THE SIEVING OF GOAT'S MILK.
THE SIEVING OF GOAT'S MILK:
AN EXAMINATION
INTO
THE HISTORICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS
OF
EDMUND HUSSERL'S
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

The thesis objective is proof that the theory of immanence is the foundation of Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. This point is important because transcendental phenomenology is not capable of justification of the use of this theory as its foundation. As a result, the proof of this point is proof that transcendental phenomenology is the systematic development from this key presupposition.

The method of proof is contained in two parts. In the first part, the assumption we are looking for, i.e., the theory of immanence, and, the framework within which we are looking for this assumption, i.e., the foundation of transcendental phenomenology, are examined. This is necessary as the context for the second part to this proof. The second part is examination of the three fundamental ingredients to the foundation: the problem of cognition; the theory of transcendental subjectivity; and, the phenomenological epoche. Examination of each of these ingredients uncovers various implications and other manifestations of the theory of immanence.

The result of these examinations is proof of the conviction that transcendental phenomenology is the systematic development of the presupposition of the theory of immanence. In addition, the incapacity of this philosophy to justify this presupposition is proven by the linear line of development of both the theory of immanence and transcendental phenomenology.
"To know what questions may reasonably be asked is already a great and necessary proof of sagacity and insight. For if a question is absurd in itself and calls for an answer where none is required, it not only brings shame on the propounder of the question, but may betray an incautious listener into absurd answers, thus presenting, as the ancients said, the ludicrous spectacle of one man milking a he-goat and the other holding a sieve underneath"

-- Immanuel Kant
Critique of Pure Reason
abbreviations used for citation of works by Husserl:

CM  Cartesian Meditations, tr. D. Cairns.  
     Husserliana pagination also listed.

FTL  Formal and Transcendental Logic, tr. D. Cairns.  
     Husserliana pagination also listed.

IP   The Idea of Phenomenology, tr. Alston and  
     Husserliana pagination also listed.

PL   The Paris Lectures, tr. P. Koestenbaum.  
     Husserliana pagination also listed.

PRS  "Philosophy as Rigorous Science", tr. Q. Lauer.  
     from Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy.  
The theme of transcendental phenomenology is the transformation of a philosophically unintelligible universe into a universe with the highest degree of rationality. Rationality is measured in direct relation to the intelligibility of the past, present, and future potential of any thing. This potential is considered intelligible to the extent that it can be contained within the rules and decisions of knowledge. Something which does not act or find its potential essentially within these rules and decisions of knowledge is considered unintelligible and, therefore, irrational.

The result is the need for a cosmological subordination to the rules and decisions of knowledge in the sense that the potential of any thing must be subordinate to cognitive demands. The interesting thing to note about both the historical and transcendental phenomenological use of this theme is that this cosmological subordination is always assumed as a given. Instead of being something which must be proven, this cosmological subordination is always present as a manifestation of the assumption of a rational universe. With this conclusion, it is considered legitimate to begin the process of reconstruction of the universe upon the basis of this assumption. Any concept of external existence which does not accord itself.
properly with cognitive demands is simply thrown out of the set of accepted concepts upon the basis of its obvious contradi-
tion with the given, i.e., cosmological subordination to human knowledge. Post-Cartesian philosophy contains philoso-
phical examples of this process of reconstruction in actual use.  

Transcendental phenomenology functions as the histor-
ical denouement to the theme of a rational universe. Post-
Cartesian philosophers, especially Hume and Kant, had indi-
cated the direction essential to this theme. The erosion of
substance into an immanent content and the positing of a con-
ditioned reality was followed by the assumption of the trans-
cendental ego. Transcendental phenomenology functions to
systematize and clarify these insights into the purified form
of a cosmology absolutely faithful to the need for cosmo-
logical subordination. In this sense, the value of transcen-
dental phenomenology is evident in its clarification of the im-
plications of an idea initially posited at least three hundred
years before, i.e., the idea of a completely rational
universe.

The results of transcendental phenomenology also in-
dicate that the demands of this idea of a philosophically in-
telligible universe lead to a perverse cosmology. The demand
for cosmological subordination to knowledge can be intellig-
ibly met only through cosmological subordination and, ulti-
mately, absorption into the mind as an immanent content. If everything in the universe must be intelligible, the unintelligible must be rejected as absurd.

The problem for this historical theme, however, is that the absolute necessity of an intelligible universe is a cognitive necessity. In order to place this cognitive necessity upon the universe, it is necessary to first prove the cosmological subordination of the universe to any cognitive necessity. Otherwise, the cognitive necessity is simply a cognitive necessity, with no justification for application as the sole foundation for new systems of metaphysics.
In order to avoid possible confusion, it is necessary to note that the definitions of 'rational' and 'intelligible' used within this discussion are not precisely the same as common usage would indicate. The concern is with discovering a foundation which is philosophically acceptable for the assertion that the universe acts in accordance with cognitive structures. The discovery of this foundation renders the universe potentially intelligible and actually rational. It is not meant as a move to immediately turn everything into the universe into something totally and completely intelligible. It is meant to provide the foundation for claims that anything in the universe is really intelligible and that every thing is potentially intelligible. An irrational universe would be one which did not accord itself with the cognitive structures of the human mind. It could appear to be intelligible, momentarily (or forever) but would still not be rational since there would be no acceptable cognitive foundation for this intelligibility.

Husserl asserts a similar concept of 'rational' in his works, see especially: CM, 85=118, (cited at the end of Section One of this discussion).

The discussion in question is indicated in II of the Introduction to this discussion.

This is not by any means to suggest that Husserl does not acknowledge the historical roots to the problem of cognition and, in consequence, transcendental phenomenology, e.g, FTL, "Introduction", IF, "Lecture One". This is one instance where Husserl indicates some amount of similarity with Hegel and the idea of the historical movement towards a single result. As with all such interpretations of the movement of philosophy, transcendental phenomenology is the fructification of this movement according to Husserl's interpretation.
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INTRODUCTION

On the basis of his own conclusion that a systematic philosophy derived from presuppositions is not acceptable, Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is a failure. Transcendental phenomenology results from the combination of the problem of cognition with the theory of transcendental subjectivity to produce the method of the phenomenological epoche with its field of transcendental experience as the appropriate field of evidence for transcendental phenomenology. As this study will indicate, this line of development is not a presuppositionless development from problem to solution. In fact, it is the systematic development of a historically prominent presupposition concerning the nature of the relation between subject and experienced object. Basically, the presupposition is the assumption of objective dependency upon cognitive structures. Within this thesis, this presupposition and its ramifications are stipulated by the theory of immanence. In consequence, transcendental phenomenology is properly interpreted as the systematic development of the presupposition of the theory of immanence and, on Husserl's own standards, is an unacceptable philosophy.

The legitimacy of this interpretation can be uncovered through simple examination of the problem of cognition, the
theory of transcendental subjectivity, and the method of the phenomenological epoche with its field of transcendental experience. Examination of each will indicate that the interpretation of the theory of immanence is the fundamental ingredient to each. But, before these examinations can occur, it is essential to present some preliminary discussion of the important concepts which will function as the tools for any such examination.

The most important preliminary discussion is concerned with the theory of immanence. Since the purpose of the proposed examinations is to ground the interpretation of transcendental phenomenology as the systematic development of the presupposition of the theory of immanence, the importance of explication of the theory of immanence is obvious. Secondly, and not quite as obviously, it is essential to present a preliminary sketch of transcendental phenomenology. The preliminary sketch is essential because of the assertion that transcendental phenomenology is the systematic development from the presupposition contained within the three facets of the foundation previously mentioned. Only a sketch of transcendental phenomenology, with detailed consideration of the function of these facets within its development, can indicate that these facets are fundamental to the foundation and would indicate this philosophy to be a metaphysical system if containing a fundamental presupposition. Finally, it is necessary to give some amount of attention to the nature of a presupposition.
The point of this discussion is to ground the claim that the theory of immanence is an essential presupposition to the development of transcendental phenomenology. The distinction between a presupposition and a legitimate assumption must be presented in order to secure this conclusion.\textsuperscript{1}
II

The theory of immanence is a claim concerning the relation between the mind, as experiencing consciousness, and the world, as the realm of the experienced. The crux to this theory is the assumption of a subjective turn. This subjective turn occurs with the assumption that the objective world depends upon the cognitive structures of the mind. The theory of immanence derives its title from an important ramification to the assumptions which actually constitute its core. This ramification is the interpretation of an experienced objectivity as essentially an immanent content of the mind or consciousness.

The best path to clarity of the theory of immanence is through a brief examination of the genesis of this theory within the history of modern classical philosophy. Not only are the illustrations familiar, but, in consideration of the fundamental nature of this theory throughout this tradition, the illustrations are the most appropriate. Historically, the theory of immanence begins with the assumption that metaphysical considerations are properly subordinate to epistemological considerations of evidence and justification. The initial example within modern classical philosophy is that of Cartesian philosophy with its quest for epistemological certainty of evidence.
The Cartesian demand for epistemological certainty of evidence is important in the genesis of the theory of immanence because it is essentially the demand for a subjective grounding of the objective world. This subjective turn is present in the universal scrutiny of the field of experience in search of experiential evidence capable of absolute epistemological certainty. The objective of this search is to secure such evidence and utilize it as the grounding for the experiential evidence of the remainder of the world of experience. The important point here is to recognize the nature of the grounding demanded by the demand for evidence with absolute epistemological certainty. Epistemology is basically the science of human cognition, outlining the appropriate procedures and theories of cognition. Epistemological certainty, therefore, is certainty of the evidence in the sense that the evidence accords itself with the demands contained within the procedures and theories of human cognition. The evidence, in consequence, would have a subjective grounding within the structures of cognition. Since the Cartesian demand is for evidences with epistemological certainty, this demand is for evidence with a subjective grounding. The demand that all other evidences lacking this foundation derive their foundation from this subjectively grounded evidence is the demand for the subjective grounding of the objective world. The subjective turn, however, does not cease at this point.
The development of this subjective turn continues through the efforts of post-Cartesian philosophers to utilize the original Cartesian assumption of the need for a subjective grounding of theories of objective experience as the only appropriate grounding. This utilization, simplistically considered, can be interpreted as present in one of two fashions. In the first fashion, the demand for the appropriate epistemological grounding of theories of reality is utilized as a means for the erosion of objective concepts accepted previous to the Cartesian subjective turn. In the second fashion, the process of this erosion is subordinated to the original Cartesian demand for a metaphysics capable of yielding epistemological certainty or, in Husserl's terms, philosophy as rigorous science. In relation to this explication of the theory of immanence, this post-Cartesian development is important as the clarification and sophistication of the original Cartesian subjective turn and the implications of this move.

