

MAN AND SOCIETY:
THE FACTUAL BASIS OF MORALITY

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By

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS: An attempt to discover the essential nature of morality through an analysis of 'human nature', so as to show not only that morality has a factual basis in 'human nature' but also exactly how this factual basis of morality is related to morality.

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INTRODUCTION

1. What is the relationship between factual assertions and moral judgements, between facts and moral values? And is this relationship, whatever form it takes, of importance to moral philosophy? Can we discover and justify fundamental moral standards without recourse to 'facts'? These last two questions are concerned with the possibility or non-possibility of morality in general being independent of 'facts', being autonomous. Whatever we answer to these questions, we are asserting something about the fundamental nature of morality and of morals, which is obviously of great importance to moral enquiry insofar as these assertions tell us the fundamental nature of that about which the enquiry is concerned. Raising the question of 'is' and 'ought', or of 'fact' and 'value' can be seen then, as a search for an adequate understanding of the nature of morals and morality. There is here a proposed connection between the question of 'is' and 'ought' and the question of 'fact' and 'value' which does not amount to an assertion that the problem of deducing an 'ought' statement from an 'is' statement is equivalent to the problem about specifying the nature of the connection between facts and values. Rather, the connection proposed is such that the problem of deducing 'ought' statements from 'is' statements is a specific aspect of the wider problem of the relation between facts and values, so that such a problem concerning statements can be solved via a

solution to the wider problem of the relation between fact and value. This means that a linguistic analysis of 'is' and 'ought' statements can only solve the problem by presupposing a general connection between fact and value. If in the sphere of moral discourse we were to conclude that 'ought' statements can be deduced from 'is' statements, we will have made a general point about the nature of morality, namely that the essence of morality can be discovered in an analysis of factual material and similarly with value in general. This latter general condition must be satisfied if it is to be true that 'ought' statements can be deduced from 'is' statements. Accordingly, the problem of 'is' and 'ought' in moral discourse can be construed as a problem of the relation between fact and moral value; or, in other words, a problem of discovering the nature of morality as such, rather than solely a problem of the connection between two types of statements.

All normative discussions centering on the search for one or a set of ultimate values which men ought to follow inevitably presuppose some degree and level of 'factual' material in which the norms are 'placed' even if not deduced from it. If we believe no 'ought' can be deduced from an 'is' this does not preclude us from relating in some way the value to a factual situation. All it precludes us from is saying that description entails prescription.

The modern philosophical dispute concerning 'is' and 'ought' has centered around the question as to whether or not it is the case that only factual statements can follow from one or

a set of factual statements. It is the case that we do pass somehow from statements of fact to judgements so it seems that the gap between 'is' and 'ought', between fact and value, must at least be bridgeable in some way. Those who admit that can still deny that the connection is one of entailment. So the dispute has two aspects: first, what, excluding entailment, constitutes this bridge?; second, must we exclude entailment? The most common answer given to questions of the first category is that the transition from 'is' to 'ought' can only be made by use of some psychological notion such as wanting, needing, liking, etc., so that given a certain factual situation and certain psychological states of mind, feelings, or passions, certain non-factual conclusions will follow (either logically or empirically as in Hume's theory). This type of answer is a characteristic of Hume's writing as well as that of some contemporary philosophers such as MacIntyre, Anscombe, Foot and Flew.¹ However, since wants, needs, feelings, etc., are types of 'is's', the problem of the connection between 'is' and 'ought' is not settled, but only made more specific, i.e., it now becomes the problem of the relation between certain types of 'is's' and 'oughts'. So we have the same kind of problem with which we started, only in this form it may be more easily solved. However, it is not quite as easy as saying that the evaluation is equivalent to the feeling, etc. I am here referring to a subjectivist type of theory which

1. The views of MacIntyre, Anscombe, Foot and Flew, amongst others, on the 'is'/'ought' problem appear in W.D. Hudson (ed.): The 'Is-Ought' Question.

says something like 'X is good' means 'I like X', so that presumably other sorts of evaluations would mean the same as other psychological states. If it was the case that values express and refer to subjective likes and dislikes, then it is impossible that a description of objective fact should include the value. For example, if I were to say 'X is good', meaning 'I like X', then a description of X cannot include the 'I like it'. Nor would a description of A's likes and dislikes be a prescription for B, since A would be applying the statement only to himself, saying nothing about the object as it does or as it should appear to B. On the other hand, I think we would want to allow that evaluation is at least a necessary aspect of moral value, i.e., it is necessary that if X is valuable, it is valued. We must always take feelings into account.

One way of accounting for this that has been adopted by at least one contemporary philosopher, namely Philippa Foot, is to say that such categories - needs, feelings, etc., - are logically tied to their objects in such a way that it is not the case that just anything can be liked, needed, thought to be dangerous, etc., so that presumably given a certain factual situation, certain psychological states logically follow and hence certain evaluations logically follow.¹

This view seems to be the kind of thing Anscombe is calling for when she says that moral philosophy ought to be dropped until

1. See 'Moral Beliefs' and 'Goodness and Choice' by Philippa Foot in W.D. Hudson (ed.) The 'Is-Ought' Question.

we have sufficiently developed philosophical psychology.¹ However, I think this kind of position cannot be fully justified by restricting one's analysis to certain kinds of statements, for in it there is an implicitly proposed connection between fact and value such that description is not completely independent of evaluation (judgement). Whether or not we accept such a view that Foot proposes turns on whether or not we can show how such a logical connection between fact and value can be the case. In other words, to show how it is that psychological states enable us to pass from 'is' to 'ought' we have to show the nature of the logical connection between this kind of fact and value. We will see that the only way that psychological states can bridge the gap between 'is' and 'ought' is by eliminating it -- that is, by showing the connection to be one of entailment. This obviously requires an analysis of the factual material supposed to be relevant to evaluation so that we can see how statements about such material are connected to statements 'about' value.

The view that description cannot entail prescription only holds within a limited sphere. It only holds in what may be called the 'positivist' sphere, where there is a radical distinction between 'fact' and 'value'. In this sense, the scientist is a positivist and the positivist philosopher takes his general 'world-view' from him. Although this is less true today of the scientist, I think the

1. See 'Modern Moral Philosophy' by G.E.M. Anscombe in W.D. Hudson (ed.) The 'Is-Ought' Question.

generalization can still be made, if only for the purpose of example. The world of the scientist is composed of physical things and so by definition, there is no place in the real world for values. Description of the real world, then, cannot possibly entail prescription. Nevertheless, there are values, and reconciling these two aspects has caused much concern and philosophical diversion. But we need only accept the radical distinction between 'fact' and 'value' if we accept the scientist's 'world-view'. Need we do this? The only reason I can think of is practical in nature.¹ Logically speaking, there is no reason. So we have two alternatives in reconciling 'oughts' and 'is's'. Either show how an 'ought' may be derived from an 'is', or, rejecting the distinction in the first place, show how description can entail prescription (showing value to be a 'fact'). For example; the sociological approach in the search for ethical norms can attempt to meet the attack on the 'is-ought' question by either showing how an understanding of sociological facts will yield understanding of the normative secrets by showing the relation of a world of 'oughts' to a world of 'is's', (which it may not be able to do without the help of psychology), or showing how an understanding of sociological facts, properly interpreted, is amongst other things, an understanding of normative 'facts'. This latter I would call a 'radical' reconciliation of

1. Given that this kind of 'world-view' is widely accepted as being the correct 'view', one would have difficulties in, for example, communication, if one took a different 'view' of reality; because of the difference rather than because the 'view' was mistaken.

fact and value to distinguish it from the former. This paper will be an attempt at laying the foundation for a radical reconciliation of 'fact' and 'value'.

Assuming that 'fact' is not synonymous with 'physical object', which is surely an acceptable assumption, I may be said to be asserting a fact about X when I assert 'X is good', or at least to be purporting to assert a fact about X. And is not the making of the assertion (the moral judgement) a fact about the maker? What, then, is the difference between 'moral facts' and other 'facts', and why is it that, supposedly, we cannot deduce a 'moral fact' from a 'non-moral fact', an 'ought' from an 'is'? If we could deduce an 'ought' from an 'is' we would be exhibiting an entailment of the 'ought' in the 'is'. So a complete description of the 'non-moral fact' would, amongst other things, contain a 'moral fact'. If, then, we are to show that the relationship between 'facts' and 'values' is one of conceptual entailment, one way of doing so is to show that a complete description of non-moral facts is amongst other things, a description of moral facts, a reconciliation of fact and value, which will eventually result in a situation where the status of certain facts will be a moral status and where the status of values will be a factual status.

Since it is individuals who evaluate, who 'have' values, and it is the objective world to which these are appended, that is, the world of 'physical things', the reconciliation of fact and values requires a reconciliation of 'subjective' and 'objective'. As has been said earlier, Philippa Foot thinks that there is some kind of logical connection between the psychological state and the

object concerned, so that a description of either the psychological state or the object is logically dependent on a description of the other. The connection between consciousness, then, and a particular object of consciousness, cannot in this case be a sort of passive receptivity, as it would be if there were only an empirical connection. If we are to conclude, then, that there is a logical connection between fact and value, we must also show that there is something more than an empirical connection between subjective and objective, for example, something more than a contingent perceptual connection.

This reconciliation, however, is not the starting point. The starting point is this: - acceptance of the view that there are some kinds of 'facts' which are directly relevant to moral enquiry, whether normative or descriptive, and stating what kinds of facts these are. Showing exactly how they are relevant, what the relevance is, is the 'reconciliation', and comes later. We can say without any hesitation, that whatever morality and value are, persons are directly involved in some, as yet imprecise, way, and persons are thought to exist in the real world (are 'factual'). Persons are the only makers of moral judgements; they are the ultimate reference point for decisions about praise and blame. Moral situations and 'systems' of morality always involve persons. We have to examine this involvement through an examination of the concept of 'person'.

Persons also have relationships with other persons and with institutions, the network of these relationships being termed 'society'. Society, meaning social relationships, I also take to be directly relevant to moral enquiry. We have to examine this

relevance by examining certain fundamental sociological concepts. Whatever else persons may have we can also say, without hesitation, that they have consciousness, of themselves, of others, of the physical world, and of the 'moral world' of values. Reference to conscious experience of persons is what makes definitions of moral concepts and moral theories non-tautologically acceptable, i.e. not mere definitions and not mere theories. The relevance of the psychological approach and the plausibility of the phenomenological approach in explaining the basis and meaning of 'morality' are primarily due to the indisputable involvement of experience in general, of self-consciousness and moral-consciousness in particular, in 'morality'. We have to examine the nature of this involvement and through it, the relevance of psychology as a type of explanation of moral phenomena.

