GEORGE HERBERT MEAD'S THEORY OF THE SELF

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THEORY OF THE SELF

By

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS: This thesis explores Mead's thought from his social psychology through his cosmology. It argues that Mead felt compelled to introduce the speculative principles of sociality and temporality into his social psychology in order to do full justice to the experience of the individual. In so doing he developed a radical theory of the self.

I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Carl Pfuntner who first introduced me to Mead and my appreciation to Dr. Shalom for his patience and instructive comments.

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I

MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY

George Herbert Mead was born in South Hadley, Massachusetts, in 1863. His formal education took him from Oberlin College to Harvard, Leipzig and Berlin. Mead taught at Michigan for a few years and went to the University of Chicago in 1893 where he remained until his death in 1931.

As a philosopher Mead was a pragmatist; as a scientist he was a social psychologist.[1] In neither field did he share the quality of systematic thinking associated with men like Dewey or Cooley. Mead's publications were restricted to the journals of his profession. After his death his unpublished manuscripts, lectures and notes were collected, edited and published in four volumes. The first to be published, despite its being the last to be written, was The Philosophy of the Present (hereafter: PP). This consists of the Carus Lectures which Mead presented at Berkeley three weeks before his death. It is supplemented by a few previously published articles. The next volume to be published was Mind, Self, and Society (hereafter: MSS).

This is made up of sets of student notes from Mead's course in Social Psychology which he gave at Chicago from 1900 until the year of his death.

The next volume to be published was The Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century (hereafter: MT). This was also made up of student notes and unpublished manuscripts. It represents Mead's view of the history of ideas. The last volume was published in 1938 as The Philosophy of the Act (hereafter: PA). This volume represents Mead's pragmatism as formulated over the last ten or fifteen years of his life.[2] It is obvious from this sketch that the order of publication is independent of the order of composition. Intellectually the chronological order of Mead's life would be : MSS, PA, and PP. MT has been left out of this scheme because the view of history expressed in that work is covered by PA and PP.

MSS appears first on the list - yet it is based on notes taken as late as 1930. This placement is justified because of the general nature of undergraduate courses and a teacher's responsibility to students. Mead was constantly revising his lectures to include recent experimental findings as well as the refinements of his own thought. Considerations to a theory of mind or self which are outside the field of social psychology could not be included in such a course. The lectures stick to the level of the audience as well as to the general confines of social psychology.

MSS is Mead's attempt to "show that mind and the self are without residue social emergents; and that language, in the form of a vocal gesture, provides the mechanism for their emergence."[3] For Mead mind evolves in a social context. Previous psychologies, such as those of Tarde, Baldwin and Wundt, cannot explain the origin of mind within the framework of observable behaviour.[4] All of these views assume that mind is necessary for the inception of a social process. Mead disagrees with this kind of analysis because they are attempting to explain the evolution of mind in a social context and, at the same time, they are asserting that the social context is only possible because there are minds. A further reason why Mead rejects these psychologies is that they have not shown how those aspects of mind which they claim have evolved in a social manner could have been socially initiated.

Mead refers to his social psychology as social behaviourism. He does this for a number of reasons. In the first place, Mead feels that no clear line can be drawn between individual and social psychology. The particular analysis of social psychology is concerned with the origins of the self, of mind and of individual consciousness. Individual psychology "abstracts certain factors from the situation with which social psychology

deals more nearly in its concrete reality."[5] Mead wishes to maintain the behaviouristic approach because behaviourism for Mead is "simply an approach to the study of the experience of the individual from the point of view of his conduct, particularly, but not exclusively, the conduct as it is observable by others."[6]

To clear the ground for his own methodology Mead begins MSS with a criticism of the dominant force in psychology in his day - Watson and his behaviourism. Mead has no quarrel with the Watsonians so long as they keep to their original field of investigation, that of animal psychology. Animal psychology had long ago dropped any reference to consciousness on the grounds that it was not testable. The pre-Watsonians who adapted this model of investigation to human psychology had also omitted the reference to consciousness. Watson, however, went a step further and removed the reference to the entire introspective field of private subjective experience within the individual.[7]

Watson argues that thought is actually subcutaneous speech. Thought, word, symbol and vocal gesture are all synonomous terms for Watson. Words become associated with things and our responses to the things of our language is thought. There is an interaction between the word and that

which the word represents; this interaction becomes a conditioned reflex. When our responses have become conditioned in this manner the word is sufficient to evoke the action which has become associated with it. All phenomena must be reduced to the terminology of the conditioned reflex. What cannot be so reduced, such as mind, consciousness or introspection, is denied. Denied, not just as an explanation of behaviour but as existing in any sense. What Mead argued at this point is that though it is impossible to reduce mind, e.g., to behaviouristic terms, this does not rule out the possibility of explaining mind in those terms. Mead is arguing that mind or consciousness can be shown to be functioning.[8]

Mead has many specific criticisms of Watson in the first section of MSS,[9] but I will only concern myself with his most important criticism as it is the one which most directly introduces Mead's own theories and methodology. Mead's major criticism of Watson grew out of Mead's understanding of John Dewey's work Psychology. In this work Dewey was arguing against the prevailing theoretical orientation in psychology before the turn of the century. This orientation was 'elementalism' and its "psychological counterpart, reflexism."[10] Dewey rejected this analysis

because "the reflex arc is not a comprehensive, or organic unity, but a patchwork of disjointed parts, a mechanical conjunction or unallied process."[11] Dewey corrects this view of the stimulus-response problem by showing that "sensory stimulus, control connections and motor responses shall be viewed, not as separate and complete entities in themselves, but as divisions of labor, functioning factors, within the single concrete whole, now designated the reflex arc."[12] Instead of treating the reflex arc, or the stimulus-response mechanism, as a series of technical unrelated sub-acts, Dewey is seeking the mechanism of the coordination of the act as a unitary function.

In filling this view out, Dewey denies the possibility of experientially making a radical distinction between the stimulus and the response. The "response is necessary to constitute the stimulus..."[13] A response is a mediation of a stimulus. Considered from the point of view of experience Dewey is saying that our conduct in the world is that of a unified actor and that any explanation of that conduct must be able to explain the unity of action. The model of an arc is not appropriate for the explanation of the responses of a minded organism. Dewey's model is that of "a circuit, not an arc or broken segment of a circle."[14] Dewey is saying that the distinction between stimulus and response is a functional or teleological distinction and not an existential or ontological distinction. A response

is an interpretation of a stimulus. Response is a process whereby organisms structure or organize experience and their behaviour "with reference to reaching or maintaining an end."[15]

Mead, following Dewey, criticizes Watson on the grounds that the mechanistic conception of response to stimuli is inadequate to explain the majority of human actions. That is, a mechanistic model can offer explanations only in a very limited number of situations. For example, habitual behaviour or the behaviour of a company of soldiers can be explained under this model but the conditioning model cannot explain the inception of the habit nor the origins of the commands to which the troops are mechanically responding. For Mead, responses are always adjustive. This is to say that stimuli always require interpretation. The total field of sensuous stimulation is always much greater than the actual aspect of the field to which a response is made. This selective element of a response changes the nature of the stimulus. Responses have to be seen on an interactionist model and not on a mechanical model which has an isomorphic correspondence between stimulus and response. The environment is affected and changed by the response just as much as the organism is affected by the stimulus.

Watson's model is a simple S - R determination. Mead's model is more like this : S -(r - s)- R. The capital S and R are the same as Watson's from the point of view of an observer but for Mead the original S is interpreted (small r) and this interpretation changes the nature of the S (hence changing the environment for the organism). It is the interpreted S which leads to action (R). Mead is holding that Watson's model does not require an actor, i.e., we can mechanistically stimulate all possible responses without reference to the organism. Mead rejects this completely by holding that the interpretation is relative to the needs or the interests of the organism being stimulated. To put this another way, which will be clarified in greater detail later in the paper, for Mead minded organisms have a history - indeed, in Mead's extended sense of history, minded organisms are their history. Watson's conception of mind makes history irrelevant. For Watson, the conditioning process occurred in time but time is essentially irrelevant to the conditioning process. For Mead, as we shall see, the notion of temporality is crucial to the genesis of the self.

Mead is asking for the conditions within which the experience of the individual arises.[16] The key mechanism allowing for the development of mind and self is language.

Language "has to be studied from the point of view of the gestural type of conduct within which it existed without being as such a definite language. And we have to see how the communicative function could have arisen out of that prior sort of conduct."[17] The basic form of all communication is gesture. For animals this is their only form of communication. Mead's famous example is that of a dog fight. In this example one animal recognizes the intention or attitude of the other. Each movement of one animal serves as a stimulus to which the other animal responds. Mead calls this a 'conversation of gestures.' No assumption of consciousness or of reflection is necessary for such a conversation. Any action which one individual performs and which another individual takes to be a stimulus requiring a response is a gesture.[18]

What is lacking in the conversation of gestures to qualify it as a language is the objective basis of secure or sharable meanings. That is, a gesture by A need not communicate anything to B except what B happened to take the gesture as signifying. But the significant point about gestures is that they are the original and rudimentary form of all social acts. They do not require consciousness. All they require is the ability to make a response which adjusts the behaviour of one animal to the gesture of another.[19] Objective communication is impossible until

A's gesture can arouse the same response in B as it was intended to arouse by A. For Mead, it is the vocal gesture that makes this possible.

Mead holds that the unique role of the vocal gesture, in the genesis of the self, is that it alone among gestures is 'observable' or accessible to both parties of the 'conversation'. We cannot see our hands and shoulders in gesturing, we cannot see our facial movements in conversation, we cannot observe their interplay in an argument, but we can hear the inflection of tone, the pitch and the timbre of our vocal gestures. This is not to say that we can necessarily hear our vocal gestures with the ears of the other party but vocal gesture is the first form of conversation in which the possibility exists for objective communication. In vocal gestures, because A can observe the gesture, along with B, the possibility exists for the establishment of the identity of what is being communicated and what is being received in the communication.

Vocal gestures are of course signs for things in the world, at least they were with respect to origins. In later stages of development these signs became symbols, i.e., they were no longer tied down to the presence of the things being vocalized. When the vocal gesture of A serves as a stimulus for A as well as a stimulus for B's response, that defines the relation as a significant gesture. It is no

longer a simple gesture because, if there is to be communication, the response can no longer be arbitrary. The tendency of A to respond to his vocal gesture in the same way as B will respond or tends to respond presupposes a common social (shared) mode of behaviour. This common element, this element which serves to create an identity between the two responses (A's and B's) is meaning. The meaning is independent of the thing itself but is dependent on shared common forms of action.

Meaning is a triadic relationship. Meaning is the cement which holds a social act together from the inception of the shared activity through the original stimulus and the later stages of the act. By act and social act I do not mean elaborate or overly complicated sets of behaviour. A social act is simply one in which more than one individual is implicated and the implication need not require physical presence. Thus, the buying of a gift is a social act, as is the offering of a chair to another person. Meaning does not require consciousness but it does require some objective shared characteristic. Mead calls this common characteristic, attitudes. Attitudes are the beginnings of acts.[20] They are the socially conditioned dispositions which have accompanied our learning of a language and the way of life involved in that language. That is, attitudes are the behavioural dispositions correlated to meanings. Attitudes are the functional equivalent of ideas.[21]

For Mead there are physiological counterparts to his psychology. Mead's parallelism is much broader than the associationistic model which had dominated psychology since Hume.[22] His is designed to account for the dynamic forms of experience. Mead sees parallelism as the "attempt to find analogues between action and experienced contents."[23]

Answering to attitudes are pathways of the central nervous system. What Mead is doing is to analogize from the reflex pathways such as the knee-jerk reflex to the vast complexity of the central nervous system itself. He holds that attitudes or ideas are represented in the central nervous system's pathways just as the physiological functions are represented. He is attempting to find some physiological mechanism which will allow him to reintroduce consciousness into psychology without violating his behaviouristic demands. I think that Mead felt constrained to do this because of the power of the Watsonian influence in psychology. Another, and more important reason, goes back to Dewey and his work.

In order to have a circuit as opposed to an arc there must be more than just a spatial dimension to the physical system itself. It must also have a temporal dimension. I am holding that Mead himself was never very clear on his parallelism. He was never sure how far he wished to go to keep within a rigorous scientific, i.e., empirical account

of behaviour. What he was searching for were functional equivalents which conceivably could account for his psychology. The notion of habits plays a great role in his thought and hence he needs a way of accounting for the past within present conduct. Mead writes:

> The past that is in our present experience is there because of the central nervous system in relation to the rest of the organism... The past must be found in the present world. From the standpoint of behavioristic psychology we pick out the central nervous system only because it is that which is the immediate mechanism through which our organism operates in bringing the past to operate on the present. If we want to understand the way in which an organism responds to a certain situation which has a past, we have to get into the effects of the past actions on that organism which have been left in the central nervous system. There is no question about that fact.[24]

The main reason for my wishing to emphasize this passage is that it is so uncharacteristic of Mead. In other places when Mead talks of facts he presents some. Here he does not. The whole tone of the passage is more like a man who is trying to convince himself than the reader. But I think that all that Mead is unsure of is the exact mechanism for this process. What he is convinced of is that the central nervous system has a temporal dimension of some sort which allows for the inhibition of present conduct.

Consciousness is a response to a problematic situation. When habitual behaviour becomes inadequate to deal with a

present situation, when new meanings are being indicated in a situation or when a novel experience is encountered we then become conscious of the symbols we are using, the signs we are indicating and the objects around us. Until a present course of action is thwarted we are not conscious for Mead. Consciousness is a response which allows for an adjustment of behaviour. The inhibition of conduct occurs at a point in time after an act has been initiated. It is the temporal dimension of the central nervous system which allows for the earlier stages of the act to be retained as the objects of thought or consciousness while we think through possible modes of the continuation of the conduct. Hence consciousness is functional for Mead and not substantive.[25]

The brain has the mechanism for achieving consciousness but consciousness itself is a part of the human environment. Our mode of experiencing the environment is as much a part of the environment as the actual physical objects within the environment. There is no food in nature except in so far as there exists an organism which can use those objects as food. In the same way there are no problematical situations in the environment except relative to an organism which has interests and needs such that the environment becomes problematical. But

relative to that organism the environment itself is problematical.

