MAN IN THE MODE OF NOT-BEING
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AN ONTOLOGICAL STUDY OF HUMAN FREEDOM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE DEVELOPED FROM THE ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE ORIGIN OF THE NEGATION.

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Man in the Mode of Not-Being.
An Ontological Study of Human Freedom in the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre Developed from the Ontological Analysis of Consciousness as The Origin of the Negation.

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS: The subject of this thesis is Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy of freedom. This involves an examination of Sartre's ontological description of the being of the world, the being-in-itself, and the being of man, the being-for-itself. Sartre's description reveals man, a conscious being, as the origin of negation. The nihilating characteristic of man's consciousness enables him to freely project ends of action in a world of obstacles. By choosing his own mode of being, man makes himself and his world takes on meaning in relation to his projects. In short, freedom, Sartre claims, is absolute and limited only by freedom itself.
 PREFACE

The main purpose of this thesis is two-fold. In the first place, it is to present an argument in support of human freedom as opposed to those theories which hold that all human actions, or a large part of them, are determined by external causes or internal motives. This argument for human freedom will be that of the French existentialist philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre. Our second purpose is to present this philosophy devoid of all popular and philosophical misconceptions, as one worthy of critical examination by contemporary philosophers.

The issues between human freedom and determinism have been raised and debated since the dawn of philosophy. Others, such as physicists and psychologists and theologians, have periodically entered the argument on one side or the other. When they have, philosophers have often called upon their opinions to support their own arguments and to counter those of their opponents. These non-philosophical arguments have often been presented, either by the protagonist himself, or by some philosopher who supports it, as an authoritative statement on the subject rather than an opinion to be critically analyzed like any other. But others seem to eventually tire of the problem and leave it to the philosophers to keep the issue from dying. An initial assumption of this thesis which we shall not attempt to prove, is the belief that after all is said and done by others, and all sorts of data have been collected and presented.
by the natural and social sciences, the problem of freedom and determinism
remains basically a philosophical one. It is human freedom as a philo-
sophical problem that we are interested in throughout this thesis, but
looked at in a more radical way than ordinarily.

In the introduction of this thesis, we shall attempt to describe
Sartre's philosophical method. This will include a brief look at some
of the main influences on Sartre in order to provide a general background
against which his views may be seen to belong within the context of a
specific philosophical tradition. The first chapter is concerned with
Sartre's descriptions of the being of consciousness and the being of the
world. Because of the ensuing radical separation of these two regions
of being, consciousness emerges as the dynamic, spontaneous being which
introduces freedom into the world. The second chapter concentrates more
fully on consciousness and indicates that it is through man, as a conscious
being, that meaning and significance are given to the world. These first
two chapters, in addition to the introduction which provides a background,
present the foundation on which Sartre builds his philosophy of freedom
as an integrated ontological feature of consciousness.

The third chapter is concerned specifically with the problem of
freedom. The first part of the chapter discusses Sartre's ontological
description of the causes, motives and ends of one's acts and their
relationship to freedom. In the second part, we bring out the implications
of Sartre's radical concept of freedom, and attempt to show that his
argument that freedom is absolute is a significant one which can plausibly
meet certain criticisms directed toward it.

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Chapter four argues for the value and significance of Sartre's description and analysis of the human situation but contends that his method limits him to "this-side" of the world. In other words, any judgements concerning events beyond the objects of our experience in this world must be suspended. On this view, Sartre's claim for atheism must be bracketed, as indeed must any metaphysical assertions made by him.

Having given a brief outline of our intentions, we hope that by the end of the thesis our paradoxical title, Man in the Mode of Not-Being, will have acquired both meaning and significance.
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INTRODUCTION

THE SUBJECT-POLE OF EXPERIENCE

... and set me down in the midst of the valley which was full of bones, and caused me to pass by them round about: and, behold, there were very many in the open valley; and, lo, they were very dry. And he said unto me, Son of man, can these bones live?
Ezekiel 37: 1-3.

It is unusual that one feels compelled to begin a thesis in philosophy with an apology. The fact that one is about to examine a particular philosopher, or philosophical point of view, or philosophical problem, is generally sufficient justification for the undertaking. In the case of Jean-Paul Sartre, however, one's self-confidence in this respect is somewhat undermined by the often careless and haphazard analyses that pass for philosophic criticism, as well as popular misconceptions of this philosopher's views. Most philosophers have their unsympathetic critics, but Sartre seems to have more than his share, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. To be an unsympathetic critic is, in itself, no crime; but it is a crime when the critic's lack of sympathy gains control over his philosophical "impartiality" and makes him see chimeras where none exist. Sartre's philosophical radicalism and unorthodox use of language, at least to the Anglo-Saxon reader, adequately supply grist to this type of critical mill. Rather than attempting to find out what it is Sartre is doing and why he uses the language he does, such critics are overcome with a fierce passion that desires the slow roasting of the object of their wrath over a
fire eternally fueled by his own manuscripts.

At the risk of appearing presumptuous, we shall attempt to set the record straight concerning what Sartre is trying to do. This will involve, among other things, an inexact look at some of the philosophical influences in the development of Sartre's thought, notably of Husserl. We do not intend, except in a very general way, to discuss the characteristics common to existentialists, for this is an area of some ambiguity and to understand Sartre's philosophy it is arguable that such an undertaking would be tenuous.

In dealing with Sartre, it is not only important to make clear the meaning he gives to such terms as "being," "nothingness," "project," "freedom," etc., but also how he uses them and, perhaps most important, why. Why, for example, does Sartre describe man paradoxically as the being that is what he is not and is not what he is? It is easy to dismiss such an assertion as an abuse of ordinary language, or scientifically unverifiable, or simply a violation of traditional logic. However, if it is the desire of the philosopher to understand Sartre's meaning, he must put aside such a temptation and examine this paradoxical assertion within the context of Sartre's descriptive ontology. It is only here that such a paradoxical claim acquires significance and in turn vivifies the general ontological analysis. What one should be looking for is an analysis of Sartrean terminology, we believe, is not simply clarification, important as that is, but also the significance, if any, of the terms and the context in which they are used.

It is no secret that Sartre employs language in a very persuasive
way. With all deference toward some analytical philosophers, it is nevertheless arguable that the meaning and use of such words as "freedom," "nothingness," "existence," etc. involves a certain amount of persuasion even when used in the ordinary way. If one claims that the philosopher's task is only to analyze and clarify words as they are, in fact, used in ordinary and non-ordinary language, this is nevertheless, we maintain, a recommendation on the way philosophy should operate, and not a categorical assertion. In order not to become embroiled in a discussion on the nature and scope of philosophy, let us simply say, somewhat dogmatically, that philosophers are not so impartial that they do not direct our attention toward certain features of experience, including uses and meanings of language, away from others; in other words, that some sort of persuasiveness is involved in philosophical discussions. This, we maintain, is not a bad thing, providing it is in the open and arguments that do contain a persuasive element are not presented as though they were descriptively pure and "uncontaminated".

If the above argument has any validity, we might ask why existentialists in general, and Sartre in particular, fall into such disfavour when they use emotive, persuasive and provocative language. At least part of the answer seems to lie in the fact that existentialists very often draw our attention to data which are interpreted in a radically different way to what we are ordinarily accustomed. In most cases, and this is true of Sartre, they do not deny the ordinary data of our experience, (and this includes scientific hypotheses) nor ordinary language, but rejects claims that such data are all-inclusive, or even the primary data. Whether
others agree with this view or not, it is nevertheless the case that such rejection and re-emphasis upon other data has a point and is not without justification.

Sartre has in many cases departed from ordinary usage. This, we claim, is a legitimate procedure since Sartre's purpose is to get us to see things in a different way, to look at ourselves and the situations in which we find ourselves in ways which never occurred to us before. In discussing man's freedom, for example, Sartre's "wild" use of language is to emphasize man's freedom and the complete responsibility which this implies. Sartre's concept of human freedom is so radical, and so absolute, that a radical language is required to put the point across. For Sartre, the importance and responsibility of each individual, subjective choice is such that it cannot be overemphasized nor taken too seriously. In discussing Sartre's use of the word "freedom", one commentator says: "To stress in its definition the totality of its relevance to human life, is, in effect, to urge that we look again at the degree to which we all do exercise control over our lives and at the extent to which we are too often in search of an escape from acknowledgement of our responsibility for ourselves -- and for our world. Emotional power in persuasion is used by Sartre both as a carrot and as a stick ... ."

Although Sartre tries to persuade the reader to look at various situations in a different and more radical way, it is important to point out that such persuasion is not grounded in irrationalism. Rather his interpretation of human existence and all it involves is based on a keen insight tempered and systematized by a clear-headed critical analysis.
In describing the human situation, Sartre is as concerned with the logic of that situation as with persuading us to look at it from the standpoint of the existing subject instead of thinking of it only in a detached objective way. Throughout the thesis, we hope this point will make itself evident.

In his description of man and human freedom, Sartre is not primarily interested in presenting a thesis to rival those of the objective natural and social sciences. Instead, he is analyzing man from a particular starting-point, namely the subjective. In so doing, he is attempting to point out that the other, objective claims are not to be taken so seriously and literally that we think them all-inclusive. To do so, he argues, is to treat man as another thing in the world to be clinically taken apart, thoroughly examined and neatly pigeon-holed. Man's being, however, "goes beyond" such an analysis, Sartre maintains, and until consciousness and subjectivity have been described and analyzed as best one can, man has not been given his due.

Thus Sartre begins his analysis of man and the world on the side of the subject. For him, subjectivity is a necessary starting-point because man is a problem to himself, is to himself a paradox, is in question within his own being. Sartre's problem is the meaning of human existence. In agreement with existentialism in general, Sartre is aware of the crisis confronting many contemporary men. This crisis focuses on a loss of faith not in reason, science and logic per se but in their absoluteness. Ours is an era when men are torn between chance and order, justification and nothingness, peace and anxiety, hope and frustrations. It is in this context
that Sartre offers his description of the human condition.

In order to fully appreciate Sartre's description of man from the subject-pole of experience it is necessary to look at part of the background upon which he builds his philosophy. To do this we shall look only at Husserl, though we shall refer briefly to Heidegger. Of course, there are other influences on Sartre but we think, for our present purposes at least, Husserl's is the most notable. It was Husserl who was largely influential in emphasizing the importance of consciousness and beginning one's analysis of the world on the side of the subject by employing the method of phenomenology. Husserl's description of consciousness had a profound methodological influence on Sartre. For Husserl, "the wonder of all wonders" was pure consciousness.

Throughout his academic life, Edmund Husserl was pre-occupied with foundations. Beginning with the philosophy of arithmetic, he questions the foundations of arithmetic. This takes him back to logic, and an examination of its foundations leads him to epistemology, and from there to ontology. By this perpetual "going-beyond", Husserl attempts to elicit the absolute foundations of science. Though he recognizes that the results of the individual sciences are always approximations, they are nevertheless oriented towards an absolute objectivity, toward the idea of absolute truth. The individual sciences deal with facts, they exemplify the "natural standpoint" or common-sense approach in which the reality of the world is not questioned. But the sciences are always overpowered by the ideal, by a perpetual going-beyond toward the goal or ideal. Each science is an approximation of an ideal that continually recedes into the
horizon. In one of his later works, Husserl says: "Though de facto, as science itself must ultimately see, it does not attain actualization of a system of absolute truths, but rather is obliged to modify its 'truths' again and again, it nevertheless follows the idea of absolute or scientifically genuine truth; and accordingly it reconciles itself to an infinite horizon of approximations, tending toward that idea." It is the "idea" of science wherein lies the meaning of science and one must begin here to examine the foundation of science. This, for Husserl, leads us to the intention of the scientist, that is to the intentionality of consciousness. The analysis of the foundation, then, must be undertaken on the side of the subject, that is, on the side of consciousness. As one commentator puts it: "We see here the double preoccupation of phenomenology: it will be at one and the same time a search for an absolutely objective foundation and an analysis of the subjectivity of consciousness."

Husserl's ultimate concern, then, is with consciousness of things. For him, phenomenology is a study of consciousness and the contents of consciousness but without any questions of an empirical or realistic kind being raised: it is an a priori examination of consciousness. Our interest in an object, on the phenomenological view, is solely with that object as an object of consciousness. Husserl is indifferent to the existence of things; indeed, judgments concerning their existence are suspended. Husserl says that transcendental (or pure) phenomenology will not be established as a science of facts, "... but as a science of essential Being (as 'eidetic' Science); a science which aims exclusively at establishing 'knowledge of essence' ... and absolutely no 'facts'." In the case
of perception, for example, it is the essential structure of perception as a feature of consciousness and its relation to other features of consciousness that is examined and not the question of the existence of perception \textit{per se}, nor the question of the existence of material objects.

Husserl is also concerned with the revelation of the thing in itself. However, this is something we can only aim at but never achieve since there are infinite relations, situations, etc. in addition to what we know, making it impossible for us to grasp the thing in its completeness. In an article especially written for the \textit{Encyclopaedia Britannica}, Husserl says:

Each phenomenon has its own intentional structure, which analysis shows to be an ever-widening system of individually intentional and intentionally related components. The perception of a cube, for example, reveals a multiple and synthesized intention: a continuous variety in the "appearance" of the cube, according to differences in the points of view from which it is seen, and corresponding differences in "perspective," and all the difference between the "front side" actually seen at the moment and the "backside" which is not seen, and which remains, therefore, relatively "indeterminate," and yet is supposed equally to be existent. Observation of this "stream" of "appearance-aspects" and of the manner of their synthesis, shows that every phase and interval is already in itself a "consciousness-of" something, yet in such a way that with the constant entry of new phases the total consciousness, at any moment, lacks not synthetic unity, and is, in fact, a consciousness of one and the same object. The intentional structure of the train of a perception must conform to a certain type, if any physical object is to be perceived as there! And if the same object be intuited in other modes, if it be imagined, or remembered, or copied, all its intentional forms recur, though modified in character from what they were in the perception, to correspond to their new modes. The same is true of every kind of psychical experience. Judgement, valuation, pursuit, these also are no empty experiences having in consciousness of judgements, values, goals and means, but are likewise experiences compounded of an intentional stream, each conforming to its own fast type.
Since the existence of things, for Husserl, is bracketed -- or, placed in parentheses; that is, judgements concerning their existence are suspended and phenomena are examined by virtue of their being objects of consciousness, the emphasis in a phenomenological investigation shifts from the nature of reality to the question of meaning. Unlike a logical inquiry, the phenomenologist does not examine the conditions of a true judgement; nor, like the scientist does he ask if it is true that such and such is the case; nor does the phenomenologist study what effectively goes on in consciousness, as the psychologist does. Rather, the phenomenologist asks the question of meaning: what do we mean by such and such an object -- a judgement, a dream, life, thing, etc. -- intended by consciousness. Husserl says: "...To have a meaning, or to have something 'in mind', is the cardinal feature of all consciousness, that on account of which it is not only experience generally but meaningful...".

By setting aside the question of the reality of a thing and concentrating on meaning, Husserl is lead to regard the intended object as a phenomenon rather than as a material object. Consequently, as a result of the phenomenological reduction or bracketing, there can be no contrasting the phenomenon with a thing-in-itself as this latter has been bracketed. A phenomenon, for Husserl, is that which reveals itself immediately to consciousness and is grasped in a pre-judicative, pre-reflective intuition. That is to say, the phenomenon needs only to reveal itself unconditionally and without presuppositions on the part of the observer. A phenomenological analysis describes the phenomenon as it gives itself to consciousness and this intentional relation between consciousness and the phenomenon
reveals the phenomenon as a field of meanings. This would involve, then, describing the essence of the phenomenon. Every description of an intentional experience, even of an illusion, will involve a description of what in the experience is, as such, the object of consciousness -- for example, this chair, this judgement, the world in general in its particular mode. In the words of Husserl our comprehensive reduction puts

... the world between brackets, excludes the world which is simply there! from the subject's field, presenting in its stead the so-and-so-experienced-perceived-remembered-judged-thought-valued-etc. world, as such, the "bracketed" world. Not the world or any part of it appears, but the "sense" of the world. To enjoy phenomenological experience we must retreat from the objects posited in the natural attitude to the multiple modes of their "appearance," to the "bracketed" objects.

The phenomenological reduction to phenomena, to the purely psychical, advances by two steps: (1) systematic and radical ... (reduction) of every objectifying "position" in an experience, practiced both upon the regard of particular objects and upon the entire attitude of mind, and (2) expert recognition, comprehension and description of the manifold "appearances" of what are no longer "objects" but "unities" of "sense". So that the phenomenological description will comprise two parts, description of the "noetic" ... or "experiencing" and description of the "noematic" ... or the "experienced". 14

The purpose of the phenomenological analysis, beginning with the foundations of arithmetic and logic, eventually became, for Husserl, a search, without pre-suppositions, for the radical foundation of philosophical inquiry. In short: "It will be a question of finding an absolute evidence which, like the 'phenomenon,' would justify itself, which would present itself as primary and absolute, in need of nothing outside itself to found it, in short, a radical source of 'apodicticity' which would give to science and to reason in general their meaning." On this basis,
the reduction, the bracketing of individual phenomena must be made
more radical. For Husserl, the reduction becomes transcendental; that
is, it now includes the world as well as particular phenomena and is
carried out by the transcendental consciousness. "What is 'reduced'
is now -- rather than facts or the 'real' in such-or-such an area of
knowledge -- the world, the ensemble of all the empirical, rational,
and even scientific judgements that we make about the world in the
natural attitude."

As with the bracketing of phenomena, the transcendental re-
duction of the world does not eliminate or doubt the reality of the
world but judgements concerning its reality are suspended. Here the
reduction becomes all-embracing. The purpose of the reduction "... is
to bring to light this essential intentional contact between consciousness
and the world, a relationship which in the natural attitude remains
veiled. For Husserl, in the reduction the world remains where it is,
but now one perceives that every act of knowledge in fact refers to a
subject (the transcendental Ego) as to an ultimate and primary term which
is the origin, the support or foundation of its meaning.

The transcendental problem, for Husserl, includes a suspension of
one's judgement of the entire world and all its sciences; in short, a
bracketing of the whole. Husserl says: "The world and its property,
'in and for itself,' exists as it exists, whether I, or we, happen, or
not, to be conscious of it. But let once this general world, make its
'apparance' in consciousness as 'the world, it is thenceforth related
to the subjective, and all its existence and the manner of it, assumes a
new dimension, becoming 'incompletely intelligible,' 'questionable.' "
One might wonder at this point if there is anything outside, or
excluded from the transcendental reduction. In Husserl's view, con-
sciousness is the one thing on which judgement cannot be suspended. On
this point he says: "...Consciousness in itself has a being of its own
which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaffected by the
phenomenological disconnection. It therefore remains over as a 'pheno-
menological residuum', as a region of Being which is in principle unique,
and can become in fact the field of a new science -- the science of
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Phenomenology."

The phenomenological reduction leads Husserl to the source of
apodeicticity, the transcendental consciousness. Only certain abstract
notions in consciousness can be attained "in themselves". Also definite
assertions can be made about self-consciousness; that is, we can make
apodeictic or certain statements about that of which we are conscious of,
but not about the material world or knowledge acquired from the "natural"
standpoint. But to repeat, what we are conscious of need not exist as
its existence, from the phenomenological standpoint, is irrelevant. Any

Thus any intentional experience, even an "illusory" one, is described
as an object of consciousness.

From the apodeictic starting-point of the transcendental conscious-
ness we can now move back, as it were, to the world of objects seen now in
their intentional relationship with this consciousness as the source of all
meaning. Husserl holds, according to Thévenaz, that "...to make the
world appear as phenomenon is to understand that the being of the world
is no longer its existence or its reality, but its meaning, and that this
meaning of the world resides in the fact that it is a cogitatum intended

by the cogito. The reduction reveals ... consciousness-of-the-world, 22
consciousness constituting the meaning of the world." By considering
objects only in their relationship as intended objects of consciousness,
Husserl maintains that the inquiry is kept pure and certain by proceeding
without presuppositions and accepting only that which actually confronts
consciousness and cannot be thought away.

The preceding short account of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology
provides us with a background on which some of Sartre's concepts are
developed. Most notable, we see Husserl's presentation of the radical
notion of the intentionality of consciousness which was to receive further
radicalization by Sartre. In this respect, Sartre adopts the Husserlian
method whereby phenomenology does not examine exclusively either the
object of experience or the subject of experience -- the noema and the
noesis, respectively, in Husserl's terminology -- but concentrates on the
point of contact between being and consciousness. Consciousness as
intentional, as directed toward objects in an intentionally constituted
world, bestows meaning upon the intended object which reveals itself to
consciousness. Sartre employs the method of phenomenology to describe
this strict reciprocity between consciousness and its intended object
for each region of experience: perception, imagination, emotions, discursive
reason, recollection, etc. But, by beginning on the side of
consciousness, Sartre, with Husserl, attempts to disclose the structure
of consciousness as consciousness, and from here to describe the point
of contact between consciousness and the intended object; to make
meaningful the assertion that all consciousness is consciousness of ...
Though considerably influenced by Husserl's phenomenology, Sartre nevertheless disagrees with much of the content of Husserl's ideas. In this respect, Sartre is closer to Heidegger whose main philosophical work, Sein und Zeit, has had considerable influence on the development of Sartre's thought. Briefly, Sartre and Heidegger reject Husserl's phenomenological reduction since they intend to analyze the very existence Husserl brackets. Sartre in particular does not believe an eidetic phenomenology of essences can lay hold of freedom, which, for him, as we shall see later in the thesis, is identified with consciousness and with an existence that is the basis of all human essence. Further, Sartre and Heidegger do not think the world can be bracketed but that man is a being always-in-the-world. They claim that existence is there in its brute givenness and does not require proof, nor should it be placed in brackets but instead given meaning and significance. Sartre criticizes Husserl for never returning from the phenomenological reduction of the world. "This spells the final disqualification of eidetic phenomenology as the adequate foundation for the task that Sartre has set his own philosophy. It does not eliminate the fact that Husserl was for Sartre the most important philosophical stimulus. But precisely because Husserl was for Sartre chiefly a liberator it would not do to see in Sartre a mere disciple of Husserl." Sartre uses phenomenology as a method which permits him to build up an ontological system around human existence which he plans to analyze in detail. In short, Sartre intends to "reveal" the being of the existent using the method of phenomenology.

Briefly, we may say that the question, "What is meant by being?"
becomes the central problem and the focal point in Heidegger's philosophy. But since being itself is so elusive, Heidegger's starting-point is a particular being, namely, the human being. For Heidegger, intentionality no longer applies simply to consciousness, as for Husserl, but now includes the Dasein, the human being, or, literally, being-there, as a unity whole, as a field of experience.

Sartre translates Heidegger's word, Dasein, by "human reality". Thévenaz, in his book on phenomenology, says that such a translation is unfortunate as it carries one toward anthropology, toward concrete man, "... while Heidegger is oriented in the diametrically opposite direction, since he goes beyond not only the empirical and psychological towards the transcendental but even beyond consciousness towards something less personal and more antological. The there of the to-be-there does not express simple factual existence; nor does it indicate a place, but rather indicates, below the level of empirical data, that which renders it possible that something exists or is present in a certain place. ... the there is a fundamental structure by means of which man is open onto something. It is on the most radically ontological level, as 'irruption' or as 'opening up of the open,' that the Dasein and consequently man will finally be able to be understood in that which gives meaning to their being .... "Daseinsanalytics,' by revealing this possibility of opening up, clears the way to hidden and forgotten being..."

Sartre agrees with Heidegger that Dasein is a being-always-already-in-the-world and that the world cannot be bracketed. But human reality, for Sartre, is a more personal concept than Dasein and human reality is
committed to the world of every day existence. And Sartre, contrary to Heidegger, begins his description of man with an analysis of man's consciousness. Sartre objects "... to Heidegger's elimination of Descartes' and Husserl's consciousness from his Dasein ..." Heidegger's phenomenology was pointedly a phenomenology of Dasein, of human Being, as contrasted to Husserl's consciousness. In contrast to Heidegger, Sartre conceives of this Dasein (réalité humaine) again as consciousness."

And like Husserl, Sartre's conception of consciousness is that of the cogito which Heidegger repudiates. Though rejecting most of Descartes' metaphysics, Sartre does begin from the cogito, although he doesn't think of it in the same way as Husserl or Descartes did, as we shall see in the first chapter.

In our preceding presentation of Husserl and Heidegger, the term "intuition" has appeared periodically. This important concept now requires some explanation as it is a mode of evidence employed by Sartre.

For the phenomenologist, intuition involves an act of consciousness in which the intended object is actually confronted by an act of perception or imagination and not simply thought about. The intuitive act is "filled out," as it were, rather than "empty," and is primarily a "looking at" the intended object. The phenomenologist maintains that every inquiry must ultimately be grounded upon intuition, even if other modes of evidence are introduced subsequently, such as inductive-deductive reasoning, to further develop the investigation. In short, at the beginning of an investigation the object of consciousness must be present, confronted, and reveals itself as phenomenon to consciousness, before one is able to digress
from this original confrontation in the ensuing investigation. Hence the phenomenologist's talk about pre-predicative, pre-judicative intuition of intended phenomena. Thus phenomenology as a descriptive investigation, and Sartre's philosophy as descriptive ontology employing the method of phenomenology, hold that the first step is to look at the object under investigation, to allow it to reveal itself.

For Husserl specifically, the most important intuition is the intuition of essences. However, all intuition, for Husserl as well as Sartre, excludes intuition in the sense of an inspiration or in the sense of instinct. Intuition includes non-sensuous intuition as well as sensuous, reflective as well as pre-reflective. Concepts like "negation," "unity," "conjunction," "similarity," and so on, that have no corresponding sense datum, can still be fully understood and their meaning made clear. This involves, for Husserl, non-sensuous intuition.

It is important to stress that the word "intuition" as employed here, has no relation with mystical insight. Nor, as we have also mentioned, is it limited to sense-perception but it can also be a feature of imagination and recollection, as well as being directed to consciousness itself. Also it is not limited to objects in the sense of things but includes states of affairs, and can be employed at any level of abstraction. Intuition, further does not mean that we necessarily know anything about the object of intuition. For example, to perceive an object, which involves perceiving the object in profile, is one thing, knowing the object is another. Intuition does not mean, then, certain knowledge although some intuition could be, ex hypothesi, certain. Nevertheless, to conclude,
the primary mode of evidence for the phenomenologist is intuition, that is, the confrontation of the intended objects or states of affair.

"To intuit the phenomena seems at first blush a fairly elementary affair," Spiegelberg writes about the phenomenologist's use of intuition, "if one approaches this task without preconceptions. This may be so in theory, but it is certainly not so in practice. It is one of the most demanding operations, which requires utter concentration on the object intuited without becoming absorbed in it to the point of no longer looking critically. Nevertheless there is little that the beginning phenomenologist can be given by way of precise instructions beyond such metaphoric phrases as 'opening his eyes,' 'keeping them open,' 'not getting blinded,' 'looking and listening,' etc. Some help in the attempt to grasp the uniqueness of specific phenomena can be obtained by comparing them with related phenomena, giving special attention to similarities and differences."

To the phenomenologist's emphasis upon the subject-pole of experience and all this involves, the existentialist adds special consideration to the problem of existence. Indeed, it might be argued that the fundamental datum of existentialism is the notion of existence. It is so fundamental that it cannot be proven, indeed requires no proof for the existentialist, but through it everything else becomes intelligible. Nor can existence, for the existentialist, be accounted for by anything that precedes it. As one writer puts it, existence "... appears before everything; it precedes every essence." We cannot reduce it to some other principle which would account for it; quite the contrary; it is existence
itself which is absolute, and cannot be rationally deduced."

"Existence" does not refer to brute fact, for the existentialist, but to the being, *sui generis*, belonging to man. In this narrow sense, one might say, as does Heidegger, that only man exists. This does not mean there is nothing outside of man but that man's mode of being is peculiar to him only. It is this "existence" which distinguishes man from the rest of nature and the universe as a whole. He is not simply a thing among other material things, nor a natural object, nor an object in any sense, although he is often studied and treated as an object, and within its own limits such an approach can be of value. But fundamentally, man is a subject who is constantly developing himself by total engagement in a world which affects him and upon which he gives meaning and significance through his projects. There is an active and continuous dialectic between man and the world. The way in which the individual chooses to look at the world decides what aspect of it is to be revealed to him and given significance by him. Hence the world for a particular individual, in short "his world," can be different from that of another person, and even differ from time to time in the life of the same person.

Sartre's existentialism is a deeply felt concern for the concrete reality of the individual person. The vital question concerns the existence of the individual and the individual alone must attempt to define himself. The existentialist attempts to prod, persuade, cajole, men not to forfeit themselves to the mundane, to the "system," and to the attitude of thinking of themselves as objects to be used and exploited by abstract powers whether political, scientific or society at large. The individual,
in his own personal existence, in his subjectivity, is at stake. Sartre
maintains that a person's essence is not revealed by any theory which
speaks about man prior to and independent of his concrete existence.
Sartre is specifically concerned with the concrete subjectivity of man
as he defines his actual and concrete existence. Man as a biological
organism, as a part of the natural world, as containing various desires
and patterns of behaviour, cannot reveal the situation of one particular
person's existence except in relation to the fact that here is a person
who happens to exist here and now. If this is lost sight of, then all
else one might know about the person loses its significance. The term
"existence," then, refers to: the individual's coming into being, and
existentialists, including Sartre, attempt to understand this becoming
as the fundamental structure of existence.

