PLATO'S PHILOSOPHIC DOG
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by

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ABSTRACT

The image of the philosophic dog plays a major role in the Republic. The analogy is used to illuminate the phenomenon of viciousness, a mode of behaviour that is ultimately self-destructive. Viciousness, as such, is intimately connected to the problem of the self. The analogy, therefore, functions as a guide into those very problems which affect the conception of the self.

When the image of the dog is invoked, the analogy alerts us to difficulties in the arguments of the dialogue. The analogy does not resolve these difficulties, since it only functions to give expression to them, but in so doing it plays a central role in providing a consistent thread which binds together the diverse issues that are brought up in the Republic.

Initially, the image is used to elucidate characteristics of the auxiliaries, but the image is subsequently implicated in the description of the just man and the philosopher, as well as their respective antitheses. The image illuminates the nature (and problem) of the philosophical relationship between the just man and the philosopher, as well as the nature of the political relationship between these two and their opposites. The thesis, therefore, uses the image as a vehicle to address the broader concern of the relationship between philosophy and politics.
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Towards the conclusion of the Myth of Er, Socrates depicts Odysseus' soul choosing the life of a just man, a private person who quietly minds his own business. This choice of a simple, rather austere and altogether obscure way of life stands in stark contrast to the dynamic and adventurous life of the famed voyager in Homer's epic. Odysseus' adventure takes him away from the city for nineteen years. In the meantime, his son, anxious of his whereabouts, goes off in search for him; his wife, Penelope, has to keep her wits about her amidst the clamour among rival suitors all with an eye to the vacated throne. Throughout this excitement, Argos, the dog, faithful but neglected, matures, grows old and pines patiently for the return of the master. When, indeed, he comes home, albeit incognito, Argos is the first to recognise him. By then, however, he is too old and weak to greet his master. He manages a frail gesture and dies soon after.

There's surely a moral to be culled from this. When the master is away, the household threatens to fall into disorder, anxiety is high, and the most capable members of the household have an excruciating time keeping their sense of balance against the many allurements that threaten to steal them away, and meanwhile, the less capable are ignored and wasted in neglect. The Republic is about restoring such a household to some semblance of order, and I believe
it is sensitive to the fate of such dear creatures as Argos.

Socrates, the protagonist, has a reputation for his reluctance to leave the city. He pursues his philosophy in the market place, constantly persuading and exhorting his people to lead a good life. With great skill, cleverness and imagination he regales them, provokes them and even angers them with his conversations. He angers one too many, and is hauled to court one day, charged, convicted and sentenced to death. In his defence, he proclaims his commitment to philosophy, his eagerness to speak the truth and his aversion and ineptitude for political office. The lover of wisdom announces to all and sundry that he is wise in his appreciation of his ignorance. Is this what philosophy is about? He claims to speak the truth, but he resorts to persuasion and subterfuges when it seems appropriate. For all his professed ignorance and his aversion to politics, one gets the impression that he is a deeply politically motivated creature. How else could one reconcile his way of life to the political accusations that finally stifled his being?

In my reflections on Socrates through Plato's dialogues I have been guided by the concern for the relation of ethics to politics, and the role played by philosophy in addressing this issue. Who is the philosopher, what does he do and where is his place in the order of things? I believe that Plato, more than any other philosopher, reflected particularly on these concerns which, in turn, are expressed through those dialogues which centre around the figure of Socrates.

In attempting to arrive at some resolution to these questions, I have taken as my point of departure, the Republic, and I focused on the analogy of the philosophic dog as the vehicle that would help
unlock the complexity of the dialogue, and pave the way towards some understanding of the problems and perspectives that surround these concerns.

The analogy of the philosophic dog itself, as well as its employment at various places in the dialogue, has a significant, if not central, role in the unfolding of the discourse. The image itself is derived from the image of the noble pup, known for its gentleness towards those familiar to it, and its harsh, if not vicious, treatment of strangers. The point of the analogy has to do with understanding the context which frames the constitution or definition of one's own. You cannot know what belongs to you unless you already have some idea about what you are. The analogy, as such, is profoundly related to the notion of the self. The Republic, as we know, is motivated by the concern for justice and the fate of the just man, and these led invariably to the consideration of justice in the city. The impetus behind this motivation is provided by Thrasymachus' defence of injustice, and Glaucon's own admission, through his account, of the cogency of this conventional view.

The analogy embodies the attributes of spiritedness and the philosophic. It is used to illuminate a condition and nature of the soul wherein the interplay of these attributes produces modes of behaviour that are either gentle and just or savage and unjust. The whole programme of education proposed by Socrates is aimed at shaping these attributes, which are apparently incompatible, into an harmonious accord. Because the education rests on a set of true beliefs, its foundation proves to be vulnerable in virtue of the uncertainty and ambiguity that is reflected in any form of opinion. The search for a
more secure foundation leads to the encounter with philosophy. During the discussion on philosophy and the philosopher-king, we confront the philosophic spirit and the tyrannic spirit. The former expresses the dominant attribute of the gifted auxiliary, selected to be a potential guardian of the just city. The latter is, of course, his antithetical other. They are minted from the same coin; they are the two faces of the philosophic dog.

Those features of the dialogue mentioned above sufficiently establish the claim of the centrality of the image as a leading analogy in the unfolding of the discourse. The analogy is used initially to focus on certain characteristics of the class of guardians. The noble pup captures the fundamental disposition of the city's guardians. Socrates might just as well point to an existing guard to achieve the same effect. It is so blatantly obvious that to describe a guard, one merely has to point to one in support of one's description. Why choose a dog? The point of the reference suggests that the empirical entity is non-existent or unworthy to serve the argument at hand. This guardian which Socrates is trying to explicate through the image of the philosophic dog is something else altogether. The what it is that this something else is, steers the winding course of the dialogue, that every now and then, threatens to go off on a tangent. In the grand parade of shifting imagery, the philosophic dog provides a consistent thread which guides us into and possibly beyond the Republic.

The image of the philosophic dog is a representation, used as a familiar device to illuminate something novel. The image, as such, functions as an analogy. Chapter One is devoted to an outline of what analogies are and do. I begin by addressing some criticisms of
Platonic analogies, viz., that they are difficult to use, can be misleading, false and even dangerous. On the basis of my sketch of the nature of analogies I support the claim that analogies can be difficult to use and are potentially dangerous. However, I argue against their being false or misleading. I propose the view that analogies in themselves are not strictly meaningful entities, since they are not about any particular thing, nor are they universals. They point the way towards possible universals, and as such express an undisclosed potentiality. We have to follow the point of an analogy and be informed of those circumstances and contexts that generate it. In terms of the Platonic analogy considered here, we have to consider the context within which the analogy is shaped. As the philosophical issues concerning the nature and use of analogies are deeply complex and beyond my competence, I make no firm arguments in this chapter. Notwithstanding that critical flaw in this chapter I wish to promote the view that one has to follow the movement of the dialogue as a whole to observe the functional role of the analogy when it appears as well as when it is reformulated to suit the changing circumstances within the dialogue.

Chapter Two traces the genesis of the philosophic dog. Although the analogy appears towards the close of Book II of the Republic, the chapter begins with a somewhat lengthy and detailed exegesis of Book I. It is not that various notions of justice discussed in Book I justify this extensive treatment of it, but the real motivation behind this exegesis is to show, on the one hand, Socrates' technique in managing the flow of discourse and how this infringes on the logical form of the arguments as such, and on the other hand, to
shed some light on the character of the interlocutors whose interests shape the context of the emerging dialogue on justice itself.

I try to show that it is necessary to follow the flow of discourse and not to treat the arguments as arguments because Socrates seems to treat his arguments like analogies. His arguments are enunciated in such a way as to render them vulnerable to a strictly logical analysis. They break down in just the same way an analogy would when it is pressed too far.

The exegesis also tries to show how the initial movement of the dialogue is directed towards Thrasymachus, who is the unfortunate catalyst that galvanises Glaucon and Adeimantus to confront Socrates for an explicit treatment of the problem of justice. Thrasymachus' personality is of particular importance in the chapter. He is the only person who appears to take the discussion seriously to the point of hurling a series of excoriating invective at Socrates. He is subsequently "shamed" into quiet submission. What is interesting is Thrasymachus' attachment, not to ideas, but arguments that hinge on an image of tyranny. Thrasymachus' personality is inextricably bound up with the image which his arguments attempt to articulate. Far from being a figure of ridicule, the analysis in Chapter Three will reveal the tragic condition that plausibly underlies the persona assumed by Thrasymachus. That is not to say that he is therefore exonerated from criticism; indeed, he may well be the bastard of philosophy that for a while inflames the ire of the usually self-possessed protagonist —-Socrates. The chapter concludes with the characterisation of the philosophic dog and raises a number of questions that set the context for the ensuing exegesis in Chapters Three and Four.
The major problem addressed in Chapter Three has to do with the relation of the philosophic dog to viciousness. As Socrates does not fully explicate the relation I try to give an explanation that is consistent with his views. In this connection, I attempt an account of the relation of speech to identity. Speech merely represents the condition of soul and is, therefore, never really authentic in its expression of that condition. Yet, it is through speech that the soul is able to reflect on itself. It is a misunderstanding of the function of speech that generates the savage behaviour of someone like Achilles. In view of what is said concerning speech, I attempt an explanation of Achilles' behaviour. He is a tragic figure who intuits the lie, the fictions of opinion, but is misled into thinking that they are true lies. Viciousness is ultimately connected to this sense of being betrayed by one's convention, and I try to show how in these circumstances the philosophic dog degenerates into a wolf which attacks its own.

In light of Achilles' behaviour we can better appreciate the intention behind Socrates' educational proposals, the most significant of which is the distinction between the realm of the human and the divine. The distinction is used to enforce the view of man's imperfection, and also his independence and freedom in shaping his own existence. The struggle with existence and the potential for change, disruption and destruction sets the stage against which the moderate city comes into being.

The use of false speech is a primary part of the education of the auxiliaries. Through this regime of education, the auxiliaries come to recongise their own, and are thus enabled to fulfill their
function as protectors of the city. The education is used to contain and modify the spirit through the definition of what constitutes one's own. It aims to prevent viciousness since, according to the analogy, a dog is always gentle to its familiars. To accomplish this, Socrates transforms the institution of the family, and extends the notion of self. However, he goes further in his distinction between the Greek and Barbarian, to introduce a concept of self which goes beyond the city. Socrates is slowly legislating the idea of what it means to be fully human.

Throughout this discussion, the image of the philosophic dog recurs when a difficulty presents itself, and the image is invoked to alert us to the nature of the problem. When, for instance, the "sleepless hound" appears, we are led to observe the problem of locating the threat. And in this context, Socrates introduces the notion of health, and its connection to the practice of medicine. An important distinction is drawn between the doctor and the judge. The former takes on a critical function in Chapter Four. The view of the latter sheds light on the peculiar vulnerability of the auxiliaries. Time and again, the analogy is invoked to alert us to the context and particular problems that stand in the way of the creation of the self. The analogy, in particular, constantly alludes to the mutual dependence of the auxiliaries on the rulers, and the problems inherent in this relation. The burden of responsibility falls on the rulers to define and maintain those boundaries that define the auxiliaries. The problem of viciousness cannot be fully resolved until a more secure basis than opinion could be found to anchor the conception of the self. Chapter
Four, therefore, addresses this attempt to find a more secure foundation. Chapter Four opens with a consideration of the four virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation and justice in their relationship with each other and their connection to the structure of the city and the soul. Justice co-exists uneasily with the other three primary virtues. Assuming a structural isomorphism between the city and the soul, Socrates insists on a tripartite structure. In the face of the four virtues, and four classes reflected in the myth of metals, this procedure is at once disturbing and illuminating. I try to render an interpretation that resolves the seeming inconsistency in his view of the soul. I introduce as an explanation, the unity of the primary virtues, and a notion of the individual self. I suggest that this view of the soul is related to the idea of the good. I produce a scheme which anticipates the view that the good is thrice removed from the sphere of opinion.

In his attempt to distinguish spiritedness as a separate component of the soul, Socrates renders an anecdote on Leontius. In this context, the philosophic dog is invoked to convey an image of the just man, who behaves like a self-sufficient entity. However, the context of the analogy indicates that such an individual is capable of anger, although he has the ability to motivate himself into a frame of mind that would be reconciled to injustice. This particular image is especially significant since such a possibility could not be entertained in the character of the auxiliaries. As such, it announces something new and possible which lies ahead. Furthermore, Socrates' anger and his self-rebuke are connected to this image of the dog.
The nature of this entity, the just man, is addressed in the conception of philosophy. In his defense of philosophy, Socrates introduces the philosophic exile. I make the argument that the philosophic exile is the mediator who unites the philosophic nature and philosophy, thus effecting the consummation of philosophy in the creation of the philosopher. However, this possibility is denied to the exile who is like the doctor, able to heal others but is himself a little sickly. There is a philosophical motive for the exile to renounce his banishment and return to the city which had abandoned him. The search for the true object of philosophy, the good, is intimately bound up with the way men lead their lives. The good is, therefore, a human ideal that has to be validated through human existence. There is also a political motive in his returning to the cave world of opinion. The situation of the degenerate cities, opens the way for the emergence of tyranny. The tyrant will destroy the city and in so doing, kill the hope of philosophy to realise the good in human society.

It is ironic that the pursuit of philosophy engenders its own nemesis. The discovery of the dialectic unlocks the mystery behind the ways of men. In the hands of the tyrannic spirit, the dialectic will be used to enslave the city. The philosophic spirit uses it to ensure the survival of the city as well as pave the way for the realisation of philosophy. The tyrannic spirit and the philosophic spirit are minted from the same coin; they are the two faces of the philosophic dog.

I conclude the thesis by addressing those questions regarding the place and role of the philosopher in the city. On the basis of my interpretation of the text, I restate the philosophical and political
motivations behind the return of the philosophic exile to the city. I relate this to Socrates' attitude towards Adeimentus and Glauccon, the philosophically spirited who serve as auxiliary as well as the hope for the philosophic exile to bring philosophy back to the city. Along the way, they have to contend and confront the tyrannic spirit. Socrates' treatment of Thrasymachus indicates how in certain contexts, that spirit can be tamed or subdued without destroying the soul.

The philosopher's care is shaped by his understanding and sensitivity towards the tragic image of man, limited by his incapacities not of his own choosing. The many are constrained to abide by the seeming truths of opinion simply because they have to get on with the mundane task of living their many and varied but orderly lives. Yet their way of being is set amid the struggles of powerfully motivated individuals attempting to find meaning in their own lives. Like Glauccon, they cannot settle for a city of pigs. In their struggle to be, they set the world in motion, generating the flux that threatens to destroy the fragile structures of the weak. Against this backdrop, the philosopher comes home looking to avoid the experiences of Odysseus, and spare the many, the fate of the sad and neglected Argos.
CHAPTER ONE
A Note on Analogies

Introduction

The image of the philosophic dog is used to shed some light on the guardians of the city. The image itself is drawn from the characteristic behaviour of a familiar domesticated animal, the 'noble' pup. The image draws on something familiar to illustrate a novel entity. As such, it functions as an analogy.

Plato frequently employs analogies in his dialogues. Quite popular among the variety of analogies are those drawn from the arts, some of which are central to the arguments in the dialogue. In the Gorgias, for instance, the medical model is constantly invoked to draw the contrast with rhetoric. In the Republic, the better known analogies are those of the Ship, the Cave and the Line. The analogy of the philosophic dog has traditionally occupied a less distinguished place in the hierarchy of analogies.

This analogy has received scant attention in the host of commentaries on the Platonic dialogues. Werner Jaeger regards the attribution of such a sublime property to such an earthy beast as a mark of humour in Plato, the implication being that the analogy is some kind of joke. Attempting to rehabilitate the analogy, another commentator suggests that it may be a parody aimed at obfuscating the
sophists. Yet another considers it among the great analogies of the *Republic* but offers no sufficient account of it. Sir Ernest Barker mentions it in an almost perfunctory manner, grudgingly according it some importance but promptly dismissing it on the grounds that, "...the analogies drawn from the animal world which he [Plato] employs can hardly be accepted."

Barker admits the difficulties with employing analogies and warns of the dangers apparent in false or misleading ones: a sentiment that finds its complement in J.R. Bambrough's work on Plato's political analogies. In his judgement, Plato's analogies are powerful tools, almost seductive, but if taken too seriously or pressed too far, they become "radically misleading as to the character of political thinking and political action." Not without just cause, Bambrough is concerned with the power of analogies to frame theoretical speculation and guide the course of political action. With this in view, he systematically undermines a series of Plato's better known analogies. The main thrust of his criticism is that these analogies disguise the distinction between ends and means, and consequent to this, the further distinction between matters of fact and matters of value.

In this chapter I shall endeavour to address these concerns about the Platonic analogies. I begin by first raising some questions regarding the nature of analogies using as an example, a familiar simile. It should be said at the outset that this is not a strictly philosophical account of analogies as such; this is a vast problem area that goes beyond the scope of this thesis and beyond my competence. The aim of this chapter is to give a generalised account of the problems of analogies, and to arrive at a satisfactory understanding for the
proposed treatment of the Platonic analogy.

What is required is an orientation towards the treatment of the analogy of the philosophic dog without being bogged down by the seemingly intransigent problems that surround the nature and role of analogies in discourse. No doubt these problems will ultimately affect the arguments of the thesis, but begging the reader's indulgence in this matter, the scheme I propose not only provides a fairly coherent way to treat the analogy but, as the later chapters will demonstrate, the scheme is also fairly consistent with the way the analogy is conceived and utilised in the Republic.

1) Analogies

Platonic analogies, it is claimed, are difficult to use, can be misleading, false, and even dangerous. But what are analogies? We should perhaps look first to the kinds of analogies there are. Analogies can be descriptive like metaphors or similes, or expressive like allegories or parables. In explanation, analogies work through the medium of the familiar to illuminate the unfamiliar, and these may be complex and technical in theoretical constructions. In dispute or discourse, there is recourse to arguments from analogies, where the form of one argument is utilised to illuminate the structure of another argument. Plato uses analogies in all those varying modes.

All analogies have one thing in common: they operate on the basis of some similarity that is known or assumed to exist between two or more objects. This, in turn, presupposes that there are known or assumed dissimilarities with these objects. Hence, the view
that analogies are based on relations of similarity and not on identity. These relations of similarity vary in degrees and as such, raise problems of ambiguity and relevance. Therefore, an important factor in the use of analogies is in the choice of them.

Consider a rose. It is a familiar, everyday object. As an analogical device—a simile—it can be employed as a comparison to a person. While a rose is not the same as a person, it is suggested that there are certain similarities to warrant the comparison. Suppose someone objects to such a comparison and remarks instead that the person is more like a daisy or a tulip or better still, like a cat. What are we to say to that? Is there a way of justifying the analogy? Could we resort to finding something unique and distinct about the rose? Yet what assurances do we have that other objects do not have the same qualities? No doubt, reasons like these prompted Barker to remark that analogies are difficult to use.

Now suppose the detractor retracts his earlier statements but adds that just as a rose has thorns and is liable to prick one's fingers so that the person in question is not only beautiful but also liable to hurt and is therefore dangerous. The image of the rose is retained but the sense of it is evidently inverted. We could retort with an argument that the thorns attest to the fragility of the rose, necessitating some form of natural protection, and what's natural in this sense cannot be negative. The repartee can go on interminably. This is a case of pressing an analogy too far. We should, however, pause to take note of a possible weakness in Bambrough's criticism of analogies. For it is possible that when an analogy is pressed too far, anything could happen; that is, its sense can be either inverted or
reinforced. As such, this feature of analogies renders criticism of them rather ambiguous. This leads us to consider the meaning of analogies.

We can try to describe an object by enumerating the qualities that it appears to have. We may further attempt to demarcate a number of these as essential to its characterisation. The problem with such an attempt has to do with the criterion for arriving at such a determination. It is notoriously difficult to find such a criterion, without which we are hard pressed to say what the object is, or what it means.

When an object is employed as an analogy, something else is done to it. We wish to infer from the analogy that the object to which it refers—the referent—has qualities similar to the object on which the analogy is based. However, the literal meaning of the object is not and cannot be the same as its analogical "meaning". The analogical "meaning" is constituted in the relation of the object and the referent. Elements of the two are brought together to constitute its "meaning". Since the two objects are related only on the basis of similarity, the "meaning" of the analogy is rendered equivocal, or indeterminate. And if there are no determinate relations between two objects, then, even if the literal meaning of one object is precise and the nature of the referent fully known, an analogy only allows for inferences that are probable. The degree of probability diminishes if the referent happens to be unfamiliar or if the meaning of the literal object is not precise. For this reason, analogies cannot be false as they assert no truths. The worst that can be said is they are highly improbable or that they are misleading.

In disputing an analogy, we have already noticed from the
example of the analogical use of the rose, the problem of adjudicating amongst competing analogies, as well as the problem regarding the degree to which a particular analogy is to be analysed. These problems arose over an argument about a particular analogy. The argument had the appearance of a dispute over the "meaning" of an analogy. However, the "meaning" of an analogy is deceptive and the nature of the dispute is liable to be confounding, if not confusing.

If the object on which an analogy is based and its referent are familiar or known entities, what is the point of the analogy? It may function to draw our attention to similarities between the two objects and by implication, dissimilarities between the objects. Through it we know a little more about both objects which goes to show that we did not know as much before. So, when an argument arises over the analogy, it should revolve around this novel attribute. The argument cannot be about an object as a fact or about its meaning in a literal sense since the analogy makes no assertion about any facts which can be affirmed or denied. The analogy is not about any distinct object but about both the object on which it is based and its referent.

When an expression—"He is as delicate as a rose"—is used, the rose is the controlling analogy. A dispute over the analogy has to do with the meaning of the term "delicate". The way a person is said to be delicate is not the same as or identical to the way a rose is thought to be. In the context of this discussion, to describe two distinct entities with the same word is either to give two different meanings or senses to it. What the analogy seems to be doing is give expression to a third meaning or sense. This novel meaning or sense cannot be adequately apprehended unless the other two more familiar
meanings or senses are already presupposed.

As a preliminary assumption, let us suppose that an object and the word that locates or names it are necessarily related. So when someone asks what a rose is, we can point to one, or should someone else ask what it is we are pointing to, we say, "rose". If someone was to ask about more information regarding the object or the word, then he is, in fact, requesting that the meaning of the word be made more apparent. He is asking for something like a definition of the word, or what it is which makes a rose, a rose. The definition will be composed of words that name various essential properties of the object, properties without which the object cannot be said to be a rose. These words however, do not have the same status as the noun word. If all roses are red, we cannot point to red, we can only point to red things. Words like these have meaning only when they are predicated on a noun, and the properties they name are only substantial when they are similarly connected to an object.

In the context of our analogy, the rose is compared to a person, subsequently, a particular attribute of the object—delicate—was used as the basis for comparison. Any disagreement over the analogy centres around the use of the word, delicate. The analogy focuses on the term which refers to a similar property shared by two distinct and different objects. The analogical "meaning" of the term refers to no particular object, nor is it used to indicate a third. As such, the analogy cannot be strictly meaningful, although it is suggesting something about the meaning of the term "delicate". In principle, any two or more objects can be brought together by an analogy. A solid building can be deemed to be a delicate structure when it is sitting on
the path of a raging cyclone. An analogy may well bring this feature to the fore. This goes to show that the term "delicate" may, in principle, be applied to an infinite number of cases. It surely cannot mean that there is a corresponding meaning of "delicate" in each case, and by implication, our analogy cannot be recommending a third possible meaning to the term "delicate". Moreover, it would seem that there cannot even be two possible meanings. There are, instead, a variety of applications.

In the context of our example, the analogy challenged the way we applied the word in two different instances. Our analysis further suggested that it can be applied to a variety of cases. The analogy seems to be inviting us to look at the term "delicate" itself. It plays with it in such a way as to render it apparently ambiguous. If words describe objects and analogies render their meaning ambiguous, then analogies work to undermine our certainty about things, and the words that name them. Analogies have a way of rendering familiar things unfamiliar. What we consider our own suddenly appears as something strange. As such, an argument over an analogy ineluctably slips into an argument about meaning. Unless the disputants are aware of this, they may be arguing at cross-purposes.

This account of the role of analogies challenges our preliminary assumption underlying our use of words altogether. And given that we express our thoughts through words, analogies challenge the very way we think. We are aroused from our complacency to reconsider the possibility of universals like redness, delicate, justice and so on, and then to reconsider the relation of these universals to the particular manifestations of them in particular things. Analogies seem to
act like vehicles to lift us above the world of sensible objects, and
to evaluate those "ideas" that shape them into meaningful entities for
us. Analogies act as guides by pointing to those possible universals
and reminding us of the ground, the point of departure in the sensible
world in which these possible universals are expressed as particulars.
We are led back to the world because we are keen to explore the processes
that give rise to these particulars in such a way as to render them
unique as particulars and yet similar to the universal which they
express. Our analogy, therefore, leads us to consider the term
delicate itself, and the particular ways in which a rose, a person or
any other thing is said to be delicate.

Analogies in themselves are not strictly meaningful, they pave
the way for the possibility of meaning; they signify the potentiality
of thought. They do not by themselves refer to any particular thing, or
property of a thing, they tear out or abstract that property and
announce the possibility of a universal with infinite expressivity.
Analogies are, therefore, not misleading. Something is misleading
when we take it to be one thing and it turns out to be something
else. Analogies are not about any one thing, but about that one "idea"
that is shared by a variety of things. It should be apparent now
that analogies do not so much . disguise the distinction between
matters of fact and matters of value as reveal how tenuous the founda-
tion is on which such a distinction rests.13 Owing to their special
nature, analogies pose a dilemma. Their disruptive nature threatens
to undermine conventional thought and the extreme consequence of that
is a kind of nihilism. Not to recognise or acknowledge this function
of analogies, on the other hand, would merely serve to justify the
worst kind of dogmatism. For these reason, analogies can be dangerous.

On the basis of the foregoing, some tentative remarks about analogies can be inferred. In themselves, analogies are not intrinsically meaningful, yet they provoke the imagination and incite the intellect by demanding interpretation. They elicit the sense of things without fully articulating them.\textsuperscript{14} We speak now of sense and not of meaning; we draw on the notion of intuition, of having a feel for things or an intimation of them. Analogies expose the lie of convention, disrupt its comfortable repose by revealing its precarious reliance on intuition and how problematic that is, and hence, confronting us with the challenge of elucidating those intuitions, of re-examining and re-evaluating the sources of our deepest convictions.\textsuperscript{15} Analogies can be misleading when we take them to be what they are not. They do not provide solutions to problems by revealing their complexity or ambiguity. They point the way suggesting possible pitfalls in our attempt to surmount the terrain of the spurious in our quest for the true. As such we have somehow to become aware and sensitive to the point of the analogy and to look beyond it towards those processes which give shape and form to it.

In our example of the rose, it was evident that the person who employed it as an analogy and the person who challenged it, each expressed a particular point of view. They had a particular interest in shaping the particular analogy. This interest is premised on their individual understanding of the term(s) implied by the analogy and its relation to the object on which it is based and its referent. We are better placed now to appreciate the fact that the meanings of the term(s) were rendered ambiguous by the analogy and that the
dispute was in fact a dispute about the meaning of words. It was, however, within the particular context in which the analogy was framed which gave impetus to the debate.

To get to the point of an analogy, we have to get a fix on the context in which it operates. Determining a context may be problematic, as any particular context may change; it could be enlarged or shifted and in the course of that, affect the analogy which operates in it. In terms of the discussion of context, it should be appropriate here to direct our attention to the Platonic text and consequently, deal with the approach to the analogy of the Philosophic Dog in Plato's Republic.

2) The Republic and the Analogy of the Philosophic Dog

Plato is both philosopher and playwright, and in the composition of a dialogue elements of philosophy and drama are intricately woven into the fabric of the text. To abstract the philosophical arguments from the dramatic interplay of characters may distort the message carried in the dialogue as a whole; conversely, an over-emphasis on the dramatic component may overshadow the deeper philosophical concern that lies at the heart of the dialogue. The message of the dialogue can be as slippery as the "meaning" of an analogy. The dialogue brings together a variety of characters of different persuasions and dispositions. At any one time, an argument may be addressing one, a number, or all the interlocutors; and sometimes the presence of an audience is indicated extending the possible range of addressees. With the inclusion of the audience it is not altogether illegitimate to
contemplate a distinction between the audience in the text and the audience implied by the text, that is, the possible reader(s). The dialogue which we are concerned with belongs to a series in which Socrates is depicted as the principal protagonist. In conjunction with questions relating to the audience, are those which are directed at distinguishing Plato from Socrates. These questions, though they may be perplexing, are quite proper even if they are ultimately unanswerable. This is because the notions of intention and motivation crop up again and again as one delves deeper into the dialogues. In any case, these are some of the likely yet not exhaustive set of problems in undertaking a contextual analysis.

Plato's philosophic dog is introduced to illuminate characteristics of an element of the luxurious city--its guardian. This, however, is set within the context of the search for justice and injustice in the city. The dialogue works its way from here to an articulation of the nature of the just city. This city is intended to be a model through which the just man can be apprehended. The discourse on justice is motivated by the inconclusive treatment of it in Book I, especially in light of Thrasymachus' ardent but abortive defense of injustice. The notion of justice as such seems to be the central concern of the dialogue, around which we witness the interplay of images within images. The dialogue reads like an elaborate and sophisticated analogy--an analogy, so it seems, of what justice means.

