

AN INTRODUCTION TO HEGEL'S

PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND

AN INTRODUCTION TO HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY
OF MIND: A CRITIQUE OF FORMALISM

BY

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PREFACE

For various reasons a revival of interest in the Hegelian philosophy is upon us. The vagueness and obscurities of Hegel's work provide a playground for eager beavers to swarm around in hallucinatory delight. Gustav Mueller in his introduction to his translation of Hegel's Encyclopedia sums up in fine fashion the present state of philosophy and the need for a return to the Hegelian method.

There are good reasons for the Hegel renaissance in the twentieth century. The so-called breakdown of Hegel's "system" signaled the breakdown of human and philosophical culture, whose bitter fruits we have harvested in this century. Hegel requires an "informed consciousness" which is just what was slipping away from us.

The extremes which he saw and integrated in himself have become more extreme; they flew apart in all directions, everyone of them in outcries of derision and contempt against Hegel.

And empty, analytic formalism and intellectualism, devoid of all reality-sense, stands against various forms of irrational immediacies and vitalisms; a dogmatic and moralistic finitism and impatient pragmatic secularism fights against a revived confessionalistic religious fanaticism which confuses progress in physical machinery with human progress is opposed by a desperate "existentialism" - the voice of despairing, isolated soul - lost in mechanical mass-formations and abstractions; the loss of confidence in himself, the loss of his human dignity has its counterpart in dead and meaningless routines: the drifting aimlessness calls for coercion and totalitarian panaceas.

The name of Hegel in this situation is a sign of courage and wisdom, of hope and faith and love - the reaffirmation of an eternal humanism, collected in logical self-comprehension.¹

In the Philosophy of History Hegel says of his own culture that, it "is essentially comprehensive and immediately changes all events into historical representations".² By this Hegel means that observers of Society of his day saw events in an historical context and not as isolated events. In our day, not only are we ourselves overly reflective, but events themselves seem to be reflective in that they undercut their own significance almost in the same instant that they are unfolding. There is a feeling of uneasiness in our souls when we are questioned or question ourselves as to our own convictions and involvement in the burning issues of our time, and must answer that we only became concerned just yesterday. Perhaps, out of this general atmosphere, has come a generation conditioned to look favourably on the Phenomenology of Mind which features pulling the rug out from under at every turn.

Hegel's works require a buffer between them and the student, more so perhaps than any other philosopher. Until now Hegel has not received the scholarly examination by English commentators that Kant has. Commentators have been generally good, but as a rule they tend to treat general principles that give the student little help in wading through the original material. There seems to be no general

work that introduces the dialectical jargon of Hegel's day in a simplified way to enable one to proceed to a reading of Hegel that will not prove entirely fruitless. In this thesis I hope to help in overcoming this problem.

This thesis is an exposition and does not present any critical material.

The program carried out in the Phenomenology of Mind is not a new one. It echoes the philosophical quest for Truth that Plato carried on. Aristotle in the De Anima and elsewhere expresses a genetic development from lower cognitive levels to higher ones.³ Schelling the immediate predecessor of Hegel advocated a system in which mind is shown to arise out of the ooze of nature.⁴ In his Encyclopedia, Hegel, referring to his Phenomenology, states:

One could if one wanted to, show that a vague notion of philosophy is implicit in ordinary thinking. One might begin with immediate sensuous perception and appetite, and show that man is soon driven beyond immediacy towards a feeling and presentment of something higher than himself - an infinite being and infinite will. I have followed this course in my Phenomenology of Mind.⁵

In this thesis I will follow Hegel's development from lower stages of mind to higher ones. Along the way we shall have reason to define certain concepts which characterize certain key notions of the dialectic. We shall see what formalism is and how it develops out of a state of immediacy. Hegel takes consciousness "from the first

crude opposition between itself and the object, up to absolute knowledge."⁶

I shall not trace the development to its ultimate conclusion but stop at the end of 'Consciousness' which constitutes one major section of the book. This much will suffice to give us a clear notion of certain concepts and how Hegel uses them.

INTRODUCTION

A general understanding of central aspects of Kant and Fichte is essential for anyone who hopes to understand the Phenomenology of Mind. Some attention should be given to the similarities and differences between Kant's transcendental method and Hegel's dialectical method, and an understanding of certain key notions of Fichte's dialectic should be helpful.

Kant's introduction into philosophy of the idea of the synthetic activity of mind, stands as one of the most significant innovations in philosophical ideas, the repercussions of which we have not yet heard the last. Hegel's belief that higher forms are more concrete and include within themselves the lower forms as parts or moments¹ can best be understood as a derivation of Kant's idea that a concrete experience can only be broken up into abstract parts for the purpose of analysis and cannot in reality exist apart. (These parts by themselves do not constitute concrete experience; there is no experience without both intuition and the categories.) Aristotle seems to me to have operated from this same principle of concreteness and its priority over abstract parts.² In respect to the theory of number he states: "All these objections, then, and others of the sort make it evident that number and spatial magnitudes cannot exist apart from things."³

The dialectic is not some fantastic invention of the (romantic) idealists but has its beginnings firmly grounded in Kant. Further, the notion of evolution developed in Schelling and Hegel was not born out of the scientific tradition but is decidedly philosophical. Kant's model, treating abstract parts as if they were coming together to form concrete experience served as a model for Hegel's program of carrying out a series of deductions from lower abstractions to higher more concrete ones in the dialectic.

The general feeling of philosophers after Kant was that his philosophy lacked unity. Hoffding in his History sums up this general view. "Totality, the conception of a whole, was felt to be lacking in Kant's doctrine; the living unity of the spirit seemed violated by his work of analyzing and distinguishing;" ⁴ The derivation of the twelve categories had been criticized and questioned. Why should there be exactly twelve categories, and what relationship have they to one another? Hegel interprets Fichte's work as an attempt to make Kant's philosophy into a unitary science.

Kant's transcendental method shows that what is truly known is necessarily known, and that which is falsely claimed to be known can be shown to be impossible to be known. This method takes a known fact and analyzes out of it the components that make this fact necessary. Kant starts out his analysis with the fact that we do have apriori concepts. He then asks himself what condition justifies this fact. He answers

as follows:

The objective validity of the categories as a priori concepts rests, therefore, on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience become possible.⁵

In other words with the hypothesis of a priori concepts the organization of the object must be determined by the concepts. Here we see Kant still under the influence of the Cartesian tradition.

Fichte follows Kant in using the transcendental deduction as a primary tool for philosophical analysis. His article "Critique of Revelation" (which brought him fame) contains an argument about the necessary conditions for a religion that has no theoretical (rational) justification.⁶

Hegel in many ways follows the Kantian method in his writings on religion. The Christian religion, according to Hegel, was positive, which constitutes an historical fact, and so Hegel asks himself what were the conditions that brought this about.⁷ Positivity for Hegel simply means the non spiritual components such as institutionalization, laws and dogmas. It is easy to see then how Kant's method could lend itself to historical analysis. How much did Hegel in his subsequent career change and modify the Kantian method? It is my belief that Fichte's introduction of a unified system and the absolute without contradiction was the moving force behind a total

radicalizing of the transcendental method complete. Kant's method is the method of science which starts with fixed presuppositions. Hegel denies this point of view which he calls formalism and introduces the dialectical method in which the analysis changes the very principle one started out with. For Hegel, philosophy must take what is known and determine if it really is known. As Hegel says, "the familiar is not known because it is familiar".⁸ The Hegelian stress on the absolute and completeness allows for a modification in the transcendental method. Instead of transcendental dialectic destroying only the "beyond", its absolutizing allows it to turn on the very things that gave it life, in Kant's case the categories themselves. The a b c of Hegelian dialectic is simply this. In the process of determining an object, the original object is changed, and a new object arises which contradicts the old object. At the same time the process which developed this new object is itself cancelled. In being cancelled these previous moments are taken up in the new object as dead moments. Thus, a new object arising out of this analysis has its own history or abstract parts. Kant, through analysis, justifies his principle whereas in Hegel's analysis the principle is negated and shown to be incorrect. As opposed to Kant's method of verifying a principle and showing it to be necessary, Hegel's method of analysis shows the principle to be in error and only finite. Negation is a form of determination and in respect to

genetic components it is a process that results in a new object different from that which one started out to analyze. Hegel's dialectic finishes with a stage of comprehension in which the object contains within itself its own negative or process of becoming. If one can imagine a billiard ball being hit by another one, then the resulting activity of the billiard ball is dependent on the ball that hit it and we can say that the process or movement of the ball is outside of itself. In contrast to this, the human organism to a certain extent has its moments or movements within itself. We call this purposeful action. At various points in his life Hegel thought different disciplines embodied this principle of self-determination. He found each of these disciplines such as art, ethics, politics, and religion to imperfectly exemplify the principle and he finally rested on thought or philosophy as the one true principle. Each of these others finds a momentary blossoming in the Phenomenology.

Hegel's criterion for a progressive development is spelled out in the same manner that one might say higher biological organisms are more complex than the lower ones. Hegel's criterion is that objects internally related are higher than objects externally related.

- At a low level of development an object is determined by its environment. An object only becomes related internally to itself if it can incorporate the environment into itself as part of itself. The terms organism and environment we are familiar with and they are terms constantly used

in many disciplines. For philosophy however, they are crucial concepts not to be taken for granted. In these terms then, we can get our first definition of the absolute. The absolute or highest principle is as James puts it: "The absolute is true because it and it only has no external environment, and has attained to being its own other".⁹

The absolute is an organism that has no environment or in other words has incorporated the environment into itself. This is Hegel's restatement of Aristotle's "thought thinking itself".

The Phenomenology is a journey through partial systems to an absolute system, one that is the proper object of philosophy. In the beginning of the Phenomenology we should expect to find an object that has its environment very much external to itself. It is the process of overcoming this relationship by consciousness that constitutes the development which we see in the Phenomenology. The higher on the dialectical scale we are, the more the object we are studying has negativeness within it. This means that the object contains within itself more of the factors which determine what it is. This results in the final object after analysis being not very much different from the object we start with. As we shall see, the natural consciousness which begins the Phenomenology does not have this self-determination, and as a consequence, the judgements or determinations that it puts forward quickly turn into their opposite.

For our limited purpose, we can look at the finite stages in the Phenomenology as levels in a hierarchy which illustrate more or less the extent to which self-determination has entered into the object. In this way we treat the dialectic of the Phenomenology as one which explains the coming together of two systems external to each other, and coalescing into one another. For our purposes it seems to me the correct and most faithful way to proceed is to give full priority to the method. This schema would make the system subservient to the dialectical method. We ignore the intricate problems of Hegel's absolute system, and the form of that system (i. e. the relations between Logic, Nature and Spirit). This interpretation sets aside the problem of the absolute spilling forth into a plurality of nature and then returning to itself through spirit. I will not defend this decision at this time. However, from our analysis of the dialectical method we will propose an hypothesis as to the relation between the Phenomenology and Hegel's subsequent works, especially the Science of Logic.

The Phenomenology is an odyssey out of the cave into the glare of the sun - absolute knowledge. The blinding glare might cause one, on first exposure, to react as Schopenhauer did.

But the greatest effrontery in serving up sheer nonsense in scrabbling together senseless and maddening webs of words, such as had previously been heard only in madhouses, finally appeared in Hegel. It became the most ponderous and general mystification that has ever

existed, with a result that will seem incredible to posterity and a lasting monument of German stupidity.¹⁰

In defence of Hegel, one might say that when one confronts a new language, one does not immediately declare it nonsense and leave it.

CHAPTER I

Definition of Polar Terms

1. Substance versus Subject:

The interaction between subject and substance represents one of the most general movements of the Phenomenology. The movement consists of an attempt to dissolve the distinction between the two.

The hitherto accepted concept of Logic rests upon the assumed separation of the Content of knowledge and the Form of knowledge (Truth and Certainty) - a separation that is assumed, once for all in ordinary consciousness.¹

Ordinary consciousness takes the world as it is, and sees thought as an external application to the world which leaves it untouched. This is Hegel's starting point. At the beginning of the Phenomenology, consciousness takes Truth to be the object "per se", i. e. the object which is independent of the knowing subject. We can generalize this point and say that substance represents an object which is independent of any external relation. Further, the relation of consciousness to the object is one of certainty. Certainty pertains to the "form of knowledge", i. e. how the object is known. Consciousness is certain of its object's truth merely by coming into contact with it.

Kaufmann comments on Hegel's grouping of two sets of terms. The first group including "negative", "determinateness", "subject", "mediation" and "understanding", expresses movement; the latter, including "substance", "immediate" and "intuition", expresses a state of rest.² We might add the term "for itself" to the subject list, and the term "in itself" to the substance list. Kaufmann points to a remote resemblance between substance and Aristotle's concept of matter, and to a similar correspondence between Hegel's subject and Aristotle's Form.³ In Aristotle matter is pure potentiality; it is in the process of becoming something. This does appear to possess something akin to the evolutionary aspects of Hegel's dialectical process, in that the object attains more and more differentiation. However, this idea is not particularly helpful, because in any dynamic system every term is potentially something else, and one could just as easily say subject is matter in that it is potentially substance. The immediate abstract substance of "sense-certainty" does correspond with matter, but substance is not matter generally. In fact Hegel's conception of substance more closely resembles the Spinozian and Aristotelian notions of substance than Aristotle's "matter".⁴

• Substance is that which is self-grounding, that which has independent being.⁵ It is atomic in the logical sense of being unrelated to and independent of anything else. This interpretation fits Kaufmann's definition of the "in itself" as that which is taken by itself, apart from

its relations.⁶ Atomicity by its very definition has no relations.

As we shall see this definition lends itself to spatial relations and Kant's "thing-in-itself". Space and time go hand in hand with the idea that substance is truth. We know from Kant's definition of the intuitions of space and time, that they in no way determine the object; they leave the object untouched and independent. In like manner the Spinozian God has the attribute of being the cause of itself, it has no outer relations, but only relations within itself. Consciousness takes the truth to be autonomous. The only contact consciousness has with this substance is through intuition. The object simply reveals itself as it is. This attitude is commonly called naive realism. Substance can only be intuited or given directly without recourse to a middle term.

Hegel will want to argue that no substance or "thing-in-itself" can resist the power of the negative, and to posit a substance independent of cognition is to remain at the intuitive level. It begins to become clear why Hegel throws the terms substance, intuition and immediacy into the same bag. Hegel associates this simple positing of substance with Kant's pure form of intuition; and Kant's categories with the negative.⁷ For the truth to prevail, Hegel claims that the substance must be invaded by the subject and made into a subject itself. Substance under attack begins to quake and break apart. In Hegel's terms:

The circle that rests closed in itself and, being substance, holds its moments, is the immediate and therefore not perplexing relation. But that the accidental as such, separated from its circumference, that the bounded which is actual only in its connection with others, should gain an existence of its own and separate freedom, this is the tremendous power of the negative; this is the energy of thought, of the pure ego.⁸

As substance is related to intuitionism so the subject is related to formalism. The formalist, as subject, does not recognize his reflections on the object (which reduce the object to a series of relations) as changing the object in any real sense. / Thought is in no sense a threat to the immutable integrity of the object. We shall see this move from intuitionism to formalism take place in the section on Consciousness.

2. Immediacy and Mediation:

Hegel regards certainty as the poorest form of truth, in that it involves nothing more than a simple awareness of the object. To be certain is to be in possession of the facts. To the extent that the object is out of context the person has developed no relation to the truth. In other words he has no criterion for judging it as truth. For example the witness to an accident who says, "Of course I know what happened. I saw it didn't I?" is operating from the attitude of certainty. In Hegel, certainty becomes a subjective attitude toward the object with the characteristics of the immediate and the abstract. "Sense-certainty" represents truth in its weakest form, in which the object is never

really given. The result is about as revealing as a blind man in a hall of mirrors. Human cognition operates within certain limits. At 30 c. p. s. the flickering of a light is apparent, but at 60 c. p. s. it may not be detectable. A man with a better picture taking apparatus may question the other's ability to capture reality adequately. In a like manner higher stages in the Phenomenology question lower stages.

