THE SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY
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OF ANALOGY

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A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University
September, 1969
TITLE: The Scholastic Doctrine of Analogy

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NUMBER OF PAGES: iv,

SCOPE AND CONTENTS: This thesis is mainly concerned with the doctrine of analogy to be found in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas and in Cardinal Cajetan's celebrated little treatise, The Analogy of Names. Particular attention is given to Ralph M. McInerny's interpretation of analogy as a logical doctrine and his consequent criticism of Cajetan for distinguishing between two main kinds of analogy, analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionality on the basis of intrinsic and extrinsic denomination.
Acknowledgements

Much gratitude is owed by me to my supervisor, Dr. Thomas, for his help and his encouragement -- and his patience. I only regret that his own valuable work on analogy has not been adequately discussed or acknowledged in this thesis. Particular thanks also to Mr. Azenstat, my second reader, for his cheerful interest and thought-provoking comments.
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CHAPTER ONE

Two Kinds of Analogy -- An Historical Survey

Etymologically the word "analogy" comes from the Greek \( \text{λόγος} \) meaning proportion or a precise relation between quantities. The basic conception of analogy in the Elements of Euclid is that of identity of ratio, e.g. as two is to four so six is to twelve, but Aristotle, for example, uses the term to signify in addition a proportional likeness between things and so the meaning of the term was extended to include other than purely mathematical or quantitative relations. Indeed as the term is now employed, any two things or states of affairs may be said to be analogous when, although they are different, there is a certain similarity or likeness between them, or a word or term may be said to be analogous when it denotes things which are different and yet in some respect the same, or when it has different though related meanings. This rather broad characterization, however, hardly indicates the complexity of the much controverted Scholastic doctrine of analogy which has its roots in Aristotelian philosophy.
and was developed and employed, especially by St. Thomas Aquinas, in connection with the attempt to solve a number of philosophical problems. Perhaps one of the most significant of these problems is how it is possible to talk meaningfully about a transcendent deity.

In dealing with religious language Aquinas constantly strove to avoid two extremes, the first being equivocality and the second, univocality. To take the first extreme, if we call God good or wise or anything else on this view, we are merely equivocating. Socrates may be called wise and "wise" designates human wisdom, but when we call God wise, "wise" designates divine wisdom and since divine wisdom is altogether different from and transcends human wisdom, to call both Socrates and God wise is to use the term "wise" equivocally. This view of religious language, of course, either presupposes or entails agnosticism in the sense that it implies that everything we say about God necessarily fails to convey anything about God as he really is. The second extreme, that of univocality, presupposes or entails the very opposite of the first, namely anthropomorphism, for on this view of religious language to say that God is wise and that Socrates is wise is to say much the same thing about both of them, and the term "wise" is being employed not equivocally, but rather univocally, that is, it has the same meaning when predicated of God and Socrates and denotes the same characteristic which is present in both of them.
Of course, one can only hold to this view of religious language if one also holds that there is a basic similarity between the things which our language is ordinarily used to describe and explain and God. Aquinas would not wish to commit himself to either of these extremes and the theory of analogy is an attempt to find a via media between them.

Needless to say, the case we have been discussing is only one instance where analogy has been thought to have a prominent role to play -- the significance of a theory of analogy extends beyond its application to the problems one encounters in trying to explain the meaning of religious language. But it is especially within this context, where the need for analogy or at least something like it is so pressing, that the theory was developed by the medievals and it is within this context that much of the discussion in this essay will take place.

In this chapter we shall be concerned with what are usually considered to be two quite distinct kinds or types of analogy -- analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality to use the terminology of Cajetan.¹ We

shall trace the origin and background of these types in Aristotle, where they appear as *pros hen* equivocity and analogy, respectively, and in Aquinas, where they appear as analogy of proportion and analogy of proportionality. Cajetan's account of both will then be dealt with and a particular difficulty in his treatment of analogy of attribution will be taken up in Chapter Two, a difficulty which may eventually force us to question Cajetan's whole approach to the problem of analogy.

**Aristotle, Pros Hen Equivocity and Analogy**

Aristotle treats of analogy as a type of equivocity. The first sentence of the *Categories* defines an equivocal: "Things are called equivocal whose name alone is common, the definition as denoted by the name being in each case different." There are three elements involved here. First of all, there are different things; secondly, there is a name which is common to these things; thirdly, the

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2 Univocals, on the other hand, are things of which both the name and the corresponding definition are common. (Note that by "univocals" and "equivocals" Aristotle clearly means things not names or definitions, see below p. 9).

3 "Name" here is not to be understood as indicating a proper name, but stands for any verbal symbol signifying a nature or property or set of properties.
definitions denoted by the name are different. Aristotle gives us an example, the name $\zeta\nuv$ -- both a man and a painting are called $\zeta\nuv$ thus they have the same name, but a man and a painting are obviously different kinds of things and the definition or meaning of $\zeta\nuv$ as the name of a painting differs from the definition or meaning of $\zeta\nuv$ as the name of a man. This kind of situation is readily recognizable as the foundations of puns and the fallacy of equivocation. For example, in the English language the name "date" happens to denote both the fruit of a palm-tree and a day of the month, and the name "pen" happens to denote both an enclosure for animals and an instrument for writing.

Aristotle sometimes defines the equivocals as "things said in many ways" and by this he simply means things expressed by the same word in ways that differs according to form or definitions. (For Aristotle the definition expresses the form of a thing, thus when the same name is used of different things having different forms there will be different definitions expressed by the name). Aristotle is well aware, however, that not all things which are different in form and definition and yet have the same name, are given this name merely by chance -- as we might reasonably suppose is the case when an enclosure for animals and instrument for writing are both called "pens". Hence we shall have to make a distinction between those things which are "equivocal by chance" (and in these Aristotle has little interest) and those which are "equivocal by design". This distinction is brought out in the following passage from
the Nicomachean Ethics, where attention is drawn to the
equivocal nature of the term 'good'.

"The definitions of honor and prudence and
pleasure are different and distinct
under the very aspect of being good. Therefore
the good is not something common in the way
of one idea. How then are they called good?
They surely do not seem like things equivocal
by chance. Are they then called good because
they are from something one, or because they
are ultimately directed toward something one?
Or are they rather good by analogy? -- for
just as sight is good in the body, so is the mind
good in the soul, and similarly another thing in
something else." 4

Here we have different things -- honour, prudence, pleasure --
which are each being named good, but when we speak of
honour as being good and of prudence and of pleasure as
being good we certainly do not mean exactly the same
thing in each case -- in other words, the definition of
"good" seems to vary in each context. For example,
although honour and pleasure may both be good, the way in
which honour is good is very different from the way in which
pleasure is good. Thus Aristotle says "the good is not
something common in the way of one idea". He thus raises
the possibility that these various things are called good

because they have a common origin or because of something to which they are all in some way or another related (having a common origin would be an instance of this) or, he asks, are they good by analogy? In either case, whether they are called good because there is something to which they are all related or whether they are called good by analogy, they are not "equivocals by chance" but rather "equivocals by design". We now turn to examine the two main divisions of non chance equivocality -- pros hen equivocality and analogy.

There is pros hen equivocality when two or more different things receive the same name because these various things are related to one other thing. For example,

"Everything healthy is expressed in reference to health, one thing through preserving health, another through producing it, another through being a sign of health, and another because receptive of it. And the medical by reference to medical science -- for one thing is called medical because it possesses medical science, another through being naturally adapted to it, and another through being a function of medical science."  

There are two examples here of different things receiving the same name because of the reference or relation they have to one other thing. The first example concerns different things called "healthy" -- food is called healthy

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5Aristotle, Metaphysics Γ 1003a 34-b5 translated by Owens in The Doctrine of Being, p. 119.
because it preserves health, medicine is called healthy because it produces health in a sick man, a complexion is called healthy because it is a sign of health and a man is called healthy because he possesses health. All these different things are called healthy because of their reference to one thing, namely, health. Food is the preserver of health, medicine the restorer and producer of health, a certain kind of complexion the sign of health and a man is the subject or possessor of health. Thus these different things called healthy are not just equivocals by chance -- there is a certain unity among them which justifies the imposition of a common name and this unity consists in their common reference to one thing, namely health. So too with the "medical" example. The name "medical" is applied to doctors because they possess medical science, to medicine and medical instruments insofar as these play a part in the exercise and application of medical science and to the doctor's assistants and orderlies insofar as these aid the physician in the application of his knowledge and skill. Thus the name "medical" has a different meaning or definition in each of these cases but again there is a unity because in each case there is a reference to one principle, namely the science or art of medicine. "In just the same way", says Aristotle, "'being' is used in several senses, but always with reference to one central point."
"Some things are said to 'be' because they are (a) substance; others because they are (b) modifications of substance; others because they are (c) a process towards substance, or (d) destructions or qualities or privations of substance, or (e) productive or generative of substance or of terms relating to substance of (f) negations of some of these terms or of substance itself."

At this point we raise the question whether the term "equivocal" (be it "equivocal by chance" or "equivocal by design") properly applies to things which are different in nature yet share the same name or whether the term properly applies to the name so shared. In other words is it things which are equivocal or the name which is equivocal?

It seems clear enough that when Aristotle talks about the equivocals he is talking about things and not about names -- although as Ralph McInerny rightly points out, when anyone talks about equivocals they are talking about things as they are known and named by us and not about things as they exist in rerum natura apart from their being known and named by us. 7

This is clear from the very definition given by Aristotle of


7 Ralph McInerny, The Logic of Analogy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961). McInerny insists that the doctrine of analogy is a logical doctrine concerned with names and their signification and not, for example, as some have thought, a metaphysical doctrine providing explanation for the seemingly irreconcilable unity and diversity of all things considered under the aspect of being.
the equivocals ("Those things are called equivocal whose name alone is common . . . . "). Joseph Owens argues that names and definitions as well as things may be called equivocal and this extension of the denotation of the term "equivocal" is itself an instance of pros hen equivocity. For we name things as we know them and we know things through concepts and concepts are expressed precisely in definitions -- therefore names and definitions signify things, that is they are signs of things which we know and name, hence we may call names and definitions equivocal when they signify things which are equivocal.8 This is parallel to the "healthy" example where a complexion is called healthy because it is a sign of health. So too, names and definitions are called equivocal when they signify things which are equivocal. Thus Aristotle warns that equivocity may lie concealed in a definition.

"Often the equivocal follows along unnoticed also in the definitions themselves. For this reason the definitions themselves also should be examined e.g. if anyone should describe what is indicative of health and what is productive of health as 'what is related commensurably to health', we must not desist but examine what he has meant by commensurate in each case e.g. if

8Owens, The Doctrine of Being, p. 120.
in the latter case 'to be of the right amount to produce health', while in the former 'to be such as to signify what kind the disposition is'.

We now turn to the second division of non-chance equivocality-analogy. As mentioned etymologically the term "analogy" means "proportion" or "according to a ratio" and the technical use of the term in philosophy was taken by Aristotle from its application in mathematics. The mathematical model is just what Aristotle has in mind when he speaks of analogy as an equality or similarity of proportions involving at least four terms. (In a continuous proportion, however, the same term will occur twice and there will in fact be only three distinct terms e.g. a is to b as b is to c.). But he extends the mathematical sense of analogy to include equality or similarity of ratio between non-quantitative proportions. For example, he says as sight is to the eye, so intelligence is to the soul. His purpose in drawing attention to this is to show that there can be a wider unity among things than the unity of genus and this is illustrated in the following passages.

"We must similarly consider likeness in the case of things belonging to different genera. As one thing is to another, so is a third to something else. For example, as knowledge is to the knowable, so is sensation to the sensible thing, and as one thing is in another, so is a third in something

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9 Aristotle, Topics, 1.15, 107b 6-12 translated by Owens in The Doctrine of Being, p. 119.
else. For example, as sight is in the
eye so the mind is in the soul, and as
calm is in the sea, so is stillness in
the air."

"Moreover some things are one in number,
others in species, others in genera,
others by analogy. One in number are
those whose matter is one; one in
species are those of which the
definition is one; one in genus are
those whose location in a category is the
same; and one by analogy are those
that are related as a third thing is to
a fourth. The latter mentioned types
are always implied in the preceding ones.
For example, whatever things are one in
number are also one in species while
things that are one in species are not
all one number; but whatever things
are one in species are all one in genus,
while all things that are one in genus
are not one in species, but by
analogy; while all things that are one
by analogy are not all one in genus."\[1\]

While it should now be clear what Aristotle
means when he says that analogy consists in four terms
having an equality or similarity of relations between
each pair, it may not be quite clear as to just how this is a type of

\[10\] Aristotle, Topics, 1.17, 108a 7-12 translated
by Owens in The Doctrine of Being, p. 124.

\[11\] Aristotle, Metaphysics A 6. 1016 b31-1017 a3
translated by Owens in The Doctrine of Being, p. 124.
equivocity, which we remember demands that different things receive the same name, the definition as denoted by the name being in each case different. Indeed Aristotle himself gives an example of analogy in the context of biology where he says that we cannot find a single identical name to give to a squid's pounce, a fish's spine and an animal's bone although as he points out, there is a definite proportional similarity between these three.\footnote{Aristotle, Topics 2.16. 98a ff. The proportional similarity is one of function; as the squid's pounce is to the squid so is the fish's spine to the fish and the animal's bone to the animal.} However, we could presumably give these three different things a common name in virtue of this similarity between them just as we could use one name "tranquility" to denote both the calm that is in the sea and the stillness in the air. The calm in the sea and the stillness in the air are two different things yet there is an evident proportional likeness between them in virtue of which the name "tranquility" is properly applied to both of them although it means something different in each case. We can take this then as a fairly clear example of non-chance equivocation, which it may be noted, is readily distinguishable from \textit{pros hen} equivocity. \textit{Pros hen} equivocals receive the same name because they are related in different ways to one thing, but analogicals receive the same name.
because of a proportional likeness between them e.g. the calm in the sea is to the sea as the stillness of the air is to the air. In pros hen equivocity there is a relational on two-term structure e.g. food is called healthy because it preserves health and therefore stands in a certain relation to health, medicine is called healthy because it restores health and thus it too is related to health, although in a different fashion from food, and so too with the complexion which is the sign of health and the bodily organism which is in the possession of health. All of these things are called healthy because they are related in some specific way to the one thing, namely, health. In analogy, on the other hand, there is a four-term structure with an equality of ratio between the two pairs of terms and a mathematical example such as two is to four as six is to twelve, although misleading if taken literally, at least clearly conveys the form of analogy which Aristotle has in mind.

As we shall see the Aristotelian pros hen equivocity reappears in Cajetan's The Analogy of Names as the "analogy

13 Note that if we call both cabbage and cheese healthy because they are a cause of health in him who eats them the name "healthy" is not being used equivocally here because the same relation to health is signified in both cases.