According to Maurice Mandelbaum¹ these approaches mentioned here, the sociological and psychological, together with the metaphysical, are the three main types of approach to ethical questions, apart from the phenomenological approach. All except the phenomenological, he thinks, have their advantages and disadvantages, which I think we can take to mean that none are completely satisfactory in providing a conceptual basis for the understanding of morality in its complex and diverse aspects. I think in turn we can take this to mean that from each approach individually, the conceptual

1. Maurice Mandelbaum Phenomenology of Moral Experience, (Johns Hopkins, 1969)

basis provided is not compatible at worst and not exhaustive at best of what we can, at this stage, loosely call moral experience (what exactly moral experience is, is yet to be discovered). The phenomenological approach, if it means an approach that will correct this latter situation, I believe is the correct one to take. However, Mandelbaum's phenomenological approach takes the form of a generic description of moral experience, the experience we have in making judgements of praise and blame, judgements of worth, and deciding whether or not a particular action on the part of ourselves is good. This, to the neglect of sociology and psychology, the theories of so-called positivists. But, just as 'morality' does not exist in a vacuum, but in a world of persons and society, so moral experience does not take place in a vacuum apart from experience of the self as person, others as persons, personal relationships and social relationships. To provide a conceptual basis for understanding and explaining morality or moral experience, one cannot begin with a description of experience as moral experience nor a description of morality without begging the question¹ and without limiting the phenomenological field of enquiry. It is not merely our experience of the real world that Husserl was talking about, but the real world itself. To describe certain kinds of experience as moral experience before working out the fundamental nature of morality, is surely question-begging.

1. I am not necessarily imputing this purpose to Mandelbaum and, therefore, not necessarily the question-begging.

Our understanding of the fundamental nature of morality will determine the kind of characterization we make of experience as moral experience, since the kind of experience which can be called moral experience will depend on the nature of morality as such. Therefore, to begin with a characterization of certain kinds of experience as moral experience, presupposes the nature of morality as such; what exactly is presupposed depends on the characterization given of moral experience. This is why I take it that to seek an understanding of morality as such, by means of a characterization of the nature of moral experience, is begging the question. And in the context of this paper, we cannot describe morality as such without question-begging. However, this is where experience does come in: what I say about the 'facts' which I regard as directly relevant to moral enquiry will entail moral concepts. The only way that values, morality in general, can be shown to be part of the world just as certain 'things' are, is by showing that they are related to experience in the same kind of way¹ and this means first developing moral concepts out of 'non-moral' concepts, found by examining the notion of the person, society, and the nature of the psychological and sociological factors in morality and by showing them to be the essence of such understanding as we have concerning value, moral relationships, the moral sense, etc., and not merely causally

1. We are not necessarily speaking of the 'Scientist's' world here and so not necessarily speaking of the way things are related to experience in this kind of 'world-view'. The primacy of 'physical things' is not here being asserted.

explanatory of them. These 'non-moral' concepts suggested above can be generally subsumed under the heading 'human nature', so it is through an examination of human nature that the nature of morals and morality can be discovered.

2. The moral philosophy of the Eighteenth Century in Scotland is distinguished by an interest in 'Man, Society and Morals', despite inevitable differences amongst the individual philosophers of the period. For example, David Hume attempts to discover the 'origin' of morals in a psychological analysis of man; Adam Ferguson attempts the same sort of thing with a sociological analysis of man. Even Hume's psychology is a social psychology when it comes to explaining morality. It seems then that Hume and Ferguson are typical of the period in seeking to understand morals and morality in an understanding of Man, an understanding of the moral aspects of man achieved through an understanding of the 'non-moral' aspects, so-called human nature. They obviously believe there to be a connection between these two aspects of man. Since these 'factual aspects' of man are generally speaking the same kinds of facts which I have already assumed to be relevant to moral enquiry, I think a profitable procedure will be to attempt to discover the exact nature of this relevance with the help of an examination of some of the fundamentals of the moral thought of this period, in particular that of Hume, not as an end in itself but as an aid in discovering the nature of the connection between man, society and morals.

The connection between human nature and morality lies at the centre of the modern dispute as to what Hume thought the connection between 'is' and 'ought' to be, and whether or not he was right. Those who believe that Hume did not wish to deny the possibility of basing 'oughts' on 'is's' often cite as support the fact that he does do so, basing morality in human sentiments. Indeed, Hume does base morality in a psychological analysis of human nature, in terms which, although not referring to 'outside facts', are not moral terms strictly speaking. So the least that can be said about Hume on this matter is that he believes morals and morality can be understood through an understanding of non-moral aspects (specifically psychological facts of human nature) of the person. Further than this it is difficult to state what Hume thought the general nature of the connection between psychology and morality to be, apart from explanation, i.e., how it is that psychology does explain morality. Even taking into account psychological facts, does not show how 'oughts' can be deduced from 'is's', without making a logical point about the nature of 'oughts'¹, it only introduces special kinds of 'is's'. Antony Flew thinks it is "better to say that Hume's central insight was: that moral judgments are not statements of either logically necessary truths, or facts about the natural (or Supernatural) universe around us; and,

1. We do not make a logical point about the nature of morality if we state the connection to be merely derivation but facilitate an empirical understanding. See Page 2.

hence, that "All morality depends upon our sentiments" (Treatise, Book III, Part II, Section 5)¹. But this gets us nowhere nearer to an understanding of the nature of morality and its connection with our sentiments. And then we have Hume's mysterious passage in the Treatise before the one concerning 'oughts' and 'is's'.²

"....when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but from the constitution of your nature, you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."

Here it seems that Hume is making a logical point; 'x is vicious' is equivalent to 'I have a sentiment of blame from the contemplation of x'. If Hume did mean this then surely he is wrong. The pronouncement may, at most, be caused by the sentiment but its content is surely not equivalent to the sentiment, as generally characterized by Hume, i.e., subjective fact of individual consciousness. The essential problem is still the nature of the connection between sentiments and morals as pointed out but not answered by A.C. MacIntyre;³ "Hume is not in this passage (the one concerned with 'is' and 'ought', previously mentioned) asserting the autonomy of morals -- for he did not believe in it; and he is not making a point about entailment -- for he does not mention it.

1. Antony Flew: On the Interpretation of Hume, Philosophy, Vol. XXXVIII (1963).

2. Treatise of Human Nature, ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford 1888) Page 469.

3. A.C. MacIntyre; Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought', Philosophical Review, Vol. LXVIII (1959).

He is asserting that the question of how the factual basis of morality is related to morality is a crucial logical issue, reflection on which will enable one to realize how there are ways in which this transition can be made and ways in which it cannot. One has to go beyond the passage itself to see what these are; but if one does so, it is plain that we can connect the facts of the situation with what we ought to do only by means of one of those concepts which Hume treats under the heading of the passions and which I have indicated by examples, such as wanting, needing and the like. Hume is not.....trying to say that morality lacks a basis; he is trying to point out the nature of that basis."

The connection, then, between psychological facts of human nature and morality is a crucial logical question and is no less puzzling, let alone an answer to the "crucial logical issue" of "how the factual basis of morality is related to morality" and how these factors facilitate "this transition....". To settle a logical issue concerning the connection between two kinds of things, one must surely make a logical point or points about them and show that they are logically connected. Hume is then committing himself to the belief in a logical connection between psychology and morality which he cannot explicate by empirical methods alone, by observation alone. However, at this stage, I merely wish to say that the "crucial logical issue" was just as much an issue which concerned Hume, whether consciously or not, as it is an issue which concerns this paper.

I hope to show, in this paper, that the fundamental basis of

morality can be discovered in an analysis of 'non-moral' kinds of concepts found in the study of 'human nature', in such a way that the essential nature of morality can be seen to be 'factual' i.e., to be entailed in such kinds of concepts. An examination of the nature of the concepts which lie under the general heading of 'human nature' will purport to lay the foundation for a settlement of the crucial logical issue and through this, the empirical issue, concerning Man, Society and Morals. Enumerating empirical instances in which sentiments and values are found together does not tell us what the nature of the connection between them is. This is the logical issue and will show how, in principle, the citing of instances of sentiment can be an explanation of the particular values involved in these instances, and hence how a psychological analysis of man can facilitate the transition from 'is' to 'ought'. It is this logical issue that we now proceed to examine in the following chapters: - the logical connection between 'human nature' and morality.

SUMMARY

1. Questions concerning the connection between fact and moral value, of which questions concerning the connection between 'is' statements and 'ought' statements are a specific aspect, are of importance to moral philosophy. They are important because conclusions regarding such a connection will assert something about the nature of morality as such. One way to discover the nature of morality, then, is to examine the nature of the connection between

fact and moral value.

2. The modern dispute concerning Hume's views on 'is' and 'ought' has been construed as exhibiting this more general problem of the nature of the connection between the factual basis of morality and morality. The question of the exact nature of the connection between sentiments and value judgements has been seen as the crucial logical issue concerning the connection between fact and value, between the factual basis of morality and morality. Since Hume both a) believed that the transition from 'is' to 'ought' could only be made by means of some such concept as 'passion', i.e., by means of psychology, and b) believed that the essence of morality could be understood through an analysis of certain kinds of factual material (human nature), some aspects of his work provide an ideal vehicle for the main ideas of this paper, since we are here concerned to show just how morality can be understood by an analysis of certain kinds of factual material; to show the nature of the logical connection between fact and value. Ferguson will also be discussed for the same reasons. (We will also see that Hume provides the clue to the solution of the problem of the connection between fact and value in his 'doctrine of sympathy').

3. The proposed nature of the connection, in this paper, is one of entailment. This, together with the assertion that there are some kinds of facts which are directly relevant to such an enquiry mentioned above and statements outlining these kinds of facts, means that the overall procedure of this paper is to make an analysis of these kinds of facts such that morality is shown

to be entailed in them. This analysis is an attempt to show how these kinds of facts are relevant to the notion of morality. This means that it is an attempt to indicate the nature of the connection between the factual basis of morality and morality, by developing a notion of morality out of certain 'non-moral' notions, (thus rejecting the radical distinction mentioned between fact and value). The material here referred to as factual is factual in the sense that statements concerning it are regarded as being factual statements. The specific sense of the term must be left open at this stage in order that an analysis of the factual material can be carried out in such a way that morality is entailed by it. These 'non-moral' notions together may be subsumed under the general heading of 'human nature'. We will be examining the notion of the person, of society and the nature of the psychological and sociological factors alleged to be relevant to the notion of morality.

CHAPTER ONE: THE PERSON

The procedure of this paper, as outlined in the Introduction, is to examine certain non-moral phenomena that can be generally subsumed under the heading of 'human nature' in order to provide an understanding of moral phenomena. In this chapter, a description of 'human nature' is construed as being a description of 'Man-in-Society' and the first step in an analysis of human nature is an analysis of the notion of the person along two lines; (a) the general question of the ontology of persons and (b) the manner in which the concept of the person is formed. The basic conclusions of this analysis are that; a) the ontology of persons is a relational ontology, such that Man has his being in relations with others, i.e. in social relations and that b) self-consciousness and, therefore, consciousness of others is consciousness of social relations.