The utilization of the Cartesian subjective turn as a tool for erosion of traditional concepts of objective existence is a primary characteristic of the empiricist philosophies of Berkeley and Hume. The erosion of traditional concepts of objective existence begins essentially with the original use of this subjective turn within Cartesian philosophy. For Descartes, epistemologically certain evidence is evidence
which presents something as indubitably existent. Ontological certainty is established on subjective grounds concerning the ability of the object to consistently present acceptable epistemological evidence in support of its being-status. The important ramification of this treatment is in relation to the traditional assumption that what is experienced has objective existence as such. The being-status of an experienced object of the external world is not considered questionable unless it is surrounded by unusual circumstances which indicate it is, in fact, not an object of this external world. The conclusion of the Cartesian examination of the being-status of the experienced world, however, is that it is inadequately supported by the appropriate epistemological evidence. In other words, the being-status of an experienced object becomes a decision of the experiencing subject and not something predestined by the essential nature of the experienced thing.

The Cartesian erosion of the being-status of experienced objectivities on the basis of the subjective turn is merely a faintly realized beginning. In the empiricist traditions of Berkeley and Hume, the erosion of the traditional concept of experienced objectivities is brought almost to full fruition. With these philosophies, the demand for a proper grounding in subjective evidence is utilized to destroy the concept of an experienced objectivity as an independent sub-
stance grounding a set of essentially appropriate predications. The concept of experienced objectivities as being independently existent substances is rejected as lacking the appropriate subjective foundation. Predications which were previously ascribed to this substance as essentially appropriate are subsumed within the subject as properly existent solely within the immanent limits of subjective consciousness. The grouping of these predications into a consistent form, traditionally thought to be the existing object, is reduced to the result of inclinations on the part of the subject. The yield of the empiricist use of the Cartesian subjective turn, in consequence, is the dissection of the traditional concept of experienced objectivities into phenomenal presentations existent, in their phenomenal form, only within the immanent limitations of consciousness.

The development of the Cartesian turn into a full fructification of the theory of immanence occurs with the Kantian manipulation of the results secured from the empiricist tradition. The empiricist erosion of the form of predicational groupings into the subject lends a new direction to the subjective turn. The meaning of the experienced objectivity is subsumed into the subject as the product within the immanent limitations of consciousness. More importantly, the Kantian Copernican revolution continues in the direction of the empiricists with the conclusion that the actual mean-
ing of any particular experienced objectivity is merely the judgement result of subjective conditions for experiencing consciousness. This occurs through the process of examination of the evidence for the principles of knowledge essential to the concept of any object and the necessary conclusion that these can be appropriately grounded only in this manner. With this conclusion, the concept of immanence reaches its initial fructification in the limited Idealism of Kantian philosophy.

With the illustrations from this brief examination of the use of the theory of immanence within modern classical philosophy, more detailed conclusions concerning the nature of this theory of immanence can be indicated. First, it begins with the subjective turn. The subjective turn occurs with the demand that any concept must be grounded upon the basis of specific varieties of epistemological evidence. The first result of this demand is the implication that the nature of any thing experienced by the subject must be fully accessible to the experiencing grasp of the subject. This is because the subjective turn depends upon the assumption that the true or actual concept of the experienced object can be legitimately determined upon the basis of accessible evidence. The assumption that the actual nature of the experienced object must be fully accessible to the experiencing grasp of the subject means that all of the ingredients actually composing the experienced object are contained within the subject.
This is the culmination of the process of erosion of the object. This ultimate subsumption into the subject has more implications than the simple fact that the ingredients for the experienced object happen to be contained also within the subject. Since the appropriate concept of the experienced object is also determined by cognitive structures concerning evidence, etc., the leap is easily made to the conclusion that the essential nature of the experienced object is contained solely within the subject. This is because the cognitive structures are that which allow the object to exist in the manner which it does. The being-sense of the object is determined in consequence to these structures.\(^5\) The denouement to the theory of immanence, in consequence, is the system of transcendental idealism as the system which asserts that all objects are manifestations of analytic a priori laws contained at the foundation of all human cognition.

As a precaution, it is necessary to assert that this theory of immanence is not an innate truth. The fact that it has been employed industriously for the majority of the past three hundred years, prominently so, is not an adequate justification for its employment. As indicated within the Preface to this discussion, the cosmological subordination to cognition demands justification. In fact, with consideration of the nature of human minds and the knowledge which it pro-
roduces, it is incredible to imagine that anyone would consider such a ludicrous assertion. There is absolutely no reason why the universe must subject itself to the rules of human cognition. And, if there were such a reason, it would have the incredible task of providing its own legitimacy. After all, if there were a reason why the universe had to be cosmologically subordinate, this reason would have to legitimize the assertion of its own application. It is a reason and, hence, a cognitive demand, just like any other.

The alternative, briefly, is simply acceptance of the fact that the mind does not determine the appropriate evidences essential to any concepts of objectivity. The objectivity has its own peculiar evidence and, probably, its own inaccessible essence. With Alfred North Whitehead, we must accept the fact that a rational universe is an ideal with only asymptotic approaches. And, we must also accept the fact that some concepts are based upon the very sound evidence of belief, in the same manner that I believe I am perceiving something.
introduction

III

Historically, transcendental phenomenology is the synthesis of the epistemological certainty of evidence of the Cartesian *Meditations* with the epistemological certainty of principle of the Kantian *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The Cartesian epistemological certainty of evidence is the grounding of all solutions and mediate evidences upon the ontological certainty of the *cogito*. Potential solutions are accepted or rejected upon the basis of the grounding which serves as their justification. Since the intent of Cartesian philosophy is to found a system of universally acceptable conclusions, it assumes the motif of the radical examination of all potential ingredients to this system to determine those which have the proper grounding in a universally acceptable justification. Those evidences which are found to be incapable of universal acceptance are eliminated from the field of potential groundings for Cartesian solutions. And, those concepts and solutions which are inadequately grounded are also rejected. Through this process of elimination, Cartesian philosophy intends to uncover a point of absolute certainty from which the reduction can be legitimately reversed. The evidences and solutions which were eliminated from the field of investigation could then be re-introduced after their ground-
ing and re-definition in terms of this absolutely certain point. However, Cartesian philosophy failed to achieve this objective because it could find no legitimate mode of reversing the reduction in order to uncover the principles of human knowledge. The cogito was available as an epistemologically certain evidence but there appeared to be no legitimate method for its utilization.

The Kantian epistemological certainty of principle is the grounding of the consistent objective validity of the principles and rules of human knowledge in the concept of the transcendental ego. The transcendental ego is the self as a conscious entity which conditions and constructs its experienced world in accordance with innate principles. Since these innate principles are also the source of the principles and rules of human knowledge, the objective validity of human knowledge is guaranteed by the necessary functioning of the transcendental ego as an essential factor for all human experience. However, while the Kantian system is successful as an explanation for the objective validity of human knowledge, it is not philosophically successful because of its inadequate grounding in evidence. The only justification legitimate for this solution is based upon its successful explanation of the principles of human knowledge and, hence, the very conclusion it should prove is assumed. And, even if the general system were to acquire universal philosophical acceptance, many
of the details of the system would still be unacceptable as a consequence of their grounding by Kant in presuppositions which were poorly or inadequately examined. In other words, the Kantian solution is a system without a proper foundation for either itself or its details. The problem with the Cartesian cogito is an inability to move beyond its evidence; the problem with the Kantian transcendental ego is a lack of evidence for the system which it yields. Transcendental phenomenology functions as the synthesis of these two themes in the attempt to correct the weaknesses of one with the strengths of the other.

In keeping with the Cartesian theme of epistemologically certain evidence, transcendental phenomenology must remain throughout a process of radical sense-investigation or clarification of the potential field of evidence and concepts. Sense-investigation is radical if it recognizes the constructive aspects of a genuine clarification or sense-investigation. In other words, simple clarification or sense-investigation as analysis of the given cannot go beyond the actually given. It must culminate with the same degree of clarity as it began with, the only fresh conclusions being about the order of the contents. Radical sense-investigation, however, recognizes clarification as a constructive process which goes beyond the given to recognize new implications and aspects of the meaning under investigation. It recognizes that the pro-
cess of genuine clarification must go beyond the given to uncover new and more accurate meanings based upon the implications and direction of the unclear meaning:

"Radical sense-investigation, as such, is at the same time criticism for the sake of original clarification. Here original clarification means shaping the sense anew, not merely filling in a delineation that is already determinate and structurally articulated beforehand" (FTL, 10=9).

