

HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY: 1907-1911

By

BRIAN F. KAIN, B.A.

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## PREFACE

The philosophy of Edmund Husserl is not easily characterized by a single phrase or even a few sentences. It has been labelled psychologism, Platonism, subjective idealism, transcendental idealism, realism, phenomenalism, reconstructed empiricism, etc. And according to the aspects of his philosophy which are neglected in interpreting the rest, all such labels are, in part, justifiable. It is undoubtedly true that Husserl's thought underwent important modifications. Eugen Fink, Husserl's assistant in Freiburg, has suggested three main stages in Husserl's philosophical career. It is our contention, however, that such periodization is contributory to a distortion of his philosophy. Aside from his early psychologism, Husserl's thought forms a systematic whole. It is systematic in the sense that his search for the "absolute foundation" of knowledge leads him progressively deeper and deeper into subjectivity.

Nevertheless, one may emphasize different layers of the Husserlian "diggings". We have chosen to examine a relatively small one, viz., the years 1907 to 1911. On the basis of this examination, we hope to portray phenomenology as a method - a metaphysically neutral method whereby "objects" may be brought to clarification through reflecting on their modes of appearance. The period suggested for investigation cannot, however, be quite so neatly cut off. To avoid, as far as possible, a one-sided (mis-)interpretation of Husserl's philosophy, it will be necessary to consider briefly the foundations of phenomenology. Only by re-thinking Husserl's thought can

we hope to understand him. Also in the interest of clarification, we shall not hesitate to refer, both explicitly and implicitly, to his works published after 1911.

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## I.

### PSYCHOLOGISM AND PHILOSOPHY

#### 1. Historical Considerations

It seems a truism that, at least since the sixteenth century, the philosophy of a given period is conditioned and influenced by the leading scientific ideas. Thus, in the 1880's, the rising science of psychology was prominent in conditioning many philosophical thinkers. In England, John Stuart Mill was the most renowned upholder of psychologism; in Germany one may cite Theodor Lipps as a typical representative of those falling under this influence. To such thinkers, philosophical psychologism had a two-fold significance: "It suggested a sure way of solving perplexing problems of logic and the theory of knowledge, and it afforded either a substitute or a supplement to the idealistic standpoint in philosophy."<sup>1</sup> Yet, the psychologism as put forward by these men was an extreme point of view. It is little wonder that an early reaction appeared in the writings of thinkers such as Natorp, Stumpf, Frege, and especially Husserl. If science is to be objective at all, it must be objectively founded. Thus, psychological and/or subjective experiences could not possibly be the sole basis for "deriving" logic and the theory of knowledge. Hence, the mathematician and the physicist were not to look for the ground of the truth of their cognitions in psychology.

The beginnings of Husserl's phenomenology are related directly to

his attack on psychologism. As early as 1895 he was lecturing on the absurdities to be found in such an approach. His celebrated critique and refutation of psychologism was subsequently to form the major part of Volume I of the Logical Investigations (1900) entitled Prolegomena to Pure Logic. But it was not merely the psychological founding of logic alone with which Husserl disagreed. He was just as strongly against "biologism", "anthropologism", traditional subjective idealism, relativism, and/or skepticism. In short, he refused to regard reason as somehow dependent on anything non-rational in character. And the upholders of the latter notion are, in Husserl's wider use of the term, all guilty of "psychologism". Thus, before we consider Husserl's explicit criticisms of psychologism in logic, it may be advantageous to reflect on the nature and sources of psychologism in the wider sense of the term.

Husserl's polemic against the tendency to "psychologize", i.e., the tendency to convert objects of any type into psychological experiences, is similar to Plato's criticism of sophistical philosophy.<sup>2</sup> To Plato, the Sophist is an idol-maker and an imitator of appearance. "Instead of images, directed outward and proportioned to the real paradigm (the work of philosophy), he fashions idols, directed toward himself, and proportioned to his own perspective and faculties."<sup>3</sup> The sophist, like the subjective idealist or the skeptic, lives in a world of his own manufacture. Why is this?

Plato's fundamental epistemological question is 'What is knowledge?'. If we cannot answer this question satisfactorily, then we cannot philosophize at all. Firstly then, we may say that all knowledge must involve at least



two things - a subject or "knower" and an object or thing-known. Of course, there is a relation of some sort between the two. But it must be emphasized that there is always a duality resulting from the separation of knower and known. "The object can never become one with the subject nor the subject with the object; if they united, if they ceased to be two, there would not be knowledge."<sup>4</sup> In short, knowledge is always knowledge of something. What, then, is the relation between subject and object? Clearly, the subject "prehends" the object, it "grasps" or "captures" the object (not bodily, of course, for that would remove the distinction between them) via "thought". Now the problem arises. Does this "capturing" of the object by the subject in any way modify that which is "captured"? Surely the object produces a modification in the subject - a modification we call "thought". But does the subject similarly modify or change the object in the relation? According to how one answers this question, he is classed generally as an idealist or a realist. It is clear what Plato's answer is. "Knowledge is relative to being and knows being as it is."<sup>5</sup> Thus, the philosopher's knowledge is determined by the object; whereas the Sophist's "knowledge", and/or the object of his knowledge, is determined by himself, by the subject. In short, the Sophist is guilty of "psychologism". "Removing reality to a distance by 'logical' and 'epistemological' difficulties, he is then free to substitute distorted 'idols' of his own making for images truly representing things as they are."<sup>6</sup>

Generally speaking, psychologism results from a failure to distinguish clearly between the object-known and the act or psychological processes by which it is intended or known. The distinction between the act and the

object of knowledge was clearly recognized by Plato: "Every sentence must have and cannot help having a subject . . . and a certain quality."<sup>7</sup> For Plato, when a sentence or thought has the quality of being true, it must be a description of that which is, and as it is. A false sentence speaks of things which are not, and as if they were. Thus, true knowledge is the agreement or concurrence of thought with that which is, with reality. This is not to say that such agreement or harmony is the criterion of truth; rather, this harmony is the essence of truth. Coincidence of thought and object is truth. "It is not the touchstone through which we discover if knowledge is true or not, but it is the requisite for any knowledge to be true. . . . When knowledge does not agree with the thing, it is not that we have a false knowledge; it is that we have no knowledge. The knowledge we will call true or genuine knowledge is the one in which thought concurs with the object."<sup>8</sup> The harmony of thought and object renders "the truth of knowledge" possible.

These considerations will be important in our understanding of Husserl's pure phenomenology.<sup>9</sup> Now, however, we must emphasize again the intentional structure discernible in every type of knowing. That is, all "knowledge situations" are analyzable into act and object. And it is not the case that the former is a "cause" of the latter. Berkeley's refusal to recognize the distinction between idea and thing led him to the extreme position of asserting that "to be is to be perceived". The distinction is also absent in Hume and led him to his ultimate skeptical conclusions. He and the whole empirical tradition stemming from him are subject to Husserl's critique of psychologism.

Hume and Mill made logic relative to psychology; they made it dependent upon something other than reason. According to Mill, logical statements are nothing more than familiar generalizations from experience about the way people think. "Thought-processes - not 'objectives', 'states of affairs', or any other kind of 'superempirical' entity - constitute the subject-matter of logic. Thus Theodor Lipps had said: 'Logic is either the physics of thought or it is nothing at all'."<sup>10</sup> As was noted above, one of the more serious consequences of this view is its implication of skeptical relativism. Man, in all his instability, is made the measure of everything. This was as unacceptable to Husserl as it was to Plato.<sup>11</sup> And again, it arises from the same confusion; viz., a failure to distinguish between the acts of judging, proving, concluding, etc., and those things which are judged, proven, concluded. The former are forms of psychic activity; the latter are not. And, it should be noted, the latter determine the former, not vice versa. Undoubtedly, the subjective feeling of truth has many psychological requirements. But the satisfaction of such requirements is dependent upon that which presents itself, upon the object of knowledge. Thus the subjective feeling of truth cannot be wholly dependent upon the knower. Consequently, the study of logic, for example, cannot be restricted to an investigation of the knower, of the "physics of thought". It must also include an investigation of logical objects, of the ideal structure of logical entities.

One of the earliest definitions of psychologism was given by Orestes Brownson: "Pure, unmitigated psychologism asserts the subject as its own object, or at least as furnishing its object, from its own resources, independently of the real order of objective truth."<sup>12</sup> One can see that

not only logical and psychological considerations are involved, but also, and underlying the internal contradictions of psychologism are misconceptions of an ontological nature. From the quotation above, it is evident that the object loses all importance in comparison with the subject. But this is a result of a more fundamental mistake. Subject and object, mind and nature are at first radically separated. This initial bifurcation subsequently leads to unintelligible "solutions" as to the manner in which they interact. The gulf between subject and object thus opens the way for the Sophist to substitute his distorted "idols". The unity of the world (i.e., the correlation between subject and object) is finally forced into an idealistic mould wherein the object "disappears". "Instead of being regarded as matter to be understood, things are formalized or hypostatized into unknowable noumena. Instead of being regarded as the capacity to understand, reason is hypostatized into 'the mind' which can only 'create' phantasms of its own. Agent and patient are falsely substantialized into 'things in themselves', and the bond of potency between them is broken."<sup>13</sup>

We noted at the outset of this section that philosophers have often accepted uncritically the methodology of a particular science and allowed that methodology to condition their own. The claim is often made that experience and observation must be our sole teachers.<sup>14</sup> And, of course, all knowledge is "derived" from experience of one type or another. But this is not to say that experience is the final sounding board for all knowledge. Empirical observation cannot, for example, justify our knowledge of knowledge itself.<sup>15</sup> This latter type of knowledge, traditionally called 'philosophical knowledge', is of a different order than our knowledge

of the "world of facts". Consequently, philosophy, conceived as the science of sciences, is not on the same level as the "natural" sciences. It cannot be restricted to empirical facts alone.

Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them. . . . Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science. . . . Darwin's theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis in natural science. . . . Philosophy sets limits to the much disputed sphere of natural science.<sup>16</sup>

## 2. Husserl's Critique of Psychologism

In the Logical Investigations, Husserl was not directly concerned with psychologism in the wider sense as outlined in our historical considerations. His early training had been in the field of mathematics and he had come to psychology and philosophy with the hope that he might find therein the answers to "pressing problems" about the origin of fundamental mathematical concepts. His first major work, The Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891), which, incidentally, was dedicated to Franz Brentano,<sup>17</sup> was an attempt to derive the concepts of mathematics from certain psychological acts. This work proved unsatisfying, however, as he was unable to reconcile the objectivity of mathematics with a psychologistic or subjective foundation. His own uneasiness, coupled with Gottlob Frege's devastating criticism,<sup>18</sup> finally compelled him ". . . to retract completely my philosophico-mathematical studies until I had succeeded in advancing to sure clearness in the fundamental questions of epistemology and in the critical understanding of logic as a science."<sup>19</sup> It was, in effect, an abrupt about-face for, having

realized that logic and psychology were fundamentally different, he abandoned his earlier psychologistic derivation of mathematical concepts. It is natural, then, that the Prolegomena should "prepare the way for a new conception and treatment of logic" by showing the inadequacies in the hitherto prevailing psychologistic theories.<sup>20</sup>

At the risk of repeating several observations made in Section One of this chapter, we may find it profitable to consider Husserl's case against logical psychologism. His method is twofold: a depiction of the absurdities inherent in any such view and an explication of the erroneous psychologistic prejudices.

Husserl contends that any theory which makes truth<sup>21</sup> dependent upon "natural" or real being (as opposed to ideal or non-temporal being) is a relativistic theory. And, he argues, any theory which is relativistic loses sight of the very meanings of 'true' and 'false'. The "psychologizers", for example, suggest that truth is dependent upon a certain being or a certain species. They assert the possibility that what is true for one species may not be true for another. Yet the very significance of the word 'true' lies in the fact that that which is true cannot, at the same time, be false. Or, on a different plane, that which is is and cannot (at the same time) not be, nor can it be that which it is not. If the relativist claims that the meaning of truth is different for differently constituted species (e.g., what humans mean by 'tree' is 'virtue' for a zukur), then the dispute is merely verbal. If, on the other hand, the words 'true' and 'false' mean the same for both zukors and humans, then the same fundamental principles of logic are applicable, for it is these fundamental principles (e.g.,  $\sim(p \cdot \sim p)$ )

which contribute to the meaning of the words as we understand them. Consequently, if one asserts a psychologistic or relativistic theory, one necessarily asserts an inconsistent theory.<sup>22</sup>

Husserl cites three main prejudices on which the psychologizers customarily base their arguments.

(a) Since ideas, judgments, inferences, etc., are psychic phenomena; and since these phenomena are the subject-matter of logic; then logic must be based upon the psychology of knowledge. This argument, according to Husserl, is founded on an equivocation of terminology. No one can deny that ideas, judgments, and so forth are psychical phenomena in that they have a psychological origin. But the same terms are loosely used in referring to "judgment-contents", "ideal-meanings", or propositions. These concepts, i.e., that about which one judges, are entirely ideal in character. "Just as mathematics does not deal with our operations of counting but with numbers, . . . its 'sister-study, logic' is not concerned with the operations in which we form concepts, judgments, and inferences."<sup>23</sup> The proper subject-matter of logic is, therefore, the ideal entities about which one judges.

(b) Logical principles are only rules or "norms" which govern valid thinking. Since thinking is a psychological process, the rules must be derived or related to our factual psychological constitution. Husserl points out, however, that such norms rest on the ideal structures which are directly apprehended as true or false. Such structures may be used as norms but this is not to say that they are norms. Hence, any truth can be relevant for rules of thinking. "Psychological laws enter only where such rules are technical instructions adjusted particularly to human nature."<sup>24</sup>

(c) The third prejudice of psychologism is one which we have dealt with in Section One; viz., that logic deals with truth and truth is related to evidence which is a special (psychological) feeling. Husserl argues that this is to confuse and misrepresent the nature of evidence and truth. Self-evidence arises only when one apprehends or has insight into "truth". The relation of logical propositions to the experience of evidence is only possible through application. "The evidential propositions arising thus retain their a priori character, and the conditions of evidence which they express are not psychological or real conditions."<sup>25</sup> For Husserl, evidence is the coincidence between judgment and that which is, between what is meant and what is given (either as a real or an ideal object).<sup>26</sup> In short, the psychological feeling of certainty arises only when there is an agreement between meaning and that which is meant, only when there is an apprehension of the independent validity of an ideal structure. Just as genuine knowledge of the spatio-temporal world is dependent upon the agreement between thought (or intention) and "real" object, so too, genuine knowledge of ideal entities is dependent upon the agreement between thought and Idea. Husserl calls this agreement "evidence". It is not a psychological feeling (although, to be sure, it is accompanied by a feeling of certainty). It is evident, then, that where there is no "truth" (taken as an ideal entity), there can be no evidence and, of course, no genuine knowledge.<sup>27</sup> In summary, logic is concerned with evidence not qua feeling but rather as the character of knowledge as such. The possibility of the feeling of certainty is dependent upon evidence itself.



### 3. The Conception of a Pure Logic

It is evident from the above that, for Husserl, the totality of that which is is not exhausted by real or empirical objects. Both real and ideal objects exist. (Or, perhaps, one would be more correct in saying that ideal objects "subsist"). The psychologizers had overlooked ideal objects and, in particular, the ideality of truth. Empirical psychology participates in the foundation of logic only insofar as it studies the psychical phenomena related to concrete acts of judging, etc. The content of logic and the concepts related to such ideal species belong to the sphere of pure logic. "Truths" and the laws about them are not temporally determined facts. Nor are they "grasped" in the same manner as is an empirical fact. Certainly we experience truth; but such experiences are acts of ideation founded upon intuition or, as Husserl calls them, acts of insight.

Corresponding to the fundamental objective-ideal difference between law and fact is a subjective difference in the mode of the experience. . . . If we had never experienced the consciousness of rationality as characteristically different from that of factuality, we would not have the concept of a law, and could not distinguish it from a fact. Laws as ideal truths are known by us in an apodictically evident manner, as distinguished from the knowledge of matters of fact.<sup>28</sup>

Husserl, then, is concerned with the ideal elements and laws which found the objective validity of knowledge in general; i.e., that which makes possible the various sciences (including logic in the usual theoretical-practical sense). In his own words:

Pure logic is the scientific system of ideal laws and theories which are grounded purely in the sense of the ideal categories of meaning; i.e., in the fundamental concepts which are the common estate of

all sciences, because they determine in a most general manner that which makes sciences in an objective sense to be sciences at all, namely, unity of theory. In this sense, pure logic is the science of the ideal 'conditions of the possibility' of science in general, or of the ideal constituents of the idea of theory.<sup>29</sup>

To be sure, the idea of a pure logic was anything but new. Husserl cites Kant, Herbart, Lotze, Leibniz, and Bolzano as his predecessors in the attempt to formulate the theory of theories or science of sciences. It was his life-long conviction that all empirical sciences and even "methodological" logic were valid only to the extent of their dependence upon the ideal elements and laws of pure logic. And, unlike his predecessors, he was to spend the whole of his philosophic career in digging down to the ultimate foundation of knowledge.<sup>30</sup> "This conception of the task of philosophy also accounts for the characteristic mixture of pride and humility with which Husserl referred to his final ambition as that of being a 'true beginner'."<sup>31</sup>

Pure logic, then, is the theory of sciences. It is that which gives them unity as sciences. It also has the further peculiarity of being subject to the content of its own laws. "The elements and theoretical connections of which it consists, as a systematic unity of truths, are subject to the laws which belong to its theoretical content. The science that refers to all sciences with respect to their form eo ipso refers to itself."<sup>32</sup>

One can readily see the importance which Husserl attached to a correct development and understanding of pure logic.<sup>33</sup> We have considered, however, only the "formal" aspect of the science of sciences. And every science can be considered from two points of view; viz., subjectively (or psychologically, i.e., with respect to the ways in which we, as humans,

experience data) and objectively (i.e., with respect to the content or subject-matter). We have so far been concerned with the latter point of view in our discussion of pure logic. But the ideal entities and states of affairs of pure logic can only be given to us in experiences. How can one have an absolutely objective foundation if subjective considerations are involved? Certainly, they cannot be ignored, for that would leave the content of pure logic hanging unsuspected, so to speak. What is required, then, is a "psychological" description of these experiences which is yet "objectively" founded. This new objective approach to the subjective side of pure logic Husserl termed 'phenomenology'. He outlines the necessity of such an approach and its nature in the following way:

A sufficient clarification of pure logic, hence a clarification of its essential concepts and theories, of its relation to all other sciences and of the way in which it regulates them, requires very far-reaching phenomenological (i.e., purely descriptive-, not genetic-psychological) and epistemological investigations. One can say that this task of an epistemological elucidation of logic coincides in the main with the critical elucidation of thinking and knowing in general, hence with epistemology itself.<sup>34</sup>

The objectivity of phenomenology arises from the fact that its descriptions are not of the actual experiences corresponding to logical laws but rather of the ideal types of logical experience corresponding to ideal logical laws and entities. "Once this had been achieved, philosophy would be in a position to account epistemologically for our supposed knowledge of the logical entities and evaluate its claims, by showing the adequacy or inadequacy for their task of the basic types of our experiencing acts."<sup>35</sup>

## II.

### STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF MEANING AND KNOWLEDGE

#### 1. Introductory Remarks

It was indicated in the concluding remarks to Chapter I that the development of a pure logic, a science of sciences, must involve the clarification of the fundamental experiences in which the ideal laws and entities are given. Husserl's second volume of the Logical Investigations is devoted primarily to this task. The Prolegomena and the investigations themselves are thus complementary. The former asserts the existence of ideal objects and defends their objectivity against psychologism while the latter attempt to clarify the foundations of thinking and knowing in general. Indeed, the correlative nature of the subjective act and objective referent is one of the most important and all-pervasive notions in Husserl's whole philosophy. His method of clarification of objective entities is primarily a clarification of their modes of givenness. And as we shall see, to be an object at all is, for Husserl, to appear as the object of certain acts.

This "subjective" aspect of Husserl's philosophy is not, however, a re-lapse into psychologism. Pure phenomenology is a discipline which describes the fundamental knowledge-experiences basic to empirical psychology and all other sciences. It

has to do with the experiences that can be grasped and analyzed in intuition in their essential generality, but not with empirically apperceived experiences as real matters of fact, as experiences of experiencing people or animals in the appearing world, posited as a matter of fact of natural experience. The essences directly grasped in essential intuition, and the connections based solely upon the essences, are brought to expression descriptively in concepts of essence and lawful statements of essence. Every such statement is an a priori one in the best sense of the term.<sup>1</sup>

The essences here spoken of are approached through reflection upon the intentional experiences of the phenomenologist. Such reflection, i.e., upon the immediate data of experience, provides the ultimate touchstone for the validity of his analyses. This is the meaning of the familiar phenomenological war-cry "back to the things themselves". Fundamental principles must be "seen" rather than constructed. And they must be seen as they present themselves rather than in the light of unexamined presuppositions. Phenomenological "intuition" not only leads us to the discovery of essential structures but also provides us with the evidence of their truth. To be sure, the phenomenological mode of "seeing" is not as natural as seeing in the sense of perception of the external world. Special techniques, e.g., the reductions, are often necessary in order to avoid error. But this does not detract from the radical authority of intuition. "The realm of ideas which is thus disclosed is finally referred back to the subjectivity of consciousness, which is 'the primal field of everything a priori'."<sup>2</sup>

One can clearly see the similarity between the main problem facing Husserl in the Logical Investigations and the so-called "traditional" problem of knowledge. How can objectivity be encountered (or constituted)

in subjectivity? What is the relationship between knowing and object known? How can an independent object enter into a subjective experience? This is not to question the fact that we do encounter objectivity. That is evident. But the 'how' requires clarification.