'Human nature' can either mean 'what is natural to man' or 'what Man is'. Either way, human nature can only be 'discovered' through observation. This fact has two basic and important implications that will be stated here and considered in more detail later. First, unless we want to regard man as merely a different kind of physical object, we have to allow that at least part of the real world is a 'construction out of experience'.¹

1. The meaning of this phrase will become clearer later in the chapter.

Second, since Man cannot be observed in a void, so to speak, 'human nature' as a description of Man is not something that is independent of social context. 'Human nature as such' has no meaning. A description of the so-called 'state of nature' cannot, on this account, be a description of 'human nature as such', but only a description of Man in a particular social context, (one that is supposed to be fundamental). Nor on this account does a description of Man in a particular social context have any claim to be more fundamental (prior in a logical sense and, therefore, explanatory of the facts in other descriptions of Man in particular contexts) than other descriptions. The 'state of nature' as an abstraction from observation cannot serve to explain the data of that observation and human nature in a family context is not more fundamental than human nature in a wider social context.

A description of 'human nature' I, therefore, take to be a description of 'Man in Society'. The sense in which it is a description and the content of this description, must now be developed, by making first of all an analysis of the concept of the person. This analysis will, I hope, support the view that Man is always 'Man in Society', and thereby (as we shall see later) necessarily a moral being.

There are two basic questions which I want to consider in this section: the general question of the ontology of persons; and the manner in which such a concept as 'the person' is formed, both of which are important when the ultimate aim is an understanding of morals and morality, i.e., an objective and a sub-

jective analysis of the concept of the person is necessary to understand the objective and subjective aspects of morality -- how X is valued and valuable. I hope this will become clear.

a) First, then, the general question of the ontology of persons. If we want to discover what defines and determines the individuality of a single person, there are two related notions which must be understood; the notion of individuality, identity; and the notion of person. With a problem such as that of the person, there are two kinds of concepts involved. First, what may be called the 'formal' concepts, those which make up the structure of the problem -- individuality, identity, (the 'what it is' that is asked). Second, the concepts which 'fill in' this structure; the content, so to speak -- person, self-consciousness, etc., (the 'about which' we are asking). This sub-section will be more concerned with the 'formal' concepts, the 'content' concepts will be considered in the next sub-section, together with the question as to whether or not, and in what sense, we can observe individuality and identity.

An examination of the 'formal' concepts will amount to a definition, in the sense of a putting within formal limits, of the question of person identity,¹ since the 'formal' concepts also define the limits of the 'content' concepts so that, when combined with the latter, they determine the kind of answers we give to the question

1. Person identity here means static identity, as opposed to person identity over time.

of what a person is.

In order to discover what person identity is, what it means and when we are justified in making person identity assertions, we may take the approach which attempts to discover conditions and criteria of person identity. We can examine how such things are discovered (and their status once discovered), and I think this examination will lead us to conclude either (1) that when we say X is a necessary/or sufficient condition for Y, we are making a straight-forward assertion about what person identity is or (2) asserting X to be implied by, or implying Y while not actually entailing Y in the sense that it is not an aspect of Y, part of it. Both (1) and (2), I think, presuppose knowledge of Y, what it is or what it means. Knowledge of Y cannot be obtained through X without begging the question.

An example from the problem of person identity over time: when we say bodily continuity is a necessary condition of person identity over time, we could either be saying 1) that amongst other things, this is what person identity over time is, part of its meaning, or 2) that without bodily continuity, we would have no grounds for asserting something about Y, namely person identity. This something which we are unable to assert does not include bodily continuity but rather the latter is a sign of the former. Both 1) and 2) are in need of justification and we cannot appeal to the 'facts' without presupposing what it is that needs justification, namely what person identity means, what it is.

So we have to approach the question from the point of view

of asking what identity is, what constitutes identity, i.e., its meaning. Static identity I take to be equivalent to individuality. Although identity, when asserted of something, is always 'identity as ...', what it means in general to say of something that it is an identity as independent of what it is identified as, i.e. conceptually independent although it never is in application. What are the conceptual requirements of anything being an individual, an identity?

In his criticism of Hume,¹ Terence Penelhum uses an example of a series of musical notes to illustrate his criticism of Hume's notion of identity. Hume believed that because the mind was a series of distinct perceptions, it had no identity. Penelhum criticizes this by arguing that a series can have an identity as that particular series - which may sometimes be called a symphony to indicate its identity, its individuality. The individual notes are part of a series but the problem is what do we mean by calling it a series to begin with, by identifying the series as that particular series. What we are doing in individuating this particular series is, at least, distinguishing it from other actual or possible series. Now there are two aspects to this in individuating process; in individuating the particular series, there must be something in an experience which distinguishes it and the series itself is distinguished, i.e., distinct. To be an identity, then, the series

1. Terence Penelhum: "Hume on Personal Identity", Philosophical Review, 1955.

must be distinguished in experience and distinct in reality. The former aspect will be considered shortly but the latter can be said to mean that the series must be related to other actual and possible series, in the sense of 'bearing relations'. Relating the series to other actual and possible series is individuating. Individuating as (in this case a series) is this relating to actual and possible series, plus relating it to actual and possible 'non-series'. In other words, we are positing an existent and an existent as ..., and this positing logically requires relations. The series only exists insofar as it has relations and the series exists as a series only insofar as it has certain kinds of relations. If we were to specify further the kind of series it is, it would be this kind of series only insofar as it has certain kinds of relations, but we are here only concerned with identity as such. A thing, then, is an identity, it is (as something self-identical, existing) only insofar as it has relations - it has existence only in and through these relations.

What this amounts to is the view that ontological status in general and particular varieties of ontological status is really a matter of relations. To determine particular kinds of ontology is to determine particular kinds of relations so that determination of ontology in general is a matter of determination of relations.

Take, for example, X's identity as a particular physical 'thing'. 'Thing' normally means 'physical thing' and 'physical' normally means 'spatio-temporal'. So X has the ontological status as a self-identical spatio-temporal object. (The word 'object' is

very vague here and necessarily so -- for the only characterization that can be given of it that it is spatio-temporal. It is, therefore, in a sense superfluous, merely an indication that we are talking about something - an individual something - rather than nothing). Now this 'object' is only spatial insofar as it bears spatial relations - this is what 'spatial' means. And it is only temporal insofar as it bears temporal relations - this is what 'temporal' means. So it is only spatio-temporal insofar as it has spatio-temporal relations. If spatio-temporality is the only characterization that can be given to this object, i.e., this is what 'object' means, then the object is only insofar as it has spatio-temporal relations. Saying that it is a self-identical physical thing, then, is saying that it has spatio-temporal relations and existence as will entail certain kinds of relations. If the 'object' above were to be a chair, a spatio-temporal 'object' for sitting on, designed for sitting on (to eliminate tables from being called chairs) then the chair is insofar as it has relations, it exists as an object insofar as it has spatio-temporal relations and it exists as a chair, i.e., it is a chair, insofar as it has certain kinds of relations to people, manufacturers, etc. In saying what kind of an object an object is, its ontological status and its characteristics, we will be giving a word which 'represent' a certain kinds of relationship. If it were characterized as my chair, this will merely be adding relations.

The relata of these relations, then, are not 'prior' in

any temporal or logical sense. We cannot logically eliminate relations and be left with 'things', either as 'things' or as particular kinds of things. So we cannot abstract from a world of things and relations to a world of things which affect relations amongst themselves - they are related as existing and related in a certain way as existing in a certain way and they are existing as related and existing in a certain way as related in a certain way.

A 'thing's' identity, then, depends on definition; definition in both its objective and subjective senses is a placing within limits and this placing within limits entails relations. A definition of person will entail certain kinds of relations peculiar to that definition.¹

b) It has previously been said that human nature can only be 'discovered' through observation. How, then, do we reconcile this with the above assertion that the concept of person is a matter of definition?

I want to introduce here, the notion of 'observational definition'. The peculiar sound that this phrase has results from the combination of two different 'functions' of consciousness: Observation, in its usual sense, is of a passive nature, all that is required of consciousness is receptivity. Accordingly, in this sense of observation, a thing has its existence and its

1. Once we have determined the nature of the relations which define 'person', we can determine the conditions and criteria of person identity, both in general and particular.

characteristics independently of the consciousness which 'observes' them and which is made aware of them through this receptivity. Definition is obviously different since here consciousness is active; here, a thing's particular nature defined from a particular point of view, is the result of a conscious activity. Strictly speaking, we only define terms but insofar as these terms refer to something in the world, we also define the nature of that something. The meaning of the term 'person' and, therefore, what a person is, results from a combination of these two 'functions'. We all claim to encounter persons in the real world, persons form a large part of our reality, i.e., a large part of our observable environment. The purpose in raising the notion of an 'observational definition' is to try to give a sense to this claim given the belief that it is only possible to observe physical bodies, i.e., that the only kind of thing consciousness can be passively receptive to through the senses is of a spatio-temporal nature. The way that this can be done is to give a different sense to the term 'observation' such that observation is not restricted to passive receptivity but also includes the active element of definition, so that persons can be said to exist in the real world only if such a restriction is dropped. Since what results from this activity of consciousness is thought of as being an element of the real world, we must allow that if making such a combination of the passive and active functions of consciousness is correct, at least part of the real world is existentially dependent on the activity of consciousness.

Through observation then, in its restricted sense,

consciousness only receives spatio-temporal data. Since physical bodies are distinguished (and distinct) from one another through spatio-temporal relations, we can observe things, physical objects, but in the above mentioned sense of observation, we cannot observe things which are more than mere things, i.e., that are not merely spatio-temporal. Assuming persons to be at least physical bodies of a certain kind, which kind they are being a matter of particular spatio-temporal relations, but also something more than physical, then observation is at least a necessary but not a sufficient condition of the truth of the claim that we encounter persons in the real world. So, to say that we know what persons are by observation, is to say that persons are a kind of physical object.

So, if observation in its restricted sense, yields only ontology of a spatio-temporal kind and if persons are to be regarded as more than mere physical bodies, i.e., not completely characterizable in spatio-temporal terms (just as the vast majority of things in the world are not), how do we characterize such things as the person, human nature, etc., through observation? In what sense can such things be observable?