14 The mathematical example is misleading because if we call two a "half" on account of its relation to four, and if we call six a "half" on account of its relation to twelve, then the name "half" as applied to two and six means exactly the same thing in both cases (or the definition corresponding to the name is the same in both cases), hence there is no equivocality and no analogy. Proportionality in its philosophical use demands a similarity rather than a strict identity of ratio between the two pairs of terms, and mathematical proportionalities do not fulfill this condition.
of attribution" and the Aristotelian four-term analogy reappears as the "analogy of proportionality" but before examining Cajetan's treatment of analogy we shall briefly indicate how St. Thomas Aquinas deals with the subject, for it is the thought of Aquinas which Cajetan claims to be interpreting and systematizing in The Analogy of Names.

**St. Thomas Aquinas, Proportion and Proportionality**

Although Aquinas deals with analogy in a considerable number of texts (a very useful collection of which is to be found in *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy* by George P. Klubertanz), he wrote no formal treatise on analogy nor did he ever devote a Question or Article to the subject in either of his large *Summae* or, for that matter, in any other work. He seems to have taken it for granted that his readers were already familiar with the essential notion of analogy and when he does discuss the matter at any length, it is always within the context of some particular problem which he is trying to solve. Indeed, more often than not, the problem is how we can talk meaningfully about a transcendent God without falling into either of the two extremes mentioned above -- univocity which entails anthropomorphism and equivocity, which entails agnosticism. The upshot of this is that it is extremely difficult to extract from the writings of Aquinas a consistent and clear-cut doctrine of analogy, for in one context he seems to say one thing and in another context something quite different, and although one may sympathize
with Whitehead's dictum that a contradiction is not a failure but rather an opportunity, such a situation does not make things easy for the interpreter. It may be, of course, that Aquinas never systematically developed for himself a definitive doctrine of analogy and that therefore we ought not to search in his writings for what is not to be found there in the first place. Most of his interpreters nevertheless seem to assume the contrary and although it will be impossible for us to give all of these a fair hearing we shall have to give some of them serious consideration later on. In the meantime let us note that it does seem to be the case that there is a very definite shift of emphasis where analogy is concerned, between the earlier and the later works of Aquinas and this will be pointed out as we go along. In this present chapter, we shall examine two texts which at least shed some light on the development of the doctrine since the time of Aristotle. Our first text is from the De Veritate, a work written by Aquinas between 1256 and 1266, and in this passage he discusses how we predicate "knowledge" of God. In other words, what do we mean when we say that God has knowledge? He dismisses the view that we mean exactly the same thing as when we say that Socrates has knowledge. For in this case "knowledge" would be predicated univocally of God and Socrates and this commits us to anthropomorphism. He then dismisses the view that "knowledge" is predicated of God purely equivocally for
then "knowledge" would be predicated of God without any real meaning -- if God's knowledge is not somehow or in some respect like Socrates' knowledge how can we meaningfully say that God has knowledge at all? We do have a certain understanding of what knowledge is in Socrates, that is, we do have a certain understanding of what human knowledge consists in, and if God's knowledge is totally different from and unrelated to, human knowledge, in what sense is it meaningful to assert that God has knowledge? This is the problem, and having drawn attention to the impossibility of finding a solution in terms either of univocity or pure equivocity Aquinas turns to analogy.

"Consequently it must be said that knowledge is predicated neither entirely univocally nor yet purely equivocally of God's knowledge and ours. Instead, it is predicated analogously, or in other words according to a proportion. Now an agreement according to proportion can be of two kinds. According to this, two kinds of community can be noted in analogy. There is a certain agreement between things having a proportion to each other because they have a determinate distance between them or some other relation to each other as two is related to one because it is its double. Sometimes an agreement is also noted between two things between which there is no proportion but rather a likeness of two proportions to each other, as six with four because six is two times three, just as four is two times two. The first kind of agreement is one of proportion; the second of proportionality.

According to the first type of agreement we find something predicated analogously of two things of which one has a relation to the other, as being is predicated of substance and accident from the relationship which
substance and accident have, or as healthy is predicated of urine and animal because urine has some similarity to the health of an animal. Sometimes, however a thing is predicated analogously because of the second type of agreement, as sight is predicated of corporeal vision and of the intellect because understanding is in the mind as sight is in the eye.

Because in those terms predicated according to the first kind of analogy there must be some determinate relation between the things to which something is common by analogy, nothing can be predicated analogously of God and creature according to this type of analogy; for no creature has such a relation to God by which the divine perfection could be determined. But in the second kind of analogy, no determinate relation is noted between the things to which something is common by analogy; so according to this kind, nothing prevents us from predicating some name analogously of God and creature."15

We are told here that when a name or term is predicated analogously, it is predicated according to a proportion and according to Aquinas, agreement according to proportion can be of two kinds -- two things can be proportioned or related directly to each other (as two is related to one because it is its double) or there can be a likeness or similarity of two proportions (as six agrees with four because six is two times three just as four is two times two). In the case of the two-term proportion a name

is predicated analogously when one of the things so named is related or proportioned to the other, as when we predicate "being" of substance and accident because of the relation between them (an accident is a modification of substance and can only be said to have being because of this) or when we predicate "healthy" of urine and animal because urine can signify or be a sign of, the health which is in the animal. In both these cases there is a determinate relation or proportion between the things which share the common name, that is, between substance and accident in the one case, and between the animal and its urine in the other. It is precisely because there is this determinate relation between the two things which receive the common name that Aquinas rejects predication based on a two-term proportion, as being adequate to explain the analogous predication of the same name of both God and creatures, for the simple reason that between God and creature there can be no such determinate relation. Between the infinite (God) and the finite (creatures) there is no determinate relation or proportion, therefore there cannot be any predication based on such a two-term relation or proportion. However, there may be an agreement between two very different things in virtue of which both can share the same name without there being a proportion or determinate relation between them, but rather, to use Aquinas' words, "a likeness of two proportions to each other", and such is the case when
"sight" is predicated of corporeal vision and the intellect because understanding is in the mind as sight is in the eye. Here we have the four-term proportionality structure, which alone was designated "analogy" by Aristotle, and it is only in this way that names may be predicated meaningfully of God and creatures -- at least this is what Aquinas says in this text. 16 In any case the point being made is that when we predicate "knowledge" of God, we do so on the basis of a proportionality. Just as we can predicate "sight" of corporeal vision and of intellectual understanding because in the one instance things are made present to us through the eyes and in the other instance things are made intelligible to us through the mind, so we may predicate "knowledge" of God and creatures, for just as things are present to us in a way proper to our psycho-physical nature, so too,

16 Even in the De Veritate itself Aquinas shows some inconsistency or perhaps it might be better to say that he is willing to consider more than one possibility in this matter, e.g. in q. 23, a. 7, ad 9, he says "In the sense in which the term proportion is transferred to signify any relationship of one thing to another . . . ., nothing prevents us from saying that there is a proportion of man to God, since man stands in some relation to God, as that he is made by God and is subject to him.

Or the answer could be given that, although there cannot be a proportion strictly so called of the finite to the infinite, yet there can be a proportionality which is the likeness of two proportions". Translated by Klubertanz, Ibid., p. 32.
things are present to God in a manner proper to his divine nature, and we may meaningfully call both of these "knowledge" although we certainly do not mean exactly the same thing when we talk of human knowledge and divine knowledge.

In this text, then, a distinction is drawn between two different foundations for analogical predication. Firstly, different things may receive the same name because of their relation or proportion to some one thing. Secondly, proportional similarity may provide the basis for the predication of the common name. This division seems to parallel exactly Aristotle's division between ἐπώνυμος ἀναλογία and analogy. Aquinas, however, goes on to distinguish between two kinds of analogy of proportion, between analogy which is based on a "many to one" type of relation and analogy which is based on a "one to another" type of relation. We can use the "healthy" and "being" examples to illustrate this distinction. When "healthy" is predicated of animal and also of urine when the quality of the urine assures us of the health of the animal, and when "being" is predicated of substance and also of quantity because quantity is a modification or property of substance, here we have analogy based on the "one to another" type of relation. On the other hand, when "healthy" is predicated of urine and food and medicine because of the different relations or proportions which these have to the health of the animal, and when "being" is predicated of quality and quantity because of the different relations or proportions these have
to substance, in this case we have analogy based on the "many to one" kind of relation. (The locution "two to a third" is sometimes used by Aquinas instead of "many to one" when he is considering only two things or classes of things which receive a common name because of their relation to some third thing, as, for example, when he asks whether God and creatures receive a common name because of their relation or reference to some third thing.)

We find the distinction we have just been discussing made by Aquinas in the following text taken from the First Part of the Summa Theologicae, a work written between 1266 and 1268 and thus a later work than the De Veritate. In this text no mention is made of proportionality as a distinct kind of analogy, nor is proportionality employed to explain how terms predicated of God are analogous. Indeed, this passage seems to indicate at least a shift of emphasis in Aquinas' treatment of analogy.

17 In point of fact Aquinas will always deny that any name can be predicated analogously of God and creatures because of their relation to some third thing. What he wants to avoid is any suggestion that the likeness between God and creature can be explained in terms of the participation of both in a Platonic Form. He argues that there is nothing that can in any way be prior to God, in which both God and creatures could participate. Hence, where names common to God and creature are concerned, we cannot have an analogy based on the "two to a third" or "many to one" kind of relation. When Aquinas does talk about analogy of proportion in this context he is always careful to point out that it can only be an analogy based on the "one to another" kind of relation.
"Yet although we never use words in exactly the same sense of creatures and God we are not merely equivocating when we use the same word, as some have said, for if this were so we could never argue from statements about creatures to statements about God -- any such argument would be invalidated by the Fallacy of Equivocation. That this does not happen we know not merely from the teachings of the philosophers who prove many things about God, but also from the teaching of St. Paul, for he says, 'The invisible things of God are made known from those things that are visible:

We must say therefore that words are used of God and creatures in an analogical way; that is in accordance with a certain order between them. We can distinguish two kinds of analogical or 'proportional' uses of language. Firstly there is the case of one word being used of two things because each of them has some order or relation to a third thing. Thus we use the word 'healthy' of both a diet and a complexion because each of them has some relation to health in a man, the former as a cause, the latter as a symptom of it. Secondly, there is the case of the same word used of two things because of some relation that one has to the other -- as 'healthy' is used of diet and the man because the diet is the cause of the health in the man.

In this way some words are used neither univocally nor purely equivocally of God and creatures, but analogically, for we cannot speak of God at all except in the language we use of creatures and so whatever is said both of God and creatures is said in virtue of the order that creatures have to God is to their source and cause in which all the perfections of things pre-exist transcendentally.

This way of using words ties somewhere between pure equivocation and simple univocality, for the word is neither used in the same sense, as with univocal usage, nor in totally different senses, as with equivocation. The several senses
of a word used analogically signify different relations to some one thing, as 'health' in a complexion means a symptom of health in a man, and in a diet means a cause of that health. 

We shall have reason to refer again to this discussion in the Summa Theologiae but now we turn to Cajetan's treatment of analogy in The Analogy of Names, a short but very influential treatise written in the year 1498.

Cajetan, Attribution and Proportionality

Cajetan tells as he was motivated to write The Analogy of Names "both by the obscurity of the subject itself and by the deplorable scarcity of profound studies in our age." He says that "in this work the word analogy means proportion or proportionality as we have learned from the Greeks" and 'all analogous terms can be reduced to three modes of analogy: analogy of inequality, analogy of attribution, analogy of proportionality". Only the last mode is truly analogy -- "the first one is entirely foreign to analogy". We shall not examine the first mode of analogy, the analogy of inequality -- which is sometimes called the analogy of genus. Suffice it to say that it is rejected by Cajetan because it resembles a type of univocity far more than a

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19 Cajetan, The Analogy of Names, Chapter one, paragraphs one to three, p. 9-II.
type of analogy. In the second chapter of his treatise, he discusses analogy of attribution and we shall have no difficulty in recognizing what is going on here.

"Those things are analogous by attribution which have a common name and the notion signified by this name is the same with respect to the term but different as regards the relationship to this term. For example, the name 'healthy' is common to medicine, wine and animal, but the notion of all differs insofar as healthy expresses different relationships to one term, namely, health. For if anyone describes what an animal is insofar as it is healthy, he will say that it is the subject of health, and that urine insofar as it is healthy is a sign of health, whereas medicine insofar as it is healthy will be mentioned as the cause of health. In this example it is perfectly clear that the notion of health is not entirely the same nor entirely different, but to a certain extent the same and to a certain extent different. For there is a diversity of relationships but the term of these relationships is one and the same."

Here is the pros hen equivocity of Aristotle and the analogy of proportion already seen in the De Veritate and Summa Theologiae of Aquinas. However, Cajetan deals much more systematically with this kind of analogy than do the others, and he proceeds to lay down four conditions.

For an interesting defence of analogy of inequality as a genuine analogy see Armand Maurer's article "St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus", The New Scholasticism, XXIX (April, 1955), p. 127-144.

The Analogy of Names, Chapter two, paragraph eight p. 15.
which are necessarily attached to analogy of attribution. The first condition is that "This analogy is according to extrinsic denomination only, so that only the primary analogate realizes the perfection formally, whereas the others have it only by extrinsic denomination."²² By this Cajetan appears to mean that only one of the analogates has or possesses the property (or "perfection" as he calls it) formally i.e. possesses the property as a form inherent in it. The other analogates receive the name not because the property signified by it is possessed formally by them but because they are related in some way to the analogate to which the property is intrinsic -- hence, these analogates are said to be denominated extrinsically, that is, they are so named not because the property signified by the name is intrinsic to them but because they are related to that to which the property is intrinsic. This also explains why this kind of analogy is called "analogy of attribution" -- the property signified by the name, since it is only possessed formally by one analogate (which for that reason is designated the primary analogate), is "attributed" to the other analogates (the secondary analogates). The "healthy" example very clearly exemplifies this first condition as it is set out by Cajetan -- the animal which is the subject of health is the prime analogate for it

²²Ibid., Chapter two, paragraph ten, p. 16.
alone possesses the property signified by the name, namely health. Medicine and urine are the secondary analogates -- they do not possess health but are only called "healthy" because of their relation to the health which is in the animal. However, when Cajetan gives the example of "being" predicated of substance and accident, as an example of analogy of attribution the applicability of the first condition is less readily evident and Cajetan, realizing this, proceeds to qualify the first condition. But we shall defer discussion of this until the next chapter.

The second condition of analogy of attribution -- which we are told directly follows from the first -- is that "the one thing which is the term of the diverse relationships in analogous names of this type is one not merely in concept but numerically"\(^{23}\) and to demonstrate the point the "healthy" example is once again employed: "health is not multiplied numerically in animal, urine and diet, since there is not one health in urine, another in animal and a third in diet". This illustrates how a name which is analogous by attribution differs from a name which is univocal -- for example, a man, a hare and an ox are all correctly named "animal" and they are so named in virtue of

\(^{23}\)Ibid., Chapter two, paragraph twelve, p. 18.
the animal nature which each of them possesses. One could say that this animal nature is "multiplied" in them -- in contrast to the property signified by a name analogous by attribution which is possessed only by the primary analogate.

