

CONSENSUS AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

CONSENSUS AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY:
QUEBEC IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

By

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A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University

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MASTER OF ARTS (1991)
(Sociology)

McMASTER UNIVERSITY
Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: Consensus and Liberal Democracy:
Quebec in the Late Twentieth Century

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SUPERVISOR: Professor Alfred A. Hunter

NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 85

ABSTRACT

An essential issue in the analysis of modern liberal democracy is the role of social consensus in the creation, institutionalization and stabilization of democracy. Both consensus and conflict theories implicitly address the role of consensus in democracy. Consensus theory cites the widespread existence of consensus as one of the necessary conditions which allow for the initial creation of democracy. By contrast, conflict theory denies consensus a stabilizing role in democracy; instead, it is the threat or reality of coercion, either economic or physical, that binds democracies together. Neither theory explicitly identifies the source of consensus. Democratic rights are postulated as the focus of consensus for consensus theory. Conflict theory supports the view that democratic procedures will be the focus of whatever consensus exists in society and that this consensus will be segmented by class. This theoretical framework is examined using data from the "Social Change in Canada" project for French Quebec in the context of the nationalist struggle for sovereignty from 1976 to 1981. The results indicate that consensus is focused upon democratic procedures, providing minimal support for conflict theory. However, there was no evidence to support the prediction of a class-based segmentation of consensus. Nor was there any support for consensus theory, casting doubt on the explanatory power of the consensus-conflict debate for modern liberal democracy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To list the number of people who contributed to the completion of this project would be a daunting, if not impossible, task. With this mind, I wish to gratefully acknowledge the generous efforts of several individuals. To my supervisor, Professor Alfred A. Hunter, whose boundless supply of good advice and good humour made the writing of this thesis an enjoyable experience, I acknowledge a debt that I could never even begin to repay. To you, I extend my deepest gratitude. Further acknowledgements are owed to the other members of my committee, Professor Greg Brown and Professor Julia O'Connor, for their advice and guidance in times of trouble.

This thesis relies on data generated by the Social Change in Canada Project under the direction of Tom Atkinson, Bernard Blishen, Michael Ornstein and H. Michael Stevenson of York University, Toronto. Their research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Grant # S75-0332). The data were collected by the Institute for Behavioural Research of York University and the data files were obtained from the Institute's Data Archives. Neither the principle investigators nor the disseminating archive are responsible for the interpretations presented here.

Additional acknowledgement is due to Brenda Nussey for her continual willingness to help and limitless patience in dealing with the crises which seemed to arise almost daily. I would also be remiss if I did not recognize the support and indulgence provided by the secretaries of the Sociology Department. These ladies have helped to make my time at McMaster University very pleasant.

On a more personal level, I wish to acknowledge the essential contributions made to this project by the members of my family. To my parents-- what can I say? I humbly offer my heartfelt thanks and love for your continual support and love. Without your examples, I would not have made it this far. To Kathleen and Cary, I appreciate your thoughts and understanding more than you probably are aware. To Dana, thank you for the ray of sunshine that you have brought into my life.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The nature of modern democracy has long been an issue for analysis by political scientists and sociologists alike. One of the most important elements in the consideration of the nature of modern democracy is that of the role played by the general populace in the creation, institutionalization and stabilization of democratic systems. The essential issue in this analysis devolves to the question of whether the majority of the citizens in a democratic regime actually believe in the values and rights which are supposed to form the foundation of democracy. The analysis of this issue of social consensus must begin with the identification of what this term means. However, an examination of the various definitions used by previous researchers reveals that even this preliminary step is problematic. Different researchers have defined consensus in different ways, from the imprecise "value consensus" (Mann, 1970:423) and "shared beliefs" (McClosky, 1964:363) to the overly specific as the absence of "a real threat of organized violence against the state" (Breen and Foster, 1973:7). Beyond the lack of agreement among researchers as to what constitutes consensus, the debate between the "consensus theorists" (Mann, 1970:423) and the conflict theorists further clouds the issue.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Consensus theorists take the existence of consensus as axiomatic in their analyses of democratic societies. Although the argument is rarely stated explicitly, the consensual approach is based on the acceptance of the classical theory of liberal democracy. Modern Western democracy is characterized as a political system which "combines a large measure of individual liberty with a fair approximation to majority rule" (Macpherson, 1965:3) based on the mid-nineteenth century views of John Stuart Mill and other ethical liberal democrats (Macpherson, 1977:1). Thus, consensus is an integral element of democracy through the mechanism of majority rule. The consensus theorists do not stop, however, at simply making consensus the key to the smooth functioning of the political process. Instead, consensus is often cited as one the main conditions which allow for the initial creation of democracy (Pennock, 1979:249). These conceptions of the priority of consensus in democratic society presuppose an informed and attentive public with a definite stake in the political life of the society. When recent empirical research demonstrated that this assumption was overly optimistic, and perhaps completely erroneous (Mann 1970, Prothro and Grigg 1960, McClosky 1964, Converse 1964), the consensus theorists revised their views of the role of consensus slightly. Consensus among the general populace was no longer essential; consensus among the elite

groups in society, however defined, was sufficient for the proper working of democracy. This view relies on the greater access to information and, consequently, greater political awareness and sophistication that characterizes members of the political elite as compared to those individuals outside the elite (Converse, 1964).

This elite theory of democracy divides into two camps itself. The elite consensus school contends that the elite constitutes a single coherent whole based upon frequent personal interaction resulting in bonds of friendship (Useem, 1979:228). The elite competition school rests on the assertion that many different elite groups exist and no single elite is able to become dominant in society. The contending elites require the electoral support of the general populace to govern in democratic society (Schumpeter as reported in Medding, 1987:22). Sidestepping the issue of the empirical accuracy of these divergent elite theories, it is clear that "there is still agreement between almost all theorists that some minimal degree of value consensus exists in liberal democratic societies, permitting them to handle conflict and remain stable" (Mann, 1970:423). In fact, most consensus theorists take their approach one step further and assert "without consensus, there can be no democracy" (Lipset, 1981:1).

The opposing theoretical school of the conflict theorists focusses upon the obverse of consensus in society,

conflict. This approach stresses the coercive elements in modern democratic societies. Institutions such as the police, the armed forces and the judiciary are cited as evidence of the inability of consensus alone to provide stability to democratic regimes. The existence of these institutions is also proof that consensus is not universal in democratic societies. Conflict theorists argue that it is the threat or reality of coercion (physical or economic) that binds democracies together. The major variant of the conflict school, Marxism, views "liberal-democracy ... (as) the unique product of successfully developing capitalist market societies" (Macpherson, 1965:35). Capitalism is an economic system which is driven by the creation of classes based on material wealth. These classes have their own interests which become entrenched over time and hostility between classes with diametrically opposed interests is said to be unavoidable and inevitable. Given this endemic nature of economic conflict in democratic societies, the importance of consensus in maintaining the stability of democracy is negligible. Instead, the state, under the control of the ruling class, is the guarantor of democracy, and "it always intervenes for the purpose of maintaining the existing system of domination, even where it intervenes to mitigate the harshness of that system of domination" (Miliband, 1977:91). While conflict theorists may accept the proposition that consensus is indeed possible on

some minor issues in the political arena, the democratic system is better characterized by coercion and conflict.

The empirical research to date does little to clarify these debates over the necessity of consensus in maintaining the stability of democracy. The chief problem with the results of this research to date is the lack of identification of the vital issues or problems which require general consensus in order to ensure the stability of democracy (Prothro and Grigg, 1960:276). This lack of conceptual clarification is evident in conflicting empirical results which have been generated mainly by U.S. researchers. Prothro and Grigg's research in the midwestern and southern United States (1960) indicated that "consensus can be said to exist among the voters on the basic principles of democracy when they are put in abstract terms" (page 284). Attempting to translate these democratic principles into more specific propositions, it is the "complete absence of consensus" which appears to characterize democracy (page 280). Instead of popular consensus on democratic values and rights providing the firm foundation for stable democratic societies, it is only general apathy on the part of the majority that allows the continued survival of democracy (Mann 1970, Prothro and Grigg 1960, McClosky 1964, Converse 1964). This widespread apathy may be the consequence of social inequality (Macpherson, 1977:88), the lack of information (Converse 1964), the feeling of being ineffectual or a

combination thereof. These discoveries, however, do favour the conflict theory by denying that consensus is the cement that holds the day-to-day operation of democracy together. At the same time, the mere fact that armed internal conflict is not endemic to Western democratic societies tends to mitigate the strength of the conflict theory as well. Perhaps the only way to characterize the empirical research on the issue of consensus in democracy is that it is inconclusive.

Indeed, some recent assessments of the consensus-conflict debate have denied the debate's empirical validity by stressing its normative aspects. The two schools agree on the basic social reality: society contains elements of both consensus and conflict. The whole debate then has been characterized as being based on divergent philosophical and ideological conceptions of society. These different conceptions of society are the result of disparate evaluations of the ideal social order. Consensus theorists view social order "less as a fact than a problem" (Rocher as reported in Lipset, 1985:16). In essence, order may be greater or smaller in society but it is the consequence of a continuing effort at producing consensus. By contrast, conflict theorists, following the lead of Marx, posit order as natural in society; it is competition that must be accounted for, using the concept of economic classes. It is these different views of social order underlying the debate that accounts for the conflicting

empirical research results reported above because it "is not an empirical debate and cannot be resolved through empirical investigations" (Bernard, 1983:217).

Moreover, this issue of the definition and nature of consensus has generally been explored both theoretically and empirically at only one moment in a democratic society's history. Accepting the presence of philosophical and ideological elements in the debate, this absence of a historical perspective on this issue severely limits the explanatory power of the consensus and conflict theories. The utility of an historical research agenda becomes clear once it is recognized that consensus is a process and "not at all a static and unchanging attribute of citizens" (Dahl, 1961:316). Conceptualizing consensus in this manner allows for the possibility of cross-temporal variation in the same society, an issue which has been rarely addressed. A cross-temporal research strategy is helpful to better comprehend the nature of consensus in processes of social change (Markoff and Shapiro, 1985:30). Furthermore, a historical emphasis will fill in the gaps in the empirical research to date. The prime obstacle to research on the nature of consensus has been the inability to specify "the amount, kind and distribution of consensus necessary for stable democracy" (Pennock, 1979:249). By employing a cross-temporal approach, it will be possible to observe the nature of consensus as a society changes, and this

information should allow for the identification of what constitutes consensus in a period of stability.

THEORETICAL APPROACH

The first step in specifying the nature of consensus in a democratic society is to explore the implications arising from the consensus and conflict theories. Consensus theory supports the stand that consensus is an essential element for the stability of democracy and so should be quite diffuse throughout society. By contrast, conflict theory expects a lower level of agreement than the consensus theory. It is important to keep in mind that conflict theorists do not deny the existence of consensus in society. What is denied is the ability of consensus to ensure the stability of democracy. Furthermore, conflict theory suggests that there should be differences in levels of consensus for different social groups. In essence, if there is evidence of a structuring of consensus across major divisions in society such as class, this would constitute support for the position of conflict theorists.