The dialogue is not a logical treatise; it is shot through with logical "gaps" in its arguments, therefore, a purely logical analysis could possibly damage or distort the message contained in the dialogue. The dialogue reads more like a serious work of literature,
amenable to some form of critical analysis. We assumed that an analogy has something to say or suggests something by pointing to it. It is incapable of being explicit about that which it is about. At first glance, it appears that the dialogue is about justice. But it is also about the good or the idea of the good that is more fundamental than justice. The good is the ultimate object in the pursuit of knowledge and therefore has bearing on the activity of the philosopher. Philosophical activity is not necessarily consistent with the needs or ideals of the city and the dialogue seems to give expression to the problem of the relation of philosophy to the city, or the tension between philosophy and politics. Philosophy and politics each express a particular way of life. The dialogue, as such, may be addressing the problem of the conduct of life and in this it is consistent with the Socratic injunction to "know thyself".

The image of the philosophic dog embodies the attributes of spiritedness and the philosophic. The analogy is based on the behavior of the noble pup which is gentle to its own and harsh to strangers. The analogy is used to shed light on the class of guardians who are to protect and promote the interests of the city. Apparently, the analogy is used to forestall any anticipation of what the guards are to be like. That is, the guards Socrates has in mind, are not like the conventional guards that the interlocutors are familiar with. The guards he has in mind are like the noble pup. But the noble pup only manifests gentleness and viciousness. Socrates uses the analogy to suggest that these are connected to being both spirited and philosophic.

Spirited and philosophic are words that describe certain dispositions. They describe the natures of certain kinds of beings.
So it appears that Socrates is using the analogy as if to say that the guard is as spirited as the noble pup. In which case he is drawing our attention to the word, spirited. However, the analogy embodies both the spirited and the philosophic. Socrates is therefore alerting us to this complex union. And he uses the analogy in association with the behavioural modes of gentleness and viciousness, and these in turn, are supposed to describe the character of the guardians. The analogy is attempting to convey to us the relation of the interplay of spiritedness and the philosophic in the production of these modes of behaviour. These modes of behaviour have a bearing not only on the guardians, but also on the just man and the philosopher, and their opposites, the unjust man and the tyrant. The analogy as such is alerting us to the connection between these and the relation between spiritedness and the philosophic.

The image of the dog appears at various places, the most significant are:

(i) 375 a-c: where the philosophic dog is introduced in an attempt to characterise certain qualities of the city's guardians.

(ii) 404a: The guards are said to be "sleepless as hounds" and this is set into the context of the regime of gymnastic exercises and its connection to war.16

(iii) 416a: Where the possibility of the guard dog attacking its flock like a pack of wolves is entertained.

(iv) 422d: Here the dogs are invoked to reinforce the view of the military effectiveness of a small class of guardians.

(v) 440c: In characterising the response to injustice, the analogy is used to illuminate the notion of reconciliation.
(vi) 451d: The argument for the equality of the sexes is cast in the image of the guard dog.

(vii) 469e: The analogy is employed to express the problem of the attribution of responsibility to agents of injustice.

(viii) 539b: The power of dialectic and its possible misuse is demonstrated in the image of the dogs pulling and tearing at arguments.

The arguments in which the analogy figures are evidently interconnected. However, each argument is an emphasis on an aspect of the larger concern of the dialogue as a whole. As such, the analogy is shaped in accordance with the particular context of that argument. We have, therefore, to be aware of the shifts in context as they affect the characterisation of the analogy. As these shifts are not arbitrary but part of the development and movement of the dialogue, we shall keep in mind that the analogy is carried along and evolves with it.

The arguments are supposedly quite explicit; they appear to tell us quite clearly what they are about. The introduction or the inclusion of the analogy may be a cue that the clarity is only apparent and the arguments may not be as cogent as they appear to be. If the argument is vulnerable, the analogy suggests it, yet its conscious inclusion may be an indication to withhold from pressing the analogy too far. We should, instead, pay more attention to the context and the movement of the discussion. 17

To set the appearance of the dog in context, we have to begin our inquiry at the very beginning, way before it is conceived. We have to observe the various interests which gave rise to the speculation on the question of justice. We shall try to ascertain the character
and motives of the participants. We shall also attend to the style of discourse in order to glean something like a method in the flow of the dialogue. And when these have been accomplished, we can set ourselves on the trail of the philosophic dog.
Notes

1. W. Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture* (New York, 1976), p. 209. In his interpretive essay, Allan Bloom considers the identification of the image with philosophy not to be serious; indeed, the image of the philosophic dog is said to be contrary to the image of the philosopher (*The Republic of Plato*, New York, 1968, p. 350). Contrary to Bloom, I suggest that the image recurs in the description of the philosopher, and that Bloom may have neglected the change in Socrates' later interpretation of the image.

2. T.A. Sinclair, *Plato's Philosophic Dog* (Classical Review, Vol. 62, No. 2, 1948, p. 62). This is a short, mostly polemical note on the analogy—but there is, however, some plausibility to the claim in that Thrasymachus seems very much to bear on the original image of the philosophic dog. This is discussed in Chapter Three.

3. R. Robinson, *Plato Earlier Dialectic* (London, 1970, p. 205). Robinson's book, although important, does not stress Plato's use of analogies. He does, however, come across a rather paradoxical feature in the use of analogies: the implication that the user must already know the thing of which the analogy is an illustration (p. 214). The arguments of this chapter suggest that this is really not necessary, for the degree of 'knowledge' which shapes the analogy may only be intuitive—or in Socrates' case, it may be guided by the demands of the particular argument. Overall, his judgement on the Republic is quite severe: he pronounces the uses of analogies there inconsistent and ultimately incoherent (p. 221). This thesis will show that the analogy of the philosophic dog is, in fact, coherent, if not consistent, and furthermore, that the image of the Pilot, the Cave and the Line, emerge from that analogy.


5. J.R. Bambrough, "Plato's Political Analogies" in *Plato, Popper and Politics*, ed. by R. Bambrough (Cambridge, 1967), p. 154. This seems, to my knowledge, the only explicit treatment of Plato's political analogies.


7. Ibid. The three analogies criticised are those of the Pilot (p. 159), the Medical Model (p. 162) and the Shepherd (p. 165).

8. Ibid., p. 166.


and Being (St. Louis, 1949), pp. 1-21. Bruell sees analogies as being integrally related to the purposive uses of language, and his understanding is shaped by the philosophical views of Heidegger and Wittgenstein. This view of analogies is not too far off the mark from the basic assumptions guiding the treatment of analogies proposed here. This view is, however, at odds with J.L. Ross who claims that intention alone is insufficient criterion to adjudicate analogies since words can mean what we intend them not to (Portraying Analogies, Cambridge, 1981, p. 5). Analogies, to Ross, are strictly a function of language, and thus, not necessarily connected to the language user.


12. B.G. Caraher suggests the same with respect to metaphors:

In the simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction (Metaphor as Contradiction in Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1981, p. 93).

13. J.R. Bambrough, "Plato's Modern Friends and Enemies" in Plato, Popper and Politics (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 97-113. This is a later paper in which the hostility towards Plato is mitigated by the realisation that disputes over Plato's ideas may be at cross-purposes, and what is implicit but undecided in these disputes has to do with the problem of values.


15. John Wisdom, Philosophy and Psycho-analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). Wisdom's discussion of paradoxes parallels much of what is said of analogies in this paper. His essay, "Philosophical Perplexity", has a good discussion on the nature of philosophical discourse, and the dependence of such discourse on falsehoods (p. 50). The point is that the "philosopher draws attention to what is already known with a view to giving insight into the structure of what it means". I understand the expression "what is already known" to be an intuition, whose meaning is not fully articulated.


16. In his introduction to the Lectures on the Republic of Plato (London: Macmillan and Co. 1961), R.L. Nettleship considers Plato's method to be neither inductive nor deductive but rather "genetic" or
"constructive"— "starting with a conception of what man is, he [Plato] builds up a picture of what human life might be, and in this he is guided throughout by principles he does not enunciate till he has gone on some way". This relation of image to argument in the development of the dialogue supports the proposed treatment of the analogy of the philosophic dog.
CHAPTER TWO

Genesis of the Philosophic Dog

Introduction

This chapter establishes the characters and circumstances that give rise to the extensive discussion on justice. A considerable portion of the chapter is an exegesis of Book I. The interpretation is interspersed with a measure of restrained critical commentary. The point of the latter is to demonstrate the unevenness in the structure of discourse; it is restrained because we have no desire to press the criticisms too far; that is, we wish to treat the arguments themselves as if they were analogical. This is not to say that they cannot be abstracted, formalised and treated rigorously but that is not to our purpose here. We work on the assumption that what is contained in Book I, that is, both the arguments and the dramatic play of the dialogue, is further elaborated in the later books. So we have to observe what is involved and unresolved.

The arguments in the dialogue are shaped by the interests of the interlocutors. The dramatic form of the dialogue sheds light on the particular attributes and turn of mind of the major participants. Socrates' character is partially revealed through his management of arguments in a conversational setting. His engagement with Cephalus on the question of justice, announces the main theme of the dialogue. As the discussion proceeds, related issues are touched on but not fully
explicated, and Socrates appears to be playing with the arguments so much so that the integrity of the argument form becomes doubtful and dubious. Nevertheless, the theme of the discussion and the style of the discourse captures the attention of the assembly, one of whom is particularly frustrated with the proceedings.

The central figure in this dialogue is Thrasymachus. He attempts to urge on the audience a view which promotes injustice and his unseemly behaviour in the dialogue reveals more than a mere academic interest in this view. Against Socrates' partiality towards justice, Thrasymachus is roused to defend and promote a particular vision of the world, a state of affairs that draws strong support from Adeimentus and Glaucon's tacit acknowledgement that the view has considerable cogency in conventional circles. Thrasymachus' mode of behaviour is similar to the image of the philosophic dog, a creature that is gentle to its own and harsh on strangers. Thrasymachus appears to have a conception of what constitutes his "own", and his behaviour, although aggressive, assumes a defensive posture.

Adeimentus and Glaucon also express a certain frustration with the proceedings. Their indignation has to do with justice's inability to vindicate itself against the almost inexorable force of injustice. Glaucon, in particular, appears to be at the end of his wits, "having been talked deaf by Thrasymachus, and countless others" on the seeming virtue of injustice (358c). He appears to be at the edge of a precipice, verging on a profound disbelief in justice, and his mock but powerful defence of the life of the unjust expresses an equally profound plea for deliverance. The brothers quite clearly indicate that they are open to Socrates' persuasion but one which is constrained to take as its point
of departure, the seeming intractable argument for the life of injustice.

The image of the philosophic dog appears at that point when the luxurious city is poised to commit an injustice—the invasion of its neighbour's territory. This chapter concludes with Socrates' elaboration of the twin attributes of the philosophic dog, its spiritedness and its philosophic nature, their inter-relation and the structure of social relations that it presupposes. This potent image contains implicitly most of the crucial elements that will be raised and elaborated in the course of the dialogue.

1. The Setting

Having observed a festival with Glaucon, Socrates was on the way back from the Pireaus, the Athenian port, when he is suddenly accosted by a party led by Polemarchus, the son of the wealthy Cephalus. As the self-appointed spokesman of the party, Polemarchus insists that Socrates join them and will not be persuaded otherwise. This puts Socrates in a rather awkward situation and the scene signals in one brief and poignant moment the limitations of persuasion and the constraints on the philosopher. The ever wakeful Adeimentus discreetly interposes to mitigate the matter with the promise of a more delightful occupation should Socrates accede. This offers an opportunity for Socrates to reconcile himself to Polemarchus' demand. The situation is resolved to everyone's satisfaction, whereupon they set for Polemarchus' home in which there is assembled another gathering of friends.
2. Cephalus

On their arrival, Cephalus had just completed a ritual of sacrifice. Observing his piety as well as his seniority and social status—for Cephalus was a man of means—Socrates expresses curiosity about Cephalus' view on old age. Old age, according to Cephalus, promises salvation for the powerful and disturbing temptations of the flesh but adds that, above all, good character determines for both young and old whether or not old age is easy to bear (329d). The passing of youth is received with a sigh of relief. Surely, Cephalus had not been profligate in his youth for otherwise he would not have attained his present stature. We can surmise that he had been vigilant and restrained and got by not without a bit of effort. In his autumn days he accomplishes with ease what may have been achieved in youth at considerable discipline and self-control.

Playing the devil's advocate, Socrates wonders if it were not by virtue of his wealth that Cephalus finds such comfort and repose in his later life. Cephalus does not deny the fact of his wealth but reiterates again that it is of little consolation if not for good character. On the other hand, poverty is an evil for good and bad alike. Wealth, therefore, seems to guarantee the possibility of a decent and temperate existence. What good then, asks Socrates, does the possession of wealth bring? For Cephalus, the realisation of imminent death and fear of the afterlife combine to arouse his anxiety about the conduct of his life, the worry that he may have committed an injustice to either god or man. Wealth, therefore, affords him the facility to rectify these injustices. In his words:
Cephalus assumes it is an injustice to cheat, lie and renege on debts, and that these offend the gods. Money saves him from having to resort to these, but the lack of it may cause him by necessity to take recourse to such activities. Clearly Cephalus refers to some possible injustice which he is able, through his present piety, to absolve. Cephalus' perception of absolution seems to be premised on a combination of money and religion—a curious mixture of the very mundane and the very sublime. His care for justice springs from a perception of injustice to which wealth and piety afford a dignified resolution.

Socrates abstracts from Cephalus' peroration, a general proposition of justice—"...the truth and giving back what a man owes another" (331c)—and then cites an example that contradicts it.¹ In the case of a man of unsound mind, to return a weapon owed to him works more harm than good, and speaking the truth in this instance cannot be helpful. Thus, such a conception cannot be a sufficient basis for justice. At this stage, Polemarchus intervenes to reaffirm his father's belief. It should be noted that at this point the notion of truth-telling is dropped from the discussion. It is not clear why Polemarchus is unaware of this when he is sufficiently alert to intervene on his father's behalf. A likely conjecture is that he moved in to spare his father the embarrassment of an anticipated and extended confrontation with Socrates. Thus, he has come upon his father's
defence equipped with less than his due "inheritance". Socrates does not appear anxious to press the case. The notion of truth-telling will only emerge again in Book II.²

3. Polemarchus

Socrates reiterates his earlier example, compelling Polemarchus to reformulate his notion of justice. Justice now means doing good to friends and harm to enemies. To this Socrates raises a question concerning the instrumental value of such a conception of justice: in what respects is this conception of justice useful? It seems justice is only useful in terms of the safekeeping of money, yet when money is kept it is useless, hence, justice appears to be "useful in its uselessness" (333d). Money is once again mentioned within the context of a conception of justice, and this leads us to wonder if there is some possible connection. In the face of this paradox, Polemarchus is left in a bit of a quandary. Socrates presses on. The person most qualified to watch over money is also equally capable of filching it (334a). A clever guardian is therefore a clever thief. Polemarchus is stymied. However, the inference that Socrates makes does not quite hold up. The fact that the guardian is capable of stealing does not make him a thief. Presumably, one does not entrust one's valuables to another unless one has extracted a promise and is assured that the valuables will be protected and returned on request. A promise presupposes a notion of truth-telling. Polemarchus' position does not include such a conception. Thus, while Socrates may have exploited a weakness in that position, his own conclusion is of dubious character. What emerges in this interlude is a conception of techne, or ability to
perform a certain task--evident from the series of analogies that Socrates draws to confute Polemarchus, analogies which function like a double-edged sword.

The probing proceeds with Socrates eliciting from Polemarchus a definition of friendship. Friends are those who seem good to one (334c). Appearances are deceptive, errors of judgement occur, confounding one's perception of friends from enemies, consequently, one is liable to harm one's friends. On this basis, Polemarchus' notion of justice and friendship is rendered fallacious. But surely the fallacy is more apparent than real. Polemarchus' notion of friendship is subjective and based on appearances; Socrates' criticism of it presupposes an objective appraisal that is not available nor necessary to Polemarchus. Nevertheless, Polemarchus is once again compelled to redefine his notion of friendship. The new formulation is not a refinement but a transformation that articulates what was implicit in Socrates' criticism. One does good to a friend if he is good (335a). This formulation draws a distinction between friendship and good; it retains an element of subjectivity but includes an objective element. It is not evident that Polemarchus appreciates the distinction. It would follow that the next logical step would be to clarify what good means in this instance. Instead, Socrates' subsequent questions circumvent the natural sequence and are directed at an altogether distinct issue, viz, whether it is just to harm another. If justice is good and beneficial, then the just man cannot work any harm or injury. This, of course, begs the question of justice but that does not prevent Socrates from asserting it. He further enforces the view with analogies drawn from the art of music and horsemanship. In a
reversal of similar analogies drawn previously, the point of the current analogies suggests that the arts are only beneficial and not harmful (335c,e). The conclusion which Socrates draws from these is that it is never just to injure anyone, an apparently universal claim premised on a spurious use of arguments from analogies, and one which is inconsistent with the view of justice held thus far. A conclusion which Polemarchus greets with uncritical approval!

4. **Thrasythracus**

Throughout this discussion, Socrates notices Thrasythracus' growing impatience. It may be very well attest to Thrasythracus' perspicacity if his sense of frustration was due to the conduct of the argument. Analogies were manipulated to further an argument; the sequence of arguments was illegitimately circumvented, and last but not least, arguments which were question-begging were proposed. It is fair to assume that Socrates was conscious of the manner of the proceedings and that Polemarchus was merely a guileless pawn in this duplicity. Although the notion of justice has been bandied about, there is a consistent thread that runs across Socrates' arguments; there is an underlying concern with harm and/or injury which colours his perception of justice.

At this point in the discussion, Thrasythracus' impatience gets the better of him and he explodes in a tirade. The atmosphere of hitherto urbane amiability is suddenly ruptured by the vehemence of this rude intrusion. As he vents his anger, we get the distinct impression the outburst is far out of proportion to the general attitude of patience and tolerance of the other participants. Is Thrasythracus
taking the arguments too seriously? The arguments are obviously flawed, frustrating perhaps, but had it been intended to be serious, we would have expected some comment from Glaucon or Adeimous. Thrasymachus' behaviour had already been noticed by the other participants who had restrained him (336b). This might suggest their awareness that the discussion is only of an exploratory and preliminary nature. In other words, the discussion had been viewed with interest both in its seemingly playful nature as well as in the substantive issues that were slowly taking shape. Thrasymachus' ire seems to be based on a misunderstanding. He interpreted the playfulness as a sign of a competitive game and accuses Socrates of gratifying his love of honour in refuting arguments (336c). Thrasymachus is a sophist; the very game which he accuses Socrates of playing is part of his stock-in-trade. He must have been thinking that either Socrates was abusing it or using it to show him up. That seems to be a reasonable explanation of his anger since he does not seem aware of the purpose of the discussion, nor is he indignant with the fate of Polemarchus who apparently suffered the "refutation" with a degree of equanimity commensurate with the nature of the discussion. As he is not protecting Polemarchus, then it must be the nature of the discussion, in particular, its conduct, which angered him. He must have taken the "game" seriously—and no wonder, for we expect him to be as serious about it as he would his livelihood. The "game" is refutation but Socrates is not strictly refuting Polemarchus. The arguments are too weak. He is aware of that, indeed, responsible for their being that way. We can surmise that he was manipulating the discussion either to raise a more fundamental issue or to draw in some other observer(s). Thrasymachus may have read into Socrates' motives
the latter, and in so doing, took the impression that he was being singled out.

A brief interchange takes place. Socrates claims to have made an unwilling mistake, which is, of course, not really true. He entreats Thrasymachus to relent, "...it's surely far more fitting for us to be pitied by you clever men than to be treated harshly" (336e). Thrasymachus is incredulous and points to Socrates' characteristic irony. A person who is able to turn arguments around in the way that Socrates does must know something even if he is not saying it. Thrasymachus has that suspicion and challenges Socrates for an answer. However, Thrasymachus' behaviour itself suggests that he may know something himself. Without any prodding he indicates that he may, indeed, have a finer view of justice. He draws attention to himself but keeps up the pretense of courting Socrates to answer instead. The observers, whose interest has been stirred, now persuade Thrasymachus to share his view of justice.

Inspired, Thrasymachus boldly proclaims that justice is the advantage of the stronger (338c). This general notion is necessarily vague and Socrates makes a seemingly facetious criticism of it. Citing an example of a wrestler, Socrates suggests that if beef was advantageous to his body, then that food is also advantageous and just, the implication being that the food is also stronger. This argument from an analogy looks to be silly but it cleverly collapses the distinction between the just, the strong and the advantageous. There are, by inference, three possible distinct categories. Unaware of the force of these distinctions but piqued by the particular example that embodies them, Thrasymachus berates Socrates. His recourse to save
his definition is to cite the practice of rulers who frame laws that
are to their advantage. He assumes the rulers are the stronger but
adds unwittingly that the laws are just. As rulers may mistake what
is truly in their interest, it is likely that they may frame laws that
are not to their advantage; as such it is not necessarily true that
justice is the advantage of the stronger.

Polemarchus, to Thrasymachus' chagrin, is quick to applaud
this conclusion despite Cleitophon's interjection on behalf of
Thrasymachus; Polemarchus is, at least, perceptive enough to discern
the two principles involved in this argument. Cleitophon tries to
get around this by amending the original formula. He claims that
Thrasymachus had only to say that the advantage of the stronger is
premised on their belief of what is to their advantage (340b). This
however, will not do as Socrates merely has to re-state the previous
criticism levelled at Polemarchus's notion of friendship. Socrates
willingly defers to Cleitophon's proposal but Thrasymachus rejects it.

In a telling exchange that follows, more of Thrasymachus's
character is revealed. He accuses Socrates of being a sycophant;
accusing him, therefore, of attempting to harm his person (340c-341b). The perceived assault is neither physical nor directly verbal. Instead
the indication of assault is detected in the harm done to the argument!
(341b) There is a sense in which Thrasymachus and his arguments are
one, that a refutation of the latter is evidence of an assault on his
person. He cannot distance himself from his arguments; he is what he
believes. Unwilling, therefore, to alter his opinion, he does not
take up Cleitophon's offer but plunges ahead, insisting that his
definition does not need to be amended. Strictly speaking a ruler's
craft, like any art, is premised on knowledge, and knowledge cannot err; therefore, a ruler so long as he is ruling cannot err.

In line with Thrasymachus's comparison to the arts, Socrates refers to the practice of medicine and navigation. The doctor cares for his patients, just as the pilot for his crew. As to the question of advantage, Socrates is a little ambiguous. He asks if there is some advantage to "each of them", meaning of course, the craftsman and his object (341d). Thrasymachus replies in the affirmative. The following question relates to the craft itself, excluding its practitioner; the advantage it seems, then, applies to the craft and its object. Yet, if the art is perfect, need it consider its own advantage? Apparently, not. Therefore, it only concerns the object of its practice. Since ruling is an art, it cannot consider its own advantage but the advantage of the ruled (342e). Thrasymachus concedes with resistance and it seems he did not notice that subtle evasion of the question regarding the peculiar advantage of the practitioner.

He seems to sense that something has gone amiss but is unable to pinpoint it. Instinctively he lashes out at Socrates' seemingly naive view of politics. He counters Socrates' argument with the image of the shepherd. In his depiction, the shepherd, who rules over the flock of sheep, is in the service of his masters whose interest is to feast on the flock (343b). Extrapolating from this, he describes and compares the lives of the just and unjust, and ends up praising the life of injustice. This is in every sense a strange and radical turn of events. The argument has been abandoned and instead a badly contrived rhetorical piece is substituted.

The analogy that Thrasymachus introduces does not fit into the
context of the argument. The discussion centres around the character of the ruler, the nature of his ruling and the interests of the ruled. There are two subjects and a relation. He has introduced categories that have no place even in the context of his own argument. There are the superordinate masters, the subordinate rulers—the shepherd—and the ruled—the flock. Here, there are three subjects and two possible sets of relations. This division is not without interest, it only occupies a vacuum at this stage of the discussion. Furthermore, the introduction of the lives of the unjust, unwittingly introduces a distinction between justice and injustice, and lays open the ground for Socrates to exploit the undisclosed standard that underlies this distinction (343cd). Now the problem takes a different turn: the question is whether the life of injustice is more advantageous than the life of justice, a question that depends on an understanding of justice which evidently has not been settled yet.

How do we account for this turn of events? Twice already Thrasymachus has been refuted. On both occasions he had unwittingly allowed the subtleties of Socrates to out-maneouvre him. Unable to latch onto the argument, he abandons it, the outcome of which is his testament of the political life and the eulogy of the tyrant. This last discourse is the trump that he had hidden away, and now that it has been delivered, he hopes to walk away, triumphant. But his only claim to victory is to arouse the interest of the observers for a further account of this terrible but seductive vision of the life of tyranny. They urge him to stay for a further elaboration. Socrates, too, pleads his case, for surely this is a matter of the deepest concern, and ultimately about living the best life. Thrasymachus accedes to the
request, thinking he has merely to elaborate on the matter; he does not anticipate a further argument and therefore, when Socrates claims not to be persuaded, Thrasymachus wonders if the "argument"—so self-evident—should not be forcefed to him (345b).

Socrates, however, reminds him of their mutual agreement on the notion of the arts. It was already established that the arts do not consider their own advantage but advantage of their subjects. In which case, the art of shepherding does not consider its own advantage but the advantage of the flock. Thrasymachus' example says no such thing—there, neither the advantage of shepherd nor sheep but rather the advantage of the amorphous master class that was served. This, however, is overlooked and Socrates now introduces a rather novel notion. He claims that no one rules willingly but demands a wage for it (346e). This is possible given his earlier, but inexplicit assumption that there is a distinction between ruler, rule (the art or knowledge presupposed by the art) and the ruled. The rule only considers the advantage of the ruled. The ruler, however, is a distinct entity, called into being to apply the rule. In this context, Socrates introduces, surreptitiously, the wage-earner's art.

The wage-earner's art is as amorphous as the rule of Thrasymachus' master class, and it is also ubiquitous as it affects all the practices of the arts. The wage-earner is necessarily self-interested, as such, the art paradoxically, considers only the advantage of its practitioner. This, then, is the advantage of the practitioner that was earlier deliberately ignored or neglected by Socrates. Because self-regarding, no practitioner performs his function willingly unless he is also paid a wage. This argument is
meant to show that no art provides for its own benefit, but it does not depend on the notion of the wage-earner's art.

Although Thrasymachus concedes the point he does so with reluctance, again, he seems to have an intimation of a sleight-of-hand without fully apprehending the curious, convoluted, twist in the argument.

Socrates seems to have introduced into the discussion two notions of art, one which is particular, the other, universal. The fact that the two are apparently incompatible does not strike a note of discord among the observers. The contradiction is only apparent seeing that the seemingly common denominator is quite ambiguous. Socrates appears to be using it analogically and this is suggested in the different forms or instances of its manifestation. Wages do not merely mean money, but also honours and ironically, penalties (347a). Wages seem to stand for what we commonly understand by the phrase, just desserts.

The notion of penalty as a wage is bewildering and prompts Glaucon to press Socrates for an explanation. Good men, according to Socrates, desire neither money nor honours, the usual wages of political office. Therefore, if they are to rule, they must do it as a matter of necessity or a penalty. They are penalised insofar as they are forced to rule, and it is a necessity insofar as no other can be trusted to do a good job, and no one desires to be ruled by a worse. Glaucon's request is only partially met in this explanation for it touches on a number of issues which it does not clarify. Who is the good man? What are his real wages? Why are his interests incompatible with the demands of political office? It is quite certain that
Glaucon's interest has already been aroused but instead of waiting for a reply to this explanation, Socrates brings the discussion back to Thrasymachus. He is now set to address the question concerning the life of the unjust man.

Is injustice profitable? Thrasymachus affirms this, and in conjunction with it he also regards the unjust as prudent and good (348ed). His purpose in this is to express the view that the unjust man profits in getting what he wants and he gets what he wants because he has the appropriate means and abilities. To Socrates, Thrasymachus concedes that while the just man will only get the better of the unjust, the unjust will get the better of both the just and the unjust (349c). The unjust will compete with his own. On the basis of the analogies based on the musician and the doctor, Socrates is able to elicit from Thrasymachus the view that these technicians are prudent and do not compete amongst themselves. Because the unjust competes with his own, he is not prudent, instead he is unlearned and bad. This conclusion follows on Thrasymachus' acceptance of a subtle distinction between being both prudent and good, and being like the prudent and good (349d) which allows him to introduce the analogies. Why, in fact, Thrasymachus accepts the distinction is not clear. Such a distinction is especially significant in light of Socrates' previous introduction of the wage-earner's art which straddles the rest of the arts. The art as universal practice is similar but not identical to the other arts. It is also conceivable that where money making is concerned that the practitioners compete among themselves. Nevertheless, this apparently does not come to Thrasymachus' mind. The analogies which he accepts unwittingly focus
on particular practices which allows Socrates to consider injustice as if it was a particular practice.