Mead sees consciousness as the response to situations and as the mechanism for the possibility of the control of conduct in a mode unique to man and fundamentally different from the trial and error method of control used by animals. Consciousness is not only aware of the actual inhibitory elements of the environment but it holds the inhibition up to a standard, i.e., the interest or need which initiated the action in the first place.

The physiological basis for Mead's parallelism is the distinction between motor processes and sensory processes. Motor processes are non-conscious; sensory processes are conscious. The sensory processes select courses of action which are given by the alternative modes available in the motor processes. For example, we lose the keys to our car. We pause and try to think of where they can be. We focus our attention on our day. We look into the car and see the keys still in the ignition. We look to see if the window is cracked a little, if it is we look for a long thin object. If it isn't we may have to break the window. We look for a heavy object. In all of these processes there is an interest or a purpose held firmly in mind. This interest dictates to our

sensory processes a criterion which they then attend to on the basis of the possibilities available to them from the motor processes. The sensory processes inform us that our fingers cannot get through that tiny crack in the window. This initiates the process of reflection seeking similar classes of experience which correspond to a pathway or attitude within the motor processes.

Consciousness of the situation is initiated when the standard motor processes are no longer adequate in their performance. In other words, when action can no longer be habitual, the response to that situation by a minded organism is called conscious. Consciousness is a selective mechanism; selection is "sensitizing the organ to stimuli..."[26] Consciousness selects contents within experience; consciousness makes certain contents accessible to the individual. In so doing, an observer is also given access to the contents of consciousness.

This selective function of consciousness leads to Mead's theory of universals. A particular object is called a social object by Mead if two or more individuals may implicate that object, i.e., use it identically, within an act.[27] The capacity of more than one individual to share identical attitudes toward the same object makes that object a social object. Consciousness functions to

isolate those characteristics of objects which are useful in a particular situation. Behaviouristically, consciousness has its origin in the same processes which give rise to universals.

Any object or aspect of an object which will satisfy a need without necessarily corresponding to present objects is a universal for Mead.[28] Methodologically it is the task of behaviourism to account for conduct from the point of view of observed responses. Mead is arguing that we are not stimulated by a particular when our responses can be called conscious, i.e., when the individual is operating in a problematical situation and not in a habitual one. Universals are responses just as consciousness is a response. But just as the mechanism for consciousness is always present so the mechanism for universals is always present in the symbols of language. The symbolic nature of language and the temporal dimension of the nervous system allow abstractions to be entertained and held while a process of thinking or selective observation is going on. We always think in universals because thought arises in the inhibition of conduct.[29] Mead is trying to account for universals within his behaviouristic orientation. He does this by seeing the stimuli as a particular which inhibits conduct and the response to the inhibition as the universal. In the inhibition a solution is sought for the problem. This search is reflection and involves the

active attending to memory and the present field of perception for any kind of a solution to the problem. In my example on p. 11, we do not look for the key to the car but we look for something which is key-like, something which will serve to open the car. We are seeking a particular solution to a particular problem but our response involves abstract, general aspects of the situation which are what Mead calls universals. Thought also shares the characteristic of so much of Mead's thinking, that of being adjustive. Thought is a process of adjusting needs to situations.

II

MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY: THE SELF

As language is necessary for the emergence of mind, so it is necessary for the emergence of a self. Mind emerged as the mechanism which allowed an adjustive response based on the meaning of social acts. Language functions to indicate characters of objects which can be meaningfully communicated and acted toward with reference to the field of cooperative behaviour. Self, like mind, has a history. Neither is within the individual at birth: "The self is something which has a development; it is not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process."[1] The focal point for the organization of experience is the self. The self and its organization is radically distinct from the psychological and physiological processes which characterize mind. Our organization of bodily experience is structured around a self; but the self is distinct from these objective experiences. Objective is being used here in the sense of pertaining to an object, in this case the body. The self is the only subject which has itself for an object.

Mind and consciousness are all characterizations of the object which I have been calling the individual. As aspects of experience which pertain to the individual they are subjective modes of experience. Their experience is always of something other than themselves. That is, consciousness is always consciousness of something toward which consciousness is a response. Similarly, mind is always a response to a gesture, to a problem, to a situation. As these aspects of the individual are centered on the world in some way we can characterize their kind of experience as discontinuous. These analyses do not account for the continuity of experience, memory, or, most importantly, the initiation of action.

The self is what can be both subject and object. The self is "entirely distinguishable from an organism that is surrounded by things and acts with reference to things, including parts of its own body."[2] Mead bases this on an observational characterization of consciousness. That is, that there are experiences in which we are 'immersed' in our activity. Our actions may be totally focused on our behaviour or on the things toward which we are acting. There is a consciousness in these actions but there is not the consciousness of an involvement of the self with these activities. It is the problem of how "can an individual

get outside himself (experientially) in such a way as to become an object to himself?"[3] In this case, the individual has gotten completely outside of himself and is acting exclusively in the objective sense.

Through language and the social process man can not only be an object to himself but man can be aware that he is being an object. Mead is insisting on this idea of objectivity so that he can answer a very old philosophic question: "What does it mean to be a rational man?" Mead's general framework for the answer is given in this quote: "For the individual organism is obviously an essential and important fact or constituent element of the empirical situation in which it acts; and without taking objective account of itself as such, it cannot act intelligently, or rationally."[4] To be a rational man means to be self-conscious. Rationality is a valuative concept. To be self-conscious is to have a 'self'. To be rational, man must evaluate himself as a part of the field within which he is acting. The core of rationality is the ability to offer explanations for actions. The kind of explanations offered varies with the society. This is true only because the actions themselves differ in different societies, i.e., to say that behaviour differs is to state conditions for action

and thereby conditions for explanation. The point that Mead is making is that the goal is the same in all societies, i.e., to give rational accounts of behaviour. Explanations are modeled along social lines which demand that behaviour be explicable.

Rational behaviour is a characteristic of human behaviour because only man has language and thereby symbolic behaviour. We explain the behaviour of others as well as our own behaviour in terms which are communicable. The communication may be intended for another person or addressed to ourselves. The explanation is social in the same sense as the behaviour to be explained is social. Behaviour is social because it is based on goal achievement which can only be attained by cooperative adjustive behaviour. Explanation is social because its mode is that of language which is the human mechanism which allows the very processes of adjustment, which are what we mean by social, to be effected.

In his behaviour the actor assumes the attitudes of others toward himself and acts with reference to himself as object rather than as subject. The experience of the individual gua individual is possible because he has a common standard which allows self reference, i.e., language and the world of social objects which are selected by our language to be the environment which gives alternative modes of action.

Once a self has emerged within the individual organism it is able to provide a basis for its own social experience. This is another way of affirming the unity of the social act. That is, because the self has arisen within and through the social process that self must be social. The social process has involved the organization of attitudes in such a way as to allow the development of a structure which is able to determine the selection of certain attitudes or courses of behaviour over others without, at the same time, being determined by the causal series which are selected to participate in. The causal series refers to the discernible perceptual patterns which are revealed through memory and observation. Even if we grant a strict determinism to the events in the world, Mead is asserting that there is human freedom and this freedom exists in the individual's ability to select the point at which he shall enter the causal processes. The details of this analysis must wait for the section on perspectives. The point I wish to stress here is that only after the self has emerged can it be seen as solitary, i.e., that the self can create its own social experience.

A distinction must be drawn between the unity of the social act, the unity of mind, and the unity of the self. The unity of the social act is the continuity

of the process of adjustment itself taken at any level. To isolate this kind of continuity is to transcend the social process itself and for Mead this is impossible as we would have to step outside of language to do this. Outside of a symbolic framework we would not only be incapable of communicating the experience but we could not have or be aware of distinctions within our perceptual field and hence could not have an identifiable experience. The isolated individual is isolated only in that he can indicate his isolation to himself.[5]

The unity of mind is an aspect of the unity of the self. The unity of the mind is the consciousness of the world insofar as this awareness of the world can be related to a potential action. This is a rather vague understanding as we could have an experience which we did not understand and call it a 'weird' experience; this name would then be sufficient for us to act intelligently or meaningfully. Mind is the mechanism for the mediation of behaviour. Mind leads to behaviour based on its reception of stimuli, from within or without the organism. Mind itself is a response to these stimulations. This ability to function as mind is dependent on its adequacy to correlate stimuli and responses. Its unity is its function. As mind is a response it is

always conscious of the particular aspects of the organism which it is involving in making its responses adequate. As yet there is still no reason or criteria for adequacy or for the notion of selection itself. It is not enough to say that successful functioning is the reason why mind selects patterns of behaviour which will lead to completion of certain tasks. The reason for selection and the criteria of adequacy, i.e., when to cease that kind of action because the goal is evaluated as being attained, are given by the self, through self-consciousness.

To bring the concepts of gesture, language and self together we must examine in detail the genesis of the self. The concept of role taking is crucial to the understanding of language and the self. Role taking is the formal mechanism by which one individual assumes the attitude of another individual; role taking allows identical participation by a number of individuals in the identical meaning which, to one individual, may be seen as subjective. Role taking begins in the play of children.

Children play at something. They observe various patterns of action around them. In play they involve themselves in these actions and play at these behaviours. Children play at being mother or father, policemen,

store clerks and a host of other behavioural patterns. The child is conscious of his role playing. He has organized these behaviours into his consciousness and is acting as if he were the other. The child cannot consciously express this organization but he can act on the basis of this organization. Not only must the child organize the role of the particular individual he is playing at being but he must organize the roles of the multitude of others who are implicated by that one role. For example, a mother is a mother because of specific actions she performs with reference to father, children, pets and the milkman. The child, in taking the role of the mother, must not only organize the mother's role but must organize all of these other roles so that the child can be a successful mother. In play the child is carrying on a "conversation of gestures..."[6]

The next stage of development is the organized game. Here the child is still playing but to play a game he has to know rules and specifically which of those rules apply to him. He must also know that there are a variety of roles which are integrated into this total pattern called a game. To play he must now know his relation to all of the other roles in the game. This is different from the first stage of play where the child had a certain license

in the specific roles he assigned, e.g., to father, child, or pet. In the game the roles are definite and the child must accept this determination if he is to play the game. The rules delineate a set of conditions which demand that the child take the attitude of possible future events rather than immediate spontaneous creations of behaviours as he was at liberty to create in the case of play. In the game, the rules describe possibilities. In baseball, for example, the rules tell one how to score runs and how to prevent the other team from scoring. The rules dictate that the individual in the outfield throw the ball to the base ahead of the player on a particular base. The individual's role is now relative to the situation and limited by the existing conditions. In knowing the rules of a game and the variety of roles which make up that game the individual has an organization of attitudes and responses; but, this organization does not yet involve a self. The organization is at a particular level and is not a generalized attitude of behaviour. The game is still a game and the rules are specific enough to preclude the individual's seeing himself as an object. That is, the rules are not yet organized into the social process.

The organization of his role to the rules is still seen as given to the individual. The importance of the move from play to the game is that the notion of the

'other' has become introduced to the child. In play the child is the role and the others involved in that role serve to define the role that the child is playing. In the game the child learns his role only in relation to other roles which the child only has to play implicitly. It is "the organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self (and this) may be called 'the generalized other.'"[7] This is the attitude of the community; it develops from the game in that the entire sets of individuals involved in the game and the rules form the 'generalized other' of that game. When the individual begins to consciously work out strategic problems, to ask himself 'what would I do if I were in such and such a position,' and when he begins to organize his action in the game on the basis of what he thinks the others in the game are expecting him to do, on a conscious level, then the self is beginning to form. The team spirit is the spirit of the generalized other.

In the individual's act of referring his attitudes to a general social attitude which he sees at work in the group the self is being exhibited. The reference has meaning because this identification of attitudes with those of the group is based on the individual's understanding and knowledge that they are his attitudes, i.e., they belong to

himself as an object with which he can identify the attitudes. In play the child is only conscious of his role; in the game all of the roles are external to the individual.

Play and the game also introduce the notion of purpose. Play is an activity for its own sake. The game introduces a goal. One plays a game to win. If one is playing defense he defends in order to win. The game not only introduces the notion of 'ultimate' goals (winning) but the notion of subsidiary goals or means (defending). At the level of the entire social group, the goals are set out by the generalized other. The validity of these social goals is proportional to the attitudes of the individuals who make up that society. The notion of private property has no force in a society dependent on thievery for its existence. Just as in a fragmented society you have different kinds of socialization, so the divergence of goals is a function of the cohesion of the various groups within a society.

On any level it is the set of common responses of the participating individuals which gives the meaning to the social goals and values. To participate in social values the child must move away from the kind of locus of experience which he had in play and the game. In both

of these the possiblity of centering the experience within the individual existed. The game is something which is done at a certain time and with certain people. There is still no continuity within the child between the example of the game and the larger social process which is embodied within the game. A game "lies entirely inside...the child's own experience..."[8] Social participation is dependent on the understanding that the meaning of the experience has a reference outside of the individual's experience. Without this external element the child can never turn back on himself as an object, i.e., the child can never develop a self. The social experience generates a continuity of behaviour; the continuity is the ability to take the attitude of the other and to act on the basis of that attitude.

