THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN HONG KONG

THE ROLE OF CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS

IN

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY:

THE EXPERIENCE OF FOUR CHRISTIAN SOCIAL CONCERN GROUPS

IN

HONG KONG.

by

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A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Master of Arts

McMaster University

MASTER OF ARTS (1999) McMaster University
(Sociology) Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: The role of civic organizations in the development of civil society:

The experience of four Christian social concern groups in Hong Kong.

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SUPERVISOR: Professor N. McLaughlin

NUMBER OF PAGES: vii, 244

Table of Contents

List of Figure

List of Tables

Appendices

Chapter One

Introduction

The concept of civil society has a long history, and in recent years there has been a renewed interest in this theoretical tradition, both inside and outside the academy. Since the 1980s there has been a virtual explosion of academic literature on the topic. Some social theorists focus on the theoretical aspect of the concept of civil society. To these theorists, the meaning of the concept of civil society and its applicability beyond the Western context are the major concerns (e.g. Taylor 1990; Kumar 1993; Calhoun 1993). Other social theorists focus on the practical aspect of the concept of civil society. To these theorists, civil society is an idea used to theorize the process of democratization in the international context (e.g. Gold 1996; Cohen and Arato 1994; Sullivan 1990).

The revival of the discourse on civil society has not remained purely academic, however, for the concept has entered the language of politicians, religious leaders, and journalists. Hillary Clinton once talked the importance of civil society, "the stuff of life."[1] Pope John Paul II used the phrase in his prayers for Lebanon.[2] The phrase could be found in religious journals like *The*

[1] When Hillary Clinton used the term, she likened it to family, religious belief, voluntary associations, art and culture (K.T.Walsh's "Hillary Clinton's Coping Strategy" in U.S. News and World Report, 11 May 1998, 18-20).

[2] Donnelly, J. (1997). Pope Calls for an Independent Lebanon: His Visit Creates New Hopes and Sparks Torrent of Criticism toward Syria. The Miami Herald, 12 May 1997. Http://www.aflnet.com/ART12May97.html.

Ecumenical Review, and in secular magazines like *Time* and *Newsweek*.[3] So the phrase 'civil society' is undoubtedly popular.

Three Examples of Civil Society

The concept of civil society is more complex than we might have thought at first. The concept represents a wide range of concerns, from political to economic, in different social contexts. The practice of civil society also takes a variety of forms, from forums among intellectuals to mutual aid in poor neighbourhoods. Hence, the complexity of the concept of civil society goes beyond its literal meaning. The following three examples demonstrate this complexity.

The first example of civil society was emerged in the Eastern European countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland during the 1970s and the 1980s. The development of civil society in these countries represented the struggle for an independent sphere where individuals would be protected from the surveillance and manipulation of the totalitarian party-state. In the totalitarian party-state, the government had pervasive domination over society. Every aspect of social life was either subordinated to or suppressed by the state. Except for government-formed organizations, no spontaneous or independent civic association was allowed. As such, society was swallowed up by the state (Batista 1994, p.15; Madison 1998, p.13).

Nevertheless, people in these countries still struggled for an independent social sphere. They took refuge in the churches and searched for

[3] See R. Stengel's "Bowling Together" in Time, 22 July 1996, 35-6. and G.F.Will's "The Politics of Soulcraft" in Newsweek, 13 May 1996, 82.

moral alternatives from their faith communities. Meanwhile, intellectuals organized such independent activities as civic associations, forums, and publications. They also initiated citizen movements for an autonomous sphere. Gradually, civil society was formed and separated from the state (Ibid., p.13; Batista 1994, p.16; Walzer 1991, p.301).

The second example is the civil society found in Latin America. In this part of the world, the rise of civil society was closely related to the masses' struggle for subsistence during a period of economic deterioration. From the 1960s to the 1970s, seventeen out of the twenty-one Latin American countries were governed by the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (Wiarda 1991, p.44). While the control of these regimes over political affairs was tightened, the state's role over economic affairs was minimized. Economic regulations were lifted and state enterprises were privatized on a large scale. At the same time, the regimes withdrew their responsibilities for the disadvantaged. State expenditure on health care and education were substantially reduced.[4] The results of these policies were pauperization and polarization in these countries.[5]

In this harsh economic milieu, the masses were expected to struggle for survival alone. What was unexpected was the contribution of these struggles to the development of civil society. For subsistence, the masses had to

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[4] State expenditure on health care and education in the Latin American countries declined 50% during the 1980s (Schuurman 1993, p.192).

[5] According to ECLA reports, about 44% of Latin Americans lived below the poverty line and the average per capita income in Latin America decreased in the 1980s by 8% (Ibid., p.192). Meanwhile, income inequality was common in the region. In 1970, the poorest 20% of Latin Americans shared only 2.5% of total income of the region while the top 15% shared 74.1% of total income (Pinto 1976, p.118).

organize themselves and help each other. Mutual aid organizations and local movements were initiated at the grass-roots level.[6] As such, the poor communities were able to be self-sufficient. Furthermore, mutual aid organizations not only helped the poor to survive, but also fostered solidarity among the participants, and gave them the will and the ability to strive for greater autonomy and self-determination over their lives. In other words, the participation of the community members in collective actions was a process of empowerment. Thus, despite political repression and economic hardship, the terrain of civil society was actually broadened by the emergence of various civic organizations, networking, and social movements.

The third example is the civil society of the West. In this case, the issue is not the struggle for its formation but rather which version of civil society is desirable. For decades, the choice between the private liberty of disconnected individuals and the public good of social members is the leitmotif of debates in the Western society.

To those who emphasize public goods, civil society is an egalitarian and just society. Since society is the source of individuality, the common good of society has the primacy over individual interests (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.9). The concrete expression of these ideas at the national level can be found in welfare state policies. After the Second World War, some European

[6] For example, ecclesiastic base communities were formed in Brazil by Catholic priests to give mutual aids to their members (Lowy 1996). In Uruguay, food-purchasing clubs were formed to buy and distribute wholesale foods at much lower prices. Local residents also donated food or cash to soup kitchens so that the poor could prepare and consume the food. Moreover, nonprofit health-care clinics were set up with the helps of foreign non-governmental organizations (Canel 1992, p.278). In Mexico, residents of the poor community

governments abandoned the "night watchman state" idea and became more active in promoting the well-being of the populace (Briggs 1961, p.225). For their commitments to equality, these governments gave equal opportunity and equal treatment to all citizens.[7] Driven by the belief of fair share, these governments modified market forces by providing subsistence, security, and social services to all citizens (Ibid., p.228; Marshall 1961, p.288, 299).[8] As a result, all citizens in the welfare states were able to enjoy political rights and social rights (Briggs 1961, p.221-2). However, the welfare state policies had many drawbacks. In terms of administration, the excessive functions of the state overloaded the system. As a result, fiscal crises were created in the welfare states and grievances were nursed among the public (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.12).[9] More importantly, the demarcation between the state and society became less distinguishable. Since civic associations like labour unions were increasingly integrated into the welfare states' decision-making processes, the state and society seemed to be fused together. Consequently, it was hard to differentiate civil society from the state (Taylor 1990, p.96-7).

On the other hand, those who emphasized individual liberty would conceive of civil society as the market or bourgeois society (Cohen & Arato

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were mobilized to deal with such daily problems as high water rates, forced relocation, high property taxes, and the lack of public services (Bennet 1992, p.244).

[7] While educational reforms give greater equality of opportunity, the idea of equal treatment was implemented through the provision of optimum social services to all citizens (Briggs 1961, p.221 & 228).

[8] In a competitive market, individuals were encouraged to take as much as they could get. Thus, if the government did nothing, the distribution of real income would be unequal (Marshall 1961, p.299).

[9] Fiscal crises were caused by the increasing costs of social services and the decreasing economic growth created to these countries. Besides, there was a widespread of grievance among the middle class due to the high taxation and inflation as well as the intrusion of the state into private life (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.12).

1994, p.23). To them, individuals were rights bearers whose autonomy and dignity should be fully respected by the government (Ibid., p.8). These ideas were concretely expressed by neo-conservatism. The neo-conservatives emphasized the self-regulating market mechanism, the liberty of entrepreneurs, and self-reliance. They rolled the state's role back over a wide range of functions and tried to abolish social rights. To restore the authority and efficiency of the state, they limited its scope and shielded it from the public demands (Ibid., p.14). In doing so, a self-administrated society seemed to be created. But the self-reliant and autonomous "civil society" was in fact only a "private sphere, composed of an agglomeration of autonomous but egoistic, exclusively self-regarding, competitive, possessive individuals...."(Ibid., p.22). Consequently, disintegration was constantly a menace to society.

Though sketchy, these three cases do show the diverse and complex ideas of civil society. For one thing, civil society may mean different things to different people. As was demonstrated in the third case, civil society to the neo-conservative is simply a private sphere in which atomistic individuals have the freedom to pursue their interests in the self-regulating market. Yet to the others, civil society is an egalitarian society where the social members are committed to the public goods. Additionally, the ideas of civil society are complex too. Civil society can take a wide diversity of forms. From civic organization to social movement, from forum to collective practices, we can see the multi-facets of civil society. In addition, civil society in different social contexts will represent a wide range of concerns. For example, political

concerns were predominant in the Eastern European countries but it was less important than economic concerns in Latin America. Finally, the complexity of the idea of civil society is also caused by the difficulties that come with civil society. For example, the conflicts between the autonomy and interests of individuals and the public good is one of the difficulties that civil society has to overcome. The relationship among the state, market, and society is another difficulty. For the moment, we will not look into these issues any further. Nevertheless, we must be cautious about the meanings of civil society whenever we come across the phrase 'civil society.'

The Concept of Civil Society.

Civil society is a society organized on the principle of communicative rationality (Madison 1998, p.37).[10] At first glance, communicative rationality as a concept is difficult to understand. Yet in a nutshell, the principle is simply a democratic process of will formation. The principle asserts that all affected persons of a particular policy must have chance to speak out and receive a fair hearing in the decision-making process. A reasonable manner is therefore required in the decision making process (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.348; Madison 1998, p.41).[11]

The reasonable manner involves the aspects of participants, procedure, and arguments of a communicative process. Regarding participants, the communication should be a public process in which all affected and concerned

[10] Cohen and Arato also say the norms of civil society are discourse ethics (1994, p.346). Madison asserts that communicative rationality is the common principle of the moral, political, and economic spheres. Cohen and Arato insist that the primary rationality for political, economic, and civil society are different. Discourse ethics is primary only in civil society. The in-depth definition of civil society will be given in Chapter Two.

persons can participate. To this end, no political or economic constraint that keeps anyone away from participation should be imposed on the process. In terms of procedure, a mutual acknowledgment of each participant as a rational and autonomous person who participates on equal terms is needed. They should have an equal chance to make assertions, explain, and challenge the argument. In other words, while participants can challenge the others' argument, they should be willing to accept being challenged. With regard to arguments, each opinion should be judged by the merits of its arguments. In short, these three aspects are what communicative rationality is all about (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.348).

In practice, civil society has the following characteristics: (1) plurality: civil society allows for a variety of associations and forms of life; (2) publicity: civil society has not only the public institutions of communication but also a public who commits itself to the commonwealth; (3) privacy: civil society is a domain of individual self-development and moral choice. Hence, it connotes autonomy of the civil society because it is self-constituted and self-mobilized; (4) legality: general laws and basic rights are needed to maintain the plurality, publicity, and privacy of the civil society; (5) self-limiting: civil society abolishes the revolutionary utopia and accepts the necessity of the state and market system (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.ix, 346, 454; Cohen 1995, p.36).

The Advantages of the Civil Society Approach

[11] The meaning of reasonable manner will be elaborated in next chapter.

The concept of civil society is imperfect; however, it does prevent several weaknesses of other political theories. First, unlike the theory of political culture, the approach of civil society has no deterministic connotation. Civil society does not assert that a certain degree of political apathy is necessary for democracy. Nor does it ascribe a particular unchangeable political culture to a particular country.[12] Rather, the approach of civil society encourages social engagement of the public. It believes the ordinary people will regain their lost responsibilities, arouse their social consciousness, and increase their political efficacy through their involvement in public affairs. Eventually, a civic culture will replace the existing conservative and apathetic political culture.

Next, civil society avoids "the dilemma of pluralist democracy"(Dahl 1982). Ideally, a pluralist democratic system will give equal chance for every autonomous organization to lobby the neutral state for needed resources or preferable policies. Under this circumstance, the role of the government is as an arbitrator instead of a ruler. Indeed, the government will pay a heavy price for its domination over the society.[13] Thus, the existence of a plurality of relatively autonomous organizations is a necessary condition for sustaining democracy (Ibid., p.32-5).

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[12] To Almond and Verba, civic culture is the only political culture that makes democracy work. The ideal citizens in the civic culture are potentially active citizens. They should not intensively involve themselves in the decision-making process; otherwise, the governmental power would be weak and could not execute smoothly (1965 p.354).

[13] To Dahl, organizations will cooperate and combine their resources to resist the domination of the government. The public will also support the autonomy of the society. Since the cost of control is too high, the government will be unwilling to dominate the society (Dahl 1982, p.32-5).

Ironically, the pluralist political system will also damage the democratic development over the long-run, in three ways. First, pluralism helps to stabilize inequalities. Although there is unequal access to resources among the organizations, they will accommodate with others. In the long run, the system will be so highly conservative that it will reject any innovative structural changes (Ibid., p.40-3). Second, the system deforms civic consciousness. In a democratic pluralist system, organizations tend to exaggerate their particularistic short-run demands and de-emphasize the broader long-run needs. The result is a fragmentary society with rival interests which overlooks the common goods (Ibid., p.43-4). Third, the system distorts the public agenda. Congress and parliament, the ideal places for open discussions of public issues, are degenerated into places for compromising and bargaining among the parties. Many issues and alternative voices are excluded from the agenda of the decision-making process (Ibid., p.45-7). Since the pluralist democratic system has both positive and negative effects simultaneously, this reality creates the dilemma of pluralist democracy.

Civil society overcomes this dilemma in several ways. First, the approach of civil society will not disregard the common good. In a civil society, members will mutually recognize the autonomy, dignity, and equal treatment of each other. It is impossible to protect an individual's rights and freedom without protecting the collective welfare and autonomy of the community to which the individual belongs. Hence, common interests will not be ignored since its relation with personal interests is inseparable (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.378-9). Second, communicative rationality emphasizes

reflexiveness. While institutions of society need to be democratized, reforms should be carried out within the administrative and economic systems. So unlike the pluralist democratic system, the approach of civil society will not reject any constructive structural reforms. Finally, social actors of civil society will speak out for the needs of civil society and denounce social injustice. Social actors are self-limiting in the sense that they have no intention for political power; therefore, no political bargaining can silence the social actors. Rather, social actors of civil society will constantly bring new issues and values into the public sphere and political society. As such, demands and alternative voices from civil society cannot be ignored by the political authority (Ibid., p.19-20).

The Theoretical Development of Civil Society in the Chinese Communities

Recently, social scientists in the three largest Chinese communities (Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) have increasingly talked about the concept of civil society.[14] These discussions can be classified into two types. The first type of discussions questioned the existence of civil society in China from a historical perspective.[15] The sinologists either searched for self-organized local communities, or examined elements of civil society in the institutions and culture of China.[16] Their findings were mixed. For some, civil

[14] For more information on civil society in Mainland China, see Rankin 1990 & 1993; McCormick, Su & Xiao 1992; Wakeman 1993; Rowe 1993; Huang 1993; Chamberlain 1993; Madsen 1993; Tong 1994; Shils 1996. On civil society in Taiwan, see : Ngo 1993; Gold 1996; Chang 1997. On Hong Kong, see: Ma 1998; Hong Kong Transition Project 1998.

[15] Except McCormick et al., 1992 and Tong 1994, all articles about Mainland China we listed above belong to this type of discussion.

[16] Rankin (1993) and Wakeman (1993) belong to the first case. Rowe (1993), Huang (1993), Chamberlain (1993), and Shils (1996) belong to the second case. Some of these elements of

society has existed since the Qing dynasty.[17] For others, the conclusion was negative.[18] For still others, the existence of civil society in China was partially true.[19]

The second type of discussions focused on the contemporary social contexts and emphasized the state versus society thesis. In these discussions, the development of civil society was believed to be positively associated with the process of democratization. For example, some scholars suggested that the absence of a critical public sphere was an important factor that contributed to the failure of the 1989 Democracy Movement in Mainland China (McCormick etal. 1992; Tong 1994). By contrast, the democratization of Taiwan is partly attributed to the existence of a strong civil society.[20] At first glance, civil society was only developed during the period of liberalization between 1986 to 1988.[21] But in fact, a critical realm had already existed for decades.[22]

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civil society are capitalism, public management, civil law, autonomous organizations, natural rights, individualism, civility, and public opinions (Rowe 1993).

[17] Rankin (1993) is the example in hand.

[18] For instance, both Wakeman and Huang did not think a civil society was existed at all because the notion of public realm against the state was absent in China (Huang 1993, p.238; Wakeman 1993, p.133).

[19] For example, Rowe (1993) found some features of civil society did exist in China even though it was not identical to that of the West. Shils too said that even though Confucius was entirely silent regarding the institution of civil society, however, Confucius did emphase on "the genuinely civil virtues - the civility - of the gentleman-scholar. So Shils' concluded that "in this limited but crucial respect, Confucius can be regarded as an ancestor of the idea of civil society" (1996, p.351).

[20] The other important factor is the government's attitude to the civil society (Ngo 1993, p.13-4).

[21] The political liberalization of Taiwan was undertaken between 1986 and 1988. The immediate results were the rapid growth of non-governmental organizations and of various types of social movements. For example, in 1987, seven new movements were formed, over 1800 demonstrations and rallies were mobilized, and about 11300 civic associations were registered (Chang 1997, p.9 Table 1; Ngo 1993, p.7).

[22] First, a large group of intellectuals had organized seminars and published journals to advocate political reforms, abolish martial law, and respect human rights since the early 1970s. Besides, the radical Taiwanese also published their journals to discuss the possibility of an independent Taiwan. In addition, the Presbyterian church also showed its concern over social justice, human rights, and political freedom. When these three forces joined together,

Meanwhile, grass-roots intellectuals and young students also started to examine the concept of civil society seriously.[23] Thus, the accomplishment of democratization in Taiwan was very likely related to the consolidation of a local civil society.

In short, these recent discussions in the Chinese communities do raise some questions of which we have to take notice. The first question relates to the meaning of civil society. Does the existence of self-organized local communities or associations mean the existence of civil society?[24] The second question is cultural. If civil society was absent in the history of China, can it exist at present? Finally, how can civil society contribute to democratization? This study is unable to take account of all of these questions. If civil society needs to be developed in the Chinese context, some social scientists must address these issues in the future.

The Present Study

This study attempts to analyse the role of Christian social concern groups in developing a local civil society in Hong Kong during the past ten years because we believe it is urgent to study the theory and practice of civil society.

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they became the most powerful force outside the Nationalist Party. In 1984-5, they published more than thirty political journals, most of which were weekly (Chiou 1986, p.19, 20, 23; Ngo 1993, p.6).

[23] The intellectuals' understanding of civil society was expressed in the magazine, "The South" (Nanfang). They concerned political autonomy, economic justice, and social equality. They hold that citizens' participation, self-education, and organic intellectuals were crucial factors that made society change. It was these concerns and factors that created Taiwan's civil society (Chang 1997, p.11-3).

[24] This question was put on the table by Craig Calhoun. To Calhoun, civil society is not simply the existence of civic associations. Otherwise, why was democracy absent in Hong Kong (1993, p.268)?

Theoretically, the local understanding of civil society is rudimentary although social scientists and social activists have already started to use this new concept in their works.[25] The meanings of civil society in the works of the local social scientists are imprecise because they only employ the minimum sense of civil society: the number of civic associations existing in the city (Taylor 1990, p.98).[26] As such, the local social scientists overlook the practice of communicative rationality in civic associations on which the foundation of civil society is built. The analyses of the public dimension of civil society are also insufficient.[27] There is no thorough study on how these civic groups can contribute to the society at large in a systematic and strategic way. More often than not, the role of civil society as a counter-force to the government and business alliance is over-emphasized, and the necessity to democratize the civic associations and institutions is under-emphasized, in

[25] The concept of civil society was only introduced from Taiwan's "The South" magazine to Hong Kong's university students in 1990 (Huang, Xin Ran 1996). We can see some social activists have already employed the notion of civil society in their works. For instance, the groups we interviewed in this study had initiated the July 1 Link project. The building of a global civil society is one of the aims of this project. Some civic organizations did not mention "civil society" at all, but the name, form, and aims they adopted were clearly influenced by the Eastern European model. The project of "Charter 97" is one of these examples.

[26] For example, the Hong Kong Transition Project used the number of NGOs as the indicator of the development of civil society in its January 1998 report, "Tomorrow Has Not Died" (http://www.hkbu.edu/~hktp). Sing, Ming (1996) is another example. Although Sing adopted White's definition of civil society, civil society was merely the civic associations which worked outside the political society. Under this treatment, civil society is almost the same as society.

[27] The idea of the public dimension of civil society comes from Charles Taylor. According to Taylor, the public dimension of civil society refers to civic association's contributions to the society and the state. Through the coordination of civic associations, the self-administration of society is possible. Through the influence of civic associations, the public can change state policy. These are the two public dimensions of civil society (1990, p.98).

these studies.[28] As a result, the theoretical development of civil society in Hong Kong is far from mature.

Practically, the study of civil society will be a sine qua non for the democratization of Hong Kong given the fact that the decolonization of Hong Kong in 1997 has paradoxically created the most unfavourable condition for the development of democracy in the city. On the one hand, decolonization is a reasonable and positive development in the modern world. Since a colony represents the domination of one country over the other, the subordinates lose their autonomy and the right of self-determination. Thus, colonies should not be maintained. Yet on the other hand, the decolonization of Hong Kong is counter to the global democratic movements which have already been developing since 1989. At the national level, the city was recolonized by the authoritarian PRC. At the local level, the Government of the Special Administrative Region (SAR) has strengthened its power by allying with the business community. By contrast, the power of the Legislative Council (LegCo) has been severely undermined.[29] From this perspective, the future of the democratizing process can no longer rely on the Legislative Council. Worse still, divisions are also found between the democratic councillors and the social activists at the grass-roots level (Lui 1997, p.138). Under this circumstance, some social activists are beginning to think that civil society is

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[28] Some intellectuals like Ma (1998) did acknowledge the importance of internal democracy in the civic organizations because "this can indirectly promote gradual democratization in some social groups in civil society." Nonetheless, internal democracy to these social scientists was simply the open elections for board members (Ibid., p.35).

[29] The government changed the electoral system, the composition of LegCo, and the procedure in raising and passing private motions. After all, the senior officials could simply ignore LegCo and did not show up in LegCo to answer the questions from the councillors.

the only alternative way to develop democracy in Hong Kong (Chan, K.W. 1997a). We therefore maintain that both the theory and strategy for the development of civil society should be systematically studied.

While there is no doubt that we should study the role of civic organizations in civil society, we still have to decide which groups should be studied. In this study, we chose four Christian groups (three Protestant and one Catholic social concern groups) for the following reasons.

Theoretically, Christianity was closely tied with the development of the idea of civil society.[30] From the outset, the Church had been an exemplar of an autonomous community. The autonomy and integrity of the Church distinguished itself from the powerless feudal monarchs in the disintegrated Medieval European political environment. Furthermore, the doctrines of Christianity like the Doctrine of the Second Swords not only consolidated the bifocal social organizing principle of the state and the Church, but also inspired many social philosophers to develop the modern ideas of civil society.[31] For instance, the Lockean ideas of a pre-state community and the rights-bearing human beings which are considered to be one of the two origins of the ideas of civil society are clearly influenced by the doctrines of Christianity (Taylor 1990). Currently, neo-conservative thinkers like Michael Novak also use the Catholic social teachings on "the creative subjectivity of the human person" and "social justice" to emphasize the role of a self-

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[30] A more detailed analysis on this aspect will be given in Part One of Chapter Two.
[31] See Sabine 1973 and Taylor 1990. Further elaboration on this doctrine can be found in Part One of Chapter 2.

administrative civil society in achieving the common good, and to play down the direct involvement of the state in this process (Novak 1993, p.xv, 78-86).[32]

Empirically, the role of Christianity in the process of democratization is so important that Huntington has to describe the third wave of democratization as the Catholic wave (Novak 1993, p.xiii). In Eastern Europe, the Church is the protector of the political dissidents. In Latin America, the Church is the material and spiritual supporter of the poor. The influence of Christianity is not, however, limited to the Western countries. If we examine the three Asian countries that have recently accomplished the democratizing process (Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea), we can find the influence of Christianity. In Philippines, the Catholic church was the significant force in the overthrow of Marcos' dictatorship, and served as a chief promoter of human rights in the post-Marcos period (Claude 1996).[33] In Taiwan, the Presbyterian church was the only autonomous organization for three decades. During that period, the Presbyterian church participated in the opposition movement and became one of the three most powerful political oppositions that Taiwan had ever seen in its history (Ngo 1993, p.6; Chiou 1986, p.21).[34] In South Korea, the contribution of the Christians to the opposition against the dictatorial governments from Park Chung Hee to Roh

[32] To Michael Novak, social justice, the central concept in Catholic thought, means to make the system work better. But social justice should be achieved through the cooperation of free individuals in civil society rather than through the direct involvement of the state, since if the individuals are given full play to their creativity in civil society, they can achieve their personal interests as well as the common good. What the government should therefore do is guarantee the political, economic and cultural liberty of civil society (1993, p.78-86).

[33] Strictly speaking, Philippines is an exceptional case in Asia due to its past colonial history under the rule of Spain and the United States.

Tae Woo should not be overlooked. For instance, the Roman Catholics have been actively involved in democratic movements since 1974. They formed the Korean Association of Priests for the Realization of Justice, and participated in prayer meetings, masses, and street demonstrations for the restoration of human rights (Kang 1997, p.104-5).

Under these theoretical and practical considerations, we believe it is reasonable to study the role of the Christian social concern groups in the development of civil society in Hong Kong. By saying that, we have no intention to overemphasize the role of Christianity in civil society. Nor do we wish to assert that the Church is a necessary element in developing civil society. Nevertheless, if we think that religion can play a key role in building up a local civil society, then Christianity will be a logical choice for study.

The Four Aspects of Our Empirical Analysis.

Our study will analyse the internal and external aspects of the Christian social concern groups. Internally, we will examine the religious beliefs and social ideals of these Christian groups, as well as their internal democracy. Externally, we will look into the concern groups' roles in the church and in society. As such, we will be able to achieve a more integral analysis of these civic groups.

Specifically, these internal and external aspects of the Christian groups are examined for the following reasons. We examine the religious beliefs and social ideals of these Christian groups for three purposes. By studying their

[34] The other two political forces were the political dissidents who requested for political reforms, and the radical Taiwanese who advocated independence (Chiou 1986).

religious beliefs, we can understand the theological justifications for the social involvement of these Christians. Through examining the social ideals, we can know the social visions of these groups. Simultaneously, these commonalties in religious beliefs and social visions also help to explain why a long-term collaboration is able to be established among these four groups.

The second aspect of our analysis concerns the internal democracy of these civic groups.[35] Our concerns are threefold. First, the practice of democracy within these groups will allow us to determine the consistency between their social beliefs and the actual practice. Second, since the investigation will include the decision makers, the management of disagreements, the handling of influential persons, and the practice of task sharing, a richer understanding of these civic groups' internal democracy is possible. Third, by studying the handling of disagreements and influential members as well as the self-reflexiveness of each civic group, we are able to generate some preliminary ideas about the practice of communicative rationality in each group.

The third aspect will look into the Christian groups' role in the churches of Hong Kong. As Cohen and Arato say, civil society is the target of democratization (1994, p.526).[36] Democratization is not simply about the defense of the autonomy of civil society against the state. It is also about which kind of society is to be defended. Since it is quite possible that inequality, domination or other deficiencies will be found in the institutions of

[35] The specific indicators of internal democracy are given in the section of research method.
[36] The idea of civil society as a target of democratization is explained in Part 2 of Chapter 2.

civil society, institutions of civil society must also be democratized (Ibid., p.516). Therefore, a study of the civic groups' role in civil society should include the analysis of their works in democratizing the institutions of civil society. To this end, we will determine how these groups perceive the church, and what the following actions are.

Nonetheless, civil society is also the terrain of democratization; therefore, the fourth aspect will focus on the social concern groups' actions in response to the political society. First, we have to know the concerned groups' perception of the Hong Kong society. Then, we will examine the concerned groups' efforts in building a local civil society through cultivation and networking. Finally, we will illustrate how different tactics are being used by these concerned groups to influence the government's decisions through two examples.

How the Research Was Done

The Potential Interviewees.

The first challenge for us was to identify potential Christian social concern groups to interview. The restraints on space, time, and financial restraints prevent us from making a complete list of all civic groups in Hong Kong, let alone the Christian groups. By taking advantage of inter-library loan and internet, we did find some limited information about the local civic groups. From the literature, we identified some potential Christian social concern groups. From the internet, we gained access to some of these

Christian groups.[37] And through the latter, we were able to contact other Christian social concern groups, especially those with no access to the internet.[38] Our research method then, could be classified as an internet-driven snowball method.

The next step was to gain the permissions of the eight Christian groups for interviews. To this end, we sent a letter which outlining the purpose of the research to each group. While five of the Christian groups agreed to be interviewed, the rest did not give us any reply.[39] In the end, only four out of the five groups actually sent their answers back to us.[40]

Nevertheless, these four groups do give us a variety of perspectives. In terms of religion, our study includes both Catholic and Protestant social concern groups.[41] In terms of social sectors, the four groups can be classified as the professional, blue collar, and student.[42] Therefore, although our study is not based on a representative sample, the variety of perspectives represented

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[37] For instance, we know of some Catholic social concern groups from Chan & Leung (1996, p.295-7) and of the Hong Kong Christian Institute (CI) from its director's book (Kwok 1991, p.54). However, only the Justice and Peace Commission of the Diocese (JP)among the Catholic groups and CI have their homepages on the internet.

[38] From JP and CI's homepages, we found six other Christian social concern groups that were involved in the July First Link project (The Student Christian Movement in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee, the Christian Study Center on Chinese Religion and Culture, the Hong Kong Catholic Youth Council, and Christians for Hong Kong Society as well as Hong Kong Women Christian Council). The staff of the Student Christian Movement (SCM) suggested some persons from the last three groups for us to interview. The staff of CI also introduced the associated director of the Christian Industrial Committee (CIC) to us.

[39] Even though we sent additional letters to the specific persons suggested by the staff of SCM, no response was made by them.

[40] At the beginning, the Christian Study Center agreed to be interviewed. However, we did not receive any answer from it even though we used every method (e.g. e-mails, long-distance calls) to contact the interviewee. So only JP, CI, SCM, CIC sent the answers back to us.

[41] JP is the Catholic groups and the rest are Protestant groups.

[42] The occupations of members of JP and CI are professionals on average. The majority of CIC's members are factory workers. SCM is a student association.

by these Christian groups prevents a one-sided opinion and allows the differences among these groups to emerge.

The Source of Data.

The major sources of data are the answers to the questionnaires we sent to the Christian social concern groups and the literature they gave to us. Regarding the first source, we sent a semi-structured English questionnaire to each Christian group (See Appendix 1).[43] Three areas of questions were probed in the questionnaire. The first area related to the Christian groups' beliefs and their impression of the churches in Hong Kong. The second area was about the internal structure of each group. The last area concerned the internal democracy within each group.[44]

This study has examined three aspects of internal democracy: the decision-making processes, the practice of task sharing, and reflectiveness within the Christian social concern groups. To address decision-making processes in each group, several indicators were used. The first indicator was the decision maker(s). Specifically, we asked who made the decisions on resource allocation, policies, and activities within the group.[45] We also examined the influence of the rank and file of the group.[46] To us, those groups

[43] About one third of the questions are structured and two thirds of the questions are open-ended. Even in some structured questions, we asked the interviewees to give some explanations instead of just choose yes or no. Although the questionnaire was written in Chinese, the interviewees could answer it in the language they preferred. It turned out all answers were in English.

[44] These three areas correspond to Part A, B, and C of the questionnaire respectively.

[45] These refer to Part C, Question 2 to 4 in the questionnaire.

[46] It refers to Part C, Question 7 in the questionnaire. Literature like annual report is also used for our analyses.

who practiced collective decision making were considered more democratic than those whose decisions were determined by a small group of people.

The second indicator was the opportunity to express different opinions. A democratic organization should give its members sufficient opportunities to speak out regarding their opinions. Even the minority in the group should have a fair hearing. Thus, questions about the existence of any channels for members to express their opinions were included in the questionnaire.[47]

The third indicator was the groups' manner for dealing with conflicts of opinions. As we will see in Chapter Two, the principle of civil society was communicative rationality which was the "tolerance, reasonableness, a readiness to compromise, and a willingness to work out mutual agreements by means of discourse rather than force (Madison 1998, p.63). Since the manner of handling conflicts of opinions was an important indicator of a civilized and democratic society, we asked each group how they resolved such situations.[48]

The fourth indicator related to the issue of influential persons. As Madison said, there were always some influential persons (authority) in a discussion community. These persons were respected and influential because of their knowledge, and not because of any extrinsic factors such as race, sex, and social status. However, the presence of these influential figures should not deprive the opportunity for the rest to speak out. Rather, these influential persons should be more readily listened to the rest (Madison 1998, p.64-5). Hence, a democratic association should address the issue of influential persons

[47] These are Question 6a and 7 of Part C.
[48] This is Question 6b of Part C.

and try to maintain a balanced discussion between the influential ones and the general members. In the questionnaire, we would first find out whether such influential figures exist or not. If the answer was positive, then the groups' attitude to this issue would be addressed.[49]

Another aspect of internal democracy was the practice of task sharing in each group. Task sharing not only represented an egalitarian environment, but also gave members the chance to learn from each other, to respect the others' opinions, to accept individual differences, to criticize each other's work constructively, and to give instruction without giving orders. As such, the spirit of democracy would be cultivated (Brown 1989, p.229). Regarding this aspect, three questions were asked in our research. The first question let us know whether developing members' organizing skills was a priority of the groups or not. The second question concerned the practice of leadership rotation, position rotation, and task sharing within each group. The third question would reveal the existence of any sub-groups that were exclusively managed by group members.[50]

The last aspect of internal democracy was the reflexiveness of the group. As suggested by Cohen and Arato (1993) as well as by Madison (1998), the institutionalization of a self-reflexive, critical attitude inside the association was essential in establishing a civil society. We considered those associations which practised self reflection to be more open and democratic

[49] Question 5 of Part C.
[50] These three questions refer to Question 8, 9, 10 of Part C.

than those without self-reflexiveness. In this study, the indicator was the evaluation meetings in the groups.[51]

The second source of data is literature from the Christian groups. At the outset, we did not have any literature from these groups. Fortunately, after we contacted the groups, newsletters, books, and annual reports were generously given to us. Besides, we also purchased the bimonthly journal "Reflection," and several publications from CI. Gradually, an abundance of literature was available for us. However, only those relevant articles that were written by the staff of the Christian groups were selected for content analysis.[52] As a result, approximately seventeen articles from the four Christian groups were used in this study.

Although the analysis of answers in the questionnaire and literature is a painstaking job, the advantage is that information from both sources can supplement the limitation of the others. While content analysis of the literature enriches our understanding of the ideas of the Christian groups, answers from questionnaires have enhanced the validity of our analysis of the literature. The internal democracy of JP is an example for illustration. While the content analysis shows JP's emphasis on internal democracy, the interviewee's answer confirms our findings.[53] In this case, answers from questionnaire have enhanced the validity of our analysis of the literature.

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[51] Only CI& JP replied to our follow-up questions, so we can only rely on literature.

[52] For example, the bimonthly journal "Reflection" is a forum for Christians. Articles in Reflection do not necessary represent the CI's view. So, we only used the editorials and the reviews which were written by the editors. The only one exception is the Tenth Anniversary issue of CI, where all articles are written by its founding members.

[53] Compare the section of internal democracy in Chapter Four to the interviewee's answer to Q.8 in Part B of the questionnaire.

Another example is the appropriateness of social participation. Not every interviewee gave us a detailed answer on this question as the interviewee of JP did.[54] The majority only answered in one or two sentences, so it was difficult to interpret these answers. This difficulty could only be overcome when the additional information from the literature was available for us. In this case, information from the literature has enriched our understanding of the questionnaires.

The Difficulties.

From the outset, we have met several difficulties in our research. First, we had difficulty contacting the potential interviewees. For an unknown reason, some Christian groups gave no response to the contact letters. It was therefore difficult for the interviewer to know whether the groups were considering or rejecting the interview. Another difficulty was the length of the questionnaire. Since a considerable number of questions were open-ended, the interviewees might be annoyed by its length. As a result, interviewees either procrastinated until several long-distance calls had been made, or simply gave short answers. Finally, geographical separation between the interviewer and the interviewees was another hinderance. Even though e-mails, facsimiles, and long-distance calls were used, we were unable to keep in close contact with our interviewees. Consequently, it took several months to receive all the questionnaires back.[55]

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[54] This is Question 4 of Part A.

[55] The first questionnaire was returned to us in June 1998 while the last one returned in December 1998. Answers to follow-up questions from CI and JP were received in February and May 1999 respectively.

A Preview

This study is divided into three major chapters. The first chapter provides a theoretical understanding of the ideas of civil society. To do so, we will review the social origins and the theoretical development of the concept of civil society. Then, a comprehensive modern concept of civil society from Cohen and Arato (1994) as well as from Gary Madison (1998) will be introduced. The second chapter offers some references to the historical and social context of Hong Kong. To this end, a brief account of the social changes and the governmental policy over the past hundred years will be presented. The last chapter examines the role of the four Christian social concern groups in developing a local civil society. Specifically, we will first examine the religious beliefs, social ideals, and the practice of internal democracy in these civic groups. Then, the works of these concerned groups in the churches and the society will be analyzed. As such, we may understand how the civic groups can contribute to the development of civil society.

Chapter Two

Part One: The Historical Development of Civil Society

In this modern age, the differentiation between civil society and the state is taken for granted. This mode of thought, however, has prevailed since the seventeenth century. In comparison with the five-thousand-year human history, the idea of an autonomous society counterposed to the state is relatively "new." Yet, this "new" idea is not an alien concept at all. In fact, the idea of an autonomous society is a result of the political, social, and economic development of the West during the preceding centuries. Hence, all these aspects are indispensable to an understanding of the concept of civil society.

This chapter aims to give a comprehensive understanding of the concept of civil society. There are two parts in this chapter. The first part is the theoretical development of the concept of civil society during the past three centuries. We will first elaborate the conception of society in antiquity represented by the Greek city-state. In doing so, we will realize how different the ancient concept of society is from the modern one. Then, we will show how the dichotomy of the state and society emerged from the medieval social context. Since we believe both the dichotomy and the conceptualization of this dichotomy are closely related to the medieval social context, we will show how social philosophers have drawn their inspirations from these social changes in deepening their understandings of the unprecedented duality.

Finally, the lineage of several major theories of civil society in the modern age will be presented. The second part is an introduction of a modern theory of civil society. First, we will examine communicative rationality, the basic foundation of the theory of civil society. Then, Cohen and Arato's tripartite model of civil society will be introduced. Finally, we will show how the model of civil society can be operationalized through the project of civil society.

The Conception of Society in Antiquity

Polis, the small Greek city-state, was often be considered as the first version of civil society in the West.[56] Even the origin of the English term "civil society" can be traced back to the Greek term "politike koinonia."[57] Yet, polis was quite different from the modern society to which we are accustomed. Indeed, the Greek city-state was a unique political community in the civilization of the West, for several reasons.

