IDENTITY FORMATION AND OCCUPATIONAL STATUS IN MASS SOCIETY
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By

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Abstract: Individuals form their identities within the context of their social system. The conditions peculiar to modern mass society, therefore, effect the individual's formation of self.

A discussion of mass society in the first section of the thesis sets the stage for the examination of the individual in this society in the latter half. Mass society is a highly stratified differentiated social system. It is "classless" only to the degree that mass culture has standardized consumption. Individuals in contemporary society live the paradox of equality in terms of consumption but inequality in terms of the occupational status hierarchy. This paradox is a function of social control. The individual is manipulated within this social context, consumption becoming a superficial status equalizer which does not change the fundamental stratification pattern.

Individuals of lower occupational stratum have more
difficulty forming an identity within this social system than those of higher occupational levels. Their occupations do not demand commitment, therefore they do not include high degrees of socialization. The result is that individuals of lower occupational status do not identify with their work. They suffer from an "incomplete" identity; they are dominated, therefore, by the identity which they formed under the conditions of primary socialization. They cannot internalize the reality of secondary socialization.

The individual, however, does not become dissatisfied or recognize the source of his identity problems. Instead, he is lulled or compensated by the production-consumption system which created his identity problems. The wealth of conspicuous consumption which serves as status symbols no longer serves the purpose of status differentiation. Instead, consumption serves a "new" compensatory function. This new function takes the form of production images, made up of a combination of material goods which serve as the props for a manufactured, highly visible style or "identity". Lower status individuals who are still attempting to achieve higher status assume extra-occupational roles; individuals who resign themselves to their low status seek only to mask this status, therefore they assume these production images.
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INTRODUCTION

The Problem

My main concern in this thesis is the problem of identity formation associated with low occupational status, and the use made of consumption as compensation.

The problem of individual identity formation is not new. William James, for example, developed his concept of multiple identities in 1892, followed shortly by Cooley's (1902) explanation of identity and the looking-glass self, and later by Mead (1934) who elaborated on identity in terms of the self in relation to others. More recently theorists such as Berger and Luckmann (1967) examined identity formation and construction of surrounding social reality.

Other sociologists have focused more on the nature and structure of society itself. We are particularly concerned with those who deal with modern mass society (for example, Selznick 1963, Marcuse 1966). Like many others who have addressed the problems associated with identity both empirically and theoretically, (see for example Knupfer, 1947; Hyman, 1953; Meier and Bell, 1959; Luckmann and Berger, 1964; Otto and Featherman, 1975) our concern finds expression at both micro and macro levels: we will examine the processes, problems and eventual product of identity formation in contemporary society.

Our problem involves the interaction between individual status location and identity of blue collar workers in context of mass society. We outline the individual's inability to form an identity under conditions of secondary socialization; we then deal
with the complications which arise from an individual's recognition of his low status which he has not internalized into his self. This suggests that the individual would become dissatisfied with his lot. Marcuse points out, however, that the working class - or low status individuals - has lost the potential for revolutionary change. They have become, instead, staunch supporters of the status quo (Marcuse 1966, p.256). This appears contradictory to the work of other sociologists who theorize and "document" identity problems among those of low status in the social hierarchy. This leads us to a question which we answer in the last chapter: If the individual does not find satisfaction of self within the social system, why does he continue to support it? We hypothesize that the individual, although not "successfully" socialized into the system, seeks identity and status compensation through the commodities offered by mass culture, rather than through what Marcuse (1966) refers to as qualitative change in the system itself.

An individual may have several identities. We concentrate on occupational identity because, as we shall see in Chapter Two, occupation is a universal status system; that is, it is a method by which each individual can "locate" or rank himself and others in the social hierarchy, as well as being the major full-time role of most individuals. Let us elaborate briefly.

Berger and Berger define identity as the socialized part of the self. Individual identities have objective counter-parts. Society has a "repertoire of identities" for example, girl, policeman, which are assigned to the individual in various ways (Berger and Berger 1972, p.62). Berger and Berger state that:
whether an identity is assigned or achieved, in each case it is appropriated by the individual through a process of interaction with others. It is others who identify him in a specific way. Only if an identity is confirmed by others is it possible for that identity to be real to the individual holding it. In other words, identity is the product of an interplay of identification and self-identification. This is true of identities that are deliberately constructed by an individual. (1972, p. 62; see also Stone 1970, p. 399)

For identity to be formed, the individual must internalize and identify with his role or behaviour, making it part of his subjective reality (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 130-133). Occupations of lower status, however, do not demand commitment or extensive socialization (Berger and Luckmann 1967, Faunce 1968) as our discussion in Chapter Two will reveal. The individual, therefore, cannot internalize and form an identity from his occupational role. On the other hand, the individual is accorded social honour by others according to the rank of his occupation. The individual recognizes his low status but does not internalize this status. His objective and subjective realities do not match, and he is not fully integrated into the system without discontent. He is thrown back upon his primary identity which should be (but under these conditions is not) completed by the identity of secondary socialization to form a total self. The core of the total self is formed in childhood, when the processes of primary socialization have a greater degree of "inevitability" because the child knows no alternatives; this total self is completed by the formation of the social self. The latter is
composed of the many easily detached selves of the alternate worlds of adult (secondary) socialization (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 130-131). Low occupational status individuals, therefore, suffer from two related problems: a) they cannot form an identity from work because the nature of low status occupations does not provide the necessary conditions, thus they are thrown back upon their primary identity and b) they are recognized by others and consequently recognize themselves as low status individuals, although this is not part of their identity.

Our definition of status we borrow from Faunce. Status is the amount of social honour accorded to the individual. Status systems are defined as certain criteria unequally distributed resulting in differing degrees of social honour (Faunce 1968, p. 93). Objectively, we are concerned with status distribution associated with occupation as Mills describes it (1974, Chapter 4). Faunce distinguishes between interpositional and intrapositional status; as we will see in Chapter Two. The former refers to location within the entire occupational hierarchy; the latter refers to location within the same occupational stratum (Faunce 1968, p. 118). A general practitioner, for example, may consider his position to be one of high status compared to a factory worker, but of low status compared with a brain surgeon. We will change Faunce's distinction slightly. We retain the meaning of interpositional; intrapositional, however, we will define as a grouping of
occupational strata. Thus, using Mills' criteria, we may deal in terms of blue collar or wage worker occupational strata, and white collar occupational strata, both of which are internally graded (Mills 1974, Chapter 4). This definition of intrapositional includes self-evaluation within a stratum itself, as Faunce originally defined the term.

Subjectively individuals may evaluate themselves as lower status inter- or intrapositionally. This depends on which criteria they choose for self-esteem maintenance (Faunce 1968, p. 91-93). By low status we will refer to those individuals who occupy the lower rungs of the occupational hierarchy, i.e. blue collar strata. Subjective interpretation by these objectively identified individuals is dealt with in the last chapter.

We focus initially on the occupational status which other people attribute to the individual. This is a major source of self-esteem maintenance (or destruction); it is how others react and locate the individual in the social hierarchy, therefore it is an important method of evaluating one's self. The importance of status on self-esteem maintenance depends on the reinforcement of the primary identity. The social reference group is an important source of this reinforcement, therefore a change in reference group has significant effects on identity. Based on Wilensky's predictions (1970), we are able to hypothesize that individuals of low occupation status may be divided into two types: a) those who change their social reference group
to the strata above them. In this case outward signs of status are especially important for self-esteem maintenance. These are how others identify the individual and thus how he evaluates himself. The primary identity is not reinforced, and b) those who do not change their social reference group of primary socialization. Their primary identity continues to be reinforced. This reinforcement results in their resignation from or indifference to status achievement. These individuals, accepting low status identities, seek to disguise their lower status in the eyes of others rather than achieve it. In both cases, as we shall see, compensation is offered by mass culture.

We will borrow Wilensky's definition of mass culture:

'Mass culture' will refer to cultural products manufactured solely for a mass market. Associated characteristics ... are standardization of product and mass behavior in its use. Mass culture tends to be standardized because it aims to please the average taste of the undifferentiated audience (1964, p. 176).

We will define mass society in relation to mass culture:

All members of mass society are equally valued as voters, buyers, and spectators. Numerical superiority therefore tends to be the decisive criterion of success. In the political realm this means the number of votes; in the economic realm it is the number of sales; and in the cultural realm it is the size of the audience (Kornhauser 1968, p. 59).

We have, then, defined the mass in terms of its function as a market, its consumer capacity as a whole. This definition deliberately excludes a description of the internal structure of the mass because, like Wilensky (1964), we believe that
the two are different aspects of the term; one does not imply the other. The mass in its market function is an undifferentiated audience, but not an undifferentiated social population, as Wilensky clearly points out:

... social differentiation persists, even increases. It is rooted first in specialization by job and occupation ... (1964, p. 177)
... 'mass culture' ... can vary independently from 'mass structure' ... (1964, p. 178).

We are now experiencing "the simultaneous growth of structural differentiation and cultural uniformity" (Wilensky 1964, p. 178). Thus standardized consumption and lifestyle habits do not automatically imply an undifferentiated mass.

Our argument is theoretical and relies heavily upon theoretical literature. Our discussion unfolds through contributions synthesized from selected sociologists. For example, the social context of mass society incorporates the structural effects Zijderveld outlines, Mills explicit stratification criteria, and Marcuse's description of rational-technical control. Where possible, we have supplemented our theoretical propositions with more empirical evidence.

Outline of the Discussion

a) Macro Level - Mass Society

In Chapter One we portray the social context within which the individual forms his identity. This sets the stage
for the discussion to follow in the remaining chapters, in that it defines certain socially imposed limitations to identity formation. We open Chapter One with an examination of the confusion between standardization due to mass culture and class levelling. Then we will turn to the degree of control exercised over the individual.

We discuss several theorists in an effort to clear away the confusion surrounding cultural and (what is clichéd as) class levelling. Selznick (1963) considers cultural and class levelling to be part of the same processes; Shils (1963) on the other hand, recognizes stratification differences, but considers these to be neutralized or rendered insignificant by the egalitarian ethos of mass culture. Zijderveld (1971), Mills (1974) and Marcuse (1966) however, make strong distinctions between mass culture standardization and class or stratification levelling.

We then examine mass culture as a method and manifestation of social control. In order to facilitate this examination, we modify Kornhauser’s distinction between two categories of mass society theory: the democratic and the aristocratic. Democratic theories postulate the manipulation of the mass by the elite; aristocratic theories describe an elite dominated by the mass (Kornhauser 1959, p. 24). We will change this distinction to one of source of power. Consequently, we will divide mass society theories
into those which place the source of power in the mass itself, that is, an autonomous mass; and those which consider the mass to be controlled and manipulated by an external elite.

This distinction is better suited to our overall goal of examining identity formation in contemporary society. The individual as a member of the autonomous mass implies either a situation in which individuals, independent of each other, pursue similar goals; or a situation in which the individual acts as a consenting member of a collectivity providing its own direction and momentum. In either case, the individual, as a member of the autonomous mass would be free i.e. not manipulated by a source external to the mass, to choose the paths and activities which would benefit him the most. He would have ample avenues to choose from for identity formation and development. The individual as a member of the controlled mass, on the other hand, would be subject to overt and subliminal manipulations which would affect his formation of self. We find generally in our discussion that those theorists who equate cultural and class levelling recognize an autonomous mass; those theorists who clearly distinguish between the two consider the mass to be controlled by a source of power external to itself.
b) Micro Level - The Individual

In Chapter Two we drop from the societal level to that of the individual, and deal with the processes and problems of identity formation in a segmented institutional structure. We begin with a description of identity formation and then look at the associated problems. We conclude this chapter with a discussion of status location of identity in the objective world.

Berger and Luckmann's (1967) processes of identity formation are discussed in context of Zijderveld's (1971) analysis of meaningless, segmented society. We are able to qualify Zijderveld's all-pervasive meaninglessness with Faunce's (1968) work. Thus we are able to suggest that individuals at the lower levels of the occupational hierarchy experience greater degrees of meaninglessness than those at the higher status levels. They have no strong occupational socialization and consequent identity which counteracts the overall lack of meaning of segmented roles. Secondary socialization in terms of the occupational identity is not successful, therefore the individual is thrown back upon his primary identity. I suggest that the individual of lower occupational status will not only suffer from lack of identity 'completion' or modification, but will then experience discrepancy between his occupational status (according to which others identify or locate him in the social hierarchy) and the
status location of his primary identity. Faunce suggests that individuals choose the most flattering role for self-evaluation (1968, p. 92-93). In this case, the individual would choose the most flattering status location for his self-evaluation. He faces certain difficulties no matter which choice he makes, because his occupational status is not that of his identity. In Berger and Luckmann's words, the individual is not "successfully" socializes, his subjective and objective reality do not match (1967, p. 163).

This discrepancy is complicated by the status competition in contemporary society (Wilensky 1970). Occupational role is a major means of identification of the individual by others (Barber 1961, Mills 1974). The individual, sharing the everyday knowledge\footnote{with other members of his social system (Berger and Luckmann 1967), recognizes the position of his occupation in the objective hierarchy and realizes that others locate or rank him according to this position. He does not incorporate into his identity the status location of his occupation, but this is how he is identified by others. Occupational status, therefore, becomes crucial to the individual's self-esteem maintenance.} occupation by others (Barber 1961, Mills 1974). The individual, sharing the everyday knowledge\footnote{with other members of his social system (Berger and Luckmann 1967), recognizes the position of his occupation in the objective hierarchy and realizes that others locate or rank him according to this position. He does not incorporate into his identity the status location of his occupation, but this is how he is identified by others. Occupational status, therefore, becomes crucial to the individual's self-esteem maintenance.} with other members of his social system (Berger and Luckmann 1967), recognizes the position of his occupation in the objective hierarchy and realizes that others locate or rank him according to this position. He does not incorporate into his identity the status location of his occupation, but this is how he is identified by others. Occupational status, therefore, becomes crucial to the individual's self-esteem maintenance.

c) Synthesis - The Individual in Society

In Chapter three we bring together the societal and
individual strains of the first two chapters, and turn to the individual in the context of mass society. We are concerned with the demise of "Veblenian" consumption and the "new" function of consumption in relation to the status and identity problems of the individual. We culminate with the two major reactions to the status problem - ambition and withdrawal - and the role consumption plays in each.

We find that patterns of consumption in mass culture are relatively homogeneous across the different strata (Wilensky 1964, Westley and Westley 1971). The standard package of consumption (Reisman and Rosaborough 1965) representing the "American way of life" (Parker 1972) is achieved by some with greater difficulty than others. The lower status individual only achieves this level of consumption through such "extra opportunities" as working wives, credit, overtime and moonlighting (Levitan 1971, Westley and Westley 1971, Parker 1972). Consumption status symbols have lost their meaning through widespread distribution (Klapp 1969), therefore the Veblenian function of consumption (Wilensky 1970) has become ineffective.

We find, therefore, that conspicuous consumption is no longer a reliable method of achieving status. The routes to higher status have become more complicated than consumption alone. Consequently, we agree with Wilensky (1970) that lower status individuals will react in two major ways; they will maintain their status drive, or they will resign from the status competition.
Individuals who retain their status drive are those who have contact with the strata above them and have made this their social reference group (Form and Geschwender 1962, see also Hyman 1953). The change in reference group away from the one of primary socialization (described by Form and Geschwender as being made up of fathers, brothers and peers in particular) results in a lack of reinforcement of the primary identity. These individuals also absorb the mobility ethic of status levels above them. The combined effect is that status location by occupation becomes more important to this individual. He cannot achieve the necessary status through his present occupation. He will tend to assume roles in non-work organizations in an effort to evaluate himself and be evaluated by others in terms other than occupational status (Wilensky 1970). In this case, the individual is assuming what we will refer to as role-identities. He may only learn and play the role - still suffering the contradiction of a low status primary identity - or he may actually internalize the role to form a new identity. In either case, the extra occupational roles of what Luckmann and Berger (1964) call secondary institutions of mass culture become the method of status attainment. We deal with how this extra-work status is equivalent
to occupational status in Chapter 2.

The second type are those who resign from the status competition. These individuals retain their relatives and peers in the lower occupational strata as their social reference group (Form and Geschwender 1962). In this case, their primary identity is reinforced, which means that they have internalized a certain status location. In addition, they do not absorb the mobility ethos of the white collar strata above them (although as Kahl pointed out, they recognize that it is a dominant belief in their society without subscribing to it, 1953, p. 198). Achieving status in order to emulate a white collar reference group is not significant to them. Interpositionally, in terms of the entire occupational hierarchy, they are resigned to their status location.

The case for these individuals is more complicated than the situation of the other type. They may evaluate themselves intrapositionally as well as interpositionally. The individual who is indifferent to the status competition may find that his occupational status position intrapositionally, that is in terms of within the blue collar occupational levels, may be of a higher status location than his primary identity. In this case, the individual may use his occupational status for self-evaluation over his primary
identity (in a choice similar to the one that the "status striver" makes). The degree to which he relies on this for self-evaluation will depend on whether he emphasizes inter- or intrapositional status location.

The individual, on the other hand, may not have a favourable interpositional evaluation. Form and Geschwender discovered that a blue collar individual's occupational status had to be the same or above that of his father and brothers for him to be able to maintain his esteem (1962, p. 231). If the individual's occupational status is lower than the status location of the primary identity which is related to the occupational status levels of the social reference group (especially the father's), then the individual will not have any basis for positive self-evaluation - inter- or intrapositionally. His reference group in this case reinforces the status location of his primary identity, a location which he cannot maintain in secondary socialization.

We suggest that the individual's self-esteem needs will assert themselves, but in a different way from those of the status striver. These individuals will seek to hide or mask their identity or status (except in the case of the individual who chooses to evaluate himself on his favourable intrapositional occupational status). They will attempt to compensate for the low status locations internalized in the
primary identity, and for their low occupational status, inter-and/or intrapositionally. This compensation will take the form of temporarily assuming a different identity which "hides" who the individual "really" is (Klapp 1969, Chapter 3). This individual turns to a different feature of mass culture—production images.

These images are pre-fabricated identities (Luckmann and Berger 1964) made up of combinations of material props sold on the mass market. Unlike the other form of status compensation, these images are not roles. They have no recurring pattern of behaviour (Gerth and Mills 1964) neither do they fit into a pattern of duties, rights and obligations (Nisbet 1970). Klapp (1969) describes these production images as characters deliberately assumed for masquerade purposes. These images have no universal meanings (Klapp 1969) thus they do not become typifications (Berger and Luckmann 1967) or the basis of roles. No identity can be internalized or reinforced by assuming these images. The individual, therefore, cannot be identified by others and "re-located" status wise. Production images, therefore, are not successful identity or status compensation.

d) Conclusion

Finally, we synthesize the main themes of the three major chapters. We point out that the production-consumption
system, the control force of the stratification pattern (Chapter One), and the source of these individuals' low status (our discussion of Chapter Two) is the source of compensation (Chapter Three) for the problems it creates. In answer to the question we ask in the statement of our problem of why individuals do not push for change, we conclude that "unsuccessful" socialization will never lead to discontent as long as mass culture offers forms of status and identity compensation.
FOOTNOTES - INTRODUCTION

1. Berger and Berger state that "... we simultaneously inhabit different worlds, ... we inhabit the micro-world of our immediate experience with others in face-to-face relations. Beyond that ... we inhabit a macro-world consisting of much larger structures and involving us in relations with others that are mostly abstract, anonymous and remote." (1972, P.8)

2. We are primarily concerned with male blue collar workers. Although women also enter the labour force as workers at this level, studies suggest that their orientation to work differs from that of men. Working is often secondary to their traditional role in the home. Women work in short spurts for extra cash; to get out of the house ("social life"); or even work full time and continuously to supplement their husband's income, while still considering their primary function to be running the home (women in such a position often consider themselves to be at work only "temporarily" which effects their commitment). We suggest that identity problems will be similar but also different in some respects for blue-collar wives and female workers (often the young woman in the factory may be biding her time waiting for marriage to "take her away from all this"), therefore we refer primarily to male blue collar workers. See Royal Commission on the Status of Women 1972, p. 56-7; Komarovsky 1967, p. 61-72; Holter 1973 p. 152.

3. "Problems" include those conditions or traits which effect identity formation, also those characteristics which do not equip the individual for competing in a mobility-oriented industrial society. For example: low aspiration and achievement values, lack of self-confidence, difficulty internalizing roles, disjunction between identity status and role. See for example: Knupfer 1947; Meier and Bell 1959; Wilensky 1970; Luckmann and Berger 1964; Ashton 1973; Lueptow 1975; Haller, Otto, Meier and Ohlendorf 1974; Otto and Feathermann 1975.
4. Mills deals specifically with white collar gradation, which, he states, are not one compact stratum but range from almost bottom to top of society (1974, p. 64). The workers of the new lower class are predominantly semi-skilled (Mills 1974, p. 67). Differences between the highest blue-collar stratum and lowest white collar stratum may only be the prestige associated with manual/non-manual labour. The nature of the work itself and other traits such as income and property-ownership may be similar. This merging of the boundary between blue and white collar strata has been called the proletarianization of white collar work (see Westley and Westley 1971). Marcuse's description of the change in the nature of work is found in Chapter 1. As we see later in the thesis, this distinction between blue and white collar status becomes extremely significant in self-evaluation.

5. It should be pointed out that the concept of everyday commonsense or recipe knowledge which we attribute throughout to Berger and Luckmann originates with Schutz (see "The Social Distribution of Knowledge" 1964 in Collected Papers Vol. II.) Berger and Luckmann's treatment of this concept is stressed in our argument because it is consistent with other parts of their theory upon which we heavily rely.
CHAPTER I
SETTING THE STAGE -
CONDITIONS OF MASS SOCIETY

In this chapter we will discuss mass society in terms of stratification, mass culture and control. The first section is a variation on the societal-individual theme which we discussed in the Introduction. We will examine the meaning of mass culture for each theorist, and then briefly look at their concept of integration of the individual. In the second section we will deal with social control operating in mass society. We will then be able to draw some general conclusions about the social context within which the individual develops his identity.

We will begin with an examination of several mass society theorists in an attempt to demonstrate and clarify the confusion between mass cultural standardization and class levelling. Standardization of consumption does not necessarily imply a 'withering away of class' (a term used by Westergaard 1966). We will attempt to set out stratification as one of the conditions of mass society, on the assumption that individuals who belong to lower status
strata (or what Berger and Luckmann call lower class objective worlds, 1967, p.137 as we shall see in the next chapter) will form different identities than those who 'belong' at higher status levels.\textsuperscript{1} We also discuss the method of integration as this may also restrict the individual's behaviour and thus effect identity formation. We will begin with those who in some way combine or confuse class levelling and cultural standardization, and proceed to those who clearly differentiate between the two.

We then turn to the question of control. This is significant to identity formation for two related reasons: a) because it maintains the status quo and thus the individual's status level in the stratification pattern, and b) because it restricts the opportunities the individual has for development of his identity by controlling his participation in the social structure.

The method of integration may also be a method of control, as we will see. The individual who is functionally integrated, that is, connected to the institutional structure by his major (usually occupational) role may be controlled by that structure (or those controlling it) by means of this tie. We examine mass culture as a method
of control which helps to maintain the stratification pattern, not as an alternative to it. The individual may be integrated both by consumption habits which have now become "needs" to be fulfilled, and by his functional role which he must maintain in order to fulfill these needs (at the same time supporting the stratification pattern). Gorz, for example, points out the effects of control on the individual, as neo-capitalism

...demands a type of personality that can be moulded into a condition of passive consumption: 'mass' individuals, on whom it strives to impose aims, desires and longings which are no more than its own instruments (1966, p. 348).

We deal with the relationship of consumption and the individual more in the third chapter. What is significant at this point is Gorz' emphasis on the effects of the controlled social system upon the individual. We are not concerned with a 'type of personality', but rather the identity of the individual formed within the restrictions of a controlled mass society.

We may use Lowenthal also for an example of the rationale which motivates us into examining the individual in his social context. He rejects the idea of the "taste of the masses" but instead suggest that "taste is fed to the masses" by those in control of production (1961, p. 12).
Lowenthal measures the effects of control in terms of the individual, stating that

... I wish I knew whether the consumption of popular culture really presupposes a human being with pre-adult traits or whether modern man has a split personality: half mutilated child and half standardized adult (1961, p. 12).

While we do not see the individual in quite the same way, our problem is similar: the effects of a controlled social system on individual identity. We begin this task in this chapter by examining mass society in terms of stratification and mass culture, and control in an effort to construct the constraints within which the individual must develop his identity. The actual processes of identity formation within these constraints are discussed in the following chapter.

