

IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT IT SAYS . . .
A STUDY OF HEBREW AND GREEK LEXICAL ANALYSES IN COMMENTARIES

by

Benjamin J. Baxter, B.Th.

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AUTHOR: Benjamin J. Baxter

SUPERVISORS: Mark J. Boda and Stanley E. Porter

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Upon the recommendation of an oral examination committee, this thesis-project by

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Michael P. ...", written over a horizontal line.

First Reader and Advisor

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Stacy E. Pater", written over a horizontal line.

First Reader and Advisor

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. P. ...", written over a horizontal line.

Second Reader

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. A. ...", written over a horizontal line.

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ABSTRACT

“In the Original Text it Says . . . : A Study of Hebrew and Greek Lexical Analyses in Commentaries”

Benjamin J. Baxter
McMaster Divinity College
Hamilton, Ontario
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This thesis examines Hebrew and Greek lexical analyses in commentaries that were written after the publication of James Barr’s *The Semantics of Biblical Language* in 1961. Commentaries used by evangelical pastors and that discuss one of the following four biblical passages are examined: Gen 15:1-6; Isa 53:1-6; Luke 18:1-8; Rom 3:21-26. Using a modern linguistic approach, it is demonstrated that Old and New Testament commentaries evidence many lexical fallacies. In addition, statements are regularly made by commentators which do not evince linguistically-nuanced language, and thus could easily lead pastors to make errors in their statements from the pulpit about Hebrew and Greek words. In the hope that evangelical pastors can become more ably equipped to exegete the Scriptures, suggestions are made for how Bible colleges and seminaries can prepare students to incorporate the knowledge which has been gained from modern linguistics into lexical analysis.

*To my parents, Thomas S. H. and Janene E. Baxter,
by whose words and actions I first learned the importance of the Scriptures;*

*my future parents-in-law, Philip and Brenda Masters,
who fed me and put a roof over my head while I wrote this;*

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ABBREVIATIONS

<i>BAGD</i>	Bauer's <i>A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament</i> , 2 nd edition (1979)
<i>BDAG</i>	Bauer's <i>A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament</i> , 3 rd edition (2000)
<i>BDB</i>	<i>The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon</i>
<i>BHRG</i>	<i>A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar</i> by van der Merwe, <i>et al.</i>
EV	English versions of the Bible
<i>HALOT</i>	<i>The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament</i> by Koehler and Baumgartner
LXX	Septuagint; Greek version of the Old Testament
MT	Masoretic text of the Hebrew Bible

CHAPTER ONE: A LINGUISTIC APPROACH TO LEXICAL ANALYSIS

Biblical scholars have for generations recognized the importance of studying the biblical languages of Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek. Bible colleges and seminaries offer courses in the biblical languages, encouraging future pastors and scholars to become familiar with the languages that were used in composing the Scriptures. Yet in spite of this, Cotterell and Turner were still able to write in 1989: “Unfortunately our system of higher education seems designed to keep the disciplines of biblical studies and linguistics isolated from each other, and few theologians have been exposed even to those aspects of linguistics which are of most obvious relevance to them.”¹ It is important then, to become familiar with the significance of linguistic study for exegesis, and in particular, lexical analysis.

Lexical Analysis and Exegesis

At its basic level, exegesis is the study of what a text meant at the time in which it was written.² In their introductory, popular-level book on biblical interpretation, Fee and Stuart define exegesis as “the careful, systematic study of the Scripture [*sic*] to discover

¹Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 9.

²Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 22.

the original, intended meaning.”³ This is a useful definition which succinctly states a common evangelical approach to exegesis.

In a handbook for exegesis, Porter and Clarke caution against the hope of finding a definitive exegesis of a biblical text, due to the various aspects of a text’s meaning and the different types of exegesis which are able to illuminate those various aspects. They therefore suggest: “Rather, one does an exegesis of a passage in which a coherent and informed interpretation is presented, based upon that interpreter’s encounter with and investigation of a text at a given point in time.”⁴ It is a helpful caution to note that with any human’s limited understanding, the definitive exegesis of a biblical text, which fully explicates every aspect of the text, may not be achievable. However, there could be some danger in pitting various forms of exegesis against one another. If one’s exegesis is faithful in adequately presenting a particular aspect of a passage, then the various types of exegesis should be able to support one another, working together for a coherent, unified understanding of a biblical text. Therefore, if any person’s exegesis does in fact accurately represent an element of what the text originally meant, whether it be through genre analysis, discourse analysis, literary criticism, or any other type of exegesis, it can be seen to further our understanding of a biblical text. The various types of exegesis should indeed make us aware of the enormity of the task and our reliance upon the work of others, and give us a willingness to change our understanding of a biblical text as a

³Fee and Stuart, *How to Read the Bible*, 19. However, they each define exegesis differently in their respective handbooks for exegesis. Fee writes: “The term *EXEGESIS* is used in this book in a consciously limited sense to refer to the historical investigation into the meaning of the biblical text,” *New Testament Exegesis*, 1; Stuart says: “An exegesis is a thorough, analytical study of a biblical passage done so as to arrive at a useful interpretation of the passage,” *Old Testament Exegesis*, 1.

⁴Porter and Clarke, “What is Exegesis?,” 18.

result of others' exegetical work. Nevertheless, the different forms of exegesis should not be seen to be at odds with one another, but rather to be a collection of tools which will, when used together, lead us closer and closer to a correct understanding of the biblical text.⁵

The degree to which an exegetical study is considered to be a correct understanding of a biblical text is directly related to authorial intent. As Osborne writes, "The goal of evangelical hermeneutics⁶ is quite simple— to discover the intention of the Author/author (author= inspired human author; Author= God who inspires the text)."⁷ The typical evangelical perspective, taken by Osborne, is that in determining the author's intention, the purpose of the Author also becomes evident. One difficulty with this understanding of authorial intention is in cases where the author is unknown. Is authorial intention even possible to determine with these biblical texts? Therefore, some would argue that the text is sufficient, apart from knowing anything about its author, for determining the message that it (or its implied author) intended to convey to those who read it. Thus, Authorial intention is considered possible to determine, even without knowing the human author.

Yet some scholars have challenged the belief that the meaning of any biblical text

⁵I disagree with Davies, who writes: "All critical commentaries include exegesis, although many also discuss other interpretative issues, like form, genre, or significance for the modern reader," "Exegesis," 220. With the exception of significance for the modern reader, which falls under the broader task of hermeneutics, the other interpretative issues that Davies cites are better understood as various aspects of the exegetical task, for they all advance one's understanding of what the text meant.

⁶Osborne uses "hermeneutics" as an overarching term for both understanding a biblical text and applying it to one's life. Exegesis and contextualization (the crosscultural communication of a text's significance for today) are the two aspects comprising the larger task of hermeneutics, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 21.

⁷Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 24.

for its original audience can be determined. They would suggest that due to issues of distanciation (such as time and culture), the author's meaning (or meaning intended for the text's original audience) is lost forever, and we should only be concerned with the meaning that a community of believers derives from the text for themselves.⁸ Yet if all that matters is the meaning that is derived from a text for a present-day community of believers, one must wonder why the Bible should be the source of deriving meaning, as opposed to any other books? It is not interpretations which are inspired, but the words of Scripture themselves, conveyed through a human author to speak to a particular situation. Cotterell and Turner refer to Hirsch, who insisted

that we may only legitimately assert that we have brought to light the significance of, say, *King Lear*, for our lives if we have first discovered Shakespeare's intended meaning, and then related *that* meaning to our world. Without this important control, we are not discovering the significance of *Lear*, but of our parody of *Lear*.⁹

Similarly, we cannot claim to have understood the meaning of a biblical text unless we exegete it in light of the Authorial intention for its original setting.¹⁰

⁸Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 24. It must be admitted that this attitude is commonly held within the evangelical church, even if it is not recognized as such. An example would be Bible studies in which those in attendance are encouraged to share what the text is saying *to them*. The biblical text thus becomes a platform on which to stand as a believer shares their views on a particular topic. What the text says to that person is considered to be valid because it is based upon what the text says, in plain English, and is often accompanied by pleas such as, "God really laid this upon my heart." Nevertheless, evangelical believers often claim the importance of authorial (and Authorial) intent; a pursuit of the implications of this intent is often evident in sermons and scholarly evangelical literature (whether or not the author's [or Author's] intended meaning is ever actually found is the matter of a separate discussion).

⁹Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 57; referring to Hirsch, *Validity in Interpretation*. A similar sentiment is expressed by Vanhoozer, when he writes: "In the face of such interpretative plurality, it is important to ensure that one's interpretative interest corresponds to the communicative intent of the text. Otherwise interpreters will describe not the theology of the text but only their own agendas and ideologies," "Exegesis and Hermeneutics," 63.

¹⁰My brief discussion of authorial meaning here does not do justice to the complexities involved in determining the original, intended meaning. For an excellent introduction to the issues involved from an evangelical perspective, see: Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 465-521.

One aspect of exegesis is to study the biblical text in the original language in which it was written: Hebrew, Aramaic, or Greek.¹¹ The initial step in that process is textual criticism, or determining what the text is that should be studied. Once the text is established, there are two major components to language study, according to Porter: “lexis or the analysis of vocabulary, and grammar or the use of these words or the elements that make them up.”¹² Even though determining the meaning of words cannot be achieved completely apart from a study of grammar, the primary focus of this thesis will be on the meaning of words or lexical analysis. Only when it is necessary for determining the meaning of a word will grammar be discussed.

Osborne indicates the significance of lexical analysis when he writes: “Word studies [lexical analyses] have certainly become the most popular aspect of exegesis.”¹³ In their respective evangelical handbooks for exegesis, Stuart and Fee encourage students and pastors to study the key words found in a passage.¹⁴ Similarly, many popular-level books encourage evangelical pastors with any level of training in Hebrew and Greek to conduct lexical analyses.¹⁵ *Interlinear Bibles*, *Vine’s Expository Dictionary*, Strong’s *Dictionary of Bible Words*, and *The Amplified Bible* have for many years encouraged pastors to seek the supposed richness of important Hebrew and Greek words.¹⁶ More

¹¹Porter and Clarke, “What is Exegesis?,” 12.

¹²Porter, *Studies*, 8.

¹³Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 82.

¹⁴Stuart discusses lexical analyses throughout his handbook: *Old Testament Exegesis*, 21-22, 55-58, 79-81, 134-144; Fee devotes an entire chapter to the discussion of words: *New Testament Exegesis*, 79-95; see also 142-43, 162-64.

¹⁵From this point on, Hebrew and Greek lexical analyses will be the focus of study, to the neglect of any discussion of Aramaic. Only a small amount of the Bible was written in Aramaic, and sermons which discuss Aramaic are exceedingly rare.

¹⁶For example, Marshall, trans., *NASB-NIV Parallel New Testament*; Vine, *Vine’s Expository Dictionary*; Strong, *Dictionary of Bible Words*; The Lockman Foundation, *The Amplified Bible*.

recent years have also seen the publication of *The Key Word Study Bible, Greek for the Rest of Us*, Mounce's *Complete Expository Dictionary of Old and New Testament Words*, *Interlinear for the Rest of Us*,¹⁷ and a number of books in the *Complete Word Study* series.¹⁸ All of these books encourage evangelical pastors (and indeed all believers) to study the words found in the original biblical text to determine what they mean.

Pastors are certainly getting the message. It is by no means uncommon to listen to a sermon in an evangelical church on a Sunday morning, and to be told what a certain Greek (or occasionally Hebrew) word means. The impression given is that by knowing what a Greek or a Hebrew word lying behind the English text means, we will be able to understand the biblical passage more fully. However, when studying a biblical passage, how can a pastor correctly determine the meaning of a word which is encountered? In order to answer this question, one must learn from advances in modern linguistic study.

Linguistic Principles for Lexical Analysis

In order to introduce the reader to linguistic study, I will highlight a number of principles of modern linguistics which are particularly pertinent to a study of the Scriptures. These principles are helpful in leading to a linguistic approach to the study of the biblical text. For a more complete introduction to linguistics, the reader is encouraged

¹⁷Zodhiates, ed., *Key Word Study Bible*; Mounce, *Greek for the Rest of Us*; Mounce, ed., *Expository Dictionary*; Mounce, *Interlinear*.

¹⁸Spiros Zodhiates, ed., published by AMG Publishers. Titles include: *The Complete Word Study New Testament*, *The Complete Word Study Dictionary: New Testament*, *The Complete Word Study Old Testament*, and *The Complete Word Study Dictionary: Old Testament*.

to begin with a perusal of the sources referenced in this section.¹⁹

One of the primary underlying principles of modern linguistics is the recognition of structure in language. That is, a particular language is viewed as a cohesive whole where the selection of a particular element within that language implies not choosing other elements.²⁰ The element of choice within a language's structure has an important role to play in determining meaning. As Porter writes, "For example, selection of the Greek perfect tense automatically implies not selecting the present or aorist, and it is the relationship among these tense forms which establishes their function and meaning within the language."²¹ Likewise, the selection of an imperfect verb in Hebrew implies the non-selection of a perfect verb. The meanings of the words in a language also impact one another. As Lyons writes: "Any broadening in the sense of one lexeme involves a corresponding narrowing in the sense of one or more of its neighbours."²² The tendency in teaching biblical Hebrew and Greek is to relate everything to English categories.²³ Thus, words are not defined or considered within the structure of Hebrew or Greek, but are simply given English glosses which are then said to be what the (Hebrew or Greek) words mean. Such an approach fails to take seriously the cohesive structure of each language,

¹⁹There are a number of different linguistic models currently in use. Part of the reason for the diversity in linguistic approaches is due to the fact that linguistic study is a relatively recent discipline. Nevertheless, the principles I outline in the body of the paper are common to the majority of linguists, and are therefore valuable for bringing a linguistic approach to the analysis of the biblical text. See Porter, "Ancient Languages," 155-58.

²⁰Porter, "Ancient Languages," 152.

²¹Porter, "Ancient Languages," 152.

²²Lyons, *Semantics*, 1:252. The comments made here allow for the possibility that a language may have gaps and overlaps in its lexical field; see Lyons, *Semantics*, 1:260.

²³For example, Mounce's popular introductory Greek grammar introduces most chapters with a discussion of English grammar, to which the Greek grammar in that chapter is then related. This tendency is related to the usual focus on translation in Hebrew and Greek courses, an issue which will be discussed below, Mounce, *Basics*.

and encourages students to use English as the framework for understanding the biblical languages. Modern linguistics recognizes that each language is to be studied as a coherent whole, and in a systematic manner.

A second principle, which is related to the first, is that there is a difference between determining the meaning of a word or sentence, and being able to translate that word or sentence into another language.²⁴ It is certainly true that translation is an important element of biblical studies; without it, millions of people would not have personal access to the Scriptures. However, since each language is a coherent structure, it is important to recognize that the meaning of a word is determined by how it is used within the structure of that language, rather than by the meaning of the words used to translate it into English.²⁵ Lyons demonstrates the importance of this when he writes:

We could not reasonably say that ‘mat’ has two meanings because it is translatable into French by means of two non-synonymous lexemes, ‘tapis’ and ‘paillason’; or that ‘tapis’ has three meanings because it can be translated into English with three non-synonymous lexemes, ‘rug’, ‘carpet’, and ‘mat’. The meanings of words (their sense and denotation) are internal to the language to which they belong.²⁶

A focus on translation of the biblical languages may at times hinder understanding of the text, for ambiguity can be present in a translation, which was not present in the original text, due to the difficulty of conveying information which was originally written in

²⁴Porter, “Ancient Languages,” 166.

²⁵Any of the general principles I state about translation into English would also be true of other languages. However, I will only discuss English herein because that is the primary language spoken in Ontario, and indeed, in most parts of Canada.

²⁶Lyons, *Semantics*, 1:238.

another language.²⁷

Third, modern linguistics emphasizes synchronic, rather than diachronic, study. A number of helpful analogies have been postulated to demonstrate the relationship between the two. One of those is the analogy of a chess game. The history of the chess game (diachronic study) is inconsequential to the present possibilities in the game (synchronic study). What matters most at any given moment is the relationship between the pieces as they presently stand on the board which, of course, can change at any moment with the movement of just one piece.²⁸ Just as a person who understands how the game of chess works is able to understand the significance of the current placement of the chess pieces on the board, so too a speaker of a language is able to communicate effectively without any knowledge of the history of that language. As Silva writes: “even a knowledge of that development is not bound to affect the speaker’s daily conversation: the English professor who knows that *nice* comes from Latin *nescius*, ‘ignorant,’ does not for that reason refrain from using the term in a complimentary way.”²⁹ It is the synchronic analysis of a word which is of primary importance in a study of the biblical text.³⁰

These three principles merely scratch the surface of modern linguistic study. They

²⁷For a discussion of some of the difficulties in translation, see: Nida, “Contemporary Linguistics,” esp. 74-76. Lyons writes: “So-called literal, or faithful, translations are notoriously unsatisfactory as translations; the Italian slogan, ‘Traduttore, traditore’ (‘The translator is a betrayer’), which itself can hardly be translated satisfactorily into English, is relevant in more ways than one to the whole question of faithful translation,” *Semantics*, 1:257-58.

²⁸Porter, “Ancient Languages,” 153. He also mentions a second of de Saussure’s analogies, that of a plant stem. Cotterell and Turner give the analogy of a river: “If we see the length of the river as signifying time then taking a cross-section at different points along the river, and comparing what is found, corresponds to *diachronic* linguistic study, while the examination of a single cross-section corresponds to *synchronic* study,” *Linguistics*, 25.

²⁹Silva, *Biblical Words*, 38.

³⁰Lyons, *Semantics*, 1:243-45.

are, however, particularly pertinent for a discussion of lexical analysis. Each one of the principles mentioned above has direct application to the meaning of words in the biblical text. In addition to these general linguistic principles, there are a number of issues which need to be taken into account when determining the meaning of a word.

Linguistic Issues and Lexical Analysis

A challenge in determining the meaning of words is explained by Cruse:

One of the basic problems of lexical semantics is the apparent multiplicity of semantic uses of a single word form (without grammatical difference). There seems little doubt that such variation is the rule rather than the exception: the meaning of any word form is in some sense different in every distinct context in which it occurs.³¹

The fact that a word may be used in many different ways can be described as the semantic range of a word. That is, a word can be used with different senses or meanings in different contexts. As Cotterell and Turner write: “In fact, single point meanings usually arise only temporarily with neologisms, words freshly minted.”³² For all other words, those having more than one meaning, the semantic range of a word, as Osborne states, “is the result of the synchronic study, a list of the ways the word was used in the era when the work was written.”³³ It is, therefore, important to ensure that the uses of a word which are noted in determining a word’s semantic range, are uses that were extant during the same time period.

As an example of a word’s semantic range, Carson discusses the word “board”:

³¹Cruse, *Lexical Semantics*, 50-51.

³²Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 135.

³³Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 100.

Many people pay room and board, an expression possibly derived from the fact that in older English the table from which one ate on special occasions was called a festive board. A group of people gathered together for business might be called a board of trustees; and if they get on a ship or a train, they will step on board and hope they do not fall overboard. The same word can function as a verb: workmen may board up a broken window, and passengers board a jetliner.³⁴

The same word-form, “board,” can be used as a noun and a verb, in a multitude of contexts. It is essential to consider the context in which a given word is found to determine the meaning that it contributes there, or the portion of the word’s semantic range which contributes to the meaning of the sentence.

It is worthwhile to mention two terms which are related to the semantic range of a word. The first term is “homonymy,” which refers to the phenomenon of two or more words which have the same lexical form. The second term is “polysemy,” which refers to the phenomenon of a single word which has a multiplicity of senses.³⁵ Cotterell and Turner suggest limiting the first term to words which have distinct and apparently unrelated senses; the second term is therefore used to refer to multiple related senses of a word.³⁶ Distinguishing between cases of homonymy and polysemy is not always an easy task, for it is often difficult to determine whether different senses of a word are related or not. Therefore, not all linguists choose to make a clear distinction between the two.³⁷ Nevertheless, it is important to note that every time a lexical form is found in the biblical text, it will not necessarily carry the same meaning, nor will the meaning of a word in one context necessarily be related to the meaning of that word in another context.

³⁴Carson, *Exegetical Fallacies*, 57.

³⁵Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 136.

³⁶Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 137.

³⁷See Cruse, *Lexical Semantics*, 80; Lyons, *Semantics*, 2:552, 565.

A popular view of words has been that they are referential. A referential view of words is that each word has a particular referent, that is, an extralinguistic thing that is signified. In light of the fact that words have a semantic range, it can be seen that each word does not have one extralinguistic thing to which it always refers. Even though words are not referential, there are many words which can be used to refer to extralinguistic things in certain contexts. Porter explains:

Words are not the things, and they do not emerge from or return to the thing, except that within a linguistic system the users of the language may use a word to signify a thing. When a speaker uses a word to speak of a thing, this can be called reference. . . . It is when specific items are being spoken of that language users are using language to refer.³⁸

Although some would wish to differentiate between things in the physical world and things in the spiritual world, or in fictional stories, it seems best to conclude that in any case a word can be used to refer to an extralinguistic thing, as long as it exists in *a* world.³⁹

Cotterell and Turner emphasize that for a word to be used referentially (the thing to which it refers being an object, event, or process), it must be found within a particular context:

A contextless sentence, for example, a sentence produced to illustrate a point in a grammar, does not have intentional reference. Even a sentence such as ‘London is one gigantic chaos’, if it is contextless, can have no reference. It might appear to have, provided that we are prepared gratuitously to assume that ‘London’ is an

³⁸Porter, *Studies*, 68-69.

³⁹Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 87. Somewhat different than this example, Porter also mentions that “denotation” is used by some to signify things that exist in the world in an idealized realm, rather than in any particularity. That is, to classes or types of things, e.g. “cows” as a class, rather than to a particular “cow” or “cows,” *Studies*, 69. Particularly considering the comments of Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 84-85 (see their comments about “London” in the body of the present chapter), Porter’s distinction between “reference” and “denotation” is a good one.

intentional reference to London, England. But firstly ‘London’ could in fact be the name of a house, a boat, a pet, or some other city: London, Ontario, for example.⁴⁰

It is important to note then, that the extralinguistic thing to which a word may refer is determined by the context of a passage. The word itself has no referential meaning; it can only be used by an author to refer to something.

Silva wishes to distinguish between technical and nontechnical words, suggesting that technical words are actually referential.⁴¹ That is, certain words refer to or stand for defined concepts or ideas, apart from context.⁴² Osborne seems largely to agree with him, adding the caveat that there is no clear-cut distinction between technical and nontechnical words.⁴³ I will refrain from examining their arguments in detail, but Osborne notes that there is still some flexibility in the words that Silva says are technical. Context is ultimately key for determining the meaning even of technical words.⁴⁴ It is difficult, therefore, to see how so-called technical words are any different than nontechnical words which can be used referentially. In either case, words can in some contexts be used by an author (in the case of the biblical texts) to refer to an extralinguistic thing. The nature of the referent will be evident by an examination of the context(s). Rather than suggesting that words in-and-of themselves can be technical, it may be best to say that an author is able to use a word in a technical sense in their writings.⁴⁵

⁴⁰Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 84.

⁴¹Silva, *Biblical Words*, 107. He also creates a category of semi-technical words, which for the purposes of this discussion is immaterial, as can be seen by my treatment of technical words.

⁴²Silva, *Biblical Words*, 107.

⁴³Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 95.

⁴⁴Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 95. He gives the example of “sanctification.”

⁴⁵Such an understanding of technical words is helpful in reminding students of the Bible to examine the use of a word by a specific author, prior to examining its use in the entirety of the Scriptures, and as well in extra-biblical literature. Furthermore, it must be argued that an author is using a particular

The meanings of words are particularly influenced by their syntagmatic relations, which are, in the words of Lyons: “those which it [a word] contracts by virtue of its combination (in a syntagm, or construction) with other units of the same level. For example, the lexeme ‘old’ is syntagmatically related with the definite article ‘the’ and the noun ‘man’ in the expression ‘the old man’.”⁴⁶ Thus the meaning of the word “old” is not determined by its examination in isolation, but by considering how it is used in a particular context (in this case, “the old man,” which will in turn be influenced by the sentence and the whole discourse in which this phrase is found).

One aspect of syntagmatic relations that is particularly important to consider is idioms. Cruse gives a helpful definition: “an idiom is an expression whose meaning cannot be accounted for as a compositional function of the meanings its parts have when they are not parts of idioms.”⁴⁷ When determining the meaning of an idiom, great care must be taken. For as Cruse writes: “in considering *to pull someone’s leg*, for instance, there is little point in referring to *pull in* or *pull a fast one*, or *leg* in *He hasn’t a leg to stand on*.”⁴⁸ An idiom has a meaning which cannot be determined by considering the meaning of its parts (i.e. individual words) in different contexts.

Cruse defines “synonyms” as: “lexical items whose senses are identical in respect

word in a technical sense, rather than merely assuming it to be true. In their introduction to Bible translations, Fee and Strauss write: “*Sarx* serves for Paul as a technical term for the eschatological concept of the old age of existence characterized by sin and death that is now superseded by the new age of salvation inaugurated by Christ,” *Translation*, 60. Considering the various contexts in which Paul uses σάρξ (*sarx*), however, one wonders whether it is really a technical term for Paul, or if the semantic range of σάρξ merely makes it an appropriate word choice in contexts where Paul is describing the “eschatological concept of the old age of existence characterized by sin and death that is now superseded by the new age of salvation inaugurated by Christ.”

⁴⁶ Lyons, *Semantics*, 1:240. Cf. Porter, *Studies*, 71; Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 155-59.

⁴⁷ Cruse, *Lexical Semantics*, 37.

⁴⁸ Cruse, *Lexical Semantics*, 37.

of 'central' semantic traits, but differ, if at all, only in respect of what we may provisionally describe as 'minor' or 'peripheral' traits."⁴⁹ He then goes on to explain his scepticism that absolute synonyms exist at all in language, writing: "There is no obvious motivation for the existence of absolute synonyms in a language, and one would expect either that one of the items would fall into obsolescence, or that a difference in semantic function would develop."⁵⁰ Sometimes the difference in meaning between two words can simply be expressive, which is the emotion or attitude that is conveyed through the use of a word.⁵¹ Thus, the semantic ranges of no two words will be entirely synonymous. However, it is possible that in certain contexts, two different words could be used interchangeably, without any noticeable difference in meaning.

Cotterell and Turner mention some extralinguistic factors which impact the meaning of words. These factors include perceived meaning (the response to an utterance by the original hearers), connotation (the societal or cultural perspective of the referent signified by the author's use of a word; e.g. foxes are cunning, mules are stubborn. These perspectives differ from culture to culture), implicature (the meaning which is implied through the use of words; the implied meaning has little to do with the meaning of the actual words used), gesture (physical signs such as placing a hand or finger over the mouth, crying, throwing dust in the air; these gestures differ from culture to culture), and body language (differs from gesture in that most people are overtly unaware of this

⁴⁹Cruse, *Lexical Semantics*, 267.

⁵⁰Cruse, *Lexical Semantics*, 270.

⁵¹Cruse, *Lexical Semantics*, 274.

language of communication, which includes posture and proximity between people).⁵²

When examining words in biblical texts, it is important to be aware of (or at least consider the possibility of) extralinguistic factors which could impact the meaning of them.

There are many factors which influence the meaning of a word. Any lexical analysis must be done carefully, with a view to a synchronic study of a word in the contexts in which it is found. The brief introduction to linguistic study above has been given to highlight a number of the issues that are particularly relevant for lexical analyses of Hebrew and Greek words in biblical texts. It will serve as a framework for the remainder of this study.

LXX Influence on New Testament Words

A particular difficulty in determining the meaning of words in the New Testament is to ascertain the influence of the LXX on them. This is an area of great debate in New Testament studies, and certainly no complete answer to this perplexing problem can be offered here. Silva offers a brief survey of the discussion from about the one hundred years prior to the publication of his *Biblical Words and their Meaning* in 1983. After taking into consideration what Silva has said, as well as the linguistic principles and issues outlined above, three principles for determining the influence of the LXX on New Testament words will be followed within this thesis.

First, there is an important distinction between word-meaning and a theological

⁵²Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 45-51.

concept. The LXX has undoubtedly had a tremendous influence on the New Testament, but this influence is seen primarily in word-combination rather than word-meaning.⁵³ Second, one cannot equate the semantic range of a Greek word with the Hebrew word it translates. No two languages use their words in exactly the same way. Furthermore, the translators of the LXX had differing levels of competency in Hebrew and Greek, and different styles of translation.⁵⁴ Great care must then be taken in determining the relationship between Greek words in the LXX and the Hebrew words of the text which was translated. Third, it is only in particular contexts that the meaning of Greek words (in the New Testament) will display a connection to their meanings in the LXX. Silva gives the English example of the use of the word “quick” to mean “living” or “alive”: “Thus, a writer of the present day, even if he is immersed in the language of the King James Version, will not consider using the word *quick* except in such idioms as *the quick and the dead*.”⁵⁵ Similarly, it would need to be demonstrated, rather than assumed, that a New Testament author’s use of a Greek word reflects the meaning of that word in the LXX.

Pastors, Commentaries and Lexical Analyses

The busy pastor who wishes to determine the meaning of a Greek or Hebrew word will often turn to secondary sources for help. Some pastors may use the tools for lexical analysis which are listed in the first section of this chapter. All are likely at some point to consult at least one commentary for insight into the biblical words. In their respective

⁵³Silva, *Biblical Words*, 66-67n50.

⁵⁴Silva, *Biblical Words*, 61, 63.

⁵⁵Silva, *Biblical Words*, 67.

handbooks for exegesis, Stuart and Fee correctly instruct their readers to consult the critical commentaries only after they have conducted their own exegetical work.⁵⁶ The commentaries thus serve as a check for the exegetical conclusions one has drawn.

Even in the process of exegetical study, a pastor may look to the commentaries for help. Fee tells his readers who only have competency with English that they will need to look to the commentaries and other secondary sources in order to find out what a particular Greek word means (among other language issues, such as textual criticism and grammar).⁵⁷ Osborne notes that many commentaries are “organized as a word-by-word

⁵⁶Stuart, *Old Testament Exegesis*, 26-27; Fee, *New Testament Exegesis*, 32-33. These two books were particularly helpful to me in learning how to exegete a biblical text. There is much valuable information in each one of them. However, their discussions of lexical analysis seem to demonstrate an ignorance of what James Barr wrote in 1961 in his *Semantics of Biblical Language* (see ch 2). Stuart recommends the reader look at *TDOT* or *TWOT* for a “relatively exhaustive” analysis of a term (p 56). He cautions the reader to read the theological dictionaries with a critical eye, but also states that the theological dictionaries provide the results of careful lexical analyses, and further writes: “The *TDOT* theological dictionary is thorough, erudite, and invaluable as a reference tool” (p 142). Stuart writes on p. 81 that “there is a difference between a word and a concept, and it is the actual concepts of the passage that convey its message, not so much its individual words as isolated units of speech.” Yet, in his description of lexical analysis, he talks about words and concepts as though they are equivalent, and describes the purpose of lexical analysis as: “what concept the word or wording connotes, and, as appropriate, what other words or wordings may connote the same essential concept” (pp 140-41). As his final point in discussing lexical analysis, Stuart writes: “Again, remember that the concept is the ultimate goal and the word or wording functions not in itself alone but always in the role of pointing to a concept” (142). It is difficult to see how this confusion of word and concept, as well as a high regard for the theological dictionaries can possibly result in anything but an abuse of lexical analysis by pastors who read and follow Stuart’s handbook for Old Testament exegesis.

In Fee’s *New Testament Exegesis*, things are not much better. He suggests that certain words are theologically loaded (p 11), perhaps not surprising when the reader learns that he agrees with the evaluation that *TDNT* is a monumental and invaluable tool (p 93). Fee does caution the reader to read *TDNT* with a critical eye, but no more critically than any secondary source (p 93). He also cautions the reader against etymologies and root fallacies (p 79), but certainly does not give any suggestion that these may be common occurrences in *TDNT*. Again, the pastor who reads Fee’s handbook is quite likely to abuse lexical analysis in a similar manner to many of the articles in *TDNT*.

It is also interesting to note that in Fee and Strauss’ introductory book on Bible translations, which is in many respects very good, they succumb to committing at least one lexical fallacy. They are guilty of *Etymologizing: Reverse* (see ch 2) when they write: “The primary meaning of the Greek *anthrōpos* is ‘person,’ not ‘man.’ (We get the English word *anthropology*— the study of human beings— from this word.)” *Translation*, 98. Fee and Strauss’ appeal to a later usage of a word (in English, no less!) is meant to support their argument regarding the meaning of *ἄνθρωπος* (*anthrōpos*).

⁵⁷Fee, *New Testament Exegesis*, 14.

walk through the text.”⁵⁸ Such a reality makes the commentaries a natural source to which pastors can turn for information regarding Hebrew and Greek words.

Osborne discusses the need to be aware of how well the biblical languages are handled in the commentaries. He writes regarding lexical analysis that “the knowledge of a proper methodology is critical because the student of the Word will want to note whether or not the commentator has indeed done a proper word study [lexical analysis] or only a cursory background study before coming to any conclusion.”⁵⁹ Some important principles and issues to consider for lexical analysis have been outlined above. Do commentaries show any recognition of the advances in modern linguistics? Are the lexical analyses in commentaries conducted from a modern linguistic approach?

Turner suggests that “modern linguistics has had relatively little influence on NT exegesis.”⁶⁰ Writing about both Old and New Testament studies in 1983, Silva was of the opinion that modern linguistic study had in fact influenced exegetical study in the previous twenty years.⁶¹ He went on to say, however, that “we must not fall under any delusion that linguistics and exegesis have been genuinely integrated in modern scholarship.”⁶² Another twenty years have passed since Silva wrote: another twenty years of linguistic study, and another twenty years providing time for biblical scholars to incorporate the advances of modern linguistic study into their exegetical work.

Speaking in particular about the Greek of the New Testament (although the same

⁵⁸ Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 82. He discusses this in relation to lexical fallacies on pp 93, 97.

⁵⁹ Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 109; cf. 102.

⁶⁰ Turner, “Modern Linguistics,” 147; quoted in Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 82.

⁶¹ Silva, *Biblical Words*, 20.

⁶² Silva, *Biblical Words*, 22.

is generally true of Hebrew), Porter writes:

In some cases, the standard reference tools used in New Testament studies were written before the advent of and certainly before the development of modern linguistics. Of course, scholars cannot be held blameworthy of not using a not-yet-developed method, but neither should their conclusions be exalted or at least held immune from criticism on that same account.⁶³

Many of the standard reference tools for Hebrew and Greek study are as-of-yet indispensable. We are dependent upon the study of those who have gone before us, but we are also free to learn from advances in linguistic study. Commentators who purport to declare what words mean should be incorporating modern linguistic study into their discussion. If they do not, pastors who rely upon their research can hardly be blamed for following suit. For how can a pastor know something about a biblical language that a Hebrew or Greek scholar has failed to tell them?

To my knowledge, no one has conducted a systematic study of commentaries to see whether or not the advances in modern linguistic study have been incorporated into their discussions of lexical analyses. It is my intention to begin such a study within the pages of this thesis. In the course of this study, it will be demonstrated that Old and New Testament commentaries evidence many errors in lexical analysis. Incorrect statements are made about words, and language is used by commentators which could easily lead pastors to make errors in their statements from the pulpit about Hebrew and Greek words. The following chapter will explain the methodology that will be used to support this bold claim.

⁶³Porter, *Studies*, 60.

CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY

In order to determine the accuracy with which lexical analyses are conducted in commentaries used by evangelical pastors, it will be helpful to have a list of lexical fallacies. To do this, I will primarily (but not exclusively) use two sources: James Barr's *The Semantics of Biblical Language* and D. A. Carson's *Exegetical Fallacies*. After explaining why these two sources have been used, a list of lexical fallacies will be given, followed by an explanation of the biblical passages, and commentaries discussing those passages, which will be examined within this thesis.