In keeping with this demand for radical sense-investigation, transcendental phenomenology begins with the radical sense-investigation of the apodicticity of evidence demanded by Cartesian philosophy. The investigation reveals a number of important distinctions in the corrected definition, the most important being the conclusion concerning its dependence upon ontological certainty for the certainty of evidence. The Cartesian doubt is recognized as the assumption that any potential doubt concerning the existence of what is given in evidence is the discovery of a potential non-existence of the evidenced. In any instance where such a potential non-existence is actual, the conclusions based upon this evidence are falsified. If the conclusions are to be consistently correct, the evidence given in justification must be consistently justifying. This means that the evidence must have the characteristic of ontological certainty:

"An apodictic evidence, however, is not merely certainty of the affairs or affair-complexes (states-of-affairs) evident in it; rather it discloses itself, to a critical reflection, as having the signal peculiarity of being at the same time the absolute unimaginableness (inconceivability) of their non-being, and thus excluding in advance every doubt as "objectless", empty" (CM, 15-16=56).
The needed apodictic evidence, as ontologically certain being, is recognized in the unique ontological status of the self as cogito. It is with the radical sense-explanation of this Cartesian residue that the Kantian theme is introduced into transcendental phenomenology. Clarification of the residue reveals, to Husserl, a peculiar transformation of the status of all non-apodictic being (i.e., states-of-affairs given in non-apodictic evidence) into mere phenomena which present a claim of being to the cogito. This means that experiences which previously contained experiences of being have now been transformed by the Cartesian motif of re-interpretation as a consequence of the demand for certain evidence into experiences containing various phenomena which claim being-status but are dependent upon the cogito for any being-status actually accorded to them:

"Instead of simply existing for us—that is, being accepted naturally by us in our experiential believing in its existence—the world is for us only something that claims being" (CM, 18-58).

This interpretation of the Cartesian residue leads to the theory of transcendental subjectivity. This is the assertion that the meaning of experience is a product of the judgement-decisions of the cogito. Radical sense-investigation of the Cartesian residue has uncovered the conclusion that the entire world exists for me in the sense that it is dependent upon my judgements for its existence. It is the conclusion that the world as experienced by me is also for me
and something which must gather its meaning or existence-sense through my judgements, i.e., the theory of transcendental subjectivity:

"Anything belonging to the world, any spatiotemporal being, exists for me—that is to say, is accepted by me—in that I experience it, perceive it, remember it, think of it somehow, judge about it, value it, desire it, or the like. Descartes, as we know, indicated all that by the name cogito" (CM, 21=60).

The Kantian transcendental ego has been established as the conscious self which conditions and constructs its experienced world in accordance with innate principles. While it would constitute a violation of the Cartesian theme of the continuous foundation in evidence to assume this concept of the Kantian transcendental ego in full, the uncovering of the theory of transcendental subjectivity as a product of radical sense-investigation makes a more limited identification of the self with the transcendental ego legitimate. Radical sense-investigation of the Cartesian residue has revealed that the world exists for the cogito. The cogito is an essentially necessary factor in the meaning of my experienced world because the world is dependent upon my judgement-decisions as the cogito. This means that the ego can be legitimately posited as an essential and necessary component of all my experiences, the meaning of my experiences being dependent upon the judgement-decisions of this ego as cogito. Fundamentally, this ego is the Kantian transcendental ego restricted in its meaning, for the moment, to the simple conclusion
that it is a necessary and conditioning factor to all my experiences. The question of the remainder of this Kantian concept, i.e., the transcendental ego as working in accordance with innate rules and conditions, can be decided solely upon the basis of more extensive sense-investigation of the Cartesian residue. The first ingredient to this sense-investigation is the radical sense-investigation of the judgement-judging process of the cogito in order to discover the aspects which are present as manifestations of the judgement decisions of the transcendental ego.

The interpretation of the relation between thought and language given in Formal and Transcendental Logic serves as an excellent basis for illustration of Husserl's interpretation of judgement. Radical sense-investigation of language situations uncovers three distinct ingredients. The first ingredient is the physical medium or locution which is used as a device for transfer of the meaning. The meaning exists within the locution as a spiritual corporeality which does not vary with the limited variation of the manners of the locution. The locution can vary through various examples of, e.g., type script, but the meaning found in each of these variations remains the same. This meaning is the important concern because it serves to define the thought within transcendental phenomenology. Thought, in its broadest aspect, is the function of generating and fusing the meaning within the physical vehicle of the locution:
"The latter, however, does not lie externally beside the words; rather, in speaking we are continually performing an internal act of meaning, which fuses with the words and, as it were, animates them. The effect of this animation is that the words and the entire locution, as it were, embody in themselves a meaning, and bear it embodied in them as their sense" (FTL, 22=20).

The remaining two ingredients of language-situations, and the primary concern for the interpretation of judgements, are found within this process of thought. The first is the act or function of thought as the process of actual generation of the meaning eventually conveyed. In the above quotation, it is the internal act of meaning. This aspect is the meaning-act or meaning of thought. In relation to the specific type of thoughts, judgements, this aspect is the judging-act or judging. The second ingredient within this process of thought is the result or product of this meaning-act, i.e., the meant. As a constituted product, it has a certain type of objectivity, here presented as the spiritual corporeality which does not vary within the limited variation of the locution. It is that which is embodied in the locution by the internal act of meaning. In relation to the specific type of thoughts, judgements, this aspect is the judged or judgement.

Returning to the transcendental ego and the quest for appropriate evidence, the implications of this interpretation of thought are important. The problem is to move beyond the simple cogito in quest for epistemological certainty of principles but on the basis of evidence which is fruitful, acces-
sible, and ontologically certain. The transcendental ego has already been established as that which constitutes its world through its judging-acts. Radical sense-investigation of thought has uncovered the conclusion that each act of judging must contain both the act of judging itself and the judgement as the product of this judging-act. In relation to the acts of judging of the transcendental ego, this means that the experienced world, as the product of these judging-acts, must be potentially accessible qua judgements (cogitatum). And, of prime importance, the experienced world qua judgements of the judging-acts of the transcendental ego would be ontologically dependent upon the transcendental ego. In consequence, the experienced world qua judgements consists of evidence which is ontologically and, hence, epistemologically certain. At this point, the foundation for the major innovation of transcendental phenomenology has been achieved. This innovation consists in the radical alteration of the experienced world into judgements qua products of the transcendental ego, and, thereby, conversion of experience into transcendental experience. Transcendental experience, as ontologically certain, provides the previously unattainable field of evidence capable of founding the principles of human reason, in the spirit of Kant, with unquestionable certainty and clarity.

Realizing the potential of this newly uncovered type of experience, it now becomes essential to reveal the method
whereby it becomes accessible, i.e., the phenomenological epoché. The difficulty with rendering the field of transcendental experience accessible is that it remains hidden by the necessary standpoint of the naturally existing ego, i.e., the natural standpoint. In the natural standpoint, the ego is necessarily committed to a straightforward perception of the experienced world as something Objectively present. In order to reveal the field of transcendental experience, experience must be perceived as judgement, i.e., as the product of the judging-acts of the transcendental ego. Radical sense-investigation of reflection reveals the mode by which the ego of the natural standpoint can be retained, as it must be, while the field of transcendental experience is uncovered. Cognitive reflection is interpreted to be the process of objectification of a process which was originally present as a subjective process. It accomplishes this through the alteration of a straightforward perception into a reflective objectification of the process allowing the objective result of the straightforward perception:

"Natural reflection alters the previously naive subjective process quite essentially; this process loses its original mode, "straightforward" by the very fact that reflection makes an object out of what was previously a subjective process but not objective" (CM, 34=73).

This interpretation of reflection suggests the potential for a new mode of reflection, i.e., transcendental reflection, with the task of objectification of the subjective
processes behind the constitution of the experienced world. The phenomenological epoche is essentially the functioning of this new mode of reflection. The epoche is marked by a division of the ego into two levels: the level of the natural standpoint ego with its straightforward perception of the world; and, the level of the philosophizing ego as perception of the judging-judgement process through transcendental reflection. At the level of the philosophizing ego, the ego can no longer be characterized as living within the objective result of the experienced world. It is no longer interested in this aspect of the judging-judgement process. The objective world is retained simply in the modified form of the intentional result of a judging-act of the cogito, i.e., as judgement or cogitatum:

"Only by virtue of this new attitude do I see that all the world, and therefore whatever exists naturally, exists for me only as accepted by me, with the sense it has for me at the time—that it exists for me only as cogitatum of my changing and, while changing, interconnected cogitationes; and I now accept it solely as that. Consequently I, the transcendental phenomenologist, have objects (singly or in universal complexes) as a theme for my universal descriptions: solely as the intentional correlates of modes of consciousness of them" (CM, 37=75).

With the uncovering of this new field of transcendental experience, transcendental phenomenology becomes capable of the foundation of the remainder of the Kantian transcendental ego upon the basis of apodictically certain evidence. This occurs through the simple explication of the intentional sense consistencies of the transcendental ego in providing the ob-
jective meaning for the external world, now present as transcendental experience. The point is that the judging products of the transcendental ego are present with a consistent pattern. Not only is the whole contained within a consistent pattern, but individual types of judgements are evident. The cogitatum is evident as this type of cogitatum rather than some other variety. There are also subjective restrictions upon each individual cogitatum which restrict and limit prospective cogitata. All of this is open to sense-explication within the realm of transcendental experience. One can explicate the sense of one type of cogitatum and the subjective structures which allow this intentional product to remain the one which it is. Throughout this sense-explication, the transcendental clue is constantly the cogitatum as a device of reflexion of the subjective structures of the transcendental ego.

