THE PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE

IN BEING AND TIME
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SCOPE AND CONTENTS: The thesis shows how "language" is relevant to Heidegger's overall ontological project in Being and Time through an investigation of "significance" as it is founded in everyday things which are ready-to-hand, and "Being in the truth", as it is shown in the Existentiales: "mood", "discourse", and "understanding". It considers what Heidegger thinks is implied by an Husserlian approach to language, if his own views on the reductions are adopted. The view is that, even more basically than being communication, the essence of language is articulation. Truth is taken to be disclosed-ness. Heidegger's temporal account of language based upon the structures of lived experience is also shown to be a fully temporal (and non-technological) approach to Being problematics.
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For all of this I am deeply grateful.
Dedicated to

the memory of Wm. Newell,

and the wisdom of my grandfather:

deep roots - green leaves.
# THE PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE IN BEING AND TIME

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The scope of this thesis was originally conceived to be considerably broader than it has finally become. It is to be hoped that this focusing on a smaller area has resulted in the shedding of light on the many interrelated aspects of Heidegger's conception of language in *Being and Time* and that it thereby justifies the extensive exposition of this thesis. If there is any clarity in this, I must thank the wisdom of my advisors for insisting upon it at the expense of losing sight of pretentious ambitions.

Since language is always about something, however, a discussion of language can never be relevant unless it deals, at least provisionally, with ontology. With that in mind, I must apologize for the stress which the ontological problems are given, and the sketchiness with which they must, in this thesis, be inevitably treated.

In this thesis, I hope to show how Heidegger's theory of language as an articulation of Being develops from an interpretation of Husserl's theory of signs in terms of our concernful dealings in the world. The explicitation of this development forms a specific part in the broader context of Heidegger's developing ontology and may at times seem to be at cross-purposes with it. Nevertheless, when the issues involved become clear, they are as interesting as they are challenging.
Husserl tells us that the subject-predicate form is the underlying a priori structure of thought, language, and logic. The full explication of this is given by someone saying something (P) about something (S) to someone. As I read the explication of signs by the doctrine of duality of reference in Being and Time, Heidegger is concerned to show that there is a fundamental truth in Husserl's schema only in so much as man is a being in the world confronted with and engaged in certain equipmental totalities. It is the whole structure of these totalities ready-to-hand which forms the basis of language and of words as they are actually used. Heidegger indicates that what is significant, and hence the linguistic, operates because there are two interacting levels of reference -- the meaning and the meant. Meanings are announced by the referential totalities of language. The totality of equipment which is meant has as its target the meaning of a situation ready to hand. The sign serves to indicate something about this meaning. Signs are established by everyday use; they are ready-to-hand and not just bare marks. Hence the involvement of Being in the world influences not only what is meant, but how it is meant in terms of these bi-polar moments of reference. Thus in Heidegger one does not find a priority of the nominalized form of language over the predicate, nor does one find things abstracted from their properties.
This can in fact be done, but it is not a most basic \textit{a priori} structure of thought and language.

What I have attempted to show is that Heidegger thinks that if language has a basis at all it is in our everyday form of Being in the world. He maintains that this is a concernful interaction with entities ready-to-hand. This interaction with the aid of signs is a fundamental kind of articulation. As such it has a basically poetic origin, for it brings things forth and lets them stand as if for the first time. This is why I indicate the importance of Heidegger's views on the reductions as opposed to Husserl's and why I think that the concept of "announcing" is relevant. I have indicated that Heidegger implicitly uses a reduction to absence rather than a transcendental reduction in an attempt to deal with the projections and interpretations of the lived experience of Dasein. Such a method can deal with the essential structures of experience without deifying them. It is also important to keep in mind that instead of appealing to a transcendental set of categories Heidegger refers to a discoverable set of \textit{existentiales} which, if \textit{a priori}, have more to do with what we are than with what we think. The task of discovering the \textit{a priori}'s of thought and language in the abstract or in empirical linguistics depends upon premisses incompatible with Heidegger's thesis. If there is anything \textit{a priori} about
the subject-predicate form it is, as Wittgenstein said, "right there in the world", as it is the articulating by men in language. The priority of the world and the concerns of Dasein, as they are found, can be the only a priori of language.

This brings us to what for some is the weakest point of the theory of language as articulation; and that is the theory of truth as disclosedness. At this point one is struck by a dilemma. One would like to say what really is, only he would like to do so with evidence. If this problem were no longer with us then we could stop doing philosophy. I happen to think that either something like Plato's realm of the Forms or Heidegger's Being-in-the-world as the Openness of Being provide the only clear ways of dealing with this problem. Either there is an Absolute standard of Truth which is somehow reflected in the world, or truth is a matter of 'what' comes into the openness of the world. The third view that says that the truth is purely subjective is, so far as I can see, only a very bad joke. As I try to indicate, Heidegger's approach to truth and reality is anything but subjective. But it does depend upon Dasein, without whom there would be no openness within which things are articulated as such.

I do not claim to have said the last word on these matters, either for Heidegger or for anyone else.
But I do think that it is important to get some views out in the open.
THE EVERYDAY BASIS OF LANGUAGE

1. Introduction to the Problem

That the speaking of Being can become the destiny of truth is the first law of thought and not the rules of logic, which can become rules only through the law of Being. To attend to the destiny of the thinking-speaking does not only include our recollecting each time what is to be said about Being and how it is to be said. It remains equally essential to consider whether that which has-to-be-thought may be said, to what extent, at what moment in the history of Being, in what dialogue with it, and with what claim. ¹

* * *

Voyant se cristalliser de plus en plus les théories nazies, j'abandonnai la Logique dans le semestre qui suivit ma démission et je me mis à traiter, sous le titre "Etude du Logos", de l'essence du langage, essayant de montrer que la langue n'est pas le produit de la pensée humaine sous son aspect biologique et racial, mais au contraire que l'essence de l'homme est fondée dans le langage considéré comme réalité fondamentale de l'esprit.

* * *

But the time may finally have come to release language from the leash of common speech and allow it to remain attuned to the keynote of the lofty statement it makes - without, however, rating customary


speech as a decline, or as low. It will then no longer suffice to speak of a lofty statement, for this, too, is, at least in name, still rated by low standards.

* * *

Man is a sign that is not read.

* * *

These statements by Heidegger are especially timely, for in a subtle way they speak directly to the situation of contemporary philosophy, and that of the present world.

Moreover, they are laden with a challenge, or rather an invocation, to philosophers to think-speak about Being and the destiny of man. Needless to say, we cannot follow such a development within the limits of this thesis. What we propose to do is to follow what Heidegger says in Being and Time which is of central importance to his conception of language and how it is related to certain ontological requirements.

Heidegger begins Being and Time by bringing to our attention the question of Being which if not forgotten is regarded, in our time, as trivial. By treating the views that Being is universal, indefinable, and self-evident he indicates that the question of philosophy which would seem to be the most important still lacks direction. It is my purpose in this thesis to follow-up those aspects of the formulation of this question which have to do with the


\[2\] Ibid.
phenomenon of language and to place them in the context of Heidegger's over-all ontological project.

Heidegger's recognition of the fact that the question of being has not yet been adequately formulated results in an investigation which is programmatic in character. He tells us that "Every inquiry is a seeking (Suchen). Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought."\(^1\) Furthermore, he endeavours to make the enquiry explicit in terms of what is asked about, that which is interrogated, and that which is found out by the asking.\(^2\) Being is asked about, by interrogating entities in order to ascertain the meaning of Being.\(^3\)

Heidegger agrees\(^4\) that everything is Being\(^5\), but he also asserts that the meaning of our Being and furthermore the way of access to it is as yet obscure.\(^6\) Therefore, in order to render the question of Being more meaningful, he proposes to "first give a proper explicitation of an entity


\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Ibid., pp. 25-26.

\(^4\) The prevailing view of ontology put forward, for example by Quine, is not simply denied by Heidegger. Rather, in accepting that everything is, Heidegger also accepts that it is meaningful to ask for the meaning of the Being of entities (the values of bound variables).

\(^5\) B.T., p. 26; 29 "Being is always the Being of an entity."

\(^6\) Ibid., p. 26.
(Dasein), with regard to its Being. Here we encounter the famous problem of gnoseo-ontological circularity.

In order to formulate the question of Being, Heidegger proposes to show us what the Being of one entity (Dasein) is. Furthermore, he claims that there is no problem with this, for we can have provisional knowledge of our Being without having explicit understanding of the meaning of Being. The task is one of demonstration in terms of what we know, and is not one of proof from axioms. It could therefore never be circular. The task of demonstration, however, is not one of collecting data, but of dealing with the foundations of these data in terms of basic concepts. Heidegger, therefore, sees that his problem will involve the calling into question of previous ontologies.

Heidegger proposes an analytic of Dasein before all else for two distinct preliminary reasons: (1) "Understanding of Being is itself a definitive characteristic of Dasein's Being"; (2) since all ontology is understood by, and in terms of, Dasein, an understanding of the things that are has an analytic of Dasein as an absolutely necessary pre-requisite. To this analysis Heidegger gives the title fundamental ontology. The entity itself (Dasein) is shown to have three priorities over other entities:

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1 Ibid., p. 27.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid., p. 28, 31.  
4 Ibid., p. 29.  
5 Ibid., p. 30.  
6 Ibid., p. 31.  
7 Ibid., p. 32.  
8 Ibid., p. 33.  
9 Ibid., p. 34.
(1) existence is determinative for its Being; (2) this self-determining existence is therefore ontological;
(3) this entity understands contemporaneously with its own existence the Being of all entities and is therefore the necessary pre-condition of all ontology.¹

The difficulty of Heidegger's task is shown by the fact that he claims that an analytic of Dasein is a prerequisite for ontology and that while in an ontic sense Dasein is closest to us in an ontological sense it is the farthest removed.² That is to say, that whereas we are in most immediate contact with this existing entity, that is, we know it more directly and completely than any other, we do not understand the meaning of its (our own) Being in a manner approaching the completeness with which we understand other beings. Hence, if it is necessary to overcome this problem before any ontology is possible, one can expect the road to be difficult indeed.

With this realization, Heidegger is not completely out at sea, however. For Dasein offers a clue to its own interpretation in terms of the way it comports itself towards other entities in the world in a way which is relatively constant.³ This does not mean that Heidegger will proceed according to "dogmatic constructions". Rather, he proposes to "let the entity show itself in and from itself" as it is "proximally and for the most part - in its average everydayness".⁴ This treatment of our average

¹Ibid., p. 34. ²Ibid., p. 36. ³Ibid., pp. 36-37. ⁴Ibid., pp. 37-38.
everydayness brings to light our concernful dealings in the world and the over-all notion of Care. Heidegger later concludes that "The Being of Dasein is Care" and he shows why he thinks that temporality is the meaning of the Being of that entity which we call "Dasein". The completion of this task comprises the first half of his "twofold task in working out the question of Being."

The second half of the task is that of destroying the history of ontology. This is in a very fundamental way necessitated by the first part of the task. For in order to give a temporal interpretation of Dasein, a proper analysis of temporality is required.

Since Heidegger thinks that in the history of ontology even the greatest of thinkers have not properly understood the phenomenon of time he proposes to rethink that tradition in terms of a more basic approach to temporality. This destruction is not merely a negation or a denial of our ontological tradition. Rather, it takes the basic form of a phenomenological reduction which attempts to preserve what is most fundamental in this tradition. It is therefore a destruction which is positive in intention.