Toward a Methodology for Examining Lexical Analyses in Commentaries

In 1961, James Barr published his *The Semantics of Biblical Language*. In it he brought some advances in linguistic study to bear upon biblical scholarship, primarily criticizing "certain methods in the handling of linguistic evidence in theological discussion," which were particularly evident within the biblical theology movement.¹ His primary argument may be summarized with his sentence: "But as a whole the distinctiveness of biblical thought and language has to be settled at sentence level, that is, by the things the writers say, and not by the words they say them with."² Barr understood

¹Barr, *Semantics*, 6; cf. 1.

²Barr, *Semantics*, 270; cf. 233; Childs, review of *Semantics*, 375.

that a word contributes meaning to a sentence; it does not contain the meaning that is found in the words with which it is syntagmatically related.

Semantics begins with a discussion of the contrast between Hebrew and Greek thought structures which was widely believed within the biblical guild of Barr's day. He was clear that his intention was not to dispute the belief that Hebrews and Greeks operated under different thought structures. Thus he wrote,

The validity of the thought contrast is no part of our subject; our subject is (a) the way in which the thought contrast has affected the examination of linguistic evidence, and (b) the way in which linguistic evidence has been used to support or illustrate the thought contrast.³

After a lengthy discussion of the Hebrew and Greek thought contrast, Barr moved to an analysis of the uses and abuses of etymologies, and then concentrated on Kittel's *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*. Throughout *Semantics*, Barr indicated a number of lexical fallacies which were evident in the particular works he was discussing.

The widespread influence of Barr's *Semantics* on biblical scholarship is undeniable. Silva wrote that it "was a trumpet blast against the monstrous regiment of shoddy linguistics. Controversial throughout, undiplomatic at times, it has been recognized as a major contribution to biblical studies."⁴ Likewise, Osborne positively refers to Barr's *Semantics* as an "epochal work" which was the first to apply "linguistic principles scientifically to biblical study."⁵ Osborne's discussion of what he calls "semantic fallacies," which follows this comment, relies heavily upon Barr's work. In

³Barr, *Semantics*, 14.

⁴Silva, *Biblical Words*, 18.

⁵Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 82; so also Childs, review of *Semantics*, 374.

Guthrie's discussion of language within the New Testament, he writes: "students of the text neglect to their peril recent advances in the study of language, most notably the redirection brought about by James Barr in *The Semantics of Biblical Language*."⁶ Other scholars to note the significance of Barr's *Semantics* for bringing the advances of linguistics to bear upon biblical studies include Bartholomew,⁷ Boda,⁸ Nida,⁹ Porter,¹⁰ and Vanhoozer.¹¹

Nevertheless, Barr's *Semantics* has certainly not escaped criticism. According to Cotterell and Turner, the response to Barr has been largely positive, and his strongest critics largely misunderstood him, diminishing the validity of their criticisms.¹² They also state that G. Friedrich, who became the new editor of Kittel's *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* (beginning with volume 6), despite his criticism of *Semantics*, "actually accepted many of Barr's points," and the volumes of the dictionary under his editorship attracted much less criticism from Barr, than did the earlier volumes.¹³

In his review of *Semantics*, Childs is largely supportive, saying, "Many of Barr's criticisms will be accepted by almost everyone," and "regarding Barr's criticism of Kittel's *Wörterbuch*, one can only welcome many of his criticisms."¹⁴ With regard to his own criticisms of Barr, Childs reflects a desire to see a greater emphasis on tradition in

⁶Guthrie, "Exegesis of Hebrews," 596.

⁷Bartholomew, "Biblical Theology," 8.

⁸Boda, "תּוּר in Hebrew Research," 283-84.

⁹Nida, "Contemporary Linguistics," 83n12.

¹⁰Porter, *Studies*, 8; Porter, "Ancient Languages," 161.

¹¹Vanhoozer, "Exegesis and Hermeneutics," 56-57.

¹²Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 123-24. They refer particularly to T. Boman and David Hill.

¹³Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 124-25.

¹⁴Childs, review of *Semantics*, 376.

exegesis, and to maintain a connection between the thought structure of a person and the semantic range of the words in that person's language.¹⁵ His final criticism shows a misunderstanding of what Barr said. Childs writes in regard to the character of the biblical languages: "In our opinion, the problem lies again in the failure to appreciate the new forms of community life found in the early church which in turn affected the language."¹⁶ Yet Barr did not claim that the early church had no influence on the Greek language. Rather, he wrote: "The extent to which words received 'new content' is to a large extent related to the degree in which words became technical."¹⁷ Barr simply wished to significantly reduce the number of Greek words which were considered to hold "new content."

A legitimate criticism which was levelled against Barr is that he has unfairly discounted entire works within the biblical theology movement based upon linguistic evidence. After having written *Semantics*, he published a book entitled *Biblical Words for Time*, which in particular criticized heavily Cullmann's *Christ and Time*. In his introduction to the third edition of that book, Cullmann responded to Barr's criticisms by saying:

On my part, I can only agree to much of what he says in both his works, for example, to his conviction that one ought not to base oneself too strongly on a

¹⁵Childs writes: "In my opinion, the chief weakness of the book lies in the failure to appreciate the dimension of tradition in exegesis." And later, "However, when the mythopoeic background of *dābār* within the cult is discovered, it becomes apparent that the primitive mind conceived of these two entities as one. Barr's claim that research should focus only on what the writers say, not on the words they say them with, can not be sustained," review of *Semantics*, 376.

¹⁶Childs, review of *Semantics*, 377.

¹⁷Barr, *Semantics*, 249. The position taken within this thesis is that there are no "technical" words; see ch 1.

singular word, or confuse the word with the concept. . . . I do not feel myself refuted in the main conception of my book by Barr's criticisms.¹⁸

Yarbrough largely agrees with this assessment, saying: "Barr's arguments rightly question Cullmann's faulty use of linguistic evidence, but Cullmann's salvation historical reading of the New Testament is not primarily based on such evidence."¹⁹ Considering discussions of words within the biblical theology movement, and Cullmann's writings in particular, Watson says: "This focus on Barr's polemical strategy suggests that there is little basis for his claim that 'biblical theology' as once practised was fundamentally and irretrievably flawed."²⁰ Even though Barr may not have gone so far as to dismantle the entire biblical theology movement, it is significant that the majority of his discussion about the importance of linguistic study for lexical analysis, has been accepted even by his critics.

The high regard which has been given to Barr's *Semantics* for incorporating linguistic study into lexical analysis, makes it a suitable resource for examining lexical fallacies within commentaries published after 1961. Unfortunately, Barr does not list his lexical fallacies, but rather discusses them in the midst of his broader discussion of the treatment of words within the biblical theology movement. Nor is his discussion perfect; his categorisation of lexical fallacies is not always best.

In order to develop a suitable list of lexical fallacies, Carson's *Exegetical Fallacies* was also consulted, whose first chapter in particular ("Word-Study Fallacies")

¹⁸Cullmann, *Christ and Time*, 15.

¹⁹Yarbrough, *Salvation Historical Fallacy?*, 232. He is here discussing both *Christ and Time*, and Cullmann's later work, *Salvation in History*.

²⁰Watson, *Text and Truth*, 24.

was influenced by Barr's *Semantics*.²¹ Now in its second edition, Carson's *Fallacies* has been well-received as an introductory text for evangelical pastors and seminary students who wish to be aware of a number of common fallacies made in exegetical study.

For ease of reference, Carson systematically lists a number of common exegetical fallacies, subdivided into four chapters, each of which deals with a particular set of fallacies: (i) word-study, (ii) grammatical, (iii) logical, and (iv) presuppositional and historical fallacies. Carson's systematic listing was particularly helpful in distinguishing the lexical fallacies noted by Barr in his *Semantics*.

Carson does not claim to present anything new in *Fallacies*, nor does he claim to be comprehensive in his listing.²² His purpose in writing *Fallacies* was to present a list of common fallacies that the evangelical pastor should seek to avoid; his lists are based upon the works of others. As with Barr's categorization of fallacies, so too Carson's could have been better. Therefore, the lexical fallacies which are listed in both *Semantics* and *Fallacies* have been given primary consideration, but some consideration has also been given to the discussion of lexical fallacies within other scholarly literature, including Osborne's *Hermeneutical Spiral*, and Silva's *Biblical Words*.

Lexical Fallacies

I have identified sixteen lexical fallacies which may be committed in the course of conducting either a Hebrew or Greek lexical analysis. In most cases, both a Hebrew and a

²¹Carson, *Fallacies*, 27n1.

²²Carson, *Fallacies*, 24-25.

Greek examples have been given, but with fallacies where it seemed redundant to give an example for each biblical language (or for one fallacy which solely applies to Greek), only one has been given. No example has been included for two of the fallacies, whose descriptions should be sufficient for comprehension. The reader is encouraged to consult the footnotes for justification as to why I have diverged from either *Semantics* or *Fallacies* in a number of instances.

1. Supporting Hebrew and Greek Thought Structures by use of Linguistic Evidence

As Carson writes: “The heart of this fallacy is the assumption that any language so constrains the thinking processes of the people who use it that they are forced into certain patterns of thought and shielded from others. Language and mentality thus become confused.”²³ Linguistic evidence used to support the supposed thought structure of a particular group of people includes morphology, syntax, and grammar.²⁴ Particularly significant as a lexical fallacy is the assumption that for each distinct thought there will also be a corresponding distinct word to convey that thought. For example, Hebrew has one word (בָּשָׂר, *bāśār*), while Greek has two words (σάρξ, *sarx*; σῶμα, *sōma*) which can be used to describe the same object.²⁵ The fallacy lies in suggesting that a distinction in how Hebrews and Greeks viewed the body is evident within the lexical structure of their given languages.

²³Carson, *Fallacies*, 44.

²⁴Barr, *Semantics*, 38-106.

²⁵Barr, *Semantics*, 35; cf. 145-46.

2. *The Root Fallacy*

Each lexical root is believed to carry a “basic meaning” which is evident in every use of every cognate form of that root. Thus, the meaning of one word will be included somehow in the entire semantic range of another.²⁶ A Hebrew example would be drawing a connection between the meanings of לֶחֶם (*leḥem*) and מִלְחָמָה (*milḥāmāh*) because they are built upon the same root.²⁷ A Greek example is to start with the verb ἀποστέλλω (*apostellō*), and to give it the “basic meaning” of “to send out.” This “basic meaning” would then be applied to every use of the noun ἀπόστολος (*apostolos*) simply because they share the same root.²⁸ With Hebrew, this fallacy is also evident when the “basic meaning” of a *qal* verb is seen in every verbal stem of the same lexeme.²⁹ It must be argued, rather than assumed, that (for example) the semantic range of a *hiph ʿil* reflects the semantic range of that lexeme’s corresponding *qal*. *The Root Fallacy* places far too much emphasis upon a diachronic study of language, and fails to consider the synchronic uses of each word.

3. *Etymologizing*

The meaning of a word is determined by examining its origins (i.e. diachronically), either within the same language or across languages.³⁰ This fallacy is in

²⁶Barr, *Semantics*, 100-06; Carson, *Fallacies*, 28-33.

²⁷Barr, *Semantics*, 102.

²⁸Carson, *Fallacies*, 28, 30.

²⁹I am following here the suggestion of Barr, *Semantics*, 102.

³⁰Barr, *Semantics*, 107, 159; Lyons, *Semantics*, 1:244; cf. Boda, “Lexical Analysis,” 2. It is difficult to determine exactly Barr’s understanding of the relationship between *The Root Fallacy* and *Etymologizing*. Part of the confusion may be caused by the fact that these two fallacies so often operate together. Since Barr does not systematically list his fallacies, he sometimes refers to *The Root Fallacy* in

view whether the author finds the earliest known meaning of the word, or simply an older meaning which is no longer pertinent to the use of the word in the literature under study. This fallacy can quite often be made in the study of Hebrew words, where the meaning of a cognate word in a different language is taken as the meaning of the Hebrew word. In determining the meaning of a Greek word in the New Testament, appeal is sometimes made to the use of that word in classical Greek literature. Yet due to the fact that words change meaning over the course of history, the semantic range of a word in Hellenistic Greek does not always equate to the semantic range of that same word in classical Greek. Included in this fallacy is the case of a dead metaphor. Osborne states, “This occurs when the imagery behind a word in its past no longer has meaning.”³¹ In such an instance it would be a case of etymologizing to impose the dead imagery on a later context. Word meaning is determined by a synchronic study of its uses, rather than through an examination of its history, as interesting as such a study may be.

4. Etymologizing: Reverse

A later development of a word’s meaning is read into its use in earlier times, either within the same language or across languages. Carson notes that the early church fathers were sometimes guilty of this with Greek words.³² More commonly-cited are cases

conjunction with *Etymologizing*, without any obvious distinction between the two (e.g., pp 159, 187). It does seem to me, however, that Barr finds a distinction, as do I, between *The Root Fallacy* and *Etymologizing*, for he writes: “Thus excessive etymologizing is accompanied as so often by the ‘root fallacy’ . . .” (p 163). Carson, on the other hand, divides the two fallacies differently under the rubrics: “The root fallacy” and “Semantic obsolescence,” *Fallacies*, 28-33, 35-37.

³¹Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 88-89.

³²Carson, *Fallacies*, 33.

of this fallacy across languages. For example, the fact that “dynamite” finds etymological connections with the Greek word δύναμις (*dunamis*) is sometimes thought to aid understanding of Rom 1:16.³³ Cotterell and Turner note an important caution when considering this fallacy, suggesting “the possibility that some senses only certainly attested in the period shortly after the New Testament, might actually have been current in the New Testament period itself, although not witnessed to it in any extant writing.”³⁴ One must, of course, be cautious in suggesting evidence of this occurring in any particular passage.

5. Basic Meaning via English

In order to determine the meaning of a biblical word, one begins with an English gloss, and takes this as the meaning of the Hebrew or Greek word. Statements about the meaning of the word are based upon the English gloss, rather than any Hebrew or Greek lexical analysis. Barr cites an example (which also includes etymologizing) in which the “original meaning” of “holy” is said to be “healthy, sound.” This supposed “original meaning” is then read into every context in which the word “holy” is used to translate a Hebrew or Greek word. Barr writes, “The whole absurd construction of ‘holy’ as really meaning ‘whole’ could only arise on the basis of English and by ignoring the Greek and Hebrew represented by that English.”³⁵ The problem with basing one’s lexical analysis on

³³Carson, *Fallacies*, 33-35; Boda, “Lexical Analysis,” 2; Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 133. Carson refers to this fallacy as “Semantic anachronism.”

³⁴Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 134-35.

³⁵Barr, *Semantics*, 112. Barr actually gives this as his example for what I have titled *Etymologizing*. However, it seems best to me to consider this as a separate fallacy, since the fallacy is based entirely upon an English etymology, rather than a Greek or Hebrew etymology.

the English word is seen in another example given by Barr where the “basic meaning” of מְצִיבֻתָּהּ (³⁶*mûnāh*) is said to be “firmness.” This English word is then extended to include “strength” and “permanence” as part of the meaning of מְצִיבֻתָּהּ. The meaning of the Hebrew word has been wholly derived from English, rather than Hebrew.³⁶ It must be remembered that each language forms a coherent structure, and the meaning of a word is related primarily to the other words in that language, rather than words that can be used to translate it in a different language.

6. Illegitimate Totality Transfer

The entire semantic range of a word in a particular body of literature, whether it be the entire New Testament, or an individual book or set of writings by an author (inside or outside the New Testament), is taken to be the meaning of that word in a given context.³⁷ An example of this is given by Barr: one could take everything that has been said about ἐκκλησία (*ekklesia*) in the New Testament, and load all of that information onto the use of ἐκκλησία in a particular context.³⁸ This fallacy would also be committed by an author who assumes that the semantic range of a word which is used in Leviticus will be paralleled exactly by its semantic range in a prophetic book. The context in which a word is found is key for determining that word’s meaning. Another example of this

³⁶Barr, *Semantics*, 166.

³⁷Carson’s definition of his “Unwarranted adoption of an expanded semantic field” seems to roughly equate it with my *Illegitimate Totality Transfer: Fallacies*, 60-61. Also subsumed under this category is Carson’s “Unwarranted neglect of distinguishing peculiarities of a corpus,” *Fallacies*, 62-63. See also Boda, “Lexical Analysis,” 2, who calls this “Swamp Water”; cf. Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 84; Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 122-23.

³⁸Barr, *Semantics*, 218.

fallacy is when it is assumed that the semantic ranges of a noun and a verb (e.g. ἔραυνητής, *eraunētēs* and ἔραυνάω, *eraunaō*), are equivalent simply because they share the same root. There is quite likely a semantic relationship between a noun and a verb which share the same root, but a synchronic study of those two words in the contexts in which they are used would need to be conducted in order to determine the nature of that relationship.

7. Illegitimate Contextual Transfer

In a given context, a word may be limited or clarified by other information. This fallacy lies in taking a word along with its context and suggesting that the significance which is given through association of the context is in fact the meaning of that word.³⁹ For example, one might come across the phrase, ὁ λαὸς τοῦ θεοῦ (*ho laos tou theou*), and take this as the meaning of λαός itself (or אֱמֵ הָאֱלֹהִים, *‘am hā’elōhîm* for אֱמֵ).⁴⁰ Each word will contribute meaning to the context in which it is found, but that word’s meaning will not include the meaning of the other words with which it is found in a syntagmatic relationship.

8. Illegitimate Informational Transfer

Finding numerous instances of a word, and claiming that the information derived

³⁹Barr, *Semantics*, 69.

⁴⁰Barr, *Semantics*, 234-35; cf. 217-18; Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 122. This example is given by Barr (and Cotterell and Turner) for his *Illegitimate Identity Transfer*, but it seems better to take this as an *Illegitimate Contextual Transfer*.

from all of those contexts is the meaning of the word itself.⁴¹ This fallacy is regularly, although not always, committed when a particular theological position is under discussion. Boda gives the example of those who gather together everything said by Paul in many contexts which include the word δικαιοσύνη (*dikaioō*), and then take all of that information to be the meaning of δικαιοσύνη itself.⁴² Another example of this fallacy would be to find contexts which include the word עֵרֶשׁ (‘*eres*), and then to suggest (either explicitly or implicitly) that the meaning of the word עֵרֶשׁ is the sum of the information derived from those contexts. The meaning of a word is determined by seeing what meaning the word contributes to the context, rather than by importing the information found in the context onto the word itself.

9. Defining a Greek Word via Hebrew or vice versa

The meaning of a Hebrew word (or words) is taken to be the meaning of the Greek word used to translate it (or them), without giving adequate justification for so doing. The entire semantic range of the Hebrew word(s) may be imposed on the Greek word, or any of the other fallacies which have been used to determine the meaning of the Hebrew word(s) may be evident in the transference of this meaning to the Greek word.⁴³ Equally fallacious is to give a Hebrew word the meaning of the Greek word(s) which is (are) frequently used to translate it.

⁴¹Barr, *Semantics*, 70-71, 197, 221. Included within this fallacy is Boda’s “Theologizing,” defined as “Attaching theology to a word alone and reading that theology into every instance,” “Lexical Analysis,” 3.

⁴²Boda, “Lexical Analysis,” 3; cf. Carson, *Fallacies*, 62-63.

⁴³Barr, *Semantics*, 155, 188; Carson, *Fallacies*, 61-62; Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 88.

10. Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning

The assumption that each word has a central core of meaning which exists, either implicitly or explicitly, in every context in which it is used.⁴⁴ Thus, when the same word is used to refer to two distinct objects or events, those things may be equated because they are referred to by the same word. Dealing with a discussion of the Greek word παραμυθέομαι (*paramutheomai*), Barr writes:

Now there may be a sense in which it can meaningfully be said that in Hellenistic life there was some relation of exhorting to comforting. It is more clearly true that the two were connected in practice in the NT. What is not true is that the relation between these sets of acts in either case has any essential relationship with the fact that both are expressed by the same Greek word.⁴⁵

Since each word has a semantic range, there may be contexts in which the same word is used, but with entirely different meanings. The meaning of a word will be clarified by the context in which it is found.

11. Equating a Central Core of Meaning across Languages

Assuming that for every word in the source language, there will be a word in the receptor language which is able to convey the same semantic range (or the supposed central core of meaning). This fallacy leads to the belief that one English word must always be used to translate the same Hebrew or Greek word, and will be capable of adequately conveying the meaning of that word in every context. Boda gives the following example:

⁴⁴Nida, "Contemporary Linguistics," 84.

⁴⁵Barr, *Semantics*, 232.

In Hebrew there is a word ‘todah’ [תָּוֹדָה] which [it has been argued] can mean one of two things: thanksgiving or admission of sin. Some scholars have sought for a central core of meaning by offering the word ‘confession’ which in English is used for admitting sin (confession of sin) but also for praising God (confession of faith). But they are really two different things in English with no real connection between the two.⁴⁶

No two languages use their words in exactly the same way, or express themselves in a parallel fashion. To force one English word to be used in every instance of a Hebrew or Greek word is to demand that the languages be more similar than they are.⁴⁷

12. *Inadequate Parallels of Word Usage*

Compounding references in which a word is used that are questionable for determining the meaning of that word in a particular context. The inadmissibility of a given parallel may be due to issues such as dating, syntax, or different corpora. It is also important to note that the use of a word by one author will not necessarily be paralleled by all other uses of that word by the same author. People will often use the same word with slightly different nuances only a couple of sentences later.⁴⁸ For example, the meaning of יוֹם (yôm) is clearly different when used in Gen 2:2 (“And on the seventh day [בַּיּוֹם, bayyôm] God finished his work that he had done”) than when it is used in Gen 2:4 (“These are the generations of the heavens and the earth when they were created, in the day [בַּיּוֹם, b^eyôm] that the LORD God made the earth and the heavens”). Each word has a

⁴⁶Boda, “Lexical Analysis,” 3; cf. Boda, “תָּוֹדָה in Hebrew Research,” 277-97.

⁴⁷Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 90-91.

⁴⁸Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 91-92. Or even in the same sentence. Consider the following: *The bulk of the food that I bought today at the Bulk Barn will help me bulk up for the start of the football season.*

semantic range, and any user of a language is free to use that semantic range in order to convey meaning. The fallacy lies in assuming that all instances of a word found in any piece of literature are equally valid for determining the meaning of a word in a particular context.⁴⁹

13. *Illegitimate Synonymy*

There are at least three different ways in which this fallacy can be committed. First, two words which can be used to refer to the same object or event are therefore assumed to be equivalent in meaning. When words *A* and *B* are used to signify the same thing in particular contexts, it is then assumed that *A* means *B*.⁵⁰ For example, קְהָל (qāhāl) can in many contexts be used to refer to the same group of people that is identified by the word יִשְׂרָאֵל (yisrā'ēl). The fallacy comes when it is assumed then that קְהָל means the same thing as יִשְׂרָאֵל.⁵¹ In other words, two words are treated as absolute synonyms when in fact they are not. Second, if two or more Hebrew (or Greek) words are regularly translated by the same English word, it is assumed that the Hebrew (or Greek) words mean the same thing. An example of this is when words translated by the English

⁴⁹Carson, *Fallacies*, 43-44. He calls this “Verbal Parallelomania.”

⁵⁰Barr, *Semantics*, 217-18; Boda, “Lexical Analysis,” 2; Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 122. Barr (followed by Boda, and Cotterell and Turner) calls this *Illegitimate Identity Transfer*, giving as an example: “We have already seen that *dabar* ‘matter, thing’ may be used of a matter or thing which is in fact a historical event [“The thing happened at Waterloo in 1815 {p 131}], but that it is not justified therefore to say that *dabar* means ‘event’ or ‘history’ or the like,” *Semantics*, 217. Yet the fallacy in Barr’s example lies in implanting information which has been derived from the context onto the word דָּבָר (dābār) itself. This is *Illegitimate Contextual Transfer* (see above). Barr’s example on p 235 (same as Cotterell and Turner’s example on p 122) is also better understood as a case of *Illegitimate Contextual Transfer*.

⁵¹Barr, *Semantics*, 124-25. He does not, however, use this as an example of *Illegitimate Synonymy* (or his own *Illegitimate Identity Transfer*).

word “sin” are therefore treated as though their semantic ranges are entirely equivalent. It must be remembered that since each language is a coherent structure, there will not be one distinct English word which is able to convey the entire semantic range of each Hebrew or Greek word. Third, “Assuming that because two [Hebrew] words are used in a parallelism in the same grammatical location they are identical in meaning.”⁵² Words which are found in parallelism in Hebrew poetry relate to each other in more ways than equation-of-meaning. Thus it must be argued, rather than assumed, that in a particular context, words found in parallelism do not have any noticeable difference in meaning (i.e. they are synonymous).⁵³

14. Inhibiting Synonyms

The failure to recognize that two words can be used in certain contexts without any noticeable difference in meaning. This can sometimes be a result of the assumption that if the entire semantic range of two words are not exactly parallel, then they cannot be synonymous in a given context.⁵⁴

15. [2+2]= The Meaning of a Compound Word

The meaning of a Greek compound word is determined by adding together the meanings of each part of it, without adequate justification for so doing. This fallacy is

⁵²Boda, “Lexical Analysis,” 3. He calls this “Illegitimate Parallelistic Equation.”

⁵³See Carson, *Fallacies*, 47-53, for his discussion of synonyms, which is included in the broader fallacy, “Problems surrounding synonyms and componential analysis.”

⁵⁴Carson, *Fallacies*, 47-53. He includes this under his fallacy: “Problems surrounding synonyms and componential analysis.”

often evident in discussions of Greek verbs which are prefixed (compounded) by a preposition. For example, one could suggest that the word ἀναγινώσκω (*anaginōskō*) should be glossed: “to know more than,” due to the common glosses given for its component parts (“upwards, up” for ἀνά, *ana*, and “to know” for γινώσκω, *ginōskō*). The fallacy with this approach is in assuming that a “verb-with-prefixed-preposition” in Greek always bears the combined meaning of each component of the new word. There are, in fact, three options: (i) the force of both preposition and verb continues, (ii) the preposition intensifies the thrust of the verb, or (iii) the preposition transforms the meaning of the verb altogether.⁵⁵

16. Contextual Amnesia

This is a catch-all fallacy in which a meaning is given to a word without due consideration for the context in which it is found.

“Literally”

One aspect of linguistically-nuanced language which will be discussed in its own section (in the following chapters) is the use of the word “literally” in the study of words. Cruse exhibits a common understanding of “literally” when he says: “The independent sense is often also the ‘literal’ sense, in that it is the only one, or at any rate the most plausible one, from which all the others can be derived by metaphorical interpretation.”⁵⁶

⁵⁵Osborne, *Hermeneutical Spiral*, 86; Porter, *Idioms*, 140-41.

⁵⁶Cruse, *Lexical Semantics*, 73.

Silva gives an example of what Cruse talks about when he summarizes *BAGD*'s entry for αἷμα (*haima*):

1. literally: a. of human blood; b. of the blood of animals
2. figuratively: a. as the seat of life; b. blood and life as an expiatory sacrifice
3. of the (apocalyptic) red color⁵⁷

Cotterell and Turner write that a “literal” translation of the biblical text is one which attempts to use the same English word every time a particular Hebrew or Greek word is being translated.⁵⁸ That is, the English gloss which expresses the “literal” sense of the word (by Cruse’s definition, above) is always used, regardless of the context. Thus the impression is often given that a “literal” translation is what the biblical text “really means.”

The use of the word “literally” will be examined in the commentaries which are studied for each passage. It will be seen that commentators do not use the word “literally” consistently. Rather, it is used to demonstrate a number of different aspects within the Hebrew and Greek texts. The inconsistency with which the word “literally” is used in the commentaries could quite easily lead to confusion and misunderstanding in the minds of pastors who are using them.

Examining Lexical Analyses in Commentaries

In order to examine the accuracy with which lexical analyses are conducted in commentaries used by evangelical pastors, four biblical passages have been chosen, as

⁵⁷Silva, *Biblical Words*, 172; cf. 173.

⁵⁸Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics*, 169; cf. 135, 170.

well as eight commentaries for each one of those passages. The Old Testament is dominated by two types of literature: narrative and poetry. Genesis 15:1-6, a narrative passage, and Isa 53:1-6, a poetical text, will therefore be studied. Similarly, the two largest sections in the New Testament are the Gospels (largely narrative) and the Epistles. Therefore, Luke 18:1-8, a parable, and Rom 3:21-26, an epistolary text, will be discussed. All four of these biblical passages are well-known, and contain words which are often considered to be theologically significant.

In order to select commentaries for the study, I have followed the recommendations of two evangelical scholars: Tremper Longman and D. A. Carson. Both of these men have written a commentary survey for the Old Testament and the New Testament, respectively. The surveys are written from a consciously evangelical stance,⁵⁹ and have been prepared for the purpose of recommending commentaries for pastors and seminary students.

For the purposes of this thesis, four commentaries which are primarily intended for the scholar and four which are primarily intended for the pastor have been selected for each biblical text. There is some overlap between the commentaries in each of the two categories, and not all which are primarily intended for scholars are necessarily more linguistically-accurate in their lexical analyses. Since it is impossible to choose the commentaries *after* doing the lexical analyses, I have simply done my best to work with the information in Longman's and Carson's commentary surveys to select commentaries

⁵⁹Longman, *Old Testament Commentary Survey*, 16; Carson, *New Testament Commentary Survey*, 8.

that are appropriate for each category.

Longman (Old Testament) rates the commentaries he surveys on a one-to-five-star scale (with five being better than one). He also categorizes the commentaries as being aimed at the layman (L), minister (M), or scholar (S). Some commentaries which are intended for more than one audience are thereby labelled as LM or MS. As much as possible, I have tried to select commentaries which receive the highest ratings from Longman, as well as commentaries which fit into the categories of “scholar” or “minister” (my “pastor”). When a commentary could have been placed in either category, I have looked to Longman’s descriptions of each commentary for guidance in determining whether that commentary’s discussion of Hebrew would more likely be appropriate for the category of “scholar” or that of “pastor.”

Carson (New Testament) organizes his commentary survey much differently than does Longman. Rather than giving a rating for the commentaries, Carson describes the usefulness of each one. Neither does he include a clear system for categorizing each commentary according to its intended audience. Rather, Carson seems generally first to discuss the commentaries which he considers best, and then to move to the weaker ones. He also tends to mention the scholarly commentaries first, and then moves to those which are primarily intended for the pastor, and finally the layperson. I have done my best to select those commentaries which Carson considers strongest, and to use his brief descriptions of the commentaries as guidance for the category (“scholar” or “pastor”) in which each should be placed.

The commentaries which have been selected for study are as follows:

Genesis: Scholar

Nahum M. Sarna, *Genesis*, The JPS Torah Commentary
 Gordon Wenham, *Genesis 1-15*, Word Biblical Commentary
 Victor P. Hamilton, *The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1-17*, New International
 Commentary on the Old Testament
 Claus Westermann, *Genesis 12-36: A Commentary*, Continental Commentaries

Genesis: Pastor

Kenneth A. Matthews, *Genesis 11:27-50:26*, The New American Commentary
 Bruce K. Waltke and Cathi J. Fredricks, *Genesis: A Commentary*
 John Walton, *Genesis*, The New International Version Application Commentary
 John E. Hartley, *Genesis*, New International Biblical Commentary

Isaiah: Scholar

Klaus Baltzer, *Deutero-Isaiah: A Commentary on Isaiah 40-55*, Hermeneia
 Claus Westermann, *Isaiah 40-66: A Commentary*, The Old Testament Library
 John N. Oswalt, *The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40-66*, New International
 Commentary on the Old Testament
 John D. W. Watts, *Isaiah 34-66*, Word Biblical Commentary

Isaiah: Pastor

Larry L. Walker, "Isaiah," Cornerstone Biblical Commentary
 John Goldingay, *Isaiah*, New International Bible Commentary
 J. Alec Motyer, *Isaiah: An Introduction and Commentary*, Tyndale Old Testament
 Commentary
 Brevard S. Childs, *Isaiah*, The Old Testament Library⁶⁰

Luke: Scholar

Darrell L. Bock, *Luke: Volume 2: 9:51-24:53*, Baker Exegetical Commentary on
 the New Testament
 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke (X-XXIV)*, The Anchor Bible

⁶⁰It may seem strange to have Childs' commentary from the OTL series in the "pastor" category when Westermann's from the same series is in the "scholar" category. Both commentaries were placed in the "MS" category by Longman, which means that they could go in either my "pastor" or "scholar" categories. I chose to place Childs in the "pastor" category because Longman's comments made it sound like his commentary was more theologically-focussed, and thus would perhaps not focus so much on lexical issues, Longman, *Old Testament Survey*, 99, 103.

I. Howard Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke*, The New International Greek Testament Commentary

John Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, Word Biblical Commentary

Luke: Pastor

Walter L. Liefeld, "Luke," The Expositor's Bible Commentary

Robert H. Stein, *Luke*, The New American Commentary

Craig A. Evans, *Luke*, New International Bible Commentary

William Hendriksen, *Luke*, New Testament Commentary

Romans: Scholar

Douglas Moo, *The Epistle to the Romans*, New International Commentary on the New Testament

C. E. B. Cranfield, *Romans: Volume 1*, The International Critical Commentary

James D. G. Dunn, *Romans 1-8*, Word Biblical Commentary

Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *Romans*, The Anchor Bible

Romans: Pastor

John Ziesler, *Paul's Letter to the Romans*, TPI New Testament Commentaries

Robert H. Mounce, *Romans*, The New American Commentary

Grant R. Osborne, *Romans*, The IVP New Testament Commentary Series

Leon Morris, *The Epistle to the Romans*, The Pillar New Testament Commentary

In the following four chapters, the discussions of words in the above commentaries will be examined, in the following order: Genesis, Isaiah, Luke, and Romans. As each selected passage is studied, lexical fallacies will be noted, followed by language which is not linguistically-nuanced, and could result in pastors committing lexical fallacies. Finally, the use of the word "literally" in each commentary will be examined. It will be seen that despite Barr's best efforts in 1961, lexical fallacies still abound within scholarly literature that is used by evangelical pastors (at least the portion of that literature known as commentaries). Furthermore, a tremendous lack of

linguistically-nuanced language in commentaries is misleading and could quite easily lead to lexical fallacies being promulgated from the evangelical pulpit. After examining all thirty-two commentaries, the final chapter of this thesis will include a discussion of the most common lexical fallacies, and the failure of many commentators to use lexically-nuanced language. Suggestions will also be made for how Hebrew and Greek can be taught in Bible colleges and seminaries to equip pastors with the appropriate linguistic knowledge to conduct lexical analyses and critically evaluate lexical analyses in commentaries.

CHAPTER THREE: GENESIS 15:1-6

Genesis 15:1-6 is a passage in which Yahweh reaffirms his covenant with Abram (see Gen 12:1-3) and assures him that he will indeed be the father of many descendants. In order to examine how commentators deal with the words that are found in this passage, I have selected four commentaries which are primarily intended for scholars (Sarna, *Genesis*; Wenham, *Genesis 1-15*; Hamilton, *Genesis*; Westermann, *Genesis 12-36*), and four which are primarily intended for pastors (Matthews, *Genesis 11:27-50:26*; Waltke and Fredricks, *Genesis*; Walton, *Genesis*; Hartley, *Genesis*). To help orient the reader to the passage, an English translation is provided. Lexical fallacies within the eight commentaries will then be illuminated, followed by instances where more lexically-nuanced language is needed, and a discussion of the uses of the word “literally.”

Genesis 15:1-6, ESV

After these things the word of the LORD came to Abram in a vision: “Fear not, Abram, I am your shield; your reward shall be very great.”² But Abram said, “O Lord GOD, what will you give me, for I continue childless, and the heir of my house is Eliezer of Damascus?”³ And Abram said, “Behold, you have given me no offspring, and a member of my household will be my heir.”⁴ And behold, the word of the LORD came to him: “This man shall not be your heir; your very own son shall be your heir.”⁵ And he brought him outside and said, “Look toward heaven, and number the stars, if you are able to number them.” Then he said to him, “So shall your offspring be.”⁶ And he believed the LORD, and he counted it to him as righteousness.