First, there was no distinction between society and the state in the all-encompassing social system of the city-state (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.84). The city-state gave meaning to the lives and activities of its members. By birth, the residents attained their memberships. Being accepted as a member, the resident was entitled to participate in the community's political life. Thus, membership was equivalent to citizenship (Sabine 1973, p.21).[58] On the other

[56] See Cohen & Arato 1994, p.84.
[57] The term "civil society" came from the Latin "societas civilis" which was translated from the Greek "politike koinonia"(Ibid., p.84).
[58] There were three classes in the city-state which are slaves, resident foreigners (metics), and citizens (Ibid., p.20). Only the citizens had the privileges to participate in the public sphere for discussion (lexis), consultation, sitting in the court as juries, and in common action (praxis) (Habermas 1989, p.3).

hand, family (oikos), the only "private" sphere, was merely the residual category of what was left out of the polis. The connection of each household was only through its master's public life in the polis (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.84). In this milieu, the city was a common life to the extent that there was no compartment of public and private sphere. Every aspect of life was centered toward the city and gave way to the public goods.[59](Sabine 1973, p.27-8). As such, societies of the city-state did not have an identity in any of themselves. Societies were defined by the political community.

In addition, the opposition and balance of "state power" and "private rights" were absent in the city-state. The modern ideas that the state should have enough power to function effectively on the one hand, and yet that civil liberties and rights should be institutionalized on the other hand, were inconceivable to the Greeks. To the Greeks, the supreme value of humans lay in their contributions to the common life of the city-state (Sabine 1973, p.33).[60] For this purpose, the rights that were given to the citizens were never private rights, and law was an institution designed not to protect citizens' rights, but rather to find the proper place and function for each individual in the total life of the city-state (Ibid., p.32). Since the Greeks shared this common ethos, they were willing to accept this self-imposed kind of restraint (Ibid., p.32).

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[59] As Sabine said, "His [the Greek] art was a civic art. His religion was a religion of the city" (1973, p.27).

[60] The Athenians held that "a man who takes no interest in public affairs is a useless character" (Ibid., p.28).

The Greek city-state was an all-encompassing society. In this social system, society did not have its own identity. The meaning of society could only be defined by the political community.[61] Since the harmony of this common life was the ideal for the Greeks, the antagonism between the state and society was incomprehensible to them. It is precisely these aspects that differentiate the polis from modern society.

The Medieval European Societies - Sources of the New Conception of Society

The conception of the state and society as two distinct entities that developed in the eighteenth century did not appear out of nowhere. Rather, the emergence of an autonomous society was the result of the unique developments of European societies in the preceding centuries. From the downfall of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century to the end of feudalism in the fifteenth century, the European societies disintegrated for the lack of a strong centralized power. Yet, disintegration did not necessary mean stagnancy. Feudalism and the subsequent absolutism had created an unique milieu for a series of political, economic, cultural, and social developments that were different from the rest of the world (Szücs 1988, p.296).[62] It was

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[61] This is why Aristotle described the city-state as a "politike koinonia" (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.84).

[62] Feudalism emerged in 10th Century, consolidated and reached its zenith in 11th and 12th Centuries. Feudalism was an organizational arrangement based on the patron-client relationship in medieval European societies. Under the prolonged chaotic milieu, the weak had to seek a patron for protection. While the patrons gave protection to their clients, they also depended on the subsistence and revenue from the latter. In this sense, the patrons and the clients were interdependent. (Szücs 1988, p.300; Sabine 1973, p.205; Anderson 1978, p.182).

Absolutism was the result of the reactions to the feudal crisis in C.14. In C.14, the European feudal societies faced a series of crises ranged from famines to the Black Death, and from peasant revolts to civil wars. The nobility exhausted its financial and military resources, and they expected the state to safeguard its privileges (Szücs 1988, p.309-311). Meanwhile, the abolition of serfdom facilitated the economy and the semi-commercial agriculture. As a

these developments that led to the state-society distinction on the one hand, and animated the subsequent theory of civil society on the other hand.

Although the distinction between the state and society was consolidated around the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this kind of dichotomy could be traced back to the duality between the monarch and the privileged estates in the feudal age. In feudal political system, the state's functions and revenues were allocated downward along the hierarchical structure and relied on the vassals' loyalty to perform their duties.[63] As a result, a duality was created where a weakened monarch faced a number of independent estates (Taylor 1990, p.103; Szücs 1988, p.303; Sabine 1973, p.207; Cohen & Arato 1994, p.86).

Since then, the dichotomy has been maintained although the components and the weights on both sides have changed substantially. On the one end of the dichotomy, we find a modern nation-state was formed and replaced the role of monarch in the former duality. The framework of a modern nation-state was built in the Age of Absolutism. During this period, the absolute monarchs had initiated a series of reforms included standing armies, permanent bureaucracy, national taxation, and codified laws into their countries. Although these reforms served the private interests of the monarch,

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result, a class of merchants emerged and demanded a stable ordered social environment as well as commercial regulations. So they preferred a strong government and supported the monarch (Sabine 1973, p.311-2). It was these social demands that helped such absolute monarchs as Louis XI in France, Ferdinand and Isabella in Spain, Henry VII in England to rise around C.15 (Szücs 1988, p.311). These monarchs monopolized the military force and taxation. In turn, these resources reinforced the monarch's power. Also, the monarchs had the "absolute power" to ignore the positive law and the medieval representative system (Sabine 1973, p.314; Taylor 1990, p.103).

they were nonetheless the foundation of the modern state (Ibid., p.86). On the other end of the dichotomy, a new autonomous social sphere developed. This new social sphere was constituted of components from different realms. Although these components emerged under different circumstances, all of them represented the independent realms that stood outside and beyond the control of the state.

One of these components was medieval urban towns. Aside from technological innovations, the growth of medieval urban towns was the product of the divided or shared ownership of a property, an unique feudalistic social arrangement.[64] While the lord had direct ownership (dominium directum, the allodial rights over the property), the vassals had the useful ownership (dominium utile, to make profit from the property) (Ganshof 1952, p.118). To further complicate matters, the vassals might transfer the land to their subvassals. The shared ownership of a property created the overlapping boundaries of sovereignty and created interstices for the self-governing and self-sufficient local towns. Since these towns had the necessary conditions for the growth of mercantilism, these new autonomous towns became one of the constituents of the emerging society (Anderson 1978, p.148-150).[65]

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[63] Perry Anderson called this political phenomenon as "the parcellization of sovereignty" (Anderson 1978, p.148).

[64] New technologies such as the water-mill and new farming methods such as the three-field system for crop rotation had substantially increased the agricultural productivity (Ibid., p.183). In turn, the rise of productivity encouraged demographic expansion in Western Europe from 20 million in 10th Century to 54 million in 14th Century (Ibid., p.190). As such, these factors helped to accelerate the process of urbanization.

[65] First, urban towns attracted the influx of skilled labour and capital. Skilled labour and capital flocked into the medieval towns for greater freedom and better economic treatments. In C.14, serfs were considered free if they could avoid capture for a year. As a result, many serfs sought refuge from the town by providing the needed skills or labour force for the town manufactures (Ibid., p.206). While the influx of skilled labour and capital provided the

The second component of the newly formed society was the Roman Catholic Church. The Church itself was an exemplar of an autonomous community. In the Middle Ages, the Church was the only institution which retained its integrity in the disintegrated European societies. The power vacuum that resulted from the parcellization of sovereignty also allowed the Church to retain its autonomy. Since then, the Church has become the focus of civil society (Ibid., p.152; Szücs 1988, p.299).

Finally, the formation of a public and a public opinion also helped to develop an autonomous society. After the seventeenth century, discussion of commonly concerned affairs was no longer confined within the Assembly. Through the extensive circulation of newspapers, journals, and books, a new "sphere" beyond the limitation of a specific face-to-face geographical locale was created for the exchange of opinions. Meanwhile, discourses also took place in small-scale, face-to-face locales such as coffee houses in England, salons in France, and table societies in Germany (Habermas 1989, p.32-4). In these open discursive processes, participants "discovered" their common concerns and shared interests. These similarities animated them to identify with each other. Although they could not meet with each other, the sense of belonging to a "virtual community" was strong. As a result, a "public" and "public opinion", and a commonly recognized opinion among the public, stood in opposition to the state (Taylor 1990, p.108-9).

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needed means of production for petty commodity manufacturing, the network of towns and the neighbouring rural areas permitted an intensive commodity exchanges (Szücs 1988, p.299).

The consolidation of society was finally completed in 18th Century. The existence of an autonomous social sphere became an undeniable reality. Aside from the tangible and visible communities like the Church and urban towns that existed beyond the state's control, there was an invisible community, spontaneously formed by the public. More importantly, society could define itself instead of being defined by the political community. For the first time in history, society set its goals, expressed its will, and even challenged the state authorities. As such, society created its own identity.

Medieval developments not only created the dichotomy of the state and society but also animated the development of the theory of civil society in several ways. First, the distinction between the state and an autonomous community was highlighted in the Church's social teachings. According to the Doctrine of the Second Swords, the Church perceived human society was under two authorities, the temporal and the spiritual.[66] Each authority had its own legislation, administration, and values. The state and the Church imposed different sets of obligation and loyalties on the same population.[67] However, since these two institutions were established by God for different purposes, they were not subordinated to each other. In other words, they were two independent, and yet interacting entities (Sabine 1973, p.188; Taylor 1990, p.102).

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[66] The Doctrine of the Two Swords was proposed by Pope Gelasius I in C.5 (Sabine 1973, p.188).

[67] While the Church was administrated by the clergy and focused on spiritual interests and salvation, the state was administrated by the magistrates and focused on secular interests like peace, order, and justice (Ibid., p.188; Taylor 1990, p.102).

Meanwhile, the liberal contractarian also drew the inspiration from the contractual feudal relationship in two ways. First, the contractual feudal relationship shed light on the notion of subjective rights. The vassalage relationship acknowledged the fact that individuals had rights regardless of their status and power, and confirmed these rights in the written charter. So even though the vassalage relationship was unequal, both parties had mutual obligations once the contract was signed.[68] This notion of subjective rights had evolved into the natural rights doctrines of the modern age (Taylor 1990, p.103). Second, the contractual relationship highlighted the notion of consent on the part of the subordinates. The lord needed the consent of the inferiors in order to exercise his power over them. If the lord did not live up to his obligations, the subordinates could denounce the contract, confiscate the fief, and resume their autonomy (Ibid., p.103; Szücs 1988, p.301; Sabine 1973, p.207). So it was not surprising that Locke would suggest society could recover its freedom of action if the government violated the contract six centuries later. Thus, it is reasonable to conceive that the contractual relationship in feudalism was the embryo of the social contract theories of the eighteenth century (Taylor 1990, p.103; Szücs 1988, p.303-4).

Finally, the emergence of market economy also contributed to a new interpretation of society. Social philosophers of the eighteenth century believed the logic of economy was the basic law of the social world, and tried

[68] The lord and the vassals had mutual obligation to each other. To the lord, he had to protect his vassals through the military, to defend for them in a court of law, and to grant them fief for maintenance. To the vassals, they were demanded to be loyal to their lord and provided military service, financial aids, and giving judgment in the court (Ganshof 1952, p.77-87).

to apply this logic in understanding the social world.[69] Specifically, they were fascinated by the self-regulating nature of economy and asserted that the same nature could be found in society. If society was allowed to follow its logic without the state's regulation, social equilibrium would be achieved.

Summary.

After a thousand years of disintegration, reintegration finally took place on the Continent and gave new faces to the European countries. Yet re-integration did not bring back the ancient city-state or the revival of one single empire. Rather, the European countries were reborn in the sense that an unprecedented dichotomy between modernized nation-state and autonomous society emerged in the new milieu.[70] On the top level, a series of political reforms initiated by the absolute monarchies had in fact consolidated the foundation of modern nation-state. On the base level, an independent social sphere gradually emerged side by side with the state. Such social elements as urban towns and the Church had shaken off the state's control one after another and constituted into a new independent realm. From economic activities to discourses in the public sphere, self-regulating new aspects of social life came forth consecutively. As a result, an unprecedented dichotomy was established at the early modern age. Meanwhile, the conceptualization of

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The written contract, charter, had been commonly employed since the twelfth century (Ibid., p.73).

[69] Social philosophers in C.18 were influenced by the Enlightenment. They conceptualized the natural world and the social world in the same manner. In the natural world, the scientists' task was to discover the basic law of nature. Likewise, the social philosophers had to discover the basic law of the social world in order to comprehend it (Chandhoke 1995, p.88-9).

[70] Interesting enough, eleven European countries are undertaking another kind of integration in 1999. By implementing a new single currency, euro, an economic and monetary union begins to emerge.

the state-society relationship was developing in the intellectual community. This is the aspect to which we now turn our attention.

The Concept of Civil Society in the Modern Age

From denial to acknowledgment.

Although the autonomous society had already formed in the seventeenth century, the contemporary intellectuals were unwilling to acknowledge this reality. It took more than one century for intellectuals to change their attitudes from denial to acknowledgment. Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu were the most influential figures in this transition since their ideas were affecting the theory of civil society.

In the first half of seventeenth century, the intellectuals had a bias in favour of Absolutism. To justify Absolutism, they denied the existence of society. To emphasize sovereign power, they undermined the autonomy of society. One of these intellectuals was Thomas Hobbes.[71] Based on his two premises of human nature, Hobbes asserted that society was a mere fiction (Sabine 1973, p.434). The first premise was the unsociability of human nature. Humans always acted according to their desires and aversions. They would not spontaneously respect to the others' rights. Without law and order, there would be endless fighting among humans. Thus, the state of nature (pre-state condition) was the state of war (a condition of perpetual war). The second premise was that only individuals, not a multitude, could act (Ibid., p.434). To Hobbes, there were only individuals acting in the name of a group

[71] We have to remember that England in the first half of 17th Century was still under the rule of absolute monarch, Charles I. During the English Civil War of 1640, Hobbes was on the side of the royalist party (Sabine 1973, p.422).

as agents. Without the agents, there would be no collective existence at all. Thus, society as an autonomous collective body was only created by humans' imagination (Ibid., p.434). Hobbes' conclusion was that an indispensable sovereign is necessary for the survival of humans. For mutual advantages, humans had to give up their individual rights and reside absolute power in a sovereign. In turn, the sovereign would curb the unsociable inclination of humans and create a secure living condition for its members (Ibid., p.432-4; Taylor 1990, p.103; Keane 1988, p.350).

Obviously, there was no room for a self-regulating society in Hobbes' social and political philosophy. No society was possible until the formation of a sovereign. Neither was there any distinction between the state and society because making such distinction was to ignore the fact that only individuals could act. Without the agents (the government), neither the state nor the society would be left except a multitude (Sabine 1973, p.434-5). Finally, the idea of state against society was undesirable and unrealistic. The overthrow of the sovereign would only restore the insecure state of nature and nobody would benefit from it. So society should not challenge the sovereign.

After Hobbes, intellectuals' attitudes to the state and society began to change along with the downfall of absolutism. Locke and Montesquieu were influential social theorists who began to acknowledge the existence of an autonomous society and to study the relationship between the state and

society. Both theorists were said to be the two founders of the theory of civil society.[72]

Unlike Hobbes, Locke believed society existed prior to the government and had the priority over the latter. To Locke, the state of nature was imperfect but it was not equivalent to state of war.[73] The major drawback of the state of nature was the lack of an effective apparatus to guarantee contracts and mutual obligations (Sabine 1973, p.485; Chandhoke 1995, p.81). To remedy this deficiency, humans agreed to vest the government with authority and let the latter protect themselves. As a result, two social treaties were made. Accordingly, community and government were formed.[74] From this perspective, there was no doubt in Locke's mind that society existed prior to the state. It also implied that there was a distinction between society and the state.[75]

If society was different from the state, what then would be the appropriate relationship between the two institutions? Locke adopted an anti-

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[72] See Charles Taylor (1990).

[73] To Locke, the state of nature is only "the condition in which the executive power of the law of nature remains exclusively in the hands of individuals and has not been made communal" (Laslett 1967, p.95). This statement implies the human being has the capability and the will to follow the law of nature which is the other name of reason. They also enjoyed the natural rights in the state of nature (Taylor 1990, p.104).

[74] Under the first contract, individuals agreed to give up their rights to protect themselves and let the community protect them. Thus, community was the "trustee of individual rights" (Ibid., p.496). Under the second treaty, the majority of the community agreed to form a government for the well-being of the community. By acting as a judge on earth and vested with the legislative, executive, and federative power, the government could and should protect individuals' life, liberty, and estate (Laslett 1967, p.106). As such, government was the "trustee for the community" (Sabine 1973, p.496).

[75] Locke also justified the distinction in another way. When Locke said the citizens had the right to overthrow the unconstitutional authority, he simultaneously held that revolution will only dissolve the government but not the community. By contrast, if the society dissolve, the government will dissolve too (Sabine 1973, p.490-1; Keane 1988, p.41). This perspective implies not only the difference of the government and the community but also the dependence of the first on the latter.

absolutist stance in answering this question.[76] He held that the power of the government had to be limited through several arrangements.[77] More importantly, the consent of the individuals to resign their power to the community and the government was conditional. If the community or the government violated the trust, the individuals had the right to withdraw the contract (Sabine 1973, p.484; Taylor 1990, p.104).[78]

In short, Locke's contribution to the civil society tradition was threefold. First, Locke acknowledged the existence of society prior to government. The formation of the government would be impossible if the community were absent. Nevertheless, Locke believed the civility in human relations had to be accomplished and maintained by the government (Chandhoke 1995, p.81). Second, the locale of civil society was implicitly indicated by Locke. Since the government's functions were limited to several particular areas, areas beyond this boundary should be left for the citizens to manage. In other words, this free space is what we called "civil society" today (Ibid., p.85). Third, Locke's concept of trustee implied humans were rights

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[76] While Hobbes' major thought appeared in the first half of 17th Century, Locke's ideas came out in the last decade of 17th Century. By that time, England's constitutional ideals had already been realized in the 1688 Revolution. Therefore, Locke's attitude towards absolutism was quite different from Hobbes' (Sabine 1973, p.484). Besides, Locke saw monarch was an individual like the rest of human. Although monarch had the law of nature to guide him, he also had passion and interests. Hence, the monarch would make mistakes too. But if the power of the monarch was unchecked and unlimited, there would be no way to correct his misconduct (Laslett 1967, p.96).

[77] First, the power of the government will be limited by moral law, constitutional traditions, conventions, and periodic elections. In addition, property, liberty, and estate cannot be confiscated without the majority of the representatives' consents. Moreover, the government's functions should be limited to several specific areas. For instance, the government should not intervene in the family (Keane 1988, p.41-20).

[78] There are two conditions that the government should be dissolved. First, when a change in the location of legislative power. For example, when the King of England wants to extend his prerogative and to rule without the parliament. Second, when the government violates the trust. For example, the misconduct of the Long Parliament (Sabine 1973, p.494).

bearers. In the state of nature and in the community, humans had already enjoyed natural rights. They gave up their power and let the government work on their behalf. They reserved the right to denounce the social contract. Thus, rights were not given by the government but rather the other way around.

While John Locke founded the first stream of the civil society tradition in England, Montesquieu created the second stream in the particular social context of France.[79] To him, government and society were two different but inter-related entities. The nature of government was determined by "who" and "how" the sovereign power was exercised. Accordingly, three forms of government (i.e. the republic, the monarchy, the despotic) were identified.[80] On the other hand, society was characterized by "sentiment."[81] Accordingly, three types of society were identified.[82] Although government and society were two different entities, the functioning of government depended on the sentiment of society. For example, a monarchy was an unequal society. Yet, when inequality was combined with honour, they turned into a positive force

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[79] In 18th Century, France, the country of Montesquieu, was quite different from Locke's England of 17th Century. After the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the monarchy of England had already transformed from absolute monarchy into constitutional monarchy. Yet, France was still ruled under Louis XIV until 1715. Discussions of political systems emerged only began at the turn of C.18 when the decadence of absolute monarchy was exposed. By this time, there was a deep-seated resentment against the privileged like clergy and nobility. In this milieu, Locke's political philosophy was employed as an attack on vested interests in France rather than as a defense of them in England (Sabine 1973, p.501, 505-6).

[80] The *republic* was a form of government where sovereign power rested in people. The *monarchy* was the government in which a single person governed his country by laws. The *despotic government* referred to a single person governs his country according to his own will (Aron 1968, p.23).

[81] To Aron, sentiment is a principle of social organization (1968, p.26). I tend to conceive sentiment of a society as the temperament of individual.

[82] When society was based on *virtue*, members would regard themselves as citizens with equal status and dedicated to public good. When *honour* was pre-dominant, members knew and respected their positions on the social ladder. They rejected all disgraceful behavours. Finally, when the members were fear to each other, the society was characterized by *fear* (Ibid., p.26).

in resisting royal encroachment. As such, a monarchy was prevented from degenerating into a despotic government. Hence, each type of government had to be based on the corresponding type of sentiment in order to function properly.

If Locke's contribution was the identification of an autonomous social space, Montesquieu's contribution was the discovery of the intermediary bodies between the state and society. To Montesquieu, a strong monarchical government was irremovable. The rule of law was a necessary but insufficient condition of safeguarding social liberties.[83] The remedy was the balance of social power by establishing intermediary bodies, namely the class and rank.[84] For the competition of power among the class and rank, the power of each social class was checked by the rest. The result was an equilibrium of powers (Aron 1968, p.33). As such, Montesquieu opened up a new path to protect human liberties in the civil society tradition. Since then, intermediary bodies have taken a central position in the theory of civil society.

In summary, the tradition of civil society was not created at one fell swoop. Although the social pre-conditions had been laid during the Middle Ages, it took a century for the intellectuals to change their attitudes from the

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[83] The rule of law is insufficient in protecting social liberties because despotic government can ignore, change, or simply re-interpret the laws to fit its interests. And since law cannot protect itself, law alone is insufficient. Yet, law is necessary because it is the legal base for the existence of the intermediary bodies (Taylor 1990, p.105).

[84] Aron interprets "intermediary bodies" as the social rankings, especially the aristocracy (1968, p.34). To Taylor and others, this term also refers to the voluntary associations (1990, p.114; Cohen & Arato 1994, p.88). In early C.18, France was still a monarchy. The nobility was still existed in Montesquieu's times. After the French Revolution, the maintenance of nobility had no longer made any sense. In this circumstance, Tocqueville had to find something to replace the intermediary bodies of nobility. As we shall see, the substitution that Tocqueville found was the voluntary associations. Under this consideration, we tend to think

denial to the acknowledgment of civil society. In the eighteenth century, the two streams of civil society tradition, represented by Locke and Montesquieu, had already been established. In the following centuries, no theorist had not been influenced by these two streams of thought.

From the exploration to the consolidation of a theory of civil society.

From the eighteenth century onward, new perspectives were put into the theory of civil society. These new inputs had deepened our understanding of civil society. One of these new inputs was came from such political economists as Ferguson.

To Ferguson, civil society was a "polished society" (Keane 1988a, p.40). A polished society was judged by the society's cultural achievements, the prevalence of public spirit, and the rule of laws. Since society was progressing from a primitive stage into an advanced stage, civil society could only be achieved in an advanced society where economic, cultural, social, and political advancements were all highly developed. In other words, civil society (polished society) was purely a natural result of social evolution (Ibid., p.40; Chandhoke 1995, p.90).

Ferguson's evolutionary approach gave new implications to the theory of civil society. In the first place, the conception of civil society as a natural result of social evolution was totally broken away from the old conception that civil state was an artificial condition whereas state of nature was natural. The social evolutionary process also implied society had its own dynamic of

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the intermediary bodies are less likely referred to voluntary associations than nobility and other social rankings in Montesquieu's theory.

progress. In other words, society was a self-regulating entity (Ibid., p.91). Moreover, Ferguson and other political economists held that the economy was the determinant factor in social behaviours and they analyzed the social world in terms of the logic of economy. The new analytical framework not only represented the changes of methodology, but also signified economic activities which had already replaced political activities as the natural human behaviours. Economic society substituted for political society as the natural setting for our daily life (Ibid., p.92).[85]

In the eighteenth century, Hegel injected new ideas into the theory of civil society. From the outset, the analyses of civil society had been exclusively dominated by the liberal tradition. Unfortunately, the liberal tradition was unable to see the flip side of civil society. This inaccurate and partial picture of civil society became the major deficiency of the liberal tradition. It was Hegel who changed this one-sided understanding of civil society. For his part, Hegel believed the harmony of civil society was overestimated and the crash of self-interests and public goods was underestimated. It was under these concerns that motivated Hegel to examine the concept of civil society. As a result, Hegel developed the first modern theory on civil society (Chandhoke 1995, p.114-6; Neocleous 1996, p.1; Keane 1988, p.46-7; Cohen & Arato 1994, p.91).

[85] Obviously, it is reasonable to cast doubt on such perspective since economic activities are only part of the daily life. It is also wrong to equate l'homme and the bourgeois. In fact, this opinion is the Marxists' major critique to the liberal tradition (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.219-220)

First, Hegel redefined the meaning of civil society. To him, civil society was a moment of ethical life that distinguished from the family and the state (Keane 1988, p.46; Chandhoke 1995, p.118). While the family was a natural and unreflective unity based on love, the state was a genuine public authority that based on conscious ends, known principles and laws (Sabine 1973, p.598).[86] In addition, the notion of civil society was expanded into two levels. On the first level, civil society was the system of needs where atomized self-seeking individuals pursued survival and private interests.[87] On the second level, civil society referred to the administration of law, police or general authority, and corporations or associations.[88] On this level, individuals had such different roles as legal persons, clients of the authority, and members of voluntary organizations instead of the economic beings. (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.97).

Then, Hegel reexamined the nature of civil society. Unlike the political economists of the liberal tradition, Hegel held that there was a tension between individual interests and ethical life. Self-seeking individuals in the modern society were restlessly pursuing private interests. Social interactions

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[86] The state can either be the political state or the universal state. While the first meaning refers to such state institutions as the crown, the executive, and the legislature (the Estate Assembly), the second refers to "the totality of human life within an ethical community united by tradition, religion, and morality"(Neocleous 1996, p.2). Since the state must act according to law and known rules, the state does not have arbitrary power. Yet, the state's power is absolute for the reasons of its superior moral position and its monopoly of the ethical aspects of society (Sabine 1973, p.600).

[87] Hegel's usage of bürgerliche Gesellschaft, a bourgeois society, is significant in two aspects. First, it signifies the economic aspect of the concept because the bourgeois were the economic beings, homo oeconomicus. Second, Hegel's unwilling to use Bürger or citoyen represents his treatment of the concept of civil society is different from the concept of citizen society (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.97).

[88] Police or general authority refers to those institutions which responsible for surveillance, economic intervention, and providing education, charity, and public works (Ibid., p.104).

were pre-occupied by utilitarian calculation. Hence, self-interests would eventually destroy ethical life and civil society itself.[89] Under this consideration, Hegel asserted that the pathological civil society should not be left alone, and had to be remedied (Chandhoke 1995, p.129). To Hegel, the solution laid with the intermediary bodies which referred to classes, estates, and corporations. Through birth and occupation, individuals became members of social classes. When classes grouped together for political purposes, they became estates. The Assembly of Estates was the peak of the representative institutional system. The last component of the intermediary bodies, corporations or associations, took a more significant role in moral education. First, corporations gave identity and sense of belonging to its members. For its openness, individuals could join these corporations regardless of their social classes. In doing so, the isolated individuals were related to the rest of the society. Second, corporates tamed individual self-interests. By imposing discipline and the egalitarian practice, self-interests would be remedied. Third, corporations would promote social interests. When corporations concerned social issues, they would turn into pressure groups and exerted influence on the state. As such, the ego-centered tendency would be minimized through the engagement in the intermediary institutions (Ibid., p.128).

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[89] This negative image of the modern society may relate to Hegel's perception of the social consequence of the French Revolution. The Revolution give liberties to individuals but it also gives them an excuse to pursue private interests. Worse still, state institutions are used as means to satisfy private interests instead of organs of the nation for the public goods (Sabine 1973, p.590-2).

Finally, Hegel emphasized the role of the state. Although civil society could exert its influence to the state through the intermediary bodies, the state had ultimate authority.[90] Since the administration of society and the remedy of injustice and inequalities relied on the state apparatus, and since the state can intervene the society in the name of public interests, there are virtually no boundary for state intervention. Therefore, the state's power was ultimate and no one could challenge the state power (Keane 1988b, p.48; Chandhoke 1995, p.130).

The final input to the theory of civil society came from Tocqueville. His contribution to the theory of civil society was twofold. Like Hegel, Tocqueville brought the flip side of civil society to our notice when most social philosophers were still dazzled by the beauty of civil society. Tocqueville was aware of three latent crises of the nineteenth century's civil society and took great pains to find the solution. The first threat came from the Jacobin notion of democracy. Tocqueville was appalled at this kind of democracy because individuals would be forced to subordinate their wills to the mass in the name of general will. Eventually, democracy would be replaced by the tyranny of the majority. [91] The penetration of the state was

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[90] When civil society exerts its influence to the state via the intermediary bodies, it is called the penetration of civil society into the state (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.109; Neocleous 1996, p.4-5).

[91] The Jacobin notion of democracy was based on Rousseau's general will. Since a society was constituted by a general will of its members, sovereignty belonged to the people. And since sovereignty belonged only to the people, direct democracy in town-meeting was preferred (Ibid., p.544). However, this kind of democracy will turn into the tyranny of the majority for two reasons. First, general will had absolute right over individual liberties since it represented the social interests. Second, it cannot tolerant and not to mention to take account of different opinions. So it is reasonable to say this kind of democracy is pathological (Sabine 1973, p.543).

another threat to civil society. Since civil society lost its dynamic, it increasingly depended on the state for basic amenities. The increasing social demands legitimized the state's intervention of civil society. Eventually, civil society would lose its autonomy to the state. The question for Tocqueville was how to limit the state's power, given that the state apparatus was indispensable for society's law and order. It was this question that led to the third crisis of civil society (Chandhoke 1995, p.108). For Tocqueville, the limitation of state power required civic engagement. On the one hand, liberties rely on the public for its protection. On the other hand, no one could be forced to participate in public affairs for it would violate the person's liberty. Yet, if the public did not engage in public affairs, their liberties would be endangered. Hence, the tension between individual rights and the demand for civic engagement became the third latent crisis of civil society (Ibid., p.108-9).

To overcome these crises, Tocqueville drew his inspiration from Montesquieu's intermediary bodies.[92] This was Tocqueville's second contribution. In the new era, the intermediary bodies were no longer the nobility but rather the civic associations. Since participation in these civic associations was voluntarily, the tension between individual rights and the demand for participation was dissolved. Individuals were attracted by these associations because these associations concerned every aspect of daily life

[92] In Montesquieu's original ideas, the pivot of the balance of power laid in the nobility and ranks, the so-called intermediary bodies. But after the French Revolution, social inequality and privileged classes had already been cast aside by the public. So Tocqueville substituted civic associations for the nobility. Therefore, Tocqueville belonged to the Montesquieuian stream.

ranging from social, cultural, professional, to religious spheres. Individuals were willing to participate in order to pursue their private concerns (Chandhoke 1995, p.108).

More importantly, civic associations created and enhanced social capital for several reasons.[93] First, civic engagement would create inter-associational networks and social bonds within each association. Hence, isolated individuals were brought together and constituted collective bodies. Eventually, reciprocity and solidarity within the association would encourage social trust among the members. Second, civic engagement would cultivate civic virtues among the participants. By engaging in the dense networks of interaction, individuals would broaden their perspectives and look beyond their private interests. While individuals had the chance to cultivate democratic spirits in cooperation with others, they would also be empowered by collective actions (Putnam 1995, p.66-7).

Although civic associations were established for non-political purposes and existed outside the political structure, civic associations were the "independent eye of society" (Ibid., p.108, Keane 1988b, p.51).[94] Since these associations covered a wide range of social concerns, government's power

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[93] Social capital refers to social networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam 1995, p.67).

[94] Madison shares a similar idea. He holds that those civic associations are not necessarily political-oriented. It does not matter whether the organization is recreational or religious association. What matter is what people do. It is more important to have a plurality of different associations acting and communicating to each other in the public realm (Madison 1998, p.90-1). I think this idea is correct because even recreational organization will turn into political action group in some situations. For example, people involved in the sport of shooting and fox-hunting in England became political activists when new regulations were introduced (The toughest regulation on gun-control in the first case and the ban of fox-hunting in the second case). Both issues triggered public debates in England. Thus, Madison is correct in saying that the people's action is more important than the motivation.

would be checked by these aspects. This assertion was supported by the American experience. Frequent civic engagement had already created a habit of public concern among the Americans; therefore, voluntary organization(s) would be formed whenever an issue was raised. The citizens would devote their time and money to study the issue. As such, the independent eye of society was constantly supervising the government. Therefore, although these non-political civic associations were outside the political structure, they played a significant intermediate role between the state and civil society. Through these intermediary bodies, civil society exerted its influence on the state (Keane 1988b, p.51; Aron 1968, p.197, 201; Taylor 1990, p.114).

Summary.

Locke and Montesquieu are the two founders of the theory of civil society and there is little difference between the Lockean and the Montesquieuan streams. The Lockean stream emphasizes the autonomy of civil society. Since creativity is the essence of humans, they should be allowed to realize their creativity. And since only a free person can realize his/her creativity, autonomy should be given to individuals. Hence, civil society should be a free space for humans to realize their creativity. By contrast, the Montesquieuian stream emphasizes the need to limit state power. Since extensive regulation from the state will suffocate human potential, state power must be limited. Therefore, both streams assert different positive aspects of civil society.

While the liberals focus on the bright side of civil society, the Hegelian tradition brings the flip side of civil society to our attention. Although the

Lockean economic society and the Montesquieuian intermediary bodies are brought together in Hegel's synthesis, Hegel rejects the idea of a self-regulating civil society. There are no hidden hand to turn self-interests into public good. Civil society will deteriorate without the state.

Into the late twentieth century, political developments around the world have initiated the re-discovery and refining of civil society among the intellectual community. The latest theoretical development aims to preserve the strength of civil society while avoiding its weakness. This is the aspect we must now turn.

Part Two: The Theory of a Modern Civil Society

Communicative Rationality: The Essence of Civil Society

Whether it is primitive or advanced, capitalist or communist, every society is built on some basic principles. Civil society is no exception. Indeed, democracy and the respect of basic human rights are the two principles that are usually associated with a civilized society. What makes civil society differ from the rest is the validity of these principles. In a civil society, such principles as democracy and the respect of basic human rights are not imposed by the government. Rather, the acceptance of these principles is an outcome of a rational communicative process that involves all social members on an equal status.[95] From this perspective, civil society, in both the

[95] The Constitution of the United States and the Basic Law of Hong Kong are two excellent examples. The former was seriously discussed and voluntarily accepted by the founding fathers. In this process, they had the right to make amendments. The latter was drafted by a small group of people appointed by the PRC government and was designed to fit its will. There was no referendum for the public to express their attitudes towards the Basic Law. Obviously, the Basic Law was not established according to communicative rationality and was not voluntarily embraced by the majority.

broadest and the strictest sense, is a society that organized by the principle of communicative rationality or discourse ethics.[96]

What is communicative rationality?

Literally, "communicative" represents a dialogue between at least two persons whereas "rationality" implies a reasonable manner.[97] Communicative rationality, therefore, is a reasonable way of communication. Unlike instrumental rationality, communicative rationality is neither a calculation of cost and benefit nor a manipulation of the others for one's private interests (Madison 1998, p.42).[98] Rather, the aim of communicative rationality is to achieve a common understanding of the situation and to coordinate the society on that common understanding (Moon 1995, p.146). At the same time, communicative rationality is not the grammatical rules in our language although it is employed in communication. Rather, we may conceive communicative rationality as a meta-norm, the indispensable procedure to reach democratic agreements among the participants in the dialogue (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.347). Specifically, what communicative rationality all about is the three questions we face in communication. Who ought to be included in

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[96] In the broadest sense, civil society is used as an all-inclusive concept like the way used by Madison (1998, p.36). It encompassed the cultural-moral, economical, and political order. Only when all of these orders are based on the principle of communicative rationality can the society be called as civil society. In the strictest sense, civil society is only a component of the three-part model and stands side-by-side with the administrative and economic subsystems (Cohen & Arato 1994).

[97] To Madison, the supreme virtue of communicative rationality is reasonableness (Ibid., p.63). Also see his ideas on civility (1998, p.41).

[98] Although the rational choice theorists attempt to use instrumental rationality and mathematical models to explain all human behaviours, their efforts are futile because the supreme ends of human life are not determined by utilitarian considerations. In history, many people had upheld their beliefs (whether these were political, intellectual, or religious in nature) regardless of their own safety. Obviously, those individuals who sacrificed their

the communication? What is the reasonable manner of communication? And how should we differentiate a valid agreement with binding force and an invalid one?

With regard to the first question, the concept of communicative rationality suggests that everyone who will be affected by the decision ought to take part in the decision-making process (Ibid., p.348). This position is based on the assumption that every individual is an autonomous, rational subject. No one is intrinsically superior to another. Since every one has the same equal status, no one can be subjected to the power of another without one's consent. Therefore, the voice of those potentially affected ought to have a fair hearing and their interests must be given equal consideration during the decision-making process.[99]

As was stated above, communicative rationality is a reasonable manner of dialogue. To be reasonable, the conditions of symmetry, reflexivity, and reciprocity must be met. Under the symmetry condition, all participants have equal chance to undertake their roles fully in the dialogue. Since civil society is a free space for dialogue, and since the aim of civil society is mutual understanding among the participants, every participant should have equal chance to make assertions, to receive proper hearing, and to be assessed fairly. Otherwise, no genuine argument can be made. Therefore, no constraint should be imposed on the participants (Ibid., p.348; Madison 1998, p.40).

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freedom or even their lives for their beliefs were not thinking in an instrumental way. Hence, instrumental rationality is insufficient to explain all human activities.

[99] To my understanding, the assumption of humans as autonomous, rational subjects and assuming a role in discussion is in harmony with the principle of equal consideration of

Under the condition of reflexivity, there will be no taboo on any subject in rational discourse. For one thing, a taboo damages human rights since freedom of expression is an essential means to safeguard other civil rights. If the public's right of free expression is deprived, there will be no way to check the authority's power. Thus, the likelihood of the abuse of human rights will increase. Moreover, when discussion of a belief is prohibited, it will become a dogma and no longer be a living truth. Under these considerations, participants must be free to challenge unquestioned truth, traditional practices, orthodox beliefs, or political authority. The most important aspect of reflexivity, however, is related to the condition of reciprocity.

If the first two conditions guarantee the participants' rights, the condition of reciprocity emphasizes their obligations. Participant's rights in the discursive process can only be protected if these rights are mutually recognized and respected among the participants. Once the participants enter the discourse, they are not only acknowledged as communicative partners but also they must assume their partners will follow the same rules as they do in the process. When it comes to reflexivity, the condition of reciprocity demands that each participant project himself / herself into the perspectives of all others and then to re-examine his / her original arguments. Therefore, the most important aspect of reflexivity is the willingness to challenge one's own arguments (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.348; Moon 1995, p.151).

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interests. The principle is developed from Locke's idea of intrinsic equality that all humans ought to be considered as equal on making collective decisions (Dahl 1989, p.85).

After we know who should be included in the discussion and how the discourse should be conducted, the final question is the differentiation between a valid agreement with binding force and an invalid one. The only way to make such differentiation is by applying the principle of universalization, which means "[a]ll affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests ..."(Cohen & Arato 1994, p.350). To be a valid agreement, actual discourse based on reasonably manner must be held for all affected. Also, all participants must fully understand the consequences of their decisions and accept them willingly. If this is the case, then the agreement they reach will be valid.

What is communicative rationality not about?

We can understand communicative rationality as the rigorous procedure for reaching a rational mutual understanding in a society. Unfortunately, there are some misunderstandings over communicative rationality. In order to have an accurate perception of communicative rationality, we have to clear up these misunderstandings.

First, mutual agreement in the rational discursive community does not mean the attainment of an absolute truth (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.362). Absolute truth means the final answer has been found, a conclusion has been drawn, and no further study is needed (Madison 1998, p.45). Yet, mutual agreement reached in the discursive community is not absolute truths. The mutual agreement only suggests that a particular theory, say (T_1), is more convincing than the rest according to the existing knowledge, the merits of

arguments, and the rational procedure. So the members of this discursive community agree to acknowledge the merit of (T_1). Nevertheless, there is always a possibility that (T_1) will be wrong since its acceptance is based on the existing knowledge which is certainly not static. When (T_1) fails to explain new phenomenon or to defend itself from the challenge of new knowledge, (T_1) will no longer be considered as correct in the community. For the fallibility of these mutual agreements, it is very unlikely that these agreements will be absolute truths. This limitation forces us to perceive discussion as an on-going, open-ended discursive process rather than a once and for all one. Under these considerations, we may understand why the process of pursuing knowledge rather than the actual attainment of truth is the main concern of communicative rationality (Ibid, p.45-7; Cohen & Arato 1994, p.362).