Notwithstanding the validity of the argument, Thrasymachus is so tightly drawn into it that he is forced to accept its conclusion. Whether it has logical force is quite beside the point. Because he agrees to its premises, the conclusion seems inescapable to him. He is so overwhelmed by it that he blushes (350d). His much revered tyrant turns out to be an ignoramus. The sense of shame arises from his inability to defend himself, and is therefore an admission of self-defeat. Ironically, Thrasymachus is vindicated in his accusation of Socrates being a sycophant. We can view the methodically corrupt procedure employed by Socrates as an "injustice" that gets the better of Thrasymachus. Yet although it defeats him, it does not break his belief in injustice. Henceforth, he will either speak his peace once and for all, or submit to Socrates' questioning without commitment. Thrasymachus, the advocate of injustice, announces that he will not compete with Socrates. Indeed, Socrates will subsequently recall this episode as the turning point in Thrasymachus' change from a hostile witness to one "grown gentle" (354a). In apparent disregard of Thrasymachus' preference, Socrates chooses to go on with the questioning. Thrasymachus as the reluctant pawn is obliged to behave as if he were prudent. At this point, it is quite clear that Socrates' interest in Thrasymachus has diminished and the decision to proceed indicates either a desire to bring the discussion to its logical conclusion, which is doubtful, or to manage it such that the other participants are enticed into it.

Considering the deeds of the unjust, Socrates reflects on
whether as a group they are able to accomplish anything if they were unjust to each other. As a result of faction and quarrel the group will not be able to accomplish anything. Injustice is taken to be destructive in this case. Therefore, if the group intends to achieve anything as a group, there must be an element of justice binding them together (352c). Justice paradoxically co-exists with injustice. This example of efficacy in terms of function and goal achievement leads Socrates to raise the notion of virtue. On the basis of a number of analogies Socrates intends to show that each thing has a specific function. The first analogy that he draws is astonishing to say the least. He asks if there is a particular work that a horse does best (352d). The question is raised but left unanswered. The following analogies based on the sight, hearing and the pruning knife are more specific and answerable. On the basis of these, he establishes a case for the soul having a specific function. The soul is the ordering principle of life, and deprived of that virtue, life will be miserable. Socrates presumes a prior agreement that justice is the virtue of the soul when in fact there was none (353e). But on that note, it follows that a life of injustice is wretched, and the life of justice happy. The discussion on justice purportedly comes to an end. The arguments, however, assume far too much to be of value, and Socrates glibly admits to this. But the stage is set for Glaucon and Adeimentus, a far more capable duo, to show their colours, and submit to the ordeal, both humbling and edifying, of a Socratic inquiry.
5. Summary

We take pause here to recapitulate some of the more significant outcomes of our interpretation. The conversation began with Cephalus who associated justice with wealth and religion, both of which concern the individual but the former is private and latter involves a public dimension. Socrates' exploitation of the analogies based on the arts shows that they have a particularistic as well as a universalistic dimension. He emphasizes one aspect as opposed to the other whenever it is convenient to confute Thrasymachus. Relying on some analogies Socrates draws a distinction between the ruler, the rule and the ruled. The rule does not appear as any object but as a relation mediating subject and object. The distinction that Socrates drew between the wage-earner's art and the other arts suggest that there are at least two perspectives on the notion of ruling--a particularistic and a universalistic dimension. It is as if the former presupposes the latter. The wage-earning art is peculiar in that unlike the other arts, it relates to itself. The doctor when he is practicing medicine cares for the benefit of the patient. The subject of the wage-earner's practice is directed at acquiring wealth. Wealth does not constitute a particular object but objects assume the form of wealth. In this formal sense there appears to be a kinship between the wage-earner and the form of his desire. Since there is no one particular object to which the art is directed, there is no one corresponding means or method to guide the acquisition of wealth. The relation that binds the wage-earner to the "object" of his desire is thus indeterminate, or perhaps there is no mediate but an immediate relation—but that is to say it relates to itself. The most
interesting aspect of this is Socrates' conjoining of the wage-earner's art to every particular art in a unity.

We wonder if Thrasymachus' tripartite structure of social relations projected in his image of the shepherd bears some relation to this notion of the arts. After all, shepherding is a particular function that caters to the welfare of the flock, but as a moment of the universal practice of acquisition, it serves the advantage of the owning—master class. Furthermore, Socrates' description of the band of bandits may also illustrate this relation. The band is composed of disparate individuals with particular wants—as a class their individual desires to not have a definite form unless some ordering principle binds them together into a unity, in which case, both the particular and the universal are brought together. Justice functions as the ordering principle. But we noted that the relation of the wage-earner to the "object" of his desire is immediate. Roughly speaking, the relation does not have the character of a particular activity like shepherding or doctoring, but seems to express an activity itself. Justice does not seem to be any relation requiring specific relata of subject and object, but a collapse of such distinction into mere activity—justice has to do with a way of being. The example of the bandits also reflects a relationship between justice and injustice implicit in Cephalus' account of justice. In both cases, the question of justice arises only after the occurrence of injustice.

The portrayal of Thrasymachus serves as the high point of this part of the dramatic dialogue. His profession involves the use of speech yet he fares poorly in argument. His forte seems to be
rhetoric: the making of long speeches with a reliance on popular symbols and embellished with words carrying emotive force. The point of rhetoric is to further one's interest through persuasion and is, hence, singularly instrumental. It operates through opinion to influence events in the city. The image of the tyrant which he invokes in his speech is a reflection of the instinct which guides the practice of the rhetor. However, Thrasymachus is not the tyrant he applauds; his relation to it is like that of a devotee of a deity, he believes in the symbol as if it was his own, and this is reflected in his view of the world. His encounter with Socrates does not as yet alter his standpoint. Subdued but unrepentant, he humours Socrates without being persuaded. He exhibits an intuition of Socrates' manipulative technique but can find no ready resistance to it, and as a consequence, Socrates has managed to neutralise him. Through sheer persistence, Socrates has exhausted Thrasymachus' initial vitriolic; his anger dissipated, Thrasymachus becomes "gentle", that is to say, manageable. His failure as a worthy advocate has done little to detract his belief in the reputation of injustice. Injustice, like the formidable Hydra, still rears its vicious head and justice's reputation is yet to be reclaimed. This deplorable situation galvanises Glaucon and Adeimentus to restate the case for justice by restoring Thrasymachus' abortive challenge.

6. Glaucon and Adeimentus

The entrance of Glaucon and Adeimentus is greeted with mock surprise by Socrates. He had fully anticipated that someone would take up the question of justice that was so heatedly contested only to culminate
in an inconclusive, anti-climatic vacuum.

Glaucan expresses his earnest conviction for justice but is disenchanted by the previous proceedings and is discontented by the seeming inability of justice to find an adequate champion (358c). He, therefore, appeals to Socrates to undertake the task of being justice's spokesman. They agree that justice is something that is intrinsically as well as instrumentally valuable. To promote the case of justice, Glaucan embarks on the strongest possible characterisation of injustice, against which the waning embers of justice, on being vindicated, will rekindle and glow the more magnificently.

In Glaucan's account, doing injustice is naturally good, suffering it, the greatest evil. The pain of suffering injustice far exceeds the good gained by doing it. While desiring to do injustice, men are deterred by the dark prospects of suffering it. Hence, they are compelled to reach a compromise both to avoid doing and suffering injustice. This then is the cause of justice, honoured "due to a want in vigor of doing injustice" (359a). Justice then is an artificial restraint on man's natural impulse. Set against this background, Glaucan depicts the life of the successful but unjust man who, like the clever craftsman, is able to cover his tracks and repair his mistakes. He enjoys the fruits of his labour in the form of wealth, honour, fine friends and the favour of the gods. In contrast, the life of the just is poor, despicable, friendless and neglected by the gods.

Before Socrates has time to respond, Adeimentus steps in to reinforce his brother's account. His intention is to complete and thus complement his brother's mock defence of injustice. While men
extol justice it is not because they value it in itself, but because of the rewards that the appearance of justice confers. In terms of these stated objectives, there seems to be no difference between the just and the unjust. The advantage of the unjust consists in the ability to attain the desired end with impunity. Injustice, moreover, is "easy and sweet" while justice is "hard and full of drudgery" (364a). The unjust has merely to cloak himself in "a shadow painting of virtue" to achieve his ends.

In both accounts there is an implicit distinction drawn between the seeming or appearance of justice and the being or actuality of justice itself. In terms of the latter, Socrates is obliged to explain what justice is itself. To Glaucon, he has also to argue that it is intrinsically valuable, whereas to Adeimentus he has to prove that it is both useful and pleasant. The brothers share a mutual interest in the morality of justice, and are only incidentally concerned with political justice. In their characterisation of injustice both brothers cite the use of persuasion and force (361b/365d). Together, the brothers have usurped Thrasymachus' place and in their vivid depiction of injustice have created a portrait finer and more dynamic than the orator can hope to match. While delighted on the one hand, Socrates is, on the other, quite chary of the task set before him. He is nevertheless inspired in his pious duty to vindicate the claims of justice.

7. The Philosophic Dog

He proposes a method. For a person who does not see too sharply, it is difficult to discern the "little letter" from afar.
But if he was taken to a bigger (?) place where the same letters are larger he would be better able to see these letters (368d). This analogy is based on the presumption that the larger and smaller letters are the same. On the basis of this analogy, Socrates proposes that the search for justice begin by exploring the city which is the presumed macrocosm of the individual. Glaucon and Adeimantus agree to the procedure. Together, they embark on the founding of the city in speech.

The first thing to establish then is how a city comes to be. It comes to be since the individual is not a self-sufficient entity. As a consequence, men gather to form a self-sufficient unit, and this is the foundation of the first city.

The first city is composed of men who divide their labour, each according to his ability and share in common the fruits of their labour. Life is not complicated, the necessary work quite well defined. The economy, while not primitive, is nevertheless, quite simple. There is trade and a currency system. A veritable picture of idyllic life, where men feast on vegetarian fare and, afterwards they will drink wine and, crowned with wreaths, sing of the gods. So they will have sweet intercourse with one another, and not produce children beyond their means, keeping an eye out against poverty and war (372b).

Unfortunately, there is no provision in this account for the means or wherewithal with which these gentlefolk are to defend themselves. Glaucon, however, seems not to have taken notice of this lacuna in
depiction of the first city. He appears more taken by the seemingly placid and uninspiring lifestyle of its inhabitants. This, to him, is a city of pigs.

The city lacks the relish of the luxurious city where "men who aren't going to be wretched recline on couches and eat from tables and have relishes and desserts just like men have nowadays" (372d). Glaucon, therefore, insists that the discussion involve the presence of the luxurious city. Socrates offers no resistance to this request. Although he equates the first city with the healthy city, it was founded on a rather precarious set of relations: with one man doing one job and no provisions for the defence of the city. Furthermore, the original intention was to discern in the coming to be of the city in speech, the roots of justice as well as injustice. There seemed little scope for injustice to occur within the idyllic setting of the first city.

The new and refurbished city goes beyond necessity and paves the way for the liberation of the desires. All kinds of goodies are craved for and catered to, the city reaches beyond itself. It invades its neighbours to enlarge its bounds and largesse. They go to war. An army is needed both to conduct its wars and to defend its territory. The army is created out of the desires of the city. Again, Socrates stresses the principle of efficiency: one man, one job. If each man was suited to a particular function, then there is cause to think of individuals of the type that are suited to war, a possibility that was unexplored in the first city. War-like men are invariably tied up with the birth of the luxurious city.

Socrates is unconcerned at this stage to investigate the
morality of this city which causes it to invade its neighbours. What are we to make of that? Apparently, the guardians who are connected to constitution of the army—the breed of war-like men—has displaced the consideration on the morality of war. The movement of the argument thus far seems to bear this insinuation. Moreover, we should recall that in the analysis of Cephalus' comment on justice as well as Socrates' account of the justice of bandits, justice follows upon the commission of injustice. Glaucon's depiction of the social contract also reflects this (358e-359a).

To explain the function of this breed of men, Socrates introduces the image of the noble puppy, and compares its nature with that of a well-born young man. The qualities these are said to possess are sharp senses, speed and agility, courage and strength. Foremost of these is the quality of spiritedness which is irresistible and unbeatable, and makes the soul "fearless and invincible in the face of everything" (375b).

However, this quality which makes the soul savage and fierce is incompatible with the function of the guards, who need to be "gentle to their own and cruel to their enemies" (375c). The qualities of gentleness and spiritedness seem diametrically opposed; they "resemble impossibilities" (375c). And if impossible, a guardian is equally so. For a moment the interlocutors are at a loss as to what to say. But Socrates reiterates the image of the noble pup. This all seems very suspicious as Socrates had introduced the image immediately after establishing the unique function of the guards. The choice of the analogy does not appear arbitrary and accidental.

He goes on to elaborate,
...by nature the disposition of noble dogs is to be gentle with their familiars, and people they know and the opposite with those they don't know (375e).

It is not evident what Socrates means by the phrase "by nature". The image of the pup conveys the notion of a domesticated beast—a natural beast of prey. Notwithstanding this fact, Socrates goes on to infer that the qualities sought after in the guardians are not against nature. What was once thought to be impossible and by implication, unnatural, is now a possibility in light of the analogy.

Socrates goes on to say that apart from spiritedness, the guard also has to have the nature of the philosopher. Glaucon is a little bewildered. Socrates relies on the analogy to elucidate his point. A dog, it can be observed, greets someone it knows warmly, "even if it never had a good experience with him" (376a), and is angry at strangers who may not even have harmed it. The stress here is on the notion of familiarity. Glaucon seems satisfied with this explanation. How, though, is such a characteristic possible in an animal let alone a human being?

This quality, Socrates emphasises, is the endearing one which makes it truly philosophic, and it is so,

In that it distinguishes friendly from hostile looks by nothing other than by having learned the one and being ignorant of the other...so, how can it be anything other than a lover of learning since it defines what's its own and what's alien by knowledge and ignorance (376b).

A lover of learning is equated with a lover of wisdom, and the guardian
therefore has to be both a philosopher and a lover of learning if he is to be "gentle to his own and those known to him" (376c).

We have already noted Socrates' subtle use of analogies, and in this connection, and so we recognise that the image of the noble pup was not an accidental or arbitrary invention. It does manifest the composite characteristics of gentleness and viciousness. The most obvious problem is of course the fact that human beings evince similar characteristics. So it is not quite so obvious, on the surface, why the analogy was introduced in the first place. We should look more closely at its qualities to discern the direction to which it points.

It was introduced, allegedly, to illuminate the quality of spiritedness. Although necessary, it was insufficient for the purposes in store for the function of the guards. Later, it is reshaped only after it became evident that the guards were both gentle and vicious. In light of what was said previously regarding the justice of the bandits, this seems a foregone conclusion. To recapitulate, it was claimed that there must be a bond of justice if the bandits as a group were to accomplish anything with success. The guards grew out of the needs of the city to expropriate its neighbours' land. In this regard, it is no different from the band of bandits. But the choice of the analogy neatly embodies, in a paradoxical way, the co-existence of justice and injustice, signifying a yet undisclosed but possible connection, perhaps even a symbiotic relation, between the two. Moreover, this relation seems to spring from an original act or intention of injustice; an act or intention which has its roots in the liberation and cultivation of the 'unnecessary' desires.
In the extended analogy, the point seems clear enough: the noble dog is well disposed and gentle to its familiars, and opposite to aliens. This, however, does not go very far in explaining the impossibilities encountered earlier on. It merely restates the problem in a different form. On the other hand, the stress on the analogy is that these attributes are natural. If they are natural, then the guards are natural types, and insofar as they are created in the growth of the city, the luxurious city is, by inference, a natural phenomenon.

The third mention of the noble pup elucidates the nature of the philosopher in the guard. In this regard, the dog is said to be well disposed to a familiar person "even if it never had a good experience with him." This attests to the strength of the bond between the dog and its familiars. Looking back at Thrasymachus, we can appreciate a little more the nature of this bond. His love for argumentation and his identification with the opinion embodied in his thoughts, coupled with his ineffectiveness and inadequacy in wielding the instruments of refutation shows him to be a pitiful figure. Since his love for argument is incommensurate with his skill, one could say that this love has done him little good. In the face of Socrates' onslaught, this love failed to give him a good experience. Yet, he was adamant in his defence, and earnest and sincere in protecting his own, and when Socrates appeared to threaten that he became vicious and caustic. If the surmise is correct then this analogy has its connection to the experience of Thrasymachus, and clearly indicates, or presages the connection of the philosophic to the nature and conduct of certain forms of speeches.

The next reference to the noble pup further characterises its
philosophic nature. Note that this is in reference to the philosophic and not about the philosopher. No reference in the analogy is made to the spirited part, as such there is no mention of the anger or viciousness inherent in the other characterisations. The stress here is on the love of learning. But Socrates infers that from 'having learned the one' it is therefore fond of learning. There is, of course, no account of what learning consists in. Also, the fact that the dog is well-disposed towards a familiar does not necessarily suggest it is disposed to learn more. The way it behaves towards strangers seems to inhibit that. The emphasis in the context of this particular analogy seems to circumvent this problem deliberately. The focus seems to bear on the distinction between knowledge and ignorance. The dog defines its own by what it knows. Knowledge is intimately related to the quality of gentleness. There is the implication that the more it knows, the less alien things there are, and consequently, the dog is better disposed towards more things. This is quite consistent with all the previous characterisations of the noble pup: it is only vicious or angry at those it is unfamiliar with, or ignorant of; spiritedness, as such, seems to be a function of ignorance.

In this last regard, the experience of Thrasymachus seems to shed some light on the matter. It is possible that the cause of his anger was premised on the misidentification of what is truly his own, and he was moved to anger only because he misinterpreted Socrates' motives and defended a thesis that was fallacious: he did not know better. This problem of the identification of one's own is problematic. Earlier in the discussion with Polemarchus, we had an occasion to
observe Socrates circumventing a natural sequence in the argument regarding friendship. The thrust of Socrates' questioning then was to show how difficult it was to ascertain who one's own really are. When Polemarchus refined his notion of friendship to mean those who seem to be and are good, Socrates did not raise the question regarding the criterion for good. In the context of the analogy of the philosophic dog, this criterion to determine one's own, and not those that only appear to be so is the underlying basis of the educational programme of the guards. The choice of the analogy of the young pups, appropriately falls in place with the image and innocence of the young auxiliaries. There is an implicit undercurrent of tension expressed by the analogy in that it does not seem to be clear how the philosophic dog's love of learning ties in with his function as a guard. In this connection, the analogy at this point does not address the connection of spiritedness to gentleness, the problem of the initial incompatibility is raised but not resolved.

One last thing ought to be noted. The introduction of the analogy hints at a division of the soul—the attributes of gentleness and spiritedness seem quite distinct. Also, the notion of the philosophic guard-god fits into the tripartite scheme of shepherd-guard-dog and flock; it also seems to have some relation to Thrasymachus' curious tripartite scheme involving the shepherd analogy. All these seem to prefigure the similar scheme that is embodied in the city as well as the individual. Already Socrates had hinted that the larger letters in which the justice of the city is written are similar to the smaller letters in which the justice of the individual is inscribed. The noble dog was introduced to elucidate a special yet necessary
class in the city writ large. It reaffirms once again our suspicion that things are deliberately made to look too obvious; but unlike Thrasymachus, we are better advised to plod along patiently to observe and reflect on the path along which Socrates and the philosophic dog are travelling.
Notes

1. Bloom notes that Socrates does not raise the question of piety either because it is irrelevant or that he is satisfied with Cephalus' view of it. See the Interpretive Essay in his translation, The Republic of Plato (New York, 1968), p. 314. However, the question of piety is raised in Adeimetus' account which very much matches Cephalus' view of justice. It seems more likely that the question of piety is relevant and the depiction of the gods is the first issue that Socrates takes up in the education of the young. As an issue in itself, the Euthyphro clearly articulates the difficulties in tackling it.

2. This is perhaps the thorniest issue in the Republic. While I agree with Bloom's criticism of Cornford's treatment of it (Preface, p. xiv), I try to give a different interpretation to the notion of the lie and its relation to language in Chapter Three.

3. I believe that every reader of a Platonic dialogue shares this intuition where most of us are more kindly disposed towards this paradox than Thrasymachus. This is in fact a paradox that clearly emerges in Socrates' use of analogies, a fact referred to by Robinson (Plato's Earlier Dialectic, p. 214), giving perhaps some warrant to the view that the dialogue form is a contrived analogical piece.

4. The relation of languages, spiritedness and self-identification is taken up in Chapter Three. Most commentators are more intrigued by Thrasymachus' arguments and its relation to Glaucon's and Adeimetus' reiteration of it. This aspect of his behaviour is seldom analysed. The notion of the relation of language to self is, however, explicitly treated in Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus by Charles L. Griswold, Jr. (New Haven, 1986), pp. 138-151.

5. Referring to Bloom again who infers that the notion of the wage-earner's art is used as a "political substitute for philosophy" (Interpretive Essay, p. 333). The form of the argument is particularly striking. Firstly, it shows the relation of a universal to a particular in a complex unity--the former is similar but not identical to the latter. This structural form is articulated again in Socrates' analysis of the structure of the soul as well as the division embodied in the image of the Line. This is treated in Chapter Four of the thesis. Secondly, in the context of the present discussion, I am guided by Marx's formula of capitalist production which takes the form of M-C-M', where M and M' are identical. The Greek notion of Tokos as offspring and interest is not without significance here. M' is not only interest but an "offspring", so to speak, of M. That is, M' is interpreted as being M's own. It is in this sense that I claim the money-maker's art relates to itself. This need to appropriate what is one's own I develop later in Chapter Three as the source of viciousness, and as the tragic source of the soul self-becoming. In conjunction with this, I also try to explain that the use of the lie is not inconsistent with philosophy as Bloom claims it is.
6. Socrates uses the word gentle twice to describe Thrasymachus. The first is already indicated at 354a, and then again, much later at 498d. If this is any indication of what Socrates means by persuading the many to accept philosophy, then we get the impression that a certain but unrefined disposition to reason as well as an acceptance of reason as a valid normative force are necessary conditions for persuasion to be effective. The latter probably accounts for Thrasymachus' sense of shame. We can appreciate once again the potency of the image of the philosophic dog in reflecting this disposition and the value of its limitation in light of the belief in reason as a norm.

CHAPTER THREE

The Evolution of the Philosophic Dog:
The Education of the Auxiliaries

Introduction

The appetite of the luxurious city requires the presence of the guards both to extend and protect the boundaries of the city. The guards function in the service of the city; to do so they must already recognise, to some extent, who they are serving and why; some rough distinction between what constitutes one's own and what is alien must already be implied in this. Having this sense of belonging, the guards as such are no different from the other members of the city. However, in carrying out their particular function the guards must have one distinguishing attribute—spiredness. This sets them apart from the other members of the city. This is not to say that the other members are not spirited but only that the guards are eminently so. The analogy of the philosophic dog tells us what the guards ought to be like, but clearly the analogy conveys a composite picture of both spiritedness and the philosophic. The two come together in a package. The analogy seems to suggest that you cannot really treat the two separately; to do so would be to distort the picture.

The analogy poses an analytical problem, and one that pertains to the characterisation of the guards, their place and function within the framework of the city. For now, let S stand for spiritedness and P for philosophic. The analogy gives us a picture of this form: $S \leftrightarrow P$, 65
the symbol "↔" tells us that the two are related in an integral way. Because S and P are not necessarily compatible, their relation becomes problematic, and this accounts for Glaucion's comment that the condition expressed by the relation of the two resemble impossibilities. But if we are to resolve the problem of this relation it would require that we analye the terms of the relation. We have to know what S and P are about. The problem that the analogy poses is that we cannot treat S without somehow already presupposing P and vice-versa. It would be wrong to treat either S or P as distinct, autonomous units in an equation. For this reason, the analogy is critical as a guide in the unfolding of the dialogue. It signals to us that each time an analysis is undertaken that it is only partial, and that somehow, somewhere along the way the resolution must come to us all at once.

There is no doubt that Socrates attempts to treat components of the analogy separately. After introducing the noble pup, Socrates claims that spirit is "...irresistable and unbeatable....so that its presence makes every soul fearless and invincible in the face of everything" (375ab). But he claims that such natures are also savage and destructive (375bc) although there are no indications of these in the preceding description. Irresistable, unbeatable, fearless and invincible are adjectives that do not connote savagery or destructiveness. Yet clearly Socrates wants to explore the basis of this savagery or destructiveness for it is surely connected to the view that the guards can be cruel, harsh and angry to what is strange and alien, and that these in turn are related to spiritedness. The virtue of the analogy is that it shows us that it is not just spiritedness which is the sole cause of this savagery, and that much more is at stake.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of understanding this mode of behaviour an attempt at analysis is necessary. One has to abstract from what there is at the cost of some distortion to come to terms with the problem. This is clearly reflected in the movement of the dialogue. The discussion of the education of the auxiliaries is not geared towards the reasoning or philosophic aspects of the soul: it focuses instead on moulding the spirited part of it. Still we cannot get away from the feeling that the discussion cannot take place without already supposing the presence of the educator. But that is to say, one cannot deal with the spirited without presupposing the philosophic. This would explain the unevenness in the movement of the dialogue.

The guards are composed of both the guardians and the auxiliaries. The programme of education that begins at Book II concerns the young auxiliaries. It is not until the end of Book III that the guardians as a distinct class is established. Book IV draws on this division to establish the tripartite structure of the city and makes the inference that this is reflected in the division of the soul. Throughout, there is little concentration on the philosophic aspects of the soul. For this reason, Socrates is both cautious and tentative with the conclusions that he draws from the arguments. Book V is an explication of the remark that "friends have all things in common" (424c) which appears at the beginning of Book IV. But at that point, Socrates' main concern is still with the education of the auxiliaries. Although he has partially addressed the problem of spiritedness in terms of its connection to viciousness, he has not fully resolved it. The fact that this is the central issue underlying the elaboration of the communistic regime of Book V affirms this view. And it is pre-
cisely on this uncertain ground that he finally raises the possibility of the philosopher-king. It is at this point that the emphasis changes from the spirited to the philosophic. And it will be shown in Chapter Four that even there, the discussion of philosophy also presupposes the spirited.

This chapter will focus on the connection of spiritedness to viciousness with the awareness that the discourse which elucidates it is framed within the context of the analogy of the philosophic dog. Thus, it will be shown that viciousness is not merely a form of spiritedness as such but develops in conjunction with a form of ignorance. Ignorance is the antithesis of knowledge, and the latter, in turn, falls within the domain of the philosophic part of the soul. Viciousness arises from a distortion in the relation of spirit and reason, a distortion that is similar in form to the kind of abstraction that underlies analysis.

In analysis we divide a whole into parts and investigate each particular component, and then synthesize the components to recreate the whole. It is an operation of the mind wherein we treat the abstracted parts initially as if they were wholes. But this presupposes a consciousness of the process and an awareness of the undertaking. The end of course, is to put it all back again enlightened by what we may have discovered along the way. This mental process is a mode of thought which, however, need not be self-conscious. In this case, we are not aware of the fact that we have made an abstraction and not conscious of the fact that what results is not in fact a whole but actually a part. This attitude towards the part as a whole in fact distorts what is actually the case. The condition expressed by this
attitude can be described as self-deception, or being ignorant of one's ignorance. Viciousness is ultimately connected to this notion of deception, and for this reason, the cognate notion of lying plays a fundamental role in the analysis of viciousness.

Viciousness is a particular form of spiritedness. Spiritedness "itself" may just be a powerful, indestructible force; that this force should turn out to be destructive depends on additional, external elements. In terms of protecting the city, the guards if they remain vicious will not "wait for others to destroy them [the citizens], but they'll do it themselves before-hand" (375c). To destroy the citizens would be to defeat the purpose of the guards' existence. Thus, spiritedness in certain contexts can be self-destructive. This problem goes beyond the identification of "one's own"; it revolves around the recognition of the basis of one's being. This problem frames the context of the ensuing discussion on the education of the auxiliaries.

1. Educating the Auxiliaries

The analogy of the philosophic dog guides the discussion on the education of the auxiliaries. Somehow or other the guardians of the city should turn out to be like the image projected by the analogy. The entire programme is conceived in terms of what the image demands. The image as analogy does not say explicitly what it demands. It tells us that the guards are to be gentle to their own and cruel to their enemies, but it also conveys the tension that comes from being both gentle and cruel. The image itself does not resolve the problem of this tension. There is a measure of uncertainty in the image of
the philosophic dog: an uncertainty that redounds on the scheme of education that is predicated on it. The image, however, is the only available model as things stand.

Socrates recommends a combination of gymnastic and music for the young auxiliaries. Music takes precedence over gymnastics as it can be implemented before the children are capable of rigorous physical exercises. Music includes harmony, rhythm as well as speech, that is, a combination of lyrical speech accompanied by music proper. Harmony and rhythm is stressed in the belief that they insinuate themselves most effectively into the deepest region of the soul (401d). The elaboration of the scheme of education takes place alongside the transformation of the environment in which the young are educated. The city is purged of elements that threaten the foundation of this education.

The most striking feature of the early education in music is the bold admission that it is on the whole composed of false speeches which are a species of lies (377d-378a). These speeches comprise the popular myths and fables of Greek society. Socrates' proposal is directed towards the conscious manipulation of both the form and content of these in accordance to the plan adopted for the education of the auxiliaries. In each case the notion of the lie is instituted to enforce the goals of this manipulation. The initial discussion merits close scrutiny because of the seemingly offhanded way in which Socrates speaks of lies.