Hegel uses the term "immediacy" as the first moment of his triadic logic, which gives rise to spatial - temporal relations. If two objects are immediate there is no coming together over a period of time; there is no movement: the two objects stand in direct contact with one another.

In contrast, mediation implies a barrier between two related objects. The fact the mediation takes place indicates that the two objects do not stand in a natural relation (internal) to each other, but in some way they have to be brought together.

For a relation is mediate when the terms related are not one and the same, but each is a different term for the other, and is only one with the other in some third term: an immediate relation however, means in fact, nothing else than the unity of the terms.⁹

Hegel is describing a common syllogism in which two terms can only be brought together by a third term which is common to both. Man and ape are related through the more general term primate. Hegel's notion of mediation is exemplified in the general activity of scientific inquiry, in which one takes two seemingly diverse phenomena and

attempts to discover a common underlying base, a connecting link. Hegel joins mediation with that part of thought he calls "Understanding", and he classifies both Aristotle's and Kant's categories as examples of this type of thinking.

Thinkers who regard knowledge as being immediate quite often combine this intuitionism with a good deal of formalistic mediation. This type of thinker vacillates between mystical unity and absolute difference. He either has a tendency to see the universe as an undifferentiated whole or as extremely atomistic with no interaction between parts. (Wittgenstein seems to have embodied both these trends in one career.)

Stace defines "immediacy" very succinctly: "The immediate is the simple and undifferentiated; it stands directly and immediately confronting us, and purports to be in itself the sole truth without reference to anything else".¹⁰ Take for instance the common notion of a simple object of perception such as a chair, in which case it is regarded as complete within itself. Given this conception, a change such as the chair dissolving before our eyes violates this autonomy and constitutes a contradiction of our conception. This is the problem which confronts the formalist in the explanation of change. Fixed principles quickly lose touch with the environment which constitutes their object. Hegel is not opposed to this empirical - rational mode of thinking as long as the thinker is aware of its limitations. Hegel

believes that one who takes a simple object of perception, such as a chair, as an autonomous unity, is soon driven to undermine the stability of the object. Unlike atomism, unity only comes about from a move to the higher not to the lower.

3. Positive and Negative:

Dialectical logic tries to show that implicit in every positing of an object is its negative. The organism represents reality or the positive and the surrounding environment the negative. Ordinary thinking allows us to see that there are several possible relationships between the organism and its environment. In terms of spatial relations, the organism is seen to be completely independent of its environment. Both Kant and Hegel agree that spatial relations do not determine the object in any way.¹¹

Another possible relationship is one in which the environment determines or controls the object or vice-versa. According to Hegel, the more an object or organism is controlled by the environment (i. e. the negative), the more we can say that the object is positive. Earlier we mentioned that Hegel thought the Christian religion was positive. . By this he meant that Christianity's moral principle was forced to compromise itself to accommodate existing conditions. It reflected the corrupt ways of the world and was determined by them to a considerable extent. An object that is completely positive, in interacting with the

environment becomes distorted by the existing conditions. When the object becomes the same as its environment, or as Hegel calls it "its other", this constitutes a negation of the environment or a return to a positive state. As a result of this double negation, any determination by the environment in relation to this new positive state is synonymous with self-determination. The capacity for double-negation or returning to a positive state resides in consciousness or "Spirit". Objects without consciousness are reduced to a state of nature. If negation is total there can be no return to a position that has completely disappeared. This is a description of a state of nature. The more positive the object, the more total is the negation, and the more natural is the resultant state. As we advance in the Phenomenology, the power of the negating factor becomes less and less. The higher the stage of mind at the point of interaction with the environment the less change there will be in the original state of the organism as a result of that interaction. What is required for the double negation is the ability to go out into the environment and yet hold something back in order that one might return. For example, if Christianity possessed spirit then the Reformation may constitute a double negation and a positive state. If on the other hand, Christianity does not possess this spirit which allows it to return to its original state, then the Reformation constitutes a negation of religion.

The possession of "Spirit" or consciousness constitutes control over the environment. It is the capacity for self-regulation.

Higher organisms, for instance the nervous system, jump from one energy level to another in reaction to a stimulus and then return to the original level. We should get some feeling for the rhythm of Hegel's dialectic from an understanding of the triad of sensibility, irritability, and reproduction. Sensibility exists as a state of nature; it does not possess an original state. Sensibility constitutes an awareness of stimuli but does not differentiate. Irritability on the other hand does possess an original state. The organism confronted with irritation displays a desire to be rid of the irritation, to return to a state which is lacking in sensibility. Reproduction represents an even greater degree of control over the environment. Through reproduction the organism gains immortality.

4. Abstract vs. Concrete:

The first moment of the dialectic is abstract in that the determination of the object ignores the relations of the object, taking it in isolation. That is, it disregards essential parts of the object. Ordinary thinking is abstract when it ignores the complexities, such as historical factors. Prejudice and bigotry are the result of abstract thinking and are unavoidable to the same extent that abstract thinking is unavoidable.

An object is abstract or positive when it does not control itself. In sociology the breakdown of the family due to industrialization

illustrates its positive ties with the environment. At the same time the family may contain an autonomous existence which is in conflict with industrialization.

In the first moment thinking is abstract because it takes the object and excludes its environment as an important factor. In the second moment thinking is abstract because it breaks up the object into isolated units. By disregarding the object's integrity the formalist is able to take the properties out of context. The more abstract the object is, the more readily it loses its identity or existence in contact with the environment.

The role of abstraction or negating is to peel away everything that is not essential to the object. At a natural level an object tests itself or determines its own essential nature by interacting with the environment. The more concrete an object the greater is its ability to resist abstraction. The reverse is true of an abstract object. It is vulnerable in its environment. A conservative who thinks abstractly respects the necessity of maintaining the past but fails to discriminate between the good and bad things of the past. Whereas the mature conservative has some criterion for discriminating between these two aspects of the past. Similarly the naive empiricist cannot determine which facts are important and which are not. But as Hegel states in Reason, the mature scientist has certain criteria for evaluating the factors involved.¹² Sense-certainty does not possess this ability to

discriminate.

When Hegel calls an object abstract he usually means that that object has not developed all its possible relations with the environment. An organism explores a series of ploys trying to find a relation that will allow it to stay as it is. In Hegel's dialectic there are three general principles:

- (a) Every object desires to stay the same.
- (b) For an object to stay the same it is forced to change and become the opposite of itself.
- (c) The object returns to itself through circuitous routes that involve assimilating its environment.

Expressed in more naturalistic terms, every object wishes to remain the same, but if it cannot it will compromise. Nature has its movement initiated from outside and has no alternative but to succumb to change. But "Spirit" as the negation of nature has taken nature up into itself and embodies both rest and change. The ideal of "Spirit" is to return to its original state. To the extent that nature blocks this smooth return, consciousness is alienated from itself. Consciousness must lose itself in the object in order to return to itself.

...; it is the necessity compelling spirit to enrich the share self-consciousness has in consciousness, to put into motion the immediacy of the inherent nature (which is the form which the substance is present in consciousness);...¹³

A timid spirit is one which is unsure of itself, having just stepped naked out of nature, and is unwilling to engage battle with the contingencies of

nature for fear of losing itself.

In the Phenomenology the return of self is in the form of inferences on the part of consciousness concerning the relations between itself and the object. Consciousness moves from itself to the object and finds that these are not the same. The desire to return to itself is expressed by an attempt on the part of consciousness to remake the object in its own image.

In the Phenomenology, Hegel alternates the theoretical and practical sections but they are really similar activities. For instance, self-consciousness (which is a practical section) desires something and through its action it hopes to transform nature into the thing it desires. When the subject agrees with the object then one has reached the stage of "absolute knowledge". The new object of knowledge holds within itself a return to itself and this is Logic.

CHAPTER II

Hegel's Preface to the Phenomenology

In the Preface Hegel discusses three major topics: intuitionism, formalism, and comprehension. I will discuss these three and place each in more prominent relief by giving more concrete examples than the vague allusions that Hegel makes.

1. Intuitionism:

Kant was the last of the enlightenment philosophers. The turn to romanticism which followed reflected a general shift in interest from the natural sciences to areas such as politics, religion, and aesthetics. Kant's arguments against transcendent metaphysics have affected every philosophy that was developed after him. The new catch word was "immanence" (God is the ground of our being etc.).

To the romantics and Hegel, however, Kant's limitation of reason to the finite and the antinomies that result as one goes beyond the finite were not satisfactory. Perhaps some other medium could reach the infinite. Such substitutes as the highly intuitive aesthetic and religious experience were brought forward. Hegel's own development shows him progressing from one arena to another in search of some way

to express a unity that overcomes all dualisms. Richard Kroner in an excellent introduction to Hegel's theological writings describes Hegel's early development through religion, aesthetics and organicism to his final stage - philosophy.¹

To a certain extent, the Phenomenology retraces this development through immature positions. The early phases are stop gaps until Hegel can realize a logic that he thinks answers Kant's philosophy. These early positions were helpful to the extent that they gave life to static thought categories. If the categories ran into contradictions it was no longer because one had gone beyond finite representations but because the categories themselves were inadequate. Hegel's philosophy demanded that the categories be reworked to accommodate new and diverse phenomena.

Hegel claimed that his age was securely grounded in the empirical world of experience, in which intricate complex thought was compressed into a simple experience of the moment. "The bare feeling of the divine"² Hegel's criticisms of intuitionism may be readily accepted by most as the usual arguments of a rationalist. Any formal system which sets rigid limits to its extent always gives rise to poetic expression. Immediate intuitions are only the outside limits of a system and stop gaps until thought determinations can catch up with the changing situation. Mysticism is possible because we know grammar. Intuitionists bring out the inadequacies of the past, for they are the first

to feel something new, but they express the future badly. The word that Hegel puts against intuitionism is "comprehensiveness". The dictionary defines intuition as an instantaneous comprehension.

As in Kant's philosophy, in Hegel there is a working out which takes time. The object is run over by the hands and held before the eyes.

In order, therefore, to treat accurately and unconfusedly of vision, one must bear in mind that there are two sorts of objects apprehended by the eye - the one primarily and immediately, the other secondarily and by intervention of the former.
(Touch)³

The intuitionist forgets this coordination with the tactile. Touch demands constant contact and consequently in running through a series of objects does not hold them together. This ability is the property of sight. Something of the meaning of intuition is carried over in Hegel's use of the word "immediacy".

To do justice to all philosophies Hegel begins his dialectical odyssey with the emptiness of the immediate. Intuitionism, which claims to give us the clearest perceptions because there are no intervening stages, really does not have any object at all and thus is the most formal of systems. Intuitionism and rationalism have much in common. One picks up where the other left off. After enunciating a few intuitive principles, further deductions follow in a rational manner. In the Preface Hegel has Schelling in mind as Kaufmann attests.⁴

Hegel teaches that bad empiricism and rationalism lead to mysticism. In any rational system there is always that irrational nothingness of the beyond, which serves only to reinforce the systemizer's belief that he is quite justified in staying within the system and not venturing forth. He is low in spirit for he feels threatened by the new. One method of escape is to indulge in the word game in which one generalizes the language until one hopes it will include everything. The Marxist definition of "matter" has undergone this process. To sustain the materialistic base against outside attacks, the meaning of terms such as "matter" are constantly expanded.

The intuitionist is a piece of meat afraid to go into the grinder lest it become ground beef. The man says, "Take me as I am", and I answer, "Take me as I am." It is a human trait to comprehend one's own position, but only intuit the positions of others for fear one's own position will crumble if one attempts to understand another.

Intuitionism crops up when rationalism becomes excessive, idiotic and dogmatic. The old saying holds true that revolutionaries are made not born. Young people are only as ridiculous as their elders. Each extreme has a developed system of communication that works effectively within its own bounds, but which cannot accommodate the opposing group which stands apart and is intuited without being comprehended. To an extent our conditioned lives prevent us from seeing ourselves until we come into conflict with opposing beliefs. It

had already been brought out in Fichte's dialectic how negation leads to self-realization. Hegel, in the liberal tradition, preaches tolerance through involvement with one's enemies. It is in no way evident that humanity has risen to this level of spirituality.

2. Formalism:

Hegel's discussion of Formalism interests us more than Intuitionism because it quickly brings us closer to his own philosophy and at the same time allows us to introduce important material of his predecessor Fichte which will facilitate an understanding of the Phenomenology of Mind. Hegel's description and criticism of formalism puts his own position of comprehensiveness in a clearer light. I have chosen Fichte's philosophy as the stooge representing formalism. Since Fichte and Hegel use the same dialectical method the difference between Fichte's supposed formalism and Hegel's comprehensiveness should be more clearly visible. In essence what Hegel is saying in the Preface is that formalism is the application of predicates to an object according to some abstract principle.⁵ However we should not conclude that Fichte himself makes all the typical errors of formalism. From an historical viewpoint we shall see that Fichte next to Hegel is the least formalistic.

Hegel states of Fichte's philosophy:

The Fichtean philosophy has the great advantage of having set forth the fact that philosophy must be a

science derived from one supreme principle,
from which all determinations are necessarily
derived.⁶

However it is Hegel's contention that Fichte employs this "supreme principle" in a formalist manner. He describes the formalist procedure as an activity of applying certain principles to objects on the basis of criteria external to that object without due regard for the relations of the object.⁷ Hegel equates Fichte's method with that of the geometer, who relates parts of his object which are external to each other. His activity reflects the operation of the mathematician.⁸

It does not consider e. g. the relation of the line to the plane, and when it compares the diameter of the circle with the circumference it comes up against incommensurability i. e. a relation of the concept, something infinite that escapes mathematical determination.⁹

The curse of formalism is its inability to overcome subjectivity to get to the objective. The subjective person determines his experience in accordance with his own nature. The reason formalism is a curse is that the formalist in omitting certain attributes of the object is condemned to generate contradictions and as in the quote above have a great deal of irrational material left over. Hegel views Kant's antinomies as arising out of the formal thinking of the understanding. More recent evidence of the inadequacies of formalism can be seen in the mechanistic method applied in biology.

The formal thinker makes differentiations in the object but consciousness is never sure whether these distinctions are really in the object. Any subjective method is necessarily formalistic. In Kant's philosophy all phenomena are determined by the categories of the mind but whether these phenomena are actually part of the "thing-in-itself" we can never know. With the same point in mind, Hegel states of Fichte's philosophy:

....he has not grasped this principle of the ego as Idea, but solely in the consciousness of the activity which we exercise in knowing and consequently it is still laid hold of in the form of subjectivity.¹⁰

Fichte analyzes the activity of knowing, but he leaves out an analysis of the object known. What is known is completely subordinated to the knowing process.

Fichte begins his deduction with the absolute unity of the "acting ego", which is a unity of subject and object.

This principle is at first abstract and deficient, because in it no differences, or a formal difference only, is expressed; whereas, the principle should possess a content; a subject and predicate are indeed distinguished in it, but only for us who reflect upon it, i. e. in itself there is no difference and consequently no content.¹¹

In this instance whether or not Hegel's interpretation of Fichte, is or is not correct, is not our concern. Our purpose in citing Hegel at this point is to facilitate an understanding of Hegel's concept of an objective idea. The quote suggests Hegel's difference from Fichte

and the necessary form that the Phenomenology is going to take.

