

THE CONCEPT OF LABOUR IN LOCKE'S POLITICAL THEORY

**The Concept
of
Labour in Locke's
Political Theory
by
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an analysis of the concept of labour in John Locke's political theory as seen in the Two Treatises of Government. Locke uses the concept of labour in relation to his discussion on property. He does not explicitly define labour, but he does discuss labour primarily in relation to land, beasts and the fruits of the earth, and he emphasises the labour theory of value. Because of this, much of the secondary literature has assumed that Locke understood labour as productive labour only. If the context in which Locke introduces labour is examined, it is not clear that his understanding of labour is limited in this way.

Locke introduces labour in the context of individuals rights and duties to survive. He discusses the various duties individuals have towards each other and especially the duties parents have towards their children. Such duties require labour and the labour associated with them is central to Locke's political theory. Feminist theorists have pointed out that it is often assumed that the labour associated with certain duties, such as parenting, is not politically relevant labour. This means that the individuals responsible for such labour are at a distinct disadvantage, since they must perform labour that is not recognized as important or politically relevant.

To label Locke's concept of labour "productive" is to neglect the importance of duties in his theory. The Law of Nature is fundamental, civil society, or any other society, cannot obliterate the duties which arise from it. The labour necessary for performing these duties is broader than productive labour only.

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NOTE ON THE TEXT

I have used the author - date system for references. At the end of each quotation, or at any point where I wish to draw the reader's attention to an author, I have placed the author's name, the date of publication and the page number. In any sentence, however, where an author's work is mentioned, only the page number is given. In any sentence where only an author's name appears, the date of publication and the page number are given. The references are different for Locke's work. For the Two Treatises, I give the treatise number and the section number: for example, T1.4 refers to the First Treatise, section four; T2:25 refers to the Second Treatise, section twenty-five.

INTRODUCTION

In this thesis I present John Locke's concept of labour in as faithful and unadorned a way as possible. Following Locke's text itself provides solid ground for testing various interpretations of what his words may unexpectedly be taken to imply. In looking at his Two Treatises and in particular at his analysis of labour we discover that while Locke is often understood to have regarded labour as productive labour only, his account much broader. This becomes evident once the context in which Locke introduces labour is examined. He discusses labour in relation to appropriation and individuals' rights and duties to survive. These rights and duties impose crucial limitations on individuals' rights of appropriation and labouring activities. Locke's concept of labour is affected because of his belief that individuals have duties toward each other and towards their children. This performance of duties may involve labour and I will demonstrate that this labour is important in Locke's political theory.

Productive labour is human activity which increases the value of the object laboured upon. Such labour is initially the property of the labourer and one can dispose of it as one wishes; it is labour that can be alienated. It produces marketable commodities and objects that arise from relations of production as Marx described them. These objects have exchange value and the labour expended in producing them can be

seen as Adam Smith described it as "The real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities" (1937: p. 30). By contrast an activity that does not produce items to be bought or sold is not productive labour. Such labour occurs outside relations of production and produces only use values, objects that are to be used or consumed by the labourer or someone else outside the market. This type of labour will be referred to as non-productive labour.

Politically significant labour in much of political theory is labour that occurs within the public sphere. Such labour is usually understood only as productive labour. However, some analyses have criticized the restriction of politically relevant labour to productive labour. For example, feminists have pointed out that 'reproductive labour', the labour associated with parenting a child, cannot be subsumed under the category of productive labour. Reproductive labour is a type of non-productive labour; it produces use values, such as cooked meals for the child, but the objects of this labour are not intended for trade. According to these analyses, the fact that reproductive labour does not fit into the category of productive labour does not mean that it is not a politically important type of labour. In my own account, I will stress the importance of non-productive labour for Locke.

It is not my point to discuss the views of feminists, some of whom have been at the forefront of the critique of the idea that productive labour is the only politically relevant type of labour. Nor is it my intention to deal closely with other theories, such

as Marxism, which encounter problems when it attempts to deal with non-productive labour. Since reproductive labour, for example, does not produce commodities and since it is situated outside relations of production, labour is not obviously amenable to Marxist analysis. Any type of labour that cannot be subsumed under the category of productive labour is not understood to be politically significant by Marxist theory. Yet, it may be socially necessary labour, that is, it must be performed if society is to survive. Feminists argue that the burden of reproductive labour falls mostly upon women and this labour is neither recognized nor recompensed by society. The assimilation of reproductive labour and women's nature conveniently occludes the sexist entailment of the argument, which assumes that politically relevant labour and productive labour are identical.

Marx analyzed extensively the role of labour in society but it had been the subject of political writings previous to his. Liberal theorists such as Locke had considered labour and its role within society.¹ It is surprising, given our indebtedness to liberal theory for many modern concepts such as property and labour, that there has not been more criticism of this exclusive understanding of productive labour within liberal theory itself. Liberal feminist theorists have written much about the disadvantage women face in a society that assumes child caring is their natural role. In particular, Lorene M. G. Clarke, Lynda Lange and Sibyl Schwarzenbach have criticized this aspect of liberal theories. In 'Women and Locke: Who owns the Apples in the Garden of Eden', Clarke focuses her discussion on Locke and claims that the reproductive labour

assigned to women necessarily leaves them out of the social contract. Although Clark draws valid conclusions, I wish to show that within Locke's Two Treatises of Government there is an unacknowledged vagueness in Locke's understanding of labour. Thus, my argument will open up a new perspective on Locke, one which has generally been ignored in standard commentaries. Perhaps the problem which has dogged Locke scholarship is that it has generally failed to recognize that Locke did not consider his society capitalist. Therefore, to restrict his understanding of labour to productive labour may simply be to impose our modern concepts back on his.

Locke does not define labour explicitly in the Two Treatises of Government, although he initially locates it in terms of labour on land. He considers any piece of land that is unimproved as being virtually useless, since it can support little human life. Material objects acquire most of their value through their relative contribution to human survival and it is labour that renders them useful for this end. Given this assumption, it follows that, as Locke asserts, it is "Labour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing" (T2:40), and land that is cultivated can support many individuals and thus has much greater value

'Tis Labour then which puts the greater part of Value upon Land, without which it would scarcely be worth anything: 'tis to that we owe the greatest part of all useful Products: for all that the Straw, Bran, Bread, of that Acre of Wheat, is more worth than the Product of an Acre of as good Land, which lies waste, is all the Effect of Labour (T2:43).

This is referred to as Locke's 'labour theory of value'. "The intrinsic value of things, ... depends only on their usefulness to the Life of Man"(T2:37). Locke assumes that an object is largely valueless before labour, since it cannot be used in its natural state without some kind of modification, whether this would be a task as simple as gathering or a more complex one such as that of tilling and sowing. The value of an object of labour is almost entirely the result of the labour expended on it.²

Much of the secondary literature has linked Locke's account of labour to his account of property in a way that suggests that all labour is productive labour.³ If we are to get a correct understanding of what Locke meant by labour, however, it is important that we recognize its relationship to the variety of duties individuals have towards each other. These duties include the economic duties that are correlative to property rights, but the normative framework is much broader. Individuals have a duty of charity towards one another, and, as much as possible, they are to keep each other from extreme want. Moreover, parents have a duty towards their children. They must provide for their children and they must educate them. Children thus have a right to their parents' care. Given this broader normative context, I will argue that Locke understood that such duties would involve some form of labour, but this labour cannot be productive labour. Productive labour entails that the object laboured upon is, or becomes, the property of the labourer. However, because Locke denied that children can be owned, it follows that there can be no productive labour exercised upon them. Such

labour is instead an example of non-productive labour, and given the importance of duties in Locke's political theory this labour is significant within his theory.

This thesis takes issue with those parts of the secondary literature that neglect duties and thereby misrepresent Locke's concept of labour by limiting it to the appropriation which is necessary for humanity's survival. This approach is characteristic of such writers as C.B. Macpherson and Leo Strauss, who hold that Locke's theory of labour and property support unlimited appropriation.

Arguments about the function of labour in Locke's property theory center around section twenty-eight of the Second Treatise, generally known as the "Turfs Passage." After asserting that consent is not required for appropriation on the natural common, Locke supports his claim with an example of a common within civil society.

And the taking of this part, does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. This the Grass my Horse has bit; the Turfs my Servant has cut; and the ore I have digg'd in any place where I have a right to them in common with others, become my Property, without the assignation or consent of any body. The Labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in hath fixed my Property in them (T2:28).

Macpherson argues that Locke's reference to the servant's labour as the "Labour that was mine" implies that he took for granted the existence of the institution of wage labour, in which individuals may freely alienate their labour in exchange for a wage.

The free alienation of labour is crucial to any case in favour of unlimited capitalist appropriation because a key element in capitalist appropriation is the right of individuals to acquire wealth by purchasing the labour of others.

Macpherson begins his argument with Locke's statement that whatsoever a person "removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with...and thereby makes it his Property" (T2:27). This would imply that the amount of property a person may acquire is limited by one's ability to labour if Locke did not take the wage relationship for granted. But Locke's assertion that every man has a property in his person entails "the assertion of a natural right to alienate one's labour in return for a wage" (Macpherson, 1962: p.214). Macpherson cites section eighty-five of the Second Treatise as evidence that a person may alienate his labour (1962: p.215).

Macpherson turns to the turfs passage to support his claim that Locke takes the wage relationship for granted, and so a man may appropriate beyond his own ability to labour by purchasing the labour of others. The first point of support is that unless Locke is taking the wage relationship for granted, his reference to the servant's labour as the "Labour that was mine" in the turfs passage contradicts his other assertion that each person is the exclusive owner of his labour (Macpherson, 1962: pp. 215-16). But the turfs passage is set in the context of civil society and Macpherson wishes to prove that the institution of wage-labour in civil society is in Locke's view natural because it existed in the state of nature (1962: p.216). To support this point he returns to his discussion

of the spoilage proviso where he argued that consent to money leads to the creation of a complex commercial economy which presupposes the existence of wage-labour (Macpherson, 1962: pp. 216-7). Since Locke placed a commercial economy in the state of nature it is equally likely that he situated wage-labour there too. Therefore, because Locke took wage-labour to be natural he took its existence for granted.

