MARTIN BUBER AND THE UPAonisads
MARTIN BUBER AND THE UPANISHADS
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PERSON-PHILOSOPHIES

by
Ian Watson

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AUTHOR: Ian Watson

SUPERVISORS: Dr. J. Arapura, Dr. P. Younger, Dr. J. C. Robertson

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SCOPE AND CONTENT: I intend to compare the person-philosophies of Martin Buber and the Upanisads, assessing them in terms of my own opinions. Chapter One will expound Martin Buber's thought; Chapter Two will take this further, by investigating the notion of 'person-knowing'; Chapters Three and Four will be devoted to the Upanisads; Chapter Five will round off the discussion by arguing against a certain general tendency within the Upanisads in favour of a certain general tendency within Buber's thought.
PREFACE

(a) Prefatory Remarks: I intend a critical comparison of (i) Buber's thought, as found especially in 'I and Thou', a volume many believe to have influenced Contemporary Western Theology more than any other, and (ii) Upanisadic thought, as the heart of Vedanta, which is, these days, recognized as orthodox Hinduism.

I am therefore in some way comparing two traditions and disclosing common ground as well as terrain peculiar to each. Especially will my concern be with the respective teachings about 'the person'. My intention will be merely to compare, and to let these comparisons talk for themselves. Nevertheless, since Buber was familiar with the Upanisads, and since he self-avowedly underwent a Taoist phase, and since there are one or two quotations from the Upanisads in 'I and Thou', as well as elsewhere, I would like, however tentatively, to hint at an influence on Buber's thought of Upanisadic notions — and hence, however cautiously, to gesture at a possible influence in Contemporary Western Theology of the central Indian tradition. This gesturing will be no more than gesturing: I will nowhere argue the historical case. My interest is not with history, but merely to relate the teachings in question, with, as I have said above, an especial stress on points at which these teachings broach a doctrine of 'personality'.

If my intention has an aim above all others, it is, speaking most generally, to throw some light on the metaphysic of 'personality' as a strand in what has been dubbed — the *philosophia perennis*. iii
(b) Note on Method: My method has three parts: (i) a statement of certain aspects of Buber's thought, as found most especially in 'I and Thou'; (ii) an illustration of similar aspects embedded within the Upanisads; (iii) an appraisal of, and contrary views about, first of all, Buber, and secondly, the general teaching expressed in these comparisons.

I intend also to introduce one or two notions which are not to be found in either system or, at best, are there by implication only.

In general, I will be treating Upanisadic teaching as though it were a coherent whole, a point about which, I am fully aware, much dispute has raged. Any further statement of my position in this dispute will be left to the section dealing essentially with the Upanisads; and for the first section, which attempts a statement of Buber's teaching on the topic in question, it is important only to note that without much doubt, Buber will have addressed the teaching as such a whole. My method will therefore be to compare Buber's thinking with that found in the thirteen major Upanisads, and, occasionally, with my own thought upon the subject. One need, therefore, at this point make no further assumptions about the unity of these Hindu scriptures.

(c) Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Dr. J. Arapura who supervised my work for much of its duration, and whose friendship and encouragement have been beyond value. I am also sincerely grateful to Dr. P. Younger and, latterly, Dr. J. C. Robertson, who have seen me through the last, and perhaps most strenuous phases of this study. What-
ever worth this work may have is, in large part, due to their assistance and criticism.

Finally, for her constant presence in so many ways, I will always be grateful to my fiancée, without whom this work would not have begun.

(d) **Note on References:** For the convenience of those readers who desire immediate information about quotations they are reading, I have followed each quote with a bracketted note about its source. The statutory system of referencing will be found at the back of the work.
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MARTIN BUBER

CHAPTER I

EXPOSITION AND ELABORATION OF BUBER'S ARGUMENT

(i) Introductory Sketch: I will argue in this way. Buber has striven to maintain that correct analysis of the autonomy of persons must be in terms of the uniqueness of individuals. This has led him to argue that the situation in which the referent of personal pronouns about another individual is known, is necessarily a relation-situation.

But, I hope to show, he has also recognized the logic of person-language to be other than the logic of language about individuals, in that the former is about unbounded beings, and the latter about bounded ones. The "Eternal Thou", or God, he especially recognized to be about a being Who transcends all limitation. If this is so, I will argue, in pointing to what I believe to be a fundamental difference between Buber and Upanisadic thought, the situation in which a person is known cannot be one of relation, but that situation against which Buber rails as "mysticism". In other words, I will suggest the Upanisads to be a corrective to Buber's pitfalls. Let us now examine Buber's argument in detail.

(ii) Exposition of Buber's Argument: Buber talks of two primary words, "I-Thou" and "I-It", an understanding of which is an understanding of the human situation and thereby of the human person.
"To man the world is two-fold in accordance with his twofold attitude". (the opening words of "I & Thou"); and this "twofold attitude", which he expressed in expressing the two primary words, exhaust the possibilities open to him, it totally circumscribes man's factual nature. Once he has said "I-Thou" and "I-It" he has said all that he can say, and left nothing unsaid: once, that is, he has said both terms of any situation, he has said all that can be said about that situation.

In speaking further on the nature of these words or modes of personal expression, Buber says:

"Primary words do not signify things, but they intimate relations. Primary words do not describe something that might exist independently of them, but being spoken they bring about existence. Primary words are spoken from the being.

If Thou is said, the I of the combination I-Thou is said along with it.
If It is said, the I of the combination I-It is said along with it.

The primary word I-Thou can only be spoken with the whole being.
The primary word I-It can never be spoken with the whole being.² (Buber; I and Thou; p. 3)

In this statement we have in full the rudiments of theory which Buber will proceed to expound; and the few strands relating to his theory of 'persons' I now intend to investigate.

As these words make clear, Buber's system gives a role of central importance to the concept of "relation". "Primary words", he says, "do not signify things, but they intimate relations". Moreover, "In the beginning is relation", an aphorism which, if supplemented by the further words, "All real living is meeting"³ (11; italics, mine), points to a belief that the primitive situation is a "relation" situation. For Buber,
it is, indeed, the relation "I-Thou". And again, I illustrate at some length.

The life of human beings is not passed in the sphere of transitive verbs alone. It does not exist in virtue of activities alone which have some thing for their object.

I perceive something. I am sensible of something. I imagine something. I will something. I feel something. I think something. The life of human beings does not consist of all this and the like alone.

This and the like together establish the realm of it.

But the realm of Thou has a different basis.

When Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing for his object. For where there is a thing there is another thing. Every It is bounded by others. But when Thou is spoken, there is no thing. Thou has no bounds.

When Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing; he has indeed nothing. But he takes his stand in relation. (op. cit., p. 4)

Or again, "If I face a human being as my Thou, and say the primary word I-Thou to him, he is not a thing among things, and does not consist of things". (op. cit., p. 8) Furthermore, "The relation to the Thou is direct. No system of ideas, no foreknowledge, and no fancy intervene between I and Thou". (op. cit., p. 11) To which one might add the tiny remark, "all relation is mutual" (p. 8).

This approach is one with which I largely agree. However, to make more easy our approach to a crucial point of disagreement, I want to introduce two quasi-technical terms in the philosophy of 'knowing' - viz., (a) primitive situation, (b) primary given. By the former, I mean that situation in which there is knowing immediacy, that is, immediate contact between the knower and that which is to be known. By the latter, I mean that with which, within the bounds of his capacities, the knower is
immediately acquainted. These terms are to be understood generally, as applying to knowledge of all manner whatsoever. Let us now apply these two terms to Buber, and argue as follows.

Talking of person-knowing, the primitive situation is, for Buber, the 'I-Thou' situation, in which my primary given is my 'Thou'. And this primitive situation is, in Buber's understanding, necessarily one of relation. Now, it cannot be doubted that when I confront any non-personal primary given, the 'subject-object'-language implicit in all talk of this primitive situation necessitates positing distinction between myself and the world, even though there can be no distance between my organs of understanding and that which I know, even though there must be knowing immediacy. However, when it is a person by whom I am confronted, the situation cannot be assumed to be what it is when I am confronted by something non-personal. To know a person is to know a subject; is to know a knower, who must be logically distinct from what is known, if this latter is a bounded object. In the words of Bishop Ian T. Ramsey, "To objectify the subject is to deny ourselves the possibility of ever talking sense. It is the opposite mistake, though with the same result, that the mystics commit when they subjectify the object". ('Philosophy Quarterly'; July 1955) Or, to reiterate Buber's affirmation: "When Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing for his object. For where there is a thing there is another thing. Every It is bounded by others. But when Thou is spoken, there is no thing. Thou has no bounds". (op. cit., 4).

Moreover, the only possible way to know such a Thou or subject (or, to borrow Kierkegaard's term, 'subjectivity'; a term which, I believe,
approximates more nearly to Upaniṣadic language) can be the way in which such a subject knows himself; that is, the way in which 'subjectivity' is cognizant of Itself. This follows from the fact that a person knows his identity, is aware of being the person he is, simply and only in being such a person, simply and only in living his subjectivity, and never possibly in any inferential way. To find out 'something about' myself by inference, based on experiments, (and clearly this kind of language differs from language which refers to my person; but I will not at this point go into this difference) clearly pre-supposes the self-knowledge in question, knowing that I am who I am; pre-supposes, that is, knowledge of the referent of personal pronouns as used of the being in question. And as it cannot be the case that another could know me in a way I know to be impossible as an avenue to my acquaintance, it must be the case that another is acquainted with my person - as distinct from the bounded individual which may be referred to as a means of indicating this person - precisely as I am so acquainted - namely, in the living of subjectivity indicated in the use of personal pronouns in talk about the being in question.

Now if the knowing of a person entails the living of subjectivity indicated in the use of personal pronouns about him, the conclusion might appear to be the kind of disreputable monism of which, as I will illustrate, Buber quite wrongly or with lack of understanding, accuses the Upaniṣads (see, for instance, pp. 83-95, 'I and Thou'.) The point is simply this, if living my subjectivity means being the person I am, and if knowing me means living my subjectivity, then knowing me would appear to mean being me. And knowing another would likewise appear to mean being that other.
In which case, the ultimate referent of any personal pronoun would appear to be the ultimate referent of all personal pronouns; the referent of 'I'-talk would appear to be the referent of 'he'-talk and of 'you'-talk. In other words, all normal distinction might appear to be lost in a welter of monistic excess. This, one feels tempted to say, is a simple travesty of language as we use it. When I say 'he', I mean precisely to distinguish that being from me; and when I say 'me', I mean precisely to distinguish myself from him. This kind of conclusion would appear to mean that when I know myself, I know everyone, since I know the ultimate referent of all personal pronouns, or no one, since the person I know cannot be distinguished from any other person. Either alternative seems unpalatable. I intend, however, to suggest both to be true, being merely different ways of speaking, employing different logics of the same situation.

In this intention, we echo Upanisadic thought. In talking of the relation between Atman and Brahman in Upanisadic teaching Nikhilananda avers that,

"this seamless Unity, which they have described in poetic language, pervades the universe and yet remains beyond it. All objects, animate and inanimate, are included in It. Gods, men, and subhuman beings are part of It. As the unchanging Reality behind the universe, It is called Brahman by the Hindu philosophers; and as the indestructible Spirit in man, It is called Atman. Brahman and Atman, identical in nature, are the First Principle."

He continues:

"The Upanishads describe Brahman as having two aspects: the one devoid of any qualifying characteristics (nirvisesha) and the other endowed with qualities (savisesha). The former is called also the Supreme
Brahman (Para Brahman), while the latter is called the Inferior Brahman (Apara Brahman). When Brahman is said to be devoid of qualifying characteristics, what is meant is that the Supreme Brahman cannot be pointed out or described by any characteristic signs; It is not to be comprehended by means of any attributes or indicative marks. For this reason It is called the unqualified (Nirguna) and unconditioned (Nirvikalpa) Brahman; It is devoid of any limiting adjunct (nirupadhi). The Inferior Brahman, on the other hand, can be described by certain characteristic signs and recognized by virtue of His attributes and proper marks.

The Brhadāranyaka Upanisad puts the same point succinctly in these words:

"The Self, my dear Maitreyi, should be realized - should be heard about, reflected on, and meditated upon. By the realization of the Self, my dear, through hearing, reflection, and meditation, all this (world) is known". (Brhadāranyaka; 2:4:5; Nikhilananda; op. cit.) In other words, the point I have been suggesting - that proper self-knowledge does, in some sense, amount to knowledge of everyone and of everything - is clearly a part of Upanisadic thought.

For the moment, however, I wish merely to get the above seeming-paradox clearly in view - that knowing a person is to know a singular individual among others, yet also, the suggestion is, somehow to know nothing that is singular; somehow, that is, to transcend the world of singulars and plurals. Even at the moment, some clarity can be added to this distinction, for even at the moment, difference can be seen between talk about the person I am and talk about my individuality.

Another cannot be me as individual, nor can I be any individual than that which I am. To be individual means to be bounded, and this means to be impregnable. When these bounds are broken, so in the individual - so, that is, is this individual. But can another being be
the person I am? The word 'person' does not declare itself to be a synonym for the word 'individual'; we have, therefore, no right to equate the two without looking at their usage. So then, can another be the person I am?

If by this we mean, as often we do mean, the individual I am, the answer is clearly "No!" But if by 'person' is meant the subject as knower of objects, the 'Thou' to which Buber denies bounds - then the question is yet an open one. And this meaning, which I hope gradually to clarify, is a far more common idiom than present-day biases in favour of the sanctity of the individual might lead us to believe. We do, I believe, imply this meaning whenever by 'person' we understand - the total reality of one's being, one's situation in its fullness; whenever by person we mean, the total human situation.

So then, there is in the argument so far this tension or seeming-paradox about the knowing of persons, about the nature of the "I-Thou" situation. Buber's statement at least is clear: "I-Thou" is always a relation. Hence, in posing the question why he should speak this way, even when speaking of persons, we hope to rid ourselves at least of the scandal of this seeming-paradox, if not of the paradox itself.

(iii) Elaboration of Buber's Argument: Buber, we have seen, stresses relation: and the primitive situation, in which our primary given is the ultimate referent of person-language, is, says Buber, a primal relation. I want now to investigate this belief more fully.

Talking of the supreme person-knowing situation, the situation in which God (the "Eternal Thou") is known, Buber says: "To wish to understand pure relation as dependence is to wish to empty one of the bearers
of the relation, and hence the relation itself, of reality." (I and Thou'; p. 83). His argument is clearly this: if autonomy, and hence the language of 'responsibility' ('praise', 'blame', 'free', 'self-initiating', etc), are denied the being questing his fullness or Being (as a verb), then this being evaporates into the Being of his fullness, and so lacks realness. The quest, therefore, is likewise in some way unreal, and so too the relation of communion. Hence, the fullness of Being, viewed as a goal to strive towards, also lacks reality. Therefore, all the goings-on between things individual lack realness. Which, Buber would say, is an absurdity, for we do speak of things being real or unreal, and of the reality of our world. Human beings are real; hallucinated human beings are not - or anyway, not in the same way. In other words, the word 'real' has a use of our bounded world. This of course is the absurdity of Solipsism: assuming in the premisses the truth of that which these premisses are used to deny. And though of course the central trend of Upanisadic philosophy is to deny 'realness' to the bounded world, there are ways of talking within the tradition which accredit a kind of 'realness' to this world. There are two points here:

(a) A kind of talk which speaks of this world as, in some way, 'real' "That, O Gargi, which is above heaven and below the earth, which is this heaven and earth as well as what is between them, and which they say was, is, and will be, is pervaded by the unmanifest ākāśa (Brahman)." (op. cit., 34)

(b) A kind of talk which uses language of this world to speak about that which is otherwise spoken of as transcending this world; this kind of talk is clearly not meant to be descriptive, being but a metaphor-
ical borrowing for some metaphysical purpose - "That non-dual Atman, though never stirring, is swifter than the mind. The devas (the senses) cannot reach It, for It moves ever in front. Though standing still, It overtakes others who are running. Because of Atman, Vayu apportions the activities of all.

It moves and moves not; it is far and likewise near. It is inside all this, and It is outside all this." (Isa Upanisad: Nikhilananda; 90)

But, returning from this slight digression into the Upanisads, to Buber's argument. He has argued that unless the primitive situation is a relation, we have a two-member situation in which one member depends for its 'being' upon the other, a two-member situation in which one member totally encompasses the other. The quester after being would therefore be totally encompassed by the Being (as a verb) he quests. In which case, the quester, the quest, and the Being quested all would be equally 'unreal': and since this is untenable, mystical Monism - another name for the above two-member situation - is untenable. Hence, Buber concludes, the primal situation must be one of relation in which I, as subject, have an inviolable identity. Indeed, he might argue our conceptual system to make no sense unless his conclusion were the case, since the alternative (mystical Monism) can be given no meaning, cannot be coherently stated. Any assertion of it is its own parody, as well as its own refutation.