Hegel sees the move from Fichte to himself as a movement from the reflective stage of philosophy to the historical. If the development of the object must not take place solely in the ego, then, according to Hegel, the development must take place partly in the object itself. This means that the philosopher's role is relegated to that of an historian of objects which possess self-determination. The one object that does possess this self-determination is "knowledge" which is the object of scrutiny in the Phenomenology of Mind. If the object develops its own distinctions then the actual working out is not done by the philosopher. Consciousness or knowledge develops itself in time. This is what Hegel calls History.¹²

In his description of objectivity Hegel is offering us what he feels is a better definition of truth than the rational or intuitive. Whether in fact it is superior to the intuitionist and rationalist methods he criticizes remains to be seen. A few examples might give Hegel's idea more plausibility.

From what we have said it should be clear why Hegel believed his own philosophy could not go beyond his own time. To do so would be to engage in speculation that is purely in the subject, leaving the object which is in the present. Hegel does not say other disciplines cannot speculate, for indeed, humans anticipate the future every day; but he does deny this activity to philosophy. The thinker can

let his thoughts race into the future, but they will always be subjective and formal. This is to say that to a certain extent rational predictions ignore the object. The object simply may not go on the course desired. Rationalist doctrine desires to make the future subservient to the present. It does this by ^{ign}ing and glossing over certain factors in the object. Rationalists try to non-temporalize the object, allowing them to deny the freedom of the object to determine itself. The bane of the rationalists' life is that irrational rabble which is always complaining and really counts for nothing. Cybernetics as a tool for control lies somewhere between these two. It appears to have something in common with Hegel's method in that it has a built-in factor for determining the consequences of a command and making adjustments to this new result.

Marx has followed Hegel in arguing against formalism. "In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this sidedness of his thinking."¹³ Marx accepts the historical limitations of any view. This historical aspect of the object is brought out, as well, in modern Phenomenology. Its program, which involves allowing the object to appear as it is, is in keeping with Hegel's objectivism. However Hegel also stresses the importance of formalistic determinations that precede and enable the object to appear as it is. Hegel would argue that to take a simple object of perception as it is and reflect on which properties do or do not belong to it will result in a series of contradictions.

One is forced to take the object as an historical phenomenon.

In Fichte's deductions one feels a sense of arbitrariness because it is Fichte himself who is making distinctions, like a mathematician. He states that once the reflective activity of the philosopher has been completed it can then be discarded, much like the logician who claims to discover logical truths which are independent of their mode of discovery. Hegel argues that the medium to the truth must be part of the truth. To deny this is to accept a separation between thought and its object. Hegel's dialectic demands that every thought determination must find its way into the object as a real process if that thought is to be objective. Part of the object of knowledge then, are the previous attempts of philosophers to determine the object. Fichte as the immediate predecessor of Hegel (forgetting Schelling for the moment) exemplifies the philosophy closest to Hegel's. The difference is that Fichte's determinations, carried out by the ego, now find themselves developed in the object. The medium is historical rather than subjective. To the extent that Hegel's philosophy is historical it is parasitic on all previous philosophies. Hegel's interpretation of the development of historical thought is that it develops from more abstract thought to become increasingly concrete; that thought more and more agrees with the object it determines. The form, then, of Hegel's dialectic is the same as Fichte's but the content is different.

Before proceeding to the more controversial topic of the activity of the object in incorporating thought determinations, it is necessary to introduce very briefly Fichte's dialectic. As a source we have used Fichte's Science of Knowledge.¹⁴ I have condensed over a hundred pages of Fichte's book into a very few and the treatment is less than satisfactory. However I have tried to lift just enough material to enlighten us about the dialectical method which will help us in understanding the Phenomenology as well as formalism. A more adequate treatment of Fichte would have resulted in a scrapping of the original topic.

Fichte takes over the idea of form and content from Kant. Form is the relation of a given content. In the judgement - gold is a body - the content is gold and body, and the relation between them is their form. Fichte shows that the first principle of his logical science must be identical in form and content, that is, they must determine each other.¹⁵ Fichte desires a first principle that will give rise to a unitary science and in essence he thinks he has found it in Kant's transcendental ego.

Transcendental philosophy, in seeking for its concepts, has the advantage and also the duty of proceeding according to a single principle. For these concepts spring, pure and unmixed, out of the understanding which is an absolute unity; and must therefore be connected with each other according to one concept or idea.¹⁶

Fichte's pure ego is identical both in form and content. This means that the ego and its relation to itself or its positing of itself are one and the same thing. In this system then the form will determine the content and vice versa. Whenever this is not the case we shall see that there is a movement to make it the case. The contradictions that develop in formalism force consciousness to take the content into account. According to Fichte the self-transcendence of the ego i. e. its self-positing activity is inherently contradictory. Hegel appropriates this first principle; it is what he means by the objective idea. The content or object known must be identical with its relation or how it is known. Consciousness goes through a series of judgements which at first do not possess this identity, but gradually become so as one moves to higher levels of mind and the object incorporates more and more of its relations within itself.

The nature of Fichte's first principle determines the system to follow. His first principle is self-contained, which means it cannot be proven.¹⁷ To do so would involve the application of an external element which constitutes a contradiction of the original requirement embodied in the principle itself. To be an absolute truth this principle must be self-grounding; the relations of the systems being determined by the content and vice versa. Fichte's reason for demanding this of his first principle is that he is searching for a science that is true for all time. This is like a formal logic; it is ahistorical and non-Hegelian.

Fichte argues that formal logic is only possible because of his first principle.

From this first principle two further principles are derived. The second principle is determined in form, but not in content. It corresponds to formal logic and is an abstraction from the first principle. The third principle has a determined content but an undetermined form.¹⁸ This third principle is an abstraction from the second and unlike the second, which is analytic, it is a synthetic principle. By synthetic we mean the determination of form which determines and brings together the previous positions that have issued out of analysis. This form determines the object brought before consciousness in the judgement.

What Fichte is doing here will become clearer after we have explored all the elements germane to the system. We will proceed with an explanation of three concepts: determined, undetermined and abstraction.

First I will discuss abstraction. It is important to note the creative way in which Fichte uses Kant's distinction between transcendental logic and formal logic. Fichte defines formal logic as a separation of the form from the content by means of what he calls "abstraction". "No abstraction is possible without reflection".¹⁹ It is this aspect of thought which leads Fichte to his three principles.²⁰ By judgement Fichte is not only referring to the sentence but also to the act of representing on the

part of the ego. The ego in positing itself necessarily posits what it is not and at the same time is aware of this relation which constitutes a reflection on a reflection. To discuss his first principle Fichte considered the formal schema A is A .

In the formal statement - A is A , the content is left out, i. e. it is abstracted; the givenness of " A is" is not important. We say this statement is true because it expressed the correct form. This abstraction which allows for formal logic is a negation of the content of the first principle, i. e. the principle of identity of form and content. This process of abstraction is carried on by the reflective thinker. He possesses the capacity to negate the content, to leave the object out and take the form or relation as its object. From the first principle we know that in every judgement there is both a form and a content, therefore the liberation of the form to become content demands a new form. The negation of content in the second principle means that a new content must arise to take its place. This follows from the first principle which states that in every judgement there is both a form and content. Abstraction then constitutes a separation of form and content as a result of a negating action on the part of the thinking subject or ego. This ability to abstract allows the object of consciousness to be seen as existing outside of consciousness and independent of it. However, the role of the philosopher takes him beyond this formal activity to a reflection on this reflection or a double negation.²¹ The philosopher

takes this reflection as his content and the process of determining this new object constitutes transcendental logic, i. e. a concentration on the mode or relation to Consciousness of the presentation of the object. It is important to note this activity of negating. Hegel points out that consciousness has to overcome the inability to negate the object presented to it or in consequence be unaware of its relation to the object. The inability to negate means that consciousness ignores the relational factor.

It is Fichte's purpose to show that both the form and content of "A is A" are dependent on an activity of the pure ego. If ego posits "A is A", the negation of the content is dependent upon ego's having also posited "A is". Pure ego exemplifies Fichte's first principle. It has the ability of positing itself through itself. Fichte is expressing in a more formal manner Descartes' "I think, therefore I am". Since reflection involves abstraction of content the pure ego is never an object to itself as a result of the absolute unity of form and content it possesses. We never have the transcendental ego before us as an object, because to be conscious of it would involve stepping outside of it and presenting it as a content independent of its form which would involve a contradiction of the first principle.²² Objects of consciousness demand this abstracting activity. Using transcendental deduction Fichte shows that formal logic is only possible because of the nature of the pure or transcendental ego.

Now I will discuss the terms conditioned and unconditioned. The first principle is conditioned both in form and content. The second is unconditioned in form but conditioned in content. Fichte derives his second principle from the first by stating the formal logical statement "not A = not A". The content "not A" is conditioned in that it is dependent on ego's positing "A". To be conditioned or determined means to be dependent on something else for what it is.²³ The form is unconditioned in that the act of negating is not dependent on any element in the first principle. If it is unconditioned then it cannot be proven.

In the first principle ego posits itself. In the second it posits the non-ego. The non-ego as content is determined by the ego. Since in the first principle form and content were reciprocally determined, then if we negate the content, it follows that the form is left undetermined. It is this second principle which allows the ego to distinguish itself as subject, from the object or non-ego which it represents. Thus a distinction is introduced between subject and object. When the natural soul acquires this power of negating it becomes "conscious".

In the third principle the form is conditioned and the content unconditioned. The third principle arises as an answer to the contradiction between the first and second principles. In the first two stages we are faced with a contradiction in that, in positing itself the ego has posited a non-ego independent of itself which contradicts the pure unity of the ego. The role of the third principle is to determine a new relation between

ego and non-ego which will resolve the contradiction. In this case the new relation is quantity replacing quality. With a quantitative relation the ego can interact with the non-ego and yet remain pure at the same time. By splitting itself up into parts the ego is able to distinguish between its true self and parts of itself which can equally belong to the non-ego. It is a reflection on a reflection, which negates the form of the two previous principles. Thus it is determined in form but the content is left undetermined. The determinate form of this third principle corresponds to Kant's synthetic 'a priori' categories. The content is what must be deduced, i. e. it is to be discovered what content will fit the form of the third principle. The form of the third principle regulates the determination of all possible objects of experience.

In this triad the object that will fit and reconcile the contradiction between ego and non-ego is a divisible ego and non-ego. The second principle must be reconciled with the first in order to maintain the identity of the ego. In the third principle Fichte introduces the idea of limit and at the same time the idea of quantity. In the first two principles the relations were qualitative. Fichte deduces the category of quantity from the category of quality. With the introduction of quantity the limitation or determination is only partial. Mutual limitation of the ego and non-ego demands that the limit be divisible and quantitative.²⁴

In a series of reflections the philosopher uncovers a determinate category

which solves the contradiction. The third principle justifies the synthetic a priori and is the method established for the rest of the deductions. Until now, we have merely described the steps Fichte has taken in his first triadic deduction. That we are very close to Hegel's own dialectic is clear from this statement in the Encyclopedia:

There are three aspects in every thought which is logically real or true: The abstract or rational form, which says what something is; the dialectical negation, which says something is not; the speculative concrete comprehension: A is also that which it is not, A is non-A.²⁵

It becomes more clear as to what Fichte is attempting to do. These first three principles embody Kant's transcendental ego; his category of quality, which subdivides into Reality, Negation and Limitation; and finally the category of quantity. Ego posits reality ("A is") as a thesis, then the opposite is posited, and finally these two are reconciled in the third category of limitation. From the first principle of the absolute identity of the ego, Fichte deduces all the categories in a necessary series. He follows the transcendental philosophy, taking the self-positing ego as absolutely known and deducing a set of categories that make this principle true.

It is often said in defense of the idealist that by mind he means universal Mind, but according to Fichte's strict deduction, the universal Mind can have no different cognition than the finite individual mind, and it must intuit space and time to keep its identity pure. The appeal to an

objective mind is thus superfluous.

The ego and the environment reciprocally determine each other and yet have distinct identities. Fichte tries to show that the categories necessarily develop in a certain order to overcome this contradiction. The three principles constitute thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The thesis guarantees a unified system; the abstraction and positing of an opposite supplies diversified content for the system; and the synthesis supplies form. If Hegel adopts this dialectical schema to his own objective purpose we should see his object (knowledge) develop from what it is into what it is not, at the beginning losing itself but gradually as it assimilates more and more of its environment becoming less distinct from its antithesis.

A general notion that will lead us directly to the Phenomenology is Fichte's deduction of lower principles from higher ones. "A conception is higher in proportion as the mediating conceptions, whereby it is deduced from the highest (that of reality), are less."²⁶ Quality precedes quantity; after quantity comes the category of relation; and finally, the lowly intuitions of space and time. In contrast, Hegel's Phenomenology moves from the lowest to the highest. In the Phenomenology, the more mediation carried out the higher the concept. Whereas Fichte works from his own position backwards, Hegel starts from the beginning and works toward Fichte's position. However in that both systems are circular and beginning and end are both equally necessary, they are not

in this sense radically different systems.

Next we will discuss Hegel's criticism of Fichte's method and his own solution to it. Hegel says of the Fichtean philosophy:

This is the first rational attempt that has ever been made to deduce the categories; this progress from one determination to another is however, only an analysis from the standpoint of consciousness and is not in and for itself.²⁷

Here again Hegel is attacking the subjectivism of Fichte. The object should not be developed by but through itself, by its own initiative.

With this reflection a false point of view was at once introduced, namely that contained in the old conception of knowledge, of commencing with principles in this form and proceeding from them; so that the reality which is derived from such a principle is brought into opposition with it.²⁸

Fichte starts with the principle of the pure act of the ego and deduces from it the phenomenal world which is alien to it. Over against this free acting ego Fichte posits the absolutely determined phenomenal world. In the Vocation of Man he states: "Everything that exists is determined throughout; it is what it is, and nothing else."²⁹ Fichte's absolutely free ego and absolutely determined phenomena find a modern restatement in Sartre's Being and Nothingness.

Hegel argues that the ego is not an oasis in the desert. As we have seen it is Hegel's contention that any subjective position that is abstract and formal will necessarily produce its own contradiction or opposite. For Schelling and Hegel the universe must be a friendly place

for the human spirit. Any formalist philosophy will result in an irrational, highly poetic description of man's soul. For Hegel, the objects of consciousness must develop their own freedom. The ego of Fichte does not find itself in the world, but finds itself hemmed in. If one begins with fixed principles, these principles will remain external to the things they set out to explain, much as a rational plan will ignore future contingencies. The major change Hegel makes in Fichte's philosophy is to take the freedom of the ego and put it over into the object. It is the purpose of the Phenomenology to show how this liberation of the object takes place in the history of knowledge. The development involves a constant interaction between subject and object - to make the object like the subject, i. e. free. In doing this the subject becomes truly free. In a somewhat analogous way one could say that no one is truly free until all are free, because the forces that bind others may bind oneself as well. Fichte's formalism consists in isolating the subject from the object, so that the ego has nothing in common with its environment; it is the ultimate irrationality; it is there because it is there, it is the thing in itself.

3. Comprehensiveness:

Comprehensiveness in analysis requires that none of the relations of the object be overlooked. The object does not have different perspectives. One of the relations of an object is its relation to a

conscious subject and so in any analysis of the object this important relation cannot be ignored. For Hegel objectivity arises only when the program of the Phenomenology is almost complete. The program consists of a series of subjective stages. In the preliminary stages the subject possesses the power to negate but the object does not; its freedom is merely formal. Only after going through this series of subjective stages does one reach the final state of science. At the completion of the program the subject is assured of finding spirit in the object. The subject does not move out of itself and find an alien environment. A fruitful statement by Aristotle in the De Anima seems to sum up this development from unlike and like.