It is at first surprising that no note of dissent is raised against the radical position adopted by Socrates. There appears to be an implicit consensus surrounding the use of false speeches in the education of the young. On the one hand, the association of false speech with the popular myths seems innocuous, since there is a sense
in which they can be treated like allegories or parables, in short, fictions. Yet, on the other hand, these myths are the source of the religious tradition which informs the city's norms. The speech of Adeimentus reflects this view of the role that myths play in religious practice (363a–367a). We can interpret the proposed attempt to restructure the myths as tantamount to transforming a considerable part of the belief system of the city.²

The extent to which Socrates is willing to sanction the manipulation of these false speeches is portentous. It is one thing to say that short of the truth, the next expedient is to devise a fiction in its place. However, Socrates contemplates the deliberate falsification of the truth in cases when it does not fit into the general scheme of education (378a). We must note that he countenances such a blatant lie only in the context of the description of the gods and their genesis. In terms of this deception there is a sense in which Socrates is like Achilles who is disdainful of both gods and man (391c).

In Book I we occasioned the omission of truth-telling from the general discussion on the nature of justice. It was not clear then why Socrates had deliberately let slip the notion of truth from the conception of justice. He did, however, raise a question that may implicitly endorse the notion of lying, and this was in the context of the treatment of the mad man (331c–e). The Socratic sanction for the use of the lie is framed by the understanding concerning the treatment of individuals of unsound mind. The use of the lie in the context of the luxurious city indicates a similar malaise affecting the city. These lies act like antidotes to the fever afflicting the city.
Truth-telling is conventionally sanctioned since it underlies the practice of promise-keeping and provides the basis for trust. The effect of a lie is that it is not seen as such, that is, the one lied to treats the lie as a sincere or truthful statement and on the basis of which one can place a measure of confidence or trust. This trust is lost when the deception becomes apparent. It would be reasonable to assume that anger follows on the betrayal of this trust. Therefore, Socrates' legislation of the lie is fraught with danger. To better understand the intention and need to employ the lie, we turn to Socrates' account of it.

2. The Nature of the Lie

In his account of how the gods ought to be depicted, Socrates says that the gods as perfect beings have no need to deceive. Adeimintus is reluctant to grant him that point. In reply Socrates claims that "all gods and human beings alike hate the true lie" (JgZa). To lie truly is to "lie about the most sovereign things to what is most sovereign in [one]self" (382a). The most sovereign things are "the things that are" and so,

...to be unlearned, and to have and to hold a lie there is what everyone would least accept... (382b).

The things that are, we can assume, are the things that are truly real. The true lie, therefore, conceals reality.

Contrasted with the true lie is the adulterated lie. An adulterated lie cannot be about the things that are, but are presumably
predicated on things that appear to be. Strictly speaking then, an adulterated lie is not a lie at all. The adulterated lie is principally a lie in speech:

For the lie in speech is a kind of imitation of the affection of the soul, a phantom of it that comes into being after it, and not quite an unadulterated lie (382b).

This "affection of the soul" of which the adulterated lie is an imitation is the state or condition of "ignorance in the soul of the man who has been lied to" (382b). The ignorant soul is deceived about the things that are. The adulterated lie is a representation of that condition of soul in the medium of speech. In other words, speech represents this condition, and so long as it represents, it lies but only in an adulterated way. The implication here is that false speech on the whole is an imitation of the condition of soul.³

False speech is a "phantom" of this affection of the soul that "comes after it". This form of speech is an articulation of the condition of a soul already deluded about the things that are. If the poets, who are responsible for the myths, lie, then Socrates' use of the lie must be distinguished from the poets. Socrates claims that lies in speeches can be useful against enemies and as a remedy to friends (389c). But this means that the lies are used consciously in the service of certain objectives. Such lies can be construed as willing lies (535e). These are set against unwilling lies, that is, lies that do not appear to the agent as lies. He thinks he speaks the truth when he is regurgitating an adulterated falsehood. Such a person deceives himself. One of Socrates' later criticisms against
the poets is that they are deceived in this way. The myths are speeches which are false because "we don't know where the truth of ancient things lies" (389d).

According to Socrates, there are some things concerning the condition of soul from which it cannot be delivered since those things necessary to restore it are lost in time. What is the nature and significance of these ancient things?

The representative function of false speech is an objectification of the condition of the soul. This objectification is also an articulation in that it attempts to make coherent the deeper (mis)-intuitions of the soul. Through speech, the soul can reflect back on its inner state. The myths express that condition of soul. The acceptance of false speech, that is, the acceptance of the accounts of Hesiod and Homer, who are the source of these ancient things, indicates that the soul does not know that it is deluded. The myths provide a coherent account of the way the world and the cosmos are, when in fact they are not. But through the myths, the soul finds a ready explanation of its being in the world. They help to establish a sense of identity for the soul--of being related to the myths but, standing apart from them, the soul is at once distinct yet continuous with the unfolding of the myths in speech.\(^4\) False speech because it represents a misconception and serves as the medium through which the soul can come to recognise itself, is responsible in fact for the soul's mis-recognition of itself: that is, through speech, the soul comes to believe in something which is not the case.

The very dynamics of this operation indicate that the soul is itself incomplete or lacking in some fundamental way. To overcome this
inadequacy, it requires the medium of speech. But speech is only so much noise until it is shaped into something recognisable; a coherent other through which the soul can come to recognise itself by reflecting on it. What else can inform this other save the configuration of things and events, the realm of appearance within which the soul is located. The soul, longing for sufficiency, for a "still point in the turning world"—to be like a god—mistakenly appropriates the world of appearance in the belief that it is the eternal. This proposed account of the self-unfolding of the soul resembles the coming to be of the city in speech. The guards are the medium through which the city can define its own. The fact that Socrates relies on an analogy rather than a pre-existing guard supports the earlier thesis that the guard Socrates has in mind does not exist and that the conventional posture of the guard is as much a distortion as the speech which represents the misconception of the soul.

Something tragic underscores this misconception of the soul since the very thing that may restore it to an enlightened state seems irrevocably lost. Speech is never wholly adequate to the task of assisting the soul in its self-becoming. Because speech is only a representation, false speech, like the adulterated lie, is never wholly false. Conversely, speech can never really be true on the same line of reasoning. Willing lies are a species of false speech and differ from them only in that they reflect the conscious manipulation of false speech in terms of clearly conceived goals. Put differently, false speeches are rationalisations of experience whereas willing lies are further rationalisations of these in terms of certain stated objectives.
Willing lies are, therefore, inherently instrumental and pragmatic. Although willing or conscious, such lies need not be well-intended in which case the objectives need not be beneficial; even if well-intended, the outcome of these lies may not be beneficial unless the objectives are well understood, if not there could well be unintended and possibly harmful effects. Therefore, the user of a willing and well-intended lie is obligated to know with certainty the objectives serviced by the lie. In terms of the education proposed by Socrates, these objectives are not explicitly stated. They are premised on models that in turn rely on the guiding image of the philosophic dog. Socrates is clearly aware of the vulnerability of this procedure (416b). Nevertheless, these models contain the necessary ideas needed to determine the character of the guards.

3. The Educational Models: The Reconstructed Myths

The word model in the present context means something like a typical sketch, or outline although it can be interpreted to mean the general form, character or idea of a person or thing. Socrates uses the word primarily in the sense of a typical sketch. The fact that these models are constantly invoked suggests that Socrates is either unwilling or unable to give them a more explicit treatment, that is, one in which the form, character or idea implicit in these models are fully explicated. This constraint on the fundamental aspects of the educational programme renders it less than ideal.

Socrates begins by criticising the popular depiction of the gods, especially Hesiod's account of their mythical-historical genesis (378a). The myths depict fathers consuming their sons and children
taking revenge on their fathers. Despite this internecine conflict the stress is clearly on the notion of revenge. Sons cannot and should not take pleasure or pride in punishing their fathers in spite of the injustices committed by them (378b). The myths seem to promote the notion of revenge whereas the needs of the city demand that citizens should not be angry with one another (378c). The criticism as such is informed by the image of the philosophic dog at 378b.

In place of this Socrates proposes an account in which the gods do not quarrel or collude amongst themselves, each other or human-kind. They are described as perfect beings that need not change nor alter themselves and as a consequence, they do not have to deceive (381e). From this we can infer that the less than perfect humans are not spared the compulsion to change and hence, to deceive. In sum, Socrates' redescription of the gods renders them almost irrelevant to human life. The gods are removed from the sphere of human interest; henceforth, mankind is left on its own. Although Socrates claims that the god is the cause of the good, it is hard to imagine why such an enclosed and self-sufficient entity would bother to cause anything (379b).

This sudden and radical transformation of the characterisation of the gods is instructive. In a rupture an irreconcilable gulf separates the gods from man. Man is left to his own devices, to recreate his genesis, to "fiction" a history of his past. This underlies the justification for the use of the adulterated lie. In a similar vein, this rupture separates the healthy and "true" city from the luxurious and feverish city. The transition from the one to the other was similarly radical on account of Glaucon's sudden intrusion
in the discourse (372c). From out of this radical shift, the guards emerge and the philosophic dog is invoked against the problem of determining one's own. The internecine conflict reflected in the popular accounts of the gods reveal the scope of this problem. Apparently, the gods themselves misidentify their true interests, of what is properly their own, that they are compelled to act in a self-destructive manner. Their viciousness is grounded on ignorance.

Socrates' audacity in transforming the picture of the gods exemplifies the condition of man, left alone to redefine his own. There is a certain apprehension and hesitancy that accompanies this independence, and corresponding to that a willingness to meet the responsibility that comes with this freedom. This initial fear and its overcoming is also reflected in the transition from the healthy to the luxurious city. Just when the guards appear and when the problem concerning their nature is barely apparent, Socrates marvels at the task ahead but nevertheless takes courage in pursuing it (374e). Appropriately, the discussion following the description of the gods is about courage.

The next model attempts to undo the terrible visions of Hades, the place to which the dead depart. Socrates claims that the current account of Hades does little to inspire courage. Indeed, the horrific visions of Hades are more likely to promote fear and cowardice. Curiously, this does not seem to be the case with Socrates. Although fear-inspiring, Socrates is fearful that the guards "as a result of such shivers will get hotter and softer than they ought" (387c). By softer, Socrates probably means something like being paralysed by fear, and by hotter, a kind of rashness. Courage, then, is neither
one nor the other; the courageous man must have some fear, he is not altogether fearless and the overcoming of this fear becomes an act of courage. Without Hades, what is his fear premised on? Socrates does not as yet say what courage is about. This problem, however, is illustrated in the account of Achilles.

The third model describes the decent individual who is "all sufficient unto himself for living well" (387d) and who bears his misfortunes gently (387e). This is set against the depiction of grief and laughter in the extant myths. The man who laments and grieves is too attached to external things and this betrays a lack of self-sufficiency. A person given to raucous laughter undergoes violent change. The former over-values things while the latter under-values them. In this context, Socrates announces an injunction against lying (389b).

Private men must take the truth seriously and not resort to lying which is considered both subversive and destructive. The injunction against lying is stressed in connection to the notion of moderation, which is taken to mean obedience to rulers and mastery over bodily pleasures (389b). Obedience to rulers translates into the belief in the reconstructed myths, and consequently the exemplification of the ethos expressed by the myths—that is, a life dedicated to the attainment and maintenance of self-sufficiency. The reconstructed myths are a species of lies sanctioned by the rulers. The rulers, however, do not themselves make up tales (379a). The job is left instead to the poets. The injunction against lying means that private men must not put themselves to the making of tales which presuppose an independent conception of what things ought to be like. They are
not only prohibited from competing against the rulers but also against
the poets. Not to compete in terms of function means to stick to one's
prescribed role—"there's no double man among us, nor a manifold
one, since each man does one thing" (397e).

Moderation requires the exercise of endurance and forbearance
(390d). It is a measure of a person's ability to restrain himself. The
act of restraint involves a combination of understanding and will.
There is no restraint when one is indifferent, thus, restraint is
meaningful only where one has an express interest in an object, the
possession of which one forebears. This forbearance indicates a
recognition of the attraction of the object as well as an understanding
of why one should refrain from the possession of it. To forbear is
to submit to something other than immediate gratification and in so
doing one is at once being ruled and ruling. The act of restraint
itself is not so much the direct outcome of understanding as of the
will. Restraint implies force, and this force which is actualised in
the act of holding back seems to be a function of the spirit.
Moderation as such embodies the twin aspects of spiritedness and the
philosophic.

The moderate individual appears to be self-sufficient and
independent. In this context, his self-sufficiency is based on his
submission to the rulers, complying with the beliefs engendered by
them and performing his life's work. Opposed to this is the individual
who is also, in a sense, independent; left on his own but without
direction. He is thus exposed to changes and over-valuing and under-
valuing things; a manifold man who is unable to master himself. The
extreme of such a condition is expressed by Achilles, known for his
"illiberality accompanying love of money" and his "arrogant disdain of gods and human beings" (391c). And as we shall see, this very condition of soul is the source of savagery and viciousness in man.

4. Achilles

Achilles embodies the twin and opposed vices of illiberality in his love of money and arrogance in his contempt of gods and man. This duality and tension bears a close resemblance to the duality expressed by the philosophic dog. Achilles' love of money indicates that he over-values this particular commodity. Money buys the favour of gods and man alike. Therefore, the love of money is opposed to the contempt for gods and humans alike. Furthermore, Achilles' illiberality suggests a sense of anxiety and fearfulness which manifests itself in the inordinate love of money, whereas his arrogance and disdain indicate a contrary condition of hubris and fearlessness. As such, Achilles is both "softer" and "hotter" than he ought to be. He is, therefore, the antithesis of the guardian.

The question of courage was raised in connection with the depiction of Hades, with Socrates contending that the current accounts do not promote the kind of courage he has in mind. It would seem that to risk one's life, to act courageously, involves a sense of heroism that would overcome the harrowing fear of Hades. Achilles is such a figure of the hero. If Hades is so fearful, the reason one is willing to disregard it must be due to the importance of some object which the act of heroism is meant to protect and preserve. Yet would it be reasonable to attach so much store on these possessions with the prospect of Hades lurking so close? The fear that Hades
inspires seems reasonable, and by implication the disregard for it unreasonable. Thus, the attachment to these objects, whose preservation leads to the overcoming of the fear of Hades, is both inordinate and unreasonable. Achilles' spirit must thus be roused to an unreasonable degree for him to act in a way that risks both life and limb.

Since, however, Achilles despises both gods and humans, he cannot assign too much value to these things. But he loves money although it is hard to imagine how money would inspire him to acts of heroism. If, however, we take money to embody power--allowing that there is some substance to the claim that wealth finds favour with gods and humans alike--then, as power, money potentially commands everything. What Achilles loves, therefore, is power, which enables him to order and control his fate. Money becomes the symbolic expression of power, and as symbol it serves to invest its bearer's life with value/meaning. Achilles' love of money has a deep personal significance. Through money he can possess things and translate what is alien into his own. The love of money is symptomatic of a love of oneself. So paradoxically, it is the love of oneself which motivates Achilles to risk his own life. This inordinate love of the self explains Achilles' arrogance and his disdain for gods and humans.

His contempt for the gods need not be unreasonable. The myths portray them as connivers among themselves and with humans, and acting in ways that are destructive. If the gods behave like man, then man is god-like. To have contempt for one is to disdain both. Achilles' disdain sets him apart from them. He is truly one in this regard--alone against everything else. But the problem is that apart from
these, there is nothing left to shape or order the life of such an individual. Achilles is like a man without a past, and the prospect of his future is uncertain. Achilles may be one but not one that is constituted by anything—his life content is empty—the symbol of power turns out to be vacuous. Achilles, as such, typifies that condition of soul that is deluded, that is, in place of what there is and truly is, there is nothingness. The world that he comes from is filled with chaos. By abstracting himself from it, he alienates himself from a familiar but abhorrent environment. There is nothing for him in that place he has departed from. Yet his vantage point is equally empty. He is like a soul that has seen through the facade of its former existence and intuits the lie behind it. He sees the lie "about the most sovereign things to what is most sovereign in himself" (382a), and so hates it: his contempt for everything is, therefore, a measure of his hatred that knows no boundaries.

The feeling of being lied to or deceived is meaningful only when one has a contrary conception of truth. The world is seen as chaotic only because one has a conception of order. Thus, for Achilles to hate the lie, he must already possess some conception of order. To appreciate the lie as a lie, is to have first trusted in it as a truth and then have that trust betrayed. Spiritedness in the form of rage arises out of this betrayal of trust. This sense of being betrayed comes all at once, in a sudden rupture one is transported from the familiar into the alien. Achilles' love of money reveals that need to reappropriate what was lost, to make familiar what is now alien, to recreate a new order from out of nothingness. This sense of order comes from within the world he has rejected. In his rejection of the
world he cannot come to terms with that fact. He cannot be reconciled and so long as his rejection is absolute, he is lost and disoriented with an intuition devoid of content; of having a feeling for order but not knowing where to find it. His anger and rage have their source in this rejection.

Achilles' knowledge of both the gods and humankind is not gleaned from the myths. He is woven within the very fabric of those myths. He is a piece of fiction which is reflected back on itself. Achilles behaves like a man who cannot come to terms with his own fictive being. To him, the realm of false speech is not false but authentic; it does not represent but dramatises the condition of the deluded soul. Because deluded, it is empty at heart. To him everything is a lie, a true lie and nothing is worthy. Achilles is thus a fiction struggling to be. In opposing all, and in an attempt to encompass and consume everything, he is an egregious piece of resistance, a creature attempting to explode from the text in which he is ensnared. He cannot reconcile himself in this shadow world of the text, and at the same time, owing to his intuition, is inextricably implicated by it. His refusal to be reconciled renders his struggle to be, perpetual. He becomes a man at war with himself, becomes essentially, if not naturally, war-like. To be thus at war is to engage and consume one's own. This is the madness that underlies his viciousness. Achilles is the philosophic dog turned rabid. But the truth of the matter is that the philosophic dog itself is a piece of fiction that wants to be.

Ironically, it is only as fiction that Achilles can articulate the "truth" of the falsehood that underlies his (fictive) being. Yet
it is precisely because he is fiction that the "truth" that he projects is only representation. The "truth" that Achilles is, is a misrepresentation of a representation. Achilles projects the image of a man ignorant of his ignorance. Achilles, as such, is not pure spiritedness, but a philosophic dog corrupted and trammelled in a world already perverted. In his blind rage, he does not see that the way out of his dilemma is to be reconciled with the world he has rejected. He has to accept that the lie he discerns is a necessary lie although one that is perverted. The trick is not to reject it but to change it. And this is precisely what Socrates does. Socrates offers a way back to the world. By distancing the gods from man he avoids the sort of conflation of the two effected by Achilles. In so doing, he is demarcating the realm of the human as constituting the proper province of one's own. Through this division, the contrast between the perfect being of the gods and the imperfection of humankind is drawn. Man has to learn to deal with his own imperfection.

The drama of human life is no longer reflected in the affairs of the gods; man can now look to and aspire to the being of the new god who is eternal, unchanging and beyond the ways of men. In terms of the evolution of the city in speech the gulf which separates the healthy and luxurious city is as vast as that which spans the space between man and the new god. The healthy city, like the new god, is beyond man's reach—he cannot turn back. Man is trapped in an afflicted city like Achilles is trammelled in a corrupt text. But man perceives the chaos as chaos only because he intuits order. But the order of the true city, like the true god, is only vaguely intuited, and not at all clear. There are new and varied possibilities and new dangers—hence,
the philosophic dog. The danger that in seeking the truth through the possibility of the new, man turns on the old and familiar. Therefore, the reconstruction of the myths which stress independence yet balance it with a care for one's own; courage and moderation in light of the new challenge ahead; steady direction instead of constant change but all in all guided by a sketch, etchings derived from an intuition. The philosophic dog as analogy—a term without a firm reference—announces what is new, necessary but as yet just pure potentiality, a harbinger of a possible good as well as evil.

5. Gymnastics

On the agenda after music is gymnastics which echoes the adage: a healthy body makes a healthy mind. The main consideration has to do with the question of health, although Socrates' initial concern seems to be about combat fitness. In this latter regard, Socrates employs the analogy of the dog:

...they must be sleepless as hounds, see and hear as sharply as possible, and in their campaigns undergo many changes of water, food, the sun's heat, and winds without being too highly tuned for steadiness in health (404b).

Already their training in harmony and rhythm has equipped them with the sharpest intuitions for what is finest in speech (401e). They respond to a common chord both in peacetime and in war (399ac). Now their physical senses are equally tuned to a high and sensitive degree. Evidently, the analogy is absurd although trivially so (dogs do sleep). But clearly it is meant to take us beyond the fact that the auxiliaries
are physically equipped to see and hear sharply. It points to something (without saying what in fact it is) that the auxiliaries have to watch for and listen to, not when they are sleeping but when they are assaulted by a variety of elements that work to distract their vigilance. The auxiliaries are to keep a constant vigilance in the midst of change. Socrates stresses this in terms of the auxiliaries' role in physical warfare, although this image of alertness, and more importantly, of self-presence, is just as critical in another kind of warfare that takes place within the soul.

Also, the analogy points to the variety of powerful, natural elements that the auxiliaries have to endure, and because of which they cannot be "too highly tuned for steadiness in health"—as if to say that the auxiliaries cannot be too healthy; and we can take Socrates to suggest that the auxiliaries' endurance lies not in their being immune but in their suffering, e.g. fainting in the heat, and their overcoming of these physical hardships. This point is enforced in his conception of health. Health is purely an instrument in the pursuit of certain life-work (407a). Medicine is good as long as it can restore a man to the degree of health necessary for him to perform his work. Medicine like the willing lie, is a remedy whose applications are defined by some external, practical standard. In this context, the principle of one man—one job is reaffirmed.

The connection of medicine and lying is pertinent here for the light that it sheds on the distinction between the doctor and the judge. The doctor, to do his work well, should have experienced and recovered, though not wholly, from bodily disease (408e). The judge, however, whose concern is with vice in the soul should, on the
contrary, avoid it at all cost until he is quite mature (409b). The doctor who administers the lie as remedy must apparently suffer some affliction in the soul, and is therefore not quite like the judge.

If this is so, then evidently there is a remarkable difference between the judge and the founders of the just city. Furthermore, the founders --Socrates and the interlocutors--are also separated from the auxiliaries. In terms of physical stature, the auxiliaries are like the doctor of medicine--they suffer and recover. However, spiritually, they are like the judge, sequestered from any contact with vice. That is to say, in terms of their spiritual vigilance, they are not on a par with the city founders. In that respect, they are naive and vulnerable, yet they are trusting, for the lies of the myth were constructed for their sake. We are, of course, already acquainted with the problem that arises from the betrayal of trust, and so it is not surprising that at the conclusion of the discussion on medicine, Socrates reiterates the problem with savageness (410b).

Gymnastics aims more at arousing the spirited part rather than building up physical strength (410b), and in this regard its concern is more with the soul than with the body (411e). However, it is only appropriate for an individual who is already musical in spirit (410a), that is, a soul already disposed to moderation through the education in music. Music and gymnastic, as such, aim to strike a fine balance in the soul. There is a sense in which music is directed to the philosophic aspects of the soul (410e) and gymnastics towards the spirited (411d), although such a neat distinction may be misleading since part of the education in music is directed to the promotion of courage (386b/399ab). Music and gymnastic act together,
mutually determining the spirited and the philosophic part of the soul. Therefore, an over concentration of music vitiates the spirited part of the soul (411a), while too much gymnastics destroys the philosophic part, turning the individual into a misologist (411e). The intended consequence of the dual emphasis on music and gymnastic is therefore to ensure that each aspect of the soul is a harmony of moderation and courage (411a).

As moderate and courageous, the auxiliaries exemplify the ideal contained in the various models that frame the educational programme. Because these models are for the most part only sketches, they are not precise. In other words, these models are not immune from errors, and the harmony that they aim to strike may not necessarily come to light. These models as guides require a perspicacious administrator, and in this context, Socrates draws the distinction between the ruler and the ruled—the guardian and the auxiliaries (412bc). The guardian is there to oversee the programme, to guard it from being corrupted. Such a programme ensures that its subjects are moderate. However, in implementing it, the city has also been rendered moderate to some extent by purging it of unnecessary elements (399e). This is done for the sake of saving the city and its inhabitants (412a). The auxiliaries guard the city and the guardian guards the system of education. In all the one thing that is protected is the very notion of moderation itself; that is, everyone seems to be looking out for what is characteristic about himself. The care for the city becomes a form of self-love (402d-403c/412cd).

Because such care is premised on rather tenuous grounds, viz., the models, the danger that things may go wrong is always present.
The conviction that the guards and the auxiliaries manifest are based on a belief in the ideal of those models. Yet, it is precisely because it is based on belief and not knowledge which is certain, that the conviction is brittle. Therefore, the test of the efficacy of the education of the auxiliaries is in the way this conviction is defended. A belief can be lost through persuasion, forgetfulness, pleasure and grief (413b–c). These are things that the auxiliaries as well as the rulers, who come from the ranks of the former, are guarding against and over which they are "sleepless as hounds".

6. The Auxiliaries and the City

The relationship of the auxiliaries to the city is based on the notion of moderation. Moderation, as such, is the central mediating element. The city has elements in it that are moderate and in this sense, similar in some respect to the character of the auxiliaries, but because they perform different functions, are not identical to the auxiliaries. This notion of similarity which admits of difference introduces a complication into the function of the auxiliaries. They must be able to recognise in what sense something is similar and in what sense it is different. They must be able to discriminate, to see what is relevant and what is not, and on the basis of the distinction to respond appropriately to what is, in fact, their own. The problem, therefore, has to do with the fact that the belief in moderation is a belief in a notion which accommodates difference and diversity; the danger posed by this problem is that diversity and difference are associated with change. An acorn is not the same as an oak tree, but out of the one comes another; the former "changes" into the latter,
through this there are now two different objects when before there was one. Therefore, the idea of change is implicated in the notions of difference and diversity.

For this reason, Socrates introduces the Myths of the Motherland, and the Metals to address the problem arising from the nature of the auxiliaries' care for the city. The Myth of the Motherland provides the auxiliaries with a sense of a common heritage shared by all members of the city. The myth, therefore, conveys the image of a common history and continuity. The Myth of Metals secures the view of variety, of difference according to nature. From this myth, the different natures are distinguished in terms of function, so that gold, the highest metal, belongs to those natures that rule, the guardians; silver, to their assistants, the auxiliaries; and the metals of iron and bronze, to the natures which produce, the farmers and the craftsmen (415a). The auxiliaries' care for the city must be conjoined with these myths.

However, there is nothing in these myths which necessarily disposes the auxiliaries to care for the city as a city. The Myth of the Motherland depicts the earth as creator: the city only occupies a piece of that earth. This reliance on myths that are in turn based on models renders the project of constituting the guards, and hence, defining the character of the city, a little suspect and vulnerable. It is no wonder then that the city, like its auxiliaries, must be sequestered in a place where they can "control those within" and "ward off those from without, if an enemy, like a wolf, should attack the flock" (415d). But clearly, the guardians and auxiliaries are within the city, and so the problem is really about the dangers which
afflict them from within the city. Socrates intimates that the problem may be connected to money-making (415e), and to dramatise the danger, he again invokes the philosophic dog:

Surely the most terrible and shameful thing of all is for shepherds to rear dogs as auxiliaries for the flock in such a way that due to licentiousness, hunger or some other bad habit, they themselves undertake to do harm to the sheep and instead of dogs become like wolves (416a).

The image of the dog transmogrified into a wolf is not surprising, although it is highly suggestive that this possibility is envisaged when the project to educate the auxiliaries and to transform the luxurious city into a moderate one has been apparently accomplished. The analogy clearly points out that the task is not completed. Also, the analogy is used to refer to the responsibility of the shepherd in the management of this problem, as well as point to the source of that problem. These are certainly inter-related. The task of the shepherd is to guide but he is in turn guided by a set of beliefs whose foundations are not secured by knowledge. There are gaps in his blueprint that makes it vulnerable to those very vices it means to obviate. Socrates alludes to this problem in his caution to Glaucon against an over-confident reliance on the models of education (416b). Furthermore, the stress on the shepherd also affirms once again the innocence of the auxiliaries who are insulated from vice; not fully exposed, they are, therefore, more susceptible to it.

As to the problem of money-making, it is connected to some form of deprivation, some perception of lacking in something, a feeling of inadequacy and in this regard is connected to its corollary, possession
We have already noted the problem of money-making in Cephalus' case and especially in Achilles, where it was an integral aspect of his character and the ground of his savagery. Achilles was too much of an individual, whose self-love was problematised by a lack of a clearly conceived notion of self. Torn from both god and man, there was no available model for him to assimilate. The injunction against private property paves the way for the legislation of the communist regime and the dismantling of the family—an institution which is the occasion for the possibility of individualism.

7. Adeimentus

The regime of communism which Socrates imposes on the guards raises a problem for Adeimentus. He is concerned that the guards, who seem to him deprived of many fine things, would turn out to be an unhappy lot. Furthermore, they look like mercenaries who "sit in the city and do nothing but keep watch" (419a). Adeimentus does not entertain the possibility that communism may be imposed on the entire city. Adeimentus thinks of wealth when it is quite clear that the city is not rich, and the happiness he has in mind does not seem to be part of the auxiliaries' function but something which concerns their private lives (419a). But then Socrates has already indicated that privacy is one thing that is inhibited in the lives of the auxiliaries (416e). Either Adeimentus has not heard or he is quite dissatisfied with what Socrates has said so far. If it is the latter, then Adeimentus is somehow resisting the flow of discourse—he is not, therefore, persuaded.