The closely related issue of the kind of consensus which supplies the stability for democracy has also been neglected in previous studies. Another complicating issue is the complex nature of liberal democracy itself. Democracy can be seen as the dynamic equilibrium between two sets of values: majority rule and human equality on the one hand and individual rights and constitutional guarantees on the other (Hacker, 1957:1009,

footnote 1). This open-ended characterization of democracy demonstrates that it is both complex and multidimensional; many different forms are possible. For example, the Canadian political system has been described as a hybrid, "the layering on of a federal system onto a British Parliamentary form of government" (Kornberg, 1990:712). Despite these possible complications, there are two major areas of democratic life which can be identified as the possible sources of consensus. The first is democratic rights, liberty and equality. The second is democratic procedures. Neither the consensus nor the conflict theory speaks to this issue directly. Instead, both theories assume that the term consensus applies to the same phenomenon. This failure to identify explicitly the area of democratic life in which consensus manifests itself weakens both theories. It is essential to specify the object of consensus in democracy, a problem which is not addressed by either conflict and consensus theorists. It is extremely likely that the object of consensus changes as a democracy matures, as the initial efforts which result in the creation of democracy are institutionalized in a process analogous to Weber's routinization of charisma. The democratic rights, liberty and equality, must be defined and implemented in democratic procedures in order for democracy to survive. Over time, these procedures may themselves come to be seen as the bulwark of democracy, given the human propensity to transform

means into ends evident throughout history (Merton, 1957). Therefore, while the issue of the kind of consensus has up to now been peripheral to the debate between consensus and conflict theorists, it is clearly relevant to a theoretical analysis which takes history into account due to the implications which each different type of consensus raises.

Consensus theory, with its assumption of a diffuse consensus throughout all segments of society, revolves around agreement on democratic rights. The individual members of society greatly value liberty and equality, the rights seen as the pillars upon which democracy rests. In this view, consensus on democratic rights underlies the political system, regardless of the actual institutionalization of these rights in society. Conversely, conflict theory supports the position that, if consensus does exist in society, it is focused on democratic procedures. The fundamental and observable inequalities of capitalist society preclude the possibility that the majority of citizens believe in democratic rights as the foundation of democracy. Democratic procedures, such as the electoral franchise, allow the members of society a limited voice in the functioning of democracy, without fundamentally challenging existing inequalities. Democratic procedures deflect attention from the fundamental social inequalities fostered by the capitalist-democratic matrix and preserve the status quo. By examining the kind of consensus, it should be

possible to specify the nature of consensus in a democratic society more closely. In addition, by using an historical approach, it should also be possible to determine if this type of consensus is stable or not.

The second issue in specifying the nature of consensus is that of the distribution of consensus. As alluded to earlier, consensus theorists would expect a widespread belief in democratic rights throughout the whole society. Conflict theorists explicitly challenge this view. Consensus on democratic procedures should be differentially distributed among individuals and groups in society. The key criterion for the conflict theorist is the class of the individual. The members of society at the apex of the class structure should have a higher level of agreement on democratic procedures than the general population, due to the greater rewards accumulated by these individuals as a result of their dominant position of in society. Conflict theory presupposes that the privileged group should have a class basis. In other words, the dominant group in society has a disproportionate control of the means of production and is able to make this control felt on the political stage. The examination of the distribution of consensus in the context of a society in flux should provide evidence as to which approach, the consensus or conflict, better captures the essence of life in a capitalist-democratic society.

CASE STUDY: QUEBEC

The clear implication of the preceding remarks on the utility of an historical research strategy is the necessity of identifying a stable democratic society which has undergone periods of crisis and change. Quebec provides an example of such a society. Since the beginning of the 1960s, Quebec has seen the rise of a politically strong independence movement which has campaigned for this goal through both violent, the Federation de Liberation de Quebec crisis, and socially sanctioned means, the Parti Quebecois. In addition, there has been widespread debate and publicity over the proper course of Quebec's future. Finally, the focus on Quebec may provide important data for the debate over consensus in democracy, data which may have particular resonance for the newly emergent capitalistic democracies of Eastern Europe. If it turns out that consensus on democratic rights plays a significant role in the stability of democracy, then these nations face a potentially bright future in their tentative steps towards democracy. If, however, consensus on democratic rights is inconsequential in the stability of a democratic system and belief in democratic procedures is the only guarantor of democracy, then these countries may court the danger of relapsing into authoritarianism.

Since the death of Maurice Duplessis in 1959, Quebec has undergone profound social change. The rapid modernization of

Quebec society which began at this time has been so far reaching that it has been termed the Quiet Revolution (Thomson, 1973:9). This revolution allowed Quebec to shrug off the twin fetters of a paternalistic political system and the Roman Catholic Church. The decades after 1960 saw the creation, institutionalization and proliferation of "social, economic, administrative, and political institutions at all levels" (Behiels, 1987:47). Consensus theorists would argue that this was an awakening of Quebec politicians of all parties to the need to update their social and political institutions in order to meet the requirements of modern life. Conflict theorists would focus on this massive upheaval of Quebec's society as the attempt by those with economic power to create the new, better educated and technically adroit workforce necessary to compete effectively in the newly-born computer age. In essence for conflict theorists, the modernization of Quebec was the inevitable result of the logic of capitalism. Regardless of which interpretation of the Quiet Revolution that is subscribed to, it can not be denied that the development of an ideological movement toward greater political autonomy accompanied these reforms. This nationalistic philosophy was carried mainly by an emerging middle class which had benefitted greatly from the educational reforms of the early 1960s. The major thrust of this new emphasis on nationalism was the expansion of provincial powers within the federal system of Canada

(McRoberts, 1987:80) in order to complete the process of transition from a dependent province to an autonomous state (Larocque, 1973:81).

This process of social change toward greater self-determination was validated with the stunning electoral victory of the Parti Quebecois in 1976, a mere eight years after its formation under the leadership of Rene Levesque (Lemieux, 1973:99). It has been argued that the Parti Quebecois' victory in the election of 1976 was the result of voter disenchantment with the economic performance of the Liberal Bourassa government, primarily the high costs and poor management of the James Bay hydro-electric development and the 1976 Summer Olympics. This view argues that the election of the Parti Quebecois was not primarily based on separatism (McWhinney, 1979:xi). Despite this assessment, there can be no underestimating the strength of nationalistic sentiment upon which the Parti Quebecois victory lay. As history has shown, the Parti Quebecois was not able to turn this electoral victory into a mandate for independence due to the failure of the 1980 Referendum vote to grant the government the public support to proceed with exploring the option of sovereignty association with the rest of Canada. After this referendum, the more strident aspects of the debate on Quebec's constitutional future appeared to be toned down. However, the recent failure of the Meech Lake Accords to be unanimously ratified by the

rest of Canada has once again brought the issue of Quebec's future within Canada to the forefront of political debate in that province. The very recent passage of Bill 150 (the week of June 15-22, 1991) in the Quebec provincial legislature ensures that the debate will continue since this bill calls for a referendum on Quebec's future by October 1992 at the latest.

It should be evident from the brief synopsis of Quebec's history from 1960 that this society has undergone, and is still in the throes of, profound social change. This study proposes to examine consensus in Quebec throughout a segment of this tumultuous period (1976 to 1981) to attempt to discern which of the two theories, the consensus or conflict, is the more useful.

HYPOTHESES

The focus of this project is to identify and specify the amount, kind and distribution of consensus in a society in the midst of change. These issues will be addressed using an historical approach to examine consensus at three different points in time in the period bracketting the election of the Parti Quebecois and the Referendum on sovereignty association. A set of hypotheses will be tested to allow for the potential choice between the consensus and conflict theories. There will be an exclusive emphasis on French Quebec so as to simplify the interpretation of the results. The French Canadian population in Quebec is remarkably homogeneous; the vast majority are both

French and Catholic. This homogeneity remains constant in the face of immigration to Quebec because the majority of new immigrants adopt English as their new tongue, even if they were not English or French speakers before arriving in Quebec (Henripin, 1973:159). "As a consequence, Quebec is now and has always been a kind of state within a state" (Kornberg, 1990:712). The homogeneity of the French Canadian population in Quebec removes potentially intervening variables like language and religion from this consideration of democratic consensus.

The first examination of the set of hypotheses will be conducted in 1977, just after the November 1976 election of the Parti Quebecois. Consensus theorists would expect a high degree of consensus throughout the whole French population of Quebec, without any great divergences between any two given groups in society. Furthermore, as established earlier, this consensus would center around the democratic rights of liberty and equality. In fact, this emphasis on liberty and equality expected by consensus theorists should be even more evident, given the election of a political party formally committed to independence for French Quebec (McRoberts, 1988:238).

Conversely, conflict theorists would expect a high level of consensus only among the dominant economic elite. This class should demonstrate a higher level of consensus than the general populace; in other words, consensus should be segmented

along class lines. In addition, the focus of consensus would be on democratic procedures, not on rights. Given the basic and easily observable social, material and political inequalities that characterize capitalist society, popular consensus on democratic rights is almost impossible, unless the right to be unequal by defending privilege (Wright, 1985:118) is to be considered a manifestation of an individual's liberty. The election of the Parti Quebecois can further be described as an example of consensus upon democratic procedures since the Parti Quebecois became the institutionalized embodiment of separatist activity, beginning with the 1970 provincial elections (Olzak, 1982:264). Indeed, as Guindon forcefully notes,

The access to power of the Parti Quebecois was a world event probably because it was the first time that the political integrity of an industrialized western liberal-democratic state was being internally challenged through the democratic process.

(Guindon, 1978:227).

The second examination of consensus will be conducted in 1979, the year of the first Quebec provincial by-elections after the original election of the Parti Quebecois. Once again, the consensus theory leads to an expectation of a high level of consensus throughout the entire French Canadian population. Although the relative level of consensus may be slightly higher or lower compared to 1977, there still should not be any great divergences between groups in society. The

focus of consensus should still remain on democratic rights. There may be a growth in the level of consensus upon democratic procedures once the initial euphoria over the Parti Quebecois victory subsides and the party must begin to cope with attempting to implement a political platform while performing the mundane tasks of everyday government. One possible supporting example of this consensus view would be the Parti Quebecois' implementation of Bill 101 and "the establishment of the French language as the official language of Quebec" (MacMillan, 1986:1). Although the changes to Quebec's previous language law, Bill 22, introduced under the Liberal Bourassa government, were minimal, Bill 101 provided a symbolic gesture to the citizens of Quebec in their struggle for greater liberty and equality (MacMillan, 1986:2, McRoberts, 1988:276, Breton, 1978:153).

Conflict theory proposes a continued and widening segmentation of consensus between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. While the dominant class' level of consensus should remain constant, the consensus level of the proletariat should decline with the realization that the new Quebec government was not any more willing than previous regimes to pursue fundamental social reform or even implement measures to alleviate the sufferings of the proletariat. Although the Levesque government did increase "the minimum wage to three dollars an hour, the highest level in North America"

(McRoberts, 1988:267), the government's relations with working class organizations, primarily trade unions, would better be characterized as "openly adversarial" (McRoberts, 1988:271). Democratic procedures should still be the focus of consensus among the members of the dominant class with the recognition of their essential role in maintaining the privilege of this group. Whatever consensus exists among the subordinate class should also revolve around democratic procedures as they constitute the only hope for immediate relief for the members of this class.