The eventual result of this sense-explication of types within the realm of transcendental experience is the attainment of a set of Apriori laws which contain and govern each and every possible type of cogitatum. And, since the cogitatum is experienced within the natural standpoint as an object of the experienced world, the derivation of these Apriori is the derivation of the universally necessary principles for all objective existence.
"This system of the all-embracing Apriori is therefore to be designated also as the systematic unfolding of the all-embracing Apriori innate in the essence of transcendental subjectivity (and consequently in that of a transcendental intersubjectivity) — or as the systematic unfolding of the universal logos of all conceivable being" (CM, 155–181).

This suggestion of the work of transcendental phenomenology is much too brief to do it justice. The idea behind the use of the field of transcendental experience is to use the intentional object, the judged, or the cogitatum as the transcendental clue for uncovering the structure of any intention of the transcendental ego. The levels of generalization of this intentioning extend from the lowest possible level of the cogitatum merely generalized into a type to the eventual uncovering of the most generalized level contained within the eidos transcendental ego as part of the formal Apriori. Since all philosophical problems are accessible to this mode of sense-explication, Husserl projects a rigorous science of philosophy constantly attaining deeper and deeper insights into its various difficulties.
In preparation for the examination of transcendental phenomenology with the intent of uncovering its presupposition of the theory of immanence, it is necessary to present some clarification of the use of 'presupposition'. This is necessary in order to distinguish between Husserl's legitimate and illegitimate use of the theory of immanence within the formulation of transcendental phenomenology.

There are two basic modes of introduction of an assumption into a philosophical argument which are legitimate. The first and foremost of these is upon the basis of argument in favor of its recognition as an appropriate assumption for the argument in question. Assumptions can also be introduced through this mode as corollaries to assumptions which have already been appropriately grounded. The second mode of introduction involves a reflexive justification of any assumption on the basis of the completion of the philosophical system. With reflexive justifications, the completion of the system serves as the justification for each of its component assertions on the basis of the success of the system in fulfilling a specific objective. The major difficulty with this mode of justification is that the objective itself must also be justified as appropriate.
Presupposition occurs in those instances of introduction of an undefended assumption. In relation to the presupposition of the theory of immanence by transcendental phenomenology, this occurs with the assumption of the legitimacy of the demands contained within the subjective turn which leads to the theory of immanence. The lack of the appropriate grounding of the theory of immanence by some type of philosophical defense will be evident from the examination of the problem of cognition. The problem of cognition is the source for the foundation of transcendental phenomenology. Transcendental phenomenology moves forward from this problem towards its formulation. In the examination of the problem of cognition, it will become evident that this problem is formulated upon the basis of the legitimacy of the Cartesian demand for the subjective grounding of objective experience. This means it is founded upon the theory of immanence as presupposition.\textsuperscript{17}

The potential for a reflexive justification of the use of the theory of immanence as the foundation for the development of transcendental phenomenology can be eliminated with the examination of the theory of transcendental subjectivity and the phenomenological evoche. All transcendental phenomenological evidence is derived through these. Examination of each will indicate the presence of the theory of immanence as the foundation for the meaning and legitimacy of these also. This means that the completion of transcendental
phenomenology is incapable of providing a reflexive justification since the presence of this presupposition is required throughout its evidence.

A philosophically relevant presupposition is also one which is fundamental to the development of the philosophy under examination. The proof of the presupposition of a minor premise has little philosophical value. However, the fundamental importance of the problem of cognition, the theory of transcendental subjectivity, and the phenomenological epoche has already been indicated within the preliminary exposition of transcendental phenomenology. Proof that each of these is fundamentally based upon presupposition of the theory of immanence, therefore, is the indication of an absolutely fundamental premise to the entire philosophy.

The importance of the uncovering of a presupposition such as the theory of immanence within transcendental phenomenology exceeds simple interest in whether the philosophy is presuppositionless or not. The interest extends with consideration of statements made throughout the writings of Husserl, statements condemning previous metaphysical systems based upon presuppositions. This condemnation is discovered usually in the foundation of the demand for an absolutely founded or rigorously scientific philosophy. A rigorously scientific philosophy is one which has established itself upon a universally acceptable foundation capable of yielding a steady pro-
duce of universally acceptable facts:

"The following arguments are based on the conviction that the higher interests of human culture demand the development of a rigorously scientific philosophy; consequently, if a philosophical revolution in our times is to be justified, it must without fail be animated by the purpose of laying a new foundation for philosophy in the sense of strict science" (PRS, 78).

Since transcendental phenomenology is presented as the fulfillment of this demand for a rigorously scientific philosophy, it is not surprising for Husserl to assert that transcendental phenomenology rests upon a presuppositionless or self-evident basis. This claim is especially relevant in relation to presupposition of inheritances from past philosophical systems. The presupposition of such an inheritance indicates the presence of a metaphysical system built upon presupposition rather than the scientifically developed philosophy which transcendental phenomenology is purported to be: 18

"... phenomenological explication is nothing like "metaphysical construction"; and it is neither overtly nor covertly a theorizing with adopted presuppositions or helpful thoughts drawn from the historical metaphysical tradition" (CM, 150=177).

The historical roots of the theory of immanence have already been established in its preliminary explication. The requirement now is to prove that transcendental phenomenology does, in fact, presuppose quite overtly a presupposition from the historical metaphysical tradition, i.e., the theory of immanence.
footnotes

1. Harmon M. Chapman in an article called "Realism and Phenomenology" (refer to The Return to Reason, ed. John Wild, pp. 3-35) appears to hold an interpretation of transcendental phenomenology similar to this. The distinction between my interpretation and his is based upon the exact nature of the presupposition. Chapman recognizes the result of the presupposition of the theory of immanence, in this article, at least, without recognizing the source as seen in this quotation:

"But if this idealistic theory of transcendental constitution is, as I think, a speculative venture resulting from his mistaken notion that the cognitive relation is internal at both ends, then in rejecting his idealism we can, by making the needful allowances, retain the bulk of his remarkable analyses" (p. 35, The Return to Reason).

Professor Chapman and myself, however, differ on the question of how fundamental this presupposition is to the structure of transcendental phenomenology. In this article, the attempt is made to reconstruct transcendental phenomenology on the basis of a realism rather than an idealism. Personally, the charge of equivocation would appear appropriate to the philosophy which Professor Chapman presents as the corrected version of transcendental phenomenology.

2. The illustrations are mainly from Cartesian and Humean philosophy in order to counter the easy assumption that I am concerned with the developed system of transcendental subjectivity as present in Kant and Hegel. Kant and Hegel certainly constitute important factors in the development of this theory, but since their philosophies contain such a flagrant development of the ramification of the theory of immanence, there is the constant danger of the identification of the theory itself with a mere ramification.

3. In counter to those who are quick to make unwarranted assumptions, it must be noted that this is not intended to be some sort of final statement of the necessary and fundamental arrangement of modern classical philosophy in relation to schools of thought and major breaks with the past. In this sense, the tradition from Descartes to Husserl is neo-Cartesian and Kant is merely the next logical step beyond Hume. But remember the qualification, in this sense, this does not mean that this is true of this period of philosophy in every sense. The grouping varies fundamentally in relation with the criteria for the grouping. (footnote continued on next page).
3 (continued).

Refer to W. Windelband A History of Philosophy (tr. J.H. Tufts, Macmillan, 1901, New York, 2nd ed.) pp. 449-486 and pp. 532-550 for a dated (and idealist) account of this period of philosophy which is compatible with the one asserted here. Despite its orientation, it contains excellent examinations of the common epistemological strain throughout modern classical philosophy indicating both insight into the problem and into the movement from one to the next.

4. The essential nature of an object is an ambiguous concept because of the process indicated in this section of the discussion. The essential nature of an object in this instance refers to that which the object actually is in the sense of the final statement or determination of the nature of the object as an experienced object. The theory of immanence, however, ultimately results in this essential nature becoming a mere manifestation of the structures of cognition and, as a result, the essence of an object becomes a structure of cognition rather than a component of the object.

In addition, it must be clearly understood that Husserl is committed to a totally accessible essence despite his theory of the constant potential fulfillment for any external object (e.g., CM, Third Meditation). In this instance, Husserl notes that the external object always, essentially so, possesses a horizon of potential which is still to be fulfilled before the essence is completely verified. While the essence is never really grasped in this instance, all conclusions concerning its nature are based upon the assertion that all evidence for it must be accessible in the experience. It can be nothing beyond this experience in the sense that the essence must be contained, as much as it can be in any one instance, within that experience. The essence is not something which can lack evidence. In other words, an accessible evidence theory is one which asserts that the essence of any object must be fully accessible to accepted forms of evidence or be denied. Husserl's theory of the external object as constantly possessing a potential is concerned with a significantly different type of inaccessibility, that of non-completion.

5. The best explication of the justifications for the subsumption of the object into the subject upon the basis of the interpretation that the essence must be totally accessible and contained within the experiential grasp of the subject in the manner suggested is contained in Hegel's Science of Logic, "Preface to the Second Edition", especially pp. 36-37 (A.V. Miller translation, George Allen and Unwin, 1969, London).
5 (continued)

The interpretation of Hegel is quite straightforward and illustrative of this point. Since the essential nature of any thing is finally reducible down to cognitive conclusions, it must follow that the thing itself is no more than a cognitive conclusion. Once again, by definition, the essence of an object is that which it really is, its actual nature. Since the essence of an object is cognitive (a universalization), it follows that the object is cognitive and must be subsumed ultimately under the Apriori laws of all cognition.

6. Whitehead stands as a sound alternative to the movements of this tradition with its dependence upon the theory of immanence. In reference to his assertion that a rational universe must be an asymptotic goal rather than the foundation of all sciences (as Husserl asserts), refer to Process and Reality, pp. 4-26 (Macmillan Co., 1967, New York). Of greater importance for this discussion is Whitehead's analysis of the field of evidence, e.g., pp. 223-228 in Adventures of Ideas (Free Press, 1967, New York). I am not suggesting that Whitehead abandons the theory of immanence completely. It would be more accurate to suggest that he simply qualifies it appropriately with the realization of its limitations.