Macpherson recognizes that the "wage relationship is based only on the free contract of the individuals concerned" (1962: p.218). The application of the term "natural" to wage labour refers to the fact that the institution exists in the state of nature and therefore antedates political society. Macpherson makes a similar point about the consent of money and the resulting commercial economy. They are termed "natural" because they exist in the state of nature because both wage-labour and a commercial economy flow from man's natural capacity to make agreements independently of political society (Macpherson, 1962: p. 210). Therefore, because men have a right to them in the state of nature, when men enter into civil society, it must protect those institutions (Macpherson, 1962: p.218).

Macpherson states that some men have no choice but to labour for a wage. This is a consequence of the legitimate consent to the use of money and subsequent shortage of land (1962: p.213). By consenting to use money, some men agree to forgo their right to labour directly on nature in exchange for the better living of a money economy. Since the wage-relationship did not arise through force, a man who refuses

to work for a wage is not "simply given the necessary relief." Locke employs an analogy suited to Macpherson's interpretation in the chapter "Of Slavery," that of men selling themselves into drudgery:

I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other Nations, that Men did sell themselves, but, tis plain, this was only to Drudgery, Not to Slavery. For, it is evident, the Person sold was not under an Absolute, Arbitrary, Despotical Power. For the Master could not have power to kill him, at any time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free of his service; and the Master of such a Servant was so far from having an Arbitrary Power over his Life, that he could not at pleasure, so much as maim him, but the loss of an Eye, or Tooth, Set him free (T2:24).

In Possessive Individualism, Macpherson argues that by insisting that labour is the private property of the individual Locke is able to use his doctrine of property to justify unlimited individual appropriation (p.221). In doing so, Locke undermines the "traditional view that property and labour were social functions, and that ownership of property involved social obligations" (Macpherson, 1962: p.221). Leo Strauss makes a similar point in Natural Right and History. With the invention of money man has freed himself and his labour from social obligations. "Man is effectively emancipated from those social bonds which antedate all consent or compact, by the emancipation of his productive acquisitiveness" (Strauss, 1953: p.248)

Like Strauss, Macpherson does ascribe to labour the function of justifying accumulation and the right to use one's property. Every individual has a natural right to self-preservation not conditional upon the performance of any prior duty to God. Thus, an individual has a natural right to and a private use-right in whatever he removes from the common in the state of nature because his labour produced it. After the invention of money, since most men acquire property by alienating their labour for a wage, labour again justifies the right to and use right in that property. Therefore, Macpherson and Strauss assert that labour does justify the accumulation and use of property as the completion of man's natural right to self-preservation.

In order to substantiate my criticism of these views, I will examine duties in the context of labour and appropriation both in the pre-money State of Nature as well as in the world of civil society. The effect of money on duties obscures their importance and this can account for the prevalent reading of Locke as a proponent of unbounded capitalism. Locke's concept of labour understands labour as an activity that produces commodities which have both exchange value and use value. The duties individuals have towards each other imply that labour will at times produce use values that must be given to needy individuals. Thus, Locke initially understands labour as an activity that is broader than that of productive labour only. Once money is introduced, there is an emphasis on labour that produces exchange values, and this has been interpreted to mean that the only politically important labour in the post-money world is productive labour.

Other types of labour are completely subsumed under the general category of moral obligation, or duty, and this is often neglected in modern readings of Locke.

CHAPTER 1.

RIGHTS IN RELATION TO LABOUR

Property is a central concept in John Locke's account of civil government in Two Treatises of Government. Along with stressing the individual's right to self-preservation, the chapter "Of Property" in the Second Treatise is also central to Locke's discussion of labour. Locke comes closest to defining labour when discussing the moment of appropriation. His argument begins from the premise that the earth was given to people in common "... God has given the Earth to the Children of Men, given it to Mankind in common" (T2.25). The earth is a gift from God and because it is a gift, individuals can dispose of it as they wish as long as they are in agreement and as long as they fulfil God's directive that human beings should prosper. Thus, the earth must be used by individuals for their survival and happiness. But if human beings are to survive there must be some way a single individual can appropriate the means to his survival without the explicit consent of the entire human race. Locke writes:

But I shall endeavour to shew, how Men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to Mankind in common, and that without any express Compact of all the commoners (T2:25).

From this common gift, Locke wants to demonstrate how it is possible for one person to possess a particular part of the common whole. Locke explains and justifies appropriations by introducing his notion of labour. In the following paragraphs we will examine Locke's concept of labour.

Locke explains that:

The Fruit, or Venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no Inclosure, and is still a Tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life (T2.26).

Because the Indian hunts or gathers, he can rightfully appropriate what he has killed or gathered. Locke gives us the justification for this appropriation:

Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his (T2.27).

Since the Indian has property in his own person, he must necessarily own the labour performed by his body and can thus rightfully come to own the fruit he has gathered or the animal he has killed. Locke implies that the right of property in one's labour is a

part of the right of property in one's person. So by using the body and hands that I own (or the labour that I own through the use of body and hands), I mix my labour with Nature's products, I join my labour to what the hand of Nature produces. Therefore, transforming nature through my own activity I make some portion of what is common mine. Mixing labour with products of nature is another way to remove part of what is common and make it one's own. Nevertheless no one except myself has a right to what I have made my own,¹ so long as "there is enough and as good left in common for others"(T2.27),² and I have taken into account the spoilage constraint. "Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy" (T2.31). Locke is appealing to our common sense; it is the "Law of Reason" (T2:30) that tells us the Indian should own what he has killed or gathered. We can agree that a person who hunts should be able to nourish himself. But all examples of appropriation are not so easily recognizable, and Locke needs to define the exact moment of appropriation. This is undertaken in the next section of the Second Treatise.

Locke defines the specific point where appropriation begins in Section 28 of the Second Treatise.³ In so doing he also defines where labour begins:

I ask then, When did (the acorns) begin to be his?
 When he digested? Or when he eat? Or when he
 boiled? Or when he brought them home? Or when
 he pickt them up? And 'tis plain, if the first
 gathering made them not his, nothing else could.
 That labour put a distinction between them and the
 common (T2: 28)

The act of picking is the act of labour which establishes property. Raymond Polin notes

in The Moral Politics of John Locke,

Although Locke mentions labour repeatedly, he does not give an explicit definition of labour. It is clear that, for Locke, labour adds something to nature that does not depend on it and that is more than nature. It is not a biological process because the person that gathers the acorns under the oak tree does not acquire property when he swallows or digests them (and when they are definitely his) but at the time he picks them up. The moment of appropriation is the moment of the gathering, the moment of labour (1960: p.263).

Picking adds very little to nature except to make the acorns ready for consumption. Nonetheless, it is labour because it has added value to the acorns by making them immediately available for human consumption. With this rather ambiguous definition of the moment of appropriation, it would seem as if labour can encompass many different acts. The only generalization which Locke makes is that labour is an act that must add value to something. He simply gives us an ostensive definition of labour:

the Labour of those who broke the Oxen, who digged and wrought the Iron and Stones, who felled and framed the Timber employed about the Plough, Mill, Oven, or any other Utensils, which are a vast Number, requisite to this Corn, from its being seed to be sown to its being made Bread, must all be charged on the account of Labour, and received as an effect of that: Nature and the Earth furnished only the almost worthless Materials, as in themselves (T2:43).

If the act of picking is labour, then the act of cooking, sewing, and any domestic task is also labour because it adds value to things by making them more suitable for use. The point to emphasis here is that Locke recognizes such daily tasks as the making of bread as labour: "...Acorns, Water, and Leaves, or Skins, must be our Bread, Drink and Clothing, did not labour furnish us with these more useful Commodities" (T2:42). As C.B. Macpherson argues in Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, labour is not just an "exertion of human energy" (1989: p. 60), it has the dual purpose of ensuring survival and making life more pleasant.

Individuals appropriate nature through their Labour and this "labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer" (T2:27) is alienable. According to C.B. Macpherson in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, "the more emphatically labour is asserted to be a property, the more it is understood to be alienable" (1962: pp.214-215). Labourers can dispose of their labour as they see fit because it is their property. If the labourers can dispose of their labour, they can also dispose of the products of such labour. This follows because "no Man but (the labourer) can have a right to what (his labour) is once joyned to" (T2:27). Once labourers mix their labour with something it becomes their property (T2:27). Thus labour distinguishes private property from common property. Thus the ground of private property according to Locke is the fact that labour is a private possession. By mixing what is unquestionably mine with that which no one else has yet claimed I make my own what was formally

common stock.

In the pre-monetary state of nature, labourers have exclusive rights to the products of their labour. There are three ways in which individuals can dispose of their property acquired through labour: they can use it for their survival, they can exchange it, or they can give it away. In the case where they exchange the products of their labour, these products possess an "exchange value". The labourers barter the products of their labour for some other goods they might wish to appropriate. The goal of labour, in this case, is exchange. An example of this type of exchange would be that of someone trading acorns for wheat. As long as the Law of Nature is not violated, the barter can take place. In the situations where the labourers are either using the products of their labour for themselves or giving them away for someone else to use, the products of their labour possess a 'use value'. The goal of this type of labour is use. An example would be a labourer gathering acorns that will be either consumed by the labourer or someone else. Hence, there are two goals of labour: labour for exchange and labour for use. The question which will be posed is: are individuals always free to choose how they can dispose of their labour? For example, are individuals free to barter their property whenever they feel like it? In the following sections we will find that Locke does in fact impose some moral limitations on the disposal of labour.

In the post-monetary stage, there is one limitation to the free disposal of labour. This limitation is the wage relationship. When such a contract is agreed to, labourers

are no longer the owners of the products of their labour. However that limitation is not the one we concern ourselves with. In the following discussion, we want to focus attention on the moral limitations, thus the argument will consider labourers as the owners of the product of their labour.

A crucial role in the development of society is played by money: the tacit agreement of individuals that institutes money is the agreement that will propel individuals towards civil society. In the post-monetary State of Nature, individuals will now be able to accumulate possessions. In sections thirty-five to fifty-one of the Second Treatise, Locke endeavours to show how money affects individuals' right to property. According to Locke, in the early ages of the world before the invention of money, individuals either gave, traded, or consumed the products of their labour. The Law of Nature states that the products of one's labour cannot be allowed to spoil; they must be consumed or used by the labourer or someone else before they spoil. Locke says:

The same Law of Nature, that does by this means give us Property, does also bound that Property too...As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a Property in (T2:31).