The final examination will be conducted in 1981, allowing for the measurement of consensus shortly after the May 20, 1980 Quebec Referendum on sovereignty association in which the Parti Quebecois proposal was defeated. The consensus theorists would still expect a high level of consensus throughout the entire French Canadian population of Quebec, although this level may be slightly higher or lower relative to both 1977 and 1979. Furthermore, democratic rights would still be the object of consensus despite the defeat of the Parti Quebecois position in the referendum. Consensus theorists would argue that the majority of French Canadians still agreed on the necessity to pursue liberty and equality. The defeat of the referendum indicated only a shift in belief from the Quebec provincial government as the guarantor of democratic rights for French Canadians to the Canadian federal government as the

governmental body best able to fulfill this goal. The referendum result was not simply the wholesale rejection of the Parti Quebecois and its policies as the subsequent re-election of the government in 1981 demonstrated. The explicit Parti Quebecois strategy of *etapisme* --gradual and incremental change for securing sovereignty-- would be cited by consensus theorists as being responsible for this shift in focus. Although formally committed to independence for Quebec, the Parti Quebecois and especially Rene Levesque believed that the majority of French Canadians would not accept rapid, radical change. Accordingly, the government proceeded cautiously on the issue of sovereignty and it was not until June 1979 that the Parti Quebecois ratified a detailed plan outlining the basic elements of a new Quebec-Canada association. This delay fueled the illusion that the Parti Quebecois was "fearful of pursuing Quebec sovereignty" (McRoberts, 1988:286-292). If the provincial government were unwilling or unable to extend democratic rights to the French population of Quebec, then the focus on liberty and equality would shift to the federal government, following the consensus argument.

Conflict theorists would expect the continued existence of a structuring in consensus between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In fact, the consensus gap between the two groups should actually widen relative to 1979 due to the further decline of consensus within the proletariat. Democratic

procedures would remain the focus of consensus for both the dominant and subordinate classes--the dominant due to their continued reliance on these procedures to maintain their privileged position in society and the subordinate in hopes of somewhat mitigating their suffering. Conflict theorists would also cite the Parti Quebecois strategy of *etapisme* as the source of declining proletariat levels of consensus due to the continued refusal of the government to alleviate their suffering. However, the conflict position denies the possibility of a shift in focus from the provincial to the federal government because the proletariat is aware of the futility of expecting profound social reform from government sources in a capitalist society.

In essence, the main divergences between the consensus and conflict theories rest on the issues of whether there is a consistent structuring of consensus over time and the actual focus of that consensus, democratic rights or procedures.

CHAPTER TWO

RESEARCH DESIGN

Using data from the merged version of the Quality of Life Panel Survey conducted for the "Social Change in Canada" project, this study will pursue the issues outlined in the previous chapter, to identify and specify the amount, kind and distribution of consensus in a society undergoing a period of social change.

The "Social Change in Canada" project consisted of three national sample surveys conducted in the late spring and early summer of 1977, 1979 and 1981. The principal researchers were Mr. Tom Atkinson, York University sociology professors Bernard Blishen and Michael Ornstein, and York University political scientist professor Michael Stevenson. The data were collected and processed by the Survey Research Centre at the (then) Institute for Behavioural Research, aided by Mr. Charles Humphrey of the University of Alberta. The study was designed to provide both a panel component and, when appropriately weighted, three national cross-section surveys. In this project, only the panel data for respondents from Quebec interviewed in French will be used. The target population was adults at least eighteen years old not living in remote regions of Canada, native reservations or institutions. The respondents were chosen from a representative sample of 1971 Census enumeration areas, stratified by size. Within each

enumeration area, randomly selected households were chosen and one respondent was randomly chosen from those eligible in the household (Institute for Behavioural Research, 1984:1-13).

Before describing how the variables were operationalized, a brief note on the utility of survey data analysis may be helpful. The disadvantages of survey data analysis are well known. The most cogent criticism is the fact that the survey instrument itself, if close-ended questions of the kind in the Quality of Life panel surveys are used, circumscribes the possible range of results through the construction of both the questions and the acceptable responses (Guindon, 1978:234). In addition, it has been argued that surveys are an artificial construct which abstracts the individual out of his or her social context. This aspect of survey research has led some observers to question the validity of data generated by survey responses due to its inherent individualistic and static approach to complex and dynamic social phenomena (Carchedi, 1986:214), of which consensus is an example. These criticisms are extremely important to keep in mind when employing survey research techniques; however, strictly following their implications would deny the possibility of ever testing mass social theories, such as consensus or conflict theories, empirically. A further complication of survey research present in this analysis is the secondary nature of the data to be examined. The lack of

control over the variables examined in the original study, especially the original processes of operationalization, as well as the coding and data processing, are the key drawbacks. Essentially, secondary data analysis does not allow the analyst to get a firsthand feel for the data, a situation without remedy.

Despite this, there are some advantages to the Quality of Life Panel data to be used in this project. The first is the panel aspect; the same respondents were used for all three surveys (1977, 1979, 1981), allowing for a cross-temporal examination of consensus. This fact of using the same respondents in all three waves of the survey should provide an accurate picture of the trends in consensus in a society undergoing social change, provided the assumption that what is conveyed by the terms democratic rights and procedures remains consistent to individuals throughout this period. A closely related advantage is the use of the same question wordings in the applications of the survey (with slight modifications implemented between 1977 and 1979). This fact allows the analyst to attribute any change in consensus over this time period to a change in the actual empirical phenomenon of consensus. In other words, differences in the amount, kind and distribution of consensus in Quebec from 1976 to 1981 should reflect changes in the attitudes of Quebec citizens and not methodological artifacts, such as changes in question wording

and format. For example, Bishop, Tuchfarber and Oldendick (1978a:250 and 1978b:81) suggest that the greater political sophistication of the American electorate exhibited after the 1964 American national election was the result of changes in question wording and format of the surveys employed and not of any changes in the electorate itself. This is exactly the sort of result that will be excluded by employing the Quality of Life panel data. Acknowledging the potential problems with survey data analysis, it is still possible and, indeed, viable to continue using data generated by individual interviews as long as the analyst does not lose sight of the theory under investigation and become inhibited by the technical aspects of the research, in the manner of the 'abstracted empiricists' of C. Wright Mills (Mills, 1959:50-75).

OPERATIONALIZATION

The dependent variables, democratic rights and procedures, were measured using multiple indicators combined into scales. Multiple indicators were used with an eye toward both validity, maximizing the certainty that the dependent variables measured what they were supposed to, and reliability, reducing the presence of random error. The democratic rights scale was created from five separate items, each of which had an economic tinge. This focus on economic issues, as in "high income individuals should pay more taxes" (see Appendix 1) allows the researcher to identify a respondent's attitude

toward democratic rights more concretely and specifically than items which refer to individual liberty and equality as abstractions. The items used to create the democratic rights scale all follow the same general format as the example given above. They focus on social welfare, equality in the distribution of income in society. Each item was measured on a Likert-type response scale, with possible values ranging from "strongly disagree" (response category = 1) to "strongly agree" (response category = 5).

In any attempt to construct scales from multiple indicators, it is important to view a correlation matrix of the single-item indicators beforehand. The scale for democratic rights in 1977 (Rights 1977 from this point forward) contains five separate indicators, yielding ten bivariate correlations. All ten bivariate correlations are significant at the .01 alpha level. These correlation estimates range from .17 to .36. When these five separate indicators are summed to form the scale Rights 1977, Cronbach's alpha, the measure of the lower boundary of the scale's reliability, is .61. A reliability of .61 indicates that 37.2 per cent of the observed variance is true or non-random variance. In addition, the item-total statistics generated by the Reliability procedure in the SPSS-x statistical package indicates that all five indicators are necessary for the scale. Cronbach's alpha for the five item

scale is greater than would be the case if any one item were omitted (see Appendix 2).

The same five indicators were used for the scales Rights 1979 and Rights 1981, so the description of these scales will be brief. Nine of the bivariate correlations between the indicators for Rights 1979 are significant at the .01 alpha level; there is one bivariate correlation that is significant at greater than the .05 level. The correlation estimates range from .08 to .32. Cronbach's unstandardized alpha for this scale is .52 indicating that 27.0 per cent of the observed variance in the scale is true or non-random variance (see Appendix 2). As for Rights 1981, all ten bivariate correlation estimates are significant at the .01 alpha level, and range from .13 to .44. Cronbach's alpha for Rights 1981 is .62, indicating that 38.4 per cent of the observed variance is nonrandom. The item-total statistics make it clear that all of the indicators contribute to the scale (see Appendix 2). While the Rights 1977, Rights 1979, Rights 1981 scales are not highly reliable scales, they are, of course, much more reliable than any single-item indicators would be.

The dependent variable, democratic procedures (Procedures from this point forward), was created in much the same manner as was democratic rights. This dependent variable was also measured at three points in time-- 1977, 1979, 1981-- using the sum of identical multiple indicators, four in this

case. The four items all focus on the respondent's attitude toward the effectiveness of representative democratic institutions, for example, "individual has no say in what the government does" (see Appendix 1). As with the democratic rights scale, the response categories were in a Likert-type format, with a range of values (1= "strongly agree" to 4= "strongly disagree"). An examination of the correlation matrix for the Procedures 1977 scale reveals that all six bivariate correlations are significant at the .01 alpha level, and range from a low of .21 to a high of .41. Cronbach's unstandardized alpha of .67 indicates that the scale is quite reliable; 44.9 per cent of the observed variance is true or nonrandom variance. The item-total statistics indicate that all four items contribute to the scale. If any one were deleted, Cronbach's alpha would decrease. The same situation holds for Procedures 1979. All six bivariate correlation estimates are significant at the .01 alpha level, with a range from .20 to .50. The unstandardized Cronbach's alpha is .69 indicating that 47.6 per cent of the variance is nonrandom. The item-total statistics again demonstrate that all four indicators should be included in the scale since Cronbach's alpha would decrease if any one item were deleted. As was the case for the other two scales, Procedures 1981 has a single-item correlation matrix in which all six bivariate correlation estimates are significant at the .01 level and range from .26 to .52. The

unstandardized Cronbach's alpha is .73 revealing that 53.3 per cent of the variance is nonrandom. An examination of the item-total statistics shows that all four indicators should be included in the scale as Cronbach's alpha would decrease if any one item were not included. In a general sense, both the Procedures and the Rights scales become more reliable from 1977 to 1981, although the Procedures scales are clearly the more reliable of the two. The Rights scales may be less reliable due to the nature of the variable they are supposed to represent. Rights like liberty and equality are harder to conceptualize concretely than elements of representative government which form the basis of the variable democratic procedures.