The reasons which Heidegger gives for rejecting the

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1 Ibid., p. 95.  
2 Ibid., pp. 83-84.  
3 Ibid., pp. 225-273.  
4 Ibid., p. 38.  
5 Promised in the Introduction (II), of Being and Time.  
6 For example, B.T., pp. 48-49.  
7 Ibid., p. 47.  
8 Ibid., p. 44.
history of ontology are very complex. In a very general sense, he suspects Dasein's tendency to fall back on the tradition. Furthermore, he claims that "Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial 'sources' from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn ...".

Hence, what is legitimate in the past, in his judgment, is fundamentally obscured. Moreover, the ontology which has developed is taken to be self-evident, regardless of how much obvious development which it has undergone all in the name of Greek philosophy. Furthermore, Heidegger asserts that the philosopher who had come closest to understanding Temporality (Kant) could not do so because he had neglected the problem of Being and did not sufficiently analyze the Dasein (but was content to adopt the Cartesian position); and because he followed tradition he could not see the double relationship between time and the I think. Nevertheless, Heidegger thinks that all modern contributions to the history of ontology are primarily distortions of the Greek concept of Being as ςύνος (presence).

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1 I bid., p. 43.
2 I bid., also pp. 74-75.
3 I bid., p. 45.
4 I bid., p. 46 ff. This becomes increasingly significant as we consider the concept of language through the Greek notion of the λόγος. For Heidegger tells us that "When considered philosophically, the λόγος itself is an entity, and according to the orientation of ancient ontology, it is something present-at-hand." I bid., p. 201.
Heidegger therefore infers that the Being of entities has throughout our ontological tradition been regarded in terms of presence and that even the Greeks missed the clues upon which they had already stumbled. ¹ Those clues presumably are: the temporality of Being and the Being of temporality; man's essential Being which involves the potentiality for discourse; Parmenides interpretation of Being as making something present; the grounding of the analysis in Dasein. ²

The problem which concerns this thesis directly involves the second clue: what Heidegger takes to be the central importance of discourse and language in general for his over-all ontological project. We have divided this into two parts - the problem of developing an adequate ontological language, and the problem of the general conception of discourse and language in Heidegger's attempt to let what is show itself as it is. These problems themselves have two distinct stages; (1) the analysis of signs in terms of readiness-to-hand; (2) the founding of language in significance.

For the "inelegance" of Heidegger's new terms we have his apology, but also we find a stiff defense of their necessity. He says "that it is one thing to give a report in which we tell about entities, but another to grasp entities in their Being. For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 'grammar'." ³

Heidegger's concern for language even in *Being and Time* cannot therefore be regarded as inessential. Rather, as will be shown, he makes a radical claim for the importance of language in the realm of Being itself, a claim which only later gets expressed as the house of Being, but is explicitly developed in his early treatment of Being-in-the-world. The importance of language as articulation would seem, therefore, to preclude any constructivist approach to the problem of ontology. For this reason, the methodology or the way of addressing oneself to the problem of Being must be discussed. This way of speaking is, of course, Heidegger's preliminary conception of phenomenology, to which we must now address ourselves.

2. The Phenomenological Method

Heidegger repeatedly stresses that ontology is only possible through phenomenology. For example, he says:

> Phenomenology is our way of access to what is the theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible.

With regard to its subject matter, phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities - ontology.

Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others. These terms

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1. See, for example, *What is Called Thinking?* and *Letter on Humanism*.
2. *B.T.*, Part I, Division I, Chapter V.
characterize philosophy itself with regard to its object and its way of treating that object. Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast the guiding line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns.

Hence, in order to put Heidegger's over-all ontological project into focus, it is necessary to investigate his own conception of phenomenology.

On the face of things "phenomenology" consists of the "phenomenon" and the "logos". Heidegger's particular interpretation of how these two terms relate to each other, however, goes far beyond the notion of statements about experience. Furthermore, in a preliminary way it indicates the central position of language in Heidegger's over-all ontological project.

Heidegger explains the concept of a phenomenon by referring to the Greek verb $\phi\alpha\iota\nu\varepsilon\sigma\rho\iota\iota\iota$ meaning "to show itself". By phenomena, he means "the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to light - what the Greeks identified simply with $\tau\alpha\dot{\nu}\tau\alpha$ (entities)." He distinguishes phenomena from semblances - entities which show themselves to be something which they are not. Moreover, he claims that both phenomena and semblances are distinct from appearances and mere appearances.

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1 Ibid., p. 62.  
2 Ibid., pp. 49-63.  
3 Ibid., p. 51.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid.
What appears can never seem.\(^1\) For Heidegger, appearance is a not-showing-itself. He gives as an example the symptoms of a disease.\(^2\) One might say, therefore, that measles appear through being announced by little red puffy spots and a feverish condition.

Appearances can never seem, because what announces itself through something that shows itself does not give itself to be what it is not, but rather appropriates what it is not in order to announce itself.

Heidegger uses "appearance" and "phenomena" in technical ways in an attempt to avoid the inevitable confusion between what shows itself as it is, and what shows itself and thereby announces what is, and what announces itself through something that shows itself.\(^3\) Since it is possible in common speech to describe all three situations as "appearances" this technical language is warranted. Furthermore, Heidegger identifies a fourth possible use of the word appearance which he claims was also used by Kant. He calls it mere appearance.\(^4\) The mere appearance of something occurs when that which does the announcing is "taken as that which emerges in what is itself non-manifest and which emanates (ausstrahlt) from it in such a way indeed that the non-manifest gets thought of as something that is essentially never manifest."\(^5\)

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1\(^{\text{Ibid.}}, \text{p. 52.}\)  
2\(^{\text{Ibid.}}\)  
3\(^{\text{Ibid.}}, \text{p. 53.}\) The importance of this distinction for an adequate treatment of signs will become obvious later.  
4\(^{\text{Ibid.}}\)  
5\(^{\text{Ibid.}}\)
In addition to clarifying the various misleading ways of approaching appearances Heidegger's over-all purpose for outlining the character of various forms of appearance is to show that:

The bewildering multiplicity of 'phenomena' designated by the words 'phenomenon', 'semblance', 'appearance', 'mere appearance', cannot be disentangled unless the concept of the phenomenon is understood from the beginning as that which shows itself in itself.¹

The primordiality of phenomena, does not, however, eliminate the need for men to adjudicate between those things which are given in order to ascertain their character as phenomena or otherwise. By treating the concept of phenomena in this way, Heidegger has thus indicated (at least implicitly) the need for some kind of phenomenological reduction. Furthermore, he has made the crucial step towards justifying his conceptions of truth as disclosedness, and language as articulation. For unless that are things which show themselves as they are, there can be no disclosedness; and discourse would lead to confusion. This initial step, however necessary, is still far short of providing an adequate account of reality and how it may be dealt with.

The second step towards clarifying reality, for Heidegger, involves the concept of the logos. He acknowledges the large variety of different interpretations of this Greek word, but claims that the notions of logos as "reason", "judgment", "concept", "definition", "ground" or "relationship"

¹Ibid., p. 54.
are derivative from a more fundamental meaning - discourse as making manifest.\(^1\) He claims that "the λόγος lets something be seen (φαίνει)\(^2\), namely, what the discourse is about; and it does so either for the one who is doing the talking (the medium) or for persons who are talking with one another, as the case may be."\(^3\) Someone talks and thereby shows what the talking is about to someone.\(^3\) Speech is the concrete form of discourse. But Heidegger wishes to show that discourse, as making manifest, has a more basic function than is exhibited by its concrete expression, as speech.\(^4\)

Heidegger claims that discourse has the form of synthesis only because its function is to let something be seen by pointing it out.\(^5\) Furthermore, he claims that because

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 55 ff. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 56.

\(^3\)This is essentially the Husserlian position on language. Although the question of Heidegger's dependence on Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen is far beyond the scope of this thesis, it must be noted that Heidegger's treatment of discourse (Rede) explicitly follows the Husserlian view of the essence of language with the important differences necessitated by the rejection of the transcendental reduction. It will be seen that Heidegger gives greater stress to articulation and interpretation. Nevertheless, on the important question of the sign-like character of language, he follows Husserl explicitly. See footnote ii to Division I, Chapter III.

\(^4\)B.T., p. 56. This becomes much clearer when discourse is discussed as a basic way in which Dasein is in the world - B.T., Part I, Division I, Chapter V, particularly p. 203 ff.

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 56.
discourse is a letting something be seen it can be either true or false, so long as this is not seen to be agreement, but rather unhiddenness. Hence, he refutes the thesis that the truth of the logos pertains to a theory of judgment. He also claims that it is misleading to quote Aristotle to support this thesis since for the Greeks the sheer sensory perception of something (ἀίσθησις) is true in a more primordial way than is the λόγος.

If the truth has the character of uncovering, one would expect that covering over would characterize falsity. Heidegger has indicated that the logos can have a synthetic character when it refers back to something by showing it, in its togetherness, as something else. He has thereby indicated why discourse must become the object of our thought:

When something no longer takes the form of just letting something be seen, but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so that it lets something be seen as something, it thus acquires a synthesis - structure, and with this takes over the possibility of covering up.

Heidegger claims, moreover, that the interpretation of "logos" as "reason" involves a missing of the fundamental

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1 Ibid., p. 56.
2 Ibid., p. 57. He also implies at this point that he is prepared to follow the Greek view of the truth in opposition to the modern notion of correspondence. Heidegger takes up the question of truth in greater detail at p. 256 ff.
3 Ibid., p. 56.
4 Ibid., p. 57.
function of the *logos* - to let something be seen. The *logos* as *ratio* becomes a relationship between what is seen and what lets it be seen. But if there could be such a relationship, the purpose of the *logos* is already being aborted, for what is, is being covered over, and is not being shown as it is.¹

Heidegger's problem, then, is to articulate a way in which this situation can be avoided. First of all, he must develop a method for letting what is, show itself as it is. He must refuse to accept any bases in reason which are not directly demonstrated in perception. But in order to speak this he must find the vocabulary which points to it most directly. He must not only elucidate the Being of language in order to understand that being which uses language to address itself to its very Being, but also, he must discover what language items would best show this Being as it is. The problem of language in this thesis, therefore, is also twofold: to show Heidegger's problem of developing an adequate ontological vocabulary and to show his treatment of language in its ontologically revealing character as discourse.

Heidegger's preliminary treatment of the "phenomenon" and the "logos" has already been discussed. One encounters in this treatment a number of distinct theses: (1) that "phenomenon" means that which shows itself; (2) that there are such things which can be clearly distinguished from those which give themselves to be something they are not; (3) that

¹*Tbid.*, pp. 57-58.
some things can announce others; (4) that some things can announce others which are taken to be incapable of existing; (5) that the logos lets what it is about be seen for someone; (6) that concrete discourse is speech; (7) that logos can have the form of syntheses because it lets something be seen together with something else; (8) that logos can be true or false because it is a letting-something-be-seen; (9) that truth is unhiddenness; (10) that the Greeks took pure sensory perception to be more basically true than discourse; (11) that the referential character of the logos can be responsible for covering up what is (falsity); (12) that judgments are true only when they do not cover up in this manner.

Conclusive arguments in support of these theses do not in most cases seem to be possible and an indirect approach may often be required. For example, Heidegger's position about the "phenomena" and "discourse" can be questioned, but only at the expense of committing oneself to an illusory and meaningless world. That some things show themselves as they are, and, that discourse can show what it is about for someone, are presuppositions which seem to be justified by the activity itself of speaking meaningfully.

