 8), pp. 59-60. See also Elizabeth Teague, \textit{Gorbachev Proposes Dropping Communist Party Monopoly in Report on the USSR}, Feb. 9, 1990, pp. 6-8.
autonomous republics, or the IRG. The IRG also proved to be a catalyst for unofficial democratic organizations, groups and blocs that would contest the 1990 local and republic elections: many of these liberal groups modeled their programs on the platform of the IRG.94 Proto-parties, and independent groups and movements became much more active in the March 1990 RSFSR elections. The 1990 elections saw unofficial groups, organizations and proto-parties that were far more active and bolder in their approach to electioneering and campaigning. Though there was a marked increase quantitatively and qualitatively in these groups' actions, these groups could not be classified as anything more than proto-parties. For example, while all-Republic blocs seemed impressive in that the signatories to their programs included many names of activists, often, the activists in these groups belonged to more than one group95

Still, though the independent democratic groups did well in Leningrad and Moscow, the apparatus "continued to dominate most of the oblast' soviets and the Autonomous Republics, and held nearly half the seats in the Russian Congress itself".96 The lack of coherence and co-operation among democrats in the RSFSR Congress, resulting in a "failure to create coherent parties which could guarantee legislative majorities to reformist executives", meant that the development of true a multiparty system, at least on the democratic side, was not at all complete. Compounding this problem was the obstinacy of leading democratic figures like Yeltsin, who insisted on

95Duncan (fn. 70), p. 85.
96Duncan, p. 88.
remaining neutral and "above" party politics, which in turn prevented alliances and a presidential party from forming which would have helped to expedite the course of economic and political reform. Thus, these parties, blocs, and groupings, and their members, showed very little evidence of the toleration, trust, compromise and co-operation that are the normative hallmarks of parties in a stable, multi-party liberal democracy. Nevertheless, this is as much the result of the effects of 70 years of totalitarian communism — and the political culture associated with it — as the peculiar circumstances surrounding the inception of pluralist politics which preceded the downfall of the Soviet state. Indeed, the means by which these institutional reforms were arrived at is evidence of this — they were the product of the Soviet-era institutions and people. It became apparent after the participation of democrats in soviets at all levels that the largest problem was not even democrats' lack of cooperation: the elected soviets were powerless against the CPSU-dominated state and government system.

The increasing tendency of ceding more control and power from the USSR central government organs to the republics and regions also had effects on proto-parties and the development of the party system. Party and independent group or movement development tended to occur, as a result, on a more regional and local level than at an all-Union level. This, in turn, may have led to far less all-Union or all-republic co-operation than would have been the case otherwise. Subsequent co-operation between parliamentary groupings (and coherence within these groupings) in the newly elected congresses was thus negatively affected, and thus the process of
"legislative institutionalization [a hallmark of true transitions to democracy] is slow and uneven".97

In retrospect, it seems clear that Gorbachev saw democracy and democratization as a means to an end (e.g., as a way to mobilize the population against his opponents) rather than a desirable end in itself. He instituted change from above in order to maintain a modicum of control over the reform process. Moreover, democracy imposed from above, however, is fraught with problems. In terms of sufficient conditions for a multi-party democracy, imposed democracy is not enough: what occurred in the USSR and the RSFSR was a change at the institutional level but not at the real level of culture and ideas. Perhaps most importantly, it could be argued, too, that if the impetus for the formation of the above-mentioned proto-parties, groups, movements and blocs was in many cases from within the state apparatus, the CPSU, and the newly-formed and newly-elected parliaments, then these parties are not true mass parties, because they are parliamentary in all respects. And if they are parliamentary in all respects, then they are not mass parties and are neither the result of nor the participants in civil society, broadly defined.

What the liberalization accomplished was to help to bring about a new form of pluralism and in so doing create a political and social environment in which reform forces could enlist support. In turn, this led to the increased factionalization of Soviet politics in general. This factionalization had both diverse effects on the political system in general and on actors within the

97 Thomas Remington asserts that the development of an effective system of democratic parliamentary government was hindered by the absence of political parties capable of articulating and aggregating interests, and serving as linkages between citizens, deputies and the government. See Thomas Remington, Parliamentary Government in the USSR in Robert T. Huber and Donald R. Kelley, eds., Perestroika-Era Politics, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 1991, pp. 175-204.
system, including the emerging political parties: For example, there was the split in the CPSU, the formation of a new Communist party in the RSFSR, the proliferation of new parties and new political actors, the emergence of popular front independence movements in the Baltics and elsewhere, and the devolution of power downwards to republic and local-level bodies. The results on the Soviet population, too, were important: the Soviet citizenry's trust in old institutions and elites collapsed. In turn, the population became increasingly vocal in their demands, leading to frustration and discontent. The nascent proto-parties, groups, movements and informals were indeed very good at articulating these new demands. But in liberal, multiparty democracies political parties should also play a role in the interest aggregation of these newly articulated demands, in effect, acting as agents of compromise and bargaining towards a cooperative solution. The proto-parties, groups and movements in the USSR were unable to play this role.

This system-wide factionalization of politics is an important theme regarding the development of the political parties in the Soviet Union and in Russia, in particular. Thus, the following chapter will examine in some detail the more important and larger proto-parties, groups and movements to explain and show how this system is indeed fragmented, polarized and factionalized.

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99 This frustration and discontent might have been termed a case of 'relative deprivation'. Relative deprivation is defined as "a discrepancy between people's expectations about the goods and conditions of life to which they are entitled, on one hand, and, on the other, their value capabilities — the degree to which they think they can attain these goods and conditions." See Ted R. Gurr, A Comparative Study of Civil Strife, as quoted in Gabriel A. Almond and C. Bingham Powell Jr., eds., Comparative Politics Today, 3rd ed., Little, Brown & Co., Toronto, 1984, p. 70.
IV

Pluralism, Factionalism, and Polarization:
The Parties and the Political Party System, 1986-1992, and Beyond

“A gangster clique striving for power.”
Gorbachev on the Interregional Group of Deputies

“...consigned to the ash heap of history.”
Ronald Reagan on the CPSU’s demise

It would be wrong or premature to suggest that a true multiparty system has developed in Russia, as some observers have done. However, judging by the sheer number of groups, proto-parties, and movements, and their levels of activity, it would not be spurious to argue that pluralism in one form or another has taken root in Russia — albeit a factionalized type of pluralism. Pluralism is not enough to engender a multiparty, liberal democracy, but it is at least a necessary condition, and in this it is an important first step. To give some depth to this study, this chapter will focus on the more important of the groups, movements and proto-parties.

Chapter Four will examine the individual parties, groups, movements and blocs in the RSFSR and Russia from the 1990 election to the years after the dissolution of the USSR. It will proceed in this fashion: firstly, it will examine those groups that acted both inside and outside RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies and Supreme Soviet. Then, it will inventory the

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individual parties, groups, and movements, provide a brief description and history of the most important ones, and situate them on two-dimensional axes according to their various ideological and programmatic profiles; in this way, some insights into the tendencies of the formation and evolution of the parties and party system will be gained. This chapter will also look at the three "ideological poles" in Russian politics — the left, the centre and the right — in order to help explain and understand the emerging party system in general.

The Interregional Group of Deputies

The previous chapter outlined the institutional, political, social and cultural factors — and the resulting factionalization of political life in general — that helped bring about the peculiar form of Soviet and Russian pluralism. In particular, the Interregional Group of deputies (IRG) was an important precursor and catalyst for other opposition movements that followed it: in the republic and local elections that followed the all-Union elections, many liberal electoral groups and blocs based their electoral platforms or programs on the Interregional group's program.

The IRG was the parliamentary bloc in the USSR's Congress of People's Deputies that was the precursor to proto-parties in the RSFSR. Formed in July 1989 after the first session of the new all-Union Congress, the Interregional Group was the first parliamentary faction in the history of the USSR Congress or its working body, the Supreme Soviet. Most members (83 per cent) were CPSU members, and almost all members were supportive of Gorbachev's reforms, only arguing that he should have proceeded faster. The
IRG met initially through the informal group Moscow Tribune, and eventually became known as the Interregional Group (Mezhregional'naya deputatskaya gruppa) as its members were drawn mostly from large population centres from across the USSR (though most members were from the RSFSR); deputies from the Baltic republics remained closely associated with the IRG but chose to remain separate.\(^2\)

The first meeting of the group that would become the IRG was held at a Moscow Tribune meeting on June 7, 1989, during the first Congress of People's Deputies (which began on May 25 and ended on June 10); a second informal meeting was held on June 10. Deputies who attended the meetings were concerned that the Congress was being manipulated by the Soviet leadership, and in response, the 150 deputies agreed to a manifesto that spoke out against the Congress "taking decisions that did not correspond with the interests of the people", a manifesto which was later presented to the Congress.\(^3\) Yeltsin announced the creation of the IRG at a public rally at Luzhniki stadium in Moscow on June 12; Yeltsin said that this new group was necessary to empower Soviet citizens and abolish the one-party system.\(^4\)

At their third and fourth meetings, on June 24 and July 8 respectively, the group discussed policy and decided to hold a founding conference and organize formally.\(^5\)

The founding conference was held on July 29 and 30 in Moscow at the Dom kino, the filmmakers' club that had been the site for many liberal informal group meetings in previous years. The meeting, organized by


\(^3\)Narodny deputat, No. 1, 1989, as quoted in Teague (fn. 2), p. 2.

\(^4\)Teague, p. 2.

\(^5\)Teague, p. 3.
Gavriil Popov and Yeltsin, was attended by 393 deputies from the Congress and elected leading reformers like Yuri Afanasev and Andrei Sakharov to its coordinating executive; 260 of the deputies in attendance signed up at the meeting as formal members of the group. At the initial conference, members discussed the proposed amendments to the Soviet electoral law, and reviewed a tentative draft of the IRG's own program.

The IRG adopted its program at a meeting in Moscow on September 23 and 24. The program asserted that the chief source of state power was to be the popularly-elected soviets, from the lowest local level to the all-Union Congress; it proposed a new constitution that separated powers clearly between the legislature, executive and judiciary. The program proposed that the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet (or executive president, who at the time was Gorbachev) be elected by universal suffrage; that electoral procedures be redesigned such that local electoral authorities would no longer be able to control the selection of candidates; that the reserved seats in the Congress for public organizations be eliminated; and that Article 6, the section of the constitution regarding the leading role of the CPSU, be removed. The IRG's program also proposed a new Union treaty that would allow Union republics to be sovereign and allow them to decide which powers to delegate to the central government.

With respect to the economy, the IRG's platform proposed the legalization of private ownership, the dismantling of state monopolies except

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6The IRG claimed, as of July 1989, that 388 deputies supported the IRG (17 per cent of the 2,250 deputies in the Congress); furthermore, the IRG also contended that 88 members of the group sat in the 542-member Supreme Soviet (16 per cent). The majority (286) of the IRG members were from the RSFSR: 69 from the Moscow area, 25 from Leningrad, and 30 from the Urals and Siberia; 48 were from Ukraine; Baltic deputies cooperated with the group but did not join, while there was at least one deputy from each of the fifteen Union republics save Turkmenistan. As noted earlier, most members of the IRG were CPSU members — on the executive, only Sakharov did not belong to the CPSU. See Teague (fn. 2), p. 3 and Vera Tolz, (fn. 1), p. 74.