In response to the possibility of the guards' unhappiness,
Socrates delivers a long, rhetorical speech. The point that he insists on is that happiness of a specific class is not the concern of the city founders; they care for the happiness of the city as a whole (420c). The happiness of each class inheres in the performance of their assigned life work. Happiness depends on each citizen fulfilling their place in society and recognising their role in the larger context of the city. Socrates' reply partially addresses Adeimetus' concern by showing how the pursuit of wealth and pleasure interferes with the functions of its citizens, and so damage the city (420d-421c). In conjunction with this, Socrates levels a criticism against both wealth and poverty.

Wealth and poverty pose the threat of change (422a). Wealth brings luxury and idleness and both of these give scope to personal whims and fancies. Poverty breeds illiberality and wrong-doing, both of which suggest a sense of deprivation, and one which is especially inspired by the contrivances of the rich. Change means the widening of a familiar horizon, signals a new possibility and the possibility of choice. But this is the fundamental problem that plagues Achilles. A new choice raises questions about the value of the old and familiar things. Many new choices raise doubts about the worth of everything. Yet in choosing any one thing, one's self is implicated in the choice. If you don't know who you are, you can't be certain of what you want. The possession of money may lessen one's anxiety since it potentially commands everything, but still one has to choose and go mad trying to make the right choice. The point against innovation is, therefore, about coming to know about the self. Adeimetus, however, is not impressed by it.
If the city is poor, how will it sustain a war against a wealthy city? (422a) Adeimentus' question implicates the luxurious city as an aggressor, and also endorses the view that wealth engenders conflict. The just city is neither rich nor poor, and hence, the possibility of such conflict within is minimised. Socrates' reply assumes such a city. It does not make war although it is compelled to it by the belligerence of another. Socrates has therefore shifted the problem. It is no longer a question of the rich against the poor, or vice-versa, but how the just city deals with both in times of war. Under the pretext of poverty (the just city has no gold and silver), the just city plays one city against another by offering the spoils of the vanquished to its ally:

Do you suppose any who hear that will choose to make war against solid, lean dogs rather than with the dogs against fat and tender sheep? (422d)

The context of the analogy seems to promote the view that the prize everyone else, except the city, is seeking is either gold or silver. This is evidently not true, for it would not motivate the rich city to encroach on the just city. The prize is more likely to be, or include, land. Socrates' use of the analogy shows how the city diverts attention from itself. Adeimentus, however, is still bogged down by the problem of wealth (422d).

He wonders what would happen if the competing cities joined their resources together against the just city. Such an enlarged dominion according to Socrates, is rife with divisions, the most prominent of which is between the rich and poor. Again, Socrates uses
the strategy of playing one part against the other. In so doing, attention is drawn away from the just city. In both cases, the just city surrounds itself with allies, and especially those with a reason to be disenchanted. The just city defends itself by manipulating the weaknesses inherent in both the rich and poor cities. This manipulation is hidden in the context of the analogy. The city promotes itself as impoverished with little in terms of wealth to offer itself; it promotes the view that it is a tough opponent but an effective ally. In each, the character of the producing and military class is highlighted respectively, whereas the ruling class is downplayed. Certainly, the ruling class shows itself to be superior in the art of strategy—manipulation—but it is not expedient to emphasise this as it may give cause for resentment on the part of the manipulated. There is, however, another unstated problem.

The problem that a strategist has to confront has to do with selecting the best available course of action. He has to choose from a variety of alternatives. The problem of choice, of knowing what is desirable in terms of knowing what is best for oneself has to be overcome. This implies some conception of the self. But so far this conception of the self has not been firmly established. There is a lacuna in the present discourse in that the education of the rulers is assumed but not clarified. The strength of Socrates' argument on the various strategies employed by the city weighs heavily on this assumption. To enforce this assumption, Socrates tells Adeimenes about the appropriate boundaries of the just city; it must grow to a point "at which it is willing to be one...and not beyond" (423b). This, of course, is still ambiguous but it nevertheless
conveys the point. To be "one", is to be determinate and distinct, criteria that are relevant to a conception of self.

Such a conception has ultimately to do with knowing oneself, and an adjunct of this is the education that one receives and maintains. For this reason Socrates reiterates the danger against change in the educational project (424b), which is fundamental and necessary, although not wholly sufficient to ground the conception of self. The slightest change infects, in epidemic proportions, the practices of the city, and in trying to effect a cure without knowing the cause, the laws of the city are constantly changed (426e). Socrates describes such a city wherein the good man who counsels restraint is treated harshly while the man who submits to the city's desires is honoured. At this point, Adeimentus' response to these events is one of contempt (426c). His disdain is directed at those individuals who attempt to deal with the city's problem but with little success owing to their deference to the ethos of the city. Socrates' characterisation of these individuals depicts them as being sincere in motive but ignorant—thus, in trying to help the city, they merely aggravate its problems. Their ignorance is a reflection of the way of life of the city, and using ignorance to deal with ignorance is like trying to cut off the head of a Hydra (426e). This image conveys the sheer impossibility and ultimate absurdity in trying to overcome the city's problems in this manner.

The courage of these individuals is directed to an enterprise that is futile from the start. They are to be sympathised with instead of being castigated, therefore, Socrates reproaches Adeimentus for being harsh (426e). This is a telling moment in the dialogue.
Adeimentus is angry at the ignorant but his opinion on the matter is based on ignorance. His contempt is aimed at the symptom and not the cause, he sees the part but not the whole. It is not the individual but the city, and not just the city but the ideal which informs it that is corrupt.

Evidently, Adeimentus' bias towards wealth and enjoyment inhibits his vision. He is, therefore, like the philosophic dog who is gentle to his familiars even when it never had a good experience from them (376a). Therefore, he is contemptuous of an abstraction without realising that the particular thing that upsets him—the ridiculous reformer—is a piece with the city, the whole from which he has been abstracted. This moment in the dialogue depicts the ignorant (Adeimentus) angry at the ignorant (the reformer) and is thus like the degenerate city where opinion vies with opinion culminating in conflict. This scene reinforces the view that anger is the outcome of ignorance, and as a particular form of spiritedness, it arises from the attachment and detachment to things in the world. Adeimentus' behaviour, like Achilles, presupposes a sense of order, of what is right and wrong, yet the limitations of his perspectives confuse his judgement, and so like Achilles, he is ignorant of his ignorance. He reflects but is not self-reflective; he assumes that he knows where he is coming from when in fact he has been misled, deluded. He accepts the lie about himself, but because it is a lie, the truth of the matter is that his sense of self is not as secure as it seems.

8. Courage

[This portion of the chapter breaks the flow of discourse in the dialogue. The discussion with Adeimentus is followed]
Courage is the principal attribute of the auxiliaries.

Courage is defined as "the preserving of the opinion produced by law through education about what—and what sort of thing—is terrible" (429c). This notion of the terrible is stressed twice in the proceeding discussion (430a/b). The fact that such a definition is ambiguous prompts Socrates to resort to an analogy. He employs the analogy of the dye to convey the sense in which the opinion that is to be preserved is entrenched in the soul of the auxiliaries (429d/e). Socrates' use of the analogy is suspect. Courage has to do with preserving something so that it doesn't get lost. The analogy of the dye renders the sense of the verb irrelevant. If something is so well entrenched that no amount of attrition can wear it out, then there is no fear that it would be lost. The definition, unlike the analogy, discloses the possibility that the opinion to be preserved is not something that is fully secure—it is not the dying but the particular dye, that
is the problem. This reiterates the problem of the vulnerable framework of the educational programme.

The definition of courage is complex. It is consistent with the image of the dog which is gentle in spite of ill treatment by its master. Such a definition assumes a type characterised by such submissiveness. The auxiliary submits and responds to an established convention. This is complicated by the fact that the definition is phrased negatively. The auxiliaries preserve the opinion of the terrible. In principle and in practice it is easier to say what something is rather than what it is not. No opinion can be so precise as to encompass the domain of this definition. Clearly, the definition underscores the necessity of the auxiliaries' dependence on an interpreter of the established convention. In other words, it shifts the burden squarely on the shoulders of the guardian. But that is not to expose the auxiliary to the arbitrary will of the guardian. The definition also states that the opinion is a product of law through education. As such, the guardian is constrained to dictate in a manner consistent with the education of the auxiliaries. He is, therefore, bound to some extent by opinion. The definition expresses a relation of mutual dependence.

Moreover, this relation of dependence is also a political relation—hence Socrates' qualification that it is a definition of political courage (430c)—one which arises out of need in light of the possibility of conflict. This reminds us of the relation of the just city in its manipulation of its potential allies. Such a relation depends on the one party adhering to the dictates set within the framework of the other. That is to say that it is not sufficient for
the first party to arrive at an independent conception of the relation; it is a relation based on inequality, and it assumes the inferior status of the first party. The first party can be manipulated precisely because it does not have a definite sense of self—it can be distracted and diverted. The auxiliaries occupy such an inferior status, and the terms of the definition of courage inhibits their independence, their sense of initiative and consequently, their sense of self.

9. **Communism**

Concluding his discussion of the just city in war, Socrates says that the city must grow only to a point where it is sufficient and one (423b). Here, it must guard itself against change, especially in the way it educates and nurtures its subjects. In this regard, he claims that the guardians ought to observe the proverb that "friends have all things in common" (424a). Adeimentus picks up on this remark and urges Socrates to clarify what he means and intends by it. Socrates is at first a little hesitant but his reluctance is overwhelmed by the insistence of the interlocutors, including Thrasymachus.

Socrates, thus compelled, proceeds with the account by invoking once again, the analogy of the philosophic dog:

Do we believe the females of the guardians must guard the things that the male guards along with them and hunt with them and do the rest in common; or must they stay indoors as though they were incapacitated as a result of bearing and rearing the puppies, while the males work and have the care of the flock? (451d)
Again, we are to treat the Socratic use of the analogy with some circumspection. No doubt it is introduced on the admission of the difficulty in treating the question of the place and role of women in the city, but the passage cited indicates a few curious aspects underlying the purpose of the analogy.

The analogy is phrased such that it is an either/or question. The second part of the disjunction is a disguised description of the conventional treatment of women. The denial of this does not necessarily validate the first part of the disjunction. Therefore, the analogy is posed rhetorically such that in the present context, the answer will affirm the view of the equality of sexes by negating the conventional view of the sexes. Also, contained in the first part is the image of how Socrates intends to treat the question of the role of women in society. If male and female dogs are to perform the same function, then there are no essential differences between them. What remains to be done is to find a suitable justification for this view and then draw out its implications. The analogy is phrased so as to inhibit serious doubts about this view.

The most obvious difference between the sexes is their perceptible, physical forms. If the sexes can perform the same function, they must receive the same education. In terms of gymnastics, Socrates insists that men and women are to exercise together in the nude. The point seems to be that the differences between the male and female form are to be treated as irrelevant, and more importantly, that the guards are habituated not to attach any critical differences to these.

Following this, they inquire into whether there are serious,
non-perceptible differences between the sexes. Glaucon unwittingly affirms that there is a difference (453c). Socrates, on the basis of Glaucon's earlier acceptance of the analogy, accuses him of contradicting himself. Glaucon, however, does not say that they cannot do the same work, but only that their natures are different. Socrates assumes that he cannot maintain this consistently if he accepts the principle of one man, one job, and the job is such that he is naturally suited to it. The reiteration of this principle is significant (453e). It not only provides an objective standard for the assignment of value but in this case it is used to support the thesis that if the sexes can perform the same function, then their natures cannot be essentially different. The problem that confronts this procedure is that of attempting to infer the cause from the effect. Socrates tries to circumvent this problem by proceeding negatively, that is, to argue against the relevance of certain considerations. He also gets around this serious difficulty by shifting the emphasis of the problem.

In terms of warfare, physical strength is considered to be a necessary advantage. Glaucon, in fact, makes the claim that women are generally weaker. Why should this not count as constituting a serious difference? When Glaucon mentions this difference, he is ignored (451e). The example that Socrates cites to illuminate the problem of difference is quite preposterous. He asks if there is a difference between the natures of the bald and the long-haired (454c). On the basis of this example, Socrates shifts the problem to that of having the ability to learn and acquire an art (455b). Socrates then proceeds to ask: "Do you know of anything that is practiced by human beings in which the class of men doesn't excel that of women?"
This question compares men with women, whereas the initial consideration has to do with comparing women to men. In this sense, it renders the comparison on the basis of strength irrelevant. Furthermore, the context has shifted from the consideration of war and fighting to the function of ruling, of learning and acquiring a skill like medicine (454d). Although the two may not be so easily distinguishable in reference to the guards as a whole, the point Socrates is trying to convey has to do with the nature of ruling itself. It is only after the establishment of the non-martial activities that Socrates concedes the difference in strength (455e). This establishes the claim that the sexes, in terms of their function, share a similar nature.

Socrates then turns to the crucial argument affecting the family:

All these women are to belong to all these men in common, and no woman is to live privately with any man. And the children in their turn, will be in common, and neither will a parent know his offspring, nor a child his family (457d).

Socrates claims that this follows from the view of the equality of the sexes (457c). This, however, is not necessarily the case. The fact that men and women can do the same work does not mean that they have to have everything in common. The argument draws its strength from the premise that friends have all things in common, and assumes that those who share the same work and hence, similar natures, are friends of this ilk. This argument draws out the extreme consequence of the stipulation against private property. The family, in this context, is viewed as a dangerous threat to the function of ruling.

The family as the basic unit of society occasions the possibility
of individualism. It sets a boundary within the territory of the city. It defines what belongs to one in a most intimate way and consequently establishes what is outside and alien. The existence of the family complicates the allegiance of the auxiliaries and the guardians. The family also poses the danger that it produces members who see the outsiders as competitors, and such competition breeds faction. Competition presupposes the idea of private, personal possession. To avoid this outcome, Socrates has a scheme to order the relationship between the sexes (459de). The scheme turns out to be a properly managed programme of eugenics.

The offspring of these unions are separated at birth from their parents. Every device will be employed so that the mother will not recognise her own (460d). The success of such a scheme is highly doubtful. The objective, nevertheless, is to promote the view of a community of pleasure and pain (462b)—wherein everyone regards each other as members of one family. On the basis of recognition, the citizens are expected to behave like the philosophic dog, which is always gentle to its own. It would seem then that the guards, especially the auxiliaries, would only extend this consideration to those within the city.

On the conclusion of this discussion Socrates anticipates Glaucon's question regarding the possibility of this project (466d). But instead of addressing it, he raises another consideration. How will the guards behave in war? This is a deliberate move to confront the problem underlying the discussion on the community of women and children.

The question that Socrates poses deals with the treatment of
enemies. He raises the distinction between aggressors of the Greek stock and the Barbarians (469c/470c). For a while, it seems that Socrates is digressing from this when he draws attention to the treatment of corpses, and it is at this point that Socrates deploys a variation of the image of the dog. In characterising the way some men abuse a corpse, Socrates asks:

...do you suppose that the men who do this are any different from the dogs who are harsh with the stones thrown at them but don't touch the one who is throwing them? (469e)

Apparently the enemy is an alien outsider and as such the consideration of gentleness does not extend to him. It appears appropriate for the auxiliary to treat its enemy harshly. The context of this analogy seems to suggest that such harsh treatment is out of place when the enemy is dead. But why, in fact, would someone persist in abusing a corpse?

The auxiliary's courage consists in the preservation of the opinion of what is terrible. He sees the enemy as embodying this element of the terrible. The enemy inspires fear and the auxiliary's courage manifests itself in confronting this fear. The abuse of the corpse suggests that the auxiliary still perceives the threat, and his anger is an expression of an intransigent fear. In so treating the corpse, he over-values the element of the terrible. This over-valuation of the alien other is effected alongside a sense of his own lack of value. The auxiliary is acting out this injury to his self-esteem. But this presupposes a strong, inordinate sense of self, and
this perception of the self may be the outcome of his attachment to the city. The strength of the bond to his city, ironically, fuels his spirit to a point of savagery. It narrows his judgement so that he treats the part as the whole; he treats an abstraction—a fiction—as a thing in itself. He confuses the body, which is an accident, a medium of the terrible, with the true cause of it, the soul, which impells the body. The analogy conveys the necessity of the victim of injustice to discriminate between the responsible agent of injustice and the intermediary, and therefore, "to have the frame of mind of men who will be reconciled" (470e).

However, the responsibility for this form of behaviour rests on the authority of the guardian. He determines what is or is not terrible, he interprets the established convention and the auxiliary responds to his dictates. The distinction between Greek and Barbarian is utilised to neutralise the narrow determination of what truly constitutes one's own. The distinction is used to derive a further distinction between faction and war. Faction applies to the hatred of one's own, while war applies to hatred of aliens (470b). Greeks are considered to be one's own, as such the concept of self extends beyond the boundaries of the city. In faction, the victors confront their opponents "in a kindly way, not punishing them with a view to slavery or destruction, acting as correctors, not enemies" (471a). By implication, enemies are to be enslaved or destroyed. Yet in characterising the conflict among Greeks, Socrates maintains that "there are always a few enemies who are to blame" (471b), and the account comes to an end without once articulating warfare between Greek and Barbarian.
The distinction between Greek and Barbarian introduces a new dimension to the problem of determining what constitutes one's own in terms of the framework of the city. The discussion on communism conveyed a sense of self that goes beyond the body but which revolves around the city. The distinction between Greek and Barbarian extends that concept beyond the city. There is some consistency in this since the self is based on the ideal of the virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation and justice, and these are not virtues that are necessarily confined to one city. As such, the distinction between Greek and Barbarian is not based on ethnic but on ethical grounds.

But if people behave on ethical grounds, why would there be conflict or faction? There could be faction if some or all of these principles of virtue were neglected or breached. In this case, it would seem that the culprit would cease to be "Greek" and be transformed into a "Barbarian". However, given that these principles constitute true belief then, according to Socrates: "...the departure of the false opinion from the man who learns otherwise is willing, that of every true opinion is unwilling" (412e/413a). Therefore, no one willingly departs from these principles. Consequently, the culprit is not entirely responsible. To treat such an individual as an enemy and hence, to either enslave or destroy him is tantamount to being "harsh with the stones thrown". Socrates is, in effect, reasserting his intention to undermine the basis of savage behaviour altogether. The philosophic dog has been transformed, it no longer hates its enemy with a vengeance. The enemy is now perceived as a misled and pitiable caricature of one's own. What was thought to be alien is now appreciated as having emerged from what is familiar.
The distinction between one's own and the alien has been rendered artificial, a fiction with no natural basis in fact. Therefore, the cause of viciousness, of cruelty and harshness to what is alien is shown to be motivated by a misconception, and more precisely, of not recognising this lie, of being deluded and consequently, being ignorant of one's ignorance. The analogy strategically placed at the end of the discussion of the nature of the just city reminds us of the vulnerability of the auxiliaries and the burden of responsibility of the guardian, and ultimately, the precarious nature of the entire project since it is based on a set of ideals that rests on a body of beliefs. The search for a more secure foundation is subsequently undertaken in the discussion of philosophy, where the nature and role of the philosopher-king, the guardian of the city, is illuminated.

10. Conclusion

The possibility of viciousness entertained at the completion of the just city indicates that the concept of self and the problem of viciousness have not fully been resolved. The problem centres around the relation of mutual dependence of the auxiliaries and the guardians. At the close of the last section we indicated that the auxiliary behaves savagely only when it is ignorant of its ignorance. This is a condition of self-deception, yet it is an inevitable condition of the auxiliary, and a condition which renders him subservient to the guardian.

Speech represents, and so disguises, the true condition of the soul. False speech is a representation of the misconception of the soul. The beliefs of the auxiliary are premised on a further representa-
tion of this representation. His beliefs are therefore constituted by a series of willing and well-intended lies. He does not treat these as lies but as truths, and because he believes in them, and they disguise the fundamental misconception of the soul, he is necessarily ignorant of his ignorance. The attitude that he takes toward the part (representation) is as if it was a whole.

On the basis of these representations he distinguishes what constitutes the sphere of his own and what is alien. Those who share in this system of belief are regarded as kindred souls. The relationship between these are mediated by care. One's sense of self extends beyond the body of the individual. This serves as the basis of friendship or brotherhood. This care in turn, is premised on a shared ideal, on believing in a common lie. The problem of viciousness has to do with the betrayal of this ideal. By transgressing the limits of the ideal, the culprit distinguishes himself as an other, he places himself outside the common frame of reference. He becomes an alien stranger, and one who threatens the stable structure of beliefs, and hence, a danger to the self-conception of the auxiliary. Clearly, the culprit has done an injustice, but the attitude of the victim towards the culprit is one of vengeful rage bred from the feeling of betrayal. The betrayal sets the two apart and the victim is blinded to the fact that the culprit is an estranged other who has broken from the bonds of the familiar but is, as such, a creature from within that sphere. His submission to the lie determines the scope of the boundaries of his sense of self, but that boundary is an artifact, a fiction created to anchor and contain a powerful force.

The culprit, on the other hand, steps out of the boundary
only because he is dissatisfied. Because the system of beliefs is founded on opinion it is not entirely secure. There are gaps in this fortress of the soul. The system is imperfect, but is so only because it carries the idea and possibility of perfection. This very idea and possibility of perfection allows him to evaluate the system of beliefs. In other words, he is able to glean the lie through the idea which it contains. His desire leads him to the limits of the boundary and beyond. The new world that opens itself before him, strengthens his conviction on the deception. Furthermore, the moment he is out, he is also changed. He is alienated from his former habitat. However, from his perspective, he is not the culprit, but the deception that had formerly ensnared him. Therefore, the conflict between the auxiliary and the fugitive is conducted as if it was a war, when it is a faction based on a gross misunderstanding of both opponents.

Achilles dramatises the condition of such a fugitive. In his case, the world in which he is located collapses the distinction between man and god. When he steps out of that picture, he places himself in a position that is opposed to both. He intuits the lie of this state of affairs. His coign of vantage, however, sits on a vacuum. He stands on nothing as such he expresses the condition of the deluded soul, and such a soul hates a lie in that most sovereign seat of its being. Achilles is a representation which comes across the essence of its being—a fiction which cannot come to terms with itself.

Thrasymachus and Adeimentus dramatise the way of the injured auxiliary. Thrasymachus is the caricature of the philosophic dog, a perversion of the philosopher's apprentice, whereas Adeimentus embodies the problem of the apprentice. The former is enraged by the
attack on his cherished image of the tyrant, the latter, by the apparent idiocy of the corrupt city. In both cases, the ideal is hidden or obscure, and their adherents stand as representatives, auxiliaries for its cause. In both cases, they assume the "truth" of their standpoint, unaware of its fiction, its representative function.

The evolution of the healthy and true city into the luxurious and feverish city signifies the need for, and the problem which surrounds, the employment of the lie. This is paralleled in the separation of man and god. In both cases, the transition is sudden and radical. Out of this rupture, two worlds stand opposed, a profound and irreconcilable difference separates them. The healthy city, like the one true god, represents the eternal, self-sufficient, original state of purity. Socrates forecloses any account of this rupture since the truth of ancient things are lost. This rupture also signifies the sudden awakening of consciousness, of having a sense or feeling about the self, and consequently, a powerful desire to articulate and give determinate form to this feeling. But that means that the true self is not as yet developed. This phrase of transition is captured in the image of the philosophic dog, an analogy without a clear reference, a pure potentiality. The force of this desire is captured by the word "spiritedness", but it is surely not a blind and indiscriminate force. The very image of the philosophic dog—the union of the spirited and the philosophic—indicates that it is an intentional force. The movement of the dialogue so far reveals that this intentionality, which requires and constitutes its object, is misled about the nature of its object. The soul evolves through its articulation in speech. But speech merely represents. The soul
evolving out of difference, out of the space of nothingness has to create a fiction to disguise it—speech cannot represent if there is nothing to be represented. Yet speech, in the form of the fictions inherent in it occasions the possibility of truth, of true being. Speech holds out the possibility of individualism, of the security of being.

A certain confusion is introduced into this process of evolution. The soul's desire which "embraces that which it wants to become its own" (437c), draws its inspiration from that lost ideal of a pure and unchanging state; the soul "divines that it is something but is at a loss about it" (505e). Through speech, the world of sense is organised into a coherent other. By reflection on it, the soul distinguishes itself as self but because speech only represents, this sense of self is not complete. The feeling of its own inadequacy is translated into the desire to appropriate this otherness to fulfill its lack. But this operation presupposes that the soul is unaware of the fiction of these objects created in the moment of speech. The other does not appear as alien and strange, but as familiar and desirable. This should not surprise since it is constituted through the soul's articulation in speech. The problem is that the soul in its desire to be is not aware of this self-constitution of the object world.

Because of this confusion, the appropriation of the object created on the same uncertain basis of the soul's development proves or threatens to be dissatisfying. When, indeed, it turns out to resist the desire to be the "missing" element in the soul's perception of its insufficient self, its "charm" wears out, the promise it held turns
out to be disappointing. This failure to satisfy is attributed to the deceptive appearance of the object—its lie, so to speak. So regarded, it is dispelled as an alien and contemptible other. The soul goes on searching but like a ship without a pilot, it is tossed about in a sea of confusion.

This dependent nature of the soul is expressed in the characterisation of the auxiliary. In its search for a self-definition, it encounters difficulties against which it rebels. This searching interferes with its ability to do any one thing well. Thus, Socrates' insistence on the principle of one man, one job. One's vocation defines, however narrowly, the scope of one's self. This, in turn, requires a structure in which the various vocations can be organised. The city serves as the organising principle. But the city, like the soul, requires its own conception of self. The luxurious city mirrors the problem of the soul's coming to be in a vacuum. The just city is an attempt to address and redress this problem of the city's misrepresentation of itself. But the artificial boundaries which it sets reproduces the problem in a different guise.

Socrates' project endeavours to diffuse the problem of the self by extending the conception of the self beyond the family to the city and ultimately, beyond the city itself. Such an attempt is guided by the image of the philosophic dog, which is gentle to its own despite being ill-treated by it. Construing warfare and revenge as basically a faction, he hopes to mitigate the source of savagery that emerges in the treatment of the enemy. Construing conflict as faction opens up the prospect for reconciliation. The frame of mind that undertakes such a reconciliation presupposes the moderating
influence of the early education in music (399b). Such a frame of mind, unlike that of the misologist, is susceptible to persuasion, of being ruled or over-ruled by another. However, by virtue of being open to persuasion, the auxiliary, in fact, becomes vulnerable to persuasion, or countervailing influences. Although the one who does the persuading can be effective only when he adopts the perspective of the auxiliary, the loose foundation of that perspective renders it accessible to manipulation.

The essential tension that underlies the harmony of the spirited and the philosophic expresses the delicate nature of the auxiliary's constitution. This balance is effected and sustained by the system of education based on the belief in the ideals sketched out by the models. The success of the project hinges on the ability of the guardians to maintain the system and guard it from countervailing influences that threaten to force their way in through the gaps. The task of maintaining and legislating the re-representations of the conventional, pre-established system of beliefs presupposes that the guardians understand what they are attempting in terms of their own framework of reference. Their sense of self is taken for granted. However, they are equally vulnerable and in this sense, are not in a better position than the auxiliaries. The failure of the guardians will unleash the forces contained by the lie. This problem motivates the search for a more secure foundation and is addressed in the discussion concerning the philosopher-king.
Notes

1. This view of spiritedness as a thing-in-itself, and its transformation into a vicious force as a result of an "additional" factor can be compared to the discussion, attempted by Socrates, that draws out the various elements that constitute the soul. In that discussion Socrates tries to articulate what desire itself is about:

Each particular desire itself is only for that thing itself of which it naturally is, while the desire for this or that thing kind depends on additions (437e).

It will be my contention that viciousness is a particular form of spiritedness that presupposes the element of the philosophic as the "additional" element. Viciousness is intentional, it directs itself at a particular object, the object, in turn, is constituted in the "mind", the seat of the philosophic faculty.

2. Barker notes that the Greek polis was an ethical association, and as such, "knew no distinction between State and Church" (The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, pp. 5-8). In terms of the function of myth in the system of belief, Ludwig Edelstein claims that myths in Plato's time were a living power that almost constitutes a "theology" (The Function of the Myth in Plato's Philosophy, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 10, 1949, p. 465).

3. Nettleship distinguishes two senses of the false. Myths are false in one sense, since "they represent things otherwise than they actually are" (Lectures, p. 84). They can also be false in the sense of being fictions. In this case, they may not wholly be false, especially when they represent a true idea (p. 9). I believe that the use of these two senses of the false is ambiguous. I think Nettleship is attempting to convey what I interpret as the distinction between Socrates' notion of the true and adulterated lie. The true lie, as the negation of the truly real, cannot be reproduced in speech. There is a sense in which myths, because they are cast in speech, always represent things otherwise than they actually are.

4. The relation of myth to self-knowledge is explored by C.L. Griswold Jr., Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus (New Haven, 1986). Griswold suggests that the willingness to engage the myths in a dialogue leads to self-reflection, and this consequently results in self-knowledge (pp. 138-156). I try to show that this engagement with the myths, as part of the process of self-realisation, may present dangers of its own.

5. I am indebted to Dr. Spiro Panagiotou of the Department of Philosophy for assistance with this term.
6. For a more explicit treatment of the psychology that frames the composition of the Illiad, see Sagan, *The Lust to Annihilate: A Psycho-analytical Study of Violence in Ancient Greek Culture* (New York, 1979). His interpretation of Achilles is especially interesting. The infamous anger of the protagonist in the epic is a classic manifestation of the Oedipal conflict, and the failure to overcome it underlies the cause of his violent behaviour (pp. 25-53).