As we have said, what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the other and is identical in quality with it.³⁰

At the subjective level of spirit the subject does not want to participate in the environment and chooses to ignore it. However Hegel will show in the Phenomenology that this subjective spirit is soon forced to go out and make over the object in its own image. This assumption is based on the logic of self consciousness which Hegel has adopted from Fichte. This self consciousness possesses the capacity to relate itself to the environment and maintain itself over against that environment.

Scientific knowledge, . . . , demands precisely that we surrender to the life of the object or - and this is the same - that we confront and express its inner necessity. ³¹

It is Hegel's belief that the most comprehensive analysis requires a study of the history of the object. The historical object possesses two aspects. First, the natural aspect consists of that part of the object which changes, i. e. becomes something different. Whereas the second, the logical or substantial aspect of the object will remain the same through time. It is not subject to change. This second aspect is the middle term which logically unites the series, i. e. the various phases of the natural aspect. From Kant's treatment of substance we know that both these moments i. e. rest and change, are equally dependent on each other. In the formal approach to the understanding these two moments are seen as opposites which are irreconcilable. The "comprehensive" attitude or what Hegel calls the Concept takes these two moments as part of a third.

Any combination of rest and change involves a teleology. Hegel makes a distinction between rational teleology and his own notion of dialectical teleology. The Phenomenology of Mind, for instance, is a rational teleology because the end is not present to the naive consciousness at the beginning. Hegel wants to show in the Phenomenology that behind the movements of this natural consciousness lies the ideal dialectic teleology, which constitutes the real goal of consciousness. The naive

consciousness does not view its interaction with the environment as an actualization of itself, but only as an expedient move on its part.

Consciousness at this point does not see itself as having a relation to the object which is really part of what it is.

When Hegel uses the term "not yet for itself" he is expressing this lack of having one's own ends before oneself. In a rational teleology one takes into account the process and the apparent end, but if these terms are brought together arbitrarily the end may be purely accidental, that is, it could easily have been something else as a result of its dependence on environmental factors.

Hegel demands that a philosopher be comprehensive, and not a natural scientist. Most of our empirical studies are limited to the rational; the ends are nearly always different from what they were thought to be in the beginning. To be comprehensive then, the philosopher can only analyze those objects which are completed, i. e. not in the process of becoming. If an object is not complete it cannot be studied philosophically.

Hegel has often been accused of stating that history had been completed in his own time. It should be recognized that Hegel is forced into this position by his criterion of surrendering to the object. One method of studying history consists in locating an event in a set of circumstances and proceeding to say that such and such happened because of such and such factors. Hegel's method differs from this

formal method in that he leaves the event a certain amount of freedom to develop itself. This is not to say that he gives events an irrational freedom which renders them unexplainable. In using the logic of self-consciousness Hegel analyzes an object with respect to its own self development, or how it sees itself in regard to surrounding circumstances. This done, then and only then can the philosopher with benefit of hindsight view the event in its formal aspects, i. e. the results which the object itself did not foresee. Formalism only has meaning once the freedom (limits) of the object has been delineated. An object in the present does not possess this formal future and thus Hegel must treat the object as complete in itself.

The development in the Phenomenology incorporates both the formal and comprehensive method. One can equate the formal with rational teleology and comprehensive with dialectical teleology. Comprehensively each stage of the Phenomenology is allowed to develop itself out of its own position. Formally each stage is seen as inadequate in relation to successive stages, which consciousness did not foresee at all. Why, then, does the philosopher follow this method? In dialectical analysis the object must reflect in it the means or mode of its being known by consciousness. In this case the mode of knowing is being self-conscious. The conscious human being is aware of a self that is complete in the present moment, but at the same time goes beyond this self in relating self to a non-self. Fichte's dialectic posits

a self, a non-self and a relationship between these which maintains the integrity of both. The object in history, however, does not have its future, i. e. the equivalent of a non-self, or what is not before it in a concrete sense. As an historian Hegel could step in as a formalist, as he clearly sees what the object is not, and by relating what it is not with what it thought itself to be can realize a truer understanding of what was going on. The farther one goes into the past the more one is likely to find an attitude one can criticize as having little historical sense, i. e. little awareness of its historical significance. As one approaches the present, the philosopher becomes progressively more passive and less critical of the object. Hegel as a philosopher advocates the status quo. It is hard to see how a good revolutionary would make a good philosopher and vice-versa. It would be interesting to examine the history of political theory to determine whether in general those who employ a rational method are usually revolutionary, while the more empirical theorists are conservative. If so one would expect that Hegel's method is more closely allied with empiricism. If Marx in fact adopted Hegel's dialectical method it would seem one should make a clear distinction between Marx the historical analyst and Marx the political pamphleteer. There have always been two opposing factions in Marxism; one being concerned with the belief in the freedom of individuals to interact with reality and help mould history, the second faction being the determinists who stress the historical circumstances. Lenin, a follower

of the first method, was in constant battle with the more slavish determinists who argued that Russia must first pass through a capitalist stage.

CHAPTER III

Hegel's Introduction to the Phenomenology

Hegel's introduction is more clearly expressed and more specifically related to the form of the Phenomenology than the broad generalities of the Preface. The Preface deals with the proper attitude of philosophy, whereas the Introduction treats the nature of the object to be studied. It is the character of the object, i. e. knowledge, which necessitates the method advocated in the Preface.

The overall dialectical movement in the Phenomenology consists in consciousness incorporating the necessary form or movement of the Phenomenology into the object it is conscious of. From Fichte's dialectic we saw that consciousness could only bring the form of an object before it, if it negated the content. At each succeeding stage of the Phenomenology content is negated and the accompanying form of this original content becomes the new content of the next stage. As the negation of content proceeds each new form more closely approximates the form of the whole Phenomenology, i. e., the relation between all the different stages. The Phenomenology starts out with a form that is alien to its object but ends with this form being an integral part of the object.

What is this negating power which brings the form of an object into the object as a necessary part of it, i. e. what causes form and content of knowledge to be identical? What is the moving principle that speeds us along on this "highway of despair" ? Hegel answers these questions for us in the Introduction.

He begins by asking whether it is necessary to his examination of "knowledge" to establish some criterion for control.¹ If the stages of knowledge as treated in the Phenomenology are in error or incomplete then what is the criterion for deciding if they are in error? If there is a criterion for deciding this, does not this criterion constitute a pre-supposition? Hegel rejects the notion that a criterion of this type is necessary. Unlike Fichte's philosophy the movement cannot be initiated by the reflection of the philosopher. The object or content which Hegel is presenting to us is taken as it is, to develop itself through its own efforts. The form of the Phenomenology is shown to issue out of the content itself i. e. "knowledge". At the beginning only the observing subject sees the movement as the necessary one but at the end the object has incorporated this movement as a necessary part of itself. The end of the Phenomenology is the unification of notion and object, and, substance and subject.

The terminus is at that point where knowledge is no longer compelled to go beyond itself, where it finds its own self, and the notion corresponds to the object and the object to the notion.²

Hegel says here that consciousness is "compelled to go beyond itself" - the question is, why is it compelled to go beyond, i. e. to negate itself? Natural consciousness ("will prove itself to be only knowledge in principle or not real knowledge. Since however it immediately takes itself to be the real and genuine knowledge..."³) at each stage sees itself as positing real knowledge. If consciousness sees itself able to posit "real knowledge" what causes consciousness at another point to deny or negate this knowledge? Consciousness engages in the dual activity of positing what is real and also correcting this assertion subsequently. This means that consciousness has the negative within it. In different words Hegel states the same thing as follows: "consciousness, however, is to itself its own notion".⁴

To the extent that consciousness limits itself it distinguishes itself from what lies outside it, i. e. the independent object in the environment that exists separate from it. In like manner, in positing an object it also goes beyond this object to the surrounding environment of the object. It is this going beyond which is characteristic of consciousness and not characteristic of nature, and which initiates the movement toward Science. Consciousness, interpreted in traditional terms of knowledge, consists of a three part system: consciousness, the object of consciousness and the relation between the two. For consciousness to have an object before it, it must first distinguish itself from that object and stand in relation to that object. This is the

essence of consciousness as distinct from soul, which precedes it and fails to make these distinctions.

The relation of the object to consciousness - the object "for consciousness" Hegel calls "knowledge". The independent object of consciousness Hegel calls "truth".⁵ This truth possesses "being in itself". It possesses this nature as a function of the nature of consciousness, which originally posits the independent character of the object.

At the same time consciousness is in a relation to that object. Consciousness has within itself both a subjective and an objective mode. In endowing consciousness with the ability to posit objects independent of itself, one might argue that Hegel has given the subjective mind too much power. However, it is only this interpretation that makes any sense of the correspondence theory of truth. For Hegel, the independent object of consciousness is really the result of consciousness. In this way, consciousness can determine whether its knowledge in fact approximates the truth. To quote Hegel:

At the same time this "other" is to consciousness not merely "for it", but also outside this relation, or⁶ has a being in itself, i. e. there is the moment of truth.

Hegel's arguments here are very similar to the internal criteria that empirical realists use in arguing that we can distinguish illusion from the real. Husserl argues in the same way in his book Ideas.⁷

Not only does consciousness have these two notions of truth and knowledge, but it also has the capacity to compare the two to see if they agree.

Since both are for the same consciousness, it is itself their comparison; it is the same consciousness that decides and knows whether its knowledge of the object corresponds with this object or not.

On the basis of this capacity to compare, consciousness develops from stage to stage always trying to bring knowledge into closer agreement with truth. Consciousness is insecure knowing that the object is external to itself and its label or naming may be an empty notion devoid of truth. Since truth is dependent on our knowledge of it, it follows that if these two objects do not agree then a new truth or independent object must be posited. If I look at the room, the room exists both independently of me and also "for me" and when I turn away from the room then the object becomes only an 'object-per-se' for me. The independent aspect of the room has disappeared. The negation of the "object-per-se" or truth represents the negation of the content or object of knowledge. The negation brings forward the form as a new content, a new object for consciousness. What was for Fichte the negation of content through abstraction by the philosopher, is here carried out by consciousness itself. The positing of reality - the object-per-se (thesis) - and the negation or opposing of the object for consciousness are both part of the makeup of consciousness.

When I have turned from the room to a view out the window there arises a new object "for consciousness" and also a new truth independent of me. Hegel calls this development simply - Experience. He sees this simple flow of objects past our minds as the result of the negative activity of consciousness. What is experience if it is not simply the seeing of an object over beside me which is immediately "for me" and yet "independent of me".

In the beginning natural consciousness does not have the ability to relate succeeding objects because it lacks memory. Consequently, objects succeed one another in an external fashion. A new object succeeds the old one but the content or truth of the old one is completely lost. To the natural consciousness this seems to be merely a flow of objects. Hegel however regards it as an activity of negating or cancelling that part of the object which is the "in itself" or the abstract lifeless substance. Through experience the naive consciousness learns that what it originally took to be independent of itself is really not. If one asked a subjectivist what is independent he could only point to the objects he has experienced and ultimately the objects he is presently experiencing. Scepticism views the loss of the independence of the first object as an indication of its non-truth or non-existence. It is only with the arrival of memory that consciousness builds up an historical sense and sees new experiences in the content of previous experiences. Hegel can then argue that he is not bringing

any presuppositions into his work, because consciousness, as he has described it, has all the elements needed to develop itself.

CHAPTER IV

The Natural Soul

Now that we have armed ourselves with compass and hatchet, it is time to plunge into the dense jungle in the hope that our newly-found serenity does not turn into raving lunacy. Before entering into the Phenomenology it may be helpful to observe Hegel's transition from the natural soul to consciousness and the general attitude of consciousness in its early stages.

In the Encyclopedia natural soul precedes consciousness. The soul is in direct contact with nature and under its influence. It is in harmonic vibration with and subject to the conditions of nature. The soul does not make subject-object distinctions; it cannot take itself as an object for itself.

A discussion of the Hegelian and Freudian conceptions of the unconscious will clarify this conception of soul. For Hegel, the unconscious represents the general background of consciousness. This natural state, like space and time, is necessary for the development of higher forms. They are the "absolute precondition"¹ or ground; there is no individual, no specificity, without this general background. As in a Gestalt conception, the background or whole precedes the foreground of parts. The unconscious

is a generalized instinct that does not differentiate the objects it acts upon. For example, a new-born animal evinces an attraction for the first object it comes into contact with. This instinct is abstract because it does not involve a specific relation to an object, i. e. it treats all objects in the same way. This is what Hegel calls an "abstract universal" which simply implies a general drive which does not discriminate between objects. These general responses precede in the same way that space and time precede the categories.

Freud's schema resembles Hegel's in that he regards unconscious drives as universal, i. e. occurring in all individuals and being abstract in character. For Freud, the proper development of the individual consists in the channeling of erotic drives from a non-specific attraction to any object, to a specific drive for heterosexual relations. Centred on the genital region rather than oral or anal. Hegel defines insanity as the return to this more primitive attitude of an abstract response when specific responses have broken down.² Freud subdivides the development into a series of stages and establishes points at which development may be blocked. As an example, Freud relates the abstract activity of the creative artist to his lack of sexual maturity and his proneness to insanity. Hegel refers us to an intuitive romantic, Novalis, who became insane.

How according to Hegel does consciousness develop out of this natural state? The movement in the Phenomenology is from general

representations of the object to more specific representations. The next step then is to see how the natural soul liberates itself from the environment. We shall follow the soul from its most primitive state of individuality to a state of individuality capable of resisting the environment. At first the soul is individual merely in the sense that it reacts, but it is at the mercy of every incoming stimulus. The natural soul gains its freedom from this bombardment through the development of habit. Habit is the repetition of this universal response irrespective of the existence of stimuli. The organism becomes numb to immediate feeling.

This habitual response of the organism is the first step toward freedom. In effect, the organism is excluding certain stimuli; some stimuli no longer elicit a response. If we regard conceptualization as a limiting or a movement from more general to more specific response, then habit can be recognized as a primitive form of conceptualization. Part of freedom is having a subjective response that ignores the external stimuli, i. e. the message is not received. This blocking out of messages by habit is a negating action. In establishing repetitive behavior the organism stands over against the environment.

In the beginning environmental stimuli dictate the responses of the organism, whereas at higher levels, when it is ready to pass into consciousness the organism has developed habit or what Aristotle and Hegel call "second nature". Primitive forms of life have the least specific habits, that is they have internalized the most abstract objective

universals and therefore their distinction from the environment is limited. (At the same time they have the easiest time of surviving.) An objective universal is simply a repetitive stimulus coming in from the environment, which determines the subjective habit that will develop.

Man, on the other hand, internalizes a wider range of stimuli and more specific stimuli. In a simple system the response merely duplicates the stimuli like the contact of billiard balls, but in contrast the human organism takes a simple stimuli and channels it into the nervous system where multiple responses occur. The greater freedom that the higher organism gains as a result of this, precludes a purely environmental approach. By developing habitual responses the organism gradually cuts itself off from stimuli that don't fit the pattern set up; in a sense the organism establishes "a priori categories". From a Kantian point of view, the more primitive the categories the more objective they are, and hence Kant's dialectical reasoning is the least objective, in that it constitutes a subjective use of the categories without resort to experience. In contrast, in Hegel's dialectic consciousness makes its more subjective nature objective by acting on the objects outside of itself.

The actual soul with its sensations and its concrete self-feeling turned into habit, has implicitly realized the ideality of its qualities; in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself, and its infinite self-relation.³

Inwardizing itself means becoming an object for itself. The movement in the natural soul is from immediacy to mediation. The actual soul,

i. e. the end of the natural soul before it becomes consciousness, no longer takes stimuli as they are but reworks them into its own pattern. At first the soul does not distinguish between stimulus and response because it has no concept of self. As it builds up repetitive patterns different stimuli are fitted into different patterns, which constitute a primitive way of defining them. Those objects that present an immediate stimuli but which incur no general response from the organism are separated out from those that are mediated or receive a habitual response. The actual soul has risen to the level of mediation in which immediacy is lost. This is the state of formalism, in which nothing is given in itself and irrational matter, or those stimuli which are not mediated, count for nothing.

