AN EXAMINATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT
OF PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
IN HIS EARLY DIALOGUES

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. THE PRESOCRATIC ORIGINS OF PLATO'S THOUGHT</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. SOCRATES AND THE SOCRATIC DIALOGUES</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE MENO</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE PHAEDO AND THE SYMPOSIUM</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Before stating the aims and the plan of this thesis, it is necessary to discuss two problems which need prior justification. Since the topic of this thesis is the development of Plato's theory of knowledge in the dialogues prior to the Republic, we must determine what the relevant dialogues are and the order in which they were written. And we must argue, against Taylor, Burnet and Shorey, that the doctrines of these dialogues are not merely Plato's inheritance from Socrates, if we are to talk in terms of development at all.

The Dialogues and the Order of Their Composition

There are two main methods of deciding in which order the dialogues were composed: stylometric analysis and doctrinal analysis. The results of each method should complement each other if we are to be sure of an order. Since the results of stylometric analysis are surer when determining broad, rather than narrow, divisions in Plato's works, they must be complemented by other considerations when the dialogues in question were written within a short period of time. Thus, table one, which lists the stylometric results of five scholars, provides us with a framework. 1 We can be confident (1) that the Theaetetus, Parmenides, Sophist,
Politicus, Timaeus, Philebus and Laws were composed after 
the Republic; (2) that the Apology, Euthyphro, Protagoras, 
Laches, Cratylus, Charmides, Meno, Phaedo and Symposium precede 
the Republic; (3) that the Apology, Euthyphro, Charmides and 
Laches precede the Meno; (4) that the Meno precedes both 
the Symposium and the Phaedo. The dialogues with which we 
are most concerned are the Meno, Phaedo and Symposium. We 
shall argue that the Phaedo precedes the Symposium and that 
the Meno is the latest of the dialogues preceding the 
Phaedo.

Although stylometric analysis tends to place the 
Symposium before the Phaedo, there is good reason to regard 
it as later. Raven conjectures:

I believe that the Phaedo was written before the 
Symposium, that one main motive of the Symposium was 
to relieve the extreme asceticism of the Phaedo by a 
vivid picture of the aesthetic as opposed to the 
strictly intellectual aspect of the theory of Ideas, 
and that the Republic then gives us the required 
synthesis.\(^2\)

Augmenting this view is the argument that, since the theory 
of Ideas is introduced carefully in the Phaedo\(^3\) but is 
assumed in the Symposium, the Phaedo must be prior.

The Meno, in form, content and method, illustrates 
characteristics which clearly mark it off from other dia-
logues of the same period. It continues beyond the aporetic 
stage, which is reached at 80a, and posits doctrines which 
clearly foreshadow the Phaedo. R. Robinson writes of the new 
method:
The Meno's discussion of hypothetical method seems to have value as the symbol of a valuable change in Plato's writings. With the introduction of this method he is passing from destructive to constructive thinking. . . . The dialogue begins with refutations of Meno's definitions of virtue, and ends with attempts to say something positive about virtue . . . by means of the hypothetical method. It is thus a microcosm of the whole series of Plato's dialogues; for on the whole those previous to the Meno are merely destructive and those after it are definitely constructive.4

To argue from an interpretation of Plato's dialogues for their relative order is a dangerous procedure, but I believe that the differentiating characteristics of the Meno, Phaedo and Symposium are clear enough to justify it.  

The Static and the Evolutionary Theories

By the "static theory" is meant that many of the teachings which Plato makes Socrates express in his dialogues were held by the historical Socrates. These teachings include the theory of Ideas, the immortality of the soul, mystical views of religion, and stress on mathematics.5 The "evolutionary theory" is that Plato's metaphysical doctrines grew from his reflection upon Socrates' search for universal definitions and upon the work of other Greek philosophers.

The static theory has to explain why Plato, having inherited the theory of Ideas, refrained from stating it fully until he had written some dozen dialogues. Thus, what becomes crucial for this theory is the presence or absence of the doctrine of Ideas in the early dialogues.
We shall discuss Euthyphro 6d, which is, as we have seen, an early dialogue. Socrates says:

Remember then that I did not ask you to inform me of one or two of those many holy things, but to define that one essential form which makes holy all that is holy. For you agreed that holy actions are holy and unholy actions unholy by virtue of a single form in each case. Do you not remember?

Then, when Euthyphro agrees, Socrates says:

Tell me then what is this actual form: then by looking at it and using it as a pattern I may call holy any action of yours or another's that conforms to it, and call unholy what does not conform to it.

P. Shorey writes of this passage: "the language of the definition here is indistinguishable from the language of the metaphysical theory of Ideas in the later dialogues." This is undoubtedly correct: "eidos" and "idea" ("form") are regularly the technical terms of Plato's theory of Ideas. But Euthyphro, for all his agreement, gives no indication of understanding by "eidos" and "idea" anything more than a characteristic common to some particular instances. It is Aristotle's testimony that clinches the problem; at Metaphysics, M1078, b30, he writes:

Socrates, however, did not regard general terms or definitions as having independence; it was other philosophers [Plato and his followers] who separated them from things and gave them the name "ideas".

Since Aristotle is not criticizing so much as making a statement of fact, we can be confident of this testimony. The significance of "eidos" and "idea" in the Euthyphro is that Socrates used words to which Plato, later,
came to attach considerably more importance than Socrates ever did. The arguments by which Taylor, Burnet and Shorey upheld the static theory have been refuted or shown to be doubtful by Adam, Robin, Ferguson and Grube. 9

Furthermore, not only can the evolutionary theory be substantiated by an analysis which shows that there is a development in Plato's thought, it also attributes to Plato a dynamism and originality which are in keeping with his later philosophizing.

The aim of this thesis is to give an account of the development of Plato's theory of knowledge in the dialogues preceding the Republic. We shall see what this theory grew from by examining previous notions, in Greek religion and philosophy, that influenced Plato. Because of the distinctive character of Plato's doctrines, his metaphysics and theory of the soul are closely tied to his epistemology, and an adequate account must show the effect of their development upon Plato's theory of knowledge. We have to do this because the "Forms" are the objects of knowledge and because the doctrine of anamnesis is that which makes knowledge possible for Plato. Perhaps because he was writing dialogues, in which question and answer play an important role, Plato became particularly aware of the virtues and defects of the Socratic method of inquiry. Thus we shall trace not only the development of Plato's theory
of knowledge, but also the development of the method by which knowledge is to be achieved. These two topics have much in common, and their treatment in the dialogues serves more to relate them than to differentiate them.

The plan of this thesis is basically a historical analysis. Chapter one commences with an account of the development of "psyche" in Greek thought. This leads into a discussion of Pythagoreanism and the "puritan" tradition, where a sharp distinction is made between a soul which is immortal and a body which is not. To conclude this chapter we consider other influences upon Plato's thought, particularly the doctrines of Heraclitus.

Chapter two is divided into three parts. The first of these is an account of the influence of Socrates upon Plato, the second an examination of the dialogues that precede the _Meno_, and the third a discussion of the development of "eidos" and "idea", the technical terms of Plato's metaphysics. The second part is concerned with assessing the significance of the search for universal definitions, the status of these definitions, and the method that is used in the search.

Chapter three is devoted to the _Meno_. It is also in three parts. The first of these is concerned with problems arising immediately from the text, and the second with more general problems of knowledge, in particular the stages of the process of anamnesis, the types of knowledge and belief
indicated in the text, and the status of the objects of knowledge and belief. The final part considers Plato's reservations about the doctrines of anamnesis and of the soul.

Chapter four is in three main sections. In it we discuss the advances and the problems of the Phaedo, the relations between the doctrines of the Phaedo and the Meno, and, finally, the Symposium, both as an advance upon the Phaedo and as a pointer to the Republic.

In all the chapters concerned with Plato's dialogues we discuss four related topics: (1) what it is to know; (2) what is the method by which to achieve knowledge; (3) what is the status of the objects of knowledge; (4) what is the nature of the knowing entity, the soul. The last two chapters are particularly concerned with the role of sense-perception in Plato's theory of knowledge.
I

THE PRESOCRATIC ORIGINS OF PLATO'S THOUGHT

The complex character of Greek society which resulted from the blending of different stocks gave Greek religion a distinctive diversity. W. K. C. Guthrie writes:

In religion, two widely different strains seem to call for notice, the one being a characteristic of a "Nordic" people and the other of a "Mediterranean race" with which they fused. . . . The two main types of religion which appear among the classical Greeks . . . are represented by the Olympians of Homer on the one hand, and on the other, by the kind of cult of which we have an example, considerably modified by official Athenian sentiment, in the Eleusinian mysteries.

In most cases the dark and orgiastic phenomena in Greek religion, connected with fertility and showing an interest in the soul of man as a potentially divine entity, are to be associated with the religious life of the pre-Achaean inhabitants of the land.

Corresponding to these distinctions we can see that the Greek tradition regarded the relationship between man and god in two ways. Homer, Herodotus, and the tragedians stress that man has no part of the immortality and divinity of the gods. Pythagoras, Empedocles, the Orphics, and, later, Plato saw the soul as akin to the gods and as sharing in their immortality and divinity. The concepts of immortality and divinity seem to have been closely connected for the Greeks. "Thnētos" and "anthrōpos" are practically equivalent, as are "athanatos" and "theos". "To believe the soul to be immortal is to believe it to be divine."
This chapter concentrates first on how the "Achaean" tradition shaped the concept of "psyche"; then it examines the "puritan" tradition, in particular Pythagoreanism; finally there is a brief discussion of the influence upon Plato of Alcmaeon, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Heraclitus.

Whereas the pre-Achaean religions tend to collect the soul and divinity, the Homeric conception of the gods denies that man can aspire to divine status. It is true that the Homeric poets describe the gods as very close morally and physically to humans, but the reason for this is not that man has something of the divine in him but that the gods have something of the human in them.

In the Homeric poets that which distinguishes the dead from the living is the "psyche"; in life after death the "psyche" survives as a shadowy image. Since Homeric society stresses the body as the source of joy in life, hope of joy in after-life is precluded. The surviving existence of the "psyche" is abhorred. Similarly the elegiac and iambic poets of Ionia write of the joys of battle and of good living, and of the horrors of old age and death.

Besides the use of "psyche" to describe that which gives the body life, the Homeric poets used it in other contexts. Its main use was in reference to the emotions. So too with the early lyric poets, Pindar, Bacchylides, and Aeschylus, its use was predominantly in describing the emotional aspects of personality. J. Burnet has shown that
in the fifth century Attic writers, such as Aeschylus and Thucydides, and in Herodotus, there is little divergence from this "Homerian" use of "psyche", and that only in Sophocles and Euripides is there an extension of its use to the intellect. The ordinary vocabulary for psychological description in the fifth century did not make a sharp distinction between "psyche" and "soma" (the body). At one line Sophocles can use "psyche" to refer to Oedipus' self, and at another "soma"; Pindar speaks of the "soma" of those who die being escorted to Hades, while an Attic inscription refers to the death of the "psyche".

In addition, "psyche" seems to have had no connotations of transcendence or of metaphysical status for the "average" Greek of the fifth century. E. R. Dodds points to an interesting confirmation of this in Xenophon's *Cynegicus* (? , 5):

> And how remote it ["psyche"] was in common speech from religious or metaphysical implications is nicely shown by a passage from the devout Xenophon (if it be his): when he sets out to provide the uninventive with a list of suitable names for dogs, the very first name that occurs to him is *Psyche*.

Nor is there any suggestion in the Milesian philosophers that the "psyche" was of divine origin. While they believed in a "panpsychism" or a "pantheism", these beliefs were not religious; they were trying to give a physical explanation for the world. They tried to correlate "psyche" (the source of life and consciousness) with a principle permeating the whole universe. For Thales "psyche" was
something that caused motion; Anaximenes tried to correlate "psyche" with his first principle of the cosmos, air or mist.\footnote{11} The natural philosophers sought a single substratum, to which they allied "psyche" as a principle of change. Thus it seems to have been an integral part of their conception of "psyche" that it is the source of motion. Their doctrines significantly affected the intellectual climate of their own and succeeding times. The old belief in anthropomorphic gods could never be held again, by the intellectuals of the age at least, in the way that it had been held. The critical tradition had been born.

To conclude this section on the development of "psyche" we shall note what E. A. Havelock says about the later history of "psyche". He thinks that it was becoming possible, by the end of the fifth century, for the intellectual minority to think and talk about their souls as autonomous personalities. This conception of the soul, he writes, had gained general currency in the Greek language by the end of the fourth century. He sees the doctrine of the autonomous personality, the autonomous "psyche", as the counter-part of the rejection of the oral culture. "A psychic mechanism which exploited memorization through association was being replaced, at least among a sophisticated minority, by a mechanism of reasoned calculation."\footnote{12} In the oral culture the social memory inherited by each generation was a much more significant element of a person's life than was
the case in the fifth century. With the spread of literacy men came to rely less on their "oral" inheritance; memory became less "social", and there was a corresponding increase in their awareness of their individuality. Coupled with this awareness was a greater reliance on intellect and a greater measure of self-reflection. These factors led to a conception of the individual, with his distinct memory, as an autonomous being, and of the "psyche" as the core of personality.