This means that individuals' share will be limited and they will not be able to accumulate goods beyond what the spoilage limitation allows.⁴ In Section 32 the adding of labour is

more prominent. "As much Land as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates and can use the Product of, so much is his Property" (T2.32)⁵. The significance for Locke of adding to nature is stressed in the following sections. In giving the earth to all mankind, God

"commanded Man also to labour... subdue the Earth, i.e. improve it for the benefit of Life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour" (T2:32).

Farming the land annexes to that land something that is already the farmer's property, his labour. He also has property in his person, so person and labour go together to acquire additional property. In such a society, the Law of Nature ensures that an individual's property does not encroach upon another's.⁶ Locke explains:

The measure of Property, Nature has well set, by the Extent of Mens Labour, and the Conveniency of Life: No Mans Labour could subdue, or appropriate all: nor could his Enjoyment consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any Man, this way, to intrench upon the right of another, or acquire, to himself, a Property, to the Prejudice of his Neighbour, who would still have room, for as good, and as large a Possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated. This measure did confine every Man's Possession, to a very moderate Proportion, and such as he might appropriate to himself, without Injury to any Body in the first Ages of the World (T2:36).

This simple life of labour for use and limited exchange could conceivably go unchanged if individuals were living on islands isolated from each other. Locke sees no reason why anyone in such an isolated community would want to produce beyond the limits of their consuming ability. He asks:

What reason could any one have [on this isolated island] to enlarge his Possessions beyond the use of his Family, and a plentiful supply to its Consumption, either in what their own Industry produced, or they could barter for like perishable, useful Commodities, with others (T2:48)?

If an individual cannot accumulate, there is no reason to labour beyond what is necessary for survival.⁷

Although this might have been the case in the early ages of the world, it is no longer the case once money is invented. In the later ages of the world connections are forged between countries and communities. Natural progress implies that commerce and exchange should spread to all parts of the world. But if individuals are going to have "Commerce with other parts of the world" (T2:48), something non-perishable will be needed to facilitate this exchange. "And thus came in the use of Money, some lasting thing that Men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent Men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable Supports of Life" (T2:47).⁸ Money facilitates trade because it does not spoil and because its worth can be determined by

convention. Money is useful to the extent that it becomes a common unit of measure.

Expanded commerce, a positive achievement for humanity, is the reason why men consented to money. Money helps humanity survive and prosper. Money in itself is irrelevant to human survival because it is not a 'good' that can be used or consumed. However, it is indirectly relevant because it encourages trade in the useful but perishable commodities. Money also encourages increased productivity of these useful commodities.⁹ Because money can be accumulated without doing any harm to one's neighbours since it does not keep anything from them that they actually need, there are no limits to its accumulation. For Locke, accumulating money is not like accumulating food because food can be wasted and this waste harms other people's survival.

If the fruits rotted, or the Venison putrified, before (the labourer) could spend it, he offended against the common Law of Nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his Neighbour's share, for he had no Right, farther than his Use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him Conveniences of Life (T2:37)

This restriction also applies to the "Possession of Land" (T2:38). A labourer can only enclose as much land as he can use. Otherwise,

If either the Grass of his Inclosure rotted on the Ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering and laying up, this part of the Earth, notwithstanding his Inclosure, was still to be looked on as Waste, and might be the Possession of any others (T2:38).

But money does not waste, so it can be accumulated without violating the spoilage clause

of the Law of Nature.¹⁰

Furthermore, money encourages individuals to labour beyond their consuming capacities. In the pre-monetary State of Nature, they had to give their surplus to others because "Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy" (T2:31). What could not be consumed by the labourers had to be used by someone else. Since money implies that goods can be traded before they spoil, individuals can simply trade their surplus for money. Money introduces the possibility of enlarging one's possessions. Locke understands that individuals will naturally try to enlarge their possessions. "Find out something that hath the Use and Value of Money amongst his Neighbours, you shall see the same Man will begin presently to enlarge his Possessions" (T2:49). Therefore in a post-monetary state, individuals can labour not only for their survival but also in order to accumulate property. Their increased productivity will mean that they can become more prosperous and can indulge in more of the conveniences of life. As Locke states, "the Invention of Money, and the tacit Agreement of Men to put a value on it, introduced (by Consent) larger Possessions, and a Right to them" (T2:36).

As a result of this development money will result in different levels of accumulation. Because some individuals will be more capable or industrious than others they will garner more property. "And as different degrees of Industry were apt to give Men Possessions in different Proportions, so this Invention of Money gave them the opportunity to continue to enlarge them" (T2:48). Locke believes that this result has a

positive effect on society because, increases in productivity help the whole of society. If persons are motivated by greed to labour incessantly and to accumulate, it will not only benefit them, it will also benefit everyone in that society. Locke states that "he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen but increase the common stock of mankind" (T2:37). Locke believes that the more industry and production grows, the better the lot of the other members of society will be.

There cannot be a clearer demonstration of anything, than Several Nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in Land, and poor in all the Comforts of Life; whom Nature having furnished as liberally as any other people, with the materials of Plenty...yet for want of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the Conveniences we enjoy: And a King of a large fruitful Territory [in the Americas] feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day Labourer in England (T2:41).

Locke argues that productivity can only increase everyone's quality of life.

Locke believed that the introduction of money has profound effects on social relations. First, the spoilage clause is effectively removed as a limit to accumulation. In the pre-monetary State of Nature, individuals could not accumulate goods because they had to be used before they spoiled. The elimination of this limit, however, encourages material progress as was noted above. Now Labourers can produce beyond their capacity to consume, sell this surplus and accumulate the money from the sale. A labourer's

neighbours will no longer benefit directly from excess production. Instead, the labourer now has a right to produce goods in order to exchange these for money. The duty to share which existed between individuals because of the spoilage clause is considerably lessened but overall material progress is encouraged. This is a great change from the pre-monetary State of Nature where there was no incentive to labour beyond the needs for one's survival. In the pre-monetary State of Nature, labour was primarily for one's use. In the post-monetary world on the other hand, there is a strong incentive to labour for exchange since one can accumulate more property. With the introduction of money and the incentive of greater property, labour becomes increasingly labour for exchange.

Locke does not object to this, nor does he object to the possible implications that some individuals could start accumulating large sums of money or property. He never considers that unlimited accumulation might hinder another individual's ability to acquire property. This is strange since he does consider injurious the case where an individual accumulates property to the detriment of another. He limits his concern to cases where goods are spoiled and not enough is left good for others. But accumulation in itself is fine. "The exceeding of the bounds of his just Property not lying in the largeness of his Possession, but the perishing of any thing uselessly in it" (T2:46). As Macpherson notes in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism,

What Locke has done, then, is to show that money had made it possible, and just, for a man to

accumulate more land than he can use the product of before it spoils...The spoilage limitation imposed by natural law has been rendered ineffective in respect to the accumulation of land and capital (1962: p.208).

This right of accumulation thus diminishes individuals' responsibility towards each other. The labourer's obligation to share his/her surplus is now removed. In the pre-monetary world "it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than (the labourer) could make use of" (T2:46). But as we have seen this is no longer the case in the post-monetary world.

Thus, the introduction of money, by making labour for exchange dominate introduces market relations. If individuals are no longer labouring simply to use the products of their labour but to accumulate, they can have a vested interest in manipulating market relations. Thus a person could raise the prices of certain essential commodities leaving those with less capital to suffer. Such abuses could very well take place within the bounds of the Law of Nature. But this is acceptable because by tacitly agreeing to money, "Men have agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possessions of the Earth" (T2:50).

The agreement to use money also weakens the Law of Nature's stipulation that an individual must leave "enough and as good for others" (T2:27, 33). This is so because in the post-monetary world, individuals do not necessarily depend on the land

for their survival. There are other ways in which the useful things of life can be acquired, most obviously, individuals can purchase what they need with money. The Law of Nature will be satisfied if all individuals have purchasing power. Wage Labour meets this requirement. An individual could have land beyond his needs and still leave enough and as good for others as long as these other individuals have an opportunity to labour and receive a wage. If an individual has the possibility to earn money, the enough and as good limitation is not violated. Individuals no longer have to be concerned about limiting their appropriation. Neighbours can always look for work somewhere. The removal of this enough-and-as-good limitation implies that individuals can now focus their labouring activity on the survival and accumulation of property without having to worry about what is being left behind for others. The obligation individuals have towards each other becomes lessened since they do not have to look out actively for one another during their appropriating activities.

However, the duty to help those in extreme want still holds and the principle of charity still operates in the post-monetary world. All individuals have a duty to keep others from extreme want (T1:42) and to help those in need as much as possible (T2:6). But the introduction of money makes this duty less immediate. Instead of offering goods that can be consumed, now a wealthier individual can simply offer a starving neighbour a bare subsistence wage. In this way one may have acquitted his duty towards the other. Locke would consider this action the proper fulfilment of one's duty. As Neal Wood

notes, in John Locke and Agrarian Capitalism in Locke's proposal for the reform of poor laws,

(he) stated categorically that every one must have meat, drink, clothing, and firing, adding that the true and proper relief of the poor consists in finding work for them, and taking care they do not live like drones upon the labour of others (1984: pp.78-9).

Because money in general lessens individuals' responsibility towards each other, the institution of wage labour, creates the possibility that one person could effectively subjugate others by forcing them to labour for a bare subsistence wage. Thus, money alienates individuals from each other. Since accumulation beyond need is legitimized labour will increasingly become labour for exchange. The emphasis is shifted from the survival of all individuals to the possibility of accumulation for each individual. Everyone who is able and willing to labour can survive by means of wage labour.¹¹ And because of this emphasis on labour for exchange as opposed to labour for use, labour becomes a more individualistic enterprise in the post-monetary world.

Locke insists that individuals' labour is their own. Macpherson replies that

If it is labour, a man's absolute property, which justifies appropriation and creates value, the individual right of appropriation overrides any moral claims of the society. The traditional view that property and labour were social functions, and that ownership of property involved social obligations, is thereby undermined (1962: p.221).

I would agree with Macpherson that this is usually how we have interpreted Locke's concept of labour in our modern context. The capitalist rationalization for unlimited accumulation considers that the primacy of ownership defeats all social obligations and that, in fact, liberal theory does give everyone an unlimited right to accumulation regardless of the social consequences.¹² But I would not agree with Macpherson to the extent he argues that this is what Locke understood. Although obligation between individuals is lessened in the post-monetary world, individuals still have duties towards one another. This duty follows from the principle of charity which is an element of the Law of Nature. This Law still applies in the post-monetary State of Nature and Civil Society. This duty of charity will be examined in more detail in the next chapter. For the moment it is necessary to explore further the consequences of the introduction of money.

