

THE BUDDHA
AS AN OMNISCIENT RELIGIOUS TEACHER

by
LAKSHUMAN PANDEY, M.A., SHĀSTRĪ

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University
March, 1970

MASTER OF ARTS (1970)
(Religion)

McMASTER UNIVERSITY
Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: The Buddha as an Omniscient Religious Teacher

AUTHOR: Lakshuman Pandey, M.A. (Banaras Hindu University
Varanasi, U.P., India)
Shāstrī (Sanskrit University
Varanasi, U.P., India)

SUPERVISORS: Professor T. R. V. Murti
Professor J. G. Arapura
Professor L. I. Greenspan
Professor S. Ajzenstat

NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 146

SCOPE AND CONTENT:

This dissertation provides a clear understanding of the Buddhist conception of human omniscience. The Buddhist philosophers, Śāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla hold that religion and philosophy should be based on the teachings of an omniscient person who in turn becomes a religious teacher.

The Mīmāṃsakas raise many objections against the concept of human omniscience and establish the omniscience of the Vedas (revealed literature).

The Buddhists disprove the omniscience of the Vedas and God and hold that only a human being can become omniscient. They go further and dialectically establish on the basis of his teachings that only the Buddha, not the other religious teachers, is omniscient, because of his perfect enlightenment (Bodhi). Therefore, only the teachings of the Buddha are authority for religion.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Very sincerely and deferentially the author renders his homage to his revered Gurū (teacher), Gurūnāṅgurū (teacher of the teachers), Professor T. R. V. Murti who has very kindly encouraged, inspired, directed, and supervised this thesis to a successful completion and who has been so generous, sympathetic and unfailing in his understanding of the time and effort which this research demanded.

Deference, sincere appreciation and gratitude are also expressed to the Revered Professor J. G. Arapura for the stimulating encouragement, keen interest, helpful suggestions and inspiring guidance provided by him during all phases of this research project, since without him this research would have been impossible. The writer also feels immensely indebted to Professor G. P. Grant and wishes to acknowledge his gratitude for the sustained affections, encouragement and kind support he received from him, for creating a peaceful atmosphere conducive to learning and research and for taking a keen interest in this undertaking. Very sincere gratitude is expressed to Professor L. I. Greenspan whose help and encouragement through different stages of this work led to its successful completion. Moreover, the writer is deeply indebted to Professor S. Ajzenstat for his stimulation and

inspiration for the improvement of this dissertation.

The author is immensely benefitted by his discussion with the members of the staff of the Department of Religion of McMaster University, and records his sincere appreciation and gratitude to Dr. Yun-Hua Jan under whose inspiring guidance this project was started; to Dr. Paul Younger for kindly reading the first draft with valuable suggestions; to Dr. A. E. Combs for his encouragement; to Dr. E. P. Sanders for his generousness with time and advice and to Reverend E. B. Heaven for his valuable suggestions.

The author would also like to take the opportunity of acknowledging his thankfulness to Dr. H. J. Johnson, Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, London, Canada; to Dr. Nalini Devdas, Department of Religion, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada; to Dr. G. M. C. Sprung, Department of Philosophy, Brock University, St. Catharines, Canada; to Pt. Dalasukh Malvania, Director of L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahamedabad, India, and also visiting Professor in the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Toronto, Canada in the year 1968-69.

The acknowledgement would be incomplete without recording the author's gratitude and indebtedness to his revered Indian teachers, viz. Dr. N. K. Devaraja, Dr. R. S. Misra, Dr. A. K. Narain, Dr. R. K. Tripathi and Dr. S. K. Sivaraman of Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, U.P., India,

Pt. Jagannath Upadhyay of Sanskrit University, Varanasi, U.P., India; Dr. Chandradhar Sharma, Jabalpur University, Jabalpur, M.P., India, and Bhikshu Jagadish Kashyap Navanālandā-Mahāvihāra, Nālandā, India.

Very special thanks are due to late Reverend Harry Mansfield, because the author feels particularly indebted for his friendship and useful suggestions.

The author would like to offer his sincere thanks and gratitude to his esteemed friends, the graduate students of the McMaster Religion Department, who through many discussions, contributed to the solution of various problems. Special thanks go to Russel Legge, Jean Angi, Daniel Thomas, Robert Forrest, Philip Hanson, Paul Bowlby, Wayne Whillier, John Horman, Ian Watson, Shirley Gibson, Peter Graigie, Joyce Rilett, David Wood, Robert Florida, Ron Disanto, Don Schultz, Terry Rigelhof and Stanley Weber.

The author is greatly indebted to all the writers whose works have helped him to bring this thesis to its successful completion.

The author would like to thank McMaster University for awarding him Graduate Teaching Fellowships which enabled him to carry on this research.

Thanks are due to Miss Mary Patters for her kind help in typing this dissertation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION	1
 <u>Chapter</u>	
1 THE CONCEPT OF OMNISCIENCE IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN BUDDHISM	11
2 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN OMNISCIENCE	41
The Valid Means of Cognitions	54
Arguments of Sāmaṭa and Yajñata	62
3 BUDDHISTS' ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF HUMAN OMNISCIENCE	67
The Valid Means of Cognition	75
Inference as a Proof of Human Omniscience	80
4 THE BUDDHA AS AN OMNISCIENT RELIGIOUS TEACHER	84
The Buddha and the Other Religious Teachers	87
The Buddha and the Vedic Ṛṣis	90
The Buddha and the Hindu Gods	93
The Buddha and Hindu Religious Teachers	96
The Buddha as the Only Omniscient Teacher	99
5 SUPERNATURAL POWER OF AN OMNISCIENT PERSON	101
A. The Apprehension of the Omniscient Person	101
B. Omniscience and Speech	116
6 CONCLUSION	123
BIBLIOGRAPHY	138

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to present the logical proofs given in support of the omniscience (Sarvajñatā) of the Buddha by the later Buddhist philosophers: Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla, who lived in the eighth century A.D. and whose writings represent the last phase of Indian Buddhism. Emphasis will be laid primarily on Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṅgraha and on Kamalaśīla's commentary entitled Pañjikā on it.

In Indian philosophy, logical argument was a commonly accepted method used to defend a religio-philosophical concept already accepted at the time. With this intention, the above named exponents of Buddhism have set forth logical evidence in order to establish the fact "that only the Buddha was an omniscient (Sarvajña) religious teacher."

The Saṅskrit word Sarvajña (Sarva meaning "all" and jña meaning knower) is used to translate the English "omniscient" or "all-knowing" person. The Saṅskrit word Sarvajñatā, however, is translated into the English by the word "omniscience" or "all embracing knowledge". The word Sarvajñatā (Omniscience) means to have the knowledge of each and everything in the universe. The Saṅskrit words Sarvajña, Sarvākārajña, Sarvavit and Viśvavit are used as

synonyms, meaning a person who knows everything. In Indian philosophy these words have been used in a special sense to mean a person possessing the knowledge of supersensuous truths such as Dharma (religion), Svarga (heaven) and Moksa (liberation), apart from the knowledge of sensuous objects of the world.

It cannot be said with certainty how and when the concept of omniscience appeared in Indian philosophy, and which particular system was the first to accept this concept, for the development of it is not clear and is difficult to trace. It is hard to say whether this concept was originated in the course of man's realization of the absolute reality in order to achieve liberation or in the aim of each different religious sect to assert its own supremacy by attributing omniscience to its "teacher". Undoubtedly religious practices implying omniscience precede their actual conceptualization; but the concern here is not with the realization of omniscience, but with its rationalization.

What can be said with certainty is that in the period following the sixth century B.C., that is the time of the Buddha and Vardhamāna, the Jaina teacher, there was a great deal of discussion among Indian philosophers on the concept of omniscience. Because the Buddha and Vardhamāna were considered to be omniscient teachers by their respective followers, the nature of this concept has centered on

attempts to prove whether or not a person can be omniscient. On account of this attempt mainly two streams of thought have emerged concerning human omniscience. According to one position, that is, the Cārvāka and Mīmāṃsā, an omniscient person is an impossibility; to the other, that is the school of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Buddhism and Jainism the omniscience can be achieved by human being.

Was the concept of human omniscience developed because of its attribution to God or the Vedas (revealed literature), or was the concept attributed to God or the Vedas because an enlightened person was thought to be omniscient? Or was this concept attributed to God, the Vedas and man simultaneously? These questions do not pertain particularly to the subject of this thesis: What can be said with certainty is that the concept of omniscience was used to describe God, the Vedas and man and probably arose in Indian philosophy through attempts to understand the conception of the enlightened persons who in turn became a religious teacher.

It seems that this concept of human omniscience was first introduced into Indian philosophy because of the religious controversies among Heterodox (Nāstika) Schools, specially Jainism and Buddhism and Orthodox (Āstika) Schools, specially Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā. The religious teachers of some of the

Nāstika schools claimed omniscience for themselves in order to prove the validity of their teachings. The Āstika Schools had already accepted the omniscient authority of some supersensuous and super-human realities like God or the Vedas as proof of the validity of their religious teachings. But those who were not the followers of this tradition had to prove their own religious authority by attributing omniscience to their teachers. Thus the concept of human omniscience came into philosophy as a reaction against the Āstika School who believed in the omniscience of supersensuous truths like God and the Vedas.

Since the time of the Buddha and onward, the concept of omniscience began to be used in Indian religious and philosophical systems in order to establish the omniscient authority of the religious teachings. Whether or not this religious authority was a person or the Vedas (revealed literature) or God, it was essential that it be considered omniscient. It was felt only in this way it is possible to have a "true religious teaching", because an omniscient authority knows the true nature of everything. Only a "true religious teaching, if followed properly, can fulfil the real purpose of a religion by leading the people to prosperity in this life and to the highest good or liberation after life. Thus the concept of omniscience was accepted as an essential part of the religio-philosophical discussions

in the history of Indian philosophy, and every religious teacher or authority was necessarily considered to be omniscient.

To establish the authority of its own, each school has developed a different concept of omniscience, and has used this word with a slightly different connotation. The School of Cār-vāka does not believe in omniscience. The School of Mīmāṃsā maintains the non-omniscience of all beings and the omniscience of the Vedas. The School of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Yoga accepted the omniscience of God. The School of Sāṅkhya holds the omniscience of Prakṛti. Because they do not accept the authority of the Vedas or of God, or Prakṛti the Buddhists and Jainas hold that only a human being can become omniscient.

The Cār-vāka School does not believe in the existence of an omniscient being, nor do they believe in the existence of super-natural objects. They are purely materialistic, and, as such do not accept the idea of a creator of the universe, nor release from the world, that is, liberation. Therefore, it is but natural for them not to accept the concept of omniscience at all, neither in relation to God, the Vedas nor any individual soul.

The Schools of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya maintain the theory that God is omnipotent and omniscient as a creator of the universe and take the Vedas revealed by God as the

authority for Dharma. They deny that the Vedas are composed by any human being. In this system other souls also can be omniscient but not in the same sense as God. The soul of a person can become omniscient by the proper practice of Yoga. But after the attainment of liberation, the omniscient soul loses its omniscience because its omniscience is not permanent or identical with that of God. It is impermanent because it is an effect, that is, produced by the practice of Yoga.

According to the Sesvara-Sāṅkhya School God is omniscient because He is the knower of the true nature of the universe since he directs Prakṛti for cosmic evolution. The Sāṅkhya School takes the cosmic principle of Prakṛti as omniscient.¹ Here it should be noted that Prakṛti does not possess the pure consciousness of the Puruṣa because it is unconscious up to the point when the creation starts. This school holds Prakṛti as omniscient in the sense of knowing everything of the universe, because it is the creator of the universe.

The School of Yoga accepts the omniscience of God as it has been accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But it

1

"Nikhila Jagatkartrttvāccāsyā Evāśeṣajñattvamastu Prakṛteḥ Sarvajñatvam Jagatkartrttvam ceti Sāṅkāprakaraṇe," cited from Prameyakamalamartandah in Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics by Hari Satya Bhattacharya (Bombay, 1966), p. 372.

does not accept the omniscience of the soul, because it holds that the omniscience of God will shine in the intellect (Buddhi). Just like Jainism, the School of Sāṅkhya and Yoga accepts that in order to achieve the liberation, the Yogi becomes omniscient because the omniscience of God is reflected in his intellect. It should be noted that the School of Sāṅkhya-Yoga attributes omniscience to its teacher Kapila in this sense.

The Mīmāṃsakas believe in the existence of supersensuous realities like soul, rebirth, Dharma, heaven and liberation. Therefore, it is a logical necessity for them to believe in omniscience in order to have supersensuous knowledge. But they do not accept omniscience in any being apart from the Vedas. Due to this belief, he has not accepted any being can be the knower of Dharma. Therefore, only the Vedas should be accepted as authority for Dharma because they alone contain omniscience.

The Buddhists and the Jainas believe in the existence of an omniscient person who should be accepted as a real teacher on the basis of their true knowledge of Dharma. They have rejected the view of the Mīmāṃsakas that the Vedas could not be the work of a human being. They assert that the Vedas should be accepted as an authority only if they are taught by an omniscient being. Furthermore, the Buddhists go further and claim that the Buddha alone is

truly omniscient and that only the teachings of the Buddha should be taken as authority for Dharma. The Jainas make a similar claim for the teachings of Vardhamāna.

Though the Buddhists and Jainas do not believe that the universe is created by God, they accept the existence of an omniscient person. This omniscient person is conceived by them as God, because he is the highest being in the universe, not in the sense of the creator of the universe but as the highest conscious being. They both agree in maintaining that omniscience is not only a possibility but every individual has the potentiality of becoming an all-knowing perfect being by a particular practice of Yoga.

Although both the Buddhists and Jainas commonly accept the concept of human omniscience, yet there is a fundamental difference in their conception of this power. The Jainas believe that the omniscient person has complete knowledge of everything at every moment. The Buddhists, however, reject the possibility of this type of knowledge in an omniscient person. For instance, the omniscience of the Buddha was not a continual knowledge of everything simultaneously. He was omniscient in the sense that he was able to know anything which he wanted to know.

Omniscience depends upon the full knowledge of all things sensuous and supersensuous. According to the Buddhists it follows from the removal of the hindrance of affliction

(Kleśāvarana) and hindrance of cognisable things (Jñeyāvarana).

The Buddhists hold that that person alone is omniscient who knows the whole world in its real form of "soullessness" (Anātmavāda). They further assert, only the Buddha, not the other teachers, fulfills all the conditions of this definition. Therefore, he has been placed at the top of all the philosophers and religious teachers.

By accepting human omniscience, the Buddhists aim to prove the existence of a person who knows Dharma (religion) itself. They believe that Dharma should be based on the teachings of an omniscient teacher who knows the correct way leading to liberation. They do not admit the concept of a permanent self (Ātman) as the apprehender of consciousness. However, they do admit the possibility of an omniscient person (Sarvajña) as the cogniser of all objects of the universe. This omniscient person should be accepted as the real teacher of Dharma (religion), because he possesses true knowledge and can never have a false idea about any thing sensuous or supersensuous.

The concept of human omniscience has been used to prove by the Buddhists that Buddhism is the only "true religion" (Saddharma) because its teacher, that is, the Buddha, is himself an omniscient person. Furthermore, Buddhists content that only the Buddha should be accepted as the omniscient religious teacher because he is the only

person to perceive the true nature of all things and to know about all things, both empirical and supersensuous. His knowledge cannot be contradicted by any valid means of cognition.

The main concern of this thesis will be to show that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla offer arguments that successfully answer the objections lodged by the Mīmāṃsakas against the Buddhist's conception of human omniscience. In addition, we will also try to show that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla offer further arguments which establish the complete validity of this fundamental Buddhist tenet. Here they are not only philosophers or logicians but they are theologians defending the Buddhist tenets. In fact the concept of omniscience is not only a philosophical and religious problem but a theological problem. The aim of these Buddhists is to prove the superiority of Buddhism among all religions, because it is based on the teachings of omniscient Buddha. Any religious authority is a matter of conventional recognition. By dialectical establishment of human omniscience and omniscience of the Buddha, these authors prove the authority and infallibility of the Buddha and his teachings of Dharma.

Chapter 1

THE CONCEPT OF OMNISCIENCE IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN BUDDHISM

In this chapter we will have a bird's eye view of the concept of human omniscience as understood by the Indian Buddhists through the ages. We will first outline the Hīnayānist position and then make a comparison with the Mahāyānists. From this point, we will concentrate on the difference between the two with regard to the human omniscience and show why human omniscience is important to the school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Then we will proceed by discussing the concept of human omniscience as well as the omniscience of the Buddha according to the Mahāyān Buddhism in order to prove the authority of Buddhism as true religion.

In the Hīnayāna Buddhism, the concept of human omniscience was not emphasized. Vardhamāna, the religious teacher of the Jainas was contemporaneous to the Buddha. Vardhamāna was accepted by his followers as omniscient in the sense of having knowledge of each and everything of the universe, at each individual moment, while standing or walking, sleeping or awake. In his life the Buddha himself was

asked by his disciples whether he was an omniscient religious teacher like Vardhamāna. He replied that this type of omniscience which is attributed to Vardhamāna was ridiculous as well as impossible, and that those who claimed that they had this kind of knowledge were in error. There is no doubt that the Buddha admitted possessing some sort of supernatural power of knowing, knowledge not possible by normal human cognition. He had the power to remember the past and future births of anyone if he so desired. Moreover, he was able to know everything in the present because of his removal of the hindrances of knowledge (āsavas).

Already the Jainas claimed omnisciences for their leader. They are said to have held that he was "omniscient, all-seeing, and possessed complete knowledge and insight; that whether walking or standing, asleep or awake, knowledge and insight were continuously present." This claim is ridiculed by the Buddhists, and the omniscient teacher is described as so ignorant that he goes for alms to a house not knowing that it is empty, or as having to ask his way to a village. Buddha is represented as denying that he claims such omniscience.* What he claims is the three knowledges, (1) that he remembers numberless past existences, as far back as he wishes, (2) that with his divine eye he can see beings passing away and being reborn according to their karma, (3) that with the destruction of the asavas he has of himself attained and realized release of mind and knowledge in this life and abides by it.¹

*Footnote No. 1 in original source. Majjhima-nikāya, i, 482.

1

Edward J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, (London, 1933), p. 148.

The ideal of Hinayāna Buddhism is Arhathood, which is attained by the removal of the hindrance of affliction (Kleśāvarana). An Arhat is essentially self-centred, caring only for his own liberation, and having no concern for the liberation of other people. A Buddha, on the other hand, foregoes his own liberation for the sake of others. He takes a vow that he will not enter liberation until the whole world is liberated.² This distinction is clearly implied in the Pāli text (Majjhimanikāya, III, 8) itself where the Buddha is called the originator of the path, the perceiver of the unknown path and preacher of the unpreached path. In other words he has discovered a way by which one can be liberated, has realized this unique path by his self-effort in the Samādhi and has taught this means of liberation to others, as it has never been taught before.

The question is raised in Majjhima, iii, 8, whether there is a monk endowed in every way with the qualities that the Lord possesses. The only difference there mentioned is that the Lord was the originator of the Path, the knower of the unknown Path, and the preacher of the Path that had not been preached.³

A further development in the growth of the concept of Buddhahood in Mahāyāna was that the Buddha was considered

²
Bodhicaryāvatāra, 8, 108.

³
E. J. Thomas, op. cit., p. 149.

the possessor of "ten-powers" (dasabala). Rather than being a new idea, this was development of ascription of superhuman powers to an Arhat in Pāli literature:

The special qualities and marvellous powers of Buddha are many, but we can see their growth from simple beginnings. The superhuman qualities ascribed to the arhat were enough to give them a start. We find them already developed in the ten powers (bala) of Buddha:

- (1) Hew knows what is possible as possible, and what is impossible as impossible.
- (2) He knows the ripening of karmas, past, present, and future.
- (3) He knows whither all paths (of conduct) lead.
- (4) He knows the many and various elements or factors of the world (existence).
- (5) He knows the various intentions of individuals.
- (6) He knows the faculties of other beings, whether quick or slow, etc.
- (7) He knows the impurity, purity, and growth of the trances, releases, concentrations, and attainments.
- (8) He knows numberless former existences.
- (9) With his divine eye he sees beings passing away and being reborn according to their karma.
- (10) With the destruction of the asavas he has of himself attained and realized release of mind and knowledge in this life and abides in it.⁴

When asked if he were omniscient, the Buddha claimed the last three of the ten powers, these being the three knowledges of an Arhat. At the time when Majjhima-nikāya was compiled, the claim to Buddha's omniscience had not been made, but later this quality was attributed to him. This

⁴E. J. Thomas, op. cit., p. 149. cf. Majjhima-nikāya, i, 69; Dhs., 76; Mvyut., 7; commentary in Vibhaṅga, 335-344.

claim is to be found in the latest parts of the Canon as an apparent development of the doctrine of the ten powers. The difference between omniscience and the knowledge involved in the ten powers is discussed by Buddhaghosa in his comments on the above passage. Other schools, Buddhaghosa says, hold that the knowledge of the ten powers is not knowledge of the particular objects while omniscience is. Buddhaghosa does not regard this as the principle of division. Through the ten powers the Buddha knows each one's particular duty and omniscience is everything beyond this. It is infinitely extended human knowledge, which however does not produce freedom. The trance or magic power can be known by it, the knowledge of how to perform them is not included under it. "One might know the path, but could not thereby get rid of the depravities. That belongs to the three knowledge of the Path. They are intuitive and direct, and have to be realized."⁵

8 The Mahāyānists, especially the Vijñānavādins, hold that the knowledge and power of a Buddha are much more superior than an Arhat who is the ideal of the Hīnayāna Buddhism. A Buddha, according to them, is omniscient on account of the removal of both the hindrance of affliction (Kleśāvarana) and hindrance of cognition (Jñeyāvarana) while an Arhat is

⁵ E. J. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 149-150.

not, because he removes only Kleśāvarana. In fact in the Hīnayāna literature (Nikāya) itself the Buddha is conceived as omniscient. Here the main difference between an Arhat and a Buddha is drawn. The Buddha is a founder of Dharma while the Arhat is not.