The doctrine of the autonomous "psyche" owes much to what we have called the "puritan tradition" -- Orphism and Pythagoreanism. For, the doctrines (1) that the soul is immortal and the body mortal, (2) that the soul must aim for a complete release from the imprisoning body, and (3) that the soul, having migrated from one body to its next incarnation, can retain personal memory, clearly point to the belief that the soul is a man's self. We shall examine these notions further when we discuss the significance of Pythagoreanism for Plato's thought. But to start this section we shall give a brief account of the origins and general characteristics of the "puritan" tradition.

Although the Hellenic background of the Greeks contained elements in which man and god are thought to be akin, there is good reason to suppose that this tradition which achieved such prominence in Orphism, Pythagoreanism, and, ultimately, Platonism, was part of a new culture pattern
in Greece. According to one scholar, H. J. Rose, this new culture pattern is exemplified in the way in which the Greeks thought about dreams. He distinguishes the following three pre-scientific modes of regarding the dream: (1) the dream vision can be taken as objective fact; (2) it can be interpreted by means of symbolism; (3) it can be taken as something seen by the soul while temporarily out of the body. The first two modes are to be found in Homer. The interpretation of the dream as a psychic excursion occurs in Pindar for the first time (fragment 116B). E. R. Dodds draws attention to the fact that "in India, as in Greece, the reincarnation theory and the interpretation of the dream as a psychic excursion make their first appearance together." He analyzes at length the possible origins of Orphism and comes to the conclusion that its source is the Shamanism of central Asia.

Of the essential content of Orphism W. K. C. Guthrie writes:

For them [Orphic writers and initiators] the hope of immortality was based on a complex myth concerning the nature of the human soul as a mixture of divine and earthly. It could only be attained by strenuous efforts, lasting through life;... initiation was an essential part, but the rites must be periodically renewed and life as a whole lived differently. The whole religious side of the movement, which included an elaborate cycle of rebirths, cannot be separated from that adopted by Pythagoras, and to make the attempt would probably be unhistorical.

I doubt that Orphism would have influenced Plato in any way that Pythagoreanism would not. We shall confine the rest
of our account of the "puritan" tradition to Pythagoreanism.

Firstly, whereas the Ionian philosophers seem to have considered philosophy as a means of satisfying curiosity, the Pythagoreans conceived of it as a way of life. Alongside the observance of rites and taboos, philosophy, they believed, was the means of escaping from the cycle of rebirths; the pursuit of philosophy led, for them, to a better life. This is clearly true for Plato too.

Plato shared their interest in mathematics, astronomy and harmonics. For the Pythagoreans number and its relations acted as a kind of substructure to the world through which the world was intelligible. For Plato, the significance of mathematics lay in the force of its truths. The inconvertibility of the truths of mathematics was what Plato coveted for the whole realm of truths. While noting the scientific and intellectual characteristics of Pythagoreanism we must, with F. M. Cornford, draw attention to the strong element of mysticism inherent in their philosophy. This blending of science and mysticism, common to Pythagoras, Plato, and Heraclitus, too, Russell sees as lying at the heart of philosophical greatness:

But the greatest men who have been philosophers have felt the need both of science and of mysticism: the attempt to harmonize the two was what made their life, and what always must, for all its arduous uncertainty, make philosophy, to some minds, a greater thing than either science or religion.

We shall now turn to the doctrine of the transmigr-
ation of souls, also called metempsychosis. Closely allied to this doctrine are the notions: (1) that the soul is immortal; (2) that it is possible to possess knowledge not directly dependent upon the present incarnation of the knower; and (3) that the soul can escape the cycle of rebirths through a return to its (divine) source.\(^{19}\)

The primary point to make in this connection is that there is no evidence for the view that the Pythagoreans thought that, during the period of transmigration, they had experience of absolute mathematical forms of concepts. It is only to empirical experience that we can apply our evidence. The Pythagorean view that number and reality are facts of this world rules out any possibility that anamnesis involved more than an ability to remember past events. We must agree with Robin when he writes:

Il y a dans le Pythagorisme une anamnesis en relation avec les croyances relatives à la nature et à la destinée des âmes. . . . Cette mémoire exceptionnelle, qui rend sensible à des hommes privilégiés la continuité de l'existence de l'âme, n'a rapport qu'au souvenir des individualités et des états qu'elle a successivement traversés. Mais rien dans les témoignages ne nous autorise, que je sache, à la considérer comme le fondement général de toute connaissance qui ne derive pas de l'expérience immédiate.\(^{20}\)

It is clear that Plato's interest is in non-sensuous objects of knowledge. These, he thinks, the embodied soul can know by recollecting its experience of them when it was discarnate. By contrast, the Pythagoreans are not so much interested in a theory of knowledge \textit{per se} as in a doctrine
of the soul. For the Pythagoreans, the wisdom gained by the ability to recollect is, as the wisdom traditionally ascribed to the old, the summation of a more extensive experience. Plato's definition of knowledge restricts what is known to that which is recollected through the process of anamnesis. Since the objects of knowledge are the same for all, there is strictly no personal element in the content of the memory which anamnesis represents. There is no doubt, however, that the memory represented in the Pythagorean doctrine of anamnesis is personal and individual.

It is difficult to tell what the Pythagoreans meant by the soul. G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven find four different views of the soul ascribed by Aristotle to the Pythagoreans. We can see that Empedocles, who believed in the Pythagorean eschatology, felt his concept of soul to be radically novel, since he restricts "psyche" to the sense of "life principle" and uses "daimôn" to refer to the soul after death. Even he, then, seems to hesitate in equating the "Homeric" conception of "psyche" with a personality that survives after the body has died. A new emphasis arises out of the "puritan" view of the soul. The soul must strive to better its lot through "theōria" and there is a heightened consciousness of good and evil, since the ethical conflict is now within the person. The focal point of ethical conflict is the body-soul complex ("sōma-sōma").

The new formulation of the concept of soul seems to
have been well suited to Greek temperament, since its acceptance was widespread. The fundamental community of nature was affirmed and the doctrine of posthumous rewards for the deserving was formulated. The way was open for an ethic based, in part, on the conception of rewards and punishments after death. We can see both Pindar, in his second Olympian ode, and Empedocles amplifying on these notions. 22

We shall now consider briefly other influences upon Plato's thought. W. K. C. Guthrie thinks that Alcmaeon deeply influenced Plato. 23 There is a clear fore-runner of the "attunement" theory of the Phaedo (85e-86d) in Aetius' description of Alcmaeon's theory of health (Aetius, V, 30, 1). His writings on sense-perception may have influenced Plato, particularly the distinctions which he seems to have drawn between thought and perception (Theophrastus, De Sensu, 25f.). Xenophanes may well have influenced Plato deeply, but it is difficult to say to what extent since his works survive in fragments only. We do not have in these fragments an explicit statement that there are two realms of existence, one of which knowledge is possible and one of which opinion only is possible, but there is, beyond doubt, a confrontation of knowledge and seeming in his work (fragment 35).

Parmenides' elaboration of the antithesis between seeming and opinion, on the one hand, and reality and knowledge, on the other, helped shape Plato's thought -- the
objects of knowledge had to be real. Aristotle tells us of Plato's familiarity with the theories of Heraclitus, including his doctrine of flux. This familiarity gave rise to reflection upon the possibility of knowledge. It was precisely because Plato could not bring himself to abandon such a possibility and because he thought, with Xenophanes and Heraclitus, knowledge of the sensible world to be impossible, that he posited the theory of transcendent Forms as the objects of knowledge. In this he was influenced too by reflection upon mathematical concepts. He realized that a priori knowledge was of a different order to empirical knowledge and consequently needed a different explanation.

We shall discuss the influence of Socrates upon Plato's thought in the next chapter.
II

SOCRATES AND THE SOCRATIC DIALOGUES

In this chapter we are concerned with the influence of Socrates upon Plato. We shall discuss Socrates' view of the soul and his equation of virtue and knowledge in the first section. In the second we examine the significance for Plato of Socrates' search for universal definitions in ethics, the method by which he conducted this search, and the meaning we are to give to "knowledge" in the early dialogues. The third section is devoted to a discussion of the early development of the terms "eidos" and "idea", since it is important to know what significance Plato gave to these terms.

Socrates

While it will always be a matter of dispute to what extent Plato's philosophy is owing to Socrates, there can be no doubt that Socrates was the source of Plato's philosophical inspiration. Plato acknowledges his debt by making Socrates the principal speaker in most of his dialogues.

The nature of our sources makes it difficult to say exactly what Socrates' philosophical thought was, so we shall be conservative in our account. In his early life he seems to have been well acquainted with the traditional
scientific philosophies and with the work of Parmenides and Zeno. Becoming dissatisfied with physical theorizings, because they could not be verified and because, it seems, he doubted their veracity anyway, he turned from scientific investigation to a study of the individual. He seems to have initiated a new interest in human behaviour, thinking that it must be regarded in relation to an end or purpose. Thus his interests became centered upon ethics. He, as Plato after him, reacted strongly against the Sophists, with their emphasis upon the role of convention and their antagonism to ethical standards of an absolute nature. Socrates set himself to refute the attitudes and beliefs of these men.

He was convinced that it was possible to achieve knowledge by intellectual means and saw this as the moral basis of life. The famous equation of virtue and knowledge led to a new emphasis upon the place of knowledge in life: people may think that they know what is conducive to their own happiness and misery but, he says, there are objective standards according to which people can be shown to be right or wrong in these beliefs. Wrong becomes the result of ignorance and moral wrong lies in ignorance of these absolute standards. The basic assumption is, of course, that people act to promote their own happiness.

His doctrine of "caring for the soul" stresses the role of knowledge in a man's life: to care for the soul is not a question of obeying ascetic principles or ritual
activities but involves acquiring the kind of knowledge which will lead the knower to a better life. We have seen in chapter one that the main use of "psyche" in fifth century Attica was to refer to the emotional personality. The doctrine that virtue is knowledge is an appeal to the use of reason in determining our behaviour -- in making our lives as happy and as good as possible. Thus Socrates seems to integrate "psyche" as the emotional personality with man's intellectual capacities. If we are right in this, the doctrine of "caring for the soul" comes to mean much more than "having a prudent regard for one's well being"; it acquires the meaning that man must work towards knowledge to gain happiness and that a man's safe-guard is his reason. Finally, we may note that, whatever Socrates' religious views may have been, this doctrine of care for the soul is not based on the hope of rewards after death. It is a doctrine which is concerned with this present life and the reward that it offers is the happiness of living a morally good life.

Socrates' influence can be seen as the result of his deep penetration into the problems of human life, his integrity and his intellectual independence. His appeal to reason as the determining factor of a man's life is matched by Plato. Aristotle tells us that Socrates' contribution to Platonic philosophy lay in the fields of inductive arguments and universal definitions. We discuss the significance of these influences in the second section.
We have already noted the emergence of a strong emphasis upon ethics and upon knowledge as the basis of ethics. Plato's acceptance of the view that ethics must be founded upon knowledge and of the Socratic emphasis upon universal definitions led him to seek the postulates of an absolute ethical system. He had to provide the epistemology, metaphysics and psychology upon which he could found an ethic securely, and he had to achieve this by means of a more adequate logic.

H. Cherniss, writing of the economy of the theory of Ideas, holds that Plato has to account for three types of phenomena: ethical, epistemological, and ontological. Despite the "conflicting and paradoxical" theories developed in each of these fields by the end of the fifth century, he writes,

Plato thought it necessary to find a single hypothesis to solve the problems of these spheres and create a rationally unified cosmos by showing the connection among the separate phases of existence. The interests of Socrates, . . . the subject matter of the early dialogues, the "practical" tone of Plato's writings, show his starting point to be in ethical problems.

The Socratic Dialogues

We learn from the early dialogues that the Socratic emphasis upon ethics and knowledge, together with the consequent search for universal definitions in ethics, influenced Plato deeply. The Lesser Hippias discusses the necessity for independence in arriving at the fundamental principles of
morality; the Laches searches for a definition of "courage", the Euthyphro for a definition of "piety"; the Charmides, Crito, Gorgias and other lesser dialogues are concerned with ethical topics. Two characteristics are prominent in these dialogues: there is the search for universal definitions and there is also the method used in this search. Firstly, we discuss the method of the Socratic dialogues; then we give a further account of the search for universal definitions, with particular attention to the meaning of "to know". Finally we examine the meaning of "eidos" and "idea". This examination is supplemented by the third section of this chapter.

The method of inquiry is essentially one of question and answer. An answer, or opinion, is considered adequate if it meets with the approval of the interlocutors and if it does not contradict in any way any other opinion held as (or more) strongly. These criteria of agreement and consistency are the sole criteria advanced. They cannot prove the validity of the method itself since they are intra-systematic, and there would seem to be good reason to suppose that Plato, in fact, regarded it as limited and, as such, inadequate. This "good reason" is based on two factors.