7. Here I am partially guided by Bloom (*Interpretive Essay*, pp. 354-357). I try to go beyond it to analyse the source or foundation for Achilles' behaviour in a way that is consistent with the text. I do not agree to his view that Achilles is the example of pure spirit. Viciousness has its roots in the corruption of the relation between the philosophic and the spirited. B. Simon, *Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece* (London, 1978), alludes to an instance in the Illiad when Achilles comes closest to denouncing warfare and violence (p. 54). Construing Achilles as the personification of spirit obscures the complexity of his character.

8. Cross and Woozley, who do not treat the problem concerning the uses of deception, find the "foundation myth" a little less than insulting, especially given the possibility that the guardians may be included in the deception (*Plato's Republic*, p. 103). It should be quite apparent that the myths are intended to fill a void in the soul. The deceptions are necessitated by the circumstances surrounding the evolution of the soul. Moreover, in terms of the foundation myth(s), Socrates clearly indicates that it is nothing novel—a "Phoenician thing" (414c).
CHAPTER FOUR

Transcendence of the Philosophic Dog:

The Possibility of Philosophy

Introduction

We concluded the previous chapter with the view that the education of the auxiliaries, being predicated on a series of lies and deception, stands on rather precarious ground. The thrust of the programme was directed at undermining the possibility of savagery. The myths as well as the musical forms in which they are cast, imbued them with a sense of moderation. Being so accustomed and habituated, the auxiliaries inevitably take comfort in those like themselves. But moderation is not an object, it is a way of being, a notion that expresses itself in activity. So the auxiliaries do not judge one another on the basis of what they look like but by the way they conduct themselves. But that is to evaluate one another by what appears to be the case. Appearance can be deceptive, and the auxiliaries are therefore especially vulnerable to it.

In their conformity to moderation, the auxiliary are a trifle dogmatic, not because they insist on principle but because they rely on it. It constitutes the essence of their being. It never occurs to them why they have to be moderate except that it conduces to the happiness of the city as a whole. Theirs is not to question why. Their education conditions them to respond in certain way to a certain defined threat. They do not take the initiative but rely on law, and
this translates into a reliance on the interpretation of the rulers.
The dog is never without his master, because the master cannot always rely on the dog. This dependence on the auxiliary to the ruler is an inevitable result of the education instituted by him.

The auxiliaries are constituted such that they do not have an independent conception of the self. The way of Achilles exemplifies a particularly vicious expression of individualism. An individual which has confronted itself through its disenchantment with the necessary lies that underly the system of beliefs. Because not independent they are naturally reliant. The weight of responsibility rests squarely on the shoulders of the ruler who legislates as well as administers the law. This responsibility can be acquitted only if the ruler has a clear sense of self, of knowing what are the appropriate goals and relevant actions to pursue. So far, it seems that the basis on which the notion of self is conceived, rests on a fragile foundation of lies. The error of the ruler is transmitted to the auxiliaries with resounding repercussions. The search for a more secure basis to found the notion of the self forms the context of the discussion in this chapter.

In the last chapter, the image of the philosophic dog was used to illuminate the problem of anger, and how this is, in turn, connected to the notion of self. Anger is premised on a form of ignorance. The image of the dog shows that it is harsh to strangers. Anger issues from a perceived threat or injury from another. But underlying it is the perception of the other as something alien, one who does not belong to one's common frame of reference. What Socrates attempted to convey was that this alien other is an abstraction, that it is, in fact, one's own solely in virtue of the common condition of
the soul which it expresses. Every man has an opinion which expresses himself. Those who share a common belief are related, those who differ are treated as outsiders. It is the misunderstanding of this difference that arouses the spirit. The gravest threat that this misunderstanding poses is the rejection of one's own. The person who somehow or other has risen above the established opinion is faced with a dilemma. How that dilemma is resolved is of critical importance. Achilles evinces the condition of one who is rejected or has rejected one's community. His anger stems from his alienation, and his savagery exemplifies the spirited way in which he tries to reappropriate what has been denied to him. The creation of the individual springs from this transcendence or rejection of the community.

The search for a more secure basis for the self leads to the consideration of individuality. The task of philosophy is to articulate the conditions that would satisfy the needs of the individual. Philosophy is the attempt to base the conception of the self on knowledge. What knowledge is and what it requires, and how it differs or is related to opinion are the central concerns of philosophy. The resolution of these issues will pave the way for a more secure notion of the self. This chapter traces Socrates' attempt to articulate these issues.

The image of the philosophic dog only appears twice in this discussion, yet its presence is felt throughout. There is an uneasy tension in the image of the just man, the man who reflects the city in speech, the city of the auxiliaries. The tension exists in the emphasis of justice and consists in the fragile framework that contains the savage beast. The disclosure of philosophy reveals how the very
pursuit of knowledge threatens to unleash the very spirit it seeks to contain. The very demands of philosophy require just the type that would most easily succumb to tyranny—a type that is strong-willed, high-spirited and keenly intelligent, the very attributes embodied in the image of the philosophic dog.

1. The Four Virtues

Having founded the city in speech, Socrates proposes to find justice in it, and to discover its nature. The city has already been divided according to the structure of the Myth of Metals. The guards as a class have been sub-divided into the ruling, guardian class and the subordinate class of auxiliaries. The lower classes, in accord with the metals of iron and bronze, are divided into the farmers and craftsmen (415a). However, the city evolved out of the education of the auxiliaries. Their education provided the focal point of the city's unfolding. On this basis, Socrates infers that the main features of the city are wisdom, courage, moderation and justice (427e).

Socrates' comment on wisdom is vague and is motivated by the need to locate its place in the hierarchical organisation of the city. Wisdom consists of good counsel and this implies some form of knowledge. The needs of the city as a whole require a form of knowledge peculiar to it. This knowledge must be assumed in those who rule the city. Hence, wisdom is located within the class of guardians, the "supervising and ruling part" (428c). Socrates does not say what this knowledge is about. Moreover, there has been no indication, thus far, that knowledge underlies the proposed educational project that is to be administered by the guardians.
Courage, the main attribute of the class of auxiliaries, consists in the preserving of the opinion of the terrible (429c). Socrates has surreptitiously introduced a distinction between knowledge and opinion. His definition of courage assumes that the auxiliaries recognise the opinion which they are called on to preserve. Our analyses of the auxiliary show that he has formed, on the basis of his education, a strong attachment to the opinions sanctioned by the rulers. The definition of courage implicitly endorses the view that the auxiliaries preserve the opinion not only because of their attachment to it but also because their capacity limits them to the realm of opinion. On the basis of the distinction, a critical difference separates the auxiliaries from the rulers.

Moderation is a unique property which infuses every segment of the city (432a). It is "a kind of accord and harmony"; "a certain kind of order and mastery of certain pleasures and desires" (430e). Moderation implies ruling and being ruled. The right balance is struck when the element naturally suited to the task, rules over those which require guidance and direction. The ruled elements may or may not willingly submit to the ruling element. If unwilling, then the accord and harmony can only be effected by force. Socrates suggests that few are capable of mastering the desires (431c). This means that only a few are capable of ruling and being ruled. A city that is moderate must be populated by a multitude of this type. If the many are not disposed to moderation then it is hard to see how the city can attain a harmonious accord. On the one hand, Socrates seems to suggest that moderation resides in an entity that can both rule and be ruled, yet, on the other hand, there is a suspicion that the ruling
and ruled elements are quite distinct. Due to ambiguity, there is a certain underlying tension in the notion of moderation.

Justice, like moderation, is found to be a universal element. Justice consists in "each one [practicing] one of the functions in the city, that one for which his nature made him naturally most fit" (433a). But it is not clear how distinct justice is from the notion of moderation. Moderation involves ruling and being ruled. The auxiliaries, for instance, are ruled by the guardians, who are responsible for the opinion which it is their function to preserve. Their enforcement of this opinion can be seen as a form of ruling, and insofar as they are enforcing it, they are performing their rightful function. Hence, in being moderate they are also being just.

Socrates claims that it is difficult to evaluate the relative worth of these virtues (433c). Each of them seems to have a worthy role and place in the city. Curiously, and surprisingly, he considers justice a rival to the other virtues. It is as if justice was an upstart, a competitor in a contest. Given that there is a sense in which moderation already implies justice, it would seem that Socrates is suggesting that the need to emphasize justice as a distinct virtue is unnecessary; and if necessary, then something unnatural or unjust has necessitated it. The view that justice is a rival, a competitor, alludes to the problem of faction that arises from competition. Since justice pervades the city, this current view of justice indicates a vulnerability and a threat which co-exists alongside the other virtues.
2. Tripartite Soul

Given the four virtues of the city, it is a little disturbing to observe Socrates insistence that the soul is constituted by three forms (435c). The three forms of wisdom, courage and moderation correspond to the three classes in the city. But according to the myth of metals, there should be four classes. Also, it is ambiguous when Socrates claims that the city is just when each of the classes perform their function appropriately (435b). If the three classes are distinguished by a particular virtue, then their function turns out to consist of being wise, courageous and moderate respectively and exclusively. Justice is about the wise being wise, and so on. But why should justice concern itself with these unless there is a problem with the wise not wanting to be wise and so on. The question of justice, therefore, arouses a concern about dangers that tends to afflict the capacity and function of certain natural dispositions.

Given this view of justice and the view that it is a rival, it seems that justice does not have a distinct and defined place in the natural order of things. In the natural order of things, justice would have been quietly subsumed under the umbrella notion of moderation. For this reason, the proper order and constitution of the city and the soul are naturally determined by the three primary elements of wisdom, courage and moderation.

2A: Knowledge and Desire

In establishing the correspondence between the structure of the city and that of the soul, Socrates proposes a less rigorous method (435d). On this basis, he urges the acceptance of this preliminary
Isn't it quite necessary for us to agree that the same forms and dispositions as are in the city are in each of us... Surely, they didn't get there from any other place? (435e)

This proposition presumes the isomorphic structure of the city and the soul. On this basis, Socrates merely has to give some sufficient justification to establish the corresponding elements of the soul.

Given that assumption, Socrates begins to argue his case by postulating a central principle:

It's plain that the same thing won't be willing at the same time to do or suffer opposites with respect to the same part and in relation to the same thing (436b).

The metaphors of willing and suffering imply some intentional agency. It seems to suggest that an entity would not consciously contemplate to do or suffer opposites. Strictly speaking, this is not a formal principle. As it stands, it does not define the principle of contradiction but expresses a notion of non-opposition. For a thing to be totally white and totally black would be contradictory. Black and white are opposite colours that need not contradict each other, they can co-exist in the same thing and in the same part of it by being blended together. The principle cited by Socrates is directed against the coming together of these opposed qualities. This principle would save Socrates the difficulty of explaining how there may be opposed and conflicting desires that may co-exist in the desiring part of the
soul. That this may have been the problem which he is attempting to avoid is supported by the fact that he uses the principle in conjunction with an example of the desires to draw the distinction necessary to establish the desiring and calculating parts as exclusive elements.

In attempting to use thirst as the principle example of desire, Socrates proposes this:

> Each particular desire itself is only for that particular thing itself of which it naturally is, while the desire for this or that kind depends on additions (437e).

It is important to note that Socrates has not mentioned desire itself, but assumes it in this case. Desire can be generally construed to be for pleasure. In which case, thirst can be considered the desire for the pleasure of drink, and curiosity, the desire for the pleasure of knowledge. The principle of non-opposition clearly obviates the problem that is potentially contained in this view of desire. The proposition which follows it shifts the concern further away from it. However, the form of the current proposition is of considerable import.

Given the proposition, thirst, which is a particular desire, can only be a desire for drink and no more. Whether it is directed to a cold or warm drink depends on additional factors (437e). At this point, Socrates raises a possible objection (438a). It may be that the desire for drink is always for a good drink. Glaucon finds this objection sensible (438a). This would suggest that each particular desire is not for that particular thing itself but the form of that particular thing. This objection characterises desire as not only directional but intentional. If every particular desire is directed
intentionally onto some particular thing that is good, then it can be said that the desires always intend the good, and from that one can infer that the desires are always and naturally inclined toward the good.

Socrates tries to meet this objection with yet another proposition:

All things are such as to be related to something, those that are a certain kind are related to a thing of a certain kind, as it seems to me, while those that are severally themselves are related only to a thing that is itself (438b).

This proposition is exceedingly abstruse and Socrates' qualification does little to encourage any optimism about it. The examples that he gives are far more illuminating although one has to retain a certain skepticism about them. He cites a series of examples (hot/cold, greater/lesser, double/half, and so on) that share a common feature (438bc). They are relative opposites that are bound together by a specific relation.

To further clarify himself, Socrates continues:

I mean something like this. When knowledge of constructing houses came to be, didn't it differ from other kinds of knowledge and was thus called housebuilding? (438cd)

If this is to be taken seriously, then in terms of what he said about specific relations, what is housebuilding opposed to? Here, again Socrates does not mention knowledge itself, but uses it as an assumption to base his example. There is lacking in this entire
discussion a notion of a universal relation. However, following this example, Socrates introduces a qualification: "Knowledge itself is knowledge of learning, or of whatever it is to which knowledge is related" (438c). This statement announces an important and implicit distinction—a universal thing in itself and the particular expressions of it which are similar and not identical to it. So there can be knowledge itself and particular kinds of knowledge. In terms of knowledge, Socrates seems to suggest that it is a universal relation. If knowledge itself is about learning, then as a mode of acquisition, the particular kinds of knowledge are related to it in terms of this mode. But being a relation it does not seem that knowledge is directed to any particular object, although that possibility is not foreclosed.

Finally, Socrates expresses his intention and concern in postulating these difficult and abstract notions:

And I in no sense mean that they [the particular kinds of knowledge] are such as the things to which they are related, so that it would follow that the knowledge of things healthy and sickly is healthy and sick, and that of good and bad is itself good and bad (438de).

This is perhaps a more lucid explanation. Medicine, as a particular kind of knowledge, admits of opposites; it is knowledge about health and sickliness. What Socrates wants to deny is the possibility that such knowledge reflects on its practitioner, so that he who knows about health is healthy, and he who knows about sickness is sickly. He raises a whole battery of abstractions in order to counter the objection based on the possibility that the desires are good. It is therefore germane to inquire into the force of that objection.
The problem is that thirst, as a particular desire, may be directed at a good drink, and not just drink. Thirst, then, is an intentional desire. But that is to say, what it intends on is already inherent in the desire itself. Hence, the desire for good drink, reflects on the nature of the desire itself. This view threatens to collapse the fine distinctions Socrates is attempting to elucidate. It views the soul as a body of intentional desires. That is to say, all the categories of calculation, spiritedness and desire are intimately and integrally woven together. This poses a problem that is a variation on the problem of the philosophic dog. The analogy suggests that you cannot deal with one aspect of it without presupposing the other, and if a component is abstracted and treated separately, it may distort what the analogy is conveying.

Consider the example of thirst. The objection states that the thirst is for good drink. This does not contradict the proposition of 437e. Thirst is always the desire for good drink whereas the good drink can be either wine or water but that would depend on additional factors. The force of the objection is apparent when we see how the three virtues can be connected to it. Thirst is the desire, but contained in it is the knowledge of what is good, and the intensity of the desire constitutes its spiritedness. This is quite sensible since the soul can be viewed as an indivisible entity. But the problem with such a view is that it vitiates the problem of injustice. Socrates' counter proposal gives scope for the consideration of injustice.

It is possible now to marshall Socrates' array of abstractions for a general account of his intentions:
(1) All things are such as to be related to something, those of a certain kind are related to a thing of a certain kind. (438b)

(2) Those that are severally themselves are related to a thing that is itself. (438b)

and the form of proposition at 437e can be rephrased:

(3) Each particular x itself is for that particular thing itself of which it naturally is.

where (3) is equivalent to (1)

(4) While the x of this or that kind depends on additions.

Using (1), (2) and (4) and knowledge as the example, the following scheme can be produced:

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Object (Good?)

Knowledge

Mode ----> Particular ----> Object

Knowledge

(Medicine) ----> (body) ----> sickness

(Ethics) ----> (soul) ----> justice
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The division within knowledge is indicated by Socrates' qualification at 438c. Medicine and ethics are branches of knowledge and as such, they embody the particular mode of acquisition peculiar to knowledge. As a kind of knowledge, medicine is related to the body which is its natural object of interest. Whether such a body is healthy or not depends on additional factors. A variety of things can contribute to
the health or sickness of a body. Because any number of factors singly or in combination can contribute to health and sickness, this particular kind of knowledge is limited by the awareness of the number and scope of these factors. Medicine as a kind of knowledge must come in contact with these factors. As such, the medical man must experience the ailments suffered by the body. This is consistent with Socrates' view of the doctor who learns his art by experiencing sickness himself (408de). The same would follow for ethics. Thus, the knowledge of justice and injustice depends on an intimate acquaintance with those factors which contribute to the one or the other. This view of knowledge, relegates the particular expressions of it into the world of sensible experience and is therefore related to the sphere of opinion.

Also, Socrates will subsequently introduce the notion of the good. This scheme provides a place for it and indicates the manner in which it is related to the pursuit of justice. The desire to find a more secure basis for justice leads naturally to the question of knowledge, and this in turn to the idea of the good. This scheme shows that the idea of the good is thrice removed from the question of justice. Already Socrates is pointing to the difficulties in the endeavour of educating the philosopher-king. At the same time, he is also suggesting that knowing about justice and injustice does not prevent someone from being unjust, and this has to do with factors that are not always within his control. The most significant problem that emerges out of this has to do with the connection between the idea of the good and justice.

This scheme is produced out of Socrates' arguments to counter
the objection that there may be good desires. It was suggested that this objection makes sense on the grounds that it implies the unity of virtues and the indivisibility of the soul. If the objection is valid then Socrates' scheme is premised on a distortion of it. Yet, even this distortion is equally sensible for it shows that the soul is divided and will remain so until the problem of the good is finally resolved. The view expressed by the objection had no place in it for injustice given the unity of the virtues. Justice is not one of the virtues. When Socrates claimed that justice consists of the proper and naturally functioning of the three classes in the city, he may have been referring to this view of the unity of the virtues (433a). But this unity of the virtues implies the idea of the good. And so long as the problem of the good is not resolved, the unity of virtues will not be attained; the soul will be divided, and in this division lies the possible scope for injustice, and connected to that, the possibility of viciousness.

Having satisfied his interlocutors that the objection has been adequately met, Socrates returns to his original example. Thirst is only for drink, and therefore, a thirsty person has only a desire for drink. Should he withhold himself from this desire, some other agency must be at work restraining him. On the basis of the principle of non-opposition, Socrates infers that the calculating part of the soul is the restraining agent. This, then, provides sufficient justification for the existence of the desiring and calculating part of the soul.
2B: Spiritedness

Although it is quite obvious that Socrates had already prohibited a view of countervailing desires, Glaucon seems to think that spiritedness may be a form of desire. In reply to Glaucon's uncertainty, Socrates delivers an anecdote concerning a certain Leontius.

Leontius had a desire to look at some corpses laid out on a site of execution. This desire was accompanied by a feeling of disgust for it. The desires, however, were so overpowering that he finally submitted to them. He ran to the site and gazed at the corpses. At the sight of them, he severely reproached himself (339e-440a). We should keep in mind that the description is meant to demonstrate the presence of spiritedness. Leontius' anger as such is regarded as a manifestation of it. In the preceeding discussion the calculating part was the agency that restrained the desire of thirst from gratifying itself. In the case of Leontius, the calculating part is unable to restrain the desires. Leontius is angry only after he succumbs to desire. His anger is directed at a part of himself--his eyes. He abstracts from his own and treats it as a fugitive other. In the moment of anger, Leontius does not see the offending part as his own.

However, there is an implicit recognition of the power of desire to resist the calculating part, so much so that it requires the assistance of spirit. But the Leontius example suggests the possibility that reason can be overpowered by desire, that is, without the spirit, reason submits to desire. Indeed, that seems to be the case given that the realisation of the act cannot be accomplished
without a degree of calculation. Given that possibility, might it not be said that it is the calculating part, because forced, that is the angry party? Or, conversely, if the desire was thwarted, would that part of the soul be the party angered? We shall, for the meantime, keep these considerations at bay.

Turning to the nature of the desire itself, we ask if there is anything significant in the desire to look on the corpses. If Leontius had not seen the dead before, the desire may be a form of curiosity. But clearly, he must have had some idea of what death is for the dispute within himself to take place. If he has already seen the dead, what is the reason for his desire? It is possible that he entertained the belief that something else may be observed, in which case, he is curious; but the curiosity for novelty is attached to something already familiar. He thus imagines that there may in fact be something else. But to accord this novelty to the dead seems rather morbid. Could it be that the desire, desires to experience something; to feel a particular feeling. It is not likely that the motive for pleasure is the impetus for the desire. A little speculation seems in place. We could conceive the desire as intentional, not just blind desire, but one which attaches meaning to itself. It is as if Leontius wanted to ask a question about himself that stirred the desire to look. The dead have a way of inspiring thoughts about life, in particular the meaning we attach to it.

Leontius' behaviour seems to exhibit a conflict of desires and his anger seems to be the inevitable result of it. In any case, Socrates chooses to infer that the anger is the expression of spiritedness and as a consequence spiritedness is a distinct part of the soul.
If we recall the genesis of the auxiliaries, we shall notice that in the wake of the luxurious city, Socrates invokes the philosophic dog. But the image is a composite of two elements. Interestingly, the Leontius example parallels the evolution of the luxurious city. It was desire that spawned the need for the guardians. It is desire too that brings together in Socrates' view the philosophic and the spirited. Desire seems to be the catalyst for the emergence of both calculation and spirit. In either case, spirit does not appear as a distinctive entity.

In light of the description of Leontius, Socrates makes the inference:

...that when desires force someone contrary to the calculating part, he reproaches himself, and his spirit is roused against that in him which is doing the forcing; and just as though there were two parties at a faction, such a man's spirit becomes the ally of speech? But as for its making cause with the desire to do what speech has declared must not be done, I'd suppose you'd say you had never noticed anything of the kind happening in yourself, nor I suppose, in anyone else (440ab).

Socrates' inference glosses over much that is significant in the depiction of Leontius' behaviour, and it does not wholly match the description. To reiterate, Leontius' anger issues after reason has been defeated. It did not erupt when the dispute occurred. Characterising the dispute as a faction—a quarrel amongst one's own—raises the possibility of opposition that Socrates had earlier foreclosed (436b). Socrates seems fairly insistent in assuming that spirit is always the ally of reason.
On the basis of spirit's subordination to reason, Socrates compares the action of the just and unjust man. When punished for his injustice—Socrates carefully qualifies him as being moderate to some degree—the unjust man would not be roused to anger. Presumably, his moderation underlies this implicit recognition of the just action of his executioner. To submit is to desist from wrong-doing. The way the unjust man is characterised clearly implies that he recognises his error and submits to correction. Not to be roused to anger in this instance might seem to indicate that the spirited part is not active. Yet the very act of restraint implied in the act of desisting and submitting to authority conveys the sense that spiritedness, in the form of moderation, is actively at work. The unjust man is behaving like a prized auxiliary.

In the case of the just man, his spirit is aroused when he is done an injustice. In characterising his response, Socrates invokes the philosophic dog:

Doesn't his spirit in this case boil and become harsh and form an alliance for battle with what seems just; and even if it suffers in hunger, cold and everything of that sort, doesn't it stand firm and conquer, and not cease from its noble efforts before it has succeeded, or death intervenes, or before it becomes gentle, having been called in by the speech within him like a dog by a herdsman? (440c)

This passage characterises the just man as being angry and harsh. Therefore, like Leontius, his spirit allies itself with reason against injustice. The depiction echoes many features of the philosophic dog; keen sighted and courageous, it is willing to undergo great
sacrifices to accomplish its duty. However, this picture of the just man has to be set in the context of the issue at hand, which is the depiction of faction between two somewhat moderate individuals. It would be unlikely that the unjust man would submit to correction by an injured party who is at that moment blinded in an angry rage. Indeed, we have come to understand that anger is due to an inordinate estimation of the value of things, a sign of immoderation. As such, it is more likely to be an impediment than a reliable ally in the service of justice. For this reason, Socrates carefully phrases his account, so that the alliance is struck on behalf of "what seems just".

Once again, Socrates calls on the philosophic dog to carry the point of the discussion. Clearly, the analogy suggests what is explicated later in the account of the auxiliaries' behaviour in war and in faction; that is, the just man must be in a frame of mind of those who would be reconciled (470e). He must not be carried away or lose his bearing, on account of his anger; he must behave with moderation. Lacking that, his behavior may cause the unjust man to repel his attacks with equal vigour instead of submitting to punishment.

Faction degenerates into war, when two moderately disposed individuals are led into a destructive conflict owing to the actualised potential of one of them for immoderate behaviour. Again, Socrates, through the analogy, places the burden of responsibility on the just man; it is as if he ought to know better. Moreover, the analogy is ambiguous with regard to the actual way the conflict is resolved. Socrates does not say if the injustice is fully rectified. The just man will cease from his noble efforts when he is called in by the speech within. At that point, he may or may not have corrected the injustice
he suffered. The crucial consideration shifts from the act of injustice to the manner of his response towards it. The analogy not only points the way but focuses our attention on the problem.

At the mention of the philosophic dog, Glaucon recalls the similarity of this to the function of the auxiliaries in their obedience to the rulers, who are like the shepherd. The analogy, however, conveys the impression that the speech which commands and reins in the spiritedness of the just man issues from within. The auxiliaries, on the other hand, are directed by an authority from without. Hence, the analogy, in terms of its relation to the just man, draws a contrast between these natures. The just man conveys the possibility of an independent, autonomous individual, while the auxiliaries represent the suppression of such individualism. The difference revolves around the place of reason in these natures. The just man can rely on the presence of reason within while the auxiliaries have to defer to the rulers who represent the embodiment of reason. This difference is complicated by the fact that up till now the problem of reason and knowledge has not been fully confronted. Thus, having established the spirited part of the soul, and its function as an ally to reason, Socrates immediately dampens one's confidence in it by saying that spiritedness is "by nature an auxiliary to the calculating part, if it is not corrupted by a bad nature" (441a).

3. Justice in the City and Man

Having established all three components of the soul in an order commensurate with the just city, Socrates concludes with a description of the just man (443ce). He reiterates the principle of
justice—one man, one job—but in reference to its expression in the city, claims that it is "a kind of phantom of justice" (443c). This reminds us of the uneasy place justice occupies in the city and the possibility that it is an inordinate, hence "unjust" emphasis of what is implicit in the idea of moderation. Indeed, this is further supported by Socrates' own statement of justice following the description of the just man. There he considers justice to be a "relation of mastering and being mastered, by one another that is according to nature" (444d). This relation is what moderation effects.

Given the justice of the city, Socrates describes the just man:

And in truth justice was, as it seems to me, something of this sort; however, not with respect to a man's minding his external business, but with respect to what is within, with respect to what truly concerns him and his own... he arranges himself, becomes his own friend... and becomes entirely one from many, moderate and harmonised (443ce).

This picture of the just man accords with the view of the just city. It is self-sufficient and one (423c). As such it evinces the unity of the virtues (see section 2B). However, to say of a person that he should befriend himself and that it is possible to do so, implies an equally possible but opposed condition in which he is not on such good terms with himself. The possibility of his being a harmonious, self-sufficient entity depends on his knowing himself and therefore, what truly concerns him and his own. This is the problem that confronts the just city. Until such knowledge comes to be, the fabric of the self cannot be fully and securely woven. Without it, the unity of the virtues cannot be attained. The soul is vulnerable to an
internal division, a faction that threatens to degenerate into an internecine war. It is in light of this extremity of the soul's passion that justice is emphasized. The possibility of the truly just man is reflected in the question concerning the realisation of the just city. In reply to Glaucon's concern for this eventuality, Socrates proclaims that:

...unless the philosophers rule as kings, or those now called kings and chiefs genuinely and adequate philosophise, and political power and philosophy coincide in the same place... there is no rest from ills for the cities... nor I think, for human kind...(472d)

The philosopher-king represents the most developed expression of the ideas implicit in the image of the philosophic dog. That which is philosophic must at the same time be spirited and the spirited, philosophic. This is a coming together, a blending of two distinct qualities that Socrates had initially prohibited by his principle of non-opposition. But in his discourse on the auxiliaries he had already shown that the "spirited" elements, the auxiliaries, are philosophic. They can learn and imbibe the lessons of the city, they can recognise and respond to reason. Now the focus is on the "philosophic", not merely those who are disposed to learn, but those who can do it well, that is, to philosophise. These must be spirited, keen-sighted, courageous, and moderate. They must have the war-like spirit of the auxiliaries and they fight a battle that is waged within the soul. On the success of this endeavour hangs the possibility of the soul's coming to be as one, self-sufficient entity or its dissolu-
tion into many, disjointed fragments.

4. The Reputation of Philosophy

4A: Knowledge and Opinion

At the mention of the philosopher-king, a cry of disbelief and wonder is voiced by Glaucon. His astonishment is due to the current reputation of philosophy and its practitioners. Characteristically, Glaucon does not see what is before him. Socrates is compelled to elucidate that nature of philosophy. As its spokesman, Socrates is defending his own, not merely against the opinion of the many, but also before Glaucon and Adeimentus. Glaucon's astonishment is a genuine and personal response, a semi-validation of the popular opinion on philosophy. Nevertheless, he is willing to defend Socrates, to pose as his trusted auxiliary.