I have chosen Selznick because his argument represents one extreme on the spectrum between confusion of mass culture and class levelling on the one hand, and clear differentiation between these two elements on the other. He presents the mass as increasingly homogeneous or undifferentiated. He is followed by Shils, who offers us a more compromising (in terms of the two extremes) view of the mass. His description mediates the views of Selznick and those of the more critical theorists. Stratification
exists, according to Shils, but is neutralized by a growing universal dignity of the mass members and a shift in criteria of evaluation. Zijderveld, Marcuse and Mills distinguish between cultural homogenization and class levelling, although it is the last two who make the strongest arguments for a rigid stratification pattern, and Mills who sets out specific stratification criterion.

In the second section dealing with control, we are able to divide these five theorists into those who postulate an autonomous mass and those who postulate a controlled mass. We find generally that those who equate mass culture and class levelling recognize these elements as processes of social control. Each of these five theorists was chosen because he represents a certain perspective in the spectrum from unstratified-autonomous mass to stratified controlled mass.

Mass Culture or Class Levelling?

Wilensky, in a study of the effects of mass culture on different occupational groups, writes:

... on its production side, modern society displays increasing diversity of structure; on its consumption side, increasing standardization of culture ... (1964, p. 178).

Our definition in the Introduction deliberately defines
the mass only in relation to mass culture, that is, in its capacity as the market. This definition makes no reference to the internal structure of the mass, only to its function as a whole in relation to the production-consumption system. Standardization resulting from the spread of mass culture, as Wilensky's quote illustrates, does not imply or equate to class levelling or lack of differentiation within the mass. The individual, therefore may find himself equal as a consumer, but unequal in his general class/status position (Westley and Westley 1971, p. 59).

1) Selznick

Selznick's work is an example of confusion of cultural standardization and class levelling. Part of this confusion stems from the nature or style of his argument. At no point does Selznick openly discuss or analyze stratification differences in relation to mass culture; rather, he alludes to stratification in his description of the mass. It is from these descriptive passages that we are able to glean Selznick's basis of assumptions concerning stratification.

Selznick's argument contains three definitions of the mass. He deals alternately with the mass as an
increasingly active populace which threatens culture via direct access to elites and institutions (1963, p. 16); the mass as particular amorphous groups which have 'loosened' from the institutional structure (1963, p. 17); and finally, the mass as found in mass organizations (1963, p. 20).

Selznick postulates but never defines the 'levelling pressure' of the mass (1963, p. 27). In most cases he relates this levelling pressure to cultural attenuation, without specifically delineating the nature of the processes involved. The relationship between cultural and class levelling is implicit in his argument. We may reconcile his three definitions of mass if we accept them as progressive stages in the process of cultural levelling. We shall begin with his first definition of mass, therefore, and work through to his third.

Selznick's definition of culture included the nature of the entire society, not just "high" culture:

By 'culture'... we mean not simply the arts or manners but the basic patterns of motivation and inhibition... which are transmitted from one generation to another (1963, p. 19).

Areas of 'cultural incubation and development' include education, leisure and politics (1963, p. 16). Selznick
does not consider mass culture to be a variety of widely distributed products and services, but rather change permeating the entire social system. If the mass threatens culture-bearing elites (his first definition of mass) then, by logical extension of his definition of culture, it threatens elites in society generally, that is, in all institutions, not just the creative elites for whom he expresses concern (1963, p. 15). Attenuation of culture, when culture is thus defined, would then appear to mean a breakdown of the status quo in terms of the existing hierarchy of elites. Cultural levelling - the process carried out by the mass - becomes in this sense a process of increasing homogenization of status, as positions or roles succumb to the power of the mass. In mass society...the independent functions of creative elites cannot be performed. It is not the quality of the individuals which is in point but their roles; it is not so much that the mass is unfit in any literal sense as that the nature of the system prevents the emergence of effective social leadership...a mass society is one in which no one is qualified...because the relationships involve a radical cultural levelling, not because no superior individuals exist (Selznick 1963, p. 15).

The referent of these "relationships" which involve a radical cultural levelling is not clear. Selznick would appear to mean the relationship between roles. This
implies that effective social leadership i.e. elites is 'levelled' or non-existent because roles are ordered non-hierarchically. If superior individuals do exist as he suggests, then it seems that the roles themselves are not graded or ranked, thus personal superiority has no outlet. Selznick seems to have dealt with stratification as standardization of institutional role status.

In another descriptive passage, he states that the mass society individual

... expects to retain his commonness and to be distinguished from the multitude only by a certain technical competence. (Selznick 1963, p. 16).

We can infer that this commonness is a quality resulting from the breakdown of status differentiation or "cultural levelling." Elites desert their "distinctive cultural roles" as leaders to "find security in a feeling of oneness with the common man" (Selznick 1963, p. 16-17). Thus it is in postulating the loss of a distinctive identity on the part of the elite that Selznick alludes to the homogenization of status in mass society (1963, p. 17).

Selznick offers a second definition of mass which we may reconcile to his first if we liberally interpret or "read into" his argument. The mass as an undifferentiated, amorphous body emerges "when the normal inhibitions
enforced by tradition and social structure are loosened" (Selznick 1963, p. 18). We may assume that the mass according to the first definition breaks down the institutions by its participation; and that the mass in the second definition is a result of this breakdown. This undifferentiated body, therefore, also appears to be a product of status and function levelling. The individual of the amorphous mass is experiencing "the disintegration of traditional institutional systems" (Selznick 1963, p. 18). Mass participation in these institutions appears to equate with disintegration of these.

Selznick's third definition of the mass completes our progression. Individuals join mass organizations of segmental participation, which are non-hierarchical except for an elite formed "in the image of the mass" (Selznick 1963, p. 20). Consistent with our sequential development of his definitions, we would interpret this participation as an attempt on the part of the individual "to find a way back to status and function" (Selznick 1963, p. 18) as institutional ties disintegrate. (We could also interpret this to mean that institutions, through mass participation, have been reduced to the mass organizations.)
As we have seen, the elements of Selznick's description are logical only if we interpret his revolving definitions of mass sequentially. He does not give an analysis of the factors of class or "cultural" levelling by the mass; instead he simplistically writes of this process as a function of the "solvents of science, technology, industrialization and urbanization" (1963, p. 17). His fear for the status quo seems to lead him into confusing increased participation of the mass in the various forms of mass culture with a total levelling of class differences in a "takeover" by the mass.

There is one aspect of Selznick's description with which we can agree, and which other theorists who do not confuse class levelling and mass participation also tend to support. In relation to his second definition he describes the mass as based upon "the atrophy of meaningful human relations" and the "decay of social ties" (1963, p. 18). He describes the participation of the individual:

Participation is segmental when individuals interact not as whole personalities but in terms of the roles they play in the situation at hand. This is characteristic ... of formal organizations where only the functional relevance of participants is prized. The personalities of individuals are levelled; men deal with each other as abstractions rather than as whole persons. (Selznick 1963, p. 20.)
Selznick seems to describe an unstratified but functionally integrated society in which the individual is isolated. Other theorists, as we shall see shortly, describe this same condition as a manifestation of specialized functions hierarchically arranged.

ii) Shils

Shils' theory we can place between that of Selznick and the more critical theorists. He recognizes stratification differences and also increased participation and consumption by the mass. This participation Shils explains as a result of the increased civility, dignity and consensus of the mass. We shall examine these characteristics peculiar to Shils argument.

His origin of the mass is unclear. Individuals in a bounded territory come to view one another with:

... civil disposition (which) is nothing more than the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the authority - definitely located in persons or offices, or diffuse in the form of the legitimacy of the social order - which prevails over a territory... (1963, p. 36).

This civil disposition has lead to the establishment of consensually legitimate institutions (Shils 1963, p. 36). Shils does not give a clear description of the origin of this consensus associated with civility. On one hand it
leads to the formation of institutions; on the other hand:

...this consensus grows in part from an attachment to the centre, to the central institutional system and value order of the society. It is also a product of a newly emergent ... feeling of unity with one's fellow men... (Shils 1963, p. 36).

These institutions control the conflict between class, ethnic and professional sectors in stratified mass society (Shils 1963, p. 36). This society is composed of a multitude of functions which are integrated by their interdependence (Shils 1963, p. 32, p. 47) and by

... the exercise and acceptance of authority in the major subsystems of the society, in the polity, the economy, and the status and cultural orders i.e. in educational and religious institutions and their associated norms and beliefs (Shils 1963, p. 32).

A stratified system complete with elites exists according to Shils. The mass participates, however, as equal consenting members. The distance between the mass and the elites has lessened, in fact, it is the mass who is the most important element in mass society. The following passage reveals how Shils overcomes stratification differences and the existence of an elite in his optimistic theory:

... the change in moral attitudes ... has underlain the enhancement of the dignity of ordinary people... both elites and mass have received this into their judgment of themselves and the world ... the maxim which
locates the sacred in the mass of the population is the shaping force ... in society...
the unique feature of the mass society is...
the dispersion of charismatic quality more widely throughout society, so that everyone who is a member of the society, because he is a member, comes to possess it. (Shils 1963, p.38).

Shils does not postulate a change in stratification per se, but rather an equalization of members by means of the "dispersal of charisma" (1963, p. 38). This means a shift in emphasis rather than a change of conditions.
All internal conflicts, states Shils, are bridged by the individual's sense of attachment to his society as a whole and affinity with other members (1963, p. 37). The problem of stratification has been solved in the following way:

The elevation of humanity and of membership ... has led to a diminuation of the importance of individual achievement as a standard for the direction of one's own actions and as a criterion of status ... The quality of life has tended ... to replace occupational achievement and proficiency as a source of self-esteem and as a criterion for esteeming others ... Mass society ... contributes towards a situation in which occupational role and achievement have become less important in the guidance of action and in the claiming and acknowledgement of status (Shils 1963, p. 43-44).

The impact of class, status, occupation have been reduced, but not the differentiated structure itself, according to Shils. In the above passage, we see that he
recognizes the homogeneous effects of mass culture. The source of this standardization he attributes to fundamental standards which originate or at least have their main support in the mass and which elites also share or emulate (Shils 1963, p. 37). He does not realize that support and origin have different implications. The mass may support values or standards which have been implemented by a locus of control external to itself, rather than from within itself. Despite the obvious implications of the following passage, Shils still fails to make the connection between mass and culture and control:

... the mass means more to elites now than it did in other great societies. It has come to life in the minds of its rulers more vividly than ever before. This change has been brought about in part by increased political and then the increased purchasing power of the mass (Shils 1963, p. 38).

We may conclude that rather than solve the apparent contradiction of stratification and the uniformity of mass culture, Shils contributes a conciliatory interpretation: he neutralizes existing stratification differences and conflicts by describing a blanket quality of charisma and a shift from stratification to "lifestyle" criteria of status (Shils 1963, p. 43-44), resulting in
a (stratified) egalitarian mass. His interpretation of
the individual's integration is of a similar tone. He
described a society characterized by functional inte­
gration, that is, attachment by the major role (Shils
1963, p. 32, p. 47) with certain conflict between these
parts. He does not elaborate on this form of integration,
possibly because it is not harmonious with his optimistic
view of mass society. He incorporates and neutralizes
functional integration of the individual in the same
manner that he dealt with stratification differences, by
stressing the consensus and affinity among individuals.
Thus he states that "personal relationships... have come
to be regarded as part of the right order of life" in mass
society (1963, p. 40). He does not deal with the effects
of functional integration, but implies that they are over­
shadowed by the effects of the "moral transmutation
arising from the shift in the locus of charisma" (1963,
p. 46) and neutralized by growing affinity among members
of the mass (1963, p. 37).

iii) Zijderveld

Zijderveld's view of stratification in mass society
is contained in the following passage:

A subtle division of countless specialized
functions, a large scale of various levels
of rewards and status allocations, a
differentiation of spheres of authority and power...organized on strictly rational and efficient grounds. Rational bureaucracy fulfilled this task (1971, p. 65).

Here he sets out a fundamental assumption of his argument: that bureaucracy determines much of the nature of mass society. The hierarchy of bureaucracy is the key to social differentiation:

It creates 'a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination' (Weber)... Bureaucracy... integrates society-at-large in a functional way, it also creates... systems of domination and subordination throughout all of society... all modern individuals have been socialized into the bureaucratic attitude. Indeed, this has spilled over from bureaucracy proper to social life in general (Zijderveld 1971, p. 136).

From these two passages, we get an indication of Zijderveld's view of stratification in mass society. Differentiated levels of power, status and rewards are generally hierarchically ordered according to the bureaucratic structures which predominate.

Zijderveld differentiates between cultural standardization and class levelling, although this is not immediately apparent because of confusing terminology. On one hand, he describes a specialized, hierarchically ordered society (1971, p. 65); on the other he postulates a levelling of class (1971, p. 73). He seems to confuse
levelling of class with homogenization of lifestyle, and consumption habits (1971, p. 73, p. 80-81). The problems with his argument are resolved when we look closely at his meaning of class.

Zijderveld describes a differentiated, non-class-based social system. The criteria of stratification apply to individuals, not to groups of individuals or classes:

The individual ... knows that he is coerced and controlled, but he knows this as an individual, not as a class member. He is coerced within his specific configuration of associations and groups and he shares this particular configuration with a handful of others... (Zijderveld 1971, p. 132).

Zijderveld recognized broad strata differentiated according to occupation, status, power, etc., but only as a collection of autonomous individuals sharing these rewards. (1971, p. 163).

Configuration of associations refers to the segmentation of institutions. These institutions are autonomous, that is, they lack continuity between them. This is a slightly different form of specialization. Not only is the individual performing specialized roles within the institution, he is isolated also because his specialization in each is (1971, p. 74) not connected to those specialized roles that he performs in others. Segmentation of in-
stitutions results in segmentation of individuals' roles.

When Zijderveld refers to class levelling, it appears that what he is referring to is a standardization of visible lifestyle and consumption habits due to a shared mass culture, not an undifferentiated social system:

Together with the increase in differentiation goes a gradual levelling of class differences, resulting in a society with a rather uniform and predominantly consumptive style of life (Zijderveld 1971, p. 73).

Mass culture has superimposed a shared or homogeneous lifestyle, values and habits on this differentiated system with the individual as the 'unit of measurement' rather than groups or classes (Zijderveld 1971, p. 80-81).

Stratification engenders a specific type of integration in Zijderveld's argument. Specialization is frozen in the shape of bureaucratic institutions (1971, p. 70). The abstract society experienced by the individual is the result of segmentation of the institutional structure, and a lack of continuity between these institutions (Zijderveld 1971, p. 48). As these institutions become more autonomous, the individual experiences greater degrees of segmentation. For this reason, Zijderveld considers integration in modern society to
be predominantly structural-functional (1971, p. 70).

This form of attachment "reduces the modern individual to a social functionary ..." (Zijderveld 1971, p. 11). Specialization and the segmentation which it incurs are best described in Zijderveld's own words:

Moving between the institutional sectors, the modern individual is compelled to change roles like the jacket of his wardrobe. A distance grows between himself and his roles and he experiences a loss of meaning... In this vague society, social roles tend to grow ever more autonomous ... (they) become abstract fetters that mold... to levelled and uniform patterns (Zijderveld 1971, p. 72-73).

Specialization of function leads to internal and external pluralism, that is segmentation within and between institutions (Zijderveld 1971, p. 74). The individual becomes attached to society but isolated in his function:

...a large number of personal face-to-face relations of pre-modern society have been replaced by the relations of official functionaries who practice the roles of their social positions (Zijderveld 1971, p. 49).

The greater the social distance between functions, the greater the degree of abstraction (Zijderveld 1971, p. 54). Zijderveld makes this point by example:

Not only do we not interact with political leaders, but the concept of these leaders becomes images pushed by mass media (Zijderveld 1971, p. 53-54).

The system of differentiation implemented through
bureaucratic organization results in the individual becoming a combination of functionary and social role player, and consumer (Zijderveld 1971, p. 55). As this functionary, he must "conform to bureaucratic patterns of behaviour" (Zijderveld 1971, p. 92). This discourages communication (or symbolic exchange) in which opinions are expressed and traded (Zijderveld 1971, p. 91). In summary, Zijderveld describes the effects of differentiation and functional integration on interaction:

Face-to-face relationships will shrink to a few friendships based on the individualistic principles... and difficult to maintain... (1971, p. 55).

Individuals withdraw into their own private world outside of the institutionalized structure. This withdrawal Zijderveld attributes to the segmented structure and the multiplicity of ordered positions that the individual must perform (1971, p. 87-88). As a functionary caught up in bureaucratic authority systems and attitudes, the individual begins to accept what is directed towards him without forming an opinion of his own (Zijderveld 1971, p. 87). Internalization and communication are gradually reduced to the levels required by the institutions. The individual becomes uncommunicative and isolated, being "dispersed over a pluralistic structure (Zijderveld 1971, p. 88).
We can sum up Zijderveld's argument concerning the effects of institutional segmentation and functional integration in the following passage:

Contemporary society exhibits a disparity between the individual and the institutional structures of his society. The latter have a tendency to grow independent and to exist for their own sake. The individual...seems to take the opposite road, to withdraw from the public sphere into his private world and grow increasingly autonomous... (1971, p.128).

The effect of institutional segmentation is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter of this thesis.

iv) Marcuse

Marcuse also distinguishes between lifestyle and consumption homogenization, and class levelling:

If the worker and his boss enjoy the same television program and visit the same resort places, if the typist is as attractively madeup as the daughter of her employer... then this assimilation indicates not the disappearance of classes, but the extent to which the needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the Establishment are shared by the underlying population (1966, p. 8)

Marcuse lists certain trends which are changing the nature of the stratification pattern, but not its existence. He described the transformation of the laboring classes (1966, p. 24) and the assimilation of blue collar and white collar populations (1966, p. 19). He gives
several reasons for the change. The amount of physical labour has been reduced with mechanization (Marcuse 1966, p. 25). The nature of the work becomes similar to that of white collar workers rather than that of the traditional laboring classes.

These changes in the character of work and the instruments of production change the attitude and the consciousness of the labourer, which become manifest in the widely discussed 'social and cultural integration' of the laboring class with capitalist society (Marcuse 1966, p. 29).

The working class becomes more like the white collar class both in terms of technical organization and standard of living/consumption (Marcuse 1966, p. 31).

In addition to these two classes, there exists an upper class. This consists of bosses and owners who are increasingly becoming high level managers and bureaucrats (Marcuse 1966, p. 32). The social hierarchy becomes an overlay of the division of labour, the lines between the working and middle classes merge, but the upper stratum remains distinct. In addition to these three strata, Marcuse suggests that

...underneath the conservative popular base is the substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted...the unemployed and the unemployable (1966, p. 256).

Beneath the levelling mass culture, therefore, the class structure still exists (Marcuse 1966, p. 8). This
culture blurs visible class distinctions but does not eradicate class divisions. The effect that it does have is to unite the population in the preservation of the status quo, which is the simultaneous preservation of their own increased material wealth (Marcuse 1966, p. 8-9).

Marcuse includes integration in his discussion in a manner which is more general and broad than that of either Zijderveld or Mills, who we shall discuss presently. The interrelationship between integration and control is drawn so tightly that these two elements are difficult to isolate in his argument.

Integration of the individual is accomplished by two closely related means. One is the functional tie of the individual, that is, integration or connection to the social structure by means of his major (occupational) role; the other is the controlled ideology stressing consumerism and material wealth.

The consumption habits of mass culture Marcuse describes as false needs implanted from above, that is, by those controlling the production-consumption system (1966, p. 4-5). Implanting and satisfying these false needs becomes a method of maintaining the status quo. Mass culture spreads to all class levels and becomes a "good way of life" (Marcuse 1966, p. 12).
The functional tie - the occupational role - successfully binds the individual to the social system because only through this tie could he achieve the goods and services of mass culture which he "needs". All the commodities of mass culture answer the false needs by design. Each individual's function as a producer enables him to maintain his function as a consumer. Thus it is the individual's striving for material welfare which motivates him to maintain his functional ties and support the system. Functional roles⁴ and the ideology implemented 'from above' peddling false needs combine to produce the 'healthy' i.e. active and functioning, social system.

The means of mass transportation and communication, the commodities of lodging, food, and clothing, the irresistible output of the entertainment and information industry carry with them prescribed attitudes and habits which bind the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, to the whole (Marcuse 1966, p. 12).

Actual stratification differences, as we saw earlier become acceptable because these are blurred by mass culture attitudes, habits and consumerism.

Individuals perform their functional roles in a social system dominated by institutions and bureaucracies (Marcuse 1966, p. 169). Position in the
social hierarchy is determined according to function within these settings. Functional integration is reinforced by the technical-rational ideology which legitimizes this criteria of social position as rational, thus

...the system of institutions ...are the established and frozen relationships among men... (Marcuse 1966, p. 191).

"Mass cultural" integration and functional integration combine to produce a condition in the modern individual which reinforces both of these types of integration - the condition of one dimensional thought (which is defined as lack of critical thinking).

Marcuse describes its origin:

The products indoctrinate and manipulate;
...And as these beneficial products become available to more individuals in more social classes, the indoctrination they carry... becomes a way of life... as a good way of life it militates against qualitative change. Thus emerges a pattern of one dimensional thought and behaviour... (1966, p. 12).

This lack of critical thinking reconciles the individual to his function and position in the stratification system. The 'good life' is so good that it becomes irrational, that is against the prevailing rational-technical ideology to question it (Marcuse 1966, p. 10-12). The individual in mass society is lulled into complacency and acceptance.
Mills explicitly differentiates between the stratified mass and the consumer culture:

The class position of employed people depends on their chances in the labour market; their status position depends on their chances in the commodity market (1974, p. 241).

Marcuse and Zijderveld described stratified systems in general terms. In comparison, Mills is more explicit, both in terms of the nature of the classes and the determining criteria. He considers occupation to be the "new axis of stratification" (1974, p. 65).

As sources of income, occupations are connected with class position; and since they normally carry an expected quota of prestige ... to status position ...also..power... (Mills 1974, p. 71).

He distinguishes class first on the basis of occupation, and then the combinations of these associated variables. For example: individuals of white collar occupations and wage-workers are propertyless (Mills 1974, p. 71), although generally the former earn more than the latter (1974, p. 73). The capitalist class is characterized by property and higher incomes. Near the top levels of the hierarchy, managers share the interests of and align with property owners (Mills 1974, p.103-105).

Mills divides his stratification system into three
broad classes: the propertied-managerial, the middle class (or new middle class) and the working class. The distinctions which he draws between gradations of these are too detailed to list. For example, he discussed the position of the professional as a member of both the new and the old middle class (1974, p. 112).

Like Zijderveld, Mills attributes most of the differentiation to the hierarchical gradation of functions in bureaucracies:

Bureaucracies not only rest upon classes, they organize the power struggle of classes ... as part of the bureaucratic management of mass democracy, the graded hierarchy fragments class situations, just as minute gradations replace more homogeneous masses at the base of the pyramids (1974, p. 111).

The bureaucracy is made up of smaller hierarchies that fit into bigger ones with numerous interconnections (Mills 1974, p. 209).

Mills does not confuse the levelling effects of mass culture with the disappearance of class. He recognizes that the widespread popularity of different mass cultural forms stems from the very existence of social differentiation. It becomes the status equalizer for different sectors of the population. Individuals who achieve little status in the occupational realm turn to
such aspects of mass culture as place of residence, leisure activities and material consumption generally:

... when the job becomes an insecure basis or even a negative one, then the sphere of leisure and appearance becomes more crucial for status. (Mills 1974, p. 256).

Homogenization of lifestyle that is associated with mass culture can be interpreted as each individual’s attempt to overcome or maintain the status differences in the stratification system.

Mills gives specific examples of the “equalizing” function of mass culture. Status cycles, for example, are alternating periods of work and leisure. The individuals can escape from his work status into a temporary status bracket symbolized by leisure consumption (Mills 1974, p. 257), that is, he can literally and figuratively vacation. Status cycles

... provide a temporary satisfaction... thus permitting him to cling to a false consciousness of his status position. They are among the forces that ... compensate for economic inferiority by allowing temporary satisfaction of the ambition to consume... Socially, status cycles blur the realities of class and prestige differences by offering respite from them ... (they) further the tendency of economic ambition to be fragmented ... and temporarily satisfied in terms of commodities ... (Mills 1974, p. 258).

This stratification system effects the integration of
the individual. The division of labour has specialized workers to the point where

... there are few specialists and a mass of automatons; both integrated by the authority which makes them interdependent and keeps each in his own routine (Mills 1974, p. 227).

Daily interaction is reduced to a segmental and functional character because individuals identify each other only on the basis of their occupational roles (Mills 1974b, p. 365), for example, as the person that fixes the car. Specialization confines each person to interaction within a small circle of functions whose performers he has direct contact with. Mills calls these circles circumscribed areas of interaction milieux (1974b, p. 365).