It must be admitted that it is possible to have conflicting interpretations of what is vaguely regarded as the 'same' state of affairs. Take, for example, the supplying of foreign aid by one country to another. Some may regard this as a kind of large-scale international generosity. Others, as a means of political and economic control. The list is endless

but the common factor of all such conflicts is that they cannot be resolved by pointing to the facts, for it is disagreement about what the facts are which lies at the heart of the conflict. To be impartial to such conflicts is to take either the majority (or some other such 'authoritative') interpretation or one not held by the 'extremists' in such conflicts. There is no possibility of not having some kind of interpretation. The real or objective facts of the situation are derived from the popular interpretation (however it becomes popular). There is no common world where there is no common externalization of experience (agreement), but, nevertheless, each person would have his own reality since his interpretation is inevitably taken as being a perception of the true state of affairs, i.e., not an interpretation (unless he is persuaded otherwise by some authority, e.g., a psychiatrist -- but then he is insane anyway). This is how he can see international generosity at work, or how he can see one country striving to gain political control of another.

Whether the characterization given here of such conflicts is accepted or not, it is the view here presented that the same kind of characterization is possible when the matter we are concerned with is how we can observe such things as persons and human nature. It is through interpretation of spatio-temporal data given in observation (of the restricted variety) that such notions as the person and human nature obtain their meaning. Yet, the interpretation is not something that is consciously undertaken with specific goals in sight. It is not

intentional. Rather seeing it (in this case a person) is equivalent to seeing it (spatio-temporal configuration) as a person. And because of this equivalence, both the meaning of person and the objectivity of the person are elements of conscious experience. I call the fact of this interpretation (as opposed to its particular content) definition, since whenever such interpretations of spatio-temporal data are made, the nature of the object in question is dependent on the active functioning of consciousness and not its passive receptivity. Since what is defined in this way is also 'placed' in the real world to be part of that real world, we have also given here an expansion of the earlier statement, to the effect that since persons are not regarded as being purely physical, we must allow that at least part of the real world is a construction out of experience. We will see that this notion of observational definition and what it means is of great importance to an analysis of man as a social being and through this as a moral being, thereby having, necessarily moral obligations.

The important question to ask here is "what experience is it, out of which the person, as part of the real world, is constructed"? i.e., with what material is the interpretation of spatio-temporal data carried out?

Just as the ontological category 'physical object' is a matter of spatio-temporal relations, so 'higher-level' ontological categories will be matters of 'higher-level' relations. The ontological characteristics of the person in general, then, are deter-

mined by certain kinds of relations which must be discoverable in an examination of the aforementioned interpretation of spatio-temporal data given in observation. In other words, the interpretation in conscious experience must be characterizable in terms of 'higher-level' relations and these relations will also define a kind of existent in the real world, will be factual. It must be understood, however, that the encounter of a person in the real world is a 'unified' experience¹ and is here being 'broken down' for the purpose of analysis, just as the experience of a physical object is a unified experience but analyzable as experience of spatio-temporal relations and thereby defined (distinguished).

So we have now two directly related questions. First, 'what are the relations which define 'person'?' and second, 'in what experience can these relations be discovered?'

What we are looking for then is something characterizable in terms of certain kinds of relations, a definition of 'person', which at the same time amounts to an interpretation of certain spatio-temporal data given by observation; and this something must be discoverable in an analysis of conscious experience, namely, the experience of the facticity of the being of other persons.

If it is admitted that to be able to talk of selves or of self, one is logically bound to be able to talk about others, i.e., when talking about myself, I must be distinguishing myself from

1. By 'unified', I wish to mean 'un-inferred'; such an experience is analyzable.

other selves, then in no sense is knowledge of the being of myself prior to the knowledge of the being of other selves and vice-versa. Self-consciousness then, is logically bound to other-consciousness, each entails the other and neither is prior to the other. We can conclude two things from this: first, an analysis of self-consciousness must also be an analysis of consciousness of the being of others; second, self-consciousness must be a consciousness of relations to others in general, i.e., social relations. Social relations, the fact of social relation, is a necessary aspect of the concept of person, although there will obviously be particular deviances within this basic structure, e.g., hermits, but the conceptual connection must hold even in these cases to provide the very meaning of the deviance, otherwise, they would not be deviances. The nature of Man, then, has a logical connection with Society; a study of human nature will be a study of Man-in-Society and on a less general level, a study of Man's fundamental characteristics will be a study of fundamental social relations. I am obviously not proposing a causal connection; the next chapter will, I hope, give further explanation as to why this is the case, although the basic explanation has already been indicated (page 31).

The kind of relation in which the ontology of persons subsists is discovered in self-consciousness, in general by showing how relations are posited at all in the first place through self-consciousness and in particular by showing what particular relations are posited. This will show the nature and the content of the inter-

pretation of the spatio-temporal data given in observation. What I am aware of when I am aware of myself and what I am aware of when I am aware of other selves, is a question of the particular nature of the relations I am conscious of, which lead to the particular kind of interpretation of spatio-temporal data and the positing of a particular kind of 'higher-level' ontology. So the spatio-temporal data has the 'higher-level' ontology 'person' when it is also interpreted as having 'social' relations as well as spatio-temporal relations. These relations, then, provide the fundamental definition of the person, in an objective sense and consciousness of these relations, through self-consciousness, constitutes the fundamental definition in its subjective (positing) aspect. The normal, 'everyday', distinction between subjective and objective here being referred to is such that 'subjective' refers to those elements of individual consciousness which are directly experienced by that individual only, such as feelings, thoughts, emotions, etc. If 'X is good' is regarded as a subjective claim about the speaker, say to the effect that he likes it, then any disagreement would have to take the form of 'no you don't' as opposed to 'no it isn't'. Ultimately, the speaker cannot be overruled unless some theory concerning subjectivity is introduced that diverges from the normal sense of subjective, for instance, if such elements of consciousness that are here being referred to are given a completely behaviouristic meaning. On the other hand, what is objective is dependent of individual consciousness, there are common grounds for settling disputes concerning what is objective, such that when such grounds are invoked

and recognized disagreement is in principle, impossible. Subjective consciousness takes place in an objectively real world and is connected with that world through perception and, in principle, the same world is perceptible to all. There is one objective world and many subjective thoughts about it. Many people speak of 'inner' and 'outer'. It is this sort of picture of the world and the individual's relation to it that this brief distinction between subjective and objective has been meant to portray.

Now it has previously been said that the meaning of the term 'person' and, therefore, what a person is, is dependent on the activity of consciousness as opposed to its passive receptivity. If this is the case, its objectivity is dependent upon the activity of consciousness and the particular nature of the characteristics of the person is dependent on the nature of that activity, i.e., its content. In this way, objectivity, as such, and particular real characteristics of those things that are involved in such activity of consciousness, i.e., those things which are more than spatio-temporal, have meaning only in and through consciousness. How does this apply regarding what has been said about self-consciousness and consciousness of relations? Self-consciousness would normally be taken to be subjective, a sort of feeling. Self-consciousness, however, is consciousness of relations, so that consciousness of relations is subjective, in the normal sense of subjective. However, the person is an objectively real element of the real world, normally understood. The social relations which constitute the person are also elements of the

objectively real world, in the same sense of the word. However, they have their meaning only in terms of consciousness, so that in general, the meaning of objectivity lies in conscious experience. The objective reality of the person is part of the active conscious experience interpreting spatio-temporal data given in observation. This is why I call the (real) relation the objective aspect of consciousness of relation. The relation has its total meaning in individual self-consciousness, just as the relations which define the person have. And this is what is implied by the 'reconciliation of subjective and objective'. We are, then, accounting for the normal sense of objective in terms of consciousness.¹ Disputes concerning the objectively real, will be settled by influencing the interpreting activity of consciousness, e.g., by authority, education, discussion, by pressures of the majority or elite, which take many various forms. Objectivity, then, both in general and in particular, is a collective externalization of typical experiences.² So the objective reality of the person and the social

1. The above statements concerning 'objective' and 'subjective' will apply to all future references to the terms and also to references to the proposed reconciliation between them. In this way, we will see that since the objectivity of social relationship is an element of consciousness and since the essence of morality will be seen to be in social relationship, so the objectivity of morality will have its meaning in consciousness. If, then, social relationship is regarded as a real component of the real world in the above normal sense of objective, so must morality be regarded. The position in this paper is, thus, on a different level compared to e.g. subjectivist theories and absolutist theories of ethics.

2. For a thorough development of this view, see P.L. Berger and T. Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality, esp. Ch. II.

relations by which he is constituted is an externalization (objectivation) of the experience of self-consciousness, which is itself an experience of social relation.

It is only a very short step to apply this thesis to physical objects which are not regarded as being merely physical objects but which obtain their particular definitions through use, purpose, etc., which in themselves are not observable 'in the object', so to speak. When the definition of anything makes it more than just a physical object, interpretation of spatio-temporal data is the link which provides definition in terms of relations. So we see that a very large part of the real world is a construction out of experience, in the sense previously given to this phrase. It would be harder to imagine a situation in which various kinds of components of the real world were related to experience in radically different ways, although different individuals may have 'content' differences, i.e., different specific interpretations due to their different relations.

By applying a general theory of relational ontology to the particular case of the ontology of persons and by taking into account the way in which the concept of person is formed, we have reached the conclusion that the ontology of the person consists in social relationship. To show the full relevance of an analysis of person in understanding the nature of morality, we now have to examine the connection between this kind of ontology and morality, i.e., we have to examine the relevance of social relationship to morality. And, according to the overall procedure of this paper,

this means examining the logical connection between social relationship and morality. In doing this, we will be showing the nature of the connection between the person and morality.

We now proceed to an examination of 'social relationship' as an aspect of human nature, by first showing (in chapter two) that psychological explanations of morality, insofar as they refer to 'human nature' as the explaining factor, can only be understood in terms of social relationship. This is initially plausible since we have said that the ontology of the person consists in social relationship, so that the psychological descriptions of man must be understandable in terms of social relationship. It will be seen that psychological explanations, as a type of explanation, are plausible only because this understanding of them in terms of social relationship is possible and because it is in terms of social relationship that human nature can be seen to be connected with morality. This will become clearer in chapter three, when we will see that the nature of this connection between human nature, understood in terms of social relationship and morality, is one of entailment.

The relevance of an analysis of person, both on this level of general ontology and on the level of psychological description of Man, is determined by the fact that Man is always Man-in-Society. We have seen that the general question of the ontology of persons supports the view that Man is always Man-in-Society. We now have to show that psychological descriptions of Man are essentially descriptions of Man-in-Society, i.e., relational. This will be

done in the following chapter. It will then remain to be shown what the nature of the connection between social relationship and morality is. This will be done in chapter three. Once we have done this, we will have shown the nature of the connection between human nature and morality and, at the same time, we will have shown just how sentiments are connected with values, through their being, necessarily, references to relationships. We will see that the success of sentiments as explanations of moral values is dependent upon this fact, as also is the relevance of the notion of the person dependent upon this fact. In other words, the relevance of 'human nature' to the notion of morality obtains through the fact that 'human nature' is analyzable in terms of social relationship and because social relationship is analyzable in such a way that the essence of morality lies in it.

I would now like to examine Hume's doctrine of sympathy and its proposed connections with morality, as an example of a psychological analysis of human nature as an explanation of morality.