The final hurdle to clear before proceeding to delineate the logic of hypothesis testing in the next section is to operationalize the major concepts in consensus and conflict theory. As discussed previously, consensus theory forecasts a diffuse consensus in society. Perhaps the most famous attempt to approach Canadian society in the vein of consensus theory is Porter's (1965) use of a plural elite model. In this view, Canadian society is composed of multiple elites alternating between co-operation and competition depending on the context. The two most important elites for the purposes of examining consensus in liberal democracy are the economic and political. Porter defines these elites as being composed of "those who

occupy the major decision-making positions in the corporate institutions of Canadian society" (Porter, 1965:264).

Regarding the economic elite, this depiction extends the traditional strict Marxist conception of the bourgeoisie to include both the "owner-managers"--those who own the means of production--and the "professional managers" involved in the day-to-day operation of the enterprise (Porter, 1965:21).

While at first glance, Porter seems to be arguing for a broader view of the economically dominant class by including individuals who do not own the means of production, Porter himself perceives the economic elite to be a narrower concept than the traditional Marxist bourgeoisie. "What we have instead of a class of capitalists is a smaller and probably more cohesive group--an elite within the private sector of the economy" (Porter, 1965:23). Not only is this economic elite more cohesive than the traditional bourgeoisie, it is also less inherently antagonistic to the non-elite. Since membership in the dominant group is based on decision-making potential and not solely dictated by structural conditions, such as the ownership of the means of production, there is a greater possibility, theoretically, of mobility into the elite. It is this potential openness to the non-elite that prevents the development of visibly conflicts relationships in Canadian society between the members of the elite and the non-elite in both the economic and political sectors. This lack of conflict

allows consensus to be diffuse throughout Canadian society. Having set out this theoretical framework, Porter proceeds to demonstrate at great length that both ethnicity and religious affiliation greatly constrain upward mobility into the elite, somewhat mitigating this optimistic conception of modern liberal democracy.

The political elite is also theoretically conceived of as an open elite consisting of those individuals with decision-making power in society. In addition, one defining characteristic of the political elite is its educational background. "Although all elite groups, except trade union leaders, have a much higher proportion of university graduates than the general population, the political elite has a higher proportion than any other" (Porter, 1965:388). This is clearly reflected in the overwhelming number of highly educated individuals who were key members of the first Parti Quebecois government. "Teachers, professors and administrators composed more than 75 per cent of the new cabinet, whereas they had constituted only 35 per cent of the pre-election (1976) Bourassa cabinet" (McRoberts, 1988:264). With the rise of the Parti Quebecois, so too came the rise of highly educated Francophones because "for the first time in Quebec history, the cabinet contained no Anglophones" (McRoberts, 1988:264). Leaving aside the issue of the empirical accuracy of Porter's model of plural elites, the discussion of the economic elite

and the political elite indicates three essential criteria needed for the operationalization of the dominant group: ownership of the means of production, managerial control at the workplace, and educational achievement.

As noted earlier, conflict theory posits a segmentation of consensus along class lines between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. One notable depiction of Canadian society in conflict theory terms involves the reworking of Porter's multiple elite schema. Clement, a student of Porter, reinterprets and supplements Porter's data using a conflict viewpoint. "Class is defined objectively by relationships to the ownership and control of capital and other valued resources" (Clement, 1975:10). In keeping with the traditional conflict perspective, the key distinguishing aspect is that the bourgeoisie own the means of production while the proletariat do not. In conflict theory, the bourgeoisie are necessarily the dominant class. For Clement, there is a clear relationship between the economic elite and the bourgeoisie. "Because of their relationship to ownership and control of property, all members of the corporate elite are also members of the bourgeoisie" (Clement, 1975:5). Clement further extends the bourgeoisie to include "their families and elites from other key institutions such as the state and their families" (Clement, 1975:6). In Clement's view, this "big bourgeoisie" (Clement, 1975:6) corresponds to the corporate elite. Thus, in

Quebec during the period from 1976 to 1981, the bourgeoisie constitute the dominant elite since they include both the economic and political elites in consensus theory terms.

The implication from the above discussion of consensus and conflict theory is that the class structure created for this study to test the hypotheses of elite and bourgeoisie cohesion must capture the essence of both the dominant elite and the dominant class. Essentially, the class structure was composed of two separate employment variables. The first variable used to distinguish between the dominant and subordinate groups was whether the respondent was employed in the labour force or not. Unfortunately, the 1979 and 1981 surveys collapsed the options "full-time" and "part-time" into a single response category. This does not pose a problem in distinguishing between either the elite and the non-elite or the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; however, it does make it difficult to distinguish between the traditional proletariat and what is commonly termed the marginal. The proletariat is generally conceived of as full-time wage labourers, while the marginal is often considered those individuals engaged in part-time wage labour, if employed. Due to this unfortunate wording of the item on employment, the marginal in this project will be composed of those respondents who did not report being employed either full-time or part-time. One brief note of clarification is necessary at this stage. In this study, the marginal will

be spoken of as a group and not a class because the term serves as a catch-all for any respondent who is not a member of either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. As such, there has been no attempt to delineate the objective relationship to the means of production for members of this group, a procedure which is essential for categorizing individuals by class. The members of both the elite and non-elite and the bourgeoisie and proletariat reported being employed either full-time or part-time. The second employment variable used to distinguish between the elite and non-elite and the bourgeoisie and proletariat was whether the respondent was self-employed or worked for someone else. The respondent was characterized as a member of the non-elite and proletariat if he/she reported being employed by someone else. The respondent was classified as a member of the elite and bourgeoisie if he/she reported being self-employed; in addition, a respondent was classified as elite and bourgeois if he/she reported being autonomous at work or having at least a Bachelor of Arts degree. The variable of employment is self-explanatory; however, the other two characteristics contributing to the classification of the elite and bourgeoisie require further elaboration.

For consensus theory, the concept of the elite's job autonomy follows from the discussion of managerial decision-making power in Porter's conceptualization. While decision-making power is not strictly reducible to job autonomy, once

again, there were no satisfactory measures of decision-making capacity in the original 1977 survey. Job autonomy in the present context will serve as an indirect measure of an individual's decision-making capacity.

There is also a precedent for including decision-making capacity as a characteristic of the bourgeoisie in conflict theory. The argument has been made that

the changing character of Canadian capitalism has brought forward several categories of people who do not stand in unambiguous relation to the traditional three classes... but have assumed an importance which cannot be denied easily in any modern class analysis

(Hunter, 1981:173).

Dahrendorf located the force behind this changing character of modern capitalism as the rise of the joint-stock company in which "the roles of owner and manager, originally combined in the position of the capitalist, have been separated and distributed over two positions, those of stockholder and executive" (Dahrendorf, 1959:44). Following up this changing nature of capitalism theme, Wright (1985) defines the bourgeoisie as exploiters along three separate productive dimensions--the control/ownership of capital assets, organization assets and skill assets (Wright, 1985:73-82). Organization assets in Wright's discussion correspond to what is being termed the decision-making capacity of an individual. Wright himself recognized potential problems with this view. Wright admits that organization assets may simply be "a

specialized type of skill asset, managerial ability" or a "special case of a more general problem that might be termed 'positional' exploitation" (Wright, 1985:93). Furthermore, the objection has been made that organization assets have "no existence apart from the positions within which it is (they are) exercised and cannot be transferred by its (their) owner(s)" (Burris, 1988:61-62). Consequently, defining organization assets as the basis of a separate form of capitalist exploitation is argued to be an artificial and meaningless exercise (Burris, 1988:62, Carchedi, 1986:200, Carchedi, 1987:127). These criticisms are all aimed at denying theoretical import to Wright's conception of the intermediate classes in capitalist society as simultaneously exploiters and exploited, a goal attained successfully. However, this project is not concerned with the problem of the middle class in capitalist society. What it is concerned with is specifying the nature of the divisions between the dominant (bourgeoisie) and subordinate (proletariat) classes in the capitalist class structure of French Quebec in 1976 in order to determine if there is a segmentation of consensus along class lines as postulated by conflict theorists. With this in mind, Wright's conceptualization of organization assets as a distinguishing aspect of the capitalist class structure is extremely valuable because it helps to provide a concrete basis for using decision-making capacity in discerning the existence of "the

two decisive classes" despite "a certain fluidity at the boundaries of these classes" (Milner, 1978:53).

The job autonomy variable was actually created from two separate variables (see Appendix 1). The first item asked if the respondent was able to control the pace of work or whether the speed of the work process was regulated by the equipment. If the respondent was able to dictate the pace of his/her own work, then this was taken as an indication of autonomy. The other item focused on whether the respondent was supervised by an immediate superior and the frequency of this supervision. If the respondent reported no direct supervision or a frequency of supervision that was equal to or less frequent than once every two or three days, then this was seen as evidence of autonomy. To be classified as a member of the elite and bourgeoisie, the respondent had to report a work environment in which he/she was considered autonomous on both items. Failure to be considered autonomous on both items meant that the respondent was classified as a member of the non-elite and proletariat.

The final characteristic attributed to the elite and bourgeoisie, high educational achievement of at least a Bachelor of Arts degree, is much more problematic for conflict theory than consensus theory. As outlined above, Porter explicitly considers educational achievement as a defining characteristic of elites, especially the political elite. In

contrast, conflict theory has not traditionally conceived of formal educational achievement as a defining criterion of the bourgeoisie. Returning to Wright, however, there is a precedent for including educational credentials as a characteristic in establishing a class structure. Wright argues that educational achievement is a formal credential which is viewed as a sub-category of skill assets. Credentials can be used as a criteria for distinguishing between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat because they artificially restrict the supply of skills (Wright, 1985:76). This restriction occurs because the holders of credentials have a definite material interest in ensuring the credential does not become widely accessible. By strictly regulating control of the credential, the holders are able to force employers to raise wages of the credential owner, relative to those without, over and above the costs of producing the skills, a form of skill asset exploitation (Wright, 1985:76).

Once again, Wright recognizes the limitations of his conceptualization "since a formal credential only becomes the basis for an exploitation relation when it is matched with a job that requires such credentials" (Wright, 1985:152). Other observers have attacked this position for the same reasons that organization assets are not seen as the source of distinct relations of exploitation, the impossibility of "separating skill and labour power as two different productive assets"

(Carchedi, 1987:127). Despite these objections, Wright's concept of skill exploitation through formal credentials addresses an area requiring improvement in traditional conflict theory. The fact that "labour power is not homogeneous" in capitalism and "massive income differentials exist among wage earners" (Wright, 1988:95) can not be adequately explained with the labour theory of value which underlies conflict theory. While this debate over the use of skill assets to distinguish between the bourgeoisie and proletariat is likely to rage for some time, Wright's contribution is important because it provides a concrete basis for including formal educational achievement as a characteristic of the class structure. For this project, a respondent was classified as a member of the elite and bourgeoisie if he/she reported having a Bachelors of Arts degree or higher. A respondent who did not report attaining at least this educational credential was classified as a member of the non-elite or proletariat.