Accustomed to the routine of the workplace, individuals begin to accept without feedback the values and policies handed down through the structure of the bureaucracy and the mass media (Mills 1974b, p. 362). Stereotypes of other occupational milieux are spread in this manner, thus reinforcing the isolating effects of functional integration. The individual becomes isolated by means of his specialized function and by means of his stereotyping other functions.
In this subsection, we have examined the confusion between mass culture and class levelling as well as the integration of the individual into the social system. In the next subsection, we will relate these aspects of mass society to the dimension of control.

The Source of Control

We include control in the social context of the individual because, to some extent, it will determine the conditions and opportunities within which identity is formed. The degree and nature of control will determine the availability of solutions to identity problems. Certain sociologists, for example, believe that upward mobility is blocked or limited in modern industrial society (for example, Little and Westergaard, 1964; Westergaard and Little, 1970; Goldthorpe and Lockwood 1963). The individual, therefore, who has identity problems due to his occupation would find that working towards or changing to a higher status job is not an available solution to his identity problem.

Kornhauser distinguishes between two approaches in mass society theory:

... any theory that locates the decisive feature of mass society in the exposure of accessible elites to mass intervention is classified as 'aristocratic', while any theory that locates the essential feature
of mass society in the exposure of atomized non-elites to elite domination is classified as 'democratic' (1959, p. 24).

We have changed the basis of distinction slightly. Our concern is not with who is "accessible" but rather with the source of control. We distinguish between control exerted by an elite group external to the mass, and responsibility for its action based in the mass or in mass members as individuals.

Control from within the mass itself suggests an autonomous collective body, or a mass of independent individuals, each controlling his own actions. Our first category therefore, we will refer to as "Theories of the Autonomous Mass." Generally, we will consider autonomous to mean uncontrolled by a source external to the mass itself, that is, by a power elite. We do not refer here to mass movements or the mass as a crowd, but rather to the actions of individuals as members of the mass in everyday living routines and patterns - the mass in its market capacity as buyer, consumer, spectator as we defined it in the Introduction. The mass may be a body of consenting individuals following a leader from their ranks, or it may be a population of individuals acting independently within the same social system. In either case, it is not controlled or manipulated by a force
outside of itself. Theories of the autonomous mass do not recognize mass culture as a method of control; rather mass culture is seen as a manifestation of the increasing egalitarianism or of the egalitarian ethos of the mass.

"Theories of Control" will be our second category. In these theories, the individual is recognized as an object of control and manipulation by a source outside of the mass. This has different implications for identity formation. The individual develops his identity in an environment which manipulates him and therefore manipulates and directs his identity formation. It eliminates some of the possibilities for him to satisfy, compensate or change his identity. The theories of control which we will discuss recognize mass culture as a method or manifestation of manipulation.

We will continue to examine the same five theorists because they represent a spectrum of views from autonomy to control of the mass. Selznick (1963, in his first definition of mass) implies control originating in the mass itself, Shils (1963) regards the members of the mass as fully consenting, participating individuals who are the major element of society. Zijderveld (1971) offers us a perspective which emphasizes the structural aspect: the individual is controlled by autonomous institutions.
Mills (1974) in part agrees with this "built-in irresponsibility" but also recognizes a power elite. We culminate with Marcuse, (1966), who considers ideological domination to be the method of control.

a) Theories of the Autonomous Mass

i) Selznick

The only clear inference which we can draw from Selznick’s argument is that the mass is not controlled by an external elite. The actual source of momentum and power of the mass is unclear.

Selznick suggests at one point that industrialization and urbanization have weakened social structure and

...thrust ever greater numbers into direct contact with the centres of cultural development (1963, p. 19).

Consequently, these central institutions have had to bear the burden of increased participation (Selznick 1963, p. 19).

We become caught up in the confusion of his definitions of mass. Social disintegration results in an amorphous, unconnected mass which has no institutional participation (Selznick 1963, p. 17-18). At the same time, it forces individuals into participation in cultural institutions (1963, p. 16). This participation by a demanding mass results in a breakdown of institutions i.e.
social disintegration (Selznick 1963, p. 16-17). Thus the source of social disintegration and its effects remains unclear. Selznick's fear for the status quo seems to cloud his view of the mass. He desires institutional integration in those "traditional institutions" which bind the individual tightly to his place in the social structure. For example, he laments that:

... the family, the neighborhood, the workplace, and the local community lose their near-monopoly over the life of the individual (Selznick 1963, p. 19).

Cultural attenuation stems from trying to adapt the "character-defining" institutions such as the schools, churches and political order to "the multitude" (Selznick 1963, p. 19). He fears for those institutions which maintain the status quo. Thus when Selznick describes institutional breakdown he is lamenting not the loss of the institutions per se, but rather the loss of their function as strongholds of the elite.

Selznick suggests that mass participation is the result of historical factors (1963, p. 19), yet his terminology reflects his implicit view of the mass as a malevolent autonomous force. For example, institutions are "falling prey to the masses" and subject to "mass intervention" (Selznick 1963, p. 16). The mass has
certain qualities, the most important being commonness (equality?) for which individuals, including elites, strive (Selznick 1963, p. 16-17). The mass also has leaders - which implies that they are autonomous according to our definition - which are formed "in the image of the mass" (p. 15) "reflecting the mind and fluctuating mood of the mass" (p. 17).

Somewhere in the confused processes of social disintegration and participation (or vice versa) the mass begins to act as a body. In other parts of the argument, as we have seen, the mass is considered to be a group of individuals subject to the same historical forces, who act "freely" i.e. uncontrolled by an external elite. In either case, mass participation comes from the mass itself, it is not manipulated or controlled by a body outside of itself.

Selznick's view of mass culture, therefore, appears to be one of transformation of the social structure from below. Cultural attenuation, increased participation are all symbols of the status levelling brought about by the mass and their ethos of "commonness."

ii) Shils

Shils considers the mass to be a product of civilization and industrialization, "uncontrolled" by an elite
although an elite group exists (1963, p. 41-42). The individuals of the mass participate more in the values and institutions (Shils 1963, p. 36-37). Traditionally closed institutions have become open to mass participation (Shils 1963, p. 40). Unlike Selznick, Shils considers this to have beneficial effects on the mass and society generally. Individuals experience more and have more freedom to make choices:

People make many choices in many spheres of life and do not have choices made for them simply by tradition, authority and scarcity. They enjoy some degree of freedom of choice, and they exercise that freedom in more spheres than in societies which are not mass societies ... they are choices and not the dumb acceptance of what is given (Shils 1963, p. 41-42).

Individuals of the mass experience

... heightened mutual awareness, ... (which) has enlarged the internal population which dwells in the minds of men (Shils 1963, p. 43).

From this we gather that Shils conceives of the mass as a body of individuals participating independently but with an awareness of each other and their mutual membership in the social system.

According to Shils, the elites and the mass have changed, becoming more attached to each other (1963, p. 36-37). Thus he describes the mass and elites as being “at one” with each other (1963, p. 37) in "closer
approximation" of each other (1963, p. 45). The mass is not controlled by the elites, rather, it would appear from Shils' argument that they merely have different positions as members of the same mass society (1963, p. 37).

Shils recognizes that mass culture and stratification exist side by side, as we saw previously. He writes of a growing uniformity across all strata, regions and ages (1963, p. 46). He also states that the mass means more to elites now than ever because of their increased purchasing and political power (1963, p. 38) thus implicitly recognizing the importance of the mass as market in the sense that we defined it earlier. He fails to make any connection between this cultural uniformity and participation of the mass, and increased elite interest in this body. The mass is important to the elites only because of the "moral transmutation" which the entire society has undergone, not because increased mass purchasing power aids in maintaining the elites' positions. Shils invents an egalitarian ethos emanating from (what he openly admits to be) a stratified mass to explain cultural uniformity and standardization. To admit to elite control would be to destroy his own semi-utopian description of mass society.
b) Theories of the Controlled Mass

i) Zijderveld

Zijderveld considers control to be of a structural nature. He states that modern bureaucracy is the general coercive force that integrates society as a whole in a functional manner (1971, p. 135-136):

The freedom of the modern individual is continuously, limited by various forms of coercion and social control stemming from different institutional sectors. The novelty of modern social control lies in the fact that the individual is controlled by many, often independent institutional patterns, while he is hardly able to grasp this control... Thus to the modern individual... control is experienced as an alienating and dehumanizing force (Zijderveld 1971, p. 128).

An institution can only dominate an individual when he is acting within its jurisdiction (Zijderveld 1971, p. 70). In a society of multiple institutions, this makes the nature of control more abstract, harder to define and consequently stronger (Zijderveld 1971, p. 133).

Mass society is ruled by

.....industry, technology and science, and organized by the rational principles of bureaucracy... (Zijderveld 1971, p. 74).

Zijderveld's theory of abstract institutional control does not explain mass culture unless we assume that it is an inevitable product of industrialization, science and
technology. He describes it in the following way:

A cultural uniformity has spread out over industrial society which is coached and stimulated by the mass media that offers fads, fashions, norms and values by the thousands merely for the sake of consumption (Zijderveld 1971, p. 81).

He states that we are a consumer society (1971, p. 81). This does not ask or answer the question of why we consume or why this is a consumer society. "For sake of consumption" implies that individuals have an inherent propensity to buy. He offers no explanation for the cultural uniformity which he sees as spreading through industrial society.

Zijderveld does not recognize human elements of control within institutional settings, that is, a power elite. The very bureaucratic structures which he describes are, by definition hierarchical structures or graded authority positions (Weber 1970). Individuals of higher echelon positions who would have the power to direct policies and the workings of the institution would also, intentionally or unintentionally, control and manipulate the individuals under the jurisdiction or participating in that institution (a view that Mills holds, as we will see shortly). Suggesting that mass culture is a method of control for the bureaucracy itself is not acceptable if
we accept that bureaucracy is a

...formalistic principle of organization that does not, and cannot care about a meaningful existence for the individual... (Zijderveld 1971, p. 136).

Bureaucracy is a form of organization, it does not have the kind of intentionality which perpetuates its own existence, unless we acknowledge human elements of control. Zijderveld, however, stresses that control is structural, exercised through this bureaucratic setup and institutional autonomy. Control is not deliberately implemented by the human element. Mass culture, therefore, is not a deliberate tool of control. Zijderveld recognizes mass culture but offers no explanation of its origins. In his argument, it is another condition associated with contemporary society which we must assume, arose from industrialization, technology and science.

ii) Mills

Mills' argument revolves around the human element of control. The mass is subject to elite control expressed through or buried in institutional bureaucratic settings:

... across the bargaining tables of power, the bureaucracies of business and government face one another, and under the tables their feet are interlocked in wonderfully complex ways (Mills 1974, p. 79).

The result is that
at the top, society becomes an uneasy interlocking of private and public hierarchies, and at the bottom, more and more areas become objects of management and manipulation (Mills 1974, p. 77).

Elites form a strong network of control in and across institutional settings. We move towards a corporate-like society characterized by "more managed integration" (Mills 1974, p. 78).

The managers of big business in these bureaucracies, according to Mills, have become the powerful new elite in society (1974, p. 100). These managers identify with the interests of big property owners.

Changes have occurred within the industrial propertied class in such a way that the actual wielding of power is delegated to hierarchies; the entrepreneurial function has been bureaucratized. But the top man in the bureaucracy is a powerful member of the propertied class. He derives his right to act from the institution of property; he does act ... (in) the interests of the private-property system; he does feel unity ... with his class and its source of wealth (Mills 1974, p. 102).

The elites and the bureaucracy, however, are part of the same source of control. Thus,

No matter what the motives of individual owners and managers...may be, the Enterprise itself comes in time to seem autonomous, with a motive of its own: to manipulate the world in order to make a profit. But this motive is embodied in the rationalized enterprise, which is out for the secure and steady return... (Mills 1974, p. 109).
Zijderveld (1971) attributed unresponsiveness and abstraction to structural control created by bureaucracy. Mills attributes these characteristics to the structure of bureaucracy which removes and insulates the elite from others, thus irresponsibility is built into the system (1974, p. 111).

The motive of the Enterprise and the elite is identical: "to manipulate the world to make a profit" (Mills 1974, p. 108) as we have seen. Manipulation, states Mills, is a secret or impersonal use of power, so that the victim is not explicitly ordered but is subject to the will of another (1974, p. 109). This will is that of the elite:

The formal aim,... is to have men internalize what the managerial cadres would have them do, without knowing their own motives, but nevertheless having them (Mills 1974, p. 110).

This manipulation was the element missing in Zijderveld's work which left mass culture unexplained: bureaucracy controls individuals by its structural limitations, but it is this human element of vested interest i.e. elites that manipulates individual's for its own ends.

Profit becomes the key motive and mass culture has become the means of profit making which is not necessarily expressed monetarily. Mass production and mass consumption have become The Fetish in contemporary society (Mills 1974c,
p. 418). Artistically, scientifically, intellectually and in the work world, mass culture takes over, and these areas "become part of society as a set of bureaucracies and a great salesroom" (Mills 1974c,p. 418). The distributors of mass culture create fads and fashions to sell to the market, and at the same time control the many workers and producers of this "commercially established cultural apparatus" (Mills 1974c,p. 418-419).

Mills, therefore, describes mass culture as controlled and indirectly controlling. He points out that:

People experiencing ...increasing and uninterrupted material contentment are not likely to develop economic resentments that would turn their political institutions into means of ideological conflict, or turn their minds into political forums (Mills 1974, p. 340).

iii) Marcuse

Marcuse (1966) is more explicit about the connection between this form of political "contentment" which Mills describes, and mass culture. Distribution of wealth is a deliberate function of control aimed at welding the mass to the system. As we have seen, false needs are implanted in individuals, and they consume the various products of mass culture in order to satisfy them.

The production apparatus, according to Marcuse, determines the social occupations, skills and attitudes as well as the individual needs and aspiration (1966, p. 10).
Domination by the rational-technical ideology means controlling the methods of implementing and answering needs (Marcuse 1966, p. 3). Products themselves become carriers of the ideology, representing "the good life". The individual is indoctrinated and integrated into the system through consumption (Marcuse 1966, p. 12).

Technical rationality becomes the ideology of domination (Marcuse 1966, p. 111). It improves the material wealth and standard of living of individuals until, in the lower strata, they lose their revolutionary potential and become incorporated into the system of values, lifestyle habits and beliefs (Marcuse 1966, p. 256):

... the technical apparatus of production and destruction... sustains and improves the life of individuals while subordinating them to the masters of the apparatus. Thus the rational hierarchy merges with the social one (Marcuse 1966, p. 166).

Embedded in the processes of production, this rational-technical ideology effects the individual in such a way that it prevents him from desiring qualitative change (Marcuse 1966, p. 11):

Thus emerges a pattern of one-dimensional thought and behaviour in which ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of this universe. They
are redefined by the rationality of the given system and of its quantitative expression (Marcuse 1966, p. 12).

Manipulation of needs is achieved by those "vested interests" in control of economic-technical coordination (Marcuse 1966, p. 3). The dominant ideology, while somewhat autonomous as a function of modern science and rationality, also has its directing elite. The interrelated aspects of this rational-technical domination and the controlling elite are pointed out in the following passage, where he describes

... the effect of the technological organization of production... on management and direction. Domination is transfigured into administration. The capitalist bosses and owners are losing their identity as responsible agents; they are assuming the function of bureaucrats in a corporate machine. Within the vast hierarchy of executive and managerial boards extending far beyond the individual establishment... the tangible source of exploitation disappears behind the facade of objective reality... With technical progress as its instrument, unfreedom... is perpetuated and intensified in the form of many liberties and comforts (Marcuse 1966, p. 32).

His view of the "master of the apparatus" is similar to that of Mills: high level bureaucrats and managers who identify with the propertied class, and this class itself. Mills, however, does not develop his argument to the point of postulating a repressive ideology of
which production-consumption is a key component. We may conclude from Marcuse's argument that the effect of mass culture is to maintain the status quo by indoctrinating individuals with the rational economic ideology and thus preventing qualitative change (Marcuse 1966, p. 256).

Summary

We tend to support the general position taken by those theorists who contend that mass society is stratified, in some form and according to certain criteria. We cannot accept Selznick's conception of a mass which is differentiated in terms of function but not stratified. His own examples of the student and demagogue, parishioner and priest suggest the contrary. We also find it difficult to accept Shils' view that inequalities and associated conflicts exist, but are neutralized by a mysterious (but catching) universal charisma and dignity, whose origins he cannot explain.

Marcuse and Zijderveld definitely write in terms of stratified societies. Marcuse uses the term class without definition. Zijderveld refers generally to "various levels of rewards and status allocation (1971, p. 65) associated with bureaucracies but does not elaborate. Accepting from the work of all three that ours is a
stratified society, we will rely upon Mills' more explicit description of stratification. The first condition under which the modern individual forms his identity then, is a stratified social system of which occupation is the key criterion.

We found that all of our theorists postulate some degree of functional integration. We say degree because each weighed the importance and effects of this form of integration differently.

Selznick considered functional integration beneficial if it bound the individuals to their places in the social hierarchy, and thus maintained the traditional function of institutions and their associated elites. Functional integration was destructive in mass organization, however, in which case it was of a segmental character. He gave one description of the mass as isolated amorphous individuals, with which we agree, but he described it as such "for the wrong reasons"; that is, this was the state of the mass when it loosened from traditional structures.

Shils' argument would be similar to that of Zijderveld's - integration by function in bureaucratic institutions and also by the authority of these institutions -
if he did not choose to obfuscate it with his universal dignity ethos. The individual in Shils argument is a consensually participating member of the social system; lifestyle and dignity have succeeded work roles as the integrative mechanisms, although not the structural organization of society.

Mills and Zijderveld consider the individual to be functionaries, receiving information but not participating in their social system beyond their roles as functionaries. They are truly functionally integrated. These individuals are isolated from each other by their specialized roles. This is the view of functional integration which we find most consistent with our conception of a stratified society; that is, it is unclouded by qualifications such as Selznick or Shils make.

We have now added to our description of mass society. We accept that the individual is functionally integrated by the roles that he plays, as well as believing that he is integrated not as an equal member of the mass generally, but as a member of a definite stratum within that mass. Let us now turn to the question of control.

Conceptions of the mass as autonomous do not account for the origin of standardization or levelling of differences in the mass; that is, the levelling forces are
attributed to the mass itself, but this does not explain why these forces arose. Shils' argument suggests that the egalitarian ethos arose when individuals recognized themselves as members of the same society, but he admits that these members occupy unequal positions in this society. The reasons for this egalitarianism remain unexplained, unless we accept that it arises from an unexplained universal dignity of mass members. Shils' argument corresponds in some ways to what Westergaard refers to as the theory of countervailing power. According to this theory, power is distributed among a variety of groups resulting in a balance of power "in which no single set of interests is dominant" (Westergaard 1966, p. 98). Westergaard's criticism of this theory neatly summarizes our reasons for rejecting Shils' argument, therefore he is worth quoting at length. He states that the theory of countervailing, pluralistic power provides "something of a 'conceptual framework' for analysis of the distribution of power". It is not a substitute for such analysis however,

For it leaves two crucial questions unanswered. First, how far do the various formally separate groups among which power is distributed represent in fact, not distinct and competing interests, but broadly similar interests in different institutional dress? Closer analysis may reveal not a scattered diversity of influences, but a broad clustering of major sources of pressure.
Secondly, once such major clusters of interest have been identified, at what point between them has the balance of power been struck? To answer these questions requires examination of the composition of the various elites and pressure groups in the main institutional fields of power, to establish the degree of identity between them... (Westergaard 1966, p. 99).

In Selznick's work we find industrialization, science and technology blamed for social disintegration which "loosens" the individual from certain institutions but results in his increased participation in others. Like Shils, he does not make the connection between these historical forces and increased participation clear. Parts of Selznick's argument also imply a mass which is a collectivity rather than a group of individuals acting similarly and propelled by industrialization and urbanization. This description of mass approximates the definition of mass movement offered by Kornhauser (1958, p. 47). At the same time, he describes the mass as amorphous and isolated individuals, experiencing segmental participation without direction. Selznick's argument becomes a description of certain aspects of the mass governed by his own fears for the status quo, rather than an analysis of the origin of its characteristics.

Theories of an autonomous mass do not adequately account for the conditions of mass society because they do
not explain a) the nature of standardization, confusing it with stratification and, b) the origins or reason for this standardization, which they can only explain in a somewhat circular argument as a manifestation of the egalitarian ethos of the mass. We find more coherent analyses of mass society among those theories postulating control, for they distinguish between stratification, cultural standardization and controlled as opposed to "uncontrolled" behaviour by the mass.

Zijderveld considered functional integration to be a method of control resulting from segmented institutional autonomy. Although he did not incorporate mass culture as a function of this control, his conception of structural control complements the views of Mills and Marcuse.

We choose to see conditions of control as postulated by Marcuse and Zijderveld as co-existent rather than mutually exclusive. Zijderveld's concept of meaninglessness we will interpret as the identity problems stemming from participation in multiple segmented roles with which the individual is unable to internalize and identify with - the condition that Zijderveld himself considers the cause of meaninglessness. This is different from meaninglessness in terms of lack of belief in the system itself. Despite
his own identity problem, the individual may still be "hooked into" the predominant value and belief system of his society. Lower status individuals - Mills' or Marcuse's working class - may experience meaninglessness in Zijderveld's sense yet still participate in, support and be placated by the promises and wealth of the system itself. The lower status individual supports the system for his own "benefit" even while experiencing individual identity and meaning problems. Functional roles become the means to the end i.e. consumption, wealth and fulfillment of implanted needs in Marcuse's argument, even though he does not explicitly discuss functional integration. Marcuse's ideology of control appears even more cohesive and integrating considering the meaninglessness which the roles themselves represent for the individual, which this form of control must overcome.

Marcuse considers the working class to be the potential source of change through its traditional role as the reproach to the capitalist system (1966, p. 27). This role has changed under modern rational-technical domination:

'The people,' previously the ferment of social change, have 'moved up' to become the ferment of social cohesion. Here rather than in the redistribution of wealth and equalization of classes is
the new characteristic of industrial society (Marcuse 1966, p. 256).

In conclusion, therefore, we may say that individuals form their identity in a stratified social system, to which they are functionally bound and controlled by an external elite. These individuals are of lower status levels when defined in terms of Mills' stratification criteria (1974); they experience identity problems through meaninglessness experienced in segmented roles (Zijderveld 1971). Going one step farther than Marcuse, we believe that these individuals are so indoctrinated and "supportive" that they will turn to compensation within the same social system that creates their status and identity problems. Mass culture as a major method of control also becomes this major method of compensation.

Let us now turn to the nature of these status and identity problems.
FOOTNOTES – CHAPTER ONE

1. Goldthorpe et al., for example, point out that the class situation of the worker, that is, the position that he holds within the social organization of production has associated constraints and life chances for the individual (1974, p. 151). At the risk of repetition, it is these types of "class" or strata associated restriction which we suggest will influence identity formation.

2. In his discussion of popular culture, Lowenthal touches on the discrepancy between an individual's position in the social hierarchy and his function as consumer. For example, the mass from all strata are exposed to the stereotype "heroes" of the mass media, that is, those who have "made it" such as movie stars, socialites, etc. He points out, however, that although these individuals differ in terms of their location in the social order, but they are "at one with the lofty and great in the sphere of consumption" (Lowenthal 1961, p. 129-6).

3. Wilensky (1964) uses the social context of production to distinguish between mass and high culture. High culture is created or supervised by a cultural elite in certain aesthetic, literary or scientific tradition. The critical standards applied to it are independent of the consumer. Products of "high" culture are of good quality by these critical standards rather than of mass quality. Selznick is concerned with what we may call generally the nature of the society itself, rather than products of high culture (such as a play or symphony to use Wilensky's examples 1964, p. 175-76).

4. The individual's roles i.e. social position is rationalized by the ideology (Marcuse 1966, p. 169). It should be noted, however, that Marcuse does not explicitly refer to functional integration in his argument.

5. Goode, in his theory of role strain, states that the social structure determines how much freedom in manipulation the individual possesses (1960, p. 495).
He continues "... one important element in the persistence of personality patterns is to be found in these institutions. The role structure remains fairly stable because the individual cannot make many free role bargains and thus change his role system or the demands made on him, and consequently the individual personality structure is also maintained by the same structural elements" (1960, p. 492).

Also, Gerth and Mills tell us that "The chances for an individual to emerge and to control himself by a generalized other are decreased as the variety of voluntary choices and decisions which confront persons diminish." (1964, p. 100).

6. Political power, for example may have monetary-related aspects, but may be considered a profit in itself. We refer back at this point to our definition of the mass in its function of consumer to mass culture: All members of the mass are valued as voters, buyers, and spectators in the political, economic and cultural realm (Kornhauser 1968, p. 59).