7Teague, pp. 3-4.
where economically efficient (e.g., defence), the encouragement of private enterprise, the dismantling of large state-owned enterprises into smaller units with private ownership, and the use of market forces to determine and regulate economic activity. The IRG proposed full compliance with international human rights protocols to which the USSR was a signatory; the right for Soviet citizens to freely associate and organize in independent groups as well as form parliamentary groups which would be given access to resources such as printing facilities and office space; the elimination of the state's monopoly in the mass media; and the elimination of internal passports and the rules associated with them, and the right to move freely both within the USSR and out of it. Yuri Afanasev noted that this platform was only preliminary and would be revised in the future.8

Reaction by conservatives to the IRG's formation was hardly positive; perhaps Gorbachev encapsulated the sentiments of most hardliners when he referred to the IRG as a "gangster clique striving for power."9 The United Front of Workers of Russia, for example, consistently attacked the Interregional group, and top government and party officials harassed the group through such means as not allowing it access to printing facilities.10

Initially, the members of the IRG did not think of the group as a political party or an opposition per se, but rather as a club.11 Nevertheless, the seemingly slow pace of reform under Gorbachev seems to have compelled the IRG's leading members like Afanasev to assert in late September 1989 that the group was in fact a political opposition.12 By 1990,

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8Teague, p. 4.  
9Teague, p. 1.  
10Tolz (fn. 1), p. 77  
11Tolz, p. 75, 77.  
12Tolz, p. 78.
the IRG was headed for a split with some members agreeing with Afanasev and Sakharov that the IRG should become a full-fledged political opposition, while most moderate members disagreed. Divisions became more obvious when Afanasev suggested that the group boycott upcoming discussions in Congress on what he believed to be an insufficient new Union treaty and constitutional amendments; most IRG deputies disagreed with Afanasev's stance. In 1990, Afanasev, Yeltsin and Popov — still at this time members of the CPSU — began to organize the Democratic Platform of reform-minded communists within the CPSU.

Analysts like Teague suggested that the IRG's initial platform expressed the group's "general orientation", which was western and liberal in nature; Soviet analysts suggested that the Interregional Group helped to incline pro-democratic Soviet groups and proto-parties toward "liberal westernism". Members of the group like Anatolii Sobchak argued that the group also set an example for other groups by expressing a willingness to compromise and "showing professionalism in the search for solutions to complex political problems". Thus, the role played by the relatively small group of IRG deputies was disproportionately large, not only for setting an example for other groups and movements but also for the role its key members like Yeltsin, Afanasev, and Popov played in the split in the CPSU, and hence its eventual demise. Nevertheless, given the evidence the IRG did indeed act "less as an interest group and more as an embryonic political party.""
The Withering Away of the Party: Evolution and Dissolution of the CPSU

Though the elimination of Article Six from the Soviet Union's constitution (in March, 1990) gave impetus to the de facto split and eventual demise of the CPSU, Article Six's elimination was more of a symptom than the cause of the party's decline.

Vladimir Lysenko and Igor Chubais, two young Party members, were the founders of a club in February 1988 of young communist intellectuals, the Mezhklubnaya partgruppa (the Interclub Party Group). This club later split in the spring of 1989 into two clubs, the Moscow Party Club and the Interclub Party Organization, both devoted to the liberalization of the CPSU from within. By early 1990, with the October 28th Party Conference looming, many progressive party members sought a means of exerting an influence on the CPSU. Figures like Yeltsin, Travkin, Afanasev, Popov (all Interregional Group members in the all-Union Congress) and Moscow Higher Party School chief Vyacheslav Shostakovsky soon became enamoured with the idea of a liberal wing or faction within the CPSU, and the newly-named 'Democratic Platform of the CPSU' had attracted more than two million supporters within the CPSU two months after its opening congress on January 20 and 21, 1990 in Moscow. The group's policy platform included calls for the creation of a multiparty system, the transformation of the CPSU into a true parliamentary political party, the elimination of democratic centralism, and the elimination

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17 The founding conference attracted delegates from 78 Soviet cities representing approximately 100 informal groups and clubs; most participants were intellectuals but some were also workers, including strike committee members from the 1989 Kuzbass, Western Siberia miners and Vorkuta region. See Julia Wishnevsky and Elizabeth Teague, "Democratic Platform" Created in CPSU in Report on the USSR, Feb. 2, 1990, p. 7. See also Michael McFaul and Sergei Markov, The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy, Hoover Press, New York, 1993, pp. 9-10.
of Article Six from the constitution. Initially, the group was concerned about the upcoming Twenty-eighth Party Conference; their goal was to ensure delegates to it were elected democratically and that an alternative viewpoint was presented. Discussion at the inaugural conference resulted in differing viewpoints: some, such as Yeltsin and Sergei Stankevich, suggested that the group work for change from within the CPSU; while others like Afanasev and Popov said that if the selection of delegates to the upcoming congress was not democratic and the requested reforms were not implemented, then the group should split from the CPSU and form a social democratic party. Calls also came at the founding conference for Gorbachev to resign as Party leader but stay on as president.

At the February 1990 Central Committee plenum that followed Democratic Platform's founding, the Central Committee voted to do away with Article Six; the constitution was formally amended by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies on March 14, 1990. However, on April 11, the CPSU Central Committee, in an apparent change of heart, issued a statement that accused the Democratic Platform of trying to split and dismantle the CPSU. Yuri Afanasev, part of Democratic Platform's leadership, quit the CPSU on April 18, while Igor Chubais was expelled from the Party a few days before this. It seemed that at this point, at least in the CPSU's leadership, the conservatives held the upper hand. On April 23, the Democratic

18Wishnevsky and Teague (fn. 17), p. 7.
19Wishnevsky and Teague, p. 8
20The delegates called this the "East German variant"; Gorbachev was to have appointed his liberal ally Aleksandr Yakovlev (who, incidentally, was quite close to the Democratic Platform executive member Shostakovsky) as head of an interim committee to organize an emergency Party congress. Reported by Jonathan Steele in The Guardian, Jan. 23, 1990, as noted in Elizabeth Teague, Gorbachev Proposes Dropping Communist Party Monopoly in Report on the USSR, Feb. 9, 1990, p. 7.
21Tolz (fn. 1), p. 82.
22Tolz, p. 82.
Platform leadership held a meeting in Moscow to plan for the group's transformation into a true political party; Afanasev and Chubais argued for the creation of a true Social Democratic Party made up of both Democratic Platform and Interregional Group members.\footnote{Elizabeth Teague, \textit{Is the Party Over?} in \textit{Report on the USSR}, May 4, 1990, p.1. See also Tolz (fn. 1), p. 82.}

The party was also fracturing along national lines: pro- and anti-Moscow factions appeared in the Baltic states, while in other union republics the party leadership was forced to compete with nationalist popular front movements. As Gorbachev's attempt to create Russian bureau in the CPSU had been a failure, a founding congress for a Russian republican party was held on June 20-23, 1990, in part as a way to compete in the new state structures of the Russian Republic. Gorbachev's attempt to create a Russian bureau in the CPSU structure had been a failure.\footnote{Julia Wishnevsky, \textit{Two RSFSR Congresses: A Diarchy?} in \textit{Report on the USSR}, July 6, 1990, pp. 1-3.} The RSFSR Communist Party was composed, for the most part, of conservatives opposed to reform; they elected conservative Ivan Polozkov as first secretary. At the 28th Party Congress in July 1990, the Party adopted new party rules which, though ambiguous — gave the republican parties and lower party organs substantial new powers and autonomy, and in so doing helped to further devolve power to the republics — in effect, a \textit{de facto} federalization. Finally, in the 18 months preceding July 1991, 4.2 million members left the party.\footnote{Stephen White, Graeme Gill and Darrell Slider, \textit{The Politics of Transition}, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, 1993, pp. 134-135.}

The Democratic Platform served to highlight the divisions that were becoming more and more prevalent in the CPSU. In fact, Shostakovsky, writing in \textit{Sovetskaya kultura} in December 1989, asserted that there were
approximately eight factions within the CPSU. On other fronts, the party seemed unable to deal with the many challenges that faced it: demoralization among its members; factionalization of its ranks; problems with republics, and republican parties clamouring for more power. The disunity within the party also affected its ability to deal with these challenges.

In the year following the 28th Party Congress, many new factions and groups emerged from the CPSU. Democratic Platform formalized its split from the CPSU; participants in the Democratic Platform would become active in the establishment of a number of new political parties in Russia. In July 1991, Yeltsin, now president of the RSFSR, banned political activity of Communists in state bodies, soviets and enterprises in the RSFSR, a decree aimed solely at the CPSU. When the attempted coup collapsed on August 22, 1991, party headquarters in Moscow and Leningrad were sealed off; by the next day, Yeltsin had signed a decree that temporarily stopped the activities of the Russian Communist Party in the RSFSR. On August 29, the Supreme Soviet froze the party's assets and ordered an investigation of its actions.

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26 Shostakovsky described these factions, from left to right: Firstly, there were liberals — social democrats — who, citing Austria or Sweden as their model call for a mixed economy and a multiparty parliamentary government based on the rule of law. The second group were socialists who desired an alliance between new non-Communist parties and the so-called radical (liberal) wing of the CPSU, and who wanted the nomenklatura system dismantled, a mixed economy, and worker self-management. The third were those seeking a "Marxist-Leninist renewal" modeled on Lenin's New Economic Policy; this group desired a new and larger cooperative sector, the democratization of the CPSU which would still monopolize power. The fourth group were those who "wanted the party to resume its role as vanguard of the working class". This fourth group purportedly mistrusted the intelligentsia, opposed cooperatives, and wanted control of the means of production to be in the hands of workers. The fifth group were supportive of the conservative and nationalist United Front of Workers, and opposed private enterprise and the market. This group also desired a new electoral system in which candidates would be nominated not according to their area of residence but rather according to "production", e.g., the enterprises in which they worked. The sixth and seventh groups were loosely defined by Shostakovsky as supporters of extremist Russian nationalist groups like the Patriotic Front of Russia and "Edinstvo" (Unity). The final group was defined as the "silent majority."

27 White, Gill, Slider (fn. 25), pp. 136-137.

during the coup\textsuperscript{29}; and on November 6 Yeltsin ordered the party banned in Russia\textsuperscript{30}.

\textit{Democratic Russia (Demokratischeksaya Rossiya - DR)}

Democratic Russia was not so much a political party but rather an electoral movement as well as a parliamentary bloc and faction. DR grew out of a number of liberal informal groups and voters' clubs in the summer of 1989 (its formation is discussed in Chapter 3). At a meeting on January 21-22, 1990 in Moscow, democratic activists and 170 candidates from across the RSFSR approved a program and organizational structure for the electoral alliance; it took the name 'Democratic Russia', and by February 20, over 5,000 candidates running for seats at all levels had declared their support for DR\textsuperscript{31}.

DR's electoral efforts were highly organized, both nationally and at the local or district level, though mostly in larger urban centres. Its platform was published and widely distributed, literature and posters advertising DR's candidates was produced and distributed, and large public rallies were organized. In Moscow, 57 of 65 DR candidates for Congress of People's Deputies seats won; in Leningrad, they won 25 of 33 seats; and in Sverdlovsk, they won seven out of nine seats. As well, they won 282 out of 499 seats for the Moscow city Soviet, 240 out of 400 seats for the Leningrad city Soviet, and majorities in Sverdlvosk, Tomsky, Ryazan, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and Nizhnyevartovsk city soviets, as well as in the

regional soviet of Sakhalin. DR factions were formed in the newly-elected deputies' parliaments. Most notably, the organization of a DR bloc in the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies resulted in Yeltsin's election as Supreme Soviet chairman by just four votes, though DR controlled only about 30 per cent of the seats. DR also had success in passing a bill that declared the sovereignty of the RSFSR and that also banned the heads of soviets from holding positions in social organizations or parties. However, membership in the bloc declined from 205 to 67 deputies, discipline and organization declined and regular meetings were not held after the first Congress.

After the formation of the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) by a number of DR activists (see below), DR attempted to reform itself along the lines of a 'social movement,' which would recognize existing local political sensitivities among members and would contrast with the DPR idea of a disciplined and vertically-structured party. On June 24, 1990, the Moscow Association of Voters (one of the original sponsoring groups involved in the creation of DR) organized a conference for other voters' clubs which decided to form a DR 'social movement'. By September 1990, an organizing committee had published a declaration suggesting that a lack of cooperation and coordination among like-minded democratic groups had allowed the CPSU to remain in power. The solution, this declaration affirmed, was to organize a social movement to rally democratic forces against the CPSU. It would seem that in the short term, a social movement of this nature would

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32 Brudny (fn. 31), p. 145.  
33 Brudny, p. 145.  
34 Brudny, p. 149.  
35 Brudny, p. 148.
be the best method of confronting the CPSU. However, in the longer term a social movement was bound to disintegrate due to its loose and horizontal (local) organizational structure and lack of ideological coherence amongst different members and factions. Undoubtedly, a hierarchically organized political party would have been viable in the longer term, but the political situation in the USSR at this time made this type of structured political organization impossible.