The meaning of "phenomenology" is shown by Heidegger to exhibit the characteristics of its component parts. Phenomenology is a method of describing what is, through demonstrating how it is experienced. Hence, it is a method for disclosing what is as it is, that is, arriving at the truth. The struggle against un-truth, or falsity, can occur

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1Ibid., p. 59.
when phenomena are merely undiscovered or when they are buried over. This can happen either completely or only partially. It can also happen accidentally or with necessity.¹

Within the domain of knowledge itself, there lurks the possibility for necessary untruth. For, as Heidegger tells us, "Whenever a phenomenological concept is drawn from primordial sources, there is a possibility that it may degenerate if communicated in the form of an assertion."² This inherent dilemma of language accounts for the increasing importance which Heidegger gives to its study. In some cases, discourse is necessary to let something be seen, and at the same time it provides the possibility for obscuring it.

Heidegger freely acknowledges that his understanding of phenomenology is a development of Husserl's philosophy, but at the same time he hints that he is investigating the possibilities opened up by the new method rather than merely reiterating its existing doctrines.³ Husserl had claimed that objectivity is not primary, but is derivative from our phenomenal experience. He said that

`Phenomenologically speaking, Objectivity is not even constituted through "primary" content but through characters of apprehension and the regularities which pertain to the essence of these characters. It is precisely the business of the`

¹Ibid., p. 60.
²Ibid., pp. 60-61.
³Ibid., pp. 62-63. "Possibility stands higher than actuality."
phenomenology of cognition to grasp this fully and to make it completely intelligible.

What most clearly distinguishes phenomenology from other philosophical approaches is the phenomenological reductions and the notion of constitution to which Husserl is making an indirect reference in the above passage. The transcendental reduction and the eidetic reduction are the most prominent of these reductions. Phenomenology begins by recognizing the fact that subjects and objects cannot in actuality be separated from each other. It then makes an attempt to approximate this separation by a method of reductions in an attempt to show "the things themselves." 2

Phenomenology in general does not deny the reality of the world or of entities within the world but claims that we can only know what is real and its meaning after we have gone through a process of suspending the natural attitude and bracketing out its inessential aspects. Husserl, at least in his early period, claimed that it was possible to complete this process of bracketing until nothing but the essential structure remained. Hence, we find such statements as "Let us reduce until we reach the stream of pure consciousness." 3 Heidegger, by contrast, does not


2 See B.T., p. 86, for example. For a more comprehensive account of the paradoxes of phenomenology, see the introduction to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception; and for a more comprehensive treatment of the phenomenological reductions see Husserl's Ideas, and Kockelmanns' Phenomenology, pp. 24-36, 58-117.

accept the premiss that the phenomenological reduction is completable. ¹ Heidegger rejects the transcendental reduction, presumably because it tends towards idealism ² or positivism."³ The analytic of Dasein is, to be sure, an analysis of transcendence, but it does not aim at a pure ego. Heidegger does, however, make use of the eidetic reduction through which we discover the thematic character of situations and obtain ideas, ⁴ where before there were merely facts. What we encounter in our "circumspection" is regarded according to its possibilities. A free variation of the possibilities allows what is "to show itself as it is". This is what phenomenology means for Heidegger.⁵

¹ Heidegger rejects the notion of a pure transcendental ego entirely. Not only does he claim that Dasein always has a mood, but he claims that it is one of the essential ways in which what is is disclosed. Cf. B.T., p. 172 ff.

² The very difficult question of Husserlian idealism cannot be broached here. Nor can that of the differences between Heidegger and Husserl. For further treatment, see Kockelmans op. cit., p. 31 ff. and 226-36.


⁴ B.T., p. 57. "Just as seeing aims at colours, any ἀφθονία aims at its ἁπλα..."

⁵ B.T., p. 58. See also p. 96, where Heidegger says: "The achieving of phenomenological access to the entities which we encounter, consists rather in thrusting aside our interpretative tendencies..." Hence it is of utmost importance to distinguish between the way things "are proximally and for the most part" and the way in which one can grasp them phenomenologically.
In addition to the eidetic reduction Heidegger introduces a new kind of reduction to the phenomenological method. This might be called the reduction to absence. It is made possible by Heidegger's distinction between the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand, and reinforces his over-all ontological project. Heidegger claims that the readiness-to-hand of something may be understood clearly when it is suddenly found to be missing. This theme is repeated again and again in Being and Time in such concepts as inauthenticity, resoluteness, the call of conscience, and the projecting of the understanding. Yet it must not be forgotten that it is made possible by the concept of readiness-to-hand and the more general notion of a referential totality of equipment. Heidegger specifically tells us that:

The context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality constantly slighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however, the world announces itself. Similarly, when something ready-to-hand is found missing, though its everyday presence Zugegensein has been so obvious that we have never taken any notice of it, this makes a break in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers. Our circumspection comes up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time what the missing article was ready-to-hand with, and what it was ready-to-hand for. The environment announces itself afresh.

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1 B.T., p. 105. See also p. 75, 85. For a deeper treatment of this particular reduction see Heidegger's brilliant essay called "What is Metaphysics" in Brock's Existence and Being. See also Heidegger's introduction to this essay entitled "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics" in Kaufman's Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre for further elucidation of its existential and ontological implications.
The further implications of Heidegger's methodology will become obvious in how he uses the eidetic reduction and the reduction to absence. But more important, Heidegger indicates that these formal methods would be totally absurd if they were not based in the experience of a particular Dasein. Underlying this methodology, then, there is the assumption that something can show itself to someone as it is. And that it can do so directly when its possibilities or non-existence is entertained. Moreover, Heidegger insists that what is can only be approached from the perspective of its everyday existence.

3. The Concept of "Readiness-to-Hand"

Of central concern to us, therefore, is Heidegger's claim first of all that things are ready-to-hand; and secondly that, in circumspection, we can determine what a thing was ready-to-hand with and for. The over-all significance of entities within the world with others for something or other cannot be adequately dealt with at this time. It is possible, however, to outline Heidegger's intentions on this matter which underlie the problem of language.

When Heidegger analyzes Dasein he finds that each Dasein is characterized by "mineness" and by the fact that Being is that which is an issue for every such entity which can comport itself towards its own Being. In order to deal with the peculiar existence of Dasein Heidegger thinks

\[1^{\text{Ibid.}}, \text{p. 67.}\]
that it is important to differentiate it from the traditional notion of existentia. Depending upon his previous analysis of "ousia" as "presence" Heidegger decides to render existentia as Being-present-at-hand and to reserve "existence" (Existens) for that entity which comports itself to its own Being.\(^1\) Furthermore, he tells us that the Being of beings present-at-hand can not matter for them.\(^2\) This clearly differentiates them from Dasein and puts forward a preliminary distinction based upon Dasein's everydayness.\(^3\)

Heidegger takes "everydayness" as a point of departure for the analysis of the Being of Dasein. For him, this means "Being-in-the-world" which he has already characterized in terms of mineness, and the possibility of comportment towards its own Being.\(^4\) Heidegger develops this crucial concept in terms of the phenomenally based character of its component aspects. But for our purposes it is sufficient to grasp the bases of "readiness-to-hand" in this concept of "Being-in-the-world". In the distinction between "Being-in" (as an existentiale) and "insideness" (as a categoriale)\(^5\) one finds a further development of the distinction between Dasein and entities present-at-hand.

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\(^1\)Ibid.
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 68.
\(^3\)Heidegger also proposes to deal with all entities as either Dasein or non-Dasein (who or what) in terms either of existentiales or categories. B.T.s, pp. 70-71.
\(^4\)Ibid., p. 78 ff.
\(^5\)Ibid., p. 79.
Furthermore "'Being-alongside' the world in the sense of being absorbed in the world (a sense which calls for still closer interpretation) is an existential founded upon Being-in."¹

Heidegger thus brings to our attention the fundamental ontological distinction between an entity which can encounter another and two entities which cannot encounter each other and, in addition, claims that traditional ontologies cannot maintain such a distinction.² The encounter of other entities by Dasein reveals its own facticity³ and subsequently, the general concept of concern⁴ through which the Being of Dasein is to be shown as care.⁵ There is a definite and important connection between this development, the incompleteness of the phenomenological reduction, the ontological priority of ambiguity, and the emerging concept of "readiness-to-hand".

Heidegger concludes that:

"Being-in" is not a "property" which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, and without which it could be just as well as it could without it . . .

¹Ibid., pp. 80-81.

²Ibid., p. 81. His suggestion is that this is because of a lack of "a stable coinage for the appropriate structural concepts."

³"The concept of 'facticity' implies that an entity 'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world." Ibid., p. 82.

⁴Ibid., p. 83.

⁵Ibid., p. 84.
another entity can "meet up with" Dasein only in so far as it can, of its own accord, show itself within a world.¹

Hence, the following provisional conclusions may be adopted: (1) Dasein is always in-the-world; (2) its encounter with entities reveals a way in which those entities can be in addition to the way Dasein is; (3) facticity and concern are always constitutive of the way in which Dasein encounters entities within the world; (4) Dasein itself is revealed through the way in which it encounters other entities; (5) "addressing oneself to the world and discussing it (λόγος)"² will always be perverted so long as one grasps this as a relationship between two entities present-at-hand; (6) knowing (νοεῖν) only has "first significance in so much as it is founded in Being-in-the-world; ³ (7) traditional ontology cannot deal with the concept of the world because of its construction of the reversed priorities of Nature and things invested with value.⁴

In pointing out the fact that Dasein is always in the world concernfully, Heidegger reminds us that Dasein can never encounter entities in the world in pure presences-at-hand. Dasein can, however, tarry along-side other entities and in so doing perceive their presence. But such perception is still interpretation, with respect to some "point of view" or other by which something is made determinate. When passed on as assertions this knowledge becomes a new

¹Ibid.
²Ibid., p. 85.
³Ibid.
⁴Ibid., pp. 88-92.
possibility for controlling one's Being-in-the-world.\(^1\)

In developing the concept of presence-at-hand\(^2\), Heidegger has outlined the goal of phenomenology and knowledge in general. Furthermore, he has stressed that such knowledge is **founded** in the practical world of our concernful dealings. Subsequently\(^3\) he calls the entities which we encounter in concern "**equipment**"\(^4\) and says that it has the kind of Being to be known as readiness-to-hand.\(^5\) The isolation of things as being ready-to-hand is a direct result of Heidegger's decision to treat **Dasein** in its everydayness and his subsequent conclusion that "The kind of dealing which is closest to us is as we have shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use; and this has its own kind of 'knowledge'."\(^6\)

With the category of things "ready-to-hand", Heidegger begins to reveal his divergence from the tradition of ontology. The Being of entities is first of all concernful.\(^7\) Heidegger thinks that to speak of pure things and

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1. Ibid., pp. 88-90. In this compact passage Heidegger indicates the necessary dangers of founded knowledge and hints at the ontological basis of his denial of the will to technology. See also B.T., pp. 99-100. Even the most neutral expression of science involves a crude limitation of the possibilities of Being with regard to some aspect or other. With respect to interpretation, see B.T., p. 188 ff.