In their attempt to describe the structure of existence, existen-
tialists are led to a description of such "existential" phenomena as
freedom, anguish, dread, temporality, being-in-the-world, existence of
others, and so on. In the philosophy of Sartre, freedom and existence are
so interdependent that the one term means the other. Though the notion of
freedom is most radical in Sartre's philosophy, existentialists in general
are unable to talk about existence for long without reference to the
important concept of human freedom.

Existentialists contend it is due to man's freedom, indeed it is
an awful freedom, that in his existence he is radically separated from the
rest of the world. It is only man who has the possibility of transcending
himself to what he is not yet. In short, man is possibility. Existential-
ists claim that both naturalism and idealism, in their own respective ways, are in error in attempting to integrate man into a unified cosmos, to regard him as a strand, albeit a highly valuable one, perhaps the most valuable, belonging to a larger nexus. Rather than being closely related to the rest of nature, existentialists hold, without necessarily denying certain objective relationships between man and nature such as biological relationships, that in his being, in his subjectivity, man is cut apart, alone, separated from the rest of the universe. The being of the world and its content is quite unlike the being of man who exists in a world that is foreign to him and where even his own being is often strange and alien to himself.

Freedom, for the existentialist, is not just a fact, it is a venture. From birth to death man lives under the compulsion of brute fact. Yet from the givenness of the situation, it is man who shapes himself and his situation. In this he succeed or fails. To succeed does not mean to escape compulsion but to transcend it and give it meaning by a self-projection towards his possibilities. He may accept his freedom or lose it; but to comprehend this freedom includes an understanding of what existence is in itself. Because a man may forfeit his freedom, it is a demand, a venture, a risk. It may fill him with anguish when faced with a choice, or guilt when it is forfeited, but it is this freedom, the existentialists maintain, which makes him human.

Without spending any more time on these and other features of existentialism in general, we may attempt to characterize this philosophy by the following quotation, being well aware of the limitations involved in such a capsule comment:
As a distinctive attitude and cultural phenomenon, as a central nerve trunk in the corpus of world literature, and, finally, as an historical development, the content of existential thought may be summarily indicated by listing four of its predominant characteristics. Existential thought is characterized, first, by a profound concern for the everlasting categories of man's being, his fear, dread, suffering, loneliness, anguish, and death; second, by the fact that it takes man as the object of its inquiry, but man as an "unhappy consciousness," as a fragmentary and fragmented creature who locates his existence in a cosmos that is at once overpowering, threatening, and demanding; third, by its internal un-neutrality toward God -- the existentialist's dialogue takes place in an empty cathedral, and the protagonists debate the terminology of the mass and, more important, for whom the mass is to be said; and fourth, by a decisive concern with man's authenticity in existence, his gift of freedom which is his anguish, his total responsibility which is his dread.36

If one looks upon our present age as an involved individual rather than a disinterested spectator, it is perhaps not too far amiss to once again see the human world resembling a valley full of bones as in Ezekiel's vision. At a time when man is in danger of becoming more and more de-humanized, not through fate or the will of God, but by his own actions, the question can be asked with increasing relevance: Son of man, can these bones live? It is, of course, debatable whether existential philosophy, and Sartre in particular, can adequately answer this question; but the raising of the question and its subsequent analysis existentialism considers worthy of philosophical investigation. Existentialism's description of the existence of the concrete individual and the problems pertaining to him, once again places man at the centre of philosophical inquiries. Here existentialism is not concerned simply with the intellect and abstract reasoning but with the whole man. By so doing,
existentialism has consistently refused to adopt a spectator attitude and maintains, in the spirit of the Socratic dialectic, that questions concerning the good life, virtue, existence, good, et al., deserve philosophical attention.

A criticism often leveled against existentialists is that they lack analytical rigor. In a sense this is true, although in varying degrees depending on the philosopher being considered. But it should be pointed out that the existentialist is not simply interested in the meaning of the word "existence," for example, but attempts to analyze the meaning of existence as an experience, indeed as the life, of the concrete individual. Thus by its very approach and scope, existentialism will not be as analytically rigorous as some other philosophies with narrower and less ambitious goals. But to admit this does not mean, as many critics seem to think it means, that existentialism is entirely lacking in rigor. As we mentioned earlier, much of Sartre's language, for example, is "wild" and paradoxical. But such language has a point and far from being presented in an irresponsible and illogical way, Sartre gives us a disciplined and detailed analysis of a particular situation which he describes in a language that is inherently logical. We shall not dwell on this point here, but hope it will manifest itself in the subsequent chapters. It is sufficient to say here that Sartre's ontological description of the human situation indicates a profound insight into human existence that is systematized by a critical analysis that is lacking in neither logic nor rigor.

Men will not be dissuaded from asking the old and often vague
questions: "What is existence?", "What is virtue?", "What does it mean to be human?", etc. One does not expect the philosopher to breathe new life into dead bones. However, one can expect to be reminded of what it means to be human and to have the problems of existence aired in the philosophical forum. In this forum, Sartre presents a description of human freedom that is undoubtedly more radical than any presented before. Such radicalism, we maintain, requires the context of Sartre's systematic ontological description of human existence. It is to this we now turn, reminded of Iris Murdoch's statement in viewing Sartre's Being and Nothingness: "It is doubtless the case that writers of brief and meticulous articles will always look askance at writers of large emotional volumes; but the latter, for better or worse, have the last word."
CHAPTER I

THE BIFURCATION OF BEING

Dualism, such as that of mind and matter, has been a recurring theme of philosophical discussions from classical times to the present. To many, the existence of any dualism constitutes a scandal in philosophy and ought to be quickly eliminated. Others maintain, with equal passion, that a dualism indicates and guarantees the uniqueness and irreducibility of one element of the dualism over other elements. This latter view is often accompanied by a strong sense of the worthiness or value of one of the elements involved which would somehow be forfeited if the dualism did not exist: for example, the value of a mind that cannot be reduced to matter, or of non-natural qualities over natural ones.

Descartes' two irreducible substances, mind and matter, constituted a dualism which had its epistemological starting-point in the reflective cogito, whose certainty of the data of apprehended clear and distinct ideas was, in turn, guaranteed by God's perfect nature. This philosophy became the prototype of many philosophies which took what was later referred to as the Cartesian cogito as their point of departure. Sartre, along with Husserl, follows in this tradition, but unlike Descartes and Husserl, begins from the primacy of the pre-reflective cogito.

Descartes' philosophical dualism which has had a profound
influence upon the development of subsequent philosophy, whether that influence be considered a profound scandal by some or a radical point of departure by others, has some sort of parallel in ordinary language. We ordinarily talk about objects in the world as one kind of thing, and minds, human emotions, desires, etc. as another kind of thing. There are many ways of saying the same thing but, in general terms, we might say that ordinarily we talk about, and refer to, physical things and mental things. Although such classifications are often unclear and ambiguous, it is nevertheless the case that in such usage we do not refer to the same thing as both mental and physical and rarely do we mistake a mental thing for a physical thing or vice versa. This does not mean that "mental" things (if there are such things) and "physical" things (if there are any) are, in fact, irreducible, the one to the other, or to some third thing. For a philosophical investigation, the initial task is not to determine whether those things called "physical" in ordinary usage really are physical, or whether "mental" things really are mental. Rather, one must begin by differentiating characteristics that one group of things possesses or seems to possess which leads some people to call it "physical," from characteristics that another group of things possesses or seems to possess which results in its being called "mental": this latter term signifying that this sort of thing differs characteristicly, and often, though not necessarily, in kind, from that other group of things called "physical."

The Sartrean ontology ought to be approached in a similar way. Beginning with the cogito, as Sartre does, we may ask what characteristics does consciousness possess which distinguishes it from that of which we
are conscious? We may also ask whether consciousness and its object comprise an irreducible duality? Beginning with consciousness, Sartre approaches the description of being through the being of man, consciousness, being-for-itself; the synonymy of these concepts will become apparent later. Such an ontological approach and description does not hesitate to use and exploit, as data, various human moods and experiences; or, in the language of such a description, "existential moods" and "existential experiences". The subsequent description of the cogito enables Sartre to present a description of being itself, thereby providing a framework on which an intelligible description of human freedom can be grounded. It is therefore important to take a look at this description of being itself through the being of consciousness.

The problem of the structure of being, for Sartre, is not resolved by a definition which provides a preliminary statement upon which all other descriptive statements are based. Any definition of being in general would involve inquiring into the being of the definiens and then the being of the being of the definiens, ad infinitum. Also, any definition of being in terms of genus and species would begin with being as the ultimate, undifferentiated and least specific genus. Any such attempted definition would already presuppose the definition of the definiens. Although one may stipulate the way one is going to use the word "being," such a definition is not very helpful if one's purpose is to describe the structure of reality, as Sartre proposes to do. For Sartre, we may argue, any definition of "being" that is significant would have to be a real definition as opposed to a nominal one, but any such definition already presupposes being. And
a description of being, from which at a later time we may formulate a
definition, becomes clearer and more significant as our experience itself
grows. 3

Sartre, then, is not attempting to present, in Being and Nothing-
ness, his major philosophical work, an analytical description concerning
the structure of being. Rather, he attempts to describe being by a direct
"looking upon" or inspection of the givens of experience, in conformity
with the method of phenomenology as outlined in the introduction. This
is not accomplished, however, by an abstract analysis of the being of
the given existent. Rather, Sartre's method is to describe the being
of the given existents "looked upon" through the concrete human experience
of these givens and of reality in general. 4 For Sartre this experience of
being is presented by means of certain existential moods such as meta-
physical nausea or boredom which reveal themselves as phenomena. From this
starting-point, which already anticipates the primacy of the cogito,
Sartre attempts to systematize these "existential" experiences into an
objective and universal ontological description of being.

For Sartre, the world itself constitutes one of the givens of
experience, and its existence requires neither proof nor bracketing.
Sartre, unlike Descartes who also started from the primacy of the cogito, 5
does not end up in the Cartesian dilemma of placing the external world in
question and later trying to prove its existence. The "givenness" of
the world is not in doubt, Sartre maintains; it is there, given, and
immediately apprehended by pre-reflective consciousness. Indeed the
foundation of the world is prior to any reflection by the human being.
The method of "looking upon" the world given in experience may analyze, define and give significance to the world, but the world's givenness, its existence, does not require proof. As Wilfrid Desan, in his book on Sartre, puts this point: "Existence is there as a background in its brutal facticity; it ought not either to be proved or put between brackets, but simply clothed with meaning and signification." By looking upon or intuiting the world as it is given in experience we are able to give some indication of the structure that is revealed.

Looking upon the world in order to describe its ontological structure by inspecting or intuiting the givens of experience, in the sense explained in the introduction, such an inspection reveals appearances, according to Sartre. The tree, the leaves, the bird in the tree, in short, the things in the world, appear to the individual and these appearances simply are in the sense that we are presented with them and they would not be appearances unless they appeared. The appearance simply is indicative of itself. It does not in itself refer to any being beyond itself that is hidden behind the appearance. The appearance merely presents itself and refers to the total series of appearances to which it belongs and also refers to other sets of appearances. Thus to take an example: force is not some metaphysical reality that hides behind its appearances of acceleration, velocity, etc. Rather, force is the totality of these appearances.

The preceding paragraph suggests that any view advocating the existence of a substance or noumenon behind the appearances, or on which they are founded, would not receive support from Sartre. And this is indeed the case. Since Sartre begins with the cogito looking upon the
givens of experience, the appearances which are the intended objects of consciousness do not point to, or indicate, anything beyond themselves. Each appearance also points to the total series of its appearances and refers to other appearances qua appearances. In other words, our looking upon the givens of experience reveals to us appearances which are a full positivity and refer to themselves alone. As Sartre puts it in *Being and Nothingness*, the essence of the appearance "... is an 'appearing' which is no longer opposed to being but on the contrary is the measure of it. For the being of an existent is exactly what it appears."  

The phenomenon or appearance is both relative and absolute, according to Sartre. It is relative since to appear it must appear to someone, its essence presupposes a percipient. This does not mean that the being of the phenomenon is in its being perceived. We shall leave this for the moment and return to it when we discuss the structure of consciousness. To anticipate, we may simply say that in appearing to consciousness, the being of the phenomenon transcends the phenomenal condition but without the postulation of a noemal being.

The phenomenon is absolute in the sense that what it is, it is absolutely -- it reveals itself as it is in itself. Sartre says: "The phenomenon can be studied and described as such, for it is absolutely indicative of itself."

In maintaining that the phenomenon reveals itself as it is, Sartre also says that the appearance does not hide an essence. Rather, the appearance reveals the essence of the phenomenon; the essence, for Sartre, is the principle of the series of appearances and is merely the interdependent connection of the appearances of the phenomenon, and thus is
revealed as an appearance. "The phenomenal being manifests itself; it manifests its essence as well as its existence, and it is nothing but the well connected series of its manifestations." 10

In like manner, Sartre adds, the appearance does not contain a hidden potency. For Sartre, the act is everything and behind the act, which is an appearing, there is no potentiality. Of a genius, we cannot say that he has the potentiality or capacity of producing certain works that was not exhausted in the producing of them. "The genius of Proust", Sartre says, "is neither the work considered in isolation nor the subjective ability to produce it; it is the work considered as the totality of the manifestations of the person." 12

For Sartre, then, the appearance, as a finite phenomenon, does not point to any hidden being. But it does refer to an infinite series of appearances of which it is a finite part. That is, the phenomenon which appears cannot be reduced to a finite set of appearances since, in the first place, the percipient is not static but continually changing. This means that the perceiving subject is capable of expanding its points of view on the phenomenon, knowing it in increasingly greater and microscopic detail, perceiving it from an unlimited number of perspectives, and relating this phenomenon to the infinite series of appearances of the unlimited number of phenomena appearing in the world. The same applies to any phenomenon, whether the variety of its appearances is limited, such as a stone's, or whether they are diverse and changing, such as a living organism's. In the second place, the appearances can appear and reappear many times thereby implying an infinite number of appearances of the one phenomenon. And, thirdly, the appearances of any one phenomenon cannot
all appear at once, which they would be capable of doing if its set
of appearances were finite.

For Sartre, the "... theory of the phenomenon has replaced the
reality of the thing by the objectivity of the phenomenon and that it
has based this on an appeal to infinity." Thus, the reality of the book,
for example, is its appearing here and now, that it is neither the
perceipient nor depends on the perceipient either for its being or the being
of the series of its appearances or the set of appearances to which it
belongs. In looking at the book, we perceive its shape, colour and
position. These various qualities have traits in common. "To begin
with," Sartre says in an early work, "they present themselves as beings
whose existence in no way depends on my whim, as beings of which I can
only take note. They exist for me, but they are not myself." It is
certain that we are unable to spontaneously produce any of these qualities
which we perceive. If we take this one appearance of the book by itself,
independent of the set of appearances, then it "... could be only an
intuitive and subjective plenitude, the manner in which the subject is
affected. If the phenomenon is to reveal itself as transcendent, it is
necessary that the subject himself transcend the appearance toward the
total series of which it is a member." 15

Since the set of appearances of a phenomenon is an infinite series
of appearances, Sartre maintains that we cannot know the phenomenon in
its entirety, even though we can apprehend and analyze it to a considerable
degree. A desk, for example, contains certain qualities -- hardness,
colour, shape, etc. -- which appear to us and which we are able to discern
as an ensemble of appearances. As a result of the series of appearances
of the desk, we can recognize an essence of "deskness" which is implied by these qualities. The essence is not in the desk as one of the qualities of the desk in the way that brownness is a quality of the desk. Rather, the essence is the meaning of the desk -- it is the principle of the infinite series of appearances that presents the desk as an organized whole to the percipient. But the being-in-itself of the desk overflows its appearance; it is transphenomenal.

The being of the phenomenon is transphenomenal, but Sartre does not intend this to mean that it is a hidden noumenon, or Lockean "thing in itself of which I know not what". Rather, the being of the phenomenon is coextensive with the phenomenon but is not subject to the phenomenal condition which is to be revealed, to appear. The being of the desk is not one of the qualities of the desk that can be apprehended as an appearance, nor is it the meaning or essence of the desk since the essence is the principle of the series of appearances of the phenomenon and does not indicate the being of the appearances. Even though the phenomenon appears to the percipient, one cannot thereby claim that the being of the phenomenon is a presence since absence also implies being because not to be there still means to be. Furthermore, the phenomenon neither hides being nor reveals being. If it hid being then one would, theoretically at least, be able to go beyond certain qualities of the phenomenon in order to find the being behind them. But the being of the phenomenon is being equally of all the qualities of the phenomenon. Since one is unable to apprehend the being of the phenomenon as a quality, the phenomenon does not reveal being. All that can be said of the particular phenomenon, the
desk, is that it is. This is the only way its manner of being can be defined. "The existent is a phenomenon; this means that it designates itself as an organized totality of qualities. It designates itself and not its being. Being is simply the condition of all revelation. It is being-for-revealing ... and not revealed being ... "\textsuperscript{16}

The above does not mean that we are unable to inquire into the being of a particular object; or, in other words, into what it means to be an object, or more specifically, a desk. Here, Sartre maintains, we go beyond the phenomenon of the desk toward the phenomenon of being itself. The phenomenon of being is not the condition for phenomena appearing, the condition of all revelation, but itself is something revealed. The phenomenon of being is revealed through nausea, boredom, etc., for Sartre; in short, through certain types of existential moods. The phenomenon of being is an appearance which itself requires trans-phenomenal being as a basis on which to reveal itself.

The being of the desk, then, is not revealed in a phenomenon of being, but according to Sartre, we are unable to say anything about being without examining the phenomenon of being. But the being of the phenomenon cannot be reduced to the phenomenon of being. The phenomenon of being "... is an appeal to being; it requires as phenomenon, a foundation which is transphenomenal." As indicated earlier, being is not found hidden behind phenomena. Also the phenomenon of being as an appearance does not refer to a distinct being but exists only as appearance, thus pointing to itself as the foundation of being. In short, "... the being of the phenomenon although coextensive with the phenomenon, cannot be
subject to the subject to the phenomenal condition -- which is to exist only in so far as it reveals itself -- and that consequently it surpasses the knowledge which we have of it and provides the basis for such knowledge." 18

To acquire some approximation of the nature of being-in-itself, that is the being of the world, the being of phenomena, we are limited to phenomena, Sartre maintains. "Being will be disclosed to us by some kind of immediate access -- boredom, nausea, etc., and ontology will be the description of the phenomenon of being as it manifests itself; that is, without intermediary." But, Sartre hastens to add, the being of the phenomenon is not reduced to this phenomenon of being, but remains transphenomenal and the condition 'for all revelation and not in-itself revealed being.

The confrontation of the phenomenon of being is made possible by a pre-judicative intuition involving certain "existential" moods. Concerning such moods, one commentator states that for existentialists:

"... the real is held to reveal itself in certain immediate or affective experiences ... which it would be erroneous to regard as no more than 'states' of consciousness without any objective value, since they give us completer, truer, and more immediate access to reality than do intellectual concepts ..." 20

Sartre's most vivid description of the phenomenon of being is seen in his novel, *Nausea*. Here Sartre presents, through Roquentin, the writer of the diary, his experience of nature, the being of the world, as absolute contingency, pure absurdity, an experience characterized by metaphysical nausea, of which physiological nausea is only one form.
Roquentin's problem (and Sartre's) is one of alienation from the world itself.

After a long period, one might even say, preparation, of boredom and emptiness, Roquentin comes face to face with the stark thereeness of the root of a chestnut tree he is sitting beside in the park. As he looks at the root, the meanings which characterize the ways it can be used or appreciated by men are peeled away, and it stands forth in its thereeness. Roquentin writes in his diary that he had this vision:

It left me breathless. Never, until these last few days, had I understood the meaning of "existence." I was like the others, like the ones walking along the seashore, all dressed in their spring finery. I said, like them, "The ocean is green; that white speck up there is a seagull," but I didn't feel that it existed or that the seagull was an "existing seagull"; usually existence hides itself. It is there, around us, in us, it is us, you can't say two words without mentioning it, but you can never touch it. When I believed I was thinking about it, I must believe that I was thinking nothing, my head was empty, or there was just one word in my head, the word "to be." Or else I was thinking ... how can I explain it? I was thinking of belonging, I was telling myself that the sea belonged to the class of green objects, or that the green was a part of the quality of the sea. Even when I looked at things, I was miles from dreaming that they existed: they looked like scenery to me. I picked them up in my hands, they served me as tools, I foresaw their resistance. But that all happened on the surface. It anyone had asked me what existence was, I would have answered, in good faith, that it was nothing, simply an empty form which was added to external things without changing anything in their nature. And then all of a sudden, there it was, clear as day: existence had suddenly unveiled itself. It had lost the harmless look of an abstract category; it was the very paste of things, this root was kneaded into existence. Or rather the root, the park gates, the bench, the sparse grass, all that had vanished: the diversity of things, their individuality, were only
an appearance, a veneer. This veneer had melted, leaving soft, monstrous masses, all in disorder -- naked, in a frightful, obscene nakedness. 22

Roquentin’s experience here is not the result of an epistemological analysis, but rather a direct encounter. It is not so much an encounter with a particular object, the root of the chestnut tree, as it is an experience of the world itself, revealed through nausea. Everything for him is superfluous, unnecessary, in the way. Roquentin is on the verge of an important discovery. The word "absurdity" is beginning to form in his mind, but he wants to resist words and get to the heart of the matter. And here he understands what the nausea signifies and thus what existence is. The central point for him is contingency; existence cannot be defined as necessary, but simply "to be there":

This moment was extraordinary. I was there, motionless and icy, plunged in a horrible ecstasy. But something fresh had just appeared in the very heart of this ecstasy; I understood the Nausea, I possessed it. To tell the truth, I did not formulate my discoveries to myself. But I think it would be easy for me to put them in words now. The essential thing is contingency. I mean that one cannot define existence as necessity. To exist is simply to be there; those who exist let themselves be encountered, but you can never deduce anything from them. I believe there are people who have understood this. Only they tried to overcome this contingency by inventing a necessary, causal being. But no necessary being can explain existence: contingency is not a delusion, a probability which can be dissipated; it is the absolute, consequently, the perfect free gift. All is free, this park, this city and myself. When you realize that, it turns your heart upside down and everything begins to float ... here is Nausea ... ."

Here Roquentin has taken the giant step from existence as a concept, a predicate, a linguistic form, to existence as encounter, as the experience of a radical contingency. The original feeling that
characterizes this transition is nausea. Sartre tries to describe this experience when, still sitting in the park, Roquentin reflects:

Had I dreamed of this enormous presence? It was there, in the garden, toppled down into the trees, all soft, sticky, soiling everything, all thick, a jelly. And I was inside, I with the garden. I was frightened, furious, I thought it was so stupid, so out of place, I hated this ignoble mess. Mounting up, mounting up as high as the sky, spilling over, filling everything with its gelatinous slither, and I could see depths upon depths of it reaching far beyond the limits of the garden, the houses, and Bouville, as far as the eye could reach. I was no longer in Bouville, I was nowhere, I was floating. I was not surprised, I knew it was the World, the naked World suddenly revealing itself, and I choked with rage at this gross, absurd being. You couldn’t even wonder where all that sprung from, or how it was that a world came into existence, rather than nothingness. It didn’t make sense, the World was everywhere, in front, behind. There had been nothing before it. Nothing. There had never been a moment in which it could not have existed. That was what worried me: of course there was no reason for this flowing larva to exist. But it was impossible for it not to exist. It was unthinkable: to imagine nothingness you had to be there already, in the midst of the World, eyes wide open and alive; nothingness was only an idea in my head, an existing idea floating in this immensity: this nothingness had not come before existence, it was an existence like any other and appeared after many others. I shouted "filth! what rotten filth!" and shook myself to get ride of this sticky filth, but it held endless: I stifled at the depths of this immense weariness. And then suddenly the park emptied as through a great hole, the World disappeared as it had come, or else I woke up -- in any case, I say no more of it; nothing was left but the yellow earth around me, out of which dead branches rose upward.24

The objection might be raised in this context that Sartre’s experience of the world as contingent is nothing to get nauseated about. After all, we had been prepared long ago by Hume and others to accept this fact. In nature regularities are observed but there is no
necessary connection between cause and effect; and science admits its laws are not iron-clad. Theoretically, at least, everything may be "possible" in a universe whose laws are not necessary. But the objection might continue, to say, as Roquentin does, that we have no security in such a universe, and consequently there is no reason why his tongue could not turn into a centipede, Sartre is allowing a vivid imagination to run unchecked. It is wildly fantastic, one might add, to think in such a way in a universe which operates in an intelligible and regular way and where scientific laws, if only "probable," are still reliable.

We may ask, however, whether a criticism of the preceding kind has not been made to hastily and with an unreflective bias towards the language of common sense and/or empiricism. As one commentator puts it: "The language and the spirit of existentialism belong to another, and altogether more emotional order, to Romanticism, and indeed, historically, to religion." We may say that for Roquentin, and for Sartre, metaphysical questions are questions of life and death, and in a universe whose laws are contingent, he has no security. Such an attitude, although not widely held, is nothing new and has been profoundly expressed throughout the ages in literature, poetry, painting, music, the theatre, religion, philosophy, and in ordinary expressions of everyday anguish. Roquentin's feeling of nausea is not too far afield from that of many Christians who directly experience in lonely anguish the separation of the sinner from God. For many people, even in this secular age, the thought of living in a world without a God would be intolerable. Roquentin's plight is related to their's. Sartre is well aware of man's thirst for God, but maintains that they must learn to live with this thirst
forever unsatisfied.

For Sartre, Roquentin's experience of nausea is the experience of what it means to be. Sartre realizes that this interpretation of the universe, and, subsequently, of man in the universe, rests upon a particular, perhaps a unique, type of experience. Sartre does not try to prove, by demonstrative reasoning, the absurdity and contingency of being. Rather, his concern is primarily with the existing individual and his encounter with concrete situations. This is Sartre's raw material, as it were, but to avoid solipsism, he presents an ontological setting in Being and Nothingness which will do justice to this raw material.

The other side of Sartre's ontological description has already been alluded to in discussing Roquentin's encounter with being. This is the being-for-itself; that is, consciousness.

The essential structure of all consciousness, Sartre agrees with Husserl and some other phenomenologists, is intentionality. The intentionality of consciousness signifies that all consciousness is consciousness of something. This implies more than simply the truism that all consciousness has some object or content as this may take many forms, not the least frequent being some form of idealism. For Husserl, intentionality signifies that "the object is not constructed by this consciousness; it gives itself or reveals itself to the view of this consciousness ... In other words, the world gives itself to consciousness which confers on it its meaning." Consciousness, then, for Husserl and Sartre, is consciousness of an object and makes up or composes no part of the object. Cranston, in the work previously referred to, put this
same point in more metaphorical language: "Just as a mirror has no content except that which is reflected in it, so consciousness can have no content except the objects on which it reflects. Yet such an object is always separate and distinct from the consciousness which 'mirrors' it." 27

The notion of the intentionality of consciousness indicates a radical distinction for Husserl and Sartre between intentionality (consciousness) and the non-intentional (non-consciousness; in short, being-in-itself). But Sartre's aim is to press the principle of intentionality even more radically. Sartre says: "Whatever it may be, the object of consciousness is a matter of principle outside consciousness (except in the case of reflective consciousness), or is transcendent." 28 Intentionality for Sartre means that consciousness has no contents at all. All content is on the side of the object. Consciousness is pure spontaneity, a sheer activity transcending toward objects. Sartre says, concerning one's perception of a sheet of white paper: "What is certain is that I cannot spontaneously produce the white of which I take note. This inert shape, which stands short of all spontaneities of consciousness, which must be observed and learned about bit by bit, is what we call 'a thing.' Never could my consciousness be a thing, because its way of being in itself is precisely to be for itself; for consciousness, to exist is to be conscious of its existence. It appears as a pure spontaneity, confronting a world of things which is sheer inertness. From the start, therefore, we may posit two types of existence. For it is indeed just insofar as things are inert that they escape the sway of consciousness; their inertness
is their safeguard, the preserver of their autonomy."

Husserl held that intentionality was one of the essential characteristics of consciousness. For Sartre, intentionality is consciousness. On this view, the object of consciousness remains independent of consciousness and can be analyzed in its own right rather than as a content of consciousness. One of Sartre's translator's puts it this way: "To use the metaphorical language sometimes employed by Sartre (since literal usage tends to suggest objects rather than consciousness), consciousness is a great emptiness, a wind blowing toward objects. Its whole reality is exhausted in intending what is other. It is never 'self-contained,' or container; it is always 'outside itself.'" 31

In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre adheres to all the consequences of this notion of the intentionality of consciousness. For there to be a consciousness, Sartre maintains, there must be an object of consciousness. The phenomenon appearing to consciousness indicates an infinite series of appearances and remains transcendent, that is, appears before consciousness but not in consciousness as a content. If the phenomenon was a content of consciousness, it would require an infinite process in consciousness to reveal the total contents of the object. Neither the phenomenon, nor its being, are contents of consciousness, but are revealed to consciousness as transcendent such that consciousness is directed toward the outside, toward the phenomenon. "All consciousness is positional", Sartre says, "in that it transcends itself in order to reach an object, and it exhausts itself in this same positioning." 32 It can be seen that in Sartre's view, the being-for-itself, consciousness, implies the being
of the phenomenon, and this implication is immediate and prior to reflection.