We have to keep in mind that Socrates is poised to defend philosophy itself, and consequently, the reputation of its practitioners, against popular opinion. We must not assume that his characterisation of the philosopher is also a depiction of the philosopher-king. The two may not be identical.

He begins by reminding Glaucon of the nature of the lover who loves the object of his desire as a whole, and does not divide it into parts. Thus, the lover of honour pursues all aspects of it as do food and wine lovers pursue their respective objects (475b). The same could be said of the philosopher's love of wisdom (475b). We should note that in his example of the erotic lover of youth, the lover is depicted as loving every facet of it, such that he attaches a particular lovable quality in each and every category of the young.
Thus, in a sense he treats the domain of youth as a whole but differentiates the diversity that constitutes it. The erotic lover operates on a partial discrimination, that is, he does not discriminate far enough; it is as if he has no conception of an ugly and abhorrent youth. This has all the character of a self-imposed blindness that contains the latent form of viciousness.

On Socrates' drawing the similarity between the philosopher and the lover, Glaucon remarks that there does not seem to be a substantial difference separating the philosopher and the lovers of sight and sound who are eager and want to 'learn' as much of their respective love interests as their philosophical counterpart (473d). To oblige Glaucon, Socrates delineates the specific object domain of philosophy.

In opposing philosophy to the other inclinations, Socrates utilises Glaucon's example in a totally different manner. In contrast to the erotic lover of youth, Socrates characterises the lovers of sight and sound as taking delight in one quality, not a diversity; that is, they take joy in particularly fair sights and sounds (476b). He does not say if the lovers in taking pleasure in the fair things discern the ugly that sets the fair apart. The possibility that they do not probably enables Socrates to say that they are unable to judge the fair itself. This view of the lovers of sight and sound accords with the character of the erotic lover.

On the basis of the distinction between the fair and the particular things that are fair, Socrates draws the contrast between knowledge and opinion. The lovers of particular things only opine and do not know. At this point, Socrates raises a seemingly curious
question. What, he asks, if the person who opines should get angry and dispute with the interlocutors (476d)? But why should the lovers of opinion by angry in their dispute with Socrates? Socrates is suggesting that this distinction poses a great threat to the lover of opinion. The lover of opinion is partially deluded, he cannot admit the ugly among the many fair things, consequently he betrays his deep attachment to these particular things qua particular. The distinction between knowledge and opinion threatens to trivialise and demean these things in terms of a universal value. The lover of opinion, although he does not know, may in fact be incapable of knowing the thing-in-itself, and so he perceives that his way of life is being threatened by this alien and invisible object. His anger is aroused from this perception of an assault.

Because the lover of opinion is liable to be angry at this intrusion, Socrates devises a strategem to "soothe and gently persuade him, while hiding from him that he is not healthy" (476e). This statement contains a subtle announcement of the procedure that is to follow. Socrates is assuming that these lovers will respond to persuasion, that is, they will respond to a particular kind of discourse constructed by him. Socrates is treating these lovers as moderate individuals, and in that respect, they are like the auxiliaries. The method Socrates proposes will also be applied to Glaucon and Adeimentus. Glaucon is not only his professed auxiliary but he is also an erotic lover (402de). The strategem suggests that the addressees constitute a class that is somewhat deficient and so the explanation has to be cast in a framework that is comprehensible to them and phrased in such a way that will not make their deficiency apparent.
Socrates is acting like the just city in a conflict, surrounding itself with allies and drawing attention from itself and diverting it towards a common threat (Chapter Three, section 7). What follows, then, should be taken as a sort of shadow painting, an elaborate deception that aims to convince and edify without being explicit about the truth.

Knowledge is about that which truly is, and ignorance, its antithesis, about that which is not (477a). Opinion is neither but seems to be in between (477a). Hence, there is some relation that binds opinion to knowledge. We recall the scheme derived from Socrates' proposition in Section 2B. To articulate what opinion is specifically about, Socrates has to introduce the notion of a specific power. On this basis, he can establish the difference in their respective capacities to appropriate a corresponding class of objects. The discussion on power does not consider ignorance since it has no object domain and this, in turn, implies that there is no faculty or power in ignorance. The very idea of what there is not, is an artificial construct, an abominable fiction.

A distinct and exclusive power enables the acquisition of knowledge and opinion respectively. Opinion, it is asserted, operates in the sphere that participates in what is and what is not, which leads Socrates to conclude:

And as for these who look at the many fair things but don't see the fair itself and aren't even able to follow another who leads them to it, and many just things but not justice itself, and so on with the rest, we'll assert that they opine all these things but not justice itself, and so on with the rest, we'll assert that they
opine all these things but know nothing of what they opine (479de).

Again, Socrates stresses the limitations of a certain but varied class of individuals. Philosophers, by implication, are not limited in this respect. They are endowed with the faculties of knowledge and opinion. They are able to utilise opinion in the service of knowledge. On the basis of this distinction, Socrates recapitulates the class of guardians and sets them apart from the other classes of the city (484b). Implicitly, he is combining philosophy and politics, and at this juncture, he is assuming the possibility of the philosopher-king. The philosopher does not lack the virtue of the guards, he is by nature "a rememberer, a good learner, magnificent, charming and a friend and kinsman of truth, justice, courage and moderation" (487a). To be a kinsman is to share in the same heritage; the philosopher rises from within the ranks of the auxiliary.

4B: The Accusations Against the Philosophers

While Glaucon appears satisfied with Socrates' explanation of the difference between the philosophers and non-philosophers, Adeimentus disrupts the enchanting picture of the philosopher by reciting the charge of the many that the philosophers are either useless or vicious (487d). By posing this accusation, Adeimentus is acting on the behalf of the city but he is also committed to the search for knowledge. Straddled between these, his allegiance to either is undecided. He is the potential ally that has to be gradually drawn into the philosopher's camp.
Socrates does not deny the charges, he doubts that the many are lying and so infers that there is a measure of truth in their accusations (487d). To address the charge of uselessness, he resorts to the image of the ship. The analogy is deployed to illuminate the true character of the charge against the philosophers. In this simple allegory, the ship's pilot stands aloof from the politicking that engulfs the ship-owner and the crew (488ac). This vignette calls to mind a structurally similar analogy employed by Thrasymachus. In his effort to controvert Socrates' image of the shepherd, Thrasymachus alluded to a class of owners whose interest the shepherd is said to truly represent (343b). The current analogy clearly reverses the relationships represented in that analogy. Here, the owners and crew are depicted as equally ignorant and the pilot-philosopher is the true master. In their ignorance he is castigated as a useless stargazer. The pilot, however, cannot function in a ship overtaken by men who do not know their place. Such a ship could not possibly have left port, and yet if it did, it would have been lost at sea.

To the charge that the philosophers are vicious, Socrates proceeds on a more elaborate explanation. He reiterates the traits of the philosopher, especially his love of wisdom and then adds that those elements that go into the constitution of the philosopher also play a part in destroying his nature (491b). Socrates cannot mean that wisdom, justice, courage and moderation destroy the philosopher. He must be referring to the philosopher's natural capacity and disposition to acquire these virtues which renders him vulnerable to corruption. He is referring to what constitutes their potential to be philosophers, the very potential that is exemplified through the image of the philo-
sophic dog. The cause of the corruption lies beyond the philosophic
dog. Deploying the image of a delicate organism, Socrates puts the
blame on the environment within which the organism is nurtured (491d).
The analogy points to the city for corrupting the philosophic
nature. The very people who framed the charge against philosophy are
unwittingly the responsible agents for the truth of that accusation.

In both of Socrates' explanations, the charges laid on philo-
sophy bear an element of truth. The "truth" of the charges seems to
validate the claims of opinion. Opinion seems to opine something
that is. Yet, like the erotic lover enamoured of his own opinion,
the judgement is partial and based on a distortion. The men of opinion
opine the "truth" of philosophy only because they do not see their own
capability implicated in it. The absence of self-reflection which is
their ignorance is the contributing cause of the corruption of the
philosophic nature. This is aggravated by the complicity of the
sophists who play an instrumental role in inciting the "great, strong
beast" of the city (493ab). Out of this corruption emerges the most
dangerous men who will work the greatest harm on the city (495b).
Inadvertently, the city breeds its own nemesis. The philosophic
nature, the potential to save as well as destroy the city; the philosopher
and the tyrant spring from the same roots.

The image of the ship reflects the condition of existing
cities which are all unworthy of the philosophic nature (497b).
Nevertheless, such natures exist and are invariably corrupted. This
state of affairs leaves philosophy unconsummated (495c). The
legitimate union of the lover (the philosophic nature) and the beloved
object (philosophy) is disrupted, and their natural offspring (the
philosopher) cannot come to be. The vacated seat of philosophy is usurped by the charlatan-sophists (498d). This coming to be of the true philosopher is inhibited by the practices of the city. Those few natures that do not get corrupted are considered exiles (496b). They are banished from their own. Yet this exile is said to be effected by philosophy (496b). The philosophic exile is described as:

a human being who has fallen in with wild beasts, and is neither willing to join them in doing injustice nor sufficient as one man to resist all the savage animals....Taking all this into consideration, he keeps quiet and minds his own business—as a man in a storm, when dust and rain are blown about by the wind, stands aside under a little wall (496d).

The exile must have great faith in such a brittle fortress, and trust that it will not be swept away in the storm.

The philosophic exile is not truly a philosopher. In the analogy of the ship, Socrates compared the pilot-philosopher to a doctor. The doctor does not seek the patient, but the patient, aware of his own disease, comes on his own accord (489b). The men of the city, unaware of their affliction, ignore the philosopher. But a doctor without a practice, like a pilot without a ship, is not fulfilling his natural function. The philosophic exile's alienation incapacitates him. For philosophy to be consummated, he has to step out and brave the storm. Beseiged by wind and rain, he will seek the assistance of allies. The union of the philosophic nature and philosophy can only be effected in the transformation of the city, and the birth of the philosopher threatens to destroy the city (497d). The city is
trapped between the tyrant and the philosopher. Socrates seems to be suggesting that the city can be saved if it forecloses both possibilities. But so long as the city is unaware of its affliction, the tyrant will come to be as an unintended consequence. The tyrant will not only consume the city but will crush the brittle fortress of the philosophic exile. The exile has, therefore, a self-interested reason to end his banishment.

In attempting to address the question of mitigating the effects of philosophy's role in the city, Socrates makes a subtle shift in his assumptions. He moves from the picture of the ship back to the rehabilitated city of the auxiliaries. He is trying to impress the interlocutors that the city can be persuaded to accept the philosopher (499e). The condition of the ship is incorrigible and it is almost impossible to persuade the people in it. The rehabilitated city, however, is purged of the worst elements. Such a city is more accessible to the speech of the philosopher. The rehabilitated city is a city that is bred on opinion. We can assume, therefore, that its members, like the auxiliaries, are lovers of opinion. But since they have become moderate, they are also amenable to persuasion. Glaucon notices this shift by remarking that unless the people are moderate they will not be convinced (501c). Adeimetus seems unaware of this and expresses a certain degree of pessimism and is chastised (499e). It is only on the presumption of a moderate city that Socrates can claim the effective power of persuasion in convincing people or shaming them into submission. The latter assumes a type that can recognise reasonable speech without being thorough experts, and in this regard, like Thrasymachus and Adeimetus.
5. The Philosopher's Apprentice

The re-emergence of the rehabilitated city brings the consideration back to the possibility of the philosopher-king. After establishing the philosopher as the "most precise guardians" (503b), Socrates goes on to describe the natures that are suited to the task. The description of the philosopher's apprentice recalls the philosophic dog but with a twist. The education of the auxiliaries was guided by the need to contain their spiritedness, and transform it after the pattern of moderation. The education did not specifically address the philosophic aspect but assumed it as a necessary condition for the auxiliaries to imbibe the lessons of the city. The reconstructed image of the philosophic dog underlies the current characterisation of the apprentice.

The "philosophic" nature of the potential apprentice is as:

...good at learning, having memories, are shrewd and quick...and are as well full of youthful fire and magnificence--such natures don't willingly grow together with understandings that choose orderly lives....Rather, the men who possess them are carried away by their quickness wherever chance leads and all steadiness goes out from them (503c).

Whereas its "spirited" part is described as:

...those steady, not easily changeable dispositions, which one would be inclined to count on as trustworthy and which in war are hard to move in the face of fears, act the same way in studies. They are hard to move and hard to teach, as if they had become numb (503d).
The philosopher's apprentice has to have a combination of both the "philosophic" and "spirited" aspects. He is not only an auxiliary but an especially gifted one. Again Socrates is concerned about his spiritedness that underlies his zest for knowledge. Such a nature tends to be highly independent, confident of its own powers to the point of hubris. But this already presupposes a highly spirited nature. Hence, the capacity of his intellect coupled with his spiritedness makes him an especially potent and dangerous creature.

In light of this new problem, Socrates announces an entirely new gymnastic to manage the spiritedness of this "philosophic" prodigy (503e). Gymnastic used to mean rigorous physical exercises, now it denotes an equally rigorous exercise but one that is undertaken by the intellect. Such an intellect has first to be restrained and redirected. Since it has the facility to undergo intellectual exercises, this does not seem to be a great problem. The problem is introduced along with the exercises in dialectics. Here the combination of the "philosophic" and "spirited" comes to light as necessary pre-conditions. Not only is it intellectually demanding but also psychologically and emotionally challenging. The apprentice has to have courage to withstand the ordeal as well as trust in the guidance of the dialectician.

The goal that guides the education of the apprentice is the idea of the good (505a). No longer is the philosopher's love of knowledge and truth premised on the knowledge of what is. But the higher ideal of the good is the ultimate object of his quest. It is only in virtue of the good that such things as the just and fair become truly useful and beneficial (505a/506a). The problem of the self has been shifted to the consideration of the good. In terms of this ideal,
Socrates refers again to the condition of the soul and maintains that:

...this is what every soul pursues and for the sake of which it does everything. The soul divines that it is something but is at a loss about it and unable to get a sufficient grasp of just what it is, or to have a stable trust such as it has about the rest (505e).

Where this one thing is at stake, the soul would sacrifice everything; this, then, is the most sovereign thing to the soul. Furthermore, the soul is capable of intuiting it, although in the main it seems unable to fully comprehend or give expression to it. Going beyond order, the good holds out the promise of a state of being that is unchanging and pleasurable; as such, it supersedes the idea of justice as something which is quintessentially valuable in itself as well as for its consequences. For the soul to find security in the good, it has to go beyond the knowledge of what is, to the idea of the good. For a soul that is nurtured in the realm of opinion, this means that it is thrice removed from the ultimate object of its quest. This confirms the scheme sketched out in Section 2A. The intensity of the drive towards the good and the frustration of articulating it so as to be able to appropriate it as one's own underlies the self-unfolding of the soul discussed in the previous chapter. Achilles stood out as a prominent instance of the failure and frustration of this quest (Chapter Three, section 4). The promise of the good also portends the gravest danger to the soul in its self-becoming.

The honour Socrates accords the idea of the good so far exceeds the worth of knowledge and truth that Glaucon in his awe calls it a "demonic excess" (508c). Socrates is unable himself to elucidate
the idea. Instead, he resorts to an image, "What looks like a child of the good" (506e); in other words, not quite the child but an image of it. The imagery of the Sun that Socrates employs to illuminate the idea is a representation of a representation—a fiction three
removes from the good. This, then, functions as the myth for the philosopher's apprentice.

6. The Line and the Cave

The good like the Sun which illuminates the sensible world, sheds light on what is and truly is (508d). On the basis of this analogy, Socrates distinguishes the various cognitive faculties of the soul. Using the image of the line, he distinguishes four faculties and corresponding to each, a specific object domain.

The Line divides the visible and the intelligible spheres into unequal segments. These in turn are further divided into unequal halves (509a). The visible occupies the lower segment. Within the latter, the images which imitate objects in the world occupies the lowest strata. This is the realm of imagination. Above it are the objects that were imitated by the imagination and the faculty suited to these is called trust.

The intellectual faculties are divided into thought and intelligence (511d). Thought is the inferior half of this segment. Thought takes as its point of departure the objects of trust which it treats as images that frame the hypotheses that lead it to an end. Apparently the attitude that thought takes towards its hypotheses are different from that of intelligence. Thought expects to see the things themselves, or their true form through these hypotheses. Socrates
implies that they may be mistaken in this (511a). Intelligence, the highest faculty, uses hypotheses as hypotheses, that is mere stepping stones (511b), in order to reach a beginning free of hypothesis, and then to go on to an end. This is the faculty that is suited to comprehend the good.

On the basis of the Line, Socrates deploys another image, the Cave, to describe the stages of enlightenment of the philosopher's apprentice. The Cave does not necessarily represent the city as a whole unless we assume that the city as a whole is moderate. We should note that the cave admits light from the outside (514a). This matches Socrates' description of the soul that divines the good. The image depicts the struggle of the individual freed from the bonds of the shadowy world of the Cave, and traces his ascent to the region of the Sun. This journey represents the metamorphosis of the apprentice into a philosopher. The allegory also depicts his descent into the Cave where he is received as an outsider, an enemy that is to be destroyed (517a). This symbolises the fate of the philosopher-king. Assuming that the case represents the rehabilitated and moderate city, the virulence of the inhabitants' response to the philosopher dramatises the profound change undergone by the apprentice, he becomes almost unrecognisable to his own.

The descent back to the Cave is described as a compulsion (519c). The apprentice turned philosopher has no natural desire to return since he thinks that he has "emigrated to a colony on the Isles of the Blessed" (519c). Glauccon considers this compulsion an injustice (519d). Socrates reminds him that the philosopher is obligated to the city. The laws contrived his ascent for the sake of
the city (519e). It is not the city and the citizens who are directly involved in this scheme. The laws are the fabrication of the city founders, the interlocutors. The interlocutors, and Socrates in particular, are the mysterious presence that guides the apprentice in his ascent to the sunlike region (515d). The mediator is the philosophic exile, not a true philosopher-king. He, however, paves the way for the apprentice, his ally, to effect the consummation of philosophy. This relation of the apprentice to the exile is effected out of mutual need, and it corresponds to the political interdependence of the rulers and the auxiliaries (Chapter Three, section 7). The rulers in protecting the city need the auxiliaries, and the auxiliaries, in turn, depend on the rulers for their self-definition. The problem then was that the rulers could only protect the city given that they had a more secure notion of the self. The metamorphosis of the apprentice, the gifted auxiliary, represents the coming to be of these rulers. The philosophic exile who renounces his self-imposed banishment requires the apprentice both as the ally and the medium (the philosophic nature) to restore philosophy through the birth of the philosopher. The apprentice requires the philosophic exile as both match-maker and mid-wife, to guide him toward the self-realisation of his essence.

7. Dialectic

Having traced the path to be taken by the apprentice, Socrates turns to the practical question of devising a course of studies necessary for his intellectual development. He recommends a regime of exercises in the mathematical sciences. These studies he maintains, must be useful to war-like men (521d), and in this regard, he affirms
the view that the guardian is both a warrior and a philosopher (525b). The subject matter of these sciences concerns the object domain of thought, and Socrates gradually emphasizes the sheer exercise of thought itself as against its application to practical affairs. Indeed, he rebukes Glaucon for being overly concerned with the practical implications of those studies (527d). Glaucon is unable to trust in the intrinsic value and attractiveness of these studies that he feels the need to advertise their usefulness. In diverting his attention from their public worth, Socrates is attempting to convey the value of doing something worthwhile for its own sake. In this case he is not just saying that one should think without an object in mind, but he is recommending the thinking through on the thought itself, to reflect on thought and hence, to be self-reflective. To know oneself is to realise in what respect one is lacking. This mode of consciousness presupposes and transcends opinion and mere thought. It is a thinking that reflects back on itself. Socrates prepares the way for the introduction of the dialectic, the instrument that would turn the soul toward the good.

Intelligence is the faculty with the capacity to use and operate the dialectic. Since intelligence shares with thought the use of hypothesis, we can infer that dialectic can operate through thought. Socrates had been critical about thought's relation toward these hypotheses. Thought is unable to get beyond its reliance on hypotheses (511a). Now, he clearly demeans it by claiming that its practitioners only "dream about what is" (533b). In essence, these practitioners and their respective arts are caught between what is and the realm of appearances (what seems to be). Dialectic destroys these
hypotheses in the effort to reach a beginning free of them (533c), and in so doing it seems to transport the soul out of this world. However, the destruction of these hypotheses leaves the soul "buried in a barbaric bog" (533d). That is to say, these hypotheses to the soul are not mere stepping-stones but something fundamentally intimate. They are treated as constituting a world view through which the soul comes to understand itself. To destroy them is to undermine the soul's conception of itself. At this point when the soul is decimated, dialectic "gently draws it forth and leads it up above" (533d). This is the picturesque manner in which Socrates describes the dialectic. He is constrained to do so as he doubts if Glaucon would otherwise be able to comprehend it (532d).

Seeing that the dialectic can work such havoc on an individual, it is no wonder that Socrates expects the apprentice to be stout-hearted and ready for war (533c). The apprentice must both be courageous and trusting to undergo such an exercise and survive. The regime of mathematical exercises worked towards disciplining the mind of the wildly enthusiastic apprentice. The dialectic will undo all that and more.

The ambivalence surrounding the nature of the dialectic not only renders its authenticity doubtful but also obscures from us the processes underlying the operation of intelligence. Since Socrates considers the mathematical arts limited in apprehending what there truly is, we can infer that intelligence's object domain includes all that Socrates' image of the Cave posited in the region of the Sun ---that is both reality as well as the good. In the realm of the intellect, we can only be confident about the faculty of thought and
its object domain. As in Socrates' own account, dialectic utilises thought as "assistants and helpers in the turning around" (533d). Thought, then, functions like an ally or auxiliary to the dialectic, whatever that may be. We are only told that it involves discussion — "by means of argument without the use of the senses" (532a). Dialectic as such is a form of argumentation that contains potentially harmful effects.

8. **The Roots of Tyranny**

The dialectician has to have great assurance in his own understanding of the good to be able to draw the resurrected soul gently toward it. He also has to have complete confidence in his ability to master the dialectic. In both cases, the good and the dialectic are conveyed through analogies so that they authenticity is rendered somewhat doubtful. If there is no true or authentic art of dialectic, then there can only be something that is less than an ideal version of it. Socrates suggests that there is an existing, popular practice of dialectic (537e). He is obviously referring to the various techniques of argumentation and persuasion practiced and promoted by the sophists. Even if what is popularly practiced is not identical to the ideal form of dialectic, there must be enough similarity to substantiate Socrates' reference. That being the case, something like the destructive power of the dialectic is implicit in these practices since they are regarded as bad imitations of the idea. They can be considered to be forms of a corrupt dialectic. This can be contrasted with a non-corrupting but nonetheless, imperfect dialectic.
Due to the disruptive nature of the dialectic, the apprentice has to be eminently qualified to undergo it. Both keenness of mind and strength of courage are necessary attributes (535b). An individual who has an exclusive predilection for one or the other is considered lame (535d). And with respect to the truth, Socrates maintains that a soul that hates the willing lie, "finding it hard to endure in itself, and becoming incensed when others lie" is a soul that is maimed (535de). Seeing that the dialectic will divest the apprentice of the opinions (willing lies) that he has grown accustomed to, this qualification is especially critical. Only when the suitable candidate is selected, can philosophy, through the dialectic, fully come into its own. In his attempt to restore philosophy in light of the aspersions cast upon it, Socrates rebukes himself for having "been vexed and said what I had to say too seriously" (536c). This is another telling moment in the dialogue, one which is commensurate with Socrates' reproach of Adeimentus (Chapter Three, section 7). There he rebukes Adeimentus for being harsh with the city and not seeing his ignorance reflected in the ignorance of the city. Here Socrates rebukes himself for being harsh with the city for its accusations of philosophy. Socrates, who had just recommended that the apprentice must not hate the willing lie, himself defaults on this rule. He allowed himself to be caught up with his own speech, his representation. In this brief moment, Socrates shows himself to be vulnerable and while he is not maimed, he is surely not one with himself. He behaves like Leontius, but like the just man is able to reconcile himself having been called in by the speech "within" (440c). The mediator, the philosophic exile, is like the doctor who
can heal and anneal but is himself not wholly healthy (408d). The mediator's anger is assuaged by his own self-presence. If Socrates had not openly rebuked himself, this anger would have passed unnoticed (536c). This moment in the dialogue announces an added dimension to the problem of anger and its extreme manifestation in savagery. The "enemy" can be hidden away from view, it can disguise itself. This makes it all the more potent and dangerous. This presages the problem of the tyrant who is not only great spirited but also cunning. He will wield the corrupt dialectic, the instrument of argumentation and persuasion, to his own perverted self-interests.

To illustrate the danger and impress on the interlocutors the potency of the dialectic in both its corrupt and imperfect form, Socrates resorts for the last time to the image of the philosophic dog. The gymnastic exercises of the young auxiliaries involved their observation of war where like young puppies they are "led up near and taste blood" (537a). They do not literally get a taste of war since they are merely observers. The apprentice in this intellectual gymnastic is not to take the same route. He must be prohibited from an early and unsupervised exposure to argument, for his acquaintance with argumentation at this stage would result in an unhealthy and inordinate taste for refutation:

...when lads get their first taste of them, they misuse them as though it were play, always using them to contradict; and imitating those men by whom they are refuted, they themselves refute others, like puppies enjoying pulling and tearing with argument at those who happen to be near (539b).
This image of the dog is disarming in its depiction of playfulness. However, to pull and tear away at arguments is tantamount to assaulting a person. Thrasymachus in his confrontation with Socrates accuses him of playing the sycophant and attempting, therefore, to harm his person (341b). Furthermore, the image of the dog depicts it as being indiscriminate in its activity, it "attacks" anyone who comes near. This conveys the impression of a young disputant, proud and confident of his ability, that he gleefully picks on anyone and everyone. Yet in refuting and being refuted, the young disputant falls "quickly into a profound disbelief of what [he] formerly believed" (539c).

To renounce one's former beliefs is to tear oneself away from those conventions that bound and directed one's conduct. The despondent refutant, defeated and humiliated, loses faith in himself. Torn away from his former moorings, he is entirely isolated, ostracised like an unwilling exile. In this condition he looks on and distinguishes himself from all that was familiar. Like an apostate in a godless world, his despair turns to resentment and he turns on his own (538ac). In his ignorance, he is poised to repeat the dilemma and recreate the angry confusion of Achilles (Chapter Three, section 4). This, then, is the consequence of the dialectic, whether it is corrupt or just imperfect. Only the true dialectic can lift a soul, sunk in the barbaric bog, towards the generative idea of the good. It signals the fate that awaits the philosophic dog, one that is both great spirited and intellectually sharp, as it encroaches on the domain of the dialectic.
9. The Tyrant

The seed for tyranny is sowed on the demise of the rehabilitated city, the aristocratic city. The break up of the aristocratic regime is accompanied by the rebirth of the institution of the family. The regime which follows upon it, the timarchic is distinguished by its love of honour; the timarchic soul has a predilection for war, however, it has a secret desire for money. This dark desire for wealth, for personal enrichment, inflames the desiring part of the soul. The oligarchic soul emerges from the failure of the timarchic family. The son, on seeing his father dishonoured, and humbled by poverty, openly turns to money-making. The son inherits the sin of the father. The regime which this soul legislates is based on the pursuit of wealth. The unequal division of wealth rends the society apart. The tyrant emerges from the dregs of this society (556a).

The liberal son of an oligarchic father heralds in the democratic regime in which freedom is promoted as the supreme virtue. The germ of tyranny festers in this regime. The son of the democratic father raised in an atmosphere suffused with freedom is assaulted by conflicting pressures, among which are the "dread enchanters and tyrant-makers", the bogus teachers of a corrupt dialectic--the Sophists (572e). In an attempt to lay hold of him, they implant a love in him nurturing it til it develops into a profound longing (573ab). They help to awaken and arouse all the idle and unnecessary desires. The tyrant is characterised as "drunken, erotic and melancholic" (573c).

Socrates distinguishes between the petty and the powerful tyrant. The former are those criminal or outcast elements that proliferate in the oligarchic regime, and infest the democratic. These are
the auxiliaries to the tyrant-master. The true tyrant is the one who rules, whose regime is a nightmare brought into being by the profound longing over which he has no control. He is a wolf which has come to taste of kindred blood (565e). The tyrant consumes his own. In depicting the tyrant as a wolf, Socrates alludes to his analogy of the guard dog transmogrified into a wolf as the result of some deprivation (416a). This affirms the view that the tyrant is a perversion of the philosophic dog. It is impossible that the tyrant, consumed by madness, can take any effective, directed course of action. Tyranny comes to be when it subjugates reason and its ally, spiritedness, to the demands of the desires. Tyranny is based on the enslavement of the philosophic dog. The tyrant employs his cunning intellect to seduce the people into submitting to his rule (566e). He establishes his regime by destroying his critics and surrounding himself with slaves (567e). He is obliged to conduct wars abroad and faction at home to divert attention from himself (566a/567a). The tyrant, therefore, perverts the relation of the just ruler and the auxiliaries. He is the veritable anti-thesis of the philosopher-king. His presence, whether latent, nascent or manifest in all the regimes implies the presence of his diametrically opposed counterpart, the philosopher.