The **third** condition of analogy of attribution is that "the primary analogate is put into the definition of the others with respect to the analogous name" and this third condition follows from the second. For example, when medicine or urine is called healthy, the meaning (or definition) of "healthy" as it is predicated of these must include a reference to the health of the animal for it is only in reference to the health of the animal, that these things are called healthy in the first place.

The **fourth** condition, according to Cajetan, follows from the third: "a name which is analogous in this manner does not have one definite meaning common to all its partial modes, i.e. to all its analogates." For example, "healthy" predicated of animal means "possessing health"; predicated of urine, "signifying health" etc. And so he says, there

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24 *Ibid.*, Chapter two, paragraph fourteen, p. 19. Cf. Aquinas In the De Veritate p. 2., art. 11, ad 6, where he is discussing analogy of proportion he says, "one analogate must be found in the definition of the other, as substance is found in the definition of accident, or else some common note must be put in the definition of both, inasmuch as both are denominated by their relationship to that one thing, as substance is found in the definitions of both quantity and quality*. Translated by Klubertanz, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

are three elements in this kind of analogy: "the name, the term and the relationship to this term. The analogous name signifies the term distinctly, e.g. healthy distinctly signifies health. The diverse relationships, however, are implied in such an indeterminate and confused way that the primary relationship is signified distinctly or about distinctly, but the others in a confused manner and by way of reduction to the primary relationship".\(^{26}\) The primary relationship signified distinctly (or almost so) by "healthy" would of course be "possession of health" -- the other relationships being sign of health, cause of health etc.

Having set out these four conditions of analogy of attribution, Cajetan's next step is to indicate that "this analogy is divided by St. Thomas into analogy of 'two to a third', such as of urine and medicine to a healthy animal, and analogy of 'one to another', such as of urine or medicine to a healthy animal".\(^{27}\) This division we have already seen in our account of analogy of proportion. In one case, two things are considered analogous because of the

\(^{26}\) Ibid., Chapter two, paragraph fifteen, p. 20.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., Chapter two, paragraph seventeen, p. 21.
relation between them. In the other case, two things are considered analogous because of the relation they have to some third thing.

Cajetan concludes his account of analogy of attribution with the assertion that terms analogous in this way should be called equivocal — equivocal by design — rather than analogous. He cites the *Nicomachean Ethics* where it is asked concerning "the good" whether "goods are one by being derived from one good, or by all contributing to one good or are they rather one by analogy?" In other words, he appeals to Aristotelian usage, where the type of situation we find in analogy of attribution is described as *pros hen* equivocity, and the term "analogy" is reserved for the four-term proportionality structure. This brings us to Cajetan's analogy of proportionality which is the final member of his three-fold division.

"Passing over from what is incorrectly called analogous to analogy in the proper sense we say that those things are called analogous by proportionality which have a common name, and the notion expressed by the name is proportionally the same. Or to say the same in a different way, those things are called analogous by proportionality which have a common name, and the notion expressed by this name is similar according to a proportion. For instance, to see by corporeal vision and by intellectual vision are indicated by the common term 'to see', because just as to understand presents something to the mind, so to see presents something to the animated body." 28

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Again we are familiar with the structure of this kind of analogy from our brief treatment of Aristotle and Aquinas and there is little need to elaborate much further. However Cajetan does draw an interesting distinction between two kinds of proportionality -- between proper proportionality and metaphor (or improper proportionality). To illustrate what he means by a metaphorical analogy he uses the example of "smiling", predicated of a blooming meadow or good fortune, and points out that neither a meadow nor fortune can really smile but can only be said to do so by a figure of speech. Nonetheless there is a genuine

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29 For the foundation of this distinction in Aquinas, see the De Veritate q. 2, a. 11; "(Analogy of proportionality) occurs in two ways. Sometimes the name implies in its primary meaning something in which no agreement can be found between God and creature, not even in the aforesaid manner (i.e. as sight with respect to eye and intellect). This happens in all names which are symbolically predicated of God; e.g. when he is called a Lion, the Sun; or other names of this sort, for the definition of these names implies matter, which cannot be attributed to God. At other times, however, a name predicated of God and creature does not imply in its primary meaning anything in which the aforesaid mode of agreement cannot be found. This is the case with all things whose definition does not include any defect and which do not depend on matter for their 'to be'; e.g. being, good and such like things." Translated in The Analogy of Names, p. 25-26. footnote number eight.
proportional likeness in metaphorical analogy and both Aquinas and Cajetan draw attention to the way it is employed in the Scriptures and religious language generally. For example when it is said that Christ is a lion the name "lion" is predicated of him not because he actually possesses the specific animal nature of the lion, but because he has properties similar to those manifested by the lion e.g. great courage and fearlessness in dealing with his enemies, strength, the quality of arousing fear, awe, respect etc. or he could be said to be noblest of men as the lion is the noblest of the animals. However, the thing to which a name is applied metaphorically does not possess the property signified by the metaphorical name and in this respect metaphorical analogy is very similar to analogy of attribution.

Turning to analogy of proper proportionality on the other hand, we see that what is signified by the analogous name is intrinsic to both analogates, hence the name is used in its proper sense of both of them. "For instance", says Cajetan, "'principle' can be predicated of the heart with respect to an animal and of a foundation with respect to a house."\(^{30}\) Both the heart and the foundation of the house are properly termed "principle" — although "principle" has a somewhat different meaning in each case.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., Chapter three, paragraph twenty-six. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* \(\Delta\) 1013a 4-8.
Nevertheless there is a proportional unity which can be expressed thus -- as the heart is to the animal, so the foundation is to the house -- in virtue of which both heart and foundation are intrinsically denominated a "principle".

Cajetan rounds off his chapter on analogy of proportionality by asserting that analogy of proper proportionality excels above all the other kinds of analogy he has dealt with both "by dignity and name." For this type of analogy alone "arises from the genus of inherent formal causality for it predicates perfections that are inherent in each analogate whereas the other analogy (attribution) arises from extrinsic denomination." Of course this "superiority" of proportionality over attribution would be undermined if it could be shown that there is an intrinsic as well as an extrinsic analogy of attribution. We shall take up this question in the next chapter. Analogy of proper proportionality also excels above the other kinds of analogy "by name", "because only terms which are analogous by this type of analogy are called analogous by the Greeks, from whom we have borrowed the term."

\[31^{\text{i}}\text{bid., Chapter three, paragraph twenty three, p. 27.}\]
Attention should be drawn to the fact that Cajetan bases his three-fold division of analogy on a text from the first book of the *Commentary on the Sentences*, one of the earliest works of Aquinas, written between 1254 and 1256. In this text Aquinas says that "there are three ways in which something might be said by analogy. In the first place, according to intention only and not according to being. This happens when one intention refers to several things according to priority and posteriority, but has being in one only." The familiar "healthy" example is given in illustration. As we have seen, the property signified by the name "healthy" (or its "intention") is possessed by (i.e. has being in) the animal alone. Thus the primary meaning of the term "healthy" is "possessing health" -- the other related meanings "sign of health", "cause of health" are posterior or secondary meanings of the term "healthy" in that such things as medicine and urine are only called "healthy" because of their relation to the health of the animal. "In the second place (something may be said by analogy) according to being and not according to intention. This happens when several are considered equal in the intention of something they have in common, but this common element does not have a being of the same kind in all."

This corresponds to Cajetan's analogy of inequality and refers to unequal participation by different things in the same generic notion. "In the third place (something may be said by analogy) according to being and according to intention. This happens when a thing is considered neither equal in intention nor equal in being. For example, being is predicated of substance and accidents in this way. In such cases, the common nature must exist in each of those things of which it is predicated, but its existence differs according to a higher or lesser degree of perfection. In this manner I say that truth, goodness and all other similar terms are predicated of God and creatures by analogy". This corresponds to the analogy of proper proportionality where the property signified by the analogous name is possessed by both analogates and yet exists in both of them in a different way (hence, diversity in being). Furthermore what is signified by the analogous name differs as the name is applied to different analogates (hence, diversity is intention) yet there is a similarity of proportions which is the source of likeness amid difference. And Cajetan, following Aquinas' suggestion here, says that it is this kind of analogy which is of great importance in metaphysics and hence in the predication of names of both God and creatures.
Conclusion

We have attempted in the first chapter to explain the origin and nature of two kinds of analogy -- the analogy of attribution and the analogy of proportionality. Although the term "analogy of attribution" is not used by either Aristotle or Aquinas, this kind of analogy clearly has its origin in the pros hen equivocity of Aristotle and the analogy of proportion of Aquinas. Analogy of attribution, whether of the "one to another" type or of the "many to one" type is to be sharply distinguished from the analogy of proportionality which involves two pairs of terms and a similarity of ratio between them. Analogy of attribution demands that among the analogates, one must be the primary analogate and the others secondary analogates, which only receive the analogous name because of their various relations to the primary analogate, which alone possesses the property or perfection signified by the analogous name and therefore alone is intrinsically denominated. In analogy of proper proportionality on the other hand, both analogates are intrinsically denominated -- both possess the property or perfection signified by the analogous name, and yet the property or perfection so signified differs in such a way that it is only by virtue of the similarity of proportions that the name is not purely equivocal.

Our next step will be to examine a little more critically Cajetan's treatment of attribution and to question whether his statement of attribution really corresponds to the analogy of proportion to be found in Aquinas.
CHAPTER TWO

The Two-Fold Division in Question

Extrinsic and Intrinsic Attribution

Cajetan rejects attribution in favour of proper proportionality because he believes that the latter is a "truer" kind of analogy and in it alone is the perfection signified by the analogous name intrinsic to both analogates. He finds support for this contention in his interpretation of the Commentary on the Sentences I. d. 19, q. 5, a. 2. ad I and in the De Veritate q. 2, a. 11 text. However we have already noted that Aquinas' doctrine of analogy appears to undergo some modification in his later works -- particularly the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles, where in the important discussions on analogy and the predication of names of God, no mention is made of proportionality. Indeed, one would get the impression from these works that analogy is to be identified with analogy of proportion and no further classification is necessary except that analogical predication may be based on the "many to one" type of relation or on the "one to another" type. Nonetheless, until fairly recently, Cajetan's
classification of analogy and his interpretation of Aquinas has been accepted by the majority of philosophers in the Scholastic tradition, and although nowadays it is under attack from several quarters, it is still defended with spirit by Cajetan's followers.

We commence this present chapter by examining a difficulty to be found in Cajetan's treatment of the first condition attaching to the analogy of attribution -- namely the condition that only the primary analogate possess formally the property signified by the analogous name. This condition is important not only in that it sharply differentiates analogy of attribution from analogy of proper proportionality, but also because if analogy of attribution is purely extrinsic, then it cannot provide us with an adequate interpretation of the meaning of names predicated of God. That is, it will be of very limited value when we are seeking to explicate the meaning of religious language. For if, for example, we say by analogy of attribution that God is good, what we mean in fact is something like "God is the cause of good things". But presumably God's being the cause of good things is logically compatible with his being

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1Francis Suarez and Sylvester of Ferrara were two early critics of Cajetan. Among more recent critics we can number Hampus Lyttkens, George P. Klubertanz, Battista Mondin and Ralph McNerney, although it should be remarked that none of these critics, who are all in the Scholastic tradition, take the same stand on the question of analogy. Persistent defenders of the Cajetanian interpretation include Gerald B. Phelan and James F. Anderson.
wicked or evil in himself; although, of course, if by analogy of attribution we say "God is evil", all that we can mean is that God is related to evil things as their cause. In short, names analogous by analogy of attribution tell us nothing about the nature or intrinsic properties of the secondary analogates, except that they are in some way related to the primary analogate and since God is known and named not directly but only from the things he has created which are directly known and named by us, names said of him in this way tell us nothing about his nature or intrinsic properties other than that he is the cause of creatures and their properties. Granted, then, that names said of God by analogy of attribution, as set out by Cajetan, tell us practically nothing about God, analogy of proper proportionality would seem to be the only alternative left to us in our attempt to explain how we can meaningfully talk about God. Yet, as we have remarked, this is not the impression that Aquinas gives us in his treatment of this problem in his more nature works. But we will take this up again later.

Cajetan's first condition, it will be remembered, is that "This analogy (attribution) is according to extrinsic denomination only, so that the prime analogate realizes the perfection formally, whereas the others have it only by extrinsic denomination". As we pointed out, the "healthy" example is a clear-cut illustration of this condition, for only the animal (the prime analogate) possesses
formally the property signified by the analogous name. But Cajetan goes on to say that both substance and accident are called "being" in this way, as the "essential good" (God) and all others goods are called "good". In both these examples, however, the property signified by the analogous name -- "being" in the one instance, "goodness" in the other -- is intrinsic to both primary and secondary analogates. How then are we to reconcile this with the claim that "only the primary analogate realizes the perfection formally"? Cajetan recognizes the difficulty and hastens to qualify his statement of the first condition by asserting that "it should not be understood as if every name which is analogous by analogy of attribution is common to the analogates in such a way that it pertains only to

2 We saw this example of "being" predicated of substance and accident when dealing with Aristotle's pros hen equivocality and Aquinas' analogy of proportion in the De Veritate q. 2, a 11 text. The same example is also used to illustrate the analogy "according to intention and according to being" mentioned in the Commentary on the Sentences I, d. 19; q. 5, a. 2, ad I, which Cajetan identifies as analogy of proper proportionality. It may seem somewhat unsatisfactory to use the same example to illustrate two different kinds of analogy, but, in this case, we might question Cajetan's accuracy in identifying analogy of proportionality with analogy "according to intention and according to being" or we might prefer to argue that the same ontological situation can be the basis for different types of analogical predication.
the primary analogate formally and to the others by extrinsic denomination, as happens to be with 'healthy' and 'medical'. Such a generalization is false, as is clear from 'being' and 'good' and cannot be gathered from what we have said unless it were understood materially. The qualification of the first condition is that this condition is to be understood formally and not materially. What is the difference between understanding the condition formally and understanding it materially? As Ralph McInerny remarks, there seems to be no difference, at least if we interpret Cajetan literally, for the material understanding is that "every name which is analogous by analogy of attribution is common to the analogates is such a way that it pertains only to the primary analogate formally and to the others by extrinsic denomination" (and this is how we are not to understand the condition) and the formal understanding is that "Our explanation must be understood in the sense that every name which is analogous by analogy of attribution as such i.e. insofar as it is analogous in this manner, is common to the analogates in this way, that it pertains to the primary analogate formally and to the others by extrinsic denomination".