The first of these is that the dialogues in question are not only inconclusive but also illustrate Socrates as having little confidence in attaining the truth. Secondly,
we have Plato's insistence upon the "ignorance" of Socrates. This gains significance from the fact that none of the other men who wrote about Socrates testifies to this "ignorance". There is a clear implication that Plato had a serious reason for insisting on this ignorance. Plato's Socrates professes himself ignorant and despairs of attaining the truth; thus it seems that Plato is insisting on the limitations of the method. This insistence, Gulley writes, "may reasonably be taken to imply an appeal to the need of a constructive theory of knowledge which will provide a more adequate criterion of truth than that upon which the Socratic method relies". And he sees it as significant that the doctrinal advance of the _Meno_ is accompanied by a change in the method posited for attaining knowledge. (We shall discuss this new method in the next chapter.)

Moreover, there is a further characteristic of some of the early dialogues that is significant for the development of Plato's methodology. The _Gorgias_ indicates that there is a "good" above the particular virtues, like "piety" and "courage"; the _Lysis_ claims the good as man's highest purpose -- a purpose that cannot be subordinated to another end. This assumption, that there is a good which unifies, as it were, all virtues, would seem important when considered in the light of Plato's development of the method by which we are to attain knowledge. For the conception of the good as a unifying factor leads to the establishment of levels
within the realm of moral ideals. The realization that there are such levels would in turn lead to a theory of how we can attain knowledge which would take into account these levels. And such a theory is the hypothetical method of the *Meno* and the *Phaedo*—a method which "involves working up to ever higher hypotheses until one reaches 'something sufficient!'".  

To turn to the search for universal definitions, one gathers the impression from the early dialogues that the meanings of certain Greek words are in question, whether it be "courage" in the *Laches,"piety" in the *Euthyphro*, or the "good" elsewhere. And while it is true that, for example, the utilitarian character of Greek ethics would follow from the implicit meanings that the terms "agathon" and "eudaimonia" had for the Greeks, yet the Greek language may have been less crystallized than modern English or French, for example. Consequently, Plato may have been seeking in the early dialogues definitions that were intellectually satisfying rather than definitions of "what was meant commonly" by a term. The new stress upon the role of reason in ethics, the insistence on the method by which we can arrive at knowledge, and the elements of the early dialogues which are destructive of what might be termed "the commonly accepted meaning" of a word reaffirm this view. The implications of what a definition was for the Greeks are described by A. E. Taylor as follows:
From the Greek point of view, the problem of definition itself is not one of names, but of things. If our moral judgement is to be sound, and our moral practice good, we must approve and disapprove rightly. We must admire and imitate what is really noble and must not be led into false theory and bad practice by confused thinking about good and evil. The problem of finding a definition of a "virtue" is at bottom the problem of formulating a moral ideal.9

How Socrates in particular thought about definitions is hard to determine. If such passages as Euthyphro 6d, quoted in the introduction (p. 4), are taken as illustrative of Socrates' way of thinking about them, then he would seem to have regarded a definition as being a "one as against the many", as being something common to a number of instances. In the early dialogues he frequently has to explain to his interlocutors the characteristics which a proposed definition has to have if it is to be a definition. For example, at Meno 72a, Meno confuses definition and enumeration, and at 75c Socrates has to give him an example of a definition. The implication is that to confuse definition and enumeration was a common practice. Thus we might be justified in seeing Socrates' realization of what it is to be a definition as one of his major contributions to philosophy. If we are to interpret "logoi" at Phaedo 100a as referring to a Socratic formulation of a "formal cause", then we can say that definition served for Socrates as a formal cause, too. (We shall discuss this interpretation further in chapter four.) Finally, Charmides 158e-159a might help us to bridge the gap between Socrates' conception of a definition and Plato's
conception of the Forms. Socrates and Charmides are trying to define "sōphrosynē", "temperance". Socrates shows that "sōphrosynē" is presupposed in spiritual health (155e-158e). He then claims that this characteristic of soul, or any other characteristic of soul, must make its presence felt in the soul. If Taylor is right in thinking that "the problem of definition is not one of names, but of things", the Cratylus (if it is an accurate pointer to Socrates' thought) indicates that Socrates thought a definition to be something directly known, since it is present in the soul. If it is not an accurate pointer, it is still a valuable indication of the way in which Plato's thought developed.

The search for real definitions is significant in trying to determine the nature of "knowledge" in the Socratic formula "virtue is knowledge". J. Gould applies Ryle's distinction between "knowing how" and "knowing that" to the role of knowledge in the Socratic ethic. His thesis is that "knowledge" ("epistēmē"), so far from being a theoretical knowing preceding practice, is a form of moral ability, "a knowing how, that is, how to be moral". Gould analyzes the use of "epistēmē" and "epistathai" before Plato, and shows convincingly that their primary meaning is "efficiency in practice" and not "knowledge of facts". In favour of his interpretation he claims that it provides the explanation for the common comparison between morality and the arts ("technai"). Moreover, his interpretation has the advantage
of simplifying the otherwise difficult doctrine that virtue is knowledge. Usually the doctrine is taken to mean that if one "knows that" one is virtuous. Gould's thesis removes the difficulty of a transition from theory to practice. For, the doctrine would, according to Gould, imply a condition of moral capability: "to know how" is the same thing as "to be able".

Gould is certainly right in seeing a "knowing how" in the Socratic "epistēmē". The question is whether he is right to exclude a theoretical "knowing that". Aristotle summarizes Socrates' ideal of knowledge as follows:

Socrates believed that knowledge of virtue was the end, and inquired what justice is and what courage is, and so with each of the parts of virtue. And he did this with good reason. For he thought that all the virtues were forms of knowledge, so that to know what was just was at the same time to be just. For to have learnt geometry and house-building is at the same time to be a geometer and a house-builder. That is why Socrates inquired what virtue is, and not how and from what conditions it comes into being.  

While this passage corroborates Gould's conclusion that the Socratic "epistēmē" has the meaning of "to know how", it also indicates that the Socratic ideal of morality is "intellectualist", in that Socrates is inquiring into "what virtue is". We have shown above that Socrates is searching for "real definitions" by a systematic method of inquiry. This emphasis upon definitions, upon "knowing what a virtue is", clearly indicates that "knowing that" is a part of the Socratic "epistēmē". N. Gulley, arguing against Gould, writes: "one
thing that seems quite clear from Xenophon's and Plato's accounts is that Socrates did not distinguish "knowing how" and "knowing that", and that his conception of 'epistēmē' included both.12 He draws attention to the criticism that Aristotle makes of the doctrine that virtue is knowledge (that "knowing that" does not necessitate correct practice) in order to show that Gould's thesis "has to dismiss Aristotle's account as a complete misrepresentation".

Even if we accept the view that both meanings are implicit in the Socratic "epistēmē", as I think we should, there is good reason to suppose that the definition of "epistēmē" in the _Meno_ precludes a "knowing how". The point is this. In the _Meno_ the standard of what can be called "epistēmē" is raised: it becomes knowledge recoverable by the process of anamnesis and "tied by a chain of causal reasoning". It is contrasted with the "technai" (90b ff.), which can be learnt without any sort of formal analysis. A father can teach his son a "technē" but no one can teach knowledge. Thus "epistēmē" is no longer a "knowing how" on a par with the arts, but a "knowledge of what is".

To resume the discussion of knowledge through definition, it is important to note that Plato uses, in his attempts to arrive at definitions, the terminology which he later uses in the theory of Forms. We refer in particular to "eidos". Taking the _Euthyphro_ as representative of Plato's use of "eidos" in the dialogues preceding the _Meno_, we have
seen in the introduction to this thesis that Plato uses "eidos" to mean the "look" which would be manifest in any instance of holiness. We have argued that no metaphysical doctrine is implied in this use. And we agree with Grube's conclusion that "eidos" is to be taken as "describing no more than the common characteristics of particular things to which the same predicate is applied; these common qualities being considered not as transcendentally existing but as immanent in particulars".\(^{13}\) (The stress is Grube's.) We shall now consider the development of "eidos" and "idea", the terms which Plato uses in his theory of Forms to describe these "Forms".

**The Development of Plato's Technical Vocabulary**

There are several reasons why we discuss the development of "eidos" and "idea" after the Socratic dialogues and before the *Meno*. Firstly the influence of Socrates upon their use forbids a full discussion of their development before giving an account of Socrates and the Socratic dialogues. With the *Meno*, however, Plato begins to impose meanings on "eidos" and "idea" which go far beyond the range of meanings which he inherited. Finally a discussion of their development is useful as a summary in miniature of influences upon Plato.

In *Varia Socratica* A. E. Taylor advances the views that "eidos" was used of the stuff, matter or substance of
a thing and that it had a highly metaphysical sense, being used to denote "elementary bodies". Thus, he argues that Plato, finding "eidos" in general use with the specific sense of "simple body", merely transferred that meaning to a new kind of super-sensible "simple body". The general conclusion that he draws from his investigations is that "we may thus take it as established that "eidos" and "idea", whenever they appear as technical terms, alike in rhetoric, in medicine, and in metaphysics, have acquired their technical character under Pythagorean influence".

These views have been challenged, and comprehensively refuted, by C. M. Gillespie. His analysis of "eidos" and "idea" in the Hippocratic Corpus disproves Taylor's view that therein, if anywhere, they are used to denote "substance". Similarly, Gillespie shows that there is no instance, save in Democritus, of "eidos" as "simple body", and that there is no evidence to support Taylor's connection of Pythagoreanism with all the technical uses of "eidos" and "idea".

The positive conclusions that Gillespie reaches are shared by R. S. Bluck. They distinguish two main trends in the use of "eidos" and "idea" at the time of Socrates: (1) the look of a thing, the form of a bodily object, a use which was without mathematical connotations; (2) a semi-logical classificatory use, particularly evident in the Hippocratic Corpus, in which the terms have the meaning of "sort" or "kind".
He starts from the position that both "eidos" and "idea" are to be understood in terms of their root $\delta$. This root is associated with the notion of perception, particularly sight. He makes four demarcations in their use. 18 (1) He draws attention to their meaning of "shape", writing: "most relevant to Plato...is the way in which the Pythagoreans used "eidos" and "idea" of numbers, which they regularly represented by pebbles arranged in patterns." (2) Then he contends that the words came to denote "kind" or "type". He regards this meaning as closer to a generic notion based on aspect than to "the hypostatization of a concept corresponding to a class". (3) He discusses the role of "eidos" in contrasting "appearance" with "real nature". This meaning is not particularly relevant to Plato since it refers mainly to the motives of a statement. (4) The final use to which he points is that which stresses the qualitative appearance of a thing. Writing of "eidos" and "idea", he says: "it was natural that in the course of time their use should diverge a little further from their root meaning -- that as abstract thought grew they should be applied to non-sensible properties, such as qualities of value."

Citing Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (A, 987b7), Baldry comes to the conclusion that Plato was the first to use "eidos" and "idea" for "ta katholou" -- "that he gave the terms a new application peculiar to his own philosophy". 19 We quote
Baldry's summary at length since it can hardly be improved:

Socrates, according to Aristotle and to the view most generally accepted today, had confined his attention to the discussion and definition of "ta Ethica" -- of moral values like "the brave" or "the just" or "the good". The Pythagoreans had sought in numbers the ultimate explanation of the universe. To us there may seem to be little possibility of connection between the two; but when we remember the Greek tendency to regard value as a matter of symmetry or balance or form, and the Pythagorean habit of representing numbers by patterns, it becomes credible enough that Plato should have set "the good" or "the just" or especially "the beautiful" alongside "twoness", "threeness" and so on, not at this stage identifying the numbers and the values, but looking on both alike as perfect patterns, different, as Socrates had shown values to be, from any of the phenomena of sense, but open to contemplation as objects of the mind. And to fit such "quality-patterns" he could find no more suitable terms than "eidos" and "idea". 20

After discussing the various terms used by Plato to describe the relation between "eidos" and particulars, he summarizes his conclusions:

I believe that Plato acquired from Socrates an interest in qualities of value, and learned to differentiate them from their particular examples; that he perceived an analogy between them and numbers, represented as patterns by the Pythagoreans, and combined the two to form the notion of quality-patterns, not only logically "different" but substantially "separate" from particular phenomena; that because they were both "shapes" or "forms" and "qualities visible to the eye of the mind", he was doubly justified in calling them "eidos" or "idea"; that he adopted from the Pythagoreans the term "mimesis" and its like to denote their relation to particulars; that he further described this relationship in language already used by others for the connection between qualities and things -- "metechein", "koinōnion", "pareinai" and "eneinai"; and that he was particularly led to employ these by an analogy between the "chōrismos" of his own transcendent objects of knowledge and the disputed "chōrismos" of the sensible "eidos" to which such words were applied. 21

What "eidos" meant for Plato in the Meno and the Phaedo we discuss in the context of those dialogues.
III

THE MENO

The Meno, with its doctrines of the soul and of anamnesis, would seem to indicate the influence of Pythagoreanism. J. E. Raven, while commenting on the effects of these doctrines upon Socratic ethics, writes: "I do not think that it is by any means safe to deduce from this fact that between the Gorgias and the Meno Plato had paid his first visit to Sicily and Italy, but the hypothesis is attractive." But, considering Plato's friendship with Archytas (attested in Epistle VII, 338-9 and 350) and the marked Pythagorean elements of the Meno, he feels that it is "an almost irresistible conclusion from the Meno that the theory of Ideas first dawned upon Plato's mind as the result of his reflection on what he had learnt ... from the Pythagoreans."¹

The dialogue is one of transition, in the sense that it is the first dialogue to proceed beyond the aporetic stage (Meno is reduced to "aporia" at 80a), and in so doing, it foreshadows clearly some of the major doctrines of Plato's work. The new method to which we referred in chapter two (pp. 24-5) is integral to this novelty of form and content. We shall be concerned with analyzing what exactly this novelty of content and method is.