Now this primal 'relation' must be of mutual interdependence: otherwise, says Buber, we are back with absurdity. Intercourse always
demands two members. "Relation is mutual. My Thou affects me as I affect it. We are moulded by our pupils and built up by our works. The 'bad' man, lightly touched by the holy primary word, becomes one who reveals. How we are educated by children and by animals! We live our lives inscrutably included within the streaming life of the universe." (pp. 15-16) How then are we to talk of this "interdependence"? In words like these:

The Father and the Son, like in being - we may even say God and Man, like in being - are the indissolubly real pair, the two bearers of the primal relation, which from God to man is termed mission and command, and from man to God looking and hearing, and between both is termed knowledge and love. In this relation the Son, though the Father dwells and works in him, bows down before the 'greater' and prays to him. All modern attempts to interpret this primal reality of dialogue as a relation of the I to the Self, or the like - as an event which is contained within the self-sufficient interior life of man - are futile: they take their place in the abysmal history of destruction of reality. (op. cit., p. 85)

The "relation" is seen to be a communion in which each shares and partakes in the being of each, without either losing his identity. Though there is no distance, yet there is distinction. This, to Buber, is what it means to live the being of another. The other does come: within the compass of my being, he is in my situation - as my "Thou", the other over against me, as at least distinct, and most often also at a distance. Mostly my "Thou" is also an "It" with whom I seek to be reconciled. Or to put this another way, most often my "Thou" is a being I can cause to be an "It" (for me), so that mostly my communing will not be a primal relation embodying any "indissolubly real pair". Most of our primitive situations reflect our limitations. And part of the training of Vedanta, of which the Upanisads form the centre, was, in the words of Swami Nikhilananda, "to discriminate
between the real and the unreal, and renounce the unreal". \( ^{17} \) (op. cit., 23)

"The central theme of the Upanisads" avers Sten Rodhe, "is the description of the experience of a world without individuality, without death. Contrasted to that world of Brahman-Atman, the visible world loses its value." \( ^{18} \) (Sten Rodhe; 'Deliver Us from Evil'; 127)

These then are Buber's conclusions, and with them I mostly agree - with one highly important proviso. All is well, provided the "fullness" spoken of, the "God" alluded to, is addressed as a possible end to which we might strive, is dealt with as that about which we might be articulate. All then follows impeccably, Buber's conclusions entire. "Than the senses the objects of sense are higher: and higher than the objects of sense is the Mind: and higher than the Mind is the faculty of knowledge; and than that the Great Self is higher. And higher than the Great Self is the Unmanifest: and higher than the Unmanifest is the Purusha. Than the Purusha there is none higher: He is the culmination, He is the greatest goal of the journey." \( ^{19} \) (Katha Upanishad; 1: iii; 'Eight Upanishads', trans. Aurobindo.) Once more we see the same brand of language in use, this time within Upanisadic thought - the Purusa is "the greatest goal of the journey", and we who quest Him are 'journeymen' who approach Him as 'One beyond'.

But if, on the other hand, we address ourselves to this 'fullness' in itself, and this so far has been our inclination, then are we led to a conclusion it seems to me Buber has ignored or overlooked: that we are addressing ourselves to a state of Being about which nothing can be said, since, in its finality, it precludes the possibility of standing above to clothe it in words, the possibility of transcending to articulate. What it is to "address ourselves to" is, of course, a problem - though the
answer is perhaps a simple one: and I merely mean, to recognize the necessity of using words in a ritualistic sense concerning Being (a verb), words, that is, which evoke within or wake upon some certain individual a 'living' of this situation, as distinct from any articulate 'grasping' of it. To speak is never to state it, but to express a living of it. And the Upaniṣadic multilogical system does not ignore this, the apophatic element which Buber oddly endeavours by implication to discredit. Indeed, in Upanishadic thought, the Ultimate is explicitly said to be "that which cannot be expressed by speech, but by which speech is expressed" (Kena 1: IV; Nikhilananda, 99). And this we can plainly link with our above discussion of the 'subject-object' distinction. For the subject (person, subjectivity) is that which describes (i.e., delimits the perceivable bounds of), but which cannot be described (i.e., delimited or perceived). Once more, the oddity of Buber's denial of "mystical Monism" is patent; for the 'Thou', which, we have seen, parallels in so many ways the referent of our use of the term 'subject', and, in so many ways, the Upaniṣadic use of the term 'Atman' (and so, very often 'Brahman' as well), is properly spoken of in relation-language. And relation-language is language of beings which do have bounds. Relation-language, we may say, pertains to individuals, but not to the referent of person-talk. Hence, to restate the objection to which we are moving, 'Thou' - language is about this latter referent only if spoken of as an end we might strive to attain: it is never about this latter referent in itself, which cannot be spoken of in relation-language.

I will say more about the above in a moment. The point of immediate cogency is this - it is clear that so far as a systematic
metaphysic goes with its effort to understand in terms of propositional utterance, the primal situation must be said to be a relation, admitting distinction but no distance: but nothing of the kind is clear of Being per se, of the situation in its central living. When we address ourselves as above, and thereby endeavour to penetrate to the ultimate nature of this situation, to its heart in truth, then whether this situation is "relational" or not is still an open question; or rather - it is not a question for it cannot be put. And what this eventually will mean is a radical difference of opinion, for what it implies is this: that knowing a person is always knowing a being, or living a situation, which cannot be objectified or legitimately seen as 'It'. Let us now take this a little further.
CHAPTER II

ON PERSON-KNOWING

BUBER'S CLAIMS EXAMINED, AND PLACED IN WIDER CONTEXT

Since persons are that to which personal pronouns refer, one way of doing philosophy about them will be to analyse the use of these pronouns. It is therefore clear that a test of Buber's claims about persons will be a comparison of these claims with such an analysis. If Buber's teaching is sound, it ought to hold firm in the light of this analysis; if not, it will wilt. The central question of this chapter will therefore be: what can one say about 'self-knowing'? What would be Buber's primitive-relation situation here? In other words, what is, and how do we know, the meaning of 'I'?

In approaching this question, I intend not merely to criticize, but also to interweave Buber's understanding with that of the Upanisads, and with my own. Moreover, the understanding I speak of as my own will, as least often, be Upaniṣadic thought, put in my own words and ways. I begin with a statement of the basic and important affirmation - that the beings of whom we correctly employ personal pronouns are open to this employment as soon as they can be referred to, and not merely following some arbitrarily chosen phase of their existence; that the referent of personal pronouns is innate in human beings; that is, as we choose to put it, adopting a colloquialism - persons are born, not made. In Upaniṣadic language: the Purusa is not born, neither does he die.

(i) That a person is born, not made; The beings to whom we refer
in the use of personal pronouns are beings of a given structure, which, in any particular moment, confronts what it knows as wholes or, to borrow a phrase from Buber, in "full actuality". Buber's assertion, alluded to earlier, that "The primary word 'I-Thou' can only be spoken with the whole being" is cogently correct. His meaning is merely that the ultimate referent of personal pronouns is the initiator of all personal acts; that person-talk, talk about the primary word 'I-Thou', is talk about the ultimate referent of personal pronouns - and this referent is, of course, "the whole being" implicit in such talk. When a person acts, it is not merely part of that which is referred to in person-talk which acts, but the whole of this referent. These affirmations are all linguistic ones, true by the meaning of words.

Now this "whole" is that identity to which we refer in adverting to the 'same person'. Hence this "whole" is an, in some sense, unchanging given structure; the person, that is, who is born and not made. I want now to argue this is more detail.

Firstly, in saying this, I do not deny that some seemingly non-personal thing might be wielded in a manner that renders it feasibly personal - as a sculptor's mallet, or a tennis-star's racquet. But this is not the making of a person, but of something personal; an extension, by a person, of his personal geography. Persons cannot be manufactured, since this is the pre-condition of manufacture. One is almost tempted to say, a person cannot be created, since he always is the being who creates. Again, we can refer to the Upanisads for thought of a similar kind. The Katha Upanisad affirms: "The knowing Self is not born; It does not die. It has not sprung from anything; nothing has sprung from It. Birthless,
eternal, everlasting, and ancient, it is not killed when the body is killed" (op. cit., p. 73). "He, the Purusha, who remains awake while the sense-organs are asleep, shaping one lovely form after another, is indeed the Pure; He is Brahman, and He alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in Him, and none can pass beyond. This, verily, is That" (op. cit., p. 79-80).

These indicate closely enough a doctrine parallel to our suggestion that the referent of person-talk cannot be created. But this must be spiced with the theological palliative that I speak here merely of human creation. The prerogative of God I don't for the while even dare venture on. And obviously there is the sexual sense in which people as individuals can be procreated, multiplied on the face of the earth. Which is not, however, to manufacture a person; it merely is to give birth in the world to something which is, ever has been, and ever shall be a person. Put simply - to occasion the birth of a new individual who is a person. That a person might bestow a non-person with the power to be a person - viz., the power of behaving such that responsibility-language is opposite; the power that is, of self-initiation - is strictly inconceivable. For this would entail the paradox of movement to allocate elsewhere than the origin of this movement which originates the movement; to give a being the structure of the giver's being whilst yet retaining it. - And this, I suggest, is a strict absurdity. Nor ought this impossibility be confused with the indwelling of another's subjectivity, which I have said can be thought of, both as a retaining, and yet as a losing of one's individual identity; for this latter is not a giving of one's person but a disclosing of it. That is, a discovery
at a deeper level of its true structure.

And to reiterate, this means neither that a person cannot dis-
close as personal what was hitherto considered to be non-personal, nor that a person cannot destroy, deplete, or add to the referent of individual-talk about him. It argues merely the absurdity of human striving to fashion in the form of a person, that which is not so already. It argues merely that a human being is never other than a self-initiating being, whose behaviour is 'intentional doing' behaviour, is never other than a person. For, to introduce a slightly different argument, the sense in which we can 'make' something of a human being is only that sense in which we teach him what he learns; and learning is, in a degree at least, 'an intentional doing response': hence, personhood underlies it.

In other words, were I not a being who begin, from the very first, with a certain ready known given structure, I never could respond in the ways I do respond in learning from my first moment. If this be denied, we are left with magic or the hand of God descending in some arbitrary moment to impose personhood on a non-personal being. And each alternative is untenable, since contrary to the facts: the facts never justify us to conclude human movement to be less that a 'doing' response. And where there is room for uncertainty, as there may be of a pre-natal babe, a healthy rejection both of magic and of capricious fiat is bound to in-
spire us in favour of an innate nature whose behaviour is intentional.

And yet those who find the source of personhood only - and I take an obvious case as an example - when "I" gain awareness of myself, must conclude that this awareness somehow ushers in this magical transvaluation.
But unless this move is a definition ("To be a person means to be self-aware."), it is quite unfounded. For even achieving awareness of myself, myself as a bounded individual over against others, is something I do. There are more kinds of awareness than merely wakeful-awareness; and more kinds of 'doing' than wakeful 'doing' only. And here we might with profit refer to three stages of the four-fold 'awareness' schema spoken of in Upanisadic thought. The Upanisads advocate an hierarchic way of talking about our knowledge (or awareness) of what there is, which starts with talk about what we have called 'wakeful-awareness', progresses through the state of dream-filled sleep, then concludes with talk about 'dreamless' or 'deep sleep' in which the Ultimate is known per se, and in which awareness amounts to awareness of being Brahman. I quote at some length a passage from Swami Nikhilananda who adds details to this brief outline:

All our relative experiences are included in the waking state, the dream state, and the state of deep sleep. In the waking state we experience, through the gross body and the sense-organs, the gross world. In dreams we experience subtle objects through mind, or the subtle body. The causal world we experience in dreamless sleep, when the mind and the sense-organs do not function. One uses the gross body to experience the gross world, the subtle body to experience the subtle world, and the causal body to experience the causal world. Corresponding to the three worlds - the gross, the subtle, and the causal - there are three states, namely, waking, dreaming, and deep sleep, and also three bodies, namely, the gross, the subtle, and the causal. But it must not be forgotten that Consciousness is Atman, which is always present in the three states and forms their substratum.25 (op. cit., p. 50)

In other words, there are three ways of thinking about less-than-transcendent awareness, which involve (perhaps inter alia) talk about three states and three 'bodies', and whose ultimate referent is neverthe-
less one and the same - Atman; i.e. Brahman, i.e. Purusa; i.e. the referent of person-language.

(ii) Knowledge by "me" of "the person I am": Above I have made brief mention of wakeful self-awareness, in contrast to a more deep kind, the kind which it pre-supposes. And about this deeper awareness, let us at this point make this brief comment for clarity.

Knowledge by the individual I am of the person I am, that is, knowledge of how my body and my psyche are deployed in the condition defined by the bounds of the extension of my person, must be the primitive situation in which those physical and psychical attributes which are somehow intrinsically associated with me as subject are primary given. In this are they known for what they are, directly to the person I am, who thereby has 'possessed' and 'transfigured' them into centres expressing personhood. Moreover, these attributes are not objects but that which is known in the primitive world. They differ from other "primary givens" in that, through this knowledge, they are my person. Nor are they "used", but transfigured and lived; objects alone can be "used".

And there is a second and more important point: that the phrase "intrinsically associated with" is merely a way of saying that certain expressions of my person can get treated as if they were less than personal, and that these, which are presently expressions, can cease to be expressions - as it is with the cane the blind-man discards, or the limb I refuse to "own". And this whole short statement is further only a way of saying how one would put it, were one to want words for the relation between these expressions treated "as if", and the person whose expressions they are. There is not the expression and then the person, actually
linked. There is only the person who expresses, and who is his expressing; i.e., his being (a verb).

Though the above is a statement of the origins of what I have called "transfiguration", these origins are not an established relation but a recognized living. We discover, not create our bodies. We live them first, then know what they are; i.e., we first of all know in the deeper sense, then become wakefully conscious of so doing. As a babe delights in the discovery of her twinkling toes; or as Helen Keller delighted in the discovery that she was naming things.

Nor is this merely true of the bodies we are born with. Did not the blind-man first live in his mind this stick as a tapping-cane, he never would accept it as such; unless it first was of his body in this way, it would ever remain a stick. This of course is also true of Koehler's apes - who get wakefully-aware of living in their minds the conjunction of these two bamboo poles as an extension of their arm to reach the otherwise inaccessible banana. Did they in fact not do this first, they never could view the poles as other than poles.

But, "live in his mind", one might say - "Isn't that rather attenuated living?" And perhaps it is; but even attenuated living is living. My meaning is this: when I say a being lives his body in his mind, I of course mean firstly that he already and assuredly lives it. To the blind-man, this stick already belongs to his body. And to say that the living is "in his mind" is to say that he believes that, should he do such-and-such then such-and-such body movement would ensue. And this statement is always true of that which is my body. It is always true that, for instance, I believe that should I choose, decide, intend
to bodily perform (say, kick with my left leg) then I can or will: or even that I merely believe I can, without first choosing, deciding, wanting, intending, etc. And here the difference is only in degree. To say that this blind-man lives this stick as a tapping-cane in his mind, is merely to say that he believes that should he reach out, grasp it and tap with it, he can and/or will (should his movement rest with prior deciding) do so. And quite as he might be wrong about his left leg (it may be a phantom so that, though one might not say he lacked it, one would have to say he couldn't kick with it), so might he be wrong about this 'stick' - it might crumble in his fingers, or prove nailed to the table-top, or be too heavy or hot; all of which he could not have known merely in (say) running a hand across it. And this "belief" is, of course, a pre-wakefully-conscious one.

And finally, the question when one started this discovered living is clearly a question impossible to answer.

We may compare what Deussen calls "the fundamental thought of the entire Upanishadic philosophy" with what we mean by 'discovered living', or 'discovered' extensions (an obvious metaphor) to our person. Deussen remarks:

"the fundamental thought of the entire Upanishadic philosophy may be expressed by the simple equation:-

\[
\text{Brahman} = \text{Atman}.
\]

That is to say - the Brahman, the power which presents itself to us materialised in all existing things, which creates, sustains, preserves, and receives back into itself again all worlds, this eternal infinite divine power is identical with the atman, with that which, after stripping off everything external, we discover in ourselves as our real most essential being, our individual self, the soul.\(^2\)\(^4\) (Paul Deussen; 'The Philosophy of the Upanishads'; 39)
And though we might take exception to the phrase "individual self", for in our opinion 'soul' (or, person)-language is logically distinct from individuality-language, his statement yet remains the final word on what this 'discovered living' would be in Upaniṣadic terms - i.e., that the proper referent of the reflexive pronoun is Brahman.

(iii) Distinction between my present condition, and a possible future one. I have now spoken of - knowledge by me of the person I am, and related this a little to the process of self-discovery; that is, to the translation from pre-wakeful awareness to wakeful awareness, the transfiguration of logics such that, what was true about the former, has now become true about the latter. This I now hope to take a little further, relating it to one or two other distinctions which the phenomena thrust upon us.

Let us first, then, distinguish between the being I presently am wakefully aware of being, and that which I might be so aware of being: a present condition and a possible future one. Talk about the former will entail talk about certain wakeful awareness and pre-wakeful awareness; whilst talk about the latter will be such that what we were merely pre-wakefully aware of, now has become part of our wakeful awareness.

I speak, in this concept of a possible future condition, of that galaxy of structures upon which I might conceivably bestow the personal accolade, elevate from their present (at least apparent) impersonal rank, to the recognized dignity of a personal one. I speak of the instruments I might yet skillfully master, the capacities I might yet encompass, out of their isolation and into my person. Moreover, the argument stated here differs in no way from that put by Merleau-Ponty when,
in the name of Lavelle, he declares as paradox the "total being, which is", he says, "in advance, everything which we can be or do, and yet which would not be without us, and which must needs be augmented by our own being". ("In Praise of Philosophy", p. 5) This I agree with, for though it seems clear that no individual can wakefully know "in advance" the full bounds to which his being might extend in its expression (for that would be already to have reached them), yet does everyone know himself capable of higher and better things, know himself able to be other than he presently is. Which assuredly entails knowing that there can be a higher and better, and hence of its character in this degree; entails an active influence in the present of the pre-wakefully conscious knowledge spoken of, whose measure we never can wakefully know, whilst we still have a future and a destiny. For no individual can of himself create a knowledge of that which transcends himself. And as pointed out already, this knowledge must be visited on him. That life might be, and be more abundantly must break through and in upon the vista of his wakeful living. This knowledge must declare itself. Again, one can cite Upanisadic parallels, since it is clear Upanisadic doctrine, as the logic of 'self-discovery' - talk makes necessary, that 'Brahman' must 'declare Itself'. In other words, this kind of language belongs to the multi-language system used by the Upanisads to express its teaching. "This Atman cannot be attained by the study of the Vedas, or by intelligence, or by much hearing of sacred books. It is attained by him alone whom It chooses. To such a one Atman reveals Its own form". (Katha Upanisad, p. 74, op. cit.) Or again Katha Upanisad, p. 81: "His form is not an object of vision; no one beholds Him with the eye. One can know Him when He is revealed by
the intellect free from doubt and by constant meditation. Those who know this become immortal. Here the suggestion is that, via the medium of 'meditation' this 'disclosure' can be 'achieved'. In the words of the Shree Parohit: Yeats translation: "No eyes can see him, nor has He a face that can be seen, yet through meditation and through discipline He can be found in the heart. He that finds him enters immortal life." ("The Ten Principal Upanishads"; translated & ed., Shree Parohit Swami & W. B. Yeats; p. 37).