The tacit agreement to the use of money changes the emphasis on the goals of labour. Individuals not only labour to ensure their survival; they also labour to accumulate property. The rights of individuals will be protected, including their rights to dispose of property. "All Men are naturally in...a State of perfect Freedom to...dispose of their Possessions" (T2:4). [And in a civil society people] "are allowed their due property, which is so to be Proprietors of what they have, that nobody can take away any part of it without their own consent" (T2:192).

This emphasis on the importance of rights is not an accurate description of

Locke's civil society. Within civil society, Locke understands that the laws of nature will still be important and that they should be obeyed. Locke states that "the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as others" (T2:135). This implies that legislation in civil society must "be conformable to the Law of Nature, i.e. the Will of God" (T2:135). The Law of Nature underlies all other legislation. Freedom, for Locke, is not complete license:

But Freedom is not, as we are told, a Liberty for every Man to do what he lists...but a Liberty to dispose, and order, as he lists, his Person, Actions, Possessions, and his whole Property, within the Allowance of those Laws under which he is (T2:57).

All rational individuals will have the liberty "to dispose of [their] Actions and Possessions according to [their] own Will, within the Permission of...the Law [of Nature]" (T2:59). One is never free from the Law of Nature. This is of crucial importance to Locke and to his society. The Law of Nature gives everyone duties, and these are as important or even more important than rights. These duties will be the focus of the following section.

CHAPTER 2.

DUTIES IN RELATION TO LABOUR

The context in which Locke introduces labour is essential to a proper understanding of the meaning of this concept in his work. Not only will it help us understand what Locke means by labour, it will also help us understand the limitations that Locke imposes on labour and appropriation. Since property is closely linked to labour for Locke, we will examine his concept of property. The relationships of obligation and duty between individuals can best be understood if the concept of property and the role it plays within Locke's theory is clear. This will also bring out certain tensions in Locke's understanding of ownership. It is usually assumed that Locke means ownership as private property but, as we shall see later, this is not necessarily the case for all instances of ownership. In section two of this chapter, we will examine property and the duties individuals have towards each other. In section three, we will look at Locke's two concepts of ownership and the implications of these different concepts for labour.

PART A

PROPERTY AND INDIVIDUAL DUTIES

Locke states that he will "endeavour to show, how Men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to Mankind in common: (T2:25). To accomplish this, he introduces the concept of labour. As noted by Wood in John Locke and Agrarian Capitalism, "if the world and its fruits were initially according to Locke, a divine gift to men in common, he justified its subsequent parcelization and privatization by individual labour" (1984: p.51). Thus Locke expounds a labour theory of property which holds that labour is the primary means to the acquisition of private property. Thus, property and labour are closely linked for Locke, and to fully understand his concept of labour, we must understand what he meant by property. As Locke's definition of property is clearer than his definition of labour, an examination of the former will shed light on his somewhat vague definition of the latter.

Locke employs two definitions of property. It is generally accepted that he gives a narrow definition of property as well as a 'broad' one.¹ Property in the narrow sense is the private possession of 'worldly objects' by an individual. These worldly objects can be the fruits of the earth, animals and land. Locke explains that

Property, whose Original is from the Right a Man has to use any of the Inferior Creatures, for the Subsistence and Comfort of his Life, is for the benefit and sole Advantage of the Proprietor, so that he may destroy the thing, that he has Property in by his use of it, where need requires (T1:92).

This is property in the narrow sense where, for example, individuals can possess animals and use them for food and other conveniences of life. Property, in this narrow sense, implies that individuals can dispose of their property as they see fit, in other words, property is alienable. The initial purpose of this property, at least in the pre-monetary State of Nature, is to provide the means of subsistence to individuals.

However, for Locke, property does not only mean possession of worldly goods. Locke also describes property broadly as "Lives, Liberties, and Estates" (T2:123). This understanding of property includes the freedom and lives of individuals as well as their worldly possessions. Locke explains that "(By Property I must be understood here, as in other places, to mean that Property which Men have in their Persons as well as Goods") (T2:173). This is the broad definition of property. The narrow definition of property understands property as individuals' material possessions only, not their rights or lives; the broad definition includes their possessions as well as their lives and rights.

Locke explains how an object can become a person's property: "Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed

his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property" (T2:27). Here, Locke is writing about property understood in the narrow sense. The property resulting from labour is an acquired property. Locke's explanation of appropriation through an individual's mixing of labour implies that he understands labour as relating only to property in the narrow sense. In fact, it is generally recognized that in the fifth chapter of the Second Treatise, where Locke discusses labour, he only explicitly discusses labour in relation to property in the narrow sense.² Geraint Parry asserts in John Locke that "nevertheless it is clear that in chapter five entitled 'Of Property' the topic is the narrower (understanding of property) of goods and land" (1978: p.198). But in the same chapter, Locke uses property in the broad sense to justify appropriation through labour. Appropriation is justified because "every Man has a Property in his own Person" (T2:27). Thus, for Locke, labour produces property in the narrow sense, but this acquisition is justified by property in the broad sense. Hence both types of property have some kind of relation to labour: one is to justify appropriation through labour, or to explain why an individual can appropriate; the other is to define how appropriation can occur.

For Locke, property and labour are inextricably linked, although one does not necessarily imply the other. Thus, what might appear to be a simple causal relation is in fact far more complex. There are ways of obtaining property other than labour. For example, property can come in the form of a gift. Although the recipient of the gift has

not expended any labour, the gift is still that person's property. For example, individuals have property in their own persons, and this property is a gift from God rather than the result of some action that was performed by the individuals themselves. Locke says that "Men...(are) all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker...whose Workmanship they are" (T2:6). Individuals have property in the broad sense in their own persons. The world is also a gift from God. All human beings possess the earth in common; it is a gift from God to Adam and his descendants. It is their labour as well as their quest for survival that will distinguish what and how much each of them can appropriate. The property that can be acquired through labour will be property in the narrow sense. Property then, can be acquired through labour or can be the result of a gift.

As John Dunn states in The Political Thought of John Locke, "it is God who constitutes the order of law which instructs men in their duties at all points in the world" (1969: p.15).³ Locke states God's directive in the following words, "God who bid Mankind increase, and multiply, ...[gives men] all a Right to make use of the Food and Rayment, and other Conveniences of life, the Materials whereof he has so plentifully provided for them" (T1:41). Humanity must increase and multiply. As Locke explains, "God in his infinite Wisdom has put strong desires of Copulation into the Constitution of Men, thereby to continue the race of Mankind" (T1:54).

In order to fulfil these commands individuals must have a right to self-

preservation. If self-preservation is a right, it is also under normal circumstances a duty. "Every one...is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station wilfully" (T2:6). Human beings are part of God's design, and God's design is to have the human race flourish and prosper. Locke explains that,

...Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker, All the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order and about his business, they are his Property, whose Workmanship they are, made to last during his, not anothers Pleasure (T2:6).

Because individuals are created by God, for God's pleasure, they must obey God's commands. One of these commands is that they must labour. Whether this command is punishment for men's sins (T1:44) or whether it is to improve the earth for the benefit of life (T2:32), it remains that God commands individuals to labour. "God, when he gave the World in common to all Mankind, commanded Man also to labour, and the penury of his Condition required it of him" (T2:32).

Along with the statement that the earth was given to individuals in common, Locke also reminds the reader at the beginning of the fifth chapter of the Second Treatise that individuals have a right to their self-preservation. Whether one consults natural reason or revelation, it is clear "that Men, being once born, have a right to their Preservation, and consequently Meat and Drink, and such other things, as Nature affords

for their Subsistence" (T2:25). It is within this context of the individual's right to self-preservation that Locke introduces labour. Individuals have a right to their self-preservation and this can only be accomplished through labour. If labour means appropriation, then individuals must appropriate.

The right and duty of self-preservation is important since it both explains why people must labour and why it is important that each person has a right to the fruits of his labour. Locke does not define the concept of labour explicitly, but rather states its purpose which is the preservation of the individual. For Locke, individuals can only survive if they can appropriate. Thus, labour is important because it is the means throughout which we can fulfil our duty to survive and prosper. It is not the act itself which is the subject of much discussion but rather its purpose and its goal.

If one observes the importance of God's directive, it is clear why Locke introduces the chapter on labour with the statement about the individual's right to self-preservation. Individuals must labour because they have both a right and a duty of self-preservation. The duty to preserve oneself and others will impose important constraints on Locke's conception of labour. As Richard Ashcraft notes in Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government,

Through their labouring activity, individuals are fulfilling an obligation to obey God's commands. This should not appear surprising since the command to labour is simply a specific manifestation of God's designs that govern the relationships posited by the theory of creationism (1986: p.262).

Self-preservation is not only the right and duty of a single individual, it is the right and duty of all individuals. In the State of Nature, all individuals are bound to each other by God's directive. Locke explains that

As Justice gives every Man a Title to the product of his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors descended to him, so Charity gives every Man a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise (T1:42).

This has important implications for property rights since the duty to flourish requires that sometimes one person has to give his surplus to someone in need. Charity is as important as justice. Justice secures individuals' rights (T2:219). Charity secures, as much as possible, everyone's survival in society. Individuals must not only act in a just manner, they must also act in a charitable way. This will insure prosperity for humanity. According to Raymond Polin in 'Justice in Locke's Philosophy' in Justice⁴ "it is...charity which comes first, according to the original Latin text of the Letter on Toleration (and in spite of the contrary sense of the English translation): The rule of justice ought to be added to the duties of benevolence and charity" (1963: p.276).

The duty of charity means that a person in need and in danger of perishing has a right to another's surplus. The individual's self-preservation is so important that in cases of extreme want, when there is no other recourse, the person in need has a right

to another's property. The individual right to survive overrides individual property rights. Equally important is the fact that every individual has an obligation to help those who are in a position of extreme want. Locke emphasises this when he writes,

Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station wilfully; so by the like reason when his own Preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind (T2:6).

All people are under an obligation to help those in extreme want by sharing their property, except where this puts their own survival at risk.