7. It should be noted that Marcuse uses the term without definition in the particular work discussed in this section.

8. According to Kornhauser's definition, mass behaviour becomes a mass movement if the objectives are remote and extreme; if activist intervention in the social system is favoured; if uprooted and atomized sectors of the population are mobilized; and if the internal structure of the mass is not composed of independent groups. He borrows from Blumer (1946, p. 187) to sum this up: "When mass behaviour becomes organized around a program and acquires a certain continuity in purpose and effort, it takes on the character of a mass movement."

9. Richard Parker (1972) sums this up as the myth of the middle class.

10. Goldthorpe et al, for example found that the industrial workers, especially the unskilled or semi-skilled, tend to define their work in instrumental terms, that is, as a means to an end extrinsic to their work situation (1968, p. 174).
CHAPTER II
CONDITIONS OF IDENTITY

Introduction

Theories of mass society, as we saw in the previous chapter, describe a stratified, controlled system. In this section, I want to formulate a theoretical description of individual identity within the context of mass society as we have described it in Chapter One. This will be developed in terms of two elements or stages: theory which explains processes of identity formation; and theory which places these processes in context of contemporary society. I have chosen Berger and Luckmann for the first purpose and Zijderveld for the second. I will use the identity formation processes of Berger and Luckmann to elaborate Zijderveld's conception of identity in a specialized, segmented society.

Let us first look briefly at the interactionist perspective before turning to Berger and Luckmann's work. Manis and Meltzer locate the foreshadowing of symbolic
interactionism as far back as Hume and Adam Smith, and its emergence with the work of Cooley, Baldwin, Thomas, Znanieki and Mead (1972, p. V). We can describe the interactionist approach briefly in Blumer's words:

... human beings interpret or 'define' each other's actions instead of merely reacting to each others actions. Their 'response' is not made directly to the actions of one another but instead is based on the meaning which they attach to such actions. Thus, human interaction is mediated by the use of symbols, by interpretation, or by ascertaining the meaning of one another's actions. (1972, p. 139)

The self arises through definition by others and is reinforced through interaction (Meltzer 1972, p. 10).

This perspective will be the basis of my eventual description of identity in mass society. Berger and Luckmann, and Zijderveld hold in common the interactionist perspective, which provides the shared element for synthesis of the two theories. Berger and Luckmann recognize the importance of the structural context, but devote their argument to the theory of identity formation. Zijderveld's argument, firmly rooted in Berger and Luckmann's work, offers certain complementary elements. He concentrates on the effects of the social system or structure on identity but does not expand on the actual processes of identity development. Through Zijderveld's work, we may
relate the specific case of unsuccessful socialization which Berger and Luckmann describe to a specific condition of the social system - autonomous, segmented institutional control. Berger and Luckmann's work will be applied to Zijderveld's analysis in an attempt to explain more fully the effects of social structure on identity, and consequently to arrive at a theoretical formulation of the nature of identity in mass society.

Processes of Identity Formation

Before we turn to the case of unsuccessful socialization, we should understand the meaning of socialization in relation to identity development. According to Berger and Luckmann:

> Identity is formed by social processes. Once crystallized, it is maintained, modified or even reshaped by social relations. (1967, p. 173).

Let us examine in detail the fundamental components of these 'social processes' of identity formation.²

The basic form of interaction is of a face-to-face nature, according to Berger and Luckmann (1967, p. 28). In this situation, the individual is confronted by the other's attitude towards himself which leads him to turn his attention inwards toward his own self (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 29-30). This form of interaction is
not rigid, rather it is characterized by a subtle interchange of subjective meanings (Berger and Luckmann 1967 p. 30). In the context of everyday life, primary interaction of this sort takes on patterns determined by the routine of living (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 30). Interaction in these patterns takes place within the guidelines of typifications of each actor by those involved. These typificatory schemes involve organized sets of characteristics by which we classify others. We then interact with them within the guidelines set down by these typifications (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 30-31). In this sense, interaction will be ordered by the typifications required by the specific situation.

Interaction according to typifications 'works' if the individuals themselves do not interfere, that is, other aspects of their personalities do not show through in a manner which destroys to some extent the typification. Berger and Luckman's conception of face-to-face interaction may be summarized briefly in their own words:

"The two typificatory schemes enter into an ongoing 'negotiation' in the face-to-face situation. In everyday life such 'negotiation' is itself likely to be pre-arranged in a typical manner. Thus, most of the time, my encounters with others in everyday life are typical in a double sense - I apprehend the other as a type and I interact with him in a situation that is itself typical. (1967, p. 31)."
These typifications are the basis of recurring patterns of interaction with the result that "social structure is the sum of these typifications" (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 33).

These shared typifications which arise out of face-to-face interaction are the basis of roles. The actor and his action or conduct become standards for repetition of the action or behaviour in the same or similar situation. In Berger and Luckmann's words:

We can properly begin to speak of roles when this kind of typification occurs in the context of an objectified stock of knowledge common to a collectivity of actors. Roles are types of actors in such a context. (1967, p. 73-74)

At the moment of involvement or performance, the individual identifies with the action and perceives himself as the actor in the role. The individual is able to recognize part of himself as the actor in that role once the action is finished and he is no longer performing the role. He is thus able to separate the part of himself which was the role player from his 'total' self. Berger and Luckmann describe the consequences when the individual has a series of roles to perform. In this case, part of the self is recognized and objectified in terms of the typifications associated with the roles;
This segment is the truly 'social self' which is subjectively experienced as distinct from and ever confronting the self in its totality. (Berger and Luckman 1967, p. 73).

Berger and Luckmann clarify the notion of the 'social self' and the total self in their discussion of primary and secondary socialization. This discussion, as we will see elaborates on the implications of role-playing for identity formation in each of these socialization processes.  

Primary socialization occurs in childhood. The individual is born into specific objective circumstances. According to Berger and Luckmann the child has no choice of identity because he is restricted by these objective conditions. These conditions constitute 'the' world for the individual at this stage in the sense that they are the only social reality that he knows. He has no choice of other 'worlds'. The identity of primary socialization, therefore, has a great deal of 'inevitability' attached to it, that is, "it is much more firmly entrenched in consciousness than worlds internalized in secondary socialization" (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 135).

The primary socialization process occurs within the context of these objective circumstances. The individual learns the world from the point of view of the significant others who are part of these specific objective conditions. (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 131-132). He identifies
with these significant others by taking on their attitudes, values, roles, etc. for his own. He therefore develops an identity of his own which has a place in the social world (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 132). From these specialized roles and attitudes of the significant others, the individual learns the expectations of the generalized other. The individual has a firmly established identity when he internalizes objective reality in terms of the generalized other (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 133).

We now understand why Berger and Luckmann seem to consider identity formed in primary socialization to be the root or basis of the total self. The other component, the social self, is part of but less 'firmly entrenched' than this identity formed through the primary social processes. If we examine Berger and Luckmann's secondary socialization we will understand how this social self is formed and its relation to the total self.

Berger and Luckmann describe secondary socialization as the internalization of institutionally-based sub-worlds and the acquisition of role-specific knowledge (1967, p. 138). This form of socialization does not have the element of strong identification with significant others which occurs in primary socialization; rather the process involved is one of mutual identification between actors in interaction (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 141). The roles are set
functions of institutions, and the individuals become their functionaries. There exists in this situation a certain amount of role anonymity, "that is, they (roles) are readily detached from their individual performers" (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 142). The result is that, under conditions of secondary socialization, the individual is able to separate realities and parts of self according to the role-specific situation or activity (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 143). Secondary socialization has less 'subjective inevitability' because, unlike primary socialization, the individual is involved in more than one 'world'. The multitude of institutionally based sub-worlds (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 138) directly effect the identity of the individual:

This (these sub-worlds) makes it possible to detach a part of the self and its concomitant reality as relevant only to the role-specific situation in question. The individual then establishes distance between his total self and its reality on the one hand, and the role-specific partial self and its reality on the other (1967, p. 143).

Certain such roles do however require total commitment. Socialization into these borders on re-socialization. These are the exceptional cases of secondary socialization (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 145), such as religious or political conversion, in which the individual incorporated the sub-world into his identity as a new total subjective
reality. In summary, we may say that secondary socialization is vulnerable because this high degree of commitment is not normally required; therefore internalizations are open to competing definitions of reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 148).

The processes of secondary socialization build upon the identity formed by primary socialization, that is, the new internalizations of secondary socialization are superimposed on those of primary socialization (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 140) for "in secondary socialization the past is part of the present" (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 163). Consistency and continuity between primary and secondary socialization processes are necessary in order for the individual to acquire and maintain his social reality (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p.162, p. 143). The individual can only be 'successfully' socialized that is, he identifies with the roles of secondary socialization in conjunction with his earlier formed self, if his previous and new internalizations are consistent (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 143).

Berger and Luckmann, however, describe instances in which socialization is 'unsuccessful'. We shall now examine one of these instances which (as we will see later) is a
product of contemporary society.

Problems of Identity Formation

The result of being faced with alternate realities and identities that is, is that the many sub-worlds of secondary socializations individuals are able to know the different realities of multiple roles without identifying with them,⁷ therefore,

... if an alternative world appears in secondary socialization, the individual may opt for it ... The individual internalizes the new reality, but instead of its being his reality it is a reality to be used by him ... (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 172).

We will make a distinction in terminology which Berger and Luckmann do not make, in order to clarify the difference between enacting and identifying with a role. By learning we will refer to the situation where the individual performs but does not identify with the role. Only when he does incorporate the role into his identity will we refer to him as internalizing that role. Individuals who learn the realities of their multiple roles only play at "what they are supposed to be" without forming any identification with these roles (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 173).⁸ Berger and Luckmann do not draw out the full implications of role learning on identity. We can complete these implications by drawing on their discussion to the
point. Role playing without identification constitutes a break in continuity and consistency between primary and secondary socialization, leaving the identity of the former unconnected with that (or those) of the latter. The roles do not become part of the individual's consciousness, thus causing a break in the biography of the individual (Berger and Luckmann define biography as the totality of the individual's life, the successive moments of his experience which he must find consistent and subjectively plausible, 1967, p. 64, p. 82). The social self in this case would not become fully formed, leaving the individual to rely upon the identity formed in primary socialization which is not reinforced by consistency with secondary socialization.

Berger and Luckmann relate secondary socialization to the general organization of society:

We may say that secondary socialization is the acquisition of role-specific knowledge, the roles being directly or indirectly rooted in the division of labour. (1967, p. 138).

They finish with the following paragraph which opens the door to Zijderveld's work:

... such a situation cannot be understood unless it is ongoingly related to its social-structural context... in the contemporary situation this entails the analysis of both reality and identity pluralism with reference to the structural dynamics of industrialism, particularly the dynamics of the so called stratification pattern produced by industrialisms. (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 173).
A brief summary of Zijderveld's work, especially his description of this social-structural context should be given at this point before we turn to his analysis of identity within this social system.

Zijderveld describes a pluralistic, differentiated society in which the individual has lost his sense of reality and meaning (1971, p. 7). Institutions have become increasingly autonomous of each other, at the same time growing more internally segmented in terms of roles and functions. The individual in the institutional setting is reduced to homo externus by the multiple roles which he must perform (Zijderveld 1971, p. 82). Outside of this setting he becomes an increasingly withdrawn person, what Zijderveld refers to as the homo internus component of the individual's nature (Zijderveld 1971, p. 91).

Pluralism, which Zijderveld defines as segmentation of roles and institutions, results in modern society becoming abstract in the consciousness of man, a condition which Zijderveld equates with loss of meaning (1971, p. 68). Consequently, individuals are reduced to social functionaries performing institutional roles characterized by heightened anonymity (Zijderveld 1971, p. 55). Social roles do not increase man's freedom and aid in identity formation,
rather they become 'abstract fetters' which bind him into conformity (1971, p. 73). In all these roles, man becomes socialized with the bureaucratic attitude. This attitude becomes part of the individual's consciousness, reducing him to the existence of exteriority demanded by his capacity as functionary in various roles (Zijderveld 1971, p. 81). This series of roles ultimately effects his identity:

Living between various institutional sectors, each requiring from him a behaviour that conforms to its autonomous norms and values, the individual will automatically develop a pluralistic identity... (Zijderveld 1971, p. 72).11

It is to the actual processes of identity formation in a contemporary society that we now turn.

Internalization and identification in interaction are the crucial components in identity formation. In the following passage Berger and Luckmann stress the significance of internalization:

... internalization ... is the basis, first for an understanding of one's fellow men and second, for the apprehension of the world as a meaningful and social reality ... in the complex forms of internalization ... we now not only understand each other's definitions of shares situations, we define them reciprocally (1967, p. 130).

The individual is 'a member of society' only when he has achieved the degree of internalization which enables him to identify both mutually with others and to perceive
himself as part of a meaningful social reality (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 138). As we have seen, however, individuals may 'act out' or "play at what they are supposed to be" without internalizing the role.

Zijderveld's theoretical position on identity formation is rooted in Berger and Luckmann's:

... in the process of interaction I anticipate the actions and reactions of the other actor by addressing myself as if I were the other actor. I internalize the communication process into myself through the encounter with the other actor ... The crucial point is that, because of this internalization, my participation receives a feedback, which again stimulates and directs my further communicative behaviour. (Zijderveld 1971, p. 86).

Multiplicity of roles in mass society effects the role performance and consequent identity of the individual in the following way:

Living between various institutional sectors, each requiring from him a behaviour that conforms to its autonomous norms and values, the individual will automatically develop a pluralistic identity ... Moving between institutional sectors, the modern individual is compelled to change roles like the jackets of his wardrobe. A distance grows between himself and his roles, and he experiences a loss of meaning and reality ... (Zijderveld 1971, p. 72).

The individual is split between the many allegiances of a series of unconnected roles which ultimately become meaningless to him. He is no longer able to relate to his social environment as a total personality (Zijderveld 1971, p. 134-137).
Zijderveld does not adequately explain the progression from his theoretical perspective of identity formation to his conclusion that man is a social functionary in modern society; that is, he does not clearly describe how the social structure effects these processes, but instead concentrates more on describing the eventual results. In one particularly confused passage, Zijderveld suggests that internalization and thus participation have declined because of the structure of modern society (1971 p. 87). Individuals 'dispersed' over the segmented social structure begin to recognize each other by the roles that they play and the associated stereotypes (Zijderveld 1971, p. 88). It is diminishing participation which seems to concern Zijderveld most at this point in his argument, although he recognizes that participation is a function of internalization (1971, p. 87). We are left wondering if it is the decline in participation or internalization which is structurally blocked. As well there is to question whether individuals become functionaries because they are blocked from interacting with each other because of the social structure and therefore cannot maintain or acquire identity through face-to-face interaction, or whether internalization is blocked by the social structure with the result that roles lose their meaning for the individual, and "... man loses his sense of reality and gets caught up in stereotypes ..." (Zijderveld 1971, p. 88).
For this reason, we link Zijderveld's argument with the more explicit discussion of identity formation found in Berger and Luckmann's work. The two arguments complement each other and we end up with the "total picture" of identity in its social context: individuals learn to play roles as social functionaries without internalizing and identifying with them. This happens as a result of a social structure which offers the individual many alternate and disparate roles and identities.

I found concern for consistency of role internalizations in the work of Berger and Luckmann, and Zijderveld. If we examine their arguments, we find that in both this consistency is a key element in identity formation. We also find, however, that they each stress a different aspect of a common perspective.

New realities can only be internalized into the individual's subjective reality if they do not conflict with those of the past. This consistency is necessary because the processes of secondary socialization

... always presupposes a preceding process of primary socialization; that is, that it must deal with an already formed self and an already internalized world ... This presents a problem because the already internalized reality has a tendency to persist. Whatever new contents are now to be internalized must somehow be superimposed upon this already present reality ... (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 140).
We find the means for maintaining this continuity inherent in the nature of the roles and in the individuals' method of dealing with them. The roles of secondary socialization, according to Berger and Luckmann, are more formal and anonymous than those found in primary socialization. Thus, as we have seen, role-specific selves are easily formed and detached from the total self. When the individual is presented with a series of discrepant sub-worlds, the many internalizations of these roles sever the continuity of the present with the past. The individual "learns the ropes" and continues as a social functionary.

Zijderveld does not describe the need for consistency in terms of continuity between major stages of socialization. His focus is on what Berger and Luckmann consider to be the conditions of secondary socializations, the actual structure and nature of role combinations. Lack of consistency in his context refers to the series of unconnected roles associated with a variety of autonomous institutions. The result is that this segmentation in the social system has failed "to provide the individual with one coherent system of meaning." Zijderveld's argument at this point suggests that in this case, what
Berger and Luckmann would call the role-specific selves of secondary socialization, also need consistency between them in order for the individual to maintain a cogent total identity or self. Each role, according to Zijderveld involves a different, unconnected even conflicting identity. In summary, we may say that the individual is faced with two closely related situations which disrupt the continuity or consistency of his social reality. The first is the break between primary socialization and secondary socialization. The roles that he performs as part of the process of the latter do not become role-specific selves, that is part of his social identity, therefore they are not part of his total identity which has its roots in primary socialization. At the same time, he finds that the structural conditions within which he must form these partial selves are not conducive to the formation of these. By this I mean that the arrangement of the roles (in many autonomous institutions) discourages the individual's identification with them. The result is that objective reality - the roles that the individual is performing - and the subjective reality - the identification with these roles - do not 'match' or 'fit'.

Nature of Identity in Mass Society

We have so far discussed the problems associated
with identity formation in contemporary society. Our next task is to examine the consequent identity and to derive a theoretical nature of identity for the individual in contemporary mass society.

Zijderveld suggests that the contemporary individual is best characterized in terms of his dual nature composed of exteriority and interiority (Zijderveld 1971, p. 24). We have already examined exteriority in detail. The individual is reduced to a social functionary. He performs his various roles but does not internalize and identity with them. This is man the homo externus according to Zijderveld.

The lack of meaning and continuity stemming from conditions of multiple roles results in the individual becoming privatized and turning inward (Zijderveld 1971, p. 137). These are the conditions of interiority. The individual becomes a homo internus in the 'space' between his institutional roles. Interiority is best described in Zijderveld's own words:

... modern society leaves voids... which the individual fills up with his private meanings... since they lie between the institutional segments... these private meanings escape... the social structure and are experienced as the subjective and unalienable foundation of human existence. The individual calls this his private autonomy... but is unaware of the fact that his 'freedom' is residual: it is... put together from the left overs of a segmented social structure... (1971, p. 138).
The dual nature of man as Zijderveld presents it depicts the individual's adjustment to the social structure. Unable to form an identity from the roles that he performs, the individual becomes privatized, seeking meaning in the non-institutional spheres with the result that he wallows in "uncommitted feelings, sentiments, and irrationalities" (Zijderveld 1971, p. 138). Interiority and exteriority in Zijderveld's sense describe the extremes of adjustment of human nature to an unfulfilling social structure. We may conclude from Zijderveld's argument that the individual cannot form a coherent identity within or outside of the institutional structure under contemporary conditions.

We are able to add a specific qualification to this conclusion by drawing on Berger and Luckmann: the individual is unable to form role-specific selves under conditions of secondary socialization. The total identity of the individual would then appear to rest mainly upon the 'residual' primary identity. The primary identity would exist in a form unmodified by the social or role-specific selves. We can theoretically depict the situation of modern individual: unable to identify with institutional roles, and unable to develop self in the private spheres, he remains dominated by the identity formed in primary socialization.
Identity Location in the Objective World

The individual is fully and successfully socialized only if objective and subjective reality correspond, according to Berger and Luckmann (1967, p. 163). We are concerned in this section with this overlap of subjective and objective reality; or, more specifically, where and how the individual locates his self in the objective social order. We will borrow Faunce's framework of analysis.

Faunce describes this interaction between subjective and objective reality in two related schemes or processes: self-esteem maintenance and the status system respectively (1968, p. 92-94).

He describes self-esteem maintenance as a process of self-evaluation which reinforces the image of self (Faunce 1968, p. 92). The individual claims esteem from certain roles. These claims are then supported or rejected by others, thus effecting the individual's self-evaluation. Not all roles are of equal value in this evaluation process. According to Faunce

...we choose from among the roles that we play certain ones in which we need to succeed in order to think well of ourselves (1968, p. 92).

This self-evaluation is the product of interaction with others, therefore, "we need to find others whose
definitions of what constitutes an achievement is the same as ours" (Faunce 1968, p. 93). This is the link to the objective world. We must share objective criteria in order to evaluate ourselves and others. This organized objective criteria Faunce refers to as the status structure or system:

The term status structure refers to a hierarchy of persons based upon the extent to which they are accorded social honour. Differences in the amount of social honour accorded to persons may be produced by the unequal distribution of anything that is valued. (1968, p. 93).

The subjective evaluation of self, therefore, is related to the social regards of actions and roles performed in the objective sphere. Faunce suggests that the individual may choose the roles which he evaluates himself in (1968, p. 93-95). Certain status systems assigning social honour connected to role are more universal or pervasive in society than others. There may be discrepancy therefore, between the roles the individual stresses and the roles that the society in general considers important (Faunce 1968, p. 94). Let us expand on Faunce's example of the assembly line worker. With low occupational status, and little chance for advancement, he chooses to evaluate himself in non-work-related terms (Faunce 1968, p. 94), perhaps as a skillful bowler. This recreational role affords prestige in
local circles only. The occupational role, on the other hand, is part of a status system which operates or includes the majority of members of the society. In this way, individuals may choose to evaluate themselves in terms of one role, but still be evaluated by others in terms of a different role which is part of a more universally applicable status system. 26

Faunce centres his discussion of both subjective and objective reality around the occupational role and the associated status structure. He does this for several reasons (which we discussed implicitly and explicitly in his argument). First of all; in terms of subjective reality, it involves the majority of the population in a necessary, not voluntary participation in social life providing them with a full-time, major role (Faunce 1967, p. 115), which ultimately affects their identity formation. In terms of the objective reality, these roles and their order form a structure which is inherent in modern industrial society (Faunce 1967, p. 115).

For status systems to include and rank the entire population of a society, the criteria must be recognized and shared by these individuals. Only in this way are they able to locate their own and others' position in the
objective social order. Berger and Luckmann's concept of general knowledge explains how this mutual understanding of ranking criteria allows the individual to recognize his own position:

The social stock of knowledge includes knowledge of my situation and its limits. For instance, I know that I am poor and that, therefore, I cannot expect to live in a fashionable suburb. This knowledge is, of course, shared by those who are poor themselves and those who are in a more privileged situation. Participation in the social stock of knowledge thus permits the 'location' of individuals in society... (1967, p. 41-2).

The social stock of knowledge includes knowledge of the regular performances and typifications which facilitate the major and minor routines of everyday life\(^{27}\) (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 41-43). It is, in Berger and Luckmann's words, "recipe knowledge" of the commonsense world (1967, p. 42).\(^{28}\)

Faunce discussed the occupational status system in terms of two criteria, occupational prestige (a term which he uses apparently interchangeably with status) and quality of the work-role performance (1968, p. 116), although he recognizes that there are others. These two criteria translate into two levels of evaluation: interpositionally, that is, between different occupations; and intrapositionally, positionally, that is, within the same
occipation (Faunce 1968, p. 118). Faunce states this difference simply:

... a person may evaluate himself in terms of how good he is at what he does rather than how his occupation ranks in comparison with other occupations...

(1968, p. 118)

The occupation of the individual must be of sufficient status to enable the individual to evaluate himself positively or favourably in relation to the remainder of the social order, or at least within his stratum. As Faunce points out, however, evaluation in both levels is positively related:

...in lower status occupations, whether the basis for self-evaluation is intrapositional or interpositional, the probability of social support for self-esteem based upon work is smaller...

(1968, p. 119).

because,

...low status occupations also involve narrowly defined tasks in which it is hard to distinguish skillful from unskillful performance on the job. There is usually no easily identified end product of individual effort that can be compared with others as a test of self-esteem (Faunce 1968, p. 121).

Generally, then, the lower the job in the occupational hierarchy, that is interpositionally, the less its nature or content is likely to afford esteem in the job context or sphere, that is, intrapositionally, (Faunce, 1968, p. 119).

While we agree with Faunce's definitions of inter-
and intrapositional, we will make the meaning of the second term broader. In our argument, intrapositional will refer to the grouping of occupational status strata, for example, blue collar strata, and white collar strata. A skilled machinist may rate himself as high status in terms of an assembly line worker, but low status in terms of a bank manager. This meaning of intrapositional will replace Faunce's more restricted meaning unless otherwise stated.

We will borrow Faunce's general definition of lower-status occupational strata for our discussion:

When we say an occupation has low status, we mean that relatively few people would be willing to act toward persons in that occupation in ways that would support a favourable self-image based upon success at work...(1968, p. 118).