CHAPTER TWO: HUME'S DOCTRINE OF SYMPATHY

We are examining, in this chapter, Hume's doctrine of sympathy as an example of an attempt to explicate the notion of morality through a psychological description of human nature. We will see that the only way such an attempt can succeed is by construing descriptions of human nature as essentially relational, so that the psychological factors alleged by Hume and generally taken to be relevant to moral enquiry, are indeed so, only because they entail relationship, both in general and in particular.¹

It is difficult to talk of Hume's doctrine of sympathy out of its context of an explanation of morality in terms of human nature. As a fundamental fact about human nature, it plays an important part in Hume's moral theory as a whole and, therefore, cannot be considered in isolation. The implications of the doctrine cannot be brought out if it is considered merely as a psychological principle. Indeed Hume does regard it as a principle of psychology (human nature), but he was trying to explain the origin of morals and so it is the part the principle plays in this explanation that is of prime importance to him. Although finding the doctrine unacceptable as a psychological principle will no doubt preclude it

1. The relational characterization of human nature will be further discussed in the following chapter where the connection between the subjective aspect of relationship (sentiment) and the objectively real relationship will be discussed and, thereby, further substantiate the claim that psychological factors, such as sentiments, entail relationship.

from taking part in any explanation based on human nature, this is not our main concern; we are chiefly interested in the Doctrine as a kind of attempted explanation.

I would like, therefore, to examine the doctrine of sympathy along two broad lines; first, as a psychological principle; second, as a part of the more general moral theory. It is obvious that these two are not totally distinct and I think together they show that the doctrine of sympathy, as a type, (i.e., an application of the tendency to seek an explanation of morals and morality in fundamental human nature) fails to explain a system or morals either in principle or in specific content and to show why in principle this is the case.

A. Sympathy as a psychological principle.

1. The notion of sympathy is first introduced in Book II of the Treatise where Hume is dealing with the passions of pride and humility, those passions which have the self as object. It appears in a section entitled 'Of the Love of Fame'¹ where Hume wants to account for the fact that "Our reputation, our character, our name, are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride, virtue, beauty and riches, have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others"². The immediate question is 'by what process do the sentiments of others

1. Treatise Book II, part I, section XI

2. Ibid.

come to influence and determine our own passions?' This process, or principle of human nature, as Hume calls it, is 'sympathy'.

"No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others and to receive by communication, their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own."¹

In other words, the sentiments of others are communicated to us by means of sympathy. Hume is thus using the word "sympathy" in a technical sense, similar in sense to the word 'empathy', to describe a psychological fact, the fact that sentiments are communicated from one human being to another. I use the word 'describe' here purposely; Hume does not seek an explanation of this fact, but rather regards it as a fundamental fact of human nature which is known through experience and must, therefore, be accepted on grounds of experience.

It is clear then, that Hume is not using 'sympathy' in the way we today would use it. To us, 'sympathy' entails pity or some other mode of approval or agreement. To Hume, sympathy is that process or principle by which the feelings (impressions) of another are communicated to us, it is not itself a feeling. Agreement or approval may result from such a process, but not necessarily so.

It is necessary to describe this process in more detail in order to bring out its essential nature. When a man has the sentiment of misery, this sentiment will be manifested in his

1. Ibid.

behaviour and perception of this characteristic behaviour will give an observer an idea ¹ of the sentiment. Now this idea of misery will be converted into an impression of misery, which is the sentiment itself. This is because the idea of misery will be associated with an idea of the self, an idea which derives from the relation with the other person involved. According to Hume, anything which is related to the self achieves a greater force and vivacity through that relation, so that the idea of misery associated with the idea of self is made more forceful and becomes the impression of misery itself.²

It is the association of ideas and impressions, therefore, that facilitates communication of sentiments, but it is obvious that what is more fundamental to communication is relation. A relation must exist before communication is possible, for it is through this relation that the individual achieves an idea of the self and it is the idea of the self in relation to 'the other' that brings about a conversion of the idea of the sentiment into the sentiment itself. 'Relation' here does not mean 'perceptual relation' but something more substantive. Such a relation would be, for example, resemblance or contiguity, or 'closeness' of the sort found in families or among friends.

What are the immediate effects of this communication on

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1. Idea = thought, impression = feeling or sentiment.
 2. An impression is a more forceful version of the idea.

those that have such relations with others? To find out, we must first introduce another 'fundamental fact' of human nature; the approval of pleasure and the disapproval of pain. This, again, is something which Hume does not seek to explain but regards as given in experience and by this, he must mean observation. Now the sentiment of misery is a painful sentiment, by which Hume would mean that the sentiment of misery is accompanied by the simple impression of pain; so that the idea of misery, gained from the 'other' is accompanied by the impression of pain -- and by the association principle we disapprove of the sentiment of misery through our disapproval of pain. The same process applies to pleasurable sentiments. It is this approval and disapproval that result in the four basic indirect passions; pride and humility, where the object of approval is directly related to ourselves, love and hatred, where it is directly related to others.

It follows from what Hume says that, without sympathy, there would be no indirect passions, although each individual would have his own sentiments -- which is the same as saying that there would be no communication (of sentiments).

2. Hume is concerned with human nature as a cause of judgements (evaluations) and of actions. He seems, therefore, to be saying that sympathy, as a principle of communication, is at least a necessary part of any explanation of such judgements and actions. There are two levels on which this claim can be examined: firstly, that level which is concerned with the person as connected with others in the relation of contiguity, or of the 'closeness' found in families. This may be called the psychological level, as it is

concerned with particular, definite instances. The second level is a general one which transcends particular instances and is concerned with judgements and actions in principle, i.e., our morals. This may be called the social level to indicate the absence of particular relation.¹ As this section is concerned with sympathy as a psychological principle, I will leave this latter to another section.

An obvious criticism and an informative one too, I think, is that the process of sympathy as Hume describes it is empirically false. This does not mean that there is no communication, for there plainly is. What it does mean is that we understand or perceive the sentiments of others rather than feel them ourselves. In other words, the idea of the sentiment is not converted into an impression, we are merely aware of the sentiments existence through its manifestation in behaviour and through memory of our own experience of the sentiment come to have the appropriate passion, e.g., pity. This would explain many cases which remain problematic on Hume's account. Take, for example, the case of anger. A man may be angry because he has lost his job.² According to Hume, by means of sympathy, I would also come to feel anger and by the association of ideas disapprove of the cause of the anger, i.e., losing the job. But it may be the case that I think the man should lose his job, in which

1. I hope this distinction here will become more apparent as we proceed.

2. An example used by D. Stewart, The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume:— for a different purpose.

case I will approve of the cause of the anger. There are, therefore, other and stronger factors than sympathy determining my judgement and possibly action. To add further complication -- suppose that the sentiment of the man who did the firing is also communicated to me. Is it possible to have the sentiments of both myself?

Sympathy is supposed to be a process whereby the sentiments of those that I am in relation with are communicated to me, so that I come to feel those same sentiments. Now from the above we see that the mere fact of a relation existing between one person and another does not determine what sentiments each person feels. If a 'close' relation is one between family or friends, then not all 'close' relationships are sympathetic. Not everyone feels the same sentiments as the other members of his family, so the fact that a family relationship exists, as such, cannot be used to explain sympathy and vice-versa. On the other hand, I may agree with, approve and pity a large number of people in various relationships with me but I need not feel as they do in order to agree, approve or pity. Undoubtedly, sympathy in Hume's sense does sometimes occur but for it to be a principle which explains this type of judgement, it would have to be universal, which it plainly is not.

So, no one type of relationship (e.g., 'close' or family) ensures that the relation is sympathetic and this means that sympathy if taken strictly in Hume's sense, is not a necessary factor in judgement and actions within the narrow sphere of particular instances and relations. A sympathetic relation is

only contingently characterizable as some other kind, e.g., 'close' or family relation. The importance of 'sympathy' in judgements and actions will, I hope, become apparent on examination of the 'social level'.

3. Sympathy and Benevolence. Still on the psychological level is the consideration of the connection between sympathy and benevolence. Assuming for the moment that sentiments are communicated by the sympathetic process from those in close relation to us, what is it that produces benevolence? Since sympathy is a process and benevolence is a particular kind of sentiment directed towards another person, it is clear that sympathy alone is not a sufficient condition of benevolence. Hume regards benevolence as only a contingent accompaniment of the pleasurable passions, e.g., love of another person does not necessitate a concern for that person's happiness; the two will usually be found together but it is conceivable for them not to be. What is necessary, however, is approval of the cause of the sentiment in the other person, which causes us to have the passion of love for him. But for consistency, we will have to say that this too does not necessitate benevolence towards that cause. So sympathy, even with approval added, does not explain benevolent feelings towards those in close relation to us.

Another aspect of this same position is that sympathy does not mean the absence of self-love. But if sympathy and self-love are not incompatible, then sympathy cannot possibly explain why a particular relationship should involve benevolence rather than

some other malevolent, sentiment since a sympathetic relationship could equally well involve benevolence or malevolence. However, that the relationship should be characterized as sympathetic is a necessary condition for the relationship to involve benevolence (as it is for it to involve some other, malevolent, sentiment). So it is the generality of the notion of sympathy which enables it to be used in explanation of these sentiments but it does not tell us why one particular sentiment, rather than another. However, if this is the case, the citing of sympathy as an explanation of sentiment, amounts to no more than an indication of the fact of relationship (communication). Obviously, for there to be a particular kind of relationship, there has to be relationship -- this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of the particular relationship. This means that if we are to regard sympathy as the basis of morality, either (logically) as that which entails the essential meaning of morality, or in the sense of empirical explanation, then we are bound to regard the fact of relationship as that basis of morality. This will be further examined in the next section and in the following chapter. However, as Hume is eager to stress, it is an empirical fact that people do have benevolent feelings and the inevitable conclusion from this is that benevolence, like sympathy and approval, is a 'fundamental fact of human nature'. Man sometimes approves and sometimes feels benevolent and further analysis, in terms of general explanation, is impossible. Of course, communication in some sense must exist for such feelings of benevolence but as we shall see, the logical requirement of 'communication' is

satisfied by the fact of relationship, as opposed to 'what goes on in that relationship'¹. Even in those cases where feelings are communicated, there may be what are called 'extraneous modifications', but which are really different relationships, for example, the modification involved with comparison, interest, social role and a general attitude towards society and human affairs, (which is itself a particular relationship or relationships).