Of the extraordinary spiritual powers attained by a Buddha, the Hīnayānists say very little. We have in the Nikāyas the remark that Buddhas (including Paccekabuddhas) attain perfect knowledge by themselves, and by following the dharma unheard before.* A Samyaksambuddha preaches the dhamma and becomes the founder of a religion, and the leader of men and the gods. He is sabbaññū (omniscient)** and his knowledge in any matter whatsoever does not require any āvajjanā (reflection); he possesses ten balas, and four vesārajjas.... In their literature the Hīnayānists tried to prove that a Buddha is a rare being and superior to the men and the gods, but they mention also that there is hardly any distinction between an Arhat and a Buddha except that the latter is a founder and teacher of a religion.***⁶

*Footnote No. 4 in original source. Āṅguttara, III, p. 9; Pug., P., p. 14.

**Footnote No. 5 in original source. Majjhima, I, p. 482 sabbaññū sabbadassāvī aparisesam naṇadassanaṃ paṭijānāti.

***Footnote No. 8 in original source. For a comparison of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Buddhas see ch. II, pp. 80-4. Dial. of Buddha, II, 1-3; III. 6.

Oldenberg also observes that the concept of the omniscience of the Buddha is found in the Hīnayāna literature.

One night, the old traditions narrate, the decisive turning point came, the moment wherein was vouchsafed to the seeker the certainty

⁶ Nalinaksha Dutt, Aspects of Mahāyāna and Its Relation to Hīnayāna, p. 285.

of discovery. Sitting under the tree, since then named the Tree of Knowledge, he went through successively purer and purer stages of abstraction of consciousness, until the sense of omniscient illumination came over him: in all-piercing intuition he pressed on to apprehend the wanderings of spirits in the mazes of transmigration, and to attain the knowledge of the sources whence flows the suffering of the world, and of the path which leads to the extinction of this suffering.⁷

On the basis of Pāsādikā Suttanta⁸ A. B. Keith observes the Buddha as omniscient. Though he has more capacity to know the past things in comparison to the future things.

On the contrary, the Tathāgata, while able to remember all the past, has enlightenment as to the future to the effect: "This is the last birth; there is no more coming to be." Nor does the Tathāgata reveal all that is past; what is not true, what is not fact, what does not redound to the good of mankind, he leaves alone; nor does he reveal what is true, what is fact, but what does not redound to good; but he reveals what redounds to the benefit of man desirous of salvation, both as regards the past, the present, and the future. He knows whatever throughout the world is discerned, striven for, accomplished, or devised, by gods or men; all that he spoke between his enlightenment and his passing away was true; and he does according to his word, as his word is according to his going, he is styled Tathāgata.⁹

⁷ Hermann Oldenberg, Buddha: His Life, His Doctrine, His Order, p. 107.

⁸ cf. Dighanikāya, III, 134ff.

⁹ A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 44. Also cited by

After reaching the state of omniscience and perfect enlightenment the Buddha was enjoying the pleasure of liberation (Nirvāṇa) and wanted to enter the state of liberation by giving up his body (Nirupadhiśesanirvāṇa). Meanwhile Brahmāsāhampati appeared before him and requested the Buddha to teach the suffering people of the world.¹⁰ In fact, the Buddha wanted to enjoy his own freedom and to enter liberation but since the idea of the suffering of others came to his mind due to compassion, he started his teaching of Dharma. This is called action of the Buddha (Buddha-Karma) which does not bring the Buddha into bondage by producing any result. That is why the Buddha is called supermundane (Lokottara) and his duty is to teach the Dharma.

The Buddha is the adept in the wisdom of Buddhism (Bodhiñāṇa), whose first duty, so long as he remains on earth, is to communicate his wisdom to those who are willing to receive it. These willing learners are the "Bodhisattvas", so called from their hearts being inclined to the wisdom of Buddhism, and "Saṅghas", from their companionship with one another, and with their Buddha or teacher, in the Vihāras on coenobitical establishments. The Bodhisattva or Saṅgha continues to be such until he has surmounted the very last grade of that vast and laborious ascent by which he is

Keith in footnote 2 are: JRAS, 1898, pp. 103ff., 865ff.; AJP, XXXII, 205; Franke, DN., p. 287; Eliot, Hinduism and Buddhism, p. 133, Np. 2.

¹⁰

Mahāvagga (Vinaya-Pitaka, I, 1-24).

instructed that he can "scale the heavens", and pluck immortal wisdom from its resplendent source; which achievement performed, he becomes a Buddha, that is, an Omniscient Being.¹¹

A Tīrthaṅkara, the Jaina teacher, unlike the Buddha, is not concerned with the world and has no consideration for the suffering of the people of the world. Just like a Pratyekabuddha the Tīrthaṅkara does not teach Dharma to the people. In Hinduism God reveals the Dharma due to His active grace. God performs the moral action and confers the knowledge of Dharma.

Dr. T. R. V. Murti quite consistently holds that a mediator is necessary to reveal the Dharma leading to the realization of the Absolute Truth. In fact the Absolute Truth does not become affected by being taught or not being taught. Because of his inherent limitation a person cannot know beyond the sensuous world. Therefore, a mediator is needed to provide the knowledge of Ultimate Reality. In other words a mouthpiece is needed to declare the Absolute Truth. Every religious system has accepted a mediator between the people and the Ultimate Reality. The Jainas accept a Tīrthaṅkara. The Buddhists accept a Buddha and

11

Cited by H. Kern in his introduction to the translation of Saddharma-Pundarika, p. xxxv, by B. H. Hodgson, Essays on the Language, Literature and Religion of Nepal and Tibet, p. 62.

the Hindus accept God as the mediator. All of these have a direct realization of the Ultimate Reality.

Can a person not have the knowledge of Dharma by himself in order to achieve liberation? Every system of Indian thought accepts the possibility of knowing the Dharma by self-effort through the means of yoga. The Buddhists accept that a Pratyekabuddha can become omniscient and achieve liberation by his self-effort. But in this case also a teacher (Gurū) is needed to guide. Candrakīrti holds that the Pratyekabuddha is also taught by a teacher in his previous births. The Buddhists hold that the Buddha is counsellor-friend (Kalyāṇamitra) of mankind. The Buddha plays the role of God revealing the Dharma as a path to freedom.

The Tathāgata, it was pointed out before, is the principle of mediation between the Absolute that is transcendent to thought (śūnya) and phenomenal beings. The need for a mediator is felt in all absolutism; Vedānta has recourse to Īśvara, apart from Brahman, to account for the revelation of truth; in the Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda that function is performed by the Tathāgata.

Śūnyatā does not need to be declared as Śūnyatā; the Real or the Truth is not constituted by our knowing or not knowing it as such.... Truth is impersonal, true for all and for all time. Prajñā or Śūnyatā is bhūtakoti or dharmatā, the intrinsic nature of all things; it is Tathatā--the 'Thatness', invariable for all time "tathā-bhāvo'vikāritvam*").... Only a being which enjoys a sort of dual existence having one foot in phenomena and the other in the Absolute, can possibly know the Absolute and reveal it to others. A difference is

is therefore made between Tathatā (the Real or Absolute Truth) and Tathāgata, who knows the truth.** ...From time to time the Buddhas, out of great compassion, condescend from their exalted position to reveal the truth to all beings (gods and lowly creatures).

...The Absolute is the impersonal reality underlying all phenomena; Tathagata is an Exalted Personality (bhagavān), a being freed of limitations and endowed with excellences. Though Śūnyatā does not necessarily imply the Tathāgata, it does not, however, lose its nature by freely manifesting itself as a Person, as God. It is the nature of the Good to 'overflow'.¹²

*Footnote No. in original source, p. 276.

Tathābhāvo'vikāritvaṃ sadaiva sthāyitā.
sarvadānutpāda eva hy agnyādīnāṃ paranirā-
peksatvād akṛtrimatvāt svabhāva ity ucyate.
MKV. p. 265.

**Footnote No. 1 in original source, p. 277.

atīta tathatā yadvat pratyutpannāpy anāgatā;
sarvadharmās tathā-dṛśtās tenoktāḥ sa
Tathāgataḥ. CSV. p. 32.
sarvākārāviparīta-dharma-daiśikatvena parārtha-
sampadā tathāgatāḥ. AAA. p. 62.

In the Mahāyāna Buddhism the Buddha is held to be a free phenomenal Being. Just like the Tīrthaṅkaras of the Jainas he is considered to be God. He possesses all powers, knowledge, acts and etcetera. He has removed all his passions, actions and true obscurations of affliction and cognition. He is omniscient because he has complete knowledge of the Absolute Reality and empirical world. Apart from his omniscience the Buddha possesses ten powers (Daśabala), Four confidences (Catvāri Vaisāradhyāni), and thirty-two mercies (Dvātriṃśat Mahākaruṇāḥ).

Buddha is Bhagavān, God, endowed as he is with power and perfection. He possesses, in entirety, all power, splendour, fame, wealth, knowledge and act.* He has completely eliminated all passion and karma and the two obscurations (kleśāvaraṇa and jñeyāvaraṇa).** He is omniscient (sarvajña and sarvākārajña), having a full knowledge of the Absolute Truth (prajñā-pāramitā) and of the empirical world likewise. His wisdom is spoken of as consisting of five varieties: (1) "The perfectly pure intuition of the Absolute, there being no bifurcation into the 'is' and the 'is not' (advaya-jñāna); (2) the knowledge resembling a mirror wherein everything is reflected (ādarsa-jñāna); (3) the discriminative knowledge precisely cognising all the separate objects and elements without confounding any of them (pratyaveksanājñāna); (4) the cognition of the unity, the equality of one-self and of others as possessed by the unique Essence of Buddhahood (samatājñāna); and (5) the active wisdom pursuing the welfare of all living beings (kṛtyanuṣṭhānajñāna).*** The first two forms of knowledge, especially the first, belong to the Dharmakāya of the Buddha; the third and the fourth (pratyaveksanā and samatājñāna) to the Sambhoga Kāya (body of Bliss) and the pursuit of the welfare of beings to the Nirmāṇakāya (Apparitional Body). Besides omniscient knowledge, Buddha possesses several other perfections such as Ten Powers--(daśabala),*** Four confidences (catvāri vaiśāradyāni), Thirty-two mercies (dvātriṃsat mahākaruṇā) etc.¹³

*Footnote No. 1 in original source.

"aiśvaryaśya samagrasya rūpaśya yaśasaḥ śrīyaḥ;
jñānasyātha prayatnaśya ṣaṇṇāṃ bhaga iti śrutiḥ."
so'syāstīti samagraiśvaryaḍimān Bhagavān.

"kleśa-karma tathā janma Kleśajñeyāvṛtī tathā;
yena vaipakṣikā bhagnās teneha Bhagavān smṛtaḥ."

AAA.p. 9.

**Footnote No. 2 in original source. Obermiller's
The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā, p. 45. Acta
Orientalia, Vol. XI.

***Footnote No. 3 in original source. Mahāvvyutpatti,
pp. 2-4 (B. Budd. Edn.)

¹³T. R. V. Murti, op. cit., p. 280.

The Saddharma-Pundarīka establishes the concept of human omniscience as well as the omniscience of the Buddha to prove the religious authority of his teachings of Dharma. It holds the doctrine that every individual can attain the state of an omniscient Buddhahood. Here we find a very clear distinction between the schools of the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism. This distinction is based on two different kinds of the teachings of the Dharma taught by the Buddha. It maintains that the Buddha advocated different types of the teachings of the Dharma as an expedient resort ✓(Upāya-Kauśalya). His main aim was to attract the people of lower intellect towards his teaching of the Dharma leading to liberation. ✓Only with this view in mind he taught the doctrine of Hīnayāna. The doctrine of Hīnayāna does not reveal the whole truth. Here he has taught the "Four Noble Truths" (Catvāri Ārya-Satyāni), the "Noble Eight Fold Path" (Ārya-Aṣṭāṅgika-Mārga), the doctrine of Dependent Origination" Pratītyasamutpāda, the doctrine of soullessness (Pudgala-Sūnyatā) and thirty-seven (Bodhipakṣīya Dharmas) to remove the hindrance or affliction (Klesāvarana). By following these teachings of Dharma a person can reach only the state of Arhathood.

However, the teachings of the Mahāyāna Buddhism goes further than the teachings of the Hīnayāna Buddhism by prescribing a further spiritual discipline leading to the state of omniscience and to the Buddhahood. ✓According to

the Saddharma-Pundarīka, an Arhat has to practise the spiritual disciplines of the Bodhisattvas in order to become an omniscient Buddha. Furthermore, he has to realize the voidness of elements (Dharma-Sūnyatā) and the identity of all the elements (Dharma-Samatā) which would remove the hindrance of cognition (Jñeyāvarana). Then he would become a perfect enlightened (Samyak-Saṃbuddha) omniscient religious teacher.

The Saddharma-Pundarīka holds that the different paths (yāna) are only an expedient resort of the Buddha leading to omniscience and perfect Buddhahood. This distinction of Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna and Bodhisattvayāna are only from practical point of view. Really there is only one path named as the Buddhayāna which leads to the state of omniscience and to the perfect Buddhahood. The Buddha has taught the Dharma to all beings by means of only the Buddhayāna which finally leads to omniscience.¹⁴

✓ The omniscient Buddha teaches the Dharma without inequality to all beings of the five states of existence, who are followers of either the Mahāyāna or the Pratyeka-Buddhayāna or the Śrāvakayāna according to their particular disposition. Really there are not three paths (yāna). In

14

Te'pi Sarve Śāriputra Buddhā Bhagavanta Ekameva Yānamārabhya Sattvānām Dharmam Desitavantah, Yadidam Buddhayānam Sarvajña-Tāparyavasānam. The Saddharma Pundarīka-Sūtra, p. 27.

fact, the different beings act in various ways. On this ground the Buddha has declared that there are three paths (yāna).¹⁵ Really, there is only one path (yāna), viz., the Buddhayāna; there is no second or third path (yāna).¹⁶

✓ The Saddharma-Pundarīka holds that ultimate goal of all the spiritual disciplines is to reach the state of omniscience. The Buddha is the master, king and lord of Dharma. The Dharma taught by the Buddha finally leads to the state of omniscience. The Buddha knows the real meaning of Dharma, because he reaches the highest perfection of knowledge, that is, omniscience. Therefore, he is able to know and decide the Dharma, he can apprehend the knowledge of omniscience, he can impart the knowledge of omniscience and he can produce the knowledge of omniscience, because he is perfectly enlightened.¹⁷ ✓

15

"...Tathāgatānāmarhatām Samyaksambuddhānām Sarvajñajñānacittaprabhā Sarveṣu Pañcagatyupapanneṣu Sattveṣu Yathādhimuktim Mahāyānikapratyekabuddhayānikaśrāvakayānikeṣu Saddharmadesanā Samam Pravartate....Nasanti Kāśyapa Trīṇi Yānāni. Kevalamanyonyacaritah Sattvāḥ, Tena Trīṇi Yānāni Prajñāpyante." The Saddharma Pundarīka Sūtra, p. 90.

16

"...Ekamevedam Yānam Yaduta Buddhayānam. Na Dvitiyam Na Tṛtiyam Va Yānam Samvidyate." The Saddharma Pundarīka Sūtra, p. 91.

17

Dharma-Svāmī Kāśyapa Tathāgataḥ Sarva-Dharmānām Rājā Prabhurvaśi. ...(Tathopanikṣipati) Yathā Te

On account of his perfect wisdom the Buddha is omniscient, knowing all and seeing all. He knows this world as well as the other worlds in their real form. He is the indicator of the path, preacher of the path, knower of the path and acquainted with the path. By hearing the Dharma taught by the Buddha a person can remove the hindrances. The removal of the hindrances ultimately leads to the state of omniscience.¹⁸

The Buddha has taught only one Dharma which is always the same. The essence of Dharma is liberation, it is free from passion and annihilation and it ends with the knowledge of omniscience (Sarvajñajñānaparyavasānah). This knowledge of omniscience is not revealed all of a sudden. The state of omniscience is reached by following the Dharma taught by the Buddha.¹⁹

That person is called omniscient who knows the five transcendental faculties. Those who are desirous to achieve the state of omniscience should remove the ignorance.

Dharmāḥ Sarvajñabhūmiṃ Eva Gacchanti.... Sarvadharmārtha-
Vaśitāprāptāḥ Sarvadharmādhyāśayaprāptāḥ Sarvadharmaviniśca-
yakaśālyā Jñānaparamapāramitaprāptāḥ. Sarvajñajñānasam-
darsakāḥ Sarvajñajñānavatārakāḥ Sarvajñajñānopanikṣepakāḥ
Kāśyapa Tathāgato'rhan Samyak-Sambuddhah." The Saddharma
Pundarīka Sūtra, p. 84.

¹⁸
Ibid., pp. 84-85.

¹⁹
Ibid., p. 85.

By removing the ignorance one would become omniscient and acquire the knowledge of Dharma and five transcendental faculties. Without reaching the state of omniscience, liberation is not possible.²⁰

In his book the Mahāyāna Śraddhotpāda-Śāstra, which is translated into English as the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna, Aśvaghōṣa has accepted the concept of human omniscience. He maintains the difference between a Bodhisattva and a Buddha. A Buddha is one who has become omniscient on account of his perfect enlightenment (Bodhi). A Bodhisattva is one who aspires to achieve the state of omniscience and perfect enlightenment through the following three prescribed practices of spiritual disciplines (yoga). First, through the perfection of faith. Second, through understanding and action. Third, through intuition.²¹

The practice of the perfection of faith produces three characteristics into the intellect. First, the intellect becomes centered in meditation upon Tathatā (suchness). Second, it becomes profoundly mature by the introduction of all kinds of unlimited good qualities into the intellect. Third, it becomes compassionate towards removing

²⁰ The Saddharma Pundarīka-Sūtra, V, 71-75, p. 95.

²¹ The Mahāyāna Śraddhotpāda-Śāstra, p. 80.

the sufferings of all the beings.

According to Aśvaghōṣa the Absolute Reality (Dharmatā) is one without a second and it is pure consciousness. This consciousness is conceived from two aspects. From the absolute point of view the same consciousness is called Tathatā. From the phenomenal point of view the same consciousness is called the Samśāra (world) which is based on Tathāgata-Garbha.²³ The real nature of man is the Tathatā itself. However, it is associated with impurities and defilements. These impurities and defilements are removed through good actions as well as meditation upon Tathatā.²⁴

Through the means of understanding and action a Bodhisattva has the correct realization of Tathatā and has no attachment for his own action. He acquires the perfect meditation upon Tathatā which is calm and free from ignorance.²⁵

Through intuition a Bodhisattva realizes the Tathatā. There is no realization of any object in the

²²

The Mahāyāna Śraddhotpāda-Śāstra, p. 82.

²³

Ibid., pp. 31-36.

²⁴

Ibid., p. 82.

²⁵

Ibid., p. 86.

intuitive realization of the Tathatā. In fact, there is only intuition into Tathatā which transcends both the subject-object duality. This is also called the realization of the Dharmakāya (the cosmical body) which is identical with the Absolute Reality. The Bodhisattva becomes the highest being due to the realization of Tathatā. Then he manifests himself into the heaven named Akāṇiṣṭha which is the highest heaven in the world of form (rupāvacara) according to the Buddhists. The unity of his intellect with Tathatā suddenly vanishes his ignorance. By the removal of his ignorance he becomes omniscient. Now he can perform supra-rational acts spontaneously and he is able to appear everywhere in the universe and can help all the beings.²⁶

It is possible for the omniscient person to know the unlimited objects of the senses and mind of innumerable beings of all the worlds? Again there would be no thought in the mind of the omniscient person when his ignorance is destroyed. How can he be called an omniscient person in the sense of knowing each and everything of the universe? Āśvaghoṣa answers these objections by holding the view that the objects of the world are mere appearance of the Tathatā which is beyond the categories of thought. [The non-omniscient person, because of his ignorance, imposes limitations in his own intellect while apprehending the objects of the world.

²⁶ The Mahāyāna Śraddhotpāda-Śāstra, pp. 87-89.

The categories of thought do not correspond to the Absolute Reality (Dharmatā). The mind of the non-omniscient person is like a mirror coated with the dirt of defilements. It cannot reflect the Dharmakāya of the Buddha until it is purified. The Dharmakāya of the Buddha is omnipresent. The omniscient Buddha is free from any limitation of thought. In other words he is free from all perverse views of thought. His intellect is pure and real. It is the very essential nature of the things. He can perceive into every corner of the universe and can illumine all the things which appear due to ignorance, because he is endowed with such great wisdom. He has the capacity of understanding the thoughts of all the beings. He can reveal the true Dharma, because he is omniscient.²⁷

The Daśabhūmikasūtra also accepts the concept of human omniscience. A Bodhisattva enters the tenth Bhūmi (stage) named Dharmameghā or Parama-Vihāra after crossing the ninth Bhūmi, through his practice of yoga. In this Bhūmi he obtains the knowledge of the form of all things and becomes omniscient:

A bodhisattva on completion of the duties of the ninth bhūmi passes to the tenth.* Now he masters countless samādhis, and as the result, a lotus of infinite splendour and size

appears and he is found to be seated on it with an equally resplendent body and established in the samādhi of omniscience (sarvajñajñānaviśesābhiṣeka)** surrounded by countless bodhisattvas who are yet in any one of the nine bhūmis and all looking at him. The rays of light issue forth from his body and make all beings happy.*** While he is thus seated on the lotus, rays come forth from the Tathāgatas and consecrate him as a Samyaksambuddha possessed of omniscience, and hence this bhūmi is called Abhiṣekabhūmi.

It is after the tenth bhūmi that a bodhisattva becomes a Tathāgata, and so the Laṅkāvatāra calls this stage Tathāgatabhūmi.**** The Satasāhasrikā also remarks that a bodhisattva in the tenth bhūmi can be called a Tathāgata.²⁸

*Footnote No. 3 in original source. The Mtu., I, p. 142, has nothing corresponding to the account of the Dasa. It mentions something connected with the Bodhisattva's descent from the Tuṣita heaven and birth in the world of mortal beings.

**Footnote No. 4 in original source. Cf. B. Bh. 24.

***Footnote No. 5 in original source. The wonders of raśmi are described here as well as in the Prajñāpāramitās and other Mahāyāna works.

****Footnote No. 4 in original source, p. 284. Sata., p. 1458. Author's Note: Sata., stands for Satasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā.

Abhisamayālaṅkāra or Prajñāparamitopadeśasāstram aims, as described in the beginning, that the wise man should observe the path of omniscience and by remembering the meaning of the Sūtra, should blissfully reach the ten-fold religious virtue. The perfect wisdom (Prajñāpāramitā) is attained through the means of omniscience. The knowledge

of the form of all objects (Sarvākārajñatā) is attained through the knowledge of the path (Margajñatā). The knowledge of the form of all the objects lead to omniscience. The excellence of omniscience is the highest wisdom which leads to the Buddhahood.