A founding congress for DR was held on October 20-21, 1990, and 1,273 delegates from 10 political parties and 31 democratic organizations participated, which included the Interregional Group, DR's parliamentary bloc, and regional deputies from 70 Russian regions. Travkin, from the DPR, argued for the formation of a hierarchically-organized party, but in the end decentralization and the idea of a loosely-structured coalition won the day. A 48 member Coordinating Council was established along with a 138-member Council of [regional] Representatives; as well, by-laws were adopted that stated that "DR's goals were the 'coordination of democratic forces opposing the state-political monopoly of the CPSU, the carrying out of joint electoral campaigns, the coordination of parliamentary activity, and other concrete actions promoting the creation of a civil society'".36 No comprehensive policy platform was adopted, however, it is worth noting that DR elaborated a policy platform earlier when it was initially formed for the purpose of the 1990 elections.37

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37This electoral platform expressed support for perestroika generally, called for "the state for the people, not the people for the state" and a new constitution supporting human rights, the end of CPSU control, freedom of speech and organisation and the press, the support for a free market with some state control (but avoided calling for an end to socialism). See Peter J.S. Duncan, The rebirth of politics in Russia in Geoffrey Hosking, Jonathan Aves and Peter Duncan, eds., The Road to Post-Communism, Pinter, New York, 1992, pp. 84-85.
DR later organized several large demonstrations of hundreds of thousands in support of striking miners in January 1991 and against the Union referendum in March. On March 28, 1991, a large rally was held in Moscow to support Yeltsin, who was under attack in the RSFSR Congress by communist deputies. Thus, DR could still mobilize large numbers of Soviet citizenry and act as an opposition bloc against the CPSU; this was proven again in their organizational efforts in the June presidential elections on behalf of Yeltsin. Yeltsin himself, however, attempted to refrain from appearing too close to DR when he campaigned. Relations in the leadership of the DR through 1991 became quite strained, though by April 1991 DR had 1.3 million members in over a thousand towns and cities in the RSFSR. During the August 1991 coup attempt, DR helped to organize the large demonstrations against the coup at the Russian parliament, and DR's headquarters at the Moscow City Council acted as an organizational nerve centre for anti-coup forces.

DR's second congress, held on November 9, 1991, was attended by 1,298 delegates from 74 regions. At this congress, the splits in the movement began to widen, especially as proposals to turn DR into a full-fledged political

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40 Michael Urban writes that though Yeltsin was one of the initial founders of DR, he had suspended his membership in the group when he ran for the office of Chairperson of Russia's Supreme Soviet in 1990. He was still regarded as DR's symbolic leader when he called for Gorbachev's resignation on February 19, 1991. Urban described how Yeltsin "appeared simultaneously as leader/not leader of the organisation [DR] that secured his election;" and noted how Yeltsin allowed others (e.g., DR) to campaign for him while he acted as a statesman who was above the political fray. Urban (fn. 39), p. 201.
41 Relations were strained in DR for a number of reasons. The structure of DR — an alliance — meant that it was "top heavy" with disparate parties and groups. Nezavisimaya gazeta, no. 50, April 25, 1991 in Urban (fn. 39).
party left party leaders within the movement feeling threatened. Divisions also occurred regarding the preservation of the Union and the Russian Federation, with most of DR arguing for at least the dissolution of the Union. The Democratic Party of Russia, the Christian Democratic Movement, and the Constitutional Democratic-Popular Freedom Party — arguing against the breakup of the Soviet Union — quit DR over this issue. In February 1992, a disagreement arose between those who wanted to oppose Yeltsin versus those who wished to support him, and by April of that year only two of the original six co-chairs of DR, Father Gleb Yakunin and Lev Ponomarev remained in DR.

A number of DR activists and organizers were instrumental in helping to establish many of the new political parties in Russia; in this sense it was a starting point for many other groups, parties and movements. This also emphasizes how dependent most of these proto-parties and movements were on leadership and personalities rather than programs or organization (the true hallmark of a political party). Ultimately, DR's failure showed how difficult it was to create unity among ideologically diverse anti-Communist elites in the nascent party system. The attempt to organize DR as a social movement meant that individual membership was encouraged, and DR thus tried to be all things to all people. After the collapse of the coup and communism, the raison d'être that united the diverse amalgam of parties and groups under DR — the overthrow of Soviet communism —

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44 *A Split or A Purge?*, p. 6.
45 *A Split or A Purge?*, p. 6. See also McFaul and Markov, p. 138-139.
48 Brudny, p. 142.
disappeared. Thus, the case of DR seems to show that the long-term political potential of broad, horizontally-based social movements (versus hierarchically organized proto-parties) is not great.

**Democratic Party of Russia (Demokraticheskaya partiya Rossii, DPR)**

Nikolai Travkin, a member of the Interregional Group and DR, was the leading figure behind this party, conceived as an attempt to overcome the organizational difficulties of DR. 49 Travkin and other DR members held a founding conference on May 26-27, 1990 in Moscow, adopting an imprecise program that included democratic institution-building, making Russia an independent federal state, instituting a market economy, and reviving culturally and spiritually Russia's ethnic groups and traditions; the program was thus short on specifics and was mostly anti-communist in nature. 50 The congress elected Travkin as party chairman; Travkin's autocratic leadership style alienated many prominent founding members who left the party soon after its creation. 51 The defections did not seem to hurt the DPR, and many local democratic groups joined the DPR. At the party's second congress in April 1991, the more "liberal" faction of the DPR quit the party over whether to support the union; Travkin himself argued that the union needed to be preserved. 52 Garry Kasparov and Arkady Murashev — the liberal faction's

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51 RSFSR People's Deputies Lev Ponomarev, Marina Sal'e and Ilya Konstantinov — all of whom were DR members as well — left the DPR. From *Argumenty i fakty*, v. 8, no. 20, 1990, in Brudny, p. 147.

52 Travkin spoke out vociferously and often about the need to preserve what he termed "the Russian state." He told *Radio Rossiya* on Sept. 29, 1991, that "our concept of Russia has always extended beyond its
leaders who submitted an alternative program that suggested the dissolution of the USSR — quit the party along with several other delegates. Over the summer of 1991, Travkin made attempts to form an all-Union democratic party, and the DPR focused on the rights of Russian minorities in other union republics, e.g., Russian nationalism under the guise of protecting Russian minorities. The party also placed more emphasis on a strong state, and became more supportive of entrepreneurship and private property. By August 1991, the DPR had approximately 18,000 members.

Travkin's stance against the breakup of the Union, as well as his overbearing leadership style, made relations with Democratic Russia, the main democratic bloc in Russia, exceedingly strained. Travkin was also upset that most local Democratic Russia organisations were being formed by DPR members and through DPR structures. In January 1991, the DPR became a member of the Democratic Russia coalition with Travkin and Valerii Khomyakov (the head of the DPR's Executive Committee) becoming members of Democratic Russia's Coordinating Council. In recognition of the DPR's special status and size, the DPR was also allocated more seats in Democratic Russia's Council of Representatives than other organizations (as were the Social Democratic Party and the Republican Party, who also joined Democratic Russia at this time).

In the spring of 1991, Travkin allied the DPR with Viktor Aksiuchits's Russian Christian-Democratic Movement and Mikhail Astafiev's Constitutional Democratic Party-The Party of People's Freedom to form

geographical framework [e.g., the borders of the USSR] See Travkin in Moldavia in RL Daily Report, Oct. 11, 1991, p. 35
54 Brudny, p. 148.
Narodnoe Soglasie (Popular Accord). This bloc's primary aim was to preserve the Soviet Union and a strong Russian state. In November 1991 the parties involved in Popular Accord, including the DPR, left Democratic Russia arguing that DR was responsible for the end of the Soviet Union and DR would also hasten the end of the Russian Federation.56

The DPR's third congress was held in Moscow in December, 1991, with 700 delegates in attendance. Stanislav Shatalin, the creator of the 500 day plan, was elected chairman of the party's Political Council.57 The dissolution of the Soviet Union prompted Travkin to denounce the newly-established Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); a rally organized to oppose the CIS also attracted nationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Viktor Alksnis.58 In protest, Shatalin and the party's co-chairman, Alexander Terekhov, immediately resigned from the DPR. In February 1992, Viktor Aksiuchits and Mikhail Astafiev, Travkin's partners in Popular Accord, helped to organize the Congress of Civil and Patriotic Forces, a nationalist coalition of parties; Travkin and the DPR did not join and the Popular Accord alliance was thus dissolved.59

In June 1992, DPR entered into a new coalition, called Civic Union, with Aleksandr Rutskoi's People's Party of Free Russia (PPFR), Arkady

56McFaul and Markov, p. 63.
57The Shatalin 500-day plan was a comprehensive plan developed by Shatalin and other liberal economists designed to move the USSR towards a market economy within a decisive 500-day time period. Gorbachev rejected the plan. See McFaul and Markov, p. 63.
58Zhirinovsky was the leader of the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, which was anything but liberal or democratic. Alksnis was known as the "black colonel" in the press, a military deputy in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies who represented Soviet military bases in Latvia. Alksnis was a self-proclaimed reactionary ("Before you stands reactionary scum!" he once told the Congress) who promised to, among other things, restore the honour of the military, crush "separatism" in the Baltic states, disband the elected parliaments, and arrest all dissidents (including Yeltsin and Lithuania's Vytautas Landsbergis). Alksnis also helped to organize the right-wing Soyuz faction in the Congress; Soyuz pressured Gorbachev to fire liberal internal minister Vadim Bakatin and replace him with hard-liner Boris Pugo. From David Remnick, Lenin's Tomb. Vintage Books, 1994, pp. 385-386.
59McFaul and Markov, p. 64.
Volsky and Aleksandr Vladislavlev's Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and its associated Renewal Party, and the *Smena* faction in the Congress.

**Civic Union (Grazhdansky soyuz)**

-created on June 21, 1992 in Moscow as an alliance between Aleksandr Rutskoi's (the Russian vice-president) People's Party of Free Russia (NPSR), Nikolai Travkin's Democratic Party of Russia (DPR), and Arkady Volsky's All-Russian Renewal Union (known in Russian as simply *Obnovleniye*, 'Renewal'). Civic Union later attracted the centrist parliamentary bloc *Smena*, the Russian Youth Union, and the Social Democratic Center. Civic Union's two main parties, the DPR and the NPSR, had approximately 50,000 and 100,000 members respectively, though these estimates are considered to be generous.\(^{60}\)

Though Civic Union ostensibly asserted support for the gradual transition to a market economy, inasmuch as a rejection of Gaidar and his reformers' market and privatization plans means a tacit rejection of any quick plan to implement a market economy, Civic Union's concept of a free market (and the means to achieve it) remain unclear at best, and opposed to marketization at worst. Civic Union's members were also Russian nationalists of varying degrees, and desired strong ties between the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).\(^{61}\) Initially, Civic Union was heralded by the media as an opposition that would be capable of replacing

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the Gaidar government should it leave office, and it was said to have widespread public support as well as support in the Russian parliament through the New Generation-New Policy bloc. Though the group was opposed to Gaidar, his cabinet, and his policies, Civic Union asserted loyalty towards Yeltsin by suggesting that they were a loyal and constructive opposition; Rutskoi, as Yeltsin's vice-president, could not of course be seen to be opposed to his president. The June 21 founding conference adopted a number of policy declarations. Members agreed that Russia should be preserved as a "strong, multiethnic, democratic state"; that Yeltsin should continue to wield the considerable presidential powers that the Russian parliament had given to him, but that Yeltsin should not dissolve what they believe to be a democratically and legally elected legislature. The Civic Union delegates recommended that a moratorium be established preventing new elections or referenda, thus preventing Yeltsin from holding a referendum that might assemble public support for the dissolution of parliament. Civic Union also adopted declarations to the effect that constitutional and political reform be delayed until a stable economic and social situation was achieved.