The fact, that is to say, that all thinking and knowing relates to objects or facts whose unity relative to the variety of real or possible thought acts is just 'unity in variety', is therefore of an ideal character; the further fact, that in all thinking there inheres a thought form which is under ideal laws and certainly under laws which circumscribe the objectivity or ideality of knowledge - these facts, I say, constantly reawaken the questions: how the 'in itself' of objectivity may become an idea, therefore to some extent may become subjective again; what it means for the object to exist 'in itself' and to be 'given' in knowledge; how the ideality of the universal as concept or law can enter into the stream of real psychical experiences and can become the epistemological property of the thinking being; what the cognitive 'adequation of the thing to the intellect' signifies in various cases, according as the cognitive 'comprehension' concerns a particular or a universal, a fact or a law, and so on.<sup>3</sup>

It is this "traditional" problem which lies at the heart of the Investigations, and indeed, which really determines the evolution of Husserl's phenomenology. As we have indicated above, his life-long philosophical enterprise consisted in digging deeper and deeper into subjectivity in order to secure the realm of objectivity. At this period of Husserl's investigations then, there is little, if any, distinction to be made between the terms 'phenomenological' and 'epistemological'. Phenomenology is epistemological not in the sense of explaining knowledge genetically but rather in describing and clarifying the essential structures of the experiences of meaning and knowledge. In connection with the problems of pure logic, it will lay bare the origins of fundamental concepts and ideal

laws. Only by returning to "the things themselves", e.g., 'truth', 'proposition', 'judgment', etc., can we hope to understand what they really mean and thereby arrive at a satisfactory determination of the laws of pure logic. Thusly may we avoid the pitfalls of confusion which lead to psychologism.

In order to take nothing for granted, however, Husserl begins his Investigations with an analysis of 'meaning' itself. Theoretical thinking and knowing occur within the context of statements and expressions which are meaningful. Before considering the concepts of pure logic themselves, we must, therefore, analyze the more primordial level of meanings.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. Expression and Meaning

In any meaningful utterance, we may distinguish between the act(s) which forms the word or physical sign and the act(s) which contributes meaning to the word or constitutes the meaning itself. We have, then, two distinct acts which may be further analyzed. The former, however, is of only secondary importance. It is the meaning itself and its constitution which we are interested in. That this is so can be seen upon reflecting that there can be meaning without expression.

What can be said of the meaning situation itself? Husserl finds that it is tripartite in nature. He distinguishes between (a) the acts of meaning-giving and meaning-fulfilling; (b) the content of the acts, or the meaning or sense conveyed; and (c) the reference to an objectivity or the object-meant. Acts which endow meaning (meaning-intentions) are not necessarily accompanied by a perception or image. They may be intuitively "empty".

Thus, we may distinguish between meaning-intentions and meaning-fulfilling acts. The former are essential if there is to be meaning at all. Meaning-intentions always refer to or "point to" an object, whether real or imagined. The object-meant, as noted above, need not be given intuitively, however. Those who insist upon the contrary are unable to account for purely symbolic thought.

The distinction between (b) and (c), i.e., between the content of the meaning and the object-meant is revealed by the fact that different meanings may refer to the same object; and conversely, that two expressions may have the same meaning while referring to different objects. The distinction between (a) and (b), i.e., between the acts of meaning and the content of meaning is equally evident upon consideration of any proposition. The meaning-intentions may be repeated innumerable by one or many people whereas the meaning itself has (or is) an ideal unity.

Take, e.g., the statement the three altitudes of a triangle intersect in one point. Essentially "the same" statement may be repeated because it is the form of expression for the identity that is called its meaning. The actual act of judging and the person who asserts the judgment have no place in this identical meaning, which can be brought to evident consciousness by repetition of the statement at all times. By means of this statement we gave expression to a fact of whose validity we felt assured. The fact itself is what it is whether we assert its validity or not; it is a valid unity in itself. My act of judgment is a transient experience which arises and passes away; but not that which the statement asserts, the content that the three altitudes of a triangle intersect in one point. That which is asserted in a statement is not something subjective but is always the same.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, the essence of an expression lies in its ideal meaning.



Meanings are ideal in the sense that they themselves do not change. To affirm the ideality of meanings, however, is not to hypostatize them à la Plato. Their objective ideality is merely a phenomenological "fact" which can be clearly seen by all. And as noted above, that which can be "seen" directly, that which is "originally given", that which can be experienced in "direct observation" is, for Husserl, indubitable. He is not concerned with theoretical (metaphysical-epistemological) constructions which attempt to infer or deduce the ontological status of what is given. "That which is seen cannot be explained away, and is the final standard in all truly philosophical thought."<sup>6</sup> Self-evidence is the final authority on questions of knowledge.

We have been speaking of meanings in general and of the relative importance of the meaning-endowing acts. But it is obvious that we do not "live" in a world of meanings. Ordinarily, our attention is focused upon the objects-intended or the objects-meant. All meaningful expressions are directed to objects that are meant. Thus, a meaningful act is an "objectivating" act. This reference to an object is constituted in the meaning. That is, an expression signifies or names the object by means of its meaning. "To use an expression with meaning, and to refer to or to present an object, are one and the same thing. It does not matter if the object exists or is fictive in character."<sup>7</sup> Meaning itself, however, (i.e., the sense of an expression) is not to be identified with the object-meant. If that were the case, then expressions like 'The present king of France' would be meaningless.

Finally, we may note that while all meaningful expressions are

objectivating, they are not all objective. A "subjective" or occasional meaning is such that its actual meaning is dependent upon the circumstances of its expression. For example, questions, wishes, and commands must be oriented with respect to the speaker. Nevertheless, Husserl considers them to be objectivating acts because they "bear" or carry the object of the meaning of the expression, i.e., the speaker's wishing or wondering. They are, in addition, not "subjective" with respect to meaning qua meaning but only insofar as there are changes in the subjective acts of meaning. "It would be wrong to conclude that meanings are divided into objective and subjective varieties. The content which is meant by a subjective expression, whose meaning is related to a particular occasion, is an ideally unified meaning in just the same sense as the content of a fixed expression. This is shown clearly by the circumstance that it is ideally possible to replace every subjective expression, with the identical retention of the meaning-intention belonging to it at the moment, by objective expressions."<sup>8</sup>

By examining the relationships between expression and meaning, we have begun to clarify the foundation of pure logic. Logic deals with the ideal unities of meaning or meanings-as-such.

If all given theoretical unity is according to its nature unity of meaning, and if logic is the science of theoretical unity in general: then it is evident that logic must be the science of meanings as such, of their essential kinds of differences, just as of the pure laws based on them (and therefore ideal). For to those essential differences belong also those between objective and objectless, true and false meanings, and to these laws therefore also the pure 'laws of thought', which express the a priori connection of the categorical form of the meanings and their objectivity or truth.<sup>9</sup>

### 3. Intentionality and Intuition

In Section 2 we have considered some of the more obvious distinctions in the realm of expression and meaning. Our purpose has been little more than to familiarize the reader with the general direction of Husserl's thought so as to present a framework for the investigations to follow. The question of meaning led us to analyze the nature of meaningful acts. The latter were found to be objectivating or intentional acts. We must now analyze somewhat more carefully the nature of intentionality itself. Husserl's investigations concerning intentionality are the most important ones to be found in the Logical Investigations with regard to our understanding of phenomenology in general.

It is well known that Husserl's doctrine of intentionality may be traced back to his teacher Brentano. The latter held that all conscious acts involved consciousness of something; and, furthermore, that the "something" (i.e., the object of consciousness) was immanent in the act. Husserl, however, while retaining the term 'intentionality', rejected Brentano's notion of immanent objectivity. Consciousness, rather than being enclosed within itself, always involves reference to an object which is "out there", so to speak. In other words, the relationship of consciousness to object is not simply a relation between two "internal" factors. Such a doctrine would inevitably lead back to psychologism. We are conscious of objects, not merely of some effect which they make upon our senses. Brentano's doctrine of immanent objectivity implies not the intention of an object but rather the intention of the idea of an object. But if this is all we could be aware of, there would in fact be no objective knowledge

at all. Thus, the object intended must be other than a real part of the act of intention. And it is precisely the function of the act of intention to establish the object of consciousness as an object. This function, the role of intentionality in constituting objectivity is the main problem to be considered in this thesis. It is, as we have noted above, the question with which Husserl was concerned throughout his philosophical career. We cannot discuss objectivity apart from the experiences in which objects are presented to us; for all objects, and their relations, are what they are for us only through those very objectivating acts themselves. "Simple" objectivating acts are therefore the basis for all other intentional acts. "Every intentional experience is either an objectivating act or has such an act as 'foundation', i.e., in the latter case, it necessarily has an objectivating act as a component part in itself. . . ." <sup>10</sup> It is of utmost importance, then, that we analyze the nature of such acts.

An objectivating or intentional act, Husserl argues, is comprised of two components, a "quality" and a "material". The quality characterizes the act as a particular type, e.g., as an act of imagining, or judging, or remembering, etc. The matter of an act is that which refers the act to a specific object. That matter and quality may be distinguished is evidenced from the fact that two acts may have the same material content while differing in character or, conversely, that two acts may be of the same quality while referring to different objects. Thus, for example, 'The moon is made of green cheese' and 'A unicorn has four legs' are expressions which have a different matter but are alike insofar as they are both judgments. Conversely, 'Is any tree green?' and 'There is a green tree' are expressions

of different quality having the same intentional objectivity. There is, however, an intimate relationship between matter and quality. The quality of an act would be unthinkable if the material content were absent.

It was noted above that "every intentional act is either an objectivating act or has such an act as its foundation". We have seen that all intentional acts have both a quality and a material. In the case of a simple objectivating act, the quality is merely that of presentation. The represented object is neither posited (as existing) nor believed (as true or false); it is merely presented. All other types of intentional acts are founded upon such simple objectivating acts. In order to be judged, desired, etc., an object must be first presented. However, when a simple objectivating act lends itself as a foundation for another type of act, only the matter of the original act is taken over by the new one. In short, the new act quality is grafted upon the act material of the original objectivating act. "Judgment does not consist in the act of belief plus the mere understanding or representation of the proposition. The mere understanding has given place to a totally new act, directed towards the same matter though."<sup>11</sup> Thus, acts of supposedly greater complexity, e.g., the judgment that S is P, can be accomplished through one "unifying ray" of meaning rather than through a series of multiple steps.

The question arises of the role of sense-data in the structure of an intentional act. Husserl claims that sensations serve as "carriers" in acts of intentionality. Obviously, we intend objects, not sensations. We therefore cannot equate the two. "I do not see color sensations but colored things; I do not hear sound sensations but the song of the singer."<sup>12</sup>

Sensations, then, are non-intentional. Objects are perceived "through" them. Husserl states: "The presentation . . . in perception comes about through the following: the experienced complex of sensations is animated by a certain act character, by a certain apprehending or intending. When this happens the perceived object appears. . . ." <sup>13</sup> Thus, sensations undergo an interpretation or process of apprehension resulting in our knowing the object itself. "It will be immediately understood that the same thing that, in reference to the intentional object, is called presentation (a perceiving, imagining, or representing intention towards it), is called apprehension, interpretation, or apperception in reference to the sensations which really belong to the act." <sup>14</sup> Sensations are animated by intentional acts and, at the same time, function as "representants" through which the object is given. Since it is the object which is perceived, Husserl uses the term 'experienced' for our awareness of sensory data. "Thus the sensations, and likewise the acts which 'apprehend' or 'apperceive' them, are experienced, but they do not appear objectively; they are not seen, heard, or perceived with some 'sense'. On the other hand, the objects appear, they are perceived, but not experienced." <sup>15</sup>

We may note again that an intentional act is either an objectivating act or has such as its foundation. Where there is meaning, there is always an object meant. We have used the term 'constitution' for the process by which the object is established as an object. And it has been suggested that although sensations play some role in the determination of an object, that role is more passive than active. They act merely as a "raw material" (later to be called by Husserl "hyletic data") which becomes "animated" by

the intentional act. The essence of "objectivation", consequently, lies in the intentional moment of the act and not in the sensory data. Thus, objects are somehow constituted by a subjective activity. "Objects that we are 'conscious' of are not simply there in our consciousness as though in a box, so that one could simply find them there and reach for them. Rather they are only constituted in various forms of objective intention, as that which they are and that which they signify for us."<sup>16</sup> The question may therefore be raised of how something transcendent to consciousness is nevertheless constituted subjectively. Husserl answers that the object is formed out of a series of "partial intentions" which coalesce to form a simple act. The "partial intentions" are none other than the series of sensory representants which carry the act as a whole. For example, when I look at an object, say a box, "I continually see this one and the same box however it may be twisted and turned. Thereby I have continuously the same 'conscious content' - if I wish to characterize the perceived object as conscious content. With each twist I have a new conscious content if I, in a much more appropriate sense, so characterize the experienced contents. Hence very different contents are experienced, and yet the same object is perceived. Moreover the experienced content, speaking generally, is not itself the perceived object. . . . It is to be noticed that the being or non-being of the object is irrelevant for the real nature of the perceptual experiences."<sup>17</sup> Thus, intentionality functions in a perceptual act to integrate or synthesize the series of representants (and the corresponding series of object-profiles) into the object which is given. It can be seen (and this will be shown somewhat more fully in Chapter Four) that the

constitution of perceived objects is process-like. It involves a certain temporal lapse. "Constitution is the result of an intentional process, and not simply the result of the presence of a structural element, apprehension, in intentionality."<sup>18</sup>

In Section 2 we mentioned that there is a definite distinction to be made between meaning-conferring acts (or intentions) and meaning-fulfilling acts (or intuitions). It was established that the essence of meaning lies in the intentions. An expression can be meaningful even in the absence of an intuitive presentation of the object. This is most obvious in the case of symbolic thought wherein the sensory content (i.e., the presentation of the symbol) is no more than a sign. Husserl insists that the act of meaning or intending does not lie in perception.

" Perception . . . does not itself constitute meaning, not even a part of it."<sup>19</sup> Conversely, although all meaningful acts refer to an object-meant, the meaning intention itself does not have the character of a picture. There is then an important distinction to be made (as was briefly indicated in Section 2) between signification or meaning-intention and intuition or meaning-fulfilment. The essence of meaning itself lies unmistakably in the former. Nevertheless, intuition is of no small importance for it contributes the element that is essential for knowledge.

Whereas thinking consists in the meaning-intending act, knowing consists in the appropriate fulfilment of the meaning intention. So long as the meaning intention is not fulfilled, we do not have knowledge. Knowledge is an intuitive apprehension of what otherwise was only symbolically thought of. And yet the symbolic thought was meaningful. A satisfactory theory of meaning should bear this in mind, and should not confuse between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment. This latter confusion is . . . the chief error of all imagism and verification-theories.<sup>20</sup>



It is this aspect of Husserl's phenomenology of knowledge - the notion of meaning-fulfilling acts or acts of intuitive apprehension - which is in the tradition of empiricism and which compares favorably with all that is best in positivistic theories. Since this notion is essential for our understanding of Husserl's conception of knowledge, we must consider carefully what it involves.

We have argued that it is not always the case that a meaning-intention is fulfilled. An act of meaning may be merely symbolical, signitive, or "empty". This is not to say, however, that the meaning-intention is indefinite or indeterminate. Rather, meaning-intentions, being objectivating acts, always have a specific sense and a correspondingly specific object-meant. Thus, the difference between a "mere" intention and an intuition is not reference to an object. The essential difference lies in the fact that whereas in a meaning-intention the object is "merely" meant, in an act of intuition, the object is constituted as "given".

"Where the meaningful intention is fulfilled on the basis of a corresponding intuition, in other words, where the expression is referred to a given object in actual naming, there the object is constituted as 'given' in certain acts."<sup>21</sup> In an intention, the object is merely meant. In a subsequent fulfilment, the empty intention becomes "filled" by the presence of "its" object. When this happens, we experience that is now intuited as being the same object as that which was previously meant. We are conscious of the identity or the coincidence of the fulfilment with the intention.<sup>22</sup>

"The thought, as it were, rests content in the intuition of that which is thought; and what is given "in" intuition is thus experienced as that which

is meant by this thought, as the goal of our thinking which has now been more or less completely reached. Once achieved, the relation of "fulfilment" takes on the form of the relation we call 'knowledge of the object'. The act's being "fulfilled" is the knowledge of the object meant."<sup>23</sup> Thus, although an act of meaning intention may function independently from an intuition, the latter is necessary if we are to have knowledge of the object-meant. Error is explicable in terms of "disappointment" when a meaning-intention (i.e., the object meant) is not fulfilled intuitively as "expected" - when the intuitively given object fails to coincide with the intended object. Even in such "disappointments", however, there must be some ground of similarity between the object-meant and the object-given. If this were not the case, they would be so far apart that the notion of one being relevant to the other would not occur. "For when the act of meaning means that A is red, an intuition of A's being green cannot contradict the act of meaning unless at least the object A that is seen is experienced as the same A that was meant by the act of meaning."<sup>24</sup>

This brings us to the realization that there may be various levels of fulfilment. Indeed, Husserl asserts that there are even different types of fulfilment. A "static" unity of intention and fulfilment is one in which the thought and the intuition are temporally coincident. For example, upon turning around and perceiving an ashtray on the table, I may say "my ashtray". In this case, the expressed meaning is as close to the intuited object "as if it were its clothing". On the other hand, a "dynamic" fulfilment is one in which a merely signitive meaning "passes into" an intuitive apprehension. There is a temporal lapse between them. It is in this type of relationship

that various levels of fulfilment may be found. A completely adequate intuitive fulfilment in the perception of a three-dimensional object, for example, is necessarily dynamic; for it can never give itself from more than one perspective at one time. Thus, a series of perceptions is required if knowledge of the object is to approach adequacy. Husserl uses the term 'shadings' to refer to the various (successive) perspectives which are synthesized into a unity of apprehension pertaining to the object intuited.

In the one perception the object appears from this side, in another from that side, now it is near, the next time it is distant and so on. In each and all the one and the same object is 'there', in each it is intended as the sum total of that which is known to us, and which is present in this perception. To it corresponds phenomenologically the continual flow of filling and identification, in the continual arranging side by side of perceptions 'belonging to the same object'.<sup>25</sup>

Since 'imaging' is also an intuitive act for Husserl, the same process may occur in that sphere. Thus, in both imagination and perception, various levels of fulfilment are possible. "The total synthesis in any sequence of images or intuitions represents in comparison with any individual image or intuition . . . a growth in the fullness of knowledge. . . ."<sup>26</sup>

The ideal limit, of course, is the total coincidence of object-meant and object-given. When this limit is reached we have an experience of perfect fulfilment or complete 'adequation'. The intuited object is then given wholly or just as it is in itself: no partial intentions remain in an unfulfilled state. It has been noted that we consciously experience the final fulfilment or the complete identification of object-meant and object-given. This experience is an act of evidence or an 'evidential' act.

The epistemologically precise sense of evidence . . . concerns this ultimate goal which cannot be passed, the act of this most perfect synthesis of filling which gives the intention, the intention of judgment for instance, absolute fullness of content, that of the object itself. The object is not merely meant but it is given in the strictest sense just as it is meant and is posited as one with the meaning.<sup>27</sup>

The act of evidence, like all other meaningful conscious acts, is an objectivating act. Its objective correlate, Husserl claims is being in the sense of truth or, more simply, truth. Looked at from the point of view of the act of identification, truth is the ideal of adequation. Considering the objective correlate as completely "given", we may use the phrase 'being in the sense of truth'. Thus, 'being' (in the sense of truth) expresses the fact that that which is wholly given is true-being. This is in accordance with a fundamental phenomenological principle stated earlier, viz., to be an object is to appear as the object of certain acts.

In this section, we have considered intentionality and intuition with regard to "sensibile" objects. The term 'perception' has been used in its ordinary "narrow" sense. It is the case, however, that relatively few ideas remain on this perceptual level. We have knowledge of relations, of complex states of affairs, etc., which is not given via sense-perception alone. Two other notions we may now recall: (a) Meaning-fulfilments or intuitions are necessary if there is to be knowledge at all, i.e., we must see things as they are in themselves if we are to have genuine knowledge; (b) To be an object is to appear as the object of certain acts. It becomes alarmingly clear, therefore, that if Husserl equates intuitive givenness with sense-perception, he will be unable to account for anything normally called 'knowledgable' which is not given via the senses. In addition, unless

he expands the realm of perceptual acts, he will necessarily have to restrict his ontology to the domain of sensible objects. For that which does not appear in an intuitive intention, simply, is not. To these problems we must now turn.

#### 4. Categorical Intuition and Categorical Objects

The answer to the problems raised above has been already indicated by the manner in which the problems themselves were formulated. Husserl does expand his concept of perception to include the intuitive apprehension of non-sensuous objects. Perhaps, however, the best path into the forest of categorial intuition is that labelled "true-being" or "being in the sense of truth". We noted that the latter phrase is applicable to the objective correlate of an intentional act when that act realizes its perfect fulfilment. This suggests that the difference between being and non-being is not a characteristic of objects themselves but rather a difference in the way in which an object is given to consciousness. In a predicative statement, the word 'is' refers to an agreement between intention and fulfilment; 'is not' expresses a predicative conflict. 'Being' itself is not a predicate. Being itself cannot be seen. "I can see the color, but not the colored being. I can feel the smoothness but not the smooth being. The being is nothing in the object, no part of it, no factor inherent in it; no quality or intensity, but also no figure, no inner form in general. But the being is also nothing at an object; it is not a real inner or a real outer character, and therefore in a real sense no "character" at all."<sup>28</sup> Thus, there is nothing in a sensible object which corresponds to being. Consequently,

there are no grounds for restricting the realm of being, the realm of that which is, to purely sensuous objects. This is not to say that there are not different types or "regions" of being. Indeed, Husserl holds that there are. But the distinction between the various regions of being cannot be based upon a difference in the objects. There is no quality or predicate which can be assigned to a "real" house that cannot be assigned to an "imaginary" house. The distinction between regions of being must be based solely upon the different ways in which objects are "given" to consciousness. Thus, anything which appears as the object of an intentional act is an object, whether real or ideal. And when we are in the "presence" of an object; when we have an intuitive apprehension of it; when we see the object as it really is in itself, then we may designate that object as truly-being.