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3Cajetan, The Analogy of Names, Chapter two, paragraph eleven, p. 17-18.

There seems to be only one way to interpret this qualification of Cajetan's. Perhaps he wishes us to understand that in analogy of attribution, the property or perfection signified by the analogous name is always possessed by, or inherent in, the prime analogate, from which the other analogates are denominated, or receive the analogous name, because of their relation to this prime analogate (as medicine is denominated "healthy" because of its relation to the health of the animal or as accident is denominated "being" because of its relation to substance) regardless of whether these according analogates do or do not possess formally the property signified by the analogous name -- the essential point being that they receive the name because of their relation to the prime analogate. But if this is the case, it would seem that the first condition of analogy of attribution is irrelevant, at least insofar as it lays down that "only the primary analogate realizes the perfection formally" for understood in the sense that we have suggested, the secondary analogates may or may not realize formally the perfection or property signified by the analogous name.

Let us examine more closely the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. In his commentary on the *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 6, a. 4 Cajetan says:

"Denomination is two-fold. One is intrinsic and the other is extrinsic. A denomination is called intrinsic when the form of the denominative (perfection) is in that which is denominated, say, white, quantified etc.;
whereas a denomination is extrinsic if the form of the denominative (perfection) is not in the denominated thing e.g. located, measured and the like.  

He goes on to draw attention to two distinct kinds of extrinsic denomination:

"In two ways a thing may be called such or such after something extrinsic. In one way, if the reason for the denomination is the very relationship (of this thing) to something extrinsic; e.g. urine is called healthy for the sole reason of its relationship as a sign of health. In another way, if the reason for the denomination is not a relationship of similitude or any other, but a form which is the foundation of a relationship of similitude to an extrinsic thing; e.g. as air is said to be lucid because of the light of the sun inasmuch as it participates in it through the form of light.

When a denomination is made in the first way there is a purely extrinsic denomination, but when the denomination is made in the second way, there is extrinsic denomination, yet not only extrinsic denomination, because there

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5 Cajetan, Commentary on the Summa Theologicae I, q. 6, a 4 cited and translated in The Analogy of Names p. 16, footnote seven.
is also intrinsic denomination, as is clear."

When something is intrinsically denominated the name which is predicated of it, or given to it, signifies a property or perfection intrinsic to it; thus when I say "the wall is white", "white" signifies a property intrinsic to the wall, a formal determination of the wall. In the case of extrinsic denomination, on the other hand, the name which is predicated of something signifies not a property intrinsic to that thing, not a form inherent in the thing determining its mode of being, but rather a relational property telling us how the thing in question is related to some other thing. For example, to say that the Eiffel tower is in Paris is to indicate the location of the Eiffel tower,

Ibid. The following explanation given by Aquinas in the De Veritate is perhaps a little clearer. "There are two ways of denoting something with respect to something else. One way makes the relationship the meaning of the denomination. Thus urine is called healthy in relationship to the health of the animal. The very meaning of healthy as it is predicated of urine is to-be-a-sign of health in the animal. In such predication that which is denominated with respect to something else is not so denominated because of any form inhering in it but because of something outside it to which it is referred.

The other way of denoting something in relationship to something else does not make the relationship the very meaning of the denomination, but rather its cause. Thus when the atmosphere is called bright because of the sun, this does not mean that the very relationship of the atmosphere to the sun is its brightness, but rather that the location of the atmosphere directly opposite to the sun is the cause of its brightness". De Veritate q. 21, a. 4, ad 2, translated by Klubertanz in St. Thomas Aquinas and Analogy p. 45-46.
its relation to its surroundings and not to tell us something about the intrinsic properties of that structure; hence the Eiffel tower in this instance, is denominated extrinsically. We may now go on to clarify the two kinds of extrinsic denomination. When the denomination is purely extrinsic a name is simply being used to signify a relationship, as urine is called "healthy" because it can be a sign of health. "Healthy" as predicated of urine simply means sign-of-health. In the second type of extrinsic denomination, on the other hand, a name is applied to a thing because of its relation to another thing, but the name so applied does not just signify a relationship of one thing to another, but a property which is intrinsic to both things, yet a property which is possessed by one thing only because of its relation to the other, as the atmosphere can only be said to be bright because of the sun's causality, for the sun is the cause of the brightness of the atmosphere; hence "brightness" is predicated of the atmosphere by this kind of extrinsic denomination and as predicated of the atmosphere it does not simply mean effect-of-the-sun's-causality but indicates a property intrinsic to the atmosphere. And so Cajetan says, "there is extrinsic denomination, yet not only extrinsic denomination because there is also intrinsic denomination, as is clear." It is to be noted that Cajetan does not distinguish between these two kinds of extrinsic denomination in The Analogy of Namás.
Are we now in any position to make more sense of Cajetan's analogy of attribution? Some would say yes, provided we are prepared to do what Cajetan does not do, that is, to make a distinction within analogy of attribution between analogy of extrinsic attribution (where the denomination is purely extrinsic) and analogy of intrinsic attribution (where the denomination is not purely extrinsic). On this view, the "healthy" example is a perfect illustration of the former kind of analogy, where Cajetan's four conditions are indeed satisfied. On the other hand, "being" as predicated of substance and accident provides us with a good philosophical example of analogy of intrinsic attribution, for here it is certainly not meant that accidents have no being but rather that the being of an accident consists in its being a modification of substance. It is the very relation of accident to substance that is the source of the accident's being, thereby enabling the accident to be denominated "being" intrinsically (just as it is the very relationship between the sun and the atmosphere which is the cause of the intrinsic brightness of the atmosphere). In this kind of analogy although the property signified by the analogous name is intrinsic to both analogates, nevertheless, there is an evident distinction to be drawn between primary and secondary analogates. In our example, substance is the prime analogate, because "being" is predicated primarily and most properly of substance, only secondarily and less properly of accidents and then, only
because of their relation to substance. In such an analogy, therefore, we find a relationship of priority and posteriority and Cajetan's third condition that "the primary analogate is put into the definition of the others" would seem to be verified. (For instance, one cannot define the being of accident without referring to substance, for to be an accident is to be a modification of substance.)

These considerations might prompt us to give the following generic definition of analogy of attribution. What is essential to this kind of analogy is that there be a primary analogate i.e. something to which the analogous name primarily and most properly applies and to which the property signified by this name is intrinsic, and that the secondary analogates receive this name because of their relationship to the prime analogate. Any analogy of attribution is essentially a relational type of analogy, involving a direct relationship between primary and secondary analogates, "the primary analogate being put into the definition of the other analogates" with respect to the analogous name. We can now go on to distinguish two species of analogy of attribution: firstly, analogy of extrinsic attribution, where the property signified by the analogous name is intrinsic to the primary analogate alone and the secondary analogates are denominated purely extrinsically; secondly, analogy of intrinsic attribution where both primary and secondary analogates are intrinsically denominated i.e. where the property signified by the analogous name is
possessed formally by both primary and secondary analogates. It is just this kind of classification which is urged by Suarez and which a modern commentator, Battista Mondin puts forward in "The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology", not simply because he is dissatisfied with Cajetan's obscurity in The Analogy of Names but because he sees this as the most faithful interpretation of Aquinas and he is further convinced that the meaning of religious language can only be satisfactorily explained on the basis of analogy of intrinsic attribution. We have already indicated why analogy of extrinsic attribution is of little help to us here and a contention such as Mondin's that analogy of intrinsic attribution is of key importance when it comes to predicating names of God draws considerable strength from what Aquinas has to say in the Summa Contra Gentiles, Chapters twenty-nine to thirty-four and in the Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, as the following passages from these works make clear.

"... what is predicated of some things according to priority and posteriority is certainly not predicated univocally. For the prior is included in the definition of the posterior, as substance is included in the definition of accident according as an accident is a being... now nothing is predicated of God and creatures as though they were in the same order, but rather according to priority and posteriority. For God is called being as being entity itself and he is called good as being goodness itself."

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"From what we have said it likewise appears that not everything predicated of God and other things is said in a purely equivocal way, in the manner of equivocals by chance.

For in equivocals by chance there is no order or reference of one to another, but it is entirely accidental that one name is applied to diverse things: the application of the name to one of them does not signify that it has an order to the other. But this is not the situation with names said of God and creatures, since we note in the community of such names the order of cause and effect, as is clear from what we have said."

"In the case of all names which are predicated analogously of several things, it is necessary that all be predicated with respect to one, and therefore that one be placed in the definiton of all. Because 'the intelligibility which a name means is its definition,' as is said in the fourth book of the Metaphysics, a name must be antecedently predicated of that which is put in the definitons of the others, and consequently of the others, according to the order in which they approach, more or less, that first analogate...

Thus, all names which are predicated of God figuratively are predicated antecedently of creatures rather than of God... The case would be the same for other names as well, which are not predicated of God merely figuratively, if they were predicated merely as cause, as some have held. Thus, when God is called good this would mean only that God is the cause of the creature's goodness; the goodness thus predicated of God would therefore include in its intelligibility the creature's goodness and goodness would be predicated antecedently of the creature rather than of God.

8 Ibid, Book I, Chapter thirty-three, paragraphs one to three, p. 145-146.
However, as was shown above, names of this sort are predicated of God not only as cause but also properly. For when God is called good or wise, this signifies not only that He is the cause of wisdom and goodness, but also that these perfections exist in Him in a higher way."

What Aquinas seems to have in mind here, where he is explicitly reflecting on naming God seems to be none other than our analogy of intrinsic attribution. We do not intend to examine in detail here the kind of relationship which, Aquinas asserts, holds between God and creatures, the knowledge of which enables us in some sense to know and name God. Suffice it to say here that it is very obviously a causal relationship. Because God is the cause and ultimate source of created things, he can meaningfully be said to have certain properties, such as being, goodness etc., which are evident in his effects.  

9 Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 6, translated by Klubertanz, ibid, p. 68.

10 Two points should be noted here: (1) According to Aquinas the only knowledge we have of God is what we know of him as cause of creatures. One of his standard principles is that every cause reveals something of its own nature in its activity. It is because of this that we can move from the affirmation that God is the cause of creatures to the affirmation that certain properties necessarily belong to him. Just how Aquinas decides that there must be a cause of the universe, that this cause is in fact what we mean by the name "God," and why some properties and not others must be ascribed to this cause, is dealt with in some detail in the first parts of both Summae. (2) God, as creator, is obviously a unique kind of cause. He is not, for example, the cause of creatures in the same way medicine is the cause of health. Indeed, "cause" itself is an analogical term and our concept of God's causality will necessarily be derived from our understanding of causality as operative in the universe. Aquinas insists that every term predicated of God (even the term "God") will be predicated of him analogically.
is because he is related to creatures as their cause that he can be known and talked about in human language, not univocally, of course, but only analogically. Furthermore, in explicating the nature of this analogy, Aquinas makes quite clear that there is priority and posteriority involved and that this necessitates that the prior (the prime analogate) is included in the definition of the posterior (the secondary analogate), and this we saw to be the essential condition of analogy of attribution. Nor quite obviously is he talking about analogy of extrinsic attribution, for when God is called good or wise, this signifies not only that he is the cause of wisdom or goodness in creatures, but that these properties are intrinsic to him. Indeed, we are told that these perfections exist in him "in a higher way". This last remark raises some difficulty. Is God the prime analogate in this particular analogy? It seems he must be since he is the cause of goodness in creatures and possesses goodness in a higher way than they do. (Indeed God is said to be goodness, a startling assertion, as Aquinas himself realizes.) But if God is the prime analogate are we to insist that human goodness can only be defined by reference to Divine goodness, which must be the case if the condition that the prime analogate be placed in the definition of the others be fulfilled. This, however, is patently unacceptable, for we do not have to know what Divine goodness is before we can meaningfully talk about human goodness. Indeed, it is quite the reverse.
To meet this obvious difficulty Aquinas posits a distinction between priority and posteriority in the epistemological order and priority and posteriority in the ontological order. What is prior in the epistemological order is what is most easily grasped and understood by us but what is most easily grasped and understood by us is not necessarily what is most fundamental in reality. Indeed it invariably turns out to be the case that what is most fundamental in reality, that is, in the ontological order proves to be most difficult for us to know, and this is especially so when we attempt to know and to understand God. Thus when we attempt to talk about God the prime analogate will be what is most familiar to us, in this case, human goodness, and any effort to understand Divine goodness will always include a reference to human goodness, but in reality, of course, Divine goodness is indisputably prior to human goodness, just as God the creator and source of all things is ontologically prior to all things.\(^\text{11}\)

Enough has been said perhaps to justify making a clear distinction between analogy of intrinsic attribution and analogy of extrinsic attribution, and to claim for the former a key role in the interpretation of theological discourse (at least, as far as Aquinas is

\(^\text{11}\)See, for example, the Aquinas texts translated by Klubertanz, \textit{ibid.}, p. 67-69.
concerned). But we will be disappointed if we expect a Cajetanian to agree with us. For him the so-called analogy of intrinsic attribution remains somewhat of a contradiction in terms and, furthermore, inevitably confuses analogy of attribution with analogy of proper proportionality, thereby, rendering impossible any coherent and comprehensive understanding of the true nature of analogy and its divisions.

**Analogy of Intrinsic Attribution**

**versus**

**Analogy of Proper Proportionality**

Is the so-called analogy of intrinsic attribution based on the kind of confusion referred to above? We have seen that Cajetan insists on keeping attribution distinct from proper proportionality on the grounds that in the analogy of attribution "only the primary analogate realizes the perfection formally, whereas the the others have it only by extrinsic denomination." What he is obviously most anxious to emphasize is that attribution is essentially a two-term analogy involving a reference of one thing to another, such that the meaning of the analogous term when predicated of the secondary analogate is "related-in-some-way-to-the-primary analogate". Thus m when predicated in this way of x and y (x being the primary analogate, y the secondary analogate) means related-in-some-way-to-x (to which the property signified by m is intrinsic) when predicated of y. The difficulty arises as soon as you introduce intrinsic denomination of the secondary analogates as well as the
primary analogate, for then \( m \) is used to signify a property intrinsic to both \( x \) and \( y \), and \( m \) as predicated of \( y \) is supposed to take on a double signification; it is supposed to mean both related-in-some-way-to-\( x \) (to which the property is intrinsic) and possesses-the-property-signified-by-\( m \) which is also possessed by \( x \) (although in "a higher way"). But once it is admitted that there is a common property intrinsic to \( x \) and \( y \) and that this property is signified by \( m \), then \( m \) as predicated of \( y \) ceases to mean related-in-one-way-to \( x \). What we are attempting to point out is simply this: precisely insofar as the secondary analogates are intrinsically denominated, the name which is predicated of them signifies a property intrinsic to them and not a relation to the primary analogate; insofar as the name predicated of the secondary analogates signifies a relation or proportion between them and the primary analogate, it does not signify a property intrinsic to the secondary analogates. It seems to be just this formal condition that Cajetan is emphasizing in Chapter two of The Analogy of Names and it is this which prevents any Cajetanian from accepting the so-called analogy of intrinsic attribution as a formal division of analogy. It is, indeed, often the case that we predicate a name signifying an (intrinsic) property of a number of things which are so related that one of them (the primary analogate) is the cause of the other things having this property (e.g. the God-creature and the substance-accident situation) but the essential
point is that the relationship of these other things (the secondary analogates) to the primary analogate is not what is signified by a name so common to the secondary analogates if the denomination is intrinsic, that is, if the name genuinely signifies a property inherent in all the analogates. Where you have several things denominated intrinsically the Cajetanian will insist you either have univocity or an analogy of proper proportionality but not an analogy of attribution. He will admit, however, that where one of the things (let us call it x) which is denominated extrinsically is in some way responsible for the possession by the other things of the property signified by the common name, there you have the basis for a virtual analogy of attribution, for you can conceive of these other things not insofar as they possess the property signified by the common name, but merely insofar as they are related to x and, in this case, the name common to them and x, as predicated of them simply means related-in-some-way-to-x. This, of course, is not to admit that what we have here is an analogy of intrinsic attribution, but simply that there are cases where the same ontological situation can be the basis for an analogy of proper proportionality (or univocal predication, as we shall see) and also the basis for a virtual analogy of attribution.  