2. Ibid., pp. 67-94.

3. Ibid., p. 95 ff.

4. Ibid., p. 97.

5. Ibid., p. 98.

6. Ibid., p. 95.

7. Ibid., p. 96.
things invested with value is to leave obscure what such
terms could possibly mean, and to ignore the fact that they
have no ontological foundation.¹

Dasein encounters entities in concern (equipment).
Such entities are never to be found in isolation, but only
as interconnected totalities with a certain function.²
Heidegger tells us that "A totality of equipment is consti-
tuted by various ways of the 'in-order-to', such as service-
ability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability,"³ and
that "Equipment in accordance with its equipmentality -
always is in terms of (aus) its belonging to other equip-
ment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table,
lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room."⁴

This usability, this "readiness-to-hand" is the way
in which entities are and are revealed to us in the everyday
world of concern. Heidegger is very explicit on this point⁵
and it is very important not to lose sight of the implica-
tions of the fact that each such entity has its own "in
order to" and "in terms of" and that therefore the usability
of things can never be arbitrary.⁶ This "in order to" is

¹Ibid., pp. 96-98, 111, 114-148.
²Ibid., p. 97.
³Ibid.
⁴Ibid.
⁵Ibid., p. 98.
⁶The notion of function which appears in this manner
undoubtedly provides the basis for a finite teleology. More-
over, it demonstrates the inter-connectedness of Heidegger's
"two-fold task" and the character of his "destruction" of onto-
logy. By investigating the entities which Dasein encounters,
Heidegger has put forward what appears to be his interpreta-
tion of what is essential in the Greek teleology, their con-
ception of function, and treatment of πραγματα.
grasped in circumspection as the kind of "sight" of our practical concern. In this way we see not the things "ready-to-hand" but rather the work which is to be produced. But the work is only by reason of its use and the assignment-context of entities which is discovered in using it."

4. Signs

In Heidegger's concept of readiness-to-hand one finds the ontological basis of assignment. Something is already to be taken as, or in terms of something else which can be seen as that towards which it points. This referential

1 *Ibid.*, pp. 90-99. For a further discussion of the theoretical as opposed to the practical see Heidegger's essay "Science and Consciousness" in **Vortraege**, especially p. 52 ff. The connection with the phenomenological method and Heidegger's view of cognition will become obvious. Moods disclose what matters to us and, as Heidegger tells us, "even the purest *Theory* (theory) has not left all moods behind it". *B.T.*, p.177. Hence, the incompleteness of the reduction is at bottom connected with the basis of our language in our concernful dealings. This in turn may explain why Heidegger does not accept Husserl's proposition concerning the universality of linguistic structures.

2 *B.T.*, p. 99. The "work" is also seen to be the end of art (techne) in "Science and Consciousness", "The Question about Technology", **Introduction to Metaphysics**, and "The Origin of the Work of Art". In this sense, the end as the result of "pro-duceing" is also the equipmental origin of truth.


4 One should not, therefore, confuse Heidegger's later statements such as "Language speaks", with mysticism. What may or may not be disputed is that entities are found replete with significance in so much as they have Being in the world. These entities in Heidegger's view are already assigned and it therefore follows that in disclosing them as they are in themselves, Being speaks its language to and through us.
character is seen to belong essentially to entities even when it ceases to function as in the case (1) where the equipment is broken and cannot be used and therefore becomes conspicuous; \(^1\) or (2) where what is needed is missing and thereby becomes obtrusive; \(^2\) or (3) where what is ready-to-hand will not serve the purpose which it is taken to have and thereby shows itself to be obstinate. \(^3\) Just as these are ways in which things ready-to-hand do not function properly, "inconspicuousness" and "un-obtrusiveness" and "non-obstinacy" are characteristics of things which are properly ready-to-hand. \(^4\) What is revealed in this way is the way in which things are already assigned. Furthermore, this concept (assignment) provides us with a basis for the understanding of language. Heidegger has already shown that, in their most basic way of Being, entities are ready-to-hand with others in a totality which can be seen to exist for some particular purpose. The implications of this for language must be made more explicit.

A relation may be said to hold between any two entities. Hence, the assertion that a relation holds between a sign and what is signified may be true but proves to be uninteresting. What is interesting is the way in which the one aspect of this relation refers to the other. Heidegger

\(^1\) Ibid., pp. 102-03.  \(^2\) Ibid., p. 103.  
\(^3\) Ibid.  
\(^4\) Ibid., p. 106. That these characteristics can be shown by their aborted forms is a positive example of the reduction to absence.
wishes to show that this could never be a matter of the way in which a bare mark relates to an entity, but that it requires an ontological basis in the world of our concernful dealings in order for there to be a sign in the first place. He says: "But signs . . . are themselves items of equipment whose specific character as equipment consists in showing or indicating."¹ Accordingly he asserts that there is a formal (asymmetrical, transitive) relationship between all indications, all references and all relations.² The very simple conclusion from this is that some relations do not refer, and some references do not indicate. In the first case such relations cannot be signs, and are not of interest to us. It is the second case, however, which is of interest—the distinction between references which do and those which do not indicate.

To illustrate what he means by signs, Heidegger gives the example of the turn-signal of a motor car.³ Such an item of equipment is ready-to-hand for those whose concerns have to do with the totality of traffic and its regulations. It is equipment for indicating. It can also refer to a situation because what it indicates has already been established; it is thereby grounded in this "serviceability for" something.⁴ Whereas things like hammers are also

¹Ibid., p. 108.

²All indications are references are relations, but not all relations are references, nor all references indications.

³Ibid., pp. 108-10.

⁴Ibid., p. 109.
serviceable for something, they are not signs. The reference of indicating is a particular situation - a car will make a turn. The reference of serviceability is the way in which a totality of equipment shows itself to be of concern - in driving a car, signalling a turn points to a whole apparatus of equipment already established in accordance with the rules of traffic. Heidegger says that "These are so far from coinciding that only when they are united does the concreteness of a definite kind of equipment become possible."¹

Grasping the distinction between these two kinds of reference is a necessary preliminary to understanding their unity and thereby understanding the special character of signs. The distinction between entities like a hammer and those like a signal arrow with respect to their equipmental character lies in the fact that the signal arrow is distinct from the actual turning but points to it, whereas the hammer is involved in the hammering for which it is usable. Hence, being a sign for something is distinct from being a tool for something. Therefore, in order to understand signs it is important to see that they can only be items of equipment indirectly, in so much as they can point beyond themselves. For this reason it becomes much easier to misinterpret signs than it is other kinds of equipment. Heidegger tells us "That the sign is not authentically grasped (erfasst) if we just stare at it and identify it as an indicator-Thing which occurs."² Signs also reveal the temporal focus of our

¹Ibid. ²Ibid., p. 110.
concerns. They can forewarn, mark, or record and thereby show where one's concern dwells.  

Heidegger tells us that the particular physical mark is accidental. Hence, he points to the importance of the historical establishing of a sign. The requirements of this activity are: (1) that Dasein be able to project to the future; (2) that "one's particular environment can announce itself for circumspection at any time by means of something ready-to-hand"; (3) that this possibility be itself ready-to-hand; (4) that such equipment be able to show something ready-to-hand as something conspicuous; (5) that such conspicuous signs must be kept from becoming randomized; (6) that signs either be ready-to-hand already or become ready-to-hand; (7) that the world be already encountered; (8) that the sign make accessible the world of one's involvements.

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1 Ibid., pp. 110-111.  
2 Ibid., p. 109.  
3 Ibid., p. 111.  
4 Ibid. For this reason the indicating of a sign should not be regarded as a property of an entity. Ibid., p. 114.  
5 Ibid. The notions of presence and absence provide a phenomenological basis for logic and the so-called laws of thought. See for example, B.T., pp. 166, 199-203, 209, 330-33, where the significance of the essay "What is Metaphysics" comes to light in terms of "fallenness". The two-fold nature of signs as usable or unusable (but still assigned) would seem to be related not (directly) to logic, but to these more basic notions of presence and absence.  
6 Ibid., pp. 111-12.  
7 Ibid., p. 114.  
8 Ibid., p. 115.
Hence, signs themselves make accessible that for the sake of which they are, and, thus, give us primary access to Dasein.\footnote{Ibid., p. 116-17, 119.} The relationships of with, in, towards, and for the sake of (which come to light in the character of signs) themselves point to the understanding\footnote{Ibid., p. 120 and 82 ff.} which discloses the world of Dasein's\footnote{Heidegger even goes so far (in \textit{What is Called Thinking}) as to say that "man is a sign which is not read". This will be discussed later.} involvements.

The establishing of a particular sign is involved in the more general framework of disclosedness, which, for Heidegger, is the meaning of "truth". Heidegger tells us that "It is only this unhiddenness which mankind can't order or arrange."\footnote{Vortraege and Aufsaetze, p. 25.} Hence, it is the truth which must form the standard through which things are shown to be as they are. The importance of signs lies in the fact that they "signify" and thereby found "the Being of words and of language."\footnote{B.T., p. 121.} Therefore the establishing of signs has an essential link with the truth. Since signs serve to bring something forth and let it stand as it is, they are also related to art.\footnote{Heidegger treats the concepts of \textit{techne} and \textit{poiesis} at much greater length in \textit{Vortraege}, in \textit{An Introduction to Metaphysics}, and in "The Origin of the Work of Art" in \textit{Hoffst"atter Philosophies of Art and Beauty}. These important and relevant concepts, however, cannot become our concern at this time.}
The establishing of signs aims at the truth through the existence of language, just as the artist aims at knowledge through the work of art. Hence, care for the use of language from the very beginning of recognizing the significance of signs is essential to pursuit of the truth. It is precisely because equipment once established does not lose its equipmental character that Heidegger warns us that:

... the ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from levelling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems.

Hence it is important for us to move from the general, thematic basis of significance to the more concretized expression of this in Discourse (as the basis of language). By so doing, Heidegger's contention that Dasein is in the truth in discourse, moods, and understanding will be discussed in the over-all framework of truth and language.

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1 B.T., p. 112.  
2 Ibid., p. 262.  
3 In this section we have shown how Heidegger moves beyond the Husserlian view of language by developing his doctrine of significance through the considerations of an ontology of things ready-to-hand as is implied by his views on the reductions themselves. That Heidegger regards his analysis of language to be rooted in the Husserlian problematic is indicated internally as well as in Division I, Chapter III, footnote ii; and Chapter V, footnote x.
II

TRUTH

How can one hide oneself from what never goes down?

Heracleitus, Fr. 16. 1

1. Disclosedness

Philosophically there seems to be nothing more important than the truth. But where is it demonstrated and who can say for certain when it has been revealed? Heidegger's interpretation of "Truth" depends upon his analysis of the Greek word ἀλήθέν into its components ἀ and λήθ. "True" thus becomes "un-covered" and the "truth" is rendered as "Being true" or "Being-uncovering". 2 Heidegger finds evidence for this interpretation in Aristotle, Plato, and even in the fragments of Heracleitus. 3 It is his belief that the truth is to be understood as something which shows itself. It is therefore related to actions and

1 Burnet's translation.

2 B.T., p. 262 ff. and p. 57. The broader implications of "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" cannot be dealt with at this time.

3 For example, Fr. 16 of Heracleitus (above). Fr. 5 of Parmenides, Aristotle Metaphysica A, 984a 18 ff., 984b 10, 938b 2, 986b 31, 988a 20, 993b 17, 993b 20 are given as examples by Heidegger in footnotes to Sein und Zeit, p. 213 (B.T., p. 256). Heidegger's essay "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" which is a later development of this analysis cannot be treated at this time.
phenomena, things, and Being. What is there which fundamentally unites Being with the truth? Heidegger tries to answer this question by showing how the traditional conception of truth as correspondence is not fundamental but is derivative from the more primordial phenomenon of Being disclosing itself. The traditional conception of truth, in Heidegger's judgment, involves the theses that truth has to do with assertions or judgments, that its nature is the agreement of these judgments with their objects, that Aristotle is responsible for both of these.