Communicative rationality does not guarantee consensus. For one thing, communicative rationality is only a guideline for practical discussion. It can differentiate the valid norms from the invalid, but it cannot ensure any agreement will be reached at the end of the day. If a consensus is reached that violates communicative rationality, then it is not rational at all. If a consensus is reached without violating communicative rationality, it is still subject to challenge and reexamine in the future. Meanwhile, rational disagreement is not unusual in a discursive process (Ibid., p.362 & 689 n.30). In fact, what makes civil society different from the totalitarian society is precisely the existence of disagreements. While official view is the one and only voice in totalitarian society, a diversity of opinion is encouraged by civil society. Hence, the issue is not whether a consensus or a disagreement is resulted.

Rather, it is how the consensus is arrived at and how the conflict of opinion is handle that matters to communicative rationality (Madison 1998, p. 48-9).

Finally, the practice of communicative rationality is not a utopia and it should be carried out in civil society. Empirically, not all discussions conform to communicative rationality, and certainly not all agreements result from a rational communicative process. Nonetheless, it does not mean that there is no room for communicative rationality in actual dialogue. In the first place, if the participants of a discussion are determined to reach a rational consensus, then it can only be accomplished through the practice of communicative rationality. Otherwise, the agreement will remain an empirical instead of a rational one (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.348-9).[100] In the second place, actual dialogue takes a central position in the social integration process. Nothing can replace actual dialogues for generating and enhancing solidarity, which is the mechanism of integrating social elements. Nowadays, artificial intelligence is so highly developed that it has already helped humans make decisions.

In the third place, the personality and rationality of humans can only be fully developed in actual communication (Madison 1998, p.43-4). If we can use an analogy, communicative rationality is like the ability to drive. My driver's license signifies that I have the ability to properly drive a car. Nevertheless, my ability to drive will never be put on trial if I have no access to a vehicle. Likewise, a person will never have a chance to use his or her communicative rationality if he/she never participates in any form of

[100] From this perspective, all rational consensus must be empirical agreements, but not vice versa.

communication. Under this condition, we cannot say this person does not and/or will not communicate reasonably; yet his or her ability and willingness to use the communicative rationality will remain in doubt.[101] Certainly, the development of this person's personality and rationality will be severely hampered.

In summary, communicative rationality is the principle of civil society. Its aim is for the achievement of a rational consensus in the lifeworld. For this major objective to be met, a rigorous procedure has to be followed. Meanwhile, the practice of communicative rationality also closely relates to the three symbolic resources that constitutes the lifeworld (that is knowledge, solidarity, personality). In achieving a rational mutual agreement, communicative rationality also points to an appropriate way to pursue knowledge. In practicing communicative action, it also generates solidarity and facilitates personality development. In other words, communicative action is the medium of creating and reproducing our lifeworld.

The Relationships among Communicative Rationality, Democracy, and Basic Rights

Communicative rationality is a theory of democratic legitimacy. At first glance, the basic principles of a society are legitimate if they conform to democracy and basic rights. But this kind of justification has overlooked the role of communicative rationality as a source of legitimacy. Such basic principles as norms and constitutions are legitimate not because of the sacred

[101] In this case, the major premise is "If discussion occurs, communicative rationality will be implemented." The minor premise is "there is no discussion at all." According to the rules of

nature of democracy and basic rights, but because they are the results of a prolonged rational communicative process among the members.[102] Since all affected have a say in the communicative process, it is not surprising to find the spirit of democracy is embodied in a rational communication. Thus, communicative rationality is not only compatible with but also the source of democratic legitimacy (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.354).

Meanwhile, there is a close relationship between communicative rationality and basic rights. In the first place, basic rights are the preconditions for the institutionalization of discourse. As was stated in last section, rational communicative community is a free space of unconstrained discussions. This will be the case only if the individual and collective autonomy has been secured by rights. If such communication rights as public discussion and assembly were deprived from the public, then it would be impossible to carry out genuine discussion, not to mention the practice of communicative rationality. From this perspective, communicative rationality requires the rights of communication. To some extent, it seems to suggest that basic rights are derived from communicative rationality (Cohen & Arato 1994, p. 397).[103]

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syllogistic argument, the conclusion is indeterminate.

[102] The rational communicative process is an indispensable procedure for drafting the constitution of a country. Without it, democracy and basic rights will be the lip service of the ruler. Take the Basic Law of Hong Kong as an example. The mini constitution says democracy and basic rights will be practised and respected in the Special Administrative Region (SAR). It turns out that both democracy and basic rights have not been fully implemented. In fact, democracy and basic rights are arbitrary interpreted according to the will of the government. If the general public of Hong Kong had a role in discussing and drafting the Basic Law, the result would totally be different.

[103] The term "basic rights" implies these rights are antecedent to and inviolable by any positive law. These rights are not the result of any rational communication but rather the conditions for rational communication (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.400).

On the other hand, basic rights are not purely for the demand of communicative rationality. There are other raisons d'être of basic rights which are based on some assumptions of human beings: (1) humans have the ability to construct, revise, and pursue their own life plan; (2) humans should determine their individual choices by themselves; (3) humans could only be transcended from animal status to human status by acting as free creative agents. The denial of this creativity means the deprivation of the opportunity of being a human. Based on these assumptions, humans should have the right to develop their unique personalities (Ibid., p.398; Madison 1998, p.17).

Accordingly, the right of free communication and the right of autonomous personality development are the two pillars of civil society. The former guarantees unconstrained communications which in turn defends the institutionalized rights. In this way, the right of free communication constitutes the public sphere of civil society. The latter safeguards the development of autonomous and unique personalities. As such, it constitutes the intimate sphere of civil society. Together, these two basic rights give each individual the justification for the right to assert rights (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.403-4).

Summary.

In short, communicative rationality is the basic principle of civil society. As the medium of the lifeworld, communicative rationality aims to promote the rational, mutual understandings in the lifeworld. For this major objective, such rigorous conditions as symmetry, reflexivity, and reciprocity have to be met. In addition, the practice of communicative rationality fosters

and enhances such symbolic resources as knowledge, solidarity, and personality of the lifeworld. In other words, communication facilitates the reproduction of the lifeworld. Meanwhile, communicative rationality is also indispensable to a modern theory of civil society. The modern theory of civil society demands the democratization of political, economic, and civil societies. Since communicative rationality helps to promote a critical, reflexive culture, and since its interdependent relationship with basic rights, communicative rationality is indispensable for the democratization process. So communicative rationality is the fundamental principle for the coordination of the lifeworld and the essence of a modern theory of civil society.

The Framework of the New Model of Civil Society

To understand the concept of civil society, Cohen and Arato's tripartite, society-centered model is employed in this thesis. In this tripartite framework, civil society stands side by side with the state and the economy. The strengths of this design are summarized as follows. First, this design avoids the confusion of the economic society with civil society as the Lockean tradition did.[104] Second, unlike the state versus society model, the tripartite model will not over-emphasize on the coercion of the state and overlook the threats from economic society and the internal crisis of civil society (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.469, 447). Third, the tripartite framework acknowledges the necessity of the state and the economy.[105] Instead of abolishing the system, this framework suggests an appropriate way for the co-existence of these three

[104] See the section on historical development of civil society theories. A more detail criticism on this aspect by the Marxist tradition can be found in Cohen & Arato 1994, p.219-221.

spheres on the one hand, and the autonomy of civil society on the other hand. From this point of view, the tripartite model is desirable for its feasibility and compatibility with the late twentieth century social context (Ibid., p.469).

Furthermore, this is also a society-centered model that emphasize the public's participation in a plurality of voluntary associations secured by rights. As was stated from the outset, communicative rationality is the basic principle of civil society; therefore, civil society must give priority to communicative interaction. Since voluntary associations give their members the opportunities of direct participation and open discussion, the new theory of civil society encourages the citizens to join in these associations. In turn, the practice of rights in these associations will foster a civic culture that is capable of safeguarding the basic human rights. However, since institutions of the lifeworld may not be democratic or may have already been distorted by the system, reflexivity and reforms have to be carried out in these institutions. So, democratization is required in the lifeworld's institutions. In other words, these institutions of the lifeworld are both the terrain of and the target for democratization (1994, p.417).

The locus of civil society.

To Cohen and Arato, civil society is located in the institutional level of the lifeworld (1994, p.429). Following Habermas' direction, Cohen and Arato conceive the modernization of society as constituted by two processes, the emergence of the system, and the rationalization of the lifeworld. In the first

[105] A further examination of this self-limiting stance of the model will be given later.

process, the system is differentiated from the lifeworld.[106] By regulating the unintended consequences of strategic action through market or bureaucratic mechanisms, diverse activities are integrated in the system (Ingram 1987, p.115). Then, the system is differentiated into the administrative and economic subsystems. The economic subsystem includes all privately owned capitalist enterprises. Its medium of integration is money. The corresponding social relationship is an exchange relationship aiming to make profits. The administrative subsystem refers to the state apparatus. Its medium of integration is administrative power that ties to bureaucratic roles and hierarchies. The corresponding social relationship is a power relationship between the superiors and subordinates in the hierarchical administration system (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.426).

By contrast, the lifeworld is the reservoir of taken-for-granted definitions and understandings of the world (Ibid., 427-8). With the aid of this knowledge, we construct our worldview. Most often than not, we will not cast doubt on the validity and justification of this background knowledge.[107] Meanwhile, since these definitions and assumptions are shared by members of

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[106] For Habermas, there would be no differentiation between the system and lifeworld in a society that was organized by the least developed organizational principle like kinship. Subsequently, mechanisms of system differentiation appear in the course of social development. At first, segmentary differentiation occurred with the growth of homogeneous units. Next, a vertical stratification of power was established to organize the increasingly complex activities in the society. Then, a political stratified class society emerged and formal political office was formed. In this stage, the state as an administrative subsystem was differentiated from the society. Finally, the economic subsystem was also differentiated from the society when capital and labour were transformed into monetary exchange media in the free market (Ingram 1987, p.126-7).

[107] It is like a fish living under the sea for its whole life who never knows what the sea is. Only when the fish has the chance to leave the sea can it realize the existence of the sea. Likewise, a person will be never aware of the cultural influence upon her unless she is

the society, this background consensus makes ordinary symbolic interaction and communication possible (Pusey 1987, p.58). Accordingly, communication and communicative rationality are the medium and the fundamental principle of the lifeworld respectively. It is hoped that coordination and mutual understanding will be achieved through communicatively created consensus which results from the intentional efforts of the actors.

The lifeworld has three structural components (culture, society, and personality) that rely on a series of social processes for their reproduction. In the case of culture, symbolic meanings and knowledge are transmitted and reproduced to social members in the process of cultural reproduction through cultural institutions like religious and artistic institutions. Since the members draw the symbolic meanings from the same source, they are sharing a cultural tradition. It is this common cultural tradition that makes communicative action and mutual understanding possible among the social members. In the case of society, the second component of lifeworld, solidarity is the major concern and is achieved in the process of social integration through social groups and associations. By following the inter-subjectively recognized norms rigorously, members of a solidarity collective body are forced to behave in a single manner. In turn, solidarity is reproduced among members.[108] In

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exposed to another culture. At first, she will be shocked by the differences. When she returns home, she will have a different understandings and awareness of her own culture

[108] The point is best elaborated by the example given by Durkheim in The Division of Labour in Society. During Moses' times, the person who collected firewood on Sunday was stoned to death. To us, this was incomprehensible. But to the members, the person's violation of the law was a threat to the society's cohesion, and destroyed the solidarity of the community.

the case of personality, children internalize values of the society, learn to conform social norms, and acquire a capability for interaction with others in the family and the education institutions. In this process of socialization, children will gradually develop their individual and social identity (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.428).

Now, we may realize that civil society is located neither in the system nor in the linguistic and cultural background of the lifeworld. Civil society must be coordinated by communicative rationality and aims to promote mutual understandings among its members. Since both the principle of coordination and the objective of civil society are totally different from the system's, the political and economic systems cannot be the locus of civil society. By contrast, the institutional complexes of the lifeworld depend on communicative interaction for their functioning and reproduction. Logically, institutions of socialization, social groups and associations, and institutions of culture are the locus of civil society (Ibid., p.429).

The Objectives of the Theory of a Modern Civil Society

The objectives of a theory of civil society is to serve the needs of the lifeworld. These needs are derived from the deficiency of the lifeworld. By now, the major deficiency is the lack of a fully implemented cultural rationalization process. Ideally, cultural rationalization is the promotion of a balanced development in cognitive-instrumental, aesthetic-expressive, and moral-practical values together with the re-examination of the cultural norms

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Through such severe punishment as death penalty, the society was able to prevent any behaviour that would threaten its solidarity.

and authority.[109] Yet in reality, cultural rationalization has never been fully implemented. Economic and administrative factors predominate over the lifeworld's concerns. Cognitive-instrumental development outstrips the development of other cultural potentials.[110] The practice of communicative rationality is also undermined. The lack of a fully implemented cultural rationalization process prepares the way for the penetration of the system's influence into the lifeworld.[111] Thus, the institutional complexes, the original terrain of a modern civil society, are increasingly influenced by the subsystems, whereas areas that coordinated by communicative action shrank dramatically (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.448-450). As a result, the objectives and the biggest challenges of the theory of a modern civil society will involve: (1) to rebuild the rationalization process within the lifeworld; (2) to defend the autonomy of this renewed lifeworld against the dominance of the system. It is to this project we must now turn.

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[109] If cultural rationalization is fully implemented, a communicatively grounded rational agreement on cultural norms will replace a conventionally based normative agreement. Its institutional complexes will be independent of the metaphysical-religious world views. Its members will have greater freedom to interpret traditions, to participate in interpersonal relations, and to develop their personalities and identities (Ingram 1987, p.117; Cohen & Arato 1994, p.434-5).

[110] This disproportional development is called the selective institutionalization of cultural modernity. The Ontario premier Mike Harris' ideas on the tertiary education is an example of this selective development. Since such disciplines as classics and sociology contributed neither to economic growth nor to technological invention, the premier once suggested that there were no need to have these disciplines in each university. In this case, the premier gave his priority to cognitive-instrumental development. If this idea is implemented, the result will be cultural impoverishment in our society (Ibid., p.447-8).

[111] The penetration of the system's influence into the lifeworld institutional complexes is called the colonization of the lifeworld (Ibid., p.448-9). Specifically, social relations are bureaucratized and monetarized after the colonization of the lifeworld. For example, the penetration of the state has turned the acting subjects from independent citizens to dependent clients. The public have lost their autonomy. On the other hand, when the social relations are monetarized, utilitarianization and over-aggressively personal achievement replace other virtues and values of the society (Pusey 1987, p.108).

The Project of the Theory of a Modern Civil Society

The self-limiting posture of the project of a modern civil society.

In the contemporary political and economic milieu, the only feasible project for a modern civil society must be a self-limiting in nature. The notion of self-limitation has two implications. First, it means the abolition of the revolutionary utopia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, social theorists like Cohen and Arato have realized that a violent revolution could not bring forth a better society for humans. Instead, revolution only leads to "the inevitable chaos and power vacuum that follow, are driven to increase rather than limit sovereign power" (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.454). By contrast, the "velvet revolutions" that torn down the bloc of Eastern European countries in 1989 were not "revolutions" at all. These social movements replaced revolutionary violence with dialogue or communicative rationality (Madison 1998, p.14). Also, the initiators of these non-violent social movements had no illusions about social utopia. They did not believe in the existence of a single correct solution to the political and economic crises of the Eastern European countries (Ibid, p.117). The lesson here is that a self-limiting project of civil society ought to influence rather than overthrow the existing institutions. The project should be to preserve and broaden the democratic political system in the country, if any, instead of replace it with an entire new system.

Second, self-limitation suggests the need to maintain the differentiation between the system and the lifeworld. One of the temptations of social philosophers is to fuse these two realms. For some, there are desires for an

abolition of the state and/or the capitalist market economy.[112] But these desires are incompatible with the modern era because both institutions are desiderata to every modern country. For others, there was often the tendency to totalize society with a single rationality, whether it was an economy-centered instrumental reason, a state-centered strategic reason, or a society-centered communicative reason(Cohen & Arato 1994, p.451-2). As such, they ignored that each sphere's weight of coordination is different although all action types could be found in each sphere.[113] Thus, a self-limiting project should acknowledge the sine qua non of the state and market economy and take them into account in the project. And yet the boundaries among the three spheres must be maintained so that the coordination principle of each sphere will remain to be dominant in the corresponding area only.

In short, the feasible project of civil society can only be a self-limiting one. It serves the defense of the lifeworld instead of the abolition of the system. It exerts indirect influence rather than exercise direct control over the system. Hence, it should consciously promote communicative rationality and direct participation in the institutional complexes of the lifeworld but not

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[112] For example, Thomas Paine in C.18 yearned for a society without the state whereas Hegel in C.19 preferred a universal state (Keane 1988, p.35-6).

[113] Weight of coordination can be elaborated in the following way. For Cohen and Arato, strategic, instrumental, and communicative actions all exist in each subsystem and lifeworld. However, the center of gravity of the coordinating mechanism is different in each sphere. In the lifeworld, we may find strategic and instrumental actions. However, they must be subordinated to communicative coordination. Likewise, the primary coordinating mechanism in the system must be instrumental and strategic actions. However, it is possible to introduce communicative action in the state and economic institutions under the condition that communicative action will be subordinated to the strategic and instrumental concerns (1994, p.479, 723 n.77).

necessary in the system (Ibid., p.451).[114] Eventually, a civic culture capable of protecting the lifeworld will emerge.

The project of a modern civil society.

The major objectives of the project of a modern civil society are the democratization of civil society and the defense of its autonomy (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.526). Two procedures will be involved in achieving these objectives. The first step is the establishment of bulwarks in the lifeworld and sensors (or receptors) in the system.[115] Bulwarks built in and by the lifeworld will protect the latter from the domination of the system. However, if self-limitation is not initiated by and upon the system, it will be impossible to restrain the ever-expanding influence and dominance of the system over the lifeworld.

Under this consideration, the creation of a second supplementary device, sensors, in the system that will make the system respond to the needs of the lifeworld is indispensable (Ibid., p.471-2). The second step is the operation of these bulwarks and sensors through four types of political activities. The politics of identity will re-examine and renew the lifeworld through the associations of civil society. The politics of reform will promote internal rationality in the institutions of the system by introducing procedural reforms. While the politics of identity and politics of reform correspond to the

[114] Since Madison maintains communicative rationality ought to be employed in all three orders of the society, he may disagree with the first part of this assertion. However, he too agrees that "the goal of self-limiting social movements ... is to change institutions, not necessarily to participate directly in the decision-making activities of government itself" (1998, p.118).

democratization of the lifeworld and the system respectively, the politics of influence and the politics of inclusion are the links of actors in civil society and actors in the political society (Ibid., p.526). These relationships are depicted in the following diagram.

Figure 1 The Theoretical Framework of Civil Society



The bulwarks of the lifeworld.

The effective bulwarks of lifeworld are constituted by associations and basic rights. The institutional complexes of the lifeworld, the locus of civil society, are central to the project of civil society for several reasons. First, voluntary associations are the ideal terrain for the practice of communicative rationality. To Madison, the degree of success in democratization is a function of the degree in practising communicative rationality (1998, p.118). By now, this assertion is understandable to us. There is no doubt that communicative rationality will promote a critical, reflexive stance to the formerly unquestioned cultural background of the lifeworld. The issue is to find out the ideal place for the practice of communicative rationality.

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[115] Bulwarks refer to the voluntary associations of civil society secured by rights. Sensors/receptors refer to procedural re-arrangement of the institutions of the system. These concepts will be examined in the next section.

For Cohen and Arato, associational life will be the perfect terrain for this practice, for several reasons. First, communication is the medium of the institutional complexes of the lifeworld. Besides, the public and egalitarian nature of voluntary associations provide the favourable condition for direct participation and discourse formation.[116] By contrast, the institutions of the system cannot afford open-ended communication. After all, mutual understanding is not the priority in the system (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.ix). Under these considerations, the plurality of associations is the best place to institutionalize the communication. So if Madison's assertion is correct, a conscious association building and the institutionalization of reflexive communication in these associations are sine qua non of the project of civil society.

Second, voluntary associations foster solidarity, the essential component in the defense of individual liberties and rights (Ibid., p.472). According to the double aspect of the moral phenomenon, individual integrity will be secured only when the integrity of all has been secured (Ibid., p.378). Likewise, the desirable individual liberties and rights can only be obtained through the struggle for the collective liberties and rights, since the latter presupposes the first (Ibid., p.378-9; Madison 1998, p.74). However, these mutual recognition of reciprocal interdependence and willingness of taking mutual responsibilities relies on the existence of solidarity. Without solidarity,

[116] The word 'public' implies: (1) membership of the civic associations are open to all individuals; (2) the civic associations are open-minded that members can express different opinions in the meetings; (3) the associations concern public affairs and are highly responsive to the general public; (4) the relative transparency of these associations' structures, power, and

atomic individuals are unable to acknowledge this mutual interdependence, not to mention share these mutual responsibilities. Hence, the protection and enhancement of solidarity are crucial for the defense of individual liberties and rights. Yet solidarity cannot protect itself; its protection relies on the institutional complexes of a civil society (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.472). Through the participation in associational life, participants will discover their common viewpoints and shared interests. So, they are willing to identify, to share feelings, and to take responsibilities with each other. In short, associational life fosters solidarity (Ibid., p.472-3).

Third, associational life facilitates the development of individual personality. Personality, one of the three structural components of the lifeworld, is formed in the process of socialization.[117] But the process of socialization is an ongoing communicative process in an intersubjectively shared social world. Individuals will acquire their identities only as members of a collective. The more we are involved in the network of social relationship, the more unique our individual identity will be. Thus, the development of individuals' personalities and identities (the process of individuation) relies on their engagement in a plurality of collectives which is based on mutual recognition. From this perspective, the deprivation of associational life in the process of socialization will be hazarded not only to

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monetary relations to its members and outsiders (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.712 n.122, 713 n.134, 472-3).

[117] See the section on lifeworld. The three components of the lifeworld are knowledge, solidarity, and personality.

the formation of collectives but also to the development of individual personality and identity (Ibid., p.376-9).

Although voluntary associations are important to the defense of civil society, an effective bulwark of the lifeworld cannot depend on associations alone. The institutional complexes of civil society are so precarious that they are constantly threatened by the power of the political system. To secure associational life, basic rights must be institutionalized.[118] In the short run, the opportunities to practice these rights in civil society will be guaranteed. In the long run, the practice of these rights will become a social learning process which will make the public increasingly value societal self-organization and publicity. In turn, this political culture will be the major force to defend a modern civil society (Ibid., p.440).[119] To secure the associational life and public communication, three groups of rights that corresponding to the three institutional complexes are identified. In order to renew our culture, freedoms of thought, press, speech, and communication are indispensable in the process of re-examination and reproduction of culture. For the enhancement of solidarity, the process of social integration must be protected by the freedom of association and assembly. For the free development of personality, the privacy rights and the inviolability of the person are required in the process of

[118] Although institutionalized rights means rights are guaranteed by the legalization of rights in the legislature, it does not mean that rights are given by the state. Rather, rights are achieved through the struggles of the autonomous individuals from below. Rights as the fruit of these struggles are secured and stabilized by the positive law in the process of institutionalization. So, the state is not the source of these rights and hence should not take the rights away from its people (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.441-2).

[119] Again, the case of Hong Kong fits well in this context. For the past decades, the people of Hong Kong have enjoyed the highest degree of freedom in comparison with those Chinese on the Mainland and in Taiwan (see next chapter). The practice of these liberties increases the

socialization. Besides, while rights of property, contract, and labour have to be institutionalized in order to mediate between civil society and the market economy, political rights are demanded to mediate between civil society and the state (Ibid., p.441).

In short, the protection of the lifeworld's autonomy against the intervention of the system relies on associations and basic rights. Only when associational life and unconstrained communication are secured by the institutionalization of basic rights could the former be able to renew and reproduce the lifeworld. In other words, an effective bulwark of the lifeworld is the collaboration of associations and basic rights.

The politics of identity.

A project like the state versus civil society thesis that exclusively emphasizes securing the autonomy of civil society is insufficient for the well-being of the lifeworld. The issue is which kind of society we want to defend. Is it a society of discrimination, inequality, and domination or is it a society of justice, egalitarianism, and democracy? In fact, the biggest resistance of the modernization of the lifeworld comes from the lifeworld itself rather than from the system.[120] In other words, the corresponding changes of public awareness and consciousness among individuals are needed to implement

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public's awareness of the fact that freedom is invaluable. As a result, they are willing to safeguard these liberties.

[120] For instance, the United States' women's movement had existed for decades with little changes until the mid- 1970s (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.550). To take another example, contraception for women has been legalized in France since 1968. Nevertheless, advertisement of contraception was restricted and single females were prohibited to use contraception in the name of the family values (Ibid., p.730 n.135). These setbacks point to the fact that without the corresponding changes in the culture of the lifeworld (as in the case of

institutional reforms. Civil society, therefore, needs not only protection but also democratization. From this perspective, civil society is both the terrain and the target of democratization.

The politics of identity is the road to a democratized civil society. The two major objectives of the politics of identity are the inculcation of a critical and reflexive attitude among the general public, and the creation and defense of collective identities. For the first objective, three sets of actions will be taken. The first set of actions includes: (1) the re-examination of cultural norms, social relations, institutional arrangements and practices; and (2) the input of new interpretative framework and contents for discourse. The second set of actions includes: (1) the formation of new associations; and (2) the preservation of the existing associations and at the same time developing democratic and egalitarian within them. The last set of actions are consciously to expand and to enrich public discussions in numerous small public spheres of the civil society (Ibid., p.548). All of these objectives will be carried out through the rights-secured associations of civil society, (the bulwarks of the lifeworld).

The politics of identity also concerns the formation and the defense of collective identity. This second mission will be achieved in the struggle of the first mission.[121] For one thing, during their challenges to the unquestioned

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France) and the awareness as well as consciousness among individuals (as in the case of U.S.A.), reforms from above alone are futile.

[121] Unlike the resources mobilization theorists, theorists of the new social movement reject the assumption that any cohesive groups exist prior to the collective actions. An increasing number of collective actions are not initiated by a particular social group. Rather, participants of these collective actions are drawn together out of different concerns. It is only in the process of their collective activities that they realize their commonalties. A sense of "we"

social norms and practices, participants will come across many obstacles and counter-reactions. The process of struggling will make the participants aware their capacity and the power relationship in the social environment. These common experience and shared interests will become their common grounds; and hence, they will identify with each other. Solidarity will be generated and new identity will be formed eventually (Ibid., p.511). In addition, new identities will be created in the reinterpretation of cultural values and social relations. New meanings will be instilled into existing social roles and hence new identities will emerge.[122]

Let us summarize the project of civil society thus far. To protect the autonomy of the lifeworld, bulwarks have to be established. The effective bulwarks against the intervention of the system can rely only on the associations of civil society secured by rights. However, a project of civil society that is exclusively oriented to the autonomy of the lifeworld is doomed to failure. The project of a modern civil society, therefore, must include the democratization of the institutional complexes and the re-examination the cultural background of the lifeworld. It is hoped that the democratization process will minimize inequality and injustice in the lifeworld. Meanwhile, this process also facilitates the formation of new identities. From this point of

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group gradually forms with increasing chances and times of collaboration. Therefore, it is the collective action that brings forth the new identity, rather than the other way round.

[122] For instance, gay, lesbian, aboriginal people were traditionally treated as deviants and social disadvantaged. Decades ago, these groups of people were unable to speak out for themselves. However, the reinterpretation of social values and roles have turned private issues into public concerns. Consequently, these people acquired new identities for themselves.

view, the establishment of bulwarks and the politics of identity associated with it constitute the defensive part of the project of civil society.

The sensors of the system and the politics of reform.

As was stated above, the defense of the lifeworld relies not only on the establishment of bulwark of the lifeworld, but also on the self-limitation of the system. Voluntary associations of a modern civil society may be influential, but they can influence only those economic and political institutions that are willing to be influenced. Unfortunately, the main difficulty of the current situation is the lack of critical self-reflection among the institutions in the two subsystems. Thus, these institutions will not voluntarily restrain their influences. To remedy this shortage, "sensors" which can initiate institutional reforms in these institutions are required (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.487, 452).

The aim of these sensors and the accompanying institutional reforms (the politics of reform) is to promote reflexivity in the institutions of the system. It is hoped that these sensors will introduce communicative rationality into the institutions.[123] In doing so, the lack of critical self-reflection in the system will be remedied. These sensors will maximize the internal rationality of the institutions and make them take the external needs and consequences of the institutions' decisions into account without jeopardizing the institutions' performance (Ibid., p.482-7).[124]

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[123] It seems to me that Cohen & Arato's idea on this aspect is compatible to Madison's idea on the practice of communicative rationality in the three orders of the social world. The major difference is the former's insistence on the primacy of strategic and instrumental rationality in the system, whereas the latter suggests the primacy of communicative rationality in all three areas.

[124] This is why the sensors are also receptors. They are more likely to receive influence from the lifeworld.

Specifically, sensors refer to the discursive structure in the institutions of the system. According to Teubner, every political or economic institution will be oriented to function, performance, and reflexion (1983, p.272).[125] Theoretically, the orientation of reflexion will promote self-reflection and self-restraints in the institution. Yet, reflexion is possible only when a discursive structure has been established in the institution. In reality, few institutions have the will to establish such discursive structures. This is where the reflexive law comes in.

As procedural, self-limiting regulations, the reflexive law helps to promote this discursive process. Unlike either the detailed, rigid formal rules or the instrumental, substantive standards and regulations, the reflexive law is procedural because it exclusively concerns norms of procedures, organization, and competence that will promote the discursive process (Ibid., p.275). Meanwhile, the reflexive law is self-limiting too because it has no desire for power of control. It does not attempt to determine the function and performance of the institutions. The increase in participation as an end in itself is not the ideal of the reflexive law. In fact, the reflexive law realizes that open-ended discussion is impossible due to the constraints on time. Yet, it does want to create a specific participation that will increase the institution's reflexivity so that the institution will be more sensitive to the lifeworld's needs

[125] Function is the orientation toward the entire social system. Performance is the orientation toward other societal subsystems in terms of input and output. When the orientation is toward the institution itself, it is called reflexion (Teubner 1983, p.272).

and more willing to take these needs into account (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.482).[126]

For illustration, we may take labour disputes in economic system as an example. In some countries, there are no collective bargaining rights for workers. Negotiation with the employers will put the representatives of the workers in jeopardy, for they may lose their jobs. Under this condition, the economic institution is insensitive to the needs of the workers. However, if some reflexive regulations were introduced to legalize collective bargaining power and to protect the representatives during the negotiation, the institution's sensitivity will certainly be increased. Under this condition, every decision has to take the workers into account. By introducing these procedural reforms, the weights of all parties affected will be altered too. Accordingly, outcomes before and after these institutional reforms will be different too.

If the creation of bulwarks is the defensive side of the project of civil society, the creation of sensors is the offensive side. Through these sensors, reforms will be introduced inside the institutions so that these institutions will be democratized. Accordingly, the sensitivity of the institutions to the

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[126] I believe procedural changes have bigger impact than other type of regulations. The Hong Kong's political system will illustrate how the alternations of procedure have affected the legislature drastically. In the 1998 Legislative Council (LegCo) Election, the voting system was changed from single vote single seat in each constituency to proportional system in order to reduce the democrats' influence in the legislature (Lo 1995). Procedures for voting on bills and motions have also substantial changes. Before 1997, the passage of private bill or individual motion was based on simple majority of those who were present at the meeting. Now, it "require[s] a simple majority vote of each of the two groups of members present: *members returned by functional constituencies and those returned by geographical constituencies through direct elections* and *by the Election Committee* " (Basic Law Annex II Section II. Italics is added by the writer). In the present composition of LegCo, no private bills, individual motions or amendments can be passed. By contrast, this requirement is inapplicable to the bills introduced by the government. Hence, these procedural changes have

lifeworld will be increased. The self-reflection will impose self-limitation on the institutions. As such, the penetration of influence from the institutions to the lifeworld will be minimized. In other words, the democratization of the system through sensors helps to protect the autonomy of the lifeworld.

The politics of influence and the politics of inclusion.

Although civil society in the lifeworld and political society in the system are autonomous, they are not two isolated entities. In fact, these two spheres are interacting with each other. What the politics of influence and the politics of inclusion in the project of a modern civil society try to do is bridge the gap between civil society and political society so that the two societies can interact with each other.

The politics of influence plays a central role in the defense of the lifeworld's autonomy by minimizing the influence of money and power in the lifeworld. Influence is the medium that flows from civil society to political society. In numerous, small public spheres of associations in the civil society, public opinions will be formed. By using these public opinions, collective actors are able to "inform, thematize, and potentially alter" political discourse, institutional reforms, and social policies in accordance with new needs, new norms, and new identities (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.504, 532).

If the politics of influence exerts influence over political society from outside, the politics of inclusion exerts influence from within. The aim of the politics of inclusion is the recognition of new actors by accepting them as new

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totally changed the balance of power and minimized LegCo councillors' challenge to the government.

members of political society. Ideally, these new political actors will bring new issues, attitudes, discourses into the establishment. Through these new initiatives, political society will be more responsive to the needs of civil society.[127] As such, these new actors will bring benefits to those formerly unrepresented (Ibid., p.526).

Meanwhile, the co-existence of the politics of influence and inclusion provides interacting opportunities between the political insiders and outsiders. On the one hand, since new actors in political society are relatively more sensitive to the public's concerns, they provide access to political society for the political outsiders. From this perspective, political outsiders rely on political insiders. Yet, political insiders rely on political outsiders too. The outsiders' opinions, collective actions, and unconventional tactics will give the strongest support and justification for the new insiders' motions and decisions. These two politics, thus, maintain a supplementary instead of mutually exclusive relationship (Ibid., p.558).

Conclusion

This chapter is a concise study on the complex concept of civil society. Through the portrait of the development of civil society in the first half of this chapter, we demonstrate how the rise of civil society is related to the Western social context in the past several centuries. However, an adequate model for

[127] An vivid example to illustrate the politics of inclusion is the political reforms in the Hong Kong Legislative Council in the 1980s. When the middle class was included in LegCo for the first time via election of functional constituencies in 1985, these new members of political society had totally changed the rules of game. Then, there were secret deals between the appointed councillors and the government. Now, since the new actors had to be responsible to their voters, they rejected any compromise behind closed doors. The grass-roots interests

the analysis of a modern civil society must fulfill two basic conditions. First, the new model must be based on universal foundation rather than European social context. Second, the new model should adopt a critical attitude towards civil society itself and re-assess the proper relationship among the state, the economy, and civil society. Under these considerations, a new model of the modern civil society is introduced in the second half of this chapter. This new model is based on communicative rationality and basic rights. Since humans need communicative rationality and basic rights to develop their creativity (the essence of being as "humans"), these two elements are universal in nature. Based on this universal foundation, the new model is applicable to non-Western society.

Meanwhile, the new model also re-examines the relationships among the political, economic, and civil societies. The tripartite model acknowledges the necessity of the state and market economy. It holds that each sphere has different priority; therefore, each sphere's principle of coordination will be different. From this perceptive, the new model is self-limiting. Moreover, the model addresses the undemocratic aspects of the lifeworld. The democratization of the lifeworld should be carried out hand in hand with the defense of the autonomy of the lifeworld. Finally, the new project of civil society suggests that a successful defense of the autonomy of a renewed lifeworld will rely on the collaboration of the system and civil society.

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were more-or-less brought into LegCo (See Chapter 3's section on Hong Kong's political development in the third stage).

Chapter Three

Hong Kong, a unique city, is facing a unique challenge.[128] Since its cession to the British in 1842, the city has already become a mixture of oriental and occidental culture.[129] But being "a Chinese society with British characteristics" is not sufficient to distinguish the city from other countries.[130] It may merely create another mosaic of multiculturalism. What makes Hong Kong so unique can be expressed in the phrase of Han, Suyin, "Prosperous but precarious, energetic on borrowed time in a borrowed place" (Quoted by Hughes 1968 Acknowledgment). Although written in the 1950s, this is still the best description of Hong Kong. It captures not only the particular history and status of Hong Kong but also the mentality of its citizens. It is this mentality that creates the distinct identity of the Hong Kong people and in turn shapes their political behaviour.

After one hundred and fifty years of colonial ruling, the People's Republic of China (hereafter PRC) resumed its sovereignty of the City on July 1, 1997. According to the Sino British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law (a

[128] Hong Kong means fragrant harbour in Chinese. It includes the Hong Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula, New Territories, and dozens of small islands.

[129] In the late 1830s, there were disputes between China and Britain on the issue of opium and trade. Subsequently, in 1840, a small-scale of war broke out near Guang Zhou (Canton). Hong Kong was demanded by the British Superintendent of Trade, Charles Elliot. The cession was formally written in the Treaty of Nanking after a full scale war in 1842, the so-called Opium War on the Chinese side, and the first Sino-British War on the British side. On 26th June, 1843, Hong Kong was formally declared to be a British colony (Endacott 1973 p.22). After the second Sino-British and France War in 1858, the south part of Kowloon was ceded to Britain by the Treaty of Tientsin in 1858 (Ibid., p.109). By the Treaty of Peking in 1898, Britain leased the rest of Kowloon and called it New Territories for ninety-nine yeas dating from July 1 1898 (Ibid., p.262).

kind of constitution of Hong Kong), the "One Country - Two Systems" policy would be adopted. Under the premise of one PRC, the socialist system and policies would not be carried out in the territory. Hong Kong would be a special administrative region of the PRC.

This is a unique challenge for the city. The policy of one country two systems is an unprecedented case. Could the City sustain the prosperity it enjoyed, maintain the life-style it is used to, and uphold its hard-won limited democracy? Or is the change of sovereignty merely from the decolonization of the Britain to the recolonization of the PRC? Would the tiny city be absorbed by the political culture of the giant PRC? Or was the renowned dissident Wang Dan correct in anticipating that the democratic atmosphere in Hong Kong would display a demonstration effect to the Mainland and hence influence the Republic's democratization process? The unique challenge of Hong Kong is indeed a challenge to the PRC too. In the last century, the imperialism of the West challenged the nationalism of the Old China. In the twentieth century, the communist China is facing the challenge of the capitalism of the West.

The following sections are about Hong Kong's history. By means of this elaboration, we are able to understand how the Hong Kong people perceived themselves as responding to the changing context during different eras. How has the identity of the Hong Kong people changed from transients to Hongkongese? How have these perceptions shaped their attitudes towards

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[130] The phrase was used by the last Governor Chris Patten in the farewell ceremony on 30th June, 1997.

politics from apathy to empathy? How has the Colonial regime reacted to these different contexts and political behavour in the society? Most importantly, how do these interactions among the milieu, the public, and the government set the scene for the development of a civil society in the 1990s?

The First Phase (1842-1941)

The Rise of a Commercial Centre

Although significant commercial activities were absent in the first decade of the Colony's history, economic development has gradually gained the momentum since the second half of the nineteenth century. By the end of the nineteenth century, Hong Kong had incredibly been transformed from a fishing village into an international commercial centre. According to Endacott, three factors contributed to this remarkable change.

The first one is Hong Kong's unique political status. Although commercial activities were undertaken in the free ports on the mainland, the foreign companies needed a secure place for managerial and financial services like accounting and banking. Since the Colony was ruled directly by the British government, the European companies felt secure enough to establish their headquarters and financial services on the island. By the mid nineteenth century, Hong Kong was the administrative centre in the coast of South China (Endacott 1973, p.76).

Second, the opening of China after the mid nineteenth century also accelerated the growth of entrepôt trade in Hong Kong. On the one hand, China was forced to open more free ports and permit foreigners to travel freely in the country under new unequal treaties. These arrangements stimulated

commerce. As a British Colony, almost half of the British export passed through Hong Kong (Ibid., p.194). On the other hand, a large amount of Chinese had been emigrated to North America from 1848 on.[131] Chinese products were in great demand in the overseas Chinese communities. Many of these products were exported overseas via Hong Kong (Ibid., p.127). By the end of 1880, entrepôt trade was fully developed in the Colony. It handled 21% of the value of China's total export trade and 37% of the import trade (Ibid., p.194).