The class structure set out above is admittedly not exhaustive. However, the measure of any theoretical construct is its ability to fulfill the role for which it was designed. In this case, the divisions between the elite and non-elite and the bourgeoisie and proletariat are created with the goal of testing conflict theory's hypothesis of a class-based segmentation of consensus. In addition, the theories of greater dominant group consensus relative to the subordinate

group can be assessed. For these purposes, the class structure depicted above is more than adequate. Having presented the logic behind the constructed class structure, there remains only the description of an unavoidable methodological complication and its solution to be discussed.

The original 1977 survey conceptualized employment in a rather limited manner. A respondent was asked simply if he/she owned the company which they worked for, severely limiting the number of individuals able to be classified as bourgeois. The two later applications of the survey expanded this area of the survey to include items which sought to determine if the respondent was employed by a firm which was owned by a member of his/her own family. As Clement emphasized, it is logical to assume that an individual working for a family owned company would more likely have a higher class status and be a member of the bourgeoisie than a regular wage labourer. The addition of these related questions in the latter two waves of the survey greatly increased the number of individuals who reported being members of the bourgeoisie over the 1977 survey application. As a result, there was only a small number of respondents, twenty-one, classified as bourgeoisie in 1977. The next step in constructing the class structure across the three waves of the study was to identify those respondents who were classified as bourgeois in both 1979 and 1981. This was accomplished by comparing a respondent's survey identification number with the

corresponding values on the class variables. This procedure yielded forty-nine respondents who were classified as bourgeois in both 1979 and 1981 but not in 1977, presumably due to the absence of items on employment in family-owned firms. These forty-nine cases were then recoded as members of the bourgeoisie in 1977, increasing the number of respondents in that class category to sixty-nine versus eighty-eight for 1979 and ninety for 1981.

One potential issue in this method of constructing the class structure is the amount of slippage that occurs across each wave of the survey. There was no way to calculate the amount of slippage from 1977 to 1979 due to the problem outlined above. From 1979 to 1981, there were twenty-three respondents operationalized as bourgeoisie in 1981 who were not classed as bourgeoisie in 1979. These twenty-three cases represent 25.5 per cent of the ninety members of the bourgeoisie in 1981, indicating a 74.5 per cent carry over from 1979. This substantial carry over provides a reliability estimate of the data from 1979 and 1981 of .86. This reliability estimate of the data corresponds to that of the test-retest reliability of other attitudinal variables-- .85.

LOGIC OF HYPOTHESIS TESTING

The first issue to be pursued is to identify the focus of consensus in democratic society. As outlined earlier, consensus and conflict theories yield different expectations as

to the focus of consensus in society. Consensus theory projects democratic rights to be the focus of consensus, while conflict theory expects procedures to fulfill this role. This first set of hypotheses will be examined by using the coefficient of variation. The coefficient of variation is created by dividing the standard deviation of responses for each specific scale by that scale's mean in order to get a sense of the relative variation of responses for that scale (Loether and McTavish, 1988:156). The chief advantage of this statistic is its simplicity and easy interpretation, avoiding the sort of technical fascination that removes most quantitative research from the grasp of the uninitiated. For each year, a number of coefficients of variation were calculated for both the democratic rights and procedures scales. A coefficient was calculated for the population and each class, the bourgeoisie, proletariat and marginal, on each scale. The resulting eight coefficients are comparable across the rights and procedures scales, with the scale with the higher value coefficient representing a higher degree of consensus, allowing for a quick identification of the focus of consensus. This process was replicated for each wave of the survey--1977, 1979 and 1981--allowing for a cross-temporal examination of the focus of consensus.

Beyond the identification of the focus of consensus and whether this focus remains constant in a society in the throes

of social change, the second set of hypotheses to be tested revolve around the issue of the segmentation of consensus by class. It will be possible to examine if there is great divergence by class on each scale. Consensus theorists, with their expectation of a highly diffuse consensus throughout the whole society, postulate that the coefficients of variation for each class will be very similar. By contrast, conflict theorists posit a low coefficient of variation for the bourgeoisie, the direct benefactors from the system of economic exploitation that exists in capitalist society, and a still lower value for both the proletariat and the marginal. Furthermore, consensus theorists expect the level of consensus to remain fairly constant over the three waves of the study. Conflict theorists propose a widening divergence of consensus between the bourgeoisie and the other two classes between the first and third waves of this study. A test-retest format allows for the examination of cross-temporal change of these hypotheses during a period of social crisis.

The third set of hypotheses to be examined relates to the theories of elite consensus. As discussed in the first chapter, both consensus and conflict theories are in some senses postulating a tightly cohesive upper group. This concept will be examined by using the tests for homogeneity of variance available in the one way analysis of variance procedure in SPSS-x. This test will allow for the examination

of the cohesiveness of the bourgeoisie by testing it against the cohesiveness of the other two classes. In brief, if there is an indication of the presence of heterogeneity of variance in which the variance of the bourgeoisie is lower than that of the proletariat and the marginal, then that result would indicate that the bourgeoisie is more cohesive than the other two classes. If the results indicate that there is homogeneity of variance, the null hypothesis for the procedure, then this is evidence that one class is not any more cohesive than the next. Once more, these hypotheses will be tested separately for each year to discern if there is cross-temporal variation. Having set out the logic of hypothesis testing to be used in the study, the next section will provide a description of the data itself.

CHAPTER THREE

DATA ANALYSIS

The focus of this project is to identify and specify the amount, kind and distribution of consensus in a society in a period of change. As outlined previously, this project uses the panel data generated by the "Social Change in Canada" study; there was 475 respondents who were interviewed in all three waves of the survey, 1977, 1979 and 1981. Of these 475 individuals, 423 or 89 per cent were French Canadians, the focus of this study. As described in the last section, a coefficient of variation was generated for each of the dependent variable scales, Rights and Procedures for each of the three years for each class, bourgeoisie, proletariat and marginal. These coefficients of variation will be able to shed some light on the focus of consensus in a late twentieth century democracy in the midst of turmoil as well as allow for the tracking of consensus over time.

The first dependent variable, democratic rights, has a coefficient of variation for the population of .156 for 1977. This coefficient declines to .144 in 1979 with a slight rise to .148 for 1981 (see Table 1). This trend shows that consensus on democratic rights remains basically stable over the length of this study, with a slight decline from the first to the final wave of the survey. With regard to the other dependent

variable, the population coefficient for democratic procedures in 1977 has a greater value than that of rights, .242. The population coefficient for 1979 reveals that consensus on procedures actually increases to .261. The 1981 coefficient decreases slightly to .252; however, this value is still somewhat higher than its corresponding value for 1977, indicating a general increase in consensus on procedures over the period of study (see Table 1).

Table 1: Population Coefficients of Variation

Scale	N	Total
Rights 1977	348	.156
Procedures 1977	372	.242
Rights 1979	379	.144
Procedures 1979	366	.261
Rights 1981	373	.148
Procedures 1981	374	.252


*Note: All values generated by SPSS-x

A number of general trends are discernible from this description of the population coefficients for rights and procedures. The first element to note is that the coefficient for democratic procedures is greater than that of rights for every wave of the survey. This indicates that procedures is the focus of greater consensus for the population than rights over the period of this study. The other important aspects to note are the cross-temporal trends of each dependent variable.

Essentially, the two scales are inversely related to another. In other words, as the population coefficient for rights declines from 1977 to 1979, the coefficient for procedures increases. Similarly, the coefficient for rights increases from 1979 to 1981 while that of procedures declines. This trend is easily recognizable in Graph 1 as the two scales appear to be mirror images. As will become clearer as the descriptive analysis continues, these two trends capture the essence of the results for all three classes-- the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the marginal.

Having broken the population down into class categories in order to examine the implications of conflict theory, it is necessary to move beyond the general level of analysis reported above. The first class to be examined will be the bourgeoisie. As alluded to above, the bourgeoisie replicates the pattern evident in the general population. The 1977 coefficient for the bourgeoisie for rights is .162 as opposed to .206 for procedures, repeating the pattern of procedures as the focus of consensus demonstrated by the whole sample. Bearing the technical problem outlined in Chapter Two in mind, it is necessary to place this result for the bourgeoisie in 1977 in the context of the rest of the results for this class. The bourgeoisie coefficients for 1979 are directly comparable to those of 1977. The procedures value, .213 is greater than that of rights, .141. It is apparent that the coefficient for

Graph 1: Consensus Trends for the Population



rights declines from 1977 to 1979 while that for procedures increases. The results for 1981 are similar to those for 1977 and 1979; the coefficient for procedures is greater than that of rights, .186 versus .154 (see Table 2). Once again, rights and procedures show divergent trends; in this case, rights increases while procedures decreases (see Graph 2). As will become clear, the case of the bourgeoisie is not unique compared to either the proletariat or the marginal.

Table 2: Class Breakdown of Coefficients of Variation


Scale	N	Bourgeoisie	N	Proletariat	N	Marginal
Rights 1977	58	.162	142	.149	148	.155
Procedures 1977	66	.206	147	.247	159	.246
Rights 1979	82	.141	125	.128	144	.155
Procedures 1979	85	.213	125	.277	151	.262
Rights 1981	83	.154	125	.138	151	.147
Procedures 1981	86	.186	130	.221	158	.302

*-Note: the number of cases across each scale may not add up to 100% due to missing values on the employment variable.

** Note: all coefficients generated by SPSS-x

The 1977 coefficient for the proletariat on rights is .149 while that for procedures is .247, indicating that procedures are the focus of greater consensus than rights. This same pattern is repeated in both 1979, rights .128 versus procedures .277, and 1981, rights .138 versus procedures .221 (see Table 2). Again, the cross-temporal trends for rights and procedures go in opposite directions. From 1977 to 1979,

Graph 2: Consensus Trends for the Bourgeoisie




consensus on rights declines, while it increases from 1979 to 1981. By contrast, consensus on procedures increases from 1977 to 1979 and decreases from 1979 to 1981 (see Graph 3). From this evidence, it is clear that the proletariat replicates the pattern that was apparent in the coefficients for both the total population and the bourgeoisie.


The case of the marginal repeats the patterns evident for the other classes. The values for the coefficients on procedures are greater than that for rights for each year. One interesting aspect is the constancy of consensus on rights from 1977 to 1979. In 1977, the procedure coefficient is .246 versus .155 for rights; the procedure coefficient increases in 1979 to .262 while rights remains at .155. This is the only occasion in the whole data set in which the value of a coefficient remains constant across two waves of the study. The value of the procedure coefficient in 1981 is .302, the highest value for either scale in any of the three years, representing an increase from 1979. The rights coefficient for 1981 is .147 (see Table 2 and Graph 4), a decrease from 1979, repeating the divergent cross-temporal pattern for rights and procedures prevalent throughout the data.