According to Abhisamayālaṅkāra a Śrāvaka removes only the veil of affliction. A Pratyekabuddha removes both the veil of affliction and cognition which is imagined by the subject only. Thus, it should be noted that only a partial veil of affliction and cognition is removed by a Pratyekabuddha. The perfect omniscience and Buddhahood is attained by the removal of the veil of affliction and cognition. Omniscience, which means the true knowledge of all things, is of two kinds: the knowledge of the objects that are near, and those that are remote.

The Bodhicaryāvatāra also includes the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha in the Hīnayāna Buddhism. The aim of the Mahāyāna Buddhism is to reach the state of omniscience and the perfect enlightenment (Buddhatva). The realization of the voidness of elements (Dharma-Nairātṇya) removes the hindrance of cognition, which leads to omniscience and the Buddhahood.²⁹

²⁹ Kṛṣṇajñeyāvr̥ttitamah Pratipakṣo Hi Śūnyatā; Śīghra Sarvajñatākāmī Na Bhāvayāti Tam Kathaṁ. The Bodhicaryāvatāra, 9-55.

The Mādhyamika School of Mahāyāna Buddhism describes the Buddha as a great religious teacher (Śāstā). However, it has not given an elaborate description of his omniscience. Nāgārjuna in his Mūlamadhyamaka-Kārikā reverentially bows to the Buddha as the propounder of "dependent origination" (Pratītyasamutpāda),³⁰ but he does not ascribe omniscience to him. The omniscience of the Buddha is emphasized and elaborated mainly by the Viññānavāda Buddhism beginning about the fifth century A.D.

The fifth century A.D. is the start of the golden period of Indian philosophy. Here we find a tripartite struggle between the Mīmāṃsa,, Nyāya and Buddhist schools. This tripartite struggle was originally started by Dinnāga, the father of medieval logic in India. He criticized the Nyāya-Sūtra of Akṣapāda Gautama and its commentary by Vātsyāyana called Nyāyabhāṣya.

Dignāga by the celebrity he won in disputations has been one of the most powerful propagators of Buddhism. He is credited with having achieved the "conquest of the world."* Just as an universal monarch brings under his sway all India, so is the successful winner of disputations the propagator of his creed over the whole of the continent of India. Cashmere seems to have been the only part of India where he has not been, but he was visited by representatives of that country who later on founded schools there. These schools carried on the study

of his works and produced several celebrated logicians.³¹

*Footnote No. 1 in original source. dig-vijaya.

Diñnāga felt that the charges lodged by the school of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya against the Buddhist doctrines could not be disproved without accepting a new form of logic. This new logic would enable Buddhism to be on an equal footing theologically, philosophically and religiously with the other Indian traditions. This was most essential since Buddhism until this time was devoid of an adequate framework in which to interpret the tradition of the Buddha. Diñnāga, however, gave a new definition of logic on the basis of Buddhist philosophy and from this standpoint he criticized the views of others and set forth a new logical proof of Buddhist doctrines:

The Buddhist philosopher Diñnāga (c. 425 A.D.) may be regarded as the founder of the school of pure logic in Buddhism.....

It is interesting to note that in the hands of Diñnāga, Nyāya becomes a pure science of logic..... With Diñnāga, as with other logicians of the Medieval School, the utility of Nyāya primarily lay in its being a means of defence and attack in the philosophical controversies that were then raging in the country. He tries his best to demolish the position of Vātsyāyana, the commentator of the Nyaya-sutras. Udyotakara (c. 550 A.D.)

31

Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, "Introduction," p. 34.

came forward to defend Vātsyayana against Diñnāga.

The task of defending Diñnāga against Udyotakara was undertaken by Dharmakīrti, (c. 600 A.D.) pupil's pupil of Diñnāga.... Dharmakīrti also criticises the views of Bhartrihari and Kumārila as well. Dharmakīrti in his turn is criticised by Vyomaśiva, Akalaṅka, Haribhadra and Jayanta.³²

Eventually the Jaina, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṃsa and Nyāya Schools also adopted their own logical methods to support their doctrines and criticize those of others. Uddyotakara, a propagator of the Nyāya School, in his book Nyāya-Vārtika, has refuted the arguments of Diñnāga against Nyāya-doctrine. God, he holds, is the basis of Dharma because He is the only omniscient supreme being. He has proved the sole omniscience of God on the basis of His function as creator of the whole universe. Only a being who is the creator of the universe can be omniscient. It is, therefore, impossible for any human being like the Buddha or Vardkanāna to be the omniscient religious teacher.

To answer the objections of Uddyotakara the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsakas and re-establish the Buddhist doctrines, Dharmakīrti wrote the Pramāṇa-Vārtika. His criticism was answered by Vācaspati Miśra in his book Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātparya-Tīka. Dharmakīrti also criticized

vigorously the doctrine of the Mīmāṃsakas. His criticism was answered by Kumārila in his book Ślokavārtika. In order to re-establish the doctrine of Mīmāṃsā he severely attacked the Buddhist doctrines and attempted to prove the authority of the Vedas. He holds that only the Vedas can be omniscient and an omniscient being is an impossibility. According to him, the non-omniscient teachers like the Buddha or Vardhamāna should not be accepted as authority for Dharma.

✓ Thus the schools of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya challenged the religious authority of Buddhism by seeking to disprove the omniscience of any human being. On this basis the Buddha's teachings regarding Dharma were not accepted authoritative by them and were seen as misleading. The attack of Kumārila, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra on the doctrines of Buddhism and their refutation of the omniscience of the Buddha, shook the position of the Buddhism as religion and it became difficult for people to have faith in the teachings of the Buddha.

...Buddhism in India was doomed. The most talented propagandist could not change the run of history. The time of Kumārila and Śaṅkara-acārya, the great champions of brahmanical revival and opponents of Buddhism, was approaching.... What might have been the deeper causes of the decline of Buddhism in India proper and its survival in the border lands, we never perhaps will sufficiently know, but historians are unanimous in telling us that Buddhism at the time of Dharmakīrti was not on the

ascendency, it was not flourishing in the same degree as at the time of the brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. The popular masses began to turn their face from that philosophic, critical and pessimistic religion, and reverted to the worship of the great brahmin gods....

Dharmakīrti seems to have had a foreboding of the ill fate of his religion in India. He was also grieved by the absence of pupils who could fully understand his system and to whom the continuation of his work could have been entrusted. Just as Dignāga had no famous pupil, but his continuator emerged a generation later, so was it that Dharmakīrti's real continuator emerged a generation later.³³

The Buddhist theologians of this age felt the need to answer this challenge by establishing the Buddha as the only omniscient religious teacher in order to prove that Buddhism is as valid as Hinduism, if not superior. They have tried to prove that only a human being could be omniscient not the Vedas or God. They also tried to demonstrate that among human beings who have been acclaimed as omniscient religious teachers only the Buddha is omniscient because his teachings have not been disproved by any valid means of cognition. They have used logical arguments to support the omniscience of the Buddha so that they could prove that Buddhism is the only true Dharma, since only Buddhism has been taught by an omniscient religious teacher.

Diñnāga paved the way for development of the Buddhist proofs for the omnisciences of the Buddha by providing the

logical structure. The later Sautrāntika Vijñānavādin Buddhists adopted this dialectical method in discussing the omniscience of the Buddha.

We should, however, remember that the logicians of the age had cultivated a purely rational outlook to a great extent. Dinnāga was no doubt held in high esteem by the Buddhists but this did not prevent Dharmakīrti, his vārtikakāra, from dissenting from him and maintaining that the example, or Udāharana, cannot form part of syllogism. The very emergence of vārtika as a form of literature is a clear proof that rationalism was fairly well developed in the period; the vartikakaras were no doubt commenting upon earlier works....³⁴

Dharmakīrti, however, has not rested his case on the omniscience of the Buddha, because he felt that the omniscience of any person cannot be examined by any empirical criterion. But he maintains that the Buddha is a reliable guide to Dharma, because he possesses true knowledge (jñānavān).³⁵

This is much more so because the whole chapter on the validity of knowledge is supposed to contain only a comment upon the initial stanza of Dignāga's work. This stanza contains a salutation to Buddha who along with the usual titles is here given the title of "Embodied Logic" (pramāna-bhūta).^{*} The whole of Mahāyānistic Buddhology, all the proofs of the existence of an absolute, Omniscient Being are discussed under that head.

34

A. S. Altekar, op. cit., p. 7.

35

Pramāna-Vārtika, ii, pp. 145-146.

We would naturally expect the work to begin with this chapter upon the validity of knowledge and the existence of an Omniscient Being.... A further notable fact is that the chapter on Buddhology, the religious part, is not only dropped in all the other treatises, but Dharmakīrti most emphatically and clearly expresses his opinion to the effect that the absolute omniscient Buddha is a metaphysical entity, something beyond time, space and experience, and that therefore, our logical knowledge being limited to experience, we can neither think nor speak out anything definite about him,** we can neither assert nor deny his existence.³⁶

*Footnote No. 2 in original source. pramāṇa-bhūtāya jagad-dhītaisine, etc. cp. Dut., Nyāya-praveśa, Introd.

**Footnote No. 2 in original source, p. 39, Cp. the closing passage of Santānāntarasiddhi, and NB, III, 97.

The omniscience of the Buddha was most convincingly demonstrated in the last phase of Indian Buddhism. Th. Stcherbatsky names it as "The Third or Religious School of Commentators."³⁷ This religious school has followed the logical tradition of Dinnaga in proving the validity of knowledge. In this connection they have logically established the concept of human omniscience as well as the omniscience of the Buddha.

Prajñākaragupta in Pramānavārtika-Bhāṣyam (or Vārtikālaṅkārah), Śāntarakṣita in Tattvasaṅgraha and Kamalaśīla in his Pañjikā went further than Dharmakīrti and dialectically established the concept of human omniscience

³⁶

Th. Stcherbatsky, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

³⁷

Ibid., p. 40.

and omniscience of the Buddha while answering the objections of Vācaspatimiśra and Kumāṛila.

These Buddhist philosophers have accepted the possibility of human omniscience and have maintained through various modes of logical arguments that only the Buddha and no other religious teacher is omniscient, because his teachings of Dharma have not been disproved by the accepted valid means of cognition (Pramāṇa).

By holding the concept of human omniscience and omniscience of the Buddha, the Buddhists do not mean that the omniscient person should know all the objects of the world. Their primary aim is to prove that the Buddha has the knowledge of supersensuous truths and his teaching of Dharma is the means of attaining heaven and liberation. The knowledge of the Buddha is not hampered by obstacles because he is omniscient. The Buddhists indirectly establish the concept of human omniscience in order to prove the existence of a person who knows the means leading to heaven and freedom.³⁸ Their main aim is to prove that the authority for Dharma is the teaching of an omniscient person and only the Buddha is an omniscient religious teacher.

38

Svargāpavargasanprāpti Hetujñō'stiti Ganyate;
Sāksāṇna Kevalaṁ Kintu Sarvajñō'pi Pratīyate.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3309.

Chapter 2

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN OMNISCIENCE

One of the orthodox philosophical schools, the Mīmāṃsakas, believes that only the Vedas are omniscient. No human being can be omniscient because of the mind's inherent limitation. Kumārila, the expounder of the Mīmāṃsaka's view, vigorously argues that only the Vedas are omniscient, because it is the work in a spacio-temporal dimension--they are not written by man, for they are eternal. The Vedas are the only basis upon which man can know the supersensuous truths, because they are omniscient (sarvajña). Therefore, the Vedas are the only authority upon which Dharma (religion) can correctly be based.

It should be noted that this school is the most orthodox and firm supporter of the Vedas. It denies through various arguments the existence of a creator of the universe as well as the possibility of human omniscience. According to this school an omniscient person is non-existent, like a sky-lotus, because he is not apprehended by any of the valid means of cognition. All objects cannot be known by anyone. Here the term "all" (sarva) does not mean objects

other than Dharma and Adharma (anti-religion) such as oil, water and butter, and so on.¹

In order to maintain the omniscience of the Vedas the Mīmāṃsakas have raised many objections against the existence of an omniscient person. First, they deny the possibility of human omniscience by logical arguments. Second, they argue that the existence of an omniscient person cannot be proven by any of the valid means of cognition.

This school has established that the Vedas should be taken as the supreme authority regarding Dharma, Svarga, Moksa and other super-sensuous truths. Kumārila asserts that it is always doubtful whether the words uttered by a person are valid or not. Therefore, only the Vedas can be omniscient, because they are impersonal.² It is natural that this school would deny the existence of an omniscient person. Even those schools which believe in the existence of an omniscient person have criticized each other on the concept of human omniscience. The Buddhists say that

1

Athāpi Prakṛtaṁ Kiñcittailodakaghṛtādivat;
Tena Srveṇa Sarvajñastathāpyastu Na Vāryate.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3131.

2

Doṣāḥ Santi Na Santīti Puṁvācyesu Hi Saṅkyate;
Śrūtāu Kartur Abhāvān Nu Doṣaśaṅkaiva Nāsti Naḥ.
Ibid., Verse 2087. cf. Śloka Vārttika, p. 74 (Chou. Edn.)
cited in The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 281.

Vardhamāna, the Jaina teacher, should not be regarded as omniscient, because his teachings of Syādvāda and other doctrines are false. On the other hand, the Jainas say that the Buddha should not be regarded as omniscient because his teachings regarding the doctrine of momentariness (Ksanikavāda) etc. are incorrect. Both the Jainas and the Buddhists have put forth reasoning and counter-reasoning but no definite criterion has been established to verify omniscience of a person. On this basis the Mīmāṃsakas conclude that the existence of such a person who knows everything of the universe cannot be proved by any valid means of cognition.

There are two possible interpretations of human omniscience. First, a person may know a little of the universe as a whole. Second, he may know the whole of the universe in full detail.

However, it is futile to accept the first possibility. The objects of the world are either existent (bhāva-rūpa) or non-existent (abhāva-rūpa). A man could not be called omniscient by knowing this epitome of the world.³ Again, a person may not be called omniscient on the basis of this knowledge that all objects of the world

³ Bhāvābhāvasvarū-Pam VājagatsarvamYadocyate;
Tatsaṅkṣepeṇa Sarvajñaḥ Puruṣaḥ Kena Nesyate.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3132.

are knowable (jñeya) and cognisable (Prameya).⁴ Some philosophers have reached the conclusion that the world is divided into certain limited categories. The Buddhists have postulated the "Five-Thought-Phases" (Pañcaskāṇḍha), the Vaiśeṣika have postulated "Six-Categories" (ṣaṭ-padārthah) and the Sāṅkhya have accepted "Twenty-five-principles" (Tattvas). But it is absurd to conceive of them as omniscient, because those who read their philosophical doctrines, would also become omniscient.⁵ It is also impossible to regard a person as omniscient if he cognises six kinds of objects through the six valid means of cognition (Pramāṇa). Consequently, that a person is omniscient cannot be proven on the basis that he knows a little about the universe as a whole.⁶

As far as the second alternative is concerned, a person cannot know in full detail all the atoms contained even in a single body. How then is one to know all the

4

Evaṁ Jñeyaprameyatvasaṅksepēnāpi Sarvatām;
Āsṛitya Yadi Sarvajñāḥ Kastaṁ Vārayitum Kṣamaḥ.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3133.

5

Padārthā Yaiśca Yāvantāḥ Sarvatvenāvadhāritāḥ;
Tajjñātvenāpi Sarvajñāḥ Sarve Tadgranthavedināḥ.
Ibid., Verse 3134.

6

Tathā Śadbhiḥ Pramāṇairyaḥ Ṣaṭprameyavivekavān;
So'pi Saṅkṣiptasarvajñāḥ Kasya Nāma Na Saṁmataḥ.
Ibid., Verse 3135.

little details that constitute the whole universe. It is impossible to have the knowledge of the entire universe even in a hundred years. At the same time this knowledge is as futile as examining the teeth of a crow because it has no bearing upon Dharma and Adharma and it will not fulfil any purpose of mankind.⁷

Human omniscience cannot be established by perception and other valid means of cognition, so Dharma and Adharma can be known only through the Vedas.⁸ It is impossible to know them through the teachings of the Buddha and other religious teachers, because these teachings are not contained⁹ either in the Vedas or in the Upveda (sub-revealed literature like Āyurveda, Dhanurveda and the like), nor in the Āṅgas (subsidiary sciences) of the Vedas or in the Pratyāṅgas (auxiliaries) of the Vedas. Again these teachers have not composed any scripture which provides the knowledge of all the objects. It is wrong to say that those objects which

⁷
Ekasyaiva Śarīrasya Yāvantah Paramāṇavaḥ;
Keśaromaṇi Yāvanti Kastāni Jñātumarhati.
Samastāvayavavyaktivistara Jñānasādhanaṁ;
Kākadanta Parīkṣāvatkriyamāṇamanarthakaṁ.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3137-3138.

⁸
Sarvapramāṭṛsambaddhapratyakṣādinivāraṇāt;
Kevalāgamagamyatvaṁ Lapsyate Puṇyapāpayoḥ.
Ibid., Verse 3142.

⁹
Naca Vedopavedāṅgapratyāṅgādyarthabodhanaṁ;
Buddhaderdṛsyate Vākyaṁ Sa Sarvajñaḥ Kathaṁ Mudhā.
Ibid., Verse 3146.

are not mentioned in their teachings might have been known them. In that case all the poets should be regarded as omniscient due to the composition of their poems.¹⁰

There are many teachers such as the Buddha, Kapila, Kaṇāda, Gautama, Vardhamāna and others who are regarded as omniscient by their respective followers. But it is not proper to regard them all as omniscient, because they have taught mutually contradictory doctrines regarding super-sensuous objects. If the Buddha is omniscient, then what is the proof that Kapila is not so. If both are omniscient then there should not be any difference of opinion between them.¹¹

Again the Buddhists are not right in saying that that person alone can be regarded as omniscient whose teachings cannot be contradicted by any valid means of cognition. The Buddhists assert that the Buddha should be regarded as omniscient in the sense that he directly knows the true nature of all things. His omniscience is derived from his unique teachings, teachings which are in accord with reality. In

10

Svagrāntheṣvanibaddho'pi Svajñāto'rtho Yadīṣyate;
Sarvajñāḥ Kavayaḥ Sarve Syuḥ Svakāvyanibāndhanāt.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3147.

11

Sarvajñeṣu Ca Bhūyassu Viruddhārthopdeśiṣu;
Tulyahetuṣu Sarveṣu Ko Namaiko'vadhāryatām.
Sugato Yadi Sarvajñāḥ Kapilo Neti Kā Pramā;
Athobhāvapi Sarvajñau Matabhe-Dastayoḥ Kathām.
Ibid., Verses 3148-3149.

other words, the Buddha is omniscient according to the Buddhists because his teachings are not heard or inferred from any external source, and because they describe the true nature of things. The same reasoning is used by the Digambara Jainas to prove the omniscience of Vadhamāna.¹² Here again the matter is doubtful because both the and Jainas have criticised each other on the conception of omniscience. On this ground the Mīmāṃsakas have refuted their doctrines very successfully.¹³

The Mīmāṃsakas assert that no being can perceive super-sensuous truths; they can be observed only through the Vedas.¹⁴ It is not correct to say that the Buddhists know super-sensuous truths through the words uttered by other Buddhas such as Kanaka, Kāśyapa and Dīpaṅkara and not through the Vedas, because the reliability of their teachings also can be ascertained no more than that of the Buddha.¹⁵ The Buddhists are also not correct in saying that

12

Pañjikā, 3153, p. 823.

13

Evam Sarvajña Kalpeṣu Nihateṣu Parasparam;
Alpaśeṣīkṛtansarvān Vedavādaī Hanisyati.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3154.

14

Tasmādatīndriyārthanām Sākṣādraṣṭā Na Vidyate;
Vacanena Tu Nityena Yah Paśyati Śa Paśyati.
Ibid., Verse, 3175.

15

Ibid., Verses 3176-3177.

the line of the Buddhas is beggingless. Therefore, the teachings propounded by the Buddha should be regarded defectless and without beginning just like the Vedic tradition. The Mimamsakas declare that the teachings of the Buddha are not reliable because he has no direct knowledge of Dharma.¹⁶ The mere fact that the teachings of the Buddha are beginningless as the Buddhists hold also does not prove that they are reliable. Neither reliability nor unreliability is necessarily connected with the beginninglessness. For instance, real gold has been in use since the beginning of time, just like unreal gold, but both are not equally real.¹⁷

It is also wrong to say that both the Buddha and the Vedas are equal source of right knowledge, because both are omniscient. The Mīmāṃsakas do not believe in the existence of an omniscient person, because such a person cannot be proven by any valid means of cognition except non-apprehension (abhāva). Therefore the omniscient person who falls within the scope of non-apprehension cannot be placed at the same level as the Veda.¹⁸

¹⁶ Na Śauddhodanivākyaṇām Pāratantryātpramāṇata;
Apaśyataḥ Svayaṁ Dharmam Tathā Śauddhodanerapi.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3179.

¹⁷ Ibid., Verses 3183-3184.

Also the existence of an omniscient person cannot be proved on the basis of the proclamation of the Buddha himself, such as "I am omniscient, perceiving all things, there is nothing that is unknown to the Tathagata,"¹⁹ because there is interdependence in this assertion.²⁰ This statement cannot be accepted as reliable unless it is proved that it was spoken by an omniscient person. How can he be accepted as omniscient on the basis of his own declaration.²¹

Again the Buddha cannot be accepted as omniscient on the basis of the assertion of the Śrāvakas such as Śāriputra and others who declare the Buddha, the worthy scion of the Śākya family, as omniscient.²² This type of statements made by the non-omniscient person cannot establish the omniscience of the Buddha. If a person accepts this state-

18

Pañjikā, 3185, p. 830.

19

Sarvajño'haṃ Sarvadarśi Nāsti Tathāgatasya
Kiñcidajñātamityādi.

Ibid., 3187, p. 831.

20

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3188.

21

Sarvajñoktatayā Vākyaṃ Satyaṃ Tena Tadastitā;
Kathaṃ Tadubhayaṃ Siddhyetsidhān-Mūlāntarādr̥te.

Ibid., Verse 3189, p. 832.