That is, they accord little social honour to the individual. Success at work is interpreted both in terms of evaluation of the job performance but also the attribution of intrinsic criteria particularly prestige. Lower-order occupations are accorded little social honour by the rest of society. Faunce lists several characteristics of lower-order occupations. The first is the relatively low intrapositional status, which we have already discussed. The second he refers to as "meaningless intrapositional-status distinctions" (Faunce 1968, p. 122). This is significant because
it implies that the individual can achieve no positive evaluation of self within the job context as an alternative to or compensation for his low interpositional or societal status. The last two traits are closely related to the second one: limited possibility for upward mobility, and restrictions of work associates to persons at the same status level (Faunce 1968, p. 122). The third is self-explanatory, but the last requires some further explanation. Faunce suggests that individuals who constantly interact with individuals of lower status levels have their favourable self-image constantly reaffirmed (1968, p. 121).

These lower-order occupation strata he specifically identifies as unskilled labourers, semiskilled machine operators and lower-level clerical workers (1968, p. 122), or more generally as "semi-skilled blue-collar and white collar occupations created by the mechanization process" (1968, p. 124).

Like Faunce, I too will consider the occupational role as the status indicator of the objective world. Even if the individual chooses to evaluate himself in terms of his other roles, his occupational role is still the major criteria by which he is ranked in the social order and by which others generally evaluate him (Barber 1961; Mills
By 'generally' I mean that he is easily located and identified in the general stock of knowledge by other individuals and they may then assume certain behaviour towards him on the basis of that immediate positioning or ranking. This immediate recognition of social status would take place whether the individual identifies or evaluates himself in terms of the occupational role or not, because the occupational structure is part of the social stock of knowledge which contains the typifications of these occupations. The individual may choose to evaluate himself in terms of another role and a select group of significant others, but this does not prevent him from being ranked and evaluated in terms of his occupational role by individuals outside of this select group. This is the distinction that we noted earlier, between local and universal status systems.

I find Faunce’s two criteria of occupational status or location to be inadequate on their own. I find that Mills offers a more comprehensive system of differentiation. To Mills, like Faunce, the "new axis of stratification" is occupation (1974, p. 65). As we saw in the previous section, however, Mills considers occupation to be "tied
Mills considers income to be an indication of class, and occupational prestige to be an indication of status position.

Mills' work conceptualizes the objective social order as overlapping and superimposed on each other, rather than homogeneous strata (1974, p. 64, p. 73). These pyramids are organized according to the various criteria associated with occupation. Interpositional status, that is, social honour in Faunce's sense therefore may be judged on a variety of criteria, not on occupational prestige alone.

The following excerpt from Mills illustrates the overlapping strata of the objective social world:

Wage earners certainly do form an income pyramid and a prestige gradation, as do entrepreneurs and rentiers; but the new middle class, in terms of income and prestige, is a superimposed pyramid, reaching from almost the top of the first to almost the top of the second (Mills 1974 p. 73).

Thus, like Faunce, Mills classifies the objective world according to occupation. We can still accept Faunce's definition of lower status occupation as one in which the individual does not receive social honour enough from others to support a favourable self-image through his occupation. The inclusion of other criterion offered by Mills expands the characteristics on which the occupation
may be considered lower-status. For example, an occupation may be considered low in terms of prestige and job content (there are Faunce's interrelated criteria), as well as income and power. The interrelatedness which Faunce points out is significant in terms of these added criteria also. Prestige, skill, function, income and power are also interrelated to various degrees, with some exceptions. It is possible for Mills to speak of such objective strata as lower-white collar employees (1974, p. 73) and the new lower class of semiskilled workers (1974, p. 67) by identifying these collectivities by occupation and associated levels of the other characteristics.

Subjectively, this added criterion of ranking broadens the possibilities for evaluation of self. We discussed in another section of this argument Faunce's belief that the individual selects the roles in which he wishes to evaluate himself and have others evaluate him. I suggest that this principle may be carried over to include the various evaluative criteria associated with the occupational role. The individual in this situation would choose the criterion most favourable to his self-image on which to be evaluated. For example: the plumber may wish to evaluate himself not in terms of his occupational prestige, but rather in terms of his annual income. The grocery store
manager may wish to evaluate himself not in terms of occupational status, income or skill, but rather in terms of power (over his employees).

The individual may also choose whether to evaluate his self according to his inter- or intraposition. For example, a doctor living in a community of other doctors may evaluate himself less favourably (and be evaluated this way) if his income is less than other doctors'. The income element may be relatively unimportant to him, however, he may not form a favourable self in terms of prestige if he does not specialize and the other doctors do. Interpositionally, however, he may evaluate himself favourably on these two elements, being in one of the highest objective stratum of income and prestige.

A 'lower-order' occupational level, then, has objective and subjective meanings. Objectively it is the stratum which is of lower occupational status and associated criteria of ranking. This does not contradict Faunce's characteristics of lower-order occupations, which he lists as low interpositional occupational prestige, lack of mobility, lack of on-the-job prestige hierarchy, and isolation from other occupational status levels. We must qualify these characteristics, however, as intrapositional only at this point. The reason becomes apparent if we examine two occupational
groups which he defines as lower-status. These are assembly-line workers, and low level white collar workers. Intrpositionally, both qualify as lower-status. Lower white-collar workers are accorded little status recognition by other white collar workers who rank above them. Assembly-line workers are accorded little status by skilled blue collar workers. Interpositionally, however, one ranks above the other. In another example, Faunce does not consider these skilled craftsmen or labourers to be lower-order occupations, yet interpositionally, they rank below the lower white collar workers in terms of prestige. Subjectively, however, lower-order may be seen as associated with occupation which few people would act toward "in ways that would support a favourable self-image" (Faunce 1968, p. 24). Subjective evaluations may be inter- or intrapositionally based.

Faunce, like Zijderveld, believes that roles in modern society have become meaningless. While Zijderveld considers this meaninglessness to be pervading the social system generally, Faunce considers it to be characteristic of certain occupations in the occupational status system, specifically, those of lower status. While we accept that meaninglessness does exist throughout the social hierarchy we would agree with Faunce that the degree of meaninglessness
is related to the status of the occupational level (for reasons which we will discuss shortly). This means that individuals of different strata would internalize and identify with their occupational roles to different degrees. This has obvious implications for our discussion of blue collar workers. For this reason, we will qualify Zijderveld's all-pervasive meaninglessness with Faunce's concept of status-related meaninglessness.

Faunce's explanation emphasizes meaninglessness associated with low status occupational roles. The individual can only identify with his role if there is correspondence between the needs of his self-esteem maintenance and status assignment (Faunce 1968, p. 94); that is, in terms of our specific focus, the individual must be able to favourably evaluate himself in terms of his occupational role. Individuals of low status occupations tend to evaluate themselves in other terms because they recognize their low status in relation to the rest of society and therefore cannot maintain a positive identity (Faunce 1968, p. 94, p. 119). Faunce concludes that low occupational status is directly related to unfavourable work identity (1968, p. 121).

Berger and Luckmann also point out that identity formed in relation to the major role is related to the
status of that role. Identification with the role varies according to the amount of commitment, the role itself demands. They suggest that this degree of commitment is in turn connected to the status of the role. The following passage explains this relationship:

Thus the degree of commitment to the military required of career officers is quite different from that required of draftees. Similarly, different commitments to the institutional reality are demanded from an executive and from lower-echelon white-collar personnel. There are, then, highly differentiated systems of secondary socialization. (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 146).

The stronger the commitment required to the new reality (of the occupational role), the more effectively charged is the socialization, that is, the more it approaches resocialization rather than secondary socialization which has less 'permanence' (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 145).

Faunce also notes difference in commitment between occupational status levels. Professionals, or those in occupations commonly defined as professions such as doctors, lawyers, etc., have high levels of commitment to work (Faunce 1968, p. 123). In addition, the conditions of this work - autonomy, responsibility, no separation of work and the final result or 'product' - enable the professional to identify with his work (Faunce 1968, p. 123).
Lower order occupations as both Faunce (1968, p. 121-2) and Berger and Luckmann (1967, p. 146) point out, do not demand this commitment, or strong socialization into the role, the individual, therefore may not strongly identify with his role. 32

We may draw certain conclusions from the arguments of Berger and Luckmann and Faunce: the higher the occupational status, the greater the commitment to and identification with the occupational role. On the basis of this, we may make certain general qualifications of Zijderveld's concept of role meaninglessness in modern society on the basis of status differences. 33

Faunce points out that individuals who find themselves with high status location in the status hierarchy are more likely to evaluate themselves in those terms, that is in the terms of their occupational role (Faunce 1968, p. 95). 34 The social honour accorded by others on the basis of this role reinforces and confirms this "favourable evaluation of self" (Faunce 1968, p. 95).

We may hypothesize, therefore, that these individuals may not suffer the total meaninglessness of segmented role structure that Zijderveld describes. These individuals would be able to form an identity from their major role
which would be all-pervasive; for example, a doctor would identify himself and be identified by others as a doctor even in his role as member of the local PTA. In Faunce's words:

The work role...of the professional does not have a separate and instrumental function but is an integral part of their total life experience...there is not a work identity that is clearly distinguishable and isolated from an image of self in other social contexts. (1968, p. 125).

When we look at lower status occupations, however, we are dealing with lower levels of commitment and less intensive socialization into the role. We may hypothesize that these are the individuals who experience the meaninglessness of Zijderveld's segmented social structure. They do not internalize and identify with their roles but rather consciously perform and act them out (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 172). Faunce, as we have seen, suggests that this is because they recognize the low status of these roles. This recognition in addition to the less intensive socialization associated with the role contributes to the individuals lack of commitment.

Previously, we examined the dilemma of those who could not identify with their roles. We suggested that the individual who is unable to form a successful social
self (in Berger and Luckmann's terms) would be thrown back upon his primary identity. We may now suggest that this condition is more prevalent among individuals of certain lower status occupations. Lower-status has both objective and subjective meanings. As we saw already, if we use Mills criteria associated with occupations, we may objectively identify and rank certain strata interpositionally. Within this framework, we may apply Faunce's characteristics for identifying objectively lower status occupations intrapositionally. Subjectively, lower status depends on the individual's choice of objective criteria for his evaluation and self-esteem maintenance.

The lack of intensive socialization in low status (Berger and Luckmann) occupations as well as little commitment related to recognition of this low status (Faunce 1968, p.98), suggests that individuals of low-status occupations do not identify with their roles and therefore do not form a successful social self. These individuals, unlike those of higher occupational strata, would be dominated by an 'unmodified' primary identity. This primary identity, however, also has a location in the objective world:

> Every individual is born into an objective social structure within which he encounters the significant others who are in charge of his socialization... He is thus born into...
an objective social world... Thus the lower-class child... absorbs the lower-class perspective on the social world...(and) inhabit a world greatly different from the one of an upper-class child (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 131).

The primary identity, therefore, also has a status location in the objective world.36

The lower status individual who cannot successfully develop a social self, that is, identify with and internalize the roles of secondary socialization (of which the occupational is particularly important, for reasons which we have discussed already) retains a primary identity which is associated with the objective world of a certain status location. The individual, therefore, may have an identity which is not necessarily of the same status as the attributes of his major occupational role. We can conceptualize a situation, in which the individual may evaluate himself either in terms of his major occupational role, or in terms of the status of his primary identity. Faunce suggests that an individual will choose the roles which are most favourable to his evaluation of self, and self-esteem maintenance. I suggest that this selectivity applies also to the individual who finds discrepancy between the status location of his occupational roles and that of his primary identity.
The individual's primary identity may be of the same objective location as his occupation status. In this case, he does not have a choice in his self-evaluation, for his status has not changed. The status of his primary identity corresponds to his location as a social functionary. He would not suffer contradiction or discrepancy between his role status and his primary identity, although he would not be successfully socialized in Berger and Luckmann's sense because he does not internalize the roles that he plays; that is, his objective reality and subjective reality do not correspond. We will return to this point shortly.

Social mobility of individuals in industrial society whether between or within strata, makes discrepancy between primary status identity and occupational status location a likely possibility. Let us look first at the individual who chooses the status location of his primary identity.

As we have seen, an individual is identified by others according to his roles in the routines of secondary socialization (Mills 1974). Much of the individual's interaction takes place within the institutional settings of his roles. This interaction, therefore, would reinforce the selves formed in the associated "visible" functional roles. The individual is recognized and interacted with
by others according to the expected role identity, not according to his 'residual' and 'hidden' primary identity. The status location of the primary identity cannot be reinforced in the settings of secondary socialization (unless a "perfect fit" exists between the status location of the primary identity and the occupation role of secondary socialization). An individual who locates himself according to his primary identity does not have this identity confirmed by others in his occupational role (unless they are of the significant reference group of his primary socialization) but this confirmation is one of the requisites for self-esteem maintenance, according to Faunce (1968, p. 92-94). The individual is not confirmed in his dealings with others as what he feels he is on the basis of this primary identity; yet because he cannot internalize and identify with this major role of secondary socialization, he has no identity which can be reinforced through interaction. In short, his primary identity is of a location which is different from and therefore in no way reinforced by his present situation. The individual suffers the gap between what he thinks he is and what others think he is. In this case he suffers the effects of dysjuncture between self-esteem maintenance and the status system that Faunce describes:
the criteria we use to evaluate ourselves are different from the criteria used by others in evaluating us (1968, p. 94).

The individual suffers a similar problem if he locates himself according to the roles that he performs but does not identify with. His identity is of a different status level. He is locating himself and interacting in manners associated with the status that he is assuming, but his identity is not being reinforced by this interaction. He is masquerading in a status location which he has not internalized as part of his own subjective reality. Under normal circumstances, according to Berger and Luckmann, mobility is accommodated by certain mechanisms, these being the role-specific identities of the social self which superimpose the internalizations of secondary socialization upon those of primary socialization in a continuous and consistent manner (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p.134). The individual accepts the change in status between these phases of socialization as he internalizes new objective reality into his subjective reality. Under the conditions of low status and meaninglessness which we have described however, the individual does not internalize the highly significant occupational role of secondary socialization. The result is discrepancy between his identity (based upon primary socialization) and how others identify him, that is, in
terms of his occupational role and associated status. This may create difficulties both in terms of maintaining identity and status location in the objective world.

SUMMARY

In this chapter, I have touched upon the identity problems of the individual in modern mass society. Occupational roles for those who are not in the upper echelons are meaningless. The individual cannot internalize or identify with them. The identity which he forms as a child is not consistently developed in secondary socialization, yet neither can this primary identity be reinforced through interaction with others. It is also, in many cases, discrepant with the status location of the individual according to his occupational role - the major one of secondary socialization. If left alone, this unsettled situation for the individual could possibly lead to the unresolved discontent and 'revolutionary consciousness' of the lower classes which Marcuse laments. In the next chapter, however, we will see the alternatives and compensation offered to them which smothers any widespread discontent.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II

1. Berger and Luckmann have discussed the social context of identity formation in other works. Berger in The Sacred Canopy (1969, Chapter 4) gives a general description of social controls effecting the individual. Luckmann and Berger (1964) discuss the effects of stratification on identity. A more general theoretical discussion of institutions is found in The Social Construction of Reality (Berger and Luckmann) and The Sacred Canopy, Chapter 1. We find in Zijderveld a more substantive focus based upon the general perspective expressed in all of these works.

2. A similar account of identity formation is found in Berger's Invitation to Sociology (1963). I have chosen to discuss his theory predominantly as presented in The Social Construction of Reality because of its scope and detailed accounts of sociology of knowledge, socialization and identity processes - all of which are highly significant to our present discussion.

3. See also for a short succinct explanation Berger and Berger Sociology (1972), Chapter 3.

4. This is borrowed directly from Schutz. 1962, p. 229-234.

5. According to William James: "... a man has as many selves as there are individuals who recognize him... From this there results ... a division of the man into several selves; and this may be a discordant splitting ... or it may be perfectly harmonious ..." (1970, p. 374). This has significant implications for our discussion to follow.


7. Consistent with this idea, Gerth and Mills (1964, p. 109) suggest that "the relationship between different roles may be construed as a scheme of means and ends." Certain roles may be enacted i.e. role-playing as opposed to internalization, in order to facilitate goals in one of the roles. He gives the example of
the politically-minded clerk who uses his salary to have pamphlets printed for his political movement. Other roles that he plays or performs have an instrumental function channelled towards his role as political activist. Gerth and Mills also suggest, as in this case do Berger and Luckmann, that certain individuals consciously perform roles but are not dominated by any of them. (p. 109-110).

8. See also Goffman (1961) on role distance. A similar discussion is found in Berger (1969) Chapter 1.

9. Freidson discusses three different principles and ideologies which incorporate and explain the division of labour (1976, p. 304). He concludes that the division of labour can be analyzed at a strictly social level (1976, p. 311): "At bottom, then is the everyday world of work ... it seems accurate to see the division of labour as a process of social interaction in the course of which the participants are continuously engaged in attempting to define, establish, maintain and renew the tasks they perform and the relationships with others... individuals are always involved in collective attempts to control their work, and these collective attempts may be represented as social organization" (1976, p. 311).

10. Zijderveld's definition of social role is based on Berger and Luckmann's (1967). He defines them as ways of acting created by individuals to deal with situations defined as "real". These ways of acting become somewhat independent of living individuals (1971, p. 41).

11. Zijderveld's view appears to some extent to be an elaboration of Luckmann and Berger's (1964). The individual is a functionary under the tight control of primary institutions, but seeks identity in the areas of "secondary institutions" of mass culture that are identity producers and marketeers (1964, p. 336-337).

12. See W. James where he deals with the rivalry and conflict of the "different me's." (1970, p. 375).

13. This discussion of Zijderveld's is based on C. W. Mills (1974b). Mills analysis of mass culture is elaborated in Chapter 1 of this thesis.

14. Berger and Luckmann point out that society provides the individual with interpretative schemes which make social mobility "continuous" rather than descriptive internalization (1967, p. 162). See also Luckmann and Berger's
discussion of an anticipatory socialization associated with upward mobility (1964).

15. I do not mean to imply that Berger and Luckmann do not include or consider consistency in secondary socialization to be important; quotations scattered throughout this chapter illustrate that they do (see also Luckmann and Berger 1964; Berger and Pullberg 1966). In the work under discussion, however, it is not given the emphasis and attention which Zijderveld devotes to it. Neither does Zijderveld pay particular attention to consistency between primary and secondary socialization. We have discussed the main emphasis of each in order to show how both dimensions of consistency exist and are significant to identity formation under modern conditions.

16. Zijderveld, and Berger and Luckmann, like Durkheim, stress the individual's development through institutions and participation in the social system. Durkheim also emphasized the need for consistency and continuity between institutions and functions for the individual to be fully integrated into the system. "The parts" must not become autonomous of each other (Durkheim 1964, p. 370). It is precisely this lack of continuity and consistency which results in meaninglessness according to Zijderveld. However, Zijderveld points out, that Durkheim overemphasizes the role of institutions (1967, p. 30).

17. Gerth and Mills offer a similar explanation (although in slightly different terms) of meaninglessness, in a multi-role social system. The individual takes on a different institutional motive with each role that he assumes. These motives then conflict within the individual even though the institutions that embody them exist side by side in the social system. The number of roles would then aggravate this conflict, consequently threatening the sense of unity and identity of the role-player (1964, p. 123-124).

18. This is a more critical perspective than that of William James. James suggested that the individual could choose the self "on which to stake his salvation" (1970, p. 375), with chances of success or failure dependent on his performance in the role.
Zijderveld suggests that this multiplicity of institutional roles and the necessity involved with changing back and forth between them destroys their meaningfulness. The various aspects of the many selves create contradictions between them which the individual cannot cope with. Zijderveld takes a view similar to Berger and Luckmann's: the individual is faced with too many discrepant worlds.

19. O'Neill also emphasizes the relationship between institutional participation and privatization. "Para-social", political and economic activities he interprets as an indication of individual withdrawal. These are the ideological alternatives to political action on behalf of the world that individuals share. "This loss of a common world separates society into a corporate hierarchy and a multitude of individuals who are turned in upon themselves..." (1972, p. 36-7).

20. Goffman states that in total institutions, to engage in the prescribed activity "is to accept being a particular kind of person" (1961a,p. 186). He examines the situation of the individual performing the prescribed activity but defaulting from the prescribed associated identity (1961a,p. 188). In this sense the identity is developed in the 'space' between the rules, regulations and activities of the formal organization.

21. Duality is discussed in depth in Zijderveld's The Abstract Society (1971). He points out that Durkheim stresses exteriority through participation to the point where this becomes internalized social coercion. Marx, on the other hand decried... the exteriority expressed through institutions that Durkheim supported. Luther set the two components of duality in opposition to each other, considering homo internus to be "authentic" and homo externus to be "alienated". His discussion includes others such as Mead, James, Cooley and Thomas. Zijderveld stresses that, although the individual needs to express himself through the institutional structure, this structure itself can destructively separate the two sides of the individual's dual nature. (1971, p. 15-28).

22. Like Faunce, Gerth and Mills suggest that prestige in the status sphere needs one person to claim it and another to recognize this claim (1964, p. 86).
23. A similar idea is also expressed in Gerth and Mills. The individual selects and pays attention i.e., chooses his significant others, to those who confirm a favourable self-image, or those who offer him an even more attractive evaluation of self (1964, p. 86).


25. See Gerth and Mills (1964, p. 315-322) for a clear discussion of status systems and claims.

26. Benoît-Sullivan suggests that there are an innumerable (1944) number of distinct status hierarchies, although there are only three major "universal" systems which determine objective ranking in society: the economic, power and prestige status hierarchies. This in some ways corresponds to our use of "local" and "universal" status systems.

27. Berger and Luckmann point out that occupations also have their specialized stock of knowledge which meaningfully order the routines of everyday life (1967, p. 41, 138-9).

28. This argument is also found in Berger's Invitation to Sociology (1963, p. 110-121).

29. Runciman found that manual workers held either the traditional working class frame of reference, or compared themselves to the non-manual occupational strata above them. Thus they located and compared themselves inter- or intrapositionally (1972, p. 193-196). This has particular significance for the last chapter of our discussion.

30. One of the reasons for this identification by occupation is that roles, especially occupational roles, are stereotyped by values handed down from above. Thus these roles are easily identifiable, and the individual interacts with others according to these occupational stereotypes. See the discussion of this in Chapter 1 of this thesis, from Mills (1974b). See also Gerth and Mills (1964, p. 94).
31. See Barber 1961. He suggests that social class position is the relative place in a hierarchy of such positions determined according to differential evaluation of the "functionally significant" i.e. occupational role (1961, p. 3-4).

32. A similar idea is found in Goffman (1961a, p. 201-202), in relation to the structure of large organizations. Low placed members in the organizational hierarchy tend to have less commitment and attachment to the organization than those higher placed. These low level individuals have jobs not careers according to Goffman.

33. Zijderveld himself pointed out (see Chapter 1 of this thesis) that rewards are differentially distributed. Like Faunce, we believe that this distribution will effect identity development; that is, "where one is" in the social hierarchy effects "who one is". Consequently, Zijderveld's meaninglessness will not be experienced equally by all, for certain individuals will have stronger identities than others which may withstand performance in many roles.

34. Gerth and Mills suggest that status is the element of stratification most directly related to the psychology of the person. The individual's level of self-esteem is directly a function of status position. Also, the type of self-image and conduct may be understood in terms of status position and spheres (1964, p. 325.)

35. Gans, for example, found the West Enders (second generation Italian blue collar workers) were person oriented rather than object oriented, and strongly attached to their relatives, friends and neighbourhood of primary socialization. This world continued as the setting of secondary socialization (1966, p. 90-93).

36. Gerth and Mills add a slightly different dimension. If upper classes monopolize the media and perpetrate the idea that individuals of low status levels are "lazy, unintelligent and in general inferior," then these appraisals may be taken over by the poor and used in the building of an image of their selves.
The appraisal of the wealthy privileged children may then be internalized by the underprivileged children and facilitate negative self-images. Such images, if impressed early enough ... may cripple their chances to better their social position and thus obtain economic and social bases for more favorable self-images" (1964, p. 89).

37. See Gerth and Mills for discussion of conflict and consistency between our own self-image and the image others have of us. (1964, p. 91-95).
Chapter One of this thesis we devoted to depicting the nature of modern mass society. Through the work of several theorists we were able to conceptualize contemporary mass society as a highly stratified system controlled by power external to "the mass".

We dropped from the societal to the individual level in Chapter Two. We described the conditions of identity formation within this mass society context. Consequently, we were able to come to certain theoretical conclusions about identity in relation to a stratified social system. We were able to hypothesize that individuals of certain objective lower-order strata would have difficulty with formation of self. This difficulty we can divide into two closely related problems: low status in the objective order, and identity "completion" or formation.