Finally, technological developments in the late nineteenth century created the most favourable environment for many small British firms to do business in China. The invention of the telegraph let trading companies master the latest market information and act on it immediately. By using the Suez Canal, the trading companies could quickly transport their products to meet the demand in China.[132] As such, small British firms could assess the China market even though they did not have warehouses in Hong Kong.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Hong Kong was no longer a barren island. Rather, the City became a great commercial centre. Bowen, the Governor of Hong Kong in 1884 described Hong Kong as "the greatest port of the Empire next to London and Liverpool" (Ibid., p.253).

A City of Transient Individuals

[131] In 1853, 17, 000 Chinese lived in California. Even when the gold rush fever receded, the influx of Chinese had no sign of decrease (Sylva 1972, p.34 & p.51). The construction of transcontinental railroads in the United States during 1851-1869 and the Canadian-Pacific Railway during the 1880s also attracted a large number of Chinese labourers.

[132] The Suez Canal was opened in 1869.

Economic prosperity created lots of jobs, and opportunities of profit making that led to an enormous influx of population. In 1841, the total population was about five thousand with virtually no foreign settlers. A century later, Hong Kong's population had already reached over one million (See Table 1).

Table 1. The Population of Hong Kong from 1841 to 1941

Year	Foreigner	Chinese	Total
1841	-	5,650	5,650
1851	1,520	31,463	32,893
1861	2,986	116,335	119,321
1871	8,754	115,444	124,198
1881	9,712	150,690	160,402
1891	10,494	214,320	224,814
1901	20,096	280,564	300,660
1911	18,893	445,384	464,277
1917[1]	-	-	431,700
1921	14,798	610,368	625,166
1931	19,522	859,425	878,947
1941	-	-	1,639,000
1942-5[2]	-	-	600,000

Source: Endacott & Hinton 1962, p.98

[1] The population of this year come from Endacott 1973, p.276.

[2] This is an estimated number given by Endacott & Hinton 1962, p.94

However, a thriving economy and the influx of population created a commercial centre but not a cohesive community. In fact, there were "innumerable divisions and subdivisions" in the territory at the beginning of this century (Lethbridge 1978, p.164). An understanding of the dwellers' perception of their life situation will help us to understand this particular context.

Although there were lots of differences among the dwellers, most of them considered themselves as transient individuals in a temporary place. For one thing, Hong Kong was a place where money could be earned. To the Europeans, Hong Kong was just another "booming frontier town" in Asia

(Ibid., p.171). They could take as many opportunities as they found to make profit regardless of their social status, education, or infamous past. When they earned enough money, they would leave the city and return to their home. As Lockhart, the Colonial Secretary in 1901, told the Governor Sir. Robinson, "[Englishmens came] to the Colony [was] to acquire wealth and to return to Great Britain as soon as they possibly [could]" (Quoted by Lethbridge 1978, p.135). Thus, Hong Kong was a temporary place rather than a permanent settlement for these Europeans. Likewise, money making was also a pull factor that attracted the Chinese to the Colony. For example, although the salary of a worker was low (H.K.$ 2.50 a month in average), hundreds of Chinese were still attracted by the salary and rushed into the Colony in 1887 (Endacott 1973, p.252).

Yet there was another equally important push factor for the Chinese who flocked to the Colony. To the Chinese, Hong Kong was a refuge from the turmoil in their country. Whenever human and natural disasters happened, the Chinese would seek refuge in Hong Kong. Take the Tai Ping Revolution (1851-1864) as an example. The local Chinese population had a fivefold increase in 1851 and twenty times in 1861 in comparison with the population in 1841. The 1911 revolution was another example. The Chinese population in Hong Kong had increased 59% from the number ten years previously (Endacott & Hinton 1962, p.98).[133] Once the situation at home was improved

[133] As we mentioned, China has been a war-torn country during the past hundred years. However, in here, we cited these two examples were not merely because their significance but also for their location. These two incidents were started in Guang Dong and Guang Xi, the provinces surrounding Hong Kong. Hence, we guess the chance for the refugees came to Hong Kong might be larger than the 1900's Boxer Movement happened in Peking.

or the local situation became worse, the Chinese would return home.[134] As a missionary put it, "Hong Kong is English soil, with a Chinese population of various dialects, and mostly unsettled in residence, going and coming constantly" (Smith 1985, p.173).

The mentality of the sojourners was reflected in their behaviours. For instance, while the singles rarely formed family units in Hong Kong, the family holders usually left their children in China for education (Ibid., p.2). To those who died in the Colony, their bodies would be transferred back to their home villages for burial. If they were alone, then their coffins would temporarily lodge at a house of the Tung Wah benevolent organization. It was hoped that one day their relatives from their villages would come to find them and transfer them back to their villages for a graceful burial.[135] Moreover, since they were preoccupied with problems of livelihood, they were uninterested in politics. They accepted every governmental policy and obeyed every regulation passively. In Lethbridge's words, they were "a mainly quiescent Chinese populace" (Ibid., p.2).

Since both the European and the Chinese perceived themselves as transient individuals in a temporary place, they were not interested in understanding each other and hence spared little effort to overcome cultural barriers. In addition to the indispensable commercial contacts, there was

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[134] The decrease of Chinese population in 1901, 1917, and 1940s were examples. The first case was due to plague. The second case was due to the paucity of shipping and diminished trade. In this case, the population had dropped from 445, 384 in 1911 to 431, 700. The last case was caused by WWII. In 1941, the population was over 1 million. But after the end of the War, there were less than 600, 000 in the Colony (Endacott 1973, p.278, 276; Endacott & Hinton 1962, p.94).

absolute segregation from each other (Endacott 1973, p.122). In the first place, there was segregation between the two major ethic groups. The Europeans had their churches, clubs, and recreational facilities. While the rich resided in the Peak area, the rest lived outside the city of Victoria. Physically and symbolically, the rich looked down on everything and everybody (Lethbridge 1978, p.172-3). On the other hand, the Chinese were not bothered by the exclusion. The rich formed their own clubs while the masses kept their focus on money making. In addition, there were sub-divisions within each ethic group. Among the Europeans, there were different status groups, such as officials, merchants, and outcasts.[136] Among the Chinese, the subdivisions were along lines of dialect and locality.

In sum, Hong Kong at this phase was an enclave where acquisitive, energetic, transient individuals came to seek their fortune. Neither the Europeans nor the Chinese had any sense of belonging to the place. After all, Hong Kong was not their home.

The Minimum State

Facing a prosperous commercial centre composed mainly of transient individuals, the major objectives of the colonial regime was to minimize the cost of its administration and to maximize public support for its governance. Accordingly, the minimal state approach and the administrative absorption tactic were employed by the colonial regime. To understand how these tactics

[135] In Wong, Siu-Lun's study of the Shanghai emigrant entrepreneurs, this mentality and practice were still prevailing among the emigrants during the early sixties (1988, p.80).
[136] The term, outcaste, was used by Lethbridge to refer to the seamen and the prostitutes.

worked, it will be helpful to have some ideas on the three key political components of the Colony's political system.

The Governor was the "central institution of the Crown Colony system" (Ibid., p.25). His authority, power, and limitations were set out in the Letters Patent, the Royal Instructions, and Colonial Regulations (Miners 1986, p.73). Symbolically, he was the King's representative. Substantially, he was the chief executive of the colonial government. He had the power to appoint, promote, transfer, and dismiss all civil servants and the judges. His ambition and determination strongly influenced the colonial bureaucracy's policies (Ibid., p.74-5). Moreover, it was totally legal for the Government to ignore the Executive Council and the Legislative Council, the advisory bodies to the Governor on government policies and law making. From this perspective, the Governor had the pervasive power of a despot (Harris 1978, p.65).[137]

The Executive Council, the second key component in the Colony's political system, was established in 1844 (Endacott 1973, p.38). In principle, the Council was the advisor of the Governor on legislation. In reality, the Council had little influential power on the Governor during the first one hundred years, for seveal reasons. First, the Council could only advise on those matters that were submitted to it by the Governor (Dunn 1989, p.80).

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[137] This is especially be the case when we think of the size of the two councils during the first hundred years. There were only 3 official members in each council in 1844. The first two unofficial Legislative Councilors were appointed in 1850. At the outbreak of WWII, there were only 9 officials and 8 unofficials in the Legislative Council (Endacott 1973, p.38; Cheek-Milby 1995, p.40 & 56). This arrangement enables the Governor to have the maximum personal influence on the members. However, Harris did mention the Governor was responsible to the British Government (Whitehall) and the Parliament (Westminster). Besides, the Governor was a civil servant and was supposed to be attached to "the mores of a

Second, the Governor had no obligation to follow the Councilors' advice. In fact, he could act in opposition to the Council (Ibid., p.80; Miners 1986, p.80). After all, it was unlikely to have any serious opposition voice if we look into the formation and the size of the Council in this period.[138] Finally, since the appointment and the proceedings were controlled by the Governor, it was possible for him to manipulate the opinion in his favour.

Nevertheless, the Council had taken on a new but important role within the political system since 1896. In that year, two Unofficial Legislative Councilors were selected into the Executive Council (Creek-Milby 1995, p.47). These members served as a bridge between the Governor and the Executive Council on the one side, and the Legislative Council on the other side (Ibid., p.27). The new arrangement enabled the Governor to control the legislature subtly. In the Legislative Council, these Unofficials with mixed membership acted as spokesmen. Their responsibilities were not only to explain the Government's policy, but also to persuade their colleagues to vote for or against a bill in accordance with the Governor's preference. In the Executive Council, they informed the Governor what the predicted reaction to new proposals would be in the Legislative Council (Ibid., p.27; Miners 1986,

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liberal Western state" (1978, p.61-65). Hence, in principle, these devices meant the Governor could not act as a despot.

[138] From 1844 to 1895, there were only official members in the Executive Council. Its number was increased from 3 to 6. The first two unofficial members were appointed in 1896. They were European merchants. In 1926, the number of unofficial members was increased to 3 and the newly appointed one was the first Chinese Executive member. This composition (6 officials and 3 unofficials) was not changed until the end of the first period (Endacott 1973, p.38, 167, 225, 294). In this composition, the majority were officials. No wonder Miners found that there is a tradition for the Governor to respect the majority view of the Council. Besides, in his research on the Minutes of the Council, Miners found that the outright rejection of civil service proposals is unusual (1986, p.86). This information suggests the Unofficials are unwilling and unable to challenge the Governor's decisions.

p.82; Dunn 1989, p.82). Through this kind of prediction, modification, and persuasion, the Governor was able to achieve his preferred results.

The last component of the political system in the Colony was the Legislative Council. Its major functions were legislation, the approval of public expenditure, and the scrutiny of public policy (Miners 1986, 124-5; Dunn 1989, p.83). As was stated above, the Council had lots of limitations. The Governor could either control the legislation directly or exert his influence on the Council subtly. Hence, the Council was a miniature quasi-parliament at best or a rubber stamp at worse.

Despite the fact that the Governor and his small bureaucracy were able to control the two councils, the Colonial regime still faced challenges from several social sectors. First, there were conflicts between the regime and the European interest groups over the cost of government.[139] Then, there was the question of right to rule raised by the Chinese in the 1890s. The nascent Chinese elites demanded to share the power with the European merchants.[140] Thus, the major objectives of the government were to minimize the cost of its administration and to find ways to legitimize its governing over the majority Chinese subordinates (Cheek-Milby 1995, p.59-60).

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[139] If we recall the reason for the formation of a British Colony in South China, the interests of merchants (the thirteen "Co Hong", the organized groups of merchants in Canton) were an important factor. In 1845, the European merchants complained to London about the cost of the Colonial government. According to Ian Scott, this was the first crisis of the Colonial government. At first glance, what these merchants opposed was only the cost of government. But as Scott correctly pointed out this challenge was indeed about the location of power. It involved whose interests were being considered and who had the power to control the finance (1989, p.56-7).

[140] As mentioned before, the world development created a favourable condition for the rise of small firms during the 1860s to 1880s. Rich Chinese merchants gradually emerged in the Colony in the same period. They began to find ways "to translate [money] into tangible forms of prestige and power" (Lethbridge 1978, p.58).

To minimize the cost of administration, the minimal state approach was adopted (Scott 1989). Basically, the approach meant that the government was taking an non-interventionist stand on economic and social affairs. Since the government perceived its primary task as to maintain law and order in the Colony, it relied much on missionaries and benevolent organizations to provide social services like education and medical services. For everything else, the individuals would take care of themselves. These strategies helped the government to keep both its departments and expenditure to the minimum and maintained a balanced budget on its limited revenue.[141]

While the minimum state approach was in accordance with the Colonial government's preference on free trade, it was also a result after considering the financial reality. [142] From the outset, the Colony's major advantages were no tariffs and a system of low taxation. But these advantages also limited the financial resources of the Colony. Therefore to be financially self-reliant, the colonial government had to adopt a conservative approach to its budget. Its motto was to keep expenditures within the limits of income. Every indispensable social service was subjected to penny-pinching measures (Scott 1989, p.50). After all, the society was composed mainly of transient individuals who cared for nothing but profit making. Hence, the minimum approach of administration was the logical choice for the government.

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[141] In the 1840s, there were 8 departments operating at a cost of £24, 428 per annum (Scott 1989, p.56).

[142] To Endacott, the minimal state approach is consistent with the foreign policy of the Great Britain of the early Victorian era. The British politicians favoured a free trade system. They prefer a commercial empire to a territorial one (1973, p.23). Therefore, the Empire would try every method to minimize its effort on the administration of its colonies. The minimal state was an ideal approach to meet this expectation.

In order to legitimize its governance and to minimize the disruption of its governance, the colonial government tried to absorb the indigenous elites into the political system. This strategy, called "administrative absorption of politics" by King, means:

> "A process by which the government co-opts the political forces, often represented by elite groups, into an administrative decision-making body, thus achieving some levels of elite integration; as a consequence, the governing authority is made legitimate, a loosely integrated political community is established" (1981, p.129-130).

This strategy worked especially well in the context of earlier Colonial Hong Kong society. Both the local elites and the government benefited from this strategy. To the local elites, they desired to be accepted as the leaders of Chinese community by the regime (Lethbridge 1978, p.4). To the Colonial government, they needed the goodwill of the Chinese notables. Therefore, the government encouraged this aspiration, designed a hierarchical system of prestige, influence, and power, and absorbed these local elites into the establishment.[143] Once into the administrative decision-making bodies like the Executive and the Legislative Council, the elites were contained and subordinated their will to the Governor. At the same time, since the elites were influential leaders in the Chinese community, the government was able

[143] The system was composed of two parts. While the official establishment (the two Councils) formed the upper part of the hierarchy, the civic part formed the lower part. In the civic part, there were four levels. At the bottom were the local associations such as Kaifong Wui (which means neighbourhood). Members from these local associations would be brought into the third level, Po Leung Kuk. Then, directors in the Board of Directors of the Tung Wah Groups were usually ex-committeemen of Po Leung Kuk. Hence, Tung Wah Groups became the next level. At the top of this system came the District Watch Committee. Its members usually had a long history of social services in different levels, and most of them came from the Permanent directors of the Tung Wah Groups. Initially, all of these organizations except the District Watch Committee were voluntary benevolent in nature. Since their formation had to be approved by the government, the government was able to transform these organizations into devices of co-option. More importantly, this system was the source for the Government to choose its preferred Chinese elites into the Legislative and Executive Councils. Thus, the

to achieve the consent of the masses through the subordination of these elites. Thus, the strategy of administrative absorption of politics allowed the government to contain the new emerged elites and gained the consent of the masses simultaneously. From this perceptive, the strategy was really a clever approach that killed two birds with one stone.

By using the minimum state approach, the government minimized not only the cost of administration but also interference of the local Chinese community. The low profile of an alien regime in the Chinese community could definitely prevent any potential conflicts between the government and the governed. In addition, the administration absorption of politics also helped to neutralize and to contain the opposition from the Chinese elites. Consequently, there was no further challenge to the colonial regime throughout the rest of the first phase. Since then, the model of an executive led government with an non-interventionist approach was consolidated, and the administrative absorption strategy was maintained until the second phase.

The Second Phase (1946-1981)

From Poverty to Prosperity

After the Second World War, Hong Kong struggled to rebuild itself from devastation. At first, the economy of Hong Kong suffered from the collapse of entrepôt trade, the pillar of the city's economy. Then, this gloomy situation was altered by the subsequent international condition. Within two

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rich Chinese were eager to compete for these few prestigious status (Lethbridge 1978, p.63-113).

decades, Hong Kong was transformed into an "Industrial Colony" with a remarkable economic performance.[144]

The industrialization of Hong Kong began in the early 1950s. After the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, a number of Shanghai industrialists along with a massive amount of capital inflowed into Hong Kong.[145] These Shanghai textile entrepreneurs were determined to rebuild their textile mills in the colony; therefore, they invested their capital in the textile industry and diverted new machinery for spinning mills to the city (Berger & Lester 1997, p.16-7). As such, the industrialization started in the Colony. However, the unemployment rate during the early stage of industrialization remained high because of the limited capability of the rudimentary textile industry and the large influx of refugees.[146]

Into the 1960s, manufacturing became the pillar of the Hong Kong economy. Such industries as textile, clothing, plastic, electronics took a prominent position in the world market. The number of manufacturing establishments increase threefold in 1961 to 5346 (Berger & Lester 1997, p.19). The manufacturing industries employed 42% and 49% of the total work force in 1961 and 1971 respectively (Youngson 1982, p.17) and accounted for one-fourth of GDP(Berger & Lester 1997, p.19). Since then, the Hong Kong

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[144] The term "industrial colony" was borrowed from the title of a survey done by Hopkins (et al.) in 1971, "Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony." The city's remarkable economic achievement will be described later in this section.

[145] Other factors that facilitated the industrialization include, the Chinese habit of enterprise, the stimuli from the government, the availability of finance from family and local banks, and the availability of merchant houses for marketing Hong Kong products overseas (Brown 1971, p.1-20). However, the influx of capital was considered the most important factor by the economists (Peebles 1988, p.50-53).

economy began to take off. The average growth rate of Gross Domestic Product from 1962 to 1980 was 9.7%, and the average growth rate of the GDP per capita was 7.1% in the same period (Ibid., p.9). As a result, the export-led industrialization became a specific model of economic development, and Hong Kong also became one of the four newly industrialized countries in Asia.

Despite the spectacular economic growth, there was little improvement of the living condition of the masses (Scott 1989). The majority of the population was still confined at the bottom of the educational, occupational, and the income structure. On the issue of educational attainment, a large proportion of the population was poorly-educated. According to the 1966 By-Census, 63.3% of the population had only primary education or no formal education at all (Podmore 1971, p.30 & 45). This low education attainment might be due to the financial difficulties of the working class families. In the 1960s, there was no free education and the provision of education from the government was insufficient.[147] Few families were able to sacrifice their meager earnings to the expensive education of their children.[148] Consequently, the poorly-educated second generation of the refugees had little

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[146] In 1951, about 30, 000 people (or 30% of the workforce) were unemployed (Scott 1989, p.67). In the mid-1950s, the unemployment rate was 15-17% (Lin 1985, p.397). Among the post-war immigrants, the rate was 15.1% in 1954 (Hambro 1955, p.47).

[147] For instance, in 1960-1, the revenue of the government was $859 million. The expenditure on education was about $94.6 million, which was only 11% of the total expenditure of the year (about $845 million). In 1964, the revenue was $1518 million. The expenditure on education was about $180 million, which was 12.5% of the total expenditure of $1440 million (Calculation based on the data from Scott 1989, p.74 table 2.3 and Podmore 1971, p.44 table 2.15).

[148] According to the 1966 By-Census, 22% of those aged 5-14 did not attend school at all (Podmore 1971, p.42).

chance to move upward. They were confined on the bottom level of the education and occupational structures.

Regarding working lives, the masses were in a disadvantageous position. For one thing, a substantial proportion of the labour force was employed in lower level posts.[149] These jobs were usually associated with lower than average income.[150] Most often than not, these low-paid jobs required that the workers worked for extremely long hours in an unsafe environment.[151] But even for the workers willing to work, their incomes were not guaranteed. Their jobs were insecure and their incomes fluctuated greatly from month to month.[152] Thus, few workers were able to improve their

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[149] In 1961, 42% of workers were employed in labour-intensive, low cost manufacturing industries (Youngson 1982, p.17). In 1969, Mitchell used a 8-point occupational scale to classify the jobs of his respondents. He found that 54% of the labour force were worked in lower level posts, and 53% of the workers perceived their jobs as below average or low prestige jobs (1972, p.134, p.358). Furthermore, 44% of the sons' occupations were lower than the fathers' occupations (Ibid., p.143-4).

[150] In 1966, the average household income of the poorest 20% was HK$166 and the middle 40-60% was HK$436. Meanwhile, the average daily wages in manufacturing industries of the unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled workers were HK$ 8.2, 13.25, and 17.75 respectively. If the unskilled workers worked 30 days without rest, then they were able to obtain a salary of $246 which was higher than the income of the poorest. However, this scarcely happened since the fluctuation of employment and wage cuts were common. Therefore, it is reasonable to hold that these jobs were low-paid (Hsia & Chau 1978, p.131 & 147).

[151] Until 1968, there was no regulation on the working hours for women and young workers aged 16 to 18. Even today, there is no protection for male workers on this issue. As a result, 8 to 9 hours a day plus overtime and six days a week were not uncommon (England 1971, p.221). In Mitchell's comparative survey, 52% of Hong Kong workers had to work 10 hours a day or more, which was the highest rate among the five Asian cities. At the same time, the rates of workers worked 7 days a week was 58%, which was also the highest one in comparison to five Southeast Asian cities (1972, p.324-7).

[152] Fluctuation in income was caused by fluctuation in employment. In Hong Kong, fluctuation in employment was common. For the fierce competition in the manufacturing industries, there was no guarantee for the factory owners to get contracts from the buyers. When this was the case, workers would be laid off . For example, in 1963, 55 garment factories were closed and equivalent to 2.5% of the workers were laid off (England 1971, p.212). This is why in Mitchell's study, 39% of the respondents had a great fluctuating income from month to month (1972, p.272). In Salaff's study on the working daughters of Hong Kong, her informants had the same sufferings. "[The young female workers] put in long hours for relatively low wages and their job tenure was uncertain .... "(1981, p.119).

standard of living.[153] Indeed, poverty was so severe that during the early 1960s, one third of the population lived under the poverty line.[154] Worse still, as argued by Scott, the new-created wealth was not re-distributed throughout the society (1989, p.72). The unequal distribution of income reached its highest level in the 1960s.[155] Thus, the rapid industrialization created a disparity between the rich and the poor.

Under this circumstance, the masses were the most unhappy citizens in comparison with the other four Southeast Asian cities.[156] They had to worry a great deal in their course of life. They had a high degree of anxiety of economic matters, such as money and jobs.[157] They were very dissatisfied with their career, living situation, and their life.[158] They were pessimistic

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[153] According to Mitchell's study, the earnings of the majority (55%) remained the same at best, or decreased at worst, compared to their income three years before (1972, p.156-7).

[154] In 1963/64, 35.6% of the population lived below the poverty line (Islam & Chowdhury 1997, p.115).

[155] Income inequality can be reflected through the following three indicators. First, the income distribution showed that a wide gap existed between the poor and the rich from 1957 to 1966. The shares of income for the two poorest income groups decreased from 5.7 to 4.7 % and 9.7 to 8.4% respectively while the richest's share increased from 56.2% to 58% (Lin 1985, p.395). Gini coefficient, the second indicator, also showed an increase from 0.48 in 1957 to 0.5 in 1964 (Ibid., p.395). Finally, the maximum equalization percentage (MEP) in the 1950s and the 1960s were decreased from 0.462 to 0.381. The changes of the MEP represented a substantial proportion of total income of Hong Kong would have been transferred from the rich to the poor if an absolute equality had to be achieved (Ibid., p.393-5).

[156] According to a large survey conducted in 1967, 33% of the sample said they were quite or very unhappy which was the highest rate in comparison with Taipei, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Bangkok. This proportion was two times larger than the second one. The same survey also showed that 54% of its sample worried a great deal or somewhat (Mitchell 1972, p.22-4).

[157] In Mitchell's study, the majority of respondents worried about money frequently. Besides, among nine other items, money and job were identified by the respondents as the things they worried the most (1972, p.284-7).

[158] In Mitchell's study, Hong Kong workers had the highest rates of dissatisfaction in comparison with the other 4 Asian cities. 32% of the respondents expressed their dissatisfaction with their present living situation. With regard to their career, 41% of the respondents felt dissatisfied (1972, p.191). In fact, only 24% said they liked their jobs (Ibid., p.375). More importantly, 30% said they had no satisfaction in life. Again, this proportion was the highest one among the other cities (Ibid., p.288).

about their future.[159] If alienation refers to the lack of intrinsic satisfaction of jobs, and the denial of the actualization of human potentials, then the unhappy masses with empty lives and gloomy futures were really alienated. The dissatisfied masses eventually became the unstable force in Hong Kong society.

From Refugees Mentality to the Emergence of the Hong Kong Ethos

The refugees' experience.

After the Second World War, a large population flocked into the tiny war-torn city. A substantial proportion of this population were new immigrants.[160] Many came to Hong Kong with nothing but a few clothes and a single sheet of mat. Although they suffered many hardships, they were determined to struggle for survival. After twenty years, these immigrants and their second generation were relieved from the miserable experience of refugees. They possessed a distinct outlook and behaviour, that marked them out from other Chinese communities around the world.

It is impossible for us to claim a causal relationship between the refugee experience and those ethos. Yet, it is equally wrong to ignore the impact of this particular experience. We suggest that to comprehend the Hong Kong people in the 1970s, it will be fruitful to trace this ethos back to the refugees experience. Therefore, the following paragraphs will describe this particular refugee experience. A description of the Hong Kong ethos and its

[159] In Mitchell's study, only 18% of the respondents were optimistic about their future. This minority believed they had a chance to be successful (Ibid., p.173).

[160] The term, "new immigrants" were the immigrants who had never resided in the territory. Thus, citizens who returned to the City after WWII and those who had immigrated to the Colony before WWII, the so-called pre-war immigrants, were not included in this category.

relationship with the refugees experience will be given at the end of this section.

Table 2 Hong Kong Population from 1945 to 1952

Year	Population at end of year[1]	Natural Increase[2]	Immigrants[3]
1945	(600 000 \ 900 000)	--	--
1946	1 400 000	14445	485555
1947	1 800 000	29242	370758
1948	2 000 000	34041	165959
1949	2 300 000	38487	261513
1950	2 100 000	42135	-242135
1951	2 175 000	47920	27080
1952	2 250 000	52517	22483

Source of 1: Hambro 1955, p.148. Table 9, column 6.
Source of 2: Ibid., p.145. Table 5, column 7.
Source of 3: My calculation which is based on the information of column 2 and 3.

While migration was nothing unusual to the territory, the size, background, and prospects of the refugees after the end of the Second World War were different from the sojourners or pre-war immigrants. The refugees' miserable living conditions in Hong Kong became such a problem that even the international community expressed its concerns.[161]

During the three years' period of Civil War on the mainland China (1947-1949), many people came to Hong Kong from elsewhere in the country. As a result, the size of this immigration was unprecedented. Table 2 shows that from 1946 to 1949, the population increased by 900,000. However, the total natural increase in the territory was barely more than one hundred thousand. Hence, the increase was mainly due to immigration. The approximate number was one million which was 56% of the total population

in 1949. After this substantial increase, immigration tended to increase in a moderate way during the early 1950s.

Unlike the previous transient individuals, these newly arrived immigrants did not intend to make a fortune in the Colony. Indeed, many of them were educated and had decent jobs in China.[162] The reason that these immigrants voluntarily came to the Colony and subjected themselves to an alien ruling was mainly political. The following table is given for illustration.

Table 3. Percentage of post-war immigrants in H.K. according to reasons for leaving China and unwilling to return.

Reasons for leaving China	Post-war immigrants arrived in							
	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952
Political	4.7	4.3	4.5	21.1	65.4	68.9	58.9	37.1
Economic	89.9	92.7	85.4	69.3	24.6	19.9	32.6	40.0
Pol. & Eco.	0.7	1.3	3.4	8.4	9.5	10.8	8.5	17.1
Unwilling to return								
For political reasons	10.6	13.0	25.6	39.3	80.0	82.7	72.5	75.5
For economic reasons	86.2	82.3	64.5	56.8	19.8	16.8	25.5	24.5
For family reasons	1.4	3.2	6.5	2.8	0.2	0.1	--	--

Source: Summarized from Hambro 1955, p.152, table 14 and p.154, table 15.

Before the outbreak of the civil war in China in 1947, the large majority of immigrants came for economic reasons. This tendency began to change in 1948. By the end of the Civil War in 1949 and in the subsequent years, political reasons became the major concern for the majority of the

[161] For instance, the United Nations assigned a research team to study the problem of the refugees. Many Christian organizations also sent relief to the territory from their overseas headquarters.

[162] According to the 1954 survey done by the United Nations, 57.3% of these immigrants had secondary and higher level of education. Among the 'Hong Kong Born Family' and 'Pre-War immigrants,' the proportion were only 21.1 and 20.9 respectively (Hambro 1955, p.176. Table 39). Besides, 41.6% of these immigrants were clerks, business men, professionals, intellectuals, and military officers. Only 0.2% were unemployed on the Mainland.

immigrants. In fact, 250 000 immigrants in 1954 were classified by the United Nations research team as political refugees (Hambro 1955, p.162, table 24). Moreover, among these post-war immigrants, 99.4% were unwilling to return to the Mainland (Ibid., p.155, table 16). Political reasons were their major concern and it was especially the case among those who arrived in the Colony between 1949 to 1952. Thus, unlike the sojourners in the past, these immigrants were strongly motivated by political reasons. They had no home to return to and nowhere to go. What they could do was struggle for their survival in the Colony.

Since the influx of the immigrants coincided with the disastrous collapse of entrepôt trade in the early 1950s, the life of these immigrants in the Colony was miserable. The living condition of the refugees were the worst in the society.[163] The unemployment figures among the refugees was higher than that of the local residents.[164] Finally, the family income of the refugees was limited. A survey showed that 66.9% of the respondents' family income was H.K.$100 or less, and 15.7% was H.K.$101-150. This amount of income was far below the subsistence level.[165]

Worse still, the government was unwilling and unable to provide any immediate relief for the immigrants. For one thing, if we recall the Colonial

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[163] In a sample survey, 10,000 immigrants were streets sleepers. Another 150,000 had to live in squatter huts and 395,000 in cubicles (Hambro 1955, p.175, table 37).

[164] In 1954, the proportion of unemployed among the Hong Kong born residents, pre-war immigrants, and post-war immigrants were 8%, 11.5% and 15.1% respectively (Ibid., p.170, table 31).

[165] In 1952-53, daily wage for unskilled labour was about H.K.$3.5 to H.K.$5.0. (H.K.$1= U.S.$0.175 at that time). Hence, the monthly wage would be $105-150. The minimum income for a minimum subsistence level was $120-150 for a family of 2 adults with 2 children

government's non-interference policy, it is not difficult to anticipate its attitudes towards the refugees' problem. Instead of providing assistance for the refugees, the government spared no effort to create jobs by stimulating industrial investment.[166] If the immigrants found jobs, they could solve the rest of their problems. Under this circumstance, the immigrants could rely only on themselves.

The Hong Kong ethos.

Twenty years later, the immigrants and their children were no longer refugees. Rather, they were the prominent part of the Hong Kong society.[167] They developed a distinct "Hong Kong ethos"(Baker 1983, p.478). It included a short-sighted, fetish of material wealth and money, utilitarianistic familism, and an aloof attitude towards politics.

Hong Kong people perceived "life in the short term" (Baker 1983, p.478). The majority of the Hong Kong people could not bother to think about their future. From their miserable refugee experience, the masses knew the future was unpredictable. An unpredictable future also represented a limited short period of a happy present. This is why the Hong Kong people said, "Let's not worry about tomorrow's problems. Enjoy your wine while you can."

(Ibid., p.49). Since 66.9% of the refugees earned $100 or under, they were living far below the subsistence level.

[166] For instance, leases on industrial land use was set below the market rates (Berger & Lester 1997, p.16).

[167] In 1954, the United Nations' sample survey showed that 44.1% of these immigrants were between 22-44 years old and 21.3% were between 5-14 (Ibid., p.165). Besides, the 1971 Hong Kong census showed that 43.6% were not local born (Data obtained directly from the Census and Statistics Department of Hong Kong via e-mail). Hence, it is safely to infer that during the 1970s, a substantial part of the local residents were either the former immigrants or their children. They were the dominant labour force in the 1970s. So, in terms of their size

Consequently, both the government and individuals in the borrowed time and borrowed place did not embrace any long-term planning.[168] Instead, they were willing to take short cuts and run risks in order to maximize the instant gratification or profit.

The other aspect of the Hong Kong ethos was the obsession with material wealth and money (Lau 1983). The Hong Kong people so emphasized the value of material wealth and money that material wealth and money became the major criteria to evaluate the worth of an object or a person during the 1970s (Mitchell 1972, p.68). As early as 1960s, Mitchell had already discovered that "earning a lot of money" was equivalent to the fulfillment in life in the Hong Kong society (1972, p.113). Thus, money making became the most significant force to motivate people for work.

Why were the Hong Kong people so obsessed with material wealth and money? This is difficult to account for. We suggest the possible hint may lie in the post-war immigrants' motivations for leaving China. If we look back to table 3, we found that between 1945 to 1948, the big majority of immigrants came to Hong Kong for economic reasons. Even in 1952, there was still a substantial proportion of immigrants who left China for economic reasons. Obviously, the poverty on the Mainland was unbearable. When they went to

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and their contribution to the economic growth of Hong Kong, it is reasonable to say that they were the prominent part of the society.

[168] A survey in 1977 showed 67.1% of the respondents did not have any planning for the next two to three years. 80.4% replied they did not have any planning for the future fifteen to twenty years (Lau 1983, p.70). Meanwhile,
the reluctance of the government to plan ahead is fully expressed in the following statement of Bremridge, the Financial Secretary in 1981. "I hate looking ahead. You can talk about looking ahead 10 or 15 years - in this part of the world 5 years is a lifetime .... You get very

the Colony and voluntarily subjected themselves to an alien government, they were determined to improve their livelihood. In addition, Gording Redding suggested that the misery of the refugee life helped create a "hunger drive" (quoted by Geddes 1982, p.13). The former refugees would never forget the pauperism they had experienced before. Since the future was uncertain, the only way to have a secure future guaranteed was by the means of money. Therefore, it was natural for the people to strive for money and material wealth under this circumstance.

Utilitarianistic familism was the third aspect of the Hong Kong ethos (Lau 1983). To Lau, utilitarianistic familism refers to individuals' overriding concern of familial interests. They placed their familial interests above the interest of society and of other individuals and groups. Inter-personal relationships were built for the purpose of the furtherance of familial interests (Ibid., p.72). Utilitarianistic familism was a unique product that was created under the traditionally Chinese cultural influence and the pragmatic calculation in the particular socio and economic setting of Hong Kong. Since the Colonial government offered little assistance to the refugees, the latter had to rely on themselves. To those who had families, they were able to pool resources from their family members.[169] Gradually, a unique normative and

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rigid if you start thinking in terms of what's going to happen in 10 or 15 years. I don't know what's going to happen in 2 years" (Geddes 1982, p.24).

[169] Bear in mind, the hardships and the pressure of unemployment for the singles was more severe than for those who had families with them. Unfortunately, the United Nations survey suggested 29.8% of the post-war immigrants were single (Hambro 1955, p.167 Table 28).

behavioral tendency, utilitarianistic familism, was formed in the 1970s (Ibid., p.72-81).[170]

This behavioral tendency was unique in three senses. In the first place, it emphasized utilitarianistic considerations. Traditionally, family is a unit tied by blood, marriage, and having a common budget and common property (Lang 1946, p.13). But in Hong Kong, even quasi-kinship was accepted to be familial members and treated as "all-in-the-family" (yi jia ren) as long as they could provide economic assistance (Lau 1983, p.74).[171] Moreover, since the mutual assistance was based on utilitarianistic calculation instead of filial piety, it could not foster solidarity and harmony among the familial members. Due to the economic pressure, the family often became a source of strain rather than harmony to the members.[172] Once the mutual economic assistance was gone, the fragile relationship broke up too. Finally, in the Great Learning, Confucians maintained that regulating family was important but individuals should not confine themselves to family affairs.[173] Rather, they should

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[170] Lau is not the only one who observed the importance of family as a resources pool. The Canadian sociologist, Janet Salaff, conducted a participation observation from 1971 to 1976 in Hong Kong and found a smiliar phenomenon. However, she called it as centripetal form of family. Since the heads of households' were not enough to support a family, and comprehensive welfare provisions were absent, "poor families [were] thrown back upon their kin to obtain short- and long-term economic assistance. The resulting form of domestic cooperation for economic survival and betterment [was] the family wage economy" (1981, p.9).

[171] Quasi-kinship are individuals with same surname or speak the same dialect. Normally, they were not relatives in any sense. For this difference, Lau deliberately used the term "familial group" instead of "family" (1983, p.73).

[172] In Mitchell's study on urban family life, couples in Hong Kong usually quarreled with each other because of money-related issues regardless of the family's income level (1972, p.113). Since family was the pool of economic resources, it gave financial pressure to its members. As a result, family became a source of strain to many Hong Kong people in the 1970s.

[173] Cultivation has four successive goals. The first level is to cultivate personal life. Then, regulate family. After that, manage the state. Finally, the supreme level is to bring peace throughout the world (Chan 1969, p.86). So cultivation is not merely for the purpose of

concern the world affairs. Yet, as stated above, under the influence of utilitarianistic familism, everything except familial interests was ignored. This result is contrary to the Confucian teachings.

In short, since utilitarianistic concern replaced the moral and civic concern of traditional Confucianism, the family generated resentment instead of harmony, centrifuge instead of solidarity, and detachment instead of devotion to social affairs among its members.

The other aspect of the Hong Kong ethos in the second phase was "political aloofness"(Lau 1983, p.102). A survey conducted in 1972 showed that only 12.7% of the respondents were active political participants (Ibid., p.113).[174] In other words, most of the citizens distanced themselves from politics.

It is not difficult to comprehend this attitude towards politics. In the first place, many refugees deeply believed that politics was dangerous. Most immigrants came to the Colony for political reasons. They might not be against Communist China, but definitely they would avoid any involvement in politics since their experience in Mainland reminded them that politics was

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oneself. Rather, sages have to concern the world and indeed it is their responsibility. This is the ideal for both Classical Confucianism and neo-Confucianism.

[174] We did not provide any voting data as an indicator of political involvement since there was no important election, such as Legislative Council election, in the Colony in this period. The only election was the Urban Council. However, this election was "conducted on a highly restricted franchise" (Miners 1986, p.168). To be an eligible voter, a person had to pass the School Certificate Examination (equivalent to the GCE O-Level), and be a salaried tax-payer, business man, or member of some listed professional associations. In 1979, both economic conditions and education levels of the population had greatly improved, yet still there were only 440,000 eligible voters (Ibid., p.168). Since the great majority were ineligible to vote, we think the voting rate could not be a good indicator of political involvement.

dangerous.[175] This belief still existed until the 1960s.[176] Besides, the life of refugees was so miserable that they had no extra energy to concern themselves with anything else except their livelihood and their familial interests. Therefore, it was reasonable for the government to take care of the politics. Finally, there was always a sense of powerlessness among the masses. For instance, in 1972, a survey showed that 81.9% of the respondents said they could do nothing to change any unjust government regulation (Ibid., p.106). Even in 1977, Lau's survey showed that 91.1% of his respondents said they had no power to change the society and 96.7% said they had no influence on the formation of government policy (Ibid., p.106). In short, the public depended on the government to maintain a stable society. However, for various reasons, they were unwilling or unable to participate in public affairs. As a result, they might not consider the Colony as perfect; nevertheless they were willing to tolerate its deficiencies.