22

"Sarvajño'yam Śākyakulanandana Iti."

Pañjikā, 3190, p. 832.

ment as authority, why does he not hold his own words as authority.²³

The Buddhists hold that there has been a series of innumerable Buddhas in the past and this series is going to continue in the future also. The knowledge of the omniscience of the Buddha is derived from the words of these Buddhas.²⁴ In other words the omniscience of the Buddha is affirmed by the assertion of another omniscient person, that is, another Buddha. On this basis the Buddhists establish the omniscience of the Buddha. The Mīmāṃsakas, however, do not accept this view also very convincing. If a single one of these Buddhas happen to be non-omniscient, then the omniscience of the Buddha cannot be established through the words of the Buddha.²⁵

The Mīmāṃsakas further argue that the people of the present time are not able to know an omniscient person because no such person is present before them. Even a man contemporaneous with the omniscient person cannot know him as omniscient unless he himself becomes omniscient, for such

²³ Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse, 3190.

²⁴ Pañjikā, 3191, p. 832.

²⁵ Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3191.

a man who is not omniscient, the teachings of the so-called omniscient person would be non-reliable and doubtful. In fact, the reliability of his words would not be more than the words of any other person.²⁶

It is also not proper to call a person as omniscient who can know all things that are known to his disciple, because it is not possible for him to know all the knowable objects of other different worlds. It is impossible to believe that all men approach the Buddha simultaneously and he answers all their questions, because all men of the past, present and future from all over the world cannot be brought together.²⁷

The omniscient person must know the things of the past and the future also. Otherwise he would be only a partial knower. However, it is impossible to know the things of the future. Nobody can know future things by sense-perception, because what is still in the future, that is, non-existent, cannot be an object for knowledge, because a future thing is not a real object. Inference and other

26

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3192.

27

Sarvaśiṣyairapi Jñātānarthān-Saṁvādayannapi;
Na Sarvajño Bhavedanyaloka-jñātārthavarjanāt.
Na Ca Sarvanarajñāta-jñeyasaṁvādasambhavaḥ;
Kālatrayatrīloka-sthairnarairna Ca Samāgamah.

Ibid., Verses 3194-3195.

valid means of cognition also cannot prove the apprehension of future things, because there shall be no inferential mark (liṅgābhāva-d),²⁸ and other necessary factors. Just like future things, there will be no apprehension of past things also because sense perception on any other valid means of cognition cannot be applied there, as that also is a non-entity.²⁹

In addition, the description of the omniscience of Brahmā and other Hindu deities is found in the Itihāsa and the Purāṇa of Brahmānic (Hindu) literature. The Mīmāṃsakas take these descriptions as commendatory (Arthavāda).³⁰ Or it can be said that their knowledge is certain regarding the objects spoken of in the Itihāsa and Purāṇa. Their knowledge is certain because they know Dharma in their own selves through meditation.³¹ Accord-

28

Anāgatena Dr̥ṣṭam Ca Pratyakṣasya Manāgapi;
Sāmarthyam Nānumānādijaṇma Liṅgādibhirvinā.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3174.

29

Pañjikā, 3174, p. 828.

30

Itihāsapurāṇesu Brahmādiryo'pi Sarvavit;
Jñānamapratigham Yasya Vairāgyam Ceti Kīrtitam.
Gaunatvenaiva Vaktavyaḥ So'pi Mantrārthavādat;
Yadvā Prakṛtadharmādi Jñānā (prati)ghatocyate.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3199-3200.

31

Ibid., Verses 3201-3205.

ing to this literature knowledge is one of the ten imperishable qualities of Lord Śaṅkara, but he is not called omniscient. His knowledge consists only in the direct perception of his pure self.³²

Apart from this Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Mahesvara are the embodiments of the Vedas. The Vedas consist of the knowledge of all things. These Gods are omniscient in this sense. But the knowledge of the Buddha is dependent upon himself.³³ Furthermore, they are deities, superior to all human beings, so they can acquire the pure knowledge through meditation. They are mentioned in the Vedas, because they are equipped with eternal qualities and eternal function.³⁴ It is better to accept the fact that Dharma is taught by the Vedas than to hold that the omniscient person is mentioned in the Vedas.³⁵

32

Jñānaṁ Vairāgyamaśvaramiti Yo'pi Daśāvyayaḥ;
 Śaṅkaraḥ Śrūyate so 'pi Jñānavānātma-vittayā.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3206.

33

Athāpi Vedadehatvādbrahmaviṣnumaheśvarāḥ;
 Sarvajñānamayādvedātsarvajñā Mānuṣasya Kiṁ.
 Kvaca Buddhādayoḥ Martyāḥ Kvaca Devottamatrayaṁ;
 Yena Tatspard-Dhaya Te'pi Sarvajñā Iti Mohadrk.
Ibid., Verses 3208-3209.

34

Ibid., Verses 3210-3211.

35

Anityasya Tu Buddhāderṇa Nityāgamagamyatā;
 Nityatve Cāgamasyeṣṭe Vṛthā Sarvajñakalpanā.
Ibid., Verse 3212.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas the clear and direct knowledge of Dharma is obtained from the Vedas, because it provides a clear knowledge of everything. On the other hand, the omniscient person provides indirect and indistinct knowledge of Dharma,³⁶ because he has retired into Nirvāṇa (liberation) and therefore cannot be clearly perceived. If it is accepted that he has not entered Nirvāṇa and is clearly perceptible even then he would not impart any teaching, because after reaching that state he has no desire for anything. Even if he imparts some teaching at this stage, it could not be heard by all men of the past, present and future.³⁷

Thus the Mīmāṃsakas conclude that a person like the Buddha or Vardharmāna should not be regarded as the knower of Dharma on the basis of the knowledge of a few supersensuous realities unless he is proved to be omniscient.

The Valid Means of Cognition (Pramāṇa)

The Mīmāṃsakas hold that the existence of an omniscient person cannot be supported by any valid means of cognition.

36

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3213-3214

37

Tirohitastu Vedabodhitasarvajñajñāto Dharma-
Stasya Nirvāṇaṅgatasyāprakatatvāt. Anirvāṇāvasthāyāma-
pyanicchayā Tadupadesābhāvāt. Upadeśe'pi Sarvatra Sarvadā
Sarveṣāṃ Śravaṇābhāvāt. Pañjikā, 3214, p. 838.

Perception (Pratyaksa) inference (Anumāna), analogy (upamāna). Presumption on necessary implication (Arthāpatti), words (Śabda) and non-apprehension (Abhāva) all these valid means of cognition cannot prove the existence of an all-knowing person.

1. Perception (Pratyaksa)

A man is called omniscient because he knows all things. This knowledge of all things could be attained either through sense-perception (Indriyajñāna) or through mental perception (Manojñāna).³⁸ Sense-perception is limited in scope. Consequently, the apprehension of all things through perception is impossible. Otherwise, all the different things such as taste, odour and so on would be apprehended through a single cognition at one and the same time which is not possible, there would be no apprehension of many things such as the mental thinking of other men and those things which are far away, or very small or hidden.³⁹ Otherwise, all characteristics could be attributed to all

38

Sarvapaḍārthajñānātsarvajña Iśyate, Tacca Sakal-avastuparijñānaṁ Kadācidindriyajñānena Va Bhavet, Manojñānena Vā. Pañjikā, 3157, p. 824.

39

Mābhūde-Kena Jñānena Yugapadaśeṣārthasya Grahaṇaṁ, Anekena Bhaviṣyatīti. Yato Yugapadanekavijñānāsambhavāt. Sambhave 'pi na Sarvapaḍārthagrahaṇamasti, Paracittasyendriyajñānāviśayatvāt, Agocaraprāptasya Ca Dūrasūksmavyavahitāderarthasya Tena Grahītumaśakyatvāt. Pañjikā, 3158, p. 824.

things. The apprehension of all things through mental-perception is also not possible. Mental perception has no independent operation of its own. It is supported by the fact that the deaf or blind persons also are found in the world. Therefore, it follows from this that mental perception envisages only those things which are apprehended by sense-perception.⁴⁰

It is inconsistent to say that a person can become omniscient by improving his power of intelligence (Prajñā) through the practice of Yoga and meditation. The power of intellect cannot reach the highest stage of perfection through any kind of Yogic practice. Sense-perception cannot transcend its inherent limitation and the mental cognition cannot overleap the range of knowledge of repeated experience. The intellect may become superior but it cannot reach its perfection. By practice a man can jump to the height of eight miles.⁴¹ All cannot know all. The knowledge of all objects cannot rest in one man. No one can become omniscient.⁴²

⁴⁰

Pañjikā, 3159, p. 825.

⁴¹

Daśahastāntaram Vyomno Yo Nāmotplutya Gacchati;
Na Yojana-masau Gantuṃ, Śakto'Bhyāsaśatairapi.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3168.

⁴²

Sarvaḥ Sarvaṃ Na Jānāti Sarvajño Nopapadyate;
Naikatra Pariniṣṭhā 'sti Jñānasya Puruṣe Kvacit.
Ibid., Verse 3173.

Again the omniscient person cannot be the object of mental-perception. In mental-perception a man can only apprehend those ideas which occur in his own mind. He cannot comprehend the thought-processes which are going on into the mind of other people. Also the omniscient person cannot be proved to exist by mystic cognition (Yogijñāna), because it is doubtful whether he is apprehended in such perception or not. Therefore, it cannot be said with certainty that an omniscient person is seen by a mystic (Yogī).⁴³

2. Inference (Anumāna)

The omniscient person cannot be proved to exist by inference. The Buddhists regard inference as based upon three kinds of mark (Linga): (1) non-apprehension (Anupalabdhih); (2) causal relation (Kāryakāranabhāva); and (3) the nature of things (Svabhāva).

He cannot be proved by non-apprehension because positive not negative reasoning is required to prove his existence. He cannot be proved by causal relation, because the causal relation is always based upon perception. The reason based upon the nature of things also cannot prove the existence of the omniscient person. His nature cannot be known, because he is not seen.⁴⁴

⁴³

Pañjikā, 3186, p. 830.

⁴⁴

Ibid., 3186, pp. 830-831.

There could be three kinds of fallacy in the reasoning for proving the existence of the omniscient person:

(1) inadmissible (Asiddha), (2) contradictory (Viruddha), and (3) inconclusive (Anāikāntika). Any reason may be

adduced as a property belonging to a positive entity (Bhāvadharma), or to a negative entity (Abhāvadharma), or to both. These three are the only possible alternatives.

The reason adduced as a property belonging to a positive entity is inadmissible, because that positive entity, that is, the omniscient person is still to be proved. The

reason adduced as a property belonging to a negative entity is contradictory. Such a reason would prove the non-existence of the entity, that is, the omniscient person.

The reason cannot belong to both, because such a reason would be inconclusive. Thus, none of the three kinds of mark can prove the inference of the existence of the omniscient person. Nor is he seen by us at the present time.⁴⁵

3. Analogy (Upanāna)

The omniscient person cannot be proved to exist by analogy which is based on similarity (Sādrśya) and its adjuncts (Upādhi). No person is seen at present time who may be called

45

Sarvajño Drśyate Tāvannedānīmasmadādibhiḥ;
Drṣṭo Na Caikadeśo 'sti Liṅgaṁ vā Yo 'Numāpayet.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3186.

similar to the omniscient person. Hence the existence of the omniscient person cannot be proved on the basis of Analogy. On the contrary, it is deduced from the Analogy that there is no existence of an omniscient person.⁴⁶

4. Presumption (Arthāpatti)

The omniscient person cannot be proved to exist through presumption. The teachings of the Buddha regarding Dharma and Adharma can be accepted as authority only when his omniscience is established. As a matter of fact, no relationship has been perceived between the omniscient person and the teachings of Dharma and Adharma. It can only be an instance of inference from a universal premise. According to the Mīmāṃsakas the teaching of Dharma may be due to dream, delusion, wrong teaching or the Vedas themselves.⁴⁷ The Buddha is ignorant of the Vedas, which has been accepted by the Buddhists themselves. Therefore, it

46

Sarvajñasadṛśaḥ Kaścidyadi DrśyetaSāmprati;
Tadā Gamyeta Sarvajñasadbhāva Upamābalāt.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3215.

47

Upadeśo Hi Buddhāderanyathā'pyupapadyate;
Svapnādīdr̥ṣṭ (Ṣṭam?) Vyāmohā (T) Vedadvādi
(Ccāvi?) Tathā (Tham) Śrutāt.
Ibid., Verse 3223.

Upadeśo Hi Vyāmohādapi Bhavati, Asati Vyāmohe Vedādapi
Bhavatī'ti Sābara Bhasya cited in Pañjikā 3223, p. 839.

is deduced that the teachings of the Buddha and other wicked teachers might have proceeded from sheer delusion for deceiving people.⁴⁸ Because a man who is ignorant of the Vedas cannot base his teachings upon the Vedas. In fact, the Buddha has imparted his teachings only to the ignorant persons and to the Śudras. If his teachings regarding Dharma had been based upon the Vedas, then he would have imparted his teachings to the Vedic scholars and the learned Brāhmanas as Manu and the other Brahmanic teacher who were learned in the Vedas have done.⁴⁹ Manu and other teachers were learned in the Vedas and they were dependent on the Vedas so far as the teaching of Dharma is concerned. They were well known among the Brāhmanas and the Vedic scholars who accepted their teachings, because their works have been based on their understanding of the Vedas.⁵⁰

48

Ye Hi Tāvadavedajñāsteṣāṃ Vedādasambhavaḥ;
Upadeśakṛto, Yastairvyāmo-Hādeva Kevalāt.
Śiṣyavyāmohanārthaṃ Vā Vyāmohād Vā Tadasryāt;
Loke Duṣtopadeṣṭṛṇāmupadeśaḥ Pravarttate.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3224-3225.

49

Ibid., Verses 3226-3227; cf. Pañjikā, 3226-3227.

50

Ye Tu Manvādayaḥ Siddhāḥ Prā-dhānyena Trayīvidāḥ;
Trayīvidāśritagranthāste Vedaprabhavoktayaḥ.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3228.

5. Words (Śabda)

The knowledge which proceeds from words (Śabda) is called verbal cognition (Śabda Pramāṇa). This Śabda Pramāṇa is based on two sources, first, that which is based on eternal words (Nityasabdajanitam), and the second, that which is based on the utterance of men (Pāuruseyadhvanihetukam).⁵¹ The human omniscience cannot be established by the means of Śabda Pramāṇa. There is no declaration in the Vedas regarding the existence of an omniscient person. At the same time he cannot be proved by an artificial truth.⁵² The Upaniṣadic declarations such as "He who is truthful in words, truthful in volition, truthful in desires, should be sought and should be desired to be known,"⁵³ are only commendatory according to the Mīmāṃsakas. There can be no reliability in the human assertion such as it has been quoted in the Buddhist scriptures: "The blessed

51,

Sabdādasannikṛṣṭe'rthe Yajjāyate Jñānam
Tacchabadam, Tacca Dvividham Nityasabdajanitam Pauruseya-
Dhvanihetukam Ca. Pañjikā, 3187, p. 831.

52

Nacāgamavidhiḥ Kaścinnityasarvajñabodhakah;
Kṛtrimēṇa Ca Satyena Sa Katham Pratipādyate.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3187.

53

"Yah Satyavāk Satyasaṅkalpaḥ Satyakāmaḥ So
hveṣṭavyaḥ Sa Vijijñāsītavyaḥ." From Upaniṣad cited in
Pañjikā, 3187, p. 831.

Lord the Tathāgata, the Arhat, is Truly Enlightened."⁵⁴

Thus human omniscience cannot be supported by Śabda
Pramāṇa.

6. Non-apprehension (Abhāva)

The existence of an omniscient person cannot be proved by any of the above mentioned five valid means of cognition. Therefore, it is concluded that his existence can be affirmed only by non-apprehension (Abhāva),⁵⁵ the sixth valid means of cognition.

Thus Kumarila, the expounder of Mīmāṃsā school, establishes the fact that human omniscience cannot be proved by reason or any valid means of cognition.

Arguments of Sāmata and Yajñata

Sāmata and Yajñata hold that the concept of human omniscience is purely baseless. It is wonder how people believe in omniscient person.⁵⁶

54

"Sarvajño 'Haṁ Sarvadarśi, Nāsti Tathāgatasya Kiñcidajñātamityādi." Cited in Pañjikā, 3187, p. 831.

55

Evaṁ Pañcabhirapi Pramāṇairna Sarvajñaḥ Siddhyatīti Pariśeṣyādabhāvenaiva Gamyat Iti Siddho 'Bhāvapramāṇa—Visayikṛtavigrahatvādityayaṁ Hetuḥ. Pañjikā 3229, p. 831.

56

Evaṁ Sarvajñatā Puṁsām Svātantryeṇa Nirāspadā; Idam Ca Cintyate Bhūyaḥ Sarvadarśi Kathaṁ Mataḥ. Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3247.

Does the omniscient person know all things simultaneously or in succession? Does he know them as possessing one nature or only very important aspects? Or, is he called omniscient because he has the power to know all things?⁵⁷ Just as fire is called the "all-devourer" (Sarva-Bhugiti), although it is not devouring all things, either simultaneously or successively.⁵⁸

If it is accepted that the omniscient person apprehends all things simultaneously, that is, at one and the same time, then there are two possible, alternative views regarding his apprehension. First, does he apprehend all things by a single cognition? Or, does he apprehend all things at once through several cognitions? The first alternative cannot be accepted because two contradictory situations cannot be cognized by a single cognition. The second alternative is not convincing either, because many divergent cognitions cannot appear at one and the same time.⁵⁹ In fact there has never been an experience of several

57

Yugapatparipātyā Vā Sarvaṁ Caikasvabhāvataḥ;
Jānanyathāpradhānam Vā Saktyā Veṣyeta Sarvavit.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3248.

58

Pañjikā, 3248, p. 845.

59

Yugapacchucyaśucyādisvabhāvanām Virodhinām;
Jñānam Naikadhiyā Dr̥ṣṭam Bhinnā Vā Gatayaḥ Kvacit.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3249.

cognitions in one single consciousness.⁶⁰

Just what does it mean to speak of cognizing all things by several cognitions in one moment? It is not possible to know, even in hundreds of years, all the innumerable things of the past, present and future.⁶¹

If it is accepted that the omniscient person apprehends only the "universal forms" (Sāmānyarūpa) of all things and he does not perceive their "specific individualities" (Svalak-
ṣaṇāni),⁶² then what is the use of such a person who knows only the "universal form" and not the "specific individuality."

Again the apprehension of the "universal form" by the said omniscient person may be either true or false. If it is true, then it means that all things are one, that is, free from plurality. This oneness of all things is contrary to our normal experience.⁶³ In that case there would be no difference between the disciple, omniscient person, Dharma, Adharma and the teachings of the omniscient person, because

60

Pañjikā, 3249, p. 845.

61

Bhūtaṃ Bhayadbhaviṣyacca Vastvanantaṃ Krameṇa Kaḥ;
Pratyekaṃ Saknuyādboddhūṃ Vatsarāṇāṃ Satairapi.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3250.

62

Ibid., Verse 3251.

63

Ibid., Verse 3253.

the "distinctive characteristic" (Svabhāva) of these things cannot be cognized.⁶⁴

The omniscient person would become a deluded person if his cognition of the oneness of all things is false. In that case there would be no faith in his words which are as good as the words of an intoxicated person.⁶⁵

The Buddhists hold that the omniscient person perceives all actions (Karmas) and their causes through extraordinary cognition produced by communion (Samādhi).⁶⁶ However, the validity of this statement cannot be proved. There is no valid means of cognition to establish the fact that an omniscient person perceives through extraordinary cognition. Neither perception nor inference nor Sabda proves that the omniscient person does so or not.⁶⁷ When the apprehension of the omniscient person through extraordinary cognition itself is not evident, there is no use in inferring whether he perceives all things simultaneously or successively

64

Tataśca Śiṣyasarvajñadharmādharmataduktayah;
Na Syurvo Bhinnarūpatve Svabhāvānavadhāraṇāt.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3254.

65

Ibid., Verse 3255.

66

Sahetu Sakalam Karma Jñānenālaukikena yah;
Samādhijena Jānāti Sa Sarvajño Yadīsyate.
Ibid., Verse 3256.

67

Pratyakṣamanumānam Vā Śābdam Vā Tadatatkṛtam;
Pramānamasya Sadbhāve Nāstīti Nasti Tadrśah.
Ibid., Verse 3257.

Either "the power of perceiving all things" itself does not exist or if it exists, it should be present in all persons.⁶⁸ Consequently all persons should know all things. But it is a fact that all people do not know all things.⁶⁹ Thus these Buddhists conclude that human omniscience cannot be established by any accepted valid means of cognition.⁷⁰ When the existence of an omniscient person is not proved, the Dharma cannot be known by human assertion.⁷¹ Consequently, the teachings of the Buddha or any other so-called omniscient person cannot be taken as authority for Dharma.

Here in this chapter we have outlined the arguments which the Mīmāṃsakas make against the possible existence of an omniscient person. They argue from what is logically possible and impossible and from what for them is the only accepted authority for truth regarding Dharma and Adharma, that is, the Vedas. Now we must show how the Buddhists attempt to meet these objections to their thesis that the human omniscience is possible and the Buddha is the only omniscient religious teacher of Dharma.

68
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3258.

69
Ibid., Verse 3259.

70
Ibid., Verse 3260.

71
Itthaṃ Yadā Na Sarvajñaḥ Kaścīdapyupapadyate;
Na Dharmādhigame Hetuḥ Pauruṣeyaṃ Tadā Vacāḥ.
Ibid., Verse 3261.

Chapter 3

BUDDHISTS' ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF HUMAN OMNISCIENCE

The main concern of this chapter is to show the logical arguments offered by the Buddhists, for example, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla to support the concept of human omniscience. In the previous chapter we have already seen that the Mīmāṃsakas have refuted the omniscience of the Buddha as well as the possibility of human omniscience through logical reasoning, so now we shall look at the Buddhist point of view.

In order to establish the possibility of human omniscience, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have set forth various modes of arguments. First, they give the definition and criterion of an omniscient person. Second, they establish that the possibility of human omniscience cannot be denied by any of the valid means of cognition.