With respect to economic policy, Civic Union called for substantial changes in the government's economic reform plan. They demanded increased government subsidies to failing industries to slow the decline in production and help stimulate economic growth, and they called for

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62 Teague and Tolz, p. 1
63 Teague and Tolz, p. 4.
64 Continuing acrimony between Yeltsin and Gaidar's reform-minded government, on the one hand, and the Russian parliament, on the other, resulted from the parliament's resistance to macro-economic and market reform plans.
65 Teague and Tolz, p. 4.
66 Teague and Tolz, p. 4.
enterprises to be given to their employees, and the enterprises' management, free of charge. At the conference, speaker after speaker criticized the Gaidar government's market reform and privatization plan; this followed Yeltsin's presidential decree of June 14, 1992 that allowed — for the first time — enterprise bankruptcies.

In fact, opposition to the Gaidar government's economic reform and privatization plans had been the original impetus for the formation of Arkady Volsky's group 'Renewal', one of the Civic Union coalition's key partners. In the fall of 1991, Gaidar's proposed macroeconomic restructuring and stabilization plan took shape after approval by Yeltsin. The Gaidar plan would mean reduced state spending to curb inflation, which would result in an end to subsidies to large-scale state-supported industries, and hence bankruptcies and unemployment. The large industrial enterprises lobbied for and received concessions in order to soften the impact of the restructuring and stabilization plan, not the least of which was the appointment of Vladimir Shumeiko, Georgii Khizha and Viktor Chernomyrdin to cabinet, all of whom were sympathetic to the industrial lobby. This lobby, led by Arkady Volsky, also formed their own so-called party, called 'Renewal', though it might more accurately be termed an interest group. Though Civic Union was supportive of the popular (and

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67This latter proposal, to give enterprises to their employees, was seen by most observers as a plan by enterprise directors (led by Arkady Volsky) to keep control of their enterprises after privatization. Teague and Tolz, p. 4.
68Teague and Tolz, p. 4.
69Volsky was an interesting and influential figure. See Eric Lohr, Arkady Volsky's Political Base in Europe-Asia Studies, v. 45, no. 5, 1993, pp. 811-829.
70Teague and Tolz, p. 2
71In fact, in April 1993 Gaidar was replaced by Chernomyrdin, a Volsky ally, as prime minister; the macroeconomic reform and stabilization program hereafter slowed considerably.
democratically-elected) president Yeltsin, they were extremely critical of prime minister Gaidar and his government.\textsuperscript{72}

By September of 1992, Civic Union had released a new economic program, entitled "The Anticrisis Program", that was designed both as an economic manifesto for Civic Union and an alternative to the Gaidar government's economic program.\textsuperscript{73} The Anticrisis Program called for state control over prices, wages, production, and a restoration of the system of state orders and state material allocation; as well as new state programs for food, housing, military conversion.\textsuperscript{74} In short, this plan called for a reassertion of traditional Soviet state control over the economy, and thus was essentially old-style central planning in all but name.

\textit{The People's Party of Free Russia (NPSR)}

Aleksandr Rutskoi's and Vladimir Lipitsky's People's Party of Free Russia (NPSR) was formed on August 2-3, 1991 as the successor of the Democratic Movement of Communists (circa November 1990), which itself came out of the Democratic Platform of the CPSU.\textsuperscript{75} Founded as a democratically-minded alternative to the CPSU, its platform stated in September 1991 that it was a "party of left democrats of the parliamentary

\textsuperscript{72}\textsuperscript{72} Teague and Tolz, p. 3
\textsuperscript{73}\textsuperscript{73} The Anticrisis Program was not, however, endorsed by Civic Union's top leadership and thus was not an official program for the bloc. Michael Ellman, \textit{Russia: The Economic Program of the Civic Union} in \textit{Report on the USSR}, v. 2, no. 11, March 12, 1993, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{74}\textsuperscript{74} This program was essentially a call for a return to central planning, and no doubt was looked on favourably by Volsky's chief constituency, namely, industrial managers who had much to gain from increased centralization of the economy and subsidies from the government. Ellman (fn. 73), p. 35.
\textsuperscript{75}\textsuperscript{75} First called the Democratic Party of Communists of Russia, the group announced at its conference in Moscow on October 19, 1991, that it would not be the \textit{de facto} successor to the Communist Party and moved to disassociate themselves from the Communist Party. It was renamed the Party of Free Russia (and later the People's Party of Free Russia) and expressed its willingness to protect the interests of the lower class. See Dawn Mann, \textit{Democratic Party of Communists of Russia Cuts Ties to CPSU} in \textit{RL Report on the USSR}, Sept. 13, 1991, p. 16. See \textit{also Democratic Party of Communists of Russia Renamed} in \textit{RL Daily Report}, Nov. 1, 1991, p. 22.
type", and its name was changed to the People's Party of Free Russia at a Moscow congress on October 26-27, 1991. RSFSR Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi was elected chairman of the party at this Moscow conference, and the congress at this time stated that all CPSU property in the RSFSR should be transferred to the NPSR. Professing its democratic orientation, the party platform argued for freedom, social justice, and market reforms tempered by social guarantees. The NPSR would later become a part of the Civic Union centrist political bloc (see above).

**The Social Democratic Party of Russia (SDPR)**

The SDPR grew out of the Social Democratic Association, an informal group made up mostly of intellectuals that helped to coordinate the social democratic movement across the USSR. A founding congress in May 1990, in Moscow, saw the party adopt the basic principles of freedom, equality and solidarity; a draft party program was adopted at the party's second congress in Sverdlovsk from October 25 to 28, 1990. This program — entitled "The Path to Progress and Social Democracy" — included an emphasis on parliamentarism; the encouragement of the creation of a civil society and social democracy of a western bent; the rejection of the doctrine of class struggle in favour of social partnerships; the construction of a social security system; and the establishment of democracy in general. The party also campaigned against the nomenklatura and its influence, calling the

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77 *Rutskoi's Party Holds First Congress*, p. 23.
Movement for Democratic Reform the "nomenklatura block"; and the party leadership — especially Oleg Rumyantsev — was active in helping to create the Russian Federation's new constitution. Rumyantsev and Boris Orlov were the SDPR's leaders.

**The Republican Party of Russia**

The Republican Party's history began with Democratic Platform, the liberal-minded faction within the CPSU (described earlier). On November 17-18, 1990, at the founding conference of the Democratic Platform Party in Moscow, the party was renamed the Republican Party of Russia. The name of the party itself was the third choice among delegates, because the Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party, the most popular names, were already taken. Very few party members who had supported the Democratic Platform in joined the new party; as of early 1991 the RPR had approximately 20,000 members.

The party's program was in fact very similar to the social democratic program: it declared the need to create a market economy; the need to involve all societal groups in relations of ownership; support for peaceful means of conflict resolution among societal groups; the establishment of a social security program with rights to education, housing, health care, a

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minimum hourly wage, and benefits for the elderly; and a list of rights that would protect entrepreneurs. The Republican program also argued for a new structure for inter-republican relations: the dismantling of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, a new inter-republican committee to replace the federal government, a new federal treaty and the abolition of the USSR constitution.85

**Constitutional Democrats**

Claiming to continue the tradition of the Kadets, the largest non-socialist party in Russia before 1917, the Constitutional Democrats began with the establishment of the Union of Constitutional Democrats in October 1989. The Constitutional Democrats (KDP-Konstitutsionno-Demokraticheskaya Partiya) held their first congress on May 20, 1990. The congress was covered by Soviet television which generally were sympathetic, probably because at this time the CD were not a threat to CPSU.86

Splits in the KDP have resulted in three competing factions, each of whom claim to be the heirs of the Kadets: the KDP, also known as the People's Freedom Party (PNS - Partiya Narodnoi Svobody), is the most politically active of the competing groups.

The KDP believe in a constitutional and democratic state, the importance of individual rights as well as civil rights, the supremacy of law over arbitrary actions by individual leaders or organs, and a new union treaty formulated by a constitutional convention.87 The KDP agreed with the

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85 Danilov and Zasorin, p. 266.
87 Danilov and Zasorin, p. 248.
aborted new union treaty and were against the creation of the CIS. After the
coup attempt, the creation of the CIS prompted the KDP to split with the
Democratic Russia movement — with which it had been allied — in
November 1991 and join with the Democratic Party of Russia and the Russian
Christian Democratic Movement (RKhDD) to form the People's Accord bloc.

The Russian Christian-Democratic Movement (RKhDD)

The journal *Vybor* (Choice), published by Viktor Aksiuchits and Gleb
Anishchenko beginning in September 1987, was the basis for the formation of
the Russian Christian Democratic Movement (RKhDD). The publishers —
after gaining the support of well-known activists like Father Gleb Yakunin
and Alexander Solzhenitsyn — later helped to advance religious causes such
as the restoration of Orthodox Churches, the financing of Christian schools,
and the publishing of religious materials.88

The RKhDD held its founding congress and elected its Duma
(executive committee) on April 7-9, 1990, in the wake of the February 1990
decision to repeal Article Six of the Soviet constitution. Viktor Aksiuchits,
Father Vyacheslav Polosin and Gleb Anishchenko, Father Gleb Yakunin, and
Valerii Borshchov were all elected to the Duma, the RKhDD's governing
council.89 The group's program emphasized traditional Russian Orthodox
values, and stressed the restoration of both the Russian Orthodox church and
religious freedoms. Its program also emphasizes individual freedoms, the

88McFaul and Markov (fn. 17), p. 117
right to own private property, and the importance of the family, culture and tradition in helping to reform Russia.\textsuperscript{90}

The RKhDD's early liberalism was tempered later with increasingly nationalistic and patriotic values; RKhDD leader Aksiuchits at times sided with the conservative Rossiya group of deputies in the Russian congress on issues like the preservation of the Union and, later, the preservation of the Russian federation.\textsuperscript{91} The RKhDD joined the Democratic Russia movement in October 1990 (only after affirming each member group's right to its own platform and identity) and in the spring of 1991 joined with Travkin's Democratic Party of Russia and Astafiev's Constitutional Democratic Party to form \textit{Narodnie Soglasie} (Popular Accord). Popular Accord left Democratic Russia in November 1991; Father Gleb Yakunin and Valerii Borshchov left the RKhDD at this time in opposition to the nationalistic line taken by the RKhDD and its coalition partners.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Aksiuchits and the RKhDD left Popular Accord to enter into an alliance with groups that were even more nationalistic. This alliance of nationalist, monarchist and patriotic forces, called the Congress of Patriotic Forces, was formed at a conference on February 8, 1992. This congress, in turn, formed the Russian People's Assembly (\textit{Rossiiskoe Narodnoe Sobranie}), an organization dedicated to upholding the rights of Russians living outside of Russia in the former republics of the USSR; this group also refused to recognize the Russian Federation's borders, arguing that Russian populations


\textsuperscript{91}McFaul and Markov (fn. 17), p. 118
would be divided by artificial Leninist-Stalinist divisions. The Russian People's Assembly was made up of former Narodnie Soglasie leaders Aksiuchits and Astafiev, former communists-cum-nationalists Nikolai Pavlov and Sergei Baburin (Russian All-People's Union co-chairmen), and militant noncommunist nationalists like Nikolai Lysenko (chairman of the National Republican Party of Russia).

In the Russian parliament, Aksiuchits united with former communists to form the antigovernment bloc Rossiiskoe Edinstvo (Russian Unity); in the April 1992 Sixth Congress this bloc led the attacks against Yeltsin; as well, the Russian People's Assembly and Russian Unity united with former official trade unions, workers' collectives and strike committees from across Russia to form the All-Russian Labour Consultation. This latter group has finalized the RKhD and Aksiuchits's transformation from anti-communist and free-market oriented policies towards state control of prices, the abolishment of bankruptcy laws, limits on trade, a ban on speculation, the indexing of wages, credits for state enterprises, and ending current privatization plans.

**United Workers' Front (Obedinennyi Front Trudiashchikhsia RSFSR - OFT)**

Though not a political party, this well-organized informal group is included as its organizational efforts advanced the right-wing's nationalist and patriotic agenda, and resulted in the creation of the Russian Communist Party. Founded in Sverdlovsk on September 8 and 9, 1989 (as an arm of the all-Union OFT), this Leninist group was against market reforms, bourgeois

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92McFaul and Markov, p. 119.
93McFaul and Markov, p. 119.
94McFaul and Markov, p. 119.
tendencies, private property, and speculators' cooperatives; the group also supported the Union, and was anti-Semitic. The OFT supported workers' control of enterprises, social equality, and the primacy of workers' soviets in workplaces (over residential districts). Working with other nationalist and patriotic groups and organizations, as well as some groups within the CPSU, the OFT was also instrumental in taking control of the new RSFSR Communist Party (RCP).