Relatively early in *Ideas*, Husserl makes a similar point concerning the distinction between consciousness and its object. Sounding very much like G. E. Moore, in *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, despite the terminology and detail, Husserl says in perceiving a piece of paper in front of us, we see it and touch it. "The paper itself with its objective qualities, its extension in space, its objective position in regard to that spatial thing I call my body, is not cogitatio, but cogitatum, not perceptual experience, but something perceived. Now that which is perceived can itself very well be a conscious experience; but it is evident that an object such as a material thing, this paper, for instance, as given in perceptual experience, is in principle other than an experience, a being of a completely different kind."33

For Sartre, all consciousness is self-consciousness. To perceive an object, for example, involves one's consciousness of perceiving the object, according to this view. Or, thinking about a particular problem includes one's consciousness of thinking about the problem. In Sartre's language, perceiving or thinking are each a positional consciousness; that is, they are directed toward a transcendent object. The consciousness of the thinking or perceiving is a non-positional (without division) consciousness of itself; that is, it is a consciousness of itself as thinking or perceiving and does not intend an object which transcends it. Sartre says: "... consciousness of consciousness -- except in the case of reflective consciousness which we shall dwell on later -- is not positional, which is to say that consciousness is
not for itself its own object. Its object is by nature outside of it, and that is why consciousness *posits* and *grasps* the object in the same act. Consciousness knows itself only as absolute awareness." This consciousness is what Sartre calls consciousness in the first degree, or the pre-reflective consciousness. The pre-reflective self-consciousness does not posit a self or ego as object. With consciousness of the first degree, consciousness of one's perception of an object, for example, is a non-reflective, or pre-reflective, consciousness of one's perception. The pre-reflective consciousness is a positional consciousness of a transcendent object, and a non-positional consciousness of itself. "Sartre uses the words *conscience non-positionelle* (de) soi and puts the _de_ in parentheses to show that there is no separation, no positioning of the self as an object of consciousness."35

The pre-reflective consciousness, for Sartre, is the condition for all consciousness. In addition to this consciousness there is a consciousness of the second degree, namely, a reflective consciousness. This latter consciousness Sartre often calls the Cartesian cogito and it is a reflective consciousness directed upon consciousness. In Descartes' dictum, "I doubt, therefore I am," Sartre hold that the consciousness which concludes, "I am," is a consciousness reflecting upon the doubting and is not the same consciousness as the doubting. "In other words this cogito is not Descartes doubting; it is descartes reflecting upon the doubting."36

The Cartesian cogito requires, for its existence, Sartre maintains, the pre-reflective consciousness: the former consciousness, as a reflecting consciousness, requires as its object of reflection the pre-
reflective cogito. Thus the principle of the intentionality of consciousness is preserved in this Cartesian consciousness which is not a reflective consciousness of itself but is a positional consciousness of the pre-reflective consciousness which transcends it. At the same time, the Cartesian cogito is also a non-positional consciousness of itself in the same sense that all consciousness is both positional and non-positional. "Insofar as my reflecting consciousness is consciousness of itself," Sartre says, "it is non-positional consciousness. It becomes positional only by directing itself upon the reflected consciousness which itself was not a positional consciousness of itself before being reflected." The consciousness which says "I think" is not the consciousness which thinks but the one reflecting upon the thinking. The Cartesian cogito introduces the "I" or "me" or "ego" in the reflected consciousness. For Sartre, no infinite regression is involved here. He says: "All reflecting consciousness is, indeed, in itself unreflected, and a new act of the third degree is necessary in order to posit it. Moreover, there is no infinite regress here, since a consciousness has no need at all of a reflecting consciousness in order to be conscious of itself. It simply does not posit itself as an object." And for Sartre, the pre-reflective consciousness has ontological priority over any consciousness reflected upon because "... the unreflected consciousness does not need to be reflected in order to exist, and because reflection presupposes the intervention of a second-degree consciousness." 

The pre-reflective consciousness, for Sartre, is the original consciousness whereas the Cartesian cogito is the basis of all judgement. The reflective or Cartesian consciousness is able to pass judgement


diction for the possibility of essence. For Barthe, "neither the transcendental fact of

essence nor existence is here revealed, such that existence is the same as

essence," or, in essence of man. Rather, the transcendental faculty of

consciousness, as announced by Kant, holds that our existence is not based on

consciousness as an inherent identity, for consciousness is not an

existence. In other words, the essence of consciousness is that

sciences existence exists as consciousness of extractions. It is a nullness

existence -- that is, the synthetic order of the possibility. -

that in reference to the center of things, it creates and supports the

not produced as any particular instance of an abstract possibility but

consciousness takes a pre-existence existence. He says, "consciousness is

in pure spontaneity, pure existence, pure consciousness, pure nothingness. In short, for

existence, alone any importance, and to without any context, consciousness

namely the being-for-itself, it is essential that consciousness, for

from the preceding account of this other region of being.

the Cartesian cogito.

consciousness which is the primary consciousness and the condition of

towards the world, but at the same time, it is the pre-representative

intuition in my actual consciousness to directed toward the outside,

phenomena and not intellect, but rather says, "... all that there is of

ness does not judge itself because it is nothing only transcendental,

upon the consciousness reflected upon, the pre-representative consciousness.
is consciousness through and through. It can be limited only by itself."\(^44\)

In Sartre's view, man, since he is a conscious being, is nothing in advance; that is, he is nothing \textit{a priori}. Man is what he makes of himself. There is no \textit{a priori} nature or unavoidable human essence which makes men heroes or cowards, successes or failures. Instead, men define themselves through their particular actions and deeds. A coward, for example, is one who has committed acts of cowardice. He may change his "cowardly nature" by refusing to commit such acts again and performing more dignified deeds. Also, a man's "nature" is exhausted in the actions he has performed and does perform. "The genius of Proust", Sartre says to illustrate once again, "is neither the work considered in isolation nor the subjective ability to produce it; it is the work considered as the totality of the manifestations of the person."\(^45\)

"Existence" does not mean, in Sartre's philosophy, the actualization of a being, the "thisness" of an entity, as opposed to the entity as a logical possibility. Rather, by "existence" Sartre refers to a more radical concept; namely, the spontaneity of consciousness. Existence and consciousness are one and the same. "Consciousness is a plenum of existence, and this determination of itself by itself is an essential characteristic." On this view, alienation and choice become, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, far-reaching notions whereby man is constantly engaged in the task of self-construction. Although there is not a human nature in the usual sense, for Sartre, there is a human condition: "'What men have in common is not a nature,
but a metaphysical condition; and by that we mean the combination of 
constraints which limit them a priori; the necessity to be born, and 
to die; that of being finite and of dwelling in a world among men. 
For the rest, they constitute indestructible totalities, whose ideas, 
moods and acts are secondary and dependent structures, and whose essential 
character is to be situated, and they differ among themselves as their 
situations differ." 47

The preceding remarks in this chapter have indicated that 
Sartre does not consider himself a realist nor an idealist in the 
ordinary sense of these words. For Sartre, consciousness is always 
consciousness of something but this something is always transcendent 
because consciousness does not create its object. Phenomena appear to 
consciousness but their being is not reducible to its being perceived. 
"Consciousness is the revealed-revelation of existents," says Sartre, 
"and existents appear before consciousness on the foundation of their 
being. Nevertheless the primary characteristic of the being of an 
existent is never to reveal itself completely to consciousness. An 
existent can not be stripped of its being; being is the ever present 
foundation of the existent; it is everywhere in it and nowhere." 48

Being is already there, independent of consciousness and is not ex-
hausted by its appearances. Further, the series of appearances of 
phenomena is infinite and not controlled by consciousness. Thus we 
are able to talk about the transphenomenal being of phenomena which 
means that the being of the phenomenon is independent of conscious-
ness. Thus Sartre is not an idealist. However, consciousness is able 
to apprehend the meaning of the being of phenomena even though this
being itself is not revealed. In this connection Sartre says:
"Consciousness can always pass beyond the existent, not toward its being, but toward the meaning of this being .... The meaning of the being of the existent in so far as it reveals itself to consciousness is the phenomenon of being." This phenomenon of being we have already seen in the description of Roquentin's experience in the park: it is the nausea.

Sartre is not a realist in the traditional sense. Consciousness is not manipulated by phenomena, nor is it simply the "discovery" of various characteristics of things. It is the being-for-itself which makes the world arise as an organized, intelligible system. Consciousness does not create phenomena nor the being of phenomena. But without consciousness, phenomena would not appear; they would not be systematically organized, nor made into a "world". Without consciousness there would simply be full, massiv and undifferentiated being; being would simply be, but there would be no world of differentiated and related things. Consciousness does not create the being of phenomena, but it is consciousness which gives phenomena their meaning and significance.

Concerning being itself we are unable to say much more than did Parmenides. Sartre says that an examination of the phenomenon of being allows us to assign three characteristics to the being of phenomena: "Being is. Being is in-itself. Being is what it is." 50 In short, being-in-itself excludes all notions of activity and passivity, potency and act. These are all human notions and relations pressed upon inert things by a spontaneous consciousness, and being-in-itself
is beyond these notions. We are even forbidden to say that being is
becoming since ". . . being is the being of becoming and due to this
fact it is beyond becoming. It is what it is." Finally, being-in-
itself is neither necessary nor derived from the possible. It is not
derived from the possible as this is a structure of being-for-itself
and being-in-itself is outside consciousness. Being-in-itself is not
necessary because Sartre says necessity involved the connection be-
tween ideal propositions but not between existents. "An existing
phenomenon", he says, "can never be derived from another existent or
existent." 52

Like Requemyn in *Nausea*, Sartre once again arrives at the idea
of contingency: being-in-itself is contingent. "This is what con-
sciousness expresses in anthropomorphic terms by saying that being is
superfluous (de trop) -- that is, that consciousness absolutely can
not derive being from anything, either from another being, or from a
possibility, or from a necessary fact. Uncreated, without reason for
being, without any connection with another being, being-in-itself is
de trop for eternity." 53

Throughout this chapter, we have noted that Sartre's ontology
is bifurcated into a full plenum of being-in-itself and the radically
distinct being-for-itself. To say the least, Sartre's almost Par-
menidean description of being-in-itself causes many eyebrows to be
raised. Thus some people are critical of Sartre's descriptive ontology
because of what they feel to be his substantivization of certain words
like "being". One critic, Van Meter Ames, in an article in the Journal
of Philosophy, says: "Such use of noun substantives, which do not stand for real things at all, is a misunderstanding of language which makes a frightening vocabulary, as if the words were living ogres in themselves and not just indications of horrors actually experienced."54

Such a criticism, however, is based upon an empirical meaning criterion and seems to assume that any other way of approaching philosophical problems is incorrect. It is true that the word "being" does signify, for Sartre, reality. If "being" is simply a linguistic abbreviation, as Ames suggests, then any description of consciousness and things in themselves would be impossible for Sartre. Indeed, if "being" does not designate anything, it nevertheless seems that the status of things in the world, as well as the world itself, is somehow implied whenever we talk about them in ordinary language or otherwise. One of Sartre's projects is to describe this status but any such description implies ontology whether we designate it "being", or "reality," or "phenomena" or what not. Sartre's problem is man as an existing individual, the world and the relationship between them in the concrete situation. For Sartre, the problem of existence cannot be fully described by empirical, naturalistic and common sense language criteria, but requires as well metaphorical language and the description of moods, such as nausea, in addition to an analysis of the intuition of man's experiential relation to the world. One might wish to question the legitimacy of this kind of philosophical procedure. But here one would be going beyond Sartre and questioning the justification of the philosophy of existentialism, and to a lesser extent that of phenomenology. This, of course, would be a proper philosophical undertaking. But to do this
fairly, one would need to analyse that philosophy first within its own frame of reference before one could justifiably apply external criteria to it. To suggest that Sartre's philosophical investigation of being is illegitimate because he does not fully comply with the procedural recommendations of the critic is to beg the crucial question of whether or not Sartre's interpretation presents the basis for a new and unique re-interpretation of human experience.

Being can, however, be questioned within the context of Sartre's investigation. Sartre begins with a description of the given of experience; that is, phenomena which appear to consciousness, the being-for-itself. His procedure, as already pointed out, is one of looking upon phenomena and describing what is revealed. But here Sartre leads us to the notion of transphenomenal being which is "being-for-revealing" but not "revealed being". Thus we may ask how Sartre can make a pronouncement concerning any being which transcends the appearance of phenomena?

The notion of a massive being, or reality, independent of consciousness, or mind in any sense, and never completely apprehended by consciousness, is common among many realists. Unlike Sartre, however, most realists do not begin with phenomena but with things qua material objects in themselves. Nevertheless there are advocates of realism who rely less on ontological descriptions than Sartre but whose advocacy of a being that is never an object of consciousness but always eludes consciousness is no less open to question. Indeed some, contrary to Sartre, tend to flirt with idealism even though claiming their realist chastity. We shall look very briefly at one of these. Our purpose is
simply to show that Sartre's problem is explaining transphenomenal
being is not more open to question than some other less radical realists
who rely on ordinary language and common sense methods rather than
descriptive ontology. In neither instance are we questioning the
philosopher's realism but rather that his claims for this realism are
not as apodeictic as he maintains.

For example, H. A. Prichard, while advocating direct realism,
say we know material objects exist but we never perceive them. In Knowledge
and Perception, he says we only see colours; not the coloured surface of
a body, but only colours. At the same time, we somehow know that the
colour is the colour of a body, that is, a material object. How we
know this, Prichard doesn't say. Nevertheless, such knowledge is, for
him, certain.

Of course, Prichard only arrived at this position gradually.
Thus in an earlier work, Kant's Theory of Knowledge, he says that we
do, at times, perceive bodies as they really are, under proper con-
ditions of perspective. But even here, the realism is being tempered,
as Prichard says this only applies to two-dimensional objects and never
three-dimensional ones. Of these latter, they only look to be such
and such, but we never perceive them as they are. However, we do know
what they are and that they are bodies.

Ultimately Prichard's realism leaves bodies only with their
primary qualities. All the secondary qualities require a percipient
and the thing itself is never perceived. What we perceive are extended
colours, noises which temporally succeed one another, etc. But in all
this we still know that bodies exist, and exist independently of any knower.
Such a view as Prichard's has some similarity in this one respect with Sartre's. Both claim that material objects and transphenomenal being, respectively, exist independently of a peripient. Further, both Prichard and Sartre hold that things themselves and transphenomenal being, respectively, are never perceived but in both cases we somehow know they exist. How we know this is not made clear by either author.

Sartre does present an ontological argument in order to prove the existence of a massive transphenomenal being that is outside of consciousness. Briefly his argument is as follows: All consciousness is consciousness of something. This can be interpreted in two ways: either consciousness is constitutive of its object, or consciousness is consciousness of a transcendent being. The first alternative is a reductio ad absurdum since to be conscious means to be confronted with something that is not consciousness; otherwise if the being of the phenomenon depends on consciousness, "... the object must be distinguished from consciousness not by its presence but by its absence, not by its plenitude, but by its nothingness. If being belongs to consciousness, the object is not consciousness, not to the extent that it is another 60 being, but that it is non-being." Thus the first alternative would leave us with a consciousness distinguishing itself from something which is nothing. But being is unable to come from nothing: "... the objective will never come out of the subjective nor the transcendent from immanence, 61 nor being from non-being." Sartre's conclusion is that the object of consciousness transcends consciousness, and that "... consciousness implies in its being a non-conscious and transphenomenal being." 62
We must observe that ontological arguments have always been open to suspicion, even by the faithful. The main difficulty involves the validity of the transition from knowledge to existence. Thus Anselm, for example, needs to elucidate on the transition from the knowledge or idea of a perfect being to the existence of such a being; Prichard must explain how knowledge of bodies is acquired and why such knowledge is sufficient reason to advocate their existence; and Sartre must present more than knowledge of transphenomenal being to justify its existence, especially since it is now revealed to consciousness.  

Sartre, we feel, has not shown the logical necessity of trans-phenomenal being which, *ex hypothesi*, an ontological argument should do. Assuming with Sartre that something cannot come from, or depend on, nothing, we need not accept the view that this logically implies that being must transcend consciousness. Even if one argues that what is not consciousness is non-being, if consciousness is regarded as constituting being, this does not logically imply that the object cannot depend on consciousness. In other words, being as a content of consciousness whereby consciousness is not necessarily related to anything external to itself is not logically excluded. This, of course, does not mean that the object of consciousness in not external to consciousness, but only that this externality is not a logical necessity.

If the preceding argument has any validity, we think it indicates that Sartre's claim that being is transphenomenal lacks, the ontological proof notwithstanding, sufficient reasons to provide an apodictic foundation for realism. However, this does not mean Sartre's realism must be rejected, nor that sufficient evidence for idealism has been laid
bare. As a postulate his realism has considerable force. This is especially the case when it is seen within the general context of his descriptions of consciousness and the world. The intentionality of consciousness, for Sartre, posits a radical separation between consciousness and the object of consciousness. The "of" in the phrase "consciousness of" signifies, for him, that the intended object is independent of consciousness, and is revealed to consciousness as a distinct entity or state of affairs. For Sartre, intentionality involved the strict separation and independence of the object of consciousness from consciousness and does not involve a dependence upon consciousness, as it did in Husserl's later writings. Sartre nowhere attempts a detailed proof of this, except the ontological argument. However, it is consistently held by him through all his writings and receives informal corroboration from the context of his philosophy, as we have attempted to point out in this chapter.

Sartre's ontological description of consciousness and phenomena has led to his positing a radical distinction between the being-for-itself of consciousness and the being-in-itself of phenomena. Sartre completely and consistently rejects any idealism which holds that nothing exists but phenomena dependent upon consciousness. But he does hold that only phenomena exist, and he denies any dualism between appearance and reality. However, he differs from most phenomenologists by holding that phenomena have a being over and above their essence which cannot be described in terms of consciousness. This being he calls "transphenomenal" which means the object of consciousness is autonomous in its being and not constituted by consciousness. The being of the phenomenon is transphenomenal
such that the phenomenon is not a mere appearance but has a being of its own. What we have attempted in the latter paragraphs is not to deny this, but to argue that the transphenomenal being of phenomena is not an apodeictic concept but rather a postulate based on Sartre's use of intuition and analysis of the givens of experience.

Perhaps we may argue that the notion of transphenomenal being acquires some plausible justification from common sense and "existential" considerations rather than formal ontological ones, and that the former ones are consistent within the context of Sartre's revealed ontology as outlined in this chapter. Earlier we pointed out that for Sartre, the "world" does not require proof. We are "immersed" in the world, in being. We are conscious of phenomena but also we are aware that they cannot be manipulated by our whim. From a common sense point of view, there is little reason to suppose that things only exist when perceived:

"... now I turn my head away. I no longer see the sheet of paper. I now see the gray wallpaper. The sheet of paper is no longer present, no longer there. I know perfectly well, however, that it has not annihilated itself: it is prevented by its inertness. It has just ceased to be for me." 64

Nor, from the common view, is there reason to hold that being or the materiality of a thing is exhausted or fully revealed in the perception of it. We are able, as Sartre suggests, to look at a thing in an infinite number of ways and through infinite relationships with other things such that an analysis of it is inexhaustible. From an existential standpoint, the person's awareness of the massiveness of the world and things as obstacles to be manipulated and overcome, a
world where he is always "in situation" and which he apprehends through various moods that have existential significance -- like Roquentin's nausea -- leads him to feel the heaviness, stickiness and contingency of a being not reducible to its percept. In speaking about the being of the world posited by consciousness, namely the transphenomenal being, Sartre says significantly: "It requires simply that the being of that which appears does not exist only in so far as it appears. The transphenomenal being of what exists for consciousness is itself in itself ...").65

It is considerations like these, or ones something like them, which we think provide some sort of reason for Sartre's contention that being overflows its appearances. But the main support for this postulate is contained throughout the context of Sartre's total philosophy: his descriptions of consciousness, things of the world, and the relation between these two areas of being in "the situation". Whether the being-in-itself is in fact transphenomenal, it is still the case that in the context of Sartre's descriptive philosophy there is a radical distinction between the being of consciousness overflowing with existence, on the one hand, and the being of phenomena, being-in-itself, on the other. Being-for-itself and being-in-itself are irreducible. In short, the intentionality of consciousness, as outlined earlier, and the description of the object of consciousness, indicate that phenomena are objects of consciousness and not objects in consciousness; and this seems to be the case within the context of Sartre's philosophy, whether the being of the phenomena is transphenomenal or whether it is completely exhausted in the transcendent phenomena. If the latter, the being of the phenomenon, for
Sartre, would still not depend upon the phenomenon appearing to a consciousness.

For Sartre, being is everywhere. Each act of consciousness intends being, it reveals being. Up to now, the world is seen as a full positivity confronting a spontaneous consciousness. The problem of the relationship between these two irreducible regions of being takes on paramount importance. Although the being of phenomena is autonomous, for Sartre, its meaning is a correlate of our projects and choices within the realm of our concrete experience. How this is made possible and its relevance to freedom will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER II
NEGATION AND APPROPRIATION

In the last chapter, we were left with two irreducible regions of being: the being of consciousness and the being of the world. In that chapter, as well as the introduction it was maintained that consciousness in some way bestows meaning and significance upon phenomena without reducing phenomena to objects in consciousness. How this dialectic between the two regions of being is made possible, is the problem of the present chapter.

In order to be conscious, the being-for-itself, or the human being, requires an intended object, Sartre maintains. Consequently, consciousness, though not reducible to the being of the intended object, requires the being-in-itself to provide it with phenomena as objects of consciousness. Up to now, we have considered consciousness and phenomena more or less as abstractions: that is, they have been considered in isolation when, in fact, they are interdependent. Sartre says: "... consciousness is an abstraction since it conceals within itself an ontological source in the region of the in-itself, and conversely the phenomenon is likewise an abstraction since it must 'appear' to consciousness. The concrete can be only the synthetic totality of which consciousness, like the phenomenon, constitutes only moments." The concrete, for is man. Sartre holds that man is a being-always-in-a-world, always "in situation". Man is consciousness "concretized". But how does the situation
arise, if the two regions of being are radically separated, we may ask? and, further, if being is a plenum, a full positivity, all that is, how are negative judgements possible? The answer to the one question includes that of the other.

For Sartre, negation is introduced into the world with the emergence of consciousness. The negation, as had been anticipated, is not in things as part of their being, nor is it part of the positivity of the trans-phenomenal being of the phenomenon. Rather it is introduced against the backdrop of being. When one asks any question, or interrogates any aspect of being, a specific and meaningful attitude of the for-itself is presented. Such an attitude is one of the ways consciousness "reveals" non-being. The for-itself, intending some object, questions that object about its being or its way of being. The question, then, presupposes the being of the interrogator and the thing that is questioned. Also, the interrogator expects a revelation of the questioned phenomenon's being or way of being. Every question, for Sartre, is ontologically directed, or at least ontologically grounded, in that it is directed toward being such that one expects some feature of being to be revealed. Further, every question implies the possibility of a negative answer, but like the question, ontologically grounded and not simply a linguistic "not". To question being, one is faced with the possibility of intending non-being as a transcendent event in the being of the phenomenon.

Every question, Sartre maintains, is conditioned by a three-fold non-being. "There exists then for the questioner", he says, "the permanent objective possibility of a negative reply. In relation to this possibility the questioner by the very fact that he is questioning, posits himself as
in a state of indetermination; he does not know whether the reply will be affirmative or negative. Thus the question is a bridge set up between two non-beings: the non-being of knowing in man, the possibility of non-being of being in transcendent being. Finally the question implies the existence of a truth. By the very question the questioner affirms that he expects an objective reply, such that we can say of it, 'It is thus and not otherwise.' In a word the truth, as differentiated from being, introduces a third non-being as determining the question -- the non-being of limitation. This triple non-being conditions every question. ...

The problem remains, as Sartre recognizes, whether this negation is grounded in the intentional structure of consciousness or is simply the result of negative judgements. Though every inquiry concerning things in the world may be conditioned by the possibility of non-being, it is arguable that negation is merely a quality of judgements. This would mean that the anticipated answer to a question would be a judgement-response whereby the possibility of a negative response is not excluded. If this is the case, the concept of nothingness would be a derivative of the negative judgement rather than an ontological concept. Sartre, however, argues for the reverse; namely, the negative judgement is conditioned and supported by non-being.

Non-being, Sartre maintains, arises in the world because being is confronted by consciousness. Since consciousness confronts being and expects certain of its aspects to be revealed, non-being becomes a possibility. "It is because I expect to find fifteen hundred frames", Sartre explains, "that I find only thirteen hundred. It is because a
physicist expects a certain verification of his hypothesis that nature can tell him no. It would be in vain to deny that negation appears on the original basis of a relation of man to the world. The world does not disclose its non-beings to one who has not first posited them as possibilities.\(^5\)

Non-being, then, for Sartre, initially arises as a pre-judicative intuition, and is only later formalized in a judgement. Thus one may question something by using an interrogative statement, but the question per se is a particular attitude of the for-itself which precedes formulation in a statement. In this connection, Sartre says: "In posing a question I stand facing being in a certain way and this relation to being is a relation of being; the judgment is only one optional expression of it."\(^6\) By asking if Pierre is in the café, for example, one confronts the café—which is full of being and expects from this being a particular revelation. By expecting Pierre to be revealed as part of the being of the café, one posits, pre-judicatively, the possibility of Pierre being absent from the café. Here a pre-judicative comprehension of non-being arises on which the possible judgement, "Pierre is not here," is based. "Thus my question by its nature envelops a certain pre-judicative comprehension of non-being; it is in itself a relation of being with non-being, on the basis of the original transcendence; that is, in a relation of being with being."\(^7\)

In order to illustrate one of the ways non-being arises in the world of being, Sartre presents the example of going to the café for a rendezvous with Pierre. We shall present this example, as it makes clear that negation, for Sartre, arises as a pre-judicative intuition of the
for-itself and precedes the negative judgement.\(^3\)

The whole cafe and its contents, in Sartre's view, appear to
consciousness as intended phenomena. The being of the cafe and its contents
is transphenomenal, in the sense described in the last chapter. That
is, the cafe and its contents are on the side of the being-in-itself,
intended by consciousness but not constituents of it. In short, the
cafe is a fullness of being and, \textit{ex hypothesi}, a full positivity without
gaps. I, for example, come to this particular cafe expecting to meet
Pierre. For me the cafe is a fullness of being. The cafe now becomes
part of my world, it and its contents become objects of my consciousness.
What does this involve?

No one object in the cafe becomes, of its own initiative, a
specific object of attention. It is because I am expecting a particular
object to be revealed to me, namely Pierre, that the other objects in
the cafe take on only marginal significance. Here we see, once again,
the notion of meaning given to the world by consciousness. Thus it is
I, as a conscious being, who specifically intend that particular cup
at the center of that particular table in that particular corner of
the cafe, and make the relationship between cup, table and location
significant. At the same time, by ignoring for the moment the other
objects of the cafe, they take on only marginal significance; that is,
they provide the background on which the specifically intended objects
arise as figures of my attention. But my main interest is finding
Pierre. The cafe and its contents, then, become the ground upon which
Pierre is about to appear.

Sartre maintains that the organization of the cafe with its
fullness of being as the ground is an original nihilation. This is so because each phenomenon in the café attempts to become isolated from the whole plenum and become a figure of my attention. But not being singled out for my attention, the phenomenon simply melts back into the fullness of the being of the café and remains undifferentiated. None of the objects of the café are given more than marginal attention. I isolate this particular table from the whole as a possible place where Pierre might be sitting. He is not there and I am no longer interested in this table. It therefore becomes, once again, part of the background of the whole café. The ground on which the various phenomena arise, only to slip back into the ground, is an original nihilation. As a conscious being, I nihilate all the objects appearing before me and they become undifferentiated as they slip back into the fullness and neutrality of the ground. Such nihilation is necessary as it prepares the way for the appearance of the principle and expectant figure, namely Pierre. By a pre-judicative intuition, I am conscious of this nihilation. I am conscious of that man sitting in the corner. Perhaps it is Pierre. For a moment he detains my attention, he becomes quickly nihilated as an intended object and slips into the plenitude of the café. But if this person had been Pierre, then "... my intuition would be filled by a solid element, I should be suddenly arrested by his face and the whole café would organize itself around him as a discrete presence."

But if Pierre is absent from the café, Sartre says, he is absent from the whole café. Due to his absence, and, *ex hypothesi*, our lack of interest in the other features of the café, the café and its contents gradually disappear as discrete phenomena and return to the plenitude
of the ground of the café. The café "pursues its nihilation" by remaining an undifferentiated ground to my marginal attention. It becomes the ground for one central figure only, namely Pierre. This figure is carried before my consciousness everywhere in the café. Thus when I look at that man in the corner, the figure of Pierre is between him and my consciousness. But Pierre is a continual disappearance since this man is not Pierre. The figure of Pierre is presented to me as a nothingness on the ground of the nihilation of the café. The man to who I am directing my attention is not the central figure which raises itself in this instance as a nothingness. I thus nihilate this man; that is he no longer attracts my attention, he is no longer intended by me and thus slips back into the undifferentiated ground of the café as I direct my attention elsewhere. I thus intuit a double negation and it is this which permits me to formulate the judgement, "Pierre is not here". Sartre declares that "... what is offered to intuition is a flickering of nothingness; it is the nothingness of the ground, the nihilation of which summons and demands the appearance of the figure, and it is the figure -- the nothingness which slips as a nothing to the surface of the ground."  