It "is a structure of attitudes, then, which goes to make up a self, as distinct from a group of habits."[9]. When the individual stops playing at roles and the roles are no longer at a completely conscious level the self has developed. The performance of behaviour and hence the performance of a role are on the conscious level but the individual has a great variety of roles at his disposal. The selection of one of these roles is the work of the self. Self consciousness is the ability to evoke the organized

attitudes of others in ourselves and act on the basis of these social roles. The consciousness is not the same as the consciousness which is a response to the mind, nor is the selective ability of the self the same sort of selective mechanism as is attention. The consciousness of mind allows us to find alternative modes of conduct within the process of attention. It is an analytical or isolating mechanism. This mode of consciousness serves to indicate the causes of a problem; in itself it is not capable of finding alternative kinds of conduct. It can be compared to a flashlight which serves to highlight aspects of our environment and to focus on specific objects. The illumination of a problem is not the solution of that problem. The continuity of our behaviour, the purposiveness of our behaviour, and the initiation of one kind of conduct rather than another kind is the work of the self.

This distinction is recognized terminologically by the "I" and the "me."

> The 'I' lies behind the range of immediate experience. In terms of social conduct this is tantamount to saying that we can perceive our responses only as they appear as images from past experience, merging with the sensuous stimulation. We cannot present the response while we are responding. We cannot use our responses to others as materials for the construction of the self - this imagery goes to make up other selves. We must socially stimulate ourselves to place at our own disposal the material out of which our own selves as well as those of others must be made.

> The 'I' therefore never can exist as an object in consciousness, but the very conversational character of our inner experience, the very process of replying to one's own talk, implies an 'I' behind the scenes who answers to the gestures, the symbols, that arise in consciousness...
>
> The self-conscious, actual self in social intercourse is the objective 'me' or 'me's' with the process of response continually going on and implying a fictitious 'I' always out of sight of himself.[10]

Functionally this distinction is between habitual behaviour and conscious behaviour. Habitual behaviour is not the behaviour of the "I." A habit is exhibited in that kind of behaviour which presupposes previous experience but does not require reflection to guarantee the ongoingness of that behaviour. Consciousness is the human response to the disruption of habitual behaviour. This indicates the problem but does not solve it. The distinction between "I" and "me" can be illustrated in terms of Mead's methodological criteria of accessibility.

The consciousness of an object's being problematical and the consciousness of an object's being an experiential item within my field of memory, for example, do not have the same kind of accessibility about them. That is, the problematical object is available to all who share the same perceptual apparatus (within limits) and participate in the same kinds of action. This is the kind of access which allows a formalization of the self. It

is individual only insofar as it can be communicated, i.e., put into language. This kind of experience forms the core of Mead's inter-subjective theory of meaning. The experiential object is private but the consciousness of this object is not self-conscious: "A man alone has, fortunately or unfortunately, access to his own toothache, but that is not what we mean by self-consciousness."[11]

The process of reflection, of breaking acts into parts and removing some aspects and adding others to the act is the sphere of conduct within which the self arises. The self cannot be defined in terms of simple accessibility. The self has a development, the self is historical. The self, if identified with the accessibility of perceptions and perceptual objects becomes a-historical and dependent on the givenness of objects within the present perceptual field. Memory would be seen according to the Humeian criteria of force and vivacity. The criteria for action would be constant conjunction of certain impressions leading to a kind of prediction about the future. Mead wants a historical self. Memory and analysis cannot belong to the part of the self which initiates action, i.e., the "I". These aspects of the self belong to the observable, behaviouristically accessible self, i.e., the "me".

Methodologically then, Mead has an unknown in his

analysis of the origins of the self. His methodological considerations of accessibility and his demand that experience be reconstructed in the same terms which formulated that experience for the actor cannot be met. The "I" is not a part of our experience. It is a condition for experience and yet is never met in any experience. At the same time Mead sees the "I" as an indispensable aspect of experience, though it is never revealed within experience. It is important for experience because it gives the "me" an identity which is far more cohesive than the kind of identity which the Humeian associationist model could generate. Mead's move is a subtle one which involves a new locus for experience. As the human mind selects its environment so the self, as the "I", must have an active hand in the making of the meaning of the experience.

In the move from the kind of personality which participates in a game to the kind of personality which we could call social, the difference lay in the placing of the experience. The game player had all of his experience inside himself. The performance of the roles of the game and even the following of the rules of the game was a question of volition. If the individual chose not to follow one of the rules and did not mind the particular

consequences of the group action he could opt out and no sanction could be imposed on him which could coerce his behaviour. The recognition of the social personality requires a different kind of move. The social experience lies outside of the individual. It is not something which the individual can have without his acting on it. The rules of a game are available to all through a process which does not require an identification of the self with the rules. The desire to learn the rules and thus to play and thereby be accepted by the group involves the initial stage of the development of the self. In order to participate in this social experience the individual must act within the social framework as a part of that framework. Social experience does not belong to the individual until the individual acts on that kind of experience and makes it his.

To illustrate this in the case of memory, Mead states: "If we had no memory which identifies experiences with the self, then they would certainly disappear so far as their relation to the self is concerned, and yet they might continue as sensuous or sensible experiences without being taken up into a self."[12] Experience must be taken up into the self. Experience without the action of an actor is not the experience of a self. The self is some kind of an act which makes experience a part of the self. The "I" makes itself by objectifying itself and evaluating

its behaviour. The terms of behaviour, the terms of perception and the terms of evaluation[13] are part of the process which allowed the "I" to arise within experience, i.e., the social experience of language. The "I" cannot communicate its experience in terms other than those which made up the objective experience in the first place. Only social experience can be communicated. To be social means that we act outside of ourselves; to be a self means that we internalize those external experiences. The self emerges when the action of the individual is mediated by the social process of interpreting the behaviour of others as symbolic, i.e., talking over their behaviour to oneself and acting on the basis of the meaning of those symbols.

The involvement of the self means the taking of the attitudes of others toward oneself. The child's act of referring his action to the generalized other of the game has a new kind of meaning over that of role playing in the game. In the game the meaning comes from the identification of the attitude of the individual with that of the group as an organization of responses. The attitudes of the individual in the game must refer to attitudes external to the individual, i.e., to those of the generalized other.

This is a process of objectifying oneself to be in a better position to determine the adequacy of one's responses. The response is toward the meanings generated by the common

social experience of the generalized other through symbolic behaviour. The response is rational, i.e., it is a controlled response evaluating the means in a situation according to the desired end.

Methodologically Mead is using his criteria of control. I have shown why accessibility is not adequate to differentiate self experience from conscious experience. Our action in the cooperative social situation is successful to the extent that social acts can be completed. This requires that the respective subjectivities involved in the social act be delimited in their range of activities. That is, they see themselves as part of the larger process of cooperation. The various selves cooperated by adjusting not only to the situation at hand but to the other selves involved in the social act as well. The social act in its entirety is this process of adjustive behaviour towards an end. The self is involved in this kind of behaviour when one sees that the experience itself is external to the individual and that one's relationship to the experience is evaluated as the others evaluate it. The self sees himself as the relationship within the act, as an object which is behaving in a controllable manner. The actions are identified with the behaving object and the behaving object is the self.

Meaning is objective for Mead. The meaningfulness of a gesture, act or symbol for the individual is subjective, but when it is responded to by the individual the resulting action is objectively evidenced. Other individuals are stimulated by our response. They can judge if our response is adequate to the intention of the stimulus. Language implicates ourselves as kinds of actions in a social process. Meaning is only possible through social experience. Social experience originates in gestural behaviour. The build up of social experience becomes meaningful as we develop a self. A self is not necessary to begin social experience.

Mead is showing that language is the basis for social action. Attitudes are all tendencies to act in a certain way: "The response to the vocal gesture is the doing of a certain thing, and you arouse that same tendency in yourself. You are always replying to yourself, just as other people reply. You assume that in some degree there must be identity in the reply. It is action on a common basis".[14] This is not to say that this process is always on a conscious level. We internalize the social process as we externalize its meaning. Our vocal gestures are creating a continual dialogue within ourselves as if

we were the other. Our conduct is built up by seeing ourselves as others see us. This is quite different from Watson's idea of thinking as the using of words. Mead is saying that the words we use are stimuli to responses only in so far as they are within a social process. The alternative modes of behaviour are not the result of various kinds of conditioning but are made available through the varieties of social experience.

In distinguishing between the "I" and the "me" Mead is asking "for the significance of this distinction from the point of view of conduct itself".[15] The "me" is the perceptually available social behaviour of the self. As it is always in the perceptual field it is always in the past. The "I" is never given in the behaviour, it is what initiates the behaviour. The "me" as the structure or organization of tendencies to act is a given, is an object, and as such it is not only passive but it is not responsible for any of its actions. The "me" cannot be responsible because the "me" itself is only a response. The "me" is the structural conditions which allow habitual response. The "me" is the behaviouristic, conditioned, associationistic aspect of the self. Human action requires an "I". The "I" is allowable in Mead's behaviourism because it is physio-

logically accounted for by the temporal dimension of the human nervous system. What happens when action is inhibited is that a solution is sought which could not be given by the habitual associations which are normally sufficient to account for behaviour. The solution is always a novel solution and novelty can only be accounted for by the introduction of the action of the "I".

We have gone as far as we are able within the boundaries of social psychology. MSS has laid the foundations for the further analysis of the self and the act; but, the further analysis must be at a different level. The unity of the act is exhibited in the adjustive processes characterized as social but it cannot be explained simply as the functional unity which guarantees the continuity of these processes. The methodological criterion and the conceptual framework of social psychology are not adequate to serve as solid foundations for the experimental analysis of the field. Specifically, the act is not accessible as a functional unity; it requires further analysis to give it a form which can be treated analytically. The notion of the temporal dimension of the nervous system and its intimate relationship to the self as both "I" and "me" needs to be clarified. At a more basic level the exact understanding of a linguistic symbol and a symbolic gesture as containing a meaning needs elucidation. These problems were present in Mead's mind and in his attempts to solve them he generated

a conceptual scheme which has ramifications far beyond the specific problems which led him to their formulation.

III

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACT

The first two chapters have provided an account of Mead's social psychology. It is part of my contention that the rest of Mead's intellectual life was modeled on his social psychology. We will see how, for example, the 'social' as a social-psychological concept is carried over in his general philosophy of the act and into his later theory of temporality. The unit of analysis in MSS was the individual as a social being. In Mead's general philosophy this unit of analysis takes on a greater depth and becomes the experience of the individual. A more intensive analysis of the self will be undertaken in the final chapter.

Mead considers the 'act' to be the ultimate unit of analysis. The act "stretches beyond the stimulus to the response."[1] Mead sees the act as a functional unity which can be logically analyzed into three stages: perception, manipulation and consummation.

Perception is both a process and a relation. In perception there are a myriad of activities within the organism. It is a "relation between a highly developed physiological organism and an object, or an environment in which selection emphasizes certain elements."[2] The

selection within the environment is a function of the physiological, biological and physical make up of the organism, as well as the particular activities in which it is engaged at the time of perception. For example, man selects or is sensitized to a certain range of light waves, a certain frequency of etherial vibrations and a certain class of orafactory phenomena. Other organisms have other kinds of sensitivities and hence make other kinds of selections within their environment.

The social nature of man makes perception a social activity. The objects of perception have a dual quality. They are partially a product of the world independently of the perceiving organism and partially a product of the perceiving organism. Thus the 'same' object is perceived differently by different kinds of organisms and by different members of the same species.

The difference in perception between man and the animals is that the perceptual object, for man, is always problematical. That is, man can indicate to himself the problematical nature of the perceptual object by posing questions to himself. "Does the object have the characteristics that I perceive?" "Is the object actually as it appears?" Objects are always perceived at a distance.[3] Some response is necessary to complete the act. Perception leads to the next stage of the act.

Manipulation can be either negative or positive. Negative manipulation would be to avoid contact experience with the object if it is perceived to be, for example, an enemy. Positive manipulation invites contact. It is through manipulation that the perceptual object is tested and the problematic instigated in perception becomes resolved.[4]

The act is completed in the consummatory stage. This is the stage of value experience. "Within the field of consummation all the adjectives of value obtain immediately. There objects are possessed, are good, bad, and indifferent, beautiful or ugly, and lovely or noxious."[5]

Perception is always initially of universals. We are sensitized according to our past experiences and our future expectations. When our habitual behaviour leads to unsuccessful conduct the process of reflection begins. In reflection the act becomes inhibited. In inhibition perception attends to particulars rather than to universals.[6] The individuality of the object becomes the subject of attention.

During the inhibition of the act the particular characteristics of the object which are unique with reference to past experience or habits are isolated. It is these novel characteristics which have made the habitual response to the perceptual object inadequate.

> The individual selects out of the object as it exists what answers to the nature of the individual in his present attitude - a selection which answers both to his immediate sensitivities and to his experience. The material which failed to call out the appropriate response and that which was found in the object as that which would have answered to the response which has been inhibited - these remain and, with the appearance of a self, are referred to that self.[7]

The self is a response to the inhibition of action. The function of the self in this situation is to hold the isolated novel characteristics of the problematic object. This is the empirical self, the 'me'. It holds those novel characteristics until it can re-orient itself and its experience toward that object; or, in Mead's terminology, until it can reconstruct the object.

There are two separate kinds of questions we can ask about the process of inhibition. The first set concerns the actual process of the inhibition, analysis of the object and its eventual reconstruction and integration into experience and action. The second set concerns the process of the initiation of the perception in the first place, the particular kinds of sensitivities which the organism is under at the time, the impulses or needs which are seeking expression or satisfaction and why the solution for the problem must be found within the framework of the problematic and not within a host of alternative approaches such as rejection of the situation. My concern in this chapter will be with the first set of questions.

That is the province of the empirical self or the 'me'. The second set of questions will wait until my discussion of the 'I'.

As yet I have not clarified exactly why the act is a strictly human form of behaviour. In MSS Mead drew the distinction between a gesture and a significant gesture. Gestures are forms of communication used by all organisms. Significant gestures arise through language and social interaction. It is the symbolic nature of language which allows gestures to become significant gestures. The main feature of these gestures is that they arouse the same attitude in the speaker as they do in the receiver. The key concept which is being used by Mead is the notion of responsiveness. The gesture is significant because any individual with similar language and similar socialization can respond to that gesture in the same way as any other individual.