12 For a more detailed discussion of this, see, for example, James F. Anderson's The Bond of Being (St. Louis and London: B. Herder Book Co.; 1949), p. 235-240.
There is a further difficulty to be encountered in the so-called analogy of intrinsic attribution. Given that a name so analogous signifies a property intrinsic to all the analogates, and what is it that prevents such a name from being purely univocal insofar as it denominates intrinsically those things of which it is predicated? For example, when a man and a lion are intrinsically denominated "animal" few will deny that this is a clear example of univocity, for in this case, the name "animal" designates a property or set of properties (being alive, capable of sensation etc.) which both lions and men formally possess. Admittedly among those things which receive a common name by analogy of intrinsic attribution there is a certain order or proportion but this in itself is not enough to avoid univocity. For example, we call John Brown and his parents "human"; his parents are the cause of John Brown and he is related to them as a product, an effect, but "human" as predicated of John Brown and his parents does not cease to be univocal for all that. Of course, those who uphold analogy of intrinsic attribution would not for a moment deny this, for they would insist that a name analogous by this kind of analogy is predicated primarily and most properly of only one of the analogates (the primary analogate) in which the property signified by the analogous name is to be found "in a higher way" (e.g. "being" is predicated primarily of substance, only secondarily of accident; "goodness" is predicated primarily of creatures only secondarily of God). But what exactly is
meant here? Is it meant that the analogous name signifies exactly the same property when predicated of primary and secondary analogates, the only difference being that the primary analogate possesses the property more perfectly, much as when two men have the ability to recall something, but one of them can do so at greater speed and in greater depth than the other, we say his is the better or more perfect memory? But although everyone admits there is a difference between a good memory and a bad one, no one has ever suggested this makes memory an analogous term.\(^{13}\) We can then conclude that it is not this kind of thing which is meant when it is asserted that the primary analogate possesses the property signified by the analogous name "in a higher way". It will be found, we think, that this can only be explained, without at the same time lapsing into univocity, by a reference to analogy of proper proportionality. Here, as we have seen, "it is not the case that exactly the same property is signified by the

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\(^{13}\) Interesting in this regard is the remark of Aquinas in the *De Malo* (24, 5), that "all animals are equally animals but yet are not equal animals. Rather one animal is greater and more perfect than another." Of course, "animal" is clearly a generic term whereas "memory" would not normally be considered as such. Some have argued that all generic terms are analogous because of the unequal way in which different members of a genus realize the properties signified by the generic term; however, there is hardly sufficient evidence in Aquinas to merit this interpretation and furthermore, if it is admitted that all generic terms are analogical terms the next step might well be to deny that any term (even a specific one) is univocal, for on the same reasoning could it not be argued that all men are equally men yet not equal men; rather one man is greater and more perfect than another (and so too with memory)?
analogous name which intrinsically denominates all the analogates, rather we have to deal with a property which is only proportionally the same in the various analogates. In this kind of analogy, moreover, we have a likeness or similarity of the proportions rather than a case of things directly related or proportioned to each other. Now if we are correct in affirming that in every case where two or more things are intrinsically denominated univocity can only be avoided if there is an analogy of proper proportionality (formally based on a similarity of two -- or more -- proportions, not on a relationship of one thing to another or many things to one) this must further confirm our suspicion of the so-called analogy of intrinsic attribution. But to return to the demand that in any analogy one of the analogates must possess the perfection signified by the analogous name "in a higher way" can we understand this any better in the light of proper proportionality? In a sense we can, for it is of the essence of this kind of analogy that there be inequality in the way the different analogates possess the perfection signified by the analogous name; it is this very inequality after all which leads to the assertion that the common perfection is only proportionally similar in the different analogates. For example, "vision" as said of corporeal sight and of intellectual understanding does not signify a common property in the way that "memory" as said of a man with a good memory and a man with a bad memory does, for the "vision" attributed to the eyes and the intellect has a different mean-
ing in each case (yet there is proportional similarity, for
as things are made present to us in their sensible reality
through the eyes, so they are made present to us in their
intelligible reality through the intellect) whereas
"memory" has precisely the same meaning in both instances
of its prediction. Likewise in the case of the substance-
accident example, what really prevents univocity when both
substance and accident are intrinsically denominated "being"
in the proportionality "as substance exists in a manner is
proper to its nature, so accident exists in a manner proper
to its nature", the differences of substance and accident
determining two very different modes of being which are
only proportionally similar. It is this kind of inequality,
then, which is the foundation of analogy of proper
proportionally (and, therefore, of any analogy where all the
analogates are denominated intrinsically) and this kind of
inequality which gives rise to the fact that what is
signified by the analogous name is found "in a higher way"
in one of the analogates (the primary analogate). 14

14 Difficulties of course, remain. For instance is
vision found "in a higher way" in the eye or in the intellect?
On the one hand, it might seem that it is the intellect which
possesses it in a higher way, since the act of the intellect
when it understands is more penetrating and comprehensive than
the act of the eye when it sees. On the other hand, it does
seem that "vision" is more properly said of the eye and by
extension of the intellect. In other words, there seems to
be a difficulty in specifying the primary analogate in this
case. (There is the same trouble in the case of names
predicated of God.) In Chapter three it will be argued that
there is a basic defect in Cajetan's whole conception of
analogy, which inevitably gives rise to difficulties such as this.
Thus far we have outlined the Cajetanian objection which calls into question the possibility of any analogy where all the analogates are intrinsically denominated which is not an analogy of proper proportionality, and claims that the attempt to posit an analogy of attribution where all the analogates are intrinsically denominated rests on a confusion, the confusion between analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionality. We have further seen how it can be claimed that in any analogy of proper proportionality, there is such an inequality that one of the analogates (the primary analogate) can be understood as possessing the property signified by the analogous name "in a higher way" than do the others, a condition which is clearly demanded in the Summa Theologiae. Now since it is an important part of our inquiry to discover whether Cajetan is really interpreting Aquinas correctly, we should ask whether, in the passages quoted earlier in this chapter, Aquinas has in mind analogy of proper proportionality and not analogy of intrinsic attribution (which seemed, at first, so natural an interpretation). In one of these passages it is stated categorically that "in the case of all names which are predicated analogously of several things it is necessary that all be predicated with respect to one, and that therefore one be placed in the definition of all." Now it is obvious that it is far easier to reconcile this statement with analogy of attribution than with analogy of proper proportionality.
Indeed, Aquinas explicitly distinguishes between analogy of proportion (attribution) and analogy of proper proportionality in the *De Veritate* text (quoted on page thirteen) by insisting that in proper proportionality there is no direct proportion or relation between the analogates and in the answer to *Objection two of the same article* he explicitly rejects that in this kind of analogy "one be placed in the definition of all", which surely forbids us from identifying the kind of analogy defined in the *Summa Theologicae* with analogy of proper proportionality. There is one commentator, however, Sylvester of Ferrara, who, accepting the basic validity of Cajetan's classification of analogy, valiantly attempts to demonstrate that every analogy (whether it be one of attribution or proper proportionality) involves a reference of one analogate to another and thus the placing of the primary analogate in the definition of the secondary analogates insofar as these are signified by the analogous name. Moreover, he contends that this represents a faithful interpretation of Aquinas and that the apparently contradictory *De Veritate* and *Summa Theologicae* texts can be reconciled.\(^{15}\) He

argues that in the former Aquinas is merely rejecting the view that a name which is predicated absolutely of a creature (as, for example, when a man is said to be wise without any reference to God or divine wisdom as the source and origin of human wisdom) can be predicated of God in such a way that divine wisdom is defined in terms of (and to that extent, limited by) human wisdom. In this sense there can be no proportion or relation between God and creature for between them there is infinite distance and since God is in no way limited by the finite, he cannot be defined in terms of it. This is what is meant by the denial of the applicability of analogy of proportion to the predication of the divine names in the De Veritate. Analogy of proper proportionality, on the other hand, seems eminently suitable in helping us to avoid the error of seeing God as in some way limited by the finite, for in this kind of analogy there is no explicit reference to a relation or proportion between the analogates -- but this is not to deny that in every analogy (including analogy of proper proportionality) there is such a relation. Indeed, in the God-creature analogy we are discussing, there is obviously some kind of a relation between God and creature and it is such that the creature is the imperfect imitation of its most perfect source, in whom all the perfections and properties of the creature pre-exist in a higher way. Seen from this point of view God is the prime analogate in
any analogy involving him and creatures. As we noted earlier the problem of predicating names of God is complicated by the fact that although he is prior or first is the real order, he is certainly not that which is first known by us, that is, first is the order of knowledge. He is only known and named second-hand, as it were, from creatures. Following Aquinas, Sylvester wants to make clear that although it is only in terms of our knowledge of creatures we can talk or think about God, this is, in fact, the reverse of the real order: although the meaning of our words used to describe God inevitably includes a reference to what we know best, namely creatures, in reality, since creatures derive everything they have, including their very existence, from God, it is they who are completely dependent on him and to be defined by reference to him, not the other way around.

There is no doubt that in his textual analysis Sylvester displays considerable ingenuity in attempting to reconcile the following assertions: (a) analogy of proportion involves a reference (or proportion or relation) of one thing to another, such that the definition of the analogous name as predicated of the secondary analogates necessarily includes a reference to the primary analogate, whereas in analogy of proper proportionality there is not a proportion of one to another (and, hence, one is not placed in the definition of another) but rather a similarity between two proportions
(De Veritate); (b) every analogy involves a reference of one thing to another such that the definition of the analogous name as predicated of the secondary analogates necessarily includes a reference to the primary analogate (Summa Theologiae). Now, however successful Sylvester may be in exhibiting certain features attaching to the predication of any name of God, it is difficult to see how one could agree that every analogy of proper proportionality can be an analogy of proportion, without running into the same basic confusion which the Cajetanian points to in the so-called analogy of intrinsic attribution. The question here is how can an analogy which is based on a similarity of proportions be identified with an analogy which is based on a direct relation or proportion between the analogates? Perhaps one might have the basis here for two different types of analogical predication, but the important point seems to be that if there is such a basis it will be the basis for two quite different kinds of analogy, each having its own formal structure and properties as indicated in the De Veritate. If this is the case we find ourselves having to reject both analogy of intrinsic attribution and Sylvester's claim that analogy of proper proportionality is a kind of analogy of proportion (attribution) and having to accept Cajetan's classification of analogy as the most satisfactory of the alternatives yet encountered. However is Cajetan's account of analogy really satisfactory?
Hardly insofar as it claims to be an interpretation of Aquinas, for the threefold classification of The Analogy of Names, as we have seen, nowhere appears in the Summa Contra Gentiles or in the Summa Theologiae which would be unthinkable if it really expressed the essence of Aquinas' thought on the subject.

Conclusion

We began this chapter by examining Cajetan's qualification of his demand that in analogy of attribution only the primary analogate formally possesses the property signified by the analogous name. We then attempted to understand more fully the business of intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. This, together with our reflection on certain texts on analogy to be found in the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Summa Theologiae, brought us to examine the contention that Cajetan fails to account for a very important division of analogy, analogy of intrinsic attribution. We then saw the Cajetanian response to this objection. Next we examined the view of Sylvester of Ferrara, who claims that in every analogy, even analogy of proper proportionality, there is a reference of secondary analogates to primary analogate, such that the primary analogate must be included in the definition of the secondary analogates. However, from the Cajetanian standpoint this would seem to involve the same sort of confusion that is found in the so-
called analogy of attribution. At this stage the two-fold division of Cajetan would seem to emerge rather well. However, our analysis has made us realize more than ever that it certainly does not seem to be (as it claims to be) an adequate interpretation of Aquinas, who, as he proceeded to lay more and more stress on analogy of proportion, ceased to talk about analogy of proper proportionality.
CHAPTER THREE

A New Approach to the Problem

Cajetan's Mistake

We now turn our attention to a rather different approach to the whole question of analogy, an approach developed by Ralph McInerny in The Logic of Analogy. With regard to Cajetan's analogy of attribution, firstly, McInerny contends that Cajetan's first condition is irrelevant and secondly, that the second and third condition stipulated by Cajetan should not be restricted to analogy of attribution alone but are the necessary conditions of analogy as such. It will be remembered that these conditions are, respectively, that "the one which is the term of the diverse relationships in analogous names of this type is one not merely in concept but numerically" and "the primary analogate is put into the definition of the others with respect to the analogous name". McInerny draws our attention to something Aquinas clearly lays down in the Summa Theologiae, namely, that "whatever is said analogically of many things is found according to its ratio propria in only one of them

1 See above p. 27-28.
from which the others are denominated".\(^2\) This dictum is a universal statement about all analogous names and meant to be taken as such. But Cajetan will not admit this. Why? The reason is fairly simple. He thinks that to say that in the case of analogous names, the \(\text{ratio propria}\) is saved in only one of the things to which the name is common is the same as to deny that there is something intrinsic to the secondary analogates in virtue of which they receive the analogous name. Understanding the dictum in the Summa Theologiae thus, he cannot, of course, accept that it is true of every class of analogous name, although it might appear to be the distinguishing mark of analogy of attribution, as he understands it.\(^3\) In other words he interprets the condition that "whatever is said analogically

\(^2\)\textit{Summa Theologiae}, Ia, q. 16, a. 6. The term \(\text{ratio propria}\) is not an easy one to translate. We could think of the \(\text{ratio propria}\) of a term as its proper or primary meaning (For a discussion of the meaning of "ratio" in this context see \textit{The Logic of Analogy}, p. 61-64). Further discussion on the \(\text{ratio propria}\) of a term will be found in this chapter.