7. This interpretation is presented more in preparation for the explication of transcendental phenomenology than for an accurate historical examination of Cartesian philosophy. The attempt has been made to present an interpretation compatible with that of Husserl on Cartesian philosophy.

The debt of Husserl to Cartesian philosophy is difficult to stipulate since Husserl accepts nothing without important modifications. Basically, the use of Cartesian philosophy terminates with the attainment of the cogito by Descartes. Husserl, however, does not use the method of doubt for this reduction to the cogito, but a modification of it employing the simple suspension of belief. The suspension is purported to contain no prejudice concerning the status of the thing. In addition, he gives considerable employment to the Cartesian demand for clarification of all ingredients of one's conclusions. This is done in his theory of radical sense-investigation (meaning-investigation). For Husserl's own discussion of the distinction between his own philosophy and the original Cartesian philosophy, refer to Cartesian Meditations, especially "Introduction" and the First Meditation.

8. This interpretation of Kant is presented with the same interest in transcendental phenomenology over historical accuracy. (continued next page).
The debt of Husserl to Kantian philosophy is even more difficult to determine because of the dearth of remarks by Husserl on the subject. Husserl appears to represent a Kantian philosopher enlightened by Germanic philosophy after Kant with the resulting modifications in his philosophy. Considerable clarity of Husserl's exact orientation would result from his statements concerning his interpretation of both Hegel and Kant since the fundamental distinctions which would be important are between these two. However, we can note the presence of the following Kantian concepts, albeit ab ovo, within transcendental phenomenology and, in consequence, considerable debt: the transcendental ego, the importance of internal time-consciousness and its function, the use of logic, the self as original unity of apperception, and consciousness as the functioning of synthesis of apperception and consciousness as the functioning of synthesis.

One enlightening note can be derived from the Introduction to Formal and Transcendental Logic where Husserl traces the essentials of the Copernican revolution back to Plato. The justification is the fact that Plato conceived of experienced reality as a reality created through the use of the pure Forms contained within the consciousness (or where-ever). In keeping with many interpretations of the roots of Kant on this subject, Husserl acknowledges Aristotle as the founder of the first true attempt at logic. Husserl considers the only legitimate logic to be one ultimately containing the analytic a priori. This logic, in turn, stipulates the conditions for experience.

The only major point in Husserl's writings which I have located concerning his interpretation of Kant is pp. 146-7=173-4 of the Cartesian Meditations with occasional references throughout this work.

Once again, it is necessary to stress that this is not an attempt to discover the process of Husserl's development or the actual origins of his philosophy (within the history of philosophy). This happens to be an accurate mode of preparation for the considerations to follow.

Husserl recognizes throughout his exposition that transcendental phenomenology is a process of clarification and redefinition of accepted concepts and evidences. For example, he states the theme of his essay RTL as a radical sense-investigation of logic:
"So much by way of a most general characterization of the aim and method of this essay. It is, accordingly, an intentional explication of the proper sense of formal logic" (10=9).

Husserl sums up the work of the more ontological essay, Cartesian Meditations in this manner:

"Thus the investigations concerning the transcendental constitution of the world, which we have roughly indicated in these meditations, are precisely the beginning of a radical clarification of the sense and origin (or of the sense in consequence of the origin) of the concepts: world, Nature, space, time, psychological being, man, psyche, animate organism, social community, culture, and so forth" (154=180).

11. Husserl acknowledges this concept of the transcendental ego in CM:

"The transcendental ego was conceived accordingly as an ego who experiences within himself a world, who proves a world harmoniously" (CM, 136=7=164).

12. The theory of radical sense-investigation is found in FTL pp. 19-26=17-23.

13. This aspect is mentioned in FTL, pp. 22-26=19-23.

14. This is also the point where the synthesis of Kant and Descartes within transcendental phenomenology attains its fruition. The cogito functions as the anchor of all conclusions within a specific and desired type of evidence. The transcendental ego functions as the anchor of objective validity and consistency of the principles of human knowledge. Through the grounding of the transcendental ego in the certainty of the cogito, and the transcendental experience of the transcendental ego in the evidence of the cogito, Husserl has managed to combine the two anchors into one, apparently, unquestionable, anchorage.

15. It is necessary to note that this preliminary view of transcendental phenomenology is intentionally as sympathetic as possible. Although it is evident from even this meager sketch of transcendental phenomenology that the theory of immanence is present, the point is that it is a presupposition and not simply an idea which Husserl acquired from the history of philosophy.
Explications of transcendental phenomenology are almost impossible to write with any accuracy. It always takes on the appearance of a caricature because of the necessary emphasis upon one aspect of this complex philosophy. Language is a linear presentation. The linear presentation of a web of conceptual thought results in a distortion. An excellent balance to this interpretation can be found in Bochenski, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, pp. 129-140 (tr. Nicholl and Aschenbrenner, University of California Press, 1969, Berkeley and Los Angeles). Bochenski deals with more of the logical orientation of transcendental phenomenology and the medieval roots of some of Husserl's concepts.

Marvin Farber's "The Ideal of a Presuppositionless Philosophy" (see pp. 37-57 of *Phenomenology*, ed. Kockelmans Doubleday, 1967, New York) states that Husserl acknowledged the necessary foundation of his philosophy upon the presupposition of idealist interpretation. While such an acknowledgement is compatible with the interpretation of this discussion, it is not significant unless Husserl also recognized the fundamental nature of such a presupposition. If one did not realize the necessary presupposition of the theory of immanence at the root of idealistic presuppositions, one could assume that idealistic presuppositions are experientially evident.

This point must be clear. The suggestion is not, at this point, that I am going to disprove this statement by Husserl by proving that Husserl had ancestors in the philosophical sense. Philosophies do not appear out of the head of Zeus despite Husserl's statement to the contrary (see FRS, he meant it in a distinctly different manner but similar enough sense). Transcendental phenomenology is acknowledged by Husserl to be deeply rooted within the history of philosophy.

My point is that transcendental phenomenology is based upon the systematic development from a fundamental presupposition which stands in need of justification. History enters only as the obvious source of this presupposition.
SECTION ONE

The theory of immanence, as a philosophical presupposition, is essentially a presupposition of a certain type of foundation. In consequence, examination of presupposition of the theory of immanence by transcendental phenomenology properly begins with the examination of the foundation to this philosophy. This foundation is contained within an epistemological consideration known as the problem of cognition.

The problem of cognition is, for Husserl, essentially the problem of rendering intelligible the unity posited between the principles of human knowledge and objective reality by the pre-philosophical claim to objectively valid truth. Pre-philosophically, cognition is interpreted as the mental act of grasping what objectively is:

"... cognition is essentially cognition of what objectively is; and it is cognition through the meaning which is intrinsic to it; by virtue of this meaning it is related to what objectively is" (IF, 15=19).

The problem of cognition occurs with the demand for some type of justification for the legitimacy of this positing of a correlation between the cognition and the thing cognized. In other words, the problem of cognition is the problem of providing a philosophical explanation capable of guaranteeing a constant correspondence between the act and the object in a true cognition:
"Cognition in all of its manifestations is a psychic act; it is the cognition of a cognizing subject. The objects cognized stand over and against the cognition. But how can we be certain of the correspondence between cognition and the object cognized? How can knowledge transcend itself and reach its object reliably? The unproblematic manner in which the object of cognition is given to natural thought to be cognized now becomes an enigma" (IP, 15=20).

In addition, it must be clear that the problem of cognition is not merely the problem of determining whether this correspondence essential to true cognition can be justified. Husserl asserts the position that this correspondence must be rendered legitimate in the face of the absurdity of the only possible alternative, i.e., the scepticism which asserts that cognitions can never grasp transcendent existences. The alternative of this type of scepticism is constantly present as the example of the type of absurdity which will result if the problem of cognition does not find solution:

"We are in constant danger of becoming sceptics, or still worse, we are in danger of falling into any one of a number of scepticisms all of which have, sad to say, one and the same characteristics: absurdity" (IP, 17=21).

Explication of the problem of cognition can continue in a moment, following discussion of what has been presented to this point. The discussion is necessary in order to indicate the presence of the theory of immanence as the underlying presupposition for even the brief explication of the problem of cognition to this point. Since almost all of the presupposition of the theory of immanence to this point is derived from historical sources within the Cartesian tradition,
a large portion of this discussion is similar to the introductory explication of the theory of immanence.

The problem of cognition is basically a problem of philosophical justification for epistemological certainty of cognition. The fact that Husserl is seeking a justification for epistemological certainty rather than conclusions concerning its possibility is evident in his rejection of the alternative of scepticism as absurd. In fact, Husserl appears to interpret the conclusion of epistemological scepticism by any epistemological analysis as the refutation of that analysis in the form of a reductio ad absurdum. In consequence, the problem of cognition is for Husserl a problem of rendering epistemological certainty philosophically intelligible.

The subjective turn indicating the essential presupposition of the theory of immanence is the foundation for any claim to epistemological certainty. This is because the process of its philosophical justification is committed to a reconstruction of reality in accordance with subjective limitations. These subjective limitations are metaphysical restrictions which are essentially present if epistemological certainty is to be intelligible. These limitations result from two important manifestations of the demand for epistemologically certain cognition.