Concerning the second thesis Heidegger asks the significant question: if truth is an agreement, with what does an assertion agree? What is its object? He agrees that there is a certain limited formal truth to this thesis, but in pressing the question finds that it cannot bear interpretation. If we determine the object of truth do we give it any more truth by making an assertion which agrees with it? If "agreement" merely means similar, then "Truth"

\[ \begin{align*}
1 \text{B.T., p. 262.} & \\
2 \text{Ibid., p. 256.} & \\
3 \text{Ibid.} & \\
4 \text{Ibid., p. 257.} & \\
5 \text{The agreement expressed by } \text{adequatio intellectus et res is taken by Heidegger to be quite empty. Ibid., p. 258. This was even to be Husserl's conception of truth; adequation clarification; that is verification. Hence truth was taken to be correspondence even for Husserl. But it is obvious that truth can only be agreement if what is non-temporal. There is a fundamental unity between Heidegger's conception of truth and the search for a temporalized ontology.} & 
\end{align*} \]
is destined to ambiguity. If "agreement" means equality then it cannot be total equality since the two parts of the relation are of different kinds. There must be a restricted equality "with regard to" some factor or other. But this assumes that we already know what relevant aspects of the assertion and of its objects are being considered or discovered. If we know this then we already know the truth before the assertion is made.

The traditional theory of truth, in Heidegger's judgment, is based in the distinctions between the Subject and the Object and between the Ideal and the Real.\(^1\) Judgment is an act of the "subject" producing an "ideal" content. If the Judgment is true, it agrees with Real Objects. What this seems to do is to make of truth a very hypothetical conception. For if there is such a basic distinction between the subject and the object how could agreement between them ever be known? If this agreement could never be known it must be at most, hypothetical. But Heidegger finds evidence to suggest that the the ancient Greeks the truth was equated with προγυμα and Θενυφελα.\(^2\) In arguing for a conception of truth as unhiddenness Heidegger is appealing to these primordial aspects of our tradition. But he also appeals to the everyday situations—actions and phenomena so as not

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 259.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 262. The implications of these two concepts for the phenomenological method in general and for Heidegger's starting point in our concernful dealings have already been discussed, "entities in the how of their uncoveredness".
merely to explain a word but to show how that word relates what is for man.

In order to clarify the sense of agreement which could be meant by the traditional theory of truth Heidegger suggests that someone with his back to the wall makes the assertion "the picture on the wall is hanging askew". The assertion is confirmed when he turns around and sees that it is in fact true. But does this mean there is some sort of agreement between the knowledge and the object on the wall? If the person had not perceived the picture before he made the assertion with what does his assertion agree? But is it less true in this case?

The phenomenon of asserting is not yet clear. Asserting is an action of men. It is characterized by the particular way in which men comport themselves to what is. Heidegger says "Asserting is a way of Being towards the Thing itself that is." But how does one explain Being towards? First of all there is something not yet attained, which an existing man is attaining. But how does an assertion grasp the thing in itself? It does not do so by mirroring it, nor even by agreeing with it but by letting it show itself.

\[1\] Ibid., p. 260.  \[2\] Ibid., p. 260.  \[3\] Ibid., p. 261. It will become more and more obvious that an adequate understanding of assertions requires the previous understanding of 'Being-towards' in terms of things ready-to-hand in the world and the equipmental character of significant things.
Things are. But not in complete isolation from Dasein. When a thing reveals itself it does so for and to Dasein. Thus, to say that an assertion agrees with its object is to say that something put forward in the mind via language agrees with something else in the mind. But if something comes into my mind is it not trivial to say that it agrees with the assertion that there is such a thing in my mind? The Object of agreement is presumably intended in the traditional theory of truth to be outside of the mind. This view thus renders agreement and therefore truth either impossible or meaningful only to some supra-human being if the basis of assertions in the significance of things in the world is overlooked. Nevertheless assertions are still meaningful and relevant to the question of truth. This is because assertions can have a different way of being (ready-to-hand) than do the things they are about. Assertions are ministerial. They point to something other than the act of asserting. If they are true they are active in showing things as they are. They are then Being-uncovering — that is, the active manifestation of what is by an existing man to an existing man. By showing the derivative character of assertions, Heidegger finds that his conception of truth is more primordial than the traditionally accepted one of agreement.¹

The act of discovering, however, suggests that something was previously obscured. Moreover, in claiming that truth is Being-uncovering, is Heidegger not committed to

¹Ibid., p. 262 ff.
making truth Dasein dependent? A relativistic theory of truth? There is a sense in which this is true.\textsuperscript{1} But this does not mean that what is, or what is true, can be changed at will. It does mean that it is, and that it is true, to, and for, Dasein. This is more important, however, since it gives an indication of the kind of being which belongs to Dasein. Just because Dasein alone cannot create truth, it does not mean that it cannot be responsible for untruth. That is, something can seem to be what it is not, only because there is Dasein. But it can never be what it is not. Seeming is an obscuring - an untruth. Things seem to be before they are clearly understood. Heidegger therefore asks, "It is accidental that when the Greeks express themselves as to the essence of truth, they use a privative expression - ἀ λήθεια?\textsuperscript{2} He obviously doesn't think so. His whole treatment of the question is linked to the time-honoured notion of seeing the light, coming out of the darkness or oblivion. For example, consider the phanos which underlies phenomena, one of the most direct ways of discovering what is. Things stand before us as they are only if they are in the light. This metaphor may be abandoned as a kind of super-picture. It is only one of the many methods which Heidegger employs.

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 270. "Because the kind of Being that is essential to the truth is of the character of Dasein all truth is relative to Dasein's Being."

\textsuperscript{2}B.T., p. 265. It was noted earlier that such 'privations' form the basis for a peculiar kind of analysis for Heidegger (the reduction to absence). In this case the privative aspect of truth serves to deny the uncertain, hidden and ambiguous character which belongs to primary perception.
to express the distinctions which are most basic to philosophy. It is helpful initially for directing thought to the need of patiently letting what is be for man, as it is. It continuously underlies the phenomenon of seeming and the fact that what is, is all the time before us in the world. If we would only let it be, we could know it. Hence, this view is directly connected with his later metaphysical position which rejects the will to mastery above all else and suggests in its place the patience of waiting and understanding. Thus what may appear to be a relativistic position on truth is in fact an acknowledgment of men's finite perspective on something far greater than he, of which he is only a part.\(^1\) It is to him that the whole and its parts become meaningful. Although the truth may be said to be relative to a Dasein, it is never merely relative to him. "Once entities have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as entities which beforehand already were."\(^2\) Moreover, there are certain important conditions which are implicit in Being-disclosed. One of these is inter-subjective correspondence. If entities have been before their disclosure, then what is disclosed must be governed by them. All true disclosures and thus all true assertions must correspond with each other. The correspondence of agreement thus comes after the truth, as one of the indications that the truth has been attained. If there is to be public truth, then it is to be expected that what comes into the openness of different Dasein's will be in agreement.

\(^1\)It is only this unhiddenness which mankind can't order or arrange." Vortraege, p. 25.

\(^2\)B.T., p. 269.
But if this publicness is taken as something given and established, then, the theory of truth as correspondence between assertions and things is re-introduced. Heidegger expresses it this way: "When the assertion has been expressed, the uncoveredness of the entity moves into a kind of Being of that which is ready-to-hand within-the-world. But now to the extent that in this uncoveredness, as an uncoveredness of something, a relationship to something present-at-hand, persists, the uncoveredness (truth) becomes, for its part, a relationship between things which are present-at-hand (intellectus and res) - a relationship that is present-at-hand itself."¹ This situation is akin to the decaying of language. It demonstrates how the possibility of discovery leads to the possibility of covering over. Assertions take the place of inquiry and observation. When things and assertions are seen in isolation from their functions they become present-at-hand rather than ready-to-hand. Heidegger has located this in Dasein's facticity,² that is, the dependence of his fate upon the fate of others. In recognizing this he may inauthentically adopt their assertion as his own truth. Thus from an ontological necessity that things are as they are and not other, and the need for assurance that what has been disclosed is not only a semblance, and the existential realization of mutual interdependence has come the demand for a public criterion. This is how Heidegger sees the derivation of the theory of truth as agreement from its more primordial basis in Being-uncovering.

¹Ibid., p. 267.
²For example B.T., p. 265.
It becomes important, therefore, to investigate more closely how the Dasein uncovers what is. Essentially there are three ways, according to Heidegger—understanding, discourse, and states of mind.¹ These are so fundamental, however, that they must be dealt with separately. But even before doing this, it is necessary to see why one must presuppose the truth. Dasein is essentially disclosing, for he comports himself towards what is and understands that for which it is. He understands that some things are the bases of others. But his most basic presupposition is that he was before he disclosed himself to himself. Thus the fundamental basis of the phenomenon of truth lies in Dasein. This is the primordial act of disclosure without which no truth is possible. Dasein aware of itself already discloses and presupposes the possibility of this disclosure. For this reason: "We must presuppose truth."² If it is forgotten that Dasein does not always have the character of an "I" it may be thought that nothing is necessary about our presupposing the truth.³ But in so much as we are Dasein we have already done so. And in so much as we are authentic we have done so explicitly.

The most basic aspect of Dasein's being is his understanding. In his understanding the truth is disclosed.

¹ This term is taken to be equivalent to "mood".
² Ibid., p. 271.
³ Heidegger's rejection of the transcendental reduction and of Husserl's notion of a pure ego (as was indicated earlier) is now shown to make new demands on the existential basis of truth. See Ideas, p. 156 and B.T., p. 272.
Somehow and often indefinitely this word "understanding" is surrounded with intimations of that which is highest for man or that which most properly and most basically belongs to him.\(^1\) On the other hand, the term is sometimes used merely to designate a kind of knowing. The two different ways of speaking are not arrived at by adding or subtracting a value. We say "He understands the use of that machine." Then we ask "But does he really understand its use?", as if we had thereby added something.

It may be said that understanding is man's specific excellence. It is in virtue of this that he is able to come to grips with himself in a way that no other creature can. Understanding therefore seems to be characterized by a closeness to man's Being, and by far sightedness. The paradox of understanding is that man may have to look the farthest in order to see what is closest to him.

Heidegger conceives understanding to be one of the fundamental ways in which being-there in the world is revealed. Together with discourse and state of mind it is called a fundamental existentiale, that is, an existential structure - something constitutive of the kind of existence which belongs to Dasein. He also acknowledges the kind of understanding which is a kind of knowing and says that it is derivative from the former.\(^2\) But in what sense is it derivative? Can I not understand something in a limited way

\(^1\)The following comments derive from B.T., 114 ff., and 182 ff.

\(^2\)See B.T., p. 182.
before I understand its overall significance? It seems that we do in fact do this. Some of us seem only to have this limited kind of understanding. Does this mean that we therefore do not exist in the world? That we are no longer Dasein? Heidegger does not mean to imply this. Understanding reveals Dasein's possibilities and thereby even makes new possibilities. Understanding belongs to his authentic being. The question still remains. In what sense can a limited actuality be derivative from a possibility limited only by reality itself? Surely something must be possible before it could be actual, but in what sense is understanding in the overall sense a possibility for man?

Heidegger's conception of understanding seems to require certain teleological assumptions, and certain assumptions concerning traits which all men possess. Man has an end, a specific excellence which is made possible by his very essence as a being in-the-world. Possibility thus has ontological implications, for Heidegger. It is only in view of the fact that man can know his possibilities that he understands anything at all. What does it mean to say that he is essentially the creature which understands? The essence of Dasein is said to be its existence. That is, its being as a what, is its being as a so that. In this projective character it is something unique. Heidegger views

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1 In Being and Time this only appears through his concerns. But in later writings, for example, The Question of Being, Discourse on Thinking, and especially What is Called Thinking?, the specific excellence of man appears to be thinking towards which man is projected, the germs of this idea are to be found, however, in Being and Time and its interpretation of discourse as an essential Articulation of Being.