Due to my expectation, therefore, the absence of Pierre is a real event concerning the café. This absence is an objective fact and is a synthetic relation between Pierre and the café, Sartre holds. A statement such as, "Wellington is not in the café either," has simply an abstract meaning. Such statements, Sartre says, "... are pure application of the principle of negation without real or efficacious foundation, and they never succeed in establishing a real relation between the café and
To sum up this example, then, we may say that, for Sartre, negation is a refusal of existence. The for-itself posits Pierre's presence as a real possibility in the cafe. On the original negation of the cafe and its contents, Pierre's presence is revealed as nothingness. On this basis the negative judgement, "Pierre is not here," can be made. All this is made possible, in Sartre's view, because of the confrontation of being-in-itself by the radically distinct being of consciousness. Being-in-itself has priority over nothingness since this latter requires the backdrop of being. But nothingness breaks the continuity of being and arises as a pre-judicative intuition which appears as consciousness of the not. In short, being-in-itself is a plenum that is empty of any determination other than self-identity; consciousness (and nothingness) are empty of being-in-itself.

The origin of negation for Sartre, we now may say specifically, is the pre-reflective cogito. Nothingness, in other words, is introduced into the world by man on the basis of a pre-reflective or pre-judicative intuition of being. But, for Sartre, negation arises in many instances other than interrogation or the questioning of being. Negation arises in every act of consciousness. We shall look at this more fully later on in the chapter. For the moment, let us simply say, and this was clearly intimated in the example of Pierre, the simple consciousness of this table is made possible by negation. In such a case, there is the pre-reflective intuition that this table is not my consciousness and also that the table is other than the other phenomena apprehended. Because of negation, consciousness is able to isolate a particular intended phenomenon from the
rest of being, or refuse to give significance to a particular phenomenon that rises on the ground of being. In addition, there are a variety of ways or specific attitudes by which the for-itself apprehends being such as absence, otherness, repulsion, fragility, destruction, regret, distance, change, etc. Like interrogation, these attitudes are experienced by, and originate in, consciousness and are ways by which consciousness is able to nihilate being-in-itself. These attitudes Sartre calls "negatiues" and they contain as much reality and efficacy as other realities although enclosing non-being within themselves.

Negation, then, for Sartre, is the specific activity of the for-itself. This is made possible because consciousness is spontaneous and completely lacks the being-in-itself. If consciousness were a plenitude like the in-itself, negation would be impossible, Sartre maintains. By not being a being-in-itself, consciousness is able to understand, organize and give meaning to that being. Sartre says: "The Being by which Nothingness arrives in the world is a being such that in its Being, the Nothingness of its Being is in question. The being by which Nothingness comes to the world must be its own Nothingness." This being is consciousness and nothingness is an ontological characteristic of it. Again, Sartre says: "Thus in posing a question, a certain negative element is introduced into the world. We see nothingness making the world iridescent, casting a shimmer over things. But at the same time the question emanates from a questioner who in order to motivate himself in his being as one who questions, disengages himself from being. This disengagement is then by definition a human process. Man presents himself at least in this instance as a being who causes Nothingness to arise in the world, inasmuch as he
himself is affected with non-being to this end." 18

It seems pertinent to pause at this point in order to consider a specific criticism levelled at Sartre's view of negation. In an article in Horizon, A. J. Ayer agrees with Sartre that a negative judgement cannot be reduced to a positive one. If one held that the statement, "Pierre is not in the café," was equivalent to the statement, "He is somewhere else," the negative element would not be eliminated. Assuming the latter statement to be correct, the negative is concealed in the phrase "somewhere else". Ayer says: "It is indeed possible to conceive of a logical language in which the expression 'somewhere else' would be replaced by a disjunction of place-names, in such a way that the possibility of any two names standing for the same place was logically excluded; but the trouble is that the disjunction would have to be infinite, so that the original negative proposition could never actually be translated." 19 But if it is agreed that negative judgements are irreducible, Ayer contends, this does not mean there are negative facts. The facts are always positive, Ayer says, "... inasmuch as what verifies a negative proposition is always an experience which has a positive content." 20

Without going beyond this point, we may say that the disagreement between Sartre and Ayer appears mainly to arise from a misunderstanding of Sartre's terminology. Sartre would agree that the facts per se, in his language the being-in-itself, are always positive. In the world there are no negative facts; that is, being-in-itself is unable to annihilate itself. But for Sartre, non-being is a reality not of being in-itself but of consciousness. Thus only with the emergence of consciousness does negation arise in the world as a pre-judicative intuition. But again, it
is not a fact of being-in-itself per se, but only arises as a result of the close dialectic between the two regions of being. Being-in-itself is always positive in itself. Further, negation, for Sartre, only arises on the ground of being-in-itself. Thus without the positive in-itself, there would be nothing for consciousness to intend and consequently nihilate, in Sartre's sense of that term. The negation, then, as a characteristic of human experience in Sartre's view, is introduced by consciousness as it intends the positive world. In this sense, we could say that Sartre's judgement, "Pierre is not in the café," is confirmed by the positive contents of the café, none of which are Pierre.

But such a decision, for Sartre, is only possible because consciousness as the origin of negation is able to isolate each of these contents from the total positivity and nihilate each in turn in the way described in the preceding example.

Ayer's criticism of Sartre's use of the negative does not stop here. He holds that the notion of a pre-judicative comprehension of non-being appears to be a misuse of language based on the substantizing of words like "nothingness" and "negation". Such words are not used by most philosophers to denote something mysterious and insubstantial; in short, they are not used to name anything, Ayer maintains. The statement, "Pierre is not in the café," does not contain any negative facts. Sartre's reasoning on negation, Ayer says, is a kindred spirit of the King's in "Alice through the Looking-glass". Alice says, "I see nobody on the road"; the King replies, "I only wish I had such eyes to be able to see Nobody! And at that distance too!" Also, "Nobody passed me on the road", to which the reply is, "He couldn't have done that or he would have been here.
Ayer agrees that Sartre's analysis is more sophisticated than this but his reasoning is no better. If one says, according to Ayer, that two objects are separated by nothing, one means, ordinarily, that they are not separated. But when Sartre makes such a claim, Ayer states, he means that the objects are both divided and united, that there is a thread between them; "... only, it is a very peculiar thread, both invisible and intangible." This, for Ayer, is merely a trick and shouldn't deceive anyone.

In attempting to answer such a criticism, we must consider Sartre's analysis of nothingness within the context of his ontological description of being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Since we have tried to present this description in the last chapter, and, again, throughout this chapter, we will not specifically refer to it again in this context. Suffice to say that many of Ayer's points will be seen to be either in general agreement with Sartre and are mainly misinterpretations, or they are explainable on the basis of Sartre's philosophy even though we may continue to disagree with them. Such disagreement is somewhat different and more conducive to philosophical discussions than claims that various isolated statements by Sartre are literally non-sensical or that he is a cunning linguistic wizard. Ayer's criticism that Sartre substantizes words like "nothingness" is, however, a pertinent one. Nonetheless, it seems plausible to argue that it is answerable.

The words "nothingness," "negation," "annihilation," etc. are used by Sartre in a quasi-technical sense. On the other hand, they are not without a sense that is often and unfortunately very real in ordinary life, namely, contrary to Ayer, they designate something insubstantial. "Nothing-
ness," is used by Sartre to mean all kinds of negation, including ordinary linguistic "nons" contained in negative judgements. But more especially, the word "nothingness" is employed by him to specifically name the void, or gap, or cavity, or emptiness which surrounds being-for-itself and separates it from being-in-itself. Further, in his description of nothingness, Sartre is not in the position of the King in "Alice through the Looking-glass," even though more sophisticated. Rather, Sartre's analysis is of someone who is actually conscious of what is absent. The situation is analogous to that of someone returning home from the funeral of a loved one and finding nobody in the house. Here the emptiness is felt. Sartre's example of expecting to find Pierre in the cafe only to be confronted by his absence, is not as awesome an experience (usually) but it is still similar in kind. The statement, "Pierre is not in the cafe," has the same logical status as the statement, "Wellington is not in the cafe," and the same truth-value. However, these statements say two very different things for Sartre. The signification is different: by expecting to find Pierre in the cafe, we become aware of a void and the cafe takes on a different meaning when Pierre's absence is revealed. In his book on Sartre, Cranston says in support of Sartre's view of nothingness: "The experience of nothingness one has in looking in vain for a friend in a cafe is a relatively trivial experience. The experience of nothingness we have when we become aware of the void which divides us from the world of objective existence, is a profoundly disturbing one."

If the above argument has any validity, then nothingness for Sartre is not a derivation of negative judgements as these latter only arise on the basis of a pre-judicative intuition. But Sartre does not represent non-being as independent of being-in-itself. Thus being is
prior to non-being and the former serving as ground, enables the latter to arise. This, of course, has been anticipated right from the beginning of our first chapter where it was pointed out that consciousness requires the being-in-itself to supply data for consciousness to intend. Everything is exterior to consciousness, it is more bare than a tabula rasa. Thus consciousness in itself is a nothingness and by nihilation continually causes a gap to arise between itself and its intended object. On the one side is being-in-itself, a full positivity; on the other is consciousness which separates itself from being and is a being for-itself. Consciousness is not an absolute nothingness but is defined in its relationship with the in-itself: it is both detached from being-in-itself by its nothingness and is inserted in the midst of being by intentionality, which also is an original nihilation. For Sartre, then, "Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being -- like a worm." But this nothingness is not a fiction that is imposed upon the being-in-itself. Rather, it is an original, objective negativity emanating from the being-for-itself and arises because the for-itself confronts and experiences the in-itself. In metaphorical language, negation has as much reality as a gap or fissure. "Without man," one commentator remarks in this connection, "there would be no 'not' in the world."25

Sartre sees here a connection between nothingness and human freedom. He says that freedom is the "... possibility which human reality has to secrete a nothingness which isolates it ...".26 Freedom, however, does not comprise man's "nature". Rather, with his existence, freedom precedes man's essence and this latter is only formed on the basis of individual free choices. Consciousness, or man, for Sartre, must com-
tinually choose one act or one possibility over others which are
nihilated and rejected. This freedom is indistinguishable from the
being-for-itself or the being of man. Sartre holds that "Man does not
exist first in order to be free subsequently; there is no difference
between the being of man and his being-free." Freedom is the fundamental
condition of the nothingness which is man and which he has carved out of
being like a hole that can never be filled. As one critic at the
University of Padua puts it: "Sartre's man is the sheer antithesis of
the Christian God, Who creates the world out of nothingness; he creates
nothingness out of the world."28

For Sartre, our past, like the intended object, is also nihilated. Even if we act always in the same way, and our present condition is a
consistent outcome of past choices and actions, we must continually re-
affirm this past by negating the possibility of acting contrary to it.
Such re-affirmation is, in most cases, a pre-reflective acceptance of
this past. In short, we do not call it into question. For Sartre,
nothingness, as an intended nihilation, separates our present from our
past. This allows us to call that past into question, to suspend
judgement on it, or to reject it, or to praise it, or to re-affirm it in
our present choices. And each intended nihilation for Sartre is de-
rivative from itself alone. Consequently a past consciousness does not
determine a present one because the for-itself, being spontaneous and
lacking being-in-itself, contains nothingness which can nihilate that
past consciousness in a way analogous to the nihilation of the contents
of the cafe.
The series of states of consciousness are consequently dis-engaged, Sartre maintains. Not only does the intended object transcendent consciousness, but a past consciousness presently intended is an object of that present consciousness and therefore other than the present consciousness. A nothingness slips between states of consciousness. In ordinary language such a claim would simply mean that no division exists between present and past consciousness. But for Sartre, this nothingness has a reality of its own: man's freedom endows him with the possibility of secreting a nothingness, the source of negation, which separates him from his own past and from being-in-itself. Past consciousness does not lose itself urgency but, no longer a present consciousness, it becomes an intended object. In its pastness it is complete and both an object of consciousness and nihilated by the intending consciousness.

Nothingness also separates man from his future, Sartre claims. When he acts, man posits an end of action which is a not, and in projecting himself toward this end he nihilates his present state of affairs. Even the re-affirmation of one's present state of affairs as an end to be continued requires this nihilation. This is the case because man is separated from this future state which is a transcendent in the mode of not-yet: man must negate himself in order to transcend himself toward this future re-affirmation. Sartre says: "... I am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it." For Sartre, man, as the free being, is always negating himself in order to become what he is not. Man has to make himself down to the last detail such that he is always choosing himself, projecting and transcending himself. In this way, man constructs his present and gives meaning to his past. Concerning this aspect of
man, one commentator says: "... the negativity lies at the root of the ultimate and deepest assertion which can be made about man -- an assertion which amounts to saying that he defines definition, that he is absolutely and radically free, and that he is whatever he makes of himself."30

Sartre claims that there is a specific consciousness by which we are aware of our freedom, namely anguish. Anguish brings us face to face with nothingness. Anguish is a consciousness of our choices, decisions and actions as our possibilities to be freely acted upon or freely nihilated. It is the consciousness that nothingness separates us from our past and our future, that we are this past and this future in the mode of not being them. Anguish, then, makes us aware of our freedom as the condition whereby being is nihilated. We are not, however, always conscious of our freedom, or always in anguish. Anguish only arises when we ceased trying to hide our freedom or evade it by positing some form of determinism. In fact, anguish is a privileged feeling, one which is manifested only at certain exceptional moments in our lives when we act in the knowledge that our acts are dependent on us as free beings. To deny this is an evasion of our responsibility. Anguish, we might suggest, seems almost a state of grace for Sartre. But let us be quite clear: the absence of anguish in an individual is not the nihilation of freedom but simply a lack of lucidity and authentic existence.

One might argue that anguish is not a reliable indicator of freedom. Thus a soldier may fear an artillery attack. Anguish arises only when he thinks of his possible behaviour in this situation. With the firmest of intentions and the strictest methods of training, the soldier
may still panic and flee during the barrage. But this is precisely
Sartre's point. Like the compulsive gambler who has resolved never to
赌博 again, the soldier apprehends in anguish that his past training
and resolutions are ineffectual. In this respect, Sartre says: "The
resolution is still me to the extent that I realize constantly my identity
with myself across the temporal flux, but it is no longer me -- due to
the fact that it has become an object for my consciousness ... The re-
solution is there still, I am it in the mode of not-being." Once again,
for Sartre, it is nothingness, as a nihilating structure of consciousness,
which separates one from past resolutions. In order not to flee or in
order not to gamble now that he stands before the tables, the person
must make his resolution again "ex nihilo and freely." Sartre says:
"After having patiently built up barriers and walls, after enclosing
myself in the magic circle of a resolution, I perceive with anguish that
nothing prevents me from gambling. The anguish is me since by the very
fact of taking my position in existence as consciousness of being, I
make myself not to be the past of good resolutions which I am." 34

Anguish, for Sartre, is not a proof of our freedom. It is simply
a specific consciousness of that freedom. Freedom, for Sartre, is given
as the necessary pre-requisite for consciousness to stand before being-
in-itself under one or more specific attitudes, such as the question.
"We wished only to show that there exists a specific consciousness of
freedom," Sartre claims, "and we wished to show that this consciousness
is anguish. This means that we wishes to establish anguish in its essential
structure as consciousness of freedom." 35
Anguish in Sartre's view is consciousness of our freedom, consciousness that our choices are our possible choices of action. But possibilities, for Sartre, only arise because the for-itself is firmly and constantly entrenched in a situation. The world is given and the situation includes the total content of the for-itself's environment, including political situations, geography, association and communication with others, etc. In short, the situation is the total content of the for-itself's "world", that is, his facticity. There is no freedom, for Sartre, that is not engaged, in situation. And this is what he means by "facticity". Although the individual's facticity is given, it is he who gives his situation meaning and significance; in short, he appropriates his situation. In Literature and Existentialism, Sartre says in this connection: "Each of our perceptions is accompanied by the consciousness that human reality is a 'reveler,' that is, it is through human reality that 'there is' being, or, to put it differently, that man is the means by which things are manifested. It is our presence in the world which multiplies relations. It is we who set up a relationship between this tree and that bit of sky. Thanks to us, that star which has been dead for millennia, that quarter moon, and that dark river are disclosed in the unity of a landscape. It is the speed of our auto and our airplane which organizes the great masses of the earth. With each of our acts, the world reveals to us a new face. But, if we know that we are directors of being, we also know that we are not its producers. If we turn away from this landscape, it will sink back into its dark permanence. At least, it will sink back; there is no one mad enough to think that it is going to be annihilated. It is we who shall be annihilated, and the
earth will remain in its lethargy until another consciousness comes
along to awaken it. Thus, to our inner certainty of being 'revealers'
is added that of being inessential in relation to the thing revealed."

It will be our present task to discover how far Sartre intends
to take the above claim. Indeed, this claim is simply a continuation
of Sartre's description of the two regions of being. But it is only now,
after consciousness has been exposed as the origin of negation, that the
dialectic of the situation can be fully appreciated. Let it be emphasized
again, however, that Sartre is not falling into some kind of idealism.
He does agree with idealists that consciousness is the source of meaning
but stops short of the claim that the being of the world depends upon
consciousness in some form or other. The things of the world do not
unambiguously reveal their qualities to consciousness. This latter,
therefore, must decide which features of things are to be intended, and
what labels are to be affixed. What the world is like will require an
account of how the being-for-itself sees the world.

Like Heidegger, Sartre maintains that man sees things as tools.
Things go their own way, as it were, but how they operate is made signifi-
cant by the for-itself. One may concentrate on specific aspects or
qualities of things to the exclusion of others, but these qualities are
nonetheless there as part of the appearing phenomenon or state of affairs.
Such concentration may lead to the formulation of false judgements or
wrong courses of action. It is still consciousness, however, which endows
the world with meaning and decides whether that meaning and any action
based on it are significant or not. But to give meaning to one's situation,
in which one is totally engaged, does not mean that one can arbitrarily
choose one's position. Thus each for-itself is born at a certain time, of certain parents, in a particular historical world, in a particular country with a specific social-economic-political-religious environment, etc. As a result of one's facticity, Sartre says, the world in which consciousness finds itself is given. But this world does not constitute the being of consciousness and because consciousness constitutes the meaning of this world is it able to act within it and make it a significant world. In short, consciousness chooses itself within this world, and in so doing makes it meaningful to itself. Sartre says the fact of its condition makes the for-itself, "... while choosing the meaning of its situation and while constituting itself as the foundation of itself in situation, not to choose its position."37

The for-itself, for Sartre, does not endow the world with meanings in any passive or disinterested sense. The for-itself, as the originator of meaning and significance, exists this significance. This is the meaning of the word "appropriation". In his book on Sartre, M. Natsanson says in this connection: "In appropriation the pour-soi gives meaning to its reality; it molds the significations for which it is responsible; the pour-soi 'exists' its significations."38

The word "appropriation" indicates the special status of being-for-itself. The existence of the world as a world of meanings is a function of the for-itself. Reality can only be grasped, as it were, in the situation in which the for-itself exists. Through appropriation the for-itself "egotizes" its reality. The mountain which it climbs is ontologically independent. But to the extent that the for-itself climbs the mountain, overcomes its resistance, it is that for-itself externalized
in that its meaning as a mountain-to-be climbed is posited and acted upon by that for-itself. In this sense, the mountain, the fatigue resulting from the climb, and the panorama which unfolds after the summit is reached, exist only through and for the for-itself. Without the for-itself, only indifferent materiality, the being-in-itself, is present.

In short, we have this strange dialectic: the object must simultaneously be wholly the for-itself and wholly independent of the for-itself. The possessed or appropriated object as possessed, Sartre, says, "... is a continuous creation; but still it remains there, it exists by itself; it is in-itself. If I turn away from it, it does not thereby cease to exist; if I go away, it represents me in my desk, in my room, in this place in the world. From the start it is impenetrable. ... The pipe there on the table is independent, indifferent. I pick it up, I feel it, I contemplate it so as to realize this appropriation; but just because these gestures are meant to give me the enjoyment of this appropriation, they miss their mark. I have merely an inert, wooden stem between my fingers. It is only when I pass beyond my objects toward a goal, when I utilize them, that I can enjoy their possession."39

Appropriation is a paradoxical concept in Sartre's philosophy. It attempts, on the one hand, to explain the objective aspect of experience which involves an intended object, and, on the other hand, to explain the subjective aspect which is the for-itself existing its experience. The world and its contents are given. But it is the for-itself in its facility which chooses, through nihilation, to intend, act upon, and signify certain phenomena and ignore, by nihilation, others. This is made possible, for Sartre, because the for-itself is free and indeter-
minate. "For the for-itself," Sartre says, "to be is to annihilate the in-itself which it is. Under these conditions freedom can be nothing other than this annihilation. It is through this that the for-itself escapes its being as its essence; it is through this that for for-itself is always something other than what can be said of it." \[41\]

Sartre says that of all negations, the one penetrating most deeply into being is lack. And this lack characterizes the for-itself which lacks the being-in-itself. Lack does not belong to the being-in-itself and only appears in the world with the emergence of consciousness. Thus the moon, for example, requires consciousness in order to be considered a quarter moon. But again, this involves meaning and not the manipulation of the moon's being by the for-itself. Thus consciousness is able to pass beyond the given datum -- the quarter moon -- to its full realization -- the full moon -- and then return, once again, to the given datum. It is the full moon which gives to the quarter moon its being as quarter in order that consciousness as lack is able to pass beyond the given phenomenon toward the lacked fullness. Sartre says: "... if I say that the moon is not full and that one quarter is lacking, I base this judgment on full intuition of the crescent moon. Thus what is released to intuition is an in-itself which by itself is neither complete nor incomplete but which simply is what it is, without relation with other beings. In order for this in-itself to be grasped as the crescent moon, it is necessary that a human reality surpass the given toward the project of the realized totality -- here the disk of the full moon -- and return toward the given to constitute it as the crescent moon; that is, in order to realize it in its being in terms of the totality which becomes its foundation. In
this same surpassing the lacking will be posited as that whose synthetic
addition to the existing will re-constitute the synthetic totality of
the lacked." 42

Sartre holds that the possible appears to the for-itself as a
structure of things. Thus the structure of being of the quarter moon
perceived by the for-itself is a transcendence toward the full moon.
Similarly, the structure of the being of the cloud perceived, for example,
is a transcendence toward rain. Such surpassing is not necessarily
realized, Sartre says, but the structure of the cloud's being is a trans-
cendence toward rain: it "lends" itself, we might say, toward the
possibility of rain. The possible, then, is not entirely reducible to
a subjective reality, but it is not, at the same time, prior to the
reality of things. The possible is a "... concrete property of already
existing realities", Sartre states. Thus for the full moon to be possible
the quarter moon must be in the sky; rain is possible because there are
clouds in the sky. 44

Sartre makes it clear that he is not advocating the view that
some type of potency or possibility belongs to being-in-itself in-
dependent of being-for-itself. Being-in-itself by itself "... it what
it is -- in the absolute plenitude of its identity ... The in-itself
is actuality." The quarter moon is not potentially the full moon but
is in itself a certain revealed satellite in the sky. Likewise, the
cloud is a certain quantity of water vapour which at a certain temperature
and pressure simply is what it is and nothing more. The possible
illustrates the dialectic between the two regions of being: the possible
arises in the world through the for-itself which is a lack, but only on
the backdrop of being-in-itself. "These clouds can change into rain only if I surpass them towards the rain, just as the crescent moon lacks a portion of the disc only if I surpass the crescent towards the full moon. ... Just as there can be lack in the world only if it comes to the world through a being which is its own lack, so there can be possibility in the world only if it comes through a being which is for itself in its own possibility." 46

Thus consciousness, for Sartre, by effecting a nililation brings meaning and significance to the world that is apprehended as a field of instrumental possibilities. Being-in-itself is not limitless in its malleability, however. It offers both possibilities for use and resistance -- what Sartre calls a "coefficient of adversity" -- to the for-itself's projects. But it is through consciousness that multiplicity, relationships, possibilities, in short, négatités, arise on the ground of the full positivity of the world.

Sartre's view of appropriation as we have set it out in the preceding paragraphs, undergoes considerable modification in a more recent book; though for our purposes the substance of his view remains unaltered. In Critique de la Raison Dialectique, Sartre says: "Ought we then to deny the existence of dialectical connections at the center of intimate Nature? Not at all. To tell the truth, I do not see that we are, at the present stage of our knowledge, in a position either to affirm or to deny. Each one is free to believe that physico-chemical laws express a dialectical reason or not to believe it." 47 The possibility that at some time we may discover the existence of a "concrete dialectic of Nature" must be kept open, Sartre now says. However, this present
agnosticism with regard to "laws of Nature" does not alter Sartre's earlier view, expressed in Being and Nothingness, that human affairs are not in any way determined by external laws imposed upon them. He claims that today's Marxists have attempted to hold a "dialectic without men," and this is precisely what, in his view, has caused Marxism to stagnate and turned it into "a paranoid dream." 48

Sartre's present day view does not alter his earlier position that neither God nor Nature has allotted a privileged position to man in the world. Despite this, man as the being-for-itself is able to effect a nothingness which puts a distance between consciousness and the intended object, as well as nihilating that object in the senses we have described earlier. The being of reality as a being completely devoid of human signification is never encountered in human experience, Sartre maintains. Even if it could be shown that there are dialectical connections in Nature, man would still have to take them into his own account, establish his own relations with them, in short, appropriate them. 49

Throughout Sartre's philosophy, the for-itself as nothingness and as project towards its chosen possibilities, remain central themes. The for-itself is able to disengage itself by nihilation from the in-itself, to transcend its situation by a negation founded on the free spontaneity of consciousness. The for-itself is never identical with its situation but exists its situation by a total and agonizing freedom which chooses how to live this situation and determines its meaning and significance. By this continual surpassing, men make history. From the starting-point of the subject-pole of experience, this existence is never an objective datum. It is rather, the esteemed freedom, the existence continually engaged in
situation, the ensured existence of *Nausée*. But man has many little schemes whereby he attempts to place the choice, the project and meaning all on the side of being-in-itself. These are ways in which he attempts the impossible: to nihilate his freedom.

The alarm clock, for example, rings in the morning. The alarm clock arises as a summons to get up and appears to acquire this meaning by the work situation which is posited as some kind of transcendent force compelling me to start the daily routine. By being active and not questioning either the alarm or the work situation, the possibility of going to work remains at a distance. That is, it is my possibility which I refuse to question. In this way, I can avoid the anguished awareness that going to work is my possibility which I can nihilate at any moment. In this way, I can try to hide the knowledge that the alarm and the work situation acquire their meaning from me as consciousness which appropriates them. But, by this means I lose lucidity and try to be rather than exist. Such a condition, Sartre's view, is to fall from a state of grace, namely, the state of anguished awareness that my possibilities and projects depend on my free choice.

Man tries to flee his anguish and hide his freedom. Before it becomes a theoretical conception, psychological determinism, Sartre maintains, is first of all an attitude of excuse, a pattern of escape. It is a reflective conduct whereby man attempts to nihilate his anguish by claiming that there are "thing-like" causes controlling his behaviour. It further attempts to fill up, as it were, the nothingness separating man from his past and his future. Psychological determinism attempts to transform consciousness as lack into being-in-itself by denying that
consciousness can transcend itself and be anything other than what it is. In short, it attempts to make consciousness into a determinate and full positivity. "But this determinism," says Sartre, "a reflective defense against anguish, is not given as a reflective intuition. It avails nothing against the evidence of freedom; hence it is given as a faith to take refuge in, as the ideal and toward which we can flee to escape anguish." This evidence, for Sartre, is found in the question and the other nihilations which are based on freedom as their necessary condition.

For Sartre, man must make himself by choosing his goals, re-affirming them, and bestowing meaning and significance upon them and the world in which he is engaged. Man is forced by his own nothingness to define and re-define himself. Man as lack, as pure spontaneity appropriating the in-itself, is what Sartre means by "nothingness" and "freedom". And to this radical freedom, man is condemned, and he can react toward it either authentically or inauthentically, but he is unable to negate it.

"The nothingness of the pour-soi", Matansou says in a reply to one of Sartre's critics, "is thus the dialectical state of continual self-creation in which one's actions, aspirations, attitudes, memories, and desires are all regrouped, re-identified, re-understood, reformed, and transvalued by the movement of the dialect." But whatever choices are made, Sartre contends, man acts on his own, without foundation or any support. In this sense, then, he must choose absurdly, that is, without hope of ultimate justification. In this respect, Jean Wahl, writing on Sartre's philosophy, says, "Choosing its own being but not founding it, freedom participates in the universal contingency which Sartre chooses
to call absurdity."

In the next chapter, we shall explore more fully the freedom of the being-for-itself. In addition, we shall see how far Sartre extends this radical freedom of the for-itself, and look at its critical reception by some people who cannot be considered unsympathetic toward Sartre's philosophy.
CHAPTER III
THE FREEDOM OF THE FOR-ITSELF

Part I: The Possibility of Human Freedom

The last two chapters have cleared the way for a more specific look at Sartre's theory of human freedom. The radicalness of this theory was anticipated in the introduction and has been gradually unfolding since the first chapter. Now a more detailed look at this freedom in its various aspects can be undertaken.

Since Sartre places considerable emphasis upon the consciousness of our freedom, namely anxiety, the necessity and desirability of his ontological description of the two regions of being might be raised. In other words, why not analyze human freedom in terms of introspection alone? However, it is the reliability of this alleged consciousness of our freedom which is most quickly and vehemently attacked by determinists and others. Sartre himself is aware, as we pointed out in the last chapter, that anxiety is not a proof of our freedom. Hence the necessity, in his view, of the ontological description of negation as emanating from a free consciousness.

To give a fuller ontological description of human freedom, Sartre analyzes acts, motives and desires. Rather than limiting freedom, motives and desires, for Sartre, only arise qua motives and desires because of the nihilating character of consciousness. In short, motive and desire,
and the subsequent act, acquire meaning because of, not in opposition
to, the freedom of the for-itself.