Many personalities who later formed other right-wing neo-communist parties were active in this organization, including Viktor Anpilov, Richard Kosolapov and communist philosopher Vladimir Yakushev; as well, groups like Nina Andreeva's Edinstvo and the CPSU's Marxist Platform also sent representatives to the OFT's inaugural congresses. Membership in the OFT is collective, in that groups rather than individuals are members. As such, the OFT co-operates with other groups like the RKRP to organize demonstrations; its newsletter later merged with the RKRP's.

**Socialist Party of Russia (SPR)**

Formed in June 1990 in Moscow, the SPR's program is entitled "The Path to Freedom." This platform promotes a democratic society based on workers' self-government, the formation of a social sector that includes collective and state ownership, ecology, municipal self-government, citizen participation in decision-making, and opposition to liberal authoritarianism and the free market. By 1992, this party was experiencing organizational

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95 See the OFT's platform, entitled "The Motherland is Sick. How Can She Be Aided?" in McFaul and Markov (fn. 17), pp. 219-28.
difficulties due to infighting and the defection to other parties of some of its key organizers.97

Socialist Party of Working People (SPWP)

Founded at a conference attended by 300 delegates on October 26 and 27, 1991, the SPWP is led by historian Roy Medvedev. Its goals include the restoration of "fairness and legality with regard to the CPSU," as well as an investigation into past CPSU wrongs.98 TASS called the SPWP "virtually a legal successor to the CPSU", but did not say whether the new party had made any claims to CPSU property as did, for example, Rutskoi's PPFR.99

Russian Party of Communists (Rossiiskaya Partiya Kommunistov - RPK)

Formed at a conference in December 14 and 15, 1991 near Moscow, the RPK came out of the Marxist Platform of the CPSU. Its program was supportive of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia, as well as those on salaries, pensions or aid. The RPK's program argued against social democracy, bourgeois and Stalinist approaches, and was in fact similar to the programs of other communist parties. The RPK was led by an executive committee that included Aleksandr Kriuchkov, former leader of the Marxist Platform, as chairman.100

97Danilov and Zasorin, p. 240.
99See McFaul and Markov (fn. 17), pp. 219-228.
100Danilov and Zasorin, p. 243.
Russian Communist Workers' Party (Rossiiskaya Kommunistecheskaya Rabochaya Partiya - RKRP)

This party came out of the Communist Initiative, and later the Leningrad Initiative groups of the Russian Communist Party in 1990. These hard-line groups argued for a special congress of the CPSU where Gorbachev and his "liberal-bourgeois" leadership would be expelled. The RKRP itself was formed on November 23 and 24, 1991 at a conference in Yekaterinburg by 525 delegates. This party was self-described as the "successor of the communist principle in the workers' movement," was run on the basis of democratic centralism, and its program stipulated that its organs would be led by majorities of workers and peasants. Its leaders included Richard Kosolapov, Viktor Anpilov, General Albert Makashov and Viktor Tyulkin, and it claims 150,000 members. The RKRP refused to participate in the Communist Party of the Russian Federation's re-founding conference in February 1993, saying that the CPRF was social democratic.

Russian Unity (Rossiiskoe Edinstvo) — The "Red-Brown Coalition"

Composed of five factions, Russian Unity was formed in April 1992 and makes up the so-called "Red-Brown" coalition of opposition forces in the Russian Congress. The factions include communist successor parties such as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Socialist Party of Working People, and the Russian Party of Communists; as well as more conservative communist parties, such as the Russian Communist Workers'

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103 Democratic forces have called this group the "Red-Brown" coalition for their members' communist and fascist beliefs.
Party (and its associated extra-parliamentary groups Working Russia and Working Moscow), and the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a neo-Stalinist party led by Nina Andreeva.

In parliament, Russian Unity consists of deputies who are members of the Agrarian Union, Civil Society, Communists of Russia, Native Land, and Russia factions, totaling 375 members. This bloc opposes Yeltsin and his government; however, there is a diversity of opinion among these factions, from socialism to monarchism. In the Congress, the bloc is led by Sergei Baburin, who is the head of the extra-parliamentary National People's Union (see below).

**Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF)**

Founded at a conference on February 13 and 14, 1993 as a revival of the Russian Communist Party, it claimed 600,000 members and was led by former Russian Communist Party ideology secretary Gennady Zyuganov. Its orientation is both communist and nationalist. By 1994, this group would be the largest, most powerful, and arguably the most important post-Soviet communist party with Zyuganov as its leader.

**All Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks**

Based on the Bolshevik platform of the CPSU, the ACPB was organized on November 8 and 9, 1991 by 234 delegates at a conference in St. Petersburg, and was led by Nina Andreeva. This Bolshevik and Stalinist party wanted

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105Tolz, Slater and Rahr (fn. 102), p. 20.
Gorbachev expelled from the CPSU for betraying Marxist-Leninist principles; their platform suggested the ACPB was a "broad proletarian party of action."\textsuperscript{106} The platform included preserving and protecting the Union, reasserting the importance of socialism socialist property, and a planned economy.\textsuperscript{107}

\textit{The Communist and Nationalist Right}

There is a substantial grouping of smaller parties on the right of the political spectrum that have two wings which are distinct: hardline communists and right-wing ultranationalists. Both of these groups agree in their opposition to economic reforms and democratization, though some have been more willing than others to compromise. In terms of policy positions, these groups have called for the restoration of the Soviet Union in one form or another (or at least an end to the right of secession for republics and areas within the Russian Federation), an assertive Russian foreign policy, and are anti-Semitic. Parties in this grouping include Sergei Baburin's National People's Union (Baburin is also the leader of the Russian Unity faction of deputies inside the Supreme Soviet); the Marxist-oriented and hardline Party of Labour (\textit{Partiia Truda}); the Worker's Party of Russia (RPR — \textit{Rabochaia Partiia Rossii}), formed in June 1991 by 72 RSFSR Supreme Soviet members and Congress of People's deputies from all regions of Russia; the Socialist Party of Workers, formed in October 1991 by former people's deputies of the USSR including pseudo-dissident Roy Medvedev and A.

\textsuperscript{106}Danilov and Zasorin, p. 245.
\textsuperscript{107}Danilov and Zasorin, p. 246.
Denisov; and the Union of Communists, formed in August 1991 by members of the coordinating council of the Marxist Platform of the CPSU.

**Liberal Democratic Party**

Established at a congress in March, 1990, the LDP was one of the first political parties registered with the USSR's Ministry of Justice in April 1991. While the party's program is liberal and democratic in nature, and espouses the free market and capitalism, its leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, professes little regard for either liberal or democratic principles. While Zhirinovsky called for the elimination of the CPSU's power in politics and economics, he also argued for the preservation of the Union, the strengthening of the military, the use of force against secessionist republics, the defense of Russian minorities in other republics; Zhirinovsky was also anti-Semitic.

Zhirinovsky ran unsuccessfully against Yeltsin in the June 1991 presidential election, placing third out of six candidates with six million votes. His promises included law and order and cheap vodka. In August, 1991, Zhirinovsky and the LDP were openly supportive of the coup attempt; earlier in the summer of 1991 — along with other nationalist, patriotic, and neo-communist groups — they had publicly discussed the creation of a national salvation committee to save the country. Nevertheless, as Russia's political and economic problems have worsened, Zhirinovsky's simplistic

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solutions have managed to gain support from an increasingly disenchanted Russian public.

**Parliamentary Factions and Blocs**

The development of parties and the party system in Russia by 1992 was characterized by a number of trends. Many, but not all, of the formal parties discussed above had parliamentary representation. In the Russian parliament itself, a number of factions existed, made up of different groups of deputies; these factions were essentially proto-parties but were not full-fledged parties. What determined deputies' political positions is how they voted rather than their party affiliation, as members from the same party might be members of different parliamentary factions. The members of these factions made up blocs.\(^{110}\)

The First Congress of People's Deputies in 1990 had 920 deputies as members of the CPSU, out of 1,041 (86 per cent). By 1992 in the Seventh Congress, the Communists of Russia faction in parliament had just 80 deputies; the Socialist Party of Working People (which came out of the CPSU) had 31 deputies. Another eight parties had between one and eight deputies each: the Republican Party, the Social Democratic Party of Russia, the Democratic Party of Russia, the Constitutional Democratic Party, the People's Party of Free Russia, the People's Party of Russia and the Russian Christian Democratic Movement. In this Seventh Congress, 338 deputies were without party affiliation, and 648 refused to specify their affiliation (See Appendix One).\(^ {111}\)

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\(^{110}\) Nina Belyaeva and Vladimir Lepekhin (fn. 104), p. 18.

\(^{111}\) Belyaeva and Lepekhin, p. 18.
At the time of the Seventh Congress, three blocs had developed in parliament. A left-wing bloc, supportive of radical economic reform and the Yeltsin-Gaidar government's, was formed in December 1991. This bloc's membership was individual (in that parties were not *de facto* members) and consisted mostly of members of Democratic Russia and the Radical Democrat factions; it totaled 222 members.\(^{112}\)

In the centre, there were two blocs: the Democratic Centre and the Creative Forces bloc. The Democratic Centre (209 deputies) consisted of the Nonparty Deputies, the Left Centre, Free Russia and the Sovereignty and Equality factions. The Creative Forces bloc consisted of the Industrial Union, the Workers' Union of Russia, and the New Generation-New Policy factions. The Creative Forces bloc totaled 163 members, who support measured reform, increased support for state-run industries, and better social programs for those affected by reform.

On the right, the Russian Unity bloc had a membership of 375. It consists of the Agrarian Union, Civil Society, Communists of Russia, Native Land, and Russia factions. This right wing bloc rejects the Yeltsin-Gaidar government and reform; ideologically, they espouse diverse views, including monarchism, socialism, and nationalism. Please see Appendix Four for a list of proto-parties and factions in the Seventh Russian Congress of People's Deputies, 1992.

\(^{112}\)Belyaeva and Lepekhin, p. 19.
The Party System

Whereas before the coup attempt in August 1991, the polity was divided into two opposing camps, "democrats" and "communists," afterwards the political system became more complicated. The collapse of the USSR also helped to force Russian political movements, groups and proto-parties to reevaluate their beliefs and platforms. Perhaps most importantly, the raison d'être for the democratic camp in general and Democratic Russia in particular — their opposition to communism — collapsed.113 Afterwards, when Democratic Russia decided to defend Gaidar's "shock therapy" program and Yeltsin, the movement split. Nikolai Travkin's Democratic Party of Russia, Aksyuchits's Russian Christian Democratic Movement, and Astafiev's Constitutional Democrats disagreed with the new goals for the movement and left DR.114

The events of August 1991 had particularly serious effects on the so-called "communist" side. Though the nationalist and patriotic forces — led first by Pamyat, then by the United Front of Working People (OFT) — were successful in taking control of the new RSFSR Communist Party, the collapse of the coup allowed Yeltsin the opportunity to effectively dismantle the political organisation of his opponents on the right.115 Consequently, the

113Brudny (fn. 31), pp. 141-170.
114The DPR, the NPSR, the RXDD, and the Constitutional Democrats broke with DR at the movement's second congress on Nov. 8 and 9, 1991. The primary reason for the split was the issue of DR's leadership's support of the rights of the RSFSR's autonomous republics to declare independence. See Split in DR Movement in RL Daily Report, Nov. 22, 1991, p. 30.
collapse of the CPSU and Russian Communist Party in the wake of the failed coup led to a number of different communist movements and proto-parties, many of which laid claim to the CPSU and Russian Communist Party's assets.