34
The ostensible question of the Meno, raised by the question "is virtue teachable?", is "what is virtue?", but the problem to which the Meno is more directed is that raised at 80e, where Socrates says:

Do you realize that what you are bringing up is the trick argument that a man cannot try to discover either what he knows or what he does not know? He would not seek what he knows, for since he knows it, there is no need of the inquiry, nor what he does not know, for in that case he does not even know what he is to look for.2

This objection not only attempts to undermine the whole search for knowledge, and is thus a serious objection until it is refuted, it also gives Plato an artistically excellent opportunity to express new elements of his philosophy. Given the inconclusiveness of earlier dialogues, it would not stand well with Plato if he failed to meet this objection.

We shall consider the Meno in three main sections, the first of which will be concerned with the Meno's text; the second will discuss problems arising, notably the stages of the process of anamnesis, the types of knowledge and belief indicated and the status of the objects of knowledge and belief. Finally we shall consider Plato's reservations about the doctrines of recollection and of the soul, and the limitations of the dialogue itself, limitations which imply the problems with which Plato has later to concern himself.
Section A

To answer the sophistic problem raised at 80e, Plato puts forward his doctrine of anamnesis; and if he is to overcome the objection, he must mean his theory to tell us how we are to know that a proposition is true. He introduces the doctrine of anamnesis in terms of religious beliefs (81a-e) and proceeds to demonstrate his meaning in the passage from 82a to 86c by leading a slave to solve a geometrical problem. In the ensuing sections the hypothetical method is introduced into the field of ethics; then, at 97a ff., he further discusses the relations between right opinion (belief) and knowledge.

In chapter one (pp. 12 ff.) we have already outlined the religious background to which Plato refers here, but it is as well to point out that this introductory section (81a-e) is for the most part consonant with this religious background. This, of course, means that the passage need not be an expression of Plato's own theory. We shall argue that the failure to make a distinction between what is said at 81a-e and the later discussion of anamnesis, particularly the section with the slave, leads to serious problems. If Meno were to look at early religious doctrines, he would see there the adumbrations of the theory of anamnesis. The purpose of the passage is to introduce Meno to the theory of anamnesis, and to 81e Plato is merely introducing, as a preparatory answer to Meno's objection, a theory of anamnesis. 81a-e does
not imply differing levels of experience but the accumu-
lation of personal experience to which we referred when
discussing Pythagorean transmigration. The introduction is
very much like a Wagnerian overture, where attention is
drawn to themes which are to be given fuller meaning in
the opera proper.

The passage at 81c5,

Thus the soul, since it is immortal and has been born
many times, and has seen all things both here and in the
other world, has learned everything that is. So we need
not be surprised if it can recall the knowledge of
virtue or anything else which, as we see, it once
possessed. All nature is akin, and the soul has learned
everything, so that when a man has recalled a single
piece of knowledge . . . there is no reason why he
should not find out all the rest.

is important in this respect. While, as R. S. Bluck points
out, the infinitive construction which has characterized
the reporting of what the "priests and priestesses" said has
been dropped — an indication that this passage is more
than a continuation of the preceding passage —, yet since
it follows exactly upon the passage quoted from Pindar in
its reference to "both here and in the other world," it
remains within the circle of religious ideas. Bluck seems
certainly correct in writing: "what follows here, down to the
beginning of 81e, should not be taken as a precise state-
ment of Plato's 'theory of recollection'". However, Plato
is not forgetful of his own ends, as N. Gulley points out:

It is certainly true that Plato here orders these ideas
to suit his purpose in introducing the idea of recoll-
ection. And it is, I think, an exaggeration to say that
the idea that everything can be recalled from the remembrance of one single thing is nothing more than "mythical symbolism". Plato is adding here his own suggestion of the possibility of recalling ideas in a continuous chain, the link at each successive point being the association in memory of two ideas. But the suggestion is made within the circle of religious ideas, and provides no reason for taking this introductory passage as a presentation of Plato's own theory.

We wish to stress, then, that the passage Sia-e is not to be taken as direct evidence from the text in determining what Plato's doctrine of anamnesis is. We shall return to this point in our discussion of the objects of knowledge and belief in the _Meno_; but we shall anticipate to a certain extent our later discussion in order to illustrate the serious problems that ensue when this passage is subjected to an inappropriate analysis.

It is our contention that the phrase, "has seen all things both here and in the other world, has learned everything there is", would contradict what we know of Plato's thought from other parts of the _Meno_ or would be subversive of the doctrine of anamnesis, a doctrine which Plato never abandoned in his dialogues. For, if we inquire what is the nature of the process by which the soul has acquired knowledge in a previous existence, we find it has to be some form of direct intuition. (The other possibility, that what we recollect from a previous existence is recollected from an even prior existence, is unsatisfactory since it involves an infinite regress, and since in so doing it begs
the question, what is the origin of our knowledge? But the text reads: "seen all things both here and in the other world". Thus direct intuition is possible in this world. But this makes redundant the doctrine of anamnesis, which Plato takes such care to introduce in the *Meno*, and which is, in the *Phaedo* at least, the *sine qua non* of knowledge. What is entailed in the process of anamnesis we shall consider in the second part.

Many and different points are raised in the section 82a-86c, the section in which Socrates is depicted as leading a slave-boy who is by and large ignorant of geometry to recognize as indubitably true (or false) certain propositions of geometry.

To commence, we shall consider some of the implications which are attached to the fact that it is a geometrical example that is used. Firstly there can be no doubting the artistic effectiveness of the passage, in that it introduces a different focus of communication. This relieves the monotony of the discussion with *Meno*, and marks clearly the change of approach which Plato is adopting — a change that culminates in the adoption of the hypothetical method and the drawing of various conclusions about virtue. Perhaps too Plato wishes to arouse a new appreciation of the achievements of Greek mathematics, and a new realization of the problems inherent for philosophy in relation to these mathematics, notably the problem of the commensuration
of irrationals. We have suggested that Plato's first visit
to Sicily and Italy might well be responsible for his
sudden interest in mathematics, and consequently for his
use of a mathematical example. His interest in mathematics
must be seen in conjunction with his realization that the
truths of mathematics are of a non-empirical kind. At this
time mathematics was the area in which a system of necessary
truths had been achieved, and we believe, with Gulley, that the
"argument of the *Meno* suggests that reflection on the
nature of mathematical truths was perhaps the decisive
factor in Plato's adoption of recollection as a general
theory of knowledge".  

Moreover, to return to the point made above about
a different focus of communication, it is our opinion that
this difference makes more explicit some of the problems
raised, both for us and for Meno. That there is a decided
parallel between the states of mind of the slave and those
of Meno we can see from the text: at 82e2, the slave's
confident assertion of an answer which is in fact wrong
corresponds to Meno's at 71e; the passage at 84b5-6, which
is a clear reference to 80a5, emphasizes this parallel
strongly; and at 84b10 Socrates makes an explicit reference
to Meno's claims at 80b. Thus, it seems, Plato is at great
pains to make Meno see his own activities in the light of
the slave's, and the geometrical example illustrates
dramatically not only the slave's "aporia" but also Meno's.
Furthermore, since the continued implication is that Meno's position is little different from the slave's, and since one way or another the slave has sought for something which he did not know and recognised a particular proposition as that for which he was looking, Meno's sophism is to be taken as refuted. If the slave can do it, so can Meno.

Part of the excellence of the example must be seen in the fact that there was available no arithmetical answer to the problem asked of the slave. This means that the slave's first numerical answers can easily be shown to be wrong (and the slave can recognize that he is wrong), but, more important, it shows that more than one sort of answer can be given. The slave is able, with the aid of sensible diagrams, to realize not only that he is wrong when he is wrong, but also that he is right in thinking the length of the required line to be the same as the length of the diagonal, although he cannot say what this length is in numerical terms. We may note in passing the complaint of Russell that Socrates "has to ask leading questions which any judge would disallow"; it still remains true that Plato has achieved his point — the slave has been able to recognize as true a particular proposition of mathematics, that the length of the side of a square double the area of a given square is the same as the length of the diagonal of the given square, although he was previously ignorant of this proposition.
We shall deal with the role of sensibles in Plato's theory of knowledge when we discuss the Phaedo; however, we wish to point out here that, despite the use of sensible diagrams in this passage, Plato does not discuss in the *Meno* the role of sensibles in theory of knowledge. In fact, he consistently emphasizes the part of questioning (see *Meno* 82e5; 84c11-d2; 85c10; 85d3; 86a7). He would seem to be giving a tentative, rather than explicit, account.

In the interview with the slave there is a significant change in the type of questions being asked. To the stage where the slave is reduced to "aporia", the question which Socrates is asking of him is of the type: "what is . . ." ("ti esti . . ."); but after that stage Socrates asks "poion"-type questions ("what sort of . . ."). The important passage at 84a1 reads: "Try to tell us exactly. If you don't want to count it up, just show us on the diagram." This change is in marked contrast to what Socrates says elsewhere, notably at 71b and 86d-e, where he stresses that "ti"-questions are prior to "poion"-questions. M. S. Brown concludes that this contrast shows Plato to be dissatisfied with the answer reached. Plato, he claims, is happy with a substantive answer arrived at by means of arithmetical mathematics, but, in so far as an appropriate answer is discoverable only at the expense of the rigour of arithmetical mathematics -- that is, by geometrical mathematics --, then Plato is dissatisfied with that result.
He writes: "the answer to the problem of doubling the square which the boy finds, insofar as it is geometrical in type, represents an inferior grade of knowledge." I agree with what Brown says, as far as he goes here. What Plato would like is an answer to "ti"-questions -- an arithmetical answer in the geometrical problem. But the impossibility of getting such an answer implies the need of a different mode of inquiry. It seems that the inability to express the square root of eight in arithmetical terms, and the corresponding ability to give some (less adequate) expression of it in geometrical terms is to be taken as indicating that Plato felt the Socratic method of inquiry to be inadequate in answering particular problems connected with what Plato took to be a priori knowledge. I feel that the subsequent adoption of the hypothetical method of inquiry bears out this conclusion. We shall examine the hypothetical method in the next section.

We must note now that Plato does not claim that what the slave-boy has remembered is knowledge; in fact, he explicitly says that it is true opinion (86a4). And, in a way, to refer back to the distinctions which we discussed in the last chapter (between "knowing how" and "knowing that") the slave-boy now knows how to construct a square double the size of a given square. Knowledge is something beyond this. It is the comprehension of a system of truths. "Knowing that", knowledge for Plato, will provide the reason
why for "knowing how". We shall discuss this further in the next section. Finally we note that Plato's answer to the sophistic dilemma has provided for degrees between the extremes of knowledge and ignorance. The slave has true opinions. At 97a ff., Plato discusses the relations between right opinion and knowledge. F. N. Cornford sees the position as follows: "In the *Meno* the theory of anamnesis was put forward to escape the sophistic dilemma... . The dilemma assumed that the only choice is between complete knowledge and blank ignorance. Anamnesis provides for degrees between these two extremes. There is in the first place unconscious knowledge."11

Section B

We have argued that, for Plato, the doctrine of anamnesis is very different from the Pythagorean doctrine of anamnesis;12 the main difference lying in the fact that the Pythagoreans did not envisage anything more than recollection of past empirical experiences by anamnesis. We have argued in this chapter that if this were applied to the Platonic doctrine, then Plato's position would be untenable since it would involve an infinite (and vicious) regress. To avoid this regress, which is based in the main on an empirical interpretation of anamnesis in Plato, we have to see Plato as giving some sort of ultimate status to the soul's "vision" in its discarnate existence; this vision we have referred to
as "direct intuition". The point then is that the process of anamnesis does not include this intuition, since the intuition has to be prior to the process in order to make the process a recollection of an awareness of transcendent beings. We shall proceed to argue that there are three processes associated with anamnesis.

At *Meno* 84a, there is a significant passage:

SOCRATES: Observe, Meno, the stage he has reached on the path of recollection. At the beginning he did not know the side of the square of eight feet. Nor indeed does he know it now, but then he thought he knew it and answered boldly, as was appropriate -- he felt no perplexity. Now however he does feel perplexed. Not only does he not know the answer; he doesn't even think he knows.