B. Sympathy as a fundamental part of the moral theory.

1. "In 'Of Morals', Hume is seeking to show that it is feelings, which through sympathy, give rise to the distinction between vice and virtue. All human characteristics that we come to approve through the sympathetic process he calls 'virtues'....."²

Stewart believes that "Hume's view is that it is by the feelings that men distinguish between good and evil and, therefore, that men are most virtuous when they are most agreeable and useful to themselves and others. That is, he traces the distinction between moral virtue and vice primarily to the passions rather than reason."³

Since we have already seen that on Hume's view there would be no indirect passions without sympathy, the above statement implies that without sympathy, there would be no distinction between moral vice and virtue in general, as opposed to a distinction between good and bad in particular instances, which has already been

1. That is to say, satisfied by the fact that there is a relationship as such, as opposed to a benevolent relationship or a malevolent relationship.

2. Stewart: Moral & Political Philosophy of David Hume, Ch. IV

3. Ibid.

considered.

Hume admits that our feelings are biased in favour of ourselves and those in close relation to us, so that our evaluations, unless otherwise influenced, will be biased. What, then, must we do in order to make an unbiased moral evaluation of a man's character? The kind of answer Hume would give to this question is that we should put ourselves in the position of an impartial observer, so that, in effect, our evaluation will result from a comparison with a social (or moral) standard, rather than our own biased standard. And this implies, I think, that one is never in a relation with another person exhibiting only basic human nature. On the personal level, the relation will be biased by personal interest and attitude and the social level, which is an abstraction from the personal level, will be a general manifestation of this biased attitude applied to all members of the society.¹

Having distinguished between the 'psychological level' and the 'social level', where the former is concerned with particular relations between persons, one thing that is entailed in the 'social level' is the absence of relation of this sort. While it is true that there can only be one basic type of relation, particular relations between particular people, when we are concerned with our place in society, or when we are placing ourselves in the position of impartial observers, etc., we are concerned with social re-

1. 'Biased' here is meant in a sense which allows the possibility of attitudes being influenced by prevailing attitudes in the society.

relationship on a general level, as opposed to particular concrete instances of relationship (the particular, individual level). The kind of characterization we give of this general level of social relationship is an abstraction from the particular instances of relationship, as opposed to an aggregate of those relationships. Our moral evaluations on this level do not have any specific objects, (e.g.: John Smith, Fred's promise, Tom's anger) of the sort that they do on the particular level of particular relationships and judgements. So, since there is neither a specific 'other' from which sentiments can be communicated, e.g. John Smith, and there is no particular concrete object of judgement (but rather something like e.g. the public good) and if sympathy is meant to be a causal factor in moral evaluation on this level, it cannot have the same characteristics as sympathy on the level of particular relationships. Since the social level is an abstraction in the sense previously given to this term, social sympathy, i.e., a communication of sentiments on an abstract social level, must be an abstraction itself from the particular level. For instance, we can substitute 'convention' for 'social sympathy' --- a convention as an abstraction from an aggregate of several 'things done in a typical way' is a kind of judgement or action which has particular applications. It does not cause those judgements or actions in normal circumstances.¹ In the same way 'social sympathy' designates

1. Sometimes, one's motive for doing something might be to conform to a convention. This, however, is not strictly speaking what 'acting conventionally' means, rather 'conforming to a convention' means doing something in the usual, accepted, etc., way, in a certain set of circumstances. In other words, a convention is an abstraction from instances of (conventional) behaviour.

the fact of social relationship, it does not refer to a cause of relationship; it is social communication rather than a cause of it and social communication considered generally is an abstraction.

It is true that once a particular kind of character has come to be regarded as morally good, future manifestations of that character will be accompanied by feelings of moral approbation but we still have to explain the origin of the evaluation 'morally good'. Particular passions, then, (sentiments and judgments) are not causally explained by sympathy (communication) either on the particular level or on the abstracted social level but originate in social relationships themselves, are part of them.

Going back to an earlier section, where it was said that the relation required for sympathy to operate could only be characterized as a sympathetic relation,¹ we can now see how this applies to the moral or social level. What is required for sympathy at the social level is the very sentiment or evaluation that the sympathy is invoked to explain.

Hume's account of the 'artificial' virtue of justice may be illuminating here. Hume would call an action right only if by that was meant that the quality of the person or character from which it stemmed was morally good. But at the same time, he thinks that the rules of justice, considered abstractedly, do not stem

1. Please refer to page 46.

from any natural quality that human beings may have. So, there are two questions which may be asked here. First, how do the principles of justice and the particular rules of justice originate? And, second, in what does the moral obligation to observe the rules of justice lie?

"On considering any particular instance of just conduct abstracted from the system of justice, there may not seem to be any reason at all why we should engage in it: for just actions sometimes seems to be contrary to our own interest and even contrary to the public interest, when taken in isolation".¹

In other words, there is no natural motive which serves to explain this adherence and consequently it cannot be explained by means of sympathy. Hume gives the answer himself when he says: -

"The sense of justice arises artificially, though necessarily, from education and human conventions".²

But if it is also true, as Ardal says, that "It is their incapacity for objective judgement which explains why animals are capable of the indirect passions and yet cannot morally approve or disapprove",³ objective judgement, in this case of justice, seems to be synonymous with "education and human conventions".

It is, therefore, only one painless step further to allow that 'objective judgement' in all moral evaluation is a matter of "education and human conventions". In fact, it seems necessary to

1. Pall Ardal: Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise, Ch.8. We shall learn just why this should be so at a later stage.

2. Treatise, Book III, Page 189 (Everyman edition).

3. Ardal, Page 174.

take this step in order to explain how disinterested benevolence is possible, or what amounts to the same thing, how objective evaluation is possible. This seems even more plausible when it is specific rules that are being considered, as opposed to the notion of justice as such.¹

It is then, the objectivity brought about by education and conventions which provides the particular relationships (and therefore passions) which may be characterized as sympathetic. These relationships and the passions involved 'in' them are relatively stable over a period of time due to the tendency to 'institutionalize', and their objective characteristics. If we are going to speak of these as constituting human nature, then we must use the phrase in a more restricted sense; human nature in a particular kind of society, (which itself means a set of a certain kind of relationships). What, fundamentally, constitutes the society is the relationships between its members, so that here we can also account for particular deviations from the norm associated with interests and roles, since interests and roles determine the nature of the relationship in the particular case.

2. Now sympathy is not a feeling or sentiment in Hume's account: it is a psychological process of communication of sentiments, so that whenever we have a case of a sympathetic relationship, either

1. This notion is itself an invention, as well as its specific content and obtains its objectivity through education etc. Education, among other factors, determining what we objectify.

on the restricted level of the family sort or on the social, there must be some degree of sentiment involved. A sympathetic relationship, then, can always be characterized as another kinds of relationship, in terms of sentiments. So the sympathetic relationship cannot be a cause of the sentimental relationship - it is that relationship. Sympathy cannot explain benevolence ('the moral sense'), approval or disapproval, for these reasons. Moreover, the moral sentiments, benevolence, approval and disapproval, are always 'other-regarding' as opposed to feelings of pain or boredom. So 'moral sense', benevolence, etc., represent an abstraction from relationships between people; they do not explain these relationships in any causal sense. This, I think, is why Hume (and no doubt many others) find it difficult to use the same kind of explanations on the 'impersonal' social level,¹ where these relationships are not readily discernible and thus neither is the abstraction. Strictly speaking, the psychological sphere is restricted to personal relationships, such as between families and friends. To explain the wider, 'moral' sphere; some other factor has to be invoked, and as has been mentioned, this factor is 'social'; for Hume, education and convention. This factor must, however, have some kind of effect on man's 'psychological make-up', both for Hume, since his moral theory is based on man's sentiments and for us, since man and society are logically connected and it is always people who originate

1. It seems that by definition, the social level excludes relationships between people.

moral judgements and values. But again, we will see that for similar reasons as those mentioned above, we cannot regard this 'social factor' as a causal explanation of morals and morality.

Hume restricts the term 'moral' to this social level, so that obligations or duties within it are moral obligations or duties. Now he believes that man has no natural motive (strictly psychological?) for conforming to a moral obligation or for even regarding it as such in the first place. Education and convention are necessary for this. So man's social environment is supposed to provide the motives for moral action and feeling. How does it do this? Presumably it does this by extending the area of each individual's 'sympathy', so that man comes to have extended (and necessarily abstracted, for there are by definition, no 'personal' relationships involved) sympathetic relationships. Admittedly, this is an exaggeration since once something has come to be regarded as good, no abstraction or extended sympathy is required. But for this process ever to begin, such an extension is necessary.

But, just as a sympathetic relationship cannot be said to be a causal factor on the 'personal' level, so extended sympathetic relationships cannot be said to be a causal factor on the 'moral' level. Again, sympathy is not a feeling but a process and this also applies to extended sympathy. Being a social process, an extended sympathetic relationship must also be characterizable in other terms, in this case in terms of both social environment (e.g. education and conventions) and social or moral sentiments.

There are no causal connections here and consequently no causal explanations: a relationship characterizable in terms of certain moral sentiments or obligations is the relationship characterizable in certain terms of social environment, which in turn is the relationship characterizable as an extended sympathetic relationship. In other words, at least some social relationships are moral relationships, i.e. involve values, obligations, duties, etc., concerning right and wrong, good and bad, as their very essence and all moral relationships are social relationships. Moreover, psychological and sociological descriptions of human nature are descriptions of 'personal' and 'social' relationships and also do not serve as causal explanations of morals and morality.

What we have shown, I think, in this chapter is that, first; sympathy cannot be regarded as a causal explanation of morality, second; particular kinds of relationships, such as benevolent ones, are no less 'fundamental facts of human nature' than 'sympathetic' ones (since they all are sympathetic ones and sympathetic ones are always as such some undetermined particular kind, e.g.: malevolent, depending on the particular relationship. In other words, 'sympathetic' is a general description, 'malevolent' or whatever, is a particular description applied to some generally 'sympathetic' relation). Third; if the explanatory power of 'sympathy' lies in its generality, this means that it is the fact of relationship which explains morality,¹ and it is the fact of re-

1. That there is a relationship does not determine itself what kind of relationship there is. Sympathy means that there is a relationship but it does not say whether it is benevolent, malevolent or whatever. The general notion of relationship as such explains morality as such as opposed to 'good' and as opposed to 'bad', or whatever, which are all moral terms.

relationship which is more fundamental than a certain kind of relationship, e.g., a benevolent one. In this chapter we have also seen that asserting sympathy to be at least a necessary condition of morality, is asserting that relationship is at least a necessary condition of morality. We have also seen that sympathy does not itself explain the existence, in a particular case, of benevolence as opposed to malevolence (just as a certain particular kind of relationship is not explained by the fact that there is a relationship). Now, if benevolence and malevolence do, in fact, have equal claim to be regarded as moral sentiments, (one morally good and the other morally bad) and do, in fact, entail the existence of certain relationships, then morality as such is not restricted to certain kinds of social relationships but to social relationship as such. Sympathy entails the fact of social relationship and as such it constitutes a sufficient condition of morality since the fact of social relationship is a sufficient condition of morality. This would be true so long as we are concerned with other-regarding sentiments, whether 'good' or 'bad' and so long as these sentiments entail relationships.