Lexical Fallacies

Verse 1

בַּמַּהֲזֵה (bammah² zeh): In a discussion of visions and theophanies, Matthews writes:

Theophanies involving a divine ‘appearance’ are frequent in the patriarchal narratives ([Gen] 12:7; 17:1; 18:1; 26:2,24; 35:1,7,9; 48:3; cf. Exod 3:16; 4:5; 6:3). The signature formula for prophetic revelation, ‘the word of the LORD,’ may here by itself indicate that an appearance accompanied the message. The theophanic revelation to Jacob ([Gen] 35:9-10) is characterized in this way in 1 Kgs 18:31.¹

He then goes on to explain that the context of Gen 15 does not explicitly state that God visibly appeared to Abram. The references that Matthews cites (above) for divine appearances certainly are instances where God appeared to someone. Yet none of them (including Gen 35:9-10) contain the “signature formula for prophetic revelation,” דְּבַר־יְהוָה (d^e bar-yhwh), which is present in Gen 15:1. It does occur in 1 Kgs 18:31, which reads: “Elijah took twelve stones, according to the number of the tribes of the sons of Jacob, to whom the word of the LORD came, saying, ‘Israel shall be your name.’” Yet that text does not explicitly refer to the fact that God appeared to Jacob in Gen 35:9-10. Matthews is incorrectly assuming that in 1 Kgs 18:31, דְּבַר־יְהוָה is referring to God’s appearing to Jacob, rather than to the words God spoke, which are what is quoted in 1 Kgs 18:31. He then applies this misinformation to Gen 15:1, when he says that the presence there of דְּבַר־יְהוָה “may here by itself indicate that an appearance accompanied the message.” Matthews is guilty of *Contextual Amnesia* (for lack of a better term),

¹Matthews, *Genesis 11:27-50:26*, 162.

because he is attempting to build his interpretation of the text upon the phrase **דָּבַר** **יְהוָה**, rather than the sentences in which that phrase is found.

Verse 3

יָרַשׁ (*yôrēs*): Westermann uses the presence of this word to argue that the phrase in which it is found, beginning with **יְהוָה**, is from the post-patriarchal period. He writes:

It is only in the sedentary period, when property acquires a significance that determines life itself, that the son becomes ‘the heir’ (2 Sam. 14:7; Jer 49:1); property cannot have such a meaning in the life-style of the nomad where the son is not the heir, but the one in whom the life of the father as a whole is carried on.²

This understanding of **יָרַשׁ** can only be correct if it always and only refers to acquiring land, and not to any other possessions. This is simply not the case. In Lev 25:46, the verb **יָרַשׁ** (*yāraš*, *qal* infinitive construct) is used to refer to inheriting foreign slaves. In Hos 9:6 (3ms *qal* imperfect), it says: “Nettles shall possess their precious things of silver.”³ Here it is material possessions, rather than land, that is being inherited (or possessed). Westermann has committed *Contextual Amnesia*, failing to take note of passages in which **יָרַשׁ** can be used to speak of the inheritance of possessions, rather than land.

²Westermann, *Genesis 12-36*, 220.

³Cf. Judg 18:7 (*qal*ms active participle), although the meaning of its object, **עֶשֶׂר** (*‘ešer*), is not known (see *HALOT*, 2:871). In Wenham’s list of the occurrences of the verb **יָרַשׁ** in Genesis, he misses Gen 45:11, *Genesis 1-15*, 329.

Verse 5

חָבַטְנָה (*habbet-nā'*): Wenham writes, “‘Look’ suggests a long look; cf. 1 Kgs 18:43; Exod 3:6.”⁴ There are a number of occurrences of חָבַטְנָה in the *hiph il* stem in which it is *possible* that a long look is in view (e.g., Lam 4:16; Hab 2:15). However, there are many occurrences of the *hiph il* of חָבַטְנָה where “a long look” is certainly *not* a necessary gloss for the passage to make sense (see Gen 19:17, 26; 1 Sam 17:42; 1 Kgs 19:6; 1 Chr 21:21; Ps 102:20 [EV 19]; 142:5 [EV 4]; Isa 38:11; 42:18; 63:5, 15; Lam 1:11; Amos 5:22). It seems that Wenham has included the context of Gen 15:5 in the meaning he gives for חָבַטְנָה, thus committing *Illegitimate Contextual Transfer*.

Verse 6

בֵּיהֶמַן בַּיְהוָה (*w^ehe^e min bayhwh*): Matthews commits *Inadequate Parallels of Word Usage* when he writes: “The Hebrew construction translated ‘believed’ (*he ḥemin + bē* prep.) means to place trust in someone with confidence (e.g., Exod 19:9; 1 Sam 27:12). The general idea is reliance, and the orientation of the person’s trust is the future.”⁵ He does well to recognize the importance of placing special emphasis on passages with בֵּיהֶמַן followed by בָּ (*b^h*), but his definition of this construction (“to place trust in someone with confidence”) does not take into account the different contexts in which it is used.⁶ When something has been said, the *hiph il* of אָמַן (*āman*), followed by בָּ and a

⁴Wenham, *Genesis 1-15*, 329.

⁵Matthews, *Genesis 11:27-50:26*, 166.

⁶Matthews, *Genesis 11:27-50:26*, 166.

personal object (that person being the one who originally spoke), indicates that the subject of אָמַן is taking the speaker at their word. In other words, they believe that the person has spoken truthfully.⁷ Matthews' reference of Exod 19:9 falls into this category. When a personal object of אָמַן is found in a context where nothing has been spoken, there seems to be the idea of trust that a person is able to, or will, do something. Matthews' reference of 1 Sam 27:12 falls into this category. His error was to assume that every occurrence of אָמַן followed by אָמַן is equally valid for determining its meaning in Gen 15:6.

Westermann is selective in his evidence, committing *Illegitimate Informational Transfer*. He writes, "Earlier, before [the time of] Isaiah, the hiph. of אָמַן occurred mainly with a negative. It was the normal, natural thing for one to believe God's word; there was no need to state it."⁸ He then goes on to explain how Isaiah came upon the disbelief of a king, resulting in the need to explain the significance of faith.⁹ Westermann has simply ignored Exod 14:31, in which belief in God is stated. He also apparently misses Exod 19:9, in which belief in a sign is stated; if the Israelites believe the sign, this means they will also believe God's word through Moses.¹⁰ Granted, Westermann does not say that אָמַן never occurred with a positive sense prior to Isaiah. However, there are only two instances of אָמַן in a positive sense in Isaiah (43:10; 53:1). This is hardly

⁷See Exod 19:9; Prov 26:25; Jer 12:6; cf. Ps 106:12.

⁸Westermann, *Genesis 12-36*, 222.

⁹Westermann, *Genesis 12-36*, 222.

¹⁰From a theological standpoint, it is also difficult to read the Pentateuch and conclude that the normal course of action for the Israelites was to trust God and obey him.

enough on which to base an entire theology. Westermann has been selective in his evidence in order to support his theological conclusions.

Linguistically-Nuanced Language

Verse 1

בַּמַּהֲזֵה (bammah^azeh): Waltke and Fredricks have only one sentence dealing with the word מַהֲזֵה (mah^azeh): “The rare term derives from a root that is connected with revelation to a prophet.”¹¹ Sarna similarly writes: “the word for ‘vision’ (Heb. *maḥāzeh*) derives from the stem *h-z-h*, ‘to see,’ which is largely used in connection with the prophetic experience.”¹² It is certainly true that many words based on the root מִזְה (hzh) are often used in contexts which speak of a prophetic experience, but they are not always used in this way.¹³ In order to help deter pastors from committing *The Root Fallacy* (and thus always finding a prophetic experience when they encounter a word with the root מִזְה), it would have been better for Waltke and Fredricks, and Sarna to write something like: *The noun מַהֲזֵה is used elsewhere in connection with the prophetic experience.* It would thus be clear that they are presenting one more piece of evidence to support their claim that Abram is presented as a prophet in the book of Genesis.

Matthews writes: “The word translated ‘vision’ (*maḥāzeh*) occurs only four times (v. 1; Num 24:4, 16; Ezek 13:7) in contrast to the common nouns *ḥāzôn* (35x) and

¹¹Waltke and Fredricks, *Genesis*, 240.

¹²Sarna, *Genesis*, 112.

¹³See, for example: Job 27:12 and Prov 22:29; both contain the *qal* verb מִזְה (ḥāzāh).

hizzāyôn (9x).”¹⁴ He then goes on to discuss visions and dreams within the Old Testament. In order to help clarify that he has moved from a lexical analysis to a concept study, Matthew would have been better to conclude his statement by saying: . . . *in contrast to the common nouns ḥāzôn (35x) and hizzāyôn (9x), which may also often be translated as “vision.”*

Hamilton mentions that חֲזוֹן only occurs four times in the Old Testament, and then writes, “But related words which also mean ‘vision,’ such as *ḥāzôn* (35 times), *ḥāzūt* (5 times), and *hizzāyôn* (9 times), appear frequently.”¹⁵ In order to help keep pastors from committing *Basic Meaning via English*, it would have been better for Hamilton to write: *But related words which can also be translated “vision,” such as . . .* He then goes on to give some misinformation, writing: “What is transmitted from God to a mortal in such visions is not a visual image but a word from God. This is what distinguishes a vision from a dream.”¹⁶ Yet Daniel describes the visual images which he sees in a חֲזוֹן (*ḥāzôn*), clearly not just words from God.¹⁷ Furthermore, in Isaiah, חֲזוֹן, and in Job, חֲזוֹן (*hizzāyôn*) seem to be used to refer to a dream, when found in a construct relation with חֲלֹם (*laylāh*).¹⁸ Thus it is the context which is key for determining whether or not visual images are present when someone receives a חֲזוֹן.

¹⁴Matthews, *Genesis 11:27-50:26*, 161-62.

¹⁵Hamilton, *Genesis*, 418.

¹⁶Hamilton, *Genesis*, 418.

¹⁷Dan 8:1, 2, 15; 9:21.

¹⁸Isa 29:7; Job 20:8; 33:15.

אל־תִּירָא (‘al-tîrā’): Wenham states, “Its use suggests that Abraham [sic] is viewed as a military warrior.”¹⁹ Since there are many words used in Gen 15:1 that Wenham uses to support his argument that Abram is viewed as a military warrior, it would have been better for him to say something like: *Its use contributes here to the presentation of Abram as a military warrior.* This is Wenham’s first mention in this section of Abram as a warrior, so some pastors may be misled into thinking that Wenham is suggesting that the presence of אל־תִּירָא alone indicates that Abram is a military warrior.²⁰

מָגֵן (māgēn): Matthews says: “G. Rendsburg finds in the verse a case of janus parallelism; *māgēn* as ‘shield’ parallels the prior line, and its consonants *m-g-n*, meaning ‘give’ (14:20; Prov 4:9), parallel the subsequent line (i.e., reward).”²¹ This statement is not entirely accurate. Rendsburg’s argument is that when Genesis was written only in consonants, the author intended the letters מָגֵן (*mgn*) to be understood by the reader to be read both as מָגֵן and מוֹגֵן (*môgēn*, *qal* active participle, “the one giving”) at the same time.²² Matthews would have been more clear if he wrote: *and its consonants m-g-n, to be understood as the participle môgēn, “to give,” parallel the subsequent line.*²³

¹⁹Wenham, *Genesis 1-15*, 327.

²⁰This is clearly not the case, as can be seen from the non-military contexts in which אל + תִּירָא (in the *qal* imperfect) are found in the Old Testament. Cf. Gen 21:17; 35:17; 43:23; Exod 20:20; Judg 4:18; 1 Kgs 17:13.

²¹Matthews, *Genesis 11:27-50:26*, 162. He is referring to the paper: Rendsburg, “Notes on Genesis XV,” 266-72.

²²Rendsburg, “Notes on Genesis XV,” 267.

²³It will be left to those who are more knowledgeable than I in Hebrew poetical devices as to whether or not janus parallelism is a legitimate category.

שָׂכָר (śākār): Hartley writes: “‘Reward or pay’ refers to the pay soldiers receive from the spoil (Ezek. 29:19), but Abram had refused to take any of the spoil from his defeat of the kings of the East (14:23-24).”²⁴ It is true that שָׂכָר can be used to refer to the pay that a soldier receives, but it is also used for the pay received by those holding other occupations.²⁵ Therefore, to indicate the broader uses of שָׂכָר within the Old Testament, it would have been better for Hartley to say: *śākār may be used to refer to the pay soldiers receive from the spoil . . .* A similar criticism is applicable for Waltke and Fredricks, who write: “This is probably a term for a mercenary’s pay (see Isa. 40:10; 62:11; Ezek. 29:19).”²⁶ It would have been better if they said: *This is probably used here to refer to a mercenary’s pay.*

Rather than looking to ch 14 for the context of שָׂכָר, Hamilton and Matthews look forward to what is still to come in ch 15. Hamilton makes note of the rewards (animals and servants) that Abram has already received in ch 12, and the spoils of war he turned down from the King of Sodom in ch 14. He then writes: “One passage in the OT, Ps. 127:3, lists ‘the fruit of the womb’ as a ‘reward’ (śākār) for a man. This might suggest that the reward Yahweh has prepared for Abram is a son.”²⁷ It is not the use of שָׂכָר in Ps 127:3 alone that makes “son” a possibility for the reward that is promised to Abram in Gen 15:1. Therefore, it would have been clearer for Hamilton to say about Ps 127:3, *This*

²⁴Hartley, *Genesis*, 155.

²⁵See Gen 30:32; 31:8; Exod 2:9. This fact is recognized by Wenham, *Genesis 1-15*, 327; cf. *HALOT*, 3:1331 and *BDB*, 969.

²⁶Waltke and Fredricks, *Genesis*, 241.

²⁷Hamilton, *Genesis*, 419. Psalm 127:3 reads: “Behold, children are a heritage from the LORD, the fruit of the womb a reward (שָׂכָר).”

shows that a son may be considered a שְׂכָר. He would then need to argue from the context that the reward in view in Gen 15 is, in fact, a son. Matthews surveys the ways in which שְׂכָר is used within the Old Testament, discusses the context of Gen 15, and then says: “Psalm 127:3 identifies the inheritance of children as a ‘reward’ given by the Lord.”²⁸ In order to clarify the relevance of the use of שְׂכָר in Ps 127:3 for Gen 15:1, Matthews would have been better to say: *Psalm 127:3 indicates that children may be given as a שְׂכָר.*

Verse 2

יְהוָה יְהוָה (^{2a} *dōnāy yhwḥ*):²⁹ Waltke and Fredricks write: “This is a rare title of God used when pleading with him.”³⁰ It is difficult to understand on what basis they say this is a “rare title of God” when *HALOT* lists numerous instances of this title, including 17 in Isaiah, 20 in Amos, and about 200 in Ezekiel.³¹ In order to discourage pastors from importing the idea of “pleading with God” into every context in which יְהוָה יְהוָה is found, it would have been better for Waltke and Fredricks to say, *This title of God is often*

²⁸Matthews, *Genesis 11.27-50:26*, 163.

²⁹Westermann should have checked, rather than have simply trusted J. Skinner, whom he claims says that יְהוָה יְהוָה “occurs only in the vocative in the historical books.” First Kings 2:26 reads: “But I will not at this time put you to death, because you carried the ark of the Lord GOD [יְהוָה יְהוָה] before David my father.” This is an historical book where יְהוָה יְהוָה is clearly not in the vocative. He also says that יְהוָה יְהוָה “is not a form of address which occurs in the course of a dialog [*sic*], but belongs to the realm of prayer.” It seems to me that it would be difficult to clearly distinguish between prayer to God and dialogue with God, *Genesis 12-36*, 219.

³⁰Waltke and Fredricks, *Genesis*, 241.

³¹*HALOT*, 1:13.

used when someone is pleading with him.³² Similarly, Sarna writes: “This Hebrew divine title, rarely used in the Torah, appears here for the first time. It is used in a context of complaint, prayer, and request.”³³ Much better would have been: *It is often found in contexts of complaint, prayer, and request.* Sarna is also misleading when he writes: “Here the word for ‘Lord’ is *’adonai*, ‘my Lord,’ not the divine name YHVH.”³⁴ Strictly speaking he is correct, but Sarna fails to mention that יהוה is here found in collocation with יהוה. He does include the Hebrew text in his commentary, so those who understand Hebrew will not be led astray. Unfortunately though, pastors who only know English could be misled into suggesting that there is some significance to the fact that the author of Genesis has referred to God as Adonai, rather than Yahweh.

הלך (hōlēk): Waltke and Fredricks write: “The Hebrew here means ‘walking, going’ and depicts life as a journey; the same verb is used in [Gen] 12:1, 4, 5, 9; 13:3.”³⁵ It is good that Waltke and Fredricks use the word “here” in order to clarify that the glosses they give are what they believe is suitable for this particular context. Comments such as this will help deter pastors from committing fallacies like *Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning* and *Illegitimate Contextual Transfer*.

³²For other contexts in which יהוה יהוה is found, see: Ps 71:16; 73:28; Isa 3:15.

³³Sarna, *Genesis*, 113.

³⁴Sarna, *Genesis*, 113.

³⁵Waltke and Fredricks, *Genesis*, 241.

עָרִירִי (^a*rîrî*): Westermann incorrectly says that this word is used only of the husband.³⁶

The two occurrences in Leviticus (20:20, 21) say that both the man and the woman will be childless (v. 20: עָרִירִים יָמָתוּ, ^a*rîrîm yāmutû*; v. 21: עָרִירִים יִהְיוּ, ^a*rîrîm yihyû*).

Verse 3

זָרַע (*zāra* ^c): Hartley writes: “He reiterated his complaint, lamenting that God had not given him ‘seed,’ which NIV renders children.”³⁷ It is likely that Hartley includes the gloss “seed” here because that is the one used in the KJV. In order to deter pastors from committing *Basic Meaning via English*, it would have been good for Hartley to write: . . . *lamenting that God had not given him “seed” (KJV), which NIV renders children.*

Verse 4

וְהִנֵּה! (*w^ehinnēh*): Waltke and Fredricks write: “The English ‘then’ does not capture the Hebrew emphatic particle *hinnēh* (‘look’), which aims to involve the audience in the narrative.”³⁸ In order to keep pastors from drawing the erroneous conclusion that *every* use of וְהִנֵּה (*hinnēh*) is an attempt to involve the audience in the narrative, it would have been better for Waltke and Fredricks to write: *The English “then” does not capture the proper nuance of the Hebrew emphatic particle hinnēh (‘look’), which is used here to involve the audience in the narrative.*

³⁶Westermann, *Genesis 12-36*, 219.

³⁷Hartley, *Genesis*, 155.

³⁸Waltke and Fredricks, *Genesis*, 241.

מִמֵּעַיָּךְ (*mimmē 'eykā*): Westermann could have done better when he writes that מִמֵּעַךְ (*mē 'eh*) “is regarded as the place whence life originates, as in Gen 25:23.”³⁹ In the reference that he gives, מִמֵּעַךְ is used to refer to part of a woman’s body. Other passages where מִמֵּעַךְ is used of a woman seem to clearly refer to the womb (Num 5:22; Ruth 1:11). Yet there are a number of passages (like Gen 15:4), where מִמֵּעַךְ is used of a male, clearly not in reference to a womb.⁴⁰ Rather, it seems to refer to whatever it is inside a man that results in the creation of a child.⁴¹ It is possible that מִמֵּעַךְ is a word which is used generally to refer to “the seat of reproduction” in either a male or a female. But it is also possible that there is a different nuance depending upon whom it is used for, so it would have been better for Westermann to give references to passages in which מִמֵּעַךְ is used of a male.

Verse 6

וְהָיָה בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא וְהָיָה בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא (w^ehe^e min bayhwh): Walton’s discussion of this phrase is, in many respects, very good. He takes syntactical issues into account, and attempts to consider the meaning that וְהָיָה הַיּוֹם הַהוּא contributes to Gen 15:6.⁴² He also takes great care to ensure that his

³⁹Westermann, *Genesis 12-36*, 221.

⁴⁰Cf. 2 Sam 7:12; 16:11; 2 Chr 32:21.

⁴¹Perhaps semen or testicles? Song of Songs 5:14b reads: “His body [מִמֵּעַיָּךְ, *mē 'āw*] is polished ivory, bedecked with sapphires.” Considering the fact that tusks (from elephants and hippopotamuses) are the primary source of ivory, might there be something else in view? (Thanks to M. J. Boda for this observation).

⁴²Walton, *Genesis*, 420-21.

understanding of the verse is done through an analysis of the Hebrew, rather than through a consideration of an English translation.⁴³ However, Walton may have unnecessarily limited the parallel passages he considered to only those with “*b^e* plus a divine object.”⁴⁴ It is a theological, rather than a linguistic, decision to consider divine objects apart from other personal objects. When all personal objects are considered, Walton’s conclusions are confirmed.⁴⁵ As was seen above in the discussion of “Lexical Fallacies,” any time a person speaks, the *hiph il* of אָמַן (‘*āman*), followed by בָּ (‘*b^e*) and the person who spoke as its object, indicates that the subject of אָמַן believes that the person has spoken truthfully.⁴⁶

Matthews makes a comment which is very poorly worded, saying: “The LXX renders the Hebrew by *episteusen*, ‘[Abram] believed.’ There is no exact equivalent in the Hebrew for Greek’s *pistis* (‘faith’) and *pisteuō* (‘believe’), but this verbal form (*hiphil*) of the word ‘*āman* comes closest.”⁴⁷ He recognizes that the Greek was translating the Hebrew, but then gives the impression that the Hebrew language is somehow deficient because it does not have a word which shares the exact semantic range of the Greek

⁴³Walton writes: “Even if we were in a position to translate the preposition *b^e* as ‘in’ (which we are not), we still could not have confidence that the combination ‘believe + in’ in Hebrew carries the same idiomatic meaning as the combination does in English,” *Genesis*, 421.

⁴⁴Walton, *Genesis*, 420.

⁴⁵Walton writes: “The common denominator that emerges from this lexical study is that the phrase in question concerns taking God at his word—believing that what he says will become reality and then acting on that belief,” *Genesis*, 421.

⁴⁶See Exod 19:9; Prov 26:25; Jer 12:6; cf. Ps 106:12. The references Walton gives with a divine object of בָּ (‘*b^e*) are Exod 14:31; Num 14:11; 20:12; Deut 1:32; 2 Kgs 17:14; 2 Chr 20:20; Ps 78:22; Jonah 3:5. The other option, also noted above, is that when a personal object of בָּ is found in a context where nothing has been spoken, there seems to be the idea of trust that a person is able to, or will, do something (cf. 1 Sam 27:12; Job 39:12; Mic 7:5). There are however, no examples of this with a divine object.

⁴⁷Matthews, *Genesis 11:27-50:26*, 166. Square brackets are his.

words under consideration.

Hartley writes: “‘Believe in’ means ‘put trust in, rely on.’ Here it means that Abram put his full trust in God.”⁴⁸ He seems to be clarifying for his English readers what is meant by the Hebrew phrase אָמַן אֱלֹהִים. In order to discourage pastors from committing *Basic Meaning via English*, Hartley would have been better to write: *The Hebrew phrase which has been glossed “Believe in” can also be translated “put trust in, rely on.”*

Hamilton begins his discussion of אָמַן אֱלֹהִים with a barrage of misinformation. He writes, “This is the first time that this word– the Hiphil of *’āman*– appears in the Bible, and it will be used only two more times in Genesis (42:20; 45:26).”⁴⁹ He says that he is specifically speaking of the *hiph ’il*, but Gen 42:20 has the verb אָמַן (*’āman*) in the *niph ’al* stem. Then in discussing the differences between אָמַן אֱלֹהִים followed by אֱלֹהִים and אֱלֹהִים (*l’*), he writes,

there are more instances where the verb followed by *b^e* is used in a positive sense. Almost all the examples with *l^e* are negative ones, as in the above example from Ps. 106:24 (except Exod. 4:8b; Prov 14:15 is technically positive, but it describes the gullible person who believes anything and everything).⁵⁰

The example from Ps 106:24 reads: לֹא־אָמְנִינוּ לַיהוָה (lō’-he^e mînû lidbārô). By

Hamilton’s own description then, a negative sense of אָמַן אֱלֹהִים includes a time when a person does not believe, even if they should. Yet in his footnote which lists the many positive uses of אָמַן אֱלֹהִים with אֱלֹהִים, five of them are actually negative uses (Num 14:11; 20:12;

⁴⁸Hartley, *Genesis*, 156.

⁴⁹Hamilton, *Genesis*, 423.

⁵⁰Hamilton, *Genesis*, 423-24.

Deut 1:32; 2 Kgs 17:14; Jer 12:6), and one of them does not have a personal object (Deut 28:66), which leaves only four legitimate examples (Exod 14:31; 19:9; 1 Sam 27:12; Jonah 3:5). Hamilton fails to note a positive sense when בָּ is used in Isa 43:10 and 53:1. This would bring the total number of positive examples with בָּ and בְּ to an equal number of four each. There may still be a distinction in the meanings of אָמַן with בָּ and בְּ , but it is not for the reasons given by Hamilton. On a positive note, Hamilton does mention the need to distinguish between theological and linguistic observations when determining word meaning.⁵¹

Wenham writes: “ אָמַן ‘he believed’ can mean ‘he relied on someone, gave credence to a message or considered it to be true, trusted in someone’ (Jepsen, *TDOT* 1:308).”⁵² He seems to be giving what he sees as the semantic range of אָמַן , but he never goes on to say what it means in Gen 15:6. He would have been clearer if he said: אָמַן “*he believed*” can be translated in various contexts as “*he relied on someone,*” “*gave credence to a message or considered it to be true,*” and “*trusted in someone.*” He then should have clarified which nuance of that semantic range (or which gloss) is applicable in Gen 15:6.

$\text{וַיַּחֲסֵב־בְּעֵינָיו}$ (*wayyahs^e be^h*): Wenham writes: “Here the imperfect qal of חָסַב [*hsb*] is used. Similar constructions using the niphal are found in Lev 7:18; 17:4; Num 18:27, 30; Prov

⁵¹Hamilton, *Genesis*, 424.

⁵²Wenham, *Genesis 1-15*, 329.

27:14. But the closest parallel is Ps 106:31: ‘that has been reckoned to him [niph] as righteousness.’”⁵³ Yet there are at least two parallel passages that are syntactically closer to Gen 15:6 than is Ps 106:31. In Job 19:11 we find: וַיִּחְשְׁבֵנִי לוֹ כְּצָרִי (‘‘and counts me as his adversary’’), and in 2 Sam 19:20 (EV 19) we find: וַיֹּאמֶר אֶל־הַמֶּלֶךְ אֶל־: וַיִּחְשַׁב־לִי אֲדֹנָי עֹן (‘‘and said to the king, ‘Let not my lord hold me guilty.’’’).⁵⁴ The general sense that these parallel passages (and others containing חֲשַׁב in the *qal* stem) give for the meaning of חֲשַׁב, seem to be something like ‘‘consider as,’’ or ‘‘in relation to,’’⁵⁵ which actually supports what Wenham argues from the passages he discusses which contain חֲשַׁב in the *niph* *al* stem .

Waltke and Fredricks write: ‘‘The verb denotes ‘the evaluative categorization of persons.’’’⁵⁶ In order to discourage pastors from falling victim to the fallacy of *Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning*, it would have been better if they said: *The verb often means ‘the evaluative categorization of persons.’* Matthews says, ‘‘The term ‘credited’ (*hāšab*, NIV, HCSB), also translated ‘reckoned’ (NASB, NRSV, NJB, NJPS) or ‘counted’ (ESV, NLT², JPSV), means ‘to assign . . . value’ [*sic*]; in this case the Lord assigns Abram’s faith the value of righteousness.’’⁵⁷ However, ‘‘to assign . . . value’’ is not a definition, but another gloss which is appropriate for some contexts in which חֲשַׁב is found. Therefore,

⁵³Wenham, *Genesis 1-15*, 329-30. Second set of square brackets are his. Psalm 106:31a reads in Hebrew: לֹא לִצְדָקָה לִי חֲשַׁב (*wattēhāšeb lô lišdāqāh*).

⁵⁴Other parallel passages with חֲשַׁב in the *qal* stem include: Gen 50:20; Job 13:24; 19:15; 33:10; 35:2; 41:19; Ps 32:2; 41:8 (EV 7); Amos 6:5.

⁵⁵These glosses do not appear to work for Amos 6:5.

⁵⁶Waltke and Fredricks, *Genesis*, 242.

⁵⁷Matthews, *Genesis 11:27-50:26*, 167.

Matthews would have been more accurate if he said: *The word* בָּשָׂא, *also translated* “reckoned” or “counted,” *is appropriately understood here to mean* “to assign . . . value.”

בָּשָׂא (s^e *dāqāh*): Westermann demonstrates a good desire to find adequate parallels to Gen 15:6, and thus only finds two in the Old Testament: Deut 24:13 and Ps 106:31.

These passages are ones, like Gen 15:6, which find a person having something accounted to them as בָּשָׂא. However, Westermann also gives a Babylonian parallel which reads:

“In my beseeching, in the lifting up of my hands, in all that I do . . . let there be righteousness” [*sic*].⁵⁸ This text does not include a person who has something accounted to them as בָּשָׂא. If it is an appropriate parallel, then he should also have considered passages such as Deut 6:25 and 9:4-6, which speak of someone doing בָּשָׂא.

“Literally”

Sarna seems to use “literally” to indicate the most common “wooden” English glosses for Hebrew. He says of the word בַּיִת (*bayit*) in vv 2-3: “*bayit* (lit. ‘house’).”⁵⁹ His only other use of the term in these verses is for a phrase in v 1: “*’aḥar ha-devarim ha-’elleh*, literally ‘after these things.’”⁶⁰ Wenham attempts to show the syntax of the Hebrew phrase לִּי בָשָׂא through his use of “literally” in v 6: “Lit., ‘one counted it

⁵⁸Westermann, *Genesis 12-36*, 223.

⁵⁹Sarna, *Genesis*, 112.

⁶⁰Sarna, *Genesis*, 112.

(her) to him.”⁶¹ Hamilton also shows the Hebrew syntax in his three uses of “literally.”⁶² Walton takes this same perspective when he refers to the gloss, “believe in” of אֱמִין בְּ (*w^e he ’emin b^e*) in v 6 as “the attempt to translate ‘literally.’”⁶³

Conclusion

Only five lexical fallacies were committed in the eight commentaries I examined for this passage. Much more significant was the lack of linguistically-nuanced language which was evident in every commentary; two issues in particular were most common. First, many statements in the commentaries placed the focus upon English, rather than Hebrew words, which could lead to the fallacy of *Basic Meaning via English* in the hands of pastors. Second, more clarification was needed that certain statements were made in reference to words in particular contexts. This lack of clarification could lead to fallacies such as *Illegitimate Contextual Transfer* and *Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning*. I have listed all of the commentaries below, along with the fallacies they committed in Gen 15:1-6, for ease of reference.

⁶¹Wenham, *Genesis 1-15*, 325.

⁶²Although his first use of “literally” misses the preposition לְ (*l^e*) in the Hebrew מַה־תִּתֶּן־לִי וְאֲנֹכִי הוֹלֵךְ עֲרִירִי (*mah-titten-li w^e ’anōcī hōlēk ’arīrī*): “Lit, ‘What will you give me, and I am going [hōlēk] childless?’” Hamilton, *Genesis*, 417n1; cf. 417n2, 418. Square brackets are his.

⁶³Walton, *Genesis*, 421.

Fallacies Listed by Commentary***Scholar:***

Sarna (0): *n/a*

Wenham (1): *Illegitimate Contextual Transfer*

Hamilton (0): *n/a*

Westermann (2): *Illegitimate Informational Transfer, Contextual Amnesia*

Pastor:

Matthews (2): *Inadequate Parallels of Word Usage, Contextual Amnesia*

Waltke and Fredricks (0): *n/a*

Walton (0): *n/a*

Hartley (0): *n/a*

CHAPTER FOUR: ISAIAH 53:1-6

Isaiah 53:1-6 is found in the midst of the fourth Servant Song of Isaiah. This passage is particularly well-known to Christians because the first verse is quoted in John 12:38. Many people see the message of these verses to be a Messianic prophecy. As with Gen 15, in order to examine lexical analyses in this controversial passage, I have selected four commentaries which are primarily intended for scholars (Baltzer, *Deutero-Isaiah*; Westermann, *Isaiah 40-66*; Oswalt, *Isaiah*; Watts, *Isaiah 34-66*), and four which are primarily intended for pastors (Walker, “Isaiah”; Goldingay, *Isaiah*; Motyer, *Isaiah*; Childs, *Isaiah*). The same format as the previous chapter will be followed here. An English translation is included first for the reader’s convenience. Lexical fallacies within the eight commentaries will then be illuminated, followed by instances where more lexically-nuanced language is needed, and a discussion of the uses of the word “literally.”

Isaiah 53:1-6, ESV

- ¹ Who has believed what they heard from us?
And to whom has the arm of the LORD been revealed?
- ² For he grew up before him like a young plant,
and like a root out of dry ground;
he had no form or majesty that we should look at him,
and no beauty that we should desire him.
- ³ He was despised and rejected by men;
a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief;
and as one from whom men hide their faces

he was despised, and we esteemed him not.

⁴ Surely he has borne our griefs
and carried our sorrows;
yet we esteemed him stricken,
smitten by God, and afflicted.

⁵ But he was wounded for our transgressions;
he was crushed for our iniquities;
upon him was the chastisement that brought us peace,
and with his stripes we are healed.

⁶ All we like sheep have gone astray;
we have turned every one to his own way;
and the LORD has laid on him
the iniquity of us all.

Lexical Fallacies

Verse 1

לְשִׁמְעַתְנָו (lišmu ʿātēnû): Westermann argues that the subjects in Isa 53:1 did not actually

see for themselves the events which were written about in 52:13-15. Thus, he sees

שְׂמוּעָה as an appropriate word for them to use to refer to this event of which they were

told about. Yet he is guilty of *Illegitimate Informational Transfer* when he writes, “For

them the event is a *š^emū ʿā*, a thing of which they have heard (I Sam. 2.24; 4.19), and, as

such, tidings which they themselves have to pass on to others.”¹ His fallacy lies in

suggesting that they must pass on what they have heard to others *because* it is a שְׂמוּעָה.

In the context of Isa 53, it may be true that the people being spoken of feel compelled to

speak of what they have heard to others. But this has nothing to do with the fact that the

word used here is שְׂמוּעָה. It is a word which is in fact used of various types of messages:

¹Westermann, *Isaiah 40-66*, 260.

bad news (1 Sam 2:24; Ps 112:7), good news (Prov 15:30; 25:25), and even rumours (2 Kgs 19:7; 2 Chr 9:6).² None of these messages must be passed on because they are a *שמועה*; Westermann derives this from the contexts of 1 Sam 2:24 and 4:19, but expects the word *שמועה* to bear it.

Verse 2

כַּיּוֹנֵק (*kayyônēq*): Oswalt discusses this prepositional phrase along with other words in the same verse, which he says “is figurative speech that is intended to convey to us the unexpected nature of the Servant’s entire ministry.”³ In support of this he says of *כַּיּוֹנֵק*: “Instead of bursting on the scene like a mighty oak or a fruit tree in full bloom, he appears as a *sprout* or ‘sucker,’ the normally unwanted shoot that springs up from an exposed root of a tree.”⁴ Due to the parallelism of *יוֹנֵק* (*yônēq*) with *שֹׂרֵשׁ* (*sōresš*), some have understood *יוֹנֵק* as referring to a plant in Isa 53:2, hence the translations: “young plant” (ESV, NRSV), “tender shoot” (NIV, NASB), and “tender green shoot” (NLT). Oswalt has apparently taken the common gloss for *יוֹנֵק*, “suckling,” and derived the English cognate, “sucker,” from it (which is a shoot from a plant’s root or stem) in order to conclude that the Servant in Isa 53 is “unwanted.” This is the fallacy of *Basic Meaning via English*, for Oswalt’s argument is based upon the English connection between “suckling” and

²This range of meanings is evident when the entry for *שמועה* is read in *HALOT*, 4:1555-56.