Who is an omniscient person? Holding the Buddhist view Śāntarakṣita claims that that particular person should be called omniscient who has the true knowledge of all the objects and whose knowledge has been found quite reasonable

and satisfactory after careful examination. These criteria of an omniscient person he asserts, cannot be contradicted.¹

In fact, omniscience means the true and perfect knowledge of each and every object without exception. The true knower cannot misconceive anything.² Only an omniscient person can be a true knower of everything. That is why Śāntarakṣita holds that that person is omniscient who knows the real nature of the universe as soulless, momentary and full of suffering.³

Kamalaśīla further adds that that person alone should be regarded as omniscient whose teachings cannot be contradicted by any valid means of cognition.⁴

What is the criterion to determine whether or not a particular person is omniscient? The Buddhists hold, says Śāntarakṣita, that the criterion of an omniscient person is that he imparts teaching regarding heaven (Svarga) and liberation (Apavarga) very clearly and distinctly because

¹
Sanyak Sarvapadārthānām Tattvajñānācca Sarvavit;
Hetāvato Na Sambodhya Sandigdhavyatirekitā.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3330.

²
Pañjikā, 3330, p. 867.

³
Anirdiṣṭaviśeṣo 'pi Sarvajñah Ko 'pi Sambhavet;
Yo Yathāvat Jāgatsarvaṁ Vettyanātmādirūpatah.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3337.

⁴
Pañjikā, 3151 p. 823.

he knows their real significances. Otherwise, there is no use in finding out a person who possesses the knowledge of other things than the above, for instance, the knowledge of the number of sands of the ocean.⁵ It is their conviction that the knowledge of an omniscient person regarding prosperity, heaven, liberation, Dharma, self and other supersensuous truths is untrammelled by normal experience.⁶

- * An omniscient person is one who apprehends the true nature of all things of the past, present and future. He perceives existing things as existent, and non-existing things of the past and future as non-existent. In other words, the cognition of an omniscient person is unlimited.⁷ He is called omniscient because he knows all actions with their causes and effects through a single extraordinary cognition produced by meditation and communion (Samādhī).⁸

5

Svargāpavargamātrasya Viśpaṣṭamupadeśataḥ;
Pradhānārthaparijñānatsarvajña Iti Gamyate.
Samudrasikatāsaṅkhyāviññānaṁ Kvopayujyate;
Tasyāsmākamato'nyārthajñānasamvedanena Kiṁ.

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3528-3529.

6

Yasmādabhyudaye Mokṣe Sahaitaiḥ Sādhitaṁ Puraḥ;
Jñānamapratighaṁ Teṣāmāvaiṇīkamatisphutaṁ.

Ibid., Verse 3533

7

Ekaññānakṣaṇavyāptaniḥśeṣajñeyamaṇḍalaḥ;
Prasādhito Hi Sarvajñaḥ Kramo Nāśriyate Tataḥ.

Ibid., Verse 3657; cf. Panjika, 3627, p. 929.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, the expounders of Buddhism, hold that only an omniscient person can perceive Dharma, because he knows each and everything about the universe including supersensuous truths like Dharma, heaven, and liberation. In fact, by proving the existence of an omniscient person through logical arguments they do not mean to seek a man who knows everything other than Dharma. Their main aim is to search for a person who knows Dharma. This is possible only through an omniscient person. The mind of an omniscient person becomes free from the hindrances of affliction (Kleśāvarana) and the cognisable things (Jñeyāvarana). On account of the latter, Dharma and other supersensuous realities are revealed to his consciousness.⁹

Is it possible to apprehend supersensuous realities? Certainly it is not possible through normal vision. However, it is possible for an omniscient person, because he removes the hindrances of cognisable things by the practice of yoga. The Buddhists hold that the manifestation of supersensuous truths is possible because of the illuminative characteristic of knowledge. In other words, the nature of know-

8

Sahetu Saphalamkarma Jñānenālaukikena Yaḥ;
Samādhiḥ jñānāti sa sarvajña'padīśyate.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3638.

9

Pañjikā, 3267, p. 847.

ledge is that of light. It is clear (Nirmal) because it is free from the hindrances of affliction and the cognisable things. It is not shaken by the force of passion. Just like a lamp, it throws light on the objects.¹⁰

Therefore, it is quite possible for an omniscient person to have the direct knowledge of supersensuous truths like Dharma and others, because he acquires perfect wisdom by the means of yoga.

How can a person be the perceiver of Dharma when he also perceives the unclean things like taste and others simultaneously? In fact an omniscient person perceives only through the mind without the help of sense-contact with the objects. He may not be detracted from his situation as the perceiver of Dharma, even if he has the sense-contact with the objects, because the objects of the world are only illusory. The objects of the world are only manifestations of the consciousness (Vijñāna). Therefore, his five-fold actions are not influenced by the afflictions and his mind also cannot be disordered by perceiving impure things, because he perceives the objects of the world in their real illusory form.¹¹ This objection is possible only in the

¹⁰

Pañjikā, 3269, p. 847.

¹¹

Bhūtārthabhāvanodbhūtamānasenaiva Cetasā;
Aprāptā Eva Vedyante Ninditā Apī Samvṛtau.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3319.

realism where matter is conceived as eternal and real. But it is not applicable in idealism in which the Buddhists believe that the world arises only from consciousness. The omniscient person removes all the impurities and realizes the absolute reality, so he does not perceive the objects in the same form as they appear in the apprehension of ordinary men as real.¹²

Śāntarakṣita does not agree with the view of the Mīmāṃsakas that the omniscient person is not perceived by any of the valid means of cognition (Pramāṇa) except non-apprehension, so only the omniscient eternal Vedas should be accepted as the authority for Dharma. His first argument is that according to the view of the Mīmāṃsakas the author of the Vedas would have to be a person who has the power of perceiving supersensuous truths. In other words, he should be omniscient, because he is supposed to know the true nature of all things.¹³

The Buddhists have already proved that the author of the Vedas can be only a person who has acquired the knowledge of supersensuous truths like Dharma. Thus it follows that the existence of an omniscient person must be accepted

¹²

Pañjikā, 3319, pp. 864-65.

¹³

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3261-3262.

who is the direct perceiver (Sāksāt-drastā) of supersensuous truths. It is not possible to perceive anything through the Vedas.¹⁴

His second argument is that it is not possible to know Dharma and other supersensuous truths through the Vedas. In fact, the Vedas which are considered to be omniscient and eternal words by the Mīmāṃsakas, are impossible. Even if it is accepted that there is a possibility of having the eternal Vedas even then, it is not proper to accept that they are the means of knowing the supersensuous truths, like Dharma, Svarga and Moksa. They cannot reveal their meanings in succession, because when the cause is present, there, the effect should appear all at one and the same time. Again, in that case they will reveal the first effect over and again even at the succeeding moments. Furthermore, the capacity of revealing their meanings is not inherent in the Vedas. Otherwise they should reveal their meanings simultaneously. Also, the capacity of revealing their meanings cannot be due to any other instrumental cause, because that capacity is not considered different from the very nature of the Vedas. Even if the instrumental cause is accepted

14

Tasmādatīndriyārthānām Sākṣādraṣṭai vavidyate;
Natu Nityena Vacasā Kaścītpaśyatyasambhavāt.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3263.

there could be no relationship between it and the Vedas.¹⁵

It follows from the above statement that the Vedas can be accepted as authority for Dharma only when they are written by an omniscient person. The author of the Vedas who reveals heaven, sacrifice and other supersensuous truths must be a person who has realized them first; or he should know the significance of Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Or he should be knower of all Dharmas. Otherwise the reliability of the Vedas cannot be accepted.¹⁶

Thus the Mīmāṃsakas are wrong in holding the view that the concept of human omniscience is an impossibility. His existence cannot be denied in all three times--past, present and future by any valid means of cognition. It is wrong to say that a particular object does not exist, because it is not seen.¹⁷ According to the Buddhists there is the highest stage of wisdom which constitutes omniscience. Therefore, the objections lodged by the Mīmāṃsakas against the concept of human omniscience is not applicable here.¹⁸

15

Nityasya Vacasaḥ Śaktirna Svato Vāpi Nānyataḥ;
Svārthajñāne Samutpādye Kramākramavirodhataḥ.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3264; and Pañjikā, 3264, p. 846.

16

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3265-3266.

17

Ibid., Verse 3503.

The Valid Means of Cognition (Pramāna)

The concept of human omniscience cannot be disproved by any of the valid means of cognition, viz., perception (Pratyakṣa), inference (Anumāna), presumption (Arthāpatti), analogy (Upamāna), scripture or words (Śabda) or non-apprehension (Abhāva).

1. Perception (Pratyakṣa)

The concept of human omniscience cannot be disproved by perception. There can be no annulment in a case where perception is not applicable at all. The cognitions appearing in the minds of other people are not perceived by a person who is not omniscient. The conclusion which is deduced from the inapplicability of perception is quite different from the conclusion which is brought about by the applicability of perception. In fact applicability and non-applicability are contrary to each other and cannot co-exist in one and the same thing. Again the inapplicability of perception is not invariably concomitant with the non-existence of the thing concerned, because the perception is inapplicable, if the thing is hidden or remote. The statement that "perception having ceased proves the non-existence,"¹⁹

¹⁸

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3509.

¹⁹Pañjikā, 3268, p. 848.

does not mean that perception has disappeared from the present state. The Buddhists have already proved that the past and future things do not exist at all. There would not be any perception of what is non-existent. Secondly, the meaning of the statement may be accepted in the sense that though existing at the present moment it does not appear in connection with a certain thing. Even so, it cannot prove the non-existence of the thing in question. The visual perception does not appear in connection with odour or taste. But this does not prove that these latter do not exist at all. Thus perception cannot prove the non-existence of anything. Śāntarakṣita says that the Buddhists declare the non-existence of a jar or anything else on the basis of perception itself, in the form of non-apprehension. When two things are capable of figuring in the same cognition, the appearance of one implies the non-existence of the other. But the omniscience appearing in the same cognition with something else is never cognized. Thus Śāntarakṣita concludes that the non-existence of human omniscience cannot be deduced by the presence of any other thing.²⁰

2. Inference (Anumāna)

Inference also cannot disprove human omniscience for

it always envisages affirmation. Negation is envisaged by non-apprehension only. It can be said that inference is not absolute negation but only the relative negation. In other words, it is the negation of omniscience in relation to all men. Even so, inference is not possible, No 'mark' (Linga) is known to be present in all men, which is invariably concomitant with omniscience.²¹

3. Presumption (Arthāpatti)

Presumption too cannot negate human omniscience. First, the Buddhists do not admit of any means of cognition apart from perception and inference. Second, presumption is based upon the idea that a certain seen or heard fact is explicable only on the basis of the unseen factors. But there is no factor among men which can cause us to presume the non-existence of human omniscience.²²

4. Analogy (Upamāna)

Nor can analogy reject the concept of human omniscience. A man apprehends by analogical cognition either the remembered thing having for its adjunct the similarity of the thing which is present before the eyes, or mere similarity of the thing before the eyes with the remembered

²¹Pañjikā, 3268, p. 849.

²²Ibid., 3268, p. 849.

thing. Thus what is remembered and perceived as similar, is the object of analogical cognition.²³ Nobody can know the cognitions occurring in the mind of all men. So nobody can remember them. Nor can any body know any such property in common with non-omniscience, on the basis of which the non-omniscient character of men could be cognized through analogy. All men may be alike on the ground of being existent; but similarity of existence does not prove their non-omniscience.²⁴

The concept of human omniscience cannot be disproved by analogy. One can deny the concept of human omniscience only after seeing all men of all times, far and near. In that case he himself would be omniscient.²⁵

5. Scripture or Words (Śabda)

Words, as a means of cognition cannot set aside the concept of human omniscience. The Mīmāṃsakas themselves recognize that words emanating from human beings are not reliable in supersensuous truths. The Buddhists have already proved that words which are not emanated from human

23

Tasmādyatsmaryate Tatsyatsādrśyena Viśeṣitaṁ;
Prameyamupamānasya Sadrśyaṁ Vā Tadanvitaṁ.
Slokavārtika (Upamāna, 37), quoted in Pañjikā, 3268, p. 849.

24

Pañjikā, 3268, pp. 849-850.

25

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3558-3561.

beings are not reliable. Apart from this, there is no Vedic assertion that all men are non-omniscient. The fact that human omnisciences is not mentioned in the Vedas cannot establish the non-omniscience of all men.²⁶

6. Non-Apprehension (Abhāva)

It is inconclusive as well as inadmissible to take non-apprehension as a proof against the concept of human omniscience. If it is used in the sense of absolute negation, then it cannot form either the cognition or the means of cognition of the omniscient person because it is a non-entity. If it is taken to be a relative negation, even then it would not be reliable, because it would be the negation of the means of cognition. It cannot be taken as a particular form of cognition that an omniscient person does not exist, because he is not perceived by any one of the five means of cognition. If it is used in this sense, then it would not be a valid means of cognition.²⁷ Thus non-apprehension which is taken to be a kind of inference by the Buddhists, cannot disprove the concept of human omniscience.

Now what is the meaning of non-apprehension? Does it

²⁶

Pañjikā, 3268, p. 850.

²⁷

Ibid., 3269, p. 850.

mean the absence of one's own apprehension or the absence of the apprehension of all men? Again is non-apprehension without any qualification or is it qualified in some way?²⁸ The absence of one's own apprehension of the omniscient person cannot disprove the concept of human omniscience. Without a qualification, it is inconclusive. With a qualification it has no substratum. The three basic forms of non-apprehension also cannot prove his non-existence. The pervader and the pervaded, the cause and the effect and contrariness are possible only when the thing concerned is perceptible. Again there can be no certainty in his non-apprehension by all men. The omniscient person perceives himself by himself, because he is self-luminous.²⁹

Inference as a Proof of Human Omniscience

Śāntaraksita attempts to establish the concept of human omniscience by inference. Some people apprehend the omniscient person by inference. Hence there is a probability of his existence though the proof is not obvious at present.³⁰

²⁸ Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3277-3281.

²⁹ Svayamevātmanā 'Tmānamātmajyotiḥ Sa Paśyati;
Ityapyāśṅkyate 'Taśca Sarvādrṣṭiraniścita.

Ibid., Verse 3290.

³⁰ Ibid., Verse 3295.

Even if there is no inference, that does not mean the absence of human omniscience, because the means of cognition cannot be the cause for the existence of a thing. It cannot be said that there can be no doubt regarding the existence of only that thing which has been seen somewhere previously. In that case, one's mother's marriage becomes disproved.³¹ There is always doubt, according to the Buddhists, when there is no valid means of cognition regarding the existence or non-existence of things. A man cannot cognize a thing when his eyes are not perfect. The same is true in a situation when the eyes are perfect but the object is not there. Just like the conception of other men, the omniscient person cannot be seen directly by dull witted persons. His activity cannot be cognized just like the feeling of love arising in other men. Just like the fire in the iron ball, he is not constantly active. Again there shall be no cognition of connection of an omniscient person with action. It is for this reason that it is said that his existence cannot be proved by inference. Sometimes the concerned thing is found to exist even when the inference is inoperative, as in the case of red-hot iron ball.³²

31

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3299.

32

Ibid., Verses 3303-3306.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla hold that the omniscient person knows all actions with their causes and results by a single extraordinary cognition produced by Samādhi. The Buddhists have proved the concept of human omniscience through inference. They hold that human omniscience can be proved at least by one valid means of cognition that is, inference. This establishes the fact that the omniscient person really exists.³³

The Buddhists have proved the concept of human omniscience on the basis of inference and not on the basis of the scriptural declarations.³⁴ Again Śāntarakṣita cites a scriptural declaration also which is not found at present, read by Brāhmaṇas affirming the concept of human omniscience. Thus he establishes the omniscience of the Buddha on the basis of scripture also. Lord Buddha has been clearly mentioned as omniscient in the Vedic recensional text called Nimitta. He has been depicted there as one who, after showing himself in a dream as a six-tused white elephant, is born as Bodhi-

33

Sahetu Saphalaṃ Karma Jñānenālaukikena Yaḥ;
 Samādhijena Jānāti Sa Sarvajño'padiśyate.
 Purastādanumānena Tasya Sattā Prasādhitā;
 Pramānamasya Sadbhāve Tadastityasti Tadrśaḥ.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3638-3639.

34

Āgamaṇa Tu Sarvajño Nāsmādbhiḥ Pratipādyate;
 Laiṅge Sati Hi Pūrvokte Ko Namāgamato Vadet.
Ibid., Verse 3510.

sattva who is the ocean of good qualities: omniscient, full of compassion, pure, the father of the whole universe and reaching the state of immortality.³⁵

Thus Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla offer logical arguments which successfully answer the objection lodged by the Mīmāṃsakas against the Buddhist conception of human omniscience. In addition, they have dialectically established the complete validity of human omniscience. Their main aim is to prove that the Buddha is the only omniscient religious teacher. Before proving the omniscience of the Buddha they have established the possibility of human omniscience. They hold that a person can reach the state of omniscience by reaching the highest grade of intellect through the means of yoga. On this ground they establish the concept of human omniscience through logical arguments.

35

Ṇimittanāṃni Sarvajño Bhagavānmunisattamaḥ;
Sākhāntare Hi Viśpaṣṭaṃ Paṭhyate Brāhmaṇairvudhaiḥ.
Yo'Sau Śaddantamātmānamavadātadvipātmakam;
Svapne Pradarśya Sañjāto Bodhisattvo Guṇodadhiḥ.
Vighuṣṭasabdhāḥ Sarvajñāḥ Kṛpātmā Sa Bhaviṣyati;
Prāptāmr̥tapadaḥ Śuddhāḥ Sarvalokapita'Pi Ca.

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3512-3514.

Chapter 4

THE BUDDHA AS AN OMNISCIENT RELIGION TEACHER

To answer the objections of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Buddhist philosophers, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have vigorously proved the omniscience of the Buddha by their logical arguments. Śāntarakṣita's primary aim is to prove that the Buddha is the only real teacher who has taught the Saddharma (true religion). They have offered further arguments to find that the Buddha was the only omniscient teacher, because his teachings are defectless. The other religious teachers cannot be called omniscient because their teachings have been proved self-contradictory by the Buddhists. The Buddha knew the means of attaining svarga (heaven) and Moksa (liberation) because of his omniscience. His knowledge is not hampered by obstacles. He is omniscient because he has removed the hindrances of affliction and of cognisable things. There would be no defect in the teachings of a person who has realized Anātmavāda (soullessness), as there would be no darkness when the lamp is there.¹

The omniscience of the Buddha is argued for by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla using the logical methods of

Arthāpatti (presumption) and Anumāna (inference). The Buddha is a teacher of the doctrine of the Anātmavāda (soulessness), which is the nature of all objects. Therefore, his teaching contains the essential knowledge of the true nature of all things. He has criticized the Vedic animal-sacrifice and condemned the belief in existence of the soul. Not only this, he has preached the "Four-Noble-Truths" (Catvāri Ārya Satyāni) leading to Mokṣa. Consequently, from the above statement, it is inferred that he had true knowledge of all things, even those things which are taught in the Vedas. No one can teach these things who does not know the real nature of all things.²

The Dharma and other supersensuous truths might have been known to the Buddha, because he has taught them without learning them from the Vedas. Consequently, these things must have been known to him. Otherwise, it is not possible for any one to go on talking about supersensuous truths which cannot be proved by any valid means of cognition. He cannot derive his knowledge through inference, because he never perceived such things previously. He has not derived his knowledge from the teachings of other teachers because

¹ Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3338 and Pañjikā, 3338, pp. 869-870.

² Pañjikā, 3340, pp. 876-877.

his teachings are not similar to other teachers. Again it is wrong to say that conformity with reality in his teachings are purely accidental. Further, his teachings are in sequence and they fulfil the purpose of men, so it cannot be said that these teachings were asserted by a demented person. Therefore, it is inferred that the Buddha was omniscient and he did possess the knowledge of Dharma. That is why he has taught the truths which were not heard before him.³

It must be understood, as the Buddhists hold, that the omniscience of the Buddha does not depend on his knowledge of all objects such as the number of insects of the world, though knowledge of such objects is also possible for him. His omniscience depends upon his everlasting knowledge of the fundamental nature of all objects. Therefore his knowledge of "soulessness" will remain constant and unchanged.⁴

There is no doubt regarding the omniscience of the Buddha, because by following his teachings a person becomes liberated.⁵

³
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3454-3462.

⁴
Pañjikā, 3337, p. 869.

⁵
T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism,
p. 281.

The Buddha and the Other Religious Teachers

The Buddhists do not say that the Buddha alone is capable of achieving the state of omniscience. Any person may become omniscient who perceives the truth of "soullessness" which leads to liberation. However, the poets and the teachers of false doctrines cannot be called omniscient because they have not realized the Parama Tatva (absolute reality).⁶ Vardhamāna, Kapila and other teachers have not taught the doctrine of "soulessness". Instead, they hold the doctrine of the soul which is the root of all evils. Not only this, but they have asserted that things are permanent, which is disproved by valid means of cognition. So these religious teachers cannot be called omniscient, because they have expounded wrong doctrines regarding the true nature of things.⁷

The aim of the Buddhists is not to prove that other religious teachers are not omniscient. They only show the defects in their teachings. In fact, it is their assertion that any particular person should be accepted as omniscient who knows the true nature of everything on account of his realization of the absolute truth. In other words, they do

⁶
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3324.

⁷
Ibid., Verses 3325-3328.

not intend to say that only the Buddha should be accepted as omniscient. In principle, they accept the possibility of human omniscience.⁸

All other religious teachers have expounded the true nature of the universe in their teachings. The Buddhists have proved their doctrines as defective and full of contradiction. Therefore, other teachers should not be accepted as omniscient persons. Only the teachings of the Buddha are not disproved by reasoning because of his direct knowledge of the true nature of the things of the universe. So only the Buddha should be accepted as an omniscient religious teacher.⁹

The Buddhists hold that any person who knows the whole universe as "soulless" may be called omniscient without any distinction.¹⁰ According to Kamalaśīla only the Buddha fulfills this condition of becoming omniscient. In fact, only the Buddha and none else, fulfills all the conditions of an omniscient person, because only he has expounded

⁸ Anātmakṣaṇikatvādi Yadyevaṃ Sarvadarsīnaḥ;
Sākṣatsamastavastūnāṃ Tattvarūpasya Darśanāt.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3332 and Pañjikā, 3332-3333, p. 868.

⁹ Pratipāditarūpasya Sarvavastugatasya Ca;
Sākṣattattvasya Viññānatsugatāḥ Sarvadarsīnaḥ.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3334.