Overall, there are three prominent elements which emerge from this description of data. The first is the prevalence of consensus on democratic procedures for every class. The coefficients for procedures are consistently higher than those

Graph 3: Consensus Trends for the Proletariat



Graph 4: Consensus Trends for the Marginal



for rights for each class for each year. Another noteworthy element emerging from this brief descriptive analysis is the tendency for consensus on rights and procedures to vary over time in opposite directions. This divergent cross-temporal tendency is constant throughout the whole data set, except for the one occasion for the marginal noted above. The fact that the coefficient values for rights and procedures typically vary in opposite directions for every class and each wave of the survey lends credence to the initial supposition of this study that the two scales measure different concepts. If the two scales were to vary consistently in the same direction, there may be some doubt as to whether they were actually measuring two different concepts or merely the same concept under different names. The fact that they vary in different directions over time allows them to be considered measures of distinct elements of democratic society, a notion which is necessary in order to test the hypotheses which emerge from the consensus-conflict debate. A third trend which should be noted is the weak class divergence of consensus, although, as will become clear in the next section, this divergence is not the same as was predicted by conflict theory. Broadly speaking, the bourgeoisie consistently has the highest coefficients on rights and the lowest coefficient on procedures for all three years. The proletariat and the marginal have fairly similar coefficients for the most part and are highest on procedures

and lowest on rights. This class divergence should not be over-emphasized, since the procedures coefficient for the bourgeoisie is greater than that of rights for every single wave of the study.

HYPOTHESIS TESTING

The first set of hypotheses arising from consensus and conflict theories as outlined in Chapters One and Two revolves around both the identification of the focus of consensus and any segmentation of consensus. As discussed earlier, consensus theorists expect a high level of consensus on democratic rights throughout the whole population. Conversely, conflict theory posits a definite segmentation of consensus by class; furthermore, the focus of consensus is on democratic procedures and not on rights. While conflict theorists allow that the bourgeoisie may have a high level of consensus on procedures, this high level of agreement does not extend to the subordinate classes--the proletariat and the marginal. Expressing this set of hypotheses in terms of the coefficients of variation, consensus theorists expect a higher value for the coefficient of variation for rights than for procedures and expect that this coefficient would be fairly uniform across all three class categories: i (Rights > Procedures) and ii (Rights for the bourgeoisie = Rights for the proletariat = Rights for the marginal). Conflict theorists anticipate a higher coefficient for procedures than for rights for all three classes. In

addition, the procedure coefficient for the bourgeoisie should be markedly higher than those of both the proletariat and the marginal: i (Procedures > Rights) and ii (Procedures for the bourgeoisie > Procedures for the proletariat and Procedures for the bourgeoisie > Procedures for the marginal). An examination of the initial set of coefficients demonstrates weak support for conflict theory (see Table 2). The focus of consensus for all three groups, the bourgeoisie, proletariat and the marginal, is on democratic procedures as posited by this theory. Beyond this assertion, the results are rather mixed. Both the proletariat and the marginal have higher values on democratic procedures than the bourgeoisie, indicating that the segmentation of consensus is not in the predicted direction. In addition, the bourgeoisie has the highest value for democratic rights, in direct contrast to predictions from conflict theory. From this evidence, conflict theory has support for one of its three hypotheses.

With regards to consensus theory, it is clear that rights are not the focus of consensus in 1977. The coefficients for rights are roughly constant across the class categories (as was predicted), supporting only one of consensus theory's hypotheses, leading to the assertion that consensus is not diffuse throughout the whole society. The best way to characterize these 1977 results is inconclusive, although there is some minimal support for conflict theory.

The second set of hypotheses includes the same predictions as were tested in the 1977 survey as well as incorporating a cross-temporal element. Briefly, consensus theorists posit a continued, widespread consensus on democratic rights; however, it is also likely that the relative level of consensus on rights may be higher or lower compared to 1977. The key characteristic remains the absence of any structured segmentation of consensus by class: i (Rights > Procedures) and ii (Rights for the bourgeoisie = Rights for the proletariat = Rights for the marginal) and iii (Rights 1979 > = Rights 1977 or Rights 1977 > = Rights 1979). Conflict theory still predicts that whatever consensus exists will focus on democratic procedures. The bourgeoisie is predicted to continue to have the highest level of consensus on procedures when compared to the proletariat and the marginal. The consensus levels of these subordinate groups is anticipated to decline relative to their values of 1977 producing a widening of segmentation: i (Procedures > Rights) and ii (Procedures for the bourgeoisie > Procedures for the proletariat and Procedures for the bourgeoisie > Procedures for the marginal) and iii (Procedures for the bourgeoisie in 1977 = Procedures for the bourgeoisie in 1979) and iv (Procedures for the proletariat in 1977 > Procedures for the proletariat in 1979) and v (Procedures for the marginal in 1977 > Procedures for the marginal in 1979). The evidence from the coefficients of variation once again

points to guarded acceptance of conflict theory as more empirically accurate for the data from Quebec in the late twentieth century. It is clear from the values of the coefficients (Table 2) that procedures remains the focus of consensus for all three classes. However, the bourgeoisie value for procedures is once again lower than that for both the proletariat and the marginal in direct contradiction to suggestions from conflict theory. The prediction that the bourgeois level of consensus should be constant from 1977 to 1979 is weakly upheld by the procedure coefficients, .224 for 1977 and .213 for 1979. In contrast, the 1979 coefficient values for both the proletariat and the marginal actually increase relative to 1977, again opposite to the predictions of conflict theory. Thus, two of the five hypotheses of conflict theory are supported by the data, consensus on procedures and consistent bourgeoisie consensus, allowing for restrained acceptance of conflict theory.

Regarding consensus theory, there is no evidence to support any of the three hypotheses. As noted above, procedures, not rights, are the focus of consensus for all three groups. Furthermore, the three groups do not have roughly uniform values for rights, with a range of .128 for the proletariat to .155 for the marginal (see Table 2). In addition, there is no trend across classes from 1977 to 1979. Consensus theory allows for the level of consensus on rights

either to increase or to decrease in 1979 relative to 1977, a hypothesis with very limited explanatory merit. However, even this relatively minor prediction is not upheld by the results. The rights coefficient values for both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat decline from 1977 to 1979, while the value for the marginal remains constant or increases very slightly. The basic conclusion from this evidence is the same as the for the first set of hypotheses, i.e., minimal acceptance of conflict theory.

The third set of hypotheses emerging from the consensus-conflict debate is centered around the 1981 wave of this study. Once more, the hypotheses contain both cross-sectional and temporal elements. Consensus theory continues to propose a widespread diffusion of consensus on democratic rights throughout the entire society. Although the level of consensus on rights may be higher or lower relative to 1977 and 1979, there is no evidence of the anticipated segmentation of consensus along class lines: i (Rights > Procedures) and ii (Rights for the bourgeoisie = Rights for the proletariat = Rights for the marginal) and iii (Rights in 1981 > = Rights in 1979 and Rights in 1977) and iv (Rights in 1979 and Rights in 1977 > = Rights 1981). On the other hand, conflict theory posits consensus on democratic procedures as well an ever-increasing segmentation between the bourgeoisie and the other two groups. This increasing segmentation should be visible in

declining coefficients for the proletariat and the marginal from their values in 1979. In addition, the bourgeoisie is again theorized to have greater cohesion than the other two classes and, so, should have constant coefficient values across the 1977, 1979 and 1981 waves of the survey: i (Procedures > Rights) and ii (Procedures for the bourgeoisie > Procedures for the proletariat) and iii (Procedures for the bourgeoisie > Procedures for the marginal) and iv (Procedures for the bourgeoisie in 1981 = Procedures for the bourgeoisie in 1979 = Procedures for the bourgeoisie in 1977). The data once again lead to the assessment that there is weak support for conflict theory. Procedures are the focus of greater consensus for each of the three classes, the only one of the four hypotheses to receive clear support from the results. The value of the procedures coefficient for the bourgeoisie is lower than that for both the proletariat and the marginal, inverting the expected segmentation, as was the case for 1977 and 1979 also. In addition, the expectation of increasing segmentation of consensus, which should be visible in the declining coefficient values for the proletariat and the marginal, is only half borne out. The proletariat consensus does indeed decline; however, the value for the marginal increases to the highest value in the study for any coefficient for either scale, producing inconclusive results. Furthermore, the declining coefficient of consensus on procedures for the bourgeoisie refutes the

hypothesis that the bourgeoisie is more cohesive than the other classes, a theme which will be picked up in the next section. Although the coefficients for 1977 and 1979 are quite similar, .206 and .213 respectively, the coefficient for 1981 is only .186.

From the perspective of consensus theory, there is no support for its three hypotheses. Procedures, not rights, are the focus of consensus for all three classes. The coefficients of rights for the three classes are not very uniform, ranging from .138 for the proletariat to .154 for the bourgeoisie. In addition, there is no consistent cross-temporal trend for this dependent variable. The values for both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat increase from 1979 to 1981; yet, the value for the marginal decreases in the same time span. The overall assessment of the 1981 data is the same as for 1977 and 1979, i.e., very nominal acceptance of conflict theory.

From the above evidence, conflict theory's stress on democratic procedures seems valid. The other aspect of this theory is its presupposition of the bourgeoisie as the most cohesive of the three classes based on its privileged relations to the means of production. This hypothesis was examined using a test for the heterogeneity of variances generated by each class for each year. In essence, if the bourgeoisie is more cohesive than the other two classes, then there will be definite heterogeneity among the three variances. The null

hypothesis for this test is that there is equal variance across the three class locations, indicating that no one class is more cohesive than the others. The one way analysis of variance generates two statistics which allow for the assessment of the heterogeneity of the variances, Cochran's C and the Bartlett-Box F. As the evidence in Table 3 suggests, the failure consistently to reject the null hypothesis over the three waves of this study reveals that the bourgeoisie are not in greater agreement than either the proletariat or the marginal. The probability statistics for both Cochran's C and the Bartlett-Box F indicate that the null hypothesis can not be rejected for both scales in all three years using the .01 level of significance, with one exception.

The test for homogeneity of variance for procedures in 1981 generates probability statistics which are significant at less than the .01 level. This result means that there is definite heterogeneity of variance among the three classes on procedures in 1981. An examination of the standard deviations indicates that the variance for the bourgeoisie has the lowest value of 3.24 (1.80 squared) while the proletariat and the marginal have greater variances, 4.20 (2.05 squared) and 6.76 (2.60 squared) respectively. This would seem to support the assertion made by conflict theorists that the bourgeoisie is the most cohesive class. However, this is the only one of the six tests to achieve statistical significance, so it is

important to avoid over-emphasizing its importance. In general, there is no strong or sustained support for the prediction that the bourgeoisie is more cohesive than the other two classes. Having tested the homogeneity of variance within year by class, it is now necessary to test the variance within the class categories over time for each scale to determine if the level of consensus remains constant over the period of the study. Before proceeding with this issue, a technical manipulation of the data set was needed.