³Oswalt, *Isaiah*, 382.

⁴Oswalt, *Isaiah*, 382.

“sucker,” rather than any actual consideration for the Hebrew text.

Verse 4

חֲלֵי יָנִי (ḥ^alāyēnū): Walker is guilty of *Illegitimate Informational Transfer* when he writes: “The Heb. *kholi* [TH2483, ZH2716], traditionally ‘infirmities,’ refers to sins as well as to physical diseases. Matthew understood Jesus’ healing ministry as the fulfillment of Isa 53:4, which he quoted in Matt 8:17.”⁵ When חֲלֵי (ḥ^olī) is found in the Old Testament, it refers to a physical ailment.⁶ Moreover, when Matthew quotes Isa 53:4, it is after Jesus has healed people from physical illnesses. It appears that Motley has taken a theological perspective of the cross and applied it in Isa 53:4 to חֲלֵי, when he says that it also refers to sins.

נֶאֱסָרָה (nāsā’):⁷ Baltzer continues to build his case for a connection between Moses and the

⁵Square brackets are his. Walker is better in his *Commentary* section where he writes: “The terms ‘weaknesses’ and ‘sorrows’ (53:4) are general terms for all suffering that is viewed as the result of sin,” *Isaiah*, 230. He goes on to discuss weakness and sorrow being the effects wrought by sin. This is a theological position, whereas in the *Notes* section, as discussed in the body of this chapter, Walker has made a statement about the lexical term itself referring to sin, *Isaiah*, 234.

⁶Deut 7:15; 28:59, 61; 1 Kgs 17:17; 2 Kgs 1:2; 8:8, 9; 13:14; 2 Chr 16:12; 21:15, 18, 19; Ps 41:4; Isa 1:5; 38:9; 53:3, 4; Jer 6:7; 10:19; Hos 5:3; Eccl 5:16. Ecclesiastes 6:2 seems to be the one exception, but it still does not refer to sins there.

⁷Oswalt uses the presence of this word to support his argument that a substitutionary atonement is in view in Isa 53. He writes: “The language of carrying and bearing sets the stage for the substitutionary understanding of the Servant’s suffering. This is the language of the cult, especially from Leviticus. There the sacrificial animal carries (nāsā’) the sins of the offerers away, so that the offerer does not carry them anymore.” He then explains how the sacrificial animal takes upon itself the sins of the one offering the sacrifice. The references he lists in support of this are: Lev 5:1, 17; 10:17; 16:22; 17:16; 20:19; Num 9:13; 14:34, *Isaiah*, 386; cf. 377. The problem with what he is arguing here is that in all of the references he lists, except one, what is carried is אָוֶן (‘āvôn: singular 5x; plural 2x); the other reference has חֲטָאִים (ḥēṭ’). Yet in Isa 53:4, it is חֲלֵי (ḥ^olī) that is carried, something that is never atoned for in the Old Testament. In the Pentateuch, חֲלֵי is used to refer to sicknesses or diseases that come upon people as punishment for their

Servant of Isa 53 by noting the occurrences of the root נָשָׂא (*nś'*) in Num 11. He writes:

“It would seem conceivable that Moses was called ‘the one who carries’ (נָשָׂא [*nōśe'*]).”⁸

He then says in a footnote: “If we remember that ‘prince’ (נָשִׂיא [*nāsî'*]) is formed from the same root, a polemic directed against the expectation of a new David could play a part here (cf. Ezek 34:24; 37:25). Unlike other ‘princes,’ ‘Moses’ really ‘carried.’”⁹ He concludes his footnote by discussing the distribution of נָשָׂא within the Old Testament, as listed in *HALOT*. Baltzer has committed both *The Root Fallacy* and *Inadequate Parallels of Word Usage* here, stretching the supposed “basic meaning” of נָשָׂא in order to make a connection between the Servant of Isa 53 and David.

סָבַל (*s°bālām*): Motyer is guilty of *Illegitimate Informational Transfer* when he writes:

“to ‘carry’ (*√sābal*) is to ‘shoulder,’ to accept that burden as one’s own.”¹⁰ It seems that he has taken a theological position that the Servant is taking ownership of the burdens which he is carrying. Motyer has then included that information in the meaning of the word סָבַל (*sābal*) itself.

sins (cf. Deut 7:15; 28:59, 61). The only other instance (besides Isa 53:4) of נָשָׂא in collocation with נָשָׂא is found in Jer 10:19, where the speaker carries his own afflictions. It seems that Oswalt’s argument for seeing a substitutionary atonement in Isa 53, because of the presence of נָשָׂא, is based on shaky evidence.

⁸Baltzer, *Deutero-Isaiah*, 408.

⁹Baltzer, *Deutero-Isaiah*, 408-09n124.

¹⁰Motyer, *Isaiah*, 334.

Verse 5

מַחֲלֵל (*m^ehōlāl*): Walker says of מַחֲלֵל: “It is used when a man is run through with a sword or spear (cf. Ezek 28:7; Num 25:8).”¹¹ His second reference, Num 25:8 actually contains a *qal* imperfect of דָּקַר (*dāqar*).¹² The unsuspecting pastor, who has no competence in Hebrew, will understandably assume that Walker is giving references for the word מַחֲלֵל (or at least, הָלַל, *hālāl*). This is not true. Walker’s error lies in assuming that two words which can be used to refer to the same action are therefore equivalent in meaning.¹³ He is guilty of *Illegitimate Synonymy*.

מְדַכָּא (*m^edukkā*): Walker is guilty of *The Root Fallacy* here.¹⁴ I will quote Walker in full, and include in brackets the words that Walker is using to determine the meaning of מְדַכָּא.

The Heb. *daka* [TH1792, ^{ZH}1917] is used for ‘broken to pieces, shattered’; it probably refers to the psychological and spiritual suffering the servant endured. It is used consistently (except in Deut 23:1 [MT 2: noun דָּכָא, *dakkā*’ written; noun דָּכָה, *dkh*, listed in critical apparatus as a textual variant in many different manuscripts]) in a metaphorical sense of a ‘crushed spirit’ (57:15 [adj. דָּכָא, *dakkā*’]) or a ‘crushed heart’ (Ps 51:17 [MT 19: *niph* ‘al participle of דָּכָה, *dākāh*]). Even David’s petition, ‘Let the bones you have crushed rejoice’ (Ps 51:8,

¹¹Walker, “Isaiah,” 230.

¹²His first reference, Ezek 28:7 is also contested, because it may be the homonym הָלַל, which can often be glossed “to pollute,” or “to defile,” cf. *BDB*, 320; *HALOT*, 1:319-20.

¹³Walker lists a couple of references for the Messiah being pierced. One of those is Ps 22:17 (EV 16), “Isaiah,” 230. The relevant phrase in Ps 22 reads: 'יְדֵי וְרַגְלָי' קָאֲרִי יָאֲדָי וְרַגְלָי (*kā'arī yāday w^eraglāy*), and is easily the most debated text-critical/translational issue in the entire psalm! Thus, this verse is not the best example to use of the Messiah being pierced. For an introduction to the issues, see the commentaries and: Strawn, “Psalm 22:17b: More Guessing”; Swenson, “Psalm 22:17”; Linville, “Psalm 22:17b.”

¹⁴Walker may also be guilty of *Illegitimate Synonymy*, depending upon how he sees the relationship between דָּכָא and דָּכָה.

lit. [MT 10: *pu'el* perfect of מִדָּכָהּ]) is clearly a figurative reference to emotional rather than physical crushing (TDOT 3:195-208).¹⁵

Notice that not one of Walker's references for determining the meaning of מִדָּכָהּ is a verb of מִדָּכָהּ (which is what he says he is discussing), let alone a *pu'el*.

מוֹסֵר (*mûsar*): Baltzer commits *The Root Fallacy*, evident when he writes:

“‘Chastisement,’ ‘rebuke,’ or ‘correction’ (מוֹסֵר) is a term in wisdom teaching. The basic meaning of the root מִסַּר [ysr] is probably ‘instruct.’”¹⁶ His discussion which follows indicates that Baltzer sees the “basic meaning” of “instruct” in every occurrence of both the noun מוֹסֵר and the verb מִסַּר, since they bear the same root.

Linguistically-Nuanced Language

Verse 1

הִיאֲמִיִּן (*he^{ve} mîn*): In the discussion of this word in the previous chapter (on Gen 15:6), it was stated that this occurrence of הִיאֲמִיִּן is an example of a positive use, followed by the preposition לְ (*l^e*). Motyer appears to be correct when he writes: “*Believed (he^{ve} mîn l^e)* means to believe what someone has said.”¹⁷ He has taken the syntax of Isa 53:1 into account in determining the meaning contributed by הִיאֲמִיִּן to the verse. *BDB* divide their

¹⁵Walker, “Isaiah,” 230. First set of square brackets are his. Cf. p 234 where he also uses the adjective מִדָּכָהּ from Ps 34:19 [EV 18] as a parallel (he lists Isa 57:5, which should be 57:15, here as well).

¹⁶Baltzer, *Deutero-Isaiah*, 411.

¹⁷Motyer, *Isaiah*, 333.

discussion of שְׂמוֹעַ with לָּ between personal and impersonal objects of לָּ.¹⁸ This is a fair division, but Motyer’s definition is able to cover both personal and impersonal objects, because the impersonal objects of לָּ are used to refer to things which have been spoken.¹⁹

לְשִׁמּוֹעַתְנוּ (lišmu ‘ātēnū): Goldingay writes: “The word for message means tidings that we hear, not a message that we preach (cf. NRSV ‘what we have heard’).”²⁰ He seems to be clarifying the meaning of the Hebrew word שְׂמוֹעַ for his English readers.

Clarification is needed because the English word “message” can refer to either a message that is heard, or a message that is preached. Goldingay is claiming that שְׂמוֹעַ refers to the former, rather than the latter. In the vast majority of occurrences of שְׂמוֹעַ in the Old Testament, it does refer to tidings that are heard, rather than a message that is preached. However, in Isa 28:9, the message is explained, rather than simply heard (וְאִתְּמַי יְבִי) שְׂמוֹעַ, *w^e et mī yābîn s^e mû ‘āh*). Of course, they could be explaining a message that they heard (and thus have not created the message), which is what Goldingay seems to be arguing for Isa 53:1-3.²¹ Goldingay’s discussion is good because he bases his argument on

¹⁸BDB, 53.

¹⁹E.g. דָּבָר (dābār): 1 Kgs 10:7; 2 Chr 9:6; Ps 106:24; Prov 14:15; or metaphorically, לִקְלֵהָאֵת (l^e qōl hā ‘ōt): Exod 4:8 (cf. 4:9).

²⁰Goldingay, *Isaiah*, 308.

²¹Goldingay is supported by HALOT, 4:1555-56. One occurrence of שְׂמוֹעַ which is difficult to understand is Ezek 16:56 (“Was not your sister Sodom a byword in your mouth [בְּפִיךָ לְשִׁמּוֹעַתְהָ] in the day of your pride”). See HALOT for a listing of some possible translations.

a study of the Hebrew, rather than on the English word “message.”

Oswalt seems to struggle with how to understand שְׂמוּעָה when he writes, “In most of its other occurrences in the OT, the word describes a ‘heard’ thing, and thus may be translated ‘rumor’ or ‘report’ (cf. LXX and AV). However, the use of ‘report’ here suggests something told by ‘us,’ which does not seem correct.”²² Oswalt seems to be questioning the fact that this שְׂמוּעָה was shared by those speaking in Isa 53:1, due to the word’s usage elsewhere in Scripture. As noted above, however, Isa 28:9 is one place where a שְׂמוּעָה was shared with others. The fact that a שְׂמוּעָה is shared does not mean that the word itself means “a shared message.” Rather, it is likely that שְׂמוּעָה refers to a message of any kind, whether heard or conveyed.²³ Oswalt is apparently reluctant to adopt this understanding of שְׂמוּעָה, perhaps due to its use in contexts where the message was heard.

נִגְלָתָהּ (*niglatāh*): Baltzer writes: “In Dt/Isa, גלה [*glh*] ‘uncover, unveil, reveal,’ refers to ‘the activity of God in history.’”²⁴ In order to prevent pastors from committing *Illegitimate Informational Transfer*, it would have been better for him to say that it is often used in contexts which speak of “the activity of God in history.”²⁵

²²Oswalt, *Isaiah*, 374n57. He curiously says that שְׂמוּעָה in Isa 53:1 is a *qal* passive participle, which must just be an honest mistake. Especially because he also gives Isa 39:7 as another verse where it occurs in the Old Testament: it is actually Isa 37:7.

²³The pronominal suffix attached to שְׂמוּעָה in Isa 53:1 (here indicating possession) may support this conclusion, *BHRG*, 255.

²⁴Baltzer, *Deutero-Isaiah*, 403.

²⁵Verb-forms of גלה are found in Deutero-Isaiah at 40:5; 47:3; and 49:9 (if one takes Deutero-Isaiah to include chapters 40-55, as does Baltzer). It is difficult to understand exactly how Childs views the

Verse 2

וַיַּעַל (wayya ʿal): Baltzer uses this word to build further support for his argument that Moses is the Servant written about in Isa 53. Yet he is unconvincing when he says, “This [וַיַּעַל] can refer both to a shoot from a root and to a child.”²⁶ There are certainly many instances in which עָלָה (ʿālāh) describes a plant growing (e.g. Deut 29:22; Isa 55:13; Ezek 47:12; Jon 4:6), but I could not find a single verse that used וַיַּעַל to describe a child growing.²⁷ Ezekiel 37:8 talks about flesh growing (וּבָשָׂר עָלָה, *ûbāsār ʿālāh*) on a person’s bones, but this is still very different than a child growing. Baltzer further notes the use of עָלָה in describing the Exodus, and then says: “53:2 can be saying that the ‘Servant Moses’ ‘grew up,’ and at the same time, on another interpretive level, that he was the first to ‘go up’– out of Egypt.”²⁸ I suppose a *double entendre* is possible, but Baltzer’s interpretation of Isa 53:2 seems to be derived more from Exodus than Isaiah.

כַּיּוֹנֵק (kayyōnēq): Oswalt writes in a footnote: “*yōnēq* refers to a ‘sucking one,’ both human and plant. The parallelism, as well as the weight of the ms. evidence, favors the

words in Isa 53:1. After mentioning the possible interpretation of v 1: “Who could possibly have believed what we have experienced?” he goes on to say, “This rendering is unlikely because the issue at stake in the confession of Israel is not that of the astonishment reflected by the nations. Rather, from the outset, those within Israel who confess understand that their new knowledge came from divine revelation, that is, derived from the arm of Yahweh.” Since it is difficult to see how he interprets the various words in 53:1, I simply do not discuss him in the body of this chapter, Childs, *Isaiah*, 413.

²⁶Baltzer, *Deutero-Isaiah*, 406.

²⁷Nor any examples of this use in either *BDB* or *HALOT*.

²⁸Baltzer, *Deutero-Isaiah*, 406.

plant imagery.”²⁹ The substantive יֹנֵק (yōnēq) is morphologically the *qal* masculine singular active participle of יָנַק (yānaq), often glossed “to suck.”³⁰ Every instance of יֹנֵק in the Old Testament can be legitimately translated as a participle of יָנַק, and thus understood to be used in reference to a human.³¹ The only occurrence of יֹנֵק which causes any difficulty is the one in Isa 53:2, due to the fact that it is in parallel with שָׂרֵשׁ (šōreš).³² Therefore, it is difficult to see how Oswalt can say that יֹנֵק is able to refer to both a human and a plant, when Isa 53:2 is the only verse where it *may* refer to a plant, and then use the parallelism in that verse to support plant imagery as the most likely option. He has set up his preferred reading as an option before giving the evidence for why it is an option in the first place. It would have been better for Oswalt to explain that every occurrence of יֹנֵק other than Isa 53:2 is used for a human, and then to give his justification for understanding it differently there.

וְכַשְׂרֵשׁ מֵאַרְזֵי צִיָּה (w^ecasšōreš mē^ʿeres siyyāh): Watts argues that Darius is the king in view in Isa 53. In order to support that argument, he writes: “A vine from dry ground is figurative language for one of parentage not in line for succession to the throne.”³³ The

²⁹Oswalt, *Isaiah*, 374n59.

³⁰This is noted in *HALOT*, 2:416; cf. *BDB*, 413.

³¹Num 11:12; Deut 32:25; 1 Sam 15:3; 22:19; Isa 11:8; Jer 44:7; Ps 8:3 (EV 2); Lam 2:11; 4:4; Joel 2:16; Song 8:1. Listed in *HALOT*, 2:402.

³²Cf. *HALOT*, 2:402

³³Watts, *Isaiah 34-66*, 230.

unsuspecting pastor could easily be led to think that the phrase **וְכִשְׂרָשׁ מֵאֲרֵץ צִיָּה** is commonly used to describe a person of non-royal birth. In fact, this phrase is never used in the Old Testament outside of this one occurrence. It appears that Watts is making a suggestion for the meaning of this phrase, in light of other evidence he sees in the text for Darius being the person spoken about in Isa 53. He would have been better to write something like: *“A vine from dry ground” could be understood here as figurative language for*

Verse 3

נִבְזֶה (*nibzeh*): Walker is misleading when he writes: “The verb ‘despise’ (*bazah* [TH959, ZH1022]) is not used elsewhere in Isaiah.”³⁴ What he meant was that **בָּזָה** (*bāzāh*) does not occur again in Isaiah *after* Isa 53:2. For it does occur once more in Isaiah, at 49:7, which he actually recognizes in his discussion of that verse.³⁵

Oswalt shows a good concern for linguistic issues when he writes that “it is important to understand the word in its Hebrew sense, not the English one. The English word [*despised*] has a heavy emotive content with a consequent connotation of belittling and contempt. The Hebrew [**נִבְזֶה**] lacks the strength of emotion. It means to consider something or someone to be worthless, unworthy of attention.”³⁶ This is a helpful reminder that the semantic range of an English word is not exactly the same as the

³⁴Walker, “Isaiah,” 229. Square brackets are his.

³⁵Walker, “Isaiah,” 213.

³⁶Oswalt, *Isaiah*, 383.

semantic range of the Hebrew word it translates. Comments such as this one can help to prevent pastors from committing lexical fallacies.

וַיִּדְרֹךְ (wāh^adal): Walker must simply make an honest mistake when he writes: “The modern versions generally agree on the rendering of the verb as ‘rejected’ (NRSV), ‘shunned’ (REB; NJPS), ‘avoided’ (NAB), but note ‘lowest of men’ (NJB).”³⁷ For in Isa 53:2, וַיִּדְרֹךְ is an adjective, *not* the verb וַיִּדְרֹךְ (hādāl).³⁸

וְלֹא חֲשַׁבְנָהוּ (w^elō^c h^ašabnuhû): Both Walker and Motyer write that חֲשַׁבְנָהוּ (h^ašabnuhû) “is an accounting word, a reckoning up of value.”³⁹ They are correct that it is used in this way, and probably should be understood as such in Isa 53:3. However, they would have been better to say that חֲשַׁבְנָהוּ *may be used* as an accounting word, or *is used here* as an accounting word.⁴⁰ Such a clarification would help prevent pastors who use their commentaries from seeing a “basic meaning” for חֲשַׁב (hāšab) which is present every time it occurs.

A similar error is made by Baltzer. He discusses the meaning of וְלֹא חֲשַׁבְנָהוּ in Isa 53:3, and then says: “This is in line with the verb’s significance as Seybold [TDNT]

³⁷Walker, *Isaiah*, 229.

³⁸HALOT, 1:292-93; BDB, 293.

³⁹Walker, “Isaiah,” 233; Motyer, *Isaiah*, 334. Walker has better wording in his *Notes* section, where he writes that חֲשַׁב “is used as an accounting word,” “Isaiah,” 229.

⁴⁰חֲשַׁב is used with a meaning more along the lines of “to think,” or “to plan” in verses such as Gen 50:20; 1 Sam 18:25; Ps 52:4; Isa 10:7; Jer 18:18; Esth 8:3.

gives it: ‘*ḥsb* carries the meaning of a technical and rational, calculating reckoning.’⁴¹

Although Baltzer may find this definition appropriate for the use of חֲשֹׁב in Isa 53:3, the unwary pastor could easily apply this definition to every instance of חֲשֹׁב , ignoring the context in which it is found. Some clarification by Baltzer that the definition he quotes is appropriate for only a part of the semantic range of חֲשֹׁב would have been good.

Verse 4

אָכֵן (‘*ākēn*’): Oswalt writes: “The opening word, ‘*ākēn*, *But surely*, expresses both affirmation and contrast (see 49:4b for the same use).”⁴² However, contrast is only seen in some of the contexts in which אָכֵן is found.⁴³ He would have been better, then, to clarify his statement by stating that אָכֵן *here expresses both affirmation and contrast*.

נָשָׂא (*nāśā’*): Motyer writes: “To ‘take up’ (*√nāśā’*) is to lift a burden.”⁴⁴ In order to discourage pastors from committing *Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning*, it would have been better for Motyer to write: *nāśā’ is used here to indicate the lifting of a burden*. It would also have been good for Motyer to justify his reason for suggesting that it is a burden which is being lifted in Isa 53:4.

⁴¹Baltzer, *Deutero-Isaiah*, 407. Baltzer seems to express a recognition of a broader semantic range when discussing this word in connection to verse 4, *Deutero-Isaiah*, 409n126.

⁴²Oswalt, *Isaiah*, 385.

⁴³*BHRG*, 309-10; *HALOT*, 1:47.

⁴⁴Motyer, *Isaiah*, 334.

סָבַל . . . נָסָא׳ (nāsā׳ . . . s^ebālām): Walker writes: “The Heb. for ‘carried’ or ‘took up’ (nasá׳ [TH5375, ZH5951]), and ‘weighed him down’ (sabal [TH5445, ZH6022]) suggest that the Servant experienced the weight of the guilt and consequences of sin, a frequent concept in the OT (cf. Gen 4:13; Exod 28:43; Lev 17:16; 22:9; 24:15).”⁴⁵ All five verses which Walker lists contain the verb נָסָא׳, collocated with either אָוֹן (āōn) or הֵטָא׳ (hēt׳), words which can be translated as “sin.” Even though neither one of those nouns occurs in Isa 53:4, אָוֹן (and פְּשָׁע, pešā׳) is found in verse 5. In a recent publication, Sklar writes that “the priestly literature is similar to the rest of the Old Testament in using terms for sin or guilt to refer not only to the wrong itself, but also to the consequences of the wrong.”⁴⁶ As is testified to by the references Walker gives (above), it is common within Scripture to find נָסָא׳ collocated with a word that can be translated “sin.”⁴⁷ Furthermore, there are many passages in which הֵטָא׳ (h^olī) is experienced as a punishment for wrongdoing.⁴⁸ Thus, it is possible that here in Isa 53:4, הֵטָא׳ and מַכָּאוֹב (mak׳ōb) are being treated as consequences for sin. Therefore, Walker may be correct in seeing a connection to the bearing of sin in Isa 53:4. In order to clarify where this connection comes from, it would have been better for him to write something like: *The Hebrew words nāsā׳ and s̄abal are often used in contexts which speak of the “carrying of” or “being weighed down by” sin. The words h^olī and mak׳ōb are often used of*

⁴⁵Walker, “Isaiah,” 230; cf. 234. Square brackets are his.

⁴⁶Sklar, *Sin*, 12.

⁴⁷See also סָבַל (sābal) collocated with אָוֹן in Isa 53:11 and Lam 5:7.

⁴⁸Deut 7:15; 28:59, 61; 2 Chr 21:18; cf. מַכָּאוֹב (mak׳ōb) in Jer 30:15; 45:3; Lam 1:12.

consequences for sin, and in this context they are closely connected with transgressions and iniquities. This suggests that the Servant experienced the weight of the guilt and consequences of sin, a frequent concept in the OT (cf. Gen 4:13; Exod 28:43; Lev 17:16; 22:9; 24:15).

וּמְכַאֲבֵינוּ (*ûmak 'ôbênû*): Goldingay is misleading when he writes: “For sorrows, NRSV has ‘diseases,’ but the word’s regular meaning is pain (NRSV renders the same word ‘suffering’ in v. 3). Matt 8:17 takes it to mean ‘diseases,’ but NT use of OT passages does not always follow their precise or original meaning.”⁴⁹ A survey of its uses suggests that מְכַאֲבֵינוּ is able to refer to pain in general, whether emotional (Ps 32:10; Eccl 1:8; Lam 1:18; Jer 30:15) or physical (Exod 3:7; Job 33:19; Ps 69:27; Jer 51:8).⁵⁰ It even seems to be able to encompass both, including physical sickness or disease in 2 Chr 6:29. Goldingay implies that the NRSV and Matthew in Matt 8:17 have taken liberties with their translations of מְכַאֲבֵינוּ, when their translations in fact fall within the semantic range of the word. He also could mislead some pastors into committing *Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning* with his phrase (above): “the word’s regular meaning is pain.” It would have been better for him to write: *the word is best translated in most contexts as “pain.”*

⁴⁹Goldingay, *Isaiah*, 308-09.

⁵⁰Either could be in view in Ps 38:18 (EV 17); Eccl 2:23; Jer 45:3; Lam 1:12.

סָבַל (s^e bālām): Oswald could have nuanced his discussion of this word a little to make it more linguistically accurate. He wrote: “In the same way *sābal* implies the bearing of a burden for someone else (Isa 46:4, 7; Lam 5:7). The Servant is not suffering *with* his people (however unjustly), but *for* them.”⁵¹ In the examples that Oswald gives, the burden certainly is being borne for someone else, but in Gen 49:15 and Isa 46:7 this is not the case.⁵² The sentence, rather than the word סָבַל is where the reader learns that the servant is bearing a burden for someone else. Oswald would have been better to write: *In the same way, sābal here implies . . .*

וְיַעֲנֶה (ûm^e ‘unneh): Baltzer finds more support for the equation of Moses with the Servant of Isa 53 when he says of this word:

if we compare Num 12:3, we see that the description in one sense fits the facts: ‘The man Moses was very humble (וְיַעֲנֶה [‘ānāw]), more so than anyone else on the face of the earth,’ where the word וְיַעֲנֶה can carry the whole semantic range from ‘poor’ to ‘devout.’⁵³

His statement needs to be clarified so that pastors do not commit *Illegitimate Totality Transfer* as a result of what he says above: “where the word וְיַעֲנֶה can carry the whole semantic range from ‘poor’ to ‘devout.’” Presumably he means that the precise meaning of וְיַעֲנֶה in Num 12:3 is debated because the many meanings of its entire semantic range

⁵¹Oswald, *Isaiah*, 386.

⁵²Nor is the burden borne for someone else when סָבַל (*sābal*) is used outside of the *qal* stem: Ps 144:14 (*pu ‘al*) and Eccl 12:5 (*hithpa ‘el*).

⁵³Baltzer, *Deutero-Isaiah*, 409.

could be appropriate there, rather than that the entire semantic range of the word should be understood.

Verse 5

מְחֹלָל (meḥōlāl): This word is a *poel* participle of the verb חָלַל (ḥālal); the only occurrence of a *poel* (of חָלַל) in the Old Testament. Both Oswalt and Walker are misleading in their discussions of it, giving the impression that this is a well-known word with many occurrences. Oswalt writes: “While ‘pierced through’ is not always specifically said to result in death, it is typically used in contexts with death ([Isa] 22:2; 51:9; 66:16; Ps. 69:27 [Eng. 26]).”⁵⁴ Three of the references he lists are for the noun חָלַל (ḥālāl), and the fourth is for a *poel* of חָלַל. Walker’s comments are even more problematic. In the quotation of what he says below, the words that are present in the references cited will be listed:

Heb. *mekholal* [TH2490A, ^{ZH}2726], one of the strongest words in the Heb. language, describes a violent and painful death; it conveys the idea of ‘pierced through,’ or ‘wounded to death’ (cf. Deut 21:1 [noun]; Isa 51:9 [*poel*]; see also [he lists references which speak of the Messiah being pierced]). It is used when a man is run through with a sword or spear (cf. Ezek 28:7 [either a *poel*, or the homonym ‘defile’ here; v. 8 is the noun]; Num 25:8 [דָּקַר, *dāqar*]. [another sentence dealing with the Messiah being pierced]. ‘Pierced’ is found elsewhere in Isaiah only in 51:9, where it is used of the death wound to the dragon. It usually means ‘to pierce fatally’ (Job 26:13 [*poel*]; Ps 109:22 [*qal*]).⁵⁵

It is difficult to determine on what basis Walker is able to say about מְחֹלָל : “one of the

⁵⁴Oswalt, *Isaiah*, 387. Second set of square brackets are his.

⁵⁵Walker, “Isaiah,” 230. First set of square brackets are his.

strongest words in the Heb. language, describes a violent and painful death.” The evidence which Walker lists does not support this strong statement. In order to clarify what they are doing, both Oswalt and Walker should have said that *מָחַל לְ* and its cognates are often found in contexts which speak of death. They would then still need to explain the meaning that *מָחַל לְ* contributes to Isa 53.

מָחַל לְ (*m^e dukkā*): Oswalt goes too far when he says, “Similarly, ‘crushed’ is stronger than that which Eng. ‘bruised’ implies. It suggests at least breaking into pieces and in some cases even pulverizing ([Isa] 19:10; Job 22:9; Jer. 44:10; Ps. 90:3 [*dakkā*, ‘dust,’ a noun form of *m^e dukkā*, ‘crushed,’ here]).”⁵⁶ This definition is too strong for the other occurrences of a *pu* ‘al of *מָחַל לְ* (*dākā*) in the Old Testament.⁵⁷ Oswalt should have clarified that he is speaking about only one part of the word’s semantic range, so that pastors do not think that *מָחַל לְ* always has the meaning which he suggests.

Motyer says that this word is “used of cruel agonies ending in death (La. 3:34).”⁵⁸ This may be true sometimes, but certainly not always, as can be seen from the other verses in which a *pu* ‘al of *מָחַל לְ* is found (see above). Motyer would have been better to say that *מָחַל לְ* may be used of cruel agonies ending in death. He is arguing that Isa 53:5 is

⁵⁶Oswalt, *Isaiah*, 387. Second set of square brackets are his.

⁵⁷Job 22:9, “You have sent widows away empty, and the arms of the fatherless were crushed;” Isa 19:10, “Those who are the pillars of the land will be crushed, and all who work for pay will be grieved;” Jer 44:10, “They have not humbled themselves even to this day, nor have they feared, nor walked in my law and my statutes that I set before you and before your fathers,” italics mine.

⁵⁸Motyer, *Isaiah*, 335.

one of those instances.

מַעֲוֹנוֹתַיִנִי (mē^{ca} ōnōtênû): Walker writes: “Heb. (ʿawon [TH5771, ZH6411]) is one of the basic words for sin and denotes ‘bent, twisted, perverted.’”⁵⁹ Motyer similarly says that אֲוֹן (ʾāôn) is “the pervertedness, ‘bentness,’ of fallen human nature ([Isa] 1:4; 5:18; 6:7; 40:2; 43:24; 50:1).”⁶⁰ All Walker and Motyer have done here is provide a number of English glosses for אֲוֹן which may be possible in different contexts. They have not told the reader what meaning אֲוֹן contributes to Isa 53:5. Every word has a semantic range, and it would be particularly helpful to the reader if Walker and Motyer had explained which part of the semantic range of אֲוֹן is in view here.⁶¹ This might discourage pastors from committing *Illegitimate Totality Transfer* or *Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning*.

Motyer says of the preposition מִן (min): “For . . . for: the preposition *min* means ‘from’, hence it is used of one thing arising from another, a relationship of cause and effect.”⁶² He would have been more accurate to explain that מִן may be used to express a relationship of cause and effect. He is arguing that Isa 53:5 is in fact one of those instances.

⁵⁹Walker, “Isaiah,” 230. Square brackets are his.

⁶⁰Motyer, *Isaiah*, 335.

⁶¹Sklar’s discussion of the semantic range of the phrase, אֲוֹן נָשָׂא (nāsā’ ʾāôn), should serve as a warning that אֲוֹן does not have the same meaning in every context, *Sin*, 20-23, 88-93.

⁶²Motyer, *Isaiah*, 335.

מוֹסַר (*mūsār*): Goldingay writes: “The word ‘punishment’ (*musar*) is not a legal one but suggests the chastisement of a child or a student by a parent or a teacher in order to teach a lesson. He [Yahweh’s messenger] gets beaten like a child or a student so that other people may learn from it.”⁶³ Goldingay is probably right, as long as it is recognized that מוֹסַר does have the idea of punishment in certain contexts, even though it may not be legal punishment (e.g. Job 5:17; Prov 22:15; 23:13; Jer 30:14; cf. Jer 30:11; Hos 5:2).

שְׁלֹמֹה (*šēlōmēnū*): In considering the significance of this word in Isa 53:5, Oswalt writes:

There is no *šālôm*, *well-being*, because things are out of order, unbalanced. Until punishment has been meted out, all the good intentions in the world cannot restore that broken order. But when the parent’s authority has been recognized, when justice has been done, then both sides of the equation are balanced again, which is what shalom is all about.⁶⁴

It is difficult to determine if Oswalt is doing a lexical analysis of שְׁלֹמֹה (*šālôm*), or a concept study of “peace and well-being.” Both *HALOT* and *BDB* attest to the broad semantic range of שְׁלֹמֹה.⁶⁵ Rather than saying what “shalom is all about,” Oswalt would have been better to have written about “the chastisement that brought us peace” in Isa 53:5.

Walker writes in regard to the NLT’s “be whole”:

This translates the Heb. *shalom* [TH7965, ^{ZH}8934] (peace), a very rich term in Heb.,

⁶³Goldingay, *Isaiah*, 305.

⁶⁴Oswalt, *Isaiah*, 388.

⁶⁵*HALOT*, 4:1506-10; *BDB*, 1022-23.

which refers to more than cessation of hostility. It can refer to a full life (Gen 15:15; 2 Kgs 22:20); personal well-being, peace of mind and satisfaction (Gen 43:23, 27; 1 Sam 1:17); harmony (Gen 26:29, 31; 1 Sam 16:4); and peace with God (Num 25:12; Judg 6:23; Ps 85:8 [MT 9]; Isa 27:5; 48:22; 57:2).⁶⁶

Walker has given an English gloss for שָׁלוֹם, and then the semantic range of the word.

Since he never explains what the meaning of שָׁלוֹם is in Isa 53:5, this could easily influence a pastor to commit *Illegitimate Totality Transfer*. The possibility of pastors committing this fallacy is increased by the fact that Walker calls שָׁלוֹם “a very rich term in Heb.” He would have been better to say, “a word with a broad semantic range in Heb.” It also would have been good for Walker to conclude his discussion of שָׁלוֹם with an indication of the meaning which he sees it contributing to Isa 53:5.

עָלַי (‘*alāyw*): Motyer is technically correct when he writes: “Upon: the same preposition as used in Leviticus 16:21-22.”⁶⁷ Yet what is placed on the head of הַשָּׂעִיר (‘*hasśāîr*) in those verses are Aaron’s two hands, all the iniquities (עֲוֹנוֹת, ‘*ônōt*) of the sons of Israel, all their transgressions (פְּשָׁעֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, ‘*pis’êhem*), and all their sins (חַטָּאתָם, ‘*hattō’tām*). None of these are what is placed on the Servant in Isa 53:5, but rather מוֹסַר שָׁלוֹם (‘*mūsār s’lōmēnū*). The problem with what Motyer has written is that pastors who read it could place far more significance on the preposition עַל (‘*al*) for drawing

⁶⁶Walker, “Isaiah,” 230. First set of square brackets are his.