But returning to the main thread of the argument, in the light of this distinction between my present self and a possible future one, we can talk of "self-development", which we distinguish from self-knowledge in calling it - the process of coming to possess as a wakefully conscious present, that which at present only is possibly so: i.e., discovering oneself in the above sense which, in common parlance, would be called, "gaining newabilities", "acquiring new capacities". In fact, as I have argued, it is neither "gaining" nor "acquiring" but "recognizing". Moreover, this development might further involve the dawning awareness that the being "I" am ever becoming is nonetheless ever more truly myself, ever a more perfect expression of how things are with the person I am. There are reasons I have yet to give and reasons I have given for so supposing, but for the moment, I reiterate and intimate the following.

No individual can act in a way whose expression would go beyond the logic of such individuality-language as may at present be truthfully used of him. Any 'going beyond' must be initiated by a being who is 'beyond'. a being such that the logic of the language about him is of a "higher order" (Gilbert Ryle; 'Concept of Mind') than logic of language about
what is gone beyond. And where this 'going beyond' is transcendent
discovery (a term more fully explained below), then clearly the logic of
this latter language is not the logic of person-talk; that is, the
language expressing this lesser condition clearly gives a false picture
of what one's person really is.

That the tenor of this kind of thinking is deeply Upanisadic is
too clear to need illustrating; but to labour the obvious, we point to
the Chandogya doctrine that "actions" ('godly acts' - dharma) only follow
"happiness" ('bliss' = ananda) which is the reward of those, and only of
those, who "find the unlimited" ('the Ultimate' = Brahman). And though I
hope to speak more about this in a moment, the present point is this -
that a clear distinction is being made between the referent of personal
pronouns, considered such that their logic is that of 'individuals' -
language and hence of bounded-things, and the referent of that 'state of
being' which transcends such 'things' and which is yet the only proper
understanding of the referent of these pronouns, the only proper under-
standing of person-language (as distinct from 'individuals'-language).

(iv) **Two Arguments**: I now intend to elaborate upon these
tentative findings by way of two arguments. With these I hope to bring
this discussion to a final expression, as well as lead into a further
appraisal of Buber's argument, having special concern with what he calls -
the "inborn Thou". And though I will not always pointedly say so, there
can be no doubt that almost every move in the following two arguments
can be found central to Upanisadic thought and, perhaps even more
clearly, to the thought of the Bhāgavad Gītā which could (I believe) be
considered the apotheosis of Upanisadic philosophy.
(a) Argument One:

1. Developing myself amounts to extending my individuality in the sense of, including within its bounds as personal that which in prior time I regarded as non-personal, or not to be within the possible bounds of my person.

2. But this might equally be put in the following fashion: developing myself is progressively disclosing or discovering the way it is (or the truth about) the person I am distinct from, though not of course contrasted with, the individual I am. Hence, the newness of my being from one point of vantage - viz., the new individual I am - is mere disclosure, in the wakefully-lived form of this new structure, of something which the former, more limited and less wise subject was ignorant. It is movement of transcendent discovery. My person was ever and ever of this nature (or, more likely, of a nature which this present new understanding more nearly approaches), though the individual subject was not so till now, nor may he (necessarily) be tommorrow. Regression and movement retrograde are ever-present dangers.

And this more enlightened state of being is the discovery, from within my person, of new fullness regarding the Being I quest and so in some way must already be. For I could not posit It as a longer-for end to my quest, the 'quest' which Gabriel Marcel helpfully calls "ontological exigence", did I not know it in the degree that I posit it. And if I so know It, since It is the Being whose wakefully-conscious living is the Destiny of this, my individual subject, in some mode I must already be It; since, being this Destiny, insofar as it exists already as, let us follow C. H. Dodd and say, a "realized eschatology", the only place It could be is somehow within the 'confines' of the being spoken of, the being whose
Destiny it is. And this "somehow" is the how for which Buber coins the phrase - an "inborn Thou" for some individual "I". These are Buber's symbols for this fact. And where Buber speaks of an 'inborn Thou' for some individual 'I', the Upanisads talk of the Ultimate, the Brahman, the Self as 'IN' the being referred to, by the personal pronouns, in a way, I believe, quite similar to an at least plausible interpretation of the Johannine New Testament tradition which speaks of 'The Kingdom of Heaven' as 'in' you. In Swami Nikhilananda's words: 'The very comparison of Atman and the Upanishads implies that the logical Principle of things must above all be sought in man's inmost self'. And for the phrase 'the logical Principle of things' we would substitute the words 'the ultimate referent of person-language'. Which well illustrates how the usage I am advocating parallels that of the Upanisads, and differs from that of Buber; since, for Buber, the ultimate referent of person-language, that is, the proper referent of personal pronouns, is but one half of a twofold relation. Returning to the Upanisads, and quoting again from Katha: "The wise man who, by means of concentration on the Self, realizes that ancient, effulgent One, who is hard to be seen, unmanifest, hidden, and who dwells in the buddhi and rests in the body - he, indeed, leaves joy and sorrow far behind" (op. cit., p. 72), or "The Purusha, of the size of a thumb, dwells in the body. He is the Lord of the past and the future. After knowing Him, one does not conceal oneself any more. This, verily, is That" (op. cit., p. 78), or "There is one Supreme Ruler, the inmost Self of all beings, who makes His one form manifold. Eternal happiness belongs to the wise, who perceive Him within themselves - not to others" (op. cit., p. 80).
Now along with this tradition, my mode of expressing this point differs from Buber. I have used "I" to mean all of "the individual 'I' plus the 'inborn Thou'". We have chosen this way, for no other way seems adequate to the facts of constancy-midst-constant-inconstancy which comprise the human situation; no other way suffices to explain the fact, sanctioned by our language as well as our understanding, of personal identity. For though the being of my present condition, of "me" as an individual constantly suffers decay and change, my person retains such constancy that through the direst alteration, I yet might be identified as the person I ever am. The constancy of persons is, I would like to suggest—though merely suggest, the constancy of Jahweh's "I am, that I am", or of Christ's "Before Abraham was, I am". In other words, no matter how radically my concrete individual alters—losing hands or habits, gaining life or limb—it always can be, and often is, said of me, that my person remains the same; or that something about my person remains the same, or that I am the same person. This distinction is clearly a factual one.

And a second deep fact is that I do grow in wakeful understanding of my personhood: I constantly baffle me; yet this is a bafflement I constantly overcome. Constantly am I astonished by the richness and complexity of my discoveries. Constantly am I unfolding the lotus of my Being, and wakefully dwelling in or shining forth some added extension to "my-body-for-me" and "my-psyche-for-me". To speak of "learning by experience" may be platitudinous; yet it is deeply so. And these two facts together do, I believe, justify my analysis of the reflexive pronoun.
3. So then, we have discovered the human situation to embody constant dialogue between the individual subject I am and my "inborn Thou". This, one might say, is the primitive-relation situation for self-knowledge, for that is, knowledge of that which "I" means, so far as this knowledge is a wakeful awareness of my present condition.

Of course, expressing the situation in these terms is no more than employment of a useful metaphor. It is not straight-forwardly the same as a dialogue between two people. And in truth, the dialogue is no dialogue which would count as such for Buber; for this relation is to be understood "as dependence". In reality, the phenomenon of which I speak is not a constant intercourse between two mutually responding members, but the progressive disclosure spoken of above. It is a matter of ever increasing understanding, within my wakeful present condition, of my "inborn Thou" whose realness is over against it. Put simply; understanding my "inborn Thou" is understanding how I really am as opposed to how, in myself, I appear to be. It takes away the masks: and nothing is more common than coming to realize myself in error about myself, coming, that is, to realize that a true interpretation of my living is not in fact as I had thought it was.

It is therefore that we can claim the following - the "becoming" of my "inborn Thou" involves the ceasing to be of me as individual subject, for it involves the recognition that this latter is but the shape of appearances pretending to reality. And from this we can reach the conclusion that the total understanding of my person, and thence of the meaning of "I", comes only in and through the total abolition or ceasing to be of my individualness; in and through, that is, achieving
a present condition whose wakeful consciousness is altogether of that which, from the individual viewpoint, is symbolized as "inborn Thou". It is a living which, in its deepest truth, lacks all trace of individual self-assertion. Clearly, such a being will move in the world - will speak and otherwise behave - as if he had such a consciousness; for, in the world, he will needfully address himself to conditions who do so think of themselves (to, that is, individuals), and whose only understanding could be in these terms. It is thus that Jesus spoke of himself as individual, even though the heart of his gospel told that he was nothing, merely shining forth the Father's fullness. To the rich young man who esteemed him "good" he replied, "Why do you call me good? No one is good but God alone". (Mark 10: 17-18) In this pericope he points the contrast - Jesus, the individual; God the Father, his unmanifestable though nonetheless liveable "inborn Thou". And yet, confronted by Philip's lack of understanding, he replied, "Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father in me? The words which I say to you I do not speak on my own authority; but the Father who dwells in me does his works. Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father in me; or else believe me for the sake of the works themselves". (John 14: 10-11) Indeed, exactly because Jesus lived in his person this deeply truthful understanding, devoid of all self-deception and every trace of individual constriction, did Schleiermacher (among others) speak of his - "God-consciousness". For Jesus was wakefully conscious of the meaning of "I" in all its fullness.

And of course, such an understanding is beyond all propositional utterance, for nothing could oversee to so proclaim it; and its only
expression will be the living itself - a shining forth in its fullness.

Now someone, a sceptic perhaps, may inquire how so total a ceasing to be could come about, and though this question forms no part of my thesis, I briefly make mention of two quite obvious facts. Firstly, this "nowness" is the "nowness" of self-development, and hence rests entirely with the discovery of my 'being' (a verb), or with this 'being's disclosure. Secondly, it must be a "nowness" in harmony with what will be the point at which we rest our second argument.

4. Now, no distinctions are herein denied. It yet remains that I, the person I am, have the body and the psyche I do, and that I can be spoken of in the normal manners. It yet remains that I can commune with other human beings, whose essential understanding will be that which, in speaking of them, can (in that degree) take an articulate form, and which I can know in living the relevant subjectivity. It yet remains that there are in the world, various subjects who all can speak of themselves as persons.

5. My claim, in other words, has simply been that wakeful knowledge by me of the person I am amounts to continual revealing of my "inborn Thou" as the person I am; or, in Upanisadic terms of the Brahman-Atman as the person I am: as the ultimate referent of person-talk. So again we note disagreement with Buber, since, for Buber, the ultimate referent is one side of a twofold-relation; whilst here, the logic of 'ultimate referent'-talk transcends the logic of relation-talk.

I have also noted that in its completion this revelation cannot be stated, since, being my Destiny, it is a state of being the shining forth of which comprises my perfect fulfillment, a state of being beyond
which I cannot proceed, so cannot transcend to articulate in statement. This is, moreover, disclosure in my wakeful living of that which ultimately enables my behaviour, of that being to whom, ultimately, my responsibility may be traced.

It may, indeed, further be - though I won't stop here to argue so - disclosure of that which likewise enables personal behaviour of other persons, and of the fact that this is so. None of which would deny to us the distinctions we do make, that we can, for instance, individuate on the basis of those criteria we use in doing so - which, when speaking of human beings, is the basis of dwelling in certain expressive centres. This argument moreover stands squarely in line with Upanisadic thought, i.e. the notion that growth in knowledge amounts to 'continual disclosure' of the 'inborn Thou' or of 'Self' as referent of reflexive pronouns. This of course introduces the notion of moksa (or liberation).

"Liberation", says Swami Nikhilananda, "is therefore not something which is created, but is the realization of what has existed from eternity but has hitherto been concealed" (op. cit., p. 63).

(b) Argument Two:

1. In speaking of Jesus I remarked that even a being of his calibre must, whilst in the world, yet appear to be of it; to this can now be added that, so far as he was in the world, he needfully was of it - i.e., he was a being who spoke and moved as a concrete individual who shared relations with other such individuals. But the difference between Jesus and those among us creatures whose concrete individuality comprises our wakeful reality, is that Jesus was wakefully aware of all such subjectness as sham and make-believe. Whilst we deeply suffer our felt estrangement, Jesus suffered only our ignorance of its unreality;
and his impotence to break upon us at a single stroke the knowledge of our ignorance - for he wept over Jerusalem.

2. Therefore, whilst mindful of the above analysis, yet are we forced to admit ourselves creatures of the world, suffering estrangement and relation; nomadic and individual, in a degree. And as we already have observed, individualness implies prior communion. As an individual, I relate myself in an "I-It" attitude, both to others as well as the world.

3. We are therefore led to further conclude that - understanding my person implies reconciliation; for it involves a return to where one is wakefully aware of living this communion-situation from which one appears to be estranged. For in this situation, and only here, is one in 'knowing directness' with that which, ultimately is one's subject, for this is that primitive situation from which we, as individuals, come forth; that situation in which we are Agents, and not the Subjects we as Agents make ourselves, to borrow philosopher John Macmurray's idiom; that situation in which we are Being, and not the "ego" we, in Being, construct of our "stresses", to speak as Marcel would. Only in this situation is our wakeful living that of our person proper.

4. Therefore, the need for Being or, in Marcel's idiom, "ontological exigence", finds it practical value in terms of the quest for communion - the struggle to overcome separation, for in such distances lurk the poisons of falsehood. "Everything isolated leads astray. Only wholeness is reliable and leads to salvation." (Buber; 'Love of God and Love of Neighbour', fr. 'Hasidism'; p. 236). Whilst I remain at a remove from any being or anything, it follows I do not fully understand my person. And this communing movement we speak
of as - love. "Love", says Buber, "does not cling to the I in such a way as to have the Thou only for its 'content', its object; but love is

between I and Thou." (Buber; 'I and Thou'; 14-15) Or again:

"Only he who learns to love one man after the other, attains, in his relationship to God, to God as God of the world. He who does not love the world can only in his relationship to God only a God who is solitary, as it were, or the God of his own soul; the God of all, the God who loves His world he first learns to know through himself loving the world. Thus one may then regard the way from love of man to love of God as decisive for the development of the person, not as though he had to go this one way and not the other. "

(Buber; 'Hasidism'; p. 239)

And whilst I will shortly argue against the suggestion of relation contained in the stressed word "between", the argument otherwise here is clear: that love amounts to communion, which is not merely enter-
taining another as one's object of knowledge, but an effort to conquer felt estrangement from the other, which, I have argued, is an effort, not merely to banish the 'otherness' of the other, an effort truly to know the ultimate referent of personal pronouns used in his regard, but also an effort wakefully to understand the ultimate referent of reflexive pronouns.

"Love", continues Buber, "is responsibility of an I for a Thou." 

('I and Thou'; p. 15) These words perfectly express my meaning; for the quest of which I speak is a responsible response to the call of Being. Ortega y Gasset approaches a similar understanding when he declares:

"There are situations, moments in life, in which, unawares, the human being professes great portions of his ultimate personality, of his true nature. One of these situations is love. In their choice of lovers both male and female reveal their essential
nature. The type of human being which we prefer reveals the contours of our heart. Love is an impulse which springs from the profoundest depths of our being, and upon reaching the visible surface of life carries with it an alluvium of shells and seaweed from the inner abyss. A skilled naturalist, by filing these materials, can construct the oceanic depths from which they have been uprooted. Nor does this differ from the German phenomenologist, Max Scheler, whose phenomenology of love is likely more adequate and certainly more thorough than any yet advanced, when he finds love to be "an originally spiritual act" ("Ressentiment", p. 182; italics his own), whose value is not that it might "further human or social welfare", but, quite simply - that it is love. "The important thing is not the amount of welfare, it is that there should be a maximum of love among men. The act of helping is the direct and adequate expression of love, not its meaning or 'purpose'. Its meaning lies in itself, in its illumination of the soul, in the nobility of the loving soul in the act of love." (op. cit., p. 93; italics his own) Love, in other words, affords its own sufficient reason; for love is fullness.

And with this I concur, for when Scheler adverts to a "spiritual act", he implies the meaning I speak of when I talk of this "act" as initiated by that to which "person as 'ultimate explanation'" - talk refers, as initiated by the ultimate referent of person-talk as distinct from anything which is merely psychical of physical or organic.. The Russian philosopher-poet, Valdimir Soloviev, speaks of "the radical meaning of love" which, he says, "consists in the acknowledgement for another creature of unconditional significance." ("The Meaning of Love", p. 58) Feeding on this tradition, N. O. Lossky was later to esteem love,
"the perfect acceptance and adoption of the existence of others" (N. O. Lossky; 'Value and Existence'; p. 40), thereby pointing both to the other's otherness, and to the fullness which love is, to the perfection it actually expresses. In so doing, he explains how the meaning I speak of is fundamentally that of Scheler as well. For whilst we here see it as the quest for communion, we earlier also have seen it as that communion, and hence, as an end of value in itself. And nothing is surprising in this - for this "quest" is possible only because the communion quested already is effected. Indeed, this "quest" is that perfection which actually expresses the communion after which we seek. Hence it is that Scheler also speaks of love as, "a blissful ability to stoop, born from an abundance of force and nobility." (op. cit., p. 95), "the moving forces within the kingdom of God" (op. cit., p. 118; italics his own), "an original force transcending the natural domain." (op. cit., p. 131). Precisely in this sense did the Scholastics speak of God as "pure act"; for then they referred to God the Father whose Being was this "act" of communion: "God", said the author of the Fourth Gospel, "is love". Which is our conclusion - that the person I am is a being who knows no bounds, understood only in living that communion who is God.