\(^3\)In point of fact there are certain properties intrinsic to medicine, wine etc. in virtue of which they are called "healthy" but it is not these properties which the name "healthy" primarily signifies. For the medievals the term primarily signifies health, or the correct balance or proportion of humours, in an organic body.
of many things is found according to its ratio propria in
only one of them" as laying down that only one of the
analogates is denominated intrinsically, whereas the others
are denominated extrinsically. This confusion McInerny
sees as a basic and fundamental one casting doubt on
Cajetan's whole classification, for what Cajetan fails to
realize is that the analogy of names is a purely logical
question, having nothing to do with intrinsic or extrinsic
denomination as such but rather with inequality on the part
of the signification of the common name.

When things are named purely equivocally they
have a common name, but that is all they have in common,
for as soon as we go beyond the name to the notions
signified by it there is total diversity. In the case of
things named analogically on the other hand, there is not
total diversity for such a name involves an order among
the notions signified. There is diversity because the name
signifies different proportions (or relations or references)
and there is unity because the proportions or relations
are to some one thing. McInerny wishes to emphasize, of
course, that the question of analogy does not arise in
discussing things as they exist but only insofar as
they are known and named: just as univocity and equivocation
are clearly logical matters, so too with analogy. Now, when
it is claimed that in the case of the analogous name,
the multiple signification of such a name can be reduced to
a certain unity, does this mean that we are reducing analogy
to univocity? The answer is no, for when things are named univocally the common name imposed on them signifies the name ratio (notion) in each case. Here the common name is said properly i.e. according to its ratio propria of each of the things of which it is predicated. Things named univocally may be said to participate equally in the notion signified by the common name; for example, "animal" signifies a living sentient being and all animals, dogs, lions, men etc. realize this notion equally i.e. they are all equally animals. 4 Where there is univocity the common name is predicated properly of all the things to which it is applied. (This makes McCherny very suspicious of Cajetan's formulation of analogy of proper proportionality where it seems it is just this that Cajetan has in mind, but if such is the case and in this kind of analogy -- as distinct from attribution -- the analogous name is predicated properly of each of the analogates, what is to distinguish such a name from a univocal name?) Where things are named analogically the notion signified by the name cannot be said to be shared equally by all the things which receive the name. Only one of the analogates is signified

4 But see p. 57, footnote no. 13.
perfectly by the name. The others are signified imperfectly and in a certain respect, that is, insofar as they refer in some way to what is perfectly signified. Thus there is an order in the multiple signification of the analogous name. This throws light on the stipulation that the one to which the secondary analogates refer is "one not merely in concept but numerically."

By this we are to understand that among things named analogically one of the things is primarily signified by the analogous name (and this thing that is signified is the prime analogate) and the others are signified insofar as they refer to this one thing. To cite once again the "healthy" example, what is primarily signified by the term "healthy" is the animal which possesses health; the animal is the prime analogate because the primary meaning of "healthy" (that is, the ratio propria of the term) is "possessing health" and only the animal, properly speaking, actually possesses health and not medicine or urine etc. which because of their relation to the health of the animal are also called healthy, but in a secondary sense. These secondary analogates then are called healthy because of their relation to the primary analogate, which is numerically distinct from them and the unity of the analogous name is based on this relation. The unity of the univocal name, on the other hand, is solely due to reason. When a man and a horse are both described as animals, what is properly signified by the term "animal"
is not something numerically distinct from the man and the horse; both the man and the horse are animals in the proper sense of the term and we will not find something primarily signified by "animal" which is numerically distinct from the man or the horse in the way in which a healthy animal is numerically distinct from healthy medicine and healthy urine. The notion of animal as something distinct from men and horses and other animals is something the mind abstracts from particular animals, but what is contained in such a notion is not something really distinct from particular animals. It is in this sense that the unity of a univocal name such as "animal" is said to be due to reason alone, i.e. it is a conceptual not a numerical unity.

Where things are named analogically, then, the one which is principally signified is not an aspect of the secondary analogates separable from them only by the operation of reason. This is so because only one of the things named saves the ratio propria, the name being given to the others precisely because of their relation to this primary analogate (thus, of course, necessitating that the definition of the name when applied to the secondary analogates involves a reference to the primary analogate).  

5 See above p. 28 and p. 48.
That the analogous name signifies one thing primarily is shown by the fact that if the name is used simply, it will then be taken to signify that thing. What is named principally by the analogous name is that which perfectly saves the ratio propria of the name, whereas the secondary analogates do this only imperfectly that is, with reference to what saves it perfectly. There is no question of such an inequality among things named univocally. That is why we must never confuse the ratio communis of an analogous name with the ratio communis of a univocal name. It is the inequality among things as named by it which makes the analogous name analogous; only one thing is named principally and properly, the others by reference to this one thing. As such analogy does not entail any determinate ontological conditions, such as the condition that the primary analogate formally and intrinsically possess the property signified by the analogous name. Indeed, this is sometimes the case, as in the "healthy" example, as it is also sometimes the case that both analogates are intrinsically denominated as in the substance-accident example. It can also happen though that there is an analogy where none of the analogates are intrinsically denominated (a situation which Cajetan's classification would not seem to recognize) as when we say that an angel on some other immaterial being or force is in place. Properly speaking, of course, only bodies or material objects or forces can be
said to be in place although by analogy this can be said of the immaterial. The point is that in this example both the primary and secondary analogates are extrinsically denominated (for "to be in place" whether said of the material in the immaterial -- is an extrinsic denomination on Cajetan's own admission).

We have then, briefly indicated McInerny's alternative to Cajetan's understanding of analogy. However, it will be necessary to examine in greater detail certain aspects of this theory to see if it offers us a more adequate understanding of analogy itself than does Cajetan's approach, whether it can meet the objections of its opponents and whether it offers us an acceptable interpretation of Aquinas. First of all we shall focus our attention on the important matter of the ratio communis.

**Modes of Signification**

and

**the Ratio Communis of Analogous Names**

The terms **ratio propria** and **ratio communis** must be clarified for they hold the key to an adequate understanding of analogy. But in order to do this we must see how
terms come to signify things and the ways in which they can signify things, and this involves a discussion of the res significata -- modus significandi (thing signified -- mode of signification) distinction. We have already mentioned that for Aquinas words or names (written or spoken) only signify extramental things or properties of things via concepts or ideas and in order to understand this dictum we have only to consider that words or names are not natural properties of things -- a name is only given to something insofar as the mind has formed a concept of that thing and so what the name directly signifies is not the thing itself but that thing insofar as it is known to us, that is, all our words or names directly signify our concepts of things, only indirectly the things themselves. Hence the insistence that we name things as we know them. Furthermore, what is most easily and first known by us is not necessarily what is most fundamental and "first" in reality. In fact, what is most easily known by us is always that which we apprehend directly in sense experience; although the object of understanding, the intelligible, is to be distinguished from the object of sense, the sensible, nonetheless the intellect can only grasp the intelligible in and through the sensible (hence the necessity to use concrete examples, diagrams and illustrations when trying to convey an idea). From this it follows that even when we are thinking about something which is in no way sensible or material
our concept of this immaterial object will necessarily be
drawn from our understanding of material objects, and to that
extent, of course, will inevitably be imperfect. Now, names
signify things as they are known and not immediately as they
exist, and in material things, which are, as it were, the
natural object of our knowledge, a distinction can be
made between a property and the one which has the property,
and because this is the case one and the same property or
form can be signified either abstractly (considered as it
is in itself) or concretely (considered as it subsists or
exists in a subject). This gives rise to a division in
modes of signification. To use a common example, "humanity"
signifies human nature abstractly, not as something which
subsists but as that by which a man is a man, whereas "man"
signifies the same human nature concretely, as that which
has the humanity, a subsistent being to be encountered in
the existent world. This example of different modes of
signifying the same thing is of particular interest when
we turn our attention to language about God. All the terms
of human language which signify properties or sets of
properties either signify these properties abstractly
(humanity, goodness, whiteness etc.) or concretely (man, good,
white etc.) and when they signify them concretely they
signify them as inhering in or subsisting in a subject.
But neither mode of signification is really applicable when
we predicate names of God. To say that "God is goodness"
does not seem to make much sense, for we do not mean to say that God is good in the abstract, a sort of Platonic form pertaining to the realm of essence and not to the realm of being, and it seems equally unsatisfactory to say that "God is good", for here "good" signifies a property subsisting in a subject, whereas in God there is no composition, no distinction between subject and properties (a conclusion which directly follows from the definition of God as Pure Act, since, according to Aquinas, whatever admits of division in any way to that extent admits of potency). However our concern here is with the fact that the same property can be signified in different ways and it is suggested that herein lies the clue to the understanding of the nature of analogy. Let us look again at the complexity of meaning in a term such as "healthy". In each instance of its use the same property (health) is signified but the way in which this property is signified differs in each case. For example, "healthy" may signify a subject of health, a cause of health or a sign of health. For this reason "healthy" is not a univocal term. If it were a univocal term it would signify the same property in the same way in every instance of its use -- where univocal terms are concerned we do not have different modes of signification. We are now in a position to explain a little more precisely the distinctions between the ratio propria and the ratio communis of analogous terms.
In analogous naming where you have the same name or term signifying in different ways a property or set of properties (the res significata) one of the modes of signifying will be primary and enter into an explanation of the other ways of signifying the res. In the "healthy" example the primary meaning of the term is "subject of health"; this is the primary mode of signification and the other meanings of the term will all have a reference to this primary meaning; "healthy" as signifying cause of health signifies something as cause of health in a healthy subject, "healthy" as signifying sign of health signifies something as sign of health in a healthy subject.

The ratio propria of a term, then, is its primary meaning and this primary meaning will enter into an explanation of any of the secondary meanings of the term. In the case of the univocal name there is no such distinction between the primary and secondary meanings of the name. The ratio propria of such a name is identical with the ratio communis.

But what about the ratio communis of analogous names? If analogous terms had no ratio communis, no common element of meaning, they would simply be equivocal. But there is a ratio communis precisely because the secondary meanings of an analogous name all have a reference to the primary meaning. Since this is the case there will always be priority and posteriority where the signification of an analogous name is concerned. There will be no such
inequality in the signification of the univocal name.

Hence the warning never to confuse the ratio communis of the analogous name with the ratio communis of the univocal name.

Not everyone, however, finds this understanding of analogy satisfactory. For instance Dr. John E. Thomas claims that "far from elucidating the ratio communis of the analogous name, McInerny's presentation either leaves us with the problem unsolved, i.e. with vague talk of 'unity of order, secundum prius et posterius' and 'extension of meaning' or else leads us to a fresh crop of difficulties arising out of the claim that 'analogy is analogous'."6

Briefly summarized, his misgivings amount to this: given that every analogous name has a ratio communis, how can that common core of meaning be specified without an ultimate reduction of analogy to univocity? (It is interesting that Dr. Thomas considers McInerny's use of the "healthy" example "could be misleading since it sets the readers mind thinking about analogy of attribution which is based on univocity" -- presumably because it signifies different relations to what is signified by the univocal term "health", but more about

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If one tries to avoid postulating any identity of meaning among the different significations of the analogous name -- and Dr. Thomas obviously feels that wherever one finds any identity of meaning univocity is unavoidable\(^7\) -- one could fall back on the claim that the several meanings of an analogous term are not identical in any respect but simply analogous which Dr. Thomas sees as implied by the dictum "analogy is analogous". But when he analyses this dictum he finds that, so interpreted, it gives rise to an infinite regress.\(^9\) One can entirely

\(^7\)An example used by Dr. Thomas to illustrate this difficulty is the description of communism as a religion. Obviously the term "religion" is given a new signification when used in this way, yet it is not being employed in an altogether novel sense. Thus it seems to function as an analogous term. In answer to the question "Is communism a religion?" Dr. Thomas points out, "an affirmative answer involves citing certain similarities between the two and these can be found; communism resembles religion in exhibiting certain qualities of devotion, fanatical zeal, loyalty, the submergence of the self in a common cause, missionary zeal and so on. So far so good. But the . . . question . . . would now be: 'Are the terms 'fanatical zeal' and 'submergence of the self' (to pick a couple of terms at random) univocal, equivocal or analogical?'

Of course whichever alternative one picks it seems one will be in difficulty. The terms signifying the common elements of meaning can hardly be equivocal. Yet if they are univocal then the analogical term "religion" can be reduced to a set of univocal terms. If they are said to be analogical still another difficulty arises.

\(^8\)Two very interesting articles on this particular puzzle are J. D. Thomas' "On the Meaning of 'analogy is analogical'", Laval Theologique et Philosophique, XXII (1966), p. 74-79 and Ralph McInerny's "'Analogy' is analogous", Laval Theologique et Philosophique, XXII (1966) p. 80-88.
agree with him that where analogous terms are concerned "the 
extension of meaning and the problem of the ratio communis 
stand or fall together" and in questioning whether identity 
of meaning (providing the basis for univocal predication) 
can ultimately be avoided among the different significations 
of the analogous name he certainly brings us to the heart of 
the problem. But let us examine the following passages 
from The Logic of Analogy:

"The analogous name is first of all 
univocal, having like any name its ratio 
propria. So long as the proper notion is 
all it has, it can only be used 
metaphorically of things which do not 
save the proper notion. It is only when 
its signification is extended, when it 
receives a ratio communis, that it becomes 
analogous. For example, "healthy" first 
of all signifies what has a proper proportion 
among its humors, and only animals save 
this notion; anything else is called 
healthy metaphorically. However, when 
usage sanctions the extension of meaning 
of the term, urine, food and medicine can 
be called healthy properly, if less so than 
animal. The extension of meaning whereby 
a univocal term becomes analogous does not 
eradicate its ratio propria, however; as 
we have seen its extended meanings involve 
reference to what saves its ratio propria."

"Does a ratio communis entail univocity? 
Does the common notion 'principle of 
manifestation' make 'light' univocally 
common to spiritual and corporeal things?

Well, does the *ratio communis entis* make 'being' univocally common to substance and accident? Cajetan has referred us to the definition of univocal terms. Things are named univocally which have a common name signifying exactly the same notion as said of each of them. It is true that both the univocal and the analogous name have a *ratio communis*; the difference lies in the way the notion is common. The analogous name has a proper notion as well as a common notion which is why, if the meaning of the name is sought, the answer will most likely be the proper notion. Moreover, if the word is used, it is going to be taken to mean only the proper notion unless some indication to the contrary is given. In the univocal name there is no such distinction between a proper and common notion; the two are identical because it is not predicated per prius et posterius. That is why the proper notion is said to be saved by each of the things of which the univocal name is said. However although the analogous name has a common as well as a proper notion, the latter is saved in only one of the things of which the name is said. The other things save the *ratio communis* in such a way that when we explain what the term means, the proper notion enters into their notion. Thus the proper notion is "that which has health" and this is verified only in the animal. When urine is called healthy, it is denominated from health, not directly but with reference to the animal. This is what is meant when it is said that the analogous name is divided by diverse modes and not by formal differences.  