For Sartre, action involves intention. The negligent smoker who
starts a forest fire has not acted in this sense since his intention was
1 to have a smoke and nothing more. One acts if one intends, and acts
toward, a conscious project, though this does not mean one must foresee
all the possible consequences of one's act. To act involves appropriation.
That is, the for-itself appropriates the world as a lack, in the sense
described in the last chapter, and posits an end or goal whose purpose is
to overcome the lack. The goal intended by the for-itself, which is the
source of lack and possibility, is given a value by the for-itself, other-
wise this latter would be unwilling to change its present situation.
Sartre says that the existence of desire as a human fact indicates that
human reality is a lack. "Desire is a lack of being. It is haunted in
its immost being by the being of which it is desire. Thus it bears witness
to the existence of lack in the being of human reality." 2

Since consciousness is not a plenum of being-in-itself, it is
able to intend its present situation as a lack and posit some end as
desirable, Sartre maintains. In this way, consciousness appropriates its
facticity as a lack to be overcome. One's act is preceded by the intention
of attaining some end of action. Consciousness as the source of lack, has
the permanent possibility, for Sartre, of getting away from its own past,
of positing an end or "ideal" value and transcending itself toward that
end which is not yet but can be. Such nullification and possibility together
mean freedom, and, reciprocally, they are only possible because of the
freedom of consciousness.
Freedom and project go hand in hand in Sartre's philosophy. Since the for-itself lacks the in-itself, the former has to make itself, and as pure spontaneity it must choose and invent itself. To choose itself involves the for-itself transcending and transforming itself and its present situation. By nihilation, the for-itself intends the transformation of the world and itself within that world. For Sartre, no given state of affairs and no situation is capable of determining the for-itself to appropriate it as a lack. In-itself, any state of affairs simply is: it is a plenum. "No factual state", Sartre holds, "can determine consciousness to apprehend it as a mégalithe (sieve) or as a lack."³ By nihilating a situation, including one's past, the for-itself becomes unstuck from that situation, is able to apprehend and contemplate it and has the possibility of transforming it. In short, action and comprehension go together. The for-itself's facticity, that is its world, including its past, cannot posit possible ends of action, for Sartre. At the most, facticity can serve only as an appeal; its meaning, including whether it is satisfying or not, is intended by consciousness which, in turn, decides whether to transform its world and give it new meaning and significance.

With the above remarks in mind, we may say that Sartre does not suggest that an act is not accompanied by a motive. But Sartre does not subsequently hold that our acts are determined by the strongest motive. He maintains that such a view misinterprets the nature of motives as these latter for him, do not cause or determine the intended act. Each act must have an end and this end is referred to a motive. "But the determinists", Sartre says, "... are weighting the scale by stopping their investigation with the mere designation of the cause and motive."⁴
For Sartre, the motive only acquires meaning in the light of the for-itself's projected goal. In this way, the motive becomes a need, an appeal, etc. He says: "It is not because I am free that my act is not subject to the determination of motives; on the contrary, the structure of motives as ineffective is the condition of my freedom." The motive, as an intended object, transcends the consciousness of the motive. The motive, not being a content of consciousness, is an appearance but, unlike external phenomena, it belongs to the individual person. For Sartre, however, the motive still transcends the intending consciousness, but in this case the phenomenon is a transcendence in immanence. Consciousness is not subject to the motive,"... because of the very fact that consciousness posits it; for consciousness has now the task of conferring on the motive its meaning and its importance. Thus the nothing which separates the motive from consciousness characterizes itself as transcendence in immanence."

The for-itself, in Sartre's view, confers upon the transcendent its value as cause or motive. And this value and meaning of the motive is understood in relation to the end or goal which the for-itself posits. This goal, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is a "not-yet," that is, it is non-existent. In this connection, Sartre says: "If I accept a niggardly salary it is doubtless because of fear; and fear is a motive. But it is fear of dying from starvation; that is, this fear has meaning only outside itself in an end ideally posited, which is the preservation of a life which I apprehend as 'in danger.' And this fear is understood in turn only in relation to the value which I implicitly give to this life; that is, it is referred to that hierarchal system of ideal objects which
are values. Thus the motive makes itself understood as what it is by means of the ensemble of being which 'are not,' by ideal existences, and by the future. Just as the future turns back upon the present and the past in order to elucidate them, so it is the ensemble of my projects which turns back in order to confer upon the motive its structure as a motive. It is only because I escape the in-itself by nihilating myself toward my possibilities that this in-itself can take on values as cause or motive. Causes and motives have meaning only inside a projected ensemble which is precisely an ensemble of non-existents. And this ensemble is ultimately myself as transcendence; it is Me in so far as I have to be myself outside of myself.7

As we pointed out in the previous chapter, men try to hide their freedom and their consciousness of freedom in a comforting determinism. Men try to regard themselves as being-in-itself. The individual for-itself, then looks on causes and motives as things containing a permanent structure and power to determine its actions. In short, the for-itself attempts to hide from itself the fact that the nature and influence of these causes and motives depend at each moment upon the meaning and significance it attributes to them.

Such an attempt to hide our freedom is thwarted when we reflect upon our situation and choices, Sartre maintains. In saying that our motives, desires and values determine actions, we attempt to overlook the ambiguity of being and place all being, including ourselves, on the side of being-in-itself. Upon reflecting, however, we realize it is ourselves, as being-for-itself, who judge that the situation is unsatisfactory, is lacking, who posit ends of action and attribute value and
meaning to these ends. But as we are that posited end of action in the
form of not-yet, to use Sartre's terminology, so the motive or desire,
which is understood only by the non-existent end, is separated from the
intending consciousness by nothingness, that is, by an intending annihilation.
In this sense, the motive is a \textit{négritude}; it is understood only by the
non-existent end.  

The for-itself is the being which posits things as obstacles to
the realization of its choices, and which determines motives through the
projected end, according to Sartre. Anguish arises because man is con-
escious of this freedom and that his choice receives justification from
himself alone. It is he alone who must decide about the meaning of being,
not only his own but the world's as well. Here a double negation is
introduced into the world by the for-itself: the ideal state of affairs
that has been posited is a present non-being; and, the present situation
is posited as nothingness in relation to the projected end. Without
anguish and the reflective awareness that motives acquire their meaning
and appeal from consciousness, the for-itself is not less free; it is only
less lucid; in short, in existentialist language, it exists inauthentic-
ically. Having made a choice, the for-itself's actions, choices and
existence are never a present plenum but are always in flight, in flux;
Therefore, this existence must be reconstructed at every moment. Now it
is to be reconstructed is up to the individual. It can either be re-
constructed authentically, in self-awareness and lucidity; or, inauthentic-
ally which involves hiding freedom by attempting, unsuccessfully, to
annihilate it. In an article to which we have made reference before, Matenson
remarks in this connection: "To be free, then, is not to choose one's
freedom, but to be aware that one is free in any case -- that one is condemned to be free -- and from there to achieve authenticity, that is, self-conscious choice in the face of anguish, through acting in the world of contingent and modal realities." 10

By positing the present situation as inadequate, Sartre holds that man, by mihilation, continually transcends this situation, either by re-affirming it or by reconstructing it. In either event, his choice and action are the result of his freedom. Sartre says that it is "... the positing of my ultimate ends which characterizes my being and which is identical with the sudden thrust of the freedom which is mine. And this thrust is an existence; it has nothing to do with an essence or with a property of a being which would be engendered conjointly with an idea.

Though Sartre, like many indeterminists, accounts for the concept of will in his philosophy, he does not regard it as the condition of free choice. It is will, or volition, which is conditioned by freedom in his view. At the same time, Sartre holds that passions and emotions are also related to one's actions by virtue or one's freedom. In both instances, volition or emotion, freedom is manifested rather than overcome. The will is not a thing, nor are the passions substances; on the basis of the ends one posits one decides at each moment through mihilation what conduct or attitude one will take in regard to them; will one act by volition or by passion?

The difference, in Sartre's view, between an emotion and a volition is that the latter is a reflective appropriation of a situation, whereas the former is a non-reflective appropriation. An
emotion is intentional and is a type of conduct which attempts to achieve a certain end in a certain way. In Sartre's words, an emotion "... is a reply adapted to the situation; it is a type of conduct, the meaning and form of which are the object of an intention of consciousness which aims at attaining a particular end by particular means." In short, an emotion, though meaningful, is a type of magical appropriation. Through an emotion, consciousness attempts to accomplish its end symbolically. If frustrated because it is unable to realize its project, the for-itself may try to fulfill its project by intending a magical transformation of the world through an emotion.

Concerning the function of emotional behaviour in Sartre's philosophy, one commentator, Albert Fowler, says emotions are a direct relationship of the individual with the world. Fowler says that emotional behaviour "... is an attempt to transform a world grown too difficult, too demanding, too urgent. Anger, for example, is an abrupt solution of conflict, a way of cutting a Gordian knot. Unable to find the delicate and precise method necessary to deal with an involved situation the individual lowers himself, degrades himself, changes into the kind of person who is satisfied with crude and poorly adapted means. He drops to an inferior level of conduct where his needs are fewer and can be met with less effort. The change is not a reasoned calculation but occurs without relection in the face of an 'impossible' problem for which no other solution is found. But it is more than a mere escape, more than a simple replacement of one set of tolls by a less perfect one. It is also a transformation of the world from the rule of exact processes to a rule of magic. The angry grimece, the wild gesture, the roaring voice are all incantations
Fear is explained in a similar way, in Sartre's view. The soldier caught in the midst of a barrage, for example, feels his legs giving way beneath him, falls to the ground in a faint. Unable to stop the barrage, in short, unable to alter the present situation, he symbolically tries to change the situation by changing himself. Thus his fainting constitutes an act of escape. Unable to change the situation, which he appropriates as dangerous, as a threat to his projects, the soldier tries to deny it, to annihilate it by a magical appropriation. The unsatisfactory situation as an object of consciousness is eliminated but at the price of changing consciousness by fainting, by shifting over to a state of unreality.

"Fear is a consciousness", Fowler says in this connection, "which employs magical behavior to deny objects in the external world, and which will substitute the imaginary for the real to get rid of them.

Joy is even considered, by Sartre, to manifest magical behaviour. To sing for joy, for example, is to cast a magical spell over existence, to make the future present or the present eternal. Thus the loved one who is coming tomorrow is symbolically here today. The one who is leaving shortly is made present forever. Emotion involves belief. "The individual believes the imaginary situation, he lives in the new circumstances he has invented, he accommodates himself to their requirements."

Though emotions are a magical way of appropriating the world, in Sartre's view, they are, though meaningful, nevertheless absolutely non-effective acts. Through an emotion, one attempts to endow a thing or a situation with greater or lesser being, or reality. Such an attempt,
Sartre says, is futile. Emotions have meaning but this very meaning is a negative which cannot alter the world but allows one to delude oneself into thinking the emotional behaviour is effective. Hazel Barnes, in her introduction to *Being and Nothingness* says that "... emotion is a consciousness personal relation to the world and as such can be temporarily satisfying, but it is fundamentally ineffective and transient with no direct power to affect the environment." 17

It is not necessary, for our purposes, to consider more critically Sartre's phenomenological description of the emotions. The preceding brief account simply outlines the nature, in his view, of emotions and emotional behaviour. What is of importance for us is his contention that emotions are a specific way in which the for-itself apprends, signifies, and exists the being-in-itself. In short, emotions are grounded in the nihilating structure of consciousness and as such the resulting magical behaviour is a free choice of the for-itself. Contrary to many other indeterminists who maintain that emotions or passions, contrary to volitions, are not free but a mechanistic part of man's animal "nature," Sartre's position remains consistent with his description of man by maintaining the universality of freedom in all acts and decisions.

Sartre holds, in the case of an emotion, that one always has the possibility of reflecting on the emotion, seeing it in perspective and analyzing it. Though such reflection usually requires special effort by the person involved, the emotion is nevertheless open to reflection. A volition, on the other hand, is not more free than an emotion but is a reflective appropriation of the given situation. A volition rejects the magical approach and adopts one that is more scientific. In this case,
one tends to apprehend the situation as involving a determined series of events and instrumental complexities in which events are revealed as so many techniques to be manipulated and acted upon. Though the reflective approach is a more lucid appropriation of the situation than emotional behaviour, it, too, is a free intentional nihilation of being-in-itself. Sartre says that the will is not a privileged manifestation of freedom but it is "... a psychic event of a peculiar structure which is constituted on the same plane as other psychic events and which is supported, neither more nor less than the others, by an original, ontological freedom." 18

Concerning this freedom with respect to emotions and volitions, Sartre says: "But what will make me decide to choose the magical aspect or the technical aspect of the world? It can not be the world itself, for this in order to be manifested waits to be discovered. Therefore it is necessary that the for-itself in its project must choose being the one by whom the world is revealed as magical or rational; that is, the for-itself must as a free project of itself give to itself magical or rational existence. It is responsible for either one, for the for-itself can be only if it has chosen itself. Therefore the for-itself appears as the free foundation of its emotions as of its volitions. My fear is free and manifests my freedom; I have put all my freedom into my fear, and I have chosen myself as fearful in this or that circumstance. Under other circumstances I shall exist as deliberate and courageous, and I shall have put all my freedom into my courage. In relation to freedom there is no privileged psychic phenomenon. All my 'modes of being' manifest freedom equally since they are all ways of being my own
of consciousness, in the sense of consciousness, that is the case of motes and atoms, etc. are the result of an ontological reduction. In this sense, determinacy is the core of action, emotion, consciousness, etc. In relation to these chosen ends, the efficacy and value of the action, emotion, consciousness, etc., is determined. In short, it is both a core aspect of action, emotion, consciousness, etc., and its result, the core aspect of action, emotion, consciousness, etc.

The core aspect of action, emotion, consciousness, etc., is determined by the past, but is not determined by the past. This makes himself at every moment, separated from the past by the event of his own moment.

The core aspect of action, emotion, consciousness, etc., is determined by the past, but is not determined by the past. This makes himself at every moment, separated from the past by the event of his own moment.

In a sense, as Bayesian points out, the core aspect of action, emotion, consciousness, etc., is determined by the past, rather than determined by the core aspect of action, emotion, consciousness, etc., and motes and atoms all indicate

"Nothingness."

19.
reason for the act; that is, the ensemble of rational considerations which justify it." The cause of an act is its explanation and not its determinant.

A cause, in Sartre's view, is an objective appreciation of the particular situation and is manifested only when a for-itself appropriates the situation. By projecting itself toward a chosen goal, the for-itself gives meaning and significance to its situation and attempts to act in the best way to attain this end. By apprehending the situation in a certain way, certain characteristics of the situation arise as reasons or causes for action. Sartre says "... this objective appreciation can be made only in the light of a presupposed end and within the limits of a project of the for-itself toward this end." 23

Suppose one of an individual's chosen goals is to act in any situation in order to produce the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Such an act acquires meaning only in relation to this projected ideal and within the limits of the transcendent projection of the for-itself toward this ideal. In Sartre's language, this projection of the for-itself is toward a chosen end or ideal of itself in the mode of not-being which produces the greatest good for the greatest number. By objectively apprehending a given situation, the individual for-itself appropriates a particular event as a cause or explanation of its actions. In this example, the objective facts of the situation might be a slum settlement where unemployment is high with very bad social and hygienic conditions. But this situation as such does not cause the for-itself to act. The for-itself simply intends the given conditions which it can annihilate as it annihilated the contents of the café when looking for Pierre; or, the for-itself can act on the intended facts in order to try to change
A need, in relation to the person's chosen project, the motive is only but another on the part of the person, the motive only has meaning as an appeal, or such as sympathy, compassion for these people, personal association, etc., to them. In this case, we might say the person acted from various motives people. Then we might be unable to explain the actions by ascribing causes might as be the event itself to have been, even if it were to help these actions in a given situation, for example, we in the other hand, is a transcendental object of consciousness, in analyzing a subject, philosophy, is interested in a transcendence, in transcendence, a cause, whereas causes are objects. As we pointed out earlier, a motive, in subjectivity, subjectively that motives are subjective phenomena.

This end.

Just as the condition of a certain end as being able to serve as the means for attaining the position of a determined situation as this situation is revealed in the subject, the subject, philosophy to mean "cause" is used in subject, philosophy to mean "cause," the opposite of the opposite of the opposite. When one the most important and allowable to another act, or perhaps, would cease to exist as an explanation of all the cause would be seen in a different light: it would be the explanation. It would raise the project and act toward a different position. Thus the chosen project by no means, subjectively holds, it is able at any instant in relation to the project. Since the for-itselbst is separated from this, we deal as a cause of action, the for-itselbst must apprend the situation in order for the condition of these people. Lving in this world to be—

In any case, the for-itselbst's conduct is based on the chosen ideal. Thus, them or, the for-itselbst can intend the given facts with indifference.
In this point, Parthe says, fear appears, "I which in name of the
man is subject to such things as expectation which he possibilities.
without. To the extent that he is an object among objects in the world,
given as part of the situation, they are possibilities which are
are a thing that is passive in relation to those possibilities which are
of the ledge can strike very and so on. Here, the man is given to himself
other words, the man can slip on a stone and be hurled into the precipice,
and that are capable of making the possibility of the death a reality. In
the moment, to be brought. He is also aware of a number of cause.
deep precipice. The precipice represents a danger to the man's life,

A man, in Parthe's example, is on a narrow ledge overlooking a

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In a vivid way, man's ontological freedom in Parthe's philosophy,
and a narrow ledge above a precipice, without grounds, illustrate.

A man which is not a common everyday experience, the example of a man
bear as consciousnesses of the consciousness, though it describes a self-

57

In order to conclude this last part of the present chapter, one

"contact with them."56

193.
in the midst of transcendentals, as an object which does not contain in itself the origin of its future disappearance.footnote The man will reflect on the situation and will move cautiously along the ledge avoiding its edge. He is acting against the danger of the situation and posits various future conducts whose aim is to keep the danger of the situation away from him. But such conduct and activity are the man's; they are his possibilities. The man's condition is now altered. His own possibilities are substituted for the transcendent ones where human action had no place and the man was merely given as a thing.

These various courses of action he has posited are the man's possibilities and do not appear to him to be determined by external causes, Sartre holds. In fact, the man is not even sure these possibilities will be effective, or even that he will adopt them. Because they are his possibilities, they have no necessary existence and he can negate them at any moment. The possibilities which he posits have, then, the possibility of negative conduct as a necessary condition; that is, instead of walking along the ledge carefully, the man can become careless, he can run, or day-dream, etc. The opposite conduct, namely, throwing himself over the precipice, also is a possibility. Sartre says: "The possibility which I make my concrete possibility can appear as my possibility only by raising itself on the basis of the totality of the logical possibilities which the situation allows. But these rejected possibles in turn have no other being than their 'sustained-being'; it is I who sustain them in being, and inversely, their present non-being is an 'ought-not-to-be-sustained.' No external cause will remove them. I alone am the permanent source of their non-being, I engage
myself in them; in order to cause my possibility to appear, I posit
the other possibilities so as to nihilate them." 28

The fear of the situation which the man originally possessed
has now given way to anguish before his possibilities. To avoid anguish,
Sartre maintains the man would have to consider his present conduct de-
termined by certain causes or motives such as prior fear, self-preservation,
etc. His conduct would no longer be a possible choice of action but
simply something about to happen, or already happening. But the man is
in anguish because he does apprehend these motives and causes as not
sufficiently effective to determine his conduct. "But I am in anguish",
Sartre says, "precisely because any conduct on my part is only possible,
and this means that while constituting a totality of motives for push-
ing away that situation, I at the same moment apprehend these motives
as not sufficiently effective." 29 The man, ex hypothesi, is horrified
of the precipice but at the same time apprehends the ineffectiveness of
the horror to determine his possible action. Sartre thus says: "In
one sense that horror calls for prudent conduct, and it is in itself
a pre-outline of that conduct; in another sense, it posits the final
developments of that conduct only as possible, precisely because I do
not apprehend it as the cause of these final developments but as need,
appeal, etc." 30

In positing a certain mode of action as a possibility, the man
is conscious that nothing can compel him to adopt that possibility. His
fear is replaced by anguish. But in a sense the man is already there
in the future, on Sartre's view. It is for the sake of his projected
being that the man is being cautious and using all his skill and strength
to reach safety. There exists a relation between his future being, which he has posited as safely beyond the danger of the precipice, and his present being, which is cautiously moving along the ledge. The possibility of cautious action, then acquires meaning from the future project which the man has chosen but which also can be negated in an instant. At the same time, however, a nothingness slips into this relation because the man is not the person he will be. There are three reasons for this Sartre holds. "First I am not that self because time separates me from it. Secondly, I am not that self because what I am is not the foundation of what I will be. Finally I am not that self because no actual existent can determine strictly what I am going to be. Yet as I am already what I will be (otherwise I would not be interested in any one being more than another), I am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it. It is through my horror that I am carried toward the future, and the horror nihilates itself in that it constitutes the future as possible. Anguish is precisely my consciousness of being my own future, in the mode of not-being."31

Sartre claims that the annihilation of horror as a motive, without annihilating the horror, has a positive counterpart, namely the appearance of other forms of conduct as the man's possibilities. In this case, the most notable alternative possibility would be throwing himself over the precipice. But this conduct too emanates from a self which the man is not yet.

The man approaches the precipice and at this moment plays with his possibilities. He scans the abyss, symbolically visualizes the fall and the sinking terror as he is carried down. Suicide becomes a
possibility; a self which is no more is a possible project. Suicide as a possibility causes certain motives for adopting it to appear such as causing anguish to cease, a way of overcoming financial difficulties, etc. But since they are the motives of a possibility which can be negated at any moment, they are revealed to the man as ineffective or non-determining. These motives are as ineffective in causing the suicide as the horror in determining the man not to fall into the abyss. Sartre says that "it is this counter-anguish which generally puts an end to anguish by transmuting it into indecision. Indecision in its turn, calls for decision. I abruptly put myself at a distance from the edge of the precipice and resume my way." 32

In the preceding example, Sartre has attempted to illustrate his view that one's actions are understood as a projection of oneself toward a posited possibility, and not as a series of causal connections. Sartre maintains that the cause, motive and end, "... are the three indissoluble terms of the thrust of a free and living consciousness which projects itself toward its possibilities and makes itself defined by these possibilities." 33 Furthermore, Sartre says, "Past motives, past causes, present motives and causes, future ends, are all organized in an indissoluble unity by the very upsurge of a freedom which is beyond causes, motives, and ends." One's freedom is the discovery of the world and of one's choice in the world. Choice involves consciousness of the choice and may be either a pre-reflective consciousness or a reflective consciousness. Consciousness and choice, for Sartre, are reciprocal; that is, one must be conscious in order to choose, and one must choose in order to be conscious. One's consciousness is one's freedom and, like conscious-
ness, freedom is, in Descartes' words, "... free from all else, able to make its past in the light of its future, and announcing itself to itself by something other than itself."

One's free choice, Sartre says, is not gratuitous. If it were, one would be able to do anything one desired. On Sartre's view, freedom involves the projection of the for-itself toward the future which, in turn, gives meaning to the for-itself's choice. The pre-reflective cogito is always intentional and in this sense is outside of itself, projecting itself toward the intended object but always separated from it. Consciousness, says Descartes in this connection, "... is committed to some future project, and it is in and with this permanent anticipation that a human being must be apprehended." Thus, on this view, the man's act of moving cautiously along the edge of the precipice was neither a capricious choice, nor a determined one. Rather, it was an expression of an original and ultimate choice; in short, it exemplified his choice of his being. It was a choice made within the world of his lived-experience. But the man's present choice, as well as his choice of being, can, at any instant, be nihilated, and this latter possibility is expressed by the man's anguish.

Sartre does not wish to hold the view that our choices must be reproduced at every moment. Rather, a choice is a continual temporal unity, but one which is always threatened by the "instant". That is, we can nihilate our choice at any moment by isolating it for analysis and reflection; or, nihilate it in order to re-affirm it; or, nihilate it to negate and dispose of it. Not only can one's ultimate choice of being -- the way one has chosen to live one's life -- but each individual
choice, can be negated and changed by one's free, nihilating intentionality.

In Sartre's philosophy, then, the being-for-itself is comprehended teleologically. That is, consciousness projects itself into the future and can be understood at the present moment only by what it will be. Man, in Sartre's view, tears himself away from his past and from determinism and projects himself toward his future goals. But this is not all. The project is also a movement from the future toward the present. Man's present actions and situation acquire meaning and significance from the project, and he defines himself, and transforms his situation, on the basis of the being which he is not yet. Man's freedom, for Sartre, involves this tearing away from the determinism of causes, motives and the past by the project and a returning from the future to the present. Man's being is understood by this double intentionality which is his freedom; namely, away from the past which is nihilated toward the future posited as not-yet. But this double intentionality, for Sartre, includes man's total engagement in the world. As we stated before, consciousness requires objects of consciousness. Analogously, freedom requires a situation in which to be free. Freedom requires facticity, that is, man's existence in the world of things and other people. His freedom is manifested by his worldly actions which, in turn, are explicable by his projects posited in this world and not beyond it.

Any view that Sartre's philosophy of freedom is irreconcilably at variance with scientific hypotheses or non-existential philosophical theses, should be dispelled. Thus A. E. Heath, in a paper delivered to the 10th International Congress of Philosophy, speaks about freedom as
"Novelty," which involves plastic adjustment to changed conditions. Heath thinks that men of science, if they look at the conception of freedom in this way, will tend to be less wary of it, and consider freedom a significant inference from their observations. He says when the ends of our activity are not being achieved, our activity is varied. One can infer purposefulness from such activity: by that, he means the new activity is not just adjusted to one's ends but is consciously directed toward them. Plasticity, Heath says, is the sign of consciousness. Scientists need not suppose that any act of choice has strayed from the causal series, Heath maintains. What is implied in any act of choice, which Heath says, contrary to Sartre, implies both reason and evaluation, is that there is no known calculus capable of foretelling that act beforehand. The act is not simply something new that has not existed before; it is also novel, that is, something which could not have been foreseen even if all the relevant preconditions were known. Once the act has happened, however, it can be placed in its novel causal setting. Man, in Heath's view, is free insofar as the door to novelty is not locked against him. Plasticity is the key.

Differences exist between Sartre's view of freedom and this brief account of Heath's conception, not the least of which is Sartre's wider interpretation of choices to include pre-reflective choices. Also, causes and causal series, for Sartre, arise on the foundation of freedom, rather than being already existing external schema in which a free choice, after it has been made, can be placed, as in Heath. But the two conceptions of freedom, apart from these and other differences, are not totally incompatible, and Heath's notion of novelty is not too unlike
We shall breathe present the views of three commentators on Cartesianism that it
claim that the philosophy of freedom is so radical and extreme that it
treats, they are at one with Paritz's more metaphysical critics, who
feet ill at ease, however, with the extremity of Paritz's views. In this
importance and destructiveness of human freedom. Some of these commentators
Some commentators agree that Paritz has rightly emphasized the
of the being-for-itself.
provide a possibility of Paritz's views. If this indeed, the very existence
introducing the causes and motives of these acts, not only as human free-
ending two chapters, is extended to include every aspect of one's acts,
to show how Paritz's philosophy of freedom, as described in the pre-
In the final part of the present chapter, we have attempted
exist.
contrary to other philosophical and scientific investigations of man's
and statements to ordinary life, and function as guide and teller
of freedom, we think, though too radical for many, can be both valuable
thought, as many critics have supposed. In short, Paritz's philosophy
strangely divorced with all the forms of both common sense and rational
philosophy does not share the interdependence of those hypotheses which
common sense and scientific theories. Paritz is more radical, but his
on the subjective pole of experience, is not on either philosophy to some
purpose is to indicate that Paritz's philosophy of freedom, though based
is not the excess of the two views' compatibility. Rather, our single
the project in Paritz's philosophy. What we are interested in here,
and importance of human decisions. But these three men, Robert Olson, V. J. McGill, and Wilfrid Desan, agree on at least one point vis-à-vis Sartre's philosophy. They maintain that Sartre's philosophy of freedom claims too much. In presenting their views, Sartre's conception of freedom in facticity will be discussed in more detail. Contrary to these three men, Sartre hold that man's freedom is absolute. Sartre does not, however, deny limits to freedom but claims that these limits come from freedom itself. The problem of absolute freedom is the subject of the second part of this chapter.
Part 2: The Plausibility of Absolute Freedom

In an article written for a New York theatrical magazine, Sartre, explaining the position of post-war French playwrights to the New York critics, makes the following assertions in conformity with his own philosophy: "The young playwrights of France do not believe that man share a ready-made 'human nature' which may alter under the impact of a given situation. They do not think that individuals can be seized with a passion or mania which can be explained purely on the grounds of heredity, environment and situation. What is universal, to their way of thinking, is not the nature but the situation in which man finds himself; that is, not the sum total of his psychological traits but the limits which enclose him on all sides.

"For them man is not to be defined as a 'reasoning animal,' or a 'social' one, but as a free being, entirely indeterminate, who must choose his own being when confronted with certain necessities, such as being already committed in a world full of both threatening and favourable factors among other men who have made their choices before him, who have decided in advance the meaning of those factors. He is faced with the necessity of having to work and die, of being hurled into a life already complete which yet is his own enterprise and in which he can never have a second chance; where he must play his cards and take risks no matter what the cost." 40

The above quotation stresses Sartre's view that freedom meets limitations on all sides. Man is free for Sartre, but only in a situation.
Freedom requires a world on which it can act, transform, affect and be affected; in short, freedom exists in facticity. However, the ontology of freedom in facticity complicated itself because, on Sartre's view, facticity is conditioned by the freedom of the for-itself. An obstacle is only an obstacle in relation to some end or goal posited by the for-itself. Man does not choose the historical world in which he lives, but this historical world is only meaningful and significant, in short, is only appropriated, in the light of man's projects. And, as we saw in the first part of this chapter, causes, motives and the nature of one's past are given meaning and significance by one's projects and choices. Thus one's facticity is only revealed by one's freedom in relation to one's projects. Here the dialectic between freedom and facticity is a variation of that earlier dialectic described in the first chapter between being-for-itself and being-in-itself, between consciousness and the object of consciousness. This present form of the dialectic is the subject of the remaining part of this chapter.