There has been some discussion, for example by James Tully and Bruno Rea, of whether Locke meant this as a real obligation to one's neighbour or whether he simply acknowledged Christian charity. James Tully claims in A Discourse on Property that for Locke "Charity is a natural duty which follows from the nature of property in a manner strikingly similar to Aquina's formulation of charity...Locke, rather than undermining the traditional obligations associated with property, gives them a particularly firm basis. Charity is a right on the part of the needy and a duty on the part of the wealthy" (1980: p.132). According to Tully's reading, a person has not only the right to a means of survival (uncultivated land), but a starving person has a right to survive itself which can be the fruits of another person's labour. Tully has been challenged for his reading of Locke. Bruno Rea notes in 'John Locke: Between Charity and Welfare Rights', in Journal

of Social Philosophy, Vol. 18, 19, 1987, "the most that this reading will yield is that men have a moral duty to respect one another's lives and this will at times include the voluntary extension of assistance to those in a state of privation" (1987: p.18). I would agree with Tully and argue against Rea that this obligation is more than a voluntary extension; it is a moral and a necessary duty that must be fulfilled in order to obey God's express orders. Rational human beings act in such a charitable way because they understand that humanity can only prosper if individuals help each other to survive. For Rea, this 'charity' must be by definition a voluntary act. He explains "If there exists a title to my charity then it ceases to be charity, for it is no longer voluntary, and withholding it is no longer purely a matter of sin. If Locke meant for the poor to have a title to a portion of my plenty, it amounts to a moral claim which is not subject to government enforceability: (1987: p.19). Rea seems to forget that for Locke the Law of Nature underlies all legislation. Rights are the subject of civil legislation but duties are not a matter of civil legislation. They are ingrained in a person's rational nature, they devolve from reason. Charity is far more than a voluntary act, it is a duty. Not only does the labourer have an obligation to needier persons, these needy persons have a right to the labourer's products. The principle of charity insures humanity's survival and it cannot be a matter of will. Rea understands charity in a modern context and equates it with altruism. The directive to prosper must be obeyed. Hence the limits put on labour and appropriation are crucial to the human race, and must be adhered to if humanity is to

prosper.

I would argue that Locke's charity is just as important as justice. Locke mentions justice and charity as principles to regulate individuals' lives (T1:42). Locke also talks about justice and charity when he says "the Duties [men] owe one another" from which are derived the "great Maxims of Justice and Charity" (T2:5). Later Locke tells us that "the same Law of Nature...that...give us Property, does also bound that Property" (T2:31). For Locke both principles, justice and charity, are needed to regulate individuals' lives. One gives individuals a title to property and the other gives everyone a title to survival. If humanity cannot prosper without appropriation, it cannot flourish without promoting everyone's survival, as much as possible. Locke states that individuals must preserve themselves and "by the like reason" (T2:6) preserve others. The preservation of others is as important as an individual's own self-preservation. Reason tells the individual to preserve oneself as well as humanity. Hence, charity is far more than simple altruism; it is a duty to obey God's directive. Locke did not mean that in an ideal State of Nature all individuals should be altruistic. Rather, he meant that all individuals are bound to God's commands, and one of God's commands is that all humans flourish. This implies sharing their property when the need arises. Duty is therefore essential to Locke's argument. In The Political Thought of John Locke, John Dunn explains that for Locke, "What defines human life is a set of duties and the right to promote happiness in any way compatible with these duties. It is a mistake to see man's

right to promote his happiness, wide though it may be, as having a priority over his duties" (1969: p.218).

Individuals are bound by the principles of charity. Locke does not elaborate on this principle of charity. He has given the broad instances in which charity is required, and now each individual has the task of applying the principles of charity in the appropriate circumstance. This obligation is rather vague, but it is, nonetheless, a real obligation. As Geraint Parry remarks in John Locke,

Respect for others thus follows from one's right that others respect oneself. But Locke goes further and suggests that the law of nature imposes a more positive duty to come to the assistance of others when their preservation is threatened. The duty to safeguard oneself as God's workmanship cannot be divorced from a duty to preserve the rest of those of God's creations which are in all essentials similar to oneself (1978: p.41).

Individuals are not isolated from each other but bound to each other in their quest for survival.

The purpose of labour is therefore not just one person's survival but that of others as well. Hence, a person's labour cannot always become labour for exchange. The labourer who gives away the products of his labour to a needy neighbour does not get anything back for his efforts except the satisfaction of knowing the needy person has

been saved from extreme want and that he has fulfilled his Christian duty. There is no personal gain involved in such labour as there would be if the products of labour had been used for personal consumption or exchange. Nonetheless, Locke understands that each individual might have to provide such a labour. This is required because all individuals are part of God's creation. Richard Ashcraft states in Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government,

In Locke's view, God has a wider purpose in mind than simply providing for the individual's self-preservation; rather, individual labour is seen as contributory action to the improvement and benefit of life, taken in a collective sense. Again, should not surprise us, for Locke's view of natural law is that it is designed to provide for the common good, and the benefit of mankind, and that it is given as a standard to individuals who exist as part of a 'natural community'. It is within this teleological framework...that the entire discussion in Chapter five of the Second Treatise must be viewed (1986: pp.264-65).

The implications of this framework on labour cannot be ignored. Under certain circumstances, because of our duties to others, labour becomes labour for use. Hence Locke's concept of labour includes as use value as well as exchange value.

Individuals appropriate so they can survive, but they must also be aware that the rest of humanity also has the right to do the same. This follows from the point

already established, that property rights are limited by the duty of charity. The principle of charity dictates to individuals the manner in which they can dispose of their property. This limitation is reinforced by the fact that individuals are also bound to others in terms of restrictions on their acts of labouring. Locke says that "For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others" (T2:27). Since everyone has a right to self-preservation, each person has the right to the means of survival. Hence, a person cannot appropriate without leaving enough and as good for others. In the pre-monetary State of Nature, Locke limits the amount of raw materials that a person can labour upon. In times of extreme want, an individual has rights to another's surplus property, but in ordinary times every individual has the right to adequate objects of labour such that survival is insured.

According to the Law of Nature, individuals' rights to property (in the narrow sense) must not infringe upon others' property (in the broad sense): "The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in Life, Health, Liberty or Possessions" (T2:6). Furthermore, according to the principle of charity, individuals self-preservation (property in the broad sense) will have an impact on others' property (in the narrow sense). If an individual is starving (property in the broad sense is threatened), one has the right to another's plenty (property in the narrow sense). It also implies that one person cannot always use the products of

his labour for exchange, in particular instances the products of his labour will have to be used to satisfy needs. If a labourer's neighbour is starving, then this labourer cannot barter the surplus products of his labour: he is bound to give enough away to keep the needy neighbour from starvation. This means that in the case of providing for someone, labour can only be labour for use, it cannot be labour for exchange. Thus labour cannot become labour for exchange simply according to the labourer's will. In the specific situation where a person is providing for a needy one, labour expended can only be labour for use. Locke does not explicitly distinguish between labour for exchange and labour for use. In fact, he assumes that in the pre-monetary State of Nature all initial labour is labour for use because it provides subsistence for the labourer. Locke understands labour to be both for use and for exchange. Circumstances will dictate when it is for exchange or for use. Charity will also have implication for labour itself. This is reflected in Locke's discussion of the limitations of appropriation and, hence, labour (T2:27,31).

So labour is tied to duty; its primary function is the survival of the labourer as well as other individuals. The freedom to dispose of the products of their labour, is limited by the Law of Nature. As seen in the previous chapter, no one is ever free from the Law of Nature. Since duties are part of the Law of Nature, they are integral to any society. The emphasis on rights in civil society may obscure duties, but it does not eradicate them. Individuals, as rational beings, are bound to preserve each other through their labour.

This duty to aid one another which results from God's command to prosper and flourish also implies that individuals must propagate the species. Locke says that "God in his infinite Wisdom has put strong desires of Copulation into the Constitution of Men, thereby to continue the race of Mankind" (T1:54). By having children, parents are fulfilling to God's plans to perpetuate the race. However, this also entails a duty. Once children are born, they must be raised and cared for, parents will have specific duties towards their children.

According to Locke, parents' duties follow from the divine plan. Contrary to Locke's vague description of individuals' duties towards one another, the duties of parents towards their children are described in detail and at length. Locke explains that the consequences of God's command,

gives Children a Title, to share in the Property of their Parents, and a Right to Inherit their Possessions. Men are not Proprietors of what they have merely for themselves, their Children have a Title to part of it...Men begin by a like Obligation bound to preserve what they have begotten, as to preserve themselves, their issue come to have a Right in the Goods they are possessed of. That Children have such a Right is plain from the Laws of God (T1: 88).

This obligation (also repeated in Sections 89 and 90 of the First Treatise), must now be examined in detail.

Children, just like any human being, have a right to self-preservation. Given the fact that all children are unable to care for themselves, this right entails a claim upon their parents' property. This includes first, the right of children to share in their parents' property while they are being raised and second, a right of inheritance. Children have a right to enjoy the same standard of living as their parents enjoy.

For Children being by the course of Nature, born weak and unable to provide for themselves, they have by the appointment of God himself, who hath thus ordered the course of nature, a Right to be nourished and maintained by their Parents, nay a right not only to a bare Subsistence but to the conveniences and comforts of Life, as far as the conditions of their Parents can afford it (T1:89).

Thus, parents must labour for their own self-preservation as well as for their children's. The children have a right to this care until they are old enough to fend for themselves. As Locke claims, "All which seems no more than that Duty, which God and Nature has laid on Man as well as other Creatures, to preserve their Off-spring, till they can be able to shift for themselves" (T2:60). Parents have an on-going duty towards their children which will last until the children can care for themselves. Furthermore, this care comprises many types of duties: the physical needs of children must be met, they must be fed and clothed, and their intellectual needs must also be cared for.

Children must be guided and educated and this important task is the duty of their

parents. Locke notes the specific obligation of parents

All Parents were, by the Law of Nature, under an obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the Children they had begotten, not as their own Workmanship, but the Workmanship of their own Maker, the Almighty, to who they were accountable for them (T2:56).

Again Locke states "the first part then of Paternal Power, or rather Duty...is Education" (T2:69). Locke explains that children are not born with a mature rational faculty. "We are born Free, as we are born Rational, not that we have actually the Exercise of either: Age that brings one, brings with it the other too" (T2:61). Until rationality is cultivated, that is until the age of reason is attained, parents have the obligation to provide for their children and help their children attain full rationality. "To inform the Mind, and govern the Actions of their yet ignorant Nonage, till Reason shall take its place, and ease them of that Trouble, is what the Children want, and the Parents are bound to" (T2:58). Children depend absolutely on their parents for all their needs, both physical and intellectual.