By not restricting the term 'being' to real (i.e., sensuous objects), Husserl has "opened the door", so to speak, for the possibility of there also being 'categorial objects' - this term being used indiscriminately for the present to refer to relations, states of affairs and/or predicative facts, conjunctions, disjunctions, totalities, universals, numbers, classes, etc. Following his characteristic mode of investigation, he attempts to clarify the nature of such objects by reflecting upon the acts wherein they are constituted.

In considering the constitution of categorial objects, probably the most important principle to be kept in mind is that, ultimately, everything categorial is founded upon sensuous intuitions. Nevertheless, the nature of categorial objects is such that their self-presentation, i.e., the way

in which they are given to us in intuition (exactly as they are in themselves), differs from simple sense-perception. In simple sense-perception, an object is intuited in its concrete particularity as a whole. For example, when I say "this ashtray", I do not mean the ashtray's color or its shape; I mean the ashtray itself as it stands before us simply. To be sure, the ashtray's color and shape are "in it". However, they are not explicit objects in the intuition of the ashtray as a whole. When we come to an instance of categorial intuition, the case is somewhat different. If I say "This ashtray is green", I no longer mean the ashtray as a simple whole; rather, I mean the explicit "being green" of the ashtray. What is given in this new founded act is the explicit fact that "The ashtray is green". Husserl describes the process in the following way:

A perceptual act grasps A as a whole at one stroke and in a simple manner. A second perceptual act is directed toward the a, the part or the dependent factor, which constitutively belongs to the A. These two acts are connected into a single act, in whose synthesis the A is first given as having the a in itself. With an inverse "direction" of the relating "perception", the a can similarly come to self-giveness as belonging to the A.<sup>29</sup>

Categorial acts are thus founded on lower-order acts of simple sense-perception. In our example, the founding object itself is "contained" in the higher act.<sup>30</sup> A somewhat different type of founding is to be found in those categorial acts which constitute universality. In such cases (specifically called acts of ideational abstraction) the intuitive presentation of a particular is used merely as an example of its corresponding universal. When we perceive (or imagine) the green ashtray, we may focus our attention on the color itself (rather than on the color as the color

of the ashtray). The particular before us, viz., the color green, may then serve as the sensory foundation for the idea of greenness. In the act of ideational abstraction, the concrete particular serves only as an example of greenness as such. The universal (or Idea of greenness) is the categorial objective correlate of the act of abstraction. The exemplification of the particular as seen when viewing the ashtray is of little importance. Indeed, an imaginary act of simple perception can serve equally as well for the subsequent ideational abstraction. I may, for example, abstract the intelligible content or essence of "unicornness" on the basis of an imagined unicorn. It is irrelevant whether or not there ever has or ever will be a (real) particular exemplification of the Idea. It stands forth merely as a pure possibility - as an ideal non-temporal object.

The first example of categorial abstraction which we considered, viz., the meaning of the statement "This ashtray is green", is founded upon and indeed "contains" certain sensuous elements. Husserl calls this type of act one of sensuous abstraction. An act of ideational abstraction, such as the intuition of greenness as such, "contains" a mixture of categorial form (in that it is a universal) and sensuous content. A third type of categorial abstraction shall now be considered which results in purely categorial concepts - the objects with which pure formal logic concerns itself. The process of pure categorial abstraction is formally similar to that of ideational abstraction. In the latter case, we may arrive at the intuitive apprehension of the expression "All equilateral triangles are equiangular" on the basis of the sensuous categorial concept indicated by



the expression "This equilateral triangle is equiangular". In a similar fashion, we may abstract the purely categorial form "All S is P" on the basis of "All equilateral triangles are equiangular". Thus, while pure logic too is ultimately founded on sensuous experience, it itself is devoid of any and all sensuous concepts. Similarly, the whole of pure arithmetic and indeed, all other formal disciplines, are pure precisely because they deal with the form of meanings as distinct from the particular meaning-contents or sensuous matter.

Thus, through his analyses of categorial constitution and categorial intuition, Husserl is able to support the ideality of meanings and states of affairs which he asserted in the Prolegomena. By widening the notion of intuition, he extends, at the same time, the realm of objects. Categorial objects are genuine objects of knowledge, even though they have an ideal rather than a real ontological status. They can be apprehended in themselves as they really are, just as sensuous objects can be apprehended in an act of meaning-fulfilment. That is to say, they can be "seen" or intuited (although not in exactly the same manner as a simple sensuous object); and, consequently, they can be the objects of genuine knowledge-giving acts.

Finally, in speaking of the possible forms of categorial intuition, of categorial objects and the a priori laws of genuine thought, Husserl emphatically asserts that they are not merely relevant to the way in which we, as humans, think. "An understanding subject to other than purely logical laws would simply not be an understanding. Logical laws specify nothing concerning the constitution of human consciousness. . . . In other words, those mental acts with which the objects of logic are so intimately correlated . . . belong to the ideal nature of understanding as such."<sup>31</sup>

## 5. Conclusion

The fundamental question of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in an act of knowledge (or, in more Husserlian terminology, the explanation of how subjectivity "constitutes" objectivity) is left unsettled in Husserl's Logical Investigations. To be sure, he has provided an outline of the manner in which categorial objects are constituted and "seen" in categorial intuition.<sup>32</sup> But since categorial acts are founded on lower-order acts of simple perception, any difficulties in the explanation of the latter must necessarily pertain to the explanation of the former. And difficulties there are.

In an act of simple perception, Husserl argues that sensations undergo an interpretation or process of apprehension which results in the perception of an object. We have used the term 'constitution' to designate this process. In answer to the question why an object is constituted specifically as that object, it has been suggested that the dominating factors lie in the specific intentional moment of the act rather than in the sensations. This "matter and form" schema is applicable to both signitive (or empty) acts and acts of meaning-fulfilment. But the explanation is faulty (or at least inadequate) on two accounts: (a) The function of sensory-data in the determination of an object is left up in the air, so to speak. They are assigned merely the passive role of "hyletic data" out of which the object is formed. (b) The origin and nature of meaning itself is not accounted for. True, Husserl has located meanings in the intentional moment of experience. But this is a long way from explaining their origin. He does, however, acknowledge this inadequacy. He claims

that meaning itself cannot be analyzed in terms of more basic constituents. "It defies all further definition, it is a descriptive ultimate."<sup>33</sup> This proclamation is soon forgotten, however, as Husserl moves from the level of pre-transcendental to strictly transcendental analyses.

The two difficulties cited above - that of the function of sensory data and that of the origin of meaning - when placed side by side, suggest that perhaps one explanation could be found to satisfy them both. It might be that sensory data function in such a way that they are related to the ultimate origins of meaning itself. This is, in fact, the approach by which Husserl attempts to remove the problems. In the Logical Investigations, his analyses are oriented toward showing how meaning-intentions become fulfilled in the knowledge situation. "He always supposes that meanings are already constituted and shows how perception can, in various degrees of completeness, "fill" the meanings that are otherwise only intended. The argument always goes from meanings to their fulfillment in perception. . . ."<sup>34</sup> What he needs then is an analysis from the opposite direction - from sensory data to the origin of meanings.<sup>35</sup>

Aside from such shortcomings, the Logical Investigations contains many important epistemological insights which, if not indubitable in themselves, are certainly indispensable for our understanding of Husserl's more mature transcendental philosophy. The first volume clears the ground for "digging" while the second equips us with the most important tools. The Prolegomena asserts the objectivity of meanings and essences while the investigations themselves point the way to the ultimate founding of objectivity in subjectivity. It must be emphasized that the analyses are

descriptive. Husserl's language, at times, makes us forget that no meta-physical point of view is implied.<sup>36</sup> Methodologically, phenomenology may be said to be an "essentialism". Metaphysically, it is "neutral". When Husserl claims that meanings and logical entities have an ideal objective status, one naturally thinks of Platonic realism. But this must be surpassed if we are to understand his philosophy. The ontological status of the ideal simply does not fall within the realm of phenomenological investigations. The ideal is given in experience as ideal and is required for the objectivity of knowledge. "In keeping with his subjective approach to philosophy, Husserl assumes that everything that exists is valid as existent by virtue of the evidence with which it is grasped in thought as being, and he concludes that "ideal being" in this sense cannot be denied. This is the unassailable form which his idealism takes in the Logical Investigations."<sup>37</sup>

Thus, when Husserl speaks of an object, he invariably means an intentional object or an object "in" consciousness as experienced. This will become somewhat more evident in Chapter Three when we discuss the phenomenological epoche.

In restricting himself solely to an analysis and description of experience, Husserl is true to empiricism. The only being we can have any knowledge of is experienced being. Subject and object cannot be separated for it is consciousness which constitutes the "sense" or meaning of an object. To the phenomenologist, reality is nothing more than a phenomenon which is the correlate of consciousness. This is not, however, to suggest that there is also an unknowable "real" world of noumena. Husserl refuses to accept the existence of anything which is not a possible object of

consciousness. He has an unbounded faith in reason as being capable of knowing everything that is. "The correlation of being-able-to-be-perceived, -to-be-intuited, -to-be-meant, -to-be-recognized, is inseparable from the sense of being in general."<sup>38</sup> Thus, to be an object is to be the correlate of a subjective act of consciousness. And to clarify the nature of an object is to reflect upon the acts "in" which it is constituted or presented. Husserl regulates the relationship between consciousness and reality according to transcendental laws which are intrinsic to both. He does not disregard one in favour of the other. Rather, he surpresses the distinction between them. Consciousness is intentional; it is always consciousness of something. Reality is presented; it is that which is intended. Subject apart from object is as meaningless as object apart from subject. Or as James Edie puts it, "Phenomenology is neither a science of objects nor a science of the subject; it is a science of experience. It does not concentrate exclusively on either the objects of experience or on the subject of experience, but on the point of contact where being and consciousness meet."<sup>39</sup> In short, phenomenology, as the name implies, is the logos of phenomena. It is a fundamental study in that it analyzes and describes those features of conscious experience which are presupposed by all other sciences. It remains true to itself in so far as it neither seeks nor accepts evidence which is not directly intuited or "seen". Being concerned with what things are (rather than whether they "really" are), phenomenology is metaphysically neutral.

We may conclude this chapter with a brief summary of the nature of logic, as seen by Husserl. Logic is, first and foremost, the science of

meanings as such. Its objects, although ideal, can be "seen" in experience via essential intuition. They are given a priori and as absolutely necessary and universal. Pure formal logic is also formal ontology. Logical relations and laws specify the possible ways in which objects may be experienced.

"All valid statements about existence and truth which can be set up on the basis of the forms of meaning and by abstracting from all cognitive matter are contained in these laws."<sup>40</sup> In other words, pure logic is an a priori (experiential) ontology. It does not deal with actual factual judgments but rather with the a priori possibilities of experience. An actual judgment is true or false according to its mode of fulfillment (as indicated in Section 3 of this chapter). This presupposes, of course, that it is not formally inconsistent; for, in such a case, its falsity would be evident upon consideration of the a priori possibilities of experience. The connection, therefore, between formal ontology and the "logic of truths" is to be found in the law of non-contradiction.<sup>41</sup>

Husserl's third level of logic, that of transcendental logic, is concerned with the "subjective correlate" of the essences and ideal unities dealt with on the level of formal ontology. That is, it is an examination of the manner in which logical objects are constituted - an examination of the way in which objectivity is constituted in subjectivity. Like any other object, a logical object is clarified by clarifying the intentional acts of consciousness in which it is given. It is this realm - the realm of transcendental logic - which Husserl is primarily concerned with. We have considered the way in which logical objects are abstracted and intuited from a sensuous foundation. Such clarification, Husserl holds to be the

science of sciences. It is an absolute science in that it is a priori; and it is the science of sciences in that the objects which it inspects are fundamental forms of genuine knowledge in any sphere whatsoever. Thus, transcendental logic may be defined as that which clarifies the fundamental concepts and the ideal laws of pure logic with a view towards securing once and for all the foundations of knowledge itself. Without such a rigorous science of sciences, all empirical sciences are suspect in that they rest on unquestioned (and hence possibly unfounded) presuppositions.<sup>42</sup>

It is clear that phenomenology is not only needed to clarify the nature of formal logic but also, and as an extension of such clarification, it should be put to use advantageously in the investigation and clarification of the various "working concepts" of the empirical sciences. Transcendental phenomenology in this wider sense is a radical theory of cognition in general. It is a clarification of that which is given in experience alone. The analysis of experience entails an analysis of the laws of transcendental constitution. To be sure, the constitutive activity of consciousness is most evident in the consideration of logical objects. They are not given immediately via a simple sensuous intuition, but are more properly said to be constituted on the basis of "founding" sensuous perceptions. Nevertheless, the investigation of transcendental constitution as a program for philosophy in general is more than merely warranted. It is, according to Husserl, absolutely necessary, if knowledge is to be unquestionably genuine.

### III.

#### PHENOMENOLOGY AS A FUNDAMENTAL THEORY OF COGNITION

##### 1. The Need

In the Logical Investigations, Husserl was primarily concerned with the reconstruction of pure logic. Nevertheless, as was indicated in the concluding remarks to Chapter Two, it soon became apparent that phenomenology, as an analysis and description of experience, had a significance far beyond the realm of formal logic. Indeed, Husserl saw in phenomenology a method whereby philosophy could at last become a rigorous science of sciences - the ultimate and necessary foundation for all knowledge. In this chapter, we shall consider phenomenology as a general program for philosophy.

In his Logos article of 1911 entitled "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science",<sup>1</sup> Husserl claims that although philosophy has pretended, from its earliest beginnings, to a certain degree of rigorousness, it has nevertheless been incapable of achieving the status of a strict science. This is not to say that contemporary philosophy is an imperfect or incomplete science. It is, rather, not a science at all. Mathematics and certain natural sciences are scientific because portions of their doctrinal content are not reasonably to be doubted. To be sure, they are "incomplete" sciences, in that an unlimited horizon of unsolved problems lies before them. But they are not, for that reason, to be called unscientific. When one considers philosophy, however, it is evident that not only are there unsolved problems, but also,



and more importantly, there are no universally acceptable methodological principles. "Each and every question is herein controverted, every position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given by a school, of a 'point of view'."<sup>2</sup> In fact, even the subject matter of philosophy is a matter of dispute. Is it essentially related to nature, to the human spirit, or to both? And how is it related? Does it perform its functions on the same level as the natural and/or social sciences, or is it above or below them? The very reasonableness of these questions suggests that philosophy is far from being scientific. May we conclude, then, that it is inherent in the nature of philosophy to be non-scientific? Is its age-old preoccupation to become a rigorous science a misguided enterprise? Husserl refused to bow in defeat. Philosophy not only can, but must become a rigorous science if the particular sciences are to be genuinely founded.

In considering modern philosophy, Husserl feels that Hegel's failure to attain absolute knowledge via a philosophy of the Spirit was the single most important factor conditioning the views of subsequent thinkers regarding the possibility of philosophy as a rigorous science. The reaction to this failure is chiefly of two types: (a) a distrust in the scientific nature of philosophy eventuating in an extreme historical relativism; or, (b) a turning towards naturalism (as opposed to the philosophy of Spirit) as providing the only ideal for a rigorously scientific reform of philosophy. Both positions, Husserl argues, are unacceptable - the former because it refuses to recognize the possibility of the ideal and the latter because its attempt at realizing the ideal (of a rigorously scientific reform of

philosophy) is erroneous from the ground up. Assuming, then, that the ideal is possible, it is incumbent on Husserl to lay bare the false principles and methods of the philosophy of naturalism.

Husserl defines naturalism as ". . . the tendency to look upon everything . . . [as] either itself physical, belonging to the unified totality of physical nature, or [if] it is in fact psychical, . . . then merely as a variable dependent on the physical, at best a secondary 'parallel accompaniment'."<sup>3</sup> In short, the naturalist recognizes only the physical as real. He either simply refuses to recognize the ideal or else attempts to naturalize it in terms of a psychophysical interpretation of consciousness. As we have seen, however (in Chapter One), a naturalistic explanation of consciousness, including the "naturalization" of the laws of pure logic, inevitably results in sceptical absurdities. The naturalist, while denying the reality of Ideas, must really presuppose an ideal objectivity to even begin theorizing. Without such ideal presuppositions, his results could in no way be termed 'scientific'.

To the naturalist, psycho-physical psychology is the scientific discipline which supposedly replaces traditional philosophy. It is looked upon as the ultimate foundation for logic and epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and all humanistic sciences. Yet, it is precisely these ideal disciplines which transcend the naturalistic interpretation of reality. Psycho-physical psychology, immersed in the contingency of empirical existence as it is, cannot by itself provide the foundation for that which is absolute or necessary.

The fundamental error of the naturalist, however, is his refusal to

consider consciousness as it is in its subjectivity. He analyzes the subject's experience of nature from an objective point of view, i.e., merely as a psychological process. In doing so, he overlooks the fact that experience is, first and foremost, completely subjective. What is needed is an analysis and description of experience precisely as experience. And this description cannot borrow "objective" concepts which are justified by experience. For, in truth, it is consciousness which prescribes the meaning of the objectivity of experience. One cannot possibly describe psychical experiences qua psychical with a set of concepts borrowed from the experience of the spatio-temporal world. To be sure, an investigation into the nature of consciousness as a psycho-physical entity, as an object in the world, has its proper place. But such a "naturalistic" investigation cannot re-place the analysis and description of experience qua experience. The naturalistic approach presupposes the very possibility of experience itself. "Questions such as how the data of experience came to be objectively determined and what sense "objectivity" and "determination of objectivity" have . . . depend . . . on the sense given to that data by consciousness . . . [as intentional]." <sup>4</sup>

All this, the naturalist completely overlooks. He either ignores or "naturalizes" pure consciousness. In so doing, he misses "the proper sense of the epistemological problematic" <sup>5</sup> and becomes tangled in a hopeless web of confusion.

Phenomenology, of course, is the science which will fill the gap left by the "naturalistic oversight". It will be ". . . a systematic science of consciousness that explores the psychic in respect of what is immanent in it. . . ." <sup>6</sup> Both phenomenology and psychology are concerned with conscious-

ness, although in different ways. Psychology is concerned with consciousness as empirical, as psycho-physical; phenomenology is concerned with consciousness as "pure", as intentional.

Husserl claims that the naturalistic confusion stems from the empirical psychologists' zeal to imitate the methodological procedures used in the natural sciences. "There is a sure conviction that the method of all empirical sciences, considered in its universal principles, is one and the same, thus that it is the same in psychology [i.e., science of the psychical] as in the science of physical nature."<sup>7</sup> It is the case, however, that a science which is genuinely true will adopt those methodological principles which are adequate for the investigation of its specific realm of objects. And obviously, the realm of the psychical is far removed from that of the physical. An empirical investigation is suitable for the latter but not for the former. Causal relations, for example, are indispensable in describing the physical, whereas they are out of place in speaking of the psychical. Consciousness as intentional is simply not a physical something; it has no corporeality.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, the methodological principles used in the investigation of pure consciousness are going to differ radically from those used by the natural scientists. The "being" of the psychical is not the same as the "being" of the natural world.<sup>9</sup> Thus, all expressions implying an existential positing of beings in a spatio-temporal framework must be excluded from the working-language of the phenomenologist. "This obviously applies also to all existential positings with regard to the empirical being of the investigator, of his psychical faculties, and the like. . . . It is clear, then, that the phenomenological investigation

must be directed toward a scientific essential knowledge of consciousness, toward that which consciousness itself "is" according to its essence in all its distinguishable forms."<sup>10</sup>

The difference between the "natural" and the phenomenological attitude of mind should now be evident. The former is unconcerned with the nature of experience as experience. In the "natural" or "everyday" attitude, we live in the world of objects. We are unconcerned with questions about the very possibility of experiencing. Cognition is taken for granted. "Constantly busy producing results, advancing from discovery to discovery in newer and newer branches of science, natural thinking finds no occasion to raise the question of the possibility of cognition as such."<sup>11</sup> Phenomenology, on the other hand, is concerned with experience as such. And since the natural attitude presupposes experience, naturalism as a philosophy cannot possibly be the ultimate foundation for either normative or natural disciplines. That foundation must be secured by phenomenology.

The need for a phenomenological investigation of experience is therefore evident. But, it may be asked, how are we to go about instituting phenomenology as a rigorous science? If it is to be the foundation for all other (exact) sciences, it itself must be absolute. Any and all contingent elements must be eliminated. Is this possible in a sphere where the objects under investigation (viz., "psychic" experiences) are constantly in flux? Can philosophy really become a rigorous science of sciences?<sup>12</sup>

## 2. The Way

The naturalistic attitude is not easily overcome. The psychical or

truly philosophical realm of "objects", i.e., the phenomenal realm of experience, is subject to naturalistic adulteration due to "the inborn habit of living and thinking"<sup>13</sup> naturalistically. In this section, the way of overcoming these difficulties will be considered. Our text will be The Idea of Phenomenology, published posthumously but originally delivered by Husserl as a series of lectures in 1907. It marks the inauguration of a somewhat deeper level in the "Husserlian diggings". For the first time, phenomenology is conceived as the ultimate foundation and critique of all knowledge.