⁶⁷Motyer, *Isaiah*, 335.

parallels between Isa 53 and Leviticus than they should. This could easily lead to

Inadequate Parallels of Word Usage.

וּבַחֲבֵרָתוֹ (ûbah^a burātô): Motyer writes about the preposition בַּ (b^a): “By: the particle of price, ‘at the cost of’.”⁶⁸ It would have been helpful for those who do not know Hebrew if he had clarified that the definition he has given is one of many options for how בַּ can be used. He is arguing that this is the significance of the preposition in this context.

“Literally”

Oswalt uses the word “literally” to indicate the most common English gloss for a Hebrew word (“root” for שָׁרַשׁ in v. 3).⁶⁹ He also uses “literally” three times in an attempt to convey the Hebrew syntax, by giving the typical English renderings. For example, he writes: “He will be a *rejection of people* (h^a dal ’îšîm, lit. ‘cessation of men’).”⁷⁰ Motyer also uses the word “literally” thrice to indicate that he is attempting to convey the Hebrew syntax and common English glosses for the Hebrew words.⁷¹ Westermann says that the same phrase listed above “means literally ‘shunning men’.”⁷² He apparently is giving typical English glosses for the Hebrew words, without trying to show the phrase’s syntax. The same appears to be true for Walker, who writes of the NLT’s translation for the

⁶⁸Motyer, *Isaiah*, 335.

⁶⁹Oswalt, *Isaiah*, 374.

⁷⁰Oswalt, *Isaiah*, 383; cf. 384, 388.

⁷¹Motyer, *Isaiah*, 333, 335.

⁷²Westermann, *Isaiah 40-66*, 262.

Hebrew וְלֹא חָשַׁבְנָהוּ (w^olō^ʿ h^ašabnuhû): “*we did not care*. Traditionally and more lit., ‘we esteemed him not.’”⁷³ There are two uses of the word “literally” which are particularly misleading, and thus invite longer discussion.

In his *Commentary* section, Walker writes: “‘Punishment from God’ is, more lit., ‘stricken by God.’ Motyer (1993:430) points out that ‘stricken’ is used sixty times in Leviticus 13-14, not of the infection of leprosy, but of the infliction or the ‘blow’ of it.”⁷⁴ This is potentially very misleading for pastors who do not have any competence with Hebrew. Walker’s commentary is based on the NLT. This is what the NLT reads for v. 4b: “And we thought his troubles were a punishment from God, a punishment for his own sins!,” which translates: וְאֵנָּהּ חָשַׁבְנָהוּ נְגִיעַ מִבֵּה אֱלֹהִים וּמַעַנָּה. This Hebrew phrase has been completely reworked to give its sense in the NLT. The word “literal” is very misleading, even from the standpoint of how “literal” is commonly used in other commentaries on Isaiah (and even Walker himself, elsewhere; see above).⁷⁵

Motyer writes of הִפְגִּיעַ (hipgîa^ʿ) in v. 6: “*Laid*: (lit.) ‘caused to meet’, descriptive of the divine act of gathering into one place, on to one substitutionary Victim, the sins of all the sinners whom the Lord purposed to save.”⁷⁶ What Motyer here calls the “literal” meaning of הִפְגִּיעַ is really just an addition of the simplistic understanding of

⁷³Walker, “Isaiah,” 229; cf. a similar instance on p. 230.

⁷⁴Walker, “Isaiah,” 233-34.

⁷⁵Walker is also misleading when he refers to Motyer’s statistics for “stricken,” which is a comment about one Hebrew word (apparently the noun נֶגַע, *nega*^ʿ, which occurs in Lev 13-14, 61 times; a word which is not found in Isa 53:4), not the entire phrase in Isa 53:4 that Walker says is “more literally”: “stricken by God,” Walker, “Isaiah,” 233-34.

⁷⁶Motyer, *Isaiah*, 336.

the *hiph 'il* stem (“to cause to”) to the common English gloss of the *qal* of פָּגַע (*pāga* ‘).⁷⁷ The meaning which Motyer gives is presented completely void of the context of Isa 53:6. This could be very misleading for pastors who do not know Hebrew; their tendency could very easily be to stretch the English: “caused to meet” for an understanding of פָּגַעְתָּ, rather than to work down from the semantic range of the Hebrew word itself. The result might be a sermon illustration in which we are told that all our sins are “caused to meet” on Christ, “socializing” in full view of everyone. The fact that our sins are “caused to meet” means (we are told) that we can do nothing to avoid the consequences of our actions, for they will be brought together for all to see.

Conclusion

Nine fallacies were found within the commentaries I studied for Isa 53:1-6. Baltzer (scholar) and Walker (pastor) committed the most fallacies, with three each, but they also discussed words more frequently than many of the other commentators. Watts (scholar), Goldingay (pastor), and Childs (pastor) did not have any fallacies, but they also had very few lexical analyses. The only recurring fallacies were *The Root Fallacy* and *Illegitimate Informational Transfer*. In addition to the fallacies, most of the commentators could have been more attentive to writing in a more lexically-nuanced manner, in order to provide clarity for the readers. Two of the most significant issues were misinformation, and a failure to clarify when the meaning of a word in a particular

⁷⁷Barr discusses the treatment of the *hiph 'il* stem as though it is “‘properly’ causative in function” for the view of a particular Hebrew psychology, *Semantics*, 182.

context was being given, as opposed to all of its occurrences. A list of all the commentaries, along with the fallacies they committed in Isa 53:1-6, has been included below for ease of reference.

Fallacies Listed by Commentary

Scholar:

Baltzer (3): *The Root Fallacy (x2), Inadequate Parallels of Word Usage*

Westermann (1): *Illegitimate Informational Transfer*

Oswalt (1): *Basic Meaning via English*

Watts (0): *n/a*

Pastor:

Walker (3): *The Root Fallacy, Illegitimate Informational Transfer, Illegitimate
Synonymy*

Goldingay (0): *n/a*

Motyer (1): *Illegitimate Informational Transfer*

Childs (0): *n/a*

CHAPTER FIVE: LUKE 18:1-8

The Parable of the Unjust Judge is found in Luke 18:1-8, a parable which has no parallel in any of the other Gospels. It is a parable which seems perplexing to many Christians, primarily because God is compared to a judge who shows no concern for the injustices being experienced by a poor widow. As with the Old Testament passages, in order to examine lexical analyses on this text, I have chosen four commentaries that are primarily intended for scholars (Bock, *Luke: Volume 2*; Fitzmyer, *Luke (X-XXIV)*; Marshall, *Luke*; Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*), and four that are primarily intended for pastors (Liefeld, "Luke"; Stein, *Luke*; Evans, *Luke*; Hendriksen, *Exposition of Luke*). The same format as the previous chapters will be followed here. An English translation is included first for the reader's convenience. Lexical fallacies within the eight commentaries will then be illuminated, followed by instances where more lexically-nuanced language is needed, and a discussion of the uses of the word "literally."

Luke 18:1-8, ESV

¹And he told them a parable to the effect that they ought always to pray and not lose heart. ²He said, "In a certain city there was a judge who neither feared God nor respected man. ³And there was a widow in that city who kept coming to him and saying, 'Give me justice against my adversary.' ⁴For a while he refused, but afterward he said to himself, 'Though I neither fear God nor respect man, ⁵yet because this widow keeps bothering me, I will give her justice, so that she will not beat me down by her continual coming.'" ⁶And the Lord said, "Hear what the unrighteous judge says. ⁷And will not God give justice to his

elect, who cry to him day and night? Will he delay long over them? ⁸I tell you, he will give justice to them speedily. Nevertheless, when the Son of Man comes, will he find faith on earth?"

Lexical Fallacies

Verse 1

πρὸς τὸ δεῖν (*pros to dein*): Bock writes, "The use of δεῖ (*dei*, it is necessary) makes such prayer a moral imperative (Grundmann, *TDNT*, 2:22; cf. Luke 15:32; Acts 5:29; 20:35)."¹ Grundmann's article in the *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* betrays the *Illegitimate Totality Transfer* fallacy. He speaks of a "neutral deity" or "necessity" that controls the world and lies behind the usage of δεῖ in Hellenistic Greek.² According to Grundmann, this conception of God was inadequate for the biblical authors, so they altered the meaning of the word when they used it: "Instead, it indicates the will of God declared in the message. This is the standpoint from which it is applied in many different ways."³ So throughout the entire semantic range of δεῖ, in Grundmann's view, it will always indicate the will of God when used by New Testament authors. He thus writes of its use in the Lukan writings: "The term may thus be used as a general expression for the will of God, the statement with which it is linked thereby acquiring the significance of a rule of life (Lk. 15:32; 18:12; Ac. 5:29; 20:35)."⁴ It seems to be based upon this discussion by Grundmann that Bock writes: "The use of δεῖ (*dei*, it is necessary) makes

¹Bock, *Luke: Volume 2*, 1447.

²Grundmann, "δεῖ, δέον ἐστί," 22.

³Grundmann, "δεῖ, δέον ἐστί," 22.

⁴Grundmann, "δεῖ, δέον ἐστί," 22.

such prayer a moral imperative.” The error lies in endeavouring to find the concept of God’s will in every use of the word δεῖ, regardless of the context. Bock is deriving his theology from the word δεῖ, following Grundmann’s lead, rather than from what is said in the passage he is discussing.

Verse 2

ΤΙΣ . . . ΤΙΝΙ (*tis . . . tini*): Nolland writes, “One of the uses of ΤΙΣ, ‘a certain,’ could well be Lukan, given Luke’s fondness for the indefinite adjective, but the former is likely to have its parallel in the interrogative ΤΙΣ, ‘which,’ of Luke 11:5.”⁵ Nolland sees a parallelism between this passage and Luke 11:5-8, and seeks to demonstrate that parallelism through the use of words common to each passage.⁶ This particular case is an example of *Inadequate Parallels of Word Usage*, due to *The Root Fallacy*. The interrogative pronoun ΤΙΣ and the indefinite pronoun ΤΙΣ look similar, but they are different words, and cannot be treated as equivalent, which Nolland seems to be doing. It is particularly strange that Nolland commits this fallacy when it is noted that ΤΙΣ is used similarly to Luke 18:2 in other Lukan passages (Luke 7:2; Acts 3:2; 8:9; 14:8).

Verse 6

ὁ κριτῆς τῆς ἀδικίας (*ho kritēs tēs adikias*): Liefeld writes:

The designation ‘unjust judge’ (*ho kritēs tēs adikias*, v.6) is similar to the idiom in 16:8, ‘the dishonest manager’ (*ton oikonomon tēs adikias*). *Adikia* (‘injustice’ or

⁵Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, 867.

⁶Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, 866.

‘dishonesty’) also appears in connection with wealth in the Greek of 16:9, where it has the connotation of ‘worldly’ (cf. 16:11). Therefore we should probably understand the judge (v.2) to be a ‘man of the world,’ who, though crooked, prided himself on shrewd judicial decisions.⁷

Luke 16:1-8 contains the Parable of the Dishonest Manager; what Liefeld indicates above is that in Luke 16:9, Jesus says: τοῦ μαμωνᾶ τῆς ἀδικίας (*tou mamōna tēs adikias*). From the context, Liefeld finds a connotation of “worldly” in τοῦ μαμωνᾶ τῆς ἀδικίας. His fallacy lies in then also seeing the idea of “worldly” in both τὸν οἰκονόμον τῆς ἀδικίας (*ton oikonomon tēs adikias*) in Luke 16:8 and ὁ κριτῆς τῆς ἀδικίας in 18:6 (note Liefeld’s “Therefore”), because they all contain the genitive, ἀδικίας. This is an example of *Inadequate Parallels of Word Usage*. The same author will not always use each word with exactly the same meaning in every instance in which it occurs, even within the same pericope. Liefeld may be correct in asserting that the κριτῆς in Luke 18:6 is “a man of the world,” but not for the reasons he is suggesting.

Verse 7

τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν (*tōn eklektōn*): Marshall writes:

ἐκλεκτός [*eklektos*] is used in 23:35 of Jesus, and of God’s people (especially in an eschatological context) in Mk. 13:20, 22, 27; Mt. 22:14; for the background see G. Schrenk, TDNT IV, 181-192; Delling, 215 n. 63. The use of the term implies that eschatological vindication is in view, and not a purely this-worldly answer to prayer (cf. the discussion in Ott, 61f.).⁸

The only references which Marshall has given support his argument that eschatological vindication is implied by the use of ἐκλεκτός in Luke 18:7. But it is not the word

⁷Liefeld, “Luke,” 999-1000.

⁸Marshall, *Luke*, 674.

ἐκλεκτός that indicates eschatological vindication there; rather, it is an argument which can appropriately be made from the context of Luke 17. Verses in the New Testament which contain the word ἐκλεκτός, *not* with future things primarily in view, are Rom 16:13; Col 3:12; 1 Tim 5:21; Titus 1:1; 1 Pet 1:1; 2:4, 6, 9; 2 John 1, 13. Marshall has committed *Illegitimate Informational Transfer*; he has derived a meaning for ἐκλεκτός which imports information from a number of contexts in which that word is found.

μακροθυμεῖ (*makrothymeî*): Hendriksen is guilty of *Basic Meaning via English* when he writes of μακροθυμέω (*makrothumeō*):

generally *to have patience* (Matt. 18:26, 29; I Cor. 13:4; I Thess. 5:14). But in Heb. 6:15 *to wait patiently*. See also James 5:7. It is clear, therefore, that the connotation *to be patient* has its ramifications; probably such as: to wait, postpone, delay, put off, be slow (to do something).⁹

He then goes on to consider the context of Luke 18:7 in order to determine the meaning of μακροθυμεῖ there. His concern for context is good, but he has started with an English gloss (“to be patient”), and then made statements about μακροθυμέω based upon that gloss. No two languages are the same, so it cannot be assumed that connotations which are valid for the English “to be patient” will also be applicable for the Greek μακροθυμέω.

Verse 8

τὴν πίστιν (*tēn pistin*): Stein writes: “The use of the article before ‘faith,’ i.e., ‘the faith,’

⁹Hendriksen, *Exposition of Luke*, 823.

suggests that this question should be translated ‘Will he find the faith?’ rather than ‘Will he find faithfulness?’”¹⁰ Stein’s understanding of τὴν in Luke 18:8 is particularly brought into question by verses such as Matt 9:29; 23:23; Luke 5:20; Rom 3:3. In these four verses, τὴν is also found in collocation with πίστιν, but the ideas of “faithfulness,” or a person’s “faith (in someone)” are in view. This is much different than the English, “the faith,” which has the connotation of a system of belief. Stein’s argument is based more on the use of the English definite article than it is on the Greek article.¹¹ Thus, Stein is guilty of *Basic Meaning via English*.

Linguistically-Nuanced Language

Verse 1

καὶ μὴ ἐγκακεῖν (*kai mē egkakein*): Bock demonstrates a good concern for context when he writes: “Since an activity is in view, ‘growing tired or weary’ is a more natural translation of ἐγκακέω (*enkakeō*) than is ‘losing heart.’”¹² He shows an appreciation for the fact that this Greek verb will need to be translated into English in different ways to convey its meaning in the various contexts in which it is found.

Nolland says of ἐγκακεῖν: “The verb expresses centrally the idea of coming to a point of failure, but may secondarily take on coloring from the implied cause of such a failing: despair, weariness, etc.”¹³ He also lists the other five occurrences of ἐγκακέω

¹⁰Stein, *Luke*, 447.

¹¹For the various ways in which the Greek article is used, see: Porter, *Idioms*, 103-114.

¹²Bock, *Luke: Volume 2*, 1447.

¹³Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, 867.

(*egkakeō*) in the New Testament: 2 Cor 4:1, 16; Gal 6:9; Eph 3:13; 2 Thess 3:13.

Nolland's mention of central and secondary meanings could encourage pastors to commit *Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning*, always finding the idea of "failure" where the word occurs. Pastors may also be misled into thinking that the "central idea" is more likely to be the meaning of ἐγκακέω in any given context. It would have been better for Nolland to write something like: *The word's semantic range allows it to be used for the idea of coming to a point of failure, and elsewhere for the implied cause of such failure: despair, weariness, etc.*

Verse 2

μὴ ἐντρέπόμενος (*mē entrepomenos*): Marshall writes: "The corruption of the judge is indicated by his double characterisation as one who neither feared God nor had regard for men (ἐντρέπομαι [*entrepomai*], [Luke] 20:13; Heb. 12:9; also (active) 'to make ashamed', 1 Cor. 4:14; *et al.*)."¹⁴ It is difficult to understand why Marshall has included a gloss and reference for ἐντρέπω (*entrepō*) in the active voice, because it adds no relevant information for *this* context.

Nolland writes: "Though it can take both senses, ἐντρέπόμενος, 'cared about/respected,' is used here with reference to how one acts toward others, rather than with reference to how one values oneself."¹⁵ What is good about this statement is that Nolland indicates the semantic range of the word, and then explains its meaning in this context.

¹⁴Marshall, *Luke*, 672.

¹⁵Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, 867.

Hendriksen has an interesting choice of words: “From the verb ἐντρέπω [*entrepō*], to turn oneself to another person with respect or deference, here middle voice, are derived ἐντρεπόμενος (verse 2), nom. s. masc. pres. participle; and ἐντρέπομαι (verse 4), first per. s. pres. indicat.”¹⁶ He gives the impression (by saying “derived”) that he is listing three different words that are etymologically related. In reality, he is discussing three different forms of the same word.¹⁷

Verse 3

Ἐκδίκησον (*Ekdikēson*): Hendriksen again lacks clarity when he writes: “And from ἐκδικέω [*ekdikeō*], to avenge someone; i.e., to procure *justice* for a person by protecting him *from* his opponent, are derived ἐκδίκησον [*ekdikēson*] (verse 3), sec. per. s. aor. imperat. act.; and ἐκδικήσω [*ekdikēsō*] (verse 5), first per. s. fut. indicat. act.”¹⁸ As in his discussion of ἐντρεπόμενος above, Hendriksen’s use of “derived” gives the impression that he is here discussing three words that are etymologically related. What he is discussing is the lexical form of the word, followed by two other forms of the same word as they are found in Luke 18. Furthermore, the meaning he lists for ἐκδικέω (“i.e., to procure *justice* for a person by protecting him *from* his opponent”) looks to be appropriate

¹⁶Hendriksen, *Exposition of Luke*, 822.

¹⁷Hendriksen seems to get a little carried away in his description of the judge: “This judge was anti-God and anti-people. He did whatever he pleased, never asking himself, ‘What does God want me to do?’ or even ‘What do the people in general approve or disapprove?’ **He was nothing but a hateful egotist.** Here, then, is a *judge* without any love for *justice*. And as to sympathy for the oppressed and satisfaction because, in his capacity as judge, he might be able to help them, he did not know what sympathy was. **Tender feelings were completely foreign to him**” [bold mine], *Exposition of Luke*, 816. Hendriksen has gone beyond what the evidence allows in his description of the judge.

¹⁸Hendriksen, *Exposition of Luke*, 823.

for ἐκδίκησον in Luke 18:3, but not for the full semantic range of ἐκδικέω. One of the three meanings of ἐκδικέω listed in BDAG is “**to procure justice for someone, grant justice.**”¹⁹ To this, Hendriksen seems to have added “by protecting him *from* his opponent.” Hendriksen’s lack of clarity could easily result in pastors committing *Illegitimate Contextual Transfer*.

Nolland shows an awareness of the semantic range of ἐκδίκησον and the importance of context for determining meaning when he writes: “ἐκδίκησον could be a call for vengeance, but an appeal for protective or restorative justice is permitted by the language and is much more in keeping with the widow image.”²⁰ He has wisely allowed the context to control the meaning of ἐκδίκησον in this verse.

τοῦ ἀντιδίκου μου (*tou antidikou mou*):²¹ Nolland writes:

ἀντίδικος [*antidikos*] is in its original use applied mainly to the initiator of a legal suit, but can also be used of the defendant. Without the court imagery, the word can mean ‘opponent’ in a quite general sense (see Schrenk, TDNT 1:373-75), though that is not likely in the present judicial context. In our parable the widow is clearly initiating the suit, but her opponent is nonetheless cast in the aggressor role.²²

He shows a good concern for context in determining the meaning contributed by

ἀντιδίκου to Luke 18:4. However, his discussion of the “original meaning” of the word

¹⁹BDAG, 300.

²⁰Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, 868. I would also think that the widow’s appeal to a judge would rule out the notion of vengeance.

²¹Bock has a footnote which reads: “In 1 Pet. 5:8 Satan is described as an ἀντίδικος [*antidikos*] in a context that clearly has adversarial, legal overtones. Elsewhere in the NT, ἀντίδικος is found only at Luke 12:58 and twice in Matt. 5:25,” *Luke: Volume 2*, 1448n10. It is hard to understand why Bock places the focus on Satan in 1 Pet 5:8, when the other two verses contain a human adversary in contexts which clearly have legal overtones.

²²Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, 868.

could mislead pastors to commit the fallacy of *Etymologizing*. A diachronic study of *ἀντίδικος* may be interesting, but it is unhelpful for a determination of its meaning in a particular passage.

Verse 4

ἐπὶ χρόνον (*epi chronon*):²³ Bock writes: “ἐπὶ χρόνον [*epi chronon*, for a time] is indefinite.”²⁴ By “indefinite” Bock is trying to indicate that there is no specific length of time in view. Unfortunately, some pastors could take his “indefinite” to mean that there is no definite article in the Greek, and build some fallacious argument on that fact. Thus they might commit *Basic Meaning via English*, expecting the Greek article to function in the same manner as the English definite article. In order to help keep fallacies out of the pulpit, Bock would have been better to make his explanation a little longer, and say something like: ἐπὶ χρόνον *does not refer to a specific period of time*.

εἶπεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ (*eipen en heautō*): Stein directs the reader to his comments at Luke 15:17, where he says: “**He said.** ‘Said’ means *thought to himself*.”²⁵ Stein is clarifying the meaning of the English translation which his commentary is based upon (NIV). However, the pastor who does not know Greek may think that the Greek word itself (εἶπεν), which is translated by the English “said,” means “thought to himself.” To make such a claim

²³Marshall says: “For a long time (ἐπὶ χρόνον, cf. 4:25) her pleas were in vain,” *Luke*, 672. The connection to Luke 4:25 is unclear, because the word χρόνος (*chronos*) is not there. Rather, Jesus makes mention of the many widows who were living in Elijah’s day.

²⁴Bock, *Luke: Volume 2*, 1448. Square brackets are his.

²⁵Stein, *Luke*, 406, 445.

would be the fallacy of *Illegitimate Informational Transfer*. Therefore, it would have been better for Stein to say something like: *The Greek phrase translated by the English “said,” means here: “thought to himself.”*

Verse 5

παρέχειν . . . κόπον (*parechein . . . kopon*): Bock says that: “the phrase is found elsewhere at Matt. 26:10 = Mark 14:6; Luke 11:7; Gal. 6:17; Sir. 29:4.”²⁶ Not one of the references he lists has the infinitive of παρέχω (*parechō*); they are rather indicatives (present and aorist tenses) and imperatives (present tense). To avoid misunderstanding, he would have been better to say something like: *the words παρέχω and κόπος are found in collocation elsewhere at . . .*

ὑπωπιάζη με (*hypōpiazē me*):²⁷ Fitzmyer writes: “The vb. *hypōpiazein* means to ‘hit under the eye,’ an expression borrowed from boxing. See the Pauline context, where it occurs in 1 Cor 9:27 (*RSV*, ‘pommel’).”²⁸ It is true that Paul is talking about boxing in 1 Cor 9:26, and that ὑπωπιάζω (*hypōpiazō*) could have been a word quite appropriate for boxing, but there is no evidence that it was “an expression borrowed from boxing.”

²⁶Bock, *Luke: Volume 2*, 1449.

²⁷Liefeld commits a logical fallacy when he writes: “Derrett (‘Unjust Judge,’ p. 191) shows that they are common idiom in eastern countries, where to have one’s face blackened means to suffer shame. Probably we can also compare our American idiom ‘to give a black eye to,’ meaning ‘to damage one’s reputation.’ If this is so . . .,” *Luke*, 1000. As his final words I have quoted show, he does exercise some caution in drawing a parallel here. However, the eastern and American idioms he has listed have nothing to do with the meaning of ὑπωπιάζω (*hypōpiazō*).

Hendriksen is confusing when he says: “here, because of the tense, probably: to wear (a person) out,” *Exposition of Luke*, 823. I am unable to fathom how the use of the present tense would lead him to the meaning: *to wear out*.

²⁸Fitzmyer, *Luke (X-XXIV)*, 1179.

Considering the passages in which ὑπωπιάζω is found outside the New Testament,²⁹ it is more likely that the term was borrowed for boxing.³⁰ It is surprising that Fitzmyer is so careless in his discussion, considering the fact that he lists the uses of ὑπωπιάζω by

²⁹Weiss (“ὑπωπιάζω,” 590-91) mentions four occurrences of ὑπωπιάζω outside of the New Testament. The first is in a play written by Aristophanes, who lived in the 5th century B.C. (Kent, “Aristophanes’ Birth,” 153), where it reads: “And look there,/ See how the reconciled cities greet and blend/ In peaceful intercourse, and laugh for joy;/ And that, too, though their eyes are swoln and blackened [καὶ ταῦτα δαιμονίως ὑπωπιασμένοι],/ And all cling fast to cupping instruments,” “The Peace,” 48-49. Weiss suggests understanding the Greek phrase containing ὑπωπιάζω to mean here: “the ‘face’ of the cities has been disfigured by the blows suffered,” “ὑπωπιάζω,” 590. There seems to be the idea of some kind of physical disfigurement, whether that meaning is included in ὑπωπιάζω, or a result of it.

The second occurrence of ὑπωπιάζω cited by Weiss is when Aristotle, who lived 384-322 B.C. (Olbricht, “Aristotle,” 119), says: “Approved hyperboles are also metaphors. For instance, one may say of a man whose eye is all black and blue [οἶον εἰς ὑπωπιασμένον], ‘you would have thought he was a basket of mulberries,’ because the black eye [τὸ ὑπόπιον] is something purple, but the great quantity constitutes the hyperbole,” *Rhetoric*, 416-17. It is possible that what Aristotle is saying is that one who has been struck in the face (ὑπωπιασμένον) will then resemble mulberries because they will have similar colouring under their eyes (ὑπόπιον). Or perhaps “a black eye” is part of the semantic range of ὑπωπιάζω, as is also possible in Aristophanes’ play (above).

The third occurrence is when Plutarch, who lived from c. 45-120 A.D. (Hershbell, “Plutarch,” 812), says of “his comrade” who has certain theories about the moon: “but he said what is true, that they blacken the Moon’s eye [ὑπωπιάζειν αὐτοῦς τὴν σελήνην σπίλων] defiling her with blemishes and bruises, at one and the same time addressing her as Artemis and Athena and making her a mass compounded of murky air . . .,” “Concerning the Face,” 48-49. According to Weiss, the sense here is figurative, meaning “‘to defame,’ ‘castigate’ (with words),” “ὑπωπιάζω,” 590. If ὑπωπιάζω refers to a “black eye” or some type of physical disfigurement in the previous two sources cited, then this may be an example of a metaphorical extension of that meaning.

The final occurrence is when Diogenes Laërtius, who lived c. the 3rd century A.D. (Chitwood, *Death by Philosophy*, 4), says of Crates: “On one occasion he provoked Nicodromus, the harp-player, and received a black eye from him [ὑπωπιόσθη]; so he put a plaster on his forehead and wrote upon it, ‘Nicodromus did this,’” *Lives and Opinions*, 251. The context seems to indicate that ὑπωπιόσθη does have the idea of receiving a black eye, or possibly a bruised and swollen face.

Hellenistic Greek is considered to have been in use from 330 B.C. to 330 A.D. (Wallace, *Beyond the Basics*, 15). It is interesting to note that Aristophanes lived prior to the time of Hellenistic Greek, but his use of ὑπωπιάζω seems closer to that of the latest source, Diogenes Laërtius, than it is to Plutarch, who lived well within the time period of Hellenistic Greek. A sense of “to strike in the face” for ὑπωπιάζω would fit quite well for its use by Aristophanes, Aristotle, and Plutarch. The idea of “a black eye” in Aristotle’s use can be determined from the context, rather than it necessarily being part of the semantic range of ὑπωπιάζω.

With so few occurrences of ὑπωπιάζω in Hellenistic Greek literature to work with, it is difficult to precisely determine its semantic range. Caution should be taken in defining ὑπωπιάζω before more writings are found where it has been used. It does seem to be used to indicate the causing of some kind of physical disfigurement (possibly a black eye), as well as possibly defamation (see Plutarch’s use, above).

³⁰Although it is even a leap of faith to presume this outside of 1 Cor 9:27, for there is no evidence that ὑπωπιάζω was used within boxing contexts. For all we know, Paul was the first person to use the word ὑπωπιάζω in such a context.

Aristotle, Plutarch, and Diogenes Laertius (see fn29).³¹ However, he also says that ὑπωπιόζω could have been used in a figurative sense: “‘to blacken the face’ (i.e. besmirch my character) or ‘wear out completely.’”³² He shows an awareness of the difficulty of determining the meaning contributed by ὑπωπιόζω to Luke 18:5 when he says that either of these meanings are possible, in addition to the possibility that the judge was afraid she would hit him in the face.³³

Evans incorrectly states: “The verb that means ‘to hit under the eye’ (see 1 Cor. 9:27) is often used in a figurative sense (‘to blacken the face’ [i.e., besmirch one’s character] or ‘to wear out completely’; Fitzmyer, p. 1179).”³⁴ Fitzmyer certainly does list those possible figurative senses of the word, but it is an overstatement to say that ὑπωπιόζω “is often used” in such a manner.³⁵ Evans’ comment could mislead pastors into thinking that there are more known occurrences of ὑπωπιόζω in Hellenistic Greek literature than there are.

An examination of the passages outside of the New Testament in which ὑπωπιόζω occurs (see fn29) indicates that it was likely used in Hellenistic Greek with the ideas of causing a physical facial disfigurement (possibly a black eye), and quite possibly defamation or slander. In addition to these two possibilities (often listed as “to strike,” and “to defame”), a number of commentators also state that ὑπωπιόζω can be

³¹Fitzmyer, *Luke (X-XXIV)*, 1179.

³²Fitzmyer, *Luke (X-XXIV)*, 1179.

³³Fitzmyer, *Luke (X-XXIV)*, 1179.

³⁴Evans, *Luke*, 269. Square brackets are his.

³⁵It would be an overstatement to say that ὑπωπιόζω “is used often” with *any* meaning.

used to refer to “wearing out (emotionally).”³⁶ This is the meaning for ὑπὸ πίεσιν which is taken by many English translations, including the NIV, NASB, NLT, and NRSV. Yet, as Nolland writes, “The difficulty here is that such a sense is difficult to document.”³⁷ Without more evidence, it seems that the popular understanding of ὑπὸ πίεσιν in Luke 18:5, of “to wear out completely,” is unfounded.

Verse 6

τῆς ἀδικίας (*tēs adikias*): Marshall directs the reader to 16:8 for his comments on τῆς ἀδικίας, where he writes: “ἀδικία usually means ‘wrongdoing, unrighteousness, wickedness, injustice’ ([Luke] 13.27; Acts 1:18; 8:23).”³⁸ These four English words are not what ἀδικία “usually means,” but rather glosses that are often used to translate ἀδικία in *different* contexts.³⁹ In order to keep pastors from committing *Illegitimate Totality Transfer*, it would have been better for Marshall to say something like: ἀδικία is often glossed “wrongdoing,” “unrighteousness,” “wickedness,” or “injustice.”

Verse 7

ποιήση τὴν ἐκδίκησιν (*poiēsē tēn ekdikēsīn*): Marshall writes:

ποιέω τὴν ἐκδίκησιν [*poiēō tēn ekdikēsīn*] means ‘to vindicate’, in the sense of punishing offenders (T. Levi 3:3) and or of rescuing those who are in trouble (cf. Acts 7:24; Test. Sol. 22:4; Jeremias, *Parables*, 154n. 8). Here the latter thought is

³⁶Fitzmyer, *Luke (X-XXIV)*, 1179; Stein, *Luke*, 445; Evans, *Luke*, 269; Hendriksen, *Exposition of Luke*, 823; Marshall, *Luke*, 673; Bock, *Luke: Volume 2*, 1449.

³⁷Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, 868.

³⁸Marshall, *Luke*, 620.

³⁹See *BDAG*, 20.

uppermost, since there is no mention of the opponents of the elect (Delling, 216f., especially n. 68; G. Schrenk, TDNT II, 445f., thinks retribution is in mind).⁴⁰

Marshall has done well to consider the various ways in which the Greek phrase is used, and then to consider the context of Luke 18:7 in order to determine its meaning there.

τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν (*tōn eklektōn*):⁴¹ Bock writes in part: “The term ἐκλεκτός [*eklektos*] is a collective (the only such time in Luke–Acts, though the singular is applied to Jesus in Luke 23:35; elsewhere in the Synoptics at Matt. 22:14; 24:22, 24, 31 = Mark 13:20, 22, 27).”⁴² It would have been a little clearer if Bock wrote: *the plural is used elsewhere in the Synoptics at . . .*

Fitzmyer is less than clear when he writes:

The ‘chosen ones’ (*eklektoi*) occurs only here in Luke–Acts. Cf. Mark 13:20, 22, 27; Luke 21:22. For the OT background of the expression, see Isa 42:1; 43:20; 65:9, 15, 23; Ps 105 [LXX 104]:6, 43, where the connotation is that of election to serve Yahweh. See especially Sir 47:22, where election suggests the love of God. Here it is being used of Christian disciples.⁴³

The use of Luke 21:22 is an odd choice of comparison to ἐκλεκτῶν in Luke 18:7 (“for

⁴⁰Marshall, *Luke*, 673–74.

⁴¹Nolland writes: “In chap. 13 [means 18] Luke does not reproduce the references of his Markan source to ‘the elect’ (Mark 13:20, 22, 27), and this language is not found elsewhere in the synoptic Gospel tradition except in Matt 22:14. Elsewhere Luke makes use of election language only in Acts 13:48: ‘as many as were ordained to eternal life believed,’” *Luke 9:21–18:34*, 869. Yet election language is found elsewhere in the synoptic Gospels at Matt 24:22, 24, 31. Presumably, Nolland does not include these because he is working from Markan priority, and Matt 24 is the parallel passage to Mark 13. Election language is used in two other places by Luke, besides those noted by Nolland: once in Luke 23:35 to refer to Jesus, and once in Acts 22:10 to refer to tasks being appointed for a person to do. Nolland goes on to say: “In the OT, election language is applied originally to the privileged status of Israel (see Pss 105:6, 43; 106:5; Isa 43:20; 45:4), but then more restrictedly to the faithful from among the People (see Isa 65:9, 15, 22),” *Luke 9:21–18:34*, 869. All of these references contain the word, בָּחֵרָה (*bāhîr*), a word which is also used in the Old Testament of David (Ps 89:4 [EV 89:3]), Moses (Ps 106:23), and the Servant in Isaiah (Isa 42:1).

⁴²Bock, *Luke: Volume 2*, 1451.

⁴³Fitzmyer, *Luke (X–XXIV)*, 1180.

these are days of vengeance [ἡμέραι ἐκδικήσεως], to fulfill all that is written”). Also, Fitzmyer starts with what seems to be a discussion *only* about the plural form of ἐκλεκτός, but the singular is found in some of the Old Testament passages to which he refers: Isa 42:1; 43:20; Sir 47:22. This is particularly strange because he does not mention the singular of ἐκλεκτός found in Luke 23:35. In Ps 105 (LXX 104):6, 43, it is not the word ἐκλεκτός (in the plural both times) that brings the idea of service to Yahweh, but the context in which the word is found. Fitzmyer’s comments could become *Illegitimate Informational Transfer* in the hands of pastors.