To take this analysis into PA involves seeing Mead's theory of objects being extended to include the social object. Objects are only perceived in their individuality after the act has become inhibited. Mead calls an object which is attended to in its individuality a physical object. All physical objects are social objects; a social object is any object which responds.[8] In order to be selected as a

physical object, i.e., an object which has the capacity to be acted toward must be social because the basic modes of action are themselves conditioned in the very process by which we come to correlate action with perception. For Mead it is not just the idea that our environment is a transaction between our sensitivities and the giveness of the world rather it is the way in which the experience of the individual makes the world accessible - accessible to a scientific observer or accessible to the individual as the centre of the experience.

The inhibition of conduct invokes consciousness. "Life becomes conscious at those points at which the organism's own responses enter as part of the objective field to which it reacts."[9] In inhibition the particular characteristics of the perceptual or social objects are tested against the backlog of previous experience. To put this a different way: the responses of the individual are being held up against the responses of the object. What is in question is the responsiveness of the object. Consciousness selects those aspects of the object which are not responsive in the satisfactory way and builds alternative modes of response for them. Consciousness reconstructs the object so that conduct may proceed.

The mode of behaviour for consciousness is empirical and hence its reconstructions are based on empirical concepts of continuity. It is consciousness which introduces or preserves causal necessity in its mode of reconstruction: "our ground for selecting some alternative is to be found in what our overt behaviour accepts as real."[10]

The reality of our world is built up through our culture, society and language. Its main reference is to the generalized other. This has differed in history and will change in the future. We now offer and attempt to find explanations through a causal order. Not too long ago reality was a function of gods and demons. It must be stressed that for Mead, the 'stuff' of nature is neutral. Nature is evolving but these are through natural processes which are independent of a teleological or a value claim. Conduct within this world is a function of that world including our sensitivities. "The world that is there does not arise from knowledge; instead, knowledge arises from it. The world that is there does not arise within consciousness; instead, consciousness is a response to it. The world that is there does not arise within experience; experience takes place within it. The world that is there does not arise at all; it is there."[11]

It is through this 'giveness' of the world that Mead is able to establish his methodological requirement of accessibility. The sensitivities of organisms do not answer to a subjective state which is forever closed off from objective analysis. The process of selection answers to "an environment, which is existent in nature, though dependent upon its relationship to the specific individual for its existence as an environment."[12] Consciousness creates responses in objects by relating the object to the sensitivities of the organism. Those ways of acting toward the object, which are possible after the reconstruction of the object, have arisen through the organism's adjustments and the change in the environment effected by those adjustments. To use a crude example, the kind of thinking done after Columbus' voyage made the world into a different place from what it was before. This is not just in the thinking itself which was obviously expanded but in the very object being thought about, i.e., the world. The world was different after Columbus and hence mind had a new object to think about.

Selection of an environment is based within the physiologic-psychologic structure of sentient organisms. Mead is following the general naturalistic-pragmatic

orientation with an uncritical acceptance of the given reality of nature. Different responses to the natural order are strictly a function of the responding organisms. Nature exists and we cannot characterize it beyond our human responses to it. Nature is real, i.e., offers modes of satisfaction of needs, interests and wants, insofar as it can be acted upon. Nature has reality only insofar as an organism accepts nature as offering viable alternative modes of behaviour. We shall come to see later in the paper how this general denial of an ontological commitment leads Mead into his epistemological failure.

Now we need to go into greater detail as to the exact mechanisms which allow our subjective experience to become objective and which make objects social. In MSS we saw how role playing allowed our experience to take on new qualities from the stage of play to the game to the generalized other. In PA we are now ready to see another quality of experience emerge through the adjustive mechanism of role playing. In perception we take the role of the distant object: "we endow it with the reality of effective occupation of space which belongs to ourselves, thus giving the object an inside content which no surfaces revealed to the eye or the hand can give, and this placing of ourselves within other objects enables

us to perceive other things, and notably ourselves from the standpoint of the thing within which we have placed ourselves."[13] This is not to deny any 'insides' to the object as an item within nature rather it is to relate the object to the experience of the individual. The individual both projects imagined states of resistance to the object as well as having contact with the object in the manipulatory stage of the act. The distant object has an inside "which exerts a pressure upon the experiencer to the extent that he reacts to the object by responding to himself as object."[14]

It is through this theory that Mead establishes the continuity of behaviour within nature. If the resistance of objects is a function of the effort exerted to complete the act then objects must be responding in exactly the same adjustive manner as the exertion of the effort. This theory also allows Mead to show that habits are only organizational structures which are a function of their origin. That is to say, we could never reconstruct objects if we could not separate stimuli from responses or habits. Thus we act toward objects by giving them the kinds of insides which we can control or at least satisfactorally incorporate into our experience.[15]

In the perception of the distant object we take the role of that object and act toward it from the per-

spective of the distant object. We control our action not as subject to object but as object to object. In role taking the self becomes objectified as acting toward an environment which is the individual acting toward himself as a part of that environment. When the individual is able to see himself as an object within the field of behaviour "the self as an object becomes a part of the acting individual, i.e., the individual has attained what is called self-consciousness - a self-consciousness that accompanies his conduct, or may accompany a portion of his conduct."[16]

IV

THE NEED FOR A THEORY OF TEMPORALITY

The essays collected in PA were written over a ten to fifteen year period and they are not presented in chronological order. The actual dates of many of the essays are unknown. In order to present Mead's work as a continuity, I will use this chapter to develop various aspects of Mead's thought which I see as forcing him to move beyond a strictly scientific approach. In order to unify these diverse aspects Mead was led to develop a speculative principle. He came to realize that his theories of the past, perspectives and sociality were being used by him in a functional yet compartmentalized sense. Separately they did not do justice to the fundamental unity of our experience. This led him to develop his theory of temporality which he sees as the glue which binds the other diverse elements of his thought together into a unified theory of the self.

The PA is being interpreted as an outgrowth of Mead's social psychology. Mead's main attempt is to ground his view of man in an adequate theory of knowlege. A theory of knowledge which will allow him to maintain his distinction between 'consciousness' and 'consciousness of...' while maintaining the view of mind as functional and not substantive. In doing so Mead dispenses with ontology as being a problem. Nature and environments are simply there.

They have no ontological status independently of the epistemological relationship with organisms. It might not be inaccurate to say that for Mead the epistemological process determines or covers the ontological. There is no reality apart from the reality of sentient creatures. Objects exist apart from organisms but it is impossible to say anything about them except in so far as they are acted upon by organisms.

I shall begin with a discussion of Mead's theory of the past and present and move through that to his theory of emergence. For Mead "reality exists in a present."[1] The present is the ultimate unit of existence. It is an act and its temporal spread is a function of the activities going on within the events which constitute that act. The present thus has duration or temporal extension. It is a focal point for the past or the perspective from which the past is oriented toward conduct. In order to more fully characterize the present we should take a brief look at Mead's view of history: "All history is the interpretation of the present..."[2] History is fundamentally a social experience. As the individual tries to capture his childhood experiences so the historian tries to systematize the accumulated experience of his race. The problems of either of these attempts are analogous: "When one recalls his

boyhood days he cannot get into them as he then was, without their relationship to what he has become; and if he could, that is if he could reproduce the experience as it then took place, he could not use it, for this would involve his not being in the present within which that use must take place."[3]

History is not a given for Mead. It is an artifact. History depends on a kind of awareness; it "does not exist except in so far as the individuals of the present in some sense put themselves back into the past...such a reconstruction of the past is possible only when we have, so to speak, reached some point that we can become aware of ourselves".[4] Just as self-reflection is necessary to objectify subjective experience so self-awareness is necessary for history. Each of these concepts, self-reflection and history, is a product of a certain kind of responsive structure. As a product they are either useful or not useful. Their utility stands in relation to the creature using them. Use is from the present. When we use the past we are selecting and reorganiing the 'real' past in accordance with present needs and desires. That past which is so reconstructed has meaning in so far as it can accomplish our tasks. There is no other value for that past.

To relate this conceptually to Mead's cosmology we must again emphasize the social nature of human experience. Just as the social process of adjustment became related to the 'act' in the analysis of the experience of the individual, so the perspective from which the process of adjustment is initiated, the present, becomes a unit of analysis. The attempt is still to come to grips with understanding the experience of the actor from his point of view, but now, in order to do this, Mead sees that it can best be accomplished if the same principles which have created that kind of experience, i.e. social experience, can be found operating in the universe at large.

The ultimate unit of analysis is the act. But Mead concentrates on the contents of the act rather than the existential structure of the act. In order to fully qualify the contents of experience Mead must give some consideration to the ontological basis for experience but he does not. Further, there is a distinction between the conditions necessary for knowledge and the knowing process itself. Mead centres his analysis on the conditions of knowledge and never fills in the knowledge as experienced. In one respect this uncritical ontology is his major failure. In the context of his actual program however I see his epistemological failure as his major weakness. The uncritical ontology is a major weakness of all pragmatists, and Mead

has inherited this blind spot. In the context of his attempt to get at the experience of the individual as the centre of experience he needs to explain or at least to describe the way in which the conditions for knowledge are experienced so that knowledge itself becomes a problem.

Mead holds that human conduct differs from animal conduct in that the only mode of action is trial and error. That is, animals have no mechanisms by which conduct can be physically inhibited. Also animals have needs but do they have interests or goals apart from the satisfaction of needs? Mead is never clear about this problem but he is clear that they have no mechanisms by which interests or goals could control behaviour. This then is the kind of epistemological analysis which I see as necessary for Mead to offer. That is an epistemology which goes beyond the conditions for knowledge to the actual content of the knowledge process. Mead must answer the question: Why is the satisfaction of an interest or a goal which is beyond a need a reason for action?

To continue my previous discussion, I will consider more fully Mead's theory of the past. The past exists as a set of conditions. These conditions have emerged within experience. The response of mind to nature creates an environment. Within this interaction mind develops an organized structure of habitual response to its environment.

Nature is then also structured as the conditions for adequate response. The past exists as irrevocable events which conditioned and determined the present state of the organism. The movement from the past to the present is "the conditioning of what is taking place by what has taken place".[5] Just as nature is a 'given' in the experience of the individual so this process of passing from a past to a present is a 'given' element of experience. The past is in the present. The past has reality only as present contents or representations in memory images.[6]

This is a cumulative process by which the conditions and response of the past emerge in the present as novel responses. Mead writes:

> The past is there conditioning the present and its passage into the future, but in the organization of the tendencies embodied in one individual there may be an emergent which belongs only to the situation of that individual. The tendencies coming from past passage, and from the conditioning that is inherent in passage, become different influences when they have taken on this organized structure of tendencies.[7]

The present includes its past. The past which is the actual set of conditions which were necessary for the emergent present remains necessarily hypothetical. The past can only

be known by the use of the materials available in the present. The major portion of that present is made out of the very past under question. The present is a changed past and "any change in the organism carries with it a difference of sensitivity and response and a corresponding difference in the environment".[8] By becoming a present the past has changed. The conditions which make up the present also create new powers of selection corresponding to an enlarged field of experience. Experience is present events: "the past is such a construction that the reference that is found in it is not to events having a reality independent of the present which is the seat of reality, but rather to such an interpretation of the present in its conditioning passage as will enable intelligent conduct to proceed."[9]

The past has only the reality of the experience of the individual. This is made clear in the first chapter of PP. Here Mead argues that the past in its entirety is unknowable because "no item in the accepted past is final."[10] The past is a continuously reconstructed object. The novelty brought about by the shift in relations within the present presents objects for which we have no adequate response. The novel "is already there in the present and introduced breaks into the continuity which we must repair

to attain an approach to certainty in the future. The emergent future has therefore a hypothetical character."[11] The seat of categorical certainty is the present. The present forms the focal point for the retrospection of a past in the attempt to discover an adequate response to the emergent novelty as well as the projection of possible states in the future which will allow conduct to continue. The past is reconstructed to find a solution to future expectations. In this process contingency is introduced into nature, "for it makes the future an active agency in the happenings in nature".[12] A more thorough analysis of this agency of the future must wait for my discussion of role-taking. The point here is that as an object the past is part of the environment of the individual only to the extent that it is used by the individual. Any object is real for an individual to the extent that the individual can take the role of that object. Thus not only does the past require a theory of temporality for the obvious epistemological reasons, but it also requires a theory of temporality for the more subtle and systematic reason, within Mead's thought, that the social nature of the individual is implemented within the "objective" temporal order of nature. Objective in this sense only means 'can be indicated to other individuals.' That is I do not mean to

see Mead asserting that there are objective temporal orders in nature. I see Mead holding only that temporal orders can be selected and participated in by a number of different individuals. One of the main uses of relativity theory for Mead is precisely to deny the possibility of objective, i.e., spatialized, temporal orders. The individual not only mediates between environment and nature but also between self and environment and self and self, i.e., "me" and "I".

Thus far I have examined Mead's understanding of emergence and the past. To continue my argument I will examine his theories of perspectives and selection and indicate how these theories also created the demand for a theory of temporality. Selection is the cornerstone of the role-taking process. To make this work, Mead used relativity theory to reconceptualize the Newtonian understanding of simultaneity. For Mead it is "the taking the role of the distant object [which] is responsible for simultaneity. It is simultaneous because there is in the hypothetical distant experience the same resistance which is in the manipulary area."[13] Thus Mead sees the distant perceptual object not in spatial terms but in temporal terms. It is "the act of self-reflection [that] separates the 'I' and 'me' as parts of the self [which] means that a time

factor is the key to that relationship, since the act of self-reflection is one in which a past content is considered in a present."[14] Its separation from the organism is in terms of the activities of the organism which are striving to satisfy the organism.