Yet this scarcely begins to say all one might about the mysteries of love: and I echo these words of Soloviev -

"But love, as I understand it is, ... an extraordinarily complex affair, obscure and intricate, demanding fully conscious discrimination and investigation, in which one needs to be anxious not about simplicity, but about the truth. ... A rotten stump is simpler than a living man." (op. cit., p. 58)
And we must of course be mindful that love is the "pleroma"; so love, in its final words, shines ineffable.

(v) A Difference of Opinions: I now want to examine more closely the contention, stated at the outset as central to Buber's understanding - that the primitive situation of person-knowing (and I have spoken especially of knowing the person I am) is one of relation. Buber indeed claims all situations to be "relational", even that final situation in which a person wakefully expresses himself in his fullness, even that situation which is love in its "radical meaning". And I have chosen not to talk like this, for I choose to remember that this situation is ineffable - and this will shortly appear to be more than merely a different way of talking, but really a difference of opinion.

"The extended lines of relations meet in the eternal Thou. Every particular Thou is a glimpse through to the eternal Thou; by means of every particular Thou the primary word addresses the eternal Thou. Through this mediation of the Thou of all beings fulfillment, and non-fulfillment, comes to them: the inborn Thou is realised in each relation and consummated in none. It is consummated only in the direct relation with the Thou that by its nature cannot become It.\(^\text{48}\) ("I and Thou", p. 75; italics his)

Here are his final words about the "inborn Thou" lived in its fullness and this living he calls a "direct relation". So what I discover when I discover my person or develop into full maturity, is an "I-Thou" relation of mutual dependence between some individual subject ("I") and the "Thou" who is his "eternal Thou". This is Buber's statement of the wakeful living of a person's "inborn Thou". And this we believe to be mistaken, for, following the Upanisads we believe descriptive statements to be impossible. It would not otherwise be ultimate.
In part, our problem will appear to be the words we choose to use or eschew. And Buber does once or twice talk as if his opinions parallel those we reflect from the Upanisads. As already noted, he says that the "eternal Thou" is "the Thou that by its nature cannot become an It". He expresses this meaning again when, speaking of expressing the "eternal Thou" in one's wakeful living or in what he labels "the pure relation", he says this "Thou" - "cannot be limited by another". He is talking of God's names, and he says - "But when he, too, who abhors the name, and believes himself to be Godless, gives his whole being to addressing the Thou of his life, as a Thou that cannot be limited by another, he addresses God". (op. cit., p. 76) This "eternal Thou", in other words, is he who cannot be made an object by me, who cannot be made an "It". Which is why, in our opinion, the only words possible are worshipful ones. In regard of the "eternal Thou", words, which are ciphers used or at least expressed by a subject having a certain present state in a world people by other such subjects, can only perform an evocative function and never an indicative one. The Oxford thinker, J. L. Austin, who so closely analysed the class of utterances which are also performances (e.g. commands, interrogatives) might have called such utterances - "ritual performatives"; for this they precisely are: to say them is to do a rite, and not to speak about one. And here lies the wisdom of speaking as, in Christian theology, Barth and others do, and as was done so long ago as the Vedas - of speaking of God, Supreme Being, the Absolute, Brahman, the "inborn Thou", as "totally other". For it certainly is not possible to use of this state of being words used of our individual one: I mean, not possible in quite the same way. And
the only vocabulary possible would be a revealed one, spoken by the
being I am, whose only positive content however would, by paradox, be
a negative one: would be apophatic, as is the way of Orthodox Theology;
would be the Upanisadic "neti, neti" ("not this, not that").

And Buber comes close to this meaning when he affirms - "God is
the Being that is directly, most nearly, and lastingly, over against us,
that may properly be addressed, not expressed". (op. cit., pp. 80-81)

Moreover, he draws still nearer the opinion I have agreed for when
he readily accepts the Johannine formula, "I and the Father are one" as
applicable to this "pure relation" (which he also calls, the "supreme
meeting", p. 77), provided this be interpreted - "'I am the Father and
Thou art I'" (p. 85).

For, "In the relation with God unconditional exclusiveness and
unconditional inclusiveness are one". (op. cit., p. 78) And we might
compare this with the Upanisadic edict" That art Thou'; i.e., 'the
Self' is 'the self'; i.e., the proper understanding of the being usually
understood as the referent of 'bounded-ego' - talk is in terms of a
language having the logic of God-talk.

Anyway, on their face, these statements by Buber at least have
the appearance of supporting our opinion. Buber appears to mean that
wakeful realisation of my "inborn Thou" is finding out that to which I
refer when I refer to myself as personal. All this might seem crystal
clear. But not to be deceived, for it is quite clear that the situation
we have shown to be given or disclosed, is that very situation which
Buber designates as "pure relation". And though this relation, Buber
agrees, cannot be further characterized, yet it is a relation: one of "addressing". Exactly at this point does Buber's difference from us and from the Upaniṣads, become more than merely a different emphasis. For this term "addressing" is Buber's term for "worship". Yet, in Buber's mind, this can quite validly be characterised as the case of one being engaged in colloquy with another: to my mind, the case is rather one of lived expressing, which Buber's twofold understanding might validly symbolize in the sense of assist someone to understand. But it does not characterize. In the idiom of philosopher John Macmurray, to worship is to celebrate communion: in Buber's, to establish relation. This is, I think, clear from the terms he uses of the "eternal Thou", terms like "lastingly over against us" and "supreme meeting". Nor as we have said is this only a matter of words, stressing one 'perspective' over another, the individual over the personal. For Buber, these relation-statements are strictly correct ones about the person I am. They refer to myself as the "I" who knows a "Thou". They refer to the first and primal attitude. In calling the Gospel of John, "the Gospel of pure relation", he uses these words in explicating an understanding of it - "The Father and the Son, like in being - we may even say, God and Man, like in being - are the indissolubly real pair, the two bearers of the primal relation, which from God to man is termed mission and command, from man to God looking and hearing, and between both is termed knowledge and love." (op. cit., p. 85; italics mine). And to Buber, no understanding or mode of living goes beyond this one.

"But what of mysticism? Does it not inform us how unity without duality is experienced? May we dispute the truth of its account?" (op. cit., pp. 85-86). And in these words, Buber gestures at my objection.
He affirms "two kinds of happening in which duality is no longer experienced. These are at times confused in mystical utterances - I too once confused them". They are after this fashion.

"The one is the soul's becoming a unity. This is something that takes place not between man and God, but in man. Power is concentrated, everything that tries to divert it is drawn into the orbit of its mastery, the being is alone in itself and rejoices, as Paracelsus says, in its exaltation. This is the deviative moment for a man.\(^5\) (p. 86)

And with this we have little need to deal. Suffice to note it to mean the integrating by man himself of all he is - a calling to order in rebuke of the warring members. But the second meaning is more to the point.

"The other happening", he says, "lies in the unfathomable nature of the relational act itself, in which two, it is imagined, become one: 'one and one united, bareness shines here into bareness'. I and Thou are absorbed, humanity, which just before confronted the godhead, is merged in it - glorification, deification, and singleness of being have appeared.\(^5\) (p. 86, italicized "become" mine.)

Quoting a dialogue recorded between Prajapati and Indra in "one of the Upanishads" (presumably Book 8 of Chandogya), Buber impugns the view he thinks himself attacking on the dubious grounds that the "Self" adverted to has "gone to annihilation"; so the doctrine in question "leads not to lived reality but to 'annihilation', where no consciousness reigns and whence no memory leads". (op. cit., p. 88) He continues, pressing his objection:

"In lived reality there is no unity of being. Reality exists only in affective action, its power and depth in power and depth of affective action. 'Inner' reality, too, exists only if there is mutual action. The most powerful and the deepest reality exists where everything enters into the affective action, without reserve the whole man and God the all-embracing - the united I..."
and the boundless Thou.

The united I: for in lived reality there is (as I have already said) the becoming one of the souls, the concentration of power, the decisive moment for a man. But this does not involve, like that absorption, disregard of the real person.\(^p.89;\) italics mine.)

Now whether this justly interprets the Upanisad in question is not the central question. For Buber's attack leaves our opinion almost unruffled. In our opinion the two do not "become one", the "annihilation" does not vanquish "lived reality", and the being concerned is precisely "the real person". Indeed, that it is "the real person" is entirely the point. And this opinion, which shortly I hope to show also to be the opinion of the Upanisads, it might be as well, in closing this section, briefly to summarize.

In common with the Upanisads, I have suggested that "realising" or "consummating" one's "inborn Thou" is wakefully to live a state of being beyond relation, at least in the sense that it beggars verbal, descriptive statement. It can, however, be said to express an adequate or complete understanding of my person; for the pattern of development towards it, which (by definition) is the pattern of self-development, is shown to be progressive disclosure of the lineaments of my person, and not "consummation" of any "direct relation" which intrinsically holds between my person and some being who is not my person.

And it must be of this pattern, for the movement is continual satisfaction of "ontological exigence", a gradual attaining to wakefully living that Being I know to be my destiny. That it is of this pattern - both progressive and disclosure - and yet also the pattern of my, personal development will appear a curious mystery only to those who expect the human person to be less complex than constantly he proves himself to be.
(vi) Small Summation: I want, in this penultimate section, to summarize why I believe Buber has argued in this way, why I believe it crucial for him to have done so, and why I believe he is mistaken in so doing.

"The person", Buber says, "is through and through nothing other than uniqueness and thus essentially other than all that is over against it." (Buber; 'The Knowledge of Man'; p. 96; italics, mine). In other words, "the saying of 'Thou'" means "the affirmation of the primally deep otherness of the other." (Buber; op. cit., p. 96; italics, mine). Here Buber's clear concern is to preserve the autonomy of persons, to establish the ultimate referent of person-talk to be a self-initiator. For Buber, a person is the being "over against him whose claim stands over against his own in equal right". (Buber; op. cit., p. 108) In this conclusion, he strives to do justice to two facts: (a) that a person is realized only in the banishment of estrangement we call 'communion'; (b) that a person is autonomous. It has therefore seemed clear to him that all person-meeting must be relation. We have seen the same concern at work in these words from 'I and Thou':

"To wish to understand pure relation as dependence is to wish to empty one of the bearers of the relation, and hence the relation itself, of reality." (Buber; 'I and Thou', p. 83)

Buber has therefore felt that unless we can use 'responsibility' terms of the being in question (viz., 'praise', 'blame', 'free', 'initiator', 'creator', etc.), this being is not a person - and with this there can be no quarrel. Yet Buber has also assumed that the being in question must be considered an individual having autonomy. Hence, all individuals of whom we use person-language are fully persons.
use of person-language is nothing other than reference to related
autonomous individuals: this Buber considers to be undeniably axiomatic.
Each individual, qua individual, is a moral creature. Hence, "All
relation is mutual" (Buber; op. cit., p. 15); i.e., every 'Thou' I relate
to has a nature similar in kind to mine, a nature which is at once over
against my nature, and yet open to 'responsibility' terms quite as mine.
"It is from one man to another than the living bread of self-being is
passed." (Buber; 'The Knowledge of Man'; p. 71): the ultimate referent
of person-talk about me is that which I am when essentially over against
another 'Thou'. This 'over-againstness' or 'ontological distance' is
irreducibly axiomatic for Buber's theory of persons. And to this, we
have seen two objections.

(i) Knowledge of the "Eternal Thou" cannot be knowledge of a
being over against yet similar in nature to myself, because this would
be to place the individual, whose autonomy Buber seeks, however oddly,
to preserve, on the same footing as the only 'Thou' who cannot be
individual, the only 'Thou' who cannot, that is, be an 'It'. In Buber's
words, the "Eternal Thou" can "properly only be addressed, not expressed." (Buber; 'I and Thou'; p. 81) "God", he says, "cannot be inferred in
anything - in nature, say, as its author, or in history as its master,
or in the subject as the self that is thought in it. Something else is
not 'given', and God then elicited from it; but God is the being that is
directly, most nearly, and lastingly, over against us, that may properly
only be addressed, not expressed." (Buber; op. cit., p. 81) And the
confusion seems clearly bespoken by the very unclarity of this distinction.
For the distinction seems to be between, 'understanding of, by ritual
participation in, the Godhead', and 'describing by distancing oneself from God'. Yet if the former alone is possible, any 'over-againstness'-language seems to me impossible. The "Eternal Thou" is the ultimate explanation, over against which nothing could stand to delimit.

For this reason, knowledge of the "Eternal Thou" can only be knowledge of a being whose nature is similar to mine, if it amounts to knowledge of the ultimate referent of personal pronouns employed in person-talk about me. Hence, the introduction of Buber's "inborn Thou", meant as a notion for the sense in which my nature can be said to be that of the "Eternal Thou". Now if this is the case, the paradigm of knowing any 'Thou', namely "pure relation" of 'I' with the "Eternal Thou", is non-relational, since it amounts to knowledge of one's self. Indeed, speaking of Hasidism, in expounding what is essentially his own position, with "His Shekina" in place of "the inborn Thou", he remarks:

The man who establishes unity in himself between the realm of thought and the realm of deed, works on the unification between the realm of thought and the realm of deed, that is, between God and His creation in which he allows His Shekina ('indwelling'), His Glory, to dwell, in fulfilling every commandment, man shall say: 'I do this in order to unite the Holy One, blessed be He, with His Shekina'. But it would mean a distortion of the teaching to understand this unification as taking place 'in' God. That the Shekina associates itself with creation may not be grasped as a division within God; no immanence, even so unconditional a one as this, can mean a diminution of the perfection of His transcendence. The suspended paradox of the overlapping influence of the Human essential deed has its truth in the inwardness of now and here; it would become nonsense if the conception of a change in the being of God were combined with it.\(^{65}\) (Buber; 'Hasidism'; pp. 214-215)

In other words, Buber himself seems to verge on admitting the ultimate referent of personal pronouns to be God.
(ii) These last few words, suggesting the referent of such pronouns to be unchanging, hence the atemporal "Eternal Thou", introduce what has been my second criticism - that it is no mere accident of expression when Buber affirms 'Thou' to have no bounds. He remarks, "Every It is bounded by others. But when Thou is spoken, there is no thing. Thou has no bounds." (Buber; 'I and Thou'; p. 4) That this is no accident of speech but recognized by Buber as central to his thought, is clear from his talk about space-time. Though 'Thou' alone has a 'present' or, as he also calls it, 'duration', these terms are not 'passage of time' terms. "The present", he observes, "is not fugitive and transient, but continually present and enduring." (op. cit., p. 13) He means, in other words, the notion borrowed from him by Tillich and expanded into the concept of the 'eternal now'.

"The world of It is set in the context of space and time. The world of Thou is not set in the context of either of these." (op. cit., p. 33)

Hence, the words: "The Thou knows no system of co-ordination". (op. cit., p. 31). This does, I suggest, spring from the early recognition (op. cit., p. 4) that the 'Thou' is a subject, not an object, the ultimate explanation of knowledge of things which cannot therefore be explained in terms of these 'things'.

And yet, as we have seen, a relation which holds between members which have no bounds can be no relation at all. Relations are between space-time things: a world which is neither spatial nor temporal, cannot, therefore, be a world of relation.
I have argued Buber's metaphysic, inadequate at one or two crucial points. I have argued also that the Upanisads are more adequate at these points. This, I believe, is because of what I have once or twice called the Upanisadic 'multi-logic' system. In other words, a way of expressing what we believe to be Buber's error is in these terms: to find this system lacking in logical richness; to find, that is, his linguistic implements inadequate to the task of expressing what is demanded of them.

Every language has a logic, a system of canons which governs its unique behaviour. There are, that is, as many logics as there are areas of discourse, or kinds of 'talk'. Whether in fact the languages precede their logics or come after them, is not our present concern. Nor is it so easy a question as it might at first glance seem. Our major point is, however, that Buber expresses his thoughts in terms of a certain number of logics, whilst the Upanisads express themselves in terms of many more; and since it seems clear that the extra languages employed by the Upanisads which Buber neglects (or perhaps deliberately omits) talk about that to which they refer such that their referent could not be talked about in any other language, then it (virtually) follows that Buber's system does not do full justice to that which is real.

In perhaps simpler, though (I believe) more metaphorical than accurate terms, the Upanisads more adequately express 'all the dimensions of reality' (an obvious metaphor) than does Buber, whose system lacks the necessary logical richness. In contrasting Eastern logic with that of the West, Govinda remarks: "The East gains by a constantly renewed 'concentric attack', by moving in ever decreasing
circles towards the object, many-sided, i.e. multi-dimensional impression formed from the sum-total or the intergrating superimposition of single impressions from different points of view - until in the last, conceptually no longer intelligible, stage of this concentric approach, the experiencing subject becomes one with the object of contemplation. Out of this experience the symbol, the directing sign (comparable to the symbolic language of mathematics) and the self-transcending paradox is born" 69 ("Logic and Symbol in the Multi-dimensional Conception of the Universe", L. A. Govinda, 'The Middle Way', Vol. 36, No. 4). And this is certainly one way to describe what we would argue to be Upanisadic practice.