This mediating activity of the actual soul leads to self-transcendence, or a position of a self over against the object, i. e. the stage of consciousness. In the last stage before consciousness, the actual soul is still a monad which designates appearances or immediate being as mere dependent moments of its own activity which is mediation or habitual response. The monads mediating activity of organizing appearances eventually leads to the positing of an object independent of the monad. It distinguishes between its lower levels of immediacy and its level of mediation. The habitual responses are distinct from singular responses.⁴ These single responses are associated with the primitive past of the soul. Hegel gives the example of dreams.⁵ In isolating these singular moments,

the soul goes beyond them and in carrying out this mediation it becomes aware of itself as outside these moments. The soul has become a subject and a self but it has cut itself off from the immediate objects.

In isolating the object the soul gains the ability to isolate itself. It would seem that both these activities arrive at the same time. The isolation of the object takes place as a result of an awareness that the object has no place in the habitual behavior of the organism. An object independent of the soul is in a state of immediacy, i. e. it stands outside the patterns of response developed by the soul. At this point consciousness relates to itself as an object only in an immediate way. In other words it does not recognize its mediating activity. The two aspects, mediate and immediate, are seen as external to each other, in the same way that consciousness is seen as independent of an object it experiences. In relating itself to an immediate object consciousness is really mediating its own self. However it does not recognize this activity. It regards self as substance, in the same way that it regards an undeveloped independent object in the environment as substance.

In the preliminary phase, in the Phenomenology consciousness is in a state of tension because it does not relate its mediating activity or formal structure to its immediate awareness of self. The relationship that consciousness first holds toward the independent object is one of immediacy. The criterion for independence or immediacy arises out of the development of the soul.

The starting point of consciousness is subjective ideality which means that consciousness distinguishes between its activity and the object. As long as ego is merely a bare abstract identity with no mediation or differentiation within it, then the object will necessarily appear to consciousness as substance. The relation between subject and object manifests itself in the immediate relation of space in which both are completed independent of each other. If ego is taken to be abstract substance, then any allusions to the "thing-in-itself" which lies behind the phenomena are merely reflections of the abstract identity of ego. It is Hegel's view that once this view of ego is overcome through the incorporation of the negating activity of consciousness then the notion of "thing-in-itself" can be done away with.

CHAPTER V

Sense-Certainty

In the next three chapters we will be discussing the three phases of "consciousness": "Sense-certainty", "Perception" and "Understanding". We have already shown that the attitude of consciousness demands that the form of knowledge be separated from the content of knowledge. Consciousness sees the truth as independent of the mode in which it is known. This general attitude pervades all three phases.

We shall look on "Sense-certainty" as a thesis which takes the object to be in an immediate relation to consciousness. "Perception" is the antithesis. It introduces the dichotomy of immediacy and mediacy. Consciousness fails in its effort to maintain a separation between the two. In "Understanding" consciousness does away with immediacy altogether. Consciousness starts with an immediate object and ends up with a wholly mediated object. The three phases constitute a movement from pure intuitionism to a pure formalism which in many ways resembles Leibniz' Monadology.

If we regard this total process from the point of view of the developing consciousness, it consists in a move from an absolute object to an absolute relativism in which the object becomes nothing but a series

of relations with other objects. In Hegel's terms, the end of the "Understanding" constitutes a return to "natural soul"; however, now the immediate object, if taken without regard to thought determinations, is an irrational nothing. In the terms of the "natural soul", the immediate object has passed over into the mediating categories of the habitual self. The independent object is seen as completely determined by subjective mind. Consciousness starts out with the object immediately given and ends up with the complete opposite, i. e. with an object that is wholly mediated. The development, through the three phases illustrates the negation of the independent object and the illumination of the form of knowledge as a new content, which constitutes the truth. Truth is no longer seen as residing in an immediate object but rather in the content of consciousness.

Hegel's purpose in describing this development is to show that the conception of immediacy is inadequate. At the level of "natural soul" immediacy and the independence of the object are taken as synonymous. The independent object and the self are regarded as immediate and separated from the mediating activities of the habitual soul. Hegel, in interpreting this for us (on the basis of Kant's categories of quality) equates unity with the immediate object of intuition, and plurality with the mediating activity of consciousness. Given this interpretation it is apparent that the problem facing consciousness at this point is incapable of solution on these terms. It is the aim of consciousness to maintain the


pure unity of the independent object, i. e. to keep it free of plurality. To do so demands that consciousness refrain from thinking about the object. However, at this point consciousness is not aware of its mediating activity and proceeds in happy ignorance. Not until the immediate object is negated does consciousness become aware of its own activity.

We will now proceed to a discussion of the activity of consciousness in its "Sense-certainty" phase. In this phase the object exists in a context characterized by aspects which resemble Kant's pure forms of space and time. Space and time in no way determine an object. Space is the language which expresses the external relation of objects, i. e. they are independent and not given to each other. (This may explain why Hume had such a hard time finding necessary connections and casual relations between objects.) Just such an environment is necessary to the maintenance of the unity of the immediate object. This conception of the "out-there-ness" of objects represents the primitive stage of consciousness. The conscious act which involves pointing to an object outside consciousness, constitutes naive self-transcendence. This first awareness by consciousness of objects existing in space and time constitutes an apprehension.


Apprehension in Hegel's terms is an immediate or intuitive awareness.

Hegel will argue that an object apprehended in space lacks existence. The meaning of existence in this context is somewhat the same as Plato's definition of existence that involves the power to affect another. It is hard to make sense of this "bare apprehension" or "blind

intuition" which Hegel has taken from Kant. It is an apprehension which really presents no object at all. Both Kant and Hegel wish to construct, out of this seemingly ephemeral apprehension a concrete object of experience. They try to show that an object can only be given determination after the mind has acquired the ability to hold together a series of determinations; what Kant calls a "synthesis of apprehensions".¹ The objects of blind intuition are "surface objects", which means that the outline or distinctness of the object is only apparent when the object is in contact with another object. This is the most relativistic conception possible.



The abstract object is perceived only if it is in contact with other objects. Before each specific object can be determined consciousness must run through a series of surface objects and hold them together. As in Gestalt psychology the whole precedes the parts.



In this activity Hegel's dialectical development parallels Kant's procedure. In each case the mind passes from one isolated intuition to the next. It is not until mind complements this negating activity, i. e.

negating one object before it proceeds to the next, with a retention of past objects, that the mind is able to grasp a specific "object image". Through double negation or synthesis the mind holds past objects with objects in the present.

Consciousness in its "sense-certainty" phase vacillates between the positions of naive realism and naive idealism. There are two aspects to the object, one being its independence from consciousness, the other its being "for consciousness". The realist stresses the first aspect and claims that we can only have knowledge of an already existing object. The idealist claims that the object only exists because he has knowledge of it. Hegel is maintaining of course that both these positions are untenable. However, consciousness, not yet having acquired this degree of insight, concerns itself with the incompatibility of the two views.

We will first look at the realist position. In this first moment the object is seen as primary and essential, while our knowledge of it is secondary.² This is the same situation that exists in the Introduction where consciousness took the "object per se" to be the truth. The naive realist's position is highly subjective and formal as a result of his ignorance of the fact, that his apprehension of the object as presented is, in fact, a reflection of his own abstract ego. This is a world view that regards the ego as cut off from the external world. The ego is just one more object among many. Objects in the world are just there, waiting for us to experience them.

Naive consciousness experiences objects in a series, each new object replacing the last. One object after another passes before consciousness. At the moment of apprehension each object is seen as possessing essential reality. Because consciousness at this point lacks memory, when it passes on to the next object the first is totally displaced. In effect, it passes into non-being until such time as it may again be present for consciousness. This last is the dialectician's interpretation. He sees this activity of consciousness as a series of negations of "objects per se" which renders them solely "for consciousness". That is, these objects only exist when consciousness is aware of them. This may give rise to a skeptical view.

The object, Hegel says, has a two fold existence; it exists both in the "here" and the "now", in a spatial and a temporal dimension. Since the object is immediate, the "Now" really only expresses an abstract moment, a separation from every previous and every succeeding moment. Consciousness does not acknowledge true temporality because it refuses to recognize annihilation and creation in the description of the object. On the other hand it takes the temporal aspect to be extraneous to the object and attempts to cling to this specious "Now". In the phrase "now is night time", the "now" is a vacuous subject and the predicate falls completely outside it. Subject and object find themselves situated within a system of spatial-temporal externality. Space and time are the form of any immediate object.

The flow of objects past consciousness causes the content of knowledge, i. e. the "object per se", to be continually negated (passes into nonexistence). From our superior position we already know that the immediate object is the result of mediation by the actual soul, but naive consciousness is restricted to seeing the object as being directly presented to it. The end of the dialectical process is to bring consciousness to a point where it recognizes this process of mediation, which produced the immediate object as a consequence of its own make-up. The subject has the power to determine and differentiate substance and substance has the need to be acted upon in this way. Consciousness necessarily goes beyond the immediate object in its determination of that object. However consciousness in its "Sense-certainty" phase chooses to deny this condition. Consciousness concerns itself with preserving the innocence of the relationship, but in vain. This is a rape of the object which is not only legal but compulsory. From Hegel's standpoint the rape has already taken place, but consciousness has not faced up to it. Consciousness in its Sense-certainty phase is the most gallant of suitors, never over reaching the bounds of propriety in courtship. Consciousness just wants to hold on to the object presented to it, but it is constantly broken up by the flow of experience. Consciousness will soon find that change is part of the object. Consciousness will plead ignorance of the pregnancy, but in vain.

The expression by consciousness of a particular "this" (possible only because consciousness ignores its own mediating nature) is an abstract positing and consequently it automatically passes into its opposite, i. e. the "Universal Now". Because content or substance is lost as soon as the object is no longer "for consciousness", the only element of the positing carried over to the next is the "instant now". The "instant now", in that it is common to each positing, becomes the "Universal Now". According to naive consciousness the temporal flow falls completely outside the object. It does not penetrate the object as such. However, having lost the immediate object as content, consciousness is forced to turn its attention to this temporal movement or "universal now".

As an object the "universal now" is highly abstract. Its only attribute is its particularity. The "instant now" is a particular "now" and in this respect it is like every other "instant now". By abstract identity Hegel means a unity as opposed to a totality in the Kantian sense. A unity possesses the characteristics of a surface object. In other words it can only be determined in the context of other objects. Ego and object as they are available to consciousness for comparison are then impossible to determine. In that each is characterized solely on the basis of the "instant now", they are like two exactly identical points. A point which has exactly the same dimensions as another cannot limit it or facilitate its determination. This, in fact, constitutes a complete denial of

immediacy. Through the course of experience consciousness continually loses the object and replaces it with the "universal now". This is sheer negation, oblivious to any content. The object has lost its immediacy and becomes its exact opposite. It is totally relative. Naive realism has failed in its attempt to maintain the immediate aspect of its object. The naive realist's conception of immediacy existing in the object has shown itself to be untenable.

The naive idealist's attempts to establish immediacy in the "I" are equally futile.³ The idealist, in this second moment posits that the essential aspect of truth resides in the "self" or "I". He then proceeds to centre his attention on the immediate "I" in place of the object out there. The action of the "I" is similar to that of a cookie-cutter. The object exists in an apparent state of immediacy because "I" see it. The abstract ego is now the cause of immediacy. The object now possesses being only when it is attached to consciousness. This attempt to situate immediacy fails for the same reasons as the previous one. The "I" has the same abstract quality as the realist's object. Like the object, the "I" becomes broken up into a series of "I's", each indifferent to the other. Both the object and the "I" being confronted with change have completely collapsed. As in our diagram, (1.) it is as if the surrounding objects were taken away, resulting in our immediate object disappearing. The fact that the "universal now" and the "universal I" have lost their content completely, illustrates the abstract level at which consciousness is

working; both the object and the "I" have become abstract universals. Hegel's point is that to take either the object or subject in isolation from the other will always result in an abstract formalism.

Consciousness still has one alternative left, that being, of course, to situate immediacy in the relationship between subject and object.⁴ If both subject and object are in flux perhaps the relationship between them is stable and adequate to account for the immediacy of both. Plato in the Theaetetus comes up with a similar suggestion is defending a theory of perception against the Heraclitean flux.⁵ The only real activity now is the act of sensing. This act is an immediate one and the "I" and object are two poles of this act, which only come into immediate being when there is a sensing activity. Consciousness now posits the relation between subject and object as the immediate. For example, the whole proposition "I-see-a-tree" constitutes the immediate. For the realist 'tree' was the concrete real, for the idealist it was the 'I' and in this third moment both 'I' and 'tree' and the relationship between them, i. e. seeing, are taken as one, to form a single concrete reality. If one breaks up this relationship, the "I" and the "now" revert to their abstract state. This formulation does not allow for another object coming on the scene. In other words it does not recognize the universality of the object it is relating to. Consciousness can only posit this relation between subject and object after the content has been eliminated. If an object is immediate there is no need to be concerned with its relation.

This third moment or synthesis takes up where the previous moment left off. The result of the previous moment was that an object both "is" and "is not". The object that is taken up into this relationship has been posited and negated. Ego, in its attempt to posit an immediate object, has necessarily in its determination gone beyond, to what the object is not. The "now" as an instant is an abstraction that eludes determination. It has no duration and no content; it is like the geometric point.

The now that is, is other than the one indicated, and we see that the now is just this - to be no longer the very time when it is.⁶


This is the ancient paradox of the "now" that comes into being only by passing out of being. This paradoxical "now" is a reflection of the mediating aspect of ego, which in any determination always goes beyond the object of determination. Think of a blind person running his hand over an object. When his hand comes to the edge and goes off, i. e. when the object vanishes, at that very moment it is determined. In the same way the object of this third moment has this dual aspect of involving what it is as well as what it is not.

If consciousness is to maintain immediacy, however, it must deny this relativity. In so doing it is carrying out a double negation. It began with being which passed into non-being and now reinstates being by denying non-being. This contradiction is to be expected of naive consciousness in its Sense-certainty stage. Hegel states:

The naive consciousness too, for that reason, is of itself always coming to the result which is the real truth in this case, and is always having experience of it: but is always forgetting it again and beginning the process all over.⁷

Consciousness is always forgetting that the object involves both being and non-being. In this case the double negation is a return to the original positing, i. e. being, but the original object has changed. From their original status the object and the "I" in turn passed into what they were not. The denial of this non-being, in the third moment, establishes that the "now" maintains itself by negating the other "nows". Before, each "now" was external to every other "now", but here, the "now" has taken on a negative relation to the other "nows". Through this double negation the "now" becomes impregnated with the negative or the power to maintain itself in opposition to other objects. A blind man, passing his hand over a series of objects, moving over one object and on to another, might deny that there is more than one object.

Figure 3.



A tactile determination relies on an immediacy, that is to say, a purely tactile person would never make the above mistake. In fact a blind man would never make the mistake outlined above, and this is Hegel's point. In making this double negation consciousness has gone beyond the tactile level to the level of the perceptual object, i. e. the visual. The contradiction in denying a new object is beyond the blind man's capacity. This

demands a new form of sensing, namely the visual sense. In a state of immediacy consciousness cannot withstand this contradiction, but if a new form of determining arises which involves both immediacy and mediation, then this contradiction can be overcome. Thus Hegel would want to argue that the visual develops out of the contradictions which arise in the tactile phase. This double negation has resulted in a new form which demands a new object, namely the "object image".