Husserl begins his critique of cognition<sup>14</sup> in a manner reminiscent of Descartes. He suspends the entire world of nature, both physical and psychological, through the institution of the famed epoche. All transcendencies posited by the natural attitude are thereby excluded. The being of everything is "left up in the air". Nothing may be presupposed as already given. The question now arises, "How can the critique of cognition get under way?"<sup>15</sup> What, if anything, can serve as an indubitable starting point? Husserl's answer is the same as that given by Descartes. Although all else may be doubted, it is impossible to doubt "doubting" itself. "And likewise with every cogitatio."<sup>16</sup> Whether or not the intended "objects" really exist, the act of intention itself is indubitable. It is given in an "absolute" manner. It is clearly "seen" as something that is. Thus, we may formulate a general principle with regard to the indubitableness of cogitationes. "Every intellectual process and indeed every mental process whatever, while being enacted, can be made the object of a pure "seeing" and understanding, and is something absolutely given in this "seeing"."<sup>17</sup> This, then, is the

absolute foundation on which the critique of cognition is to be built. It not only provides us with a "starting point" but also, and just as importantly, it is an ultimate criterion of that which can be accepted as beyond doubt. Anything which gives itself to "pure seeing" cannot reasonably be doubted. Thus, as a corollary to our first principle, we have: Absolute givenness is an ultimate which, if denied, renders all cognition meaningless. One cannot meaningfully demand that the self-evident be further justified as self-evident.<sup>18</sup>

All this sounds very Cartesian. And, in fact, but for one important difference, it is. For both Descartes and Husserl, the initial problem is to locate a presuppositionless, unquestionably indubitable starting point. This is to be found in thinking or, more precisely, in the acts of thinking. Cogitationes are given as clear and distinct (for Descartes) or as self-evidently seen as they are in themselves (for Husserl). At this point, however, the two philosophers go their separate ways. For Descartes, cogitationes are indubitable in that they are "immanent" to the thinker; they are seen via "inner perception". "Transcendent" givenness, on the other hand, is subject to doubt in that the "objects" are not themselves contained in the mind of the thinker. The problem of knowledge as Descartes sees it revolves around the question of how that which is transcendent to the thinker can be guaranteed. How can we prove that our "mental content" is really representative of extramental reality? As is well known, Descartes had to resort to God's goodness as that which guarantees the validity of our "natural" beliefs.

Apart from some such suspicious procedure as a deus ex machina, it is evident that upon the radical separation of subject and object (as found

in Descartes and the British empiricists), no adequate bridge can be constructed between the two. If we can know only "ideas", it is impossible to discover whether or not they resemble "things-in-themselves". In short, if the problem of knowledge is formulated so as to question the manner in which transcendent existents can be "guaranteed", the problem is ex hypothesi insoluble.

Husserl avoids this difficulty by revising the notions of 'immanence' and 'transcendence'. For Husserl, as for Descartes, that which is given immanently is given indubitably. But the basis of the definition of 'immanence' is not the same. Descartes considered that which is immanent to be really contained in the mind. Husserl, however, defines the 'immanent' as that which is "seen" as self-evident. And rather than define 'transcendence' in terms of external objects, Husserl considers the transcendent as that which is meant or signified but not intuitively given. We may recall here the distinction that was pointed out in Section Three of Chapter Two between acts of meaning-intention and acts of meaning-fulfilment. In an act of perfect fulfilment, the object is not merely meant; it is given as in itself it really is. One may therefore say that in such a case, the object is given as completely adequate, indubitable, or immanently. No part of the object transcends the intuitive act. On the other hand, when an object is "merely" meant or signified, it itself is not given in the act of intention and may therefore be said to transcend that act.<sup>19</sup> It must be remembered, however, that the term "transcendent object", for Husserl, carries no existential overtones. Both "external" and "internal" objects, in the Cartesian sense, can be intended as meant or as intuited. Consequently,



the distinction between immanent objects and transcendent objects is based solely upon the manner in which an object is intended. Or, to rephrase the matter, whereas for Descartes the separation of objects determines the mode of perception, for Husserl, the distinction between types of perceptions determines the distinction between objects.

Descartes' error, Husserl claims, stems from his failure to consider the true nature of an object of perception. The being of an object is its being-for-us through the intentional act in which it is given. Only the way in which it is given can determine the mode of being which it has. To presuppose that some objects have an external reality, while others are "in" the mind, is to distort the problem at the outset. It is to accept unexamined presuppositions from the "natural attitude". The problems of cognition " . . . can never be answered on the basis of a prior knowledge of the transcendent, of prior judgments about it, no matter whence the knowledge or the judgments are borrowed, not even if they are taken from the exact sciences."<sup>20</sup> Similarly, the validity of cognition cannot be assured if one presupposes a psychologistic or "naturalistic" interpretation of consciousness. To presuppose that is to miss the essence of subjectivity. As has been indicated in Chapter Two of this thesis, consciousness is essentially intentional. Every cogitatio or conscious act necessarily refers to, or "contains" an object-meant. Cogitationes have their correlative cogitata. And while it is true that we can focus our attention on either acts or objects, ultimately they cannot be meaningfully separated. Consciousness, then, is not "Locked" or shut up within itself. It is open to the world. It is not merely a passive receptacle for "ideas" which arise from "external bombardment".

And knowledge is not merely the grasp of something which more or less adequately "represents" an object. Genuine knowledge is the intuitive apprehension or self-giveness of an object as in itself it really is. In such a case, there is no question of something remaining beyond the act of cognition. Knowledge, if preconceived as "representative", becomes hopelessly enigmatic. If an object never really gives itself, it is a priori impossible to compare it with an "idea". Thus, to question the self-giveness of an object is to render insoluble the problem of knowledge.

From these considerations, Husserl claims, it is evident that any inquiry into the nature of cognition must be restricted (at least at first) to that which is intuitively given. All talk of transcendent existents (in the Cartesian sense) must be excluded. "Objects" are to be considered as nothing more than pure phenomena. Or, to rephrase the matter, the epistemological problematic is such that the imposition of the epoche or phenomenological reduction is absolutely necessary.<sup>21</sup> Within this reduced realm, objects are to be accepted as no more (and no less) than what they present themselves to be. This is stated somewhat more explicitly by Husserl in his Ideas, I. He claims that the principle of all principles is " . . . that every primordial dator Intuition is a source of authority (Rechtsquelle) for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in "intuition" in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself."<sup>22</sup>

With the establishment of this formidable principle, " . . . we have dropped anchor on the shore of phenomenology. . . . But we must take

new steps, enter into new considerations, so that we may gain a firm foothold in the new land and not finally run aground on its shore. For this shore has its rocks, and over it lies clouds of obscurity which threaten us with stormy gales of scepticism."<sup>23</sup> In short, we are far from showing the way in which phenomenology is to be the rigorous science of sciences. The field of pure cognition has been delimited. But what can be said about the phenomena in this field? Can we draw any "objective" or "scientific" conclusions from them? Or are we restricted to the absolute self-givenness of particulars, of "reduced" cogitationes? The answer, of course, is that we are not so restricted. In fact, we have already gone beyond the particular in enunciating several universal principles, e.g., that "the givenness of any reduced phenomenon is an absolute and indubitable givenness."<sup>24</sup>

Husserl claims that it is only a "naturalistic prejudice" which prevents our acceptance of the absolute self-givenness of universals, universal objects, and states of affairs. They, no less than particulars, can be "seen" in intuition. To be sure, the "seeing" of universals is not exactly the same as the "seeing" of particulars. It is, nevertheless, just as adequate. Their givenness is something purely immanent (in the genuine or Husserlian sense of "immanence").

Several methods whereby universals are brought to absolute self-givenness in acts of categorial intuition have been outlined in Chapter Two, Section Four. In general, they are "built up" or constituted on the basis of simple (particular) intuitions. This particular patch of red, for example, may serve as that through which "redness-in-general" can be grasped. It is evident, then, that phenomenology is not restricted to the

sphere of particular cogitationes. This is to say that phenomenology is not restricted to that which is immanent in the Cartesian sense. Thus, there opens up a whole field of investigation, viz., that of the various ways in which "objectivities" are related to, and constituted on the basis of, reduced particulars. "Cognition is certainly not so simple a thing as the grasping of redness-in-general ; . . . a great many forms and types of it are to be distinguished. And not only that; their essential relations to one another need to be investigated."<sup>25</sup>

What this program amounts to is nothing less than the clarification of objects by carefully considering the ways in which objects are "constituted" and thereby "given" to consciousness. Just as Hume attempted to clarify "ideas" by tracing them back to "impressions", Husserl attempts to clarify objects by re-constituting them on the basis of reduced particulars. The outcome of their investigations is, of course, radically different. Hume's conclusions are inimical to scientific objectivity whereas Husserl's function as principles which specify how that objectivity may be guaranteed.

Phenomenology is, then, the investigation of the way in which objectivity (in the sense of both "objects" and "necessity") is constituted in subjectivity. It proceeds by way of immediate intuition or "pure seeing". This is the real restriction of the epoche. Nothing is to be accepted which is not "purely seen" as in itself it really is. The phenomenological reduction does not limit the realm of objects. "The crucial question is: Is the supposed object given in the proper sense? Is it, in the strictest sense, "seen" and grasped, or does the intention go beyond that?"<sup>26</sup> If there remains nothing which is meant but not given, if the intuited object

is such as to completely fulfill the act of mere intention, and if we bracket all else which goes beyond the "pure seeing", then we are in full possession of the essence of the phenomenon. In short, essential insight takes place within the realm (and only within the realm) of pure evidence.<sup>27</sup>

It is to be noted that although the constitution of universals must inevitably be founded upon particular cogitationes, there is no necessity that such founding acts be acts of perception. Since we are concerned with the essence of a particular (rather than its existence), both memory and imagination can serve equally as well. The same essences can be "seen" or abstracted from an imaginative founding as from a perceptual founding.

The nature of intentionality in Husserl's phenomenology now becomes somewhat clearer. We have seen that in a cognitive grasp of essences, consciousness goes through, so to speak, that which is immanent (in the Cartesian sense) to grasp the object itself. The object grasped is not a "concrete part" of consciousness. It is something more than that which is contained in the founding cogitationes. In this sense, it becomes clear that consciousness (as intentional) constitutes objects as self-given. To use a somewhat different terminology, objects are neither the same as, nor contained in, the "genuine" sensory-data. They appear or are constituted "through" such data. This is true of all objects, be they particular or universal. For example, in the perception of a sound, ". . . even after phenomenological reduction, appearance and that which appears stand in contrast, and this in the midst of pure givenness, hence in the midst of true immanence. . . ." <sup>28</sup> The past phases of the enduring sound (that which appears) are objective, yet they themselves are not really contained

in the cogitatio which is presently given. The sound which we hear (and denote as the object of our perception) is constituted or intended "through" them.

Objects, then, are not to be thought of as (already-given) pre-existent referents to which the intentional acts merely refer. They are not "simply there" waiting to be "seen".

Instead . . . things come to be constituted in . . . mental processes, although in reality they are not at all to be found in them. For "things to be given" is for them to be exhibited (represented) as so and so in such phenomena. And this is not to say that the things once more exist in themselves and "send their representatives into consciousness". This sort of thing cannot occur to us within the sphere of phenomenological reduction. Instead, the things are and are given in appearance and in virtue of the appearance itself; . . . they are essentially inseparable from it. . . ." 29

Because of this "essentially inseparable" correlation between the acts and the objects of cognition, it is evident that if we are to have an adequate grasp of the meaning of an object, we must be thoroughly familiar with the way in which that object is constituted in consciousness. Intentional analysis is therefore the phenomenological method of clarification. The phenomenologist attempts to clarify the way in which an object constitutes itself in an intentional act. His analyses are absolute in that he remains strictly within the sphere of pure evidence or self-givenness. Unlike the "natural scientist", the phenomenologist does not "explain" in the sense of a deductive theory. He proceeds by way of description alone. "Along this path [that of "seeing" and describing] one approaches the methodological forms which determine all the sciences and are constitutive of all scientifically given objects, and so also the elucidation of the theory of science

and with it implicitly the elucidation of all the sciences. . . ."30 Since objects are constituted in cognitive acts, it is only through an analysis of cognition itself that the true sense of "objectivity" can be grasped. It is here that the ultimate distinctions between various types of objects and the modes in which objects may be related to one another<sup>31</sup> are brought to clarity.

To conclude this section: The real problem of knowledge is not that of the relationship between subjective psychological experiences and transcendent (external) objects; rather, it concerns the relationship between cognition and its objects. Simply stated, it reduces to the problem of how objectivity is constituted in subjectivity. And it is in analyzing this problem that phenomenology serves as the foundation for all other knowledge, that it is the science of sciences, that it is the truly genuine "first" philosophy.

#### IV.

#### CONSCIOUSNESS AND BEING

Pure phenomenology, conceived as the science of sciences, is an "essential" study of being. It proceeds by way of "immediate seeing" or pure intuition. Through the imposition of the phenomenological reductions, all existential positings, doubts, etc., are bracketed. Consequently, the contingency involved in facticity ceases to be a problem.

Intuition grasps essence as essential being, and in no way posits being-there. In accord with this, knowledge of essence is by no means matter-of-fact knowledge, including not the slightest shade of affirmation regarding an individual (e.g., natural) being-there. . . . Every judgment which achieves in definitive, adequately constructed concepts an adequate experience of what is contained in essences . . . is an absolute, generally valid cognition, and as such it is a kind of essential judgment that it would be absurd to want to justify, confirm, or refute by experience.<sup>1</sup>

The importance which Husserl attaches to "adequate givenness" is evident. It guarantees the objectivity of universals or essences. The knowledge obtained through essential insight is not true because it "corresponds" with some kind of "objective reality". This traditional conception is reversed. Essences are objective because the knowledge which we have of them is indubitable. And knowledge is indubitable precisely because all elements of factuality and particularity have been removed via the reductions. The particular serves no other purpose than that of a foundation "through" which the universal is constituted and intuited.<sup>2</sup>



In considering phenomenology as an essential study of being, we have spoken of reductions rather than reduction. Although it was not made explicit in Chapter Three, it is clear that even in Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology there are at least two types or levels of reduction. The first may be called the phenomenological reduction or, more simply, the epoche. On this level, the theses of the natural attitude are bracketed or put out of consideration. We are left with phenomena as the objects of consciousness. But these phenomena are particular phenomena, constantly in a Heraclitean flux. Thus, the phenomenologist must perform a second reduction if he is to grasp essences or universals. Since this reduction leads to the eidos of phenomena, Husserl calls it, sensibly enough, the eidetic reduction. Once the eidetic reduction is imposed, the phenomenologist is quite indifferent to particular phenomena. They serve merely as examples or as a "founding strata" for the constitution of essences. Perhaps, however, it would be advantageous to consider these particular phenomena in somewhat more detail. Husserl insists that phenomenology clarifies the being of that which is through an analysis and description of its modes of givenness. If we agree with him that the totality of ~~that~~ which is includes both real and ideal (i.e., non-temporal) objects, then we may also agree that he has clarified, to some extent, the being of ideal objects by describing the ways in which they are constituted. But we may now ask, has he really clarified the being of real objects? In asking this, we must return to the level of particular phenomena, to the level of the first or phenomenological reduction.

Throughout this thesis we have emphasized that consciousness, as intentional, always refers to or "contains" an object-meant. Subsequent

to the eidetic reduction, such an object is an essence or possibly an "essential connection". Prior to the eidetic reduction (but subsequent to the phenomenological reduction), the intentional object is a particular phenomenon, a cogitatum or, in the terminology of the Ideas, a noema. Since most of the misinterpretations of Husserl are based on incorrect assumptions regarding the status of noemata and their relation to real objects (i.e., concretely existing objects or the objects of the "natural attitude"), we must clarify that status if we are to stay within the narrow phenomenological channel between the Scylla of realism and the Charybdis of idealism.<sup>3</sup>

As a general definition, we may say that an intentional object (or noema) is the meaning which an object of experience has. It is not to be confused with a real, concretely existing object for, as Husserl observes, a real object may be destroyed while its meaning remains intact. The noema is also not to be confused with the intentio of the Scholastics. It is not a genuinely immanent (reell) component in consciousness such as the noetic and hyletic (or sensory) aspects of an intentional act. In Chapter Two, it was emphasized that the noema is constituted on the basis of sensory data (when that data is "animated" by the noetic phases) but is itself not to be identified with such data. To construe the noema as genuinely immanent would inevitably lead to a representative theory of consciousness wherein the mind is aware of nothing save its own "ideas". Consequently, it must be said that the noema is an ideal entity belonging to the sphere of meaning or sense. It is a unity of meaning constituted on the basis of hyletic data by means of the noetic phase of an intentional act. It is to be distinguished from the real object - not as a copy of the latter but rather

as its meaning. Thus, when Husserl speaks of the constitution of objects or the constitution of that which is, he must be interpreted as referring to the constitution of intentional objects, of unities of meaning.

The constitution of meaning is not to be thought of as the creation of meaning. Although consciousness constitutes reality (as meant), it is not the complete source of all meaning and sense. Consciousness does not create that which is real out of whole cloth, so to speak. To be sure, it is a necessary condition for the emergence of meaning. But consciousness alone is not sufficient. If it were, the whole positivistic element in Husserl's philosophy would have to be discarded, the distinction between meaning-intentions and meaning-fulfilments would disappear, and the notion of error would be meaningless. It is obvious that there is a certain givenness, a certain passivity and facticity about reality (as meant) which cannot be overcome. This facticity is related, of course, to the sensory or hyletic data.<sup>4</sup> It is evident, then, that consciousness, although a necessary condition for the constitution of objects (as meant), is not in itself sufficient.

The distinction between a real object (or an object simpliciter) and an intentional object sheds light on the distinction between the "natural" and phenomenological attitudes. In the natural attitude, we take objects for granted. Their independent existence is naively accepted. To be sure, we experience these objects. But no reflection is made upon the experiencing qua experience. Rather, we live in the experiencing, in the world of that which is. The phenomenological attitude is merely a change in the way we attend to the world. Rather than living in the world of that which is, the

phenomenologist reflects on the way in which that which is is meant, appears, or is constituted. The objective correlates of the two attitudes are, paradoxically, radically different yet intrinsically related. It is not as if there are two worlds, one for the phenomenologist and one for the man in the street. Both are concerned with the same objects; but they are concerned in different ways. The phenomenologist reflects upon the object as bracketed, as reduced, as a constituted meaning or noema. He reflects upon the appearance of that which appears. The man in the street, when he reflects, reflects simply upon the object, upon that which appears.<sup>5</sup>

Husserl's method of phenomenological clarification is quite explicit; the being of that which is is clarified through analyzing its modes of givenness or constitution. He is therefore completely justified in claiming that nothing is "lost" after the imposition of the phenomenological reduction.<sup>6</sup> To be sure, the existence of everything is suspended. But all objects are retained - retained as meant or as constituted. It should be clear, then, that noemata are neither "in the mind" nor half-way between conscious processes and real objects. "They are the objects one intends as "there" and perhaps deals with cognitively, emotionally, practically; they include all the objects that one correctly intends as existing in the real intersubjectively accessible world."<sup>7</sup>

Since a study of noemata is a study of the modes of givenness of the objects of the natural attitude,<sup>8</sup> Husserl claims that phenomena (or noemata) are not to be construed as "signs" or "images" standing for something behind themselves. "Through acts of immediate intuition we intuit a "self". No apprehensions at a higher level are built up on the basis of

these apprehending acts of intuition. . . ."9 Husserl therefore claims that the Kantian dichotomy of phenomena/noumena is to be rejected. There is not one reality "for us" and another reality, inherently unknowable "in itself". It is our contention, however, that this argument is fallacious. The distinction between noemata and real objects (or objects per se) is valid enough. Since this distinction refers to the difference between the appearance of that which appears and that which simply appears, there is no question of an epistemological dualism here. But it is to be noted that this is not the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena. Husserl's distinction pertains solely to a difference in the way an object is attended to. But in both the natural and phenomenological attitudes, objects are objects of experience.<sup>10</sup> And it is sheer dogmatism to assert that the totality of that which is, is experienceable as in-itself (conceived scholastically) it really is.

There is, of course, no question of the indubitableness of phenomena. But Husserl makes it quite explicit that "things" (i.e., real objects) are, in principle, dubitable. In the Ideas, before introducing the restrictions imposed by the epoche, Husserl puts forward the general thesis that consciousness is "absolute" and reality is "relative" to it.<sup>11</sup> Perhaps we should examine this general thesis in detail so as to avoid any misconceived idealistic and/or realistic interpretations.

Husserl claims that there is an essential difference between "being as experience" and "being as thing". Corresponding to this difference is an equally essential difference in the modes of givenness of the two realms. A "thing" is perceived perspectively whereas an experience has no perspectives.<sup>12</sup>

As a result, the perception of a transcendent thing<sup>13</sup> can never be "complete".<sup>14</sup> No matter how long and how carefully we study a real object, it is always possible that what we originally posited in connection with it stands in need of correction or revision. On the other hand, ". . . it is an essential mark of what is immanently given precisely to give an absolute that simply cannot exhibit aspects and vary them perspectively."<sup>15</sup>

A second difference between immanent and transcendent perception is that the former necessarily guarantees the existence of its object while the latter does not. This is because the object of an act of immanent perception is contained in the same stream of consciousness as the act which is directed towards it, whereas the object of a transcendent perception is external to consciousness. "It is an essentially valid law that existence in the form of a thing is never demanded as necessary by virtue of its givenness, but in a certain way is always contingent."<sup>16</sup> This is, in effect, basically similar to Hume's conclusion regarding the possibility of proving the existence of an "external" world. Husserl is simply claiming that

. . . no proofs drawn from the empirical consideration of the world can be conceived which could assure us with absolute certainty of the world's existence. The world is not doubtful in the sense that there are rational grounds which might be pitted against the tremendous force of unanimous experiences, but in the sense that a doubt is thinkable. . . . Nothing is thereby altered in the absolute Being of experiences, indeed these remain presupposed in all this all the time.<sup>17</sup>

Because of these differences between "being as experience" and "being as thing" it is evident that if philosophy is to be a rigorous science, it must concern itself with subjectivity. Reality is essentially subject to

doubt in that "things" are never given absolutely. Moreover, the existence of a "thing" is really an assumption, not an indubitable given. On the other hand, immanent perception gives its objects absolutely (i.e., non-perspectively) and as definitely existing. Consequently, there are no unfounded presuppositions (such as that of existence) underlying the realm of "being as experience".