In summary, during the Civil War period, a large amount of immigrants came to the Colony. Twenty years later, they were able to build a new life in the city; nonetheless, they were still haunted by the miserable refugee experience and the anxiety of an uncertain future. Whenever they

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[175] Political struggles never ended on the Mainland. For instance, there was white horror in the Nationalistic Republic of China. Then, there was anti-landlords, anti-right campaigns, and finally the Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic of China. The immigrants might not be involved in politics, but there was probability that they had heard these struggles. So it was reasonable that they would think politics were dangerous and avoid any involvement.

[176] In 1966-67, a survey showed that 27% did not fear to criticize the police force. 33% said they could not criticize the police force without any fear of future punishment. More importantly, 40% refused to answer (Lau 1983, p.108). It revealed that a substantial part of the respondents might think the question was so sensitive. To avoid any punishment in the future, it was safer not to express any attitudes at all. Although this survey focused on freedom of speech and that specific question involved the abuse of police power, it indirectly reflected the public's fear of any involvement in public affairs.

tried to transcend their immediate locale, they felt trapped.[177] For the large majority, Hong Kong was their only alternative. There was no home to return to and nowhere to go. Unfortunately, the Colony was a borrowed time in a borrowed place. They did not know the future and had no idea where they were heading. They were trapped once again. Although they tried hard not to think beyond the immediate locale, the feeling of directionlessness and the sense of powerlessness were subconsciously expressed in different ways.[178] Meanwhile, a particular ethos of Hong Kong was created when the Hong Kong people shifted their attentions to the present moment and concentrated their energies on material betterment.

Although the short-sighted and utilitarianistic Hong Kong ethos was dominant in the second phase, it is important to acknowledge that some changes occurred even in the 1970s. First, there were differences in political attitudes according to the age and the education of the population. In the Kwun Tong Survey of 1971, the researchers found that the youth and the better educated did think they had political efficacy and they were more willing to do something to change any regulation they considered unfair. The researchers described this new generation as "doers" who "exhibit greater feelings of potential power over the course of their lives" (Shively & Shively

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[177] Since C.W. Mills' description of the uneasy feeling of the masses is precisely what the Hong Kong people felt, I adopted his sentence here (See Mills 1970 (1959), p.1).

[178] Movies were one of the ways that allows us to detect this feeling. Jarvie found that both Cantonese and Mandarin films did not use life in Hong Kong as their central themes. Rather, the story was always situated in a remote or unspecified time and located in an unreal or unspecified setting. "Where people in trouble ... [they] do not know what action to take, where to turn." This might be only a commercial concern, yet Jarvie believed it reflected some aspects of the society itself. "All these patterns tell us perhaps of a society that has lost

1972, p.36-9). Second, some citizens began to ask for some kind of participation in public affairs. In Lau's 1977 survey, 58.5% of his respondents expressed their desire to influence the government. In the same year, a poll also showed that 50% of the respondents preferred to have elected Legislative Councilors (1983, p.107). Third, the public was more willing and knew how to express their grievances. In 1972, King's survey showed that 63.4% of his respondents did not know how to exert political influence (Ibid., p.113). Ten years later, 46.9% of the respondents were willing to take action if they disagreed with government policy. They also knew quite well what the action would be, such as contacting the officials in charge (34.5%) or filing complaints via media (22.4%). Even 7.3% of them said they might petition to the governor or other high-level officials (Ibid., p.115). In other words, there were signs of change among the new generation. Their life experience and the new social and economic conditions would make this new generation act differently from the last generation.

The Relationship between the Government and the Public in the Post-war Period

In the first two decades of the post-war period, there was no fundamental change in the colonial regime's rulership. The territory was still governed by a non-accountable executive-led government with the Governor at the pinnacle of the power structure and the bureaucracy operating at the next level. Despite the fact that the colonial government had subtantially

its bearings, does not know where it is, still less where it is going, [and] is unable to take command of the tide of events...." (1977, p.93).

increased the size of the bureaucracy to manage a more complex post-war society, the non-interference policy was still the basic administrative approach of the government.[179] Overall, the ruling method remained unchanged at the beginning of the post-war period.

As in the pre-war period, the colonial regime did face new challenges to its legimitacy in the new social circumstance. After World War Two, the proposal of a strong, autonomous, and more representative municiple council to take over many functions of the central government was rejected by the Governor Grantham.[180] If democratic political reform was denied, then the alternative way to legitimize the regime's governance could only depend on the maintenance of social stability, and hence, on the growth of the economy. In return, the economic growth would enhance political stability. Therefore, the government had increased the size and power of the bureaucracy so that it was strong enough to accomplish this objective (King 1981, p.133; Scott 1989, p.79). In short, it was hoped that this new strategy together with the administrative absorption tactics and the non-interventional approach would work well to win the public support for the colonial regime's governance.

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[179] The number of departments steadily increased after WWII. The establishment was about twenty thousand in 1954/55. The highest growth rates of the establishment was found from 1956/57 to 1959/60. The average growth rate of this period was 14.9% which was higher than the average growth rates of the 1960s and the 1970s (Lau 1983, p.50. Table 2.2).

[180] By the end of WWII, the preservation of the British Colony was challenged by the United States. At the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt promised to give Hong Kong back to China. Churchill was furious on this issue. Immediately after the War, the Labour party formed a new government in London. Under this new circumstance, the pressure for a more representative system in Hong Kong emerged. Thus, Governor Young put forward the proposal to alleviate the anti-colonial sentiment. However, due to the strong disagreement of the Executive and Legislative Councilors, and the will of the new Governor Grantham (1947-1958), the proposal was dropped in 1952 (Endacott 1973, p.304; Scott 1989, p.78-9).

All of these tactics, however, were unable to prevent the regime from a legitimacy crisis in the 1960s for the following reasons. In the first place, a communication gap between the government and the public was created in the new social milieu. In the pre-war social environment, the Chinese elites were so influential in the local community that the government could rely on them to obtain public support for its governance. Consequently, communication was solely between bureaucratic elites and social elites (King 1981, p.141). The Chinese elites, however, had totally lost their influence in the new social milieu. They were unable to exert the same degree of social control over the masses as in the pre-war period (Scott 1989, p.78). Meanwhile, the bureaucracy was isolated from any threat that would undermine its autonomy. Yet, seclusion also limited the bureacracy's contact with the public (Leung 1996, p.15). Since the traditional communication channel was broken down and a new channel was not established, a communication gap was created between the government and the governed. As a result, the resentment of the public to an unaccountable government could not be expressed.

Meanwhile, the traditional non-intervention approach was inappropriate in the new social environment. The argument of this approach works as follows. The Chinese could take care of themselves and wanted nothing from the government. If the regime did not undertake any undue intervention, the Chinese community would not initiate actions against the authority. Hence, the government should keep a low profile in the Chinese community by limiting its role to basic system maintenance such as law and order.

The non-interventional approach, however, could work only if the following assumptions were true. The first one was a cultural assumption. It assumed that the Chinese were politically indifferent and they would passively subordinate to the authority. The Chinese were said to be afraid of politics because the Chines proverb stated, "Do not fall into the Hell when die; do not enter into the Office when live." The second one was an economic assumption. It assumed the self-sufficiency of the Chinese community. The Chinese would take care of themselves and would not depend on the government's provisions. The final one was a social assumption. It assumed the Hong Kong society remained unchanged before and after the Second World War. The structure and value orientation of the population would remain unchanged as before.

Unfortunately, these assumption were problematic. For one thing, there were big differences between the pre-war and the post-war societies. The population was rapidly increasing due to the influx of refugees. Unlike the transient individuals in the pre-war period, these new immigrants brought their families with them. Consequently, social provisions were in great demand. However, traditional assistance based on kinship was unable to fulfill these demands due to the size of the immigrant population. As stated in the previous section, one third of population was still living under the poverty line during the early 1960s. The problem of poverty clearly showed that the Chinese community was no longer self-sufficient.

In addition, the assumption of Chinese's political indifference was challenged from two directions. On the one hand, the Chinese would only

obey a benevolent, righteous ruler who had concern for his subordinates. As Mencius said,

> "He who injures humanity is a bandit. He who injures [the] righteous is a destructive person. Such a person is a mere fellow. I have heard of killing a mere fellow Chou, but I have not heard of murdering the ruler." [181](Mencius translated by Chan 1969, p.62).

Therefore, if a ruler could not fulfill his duties and was indifferent to his people, it was morally right for the people to revolt against him. Likewise, if the colonial government turned its back on social demands, the Chinese would not be politically indifferent. And this kind of action would be justified by Chinese culture.

On the other hand, new agents of socialization had fundamentally changed the value-orientation of the young population. Since the 1960s, schools and peer groups in the work places had already replaced the family as the agents of socialization. In her interview with the working females in Hong Kong, Salaff found that socialization was beyond the capabilities and scope of the families. "Their parents have been unable to train them ... and they therefore control a smaller portion of their daughters' lives today" (1981, p.257). Consequently, there were essential changes in the value-orientation of the new generation. As Shively and Shively said in their 1971 survey, "[since the young population was] not being socialized in the family-centered interpersonal relationships ... they are more likely to deviate from traditional

[181] The Great Declaration stated, "Heaven sees as my people see; Heaven hears as my people hear" (Chan 1969, p.78). It means the ruler was expected to have a "concern consciousness" towards the society (Mou 1963, p.16-17). The people's needs and opinions were equivalent to the Heaven's mandate. Mencius, the second important philosophers in the school of Confucianism, suggested in the passage that "a wicked king has lost the Mandate of Heaven and it should to some one else" (Chan's comment on the passage we quoted above 1969, p.62).

values" (1972, p.28). This young population perceived themselves as "doers" and were able to change their families, lives, and unfair regulations (Ibid., p.36). In other words, the new generation had a higher expectation for themselves and the government than their parents. Therefore, the assumption of a politically indifferent population was no longer sustainable.

After considering all of these changes, we can understand that the riots in the 1960s were inevitable due to the obsolete administrative policy of the colonial government. For one thing, economic growth did not improve the living condition of the masses. Yet, the government did nothing to help the masses because of its belief in the non-interventionist approach. In the eyes of the public, this approach only represented the indifference of the colonial regime. The new generation was especially upset about the social situation for they could not see their future. However, there was no way to express the frustration of the youth. The communication channel between the government and the public broke down due to the outmoded administrative absorption tactics in the new social environment. Under this circumstance, the discontent of the new generation could only be expressed in the form of riots. The first riot took place in 1966 and occurred again in 1967. It was only after 1967 that the government began to be aware the implications and importance of these riots and to change its policy.

The new crisis of legitimacy and the coming of the new governor Sir Maclehose forced the government to change its approach to governing the City. Externally, the government tried to contain the masses. Internally, the

government attempted to reform the bureaucracy. Accordingly, four kinds of actions were taken by the government in 1968.

First, the administrative absorption of politics was modified. After the riot of 1967, the government finally realized that there was a gap between the government and the masses. To address the grass-roots grievances, the City District Officer Scheme was introduced in 1968. Its aim was "to extend the communications networks outwards and deeply into the lower strata of Hong Kong society" (Scott 1989, p.141). In addition, the government helped to organize the Mutual Aid Committee in every apartment. It encouraged the responsible dwellers to participate in the management of the apartment. While the Committee played a community role, it was also the government's watchful eye. In short, the City District Office and the Mutual Aid Committees "gave the government links with the population which it had never before enjoyed" (Ibid., p.142-3). From this point of view, the new communication was emphasized between bureaucratic elites and the masses. Through these devices, a vertical integration was formed in the new era.

The second action was to impose a political socialization on the youth. Through the City District Offices, the government mobilized students to do voluntary services in the community. It also sponsored voluntary agencies in promoting recreatonal activities. Apparently, these activities were apolitical in nature, yet the latent meaning and intention were political. These activities inculcated a "community-oriented civic consciousness" among the youth (King 1981, p.142). Once the youth possessed this civic consciousness, they were transformed from potential trouble-makers into good citizens and

probably future community leaders. Therefore, the government wanted to create a political culture to support rather than to go against the regime (Ibid., p.142).

The third action was the new Governor's will and determination on social provisions. When Maclehose came to Hong Kong, the economic development of the Colony had already generated a large amount of revenue. It allowed the Governor to expand its public expenditure without increasing the tax or jeoparding the capitalists' interests. Under the Governor's determination, the Ten Year Housing Programme and the New Towns Policy were carried out in the early 1970s. On education, free primary education and nine years of free compulsory education was implemented in 1978. On social welfare, some forms of assistance for vulnerable groups were introduced in the colony for the first time. Moreover, industrial relations were addressed by the government. New industrial regulations were introduced in 1968 to provide some protection for the labourer (Leung 1996, p.23).

The fourth kind of action was related to the reorganization of the civil service. The government employed the McKinsey consultants in 1972 to study the reorganization and reform of the civil service. Accordingly, reforms were made on four areas: (1) strengthing the efficiency of the government machinery; (2) establishing long-term planning machinery; (3) improving personnel management; (4) reorganizing the government into branches (policy formulation) and departments (policy implementation) (Scott 1989, p.134-6). In addition, the Governor committed himself combating corruption and thus established the Independent Commission Against Corruption in 1973.

In conclusion, we tend to think of 1968 as the watershed of the second phase of the Colony. Before 1968, the Colony still employed the out-moded way of governing the territory. Its non-interventionist approach showed the government's indifference. The secluded bureaucracy created a gap between the government and the public. Discontent was generated by the lack of social provisions and the change of value orientation among the new population. The result of this discontent was the legitimacy crisis expressed in the riots of the 1960s. After 1968, the Colonial regime modified its strategy although depoliticization was still the goal. It tried to obtain the consent of the people through two ways. First, consent was obtained through a pseudo-consultation mechanism, the City District Office. Second, consent was achieved through the provision of social services. The expansion of public housing and education improved the standard of living for the poor. The public expenditure had greatly reduced the social inequality of the society. Consequently, the government of Hong Kong was successfully regain the consent of the public. Since then, the government has enjoyed the highest degree of autonomy for a decade.

The Third Phase (1982-1997)

The end of the MacLehose era and the initiation of the Sino-British negotiation in 1982 marked the beginning of the end of the British colonial period. The third phase was characterized by the emergence of the Hong Kong identity in a politicized Hong Kong society. In the 1980s, Hong Kong was no longer a society of rootless sojourners or refugees. Rather, the new locally born generation perceived Hong Kong as their home and developed a

sentiment of attachment to the city. They broke down the fatalism and acquired a strong sense of political efficacy.[182] Meanwhile, the city was overshadowed by the resumption of the Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1st July 1997. The concern over 1997 forced the local people to focus on the political situation and to ponder their identity and future. As such, the turbulent political environment did arouse the public's political consciousness, consolidate their local identity, and educate the public on citizenship. The result was the emergence of a generation of autonomous individuals with a local identity in a politicized society.

The Social and Economic Structural Changes

Since the 1980s, Hong Kong society has undergone a series of economic, social, and political structural changes. These changes gave rise to a new generation with a strong sense of political efficacy and willingness to perform their civic duties. Economically, the Hong Kong economy has gone through a structural transformation during the past two decades. As early as the late 1970s, the manufacturing industries had faced a series of challenges.[183] While some industrialists diversified their markets and upgraded their products, the majority simply moved their factories to the special economic zones in China where the cost of production was much lower

[182] According to Lau, political efficacy means "the feeling that one's individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties" (1983, p.106). Therefore, those who have a strong sense of political efficacy are more likely to participate in public affairs.

[183] These challenges include the decreasing demand of low quality, mass-production consumer goods in the United States and the European countries, the rise of world-wide protectionism, the competition from other Southeast Asian developing countries.

than in Hong Kong.[184] In the meantime, financial services and other supporting services were in demand. Surplus labour was absorbed into the service sectors. In the 1990s, the tertiary services sector finally replaced the secondary production sector as the pillar of the city's economy.[185] Accordingly, a "new middle class" composed of administrative, managerial employees, and professionals emerged in the new economic environment.[186]

Meanwhile, there were structural changes in Hong Kong society. In the first place, there were demographic changes in the latest stage. For the first time in the city's history, the immigrant population was outnumbered by the native population.[187] The 1991 census showed that the local population was mainly composed of the young, locally-born generation (Government

[184] Special economic zones were established in 1980 under the open door economic policy of China.

[185] The manufacturing sector's share declined from about one-fourth of GDP in 1980 to less than 9% in 1995. The employment of this sector fell from 41% of total employment in 1980, to 13% in 1995. At the same time, the combined share of services rose from two-thirds of GDP to about 85%. The employment of the share of four key service sectors rose from 37% of the total in 1980 to 63% in 1995 (Dodsworth & Mihaljek 1997, p.7).

[186] The idea of new middle class is controversial due to the difficulties in conceptualizing its definition, class boundary, and political role. The local scholars have different opinions on the issue. Some affirm that the new middle class took on an important and progressive leadership role in society during the 1990s (e.g. Scott 1989, So 1992 and 1993, Hook 1993, Davies 1989). Others doubt its existence (e.g. Wang 1993). Yet others, the issue is not the existence of the new middle class but rather the uncertainty of the political role it takes. They have a range of options from active involvement, political aloof, to emigration (e.g. Lui 1993). In here, we see the new middle class as a social category and not as a "class for itself." We also agree with Lui that the political role of the new middle class is uncertain.

[187] The population before the 1970s were mainly composed of refugees and immigrants. The 1961 census showed that 47.7% of the total population were locally born. In the next two decades, the number of the native and the in-comers were approximately equally distributed. The percentages of the locally born population corresponding to the 1971 and 1981 census were 56.4% and 57.2% respectively (The 1961 & 1971 data came from the Department of Census and Statistics via e-mail inquiry; the 1981 data came from the Government Information Service 1982, p.228).

Information Service 1984, p.410).[188] Accordingly, Hong Kong was no longer a refugee society.[189]

The new generation's political outlook departed from the old generation's fatalism and political inefficacy. Unlike their parents, the young locally born generation had a strong feelings of attachment to Hong Kong. Their educational attainment was higher than the past generation's.[190] In other words, traditional socialization agent like family was less influential to the young generation. More importantly, the new generation did not have the insecure refugees experience. It was hardly conceivable to them that politics was dangerous; therefore, they were more willing to participate in political affairs. The sense of belonging and commitment to Hong Kong of the new generation became the foundation of Hong Kong identity.[191]

Apart from demographic changes, a process of disorganization was also taking place in the society due to the rapid industrialization and urbanization. The decline of the traditional organizations had torn down the social restraints and created an opportunity for the development of an autonomous individual. Yet, disorganization also meant traditional

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[188] 60% of the population was locally-born and 66.6% was aged 15 to 44 (Shen 1992, p.278).

[189] The upper end of this age group (40 - 44) may not be locally born. But since they were born between 1947 to 1950, it is reasonable to say that they are the second generation of the refugee families if they are not the native. Hence, the majority of the population should no longer be considered refugees or immigrants.

[190] The 1991 census shows that the majority of the population (62%) had secondary or above level of education and 11% had tertiary of education. (Shen 1992, p.282).

[191] The new generation's sense of belonging to the city was studied in the 1988 survey. The large majority (79.5%) said that they had a strong sense of belonging to Hong Kong (Lau & Kuan 1988, p.178). Their commitment to Hong Kong was expressed by their determination to stay in Hong Kong. According to the Hong Kong Transition Project (hereafter HKTP), about 85% to 89% did not have a foreign passport in 1997. In June 1997, only 8% had and 3% were applying one (June 1997, Table 42). If the situation turned really bad after 1997, 44% would still insist to stay in Hong Kong (Ibid., Table 41).

organizations could no longer fulfill the members' needs. Individuals were forced to ask the government for their needs. In turn, this new condition accelerated the process of politicization whenever the government was unable to meet the demands of the public (Lau 1983 p.552-7).

While there were structural changes in the economic and social environment, the political environment saw radical changes too. First, the Legislative Council (hereafter LegCo), was changed from a closed-system to an open-system where policy formulation and decision making no longer involved the private negotiation between the elites and the government. When elective elements were introduced in LegCo in 1985, the elected members were less likely to make secret deals with the government (Davies 1989, p.58).[192] Second, the nature of the fundamental questions in Hong Kong had changed from social issues to political issues since 1982. Such issues as the future of Hong Kong and the political reforms affected everyone in the society and could not be solved privately. Hence, the involvement of the public was unavoidable (Scott 1989, p.283). Finally, although the Sino-British governments deliberately excluded the Hong Kong people from the negotiation process, both sides frequently mobilized the public to support their arguments. As a result, the public's political consciousness was aroused in the process of negotiation and the subsequent period of transition.

[192] Since the increase in the importance of the new middle class, the Government decided to incorporate them into the system. The 1984 Green Paper stated that the economic and professional sectors were essential to future confidence and prosperity (Scott 1989 p.276). Therefore, 12 functional constituencies were established in 1985.

In summary, the structural changes in the Hong Kong society gave rise to a new generation. Their socialization and life experience gave them a strong sense of political efficacy. Thus, they were willing to participate in the public affairs in a changed social and political environment.

The Hong Kong Identity

The establishment of the Hong Kong identity played a significant role in the democratization process of Hong Kong. Traditionally, the Chinese political culture deemphasized individuality. Individuals were socialized into a submissive role in relation to the authorities. The only way to break away from this political culture was the development of an autonomous self. To do so, the establishment of an identity, the breakdown of fatalism, and the acquisition of political efficacy were the prerequisites (Kuan & Lau 1989, p.102). Once autonomous individuals emerged, they would see the authority from an independent and critical perspective. They would then be more likely to participate in the public affairs. This process was exactly what Hong Kong society had gone through.

The formation of the Hong Kong identity.

Hong Kong is a part of China but at the same time Hong Kong is also apart from China (Mathews 1997). Hong Kong is no doubt a part of China. Geographically, Hong Kong is located on the South Chinese coast. Demographically, 98% of the population is ethnically Chinese. Economically, Hong Kong's economy is integrated with China.[193] Paradoxically, Hong Kong

[193] Hong Kong was the largest source of foreign investment in the PRC (Berger & Lester 1997, p.5). According to the Federation of Hong Kong Industries' 1996 Survey on the Hong Kong Manufacturing Environment, 26.8% of the respondents (factory owners) had production

is also apart from China. The seclusion of Hong Kong for more than a century has created two different political, social, and cultural environments between the mainland and the colony. Politically, the Republic is a party-state-dominated society whereas the colony is a minimum state with little intervention in the social life of the residents. Thus, the Hong Kong people are able to enjoy freedoms that have never been experienced by the Chinese in traditional or modern China (Lau & Kuan 1988, p.190-1). Socially, patriotism and socialist ideology are deliberately inculcated through the educational system on the Mainland. By contrast, civic education is absent from the colonial curriculum. This educational policy may denationalize the students; nevertheless, the non-ideological education has created a free space for independent reasoning. Culturally, language is a key marker of difference between the two places. In the PRC, the official language is mandarin and simplified characters. In Hong Kong, Chinese language means Cantonese and traditional Chinese characters. These linguistic differences create communicational difficulties and hindered the mutual understanding on both sides (Leung 1996, p.68).[194]

All of these structural changes have contributed to the demarcation of "we-group" and "they-group."[195] Whenever the Hong Kong people encounter

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facilities outside Hong Kong. Among them, 96% were in China (Ibid., p.23). Meanwhile, the PRC has the third largest investment in the city. Its total investment in Hong Kong at the end of 1994 was US$20-25 billion (Ibid., p.358).

[194] For example, even students in the Hong Kong Education College complained of the difficulties of simplified characters (Zhang, Ming Pao C9 28th August, 1998).

[195] The anthropologist, Gordon Mathews, interviewed some Hongkongese. Feelings of the interviewees like "lack of fitting in - I was very obviously a foreigner" and "I felt I was a Hong Kong Chinese: I had to get out from that place [China]" were vividly shown the demarcation of "we" and "they"(1996, p.408; 1997, p.7).

the mainlanders, they identify the differences between themselves and the mainlanders. As a researcher says, "The more Hong Kong tries [to identify themselves with their compatriots on the mainland], the more it reveals its lack of 'Chineseness'" (Rey Chow quoted by Choi 1997, p.40). By contrast, the public see their collective image when they consume the hegemonic local popular culture and life style. In doing so, a "parochial yet distinct identity" is formed (Choi & Ng 1997, p.47-8).

While the seclusion of Hong Kong has created an objective condition for the development of a distinct identity, the subjective concern over the handover of Hong Kong in 1997 has pushed the public to ponder their identity. For one thing, the reunification with China has placed the Hong Kong people in a dilemma. On the one hand, the public did not have a definite nationality during the colonial period. And yet, they are unwilling to embrace the PRC, the supposed mother country of the Hong Kong Chinese.[196] According to the 1997 survey, only a small proportion of the public (14%) thought the reunion was glorious [The Hong Kong Transition Project (hereafter HKTP) June 1997, Table 4]. From this point of view, the reunion deepens rather than solves the identity problem of the Hong Kong people.

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[196] The negative attitude of the public toward the reunion was understandable. First, the Hong Kong people were excluded from the Sino-British negotiation. Second, the public had little trust in the Chinese political system, a system that based on rule of men rather than rule of law. Third, the design of the SAR was totally skewed in favour of the pro-PRC and the pro-capitalists (See Kuan 1991, p.785 and Cheek-Milby 1995, p.87 on the composition of the Basic Law Drafting Committee and the Basic Law Consultative Committee). Fourth, there was interference by the PRC during the transition; hence, the public expected the interference would be intensified after 1997. In a 1996 survey, the majority of the respondents (65%) thought the PRC would be very influential after 1997 (i.e. from 70 to 100 where 0 was no influence and 100 was totally influence) (The HKTP Sep. 1996, Table 35-6). Fifth, the SAR government was anxious to restrict civil rights even before 1997.

At the same time, the feelings and viewpoints on the handover shared by the public also helped create a common sentiment that facilitating the formation of the collective identity of Hongkongese. Everyday, the Hong Kong people are publicly and/or privately communicating with others.[197] Information is circulated in the city. Viewpoints are exchanged through the media.[198] Feelings are shared among the public. When the individuals' anxiety about the future, political frustration on the political development, decisions about staying or leaving are shared through the media, these concerns become the common concerns, common sentiment, and collective definition of the situation. In the end, this is the common fate of the Hong Kong people. All of these commonalties have bound the Hongkongese together.

The collective identity.

The salience of the Hong Kong identity is clearly shown in the following tables.

Table 4. Identity (%)

Year	Hongkonges	Chinese
1985[a]	59.5	36.2
1988[b]	63.6	28.8
1990[c]	57.2	26.4

Table 5. "What do you consider yourself to be?" (Identity %)

Year	Chinese	HK Chinese	HK
Feb 1993	19	36	37
Feb 1995	20	32	35
June 1997	25	24	44

[197] In 1982, only a small proportion of the public (24% to 46% in four districts) discussed the public affairs with friends and neighbours (Leung 1996, p.73 note 6). Yet, this proportion had already be viewed as "a far cry from the political apathy and social aloofness so rampant in the past" by local social scientists (Lau and Kuan 1986 p.36 quoted by Leung 1996, p.73 note 6). Ten years later, an increasing number of people frequently discussed such political affairs as LegCo elections and the handover. For example, more than half of the voters (56.2%) discussed the election with their family or friends in 1991 (Chan, Man 1993, p.45). In 1997, 52% of the people said there were discussions about the issue of handover with their spouses (The HKTP June 1997. Section II D).

[198] The public had no hesitation to express their opinions publicly in the 1990s. The tendency was shown from the increasing number of phone-in programs on the radio channels. All Chinese radio channels provided the phone-in programs for the public to discuss politics in the morning and evening.

Source of a: Lau & Kuan 1988, p.178. Source:The Hong Kong Transition Project June 1997
Source of b: Lau, Kuan, & Wan 1991, p.178. Table 38.[199]
Source of c: Lau 1992, p.152.[200]

In the first place, the large majority of the Hong Kong population (57.5% in the Social Indicators Project or 68% in the Transition Project) were relunctant to identify themselves with Chinese. Moreover, the identity differentiation was also intensified. We can see both numbers of "Hong Kong People" and "Chinese" were rising in the past five years whereas the number of "Hong Kong Chinese" was falling. With the approach of July 1 1997, the public were forced to choose either Hong Kong People or Chinese. The compromising choice of Hong Kong Chinese was less likely to be acceptable. Consequently, the demarcation between Hong Kongese and Chinese was deepened.

Political values and outlook of the Hongkongese.

The political culture of the locally born generation drastically departed from the traditional Chinese political culture. The traditional Chinese society was paternalistically governed. The government as the head of the "family" had the absolute right to control the citizens' life in the name of public interests. There was no room for the commons to participate in the state affairs (Lau & Kuan 1995, p.87). Since the country was viewed as a family, harmony was greatly emphasized. A "peaceful" depoliticized society was a good society and an ideal for the stateman. Thus, the primary role of the government was to control conflict and confrontation (Ibid., p.86). Moreover,

[199] For their tiny proportions, we did not present the other catergories (HK British, overseas Chinese, and Others) in Table 5. Results from 1993 (Aug.), 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 (Feb.) are also excluded.

the collectivity had the priority over individual freedoms and personal rights.[201] Thus, it was impossible to develop the modern ideas of freedoms and rights. After all, freedom in China was associated more with the idea of free from the state's coercion than with the idea of individual freedom or personal rights (Ibid., p.203 n.13).

On the contrary, the conception of freedom and individual rights of the Hongkongese was totally different. In Hong Kong, freedom was the overriding value. Since the colonial regime deliberately limited its role and functions, the freedoms enjoyed by the Hongkongese were never experienced in other Chinese society.[202] For this reason, freedom, especially freedom of speech, was viewed as a valuable asset to the Hongkongese (Ibid., p.47).[203]

Although many local people tended to use a conditional approach to conceive of personal rights, this perception was changing among the new generation.[204] The new generation considered personal rights to be inherent and undeniable. The state could not deprive its citizens' personal rights for their personal attributes or in the name of public interests.[205] In addition, they

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[200] In 1990, Lau created a new category, "Hongkongese and Chinese," and 12.2% of the respondents chose it.

[201] As argued by Durkheim, "the individual does not come first, historically; the individual, the awareness of oneself as an individual, is born of historical development itself" (Quoted by Aron 1970, p.22). There are only common feelings and collective consciousness in the traditional primitive society.

[202] Except the Taiwanese of the mid-1990s.

[203] 96% of the people hold that everyone should have freedom of speech (Lau & Kuan 1988, p.47).

[204] For example, the majority of the people (65.6%) thought rights were rewards given to the good citizens by society in the mid 1980s (Lau & Kuan 1988, p.51). It implied that if the citizens were bad or simply not good enough, society could take away the rights from them. Thus, there were only the social origin of rights instead of inborn rights.

[205] These conceptional changes among the youth were shown from two surveys. In a 1985 survey, a substantial proportion of the public (44.3%) believed that even though some voters did not vote in a rational manner, their right to vote should not be denied (Lau & Kuan 1988,

considered it unjustifiable for the government to force its citizens to act against their will.[206] Therefore, the government should use the law to protect the rights of its citizens instead of to harass them.[207] As a result, the new generation was more concerned with and willing to uphold their rights.[208]

At the same time, the need for democratization was gradually accepted by the public.[209] Although the Hongkongese preferred democratic political reforms, their understanding of democracy was different from the West's in three aspects. First, the Hongkongese adopted an instrumental approach to democracy. They believed that the public knew better than the government about the interests of the public; therefore, an elected government would perform better than a non-elected one.[210] Under this consideration, the Hongkongese supported a democratic political system in the territory (Ibid., p.73). Second, the goal of the democratic reforms was defensive in nature rather than offensive. The Hongkongese did not expect to capture the power so that the state was controlled by the elected representatives. Rather, they

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p.71). In addition, Yeung & Leung's study showed that the majority of the youth (aged 18-24) would not give up their privacy right in exchange for public order (1993, p.78).

[206] In the 1985 survey, half of the respondents (52.9%) rejected the idea that the government could force its people to do things against their will (Op cit, p.47).

[207] The majority (68.1%) agreed that law was to protect the citizens' rights (Op cit, p.47).

[208] For the increasingly public concern about their personal rights after the Tiananmen Incident, the Bill of Rights was finally introduced in 1991. Ordinances like the Societies Ordinance, the Public Order Ordinance, the Emergency Regulations Ordinance and the Crimes Ordinance were amended. When the Preliminary Working Committee of the SAR opposed these changes in 1995 and the SAR government intended to re-enact those ordinances, the public was outraged. In 1997, 52% of the public opposed any changes (The HKTP February 1997 Table 36). Based on the strong public reactions in this incident, it is reasonable to say that the public is concerned and is willing to uphold their rights.

[209] The demand for democratic reforms jumped from 38.5% in 1990 to 59.8% in 1992 (Lau 1992, p.133; Lau & Kuan 1995, p.82).

[210] In the 1985 survey, almost half of the respondents (49%) believed that an elected political leaders would perform better than the present Hong Kong government while only 24.5% disagreed (Lau & Kuan 1988, p.73). If we recall the composition of LegCo in 1985, the

only wanted to circumscribe the state's intervention and to maintain the autonomy in the social and economic spheres (Ibid., p.191). Third, the Hongkongese defined democratic government as consultative government. They demanded the government consult public opinion before making decisions and they did not require the government follow public opinion. As such, elements like the procedure of elections, and accountability were less important for the public (Ibid., p.75).[211] In short, although the public did not understand democracy "correctly," it did not hinder the public's preference for a democratic SAR after 1997.[212] After all, who could claim they understand the essence of democracy?

Finally, the Hong Kong people in the 1990s were less fatalistic than the old generation. The achievement of Hong Kong had already given the public a sense of personal efficacy and self-confidence. Their experience in overcoming the social and economic hardships taught the Hong Kong people to emphasize personal efforts and to be unwilling to resign themselves to fate.[213] Since the future was in their hands, more people were willing to plan

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indirect elected members had already been introduced. The public had the chance to compare the performance of those elected with those appointed members.

[211] From 1988 to 1992, there were more respondents who chose consultation than those who chose elected government. In the former case, the rates were ranged from 35.9% to 44.2%. In the latter case, the rates were ranged from 14.9% to 27.9% (Lau & Kuan 1995, p.82).

[212] In the 1998 survey, the large majority (86%) of the public thought the Hong Kong delegates of the National People's Congress, the legislature of the PRC should be directly elected by the Hong Kong citizens (The HKTP January 1998, Table 62). The majority of the public (64%) also supported the direct election of the Chief Executive in 2007 (According to the Basic Law, amendment would only be considered in 2007) (Ibid., Table 63).

[213] In the 1985 survey, the large majority (80.2%) did not think that success was determined by fate and effort was useless. In addition, half of the respondent (52.3%) disagreed to the phrase "let tomorrow look after itself" (Lau & Kuan 1988, p.53).

for their future than in the mid-1970s.[214] From this perspective, the Hong Kong people were not fatalists. It was this perception of personal efficacy, confidence, and uncompromising attitudes to fate that drove the Hong Kong people to take different actions to their future.

The Politicization Process of Hong Kong Society

As mentioned earlier, the formation of the Hongkonese, the breakdown of fatalism, and the acquisition of the political efficacy had developed a generation of autonomous individuals. Their willingness to be involved in public affairs was witnessed by the politicization process of Hong Kong. The politicization of the Hong Kong society from the 1980s to the 1990s occurred in two spheres, inside and outside the political society. Inside the political society, the process was identified as the development of an institutionalized political market.[215] Outside the political society, the process was expressed as the increasing involvement of the public in political activities. These two developments took less than two decades to accomplish. By the end of the colonial period, Hong Kong had already been transformed into a politicized city.

The evolution of the political market.

Since the introduction of universal suffrage and the direct elections at the district level in 1982, the political society had gone through an evolutionary process from the unstructured stage to the institutionalized stage

[214] In 1977, the majority of the Hong Kong Chinese (67.1%) did not have any long-term planning at all (Lau 1983, p.70). In 1985, however, the public were more likely to plan for the future despite it might not be materialized. The survey showed that 44.9% of the interviewees thought in this way while 42.4% did not think so (Lau and Kuan 1988, p.53).

(Tang 1993, p,250).[216] At first, the evolution took place only at the district level. But within a short period of time, the transformation was extended to LegCo level. After the first elections of LegCo in 1991, the political society had already been fully developed. To elaborate this transformation, the political society will be treated as a market focused on the participants (sellers and buyers), commodities (political preferences), capital (resources), and sales promotion (strategies) in each election.[217]

When direct elections were introduced to the city's district level in 1982, the political market was underdeveloped. Strictly speaking, there was no politicians in Hong Kong.[218] All of the candidates participated on an individual basis. Neither the candidates nor the voters gave any attention to political platforms. In fact, "most survivors won without knowing the reason why" (Ibid., p.257). Thus, a mature political market was absent in the 1982 District Board elections.

Three years later, a political market emerged in Hong Kong as a result of the interaction among several political forces. The evolution of the political market in Hong Kong was initiated by a new political force that emerged in the 1985 District Board Elections: the young, well-educated community

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[215] The idea of political market is depended on Tang, Lung Wai's article "Political Markets, Competition and the Return to Monopoly" (1993).

[216] In 1981, the government divided the territory into 18 administrative districts. The role of the District Boards was mainly to advise on policies and services that affecting residents in the districts (Lau 1982, p.860).

[217] This conceptual framework is based on Tang's analysis of the Hong Kong political society in 1993.

[218] The Civic Association and the Reform Club were the two political associations involved in the Urban Council elections. Probably because of their preliminary structures, few political scientists see them as political parties. Norman Miners described them as civic groups (1986, p.169). Peter Harris said they were the "voice of a particular bloc or clique" (1978, p.124). Ian Scott saw them as pressure groups (1989, p.209). Meanwhile, both the advocacy groups and the pro-China forces were indifferent to the elections.

workers. They identified themselves with the community and acted on behalf of the ordinary folks at the grass-roots level. They adopted the "proactive populist strategy" to address community's problems.[219] Since the community workers believed in "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong," a slogan advocated by the Sino-British governments for the promotion of the Joint Declaration in 1984, the community workers actively participated in the 1985 District Board elections. The result was a landslide victory for the young liberals.

Yet, the victory of the liberal social activists had repercussions in society. At the LegCo level, the conservative elites knew that democratic reforms would soon be introduced into LegCo. To prepare for the future, the conservative elites began to build up their own power bases. As a result, a loose alliance of the conservatives forces was formed in the city (Ibid., p.268 & 271). Meanwhile, Beijing also re-assessed the new situation in Hong Kong. To ensure its control over Hong Kong, Beijing determined to curtail the influence of the pro-democracy social forces. Thus, the pro-China forces were mobilized to participate in the 1988 District Board elections (Ibid., p.270-1). Eventually, the political landscape was totally changed by these reactions.

The institutionalization of the local political market was accomplished in the subsequent District Board and LegCo elections. From the well-structured political parties to the maturity of the voters, from the advocacy of

[219] The proactive populist strategy meant that the community workers actively identified and articulated issues that affecting the public estates residents rather than passively waiting for the occurrence of a problem. Then, they mobilized the residents and petitioned the government to take action in response to the issue. At the same time, the community workers mastered the media's attention. Through the media,

political ideologies to the usage of sophisticated strategies, every element of the political market had already evolved to a highly-developed level. These developments confirmed the existence of a fully institutionalized political market in the Hong Kong political society.

The formation of political parties in the 1990s was a milestone in the institutionalization process of the political market. For the pro-democrats, the idea of forming a united, pro-democracy politcal organization was gaining its momentum after several cooperations among the pro-democracy forces in the 1980s. Finally the UDHK was formed in 1990.[220] The Party was generally perceived by the public as representing the Hong Kong people's interests.[221] The Party believed that democratic political reforms should be accelerated in order to safeguard the autonomy of Hong Kong and also to implement "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong."[222] Regarding the relationship with the PRC, the UDHK welcomed the resumption of the sovereignty of Hong Kong by the PRC.[223] However, it believed that the 1989 Tiananmen Incident was wrong and the officials responsible for it should be punished.[224]

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they were able to draw the public's focus and won their sympathy on the issues the community workers addressed (Tang 1993, p.263).

[220] The other two major pro-democracy organizations, the Meeting Point and the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (HKADPL), did not join the UDHK in 1990. Four years later, Meeting Point formally united with the UDHK and the new party was renamed the Democratic Party.