2 B.T., p. 67.
man not as a lump of matter, but as a being on its way. But where to? On its way between birth and death. But is the *telos* death? Surely the end of man is death. But it would be a bad pun if we were to say this in the teleological sense.

In *Vortraege*\(^1\) Heidegger has analysed the concept of *telos* in terms of the projected end of the work being undertaken. What is the purpose of working? The work which results in the end. Man is different from his activities. He is on the way towards his end, but what results from this is care. The end in one sense is thus death, in the other it is being-towards-death, authenticity, and possibility in the ontological sense.\(^2\) It is this situation which calls to the understanding.\(^3\) The limited sense of understanding is still made possible through concernful dealings; and concernful dealings for men depend upon that for the sake of which he is - the entire basis of Care which is revealed by the overall sense of understanding. Thus the sense in which the limited kind of understanding is dependent upon the overall sense is the sense in which concernful dealings depend upon Care. In the sense of a final cause rather than as a first cause: in the sense "that Dasein is that entity which, as Being-in-the-world, is an issue for itself."\(^4\)

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2 *B.T.*, p. 183.

3 In later works, for example, *What is Called Thinking?* it is essentially about Being which calls us to think. For Heidegger's own interpretation of a final cause see "The Question about Technology" in *Vortraege*, especially p. 15 ff.

4 *B.T.*, p. 182.
The further implications of the phenomenon of understanding are revealed by what it means to be in the world. Heidegger insists that the understanding must not be taken in isolation from the total situation of being in the world. The foundation of fundamental ontology relies explicitly upon the preservation of the phenomenological unity of Being-in-the-world.

2. Being in the Truth: Mood

Chapter V of Being and Time is ostensibly a treatment of the phenomenon of being in. Accordingly, one would expect it to stress the concept of existential spatiality - what it means to be there in the world. In fact, what it does is to outline the basic concepts required in order to understand the "there" of persons in its fullest sense. By so doing, Heidegger shows Dasein itself to be the truth, the disclosedness of the things that are.

The importance for ontology of this section has to do with how it demonstrates the basic nature of man's being there in the world by analysing the basic factors of understanding, states of mind, and discourse. This can only be achieved through the basic principle of "equiprimordiality"\(^1\) or the equally basic nature of constituent factors of Dasein in the world. That this allows a radical departure from the traditional categories of a thing in itself, its properties and its relations will become eventually clear. That this departure is necessary will become evident from a consideration

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 170.
of phenomena, the failure of the traditional ontology to realise that a proof for the external world is not necessary, and the mistaken rendering of the logos in terms of a theory of judgment. The phenomenally based justification for this analysis is the moods which persons have at all times in the world. The importance of this ontological development for a theory of language lies in the elucidation of the basic structures of the disclosure of significance.

Why in the first place is it necessary to depart from the old categories of things and their properties and relations? Heidegger has shown that a Dasein's being in the world is very different from the "insideness" of for example, cookies in a jar. It is the requirement of a more explicit way to keep this ontological distinction clear which demands that the language of things and properties be abandoned. This is not merely an arbitrary decision, but is demanded by the pursuit of phenomenology itself. For if things are to stand before us as they are they must not be obscured by the language of formal relations. Heidegger has made the claim that "Only as phenomenology is ontology possible".

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1 It is essential to recall that for phenomenology objectivity is not achieved merely by an act of 'opening up the windows of the mind', but is constituted through the progressive elimination of ambiguity. The 'thing-in-itself' is a perspectively based goal and not a primary ontological item.

2 Ibid., p. 78 ff. and 169 ff.

3 Ibid., p. 60.
The adherence to phenomenological disclosure \(^1\) is seen to be necessary for a theory of the things that are.

The second reason for departing from the formal language of things and their properties has to do with traditional analysis. Once the world has been analysed it is impossible to accommodate the analysis to the phenomenon.\(^2\) The phenomenological given, the world, is pre-conceptually a unity which discloses itself in existing individuals. This Heidegger has underlined by using the word "Dasein" and by characterizing it ecstatically. Moreover, by this move he has made it almost impossible to forget his promise to be true to this phenomenological unity.\(^3\) On the other hand he must at this point begin the arduous task of resolving this unity with the multiplicity of things which are phenomenally disclosed. The basis of this analysis at this point is the moods which always accompany the multiplicity of phenomena in the unity of the world. It is found that Dasein is always there in the world in some mood or other.\(^4\)

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\(^1\)Such knowledge is of course founded on concernful dealings which (as a more basic form of disclosedness) have their own form of knowledge. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 86 ff.

\(^2\)Heidegger tells us that the traditional analysis splits the phenomenon asunder. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 170.

\(^3\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 78 and 376 ff.

\(^4\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 173 ff.
The significance of states of mind for ontology is that they disclose that a Dasein is and has to be.¹ It is important not to demand that they be either things or properties. States of mind will never fit into the modal category of possibility. But property talk depends upon contingency and possibility in a modal sense, that is, upon the assumption that things are and in addition have properties in the sense of mere possibilities - something not yet actual and not at any time necessary. On the other hand, if it is possible for Dasein to have a particular state of mind then he necessarily has it at some time.² This is simply because a state of mind provides the existential "that it is" and is necessary in every way in which Dasein is there because that is how he is there. Merely by disclosing Dasein, the moods of Dasein also become necessary.³ It is not possible that what is, is not. It is possible that how one speaks of what is, is not how it is. The requisite "contingency" of property talk therefore denies a basic ontological fact - that Dasein is and is necessarily revealed already in his attunement to the world, his state of mind, at

¹Ibid., p. 174. Heidegger warns us that this fact should not be regarded in terms of things merely present at hand. He also reminds us that the very fact that we do not always follow our moods is no evidence against the fact that we do always have them. Ibid., p. 173.

²Heidegger's analysis of the ancient ontology in terms of mere presence is the basis for his rejection of "things", "properties" and formal relations. The arguments for this have already been given in terms of the readiness-to-hand of what is closest to Dasein. See for example, B.T., 68-69, 114, 171 for references to properties and B.T., 183 for the discussion of modality.

³Ibid., p. 176.
The peculiarity of a state of mind is that it discloses Dasein to himself. This is a basic fact about the way Dasein is. Not only about how Dasein always is, but also about the way the identity of that Dasein is established in the world.\(^1\) This should not, however, be taken to deny that a Dasein finds himself thrown in the world with characteristics and situations over which he has no control.\(^2\) The establishment of Dasein's identity is a question of his existence, not of his essence, and not as a mere thing, but as being on its way.\(^3\) States of mind are ontologically determinative because they reveal Dasein to himself and thereby establish his identity as being "there" in the world. Their place in a theory of the things which are lies in their disclosing of things and their primary disclosure of Dasein as a being already in the world.

Although states of mind are most basic in an ontological sense, it is not true that everything is derived from them. The world is most basically disclosed in a state of mind as are existence and Dasein-with. But it is necessary to keep in mind that understanding is equally basic with states of mind. By recognizing this Heidegger has refused to link all factors to a common ground by some chain of deductive thinking for the sake of proving first principles.\(^4\)

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 174.  \(^2\)Ibid., p. 176.

\(^3\)Heidegger speaks in terms of a "thrown possibility".  \(^4\)Ibid., 170, 176.
Heidegger does have a ground, however - Being there in the world.

How does one find a unity in these two distinct aspects of Dasein: understanding and mood? And why should one assume from the first that there is one? The reason is clear. Understanding also discloses the Being of Dasein and its world. It also establishes identity. Since a Dasein is only as he is, the double disclosure of the being there in the world must be a unity. Moreover, it is phenomenally discovered as a unity.

It therefore becomes important to elucidate the different ways in which Dasein disclose and hence are disclosed.

The fact that the world has been primordially disclosed allows one to encounter what is in the world. Furthermore, states of mind provide a partial basis for time by ascertaining that one disclosure that matters to a person depends upon the previous existence of something else which matters to it.

States of mind already appear to be determinative for care. Heidegger characterizes them as follows:

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1 For a more thorough discussion of "the ground" which comes out of the analysis of Being and Time see Heidegger's The Essence of Reasons.

2 Being-in-the-world in terms of our concernful dealings has already been shown to be what all knowledge is founded upon.

3 Heidegger says that "A state-of-mind always has its understanding, even if it keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has its mood." Ibid., p. 182.
"Existentially, a state of mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us." He tells us that if one makes demands for an absolute knowledge of the world one will be misled into thinking that the world is non-being.

The first mistake in ignoring the importance of states of mind is the positivistic presupposition that we can be without presuppositions and without a mood. But knowledge is not possible without a state of mind which discloses what matters to us. We are deluded most when we think we can escape this personal unsteadiness of moods. Theoretically one can construct a thing which does not change with his moods. But he is mistaken if he thinks that he knows such a thing. The only way to know things in themselves is to let them be as they are in the world. One must grasp them as they are disclosed by states of mind. He who would understand things must wait on them patiently and let them reveal themselves rather than to theorize them away according to the will for (positivistic) power. Heidegger is not suggesting that science be replaced by feeling, but rather insists that unless moods are recognized as basic, rather than incidental, factors of ontology, there will be no basis for philosophy in everyday life and there will be no ontological basis for living well one with another. "It is into such

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1 B.T., p. 177.

2 Ibid. The implicit criticism of traditional ontology with its latent nihilism is obvious.

3 Ibid.
a mood and out of such a mood that the orator speaks. He must understand the possibilities of moods in order to rouse them and guide them aright." 1

The result of waiting upon the mood or state of mind, rather than denying that it is there, is the achieving of a more fundamental understanding of what the moods reveal concerning what matters to Dasein and how it is when it matters in different ways, and therefore the understanding of what is. 2 According to Heidegger, states of mind and understanding are inexorably linked to one another. 3 But the ontologically determinative character of understanding is "the for the sake of which". That is to say, that understanding is the disclosedness of being in the world, as such, since it reveals that for the sake of which things are, and, just as basically their significance. 4 At the same time, things are revealed in their function and their meaning. This is no coincidence. For they are both equally basic aspects of understanding.

1 B.T., p. 178. One can understand Wittgenstein's interpretation of Being and Time as Ethics; see "Men and Ideas" Encounter, Jan. 1969. The reason why Being and Time could never be the sole basis of an ethical theory or ethical code is also given above. It is necessary to understand moods in order to be just. This is a matter of our concernful dealings and not of theory per se. Heidegger's position thus seems to be that only the just (perceptive) man can and will be just. The reference to Aristotle is by no means accidental.

2 Ibid., p. 182 ff. In view of the incompletability of the reduction Dasein must understand moods moodfully.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

The understanding is rooted in a peculiar kind of possibility, an ontological one - Dasein's possibility for being. Possibility for Dasein means "not yet". But since this possibility will not admit of possibly not at any time it cannot be a modal category for as a possibility it is also a necessity.\(^1\) The ontological significance of the understanding lies in its ability to disclose what a Dasein can be from what he is already. It thus projects the present into the future. Heidegger assumes that the future is already held in the present.\(^2\) He thus must also assume that amid the everchanging moods of a Dasein there is a fixed determinative nature which sets out the limits of what he can be.\(^3\) Hence, his reason for dismissing the significance for ontology of possibility as a modal category is that it never allows that a thing is necessary at any time. And if it is not necessary at any time then nothing is determinative for it.

By speaking of potentiality for being, then, Heidegger is not speaking of a free-floating possibility but of an

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 183.

\(^2\)This is revealed by the analysis of understanding as projection. Ibid., p. 182 ff.