In the general thesis stated above, it was suggested that reality is relative to consciousness. By this, Husserl means that reality is dependent upon consciousness for its meaning. Experience alone prescribes the meaning of things. Even the concept of a "real thing" is derived from experience. It ". . . cannot be abstracted from any source other than the perception's own essential content. . . ." <sup>18</sup> Transcendent objects are what they are only insofar as they are constituted as objects by consciousness. <sup>19</sup> It is consciousness, then, which prescribes (or better, permits, the emergence of) the sense of reality. And it is in this sense, and this sense alone, that reality is relative to consciousness. It cannot be overly emphasized that the reality which we are here speaking of is not some "absolutely existing" reality. Rather, ". . . reality and world, here used, are just the titles for certain valid unities of meaning, namely, unities of "meaning" related to certain organizations of pure absolute consciousness which dispense meaning and show forth its validity in certain essentially fixed, specific ways." <sup>20</sup> Thus, "things", considered as unities of meaning, presuppose consciousness as their necessary correlate, for it is consciousness which bestows meaning, even on reality. Hence, our general thesis becomes somewhat clearer. Consciousness (as intentional) is absolute (in that it

depends on nothing external to itself and in that what is given immanently is given apodictically) and reality (as "unities of meaning") is relative to it (in that consciousness bestows meaning and in that what is given as real is never given as completely adequate).<sup>21</sup>

In the foregoing discussion of consciousness and reality, the term 'reality' is used in at least three different ways: (i) the reality which is naively accepted as pre-existent and as independent of consciousness; (ii) the reality of (i) which is reduced by the phenomenologist to pure phenomena; and (iii) the 'possible' reality of "noumena" which Husserl dismisses as meaningless since it is not given in experience. The distinction between objects simpliciter and noemata corresponds to realities (i) and (ii). It is a distinction based on the ways of attending to those phenomena we call 'reality'. Reality (iii) is the reality affected by Hume's scepticism. It is the reality "in-itself" of which we can know nothing. It is the possibly hidden "cause" of the reality-phenomena. It is that about which we must remain agnostic. And it is that which Husserl has no right to dismiss or pronounce dogmatically upon.

Husserl claims that the world, taken as a unity of meaning, is dependent on consciousness. This is not to say that the world qua real existence is so dependent. Such an interpretation, he argues, is "to miss the meaning of the discussion". The correlation between consciousness and objects is a correlation between consciousness and meaning. It is not that subjectivity and objectivity (taken as a real thing) are inseparable. Rather, subjectivity and meaning are inseparable. What, then, are we to say of Husserl's contention that to be an object is to be constituted as



an object by consciousness? Clearly, it reduces to a tautology. To be meant as an object is to be experienced as an object. One cannot mean anything without meaning it. "The correlation of being-able-to-be-perceived, -to-be-intuited, -to-be-meant, -to-be-recognized, is inseparable from the sense [or meaning] of being in general."<sup>22</sup> Or, to reverse the correlation, the meaning of being is inseparable from the meaning of being. This is to say that being, to be meant, must be experienced. It is not, however, to say that that which is not experienced is not. Such an interpretation would be ridiculous. It would be to commit the "constitutive fallacy" of illicitly interchanging and/or confusing the terms 'existence' and 'meaning of existence'.<sup>23</sup>

We can, therefore, find no justification for Husserl's dismissal of "the absurd" Kantian dichotomy. If he is to be true to his own rigorous principles, he must admit that there is no apodictic evidence either for or against a reality "behind" that which appears. Phenomenology must therefore be conceived as "neutral" against both idealism and realism. There can be no metaphysical axioms, one way or the other. Phenomenology is a study of phenomena, of the modes of appearance of that which appears. Once the epoche is imposed, the phenomenologist must remain within its limits. This is absolutely necessary in that he proceeds by way of "essential seeing", which can only be accomplished on the basis of phenomena. "Husserl's phenomenological reduction, like Descartes' radical doubt, can never show us more than the region of the indubitably certain. But it is by no means evident that this is the whole of reality."<sup>24</sup> Even before the reduction is imposed, however, it is evident that any attempt to escape the ego-centric predicament

is as difficult as the attempt to lift oneself off the ground by raising both feet at once. Those who try either deserve to fall.

V.

CONCLUSION

The original problem facing Husserl was that of "saving" the objective validity of logic. The Prolegomena to the Logical Investigations defended that validity by attacking "psychologistic" interpretations of logic. This attack was based primarily on Husserl's insistence that the being of that which is is not exhausted by real objects. Husserl could not rest content, however, with the mere assertion of the ideality of logical entities. The clarification of the way in which such entities are experienced seemed necessary. This clarification demanded a widening of the sphere of intuition to include the "seeing" of essences and essential connections.

The method of description utilized in clarifying the nature of formal logic was then put forward as the procedure for philosophical investigations in general. In order to avoid the acceptance of unquestioned presuppositions, Husserl, following Descartes, "suspends" all beliefs in the existence of transcendent objects. This is done purely as a matter of method to insure that nothing is accepted other than that which is "seen" as self-evidently indubitable. The world is not lost thereby; it is retained as meant, as experienced, or as "constituted" by consciousness. Such "constitution" is not to be taken as a metaphysical doctrine. Consciousness does not create the real world. It must be looked upon simply as "the place"<sup>1</sup> wherein reality "sinks its roots" so as to be reciprocally

intended or constituted as reality. Reality manifests itself, becomes meaningful, by being constituted "in" consciousness. That objectivity is constituted in subjectivity is a principle of cognition alone. Restricting himself to experience, Husserl simply tries to account for our beliefs in an "external" order. His emphasis on subjectivity, like that of Hume, ". . . is epistemological as a matter of method."<sup>2</sup>

Since consciousness constitutes that which is, the fundamental task of the phenomenologist is the determination of the various ways in which objectivity is constituted. Such constitution is not arbitrary. It proceeds by way of necessary or a priori laws. The complete formulation of these laws will specify the very possibilities of experience. And since our knowledge of that which is is ultimately founded on experience, phenomenology is ipso facto a universal ontology.<sup>3</sup>

The phenomenological method of clarification is not intended to be used exclusively. Phenomenology, through its analysis and description of fundamental concepts, "finds" the natural and social sciences in a way in which they themselves cannot. But it is not intended to replace them. It is simply a method of clarification - a clarification not of a "different" world, but of the one and only world of experience. This clarification proceeds by way of "reduction" and "pure" intuition. The epoche "brackets" a particular object with regard to its (presumptive) existence, leaving a particular phenomenon or noema. The eidetic reduction, one might say, brackets the particularity of the particular noema which then serves merely as an example, either singly or, as is more usually the case, along with other "freely imagined" particular noemata, for the "constitutive intuition

of a general essence. The latter is the nucleus of meaning which is invariable throughout the series of particular noemata. As distinguished from both the natural scientist and the mathematician, the phenomenologist neither infers (inductively) nor deduces his "results". His sole criterion of acceptability is immediate intuition. As such, his results are not subject to further qualification (which is always possible with generalizations made on the basis of a series of empirical observations).<sup>4</sup>

The universal applicability of the phenomenological method of clarification is undoubtedly its most distinctive feature. It has been used successfully in such different fields as logic and mathematics, ethics and aesthetics, the philosophy of law, sociology, psychotherapy, religion, and the philosophy of history. Considering the scope of its applicability, it is not surprising that the question "What is phenomenology?" is often answered in a variety of ways. In this thesis, we have attempted to portray phenomenology as a method of description - a metaphysically neutral method which, in its own way, contributes to the "founding" of all knowledge through the clarification of experience qua experience.

## APPENDIX A

### FRANZ BRENTANO: FORERUNNER OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT

#### 1. Introductory Remarks

From 1877 to 1881, Husserl studied mathematics at the University of Berlin under the guidance of Kronecker and Weierstrass. Transferring to the University of Vienna in the summer of 1881, he was attracted to Brentano's lectures "out of mere curiosity to hear for once the man about whom everyone in Vienna was talking".<sup>1</sup> But the curiosity soon turned to admiration for the man and for his approach to philosophy. In Husserl's own words:

It was from his lectures that I first derived the conviction that gave me the courage to choose philosophy as my life's vocation, that is, that philosophy also is a sphere of serious work, that it can also be treated in the spirit of the most exact science and consequently that it should be so treated. The pure objectivity with which he attacked all problems, the mode in which he thus sought to solve the difficulties which offered no clear way of treatment, the acute dialectic weighing of the different possible arguments, the distinguishing of equivocations, the way in which he brought back all philosophical concepts to their original sources in intuition - all this filled me with admiration and assured confidence.<sup>2</sup>

It is understandable, then, that after completing his doctoral studies in mathematics,<sup>3</sup> Husserl spent the years 1884-86 studying philosophy under Brentano.<sup>4</sup>

Brentano has been described by his students as one who was always

conscious of having a great mission to fulfill. This mission was no less than bringing about a "universal revolution, or better, a fundamental reformation of philosophy" in the service of mankind.<sup>5</sup> He felt himself to be the creator of a philosophia perennis, although like his pupil Husserl, he did not remain fixed in his views. His was a conscientious attempt to restore to philosophy the clarity and distinctness of fundamental concepts which had been lacking in the tradition of German idealism. Ultimately, such sound theoretical knowledge would "yield a proof of the divine source of all being."<sup>6</sup>

Brentano underwent a great deal of personal suffering and disappointment in his attempts to bring about the above-mentioned philosophic reformation. Born of a wealthy Catholic family in Southern Germany, he originally attempted to combine the career of a philosopher with the life of a priest. However, unable to accept such dogmas as the Trinity, the Incarnation, and eternal punishment, he became separated from the Church and resigned from the priesthood. Subsequent to this, he lost his position as lecturer at the University of Wurzburg. In 1895, after having been an unsalaried lecturer at the University of Vienna for fifteen years, he was refused permanent appointment and retired from teaching completely.<sup>7</sup>

Brentano's philosophy is not easily classified. We may say that he combined Scholasticism and the philosophy of Aristotle with the new empiricism. His emancipation from both the Catholic dogmas and the German philosophic tradition of the time may help to explain his interest in foreign contemporary thinkers as, for example, Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert Spencer. His faith in the natural sciences (as representing

the ideal of an exact science of philosophy) would allow for some rapport between himself and the positivists. Unlike the latter, however, "Brentano was by no means ready to abandon the goal of a metaphysics pursued in the scientific and critical spirit of Aristotle."<sup>8</sup> Indeed, the achievement of such a philosophic goal was urgently needed for he considered the churches no longer able to supply convincing answers to mankind's metaphysical, moral, and religious questions.

## 2. Brentano's Foundation for Scientific Philosophy: A New Psychology

It is hardly surprising that, for Brentano, "psychology was to be the proper lever for the necessary reform of philosophy and for the restoration of a scientific metaphysics".<sup>9</sup> However, his was not a complete acceptance of the "psychologism" as outlined in Chapter One of this thesis. The latter invariably lacked a preliminary verification of fundamental concepts. Only after the development of a psychology with scientific (i.e., objective) foundations would it be possible to develop the philosophia perennis. Only then would it be possible to approach the ultimate metaphysical questions of body-mind, immortality, etc.

Brentano's best-known work, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), begins with the following sentences:

The title I gave to my book characterizes its subject-matter and its method. My standpoint in psychology is empirical: Experience alone is my teacher. But I share with others the conviction that a certain ideal intuition can well be combined with such a standpoint.<sup>10</sup>

The last sentence in this quotation is quite significant in our general phenomenological considerations. Brentano regarded philosophy as



being scientific in character. Yet, "he thought that the possibility of basing knowledge upon immediate evidence would provide a presuppositionless beginning in philosophy."<sup>11</sup> What is the nature of this "ideal intuition of immediate evidence"? Although Brentano's writings do not give an explicit clarification of "ideal intuition", it would seem that he did not altogether reject non-empirical sources of knowledge. Certainly he repudiated the Kantian synthetic a priori. One can see, however, that he was groping towards something in the nature of Husserl's "essential insights" which are one step removed from primary empirical experiences. This is more than a mere induction from experience; more than traditional empiricism had allowed.

Brentano's new psychology was comprised of two major divisions - descriptive and genetic. "Of these, descriptive psychology was to be the basic part. For according to Brentano, any causal study of psychological phenomena was hopeless before the psychologist had sufficiently clarified and described what it was that he wanted to explain."<sup>12</sup> Such a purely descriptive psychology was no doubt one of Brentano's significant original contributions.<sup>13</sup>

What, then, is descriptive psychology? For Brentano, it is an autonomous enterprise - a "pure" psychology. It has its own basis which does not admit any non-psychological laws of the natural sciences (or even of genetic psychology). On the contrary, it is indirectly a foundation for such sciences. We may ask, however, if such an autonomous descriptive psychology is not doomed to failure. Is this not a relapse into the much discredited realm of "introspection"? Brentano replies that descriptive psychology is based not upon introspection but rather on inner perception -

"the immediate awareness of our own psychological phenomena, of our joys or desires, our sadness or rage."<sup>14</sup> To this awareness, he ascribed infallible self-evidence.

Thus, descriptive psychology has "psychological phenomena" as its subject matter. And it is the delineation of this amorphous territory that occupies Brentano in the first few chapters of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.

What are the characteristics by which we may distinguish between psychical and physical phenomena? Brentano suggests that we must intuitively examine the two general types of phenomena for their similarities and differences. He chooses to proceed from the particular to the general by way of simple examples. Hearing a sound, seeing an object, sensing heat, etc., are examples of mental phenomena. In fact, every presentation of sensation or imagination offers a similar example. We must note, however, that by "presentation" Brentano means not that which is presented, not the object of presentation, but rather the act of presentation. Thus, "every judgment, every recollection, every expectation, every inference, every conviction or opinion, every doubt, and every emotion is a mental phenomenon. On the other hand, examples of physical phenomena are a color, a shape, a landscape, which I see; a musical chord which I hear; heat, cold, odour, which I sense; as well as comparable images, which appear to me in my imagination."<sup>15</sup>

It is evident that presentations form the basis of all judgments, hopes, desires, etc. "We cannot judge of anything, cannot desire anything, cannot hope for anything, or fear anything if it is not presented."<sup>16</sup> Thus,

all mental phenomena are characterized by an act of presentation. And if there is an act of presentation, there must be something "acted upon". All mental phenomena include reference to an object. We refer here to the concept of "intentionality". Brentano's uncovering of this structure subsequently led to its importance as a basic pattern for all phenomenological analyses. In introducing intentionality, he states:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (and also mental) inexistence of an object, and what we would call, although in not entirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content, a direction upon an object (by which we are not to understand a reality in this case), or an immanent objectivity. Each one includes something as object within itself, although not always in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love something is loved, in hate something hated, in desire something desired, etc. This intentional inexistence is exclusively characteristic of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon manifests anything similar. Consequently, we can define mental phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as include an object intentionally within themselves.<sup>17</sup>

In reflecting upon the meaning of this paragraph we may note two key phrases: 'intentional inexistence' and 'reference to a content'. The first of these phrases is not to be understood as a loan from mediaeval philosophy. Aquinas used the term 'intentio' to signify "the peculiar image or likeness formed in the soul in the process of acquiring knowledge, thus representing, as it were, a kind of distillate from the world outside. This 'intentio' is linked up with the so-called species theory of human knowledge, which goes back to Aristotle's theory of perception as the reception of the form of an object without its matter."<sup>18</sup> This is not Brentano's conception of intentional inexistence. Broadly speaking, we may say that

it refers to the relationship to an object or objectivity of any kind, whether in purely cognitive experience, or in willing, wishing, etc. (It should not be taken to involve purpose or the pursuit of a goal.) Thus, the second phrase - 'reference to a content' - is the indispensable characterization of anything that we consider psychical. By contrast, physical phenomena lack such references.<sup>19</sup>

One may ask if even feelings and moods necessarily refer to objects. Brentano replies that they do, although not necessarily external objects. For example, when we hear a harmonious chord, the pleasure which we feel is not really a pleasure in the sound (primary object or referent), but rather a pleasure in the hearing of it (secondary object or referent).<sup>20</sup>

Every conscious act, then, presupposes an object of presentation. There are, however, distinct classes of mental phenomena; e.g., acts of judging, acts of wishing, etc. And, Brentano argues (like Husserl after him), these classes are distinct precisely because the acts of intention are different; not because of any supposed difference in the object of intention. As an example to illustrate this, we may take the case of presentation versus judgment. It is commonly held that a judgment is a compounded or relating act of thought and thus contrasted with mere presentation. Hence, "if a certain kind of union or relation of two properties were thought, the thought would be a judgment, while every thought which had no such connection as its content would have to be called a mere presentation."<sup>21</sup>

This view, Brentano argues, is untenable. An act of thought which is a mere presentation can have exactly the same content as that which in

another case forms the object of a judgment. One may, for example, enjoy the presentation of a green tree. At a later time, it may be asked of the viewer 'Is any tree green?' In both cases, the object or content of presentation is the same; viz., a tree with the property of being green. The difference between the mere presentation and the judgment must therefore be solely attributable to a difference in intentionality.<sup>22</sup> In general, such differences are discoverable immediately; i.e., via "inner perception".

Brentano's notion of inner perception provides us with a third characteristic by which we may distinguish mental from physical phenomena. Mental phenomena are those which are grasped by means of inner perception. As such, they alone are perceived with immediate evidence; for inner perception is, according to Brentano, infallible. Physical phenomena, the phenomena of outer perception, cannot be taken at face value as being true and real. Strictly speaking then, "mental phenomena can accordingly be designated as the only ones of which [authentic] perception is possible."<sup>23</sup>

Essentially related to this third characteristic is a fourth; viz., that mental phenomena are the only ones to which actual, as well as intentional existence pertains. "Knowledge, joy, desire, exist actually; colour, sound, heat, only phenomenally and intentionally."<sup>24</sup>

What further can be said of the distinction between physical and mental phenomena? Briefly, Brentano notes that it is generally agreed that physical phenomena share the distinctive characteristic of extension. This contention has not remained completely uncontested, however (cf., Berkeley, Mill, etc.). What can be confirmed, nevertheless, is that mental phenomena invariably appear unextended. Of this we may be assured.

As a final distinguishing feature between mental and physical phenomena Brentano cites the unity of presentation of the former. We ascribe color, sound, heat, etc. to particular things whereas mental phenomena, no matter how diverse, are always ascribed to one individual 'I' or stream of consciousness. The multiplicity of mental phenomena always manifests itself in inner perception as a unity. This is not to say that consciousness is something simple. Rather, "we are obliged to take the diverse set of corresponding acts of sensation, seeing, hearing, sensing heat, and smelling, and with them the willing and feeling and considering going on at the same time, and the inner perception by which we are aware of all of them as well, to be partial phenomena of a unified phenomenon which includes them, and to take them to be a single unified thing."<sup>25</sup> Physical phenomena, on the other hand, although possibly perceived simultaneously, are not necessarily presented as partial phenomena within a single phenomenon.<sup>26</sup>

This concludes Brentano's characterization of psychological phenomena. From this, we are able to state explicitly the subject matter of "descriptive psychology". It includes not only actual mental states, but also the physical phenomena of imagination and all those mental phenomena which are presented via sensation. Thus, in one sense, psychology is a more comprehensive area of study than physical science and a necessary foundation for it.

Having delimited the area of psychological investigations, Brentano is also in the position of being able to give a definition of physical science. He states:

It is not concerned with all physical phenomena; not with those of imagination, but only with those which appear in sensation. And it determines laws for these only insofar as they depend upon physical stimulation of the sense organs. We could express the scientific task of physical science precisely by saying that physical science is the science which attempts to explain the succession of physical phenomena which are normal and pure (not influenced by any particular psychological states and events) on the basis of the hypothesis that they are the effect of the stimulation of our sense organs by a world which is quasi-spatially extended in three dimensions and which proceeds quasi-temporally in one direction. Without giving any particulars concerning the absolute nature of this world, [physical science]...is satisfied to ascribe to it powers which evoke the sensations and mutually influence each other in their working, and to determine the laws of coexistence and succession for these powers. In those laws, it then indirectly gives the laws governing the succession of the physical phenomena of sensation when, by means of scientific abstraction from concomitant psychological conditions, these are regarded as pure and as occurring in relation to a constant sensory capacity. Hence, 'science of physical phenomena' must be interpreted in this somewhat complicated way, if it is made synonymous with physical science.<sup>27</sup>

It was noted at the beginning of this section that Brentano's psychology was not of the type which attempted to derive logical from psychological laws. In this sense, then, he cannot be charged with the "psychologism" prevalent in the 1880's. However, in an article entitled "Genuine and Fictitious Objects" (published in 1911 as part of a supplement to Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint) he rejects the notion that there is anything other than concrete individual things. "All that he could acknowledge was the existence of "res"; i.e., of real things and of real thinkers. Universals, being and non-being, possibility and necessity could exist only as thought by such real thinkers. All referents of expressions, ordinary or philosophical, that did not point to physical or psychical

objects were to be considered as mere fictitious entities."<sup>28</sup> Thus, for Brentano, all non-psychological phenomena such as contents of thought, states of affairs, relations, universals, ideals, values, norms, abstract truths,<sup>29</sup> etc., were fictitious objects. From this, it follows that the laws of logic have no more than a psychological status.<sup>30</sup>

Whether or not Brentano's fight against fictitious entities may be called a retrenchment of some of his own earlier writings is unimportant for our purposes. It does, however, run contrary to the trends of his students Meinong and Husserl. The publication of this article in 1911 marks the limit of his empiricism and of his phenomenological approach. "But it does not detract from his fundamental contributions to the development of a phenomenological philosophy. These might be summed up under the following headings:

- (a) the widening of traditional empiricism by admitting experiences hitherto overlooked or neglected, including even some non-inductive insights into the essential structures and relationships of empirical material;
- (b) the development of a new descriptive psychology;
- (c) the discovery of intentional reference."<sup>31</sup>



NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

<sup>1</sup>Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology (New York: Paine-Whitman, 1962), pp. 4-5.