Moreover, this duty to educate their children also has a social dimension. Through education, children become invaluable members of the society. Thus, the performance of parental duty towards children also follow from God's command that the human species should flourish. By educating their children so they become full

participating members of society, parents help society acquire fully rational members. Thus they increase the stock of able minded citizens. In this sense, the parents' performance of this duty helps their children as well as society who will benefit from these functioning members.

It is clear therefore that parents have a much stronger obligation towards their children than towards other individuals. The obligation one person might have towards another has a limited time span. An individual is only required to provide for another adults' extreme wants. The underlying assumption is that once the person is helped, he will be able to fend for themselves again. As James Tully notes in A Discourse on Property, "the duties of charity arise out of the particular circumstances and thus are absolutely binding only when the requisite circumstances are present" (1980: p.43). An individual is obliged to another only if his self-preservation is not threatened. But parents must not only ensure their own self-preservation, they must also insure their children's. Parents are bound to their children by a duty that goes far beyond charity. The principle of charity requires only that individuals give away their surplus, but children have a right to share fully in their parents estate.

Now, despite the fact that parents have absolute duties toward their children, this does not mean that they have absolute power over them. This power extends only so far as is necessary for guidance and discipline of the children. Although individuals are free because they have reason, Locke argues that: "letting individuals act according

to their free will before they have reached the age of reason would be to "thrust (him) out amongst Brutes" (T2:63). For this reason parents have authority "to govern the Minority of their Children" (T2:63). But this power is limited in range and in time. Once children have reached the age of reason, they are free.

Thus parents are guardians of their children, rather than their owners. Children have a duty to honour their parents but that is the extent of the parents' due. In sections fifty-two to fifty-four of the First Treatise, Locke explains that parents cannot own their children because they did not 'make' or 'create' them. All humans being the workmanship of God, are God's possessions. Children are God's creation and therefore God's possession. Locke clearly states the limits of parental power:

[The father's] Command over his Children is but temporary, and reaches not their Life or Property. It is but a help to the weakness and imperfection of their Nonage, a Discipline necessary to their Education: And though a Father may dispose of his own Possessions as he pleases, when his Children are out of danger of perishing for want, yet his power extends not the Lives and Goods, which either their own industry, or anothers bounty has made theirs, nor to their Liberty neither, when they are once arrived to the enfranchisement of the years of discretion (T2:65).

PART B

LOCKE'S CONCEPTS OF OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR LABOUR

When Locke discusses the property individuals have in their own persons, in section twenty-seven of the Second Treatise, he understands property in the broad sense; when he discusses the fruits of individuals' labour, he understands property in the narrow sense. Schwarzenbach, in "Locke's Two Conceptions of Property", demonstrates that just as there are two concepts of property, there are also two distinct conceptions of ownership operating within Locke's thought. These two notion of ownership are what Schwarzenbach calls "stewardship" and "private property". According to Schwarzenbach, much of the debate in the secondary literature, especially between James Tully and C.B. Macpherson, can be explained by an unacknowledged tension in Locke's understanding of ownership.⁵ She argues that, "Numerous perplexities found in Locke's thought (regarding suicide, the alienation of labour, and so on) may be clarified by keeping (the notions of stewardship and private property) distinct" (1988: p.141).

Although individuals have property in their own person, they certainly do not have the right to dispose of themselves as they please because as we saw earlier, they are God's possessions and therefore are obliged to follow his command to survive and

prosper. Thus, individuals relate to their persons as 'guardians' in the same way as parents relate to their children. This is an example of ownership as 'stewardship' which occurs when what is obtained as a gift is human life. This type of ownership involves certain moral obligations that are not present in ownership as private property. As Schwarzenbach notes,

We thus find in Locke's theory a form of ownership where

- i) various items are obtained as gifts (our life, limb, equal juridical freedom, and so on),
- ii) we relate to these (normally inalienable) items as guardians, and importantly,
- iii) our particular relations to others (to, or by way of, the donor) remain in the foreground; our moral relation to others directly conditions and circumscribes our legitimate private use and enjoyment (1988: p.148).

In Locke's State of Nature, individuals are responsible primarily for their own self-preservation and, to a lesser degree, for that of others. Self-preservation is a duty: individuals are responsible for their persons, and they cannot dispose of themselves as they wish. One example, of such limitations is that they cannot enslave themselves:

For a Man, not having the Power of his own Life, cannot, by Compact, or his own Consent, enslave himself to anyone, nor put himself under the Absolute, Arbitrary Power of another, to take away his life, when he please (T2:23).

As Schwarzenbach claims, if an individual does not have power of his own life, then he does not properly own it as private property. They must treat this life with respect and attempt to utilize the opportunity God has given them to improve life. Thus, Locke states that an individual does not have that power over himself: "and nobody has an absolute Arbitrary Power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own Life, or take away the Life or Property of another" (T2:135). Individuals cannot dispose of their lives because they belong to God. It can be argued that Stewardship of one's person means that one is essentially the guardian of God's private property and that all stewardship comes out of an initial private property. I would agree that in the specific case of stewardship of individuals, Locke does think of them as being God's private property. Since God is the creator and maker of people only he can dispose of them as he wishes. Thus it could be argued that there is only one fundamental type of property for Locke: private property. But Locke discusses property in relation to individuals and the implication is still that they are involved in two types of property relation: that of stewardship and that of private property.

Individuals have limits imposed on their right of appropriation such that humanity as a whole can best flourish. All persons have a duty, however minimal at times, to each other. Hence, all persons act as stewards of their own person and, to a certain extent, as stewards of their neighbour. This is especially true in the case of children. Locke calls parents the "guardians" of children. Parents cannot own their

children,⁶ yet they must fulfil certain duties towards them. Parents, then, act as stewards of their children. Schwarzenbach's claim, that individuals can have a certain relation of ownership as stewardship, is well-supported.

The other concept of ownership examined by Schwarzenbach is that of private property. This concept is "Modeled on a single human being's exclusive relation to a single material object" (1988: p.147). Individuals labour on objects and these objects of labour can become their private possessions. This understanding of private property is the type of ownership that is most associated with our modern understanding of productive labour.⁷ Productive labour produces 'Commodities' or objects that are made for trade and exchange purposes. Such objects are produced with the intention of disposing of them. This type of ownership has been stressed in much of political theory as the only type of ownership understood by Locke. As Schwarzenbach notes, however, it is misleading to consider either type of ownership without taking into account the other. Failure to heed this advice has led many Locke scholars to overlook the role played by ownership as stewardship.⁸

Both types of ownership are characterized by a different relationship between the owner and the 'particular other' of ownership.⁹ In ownership as stewardship, the owner cannot dispose of the particular other of stewardship at will, and usually the owner has some obligations towards this other. The implication is that this other has a certain objective worth separate from its owner, and regardless of its use value or relation to the

owner. In ownership as private property on the other hand, the owner can dispose of the object of ownership, which implies that the object does not have much worth apart from its value to the owner. Once the object's use or function is no longer important to the owner, he can dispose of it at will, it can be traded for something else. So, ownership as private property implies that the object of ownership does not have much inherent worth.

We must now examine the concept of labour in relation to the two different types of ownership discussed above. Stewardship as we have seen implies duties. The particular other of stewardship must be taken care of, and this care will involve some labour, specifically a labour for use. In ownership as stewardship, the labourers are under an obligation to perform these duties. For example, when individuals become parents, they become the guardians of their children and must therefore assume certain responsibilities with regard to providing for their children. Stewardship means that a certain amount of labour must be performed in the fulfilment of the duties in question. The individual is bound to this obligation by the Law of Nature. The duty is applied equally to an individual's own survival, and the survival of others under the individual's care. Individuals are also bound to preserve others, as much as possible. The labour involved in providing for a needy neighbour will also fulfil a duty. In all instances of stewardship, the labourer must therefore obey the Law of Nature. The labour in this case is performed in accordance with God's command. Its specific value derives directly

from the fact that it carries out God's wishes.

In ownership as private property, however, the value comes mostly from the activity of the labourer. The prime objective of such labour will be either barter or accumulation. The labourer is free to decide whether or not he will labour. As long as he has laboured enough to ensure his survival, no additional labour need be accomplished. The labour, in this case, does not have much value in itself, but it adds value to the object laboured upon because it makes it more suitable for human consumption or use.

Locke only considered labour in the sense of labour on private property. He did not bother to qualify the duty of parents or individuals, nor did he bother to analyze it further than to say it was a duty that had to be performed. But it remains that in Locke's society, this duty is required and performed by individuals who are stewards. The labour involved in carrying out such duties is labour of obligation: it is necessary labour. Labour of obligation can occur in three instances: when one person is in extreme want and requires the surplus of another's labour; when a person ensures his own self-preservation and when parents are taking care of their children. When an individual is a steward, he is bound to perform labour of obligation. In Locke's society, stewardship involves people, whereas private property includes anything non-human, from animals to inanimate objects. Labour of obligation cannot be said to add value to the particular other of stewardship, in the material sense that labour adds value to private property. The particular other of stewardship has an inherent value. Labour of obligation can be

said to help the particular other of stewardship in his survival and thus ensures his continuation as a member or a potential member of society.

Individuals' responsibilities towards each other are important in the pre-monetary State of Nature. The principle of charity keeps individuals from extreme want. As well, the spoilage clause and the enough and as good clause ensure that everyone can exercise their right and duty to self-preservation. This right and duty is not an individualistic enterprise in the pre-monetary State of Nature. Everyone has to actively look out for the next person. These duties become diminished in the post-monetary world, but the duty of charity still remains operative. Individuals must be kept from extreme want, but with the possibility of wage labour, the principle of charity becomes minimized. Individuals may have to ensure their survival by labouring under dire conditions, but as long as minimal survival is ensured, the principle of charity is not contravened. Nonetheless, in the post-monetary world, some social obligations remain and individuals are still bound to each other by the principle of charity. In the case where a labourer must rescue another from extreme want, labour of obligation is performed.