The Russian Party of Communists (RPK) was the most powerful of the new neo-communist groups, marrying nationalism and market socialism to form a new bloc. Viktor Anpilov's Russian Communist Labour Party (RKRP) did not join the RPK and remained separate, preaching more orthodox "revolutionary" Marxist-Leninism. The Socialist Party of Working People and Rutskoi's People's Party of Free Russia (NPSR) defined themselves as more social democratic in nature. The National Salvation Front was formed in October 1992 by the RPK, Russian Unity (composed of various neo-communist parliamentary factions), the NPSR and various smaller nationalist or patriotic groups, thus forming a reactionary, neo-communist, and nationalist right-wing alliance.116

The right's collapse in the summer of 1991 was due to its failure to accept the legitimacy of the new, nominal democratic order; to the right, political freedom was a means to an end rather than an end in itself.117 The right's collapse was temporary, however: the worsening social, political and economic situation have given the right's ideas new resonance to a disillusioned Russian public. The right, such as the "red-brown coalition," have shown a reluctance to compromise with the democrats, instead acting as an anti-system opposition. Nevertheless, the emergence of a truly democratic right will be necessary for the consolidation of the Russian party system and

democracy; the right's participation in elections may be some evidence of their acceptance of the democratic "rules of the game."

The failure of the coup brought to an end to the bipolar nature of Russian politics. The events also made possible the formation of new political movements, especially Civic Union in the centre of the political spectrum. The stated aim of Civic Union's broad coalition was to reinforce and strengthen the Russian state and prevent the collapse of Russia's industrial base. In short, Civic Union attempted to assert centrist policy positions, distinct from the policies of the democrats and the red-brown coalition, on matters such as economic reform, the Russian state, and federalism. In reality, Civic Union's positions were nothing more than an attempt to avoid making the difficult and complex choices required for real economic reform. Nevertheless, Civic Union's initial successes included Yeltsin's appointment of industrialist Viktor Chernomyrdin as deputy prime minister for heavy industries in the spring of 1992 (Chernomyrdin was later appointed prime minister), as well as the appointment of three other industrialists, to slow economic reform. In 1992 Yeltsin also made a number of personnel changes to appease Civic Union. By mid-1993, Civic Union's power began to wane. The group elected Rutskoi on May 20, 1993, to act as their candidate in the 1996 presidential elections; Travkin, the only popular Civic Union leader, refused to participate in this conference that

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119 In November 1992 Yeltsin agreed with Civic Union that the position of State Secretary, held by Gennady Burbulis, was unconstitutional and Burbulis was dismissed; deputy prime minister Mikhail Poltoranin, an ardent Democratic Russia supporter, was also removed; and during the Congress Yeltsin relented and chose Chernomyrdin as Gaidar's replacement. Earlier, Yeltsin had made then-acting prime minister Yegor Gaidar incorporate a number of Civic Union's economic reform recommendations in the Gaidar-Yeltsin reform plan that was presented to the seventh Congress of People's Deputies. See Michael McFaul (fn. 118), pp. 206-207.
elected Rutskoi. Rutskoi was later arrested for inciting a riot after a standoff at the Russian parliament in March 1993.

Privatization created two classes of industrialists. The directors of state-owned enterprises (the Volsky "industrial lobby" and a key part of Civic Union) split into two factions, reformers and conservatives. The latter group, the Industrial Union, led by Yuri Gekht, broke with the more moderate Volsky and rejected compromise with Yeltsin. Gekht's industrial managers wanted slower privatization (or privatization to the industrial managers themselves) price controls and more government subsidies to guarantee their industries' future; the reformers believed these policies were not sustainable, and believed in privatization.120

Whether acting as a lobby or claiming to represent social groups without any formal accountability to them, Civic Union was able to make use of old Soviet institutions and new, ambiguous democratic rules to advance its causes. As a lobby, Civic Union was able to influence government policy by entering into pseudo-corporatist arrangements with the weak Russian state.121 The creation by privatization of potentially influential new interests, such as workers or executives and managers of newly-privatized firms, meant that Civic Union could no longer claim to represent many dissimilar interests. Renewed political polarization between Yeltsin and the Congress, and the ensuing referendum meant that Civic Union had to choose between one side or the other, and elections meant that Civic Union's back-door influence on government would be lessened. 122

121 See Eric Lohr (fn. 69), p. 821-825.
122 Michael McFaul argues convincingly that Civic Union's rise and demise was the result of a peaceful revolution in progress. He notes that "social and political units constructed during the Soviet era lag[ged] into the post communist era and...co[existed] and interact[ed] with new forms emerging as marketization and
The proto-parties in pre- and post-Communist Russia exhibited all of the problems endemic to a nascent multiparty system. The reluctance of major figures like Yeltsin to become directly allied with a political party (the Democratic Russia movement) resulted in Yeltsin's early problems of a lack of a political and social base. All of the parties suffered from problems of accountability, platforms, and credible and consistent leadership. After elections, because the parties lacked organizational and political bases, there was little or no link between party politics and the policies that were advocated in the Russian parliament. Furthermore, the proto-parties and factions in the parliament seemed to have little popular or public support outside of the legislature, where, for example, reformers' strategies of working through the state apparatus meant that democrats played a visible role in the legislative process but had no real executive or judicial power.¹²³ From a developmental standpoint, the parties became still-born because they failed to adequately develop extra-parliamentary support and organization, or if there was organizational development, it was with little links to parliamentary factions or blocs. Democratic Russia, as a mass organization, was able to mobilize large numbers of supporters for campaigns but was too ideologically diverse to become an organized and influential *de facto* political party.

The membership in the parties was not broad-based, and consisted mostly of urban intelligentsia; the lack of a real middle class also affected democratization moved forward." The notion of a peaceful revolution in progress is distinct from either transitions to democracy or violent revolutions, says McFaul. Peaceful revolutions are distinguished by a regime seeking a peaceful and rapid overhaul of the polity and the economy, creating a different social and institutional setting from other types of transitions or revolutions. Unfortunately, it is not in the scope of this paper to examine more thoroughly McFaul's theoretical assertions. See Michael McFaul (fn. 118), pp. 218-219.

parties' membership. As well, the negative connotations of the CPSU's 70-year history in Russia's made Russians reluctant to participate in party politics. Ultimately, through 1992, the failure by the government and the parties to resolve the pressing issues, and the deteriorating political and economic situation, led the Russian public to become less interested in party politics.

Sartori posited eight features of polarized pluralism, which include relevant anti-system parties, bilateral oppositions, the centre placement of one party or group of parties, ideological distance between the two poles, centrifugal (versus centripetal) drives, congenital ideological patterning, irresponsible oppositions, and the politics of outbidding. With a myriad of parties, groups, movements, blocs and proto-parties, the Russian party system is undoubtedly a multiparty system; there is substantial evidence to suggest that the party system meets Sartori's eight features of polarized pluralism. An examination of the parties on two-dimensional axes, based on different issues, confirms this assessment (See Appendix Three). However, it should be noted that Sartori was referring to party systems that had evolved and were mature; the system in Russia is a new and immature system and therefore an examination using Sartori's typology requires a longer time span. Nevertheless, it is worth examining the Russian party system in this way if only for heuristic purposes.

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Graph One — Ideological Space: Democracy/Authoritarianism versus Left and Right

This graph situates the nascent parties on a two-dimensional political spectrum, according to ideological space occupied. While it is not completely accurate — for example, the parties and their leaders' views change regularly, and DR is an amalgam of groups with views and platforms that differ — it is useful because it situates the parties relative to each other and in so doing affords observers the opportunity to see the ideological space occupied by the parties and therefore the political party system as a whole.

The parties are oriented primarily towards the right or the left, but not towards the centre along either axis; this suggests polarized pluralism as posited by Sartori, because there is a maximum spread in opinion, and there is also a centre-fleeing drive. However, while the Red-Brown coalition, Russian Unity, and the Liberal Democratic Party are authoritarian parties, they differ with respect to their left and right orientation, as the graph shows. Thus, the Democratic Russia bloc is the most liberal of the parties and thus is at the extreme liberal democratic end of the spectrum; the Red Brown coalition is the most authoritarian and left wing of the groups while the Liberal Democratic Party is the most authoritarian and right wing of the parties. None of the parties have taken conciliatory positions close to the left-right axis that would act as a moderating influence.

At this point in the development of the party system, the extreme positions taken by the parties suggests a lack of moderation and polarization

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125 Refer to Chapter One for a discussion of the use of the terms "right" and "left" in the context of current Russian politics.
about fundamental polity as well as policy issues. The graph also shows that there is the potential for a right-wing, pro-democratic (and thus pro-system) party; the liberalization and democratization will remain unconsolidated until this sort of party is created that will add legitimacy to the system. In fact, the comparative literature on transitions to democracy suggests that an essential component of a transition to democracy in southern Europe has been pro-system, right wing parties.

Graph Two — Planned/Mixed Economy versus Importance of Social Welfare

This graph gauges the parties' acceptance of free market policies with respect to social welfare. According to their platforms, almost all parties profess to have a high concern for social welfare; the question is the policy means by which to achieve these objectives. Democratic Russia argues that real economic reform towards a free market will mean that workers will be protected. The Communists and those further right on the new Russian political spectrum argue in varying degrees for the renationalization, or at least the reassertion of state control over industry, the (e.g., stabilized economy, etc.). The vast majority of parties, however, support state protection of industry, to varying degrees. Only Democratic Russia supports a true Western-style mixed economy, though the many different groups that make up DR do not agree on the degree to which the new Russian economy should espouse free market principles.

There is a large amount of ideological space between those groups arguing for a mixed economy and those groups who support the state

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126 This concept, discussed in Chapter One, denotes the fundamental issues such as the way in which the political and economic systems should be organized, e.g., the free market system versus a planned economy.
protection of industry. Compromise is unlikely on this key post-Communist issue, and future disputes in parliament will likely centre around this issue. Furthermore, because these issues are about the shape and structure of post-Communist Russia, the political system is unlikely to mature until these fundamental issues are resolved.

**Graph Three — Private Property/Public Property versus Planned or Market Economy**

This question goes to the heart of the parties' and their leaders' views on the shape of the future Russian state. As such, it is a polity issue and will be one of the issues that further polarizes debate both inside and outside of the Russian parliament.

The parties and groups here follow a familiar pattern of clustering either in favour of private property and a market economy or, alternately, for public property and a planned economy. Space exists in the political system for a party espousing public property and a market economy, for example, along the Scandinavian social democratic model. However, though the Constitutional Democrats have asserted these views they have not captured the support or the imagination of a great many voters.

Only DR's members and leadership have shown any willingness to support private property and a market economy to any great extent; the other parties who support the free market and private property offer less enthusiastic support for these capitalist. Those parties who support a planned economy and public property range from the RKHDD, who are less strident in their support of these policies, to the Red Brown Coalition, whose members
and leadership desire a return to Soviet-style state planning and public property. Like the other issues examined in this section, it is not likely at this point that there can be any compromise between the two poles of opinion. However, this may work in favour of reform because the centre-fleeing, centrifugal characteristics of polarized pluralism mean that parties will be unable to waver on the issue of reform and thus must choose one of two courses: reform and the market or a reimposition of state control.

Graph Four — Unitary/Federal State versus National or Multinational State

This graph shows the ideological and programmatic space occupied by the parties on a unitary state or a federation, with respect to multinationalism and nationalism. Thus, it refers to the parties' views on whether secession from the USSR, and later Russia, was to be tolerated. These issues are all the more important given the events of late 1994 and early 1995, with Russia's invasion of Chechnya to prevent secession.127

This graph shows further evidence of the clustering around distinct poles and the polarization that marks other issues. The parties are for the most part clustered around the two extremes of support for the right of secession or a multinational and federal state, in the upper left quadrant, and support for a unitary state (or in its extreme case, support for the reestablishment of the USSR) in the lower right quadrant. These two positions are, of course, intractable, and therefore shows the ideological and programmatic space between parties on the left and right. To 1992, no party had made an effort to conciliate between the two opposing poles. Quite

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127Interestingly, a number of parties in the new Duma that had to this point been unable to agree on many issues did not support the Russian invasion ordered by Yeltsin.
simply, Russia in the future can be a democracy or an empire, but not both. The parties on the left of the political spectrum believe the former, while the parties on the right believe in the latter.

**Conclusions and Future Prospects**

The evidence, though somewhat ambiguous, points to a number of conclusions about the future of democracy and the political party system in Russia. Without a doubt, Sartori's polarized pluralism is an appropriate term to describe Russian political reality from 1986 through 1992, though the system is of course immature and an examination over the longer term would be required to confirm this assessment. The graphs are representative of a fragmented political system that — true to Sartori's typology — had a collapsing centre (e.g., Civic Union's collapse in the summer of 1993) and two distinct and opposing poles. The emerging party system is polarized in the truest sense: left versus right, one side of a policy issue versus another, and most importantly, no agreement on the polity issues that are fundamental to the future development of the Russian state.