A further examination of human nature in terms of social relationship in the following chapter, will show just how sentiment entails relationship and how, through this, sentiments are involved in morality. We will now see how these particular sentiments and the particular relationships in which they are involved, are related to morality as such, by showing just how the fact of social relationship is connected with morality and through this, how the citing of sentiments facilitates an understanding of morals, i.e.,

how psychological explanation of morality is possible. We will be seeing that sentiments are only connected with morality through their entailing particular social relationships and because morality as such is entailed by the fact of social relationship.

CHAPTER THREE: SOCIAL AND MORAL RELATIONSHIPS

1. Since psychological and sociological descriptions of human nature are descriptions of relationships, it is logically necessary that one cannot provide a description of Man in isolation from social relationships. Nor could one describe so-called 'Man in the state of nature' without claiming one or a set of social relationships to be more natural than another one or set and since man cannot be described in isolation from social relationships, it would be more natural only if by 'more natural' was meant 'observed more often'.

Adam Ferguson, in his *Essay on the History of Civil Society*,¹ takes such a view as the above. Like Hume, Ferguson seeks to enquire into the nature of morals and morality by an understanding of human nature, although unlike Hume, he makes no abstractions from the complex and diverse observations on human relationships that can be made, to posit a 'fundamental' kind of relationship in which 'true' human nature can be discovered, such as the family in Hume's case. So, for Ferguson, what is natural to Man is as complex and diverse as the relationships Man is in and has been in, although generally speaking, it is natural for Man to be 'in society', i.e. the

1. Adam Ferguson: Essay on the History of Civil Society, 1767. Ed. Duncan Forbes, Edinburgh (1966).

fact of these relationships is natural as opposed to the particular kind of relationship, which in Man's case, is immensely diverse. So the supposed 'state of nature' has never existed; if it exists in abstraction only, it is futile; and if used to explain certain other phenomena, is mistaken.¹ A valid description of human nature, on the other hand, will depend on a particular kind of social relationship in the sense that this kind of relationship will provide the description's content. However, the description will have no application outside the context of this particular kind of social relationship, since the relationship forms the essence of the description. The description will only apply where the relationship is the same. In these circumstances, human nature can be said to be constant. So, human nature, in a particular context, is not the result of the causal influence of that context (relationships) nor is it a causal factor resulting in the particular kind of context (relationships). In other words, the citing of social relationships, as an explanation of certain characteristics of individual persons,² cannot be a causal explanation of those characteristics, since a complete description of the social relationships involved will include those characteristics and vice-versa. These two 'aspects' of the situation, the relation-

1. Not simply because it is historically false but because there is no reason why one or a particular set of relations should be considered more fundamental than another one or set.

2. When these characteristics involve reference to others; this excludes, for example, physical characteristics.

ship and the characteristics of the individuals involved, are the result of different emphasis, on the objective situation on the one hand and the subjective on the other; a reference on the one hand, to the relationship thought of as belonging to the common real world, and on the other hand, a reference to the 'inner' feelings, etc., associated with the relationship. We are here saying that the connection between the 'inner' and 'outer' aspects of the relationship is not causal because a complete description of the 'inner' will include the 'outer'. The connection is rather one of entailment, the objectivity or 'outsideness' of the relationship being included in the consciousness of the relation or other-regarding sentiment. The relationship and the feelings associated with it, are not radically distinct as they would be if the connection were causal, but have their meaning in terms of each other. (see page 33).

Since specific observations concerning human nature, then, are either useless or mistaken, it is the generic notion of human nature which is of importance. By generic, I mean the notion of the kind of being Man is, as opposed to more specific notions as to what Man is - his specific characteristics. The generic notion of human nature is defined by relations. Man has his being in relations.

Although not wording it in this way, Ferguson's view is similar; he believes that Man is, by nature, a social being. However, such a conclusion is quite compatible with traditional

analyses of Man, to the effect that he naturally forms social relationships and what is more likely, Ferguson meant nothing more than this, deriving his further conclusions from the fact that this is so and not from one or other of the particular relationships that Man forms, as other analyses tend to do. However, such an analysis of human nature as Ferguson supports, must lead one into the somewhat stronger view that 'Man has his being in social relations'.

For the time being, however, let us examine the main features of Ferguson's analysis. From the fact that Man naturally forms social relations, what kind of conclusions does Ferguson draw? Because social relationships, whatever form they take, are natural to Man, so must the feelings, emotions and sentiments, etc., which are intimately linked with these relationships, be natural to Man. Call these 'social sentiments' to distinguish them from the specific feelings associated with specific relationships, for we are purposely limiting ourselves to the general level.

It only remains to give a more explicit meaning to the phrase 'social sentiments' to conclude that so-called moral sentiments are natural to Man, i.e., to say that benevolence, fellow-feeling, etc., are what is meant by 'social sentiments', and these are of more consequence to Man, are stronger, than desire of pleasure, sensual happiness, etc. Man has a stronger natural tendency to seek satisfaction of the 'social sentiments' and observation lets us conclude that fulfilment of the relationships with which these social sentiments are involved is more satisfying and takes more of Man's attention than those relationships which

are purely matters of sensual pleasure. Accordingly, Man also has a natural tendency to judge others and their actions along the same lines, i.e., whether or not they are in accord with the social sentiments (and, through these, with the social relationships) decides whether or not they are to be regarded and hence are good or bad.

So, we see that Ferguson's analysis of the basis of morality is very much like Hume's, insofar as that basis lies in 'sentiment'; the main difference being in the analysis of human nature, a difference which results in differences in belief as to the kind of sentiment which is natural to Man. To Ferguson, then, Hume would be making a mistake in supposing that the sentiments involved in a particular kind of relationship (the 'close' or family kind) are those sentiments natural to Man and only those natural to man and which consequently provide the foundation of morality. This would be a mistaken analysis of human nature to Ferguson and not a fundamental disagreement about the basis of morality. The social sentiments are not artificial as they are in Hume's case. Even though Ferguson does not, he could admit that these sentiments are, at the same time, natural and 'produced' by education and conventions, as they are in Hume's analysis. This follows from Ferguson's views on human nature, according to which he cannot exclude any kind of relationship Man is observed to uphold from being termed natural. But, the only circumstance in which this would be possible, is one in which it is natural that some, at least, of Man's relationships result from education and convention, i.e.: this whole situation

is natural to Man and we are still left with the view that the social sentiments are part of human nature and hence that human nature provides the basis of morals and morality.

However, as in Hume's analysis, we still have the question of the connection between the sentiments involved in a social relationship and the social relationship itself. One cannot have social sentiments without being in the appropriate social relationship (conceptually speaking, of course; in reality there are individual cases of hypocrisy) - social sentiments would otherwise be meaningless - and equally one cannot be in a social relationship without having the appropriate social sentiment, this is precisely the meaning of such relationships as we are here concerned with.

Are all social relationships of this nature? Ferguson's account of human nature brings out, at least, one thing which Hume's account obscures, that all social relationships necessarily involve persons in relation, however remote that relation might be. We can speak of social relationships in an abstract form and in so doing, we will not be referring to any persons in particular, but, nevertheless, of conceptual necessity, we are referring to persons in general. For example, we can speak of the relationship employer-employee, without referring to anybody in particular, but the conceptual reference to persons in general is unavoidable. Sets of 'ideal' social relationships, for example, those described as 'just', have the same characteristic. A social relationship also involves at least two persons, each being characterized by their

'position' with regard to the other - and this 'position' defines what they are, their social status or category (persons in general being defined by relations in general, i.e.: conceptually) for example, employer or employee. In other words, persons are always 'role-defined', which is another way of saying 'relation defined'. Now, 'roles' are characterized by means of behaviour, whether or not after a time they become 'institutionalized' and hence lose their 'personal' quality and their 'behaviouristic' quality. (In fact, in many cases, we can determine X's role and hence what he is, by context alone, but this is due to past experience and learning and does not change the basic position). Moreover, this behaviour must of necessity, be other-regarding and so for this behaviour to be consciously other-regarding, which it must be to be considered 'role-behaviour', there must be 'sentiments' involved, namely, particular social sentiments (be they greed, envy, hatred, love, generosity or whatever). In other words, each 'relatum' must be conscious of the fact of his relatedness to others for him to be related to others. Social relationships thereby entail social sentiments and vice-versa. We have here above, another case of 'reality' being constructed out of experience; social relationships being an objectification of social sentiments¹ and thereby an objectification of role and 'kinds' of individuals.

1. That is to say, posited as real though and in terms of these sentiments. The fact that the relationships are characterized as social relationships, determines the characterization of the sentiments as social sentiments.

Since social sentiments entail social relationships, specific kinds of social sentiments will entail specific kinds of social relationships. If what are generally regarded as moral sentiments can be shown to be kinds of social sentiments (and if all social sentiments entail moral sentiments), we will be able to show that the objectification of social relationships, and through this, the objectification of characteristics of the individuals involved in the relationship, will also be an objectification of moral relationships and through this, an objectification of the moral characteristics of the individuals involved. We will be looking at, for example, the nature of the parallel between 'he is an architect, therefore, he ought to draw straight lines' and 'he promised him so he ought to pay back the money he borrowed'.

2. Since all social relationships involve persons, it may be inadequate to say that all social relationships are role defined. If it were adequate, then we could say that society was made up of employers, employees, buyers, sellers, etc. etc., but strictly speaking, not persons as employers, buyers, etc. The common factor of all roles is that it is persons which 'fill' the roles so that a description of society, in terms of the different roles and descriptions of different societies, in terms of different kind of roles, will miss out this common factor and we will have purely factual descriptions and comparisons in terms of role behaviour. Since conscious role behaviour must involve sentiments,¹ we can

1. A role always involves reference to an 'other'. Role behaviour is always 'other regarding'; conscious role behaviour is always consciously 'other regarding'.

also say that a description of these sentiments as social sentiments, or rather a description of social sentiments as 'role sentiments', may be inadequate. The two kinds of sentiments cannot be conceptually equivalent since two societies may be completely different in terms of roles, yet equivalent in that they both involve social sentiments, social relationships as such. Strictly speaking, then, 'role' does not exhaustively define 'social relationship' and the sentiments involved in roles do not exhaustively define social sentiments. There is something else involved.