<sup>2</sup>For a more complete development of the similarities to be found, see John Wild's article "Husserl's Critique of Psychologism" in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, edited by Marvin Farber (Harvard Univ. Press, 1940).

<sup>3</sup>Wild, in Philosophical Essays, p. 23.

<sup>4</sup>M. G. Morente, Lecciones preliminares de filosofia (Buenos Aires, 1960), p. 165. We are here speaking in general terms about knowledge of "the world". The separation between "knower" and "known" also holds in the case of "self-knowledge". Perhaps, however, it would be less ambiguous if one said that in the case of self-knowledge there is a separation between consciousness and that which consciousness is conscious of. It should also be noted that separation does not preclude correlation.

<sup>5</sup>Plato, Republic (477b), in B. Jowett's translation The Dialogues of Plato, II (4th ed.; Oxford, 1964), p. 337, (*italics mine*).

<sup>6</sup>Wild, in Philosophical Essays, p. 26.

<sup>7</sup>Plato, Sophist (262c-263b) in Jowett's Dialogues, III, 420.

<sup>8</sup>Morente, Lecciones, p. 170.

<sup>9</sup>For example, they may help to dispel the tendency to think of Husserl's philosophy solely in terms of subjective idealism. For Husserl, the essence of being is constituted in reason. What is given phenomenally and what is primordially self-evident is given completely. Thus, "true being", "object that truly is", and "to be rationally posited" are equivalent correlates. Consequently, he is able to state: "For every object, 'that truly is', there intrinsically corresponds (in the a priori of the unconditioned generality of the essence) the idea of a possible consciousness in which the object itself can be grasped in a primordial and also perfectly adequate way. Conversely, when this possibility is guaranteed, the object is eo ipso 'that which truly is'." (Husserl, Ideas, p. 395.)

<sup>10</sup>R. M. Chisholm, Realism and the Background of Phenomenology (The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1960), p. 13.

<sup>11</sup>Cf., Plato's Theaetetus, 152a (and following) wherein Socrates is arguing against the famous assertion of Protagoras that "Man is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not."

<sup>12</sup>Orestes Brownson (1803-1876), Works II (1874), 468-486; quoted by Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, I (2nd ed., Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1965), 93.

<sup>13</sup>John Wild, "Husserl's Critique of Psychologism" in Philosophical Essays, p. 34. The converse, of course, is the case wherein the subject is subsumed and lost in the materialistic mould. Cf., Wittgenstein's early conception of consciousness. Wild goes on to point out the ultimate foundation of such sophistry or psychologism - a refusal to recognize "potentiality" or "the world of becoming" as a valid ontological category. In fact, a general disregard for ontology as such (and a preoccupation with logic and methodology) is common to both the Sophists and the logical positivists of today: "The knives are constantly sharpened and resharpened. But the roast is never cut. . . . The only important result of this methodological narcissism is an uncritical application of the principles of identity and contradiction, which, if consistently carried out, would eliminate change and resolve everything into 'logical atoms', or 'impressions', as in Hume. Whether they are called 'sense-contents' (Ayer), or 'logical units' (Wittgenstein), the result is the same. The world of becoming is annihilated at one stroke. Logical positivists continue to speak, as all men must, of change, potentiality, and future time. But one wonders how such language is to be reconciled with their impoverished ontology, according to which each hypostatized 'fact' is either present or not present. As Plato remarked, 'the complete separation of each thing from the rest is the utterly final obliteration of all discourse.' (Sophist, 259e.) One looks in vain through the whole positivistic literature for any critical attempt to deal with the fundamental philosophical fact of change." (Wild, p. 38.)

<sup>14</sup>Cf., Hume: "And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation." (Treatise, p. xx.)

<sup>15</sup>One must not confuse ". . . the comprehension of experience precisely as experience and the analysis of the experience of nature merely as a psychological process. In other words, in describing experience we are forced to employ a set of concepts that are derived not from experience but from an essential analysis of the acts of consciousness. It is true, of course, that we must have experiences in order to have concepts, but the concepts are not justified by experience; their validity transcends experience. The

question, then, of a scientific knowledge of what experience presents cannot be answered by experience. . . . By "naturalizing" consciousness empirical psychology is bound to miss this its essential character." (Lauer, intro. to Husserl's Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy; New York, Harper and Row, 1965; pp. 10-11.)

<sup>16</sup>Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (trans., Pears and McGuinness; New York, The Humanities Press, 1963), p. 49.

<sup>17</sup>Franz Brentano (1838-1917), although not himself a phenomenologist, is generally considered to be the forerunner of that movement. Husserl, for example, repeatedly acknowledged his intellectual debt to Brentano, calling him his "one and only teacher in philosophy". Other noted scholars including Stumpf, Meinong, Hofler, and Marty owed their start to him. For a brief outline of Brentano's philosophy (and the relationship between it and that of Husserl), see Appendix A.

<sup>18</sup>For those intimately familiar with the development of Husserl's thought, it may seem strange that little attention is paid to the relationship between him and Frege. It cannot be denied that Frege's criticism of the Philosophy of Arithmetic (and Frege's own philosophy) was extremely influential in shaping Husserl's thought in the 1890's. We are primarily interested, however, in Husserl's philosophy qua phenomenology. As such, the foundations of phenomenology are of interest only insofar as they help us to appreciate the idea of phenomenology in general. In this restricted context, Frege's influence is seen as twofold: (a) his criticism forced Husserl to enlarge his notion of that which is to include both real and ideal objects of knowledge; (b) his philosophy pointed out the need for Husserl to clarify the notion of the identity of an object with regard to its multiple modes of givenness.

<sup>19</sup>Edmund Husserl, Prolegomena to Pure Logic (preface) as quoted by Osborn, in Edmund Husserl and his Logical Investigations (2nd ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1949), p. 56.

<sup>20</sup>Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, p. 101.

<sup>21</sup>In the Logical Investigations, Husserl uses the term 'truths' to refer to ideal structures and ideal unities of meaning, i.e., to the form of that which is judged. Just as Newton's laws, for example, are independent of an act of recognition, so too, Husserl's "truths" are to be thought of as having an ideal status apart from the temporal acts of judging, "perceiving", etc. To say that  $7 + 5 = 12$  is true only when someone judges it to be so is analogous to saying that "to be is to be perceived". What is judged (or what is seen) must be distinguished from the act of judging (or seeing). The ideal content of the judgment is the same whenever it is asserted; it is not temporally determined.

<sup>22</sup>Husserl holds that skepticism is an equally absurd position. The sceptic, while denying the possibility of any and all genuine knowledge, asserts the truth of his own theory. For a more detailed account of the various "absurdities" Husserl holds to be inherent in the various types of psychologism, see Farber, Foundation, pp. 119-127. Strictly speaking, it cannot be said that Husserl disproves the psychologistic theories. All of his arguments depend for their validity upon the reader's insight into the objectivity of ideal entities. In other words, his arguments are valid only if one presupposes his principles.

<sup>23</sup>H. Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement, I, 95.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>25</sup>Farber, Foundation, p. 132.

<sup>26</sup>What Husserl calls "evidence" we would normally call a definition of "the nature of truth".

<sup>27</sup>It is hardly necessary to point out the similarities between Husserl and Plato on this subject. The Sophist speaks of things which are not, and as if they were. The philosopher speaks of things which are, and as they are. Where there is no object, i.e., non-being, nothing can be apprehended. This is not to say that apprehension (or perception in the wider sense of the term) occurs or is coincident with that which is. The latter is a necessary condition for truth. But not-seeing that which is does not imply that there is nothing to be seen. Or, in other words, a lack of evidence does not imply that there is untruth; it merely implies that the ideal has not been apprehended. Certainly for the experience of truth, the ideal must be apprehended in a real (i.e., psychological) act. But where there are no ideal structures (i.e., ideal "truth"), there can be no apprehension and accordingly no evidence. One can clearly see the difficulties inherent in the Sophist position. Cf., Section Three of Chapter One for a further elaboration of the distinction between ideal and real.

<sup>28</sup>Farber, Foundation, p. 125.

<sup>29</sup>From Husserl's own descriptive notice of the first volume of the Logical Investigations, as quoted by Farber, Foundation, p. 101.

<sup>30</sup>It is in this sense that Husserl's philosophy may be considered as a systematic effort. And it is a whole or complete system in the sense that one cannot dig half a hole. Unfortunately, however, the foundations of knowledge were not "constructed" vertically. Hence, if one digs straight down, one does not uncover everything.

<sup>31</sup>Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement, I, 76. Professor Spiegelberg also relates a story told by Husserl (in a depressed vein) in 1929 about a pocket knife which he had received as a child. "Considering that the blade was not sharp enough, he ground it again and again until it became smaller and smaller and finally disappeared."

<sup>32</sup>Farber, Foundation, p. 129.

<sup>33</sup>Husserl's interest here, however, was primarily related to establishing the possibility of pure logic. The actual systematic development is not to be found in his published writings. It is presumed that the task was assigned to some of his students, e.g., Alexander Pfander: Logik (1921). Husserl's "blueprint" for the development of pure logic incorporates a two-level structure. "The first level is that of the propositions or "truths" studied by the logic of statements as composed of meanings and their various combinations. The second level consists of the "things" to which these statements refer, i.e., of the states of affairs [Cf., Meinong's "Objectives"] which they assert, the relations, complexes, and other configurations which they can enter and which are to be investigated by what Husserl calls a formal ontology." (Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement, I, 96.)

<sup>34</sup>From Husserl's descriptive notice of the first volume of the Logical Investigations, as quoted by Farber, Foundation, p. 102. Husserl undoubtedly borrowed the term 'descriptive psychology' from Franz Brentano (see Appendix A) but he was soon (1903) to correct this unfortunate characterization of phenomenology. "For descriptive psychology as such, much like descriptive anatomy or geology, is interested only in actual facts of experience as they have been and can be observed in real individual cases." (Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement, I, 102.) Phenomenology, on the other hand, is a study of essential relationships which may be understood independently of actual cases.

<sup>35</sup>Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement, I, 103.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

<sup>1</sup>Husserl, Logical Investigations, II, 2 (2nd ed., 1913), as quoted by Farber, Foundation, p. 198.

<sup>2</sup>Farber, Foundation, p. 218.

<sup>3</sup>Husserl, Logical Investigations, II, 9 (2nd ed., 1913), as quoted by Osborn, Edmund Husserl and his Logical Investigations, p. 72.

<sup>4</sup>To bring into focus the overall picture of what Husserl is trying to accomplish, we may briefly summarize as follows: The Prolegomena clears the ground, so to speak, of psychologistic logical theories in order to make room for a pure (objective) logic. Before working out the details of a formal logic, however, we must clarify the meaning of certain fundamental logical ideas, e.g., 'proposition', 'truth', 'judgment', etc. And in order to clarify the meaning of such terms, we must first clarify the meaning of 'meaning' itself. The latter necessarily involves a discussion of grammar and expression. It was Husserl's belief that there is a universal logical grammar underlying the accidental features of all different languages. It is more elementary than formal logic in that it serves as a basis or the lowest stratum of formal logic. Its chief function is to separate meaningful from meaningless expressions by specifying the "pure categories" of meanings, their forms of composition, and their forms of modification. Investigations 3 and 4 ("The Analysis of Wholes and Parts" and "Pure Grammar and the Analysis of Meaning") contribute to such a pure logical grammar. For the purposes of this thesis, however, we need not examine the meaning of 'meaning' in the light of Husserl's pure logical grammar. Rather, we shall consider only those aspects of meaning which are necessary for an understanding of phenomenology in general, e.g., the ideality of meanings, meaning-intentions, meaning-fulfilments, etc. Finally, it may be noted again that the full working-out of a formal logic is not to be found in Husserl's published writings. The Logical Investigations and the analyses found therein are really meta-logical in nature.

<sup>5</sup>Farber, Foundation, p. 228.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 203.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 231. Rather strangely, Husserl claims that the expression 'round-square' is meaningful even though it is a priori impossible for the expression to refer to an object. He argues that genuine meaninglessness

is restricted to such senseless utterances as 'abracadabra', 'Green is or', etc. In other words, he distinguishes between "meaninglessness" and "objectlessness" (the latter taken, of course, as referring to possibilities, e.g., 'Pegasus' is meaningful because it is not a priori impossible that there could be a corresponding intuition). Nevertheless, as will be indicated, he insists that knowledge is related to the possibility of the intuitive apprehension of an object. Since it is a priori impossible to intuit a round-square, it would seem that we don't really know what a round-square is; we don't really know what it would be like for a thing to be both round and square. The conjunction 'p.~p' is neither true nor false but meaningless. This would seem to hold for the expression 'round-square'. If Husserl is to be consistent, he must hold that all meaningful expressions refer to objects, either real, ideal, or fictive which are in principle capable of being intuited.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 238. An 'ideally unified meaning' is one which remains identical throughout the various occasions that it is intended or meant. It does not depend for its "being" upon a subjective act of intention. It can be intended or meant as in itself it really is by one or any number of thinkers on any number of occasions. It is therefore atemporal or "supra-temporal".

<sup>9</sup>Husserl, Logical Investigations, II, 92-93 (2nd ed., 1913), as quoted by Osborn, op. cit., p. 77.

<sup>10</sup>Husserl, Logical Investigations, II, 458 (1st ed., 1901), as quoted by Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution, p. 47.

<sup>11</sup>Mohanty, Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning, p. 95.

<sup>12</sup>Husserl, Logical Investigations, II, 92-93 (2nd ed., 1913), as quoted by Osborn, op. cit., p. 77.

<sup>13</sup>Husserl, Logical Investigations, II, 75 (1st ed., 1901), as quoted by Sokolowski, op. cit., p. 50.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., II, 364 (Sokolowski, p. 50).

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., II, 363 (Sokolowski, p. 52). It may be noted from the first part of this quotation that intentional acts themselves are known in the same way as are sensations. They are experienced but not perceived. This is also true for sensations of pain. However, by an act of reflection, both intentional acts and sensations can be "objectivated" for purposes of analysis and description.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., II, 164 (Sokolowski, p. 60).

<sup>17</sup>Husserl, Logical Investigations, II, 382 (2nd ed., 1913), as quoted by Osborn, op. cit., p. 89.

<sup>18</sup>Sokolowski, op. cit., p. 61.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>20</sup>Mohanty, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

<sup>21</sup>Husserl, Logical Investigations, II, 50-51 (1st ed., 1901), as quoted by Sokolowski, op. cit., p. 54.

<sup>22</sup>Husserl's distinction between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment is remarkably similar to the distinction between the idea as "immanent" and the idea as "transcendent" as found in the idealistic philosophy of Brand Blanshard. Blanshard, in formulating the "traditional" problem of knowledge, states that thought and object must be somehow similar; for if they were not, knowledge would be reduced to either a miracle or a fraud. On the other hand, thought and object must be in some way different from each other; for if the object does not, in some sense, transcend the knower, we would be involved in a thorough-going solipsistic subjectivism and the notion of error would be unintelligible. Blanshard's solution to this paradox is one which suggests a sameness in "kind" and a difference in "degree" between thought and object. He writes, "If thought can be seen as a stage on the way to its transcendent end or object, as that end itself in the course of becoming actual, the paradox of knowledge is in principle solved. The idea can then be both the same as its object and different; the same because it is the object in posse; different because that object, which is its end, is as yet incompletely realized." (Nature of Thought, I, 494.) In other words, the relation between idea and object is one in which the idea, on becoming fulfilled or more fully realized, approaches the object itself. When they are coincident, we have perfect knowledge. In Husserl, basically the same analysis applies. We have knowledge when the meaning-intention is adequately fulfilled by the object intuited. When the object gives itself as it is in itself, we have perfect knowledge of that object. Husserl is not concerned with the exact ontological status of the object. To be an object for Husserl is simply to appear as the object of an intentional act. Also, for both Husserl and Blanshard, the meaning of an idea lies neither in the external object nor the corresponding verifactory experience. Simple or intended meaning is something internal to the thinker. If this were not the case, it would be impossible to recognize an object as the fulfilment of the meaning - impossible to know that a given external object is the verifactory experience for precisely this or that idea. Only by first meaning something intentionally can I then admit that the experience of object x is the experience of the object-meant. Finally, we may note again that in the case of complete adequation between idea and object, Blanshard holds



that there is no distinction to be found between the immanent and the transcendent ends of thought. The idea has "become" its object, or the object has given itself completely to consciousness. The case is the same for Husserl. Perfect knowledge demands the complete self-givenness of the object to consciousness. There is no unknowable thing-in-itself which remains forever beyond our grasp.

<sup>23</sup>Pietersma, Edmund Husserl's Concept of Philosophical Clarification (University of Toronto, Doctoral Dissertation, 1961), pp. 49-50.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>25</sup>Husserl, Logical Investigations, III, 58 (2nd ed., 1913-1921), as quoted by Osborn, op. cit., p. 98.

<sup>26</sup>Osborn, op. cit., p. 99.

<sup>27</sup>Husserl, Logical Investigations, III, 121-122 (2nd ed., 1913-1921), as quoted by Osborn, op. cit., p. 101.

<sup>28</sup>Husserl, Logical Investigations, III, 137, as quoted by Farber, Foundation, p. 452.

<sup>29</sup>Husserl, Logical Investigations, II, 625 (1st ed., 1901), as quoted by Farber, op. cit., p. 460.

<sup>30</sup>A second example of such "containment" is provided by the act of identification. An act of perception may be dynamic in the sense that various "partial intentions" or shadings are synthesized in the intuitive apprehension of an object. For example, I may look at the ashtray from the front and then the sides and then from the back, yet every perspectival perception is still a perception of the ashtray. There is a fusion of partial acts into one - into a unity of identification. This unity is not, however, the result of an act of identification. In the case of the perception of an object, identification is experienced but not meant. The perception is the fulfilment of an intended object and not the fulfilment of an act of identification. What is perceived is the object and not the object's identity with itself. However, the act of perception can serve as the foundation for a conscious act of identification. In reflecting upon the unity of the partial intentions of the original act, we are explicitly recognizing that the ashtray as now perceived is the same ashtray as that which was perceived previously. This new act, although founded upon the sensuous-perception, is clearly distinct from it. Its intentional objective correlate is identity itself, a categorial object. Such an act, like all other categorial acts, presupposes in one way or another a foundation of simple intuitions, be they

"really" perceptions or "mere" imaginations. Thus, Husserl claims that the notion of pure thought, completely unrelated to sensory experience, is absurd. "The idea of a 'pure intellect', interpreted as a faculty of pure thought (here: of categorial action) and completely detached from every 'faculty of sensibility', could only be conceived before an elementary analysis of knowledge." (Logical Investigations, III, 183 (2nd ed., 1913-1921), as quoted by Farber, op. cit., p. 465.)

<sup>31</sup>Pietersma, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

<sup>32</sup>In the Logical Investigations, Husserl argues that categorial objects, to be "seen", must be constituted. In other words, categorial objects can come to self-givenness only through the intentional acts which result in their constitution. This is the first glimmering we have of the eventual identification (in Husserl's later philosophy) of constitution and intentional intuition. In Chapter II, in speaking of the intuitive apprehension or fulfilment of an act of intention, little is said about the process whereby an object is "given". It has been suggested that the "givenness" of an object in the knowledge situation was similar to the positivist notion of verification. While such an analysis is undoubtedly applicable to the Husserl of the Logical Investigations, it must be kept in mind that as he delves deeper and deeper into subjectivity, the distinction between a priori reason and experience (from the outside, so to speak) becomes diminished. If the content of consciousness is to be as indubitable as the intentional acts of consciousness, then that content must eventually be related solely to the a priori laws of subjectivity rather than to any external (and hence contingent) world of "fact". If philosophy is to be rigorous, it must restrict itself to the apriority and apodicticity of subjectivity. If it is to be the science of sciences, it must deal with "being". Consequently, if philosophy is to be a rigorous science, it must deal solely with being-in-subjectivity or being-for-consciousness. This is not, however, an idealistic metaphysic.

<sup>33</sup>Husserl, Logical Investigations, II, 183 (2nd ed., 1913-1921), as quoted by Osborn, op. cit., p. 78. Needless to say, neither we nor Husserl will remain content with such an ultimate "simple". The problem of the transcendental origin and structure of meaning itself plagues Husserl throughout his entire career. He digs deeper and deeper into subjectivity in the hope of finding (and giving) a rational and exact analysis of meaning. It is our contention, however, that the origin of meaning cannot be located and analyzed (without distortion) precisely because it is related to the amorphous pre-conceptual and pre-predicative world of embodied consciousness. (See Chapter Five.)

<sup>34</sup>Sokolowski, op. cit., p. 73.

<sup>35</sup>Hume, in discussing perception, moves from "impressions" to "ideas". An idea which cannot be traced back to its corresponding impression(s) is meaningless. He can affirm the latter, however, only because he has previously correlated 'meaning' and 'impression'. If we may use Humean terms in characterizing Husserl's analysis, it can be said that he begins with ideas and then describes how they may be verified by subsequent impressions. What is required, of course, is a complementary investigation of the origin of those ideas with which he begins.