In the state of Nature individuals were only bound to each other as long as their own self-preservation was not threatened. The duties of parents towards children is much stronger and remains largely unaltered by the agreement to use money. The society of husbands and wives must precede that of parents and children since its chief end is "the continuation of the Species" (T2:79). According to Locke, conjugal society can "subsist

and obtain its ends" without civil society (T2:83). Civil society can only decide "any Contraversie that may arise between Man and Wife" (T2:83). Otherwise, government must stay out of marriages. A husband and a wife have entered a contract which determines the specific character of their relationship. Locke does not consider whether the wife labours for her husband when she is taking care of him. Although from our earlier discussion it is clear that the wife's labour for her husband has use value. While Locke is vague about the state of the wife's labour, he does state that the husband cannot forfeit what his wife or his children own. "For as to the Wife's share, whether her own Labour or Compact gave her Title to it, 'tis plain, Her Husband could not forfeit what was hers" (T2:183). Although Locke does not explain explicitly the origin of the wife's possessions, it is certain that they are hers and no one else can dispose of them without her consent. Part of her labour can be understood as labour for exchange since she has a title to fruits of her labour and thus a private property in them. But much of her labour, the labour done on her husband's property, and the labour expended on their children, is labour for use. The wife has entered into a contract which stipulates that she must perform certain duties. The performance of these will not be labour for exchange, but it is labour nevertheless. Each society, whether conjugal, parental or master-servant, will involve certain duties and these must be honoured.

For Locke, these different societies, conjugal, parental, master-servant and civil society, are all distinct and have different relations (T2:2). Locke states that the chief

end of conjugal society is procreation and that off-springs have "a Right to be nourished and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themselves" (T2:78). Although Locke states that children must be educated, he does not claim that civil society actually recognizes the rights of children to be educated. In fact, he considers that conjugal society can legislate itself and that the society of children and parents can also do the same, except for the matter of property. The rights of children to education and food are to be protected within the family and not civil society. Thus the labour involved in providing for children and educating seems to be forgotten by civil society. Civil society does not explicitly recognize the need for labour in educating and raising children. Civil society only implicitly assumes that such labour will take place within the confines of the family and sees no reason to address the problem any further.

The reason for this is that Locke assumes that individuals must perform their duties, regardless of the society they are in. The duties which devolve from the Law of Nature must always be performed. They are fundamental to any society. The Law of Nature is unwritten and because of this, individuals join into civil society to avoid misapplying it (T2:135). But as Locke states "the positive laws of society...(are) made conformable to the Laws of Nature" (T1:92), and the Laws of Civil Society are "founded on the Law of Nature " (T2:12). Locke understands that an individual in civil society will perform all the duties dictated by the Law of Nature, whether or not these are explicitly recognised by civil society. In fact, he states that "the obligations of the Law

of Nature...cease not in society" (T2:135). Even though the law of nature is unwritten and the duties it requires are also unwritten, they must be performed to ensure that the essential ends of society is fulfilled. The Law of Nature and the duties it dictates underlie all rational behaviour.

CHAPTER 3.

CONCLUSION

The principle of charity is as important as that of justice in Locke's political theory. Proper conduct will only result if both are obeyed. Justice insures, among other things, that an individual's property is protected and that one is not caused undue harm. Charity ensures that individuals are kept from want so that humanity as a whole will survive. The principle of justice promotes the welfare of the individual and the principle of charity promotes the welfare of the community. Both are crucial because the end of society is not only the preservation of one person, but humanity in general. This is a fundamental tenet of the Law of Nature.

The Law of Nature underlies all societies, whether conjugal, parental, master-servant or civil. Duties that are required by the Law of Nature and the principle of charity must be performed. The principle of charity imposes restrictions on individuals' labour and their right of appropriation. In the pre-monetary State of Nature, individuals are subject to the 'spoilage' clause and the 'enough and as good' clause. They have to share the surplus of their labour and they cannot appropriate without limitation. If a neighbour is in extreme want, they have a duty to give whatever conveniences of life as

might be required to keep that person from extreme want. In the pre-monetary State of Nature individuals must share the products of their labour. They cannot dispose of the products of their labour according to their personal whims. In the post-monetary world of civil society, money effectively removes the 'spoilage' clause and the 'enough-and-as-good' clause. But the duty to keep others from extreme want is still effective. Individuals must be charitable; they are never completely free from their duties towards each other. For Locke, "the Natural Liberty of Man is...to have only the Law of Nature for his Rule" (T2:22). And in civil society, liberty is "to have a standing Rule to live by, common to every one of that Society..." (T2:22), but this rule will be subject to the Law of Nature (T2:135).

Locke understands labour as a functional act, the primary function of labour is the survival of the individual and humanity. In the pre-monetary State of Nature, labour for exchange is only of secondary importance to Locke; it can only take place once the other goals of labour have been attained. Labour is originally intended for the labourers' survival as well as the survival of their neighbours and children. Only once this survival is ensured can exchange take place. In the post-monetary society, labour for exchange becomes increasingly important because individuals can labour to accumulate and trade becomes more important. Wage relationships can be agreed to and henceforth labour becomes a commodity.

Labour for exchange is not the only type of labour which take place in Locke's

post-monetary society. The labour that is required to perform a duty, such as feeding a needy person or a child, is not labour for exchange but rather labour for use. Because of the possibility of wage relationship and the effective removal of the 'spoilage' and 'enough and as good' clauses, the proportion of labour for use decreases. Labour for exchange is emphasized and it encourages individuals to become more prosperous, but labour for use is still required. Individuals must still be kept from extreme want, and children must be cared for. Therefore, labour for use is an essential aspect of Locke's understanding of labour.

Although Locke says individuals have property in their own persons, he does not mean that they can dispose of themselves as they please. It is the individuals' duty to promote their self-preservation, as well as that of others. This type of property implies certain duties, that must be understood in the context of ownership as stewardship. All individuals are stewards of their own persons, other people in need and their own children. In the case of others, duties will be required to keep them from extreme want. In the case of children, duties will be required until they reach the age of reason. The physical and educational needs of children will have to be attended. The labour involved in performing duties is labour of obligation. This labour is not only socially necessary, it is also politically significant. One of the chief ends of society, the survival of humanity, could not be attained if labour of obligation were not performed. Thus Locke's political theory relies implicitly on this labour.

Productive labour is not a concept that is used by Locke, nor is it relevant to his pre-monetary State of Nature, because he understands labour as primarily labour for use. In the post-monetary world, however, labour for exchange can properly be called productive labour. However, to assume that all labour is productive labour is to miss the essential role played by Locke's notion of obligations and duties. These cannot be ignored because they are required by the Law of Nature. This tension in Locke's understanding of labour has not been fully exposed in much of the secondary literature. To claim that all labour is productive labour is to leave out an important segment of Locke's understanding of society.

Strauss and Macpherson contend that once Locke shows how money allows men to overcome the spoilage and sufficiency limits he makes the proper function of labour the unlimited appropriation of wealth. In The Political Thought of John Locke, John Dunn attempts to block the claim that Locke justifies unlimited appropriation by showing that the concept of labour was significant for Locke as the central component of the Puritan religious doctrine of the calling (1969: pp. 214-61).

The doctrine of the calling begins with the tenet that God summons all men to labour in this world for salvation in the next. In this respect all men are equal in the eyes of God. Since salvation is a private matter between each individual and God, the doctrine of the calling is highly individualistic, so no one may interfere with another's works. In addition to fulfilling the requirements of the general calling---such as prayer and pious

work--in order to gain salvation, the individual has a duty to labour strenuously in the particular calling (employment) for which God has chosen him. For Dunn, both the general and particular callings are religious activities. Therefore, individual labour is a religious activity directed toward the rewards not of this world but of the next.

The political doctrine of the Two Treatises is an important part of Locke's overall scheme for ensuring that the individual is capable of fulfilling his or her religious commitments. Since the doctrine of property is the central part of that political teaching it too is directed at the same end. Natural law teaches that as God's workmanship every man has a duty to preserve himself and others. To perform this duty everyone has a natural right to liberty and to the materials necessary to accomplish it. Men then use their natural right in their labour to appropriate those materials. Locke's purpose in arguing for an individual right to property is to guarantee that every individual has the materials necessary to keep healthy in his calling (Dunn, 1982: pp .246-7). The individualistic nature of one's calling does not eliminate positive duties toward others. Everyone has a duty to use his property for his preservation as well as that of others (Dunn, 1982: p.217). Although the individual has to labour in his calling to acquire the materials he needs, he cannot make material wealth the objective of his labouring in his calling. Labour is a religious activity aimed at the religious goal of salvation and the penalty for pursuing wealth for its own sake is eternal damnation. Therefore, Locke's concept of labour cannot be employed in any justification of unlimited individual appropriation.

It is at this point that Tully's analysis of Locke's use of labour meshes with Dunn's. Tully states that labour serves to identify each person's share of the common to which he has a prior inclusive right. Everyone has a duty to appropriate his share and to use it for the preservation of himself and others. Labour only gives each man title to so much exclusive possessions as he needs to stay healthy in his calling and no more. This amount is set by the natural tendency of things to spoil. Acquisition of one's share puts into effect the pattern of property distribution entailed by the natural law principal to preserve mankind. Since this is the distributive pattern which satisfies natural law, it ensures that everyone has what he needs to labour in his calling and therefore it is the pattern consistent with the religious duty of all men to labour for salvation.

It becomes clear that there are a variety of views among political theorists in regard to Locke's concept of labour. However, they appear to overlook the importance of labour as generating use value. I would argue that such an omission in the debate can no longer be acceptable. Many secondary writers including those mentioned above fail to see duties as requiring labour. Rather it has been assumed that duties are just a part of human nature and are to be taken for granted. Macpherson and Strauss both discuss labour solely as productive. While they discount the importance of labour of obligation generally, Macpherson mentions the inadequacy of understanding all labour as productive labour (1989: p.65). Yet he fails to see that the duties required within society are also important. Omitting labour of obligation makes Locke's society more individualistic than

he intended it to be because this omission overlooks individuals' duties and emphasises only their rights. Without obligations, society as a whole cannot flourish. Locke did not have such a society in mind.

While the rights of individuals are usually emphasised in Locke's civil society, it should be remembered that, although rights are protected by civil society, they are nonetheless subordinate to the Law of Nature. The Law of Nature will ascribe certain duties and "the Obligations of the Law of Nature...cease not in Society" (T2:135). Although it is usually assumed that the purpose of society is the protection of the individual, Locke also emphasizes that "the fundamental Law of Nature [is]...the preservation of Mankind" (T2:135). Thus duties are as important as rights in Locke's society because they ensure humanity's survival.