In this chapter, we will elaborate on the interaction between the societal and individual levels. Our primary goal, however, is to examine these two problems more closely.
as well as the ways in which one individual, aided by the production-consumption system, compensates for or alleviates his situation. First we will look at mass culture (as we defined it in the first section), in relation to the low occupational status of the individual; then we will conclude with a discussion of identity compensation or completion in relation to mass culture.

Mass Culture and Occupational Status

i) Manipulation and Control in the Production-Consumption System

The central problem of modern capitalism, Mills states, is to whom can the available goods be sold? (1974, p. 67). The answer to this lies, not so much in expansion of the market numerically, but in 'expansion' or change of the product. Katona makes this relationship clear:

Purchases are stimulated when buyers are inclined to be attracted to new products or new features of the products ... If the gratification of needs and wants necessarily resulted in saturation, prosperity would become its own gravedigger; an upward trend would give way to stagnation if major expenditures were restricted to replacing goods that wore out... Enduring improvements in the standard of living of consumers and in any total economy that depends largely on consumer purchases is possible only if satisfaction with progress stimulates the arousal of new wants (1971, p. 62).
Westley and Westley express a similar idea:
The standard package of consumption changes continually as to specific commodities... as the content of the 'good life' is redefined. ... while desire for a particular object... may be satiated, the satisfaction of this want gives rise to others... therefore there is no end to the desire to buy (1971, p. 17-18).

The market then must continually expand in terms of its consumption, not its size as both Katona and Westley and Westley point out. Both mention the importance of consumer attitudes under these conditions (Westley and Westley, for example stating that consumerism depends on the "the consumer's optimistic faith in the economy" p. 18) but neither draw any relationship between consumption and manipulation of the market. Instead, they treat continuous consumption by the population as an almost coincidental mass of individual desires.²

Several theorists clearly point out the relationship between manipulation of the market and consumerism, as well as between this manipulation and maintenance of the status quo. We should remember that manipulation of the market means manipulation of the mass according to our definition of the mass in the first section.³ We defined the mass as the 'audience' and supporters - the market - for whatever
those in control decided to sell in any sphere such as politics, material wealth or leisure activities.

Parker (1972) suggests that consumerism is strongly linked to the belief of widespread and shared affluence in America. In the following passage he traces the origin and development of this "myth of the middle class",

... the myth of the middle class ... is a stem of the classic American myth of egalitarian homogeneity... this older myth... served an important purpose by diminishing class barriers and allowing upward mobility for the few and preventing psychic deprivation for the many... after World War II, this older myth experienced a profound reinvigoration through the myth of the affluent middle class... the country came... to see itself as embodying a new stage... in which the older preoccupations with... the material needs of life were passing away... replaced by issues of aesthetics and the 'quality of life' (Parker 1972, p. 182).

The upper middle class, according to Parker, were responsible for promulgating this myth. They had control of the mass media and "other opinion-shaping instruments of American society". Through the medium of the classic myth of egalitarian homogeneity, they spread this belief of growing optimism which was based on their own post-war prosperity (Parker 1972, p. 182). Today's version of this myth envisions the working class as upwardly mobile with a high standard of living (Parker 1972, p. 164-166). The
social system is maintained, despite the discrepancy between the myth and reality, because individuals who find that they are not affluent strive harder to achieve this affluence, or at least to appear to have achieved it (Parker 1972, p. 6). Parker's work may be considered an elaboration and explanation of Westley and Westley's contention that

it is the belief in equality of opportunity that is most important in maintaining the optimism so necessary to citizens in a democratic mass consumption society (1971, p. 59).

Mills does not explicitly elaborate the relationship between consumption and manipulation of the market. He describes a stratified society in which the locus of control is found in the propertied class and the executives of the modern corporations whose interests coincide with these big-property owners (Mills 1974, p. 105).

... at the top, society becomes an uneasy interlocking of private and public hierarchies, and at the bottom, more and more areas become objects of management and manipulation... (1974, p. 77).

Exploitation becomes less material and more psychological (Mills 1974, p. 110). The motive and purpose of the bureaucratic "Enterprise" or corporation becomes manipulation of the world in order to make a profit (Mills 1974, p. 108). (See Chapter One in this thesis). Mills implies in a
discussion of the 'cultural apparatus' that this manipulation has resulted in

... the virtual dominance of commercial culture... the mass production, the mass sale, the mass consumption of goods has become the Fetish of both work and leisure. The pervasive mechanisms of the market have indeed penetrated every feature of life... (1959c,p. 418).

Marcuse (1966) explicitly draws the relationship between consumerism and control. In his words:

Whether or not the possibility of... enjoying... destroying, possessing... is seized as a need depends on whether or not it can be seen as desirable and necessary for the prevailing societal institutions and interests... 'False' needs are those which are superimposed on the individual... by particular social interests in his repression (1966, p. 4-5).

According to Marcuse, most of the prevailing or common needs in leisure and consumption are false needs (1966, p. 5). Social control is implemented through the creation and fulfillment of new false needs by the system of rational-technical domination (Marcuse 1966, p. 9). Consumers and producers are bound together by this system of false needs:

The products indoctrinate and manipulate... and as these beneficial products become available to more individuals in more social classes, the indoctrination they carry... becomes a way of life (Marcuse 1966, p. 12).
We have returned, full-circle, to Parker's speculations about belief as opposed to the reality of affluence and mobility in America. Parker suggests that the "lower-middle" class do not attain this affluence; Marcuse, on the other hand, implies that they do. Despite this difference, they agree on one significant point: the domination function of affluence as an ideology or predominant belief. We should, however, briefly examine consumption patterns in relation to this "mythology" of affluence.

ii) Consumption Patterns in Mass Culture

When we first examine consumption patterns in mass society, we are confronted by the apparent homogeneity and pervasiveness of mass culture (as we defined it in the first section). Westley and Westley summarize from their own data:

... there is a considerable evidence that there is a tendency for everyone to want the same things and even to buy the same things... It seems evident that consumption patterns in a mass consumption society tend toward uniformity for all age, income and occupational groups (1971, p. 14-16).

There is some variation in quality, state Westley and Westley, but the only significant and striking difference in expenditure between occupational groups is in education (1971, p. 14).
Marcuse, with less empirical proof, points to a similar pattern of standardized consumption in all classes (1966, p. 8). Caplowitz (1963), in his study of buying practices and patterns, supports this trend. He found that low-income families were not only active consumers, but concentrated their buying efforts on new and more expensive models of various goods (Caplowitz 1963, p. 48).5

Levitan (1971) states that, although the consumption patterns may be similar, the economic standards of the middle class are not easily achieved by the working class. These standards are met only by means of the "extra opportunities" open to the latter. He stresses such supplements to the family income as overtime, moonlighting, working wives and the increased availability of credit (Levitan 1971, p. 37).6

This changes the significance of the broad homogeneous consumption pattern that Westley and Westley describe. It appears, in light of Levitan's work, that working class groups strive harder to achieve the standard package of consumption and the 'good life' of the middle class. Other studies support this.

Katona, for example, found that lower-paid workers work longer hours than other occupational groups and would
like to increase their paid employment time even further (1971, p. 130). This was true not only of lower-income groups, but also those involved in manual labour: more blue-collar than white-collar workers expressed the desire for more overtime (Katona 1971, p. 131). He concludes that there is a strong relationship between consumption aspirations and the desire for more work (1971, p. 132):

... there is evidence that the workers' financial expectations as well as their unsatisfied consumption aspirations also matter considerably in shaping the degree of working ambition... there were more respondents expressing a desire for more work among those who did than among those who did not indicate that they had unsatisfied wishes (Katona 1971, p. 131).

Westley and Westley also list "extra opportunities" for maintenance of the standard consumption package. The contribution to income by the wife helps to raise and maintain the consumption pattern (1971, p. 11). Extensive use of credit, according to these sociologists, also helps to bridge the gap between socio-economic groups (1971, p. 14).

Parker suggests that the lower middle and working class should be admired for their persistence rather than their achievement (1971, p. 12). He points out that:

...most often overlooked is the critical fact that blue-collar workers have actually lost the economic momentum they reached in the early
postwar years... workers have fallen behind... in their drive to increase income. Price increases have cut sharply into blue-collar buying power: in the past five years, because of inflation, workers have actually lost ground in terms of real purchasing power (Parker 1972 p. 140. See also Aronowitz 1973, p. 104). Parker sums up the sentiments of these theorists. He considers the standard package of affluence to be a deceptive index of security for the working and lower middle class (1972, p. 146). The outward consumption standard and pattern is preserved at great cost (economic and otherwise) to these strata: they have little or no savings; the wife must work; they rely heavily on credit; and the work week will probably include overtime and/or moonlighting (Parker 1972, p. 137-138, p. 13).  

iii) The Individual and "Compensatory Consumption"

The question which arises out of our discussion of consumption patterns is: why do the working class struggle to preserve a level of consumption which is not easily maintained economically and creates difficulties for them in other ways? A significant and partial answer to this question lies in the individual's status location in the occupational hierarchy. We will first briefly look at this problem of status location and then relate it to consumption.

We saw in the previous section that lower-status jobs
do not provide social support for self-esteem, either inter- or intrapositionally (Faunce 1968, p. 119). Certain jobs are low in both these scales, for example, the assembly line worker. Other jobs may rate low interpositionally, but high on the other scale, for example the skilled machine operator. Finally, there are those of high interpositional but low intrapositional status. The individual may choose which scale he will measure himself on. We found, however, that those occupations of high interpositional status usually had higher degrees of socialization, identification and commitment associated with them, (than those of lower status position), and did not present the identity problems which interpositionally low status occupations did for the individual.\(^9\)

The status connected to the occupational role "is directly related to finding social support for a favourable work identity" according to Faunce (1968, p. 120). He suggests that those in low status occupations (either inter- or intrapositionally) will choose to evaluate themselves in roles other than the work role, in order to compensate for this low status. This 'compensation' takes the form of roles for which the individual receives social support and may thus maintain his self-esteem (Faunce 1968,
p. 119). Faunce predicts that, after recognizing his low occupational status and seeking alternate ways of evaluating himself, the individual will not be interested or concerned with his evaluation in terms of the work role "because he no longer has any of his self-esteem invested in this area of his life" (1968, p. 119-120). The individual may know but not care about how others evaluate him. I disagree with Faunce on this point.

The individual is located by others according to his occupational role as shared or universal status criterion in society, the method known to all of positioning each other. This universal system contrasts with what we have called 'local' status systems. These various systems are shared only by certain 'subsets' of individuals, determined by the nature or the 'topic' of the system. The status position of the individual within these local systems is not known to others outside of the 'subset' group i.e. the remainder of society. The latter, therefore, resort to the shared system of occupation for status location.

The individual will be typified according to this occupational role in interaction with others outside of these local systems therefore his status is reinforced through interaction with others no matter how he chooses
to evaluate himself. He turns to other sources of esteem because he recognizes this low status position. In the last section of this chapter we argue that there are two ways in which the individual compensates for his low occupational status - turning to extra-work roles such as Faunce suggests is one of them. It is not because the individual does not care about his occupational evaluation, but because he does that he seeks other roles. The degree to which occupational location or identification by others pervades all activities or social spheres therefore, becomes crucial to individual self-evaluation.

Faunce restricts this location by occupational role to interaction in the work setting:

Regular contact with people at lower status levels provides support for a favourable self-image based upon work... Regular contact at work with people at a higher occupational status level makes it difficult to avoid evaluation of self in terms of the work role... (Faunce 1968, p. 121-122).

Yet he points out that for individuals of either high inter- or intrapositional status

...there is not a work identity that is clearly distinguishable and isolated from an image of self in other social contexts... (Faunce 1968, p. 125).

Faunce appears to differentiate between the subjective and objective spheres in terms of location by occupation.
The individual may identify himself, that is allow his occupational identity to pervade both work and non-work activities; but the individual is only identified by others according to his occupational role within the occupational milieux. Contrary to Faunce we support Barber (1961) in his position that the occupational role is the primary status location used by others in non-work related fields also. In local status systems, the status location of this occupational role may be modified to some extent although this modification will take place only amongst those involved in or with knowledge of the local criterion. For example: the street cleaner who is a prominent local athlete will be evaluated in terms of his athletic skill among those who have knowledge of the athletic status situation. Others meeting him, with no knowledge of the athletic status system, will identify him according to his occupational role. There appears to be, therefore, overlap and modification between locally and universally shared evaluative systems.

Mills points out that even in the confusion of other status claims in modern society, occupations "enjoy typical levels of prestige" (1974, p. 240). He alludes to this location of the individual according to his occupation
in his description of the Status Panic:

... actual job position is not so well known to those who one meets away from work... If the status struggle within the job hierarchy is lost, the status struggle outside the job area shifts its ground: one hides his exact job, claims prestige from his title or firm, or makes up job, title and firm... one can make claims about one's job... which minimize or override actual occupational status (1974, p. 255).

He illustrates how the occupational role becomes the method of identifying and locating others in mass society. We recognize each other

... as the man who fixes the car, or as that girl who serves your lunch, or as the woman who takes care of your child at school during the day. Pre-judgment and stereotype flourish when people meet people only in this segmental manner (Mills 1974b, p. 365).

The status accorded by others, that is the objective placement of the individual, pervades his activities. His status location becomes part of his general knowledge, whether he chooses to evaluate himself by it or not. His primary identity, as we saw in the last section, is not reinforced in the processes and interaction of secondary socialization (of which is occupational role is part). We may hypothesize, in fact, that even if he prefers to evaluate himself in terms of his primary identity, it is the status location of the individual's major (occupational) role in secondary socialization that others regard and rank him by.
Low status in the occupational structure, therefore, becomes part of the individual's knowledge of himself. For these reasons, we are concerned with the individual's objective location in the social order in the discussion to follow, not with his subjective choice of evaluation criterion.

In the last section we saw that lower occupational level individuals strove hard to maintain the standard package of consumption. We may suggest, therefore, that consumption answers status location needs. Caplowitz, in his study of consumption aspiration and patterns concludes:

...their (low-income families) consumer activity is not only a matter of need but one of embellishing their status by consumer goods. In place of actual movement up the social ladder, they turn to symbols of status in a pattern of 'compensatory compensation.' It is almost as though consumption compensates for status deprivations they have experienced in other spheres of life (1963, p. 48).

Originally conspicuous consumption was considered a trait of the "arriving" or "new" upper classes (Veblen 1953). Our myth of egalitarianism and wealth-for-all as Parker describes it (1972, p. 182-183) in North American society has resulted in a spread of the significance of consumption from the upper classes throughout the social hierarchy. Material wealth has become a shared symbol of what Veblen describes as social honour and esteem (Veblen 1953, p. 35, p. 37). Veblen's remarks about wealth and self-esteem,
therefore, take on a wider significance:

Those members of the community who fall short of this, somewhat indefinite, normal degree of prowess or of property suffer in the esteem of their fellowmen; and consequently they suffer also in their own esteem, since the usual basis of self-respect is the respect accorded by one's neighbours... as the possession of property becomes the basis of popular esteem... it becomes also a requisite to that complacency which we call self-respect... (1953, p. 38).

In the context of modern mass society, this conspicuous consumption becomes a method of maintaining self-esteem by camouflaging occupational status for certain lower strata groups. As Mueller points out:

The relative affluence the worker enjoys cloaks the fact that he or she has subordinate status and that society does not respect manual labour (1975, p. 114).

Westley and Westley remark that the blue-collar worker is always aware of his low status (1971, p. 92). Despite changes in the working environment and consumption habits, "they have failed to find integrative roles for themselves in our vast middle class" (Westley and Westley 1971, p. 112). They suggest that consumption, including consumption of leisure time activities, becomes a way of breaking out or leaving behind fixed status definitions based on occupational hierarchies (Westley and Westley 1971, p. 16). Consumption provides:

...an escape from...social stratification which defines some people as less worthy than others
because of the work they do... these form powerful motives, evidently, to increase income, by whatever means possible (Westley and Westley 1971, p. 18).

The last part of this statement supports our assertion that workers supplement their income by "extra opportunities" in order to "buy" status.

Parker also states that the blue-collar worker is "acutely aware" of his low status. Science, technology and automation have devalued manual labour. Those of higher occupational levels and new entrants to the labour force shun manual labour. Consequently, the lower stratum worker is constantly aware of his rank in the occupational hierarchy (Parker 1972, p. 140, p. 148). The blue-collar worker invests his "psychic status" in possessions (Parker 1972, p. 11).

Mills, like Westley and Westley, points out that leisure and consumption may be used for status compensation. Leisure activities are often used "to gratify status claims" that the individual cannot make occupationally (Mills 1974, p. 256). One specific means of this gratification is status cycles. Mills provides us with an explanation:

These cycles allow people in a lower class and status level to act like persons on higher levels and temporarily get away with it... one can by plan raise oneself to higher status: clothing changes, the restaurant or type of food eaten changes, the best theatre seats are had... one can buy the feeling, even if only for a short time, of higher status... (1974, p. 257).
Faunce generally concurs with Mills' argument of status compensation through status cycles, although his discussion is not as clear (Faunce 1968, p. 111). He makes a significant point for our discussion which he does not elaborate on:

Where status symbols are not closely tied to particular levels of achievement, they become capricious and subject to fads and fashions. (1968, p. 111).

This could perhaps be considered the key to the successful expansion of the mass market. Consumption and wealth itself, as Veblen pointed out become a combined source of esteem (Veblen 1953, p. 37). The availability of this wealth through mass production, therefore, gives everyone a potential source of esteem regardless of the actual status location of their occupation. Wealth, in the form of mass products and leisure, becomes the compensatory source of social honour which the occupational role cannot provide.

This struggle to maintain the standard package of consumption of lower status occupational groups has been translated into the working class or blue-collar occupational groups trying to gain entrance into the strata above them, specifically the middle class. Although each sociologist uses different combinations of criteria to define his classes, many describe this movement from low-status to higher status.
Consumption has, on one hand, allowed individuals to blanket occupational status distinctions. The problem of identity and status in contemporary society would be solved had this blanketing succeeded. Several sociologists, however, argue that the homogeneity of mass culture has served to reinforce status boundaries between occupational groups (or "classes").

Mills, for example, writes of the status panic of the middle class as the gap between white collar workers and wage-workers narrows in certain respects (1974, p. 254) such as:

...the levelling down of white-collar and the raising of wage-worker incomes, so that the differences between them are decidedly less than they once were...and (the) narrowing of nativity differences between white-collar and wage-worker...and the increased economic and public power of wage-workers... (Mills 1974, p. 249).

Parker, who draws a sharp dichotomy between the lower middle class dominated by blue-collar and service workers, and the upper middle class made up of professionals and managers, remarks that, in the face of cultural standardization,

...the upper middle class, instead of merging into a hazy continuum with the lower middle class, has accentuated its differences and raised its admission standards (1972, p. 12).

While patterns of consumption might symbolize status levels, they do not mean that those individuals achieving these habits have also attained assimilation into higher
strata. Young and Willmott found evidence of this lack of assimilation in their study of a London suburb:

Objective differences...are slighter than...ever...people in different classes spend their money on the same kinds of things...the two classes live in the same kind of district...
(1965, p. 122).

Subjectively, however, they found that the higher occupational status group still recognized class/status differences:

...inside people's minds...the boundaries of class are still closely drawn. Classlessness is not emerging there. On the contrary, the nearer the classes are drawn by the objective facts of income, style of life and housing, the more middle-class people are liable to pull them apart by exaggerating the differences subjectively regarded...friendliness is bounded by class lines...
(Young and Willmott 1965, p. 122).

Westley and Westley offer us a slightly different perspective. Consumption becomes a low-status individual's escape from the status hierarchy (1971, p. 16-18). The worker is caught between his equalitarian consumption pattern and his unequal status position:

The worker experiences a greater sense that he is equal to any other man, but at the same time there is nowhere to go in improving his position in life. (Westley and Westley 1971, p. 57).

What they describe as "the general trend toward equalitarianism" (1971, p. 58) is in fact what Parker considers to be the widespread myth of the middle class. But, as Westley and Westley point out, belief in this trend, real
or not, has certain consequences (1971, p. 59). They cite the homogeneous or standardized consumption patterns as one effect:

...being able to live as well as the next man tends to erode an individual's respect for social distinctions, at least those that relegate him to an inferior station (Westley and Westley 1971, p. 59).

They add a significant point which others have made implicitly. Workers recognize that the same leisure activities and consumption habits reduce the differences between classes or strata. This, they continue, is one of the most important motives for acquiring the standard package of consumption (Westley and Westley 1971, p. 83). Despite this, workers have not been assimilated into the middle class (Westley and Westley 1971, p. 112), nor are they respected by the community institutions which they use and support (Westley and Westley 1971, p. 118).

Aronowitz provides us with an example which sums up this disjuncture between consumption habits and occupational status:

The subject of a recent film, Joe, is a balding, aggressive and somewhat vituperative man... In Joe, we witness the struggle of the blue-collar worker striving to become middle-class. Joe exhibits the ambiguity of the upwardly mobile. Superficially his home resembles those of his more affluent neighbors, but he is painfully aware of the persistent class cleavage. His speech is riddled with proletarian sounds and he cannot communicate a system of shared values to his upper class acquaintance. (1973, p. 103).
The standardization of outward symbols brought about by mass culture has not changed the occupational status of lower-echelon individuals, nor has it changed others' recognition and location of these individuals by this role. Instead, the value of this material wealth as a status indicator has changed with mass consumption. In Fallers' words:

The individual who is rewarded for his striving by the trickling-down of status-symbolic consumption goods has the illusion not the fact, of status mobility (1954, p. 316).

Consumption patterns do not retain the same status-symbolic value as they become available to more people. Certainly to some degree the 'currency becomes inflated' (Fallers 1954, p. 317-318).

Klapp supports this idea. Widely distributed and consumed status symbols lose "their value for fixing status... like a debased currency" (1969, p. 112). The abundance of status indicators result in status confusion (Klapp, 1969, p. 19).

We have examined consumption as a method used by the individual to modify his status location as objectively identified by others. Consumption may standardize or blanket outward symbols of success; it does not, however, give access to occupational status systems or levels. For example: the plant foreman who buys the same car as the doctor does not gain access to the occupational stratum of the doctor, nor
to the prestige of that occupation. His consumption entitles him to the same material symbols of status as the doctor, but similar consumption habits do not enable him to change his occupational location. The individual can emulate visible signs of higher occupational status levels, but he cannot truly internalize this status into his own subjective reality. He cannot do this because he has no role to identify with. The honour and esteem attached to consumption is attached to the wealth itself, but these consumption habits are not roles. The plant foreman in his big car cannot internalize an identity in relation to that car, he can only borrow on its degree of prestige as a material symbol of wealth. Thus he may learn the symbols, manners and codes of prestige of certain occupational strata which this material symbol may represent, but he cannot, without the required occupational role, internalize it for his own subjective reality, identity and status location.

The activity of driving (to be consistent with our foreman/doctor example) may be stretched to fit Berger and Luckmann's definition of role (see page 78 of last section). The role of driver is not a status location. It may be a generally recognized, universally understood role, but it is an unevaluative role in the sense that one may be good or
bad in performing the activity, but one is not ranked in the social hierarchy according to the role of driver (this is a variation of Faunce's definition of evaluative-non-evaluative images and role 1968, p. 91-92). The individual will receive the status attributed to the material product as its owner. This possession or ownership in itself is not a role (according to Berger and Luckmann's definition).

We may briefly consider the situation subjectively, that is, if the individual chooses the status location of his primary identity over that of his occupational status location of secondary socialization. Consumption in this case offers the individual no roles to internalize and identify with, therefore the primary identity is not reinforced or modified.

In either case, however, Faunce's observation is relevant: status connected to consumption is not connected to achievement in terms of roles and occupation (Faunce 1968, p. 111), it is merely social honour according to material wealth in what Veblen, among many, has described as an economically oriented society.

Status and Identity: Compensation in the Objective and Subjective Spheres

i) Background

Much has been written about compensation for status,
identity and work problems. We can only touch on some of this literature at this point.

O'Neill for example, considers the increased participation in "para-social, political and economic activities" to be an indication that individuals have withdrawn from society. They turn in on themselves in the race of occupational status, and become other-directed at the same time to rationalize their loss of community (O'Neill 1972, p. 36). Zijderveld and Luckmann and Berger express similar ideas. Zijderveld, as we saw in Chapter 2, considers the individual to grow more privatized "between the spaces of the institutions" as he becomes increasingly homo externus within these institutional confines. He describes three protest groups which are a direct result of modern society - the gnostics, the anarchists, and the activists (1971, Chapter 4). These categories, however, appear to describe the compensation mostly of youth groups. Luckmann and Berger's treatment is applicable to the broader population or mass. Like Zijderveld, they suggest that the individual has become a functionary within primary institutions. He seeks his "essential identity", however, in a series of secondary institutions of mass culture which have arisen to exploit this identity search (Luckmann and Berger 1964).