<sup>36</sup>Husserl's language (and oftentimes careless use of words) is far from ideal even at the best of times. His philosophy could undoubtedly profit (or, perhaps, dissolve?) from a more rigorous use of terms. Key concepts, e.g., constitution, intentionality, sensory-data, etc., often have different meanings in different contexts.

<sup>37</sup>Farber, Foundation, p. 491. It may be added that that which distinguishes ideal from real being is the factor of temporality in an object's givenness. The ideal is non-temporal and the real is temporal in nature.

<sup>38</sup>Farber, Foundation, p. 476. It is, of course, debatable whether or not Husserl is saying much more than did Kant. Kant affirmed the validity of pure reason in the realm of phenomena. He limits that validity, however, to the phenomenal. Husserl also asserts that reason can attain absolute knowledge. He rejects, however, the "being" of the noumenal realm. The scope of the validity of reason remains the same for both if one considers that "to be an object is to appear as the object of an act of consciousness" is nothing more than a tautology. In that case then, it may be argued that whereas Kant limits reason (in favour of being), Husserl limits being (in favour of reason). This writer is inclined to view the fundamental phenomenological doctrine of refusing to separate subject and object as nothing more than a tautology. One cannot know anything without experiencing or knowing it. To be sure, this is an important tautology which is often overlooked. But to consider it as anything more than a tautology - for example, to claim as does Husserl that everything which is, is knowable - is to move arbitrarily from the psychological and logical to the ontological (in Husserl's case, from the transcendental to the ontological). It may be possible to demonstrate that a psychologistic interpretation of the "fundamental" laws of logic (and transcendental constitutive laws) is ultimately absurd. But it is not possible to escape from either ego-centric or logo-centric predicaments to make pronouncements of a universal nature. If there are other (than human) ways of constituting being, then there may be regions of being which are not, and never will be, open to us (presuming, of course, that the a priori laws governing our constitutive processes remain invariable). Thus, this writer would rephrase Husserl's "what we cannot think, cannot be" to read "what we cannot think, cannot be for us; and what cannot be for us, we cannot think". Assuming that Husserl's constitutive laws are (valid and) invariable (for us), there is absolutely no practical difference, however (unless, of course, one

wishes to speculate à la Kant on the possible noumenal realm(s) via a "practical" reason). Husserl's "transcendental idealism", considered from a methodological point of view, is subject to the same criticisms as traditional idealism, considered from a metaphysical point of view.

<sup>39</sup>Edie, in Pierre Thevenaz' What is Phenomenology?, (Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1962), p. 19.

<sup>40</sup>Farber, Foundation, p. 240.

<sup>41</sup>In Chapter One we spoke of "truths-in-themselves", i.e., of truths unrelated to judging. Strictly speaking, however, truth and falsity are, for Husserl, predicates of judgments. In the Second Edition of the Logical Investigations (1913-1921), Husserl, in attempting to bring the investigations themselves up to the transcendental level of the Ideas, made this quite explicit. He did not, however, remove the term "truths-in-themselves" from the Prolegomena. He felt that any such revisions might weaken the impact of the argument against psychologism.

<sup>42</sup>Transcendental logic and phenomenology in general claim to be presuppositionless. This aspect of phenomenology has often come under criticism. It is said that no philosophy can be put forward as absolutely presuppositionless. Such criticism, however, betrays a misunderstanding on the part of the critic. Phenomenology is presuppositionless only in the sense that it refuses to accept anything unquestioned. Certainly it has presuppositions. But they are examined presuppositions, which upon being brought to the light of evident self-giveness, are acceptable to the phenomenologist. It may be asked, "But what about the presuppositions from which an analysis of the presuppositions proceeds? Are these unquestioned?" The answer is an uncompromising "No". When pushed to the limit, even the principles of logic are subject to questioning. This is because (transcendental) logic is "the self-inspection of pure reason, or expressed ideally, is the science in which pure theoretical reason carries through complete self-reflection and objectifies itself in a system of principles. Pure reason, or logic, is thus referred back to itself; the self-inspection of pure reason is itself a purely rational activity and is subject to the principles which are investigated." (Farber, Foundation, p. 497.) And of course, given our logo-centric predicament, to ask that reason itself should be proved rational on any other basis than self-reference is to ask the impossible (if not the absurd).

## NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

<sup>1</sup>"Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft", Logos, I (1910-1911), 289-341. No better introduction to Husserl's phenomenology can be found than this article. It is the manifesto, so to speak, of the "new" philosophy (i.e., phenomenology), outlining not only the need for phenomenology but also its general methodological orientation. It reaffirms the capability of philosophy to be rigorous and specifies the conditions whereby it may achieve "scientific status". "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" attacks both Naturalism and the philosophies of Weltanschauung as not meeting these conditions - the former because it is naive in neglecting its ultimate foundations (viz., immediate phenomena) and the latter because its temporal finiteness inevitably results in sceptical absurdities. Husserl's criticisms of historicism are similar to those directed against psychologism (as outlined in Chapter One of this thesis) and hence need not be considered here. It is of utmost importance, however, to grasp the essence of his critique of Naturalism. If one fails to understand and/or accept Husserl's views on the inadequacies of Naturalism as a philosophic point of view, there is no hope of understanding phenomenology in general.

<sup>2</sup>Husserl, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy (Harper and Row, New York, 1965; translated and introduced by Q. Lauer), pp. 74-75.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 79.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 103. I can think of no better way of conveying the sense of this "naturalistic oversight" than by referring the reader to Sartre's Being and Nothingness (Part Three, Chapter Two: "Being-For-Others: The Body"). Sartre, in discussing "the body", distinguishes between three ontological levels of reflection, viz., the body as being-for-itself, the body for others, and myself known as body-known-by-the other. He insists that if we are to avoid becoming enmeshed in a hopelessly inextricable epistemological tangle, we must not confuse these ontological levels. Sartre claims that the body as it is for-itself does not appear to itself (i.e., to me) as in the midst of the world. It is for-itself in a different way than it is for-the-other. On this pre-reflective level, my body is not a thing among other things. Rather, it is that by which things are revealed to me. Hence, Sartre argues, "my-body-for-me" is nothing other than "consciousness", pure and simple. The terms are absolutely interchangeable. In short, the knowledge of my-body-for-me does not include reference to the physiological make-up and psycho-physical functionings of my body. The latter type of knowledge is derived from the observation of others and then referred back to myself. It is by means of the Other's concepts that I know my body as psycho-physical. Thusly am I

able to posit "illness", for example, as an object-for-me, or my hand as an object-for-me. I apprehend it as if I were the Other in relation to it. Only with the help of the Other's objectivating empirical knowledge does the knowledge of my body as a physiological organism become possible. All talk, then, of such things as sense organs and sensations is meaningless when considering my body as body-for-itself. Similarly, for Husserl, when considering experience as experience (or consciousness as intentional), it is incorrect to include reference to psycho-physical facts (or consciousness as psychological). To be sure, a psychological analysis of consciousness has its place. But that place comes after the more fundamental analysis of consciousness as intentional. Above all, the two levels must not be inter-mixed. The "naturalistic oversight", therefore, occurs when one neglects to consider consciousness as it is, in itself, pure and simple.

<sup>5</sup>Husserl, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", op. cit., p. 92.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 93.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 102.

<sup>8</sup>The error of utilizing "objective" concepts to describe fundamentally subjective experiences is no less rampant among the behaviouristic psychologists today. To describe an emotion, for example, as nothing more than the sum of publicly observable, physical characteristics which accompany that emotion is absurd. Emotion words name "inner" experiences which may precede or accompany behaviour. Correlation is not, however, identity. In fact, correlation presupposes non-identity. The experience of an emotion can neither be reduced to, nor adequately described by, either physiological reactions or patterns of behaviour. This is not to suggest, however, that all forms of behaviouristic psychology are fundamentally misguided. Those psychologists who correlate (rather than identify) psychical experiences and physical reactions are pursuing a complementary (rather than an anti-thetical) course of investigation to that of the phenomenologists. It must not be forgotten, however, that the very genuineness of the physiological psychologists' results is ultimately founded upon the more primordial phenomenological analyses of experience as experience.

<sup>9</sup>That which is psychical is ". . . ordered in an overall connection, in a "monadic" unity of consciousness, a unity that in itself has nothing at all to do with nature, with space and time or substantiality and causality, but has its thoroughly peculiar "forms". It is a flow of phenomena, unlimited at both ends, traversed by an intentional line that is, as it were, the index of the all-pervading unity. It is the line of an immanent "time" without beginning or end, a time that no chronometers measure." (Husserl, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", op. cit., pp. 107-108.)

<sup>10</sup>Husserl, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", op. cit., p. 89. It is evident that such an investigation (viz., phenomenological), must overcome the dearth of appropriate language in which what is "seen" may be subsequently expressed. We live in the world of things - our everyday attitude (and language) is the "natural" one, not the phenomenological. There is some excuse, then, for Husserl's elaborate (and widespread use of) jargon. There is also some excuse for the frequent misinterpretations of Husserl's philosophy, e.g., that being is existentially dependent on the transcendental ego. On the whole, however, Husserl's view of language is somewhat naive. He says, for example, in The Idea of Phenomenology (p. 24) that ". . . we can make our speech conform in a pure measure to what is "seen" in its full clarity". What would seem to be required, therefore, is a thorough investigation of the relationship between phenomena and description, with special emphasis on the extent to which conceptualization distorts the "pure" phenomena.

<sup>11</sup>Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology (M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1964; a translation by Alston and Nakhnikian of Die Idee der Phanomenologie, Husserliana II), p. 15.

<sup>12</sup>Hereafter, the terms 'philosophy' and 'phenomenology' are synonymous. Only the phenomenological approach is truly philosophical. "Traditional philosophy" does not really deserve being called philosophical, in that it is neither rigorous nor absolutely fundamental. Rather presumptuously, Husserl considers his own reflections on experience qua experience to be of such momentous importance, so radical, and so indubitable as alone to merit the label of 'philosophy'.

<sup>13</sup>Husserl, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", op. cit., p. 109.

<sup>14</sup>"The critique of cognition is the attempt of cognition to find a scientific understanding of itself and to establish objectively what cognition is in its essence, what is the meaning of the relation to an object which is implicit in the claim to cognition and what its objective validity or the reaching of its object comes to if it is to be cognition in the true sense." (Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, op. cit., p. 22.)

<sup>15</sup>Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, p. 22.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>18</sup>"Whoever does not see or will not see, who talks and argues, but always remains at the place where he accepts all conflicting points of view

and at the same time denies them all, there is nothing we can do with him. We cannot answer: "obviously" it is the case. For he denies that there is any such thing as "obviously"." (Husserl, Ibid., p. 49.)

<sup>19</sup>"All cognition which is not evident, which though it intends or posits something objective yet does not see it itself, is transcendent. . . . In such cognition we go beyond what at any time is truly given, beyond what can be directly "seen" and apprehended." (Husserl, Ibid., p. 28.)

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>21</sup>Husserl calls this a fundamental epistemological principle. " . . . An epistemological reduction has to be accomplished in the case of every epistemological inquiry of whatever sort of cognition. That is to say, everything transcendent that is involved must be bracketed, or be assigned the index of indifference, of epistemological nullity, an index which indicates: the existence of all these transcendencies, whether I believe in them or not, is not here my concern; this is not the place to make judgments about them; they are entirely irrelevant." (Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, p. 31.) It cannot be overly emphasized that once the epoche is instituted, it is, within the context of Husserlian phenomenology, never retracted.

<sup>22</sup>Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (Allen and Unwin, London, 1931), p. 92. Inadequate though it may be, this English translation of Husserl's "Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie" (1913) by Boyce-Gibson is the only one available. A 'primordial dator intuition' is, for Husserl, an "originarily giving perception" or a "first-hand intuition". It is the ultimate source of authority for knowledge. It is that which is given "first-hand" (not by deduction or inference) as clear and distinct, as indubitably self-evident. It is that which it is absurd to want to further justify, confirm, or refute.

<sup>23</sup>Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, p. 35. Italics added. To rephrase le bon David's advice: "Be a phenomenologist, but amidst all your phenomenology, be still a poet." One wonders (beneath the clouds of obscurity) if there is an "essential" connection between the two.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 51.



<sup>27</sup>As indicated in Chapters One and Two of this thesis, 'evidence' is not to be confused with a psychological "feeling" of truth. The difference between an evident judgment and a non-evident judgment is a difference in the fulfilment of an intention. "One time I "see", and in "seeing" the inter-relation itself is given; the other time I perform a symbolic reference. One time I have intuition; the other time I have an empty intention. . . . Evidence is this consciousness which is truly a "seeing" consciousness and which has a direct and adequate grasp of itself and that signifies nothing other than adequate self-givenness." (Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, p. 47.) It would seem necessary that, if one starts from an intentional analysis of consciousness, absolute givenness can be the only ultimate criterion of truth. Whether or not it is completely adequate, however, is another question. For one thing it makes argument, in the final analysis, impossible. If two phenomenologists disagree over what is "seen", that is the end of the matter. And unfortunately, this is all too often the case.

<sup>28</sup>Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology (in "The Train of Thoughts in The Lectures"), p. 8.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 9-10.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>31</sup>"Cognitive acts, more generally any mental acts, are not isolated particulars, coming and going in the stream of consciousness without any interconnections. As they are essentially related to one another, they display a teleological coherence and corresponding connections of realization, corroboration, verification, and their opposites. And on these connections, which present an intelligible unity, a great deal depends. . . . It is in these interconnections that the objectivity involved in the objective sciences is first constituted." (Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, p. 60.) Cf., Chapter Two of this thesis: formal logic as formal ontology.

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

<sup>1</sup>Husserl, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", op. cit., p. 113.

<sup>2</sup>It is to be noted that the laws governing such constitution are no less essential than the universals constituted. They are not mere "psychological" generalizations derived from introspection and induction. Being brought to the light of complete self-givenness, the laws and principles governing the possible modes of experience could not be other than what they are. This is part of the definition of 'perfect fulfilment'. Husserl advises us to guard against the "Humean confusion" of confounding phenomenological intuition with introspection. Acts of phenomenological intuition posit essences whereas introspection concerns itself with particular details. (Husserl, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", op. cit., p. 115.) Alternatively stated (by Lauer), "introspection" looks only at conscious activity, not at its objective correlate (noema). Only "reflection" does the latter.

<sup>3</sup>In speaking of misinterpretations of Husserl's philosophy or, for that matter, of phenomenology in general, we are, of course, always referring to those who do not agree with our own interpretation. Since no two authorities agree, in all respects, on what Husserl is attempting to accomplish, it would seem that there can be, at most, but one "correct" interpretation. There are, however, good reasons for interpreting Husserl in various ways. His lack of precision in the use of terminology and his admittedly conscious leanings toward "transcendental idealism" in his "mature period" (not to be taken as value-laden) are but two such factors. In this respect his writings are somewhat like Biblical texts, in that one is sure to find a supporting quotation for almost any interpretation one likes. Generally speaking, authorities and critics of Husserl's philosophy may be classified as realistically, idealistically, and neutrally oriented. The same classification may be applied to "practising" phenomenologists and interpreters of the movement in general. It is our belief that the only valid interpretation of Husserl's philosophy (and of phenomenology) is a "neutral" one. Those who claim that it is idealistic miss the proper sense of the epoche and thereafter interpret such terms as 'constitution', 'necessary being', etc., in such a way as to imply that consciousness actually creates being. One must not lose hold of the basic fact that out of pure consciousness can come only pure consciousness. Those who claim, on the other hand, that Husserl's philosophy is realistic, lose sight of the very meaning of the word 'phenomenology', viz., the logos of phenomena. It is not the logos of real being or of "reality" (in the Scholastic sense) but rather, the logos of "reality-phenomena" (excluding, at present, the realm of "ideal being"). One must not lose hold of the basic fact that out

of experience can come only experience. One cannot escape either logocentric or ego-centric predicaments. Husserl is surely to be criticized on this point. Husserl's philosophy (and phenomenology in general), interpreted "neutrally", must therefore be conceived as a method of clarification. To be sure, it is, in one respect, a most important method, in that it deals with consciousness as intentional, with experience *qua* experience. And it cannot be denied that all other methods of investigation presuppose cognition. Nevertheless, phenomenology is still merely a method among methods. It is, for example, subject to the same logical canons of intelligibility as are other methods of investigation. It is probable that many areas of subjectivity have been "opened" by phenomenology, which, were it not for the latter, would remain "unexplored". But in connection with the natural sciences, phenomenology can surely be dispensed with. Provided one is not pathologically concerned with "unquestionable foundations", the results obtained via "natural" investigation may be accepted at face value simply because they "work".

<sup>4</sup>In the Logical Investigations, The Idea of Phenomenology, and the Ideas, Husserl all but neglects the hyletic data in the analysis of constitution. As was pointed out in the Conclusion to Chapter Two of this thesis, such neglect is a serious shortcoming. He insists that it is the noetic phases of an intentional act which are responsible for the constitution of meaning. It cannot be denied, however, that the hyletic dimension plays a role (and, indeed, a rather large one) in the constitution of an object as this (rather than that) object. If his phenomenology is to be absolutely presuppositionless, he cannot rest content with the explanation of the constitution of noemata; for that explanation involves the assumption of two components, viz., the noetic aspects and sensory data. "The question here is thus not how to explain noemas. Their constitution is explained by noeses and hyletic data. The problem is to explain these noeses and sensations themselves." (Sokolowski, op. cit., p. 161.) Or, in Humean language, phenomenology, as a theory of cognition, must not only clarify ideas by relating them to impressions; it must also clarify the status and nature of impressions themselves. What, if anything, is the "material", the "founding strata" for their constitution? What can be said about the various noetic aspects of an intentional act, etc., etc.? Husserl does attempt to investigate these "deeper" problems in conjunction with the analysis of time. His lectures on The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (delivered between 1905 and 1910, edited by M. Heidegger and published in 1928) contain relevant material. Unfortunately, however, they are far from adequate. Aside from blatant contradictions from one section to the next, the investigations pertaining to time can hardly be said to proceed by way of "essential insight". Husserl's "seeing" is more often than not colored by what, in fact, it would be (theoretically) consistent for him to "see". Finally, since there are approximately 6,000 additional pages of unpublished material pertaining to these very problems, it would seem somewhat premature to attempt an exposition and/or criticism of Husserl's thought on such matters.

<sup>5</sup>In the straightforward attitude one ignores the object's intendedness, believedness, attendedness, etc., and lives in one's intending, believing, attending of the object per se; in the reflective attitude one pays attention to the intendedness of the same intended object. No matter how one may be busied straightforwardly - believing, doubting, denying; liking or fearing; perceiving, phantasying, willing - no matter what the object of one's concern is meant as being - a stone, an atom, an adjective, an angel, space or time, or even the world itself as a concrete whole - always one can adopt a reflective attitude and concern oneself with the object as what one is, or was, busied with straightforwardly, as what remains intended, in this manner or that, as having such and such determinations. When one does so, one is attending the "intentional" object, the same object qua object of one's consciousness." (Dorion Cairns, "An Approach to Phenomenology" in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, ed., Farber, pp. 9-10.) The natural attitude is also, of course, the attitude and approach of the "natural" scientist. That his approach is not as "fundamental" as that of the phenomenologist is not to suggest that phenomenology should replace the natural sciences. The phenomenological method should be viewed as complementary, not as antithetical, to other valid methods of inquiry. To be sure, the phenomenological field of investigation embraces all particular branches of the natural and social sciences, in that phenomenology is concerned with meaningful experiences of all types. Nevertheless, "to attempt to use the phenomenological method exclusively, with an artificial conception of experience as divorced from its natural status in the world and its cultural conditions, would be to fail to do justice to experience itself in the complete sense of the term. That would be to substitute metaphors for reality, and to miss the descriptive role of phenomenology. . . . Just as "pure logic" was not intended to displace logic as an art, so there can be no thought of making an eidetic and transcendental discipline legislate for or substitute for the factual sciences." (Farber, Foundation, p. 535.) One must remember, however, that although the phenomenological method is to be used in conjunction with other methods of inquiry, it must be used alongside those methods. If "levels" of analysis are not sharply delineated and adhered to, confusions and paradoxes are inevitable.

<sup>6</sup>In performing the phenomenological reduction, "We have literally lost nothing, but have won the whole of Absolute Being, which, properly understood, conceals in itself all transcendencies, "constituting" them within itself." (Husserl, Ideas, pp. 154-155.)

<sup>7</sup>Cairns, "An Approach to Phenomenology", op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>8</sup>Cf., Pietersma, op. cit., p. 172.

<sup>9</sup>Husserl, Ideas, p. 136. "We do not see appearances and then infer reality from them, but we perceive reality directly through appearances and sensations. . . . The world that we perceive, the world that we "constitute", is the real world. The world of phenomena is not a veil between us and reality; it is reality [as meant] itself." (Sokolowski, op. cit., p. 134.)

<sup>10</sup>For Husserl, it is axiomatic that the meaning of a "thing" is determined through what is given in "thing-perception". ". . . What things are (the things about which alone we ever speak, and concerning whose being or non-being, so being or not so being, we can alone contend and reach rational decisions), they are as things of experience. Experience alone prescribes their meaning, and indeed, when we are dealing with things that are founded on fact, it is actual experience in its definitely ordered empirical connections which does the prescribing." (Husserl, Ideas, pp. 147-148.) ". . . What else could determine the meaning? . . ." (Ibid., p. 138.)

<sup>11</sup>See especially Chapters Two and Three of the Second Section, Ideas, I.