\(^3\)See "On the Essence of Truth" in Existence and Being especially the section on freedom, p. 305 ff. This also articulates the meaning of "Being-free" in the sense of a thrown possibility e.g. B.T., p. 183.
ontological and teleological fact.\(^1\) The ontological fact has been revealed that he is and must be as he is, a being disclosed by things ready-to-hand in the world. The teleological fact is revealed by his understanding, in his totality of involvements, that for the sake of which he is and the significance of various things which are with him in the world. At the same time this teleological fact reveals the primordial origin of the future tense. Whereas states of mind pervade a person's whole being, understanding projects him beyond it. Understanding discloses teleology.

Understanding, however, is not an articulate or thematic way of projecting towards possibilities. For in Heidegger's words "Grasping it in such a manner would take away from what is projected its very character as a possibility, and would reduce it to the given contexts which we have in mind; whereas projection, in throwing throws before itself the possibility as possibility and lets it be as such."\(^2\) Understanding discloses that Daseins are more than can be factually known about them. Not only because in their facticity they are involved with the fate of others, but also because that interweaving of personal fates is possible. The

\(^1\)The compatibility of the methodological requirement of the incompleteness of the reduction must also be noted together with the decision to base the ontology upon what is in the everyday world. For it is precisely these concernful dealings which eventually make the ontology of possibilities explicit.

\(^2\)B.T., p. 185.
potentiality for being is turned into the possibility for understanding, when Daseins catch sight of that for the sake of which they are by projecting beyond themselves. One catches sight of one's self only as being along side the world with others is disclosed. One does not perceive a self but understands or projects a self.\(^1\)

Hence, Heidegger has developed his theory of truth from the basis of common sense. The importance of Heidegger's characterization of the understanding as common sense is that it deprives "pure intuition of its priority, which corresponds noetically to the priority of the present at hand in traditional ontology."\(^2\) Such a difference in fundamentals is not just a matter of replacing one concept with another. It involves a complete change of theory about what is and how it is known. First of all it denies that one's first encounter with the world can be free from a mood. It thus closes the door on positivism and the fact-value distinction. Secondly, it removes the stress on the external world and the view that knowledge is an accumulative process like filling up a tank. The alternative is that Daseins encounter certain things which concern them and towards which they are already projected. It is according to these that they notice or ignore things and appropriate them for the sake of some pre-determined and primordially disclosed purpose. The mere presence of things in the world is not

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 184-188.

\(^2\)B.T., p. 187.
sufficient to "stimulate" understanding. Rather it is the readiness or unreadiness of things to function in a particular way which discloses them to Dasein.¹

When the understanding projects itself, it brings into being a new possibility - that of "developing" itself through interpretation. What Heidegger means by "interpretation" is neither the acquiring of information nor the transformation of the understanding, but "the working out of possibilities projected in understanding".² That which is ready to hand is analysed according to its "in order to". That is, it is seen explicitly in terms of its purpose or the end in mind.

The interpretation thus lies in seeing something as something. For example we see an object as a chair. In so doing we have already understood that it is possible to sit upon it and so on. We understand a totality of involvements - fatigue, the furniture in the room, a body position, comfort, etc. There is no need to make assertions to have grasped these clearly. The absence of the predication of something as something does not mean that there is pure perception. Whenever we merely encounter something we do so in terms of a totality of involvements even if they remain hidden. Heidegger's claim then, is that the lack of interpretation is not more primordial than interpretative understanding, but derivative from it.

Interpretation is not merely a value or a preference distinct from the facts that are. "In interpreting, we do not so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when

¹It is in the sense of this readiness-to-hand that we must interpret the concept of already disclosed purposes.

²B.T., p. 189.
something within the world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation.¹

What we see is not so much a function of, for example, what is on the page, but of what Heidegger would call "the totality of involvements" and some aspect of it which we have, see, and grasp in advance. Interpretation thus already reveals that Dasein is already with or alongside of others in the world.

The character of this "fore" of the "fore-having", "fore-sight" and "foreconception" which is thus brought to our attention is of great importance for ontology. Although such phenomena may not be necessary a priori, Heidegger does not think that an analysis of them is possible without grasping their unity in the world of Dasein.² Furthermore such an analysis requires the explicitation of the rather nebulous phrase "potentiality for being" which has been used repeatedly up to this point and appears time and again thereafter. Perhaps Heidegger never reveals enough about what possibility means. And perhaps he can never go back beyond this point in a phenomenological vein. It is possible that such a further analysis requires a radical departure into an interpretation of Nature or some other non-descriptive and Metaphysical activity. Yet a great deal can be learned from this 'potentiality' by discovering how it functions in

¹Ibid., p. 190, 191. ²Ibid., p. 193.
ontology by making explicit the meaningful terms of what matters. The eidetic reduction discloses the thematic order of the world in terms of possibilities. It is in them that the world has meaning. The possibilities which are indicated by the interpretive understanding are ontologically determinative, for they articulate how the world can be.

4. **Being in the Truth : Discourse**

(Articulation of the Meaningful)

Entities which are already in the world are often understood and said to have meaning. But what is understood is the entity, or its being, not the meaning.¹ Heidegger distinguishes the meaning from the entity to which the understanding directs itself. He claims that "Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself. That which can be articulated in a disclosure by which we understand, we call 'meaning'."² Meaning in Heidegger's terms belongs not to things as a property which can be attached to them, but to the world of Dasein.³ Meanings preserve intelligibility. Meanings are themselves dependent upon the disclosed structures of things in the world which allow the further disclosure of things in the world. One looks at the duck-rabbit situation of Gestalt psychology and says "Aha! its a rabbit." He has grasped

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¹ *B.T.*, p. 192 ff.  
³ *Ibid.* "Meaning is an existentiale of Dasein."
the meaning of the lines. An apprentice hands a carpenter a hammer and the carpenter says, "Too heavy." Then the apprentice gets a lighter hammer. The apprentice understands the meaning of the situation just as he understands the meaning of the words. It all "fits", in an aesthetic\(^1\) sense, in the form of life in which he is engaged.

Meanings are more basic than words for they reveal situations which can be articulated.\(^2\) Moreover, they require a world, or a totality of significances.\(^3\) They are never singular or neutral and always provide a link to other things than those that are factually present.\(^4\) This linking characteristic of meanings reveals that interpretation is possibly problematic. For if understanding is to be interpreted, is to reveal a meaning, what is interpreted must have already been understood. This circularity\(^5\) would ordinarily be a problem were it not for the fact that \textit{Dasein} has an ontological basis in understanding, for he is that about which he is enquiring and thus must enter into this circularity in a unique way. In understanding, one must also interpret and in interpretation one must already have grasped the significance and purpose of what is to be interpreted. Therefore it is necessary that understanding and interpretation be grasped as a unity if false problems are to be avoided.

\(^1\) It must be remembered that for Heidegger the \textit{aesthetic} aims at and is culminated in the \textit{Idea}. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 57.

\(^2\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 193.

\(^3\) Hence the relevance of the previous analysis of \textit{signs}.

\(^4\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 193.

\(^5\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 194.
Heidegger's analysis of interpretation revealed that something was seen as something. But, beyond mere interpretation, one must consider its "crystallization" in assertion. This phenomenon is a common way in which man's understanding gets formulated and passed on. Heidegger isolates for analysis three inter-dependent constituent characteristics of assertion: pointing out, predication, and communication. An assertion points to a situation or an entity as it is in the world, but not to its meaning, not to a representation of it nor a psychical condition. Predicates are asserted of subjects in order to point out the thing in a certain way. The purpose of assertion is communication - in order to let someone see something with us as we see it. It is assumed, in making an assertion, that others can share what it is that is pointed out.  

Yet these factors of disclosing also can become ways of obscuring what is pointed out in an assertion unless it is bound to being in the world and the "fore-having" of what is disclosed. For this reason, assertions cannot be subservient to the formal notion of "validity" which signifies "ideal Being", or "Objectively valid" or "of universally binding" character. On the other hand, Heidegger insists that, "When an assertion is made, some fore-conception is always implied, but it remains for the most part inconspicuous, because the language already hides in itself a developed way of conceiving."  

The situation surrounding an assertion involves not only the assumptions which have

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2 *B.T.*, p. 199.
been taken into a language but the very function for which
the assertion was made in the first place. It is for this
fact that assertions must not be viewed in the formal sense
of logical analysis. For example, the statement "The hammer
is heavy" is shown by Heidegger to have many meanings de-
pending upon the context of their use. In no case can these
meanings be said to be derived from the logical analysis
that "this Thing - a hammer - has the property of heaviness". ¹
Moreover, the same assertion might be made by the mere action
of laying the hammer aside.

The assertion discloses something as ² something, but
it does so in such a way that something ready to hand becomes
present to hand and its other basic possibilities become
obscured. Thus, in Heidegger's analysis, the language of
Things and properties has a derivative character from
interpretation. ³ Its origin is in assertion and not in a
primordial understanding.

Heidegger's quarrel with ancient ontology stems from

¹ B.T., p. 200. Hence the inadequacy of the Husserlian
view of the essence of language as someone saying something
about something to someone. The structure of formal apopo-
phantics is not sufficiently linguistically basic.

² Heidegger accordingly distinguishes two kinds of
"as": the "as" of interpretation and the "as" of assertion
(hermeneutical and apophantical). For example, I interpret a
thing as a log and assert that it is not dangerous. These
two functions reveal fundamentally different ways in which
one thing is seen as another.

³ Ibid., p. 200 ff.
his claim that it was based upon an inadequate interpretation of Being involving merely presence together with a correspondingly inadequate interpretation of the logos. An interpretation which interpreted synthesis and diaresis as involving a theory of judgment in terms of true and false.\(^1\) But if the assertion of the logos is to exhibit anything it is to take it together and take it apart in the sense that an assertion takes "something as something". If the interpretative origin of assertion is denied then what is understood as ready to hand can only be dealt with in terms of what is present to hand, things and their properties, what is true or false. Heidegger finds in this lack of recognition of the derivation of assertions from interpretations the seeming self evidence of the copula and the dominance of the propositional calculus.\(^2\) It is in this same oversight that positivism and the very fundamentals of traditional ontology are based. Thus it is the case that if any advance is to be made in ontology a further analysis of the logos and of language is absolutely essential.

The phenomenon of language first comes to light in assertion. This fact discloses that its basis is in the more fundamental ways in which a Dasein is there in the world, namely, discourse, interpretation, understanding and states of mind. This is because assertions disclose in a language. Heidegger tells us that language is based in talk or discourse and that "Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with state of mind and understanding. The intelligibility of

\(^1\)B.T., p. 201 ff, and pp. 55-8.

something has always been articulated, even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it. Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion. That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse is what we have called 'meaning'.

Again the equally basic nature of understanding, discourse, and states-of-mind makes a number of philosophical problems disappear. The question of the casual link between moods, understanding and discourse is no longer possible. The conception of equally basic constituent factors of a unity does not, however, do away with the question of how such a unity operates. The question of causality and dependence of one of these factors upon the other is denied by equi-primordiality, but the question of their interdependence is not. That which talks is seen to be that which understands and has a mood at the same time. Ontologically they all appear to be the same, not only because they all reveal Dasein to be there in the world, but also because they are all disclosed by Dasein in the world as the way in which they are "there". Discourse cannot be apart from Dasein and the world because it is from an everyday stand in the world which people talk. It is also in this sense that they talk about entities in the world. Heidegger tells us that "Discoursing or talking is the way in which we articulate 'significantly' the intelligibility of Being-in-the world."

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1 B.T., p. 203, 204.

2 Epistemology cannot come to such a conclusion because it does not grasp the basis of knowledge in terms of our concernful dealings in the world.