This passage clearly illustrates that the first step to recollection is the realization that one does not know. We must make a clear distinction between a process associated with the process of anamnesis and the process of anamnesis itself. Clearly Plato does not mean that realizing that one does not know is a part of a process of recollecting, since these two activities are very disparate. What he seems to be saying is that, if we cling to opinions, believing them to be true when in fact they are false, then we are in no condition to search for the truth. If we are in such a state, we must realize that we do not know in order to recollect the truth. Similarly, Plato distinguishes between the process of recollecting and the process by which, in the *Meno*, the true opinions recollected are converted into knowledge. But
this process of conversion is necessary if we are to claim knowledge for any propositions which we hold.

To return to the realization that one does not know, we can say that this is a clear prerequisite for the process of recollection. That this is so, allied to the suggestion that knowledge is to be recollected during the course of the process that follows the aporetic stage, not only stimulates the search for truth but also, on the present interpretation, signifies that there are new criteria for truth. The old criteria of "agreement" and "consistency" are to be supplemented.

While the passage with the slave (81e-84c) shows that the reduction to "aporia" is the first stage associated with recollection, the passage that follows it (84c-85b) gives us the second stage. In particular we note Socrates' post eventum remarks:

At present these opinions, being newly aroused (anakekintetai), are like a dream. But if the same questions are put to him on many occasions and in different ways, you can see that finally he will have a knowledge on the subject that is as accurate as anybody's. (85c)

If, then, there are going to exist in him, while he is both a man and not a man, true opinions which can be aroused (epegertheisa) by questioning and turned into knowledge, can we not say that his soul has always been in a state of knowledge? (86a)

The directive is clear. The second stage is the "arousing" (anakinein) of true opinions. This stage is really the process of recollection itself, since it is the only part of
Plato's explanation of knowledge to which the term "anamnesis" ("calling to mind"; "recollection") applies appropriately. In the passages cited above Plato also intimates that continued and systematic questioning is at least a part of the final stage of coming to know.

Since the final stage is the conversion of true belief into knowledge, we shall at this point give some account of the relation of true belief to knowledge, as it is presented in the *Meno*. When we have done this we shall return to the method by which Plato thinks that we can convert true opinion into knowledge.

The passages which we have cited show that the level of apprehension which the slave has reached is that of "true belief". The term "doxa", belief, does not have the specialized meaning that it has in, for example, the *Republic*. In *Republic* 477-480 Plato makes a clear distinction between "epistēmē" and "doxa" on the grounds that the objects of belief and knowledge are not the same. Plato defines knowledge in such a way that it refers to *a priori* levels of apprehension, whereas "doxa" is of empirical propositions. In fact, the distinctions between "dianoia" and "epistēmē" that are made in the *Republic* seem to be far closer to the distinctions made between "epistēmē" and "doxa" in the *Meno*. That "doxa" is not used in its specialized sense in the *Meno*, and that the example which Plato gives to distinguish between true belief and knowledge (*Meno* 97a) refers to empirical
knowledge, seem clear indications that the *Meno* is a tentative examination of knowledge and is at least concerned as much with the possibility of knowledge as with the types of knowledge possible, if not more so. We note that Plato does not discuss false belief, nor does he refer explicitly to the role of sensibles in epistemology. There is no suggestion in the *Meno* that the objects of true belief and the objects of knowledge are different. True beliefs, as we shall see when we discuss the significance of the hypothetical method, are isolated truths. Knowledge is the comprehension of truths which form a self-sufficient and all-encompassing system. This is the distinction underlying true belief and knowledge in the *Meno*. True belief represents a "realization that a proposition is true", but we do not know why it is true since it is isolated from the system of truths which validate it.

We must now resume our discussion of recollection, and consider what the final stage associated with recollection comprises. *Meno* 97e-98a reads:

True opinions are a fine thing and do all sorts of good so long as they stay in their place; but they will not stay long. They run away from a man's mind, so they are not worth much until you tether them by working out the reason. [I prefer to translate this as "until you tie them down by a chain of causal reasoning".] That process, my dear Meno, is recollection, as we agreed earlier. Once they are tied down, they become knowledge, and are stable. That is why knowledge is something more valuable than right opinion. What distinguishes the one from the other is the tether.

There are several points to be made about this passage.
Firstly it bears out what we have said above about "doxa" and "epistēmē". In addition it describes the third stage of the process of recollection as "the tying down of true opinions by a chain of causal reasoning" ("aitias logismōi"). The passage then refers explicitly back, and the passage to which it refers must be that cited above, Meno 85c. The inference is that we are to associate "the tying down of true opinions by a chain of causal reasoning" with what is described at 85c as the final stage of the process of recollection, continued and systematic questioning. There is every reason for this association since there is no other possible point of reference.

The term "anamnesis" is used by Plato in reference to each of the three stages which we have described as being, or as being associated with, the process of recollection. (See Meno 85a and 98a, both passages cited above.) Liddell and Scott, in their Greek Lexicon, define it as "a calling to mind", "recollection". We have seen that the aporetic stage is an activity distinct from recollection; and the "tying down of true opinions by a chain of causal reasoning" is equally obviously a process distinct from "recollecting". The only stage which can be properly called "recollection" is the second stage, where questioning prompts recollection of true opinions. Thus Plato seems to be straining the use of the term "anamnesis" when he employs it to cover all these three stages, since all three refer to different states
or activities of the mind. Presumably, the meaning which we are to give to the Platonic anamnesis is analogous in some way to the situation where empirical circumstances prompt us to remember some event, and we in turn cannot be sure of the truth or validity of our recollection until we have recollected, through pondering over our original recollection, other related events which can confirm our recollection. The limitations of this analogy clearly point to the dangers inherent in making the term "anamnesis" do such duty as it does in the Meno. Although it would seem unfair to demand of the Meno that type of careful analysis of terms which characterizes so much of modern philosophy, the activities over which "anamnesis" presides are so disparate that Plato must be criticized for using the term so loosely.

We shall now discuss Plato's methodology, partly in an attempt to give further meaning to the last "stage" of anamnesis, "the tying down of true opinions by a chain of causal reasoning". This last stage seems to be connected with the new method that is introduced at Meno 86e ff. Our justification for this connection is the stronger for the facts that (1) not only does the hypothetical method appear for the first time in the Meno along with the introduction of the doctrine of anamnesis, but (2) it is outlined in the passage that immediately follows the discussion with the slave.

Socrates suggests at Meno 86e-87b that the problem
whether virtue is teachable should be investigated by means of a hypothesis. The reason why he makes this suggestion is that, since the prior problem of "what is virtue" has not been decided, it is necessary to make certain assumptions in order to continue the investigation. The assumptions which are to be made will serve as the limiting conditions of the inquiry into whether virtue is teachable. We are told that the hypothetical method is that practised by geometricians. It seems to consist of stating the conditions which will have to be met if we are to give our assent to a particular answer. An example of the use of this method in geometry is given by Heath: "out of three straight lines which are equal to three given straight lines to construct a triangle: thus it is necessary that two of the straight lines taken together in any manner should be greater than the remaining straight line." The limiting condition for the solution of the problem of constructing the triangle is that any two of the given straight lines taken together must be longer than the remaining straight line. N. Gulley writes, in reference to the Greek geometricians: "their formulation of the method, as it was known to Aristotle, reflected primarily its function of systematizing geometrical knowledge and co-ordinating results by leading propositions back to first principles -- to axioms or definitions or something already demonstrated." The significance of the method for Plato seems to have been similar. R. Robinson writes: "For Plato a hypothesis was
naturally and normally a proposition posited for the proof of some other proposition, a premiss and not a demonstrand.\(^\text{15}\)
The solving of a problem satisfactorily within the limits set by a hypothesis does not validate the hypothesis itself but some form of validation is possible by referring the original hypothesis back to another hypothesis until "something sufficient" is reached.

This is the method, in brief, with which Plato tries to prove that virtue is teachable. Plato assumes, in the slave-boy scene, that the same method of cross-examination that Socrates had used to lead the slave to the solution of the geometrical problem could lead him to knowledge not only in mathematics but also in other "mathēmata". "The slave will behave in the same way with all geometrical knowledge and every other subject." (85e.) This would include for Plato moral knowledge. After introducing the hypothetical method in geometrical terms, Plato immediately applies it to an ethical problem. Thus he assumes that it is possible to apply the same method of analysis in ethics as in geometry.

The hypothesis which is set as a limit to the question "is virtue teachable?" is "virtue is knowledge". This hypothesis in turn is reduced to the hypothesis that "virtue is good". The hypothesis that virtue is good is accepted as something sufficient, since Meno and Socrates both subscribe to it. Yet it is a hypothesis, since we do not know what virtue is. Thus the limit set to the question "is
virtue teachable?", is that virtue is knowledge; the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge depends upon the hypothesis that virtue is good.

Moreover, on our interpretation, this method of analysis is that which will convert true belief into knowledge by displaying the "indisputable" first principles which will give the inquirer the reason why ("aitia logismos"). Thus true belief becomes knowledge when the principles upon which the truth of the belief is founded are explicitly recognized as true. There is an appeal from "lower order" beliefs, or propositions, to "higher", and to avoid the infinite regress of appeals from one order to a higher ad infinitum, Plato has to claim that the highest principles are something sufficient. The criteria for what is "something sufficient" are still the criteria of the Socratic method of inquiry, agreement and consistency. Thus it seems that true beliefs are isolated truths and that knowledge is the comprehension of a system of truths, at the first principle level, which, being sufficient to account for the truths of lower order propositions, will validate the hypothetical method. Thus there is good reason to regard the hypothetical method as supplementing the Socratic method; the highest hypotheses, in the _Meno_ at least, are determined true or false by the Socratic criteria of agreement and consistency.
We shall now discuss the status of the objects of belief and knowledge in the Meno. Plato uses the term "eidos" in the Meno (for instance at 72c-d), but our previous investigations have shown that such a use need not point to the doctrine of Forms. We approach the present investigation not so much by considering the use of the term "eidos" as by examining what is explicit and implicit in Plato's account of the objects of knowledge and belief. We do this for two reasons: (1) because Plato uses "eidos" with a variety of meanings, with the result that an account of its use would not go very far in saying what the objects of knowledge and belief are; and (2) since, in the Meno, Plato is not so much expanding upon the implicit meanings of "eidos" as trying to give an account, at times, of the objects of knowledge and belief, and in so doing he calls them "eidos".

An attempt has been made by Mugler to show that the knowledge acquired through anamnesis is empirical;¹⁶ in the course of justifying this interpretation, he claims that the phrase, "has seen all things both here and in the other world" (Meno, 81c5), refers to sense-experience, to "seeing through the senses" (p. 369). He sees the recollection of a priori propositions as "the result of an abstraction based on experience in a previous life" (p. 370). Wherever the evidence for this may be, it is not in the Meno; Plato makes no reference, implicit or explicit, to "abstractions based on sense-experience". The major problem with which
any empirical interpretation of anamnesis in the Meno has
to deal is that such an interpretation of a theory which
explains a priori knowledge in terms of the pre-existence
of the soul leads to an infinite regress along the lines of:
the knowledge which I have in this life I recollected from
a previous existence; the knowledge that I had in that
previous existence I recollected from an even prior
existence; and so on to infinity. This regress is particu-
larly unsatisfactory since the answer given, "from a previous
existence", is that for which we are asking an explanation.
This regress is not fatal to the empirical interpretation
if it is assumed that Plato was unaware of the regress. Then,
this condition would indicate that Plato is advancing an
explanation of a priori knowledge which merely consisted
of putting the explanation "into anterior existences where
it presents itself in the same way". While this seems
hardly likely, other arguments for an empirical interpreta-
tion verge on the absurd. On the grounds that Plato's
conclusion concerning the relation of true belief to know-
ledge is at odds with what he says in the Republic, where we
have the theory of Forms, it is argued that the Meno contains
no appeal to a transcendent reality, and thus that Plato was
advancing a theory similar to the Pythagorean doctrine of
anamnesis. This argument is clearly invalid; indeed, it
cannot even show that the theory of Forms is absent from the
Meno since, even in the Republic (413a), "doxa" and "epistēmē"
are used without their specialized meanings at times.

The major argument in favour of the empirical interpretation is the passage at *Meno* 81a-e, where anamnesis is introduced in terms of religious beliefs. But there are good reasons why we ought not take this passage as direct evidence from the text for Plato's position. We have seen that, if it were to be taken as such, then we are led to adopt an interpretation against which there are very serious objections (p. 38). Whether this argument be fair or not, an examination of the slave-boy passage in relation to the religious passage secures the empiricist coffin very securely. The argument from 82 on is the reverse of that in the preceding section: in the latter the flow of ideas is from the pre-existence of the soul to anamnesis, whereas, with the slave, the establishment of the doctrine of anamnesis leads to the assertion that the soul is immortal. Moreover, the slave-boy interlude is clearly concerned with a particular type of knowledge, mathematical knowledge; the significance of this is that the knowledge recovered through anamnesis is not concerned with sensibles, as would have been the case if Plato had merely been elaborating on religious notions. This emphasis upon the *a priori* elements of our knowledge is paralleled by an emphasis upon "life when we were not yet men" (86a) as opposed to life in the sensible world. The suggestion is clear that knowledge of the truths of "ta mathēmata" is a type of apprehension distinct from sense-
experience, an apprehension acquired by the soul at a time when it was discarnate.