Many people who are sympathetic toward an indeterminist hypothesis would be unwilling to advocate the extreme view that human freedom is an absolute freedom. To support their unwillingness, they can point to such phenomena as a person's inability to always change his situation the way he desires; being unable to escape his heredity, economic and social conditions under which he was born and raised, to overcome many desires, to alter his height and be tall rather than short, and other such uncontrollable phenomena. One's projects, these indeterminists might continue, are being met continually with resistance from external phenomena such that the least significant result of a project may take years to accomplish, if ever.
Rather than make himself, the individual seems to be made by race, class, language, climate, hereditary, history, habits, values, culture, etc. What Sartre calls "the coefficient of adversity," that is, obstacles to the fulfillment of one's projects, is continually limiting and frustrating one's freedom.

Robert Olson, in his book, *An Introduction to Existentialism*, presents a more specific criticism against Sartre from a pragmatic point of view. Olson claims that freedom for the ordinary man, as well as for pragmatic philosophers, consists in the ability or power of the individual to achieve chosen goals. Whether a man's decision to pursue certain goals is considered to be determined or undetermined is of little importance in this connection, he says. What does matter, Olson maintains, is that the person is able to achieve the goals he has set for himself. Pragmatists agree, Olson, says, "... in holding that the object of human striving is a state of being which permits the satisfaction of desire with relative ease, 'relative ease' being defined differently for each individual according to the nature of his desires, the nature of his environment, and his own temperamental bias." 42

Freedom for the pragmatists, and many ordinary people, does not mean the possibility of doing anything one wishes, Olson hastens to point out.

Olson claims, in agreement with the contemporary American thinker, Justus Buchler, that the degree of freedom and the degree of restraint are roughly equivalent. And, Olson continues, to achieve a chosen goal one must first be able to choose, but if the range of choice is not limited and determined by external circumstances, then one has difficulty in knowing
what one wants. One may wish for anything at all, but a wish has not become a want until one has decided whether the goal can be achieved and how it can be achieved. "The mistake of the existentialists", Olson states, "was ... to push the concept of freedom or ability to achieve chosen goals to its furthest limits, only to discover that it was empty. Had they remembered the elementary fact of both private and political life that the desirable state of affairs is one with a maximum of order and a maximum of freedom and were they less disposed to think in terms of rigid antitheses they would have taken care not to empty the word 'freedom' of its conceptualization. Olson says one is set less but more free because there are laws against murder, and police enforce them. But if one wishes to kill another, laws and police are obstacles which limit one's freedom. But if one wishes to walk the streets without fear, these "obstacles" liberate one. "Freedom to achieve chosen goals then implies," he says, "not the absence of obstacles, but the existence of the right kind of obstacles in the right amounts."

Writing on Sartre's philosophy of freedom, V. J. McGill suggests a definition of freedom which closely resembles Olson's view. Rather than adopting Sartre's view that one man is as free as another, McGill says it would be better to define freedom " ... as the ability to satisfy needs plus the ability to develop new needs, with the understanding, of course, that abilities do not evolve unless objective conditions are favourable." McGill goes on to say that favourable objective conditions develop only in a free society; a society, that is, which "... provides not only the objective opportunities for the satisfaction of needs, but also the training to take advantage of them, and to develop new needs with a minimum of
Such a view of freedom has the advantage of agreeing with common sense, McGill says, whereas Sartre's subjective concept is too abstract and empty ever to win general assent.

Though the criticisms of Olson and McGill are not without point, they are concerned with freedom in a different sense than Sartre. In one sense of the term "abstract", Sartre's philosophy of freedom is abstract. That is, he is interested in an analysis of freedom as such, rather than particular freedom such as political freedom, social freedom, moral freedom, etc. Sartre maintains that these latter are only possible because man is free ontologically and it is this latter which is his primary concern in *Being and Nothingness*. In another sense of the term, "abstract," Sartre's philosophy of freedom is not abstract because his description is not of the for-itself in a vacuum, but the for-itself engrossed in situations. The type of freedom Olson and McGill are concerned with is the important freedoms of everyday life. Sartre, on the other hand, maintains that these freedoms can only be examined in detail and with any significance after man's freedom *per se* has been described ontologically.

Concerning Sartre's philosophy of freedom, Natanson, in an article to which we have previously made reference, makes the following point:

"First, what is Sartre seeking? In the simplest term, he is seeking to describe the being of man in reality, but to comprehend that being in a radical and irreducible manner. The object of existential inquiry is man's being in the world as such; and therefore it is concerned not with special aspects of the business, professional, or artistic world in which man life, but with the necessary and essential condition for being in all realms,"
for all men. Before we are citizens or fathers or employees or Protestants or Kantians we are we find ourselves in the midst of things, we are beings in the world. To understand the full nature and significance of this being in the world is a central task for existential philosophy. The importance is apparent only when we realize that all subsequent in Sartre stems from the analysis of the ground phenomenon of being in the world. For Sartre, then, existential philosophy is the analysis of being, and proceeds through the study of man's being in the world. Such an analysis leads ultimately to the structures of the self, and the multiple aspects of the relationship between the self and other selves."48

Sartre recognizes that freedom is continually meeting obstacles. But such resistance, he says, does not annihilate freedom because it is the free positing of an end by the for-itself which gives meaning to this resistance and causes it to arise in the first place. The things of the world are both resisters and aids to our projects, and do not threaten our freedom but are the means of revealing it. A crag on the side of a mountain, for example, can manifest resistance if one wishes to replace it, but it can be an aid if one wishes to climb on top of it in order to get a good view of the surrounding countryside. By itself, without an intending for-itself, the crag simply is and is neither an obstacle nor an aid. Further, the way the crag is revealed with also depend on an instrumental-complex that is already established. That is, without techniques of mountain climbing, proper tools, paths for climbing, etc., the crag would be neither easy nor difficult to climb. The question would not even be posited and would not support any relation of any kind with mountain climbing tech-
niques. Sartre says in this context: "Thus although brute things (what
Heidegger calls 'brute existents') can from the start limit our freedom of action, it is our freedom itself which must first constitute the framework, the technique, and the ends in relation to which they will manifest themselves as limits. Even if the crag is revealed as 'too difficult to climb,' and if we must give up the ascent, let us note that the crag is revealed as such only because it was originally grasped as 'climbable'; it is therefore our freedom which constitutes the limits which it will subsequently encounter. 49

For Sartre, the for-itself's facticity enables its freedom to arise. Freedom is separated from its chosen and by resisting existents but, at the same time, the for-itself nihilates these existents, illuminating them and giving them meaning and significance by means of the projected end. In this way, the end is more clearly comprehended by the for-itself which pursues its end using the existents as instruments and techniques. "Consequently the resistance which freedom reveals in the existent," Sartre says, "far from being a danger to freedom, results only in enabling it to arise as freedom. There can be a free for-itself only as engaged in a resisting world. Outside of this engagement the notions of freedom, of determinism, of necessity lose all meaning." 50

Sartre wishes to make it clear that by "freedom" he does not mean obtaining the end one has chosen. Whether the end is obtained or not does not alter the ontological status of human freedom, on his view and contrary to Olson and McGill. Sartre says in this respect: "... it is necessary to point out to 'common sense' that the formula 'to be free' does not mean 'to obtain what one has wished' but rather 'by oneself to determine oneself to wish' (in the broad sense of choosing). In other words success is not
important to freedom. The discussion which opposes common sense to philosophers stems here from a misunderstanding: the empirical and popular concept of 'freedom' which has been produced by historical, political, and moral circumstances is equivalent to 'the ability to obtain the ends chosen.' The technical and philosophical concept of freedom, the only one which we are considering here, means only the autonomy of choice. It is necessary, however, to note that the choice, being identical with acting, supposes a commencement of realization in order that the choice may be distinguished from the dream and the wish.51

Sartre does not advocate a concept of freedom which claims that a prisoner, for example, is always free to leave the prison. Nor does freedom mean the truism that the prisoner is free to dream of his escape. Rather, freedom in this example means that the prisoner is free to try to escape. Thus, on Sartre's view, whatever the conditions and security measures of the prison are, the prisoner is free to project his escape as a desirable or valuable goal and begins to try to realize this end. And, indeed, such a project only becomes significant once the prisoner appropriates his present situation as unsatisfactory, as a lack, in relation to this chosen project. In an earlier work, Olson comments on Sartre's point in the following way: "Freedom is meaningless except to a being who is not what he is and who is what he is not, who moughts his being of fact and who assumes the nothingness of being represented by his freely chosen projects of being."52

The prisoner's choice and his acting to obtain the chosen end go hand in hand, for Sartre. The prisoner's project acquires value when he begins some action toward the realization of the project. For Sartre,
Some fortunate people the most productive during


dominate problem. They are free to do what they
choose, and to express the absolute free-
er. This allows the people of „oppressed“ to be free,

freedom, not laissez-faire, regulations. Because in the book on
free, the freedom is given, and it cannot choose not to be free.

freedom of the freedom. In short, the for-rental is considered to be
not permissible freedom and is dependent for the effectiveness on the
second chapter, but such postulate still involves a free choice and does
not permit determinism as a possibility, as we pointed out in the

lease, such a choice is impossible, for there, the for-rental can only
be free, on the basis of the existence of the freedom of the being-for-
of the being which is a lack, namely, the for-rental, is not the foundation
also, not an intentional but an instrumental „but, for the reasons of congestion

22

of being but an lack of penetration of being, not as real but as presence to
congestion, it would be meaningless to desire the freedom as an existence

lack. It this were not so, then we can say in the latter work in this
lack and does not desire, therefore the chosen projects, to overcome this

On the other hand, freedom is meaningful to a being that is not a

choice, and a choice to be significant to an act.

freedom does not discern between choosing and doing; it act as freedom,

on the other, such a distinction is dropped by art into choice, for him,

involve a distinction between choice, on the one hand, and selecting.

In short, freedom, not art, does not
Desan claims of Sartre, "which he presents in different ways, is that the obstacles are not obstacles as such; my choice in choosing them is what makes them obstacles." But such reasoning hides a fallacy, Desan maintains. In substantial agreement with Olson and McGill, Desan says: "It is necessary to distinguish between a freedom of decision and a freedom of execution. It may happen, and it does happen, that I am free in deciding an act but not in executing it." For example, while climbing a mountain, a crag might be an unexpected obstacle to one's project of reaching the top of the mountain. One must either give up his project, or endanger his life by attempting to overcome the obstructive crag. Desan claims that the crag was not a part of the climber's initial choice: it was not an anticipated obstacle. He says it is true that if the climber had stayed home, the crag would not be an obstacle. But it is also true, Desan continues, that what was not foreseen at all cannot be imparted to the climber's free decision. The climber does not choose this particular situation. "The obvious conclusion", Desan says, "is that all choice supposes a certain number of data: I can choose among those data, but the data themselves I have not chosen." 57

Sartre does not claim, at least in the way Desan seems to imply, that the for-itself chooses the data of the situation as such. That is, the for-itself cannot, willy-nilly, choose a crag to be on the side of the mountain, or not to be there.

The for-itself as possibility posits, by annihilation, a lack in the being of things and in its own situation which must be overcome by working toward the realization of an intended project. The autonomy of the free being is revealed in its freedom to choose, but this independence from the world involves the independence of the world from the for-itself's
But experience cannot determine whether the free will "really" results in actuating in a certain way and in relation to a certain chosen project. Since the freedom of choice, because the free-agent apprehenses the situation in relation to the project, becomes the free-agent's object, and consequently an unpredictable;

that things only arise as obstructions, and consequently as unpredictable,

say commencing on parallel's view, at the same time, however, Berthe både
in independence of the world of fact with respect to the projects' Olson
the free-agent with respect to a world of fact identical by the same token,
freagent is limited in by the freedom of choice, but the independence of
not of the independence of things. "The independence and autonomy of the
projects, every project consists a margin of unpredictability as a re-

It is not only with the absence of freedom in the world, but the

consequences of the choice are executed by the free-agent; there

the consequence to the selecting only if the selection is intersected by freedom

except in my desire. "Nevertheless," Berthe says, "the choice can show

ensures that the free-agent will be able to examine the consequence to the

opposition to begin, to choose a project does not mean that all the possible

some of the parts of the hence being of the rock, and, therefore holds in

But experience cannot determine whether the free will "real" results to actuating

being-in-actuating, in the light of the project, the case becomes an objective.

free, which locates the case, by multiplication, from the massiveness of

case become a case-to-be-chosen only as a project of an increasing case

in a certain way and in relation to a certain chosen projects. Since the

In relation to the project, because the free-agent apprehenses the situation

that things only arise as obstructions, and consequently as unpredictable;

say commencing on parallel's view, at the same time, however, Berthe både

in independence of the world of fact with respect to the projects' Olson

the free-agent with respect to a world of fact identical by the same token,
freagent is limited in by the freedom of choice, but the independence of

not of the independence of things. "The independence and autonomy of the

projects, every project consists a margin of unpredictability as a re-
...
Sartre says, "it is I who choose my body as weak by making it face the
difficulties which I cause to be born (mountain climbing, cycling, sport).
If I have not chosen to take part in sports, if I live in the city, and
if I concern myself exclusively with business or intellectual work, then
from this point of view my body will have no quality whatsoever."63

For Sartre, then, there is freedom only in a situation, but there
is a situation only because of freedom. In short, "Human-reality every-
where encounters resistance and obstacles which it has not created, but
these resistances and obstacles have meaning only in and through the
free choice which human-reality is." 64 Freedom is not limitless, however,
as Olson and Desan imply when discussing Sartre. But any limits to free-
dom, for Sartre, arise on the foundation of the for-itself's freedom and
are not external limits.

If the freedom of the for-itself, in Sartre's philosophy, is not
limited or annihilated by being-in-itself, but limited only by the for-
itself's own free choice, we might ask: what effect other people have on
a particular individual's freedom? Can freedom, in other words, remain
an absolute freedom when confronted by the freedom of Others? This
specific aspect of absolute freedom will be our main concern throughout
the remainder of this chapter.65

As we have had occasion to mention before, the individual for-
itself is "thrown," as it were, into a world where various systems and
techniques have already been devised and put to work by Others before it.
I, for example, had no part in setting up the Canadian nation either as a
geographical or a political entity. Such action was done long before I
was born by Others who lived under systems and used techniques which
were established before they were born. Also, I was born, without con-
cultation, into a certain family which spoke a certain language namely,
English. And now, in the present, if I do not follow directions provided
by Others, I shall not reach my intended destination. Nor will that
instrument work if I do not follow the accompanying instructions. And,
finally, though the meaning of this building is contingent, it was never-
theless attributed to this building by Others independently of me. The
question, then, is how these situations, and others not mentioned, which
arise because of the presence of Others in the world, affect the freedom
of an individual for-itself?

Sartre maintains that the species "man," or the concept "humanity,
or the nation "Canada," do not exist prior to their manifestation in con-
crete existing individual men who are also, in the case, Canadians. "Man,"
"humanity," "Canada," etc., are abstractions which are only sustained by
each individual for-itself. By choosing its ends of action, the for-itself
creates the possibility of manifesting a scheme which is humanity or the
nation, and makes such schemes meaningful and significant in the light of
its own projects and those of Others. The Canadian nation does not have,
in Sartre's view, some pre-human existence which can be sustained inde-
dependently of any being-for-itself. Because several beings-for-itself choose
to accept being Canadian and choose to live in a particular geographical
area, under specific laws and institutions, the Canadian nation exists.
And each for-itself, because it exists, is responsible for the existence
of humanity. By a collective decision to commit suicide or destroy one
another by war, nation and humanity could disappear at one stroke with the
total annihilation of the being-for-itself. Since I, for example, accept being a Canadian and a man, I contribute both meaning and significance to the Canadian nation and to humanity.

Sartre recognizes the fact that various systems and techniques, such as the national language, are already in force when one enters the world. This is part of the given data which the individual has not created. But in conformity with what he has been saying all along, Sartre holds that it is the task of each for-itself to take over, to "interiorize" and make its own, the various human techniques. Once the for-itself has appropriated a technique, it is no longer a mere technique but is incarnated, as it were, and guided by the for-itself's projects and receives, besides national and/or human significance, added significance from this particular individual's projects. By its freedom, the for-itself exploits language and other techniques in a certain individual way: it uses the language, masters it, speaks it, communicates by it, all in relation to its individual concrete situation. Sartre says that "... it is in its effort to choose itself as a personal self that the for-itself sustains in existence certain social and abstract characteristics which make of it a man (or woman); and the necessary connections which accompany the essential elements of man appear only on the foundation of a free choice; in this sense each for-itself is responsible in its being for the existence of a human race."

The for-itself makes its choice, however, in a world full of meanings posited by Others. This given is undeniable as Sartre recognizes. It is in such a world, which amounts to the for-itself's facticity, its existing in situation, that the for-itself must be free, Sartre maintains.
The for-itself chooses itself by taking into account these various given, just as it chooses itself as a mountain climber by taking into account the given features of the mountain. But in the case of given meanings, systems and techniques, the for-itself is not confronted with brute existents alone but, also, Other individuals. Consequently, the Other's existence must be taken into account. Such an account requires a choice by the for-itself; by a free choice the for-itself can apprehend the Other-as-subject or the Other-as-object.

By apprehending the Other-as-subject, the for-itself recognizes that the Other's choices and actions are the manifestations of a free, existing being-for-itself. By apprehending the Other-as-object, the for-itself goes beyond the Other's existence toward his ends and possibilities and regards them as things-in-themselves. In other words, the for-itself surpasses the Other-as-subject and attempts to place this latter's being, including his conduct, on the side of being-in-itself. The other-as-object becomes, for the intending for-itself, an indicator of ends by means of choices which are apprehended, by the for-itself, as objects. In short, the actions of the Other are regarded as techniques, that is actions-as-objects, rather than the free projects of a free being who has posited certain freely chosen ends of action. In this context, Sartre says concerning the Other's conduct and ends: "... we must necessarily recognize that it is by means of the free assumption of a position by the for-itself confronting the Other that they become techniques. The Other by himself alone cannot cause these projects to be revealed to the for-itself as techniques; and due to this fact these exists for the Other in so far as he transcends himself toward his possibles, no technique but
choose to appropriate them, "Prene, for example, perform certain acts
directly because the techniques appear as objects, the for-treat can
to be dealt by the techniques", Sarre says. He adds: "Technological,
in the world that the for-treat is to be dealt and by the for-treat is to be
to the other, "Thus it is by choosing intent and by the for-treat is to be
to the other, by choosing to look at the other-as-object, to come to the
care for the other as technique, this in compliance when the
however, the for-treat does the care for the other, etc.
care for the other as technique, or a great figures of all, or restoration of the money".
are
By whatever technique is dealt such an unilateral communication, or
the for-treat can care the world in which it lives to be governed
then concrete actions of a concrete other-as-subject. To see the
for the revelation of the other, etc as objects or technique further
In Sarre's view, then, the industrial for-treat is responsible
In short, men's wage appearance in the world -- bourgeoisie and workers', French and German,
consequence-excessive, if is at this moment and at this moment only that
consequence to arise in the world as the compound of the other as a concrete
It is assumed a position with respect to the other, "Sarre says, "because
a chosen end, namely, "Isolating the shape, the for-treat as soon as
do not appear in his actions as objects but as means of attaining
leather, a hammer, Isolating the leather on the shape, etc. The lemon-tender
the situation as revealing certain concrete action, namely, a piece of
he plays a new role on a shoe. Rather, as an extract subject, he apprehends
who does not consider himself in the process of applying a technique when
Sarre follows the last statement up with the example of the shoe-tender
a concrete doing, which is derived in terms of the industrial and, "67
which have meaning for him in relation to his projected end. By making his free actions into meaningful objects, I give Pierre an outside; by me, and Others like me, Pierre can be categorized as a bourgeois, and his "bourgeois" conduct is looked upon as a technique or conduct-as-object. Pierre's conduct, which originally, and for him was founded and sustained by a freedom engaged in a project, and containing its own internal laws and consistency, now becomes, through me, an objective action with objective laws which take on universal validity for any analogous conduct by Others. Thus all such analogous conduct I call "bourgeois conduct," and Pierre as the agent-as-object becomes "anybody". Sartre says that "This historization, which is the effect of the for-itself's free choice, in no way restricts its freedom; quite the contrary, it is in this world and no other that its freedom comes into play; it is in connection with its existence in this world that it puts itself into question. For to be free is not to choose the historic world in which one arises -- which would have no meaning -- but to choose oneself in the world whatever this may be."

The for-itself can, and does, on Sartre's view, appropriate techniques. That is, the for-itself "interiorizes" techniques as its own, such as the bourgeois technique. Two consequences follow from such a choice. First, by using a technique, the for-itself goes beyond the technique toward its chosen goal. In this way, the technique is related to, and made significant by, the for-itself's project. And, second, the technique, which originally was a meaningful conduct fixed in some Other-as-object, loses its character as a technique. The technique now becomes integrated, or "interiorized," in the free transcending of the for-itself
The other, choosing to approach me as an object, categorizes me

instead as a subject.

The for-lattice to choose to no longer approach the other-as-object, but

lattice, such an approachment, to be meaningful to the for-lattice, requires

would be approached as the other-as-object, by the other-as-e-see-see-for-

projects/ would be seen by the other, as technique. The for-lattice

be placed on the side of the in-lattice, regarded as an object whose free

This would mean the for-lattice now, by a free choice of the other, would

belonging to the in-lattice. Such a procedure, however, can be narrated.

objects in much the same way as the for-lattice approachment pheno-

In the for-lattice approachment the ends and actions of the other as

and chosen ends, as if the other belonged to the in-lattice, thus results

presence case, the for-lattice approaches the other-as-see-see-see, the actions

approached phenomenon that were on the side of being-in-lattice. In the

appreciated phenomenon, in the earlier situation, the for-lattice

seen, and in relation to it, the can projects show as an "uninterpreted"

approaches the other-as-object, approachment the other, as technique as

experience of the other-as-see-see. By a free choice, the for-lattice

to one's own part, to change and motect, and, now, in regard to the

effectively in regard to the three existences of the world of being-in-lattice,

they barter the consciousness held when choosing the for-lattice's

The free for-lattice is the foundation of all limits to its freedom. This

there are no external, or external, limits of the for-lattice's freedom.

until now, barter's philosophy of freedom has maintained that

approachment the technique (as, former technique, as it now has become).

came the ends, and thus saturated by this freedom which chooses to
It is for other freedom, freedom which freely apprehended is in the light

Intuition an external Intuition from the fact that being freedom,

It cannot act-the freedom, that is, its commanded to be free! the

in freedom... Intuition an internal Intuition from the fact that
place ourselves, the only Intuitive which a freedom can encounter are found

are in the existence of the other's freedom. Thus on whatever level we

on our consciousness, that my freedom on this new level finds the Intuitive

can Intuitive freedom? we see now, when we include the other's existence

several with the component of existence-existential, that only my freedom

who apprehended me as an object, that "we" say existent, keeping our-

situation. Situative way, considering this aspect of the other's-existential

situation, just as existent, I cannot an outsider to arrive in the other's

me as the other-as-object. The other causes an outside so arrive in My

consciousness of the other's-existential. In short, the other chooses to apprehend

an object, and my situation becomes, for the other, an objective structure

My freedom in this case, paritie holds, is that the other regards me as

I choose ends which make the product function insignificant, the product

such is not harmonized in My world and it loses the significance to

specifically or as any campanion, for an object. However, the product

alternative and from an alien and free being which takes me, either

for me only or and through the foundation of my free choice. This pre-

When reads, "no campanion need apply," this product has meaning

various applications. If, on looking for a that in a certain country,

can choose to accept, unwillingly deny, or consider indirectly these

as a bourgeois, companion, arguable, pollution, protection, etc. I
of their own ends."

In a way the for-itself is able to recover its own limits, Sartre maintains. This is made possible because the for-itself apprehends itself as limited by the Other only to the extent that the Other exists for the for-itself. By its own choice, the for-itself apprehends the Other-as-subject and, hence, itself as a being-for-others. By freely apprehending the Other-as-subject, the for-itself makes the Other's transcendence exist for the for-itself as such. Sartre states that by assuming its being-a-Jew, and recognizing the freedom of anti-Semites, the for-itself becomes a Jew-for-them. Only in this way, he says, will being-a-Jew appear as the external objective limit of the situation. "If, on the contrary," Sartre says, "it pleases me to consider the anti-Semites as pure objects, then my being-a-Jew disappears immediately to give place to the simple consciousness (of) being a free, unqualifiable transcendence. To recognize others and, if I am a Jew, to assume my being-a-Jew are one and the same. Thus the Other's freedom confers limits on my situation, but I can experience these limits only if I recover this being-for-others which I am and if I give to it a meaning in the light of the ends which I have chosen."

The for-itself does not choose, in the above case, his being-a-Jew, that is, the mode of his being-for-Others. But the for-itself does choose to be a Jew-for-itself or reject this: in other words, the for-itself can choose its being in conformity with the way Others apprehend it, or can choose not to exist this being-for-Others. If the latter choice, Others will still regard the for-itself as a Jew, but now the for-itself chooses to apprehend the Other-as-object, as belonging to the in-itself.
without the color term. But the phenomenon, though it cannot be revealed,
the second term, but the second term cannot be revealed, or even be
excluded or excludable? the color term of each of these accurately reveals
to discern the color term: consciousness of phenomenon, man or situation,
which these are a part. The artesian different from the being by
consciousness of state without a part; but the for-knowledge to the being by
interaction imposed by freedom. And, finally, the for-knowledge cannot
again, freedom is as somewhat by interaction but those, in turn, are
in excludate! but excludate only emerge on the foundation of freedom.
because man exists, on the other. In the manner, chance to only freedom
after the in-the-state, on the one hand; but a situation is only possible
beauty-in-the-state. Tor, man were exist in a situation, which is on the
other. Han, on the being-for-knowledge, to interaction as determinant to
the excludately between reason, on the one hand, and freedom, on the
again, as in the other chapter, we see, in science, philosophy.
for instance, only freedom to whom to interact freedom.
by utilization of, in relation to the for-knowledge, project. In all cases,
the being-for-knowledge by utilizing the being meaning and attractiveness, or
freedom is imposed on the for-knowledge, can freedom which appears
the interaction of the for-knowledge, the important interaction of the for-knowledge
above an accordance in relation to the other, namely, an accordance opposed
the other's freedom. By referring the being-for-the, the for-knowledge still
freedom, but a interaction arising on the combination of freedom, namely,
the being-for-knowledge in the important interaction of the for-knowledge.
consciousness that does not appear the other as a free for-knowledge.

Thus the for-knowledge utilizes the being-for-others in favor of a
with more or less relevance and accuracy, the empathy of the human condition.

The empathy of the character in Parte's philosophy reflects, we maintain,
of the dialectic between the being-for-itself and the being-in-itself.

Freedom is manifested in the situation which, in turn, requires because
for Parte, then, men to free and from abstractions. This absolute
and the various choices.

Hence the for-itself, for Parte, is responsible for the mode of being
and eternity stems from the ends one posits beyond one's present existency.

I'm apparent only on the foundation of freedom and only acquires meaning.

choices will be made in, and posited by, existency but existency, in

then, is linked by one's freedom and freedom assumes its etiology. One's

an existent power which one chooses at a given time. One's freedom,

is linked. Thus one's possibilities and projects have to be existentially

a way of choosing. Since every choice is a choice of existence, freedom

choose, but he is not free not to choose because not to choose is still

does not choose to be existent be condemned to be free, men do free to

hand, however, freedom is not the foundation of life being. Thus, men

of freedom, for Parte, chooses life as an act of being. On the other

the for-itself, from the start, choose exist in a finite world.

do not lack freedom since they are the result of the existent and

by the for-itself's freedom, and, for Parte, these obstacles really

meaning, as a rule the for-itself's existency, except that given them

because the for-itself's existency, they have no

existence of determinacy to the for-itself's projects, they have no

Others which compare the for-itself's existency serve as aids of co-

dependent of the for-itself, and although the brute existences and

without the for-itself, has a being that is transcendental and in-
We may summarize and conclude this chapter on the freedom of the for-itself with the following quotation from Natanson concerning Sartre's philosophy: "The being of man is located primarily in his being there. You and I -- apart from our special statuses, roles, or purposes at any moment, apart from the differences in our age, sex, personal history, religion, ideals, attitudes -- apart from all this we are beings in reality. In an original and undervivable manner we are, and the reality in which we are is philosophically prior to the content and methods of the special disciplines and the commonsense attitude -- all of which take for granted, presuppose, our being.

"This primal reality is an everlasting conflict, a dialectic in which man is in search of a synthesis, a peace and harmony, which he cannot, in principle, obtain. Within the bitter confines of this dialectic, men is condemned to act, to choose, to create what he is; but in the moment that he chooses, he feels the profound anguish of responsibility, for his choice involves all men. When the choice has been made, the dialectic continues, for choices are moments in the dialectic, never finalities. To be free is self-consciously to take upon oneself the burden of admitting and facing this condition, and acting within its confines. Condemned to the dialectic, we cannot choose it. But we can choose to acknowledge it, and to face its implications.