The new "now" that has arisen is not an "instant now" but a "duration". As a duration it contains parts within it and reflects the fact that it has been mediated.⁸ As a result, the "now" is no longer a point but a line with a series of abstract points within it. In negating the plurality of instant "now" it has taken them up as a part of its duration. It has passed from the category of quantity to the category of quality. This new "now" is unaffected by the quantitative instants. "Now" can be a second or an "Eternity". Hegel's example of a "Now" is a day that has many hours within it. An object can only maintain a certain degree of stability by negating the changing environment around it. This negating involves taking that environment up as part of the object.

The activity that Hegel is carrying out here, is Kant's "synthesis" of apprehension in intuition. In order that "unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold it must be run through and held together."⁹ In other words the unity of an object must be united with a plurality or what it is not to form a totality. Hegel's "universal now" is a totality.

In pointing out any object I am at the same time pointing out what it is not, or in other words, including within the object the process of determining it. An object is above because it is not below; an object is both this and not this. Consciousness tried to keep mediation or the "not this" separated from the object but it failed. The mediating process could not be kept separate from the immediate object. Every previous activity or determination is manifested in the result. Consciousness in its attempt to exclude the negative process finds itself confronting a new object which maintains itself by the very process consciousness wanted to be rid of.

The object of immediacy is not the same object at the end of the process as it was at the beginning. Every determination which at first appears to leave the object completely alone, in actual fact changes it a great deal. The very result we have seen comes out of the need of sense-certainty to have an immediate object. To get to an immediate object consciousness is forced to accept mediation as being part of the object.

We saw consciousness start out by taking the truth as an immediate object which resembled Aristotle's conception of matter.¹⁰ This is the most abstract conception of matter, which has no differentiation in it. In the beginning subject and substance are total opposites, but at the end we have seen the object take on a plurality of parts. The object has gone a little way towards becoming subject by internalizing this

plurality of moments. In the section on "perception" the "universal now" becomes the "thing" and the "instant nows" become the qualities of the "thing".

CHAPTER VI

PERCEPTION

The difference between "Perception" and Sense-certainty" consists in the fact that consciousness is now aware of an interference between itself and the object. Consciousness now realizes that its experience of the independent object cannot be direct; it is clouded by its own relation to the object. The desire of consciousness is to determine the effect it has on the object, cancel that effect, and in this way get at the object "bare and naked".¹ However, the attempt to hang on to immediacy in this fashion is inherently contradictory. The proposal to cancel mediation involves a denial that this new activity will have any new effect on the object. The real result, unbeknownst to consciousness, will be a new object that is even more determined by its relation to consciousness and to other objects. Consciousness has yet to learn not to trust itself with a naked object. Consciousness no longer has a single relation to the object but a dual one, involving both a direct and an indirect aspect. To maintain an independent object or an object with a certain amount of substantiality, consciousness will try to keep these two aspects of its relation separate. In the end, however, substance loses out to the qualities that surround it. The result may be

likened to phenomenalism.

In this section on "Perception", the object before consciousness has (also) become more complicated in that it now has three aspects: its unity or substantiality, its plurality of qualities, and the relation between these. In an account of this dual relation consciousness has to the object, which occurs in every judgement, there are two aspects to consider. First, if I posit what a thing is, at the same time I am positing what it is not. Second, If I take the object as a unity I am forced to take into account the many properties that it has. More technically one can say that whenever something is posited, its opposite also occurs. The object is both "this" and "not this". These two moments occur in every judgement in this section. Hegel says of perception: "for it is only perception that has negation, distinction, multiplicity, in its very nature."²

The unstable unification of sense qualities and thought determinations causes these contradictions to arise. The stable "object image" is at the mercy of changing sense qualities, while at the same time the sense qualities owe their distinction to the unity of the object. This tension in which substantiality wishes to free itself from change, results in the expulsion of immediacy from the object. At the end of this section on "Perception" we arrive at pure thought, i. e. the "Understanding". Meanwhile the outlook of "Perception" which sees the object both as a substance and as a plurality of qualities must run its course.

The two moments of the previous object of "Sense-certainty" (the "instant now" and the "universal now"), have taken on the aspects of "Perception"; they both now involve a mediation or relation to what they are not. The qualities of the thing have both the attribute of being dependent on the "thing", in which case they are called a property; and also the attribute of being indifferent to the thing, in which case they are a mere quality of the "thing". In like manner the thing is both indifferent to its properties and also dependent on them for its unity. Put simply, the unity of the thing is dependent on the excluding power of its properties, (a black ball cannot be white, etc.), and at the same time, a quality can exclude its opposite (black-white) only because it belongs to the unity of the thing.

One can never pin down the "object image" to an exact description. If we take one characteristic of it to predominate then one is immediately contradicted. Some qualities can change and leave the unity of the object unchanged, whereas others cause the object to change. A chair is still a chair whether it be red or blue etc. but if we take away four legs what is left? The history of philosophy is full of accounts dealing with the exact status of the object image. The separation of qualities into primary and secondary illustrates the ambivalence between mediation and immediacy that Hegel describes in "Perception". "Perception" or the attitude of common-sense³ probably has its best historical example in the work of Locke. This view of perception precipitates the problem of

nominal versus real essences.

In the first few pages of this section, Hegel describes the three moments of the object-image. The first moment involves the simple isolation of the object without regard to its relation to other objects.⁴ The object is just a unity or medium in which properties such as white, pungent, cubical etc. interpenetrate.⁵ Each property is also taken in isolation from its relation to other properties. In describing the odour one does not have to take into account the colour. This moment takes both the thing and its properties as simple immediacies. If we take unity to mean that no mediation has occurred, and a plurality to represent a mediation that has taken place, then we can see that this immediate object contains a contradiction. It is equally a unity and a plurality.

The second moment of the object is the opposite of the first. It introduces mediation into the parts of the object. It is found that qualities are not totally indifferent to each other but in certain instances exclude each other. A black object cannot be white. This is the mediated aspect of a property. The exclusion of opposite properties is a consequence of the unity of the thing. Thus consciousness finds that the thing is not merely a passive medium but an "excluding repelling unity".⁶ In like manner the thing is a unity because certain properties exclude other properties. It follows that for an object to be distinct there must be properties outside the object that are excluded. Thus, consciousness

finds in the second moment the complete opposite of what it found in the first. The thing is determined by its properties and the properties are determined by other properties. The determination of the nature of the object involves the discovery of its relations.

The third moment consists of the relation between the first and second moments. Consciousness comes to see both isolation and relations to be important aspects of the "object image". The activity of the second moment is inherent in the first moment and vice-versa. The object has the double nature of being independent of other objects at the same time it is dependent on them for its uniqueness.

When naive consciousness recognizes these contradictions in the object, (consciousness in "Perception" will always find opposing moments), it will exhaust⁵ all possibilities in its attempt to keep these contradictory aspects separate. The first attempt may consist in attributing one aspect to the object and its opposite to the distorting activity of consciousness.⁷ For instance, if unity is a characteristic of the object, then plurality is a distortion made by consciousness. Here we have a more sophisticated mode of representing realism and idealism. Consciousness, seeing its activity as a distortion of the object, proceeds to determine what the distortion is and do away with it. By determining the reflecting nature of water one can determine the original direction of light, but in dialectics a similar procedure will not elicit an analogous result. In its attempt to negate distortion consciousness is really

incorporating that distortion into the object.

While "Sense-certainty" involved the category of quantity, "Perception" involves the relation between quantity and quality, and eventually the expulsion of quantity from the scene. Just as in Fichte's dialectics the introduction of quantity allowed for reciprocal limitation of ego and non-ego, here consciousness separates substance from the accidents or distortions. The truth is maintained in the object (that can be apprehended), but the contradiction is a result of the reflective activity of consciousness. The opposition in the object is seen to be caused by consciousness. The relation between subject and object is no longer solely direct but involves an indirect aspect which consists in the barrier between them. Consciousness runs into a problem because it is unsure which aspects belong to the object and which are the result of distortion. It tries out the two possibilities for size.

In the first instance, the unity or substance is taken to be the true aspect of the object and the plurality of aspects are only "for consciousness". When Hegel labels the subject a universal medium he means that is like a sieve that filters the unity of the object into a "manyness". However as before, the unity of the object is dependent on its excluding properties and the properties cannot be separated from the object or it can no longer maintain its unity. Consciousness, having discovered that it cannot take "manyness" away from the real object tries the other alternative.

This time consciousness regards itself as responsible for unity in the object and posits the properties as the real object independent of consciousness. These properties are really unconnected and exist apart; they only appear as a unity in relation to consciousness. Hegel calls these properties "free matter"⁸, somewhat similar perhaps to the modern term "sense-data". The unity ascribed to consciousness, Hegel terms "circumscribing surface".⁹ Here as in the previous moment the result or Totality is seen as made up partly by consciousness and partly by the object. This new attempt at separation is no more satisfactory than the previous one, for properties independent of consciousness cannot exclude other properties without the unity of the thing.

Consciousness as a result is forced to conclude that these two moments of "apprehension" and "reflection" are both aspects of the object itself. Through the attempt to separate these contradictory aspects, it has become clear to consciousness that both are in fact essential aspects of the "object image". The result is a new object which contains both of these opposing moments. The object is "for itself" in that as a mere unity it is independent of external properties, and it is "for another" in that this unity is dependent on its properties excluding other properties.¹⁰ The object taken in isolation is one object, and taken in relation to other objects is a second object. Consciousness now sees the object in two parts, one non-relational, the other relational. It has yet to resolve this contradiction.

The third moment for consciousness is to determine the relation between these two aspects of the subject. How can the independence of the object and its relation to other objects be part of the same real object? Hegel describes the situation as follows:

The object is really in one and the same respect the opposite of itself - for itself "so far as" it is for another and for another "so far as" it is for itself.¹¹

By "for itself" Hegel means a thing, a self-existent 'one' which does not stand in relation to others. But this position is done away with because the object taken into its immediacy has "its essential reality in another". That which makes the object unique is the very thing that destroys its independence. The object is distinct in that it has a distinct property, but at the same time the distinct property (that which makes the object what it is) is in turn dependent on the unity of the object for the expression of its distinctness. What is developed here is simply a reciprocal relation in which one object is necessary to the determination of another object and vice-versa. Once one has realized that "self-existence" and "existence for another" are two essential aspects of a single unity, one has attained the level or attitude of "Understanding".¹²

As the tactile in "sense-certainty" could not accept the contradiction of an object made up of parts, so "Perception" cannot make sense of an object that seemingly goes beyond the "object image" for what it really is. The notion of reciprocal determination can only be understood at the level of pure thought. Reciprocal determination is at

odds with any conception of immediacy. An object does not exist except in relation to something else and cannot be in relation to something else unless it exists. In keeping with its formal plan consciousness will next try to overcome this mysterious state by eliminating existence as a factor. In other words a thing exists only after its relations are developed. This constitutes the substance of the section on "Understanding".

"Perception" started out with an attempt to maintain a separation between immediacy and mediation as a purely external relationship. However, they have now manifested themselves as internally related with each equally dependent on the other. Consequently, consciousness no longer views its own activities as distorting the object, but on the contrary sees its activities as a positive contribution.¹³ This conception of the role of consciousness is similar to the attitude of Kant's philosophy. Thought determinations taken together with raw material produce the concrete objects we experience. Kant regards his own view as providing the solution to any problems such as the one that Locke had. Thus, the next section is a critique of the Kantian philosophy. Once again we have seen consciousness go beyond the object it started out to determine and consequently, it has to develop a new form or attitude toward its object.

CHAPTER VII

Force and Understanding


This section on force is one of the more difficult, perhaps because the object treated here is less familiar to us than an object-image. At the same time this section is more Hegelian in its stress on "becoming".

In this section, as in every preceding one, the starting point or the object designated as "for consciousness" is the final "form" of knowledge of the immediately preceding phase. At the end of "Perception" we saw that the unity of the object was dependent on its relation to other objects and vice versa. It is this reciprocal determination that "Force" as an object conveys. For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. We cannot have actual force without potential force and no potential force without actual force. The mode or attitude of consciousness in this section is one of complete mediation, rid of any sensuous immediacy. This is the result handed down from "Perception" to "Understanding". This is the dialectic movement in which the form of "Perception" is now the content of "Understanding".


The section on "Consciousness" began by taking the truth to reside in the immediate object, but at the end of the section on "Understanding" truth resides in the determinations made by the subjects. In the last chapter we saw the trend toward an object that involves its relations to other objects, and more specifically its relation to so consciousness. Substance in its atomic state is shown to involve more and more the temporal movement of phenomena - it is becoming more subject-like. "Thought" is replacing "Being". Consciousness at the beginning of this third phase does not yet see the activity of the object, i. e. the change that takes place within the object, as its own activity. It simply takes this new object "Force" as an independent object which consciousness merely observes.

In "Perception" consciousness took unity and plurality to be separate and tried to relate them in various ways. Here in this section, consciousness looks on unity and plurality as an internal relationship within one object. "...in other words absolute opposites are immediately posited as one and the same reality."¹ As an attitude of thought this means that an object's properties are determined by its relation to other objects. A functional equation, i. e. $y=f(x)$, is an example of this. If one knows the value of "Y" one also knows the value of "X" and vice-versa. The internalization of the form or relation can best be illustrated by a diagram.

1. External Relation



2. Internal Relation



This internalization of the form into a new object is one of the basics of dialectic. Somehow through a synthesizing activity the human mind runs through a series of externally related objects and binds them together as one unified object. Hegel's processes, negation and internalization, are similar to Kant's synthesizing activity of mind. Hegel believes that the abstract mind isolates what shouldn't be isolated and it is only in the concrete mind that ambitions resulting from this isolation are seen to be false.

When the form or relations of the object are external to it, they in no way determine the object. When the "form" has been internalized the relations are part of what the object is. The object is both form and content. What it is, is what it is related to, and vice-versa. In other words "form" and "content" are identical.

This mutual identity of form and content must be grasped in order to follow the development in the "Understanding". This formula affects the relation consciousness has with the object. Consciousness takes its relation to the object to be the same as the object itself.

We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the task of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. ²

Distinctions in the object - distinctions between form and content - will be made for the purpose of analysis; distinctions, in fact, of elements that are not distinct, and not separable. Dwelling on distinctions in the object which are wholly the result of thought determinations, consciousness will produce for itself an object that is pure thought. Though consciousness makes light of its own activity it is, in fact, remaking the object. It is Hegel's purpose here to show a transition from Kant to the bare subjective formalism of Fichte. This identity of form and content is expressed in the self-positing ego: Ego is ego, I am I, a bare tautology, the essence of formal thought where content is unimportant because form is content.

Form and content are identical, but because consciousness assumes a distinction between them it will be making determinations and judgements of the object which are already cancelled by the object. The distinctions set up are only "for consciousness". Consciousness becomes aware of its abstract activity of separating the form of an object from its content. It makes a clear distinction between its own thought determinations and the being or existence of the object. The nominalist takes these determinations to be solely an activity of the mind in the same way that consciousness has done here. An idealist on the other hand sees, that since form and content are the same, any negation or loss of content will result in a form that is no different from the content. This is the case because the negation has already been carried

out by the object.

We will now see in more detail how this process evolves. The new object for consciousness in "Understanding" is "Force", which expresses an identity of form and content. The activity of perceiving and the object perceived are no longer separate as they were in "Perception", but are now two aspects of the same object. Having its own form or determination within itself means the object can develop itself independently of consciousness or other objects. Any contradictions in the object are resolved by the object itself and not by consciousness as was the case in "Perception". The previous activities of consciousness now find themselves in the object itself. This is what is meant by Hegel when he refers to the "process of perceiving", which "assumes objective form".³ What was formerly an activity of consciousness is now an activity of the object. Having incorporated its form or relation to others, the object is able to determine itself.