The fragmentation and divisiveness in the party system probably has its roots in both the 70-year monopoly of the CPSU as well as the peculiar Russian political culture, with its lack of democratic traditions and no history of competitive parties (except the brief period at the beginning of the century). Nevertheless, a recurring characteristic of democratizing authoritarian regimes is a polarized and fragmented party system; in this sense, Russia is no different than southern Europe or the rest of Eastern Europe to some extent. The lack of agreement amongst pro-reform parties and groups will probably
mean continued uncertainty in the program of economic and political reform. As well, Yeltsin's reluctance to be identified with a political party has hindered the success of pro-reform parties and ultimately, the success of political and economic reform itself.

Looking towards the more distant future, as more distinct social groups emerge, the power of vested interest groups (such as Civic Union's state enterprise industrial managers) will decline. This will help to pave the way for parties which are truly representative of different segments of the population, giving way to class- and mass-based parties. Furthermore, polarized pluralism may actually be good for economic reform's short-term prospects, because the decline of the centre means that parties — and ultimately the voters — must choose reform and the market or old-style state control and planning. Finally, Russian democracy will remain unconsolidated until there is the appearance of a democratically-oriented party of the Russian right.

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128 This prediction was borne out in the 1993 parliamentary elections, where the reformers split into three smaller and one large group, and ended up splitting the pro-reform vote into four smaller parts.
Conclusions

"It is easy to make fish soup out of an aquarium, but no one has yet found a way to make an aquarium out of fish soup."
attributed to Lech Walesa or Russian humorist Mikhail Zhvanetskiy

Overview

By Gorbachev's time, the Soviet state was economically stagnated and was dominated by a corrupt, totalitarian party. While the original goal of the Gorbachev liberalization was to reform and rescue communism, the results were quite different. Gorbachev's reforms set in motion a chain of events that the CPSU was unable to stop, finally resulting in the end of the CPSU and the USSR itself. Nevertheless, the end of communist totalitarianism does not, ipso facto, result in democratic pluralism.

Whereas before the Gorbachev reforms there was little or no independent political group activity, liberalizing reforms resulted in independent political activity, in the form of the neformal'nye, the informal groups. These informal groups, whether dedicated to promoting a special cause or discussing current issues, proved to be the precursors to the nascent proto-parties which followed. By 1988 it was estimated that 30,000 of these groups existed.¹ Their very existence, independent from the state and party, questioned the notion of the monolithic CPSU and its monopoly on politics.

One of the ironies of the early period of liberalization — the pre-coup era — was that party conservatives' actions may have contributed more to the

¹Pravda, Feb. 1, 1988
growth of informal group activity than did party reformers. The conservatives radicalized many groups and their members by their actions, which included manipulating the delegate selection process to the 1988 special party congress, and the use of force to end peaceful demonstrations in late 1988.

The path from totalitarianism or authoritarianism to democracy is a nebulous one. Transition theory suggests that transitions to democracy proceed through two contiguous phases, destructive and constructive. The use of transition theory may offer a partial explanation for the peculiar roles and actions of the informal groups.²

The first phase, the destructive phase, is characterized by the decline, decay and destruction of the old, totalitarian institutions. The newly-formed groups in this period, from approximately 1986-1991, acted as agitators, performing the role of interest articulators. By 1988, many of these groups had coalesced and attempted to define their political and programmatic orientations with respect to each other, as well as consolidate their memberships. Organization at this time was characterized more by the quantity than the quality of these groups' efforts due to the ambiguous political climate of the time, with Article Six of the USSR Constitution still in force, and the continuing dominance of the CPSU.

As the boundaries for acceptable political behaviour widened, so did the activities of the groups: many amalgamated to form popular fronts and election committees to take advantage of opportunities presented to them. The popular front movements also acted in concert to challenge the ruling

Communist Party apparatus, especially in their actions in the semi-free March 1989 all-Union and 1990 republican parliamentary elections. Though somewhat successful in the latter elections, capturing control of several republican parliaments and the Moscow city soviet, the democratic forces through 1990 failed to create a viable and unified opposition to the CPSU. The old totalitarian structures also hindered the efforts of the reformers; though the reformers may have controlled some republican parliaments and city soviets, the real power lay in the bureaucracy, which the CPSU still controlled. Finally, the lack of a democratic tradition — save for a brief period at the turn of the century — and 70 years of paternalistic state socialism led Russians to be skeptical of democracy; many Russians still believed that a strong, appointed leadership was the solution to Russia’s problems. The most vivid example of this 19th century Russian belief was reflected in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's plan to reconstruct Russia which was published in September 1990.³ Inasmuch as initial activities of the democrats were designed to put pressure on Gorbachev and the reformers and increase their popularity, the democratic groups acted only as critics of the regime.

Nevertheless, the groups and movements in this early period, through 1989, did begin to coalesce into what might accurately be termed proto-parties. The Interregional Group of Deputies (IRG), in the First all-Union Congress of People's Deputies, acted both as a broad-based opposition to the CPSU and as a

³Published on September 18 in Komsomolskaya Pravda (circulation: 25-30 million), Solzhenitsyn's 16,000 word essay was the first time in thirty years he was able to publish in a Soviet journal. His essay was critical of perestroika (though it did not mention Gorbachev by name), and, among other things, called for the immediate separation of the Baltic republics, the three Transcaucasian republics (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), the four Central Asian republics (Kirgizia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, and Tajikistan), and Moldova. The essay decried what Solzhenitsyn believed to be the commercialism that the West had begun to foist on Russia, and while it showed grudging support for democracy and private property, it did not endorse authoritarian rule. Vera Tolz, Solzhenitsyn Proposes a Plan for the Reconstruction of Russia in Report on the USSR, no. 40, 1990, pp. 12-14.
parliamentary party. With approximately 450 members at its peak, the Interregional Group was a well-organized and vocal opposition to the CPSU-dominated legislature, arguing for policies like the elimination of Article Six from the Soviet constitution. Though it attempted to formalize organizational links to outside liberal informal groups, the IRG only managed to publish its own newspaper and lacked the ideological, programmatic and structural cohesiveness of a true political party. The IRG did, however, produce a number of leaders who went on to become active in forming newer political groups and proto-parties. Functionally, the IRG was an articulator but not an aggregator of public opinion and thus could not be classified as a true political party.

In 1989 and 1990, groups that could be classified as proto-parties began to emerge from the informal groups, election movements, and the IRG itself. These new groups — proto-parties like the Social Democratic Party of Russia, the Republican Party of Russia, and the Democratic Party of Russia — were better organized and had programmatic goals that were more clear than their predecessors. Though these proto-parties showed some evidence of acting as interest aggregators, they lacked the necessary organizational and programmatic depth to be considered real political parties, were leader-centred, and also lacked distinct socio-economic bases.

If it is true that the failed coup attempt in August 1991 was a revolution, as it marked the end of the communist "partocracy," then it was inevitable that the opposition would lose their immediate sense of purpose.\(^4\)

\(^4\)See, for example, Martin Malia for his insightful elaboration of the view that the failed coup represented the end of the totalitarian Soviet system writ large. Malia argues that western observers mistook the Gorbachev reform period as development towards democracy, when it was actually the decline of the totalitarian state. Martin Malia, *From Under the Rubble, What?* in *Problems of Communism*, v. XLI, no. 1-2, Jan.-April 1992, pp. 89-105.
These groups were united primarily by their opposition to communism, when communism collapsed the Democratic Russia movement became directionless. With respect to transition theory, at this point, the two phases overlap: the coup marked the end of the destructive phase and the beginnings of the constructive phase, and as such the independent groups-cum-parties should perform different roles.

Yet, at this point the development of political parties stagnated. On an institutional level, this could be attributed to the fact that while the CPSU collapsed, the pre-coup structures and institutions remained. Whereas before (and during) the coup, Democratic Russia could use demonstrations, the Yeltsin election, and the coup defence to mobilize citizens against communism and the old order, the promotion of political and economic reform had no clear techniques or methods. Furthermore, the parties had no chance to act as intermediaries between society and government because there had been no post-coup election. Meanwhile, the factions and blocs in the Congress were not representative of the social and political forces outside the legislature, as the deputies had been elected in the different pre-coup political environment of 1990. The deputies in the legislature were neither responsive to Russian society, nor responsible; and the parties, blocs and factions in Congress had little means to enforce discipline on their members.

The early success of Civic Union is explainable in terms of the socioeconomic structures that remained in post-Communist Russia. Civic Union was influential because it represented vested Soviet-era interests, and used left-over Soviet structures and institutions. As privatization accelerated,

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Civic Union was unable to reconcile the interests of the directors of newly privatized firms, on the one hand, and government-paid managers and labor, on the other. From a theoretical perspective, Civic Union is the best example of elements of the old (Communist) and new (post-Communist) political system co-existing with each other in the post-Communist era. This follows directly from transition theory in that the two phases, though theoretically contiguous, in reality often overlap.

While a bellwether of any modern democracy is political parties and the party system, the Russian party system, and by extension Russian democracy, remain unconsolidated. Judging from the evidence presented in this study, it is equally possible that the system could either move toward authoritarian pseudo-democracy" (e.g., soft authoritarianism) — especially due to the extraordinary powers given to the presidency in Russia — or it could evolve towards democracy and relative liberalism. Observers would do well to remember that though the economy, for example, remains a mess, there is now actually a market that sends signals. Likewise, there is now a nascent pluralist political system that is marked by a multitude of groups and parties and debate that at times resembles the free exchange of ideas, which, though polarised, could (and probably will) be a basis for future democratic development.

\textit{Analysis and Prognosis}

The situation after 1992 was difficult to categorize in terms of its impact on the development of democracy and the political party system. Nevertheless, the system has not collapsed (as many predicted it would) and,
most interestingly, the party system has continued to evolve despite the failure of pro-reform forces to implement their agenda in the face of a new government whose commitment to reform is questionable.  

The president, the prime minister, and most members of the government executive in Russia have no affiliation with any party. In hindsight, this failure to solidify an organizational and political base by establishing a presidential party (or allying with a pro-reform party) has hurt Yeltsin and his government, who have in fact drifted off the course of reform charted by the old Gaidar government in 1992. In the upper house, the Federal Council, parties play only a small role; and in the regions and in local politics, parties, too, play only a minor role. The new 1993 constitution organized the Duma's lower chamber around parliamentary parties. The new constitution also ensured that the speaker of the Duma would have limited power, to avoid the emergence of someone with too much power, like Ruslan Khasbulatov and his failed 1993 rebellion. A new collective steering group took over many of the powers that were held by Khasbulatov; this council consists of the party or faction leaders from the Duma, and each faction has an equal vote in these council decisions (which helps to restrict extremist Vladimir Zhirinovsky's power).  

Factions have also been given office space and budgets for staff, and deputies speaking for their factions have precedence in debates over independent members. As well, the leadership of the committees in the Duma are distributed by faction. The speakers and five deputy positions are all held by members of different factions. Consequently, though deputies

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6See Appendix Five for a summary of the Russian Duma December 1993 election results.
without party affiliation formed the largest group of 225 single-member-district members after the election, all but seven of the Duma's 450 deputies were faction members. These factions have become, *de facto*, parliamentary proto-parties. Though politics in Russia remains fractious and polarized, and though the executive branch of the Russian government has extensive decree power, Yeltsin and his government have not yet attempted to circumvent the Duma.

Not surprisingly, however, discipline has been difficult to maintain in these factions because the proto-party leaders have no way of rewarding or punishing their charges. Faction leaders remain attached to the party list system and proportional representation because it is through these lists that they can retain at least some sense of party discipline. Hence, those deputies elected from single member districts are more responsive to their constituents and regions and are less willing to follow party discipline. It is likely that in the future the Duma will preserve these party-oriented structures, which have had the effect of imposing a fractious parliamentary party system.