"If the more than seven hundred closely printed pages of Sartre's L'être et le néant could be reduced to a single sentence, that sentence would perhaps be this: the tragedy and the dignity of man lie in the dictum, to be is to be free."
CHAPTER IV

SARTRE'S ORIGINAL PROJECT

The being-for-itself, as a lack of being-in-itself, freely and spontaneously projects itself toward its chosen ends. In turn, these ends give meaning and significance to the motives and causes of the for-itself's actions, and, it is in relation to its chosen ends that the for-itself appropriates its facticity. These latter two statements briefly sum up Sartre's view of freedom described in the preceding chapter. We may now inquire, more specifically, into the nature of the project as such.

In the last chapter, brief references were made to the for-itself's original project, or mode of being. Such a project, though not as specific and immediate as the for-itself's everyday projects, is founded on the for-itself's freedom, and, like all projects, can be nihilated at any instant. But at the same time, according to Sartre, each individual project is integrated in a fundamental project, or original choice, which is the for-itself's chosen mode of being. Although the original project can take many different forms, it arises, in Sartre's view, because of man's desire to stabilize his being, to overcome his lack of being, his nothingness and spontaneity. What man most desires is the firmness of thing-like being combined with the transparency of consciousness: a being that is both lucid and immutable. This amounts to a desire for a synthesis of being-for-itself with being-in-itself; a desire which must remain unsatisfied, Sartre maintains.
The for-itself' freedom and mode of being, or original project, is closely connected, in Sartre's philosophy, with the view that God does not exist. Our purpose in this final chapter is two-fold. In the first place, to point out that in Sartre's philosophy man's mode of being, like his other projects, is founded on his freedom. And, secondly, we wish to maintain that Sartre's view of absolute freedom, as described in the preceding chapters, can be advocated independently of theological considerations. That is, our argument will be that absolute freedom does not imply atheism, as Sartre holds, and that it is not necessarily incompatible with theism. However, we are not attempting to claim that freedom, in Sartre's philosophy, implies theism, but that it does not imply atheism. Our contention is that Sartre's atheism arises as his fundamental project, and not as an apodeictic "cosmic truth". We shall attempt to show that in Sartre's philosophy as such, agnosticism is a more consistent postulate than atheism, or even theism, and that absolute freedom does not require God's death in order to exist.

The for-itself, in Sartre's philosophy, desires to overcome its lack of being. Since it is the origin of the lack in being-in-itself, the for-itself projects itself beyond given situations and states of affairs which it apprehends as unsatisfactory. However, the for-itself remains dissatisfied: having attained a chosen end it posits that acquired end as unsatisfactory, and, by new projects, attempts to transcend the new lack. But in each choice and action, Sartre maintains, the fundamental attitude, or, the for-itself's choice of being, toward the world is manifested.
The for-itself's actions at any given time are not isolated, discrete actions, but, apart from the odd exception, are integrated and related to wider projects, and, ultimately, to the fundamental project. Sartre says: "Every project is comprehensible as a project of itself toward a possible. It is comprehensible first in so far as it offers a rational content which is immediately apprehensible -- I place my knapsack on the ground in order to rest for a moment. This means that we immediately apprehend the possible which it projects and the end at which it aims. In the second place it is comprehensible in that the possible under consideration refers to other possibles, these to still others, and so on to the ultimate possibility which I am. The comprehension is effected in two opposed senses: by a regressive psychoanalysis one ascends back from the considered act to my ultimate possible; and by a synthetic progression one redescends from this ultimate possible to the considered act and grasps its integration in the total form". And, as each phenomenon of the world needs to be explained as having the whole world as its background, as detached from the plenum of the world, so, analogously, each act of the for-itself detaches itself from a unitary synthesis of all its possibilities; that is, each act is explicable in relation to the for-itself's mode of being, either in conformity to that being, or in opposition to it. Sartre says: "It is necessary to conceive of this ultimate possibility as the unitary synthesis of all our actual possibles; each of these possibles resides in an undifferentiated state in the ultimate possibility until a particular circumstance comes to throw it into relief without, however, thereby suppressing its quality of belonging to the totality."
One's fundamental project can be placed in perspective, analyzed, and nihilated at any moment, Sartre states. In fact, by one's everyday acts, one is continually modifying this initial project. One's anguish bears witness to the possibility of altering one's project, on Sartre's account. One's everyday projects are integrated in, and given wider meaning and significance by, this ultimate project, or mode of being, but this latter does not determine the everyday projects. At any moment one is able to nihilate one's mode of being, either by modifying that mode of being, or actually changing it. One way of changing this mode of being is through annihilation by choosing suicide. A less drastic way would be negating one's mode of being and choosing another ultimate project. Such a choice would be a conversion from one mode of being to another; for example, from theism to atheism, or vice versa. Such a metamorphosis is made when one chooses another mode of being and adopts different ends. "The anguish which, when this possibility is revealed, manifests our freedom to our consciousness is witness of this perpetual modifiability of our initial project." And, Sartre says again, "... we are perpetually threatened by the nihilation of our actual choice and perpetually threatened with choosing ourselves -- and consequently with becoming -- other than we are."

Man's fundamental project, in Sartre's view, is a desire toward being; that is, the desire to attain a perfect harmony between himself and the world. Though each person may attempt to satisfy this desire through different modes of being, the ultimate goal of these various projects is a harmonious synthesis between the individual, as a being-for-itself, with
being-in-itself. That is, the for-itself desires to nihilate its spontaneity and become like the inert being-in-itself, but, at the same time, remaining conscious. The for-itself's ideal mode of being is to be a being in-itself-for-itself. Such a being would be an Absolute being, Sartre says: in short, it would be God. Sartre states, it is as consciousness that the for-itself "... wishes to have the impermeability and infinite density of the in-itself. It is as the nihilation of the in-itself and a perpetual evasion of contingency and of facticity that it wishes to be its own foundation. This is why the possible is projected in general as what the for-itself lacks in order to become in-itself-for-itself. The fundamental value which presides over this project is exactly the in-itself-for-itself; that is, the ideal of a consciousness which would be the foundation of its own being-in-itself by the pure consciousness which it would have of itself. It is this ideal which can be called God. Thus the best way to conceive of the fundamental project of human reality is to say that man is the being whose project is to be God."

Such a synthesis between the two regions of being is unrealizable, Sartre maintains. As the source of nothingness, being-for-itself lacks the being-in-itself; and, as an opaque massive plenum, the being-in-itself can never acquire the spontaneity of consciousness. Each being is mutually, and totally, exclusive of the other. Thus, man's quest for a synthesis of his being with that of the in-itself, in short, his project of nihilating his contingency by attaining the Absolute, is doomed from the very start. However, man seeks to overcome the dualism, to transcend his own being toward the Absolute, to reach the stable and yet con-
conscious status of in-itself-for-itself. "The supreme value toward which consciousness at every instant surpasses itself by its very being", Sartre holds, "is the absolute being of the self with its characteristics of identity, of purity, of permanence, etc., and as its own foundation." Such a surpassing would require man to become a being-in-itself, a full positivity. Since man lacks any being-in-itself, such a project becomes, in Sartre's terms, a useless passion.

Man's desire to become God does not, Sartre maintains, constitute an essence, *a priori*, of man; that is, the project of being God does not define, or constitute, the nature of man prior to the existence of man as being-for-itself. For Sartre, the desire to be God does not exist first in order to cause itself to be manifested later by individual desires *a posteriori*. Indeed, there is nothing beyond the symbolic expression which this desire finds in concrete desires. "There is not first a single desire of being, then a thousand particular feelings," Sartre states, "but the desire to be exists and manifests itself only in and through jealousy, greed, love of art, cowardice, courage, and a thousand contingent, empirical expressions which always cause human reality to appear to us only as manifested by a particular man, by a specific person." Because it is a lack of being, the for-itself projects being as an end; dissatisfied with its contingency, the for-itself desires its own foundation that is both necessary and stable. And, since it is the origin of negation, the for-itself posits its facticity as a lack that is not satisfying, and posits as its end of action an ultimate, and satisfying, ideal which it strives to attain through various ordinary,
that chapter we presented the following quotation from Being and Nothing:

In Sartre's view, he identified with the for-Itself's lack of being. In the chapter I mentioned our desire, specifically as a lack, as unconsolatory, and in need of being transcended.

As we have indicated before, the for-itself is free because it
the indeterminacy. Sartre maintains, freedom is identified with utilization
the fundamental desire to an abstract, conceptual "desire to

leisure desires and their ends.

of consciousness. The ultimate desire is manifested only through part-
-
To express existence is a fact in turn the meaning of the function of consciousness-

expresses itself in turn as the meaning of the predicate of existence-

the surrounding as a situation. The desire of being is always realized
-
-ency of the end. These ends in fact are pursued in terms of a part-

the contrary, it always represents a particular desire

Sartre says that "... while the meaning of the desire is ul-

daily projects."
Desire is a lack of being. It is haunted in its inmost being by the being of which it is desire. Thus it bears witness to the existence of lack in the being of human reality. Thus the for-itself desires being because it is a lack of being. By desiring a particular end in a certain situation, the for-itself manifests its desire and choice of a particular mode of being which is also its particular attitude vis-à-vis the world. The for-itself is this particular project insofar as it is engaged in it. Thus if I am rowing on the river," Sartre says, "I am nothing -- either here or in any other world -- save this concrete project of rowing. But this project itself inasmuch as it is the totality of my being, expresses my original choice in particular circumstances; it is nothing other than the choice of myself as a totality in these circumstances."

The free for-itself lacks and desires the being-in-itself. Since desire is identical with lack of being, in Sartre's view, "...freedom can arise only as being which makes itself a desire of being; that is, as the project-for-itself of being in-itself-for-itself." This project-for-itself of being in-itself-for-itself, as earlier stated, is an abstract structure and cannot be regarded as the essence or nature of freedom. Sartre says that "Freedom is existence, and in it existence precedes essence. The upsurge of freedom is immediate and concrete and is not to be distinguished from its choice; that is, from the person himself. But the structure under consideration can be called the truth of freedom; that is, it is the human meaning of freedom." One's mode of being, in Sartre's view, is freely and spontaneously chosen by one's
consciousness as the origin of negation.

Man's fundamental project of being in-itself-for-itself is unrealizable, Sartre has said. Man desires the Absolute, but to satisfy this desire, man's existence would be annihilated qua being-for-itself. But the very ideal of the Absolute, Sartre maintains, is self contradictory since it would involve a synthesis of two radically unique and irreducible beings, namely, the for-itself and the in-itself. Sartre says: "Total being, ... that being whose existence would be a unitary synthesis of the in-itself and consciousness -- this ideal being would be the in-itself founded by the for-itself and identical with the for-itself which founds it -- i.e., the aus causa sui. But precisely because we adopt the point of view of this ideal being ... we must establish that the real is an abortive effort to attain to the dignity of the self-cause. Everything happens as if the world, man, and man-in-the-world succeeded in realizing only a missing God. Everything happens therefore as if the in-itself and the for-itself were presented in a state of disintegration in relation to an ideal synthesis. Not that the integration has ever taken place but on the contrary precisely because it is always indicated and always impossible ... If it is impossible to pass from the notion of being-in-itself to that of being-for-itself and to reunite them in a common genus, this is because the passage in fact from the one to the other and their reuniting can not be effected." 15

Sartre maintains that the non-existence of God is very annoying since it places all the responsibilities for each man's actions on the individual himself. There is no recourse to an Absolute for ultimate
justification of one's life. In his essay, *Existentialism is a Humanism*, Sartre says that without God there are no absolute values subsisting in an intelligible heaven; man is completely and totally responsible. In this essay, however, Sartre takes atheism for granted. His purpose is to draw out the implications arising from an atheistic starting-point. And, in the novel, *Nausea*, there is no room for God in a world that is absurd and contingent.

In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre presents his atheism as part of his systematic ontology. We might ask, however, whether Sartre's description of being-in-itself as a full positivity of being, and being-for-itself as spontaneous, free and lacking the in-itself, provides sufficient reasons for advocating atheism? In other words, is not Sartre's atheism instead an original project, Sartre's choice of being, which transcends his description of the two regions of being? Our point, for the remainder of the chapter, will be that Sartre's ontology *per se*, and as it now stands, is neutral vis à vis atheism and/or theism. In short, on the basis of this ontology, and without going beyond it, agnosticism, concerning the existence of God, is a more consistent project than atheism. Any "going-beyond" Sartre's ontology requires a project which appropriates a world on the "other side" of his descriptive ontology which is concerned with man's existence in this world. Such a project is one's choice to nihilate and appropriate this "beyond" in a particular way.

The God Sartre rejects is basically the God of the Scholastics; namely, the all-powerful, ever-knowing, completely perfect and infinite
creator of man and the world. That Sartre concentrates on this type of deity, probably the most vulnerable to logical and epistemological criticisms, does not suggest that a door has been left slightly ajar in his mind for another, less absolute, deity to enter. When Sartre declares that God does not exist, he includes all gods and any principle which would attempt to vindicate man's actions and values beyond man himself. Sartre's philosophy does not deny God's existence, on the one hand, nor retain all the old values as if their justification remained unaffected, on the other.

Sartre attempts to show that the idea of God is a contradiction that cannot be supported by his ontology. At the same time, he attempts to indicate how the notion of God arises, in the first place, as a notion which can be explained psychologically.

One of Sartre's arguments, a psychological explanation of one's belief in God, is based on his analysis of the look. The existence of the Other-as-subject does not require proof, Sartre holds. The for-itself knows the Other to be another for-itself since this Other can apprehend the for-itself as an object. The for-itself is conscious of its being-for-Others and can choose either to accept its being-for-Others, or deny it. In short, as we pointed out in the last chapter, the for-itself is conscious of being in a world peopled by Other for-itself's. Without going into the detail of Sartre's analysis of the look, the for-itself is conscious of its being an object for the Other's gaze. A person may, in any given case, be mistaken in "feeling" that someone is looking at him; nobody may be near him. But the very fact that he is
In this respect, one commentator says, "'To the one part, to the right,' have we intimated how consistent being can exist without necessary being. For if we can explain the ontogeny of the idea of God's existence, we still have not settled the question whether God does exist, or the idea. For if we can explain the ontogeny of the idea of God's existence, we seem to be

I see the ontogeny of the idea of God's existence, if not particularly important, for our understanding the above psychologial account of the ontogeny of our own ideas. An account of God to the darkest recesses of one's being.

By extraction and intuizione, one is able to conceive of the idea of God as the concept of God, the concept, intuitive subject for whom I exist. It is the seres of intuitive experiences of the presence of the other, the

An object, then I obtain a particular formal notion which refers to an in-

be a synonym of the intuitive substantiation of the human presence

"... If I turn away from the look as the occasion of concrete proof and seek to think simply of the intuitive substantiation of the human presence.

If one goes beyond the awareness of the other-as-subject to

start the idea of an intuitive other-as-subject for whom one is an intended

metaknown and is still conceived of like being-for-others. Indications,
in the presence of a Transcendent Stare, it does not follow that God
is unreal, though it may follow that all human responses to Him are far
from perfect because they are inevitably tinged with wishful thinking."

Sartre maintains that the being of phenomena, namely, being-
in-itself, simply is, without justification, related neither to possible
being, nor to necessary being. He also says that even if the in-itself
were created, its being would still be inexplicable since it has long
been separated from the act of creation. In short, we can's say any-
thing about the being of phenomena except that it is. This view of
Sartre's was pointed out at length in the first chapter, and, as we tried
to indicate there, it reflects his method of analyzing the givens of
experience without going beyond these givens. Assuming that Sartre is
correct in maintaining that no necessary being is given to experience,
that only being-in-itself and being-for-itself are given this sense,
can he nevertheless categorically assert that the in-itself and the for-
itself exhaust the possibilities? Granted that a necessary being, or God,
if it did exist, would be fundamentally irrelevant to Sartre's analysis
of the dialectical relationship between the in-itself and the for-itself,
since, ex hypothesi, this necessary being is not given as a part of that
dialectic. Sartre appears, however, to have extended beyond this
dialectic, in his own account, when he says that God cannot exist. Sartre's
interpretation of the dialectic, we maintain, in this instance, at least
possits beyond direct evidence and may even interfere with his description
of the givens of experience.

Sartre's philosophical method, as we tried to point out directly
in the introduction, and indirectly throughout the thesis, is geared toward human existence by means of a descriptive ontology of the givers of experience which are directly inspected in the manner described in the introduction and first chapter. Roquentin's experience of nausea, for example, is a description of man's encounter with the opacity of being-in-itself. Roquentin finds the world contingent and absurd, and maintains that God cannot exist in such a world. But, we may ask, is nausea the fundamental and only authentic appropriation of the world, as Sartre seems to suggest? Nausea, as a phenomenon of being, may acquire a different meaning and significance for someone else. And, it seems arguable that Sartre analyzes a given experience, nausea, from a particular point of view at the expense of nihilating other perspectives by which the same phenomenon could be described and interpreted. In his descriptive analysis of subjective experience, such as the experience of nausea, Sartre tends to make existential judgements concerning the objective reference of those experiences as the only adequate apprehensions of the phenomenon of being. In this way, other possible suggestions implied in these experiences are not utilized. But this tendency appears to be contrary to Sartre's own descriptive analysis of the freedom of the for-itself, since, in his analysis, it is the for-itself which gives meaning and significance to phenomena it experiences in a situation which, in turn, is appropriated in relation to the for-itself's freely chosen projects. Thus it seems conceivable that metaphysical nausea, vis à vis the material world, as an experience of the mystic, could lead to God rather than away from Him, as in Roquentin's case. If the phenomenon of being is revealed through
nausea, can Sartre say that this is the only way the phenomenon of being appears, or even, that his interpretation of it is any more than a freely chosen appropriation of it? Sartre's appropriation of being, through nausea, is not arbitrary but it is as contingent as the situation it attempts to describe. Any claims resulting from this appropriation concerning atheism, or theism, must share this contingency, and any such claim, though a meaningful and significant postulate, is not an apodictic one; it is a postulate that is an original project of one's being, but it is not necessarily a universal one.

In the introduction to *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre says that "Being will be disclosed to us by some kind of immediate access -- boredom, nausea, etc. ..." This statement suggest, though undoubtedly it is not Sartre's intention, that other immediate accesses to being, in addition to nausea, are possible. Sartre, we claim, has not presented us with sufficient reasons for asserting that being can be apprehended only through nausea, or similar experiences. Other experiences, we may argue, might suggest different meanings. As an example, we may refer to Rudolf Otto who maintains that he intuits a mysterious, overpowering, and majestic numinous which he calls God. Otto analyzes his experience and holds that a gulf exists between God and our consciousness of Him. However, we are able to apprehend God through our inner feelings, conscience and decision. Man's awareness of God, in Otto's view, is, to employ Sartrean terminology, a pre-judicative comprehension of the being of God. Sartre's prejudicative comprehension, on the other hand, is of transphenomenal being, through nausea. We are not suggesting that one view is preferable to the other,
but that Sartre's intuition is not an exclusive way of appropriating being. Nor is Otto's. Nausea need not constitute atheism, however; nor majesty and overpowerfulness, theism. But to hold that only through nausea can being be authentically apprehended, as Sartre suggests, is to obscure the experiential windows through which some light might enter.

If Sartre's atheism is his original project which is corroborated for him by, for example, nausea, then others who "feel that way" about things might agree with Sartre, whereas those who do not, can refer to the idiosyncrasy of such an experience. Not all atheists will feel nauseous toward the world. Also, there are Christians, for example, who feel as alienated and strange in this world as Sartre, but who go beyond this alienation into faith. In short, we seem to have reached an impasse where atheism or theism can be equally propagated on the basis of feeling, but neither convincing to the non-believer. However, Sartre presents ontological reasons for the impossibility of the ideal of God, 20 in addition to his feeling that way about the world. The question we wish to raise is whether these ontological reasons enable Sartre to deny God's existence, or if such a denial is a projection beyond the ontological description he presents? In other words, does Sartre make a "leap" beyond his descriptive ontology when he claims that God's existence is impossible?

We mentioned earlier that God, in Sartre's view, and if He exists, is an Absolute in every respect. God, then, would be conscious as well as immutable; He would be a being-in-itself-for-itself. God's self-consciousness would be an infinite self-consciousness, beyond time. But
least the prima facie possibility of a conscious being that is different
as perceived. By contrast, however, this distinction does not rule out at
least one barrier to ability to manifest, since it is the only one he can
only one barrier to ability to manifest, since it is the only one he can
from the internalized object and from itself, such a consciousness to the
in a lack that cannot be overcome, nothingness separates consciousness
with internalized objects. This consciousness, on Barte’s standpoint,
detailed ontological description of men’s consciousness and the relation-
essentially be of the same kind as men’s. Barte has presupposed us with a
we may ask, in the context, why God’s consciousness would not
ex hypothesi, no consciousness.
be supplanted up, since, in God’s case, there would be no lack, and hence,
be secondary to, or secondary, for Barte’s, and therefore of
be secondary to, or secondary, for Barte’s, and hence, if God existed, this consciousness would
Furthermore, since consciousness is a lack, it requires being-in-lack.
and without destruction. The God’s self-consciousness completely unites
self-consciousness, Barte says that a self-consciousness completely unites
consciousness intended is separate by the negative from the
self and experience from itself; that is, with self-consciousness, the
self-consciousness is internalized and involves destruction, as we have seen in
in itself, but then, he would not be the consciousness absolute. Can
resulting that such a unity is impossible, unless God were simple being
be no gap between his being-for-itself and his being-in-itself. Sartre
self-consciousness would be a unity, without gaps; and there could

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from the being-for-itself. And since Sartre, as a being-for-itself, is a finite being, his assertions concerning an infinite consciousness, if they could be stated, could, at best, only approximate the nature of that consciousness. Therefore, God's consciousness, if God exists, would not be necessarily identical with man's consciousness. Indeed, there may be a sense, contrary to Sartre, in which a being, besides the being-in-itself, could exist which is self-identical, and yet conscious; "identity," in other words, might have application to a being other than the in-itself. It is not inconceivable that God is both an absolute unity and conscious, although such a consciousness would be radically different from the consciousness of man, and probably ineffable to man. Sartre's descriptive ontology, as he presents it, would have no way of even approximately describing such an "other-worldly" consciousness, on the one hand; but that same ontology, it may be argued, is unable to categorically deny the possibility of such a consciousness, on the other.

In this context, Frederick Copleston, in an article, "Man Without God," attempts to clarify the position of theistic philosophers. These latter, he claims, do not develop an a priori concept of consciousness that is contrary to human consciousness, and then attribute this a priori notion to God. Rather, the theistic philosopher finds himself compelled to attribute self-consciousness to God, since the necessary being must be at least not less than contingent being. At the same time, these philosophers are compelled by reason to deny to the divine self-consciousness the limitations and imperfections found in human consciousness.

If Copleston's argument has any validity, then we need not assume
with Sartre that whatever is true of human consciousness must be attributed in unmodified form to God's consciousness. Granting that Sartre is right in maintaining that man is unable to overcome the dualism between his being-for-itself and the being of the world, the in-itself, it does not follow that the dualism cannot be overcome at all. By claiming that the description of the being-for-itself which he has presented is applicable, not only to human consciousness, but to all possible consciousness, Sartre, it seems, is applying his analysis of consciousness without qualification to circumstances where unknown conditions may modify its application: the fallacy, A dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid.

It Sartre were able to demonstrate that his analysis of consciousness was applicable to all possible consciousness, his atheism would have greater efficacy. It does follow from Sartre's analysis, however, that if God exists, and is a synthesis of consciousness and being, then He would transcend human experience and knowledge such that the terms "consciousness," "mind," "personal," etc. cannot be applied univocally to Him. Whether such a synthesis of being-in-itself and being-for-itself is possible ought not to be categorically affirmed or denied, on the basis of Sartre's ontology per se. Sartre's ontology, we claim, is restricted to "this-side" of experience and is unable to transcend being-for-itself in facticity.

Atheism is projected by Sartre in order to preserve man's absolute freedom. If God created man, Sartre says, man would be dependent on Him. Man would be endowed with an essence or nature which would act in conformity with the divine plan; man would be determined by the cosmic law.
But, Sartre claims, if man is not dependent upon God, then his existence can no longer be justified in relation to God. On this view, man's choices, values and responsibility for his actions are his alone. Sartre says that either man depends on God and is not free; or, he is independent of God and absolutely free. Sartre takes the latter alternative.

If we again consider Sartre's ontology as presented in this thesis, we may ask if the alternatives stated in the preceding paragraph are necessarily irreducible? Must God's existence end human freedom as Sartre has described it? If man's original project is a free project, as Sartre claims, could not man freely choose his original project, and God exist, as he chooses his everyday projects without denying the existence of the Other? If man's being-for-Others does not annihilate his freedom, perhaps, analogously, man could choose his being-for-God, if God exists, without annihilating his freedom.

If God exists an an Absolute in every respect, and endows man with a pre-determined essence, then one must agree with Sartre that man's freedom is impossible. It is not an uncommon view which claims that man is free though his actions are foreseen by God, and they conform to God's will because he is determined in his actions by his God-given essence. Such a view of God does give credence to Sartre's alternative: either freedom and no God, or God and no freedom. The problem is, however, whether God must be considered in Sartre's way; namely, as the being in-itself-for-itself, and as Absolute. To prove God's existence may be impossible, but it is equally difficult to affirm that God is and must be a synthesis of consciousness and the material world. Further, it does not follow that God and human freedom are incompatible concepts. A belief
in God may be intelligible only in relation to man's freedom and total responsibility, wherein man can still make himself, in Sartre's sense. Or, alternatively, man's freedom might be presented as an intelligible concept only if God does, in fact, exist. We are not prepared to present a case for either hypothesis, but only wish to maintain that Sartre's conception of God does not exhaust the possibilities; and, if this is the case, God and man's freedom may not be incompatible, as Sartre claims.

Man's original project, in Sartre's view, is the desire to attain his own permanent and stable foundation while remaining conscious. But this desire, Sartre emphasizes, as we have pointed out earlier in the chapter, is an abstract synthesis of the individual's everyday projects and is founded on his freedom. We might ask whether this view is so radically antithetical to a claim which asserts that man receives his freedom from God while remaining absolutely free to choose his own projects and choices of action? Sartre says that man is not the foundation of his freedom but is condemned to be free. Would it be an implausible thesis to claim that God, as the foundation of freedom, condemns man to be free such that he could not choose not to be free? Man's unrealizable desire to attain the Absolute, in this case, would be to desire a synthesis with the foundation of his freedom. If a divine plan existed, man condemned to be free, would still, in anxiety, have to choose his projects. And even if he were commanded by a mysterious voice to act in a certain way, like Abraham in Kierkegaard's example, the individual would still have to decide whether the voice were divine or demonic, and freely choose, in fear and trembling, whether to act or not in accordance with this voice.
Even to be divinely commanded, the individual, by the nihilating
close nature of consciousness, in conformity with Sartre's analysis of
freedom in facticity, would have to intend the command, appropriate it,
and choose it as his project, or reject it. Values, on such a view, even
if ultimately vindicated in another existence, would, in facticity, ac-
quire meaning for the individual only in relation to his projects. Since
he must act and choose in facticity, man, alone, is responsible for the
choices he makes. Without accepting the implicit atheism, or unjustly
taking Sartre's words out of context, one could reply, like Orestes in
Sartre's play, that once placed on earth, man alone is responsible for
his actions and beyond manipulation by cosmic forces. In _The Flies_,
Orestes says to Zeus in this respect: "But you blundered, you should not
have made me free. Neither slave, nor master, I am freedom. No sooner
had you created me, than I ceased to be yours."

The above paragraph is not intended as a substitute for Sartre's
atheism. It does attempt to suggest, however, that Sartre's philosophy
of freedom is not necessarily incompatible with theism of some kind, of
which we sketchily indicated one general possibility. And, we might add,
since Sartre affirms transphenomenal being, which does not appear, why
should God's affirmation be impossible? If there is a phenomenon of
being, perhaps others, like Otto, for example, have been conscious of a
phenomenon of God. And if transphenomenal being is the condition of all
revealing but itself not revealed, the view that there is an Eternal Love,
or Thought, or Wisdom, as the ground of all love, or knowledge, is no
less strange or apodeictically impossible. Far from proving God's existence,
such a claim simply points out that ontology in Sartre's sense and atheism are not necessary bedfellows. But any claim for theism, we hold, if based on an ontological analysis similar to Sartre's, would have to go beyond that analysis which is neutral, contrary to Sartre's claim, *vis à vis* God's existence. Theism, like atheism, is an original project within the context of Sartre's philosophy, we claim. Sartre's descriptive ontology presents a vivid and persuasive description of human freedom, but it tells us nothing, save Sartre's original project, about any entity or event on the "other-side" of the dialectic of man existing his facticity.