[221] Since most senior party members are professionals, the Party seems to represent the new middle class' interests too.

[222] The UDHK held that "democracy, freedom, human rights, and rule by law are the corner stone of the progress and prosperity of a modern society" (Democratic Party Platform, Basic Beliefs Point 6).

[223] "Hong Kong is a part of China. Democratic Party firmly supports the Republic's resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 .... and rejects separation " (Platform. Chapter 1. Point 1).

[224] See the Party's Platform. The Viewpoints of Democratic Party towards the 1989 democratic movement. Point 1.

The Co-operative Resources Centre (CRC) was finally formed by 21 business elites under the leadership of Allen Lee at the end of 1991 despite their indifference to party politics.[225] This was the precursor of the Liberal Party (LP)(Ibid., p.852).[226] Obviously, the LP represented the interests of the business community. The Liberal Party strongly rejected the extension of democratic practices in Hong Kong because they believed democracy would damage the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. In the end, the vested interests of the business elites would be threatened.[227] Therefore, the Party maintained any change had to be acceptable to the PRC and converged with the Basic Law. With regard to the party's relationship with the PRC, the LP adopted the non-confrontational approach. It intended to be a bridge between the Hong Kong people and Beijing (Hook 1993, p.851-2).

In 1992, the pro-China forces also formed its own party, the Democratic Association for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB). The Party represented the PRC's interests more than Hong Kong's. By following the position of the New China News Agency (the highest authority of the PRC in Hong Kong), the Party held that there should be a convergence between the

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[225] The conservatives were indifferent to the formation of a political party for two reasons. First, the conservatives were less cohesive. The linkages among the conservatives were fragile (Tang 1993, p.280). Second, the conservatives saw no reason to form a political party, since their lobbies to the government were very effective (Hook 1993, p.851).

[226] The Liberal Party in Hong Kong was formed in 1993 and did not share any political ideology with the Whigs.

[227] Specifically, the Liberal Party's worries can be summarized as follows. First, democratization would create confrontation which would damage the city's fragile stability and prosperity (Davies 1989, p.38; Hook 1993, p.853). Secondly, politicization would divert the public's energies from money-making to politics. If the city lost its values to the PRC, then the special treatments to Hong Kong would be unable to preserve (Davies 1989, p.38). Third, democratization would lead to the introduction of welfare policies. Eventually, it would bankrupt the government and create an unfavourable business environment (Cheng 1996, p.29-30).

Basic Law and the democratization process which meant the principle of "gradual and orderly progress" had to be followed.[228] In short, from the 1991 to the 1995 LegCo elections, the political parties system had already been consolidated.

However, a political market needs not only sellers but also buyers. Highly critical and broad-based pro-democracy voters had already emerged since 1988. In the 1988 District Board elections, the political orientation, like the candidates' qualifications, political groups to which they belonged, and the major political figures endorsing them, was the reference point for the voters to choose their ideal candidates (Cheng 1989, p.133). Then, the political consciousness of the public was invoked once again by the unanticipated Tiananmen Incident of 1989.[229] By watching the rights of their compatriots being brutally suppressed, the Hong Kong people became more conscious of their rights as citizens and the openness of the government (Ibid., p.276 & 289). As a result, the public actively participated in the two LegCo elections as reflected by the turnout rates of the elections.[230]

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[228] "We should follow the arrangement of the Basic Law in developing a democratic political system gradually from 1997 to 2003" (Platform, Section on Stable Transition). The principle came from the Basic Law Chapter 4 Section 3 Article 67. According to the Basic Law Annex II, LegCo members will be formed by direct and indirect elections until 2007 because no amendment will be considered until 2007.

[229] In fact, the political consciousness of the public has been invoked since 1984. The public were enthusiastically involved in the promotion of the democratic political reform in 1987. However, the government's manipulation of public opinion and the rejection of direct elections of LegCo disappointed the public. After this incident, the public was less interested in political affairs until the turning point of 1989 Tiananmen Incident.

[230] The turnout rates for the geographic constituencies and the functional constituencies were 39% and 47% respectively (Cheek-Milby 1995, p.171). At first glance, the turnout rates were low. However, we should not hasty jump to conclusion. First, there were serious errors in the registration process. About 30, 000 electors were mistakenly deleted from the Register of Electors. Moreover, 98, 935 poll cards could not reach the registered electors. According to the calculation of Louie, the error rate is 17.5% to 24.4%. Hence, the adjusted turnout rate could have been between 47.5% to 51.8% (1993, p.32-5. See also McMillen & Degoyler 1992 quoted by Cheek-Milby 1995, p.295 note 94). Moreover, the turnout rates of Hong Kong are not so disappointing in comparison to the United States'. The average turnout

Another component of a political market is the political issues promoted in the elections. In the 1990s, both the political locus and focus were different from those of the 1980s. First, the locus was shifted from the District Boards to LegCo. In 1991, direct elections to LegCo based on universal suffrage were held for the first time in the history of Hong Kong.[231] Since LegCo had substantial power, the public and the media naturally paid more attention on it. By contrast, the District Boards which located at the periphery of the political power center were considered as less important. Second, the focus was also extended from the pace of the local democratization process to the relationship with China after the June 4 1989 Incident (Tang 1993, p.277). Besides, freedoms and personal rights in the future SAR were the main public concerns too. These concerns were projected into the public voting behaviour.[232] To promote their political ideas and preference, all parties were enthusiastically involved in the elections despite the condemns from the PRC. In the campaigns, all parties mastered such sophisticated campaign strategies and skills as building images, using favourable results from the polls, and attracting the media (Cheng 1996, p.27).

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rates of the latter were 36-40% in years in which neither a president nor governor is elected (Degolyer & Scott 1996, p.74). In 1990, the turnout rate of US citizens was 47% (national average) according to the University of Michigan National Election Studies (The HKTP September 1996, n.2). So the rate of Hong Kong was better than the performance of the US. If we consider the unadjusted turnout rates, then it still within the range of the US average rates.

[231] In 1991, 18 LegCo members were directly elected by the public. The method adopted was a system of dual seats and dual votes. They accounted for 30% of the total 60 members. Appointed members were still existed in the 1991 LegCo.

[232] During the period of June 4 Incident, the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China was formed by the pro-democratic leaders. The Alliance's critical stance to the PRC and the subsequent sack of Martin Lee and Szeto Wah from the basic Law Consultation Committee won the public's sympathy and affiliation. The images of the critic of the PRC and the freedoms and democracy fighter for Hong Kong of the pro-democrats were widely accepted by the public and helped the UDHK win a large majority in the 1991 elections (Cheng 1996, p.23).

Finally, the sophisticated strategies employed in the campaigns by the political forces also signified an institutionalized political market. During the LegCo elections, all political forces emphasized campaign strategies. While images-building was the common concern of all candidates, some even hired campaign managers to organize the campaign.[233] Moreover, the political forces fully utilized their strengths to offset their weaknesses. For the conservatives, the stature of famous politicians was used to supplement the lack of grass-roots networking. In the case of the pro-democrats, they coordinated the nominations and pooled their resources to overcome their financial limitation. For the pro-China forces, mobilized financial resources and ample manpower offset their insufficient communication skills with the media (Cheng 1989, p.134).

In short, an institutionalized political market was rapidly developed within thirteen years. The consolidation of the party system, well-organized electoral competition, and the voters' rational and peaceful behaviour, all indicated that a well-structured political market had already been established in the political society. For the public, their experience in the elections was the best civic education they ever had and they would be unwilling to accept any recolonizational arrangements.[234]

The politicized social sphere.

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[233] The image of the conservatives at the district level was a "moderately conservative local core" in contrast with the community workers' "radical-factional-opportunities"(Tang 1993, p.265). The pro-PRC force also created a pro-China yet moderate image (Ibid., p.271). The pro-democrats began to employ well-educated campaign managers and workers from the tertiary educational institutions in this election (Cheng 1989, p.134).

[234] One of these arrangements was the Provisional Legislature. Since the PRC considered Patten had violated the Sino-British Agreement, the LegCo members were disallowed to stay in the offices after

Apart from the institutionalized political market in the political society, the steady growth of social protests and the emergence of new participant groups in the 1980s also suggested that the process of politicization had already taken place in the social sphere. More importantly, these social protests were not exclusively for instrumental private purposes.[235] Rather, more social protests in the mid 1980s were non-instrumental and oriented to public interests. Hence, the rapid increase of social actions might also have represented the growth of awareness in citizenship among the public.[236]

In the 1980s, the Hong Kong people were more willing to fight for their needs than they were in the 1970s (Cheung & Louie 1991).[237] The public assumed that it was the government's responsibility to fulfill their needs and they did not hestitate to ask for it (Ibid, p.50). As predicted by Lau in 1983, private issues were increasingly articulated in a new context and were redefined as public concerns. As a result, the number of social protests in the period of 1981 to 1986 had increased 60% more than in the period of 1975 to 1980.[238] More importantly, the growth of social protests represented not only

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1997, the so-called "through train" design. A provisional legislature was formed by the PRC to replace the 1995 LegCo.

[235] Kuan and Lau held that the people of Hong Kong adopted an instrumental rather than ideological orientation towards politics and government. To support their argument, they cited the 1985 survey which showed that 52.6% of the respondents agreed that political participation was for the improvement of their livelihood and not for the realization of political ideals (1989, p.97).

[236] Citizenship refers to civil citizenship, political citizenship, and social citizenship. Civil citizenship is "the rights necessary for individual freedom." Political citizenship is "the right to participate in the exercise of political power." Social citizenship is "the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life ... according to the standards prevailing in the society" (Kopinak 1995, p.7).

[237] These needs were basic material welfare, political and civil rights (Cheung & Louie 1991, p.50).

[238] The percentage is calculated by evenly dividing the ten years into two periods. However, if we divide the years according to the political development of Hong Kong, then 1982 will be the baseline. Before 1982, Hong Kong was under the MacLehose era. In 1982, the Governor

the public's willingness to fight for their demands but also their changing perception of political competence. Unlike the past generations, the new population had a strong sense of political efficacy. Otherwise, they would certainly not have bothered to participate in social affairs. The social involvements of the public had empowered them and in turn reinforced their sense of political efficacy (Ibid., p.50).

Moreover, an in-depth look at the participants and issues involved in the social actions suggests signs of the development of citizenship. With regard to the participant organizations, the emergence of new participant groups and "cross participation" were the two common trends in the 1980s (Ibid., p.38). In the mid 1980s, new participant groups emerged, the so-called "not-for-self-interest" groups (Ibid., p.51). They included students, community activists and Christian groups. Among them, the increase of the Christian groups' social involvement was the most impressive.[239] These new particpant groups were not working for themselves. For example, the Christian groups were working for social justice. Therefore, cross participation among these groups was common. Each group frequently participated in a large variety of issues.

With regard to issues, there were changes in the scope and the nature of social protests in the 1980s. Although there were more district issues than territory-wide issues, a twofold increase of the latter should not be

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retired. Also, the Sino-British governments started the negotiation on the future of Hong Kong in the same year. If we divide the period in this way, then the first period consists of 7 years whereas only 5 years in the second period. But there were 440 cases in both periods.

neglected.[240] The increase of the territory-wide issues suggested that the public's concerns were no longer confined to their own district issues. Rather, everything affecting the public interests would draw the citizens' attention. Meanwhile, the nature of the social protests were changed from basic material welfare issues to the improvement of quality of life, political and civil rights issues. For instance, politics issues underwent the largest increase in the ten years' period.[241] Among the category of politics, issues about political and civil rights were the major concerns (40 out of the 67 cases). The political and civil rights issues increased 86% in the second period. All of these developments were definitely the signs of social awareness and the development of citizenship.

In the 1990s, the public had not been discouraged from participating in politics even though there were set-backs in the social movements, frustration of the democratization process, and discontents with the interference of the PRC. Rather, the political life of the Hong Kong people remained at an impressively high level.[242] After all, when the public were bombarded by numerous surveys, and when everyone was directly or indirectly affected by

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[239] The Christian groups did not emerge until 1978. From 1978 to 1981, they only involved in 7 cases. However, from 1982 to 1986, 23 cases were found. The increase was more than threefold (Ibid., p.33. Table 21).

[240] From 1975 to 1981, there were only 33 territory-wide issues. In the period of 1982-86, the number was 84 cases. The increase was 2.5 times (Ibid., p.17. Table 10).

[241] Even though we use 1982 as the baseline rather than 1981, our result is the same as the researchers'. Political issues have increased threefold in the second period (1982-86) in comparison with the first period (1975 to 1981), which is the largest increase among the 12 fields of issues (Ibid., p.11 Table 2).

[242] First, there was no major election campaign from 1996 to 1997, yet the percentage of the respondents who had donated to a political organization increased from 11% to 16% in the two years. Moreover, 4 out of 10 of the respondents had signed a petition and 7% had participated in protests. There was also an increase of people who contacted government departments (ten percentage points) (The HKTP June 1997, Table 13).

the 1997 symdrome, no one would be exempt from being politicized to a certain extent.[243]

In short, during the past two decades, new generation were more autonomous and confident in political efficacy. They were more eager to participate in the public affairs.[244] In the mean time, structural changes in different areas of the society and the approach of the handover had created an environment in which the public had to be involved in politics willy-nilly. As the developments in the political and social spheres showed, Hong Kong had already been transformed into a politicized society.

Summary

In the past one and a half centuries, Hong Kong was secluded from Mainland China. Subsequent structural changes in the society have created an environment for the development of a new generation who identified themselves with the city. They broke down fatalism and acquired political efficacy which drove them to participate in public affairs. As such, a distinct local political culture that sharply departed from the traditional Chinese political culture developed. The result of these developments was a politicized Hong Kong society.

The resumption of sovereignty marked the beginning of a new era but it also brought challenges to the Hong Kong people. To those who choose to

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[243] In the 1990s, numerous surveys were conducted by academic, commercial, or governmental institutions. From 1996 to 1997, over one million people were interviewed either by phone or mail (Ibid., Section III Point 4).

[244] The public was asked whether they would be satisfied to obey China and make money instead of caring about politics. In February 1997, 38% said no and 50% said yes. In June 1997, 41% said no and 48% answered yes. The result suggested that more people were now

stay in the territory, how should they face the re-colonialization? How should they respond to social injustice in a supposedly de-colonialized society? Should they remain silent to these challenges? There are no easy answers to these questions. In next chapter, we shall see some of the new generation who gave their answers by building a civil society in Hong Kong.

The Church in Hong Kong

Despite the fact that only 8% of the Hong Kong population are presently Christians, the churches have been "the most influential voluntary organization in the territory" ever since the formation of the Colony in 1842 (Kwok 1991, p.113).[245] This assertion has two implications: (1) The history of the local churches is as old as the history of the Colony itself; (2) The local churches have disproportionate influence in the city. From this perspective, it is reasonable for us to associate the development of the influential churches with the political, social, and economic changes of Hong Kong.

The Initial Stage (1842-1941)

From 1842 to 1941, the sojourner society of Hong Kong was a base to Mainland China rather than a primary target for the missionary societies; therefore, the missionary societies often transferred their works from the

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realized that politics had effects on their lives. So, it was impossible to distance themselves from politics (Ibid., Table 10 k).

[245] In 1993, the Protestant Community had a population of 258,000 in more than 900 congregations (Government Information Services 1994, p.335). Approximately, 80,000 belonged to the mainline denominations, 100,000 were evangelicals, and 50,000 were independent congregations with no denominational affiliations (Kwok 1991, p.64). Meanwhile, the Roman Catholic Community had a population of 249,180 in the 63 parishes and 34 centres for Mass. They were served by 253 priests, 64 brothers, and 632 sisters congregations (Government Information Services 1994, p.336).

Colony to the Mainland.[246] Yet, local churches were gradually established in the territory.[247] By the end of the nineteenth century, most major denominations had already established their congregations in Hong Kong.[248] The main function of these local churches was evangelization although some social services like medical care were also provided in this early stage. Overall, the growth of the local churches was slow primarily because the missionaries had overlooked their works in the local community (Kwok 1991, p.101).

The Developing Stage (1945-1979)

The new political situation on the mainland in the post-war period had forced the missionary societies to shift their foci from the Mainland to the Colony, a city of which the missionaries had long been neglected. In 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was formed on the mainland. Due to the atheistic nature of the communist regime, the missionaries had no choice but to leave the Mainland. Hong Kong became the logical choice for these missionaries to continue their work. Meanwhile, the urgency of the refugee crisis resulting from the political instability on the mainland also convinced the missionaries that it was a proper decision to work in the colony. For one thing, the colonial government was unwilling and unable to cope with the

[246] For instance, the Basel, Rhenish and Berlin Missionary Societies moved to the interior of Kwangtung Province in 1844, and the Baptist Church moved to Canton in 1845 (Smith 1985, p.3 & 5).

[247] In 1843, the To Tsai Church was formed as an independent, self-supporting, self-governing, and self-propagating congregation. The first Chinese pastor, Ho Fuk Tong was ordained in 1846 (Ibid., p.183).

[248] The Baptist congregation was organized in May 1842; the Union Church and the Anglican Church were started in 1843; the Basel Church was established in 1863; the Congregational

refugee crisis due to its conventional minimum state policy. Under these circumstances, the churches voluntarily assumed the responsibility for the needs of the refugees. From then on, the church replaced the government as the major welfare services provider in Hong Kong (Kwok 1991, p.102; Smith 1985, p.184). Since the church was the only provider of both material subsistence and spiritual comfort in the city, a large amount of uprooted refugees and local residents were converted to Christianity. As a result, the churches experienced the greatest expansion in its history.[249]

The subsequent development of the local churches was greatly affected by the economic development of Hong Kong. After two decades' rapid industrialization, the refugee society had already turned into an affluent society. In this new milieu, the overseas missionary societies began to withdraw from Hong Kong. Pastoral works and welfare services were transferred to the local churches. Meanwhile, the demands of the society had changed from basic subsistance to various social services like education and medical care. The impacts of these changes on the development of local churches were threefold. First, the churches had to diversify their services to fulfill the new social needs. Gradually, the churches were compelled to assume more social services than ever before. Second, local churches with different backgrounds began to communicate with each other and worked together for common projects such as the United Christian Hospital and the

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Church and the Methodists Church were opened in 1883 in 1884 respectively; and the Rhenish Church was formed in 1898 (Smith 1985, p.2-6).

[249] From the 1950s to the 1960s, the churches in Hong Kong had the highest growth rate in the world (Smith 1985, p.184).

Community Health Project in Kwun Tong (Kwok 1991, p.105). As a result, a process of localization was developing among the local churches. Third, since financial supports from the foreign missionary societies were no longer available, the churches had to rely on governmental funding for the huge social services they provided. Consequently, the churches came closer to rather than distanced themselves from the government.

The Current Stage (1980-the 1990s)

In the 1980s, the Christian community was deeply polarized over its political stance in the new political milieu. For the approach of the change of sovereignty in 1997, the public's desire for political reforms was greater than ever before. Yet, the majority of the Christian community were unwilling to participate in the democratic development that had alienated those who wanted to renew the political stance of the church. Specifically, the Christian community were divided on three issues: (1) the participation of the church in public affairs; (2) the relationship of the church with China; (3) the churches' attitudes to political reforms.

On the one end of the spectrum, the mainline churches were apathetic regarding public affairs. Because of their reliance on governmental funding for the social services the churches provided, the ecumenical churches were unwilling and unable to criticize the government. On the other hand, since the evangelical churches exclusively focused on evangelism, they did not engage themselves in public affairs at all. Hence, both the ecumenical and evangelical churches avoided any social involvement (Kwok 1991, p.65). At the same time, the mainline churches avoided confrontation with Peking for they feared

that such confrontation would give the Chinese government an excuse to suppress the church after 1997. For this reason, the churches did not support any local political reforms (Mosher 1991, p.16).

On the other end of the spectrum, there were individual clergy and young congregation who began to re-examine the role of the church in the new political milieu.[250] Their objective was to establish a democratic and open political system before 1997 (Lau, E. 1987, p.23). Hence, they became actively involved in areas like the democratization process, human rights, the drafting of the Basic Law, and the future of Hong Kong (Ibid., p.115). From this perspective, the Christian community in Hong Kong were polarized on their stance on social involvement.

Summary

In conclusion, the hundred years' history of the mainline churches can be summarized into several points. The church is one of the decisive forces for political change in Hong Kong. Since the church is the main provider of schools, the church is able to mould students into supporters or opponents of the political authority. During the colonial period, the missionary schools had successfully inculcated denationalizational ideology to the Chinese students as well as created a group of elite who were absorbed into the political system.[251]

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[250] According to the Rev. Kwok Nai Wang, there were about 100 Christian groups or para-church organizations in 1991 (1991, p.64).

[251] The denationalizing effect in the education was addressed by Bertrand Russell in the 1920s. He said, "Education in mission schools... tends to become denationalized, and have a slavish attitude toward foreign civilization" (quoted by Smith 1985, p.191). In 19th Century, most elites studied in the missionary schools before they were able to pursue their professions. The early Chinese Legislative Councilors shared a similar background. For example, Ng Choy, the first Chinese in LegCo, was a St. Paul's student and became a magistrate (Smith 1985, p.131). Wong Shing, the second Chinese in the LegCo, studied in the Morrison

Hence, the political orientation of the church is crucial to the future political development of the city.

Second, there is a "dependency syndrome" among the local churches (Kwok 1991, p.114). Before the 1970s, the churches depended on the overseas missionaries' resources. After the 1970s, the churches depended on the funding from the government to maintain their social services. In order to maintain a good relationship with the government, the churches were unwilling to criticize government policies. As a result, they lost their autonomy to the authorities and were absorbed into the political establishment (Ibid., p.114-5).

Third, the political development of the society has substantially changed the churches. Since the majority of the Christian community was indifferent to social affairs and undermined theological thinking, they were unable to cope with the confidence crisis throughout the last two decades. As a result, empty pews and pulpits were a common phenomena in the local Christian communities (Mosher 1991, p.17). Meanwhile, the Christian community was also polarized due to differences on the issue of political and social involvement of the churches. This cleavage was deepened when the leaders of the mainline churches were co-opted by Peking in 1985 (Lau, E. 1987, p.23).

Education Society School and became a compradore (Ibid., p.147). Ho Kai, one of the most influential Chinese in this period and the Legco member from 1890 to 1914, was a barrister and medical doctor (Ibid., p.131). All of them were Christians. A century later, the situation did not have any substantial changes. The missionary schools still are the cradles of the local elites. In the 1990s, 27 out of the 30 top secondary schools were operated by the church (Kwok 1991, p.113).

Chapter Four

Introduction

This chapter is about the praxis of civil society. In Hong Kong, as in other countries, social activists increasingly believe that the concept of civil society is not simply a theory but an effective way to protect the powerless against political equality and social injustice. This is exactly the opinion of the four Christian social concern groups in this study. Based on their theological beliefs and social ideals, the Christian groups are consciously building a local civil society. From this point of view, the concept of civil society includes both theoretical and practical sides. To understand the practical side, the Christian groups and the project they undertake are the two major aspects that this chapter is going to examine.

Regarding the Christian social concern groups, we look into the theological beliefs and social ideals that are shared by these Christian groups. While the theological beliefs will justify the appropriateness of the social participation of these Christian groups, the shared social ideals will explain why a long-term collaboration among these groups is possible.

Regarding the project of building a local civil society, our examination is threefold. First, we are concerned with the practice of communicative rationality within each group.[252] According to the principle of communicative

[252] The meaning of communicative rationality is given in Part 2 of Chapter 2. Both Cohen (et al.) and Madison hold that civil society must be based on communicative rationality. To Madison, the supreme virtue of communicative rationality is reasonableness (1998, p.63). Also see his ideas on civility (Ibid., p.41).

rationality, members should have equal chance to make assertions, to receive proper hearing, and to be assessed fairly in a group. Also they are required to be re-examine their own arguments. Hence, these aspects will be examined in the section on internal democracy in order to determine whether communicative rationality is practised within each group or not.

Another concern is the democratization of the associations and institutions of the society. In Cohen and Arato's words, this aspect is called "civil society as the target of democratization" (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.526).[253] As Cohen and Arato say, democratization is not simply about the defense of the autonomy of civil society against the state. It is also about which kind of society is to be defended. Since it is quite possible that inequality and domination will be found in the institutions of civil society, institutions of civil society must be democratized (Ibid., p.516). To illustrate how democratization is carried out in the institutions of civil society, the church in Hong Kong will serve as an example. After we examine the problems of the church identified by the Christian groups, those reforms undertaken in the church by the Christian groups will be presented.

Our last concern is related to the politics of influence.[254] First, we have to know the Christian groups' perception of society. Next, we will find out the reasons for the Christian groups to build a local civil society and its

[253] The idea of civil society as a target of democratization is explained in Part 2 of Chapter 2.
[254] See Part two in Chapter two. In short, the politics of influence represents the influence of civil society exerted on actors in political soceity. The aim is not to gain power in political society. Rather, it is hoped that the authority may make some changes in order to accommodate the needs of civil society through this influence (Cohen & Arato 1994, p.504).

implementation. Lastly, an example of how the Christian groups attempt to influence the political society in order to protect their basic rights is given.

The Common Matrix of Religious Beliefs and Social Ideals

The long-term collaboration of the four Christian social concern groups in our research is based on an affinity that developed from a common matrix of religious beliefs and social ideals. For the past decade, the Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee (CIC), Justice & Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese (JP), Student Christian Movement (SCM), and Hong Kong Christian Institute (CI) have been closely working together in social actions. At first glance, this long-term collaboration can simply be attributed to the fact that all of these four groups are Christians. Yet a closer examination will tell us that there are lots of differences among these Christian groups. From initiation to experience, size to structure, the needy groups they serve to the objectives they stress, these social concern groups are not as homogeneous as we expected them to be (See the following tables).[255]

[255] In regard to objectives, the four religious groups have different emphases. CIC is working for the rights and empowerment of the workers (See Leung 1988, 117-8). JP emphasizes both cultivation and social participation of the parishes as well as the general public. JP also gives advice to the Bishop (See Review & Foresight 1993, p.14). To CI, its objective is to gather Christians (Protestants) together and to contribute to society (See Annual Report 1997-8, p.1). Cultivation and publication are the major works of CI. SCM focuses on the involvement of post-secondary students in Hong Kong (Refers to SCM's pamphlet).

Table 6 Profiles of the Four Christian Social Concern Groups

Group	Year formed	Initiation	Hierarchy of the internal structure
CIC	1968	Asian Christian Conference in the mid 1960s	2 levels [a]
JP	1977	Vatican Council II in 1965	2 levels [b]
SCM	1981	self-motivated	1 level [c]
CI	1988	self-motivated	2 levels [d]

[a] 1 director & 4 departments; management committee.
[b] Secretariat, Commission, Executive Committee at 1st level; 4 working groups at 2nd level (the base).
[c] 1 staff & the executive committee. [d] 1 director & 3 staffs; management committee.

Table 6b Profiles of the Four Christian Social Concern Groups

Group	Number of active members	Average educational level of members	Occupation of members	Religion
CIC	30-40 [i]	primary	blue collar workers	Protestant
JP	non-membership group[ii]	tertiary	professional	Catholic
SCM	30	tertiary	(college students)	Protestant
CI	Full-118 Assn-125 [iii]	tertiary	professional	Protestant

[i] CIC's membership is based on church and organizations. But the Association for the Rights of Industrial Accident Victims (ARIAV) and the Labour Church which under CIC's umbrella have individual membership.
[ii] JP is a diocesan commission. All of its members are appointed by the Bishop of Hong Kong.
[iii] Full represents full membership. Assn. represents associate membership.

Then, what are the factors that contribute to the long-term collaboration of these four groups? We think the answer lies on the "common matrix of political and religious beliefs."[256] The logic goes as follows. Although there are structural differences, an affinity that is based on shared religious beliefs and social ideals is fostered among these groups. Since this affinity is developed from the core value system of the groups, it offsets the less important structural differences and drives the four social concern groups to

collaborate constantly. Since the common religious beliefs and social ideals take a significant position in the four religious groups, we have to look into each of these beliefs and ideals in detail.

The Shared Understanding of Evangelization

For the four Christian social concern groups in our research, evangelization does not mean simply individualistic conversion. Rather, social participation is an indispensable component in preaching the gospel message. This stance is unambiguously written down in the documents of these four Christian groups:

> "On our part, actions for social justice and the rebuilding of a better world are essential components of the way the gospel message should be spread. In other words, the true meaning of the gospel message is the salvation of mankind and the liberation of mankind from unjust conditions and oppression" (Txt-JP4-FATH Text unit 2)
>
> "HKCIC aims to preach the gospel of heaven. We concern the poor and the sufferers. We evangelize them and stand with the workers because these groups of people face more difficult struggling and crises" (OBJ-CICR Text units 24-5).
>
> "It is because CI emphasizes on the practice of gospel instead of preaching the gospel" (Txt-Ci11-REF Text unit 16)
>
> "[Social participation] is part of Chritian faith. Without this part, it is not the wholistic understanding and praxis of faith" (Interview-SCM Text unit 4).

Then, what is the theological justification for the Christian groups to incorporate social participation into evangelization? In our research, we found there are three theological justifications. For illustration, these theological justications are summarized as follows.

First, care for the others and particularly for the poor is the calling of God (Boff & Boff 1987, p.7). To Christians, "love of God *and* one's neighbour" is extremely important because it is "the first and the greatest

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[256] The idea of common matrix is used by the French sociologist Michael Löwy in explaining

commandment" (Matthew 22:37-40).[257] Accordingly, an integral faith includes not only the intimate relationship between humans and God but also the tender care for the other humans. In fact, salvation or damnation will be decided on the Christian's acceptance or rejection of the poor (Matthew 25:31-46). This is why CIC and JP said:

> "Yes. Christian are *called* to serve the community, esp. The poor, not the church itself" (Interview-CIC Text unit 4)

> "As part of the Church, Christian groups like JP have responsibilities to answer the *calling* of God through actualizing our missions in society" (Interview-JP Text unit 4).

However, care for the others has a broader meaning than giving alms. Indeed, all the religious groups in our interview hold that providing aids for the poor is not enough.[258] It is necessary to find out the root of the problem and to remedy it. Otherwise, poverty will remain a serious social problem. As a result, the Christian social concern groups must engage themselves in social transformation in answering the calling of God.

Second, Christians should follow Jesus Christ's example of being a liberator of the oppressed. For the theologists like Gutiérrez and Boff, Jesus, the son of God, had made a personal option for the poor from the outset. Jesus chose to be poor, served the disadvantaged, and healed the sufferings of the marginalized (Boff & Boff 1987, p.53-5). Meanwhile, Jesus was also the

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the rise of liberation theology in Latin America (1996, p.36).

[257] This is exactly the conviction of Mr. Li, Lap Kwan, a former chairman of JP. In an internal interview of JP, LI said, "the most important teaching in our faith is 'to love God and others as we love ourselves'" so to him "spirituality and social concerns could not be separated"(Txt-JP5-Meet Text unit 21).

[258] In Part A Question 1 Item a, we ask our interviewees' attitudes on the statement "As a Christian organization, it is more appropriate to give love and material assistance to the poor than to address the root of the poverty or social injustice." All of the four Christian groups disagree (2) or strongly disagree (2) to this idea.

liberator. His mission was to liberate the oppressed (Murray 1998, p.57).[259] Hence, the true followers of Jesus must take the preferential option for the poor. This is exactly the perspective of the four Christian groups:

> "Through the incarnation, Jesus Christ participated in human sufferings and resisted the evil power on earth. As such, salvation is achieved" (OBJ-SCMR Text units 68-70).

> " .... The eminent German theologist D.Bonhoeffer ... advocated "Religiousless Christianity." It meant that the essence of Christianity was to follow Jesus Christ's ways of and attitudes towards living. Through the Incarnation, the Lord Christ became a human being. He experienced the sufferings of humans and participated in the human struggles. Therefore, it was reasonable for the disciplines of Jesus Christ to participate in social affairs ...."(Txt-Ci7-KWOK Text unit 2).

> "Jesus is the Good Samaritan who, on His journey, came across fallen humanity lying wounded and powerless at the side of the road. He stooped down and bound up those wounds. May He touch our hearts with a similar compassion and help us see that an effective concern for others, which will necessarily involve concern for a more just society, is at the very centre of our religion" (Txt-JP6-JOHN Text units 9-9).

Therefore, as CIC said,

> "CIC from its early beginning has identified itself as a mission to the poor in Hong Kong. We will take the viewpoints of workers as our viewpoints. We will stand with workers. Moreover, we will always serve the poorest of the poor in the community"(Interview-HKCIC Text unit 12).

As such, the four Christian groups are committed to the poor as Jesus was on earth.

Third, Christians should bear witness to God's mercy as well as justice. According to the liberation theology, a church of the poor is the visible sign of the presence of God within the liberation process (Ibid., p.58; Boff & Boff 1987, p.59). Concretely, the church is the agent and witnesses of salvation. Through its commitment to the poor and its struggle against injustice society, then Church will be a church of the poor and let the oppressed feel the kindness and justice of God. So we find that:

> "[Q.A.2.] Yes. As a witness to God's justice, compassion, and mercy" (Interview-CI Text unit 4).

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[259] See Luke 4:16-20.

> "Recognizing that society is not static, we consider bearing witness of our faith according to the society's current requirements a necessity. Therefore, improving people's livelihood and trying to relieve those being oppressed through involving in social and political affairs are essential missions of every Christian and every Christian group. That is our social justice ministry" (Interview-JP Text unit 4).
>
> "The basic belief of this article is: the existence of the Church is a concrete expression of the spirit of Christianity. The spirit of Christianity is to advocate "love" and "social justice." Christianity emphasizes on the value of human, and wishes no one will be excluded and abandoned in the society"(Txt-Ci7-KWOK Text unit 4).

Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the CIC has established the Christian Labour Church and fellowship for the workers.

Based on these understandings, evangelical conversion requires more than a change of heart. Rather, evangelization includes a liberation from the social and structural sin of oppression and injustice. Only through a liberation from oppression could the self-realization of humans be possible (Murray 1998, p.54).[260] The need for a liberation from an oppressing system is acknowledged and expressed clearly in the following quotation of JP:

> "As Pope Paul VI stated in his Apostolic Exhortation "Evangelization in the Modern World": For the Church, to evangelise is to bring the Good News into all the strata of the human race, so that by its power it may permeate the depths of humanity and make it new. The various strata of the human race are to be transformed. The call for transformation of the value system of each culture is a call for attitudinal change and structural change. This does not refer to a purely private and individualistic conversion. Instead, the Church is seeking to convert the individual and collective conscience of the people, something which would normally find expression in changes of the social, political and economic structures of their society" (Txt-JP7-YUEN Text units 13-16).

In summary, the four Christian social concern groups share the same idea that social participation is a constitutive dimension of evangelization. This conviction makes the Christian groups take sides with the poor and

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[260] Pope John Paul II also said, " There are two complementary and inseparable elements. The first is liberation from all the forms of bondage, from personal and social sin, and from everything that tears apart the human individual and society ... The second element is liberation for progressive growth in being through communion with God and other human beings.... (Quoted by Boff & Boff 1987, p.52-3).

motivates them to participate in social affairs. This explains why the Christian groups consider social engagement to be appropriate, and why they strongly disagree with the idea that church is only a refuge for its members and has no need to be concerned with secular affairs.[261]

The Shared Social Ideals

Aside from their common religious beliefs, the four Christian groups also share common ground on the ideal society they are striving for. "[The Christian social concern groups] emphasize and defend the dignity, equality and freedom of the human person, and consider that human life in society should be based on truth, justice, love and freedom"(Txt-JP7-Yuen Text unit 7). In other words, an ideal society is a just, democratic society that respects human rights and allows individuals to actualize their creativity.

Social justice.

For the Christian groups, the reason for justice is oriented less to religious concerns than to secular concerns. For one thing, justice is the basic condition of peace. As the former ecclesiastical adviser to JP Rev. John Russell says,

> "Peace, the work of justice. He [Pope Pius XII] knew that the only way to bring about lasting peace in the world was to ensure that relations between nations were ruled by justice .... peace within nations could be maintained only as long as fair and just conditions prevailed within society" (Txt-JP6-JOHN Text unit 3).

The rationale is that inequality and sufferings resulted from injustice will eventually force the vulnerable masses to take "recourse to violence as a means to right such affronts to their human dignity" (Txt-JP6-John Text unit

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[261] This assertion comes from Part A Question 1 Item c of our questionnaire.

4). Thus, we have to work for social justice in order to have a peaceful society. From this perspective, social justice is also the means to peace.

But what is justice? The word "fair" in the quotation of Russell suggests social justice is closely associated with social equality. Within a nation, "[Individuals] must be given equal opportunities and they must be ensured that they will get a fairer share of the fruits of success"(Txt-CI7-Kwok Text unit 33). This social condition is considered to be fair and just because "no one will be excluded and abandoned," and economic growth will contribute to "the quality of life for everybody rather than a few rich individuals," (Ibid. Text units 4 & 40). Between nations, the wealthier nations should be "more generous, more just in their trade relations with the developing world"(Txt-JP6-John Text unit 4). Based on these understandings of justice, the Christian groups are willing to strive for a fairer, and hence a more peaceful society and a better world.

Human rights.

Based on the doctrine of Christianity and the concern over personal development, the Christian groups conceive of human rights as basic, universal, and inviolable. For one thing, the respect of human rights is a key concept in Christianity. Christianity holds that God created humans in His image; hence, humans are second only to God and are equally valued in the eyes of God (Txt-Ci7-Kwok Text units 7-8). Because of the equal status of all humans, they should mutually respect each other's rights.

Aside from theological consideration, the Christian groups' conception of human rights as basic, universal rights is also shaped by the consideration of human development. To the Christian groups,

> "Certain basic conditions are needed for a person to live with dignity and protect his or her physical mental and spiritual well-being" (Txt-CI8-Kwok Text unit 14).

In the first case, respecting human rights is for the physical well-being of humans. Physical development can only take place in the proper economic and social conditions. If the check and balance is absent and the government can do whatever it likes, the masses' interests will be jeopardized. Since the social and economic living conditions of the masses are undermined, the physical well-being of each individual will be hampered. This concern is clearly expressed in the following quotation of the CI.

> "People are deprived of their economic rights because they have no access to civil and political rights.... In a way, civil and political rights are more fundamental than economic, social and cultural rights. The later set of rights can never be realized unless the former are firmly in place" (Txt-Ci8-KWOK Text unit 7 & 13)

In the second case, respecting human rights is for the spiritual well-being of humans. Human rights are the necessary conditions for actualizing the creativity of human beings. As CI says,

> "... in order to have a valuable and meaningful life, 'Man cannot live on bread alone.' Humans need to express their creativity and contribute to the society. For this objective, humans must have freedoms of speech, work, assembly, participating public policies, etc..... Only when those basic human rights mentioned in such international covenants as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are enjoyed by humans, can humans be able to live with dignity"(Txt-Ci9-REFL Unit 2 & 4).

In other words, the lack of protection and respect of human rights in a society will deprive the citizens not only of opportunities to realize their creativity, but also of their possibilities of living in a dignified way.[262]

Under these considerations, the Christian social concern groups hold that "people must reject the notion that their rights were given or defined by the authority" because human rights are inborn (Txt-Ci8-Kwok Text unit 15). Also, human rights are inviolable in that "nobody should be arbitrarily deprived of his/her rights by any body nor any government"(Txt-ci7-Kwok Text unit 8). Human rights are universal because some basic conditions are required for the physical and spiritual well-being of humans. Therefore, human rights must be respected by the government and viewed as the basic principle of their governance.

Democracy.

There is no doubt that the development of a democratic culture in Hong Kong is an essential concern of the Christian social concern groups in our research. The question is what democracy means to the social concern groups and why democracy is considered an essential element in their political ideals.

In this regard, CI's conception of democracy approximately represents the other Christian social concern groups' understanding of democracy. On the part of the government, democracy refers to a political system "with adequate check and balance mechanisms. The most important ingredient is

[262] Madison shares the same argument in his theory of civil society (See Chapter 2 of this study).

that citizens can exercise their basic rights to elect their own representatives in the government and to monitor its performance" (Txt-CI8-Kwok Text unit 19). On the part of the public, the citizens have civic responsibilities. "[P]eople must therefore be encouraged to freely express themselves and to throw themselves into working towards the betterment of the wider community" (Txt-CI8-Kwok Text unit 33). Otherwise, the lack of check and balance mechanisms and the citizens' involvement in public affairs will cause "damag[es] to the overall development of that society" (Txt-Ci8-Kwok Text unit 33).