The first of these is the demand that the essence of all experienced objectivities be fully accessible to the cog-
nitive grasp of the subject. The inaccessibility of the essence of any externally existent thing would mean that one could not know the thing with certainty, but only incorrectly through a partial grasp of it. The effect of this manifestation is to limit the meaning of the essence of any experienced thing to simply the meaning which can be cognitively grounded and judged to be present for it. The meaning of the object is determined by a constant reference back into the contents of the self and its epistemological criteria to determine precisely what meaning is legitimate for the object present. The result is that the final meaning given to the experienced thing is the product of cognitive judgement and not a derivation from intuitions.

The second manifestation of the demand for epistemological certainty is the demand that the external world and its contents consistently yield its potential in keeping with the laws of thought. The principles of human knowledge are principles for the potential of any experienced objectivity. If these principles are to have the required epistemological certainty, experienced objectivities must be found to operate in accordance with the laws of thought employed in the deduction and correction of the principles of human knowledge.

This second manifestation of the demand for epistemological certainty is important as the source of the subjective turn. The consequence of the first manifestation has been the
reduction of the objective thing to a cognitive interpretation of the experientially given. The object is now dependent upon the judgements of the subject for its experienced meaning, a meaning which is now the actual meaning of the experienced object. The content of the second manifestation of the acceptance of epistemological certainty has a significant effect in conjunction with the effect of the first manifestation of this acceptance. The second manifestation is fundamentally the demand that any system of metaphysics formulated in conjunction with epistemological certainty posit an experienced world dependent upon the subjective rules of thought. The problem of grounding knowledge upon objective existence has become the problem of grounding experiential existence upon knowledge.

The defense of the accuracy of this interpretation is readily available in Husserl's own statements concerning the ramifications of the problem of cognition and the science of cognition as its solution. The important ramifications for this discussion, and transcendental phenomenology, are the metaphysical ramifications of the science of cognition.19

"Among these [the tasks of a theory of knowledge], there is the problem of explicating the essential meaning of being a cognizable object or, what comes to the same thing, of being an object at all: of the meaning which is prescribed ... by the correlation a priori between cognition and being an object of cognition" (IP, 17-8=22).

This ontological ramification to epistemological investigations can properly be present only with the demand for
the subjective grounding of all ontological concepts. This demand is evident in Husserl's statements concerning the ontological concepts of the natural sciences. According to Husserl, it is only with the attainment of an accurate epistemology, as the basis for ontological interpretations, that an accurate ontology for the natural sciences can be possible:

"Epistemological reflection first brings to light that the sciences of a natural sort are not yet the ultimate science of being. We need a science of being in the absolute sense. This science, which we call metaphysics, grows out of a "critique" of natural cognition in the individual sciences. It is based on what is learned in the general critique of cognition about the essence of cognition and what it is to be an object of cognition of one basic type or other, i.e., in accordance with the different fundamental correlations between cognizing and being an object of cognition" (IP, 18=23).

This statement may not make many facets of my interpretation obviously correct, but it does make it obvious that Husserl thought metaphysics to be grounded within epistemological investigations.

There is one last passage which deserves comment in relation to the demand for epistemological certainty and the necessary relegation of metaphysics in consequence. In the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl extends recognition to my interpretation. This occurs in a passage dealing with the grounds for necessary acceptance of transcendental phenomenology as the only appropriate theory of knowledge. In this passage, Husserl claims that transcendental phenomenology is the only appropriate epistemology because it is the only one which reduces the world to the ultimate form of rationality
through the grounding of all objective existence within the subject:

"Genuine theory of knowledge is accordingly possible only as a transcendental phenomenological theory, which, instead of operating with inconsistent inferences leading from a supposed immanency to a supposed transcendency ... has to do exclusively with systematic clarification of the knowledge performance, a clarification in which this must become thoroughly understandable as an intentional performance. Precisely thereby every sort of existent itself, real or ideal, becomes understandable as a product of transcendental subjectivity, a product constituted in just that performance. This kind of understandableness is the highest imaginable form of rationality" (CM, 85=118).
footnotes

19. For further discussion of transcendental phenomenology as the foundation for an appropriate ontology, refer to CM, 136-139=163-6 and 154-6=180-2.
SECTION TWO

In the preliminary explication of the theory of immanence, the assumption that the meaning of all objective existence was contained within the subject was asserted to be an essential ramification of this theory. The deduction of the theory of transcendental subjectivity from the residue remaining after the reduction of the experienced world in accordance with the demand for the subjective grounding of all ontological concepts is proof of the essential correlation between the theory of transcendental subjectivity and the theory of immanence.

Proof of these statements is relevant to the theme of this discussion because it is also proof of the dependence of the theory of transcendental subjectivity upon the subjective turn of the theory of immanence, as presupposed initially in the problem of cognition. With this in mind, it is quite relevant to begin with the move towards reduction of the experienced world and the consequential deduction of the theory of transcendental subjectivity.

The reduction of the experienced world occurs in accordance with the subjective turn and its demand for subjective groundings. The grounding in question has already been mentioned as one of ontological certainty, a certainty esti-
blished upon the basis of indication of agreement with specific epistemological criteria for the presence of this certainty. The fact that this ontological certainty is essentially founded upon subjective groundings is attested by the nature of this certainty. Ontological certainty is posited as existent in any instance in which the philosophizing ego cannot conceive of the possibility of its non-existence. It would be difficult to uncover an evidential criterion more subjective than this one.

The world, as experienced within the natural standpoint, quite naturally fails to satisfy the demands of these subjective criteria. The important point for the deduction of the theory of transcendental subjectivity is that the experienced world is not eliminated from the field of evidence but retained in a manner modified by its evidential inadequacies. The experiential world has failed to account for the ontological certainty of its asserted being; and, in consequence, it cannot be retained as something which has independent existence. It is retained as essentially modified in relation to its being-status, a being which is now reduced to something which our experience of the world claims to experience:

"The being of the world, by reason of the evidence of natural experience, must no longer be for us an obvious matter of fact; it too must be for us, henceforth, only an acceptance-phenomenon" (CM, 18=58).
section two

Husserl acknowledges that the attainment of this residue of the experienced world is the beginning of the deduction of the theory of transcendental subjectivity:

"At this point, following Descartes, we make the great reversal that, if made in the right manner, leads to transcendental subjectivity: the turn to the *ego cogito* as the ultimate and apodictically certain basis for judgements, the basis on which any radical philosophy must be grounded" (CM, 18=58).

As previously stated, this deduction from the residue is a radical sense-investigation of the residue. The major factor concerning this residue is that it is still constantly presenting itself to the philosopher as before. The only modification is that now the experience of this residue is not considered to be the experience of being, it is present as an experience which is ordinarily accepted as the experience of being. But since the claim that this is an experience of being is a claim which has been shown to be lacking in the appropriate epistemological foundation, this claim is now merely a claim.

"Instead of simply existing for us—that is, being accepted naturally by us in our experiential believing in its existence—the world is for us only something that claims being" (CM, 18=58).

However, according to transcendental phenomenological analysis of this residue, the experience of the world present within the residue has not undergone an essential modification. The experienced world continues to appear within the residue as the same experiences as before. The content is essentially the same. The only significant alteration is in
The being-status accorded to the objects within these experiences. This being-status is now present as a mere claim which holds my acceptance within the natural standpoint.

"Meanwhile the world experienced in this reflectively grasped life goes on being for me (in a certain manner) "experienced" as before, and with just the content it has at any particular time. It goes on appearing as it appeared before; the only difference is that I, as reflecting philosophically, no longer keep in effect (no longer accept) the natural believing in existence involved in experiencing the world—though that believing too is still there and grasped by my noticing regard" (CM, 19-20=59).

The theory of transcendental subjectivity asserts that all meaning given to anything within or apprehended by consciousness must come through the transcendental ego. The evaluation presented here concerning the experienced world as residue of our epistemological demands allows this theory of transcendental subjectivity to be evident to us. The experienced residue is present as something which merely claims being, a claim which must be accepted or rejected by the transcendental ego. Additional examination of the residue will also uncover the transcendental ego's presence as that which must accept or reject the remaining meanings given to the experienced world.

"The epoche can also be said to be the radical and universal method by which I apprehend myself purely: as Ego, and with my own pure conscious life, in and by which the entire Objective world exists for me and is precisely as it is for me. Anything belonging to the world, any spatiotemporal being, exists for me—that is to say, is accepted by me—in that I experience it, perceive it, remember it, think of it somehow, judge about it, value it, desire it, or the like" (CM, 21=60).
The fact that this position is deduced from the demand for the subjective grounding of objective experience is adequate proof of the dependence here upon the theory of immanence.
The justification for transcendental subjectivity presented by Husserl is inadequate. This is the most unsatisfactory element to the development of transcendental phenomenology. It is inadequate because it is not clear concerning the sense in which Husserl is appealing to the doctrine of transcendental subjectivity.

The most intelligible of the suggestions concerning the exact nature of the doctrine of transcendental subjectivity employed in this instance by Husserl is derived from examination of H.J. Paton's interpretation of Kant's use of the theory of transcendental subjectivity (see, H.J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, pp. 549-551, v. 1). This interpretation simply notes that objects are synthetic unities of the various components given to the transcendental ego as the synthesizing agent. In consequence, the object is something which exists for each transcendental ego in the sense that it must be synthesized into the meaning which it exhibits in order to have that meaning. This would be in agreement with the actual metaphysical analysis of the Cartesian Meditations with the indication of the fundamental nature of objects as synthetic unities to transcendental phenomenology. Husserl's analysis of an object as containing manifestations of passive and active genesis, the interpretation of objective horizons, and his adherence to the theory of immanence (otherwise the experienced objects would not be accessible nor would the idealism necessary to this theory be possible) all indicate his total commitment to the interpretation of objective existence as a synthetic unification judged to have a specific unity by the mind.

The only alternative which I know of would be the Hegelian presentation of this which is based upon the idea that each individual thing must be universalized in order to be contained.