Since the distinction which emerges, between the soul in its discarnate state and the embodied soul, implies a distinction between two types of apprehension, and since an empirical interpretation of the *Meno* is impossible, then there is a clear appeal to some form of transcendent reality. Are the Forms the objects of true belief and knowledge in the *Meno*?

One thing is clear and that is that Plato makes no explicit reference to the theory of Forms; on the argument from terminology, R. S. Bluck comments justly:

If Socrates used the terms "idea" and "eidē" for the objects of our intellectual apprehension, as he probably did, it would be natural for Plato to retain them, especially as it was in order to justify Socrates' belief in absolute norms that he evolved his new theory; and inasmuch as his "idea" or "eidē" were still to be his standards of reference, these terms were still appropriate.

That Plato was chiefly interested in the *Meno* in showing that knowledge is possible can be taken to signify either that he had no motive for introducing the Forms in the *Meno*, or that he had not yet reached the stage where he could make such an introduction. While his doctrine of anamnesis clearly implies, as we have seen, some form of transcendent status for the objects of knowledge and true belief, there is no attempt to draw any of the "puritan" distinctions that characterize so strongly the account of anamnesis in the *Phaedo*; there is no emphasis upon the
dichotomy between soul and body, in terms of the perceptual and conceptual elements of our experience, nor between the sensible world as the realm of the changeable and imperfect and the realm of the Forms, changeless and perfect. The only appeal is to some non-sensible and superior grade of being, to a transcendent reality. Because of a lack of evidence to the contrary, it seems reasonable to claim that the problems raised in the *Meno*, in particular the nature of this "transcendent reality", provided the stimuli which prompted the doctrines of the *Phaedo*.

Section C

In the *Meno* there are passages which express some form of reservation, doubt or perplexity. While we cannot be sure to what extent these reservations are the result of Plato's dramatic artistry, they would seem to be in some measure an expression of Plato's feelings. At 80c Socrates' avowal of perplexity, characteristic as it is, serves also as a caution against mistaking pointers for answers. This is reinforced by the fact that religious notions introduce the "constructive" section of the dialogue. Robin writes:

Nous sommes en présence d'une conception de l'origine de nos connaissances et d'une méthode pour bien conduire sa pensée et pour développer tout le savoir qu'elle enveloppe. L'élément mythique que contient le thèorie en marque sans doute le caractère hypothétique, mais il n'en restreint pas la probabilité.

While these reservations, and those at 86b-c and 98b, refer to particular passages, cumulatively they colour the whole
dialogue. The inadequacy of the argument to "prove" the immortality of the soul, the consequent reservations expressed (86b), the obvious gap between the success of the geometrical examination and the success of the inquiry into virtue, the mythical setting at 81a-c, the switch from "ti"-questions to "poion"-questions, collectively reveal a purposeful stress on the tentative quality of a dialogue where Plato is advancing, for the first time, elements of a constructive theory of knowledge. He has still to explore the implications of these elements.

In order to formulate a theory of knowledge in which he can have full confidence, Plato has to meet several needs. He must specify more explicitly the relation between the soul and his theory of knowledge, analyze more closely the elements of his doctrine of anamnesis, and examine the nature and extent both of a priori knowledge and of non a priori levels of apprehension, in particular the role of sense-perception in knowledge. The _Phaedo_, although it does not deal systematically with these problems qua problems of knowledge, shows a fuller appreciation of the implications of these problems, and makes some attempt to meet them.

Finally we note what H. Cherniss says of the _Meno_:

Plato shows in the _Meno_ that a consistent and practical ethical theory depends on an adequate epistemology. Socrates' contention is that, since determination of the characteristics of virtue presupposes knowledge of its essence, we must assume that essential virtue exists and has been directly known, unless we are to surrender all possibility of considering ethical problems. Knowledge is necessary to act virtuously.20
Our investigation of the Phaedo will parallel for the most part the epistemological developments of the text as they occur; however, we shall abandon such a linear procedure when dealing with the problem of sense-perception and knowledge. The second part of this chapter is devoted to a comparison between the doctrines of the Phaedo and of the Meno. In the third part we discuss the Symposium.

The Phaedo

The Phaedo is strongly characterized by elements of what we have called the "puritan tradition", the tradition in which an extreme contrast is drawn between the body and the soul. From the very start Plato suggests a connection between the content of the Phaedo and certain doctrines of Pythagoreanism by setting the dialogue in Phlius, one of the centres of Pythagoreanism on the mainland of Greece. Then, he focusses down on religious elements such as those discussed in reference to Meno, 61a ff. The passages at Phaedo, 64d-67b and 83c-d, explicitly and violently disparage the body and the senses. The philosopher must "detach himself from the body" and "release his soul from association with his body" (64e). The philosopher must do this since it
is through the activity of reason that reality is revealed to us (65c); the body, by being a constant care, hinders such activity and deceives the soul in its attempts to inquire (65b-c). The passage 65d-66a is quoted in full since it illustrates fully this puritanism:

SOCRATES: Well, have you ever seen anything of that sort [a "good itself" and the like] with your eyes?
SIMMIAS: Of course not.
SOCRATES: Then have you apprehended them with some other bodily sense? I mean the being of things in general, greatness, health, strength, or whatever else it may be: in short I mean the reality of this or that; is the full truth of them beheld through our bodies, or is it a fact that those of us that have trained ourselves to think most fully and precisely of the object in question, in and by itself, will come closest to knowing that object?
SIMMIAS: Yes, certainly.
SOCRATES: Then the clearest knowledge will surely be attained by one who approaches the object so far as possible by thought, and thought alone, not permitting sight or any other sense to intrude upon his thinking, not dragging in any sense as accompaniment to reason: one who sets himself to track down each constituent of reality purely and simply as it is by means of thought pure and simple: one who gets rid, so far as possible, of eyes and ears and, broadly speaking, of the body altogether, knowing that when the body is the soul's partner it confuses the soul and prevents it from coming to possess truth and intelligence. Is it not such a man, Simmias, that will grasp that which really is? 2

The disparagement is complete: we shall never possess truth fully "so long as our souls are befouled by this evil admixture" (66b).

Several points must be made in this connection. Firstly, this "puritanism" seems to be Platonic rather than Socratic, since Socrates' general attitude, while perhaps being ascetic, is nowhere else pictured as radically puritan. 3
Secondly, such a condemnation of the body and the senses seems prejudicial to an investigation of the problems of knowledge, particularly in regard to an assessment of the role of sense-perception in acquiring knowledge. This is not to say that Plato does not realize that sense-perception has a role to play in acquiring knowledge. We can see how Plato could condemn the senses in the way that he does as well as realize that they have a role to play if we try to understand the considerations that may have led him to adopt the theory of Forms.

We have seen that Heraclitus' doctrine of flux influenced Plato. Since he accepted the view that the world of senses is always changing, and since he recognized that we use concepts which are not subject to change, then the changeable cannot be the object of knowledge, which is unchanging, and there must be a realm beyond the changing. His interest in the Phaedo is in determining what this realm is. It must be unchanging if it is to fulfill its function; it is also unseen, since what is sensible is changing; if it is to be truly unchanging it must be eternal. We cannot know this realm through the senses, since sensibles are changing. Thus we must know it through the soul's intellectual activities. Thus the soul is in opposition to the body. Since the soul knows the changeless, it must share in the characteristics of the realm beyond the sensible world. Thus it is eternal (immortal) and divine, in
the sense that it does not belong to the sensible world. Its kinship is with the unseen, changeless world. The body can then be seen as standing between the soul and its rightful position. But, given the doctrine of anamnesis, the body must have a role in acquiring ("recollecting") knowledge, since something must prompt recollection. In the Phaedo Plato wishes to show the existence of the immutable Forms, in opposition to the world of sensibles, and it was natural for him to stress the corresponding opposition of soul to body.

We start our discussion of the developments of the text with a brief note to the passage quoted above (65d-66a). Here we have the first mention of the theory of Forms. It is no more than a mention since the existence of such Forms is assumed, Simmias agreeing without hesitation. What is important to the argument of that passage is that there are realities which the soul apprehends without the direct aid of sense-perception. Plato both wishes to introduce the theory of Forms gradually, and seeks to refrain from interrupting his argument.

Since the passage 72e-77a is the crux of what Plato has to say about sense-perception in the Phaedo, we shall consider it at length. Cebes introduces recollection into the discussion at 72e, and summarises Socrates' past arguments in its favour, that is, the arguments of the Meno. Socrates then introduces a completely new aspect of the
theory at 73b. This new aspect is an argument which, while connecting the doctrine of anamnesis with the theory of Forms, tries to make the immortality of the soul and the existence of the Forms mutually necessary — "it is equally certain that our souls exist before birth as the reality of which you speak exists" (77a). The theory of Forms in the Phaedo, as W. D. Ross has shown, is subordinate to the proof of immortality, and so the aim of the doctrine of anamnesis is to show that, given the validity of the theory of Forms, the soul is immortal. However, this subordination does not detract from the fact that Plato is interested in examining the consequences of his theory of Forms.

The argument starts from a consideration of reminder by association: a present perception can remind us of something not at that moment perceived (73c). This reminder by association is of two types, we are told. We are reminded of something perceived in the past either (1) by resemblance (Plato cites the case of a portrait and its original), or (2) by contiguity (as in the case of the lyre and its owner) (73c-74a). In reference to reminder by resemblance, Plato writes: "Are we not certain to find ourselves doing something else besides, namely asking ourselves whether the similarity between the object and the thing it reminds us of is defective or not?" (74a.) Whatever the force of this argument from introspection, it completes the model which Plato uses in his subsequent investigation. From
he applies this model, based on a distinction between present and past perceptions, to illustrate the distinctions between sensible instances and the Form, and between perception and conception. Socrates says:

We maintain, do we not, that there is such a thing as equality, not the equality of one log to another, or one stone to another, but something beyond all these cases, something different, equality itself. May we maintain that it exists or may we not?

Most assuredly we may, answered Simmias: not a doubt of it. And we have knowledge of it, in and by itself? Certainly we have.

Then where do we get that knowledge from? Mustn't it be from the objects we mentioned just now, the equal logs or stones or whatever they were that we saw? Didn't they lead us to conceive of that other something? You do regard it as something other than those things, don't you? Look at it like this: two stones or two logs equal in length sometimes seem equal to one man but not to another, though they haven't changed. Yes, certainly.

But now what about the equals themselves? Have they ever appeared to you to be unequal, or equality to be inequality?

Never, Socrates. Then those equal objects are not the same as the equal itself?

Far from it, I should say. And yet it is from those equal objects, different as they are from this equal, that you have conceived and acquired knowledge of the latter? That is perfectly true. This latter being either like those others or unlike?

Just so. However, that point is immaterial; but so long as the sight of one thing leads you to conceive of another, whether like it or unlike, a case of reminder must have occurred.

Yes, to be sure.

And to continue: in the instance of those equal logs and other equal objects that we mentioned just now, is it our experience that they appear equal to the same degree as the equal itself? Is there some deficiency in respect of the likeness of the former to the latter, or is there none?

Yes, a considerable deficiency.
The argument from deficiency is used to prove the pre-natal existence of the soul. Sense-perception is a pre-requisite for the recollection of Forms (75a-e; 76d-e); sensibles are defective in their resemblance to Forms (74d-75b); reference to an ideal standard is presupposed in perception and, as such, previous knowledge of the ideal standard is a pre-requisite of sense-perception. Since we have perceived from birth, then we must have a knowledge of the ideal standard which is pre-natal. And thus the soul exists before birth (74e-75c.)

In the example which Plato gives of recollection, we are reminded of equality by perceiving sensible instances of the equal. Thus association by resemblance is what the example illustrates. But there are indications that we are to give the theory of recollection a broader interpretation than the example would warrant. The passage at 74d, "so long as the sight of one thing leads you to conceive of another, whether like it or unlike, a case of reminder must have occurred", seems to refer to the previous distinction (74a) between reminder by resemblance and reminder by contiguity. This conclusion is reinforced by Plato's statement at 76a. "It was possible for a person who had seen or heard or otherwise perceived an object to go on to conceive another object which he had forgotten, something with which the first object was connected, whether by resemblance or by contrast." It seems clear, then, that Plato means his model
to be applied more fully to his theory of recollection than his example might suggest. We can be reminded of the Form Equality, for example, both by equal objects and by objects which we associate with equal objects. Thus I think that Plato would allow that the sight of two unequal sticks, by reminding us of two equal sticks which we associate with the unequal sticks, could give rise to recollection of the Form Equality. We can be reminded of a Form by sensible instances which are not in fact exemplifications of that Form. If this interpretation is correct, we have to disagree with Gulley when he writes: "it would have been much better for his argument if Plato had restricted his use of the idea of association by contiguity to the examples of 73d-e." 8 Plato's main concern may be to show that the soul existed before birth, rather than to give a full account of recollection. If this is his main concern, then it is natural that he stresses association by resemblance, since it is closely allied to the argument from deficiency. But there is no reason to preclude association by contiguity and its inclusion does not alter the force of Plato's argument from deficiency.