¹⁰ Anirdiṣṭaviśeṣo'Pi Sarvajñah Ko'Pi Sambhavet;
Yo Yathāvat Jāgatsarvaṃ Vettīyanātmādirūpataḥ.
Ibid., Verse 3337.

through various means the truth about what should be sought for and what should be rejected. He has taught the "Four Noble Truths" as a perfect means for that.¹¹ Therefore, only the Buddha should be accepted as an omniscient religious teacher.

A man cannot teach about the true and perfect nature of a thing unless he knows its true nature. So far as supersensuous truths are concerned, it is extremely difficult to know them.¹² Only the Buddha has expounded the true nature of worldly things and supersensuous realities like Dharma, heaven and liberation. That is why he has been accepted as the only omniscient religious teacher.

The Buddha cannot be compared with other religious teachers who have expounded false doctrines which are disproved by valid means of cognition. He has expounded the true doctrine which is supported by valid means of cognition, because his teachings are based on his realization of the truth.¹³

¹¹
Pañjikā, 3337, p. 869.

¹²
Cited in Pañjikā, 3337, p. 869.

¹³
Tena Pramāṇasaṁvāditattvadarsanayoginā;
Na Tulyahetutā'Nyeṣāṁ Viruddhārthopadeśinām.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3341.

He has propounded the perfect method of meditation upon "soullessness," which is the means to achieve prosperity and the highest good or liberation. The real nature of things is exactly as it has been taught by him. His teachings are not different from the real nature of things to the slightest degree when examined.¹⁴

The words of the Buddha are like jewels which destroy the darkness of wrong ideas. That is why he has been called omniscient by wise persons. He is the real knower of the Prakṛiti and the Puruṣa, and has been called the great physician. Due to his superiority of knowledge, the Buddha, who is a suppressor of Māra (desire) is distinct from Rṣabha, Kapila, Vardharmāna and other religious teachers because they have not taught the above mentioned doctrine.¹⁵

The Buddha and the Vedic Rsis

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla do not accept the concept of any similarity between the Buddha and the Rsis of the Vedas.¹⁶ The significance of the Buddha is that he

14

Sambaddhanugunopāyam Puruṣārthābhī-Dhāyakam;
Drṣṭe'Pyarthe Pramāṇābhyamiṣadapyaprabādhitaṁ.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3343.

15

Ibid., Verse 3347.

16

Pañjikā, 3484, p. 903.

perceived the Dharma by himself and expounded his doctrine in public due to compassion.¹⁷ Now it may be asked, what is the proof that the Buddha himself and not others, expounded the Dharma? To answer this question from the Buddhist point of view, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have accepted the same definition of the Dharma which is mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra and which is commonly accepted by all systems of Indian thought, i.e., that Dharma is that means by which prosperity and the highest good are achieved.¹⁸ And they have shown that the said definition is only applicable to the teachings of the Buddha.

The teachings of the Buddha are the only means to know the Dharma, which gives prosperity in this life. The incantations (Mantra), prescribed by him, give wisdom, health and power, when they are properly practised.¹⁹ His teachings also lead to the highest good after this life. The highest good or liberation is the absolute cessation of the series of births and rebirths. The teachings of the

17

Yadvā'Styeva Viśeṣo'Yam Manau Tadvacanesu ca;
Sa Dr̥stavānsvayaṁ Dharmamuktavañśca Kṛpamayah.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3485.

18

Yato'Bhyudayanispattiriyato Nihśreyasasya Ca;
Sa Dharma Ucyate Tadrksarvairēva Vicakṣanaiḥ.
Ibid., Verse 3486.

19

Ibid., Verse 3487.

Buddha are the only means to attain the liberation, because only he has taught the doctrine of "no-soul" which destroys the "afflictions" which are the causes of the circle of birth and rebirth. All other religious teachers hold the doctrine of a permanent soul. Therefore, his teachings are the only indicator of Dharma which leads to prosperity and highest good or liberation.²⁰ Thus they prove that the highest good or liberation is possible only in the teachings of the Buddha.

Liberation cannot be achieved by the teachings of the Vedic Rsis, because it follows from the cessation of the Aham (I-notion). They believe in the existence of the soul which is the root cause of "I-notion". There is very little possibility for attaining prosperity through their teachings on account of the destruction of the ten sins (Daśākusālahānitah). But there is not even the least possibility for attaining the highest good, because they believe in the existence of the soul which cannot destroy the afflictions.²¹ The description of the "ten good actions" (Daśaśubha-Karma), of the Buddhists are very powerful because they have been taught by the Buddha after realiz-

20

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3488-3493.

21

Ibid., Verses 3496-3497.

ing the truth.²² The afflictions can be destroyed only by following the teachings of the Buddha and not by following the teachings of the Vedic Rsis. Therefore, the teachings of the Buddha are the only means to lead to the highest good or liberation.

The Buddha and the Hindu Gods

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as the expounders of the Buddhists' view severely attack the Mīmāṃsakas' belief that omniscience can be attributed to Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva because they are immortal gods and embodiments of the Vedas which consists in the true knowledge of all things. On the other hand, the Mīmāṃsakas assert that omniscience cannot be ascribed to mortal beings such as the Buddha, whose knowledge is not based on the authority of the Vedas.²³ He claims that it cannot be proved that these Gods are the embodiments of the Vedas. They are different from each other and are considered eternal and are not dependent upon each other.²⁴ Thus it is absurd to say that these gods are

22

Daśa Karmayathā Proktāḥ Śubhā Ye Tāyinā Punaḥ,
Samyagdr̥styupagūdhāste Balavanto Bhavantyalaṁ.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3498.

23

Ibid., Verses 3208-3209.

24

Ibid., Verse 3547.

the embodiment of the Vedas, because there is no relation between the gods and the Vedas. There can be no relation of identity, because they are different. There can also be no causal relation because both are considered eternal. At the same time the Vedas also cannot be called omniscient for its meaning cannot be ascertained.²⁵

These Buddhists argue that there is no comparison between the Buddha on the one hand and the Brahṃā Viṣṇu and Śiva on the other, because these gods are considered omniscient on the basis of the Vedas which is not considered omniscient by the Buddhists. The omniscience of the Buddha is based on his real enlightenment achieved by his own effort.²⁶

Again they assert that it is wrong to say that the Buddha is mortal. He is beyond the "five-fold cycle of the world" (Pañcagatyātmasaṃsāra Bahir). Therefore, he cannot be considered mortal. It is only the Nirmānakāya (assumed body) which appears in human form, such as that of Siddhārtha, that can be called mortal.²⁷ When the Sambhoga-Kāya

25

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3548.

26

Svātantryena Ca Sambuddhaḥ Sarvajña Upapāditah;
Na Punarvedadehatvadbrahmādiriva Kalpyate.

Ibid., Verse 3549.

27

Pañcagatyātmasaṃsārabahirbhāvāna Martyatā;
Buddhānāmiṣyate 'Smābhirnirmāṇam Tattathāmatam.

Ibid., Verse 3550.

(body of the bliss) of the Buddha rejects its pious habitation in the heaven, Akānistha,²⁸ then it appears in the form of the Nirmānakāya of the Buddha which is subject to birth and death and thus mortal.²⁹ The Dharma-Kāya (cosmical body which is the absolute reality) and the Sambhoga-Kāya of the Buddha are not mortal. Thus the mortality of the Buddha cannot be proved. Furthermore, his immortality is proved by the Buddhist scriptures.³⁰

They further add that the statement of the Mīmāṃsakas that the human omniscience is impossible cannot be supported by proof. They hold that the existence of these gods cannot be proved because they are considered eternal. An eternal entity is conceived by the Buddhists to be non-existent, because it has no capacity of production either successively or simultaneously.³¹ Even if these gods exist, they cannot be compared with the Buddha. Their knowledge is wrong, because they believe in the existence of the soul. It has been already proved that the knowledge of the Buddha is true, because

28

According to the Buddhist mythology, Akānistha is the name of a particular heaven where only pure beings dwell. On the top of this heaven lies the Maheśvara-Bhavana which is the palace of the Supreme God (the Buddha). Pañjikā, 3551. p. 916.

29

Akanisthe Pure Rame Śuddhāvāsavivarjite;
Buddhyaṅte Tatra Sambuddā Nirmitastviha Budhyate.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3551.

30

Ibid., Verse 3553.

31

Ibid., Verse 3554.

he does not believe in the existence of the soul.³²

The Buddha and Hindu Religious Teachers

The Buddhists say that the teachings of the Buddha and the teachings of the Hindu teachers also cannot be compared.

Manu and other Hindu teachers, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla hold, influenced by greed, fear, hatred and jealousy, lacked compassion. They were partial in their teachings,³³ imparting their knowledge to the Brāhmanas alone. Their teachings to the Brāhmanas alone indicated that they had imparted their teachings under a delusion for they were not sure who were the real Brāhmanas.³⁴ They realized that the Vedas were not reasonable and comprehensible. They realized also that the Brāhmanas who had become dull-witted by the readings of the Vedas were not able to discriminate things for themselves. This was why they had imparted their teachings to the Brāhmanas alone.³⁵

32

Kiñca Tesām Viparyastaṁ Jñānamātmādidarsanāt;
Duddhānām Tvaviparyastaṁ Vistareṇopapāditaṁ.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3555.

33

Ibid., Verse 3570.

34

Ibid., Verse 3581.

Realizing the fact that the Vedas and Dharmaśāstra are not based on reason, they declared, in their own words, that the Purāṇa, the Dharmaśāstra, the Vedas with their subsidiaries and the medical science were self-sufficient commandments; these four could not be condemned by reasoning.³⁶

On the other hand, the Buddha imparted his teachings to all people without any distinction on account of his compassion. He had no fear of contradiction in his teachings, because he had realized the truth. A person becomes real Brahmana by following the teaching of the Buddha. In fact the Buddha had imparted his teachings to the real Brāhmanas and not to Manu and other religious teachers of Hindus. A Brāhmana is one who has removed all his sins. Such Brāhmanas are possible only under the teachings of the Buddha for he taught the destruction of all sins by constant practice upon "soullessness". He has described four kinds of Śramanas: Srotāpanna, Sakrdāgāmi, Anāgāmi and Arhat. Furthermore, these four kinds of Śramanas are really the

35

Niryuktikatvaṃ Vedārthe Jñāpanāśaktatā'tmani;
Vedādhīti jaḍā Viprā Na Parīkṣāksamā Iti.
Kutaścinniścitaṃ Sañke Nūnaṃ Manvādibhistataḥ;
Viprebhya Eva Vedādeḥ Kṛtaṃ Tairupadeśanaṃ.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3582-3583.

36

Purāṇaṃ Mānavo Dharmah Sāṅgo Vedaścikitsitaṃ;
Ājñāsiddhāni catvāri Na Hantavyāni Hetubhiḥ.
Ibid., Verse 3584.

four kinds of Brāhmaṇas. It is useless to say that they both are different.³⁷

✓ Thus the Buddhists (Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla) establish that the Buddha alone is omniscient because his teachings are the only true Dharma, the only perfect teachings that lack nothing. Only he has realized the unreality of the universe and has taught the "four noble truths". The universe, according to him, is only the embodiment of Pañca-Skandha ("five thought phases") and is full of suffering. Desire is the cause of all suffering which leads to the cycle of birth and rebirth, but suffering can be removed by realizing "soullessness". On account of these things he has been considered the leading philosopher.³⁸ ✓

The teachings of the Buddha are pure and in his teachings he has taught the doctrine of "soullessness" which has not been contradicted by any of the valid means of cognition. This type of teachings are not known to any man of the world, even to Lord Kṛṣṇa. That is why the Buddha is worshipped by wise men.³⁹ Because his teachings are vic-

37

Ye Ca Vāhitapāpatvadbrāhmaṇāḥ Pāramārthikāḥ;
Abhyastāmalanairātmīyāste Mūnereva Śāsane.
Ihaiva Śramanastena Caturddhā Parikīrttyate;
Sūnyaḥ Parapṛavādā Hī Śramaṇairbrāhmaṇaistathā.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3589-3590.

38

Etacca Sugatasyesmādaṁ Nairātmīyakīrttanāt;
Sarvatīrthakṛtāṁ Tasmātssthito Mūrdhni Tathāgataḥ.
Ibid., Verse 3340.

torious over evil forces and is the cause of all kinds of prosperity and the attainment of liberation, a person who has taught this cannot be any ordinary man. There is no place for any doubt that he is omniscient and he is the only omniscient religious teacher.⁴⁰ ✓

?The Buddha as the Only Omniscient Religious Teacher

The Buddhists refute the view of the Mīmāṃsakas that claims that only the impersonal Vedas should be accepted as authority for Dharma, because they are omniscient. They hold that the omniscience of the Buddha and eternalness of the Vedas also cannot be put on the same level, because they are not identical. If the Vedas were eternal, then alone the omniscience of the Buddha could be compared with them. However, no wise man has placed them both on the same footing. The permanence of the Vedas has been disproved by the Buddhists. They argue that a per-

39

Svabhyastadharmanairātmyā Yasyeyaṁ Deśanā'Malā;
Sādhitā Sarvasāstreṣu Sarvamānairavādhita.
Samsaryanucitajñānā Keśavāderagocarah;
Śirobhirarcyate Śaktyā Yācātīva Maṇiṣibhiḥ.

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3641-3642.

40

Ibid., Verses 3643-3644.

manent thing would produce the cognition and its effect simultaneously. But the Vedas produce their cognition in succession. Therefore, the Vedas are not eternal and cannot be compared with the omniscience of the Buddha.⁴¹

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have argued that the Buddha is the only omniscient religious teacher because he has expounded the true doctrines which are not disproved by any valid means of cognition. Other religious teachers and Vedic Rsis should not be considered as omniscient because their teachings have been found defective when they are examined properly according to the accepted rules of logic. Since they hold this view they quite consistently maintain that even the Gods are not omniscient because they believe in the existence of a permanent soul which is against the teachings of the Buddha.

These Buddhists establish the possibility of human omniscience in order to prove that only the teachings of an omniscient person can be accepted as an authority for Dharma.⁴² They have done this by proving the Buddha as omniscient religious teacher and furthermore that he is the only omniscient religious teacher. Therefore, only the teachings of the Buddha and not the other religious teachers should be accepted as the true Dharma (religion).

42

Ittham Yadā Ca Sarvajñāḥ Kaścidevopapadyate;
Dharmādyadhigame Hetuḥ Pauruṣeyam Tadā Vacāḥ.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3645.

Chapter 5

SUPERNATURAL POWERS OF AN OMNISCIENT PERSON

A. The Apprehension of the Omniscient Person

The main concern of this chapter is to answer from the Buddhist point of view the Mīmāṃsakas' objections regarding the apprehension of the objects by the omniscient person. The Buddhists maintain that such a person perceives all objects of the world simultaneously in a single cognitive moment.

Against this view the Mīmāṃsakas assert that it is not possible for any person to know all the minute details of his own body. Therefore, how could one talk of knowing all the objects of the world in a single moment, since it is not possible to know them even in hundreds of years.

Even if it is accepted that the omniscient person knows all the objects of the world the question still arises whether he apprehends them simultaneously or successively. In other words, how can the innumerable things having different forms be apprehended by a single cognition in their real forms? All these questions have been answered by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla from the Viññānavādi Buddhist point of view.

The Buddhists hold that the omniscient person perceives the objects of the world in a single moment. Now the Mīmāṃsakas raise the question whether he apprehends taste, odour, sound and other sense-data through one sense organ or more than one sense organ.

Śāntarakṣita deals with this question in detail. He points out that the omniscient person does not apprehend the objects through sense-perception. He perceives all things in a moment by mental cognition which is as good as perception. He acquires this mental cognition by meditation upon the truth regarding the real nature of all things.¹

Further he shows that the Mīmāṃsakas also accept the possibility of mental cognition without sense perception which takes place in the recollection of colour and other objects by memory. Furthermore, the Mīmāṃsakas also accept that there is mental cognition of objects while dreaming, though there is no interaction between sense organ and object.²

Again, according to Viññānavāda Buddhism cognition

¹
Samastavastusambaddhatattvābhyasabalodgataṃ;
Sārvajñam Mānaśam Jñānam Mānamekaṃ Prakalpyate.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3381.

²
Varṇyate Hi Smṛtistena Rūpaśabdādīgocarā;
Svapne Ca Mānaśam Jñānam Sarvārthānubhavātmakam.
Ibid., Verse 3384.

is restricted by different forms of disability (Dauṣkulya-vāsanā). When all notions and impressions of disability carried forward from previous births are removed, every cognition apprehends all the objects and thus it becomes all-pervasive. By this argument Vijñānavāda Buddhism establishes its view that the omniscient person apprehends all the objects by perception through the eye and other sense organs.

The Vijñānavādins consistently maintain that since the omniscient person's mental cognition is perfect and since every trace of disability has been removed, he is no longer subject to the restrictions of sense perception. He has complete mastery over sensory-perception. In this sense it can be said that the omniscient person perceives objects perfectly through the senses also.

Both the mind and the cognition of omniscient person become superior by the practice of a particular yoga.³ He attains the highest stage of wisdom by the constant practice of that yoga. Not only wisdom but other kinds of superior powers too are acquired by him due to the practice of yoga. Thus he attains that supreme wisdom which consists in the knowledge of all things. This wisdom would be imperfect while even a single thing is unknown.⁴ Thus he becomes

³
Pañjikā, 3389, p. 887.

omniscient by acquiring this supreme wisdom. All the objects are clearly manifested in a single cognition at this highest stage of conception. That is why the Buddha or the omniscient person apprehends all the knowable objects by a single cognition.⁵

How can an omniscient person have direct perception of past and future things? Śāntarakṣita holds that a yogi or the omniscient person apprehends all the objects by direct perception and thereby also determines past and future things; because past and future things are related as cause and effect respectively in the momentary flux of the things.

The Sautrāntika, a School of Buddhism, does not agree with this view. Its followers hold that the omniscient person has direct perception of all things. An omniscient person or yogi can perceive past and future things clearly through the power of meditation (dhyāna), and communion

4

Dharmāvabodharūpā Hi Prajñā Lakṣanataḥ Sthitā;
Ekasyāpyaparijñāne Sā'Samāptaiva Varttate.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3413.

5

Ekaññānakṣaṇavyāptaniḥśeṣajñeyamaṇḍalah;
Surāsurāśīroratnabhūtaḥ Siddho'Tra Sarvavit.
Ibid., Verse 3449.

6

Yadi Vā Yogasāmarthyādbhūtājātaniḥśeṣaḥ Sphuṭaḥ;
Līṅgagāmanirāsaṁ Mānasam Yogināṁ Bhavet.
Ibid., Verse 3474.

(samādhi). For example, in the case of a "true dream," conformity with the actual state of things is found in waking experience though in the dream state there is no sense-contact with actual things. They say that this kind of dream perception is also a valid means of cognition, because it fulfills all the conditions of perception. It is clear, distinct and free from conceptual content. At the same time, it is in conformity with the actual state of things. In the same way, though there is no specific individuality in past and future things, the supersensuous cognition of the yogi, by its own power envisages each past and future thing as manifesting a specific individuality.⁷

Not accepting this view of the Sautrāntikas, Śāntaraksita says that the omniscient person has knowledge of supersensuous truths by the force of meditation (Dhyāna) which directly envisages all things through inference, without the help of the scriptures.⁸

There is no succession in the cognition of an omniscient person. The Buddhists do not admit succession in the cognition of an omniscient person, because he apprehends all the knowable objects within a single cognitive moment.⁹

⁷
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3475.

⁸
Atīndriyārthavi jñānam Pūrvoktādanumānataḥ;
Muneh Sumatayah Prāhurnānyatastvāgamātkṛtāt.
Ibid., Verse 3477.

The cognition of an omniscient person is free from limitations. He perceives existing and non-existing things equally. There is no difference between things and their functions in the cognition of an omniscient person. He envisages all things in his cognition and not only a particular thing such as blue or yellow.¹⁰

If the omniscient person embraces all the objects within the orbit of a single cognition, then how can the things of the world remain unlimited? In other words, being apprehended by a single cognition of the omniscient person would the things of the world not become limited? Kamala-sīla says that this objection is not applicable either in Nirākāravijñānavāda (the view that cognitions are formless) or in Sākāravijñānavāda (the view that cognitions have forms).

Objections Answered in the Nirākāravijñānavāda

According to Nirākāravijñānavāda the things of the world would not be limited if the omniscient person perceives all the things of the world by a single cognition. The cognition of the omniscient person simply proves that

⁹
Eka jñānakṣaṇavyāptanihśeṣa jñeyamaṇḍalah;
Prasādhito Hi Sarvajñah Kramo Nāśriyate Tataḥ.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3627.

¹⁰
Pañjika, 3267, pp. 929-930.

the things are existent. That certain things are cognized by a single cognition does not mean that the things have given up their own characteristics. In other words, the things of the world would not give up their characteristics of endlessness if they are cognized by a single cognition of the omniscient person. In our normal experience we apprehend various things, like blue and yellow and so forth while appearing in a single picture by a single cognition. But they do not give up their characteristic of being many, nor do they become mixed together. The Vedānta also maintains that the function of knowledge is to apprehend the objects as such. It cannot bring any change in the nature of things.¹¹ The things are cognized in their real form just as they are cognized in their real form in the normal cognition of a picture. The omniscient person apprehends the existing objects of the world exactly as they exist. In fact, there is no end of the things of the world. Therefore, they appear in the cognition of an omniscient person as limitless and not as limited.¹²

When the omniscient person apprehends all the things of the world, must he not apprehend their limits also? In

¹¹,
Sāriraka Bhāṣya 3/1/21.

¹²
Pañjikā, 3627, p. 930.

answer to this question Kamalaśīla argues that the things of the world do not have real existence. The omniscient person apprehends their momentary characteristic. Everything of the world is in universal flux, and the omniscient person perceives this characteristic in his consciousness. It is in this sense that it has been said that the omniscient person apprehends all the things in their entirety by his single cognition.

Now, the mere fact that all the things of the world are apprehended by a single cognition of the omniscient person implies that these are limited. To avoid this difficulty Kamalaśīla says that according to the Nirākāra-vijñānavāda this objection is not applicable. In this view there could be no actual inclusion of things in the cognition. The things are indicated by the cognition of the omniscient person merely as existing. They are limitless because they are not apprehended by the cognition. They must have limits if they are apprehended by his cognition.