Other aspects of relativity add weight to the importance of selection. Through relativity theory Mead sees nature as a structured ordered whole. The characters and relations which can be established within nature are a function of the organism. Relativity, however, is more inclusive than that for Mead. It also showed him that the normal perceptual faculties of organisms have a selective function. Not only characters and relations, but also "times and spaces, or families of duractions",[15] are selected.

The process of experience is one of selection and organization with the goal of continuing conduct. Within this selective process perspectives are created which allow the various elements a common point of reference: "Perspectives are constituted out of the past and the future as they are located in the present: this means that possibility in nature derives from the relativity of time."[16] It is also through the relativity of time that we are led to recognize "that there are an indefinite

number of temporal orders of the same events, that make it possible to conceive of the same body of events as organized into an indefinite number of different perspectives."[17]

Through relativity and Whitehead, Mead found that for every event there are an infinite number of possible alternative reconstructions. These perspectives are objective because through role-taking they can be indicated as possible courses of action to other minded organisms. The theory of perspectives then stands in an intimate relation to Mead's understanding of the creative or emergent mind. Mead is holding "that the constitutive or organizing principle in nature is the creative mind. Nature is seen to be in relationship with the organism and this relationship determines a group of perspectives which are in nature."[18]

Any selection within nature stratifies those selected elements into a perspective. This perspective is objective in that it can be indicated to other minds. When the act becomes inhibited it is the objectivity of the distant object which is being questioned. In temporal terms it is the anticipated future conduct which is no longer secure. The subjective experience of the individual centers at this

point when an attitude of the individual becomes substituted for an objective characteristic of the object.[19] This is to say that the individual reconstructs the object on the basis of a hypothetical future.

Now we can make an addendum to our earlier discussion of the 'givenness' of nature: "what is given as an event in human experience, what was given, and what will be given, are constituted in and through the perspective chosen by the organism."[20] This is not to deny the independence of nature, but it is to indicate that human experience is a social affair; for the difference between man and the animals is his social mechanism of language which allows the inhibition of acts to issue in successful conduct. The givenness of human experience is a function, then, not only of the independent reality of nature but also of the specific responsive mechanisms of man which allow him to create a strictly human social world out of nature. It is the acting organism, then, which "introduces into the perspective genuine points of reference, which are the ground for the logical determination of both the physical object and the self."[21]

Perspectives lead us to Mead's understanding of the specious present and through this to temporality. In Jamesian psychology the specious present, in his psychological sense, can be said to define a standpoint

or to give the organism a frame of reference. Mead's specious present differs from that of James, hence his understanding of perspectives also differs. For Mead, perspectives are objective and exist within nature. This stratifies and selects aspects out of nature which become objectified, i.e., serve as the basis for action for the organism.

In Mead's social psychology we saw the importance of his theory of role-playing. It served as the mechanism for the genesis of the self and for meaningful social relations. The theory of role-taking presupposes a theory of perspectives. Only insofar as there are objective alternative modes of behaviour can role-taking be possible. Indeed, only because there is an objective perspective of a group is social behaviour possible.

Mead, as we saw, conceived the central problem of role-taking and perspectives as an anlysis of simultaneity. Through his theory of the specious present distant experience is held within the present. The past is a perspective as well as the future. Both the past and the future are present within the action of the organism. The possibility of selecting different courses of action, i.e., alternative pasts and alternative futures, exists only because of the relativity of time.

To tie this down, then, Mead needs to develop a theory of temporality, i.e., a theory of lived time, which is consistent with his theory of 'natural' time. When talking of lived time Mead uses James' term "the specious present". Mead is not using it in the psychological sense, however. Mead's specious present is concerned with the act, specifically with the temporal structures of the experiences going on within acts. The crux of the specious present is the structure of temporality in relation to the process of reflection. Hence the specious present is more concerned with inhibited acts rather than with habitual completed acts. The specious present is a continuous present. It is not made up of 'moments', but rather is constituted out of events.

The specious present includes both the past and the future. The interval between these times involves 'passage', but this passage is between present boundaries.[22] The past is present within the specious present as memory images of events and objects as well as the particular objects which have caused the act to become inhibited. The future is present as the interests or needs which are seeking expression through those particular acts. The events going on are constitutive. of time. The locus of these events

is the present: "the actual passage of reality is in the passage of one present into another, where alone is reality, and a present which has merged in another is not a past."[23]

The specious present is made up of two parts, one objective and the other subjective. The objective part refers to the event which is taking place in nature. It is what is indicated in the experience. To use Mead's example, when we look at a bird in flight we indicate to ourselves the process as a completed act or we summarize the entire process. Subjectively we are piecing together a series of discrete impressions to form a continuous process. The subjective refers to the actual lived experience of the individual. On Mead's own terms it is the elucidation of the temporal structure of the subjective aspect of the specious present to which he should have turned his attention. Mead turned his attention elsewhere, however, and this must be seen as one of the major failures of his work. As a summation of a great deal of the material in this chapter I offer this quote from Mead:

> What I am suggesting is that this process, in which a perspective ceases to be objective, becomes if you like subjective, and in which new common minds and new common perspectives arise, is an instance of the organization of perspectives in nature, of the creative advance of nature. This amounts to the affirmation that mind as it appears in the mechanism of social conduct is the organization of perspectives in

nature and at least a phase of the creative advance of nature. Nature in its relationship to the organism, and including the organism, is a perspective that is there. A state of mind of the organism is the establishment of simultaneity between the organism and a group of events, through the arrest of action under inhibition. This arrest of action means the tendencies within the organism to act in conflicting ways in the completion of the whole act. The attitude of the organism calls out or tends to call our responses in other organisms which responses, in the case of human gesture, the organism calls out in itself, and thus excites itself to respond to these responses. It is the identification of these responses with the distant stimuli that establishes simultaneity, that gives insides to distant stimuli, and a self to the organism. Without such an establishment of simultaneity, these stimuli are spatio-temporally distant from the organism, and their reality lies in the future of passage. The establishment of simultaneity wrenches this future reality into a possible present, for all our presents beyond the manipulatory area are only possibilities, as respects their perceptual reality. We are acting toward the future realization of the act, as if it were present because the organism is taking the role of the other. In the perceptual inanimate object the organic content that survives is the resistance that the organism both feels and exerts in the manipulatory area. The actual spatio-temporal structure of passing events with those characters which answer to susceptibilities of the organism are there in nature, but they are temporally as well as spatially away from the organism. The reality awaits upon the success of the act. Present reality is a possibility. It is what would be if we were there instead of here. Through the social mechanism of significant symbols the organism places itself there as a possibility, which acquires increasing probability as it fits to the spatio-temporal structure and the demands of the whole complex act of which its conduct is a part. But the possibility is there in nature, for it is made up of actual structures of events and their

> contents, and the possible realizations of the acts in the form of adjustments and readjustments of the processes involved. When we view them as possibilities we call them mental or working hypotheses.[24]

We can also see in this Mead's uncritical acceptance of processes such as objective perspectives becoming subjective, the growth of shared perspectives, and the self-initiation of modes of responding. This could be partially caused by the general difficulty faced by any process philosopher, namely that of making logical distinctions within unified processes while maintaining the experiential integrity of the whole. I do not think, however, that that is Mead's major stumbling block. I see Mead as being caught up in the tension between his uncritical acceptance of nature as a given element in experience and knowledge as problematic:

> ...knowledge is an undertaking that always takes place within a situation that is not itself involved in the ignorance or uncertainty that knowledge seeks to dissipate. Knowledge is not then to be identified with the presence of content in experience. There is no conscious attitude that is as such cognitive. Knowledge is a process in conduct that so organizes the field of action that delayed and inhibited responses may take place. The test of the success of the process of knowledge, that is, the test of truth, is found in the discovery or construction of such objects as will mediate our conflicting and checked activities and allow conduct to proceed. Knowledge is inferential and always implies that a datum is involved in the inference.[25]

Knowledge is not a part of the problem. Knowledge is a conscious solution-seeking process. The knowledge relationship is not a epistemological problem - it is ontological and not epistemological. Knowledge is the way in which conscious organisms conduct themselves. It is their way of being as problem solvers. For Mead there is nothing problematic about the problem.

Selection, emergence, the past and the present are all given elements within experience for Mead. He has failed to see that these elements of experience are themselves founded relations and not the foundational constituents of experience. If, as Mead is claiming, cognition is always a relationship, mediated by consciousness, between inhibited responses and an impulse seeking expression, then the analysis must centre on the initiation of the cognitive ways the organism comes to create the demand for cognitive experience. It is not enough to see the <u>responses</u> to the non-cognitive basis for experience, i.e., selection, emergence and consciousness, as the foundation for all experience. It is part of my thesis that this tension, though not articulated by Mead, is the fundamental reason why he shifted his attention from the strictly scientific approach to the formulation of the cosmological principles of temporality and sociality. The remainder of my essay will

elucidate these cosmological principles, demonstrate their failure to systematize Mead's thought and develop a sympathetic interpretation of Mead's theory of the self.

V

TEMPORALITY AND SOCIALITY

Mead's theory of temporality allowed him to see novel forms of the organization of experience in the individual. Using the concept of the social as the process of adjustment[1] and the theory of temporality Mead developed his concepts of perspective and sociality. The theory of perspectives refers to his methodological requirement of accessibility. It is how the subjective experience of the individual becomes objectified in behaviour. The theory of sociality is a more sophisticated conceptualization of role-taking.

The key to Mead's theory of perspectives is his insistence that they are objective. We have seen how the perceptual world, the world of physical objects, is the world of particulars. This world arises in experience when conduct becomes inhibited. The perceptual world is not created by the individual; it is in nature but it is "itself a perspective, within which the subjective arises... The subjective is that experience in the individual which takes the place of the objective when the reality of the objective, at least in some respects, lies in an uncertain future...one substitutes tentatively an attitude belonging

to the individual for an existent objective character."[2] The relationship between man and nature is a creative one. Man can act only insofar as he can substitute his subjective experience for the resistant reality of his environment. The basis for action is the ability to select: "The organism introduces into the perspectives genuine points of reference, which are the ground for the logical determination of both the physical object and the self."[3] Mead is suggesting "that the constitutive or organizaing principle in nature is the creative mind. Nature is seen to be in relationship with the organism and this relationship determines a group of perspectives which are in nature."[4]

One of the difficult notions in Mead is his understanding of the 'given' elements in experience. Mead assumes without proof or argument that nature exists as material answering to the impulses of organisms. This view makes sense through his theory of perspectives: "What <u>is</u> given as an event in human experience, what <u>was</u> given, and what <u>will</u> be given, are constituted in and through the perspective chosen by the organism."[5] Mead is not denying a reality independent of human experience; rather, he is asserting that the elements of human experience emerge from a neutral environment because of the selective nature of our interactions with nature. Our experience is possible because of our faculties of sensibility, not because of the elements of nature.

A human event is strictly human. No other kind of organism can participate in that kind of experience. Our specious present gives us a certain span of attention within which our experience can be symbolized. The symbolic processes of language allow us to indicate features of our experience to other individuals. Indication may be seen as an invitation to action. Through common action 'the generalized other' becomes constituted as a part of nature. Participation in this perspective has an objective reality.

It is at this point that Mead's theory of time must be examined to form the bridge to his theory of sociality:

> ...if we take perspectives or environments seriously, the references in the doctrine of relativity are to the so-called mental processes by which these are carried out, recognizing that answering to these processes there are aspects of nature which succeed one another in the same fashion as they do in thought... the relativist had discovered not a Menkowski world but a new and more accurate method of measurement.[6]

Each perspective is objective and measurable, the perspective created by the interaction of mind and nature no less than the perspective of the speed of our solar system through our galaxy. What is the value of the theory of relativity for a theory of perspectives?

Mead holds that the theory of relativity allows an arbitrary reference point to be assumed as the focus of all activities. Newtonian conceptualizations of time allow for a

selection of more than one system at any point of time, but each set of selections is exclusive for that time. That is, the individual can be seen from different systems at the same time, but the individual is then determined by those selected systems. What Mead is claiming for relativity theory is that it allows for a multiplicity of systems to be selected at the same time by the individual.

The continuity of the individual is not determined by reference points external to himself. The continuity is the result of the interaction between the individual and nature. All systems, including the individual, must be accessible simultaneously to account for the individual.[7]

Newtonian time does not allow for a selection other than of objects and relations. Mead wants to allow for selection of "times and spaces, or families of durations."[8] This makes the act of the individual real. The needs and interests of the individual, indeed the entire range of subjective experience, can be given an objective status. Attention and action are incepted through a problem leading to the inhibition of conduct. This inhibition is always with reference to the future, i.e., the continuity of behaviour:

> It is the movement toward this problematical future that involves the selection of the time system which determines the spatiotemporal structure of the experience. But experience

> involves not only a process but an organization ...the particular spatiotemporal structure and its selected objects have only the relative hypothetical reality of our projected experience.[9]

Our selection is a determination of a mode of being-in-the-world. It is the fixation of an approach as to the quality of experience we shall participate in. At the same time it is consistent with the demands of the scientific method as well as being the very essence of the processes of thought, reflection, conscious awareness and articulation. Relativity allows Mead to preserve emergence in nature, i.e., contingency, while experientially and methodologically preserving continuity. Relativity allows for alternative interpretations of the same environment. These various interpretations, through the social process, are then objectified, i.e., from the standpoint of each participating individual, compromised.