"Force" is made up of two moments:

- (a) a passive state which corresponds to self-existence and
- (b) an active state which corresponds to being-for-another.

These states are two aspects of the same thing. That which incites another to action is also acted upon by the other which incites it to incite. When I push an object I am getting a response from the object

which is its resistance to my push. This resistance gives rise to my use of force. In this section Hegel has in mind certain aspects of physics. In terms of content the two aspects of "Force" are always distinct, in that they are always opposite to each other. In form, however, the two are not distinct, in that each exists only through its relation to its opposite. In keeping the two aspects of content distinct, consciousness is also making a distinction within form and thus presents an abstract account of "Force". When Hegel says that the two moments of "Force" have no independent substance, he means that they are nothing outside of their relations to one another. When consciousness realizes that its distinction in content is superfluous, it will have effectually eliminated substance.

The first moment of "Force", Hegel likens to substance. "Force" is withdrawn into itself holding its opposing aspects together within itself. This is potential "Force", a rock on top of the hill ready to roll. The second moment is the negation of the first. This is the form of "Force" or its active state in which it gives expression to itself. An example which Baillie gives is the mass point,⁴ which represents the first moment, and the lines of force drawn from it, which are its expression. If we can conceive of the second moment leading to the first as a trail of blood leads to the body, then we can call this second moment the mediation of the first. The first moment of "Force" corresponds to that immediate object we saw arise out of the

"natural soul", and the second moment corresponds to the mediating activity of consciousness which was at first taken to be external to the immediate object. Consciousness no longer treats the object as immediate but sees it as a mediating object. This means that the object through its own expression points towards its own existence (immediacy). The mediating activity of the object is a directional activity that points away from itself to its immediate existence or substance. More simply, this means that, consciousness only becomes aware of the existence of an object through its manifestations. These manifestations we call appearances. Appearances are the middle term that connects consciousness to the independent object. The object is no longer directly presented to consciousness, but rather is indirectly accessible to consciousness through appearances or signs. This result is in direct opposition to the original assumption of consciousness. Now the immediate object is hidden, only the mediating activity is present for consciousness.

Since a distinction is maintained between the independent object and appearances, consciousness is forced to regard it as existing in some supersensible world of the beyond. The only way this object of the beyond can be reached is through the determination of the organization of appearances. To put it into Kantian terms - the mode of appearances as determined by consciousness, i. e. how an object is presented. Transcendental logic is as close as we can come to the

object beyond or the "thing-in-itself".

In "Perception" the "object-image" was a collection of properties, but here we have a collection of appearances that point to an object beyond. The appearance taken in isolation is the same as the old "object-image". The incorporation into the object of its relation with other objects is an appearance. Since the object has its relations within itself, the relation to other appearances has been cancelled.

We have therefore no idea of substance distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or or reason concerning it.⁵


These new appearances are atomic qualities complete within themselves. The only connection they have to each other is that stated in the law of association, or what Hegel calls the "Law of Force". Historically the movement from "Perception" to the "Law of Force" is a transition from Locke to Hume.

After the same fashion as in "Sense-certainty" where the simple "now" was continually being lost to a plurality of "nows" and in "Perception" where the unity of the object was dependent on its properties, here the series of appearances are maintained in a meaningful unification by the inner being, i. e. the object beyond or the "Law of Force". Each individual appearance passes out of being but is connected to the next appearance through the medium of the law of the beyond.⁶


This atomization is what allows appearances to be connected by thought determinations. This expresses the dialectical process in which the object, which is at first perceived in a tangle of relations with other objects, has these relations cancelled by taking them up into itself and ends by cutting itself adrift, freeing itself to take part in a larger arena - namely thought. Conventionally this is viewed as an abstracting activity in which the object is simply lifted out of its empirical context. It is Hegel's contention however, that this dialectical process does not ignore the context or relations of the object. In this determination of the object, consciousness is not dealing merely with an "object-image" but with the relations of an object in temporal series. Hence an abiding interest in causality. The interest is not that of Kant's first moment of the category of relation, substances and accidentia, but rather the interest is that of the second moment - cause and effect.

In "Sense-certainty" the external relation of the "now" and plurality of "nows" became internalized to produce the object of "Perception". The object of "Perception" in turn internalizes the objects relations to other objects to produce the appearances and the "Law of Force". The old object and its moments are taken up as mere moments in the new object. This concretely expresses what Hegel meant in the Preface when he spoke of past objects or processes becoming dead moments to a new perspective.⁷


1. Sense-certainty



2. Perception



3. Force Law



In "Perception" one had to worry about substance changing, but in "Understanding" a change in appearance is just a further manifestation of the object lying beyond. By putting the object in the supersensible realm one has saved it from temporal change. By going beyond the "object-image" consciousness surrenders it to pure change. The "Understanding", in fact, represents the inverted mirror image of "Sense-certainty". Instead of the loss of the truth through change, change now in the form of appearances leads to the truth. Instead of unity leading to a plurality, a plurality leads to a unity.

In this first expression of law and appearances, the law is not much more than the appearances themselves. Anyone is free to collect a series of appearances and call it a law. From this pure phenomenalism arises the question as to why my laws are similar to yours. New appearances result in a new law being concocted. When a doctor records the symptoms of a disease, one hopes that he has gotten all of them. If no general law can be discovered it means one has not yet isolated all the moments of an individual object, so that it is possible to transcend it and put it into its appropriate slot. Not all properties are as yet seen as relational. The object-image has not yet become a completely atomic appearance. For example, a healthy citizen

of the state subordinates his more primitive drives to the higher interest of the state, but there are some unfortunate people who operate in the reverse manner. They have within themselves object-images which have not been atomized and subordinated to higher ends. The whole purpose of Freudian psychoanalysis is to ferret out these object-images and let them have their say. Hopefully, the individual returns to society a healthy human being. However the question, whether it is better to be tied to Mother or IBM, is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Hegel is criticizing a formalism which prematurely jumps from "Perception" to "Understanding" - specifically the formalism he takes Kant's philosophy to represent. If the content or previous moment has not completely purged itself of external relations, i. e. internalized these relations to become a complete object, then rough shodding over this incompleteness will result in contradictions. Hegel attributes Kant's antinomies to this formalism. He criticizes Kant for being too soft, for failing to rid the object of contradictions before allowing it to crop up in thought.

If one ignores the varying appearances then the law of unity itself will eventually show diversity or contradictions within it. A naive example of this is Thales' principle of water which is immediately contradicted by other principles.

The first dialectical moment between the unity of the beyond and the appearances results in the law of unity taking the plurality of

appearances into itself as a plurality of laws. One law is not enough to explain all appearances. Kant, having said that the mind seeks greater and greater unity, is forced to introduce a new principle of the mind. Since scientists do differentiate between objects, he introduces the differentiating aspect of mind. The systematizers - Fichte and Hegel - would say that Kant has failed to recognize the necessary or internal connections between the principle of unity and the principle of diversity.

Just as consciousness has posited the fact that appearances lead to a unifying law, similarly, it takes the plurality of laws as appearances that point to a more abstract law. Consciousness lets these laws "coalesce into a single law".⁸ Consciousness has developed new laws which are more abstract and more divorced from the specific content of various appearances than the original law.

Hegel, however, sees this formalism as a necessary step in the dialectic. For instance, he says of Newton's universal law of attraction, "it is directed against that unthinking way of representing reality, to which everything appears in the shape of accident and chance."⁹ The problem with abstract laws is that they leave more specific appearances unexplained. For instance a mechanistic treatment of biology leaves certain aspects of life unexplained. The abstract laws of chemistry are inadequate for biology. By abstracting itself from specific appearances the universal law no longer determines them; it no longer satisfies the purpose of a law, i. e. it no longer serves to unify

appearances. Dialectically this means that the universal law has negated the diversity of appearances. This means that the universal law takes up within itself the diverse laws.

In contrast to the first moment where the law and the appearances were closely identified, the second more abstract law expresses the relationship between elements that are external to each other. For instance, in the law of motion the two terms space and time have nothing in common. To be a formal law, the parts must be external to each other; the reason being that the universal law has negated and incorporated into itself unrelated laws. Hegel sums up this state of affairs as follows:

Either the universal force, is indifferent to the division into parts, which is found in the law, or else the distinctions, the parts of law, are indifferent to one another. ¹⁰

Hegel's reference here is to the two examples he has given of the law of electricity and the law of motion. In the first case the law is indifferent. It does not specify why there must be both negative and positive charge. In the second case space and time are two concepts external to each other. The distinct elements within the formal law are not caused by the law itself.

Consciousness does not wish to break up the "changeless unity" of the object in the super-sensible world and consequently regards this difference between the universal law and its particular manifestations

as a distinction which only exists in thought, not in the object itself.¹¹

This denial constitutes an attempt to arrive at an explanation that will eliminate the distinctions. In fact, this negation of diversity situates the change in the changeless object of the beyond. Consciousness is repeating the same process that it carried out in "Perception", where it located the opposing moments within the object itself.

The problem for consciousness is to find a law which in its expression eliminates the distinctions. Hegel states:

This force is then so constituted that, when it finds expression opposite electrical discharges appear, and these again disappear into one another. In other words force has the same constitution as the law.¹²

In an attempt to preserve the unity of the object consciousness goes back to the appearances to establish a unity at that point. The result of this is a law that is neither indifferent to or different from its expression. This result gets Hegel's stamp of approval. It means that appearances can now be related internally rather than having to be grouped together in some external fashion by an abstract law. As in the example of space and time, it is Hegel's ideal to express the internal relationship between seemingly diverse appearances. Also it indicates Hegel's preference for Leibniz over poor Newton.

In spirit this dialectical movement represents the historical move from Plato to Aristotle. For Plato, particular appearances participate only imperfectly in the forms, whereas for Aristotle the

particular appearances were not different from the universal. One important aspect of both Aristotle's and Hegel's teleological philosophy is to develop relations internally. The drive for unity contains the seeds of its own destruction. In response to this drive consciousness created a supersensible world of the real to satisfy the desire for unity. The same drive dictated the destruction of this supersensible world. The law of the supersensible world is no longer distinct from the world of appearances. Except in the case of his conception of God, this result shows why Aristotle had no need for a transcendent reality to explain rationality in appearances.

We have seen how the interaction between a nontemporal realm and the world of flux has corrupted this supersensible world. Interaction is impossible without the forms turning into their opposite. If the forms as abstract laws keep their pure unity then they do not fulfill the purpose for which they were originally devised, i. e. to determine the appearances. The new world is a world of permanent change. The supersensible world continuously cancels one state after another to become something else. We have moved from Parmenides to Heraclitus. Before mediation a change was in appearance, while identity resided in the supersensible world; now change and permanence are two sides of the same coin of the supersensible realm. With the realization of this new principle of the beyond, consciousness now sees every change in appearance as an expression of a law of the beyond.¹³ Everything

is something in order that it may become something else. This state is the exact opposite of the first stage in "Sense-certainty". There, change was regarded as a total negation of the immediate object, whereas at this stage change, what an object is becoming, constitutes the essence of what it is. This is what Hegel means when he states that there is no "self-existence" but only total "being for another". Instead of trying to avoid change the object seeks it out as a completion of its real nature. The world of appearance has incorporated into itself its own unifying object or law, which represents its goal or end. The inverted world, i. e. the world of appearance, is both a negation of the world beyond and at the same time is the same as this other world and internally related to it. This new object, i. e. a series of appearances, has internalized its own unity, which means it negates its present position because it realizes its own essence has not achieved true expression in this present position. The object no longer takes what it immediately is as its truth, but rather regards the immediate state as a negation of what it truly is. Thus, the object hopes that by negating its present state it will become its true self. The negation of the immediate, or what the object is not, constitutes a double negation or self-determination. The object is no longer threatened by change or by the environment, but rather takes itself to be identical to its environment. Immediacy is now the threat. This "being totally for another" is what Hegel calls the "ultimate principle of life".¹⁴ The organism now has its self before it

as a purpose or goal which it must attain by overcoming intermediary stages. The immediate stage or present has only a negative significance.

The new section, "Self-consciousness", which develops out of this embodies the exact opposite attitude to that which consciousness has taken. At this juncture Hegel argues against those who make much of the principle of identity. Hegel shows how Kant's category of Totality can be given an organic interpretation in which identity is not something we start with but rather a result of mediation or the complete development of the organism.

At this stage unity stands before the organism as a blueprint for its development. Consciousness now has before it an object that explicitly expresses the principle of self-movement. The alien environment or negative has been taken up by the object as its true nature. At an earlier point the object was seen as independent of consciousness, but this 'being-per-se' is now a distinction which has been posited and cancelled by consciousness. In this new stage self-consciousness distinguishes itself from the object but at the same time cancels this distinction. This object of experience is both independent of me and not independent of me. Self-consciousness takes the independent reality of the object to be untruth and what is "for consciousness" to be truth. Even cows eating grass realize this principle. But alas, "self-consciousness" will realize the opposite, that, in fact, the object's independence is the truth.

CHAPTER VIII

Conclusion

In the conclusion I would like to discuss the relationship of Hegel's theory of objectivity and criticism of formalism to certain aspects of the thought of Darwin, Marx and Freud.

Hegel's evolutionary theory differs from scientific theories such as Darwin's in one important respect. Darwin explains each new species in terms of its previous states, but the weakness in Darwin's theory lies in his failure to account for missing links between the inorganic, organic and mind. In Hegel's evolutionary process each new stage is not wholly explained in terms of past stages. Higher forms are not completely explained in terms of lower ones. Each new stage of the dialectic demands its own historical analysis. Since each new object has taken past processes up into itself, it has effectively isolated itself from its own past. An object issues out of its past, but at the same time is free of that past. As we have seen, the more natural an object is the less this is the case. Thus we can say that Darwinian evolution is a special sub-class of the more general Hegelian theory.

Hegel has developed a dialectical method which differs from Kant's transcendental method. In Hegel, a new object, different from the original object one started out to determine, arises in the process of analysis. The 'Form' of the Phenomenology is seen as a necessary one in which knowledge makes a series of appearances. The final appearance is absolute knowledge, a knowledge which has incorporated all previous appearances and the necessary form of the Phenomenology. In one respect it is just one more appearance, but in another it is a negation of appearances. It no longer jostles with the contingency of opposing appearances; it is pure thought which implies that any product of it will be a return to the starting point.¹ "Absolute Knowledge" can be viewed as a new object that has cut itself off from its past i. e. the Phenomenology of Mind, and entered a new world i. e. the Science of Logic. Presented as a new object, Absolute Knowledge demands dialectical analyses of the specific moments of its development. This is the form developed in Science of Logic. Logic, for Hegel, is a process of drawing deductions from a principle - deductions that never go beyond the original starting point.² "Absolute Knowledge" is the negation of "appearances". In like manner the end of "Logic" is "Nature" which negates pure thought. Next, "Spirit" follows as

the negation of "Nature". Thus we can say that Hegel's "system" evolves out of the application of a method. This interpretation of Hegel's system is the classical one and a good starting point for further investigations.

If Dialectics is really an important and true principle, then it must be clearly shown that objects indeed have a tendency to take up their past as parts of themselves. We have looked at three of the many examples which Hegel has given us: Sense-certainty, Perception, and Force. To a certain extent each of these finite stages has incorporated its past if only in an abstract way. In the lowly world of space, a change of place is really no change at all since each space is the same as every other. At higher levels change involves more qualitative readjustments. Each phase in the Phenomenology was only a partial description of the object. Parts of the real object were seen to be alien to it.