I want now simply to illustrate the logical richness I have claimed the Upanisads to have by discussing a group of Upanisadic notions. I hope in this way to show the terms dealt with in the hierarchical systems we will discuss, not to be, as they may seem, descriptive-language, but languages which express a certain metaphysic intending to evoke a certain understanding, the ultimate aspect of which being that the Ultimate cannot be described. It is not of course true to say, as many do, that the Ultimate cannot be talked about - for this is precisely what we are doing now, and precisely what the Upanisads have done; it is merely the case that certain ways of talking (namely, descriptive ways) cannot be employed of the Ultimate.

Book 7 of Chāndogya opens with a request from Narada to be taught by the sage Sanatkumara, to which the Rsi replies: "Please tell me what you already know. Then I shall tell you what is beyond" 70 (Swami Nikhilananda; op. cit., p. 336). And this reference to 'what is beyond' or, in the Shree Purohit: Yeats translation, 'above', is a reference to
'higher' wisdom which (in our terms) demands for its expression a language whose logic is a 'transfiguration' of the logic of languages expressing 'lesser' wisdom. The 'higher', in other words, more adequately gives voice to our knowledge of the Ultimate than the 'lesser'. In Buber's language 'I-Thou' can only be spoken with the whole being", whereas 'I-It' can never be spoken with the whole being". There are, for Buber, two basic ways of talking - 'I-It', the logic of which is 'transfigured' when it becomes 'I-Thou'.

By contrast, Chāndogya speaks of sixteen such languages, each one of which is said to be 'above' and 'beyond' all of its predecessors: in Govinda's words "it incorporates them into a higher system of relations" (op. cit., p. 155). The sixteen are these:

1. name (nāma)
2. speech (vāc)
3. mind (manas)
4. will (sāmkalpa)
5. thought (citta) i.e. 'mind's mother substance' (Parohit: Yeats) which could be rendered 'consciousness'.
6. meditation (dhyāna)
7. wisdom or understanding (vijnāna)
8. power or strength (bala)
9. food (anna)
10. water (āpas)
11. light or heat (tejas)
12. air or space (ākāśa)
13. memory (smars)
14. hope (āśa)
15. 'vital life' or 'that which is the penultimate explanation of movement' (prāna).
16. truth (satya).

And these are such that in each case to understand them entails, but is not entailed by, an understanding of the referent of the terms said to be 'below' or 'beneath'. Each is a word from a language whose singular logic more or less adequately expresses the nature of how things
ultimately are: nāman - the only language of which Narada is at present capable, - representing the least adequate language, and satya, in betokening the most. These are not of course in any way descriptions, but counters in a hierarchic system of logics meant by stages to express the metaphysic such that, all who follow the guru 'through' these stages, 'attain' the Ultimate, i.e. understand the language of satya. Such a person 'becomes an ativadi' (superior speaker) (Swami Nikhilananda; op. cit., p. 344).

But now the question is: how to become an ativadi? And once more Chandogya lists a series of conditions, pertinent to a series of languages - (1) 'to become a ativadi, one must desire so to become. This is the general condition, meant essentially to test Narada's sincerity and good faith. It is nevertheless a sine qua non. And with the sincerity established (to Narada, for, being a rṣi, Sanatkumara could never have been in doubt), the sage proceeds (2) 'when one understands (i.e., 'knows') satya, only then does one declare (speak) satya'. In like manner, the 'conditions', (4) 'thinking' presupposes 'faith', (5) 'faith' presupposes 'devotion', (6) 'devotion' presupposes 'action' (i.e. dharma), (7) 'action' presupposes 'happiness' (i.e., 'bliss' = ananda); and ananda presupposes being the Ultimate ('The Infinite', Swami Nikhilananda; 'The Unlimited', Parohit: Yeats; i.e., Brahman).

In this way, once again a series of more or less complex languages are interwoven to achieve, in the hearer, a 'knowledge' which amounts to union with the Ultimate.

In such a fashion do the Upanisads (cf. Taittirīya; Book 3;
Katha 1:210-11; 2:3:4-8; virtually the entire Aitareya) display a
galaxy of languages, through which shine a network of logics, by means
of which the firmament of its teaching is shown forth.
Introduction: I want now to demonstrate how the shape I have argued to be the shape of Buber's metaphysic of 'the person', can be shown also to be a viable way of illustrating, at least in broad outline, the doctrine of personality embodied in the older, canonical Upanisads. In this way, the similarities will, I trust, speak for themselves. The wider metaphysic and the wider ontology will not concern us here. Whilst I will in this section confine myself to the Upanisads, it will be occasionally necessary to mention parts of the argument which, I trust, already has found clear statement. In this way, the interests of coherent presentation will best be served.

It would not, I think, be too bold to affirm the central intention of the thirteen older Upanisads, for it is the content of these with which we will be dealing, to be the expression of an adequate philosophy of 'the person'. For the major concern is clearly to drive home the single theme that Atman is Brahman - that is, that the proper and only finally adequate referent of person-talk is that which is referred to by the term 'Brahman'. "The fundamental doctrines of the Upanisads" says S. C. Chakravarti, "may be summed up as follows: the Self in man is Brahman, and Brahman is therefore the one ultimate reality; the world is real; it cannot be unreal, because it emanated from Brahman, the Truth of the true; that the object of the Upanisads is to impart right knowledge, by means of which Atman would be found identical with
Brahman." (The Philosophy of the Upanisads; Chakravarti; p. 160)

Indeed, says M. P. Pandit, speaking of the aim of Upaniṣadic thought, "To acquire knowledge of the Truth of the Self, to realize one's identity with the utter Self is the one constant preoccupation." (The Upanisads; M. P. Pandit; p. 33).

"This is the ideal placed before man by the Rishis of the Upanisads. There is a Reality from which all derive their existence and significance; all are self-expressions or becomeings of Something which is their Source and End. They call It Brahman, they call It the Self; and they declare that it is possible for man to arrive at a realization of his oneness with this Reality. All life is a preparation, conscious or unconscious, for this endeavour which is indeed the highest and noblest purpose to which one's life could be yoked." (op. cit.; M. P. Pandit; p. 33) A simpler and more succinct expression of our claims would be difficult to find: for Pandit has at once outlined most essentials of the person-philosophy of which we are talking, and also stressed this "philosophy" as central to Upaniṣadic intentions. And when he further remarks in another work that, "To realise one's identity with the Self within is to find one's unity with all other fellow-beings, for the Self of one is also the Self of the other and of all." (Mystic Approach to the Veda and the Upanishads; M. P. Pandit; p. 133), he sounds yet a further phrase of the dominant theme and "constant preoccupation" of which we have spoken.

Perhaps no words better illustrate this "preoccupation" than these from Brhadāranyaka:
Verily, in the beginning this was Brahman. It knew itself only as 'I am Brahman'. Therefore it became all. And whoever among the gods became awakened to this - he indeed became that. And the same was the case with Rishis, the same with men. . . . Whoever knows 'I am Brahman', he becomes all. Even the gods cannot prevent his becoming this, for he himself has become their Self. (Brhadāranyaka Upanisad; 1:4:7; The Upanishads; tr. D. S. Sarma)

As the spider moves along its threads, and as from a fire tiny sparks fly in all directions, even so from this Self come forth all organs (prāna), all worlds, all deities and all beings. Its mystic name (upanisad) is 'the Truth of truth' (satyasya satya). The senses (prāna) are the truth and the Self is the Truth of truth. (op. cit., 2:1:20; Sarma)

The constantly recurring Upanisadic dogma I have here striven to demonstrate might, for simplicity, finally be placed in the following syllogistic form:

i) the self (atman) is Brahman

ii) Brahman is 'all there is'.

Hence: the self (atman) is 'all there is'.

In other words, the ultimate referent of personal pronouns used reflexively, is identical with the ultimate referent of personal pronouns, however they be used, as well as the ultimate referent of all referring expressions whatsoever. Hence, any adequate statement given the nature of personality must amount to an adequate expression of "the Truth of truth".

And it is with this point - that the ultimate referent of person-talk is Brahman - that we begin the argument as I intend, for our purposes, to illustrate it from the Upanisads.

Note on Method:

(1) Transliteration: My convention in what small trans-
iteration I will do, shall be to abide as closely to the Sanskrit original as possible. I will therefore try to retain the original pointing, rather than convert all signs and ciphers into English letters - 'Upanisads' rather than 'Upanishads'; 'rsis' and not 'rishis'; to mention the two most common examples. This will be my convention, with one important exception. In quoting, I will copy precisely as before me. I assume all authors to have their reasons for their own conventions; and these reasons I will seek always to respect.

(2) Translations: I will draw quite heavily on a little known, and sadly eclectic translation of D. S. Sarma, which seems to me to hold, not merely the most readable English of all translations I have consulted, but often the most adequate translation as well. It does, moreover, supply the devanagari script of all passages rendered, and though I will nowhere attempt my own translation, I will place in brackets the English transliteration of a devanagari word or phrase when (a) the translation seems to be to do poor justice to these words or phrases, or (b) the mention of a Sanskrit phrase seems to add helpful atmosphere of understanding.

I feel sure the reason for the relative obscurity of this volume can be traced to two facts: first, that the volume has, to my knowledge, appeared only in India, and second, that even here it emerged as an anthologized selection between paper-covers.

(3) General: This chapter is in two-parts, titled respectively:
(i) That Atman is Brahman; (ii) On the Nature of Brahman. The second chapter of this section, and the fourth chapter of the thesis, will be discussion of implications flowing from these two parts.
That Atman is Brahman: "The Self", says Brhadāraṇyaka, "is indeed Brahman (sa va ayam atma brahma), consisting of knowledge, mind, life, sight, hearing - of earth, water, air, ether (ākāśa), light and no light - of desire and absence of desire, anger and absence of anger, righteousness and absence of righteousness. It consists of all things. This is what is meant by saying that it 'consists of this and consists of that'." (Sarma; op. cit.; Brhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, 4:4:5). A similar quite explicit statement of the doctrine is offered by Taittirīya: "He who knows Brahman which is Reality, (satyam), Knowledge (jnanam), and Infinity (anantam), hidden in the cave of the heart and in the highest akasa - he, being one with the omniscient Brahman, enjoys simultaneously all desires." (Taittirīya Upanisad; 2:1:1; Nikhilananda; op. cit.)

Here, then, Atman is plainly equated with Brahman in direct indicative speech. Taittirīya also talks of Brahman as "in the cave of the heart", or, in the words of Radhakrishnan, "in the secret place of the heart". The Sanskrit word for this phrase is 'guhayam', which strictly speaking means - 'in the secret inner-sanctum of one's person'. Brahman, in other words, is once more affirmed as being in that place wherein resides the ultimate referent of person-talk. Moreover, we find here, both explicitly and by suggestion, many of the important points we will approach in coming sections. For instance, not only is this identity affirmed; it is also proposed as more than merely vacuous, as it would be were one term a mere synonym for the other. We are, in other words, given content for that notion which is here said to be the proper conception of the ultimate referent of person-talk: we are told
what Brahman is.

Also, we find here an example of one of the more important linguistic devices used by the rishis in their instruction - the method which employs the logic of paradox in speaking of Brahman. That Brahman is spoken of, both as 'X' yet 'not-X', indicates the language clearly to be other than descriptive, and to be yet another linguistic device for communicating the understanding or, in Upanisadic terms, "knowledge" (jnana) implicit in Brahman-talk; with, on this occasion, the special intention of showing a certain kind of language - namely, the language of description - to be precluded. But this once more is a premature glimpse at sections of the argument yet to come.

In slightly less explicit words, Brhadaranyakopanisad goes on:

'He who consists of knowledge among the senses, he is verily the great unborn self (mahan aja atma). In the space within the heart lies the controller of all, the lord of all, the ruler of all. He does not become greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works. He is the bank which serves as a boundary to keep the different worlds apart. Him the Brahmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, by gifts, by penance, by fasting. On knowing him only, one becomes an ascetic. Desiring him only as their world, mendicants leave their homes. It is because they know this that the sages of old did not wish for offspring. What shall we do with offspring, they said - we who have attained this Self, this World? And they, having risen above the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, the desire for worlds, wander about as mendicants. For the desire for sons is the desire for wealth, and the desire for wealth is the desire for worlds. Both these are indeed desires only.' (Brhadaranyak Upansad; 4:4:22; Sarma; op. cit.)

Once more the doctrine of this identity forms the centre of instruction; though this time, circumspectly as the assumed truth underlying a eulogy upon the supreme worth of the quest for knowledge of this
identity. 4:5:6 of this same Upanishad holds an even more explicit statement of the worth of this quest. Yajnavalkya is in dialogue with his wife Maitreyī, whom he instructs with the words - "Lo, verily, not for love of the husband is the husband dear, but for love of the Soul (Ātman) is a husband dear." (Brhadāranyaka 4:5:6; Hume 'The Thirteen Principal Upanishads') This formula is continued through progressive possible candidates for intrinsic worth, each being said to have worth so far as they can be understood to be Ātman. He proceeds through "love of the wife", "love of the sons", "love of the wealth", "love of the cattle", "love of Brahmahood", "love of Kshatrahood", "love of the worlds", "love of the gods", "love of the Vedas", "love of beings (bhūta)", "love of all": till finally he concludes - "Lo, verily, it is the Soul (Ātman) that should be seen, that should be hearkened to, that should be thought on, that should be pondered on, O Maitreyī.

Lo, verily, in the Soul's being seen, hearkened to, thought on, understood, this world-all (sarvam) is known." (op. cit., 4:5:6)

And the reasoning upon which this claim to paramount value is made is obvious. Supreme worth rests with the quest for knowledge (jñāna) of the ultimate referent of person-talk, for this amounts to knowledge of, which can be no less than union with, Brahman. Knowing Brahman entails being Brahman - that is, entails indwelling satyasya satyam. This awareness which, the Upanisads teach of as "turiya", the fourth or transcendental mode of awareness, Mandukyopanisad talks of as:
That which does not cognize either internal objects or external objects, which is not a mass of cognition, which is neither cognitive nor non-cognitive - that which cannot be seen, which cannot be described, which cannot be grasped, which has no distinctive marks, which cannot be thought of, which cannot be designated, - that of which the essence is the knowledge of the oneness of the Self, that in which the world ceases to exist - the peaceful, the benign, the non-dual - such they think is the fourth quarter. That is the Atman. That is to be known. (Mandukya; 7; Sarma; op. cit.)

And here, the need to approach this knowledge is forcefully advanced in words meant to allow satyasya satyam to shine clear in its own light. For these words are an expression of that mode of being which cannot be an object for itself, which cannot be spoken of descriptively, words about a 'Thou' which can never be an 'It': and they make the point that - indwelling satyasya satyam means being that which is Real. This, then, is the final vindication of the claim to paramount worth - that acquiring the knowledge here spoken of amounts to indwelling that which is irreducibly 'real'. Hence, the quest for self-knowledge gives rise to the conclusion that the ultimate referent of self-language is, 'that which is the ultimate explanation of all that is'; or, to put this latter phrase in different words, that which most properly deserves the epithet 'real'. "Therefore, he who knows it as such, having become calm, self-controlled, withdrawn, patient and collected, sees the Self in his own self, sees all in the Self. Evil does not overcome him, he overcomes all evil. Evil does not burn him, he burns all evil. Free from evil, free from taint, free from doubt he becomes a true knower of Brahman." (Brhadaranyaka; 4:4:23; Sarma; op. cit.)

Now clearly the quest spoken of is no ordinary quest; it clearly differs in kind from searches which occur in the world, for in wordly
searches, there is always an object to be found which differs from the finder. Yet quite the converse is true of the search for one's self, or for knowledge of the ultimate referent of self(person)-language. For the quasi-paradoxical fact about this search is that the seeker coincides exactly with the object of the search. And when Mundaka 2:2:4 uses the image of an arrow which is one with its target, the oddity of this search is beautifully expressed - for the point is precisely that the self, thought of as 'seeker' is like the arrow, thought of as in flight, whilst the self, thought of as the sought-for ultimate referent of person-talk is like the target aimed at. Hence, to wakefully recognize the ultimate referent sought for as the truth about the seeker, is to recognize that the arrow and target are one. But again, this is a note added for clarity, the essential point of which will be dealt with in more detail later.

With these textual evidences, I have briefly sketched the meaning of the maxim which heads this section - that the ultimate referent of person-talk is that which is meant by the word 'Brahman'. Yet, I have scarcely either argued, or seen but traces of argument for this supposed "identity". This is for good reason; and when Dasgupta remarks that "the Upanishads do not represent so much a conceptual system of philosophy as visions of the seers who are possessed by the spirit of this Brahman" (S. Dasgupta; 'A History of Indian Philosophy'; vol. 1; p. 48), he speaks of this good reason. "The Upanisadic doctrine of unity, it cannot be too strongly insisted, is not a mere metaphysical speculation; it is a liberating gospel." (K. N. Rawson; 'The Katha Upanisad'; p. 26) In other words, the Upanisads are manuals of spiritual
instruction, not tomes of discursive thought; and later, we shall delve further into this. For the nonce, our point is this: that in a sense, the claim in question would seem rather the end that any beginning to Upaniṣadic teaching. For the "knowledge" which is here spoken of, the "knowledge" which is indwelling satyasya satyam, the "knowledge" which is the meaning of this "Message of Identity", is that which the Upaniṣads seek to impress as the ultimate conclusion of their argument. One might therefore expect this "Message" to conclude our argument, not to be its introductory axiom. However, even were the Upaniṣads other than "the results, not of a logical but of a poetic approach to Reality" (Sarma; op. cit., p. 1), there is clear reason why, if this maxim can be accepted at all, it must be affirmable at the outset. And it is for these good reasons I now wish to argue; that is, I now want to demonstrate the limits to which argument can go in supporting the claims of this "Message", and show precisely what such "support" would amount to.