<sup>12</sup>"We perceive the Thing Through the "perspective" manifestations of all its determinate qualities, i.e., sensory-data which in any given case are "real", and strictly "fall within the perception. An experience has no perspectives (Ein Erlebnis schattet sich nicht ab). It is not an accidental caprice of the Thing nor an accident of "our human constitution" that "our" perception can reach the things themselves only and merely through their perspective modifications. On the contrary, it is evident, and it follows from the essential nature of spatial thinghood (and in the widest sense inclusive of "visual illusions") that Being of this species can, in principle, be given in perceptions only by way of perspective manifestation; and it follows likewise from the essential nature of cogitationes, of experiences in general, that they exclude these perspective shadings; or, otherwise stated, when referring to that which has being in this region, anything of the nature of "appearing", or self-revealing through perspective variations, has simply no meaning." (Husserl, Ideas, p. 134.)

<sup>13</sup>In the Ideas, the terms 'immanent', 'immanent perception', 'transcendent', and 'transcendent perception' carry their more traditional meanings related to the distinction between "within" and "without" the mind. There is no re-definition of these terms as suggested in The Idea of Phenomenology. Needless to say, this does not affect the outcome of Husserl's conclusions.

<sup>14</sup>"To remain forever incomplete after this fashion is an ineradicable essential of the correlation Thing and Thing-perception. . . . No God can alter this in any way, any more than He can the equation  $1 + 2 = 3$ , or the stability of any other essential truth." (Husserl, Ideas, p. 138.) It is not too difficult for this reader to imagine a Thing which, although necessarily perceived perspectively by man, is not perceived in this manner by a

creature with a different set of perceptual equipment. One wonders how "essential" and "universal" are Husserl's "essential insights".

<sup>15</sup>Husserl, Ideas, p. 140.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 144.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 145-146. (Italics added.)

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 148.

<sup>19</sup>" . . . The whole spatio-temporal world, to which man and the human Ego claim to belong as subordinate singular realities, is according to its own meaning, mere intentional Being, a Being, therefore, which has the merely secondary, relative sense of a Being for a consciousness. It is a Being which consciousness in its own experiences (Erfahrungen) posits. . . . Reality . . . has the essentiality of something which in principle is only intentional, only known, consciously presented as an appearance." (Husserl, Ideas, pp. 153-154.) It is essential that we understand exactly what Husserl is saying here. He is not saying that "reality" is fictitious or anything else along those lines. He is saying no more than did Hume, viz., that we cannot prove, on empirical grounds, that the reality of the Scholastics really exists. Consequently we have to readjust our conception of reality to that which is posited by consciousness as being real. No objects are lost (or gained) thereby. Trees, elephants, and ashtrays are still trees, elephants, and ashtrays. But as Hume so convincingly shows, it is a priori impossible to compare the tree as presented with some "real" tree "out there" (in-and-for-itself). This is why "reality", conceived Scholastically, is really meaningless. For both Hume and Husserl, the mode of being which a thing has is determinable solely through an analysis of its mode of givenness. Reality, for Hume, is that which is presented as an impression (rather than, say, a complex idea). Reality, for Husserl, is the objective correlate of perceptual acts (rather than, say, of imaginative acts). Perceptual acts (and perceptual acts alone) posit (real) existence. This is why reality essentially (taken strictly) lacks independence. "If anyone objects, with reference to these discussions of ours, that they transform the whole world into subjective illusion and throw themselves into the arms of an "idealism such as Berkeley's", we can only make answer that he has not grasped the meaning of these discussions. We subtract . . . nothing . . . from the plenitude of the world's Being, from the totality of all realities. . . . It is not that the real sensory world is "recast" or denied, but that an absurd interpretation of the same, which indeed contradicts its own mentally clarified meaning, is set aside." (Husserl, Ideas, pp. 168-169.)

<sup>20</sup>Husserl, Ideas, p. 168. "What world is it that is thus relative to subjectivity? The world which is meant, thought of, intended; the phenomenal,

intentional world, the world that carries a 'sense'." (Sokolowski, op. cit., p. 129.) Just as the "everyday" sense of 'reality' is modified by Husserl (into 'unities of meaning'), so also, the naturalistic definition of consciousness is here out of place. Those critics who find Husserl's phenomenology absurd because of its "idealism" invariably misinterpret the new sense of these terms. Some have even attributed to Husserl the ridiculous doctrine that before man (or an equivalent sentient being) evolved, nothing was. All Husserl is saying is that meaning presupposes consciousness. He is certainly not claiming that consciousness creates real objects. He is saying that the naive concept of reality presupposes a reality-phenomenon. His standpoint on reality is as sceptical as that of Hume.

<sup>21</sup>While we are not interested, at the present moment, in the phenomenological epoche, it is understandable why Husserl is able to introduce it with such ease at this point in his Ideas. Since the natural world "is" only insofar as it constitutes itself within consciousness; since consciousness itself is essentially independent of all natural being; and since that which is grasped immanently is grasped apodictically, it would seem obvious that philosophy, as a rigorous science, must concern itself with the phenomenal, with the constituted, with pure consciousness in its own absolute being, with the world as experienced rather than with the world as (naively) existing. If reality is considered merely intentionally, as the correlate of consciousness, as a "sense", then it can be retained for purposes of analysis (after the reduction) in the sphere of absolute subjectivity. "In this way, the reality we lose in performing the reduction is found again, and takes its place within the sphere of absolute being and absolute experience. The world itself is not made absolute, and it does not become given to us authentically and apodictically in itself, but its correlation to perception is given absolutely. If we can clarify this correlation, this "constitution", through phenomenological research, we will be giving an absolute, apodictic explanation of the sense of reality, and will thus carry out philosophy as a rigorous science. It will be a self-justifying science, unmarred by the possibility of error or doubt because, Husserl claims, we are no longer operating in the field in which error and doubt are possible." (Sokolowski, op. cit., p. 131.) It is to be noted that after the phenomenological reduction is imposed, we "live" entirely in acts of reflection, in acts of a second level or order. This, Husserl calls "the basic field of Phenomenology". (Ideas, p. 155.)

<sup>22</sup>Farber, Foundation, p. 476. (Italics added.)

<sup>23</sup>Cf., Farber, Foundation, p. 533.

<sup>24</sup>Spiegelberg, "The Reality-Phenomenon and Reality", in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, p. 96. (Italics added.)

## NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

<sup>1</sup>Pietersma, op. cit., p. 201. It is not surprising that the phenomenological movement, subsequent to Husserl, has gone the way it has. Husserl was primarily interested in the constitution of that which is, both real and ideal (taken as noemata), so as to found all other (presumptive) knowledge. But if consciousness is "the place" where reality appears, then the complete structure of that "place" should be elucidated - not necessarily with a view towards securing the foundations of knowledge but simply as to the nature of that being which "permits" other beings to be (Dasein). Husserl "disengages" consciousness from the natural world for purposes of analyzing and describing experience qua experience. He disengages it in order to reconstitute the world in it. It is in this way that he is able to "secure" the structure and order of the world. It would seem necessary, however, to deny that Husserl's transcendental ego has any kind of status apart from the world. This is supported by a passage in the Ideas where he indicates that it is merely the 'I think' which must accompany all my presentations. (Ideas, p. 173.) If, however, the transcendental ego is what it is only with reference to the world, if it is merely the pure possibility of experience in general, it is difficult to conceive how it can function as it does after the reduction - constituting this and that, "seeing" this and that, etc. Does this indicate that ". . . we can bracket the existence of the world and with it our psychological ego . . . only insofar as the psychological ego is the object of psychological analysis . . .?" (Schmitt, Reconstruction in Empiricism, p. 236.) Is it the psychological ego which performs the reduction and which in turn must be reduced? Does this infinite regress of reductions lend support to Merleau-Ponty's claim that the epoche can "go no further" than the world of "lived" experience, the world of embodied consciousness? If this is true (and Husserl's late interest in the Lebenswelt seems to confirm that it is) then what are we to say about the "absolute" foundations of knowledge?

<sup>2</sup>Farber, Foundation, p. 529. ". . . Constitution occurs only on the cognitive side, and it would be sheer dogmatism to inject such a condition into the essence of objectivity." (Ibid., p. 520.)

<sup>3</sup>The distinction between phenomenological ontology and ontology simpliciter is based upon the distinction between eidetic noemata and essential knowledge of objects simpliciter. It is a difference in attitude, in the way in which essences are attended. The phenomenologist attends to that which is by reflecting on its modes of givenness. The ontologist (simpliciter) approaches objects directly. He characterizes the essential features which an object must have if it is to be an object of such-and-such a region of being. The phenomenologist characterizes the way in which an



object must be intended if it is to be of such-and-such a region. "Eidetic descriptions of constitutive experiences take the place of physical reality." (Farber, Foundation, p. 533.)

<sup>4</sup>This aspect of phenomenology is often subject to criticism. Usually, however, the criticism is misdirected. The phenomenologist neither has a "mystic" grasp of essences nor is he incapable of being in error. That his results are absolute is really a matter of definition. If one accepts as indubitable only that which is given in its entirety, then that which is given cannot possibly be other than it is, for, if it were, it could not have been intuited originally in its entirety. One may recall here the distinction between meaning-intentions and meaning-fulfilments. Genuine or indubitable knowledge arises when that which is merely meant "reaches its fulfilment" in a coinciding intuition, when there is nothing which remains meant but not intuited, when that which is meant is "given" in its entirety. When this is not the case, "knowledge" is always subject to qualification. However, insofar as the phenomenologist remains within that which is given in "first-hand" intuition (primordial dator intuition), i.e., insofar as he does not infer that which is not directly "seen" from that which is, his results are unquestionable. If one wishes to criticize phenomenological "seeing", the more likely direction for such criticism is toward the difficulties surrounding the temporal synthesis of partial intentions in an "active" constitutive intuition. Husserl asserts that the indubitableness of cogitationes is restricted to the time in which they are enacted. (The Idea of Phenomenology, p. 24.) This "time" he describes as the triadic unity of retention - now phase - protension. Questions arise, however. If all now-phases involve a protension (the immediate horizon of expectation) then it would seem that one would have to consciously "cut-off" the area of intuition before claiming that that intuition was indubitable. If, however, this is done, then the cogitatio is no longer "being enacted" and, presumably, is subject to the viscidities of memory. The same type of problem arises in considering the other "end" of the triadic unity, that of retention.

NOTES TO APPENDIX A

<sup>1</sup>Edmund Husserl, "Recollections of Franz Brentano" in O. Kraus: Franz Brentano, zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre (Munich, 1919: C. H. Beck), pp. 151-167; as quoted by A. D. Osborn, Edmund Husserl and his Logical Investigations, p. 16.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>3</sup>Husserl received the degree of doctor of philosophy in the winter semester of 1882-1883 from the University of Vienna. His dissertation, entitled Contributions to the Theory of the Calculus of Variations, was done under the direction of Professor Leo Königsberger. Its publication was initially postponed in order that he might expand and/or amplify it. However, such amplification was not carried out (as his interests in mathematics were soon replaced by philosophy) and, consequently, the dissertation was never published.

<sup>4</sup>In our consideration of the influential factors in the growth of Husserl's phenomenology, we must not neglect the seeds sown by Brentano. However, just as the seed differs from the mature plant, the mature philosophy of the disciple differs radically from that of his master. We must, therefore, be on guard against suggesting that "such-and-such" is merely "taken-over" by Husserl from Brentano. In every case, "such-and-such" is incorporated only after transformation and development.

<sup>5</sup>Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement, I, 29.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>I acknowledge my debt to H. Spiegelberg's The Phenomenological Movement for biographical material on Brentano.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>10</sup>Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874); as quoted by H. Spiegelberg, Phen. Move., I, 35.

<sup>11</sup>Farber, Foundation, p. 11.

<sup>12</sup>Spiegelberg, Phen. Move., I, 37.

<sup>13</sup>It is also noteworthy to compare descriptive psychology with Husserl's pre-transcendental phenomenology.

<sup>14</sup>Spiegelberg, Phen. Move., I, 38. Unfortunately, however, he fails to specify why "inner perception" is indubitable. The difference between "immediate awareness" and introspection is cloudy, to say the least.

<sup>15</sup>Franz Brentano, "The Distinction Between Mental and Physical Phenomena" (Vol. I, Bk. II, Chap. i of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint as translated by D. B. Terrell) in Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, ed., R. M. Chisholm (Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 41.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 42. For Brentano, even the lowly feelings of pleasure and displeasure presuppose a presentation of some sort. He does, however, encounter a little difficulty in supporting this. Can one distinguish between pain as a physical phenomenon and the "feeling-painful"? Brentano replies that although we sometimes have difficulty in doing so, there is always a distinction to be made. Many people have been deceived on this account for two reasons: (a) When several sensory phenomena appear together (e.g., a tactile phenomenon, a phenomenon of temperature, and a feeling of pain), we often regard them as being one. This is particularly so when the strength of one phenomenon overshadows the others. (b) Quite often we use the same word to describe different phenomena. For example, we say that the foot pains and we include reference both to a physical phenomenon and a feeling. (Brentano states that such equivocation is one of the foremost hindrances to our knowledge of distinctions.) "We may, accordingly, regard it as an indubitably correct definition of mental phenomena that they are either presentations or . . . rest on presentations as their basis." (Brentano, op. cit., p. 47.)

The thesis that presentations are primary in all mental phenomena provides a characteristic example of what becomes, in Husserlian terminology, the method of 'essential insight'. Presentations (both in the sense of act and in the sense of that which is presented) are classified as the primary mental phenomena precisely because while they can stand alone, it is inconceivable that other types of mental phenomena (e.g., judging, wishing, willing) could do likewise. Such an experiment in imagination (disciplined "imaginative variation") has given us a law or essential structure which, although presupposing experiential acquaintance with the relevant phenomena, is not founded on mere induction.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>18</sup> Spiegelberg, Phen. Move., I, 40.

<sup>19</sup> See, however, Note #27 to this Appendix.

<sup>20</sup> For Brentano, it can be seen that consciousness is always reflexive (in the sense of a subject-object dichotomy). There must always be an object for consciousness; or, in other words, consciousness is always consciousness of something. Unconscious psychological phenomena (in which the object is not "there", so to speak) are self-contradictory and, consequently, fictitious.

<sup>21</sup> Franz Brentano, "Presentation and Judgment From Two Distinct Fundamental Classes" (trans., D. B. Terrell); Chisholm, op. cit., p. 63.

<sup>22</sup> In most cases (Brentano suggests), we can attribute the untenable view to our manner of expression when using the 'is' of predication. It can be shown, however, that categorical propositions are reducible to existential propositions. In such a reduction, the 'being' of the existential proposition replaces the copula. Since existence is not a predicate (i.e., since the statement 'A exists' is no more than the affirmation of 'A'), we can conclude that the content of a judgment is not necessarily greater than its corresponding presentation. It may also be shown that such propositions as 'A centaur is a poetic fiction' may be reduced similarly to existential propositions. Thus, we have, on reduction, the proposition 'There exists a centaur imaginatively created by poets.' We must, of course, add the phrase 'imaginatively created', for without such reference there would be nothing existing even in the presentation. To conclude then, we must not confuse such differences of language with differences in thought. Presentations and judgments do indeed form two distinct fundamental classes; but this distinction is not related to the content of that which is presented and judged.

<sup>23</sup> Franz Brentano, "The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena"; Chisholm, op. cit., p. 53.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. For a further elaboration, see Note #27 to this Appendix.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 58.

<sup>26</sup> See, however, Note #27 to this Appendix.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., pp. 59-60. While we are primarily concerned with Brentano's philosophy as exerting influence on that of Husserl, we have included this rather lengthy quotation in order to clear up certain misunderstandings related to Brentano's philosophy itself. Brand Blanshard cites Brentano

as influential in bringing in the neo-realist trend at the turn of the century. (Cf., his Nature of Thought, I, 394ff.) This is undoubtedly true if all that is claimed is that Brentano explicitly distinguished between the acts of consciousness and the objects of those acts. If, however, the term 'neo-realism' is used with reference to those who assert that the "external" object of knowledge is grasped as it really is, then Brentano is certainly not a realist. One can see from the quoted passage that there is a distinction drawn between physical phenomena as "immanent contents" arising through sensation and the so-called external "powers" which we assume to be the cause of the physical phenomena. Of these "powers", little (if anything) can be said; for the act of sensation manifests physical phenomena intentionally inexistent and, consequently, puts the content of the phenomena on exactly the same basis as the psychical phenomena; viz., immanent. The phrase 'outer perception' is not really appropriate therefore, except insofar as it serves to distinguish between impressions and ideas. (Brentano was, of course, extremely influenced by the empiricism of Hume. His lectures on Hume served to stimulate Husserl's interest in British Empiricism. Husserl once said something to the effect that he knew of no better introduction to phenomenology than a study of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.) It is clear, then, that the distinctions between physical and psychical phenomena are no more than ways of characterizing impressions and ideas. There is some ambiguity in this interpretation of Brentano's philosophy, however. He characterizes physical phenomena as (probably) extended, as not necessarily presented as a unity, and as not being intentionally inexistent (i.e., as having no reference to a content). Insofar as such characterizations refer to the "powers themselves", they are only hypothetical. Insofar as they are characterizations of physical phenomena qua phenomena, they are somewhat dubious. There seems to be some justification, then, in Marvin Farber's claim that Brentano is not consistent in his usage of the term(s) 'perception' (and 'phenomena'). Brentano argues that outer perception is not evident and most likely, even deceptive. This is certainly true if, by 'physical phenomena' he means the physical powers themselves and their properties, etc. However, he fails to distinguish clearly between this usage of the word 'perceived' with the figurative one "which refers to the presenting contents immanently belonging to the perception, instead of to the outer objects; and he designates not only outer objects but also these immanent contents as 'physical phenomena'". (Farber, Foundation, p. 485.) The perception of the immanent contents has the same claim to be infallible as any "inner perception" for, in fact, they are now presented exactly as are psychical phenomena. Further, "physical phenomena" in this latter sense have just as much actuality as psychical phenomena, for actuality does not, of course, refer to the reality of what exists outside of consciousness. (The problem is somewhat resolved by Husserl. Given certain qualifications, that which is presented as impression has the same claim to infallibility as that which is presented as idea. 'Inner' and 'outer' perception have the same epistemological character with reference to a transcendental ego. See Chapter Three.)

Aside from denying that Brentano was a neo-realist, we have not, unfortunately, accomplished what was hoped for; viz., a clarification of

his philosophy. Perhaps this is not absolutely necessary to do within the scope of this thesis. It has been said that Husserl's phenomenology would not have developed as it did if it were not for his misinterpretations of Brentano's philosophy. There is some justification, then (however ironical), for leaving the latter in its present ambiguous state. We at least see some of the problems which Husserl must face in his own theory. Suffice it to say that Brentano's interpretation of our knowledge of the external world is quite similar to that of Kant (with a little admixture of Hume's "agnosticism" and Mill's "permanent possibilities of sensations"). This is brought out quite clearly in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint where he states:

We have seen what the nature of that knowledge is which the natural scientist is able to acquire. The phenomena of light, of sound, of warmth, of place and local movement, with which he deals, are not things which exist really and truly. They are signs of something real which produces the representations (Vorstellungen) of them through its causal efficacy. . . . What really exists does not itself appear and what appears does not truly exist. The case is different with the phenomena of inner perception. They are true in themselves.

(Brentano, Psychologie (1874), p. 24; as quoted by R. G. Schmitt in his Husserl's Phenomenology: Reconstruction in Empiricism (Ph.D. thesis, Yale Univ., 1956), p. 50.

<sup>28</sup> Spiegelberg, Phen. Move. I, 48. Brentano agreed that such entities are often conveniently used, for example in mathematics. However, "the sentences in which they occur may be translated into other sentences whose terms refer only to genuine objects - to individual concrete things." We must refrain from the temptation to treat the content of a judgment as objectively existing. Failure to do so leads to disastrous complications and "over-populations" (e.g., the concrete apple, the existence of an apple, the non-existence of the non-existence of an apple, etc., etc.).

<sup>29</sup> "Truth has no being outside of the person judging; in other words, it exists only in that loose and improper sense, but not strictly and in reality." (Brentano, "Genuine and Fictitious Objects", Chisholm, op. cit., p. 72.

<sup>30</sup> "The fact that such fictions are useful in logic has led many to believe that logic has non-things as well as things as its object and, accordingly, that the concept of its object is more general than that of the real. This is, however, thoroughly incorrect; indeed, according to what has been said, it is downright impossible, for there cannot be anything

at all other than real objects, and the same homogeneous concept of the real, as the most general concept of all, comprehends everything which is truly an object. . . . Logic is a technical discipline, and is intended to put us in a position to acquire knowledge by means of inquiry and proof. It is an art of judgment. Only insofar as, in judging, we have things of all kinds as objects, do these come within our view - indirectly, as it were; while directly it is knowledge (strictly speaking, the knowing subject) which is to be designated as the object of logic." (Brentano, "Genuine and Fictitious Objects", Chisholm, op. cit., p. 75.)

One can see that Brentano's refusal to admit ideal objects of knowledge is in direct contrast to Husserl's program as outlined in Chapter One of this thesis. It cannot be said, however, that the criticism of psychologism in Husserl's Prolegomena to Pure Logic is applicable to Brentano. To be sure, Brentano remained a believer in psychology as the necessary foundation of philosophy. But his descriptive psychology was liberated from the physicalism and physiologism of the psychologizers. Their positions then, with regard to what is to be the foundation of philosophy, are quite similar. For Brentano, it was descriptive psychology; for Husserl, phenomenology. Even their approaches to methodological logic were similar, in that both emphasized an initial clarification of the concepts of expression and meaning. Both also appreciated the intimate relationship that exists between logic and the theory of science.

<sup>31</sup>Spiegelberg, Phen. Move. I, 50. It is hardly necessary to conclude this Appendix by stating explicitly all the areas in which Brentano's philosophy influenced Husserl's. We would like to mention one of these, however. In the Introductory Remarks, it was noted that Husserl admired "the way in which he [Brentano] brought back all philosophical concepts to their original sources in intuition". This method of clarification is characteristic of Husserl's entire philosophy. A study of that which is must include a study on the way in which that which is presents itself to a mind.

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