The first passage cited indicates how a name that is originally univocal (and every name is originally univocal) comes to be analogous. Its original meaning (the ratio

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propria) is extended through usage so that it comes to have in addition to this original meaning other related meanings. Where usage has not sanctioned this extension of meaning, the name can only be used metaphorically of things which do not save the ratio propria. (In the case of the equivocal name, the same name, through usage, is given two or more unrelated meanings. Here, there is no question of analogy.) Of course, a difficulty immediately springs to mind -- is it really the case that with every analogous name, the original meaning of the name is always its ratio propria (as McInerney seems to accept)? The answer is, surely, not necessarily. The extended meaning of a term which is originally univocal may in time become the ratio propria of the term and in that case, the original meaning of the term might only be intelligible when explained in terms of the derived (and now standard) meaning. It is very often the case of course, that the original meaning of a term has faded completely into the background and ceases to bear any relation to the meaning of the term as now used, but this simply means that the term has ceased to be analogous and is now equivocal.\footnote{For some remarks on the problem see Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology, p. 53-57.} It is important to remember that names only acquire their meanings through usage and thus names which were once analogical become equivocal, as soon as the
analogical name ceases to have one primary meaning which enters into the explanation of the other meanings. Language is not something static. Today, especially with the growth of the particular sciences, words are often employed in quite different senses to those which they had a short while before, and the constant (and often subtle) shifts of meaning do not permit us in many cases to specify with precision whether a word is analogous or simply equivocal (again, the same word as used by one group of people may be equivocal, as used by another it may be analogous.) But this should not deter us from deciding what we mean by "equivocal" and "analogous" and from examining certain words that interest us to determine into which category these words do in fact fall.

It is interesting in the respect to examine McInerny's exposition of what St. Thomas means by "analogy" and more particularly by the dictum that "'analogy' is analogous" (especially since we have mentioned Dr. Thomas' difficulty with this dictum). The Latin word *proportio* is a synonym for "analogy" and its original meaning (and *ratio propria*) is "a determinate relation between quantities". Its meaning is then extended to signify "any relation between things", of which the relation between God and creature is one example and of which "the relation between several meanings of a common term where all the meanings are ways of
signifying the same *res significata* and one way of signifying the *res* is privileged because it enters into the explication of the others.\textsuperscript{12} is another example. The term "analogy" then, is analogous because it itself has a number of different meanings, one of which is privileged ("a determinate relation between quantities") and enters into an explanation of the other meanings. (This involves maintaining, of course, that the rule which applies to terms other than "analogy", in virtue of which they are all analogous, also applies to the term "analogy" itself.) However, one might raise a number of objections here. One might, for instance, question whether the *ratio propria* of the English term "analogy" is, in fact, "a determinate relation between quantities" for, unlike the moderns, we do not usually think of "analogy" as synonymous with "proportion". But since Aquinas was certainly not faced with this difficulty, let us leave it for a more serious and fundamental objection that could be made, an objection concerning the *ratio communis*. In the example of "analogy" the *ratio communis* is seen to be "any relation between things". This is the common core of meaning

\textsuperscript{12} McInerny, "'Analogy' is analogous", *Laval Theologique et Philosophique*, p. 88.
to be found among the different meanings of the term "analogy", but if "analogy", in all its different uses, means "any relation between things" surely this implies that it is, in fact either a univocal term or at least ultimately definable in univocal terms. Does it not seem, then, that ultimately the ratio communis of analogous names gives rise to univocity? McInerny's reply to this question has been cited on p. 82. This reply cannot, unfortunately, satisfy Dr. Thomas because he seems to think that if we are to avoid reducing analogy to univocity, we must be able to explain the ratio communis of analogous names without ever using univocal terms in our explanation, and this seems, in practice and in principle, impossible. 13 Cajetan, when discussing the abstraction of the analogous concept in analogy of attribution also displays a similar malaise:

"For it is not true that healthy signifies what I call 'pertaining or related in some way to health'. First of all because if this were the case, the name 'healthy' would really be univocal with respect to urine, animal, etc., as is evident from the definition of univocal terms. Secondly, because it is against the intention of

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13 It should be noted that Dr. Thomas himself is not averse to admitting that analogous terms have a common univocal core of meaning. What he correctly points out is that where religious language is concerned, this has implications which some Scholastics (including Aquinas) could not accept since they contend that nothing can be said univocally of God and creature.
those who call wine or a diet healthy. If anyone inquires what wine is insofar as it is healthy, the answer is not "something having a relation to health", but everyone specifies the relationship and says "a sign of health". Likewise, the answer with respect to a diet is that it is preservative of health, etc. Thirdly, because it is contrary to all philosophers and logicians, at least those I have consulted thus far.¹⁴

In one way he wants to reject analogy of attribution in favour of analogy of proper proportionality (the "truer" kind of analogy), but in another way he wants to maintain that it really is a type of analogy (even if an imperfect type) and to do this he thinks he must deny that "healthy" has a ratio communis ("pertaining or related in some way to health"). Now, if the ratio communis were all that was signified by "healthy" and if this name had no ratio propria, then, indeed, it would be univocal, but the fact that one of its meanings is privileged and enters into an explanation of the others, causes it to be not an univocal but an analogical name. Of course, if you simply consider the ratio communis of the name, then, under this aspect it is an univocal name, but as Cajetan seems to be pointing out in the above passage the ratio communis certainly does not exhaust the meaning of the analogous name: indeed, it is only an aspect of the name's meaning. What particularly bothers

¹⁴Cajetan, The Analogy of Names, Chapter five, paragraph fifty-two, p. 40.
Dr. Thomas is the problem which arises when we consider names predicated of God, for here many theists will maintain that nothing can be said univocally of God and creatures. For example, if "wise" is predicated of God and John Brown and the ratio communis of the term is specified, it must be specified in either univocal or analogous terms. But it cannot be expressed in univocal terms because nothing is univocally common to God and creatures. If it is expressed in analogous terms, then the ratio communis of these terms must be specified in univocal or analogous terms and so on, ad infinitum. Is there any escape from this dilemma? Both Aquinas and McInerny see the difficulty and the latter remarks that "In any absolute reduction of names, St. Thomas suggests, we are going to get back to 'being' which is analogically common." Although in the case of creatures, "it is always possible to have a name which is univocally common to them, if only in terms of a logical genus", such an ultimate reduction to univocity is impossible where names predicated of God are concerned, for when we come down to the most comprehensive name of all, "being", this cannot be predicated univocally of God and creatures, for when predicated of God, we have to deny the mode of signification this term has when predicated of creatures, for in God being

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and essence are one, as can never be the case where creatures are concerned. Indeed, this is true of any name predicated analogically of God; the mode of signification attaching to the name as it is used in ordinary language must be denied when the same name is used in religious language. The term as used in ordinary language will be univocal; it will signify a definite property in a definite way. As used in religious language, it will signify the same property, but in an altogether different way. The ratio communis of the name will be expressible in univocal terms, but this does not destroy the fact that the analogous name as predicated of God can only be predicated of him by denying the modus significandi attaching to the name as it is predicated of creatures. In a sense, this is true of every analogous name -- as predicated of the primary analogate it signifies a certain property in a certain way, as predicated of the secondary analogates the same name signifies the same property in different ways. This is the foundation of the complexity of meaning in the analogous name. That the ratio communis is expressible in univocal terms does not destroy analogy precisely because the name has a privileged meaning which enters into an explanation of the other meanings. Were this not the case the analogous term would indeed be univocal.
We have examined in some detail McInerny's concept of analogy. In answer to the question "how many kinds of analogous names are there?" he replies that there are only two possible logical divisions of analogous naming and these are respectively the "one to another" and the "many to one" divisions.

"It can happen that what a name properly signifies is not one of the things which are said to be named analogically. For example, if wine and food are said to be healthy, they receive the common name because of their reference to a third thing, to that which "healthy" signifies _per primum_ and most properly. So too, quality and relation are named being because of their proportions to what that term signifies _per primum_ and most properly, namely, substance. This type of analogy is called that of several to one (multorum ad unum). Sometimes, on the other hand, two things receive a common name because one has a proportion to the other. For example, when food and animal are said to be healthy, this is because food has a proportion to the health of the animal. Animal, of course is not called healthy with reference to some other thing. So too then substance and quantity are named being; quantity has a proportion to substance. This type of analogy is called that of one thing to another (_unius ad alterum_)."
This, of course, is a denial of the Cajetanian division of analogous names where intrinsic and extrinsic denomination have an important role to play. But what might seem more puzzling is how McInerny can reconcile his interpretation of analogy with such texts of Aquinas as De Veritate 2, 11, Commentary on the Sentences, 19, 5, 2, ad 1 and Commentary on the Ethics, 1, 7, 95. In all of these texts there seems to be a solid foundation for making a clear distinction between at least two basic categories of analogy, namely, analogy of proportion and analogy of proportionality. The fact that Aquinas ceases to distinguish between proportion and proportionality in the later works would seem to indicate that he has changed his mind but what McInerny wishes to argue is that his (McInerny's) interpretation is equally valid when we consider the earlier texts as when we consider the later ones. In other words, he would have us believe that Aquinas did not change his mind and that his doctrine of analogy is perfectly consistent throughout. We do not intend to set out McInerny's extremely detailed and interesting analyses of these texts which appear to support Cajetan's interpretation.

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17 See above p. 17-18 for De Veritate 2, 14 text and p. 34-35 ff. for Commentary on the Sentences 19, 5, 2 ad 1. See The Logic of Analogy p. 94-95 for the Commentary on the Ethics 1, 7, 95 text and McInerny's commentary. Indeed Chapter six of McInerny's book is devoted to a thorough analysis of these and other texts.
rather than his own, but let us see how he handles one such text, *De Veritate* 2. 11 text which we have already had reason to discuss. In this text Aquinas asks whether "knowledge" (or "science") is predicated univocally of god and creatures. He concludes that this cannot be the case; rather the term "knowledge" as predicated of God is predicated of him analogically, that is, according to a proportion. He then goes on to suggest that agreement according to proportion can be of two kinds; there may be a certain agreement between things having a proportion to each other because they have a determinate distance between them or they may be a likeness of two proportions and, here, there is no determinate distance between the things so named. The latter is the case when "knowledge" is predicated of God.

McInerny comments:

"In the *Summa Theologiae*, St. Thomas spoke of names common to God and creature in terms of a proportion of one to another. Is he denying this in the text before us? This conclusion has sometimes been drawn and it leads in turn to a strange issue. We might be told in the present case, for example, that the analogous word 'science' means that 'as our science is to our intellect, so is God's to his'. To this may be added: '... only proportionally,' a curious

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18 Almost one quarter of *The Logic of Analogy* is taken up with the *Commentary on the Sentences* text alone!
addendum to the statement of the similarity of proportions. Now this does not seem to be a particularly enlightening statement, anymore than 'as sight is to the eye, so is understanding to the mind' seems to say what the common word 'sight' means. What is lost sight of when such statements are taken to give the meanings of analogous names is that one proportion is the means of knowing and naming the other. God's knowledge is known and named from ours, just as, when we speak of understanding as seeing, we are moving from something obvious to something less so, a movement which should be revealed in the notions signified by the common name. In other words where there is a similarity of proportions, one is very often the per prīus with respect to the signification of a common name.\footnote{Ibid, p. 84-85.}

In another context we are told, "The similarity of proportions, as we have seen and will see again, does not involve another doctrine of the analogy of names: if 'good' means one thing with reference to sense, and another with reference to mind, and these meanings are not wholly diverse, they will be related per prīus et posterius."\footnote{Ibid, p. 95.} Furthermore -- and this seems to be a crucial point -- "it is only when (the) community of the name is set aside that the question of similarity of proportions, of similar proportions to different subjects, comes into the picture."\footnote{Ibid, p. 95.} So what
McInerney is arguing is that even where the so-called analogy of proper proportionality is concerned, the analogous name has first of all a ratio propria; then its meaning is extended, and this new meaning of the term will involve a reference to the original meaning (the ratio propria) of the term. Every instance of analogous naming involves the reference or proportion of the secondary meanings of the term to the primary meaning. Thus every analogy is an analogy of proportion in this sense. We are reminded that "analogy" or "proportion" (its synonym) is an analogous name itself. When Aquinas in the De Veritate distinguishes between "proportion" and "proportionality", he means us to understand by proportion "a determinate relation between things" (which of course, is only one meaning of "proportion"). In this sense there is no analogy based on this kind of proportion between God and creature -- for there is no determinate relation between God and creature -- and, as an alternative, he offers us the proportionality schema. But we are reminded by McInerney that "proportionality" is another meaning of "proportion". The ratio communis of "proportion" is "any relation between things" of which proportionality is one instance and proportion in the narrow sense of "any determinate relation between things" is another. Clearly there is no contradiction in denying a proportion between God and creatures in the narrow sense and affirming a proportion between God and creatures in the broad sense. Thus there is no need to see
any contradiction between the De Veritate and the Summa Theologicae; at least insofar as the basic doctrine and division of the analogy of names is concerned.  

Particularly valuable is McInerny's insistence that knowledge by analogy (i.e. by proportionality) is not to be confused with the logical doctrine of the analogy of names. Given that two known mathematical quantities are related to each other in a definite way and given that a third known quantity is related to a fourth unknown quantity in the same way, we can swiftly determine the value of the unknown. This, of course, was the original application of the proportionality schema. Indeed, the original meaning (and ratio propria) of the term "analogy" was "a determinate relation between quantities". Proportionality was employed by Aristotle to exemplify his idea of distributive justice whereby each person is to be rewarded according to his merits, so that just as I am to be rewarded in proportion to the extent that I have merited it, so you, too, are to be rewarded to the extent to

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22 It will be remembered that Sylvester of Ferrara attempted in a rather similar fashion to McInerny to reduce analogy of proper proportionality to an analogy of proportion. However, Sylvester never really manages to break away from the Cajetan approach to analogy, and as we demonstrated in Chapter two as long as one keeps within Cajetan's frame of reference, no such reconciliation of the two divisions of analogy is strictly satisfactory.

23 Ibid, Chapter eight.
which you have merited it. We see here an extension of the meaning of the term "proportionality" beyond its original and strictly mathematical usage, for we are no longer dealing simply with the relation between mathematical quantities. A further application of the proportionality schema is the argument whereby Aristotle concludes that there must be a subject of unqualified becoming, namely, prime matter.