Locke's concept of labour is understood to be productive labour in part because he expounds a labour theory of value. He considers that labour adds most of the value to the object of labour. This does not seem to be easily reconcilable with calling labour of obligation labour proper. But Locke considers labour in the context of appropriation. And in such a context, labour of obligation means to give away the products of one's labour to another. This labour does not involve adding value to the needy other, it simply helps him survive. An activity that makes possible one's own survival is labour, and by extension an activity that makes possible another's survival is also labour. As Locke states: one of man's powers is "to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of

himself and others within the permission of the Law of Nature" (T2:128). This emphasis on the individual's and others' preservation is crucial to Locke's society and involves labour.

Feminists have often criticised the narrow understanding of politically relevant labour as productive labour, and they are right in pointing out that it necessarily leaves women out of any social contract. Society relies on reproductive labour yet assumes it will automatically be taken on by women. This burden, in turn, puts women at a distinct disadvantage because society values productive labour as the only politically significant labour. Without meaning to ascribe this view to feminists, I have held that reproductive labour is a type of labour of obligation. It is inherent to Locke's parental and conjugal societies. The duties that such a society imposes must be performed, as all duties proper to other societies must be performed. Unfortunately, the importance of duties has been overlooked in Locke's society. They are not considered to require any labour and moreover are simply taken for granted.

Modern political theories cannot discount the significance of labour of obligation in general and non-productive labour in general. In Democratic Theory, Macpherson notes the inadequacy of understanding all labour as productive labour. He analyses this from the perspective of "productive and extra-productive powers" (1989: p.65). He claims that

A man's extra-productive power (his ability to engage in activities which are simply a direct source of enjoyment) is, by democratic concept of man's essence, at least as important as his productive power (his abilities to use his energies and capacities in the production of material goods) (1989: p.67).

At least Macpherson acknowledges that a political theory should not only recognize the productive capacities of individuals but should also allow for their other non-productive capacities. But he fails to see that the duties required within society are also important. Individuals have certain duties towards each other, as is obvious in the case of reproductive labour. If these are not addressed within a political theory, it will leave the persons that must perform these duties in a position of disadvantage. Labour cannot be uncritically accepted as productive labour if we are to institute the political basis for a society that is fair and understanding of the well-being of all its members.

For those, such as, Macpherson and Strauss who advocate the unlimited accumulation of property the idea of accepting duties as labour would present some difficulty. The concept that fulfilling parental duties to children is a form of labour is not recognized by many scholars. The very motivation of such labour is inconsistent with the theory of unlimited appropriation.

Both Dunn and Tully oppose the unlimited accumulation of property but also fail to elevate labour associated with one's duties on a level with labour for exchange.

Dunn claims that since natural law originally entails a system of limited appropriation, only that system is consistent with the natural duty to preserve mankind and that is why it must be preserved. The invention of money does not mark an end of natural poverty but the end of man's comfortable and peaceful existence in the state of nature. Natural law now emphatically dictates limited appropriation. For Dunn, natural laws are immutable standards which men must always follow if they wish to fulfil their duty to preserve mankind.

I believe that it is fully possible to view Locke as a philosopher who saw labour as both productive and non-productive. He also placed as much value on labour associated with one's duties as he did on labour for exchange. He was also a philosopher who had broken away from his religious foundations. This being so it would mean that Macpherson and Strauss were partially correct in contrast to Dunn whose interpretation doesn't withstand criticism. This being so, however, does not commit me to fully embrace either Macpherson or Strauss. I contend that one can accept Dunn's conclusions without having to accept Dunn's reasons for those conclusions. If that conclusion is in part a limitation on what humans find it necessary to acquire, it would mean that the views of Macpherson and Strauss must be incorrect. Contrary to Dunn, Macpherson and Strauss, Locke was a philosopher who saw labour for exchange and labour for use value on an equal footing.

ENDNOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. See for example, Sybil Schwarzenbach, 'Rawls and Ownership: the Forgotten Category of Reproductive Labour' in Science, Morality and Feminist Theory, Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielson, eds. Also, Lorenne M. G. Clark, 'Women and Locke: Who owns the Apples in the Garden of Eden' in The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: Women and Reproduction from Plato to Nietzsche, Lorenne M.G. Clark and Lynda Longe, eds.
2. See Yolton, Compass, 193-4. Locke does say elsewhere that money (silver) has "intrinsic value", but he there seems to mean by "intrinsic value" what he calls in the Treatises "fancy or "fantastical" value.
3. See for example, C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Also, John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke. John A. Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights. James Tully, A Discourse on Property.

CHAPTER 1

1. Some have seen the "enough and as good" limit as the important limit on property in Locke (although they would not describe it as a "fair share limit"), a limit that renders the waste limit pointless or of distinctly secondary importance. Nozick provides the most prominent example of this view. (Anarchy, 175-176)
2. "If the enough and as good clause had been intended by Locke as a limit on property, it is not clear how this limit could be overcome once the abundance of the first ages was no more" (Simmons, 1992: p.289)
3. D.A. Lloyd Thomas in Locke on Government argues that this "argument evidently fails, because when a person has made something hers in the sense of having digested it, she does not necessarily possess it in a way that shows anything about property rights. She would have no right to it if she had stolen what she had eaten.

So even if she has digested the apples she has picked, it still may be that she has stolen them, and that they belong to mankind in common." (1995: p.112)

4. Macpherson and Strauss regard spoilage as a restriction on man's natural right to appropriation which men strive to overcome. Strauss sees spoilage as the chief cause of man's poverty in the state of Nature. James Tully says that spoilage is not an obstacle to appropriation, but a natural standard which guarantees all men a comfortable existence.
5. Versions of this boundary problem critique are offered by Nozick, (ANARCHY, 174).
6. "Someone may be made worse off by another's appropriation, first by losing the opportunity to improve his situation by a particular appropriation, second by no longer being able to use freely, without appropriation, what he previously could." The terminology is Nozick's. Nozick in fact conceded that Locke "may have intended" a stringent proviso, despite Nozick's own preference for a weaker version. (ANARCHY, 176).
7. Some have dealt with problems of society by saying that Locke just 'falsely assumes a continuing condition of bounty in the world. An example is Waldron, "Enough and as Good", 322-24. The only author I know who claims that Locke assumes the opposite condition of permanent scarcity is Parsons, "Locke's Doctrine of Property", 405-7.
8. For a useful general discussion of Locke's view on money, see Vaughn, John Locke: Economist and Social Scientist, 32-43.
9. James Tully in A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries argues that Locke uses disparaging language when he introduces the concept of money and that he views money as a bad and negative development of society. "Locke marks the transition to this form of activity (hoarding and heaping) with a complete change of language which evidences his moral disapproval" (1980: p. 147). I agree with Richard Ashcraft in Revolutionary Politics and John Locke's Two Treatise of Government. He points out that Locke does not view money in this negative light. Money for Locke may not have any objective value, but it certainly helps trade and this is a positive development for humanity. "Money, as Locke, elsewhere emphasizes, is a commodity of exchange, an instrument for the development of trade. Indeed, this is its primary and its most socially beneficial role" (1986: p.277).

10. On wasting money in Locke, see Seliger, Liberal Politics, 157.
11. Simmons notes that these "Wages", of course, need not be in the form of money; other goods may be adequate compensation for the servant's services, both before and, after the invention of money (1992: p.176).
12. For an effective refutation of Macpherson's reading of Locke on property, see Ryan, "Locke and the Dictatorship", 247.

CHAPTER 2

1. See, for example, C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism p.198.
2. See two articles by E.J. Hundert, "Market Society of Meaning in Locke's Political Philosophy" and "The Making of Homo Faber: John Locke Between Ideology and History". While he is sympathetic to Macpherson's interpretation of Locke's theory of property, he disagrees with his basic assertions about the condition of labour in Locke's time. He also disagrees with the extent to which the market system had evolved. See also Ross Poole's article "Locke and the Bourgeois Second Treatise to support Macphersons' analysis without having to account for any assumptions Locke may have held concerning the social structure in seventeenth century England, and which Locke may have read into the Second Treatise. Poole therefore disagrees with MacPherson's methodology but agrees with his analysis that Locke's theory of property serves to justify the capitalist class structure.
3. For Dunn, Locke's state of nature is "the condition in which God himself places all men in the world, prior to the lives which they live and the societies which are fashioned by the living of those lives. What it is designed to show is not what men are like but rather what rights and duties they have as the creatures of God" (Dunn, 1969: 97,103).
4. See, Raymond Polin, 'Justice in Locke's Philosophy' in Justice, Carl J. Friedrich and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: Atherton Press, 1963) p.276.
5. Schwarzenbach notes that Tully seems to take into account ownership as

stewardship, whereas MacPherson understands all ownership as private property. See Sybil Schwarzenbach, "Locke's two Conceptions of Property" in Social Theory and Practice, Vol.14,1988.

6. Okin, in Justice, Gender and the Family (pp.79-85), rightly criticizes Nozick for his understanding of self-ownership. Nozick, in Anarchy State and Utopia, assumes that self-ownership implies owning one's person as private property. For Nozick, this implies the right of selling oneself into slavery and of disposing of one's body. Okin notes that if we own ourselves in such a manner, and if this gives us the right to own the fruits of our labour, then children are the private property of their mothers. This understanding of owning oneself as private property can lead to various problems of this kind.
7. For example, Lorenne Clark in "Women and Locke: who owns the apples in the garden of Eden?" understands ownership as private property. Although she criticizes Locke for forgetting about reproductive labour and putting women at a disadvantage in his society, she fails to note the underlying ambiguity in Locke's concept of ownership. Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia understands all ownership as private property. Similarly, C.B. MacPherson in Theory of Possessive Individualism and Democratic Theory assumes all property is private property.
8. This tension in Locke's two understandings of ownership accounts for some of the problems that have arisen in the secondary literature concerning an individual's labour and his right to dispose of it. As Laurence Becker states in Property Rights, there are ambiguities in Locke's theory because Locke states that one should own the products of one's labour. Becker notes that "if anything is clearly the product of (one's body's) labour, a child is" (1977: p.38). But Locke denies that parents can own their children, and Becker wonders how this can be accounted for. He resolves the dilemma in the following manner: "the property in the fruits of one's labour (are) derivative from one's rights to one's body"(1977: pp.38-39). So, according to Becker, the rights to one's body must be considered first. If there is a conflict between the right to one's body and the right to one's labour, the right to one's body is of more importance because it is more fundamental.
9. Schwarzenbach uses 'particular other' in her article. I also use this term because it can mean both a person or a thing.

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