The Christian social concern groups' belief about democracy is based on three premises. The first premise is that humans are born equal. For the equal status of humans, nobody has the right to dominate the others without their consent. Indeed, everybody should have the equal right to participate and to influence public policy. The second premise is that "absolute power corrupts absolutely." Greed is human frailty. Since "nobody is immune from greed", power will inevitably lead to corruption. Hence, "all powers must be checked" (Txt-Ci8-Kwok Text unit 19). The third premise is that "politics and livelihood are inseparable." The logic runs as follows:

> "If the government is extremely powerful ... then it is hard to protect the rights of the people. If this is the case, the citizens' civil and political rights will be intruded by those who enforce the law, and the citizens' economic and welfare rights will be deprived by the administrative department"(Txt-JP10-Yuen Text units 56-57).[263]

Thus, the four Christian groups concern the development of democracy in Hong Kong. For the well-being of the public, the government should give

civil and political rights to participate in social affairs. Only "a more open, democratic and free society" will allow "all who stay in Hong Kong will be able to have a better life" (Txt-JP1-Lau Text unit 4).

In summary, a common matrix of religious and political beliefs is the basis of the long-term collaboration of the four Christian social concern groups. According to their theological understandings, these Christian groups perceive that social engagement is appropriate because it is an integral part of evangelization. They therefore do not hesitate to participate in social affairs and side with the poor. Meanwhile, the ideal of a just, democratic, mutually respectful society is also shared by the social concern groups. As a result, this common matrix has fostered an affinity that drives the Christian social concern groups to work together to create the ideal and desired society.

The Internal Democracy of the Four Christian Social Concern Groups

Civil society is a society of "tolerance, reasonableness, a readiness to compromise, and a willingness to work out mutual agreements by means of discourse rather than force (Madison 1998, p.63). Accordingly, civil society requires its associations to treat their members and each other in a reasonable manner. Therefore, the examination of each group's internal democracy will let us know how "reasonable" the Christian social concern groups are.

This study will address three aspects of the internal democracy of the Christian groups. The first aspect is about the decision-making process in each group. Issues like who the decision makers are and how the decision

[263] To JP, "the eradication of many legislative for labour rights; the decrease of profit tax" by the Provisional Legislature is a good example to explain why an "undemocratic legislature

makers handle conflicts of opinions will be examined. Second, we will study the practice of task sharing within each group. Specifically, we want to know whether developing group members' organizing skills is the group's priority or not. Also, we would like to know what kinds of works, if any, are shared by group members. The final aspect is the reflexivity of the groups. Its indicator is the evaluation meetings in the group.

The Decision Makers

We find that an inverse relationship may exist between the "openness" of the groups and the influence of members in the decision making process. According to the openness of the groups, we classify the four Christian social concern groups into three categories. The first category is "membership group." The membership group is inclusive because it is open to the public and everyone will be accepted as a member. CI and SCM are in this category. The second category is "non-membership group." This is an exclusive group because it is not open to the public. Neither individual nor association can apply for a membership. Instead, the non-membership group will invite a person to join in the group. Among the four Christian groups, JP is a non-membership group.[264] Between the "membership group" and the "non-membership group," there is the "semi-membership group." The semi-membership group accepts organizational membership but not individual membership. Among the Christian groups, CIC is a semi-membership group.

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will have great harmful effects on livelihood"(Txt-JP9-Demo Text unit 3).

[264] All members of JP are appointed by the Bishop of Hong Kong. New members are invited to join JP by existing members and staff. According to the Executive Secretary Mary Yuen's information, new members are either friends of the members or parishioners. Some have

CIC is exclusively based on organization or church as membership unit although it does set up some associations for individual members.[265]

The three types of groups have different ways of making decisions on resource allocation, policies, and activities.[266] In the membership groups like CI and SCM, all decisions are made exclusively by the leader and the elected executive committee. As a semi-membership group, CIC lets the director and associate directors make decisions on policies and resource allocation for each program while all the members in the collective meeting will decide the activities. The decision making process of JP is different from that of the other groups. The power of decision making is shared by the three components of JP, the secretariat, the commission, and the executive committee.[267] The executive committee is responsible for administration so it will decide the allocation of money and man-power. In the collective meetings, all members of JP will be the policy makers. Finally, the activities for JP are suggested by staffs from the secretariat and the executive committee and will be discussed and decided in meetings.

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participated in JP's activities before while others were former active members of students' organizations. Although JP is "exclusive," individuals are welcomed to be "Friends of JP."

[265] The Christian Labour Church of CIC and the Association for the Rights of Industrial Accident Victims (ARIAV) are such examples.

[266] See Question 2 to 4 of Part C in our questionnaire.

[267] The Secretariat is formed by 6 full-time staff (1 executive secretary, 4 project officers, and 1 accounting clerk). The Commission is formed by 12 members. Together with the executive secretary, 5 members from the Commission form the Executive Committee. These three components are located at the same level of the internal structure. Under the commission, there are 4 working groups which are responsible for the works on human rights, social affairs, consciousness education, and China affairs respectively. All 12 members from the commission will participate in the 4 working groups. In addition, 15 persons were invited to work with the commission members. These 15 persons are members of the working groups but they are not members of the commission.

How influential are the members in each group? We find that members in the membership groups like CI and SCM have the least influence on the decision making process. Their members have few opportunities to influence major decisions. They only participate in the annual meeting and vote the persons they prefer into the executive committee. In CIC, members in this semi-membership group have some influence in the decision making process. Although the general meeting of CIC will be held once a year, all members in the meeting can exercise their power in deciding the activities for the group. More importantly, they have the power to approve a new budget and to evaluate the works of the staff. However, JP's members have the greatest influence in the decision making process among the four Christian groups. In terms of frequency, there were 9 collective meetings, 7 executive meetings, 2 evaluation meetings in the year of 1997. In addition, general meeting was held in each month. The four working groups also have their own meetings. In terms of participation, all members participate in the collective meetings which includes staffs from the Secretariat, members of the Commission, and the ecclesiastical advisers assigned by the Bishop of Hong Kong. In the executive committee, representatives of the working groups and the executive secretary will work together. In terms of substantial influence, the power of decision making is distributed among the three components of JP. While the collective meetings decided the working directions and position of JP in each public issue, the secretariat and the executive committee will make decisions on administrative matters. In case of emergency, they will make immediate response to some breaking issues.

Based on these findings, it is reasonable to think that the influence of members in the decision making process may be inversely related to the openness of the group. At the one end of the spectrum, CI and SCM are inclusive. However, members in these groups have the least influence on the decision of the groups. At the other end of the spectrum, JP is exclusive. Yet, the power of decision making is shared by all members. Finally, CIC is at the center of the spectrum. It is neither totally inclusive nor exclusive. Hence, the influence of its members is greater than those of CI and SCM but is fewer than those of JP.

The Handling of Conflicts of Opinions [268]

In our study, we find that all Christian social concern groups with the exception of JP provide limited channels for the rank and file of the group to express their opinions. While there are regular meetings for the executive or management committtee members to express and discuss their opinions, channels for the general members to express their views are limited. They can voice their opinions only through informal conversations with staff and in the annual general meetings. Yet, there is no guarantee that these opinions will have any impact on the policy of the groups. Even though these opinions may be raised, respected, and rationally discussed in the general meeting, this opportunity is available only once a year. Thus, we think that there are insufficient channels for the rank and file of the Christian groups to express their ideas.

[268] See Question 6 a and b of Part C in our questionnaire.

While there are limited channels for the members within the three Christian groups, the situation in JP is quite different. JP's members have more opportunities to voice their ideas than do members of the other groups. Apart from the collective meetings, there are monthly meetings, working group meetings, and informal conversations for JP's members to express their opinions freely. The major factor that contributes to this difference is the non-membership status of JP. Unlike the other three groups, JP's works and programs are shared by all of its members. Nobody will be excluded from the works or decision making process by the rest. At the same time, when a person accepts the invitation to join JP, s/he committed him/herself to the works of JP. Hence, members are actively involving themselves in the program of the group. Since there are regular meetings in each working group and in the commission, the opportunities for its members to express different opinions are much higher than the other three groups.

With regard to the manner of handling conflicting opinions, we find that all Christian groups will respect different opinions and handle these differences in a civil way. Yet, there are still differences in their approaches for dealing with these disagreements.[269]

First, all the staffs in the Christian groups are equally influential, but the roles they assumed in handling disagreements are different. In SCM, staff will have the final say, though she will assign more time for discussion.

"generally it will leave for the staff to decide as the staff is the one really implement the decision and know better the pros and cons of a decision" (Interview-SCM QC6b Text unit 67).

[269] The interviewee of CI said he was unable to trace any example of disagreement in his group. Thus, CI is excluded in this section.

In CIC, "staff inputs are very significant in the process of decision making" (Interview-HKCIC QC6b Text unit 68). When there are disagreements, members will attempt to develop consensus. If consensus cannot be reached, voting will be held after the debate. During this process, the staff's influence is salient. The staff's stances will affect the voting result.[270] In JP, the staff will be more objective. They are not the final decision-makers, nor do they directly influence the voting result. Rather, the staff will put all opinions together and draft a statement for another discussion. Hopefully, this statement will get passed.[271]

The Christian groups have different ways for handling disagreements. In the case of SCM, it will let the staff make the final decision. In CIC, voting is the only way to find the solution and simple majority will be taken. Unlike SCM and CIC, JP has three ways to deal with disagreements. If disagreement arises among the members and no one is willing to make concession, then voting will be adopted. In case of serious disagreement and the members do not insist on issuing a position paper, then JP will not express its opinion publicly. If the disagreement is between the commission and the secretariat, then the problem is bigger since this will hinder the staffs' functioning. In this

[270] Our interviewee cited an example for illustration. After 1989, the Chinese dissident Han Dong Fen left Beijing and took refuge in Hong Kong. Since Mr. Han had experience in organizing workers' union in China, CIC's staff inclined to employ him. However, some members disagreed and great debate took place. Consensus could not be reached. The solution could only recourse to voting. Due to the influence of the staff, the result of the voting was favourable to the staff's position and Mr. Han was hired.

[271] During the interview, our interviewee cited an example for illustration. As in the case of CIC, the differences were great. Hence the staff of JP employed the method as was mentioned in the paragraph to solve it. Fortunately, the disagreement was solved peacefully and rationally. Since the interviewee reminded me the example was only for internal reference only, so I could not give further details of this example in here.

case, the secretariat will gather the conflicting opinions and try to draft a statement for discussion again. Eventually, an agreement may be reached.

In short, we find all Christian groups in our research tolerate and respect different opinions. Still, there are differences among these groups in the number of channels available, the roles the staff assume in handling conflicting opinions, and their ways of handling disagreements. In our research, JP's performance in these three aspects is quite impressive. JP provides monthly meetings for its members. In addition, the staff of JP assume a pivotal and yet objective role in handling conflicts of opinions. Finally, JP adopts various methods to deal with disagreements according to the nature and seriousness of the disagreements. Under these considerations, we conclude JP is closer to the ideal situation we mentioned at the outset of this section than the rest.

The Issue of Influential Person[272]

All of the Christian groups we interviewed conceded that some persons are more influential than the others in the decision-making process. However, there is disagreement on whether the presence of an influential person is a problem or not. On one side, the presence of an influential person is not a problem to CI because s/he will not hinder the participation of other members. On the other side, all other interviewees see this phenomenon as unhealthy. CIC and JP even realize that the staff are influential people, for they acquire more information than the members. Since there is always a possibility that

[272] See Question 5 of Part C in our questionnaire.

the discussion or decision-making process will be dominated by the influential persons, all three interviewees try to avoid it.

Some remedies deal with the dominant person. For example, the staff of SCM will address this issue immediately if someone becomes too dominant in the meeting. Other remedies aim to involve less influential participants. For instance, the chairperson and some other member of JP will invite the silent participant to share his/her viewpoints. While the preceding remedies are personal-oriented, the following solutions are procedural-oriented. To JP, they try to establish a partnership atmosphere between the members and the staffs. Once this atmosphere and understanding is established, everyone will respect each other and make decisions collectively. As such, consensus is easier to achieve. To SCM, they will slow down the decision-making process until a full discussion is completed. To CIC, additional staff sharing gatherings will be organized. As such, the domination of the influential persons in the meeting will be minimized.

Task Sharing[273]

We find that task sharing may be positively associated with the group's attitude to developing members' organizational skills. If developing members' skills is the group's priority, then task sharing will be emphasized and vice versa. At the one end of the spectrum, developing organizing skills is not an objective let alone a priority of CI. Although leadership is on a rotational basis, position rotation and task sharing are not practised in CI. At the other end of the spectrum, skill development is one of the top priorities of CIC.

Although CIC's membership is based on organization as the unit, CIC is also an umbrella association which creates ARIAV and the Labour Church for the workers. Through the mutual aid groups of the former and the sub-groups of the Labour Church, individual members are able to develop self-confidence, verbal and administrative skills. As such, these learning opportunities are considered to be "a process of empowering the powerless" (Leung 1988, p.117). At the center, both JP and SCM consider developing members' organizing skills as one priority, though not a top one, of their groups. Both groups encourage their members to learn whenever there is an opportunity. In JP, tasks are shared most of the time while leadership and position rotation are practised some of the time. In SCM, leadership rotation, position rotation, and task sharing are practised most of the time. Through these practices, SCM's members learn self-confidence, management, and organizing activities with the assistance of staffs whenever there are chances.[274]

With the exception of CI, all Christian groups are aware of the importance of the members' participation in the groups' works. This is especially the case of CIC. In fact, the executive officer of CIC concludes that "we can transmit our knowledge and skill to factory workers and social workers through training seminars, thus multiplying our manpower." This is one of the reasons that CIC can operate with a small staff (Leung 1988, p.119). Although JP and SCM do not consider skill development as their top priority, tasks are always shared by members. In fact, there is an inseparable

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[273] See Question 8 to 10 of Part C in our questionnaire.

relationship between membership and task sharing in JP because accepting the membership of JP means commitment to the work of JP. Hence, task sharing creates a favourable condition for the development of a democratic atmosphere within the groups.

Self-reflexivity

With the exception of JP, all Christian groups pay little attention to self- evaluation. JP is the only one that actively evaluates itself. In fact, JP's willingness and efforts on developing self reflexivity are salient. Internally, JP has regular evaluation meetings. For example, each of the commission and the four working groups have two evaluation meetings in a year respectively. Moreover, there are monthly meetings to evaluate the performance of each program. Externally, JP takes note on outsiders' evaluation on JP. As the former Chairman of JP Mr. Lau Kar Wah says,

> "We visited organizations and individuals within and outside church circles to learn of their views and expectations concerning its [JP] work" (Txt-JP1-LAU Text unit 6).

Thus, we think JP is actively and constantly evaluating itself.

On the other hand, the rest civic groups do not evaluate frequently. For instance, the director of CI Rev. Kwok says,

> "We try to stay away from extensive evaluation due to the shortage of resources. We rely on comments by course participants and our readers who from time to time let us know how they feel" (Txt-CI-followup Text units 12-14).

From this quotation, we can see CI adopts a passive stance to self-evaluation. Instead of actively seeking the responses of the members, CI waits for the

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[274] SCM's members had formed a sub-group to publish their newsletters. Members decided the content, design, editing, printing and distribution. Recently, this sub-group was dissolved.

members' comments. Therefore, if self-reflexiveness is not absent, then at least it is de-emphasized among the three Christian groups.

Summary

Since associations are the terrain for fostering the spirit of democracy in civil society, internal democracy ought to be emphasized within each civic organization. However, our study on internal democracy indicates that there are degrees of difference among the four Christian social concern groups. First, JP's members have the greatest influence on the decision making process and the members of CI and SCM have the least influence. Second, while JP regularly provides various channels for its members to express their different opinions, the rank and file of the other three groups depend mainly on informal conversations and annual general meetings to express their viewpoints. In addition, the staffs of JP take a more objective role in handling disagreements. Furthermore, while SCM and CIC depend exclusively on the staff or voting as the solution for disagreement, JP will tackle the disagreements in various ways according to the nature and seriousness of the disagreements. Third, the issue of influential persons exists in all Christian groups but not everyone thinks it is problematic. Thus only those groups that think the presence of influential persons is unhealthy will try to minimize the domination of these influential persons in the meetings. Fourth, task sharing is practised most of the time within CIC, JP, and SCM but not in CI. Based on these findings, we conclude that JP has used the greatest effort to promote internal democracy among the four Christian groups. CIC and SCM spend

lesser efforts on the promotion of internal democracy. And CI pays the least attention to internal democracy.

Civil Society as the Target of Democratization: The Case of the Local Church

As suggested by Cohen and Arato, associations and institutions are the targets of democratization (1994, p.526). The traditional values, norms, and practices of the institutions may contravene the principle of democracy and human rights or they are simply unable to accommodate the new needs and meanings of the modern civil society. Hence, these values, norms, and practices ought to be renewed. This is exactly the case of the church in Hong Kong. For illustration, the problems of the church identified by the Christian groups and the corresponding reforms they undertake will be presented as follows.

The Situation of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese and Its Parishes

From the JP's perspective, the Catholic Diocese and its parishes are facing different, yet related, problems. The Diocese's problem is related to its competence rather than its willingness to undertake social involvement. The Catholic Diocese is quite aware of its social mission. Since the Vatican Council II in 1962, the Hong Kong Diocese has been committed to social engagement.[275] Indeed, our interviewee "disagree(s)" that the Church in Hong

[275] As early as 1971, the Diocese has already encouraged its parishes "to establish a community action group committed to social concern"(Txt-JP2-Hurl Text unit 14). The establishment of JP in 1977 as an official organization of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese is an example. JP's members are all appointed by the Bishop and its finance relies totally on the Diocese. JP represents the Diocese to implement the social justice ministry. Its work is accountable to the Bishop (Interview Part B Question 1). In the 1990s, the Cardinal Wu, Bishop of Hong Kong in the pastoral exhortaion "March into the Bright Decade" clearly affirmed the servant and prophetic role of the Church (Txt-JP3-Chan Text unit 8). In his letter to JP, the Bishop said,"In fact, ... this [promote justice and peace in society] is what

Kong lacks a commitment to social affairs.[276] So there is no doubt that the Diocese has the will to participate in social affairs. The problem is the competence of the Diocese in dealing with social affairs.

According to the former chairperson of JP Wong Siu Kwong, "there is a gap between the Church and society" (Txt-JP5-Meet Text unit 86). The rapid social changes have brought about such new social issues as divorce, birth control, and homosexuality. Because of the complexity of these new issues and the insufficency of social teachings of the Church, it is difficult for the Diocese to find the proper positions, let alone the solutions of these issues. While Cardinal Wu describes this problem in an implicit manner,

> "With the rapid changes in present-day society, the repsonsibility of the Commission will become even heavier and its work more difficult" (Wu 1993, p.6).

Wong's comment is explicit:

> "[T]he social issues are very complicated now and JP is not competent enough to have noteworthy views on them, apart from the issues relating to Church values, like the Vietnamese refugees and abortion. We also find it hard to produce specially good views on how to cope with other issues, such as policies concerning medical services and housing. Thirdly, Church teachings are not so advanced and may not be the best way to resolve problems in society...." (Txt-JP5-MEET Text unit 83).

Consequently, the Church can not lead society but it is the other way round.

At the parish level, the problem is the hesitation of the parishes in participating social affairs. From 1971 to 1992, only 13 out of the 63 local parishes had their "community action groups" (Txt-JP2-Hurl Text unit 14). In the early 1980s, JP's members were not welcomed by some parish priests and parish councils (Txt-JP5-meet Text unit 38). This is why the interviewee from

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Yahweh asks of you: only this, to act justly, to love tenderly and to walk humbly with your God"(Wu 1993, p.6).

[276] See Question 3 of Part A in our questionnaire.

JP thinks the parishes need to change their attitude about social involvement.[277] We think at least three reasons may contribute to the hesitation of the parishes regarding social engagement. First, the incapability of the Church's social teachings to deal with new social issues makes the parishes avoid controversial issues.[278] Second, the social participation of the parishes, an unit of the Catholic Church, may create the misconception that the Catholics are organized into a political movement. To avoid this charge, the parishes shy away from social involvement.[279] Third, the parishes are afraid that social actions will scare the laity because

> "Catholic who participate in religious activities do not want to be involved in politics while parish priests, who express views concerning politics may not be accepted by laypeople" (Txt-JP5-MEET Text unit 89).

As a result, the parishes hesitate to participate in social and political affairs.

The Reforms of the Catholic Church

Since 1979, JP has carried out reforms to bridge the gap between the Diocese and society as well as to promote the parishes' social involvement. Regarding the first issue, JP's objective is "to develop a modern outlook and to come closer to real life" so that the Diocese will keep in touch with the pulse of society (Txt-JP3-Chan Text unit 16). To this end, the first thing that JP does is improve its own understanding of the development of society. The self-learning process is necessary because JP believes "if our work on formation was insufficient, how could we lead other people?"(Txt-JP5-Meet

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[277] See Part A Question 3 Item c.
[278] See Part A Question 3 Item b.
[279] Even Wong Siu Kwong thinks "Catholics should not be organized to express their views; to organize them would be a political move" (Txt-JP5-MEET Text unit 104). This is the

Text unit 13).[280] This learning process includes: (1) employing full-time staff to do research on current affairs ("Work Plan" in JP's pamphlet); (2) learning how to respond to social issues (Txt-JP5-Meet Text unit 152).

To keep the Diocese in touch with social development, the second thing that JP does is take up the role as the bridge between the Church and society. On the one hand, JP acts as an advisory body to the Bishop. JP offers its social analyses to the Church for reference. "It also gives more advice to the diocesan authorities on certain sensitive issues and on issues related to the Church, like education and matters concerning human rights"(Txt-JP5-Meet Text unit 142). As such, JP exerts influence on the Bishop and the Church.[281] On the other hand, when JP gives public statements on sensitive issues, it will consult the vicar general but JP will not yield the principle of justice and the positions which it believes to be right (Txt-JP5-Meet Text unit 92). Through this two-way communication, JP helps the Diocese adapt to a rapidly changing society. In turn, these adaptations reinforce and re-affirm JP's social involvement as the representative of the Diocese.

The next reform that JP has to carry out is to remedy the parishes' hesitation regarding social engagement by promoting social awareness and

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major difference between Wong and his successors (See their debates in Review and foresight 1993, p.21-2).

[280] In the Chinese edition of JP's literature, "formation" is translated into "consciousness education."

[281] JP has successfully invited the Bishop to issue pastoral letters on such issues as the Vietnamese refugees, labour, and the political system of Hong Kong (Txt-JP5-Meet Text unit 135).

direct involvement among the parishes.[282] To JP, this is a crucial task because the atmosphere in the parishes has direct impacts on individual Catholics' attitudes to social involvement (JP Annual Report 1997, p.17). Thus, the promotion of social consciousness and participation in the parishes is the key to the successful implementation of social teachings in the Diocese.

Under these considerations, the works of JP includes social involvement and civic education. Regarding social involvement, JP forms the social affairs, human rights, and China affairs working groups to study and to take action in a wide range of social affairs. From a novice to a veteran of social participation in the past two decades, JP has set up a model for the Catholics.

Regarding civic education, JP forms the consciousness education working group "to animate and encourage Catholics to be more concerned about society"(Txt-JP5-Meet Text unit 30). In practice, JP adopts the following actions. Strategically, JP actively reaches out to the Catholic community. "Cultivation Program," workshops, seminars, dramas are organized among the parishes' sub-groups (JP Annual Report 1997, p.9-11). The use of diverse channels also allows JP to send its message across the Catholic community in the most direct, simplest, and effective way.[283] More

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[282] The works of promoting social awareness among the Catholic community take a very important position in JP. In fact, the interviewee from JP thinks this aspect of works actually distinguishes JP from other Christian groups (Interview-JP Text unit 12).

[283] Traditional printed media like Catholic social teaching bookmarks, the simplified version of social teachings, and columns in the Diocese's weekly news (Kung Kao Po) are used to help the laity understand the Church's social mission. By taking advantage of new technology, such non-traditional electronic media as the Catholic Faith Telephone Hot-line, JP's homepage on the internet, and e-mail service also let the laity receive as well as respond to JP's message immediately (JP Annual Report 1997, p.15).

importantly, JP helps parishes organize social concern groups.[284] In the first place, JP and other Catholic organizations is preparing an instruction called *Guideline for setting up parish social concern group* to help the parishes establish their social concern groups. Meanwhile, JP tries to promote an atmosphere of social concern among the parishes' sub-groups.[285] To this end, JP publishes the *Voice of justice - for group sharing*, a teaching material for group discussion to help the sub-groups in developing their own discussions on social issues. By providing local examples and guideline for group leaders, the sub-groups can conduct their own discussions and learn how to examine social issues from the perspective of Faith. Gradually, the sub-groups will develop the capability and the atmosphere to discuss social issues independently.

The Situation of the Protestant Church in Hong Kong

According to the three Protestant social concern groups we interviewed, the Protestant church in Hong Kong is conservative in terms of its attitudes regarding social involvement and controversial issues. Specifically, the conservatism of the church can be categorized in the following way.

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[284] Since 1971, the Diocese had been eager to establish social concern group in each parish. However, it was not quite successful. In 1992, the Diocese tried another attempt to achieve this goal. In the "Plan for the Reorganization of the Diocese," the idea of "social concern sub-committee or group be established in every parish council" was "strongly recommends"(Txt-JP2-Hurl Text unit 14). Under this circumstance, "assist parishes to organize social concern groups" was on JP's agenda ("Work Plan" in JP's pamphlet).

[285] Not every parish has its social concern group, but the majority do have fellowships, "Small Faith Communities." It is very likely that members from these fellowships will be the potential members of the future social concern groups.

The church in Hong Kong is conservative in the sense that it wants to maintain its supposed "neutral" status in the society. The church's leaders discourage the laity to take sides. Yet, the church is far from neutral because the church is part of the political establishment (Kwok 1996 Section 3). Both the Colonial and the SAR government depend on the church for providing social services to the extent that the church is almost like an extension of the government. On the other hand, the church depends greatly on the government's funding and it cannot afford to lose these financial resources (Kwok 1991, p.51). To avoid jeopardizing this partnership with the government, the church tries to be "neutral" by distancing itself from any controversial issue.[286] The church wants to be apolitical, but in fact this is a political move for maintaining the status quo (Kwok 1996 Section 3).

The church is also conservative in the sense that it pursues power for itself rather than justice for the society. During the colonial period, the churches received great respect, special treatment, and regular financial support from the government.[287] During the transition (1984-1997), the leaders of the church realized that they were losing influence in the new political environment; hence, they were eager to preserve their influence. In 1986, some church leaders were co-opted by the China political authority.

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[286] All interviewees from the Protestant groups "agree" that the church avoids controversial issues (Part A Question 3 Item b).

[287] Regarding prestige, the Anglican bishop was ranked at the fifth position of the protocol. With regard to special treatments, the colonial government gave many lands for the churches to use permanently. Moreover, since the Governor and senior civil servants were Christians, many generous agreements were reached between the government and the churches (Kwok 1998, p.2).

Once these leaders were absorbed into the political establishment, their voices were either neutralized or muted (Xiao 1998, p.14).

The lack of a contextual ecclesiology contributes to the conservatism of the churches. The mainline denominations are pre-occupied with providing various social services. Thus, they pay little attention to pastoral work. From the CI's director Rev. Kwok's perspective, "These leaders have little or no time to do any reading and thinking. Their pastoral work is extremely shabby"(1991, p.51). For the evangelical churches, they de-emphasize the development of contextual theology (Ibid., p.51). These churches exclusively emphasize individualistic salvation. They are concerned about the size of their congregations and ignore the fact that social context is the place where salvation and social justice will be manifested (Weng 1997, p.12). So they do not participate in any social affairs. As a result, "the growth of church brought the development of a powerful but conservative middle class"(Kwok 1991, p.114). In turn, the conservative middle class ideology reinforces the conservatism of the church (Hu 1998, p.17-8).

The conservatism of the Protestant church has brought about three negative consequences. First, the church loses its mission (Kwok 1996 Section 3). The mute church gives up its prophetic role and shows no direction for its congregations (Kwok 1991, p.51). Second, alternative voices are suppressed within the institutionalized church. Opinions that different from the political orientation of the institutionalized church are excluded from the church's publications (Chen, Zuo Cai 1998, p.4; Kwok 1991, p.51-2). Third, the church gives no encouragement or support to the laity who want to

get involved in social affairs ("Origin" CI pamphlet). It is for these reasons that the three Protestant social concern groups think the church should renew its attitude to social involvement.[288]

To Reform the Protestant Church

To put it in a nutshell, the renewal of the church means the restoration of the balance among stewardship, evangelization, and prophetic role (Kwok 1991, p.97). In the past, the church has spent tremendous energies on stewardship. Now, it is time to restore the balance because "the urgent need of Hong Kong is not another new school nor youth center.... Rather, what Hong Kong needs most is the voice of justice"("Review" in Reflection 1998 Issue 54, p.3). So the church should focus more on its prophetic role than on stewardship. It also means the church should replace the self-centered, individualistic understanding of evangelization with a society-oriented, contextual theology and stand bravely with the poor (Kwok 1991, p.53). To restore the balance of servanthood, evangelization, and prophetic role, three aspects of works ought to be carried out which includes re-educating the

[288] All Protestant groups "strongly agree" that the Church should change its attitudes to social involvement (Part A Question 3 Item c). However, there is no consensus among our interviewees on whether the church lacks the social commitment or not (i.e. Item a of Question 3 in Part A). While SCM "agree" that the church has not committed to social affairs, CIC & CI "disagree." This result seems to be contradictory to Item c, but there are two explanations we can think of. One is the diverse stances on social participation among the churches. The 900 congregations in Hong Kong belong to 52 denominations or independent status. Each denomination has its own stance on social participation. Some are more likely to commit to social affairs while others are less likely to do so. So, the answer to this question is quite dependent on whom the interviewer asks. Another possible explanation is that the interviewees consider providing social services is also a form of commitment to the society no matter how inadequate it is. Since the mainline churches are the major social service providers, there is no reason to say that they are not committed to the society (Based on JP's answer to follow-up Question 1).

congregation, nuturing the laity, and encouraging the concerned Christians to speak out.

The re-education of the congregation.

To change the conservative stance of the church, re-education of the congregation is the prerequisite. Only when the congregation can think independently, is willing to reflect critically, and is prepared to adopt the sacrificial life-style by practicing their faith, can conservatism of the church be changed (Obj-CI1; Txt-Ci2-Kwok; "Review" of Reflection 1998 Issue 57, p.2). So, civic education is necessary in renewing the church.

Among the three Protestant groups, CI's works are illuminating in that regard. CI is determined to help "Christians to reflect on the Christian Faith and to act upon it"(Annual Report 1998, p.1). To this end, CI's works are twofold. First, CI is a think tank of the church.[289] It studies hard to search for the directions for the church in Hong Kong.[290] In fact, CI's contribution in the past decade is the search and practice of political theology.[291] Second, CI inculcates the new perspectives and new direction to the congregations. CI offers seminars, workshops, and courses for the Christians and theological students in its center, as well as reaches out to the Christian community. CI teaches Sunday Schools, offers instructional activities, and organizes book fairs in dozens of congregations (Txt-Ci4-Wong Text unit 25). In short, by

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[289] "To be a Think-tank" is one of the six major functions of CI (Ibid., p.1).

[290] Nearly every year, CI publishes a new book on political theology (Yu, Da Xin 1998, p.7). Publication is an important part of CI's works since it is a way to educate the Christians. When I asked the interviewer how CI was different from the other Christian organizations, his answer was CI's emphasis on publication (Part B Question 1 in the questionnaire).

[291] Yu used the term "political theology" but CI's Annual Report used "contextual theology" (See Annual Report 1997-98, p.1).

presenting the alternative perspectives to the congregations, it stimulates Christians to reflect on its goals and missions.

The nurturing of the laity.

The laity of the church needs not only re-education but also nurturing. According to Yu, the force that sustains Christians to witness God on earth mainly comes from a religious group setting (1998, p.7). In a solitary condition, the Christians' enthusiasm to practise their faith will soon dry up. This is precisely the situation of the Christians in Hong Kong. It is therefore urgent to give spiritual support to the Christians.

The first step of nurturing is the formation of a supporting environment for the Christians. Phrases like "gathering Christians ... to form a Christian Center;" "building a community of Christian students to witness the gospel;" or "a Christian Labour Church and fellowship for the workers" in the Protestant groups' literature suggest that drawing the Christians together is in fact a common concern of the Protestant groups.[292] The next step is to organize worship, Bible studies, sharing cell-groups, services, and study groups within these small communities. Through these gatherings, the laity will receive spiritual support, find resources, share their experiences, and reinforce their determination to put their faith into practice. As such, nurturing will sustain reforms within the church.

The voice of the concerned Christians.

[292] For these statements, see CI's Annual Report 1997-98, p.1; SCM pamphlet; Lutz, Hans 1991.

Instead of waiting for the renewal of the church, the Protestant social concern groups assume the prophetic role. Whenever "things are running in contrary to our Christian understandings of justice, peace and compassion," the Protestant groups will speak out (Txt-Ci3-Chr Text unit 9). This is why we find criticisms of the church as well as demands of the redistribution of power in church (Chan, K.W. 1997a, p.113).[293] As such, the Protestant groups like CI become the alternative voice in the institutionalized church ("Review" in Reflection 1998 Issue 57, p.2; Chen, Z.C. 1998). In addition, the Protestant groups also create a public space for the Christians to speak out their opinions. For example, CI's monthly gatherings, bimonthly journal and forums allow the Christians to exchange their thoughts. As a result, CI becomes a "window" that brings light and fresh air to the suffocated church's environment (Li, Qing Ci 1998, p.6).

Summary

The four Christian social concern groups are the reflexive mechanism in the churches. In Hong Kong, the Christian groups face different problems in the Catholic and the Protestant communities. While the Catholic Diocese lacks the competence, the Protestant churches lack the will to participate in social affairs. As a result, the Christian communities are unable to cope with the social situations and respond to social affairs. Nevertheless, the Christian groups work hard to remedy this situation. They help the lay people develop

[293] In our interview, all Christian groups say the priests are very influential (3 choose a very great deal and 1 choose great deal of influence). By contrast, the congregations only have some influence (1 choose little, 2 choose some and 1 says great deal if they are acting as a group, and not individual) (See Questionnaire Part A, Question 2). Meanwhile, 3 Christian

independent thinking, stimulate the congregations to reflect critically, and encourage the Christians to practise their faith. As such, the Christian groups help to increase the local church's reflectivity.

Civil Society as the Terrain of Democratization

Associations and institutions are not only the targets but also the terrain of democratization. Democratized associations and institutions will work together and exert their influence on political society for social juistice and the autonomy of civil society. A similar scenario is found in Hong Kong. The Christian groups are consciously building a local civil society. Also, they exert influence on the political authority through joint actions. The summary of the project of building a civil society and the politics of influence is given as follows.[294]

The Hong Kong Society through the Eyes of the Christian Groups

To the Christian social concern groups, Hong Kong is far from a just, democratic society which will care for its members and respects their basic rights. First, Hong Kong is a "highly unjust society" (Kwok 1996, Section 3). The judicial system is gradually losing its independence and fairness.[295] Economic inequality is severely high in the city.[296] And yet, the voice of

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social concern groups "strongly agree" and 1 "agree" with the statement that "church in Hong Kong needs democratization" (Part A Question 3d).

[294] If we recall Cohen & Arato's theory, the politics of influence refers to the process of how civil society exerts its influence on political society (See the last section of Chapter 2 in this study).

[295] For example, the New China New Agency (the defacto Chinese consulate in Hong Kong) and Sally Aw (a local media tycoon and a member of the Political Consultation Committee of the PRC) were exempted from being indicted (Txt-JP10-Yuen Text units 25-26).

[296] The big gap between the rich and the poor widens as Hong Kong becomes more affluent. While the lion's share of the city's wealth is concentrated in the few business-tycoons, 10% of the population are living below the poverty line with the monthly income of HK$1400 (about Can$280) (Txt-CI8I-Kwok Text unit 20).

justice is hardly heard.[297] Secondly, the human rights condition in Hong Kong has deteriorated. In terms of civil rights, the government is increasingly intolerant of social actions. Tighter restrictions on social demonstration, unnecessary violence of the police, and more prosecutions are the experience of many social activists (Txt-JP10-Yuen Text units 18-19). Even the limited protection of human rights, an incomplete Bill of Rights, is intolerable to the political authority.[298] For decades there has been no improvement on the quality of life of the low income group (Txt-JP7-Yuen Text unit 22).[299] More disturbing is the lack of awareness of the public regarding human rights (Txt-JP10-Yuen Text unit 46). Finally, the people of Hong Kong are unable to rule Hong Kong. In fact, the Hong Kong public in the SAR has less say in public affairs than it did in the colonial period (Txt-CI2-Kwok Text unit 6). For one thing, there was a big retrogression in the election system (Txt-Ci 12-ref Text unit 3).[300] For another thing, the government is unaccountable to the public.[301]

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[297] Even the democratic political parties concern the middle class's interests rather than the needs of the working class. They follow the voters' opinion instead of the principle of justice (Txt-CIC-Chan Text unit 22).

[298] The Bill excluded rights of self determination and elect representatives to government. Moreover, the Bill did not have status of supremacy and it was not entrenched in the legal system (Txt-CI8I-Kwok Text unit 10).

[299] In this "affluent" society, the comprehensive social security assistance given to each elderly is only HK$26 per day on food. Moreover, 4000 single males live in "cage homes" in which each occupies one level of a three tier bunk bend enclosed by chicken wire to "protect" his property. Another 165000 people live in temporary housing areas (Txt-CI8I-Kwok Text unit 24).

[300] "Only 20 out of 60 members were elected by Hong Kong's citizens. More than 90 per cent of the working class was deprived of the opportunity to elect a representative to the functional constituency (which had 30 seats). Further, only 800 people had the right to elect remaining 10 LegCo seats" (Txt-CI2-Kwok Text unit 7).

[301] The Chief Executive and his officials concern the thinking of Beijing rather than the wills of the public. The Chief Executive's administration never explains its policies to the public carefully since the formation of SAR (Txt-CI12-Kwok Text unit 27).

In conclusion, the Hong Kong society is far from the Christian groups' ideal. Therefore, the Christian groups are determined to be the voice of justice, arouse the public awareness of their basic rights, and protect the neglected powerless. To do so, they have to influence the political society for changes. This is the focus that we must now turn.

The Project of Building a Local Civil Society

From the Christian social concern groups' perspectives, a strong civil society is a sine qua non for the protection of the masses against economic injustice and political inequality. This stance is clearly expressed in the following citations:

> "As compared to political parties, Christian social concern groups are more conscious of the need to expand the public sphere and build a civil society " (Txt-CIC-Chan Text unit 28).
>
> "...We did not lose sight of the impact of the changing political circumstances on the development of civil society in Hong Kong .... We believe strengthening the voices of NGOs [non-governmental organizations] contributes to the healthy development of Hong Kong -- a community suffering economic injustice and political inequality" (Txt-CI5-Carl Text unit 12 & 14).

So there is no doubt that building a civil society in Hong Kong is consciously in the minds of the Christian social concern groups we interviewed.[302] The issues are how civil society contributes to the betterment of the city; what the roles of the Christian groups are in the project of building a civil society in Hong Kong; and how the project of building a local civil society is being implemented.

To the Christian groups, the preference for civil society is a strategic decision after considering the local political circumstances. In the first place,

building a civil society is the only way to break the deadlock of the local parliamentary politics. In the Legislative Council, the influence of the democratic councillors is undermined by the procedural restrictions and the composition of the Legislative Council. By contrast, social activists in civil society have a larger degree of freedom and a wider scope of action to respond to concerned issues (Txt-CIC-Chan Text unit 57). In addition, social activists do not have the baggage of ballot. Unlike the councillors, the Christian groups' exclusive concern is the principle of justice, and not the opinion of the voters. Consequently, the Christian groups are more vocal on sensitive issues and more willing to side with the social disadvantaged than the councillors. Hence, the Christian social concern groups have deliberately kept themselves away from the political society and concentrate their efforts on establishing a local civil society (Txt-CIC-Chan Text unit 24).