Mead is constantly refusing to ask the proper questions in the context of his theory of time and temporality. It is one thing to see the social process as a cosmological principle but quite another not to underpin the cosmology itself. That is, the social process has been tied down through the physiological processes. Mind and consciousness have been shown to be emergents through the gesture and the vocal gesture to a fully developed language and socialization

processes. That is, we can see the reality underlying society. In Mead's cosmology however there does not seem to be any reality except the experiencing individual. On this level of abstraction it is not adequate to assume the construction of physical objects correlative to need and interest. It is inadequate because something must be known beyond the epistemological conditions. The 'stuff' of reality seems to be, for Mead, the social process itself and yet this also seems to be the form or conditions for the content of experience. This is the ontological failure in Mead as well as his failure to give an epistemological basis for consciousness itself. Consciousness seems to be intentional for Mead but intentional toward relations and not things. It is this generalization of the consciousness rather than 'consciousness of' which has led Mead into his difficulty.

At this point we can also see why Mead could never arrive at a clear or non-functional definition of the Act. The stages of the act hold together within one another. Corresponding to these stages are the actions of the individual as well as the events in nature. To separate the stages experientially rather than logically would have severed the causal links in nature. For Mead, "Experience

of objects in reality is...described in terms of a continuum in which the separate aspects of the continuum are merely methodologically stable."[10] The stages of the act are qualitatively distinct, allowing nature the opportunity for emergence while preserving the possibility of imposing a causal hindsight.[11] What Mead has failed to do is to show why it is experientially continuous. Methodologically it must be separable and continuous to preserve causality. Mead's physiological views, however, commit him to holding that these causal links must be experientially separable; otherwise they could not be held for reconstruction whithin the inhibitory process. It is an epistemological analysis of the structure or mechanism of inhibition itself which is missing in Mead's work. Without an understanding of how we came to have symbolic (universal) purposes frustrated by the concrete (particulars) of experience, Mead's explanation must remain unsatisfactory.

What Mead has done in his move from PA to the PP is to 'socialize' nature and the universe. He has taken his process-laden germinal idea of the social as adjustment and reconstruction,[12] the idea of nature as a 'given' awaiting selection and use, his theory of time as a structure and temporality as the structure of the act, and has mixed them

together and come up with his principle of sociality, which was "meant to constitute the framework of Mead's systematic philosophy",[13] but which brings his epistemological failure - and hence the failure of his philosophic task[14]- to a head.

The remainder of my paper will be devoted to an examination of sociality and a sympathetic attempt to see Mead's philosophy of the self.

Alfred Tonnes sees a distinction in Mead's theory of temporality which will serve to introduce the principle of sociality. Tonnes sees Mead as dealing, in PP, with two problems concerning the reality of the past. The metaphysical problem concerns the past as existence and the epistemological problem concerns the past as a field of orientation.[15] This is in keeping with Mead's view of relativity theory. The reality of existence is relative to the system within which we are working. The mataphysical problem concerns the structure of existence which determines what is real for that system. Thus in Mead's other works we see existence as nature and reality as environment. The epistemological problem concerns the conscious view of the past as offering alternative modes of action.

Tonnes makes a further distinction between the concept of time and time itself. The concept of time refers to our naive awareness of time as a flow from the past to the future. Time itself is the existential structure of time. The activities of natural processes take certain directions. The processes move toward a future which is specified by the activities which constitute those processes. Time itself is the natural processes in their direction.[16]

The metaphysical reality of the past is denied by Mead: "Reality exists in a present. The present, of course, implies a past and a future, and to these both we deny existence."[17] The events within the act are the present. The structure of the present is thus the structure of time itself. Again we can see Mead's epistemological failure. The object of epistemology can only be the past. It cannot be concerned with the structure of process, as that is not conceived of as problematical, i.e., it is temporal. In criticizing Whitehead Mead asserts that if "what becomes is the event which in its relation to other events gives structure to time, then the abstraction of passage from what is taking place is purely methodological."* [18] The

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* Passage is the continuous movement from the first stage of the act to the last stage, but Mead does not indicate whether this continuity is logical or experiential.[19]

methodological data is the epistemological problem. It is what can be held up for analysis. In this case it is the past or the solidification of events. The process of events structuring time is not epistemologically problematical for Mead.

Frank Doam states that "sociality is the capacity of being several things at once".[20] He sees sociality as comprised of a structural element as well as a temporal element.[21] The objective organization of perspectives exists in both mind and nature as the structural element of sociality. The interests, needs, desires, and wishes of the organism determine the direction of activity, and, in Tonnes' terminology, time itself. For Doan, this temporal aspect of sociality is what the organism brings to experience. It is in the interaction of the direction of the organization of perspectives by mind that sociality allows for growth, change and novelty. Mind as process and structure provides Mead with the mechanism of correlation necessary to preserve the identity of the individual systems while allowing them to change. The intersection of two systems is not sufficient to establish a change or a novel emergent.[22]

Some agency is necessary to establish relations within the intersection of systems which is conducive to further action. What is necessary for action is the ability to indi-

cate the significance of the event in a meaningful way and, for Mead, man can do this because "man is able to take the role of several participants at the same time."[23]

I will now try to tie sociality into the social psychology and physiology of Mead's earlier works. It is only through the inhibition of conduct that we attend to particulars. To put this another way, consciousness is made voluntary through the stoppage of conduct.[24] For objects to have characters, i.e., marks of individuality, they must call out novel responses. Within the organism these challenges are met by 'testing' various alternative ways of acting toward the object. Role-taking is the key to the success of conduct and simultaneity is the mechanism which allows various postures toward objects to be assumed.

The individual is always at the centre of reality. His world is always world-for-him.[25] The physical requisites for action are given in the situation but the individual is the active centre of the situation: "Time and space... appear in the situations of organic forms."[26] The object stands to the individual as a means for the fulfillment of his interests. The object "is relative to his active interest, not relative in the sense that its content is a state of his consciousness".[27]

Role-taking, simultaneity and the centrality of the individual are connected with Mead's understanding of resistance. For Mead, resistance is not just a question of the physical effort involved in manipulating the object; resistance concerns the future - the hypothetical future of action. Within the stage of manipulation, either hypothetical or actual, the resistance is the same as that in the future. That is, our interests and expectations are taken to be continuous with the object.[28]

There is a duality in the principle of sociality. In effecting change, both the novel characters, for example of a problematic object and the characters retained from past experience come together in a synthesis which allows conduct to proceed.[29] Sociality shows the individual to be in a constant state of tension. Nature is defined by the sensitivity of the individual. Nature has reality in so far as it allows experience. The strivings of the individual must creatively accommodate themselves to the available modes of satisfaction offered by nature. The fundamental duality centres on experience on the one hand and the individual on the other. In the interaction either the experience is creative of the individual or the individual is creative of the experience.

It is my contention that Mead cannot resolve this central problem. His pragmatic orientation refuses to see nature as a problem. In attempting to answer the question "How does the individual come to have the kinds of experience he does?", Mead defines the individual as a stage in the evolutionary scale and experience as the kind of behaviour appropriate for that stage of evolution. Experience is conduct which is the expression of the individual; the individual is the kinds of experience he is expressing.

The individual is born into a situation. The world he comes into is already meaningfully interpreted and structured for him, but the individual makes it his world through his activities within it. Specifically, it is through the individual's errors in the world that he grows and changes. An error is unsuccessful conduct. These errors are the mistakes of a self, of an individual whose relationship to nature is conceived in a common-sense manner. Yet this self and the inter-relationship with nature are conceived in a philosophic manner. The 'givenness' of nature is never questioned nor is the basic fact that there is an interactive relationship between a minded organism and the neutral 'stuff' of nature.

The point is that it is one thing to methodologically accept certain uncritical assumptions into a philosophy, but

it is something else to erect a critical structure on the assumption that the basic elements of the structure are known. For example, we can accept Freud's assumption that nature is continuous and law-like in all her aspects and still clearly see his personality theory; in Mead's case, however, the acceptance of the neutral availability of nature does not allow us to discriminate reasons why certain errors are made by particular individuals, the difference between action and behaviour, the role of physiological sensitivities as opposed to psychological or emotional sensitivities, or when a change is the result of the individual instead of an emergent event in nature.

Sociality, as a philosophic concept, is inadequate as a basis for a conceptual framework for the analysis of human behaviour and action because it has no epistemological backing. It does not show us how the individual comes to have experience. It cannot account for the inception of the act, i.e., for the impulses seeking expression. The emergence of impulses within the individual are assumed to answer to the natural conditions which will allow their fulfillment simply because Mead cannot see any other way for our experience to be possible. This kind of logical necessity must, however, be demonstrated through an epistemological analysis of experience rather than assuming its truth and finding cosmological principles which then are used to prove that the epistemological problems are not

really experiential problems.

I think that Mead's major failure is his refusal to see a distinction between a product of the mind, the scientific method, and the operation of mind in the world. The scientific method is an historical accomplishment, one which is never complete at any single point in time. The scientific method is itself a process and a creation. There is no reason to assume, particularly in an evolutionary universe, that because at this time the scientific method seems to be the most adequate way to explore our world our individual successful experiences must follow that method.

For one thing, our experiential hypotheses are action-oriented. We hypothesize in order to accomplish and act. This seems to be quite a different kind of hypothesis from a scientific one, for example in physics. It would seem that the latter can be the attempt to summarize a series of apparently unrelated events under a single explanation. It is a means of describing observed behaviour. It can also be an attempt to expand apparent uniformities. It can, in a more practical way, be the attempt to apply a theoretical conception to the world. Mead holds, however, that the raison d'etre of mind is that it exists for action. He does not explain the relationship between conceptualization and action.

As a systematic philosopher Mead is a failure, as indeed is perhaps the entire pragmatic program. I do not think, however, that this entitles us to dismiss Mead entirely. He has made many valuable suggestions toward a philosophic anthropology as well as indications of a theory of the self. It is to this latter theory I would now like to turn. In this final chapter I will be giving a much more sympathetic interpretation of Mead. This is not to say that he is being accepted uncritically, but rather that this is not the place to suggest a more adequate basis for Mead's philosophy. What I will try to do is to indicate what Mead's theory of the self is and to offer suggestions for an expansion of his theory with the proviso that until the epistemological foundations are laid no Meadian theory of the self can be adequate.

VI

THE THEORY OF THE SELF

The purpose of this chapter is to try to integrate those elements of Mead's thought which I have been developing into a theory of the self. It is, by now, obvious that Mead had a great interest in the self. The problem of conduct cannot be adequately discussed without a comprehensive theory of initiation and motivation. Mead's desire to locate all of the processes of man's physical and mental activities within a naturalistic framework has limited his vocabulary to terms, whose usual connotations are felt to be opposed to any constructive theory of the self and self-initiation. But this understanding of vocabulary must be seen within the framework of Mead's thought and not imposed from the outside. We have already seen how, as temporality increased in importance for Mead, the concept of 'the social' expanded to include all processes of adjustment. Similarly, mechanism took on an increased dimension through the theory of temporality and emerged not as a physical model but as an expression of a functional unity.

The transition of the discussion of the self in Mind, Self and Society to the discussion in The Philosophy of the Present can be seen with the increased dimension of the temporal nature of role-taking and its effects on the self,

the interweaving of 'the social' and temporality through sociality, and the increased recognition of the role of the subject-agent aspect of the self.

In the interaction of the self and the environment the organization of events determines the temporal relations. The intial condition for the self is always a situation. The self is constantly barraged by impressions, objects and events from nature and impulses, desires and imagery from within. The self "is bound to the dimensions of temporality by being always in a situation, both objective and subjective."[1]

For the human organism, "The biological act moves by way of adjustment of the organism's acts to the requirements of the environment; the self's act is not an adjustment by the condition of experience...It is only the self for which objects are at a distance."[2] The self-conscious act is not something which is determined by the conditions given to it. It is always an act of self-initiation which stands as the condition for the appearance of an environment. The act of the self cannot be identified with the biological act. This is not to deny the host of determinations and conditions which are instigated by the fact of the individual as a biological organism. It is asserting that the human individual initiates acts. Action involves a distinction

within the organism which goes beyong the physical mechanism of the instinctual world. This distinction is that of the functional focus of action of the self, i.e., the "I" as distinct from the behaviours and the past experiences of the self as the "me".

The prerequisite for the appearance of the self in experience and in consciousness is rooted in man's biologic make-up. I have already drawn the distinction between the perceptual object and the physical object. The importance of this distinction will now be made evident. The physical object exists; the perceptual object is real. Action is initiated on the basis of the perceptual object; but the distinction within the self is dependent on its biologic nature. The biologic organism comes into contact with the physical object; the response to that object is an initiated act which is a response to the perceptual object. The two objects are unified in our experience because of the capacity for role-taking through the establishment, by our temporal structure, of simultaneity or sociality. I quote from Mead:

> It is evident that it is the formation of the physical object which is responsible for the appearance of the individual as an object, since it brings contemporaneity and also brings the possibility of the distinction between rest and motion, and the

> separation of space and time, and thus constitutes a new environment answering to the new individual. In other words, contemporaneity can arise only as distant objects which are future in their import can be brought hypothetically into the contact field, and so become physical objects.[3]

Distant objects belong only to a self. It is the selecting out of the perceptual field those objects which are perceptual, which answer, hypothetically, to the demands of our impulses. What exists in the distance, physically and temporally, is made real by acting toward it.

The reality of distant objects is always hypothetical. In Mead's theory of temporality we saw how everything is determined from the perspective of the present, i.e., those events which led to the present were necessary for the present to have the character that it does have. Role-taking, now seen as sociality, allows the self to be the necessary condition or basis for the distant object. That is, it is the self which transforms the hypothetical distant object into a categorical object of present experience; it is the self that makes experience by constantly pulling the future into the actualized present. Sociality allows the self to play the role of the distant object. Through this role playing the self is constantly ahead of itself. The mode of experience is from the future toward the present which merges into experience at the point of contact. We

give objects the insides of resistance which we experience as the outside of the object. We move toward objects from the perspective of the object and not from the perspective of the individual. The true object in experience is the "me" of the self as sociality. The "me" determines itself out of various alternative modes of action for the sake of fulfilling the demands of the "I".