How can a person be called omniscient if he does not perceive all things in his cognition according to the Nirākāravijñānavāda? Kamalaśīla says that he is omniscient by the very fact that he does not perceive things as limited. If he perceives the limitless things as limited, then he cannot be omniscient. Only that person should be called omniscient who perceives existing things as existent, and

non-existing things as not existent.¹³

How can there be apprehension of things in Nirākāra-vijñānavāda when such cognition would not be distinguished. Again is there no differentiation of a particular thing and its functions?

Kamalaśīla does not admit the differentiation of things and their functions, because the omniscient person envisages all things simultaneously and not particular things such as blue or yellow only. The common person envisages only particular things, otherwise the common person also would be omniscient. Thus the omniscient person has formless cognition which is brought about by the power of ¹⁴ yoga.

The objects that should be acquired and that should be rejected appear in his consciousness without losing their character or without any incongruity. He also has the cognition of the distinctness of the objects in his consciousness.

Thus there is no room for any objection regarding the cognition of the omniscient person in the view of Nirākāravijñānavāda Buddhism.

¹³

Pañjikā, 3627, pp. 930-931.

¹⁴

Ibid., 3627, p. 931.

Objections Answered in the Sākāravijñānavāda

Similarly no objection can be raised from the Sākāravijñānavāda (Cognition with form) point of view. According to this view, when unlimited things appear in existence they manifest themselves in endless forms. Now, how can an omniscient person apprehend all these forms simultaneously? In answer to this question Kamalaśīla says that the consciousness of the omniscient person also takes unlimited forms while perceiving the forms of the unlimited things. This possibility is proved by our normal cognitions. A single normal cognition can envisage the forms of several things.¹⁵

Again the Buddhists hold that since the forms of the things are only manifestations of consciousness they are unreal. According to this view, it would be wrong to say that one thing actually has many forms, because the forms are unreal. Either every thing may possess one real form or one thing may possess different forms. In both these cases it is difficult for an omniscient person to apprehend all these forms simultaneously. Actually many forms do not belong to one thing as they are unreal. If one thing has several real forms, then the question of incompatibility between one form and the other forms may arise. The omni-

¹⁵ Pañjikā, 3627, p. 931.

scient person perceives the true nature of all things, that
 16
 is, both the forms and things are unreal.

The omniscient person cannot be mistaken in his apprehension of external objects, because he perceives by the most valid means of cognition. In fact, according to the Sākāravijñānavāda, there is no means by which the apprehension of the things is possible. In our normal cognition only the form of a thing is apprehended. The omniscient person, however, perceives the forms of unlimited things in a single extraordinary mental cognition, because he has acquired boundless capacity of apprehension and his consciousness becomes the substratum of the cognition of all things.

The diverse forms of things do not appear into the consciousness of an omniscient person. But all the existing things as such appear into his consciousness. The capacity of the omniscient person is so great that his consciousness cannot be trammelled by envisaging all things. Also there is no incongruity in holding that the consciousness of an omniscient person apprehends the forms of unlimited things. In fact, the limitless things cannot be apprehended by normal cognition. The question regarding the number of things does not arise in the apprehension of an omniscient person.

Thus the question of a limit or number of things can arise only with normal cognition.¹⁷

According to another view there is no objective basis in the consciousness of the omniscient person. It is valid like a true dream, because it is in conformity with the real state of things. According to this view it cannot be said that the things become limited when they are apprehended by the omniscient person.¹⁸

Further, Śāntaraksita contends that all things can be apprehended, either simultaneously or successively depending on the will of the omniscient person. On account of the removal of all evil he acquires this capacity so that he knows without flaw whatever he desires to know. He can know the objects either simultaneously or in succession, according to his desire because he is the Lord.¹⁹

There is no incongruity even if the omniscient person perceives the things in succession. He is called omniscient because he successively apprehends all the know-

¹⁷
Pañjikā, 3627, p. 932.

¹⁸
Ibid., 3627, p. 932.

¹⁹
Yadyadicchatī Boddhum Vā Tattadvetti Niyogataḥ;
Śaktirevamvidhā Tasya Prahīnācarano Hyasau.
Yugapatparipātyā Vā Svecchayā Pratipadyate;
Labdhajñānaṁ Ca Sittvo Hi Sakṣanairhyādibhiḥ Prabhuḥ.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3628-3629.

able things which possess the nature of "four truths" (Catuhṣatya) through his sixteen consciousnesses (Cittāḥ). When this successive consciousness of the omniscient person takes place he has not to wait for a single moment for perceiving all the things what to say of hundred of years.²⁰

Here one question is very important whether the omniscient person apprehends the "specific individuality" (Svalaksana) of the object or only "universals" (Sāmānyalaksana). Kamalasila quotes certain Buddhist scriptures where it is said that the cognition of a yogi (omniscient person) which is free from all impurities (Anāśravam) grasps the "universal" only and not to "specific individuality."²¹ Now how it can be said that the omniscient person apprehends each and every form of all the objects unless he is a perceiver of their "specific individuality" also.

To answer this objection Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāsīla hold that it is wrong to say that the omniscient person cannot perceive the "specific individuality" of all the objects. The omniscient person cognizes the very forms of all the

20

Yadvā Sodasābhiścittaiś Catuhṣatyaśvābhavakam;
Kramenā Vetti Vijñeyam Sarvaṁ Sarvavidityataḥ.
Tatra Tādṛśi Vijñāne Kramenā Bhavati Prabhoḥ;
Lavamātro'pi Nāpekṣyaḥ Kimāṅgābdaśatāvadhīh.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3630-3631.

21

Pañjikā, 3632, p. 933.

objects apart from their own undiversified form.²² They further add that it is not inconsistent to say that the omniscient person apprehends the "universal" and the "specific individuality" in one and the same cognition.

The very "specific individuality" of a thing is called "universal" because it appears to be of similar form in comparison to the form of things of other kinds.²³ A great yogi (omniscient person) apprehends only the "specific individuality", because his cognition is produced by the force of concentration and meditation (Bhavanā).²⁴

It is clear that the omniscient person perceives the "specific individuality". Therefore, it cannot be said that all the objects must become one, because the "universal" and "specific individuality" are perceived as one by a single cognition of the omniscient person. Really the omniscient person perceives the "specific individuality" and not the "universal". In fact, the "universal" is considered by the Buddhists as illusory, because it cannot be described as

22

Svabhāvenāvibhaktēna Yaḥ Sarvamaṇavaḥśyate;
Svarūpaṇyeva Bhāvanāṁ Sarveṣāṁ So'vaḥśyate.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3632.

23

Pañjikā, 3633, p. 933.

24

Tadgrāhakaṁ ca Vijñānaṁ Bhāvanābalabhāvi Yat;
Yogisānamabhivyaktaṁ Tatsvalakṣaṇagocaraṁ.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3634.

"that" or "not that". It is wrong to consider them as real. Actually the omniscient person does not apprehend the "universal" because it is unreal. Even if he perceives those "universal" he would apprehend it as illusory because his consciousness itself is a valid perception and is free from conceptual content. If he apprehends the "universal" as real, his consciousness would be associated with conceptual content and error.²⁵

The "universal" is of the nature of conceptual content. The consciousness of the omniscient person which envisage the "universal" would also be of the nature of conceptual content. In that case, his consciousness would be associated with error because the conceptual content is already false.²⁶ The "universal," which is said to be the essence of conceptual content, and beyond description and is always in contiguity, is actually held by the Buddhists as formless.²⁷

Thus Śāntarakṣita finds every reason in holding that the omniscient person perceives all things and their

25

Tattvānyatvādyanirdeśyam Yatparāisca Prakalpitaṃ;
Sāmānyam Tasya Nāitena Grahaṇam Yogicetasā.
Avikalpamavibhṛāntaṃ Tadyogiśvaramānaṣaṃ;
Vikalpavibhramākṛāntaṃ Tadgrahe Ca Prasajyate.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3635-3636.

26

Pañjikā, 3637, p. 934.

27

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3637.

causes, by his single extraordinary cognition.²⁸ He has the capacity to perceive either simultaneously or successively when he imparts his teaching, because of his illuminative consciousness.²⁹

B. Omniscience and Speech

Though the possibility of the existence of an omniscience person may be accept in theory, still how can the teachings of any particular teacher regarding supersensuous truth like Dharma, Svarga and Moksa carry conviction until it is proved that he is omniscient, by proper examination. In other words, as long as the Buddha is not proved to be omniscient, his teachings cannot be accepted as valid.³⁰

Again, words cannot be uttered by an omniscient person while he is absorbed in the last stage of meditation, that is, the tenth stage (Bhūmi). There are three possible ways of obtaining the teachings about supersensuous truths from an omniscient person: (1) Either he should speak while

28

Sahetu Saphalam Karma Jñānenālaukikena Yah;
Samādhijena Jānāti Sa Sarvajño'Padisyate.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3638, cf. Ibid., Verse 3256.

29

Yugapatparipātyā Vā Jñānam Kāryātprakāśitāt;
Sāmarthyamapi Tasyāsti Deśanām Kurute Yadā.
Ibid., Verse 3640.

30

Ibid., Verse 3232.

he is in the state of omniscience which is reached in the tenth stage (Bhūmi) called Dharmameghā, or (2) he should speak after waking from the tenth Bhūmi. Or (3) he should not himself impart teachings but the teachings should come forth from his surroundings while he is absorbed in meditation.

How can an omniscient person utter a word while he is standing upon the Dharmameghā Bhūmi? In this stage his mind is completely concentrated and he becomes one with the Absolute reality.³¹ Consequently, he is not able to propound any teaching or Dharma because he always stays in rapt meditation.³²

It is also not correct to say that he could impart his teachings after waking from Samādhi. In this stage his teachings cannot proceed without some sort of cognition. As a matter of fact, in this conceptual state there will not be any difference between an ordinary man and an omniscient person. It is also incorrect to maintain, as the Buddhist scriptures do, that the omniscient person does not teach anything because he is always absorbed in non-concep-

31

Daśabhūmigataścāsau Sarvarāgādisaṅkṣaye;
 Śuddhasphaṭikatulyena Sarvaṃ Jñānena Budhyate.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3238, cf. Daśabhūmika-Sūtra, pp. 25-26.

32

Dhyānāpannaśca Sarvārthaviṣayāṃ Dhāraṇāṃ Dadhat;
 Tathā Vyāptaśca Sarvārthāṃ Śakto Nāivopadeśane.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3239.

tual Samādhi and that under his supervision the teachings of Dharma are revealed in the various forms.³³ This statement of the Buddhists' scripture needs clarification. How, then can we be certain whether the teachings of Dharma are propounded by an omniscient person or proceed from some other and untrustworthy sources.

→ Can a person impart his teachings after reaching the state of omniscience? In other words, can the Buddha impart his teachings while standing in this state? Speech is impossible during the state of omniscience, because there is no conceptual content in this state and speech is not possible without conceptual content. If the Buddha is omniscient, then he cannot speak. If he speaks, then he cannot be omniscient. Omniscience and speech cannot exist together, because they are contrary to each other. Conceptual content is the indirect cause of speech. It is impossible to speak without previous cognition and thinking. Conceptual content associated with verbal expression cannot perceive the form of objects, because it is associated with verbal expression. Thus omniscience is not possible during the conceptual state, because at this state the forms of objects are not perceived. As omniscience and speech are contrary

33

Yadā Copadiśedekaṁ Kiñcitsāmānyavaktrvat;
Ekadeśajñagitaṁ Tanna Syātsarvajñābhāsitaṁ.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3240. cf. Pañjikā, 3240, p. 843;
cf. Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra, pp. 142-143.

to each other, the presence of one implies the absence of the other.³⁴

The Buddhists (Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla) have sought to prove the omniscience of the Buddha on the basis of his teachings. They claim that the Buddha is the only omniscient teacher because he has taught the true nature of all things. But the question arises how can the Buddha or an omniscient person impart his teachings in the state of omniscience when he cannot speak?

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have answered this question by describing two different views regarding the speech of the Buddha. According to the first view, the speech of the Buddha is the expression of conceptual content. According to the second view the Buddha speaks even without conceptualization on account of his previous impetus.³⁵

The first view admits that there can be no omniscience during the conceptual state. But those who uphold this view maintain that omniscience cannot be disproved in the non-conceptual state because in that state the conceptual content, which is the cause of speech, is absent. Though

³⁴
Pañjikā, 3358, p. 881.

³⁵
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3359, also Pañjikā, 3359, p. 882.

³⁶
Pañjikā, 3362, p. 882.

in the conceptual state the Buddha is not omniscient, yet his words should be regarded as spoken by an omniscient person. His non-omniscience is removed through the attainment of the state of omnisciences. Once he has reached the state of omniscience, his words are accepted as reliable. He cannot be mistaken because he has a clear knowledge of real and super-imposed objects. He apprehends the objects of conceptual content as merely super-imposed (parikalpita). His speech is the outcome of his direct apprehension of the real state of objects.³⁷

The second school of Viññānavāda Buddhists holds the view that the words proceed from the Buddha even without conceptual content. His teachings proceed under the force of the initial momentum originally imparted by his previous piety.³⁸ In other words, the knowledge and piety that were already in him before his omniscience continue to impel him to speak, though now there is no further conceptualization going on in his mind.

Apart from these two Buddhist views, Śāntarakṣita himself has provided a further view arguing that it is improper to say that the Buddha would not be able to impart

³⁷

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3363-3365.

³⁸

Cakrabhramaṇayogena Nirvikalpe'Pi Tāyini;
Sambhārāvegasāmarthyāddeśanā Sampravarttate.

Ibid., Verse 3368

any teaching when he is absorbed in meditation after passing through the ten states (Bhūmis). The Buddhists do not hold that the Buddha stands upon the tenth stage (Bhūmi). In fact the ten levels mark the development towards the attainment of the Bodhisattva-stage and the state of perfect enlightenment (Buddhatva) lies beyond that.³⁹ After reaching this state the teaching of a person proceeds freely even from the walls without any appurtenance just as light radiates from Chintamani gems.⁴⁰ Thus the Buddha is regarded as the author of the scripture which is composed of his teachings. He is not an actual speaker but a "supervisor". Therefore, he should be taken as the final authority for Dharma. Hence his speech should be regarded as free from any conceptual content.

The second view does not seem convincing because speech is not possible without conceptual content. The view of Śāntarakṣita himself also does not seem to be reasonable either for it is impossible for common people to receive this mystic language through walls and understand its real meaning in their own languages.

39

Pañjikā, 3592.

40

Tasmindhyānasamāpanne Cintāratnavadāsthite;
 Niścaranti Yathākāmaṁ Kuṭyadibhyo'Pi Deśanāḥ.
 Tābhirjijñāsitanānarthānsarvān Jānanti Mānavāḥ;
 Hitāni Ca Yathābhavyam Kṣipramāsādayanti Te.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 3241-3242.

The first view, however, sounds quite convincing, that is, the teaching of the Buddha should be accepted as authoritative because he has previously reached the state of omniscience. The authority of the Vedas also is accepted by the orthodox Hindu philosophers only on the basis that the Vedic Rsis have realized it in their Samādhi. The Buddhists also believe in Jīvanamukti or Apratisthita-Nirvāṇa. So it is possible for a person to continue his present life after the realization of the Absolute Reality. The teaching of a person who has been liberated in his life time should be taken as authority for Dharma. Therefore, the teachings of the Buddha should be accepted as authoritative if he has become omniscient and has realized the ultimate truth in Samādhi.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

Why have the Buddhists given logical arguments to establish human omniscience? Or what is the purpose of using reasoning in support of human omniscience in general, or the omniscience of the Buddha in particular? In fact, Santaraksita and Kamalasila wanted to prove that the knowledge of supersensuous truths like Dharma, Svarga (heaven), Atman (soul), Punarjanma (rebirth) and Moksa (liberation) could be accepted as authoritative if they were taught by an omniscient religious teacher. The question about the omniscience of a particular religious teacher does not arise for those who have faith in him and blindly follow his teachings regarding Dharma. However it is essential to prove the omniscience of that particular religious teacher through logical arguments for those who do not have faith in him and question his religious authority.

In establishing the authority of the teachings of the Buddha regarding Dharma and other supersensuous truths, it was necessary for these Buddhists to verify the existence of the omniscient person and the omniscience of the Buddha who taught these religious truths which are not perceived

through normal human perception.

Now is there any possibility of human omniscience? It is possible according to the Buddhists because they accept the ascending grades of wisdom. It is remarkable that not only the Buddhists but almost all the systems of Indian philosophy, except the Mīmāṃsa and Cārvāka schools, believe that a man can reach the highest wisdom through the proper practice of a particular yoga. Therefore, the Buddhists are quite consistent in believing that any person can reach the state of omniscience through the practice of yoga. In other words, every individual has the potentiality to acquire this state. This state of omniscience is rooted in every individual just like the state of Buddhahood. In fact, omniscience is necessarily connected with the Buddhahood. The Buddhists hold that when a person becomes enlightened (the Buddha), he becomes omniscient by the removal of Kleśāvarana and Jñeyāvarana. On the basis of this they quite consistently maintain that omniscience is a positive entity which is featureless.¹ Every individual can achieve the state of omniscience by a particular practice of yoga.

Furthermore, we must consider the very crucial question of whether or not the Buddha has reached the state of omniscience. The Buddhists have very convincingly be-

¹

Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3357.

lieved that the intellect has the capacity to reach perfection. The intellect reaches its perfection in Samadhi and becomes one with the state of omniscience. Professor T. R. V. Murti quite consistently observes:

There is, however, no valid objection against the existence of an omniscient person. A fact cannot be denied because it is not cognised by all and sundry. There is positive evidence of the omniscience of the Buddha; for, following the path taught by him one is freed of saṃsāra. Most of the objections against the acceptance of omniscience are based on the assumption that it is the acquisition of a new faculty, or that it is a laborious process of accretion of information. It is on the other hand a case of divesting the mind of its accidental defects which have crept into it. In itself the intellect is transparent and has natural affinity with the real.* By the contemplation of the unreality of things (nairatmya-bhāvanā) it is possible to void the intellect of all defects, kleśas. Owing to the removal of the obscuring factors omniscience shines out, as there is nothing to obstruct its vision. Those that deny omniscience really deny the possibility of the intellect to be free from defects. They must logically deny freedom (mukti) too.²

*(Footnote No. 7 in original source).

prabhāsvarāṃ idaṃ cittāṃ tattvadarsana-sātmakam;
prakṛtyaiva sthitaṃ yasmān malās tv āgantavo matāḥ.
TS p. 895. (Author's note: TS p. 895 refers to
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3435.

Both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla maintain that any person can reach the state of omniscience by a particular practice of yoga which is capable of destroying the hindrance of cognizable things. They are not holding a unique view

because this possibility of human omniscience is accepted by almost all schools of Indian philosophy except the Cāravāka and Mīmāṃsā. In accepting the possibility of human omniscience they hold that the intellect (Buddhi) has the capacity to transcend its own limitation and to become identified with the Absolute Reality. This intuitive realization of the Absolute Reality is the state of omniscience. On the basis of this they are quite consistent in establishing the Buddha who claims to realize the ultimate reality, as an omniscient religious teacher.

The claim by the respective followers of Vardhamāna, the Jaina teacher, Kapila, the Sāṅkhya teacher, and Kaṇādi, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika teacher, that they are omniscient persons makes it doubtful as to who is the real omniscient religious teacher. It is very difficult to determine among all these teachers who is omniscient only on the basis of their teachings of Dharma, because their teachings radically differ from each other. If all these teachers are omniscient, then it logically follows that there should not be any difference of opinion in their teachings of Dharma and the nature of the universe.³ However, there is disagreement between their teachings regarding supersensuous truths. Therefore, it is very difficult to believe who is

³
Pañjikā, 3148, p. 822.

really an omniscient teacher.

On the basis of his teachings which are claimed by them to be the only perfect teachings, because they are not refuted by any valid means of cognition, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have tried to prove by logical arguments that the Buddha was the only omniscient religious teacher. Other schools of Indian thought, however, also have given equally convincing arguments in support of the omniscience of their respective teachers. For instance the Jainas have argued to prove that Vardharmāna was the only omniscient teacher on the basis of his teachings which they claim, just like the Buddhists, to be the only perfect teachings. This type of claim by various schools of Indian thought creates doubt as who is the real omniscient religious teacher.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, unlike the Buddha, do not accept the Vedic Rsis as omniscient. They have drawn this distinction between them on the basis of their teachings. They hold that only the Buddha and not the Vedic Rsis should be accepted as authority for Dharma because he is omniscient. They maintain that the omniscient Buddha has expounded his teachings regarding Dharma after realizing the Ultimate Reality. Therefore, his words regarding supersensuous truths are authorities.

In fact these Buddhist authors have failed to realize that the teachings of the Vedic Rsis are also based on

intuitive realization. The Vedic Rsis have also realized the Absolute Truth in Samadhi and call it the Vedas or Śrutis.

The Vedic Rsis also claim that prosperity and highest good are achieved through their teachings of Dharma. They also accept that freedom (Mukti) is the final aim of human life. The freedom is achieved by the knowledge of Ultimate Truth (Brahman or Ātman). When the soul (Ātman) is associated with ignorance (Avidyā) then it is called ego (Jīva), because it is associated with the "I-notion" (Ahaṅkāra). When the ignorance of the Jīva is destroyed through knowledge (Jñāna), his "I-notion" vanishes and he realizes his true nature, that is, the Ātman. This is the state of liberation. It can be said from the side of the Vedic Rsis that liberation is possible only when the existence of Ātman is admitted. Otherwise, who will be liberated?

Thus it is not consistent to hold as the Buddhists do, that liberation or highest good is possible only in the teachings of the Buddha and not in the teachings of the Vedic Rsis. The Vedic Rsis are also claimed like the Buddha to be omniscient because of the realization of the Absolute Truth. The omniscience of a person can be judged only by one who has become enlightened. At the same time, the teachings of the Buddha regarding Dharma cannot be disproved

by common people, because he has been claimed to be omniscient on account of his enlightenment by the Buddhists.

On the basis of Buddha's teachings of "soullessness" which he has expounded after having realized the true nature of the universe through his enlightenment, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla aim to prove that only the Buddha is omniscient teacher. He is not prepared to accept even the immortal Hindu gods, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva, as omniscient.