Table 3: Tests for Homogeneity of Variance Within Year by Class, Bourgeoisie vs Proletariat vs Marginal

Scale	Class			
	Cochran's C	P	Bartlett-Box F	P
Rights 1977	.3546	.818	.326	.722
Procedures 1977	.3860	.201	1.113	.329
Rights 1979	.4129	.044	2.643	.071
Procedures 1979	.4013	.085	1.820	.162
Rights 1981	.3592	.688	.424	.655
Procedures 1981	.4756	.000	8.276	.000

* Note: all statistics generated by SPSS-x

A brief note is essential at this point to explain the necessity of constructing an "unmerged" data file for this project. Due to the nature of the original study, a panel survey conducted in three separate waves, the data were stored in a very awkward manner. The responses were merged by the original researchers in such a manner as to preclude separating

cases within the panel study by year. The utility of being able to pull out respondents by year is that it allows for the comparison of the homogeneity of variance of the class categories on the rights and procedures scales. The solution to this quandary was to treat the three waves of the study as separate samples and merge them in a different manner than was used by the original researchers. Instead of interweaving the cases as did the original researchers, the three separate waves of the study were stacked on top of each other, in effect tripling the number of respondents. One potential area of trouble which emerges from this procedure is the addition of cases to each year (10 for 1977, 7 for 1979 and 8 for 1981). This fact indicates a minor problem with the original merging variable; however, there is no substantial effect on the results. The additional number of cases involved is quite small compared to the overall number for each year. In addition, the coefficient values are basically identical (see Table 4) and for the most part are affected only at the third decimal place, a result which is within the realm of rounding error. Keeping these technical issues in mind, it is now possible to examine the homogeneity of variance within each class to determine if the level of consensus remains constant over the three waves of the study.

Table 4: Class Breakdown of Coefficients of Variation

Scale	N	Bourgeoisie	N	Proletariat	N	Marginal
Rights 1977	58	.143	142	.141	148	.144
Procedures 1977	66	.206	147	.247	159	.246
Rights 1979	84	.142	128	.132	146	.156
Procedures 1979	87	.222	129	.277	153	.261
Rights 1981	83	.154	130	.144	154	.149
Procedures 1981	86	.186	136	.221	160	.302

* Note: the number of cases across each scale may not add up to 100% due to missing values on the employment variable

** Note: all coefficients generated by SPSS-x

The null hypothesis of the test for homogeneity of variance within each class category over time is that the variances for each class for each wave of the study are equal. In essence, any evidence of heterogeneity of variance would indicate that the level of consensus changed over the three waves of the study. This test is useful to identify if the fluctuations in consensus which are present for all three classes (see Graphs 1-4) are statistically significant. As the results in Table 5 suggest, the null hypothesis can not be rejected for any class for either scale. Not one of the twelve Cochran's C or Bartlett-Box F statistics, used to test homogeneity of variance, generated by the three classes is significant at the .01 alpha level. These results indicate that the fluctuations in levels of consensus noted for all three classes are relatively minor and are not statistically

significant. Basically, the levels of consensus for the bourgeoisie, proletariat and the marginal remain constant from 1976 to 1981.

Table 5: Tests for Homogeneity of Variance Within Class over Time, 1977, 1979, 1981

Class	Year			
	Cochran's C	P	Bartlett-Box F	P
Bourgeoisie				
a. Rights	.3475	1.000	.094	.910
b. Procedures	.3788	.441	.982	.375
Proletariat				
a. Rights	.3518	.859	.308	.735
b. Procedures	.3929	.114	2.323	.098
Marginal				
a. Rights	.3608	.575	.365	.694
b. Procedures	.4132	.017	3.360	.035

* Note: all statistics generated by SPSS-x

Combining these sets of results, it appears that there is very minimal support for conflict theory's perspective on consensus. French Quebec society is not characterized by widespread consensus, especially on democratic rights. The consensus that does exist in society is focused upon democratic procedures. However, the supposition of conflict theory that the bourgeoisie is a more cohesive social class than either the proletariat or the marginal is not borne out by the evidence.

Furthermore, the levels of consensus remain constant for all three classes for all three waves of the study. The implications of these outcomes for the consensus-conflict debate will be assessed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

This project began by attempting to address an area of theoretical weakness in the consensus-conflict debate. This debate focused on the issue of the source of social order, consensus or conflict. Consensus theory posited social order based on diffuse consensus within liberal democratic society. Conflict theory disputed the stabilizing effect of consensus given the inherently coercive nature of capitalism, the mode of production characteristic of liberal democratic society (Macpherson, 1965:35). However, neither theory explicitly identified the source of consensus in society. Liberal democratic theory was examined and two possible sources of consensus were postulated--democratic rights and procedures. Consensus theory, with its prediction of diffuse consensus, revolves around agreement on democratic rights. By contrast, conflict theory supports the position that, if consensus exists in society, it is focused on democratic procedures. Beyond ascertaining the focus of consensus in society, this project also attempted to specify the distribution of consensus in society. As noted above, consensus theory predicts widespread consensus in society. Conflict theory presupposes that there should be a class-based segmentation of consensus. The third aspect of this study was to determine if the focus of consensus remains stable over time in a society in flux.

Quebec was chosen as the focus for this research due to the internal social change that it was undergoing in the period from 1976 to 1981. The election of a government explicitly committed to formal independence for Quebec was an indication of the strength of nationalist sentiment. By examining the implications of both consensus and conflict theory in Quebec, it was hoped that the focus and distribution of consensus would become clear. Using data from the "Social Change in Canada" project, the results identified democratic procedures to be the focus of consensus. Furthermore, there was no class-based segmentation of consensus as predicted by conflict theory.

There are a number of interesting implications for the consensus-conflict debate which emerge from the preceding analysis. The most obvious is the minimal support for conflict theory and the complete lack of support for consensus theory. Conflict theory receives a measure of support from the fact that consensus was focused on democratic procedures as predicted; however, as the test for the homogeneity of variance within each year by class demonstrated, conflict theory's prediction of greater consensus among the bourgeoisie than the other two classes was not confirmed. In addition, the demonstration of homogeneity of variance within each class category on both scales for every wave of the study clearly indicated that the levels of consensus remained constant, although there were minor fluctuations. This result would tend

to negate the argument that consensus is a process and not a single static entity, a view endorsed by Dahl (1961). The combination of these outcomes points at first glance to the view examined in the opening chapter; the consensus-conflict debate is a debate which exists on the normative level and it is not amenable to empirical investigation (Bernard, 1983 and Lipset, 1985).

This conclusion follows from the lack of strong support for either of the two theories only if the context of this study is not recalled. Although Quebec from 1976 to 1981 was a society in flux and was chosen for this study due to this very fact, it was clearly rooted in the liberal democratic structure of Canada. By 1976, Canada was a mature democratic society formally committed to respecting the liberty and equality of its citizens. As alluded to in Chapter One, these democratic rights require institutionalization as democratic procedures to be extended to every member of society. Over time, it is extremely plausible that the consensus on democratic rights which is said to underlie the efforts to form a democratic society shifts to democratic procedures. The average member of society confronts democratic procedures much more often in daily life than the more abstract democratic rights. From this presentation, it would appear that the fact of Canada's long existence as a democratic society takes precedence over the nationalist struggle for political sovereignty for Quebec. It

is important to note that the goal of independence for Quebec striven for by the Parti Quebecois from 1976 to 1981 was pursued, and is still pursued today, within the democratic structure of Canada. The fact that the attempt to secede from Canada remained within legal bounds indicates the strength of agreement on democratic procedures present in modern Canada.

The most fruitful avenue for future research in this area of exploring the role of consensus on rights and procedures for the stability of democratic society would begin by identifying nascent democracies and charting the focus of consensus over time. This is a rare possibility which has recently emerged with the political turmoil of Eastern Europe due to its very sudden dismantling of the previous regimes and halting steps toward democracy. By employing the rights-procedures framework within these countries, it should be possible to chart more accurately the cross-temporal trends of consensus and assess the empirical validity of the consensus-conflict debate.

APPENDIX ONE

VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION

1. Indicators of Democratic Rights

- a. Too much difference between rich, poor:
1977 (Q23A), 1979 (QK16A), 1981 (ZQL6A)
- b. High income people should pay more taxes:
1977 (Q23E), 1979 (QK16D), 1981 (ZQL6D)
- c. Providing assistance to the unemployed:
1977 (Q22C), 1979 (QD1C), 1981 (ZQD1C)
- d. Helping the poor:
1977 (Q22H), 1979 (QD1F), 1981 (ZQD1F)
- e. Workmen's compensation:
1977 (Q22T), 1979 (QD1K), 1981 (ZQD1K)

2. Indicators of Democratic Procedures

- a. Parliament soon lose touch with people:
1977 (Q21A), 1979 (QD6A), 1981 (ZQD2A)
- b. Government doesn't care about people (me):
1977 (Q21B), 1979 (QD6B), 1981 (ZQD2B)
- c. Politics, government complicated (understand):
1977 (Q21C), 1979 (QD6C), 1981 (ZQD2C)
- d. Have no say about what government does:
1977 (Q21D), 1979 (QD6D), 1981 (ZQD2D)

3. Indicators of Class Category

a. Employment variables

- i) Now working full-time or part-time:
1977 (Q51), 1979 (QH1), 1981 (ZQH1)
value: label: class category
1 : yes : bourgeoisie / proletariat
2 : no : marginal

3. Indicators of Class Category

a. Employment variables (cont.)

- ii) Work for self or employed by others:
 1977 (Q60), 1979 (QH9), 1981 (ZQH8)
 value: label: class category
 1 : own business : bourgeoisie
 2 : part-owner : bourgeoisie
 3 : family business : bourgeoisie
 4 : none of above : proletariat

b. Job autonomy: requires bourgeois values on both to be classified as bourgeoisie

- i) Speed of work regulated by equipment:
 1977 (Q72), 1979 (QH43), 1981 (ZQH41)
 value : label : class category
 1 : yes : proletariat
 2 : no : bourgeoisie
- ii) Frequency of supervision:
 1977 (Q79), 1979 (QH46), 1981 (ZQH44)
 value : label : class category
 1 : several times a day : proletariat
 2 : one or two times a day : proletariat
 3 : two or three times a week : bourgeoisie
 4 : less often : bourgeoisie
 5 : no supervisor : bourgeoisie

c. Education

- i) Highest level of education:
 1977 (Q201), 1979 (QG1), 1981 (ZQG1)
 value : label : class category
 1 : below B.A. : proletariat
 2 : B.A., M.A. or PhD : bourgeoisie

APPENDIX TWO

DEPENDENT VARIABLE SCALE STATISTICS

1. Pearson product-moment bivariate correlation coefficients

a. Rights 1977

	Q23A	Q23E	Q22C	Q22H	Q22T
Q23A	1.000				
Q23E	.2331**	1.000			
Q22C	.2164**	.1672**	1.000		
Q22H	.2462**	.2061**	.3558**	1.000	
Q22T	.1892**	.2073**	.2582**	.3329**	1.000

Note: ** - Significance level=.01 (2-tailed)

Note: * - Significance level=.05 (2-tailed)

b. Rights 1979

	QK16A	QK16D	QD1C	QD1F	QD1K
QK16A	1.000				
QK16D	.2388**	1.000			
QD1C	.1272**	.2243**	1.000		
QD1F	.1482**	.1234**	.3019**	1.000	
QD1K	.0811	.1607**	.2242**	.3216**	1.000