Firstly, the maxim is by no means simply put as axiomatic; though it is affirmed as the undoubted experience of the rśis responsible for the teaching. "I am the mover of the tree (of the universe). My fame rises high like a mountain peak. My root is the supremely pure (Brahman). I am the unstained essence of the Self, like the (nectar of) immortality that resides in the Sun. I am the brightest treasure. I am the shining wisdom. I am immortal and undecaying."

Thus did Trisanku proclaim after the attainment of the Knowledge (of the Self)." (Taittirīya; 1:10:1; Nikhilananda; op. cit.; c.f also Brhadāranyaka 1:4:10) The words used here are an expression of the "indwelling" we are speaking of, and no longer the utterance of any
individual. Throughout, the reflexive pronoun is used to refer to the Ultimate, to the ultimate referent of person-language.

Now, as the enlightening occasion of the rṣis, an awareness of the identity in question can be thought of as the underlying fact which inspires this teaching to commence; for it certainly would prove impossible, without the prior establishment of this awareness in the heart of the teacher. If we think in this way, of the human occasion of the teaching as distinct from the logical fabric of the doctrine itself, the identity of Atman and Brahman can be said to be the start and not the end of instruction - since a firm placement in the soul of the mentor (guru) is a sine qua non of its commencement.

Nevertheless, the scriptures are laced with what I have termed, a multi-logic system. In this way do they endeavour to speak about the many, at least apparently, real phases through which a being aspiring to self-knowledge must pass to achieve the ultimate understanding expressed in statement about the identity in question. By this multi-logic system, I mean the many ways in which it is possible to talk about how things are, and especially how it is with one as a person. Each of these ways has a logic in some part unique to it; and as they appear in the Upanisads, they express a kind of order, symbolizing their greater or lesser adequacy as languages purporting, that is, to be about the ultimate referent of person-talk. And the claim is always that those who earnestly seek to understand the nature of this ultimate referent, will always be given to know this as what is meant by 'The Ultimate', 'The Infinite', 'The All Embracing' - as, that is, what is meant by 'Brahman'. There is, therefore, even within Upanisadic teaching, a
logical development such that, of any series of languages pretending to talk about reality, or of any series of understandings more or less adequate to reality, 'Atman is Brahman' - language, or the understanding expressed by it, is always final and ultimate. And to call it final and ultimate, is to say that its logic adequately accommodates everything expressed in all other languages, as well as the singular understanding expressed in its own, without itself being accommodated by any of them.

So then, it remains clear that, so far as the "knowledge" of this identity is founded upon the experience of its teaching, the teaching is based on empirical fact. Now though the suggestion is that, in fact, such will always prove the case for seekers pure in heart, that such beings will always be subject to such an experience, the doctrine neither is, nor need be, left merely there. For the claim is also that such must always prove the case - viz., that not only can every other alternative be shown to be less than adequate, but, when the language of the teaching is properly grasped, these claims (and centrally the claim to the identity in question) must be seen to be true; must be seen to bespeak satyasya satyam. Put in other words, the quest is the nature of the referent of person-talk; and when the claims of alternatives are critically examined, none will suffice but this one, which, merely to understand is to recognize as true. We can therefore demonstrate the truth of this identity-statement with a piece of clear-headed reasoning, relating to an analysis of language. For, if this statement is true, that we should arrive at its truth through a piece of reasoned analysis is a necessary corollary of it. The simple point is, that the ultimate referent of personal pronouns is Brahman, and not that the being referred
to by such pronouns becomes Brahman by certain empirical moves. At best, he may, in such moves, come wakefully to understand that he is Brahman. Yoga, in other words, changes merely the content of a being's wakeful awareness, and never the referent of person-talk about that being. "Brahman is not grasped by the eye, nor by speech, nor by the other senses, nor by penance or good works. A man becomes pure through serenity of intellect; thereupon, in meditation, he beholds Him who is without parts." (Mundaka; 3:1:8; Nikhilananda; op. cit.). In his commentary upon these words, Sankara puts the point even more clearly:

The buddhi of every man is by nature pure, like a clean mirror of water, and therefore capable of Self-knowledge. But, being polluted by attachment to external objects, it becomes unclean, like a stained mirror or like muddy water. That is why the buddhi does not know Atman, which is the immost Self of all. But when the taint caused by attachment and desire is removed, then the buddhi becomes clear and serene, like a clean mirror and clear water. Through the pure intellect one realizes Atman. (quoted, Nikhilananda; op. cit., p. 117, footnote)

The claim is, then, that personal pronouns refer to Brahman, that their meaning or use is so to refer. It is, therefore, a claim about the logic of language, and no longer an empirical one. Now at this point, the term 'Brahman' simply means - 'whatsoever understanding is ultimate! Hence, at this point, that these pronouns so refer cannot be denied, since, to this point, the argument is analytic. 'Brahman' is merely a synonym for 'ultimate referent'. So far as this is true, merely to understand the language of the point at issue is to recognize its validity. But clearly, more must be said to rescue this conclusion from vacuity. And of course, more has been said.

As we have remarked, the Upanisads certainly do give more
than a vacuous content to this identity statement. They do affirm 'Brahman' to have a meaning which differs from the meaning of terms about isolated egos or individuals.

Now, statements about ultimate reality suffer from a peculiar malady - when they are true, they can be understood, and hence sensibly stated, only by those who already know their truth, and who therefore have no cause to investigate their claims. Hence, true statements about ultimate reality need investigation only by those who cannot do so. To expand this point a little: no one who is ignorant of the nature of ultimate reality can be broken from this ignorance by discursive argument, for such a being would be utterly incapable of grasping the logical lineaments of any language in which such argument might feasibly be clothed. It therefore follows, if any statement about ultimate reality is true, only he who understands the language of its expression will know so, for he alone will have been witness to its truth; hence, the mere possibility of comprehending talk about the ultimate validates the claims of this talk. To reiterate - if these claims can be investigated, they are self-evident, so need not be; if they cannot, they have fallen on minds whose ignorance precisely, and only, does need their scrutiny. "If you only know that God is", says R. D. Ranade, "then alone is God realized by you". (R. D. Ranade; 'A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy'; p. 340)

There is of course no dilemma here, for the point is, these claims always can be investigated: 'the 'ignorant mind' I have spoken of is, in other words, a quite impossible theoretical abstraction, since no
mind at all. I have stated the situation in this way merely the more sharply to establish the place of sruti, that is, of revelation. For, to "investigate" these claims will not be to 'find something out', but to in some sense, clarify what is already known, through being revealed.

And there is perhaps some such reasoning as this behind the Upanisadic method of seldom doing more than stating the various multi-logic systems - for once they are put in words, that they express ever more adequate ways to talk about personality, either is self-evident, or beyond credence. Kenopanisad remarks that "He (the supreme Brahman) does not approach the eye, or speech, or mind. We do not recognize (Brahman as anything perceptible); therefore we do not know how to teach him (his nature to a disciple)." (Kena; 1:3; Roer translation with Sankara bhasya; vol. 1). Indeed, "Atman", says Katha, "is subtler than the sublest, and not to be known through argument." (Katha; 1:2:8; Nikhilananda; op. cit.). The overriding intention of Upanisadic methods of instruction must, therefore, be to draw into wakeful awareness that which already is known. This thought in itself ought to give one pause about assuming these or any scriptures to be works in systematic philosophy.

Finally, my argument has not proven the equation in question, because it has not looked sufficiently at what meaning is given to 'Brahman' which purports to overcome any suggestion of vacuity about the conclusion. This I will now endeavour to do.

(ii) On the Nature of Brahman: We have now seen the nature of the argument that, to understand Brahman-talk means 'knowing' Brahman, which in turn means being Brahman. But this will make little sense until
some content has been given to the word itself; until, that is, some independent meaning has been given to the cipher 'Brahman', such that its use can be distinguished from the uses of those words with which it has been equated. I have implicitly distinguished it from linguistic devices - such as any idiosyncratic use of the reflexive pronoun - which can apply only in one case, whose referring use is isolated to one situation among others; for the referent of this word, we have said, paraphrasing Upanisadic teaching, is - 'all there is'.

But this I have merely said, by way of using shorthand for Upanisadic teaching. It has not been argued. The argument sofar has reached this point: that, so far as satyasya satyam is merely a synonym for 'the ultimate referent of person-talk', then any comprehension of the meaning of this phrase amounts to the recognition that its referent is the ultimate referent of person-talk. It therefore remains, both to expose Upanisadic teaching upon the nature of this referent, and to question whether this latter does amount to the ultimate referent in question.

In this section, I shall firstly seek out this teaching, stressing only its central meaning, and, in the main, bypassing whatsoever detailed devices are used to communicate it, and secondly, partially vindicate the equation affirmed between Brahman-talk and person-talk; between, that is, the referent of these two languages. In the course of this discussion, a natural place will be found to take further my distinction between (i) development, through history, of ideas, and (ii) similar supposed development of revealed truth, between the development of philosophies or metaphysics, and of inspired utterance of
satyasya satyam; between, in other words, smrti and sruti. This elaboration, which falls within the body and not on the outskirts of this section, has been included for these reasons:

(a) to explain the preference for the phrase "Upanisadic teaching" to the more colloquial "Upanisadic philosophy", except where this latter phrase would not obscure the distinction I am making;

(b) to explain why I claim the Upanisads to be a unity, despite undoubted heterogeneity of the literature transmitted to us. To explain, that is, what is meant by the "unity" spoken of - namely, sruti. Hence, however one thinks of 'redactions', glosses', 'recensions', beneath them all must be the single thread of immutable gold, the inspired utterance of satyasya satyam which neither deceives nor alters.

(i) In a tome which bears some relation to its title, 'The Hindu Conception of the Deity', Bharatan Kumarappa traces the Upanisadic doctrine of Brahman from (a) the cosmogonic myth found in Brhadāranyaka 1:4:1-5, to (b) the referring use of words like 'water', 'food' and 'breath' (prāna), which normally are used to indicate natural phenomena. Let us examine this putative development, and Kumarappa's words about it, with this twofold intention: (1) to extract the central meaning of these certainly early deliverances upon the nature of the referent in question; or, to speak with a poetic licence I shall borrow from time to time, certainly early names of Brahman;

(2) to introduce discussion of sruti versus philosophy.

Kumarappa begins with the assurance that the Brhadāranyaka myth of creation, which likely supplies the earliest names for Brahman,
is no better than "crude anthropomorphism". From thence, he continues, "we rise to a distinctively higher level of philosophical thought", when we progress "to explanations in terms of natural phenomena" - viz, water, food and breath (or, wind). These explanations, he says, arose "precisely because these are absolutely essential to human life". (all quotations from, B. Kumarappa; op. cit., p. 3). Now clearly, certain assumptions are at work here, most glaringly that the Upanisadic rsis were attempting to present some kind of "philosophical thought". That this is a false way to approach these or any scriptures will, I hope, be clear from examination of the more basic assumption which Kumarappa has imposed upon the literature, therewith to sift it accordingly - namely, the Western myth of 'progress'. By this I mean, the Western assumption that all movement forward in time amounts to advancement, coupled perhaps with, or even implied by, the Christian notion of 'progressive revelation'.

It may be true, and shortly I will argue that in a way it is true, that "Whether the ultimately real is conceived of as Water, Food, or Breath, it is precisely because these are absolutely essential to human life" (Kumarappa; op. cit., 5); but to view the relation between (a) and (b) as "crude anthropomorphism" improved upon by "higher...philosophical thought", is totally without substance, both in assuming the relation to be of such an order at all, and in assuming any more deep interpretation, necessarily false. Let us now examine the evidences for (a) and (b) in the hope of suggesting some deeper interpretation.

A most beautiful expression is given the myth of creation in Brhadāranyaka 1:4:1-5. an expression which reminds one at once of the opening to Genesis and the first few verses of John's Gospel.
In the beginning this (world) was only the self (ātman), in the shape of a person. Looking around he saw nothing else than the shape of a person. He first said, 'I am'. Therefore arose the name of I. Therefore, even to this day when one is addressed he says first 'This is I' and then speaks whatever other name he may have. He was afraid. Therefore one who is alone is afraid. He, verily, had no delight. Therefore he who is alone has no delight. He desired a second. He became as large as a woman and a man in close embrace. He caused that self to fall in two parts. From that arose husband and wife. Therefore, as Yājñavalkya used to say, this (body) is one half of oneself, like one of the two halves of a split pea. Therefore this space is filled by a wife. He became united with her. From that human beings were produced. (Brhadāraṇyaka, 1:4:1-4; Radharkrishman; op. cit.)

To this, Kumarappa remarks, "Such crude anthropomorphism where the Prime Being is conceived of on the analogy of a man, and the method of creation is regarded on the analogy of animal reproduction, stamps the theory as one of the oldest preserved for us in the Upanishads." (Kumarappa; op. cit., p. 3) But to argue on these grounds only would seem to command such credence as any suggestion that the Fourth Gospel must be a "crude" and "pioneer" work, because it uses the relational implication "with God" (πρὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ) of the Word (λόγος), rather than simply stating outright that "the Word was God" (Θεὸς ἦν ο λόγος). To deem the teaching here enshrined "crude" seems to me absurd. The 'depth' I would argue to be here, I illustrate with but two, quite random, suggested interpretations.

(1) The first manifestation of the Supreme Being was to establish Himself as the referent of the reflexive pronoun: "Therefore arose the name of I" (tato'ham namābhavat). Hence, the suggestion that, whenever the reflexive pronoun is properly used - used, that is, to indicate a person - the Supreme Being is its ultimate referent.
(2) Whatever is predicated of the Supreme Being, is necessarily predictable of any being by whom the reflexive pronoun is properly used. His behaviour is the archetype of what would necessarily be the behaviour of any situation to which person-talk can be applied. "He was afraid. Therefore one who is alone is afraid." "He, verily, had no delight. Therefore he who is alone has no delight." Hence, the ultimate explanation of all rightful movement (dharma) of any situation to which person-talk applies, is that, in illo tempore, the Supreme Being so moved. Hence, to draw forth the central principle here expressed; since influence of the Supreme Being entails His presence (for nothing but the Supreme Being can move as He does), all personal movement is, ultimately, movement of this Being.

I find nothing deserving the epithet "crude" in this. I am not of course suggested the rṣis to have had these interpretations in their minds in expressing themselves as they did; nor even that, had this way of construing their words been put to them, they would have understood the language employed. My suggestion is only that the scriptures are open to such interpretations as can clearly be seen to be of utmost complexity. In plain words: there can be no good reason to deny such 'depth' of the scriptures in question. Nothing, it seems to me, justifies Kumarappa's claim that, "When, however, we pass to a comaratively universal and omnipresent element such as Space as the First Principle, we seem for the first time to pass to the level of abstract thought which has succeeded in dissociating itself from the sensible and the anthropomorphic." (Kumarappa; op. cit., p. 6). The very passage used to support this statement seems alien to its intent - Chandogya 1:9:1, which says,
"What is the goal of this world? He (the sage) replied, 'Space, for all these creatures are produced from space. They return back into space. For space is greater than these. Space is the final goal.' (Chāndogya, 1:9:1; Radhakrishnan.)

And these words are strikingly similar to those used of 'wind' or 'breath' (prāna) in Brhadāranyaka. "Food" say Buitenen, in a summary of Upaniṣadic doctrine, "is the atman's form, for the personal atman, which is prāna, consists in food. Without it the sensory functions of the atman cannot operate; with it, they thrive. Of Brahman's two forms, non-time and time, the time form, too, is a completion of Brahman. This is the Year through which food grows and the creatures originate, live and return. Year is Prajāpati who is Time - food is the nest of Brahman, its self." (J. A. B. van Buitenen; 'The Maitrāyanīya Upaniṣad'; pp. 65-69). In other words, "annas" is but another symbol used to indicate the referent of Brahman-talk to be 'the Ultimate Explanation' or 'source of Absolute Dependence' of all that is. All that exists is sustained by, takes shape, and exists solely because of, both 'annas' and 'prāna' which persist through and are nourished by Time, and which are "the nest of Brahman-its self". I find therefore no grounds to conclude these other than two different ways of effecting the teaching, and of indicating the referent of person-talk to be - the ultimate source of absolute dependence. I see here no evidence whatever of a "first time" move to the vaunted "level of abstract thought".

(b) Kumarappa has argued the next phase in the supposed development of Upaniṣadic "philosophical thought" to be "explanations in terms of natural phenomena", a movement into "the realm of the particular and the sensible" (op. cit., p. 4). First, anthropomorphism; then, a crude form of superior materialism: thus does Kumarappa regard this
development. So let us now look more closely at the textual evidence for
the latter.

Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, agreed by most to be the oldest Upanisad,
introduces the symbols of which Kumarappa is speaking - water, food and
'prāna' - in the following manner:

There was nothing whatsoever here in the beginning. By
death indeed was this covered, or by hunger, for hunger
is indeed death. He created the mind, thinking 'let me
have a self' (atman). Then he moved about, worshipping.
From him, thus worshipping, water was produced. 'Verily',
he thought, 'while I was worshipping, water appeared,
therefore water is called arka (fire). Water surely comes
to one who thus knows the reason why water is called
arpa (fire).98 (Brhadaranyaka; Radhakrishnan; op. cit., 1:2:1.)