The Hindus hold these gods to be omniscient on the basis of their being embodiment of the Vedas. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have tried to prove that there is no connection between the Vedas and these gods, because they both are eternal. They give reasoning that two eternal things cannot be related to each other, because there is no activity in them. Perhaps, they have misunderstood the meaning of the word "eternal" (Nitya). In fact, "eternity" when ascribed to the gods and the Vedas, means that they both are beginningless, beyond the realm of time, beyond history. In other words, they are real, that is, they are existent before the world process. However, there is no reason why they both cannot be related to each other. Eternity does not necessarily imply negation of relations. There is no third principle to check the relation between the eternal gods and the eternal Vedas. On the basis of being the embodiment of the Vedas, the gods may be called omniscient.

In Mahāyāna Buddhism also, the Buddha (Dharmakāya of the Buddha) is conceived as beyond the time process and the essence of the universe,⁴ and at the same time he is considered to be omniscient. In the case of the Buddha also, both his existence and his omniscience are eternal and are related to each other. The same is true in the case of the gods and the Vedas also. Though both the gods and the Vedas are accepted as eternal, yet these gods may be considered as omniscient. The Vedas means intuitive knowledge and these gods may possess the intuitive knowledge in Samādhi. If the mortal being like the Buddha claims to have intuitive knowledge, why cannot those immortal gods also have intuitive knowledge when they have more capacity than human beings. Śāntarakṣita also has indirectly accepted this fact, because he wants to prove the immortality of the Buddha. On account of his enlightenment the Buddha reaches the state of immortality. Thus the mortal Buddha becomes omniscient and eternal according to the Buddhists. If it is accepted, as the Buddhists do, that the Dharmakāya (cosmical body) or Sambhogakāya (the body of bliss) are immortal, then there is fundamentally no difference between the gods and these Kāyas (bodies) of the Buddha on the question of omniscience.

4

T. R. V. Murti, op. cit., p. 284.

because they are immortal.

Now the important question is whether the Nirmānakāya (assumed body) which is mortal, is also omniscient or not. In fact the Buddhists claim it to be omniscient, because they have accepted the possibility of human omniscience and on that basis have claimed the Buddha ("Gautama the Buddha) to be omniscient. Śāntara-kṣita has established the omniscience of the Buddha by holding that he is the only religious teacher to believe in the non-existence of a permanent soul. The mere fact that he has taught the doctrine of "soullessness" cannot prove that he is superior to these gods who believe in the existence of a permanent soul. He cannot disprove the omniscience of the gods for the simple reason that they believe in the existence of a permanent soul. There is full possibility for them to become omniscient, because the consciousness is the very nature of the soul. At the same time one cannot deny the omniscience of the Buddha if the concept of human omniscience is accepted.

The Buddhists have accepted the omniscience and immortality of the Buddha. Now the question may arise whether the mortal Buddha (Gautama the Buddha) is omniscient or the immortal Buddha. If only the immortal Buddha is omniscient, then there is no room for human omniscience. This would go against the Buddhist view. Again in that

case the immortal Buddha falls in the same category of gods. However, the present Buddhist doctrine of Dharma is based on the teachings of the mortal Buddha. Now, is it possible to establish his omniscience merely on the basis of his teachings?

In fact no one can be proved to be omniscient on the basis of his teachings alone, because all the teachings can and have been criticized by reason. No religious or philosophical doctrine has been universally accepted as perfect. The validity of a particular religious teaching cannot be established by reason. Therefore, a person cannot be proved to be omniscient on the basis of his teachings. In fact reason itself is not perfect because its function is limited in scope.⁵

Thus it is natural that the arguments based on reason are also not perfect. In order to reach perfection, reason must transcend its own inherent limitation through the realization of the absolute reality embodied in an intuitive realization. Since the state of omniscience is only an intuitive state, its true nature cannot be realized in ordinary experience. It is a non-conceptual state and

5

Na Pratisthitatvam Tarkānām Śakyamāśrayitum
Puruṣamativāirupyāt. Śāriraka Bhāṣya, 2, I, 11.
Nisrito'Niyato'Vyāpi Sāmvrtah Khedavānapi;
Bālāśrayo Matastarkastasyā'to Viṣayonatat.
Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, 1, 12.

one cannot speak so long as this state prevails. With the very effort to articulation, the state of omniscience vanishes. Therefore, the mere teaching of a religious teacher is neither the sole nor the ultimate criterion by which to judge his omniscience. His omniscience should be judged on the basis of intuitive experience.

Thus the omniscience of the Buddha cannot be proved or disproved merely on the basis of his teachings. In order to prove his omniscience, one must become omniscient by himself. Also, the omniscience of the Buddha cannot be denied by reasoning. If the possibility of human omniscience is accepted, there is no reason why the Buddha cannot reach the state of omniscience by using the method of yoga. In other words, one cannot deny the omniscience of the Buddha by means of empirical proof.

Śāṅgatarakṣita and Kamalāsīla quite consistently hold that the inherent limitations of man's power can be transcended by the practice of yoga. Furthermore, through the concentration of the mind and the proper practice of yoga, a man can reach the highest degree of perfection in his physical as well as in his mental capacity. He acquires the capacity called "mind-force" (Manojava) by using a particular method of yoga. Due to Manojava, the Buddha became as swift as the mind in its movement.⁶ In the same way by a particular practice of yoga, the Buddha transcended

the limitations of perceiving objects after reaching this highest stage of perfection, that is, omniscience. By that capacity, he could perceive all objects clearly by a single cognition.⁷ Thus, it is evident that the Buddha reached the state of omniscience.

Difficulties may be felt in realizing the true nature of the universe and becoming omniscient in a realistic system of thought, such as that of Mīmāṃsā school. It should be noted that this school believes that the whole universe is created from innumerable permanent atoms. Therefore, it is very difficult in this system for any human being to know all the minute details of the universe. It is no wonder that this system of thought holds that no human being can reach the state of omniscience.

As far as the Absolutistic schools of thought are concerned, that is, the Vedānta and Mahāyāna Buddhism, it is quite possible to realize the true nature of the universe and become omniscient by realizing the absolute reality through the means of yoga. Here the substratum of the whole world is considered to be the absolute reality and the world is created due to ignorance (Avidyā). Therefore,

⁶ Siddhirmanojavāsañjñā Tathāca Śrūyate Barama;
Yathā Cintitamātreṇa Yāti Dūramapi Prabhuh.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3426, cf. Pañjikā, 3426, p. 893.

⁷ Ekajñānakṣaṇavyāptanihśe-Sañjneyamaṇḍalah;
Surāsurāśīroratnabhutah Siddho'Tra Sarvavit.
Tattvasaṅgraha, Verse 3449.

the Buddhists consistently maintain that it is possible to know the "true nature", of the world, i.e., unreality by realizing the truth, the absolute in Samādhī.

The omniscience of the Buddha cannot be disproved by the objections of the Mīmāṃsakas that no one can know in detail all the atoms contained in his own body, let alone the knowledge of all the little details that make up the entire universe.⁸ The Mīmāṃsakas have taken an example from the realm of the physical and used it as an analogy regarding the spiritual realm. A man can know that two items plus two items will always equal four items without having experienced every occasion when two plus two equals four.

The main aim of these Indian religious and philosophical systems was not to prove the existence of a being who could know the minute details of the universe. This kind of knowledge has no value for humanity and serves no religious purpose. The purpose of religion and philosophy is to provide that knowledge which can release men from sufferings and lead to the ultimate goal or the highest good of life, that is, liberation. The omniscience of a person or being is proved from this perspective. It is not important that he should know all the objects. Rather, the

importance of his omniscience is, that he can perceive the supersensuous realities like dharma, heaven and liberation and can reveal them to humanity. Taking omniscience as the necessary condition for perceiving supersensuous truths which cannot be known by the normal perception, the Mīmāṃsakas prove the omniscience of the Vedas, the Naiyāyikas prove the omniscience of God, and the Buddhists prove the omniscience of the Buddha.

Because of his claim to the realization of the truth of the universe and his accuracy in evaluating man's situation, the Buddhists rightly believe that the teachings of the Buddha are valid for the path to man's liberation (Nirvāṇa). An indication of this is the general acceptance of the concept of omniscience in Indian thought. Omniscience was attributed to every religious teacher or authority in order to maintain that his religious teachings would not mislead, but rather would lead to prosperity in this present life and to the highest good in the life hereafter.

If one accepts the tradition that the Buddha broke ordinary human physical and mental limitations by the practice of yoga and became omniscient (other systems of Indian though also acknowledge such a possibility), then the Mīmāṃsakas' argument is refuted. And if the criteria for his knowing the Dharma are his unique teachings which meet the needs of men, and the fact that no one knew them before

the Buddha, the Buddhist argument, represented by Śāntara-kṣita and Kamalaśīla, holds. It is true that these latter claims are not obvious truths to all men, however, they are to those who have become omniscient due to their enlightenment. In other words, the Buddhists' propositions are based on their experience of the reality or the realization of the absolute truth.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Pali

The Pāli Tripiṭaka. (Ed. by the Pali Text Society, London.)

Sanskrit

Ālambanaparīkṣa of Dīnnāga. (Reconstructed by N. Aiyaswami Shastri, Adyar Library, 1941).

Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva. (Edited by Poussin, Bib., Ind., 1902).

Daśabhūmikasūtra. (Edited by Dr. J. Rahder, Paris, 1926).

Fragments from Dīnnāga (Edited by H. N. Randle, Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1926).

Laṅkāvatārasūtra. (Edited by B. Nanjio, Kyoto, 1923).

Madhyānta-Vibhāga-Shāstra of Maitreyanāth. (Edited by Chandradhar Sharma, University of Jabalpur, 1963).

Madhyāntavibhāga-Sūtra-Bhāṣya-Tīka of Sthiramati. (Edited by S. Yamaguchi, Nagoya, 1934).

Mahāyāna-Śraddhotpāda-Śāstra or The Awakening of Faith. (English Translation by Yoshito S. Hakeda, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967).

Mahāyānasūtralaṅkāra of Asaṅga. (Edited by S. Levi, Paris, 1907).

Mūlamādyamaka-Kārika of Nāgārjuna. (Ed. by Poussin, Bib., Bud. IV, St. Petersburg, 1903).

Pramānavārtikavṛtti of Manorathanandin. (Edited by Pt. Rahulji, JBORS, Vols. XXIV-XXVI, 1938-40).

Pramānavārtika-Svavṛtti of Dharmakīrti. (Edited by Pt. Rāhul Sāṅkṛityāyana, Kitāb, Mahal, Allāhabad, 1943).

Pramānavārtika of Dharmakīrti. (Edited by Rāhul Sāṅkṛityāyana in the Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society, Patna, Vol. XXIV, 1938).

Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti. (Edited by P. Peterson, Calcutta, 1889).

Nyāyabindutika of Dharmottara. (Edited by P. Peterson, Calcutta, 1889).

Pañjikā (Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā) of Kamalasila. (Edited by Pt. K. Krishnamacharya, Gaekward Oriental Series, Baroda, 1926).

Saddharmapundarikā-Sūtra. (Edited by P. L. Vaidya, The Mithila Institute, Darbhanga, 1960).

Śāriraka-Bhasya of Śāṅkarācārya. (Edited by N. L. Shastri, Nirmaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1927).

Slokavārtika of Kumārila. (English Translation by G. N. Jha).

Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita. (Edited by Pt. K. Krishnamacharya, Gaekward Oriental Series, Baroda, 1926).

Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi of Vasubāṇḍhu. Viṃśatikā with the author's own Commentary. (Edited by S. Levi, Paris, 1925).

Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi of Vasubāṇḍhu. Triṃśikā with Sthiramati's Commentary. (Edited by S. Levi, Paris, 1925).

Trisvabhāvanirdeśa of Vasubāṇḍhu. (Reconstructed by S. Mukhopadhyaya, Vishvabharati, 1939).

English

Altekar, A. S. Introduction to Pramānavārtikabhāṣyam.
Edited by Rahula Sāṅkṛityāyana, Pātna, 1953).

Bhattacharya, Hari Satya. Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics.
Bombay, 1966

Dutt, Nalinaksha. Aspects of Mahāyāna and Its Relations to Hīnayāna. Luzac & Co., London, 1930

- Keith, A. B. Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1923.
- Kern, H. Saddharma-Pundarika (English translation, The Lotus of the True Law). The Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XXI. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1963.
- Murti, T. R. V. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960.
- Oldenberg, Hermann. Buddha: His Life, His Doctrine, His Order. London: Williams and Norgate, 1882.
- Stcherbatsky, Th. Buddhist Logic. Vol. I & II. New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1962.
- Thomas, Edward J. The History of Buddhist Thought. London: 1933.

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Allen, G. F. The Buddha's Philosophy. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1959.
- Arvon, Henri. Buddhism. New York: Walker & Co., 1962.
- Barnett, L. D. (transl.) The Path of Light, a Manual of Mahāyāna Buddhism by Śāntideva. Wisdom of the East Sr. London: John Murry, 2nd. ed., 1947.
- Bary, W. Theodore, et. al. (ed.) Introduction to Oriental Civilizations: Sources of Indian Tradition; Sources of Chinese Tradition, paperback vol. I only. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.
- _____. (ed.) Approaches to the Oriental Classics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
- _____. (ed.) Approaches to Asian Civilization. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.
- _____. (ed.) A Guide to Oriental Classics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.
- Bhattacharya, B. An Introduction to Buddhist Esoterism. London: Oxford University Press, 1932.

- Brandon, S. G. F. Man and His Destiny in Great Religions. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962.
- Chan, Wingsit. (transl.) The Platform Scripture. New York: St. John University Press, 1963.
- Chatterjee, A. K. The Yogacāra Idealism. Banaras: Banaras Hindu University, 1962.
- Coates, H. H. et. al. (transl.) Shunjo's Honen the Buddhist Saint: His Life and Teaching. Kyoto: Chionen, 1925.
- Conze, Edward. Buddhism, Its Essence and Development. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952.
- _____. The Buddhist Meditation. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1959.
- _____. Buddhist Thought in India. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1962.
- _____. "Buddhist Philosophy and its European Parallels", PEW, XIII (1963) 9-24.
- _____. "Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy", PEW, 105-116.
- Coomaraswamy, A. K. Hinduism and Buddhism. New York: Philosophical Library.
- _____. Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964.
- Dasgupta, S. A History of Indian Philosophy. 5 vols. Cambridge: The University Press, 1922-1949.
- Datt, S. The Buddha and Five after Centuries. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1957.
- Dayal, Har. The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature. London: K. Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1932.
- Dutt, N. Early Monastic Buddhism. Rev. ed. Calcutta: Oriental Book Agency, 1960.
- _____. "Place of Faith in Buddhism", IHQ, XVI, 639ff.
- _____. "Popular Buddhism", IHQ, XXI, 251ff.

- Edgerton, F. Buddhist Hybrid Grammar and Dictionary. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953.
- Eliot, Charles. Hinduism and Buddhism: An Historical Sketch. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1957.
- Fung, Yu-Lan. A History of Chinese Philosophy. vol. II. Transl. by D. Bodde, Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1953.
- _____. A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. New York: MacMillan, 1958.
- _____. The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy. Transl. by E. R. Hughes, London: Routledge Paperbacks, 1962.
- Ghosh, Manomohan. "Meaning of the word Pāli", Indo-Asian Culture, IV/4 (1956), 420-24.
- Govinda, A. B. The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy and its Systematic Representation According to Abhidharma Tradition. London: Rider, 1961.
- Guenther, H. V. Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma. Lucknow: Boddha Vihara, 1957.
- _____. "Indian Buddhist Thought in Tibetan Perspective: Infinite transcendence versus Finiteness," Hist. of Religion, III (1963-64), 83ff.
- Hamilton, C. H. Buddhism in India, Ceylon, China and Japan. A Reading Guide. Chicago: University of C. Press, 1931.
- _____. Buddhism a Religion of Infinite Compassion. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952.
- Hastings, J. et. al. (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. vols. I-XII. New York: Charles Scribners, 1957.
- Hanayama, S. Bibliography on Buddhism. Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1961.
- Haykawa, S. I. et. al. Our Language and Our World. New York: Harper, 1959.
- Humphreys, C. A Buddhist Student's Manual. London: The Buddhist Society, 1956.

- Humphreys, C. A Popular Dictionary of Buddhism. London: Arco, and New York: Citadel Press, 1963.
- _____. Buddhism. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1962.
- _____. Wisdom of Buddhism. Wisdom of the East Sr. London: John Murray, 1962.
- _____. Zen Buddhism. London: Allen and Unwin, 1957.
- Ingalls, D. H. H. "Samkara's Arguments Against the Buddhist", PEW, III/4 (1954), 291-306.
- Jayatilleke, K. N. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge. London: G. Allen and Unwin.
- Jennings, J. G. The Vedantic Buddhism of the Buddha. London: Oxford University Press, 1947.
- Jha, Ganganatha, (trns.) Tattvasaṅgraha with Commentary by Kamalasila. Vols. I & III. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1937.
- Karambelkar, V. W. "The Problem of Nāgārjuna", Journal of Indian History, XXX/1 (1952), 21-33.
- Kimura, Ryukan. A Historical Study of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna and the Origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Calcutta: University of C. Press, 1927.
- Lee, Pi-cheng (tr.) The Two Buddhist Books in Mahāyāna. 3rd. ed. Oxford: Kemp Hall Press.
- Levi, S. Triṃśikā, Matériaux pour L'étude du system Viññaptimātra. Paris: Chappion, 1932.
- _____, P. Buddhism: A 'Mystery Religion'? London: University of London, 1957.
- Link, A. "Problem of Buddho-Taost Terminology," JAOS, vol. 77, 1-14.
- Lounsbury, G. C. Buddhist Meditation in the Southern School: Theory and Practice for Westerners. London: Luzac, 1950.
- Malalasekara, G. P. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Buddhism. Govt. of Ceylon, 1961.

- March, A. C. A Buddhist Bibliography. London: The Buddhist Lodge, 1935.
- Marlow, A. N. "Hinduism and Buddhism in Greek Philosophy", PEW, IV, 35-46.
- Masuda, J. "Origin and Doctrine of Early Indian Buddhist Schools", Asia Major, II (1925), 1-78.
- McGovern, W. M. An Introduction to Mahāyāna Buddhism. London: 1922.
- _____. A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy. Vol. I. London: 1923.
- Mookerjee, S. The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux. Calcutta, 1935.
- Moore, C. et. al. (ed.) The Indian Mind, Essentials of Indian Philosophy and Culture. Honolulu: East-West Centre Press, 1967.
- Morgan, K. W. (ed.) The Path of the Buddha. New York: Ronald Press, 1956.
- Narada, Thera. Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, an outline of Buddhist Philosophy. Transl. with explanatory notes. Colombo, 1947.
- Nanamoli, (transl.). The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga) of Buddhaghosa. Colombo, 1956.
- Nakamura, H. The Ways of Thinking of the Eastern People. Rev. ed. Honolulu: East-West Centre Press, 1964.
- Nyanaponika, Thera. The Heart of Buddhist Meditation. London: Rider, 1962.
- Nyanatiloka, Bhikku. Buddhist Dictionary: Manual of Buddhist Terms and doctrines. Colombo: Frewin, 1956.
- Pali Dictionaries: Trenchner et. al. ed. Critical Pali Dictionary. Copenhagen, 1924-1948.
- Pande, G. C. Studies in the origin of Buddhism. Allahabad: University of A. Press, 1957.
- Parsons, H. L. "Buddha and Buddhism" a new appraisal", PEW, 1 (1951), 8-37.

- Piyadassi, Thera. The Buddha's Ancient Path. London: Rider, 1964.
- Price, A. transl. The Diamond Sutra. London: Buddhist Society, 1955.
- Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy. vol. I. London. G. Allen and Unwin, 1931.
- _____, and C. Moore, (ed.) A Source Book of Indian Philosophy. Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1957.
- Rahula, W. What the Buddha Taught. New York: Grove Press, 1962.
- Raju, P. T. et. al. (ed.) Radhakrishnan: Comparative Studies in Philosophy presented in Honour of his 60th Birthday. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1951.
- Rhys Davids, T. W. Buddhism. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1882.
- _____. The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary. Rev. ed. London: Luzac, 1966.
- Reichelt, K. L. Meditation and Piety in the Far East. A Religious Psychological Study. Transl. by S. Holth. New York: Harper, 1954.
- Robinson, H. R. Early Mādhyamika in India and China. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.
- Rose, F. H. The Meaning of life in Hinduism and Buddhism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952.
- Rosenberg, O. Introduction to the Study of Buddhism according to Material Preserved in Japan and China. Tokyo: Faculty of Oriental Languages, the Imperial University of Petrograd, 1916.
- Sangharakshita, Bhikshu. A Survey of Buddhism. Bangalore: The Indian Institute of World Culture, 1958.
- Sarathchandra, E. R. Buddhist Psychology. Colombo: The University of Ceylon, 1958.
- Schayer, S. Mahāyāna doctrines of Salvation. Transl. by R. T. Knight. London: Probsthain, 1923.

- Senzaki, N. (ed.) Buddhism and Zen. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1953.
- Sinha, J. A History of Indian Philosophy. Calcutta: Central Book Agency, 1952.
- Stcherbatsky, T. The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the word Dharma. London: RAS. 1923.
Rep. Calcutta: S. Gupta, 1961.
- _____. The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa.
- Suzuki, B. L. Mahāyāna Buddhism. London: D. Marlow, 1948.
- Suzuki, D. T. Essays in Zen Buddhism. 3 vols. London: Luzac, 1927 etc.
- _____. Outline of Mahāyāna Buddhism. New York: Schocken, 1967.
- _____. Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra. London: Routledge, 1957.
- Tachibana, S. The Ethics of Buddhism. Colombo: The Buddha Sahitya Sabha, 1943.
- Takakusu, J. The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1952.
- Thomas, E. J. The Life of Buddha as Legend and History. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, rep. 1957.
- Upatssa, Arahant. The Path of Freedom. Transl. by N. R. M. Ehara, et. al. Colombo: D. Roland D. Weerasuria, 1961.
- Venkata Ramanan. Nāgārjuna's Philosophy as Presented in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra. Tokyo: C. E. Tuttle, 1966.
- Ward, C. H. S. Buddhism: Vol. I Hīnayāna: Vol. II, Mahāyāna. London: Epworth Press, 1947, 1952.
- Watanabe, S. Transl. Dynamic Buddha and Static Buddha, A System of Buddhist Practice by Susumu Yamaguchi. Tokyo: Risosha, 1958.
- Wayman, A. "Conze on Buddhism and European Parallels", PEW, XIII/4 (1964), 361-364.