μακροθυμῆ (makrothymē): Nolland writes: “The verb expresses some kind of holding back, but whether this is in terms of a delay on his part or in terms of his long-suffering nature remains to be decided.”⁴⁴ The definition of “some kind of holding back” is vague, and does not capture the semantic range of μακροθυμέω (makrothumeō) well. In every other occurrence of μακροθυμέω in the New Testament, there is an expectation of something to come in the context, and someone or something is said (or commanded) to be “patient” (μακροθυμέω) in waiting for it.⁴⁵ Nolland would have been better to say something like: *The verb expresses some kind of expectant waiting, but whether this is in terms of . . .*

Nolland is also misleading when he says: “The reference to God being long-suffering remains obscure until we look at how that verb is used of God in the OT. . . .

⁴⁴Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, 869-70.

⁴⁵See Matt 18:26, 29; 1 Cor 13:4; 1 Thess 5:14; Heb 6:15; Jas 5:7 (x2), 8; 2 Pet 3:9.

(the word involved is often translated as ‘slow to anger’ in the OT).⁴⁶ It is actually the adjective μακρόθυμος that is often translated as “slow to anger” in the Old Testament; the verb μακροθυμέω is only used with God as subject in the Greek Old Testament at Sir. 18:11 and 35:19 (32:18 in Brenton, *Septuagint*).⁴⁷ It may be true that μακροθυμέω can be legitimately understood as “slow to anger” when used of God in the Old Testament, but it is a little misleading to say that it is “often” translated this way.

Verse 8

ἐν τάχει (*en tachei*): Marshall begins by giving three possible glosses for this phrase: “soon,” “suddenly,” and “unexpectedly.”⁴⁸ He shows how Old Testament uses of the phrase evidence these three possible glosses, and then he writes: “The context and the normal use of the phrase (cf. Acts 12:7; 22:18; 25:4; Rom. 16:20; Rev. 1:1; 22:6) suggest that ‘soon’ is the meaning.”⁴⁹ He then goes on to demonstrate how the context of Luke 18:8 supports his argument. What does not make any sense is that Marshall gives the impression that all of the New Testament uses of the phrase should be glossed by “soon.”⁵⁰ But they evidence two of the glosses that Marshall gave for the Old Testament uses: “soon,” and “suddenly.” Marshall’s comments do not fully represent the semantic range of the phrase ἐν τάχει in the New Testament.

⁴⁶Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, 871.

⁴⁷The verb μακροθυμέω is found elsewhere in the LXX at: Job 7:16; Prov 19:11; Sir 2:4; 29:8; Bar 4:25.

⁴⁸Marshall, *Luke*, 676.

⁴⁹Marshall, *Luke*, 676.

⁵⁰The only occurrence of ἐν τάχει in the New Testament, that is not listed by Marshall, is found in 1 Tim 3:14.

Bock overstates his case when discussing the arguments for and against translating ἐν τάχει as either “suddenly” or “soon.” He writes of the second gloss:

Lexical evidence favors this view (BAGD 807; BAA 1609): in six (Acts 12:7; 22:18; 1 Tim. 3:14) of the other seven NT uses,⁵¹ including three eschatological contexts (Rom. 16:20; Rev. 1:1; 22:6) and one noneschatological context (Acts 25:4), ἐν τάχει means ‘soon.’⁵²

In Acts 22:18, ἐν τάχει is translated “quickly” in the ESV and NASB, so it may not be so evidently “soon” as Bock purports. Furthermore, *BDAG* list numerous examples of ἐν τάχει more along the lines of “suddenly” than “soon” outside of the New Testament.⁵³

Bock has gone too far when he says that lexical evidence favours “soon.”

πλὴν (*plēn*): Marshall writes that this is “a strong adversative.”⁵⁴ He is probably correct when πλὴν is used as a conjunction, but it is unlikely that this is true for its use as an adverb in Mark 12:32; Acts 8:1; 15:28; 27:22. He would have been better, then, to write that πλὴν *is used here as a strong adversative conjunction.*

ἐλθὼν (*elthōn*): Marshall writes: “ἐλθὼν implies a coming of the Son of man to earth, a motif that arises out of Dn. 7:13.”⁵⁵ He would have been better to write: πλὴν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐλθὼν (*plēn ho huios tou anthrōpou elthōn*) *implies a coming of the Son of man to earth.* This would help prevent pastors from committing *Illegitimate Contextual*

⁵¹Acts 12:7 is presumably the exception, although Bock does not state this.

⁵²Bock, *Luke: Volume 2*, 1455.

⁵³*BDAG*, 992-93.

⁵⁴Marshall, *Luke*, 676.

⁵⁵Marshall, *Luke*, 676.

Transfer. The word ἐλθὼν itself does not imply the idea of the Son of man coming to earth, but contexts in which the word is found that actually speak of the Son of man coming to earth.

τὴν πίστιν (*tēn pistin*): It is difficult to determine on what basis Marshall says: “The use of πίστις [*pistis*] with the article is unusual. It could refer to acceptance of Jesus and his message, which would be a developed Christian usage (Klostermann, 179; Grässer, 38), but more probably it signifies faithfulness, expressed in unflinching prayer.”⁵⁶ When the accusative πίστιν occurs, it is found with the article in: Matt 9:2, 29; 23:23; Mark 2:5; Luke 5:20; Rom 3:3; 1 Cor 13:2; Gal 1:23; 3:23 (x2); Col 1:4; 1 Thess 3:5, 6; 1 Tim 1:19; 5:8; 6:21; 2 Tim 2:18; 3:8; 4:7; Phlm 5; Heb 13:7; Jas 2:1, 18 (x2); 1 Pet 1:21; Rev 2:13, 19; 14:12. The article also occurs numerous times with πίστις when it is found in other cases, but it would be superfluous to list them. Marshall’s lack of clarity becomes an even greater problem when he goes on to say: “The presence of the article is an Aramaism (Jeremias, *Parables*, 155 n. 13; Borsch, 364 n. 1).”⁵⁷ This statement is very misleading, because pastors who do not know Greek will be misled to think that the collocation of πίστις with the article is not normal. They will thus see an Aramaic background to a Greek syntactical structure, when to do so is unwarranted.

Hendriksen’s comments on τὴν πίστιν could also mislead some pastors. He begins by explaining that virtues (“such as faith or hope or love”) are often preceded by

⁵⁶Marshall, *Luke*, 676.

⁵⁷Marshall, *Luke*, 676.

the article in Greek, but not in English. He says that it is possible to understand τὴν πίστιν in Luke 18:8 as a virtue, but argues against it on the basis of the context. He then writes: “Others, in keeping with the context, give the Greek article its full due, and translate ‘the faith’ or even ‘that faith.’”⁵⁸ Yet it is not a matter of giving the Greek article “its full due,” as is evident from Hendriksen’s own discussion earlier. Rather, it is a matter of determining how to express τὴν πίστιν in English. Thus, he would have been better to cut out the phrase: *give the Greek article its full due.*

“Literally”

The most prolific user of the word “literally” was Fitzmyer, with fourteen occurrences.⁵⁹ For the most part, he attempts to indicate the Greek syntactical structure through the use of this word. For example, he says that ὁ κριτῆς τῆς ἀδικίας in v. 6 is “Lit. ‘the judge of dishonesty,’” in contrast to the translation he gave earlier: “*that dishonest judge.*”⁶⁰ Along with syntax, he often includes the most common English glosses in his “literal” translation. For instance, he says that εἶπεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ is “Lit. ‘he said in himself,’” rather than his translation: “*he said to himself.*”⁶¹ It becomes difficult at times, however, to understand what Fitzmyer means by “literally.” For example, he says that οὐκ ἠθέλην in v. 4 is “Lit. ‘was unwilling,’ instead of his earlier translation: “*the judge refused.*” Perhaps he intends to show that there is no equivalent Greek word for the

⁵⁸Hendriksen, *Exposition of Luke*, 823.

⁵⁹Fitzmyer, *Luke (X-XXIV)*, 1178-80.

⁶⁰Fitzmyer, *Luke (X-XXIV)*, 1179.

⁶¹Fitzmyer, *Luke (X-XXIV)*, 1179.

English “judge,” but there is also no copula verb, as Fitzmyer implies with the inclusion of “was” in his “literal” translation. The first time Fitzmyer uses the word “literally” is when he says of πρὸς τὸ δεῖν πάντοτε προσεύχεσθαι in v. 1: “Lit. ‘with reference to the need (infin. *dein*) to pray at all times.’”⁶² He seems particularly intent to show by the English “to the need,” that the Greek sentence includes an infinitive. Yet there is also an infinitive later in the same verse: καὶ μὴ ἐγκακεῖν, which Fitzmyer does not identify when he says: “Lit. ‘become weary.’”⁶³ Nor does the English “at all times,” in the same verse, translate the Greek πάντοτε with its most commonly-used gloss (which would be “always”).

Stein uses the word “literally” to clarify that the Greek has a personal pronoun (“*them*,” αὐτοῖς), rather than the actual addressees, “disciples” in v 1.⁶⁴ He also uses it to say of Ἔλεγεν in the same verse: “Literally *and he was saying*.”⁶⁵ He is apparently demonstrating his belief that the imperfect tense signifies continuous action in past time.

Evans twice gives a “literal” translation to show the Greek syntax.⁶⁶ Similarly, Nolland consistently uses “literally” to indicate Greek syntax in his nine uses of the word.⁶⁷ He uses the same “literal” translation of ἔλεγεν as Stein (see above) to show his understanding of the imperfect tense.⁶⁸ It is interesting then to see that he says of ποιήσῃ τὴν ἐκδίκησιν: “lit. ‘make vindication.’”⁶⁹ His “literal” translation does nothing to

⁶²Fitzmyer, *Luke (X-XXIV)*, 1178.

⁶³Fitzmyer, *Luke (X-XXIV)*, 1178.

⁶⁴Stein, *Luke*, 444.

⁶⁵Stein, *Luke*, 444.

⁶⁶Evans, *Luke*, 269-70.

⁶⁷Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, 865-66, 868-69.

⁶⁸Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, 866.

⁶⁹Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, 869.

indicate that the Greek verb is an aorist subjunctive. There is one use of the word “literally” by seven of the commentators which warrants its own discussion.

Liefeld, Stein, Bock, Hendriksen, and Evans agree with Marshall’s assessment that ὑπωπιάζω (*hypōpiazō*) in verse 5 “means literally ‘to strike under the eye’, i.e. ‘to give a black eye to’.”⁷⁰ Fitzmyer is similar, saying: “lest she keep coming and finally wear me out. Lit. ‘lest (by) coming, she in the end give me a black eye’ or ‘fly in my face!’ The vb. *hypōpiazein* means to ‘hit under the eye.’”⁷¹ What these seven commentators mean by “literally” seems to be what Nolland actually says, that “to strike under the eye” (which thereby results in a black eye) is the etymological, or “original meaning” of ὑπωπιάζω.⁷² It is also possible that by “literally,” these commentators mean that “to strike under the eye” is the meaning from which all others were derived.

Conclusion

Seven fallacies were found in the commentaries I studied for Luke 18:1-8, spread fairly evenly among commentaries intended for both scholars and pastors. The only recurring fallacies were *Basic Meaning via English* and *Inadequate Parallels of Word Usage*, occurring twice each. Neither Fitzmyer (scholar) nor Evans (pastor) committed any fallacies. This is much more significant in Fitzmyer’s case, due to the vast difference in the number of words discussed in each commentary. Most of the commentators would

⁷⁰Marshall, *Luke*, 673; Liefeld, “Luke,” 1000; Stein, *Luke*, 445; Bock, *Luke: Volume 2*, 1449; Hendriksen, *Exposition of Luke*, 823; Evans, *Luke*, 269.

⁷¹Fitzmyer gives no reason for saying it means “to fly in my face!,” a translation which I did not find listed anywhere else, *Luke (X-XXIV)*, 1179.

⁷²Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, 868.

have been better to use more linguistically-nuanced language. Two of the most significant issues were discussing Greek words from an English (rather than Greek) language perspective, and a failure to clarify when the meaning of a word in a particular context was being given, as opposed to all of its occurrences. A list of all the commentaries, along with the fallacies they committed in Luke 18:1-8, has been included below for ease of reference.

Fallacies Listed by Commentary

Scholar:

Bock (1): *Illegitimate Totality Transfer*

Fitzmyer (0): *n/a*

Marshall (1): *Illegitimate Informational Transfer*

Nolland (2): *The Root Fallacy, Inadequate Parallels of Word Usage*

Pastor:

Liefeld (1): *Inadequate Parallels of Word Usage*

Stein (1): *Basic Meaning via English*

Evans (0): *n/a*

Hendriksen (1): *Basic Meaning via English*

CHAPTER SIX: ROMANS 3:21-26

Romans 3:21-26 is one of the most highly-debated Pauline texts, garnering much interest for its apparent implications for the doctrine of justification. It is a pericope which has been referred to by Martin Luther as “the very central place of the Epistle, and of the whole Bible.”¹ In order to examine lexical analyses within this significant passage, I have selected four commentaries which are primarily intended for scholars (Moo, *Romans*; Cranfield, *Romans: Volume 1*; Dunn, *Romans 1-8*; Fitzmyer, *Romans*), and four which are primarily intended for pastors (Ziesler, *Romans*; Mounce, *Romans*; Osborne, *Romans*; Morris, *Romans*). As with the previous three chapters, an English translation will first be provided for the convenience of the reader. Lexical fallacies within the eight commentaries will then be illuminated, followed by instances where more lexically-nuanced language is needed, and a discussion of the uses of the word “literally.”

Romans 3:21-26, ESV

²¹But now the righteousness of God has been manifested apart from the law, although the Law and the Prophets bear witness to it— ²²the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ for all who believe. For there is no distinction: ²³for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, ²⁴and are justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, ²⁵whom God put forward as a propitiation by his blood, to be received by faith. This was to show God’s righteousness, because in his divine forbearance he had passed over former sins. ²⁶It was to show his righteousness at the

¹Luther, “Margin of the Luther Bible,” 218.

present time, so that he might be just and the justifier of the one who has faith in Jesus.

Lexical Fallacies

Verse 21

δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (*dikaiosynē theou*):² Moo’s lengthy discussion of this phrase exhibits a number of lexical fallacies. He sees the LXX uses of δικαιοσύνη as being the “basic material” for determining its meaning in Romans.³ In his discussion of the LXX, he has noted:

By the same token, words from the Hebrew root *sdq* [*sic*] are translated by Greek words from the *dik*- root in the large majority of cases. This considerable linguistic overlap suggests that the meaning of *dik*- words for Greek-speaking Jews like Paul was decisively influenced by the meaning of *sdq* words.⁴

He indicates that even δικαιοσύνη is used to translate שְׂדָק [sdq], and then concludes:

“The high degree of translation equivalence between the *dik*- and *sdq* roots means that a study of the one is virtually a study of the other also.”⁵ Moo’s subsequent discussion makes it clear that the meaning he sees in the δικ- words is the meaning of the שְׂדָק words. Therefore, he is guilty of *Defining a Greek Word via Hebrew or vice versa*.

The above discussion shows that the following quotation from Moo is relevant in a discussion of δικαιοσύνη:

²Ziesler seems to slide back and forth between discussing the meaning of the word δικαιοσύνη, and doing a concept-study of “righteousness.” It is difficult to determine the exact meaning that he considers δικαιοσύνη to contribute to Rom 3:21, *Romans*, 70-71.

³Moo’s actual statement is: “Since our concern is to explain the Greek phrase in Romans, we will take the LXX occurrences as our basic material,” *Romans*, 81.

⁴Moo, *Romans*, 79.

⁵Moo, *Romans*, 81. Cf. his earlier comment: “The high degree of translation correspondence between *dikaiosynē* and *sedeq/s^edāqā* means that these can be considered together,” *Romans*, 80.

Dikairoō and its cognates were used in secular Greek, but the widespread and theologically significant use of the terminology in the LXX, along with Paul's frequent appeal to the OT in discussing the words (e.g. Rom. 3:22; 4:1-25), shows that the OT/Jewish background is decisive.⁶

Thus Moo discounts secular Greek uses of the word δικαιοσύνη for determining its meaning. He notes greater similarity between the concepts in the LXX and Paul, than he does between those in secular Greek and Paul, and then imposes those (LXX) concepts upon the word δικαιοσύνη. Moo has committed *Illegitimate Totality Transfer*.

Moo commits another fallacy when he writes:

The long-standing debate over whether the basic meaning of the root *sdq* is 'conformity to a norm' or 'mutual fulfillment of claims arising from a particular relationship' may be bypassed if we agree with Ziesler that the 'norm' in question is the demands that stem from God's relationship with his people in the covenant.⁷

Notice that Moo is making an argument for the "basic meaning" of דָּקָה that will be present in all of its cognate forms. This is an example of *The Root Fallacy*.

Moo is guilty of a fourth fallacy in his discussion of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, evident when he writes:

God's *dikaioynē* in secular Greek usually designates an attribute of God, although most of the biblical occurrences possess a more active or relational meaning. For instance, in Ps. 51:14 David prays, 'Deliver me from those who seek my blood, O God, the God of my salvation; my tongue will rejoice in your righteousness [*tēn dikaiosynēn sou*]' (LXX 50:16). Similarly, God promises through the prophet Isaiah: 'I bring near my righteousness [*tēn dikaiosynēn mou*], and my salvation will not delay" (Isa 46:13). As the parallel with 'salvation' shows, 'God's righteousness' in these verses is his saving intervention on behalf

⁶Moo, *Romans*, 79.

⁷Moo, *Romans*, 79-80.

of his people. Probably 16 other occurrences of the phrase have this same general sense.⁸

The fallacy here is *Illegitimate Synonymy*. The assumption is that δικαιοσύνη is identical in meaning to “salvation” because it occurs in a parallelism with σωτήριον (*sōtērion*), or another word that is understood as indicating God’s saving acts.⁹ He may be correct that δικαιοσύνη can be used to refer to “saving acts,” but not for the reason that Moo gives above.¹⁰ Fitzmyer does better, when he says: “The Pauline idea of ‘God’s uprightness’ verges indeed on his ‘mercy,’ but it is not the same. The judicial or forensic element is lacking in the latter idea, even though it is often used in parallelism with ‘uprightness.’”¹¹ He recognizes that two words found in a parallelism together do not necessarily mean the

⁸Moo, *Romans*, 81. Square brackets in the quotation are his. The sixteen references Moo lists in his footnote are: Pss 22:31(LXX 21:32); 35:28 (LXX 34:28); 40:10 (LXX 39:11); 69:27 (LXX 68:27); 71 (LXX 70):15, 16, 19, 24; 88:12 (LXX 87:12); 98:2 (LXX 97:2); 119:123 (LXX 118:123); Mic 6:5; 7:9; Isa 51:5, 6, 8. Later in his discussion of the semantic range of δικαιοσύνη, Moo lists a number of verses, of which he says: “In these passages, God’s ‘righteousness’ is his faithfulness, his commitment to fulfill the promises he has made to his people,” *Romans*, 82. In his footnote to support this statement, he writes in part that δικαιοσύνη “is paralleled by words such as ἀλήθεια (‘truth’; Ps. 36:6 [LXX 35:7]; 88:12 [LXX 87:13]; 98:2 [LXX 97:2]; 143:1 [LXX 142:1]; Isa. 38:19), ἔλεος (‘mercy’; Ps. 31:1 [LXX 30:2]; 36 [LXX 35]:6, 10; 88:12 [LXX 87:13]; 98:2 [LXX 97:2]; 103:17 [LXX 102:17]; 143:11 [LXX 142:11]), and χρηστότης (‘goodness’; Ps. 145:7 [LXX 144:7]),” *Romans*, 82n14. This further demonstrates Moo’s committing the fallacy of *Illegitimate Synonymy*. He seems to equate δικαιοσύνη with the words it is found in parallelism with. However, it should be noted that by “paralleled,” Moo apparently only means that the words are found within the same context together, because δικαιοσύνη does not always hold the same grammatical location as the words that Moo says it is “paralleled by.” Furthermore, in two of the verses listed (Isa 38:19; Ps 31:1 [LXX 30:2]), only δικαιοσύνη is present; the word that it is supposedly paralleled by is absent.

⁹Morris is much better in his discussion of similar verses in the LXX. He writes: “We should also notice that in the Old Testament righteousness in God is not uncommonly linked with salvation.” He demonstrates this with Isa 51:6; 56:1, and Ps 98:2 (LXX 97:2), and then says: “The thought in such passages is that God will not abandon his people. Since he is righteous, he will certainly deliver them,” *Romans*, 101-02. Notice the vast difference between Morris, who sees God’s righteousness being demonstrated by his saving acts, and Moo, who says that δικαιοσύνη θεου “is his saving intervention on behalf of his people” [italics mine]. Moo does recognize later in his discussion that in “a number of texts, God’s *dikaïosynē* is not his saving activity but the basis, or the motivation, for that saving activity,” *Romans*, 82.

¹⁰See Judg 5:11; Isa 45:24; cf. *HALOT*, 3:1006.

¹¹Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 107.

same thing.¹²

Fitzmyer makes two errors in his discussion of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. To demonstrate this, it will be helpful to quote a longer section of his commentary, in which he writes:

The phrase itself, the equivalent of Hebrew *sedeq* 'El/ 'Elōhîm or *sidqat* 'El/ 'Elōhîm, is not found in the OT. The closest one comes to it is *sidqat YHWH* (Deut 33:21), which is not quite the same thing, for the *RSV* renders it 'the just decrees of the Lord,' and the *NRSV* translates it 'what the Lord deemed right'; the *LXX* translates, *dikaïosynēn Kyrios epoiēsen*, 'the Lord has wrought righteousness.' Or again, *sidqōt YHWH* (Judg 5:11), which the *RSV* translates 'the triumphs of the Lord,' and the *NRSV*, 'the victories of the Lord'; the *LXX* has *ekei dōsousin dikaïosynas Kyriō*, 'there they will grant the Lord righteous acts.' The exact Hebrew equivalent of Paul's phrase occurs, however, in *QL*: *sedeq* 'El (1QM 4:6) or *sidqat* 'El (1QS 10:25; 11:12); see also *T. Dan* 6:10 (in some MSS).¹³

Fitzmyer is confusing translation for meaning. Notice that his reason for saying that the phrases in Deut 33:21 (דְּבָרֵי יְהוָה) and Judg 5:11 (צִדְקוֹת יְהוָה) are "not quite the same thing" as δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is *because* of ("for") how they are *translated* in the *RSV* and *NRSV*. Yet the English translations are an attempt to convey the meaning of the Hebrew phrases *in particular contexts*. Therefore, the way they have been translated is not the best indicator of the relationship between the meaning of those Hebrew phrases

¹²Dunn overstates the case when he says: "Particularly in the Psalms and Second Isaiah the logic of covenant grace is followed through with the result that righteousness and salvation become virtually synonymous: the righteousness of God as God's act to restore his own and to sustain them within the covenant (Ps 31:1 [LXX 30:2]; 35:24 [LXX 34:24]; 65:5 [LXX 64:5]; 71 [LXX 70]:2, 15; 98:2 [LXX 97:2]; 143:11 [LXX 142:11]; Isa 45:8, 21; 46:13; 51:5, 6, 8; 62:1-2; 63:1, 7; in the DSS see particularly 1QS 11.2-15, 12-15; 1QH 4.37; 11.17-18, 30-31; elsewhere see, e.g., Bar 5:2, 4, 9; *1 Enoch* 71.14; *Apoc. Mos.* 20.1; *4 Ezra* 8.36," *Romans* 1-8, 41. There certainly is a connection between righteousness and salvation, but to say that they are "virtually synonymous" is to fail to recognize that words found in a parallelism together do not necessarily mean the same thing. The connection could just be that God's righteousness is demonstrated by (or evident in) the fact that he saves his people.

¹³The remainder of this paragraph reads: "This correspondence reveals his dependence on a genuine pre-Christian Palestinian Jewish tradition. Paul did not invent the phrase, even if he uses it in a striking, otherwise unattested sense in 2 Cor 5:21," Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 105-06. I do not wish to contest Fitzmyer's conclusions here. Rather, I wish to contest the correspondence he sees between the Hebrew and Greek languages.

and the Greek phrase, δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ.¹⁴

For the second problem, it is essential to recognize that Fitzmyer is equating the semantic ranges of the δικ- words and the שֶׁדָּק (*sdq*) words. This is particularly noticeable when Fitzmyer goes on to write, after discussing שֶׁדָּקָה (*sedeq*) in the postexilic period:

Even later, *dikaiosynē* in the LXX sometimes translated other (nonjudicial) covenant qualities of God: his *'ēmet*, ‘fidelity’ (Gen 24:49; Josh 24:14; 38:19), his *hesed*, ‘steadfast mercy’ (Gen 19:19; 20:13; 21:23). This mode of translation reflects the postexilic connotation of *sedeq* more than its original judicial denotation. Indeed, Greek *eleos*, ‘mercy,’ is even found to translate *šedāqāh* in Isa 56:1; cf. Ezek 18:19, 21.¹⁵

Fitzmyer is basing his argument on the assumption that the semantic range of δικαιοσύνη will be the same as that of שֶׁדָּקָה. Yet no two languages use their words in exactly the same way; Fitzmyer’s failure to recognize this has led him to commit the fallacy of *Equating a Central Core of Meaning across Languages*.

Cranfield directs the reader to his discussion of Rom 1:17, where he surveys the extra-biblical uses of δίκη (*dikē*), δίκαιος (*dikaïos*), δικαιοσύνη (*dikaiosynē*), and δικαιοῦν (*dikaïoun*).¹⁶ He then writes: “But the ranges of meaning of these words were significantly altered through their being regularly used in the LXX to represent the Hebrew words of the *sdk* group.”¹⁷ So he then surveys the meanings of שֶׁדָּקָה (*sedeq*), שֶׁדָּקָה (*saddîq*), the verb שֶׁדָּק (*sdq*) in the *qal*, *hiph ‘il*, and *pi ‘el* stems, and שֶׁדָּקָה

¹⁴This is really an issue of *linguistically-nuanced language*, rather than a lexical fallacy. It has been discussed here in order to avoid having to reproduce the same lengthy quotation twice.

¹⁵Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 106.

¹⁶Cranfield, *Romans: Volume 1*, 93.

¹⁷Cranfield, *Romans: Volume 1*, 94.

(*s^e dāqāh*), and goes on to say:

That Paul's use of the words δίκαιος, δικαιοσύνη and δικαιοῦν (and also of δικαίωμα [*dikaiōma*] and δικαίωσις [*dikaiōsis*]) reflects his familiarity with, and is to a very considerable extent moulded by, the LXX use of them to render words of the *ṣdk* group is clear, and is generally agreed.¹⁸

The problem with Cranfield's discussion is that he wants the words, rather than the sentences, to carry Paul's theology. Rather than arguing that Paul's theology was closer to that of the LXX than Greek culture in general, demonstrated in part by the sentences in which he uses the *dik*- words, Cranfield is arguing that the theology of the sentences in which the דק words were used has become evident in the *dik*- words themselves. Thus, he has committed the fallacy of *Defining a Greek Word via Hebrew or vice versa*.¹⁹

Dunn writes: “δικαιοσύνη is a good example of the need to penetrate through Paul's Greek language in order to understand it in the light of his Jewish background and training.”²⁰ He further says: “But since the fundamental study of H. Cremer it has been recognized that in Hebrew thought $\text{דק} // \text{דק} [\textit{sedeq} // \textit{s^e dāqāh}]$ is essentially a concept of *relation*.”²¹ He goes on to discuss the meaning of “righteousness,” and says in

¹⁸Cranfield, *Romans: Volume 1*, 94-95.

¹⁹If, as Cranfield suggests, the meanings of the *dik*- words were significantly altered in the Pauline writings, and thus meant very different things than they did in the ordinary Greek culture, one must wonder how Paul expected anyone who was unfamiliar with the meanings of those words in the LXX to understand anything he was saying. Barr's comments are helpful here: “Neither the Christian preaching nor the religious structure of ancient Israel (nor indeed, I would suppose, any other religious structure) consisted primarily (if at all) in the issuing either of new words or of new word-concepts or of new conceptual ‘content’ for old words. The newness or uniqueness of the structure consisted rather in new combinations of words, in which it was often possible for the semantic value of the words to be changed only slightly or not at all, and for the new or distinctive concept to be indicated by the word-combination. It is true of course that the use of a word might come in due course to be specially stamped by its frequent recurrence in sentences of a particular kind, and so to undergo a semantic change. But I have already suggested that such semantic change is not at all to be related in its extent proportionately to the degree of newness or originality of the statements in which it occurs,” *Semantics*, 263.

²⁰Dunn, *Romans 1-8*, 40.

²¹Dunn, *Romans 1-8*, 40.

part: “People are righteous when they meet the claims which others have on them by virtue of their relationship (see particularly Cremer, 34-38; hence the possibility of using *δικαιοσύνη* to translate רַחֻמִּים ‘loving-kindness,’ in Gen 19:19; 20:13; 21:23; 24:27; 32:10 [LXX 11]; etc.”²² Notice that Dunn is determining the meaning of *δικαιοσύνη* by equating it with רַחֻמִּים . He has here committed the fallacy of *Defining a Greek Word via Hebrew or vice versa*.

Verse 22

πίστεως (*pisteōs*): Fitzmyer commits *Illegitimate Totality Transfer* in his discussion of this word. The definition he gives for *πίστις* (*pistis*) is: “the mode whereby human beings respond to the challenge of the gospel and appropriate to themselves the effects of the Christ-event.”²³ He then directs the reader to the introduction, where he discusses *πίστις* as it is used within Romans and the rest of the Pauline corpus, from which he develops the definition he has given.²⁴ Yet a survey of Paul’s uses of *πίστις* show that Fitzmyer has unfairly loaded the word with far more theological meaning than it in fact has. Paul uses *πίστις* to refer to “the Christian faith” in general (1 Tim 4:1, 6; 6:10), to the belief that something which someone has said is true (Rom 4:9), and to a trust in a person (1 Cor 15:14, 17; 1 Thess 1:8; 2 Tim 3:15). This semantic range is neglected by

²²Dunn, *Romans 1-8*, 41. Square brackets are his.

²³Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 346.

²⁴Fitzmyer gives a slightly different definition in the introduction: “The experience whereby a human being responds to God’s saving deed in Christ Jesus and apprehends the effects of the Christ-event is *pistis*, ‘faith.’” He does go on to say, as well: “The full sense of Paul’s understanding of faith, however, is not formulated in Romans,” *Romans*, 137.

Fitzmyer in his formulation of the meaning of πίστις.

Within this same discussion, Fitzmyer commits another fallacy. He writes:

... it ends as *hypakoē pisteōs*, often translated as the ‘obedience of faith,’ but which means etymologically a ‘hearing under’ (*hypo* + *akoē*), a submissive hearing. It connotes the ‘submission’ or ‘commitment’ of the believer to God in Christ, which is the end result of faith as *akoē* (10:17).²⁵

In order to determine the meaning of ὑπακοὴν πίστεως (*hypakoēn pisteōs*; found at Rom 1:5 and 16:26), Fitzmyer has simply joined together the meanings of ὑπό (*hypo*) and ἀκοή (*akoē*), for apparently no other reason than that it is how the word is formed etymologically. Thus, he has committed the fallacy of [2+2]= *The Meaning of a Compound Word*. Such a practice has allowed Fitzmyer to gain support for his suggestion that the word “connotes the ‘submission’ or ‘commitment’ of the believer to God in Christ.” He would have been better to determine the meaning of ὑπακοή by examining its uses in context, rather than by discussing its etymology.

Verse 23

τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ (*tēs doxēs tou theou*): Fitzmyer directs the reader to his discussion of δόξα (*doxa*) at Rom 1:23, where he writes:

Idols were thus preferred by pagans to what was Israel’s ‘glory,’ viz., the abiding *doxa* of Yahweh, the radiant external manifestation of his presence in the Tabernacle or Temple, what was called *kēbôd YHWH* (e.g., Exod 24:17; 40:34-35). In Hebrew *kābôd* basically denoted the weight of esteem or honor that a king or important person enjoyed (1 Kgs 3:13). This concept was extended to Yahweh and to what made him impressive to human beings, the force of his self-manifestation and the radiant splendor of his presence.²⁶

²⁵Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 137.

²⁶Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 283.

There are two fallacies here. First, in determining the meaning of קָבוֹד (*kābôd*), Fitzmyer is likely guilty of *Etymologizing*, because he includes “the weight of” in his definition of קָבוֹד. He is able to do this, probably by drawing a connection between קָבוֹד and the verb קָבַד (*kābēd*), commonly translated “to be heavy, or weighty,”²⁷ because the former was presumably derived from the latter. Second, Fitzmyer is guilty of *Defining a Greek Word via Hebrew or vice versa*, because he takes his definition of קָבוֹד as the meaning of δόξα, simply because the latter is often used in the LXX to translate the former.

The fallacies of *Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning* and *Etymologizing* are committed by Moo. He directs the reader to his discussion of Rom 1:23, where he says in a footnote:

The Greek is δόξα. In secular Greek, the word means ‘opinion,’ ‘judgment,’ ‘estimation’ (cf. LSJ). But the LXX translators used it for the Heb. קָבוֹד, and it is through this correspondence that its typical NT sense develops. From its basic meaning ‘be weighty,’ קָבוֹד came to denote the ‘honor’ or ‘importance’ or ‘prestige’ of people (e.g., Ps. 49:16; Isa. 16:14; cf. Matt. 4:8) and, when applied to God, his ‘weighty’ and magnificent presence — as revealed in nature (Ps. 97:1-6), the tabernacle (Exod. 40:34), and the climax of history, to all peoples (Isa. 40:5; 66:18) (see G. Von Rad, *TDNT* II, 238-42).²⁸

Moo takes the “basic meaning” of “weighty,” which he would have derived etymologically (see above), and applies it to every use of the word δόξα. Mounce commits the same two fallacies, because he chooses to follow Moo’s lead.²⁹

²⁷BDB, 457; HALOT, 2:455; cf. 457.

²⁸Moo, *Romans*, 108n81.

²⁹Mounce writes: “The biblical meaning of δόξα (originally it meant ‘opinion’) was influenced by using it to translate the Heb. קָבוֹד [*sic*]. Moo comments that from the basic meaning of ‘be weighty’ it

Dunn directs the reader to his discussion of this phrase at Rom 1:21, where he says:

To 'glorify God' is to render the appropriate response due to his δόξα, 'glory,' the awesome radiance of deity which becomes the visible manifestation of God in theophany and vision and which can only bring home to the individual concerned his finite weakness and corruption (e.g., Exod 24:15-17; cf. 20:18-20; Isa 6:1-5; Ezek 1; see also on 6:4 and 9:4; *TDNT* 2:238-42). So elsewhere in Paul (15:6, 9; 1 Cor 6:20; 2 Cor 9:13; Gal 1:24) and the NT (e.g., Mark 2:12; Luke 23:47; Acts 4:21; 1 Pet 2:12).³⁰

The highly-theological meaning that Dunn gives to δόξα is arrived at from a compilation of the statements made in verses in which the word is found. Dunn is guilty of *Illegitimate Totality Transfer*.

Verse 24

δικαιούμενοι (*dikaïoumenoi*): Osborne writes: "The meaning of *justified* (see 1:17) is clear. On the basis of Jesus' atoning sacrifice God has legally declared the repentant sinner righteous. He has acquitted us from the guilt and penalty of our sins."³¹ This may be a true theological statement of how Christians are justified, but it is most certainly not the meaning of δικαιόω (*dikaioō*). Paul is able to use the present passive indicative of δικαιόω to speak of justification via the law in Galatians (2:16; 3:11; 5:4). Osborne has taken δικαιούμενοι along with its context in Rom 3 in order to determine its meaning. Thus, he has committed *Illegitimate Contextual Transfer*.

came to mean, when applied to God, his 'weighty' and magnificent 'presence' (*Romans 1-8*, 226)," Mounce, *Romans*, 115n10.