The object is, then, partly immediate existence, a thing in general - corresponding to immediate consciousness; partly an alteration of itself; its relatedness or (existence-for-another and existence-for-itself) determinateness - corresponding to Perception; partly essential being or in the form of a universal - corresponding to understanding.³

Each represents a part of the real object, but as long as consciousness only sees part, the object is unable to maintain itself in its true nature.

All these isolated parts are essential to a unity.

Kant's purpose was to show the synthesizing activity of mind which brings these separate aspects together. Perhaps in Kant, but more explicitly in Hegel these parts are shown, in fact, to be internally related; not forced into an arbitrary combination.⁴ An atom, to satisfy its need for a certain number of electrons in its outer orbit will combine with other atoms. The consequence of this action is a new object i.e. the molecule, with its own peculiar problems. It is Hegel's purpose to demonstrate the need for unity within the elements themselves. Higher levels of consciousness are not in conflict with lower ones but are compatible. This is not to say there are no instances of conflict involved. An object only gives itself up to a greater whole when it sees this whole as a completion of itself. The primitive object is exposed to a great deal of propoganda. Hegel's philosophy is one of reconciliation - a promise of eventual harmony through conflict.

Two great thinkers, Marx and Freud, operate within the same framework as Hegel. In their separate fields each conceives his task as one of finding a solution to a problem which they take to be caused by formalism in the Hegelian sense. If we examine Freud's or Marx's approach to the sick individual and sick society respectively we shall see their attempt to develop an organic unity out of a formalistic one.

Freud believed that instincts formed the general response of the organism and that higher processes were a suppression or specification of particular responses in much the same way as space and time form an abstract background for the move towards individualization. This conception of some form of suppression would seem to indicate that Marx and Freud were operating in a formalistic framework. For Hegel once a moment has completed its individualizing process i. e. become a thing-in-itself it is taken up as a passive element in a higher moment of subjectivity, satisfying itself within a limited sphere. It is quite possible that a moment will not complete itself, and if this occurs, Hegel is in total agreement with Freud and Marx as to the cure. Theories of psychoanalysis and revolution both maintain that mere intellectual awareness of the suppressive state is not enough to eliminate that state. The primitive state must develop itself according to its own principles. Both Freud and Marx were dead set against any superficial cures and demanded a restructuring at the roots. The difference between a psychoanalyst or revolutionary and a philosopher is that while the former group tries to kill the past, the philosopher already finds it dead. Hegel is very much opposed to this sequestering of lower instincts. As Hegel states in "Unhappy Consciousness" with great psychological acumen:

These latter (Hegel here is referring to lower instincts) instead of being performed unconsciously and naturally as something which, per se, is of no significance, and can acquire no importance and essential

value for spirit these latter, since it is in them that the enemy is seen in his proper and peculiar shape, are rather an object of strenuous concern and serious occupation, and become precisely the most important consideration. Since, however, this enemy creates itself in its very defeat, consciousness, by giving the enemy a fixedness of being and of meaning instead of getting rid of him, really never gets away from him and finds itself constantly defiled.⁵

One should happily indulge and hope that there are some spiritual qualities left over. If not, nothing has been lost.

For Freud higher human activities are free to operate only by suppressing the activities of eros. As we have seen in "Understanding" the denial of immediacy issues out of immediacy itself.⁶ In studying abnormal people Freud may have overstated the activity of suppression. Those who take a more organic view i. e. take their examples from normal organisms, find not so much suppression as a loss of utility of lower states. Kurt Goldstein expresses the holistic approach to this problem as follows:

The fact of the removal of former reactions is usually described as repression. However if one thinks of it only in terms of "shoving away" or splitting off, . . . the denotation "repression" is not correct. . . The elimination really takes place as the maturing organism readapts itself to the environment and gains a new pattern of which the phenomenon to be repressed actually is no longer a part. . . Yet, the effects of former reactions have not been "forgotten" through repression. Rather, they cannot be remembered because they are no longer part of the attitudes of later life, and therefore cannot become effective.⁷

It would take a great deal more analysis but it may be that a Hegelian might be able to argue that Freud illegitimately generalized the formalistic state of his neurotic patients to normal development. The same argument would stand against Marx who studied societies where suppression was the order of the day. At the same time Hegel would not disagree with their formalistic descriptions. However we cannot pigeon-hole Marx and Freud entirely within a formalistic framework. Their criticisms and cures are Hegelian in nature. Marx's approach to a solution for the elimination of suppression is surprisingly similar to Freud's.

Marx attacks both Formalism and Hegel. His attacks on Hegel are not against the dialectic but the supposed neglect of it. According to Marx, Hegel in many instances is formalistic, in that he glides over moments that aren't complete. Hegel is in too much of a hurry to get to the spiritual. Marx's adamant appeals to feed the body before the spirit, to take first things first and to be realistic (Christ's body makes a poor substitute for bread) are seen as essentially Hegelian in spirit. If one makes a clear distinction between the objectivity of philosophy and other disciplines then the difference between Hegel and Marx becomes much less. Formal unity always precedes organic unity as we saw in the "understanding". Hegel in agreement with Freud and Marx does not see the higher as suppressing the lower but the lower as trying to suppress or deny

higher relations. In the same way naive consciousness wanted to stay in a state of immediacy. These lower forms block progress and have to be eliminated. In a neurotic individual or state both Marx and Freud see a ruling power that has gained its power illegitimately. It has not reconciled the moments it supposedly rules and its method of governing is suppressive. The upper class (thought) necessarily suppresses the lower classes (eros) in order to maintain its reality principle and not disintegrate. Where thought has developed internally from eros or rulers from the ruled then suppression is not necessary. (The Phenomenology is a great defense of Democracy but unfortunately where Democracy succeeds it does away with itself.) However in the neurotic state the lower classes are constantly threatening to emerge and swamp the ruling class.

Both Marx and Freud hold off reconciliation to somewhere in the future which is beyond the scope of Hegel's philosophy. The necessity for formalism and suppression is traced by these three men to a set of terms which to a certain extent are synonymous. For Hegel it is the state of nature, insecurity and the fear of the self that it will disintegrate. For Marx it is scarcity and the unwillingness to share for fear one's own self will lose out. For Freud it is again a fear of destruction on the part of an unstable ego.

Hegel's influence on Continental philosophy has never really dwindled but in the English speaking world there has been a short reign

of Positivism which has only just recently died. It may then be helpful to mention some of its criticisms of Hegel in the light of what we have seen in the previous pages.

Consciousness, as we have described it, has the ability to posit reality, the negation of that reality and the relation between them. Consciousness embodies in itself the absolute or organic whole. At the beginning of the Phenomenology consciousness did not see these moments as internally connected, as essential parts of the object. According to Hegel we can reject the fact that knowledge must be immediate and immutable and at the same time posit this immediacy as a part of the truth of the object. In taking the view that there is a plurality of independent facts one does not condemn organic logic as much as one ignores it. Part of the force of atomism was its appeal to simple facts. Objects of perception, time and space were real and not mere chimeras. The fact is that the idealists never claimed these abstractions to be illusions. In criticizing the mathematical attitude Hegel does not say the mathematician is creating myths but that he is giving only a partial picture of things. If one keeps this in mind silly questions like the one Russell raises, in his History of Philosophy wouldn't arise:

.....how could knowledge ever begin? ...
 If all knowledge were a knowledge of the universe
 as a whole, there would be no knowledge. ⁸

In the Phenomenology each step represents a partial determination of the object. Consciousness takes the object to be complete; this is a necessary aspect of dialectic. Unless one takes an object as complete with fully defined boundaries it is impossible to negate it. Hegel in the Encyclopedia uses the example of the earth's system, as an absolute system meaning that it is self-contained and generates itself.⁹ One could then easily argue with him to show that the earth isn't an autonomous system. One must take the solar system into account. One can do this however only after the earth's system has been defined in some way. In denying this abstract system one does not deny its importance in the development of a truer system. Hegelian analysis always gives the object an original freedom as an atomic fact. But where he differs from the atomist is in claiming that the parts one brings together are not true atoms in that they have gained their definite boundaries by contact with others. Atomism makes the mistake of taking a part in isolation that is really the product of a system. It is not necessary to refute an organic logic to explain pluralistic phenomena. Kant's categories for the possibility of any experience were incorporated into the Hegelian logic. The fact that man knows anything at all is due to his limited and stable structure.

Plato in one of his letters warns us against the misinterpretation put on one's philosophy by the rabble.

It is a very great safeguard to learn by heart instead of writing. It is impossible for what is written not to be disclosed.¹⁰

Perhaps Hegel has written a philosophy which in its freedom escapes any condemnations by the ignorant reader.

NOTES

Preface:

¹G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, trans., G. E. Müller, (New York: Wisdom Library, 1959) p. 39.

²G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, ed., J. Sibree, (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1956) p. 3.

³The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed., R. McKeon, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1941) pp. 184-186, pp. 689-690.

⁴J. Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, (New York: G. Braziller, Inc., 1955) p. 184.

⁵Hegel, Encyclopedia, p. 68.

⁶G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. W.H. Johnson & L. G. Struthers, (New York: MacMillan Co., 1929) p. 59.

Introduction:

¹Hegel: Texts and Commentary, trans. and ed., W. Kaufmann, (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966) p. 51.

²The Basic Works of Aristotle, p. 891

³Ibid., p. 909.

⁴H. Höffding, A History of Modern Philosophy, (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1955) p. 139.

⁵I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith (Toronto: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1929) p.126.

⁶R. Adamson, Fichte (Edinburgh: 1881) pp. 25-31.

⁷G. W. F. Hegel, Early Theological Writings, trans., T. M. Knox, (New York: Harper Torch Books)

⁸Hegel: Texts and Commentary, p. 48.

⁹The Writings of William James, ed., J.J. McDermott, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1968) p. 520.

¹⁰Schopenhauer, World as Will and Representation, trans. E. F. J. Payne, 2 vols., (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1966) v. i, p. 429.

Chapter I:

¹Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 54.

²Hegel: Texts and Commentary, p. 51.

³Ibid., p. 29

⁴Ibid., p. 28

⁵W. T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955) pp. 216-217.

⁶Hegel: Texts and Commentary, p. 31

⁷Ibid., p. 50.

⁸Ibid., p. 50.

⁹Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1910) p. 664.

¹⁰Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 105.

¹¹If negation is a determining factor of the object, does the statement that a pear is not a peach tell us something about the pear? This is a negative factor but not a determining one. Idealistic logic has been criticized on this basis. The criticism however is erroneous. The idealists have not made this highly specific claim. Their logical deduction only demands that there exist opposite properties. For

instance if the colour red is a quality that determines an object there must also be a plurality of other colours that are excluded by red. The logic does not deduce what these qualities are, only that they must be there. In this respect, then, a pear does not need a peach to be fully determined, but as a part of a larger class it does need a plurality of other fruits. One of these might be a peach.

¹²Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, pp. 281-283.

¹³Ibid., p. 800.

Chapter II:

¹Hegel, Early Theological Writings

²Hegel: Texts and Commentary, p. 16.

³Berkeley's Philosophical Writings, ed., D.M. Armstrong, (New York: Collier MacMillan Ltd., 1965) p 303.

⁴Hegel: Texts and Commentary, pp. 24-25.

⁵Ibid., pp. 74-76.

⁶Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. by E. S. Haldane & F. H. Simpson (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1892-1896) p. 483.

⁷In the Preface Hegel criticizes Schelling for trying to take a short cut to the absolute.

⁸When Hegel applies his dialectics to mathematics, history, aesthetics, and science, he does not consider himself to be dealing in a pseudo-science but in an area that these disciplines do not treat of at all, nor can they with their formal and subjective methods. Few mathematicians deduce the line from the point. P.D. Cuspensky is a Russian mathematician and mystic who has done this in his work Tertium Organum.

⁹Hegel: Texts and Commentary, p. 68.

¹⁰Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, p. 484.

- ¹¹Ibid., p. 487.
- ¹²Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, p. 807.
- ¹³K. Marx and F. Engels, Basic Writings of Politics and Philosophy, ed. L. S. Feuer, (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1959) p. 243.
- ¹⁴J. G. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, trans. A. E. Kröeger, (Philadelphia: J. B. Kippencott & Co., 1868)
- ¹⁵Ibid., pp. 63-64.
- ¹⁶Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 104.
- ¹⁷Fichte, Science of Knowledge, p. 58.
- ¹⁸Ibid., pp. 24-25.
- ¹⁹Ibid., p. 45.
- ²⁰Ibid., pp. 57-58.
- ²¹Ibid., pp. 50-51.
- ²²Ibid., pp. 63-64.
- ²³Ibid., p. 76.
- ²⁴Ibid., p. 84.
- ²⁵Hegel, Encyclopedia, p. 82.
- ²⁶Fichte, Science of Knowledge, p. 93.
- ²⁷Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, p. 493.
- ²⁸Ibid., p. 486.
- ²⁹J. G. Fichte, The Vocation of Man, ed., R.M. Chisholm, (New York: Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956) p. 8.
- ³⁰The Basic Works of Aristotle, p. 567.
- ³¹Hegel: Texts and Commentary, p. 80.

Chapter III:

¹Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, p. 139.

²Ibid., pp. 137-138.

³Ibid., p. 135.

⁴Ibid., p. 138.

⁵Ibid., p. 139.

⁶Ibid., p. 140.

⁷E. Husserl, Ideas, trans. by Boyce Gibson, (New York: Collier Books, 1962) pp. 123, 115.

⁸Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, p. 141.

Chapter IV:

¹Hegel, Encyclopedia, p. 198.

²Ibid., p. 200.

³Hegel, Philosophy of Spirit, trans. Wallace, (London: Oxford University Press, 1894) p. 45.

⁴Hegel, Encyclopedia, p. 205.

⁵Ibid., p. 204.

Chapter V:

¹Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 131.

²Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, pp. 150-153.

³Ibid., pp. 154-155.

⁴Ibid., pp. 155-157.

⁵The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed., E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, (Pantheon Books, 1961) pp. 858-59.

⁶Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, p. 156.

⁷Ibid., p. 158.

⁸Ibid., p. 157.

⁹Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 131.

¹⁰See Chapter I footnote 3.

Chapter VI:

¹Hegel, Phenomenology, p. 169.

²Ibid., p. 163.

³Ibid., p. 176.

⁴Ibid., pp. 164-166.

⁵Ibid., p. 164.

⁶Ibid., p. 165.

⁷Ibid., pp. 169-172.

⁸Ibid., p. 171.

⁹Ibid., p. 171.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 172.

¹¹Ibid., p. 175.

¹²Ibid., p. 175.

¹³Ibid., p. 175.

Chapter VII:

¹Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, p. 181.

²Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 22.

³Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, p. 185.

⁴Ibid., p. 195.

⁵D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed., L. A. Selby-Bigge, (London; Oxford University Press, 1888) p. 16.

⁶Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, p. 193.

⁷Hegel: Texts and Commentary, p. 44.

⁸Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, p. 196.

⁹Ibid., p. 197.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 200.

¹¹Ibid., p. 202.

¹²Ibid., p. 201.

¹³Ibid., p. 202.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 208.

Chapter VIII:

¹Hegel, Science of Logic, vol.i, p. 53.

²Ibid.

³Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, p. 790.

⁴"By way of introduction or anticipation we need only say that there are two stems of human knowledge namely sensibility and understanding, which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown root." (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason) p. 61.

⁵Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, p. 263.

⁶For more on this topic one should read Marcuse's book Eros and Civilization.

⁷K. Goldstein, The Organism, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963) p. 321.

⁸B. Russell, History of Philosophy, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1961) p. 714. Note: This reference really applies to Bradley more than it does to Hegel and it epitomizes the distortion English philosophers have put on German Idealism.

⁹Hegel, Encyclopedia, p. 181.

¹⁰The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Letter II p. 1567.

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