But, in other instance, the only proof for either interpretation could be analysis of the actual given of experience. And, in transcendental phenomenology, it would seem inappropriate for this analysis to be drawn from the natural standpoint, which it must. The phenomenological epoche cannot function without this presupposition of transcendental subjectivity.

The only legitimate foundation for this which I can discover is upon the implicit presupposition of the theory of immanence as correct. With this presupposition, the theory of transcendental subjectivity is easily formulated.
SECTION THREE

The foundation of the phenomenological epoche in the subjective turn of the theory of immanence has already been indicated to a great extent. The phenomenological epoche can be simply characterized as the methodology which institutes the modifications essential to reflexive examination of the intentional structures of the transcendental ego. Complete accuracy in its characterization, however, would entail a less exacting statement in consideration of the fact that the phenomenological epoche uncovers and reveals the transcendental ego as intentionally constituting its experienced world. In consequence, it can be more strictly characterized as the methodology of suspension of interest in the experienced world and acceptance of its objective existence in the interest of objectification of the cognitive structures and basic material which ground this acceptance. In other words, it can be characterized as essentially within the empiricist tradition of reduction to and full examination of the subjective evidence in favor of any concept of objectivity traditionally accepted. It is the analysis and clarification of the evidence which, according to the subjective turn, is essential to an accurate concept of any experienced objectivity. 
The fact that the phenomenological epoche itself is based upon the subjective turn is attested by the justification for its operation. In the previous section, on the theory of transcendental subjectivity, the epoche has been indicated as operating on the basis of the demand for apodictic evidence. In the interest of extending insights into the justifications behind the actual operation of the phenomenological epoche, the examination should be extended to the same points within *The Idea of Phenomenology*. In this text, it is more obvious that the phenomenological epoche is based upon the movement towards the subjective grounding of objective experience.

The functioning of the problem of cognition within *The Idea of Phenomenology* has already been established within the first section of this discussion. The problem of cognition is present as the problem from which transcendental phenomenology must move in the direction of solution. The fact that this problem is one of securing a subjective foundation for objective existence has become apparent with the field of acceptable evidence for concepts of objective existence.

The search for the appropriate field of evidence begins with the question concerning the proper characterization of this appropriate field of evidence. It is not simply present for us; and, in consequence, must be examined with its
section three

characteristics in hand for comparison with candidates for this field of appropriate evidence. Obviously, since the demand in question is one for certainty, the field of evidence in question must lack the uncertainty of the concepts which must be grounded:

"This primal cognition must contain nothing of the unclarity and the doubt which otherwise give to cognition the character of the enigmatic and problematic so that we are finally in the embarrassing position of having to say that cognition as such is a problem, something incomprehensible, in need of elucidation and dubious in its claims" (IP, 22=29).

The field of evidence is the residue which Husserl assumes to remain after the application of the epoché. The presupposition of the theory of immanence as the foundation for the interpretation of this residue as the field of evidence becomes apparent with the isolation of its more interesting facets. First, it is necessary to realize that this field of evidence is a field of cognitions:

"However, even if the critique of cognition must not take over any antecedent cognition it still can begin by giving itself cognition, and naturally cognition which it does not base on, or logically derive from, anything else as this would presuppose some other immediate cognition already given" (IP, 26=33).

Secondly, it is essential to realize that this field of purely immanent cognitions is the field of evidence from which all concepts of the transcendent objects are to be given:

"Having assured ourselves of the field of pure cognition, we can now investigate it and start a science of pure phenomena, a phenomenology. Is it not obvious that this must be the basis for the solution to the problems which have been agitating us?" (IP, 36=46).
The point to be derived from these characteristics of the evidence uncovered through the phenomenological epoche is obviously that the phenomenological epoche is motivated by the subjective turn of the theory of immanence. The evidence consists of the sphere of prospective subjective evidence for any concepts of objectivity. The fact that this is a sphere of purely subjective evidence is obvious from the statement of the first characteristic. The fact that all concepts of objectivity are to be solved upon the basis of this grounding is obvious from the second characteristic. Transcendental phenomenology, in consequence, depends fundamentally upon the assertion of the legitimacy of the demand for a subjective grounding of objective experience.

There is an additional point which is evident here and should finally be mentioned. The meaning of all experienced objectivities is to be decided on the basis of this sphere of evidence. The objective meaning is to be drawn from this sphere of data. The obvious conclusion from this point is that the meaning of all objective experience is legitimately characterized as existent within the immanent limitations of the subject. It is obviously an implication of the entire concept of the epoche since otherwise there would be no sense in the methodological gesture of the epoche. If the meaning of an object cannot be decided upon the basis of subjective evidence, there is no reason to reduce to this sphere of evidence.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of a conclusion is to laconically summarize the important points of the discussion. Discussions, being burdened with details and specifications, need such a summary because of the inherent diffusion which always obscures and, sometimes, entombs the important points of the discussion. In keeping with this function, this conclusion represents the attempt at a distinct restatement of the important points of the discussion. But, because of the obscurity of the material, this restatement is not a simple summation of statements made within the discussion. It is the attempt at a new formulation of the important points of the discussion. It is hoped that the statement of these points in new terms will clarify the meaning common to both terminologies.

First, the point to the entire discussion is that Husserl's system of philosophy presents itself as the presuppositionless development from a new, philosophically fruitful field of evidence while, in fact, it represents the systematic development of the ramifications and manifestations of the theory of immanence. Since a complete justification of this interpretation would involve a detailed examination which would vastly exceed the limitations of this discussion, the attempt at a different mode of justification has been made. This mode
of justification rests upon proof that the foundation is essentially dependent upon presupposition of the theory of immanence. Since this foundation contains the methodology and field of evidence of transcendental phenomenology, proof that the foundation rests upon this presupposition is also proof that the methodology and field of evidence rest upon this presupposition. A philosophy is incapable of legitimately deriving conclusions beyond its methodology and field of evidence; and, in consequence, it is legitimate to conclude that proof of presupposition by the foundation of transcendental phenomenology is sufficient proof of presupposition by the entire system. This is the argument emphasized within the discussion.

There is, however, another facet to proof that transcendental phenomenology is the systematic development of the ramifications and manifestations of presupposition of the theory of immanence. Proof of presupposition is inadequate unless it includes proof that this presupposition is fundamental enough to the development of transcendental phenomenology to have this effect. It must be a significant presupposition in the sense of prescribing fundamental and significant restrictions upon the potential development and ultimate conclusions of transcendental phenomenology. The significance of this presupposition is indicated by its explication as a fundamental direction for any potential metaphysics, a direction which prescribes a specific range of consistent conclusions. This has been shown through the indication of the
theory of immanence as a presupposition of considerable ontological importance. The importance of ontological considerations to transcendental phenomenology is evident throughout the discussion of it. The point which is not evident, however, is that this ontological importance is the direct result of the theory of immanence. This point becomes evident through the examination of the metaphysical and epistemological implications of the theory of immanence. This examination will reveal the theory of immanence as containing very specific demands concerning the ontological status of the external world. The importance of these demands for transcendental phenomenology can be indicated by simply restating the interpretation of this philosophy within the discussion. This restatement serves a double purpose since it will also serve as a restatement of the argument for the first point, the conclusion that the foundation of transcendental phenomenology is dependent upon the theory of immanence as a fundamental presupposition. The restatement of the conclusion is presented as this examination in support of the second point, the conclusion that the presupposition of the theory of immanence is a significant presupposition for transcendental phenomenology.

The theory of immanence is so tightly interwoven with epistemological and metaphysical interpretations that it is difficult to say whether it is actually a metaphysical interpretation with epistemological corollaries or an epistemolog-
ical interpretation with metaphysical corollaries. As an interpretation, it is both. Metaphorically speaking, the theory of immanence presents itself to the philosopher in the same manner as an iceberg appears to the mariner. One perceives what appears to be a relatively simple bulk without complications, i.e., the tip of the iceberg. The problem for mariners and philosophers both is that real and metaphorical icebergs share an extremely complicated and vague mass hidden beneath that simple tip.

The metaphorical tip for the theory of immanence is the idea that the mind can determine the actual nature of reality upon the basis of combination of epistemological considerations with the field of evidence deemed appropriate. As previously indicated, this idea, this tip to the metaphorical iceberg, has a very simple and uncomplicated appearance. After all, the idea has its obvious roots in accepted epistemological practices of everyday life. When presented with a conclusion concerning the nature of some thing, e.g., the cat is on the mat, there are accepted epistemological practices for verification of the conclusion. The situation stipulated by the conclusion establishes specific requirements of evidence which must be fulfilled in conjunction with the relevant epistemological considerations. The conclusion is established as asserting something which is true in relation to the thing if this evidential verification is present.
With the philosophical application of this procedure, however, unforeseen complications in the form of necessary implications become apparent. The foremost implication results from the demand for experiential evidence for all metaphysical conclusions. Metaphysical conclusions are, generally speaking, assertions that a specific nature is true of something. It is implicit within the assertion that this nature is true of some thing in the sense that it indicates an actual ingredient of the essential nature of the thing. The initial idea, once again, is that the mind can determine the actual nature of reality upon the basis of combination of epistemological considerations with the field of evidence deemed appropriate by the cognitive decisions of the mind. But, to make this explication even more complicated, the manifestations of this first and foremost implication are also complicated and diverse.