The building of a local civil society does not merely break the deadlock in the political society, but it also opens the door to the global civil society which will benefit the city as a whole. This is the second advantage of civil society that the Christian groups acknowledge. To the Christian social concern groups,

> "The local and global are linked together. It is often difficult for local issues to be transformed without the involvement of the international community" (Wu 1997, p.2).

> "We all live in a global village. We share many common concerns and encounter pretty much the same problems. We need each other" (CI Annual Report 1997-8, p.13).

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[302] The only exception is SCM. It does not mean SCM has no such idea in mind. It only means we cannot find any statement on civil society from SCM. One of the major reasons is that we have little literature from SCM.

Thus, the Christian groups consciously develop systematic ties with civic groups abroad in order to reach out to the global civil society.[303] This connection allows the local social concern groups learn the foreign civic groups' experience and let the international communities know the latest development of the city's political and economic situation from a non-governmental, non-partisan, grassroots-orientated perspective. As such, the city's political and social situations are monitored by both local and global civil societies (Chan, K.W. 1997a, p.114).

Building a civil society is also a process of empowering the powerless and fostering solidarity among the participants. As was said by the executive secretary of JP,

> "The Catholic concern groups should insist on the vision of establishing the Kingdom of God on earth and arouse the awareness of believers. This has to be achieved with the mutual support and cooperation of other Christian groups and community groups, *for empowering people requires the expansion of civil society and the maintenance of solidarity with various concern groups*" (Txt-JP7-YUEN Text unit 44. Italics is added by the writer).

To the Christian groups, their participation in building a local civil society will have a demonstration effect on the Christian community.

> "Their participation has not only translated the prophetic role of the Church into concrete action, but has also acted as a MODEL for lay people to follow" (Txt-JP7-YUEN Text unit 38).

The Christian groups can use this opportunity "to educate parishioners and encourage them to reflect on social problems from the principle of faith"(Yuen 1997, p.125). Once the individuals participate and see the difference they make, the political efficacy of these participants will be raised to a higher level. Meanwhile, the cooperation of the Christian groups also enhances the

[303] This consciousness is reflected from the objective and conference of the July First Link, a

solidarity among them. This may help to explain why the Christian groups we interviewed have worked for a decade and virtually few disagreements in the collaboration.[304] Equally important is the fact that these joint actions will attract the media's coverage and draw the public's attention. Hence, the joint actions will exert pressure on the government (Yuen 1997, p.123).

If civil society is preferred, then what is the role of Christian social concern groups in achieving this objective? From the associate director of CIC's point of view, "Christian social concern groups have a very important role to play in promoting civil society" because they are "a foundation stone of NGO networks" (Txt-CIC-Chan Text unit 57). In the first place, Christian groups are the ideal organizations to initiate this project of building a local civil society. Because of their "stance of non-involvement in political parties and parliamentary politics," the Christian groups find it easier to win the confidence of other civic organizations (Txt-CIC-Chan Text unit 57). Christian groups can also be the bridge between the local and global civil societies. For years, the Christian groups have already developed their connections with the international Christian communities and other social concern groups abroad. Through these networks, Christian groups can link the local and global civil societies together. Ideally, "a public space that transcends national borders" will be created (Txt-CIC-Chan Text unit 51).

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project initiated by the Christian social concern groups we interviewed.

[304] When we asked the four Christian groups about any disagreement among them, all of them said that only some tiny disagreements occurred when they were working in the project of July First Link (Part D Question 6).

In short, the Christian social concern groups are consciously building a local civil society in order to break the deadlock in the parliamentary politics and protect the powerless from political inequality and social injustice. The next question is how to implement this project and this is to what we must now turn.

The Implementation of Building a Local Civil Society

To the Christian social concern groups, the building of a local civil society involves civic education and networking. This approach is best summarize in JP's annual report,

> "In view of this situation, it is necessary to promote human rights education and to consolidate local and overseas civic forces so that a civil society with a larger space will be established" (JP Annual Report 1997, p.44).

Hence, the consolidation of civil society relies on civic culture. Without the support of civic culture, the project of civil society is doomed to failure. Without the local and international connections with other civic groups, the isolated social concern group will not be able to carry out the project. This is why the Christian groups must educate the public and simultaneously develop local and foreign linkages.

Educating the public.

Civil society is sustained by the corresponding civic culture; therefore, educating the public on human rights, social justice, and democracy is an essential element in building a civil society. As the CI's director says,

> "We also consider civic education in high schools to be extremely crucial .... Since the beginning of HKCI, a great deal of attention has been paid to civic education" (Txt-CI2-Kwok Text unit 46).

So the Christian groups have actively promoted civil education either in the formal education system or through informal channels.

Among the Christian groups, only CI and JP's works involve the formal education system.[305] At the first level, they design teaching materials for Civic Education.[306] For example, JP is writing the teaching materials on human rights for the subject of Chinese Language from Form 4 to Form 7 with Oxfam and Amnesty International (Annual Report 1997, p.38).[307] Meanwhile, CI have published the "Human Rights and You" and "What is Politics" teaching units for teachers.[308] At the second level, CI trains high school teachers for teaching Civic Education (Annual Report 1997-98, p.13). At the third level, both JP and CI do studies on Civil Education in the education system. As members of the "Concern for Civic Education Coalition," they conducted a survey on "national education" in response to the Hong Kong Education Department's Civic Education Guidelines. Also, they are currently working on the outline of Civic Education for Form 1 to Form 3 students (JP Annual Report 1997, p.39; CI Annual Report 1997-98, p.8).

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[305] Since JP is an authorized representative of the Catholic Diocese, JP can easily access all Catholic schools in Hong Kong. Although CI does not have this advantage, some of its founding members are Reverends and they may give CI access to some schools. By contrast, CIC's focus is exclusively on workers while SCM is only a student organization. Thus, CIC and SCM's works do not involve formal education.

[306] Civic Education is one of the four cross-curricular studies (Environmental Education, Moral Education, Sex Education) that are taught through other subjects and various functions and activities of the schools at secondary levels. Guidelines are provided on their implementation (See the Education Department's homepage at http://www.info.gov.hk/ed/index.htm). We use the capitalized "Civic Education" to denote this particular subject in the curriculum.

[307] Form 1 to Form 7 of the secondary school in Hong Kong are equivalent to Grade 7 to Grade 13 of high school in Canada.

[308] See the "References on Civic Education" in the homepage of Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union.

Apart from formal education, the Christian social concern groups also use informal channels or creative formats to promote civic education outside the school system. They frequently go to the churches, fellowships, youth and community centers, schools' assemblies to share experience or to lead discussions. Training camps, field trips, street dramas, social issues public forum, and carnivals are the creative formats that the Christian groups have been adopted in the past. Among these various programs, CIC's works on the workers' rights are the best examples to illustrate how civic education is effectively promoted in the informal ways.

CIC aims to help the factory workers understand and exercise their rights. Since the factory workers have no access to formal education, CIC has to inculcate the workers with labour rights through informal education and in creative manner. Each year, CIC regularly organizes labour law courses or sessions in community centers, fellowships in public housing estates, evening schools, and CIC's community church and office.[309] Each topic is systematically presented through case studies, audio-visual materials, and notes. After years' cultivation, over 50 factory workers have already become the labour law instructors themselves (Leung 1988, p.117). Meanwhile, CIC uses such creative and less serious formats as mobile exhibitions and street dramas in industrial areas to educate the workers too. Even modified popular songs and calendars are used to arouse the workers' awareness of labour rights

[309] Labour law courses range from 4 to 13 sessions. In each year, 20 courses will be organized. Labour law sessions are short courses (1to 2 sessions). Regularly, these short courses will be offered in 20 public housing estates. According to the CIC's observation, the short courses are the most popular program (Leung 1988, p.117).

(Ibid., p.118-9). According to CIC's assessment, informal education is an effective way to empower the workers and to secure justice (Ibid., p.117).

In short, the Christian social concern groups consider civic education to be a crucial step in building civil society. From formal school system to informal channels, from regular teaching materials to creative formats, the Christian groups spare no effort in inculcating the public with the concepts of justice, human rights, and democracy. It is hoped that a civic culture will eventually be developed through long term cultivation.

The networkings of the Christian groups.

Since the building of civil society requires the cooperation and mutual support of like-minded civic groups, developing connections with other concerned groups becomes the common objective of the Christian social concern groups we interviewed. In order to expand civil society to the full extent, the Christian groups exploit every opportunity to build up the connections. It is clearly written in the objectives of the Christian groups that there are no restriction on networking:[310]

1. Connection within the Christian community:

   "To gather concerned Christians together" (Obj-CI3 Text unit 3); "...SCM tries to unite post-secondary believers together for the ecumenical movement" (Obj-SCM Text unit 4).

2. Connection between Christian and non-Christian concern groups:

   "To collaborate with people of other traditions and beliefs for the promotion of social justice..." (OBJ-JP Text unit 12).

3. Connection between local and international concern groups:

[310] Jane Chui made a similar classification on the joint actions that the Christian social concern groups had taken part in the past (1992, p.26). Our classification of connections is based on the Christian social groups' objectives. Also, Chui mentioned nothing on the connections between local and international civic groups.

"We constantly solicit international attention and support for Hong Kong" (Obj-CI2 Text unit 10); "We support local as well as regional NGOs, and whenever possible worked together on important issues" (Txt- I2-Kwok Text unit 41); "To communicate with the overseas Christian students" (Obj-SCM Text unit 20).

By keeping these objectives in mind, we can see the actual development of these networks with the aid of Appendix 2.[311] First, we can see that the types of connections we classified above have actually been developed. Next, the collaboration between Christian and non-Christian concerned groups is clearly the major trend in the late 1990s. Finally, there is an increasing number of concerned groups participating in recent collaborations. In short, connections have been made between the Christian groups and the other civic groups while long-term coalitions still need to be cultivated.[312]

Influencing Political Society by Joint Actions

Based on the connections they cultivated, the Christain groups we interviewed are able to collaborate with like-minded social concern groups to influence the political society so that justice, the respect of human rights, and democracy will be restored in the Hong Kong society.[313] From monitoring the government policies to monitoring the performance of the LegCo councillors, from promoting human rights to promoting democracy, the Christian groups have formed various coalitions to address a wide range of social issues.[314] To

[311] These networks are not exhausive for our limited information. Nevertheless, the table still allows us to have some understandings of the networking of the Christian groups.
[312] Forming long term coalitions instead of short term, isolated incident-based coalition is in fact the goal of CI. "Building upon this foundation, we explored the possibility of setting up a long term coalition monitoring the public policies of the SAR (CI Annual Report 1996-7, p.11).
[313] If we recall Cohen & Arato's civil society theory, political society refers to the state, political parties, and parliament (1994). In Hong Kong, political society refers to the SAR government, the ExeCo, and the LegCo.
[314] See Appendix 2.

understand how the Christian groups influence the political society, the example of human rights is given for illustration.

In the past decade, the Christian social concern groups have initiated two long-term coalitions, the Hong Kong Human Rights Commission and the Alliance for the Hong Kong People's Human Rights, to monitor the local human rights development. Although they share the common objective of safeguarding the basic rights of the public, they adopt different approaches to address human rights issues. While the former plays the lobbyist role, the latter assumes the militant role.

The Hong Kong Human Rights Commission (the Commission) was initiated by JP and two Catholic concerned groups in 1988.[315] Lobbying is the major tactic of the Commission in protecting the human rights of Hong Kong. At the international level, the Commission submits reports to the United Nations' treaty bodies, attends hearings, and lobbies foreign government officials.[316] By putting the local human rights situation under the monitor of international community, the Commission hopes that the local government will be deterred from violating human rights. At the local level, the Commission has not overlooked communication with the local government.

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[315] A decade later, 11 local social concern groups have joined the Commission. All the Christian groups we interviewed are members of the Commission (Homepage of the Commission http://is1.hk.super.net/~hkhrc/).

[316] As early as 1989, the Commission had already given its human rights report to the United Nations. Since then, 6 reports and letters have been submitted to the United Nations. The latest one is "Report to United Nations Human Rights Committee and United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on Hong Kong Human Rights Situations after the Change of Sovereignty" in April 1998 (Ibid.). In 1997, the Commission met members from the Australian National Congress and submitted the report of its Commission on International Human Rights Affairs. The Commission also discussed the reports with the Director of the China Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Of Canada and the Canadian Consulate in Hong Kong (JP Annual Report 1997, p.37).

Lobbying the Colonial government for introducing the Bill of Rights into Hong Kong in 1989 is an example of success. Persuading the SAR government to give up the reinstatement of the draconian ordinances in 1997 is another example though, this time the lobbying failed (Yuen 1997, p.125-6; JP Annual Report 1997, p.35, 37).

The Alliance for the Hong Kong People's Human Rights (the Alliance) was also initiated by Christian social concern groups in 1997 (Chan, K.W. 1997b, p.13). Thirty civic groups including JP and CI have joined the Alliance to protest against the new government's reinstatement of the Societies Ordinance and the Public Order Ordinance which would affect the civil liberties in Hong Kong. Unlike the Commission, which emphasized lobbying the international community, the Alliance brought the public's pressure to bear on the government to make amendments. To arouse public concern on the issue, the Alliance used leaflets to help the masses understand the impact of the draconian laws on their civil liberties. Meanwhile, the Alliance also organized petition, protests, marches, rallies, and press conferences to express their grievances. Since then, the Alliance has become the public's watchdog on the human rights condition (JP Annual Report 1997, p.22-3; CI Annual Report 1996-7, p.10).

The preceding accounts of the two coalitions for human rights do not give us any detailed analysis of how influence flows from the Christian groups' joint actions to political society in a complex political environment. Yet, these two examples do shed light on several essential developments in the local politics of influence. First is the use of foreign connections in the local

politics of influence. In the Commission's case, we see foreign connections are used by the coalition as external pressure imposed on the local government. These foreign links may not bring about changes to public policies, but they do give extra leverage and additional resources, as well as support to the Christian groups in the building of a local civil society.

Second is the emergence of long-term coalitions for long-term commitments. While short-term coalitions are the immediate responses to the eruption of isolated social incidences, long term coalitions are striving for the particular long-term commitments like the promotion of human rights. Since their orientations are different, the two kinds of coalitions have to assume different roles, functions, and tactics even though they are working in the same area. From this perspective, there is coordination and cooperation between coalitions.

Third, there is an interacting relationship between networking and joint actions. While joint actions are based on the existing connections among the civic groups, joint actions will also attract new organizations to participate. The increasing numbers of civic groups participating in the Commission and the Alliance are examples. From this point of view, joint actions not only consolidate the existing networks but also help to develop new connections.

Summary

In the eyes of the four Christian social concern groups, social justice is absent in Hong Kong. Based on their belief in social justice, the Christian concerned groups are determined to remedy social injustice by building a local civil society. To this end, they carry out civic education among the public and

develop connections with local and foreign civic groups. At the same time, the Christian social concern groups also join together in organizing various social actions to influence the government policy. As such, the Christian concerned groups provide a model for the other civic organizations to follow in the development of a local civil society.

Conclusion

For nearly a decade, some Hong Kong Christian social concern groups have been systematically building a local civil society, a project they believe that will eventually bring justice and democracy to Hong Kong. By drawing on the experience of these Christian groups, we have already illustrated how civic organizations can contribute to the development of civil society. We will conclude our study in this chapter by showing the consistency and discrepancy between the theory and practice of civil society.

Civil society is an ideal society that based on communicative rationality or discourse ethics. While communicative rationality is the principle of democratic legitimacy, the practice of communicative rationality relies on the institutionalization of basic human rights in the lifeworld, the economic, and political subsystems. From this perspective, democracy, communicative rationality, and basic rights are the three indispensable components of an ideal society. Since the associational level of the lifeworld is the place to implement these three elements, civic associations take an important in the building of civil society.

Theoretically, the contribution of civic associations to the establishment of civil society is twofold. First, the practice of rational discourse in civic associations will facilitate the democratization of the lifeworld. Civic associations are the loci of civil society where autonomous individuals can practise communicative rationality. Members in each

association can also assess the organizational principles of the association. Moreover, the self-democratized associations can take the initiation of re-examining the cultural beliefs, values, and practices in social institutions. As such, civic associations will eventually renew the cultural and social aspects of the lifeworld. Second, the associational level of the lifeworld is also the terrain on which civic associations can cooperate to exert their influence on the economic and political societies. Through various kinds of collective actions, it is hoped that the economic and political social actors will consider the needs of civil society. As such, the public interests will properly be protected.

In practice, the experience of the four Christian social concern groups in Hong Kong shows that there are consistency and discrepancy between the theory and practice of civil society. Regarding the aspect of consistency, the self-limiting stance of the Christian concerned groups to political power is in accordance with the theory of civil society. The Christian concerned groups deliberately stay away from the political society (Chan, K.W. 1997a, p.111). The self-limiting stance gives two advantages to the Christian groups. The first advantage is that the self-limiting stance enables the Christian concerned groups to win the trusts of local and international civic associations (Ibid., p.115). Accordingly, the local and global civic associations are linking together through these Christian groups. Also, self-limiting stance allows the Christian groups to speak out according to the principle of justice rather than the preference of the voters (Ibid., p.114). Through the Christian groups, even the voice of the marginalized can be heard in the public communication. As

such, the Christian groups help to promote communicative rationality in society.[317] From this point of view, Madison as well as Cohen and Arato are correctly to advocate the self-limiting stance in the project of civil society.

The Christian social concern groups, however, have introduced a new element, civic education, in the implementation of the project of civil society. While Cohen and Arato focus on the importance of unconstrained discussion in the public sphere, they mention little on civic education. The experience of the Christian concerned groups, however, shows that civic education is an indispensable element in the project of civil society. The Catholic community is a good example. For the past two decades, JP has worked so hard to remedy the political apathy of the parishes. JP stimulates the congregations to develop critical reasoning, encourages the Catholics to practise their faith, and provides a space for the Christians to speak out their opinions.

After years of civic education in the Diocese, there are signs of changes in the attitude of the Catholic community to social involvement. At the clerical level, an increasing number of individual priests and nuns are actively involving in social issues (Yuen 1997, p.130). At the congregational level, the laity begins to accept social concern groups like JP.[318] More importantly, a study has showed that the Catholics' voting behaviour is

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[317] The symmetrical condition of communicative rationality demands that every one should have equal chance to participate in the dialogue. This is why we say that the Christian groups are promoting communicative rationality when they speak out for the marginalized or non-main stream opinions (See Section 1 of Part 2 in Chapter 2).

[318] In the early 1980s, some parishes did not welcome JP's visit. Now, an increasing number of Catholics and organizations will consult JP on social issues and urge JP to respond to social issues. It suggests that the Catholic community finally recognized the advisory role of JP (Li, Lap Kwan 1993 p.25, 28).

positively associated with their participation in the concerned groups.[319] In short, the experience of the Christian concerned groups suggests civic education is a crucial element in democratizing social institutions.

Nevertheless, there is discrepancy between the theory and practice of civil society. Theoretically, civic organizations should emphasize self-democratization in the same way as they do in influencing the political and economic society. Practically, most Christian social concern groups in our study stress less on the first aspect than the latter. With the exception of JP, the Christian concerned groups in our study pay little attention to the practice of internal democracy and communicative rationality. There are inadequate formal channels for the rank and file to express their opinions. The participation and influence of the general members in the decision making process are limited. Disagreements among the members are either left for the staff to decide or simply resorted to voting. At the same time, the Christian social concern groups also overlook self-reflection.

To some extent, the concerned groups' under-emphasis of the practice of internal democracy and communicative rationality may suggest that either the groups' understanding of civil society is insufficient, or they simply lack the will to practice both elements. Without the practice of internal democracy and communicative rationality, civil society will be degenerated into a residual category which contains every non-governmental aspect. This kind of

[319] In Chan and Leung's study of the Catholics voting behaviour in the 1995 Legislative Council Election, the researchers find significant difference in the voter turn-out rates between participants and non-participants in the Catholic social concern groups. The percentage of voters is 79.3% among the former group while it is 66.5% among the latter group. The

understanding of civil society is certainly improper. Meanwhile, group members will be difficult to comprehend the respectful and critical manner in discussion if internal democracy and communicative rationality have not been practised. Under this circumstance, a genuine negotiation and agreement will be unable to reach.

We therefore think remedies should be made for three reasons. First, the practice of internal democracy and communicative rationality is the only solution to the increasing disagreements among the civic organizations. To build a local civil society, the Christian groups must extend the existing networks among the Christian groups to non-religious groups. In the new milieu, it is more likely that disagreements will increase because of various differences among these civic groups. Hence, the Christian groups should consciously re-assess their own opinions from the others' perspectives. They should spend more times and methods to tackle differences rather than simply rely on voting. Otherwise, disagreements and conflicts will permanently hinder the development of solidarity among the local civic groups.

Second, example is better than precept. In Hong Kong, the Christian groups are working so hard to cultivate a new civic culture within the Christian community and society at large. These efforts, however, will be futile if there is an inconsistency between what the Christian groups promote in society and what they practice within the groups. By contrast, the earnestly practice of democracy in the Christian groups will have a demonstration effect

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observed t-statistic is 3.71 with 1223 degree of freedom. The probability of getting such t-value by chance is less than 0.001 (Chan & Leung 1996, p.297).

on the public. Once the public see the difference between the democratic Christian groups and the undemocratic associations, the public will be more willing to accept the advocacy of the Christian groups. As such, the cultivation of democracy among the public will be greatly facilitated.

Finally, the involvement of members in decision-making and task sharing is needed for the cohesion of the civic organizations. Not only will the input of the members' ideas and efforts alleviate the manpower and financial shortages of the groups, the involvement of the members also helps them to identify with the groups, and foster solidarity within the group. Hence, civic organizations should actively encourage the general members to speak out their thoughts, and to participate in decision-making and task sharing. For these three reasons, civic organizations ought to take the practice of internal democracy and communicative rationality seriously.

Although the practice of internal democracy and communicative rationality is difficult and time-consuming, we believe the practice of these two elements is a matter of will rather than ability. Take JP as an example. At first glance, the limited membership seems to be the major factor that allows JP to consider each member's opinion seriously. Yet a second look will suggest it is the determination of JP that motivates the group to practise internal democracy and communicative rationality. For one thing, if JP does not acknowledge the importance of internal democracy, JP will not consciously build up a partnership among staff, members, and board

members.[320] If JP does not determine to practise communicative rationality, it will not spend time and effort on handling disagreements and self-reflection. We therefore believe that while group size may provide the favourable condition to practise internal democracy and communicative rationality, it is the will of JP that motives the group to do so.

In short, this is only a rudimentary study on a small part of the complex project of civil society. Although the lack of representativeness disallows us to generalize the strengths and weaknesses of the four Hong Kong Christian social concern groups to other civic organizations, the experience of these Christian groups does reveal some possible differences between the theory and practice of civil society. While our study focuses on the role and contribution of civic associations, a large area of the project of civil society is still being untouched. The cooperation between civic associations and other social actors in the political society is one of these examples.[321] Another big topic is the establishment of reflexive mechanism in the economic subsystem. In Cohen and Arato's model, the issue is how the economic subsystem can voluntarily establish the reflexive mechanism within itself. In Madison's model, the issue is how it is possible to carry out communicative rationality in the economic sphere. If the project of civil society is desirable for the achievement of justice, democracy, and human rights in a society, then some further studies should be done on these aspects.

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[320] See JP's answer to Question 8 of Part B in our questionnaire.

[321] To Cohen and Arato, only when the politics of influence is supplemented by the politics of inclusion could the political culture be effectively renewed (See Chapter 2).

Appendix A
Literature From the Four Christian Social Concern Groups Used in the Textual Analysis (In NUD.IST Format).

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PROJECT: THESIS
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+++ Document Header:
**  Christian Institute
**  Carl Cheng
**  Source: Interview
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**  Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee
**  Chan, Ka Wei
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**  Source: Interview
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**  Org:  HKCI
**  Source: Kwok Nai Wang.  (1991).  Hong Kong 1997:
            A Christian Perspective.  Hong Kong:
            Christian Conference of Asia.
**  Author:  Rev. Kwok, Nai Wang.
**  Title: "Hong Kong Faces 1997: recolonization or
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+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  HKCI
**  Source: Kwok Nai Wang.  (1991).  Hong Kong 1997:
            A Christian Perspective.  Hong Kong:
            Christian Conference of Asia.
**  Author:  Rev. Kwok, Nai Wang.
**  Title: "Hong Kong: Realities and Prospects"
**  Type:  Off line document - abridgement
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: OBJ-CI3
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  HKCI
**  Source:  Annual Report 1997-98, p.1
**  Title:  "Objective and Functions"
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: OBJ-CIC1
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  HKCIC
**  Source 1:  Labour Movement in a Changing
               Society: The Experience of Hong Kong.
**  Source 2:  Christian witnesses in Hong Kong.
**  Author 1:  Leung Po-lam
**  Author 2:  Lu, H.S.
**  Title 1: "Promoting Workers' Interests Outside
              The Trade Union System: The Expereince
              Of The Christian Industrial Commitee
             (CIC)"
**  Title 2: "The Christian Industrial Commitee"
**  Type:  Both are off line documents - abridgement
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+++ Document Header:
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: OBJ-JP
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  JP
**  Source:  Review and Foresight:  15th Anniversary
             Special Issue (1993), p.14.
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**  Title:  Objectives
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: OBJ-SCM
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  SCM
**  Source: In N.W.Kwok & M.Y.Wong (Eds.).  (1991).
            Christian witnesses in Hong Kong.
            Hong Kong: Hong Kong Christian
            Institute.
**  Author: Kuang, X.J.
**  Title: "Hong Kong Christian Student Movement:
            The active minority "
**  Type:  Off line document - My abridged
           translation
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**  HKCI
**  Date: Mon, 01 Mar 1999 10:55:06
**  From: Rev. Kwok Nai Wang  <hkci@netvigator.com>
**  Subject: reply to follow up questions
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**  Source:  Annual Report 1997-98, p.2-3
**  Author:  Rev. Ralph Lee
**  Title:  "Chairperson's Remarks: 10th Anniversary
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+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  HKCI
**  Source:  Reflection (54) March 1998
**  Author:  Editor - Review
**  Title:  "The Church Of Hong Kong Has Gradually
             Lost Its Privileges" - abridged
             translation.
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-Ci11-REF
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  HKCI
**  Source:  Reflection (57) September 1998
**  Tenth Anniversary of HKCI  - abridged
    translation.
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+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  HKCI
**  Source:  Reflection (52) November 1997 (p.2-3)
**  Author:  Editor - Review
**  Title:  "The Retrogression of the SAR's
             Democracy" - translated.
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-Ci2-KWOK
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  HKCI
**  Source:  Annual Report 1997-98, p.4-15
**  Author:  Rev. Kwok Nai Wang
**  Title:  "Director's Report"
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-Ci3-CHR
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  HKCI
**  Source:  Annual Report 1996-97, p.2-3.
**  Author:  Rev. Ralph Lee
**  Title:  "Chairperson's remarks"
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-Ci4-WONG
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  HKCI
**  Source:  Annual Report 1996-97, p.13-5.
**  Author:  Agatha Wong
**  Title:  "Staff Report - Cultivation"
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-Ci5-CARL
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**  Org:  HKCI
**  Source:  Annual Report 1996-97, p.8-12.
**  Author:  Carl Cheng
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**  Title:  "Staff Report - Witness"
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-Ci6-KWOK
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  HKCI
**  Source:  Annual Report 1997-98, p.4-8.
**  Author:  Rev. Kwok Nai Wang
**  Title:  "Staff Report - A Shifting Context for
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-Ci7-KWOK
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**  Org:  HKCI
**  Source: Kwok Nai Wang(ed.). (1994).  Social
            movements and the Christian Church in
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                       Institute.
**  Author:  Rev. Kwok, Nai Wang.
**  Title: The role and responsibilities of the
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**  Type:  Off line document - my abridged
           translation.
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-Ci8(I)-KWO
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  HKCI
**  Source: Nedilsky, L. & Van Voorhis, B. (Eds.).
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            society. Conference Report.  Hong Kong
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**  Author:  Rev. Kwok, Nai Wang.
**  Title: "Humanity and Human Rights" (Part I)
**  Type:  Off line document - abridged.
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-Ci8-KWOK
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**  Org:  HKCI
**  Source: Nedilsky, L. & Van Voorhis, B. (Eds.).
            (1994).  1997: Building a global civil
            society.  Conference Report.  Hong Kong
            5th - 7th June, 1997.  Hong Kong:July 1
            Link.
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**  Author:  Rev. Kwok, Nai Wang.
**  Title: "Humanity and Human Rights" (Part II)
**  Type:  Off line document - abridged.
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-Ci9-REFL
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**  Org:  HKCI
**  Source:  Reflection (53) January 1998
**  Author:  Editor - Review
**  Title:  "Jiang Ze-min's visit of the United
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-CIC-CHAN
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**  Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee
**  Chan Ka Wai
**  Title: "Hong Kong's Protestant Social Movement"
**  Source: Forces from the Margin
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-JP1-LAU
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**  Org:  JP
**  Source:  Review and Foresight:  15th Anniversary
            Special Issue (1993), p.2.
**  Author:  Mr. Lau, Kar Wah (The chairman of the
            JP, 1993).
**  Title:  "Foreword"
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-JP10-YUN
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  JP
**  Source: Reflection (58) November 1998
**  Author:  Mary Yuen (Secretary of JP)
**  Title:  "The Turbulence Of Human Rights In Hong
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**  Type: translation
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-JP2-HURL
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**  Org:  JP
**  Source:  Review and Foresight:  15th Anniversary
            Special Issue (1993), p.8.
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**  Author:  Rev. James Hurley (Ecclesiastical
             Adviser, 1993)
**  Title:  "Review and Prospect: Words from Our
             Ecclesiastical Adviser"
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-JP3-CHAN
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  JP
**  Source:  Review and Foresight:  15th Anniversary
             Special Issue (1993), p.10.
**  Author:  Father Dominic Chan Chi-ming
             (Ecclesiastical Adviser 1987-90)
**  Title:  "Congratulations to the Justice and
             Peace Commission on Its Fifteenth
             Anniversary - Hopes for Its Growth"
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-JP4-FATH
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  JP
**  Source:  Review and Foresight:  15th Anniversary
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**  Title:  "Basis of Faith"
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-JP5-MEET
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  JP
**  Source:  Review and Foresight:  15th Anniversary
             Special Issue (1993), p.24-9.
**  Title: "Achievements and Prospects of the
            Justice and Peace Commission: A Meeting
            Of Former Chairpersons"
**  Participants: Mr. Andrew TO Yiu Ming, holds of
                  the meeting (member, 1991 to
                  present);
                  Mr. Luke WONG Siu Kwong (chairman
                  1979-84);
                  Mr. John LI Lap Kwan(member since
                  1984, chairman 1985-89);
                  Mr. Paul NG Wai Kit (member since
                  1988, chairman 1990);
                  Ms Alice Lee Pui LING (member
                  since 1988, chairlady 1991-2).
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-JP6-JOHN
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  JP
**  Source:  Review and Foresight:  15th Anniversary
             Special Issue (1993), p.2.
**  Author:  Rev. John Russell (Ecclesiastical
             Adviser, 1983-88).
**  Title:  "Justice and Peace"
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-JP7-YUEN
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  JP
**  Source: Woodman, S. (Ed.). (1997).  Hong Kong's
            social movements: Forces from the
            margins.  Hong Kong: July 1 Link and
            Hong Kong Women Christian Council.
**  Author:  Mary Yuen
**  Title: "Hong Kong Catholics' Recent
            Participation in Social Movements"
**  Type:  Off line document - abridged.
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+++ ON-LINE DOCUMENT: Txt-JP9-DEMO
+++ Document Header:
**  Org:  JP
**  Source: Annual Report 1997
**  Author:  The Working Group of Social Affairs
**  Title:  Review P.30
**  Type: abridged translation
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Appendix B: Questionnaire

A. Questions about belief and impression of the churches in H.K..

1. To what extent does your organization agree or disagree with the following statements? Please circle one number for each statement.

	strongly disagree	disagree	agree	strongly agree
a. As a Christian organization, it is more appropriate to give love and material assistance to the poor than to address the root of the poverty or social injustice.	1	2	3	4
b. Ordinary daily life comes first, theological reflection comes only after, striving to understand and serve life.	1	2	3	4
c. Church is only a refuge for its members in the ways that they are no longer concerned secular affairs.	1	2	3	4

2. How much influence do you think the following groups/persons actually have in determining the policies and actions within the Church: (Check the appropriate box)

	no	little	some	great deal	a very great deal
priests					
elites in the church (elders, deacons)					
the lay, general congregation					

3. Please circle one number for each statement.

	strongly disagree	disagree	agree	strongly agree
a. In average, churches in H.K. lack a commitment to social affairs.	1	2	3	4
b. In average, churches in H.K. avoid controversial issues.	1	2	3	4
c. The churches in H.K. need to renew their attitudes toward the involvement of social affairs.	1	2	3	4
d. There is a need to democratize the decision-making processes within the churches in H.K.	1	2	3	4

4. Is it appropriate for a Christian organization to participate in social and political affairs? Check the appropriate box.
   - Yes ⟶ why?
   - No ⟶ why?

5. As a Christian organization, is there a particular way to perceive social issues? If yes, can you elaborate it to me?

B. In this section, we would like to get some information about your organization. For instance, history, goals, membership criteria, activities, etc. If there are some publications from your organization related to these aspects, please send them to me and I would be happy to read them. However, there are several specific questions I would like you to answer in here.

1. In comparison with other civic organizations, in which aspects do you think your organization is quite different from the other similar organizations?

2. Does the organization frequently contact with other similar organizations?
   - No
   - Yes
     ↳ For what purpose?

3. How does the organization recruit its members?

4. How many members are actively involving in the organization's activities and/or give voluntary services to the organization?

5. What are the educational levels of the majority of these active, constant members?
   Primary School ☐ Secondary School ☐ Post-secondary College ☐
   University ☐
   Other professional training ☐ (specify)_____

6. What are the types of occupation of the majority of these active, constant members?
   Professional ☐ Managerial ☐ Clerical ☐ Blue Collar ☐
   Businessperson ☐
   Others ☐ (specify)_____

7. Could you briefly describe the kind of society that your organization is striving for?

8. Could you give me some examples of how the values your organization believes in are put into practice within your organization?

C. Questions about the internal structure of the organization.

1. Circle the number which best describes your organization's internal structure:

- three or more hierarchical levels or horizontal departments ----------3
- employs a full-time chief staff officer or at least three other managerial-professional staffs ---------- 2
- lacks internal differentiation and full-time, managerial-professional staffs ------ 1
- Other (specify) _____

Check the appropriate box.

2. Who make(s) decisions on resources allocation, such as money and man-power?
   - one single leader
   - the board of directors
   - elected executive committee
   - all members in the collective meeting
   - other (specify) _____

3. Who is/are the policies maker(s)?
   - one single leader
   - the board of directors
   - elected executive committee
   - all members in the collective meeting
   - other (specify) _____

4. Who decide(s) the activities for the organization?
   - one single leader
   - the board of directors
   - elected executive committee
   - all members in the collective meeting
   - other (specify) _____

5. Because of differences in personal attributes (e.g. verbal skills, access to information, interest in the task-attributes), it is so common that some participants are more influential than the rest in the decision-making processes.

   Is this phenomenon found in your organization?

   - No ⟶ Why does this phenomenon not occur ?
   - Yes
     ↳ Does your organization view this phenomenon as a problem?
     - No
       ↳ Why not?
     - Yes
       ↳ Does your organization use some tactics to solve it? If yes, how?

6. In an organization, members themselves may have different opinions on important issues (e.g. external social issues and internal strategies, policies, decisions, etc). In your organization,
   a. What are the ways in which members are allowed to express differences of opinion?
   b. Where disagreements occur, how does your organization reach a decision? (Please explain it in detail and if it is possible please use some examples to illustrate.)
7. How often is there be a general meeting of the organization?

   For the purpose of :_____

8. Is "developing members' organizing skills" a priority of the organization?

- Not at all
- Yes, it's the first priority.
- Yes, it's one of our priorities.
  a. They have chances to learn:

     verbal skills ; self-confidence ; information search and

     interpretation ; resources management ;

     managing activities ; other (specify) _____

  b. How did they learn those skills?

9. Some organizations make an effort to rotate or share all tasks and positions among members. Does your organization have similar practices? (Check the appropriate box and brackets)

- No
- Yes

	Most of time	Some of the time	Rarely
leadership rotation	( )	( )	( )
position rotation	( )	( )	( )
task sharing	( )	( )	( )
others_____	( )	( )	( )

10. Is there any sub-groupings (e.g.) in the organization that is totally managed by the members themselves?

- No
- Yes ⟶ What is/are the nature of the group(s)?

  How does the members manage the group(s)?

11. Could you briefly describe the criteria and the process for the organization in choosing its leader(s)?

D. Since your organization is one of the initial organizations of the July 1 Link Project, the following questions are related to this aspect.

1. Was your organization acquainted with the other seven organizations before the July 1 Prayer Service in 1995 and the July 1 Link Project?

   - No
     - Then, how did the organization become an initial member of the Project?
   - Yes
     - When and under what circumstance that the organization know the others?

2. We know that the Project is about "1997." What were your organization's major concerns about "1997" ?

3. Please let me know the process of formation of the project after considering the following several aspects that are interested to me. You need not to answer them separately.
   - With regard to "1997," several political and non-political organizations had formed different alternative activities. Why did your organization feel there was a need to create the Project instead of joining those alternative activities? What made the Project different from the rest? Was there something that only the Project could provide or achieve?
   - From your organization's perception, what were the favourable and unfavourable conditions of forming a project at that particular period?
   - After these considerations, what did your organization decide to do and what was the actual process in accomplish your goals?

4. What was your organization's role and duties in the Project?

5. Most of the times, how did your organization communicate with the other participating organizations?

6. During the process, was there any disagreement among the organizations?
   - Never → What factors that contribute to the harmony among the organizations?
   - Yes
     a. How often did the organizations disagree with each other? (Circle a number)
        - Most of the time ------ 1
        - Some of the time ----- 2
        - Rarely ---------- 3

     b. Usually, what were the disagreements about?

     c. What was the most serious disagreement?

     d. How to solve it?
7. How were decisions made among the organizations?

8. Was there any organization or representative more influential than the rest, and hence took a central position during the cooperation?

   - Yes - No

9. Now, the project has already been carried out for more than one year. How would your organization evaluate the Project's strengths and weaknesses, achievement and miss?

Appendix C

Some Joint Actions that the Christian Groups Participated.

Year	Name of Coalition	No. & Types of Gps. Participated	Aims
1988	The H.K. Human Rights Commission	11 local Christians & non-Christians	Safeguard human rights
1989	The Union of H.K. Catholic Organizations in Supporting of the Patriotic and Deomcratic Movement in China	unknown local Catholic	Concern pol. dev't in the PRC.
1991	The Catholic Monitors on Legistive Councillors	4 local Catholic	Promote social justice & actualize the soc. mission of Christians
1992	Joint Assn. of People's Org. For the Promotion of Democracy	unknown local Catholic	Concern demo. mov't
1995	July First Link	8 Int'l & local Christians	1997 Issue
1996	The Alliance for Civic Education	6 local Christians & non-Christians	Concern civic education
1996	The Concern Gp for Chief Executive's Public Policies	over 10 local Christians & non-Christians	Concern soc. Justice
1996	Coalition on Democratic Reversion	over 10 local Christians & non-Christians	Promote democracy, human rights, freedoms.
1997	The H.K. People's Coalition for Alternative Handover	over 20 local Christians & non-Christians	Reflection
1997	H.K. People's Alliance for Human Rights	over 30 local Christians & non-Christians	Against the two draconian ordinances.
1997	Coalition of Christian Org. On Election Concern	unknown local Christians	Concern the 1st LegCo election

Source: JP Annual Report 1997; CI Annual Report 1996-7, 1997-8; Yuen 1997.

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