This objective capacity of the self allows for the conduct of the self to be objectively and immediately available to the self for analysis and reflection. When the self is not being conducted properly in its environment, when a situation arises within which the object, the self, is not able to handle, its conduct as an object is inhibited. What issues into the world after inhibition, which is able to act adequately within that situation, is a new object capable of ongoing conduct. This is the reconstructed self.

What has elapsed in passage between the 'time' of the inhibition and the instigation of the act is incapable of effecting the continuance of the act for two reasons: (1) passage in the absence of mind is 'undifferentiated'; only a real difference can make a difference to mind, and (2) the instigation of the reconstructed act carries with it the temporal structure of the act which is inclusive of and constituent of the past and future from its locus as

the present. As object, the self is restricted to the processes and determinations of all objects. The most important restriction is that an object cannot initiate action. This is not to undermine the importance of the objective side of the self. This quote gives evidence to its import: "while an indefinite number of instances of objects in nature appear in our immediate experience, new objects arise in reflective experience only through the interaction of the individual and the environment by means of the mediation of the self as an object."[4] Mead also writes:

> The further function of the self as an object in the field of action is to be found in the attention to the universal character of the object in the environment, and its abstraction by means of symbols of communication in the form of what is (sic) called ideas.
>
> Whatever endures in the midst of the passing of event...is in so far universal... It is these persistent characters which can be indicated to others or to one's self, for only that which persists can be indicated... We identify the universal contents in things by presenting ourselves as responding to them, and we call these responses aroused by the significant symbols of social gestures, or language, the meanings of things. It is because we can summon ourselves, as organizations of responses, into the field of experience by means of these symbols, that we are able to isolate these meanings and so further the organization of our responses in a plan of action.[5]

Language is possible because the self can so organize and objectify itself as to present a <u>focus of continuity</u> to

memory. It is only because of this objective continuity which is aware of itself that the concrete data of experience can be abstracted, symbolized and universalized into the human artifact of language. There can be no novelty, no emergence, no growth without a contrast to something which does not change. The self as object, as "me", is constant and enduring but not as a set of identical permanent features, but rather as a certain unique kind of organization or unity of response. Only the "me" has experience. Only the "me" acts. Only the "me" enters into contact with other "me"s. The self as object is the constant focus of all experience - to myself as well as to others, especially to the scientist.

An implication of the above passage would serve as an explanation of the seeming impossibility of geniuses and mystics to explain their experiences. The symbolic structure of language is a response to the shared persistance of experience. It serves to isolate and indicate the universal enduring qualities of our experience. The genius's experiences are of such a nature as to be creative of symbolic environments, the persistance of which is relative to that individual's perspective. This also has implications for an understanding of social change. In applying this theory not just to society at large but to the experience of the

individual as well, the major aspect is the question of the isolation of meanings, symbols or responses. It is crucial to the theory of reconstruction to be clear as to what it is that leads to inhibition. Earlier in the paper I showed how it is the particular or concrete characters of universal, i.e., of permanent objects, which call out novel responses and the process of reconstruction.

The "I" is the non-objective aspect of the self which initiates acts. The "I" is seen by Mead as consisting of projects or goals. These projects serve as "filters", "screens" or "censors" for the undifferentiated and increasing demands at certain times in certain situations. This projecting is the direction which the "me" takes in its conduct. It is 'time itself'. Further, these projects dictate directions independently of the biological demands. They direct themselves through the mediation of the "I".

The "I" is the values or the goals of the self. The "me" is a continual response to the demands of the "I". The projects, values or goals of the "I" are never investigated by Mead, but I think we can see them as being correlated with the kinds of concepts which psychiatrists talk about, namely character traits, personality, dispositions or inclinations. Mead is arguing, I believe, that these concepts should be seen not as things which individuals have but as ways indivi-

duals are. An individual's behaviour should not be equated with the essential or constituent determinations of that person. What we do when we identify behaviour with the individual is to force the self to seek new modes of behaving consistent with our definition of the self as a piece of behaviour.

This is an interpretation of Mead which may not be entirely consistent with his earlier works (MSS and PA) or with what I have said about the "I" being projects or goals. It is an open question as to which comes first, the "I" or the "me". It is further another question to ask if before self-consciousness ("me"'s reflection on "me") the "I" can have projects. In my reading of Mead I am arguing that the "I" is present at birth but only as a mechanism which governs the order of satisfaction of biological needs. The need to play games and to enter into social process with persons other than the original 'significant other' (parent) is rooted biologically. Just as the original means of satisfaction of needs is dependent on an adjustment of behaviour to a pre-determined pattern of permissible means of satisfaction (feeding schedule, for example) so increased awareness of our dependency on others comes to set up processes of mediation within us. At the level of self-consciousness the processes of mediation become crystallized as the "I".

The projects of the "I" are then in a state of emerging. The individual is beginning to be defined as a kind of a thing. The fundamental drive is still toward satisfaction, but now with the self-conscious individual that which is to be satisfied is a picture or view of what one can become. The externally imposed labels of behaviour become internalized as the projects and goals of the "I"

The reconstruction of objects, both external and the "me", is the construction of the kind of experience which will allow the realization of the projects of the "I". The environment becomes totally purposive in an instrumental sense. Experience is comprised of certain necessary conditions which go to define situations for the individual but these conditions themselves are not a part of the experience of the "I": "It is true that we may make an analysis of the different elements of the physiological structure by anatomizing the organism and showing what the mechanism is that must work to enable the act to take place. This analysis, however, does not present parts of the act of the self. They are conditions of the action of the self, but they lie outside that experience."[6] The experience of the "I" is a primitive relation. It is foundational in that it, after its inception, presupposes no other element for its experience.

To continue this interpretation let us look closer at the basic problem of the initiation of action. Where in this process of role-taking does the initiation of its action come from? Where is the subject which needs an object? Mead states that "The self appearing as "I" is the memory image of the self who acted toward himself and is the same self who acts toward other selves."[7] The "I" is the self which acts towards the "me" as object. In the act of tending toward the self as object, however, the self as subject, as initiator, cannot appear. If this "I" could appear in consciousness during the act, then what would there be for consciousness to be a response to? We would have to see consciousness as a response to itself, or as a response to the initiation of the act. Mead sees consciousness only as response to biological fialure, i.e., when the organism as a physical mechanism cannot meet the demands of its own impulses. Consciousness is a response to a problematic situation. It is a response to objects. It cannot be a response to the "I". Mead sees this in the following way:

> Recognizing that the self cannot appear in consciousness as an "I", that it is always an object, i.e., a "me", I wish to suggest an answer to the question, What is involved in the self becoming an object? The first answer may be that an object involves a subject. Stated in other words, that a "me" is inconceivable without an "I".[8]

As subject, as the initiator of the response, the "I" cannot be exhibited in that response. It can only be entertained as an "I" after the act in memory and the past. Mead states that:

> The "I" lies beyond the range of immediate experience. In terms of social conduct this is tantamount to saying that we can perceive our responses only as they appear as images from past experience, merging with the sensuous stimulation. We cannot present the response while we are responding. We cannot use our responses to others as materials for the construction of the self - this imagery goes to make up other selves. We must socially stimulate ourselves to place at our own disposal the material out of which our own selves as well as those of others must be made.
>
> The "I" therefore never can exist as an object in consciousness, but the very conversational character of our inner experience, the very process of replying to one's own talk, implies an "I" behind the scenes who answers to the gestures, the symbols, that arise in consciousness. The "I" is the transcendental self of Kant, the soul that James conceived behind the scene holding onto the skirts of an idea to give it an added increment of emphasis.
>
> The self-conscious, actual self in social intercourse is the objective "me" or "me"s with the process of response continually going on and implying a fictitious "I" always out of sight of himself.[9]

Our responses to others are the constitution of ourselves. We cannot be built up out of these because they are what we are in the past of that conduct. When we reflectively step behind our responses to see that response as it served in

the past in the capacity of a stimulation for another then the response which that reflection calls out may be used in the construction of ourselves as a new self. The developments in psychology and philosophy within Mead's day saw the self as a fiction, as a creation which was logically necessary for the metaphysical or the anti-metaphysical structures which they had developed. Mead sees the Kantian "I" as a logical functional necessity, but its separation from the phenomenal world removes, for Mead, the possibility of the reality of the Kantian "I". Mead is ontologizing the functional unity of the Kantian noumenal self.[10] The Meadian "I" is knowable as the responsive structure which is responsible for the initiation of conduct. It is not knowable in the act, only after the act. The unity of function which was all Kant's "I" was has become transformed by Mead into that very unity of the act, the consequences of which the self is responsible for. The quality of the emergent reality is not given in the intention of the self; it is only given in the result of the self. Rather than a transcendental unity of apperception Mead had developed a transcendental unity of emergence, i.e., the given existential conditions which are constituative of the reality of experience. Mead's 'categories' are not static and constituative of our experience, they actively transform experience both with respect to what is in the environment and in our mode of response to

that environment. The response of Mead's categories to the givens in nature affects an emergence of the categories of response as well as the real characters in nature.

The reconstructive capacity of the "I" is engaged in the reorganization of itself as much as it is engaged in the reorganization of experience. It is "that phase of experience within which we are immediately conscious of conflicting impulses which rob the object of its character as object-stimulus, leaving us insofar in an attitude of subjectivity; but during which as new object-stimulus appears due to the reconstructive activity which is identified with the subject "I" as distinct from the object "me"".[11] For Mead, it is because the self can become conscious that action is stopped and that the instigation of action brings with it the temporal order that retains the continuity of human experience. Mind is only a certain kind of potential before experience. Only the temporal depth of the nervous system can be called <u>a priori</u>, constitutive of experience. For Mead it is the "whole of such a nervous system (which) provides both the field and the mechanism for selection with reference to distant futures, and this selection endows surrounding objects with the values and meanings which the future subtends."[12]

Far from this theory detracting from the self as subject, it locates the self within the very field of experience and conduct in which that self is the locus of reality. This self is not logically or metaphysically necessary; it is the ontological reality, the 'stuff' out of which reality emerges, and the explanation of the conduct of the self in terms of that self. It allows for no appeals to 'higher' realms to justify its action. It must suffer the consequences of its own creations. The Meadian self is responsible for its own responsive structure.

I beg the reader's indulgence in subjecting him to another long quotation from Mead, but I feel that, firstly, not enough "reading" of Mead has been done, and, secondly, that it is essential to my thesis to illuminate as brightly as possible those passages which stretch and extend the meanings of Mead's behaviouristic language to show that my development of the implications of Mead's thought is not doing violence to his philosophy.

> The psychological elements of an object are a definite stimulation answering to a definite response plus the results of past experience of the response. The object is a collapsed act. (my italics) It is when the results of past experience have attached themselves to the stimulations that we find a field of objects within which we can act intelligently. The conflict, together with

> its inhibition, breaks up these objects, and it is not until new objects have arisen that intelligent conduct can proceed. What is essential to this reconstruction is such an analysis of a complex act that that which has checked the whole act may be identified with the specific part of the act to which it belongs, for it is only when a definite tendency to respond answers to a stimulation that it becomes a distinct part of the field of perception and can assimilate the memory images of past experience. To isolate a part of a complex act is, then, to expose the field to the independent sensitizing influence of the other tendencies which were so organized that they acted under the conditions set by the whole act. The immediate function of the appearance of the self in experience is that of analyzing the complex response, in the face of conflict, so that a new field of objects may appear together with a reconstructed act. This takes place through the identification of the self with the defeated element of the act, and then with the entire act, deprived of this element, seeking to reorganize itself out of characters in the field of stimulation to which we would otherwise not have responded, that is, which would not otherwise have existed as objects for us in the environment.[13]

Reconstruction, then, is a polar concept. The "I" is constantly redifining its situation. In this process it is seeking various ways of achieving its ultimate satisfaction, i.e., to be actual.

It is the valuational or purposive nature of the "I" which determines the characters of objects, which directs action and selects environments. The characters of objects attended to is the response of the "me" to the valuational demands of the "I". This experience is temporal in nature.

Through sociality the subjective demands of the "I" are exteriorized to the objects. The subjective is made objective through the selective process of analysis and the reconstruction of an objective way of behaving. As certain characters become more relevant to the "I" they become objectified as an habitual response to the "me". Future conduct is then checked either by the inadequacy of the habit to sustain the value or by a too hasty institution of a habit (as when our response has only been tested in a limited number or kinds of situation) or by a redefinition of the self.

Past structures become enlarged and altered through experience. This past is however always clung to, as it is through this past that personal identity is maintained. In the interplay between the organized mode of response, the "me", and the continual demand to become more real, to act as one with our image or definition of our self, the "I", we are constantly performing 'self-experiments'. We mentally try out different ways of responding to our past. In the imagination these varied responses take on the character of ideas; ideas of how our present and future values may be realized. The action on these objects of memory is novel:

> It is the temporal aspect of things which is responsible for their psychological character. It is in so far as the reality of the thing is effected either with the future or with the past that we are able to isolate elements which are referred to the experience of the individual, which are abstracted as psychological contents. Things are the way they are in the relationship between the individual and his environment and this relationship is that of conduct.[14]

It is only the temporal self which is able to so interpose its structure into the environment that a function of unity and coordination between passage and the existence of perspectives may be affected. The temporal self is the subject and not the object. The "me" is as timeless and physical as any object. The "me" is always and only an effect. The constitution of the "me", "the stuff that goes to make up the 'me' whom the 'I' addresses and whom he observes, is the experience which is induced by this action of the 'I' ".[15] The "me" has the same reality as any other object. In ordinary experience it is a physical object and is not observed by the "I". Only when it runs into difficulty does it become attended to by the "I". The "me" only appears to the "I" insofar as it is a failure. The "me" is the biologic self. It is a necessary condition for the appearance of an "I" but it is not sufficient.

The "I" is the principle of responsiveness. Given a structure of tendencies you still do not have a response.