When we are concerned with social relationships, there seems to be a progression from descriptions of a purely factual nature, e.g. a description of a buyer-seller relationship, to descriptions of a partly factual nature and a partly moral nature, e.g., a 'promising' relationship. No doubt a situation of buying and selling could have moral implications or provoke moral judgements, but as such, it does not - it would have to have a slightly different description for this to be the case, which would make it fall into the second category mentioned above - and yet it definitely seems to be a description of a social relationship. No doubt there are many others of a similar nature. So some social relationships seem not to be moral relationships and the sentiments involved do not seem to be moral sentiments, i.e., descriptions of them have no implications concerning moral value or moral prescription - which is to say that we do not draw any moral conclusions from them. If the buyer-seller relationship is a social relationship, there must be some degree and kind of

social sentiment involved; in the persons involved if they regard themselves as socially related, or posited by observers if they posit a social relationship to be involved between the two persons. There are two possible alternatives for the buyer; either he can regard the seller as nothing other than a seller (and what this entails), thereby ignoring his 'personality'; or he can regard the seller as a person but a particular kind of person as determined by that persons relation to himself, namely, as a seller (and what that entails). Now, the former involves only 'role sentiments' which lead to the relationship being characterized purely in terms of role (and the behaviour and behavioural implications that this includes). Any morality involved will be a pseudo-morality, such as the so-called 'morality of the market-place'. If we limit our concern as sociologists to the sphere of roles and role behaviour, we limit ourselves to 'pseudo-moralities' of the above mentioned kind and cannot hope to provide much help to the moral philosopher in his enquiry into the nature of morals and morality.

Returning now to Ferguson, we can see how he, as a sociologist, does help the moral philosopher. We remember that in seeking to understand human nature, he is not concerned with the diverse and complex relationships Man fulfills. They are all natural; what is of importance to the study of morals and morality (at least for Ferguson) is the fact of Man's relationships. We saw that it was from this that he drew his conclusions about morality. So it is not in the study of Man's diverse and complex roles that

we can discover the nature of morality; and since it is the social sentiments which, for Ferguson, provide the link in the understanding of the connection between man's natural tendency to form social relations and morality, a description of society in terms of roles, does not provide us with the important social sentiments that 'explain' morality. The sentiments involved in role behaviour, then, as such, cannot be described as social sentiments. A description of social relationships, purely in terms of roles, leaves out the more fundamental social sentiments, and from such descriptions, nothing about morality can be learned.

What can be the nature of these social sentiments when there is only a set of particular relationships (roles), and the fact of these particular relationships? i.e., do people ever have what might be called social sentiments?

The only circumstance in which 'social sentiment' could have a substantive meaning (as opposed to merely indicating the fact that Man naturally forms social relations) is one in which the above statement, to the effect that there are only roles, is incorrect, i.e., that social relationship is not equivalent to role relationship.

Social relationships logically require the involvement of persons and in saying this, we fulfill the requirements of the circumstance above, for on this account descriptions, in terms of roles, will not amount to descriptions of social relationship, since the subjects of role descriptions are not persons as such, but buyers, sellers, employers, employees, etc.

If they do describe persons, then strictly speaking, they are not just role descriptions. Social sentiments are involved, then, when the relationship is to be described as a relationship between persons and the kind of sentiment which substantiates the meaning of 'social sentiment' is a moral sentiment; benevolence, fellow-feeling, etc. These are the kind of sentiments which are logically entailed in the fact of social relationship (as described by Ferguson) and are of a fundamental general nature, transcending the specific kinds of sentiments logically involved in roles and are substantiated in real social relationships (either positively or negatively), when those relationships are described as involving persons as opposed to role-types. Thus, the individual that 'has' social sentiments, does so because he is a person and recognizes the 'personality' of others -- this is a matter of entailment. Social relationships entail persons, role relationships entail role-types, such as buyers and sellers, even though the 'real' situation we are describing is, in a sense, the same, the descriptions being the varying factor. 'Social relationship' involves a general-level description, as does 'person'; role relationship descriptions constitute specific content for the former generic terms, as particular role-types constitute the specific content for the generic term 'person'. It is this general level of description of social relationship which contains the basis of morality and shows why the common factor in very different societies (different when described in terms of role-structure) is morality, which stems from the fact of social relationship and is not found in the actual and

specific role relationships. Whenever a person is described as having social sentiments, then, these will always be moral sentiments and indicate the suppression and subordination of 'role sentiments'.

In describing society as a network of social relationships, as opposed to a network of role relationships, one is constructing out of the social sentiments and since these will always be the moral sentiments of benevolence, fellow-feeling, etc., the relationships that result will always be moral relationships; those that involve persons and not role-types. It is no accident that moral sentiments are always other-regarding; to be in a moral relationship is to have moral sentiments.

On the purely factual level of description associated with roles and role behaviour, there are prescriptions; rules and procedures that are entailed in the particular role. So we can have 'factual oughts' of the kind mentioned earlier -- if he is an architect he ought to draw straight lines -- and these are not moral oughts. Similarly, roles and role relationships entail 'factual obligations' -- obligations that stem from the meaning of the role, e.g., the meaning of employer. When we turn our attention to the general level of description,¹ these 'factual obligations' become moral obligations that stem from the meaning of the description in terms of persons as opposed to buyers, sellers,

1. As opposed to a description in terms of particular relationships or roles.

employers, employees, etc. In other words, it is logically necessary that if a person is defined as something which has its being in social relationships, for X to be a person, he must be able to be described as having the appropriate sentiments, namely, social sentiments and consequently, social relationship. So, as a person, X ought to keep his promises, since he is supposed to have the appropriate sentiment.¹ This same kind of parallel exists between certain kinds of values, e.g., between a good cricket player and a good man. We are on different levels of description but, nevertheless, both levels involve descriptions of fact. However, it is not my purpose, in this paper, to undertake a full analysis of moral values and judgements, only to show the way in which this might be done by showing the general nature and extent of the moral 'sphere'. Man is a moral animal, hence his obligations, both general and specific, (to be a moral animal, is to have moral sentiments both in general and particular). To describe a relationship as one between persons, then, entails moral values and obligations through the nature of what is being described; similarly, to describe a relationship as one between

1. The particulars, 'X ought to keep that promise he made to Y' is an application of the general 'persons ought to keep promises'. Both levels are factual. A particular relationship between persons is always of some other kind, too, e.g. between promiser, promisee. The obligation here then will be a particular one we can 'point to'. We can also consider persons as such, apart from particular cases and obviously on this general level, we cannot point but, nevertheless, the material is factual in the sense of being a general empirical consideration.

employer and employee, entails values and obligations but, strictly speaking, not moral ones. This is why I believe that Ferguson's views on human nature must lead to the belief that 'Man has his being in social relationships' rather than the weaker, and very different, 'Man naturally forms social relationships' and that these social relationships provide us with the fundamental nature of morality.

So it is not in particular relationships that the nature of morality can be discovered but in the fact of relation. Particular values and obligations are entailed in particular relationships because of this general connection of entailment between the fact of relation and morality as such; the meaning of morality lies in the fact of relation and this is why particular values and obligations have their meaning in particular relationships. Having shown also, the connection between relationship and the sentiments involved, both in general and particular, we have shown how the values and obligations can be real (objective) and felt (subjective).

SUMMARY

1. Through the kind of reconciliation of subjective and objective employed in Chapter One, concerning the person (see Pages 33 + 61) where the objectivity or 'outsideness' of the person and of the relations by which he is constituted, are elements of the consciousness of relations (other-regarding sentiments), we have shown here in what way sentiments entail social relationship. Thus, we can say that whenever we have a

case of other-regarding sentiment, we have a case of social relationship and that whenever we have a case of social relationship, we have a case of other-regarding sentiment.

2. On the particular level we will have particular sentiments and through this, particular social relationships, such that a complete description of the relationship would involve such things as values and obligations, whether good or bad. The general notion of morality as such, then, lies in the notion of social relationship as such, i.e. the fact of social relationship. Strictly moral relationships on the particular level, will only occur when we are concerned with the fundamental nature of that which is related.

This is when we describe the relationship as being one between persons as opposed to merely one between, for example, employer and employee. This is so only because we are considering a particular case from the general point of view; the point of view concerned with persons as such, relationship as such. Conflicts occur here since in practice, such general consideration of particular cases is difficult -- it is difficult to ignore the role and all that its meaning entails, either in our own case or when considering others.

3. In showing morality to be entailed by the fact of social relationship, we have shown how an analysis of human nature can lead to an understanding of morality, since we have previously interpreted human nature in terms of social relationship. We have, thus, also shown the connection between psychological and sociological factors and morality, as aspects of human nature; -- a sentiment entails a relationship and relationship entails morality. A

necessary step in this procedure has been to show that the ontology of the person is relational; in order to eliminate a dualism of Man and his social relationship, that is, between Man and Society. More generally, this procedure has shown the nature of the relevance of a certain kind of factual material to morality. Through this, it has also shown the nature of the relevance of particular instances of factual material, 'is's', to particular evaluative assertions, 'oughts': - entailment, so long as the 'is', whether psychological, sociological or ontological, refers ultimately to social relationships. It is in the analysis of social relationship that we can see the relationship to be an objectification, i.e., the relationship is experienced as being 'outside', a part of the common real world and that the experience is the sentiment. Values and obligations can, therefore, be 'real' and 'felt', since they are part of the content of the experience which is objectified as the 'real' relationship. So we do not have a radical distinction between a moral value and an evaluation (an experience of the moral value), a distinction whose archetype is the separation between physical thing and consciousness of that physical thing. Hence the 'is', though referring to relationship, also refers to values and obligations, which have been objectified in the relationship and which are also, necessarily, felt. Hence, the crucial logical question, mentioned earlier, between sentiments and morals has been answered, so that now we are in a position to understand just how the citing of sentiments does explain morality, (and in what sense of explanation

this is so), and does not merely amount to the citing of different kinds of 'is's'. We can now agree with MacIntyre¹ "...that the question of how the factual basis of morality is related to morality is a crucial logical issue, reflection on which will enable one to realize how there are ways in which this transition can be made and ways in which it cannot...we can connect the facts of the situation with what we ought to do only by means of one of those concepts which Hume treats under the heading of the passions and which I have indicated by examples such as wanting, needing, and the like...." Without the preceding analysis of the connection between morality as such and fact, we would not be able to make this agreement.

This is not the place for an extensive analysis of particular aspects of moral experience or the meaning of particular kinds of moral propositions. This paper has meant to show the fundamental nature of the subject matter of such possible analyses and thereby only the general way in which such analyses might be made.

1. See Page 14.

Glossary of Terms developed

Person: that which has its being in social relationship as such, and, thereby, a moral being.

Human Nature: the nature of the person in terms of social relationship.

Sympathy: the fact of social relationship (thereby being a fundamental fact of human nature).

Social Relationship: relationship between persons on a general level of description (i.e. relationship-as-such between persons, i.e., one not described in terms of any specific relationships).

Relationship between persons as such: relationship involving sentiment.

Sentiment: Other-regarding feeling.

Other regarding feeling: Consciousness of relation.

Role Relationship: Conscious relationship involving socially categorized behaviour which has reference to another.

Morality: Relationship between persons in general, thereby relationship involving sentiment in general.

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