Indeed, the first word of this Upanisad is the mystic sound, 'AUM',
likely the most elusive and profound symbol employed by the tradition in
referring to Brahma. Chāndogya likewise stresses the importance of this
symbol, devoting much of the first chapter to its exposition. "Om",
says Randade, "is described unanimously in the Upanishads...as not
merely the supreme means of meditation, but the goal to be reached by the
meditation itself. The Om occupies in Indian philosophy the same position
which the Logos occupies in Christology." (R. D. Ranade; op. cit., 333)

But, without entering discussion of this beginning, and returning to the
words I have quoted, the catalogue of names as they appear in order could
be listed as follows:

(1) 'nothing' (nāiveha)
(ii) 'death' (mṛtyu), which is equated to 'hunger' (aśanāya)
(iii) atman, which is linked with 'mind' (manas)
(iv) 'water' (apas), followed by other such concrete symbols,
including 'speech' (vāc; 1:2:4) and 'life-giving breath'
(prāna; 1:2:6).

To this list might be added the symbol of 'food' (anna), about which I
will speak further in a moment, as here by implication, since a necessary part of the meaning of the symbol, 'hunger'. Throughout this early section of Brhadāranyaka, Brahman is personified as he who eats whatever he creates - that is, as that from which all comes forth, and to which, in every sense, all returns. Now this list may be explained in the following way.

'Nothing' is here indicated to mean 'no-thing' or 'non-being' (mrt[yu]), in the sense of 'the non-manifest'; and this is equated with 'a craving for some lack' (aśānava). This latter could be a symbol for 'that which led the unmanifest to make manifest (create)', but I think it more likely to mean the form taken by the Unmanifest in the world, through which its self-revelation is affected. It would in this case mean, 'a craving for non-being (negation of ego-assertion)', that is, indicate and explain the innate yearning for betterment, or that which Gabriel Marcel has well called - "ontological exigence". "The world", says Mātrī 6:12, "was fashioned by Brahman with a desire for food".

As might be expected, the next name to appear in the sequence is a general symbol in terms of which Brahman can be linked with the referent of individual (or, ego)-language - namely, the symbol of such universal-linkage application, ātman. Ātman' is stressed as serving this function, as being a verbal device whose purpose in the teaching is, in part, to perform this universal-linkage operation, through being affirmed a possible name only when it is also possible to speak of 'manas' or 'individual mind'. That is, talk of 'ātman' amounts, in some way, to talk of 'the inner man'. What precisely is this "way", the Upaniṣads will of course proceed to explain.

Only now, having secured the possibility of talking about, by
introducing a language especially for, 'things manifest', are the specific symbols of 'water', 'fire', 'speech' and 'prānas' introduced. There seems to me, therefore, no scriptural sanction to affirm these latter as some kind of crude beginnings from which the earlier members of our list were supposed to have emerged; if anything, the latter, it would seem, were produced, in a manner most profound, from understood expression of the former, which, from the very beginning, were the deliverances of śrutī.

There are of course passages in which 'āpas', 'anna' and 'prāna' appear as symbols for the first principle, and source of all. 'Prāna' appears in this guise throughout the scriptures (instance, Brhadāranyaka 6:1:7-12; Chāndogya 5:1:6-15; Praśna 2:3:4); whilst Brhadāranyaka remarks, "In the beginning this universe was just water. That water produced the true (satyam); Brahman is the true." (Brhadāranyaka; 5:1). And in Taittirīya we find, "From food, verily, are produced whatsoever creatures dwell on the earth. Moreover, by food alone they live. And then also into it they pass at the end. Food, verily, is the eldest born of beings. . . .

Verily, those who worship Brahman as food obtain all food." (Taittirīya; 2:2:1; Radhakrishnan; op. cit.: cf. Taittirīya 3:6-3:10; Maitrī 6:11-12.)

However, there is, first of all, as little to suggest the Brhadāranyaka passage to be a primitive one, removed to a later place in some later recension, as there is to suggest that Taittirīya is, in any sense, witness to an early shape of the teaching. In each case, the utterance belongs, if anywhere, to a later rather than earlier place in the teaching. Secondly, if any commonplace symbols were sought to convey the teaching that Brahman is 'the source of absolute dependence', that is,
'the ground of all Being', none could be more natural than the three mentioned above. Such remains as true today as then, and whilst this may relate to the referent of these symbols being "absolutely essential to human life", it has no bearing whatever on any development in "philosophical thought". These concrete symbols are merely one set of counters (there are others) used to express the ever-recurring theme - that, to talk of 'Brahman' is to talk of 'that from which all comes, upon which all depends, and to which all returns'. And this theme, which sounds eternal, occurs, whether the symbols expressing it are these concrete ones, or the vaunted ones of "abstract thought". Since, therefore, the teaching they seek to impart is the same teaching in each case, there can be little reason to elevate one above the other, and hence little reason to regard one set as historically prior to the other. In each case, the message conveyed carried the same 'depth of soul'.

Much, then, of Kumarappa's form-critical method seems based on the unquestioned axiom of what I have termed - 'the myth of progress'. The critical device of dating a piece of literature according to 'depth of soul' expressed in its theory rests squarely on two assumptions: (a) that we, in the twentieth Christian century of the Western world, know what 'depth of soul' amounts to; (b) that the understanding of man is like a machine which develops at a uniform rate through history. Little evidence supports either assumption. Our world seems to many, peopled by fewer men of wisdom and good-will today, than in many a prior age.

In commenting on the form-critical approach to the dating of Upanisadic literature, R. D. Ranade's opinions well reflect my own. He advances five criteria upon which such criticism has proceeded, only
one of which does he find of significant value. He speaks first of criticism based on language, style, grammar and vocabulary, which he argues to be virtually valueless. No a priori rule can be set for what style, manner of language, etc., any particular author or redactor must have used. Of the traditional criterion, endorsed by Deussen, that prose works are old and works in verse, more recent, he remarks - "This is a gratuitous assumption which, in the light of modern criticism, does not seem to hold much water". (Ranade; op. cit., p. 14) Thirdly, conclusions based on elaboration of detail within the documents, he also dismisses as of limited use; for once more, no a priori judgement can be established.

The question of ideological development, the criterion against a particular case of which we have sallied, is likewise dismissed as of little substance. There is, for instance, absolutely no reason to believe that fundamental doctrine must appear later rather than sooner. Finally, the quoting of one Upanishad by another is, he correctly notes, "the only test which may be regarded as being absolutely definite". (Ranade; op. cit., p. 16). "But this test can have no universal significance, because we find only few definite inter-quotations among the Upanishads." (Ranade; op. cit., p. 16) Hence, very little grounds exist for dogmatism in form-criticism of these, or of any, scriptures.

However, the basic point here is the lack of justice done the logic of language sensibly employing terms about the Ultimate or Supreme Being; for if this logic is adequate, and the language successful (or correct in its claims), if, that is, the language is sensible, the doctrine conveyed by it is one incapable of development - it is śruti, "a divine afflatus springing from within, the result of inspiration through
god-intoxication". (Ranade; op. cit., p. 9). And if this is so, "the Vedas and the Upanisads must, like the basal literature of all other religions, be regarded as having been composed by seers in a state of god-intoxication." (op. cit., p. 10) Let us look a little more closely at this claim.

Firstly, though one cannot deny development through history of, for instance, the verbal garment of the teaching, this bears scarcely at all upon the nature of the body so clad. "For essences do not have a history. Essences do not change. Yet it is an observable and important fact that what have been called religions do, in history, change." (W. C. Smith; 'The Meaning and End of Religion'; p. 130) Even were it the case, as it seems not to be, that earlier Upanisads array themselves in fewer and simpler verbal-garments in talking of the Ultimate, little would thereby be shown about the message in the hearts of these early authors. What variation is to be found need be taken as no more than a measure of the apparel thought to fit the teaching needs of any particular moment. No assumptions about what was known to the rsis can be supported from the mere fact that different symbolic dress is used to transmit this knowledge.

And if talk of 'the Ultimate' makes sense, then that to which such talk adverts cannot change; and if this talk is understood, such understanding cannot possibly be improved upon or subject to any 'development' whatever. At best, its language of expression can alter, adjusting to the shape of changing needs. If the earliest sages were Brahman-knowers and Brahman-sayers, nothing of substance would remain to be known or said.

Yet this is not to repudiate philosophy. The work of the minds of
men upon śruti can lead to more or less adequate thought systems based thereon; and it is perfectly proper to talk of "development" here. But such talk does highlight the danger of philosophy usurping the provenance of religion, of human reason assuming the authority proper only to revealed knowledge (śruti). Inevitably, human reason finds the wisdom of revelation fraught with puzzle; and inevitably, it seeks to resolve this by the drastic measure of excision. It could, I think, be argued that Samkhya arose from a misinterpretation of the Upanisadic doctrines at 'ātman' and 'māya', the former becoming the doctrine of 'multiple purusas', and the latter, that of Prakṛti (as created nature), equal in metaphysical status to such 'purusas'. In Samkhya, "matter", says Deussen, "is as truly real as the soul, and therefore cannot be recognized by the latter as illusion, as in the Vedanta." (Paul Deussen; 'The Philosophy of the Upanishads'; p. 254)

As elsewhere, when reason ousts revelation, the tendency to objectify takes charge. Because 'persons' can be said to be individuals or bounded things, that is, because the word 'person' has a plural sense, that to which 'ātman' refers is said to amount to a series of individual 'purusas'. Because the world can be said to be 'real', because the 'māya' doctrine refers also to bounded things, this referent is said to have an ontic status equal to these 'purusas'. The chief difference, it is said, is that the former alters, whilst the latter does not. And finally, because Reality amounts to the Purusa:Prakṛti dualism, there can be no place for the notion of a further Deity. Assuming this interpretation, Samkhya omits (a) the 'subjectness' of 'ātman' or 'purusa', which renders all individual-language inappropriate; (b) the fact that, speaking of Prakṛti as 'real' is merely a manner of communicating a lesser understanding
of how things are: (c) the recognition of \textit{tad ekam} as a revelation which includes yet transcends both (a) and (b).

As so often, discursive reason has entered merely to objectify the myth; to make 'things' of the meanings of notions which serve in the myth only to voice some element of \textit{sruti}. As so often, things of the mind have overcome those of the heart, in the passion \textit{manas} so often shows for partial glimpses of the truth. "As part of the Veda, the Upanishads belong to \textit{sruti} or revealed literature. They are immortal \textit{sanatana}, timeless. Their truths are said to be breathed out by God or visioned by the seers. They are the utterances of sages who speak out of the fullness of their illumined experience." (Radhakrishnan; 'The Principal Upanishads'; p. 22) In other words, the Upanisads seek, not to convince the mind so much as to touch the heart, and are meant to awaken within the reader or pupil recognition of the \textit{Atman-Brahman} equation, which is the heart of \textit{sruti}. They lay no more-claim to systematic philosophy than does the New Testament to organized Dogmatics.

We have, then, exposed much which bears, both directly and in passing, on the central meaning embodied in these early, nature-symbols for Brahman: and when Kumarappa proclaims these symbols to function as they do, because their natural referents are "absolutely essential to human life", he thus far speaks a likely truth. For to say this need be to affirm no more than their use in the myth to stress the fact of dependence. As names for Brahman, they secure their reference by indicating the notion of (i.e., by 'meaning') - 'that upon which all is ultimately and unconditionally dependent:

(ii) Brahman as 'The Imperishable' (\textit{aksara}): With admirable
simplicity, Brhadāraṇyaka 3:8:11 uses the only other name for Brahman which need detain us in this place. "Verily, that Imperishable (aksara), O Gargi, is unseen but is the seer, is unheard but is the hearer, unthought but is the thinker, unknown but is the knower. There is no other seer but this, there is no other hearer but this, there is no other thinker but this, there is no other knower but this. By this Imperishable O Gargi, is space woven like warp and woof." (Brhadāraṇyaka 3:8:11; Radhakrishnan; op. cit.)

Brahman is once more affirmed as 'that of all-dependence', that is, 'that, the knowing of which, is to know the Ultimate Explanation of all that is'. And, as that, by the knowledge of which all is to be explained and understood, He cannot either be explained or understood in terms of this explanation or understanding. That which is so explained, is explained in His light, because He is known; he cannot therefore be explained in their light. If X is, in every sense, the explanation of Y, Y cannot, in any sense, be the explanation of X. In other words, as explanation of all things, He cannot be a 'thing'. M. P. Pandit puts the same point somewhat differently, when he says - "Itself Infinite, it cannot be the subject of knowledge by the mind and sense which are but finite; similarly, finite speech cannot cover the Infinite." (M. P. Pandit; 'The Upanishads: Gateways of Knowledge'; p. 21)

Now, as there is clearly nothing apart from all that is, the only sense in which Brahman, the Imperishable, can be said to be 'understood', is the sense in which he can, in being known, be said to be - self-luminous. For this reason, He is called, "the light of lights" (jyotisam jyotis) (cf., Brhadāraṇyaka 4:16; Katha 5:15; Mundaka 2:2:9.) Hence, to once
more resolve the ever-recurrent theme, since knowledge of Him cannot admit relation (for relation-language is thing-language), knowing Him must, in some sense, amount to being Him.

Now, other language is, of course, possible, and used, of Brahman. For instance, He is said to be everything (Brhadāranyaka 2:5:18; Taittiriya 2:6; Kaṭha 5:2); He is said to be in everything (Chāndogya 8:6:5; Mundakya 2:1 4 & 9; Śvetāsvatara 1:16; 4:2-3); He is said to be all of value (Brhadāranyaka 1:4:8; 2:4:5) "Brahman" says Kumarappa, "...although unknown in His own essential nature, is as revealed in the universe that which gives significance and value to all things - Himself the most supremely valuable of all." (Kumarappa; op. cit., p. 17) Yet even in such affirmations as these, the central doctrine is patently displayed; once more, the basic teaching is seen to be that 'Brahman' means 'the Ultimate Explanation, upon whom all depends'. These are, in other words, merely further ways to say this very thing.

(iii) Finally, it will be of crucial importance to note how closely what is here argued about the nature of Brahman approaches the way in which philosophers of personality have argued about the nature of a person, as a subject who sees, thinks, knows, feels, loves, etc. In doing this, we will quite naturally be led to the next portion of our argument. There are two arguments of relevance, which might very briefly be worded as follows:

(a) Person (as, subject)-talk entails an 'identity' which persists, despite changes in time. Hence, its ultimate referent cannot be anything which can alter with the passage of time. Hence, it cannot be referring to any bounded thing.
(b) Talk about a 'subject' cannot be talk about an 'object', for an object is that which a subject sees, etc. Could the subject be an object, he could be the object of his own seeing, thinking, loving, etc. This is obvious nonsense, because (i) any object for me as subject would be logically distinct from me as subject. But (ii), the subject I am must needs always be the same, namely, the referent of person-talk about me. That is, subject-talk entails 'inviolable identity'-talk. Hence, as I can never be logically distinct from myself, I can never be my own object. All of which clearly implies— a subject cannot be an object, cannot, that is, be a bounded thing. In the words we have cited elsewhere from Bishop Ian T. Ramsey, "to objectify the subject is to deny ourselves the possibility of ever talking sense." (Ian T. Ramsey; 'Philosophical Quarterly'; vol. 5, no. 20; p. 197)

Now, if this be the case, in adverting to a person as a subject, we can never used language as we do in talking about the physical world which surrounds us. Hence, the referent of person-language is a being who must be spoken of in a way which distinguishes him from the world of bounded things. And without for the present continuing to make any ontological claims, we can at least say about the subject as the Upanisadic author has about Brahman—"verily, that Imperishable, O Gargi, is unseen but is the seer, is unheard but is the hearer, unthought but is the thinker, unkown but is the knower." (Brhadāranyaka 3:8:11)

With this, we have shown that both the subject I am, and Brahman as 'Ultimate Explanation' or 'ground of all Being', are alike in being adequately referred to only in a language which is other than the language which is used, referringly, of things in the world. Both the subject I am
and the Ultimate can be seen to be other than a thing, or any collection of things, in the world. It remains only to show that the ontological claims made for Brahman, the Ultimate, can also be made for the referent of personal pronouns as used in person-talk, and the 'Atman:Brahman' identity will have been demonstrated. In other words, it remains only to show that, "He who dwells in all beings and is within all beings, whom the beings do not know, whose body all beings are, who controls all beings from within - he is your Self (atman), the inner controller, the immortal." (Bṛhadāraṇyaka 3:7:15; Sarma; op. cit.). "As the fire, which is one, entering the world assumes different forms corresponding to different objects, so does the one Self (atman) within all beings assume different forms corresponding to different beings and also exists outside them all." (Katha 2:2:9; Sarma; op. cit.) This remains to be seen.
CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS OF CHAPTER THREE

Chapter I of this section arrived at the conclusion that the central meaning of the word 'Brahman' is 'the Ultimate Explanation of every situation, upon which, in every sense, all depends'. Let us now broach and discuss a number of implications flowing from this conclusion which, with a single notable exception, belong at once to Upanisadic teaching and to the doctrine I have argued central to Buber's thinking. Hence, in illustrating these implications, by quoting from the scripture in question, I shall be illustrating the consistency of this teaching, and spotlighting its links with this 'thinking'. In passing I have briefly mentioned several of these implication-cum-parallels: I now intend more clearly to show them forth.

At the outset of chapter three, I mentioned a certain broad outline, possible of the Upanisadic doctrine of persons, which can be seen to come very close to Buber's teaching on this subject. This chapter will be concerned with this outline, which can first of all be put in the following brief way.

Because 'Brahman' is 'the Ultimate Explanation of all there is', and because, in Upanisadic teaching, the ultimate referent of person-talk (ātman) is Brahman, the following statements are true.