Perhaps it is inevitable that one's fundamental apprehension of the world rests upon a persuasive appeal to personal assent. In itself, such an appeal can be inspirational, especially when a person, like Sartre, transcends his original intuition and attempts to give us a systematic and descriptive account of man in the world. Whether one agrees, or not, with Sartre's original project of atheism, his philosophy of freedom does not, we maintain, and as the preceding chapters have indicated, stand or fall on the assertions of this project. Rather, freedom is described by an analysis of situations and events which man experiences in facticity; an analysis which involves the confrontation of consciousness with the massiveness of being. The original project is an attempt to transcend facticity. Such an attempt strives to take us beyond our experiences in the world while, at the same time, trying to give cosmic meaning and significance to those experiences. But such a project remains each man's choice, and the value he places on his freedom will be his decision and ultimate responsibility.
Iris Murdoch, in a passage from her book on Sartre, gives us a fitting epilogue to our account of Sartre's philosophy: "His philosophy is not just a piece of irresponsible romanticism; it is the expression of a last-ditch attachment to the value of the individual, expressed in philosophical terms. Sartre is performing the traditional task of the philosopher; he is reflecting systematically about the human condition. The role of philosophy might be said to be to extend and deepen the self-awareness of mankind. Such a definition will cover both analysis and metaphysics. What the psychoanalyst does for the particular consciousness of the individual the metaphysician does for the intellectual consciousness of the group he is addressing, and through them perhaps for the consciousness of an epoch. He presents a conceptual framework which is an aid to understanding. The answer to those who wish to eliminate metaphysics is the 'moral' answer: that it is proper for intellectual groups to make this particular sort of effort at self-comprehension. That the influence of such attempts, for good or evil, is not limited to the groups concerned is evident from the history of philosophy."
the mental and social sciences.

5. By "science" Husserl means the whole body of knowledge and not just


6. For example, "existentia" and "existentia" are used to describe the

same, although they are in different contexts. Husserl, E. EXISTENTIA AND PERSONALITY, PHILOSOPHICAL

"existentia" and "existentia" are used to describe the same, although they are in different contexts. The

We should mention at this point, that "existentia" term, "existentia," and "existentia" are used to describe the same, although they are in different contexts. ...}
6. To this "natural" standpoint, Husserl contrasts a "phenomenological"
   one.

7. Husserl, Edmund, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS, An Introduction to Phenomenology,

8. Thévenaz, Pierre, WHAT IS PHENOMENOLOGY?, edited with an Introduction
   by James H. Edie, translated by James H. Edie, Charles
   Courtney, Paul Brockelman, Herlin Press, London (1963),
   p. 42.

9. Husserl, Edmund, IDEAS, General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,
   translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
   London (1958), p. 44.

    17, 1943.

11. Objects of consciousness are not, if it has not already been made
    clear, objects in consciousness.


13. A pre-judicative or pre-reflective intuition is prior to a reflective
    intuition but isn't necessarily any more complete. On the meaning of
    "intuition" as used here, more will be said later.


15. Thévenaz, IBID., p. 45

16. Thévenaz, IBID., p. 46. The"transcendental" being defined as "the
    quality of that which is consciousness". (Husserl, "PHENOMENOLOGY","p.701).

17. Thévenaz, IBID., p. 47.


19. "Disconnexion," or "bracketing".


21. In his later development, Husserl goes beyond pure phenomenology by
saying that the thing cannot exist outside of consciousness. This is
metaphysical rather than a phenomenological claim. Pure phenomenology,
which we have been describing, need not be interested in the existence
of the thing beyond intentionality.

22. Thévenaz, op. cit.

23. For Husserl, a phenomenology of time, for example, would be concerned
with time as it appears to consciousness. The analysis restricts itself
to what is given — that is, to such "undeniable" phenomena as, for example,
a melody appearing to consciousness as a succession. The phenomenological
investigation does not presume the truth of the temporal judgements of
science. Phenomenology attempts to describe the essence of the time that
thus appears: this involves the discovery of what "constitutes" time,
that is, what an appearance must be to be temporal. This includes the
explication of laws which detail general properties that must belong to
every temporal experience. Husserl's phenomenology, in short, is con-
cerned with describing the essential structure of any type of appearance
to consciousness. This example is taken from: Passmore, John, A Hundred

24. See Sartre, Jean-Paul, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS, translated with an
introduction by Hazel E. Barnes, Philosophical Library, New York (1956),


26. However, we do not intend to make a comprehensive study of Sartre's
and Husserl's respective philosophies since this would take us too far afield.
27. Although Husserl's basic phenomenon was pure consciousness, it should be pointed out that in his later period he operated with the concept of a pre-given "life-world". Spiegelberg, in his book, The Phenomenological Movement, says that the notion of the Lebenswelt, or world of lived experience, is the most influential and suggestive idea to have emerged so far out of Husserl's unpublished manuscripts. It was, however, a conception that occupied Husserl during his entire last decade.

The Lebenswelt is a notion completely faithful to the original intention of phenomenology and Husserl regarded it, according to Spiegelberg, as one of the avenues to transcendental phenomenology, revealing, Husserl believed, a valuable study of intentionality in action. Husserl maintained, Spiegelberg says, that each life-world manifests certain structures or "styles" and these invite study by what Husserl calls an "ontology of the life-worlds". (Spiegelberg, p. 160) Spiegelberg says that as Husserl later saw it, a peculiar kind of first reduction, namely a suspension of science, was indispensable in order to get sight of the life-world and its structures. It would be required of this first reduction to lead back from the structures of the Lebenswelt to the hidden functions of intentionality. Discovering these functions would then permit one to trace the constitution of the characteristic features of the Lebenswelt and of other objectivities based on these features. (Spiegelberg, p. 160-1)

Spiegelberg says the first step in this direction would be a complete inspection, analysis and description of the life-world as we experience it prior to the transcendental reduction. Husserl contributed some first
directives for a phenomenological description of the life-world. "Thus, a life world is to be conceived", Spiegelberg says of Husserl, "as an oriented world with an experiencing self at its center, designated as such by personal pronouns. Around this pole the world is structured by such peculiar patterns as 'near' and 'far,' as 'home ground' ... and foreign ground ... Its spatial frame of reference is experienced as stationary, contrary to the scientific conception of the Copernican universe. To be sure, these descriptions were deliberately sketchy and programmatic. It remains to be seen whether the present enthusiasm for this conception will lead to more substantial achievements." (Spiegelberg, p. 162)

The brief reference to the Lebenswelt in Husserl's later philosophy indicates that Heidegger's starting point from the basic phenomenon "I am in a world," had been anticipated to some extent by Husserl. Although Heidegger has presented a more detailed description of Dasein than Husserl did of the Lebenswelt, the former concept is a legitimate extension of post Husserlian thought. Dasein serves as a kind of bridge extending from the 'intellectualist' phenomenology of Husserl to the 'rationalist' existentialism of Sartre.

On the Lebenswelt, see:


31. Spiegelberg, Ibid., p. 479.
32. Evidence is adequate, for the phenomenologist, when the intended object is grasped in its entirety. It is apodeictic evidence when the intended object is apprehended as being necessarily so and so.


35. In this respect, the importance and suggestiveness of Husserl's notion of the Lebenswelt can be seen.


37. This last statement is not intended to depreciate more analytical philosophies. It is simply to argue that a philosophy which includes more, for better or worse, in its inquiry will tend to be less rigorous than one which narrows its investigation, for better or worse, to a limited set of problems. Of course, exceptions to this statement are abundant.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER I

1. The word "thing" is being used here generically and does not imply "materiality".

2. It is arguable whether such determination is within the jurisdiction of a philosophical inquiry at all. This problem, which is basically one of the nature and scope of a philosophical inquiry, does not concern us here.

3. Sartre does, indeed, define being as "being-in-itself," or "being is what it is". But, and this will be returned to, this is only one region of being. Furthermore, such a definition is not stipulative but is only derived from the general description of consciousness and the being of its intended object.

4. The continuing dialectic between being, on the one hand, and consciousness, on the other, is anticipated here. Being is not known abstractly but only through our experience (and all that this implies) of being. On the other hand, such experiences are only made possible because being is the intended object of consciousness. The efficacy of this dialectic will be made more apparent as we proceed.

5. Both Descartes and Sartre emphasize the primacy of consciousness, but Sartre maintains the pre-reflective consciousness is more basic and precedes the reflective or Cartesian cogit.


10. Sartre, *op. cit.*

11. This point, namely, that phenomena do not contain a hidden potency, will be returned to in the next chapter.


It is the series of appearances wherein lies the distinction between veridical phenomena and illusory phenomena. The former phenomena appear in an infinite series as described above in the text. The series of appearances of illusory phenomena, such as after-images, hallucinations, etc. are finite and discrete. By reflection, that is the ability to think over, to consider, to analyze what one sees, one is usually able to discern between the two types of phenomena.


21. It is interesting to observe that Roquentin's encounter with the world in its stark bareness was preceded by a preparation similar to, although in the opposite direction, the mystic's preparation for vision. One should not make too much of this, except that in both cases "vision" does not come without considerable lucidity and preparation.


27. Cranston, Ibid., p. 43.


29. The exception is self-consciousness, or reflective consciousness of itself, which will be explained presently.


The word "spontaneity" is used by Sartre to connote the underived character of consciousness in all its forms and at every stage. That which is spontaneous is active through and through, it lacks all passivity, and is entirely transparent to itself as it contains no foreign elements. This,
for Sartre, characterizes consciousness. (See, Sartre, Imagination, translator's note #1, p. 147.)

"Inert" is used by Sartre to mean events, including phenomena, that are dependent upon external relations rather than on internal ones. The law of inertia is an example illustrating this, whereby the motion of an object remains unaltered until changed by some outside force. (See, Ibid., translator's note #2, p. 147.)


32. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. li.


35. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, translator's Introduction, p.x.


38. That is, it is a non-positional, and thus unreflected, consciousness of itself.


"Consciousness, in short, is self-relational, self-identical, self-coincidental, punctual, immediate consciousness (of) itself." (Thevenaz, What is Phenomenology?, editor's Introduction, p. 24.)

Sartre maintains that consciousness of consciousness in the first degree is not positional because "... it is one with the consciousness
of which it is consciousness." (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 1iv).
Thus at one stroke it determines itself as consciousness of perception for example, and as perception.


Sartre's view that the content of all consciousness is completely on the side of the object of consciousness, applies to the ego as well. The I never appears, for him, except on the occasion of a reflective act. In such a case the complex structure of consciousness is as follows:
"... there is an unreflected act of reflection, without an I, which is directed on a reflected consciousness." The "unreflected act of reflection," we might add in order to clarify, is the non-positional self-consciousness of the Cartesian cogito. Sartre continues: the reflected consciousness "... becomes the object of the reflecting consciousness without ceasing to affirm its own object (a chair, a mathematical truth, etc.). At the same time, a new object appears which is the occasion for an affirmation by reflective consciousness, and which is consequently not on the same level as the unreflected consciousness (because the latter consciousness is an absolute which has no need of reflective consciousness in order to exist), nor on the same level as the object of the reflected consciousness (chair, etc.). This transcendent object of the reflective act is the I." (Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, p. 53).

41. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 1111

42. Sartre, Ibid., p. lv.

44. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. lv.
45. Sartre, Ibid., p. xlvii.
46. Sartre, Ibid., p. lv.
48. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. lxii.
49. Sartre, Ibid., p. lxiii.
50. Sartre, Ibid., p. lxvi.

This, of course, does not characterize the being of consciousness which is radically different: it is being-for-itself.

51. Sartre, op. cit.
52. Sartre, op. cit.
53. Sartre, op. cit.

Sartre rejects any view that being is somehow created. Creation is an anthropomorphism: "In a word, even if it had been created, being-in-itself would be inexplicable in terms of creation; for it assumes its being beyond the creation." (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. lxiv).

55. "Intuition" is used here in the phenomenological sense described in the introduction.

56. Sartre, Ibid., p. xlix.
58. "Knowledge," for Prichard, involves certainty which does not admit degrees. "Belief" and "opinion" are not forms of knowledge but rather each
is, like knowledge, *sui generis.* Thus a statement of knowledge, for
Prichard, is a statement of certainty and cannot be false.

    Oxford (1909).


63. Prichard does not present an ontological argument. However, he does
advocate the existence of bodies from the idea of them: every judgement
of perception implies a material object even though material objects are
never perceived. Material objects seem to become a necessity of thought.


FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER II


2. Whenever we speak of consciousness, or being-for-itself, we always mean man as engaged in the world, and not as an abstract consciousness which brackets its world. In fact, the analysis of consciousness in the preceding chapter attempted to make this clear, although, at times, it might have seemed as if we were dealing with consciousness in abstracto.

It should be stated at this point that there is no dualism in Sartre's philosophy between the mind and the body. We do not intend to discuss this point in detail but simply state briefly Sartre's position. The analysis of being-for-itself, for Sartre, does not include one part such as mind and exclude another part such as the body. Rather, "being-for-itself" is a term designating the whole man which includes man in-situation.

The essential characteristic of the body, in Sartre's view, is to be "the-known-by-the-Other." (Desan, The Tragic Finale, p. 74. The word "Other" in this context refers to Other for-itself's.) The body points at the Other and at the fact that the individual for-itself is for-the-Other. But the body is also, Sartre contends, for-me, and it is not for-me as it is for-the-Other. We can look in the mirror and see our own bodies, but this is looking at it from the outside. By touching an object with the hand, I can indicate the nature of the object but this does not indicate the nature of my hand as such. "There is thus a difference between
the body as Being-for-itself and the body as Being-for-the-Other", Desan says. "As for the Being-for-itself, there is no distinction between consciousness and body: they are not united, they are one. Nothing is hidden behind the body; the body is consciousness." (Desan, Op. cit.)

The for-itself thus exists in itself, Sartre claims. Also, the for-itself exists in itself the body-for-the-Other. There is also a third ontological dimension of the body; namely, the for-itself knows itself as a body-known-by-the-Other.

Concerning the body as being-for-itself, Sartre maintains there is no distinction between mind and body. Further, the body as being-for-itself cannot be reduced to the ontological level of the body as being-for-Others, nor vice versa. Sartre says that "Being-for-itself must be wholly body and it must be wholly consciousness; it can not be united with a body. Similarly being-for-others is wholly body; there are no 'psychic phenomena' there to be united with the body. There is nothing behind the body. But the body is wholly 'psychic.' " (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 303).

We do not intend to discuss the preceding statements. It is sufficient for our purposes that Sartre's description of being-for-itself involves man-existing-his-world, and includes man as both "mind" and "body". Desan says: "... to be a For-itself in this world and to appear in this world and to be able to say that there is a world and to have senses are one and the same thing." (Desan, Ibid., p. 76)

For a more detailed exposition, see Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 303-59; and Desan, The Tragic Finale, p. 74-84.
4. The notion of appropriation, of which more will be said later, is anticipated here. This is the idea that the for-itself gives meaning and significance to the world, but not in an abstract way. Rather, the for-itself exists its significations.

If one's watch stops, for example, one questions and examines it. One does not expect a judgement from the watch, but rather a disclosure of being on which a subsequent judgement can be made. But to examine the watch in the hope of having being revealed, one must also expect to find a disclosure of non-being -- the possibility of there being nothing there, of something missing. Further, the watchmaker is able to pass beyond the present appearance of the watch to its original appearance which was that of a-watch-that-functions. In this way he is able to repair it. For this example, see Sartre, Ibid., p. 7.
9. The other patrons in the cafe will, of course, have their own expectations, experiences, etc. But in this example, we are talking as if I were the only being-for-itself present and everything else, including other patrons, are on the side of being-in-itself.
10. Sartre, Ibid., p. 10.
12. Though I nihilate the man such that he is no longer my intended
object, though he may remain for a time on the marginal fringe of my consciousness, I, needless to say, do not annihilate his being. The man’s being-for-itself, as well as the being-in-itself of the cafe, transcend my consciousness. He is nihilated in the sense that I negate him as a possible object of my consciousness since my present concern is not with him but in finding Pierre.

15. Sartre, Ibid., p. 11.
17. Sartre, Ibid., p. 23.

Destruction is another negation which points to the nihilating structure of consciousness. Without consciousness there is only being which, for Sartre, is neither created nor destroyed. A storm, for example, does not destroy being but only re-distributes it. Such re-distribution, however, only acquires significance if there is a witness; that is, a consciousness which is able to compare phenomena after the storm with phenomena before the storm. The being of the phenomena is unharmed.

To suggest that the phenomena have been modified is to posit other-ness, Sartre maintains. Thus for-itself is required to retain the past and compare it with the present state. Without a for-itself, there is simply being before and after. "If a cyclone can bring about the death of certain living beings," Sartre says, "this death will be destruction only if it is experienced as such. In order for destruction to exist,
there must be first a relation of man to being -- i.e., a transcendence; and within the limits of this relation, it is necessary that man apprehend one being as destructible. This supposes a limiting cutting into being by a being, which ... is already a process of hibilation. The being under consideration is that and outside of that nothing."

(Sartre, Ibid., p. 8)


27. Sartre, Ibid., p. 25.


29. Sartre, Ibid., p. 32.


Concerning Sartre's view that man is constantly projecting himself into the future, without determination from his own past, more will be said in the next chapter.

31. Sartre holds that fear and most other emotions are directed toward something concrete and transcendent. Anguish, however, is directed inward
toward one's own possibilities, and is the reflective consciousness of oneself.

32. Sartre, Ibid., p. 33.


(Original title: What Is Literature?)

37. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 83.


40. The ultimate goal of appropriation, Sartre holds, is a synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself. This would result in a being that is stable and had the firmness of being-itself, and, at the same time, possessed consciousness. Such a being would be both lucid and immutable. However, this desire for synthesis is unattainable. The for-itself, being a lack of being-in-itself, is deprived of this opacity and is unable to annihilate its own nothingness without annihilating consciousness altogether. The for-itself-in-itself synthesis is the condition of being God and is an impossible human condition, Sartre maintains. In this sense, then, such a desire is useless, but is nevertheless efficacious. Iris Murdoch, in her book on Sartre, puts it this way: "Consciousness is rupture, it is able to spring out of unreflective thing-like conditions -- but it is also project, it aspires toward a wholeness which forever haunts its partial state." (Murdoch, Iris, Sartre: Romantic Rationalist, Yale University Press (1959), p. 57.)
More will be said in chapter 4 on this ultimate desire of the for-itself.

41. Sartre, Ibid., p. 439.
42. Sartre, Ibid., p. 86.
43. Sartre, Ibid., p. 98.
44. Like Sartre, Heidegger holds that possibility arises in the world only with the emergence of man. Like being-for-itself, Dasein is possibility. For Heidegger, a stick, for example, simply is. Its only potentiality is in its use and this is assigned to it by Dasein. Dasein as possibility, however, exists rather than is, and it exists by anticipating its own possibilities. It exists in the future, as it were, insofar as it exists in advance of itself. Thus Dasein is not a determinate thing but is able to transcend itself into the future. Its existence, then, is a project: a projection of itself into authentic existence or a forfeiture to in-authentic existence. "Human being is not a thing which has additionally the gift of being able to do something, but it is primarily possibility," Heidegger maintains. (Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, p. 143; quoted in Greene, Marjorie, Martin Heidegger, Bowes & Bowes, London (1957), p. 23.)


Another example of possibility arising in the world because of consciousness as nihilation and lack, is fragility. The gunman, for example, points his gun at the target which is nihilated; that is, it is isolated and arises as a figure on the ground of the surrounding being. In addition, the being of the target is revealed as fragile by a more penetrating internal negation, namely, lack. "And what is fragility", Sartre asks,
if not a certain probability of non-being for a given being under
determined circumstances. A being is fragile if it carries in its being
a definite possibility of non-being." (Sartre, Ibid., p. 8) But it is
through the for-itself that fragility is imposed on this particular being.
"Thus the relation of individualizing limitation which man enters into
with one being on the original basis of his relation to being causes
fragility to enter into this being as the appearance of a permanent
possibility of non-being. But this is not all. In order for destruct-
ibility to exist, man must determine himself in the face of this possibility
of non-being, either positively or negatively; he must either take the
necessary measures to realize it (destruction proper) or, by a negation
of non-being, to maintain it always on the level of a simple possibility
(by preventive measures). Thus it is man who renders cities destructible,
precisely because he posits them as fragile and as precious and because
he adopts a system of protective measures with regard to them. It is
because of this ensemble of measures that an earthquake or a volcanic
eruption can destroy these cities or these human constructions. The
original meaning and aim of war are contained in the smallest building
of man. It is necessary then to recognize that destruction is an essent-
ially human thing and that it is man who destroys his cities through
the agency of earthquakes or directly, who destroys his ships through the
agency of cyclones or directly. But at the same time it is necessary to
acknowledge that destruction supposes a pre-judicative comprehension of
nothingness as such and a conduct in the face of nothingness. In addition
destruction although coming into being through men, is an objective fact
and not a thought. Fragility has been impressed upon the very being of
this vase, and its destruction would be an irreversible absolute event
which I could only verify." (Sartre, Ibid., p. 8-9)

In like manner values arise in the world as a result of the for-

itself appropriating the in-itself. Sartre says that "... my freedom

is the unique foundation of values and that nothing, absolutely nothing,

justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this or that

particular scale of values." (Sartre, Ibid., p. 38)

47. Sartre, Jean-Paul, Critique de la Raison Dialectique, volume 1,

Librairie Gallimard, Paris (1960), p. 129; quoted

in The Problem of Method, translated with an

Introduction by Hazel E. Barnes, Methuen & Co.

Ltd., London (1963), translator's Introduction,

p. xii.


50. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 40.


52. Wahl, Jean, "Freedom and Existence in Some Recent Philosophies," 

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 8, 1948, 

p. 547.
1. The careless smoker does act insofar as he decides to smoke a cigarette and acts toward this end. After the smoke he also acts by throwing the cigarette away. This last act, however, was not intended to start a forest fire; such a possibility probably never entered his head. On Sartre's view, though the smoker did not intend the forest fire, and, in this sense, the forest fire is not his act, he is nevertheless responsible for the fire. For Sartre, though we do not foresee all the possible consequences of our choices and acts, this does not absolve us from being responsible for them. Hence, another reason for man's anxiety in the face of his freedom in Sartre's philosophy. See Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 433.


Sartre differentiates between cause and motive. Motive refers to a subjective fact or "cause". Cause refers to an external fact or situation. Neither motive nor cause, for him, have a deterministic meaning. Cf., *Being and Nothingness*, p. 435, translator's footnote #2.


8. Sartre, _op. cit._


11. Sartre elucidates this notion of positing the present situation as unsatisfactory, by referring to a person suffering from economic oppression. In this particular instance, the suffering becomes, again through free choice, though not a lucid one, part of the person's being because he does not posit beyond his present situation. "He suffers without considering his suffering and without conferring value upon it. To suffer and to be are one and the same for him. His suffering is the pure affective tenor of his non-positional consciousness, but he does not contemplate it. Therefore this suffering can not be in itself a motive for his acts. Quite the contrary, it is after he has formed the project of changing the situation that it will appear intolerable to him. This means that he will have had to give himself room, to withdraw in relation to it, and will have to have effected a double nihilation: on the one hand, he must posit an ideal state of affairs as pure present nothingness; on the other hand, he must posit the actual situation as nothingness in relation to this state of affairs. He will have to conceive of a happiness attached to his class as pure possible -- that is, presently as a certain nothingness -- and on the other hand, he will return to the present situation in order to illuminate it in the light of this nothingness and in order to nihiliate it in turn by declaring: 'I am not happy.'" (Being and _Nothingness_, p. 435)
The for-itself’s project which is a not-yet, does not pre-determine present actions in Sartre’s philosophy. The for-itself, as the source of possibility, projects its end or ideal of action which, in turn, constitutes the meaning of the present for-itself as the project of its possibility. At any instant, however, the for-itself can annihilate this intended project as a possibility since this project is a transcendent object of consciousness and is a non-being. Nothingness separates the present for-itself from its intended project. The for-itself is never this future project as future project, but it is this project in the mode of not-being it, in the sense explained in preceding chapters. This does not mean that the project is
never fulfilled, but only that another project is posited to take its place in order to "fill up" another lack posited by the for-itself. Never being satisfied because it is a lack, the for-itself is always transcending itself toward that future self which it is not-yet. The for-itself, then, can never be anything but the possibility of its future since it is separated from that future by a nothingness and can, at any moment negate its project.

26. For this example, see Being and Nothingness, p. 30-2.
31. Sartre, Ibid., p. 31-2.
32. Sartre, Ibid., p. 32.
33. Sartre, Ibid., p. 449.
34. Sartre, Ibid., p. 450.
35. Desan, Ibid., p. 102.
36. The view that freedom does not mean the attainment of every desired project, will be taken up again in the second part of this chapter.
37. Desan, Ibid., p. 103.
38. This view of man's choice again illustrates the importance of Husserl's notion of the Lebenswelt.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER III

Part 2


42. Olson, Ibid., p. 125.


44. Olson, Ibid., p. 126.


In Critique de la Raison Dialectique, Sartre is interested in describing man in terms of work in relation to his economic, social and political situations. Such a description analyzes the "existential structure of need". (Sartre, The Problem of Method, translator's introduction, p.xv) Man's need, Sartre says, is related to the scarcity of being-in-itself. "There is simply not enough of the kinds of matter which need directs its demands." (Sartre, Op. cit.) In brief, Sartre is attempting, in the Critique, to provide a total view of man's position in-the-world. The only philosophy, he claims, that is capable of providing such a view is Marxism. Existentialism is a subordinate ideology, Sartre says, whose function is to work within, and influence the future development of, Marxism.
The problem of the Critique, would, of course, take us too far afield. It is sufficient to say that Sartre is not unaware of the kind of criticism presented by Olson and McGill. Whether he can give a satisfactory answer in the Critique can be obtained only by a study of that work and subsequent books which Sartre has said will follow this first volume. However, one must realize that the Critique not only follows the ontological description of man presented in Being and Nothingness chronologically, but also logically. The philosophy of freedom presented in Sartre's earlier work provides the foundation for his mere social and political philosophy as he develops it in the Critique. We are concerned in this thesis with Sartre's ontological description of the freedom of the for-itself and maintain, somewhat dogmatically, that an understanding of Sartre's later work is only intelligible, philosophically, in relation to his initial ontology.

The Problem of Method is a separate essay published together with the longer treatise, the Critique de la Raison Dialectique, which gives its title to the total work. Though The Problem of Method was written first, it logically belongs at the end of the Critique, since the latter supplies the critical foundations for the method Sartre presents.

49. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 482.
50. Sartre, Ibid., p. 483.
53. Olson, Ibid., p. 181.
54. In our brief reference to Heidegger in the introduction, a view which has influenced Sartre was mentioned concerning man's being-in-the-world. Though not accepting Sartre's view of absolute freedom, Heidegger does hold that man is free because he is incomplete and has the possibility of projecting beyond himself. When Dasein realizes this freedom, Heidegger maintains, the determined, conditioned entities of nature become alien and strange to him since they are neither free nor seem to have any purpose of their own. The ordered realm of human society and culture may also seem strange and alien because, under examination, they often fail to give an adequate vindication of their purposes.

Dasein is alone with its freedom, abandoned to it and to a world that is alien and remote. Within the tensions of the factitious, freedom lives and it is this awful human freedom which radically separates man from the rest of the world. Only Dasein, Heidegger holds, has the possibility of self-transcendence. Dasein is not just something different, something more complex. Rather, Dasein is something different existing in a different way -- it is possibility.

56. Desan, Ibid., p. 170.
58. Olson, Ibid., p. 179-80.


65. Sartre reserves a separate and lengthy part (Part Three) be *Being and Nothingness* to an analysis of the relationship between the being-for-itself and Other-for-itself's. This relationship he terms, being-for-Others. For our purposes, we do not propose to deal with this aspect of Sartre's philosophy apart from the Other's freedom as affecting a particular for-itself's freedom. However, we need to point out, in order to show the importance of the Other's freedom on the particular for-itself, that the Other, as an object of consciousness, is immediately apprehended, and not inferred, by the intending for-itself as another subject or being-for-itself, and, thus, is radically different from the other objects of consciousness which belong to being-in-itself.

Briefly, Sartre says that we know the Other as a subject immediately by his looking at us. One example Sartre uses to illustrate this is looking through a keyhole. On being discovered by someone, I am ashamed. I am conscious of being looked at by the Other and that I am an object of the Other's intentionality. Shame is possible only through the Other, Sartre holds, and it is the apprehension of myself as an object for the Other. At the same time, this apprehension involves my apprehending the Other as an existing subject, a being-for-itself, independent of my consciousness.

When speaking of the Other as a for-itself, we shall capitalize the word in order to distinguish it from the other as a phenomenon or thing.

The Other, as an object of the for-itself's consciousness, is, of course, transcendent. When the Other is apprehended as the Other-as-object, this transcendence is again transcended. In this latter case, the Other's choices and ends are transcended by the for-itself and apprehended as techniques or objects rather than free choices and ends of a projecting for-itself. Hence, the Other as a transcendence-transcended.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER IV

1. The technique of Sartre's psychoanalysis involves tracing down the fundamental project by analysing the hundreds of little actions that occur every day.


Of course, though the idea of God may be widely held, His existence is not thereby established.

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20. We may simply mention that Otto presents reasons for belief in God, in addition to the non-rational intuition of Him. In other words, both Otto and Sartre attempt to corroborate their intuitions by rational methods.


22. Kierkegaard, who cannot be said to be antagonistic to the kind of philosophy presented by existentialism in general, and Sartre in particular, holds that man is free but achieves authentic existence in relation to God. Man, for Kierkegaard, is not determined by an "essence," but, in anguish before his lonely self, chooses the course he will follow, and is completely responsible for this decision. To choose authentic existence, which in Kierkegaard's view is a Christian existence, requires a leap by the believer beyond established ethical and social standards "into the arms of God." We have tried to argue that Sartre also makes a leap, but towards atheism. Our point here, however, is that Kierkegaard's philosophy, not unlike Sartre's in many respects, does not find freedom and God's existence incompatible concepts.


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