Note: ** - Significance level=.01 (2-tailed)

Note: * - Significance level=.05 (2-tailed)

c. Rights 1981

	ZQL6A	ZQL6D	ZQD1C	ZQD1F	ZQD1K
ZQL6A	1.000				
ZQL6D	.2616**	1.000			
ZQD1C	.1906**	.2095**	1.000		
ZQD1F	.2193**	.1989**	.3644**	1.000	
ZQD1K	.1274**	.2293**	.2996**	.4377**	1.000

Note: ** - Significance Level=.01 (2-tailed)

Note: * - Significance level=.05 (2-tailed)

(Note: all of the above values generated by the SPSS-x statistical package)

1. Pearson correlation coefficients (cont.)

d. Procedures 1977

	Q21A	Q21B	Q21C	Q21D
Q21A	1.000			
Q21B	.4088**	1.000		
Q21C	.2138**	.3429**	1.000	
Q21D	.3036**	.3764**	.3403**	1.000

Note: ** - Significance Level=.01 (2-tailed)

Note: * - Significance level=.05 (2-tailed)

e. Procedures 1979

	QD6A	QD6B	QD6C	QD6D
QD6A	1.000			
QD6B	.4977**	1.000		
QD6C	.2022**	.3193**	1.000	
QD6D	.2638**	.4197**	.4413**	1.000

Note: ** - Significance Level=.01 (2-tailed)

Note: * - Significance level=.05 (2-tailed)

f. Procedures 1981

	ZQD2A	ZQD2B	ZQD2C	ZQD2D
ZQD2A	1.000			
ZQD2B	.4434**	1.000		
ZQD2C	.2559**	.4043**	1.000	
ZQD2D	.3335**	.5248**	.4809**	1.000

Note: ** - Significance Level=.01 (2-tailed)

Note: * - Significance level=.05 (2-tailed)

(Note: all of the above values generated by the SPSS-x statistical package)

2. Reliability Analysis

SCALE: RIGHTS 1977

1. Q23A TOO MUCH DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RICH, POOR
2. Q23E HIGH INCOME PEOPLE SHOULD PAY MORE TAXES
3. Q22C PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE UNEMPLOYED
4. Q22H HELPING THE POOR
5. Q22T WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

	MEAN	STD DEV	CASES
1. Q23A	3.8145	1.0081	415.0
2. Q23E	3.7976	1.1044	415.0
3. Q22C	3.3639	1.0835	415.0
4. Q22H	3.9663	.8477	415.0
5. Q22T	3.8795	.8398	415.0

OF CASES = 415.0

STATISTICS FOR	MEAN	VARIANCE	STD DEV	VARIABLES
SCALE	18.8217	9.4126	3.0680	5

ITEM-TOTAL STATISTICS

	SCALE MEAN IF ITEM DELETED	SCALE VARIANCE IF ITEM DELETED	CORRECTED ITEM- TOTAL CORRELATION	SQUARED MULTIPLE CORRELATION	ALPHA IF ITEM DELETED
Q23A	15.0072	6.5483	.3582	.1315	.5560
Q23E	15.0241	6.4970	.3012	.1010	.5916
Q22C	15.4578	6.3068	.3550	.1591	.5596
Q22H	14.8554	6.7085	.4521	.2226	.5154
Q22T	14.9422	7.0111	.3814	.1569	.5482

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 5 ITEMS
 ALPHA = .6080 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = .6201

Note: all figures generated by SPSS-x

2. Reliability Analysis (cont.)

SCALE: RIGHTS 1979

- 1. QK16A TOO MUCH DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RICH, POOR
- 2. QK16D HIGH INCOME PEOPLE SHOULD PAY MORE TAXES
- 3. QD1C PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE UNEMPLOYED
- 4. QD1F HELPING THE POOR
- 5. QD1K WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

	MEAN	STD DEV	CASES
1. QK16A	3.8938	.9515	433.0
2. QK16D	3.6882	1.0811	433.0
3. QD1C	3.4850	1.0867	433.0
4. QD1F	3.9353	.8196	433.0
5. QD1K	3.8106	.8368	433.0

OF CASES = 433.0

STATISTICS FOR SCALE	MEAN	VARIANCE	STD DEV	VARIABLES
	18.8129	7.9441	2.8185	5

ITEM-TOTAL STATISTICS

	SCALE MEAN IF ITEM DELETED	SCALE VARIANCE IF ITEM DELETED	CORRECTED ITEM-TOTAL CORRELATION	SQUARED MULTIPLE CORRELATION	ALPHA IF ITEM DELETED
QK16A	14.9192	6.0189	.2184	.0667	.5089
QK16D	15.1247	5.3409	.2871	.0939	.4700
QD1C	15.3279	5.2070	.3138	.1230	.4509
QD1F	14.8776	5.8808	.3501	.1582	.4366
QD1K	15.0023	6.0116	.3003	.1215	.4624

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 5 ITEMS
 ALPHA = .5220 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = .5301

Note: all figures generated by SPSS-x

2. Reliability Analysis (cont.)

SCALE: RIGHTS 1981

1. ZQL6A TOO MUCH DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RICH, POOR
2. ZQL6D HIGH INCOME PEOPLE SHOULD PAY MORE TAXES
3. ZQD1C PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE UNEMPLOYED
4. ZQD1F HELPING THE POOR
5. ZQD1K WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

	MEAN	STD DEV	CASES
1. ZQL6A	3.8056	.9749	427.0
2. ZQL6D	3.6534	1.0377	427.0
3. ZQD1C	3.3185	.9378	427.0
4. ZQD1F	3.7822	.8002	427.0
5. ZQD1K	3.7307	.7722	427.0

OF CASES = 427.0

STATISTICS FOR	MEAN	VARIANCE	STD DEV	VARIABLES
SCALE	18.2904	8.1878	2.8614	5

ITEM-TOTAL STATISTICS

	SCALE MEAN IF ITEM DELETED	SCALE VARIANCE IF ITEM DELETED	CORRECTED ITEM- TOTAL CORRELATION	SQUARED MULTIPLE CORRELATION	ALPHA IF ITEM DELETED
ZQL6A	14.4848	5.8325	.2983	.1053	.6034
ZQL6D	14.6370	5.4994	.3311	.1184	.5899
ZQD1C	14.9719	5.5297	.4032	.1900	.5464
ZQD1F	14.5082	5.7904	.4563	.2685	.5267
ZQD1K	14.5597	6.0545	.4044	.2317	.5522

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 5 ITEMS
 ALPHA = .6175 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = .6304

Note: all figures generated by SPSS-x

2. Reliability Analysis (cont.)

SCALE: PROCEDURES 1977

1. Q21A PARLIAMENT SOON LOSE TOUCH WITH PEOPLE
2. Q21B GOVMENT DOESN'T CARE ABOUT PEOPLE (ME)
3. Q21C POLITICS, GOVMENT COMPLICATED (UNDERSTAND)
4. Q21D HAVE NO SAY ABOUT WHAT GOVERNMENT DOES

	MEAN	STD DEV	CASES
1. Q21A	2.0989	.7001	445.0
2. Q21B	2.2809	.7739	445.0
3. Q21C	2.3124	.7964	445.0
4. Q21D	2.4989	.9070	445.0

OF CASES = 445.0

STATISTICS FOR	MEAN	VARIANCE	STD DEV	VARIABLES
SCALE	9.1910	5.0918	2.2565	4

ITEM-TOTAL STATISTICS

	SCALE MEAN IF ITEM DELETED	SCALE VARIANCE IF ITEM DELETED	CORRECTED ITEM- TOTAL CORRELATION	SQUARED MULTIPLE CORRELATION	ALPHA IF ITEM DELETED
Q21A	7.0921	3.5388	.4035	.1900	.6287
Q21B	6.9101	3.0820	.5193	.2775	.5524
Q21C	6.8787	3.2780	.4091	.1775	.6252
Q21D	6.6921	2.8307	.4713	.2247	.5868

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 4 ITEMS
 ALPHA = .6667 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = .6685

Note: all figures generated by SPSS-x

2. Reliability Analysis (cont.)

SCALE: PROCEDURES 1979

1. QD6A PARLIAMENT SOON LOSE TOUCH WITH PEOPLE
2. QD6B GOVMENT DOESN'T CARE ABOUT PEOPLE (ME)
3. QD6C POLITICS,GOVMENT COMPLICATED (UNDERSTAND)
4. QD6D HAVE NO SAY WHAT GOVERNMENT DOES

	MEAN	STD DEV	CASES
1. QD6A	2.0966	.7396	445.0
2. QD6B	2.2090	.7407	445.0
3. QD6C	2.3124	.8484	445.0
4. QD6D	2.3798	.8736	445.0

OF CASES = 445.0

STATISTICS FOR	MEAN	VARIANCE	STD DEV	VARIABLES
SCALE	8.9978	5.3221	2.3070	4

ITEM-TOTAL STATISTICS

	SCALE MEAN IF ITEM DELETED	SCALE VARIANCE IF ITEM DELETED	CORRECTED ITEM- TOTAL CORRELATION	SQUARED MULTIPLE CORRELATION	ALPHA IF ITEM DELETED
QD6A	6.9011	3.5848	.4250	.2540	.6500
QD6B	6.7888	3.3201	.5385	.3323	.5829
QD6C	6.6854	3.2882	.4271	.2101	.6521
QD6D	6.6180	3.0294	.5030	.2751	.6012

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 4 ITEMS
 ALPHA = .6874 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = .6907

Note: all figures generated by SPSS-x

2. Reliability Analysis (cont.)

SCALE: PROCEDURES 1981

1. ZQD2A PARLIAMENT SOON LOSE TOUCH WITH PEOPLE
2. ZQD2B GOVMENT DOESN'T CARE ABOUT PEOPLE (ME)
3. ZQD2C POLITICS,GOVMENT COMPLICATED (UNDERSTAND)
4. ZQD2D HAVE NO SAY ABOUT WHAT GOVERNMENT DOES

	MEAN	STD DEV	CASES
1. ZQD2A	2.1244	.6724	450.0
2. ZQD2B	2.2667	.7157	450.0
3. ZQD2C	2.3578	.8408	450.0
4. ZQD2D	2.4289	.8366	450.0

OF CASES = 450.0

STATISTICS FOR SCALE	MEAN	VARIANCE	STD DEV	VARIABLES
	9.1778	5.2601	2.2935	4

ITEM-TOTAL STATISTICS

	SCALE MEAN IF ITEM DELETED	SCALE VARIANCE IF ITEM DELETED	CORRECTED ITEM- TOTAL CORRELATION	SQUARED MULTIPLE CORRELATION	ALPHA IF ITEM DELETED
ZQD2A	7.0533	3.7121	.4229	.2107	.7246
ZQD2B	6.9111	3.1992	.6049	.3768	.6284
ZQD2C	6.8200	3.0878	.4959	.2662	.6915
ZQD2D	6.7489	2.8923	.5862	.3611	.6332

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 4 ITEMS
 ALPHA = .7323 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = .7339

Note: all figures generated by SPSS-x

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