³⁰Dunn, *Romans 1-8*, 59.

³¹Osborne, *Romans*, 95.

Cranfield discusses the meaning of δικαίουμένοι in conjunction with δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (*dikaiosynē theou*) in verse 21 (see pp. 119-20). There it was seen that he took the meaning of the דקא (*sdq*) words and applied it to the *δικ-* (*dik-*) words. Of the validity for doing so, Cranfield writes: “It is most obvious in the case of the verb *δικαίουν* [*dikaion*]; for none of the occurrences of *δικαίουν* in the Pauline epistles (in Romans alone it occurs fifteen times) can be at all tolerably explained on the basis of the word’s use in secular Greek.”³² The semantic range may indeed be different within the New Testament literature than in secular Greek, but it is still a fallacy to determine a word’s meaning by *Defining a Greek Word via Hebrew or vice versa*.³³

Moo directs the reader to his excursus after Rom 1:17, where he discusses this word in conjunction with δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (from verse 21). It was seen above, on pages 115-16, that Moo was guilty of *Defining a Greek Word via Hebrew or vice versa* and *Illegitimate Totality Transfer* when discussing δικαιοῶ. His discussion of δικαίουμένοι at Rom 3:24 is actually quite good, as he discusses the meaning which it contributes to the context. Nevertheless, his comments here are based upon his excursus after Rom 1:17, where he did commit two fallacies.³⁴

³²Cranfield, *Romans: Volume 1*, 95.

³³Ziesler directs the reader to his discussion of δικαιοῶ at Rom 2:13, where he writes: “In biblical and other ancient Jewish literature this verb (or its usual Hebrew equivalent *tsādaq*) is used in a broadly forensic way to mean either ‘vindicate’ or ‘declare right/innocent,’” *Romans*, 86. If Ziesler is saying that he has surveyed the uses of both δικαιοῶ and דקא (*sādaq*) and found that the glosses he gives are appropriate for both, then there is nothing wrong with his statement. However, if he is equating δικαιοῶ with דקא because the former is used to translate the latter in the LXX, then he has committed the fallacy of *Defining a Greek Word via Hebrew or vice versa*.

³⁴Morris does not commit any lexical fallacies in his discussion of δικαιοῶ, but he has not done full justice to its uses within the New Testament. He writes of its use in Deut. 25:1, “Here the legal meaning is plain, and this remains with the word throughout the range of its biblical use,” *Romans*, 145. Deut 25 is clearly a judicial context; how then can this meaning be “plain” in contexts where no court is in view? For

χάριτι (*chariti*): Cranfield directs the reader to his discussion of χάρις (*charis*) at Rom 1:7, where he writes that the word “in the NT characteristically denotes— this is the meaning which it has here— God’s undeserved love revealed in Christ and so may be said to sum up the whole gospel in a single word.”³⁵ This single word (χάρις) is used in contexts where the gospel is being explained, but it most certainly does not sum up the whole gospel. Even if it could be argued that this were true, it is a theological argument, and not a reflection of the meaning χάρις contributes to the contexts in which it is used in the New Testament. Cranfield has here committed *Illegitimate Totality Transfer*.³⁶

Morris directs the reader to his discussion of χάρις at Rom 1:5, where he writes:

The word is cognate with that for ‘joy’ [i.e. χαρά, *chara*], and the basic meaning is ‘that which causes joy’. We still retain some of this meaning when we speak of, say, a ballet dancer moving gracefully, that is, in a pleasing, ‘joy-giving’ manner, or when we refer to ‘the social graces’. In a Christian context nothing brings joy like that great, inexplicable saving act of God in Christ in which he freely brings about our salvation without any contribution from our side. The term thus comes to us rich with ideas of joy and bounty.³⁷

This seems to be a combination of *Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning* with *The Root Fallacy*. Since χάρις and χαρά are apparently cognate nouns (thus sharing the same root), Morris is suggesting that there is a common meaning (*joy*) that can be found in both words. Furthermore, Morris is also guilty of *Basic Meaning via English*. He

example, in Luke 7:29, it says that the people “declared God just” (ἐδικαίωσαν, *edikaiōsan*). And in Luke 10:29, a lawyer asks Jesus who his neighbour is, because he was “desiring to justify himself” (δικαιῶσαι, *dikaiōsai*). It seems that Morris has not taken the full semantic range of δικαίω into consideration.

³⁵Cranfield, *Romans: Volume 1*, 71.

³⁶Cranfield speaks later about the “various nuances and emphases” of the word χάρις, *Romans: Volume 1*, 71. He seems to recognize that the word has a semantic range and can be used in a variety of contexts. Nevertheless, he has incorrectly stated that χάρις can be understood “to sum up the whole gospel in a single word.”

³⁷Morris, *Romans*, 48.

discusses the word “grace” in English, finds a nuance of “joy” in some of its uses, and supposes that this is relevant for determining the meaning of χάρις. This whole discussion is done completely separate from the contexts in which χάρις is found, resulting in a meaning which is subsequently imposed upon χάρις in New Testament texts.

Morris also commits *Illegitimate Contextual Transfer* when he writes at 1:5 (to which he has referred the reader): “The word may be used of salvation in general (‘by grace you have been saved’, Eph. 2:8), but here it is a gift for service.”³⁸ Here he has taken the phrase in which χάρις is found (in Eph 2:8), and taken it to be the meaning of χάρις. In Eph 2:8, χάρις is not “salvation,” but the means by which salvation is given.

ἀπολυτρόσεως (*apolytrōseōs*): Dunn is guilty of [2+2]= *The Meaning of a Compound Word* when he writes:

The uncompounded word (λύτρωσις [*lytrōsis*]) is more widely used, in the LXX at any rate (about 10 times), in the same sense of ‘ransoming’; it is quite possible that Christian tradition or Paul himself deliberately chose the weightier compound form to strengthen the sense of ransoming from (sin) or back (to God; cf. Moulton, *Grammar* 2:298, 299).³⁹

Some compound words certainly do reflect the meanings of each component part of it.

However, they all do not. Dunn’s error lies in discussing the uses of λύτρωσις, and further on in his commentary, the verb λυτρόω (*lytroō*), rather than ἀπολύτρωσις (*apolytrōsis*) in the New Testament (Luke 21:28; Rom 3:24; 8:23; 1 Cor 1:30; Eph 1:7,

³⁸Morris, *Romans*, 49.

³⁹Dunn, *Romans* 1-8, 169.

14; 4:30; Col 1:14; Heb 9:15; 11:35), and its one occurrence in the LXX (Dan 4:34).

After examining those passages, it seems that ἀπολύτρωσις has the idea of a “ransom” or “release.” The suggestion that the compound form was chosen “to strengthen the sense of ransoming from (sin) or back (to God)” does not account for its use in at least Heb 11:35.

Dunn commits a second fallacy when he writes: “in the Pauline literature ἀπολύτρωσις (like δικαιοῶ [dikaiōō]) contains the ‘already/not yet’ tension within itself ([Rom] 8:23; 1 Cor 1:30; Eph 1:7, 14; 4:30; Col 1:14); note the striking parallels in 1QM 1:12; 14:5; 15:1.”⁴⁰ Romans 8:23 and Eph 4:30 both look to the future; there is no “already” being discussed. Luke 21:28 also looks only to the future. The other non-Pauline use of ἀπολύτρωσις, Heb 11:35, looks to the past, with no “not yet” in view. The other verses listed may have an “already/not yet” tension in them. However, it is the context, rather than the word ἀπολύτρωσις which identifies that tension. Dunn wants the word ἀπολύτρωσις to contain the meaning that the sentence has. He has committed *Illegitimate Informational Transfer*, as he has taken the contexts of selective occurrences of ἀπολύτρωσις to determine its meaning.

Cranfield discusses the meaning of the word ἀπολύτρωσις and concludes that the evidence does not allow us to determine whether or not the idea of a ransom paid is inherent in the word or not.⁴¹ In the midst of his argument he writes that due to

the references in 1 Cor 6.20 [ἡγοράσθητε, *ēgorasthēte*] and 7.23 [ἡγοράσθητε] to Christians as having been bought with a price (cf. Gal 3.13 [ἐξηγόρασεν,

⁴⁰Dunn, *Romans 1-8*, 169.

⁴¹Cranfield, *Romans: Volume 1*, 207.

exēgorasen]; 4.5 [ἐξαγοράση, *exagorasē*]), and the presence in the NT of Mk 10.45 = Mt 20.28 [λύτρον, *lytron*]; Acts 20.28 [περιεποιήσατο, *periepoiēsato*]; 1 Tim 2.6 [ἀντίλυτρον, *antilytron*]; 1 Pet 1.18f [ἐλυτρώθητε, *elytrōthēte*]; 2 Pet 2.1 [ἀγοράσαντα, *agorasanta*]; Rev 5.9 [ἡγόρασας, *ēgorasas*], the possibility that Paul did have in mind the thought of a ransom paid, when he used ἀπολύτρωσις here, cannot be excluded either. We must therefore leave this question open.⁴²

Cranfield is not even limiting his discussion to cognates of λυτρόω. Many of the passages listed clearly refer to a ransom being paid, but this is derived from the context. Cranfield is presenting a concept study (of the New Testament perspective on a ransom as it relates to salvation) as though it is a word study of ἀπολύτρωσις. His suggestion that passages that speak of a ransom (with a number of different words) are directly relevant for determining the meaning of ἀπολύτρωσις is to commit *Illegitimate Totality Transfer*.

Moo is also guilty of *Illegitimate Totality Transfer* as he discusses passages in which a ransom price is found in connection to salvation through Jesus. Even though he notes instances of the word ἀπολύτρωσις in Hellenistic Greek where no idea of a ransom is indicated,⁴³ he still goes on to write:

The addition of ‘through his blood’ to ἀπολύτρωσις in Eph. 1:7 spells out the ‘price’ at which the liberation was accomplished. There is a similar emphasis on Christ’s death as a sacrifice in this context (v. 25), and this, coupled with the presence in Paul’s letters of statements such as ‘we were bought with a price’ (1

⁴²Cranfield, *Romans: Volume 1*, 207.

⁴³Moo writes: “The idea of ‘ransom’ is maintained in Josephus’s one use of ἀπολύτρωσις (*Ant.* 12.27) and of ἀπολυτρόω [*apolytroō*] (*J.W.* 2.273), and in one of Philo’s two uses of ἀπολύτρωσις (*Every Good Man Is Free* 114 – the word does not clearly refer to a ‘ransom’ in *Prel. Stud.* 109, nor does the verb in *Allegorical Interpretation* 3.21),” *Romans*, 229n51.

Cor. 6:20; 7:23; cf. also Gal. 3:13-14), makes it likely that ἀπολύτρωσις includes the notion of Christ's death as a ransom.⁴⁴

His error lies in taking the information from all of these contexts and applying it to the meaning of one Greek word.

Verse 25

ἱλαστήριον (*hilastērion*):⁴⁵ Morris falls victim to *Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning* in his discussion of this word. He writes: "The detailed examinations mentioned in n.

⁴⁴Moo, *Romans*, 230n51. He writes in the body of the commentary: "'Redemption' means, basically, 'liberation through payment of a price,'" *Romans*, 229. It is difficult to determine what he means by this. He goes on to talk about the use of ἀπολύτρωσις in Hellenistic Greek outside of the New Testament. Perhaps by "means," he intends to convey that "liberation through payment of a price" is how the word is regularly used in Hellenistic Greek (but see fn43, where his comments on Philo's use of the word are given). The unfortunate thing about this statement is that it is likely to encourage pastors who do not know Greek to adopt the "meaning" he gives for ἀπολύτρωσις. It would have been good for Moo to clarify what he meant by "means."

Morris concludes his discussion of ἀπολύτρωσις by saying: "What it tells us is that a great price was paid (Moffatt, 'ransom') to purchase sinners out of their slavery to sin (7:14), out of their sentence of death (6:23)," *Romans*, 179. He does not fully explain why he sees the idea of a ransom paid in ἀπολύτρωσις, partly because as he notes, he discusses the word more fully elsewhere ("in *The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross* (London and Grand Rapids, 1965, pp. 16-18)," *Romans*, 179n123. From what he has written, it appears that he may also be ignoring the fact that the context, rather than the word ἀπολύτρωσις, is where the idea of a ransom paid is drawn from. If this is the case, then Morris has also committed *Illegitimate Totality Transfer*.

⁴⁵Ziesler has a good discussion of this word. He considers the uses of ἱλαστήριον both within and without the New Testament, and concludes that it can be used for dealing with sin and guilt, or for dealing with God's wrath. Based upon the context in which Rom 3:25 is found, Ziesler concludes that it is sin and guilt ("expiation") which is being dealt with, *Romans*, 112-14.

Dunn writes: "Anyone familiar with the LXX could hardly be unaware that the word was always used in the LXX to refer to the golden cover of the ark of the covenant (Exod 25:17-22)," *Romans 1-8*, 180. Apparently Dunn overlooked Ezek 43:14, 17, 20; Amos 9:1.

Osborne discusses whether ἱλαστήριον refers to the appeasing of wrath or the atoning of sin. He then writes: "In reality, of course, these two options are not disjunctive. Both the appeasing of divine wrath and the forgiveness of sins are part of the concept," *Romans*, 97n3:25. Theologically, these may indeed be part of the same concept. However, Osborne is a little unclear as to whether he is making a theological statement, or discussing the meaning of ἱλαστήριον. If the latter, then it would need to be demonstrated, rather than stated, that both ideas are captured by the same word.

126 show that the word means ‘the removal of wrath.’”⁴⁶ Further on he writes: “Usage is decisive, and the usage of this noun shows that it means ‘propitiation’.”⁴⁷ Yet, as he goes on to discuss, he recognizes that ἱλαστήριον is used in the LXX to refer to the mercy seat, and with other meanings in Ezek 43:14, 17, 20, and Amos 9:1, including “the ledge of the altar.”⁴⁸ Nevertheless, he still concludes: “It seems clear that the word is understood to signify ‘means of propitiation’ or ‘propitiatory thing’.”⁴⁹ Morris’ fallacy lies in forcing every use of ἱλαστήριον to somehow reflect the meaning “propitiation.”

Moo has an excellent discussion of the uses of ἱλαστήριον, as well as of the context in which it is found at Rom 3:25. Unfortunately, he does not make a decision about the meaning that ἱλαστήριον contributes to this context. He writes:

Since this atonement takes place by means of Christ’s death as a sacrifice, and the word *hilastērion* includes reference to propitiation, translations such as ‘means of propitiation’ and ‘propitiatory sacrifice’ are not inaccurate. But they may be too restrictive. ‘Mercy seat’ would be all right if the broader theological connotations of the phrase were obvious; but, considering the breadth of the concept to which the term refers, the NIV and NRSV ‘sacrifice of atonement’ is as good as we can do.”⁵⁰

It is not the translation that is the problem, but the fact that Moo wants to find a

⁴⁶Morris, *Romans*, 180. The point made in the footnote is that the cognates of ἱλαστήριον all refer to propitiation. The evidence he gives to support this is Zech 7:2; 8:22; Mal 1:9 (along with a number of sources cited), all of which contain the verb ἐξιλάσκομαι (*exilaskomai*), *Romans*, 180n126.

⁴⁷Morris, *Romans*, 181. Morris writes that “some commentators find the concept of the divine wrath distasteful and unworthy; so they write it out of Scripture.” He goes on to say: “But unless the present term means the removal of wrath he [Paul] has left them there, still under God’s wrath,” *Romans*, 180-81. It seems that to Morris, unless ἱλαστήριον refers to the removal of God’s wrath, then the doctrinal belief that God’s wrath was assuaged by the death of Jesus will crumble to the floor. Yet, Ziesler is one commentator who would argue that ἱλαστήριον has more to do with expiation than propitiation, and yet still recognizes that the book of Romans speaks of God’s wrath, *Romans*, 113. It is not necessary to believe that ἱλαστήριον speaks of propitiation, in order to believe that God’s wrath toward humans is very real (as is its removal via the cross of Christ), as Morris would have us believe.

⁴⁸Morris, *Romans*, 181-82, 181n131.

⁴⁹Morris, *Romans*, 182.

⁵⁰Moo, *Romans*, 236.

translation that reflects every use of the word ἵλαστήριον. He has committed

Illegitimate Totality Transfer.⁵¹

ἐνδειξιν (*endeixin*): Moo seems to confuse the difference between a lexical analysis, and the determination of the meaning of a passage through the combination of the words in it, when he writes:

On the other hand, this ‘showing’ is probably to be understood as a ‘demonstration’ of something, as in Phil. 1:28 and 2 Cor. 8:24, so the notion of ‘proof’ cannot be entirely eliminated. God’s public display of Christ as ἵλαστήριον has, as at least one of its purposes, the demonstration that he is ‘righteous.’⁵²

Moo has committed *Illegitimate Totality Transfer* because he wants ἐνδειξιν in Rom 3:25 to reflect the word’s entire semantic range.

τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ (*tēs dikaiosynēs autou*): Moo writes in his introduction to Rom 3:21-26, “In making this last point, we are presuming that ‘righteousness of God,’ which refers in vv. 21-22 to the justifying act of God, refers in vv. 25-26 to the

⁵¹Mounce may also be guilty of the same fallacy when he writes: “The term *hilastērion* (translated ‘sacrifice of atonement’) has been understood either in the sense of ‘propitiation’ (in which the righteous anger of God is satisfied) or ‘expiation’ (a covering of the sins of humans). In the Greek Old Testament it translates a Hebrew term for the lid of the ark (the mercy seat). In Jewish practice the high priest entered the holy of holies once a year and sprinkled blood above the ark for the atonement of Israel’s sins. Paul was saying that Jesus is that ‘mercy seat’— that meeting place between God and humans where the great and final sacrifice has been made. The death of Christ expiates or covers the sins of the human race and at the same time propitiates the righteous anger of God against sin,” *Romans*, 39. If Mounce is saying that ἵλαστήριον in Rom 3:25 refers to the mercy seat, expiation, and propitiation, then he has committed *Illegitimate Totality Transfer*, trying to have the word include its entire semantic range in one occurrence. If he is arguing that ἵλαστήριον refers to the mercy seat, and then is discussing expiation and propitiation as the consequences of that, then Mounce has moved from a lexical analysis to a discussion of theology, and his comments are okay. It would have been best for him to state more explicitly what he sees as the meaning of ἵλαστήριον, and to clarify what his theology is, in light of Jesus being the ἵλαστήριον.

⁵²Moo, *Romans*, 237n91.

‘integrity’ of God, his always acting in complete accordance with his own character.”⁵³

He then writes in a footnote: “The jump from one to the other is not as great as might at first appear, since always lurking in ‘righteousness’ language is allusion to the character and person of God.”⁵⁴ It may be true from a theological standpoint that “righteousness” can only be determined in relation to God, but it is not true that the word itself always carries an “allusion to the character and person of God.” Moo has thus committed *Illegitimate Informational Transfer*.

Linguistically-Nuanced Language

Verse 21

Νυνὶ δὲ (*Nyni de*): Moo says that νυνὶ δὲ “is more likely to preserve its normal temporal meaning.”⁵⁵ The use of “normal” seems to be an emotive argument to support the meaning that Moo sees in Rom 3:21 (who wants to argue for an “abnormal” use of a word?). Likewise, Fitzmyer says that νυνὶ marks a temporal contrast, and makes no mention of the fact that it can be used to indicate a logical contrast, with no time reference involved.⁵⁶ It would have been better for both Moo and Fitzmyer to indicate that they are making an argument for the meaning of νυνὶ in Rom 3:21.

Morris could have been more careful when he wrote: “δέ [de] is adversative.”⁵⁷

⁵³Moo, *Romans*, 219.

⁵⁴Moo, *Romans*, 219n4.

⁵⁵Moo, *Romans*, 221.

⁵⁶Fitzmyer writes: “The adv. *nyni* is temporal and marks a new stage in salvation history, which moves beyond that of the law and the promises,” *Romans*, 343-44.

⁵⁷Morris, *Romans*, 173n95. He writes in the body of his commentary: “*But now* may be understood logically (Shedd, Godet); it is then seen as moving to the next step in the argument, not the next point in time. Or it may be temporal (Boylan, TH), moving to the next point in time. Or it may be

For the sake of clarification (particularly for his readers who do not know Greek), Morris would have been better to say: *δέ is adversative here.*

χωρὶς νόμου (*chōris nomou*): Morris is misleading when he writes: “The word *law* (not ‘the law’) is general. What is true of the Jewish law is true also of all other law.”⁵⁸ By saying that the Greek is not “the law,” Morris leaves the reader with the impression that because the Greek νόμου lacks the article, it is not a reference to the Jewish Law. Pastors could easily be led to commit *Basic Meaning via English*, expecting ὁ νόμος (*ho nomos*) to be used in the same way that “the law” is often used to refer to the Torah.⁵⁹

δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (*dikaiosynē theou*): Moo writes:

But what is this ‘righteousness of God’ (*dikaiosynē theou*)? Occurring only eight times in Romans (1:17; 3:5, 21, 22, 25, 26; 10:3 [twice]), the phrase bears an importance out of proportion to its frequency, and for three reasons. First, with the exception of 2 Cor. 5:21, Paul uses the phrase ‘righteousness of God’ only in Romans, . . .⁶⁰

His wording is misleading, because it is not actually the phrase δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ which occurs in every verse he lists. Four of the verses do have δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (Rom 1:17; 3:21, 22; 10:3 [2nd occurrence]), two of them have the word order reversed: θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην (Rom 3:5; 10:3 [1st occurrence, with the article τοῦ [*tou*] preceding θεοῦ),

both (Barrett): Paul is contrasting what people knew before the gospel came with what the gospel has revealed (cf. 16:25-26),” *Romans*, 173.

⁵⁸Morris, *Romans*, 174.

⁵⁹A legitimate argument with respect to the Greek article could be made if one was able to show that every time the Mosaic Law was in view, νόμος (*nomos*) was preceded by the article, and likewise that some other law was always in view when the article was absent.

⁶⁰Moo, *Romans*, 70. Square brackets are his.

and the remaining two read: τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ (*tēs dikaiosynēs autou*, Rom 3:25, 26).

In light of the verses that Moo uses to support his argument, it is significant that ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὐτοῦ (*hē dikaiosynē autou*) occurs in 2 Cor 9:9, and τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην (*tēn ek theou dikaiosynēn*) in Phil 3:9. Perhaps Moo has not mentioned these verses because the phrase in 2 Cor 9:9 is cited from Ps 112:9 (LXX 111:9), and it is a prepositional phrase in Phil 3:9. Yet there is no obvious linguistic reason why these verses are any less applicable than the ones Moo has chosen to examine. Moo seems to be blurring the lines between a concept study and a lexical analysis. He should have been clearer about what he was examining. A similar criticism is applicable for Morris, who does list Phil 3:9, but fails to mention 2 Cor 9:9.⁶¹

Moo also could have been clearer when he writes in one footnote: “Cf. Pss. 67:4 [LXX 66:5]; 94:15 [LXX 93:15]; and 89:14 [LXX 88:15] and 97:2 [LXX 96:2], where δικαιοσύνη appears to be parallel to εὐθύτης, ‘uprightness.’”⁶² These two words do not appear in a parallelism in any one of the four verses that Moo lists.⁶³ He is apparently arguing that the semantic ranges of δικαιοσύνη and εὐθύτης overlap, as seen by the

⁶¹In speaking about “the term *dikaioσune theou* (*tou theou* in 10:3),” Morris writes: “It is found eight times in this epistle (1:17; 3:5, 21, 22, 25, 26; 10:3 [*bis*]), as against twice in the other Pauline letters (2 Cor. 5:21; Phil. 3:9) and three times in the rest of the New Testament writings (Matt. 6:33; Jas. 1:20; 2 Pet. 1:1),” *Romans*, 100-101. Square brackets are his.

⁶²Moo, *Romans*, 83n18.

⁶³Εὐθύτης is found in Ps 67:4 (LXX 66:5), while δικαιοσύνη is found in the other three verses. On a positive note, Moo recognizes that a word does not necessarily have the same meaning in its every occurrence (“Paul uses ‘righteousness’ words in Romans in several different ways.”), and that different authors may use the same word with different nuances of meaning (“In intertestamental Judaism, *dikaioσynē* usually has this more ‘ethical’ flavor, a usage reflected in Matthew’s Gospel especially.”), *Romans*, 73, 81, cf. 85-86.

similar contexts in which they are found. It would have been good for Moo to state this, rather than to leave the reader in confusion with the ambiguous wording in his footnote.

Mounce follows Cranfield's interpretation of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ.⁶⁴ In so doing, he makes the following statement: "First, to be 'justified' (v. 24) means to be 'acquitted,' to be 'given a right standing.'"⁶⁵ The problem with this statement is that it could lead pastors to see a "basic meaning" in δικαιοσύνη which is present every time it occurs. In order to clarify that Mounce is arguing for a meaning of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in Rom 3:21-26, it would have been better for him to say: "*justified*" here is to be understood as: to be "acquitted," to be "given a right standing."

Osborne writes: "In the gospel *a righteousness [of] God is revealed (says from God, but see the following discussion).*"⁶⁶ Here Osborne is discussing δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in Rom 1:17, to which he has referred the reader at Rom 3:21.⁶⁷ As is evident in Osborne's later discussion, he is obviously aware of the fact that there is no preposition in the Greek. Therefore, he is simply misleading his readers when he states that the text "says *from God*." He would have been better to leave these three words out, and it would then become apparent to the reader that after discussing the Greek phrase, δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, Osborne is making an argument that it is most accurately translated as *righteousness from God*.

In his discussion of δικαιοσύνη, Dunn writes: "The concept which emerged from

⁶⁴Mounce, *Romans*, 37.

⁶⁵Mounce, *Romans*, 38.

⁶⁶Osborne, *Romans*, 41. Square brackets are his.

⁶⁷Osborne, *Romans*, 92.

the Greco-Roman tradition to dominate Western thought was of righteousness/justice as an ideal or absolute ethical norm against which particular claims and duties could be measured.”⁶⁸ It is unclear as to whether by “Western thought,” Dunn means during Paul’s day or his own. This lack of clarity could lead to an anachronistic understanding of “righteousness,” possibly creating even greater distancing between the concept of “righteousness” in Paul’s day and in the Old Testament than is appropriate. Dunn’s statement also confuses the difference between a concept and a definition of a word.

πεφανέρωται (*pephanerōtai*): Cranfield would have been better to rephrase his statement: “The verb φανεροῦν [*phaneroun*] (in Romans also in 1.19 and 16.26) is more or less synonymous with ἀποκαλύπτειν [*apokalyptein*].”⁶⁹ The semantic ranges of φανερόω and ἀποκαλύπτω do overlap. Yet they are not entirely synonymous, even in the writings of Paul. Ἀποκαλύπτω is used to indicate the making known of something (or someone) that is previously unknown (1 Cor 2:10; 3:13; 14:30; Gal 1:16; 3:23; Eph 3:5; Phil 3:15), or previously unseen (Rom 8:18; 2 Thess 2:3, 6, 8); perhaps in Rom 1:17-18 it is used to indicate the making known or revealing of something that was already known. The semantic range of φανερόω is broader than this. It too can refer to the making known of something (or someone) that is previously unknown (Rom 16:26; 1 Cor 4:5; Col 1:26) or previously unseen (Eph 5:13-14; Col 3:4). It is also used to refer to a message of some kind being made plain or clear (2 Cor 2:14; 7:12; 11:6; Col 4:4), to

⁶⁸Dunn, *Romans 1-8*, 40.

⁶⁹Cranfield, *Romans: Volume 1*, 202.

speak of humans appearing before the judgement seat of God (2 Cor 5:10), and to refer to something being evident to others (2 Cor 4:10-11; 5:11). The semantic ranges of φανερόω and ἀποκαλύπτω are not exactly the same. Therefore, it would have been better for Cranfield to write that the semantic ranges of the two words greatly overlap. They cannot be used interchangeably in every context in which they are found.⁷⁰

Verse 22

δικαιοσύνη δὲ θεοῦ (*dikaïosynē de theou*): Dunn is very misleading here. His gloss of

⁷⁰Dunn writes: “Paul reiterates the thematic assertion of 1:17, with φανερόω [*phaneroō*] used in place of ἀποκαλύπτω [*apokalyptō*] (but obviously as synonyms— *TDNT* 9:4; *EWNT* 3:988), [his discussion then moves into the grammatical],” *Romans 1-8*, 165. Dunn’s statement is fine as it stands, so long as “synonyms” is taken to mean that within the particular contexts of Rom 1:17 and 3:21, φανερόω and ἀποκαλύπτω are used without any noticeable difference in meaning. The *TDNT* article which Dunn quotes is not as good. Bultmann and Lührmann make the blanket statement: “Paul uses φανερόω and ἀποκαλύπτω synonymously. This may be seen especially in a comparison of R. 1:17 and 3:21. Only in 1 C. 4:5, an apocryphal quotation (→ VII, 442, 10ff.), and R. 1:19 do we detect in the usage the sense ‘to make visible.’ In the other references the main point is revelation in the Gospel. The reflexive is never used; specific things are always revealed,” Bultmann and Lührmann, “φανερόω,” 4. They then go on to discuss the use of φανερόω in specific passages. Bultmann and Lührmann seem to have been selective in the Pauline passages they have discussed, resulting in the fallacy of *Illegitimate Synonymy*. As discussed in the body of this chapter, the semantic ranges of φανερόω and ἀποκαλύπτω are not exactly the same. The context of a given passage must be examined in order to determine the exact meaning contributed by either word to that text. It cannot be assumed that Paul always uses these two words interchangeably.

Fitzmyer writes: “According to Bockmuehl (‘Das Verb *phaneroō*’), the Pauline use of *phaneroun* shows that it is not a simple synonym of *apokalyptein*. Paul uses the latter to express revelation, but the former to ‘make something evident,’ i.e., perceptible,” *Romans*, 279. He is good in recognizing that authors can use the same words to express different meanings. Unfortunately, his information regarding the uses of the two words in Pauline texts is inaccurate (see the body of this chapter).

I cannot help but note an inaccurate and therefore misleading statement by Osborne. It occurs in a discussion of Rom 1:17, but since he refers the reader to this verse at Rom 3:21, it seems appropriate to mention it in a footnote here. Osborne writes: “The term *revealed* [ἀποκαλύπτεται] is significant, referring to a near-apocalyptic (the transliteration of the term in English) event, the disclosure of God’s plan of salvation in human history,” *Romans*, 41. The transliteration of ἀποκαλύπτεται in English is *apokalyptetai*, not “near-apocalyptic,” as Osborne has incorrectly stated. This statement is particularly troublesome because of the connotations “apocalyptic” has for English speakers, particularly those who are familiar with the New Testament book of Revelation (Ἀποκάλυψις Ἰωάννου). Osborne’s “transliteration” will unfairly support his definition which he gives for ἀποκαλύπτεται: *the disclosure of God’s plan of salvation in human history*.

this phrase is: “that is, the righteousness of God.”⁷¹ He then says:

The absence of a verb in this fuller definition confirms the dynamic force of the concept itself— God’s action on behalf of those to whom he has committed himself (cf. Stuhlmacher, *Gerechtigkeit*, 87; Kertelge, *Rechtfertigung*, 75; Williams, ‘Righteousness,’ 272, has to supply the verb ‘to be’ in order to defend his interpretation of God’s righteousness as ‘an aspect of his nature’; but see again on 1:17 and 3:5).⁷²

Dunn discounts Williams’ interpretation in part on the basis that he has to include the verb “to be” in his translation. But so does Dunn: “that is.” Furthermore, even if Dunn had not used the verb “to be” in his translation, his comment confuses the issues of translation and meaning. An English translation may in some instances need to include the verb “to be” in order to convey accurately the sense of a Greek sentence which does not include such a verb. Dunn’s comment is, therefore, misleading for those who are not familiar with issues of translation.

διὰ πίστεως (*dia pisteōs*):⁷³ Osborne writes: “Michel (1975:599, 601-2) discusses the centrality of faith for Paul, noting that it is both saving faith called for in Gospel

⁷¹Dunn, *Romans 1-8*, 166.

⁷²Dunn, *Romans 1-8*, 166.

⁷³Dunn directs the reader to his discussion of πίστις (*pistis*) at 1:17, *Romans 1-8*, 166. He writes there: “As the verb πιστεύειν (‘believe’) shows, πίστις for Paul has the twofold sense: both of *belief that*— acceptance of the truth/reliability of what has been said (cf. [Rom] 4:3; 6:8; 10:9, 16; 1 Cor 11:18; Gal 3:6; 1 Thess 4:14; 2 Thess 2:11-12); but also of consequent *trust in*, reliance upon ([Rom] 4:5, 24; 9:33; 10:11; Gal 2:16; Phil 1:29), as expressed particularly in the initial act of being baptized, that is, identifying with Jesus in his death (6:3-4) and placing oneself under his lordship (10:9),” *Romans 1-8*, 43. Dunn here is giving references for the verb πιστεύω (*pisteuō*), and claiming that the semantic range of the verb is evident in the noun as well. Certainly there will be some overlap, but does it not need to be argued (and demonstrated), rather than just assumed that the semantic ranges of the verb and the noun will be equivalent? Dunn then says in the next line: “The old debate polarizing ‘objective’ faith and ‘subjective’ faith is passé (cf. Further Kuss, 131-54; Lührmann, *Glaube*, 55-59).” This statement is not particularly helpful. The fact that a particular debate is considered “passé” has nothing to do with the actual semantic range of the word πίστις. Such rhetoric is inadmissible in a lexical analysis.

proclamation and a gift of divine grace.”⁷⁴ He is not entirely clear about whether this statement is made in regard to πίστεως in Rom 3:22, or about πίστις (*pistis*) in all Pauline texts. It seems to be a theological statement about the concept of faith; Osborne would have done well to be a little clearer in order to help pastors avoid the fallacy of *Illegitimate Totality Transfer*.

οὐ γάρ ἐστιν διαστολή (*ou gar estin diastolē*): In making his argument that Paul has Jews and Gentiles in mind here, Moo includes a footnote which reads: “Cf. 10:12, where the same word — διαστολή (‘distinction’) — occurs.”⁷⁵ In Rom 10:12, Paul explicitly states: “there is no distinction between Jew and Greek.”⁷⁶ The only other occurrence of διαστολή, in the New Testament, is at 1 Cor 14:7, where the musical notes that instruments play are in view.⁷⁷ Moo’s footnote could easily result in pastors claiming that simply the presence of the word διαστολή, in Rom 3:22, serves as proof that Paul is talking about Jews and Gentiles. Moo should have been more careful to ensure that it is clear that such an understanding is derived from the *context* surrounding Rom 3:22, not the use of the word διαστολή.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Osborne, *Romans*, 93.

⁷⁵ Moo, *Romans*, 226n31.

⁷⁶ οὐ γάρ ἐστιν διαστολή Ἰουδαίου τε καὶ Ἑλληνος.

⁷⁷ “If even lifeless instruments, such as the flute or the harp, do not give distinct [διαστολήν] notes, how will anyone know what is played?”

⁷⁸ Morris has a good footnote, which reads: “διαστολή is used of the truth that there is no distinction between Jew and Greek (10:12), and again of a distinction between musical sounds (1 Cor. 14:7). In the matter of being sinners there is no distinguishing between one person and another,” *Romans*, 176.