In a slightly different vein, Goldthorpe et al. (1968) have
pointed out the instrumental orientation of workers towards their jobs. These blue collar workers find their satisfaction and meaning in extra-work activities and behaviour made possible by the income provided by the job. This satisfaction sought outside of the work role is an idea also expressed by Faunce (1968) as we have seen. In this case the individual seeks more positive status for self-evaluation. Gorz suggests that income and consumption have replaced the value and satisfaction of the job for the modern worker (1966, p. 348-9).

Mills points out the importance, not only of consumption, but of leisure as a status equalizer and source of identity when work no longer fulfills this function. Kerr et al. also believe that leisure will enable the individual to find the "individuality" which work prohibits (1967, p. 237-8). While Spreitzer and Snyder discovered that individuals attempt to find self-actualization or satisfaction in leisure activities, they concluded that these activities do not in fact replace, or are as effective as, satisfaction through work (1974, p. 218). Likewise, Rinehart suggests that work and leisure may both be unfulfilling (1975, p. 130).

Our discussion is not directly concerned with the controversy of work versus leisure for satisfaction or
self-actualization. Instead, what we are concerned with is a different dimension of the same argument: the effects of occupational status on identity and the compensatory measures taken by the individual to alleviate the low status internalized into his identity.

We concluded above that consumption for the purposes of status improvement or recognition was not successful. By successful we mean that the individual could not raise or maintain higher levels of self-esteem than those associated with his lower-echelon position in the occupational hierarchy. Increased consumption appeared only to standardize and confuse visible wealth standards among all strata rather than admit those in the lower levels into the ranks above them. As Klapp points out:

...the pursuit of status symbols would not only be a solution to an identity problem, but it would be an identity problem... When anybody can be anybody, nobody can be 'somebody' (1969, p. 112).

Individuals begin to distrust the symbols as a means of status identification when they become so widely available. Consumption, therefore, does not improve the status of the individual of low occupational level, neither does it allow him to form an identity or modify his primary identity (as we saw in the previous subsection). He still
does not command respect generally in society because of his occupation (Westley and Westley 1971, p. 118). The individual, therefore, still has a status/identity problem.

Our primary focus in this subsection is identity. Identity and status are closely related, as we pointed out earlier, therefore, an examination of identity will also have implications for the status dilemma of the individual. We will begin with a description of the new "value" of consumption as a form of identity compensation in mass society, and conclude with a discussion of the effects of this compensation on the individual's identity.

ii) Packaged Images: The Individual "In Drag"

The conditions of mass society, states Klapp, lead to identity problems for its individual members (1969, p. 84). The trend in this society is away from status symbols (in terms of conspicuous consumption) and towards ego symbols (Klapp 1969, p. 109). Individuals seek identity which status symbolism cannot provide (as his argument illustrated in the first section of this chapter). Consumption rates are still high, but the goods are put to a use different from mere display of wealth as wealth:

"status symbols are less often reminding people who they are and where they belong, and more often expressing a claim or wish to be somebody else. The range of material subject to fashion - that can be used as
dramatic props, so to speak, for a new life - seems to be widening too: ...areas to live in, places to travel, sports gear, hobbies...
Such things are more abundant, easier to manufacture and imitate and offered and bought more consciously ... So fad and fashion as a means of revising identity seem to be on the rise (Klapp 1969, p. 74).

Products are combined to become manufactured "looks" or styles which an individual may choose, ready-to-wear, like costumes hanging in a dressing room (Klapp 1969, p. 98). Klapp refers to this as masquerading, posing or pretending (1969, Chapter 3). Individuals may masquerade in production-packaged images in order to escape what they are and become someone else (Klapp 1969, p. 73). These images are "false-faced, theatrical characters deliberately created" (Klapp 1969, p. 104-5) - deliberately created by the production-consumption system for market expansion in terms of intensification of buying, and deliberately "created" that is, assumed by the individual through his consumption habits.

Masquerading in mass produced images becomes a means of identity compensation (Klapp 1969, p. 104). The person, dissatisfied with his 'real' self in his 'normal' everyday life, tries to find a new identity and to "see himself as he would like to be" (Klapp 1969, p. 104). Mass production has provided the escape: the individual takes "a costumed
adventure in identity in a fantasy world provided by the new theatricalism" (Klapp 1969, p. 99).

Klapp's specific examples of costume image are somewhat deviant or 'outside' of the 'straight' world. He emphasizes, (mostly through repetition) that "offbeat", "hipster" and "mod" styles exemplify a method of

...using costume to recast identities outside of the alternatives provided by the square structure (Klapp 1969, p. 94).

Individuals, however, may escape the status structure of the straight world not just by deviating from this world, but by assuming images which are totally acceptable to the 'middle-class way of life' or what Klapp calls the "conventional world". These pseudo-identities are an effort to be somebody else within the square structure. For example: an individual, rather than assuming the mod image, may choose instead to appear in the production props of a yachtsman. Klapp does not include examples of these more mundane escape images possibly because they do not serve the "ego-screaming, look-at-me" function which he feels the 'non-square' images serve (Klapp, 1969, p. 104-5). These images may also be found as part of the straight world, although he does not openly acknowledge or deny this. His lack of direct inclusion of conventional as opposed to non-conven-
tional images does not change the general application of his fundamental ideas. Regardless of the actual costumes chosen:

People are trying on various kinds of characters having little to do with their actual statuses (Klapp 1969, p. 96).

Luckmann and Berger suggest that the individual is left to discover his "essential identity" in the spheres beyond the limits of primary institutions (1964, p. 336). Consequently:

...To satisfy the need for 'essential identity' an identity market appears, supplied by secondary institutions. The individual becomes a consumer of identities offered on this market, some of them of reasonable durability, others so subject to fashion that one can speak of planned obsolescence. The secondary institutions, the suppliers on this market, are a variety of identity-marketing agencies ... (Luckmann and Berger 1964, p. 337).

Luckmann and Berger's description of these identities includes a broad range from costumes to actual activities and roles, for example: activity roles include ping-pong champion, or best chef at the local cook-out (1964, p. 343). The differences between these compensatory identities will be discussed shortly. Luckmann and Berger's contribution to our discussion lies in their succinct description of the manipulated nature of these identities. A "manufactured" image is ...
... a pre-fabricated identity, advertised, marketed and guaranteed by the identity-producing agencies (Luckmann and Berger 1964, p. 338).

Mills illustrates how these production images or costumes may also include 'stage settings'. The individual will achieve a 'high' in his status cycle and vacation for a short time at an expensive hotel or take a first-class cruise (Mills 1974, p. 257). The location and accommodation of the vacation become the stage setting, and the vacation staff become the supporting cast which help the individual masquerade as someone else for his short visit. In this case, the image package includes more than just the personal accessories of the actor: Mills includes the leisure setting as a significant component of these production images.

The individual's life is a mixture of work and leisure. The leisure period of these status cycles becomes a form not only of status compensation but of identity compensation:

...status cycles provide, for brief periods of time, a holiday image of self, which contrasts sharply with the self-image of everyday reality. They provide a temporary satisfaction of the person's prized image of self, thus permitting him to cling to a false consciousness of his status position. (Mills 1974, p. 258).
This is a prestige gratification or payoff for everyday status privation (Mills 1974, p. 258). Work becomes the means to an end, that end being the pursuit of the holiday identity and a change of status (Mills 1974, p. 237). This holiday self is fed by the mass media (Mills 1974, p. 237). The actual content of the holiday image - the pose or costume selected - will vary according to the individual's preference of production styles.

Mills considers these images and production types to be a means of maintaining a holiday self which is associated with higher status levels (1974, p. 257-8). Klapp, on the other hand, implies that these pseudo-identities are assumed as an escape from the status structure. These approaches are not contradictory; the key to the usage of production props lies in the origin of the image and the needs of the individual assuming it. We will follow Luckmann and Berger's (1964, p. 337) loose categorization and distinguish between those marketed identities which include activities and possible role learning (for example Luckmann and Berger's ping-pong champion or cook-out chef) and those which are only looks, styles or costumes (in Klapp's sense) to be assumed - those which Luckmann and Berger suggest contain elements of planned obsolescence. We will begin with the first type.
Wilensky predicts (from his study of work role and style of life of the middle class) that ambitious mobility oriented individuals who find no satisfaction of status drive at work will seek status by other means:

If they retain their status strivings, they will develop a pattern of status-compensating leisure. They will use the leisure ladder for their climb - seek offices in voluntary association, union, political party, spend their money in the Veblarian style... (1970, p. 134).

We have seen that "Veblarian style" spending is no longer a sure distinction and symbol of status, therefore, we shall examine Wilensky's first method of status climb.

In this case, assuming identities in non-work activities and roles becomes a method of achieving higher status. These activities may also be made highly visible by the production system, but the props are suited specially to the activity. These non-work roles provide the individual with the alternate channels for status (Wilensky 1970, p. 134). These activities or roles may provide status within their own non-occupational status system, for example: an individual who is president of the local church organization has achieved high status relative to other positions of that organization. Individuals may also assume non-occupational activities or roles as a means of vicarious identification.
with a certain occupational strata. Certain golf or yachting clubs, for example, cater to upper strata occupational groups. In this case, the individual is not just seeking compensatory status, but compensatory occupational status, that is he is finding alternate routes to gain entrance, identify with and be identified with a higher occupational level. Roles of high status in different status systems, for example the church organization president, may indirectly serve the same purpose. The individual seeks to make himself more acceptable to higher occupational levels by being identified in high status non-occupational roles. In either case, the identity assumed is composed of activities to be performed and norms and values to be learned. By assumed, we refer to the distinction made in the last chapter between learning and performing a role, and internalizing and identifying with it. The individual, may learn and perform the role, conscious of not incorporating into his self; or he may identify with it and internalize it into his subjective reality. The individual in his search for compensatory status, may do either.

Wilensky points out another trend of individual reaction. This is the individual who cannot achieve status through his occupation, but does not attempt to climb the
status ladder by means of leisure activities (1970, p. 134). Instead, this individual accepts his non-mobility and retreats from the work he performs into familial or neighbourhood localism (Wilensky 1970, p. 134). Wilensky suggests that this individual will develop his identity as the neighbour and family man. Westley and Westley point out, however, that the individual feels himself to be a failure in the eyes of his family because of his low occupational status, and receives little respect from the local institutions and community that he participates in (1971, p. 118). The first part of Wilensky's prediction may be more creditably completed by Klapp's belief: that the individual will seek costume or masquerade to mask who he is and who others identify him as. We may hypothesize, therefore, that it is this non-mobile individual who assumes the production images. Because he has resigned from the status competition this individual has no need to assume the activity identities and roles. His purpose becomes, not status achievement, but status masking. We will explain this more fully by means of Form and Geschwender's work (1962). They explained blue collar mobility aspirations and job satisfaction in terms of reference group theory (see also Shibutani 1968; Kelly 1968). Their results suggest possible reasons why certain
individuals continue their status drive and others resign from it.\textsuperscript{16}

Form and Geschwender found that working class males tend to use the occupational level of their fathers, brothers and "their peers with which they began life as social references in evaluating their occupational achievement" (1962, p. 231-234). They found differences in status orientation and aspiration between those whose relevant others or social references were strictly of blue collar workers, and those whose social references had shifted to those in white collar strata above them.\textsuperscript{17} They concluded that those who believe themselves to be non-mobile (interpositionally) or limited in their mobility "may be more satisfied with their lot than those who perceive a mobile social system in which they are limited in their mobility" (Form and Geschwender 1962, p. 234).

Like Wilensky (1970, p. 134), Form and Geschwender differentiate between individuals who do not participate in the status competition or drive, and those who do. Form and Geschwender suggest that those who continue to strive for status will be those who are:

\begin{quote}
\ldots the upper fringe of the manual workers\ldots they are likely to have come into more contact with the white collar workers and their beliefs in the reality of opportunity (1962, p. 234).\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}
These individuals who have experienced some mobility which has brought them closer to the white collar world have broken away from the group which reinforces their primary identity and lower status position. They change their social references to the white collar individuals who they are in contact with in the strata above them, as Form and Geschwender point out (1962, p. 234). This spurs on what Wilensky refers to as the status drive. In Form and Geschwender's words:

When a working class male has become imbued with this ideology he tends to shift his social references to the incumbents of the positions above him, ... The more mobility he experiences, the more he will believe in the existence of opportunities and in his own ability to rise. When mobility is blocked he will become increasingly dissatisfied with his present position... Limited occupational mobility is a self-defeating process for the manual worker who is imbued with the middle class ideology...and...faced with the relatively rigid barrier which exists between the manual and white collar occupational strata. (1962, p. 237)

These individuals will seek out activity roles as alternate routes for status improvement.

Not all manual workers form a white collar reference group. Individuals of low occupational status, unable to develop an identity from the work role and not connected to white collar strata rely upon the identity formed in primary
socialization. This individual, Form and Geschwender point out, retains his father, brothers and peers as his social reference group throughout his work career. Consequently, his primary identity and its status location are constantly reinforced resulting in a loss of status drive. We may examine this resignation in terms of inter- and intrapositional location.

We suggested in the previous section that individuals, no matter how they choose to evaluate themselves, will recognize that others locate them according to their occupational position or rank, unless they are members of a shared local status system. Even if the blue collar workers which Form and Geschwender describe are satisfied with their non-mobility and lack of status interpositionally, they will still be aware of the low status accorded them by others in society generally. The combined effects of these three factors - lack of belief in mobility ethos or lack of exposure to it, recognition of objective interpositionally low status, and reinforcement of that status - would result in individuals who do not compete in the status competition.

Intrapositionally, the individual may find that his occupational status position, that is in terms of blue
collar strata, is of a higher status location than his primary identity. In this case, the individual may choose his occupational status over his primary identity for self-evaluation. In terms of his reference group, the individual has achieved higher status. He does not need to compete interpositionally, (neither is he in the position to do so) as intrapositional esteem provides him with a basis for positive self-evaluation. The extent to which he relies on this intra- rather than interpositional status will depend on which system he emphasizes for self-esteem maintenance.

Form and Geschwender found, however, that a manual worker's occupational status had to be the same or above that of his father's and brothers' for him to be able to maintain his self-esteem (1962, p. 231). It is possible, therefore that those who do not achieve this level suffer unfavourable intrapositional evaluation, both by himself and by others. The individual must achieve the status of his primary identity in secondary socialization or suffer the disjuncture between the status location of his primary identity and his lowered occupational status - a disjuncture particularly effective because his primary identity is constantly reinforced by this reference group of primary
socialization. This individual does not have a basis for positive self-evaluation either inter- or intrapositionally. His primary reference group reinforces his low status interpositionally; at the same time, this reinforcement points out his further sinking in the status sphere.

These individuals without a white collar reference group resign from the status competition and seek status and identity compensation in a different way. We hypothesize that these individuals would assume production images in order to mask their low occupational status from others, in an attempt to find a positive basis for self-esteem. In disguising their status, they also attempt to hide the identity associated with this low status, both from others and from themselves. They get to be, in Klapp's words "someone else" (1969, p. 74).

Klapp suggests that individuals assume these identity props when they "have something to prove about themselves - especially when they cannot prove it by other means" (1969 p. 75). The following passage sums up the meaning and purpose of production images for these lower occupational status individuals:

...there are those who just get lost through costume...a sensational costume which hides identity permits them to have the satisfaction of being noticed ... without the responsibility
of living up to a reputation. Perhaps there are more of these anonymous adventurers than self-advertisers. Such poseurs help make up the anonymous mass...false-faced, theatrical characters...choosing...parts...fashion takes on a new function - not the conservative one of identifying a person with a class but setting him off as an individual, perhaps hiding his class. (1969 p. 104-5).

Of interest also in this passage is Klapp's remark that these individuals masquerade without taking the responsibility of a reputation, that is, they do not perform a role or take on a role identity on which they can be judged by others. This relates to Form and Geschwender's conclusions. They suggest that those individuals who have experienced some mobility believe that they have the "requisite ability to rise" (1962, p. 234). Individuals who have not experienced this do not have this confidence in their own ability. We may suggest that they would assume a mass market costume rather than a role or activity identity because it does not include the responsibility of role performance.

Whether an individual assumes a production-packaged costume or attempts to be identified by an activity or role appears then to depend on his status aspirations. The poses or masquerade of the first sense are unevaluated, that is, they are assumed to mask or hide identity and status rather than achieve it. Individuals choosing the second option
are still seeking to be evaluated in the social order.

Production images may be 'take-offs' or imitations of activity roles. They will be the props popularized by the mass production system without the activity content. For example: thousands of young men in various occupations drive the mass market imitations of racing cars (in this case the props have props, for the driver may purchase additional "racey" accessories), flash the emblems of various fuel, tire etc. companies who are associated with race driving, wear particular jackets, driving gloves and so on which are part of the deliberate manufactured and advertised image. Few of these young men attempt to take on the activity and role of race-car driving. They become mass-produced "contentless" copies of the leisure sport role.

The difference between assuming a leisure role identity for status and a psuedo-identity is illustrated by O'Brien's portrait of young Nick (1971). Nick is an unemployed 17 year old youth. He cannot get the kind of "good" job that he had been promised by the educational system, because he did not complete his courses. He feels unable to consider "lower jobs" despite the fact that he is not qualified for anything else. His solution is not to
attempt to find a job, but rather to withdraw from the occupational market. He assumes the highly visible costume of mod which Klapp describes so extensively. He flaunts this visible image in coffee bars where he spends most of his time, "bearded, beaded and mod" using "raised-voice expletives" to call attention to himself (O'Brien 1971, p. 332).

O'Brien describes the coffee bar scene as one apparently haunted by students. The similarity in visible appearance of the clientele disguises the fact that this group is a mixture of "students and less able alike" (it is interesting that O'Brien also differentiates between the actual role bearers and the visible-image copies in terms of ability, as did Klapp, O'Brien 1971, p. 332). The students hold certain political views, stage protest rallies and participate in university activities as well as presenting the highly visible image. Nick, mixing with them in the coffee bar, finds that he does not understand their terms and ideology, neither does he attempt to. He goes along for the good time at the university. Eventually, states O'Brien, the students move on to "better things" such as high paid jobs, and Nick remains in his costume, still hanging around the coffee bars being visibly mod (1971, p. 332).
This example illustrates how an individual chooses the mass produced costume-image copy of an actual role identity. Nick chooses to assume the packaged image of beads, Levis and "in" shirts rather than learn and play the role of university student-activist. We see here the gap between the original role and the way it is popularized and capitalized upon in terms of its expressive symbols. Nick was not interested in achieving the higher status position which the students represent (both as students and as potential high status workers). He would have tried to learn or internalize the activist student role had he been trying to achieve status by extra-occupational channels. Instead, he assumes a production identity which masks his own occupational failure and requires no ability or achievements on which he can be evaluated.

Kasschau et al. in a study of blue and white collar, college and working youth report that blue collar no college youth rejected or were disinterested in the New Left ideology and politics of the students, but "embrace the expressive components of the youth culture in a manner not much different from other subgroups" (Kasschau et al. 1974). This suggests that young blue collar workers affect a production image, in this case the combination of products which defines
one as 'hip', but not the original or full identity associated with status position (in this case the status position of the student).

iii) Unsuccessful Compensation

Spreitzer and Snyder's main hypothesis is that individuals who lack intrinsic work involvement will, for reasons of compensation, tend to define leisure activities as a means of self-identity. They conclude, however, that although there is evidence that leisure activities do have this function,

...they frequently are not a satisfactory substitute since leisure activities do not appear to be as psychologically encompassing as a self-actualizing work situation. (1974, p. 218).

We have described compensatory identities assumed by individuals low in the occupational status order. In the last subsection we distinguished between role-identities and production images. In this section, we will elaborate upon this difference, with particular reference to the latter. We will then be able to determine the effects of these production images on the individual, specifically in terms of whether they serve a compensatory function.

In the earlier part of chapter two we discussed Berger and Luckmann's concept of typifications and roles.
Face-to-face interaction is patterned by typifications which individuals have of each other (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 30). The actors regard each other as types in situations which, in the routine of everyday life, are typical situations (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 31). These types become the basis of roles, in that they represent forms of action (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 72). This action becomes objectified, and the actor identifies with this objectification. We can reiterate this process briefly in their own words:

...the actor identifies with the socially objectivated typifications of conduct *in actu*, but re-establishes distance from them as he reflects about his conduct afterward. This distance between the actor and his action can be retained in consciousness and projected to future repetitions of the actions. In this way, both acting self and acting others are apprehended not as unique individuals, but as *types* ... these types are interchangeable... (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 73).

These types are roles when they are held in common by a group or collectivity of actors, thus the "roles are types of actors." (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 73-74).

Berger and Luckmann's definition has been repeated here to emphasize an important component of role - the action content. The individual is the actor when he performs
the activity or conduct of the role. The actor recognizes his self performing the action. Gerth and Mills also emphasize the activity content of the role:

...'role' refers to 1) units of conduct which by their recurrence stand out as regularities 2) which are oriented to the conduct of other actors. These recurrent interactions form patterns of mutually oriented conduct... (1964, p. 10).

They continue

We have defined role as a conduct pattern of a person which is typically expected by other persons. It is an expected pattern of conduct... (Gerth and Mills 1964, p. 83).

Let us look at production images in light of these definitions.

The production images become manufactured types (as in Berger and Luckmann's typifications) only in a limited sense. They become costume identities which, because of the wide advertising and distribution of the mass market, are generally recognized within the limits of this distribution. The mass media attributes certain qualities to these images, either those deliberately injected by the production system itself, or those borrowed from the original identity role. These manufactured 'typifications' are widely recognized in terms of their visible composition, however, they have many varied
intrinsisic characteristics attributed to them. Hip individuals in denim jeans will be cool and with it. Or they will be considered radical, dirty, liberated, femininst, or dopefreaks. These production types represent no typical recurring patterned types of action which can be objectified. The individual assuming the costumes may then perform other roles and activities while still wearing his costume. The gas pump jockey in his hip outfit is still performing in the role of gas pump jockey; or the neighbour who sits on his front porch in his supercyclist clothes, with his ten speed displayed on his lawn is still 'the neighbour' to the man across the street, or 'dad' to his children. We may recall in the last chapter that the overlap between universal and local status systems would affect interaction. The individual may be identified by others according to his occupation, which will then influence their interaction with him. Any status which he achieves in the local status system may modify or soften the interaction on the basis of his occupational location. We may apply a similar principle in the case of manufactured typifications. Interaction with others may be influenced by the visible representation of the individual. The characteristics attributed by the mass media to the image may
influence the other individual in some ways. Dealing with the hip gas pump attendant servicing his car, this other person may react according to his subjective interpretation of the hip 'typification' as dirty or radical. These manufactured typifications have no typical contexts or recurring behaviour patterns. These types, therefore, may be easily displaced in the following way:

...the anonymity of the typifications by means of which I apprehend fellowmen in face-to-face situations is constantly 'filled-in' by the multiplicity of vivid symptoms referring to a concrete human being. (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 32).

The effect of the role which the poseur is at that moment playing will also affect interaction, in addition to these surfacing personality traits.

These manufactured typifications do not represent recurring forms or types of action. They are not the basis of roles: or, more directly, they are not roles. They have no expected patterns of conduct actions and activity which can be objectified. The individual cannot recognize a pattern of activity as a role or recognize himself as the actor. Production identities, we should remember, are packaged images - pre-fabricated, advertised, marketed and guaranteed by the identity producing agencies in Luckmann and Berger's words (1964, p. 338). They may have an activity
associated with them, but actually performing this activity is not a requisite of assuming the packaged identity, for example, the super-cyclist who does not ride his bicycle (or rides it very little). (See Klapp's example of motor-cycle toughs who do not own motorcycles 1969, p. 103).

Roles are also interpersonal, to return to Gerth and Mills definition. (1964, p. 10-11), that is an individual's role integrates one segment of his total conduct with a segment of the conduct of others (1964, p. 83) by means of the expected recurring role behaviour. Roles are caught up in the web of obligations, norms and expectations of others behaviour as it is oriented towards us (Gerth and Mills, 1964, p. 11). They are interconnected patterns of behaviour in the sense that their typical objectified behaviour is part of the interdependence of other recurring patterns or types of behaviour. Production images do not have this backdrop of mutual expectation. They provide no recurring pattern or behaviour which has a place in this web of role interaction. The individual assuming the costume does not assume rights or obligations associated with recurring activity which constitutes a role. These costumes, therefore, cannot serve the integrative function of a role for the individual, they do not bind him to others and to his society (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 76).
Roles are part of networks of expectations and obligations in recurring social situations. They cannot, therefore, be produced and distributed, although the badges or props of existing roles may be capitalized upon and turned into these packaged images. The mass market provides the individual with the props for an image, but it does not provide the role and its social context.