Gulley raises some further problems concerning this passage (72e-73a). He sees the principle by which the Forms are postulated as non-sensibles to be that Forms, unlike sensibles, cannot have contraries predicated of them. He
writes:

What makes the use of this principle particularly surprising in the present passage of the Phaedo is not only that Plato carefully specifies, and hence recognizes, the particular conditions which allow a pair of contraries to be predicated of the same sensible instance but also that he makes the fact that sensible instances are instances of one contrary, and not the other, the foundation of his argument for recollection. 

There is no inconsistency, however, in saying (1) that a sensible instance can have contraries predicated of it under different conditions, while saying (2) that what cannot have contraries predicated of it must be non-sensible. Clearly if what is sensible can have contraries predicated of it under different conditions, then what cannot have contraries predicated of it under any conditions must be non-sensible.

The other point which Gulley is making is that the use of the principle of deficiency (74b-c) does not fit with the argument of 74c-75b. The passage at 74b-c argues that because equal sticks sometimes seem unequal then Equality is something other than a sensible; 74c-75b argues that equal sticks, since they are equal, possess the characteristic of equality and do not possess the characteristic of inequality. For, equal sticks are "imperfect" not in the sense that they exemplify the contrary of equality as well as equality, but because they do not exemplify perfectly the standard constituted by Equality. "Plato is not suggesting that the experience of apparent unequals can remind us just
as well of equality as the experience of apparent equals. 10 This is clear from Plato's account and does not conflict with our conclusion, above, that the sight of unequals can remind us of equality through association by contiguity, since we are discussing reminder through association by resemblance. The problem, as Gulley sees it, seems to lie in the conjunction of two views: (1) that sensibles, unlike Forms, can have their contraries predicated of them, and (2) that the theory of recollection rests upon the fact that sensible instances are instances of one Form and not its contrary. But Plato's argument from deficiency is concerned with sensibles in general, and not with a particular perception of a sensible at a particular time by a particular person. There is no inconsistency in saying that the objects of perception are changeable and that one particular perception is of a sensible which is an instance of one Form and not its contrary. And since Plato recognizes the conditions under which sensibles exhibit contraries, he recognizes that a sensible cannot have contraries predicated of it unless there is some difference in the conditions.

It is necessary to see whether the recollection that is prompted by the senses is knowledge of the Forms for Plato, or not. In the passage which we have quoted (74b-c) Plato uses the terms "epistasthai" and "epistēmō" to refer to the conceptual level of apprehension which we attain from sense-perception. These terms are, of course, his usual
terms for "knowledge". We have seen from the Heto and can see from the Phaedo, for example two sections later at 76b, that Plato habitually uses "knowledge" in a technical sense: to be able to claim that we know we must be able to give an account of a Form; a process of analysis is necessary to convert true belief into knowledge and to enable us to give this account. It is clear that, if we interpret "epistēmē" at 74b ff. as "knowledge" in its technical sense, then the passage at 74b-c is seriously at odds with what Plato says elsewhere. For, the passage would then say that the fact that we attain a conceptual level of apprehension affords us a full knowledge of Forms. Thus any process of analysis would be redundant. That Plato should give inconsistent accounts of "knowledge" within the same dialogue is not an inviting interpretation. Consequently we believe, with Hackforth, that "epistasthai" and "epistēmē" in 74b-c are not to be taken in their precise, technical meaning.

If we see Phaedo 74b-c in the light of the Heto the suggestion is attractive that the "epistēmē" of 74b-c is analogous to true opinion; this interpretation is, I think, established by the fact that both "epistēmē" in this passage of the Phaedo and "true opinion" in the Heto are the direct consequences of recollection. In the Heto true opinion is convertible into knowledge by a further stage of analysis; and we shall argue that in the Phaedo there is good reason to view the hypothetical method as serving the same function.
But before considering the hypothetical method some assessment of Plato's view of the role of sensibles is necessary.

In the *Meno*, as we have seen, Plato does not discuss the nature of the reminding through which we can recollect or form true opinions. The role of sense-perception in reminding is not examined, although there is a suggestion that sense-perception might have an important role to play since Socrates uses a geometrical diagram to aid the slave's recollection. In the *Phaedo* sense-perception is essential to knowledge, since the whole theory of recollection is made to depend on it. Socrates, talking about the conception of the equal itself, says:

> And we agreed moreover on a further point, that the conception referred to has arisen only, and could have arisen only, from seeing or touching, or some other form of sense-perception; what I am saying applies to them all alike. (75a.)

In order to be reminded of the Forms sense-perception is essential, and without it no knowledge would be possible. Although superior methods of philosophy need not refer to sense-perception in investigating the Forms, one must have been prompted to conceive of the Form before any such investigation is possible. And this prompting is the result of recollection. We conceive of the Form by perceiving sensibles which remind us of it either through association by resemblance or association by contiguity. This conception of a Form, on our interpretation, is not knowledge in its strictest sense. Although there is an existential proposition
involved in the "epistēmē" of 74b-c "that a Form exists", this is all that we know about the Forms; our conception of a Form involves no more than a notion of a Form.

We shall consider now Phaedo 99d-102a where Plato outlines the hypothetical method, and shall be concerned to see if what Plato says about the hypothetical method is (1) consistent with what he says about sense-perception in the Phaedo and (2) analogous to what Plato says in the Meno.

In the sections preceding 99d Socrates has characterized the method by which the scientists investigate as one of sensible observation. He is dissatisfied with this method since it cannot deal with problems such as causation. He proposes to adopt another method:

On each occasion I assume the verbal account [logos] which I judge to be the scioniest, and I put down as true whatever seems to me to be in agreement with this, whether the question is about causes or anything else; and what does not seem to be in agreement I put down as false. (100a)

Socrates then offers to explain this more clearly. But instead of elucidating his remarks about "logos", he introduces the Forms and claims that they can be regarded as causes. The suggestion seems to be that the theory of Forms as causes is a clarification of what is said at 100a. 101d-e tells us that "when asked about a cause we should form our notion of what a cause is, and cling to that hypothesis". 12

And if anyone were to fasten upon the hypothesis itself, you would disregard him, and refuse to answer until you could consider the consequences of it, and see whether they agreed or disagreed with each other.
But when the time came for you to establish the hypothesis itself, you would pursue the same method: you would assume some more ultimate hypothesis, the best you could find, and continue until you reached something satisfactory. But you wouldn't muddle matters as contentious people do, by simultaneously discussing premiss and consequences, that is if you wanted to discover the truth. (101d-e.)

Bluck believes that the passage which introduces the Forms as causes marks the point in the narrative where we pass "from the definitions of Socrates to Plato's own explanation of cause by means of substantially existing Forms". Thus Plato characterizes his own use of the hypothetical method by using "hypothesis" instead of the Socratic "logos". However, the first section of what we have quoted immediately above (101d) is so similar to the section where "logos" is used to describe our verbal notion that we must not see any contradiction in the two accounts, especially if we are to see Plato as making good his promise to "make clearer" his preliminary account.

Before we turn to the method itself, we must note that the condemnation of the scientists' method from direct, sensible observation conflicts in no way with the important role which Plato assigns to the senses in the Phaedo. There comes a point where investigation through sensibles is not a satisfactory method and that point has been reached. It remains true, of course, that without sensibles and perception there could be no recollection and without recollection there would be nothing to which
to apply the hypothetical method.

It might seem surprising that Plato does not specify what the most ultimate hypothesis, which is "something satisfactory" is by introducing the Form of the Good. The reason why it is not introduced here is presumably that the long explanation which would have to accompany its introduction would interfere with the attempt to prove the immortality of the soul. What Plato tells us here is sufficient for his purpose. In the Symposium, as we shall see, Plato is concerned to show the Beautiful as the ultimate Form and this clearly foreshadows the Republic's doctrine of the Good.

It has been argued by Gulley that the hypothetical method is "an ideal of propositional analysis" and W. D. Ross treats the hypotheses as propositions. R. S. Bluck, however, argues that it is fallacious to treat the hypotheses as propositions. He points out that there is only one way in which contradictory conclusions could follow from a premiss (hypothesis) and that is "if the premiss were a complex proposition including two inconsistent propositions". But Plato does not mean the hypothesis to be a complex proposition. Bluck then shows that, if we regard hypotheses as a method of arguing from one proposition to another, Plato's argument is marred by the passage about hypotheses: the passage about hypotheses becomes a digression. The thought would run, he shows, as follows:
Forms are causes, and will prove immortality (100b-e); mechanistic causes are not a satisfactory explanation of anything (100a-c); you should always in arguing stick to one hypothetical proposition until you need to confirm it by reference to a more general proposition, and always proceed in that way, not confusing one with another (101d-e); consideration of what Form-copies can or cannot coexist in sensible objects leads to the proof of the immortality of the soul.17

Thus he shows that the remarks about propositional
analysis would be out of place. He argues that, if we are to see Plato's account as coherent, we must regard "hypotheses" as notions of "Form-causes". His interpretation runs:
"one should cling to one's provisional notion of the Form that one provisionally postulates as the cause of the thing in question, until it has been seen whether all that results from such a 'hypothesis' is consistent".18 And this clearly preserves the continuity of Plato's discussion of cause, and it seems reasonable to regard the hypotheses as "provisional notions" of Forms. If our provisional notion of a Form is correct, no inconsistencies will follow from it, and thus the comparison of the "results" of our notion is one way to validate our notion. Bluck points to the use of "hypothesis" in the Republic (509 ff.) as confirmation of the view that a hypothesis is a notion of a Form.19

Although to have a notion of a Form implies an existential proposition, "that the Form exists", to say that a Form exists is meaningless unless we have some notion of the Form.

What is the nature, then, of the "logos" of 100a? There is good reason to show that "logos" refers not to
propositions but to definitions, with which Socrates was traditionally associated. Bluck writes:

If we are concerned with propositional reasoning, the statement of the method is decidedly loose; for ... the "agreement" that will justify acceptance of proposition B because of the acceptance of proposition A must mean logical sequence, while if "disagreement" is to justify rejection of proposition C it must mean not non-sequence, but inconsistency. 20

If we regard this objection in the light of the discussion of hypothesis, then it becomes even more attractive to see "logos" as "definition". For again the coherence of Plato's discussion is safe-guarded. The point is this.

If Plato is fulfilling his promise to explain his meaning more clearly, we would expect a connection between the account at 100a and the description of the Forms as causes. And our expectation is met if "logos","definition", is seen as a cause; a "definition" is to be seen as the "cause" of all that conforms to it being what it is.

Plato, after using "logos" in 100a says that he will make his meaning clearer. His subsequent discussion uses "hypothesis". Thus, since the Forms are introduced after 100a, and since the implication is that Plato's later discussion expands something already stated at 100a, it seems reasonable to suppose that the passage with "logos" is at least a reflection of Socrates' position, while the passage which uses "hypothesis" is Platonic. As Bluck says: "the transition from the Socraticism of the "logos"-cause to the Platonism of the "chōriston-eidos"-cause is effected
by the device of making Socrates offer to explain his meaning 'more clearly'."21

We have seen, in discussing the passage at 74b-c, that what we recollect through experience of sensibles is a notion of a Form. We have also seen above that "hypothesis", which replaces the Socratic "logos", means not so much a proposition as a notion of a Form. Thus, analogously to the use of the hypothetical argument in the _Meno_, we can say that the hypothetical method of the _Phaedo_ serves to make more secure the findings of sense-perception, or, more exactly, the findings of recollection stimulated by sense-perception. Thus I think it is wrong to say, as Gulley does, that "the position in the _Phaedo_ is that the theory of recollection is now based on the postulate that the Forms exist, but that the theory is not linked with the method in the way implied by the _Meno_."22

To conclude this section we shall leave Plato's methodology and return to our previous discussions of the _Phaedo_. There is a clear implication that Plato had not yet thought out fully the implications of his theory of knowledge in the fact that he makes no provision for erroneous judgement in his account. Plato's argument that the fact that we attain a conceptual level of apprehension points to the existence of the Forms has to assume for its success that some concepts are reliable pointers to the Forms. He gives no indication how we are to distinguish between a concept
which corresponds to a state of affairs and a concept that does not. Furthermore, opinion is just as much possible only at a conceptual level of apprehension as is knowledge, and opinion can be, and often is, wrong.

The Phaedo and the Meno

In this part we shall be concerned with considering the general meaning and adequacy of Plato's theory of Forms, particularly with reference to their epistemological significance, and with comparing Plato's position in the Phaedo with that of the Meno.

To commence this discussion, we shall give a brief description of the Forms in their three main aspects: metaphysical, ontological and epistemological. The Forms are the cause of all in the sensible world that is called after them; the Forms are "real things", having a nature, and as such can have their names predicated of themselves; as distinct from sensible particulars, which are perceived by the (unreliable) senses, the Forms may be apprehended by the soul in their pure state.