Briefly put the argument is that just as accidental change is only intelligible insofar as it takes place in a subject (a substance) so substantial change is only intelligible insofar as it takes place in a subject (prime matter). This is how we come to know the existence of prime matter and we can express our knowledge thus: as accident is to substance, so is substantial form to prime matter (recognizing, of course, that prime matter still remains, in a very real sense, an unknown for us). Now it may happen that when we come to know x by analogy with y, we start to call x a y; for example, when we see that the relation between corporeal sight and the visible is similar to the relation between understanding and the intelligible, we start talking of understanding as seeing. In this case one might argue that "sight" is an analogous term, for as predicated of the intellect it has an extended meaning, a meaning which must be explained in terms of the ratio propria, which is saved only in the case of corporeal vision. There is, however, another element involved for if usage had not sanctioned this extension of meaning on the part of the term "sight", it would not be an
analogous term but simply a metaphor (as some indeed might claim it is), and as it turns out, in most cases where a name is given to something because it is known by analogy with something else in which the ratio propria is saved we have a case of metaphorical, and not of analogous, naming. For example, when we talk of God being angry or of Christ as a lion, this is metaphor and not analogy. When we are angry we punish those who thwart us and God is said to be angry because we know that he punishes those who thwart him. We know that the lion is considered by many to be the noblest and most impressive of beasts and we know that Christ was a most noble and impressive man, therefore we say that he is a lion. Metaphors are thus based on a similarity of proportions thereby a name is transferred. But the key to the divide between analogy and metaphor is to be found in the usage of the name. The analogous name is such that usage has so sanctioned its extension of meaning that all those things to which it is applied fall under its signification, although it must be remembered that only one of those things saves the ratio propria, only one of them is signified primarily and most properly by the name. Thus in the case of the analogous name, the various analogates are signified by the name (although more or less properly) and all fall under its denotation, whereas in the case of the metaphorical

24 In scholastic terminology, the term "supposition" is used and not the term "denotation"; however, the two terms are practically synonymous.
name, those things to which the name is metaphorically applied do not fall under the signification of the name and are not denoted by it. The problem with the metaphorical name is that it has no ratio communis whereby there is an extension of the original meaning so that it now has a wider signification than it did have and as a result now denotes objects which it did not denote before. Until this had been made clear our account of analogy could not be complete, for it did not enable us to distinguish precisely between analogy and metaphor.

We have seen then that proportionality as such is not constitutive of the analogous name. Names based on knowledge by analogy (i.e. proportionality) may not be analogous names at all. McInerny points out that "when St. Thomas speaks of names applied metaphorically to God, he will say that they are based on a proportionality, or on a similitudo proportionalitatis. As for names said properly of God, he will say that they are based on a similitudo analogiae as opposed to a similitudo proportionalitatis."\(^{25}\) We may conclude that we are under no obligation to accept Cajetan's notion of the key importance of "analogy of proper proportionality", still less are we obliged to consider this the only valid kind of analogy when we come to consider the names predicated of

\(^{25}\)Ibid, p. 144.
God. Rather we should regard knowledge in terms of proportionality as a possible basis for analogous naming but, far more often, a basis for the predication of metaphorical names. This undoubtedly explains why Aquinas does not find it necessary to even allude to proportionality in his treatment of analogy in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and the *Summa Theologiae*.

**Some Difficulties**

We have seen McInerny's claim that the doctrine of analogy is a logical doctrine concerned with inequality on the part of the signification of the analogous name and not with such ontological matters as whether only one or all of the analogates possess an intrinsic property. It is on this ground that he holds that intrinsic and extrinsic denomination do not provide a basis for a division in analogous naming. Two difficulties present themselves here. First of all is it true that the doctrine of analogy is simply a logical doctrine? What about the analogy of being, for example, which for many philosophers in the Scholastic tradition seems to be a rather crucial piece of metaphysics enabling us to escape from the Parmenidean One, which could hardly be the case if the doctrine of analogy were simply a logical doctrine? Secondly, even if we grant that analogy does belong to the realm of logic, is it not still the case that the logical doctrine of Aquinas has rather definite metaphysical presuppositions in the sense that he took it for granted that the distinctions built into his logic
reflected the structure of the world and given this, why can we not make a logical distinction between analogous names which signify a property intrinsic to all the analogates and analogous names which signify a property intrinsic to only one of the analogates. Such a distinction will indeed involve a reference to things as they exist, but this will not necessarily prevent the distinction being a logical distinction unless it is the case that logic has nothing whatever to do with the existing world, a claim which might seem to run counter to Aquinas' whole idea of logic.

Before we attempt to deal with these difficulties which might be urged against McInerny's whole interpretation of analogy, let us indicate very briefly what constitutes the realm of logic for Aquinas. Logic is to be distinguished from metaphysics because unlike metaphysics it is not concerned with things as they exist, but rather with the properties attaching to things insofar as they are known by reason. These properties he calls "second intentions". The mind is first of all aware of extramental realities and their properties; its concepts of these are called first intentions (what the mind first "tends toward"). Second intentions, on the other hand, are properties attaching to first intentions,

26 A full treatment of this topic is to be found in Robert W. Schmidt, S.J., The Domain of Logic According to St. Thomas Aquinas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; 1966); a brief treatment of the same topic is to be found in McInerny, The Logic of Analogy, p. 37-48.
properties which the mind or reason discovers through reflection on its own operations. Concepts such as man, dog, animal, thing etc. are first intentions; concepts such as species, genus, definition, universal etc. are second intentions. To first intentions there are things which answer directly in reality. To be a man or a dog or a thing is to be something in the real world. To second intentions there is nothing which answers directly in reality, for second intentions are properties of first intentions. To be a species or a genus or a definition or a universal is not to be something in the real world but rather to be something attaching to the concepts or intentions which the mind has drawn or abstracted from the real world. Second intentions, then, are not simply fictions, they do have a remote foundation in reality insofar as they are properties or accidents of real things as these exist in our minds.27 Logic, according to Aquinas, has second intentions for its subject matter -- it is the science of second intentions. Thus, the doctrine of analogy insofar as it is a logical doctrine will not be directly concerned with things as they exist in rerum natura but with

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27 Of course, the distinction between things as they exist in rerum natura and things as they exist in our minds is in no sense to be confused with the Kantian distinction between the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon. Aquinas takes it for granted that we do have genuine knowledge of extramental realities, but this does not prevent him from maintaining that our concepts of these realities have properties (universality, for example) to which nothing directly answers in reality.
the properties or accidents of things insofar as these exist in our minds.

Now let us return to the business of intrinsic and extrinsic denomination (to tackle the second difficulty we raised, first). McInerney's refusal to allow that these can provide a basis for a division in analogous naming meets with criticism from J. D. Beach, who claims that intrinsic and extrinsic denomination are themselves logical entities, since to be denominated intrinsically or extrinsically is not a property attacking to a thing as it exists in rerum natura but only insofar as it is known and named. If this is the case then to divide analogous names according to intrinsic and extrinsic denomination is not, as McInerney contends, to employ extra-logical criteria. McInerney replies to Beach as follows:

"My own contention was that Cajetan bases his distinction between these two (analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionality) on extra-logical criteria: on whether or not the perfection signified by the name exists.

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28 John D. Beach, "Analogous Naming, Extrinsic Denomination, and the Real Order", The Modern Schoolman, 42 (1964-1965) p. 198-213. This criticism of McInerney is cogent enough and one might expect Beach to support Cajetan, but instead he criticizes Cajetan for "passing from the fact that an analogate is extrinsically denominated to the assertion that it lacks a formally inherent perfection, and from that to the assertion that this situation in the real is a necessary concomitant of analogy of attribution." (p. 204) But Beach fails to give any alternative to this way of understanding extrinsic denomination and as a result his article is somewhat confusing, a fact which McInerney does not fail to note.
in all the analogates or in one alone. It seems clear to me that St. Thomas defines the analogous name in such a way that nothing at all is said about such determinate ontological matters. In speaking of these two determinate ontological situations, Cajetan employs the notions of intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. The clear impression one gets is that intrinsic and extrinsic denomination name diverse real situations. If that is what intrinsic and extrinsic denomination mean for Cajetan, then analogous naming cannot be distinguished on the basis of these kinds of denomination.

... Professor Beach seems to think that intrinsic and extrinsic denomination, understood logically and not in the Cajetanian fashion as ontological, properly divide the analogy of names. I will invite him to pursue overtly this hidden suggestion. I suspect that it will soon occur to him that some univocal names involve intrinsic and some univocal names involve extrinsic denomination and that therefore intrinsic and extrinsic denomination, be they ever so logical, are not appropriately divisive of analogous naming. 29

In this reply it seems to us that McInerny does insist too much on the separation between the logical and the real orders. As far as Aquinas is concerned, logical distinctions will reflect the structure of reality and no logical discussion can be carried on without some reference to the existent world. This will be the case whether we are talking about what constitutes a good definition or

about signification and its different modes or about types of analogous names. This is not to deny, of course what we have already seen, namely, that logic is not concerned with things as they exist, but rather to emphasize somewhat more than McInerney does that there is necessarily (for Aquinas, at any rate) a close relation between the logical and the real orders. Granted this, there seems to be no decisive reason why we should not divide analogous names on the basis of intrinsic and extrinsic denomination -- without "transgressing genera" (i.e. without confusing logic with a study of the real world). When McInerney claims that Cajetan employs intrinsic and extrinsic denomination to name diverse real situations, he is not being strictly fair. After all in The Analogy of Names Cajetan is talking about names (i.e. about an aspect of things insofar as they are known by us) and what he is pointing out is that some analogous names have the property of signifying something intrinsic to all the analogates and some have the property of signifying something intrinsic to only one of the analogates. In doing this, he is not talking about things as they exist in rerum natura -- to be intrinsically or extrinsically denominated is only something which happens to a thing insofar as it is known and named by us. At this point, therefore, we must disagree with McInerney.

However, this does not necessarily involve rejecting his main thesis, namely that the doctrine of analogy is a
logical doctrine, that a name or term is analogous when it has a number of different, although related, meanings, one of which is primary and that what is primarily signified by the analogous name may be said to be one of the things which are named analogically (as in the one-to-another kind of analogy) or it may not (as in the many-to-one kind of analogy). McInerny is correct, we think, in considering this to be the essential core of the doctrine of analogy, but he is wrong when he insists that one cannot further subdivide analogous names (of the one-to-another type and the many-to-one type) into those which signify properties intrinsic to all the analogates and those which signify a property intrinsic to one analogate only. However, this latter division of analogous names is not, as Cajetan seems to think, essential to the doctrine of analogy, for, as McInerny suggests, univocal names can also be divided along the lines of intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. The trouble with Cajetan is that he misinterprets the dictum that the ratio propria of an analogous name is saved in only one of the things to which the name is common: he understands this as laying down that there is nothing intrinsic to the secondary analogates in virtue of which they receive

30 See above p. 90.
the analogous name. But as we have seen the question of the ratio propria and the question as to whether the analogous name signifies or does not signify a property intrinsic to all the analogates -- although we have argued that these are both logical questions -- are two different questions and must not be confused. And it is just this confusion of which Cajetan is guilty. Thus he thinks that the dictum concerning the ratio propria just mentioned applies only to his analogy of attribution. But, as we have seen, this is not the case: any name which is analogous, whether it signifies a property intrinsic to all the analogates or not will fall under this rule. Once this has been settled, then one may go on to divide analogous names on the basis of intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. Whether it is particularly helpful to go on to make this further distinction is, of course, another matter.

But what of our first difficulty? Is the doctrine of analogy a logical doctrine in the first place? The answer, in the light of our analysis in the present chapter, must be yes. However this is not to deny that the doctrine of analogy is of some importance to one who would study metaphysics (metaphysics, that is, in the Aristotelian and Scholastic sense of the science of being as being). Just as it is very important for the metaphysician to realize that there is no such thing as a subsistant universal but rather that universality is a property attaching to the natures or essences of real things insofar as these exist in
the mind, so too it is important for him to realize that
many of the key terms he must employ in his inquiry, terms
such as "being", "cause", "unity" etc., have attached to
them a systematic ambiguity in virtue of which they cannot
be said to be simply univocal or simply equivocal. "Being"
is certainly an analogous term and like other analogous terms
its ratio propria will be saved in only one of the things
of which it is predicated, namely substance. "Being" as
predicated of quantity, quality, relation etc. and, indeed,
of God himself will be predicated of these insofar as they
are related to what saves the ratio propria of the term.
Certainly the diversity of actual being may be expressed
in terms of the metaphysical proportionality: as substantial
being is proportionate to the nature of substance, so
accidental being is proportionate to the nature of accident
and the Divine being is proportionate to the Divine nature.31
However this does not alter the fact that one meaning of the
term "being" is primary and will enter into an explanation
of the term as predicated of the other analogates. If this

31The problem with this last proportion is that in
God nature and being, essence and existence are identical.
is denied, that is, if it is maintained that the term "being" is predicated as properly of accident as it of substance or of God, it is very difficult to see how "being" can be any more an analogous term than animal as predicated of Fido and Socrates.

**Conclusion**

In Chapter One we examined the origin and nature of what traditionally have been considered two very different kinds of analogy, analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionality. In Chapter Two we focussed on the question of intrinsic and extrinsic denomination and how Cajetan employs these to draw a sharp distinction between his two main divisions of analogy. However we saw that there is a distinct difficulty in reconciling what Cajetan has to say about analogy with Aquinas' insistence that "whatever is said analogically of many things is found according to its ratio propria in only one of them from which the others are denominated." In Chapter Three we took a more thorough look at the whole question of analogy in the light of Ralph McInerny's insistence that Cajetan has misinterpreted the dictum concerning the ratio propria of analogous names as entailing that only one of the analogates is intrinsically denominated. Because of this confusion Cajetan's interpretation of Aquinas is inevitably deficient and his division of analogy into analogy of attribution and an analogy of proper proportionality is misleading insofar as he thinks that a rule which will apply to any analogy applies only to analogy.
of attribution. However, unlike McInerny, we have suggested that it is indeed possible to distinguish between analogous names which signify a property intrinsic to one analogate alone and analogous names which signify a property intrinsic to all the analogates, without transgressing genera, that is, without confusing the logical and the real orders. It is not for this reason that Cajetan's division is unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory because he fails to keep two distinct logical issues separate. He fails, in other words, to realize that it is one thing to say that an analogous name is predicated primarily and most properly of only one of the analogates and quite another to say that it signifies a property intrinsic to only one of the analogates.

We have in the course of our discussion referred to the importance of analogy in the area of religious discourse. We have not attempted to deal systematically with this problem, that is, to specify in what way the things we say of God are meaningful. To carry out this task satisfactorily -- if it can be carried out -- would require a detailed study of a host of problems which would take us beyond the scope of this essay. All that we have attempted is a limited investigation into the Scholastic doctrine of analogy and if some light has been shed on this topic, then, our end has been achieved.


---------. "On the Meaning of 'Analogy is Analogical'". *Laval Theologique et Philosophique*, XXII (1966), 70-79.