The first manifestation of this implication that all metaphysical conclusions must be grounded within experiential evidence is that the essence of any thing must be completely accessible within experiential sources. The essence or essential nature of any thing consists of the sum of metaphysical conclusions which are true concerning that thing. According to this implication, any assertions about the nature of some thing which are true and, hence, indicate actual conclusions about this nature, must be properly grounded. A proper ground-
ing is one within the experiential evidence established by epistemological considerations as appropriate. This means that the essence of any thing must consist of metaphysical conclusions, each of which are properly grounded within experiential evidence. Any assertion concerning the nature of the thing which lacks this experiential grounding is rejected as groundless. If the essential nature of any thing were not fully accessible through experiential evidence, a contradiction would exist between this conclusion and the demand for an experiential grounding of all metaphysical conclusions. It would mean that a metaphysical conclusion, i.e., that the essential nature of this thing is not fully accessible to experience, would be accepted as true despite the absence of the necessary grounding.

Once again, the initial idea is that the mind can determine the actual nature of reality upon the basis of combination of epistemological considerations with the field of evidence deemed appropriate. The first implication from this initial idea is that all metaphysical conclusions must be appropriately grounded within experiential evidence. The second manifestation of this implication is now the subject of discussion. This second manifestation is the conclusion that all principles of human knowledge claiming objective validity must be grounded within the appropriate experiential evidence. Principles of human knowledge are principles which claim to
dictate metaphysical conclusions concerning the future potential of any thing contained within the proper scope of application of the principle in question. These principles, as conclusions concerning the essential nature, i.e., the potential of things, must be grounded within the appropriate experiential evidence in accordance with the first implication. The absence of such a grounding has been a traditional source of numerous systems of epistemological philosophy both in the interest of deriving the epistemological scepticism which results and attempting to avoid this result. 

In the interest of clarity, it must be noted that there is a contradiction in this manifestation. The contradiction is in the fact that the application of epistemological principles with accepted objective validity has been used to destroy the accepted base for these epistemological principles. In other words, epistemological principles with accepted objective validity are employed to present a problem concerning the necessity for justifying the possibility of any epistemological principles with objective validity. The problem is based upon the conclusion which it either denies or seeks to question.

The final manifestation of this implication that all metaphysical conclusions must be properly grounded within experiential evidence is concerned with the nature of this evidence. The traditional objective of philosophical investigations is truth which is eternal. Since metaphysical con-
Conclusions are true only as long as the evidence is present which legitimizes this truth, it follows that philosophy has the task of discovering evidence as eternal as the truth it seeks to discover. An additional problem is the reflexive effect of the initial demand for the proper grounding of all metaphysical conclusions. The evidence presented as eternally present must contain its own evidence in support of the metaphysical conclusion that this evidence is eternally present. The result is the historically prominent quest for the proper grounding of metaphysical conclusions within evidence which is apodictic.

The second implication from this initial idea is that reality is a judgement product and, hence, cosmologically subordinate to the cognitive structures of the mind. This is a clear implication from the initial idea that the mind determines the actual nature of reality through the combination of epistemological considerations with the field of evidence deemed appropriate. This initial idea clearly means that the essential nature of reality must be judged to be as such. All metaphysical conclusions concerning the essential nature of any thing must be examined in relation to its experiential evidence and its correlation with the relevant epistemological considerations. Any conclusion concerning the essential nature of any thing, therefore, is a conclusion derived from judgements of the mind and based upon its cognitive structures.
The fact that this reality is cosmologically subordinate follows as a consequence of the acceptance of reality as a judging product. Judgements always function upon the basis of the laws of cognition. The judgement is considered correct upon the condition that it has correctly employed these cognitive structures to uncover the judged results. If the essential nature of all things are products of judgement, it follows that these conclusions are derived upon the basis of the cognitive structures of the mind. The epistemological considerations mentioned within the statement of the initial idea are precisely these cognitive structures. And, in addition, these cognitive structures are employed to determine the appropriate experiential evidence. This is all in addition to the actual conclusion which is a judgement that the demanded correlation between these two factors, i.e., the cognitive structures and experiential evidence, is present. The assertion of cosmological subordination of reality to the laws of cognition is simply the assertion that all things within reality must be subject to the laws of cognition. Clearly, if this cosmological subordination were not present, the judgements of the essential nature of any thing would not be legitimate conclusions concerning this essential nature. The legitimacy of the judgement is dependent upon supposition of the applicability of the laws of cognition employed to attain this result. Therefore, all things in reality must be cosmologically subordinate to the laws of cognition.
The third implication from this initial idea is that all things *qua* experienced objects are synthetic unities of the mind. This means that the object commonly thought to be present for us in experience is actually an artificial unity synthesized by the judging processes of the mind. Each ingredient to this unity is a separate metaphysical conclusion concerning the essential nature of the thing. The legitimization of this synthetic unity occurs with another metaphysical conclusion grounding all of these various conclusions as all belonging together essentially within this unity in this manner. It has already been established that all conclusions concerning the nature of reality are a judgement result of the mind. The synthetic unity of experienced objects is a metaphysical conclusion, and, hence, a judgement product. Common suppositions concerning the inherent grounding of this synthetic unity are rejected for a number of reasons, all implications from the initial idea, which makes the supposition of substance unacceptable. The most important of these is the lack of experiential evidence in support of the inclusion of substance as part of the essential nature of any thing. This is not surprising since substance is usually conceptualized as something existing above and beyond each instance of experience of the object. The remaining reasons are concerned with experiential evidence and implications from the initial idea resulting in the grounding of this unity within cognition.
The fourth and final implication from this initial idea is the subsumption of the thing *qua* experienced object into the mind as a cognitive content. This implication becomes possible as a result of the reduction of the thing *qua* experienced object to a mere product of cognitive judgements by the first three implications. The thing *qua* experienced object is commonly assumed to consist of an essential nature inherent within the substance which makes it an external object rather than a mere phantom. The first implication that all metaphysical conclusions must be grounded eliminates the concept of substance from the field of legitimate metaphysical conclusions. Conclusions concerning the essence of the thing are reduced to mere judgements by the second implication that reality is a judgement product. This means that the essential nature of any thing represents the sum of metaphysical conclusions judged to be correct for that thing. The third implication concerning experienced things as synthetic unities removes the unified existence from the thing and reduces it to an artificial synthesis produced by cognitive judgements. The remaining, legitimatized, concept of a thing *qua* experienced object is the concept of a synthetic unity of mental judgements. This means, quite obviously, that the object is merely a mental judgement and, hence, a cognitive content.

However, the objective of this concluding discussion is not primarily the analysis of the theory of immanence as
the combined statement of this initial idea and its implications. The objective is to stipulate the important ramifications of this theory for both epistemological and metaphysical developments of any system resting upon its presupposition. These ramifications can be summed up in the demand for the cosmological subordination of all reality to the cognitive structures of the mind. Epistemologically, this demand is seen in the need for apodictic evidence within the constitution of the self and the demand for a subjective grounding of all metaphysical conclusions. Metaphysically, this is apparent in the necessary subordination of metaphysical considerations to those of epistemology and the subsumption of objective existence into the cognitive structures of the mind.

The result of these metaphysical and epistemological ramifications is the elimination of all ontological potentials except for variations of transcendental idealism. As an ontology, transcendental idealism is the interpretation of all things as mere manifestations of cognitive operations. The essential nature of any thing is interpreted as the materialization of analytic a priori laws of cognition. Reality, in other words, is reduced to a systematic illusion of cognitive operations. The fact that the necessary commitment to this one type of ontological potential is a significant commitment is attested by the absurdity of this ontology in relation to the common sense ontological variations. Transcendental ideal-
ism is not a common sense interpretation. It is an ontology which legitimately exists solely as the ramifications of commitment to the theory of immanence.

The fact of the commitment of transcendental phenomenology to this line of development can be indicated on the basis of the problem of cognition (discussed in section one). The problem of cognition, in the terms of the concluding discussion, is simply the problem of acceptance of the initial idea that the mind can determine the actual nature of reality upon the basis of combination of epistemological considerations with the field of evidence deemed appropriate. The major problem in the path to acceptance of this initial idea is the demand for the cosmological subordination to the rules of cognition. The problem of cognition accepts this demand in the mode of the science of cognition. The science of cognition is simply the examination of the epistemological contents of the mind to determine the ontological basis of the external world. From this point forward, it must be a movement towards working out and grounding each of the implications until the logical conclusion of transcendental idealism is legitimately attained.
The suggestion is not that each philosopher committed to this initial idea immediately realized all of the implications discussed here. To the contrary, the history of modern classical philosophy is the history of working through this idea to precisely these implications. While every philosopher committed to the initial idea necessarily had some insight into some of these implications, this insight was usually limited to the amount necessary to the appropriate functioning of these implications as tools for epistemological development. The majority of these philosophers, however, lacked any sophistication in their grasp of these implications beyond this simple functional level. In contemporary philosophy, of course, there is the example of Husserl as a philosopher who understood almost all of these implications. The only problem with Husserl's grasp is that he failed to see that it was a presupposition, and not a premise which could be automatically assumed upon the basis of some innate legitimacy in consequence of the presence of the premise within everyday epistemological procedures.

By this point, the foremost names of the philosophers in question should be obvious. In case it is not, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Husserl are major figures involved in formulating systems in direct regard to this problem.

Husserl is not unaware of this problem for epistemological scepticism. In the Ideas, Husserl specifically suggests that there exists a contradiction between the conclusion of epistemological scepticism and the procedures by which this conclusion is derived.

Once again, however, Husserl failed to see that this contradiction extended beyond this. The problem itself would not be there without the supposition of this ability for these rules and the demand for this foundation. Husserl avoids this problem by simply stating that the fact of objective validity for human knowledge is a given, the problem of philosophy is to discover the appropriate grounding for them.

'Cosmological subordination' is used in two senses within the discussion. This instance is one of the weaker sense which merely concludes that all things must be governed by the rules of cognition. Analysis of this statement leads to the stronger sense of subordination when it is concluded that all things are not only ruled but contained and immanent from these rules of cognition.
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