However, it is difficult to see the Forms, as they are presented in the Phaedo, as a single answer to so many problems. For there is no doubt that Plato, in saying that the Form Beautiful is beautiful, is predicating "beautiful" of the Form, and not asserting an identity between the Form and the characteristic. This fact of predication lays the
theory of Forms open to the "Third Man" argument. Since resemblance is explained as derivative from a Form, the argument runs, there must be another Form which will cause the resemblance (of beautiful) that holds between sensible instances (called beautiful) and the Form (called beautiful). That is to say:

If sensible instances $a,b,c$ are all $F$, there must be a single Form in virtue of which we apprehend $a,b,c$, as all $F$.

If $a,b,c$ and the single Form are all $F$, there must be another Form in virtue of which we apprehend $a,b,c$ and the single Form as all $F$.

If $a,b,c$, the single Form, and the other Form are all $F$, there must be yet another Form in virtue of which we apprehend $a,b,c$, the single Form, and the other Form as all $F$.

And thus there is an infinite regress of Forms. Plato does not distinguish between a character and a thing characterized, between the Form and a perfect instance of the Form.

This suggests that the logical characteristics of the Forms are not of the type which are necessary if they are to serve as the objects of knowledge. He has to deny their "thinghood", that which allows them natures, that which allows them to be predicated of themselves, if they are to serve this purpose. But Plato's very attempt to distinguish the Forms from sensibles by ascribing to the Forms those characteristics the opposite of which are exhibited by sensibles contradicts his needs. He calls a Form "simple", "unchangeable", and the like; but what he needs to do is to elaborate upon the relations of the Forms, one to another.
What is the relation between the Form Equality and the Form Inequality? Can we conceive of the one without conceiving of the other? Such questions are important for his theory of knowledge, and so long as he sees the Forms as simple entities he is prejudicing his ideal of systematic knowledge.

The *Meno* does not suffer from this defect. But the introduction of the Forms in the *Phaedo* is not a retrograde step from the *Meno*, since the *Meno* escapes these problems very much at the expense of not tackling them.

If we are to be sympathetic to this part of Plato's theory of Forms, we must see it in its historical situation. W. K. C. Guthrie holds that substance was not yet explicitly distinguished as a category from attributes by Socrates' fore-runners. Furthermore, Parmenides' dictum that a thing either is or is not suggests that the possibility of different modes of existence was not yet contemplated. We may see these factors in conjunction with Greek usage. The article is frequently used with the neuter adjective (for example, "to dikaion") when describing what we would call attributes or qualities; hence the suggestion that abstractions as such were not yet recognized. Thus "to dikaion" carries the connotation of "thinghood" — that which is just. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that when the feminine abstract noun occurs it is often personified as a goddess (Dikē). Thus we can be more sym-
pathetic to Plato: he realizes that Forms are not of the same mode of being as sensibles, but he still regards them as "things".

We have already outlined the ways in which the Phaedo is an advance upon the Meno throughout our earlier discussion, particularly in the role which it gives to sensibles in recollection, and thus in knowledge. There are some aspects of the Phaedo, however, which can be seen as retrogressive from the Meno. The Phaedo exhibits at times a radical puritanism, according to which the body and the soul have opposing characteristics. The Meno, while containing a distinction between body and soul, does not attempt to characterize the body and soul as being in opposition, unless it be in the vague "soma-sōma" ideas of the religious introduction to the doctrine of recollection.

Moreover the tendency (but not the aim) of the argument of the Phaedo is to imply an impersonal immortality for the soul. The more Plato emphasizes the equation of the soul, on the one hand, and, on the other, pure intellect and its functions, the more difficult it is to conceive of personal individuality in immortality. Since the soul is seen very much as pure intellect and since the objects of the soul's experience in its discarnate state are the same for all souls, it is hard to see what will differentiate one soul from another. To give a theoretical background to people's natural wishes for personal immortality involves
the identification of soul and person, and it is by no means easy to identify the soul as pure intellect, the content of whose knowledge is the same for all souls, and the person. It may well be that, because he became conscious that the distinctive characteristics which he wishes to associate with soul cannot be related to soul as pure intellect, Plato adopted the theory of the tri-partite soul in the Republic.

The Symposium

While the Symposium is an advance upon the doctrines of the Phaedo, the main reason for its inclusion in this study is that it serves as a valuable pointer to later developments in Plato's thought. Since Plato seems to be striving to create a work of art, perhaps in an effort to relieve the asceticism of the Phaedo, it is not surprising that its philosophical interest is limited to but a small part of the whole.

We shall commence by giving a brief analysis of this "part", sections 208b-212a. Diotima distinguishes among three types of procreation in the beautiful: the procreation of children; the procreation of spiritual issue, motivated by a love of honours; the procreation in the beautiful itself, the procreation of true spiritual offspring. The two former types are subsumed under the latter. The whole is an account of the "ascent" to the apprehension
of the Form of Beauty. At 211, Plato writes:

And the true order of going, or being led by another, to the things of Love is to begin from the beauties of the earth and mount upward for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is.

Plato's account is a departure from the Phaedo in several respects. First of all, there is no disparagement of the body and the senses in the Symposium. The important role given to sensibles by Plato in the Phaedo is stressed in the Symposium: the process which leads to knowledge of the Form is based on sensibles, in both accounts. But the process of the Symposium is one of progressive abstraction, from fair forms, to fair practices, fair practices to fair notions, and fair notion to the notion of absolute beauty. By giving such an account Plato is stressing the fact that it is from perceiving a great number of instances of fair forms, a great number of sensible instances, that we progress towards the notion of absolute beauty. The Phaedo does not describe this stage of recollection in detail, since its account presupposes, in its examples, a certain familiarity with the concept concerned, in this case "equality". This process of abstraction tends to emphasize the Form as an object of knowledge, whereas the Phaedo is at least as much interested in the Form in its metaphysical and ontological aspects as in its epistemological
aspects.

The Form of the Beautiful, the ultimate object of apprehension, clearly parallels the Form of the Good in the Republic; and although the Republic offers an ideal of propositional analysis, while the Symposium depicts a process of abstraction, in neither case is this ultimate apprehension dependent directly upon sense-perception. While to deny this of the account of the Phaedo would be wrong, it is much clearer in the Symposium and the Republic.

Another explicit doctrine of the Republic is fore-shadowed in the Symposium: in the former dialogue Plato expands the three types of procreation, of which we gave some account above, into the doctrine of the tripartite soul, in his attempt to reconcile the "intellectualized" soul and the concept of person. The procreation of children corresponds to the appetitive element, the love of honours to the spirited, and procreation in the beautiful itself to the rational. In each case the lower elements are subsumed under the higher.

The absence of the moral puritanism of the Phaedo from the Symposium, Plato's appeal for guidance in the "ascent" (210a6-7), his conception of the unifying ultimate, his new estimation of the soul, all augur well for the Republic; and the constructive elements of both the Phaedo and the Symposium find their necessary synthesis in that dialogue.
Notes to "Introduction", Pages 1 to 7

1 The table given below illustrates the results of the stylometric analyses of Lutoslawski, von Arnim, Ritter, Raeder and Wilamowitz. It is based on the table given by Sir W.D. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford: 1951), in his introduction. Lutoslawski's results are from his *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* (1897), pp. 162-168.

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Notes to "Introduction"

5P. Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago: 1938), J. Burnet, ed., Phaedo (Oxford: 1911), Greek Philosophy: Part One (London: 1914), and his British Academy Lecture, "The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul", Proceedings of the British Academy (1915/16), reprinted in Essays and Addresses (London: 1929), and A. E. Taylor, Vcria Socratics (1911), and his British Academy lecture, "Plato's Biography of Socrates", Proceedings of the British Academy (1917). These three writers have been the chief exponents of the "static" theory.

6P. Shorey, op. cit., p. 75.

7The third part of chapter two is a discussion of the development of Plato's technical vocabulary for expressing the Forms ("eidos" and "idea").


Notes to Chapter I, Pages 8 to 18


2Empedocles says: "I go among you an immortal God, no longer a mortal". This passage is to be found in Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin: 1934), fragment 112, 4. This book is hereafter cited as Diels.

3W. K. C. Guthrie, op. cit., p. 115.

4Homer, Odyssey IV, vv. 561 ff., describes the gift of immortality — eternal life— to Menelaus. While Homer knows of an Elysium, it is an earthly paradise. If Menelaus is to have eternal life, it is by avoiding death altogether.

5Odyssey XI, vv. 488-491, is a good example of the abhorrence felt for life after death as a shade.
Notes to Chapter I

6 Mimnermos and Semonides write of this. The relevant passages are to be found in Diehl, *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca* (Teubner, 1965), under Mimnermos, fragments 1-5; Semonides of Amorgos, fragments 1 and 29; Simonides, fragments 9 and 10; Callinus fragment 1.

7 D. J. Furley, "The Early History of the Concept of Soul", *University of London, Institute of Classics, Bulletin Number Three* (1956), is a comprehensive account of the early history of the Greek concepts of "psyche", "phren", "thymos", and "kroide".

8 J. Burnet, "The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul", cited above, in section X of his article, shows that in fifth century Attic writers there is little divergence from the traditional ("Homeric") use of "psyche". He cites Sophocles, *Philoctetes*, vv. 55 f. and 1013, as examples of the extension of the word's use.


11 References concerning Thales are to be found at Diogenes Laertius, I, 21, and Aristotle, *De Anima*, A5, 411a7. For Anaximenes, see Aetius, I, 3, 4.


15 Ibid., p. 160.


Notes to Chapter I

19 The ramifications of Pythagorean philosophy do not concern us here. Suffice it to say that many of the views of Pythagoras' followers were fathered on Pythagoras. Thus we cannot say whether or not Pythagoras believed that an escape from the cycle of births was possible, and whether or not he believed that only he and his immediate followers were subject to the process of transmigration.


22 Empedocles: see Diels, B115.


24 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 987a32.

Notes to Chapter II, Pages 19 to 33

1 The main sources for the life of Socrates are Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschines. The latter two are extant in small quantities only. Aristotle is a valuable source for particular philosophical problems connected with Socrates.


4 Euthyphro, 7b-d and 11b-c are good examples of this.


Notes to Chapter II

8 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b21, is a good example of this. He writes: "to call happiness the greatest good is perhaps a little trite."


10 J. Gould, The Development of Plato's Ethics (Cambridge: 1955). The first half of this book is devoted to Socrates, and the first chapters to the problem with which we are concerned here. The discussion he gives is based on the distinction which he adopts from Ryle, and which is to be found in G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Harrondsworth: 1949), p. 28.

11 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1216b3-10.


13 G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought, p. 9. See also his note to that page where he refers to Gorgias, 497e, as a further example of the use of "eidos" without any metaphysical connotations.


15 C. M. Gillespie, "The Use of 'Eidos' and 'Idea' in Hippocrates", Classical Quarterly, VI (1912), 179-204.


17 H. C. Baldry, "Plato's 'Technical Terms!'", Classical Quarterly, XXXI (1937), 141-150.

18 Ibid., pp. 142-143.

19 Ibid., p. 144. See also Aristotle's Metaphysics M, 1078b30.

20 Loc. cit.

21 Ibid., pp. 149-150.
Notes to Chapter III, Pages 34 to 59


2. The translation is by W. K. C. Guthrie, from *Plato: Protagoras and Meno* (Harmondsworth: 1956). This translation is used throughout this chapter.


4. Ibid.

5. N. Gulley, "Plato's Theory of Knowledge", *Classical Quarterly*, N. S. IV (1954), 194-213, argues that "the now popular view that anamnesis is abandoned in the later dialogues is false" (p. 194).

6. Ibid., p. 196. He writes of Mugler's thesis (that we are able to recall general propositions through a process of abstraction based on experience in a previous life): "If a priori knowledge is not explicable within an empirical theory based on the experience of this life, then a resort to the knowledge acquired through the precisely similar experience of an earlier life is superfluous."


12. See chapter I, pp. 15-16.


Notes to Chapter III


17 Ibid., p. 369.


Notes to Chapter IV, Pages 60 to 84

1 R. Hackforth, *Plato’s Phaedo* (Cambridge: 1955), p. 29, discusses the significance of Phlius as the setting.

2 Translation by R. Hackforth, *op. cit.*; his translation is used throughout this chapter.

3 Ibid., p. 49, discusses our evidence for puritanism in Socrates the man.


6 It is important to note that Plato does not say there is a process of abstraction from sensibles which leads to a knowledge of the Forms.

7 Although we have to wait until 102b-105b for the introduction of "eidos" and "idea" as referring explicitly to the Forms, the point remains that Plato is giving a gradual explication of the theory of Forms, and that 72c-76c refers to the Forms, and not to anything as vague as the "transcendent beings" of the *Meno*.


9 Ibid., p. 30.

10 Ibid.

11 R. Hackforth, *op. cit.*, p. 75.
Notes to Chapter IV.


15 Sir W. D. Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

16 R. S. Black, *op. cit.*, p. 161. He cites Ross' theory that the "hypothesis" is a proposition.


23 *Phaedo*, 100c, reads: "if anything else is beautiful besides the beautiful itself...".


25 In this connection it is interesting to note that the early Stoics, at least, believed in the substantiality of attributes and universals; in fact, their notion was more sophisticated than we have suggested, in that they believed attributes to be as real as areas to which we assign identity, even if their language belied this sophistication at times.

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