The traits or characteristics associated with these images are constantly shifting, which suggests that the typifications - the basis of roles - are never stable long enough for recurring patterns of behaviour to form. Klapp laments the trend from traditional to "new things" in a society dominated by technology and modernism (1969, p. 113). This trend is more complicated and unstable than a straight progression from old to new. The symbols themselves fluctuate, one replacing the other and in turn being replaced before the meanings may become widely shared and entrenched (Klapp 1969, p. 19). These new symbols are produced so rapidly that they lose their meanings, thus their associated 'lifestyle' is unstable and subject to fad (Klapp 1969, p. 26).

Klapp makes a significant point in relation to the symbolism of the production system and man's sense of self:
So what happens to identity when a person surrounds himself with things that have come into existence yesterday or the day before? The answer must be that since they cannot have much meaning, he cannot give himself much meaning by them (1969, p. 114).

The individual, as Klapp's reveals in his own discussion, tries to find meaning for himself through these symbols (1969, Chapter 3). Aside from their status value in what Wilensky calls Veblenian style, these symbols are in a sense "non-symbolic" (see Klapp 1969, Ch. 1). They represent what we have elsewhere called contentless images, that is, they are not related to or derived from typical recurring patterns of conduct. For this reason, these symbols cannot be evaluated by others. They do not have universal connotation. They have only the many and varied meanings imputed by the image-producers and packagers, and/or the mass media. They may have also a degree of second-hand or vicarious meanings for evaluation borrowed from an identity role. For example: the production image of yachtsman may borrow or be associated to some degree with the actual role of yachtsman.

Why then, as both Klapp (1969) and Spreitzer and Snyder (1974) suggest, do individuals not find what the latter call self-identity in these production images?
The major block to this fulfillment of identity is the fact that these images are not, as we have seen, roles. As we remember from Chapter Two, the individual must internalize and identify with his role in order to incorporate it into his self (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 74, p. 131). The image, therefore, cannot be internalized. No identity can be formed from these production types. In this case, the individual's primary identity cannot be modified or added to by the formation of a social self in either the work situation or the images assumed for compensation.

The individual assumes these production characters as a means of finding a new identity, according to Klapp. They are a wish or claim to be somebody else (Klapp 1969, p. 74) and to be identified by others in this new identity (Klapp 1969, p. 105). As Faunce points out, a self-image is a social product, thus an individual requires at least one other person to support his claim to a certain identity (Faunce 1968, p. 92). Interaction between an individual 'in drag' and others cannot be based upon the costume that the individual sports. His interaction cannot reinforce an identity which he has not been able to form, neither can he project a self in the interaction which is related to the image and therefore elicit responses to that self from the
other. The individual can form no self from the non-role image, neither can the other in primary interaction react to him on the basis of the type of image or as the actor in a role. The individual will receive no confirmation from others of his image. Neither will the primary identity, which is not located in these spheres of secondary socialization. As Klapp points out, the individual needs guidelines, reference points and feedback to create and maintain an identity (1969, p. 19).

These production stereotypes, therefore, are not incorporated into the self or change the identity. The organized responses of a social group play a crucial part in the formation and unity of self. Mead's game analogy perhaps makes the point the best:

...the person playing a game must be ready to take the attitude of everyone else in the game - different roles must have a definite relationship to each other (1934, p. 151).

The rules of the game are the particular response that an attitude calls out. These production images are not patterned behaviour with a corresponding set of social norms; they are not integrated behaviour in a social system or structure; nor do they have specific relations or sense of duty, obligation or authority (Nisbet's definition of role,
1970, p. 148-154). There is no set of organized attitudes and responses governing the generalized other and self involved with the taking on of these images. Assuming production images in some ways compares to Mead's description of children's role playing. This play constitutes taking on a succession of roles from which no unity of attitude and response can be organized into the self. In play, what a child is at one moment does not determine what he is at the next. It is out of the game - the interlocking roles that the organized self arises (Mead 1934, p. 159). Production images do not exist as roles in the game, therefore they cannot contribute to the formation of identity or to the formation of the social self (Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 73). The individual becomes part of the mass costume collectives, (Klapp's false face mass) who are homogeneous only to the extent that they share manufactured images. This compares to the thousands of pre-schoolers who dress up as cowboys with all the toy props across the continent but who share nothing else in common but a pretend identity. Mass culture provides the props for visible identity 'change' but not the network of roles and typical situations through which the individual could modify his subjective reality.

This problem with interaction stems also from the
problem of symbols which Klapp discusses. The production packaged identities are symbols without roles. They represent nothing more than styles or poses. Neither the individual or the others interacting with him can find common meaning from the symbols. Production images operate in a meaning vacuum symbolically (Klapp 1969, p. 19). This is the case especially with those individuals who rely upon props of confused symbolic value to 'find' identity. External symbols can be chosen and worn without group support (Klapp 1969, p. 45) but this is not a condition of internalization into the identity of the individual.

Klapp suggests another reason why identity cannot be assumed via these props. Individuals are aware of their own posing (1969, p. 105). (Klapp suggests this consciousness in connection with role, although in the sense that he uses it he does not mean role as Berger and Luckmann define it, but rather he uses it interchangeably with poses, characters and images). He goes on to say that

Along with increasing difficulty of identification is the more basic difficulty that fad and fashion are forms of copying, and that true identity cannot be attained by copying...the mass...are simply draping a borrowed identity over whatever individuality they might have of their own... (1969, p. 110).
This is the culmination of our discussion: the individual who attempts status and identity compensation through consumption of pre-packaged characters or poses. Let us conclude by briefly summarizing the argument of the thesis to this point. Then we will turn to the question of why individuals seek compensation, not change.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER THREE

1. The term "standard package of consumption" was originally used by D. Riesman and H. Roseborough (1964). They describe this standard package as

"The theme, a set of goods and services including such household items as furniture, radios, television, refrigerator, and standard brands in food and clothing... The variations include both embroideries and elaborations on this standard package..." p. 114-115.

We will borrow their abbreviation to refer to the many standard elements of mass culture as defined them in the first section throughout this chapter. (See also Porter 1970, p. 130-1).

2. That consumption is a crucial component of modern capitalism is pointed out by Gorz 1966, p. 346-350; Baran and Sweezy 1967, Chapter 5; and Galbraith 1967, p. 279-282. In Gorz' words: "...advanced capitalism has found itself confronted with the problem of moulding human subjects into the shapes required by objects it has to sell, of no longer adjusting supply to demand, but demand to supply. It has resolved this problem by conditioning people to what is most profitable to produce..." (1966, p. 347-8).

3. In Riesman's words, the function of mass media "as tutors of consumption - is to introduce and rationalize changes, enrichments, or discontinuities in conventional tastes and styles..." (1974, p. 193). Manipulation in consumption begins in childhood as monopolistic competition "...building up in the child habits of consumption he will employ as an adult." (Riesman 1974, p. 97).

4. According to Marcuse: "The only needs that have an unqualified claim for satisfaction are the vital ones - nourishment, clothing, lodging..." (1966, p. 5) As
we pointed out in Chapter 1, all other needs such as those to relax, have fun, consume etc., are repressive needs, according to Marcuse. Gorz expresses a similar idea in his description of creative/work versus consumer needs: "...the individual is stripped of his creative, active needs and can find his own power only in the sphere of non-work - the satisfaction of the passive needs of personal consumption... (1966, p. 349). For a discussion of work needs in formal organizations see Silverman 1970, Chapter 4. The theorists discussed in Silverman attempt to identify the needs of the individual and how these are served within the organizational structure, in what may be interpreted as an effort to reconcile the individual and this structure. This approach differs from that of Marcuse and Gorz who question the structure and the origin of needs within it.

5. Westergaard suggests that, to some extent, the extension of general social services has released personal income for expenditure in "less essential" areas of consumption. See "The Withering Away of Class: A Contemporary Myth" in Anderson and Blackburn 1966 for repudiation of equality of the working class.

6. Kahl reported that the "Common Man Class" (somewhere "less than middle class") faced a constant struggle with inflation. The mother and even older children had to work part-time to contribute to the family income (1953, p. 191).

7. Rinehart concludes that "to regard the present situation of blue collarites as one of affluence, then, is justified only within an historical context." (1971, p. 153). See also Rosow 1970.

8. Johnson points out that in the last two decades (1951-69) there has been a great increase in the multi-earner families. He concludes that the family had adapted its structure to compensate for economic deprivation (1974, p. 27).

9. It should be noted that meaninglessness exists in different degrees throughout the whole bureaucratic structure. Haga et al. found that they could (1974) divide a group of managers into high and low professional orientation. Those rated high had
significantly higher levels of job involvement, and worked harder and longer than those of low orientation, as well as constructing their own role formats. The fact that they could divide these managers into the two groups suggests that meaninglessness exists at this level also. Their findings also serve to illustrate that individuals with strong identification to their work were able to overcome or did not experience this meaninglessness. Individuals who did not have high rating in orientation, however, still have the compensation of interpositional high status for self-esteem maintenance. We focus our discussion on those who, in addition to meaninglessness and lack of identification with work, do not have this white collar status compensation.

10. According to Westergaard (1966), the visibility of inequality may diminish and disparities may be veiled. Inequalities of income and property have only been marginally reduced. These inequalities now operate in areas of expenditure which are removed from subsistence living. He suggests that conflict will grow between desiring and achieving middle class material standards for the working class as these standards are perceived as needs rather than "frills" (1966, p. 87).


12. Benoit-Smullyan's remarks on prestige imitation and contagion are relevant here. An individual of high prestige becomes a model to be reproduced or copied by others. Prestige is contagious in that other individuals attempt to raise their own prestige by contact and vicarious participation in the prestige of those of higher "rating." (1944, p. 157).

13. Wilensky points out that, if the occupation has no visible status claim (he offers the example of a hindleg toenail remover) then there is little motive and opportunity to use occupational identity as a status-winning device, and little desire to elaborate the work role beyond the work-place. (1970, p. 136).
14. Vorwaller states that the effects of mobility on upwardly mobile individuals are referred to either in terms of the "dissociation" or socialization hypothesis. In the former, the individual is viewed as becoming isolated, separated from the non-mobile peers as well as peers in the new social destination. In the second hypothesis, the individual adapts to his mobility (Vorwaller 1970, p. 481-2), Luckmann and Berger suggest that, in cases of mobility, the individual's "past identity" associated with primary socialization becomes less and less real to him. He experiences a gap between past and present identity, and seeks affirmation of the new identity by those in his present social situation. We may speculate that the individual may lose his past identity and be "in limbo", that is only playing but not internalizing the new roles that he performs (Luckmann and Berger 1964, p. 206).

15. Wilensky's distinction corresponds in some ways to Kahl's findings. The latter's "common man class" was composed of two basic groups: those who espoused core values of "getting by" and those who espoused those of "getting ahead." Sons of each of these groups held these respective values (Kahl 1953).

16. Westergaard suggests one possible explanation: "...the chances of rising in the social scale may seem to be greater, even though they are not; and failure may be accepted with more resignation, if it is the result of a 'fair' process of selection" (1966, p. 91). On the other hand, inability to rise may be more unacceptable because this means recognizing one "intellectual inferiority." On the basis of this, we may predict that status resigners are those who have accepted that their low educational levels are not competitive. Those who strive to achieve status, on the other hand, may not be able to accept their own 'inferiority' in a society stressing equality.

17. Form and Geschwender hypothesize that the blue collar worker (without a white collar reference group) judges his occupational status according to father, brothers and peers which he began work with as a social reference group, rather than according to the
mobility ethic or his own aspirations. Studies suggest that white collar youth, on the other hand, evaluate themselves in terms of the mobility ethic of modern society, and in terms of their own aspirations and those that their parents hold for them. (See Hyman 1953; Kahl 1953; Lueptow 1975, Della Fave 1974; Haller, Otto, Meier, Ohlendorf 1974). These aspirations are to some extent class differentiated.

18. See Wilensky (1959) for a discussion of the blue-collar individual who has fallen from white-collar status.

19. Luckmann and Berger are concerned with this idea. Mobility results in changes in milieu, entailing weakening and disruption of ties to the groups of primary socialization. "The norms and values on which the individual has been brought up are no longer reaffirmed in the presently relevant social relationships. They are no longer backed by the authority of the old primary groups." (Luckmann and Berger 1964, p. 206).

20. Form and Geschwender's results are consistent with Kahl's. The latter found that those individuals of the common man class who were non-aspiring in terms of status did not know any college trained people, but mixed socially solely within their own stratum. Those individuals who believed in "getting ahead" used the middle class as a reference group (Kahl 1953, p. 193). Runciman suggests that a manual worker who thinks of himself as middle class is more likely to feel relatively deprived of status than the worker who considers himself to be working class (1972, p. 200). In terms of our hypothesis, this suggests that those whose working class identity is reinforced do not feel deprived and therefore do not strive for status. Runciman also found that the most prosperous manual workers describe themselves as middle class and have desires to increase their status (1972, p. 281-4).

21. Certain mobility studies suggest that while intergenerational mobility may have increased due to increased education, the chances of individual career mobility have decreased. See Little and
Westergaard 1964; Goldthorpe and Lockwood 1963. Jacobson and Kendrick (1973) also suggest that changes in education have "increased ascriptive characteristics by transferring some work promotion criteria out of the workplace into the classroom."

22. The findings of Form (1973) are relevant here. He takes the position that industrial workers are not a homogeneous mass but rather are a stratified body of skilled and less skilled workers (1973, p. 697). He found great differences between the skilled and unskilled in terms of organizational participation. The higher the skill, the less passive the activities engaged in and the more participation took place outside of local groups at a broader community level (1973, p. 703-4). Generally, the unskilled had very low levels of organizational participation (Form 1973, p. 704-6). Knupfer (1947) also found that lower status (or unskilled) individuals participate in fewer organizational activities. See also Komarovsky 1967.

23. Ashton's work provides another dimension to analysis of low aspirations and lack of status drive. He suggests that the process of commitment at semi- or unskilled work begins early in the school years. Children of lower working class parents would inherit a restricted language code. These children are evaluated as dunces, unintelligent and incapable on the basis of these language codes as well as norms and values which differ from those of the teachers. They are channelled into academic streams which qualify them only for what Ashton calls "careerless" blue collar work i.e. unskilled, low status jobs. It is within the school, in relation to other higher status students and teachers that the individual incorporates his "inferiority" into his identity, as well as the idea that he is incapable (Ashton 1973, p. 106-110). See also Heyns (1974) for similar ideas of academic streaming based on verbal achievement. See also Footnote 16.
24. Form's findings support the hypothesis that lower strata blue collar workers rely on primary socialization contacts. He found that skilled workers had a "cosmopolitan orientation." They retained few friends that came from their "community of socialization." They also had fewer personal, family and local commercial ties than the unskilled (Form 1973, p. 704). The latter, on the other hand, relies much more on family members and relatives for friendship in leisure time and vacations (when they tended to stay "at home" rather than travel or participate in other activities). Free, non-work time was spent visiting the communities of their origin (Form 1973, p. 703). Ashton's findings relate to Form and Geschwender's belief that the peer group existing upon entering the labour force remains significant to the worker. He reports that the main areas of support and reassurance for students identified as failures and inferior (and channelled into blue collar occupations) in the school system are the peer group of similar students (1973, p. 109). Likewise, Komarovsky in her study of Blue-Collar Marriage found that when the husband's work does not require entertaining, blue collar couples are restricted in their social contact of adult life to the friendships which they made in school (1967, p. 312-322).

25. Meier and Bell argue that anomia results when the individual is prevented from achieving life goals. They found that working-class isolates is less anomic in terms of aspiration to life goals than those who participate with kin. They conclude that the lack of participation with kin, peers and neighbours makes this individual "less susceptible to the limitations to achievement contained in lower or working class beliefs, attitudes and values." These working class isolates have left behind the primary social groups and are working for the goals of the middle class (Meier and Bell 1959, p. 196-7). They also found that those individuals of low socio-economic status who were upwardly mobile (or believed themselves to be) were less anomic than these low status individuals who were stable or downwardly mobile. See also Otto and Featherman 1975.
26. Hyman concluded that, as a group, lower status individuals have a value-system including recognition of lack of opportunity to achieve success that reduces their chances for advancement. There was a significant group within this class, however, that did not hold these values. Hyman stresses the effects of reference groups. These lower status individuals who did not subscribe to self-defeating values identified themselves with and absorbed the value system of strata at higher levels than their own. (Hyman 1953, p. 33).

27. Faunce adds a slightly different but related dimension to why individuals grow indifferent to the status competition: "Ability to deal with and 'beat' the system is most directly in proportion to experience in large, formal organization, particularly at higher administrative levels, and to the amount of formal education. For this reason, a sense of powerlessness and resulting apathy are more common among people in lower- than in higher - status occupations" (Faunce 1968, p. 104). This also relates to our discussion in Chapter 2 concerning the difference in occupational identity formation according to status level.

28. Berger tells us that life at work takes on the character of pseudo reality and pseudo identity. "Real life' and one's 'authentic self' are to be found in the private sphere" (1973, p. 217). This private sphere becomes "who one really is." For individuals who primary identity is reinforced by the primary reference group outside of work and whose occupational status is low, both "real" and "pseudo life" afford them low status.

29. He may also suffer contradiction or discrepancy between the reinforcement of his primary identity and his occupational status location, especially if he only learns but does not internalize the occupational role. This would depend perhaps upon the distance and difference between the blue collar strata. It is also possible that this reinforcement of his primary identity prevents his identification with his new occupational role.
30. Messinger et al. (1970) suggest that an individual is "on" i.e. on stage, when he becomes aware of "managing a character" and maintaining discrepancy between his "real-self" and his character (1970, p. 690-1). They describe how mental patients who are "on" try not only to appear normal, but to be normal. In fact, they continue, the patient is trying to appear normal to himself as well as to others (1970, p. 692). Thus we may say that the low status individual assuming production images are deliberately going "on" to deceive others and to try to deceive themselves. Messinger also suggests that the patient fashions a character if he finds himself a doubtful or discredited person in the eyes of others (1970, p. 695). We may hypothesize that the low status blue collar worker will also go "on" by means of production images when he recognizes his low status as evaluated by others. See also Klapp as discussed in this chapter.

31. Most individuals spend the majority of their time in the occupational role and its associated status and "identity" (that is, identification made by others). Production images provide an "instant" alternate and highly visible "identity" which is easily assumed. Thus these individuals are able to switch these images on and off at will in accordance with time allotment and demands. This is especially important if we remember that for many of the blue collar workers, moonlighting and overtime are a part of life (see this chapter section entitled "Consumption Patterns in Mass Culture").

32. Knupfer concludes that psychological underprivilege is linked with economic underprivilege, as manifest by "habits of submission, little access to sources of information, lack of verbal facility." These result in a lack of self-confidence and unwillingness on the part of low status individuals "to participate in many phases of our predominantly middle-class culture even beyond what would be a realistic withdrawal (1947, p. 114).

33. Literature on the "youth movement" suggests that it began on campuses and spread or filtered to other non-student youth cohorts, who assumed the visible symbols popularized and distorted by the mass market. See, in addition to Kasschau et al., Mankoff and Flacks 1972; Starr 1974.
We may apply Goffman's concept of role distance here (1961). Knowledge of his status in a local status system may serve as the "wedge" Goffman describes between the individual and his occupational role. The status achieved in local systems may also soften identification by others as the occupational role performer and modified the status accorded on the basis of this role. The role performer may distance himself from the occupational role by means of this status. This may also work in reverse; the other individual in interaction may choose to insert the wedge of local status into his identification and status location of the individual made on the basis of his occupation.

Stone (1970, p. 395-6) distinguishes between identification of, and identification within symbolic interaction. Identification of each other - often accomplished silently or non-verbally by appearance - is necessary for identifying with each other i.e. calling out responses in each other. Symbols such as those of visible appearance must have common meaning for interaction to make sense to both individuals. The situation which we describe is problematic in the sense that visible images do not have common meanings, thus the other cannot make an identification of the individual "in drag" therefore they cannot in interaction identify with each other on the basis of the symbolic meaning of appearance. The change of status and identity for the low status individual revolves around his appearance as it is changed by production images.

This is similar to Goffman's idea that role enactment must have role others (1961, p. 85).

Gerth and Mills define posing as stylization of self-presentations and an attempt to get others to confirm a self-image in a society in which there is no consistency of meaning (1964, p. 95).

Mills suggests that symbols also have different meanings within different strata, thus individuals are able in interaction to interpret symbols differently (1974a, p. 435).
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION: STATUS COMPENSATION 
OR QUALITATIVE CHANGE?

i) Summary

In the first chapter, we found that the individual formed his identity within the confines of a stratified, controlled society. We examined mass culture as a method and manifestation of control. We concluded that the individual is integrated by his consumption habits, that is, he consumes in order to answer "false needs" implanted in him (Marcuse 1966). This ensures that he remains functionally integrated (i.e. fulfilling his occupational task) for only by working is he able to consume.

We then looked at the processes and problems of individual identity formation. In Chapter Two we found that occupational identities were not easily formed in blue collar work roles because of their lack of socialization and low status. The individual must rely upon the identity
of his primary socialization, as he cannot form a successful identity from his major role in secondary socialization. It is this occupational role, however, which assigns his status location in the occupational hierarchy. He is located and identified by others according to his occupational role, although he does not internalize this role into his own subjective reality, that is, it is not part of his identity. The individual then suffers discrepancy between the status location of his primary identity and the status location of his occupational role in secondary socialization. Faunce suggests that the individual would choose the most favourable criterion for self-esteem maintenance.

In the third chapter, we discussed one specific method of identity and status compensation: consumption of mass culture products. We hypothesized that blue collar individuals may be divided into status strivers and status resigners. We suggest that the nature of the social reference group - white collar or blue collar - will be the key to status orientation, as it effects the reinforcement of the primary identity and status location. Where these are not reinforced and the social reference group is white collar, the individual's status drive will strengthen and
he will aim for the strata above him. When this primary identity or status location is reinforced, the individual will not develop a status drive for higher strata. Status strivers will seek activity roles (if blocked on the occupational ladder) to achieve status and recognition denied them in their occupational roles, possibly in conjunction with a more Veblarian use of consumption. Individuals who do not strive for status will assert their self-esteem needs in other ways. They will attempt to hide their low status and even their primary identities by assuming what we have referred to as production images - combinations of products which can be assumed as "characters" or "poses" (Klapp 1969) but which do not have an associated role or behaviour.

We also hypothesize that because these images are not roles, they cannot be internalized by the individual and an identity formed. Thus the individual cannot develop an identity which can be reinforced through interaction with others. Not only are these images not roles, that is have no activity content, they are not even typifications (the basis of roles according to Berger and Luckmann 1967) as they have no universal symbolic value which will channel or cue interaction.
b) The "Answer" to the Question

In the Introduction, we asked why individuals of low status with identity problems continue to support the system in the manner that Marcuse describes (1966). We shall now turn to this question.

We have described these blue collar individuals as "unsuccessfully" socialized, that is, their subjective reality does not approximate their objective reality. We could expect this "non-adjustment" to lead to open discontent and perhaps change. As Marcuse points out, however, the working class firmly supports the system as it is.

One of the possible reasons for this support rather than discontent is found in Marcuse's own work. Individual's have needs implanted in them by those in control, those elites who have vested interest in maintaining the system. Fulfillment of these needs is accomplished through consumption. In order to consume, the individual must work. Thus the system is perpetuated. Despite his own status and identity problems, the blue collar worker is able to achieve (by various means which we pointed out in Chapter Two) a standard of living which fulfills some of his "needs" and lulls him into a state of complacency by its apparent affluence.
Those individuals who are status strivers still believe in mobility and open opportunity and thus support the system through their struggle to get ahead in it. Consumption for these individuals is secondary to but "conspicuously" associated with their activity roles. For the status resigners, however, consumption has another use.

These individuals affect production images in an effort to mask status and identity. These images, however, (for reasons listed elsewhere) are not effective compensation. Yet these individuals continue to function in the social system without signs of discontent. One reason is that they, like the status strivers, may be able to achieve a "comfortable" standard of living which makes them complacent in Marcuse's sense. While resigning from the status competition, these individuals still are the recipients of implanted needs, thus they must still support the system in order to fulfill their needs. Also they may still believe in mobility and achievement, but attribute their own inability to rise to personal flaws. Consumption binds them to the system because they are able to maintain a certain standard of living, which in some ways has a
general Veblenian purpose or function. It is also possible that their own subjective interpretation of the production images they assume offers enough momentary respite from their low status that they can provide themselves with some short-term self-esteem maintenance.

Finally, we may say that as long as consumption is firmly entrenched as part of what Marcuse calls the ideology of rational-technical domination - either in terms of 'need' fulfilling or production images - individuals will overcome their status/identity problems and support the system.
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