In light of this danger of the tyrannic spirit issues the demand for a singular type that will not have the willing lie, a type which has the capacity to withstand that profound longing that is the consequence of seeing through the veil of appearance. An individual that comes to discern that it is a creature of the phenomenal world; a world in which other individuals abide by the "truth" of fictions simply because they have to get on with their mundane lives.
An individual who is sympathetic to the exigencies and limitations in the lives of the many. He is sensitive to the fragility of the fabric of the beliefs that hold together the lives of the many. Such an individual will accommodate himself to these necessary fictions, and not be distressed if he "isn't able to find those that really gave him birth" (538a). A "no-where" man, a utopian, who will adopt this accident of his life as his foster home, according it the appropriate care and protection. In this function he will confront the tyrannic spirit. The philosopher, a lover of wisdom who is not wise, sustained by his belief in the eternal, and inspired by the fiction of the good, is the very embodiment of idealism. The tyrant, in his profound disbelief and contempt, and goaded by the fiction of nothingness, epitomises the extreme of nihilism.

Conclusion

The image of the philosophic dog dissolves before the image of the fully human subject. Socrates proposes an image which accords with the tripartite structure of the soul. The calculating part is represented by the idea of a human being, the spirited by a lion and the desiring part by the many-headed Hydra, a monster surrounded by "a ring of heads of tame and savage beasts" (558cd). So long as the human part rules, the subject is like the just man, a harmonious unit, a friend to himself, altogether like a "city within himself" (592b). Being a copy of the city in speech, a representation of a representation, the image is a noble fiction of a truly humanised individual. Abiding by this belief, he is the lover of a true opinion, an auxiliary to the philosopher. Such an individual copes well with his misfortunes by
not attaching too much importance to human things, or being severely moralistic (604b). Relying on practical judgement, he will "accept the fall of the dice and settle [his] affairs accordingly" (604c).

We noted at the beginning of this chapter that the four virtues of the city seemed incompatible with the tripartite soul. We also noted that justice was considered a rival to wisdom, moderation and courage. In Book I, Socrates made the seeming facetious remark that justice is useful in its uselessness (333d). He said that in terms of the safekeeping of money. Money, we suggested had a mythical-symbolic value. The oligarch's love of money enables him to suppress the unnecessary desires (554d). He effects this as a result of a false belief, hence, his seeming justice is marred by his inordinate and unnecessary love of wealth. The tyrant is characterised by his love of money and his arrogant disdain of god and humankind. He allows free scope to the expression of the unnecessary desires. If the unnecessary desires were effectively quelled, then the role of justice would be redundant, and the tripartite structure of the soul can be fully vindicated, the unity of the virtues would have been attained. However, in the image of the human subject, the desires are depicted as a many-headed beast which has both tame and savage elements. The unnecessary desires are a living presence in the soul of man (572b). The just man is constituted by an essential tension created in this uneasy co-existence with the savage beast. Justice becomes an essential activity that requires self-presence. But self-presence requires a stable structure of belief, and it is not enough if that belief is founded on true opinion.

The unity of the virtues imply the indivisibility and unity of
the soul. Such a structure looks like it is imbued with the presence of the good, and is therefore truly one and sufficient unto itself. But the idea of the good turns out to be an ideal that is only a fiction, and at best, a possibility that is as yet unrealised. The soul of man is, therefore, not fully sufficient, and its unity is only apparent. Short of the perfect regime, the soul is surrounded by allurements that threaten to penetrate the gaps in this makeshift fortress, and arouse the beast within. As long as the regimes both within and without are imperfect, justice is a necessary virtue. It was, after all, the pleasures of the luxurious city that summoned justice to the scene.

The fully human subject can only come into his own in a truly moderate regime. The possibility of the regime is rendered doubtful since the idea of the good, and the philosopher-king are, as yet, unrealised ideals. The human subject has to contend with less. This means he has to confront a world that is constantly changing.

Change arouses hope, that something in the future is better than the present. But underlying this hope, or coeval with it, is an anxiety for the present and corresponding to that, a presentiment or fear of the future. This fear exposes him to the dread enchantments and seductions of the tyrant and tyrant-makers, who thrive on the manipulation of human weakness. Change, then, stretches the fabric of one's entrenched system of beliefs, leaving it vulnerable to corruption. Fear signals the arousal, the awakening of the savage beast.

The beast threatens to dissolve the fragile structure of the soul into an incoherent body of unfulfilled desires. But that would mean both the death of the body and the soul, sheer nothingness. The
idea of nothingness is as impossible to comprehend as the idea of the good. The tyrant as such is only a representation, a caricature of this mythical beast. He is both spirit and cunning, and to get his way he will resort to anything. He is, in that respect, as competent a manipulator as the philosopher. Because he is able to manipulate opinion, he threatens the existence of the just man who relies on it. As such, the just man requires the philosopher to preserve his beliefs against the onslaught of the tyrant's corrupt dialectic.

It was the search for a more stable foundation to the beliefs of the just man that led inevitably to the confrontation with the tyrant. The hope of Socratic programme was premised on the idea of the good, and the instrument of the dialectic that would deliver it. But the true dialectic turns out to be equally elusive. There is assurance only of an imperfect dialectic. It was the misuse and corruption of this dialectic, set in the hands of the perverted philosophic nature that gave rise to the tyrant. The perversion of such a nature is caused by the imperfect regimes that fostered its growth. The cities are the responsible agents of the corruption of the philosophic dog. And owing to the nature of the cities, philosophy is abandoned. The truly philosophic nature, spirited and intelligent, is unable to realise its essence. Abandoned by the city, if he does not conform to and serve its demands, such a nature becomes alienated from its own. It is this alienation, which presupposes a strong sense of belonging, that sets the stage for the emergence of tyranny. This need for belonging underlies the desire to learn the way of the beast, the city as a whole, so as to reappropriate that which was denied to it (593a). The imperfect dialectic is the instrument that unlocks the
essence of the beast. The corrupt form of it reproduces the savagery of the beast in its practitioner.

The same sense of alienation that produces the tyrant also underlies the creation of the philosopher. He sees in his alienation a symptom of man's ignorance, a certain self-delusion which thinks it knows, when it only opines. He sees through the lies which suffuse every sphere of the individual's existence. As such, he also confronts the idea of nothingness, but realising it is only a fiction the realm of opinion is a mishmash of what is and is not, what comes to be and passes away. But it is precisely because opinion carries within itself the latent form of what there is, that it opens up the possibility of truth. The city, in its coming to be, like a lone creature that is slowly articulating itself, confronts, through trial and error, the idea of the good, although it appears in a vague and obscure intuition. But it is an ideal that is wholly human, that comes to be in man's confrontation with his own existence. This intuition is elaborated in the image of the Sun, and corresponding to that the ideal of the true philosopher. To the philosophic exile it is a simulacrum, the myth and the hope that brings him back to the city. For it is through the city, the ways of man, that the good can come to be.

And there is a practical dimension to this return; for the city, which is necessary for the apprehension and appropriation of the good, is threatened by the tyrant. In his return to the city, the philosophic exile has to awaken men to the needs of philosophy, but the very idea of it threatens those who seek refuge in opinion, and are unable to transcend it. His very entrance into the city helps to incite tyranny. Thus, like the tyrant, the philosophic exile has to assume the
guise of something familiar, a story-teller. He, too, will study the way of the beast to entice it towards the idea of the good. He will employ the dialectic to seduce those natures suited to the task of philosophy by impressing upon them the conviction for the truth. And he will deploy the dialectic as an instrument to repulse or suppress the tyrannic spirit.

The philosophic exile sees in his own, his own salvation. The lives of the just shall exemplify the true ways of man. But these men rely on philosophy to substantiate and validate their claims. The task of philosophy depends on the best of these pursuing the life of philosophy, to rise above mere opinion and follow along the road of knowledge. Being merely on the road, they have not only to surmount the intellectual obstacles but the constant and everpresent danger that afflicts the soul. Socrates' self-rebuke shows how easily it is to succumb to one's own inordinate desires. His is a momentary failure of tolerance, an impatience like Adeimentus', with the ways of the city. For a moment, he forgets his own ties with the city and is caught up with the speech which merely represents its failure. If the philosophic exile, the guide that leads the truly philosophic on its quest, is vulnerable, the just man is all the more susceptible to this danger of forgetfulness; of allowing the human in him to sleep, and failing to attend to the beast within. Socrates' forgetfulness attests to the seduction of the city, the many pleasures and fears that threaten to seize the most convicted of men. While transcending the just man, the philosophic exile retains the essential tension that constitutes him but translated in a new key. Both the exile and the just man are fashioned from the
reconstructed image of the philosophic dog—they presuppose the moderate and courageous auxiliary. The exile is like the ruler, the philosopher-king and the just man, his trusted ally. Because they share the same essence, they are one in their union. In their alliance, they become like a city, and as a community, a city within a city. Together, the one guiding, the other assisting, they are able to repulse the incursion of the beast, and pave the way for philosophy.
Notes

1. This is another thorny and yet engaging problem in the Republic. As an issue in itself it has given rise to a series of unending and irresolvable debates. An extensive bibliography can be found in T.J. Anderson's *Polis and Psyche: A Motif in Plato's Republic* (Stockholm, 1971). The problem of the tripartite division of the soul is treated separately, and a good review of the conflicting views surrounding it can be found in T.M. Robinson's *Plato's Psychology* (Toronto, 1970).

With respect to the problem concerning the relationship between the individual and the city, the most cogent account is given in R. Demos' article, *Paradoxes in Plato's Doctrine of the Ideal State* (Classical Quarterly, Vol. 9, 1957). He draws a number of interesting distinctions to answer the seemingly intractable paradox of the relative incompleteness of the individuals in each specific class in relation to the perfection of the city as a whole. The first set of distinction is, of course, that of completeness and perfection. To be complete is to have all three elements present in the soul. Perfection describes that part of the soul that is fully developed (p. 164). Therefore, rulers, warriors and producers are perfect insofar as each respectively rules, fights and produces but incomplete insofar as neither one of those three is proficient in all these activities. But he draws a further distinction to argue that insofar as they perform their specific public roles, each individual member is limited and incomplete. Yet in their capacities as private persons they are complete in that each element in the soul, viz., reason, spirit and appetite are present and arranged in a harmonious order (pp. 171-172).

An account which endeavours to explain the tripartite division of the soul to the five regimes is given in G. Klosko's *The Development of Plato's Political Theory* (New York, 1986). The major distinction that is used by Klosko is that between normative and predominant rule. Normative rule implies the value system that informs the beliefs of an individual, whereas predominant rule is the rule of instrumental reason which ensures the interaction of the separate parts of the soul so that the normative values are realised (pp. 73-74). I suspect that the views of Demos and Klosko could be assimilated to draw a coherent account of Plato's psychology in the Republic.

2. Both Bloom and Nettleship claim that this statement expresses the principle of contradiction. Bloom, in particular, regards it as the earliest statement of the principle, see note 25 to Book IV, of his translation (*The Republic of Plato*, p. 457). Nettleship includes in this statement the principle of identity (Lectures, p. 155). Robinson, however, is a little skeptical. While there is some resemblance of this statement to Russell's definition in the *Principia Mathematica*, it is not identical (*Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, pp. 3-4). This is not a trivial problem as it bears heavily on Socrates' attempt to demarcate the structure of the soul. There is a problem with the so-called Law of Identity and its relation to the
principle of contradiction. What does it mean to contradict something? The logical form of a contradiction is expressed as $P \land \neg P$. Does $\neg P$ mean anything? How in fact is $P$ negated? If $P$ is true and if true because of what is, then $\neg P$ which is false, is false because of what is not. How is it possible then to represent what is not, which is what $\neg P$ stands for? This is the problem which is implied in the argument that false statements are impossible. For a discussion of this in terms of Plato's dialogues, see T.W. Bestor, Plato on Language and Falsehood (The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 9, 1978). This problem enters into the present discussion because Socrates is attempting to identify a unique property. If reason, spirit and desire are wholes contained within a larger whole, then their interaction, when it is negative, need not be construed as being contradictory, but merely conflicting. For this reason I prefer to interpret the statement as one which expresses non-opposition. The point that Socrates is trying to convey is, of course, spurious. He is trying to convince Glaucon that desire, as an irreducible whole, does not, therefore, have conflicting motions. This is, in fact, contradicted by his later characterisation of the desire as containing both tame and savage elements.

3. I assume that Thrasymachus, despite his earlier outburst, has some moderation in him given Socrates' remark at 498cd, where he claims that Thrasymachus has become a friend when before he was not really an enemy. Although Thrasymachus submitted to Socrates' interrogation without commitment in Book I, it may be the case that he has since come to appreciate what Socrates is trying to communicate. This understanding may explain why when Socrates criticises the bastards of philosophy we do not receive any hint of Thrasymachus' objection to this allusion to the class of sophists of which he is a member. The philosopher is not always able to overcome the recalcitrant philosophic dog with persuasion. In the Gorgias, Socrates seems unable to persuade Polus or Callicles, and his downfall in the Apology dramatises the cost of this failure. Where direct persuasion does not work, the recourse in the Gorgias indicates that the philosopher may rely on the weight of numbers, or the power of convention to set a rein on powerful individuals like Callicles.

4. At 580d, Socrates introduces three corresponding pleasures to the three parts of the soul. In that discussion he claims that there is a true and pure kind of pleasure and attributes this to the reasoning part. This desire for pure pleasure or unmixed pleasure is that which underlies the tyrant's longing, and that which stirs him to a frenzy. Aristotle sheds light on this in his Politics where he mentions the causes of crime:

Men may not only commit crime to cure a desire they already feel: they may start some desire just in order to enjoy the sort of pleasure which is unaccompanied by pain (1267a12). The Politics of Aristotle, translated by Ernest Barker (London, 1982) p. 65.
It is only through philosophy that individuals with this condition can find reprieve. But this presupposes that at least some of these are in fact capable of philosophy—a connection that is fully explicated in the Republic.

5. The problem has to do with the motivation of the oligarch. Certainly, he does not love money in the way that Achilles does, nor it seems is he as spirited. But powerful passions must motivate him. As such, the so-called tame or necessary desires are not the responsible agents. He is not a lover of learning or victory. Ironically, the very desires he suppresses, because he is conscious of them, are the motivating factor for his love of gain. The oligarch as such is a standing contradiction. Paradoxically, this very contradiction inhibits him from pursuing a life of injustice. He is just because he is ignorant. Cephalus clearly embodies this paradox. In many ways the figure of Crito seems to convey the same impression. The oligarch as such seems to be the character type that espouses the view of justice recounted by Glaucon in Book II. They desire injustice because it is naturally good but cannot hope to pursue it with impunity. Thus, the laws of convention are established to maintain a mean between doing injustice and suffering it. Cephalus and Crito both have an intense desire to follow convention and stick to the rules, suggesting that they have a personal stake in it. The very passions which motivate them are translated into the more constructive and lawful pursuits of making money. Money, hence, plays a symbolic role in fulfilling what are otherwise insatiable desires. In the regime ruled by the oligarchs, the dispossessed expose this contradiction, and the drones that inhabit this regime pave the way for the metamorphosis of the tyrant.
CONCLUSION

The Return to the Cave

We began on a summary analysis of analogies and proposed the view that they were intrinsically meaningless. On that assumption, we looked beyond the particular analogy towards the context and the human interests which shaped it. We regarded analogies as pointers that act as guides as we traverse the terrain of the spurious in the quest of the true. To a great extent, we felt that the procedure was a fruitful means to unlock the sense of a particular Platonic analogy.

We contended that the image of the philosophic dog formed the basis of a crucial analogy in the reading of the Republic. Following our procedure, we began to trace its genesis in the quasi-philosophical drama of Book I. We witnessed Socrates accosted by a band of proud and ambitious youths. Trapped in an awkward situation, Adeimentus, a worthy ally to the philosopher, comes to his assistance and reconciles Socrates to his impetuous friends. Thus reconciled, the philosopher condescends to a return to the cave.

In his brief repartee with Cephalus, the question of justice was raised in connection with wealth. In the course of it, we saw the eliding of truth from the discourse. We realise now that truth occupies an ambivalent role in speech. We
watched with a mixture of fascination and astonishment the clever manipulation of argument—a curious circumlocution that every now and then insinuated a novel conception without fully articulating it.

We wondered at Thrasymachus' furious entrance and followed his subsequent defeat and submission to Socrates' skilful weaving of the argument that was at once spurious and yet effective in its power to net and contain the indignant spirit of the sophist. Thrasymachus had accused Socrates of being a sycophant and attempting to harm his person through speech. Yet Socrates had merely been criticising injustice, and the image of tyranny. Thrasymachus' behaviour suggested a certain affinity to speech, and a bond to a particular image contained in that speech. Thrasymachus was roused to defend a particular way of life. Socrates had not, however, attacked and destroyed that image of the tyrant and the view of injustice. The lack of rigour in his arguments only raised doubts about pursuing that way of life.

Socrates had not actually "harmed" the person of Thrasymachus. Twice Socrates would refer to Thrasymachus as a friend and not an enemy—one does not destroy or enslave one's own. Socrates had merely subdued his temper by shaming him into submission. Thrasymachus' susceptibility to shame implied a recognition of the norms of reason. Yet his inability to master argument, to reason through to an end spelled his defeat. Seduced by the image of tyranny, an image which served him little, Thrasymachus, like the dog, was willing to defend it, although
having scarcely received good treatment from it. His confrontation with Socrates revealed that his inability to fully rationalise a vision of life is due to the ultimate incoherence in that way of being.

The denouement of the abortive attempt to defend the view of justice, galvanised Adeimentus and Glaucon to restore the case for justice. Seeing justice refute and being refuted, they seemed jaded and perched on the point of a profound disbelief. Like men who perceive an incipient and fatal disease, they gravitate towards the moral physician to be healed and annealed. They are thus quite willing to imbibe the bitter brew of truth, if it should ever come to that.

The scheme for the salvation of justice was undertaken through construction of a city in speech. Glaucon, passionate and erotic, spurned the healthy city. That moment of passion ushered in the luxurious city and in that outburst of desire, spirit and reason were conceived through the image of the philosophic dog.

We enquired into the character of speech and its relation to the lie. We came upon the view that speech 'lies' simply because its function is purely representative, and should we take speech for granted then we would have succumbed to the unwilling lie. Speech operates in the realm of opinion which partakes of what is and what is not; as such, it contains the element of truth; but caught in the flux of change, truth itself eludes the attempt of speech to crystallise it in its discourse.
The willing lie emerged as the conscious intention to rationalise the representation of speech in terms of certain stated goals. Such lies are, then, representations of representations. The philosophic dog as representation of the noble pup, is therefore, a species of these lies. Such lies, being neither true nor false, can be utilised in the service of either. Being of indeterminate shape and form, they can be moulded to answer any circumstance. Such, then, was our view of analogies, which are not strictly meaningful since they have no specific reference, although they can be applied to an infinite variety of cases. Yet analogies being a moment in the speech of opinion contained the possibility of a universal truth and as such herald the potentiality of true being. Following the path of the discourse, we encountered the figure of Achilles, a fiction struggling to be and confronted the terrible consequences of a deluded soul that is lost within this struggle.

Achilles expresses the extreme of viciousness, one that is directed on one's own and consumes itself—a philosophic dog turned rabid. He lived in a world where there was no essential distinction between the ways of the gods and human kind. A world that was the macrocosm of the feverish city, constantly afflicted by change, rife with discord and without proportion or harmony. Achilles' alienation implies an intuition of order, accord and balance. An intuition which is the extension of his ability to see beyond the veil of appearance, and consequently, his apprehension of the lie which pervades existence. Unable to suffer
it, and believing the lie to be a true lie—a falsehood—and hating the lie in the most sovereign seat of his being, he rebels in an uncontrollable rage. In an attempt to appropriate the truth that was denied to him, he threatens to devastate the world that encouraged and sustained the lie. So blinded by rage, he reproduced the chaos he sought to avoid. He failed to see himself implicated in the lie he could not suffer. He was created out of the material of that deception, and could only restore himself in the conscious remoulding and not the denial of what was given in his existence. Through Achilles, we were made aware of the significance of the virtue of the philosophic dog, which alerts us to the possibility of viciousness through the interaction of the spirited and the philosophic. The image alerts us to the pitfalls that surround the soul in its self-becoming.

So enlightened, we could appreciate the intention behind the proposed educational programme. We observed Socrates' delineation of the sphere of the human from the divine. The perfect, eternal and self-sufficiency oneness of the god was contrasted with the imperfection and inadequacy of the condition of man. Alone, and suddenly awakened from its idyllic dream of the healthy city, man had to recreate his existence, guided by his memory of a lost but cherished state of pristine purity.

The restructuring of the myths that informed the luxurious city transformed it and was directed at inhibiting this intuition of the soul for that pure but evanescent pleasure of its original state. Being so deluded, the auxiliaries which expressed
the desire of the city to define and determine its own, were lulled into a secure vision of being informed by moderation. But the very idea of moderation itself, escaped the grasp of the city founders who had to rely on models and sketches to express what had not as yet been fully enunciated.

Through the stress on moderation, Socrates attempted but with partial success, the transformation of spirit. We witnessed the transformation of the philosophic dog; no longer is it a creature that is meant to be vicious. The concept of self was recreated out of the destruction of the family, and the gradual extension of it beyond the boundaries of the city. The self and what constituted one's own was no longer trapped in the accident of the body and the artificial limits of the city. The idea of the self became intimately woven into what it means to be fully human.

Yet time and time again the philosophic dog would be invoked to remind us of the flaws in the proposed account of the education of the guards. The character of the auxiliaries depended on the constant presence of a non-existent philosopher-king. They were, as such, incomplete, deformed entities, necessary but insufficient to base a description of the just man.

Each time, the philosophic dog was invoked, we were led to appreciate the burden of responsibility set on the shoulders of the ruler, the guiding authority that directed the auxiliaries towards what was and was not terrible. Their keen senses were not commensurate with the ambiguity of the threat, sometimes
invisible but chameleon-like in its versatility. The threat came in the guise of change and novelty inimical to the ideal of being one and self-sufficient. With change, one's familiar horizons are extended, inspiring both hope and fear; through change came the first stirrings of the somnolent but savage beast. Hence, the search for a more secure foundation, a journey that drew us into the fold of philosophy.

On our quest for philosophy, we recalled the virtues of the refurbished, moderate city, and the hierarchy of the classes as the macrocosmic expression of the nature and structure of the soul. We were perturbed at Socrates' remark that justice is a rival to the virtues of wisdom, courage and moderation. In our attempt to articulate this cryptic remark we fell upon the idea of the unity of the virtues, an ideal in which the concerns of justice would have been quietly subsumed under the notion of moderation. The unity of the virtues we believed was intimately interwoven with the idea of the good, and these together projected a view of an undivided, harmonious soul.

Socrates' insistence on demarcating the soul, dividing it into discrete and exclusive parts, seemed like an attempt to distort the picture of the soul. But we suspected the division was warranted so long as the idea of the good had not been specifically announced. And given this suspicion, the intimation that the soul would indeed be a divided entity until the presence of the good became apparent and accessible. We stumbled on a possible scheme which displayed the relation of knowledge to opinion, and discerned the possibility of knowledge itself, related to an object, the good, that was the fulfilment of its essence. Yet
we gleaned that the realm of opinion, the sphere within which the auxiliaries were nurtured and into which the question of justice became enmeshed, was at three removes from the idea of the good. We got our first intimation of the difficulty of the task ahead.

Through Leontius and the invocation of the philosophic dog the image of the just man was conveyed. Once again, the analogy was set in context of the possibility of anger and vicious behaviour. The analogy directed our attention to the response of the just man towards injustice, and clearly located the source of the problem in that very response itself. The analogy then conveyed the possibility of a self-motivated act of restraint, an autonomous decision to be reconciled. As such, the analogy pointed beyond the auxiliary, towards a more integrated, self-sufficient entity, one that would not unduly and inordinately be dependent on an external authority or restraining agent.

Beyond the auxiliary, mid-way between the latter and the philosopher-king, was the philosopher's apprentice. Presupposing the attributes of the auxiliary, the philosophic dog was implicated in the characterisation of the nature of the apprentice. The emphasis shifted, no longer is viciousness a problem of the spirited individual, but a possibility inherent in the philosophic spirit. Given the character of the philosophic nature of the apprentice, the focus was directed on a wildly enthusiastic intellect lost in its own distorted self-reflection.

The characterisation of the apprentice, and the stages of his enlightenment illustrated Socrates' attitude towards Glaucon
and Adeimentus. Socrates, we observed, would stress the nature of the discourse, one which would be appropriate to persuade a nature pre-disposed towards certain forms of speech; a nature at the periphery of thought, whose perspective would still be clouded by the vagaries of opinion.

The discussion on the apprentice was set against the images of the Ship, the Line and the Cave. Through the parable of the Ship, we became acquainted with the philosophic exile, a nature suited to philosophy, whose essence was yet unrealised having been scorned and abandoned by the city: a nature which was unable to fulfill its function so long as it was alienated from the medium necessary for its self-realisation—the city. Philosophy can only find fulfilment in the city. Its object, the idea of the good, can only be validated in the ways of man. The idea of the good is a human ideal that comes into being with the birth of man's consciousness. The philosophic exile is the moral physician, incapacitated by his own exile, he can heal and anneal, yet like the doctor, he is not truly and wholly one. In this guise, he becomes the medium that would effect the consummation of philosophy through the union of the unsullied philosophic nature and the idea of the good. This is the philosophical motive behind the return to the Cave.

The Cave reflected the transformation of the apprentice into the philosopher, and his bitter reception by the inhabitants of the cave, composed of individuals who would normally be disposed towards moderation. The cave reflected the fragility
of opinion in expressing and enforcing the notion of moderation. And once again, the negative image of the dog is alluded to in the potential of moderate individuals towards savage behaviour. Yet, these individuals trapped by circumstance are the necessary allies, the medium through which philosophy would realise its essence. The apparent limitations of these individuals, their particular hopes and anxieties, make them susceptible to the seductive guiles of the tyrant-makers. The possibility of tyranny threatens the existence of the city, and its destruction will stifle the aspiration of philosophy. Hence, the political motive behind the return to the cave.

The task of the philosophic exile in effecting the consummation of philosophy came to be complicated by the simile of the Line. The division of the cognitive faculties introduced the idea of a dialectic, an instrument of mind, in particular the medium of intelligence, was cast in the vague language of an imagery. We could no longer be certain of the authenticity of the dialectic, and corresponding to it, the very idea of the good—"a demonic excess" cast in the image of the Sun. We could only take thought on the possibility of an imperfect copy of it, and in this, we were confronted by its corrupt copy, the medium of the sophists, the dread enchanters and tyrant-makers.

Dialectic, thought reflecting on itself, unlocks the mystery behind the ways of men. In the hands of the philosophic exile it would pave the way for philosophy, and the coming of the philosopher-king. In the grasp of the myopic sophists, it
would unleash the tyrannic spirit, and the creation of the wolf, the transmogrification of the philosophic dog, that would taste and relish on kindred blood. Thus, the irony of the philosophical quest, that in its pursuit of being, it paves the way of its own nemesis. The tyrannic spirit could and would assume the gentle and warm persona of the philosophic spirit, appearances would be shaped to deceive, and in its confrontation with the tyrannic spirit, the philosophic spirit, in appearance would be indistinguishable from its anti-theitical other, and so philosophy would always be perceived with suspicion when it assumes its ambivalent role in the city.

To preserve philosophy, to protect its own, and one self, the philosophic exile is drawn into the city. With only a flawed dialectic, he resorts to images drawn from sensible experience to entice and gather around himself his sturdy band of auxiliaries, both to promote and to protect, the city and the ideal of philosophy. Reflecting on the important dialectic, we can now appreciate the proceedings of the dialogue, and the role of the philosophic dog in framing our understanding of the drama of the dialogue as well as alerting us to the problem and conception of the image of the just man and the philosopher.

Using as a hypothesis, an image, the philosophic dog drawn from the noble pup—a phenomenon of the cultural world, therefore, an image of an image—the flawed dialectic attempts to carry us beyond the world of sensible experience into the realm of ideas; by a process of analysis it goes back to a beginning to the condition
of soul that underlies the savage behaviour of man, the seat of
the tyrannical spirit poised to destroy itself and the world
around it, and then proceeds on to an end, the image of the
philosophic quest for the idea of the good, and corresponding to
that the essential unity of the philosopher and the just man in
promoting this quest and preserving the city, ensuring its unity
and its oneness through self-sufficiency. Moving from image to
image, the discourse flows as if it were independent of the
senses. In its unfolding, it alerts us, through the image of the
philosphic dog, to the terrain of the spurious as we grope our
way towards the true.

The flawed dialectic reveals without destroying the
hypothesis, the image of the philosphic dog is transformed and
transcended and finally integrated into the humanised image of
the philosopher and the just man. Ultimately, it confronts us
with a fiction in whose "truth" we see reflected our own fictive
existence. This, then, is the problem that finally confronts us.

To be one, a whole and fully embodied existence seems to be an
enterprise that is condemned to failure. To be, we have first to
come to grips with our own imperfections. To know oneself is
to realise the extent of one's ignorance, yet this knowledge
because it is reflected in the speech that represents it is never
wholly certain--this, then discloses to us the possibility of
perfection. Through this, the idea of the good shines like a beacon
that consoles and inspires us, and premised on this is the possibility
of the unity of thought and being, of consciousness coming into its
own.
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