Given a set of interests, desires and impulses you still do not have direction. Given a present you still do not have a past or a future. That which initiates responses, directs interest, desire and impulse and which imposes the temporal order of these responsive activities is the "I". The reconstruction of the self can do nothing more to the "me" than to give it its emergent characters. As an object all it can be to the "I" is useful. The emergent organizations and constitutions of the self which overcome the problem of action emerge into the past as a new "I". Why emerge into the 'past'? Mead explains: "The 'I' remembers; but the self it remembers is always a 'me' that another 'I' remembers now. This fact alone affords the present 'I' with a measure of free responsiveness toward the 'me' and hence toward its past".[16] The responsibility of the responses of the self is to the self. The point is that this self is constantly in the process of actualization and realization of its tendencies within various acts in the world. After the response has been made the self, both as "I" and as "me", has been reconstructed; the "me" is a novel object with emergent characters and the "I" is a novel responsive structure with emergent relationships. The imagery of its memory comes to the "I" not from that "I" but from a past "me". Its selection of responses from its memory is then a completely free

selection. The present and future which are calling for a response cannot determine any aspect of the selection. The selection of a responsive tendency, the selection to select, is an act which is spontaneous, though grounded in conditions; free, though within a finite set of possible experiences; and unpredictable, though completely determined from the perspective of the actualized selection. This constant interplay between the "I" and the "me" is only comprehensible "within a theory of its time-structures".[17]

For the relativist the only determination of the order of the events which we experience is that which is imposed through the establishment of systems of reference. I have tried to show that the self is such a reference system in that it is the locus of reality by focusing all happenings into its present. The perspectives which exist objectively in nature are then fully available for the self to select those which it cares to participate in as its past and those which it cares to participate in as its future. The self is also an objective perspective and as such has a certain structure which makes it objective and which allows it to be seen as past and with the possibility of becoming future. Mead sees this metaphysical implication of relativity in the following way: "If the future is actually existant, it must be as alternative possibilities. For the succession of events

upon each other is dependent upon the consentient sets, within which the events lie. If an event can lie within different consentient sets, there will be different successions."[18]

This selection of events is a function of the "I". It is the method for the incorporation of the widest possible horizon or mode of conduct. I have earlier drawn the analogy in Mead's thought between the scientist and the individual through the conception of hypothesis as the key to action. The following quote from Mead should then be read with the individual in mind as well as the general scientific method:

> This modern conception [of investigation] proceeds from the standpoint not of formulating values, but giving society at the moment the largest possible number of alternatives of conduct, i.e., undertaking to fix from moment to moment the widest possible field of conduct. The purposes of conduct are to be determined in the presence of a field of alternative possibilities of action.[19]

Older scientific thought was restricted to a value orientation based on concepts not involved in the quest of science. This is ruled out by the modern conception of research science. In the individual, however, the purposes of conduct which go to select the alternatives available for action are the values, impulses or interests of the individual.

This hypothesis formulation is a function of the "me".

This is not contradicting what I have said earlier about the "I". The "me" as a biologic organism has its own distinct specious present as well as its own mechansims for survival. Consciousness is a faculty of the "me". The distinction is that the initiation of action and the structure which calls out consciousness, the structure which reconstructs the attitudes embedded in consciousness, and the structure which orders the temporal arrangement of consciousness is the "I". It is when the "me" becomes inhibited and unable to operate in its usual biologic mode that the "I" is called into play. It is only then that the human organism can be said to act. The "I" has arisen in nature to allow the human organism to survive.

With this distinction in mind we need to turn to a closer examination of the "me". This examination will be of the "me" as a biologic self and not in its further capacity as an object. Mead sees the "me" as the empirical self thus:

> ...as the function of the world is to provide the data for the solution, so it is the function of the individual to provide the hypothesis for that solution. It is equally evident that it is the individual as a 'me' that can perform this function. Such an empirical self belongs to the world which it is the function of this phase of consciousness to reconstruct... one of the results of the reconstruction will be a new individual as well as a new social environment...the self in the disintegration and reconstruction of its universe, the self functioning, the point of immediacy that must exist

> within a mediate process. It is the act that makes use of all the data that reflection can present, but uses that merely as the conditions of a new world that cannot possibly be foretold from them. It is the self of unnecessitated choice, of undreamt hypothesis, of inventions that change the whole face of nature. [20]

It is the empirical self which functions in the world using the data of reflection. The other self, the self of 'undreamt hypothesis', is not empirical. As an object the "me" is the ultimate point of mediation for the self as a unity. It is ultimate because its initial action after inhibition is that point at which the subjective has passed into the objective. Its action represents the compromises of the subjective demands of the "I" and the hypothetical objective alternative modes of objective behaviour represented by the perspectives in nature. The response of the "me" to inhibition transcends the "me". This is to say that the response cannot be determined to be within the "me" until it acts. The response is not predictable. The response is a solution, a selection out of alternatives; the response is intitiated by the "I".

As an object the "me" participates in all the manifestations of objective phenomenon. The most important of these is a causal order. The values and demands of the "I" are not determined by a causal sequence of events. The satisfaction of the "I"'s demands is dependent on the means

of satisfaction, i.e., the causal requirements of the "me". In inhibition both the environment and the "me" are reconstructed according to their possible modes of conduct. One causal order is selected according to the needs of the "I". The problematic is always subjective. The "me" is always able to act adequately, i.e., in a way which will satisfy the "I". The "I" is constantly striving to become increasingly one with its idealization of itself. The "I" wants to grow, and the "growth of the self arises out of a partial disintegration, the appearance of the different interests in the form of reflection, the reconstruction of the social world, and the consequent appearance of the new self that answers to the new object."[21]

The idealizations of the "I" appear as ideas. Ideas are tested, they are held up against the world. This comparison is between the past behaviours in the world, the present ideas and the future anticipated satisfaction. The novel demand is caused but is not causally explained except as conduct. The temporal nature of the central nervous system gives the individual the future as an actual way of experiencing the world. The enlargement of experience is possible only because the individual can hypothetically act as if the future were the actual present.

The conditions within which experience must be evidenced are not the conditions which make up the reality of the experience for the individual. This is to affirm that the individual, as "I", judges, evaluates, and derives meaning from his objective behaviour which is not dependent on the antecedent conditions which were necessary for the behaviour. If Mead were forced to use causal language I project that he would argue that the adequacy of the behaviour is retrodicted from future anticipations to present reflection. The individual is "continually creating a world which becomes real through his discovery. Insofar as new conduct arises under the conditions made possible by his experience and his hypothesis, the world, which may be made the test of reality, has been modified and enlarged."[22] The reality of nature answers to the subjective experience of the individual. The satisfaction of these subjective experiences depends on the ease with which they can be realized. It is the demonstration of the subjective experience of the individual which is the major task of the individual.

Mead never argues this. Mead does argue that we can come to know the subjective experience through objective behaviour. I have argued that perhaps this is possible, but not on Mead's grounds. My present argument is that is is this

demand for objective fulfillment of subjective demands which is the heart of the individual's experience. Mead was beginning to develop a self-realization view of man which goes far beyond Aristotle's common-sense development. Mead was searching for the ontological basis for the individual's experience and trying to account for that experience in scientific terms. I have argued that he would have failed inevitably even if he had lived because of his inadequate epistemology.

I see the most important contribution of Mead as his incessant interest in the self as the actor engaged in a social world. His constant struggle was to do justice to the neglected question of the initiation of action. There can be no question that Mead's impact on social psychology and philosophy was minimal. His influence in social psychology was restricted to his influence as a teacher and through his first work MSS. It is, however, obvious that Mead is starting to be read again, and in his entirety, by philosophers as well as by sociologists and psychologists.[23] Perhaps this is because sociology and psychology are today realizing what Mead saw so clearly so long ago:

> If the psychical is the functional and the consciousness of the individual at the same time, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this phase of our consciousness - or, in other words,

> the individual *qua* individual - is functional in the same sense. This individual cannot be the empirical "me" that exists in such profusion in the modern genetic and pathological psychologies, nor yet can it be the transcendental self that is nothing but the function of unity; nor the self whose realization is the goal of the ethics of Green and his ilk; nor the individual whose whole content is the other way of stating the knowable universe. For this individual cannot be an object; and yet it must have a content, but that content cannot be an ideal either of conduct or of knowledge. It cannot be an object, because ...it belongs to the subject end of the polarized process of cognitive experience; it must have or be a content, because psychical consciousness does not belong to the normative phase of reflection, and deals therefore with relations and laws only in their appearance within certain fields of experience; it cannot be an ideal, because it must be immediate, and therefore its reference, so far as it is psychical, must lie within its own phase of consciousness...There is nothing that has suffered more through loss of dignity of content in modern positivistic psychology than the 'I'. The 'me' has been most honorably dealt with. It has waxed in diameter and, not to speak of number, with continued analysis, while the 'I' has been forced from its metaphysical throne, and robbed of all its ontological garments... but the greatest loss is the constant drain from the 'I' to the 'me'. No sooner is a content of subjectivity made out than it is at once projected into the object world. This is the peculiar theme of our social psychology. The recognition of the social character of the self, that the *alii* of our experience are not secondary inferred objects with which our reason endows directly perceived physical things, but constructs whose content is derived from subjective consciousness - this recognition involves the objectifying of a content which used to belong to the subject.[24]

As a conclusion I hold that Mead's fundamental insight into social psychology is that as a science it must rest on

a philosophic or speculative theory of man. I see Mead as attempting to clarify certain key concepts such as action, the social, causation and subjectivity. Through this clarification a more adequate methodology could be constructed for the investigation of man in the social world. Mead's fundamental failure was an inadequate analysis of the subjective experience as experienced by the individual. A reapproach to the same problem from a different philosophical orientation has been attempted by Alfred Schutz and other phenomenologists. Although agreement does not entail correctness and without holding that the phenomenological analysis is adequate, I see it to Mead's credit that the problems he saw as fundamental - temporality, subjectivity, selection and purposive behaviour - are also the ones which are at the heart of the phenomenological analysis.

I have tried to demonstrate in my essay that Mead's thought is more consistent and systematic than has been generally realized. Mead's thought was determined by the 'root metaphor' of the social as a process of adjustment. He saw the working out of this process as the key to the reconciliation between the causal demands of science and the emergent nature of the universe, as the way to preserve the continuity of the self in a creative universe, as a justification of the merging of sociology and psychology

into social psychology, as the way of scientifically approaching the experience of the individual in its full immediacy.

Notes to Pages 1 to 18

1. Charles W. Morris, ed. Mind, Self, and Society, by George Herbert Mead (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. ix.

2. Charles W. Morris, John M. Brewster, Albert M. Dunham, and David L. Miller, eds. The Philosophy of the Act, by George Herbert Mead (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. v.

3. Morris, Mind, Self, and Society, p. xiv.

4. Ibid., p. xiii.

5. George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 2.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. 2-3.

8. Ibid., p. 10.

9. Ibid., p. 42-125.

10. Edwin G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, (2nd ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957), p. 90.

11. John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology", in Wayne Dennis, ed. Readings in the History of Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948), p. 356.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 359.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p. 361.

16. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, p. 83.

17. Ibid., p. 27.

18. Ibid., p. 43.

19. Ibid., p. 17-18.

20. Ibid., p. 5.
21. Ibid., p. 12.
22. Ibid., p. 18.
23. Ibid., p. 21.
24. Ibid., p. 116.
25. Ibid., p. 112.
26. Ibid., p. 28.
27. Ibid., p. 80.
28. Ibid., p. 83.
29. Ibid., p. 88.

Notes to Pages 19 to 41

1. George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 135.

2. Ibid., p. 137.

3. Ibid., p. 138.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 140.

6. Ibid., p. 151.

7. Ibid., p. 154.

8. Ibid., p. 159.

9. Ibid., p. 163.

10. George Herbert Mead, "The Mechanism of Social Control" in Mead: Selected Writings, ed. Andrew J. Reck (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964), p. 140.

11. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, p. 163.

12. Ibid., p. 170.

13. Evaluation in this sense is the overall recognition of the immediate action within the framework of ends which the "I" is holding as well as the immediate evalution within linguistic terms for the continuity of cooperative behaviour.

14. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, p. 67.

15. Ibid., p. 173.

Notes to Pages 42 to 52

1. George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, eds. Charles W. Morris, John M. Brewster, Albert M. Dunham, and David L. Miller, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 65.

2. Ibid., p. 8.

3. Ibid., p. 12.

4. Ibid., p. 41.

5. Ibid., p. 25.

6. Ibid., p. 635.

7. Ibid., p. 7.

8. E. Faris, "The Social Psychology of George Mead", American Journal of Sociology, XLIII (1937), p. 396.

9. George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, ed. Arthur E. Murphy, (LaSalle: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1932), p. 73.

10. Charles W. Morris, and et al., eds. The Philosophy of the Act, xix.

11. Harold N. Lee, "Mead's Doctrine of the Past", Tulane Studies in Philosophy, XII (1963), p. 53.

12. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, p. 330.

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19. George Herbert Mead, "Scientific Method and Individual Thinker", in Reck, Selected Writings, p. 208.

20. Mead, "The Definition of the Psychical", p. 53-54.

21. Mead, "The Social Self", p. 149.

22. Mead, "Scientific Method and Individual Thinker", p. 210.

23. Mead's influence in sociology can be seen in the works of Peter Berger and Irving Goffman. In psychology such studies as The Pragmatics of Human Communication, by Paul Watzlawick, Janet Helmick Beavin and Don D. Jackson, are developing the tools to research many of Mead's more behaviouristic theories. This is not to say that the authors recognize that the theories they are researching are those of Mead, rather, even a brief reading will demonstrate the increasing influence of Mead's thought within psychology. In theoretical sociology and philosophical anthropology Mead has a direct and recognized influence on such writers as Alfred Schutz. In philosophy Maurice Natanson has devoted much time to Mead.

24. Mead, "The Definition of the Psychical", p. 46-47.

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