On another level of analysis, this study has shown the importance of a cultural context of any study about Russian politics. Without a doubt, centuries of tyranny and repression under the czars and communism have created a peculiar political culture that has shown both a receptiveness to bold reform and a willingness to embrace extremism and convenience.

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8 The new Duma consists of 450 members: 225 elected in single-member-districts, and 225 elected through a modified party list system.
9 *Party system will stay in Russian Duma.*
10 *Party system will stay in Russian Duma.*
11 *Party system will stay in Russian Duma.*
The Last Word...

Predicting what will or will not happen to this system is difficult, if only because Russia has managed to confound its observers — and especially its skeptical observers — before. When the Russian Federation declared unilateral "independence" in June, 1990, 907 deputies in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies voted yes and only 13 voted no. Yeltsin, then the speaker of the Congress, became Russia's first president one year later in 1991 with 57 per cent support; he stood against a right wing coup in August of that year and became a symbol of the new but putative Russian democracy. Perhaps most importantly, Russia has made incredible progress in turning principles like democracy, law, privatization, freedom, and a division of powers into reality. Russia now has a new constitution, has laid the groundwork for a law-based state, and has made impressive but halting advances toward a market-based economy through private property including the mass privatisation of state-owned enterprises. Clearly, these are fundamental changes, and they make a return to what existed five years ago next to impossible.\textsuperscript{12} By 1995, however, economic reform had slowed, the economy had worsened, Russian nationalism and militarism had reared its head through an ill-conceived invasion of Chechnya, and the Yeltsin government, led by Viktor Chernomyrdin, had all but abandoned serious economic reform. There is no disputing that parties will play a key role in the evolution of post-Communist Russia: the question is in what direction will Russia go, and whether parties will be leaders or followers in this transformation towards progress or further decline. Indeed, democrats only

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Russia, five years on}, \textit{The Economist}, June 24, 1995, pp. 45.
have to look to the last revolutionary period to realize the perils of not cooperating with each other.
Appendices
Appendix One

Typology of Groups in the USSR and Russia
1986-1990

Popular Fronts

By 1990, over 40 popular fronts had been organized in larger cities and regions of the RSFSR; the largest were those in Leningrad and Moscow. The Leningrad Popular Front won the elections to city and raion soviets in the March 1990 local elections. Members were predominantly liberal and democratic, and thus Westernisers in their orientation, though they also count reform-minded communists among their members.

Minority Movements

These groups are primarily ethnic associations to express solidarity, and include associations of Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans, as well as various other ethnic groups.

Russian Nationalist Groups

These include various right-wing, patriotic and nationalist groups like Pamyat and those in other cities and regions of the RSFSR. Many are affiliated with the United Council of Russia, a group formed with the help of conservative party officials in 1989. These groups' views include neo-Stalinism, monarchism and the like, but they are united by their anti-Semitism, their anti-West sentiments, and their Russian nationalism.

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Internationalist Movements

These groups include many organizations in the Baltic republics, Moldavia, Tajikistan, and other areas. They oppose the independence movements of non-Russian nationalities and are tied to conservative groups and party circles in the RSFSR.

Party Clubs

In January 1990, 162 radical (in the sense of democratic) independent party clubs from 102 cities in 13 union republics met to create the Democratic Platform. The Democratic Platform advocates creating a social democratic party; this group held an inaugural congress in May 1990. The Marxist Platform was formed in April 1990 by orthodox communists who called for a return to "classic Marxism."

Parliamentary Groups

The Interregional Group of Deputies was the best known, largest and most active parliamentary group at the all-Union level. In the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, democratically-oriented members set up their own group called "Democratic Russia." Conservative groups include the Rossiya and Soyuz blocs, which opposed national independence movements and, later, the dissolution of the USSR.
Independent Workers' Movements

The basis for these groups were strike committees of workers that led miners during the strikes in 1989. In 1989, conservative party officials formed the United Front of Workers, whose goal was to defend workers' rights that have been violated by perestroika.

Anti-Stalinist Groups

The best known anti-Stalinist group is the informal group Memorial, founded in Moscow in 1988 to compile research on Stalin's victims. There are branches in many large cities throughout the USSR.

Ecological and Cultural Movements

The cultural movements founded in 1986 and 1987 — formed to preserve historical monuments in Leningrad — were the first to engage in open political debate after the introduction of glasnost and perestroika.

Religious Groups

Groups were formed to defend religious rights and to encourage religious participation.

Military Groups

The best known group of this sort is Shchit (Shield), a trade union for servicemen. Other groups include Afghan veterans, who have close ties to Pamyat and campaign for their own version of "social justice."
The precursors to political parties

Independence movements, popular front movements, and the like had the potential to turn into nascent political parties. The Democratic Union, founded in Moscow in 1988 called itself a political party and its goal was to challenge the existing Soviet system. By 1990, many groups were forming that called themselves political parties but were small and disorganized.
Appendix Two

Russian Political Divisions and Personalities — Summer/Fall 1990

CPSU

Central Committee Platform (Moderate Communist Reformers): Mikhail Gorbachev, Aleksandr Yakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze.

Party/Governmental Technocrats (Cautious Modernizers): Nikolai Ryzhkov, Yuri Maslyukov, Anatolii Lukyanov.

Leningrad Platform/Russian Communist Party/"Kommunisty Rossii" (Party Conservatives): Ivan Polozkov, Boris Gidaspov, Igor' Bratishchev, Albert Makashov, Nina Andreeva

Democratic Platform (Communist reformers in CPSU): Georgii Gusev

Marxist Platform (Reform Marxists/Democratic Socialists): Andrei Buzgalin

Social and Radical Democrats

Democratic Platform (Democratic Socialists/Left Democrats; split from CPSU): Vyacheslav Shostakovsky, Vladimir Lysenko, Igor Chubais.

Democratic Union (Left Democrats): Valeriya Novodvorskaya, Igor Tsarkov, Yuri Skubko, Eduard Molchanov


Leningrad Popular Front (Left and Liberal Democrats): Marina Sale, Nikolai Arzhannikov.

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Democratic Party of Russia (Left and Liberal Democrats): Nikolai Travkin, Gary Kasparov, Gennady Burbulis, Arkady Murashov, Georgi Khatsenkov.

Moscow Popular Front (Socialists, Left and Liberal Democrats): Sergei Stankevich, Igor Chubais, Mikhail Malyutin, Boris Kagarlitsky.

Interregional Group of Deputies (Left and Liberal Democrats): Boris Yeltsin, Yuri Afanasev, Gavriil Popov, Anatoly Sobchak, Sergei Stankevich, Arkady Murashov, Gennady Burbulis.

Liberal and Christian Democrats

Constitutional Democratic Party (Liberal Democrats; old "Kadets"): Yuri Deryagin.

Party of Constitutional Democrats (Liberal Democrats; new "Kadets"): Viktor Zolotarev, Anna Zolotareva, Mikhail Astafev.


Christian Democratic Union of Russia (Christian Democrats): Aleksandr Ogorodnikov.


New Left

Socialist Party (New Socialists): Boris Kagarlitsky


Libertarian Party (Left Libertarians): Evgeny Debryanskoi.

Union of Young Communists (Left Radicals): Sergei Bendin.

United Front of Workers (Populist/Stalinist/Left Radicals): Veniamin Yarin.
New Right


National Patriotic Front "Pamyat" (Nationalist/Fascist): Dmitrii Vasilev.

Russian Popular Front "Pamyat" (Nationalist/Fascist): Igor Sychev.

Popular-Orthodox Movement "Pamyat" (Nationalist/Fascist): Konstantin Smirnov-Ostashvili.

"Edinstvo" (Stalinist): Nina Andreeva.

Russian Popular Front (Populist/Nationalist): Vladimir Ivanov, Valerii Skurlatov.

United Council of Russia (Nationalist): Aleksandr Prokhanov.

Patriot (Stalinist/Nationalist): Aleksandr Romanenko

Environmentalists


Greenpeace, Leningrad Branch (Environmentalists): Aleksei Yablokov.


Monarchists

Orthodox Monarchical Union "Pramos" (Monarchists): Sergei Yurkov-Engelhardt
Appendix Three
Graph One

**Ideological Space: Democracy/Authoritarianism versus Left and Right**

Democracy

- DR
- SDPR
- RPR
- CD
- RKhDD

Left

Authoritarianism

- DPR
- NPSR
- LDP
- RBC/RU

Right

Note: This graph only shows the more prominent of the parties, and is therefore a representation of the parties relative to each other. If smaller parties and groups were taken into account, the position of the parties on the graph might change.
Graph Two

*Planned or Mixed Economy versus Importance of Social Welfare*

**Planned Economy**

- RBC/ RU
- LDP
- NPSR
- DPR
- CD
- RKhDD

**Mixed Economy**

- DR

**Low Concern for Social Welfare**

**High Concern for Social Welfare**

- SDPR
- RPR

**Legend**

- DR—Democratic Russia (1990-1992)
- DPR—Democratic Party of Russia
- RPR—Republican Party of Russia
- NPSR—People's Party of Free Russia
- RKhDD—Russian Christian Democratic Movement
- SDPR—Social Democratic Party of Russia
- RBC/ RU—Red-Brown Coalition/Russian Unity
- LDP—Liberal Democratic Party
- CD—Constitutional Democrats
Graph Three

*Private Property or Public Property versus Planned or Market Economy*

Private Property

- DR
- SDPR
- RPR
- DPR

Market Economy

CD

Planned Economy

RKhDD

Public Property

NPSR
LDP

RBC/RU

DR—Democratic Russia (1990-1992)
DPR—Democratic Party of Russia
RPR—Republican Party of Russia
NPSR—People’s Party of Free Russia
RKhDD—Russian Christian Democratic Movement

SDPR—Social Democratic Party of Russia
RBC/RU—Red-Brown Coalition/Russian Unity
LDP—Liberal Democratic Party
CD—Constitutional Democrats
Graph Four

**Unitary/Federal State versus National/Multinational State**

**Federal State**
- DR
- SDPR
- RPR

**Multinational**
- CD

**National**
- DPR
- RKhDD
- NPSR

**Unitary State**
- RBC/RU
- LDP

DR—Democratic Russia (1990-1992)
DPR—Democratic Party of Russia
RPR—Republican Party of Russia
NPSR—People's Party of Free Russia
RKhDD—Russian Christian Democratic Movement

SDPR—Social Democratic Party of Russia
RBC/RU—Red-Brown Coalition/Russian Unity
LDP—Liberal Democratic Party
CD—Constitutional Democrats
Appendix Four

Parties, Blocs and Factions in the Russian Parliament
The Seventh Congress of Peoples' Deputies — 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Agrarian Union</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonparty deputies</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Russia</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communists of Russia</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left Centre</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Native Land</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Union</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers' Union of Russia</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Democrats</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Russia</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Generation—New Policy</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty and Equality</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus for the Sake of Progress</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motherland</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform of the Army</td>
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</table>

## Appendix Five

### Election Results for the State Duma — December 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Bloc</th>
<th>Pro or Anti-Refom</th>
<th>Party Leader</th>
<th>Per cent of Party Vote</th>
<th>Party List Seats</th>
<th>Single-Seat Ballot Seats</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia's Choice</td>
<td>Pro</td>
<td>Yegor Gaidar</td>
<td>15.38%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>Vladimir Zhirinovsky</td>
<td>22.79</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td>Communist Party of the Russian Federation</td>
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<td>Agrarian Party of Russia</td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>Mikhail Lapshin</td>
<td>7.90</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc</td>
<td>Pro</td>
<td>Grigory Yavlinsky</td>
<td>7.83</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women of Russia</td>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>Alvetina Fedulova</td>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>Party of Russian Unity</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>Democratic Party of Russia (DPR)</td>
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<td>Russian Movement for Democratic Reform</td>
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<td>Civic Union for Stability, Justice and Progress</td>
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<td>Arkady Volsky</td>
<td>1.92</td>
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<td>Future of Russia/New Names</td>
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<td>Vyacheslav Lachevsky</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constructive Ecological Movement (KEDR)</td>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>Anatoly Panfilov</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Dignity and Charity Bloc</td>
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<td>Vyacheslav Grishin</td>
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<td>Other parties</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>Independents</td>
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<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>225</strong></td>
<td><strong>219</strong></td>
<td><strong>444</strong></td>
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