Verse 23

ἥμαρτον (*hēmarton*):⁷⁹ Fitzmyer writes:

For Paul ‘sin’ is a missing of the mark (*hamartanein*). This Greek verb retains in Paul’s writings its basic meaning, ‘miss the mark,’ in other words, to fail to attain a moral goal or standard, as in classical Greek literature (Homer, *Iliad* 5.287; 9.501; *Odyssey* 13.214; 21.155; Aeschylus, *Prometheus vincetus* 26) and the LXX (Judg 20:16; Prov 8:36). But it also connotes transgression against nature, custom, law, or divine will. ‘To sin’ means to commit personal, individual acts in thought or execution from which evil results (*TDNT* 1.296-302, 308-11; *EDNT* 1.65-69).⁸⁰

It is evident above that Fitzmyer quickly moves from a discussion of the word ἥμαρτον (*hēmarton*) to a diachronic survey of the concept of “sin.”⁸¹ It is certainly a stretch to argue for a meaning of “to fail to attain a moral goal or standard” in all LXX texts, in light of passages such as Gen 20:9 and 40:1, where the idea of doing wrong to another human seems to be in view, or Gen 43:9, where “to feel guilt” seems to be a more appropriate translation. Furthermore, it is too much to say that ἥμαρτον will result in evil in many passages in Leviticus, where ἥμαρτον seems to be restricted to the breaking of one of Yahweh’s commandments (Lev 4:2-3, 14, 22-23). It would have been better for Fitzmyer to limit his comments to the use of ἥμαρτον within the New Testament, and in Pauline texts especially, comparing and contrasting its uses to other words which can be translated “sin” (such as πταίω [*ptaiō*], προαμαρτάνω

⁷⁹Morris says in his footnote: “Bengel gives the word a full meaning: ‘Both the original act of sin in paradise is denoted, and the sinful disposition, as also the acts of transgression flowing from it,’” *Romans*, 176. This so-called “full meaning” is actually *Illegitimate Totality Transfer*. Bengel is trying to load the word ἥμαρτον with every conceivable motive and act of sin in the history of the world. Note from the context of Rom 3:22, though, that the lack of distinction between Jew and Greek is in view here. To impose such a distinction on the original sin is at best an anachronistic reading of Gen 3, where only the first two humans created were present.

⁸⁰Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 135.

⁸¹This error is rampant within the *TDNT* article that Fitzmyer quotes.

[*proamartanō*], ὑπερβαίνω [*hyperbainō*], and ὀφείλω [*opheilō*]).

Osborne writes: “The verb *sinned* is global, referring to all the sins of the human race as a complete whole.”⁸² This sentence could result in pastors committing

Illegitimate Contextual Transfer. In order to clarify what he is saying, Osborne should have said something like: *The verb ἡμαρτον is used here to refer to all the sins of the human race as a complete whole.*

ὑστεροῦνται (*hysterountai*): Fitzmyer writes:

The vb. *hysterein* means ‘to come too late, fail to reach,’ but also to ‘lack’ something (see Ps 23:1; Luke 15:14; 1 Cor 1:7; 8:8); in the middle voice it can mean to ‘go without, come short of, fail to attain a goal’ (governing the gen. [see BAGD, 849]). Thus Paul maintains that all human beings remain, because of their sins, without a share in God’s glory, i.e., they have failed to attain the lot that was theirs and so cannot attain their destiny.⁸³

The problem here is that he gives a number of possible translations for different forms (and syntactical relations) of ὑστερέω, and then says, “Thus Paul . . .” This could lead pastors to commit *Illegitimate Informational Transfer*, simply choosing the translation that they like. It would have been good for Fitzmyer to leave out the lexical entry, and rather to simply explain why ὑστερέω contributes the meaning that it does to Rom 3:23.

⁸²Osborne, *Romans*, 94.

⁸³Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 347. Square brackets are his.

τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ (*tēs doxēs tou theou*):⁸⁴ Ziesler directs the reader to his discussion of δόξα (*doxa*) at Rom 1:23, where he writes: “There is usually about its use in biblical Greek some connotation of brightness, and by NT times it regularly denoted the brightness which surrounded God and which both revealed his presence and also prevented his being seen directly.”⁸⁵ The remainder of his discussion shows that Ziesler is aware of a broad semantic range of the word δόξα.⁸⁶ However, his sentence quoted above could easily lead pastors to commit *Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning*. He should have been more careful with his wording.

Verse 24

δικαιούμενοι (*dikaioumenoi*):⁸⁷ Mounce would have been better to rephrase the following sentence from one of his footnotes: “δικαίωω [*dikaioō*] means ‘to declare righteous.’”⁸⁸ Luke 10:29 is a good example of a verse where δικαίωω does not mean “to declare righteous.”⁸⁹ In order to discourage pastors from committing *Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning*, it would have been better for Mounce to write that δικαίωω *here means* “to declare righteous.”

⁸⁴Morris lists the interpretations of this phrase given by many commentators, and then interestingly writes: “Commentators tend to read their own meaning into the passage,” *Romans*, 177. This is a wise caution to do exegesis well.

⁸⁵Ziesler, *Romans*, 78, 110.

⁸⁶It quickly becomes evident that δόξα does not *always* carry a connotation of “brightness.” See, for example: Matt 4:8; Luke 17:18; 24:26; John 2:11; 5:41, 44; 7:18; 8:50; 9:24; 12:43; 17:22; Acts 12:23.

⁸⁷Dunn writes: “The passive indicative participle of δικαίωω [*dikaioō*] is without parallel in Paul,” *Romans 1-8*, 168. He is evidently speaking here of the present passive indicative participle, for the aorist passive indicative participle occurs at Rom 5:1, 9; Titus 3:7.

⁸⁸Mounce, *Romans*, 116n13.

⁸⁹Luke 10:29 reads: “But he, desiring to justify [δικαιῶσαι] himself, said to Jesus, ‘And who is my neighbor?’”

Ziesler directs the reader to his discussion of δικαίω at Rom 3:20, where he writes: “If we take the verb to mean the bringing of men and women into right relationship with God, whether or not in terms of a forensic acquittal, then this verse says that such a relationship is not achieved by keeping the Law.”⁹⁰ In order to prevent pastors from committing *Illegitimate Totality Transfer*, Ziesler would have been better to say: *If we take the verb to mean here the bringing of men and women . . .*

δωρεάν (*dōrean*): Dunn gives the glosses: “as a gift, without payment” for δωρεάν.⁹¹ Yet I was unable to find a single passage in which δωρεάν clearly referred to a gift. Every passage that contains δωρεάν could more appropriately be glossed “for nothing,” “without payment,” or “without cause.” *BDAG* says that δωρεάν is the accusative of δωρεά (*dōrea*), used as an adverb.⁹² Yet even if δωρεάν is morphologically related to δωρεά, this does not mean that its use as an adverb will reflect the semantic range of the noun δωρεά. Without stronger evidence, it seems that the gloss, “as a gift,” has been forced upon δωρεάν due to its connection to δωρεά.

Likewise, Moo writes: “Gk. δωρεάν, the adverbial form of δωρεά, which means ‘gift’ (cf. 2 Cor. 9:15).”⁹³ And Morris writes: “δωρεάν is the accusative of δωρεά, ‘gift’, used as an adverb (cf. NASB, ‘as a gift’).”⁹⁴ Neither Moo nor Morris seem to consider the possibility that the adverb could have a different meaning than the noun.

⁹⁰Ziesler, *Romans*, 105.

⁹¹Dunn, *Romans 1-8*, 168.

⁹²*BDAG*, 266.

⁹³Moo, *Romans*, 228n41.

⁹⁴Morris, *Romans*, 178n15.

A similar criticism is appropriate for Cranfield, who recognizes that δωρεάν is “the accusative of δωρεά used as an adverb,” and then says: “It describes here the manner of their justification as that of a free gift, gratis.”⁹⁵ However, it is good to see that Cranfield includes the clarification, “here,” to indicate that justification is not in view every time δωρεάν is found in the New Testament.

χάριτι (*chariti*): Dunn directs the reader to his discussion of this word at Rom 1:5, where he calls χάρις (*charis*) “one of the great words which Christian vocabulary owes particularly to Paul,” and says that it is used “especially to express God’s free and unstinting concern in its outreach to humankind, in a way for which the LXX provided only partial precedent.”⁹⁶ After discussing its use in the LXX, Dunn then writes: “In Paul, however, χάρις is never merely an attitude or disposition of God (God’s character as gracious); consistently it denotes something much more dynamic—the wholly generous *act* of God.”⁹⁷ Dunn’s discussion of χάρις does not reflect the broad semantic range of the word, nor the many different ways it is used by Paul.⁹⁸ It would have been better for Dunn to explain that he is only concerned with Paul’s uses of χάρις in

⁹⁵Cranfield, *Romans: Volume 1*, 205-06.

⁹⁶Dunn, *Romans 1-8*, 16.

⁹⁷Dunn, *Romans 1-8*, 17.

⁹⁸For example, χάρις is used as part of a typical greeting (Gal 1:3), to express “thanks” (2 Cor 2:14; 1 Tim 1:12), to express the “favour” of being able to help others materially (2 Cor 8:4), and to signify what our speech should give to those who hear it (Eph 4:29).

reference to God; this would help prevent pastors from seeing “the wholly generous *act* of God” in some of the word’s other uses.⁹⁹

ἀπολυτρώσεως (*apolytrōseōs*): Osborne’s discussion shows a good concern for linguistic issues. Considering the concept of “ransom,” Osborne writes: “Moreover, many New Testament passages contain no hint of a payment made to ransom people (Mk 10:45; Lk 21:28; 1 Cor 1:30; Eph 1:14; 4:30; Heb 9:15; 11:35).”¹⁰⁰ He concludes his discussion by saying: “Therefore, the student must allow the context to determine whether the *redemption* passage emphasizes the price paid to free the person or the liberation that is effected.”¹⁰¹ Osborne does argue that a payment for ransom is in view in Rom 3:24, but he arrives at this conclusion from the context, *not* from the word ἀπολυτρώσεως itself.¹⁰²

Mounce writes in a footnote: “ἀπολύτρωσις (*apolytrōsis*) is a word rich with

⁹⁹Dunn writes: “Like ‘Spirit,’ with which it overlaps in meaning (cf., e.g., [Rom] 6:14 and Gal 5:18), it denotes effective divine power in the experience of men and women,” *Romans 1-8*, 17. After having compared the two verses listed by Dunn, it seems rather that those who have experienced grace are led by the Spirit. It is difficult to understand what Dunn means when he says: “For χάρις, a dynamic word like δικαιοσύνη [*dikaïosynē*], as denoting God’s outreach in gracious power, see on 1:5. Where δικαιοσύνη, however, is qualified by the relationship to which it refers, χάρις denotes the unconditional character of God’s action— an emphasis doubled by conjoining it here with δωρεάν [*dōrean*]; cf. particularly 5:15; ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι [*hē dōrea en chariti*],” *Romans 1-8*, 168.

¹⁰⁰Osborne, *Romans*, 96n3:24.

¹⁰¹Osborne, *Romans*, 96-97n3:24. Ziesler also shows a good concern for context when he writes: “There is no reason to suppose that in the use of this word there is any suggestion of a price paid to the Devil or to anyone else, any more than there was in the case of Israel’s redemption from Egypt. Yet this is not to deny that the redemption was costly, for it involved the death of Christ on the cross,” *Romans*, 111.

¹⁰²In presenting the arguments given by those who claim that no ransom price is suggested by the word ἀπολύτρωσις itself, Moo writes: “More important, the verb λυτρόω [*lytroō*], from which ἀπολύτρωσις is derived, and which occurs 104 times, translates Hebrew words (mainly גָּאָל [*gā’al*] and פָּדָה [*pādah*]) that usually mean simply ‘liberate,’ ‘set free’ – no notion of a price paid for that liberation (a ransom) is generally present,” *Romans*, 229n50. Osborne does not make this argument; to do so would be to commit the fallacy of: *Defining a Greek Word via Hebrew or vice versa*.

meaning. It was used of buying back prisoners of war, slaves, and condemned criminals by the payment of a ransom (λύτρον [*lytron*]).”¹⁰³ It would have been good for Mounce to write instead that ἀπολύτρωσις *is a word able to be used in a number of different contexts*. This would help prevent pastors from taking the information in every context in which ἀπολύτρωσις is found, along with the word as its meaning, thus resulting in *Illegitimate Totality Transfer*.

Mounce is also misleading when he writes: “The basic meaning of the Greek word *apolutrōsis* is ‘freed by ransom’ or ‘redemption’ (of prisoners or slaves).”¹⁰⁴ By “basic meaning,” he seems to mean that “freed by ransom” or “redemption” are the most common translations given for ἀπολύτρωσις. He would have been better to write something like: *The most common glosses given for the Greek word ἀπολύτρωσις are “freed by ransom” or “redemption” (often of prisoners or slaves)*. Mounce then goes on to write: “‘To redeem’ means ‘to buy back.’ ‘You are not your own,’ said Paul; ‘you were bought at a price’ (1 Cor 6:19-20). To be redeemed means to have been freed from the marketplace of sin by the payment of a ransom.”¹⁰⁵ Mounce’s statement that “to redeem” *means* “to buy back” could easily lead pastors to develop their understanding of the passage from the English, “to buy back,” thus committing the fallacy of *Basic Meaning via English*. The quote from 1 Cor 6 could also lead to *Illegitimate Contextual Transfer*, suggesting that ἀπολύτρωσις means something because of what a sentence in a different Pauline passage says. His final sentence would have been better if it was

¹⁰³Mounce, *Romans*, 116n15.

¹⁰⁴Mounce, *Romans*, 38.

¹⁰⁵Mounce, *Romans*, 38-39.

completely rephrased to something like: *Paul is suggesting here that humans are freed from the marketplace of sin by the payment of a ransom.* This would move the discussion from a pure lexical analysis, to a consideration of the sentence and discourse as a whole.

διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρόσεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ (*dia tēs apolytrōseōs tēs en Christō Iēsou*): Fitzmyer says this phrase points to the fact that humans are not only justified, but also redeemed by Christ Jesus. He then says about “redemption”: “Succinctly put, it denotes that Christ Jesus by his death on the cross has emancipated or ransomed humanity from its bondage to sin.”¹⁰⁶ Fitzmyer is discussing the use of ἀπολύτρωσις in this context. It would have been good, then, for him to say that *it denotes here that Christ Jesus . . .*

Verse 25

προέθετο (*proetheto*):¹⁰⁷ Ziesler is misleading when he writes:

the verb *proetheto*, in RSV rendered ‘put forward’, could be taken in a quite general way to mean ‘purpose’ (so Cranfield I, p. 209), but it may be used as a technical term for the bringing of a sacrifice (so cautiously Barrett, p. 77). In view of what immediately follows, a sacrificial meaning is quite likely.¹⁰⁸

He presents “put forward,” “purpose,” and “a technical term for the bringing of a

¹⁰⁶Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 348.

¹⁰⁷In his discussion of προτίθημι (*protithēmi*), Cranfield writes: “and ‘purpose’ is also the meaning of the cognate noun πρόθεσις [*prothesis*] in eight of its twelve occurrences in the NT [means LXX] (in the others it is used with reference to the shewbread),” *Romans*, 209. This means that one third of its uses in the LXX support the other meaning that Cranfield considers, “set forth publicly, display,” *Romans: Volume 1*, 208.

¹⁰⁸Ziesler, *Romans*, 112.

sacrifice” as if they are all equally possible meanings for προτίθημι (*protithēmi*). Yet it seems that the only support for the so-called “sacrificial meaning” is this comment in *BDAG*: “But the act., at least, seems to have had the mng. *offer* as well (s. SIG 708, 15 w. the editor’s note 5; 714, 16-18, and M-M.; also ZPE 3, ’68, 166 n. 9).”¹⁰⁹ It would have been better for Ziesler to say that the “sacrificial meaning” has been suggested, and based upon the context he thinks it is correct.

Mounce writes: “Although the term ‘propitiation’ may not be the best translation, the Greek term is best understood as the placating of God’s wrath against sin.”¹¹⁰ In order to discourage pastors from committing *Illegitimate Totality Transfer* or *Illegitimate Contextual Transfer*, it would have been better for Mounce to write: *Although the word “propitiation” may not be the best translation, the Greek word is best understood here as “the placating of wrath,” thus in this context, “the placating of God’s wrath against sin.”*

ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι (*en tō autou haimati*): Cranfield writes:

In [Rom] 5.9 ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ [*en tō haimati autou*] corresponds to διὰ τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ [*dia tou thanatou tou huiou autou*] in the following verse, and in the Ephesians [1:7; 2:13] and Colossians [1:20] passages cited above the use of αἷμα [*haima*] could perhaps be explained as simply a way of expressing the idea of death; but in 1 Cor 11.25, the three Synoptic verses [Matt 26:28; Mark 14:24; Luke 22:20], and the Hebrews [9:11ff; 10:19, 29; 13:12, 20], 1 Peter [1:2, 19] and 1 John [1:7; 5:6] passages, a sacrificial significance is clearly present, and it seems probable that in the other passages cited above also

¹⁰⁹*BDAG*, 889.

¹¹⁰Mounce, *Romans*, 117.

a sacrificial significance attaches to the use of the word ἄϊμα, whether felt more or less strongly.¹¹¹

It seems better to take ἄϊμα as an instance of metonymy for death; the idea of sacrifice comes from the context in which the word is found, *not* the word ἄϊμα.

Verse 26

ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ (*en tē anochē tou theou*): Morris writes: “‘Forbearance’, of course, means God’s withholding of punishment when he might have inflicted it.”¹¹² He would have been better to write: “*Forbearance*” here means . . . This would clarify that Morris is discussing the use of ἀνοχή (*anochē*) in Rom 3:26, rather than its meaning in every context. Pastors could be encouraged to commit *Illegitimate Contextual Transfer* as a result of Morris’ statement.

ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ (*en tō nun kairō*): Dunn is good when he writes: “καιρός [*kairos*] here denotes not just a moment in time or the passage of time, but time pregnant with significance– the appointed time, the time of opportunity, whose decisions and actions will determine the future.”¹¹³ By his use of “here,” Dunn shows that his argument is based upon the context of Rom 3:26, rather than making a statement of what καιρός *always* means.

Cranfield also demonstrates a good concern for context when he writes in a

¹¹¹Cranfield, *Romans: Volume 1*, 210-11.

¹¹²Morris, *Romans*, 183.

¹¹³Dunn, *Romans 1-8*, 174.

footnote:

That in each of these three passages of Romans [3:26; 8:18; 11:5] the time denoted by ὁ νῦν καιρός [*ho nun kairos*] is thought of by Paul as specially significant and critical is certain; but the special significance attaching to the expression derives from the context rather than from any special associations of the word καιρός; for, while it is true that in classical Greek καιρός means characteristically the right time, the exact or critical time, opportunity, season, and in the Bible it can denote especially the critical time determined by God, the time which God's decision has filled with special significance (as, for example, in Mk 1.15; 13.33), it can also be used quite generally either of a point, or of a period, of time.¹¹⁴

Cranfield is aware that it is the context, rather than the word καιρός which indicates the significance of the time in view.

καὶ δικαιοῦντα (*kai dikaiounta*): Fitzmyer writes: "Blackman (*JBL* 87 [1968]: 204) still toys with the possibility of translating *kai* as *kaiper*, 'although.'" ¹¹⁵ Fitzmyer's wording makes it seem that the gloss, "although" is not legitimate for καί, and that Blackman is treating καὶ in Rom 3:26 as though it were the word καίπερ (*kaiper*). If this is what Fitzmyer meant, he should have said it. If Fitzmyer considers "although" to be a possible gloss for καί in some contexts,¹¹⁶ it would have been better for him to write something like: *Blackman still toys with the possibility of translating καὶ as "although" (similar to καίπερ).*

¹¹⁴Cranfield, *Romans: Volume 1*, 212n2.

¹¹⁵Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 353. Square brackets are his.

¹¹⁶As it seems he does, for after considering the implications of translating καὶ as "although," Fitzmyer writes: "The context, however, seems to be all against such an interpretation, which is really born of later theological considerations, especially those of Anselm," *Romans*, 353.

“Literally”

Fitzmyer was once again the most prolific user of the word “literally,” consistently in his twelve uses to demonstrate the Greek syntax.¹¹⁷ His most perplexing use of the word is when he says that εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον in v. 26 is “Lit., ‘in order that he (God) may be upright.’”¹¹⁸ Fitzmyer’s “literal” translation does not indicate the presence of the present active infinitive of εἶμί (*eimi*), but rather gives the impression that the Greek contains a subjunctive verb (“may be”). His translation also has a personal pronoun (“he”), when there is not one in the Greek. In v. 25, Fitzmyer chooses the word “for” in his “literal” translation of εἰς (*eis*), which is certainly not a common gloss for the Greek preposition. The final problem with Fitzmyer’s “literal” translations is his treatment of the Greek article. Twice he includes the English “the” where there is no Greek article,¹¹⁹ and twice he has no English word to take the place of the Greek article.¹²⁰ He replaces the Greek article once with the word “those,”¹²¹ and once with “him.”¹²²

Ziesler uses the word “literally” twice. In his first use he attempts to show that the Greek contains a participle rather than a finite verb, saying of δικαιούμενοι: “Literally, v. 24 begins ‘being justified.’”¹²³ His second use is in reference to the preposition ἐν (*en*) in v. 24. He says in a footnote: “Compare 2¹² and 3¹⁹, where ‘under

¹¹⁷Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 344–48, 350–53.

¹¹⁸Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 353.

¹¹⁹Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 345, 353.

¹²⁰Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 348.

¹²¹Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 346.

¹²²Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 353.

¹²³Ziesler, *Romans*, 110.

the law' is literally 'in the law'.¹²⁴ Rom 2:12 has ἐν νόμῳ (*en nomō*), whereas 3:19 reads, ἐν τῷ νόμῳ (*en tō nomō*). Ziesler's "literal" translation makes it appear as though the syntax of the prepositional phrases in Rom 2:12 and 3:19 are the same, when they are not.

Morris is the only other commentator to use the word "literally," and he only uses it once. He says that τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ in v. 26 is "more literally, 'who is of faith in Jesus'."¹²⁵ His "literal" translation may show the syntax better than the English translation he is comparing it to ("the man who has faith in Jesus"), but it still hides the ambiguity of the genitive construction in the Greek prepositional phrase.

Conclusion

There were more lexical fallacies committed within the commentaries examined for Rom 3:21-26 than all other passages combined. Moo (scholar) committed the most lexical fallacies; more than twice as many as anyone else. As a whole, the commentaries which were primarily intended for pastors exhibited fewer fallacies than those intended for scholars (Morris was the one exception, committing five fallacies). These low numbers are likely due to the fact that the "pastor" commentaries contain fewer discussions about words than do the "scholar" ones. All of the commentators would have been better to use more linguistically-nuanced language. Two of the most significant issues were a failure to clarify when the meaning of a word in a particular context was

¹²⁴Ziesler, *Romans*, 112ng.
¹²⁵Morris, *Romans*, 184.

being given, as opposed to all of its occurrences, and careless wording which could influence pastors to take information found in the sentences as part of the meaning of a word. A list of all the commentaries, along with the fallacies they committed in Rom 3:21-26, has been included below for ease of reference.

Fallacies Listed by Commentary

Scholar:

Moo (11): *The Root Fallacy, Etymologizing, Illegitimate Totality Transfer (x5), Illegitimate Informational Transfer, Defining a Greek Word via Hebrew or vice versa (x2), Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning, Illegitimate Synonymy*

Cranfield (4): *Illegitimate Totality Transfer (x2), Defining a Greek Word via Hebrew or vice versa (x2)*

Dunn (4): *[2+2]= The Meaning of a Compound Word, Illegitimate Totality Transfer, Illegitimate Informational Transfer, Defining a Greek Word via Hebrew or vice versa*

Fitzmyer (4): *Etymologizing, [2+2]= The Meaning of a Compound Word, Illegitimate Totality Transfer, Defining a Greek Word via Hebrew or vice versa, Equating a Central Core of Meaning across Languages*

Pastor:

Ziesler (0): *n/a*

Mounce (2): *Etymologizing, Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning*

Osborne (1): *Illegitimate Contextual Transfer*

Morris (5): *The Root Fallacy, Basic Meaning via English, Illegitimate Contextual Transfer, Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning (x2)*

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

This study commenced with a discussion of some linguistic principles and issues which have a direct bearing upon the meanings of words. It was noted that each language is a coherent structure, so that each word in that language bears a unique semantic range. Since each language is structured differently, the meaning of a word is not best understood through translation into another language (such as English), but by considering its uses in the contexts in which it is found. Primary importance in determining word meaning is to be placed upon a synchronic study of words, that is, the uses of words in the same time period, rather than throughout the history of the language (a diachronic study).

Evangelical pastors who wish to determine the meanings of words in the biblical text will often turn to commentaries for guidance. The degree to which that information will be valuable is directly related to the degree to which commentators conduct lexical analyses using a modern linguistic approach. In order to examine the accuracy of lexical analyses in commentaries, a list of sixteen lexical fallacies was composed. Eight commentaries were then chosen for each one of the four biblical passages studied: Gen 15:1-6; Isa 53:1-6; Luke 18:1-8; Rom 3:21-26. Those thirty-two commentaries were further sub-divided into the categories of “scholar” and “pastor,” in order to consider the differences between commentaries which are intended for different audiences. Lexical

fallacies and the use of linguistically-nuanced language (or lack thereof) were discussed within the commentaries.

Lexical Fallacies and Linguistically-Nuanced Language

Many lexical fallacies were found in the commentaries examined, but far more significant was the lack of linguistically-nuanced language, which could easily lead pastors to make errors in their statements from the pulpit about Hebrew and Greek words. Three significant observations are worth mentioning in regard to the fallacies. First, a predominant number of the fallacies committed were a result of confusing the difference between a word's meaning, and the meaning of the sentence(s) in which that word is found. Far too many commentators take the information that is found in biblical passages and present it as the meaning of a specific word in that passage. This becomes particularly problematic when that meaning is transferred (either by the commentator or the pastor) to a different passage in which that same word is found.

Second, a significant number of the lexical fallacies were committed with words which are considered to be theologically significant. The words of James Barr are pertinent here: "Theological thought of the type found in the NT has its characteristic linguistic expression not in the word individually but in the word-combination or sentence."¹ This wise advice needs to be heeded more readily by commentators. What makes the written message of the Gospel (and everything else communicated in Scripture) so unique and important is not primarily found in the individual words used to

¹Barr, *Semantics*, 233.

convey it, but rather the sentences which formulate that message.

Third, lexical fallacies were more frequently committed in “scholar” commentaries than were committed in “pastor” commentaries. This observation must be tempered by the understanding that commentaries primarily intended for scholars by and large contained many more lexical analyses than commentaries primarily intended for pastors. This is not to say that the exegetical observations in “pastor” commentaries are more accurate than those in “scholar” commentaries. Rather, it simply means that “pastor” commentaries less frequently present justification for the conclusions they have drawn in their exegetical study.

A lack of linguistically-nuanced language was evident throughout both “scholar” and “pastor” commentaries. Three recurring problems in particular are worth mentioning here. First, a surprising amount of misinformation was given by commentators. Statements about word usage were made which are simply not true. This is particularly problematic when incorrect statements are made about Hebrew and Greek words in commentaries that are used by pastors who only understand English. They will not have the resources or knowledge necessary to check the information given about Hebrew and Greek words in order to determine if what is said is true or not. Even those pastors who do know Hebrew or Greek may trust the information given by the commentators due to their busy schedules, and limited time available for exegetical study. Related to this problem is when a commentator says that they are giving references or information about a particular word, when in fact the references or information given are for cognate forms of that word or a number of words which can be translated by the same English word.

Pastors will think that the references and information given apply to the one word under study, and may then draw fallacious conclusions about the semantic range of that word.

Second, commentators are not careful enough to clarify when they are making comments about a word in a particular context, when they are giving the semantic range of that word, and when they are discussing the meaning of the entire sentence or passage in which a word is found. This lack of clarification could quite easily result in pastors committing fallacies such as *Illegitimate Totality Transfer*, *Illegitimate Informational Transfer*, *Illegitimate Contextual Transfer*, and *Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning*.

Third is an issue which was discussed separately from lexically-nuanced language in the previous four chapters: the use of the word “literally.” The two most common uses of the word “literally” were (i) to give the most regularly-used English gloss of a word, and (ii) to attempt to show the syntactical structure of the Hebrew or Greek phrase. Even if these were the only uses of the word “literally,” there would still be a significant hindrance to understanding caused by each one. The first (i) use has the potential to result in the fallacies of *Basic Meaning via English* and *Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning*. The semantic range of Hebrew and Greek words will not be precisely paralleled by the semantic range of any English word. Therefore, understanding of a biblical passage can potentially be hindered when a pastor starts with the “literal” translation of a word, and thereby trades the semantic range of the Hebrew or Greek word for the semantic range of the English word, because it is supposedly the “literal” meaning of that word.

It is difficult to understand how the second (ii) use can result in anything except confusion and misapprehension of the significance of a biblical passage. The syntactical

structure of each language is unique, because each language is a coherent structure. Furthermore, the semantic range of the words in one language will not precisely parallel the semantic range of the words in any other language. This means that if word-combinations in English are forced into a syntactical structure of a different language, the resulting meaning which is communicated will not necessarily be the same as was communicated in the source language. Even if by reading the “literal” translation a pastor recognizes that, for example, the Greek phrase is a genitive construction, without any knowledge of Greek syntax the pastor will interpret the significance of that structure by reverting to their knowledge of an English genitive construction, rather than a Greek one. This will undoubtedly result in grammatical fallacies as a result of imposing the structure of the English language upon the Hebrew or Greek language.

Commentators were not consistent in their “literal” translations. When using “literally” for the first (i) use, they did not always give the most common English gloss for the Hebrew or Greek word. When using “literally” for the second (ii) use, they did not always accurately portray the syntactical structure of the source language. For instance, the “literal” translation sometimes included a definite article, when no article was present in the Hebrew or Greek. Similarly, the “literal” translation did not always contain a definite article when an article was there in the Hebrew or Greek. There were also instances where it was difficult to determine what the commentator was trying to convey through their “literal” translation.

The discrepancies in how the word “literally” is used by commentators will cause much confusion and misunderstanding in the minds of pastors. Those who do not know

Hebrew and Greek will not be able to compare the “literal” translation to the source language in order to determine the significance of that translation. Pastors may draw exegetical conclusions from the “literal” translations which do not do justice to what is written in the Hebrew or Greek text. It will be best if commentators remove the word “literally” from their vocabularies. Rather than giving a “literal” translation, it will be much more productive (and accurate) to state the significance of the Hebrew and Greek words which was intended to be communicated through the use of the word “literally.”

After discussing the many problems in how lexical analyses are conducted in commentaries, one can quickly become discouraged by the conclusions drawn in this thesis. Should lexical analysis be abandoned? It is tempting to suggest “yes,” perhaps thinking that if lexical analyses are not conducted, then the types of errors noted in this thesis will no longer be committed. However, unless one knows the meanings of the words in a sentence, it is impossible to understand the sentence. Lexical analysis is an essential component to exegetical study; rather than abandoning it, the principles learned from modern linguistic study need to be incorporated into it.

Training Pastors for Lexical Analysis

In order to adequately prepare pastors to conduct lexical analyses, many Bible college and seminary professors will need to make changes in how they teach Hebrew and Greek to their students. A number of suggestions which can be grouped into two categories will be made for how the biblical languages can be more ably taught. First, more attention needs to be placed on the context in which words are found. First-year

language courses naturally focus on morphology, and students certainly need to be able to recognize a noun or a verb before they can analyse and comprehend how one of those words is being used in a particular context. However, due to the high numbers of students who do not continue to study and use Hebrew and Greek after graduation, many professors seek to encourage students to use their knowledge of a biblical language immediately in their exegetical study. For example, in their introductory Hebrew grammar textbook, Pratico and Van Pelt include exegetical insights after each chapter, written by various authors, of which they say:

This mix of contributors, with different levels of exposure to the language, should be an encouragement that any level of competence with the language can provide a better understanding of the Old Testament and enhance one's effectiveness in the communication of biblical truth.²

A pastor who is only able to recognize that a particular word is a noun, verb, or adjective, without having any understanding of the language's syntactical structure, is completely unable to conduct a lexical analysis which adequately takes context into consideration. This pastor's only ability with the language will be to find the word in a lexicon, read what is said there, and choose a meaning which seems to work in the passage.

Even if the first-year student has the competence to recognize that a particular word is found in, for example, a genitive construction, they will be completely unable to determine the significance of this fact, or its influence upon a word's meaning. From the very beginning of a student's study in the biblical languages, it is essential that they be shown the importance of syntax for determining the meaning that a word contributes to

²Pratico and Van Pelt, *Basics of Biblical Hebrew*, x.

the sentence in which it is found. No student should complete a first-year Hebrew or Greek grammar course, without having been taught that a word's meaning cannot be determined without considering the syntagmatic relationships in which it occurs in a given context.

Many professors will undoubtedly shy away from teaching this type of information out of fear that more students will be driven away from language study. If students cannot immediately see a pay-off in their own exegetical study, it seems unlikely that they will spend the countless hours necessary to learn the Hebrew or Greek languages. However, if students can be shown how the knowledge they are gaining today can be used tomorrow, perhaps they will be motivated to continue their language studies. It must also be seriously considered whether it is more beneficial to have a large number of pastors using a small amount of Hebrew or Greek knowledge to conduct lexical analyses divorced from context, or to have those pastors carefully exegeting the sentences of their English Bibles. Students who have the ability and desire can then go on to learn enough Hebrew or Greek to be able to consider the syntagmatic relationships and contextual factors that are so essential for conducting accurate lexical analyses.

Second, more professors need to teach Hebrew and Greek language courses from a modern linguistic perspective. In regard to lexical analysis, this means that it must be taught that words have a semantic range. Far too many pastors commit the fallacy of *Illegitimate Central Core of Meaning* because they do not understand that a word will have different nuances of meaning in the various contexts in which it is found. The importance of considering a word's relationship to the other words in that language must

also be taught. Those relationships include syntagmatic ones, that is, the word-combinations that are used to form sentences, and paradigmatic ones, that is, the words in a language that can be used to fill the same slot in a sentence. Students need to be taught to ask: *Why has the author used this word here?* Thus, when a pastor comes across the Hebrew word אָדָם ('ādām), they need to consider the significance of the fact that it has been chosen to fill a particular slot in a sentence, rather than אִשׁ ('iš).

Teaching the biblical languages from a modern linguistic perspective also means emphasizing the fact that theological implications and truths need to be drawn from the sentences, rather than from the words that are used to form those sentences. Far too many pastors suggest great theological ramifications from the fact that a particular word which is considered to be theologically important in one passage is then found in another passage. The recognition that words have a semantic range, and that theological truths are conveyed through word-combinations, or sentences, rather than through individual words in isolation, will help pastors avoid lexical fallacies.

A greater emphasis needs to be placed on comprehension of words as they function within a language, rather than on translation. A student who is able to translate a Hebrew or Greek passage will not necessarily be able to explain how a particular word in that passage relates to the other words. Translation places the focus on the receptor language, which in Canada is primarily the English language. Thus, teaching the biblical languages with a focus on translation could easily lead to the fallacy of *Basic Meaning via English*. One possible way to avoid an undue focus on translation is to provide definitions for words, rather than glosses. One recent attempt to do this is T. Muraoka's *Greek-*

English Lexicon of the Septuagint.

Particularly in Hebrew and Greek exegesis courses, students should be taught to use their knowledge of modern linguistics to critically evaluate what they read in commentaries. Rather than blindly accepting what a commentator has said about the meaning of a Hebrew or Greek word, students should be able to recognize when language has been used that is not linguistically-nuanced. Especially in such a case, students can learn to carefully conduct a lexical analysis to determine if what the commentator has said is true or not.

After examining lexical analyses in thirty-two commentaries, it is clear that in spite of James Barr's criticisms in 1961, the advances in modern linguistic study have not been fully integrated into scholarly biblical literature. Commentators need to be more careful in their lexical analyses so that fallacies can be avoided. Even more important is for commentators to use linguistically-nuanced language in an effort to keep lexical fallacies out of the evangelical pulpit. There is also a need for professors to incorporate linguistic study into biblical language courses so that pastors can be better equipped to conduct lexical analyses, and to critically evaluate the information they read in commentaries.

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