3 Ibid., p. 204.
The significant articulation of what is intelligible can be done in such ways as hearing, keeping silent, assenting, refusing, demanding, warning, pronouncing, consulting, interceding, making assertions, wishing, commending. Although discourse is about something, what is said and the saying disclose Dasein in a very fundamental way to himself and to others. In discourse Dasein shares himself with another. He makes known something. Words do not do this in themselves. A language can thus only be understood in terms of the constitution of Dasein in the world as this is disclosed by discourse and insomuch as discourse is based in what is significant in terms of Dasein's concernful dealings.

In discourse we also hear. But we hear interpretively and not in naked tones. Heidegger asserts that: "It requires a very artificial frame of mind to 'hear' a 'pure noise'." The fact that we hear the motor-cycle, the column on the march, etc. is evidence of the fact that a Dasein "dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand within-the-world". It is further justification for leaving the ontological category of pure intuition far behind. When another person talks to us we already understand what he is talking about, or else we hear "unintelligible words and not a multiplicity of tone data".

1Ibid., p. 207. Hence, the reason for Heidegger's taking Husserl's distinction between unsinn and widersinn to task. Ibid., p. 193. "Only that which is unmeaning can be absurd."

2Ibid. The fact that discourse necessarily discloses Dasein-with is an early statement of Wittgenstein's theory that there cannot be a private language.
The Greeks went so far as to interpret the essence of man as the *zoon logon echon* \(^1\) - the entity which discovers the world and himself through discourse. Heidegger claims that the Greeks had no word for language \(^2\), and, that since they understood the *logos* as assertion, they were able to develop an ontology based upon the merely present at hand. In addition their grammar became logic. Heidegger sees that "The task of liberating grammar from logic requires beforehand a positive understanding of the basic a priori structure of discourse in general as an existentiale." \(^3\) In other words, if ever the proper functioning of words is to be understood apart from logic one must first of all grasp the totalities of concernful dealings because of which and within whose context *Dasein* speaks \(^4\); one must also grasp what these reveal about *Dasein*.

Heidegger's own interpretation of language leaves many basic questions. But its purpose is to introduce this phenomenon in its everydayness and to provide a basis for understanding the being of *Dasein*, "there" in the world. Thus, the basis is already prepared for understanding the everyday functions of discourse, states of mind, and understanding as idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. From the

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 208.  \(^2\) Ibid., p. 209.  
\(^3\) B.T., p. 209. Wittgenstein's programme is the same in this respect.

\(^4\) Surprisingly enough, this is precisely what Wittgenstein meant by his theory that the meaning of a word is its use in the context of a form of life. And it is precisely why he formulated it - to free men's thinking from the "subliming the logic of their language" or from the cramps of thought resulting from misplaced contexts.
character of these phenomena the ontological basis of falling can be ascertained in everyday being in the world alongside of others. This will retroactively reveal the complete temporal structure of language.

5. **Falling : The Temporalized Origins of Everyday Language**

_Daseins_ in their everyday being are faced with a dilemma. They are in the world with others. In their solicitude they reach out to others. But in being with others their talk gets reduced to the average intelligibility. The average intelligibility soon very naturally comes to dominate the talk of _Dasein_ in the world.\(^1\) Hence, idle talk becomes determinate for language and thought. On the other hand if _Daseins_ were not solicitous of others, they would not be _Daseins_, nor would they talk. For it is in the publicness of discourse that the phenomenon of persons with others first gets disclosed to any great extent.

Heidegger describes this idle talk in which everyone engages as "the possibility of understanding without previously making the thing one's own."\(^2\) The word gets passed on. The significance of such a phenomenon is not that it can always be avoided, but that in idle talk everyone covers over his basic possibilities for understanding and thus for grasping his own selfhood or the being of the world in general. The results of such "idling of language" are clearly shown by Heidegger to be the metaphysical pursuits which lead to

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 212.

\(^2\)B.T., p. 213.
technology and the will for power.¹

Idle talk is not alone in covering over a person's possibilities, for curiosity and ambiguity are also everyday ways in which Dasein is in the world. For Heidegger curiosity is a "stand-offish" way of seeing things without concern for their function, nor for understanding.² In curiosity nothing is closed off simply because Dasein never takes a stand. The possibility of being involved in everything and not really anything at all belongs to being in the world. It influences idle talk and is influenced by it.

The result of such rootless ways of being in the world is ambiguity. Not only are we unsure of what can be used and enjoyed and why, but we are also the being to whom this ambiguity belongs as an everyday way of being in the world.³ Such ambiguity leads to an ambiguity of identity in the sense that where Dasein is, is confusedly given in various public and private ways.⁴

This loss of identity to the "they" signals a very basic way in which Dasein is in the world in an everyday sense. Heidegger calls this "fallenness".⁵ He does not mean this in a moral sense, however, but in the sense that everyone must be led along by his absorption in other people. He tells us that this phenomenon itself is characterized by temptation, tranquillizing, alienation, self-

¹See Introduction to Metaphysics and Vortraege and Aufsaetze.
²B.T., pp. 214-217.
³Ibid., p. 217.
⁴Ibid., p. 218.
⁵Ibid., p. 219.
entangling and turbulence. Dasein who has lost his identity in the sleep of the others tries to overcome his alienation by looking for his "self", conceptually. In such pursuit he has become further removed from his authentic self. However, Dasein can fall only because being in the world is an issue for it. Dasein does not fall out of one world into another but loses its grasp on what it is most properly in an everyday sense.

The importance of "falling" for ontology is what it reveals about the everyday Being of persons, and how, in this Being, what might be authentically disclosed can also be obscured in its mere presence or self-evidence. Language in the form of discourse was found to be ontologically determinative for Dasein. This was because its identity depends on how it can be disclosed. But even in a more concrete sense, when man is viewed as the being which talks, discourse is seen to be ontologically constitutive for him.

The last part of Being and Time deals with Heidegger's conception of temporality. For our purposes, however, what is important in Heidegger's treatment of temporality as the unified horizon structure of Care as it is founded upon

1 Ibid., pp. 221-224.

2 Ibid., p. 224. It is interesting in this respect to compare Heracleitus' Fragment 95: "The waking have one common world, but the sleeping turn aside each into a world of his own." (Burnet's translation.)

3 Heidegger reminds us that this is not to be interpreted in a moral sense. Ibid., p. 211.
Dasein's everyday concerns is that the disclosedness ofBeing-in is also shown to be temporalized.\(^1\) Hence, the way in which the meaning of the Being of beings can be articulated is basically temporal. Heidegger claims that is is this fact and nothing else that accounts for the origins of the tenses of our language.\(^2\) Although the understanding is grounded in the future, states of mind in the past, and falling in the present, Heidegger tells us that "in every ecstasis, temporality temporalizes itself as a whole . . ."\(^3\)

Hence, the previous notion of the equiprimordiality of discourse, states-of-mind, and understanding as ways in which Dasein discloses its Being-in-the-world is reiterated by the demonstration of the unity of temporal ecstases. Furthermore, this temporal unity as found in Dasein's disclosedness promises a way not only of writing a more adequate ontology, but also of preparing an adequate language for its articulation. For it has overcome what Heidegger thinks was inappropriate in the traditional approaches to ontology and language.

Moreover, when it is realized that Dasein's understanding must interpret, and that his interpretation is often passed on in assertions, formulated in discourse and preserved in speech, it will also be realized how a temporalized language is the house of Being. How man's potentiality for being which is disclosed in the understanding gets committed to the care of language and thus how it is that from

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 384-401.
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 400.
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 401.
the beginning the business of philosophy should be to develop an ontologically appropriate language - sine qua non.¹

The elucidation of Heidegger's thought on language now enables us to appreciate the following fundamental statement on what he takes to be the distinction between his view of language and that of the tradition. He says:

On the usual view language is held to be a kind of communication. It serves for conversation and mutual understanding, generally for coming to agreement. But language is not only and not primarily an audible and written expression of something to be communicated. It not only furthers the advancement of the overt and the covert as thus meant in words and statements, but language brings what is as something that is into the open for the first time. Where there is no language, as in the being of stone, plant, and animal, there is also no openness of what is and consequently no openness also of that which is not of the empty.

¹Heidegger has shown that the results of not having done so has led to the development of modern western technology. See Vortraege and Aufsaetze, The Question of Being, and Introduction to Metaphysics, as well as What is Called Thinking and "The Age of the World View".

²Martin Heidegger, "Origin of the Work of Art" in Hoffstadter, op. cit., p. 694. This is an expression of Heidegger's view of language as articulation, which might be thought of as Being, putting the pauses in the proper place.
III

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we hope to have clearly established the significance of the following points about Heidegger's conception of language in *Being and Time*:

1. that Heidegger attempts to replace the old ontologies and their approach to language with a more adequate one which articulates what is in terms of a fully temporal language;

2. that his conception of ontology is that of addressing oneself to what is and discussing it as such (λόγος);

3. that Heidegger's conception of truth as "Being-disclosing" in its everyday mode is the basis of his theory of language;

4. that Heidegger implies that truth is temporal;

5. that *Dasein* is the being whose Being can become an issue for it through its addressing itself to that Being in discourse;

6. that the concrete expression of discourse is speech;

7. that the ontological difference of *Dasein* as the being which encounters other beings makes possible the structure of signs;

8. that *Dasein* itself is a sign;

9. that signs depend upon totalities of things ready-to-hand which indicate other entities;
(10) that the totalities of things ready-to-hand are already there in Dasein's concernful dealings and thereby form a more basic kind of readiness to hand by means of which signs can be established;

(11) that things ready-to-hand in the world exhibit the fact that the basic structures of "in-order-to", "in-terms of", "for-the-sake-of" are essentially characteristic of them and that therefore Dasein need only clearly grasp its concernful dealings in order to hear the language of Being;

(12) that Heidegger's treatment of signs (someone shows something that is, to someone through discourse) is a development of Husserl's view of signs in terms of the category of things ready-to-hand and the implications necessitated by his different conception of phenomenology;

(13) that the more general kind of thing ready-to-hand provides the basis for the particularized sign and is what gives its meaning;

(14) that meaning as "the upon which of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something" is the more basic structure which is ready-to-hand in our concernful dealings and is that "significance" towards which signs point;

(15) that meaning is disclosed to and through Dasein and its equiprimordial modes of Being-in-the-world of its concernful dealing as understanding, moods, and discourse;
(16) that Dasein's moods discover that something was already while its understanding projects to the future and thereby temporalizes the world of Dasein;

(17) that even Dasein's purest disclosure of the things that are is an interpretative form of understanding based upon its concernful dealings in the world and that therefore the most basic form of perception has the character of something-as-something;

(18) that assertions are not the primary forms of language but are derived from the more basic form of language as Articulation through the disclosure of Dasein's moodful, interpretative understanding;

(19) that idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity are everyday forms of Dasein's Being-in-the-world which tend to deny the truth, but are not therefore any less essential, for they exhibit the falling of Dasein in terms of which Dasein's pure presence can be grasped explicitly;

(20) that the temporality of Being demands that language be tensed and the Being of temporality (as it gets articulated in understanding, states of mind, and falling) makes this possible;

(21) that in terms of all of the previous considerations language gets shown to have the essential character of being the Articulation of the Being of beings, their modes and their derivatives.

. The further implications of these basic tenets are far reaching indeed. Perhaps in the future some will even
prove to be inadequate for a sound approach to ontology and therefore also to language. Nevertheless, it will be enough for the time being, if we have been able to identify some of Heidegger's most central propositions, to have clarified what they mean, and to have indicated something of their necessity, historical development, and internal interconnectedness. In the words of Heracleitus: "Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men if they have souls that understand not their language."¹

¹Fragment 4 (Burnet's translation).
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