(i) 'Ātman-Brahman'-talk is 'non-descriptive'-talk; or, in Buber's terms, God "may properly only be addressed, not expressed". (Buber; 'I and Thou'; p. 81)
(ii) Speaking of a person as a bounded-individual, or, in Buber's terms, the referent of 'I-It'-language, is less than adequate.

(iii) A person is 'born', or, in Buber's terms, an "inborn Thou", not manufactured.

(iv) Self-knowledge is the shift from pre-wakeful awareness to wakeful awareness of what is already somehow 'known', and self-development is discovery, or, in Buber's terms, realizing one's "inborn Thou".

(v) 'Person-knowing'-language is non-relational. There is of course no parallel in Buber's thought to this statement, against which he expends much energy in arguing.

I want now to look at each of these in detail.

(i) That 'Atman-Brahman'-talk is 'non-descriptive'-talk: I concluded the last chapter with this statement: "both the subject I am, and Brahman as 'Ultimate Explanation' or 'ground of all Being', are alike in being adequately referred to only in a language which is other than the language which is used, referringly, of things in the world". In otherwords, both Brahman and the ultimate referent of person-talk must be spoken of in a language which is non-descriptive. Put in Buber's language, neither the "inborn Thou", nor the "Eternal Thou" can ever be an 'It'; both must be spoken of in non-thing terms, in terms which are non-descriptive. "When Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing for his object. For where there is a thing there is another thing. Every It is bounded by others. But when Thou is spoken, there is no thing. Thou has no bounds" (Martin Buber; 'I and Thou'; p. 4).

Hence, it follows that, since language used of Brahman, of the
referent of personal pronouns, of 'Thou', cannot be language predating positive characteristics, it will be language which, in one way or another, specifically denies positive characterisation. It will therefore be (a) a form of negative characterisation, a form of apophatic utterance, such as we find repeatedly among Christian theologians of Eastern Orthodoxy, or (b) a manner of qualified positive utterance which performs the kind of verbal rite I have spoken of, which, that is, serves to lead the learner to 'Brahma-jñāna'. "Brahman", declares K. S. Murty, "can never be described but can only be shown somehow approximately... While no description is possible of Brahman, the task of the Vedanta is to teach about it, and so logically speaking it is an impropriety; but only in this way can the Vedanta emphasize the mystery of Brahman, which eludes all objective language; and yet it can be dealt with only in that way if Brahman has to be talked about intelligibly. While thus to talk of Brahman is a verbal impropriety, this impropriety is mitigated by means of qualifying epithets, which attempt to reduce of remove the spatiotemporal elements in experience, by either enlarging our conception or narrowing it down". (K. S. Murty; 'Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedanta'; p. 57).

And though I see little reason to term this "a verbal impropriety", it being, to my mind, a quite proper linguistic device, equal in status though different from others, though, that is, there seems little reason to downgrade any language-use for failing to satisfy the canons of any other, Murty has well put the point at issue. Bishop Ian T. Ramsey, to whom Murty admits his debt, and from whom he has likely borrowed this notion, in arguing religious language to "be constructed from object language which has been given appropriately strange qualifications."
I. T. Ramsey; 'Religious Language'; p. 3), illustrates his meaning with phrases like 'First cause', 'Infinitely wise', 'Infinitely good', 'creation ex nihilo', 'eternal purpose', where the underscored words are the qualifiers. These and similar phrases, which Ramsey calls "qualified models", are those whereby God, the Supreme Being, the Ultimate, is spoken of. And when the Upaniṣads speak of Brahman as satyasya satyam or jyotisam jyotis, it speaks as the Christian and Semitic traditions do in using the phrases 'Infinitely wise' and 'Infinitely good' of the Deity. Similarly, when they talk of anas, annas or prāna as the irreducibly primal substance, origin of creation, then their idiom parallels that of these traditions when they use the phrase 'first cause' as a name for, or the phrase 'creation ex nihilo' as words about the movement of, the Deity. As we have seen "food is the nest of Brahman, its self" (Buitenen; op. cit., p. 69), a "self" which has neither beginning nor end, neither is created nor uncreated, which neither has features nor is featureless.

Nevertheless, though, as above, the Upaniṣads do occasionally speak only in "qualified model" terms, most places where the doctrine of Brahman's indescribability is voiced display both this idiom and the above apophatic one. The clearest statement, of course, of the apophatic understanding is Yājñavalkya's formula in Brhadāranyaka - 'neti, neti' (not this, not this). In the second half of Brhadāranyaka 4:5:15, the first half of which will be looked to in our next section - that 'bounded-individuals'-talk is inadequate to persons - Yājñavalkya has these words:

"That self (ātman) is (to be described as) not this, not this. He is incomprehensible for he cannot be comprehended. He is indestructible for He cannot be destroyed. He is unattached for He does not attach himself. He is unfettered, He does not suffer, He is
not injured. Indeed, by what would one know the knower? Thus you have the instruction given to you, O Maitreyi. Such, verily, is life eternal (amrtatvam). (Brhadāranyaka, 4:5:15; Radhakrishnan; op. cit.)

Amrtatvam, which stems from 'amṛta' meaning 'not-dead', and hence means 'non-death', is a qualified model phrase. The predicate 'is non-death' makes no sense, unless understood as a form of the verbal rite we have spoken of. The usual English equivalents of this phrase, namely 'im-mortal' or 'life eternal', are clearly not about those things of which we can sensibly predicate 'life' or 'mortality', and serve merely to indicate that their referent, is at once linked to these 'things' as their Ultimate Source and Unconditional Sustainer, yet also in some way above them; language about Him is affirmed to be of a logic which encompasses, without being encompassed by, the logic of language about these things.

The rest of this passage contains reference to Him by denial of the applicability of certain positive attributes. An even more patent example of this denial is found in 3:8:8 of this same Upanisad, where Yajñavalkya is addressing Gargi:

The knowers of Brahman, O Gargi, call that the Imperishable. It is neither gross nor fine, neither short nor long, neither glowing red (like fire) nor adhering (like water); it is without a shadow and without darkness, without air and without space, without attachment, taste or smell; without eyes, without voice, without mind, without vigour, without breath, without a mouth, without a measure, and without an inside or an outside. It consumes nothing and no one consumes it. (Brhadāranyaka, 3:8:8; Sarma; op. cit.)

All that can be affirmed of things in the world is here denied of that which is the Ultimate Source and Explanation of these things — in other words, the use of such affirmative language as adequate in talk of this Ultimate is denied.
Similarly, suggestions of both kinds of idiom are found in these beautiful and succinct words from *Katha*:

"That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay and likewise without taste, without change, (anantam), without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the great, and ever-abiding - by realising it one is freed from the jaws of death. (i.e. one attains amrtatvam) (*Katha*, 1:3:15; Sarma; op. cit.)"

"The atman", says Radhakrishnan, commenting on this passage, "is not an object of any sort, but is the eternal subject". (Radhakrishnan; op. cit., p. 629). Finally, an even more notable instance of these idioms interwoven is given in *Mundaka*:

"That which cannot be seen or grasped, which has neither origin nor properties, which has neither eyes, nor ears, neither hands nor feet, which is eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent and extremely subtle - that is the Imperishable which the sages regard as the source of all things." (Mundakaopanisad, 1:1:6; Sarma, op. cit.)

Another, slightly less direct method of indicating the necessarily non-descriptive nature of language about Brahman, is the Upanisadic method of teaching through paradox, of seemingly predicating contradictories of the referent of this language. The intention here is to indicate that what is meant by 'Brahman' is no more adequately conveyed by 'X' (any descriptive phrase) than by 'not-X' (the negation of that descriptive phrase); that the logic of Brahman-language is of quite another order than the logic of 'thing'-language. Thus we find in *Kathopanisad*:

"Though sitting still he travels far, though lying down he goes everywhere. Who, except myself is able to know that God (*deva*) who is both joyful and joyless?" (*Katha*, 1:2:21; Sarma; op. cit.)

Or again, in *Isa*:

"The Self is unmoving, indivisible; it is swifter than thought. The senses never reach it, as it is ever ahead of them. Though standing still, it outstrips
those who run. And in it does the moving spirit support the activities of man.

It moves and it moves not; it is far and likewise near. It is inside of all this, and it is outside of all this.\textsuperscript{12}(\textsuperscript{2} Isa, 4-5; Sarma; \textit{op. cit.})

A slightly different use of the paradox-method, whose force, however, derives from the same principle (viz. that Brahman is essentially non-worldly), is afforded by the \textit{Kena Upanisad} in these words:

He who does not conceive it - to him it is known. He, who conceives it - he does not really know. It is not really understood by those who understand it; it is really understood by those who do not understand it.\textsuperscript{122} (\textit{Kena}, 2:3; Sarma, \textit{op. cit.})

Part of the edge of paradox is removed by Sarma, who, to more clearly draw forth the meaning, translates 'mata' twice as 'conceive', and 'vijñata' twice as 'really understand'. And there do seem some grounds for this, at least in the second case, where two different terms are used for the verb 'to understand' - "vijñata", which Sarma renders 'really understand'; and "vijñanata", a feminine noun form for which Sarma simply translates, 'understand'. Now, 'vijñata' stands closest to the root from which they mutually stem, which is 'vijña', 'to discern' or 'to understand'; and it is, perhaps, preserving a fine, even lost nuance to dub this the 'proper' use - hence 'understanding proper' or 'really understand'. Whilst the feminine noun form 'vijñanata' does have as one of its meanings a sense parallel to the English word 'cleverness' - hence, 'understanding' in the sense of 'intellectual cleverness'.

But to leave these semantic speculations, and come to the point of the verse; for here, as we have noted, the point of the paradox-method is a slightly different and perhaps more important one. Here, the point of the lesson relates to "knowing" Brahman; and basically, the verse says this - those who imagine this "knowledge" or "understanding" shares any parity with profane or mundane uses of these terms, which entail the
'known' dualism and hence relation and distance, are clearly in error. For Brahman, being at once the Ultimate Explanation of, source of Absolute Dependence upon, and the Ultimate Realness of all that exists, is, as we saw above, "eternal, all-pervading, and omnipresent". Even to suggest there might be 'something' apart from Brahman with which He might relate is either to have misunderstood the language in question, or to speak nonsense. He is jñotisam jñotis, self-luminous. And to 'know' Him is, in some way, to be Him:

"Once Brahman is posited as the supreme self, the problem of its description arises, and then from the Upanisads and our own reasoning we learn that all his concepts, derived from man's experience of objective things in space and time, are inadequate to describe Brahman. But as long as one inquires about Brahman, words have to be used about it; but in order that the limitations of the concepts may be brought out, and the nature of Brahman revealed somehow through this odd and logically inappropriate language, an adhyāropā, i.e. a false attribution, is first made of Brahman, and then an apavada or negation of this is made. (Murty, summarizing Śankara's opinion, op. cit., p. 59).

(ii) That 'bounded-individual'-talk is less than adequate to persons: We have now looked at one implication; and are led to another which relates not merely to Brahman, but also, in an independent way, to persons as subjects. That the Ultimate referent of person-talk (atman) cannot properly be spoken of in 'bounded-individual'-language, follows as a corollary of the fact that subjects are not objects, are not 'things'. To call it a 'corollary' may even be stronger than it merits, for it is, in a sense, merely another way of saying the same thing; which is clear once we transpose the material mode of our former conclusion into a statement about language, thus - that subject-language is not object-language, 'material thing'-language.

Moreover, were we, either to affirm this of Brahman, as Ultimate Explanation, or to assert the conclusion embodied in our first implication
of the ultimate referent of person-talk, this second implication would also be a corollary of our first implication. For, if 'X' cannot be spoken of in descriptive terms, then 'X' cannot be spoken of as we do about bounded individuals. There are therefore two sides to this second implication:

1. that persons cannot be interpreted in 'bounded-individual' terms;
2. that Brahman cannot be interpreted in 'bounded-individual' terms. And this latter, we will see in a moment, leads naturally, indeed, necessarily, to the Maya-doctrine. But to deal briefly with the former first:

"For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the other, one smells the other, one tastes the other, one speaks to the other, one hears the other, one thinks of the other, one touches the other, one knows the other. But where everything has become just one's own self, by what and whom should one see, by what and whom should one smell, by what and whom should one taste, by what and whom should one speak, by what and whom should one think, by what and whom should one touch, by what and whom should one know? By what should one know him by whom all is known?" (Brhad-aranyaka, 4:5:15; Radhakrishnan; op. cit.)

One might find two points here: (1) that the referent of person-language cannot be directly spoken of in individuals-language; and (2) that the referent of person-language is 'tad-ekam', the One Who is Ultimate. And the former, on this occasion, rests upon the shown fact of the latter. In other words, all talk possible of bounded individuals is impossible of "one's own self" ('atma-eva), because the condition endured by this latter precludes all relation - that is, the condition of "one's own self" amounts to the condition of Brahman, is, indeed, equated with Brahman. The reasoning to the first of the above two points is not,
therefore, so much the fact that no subject can be an object, as that the ultimate referent of subject-language is Brahman. It is therefore the case that, whilst this passage appears ostensibly to deal exclusively with the first side of this second implication, it does in reality rely for its reasoning upon the equation of subject-talk with talk about Brahman. The key to this reasoning is in the crucial phrase, "atmaivabhūt", which might be rendered - 'Yet where the whole created world has become one's ātman', a statement in the myth whose metaphysical content might be extracted in these words, 'in that condition where all that is open to the existential qualifier is said to be the ultimate referent of the reflexive pronoun, properly employed'. Here, then, is the ontological claim, yet to be fully examined - the claim that personal pronouns refer to satyasva satyam, that the reality of all there is must be the reality of my person.

So then, as we might expect, in Upanisadic teaching, both sides of this second implication mingle and twine as one, for uppermost is always the intention to convey the one central dogma of Ātman's identity with Brahman. Hence, every pericope asserting the ultimate referent of person-talk to be other than a bounded individual, will likely culminate in the teaching that Brahman also is necessarily other than such a bounded creature. I want now to give two further illustrations of the treatment given by the Upanisads to the implication in question.

Chāndogya 8:7-12 relates an incident between Prajāpati, the Lord of Creation, and hence Master of all that is, and two would-be self-knowers - Indra, esteemed among devas, or gods; and Virocana, high among asuras, or demons (His name, indeed, means 'the radiant one',
and is occasionally used also as a name for Viṣṇu). Prajñāpati's first reply satisfies the Radiant One, who then departs to the sources of evil amongst which he is a spokesman and mentor, to impart the teaching of this first reply - that the proper understanding of the self is the bodily one, bound to transient desire:

"But Indra, even before he returned to the gods, saw this difficulty: "Even as this self is well adorned when the body is well adorned, well dressed when the body is well dressed, well cleaned when the body is well cleaned, it will also be blind if the body is blind, lame if the body is lame, crippled if the body is crippled and will perish in fact as soon as the body perishes. I see no good in this. (nāham atra bhogyampāsyāmī)⁶²⁵ (Chandogya, 8:9:1; Sarma, op. cit.)

The doctrine that the proper and thoroughly adequate understanding of one's person is a bodily one, is that one's person is one's body, brings little satisfaction to Indra, who, voicing an Upanisadic tendency I will shortly criticize, considers the body a garment, bought of this transient world. He is equally dissatisfied with the next two answers - that the true person might either be the dreaming-person, or the person as he is in dreamless sleep. Of the former, he says:

"Even though the Self is not blind when the body is blind, nor lame when the body is lame, though he is not rendered defective by the defects of the body, nor slain when it is slain, nor lamed when it is lamed, yet it is as if they killed him, as if they chased him. He becomes even conscious, as it were, of pain, and even weeps as it were."⁶²⁵ (Chandogya, 8:10:2; Sarma, op. cit.)

And of the person as he is in dreamless sleep, he declares:

"In truth this one does not know himself that 'I am he', nor does he know anything that exists. He is indeed gone to utter annihilation."⁶²⁵ (Chandogya, 8:11:1; Sarma; op. cit.)

As before, he declares of both: "nāham atra bhogyampāsyāmī" - for,
whilst the dreaming-person is (putatively) no more bound by the bonds of the body, he nonetheless continues to suffer and experience the bonds of imperfection; and though the person in dreamless sleep (supposedly) suffers and experiences nothing, he does so at the cost of knowing nothing, of being divorced from everything, and hence being nothing. "Quietistic trance", says Radhakrishnan, interpreting this verse, "is not final freedom". (Radhakrishnan; op. cit., p. 508).

Jivan-mukti, in other words, cannot be mrtyu. Indra's persistence is finally rewarded in these words:

'Bodiless is air, and so are clouds, lightning and thunder - these are all bodiless. Now as these, when they arise from yonder space and reach the highest light, appear each in its own form - even so does that serene being, when he rises up from this body and reaches the highest light, (param jyotir) appear in his own form. He is then the Highest Person (uttamah purusa). He moves about there, laughing, playing; rejoicing with women, chariots or relatives, never remembering the appendage of this body. Like an animal bound to a cart, so is the spirit bound to this body. (Chandogya, 8:12:2-3; Sarma; op. cit.)

Only, then, this fourth, or 'turiya' understanding adequately interprets the nature of personality. And here, once more, two points are to be observed. First, that this 'turiya' understanding is deemed sufficient, exactly because the persons depicted by it is said to be "bodiless" (agarira). And by this is clearly meant "not subject to the conditions of embodiment", which, in Upanisadic terms, means "not bounded", that is - non-individual. But second, once again the "Atman:Brahman" identity is affirmed. For this which is the appearance of one's "own form", the expression of one's true or proper person, is said to be coeval with reaching the "highest light", which can be scarcely other than another reference to Brahman as "the Light of lights" (jyotism jyotis). I look
now to Taittirīya 2:2:7 for another, slightly different example of this same teaching.

Beginning with annas as symbol for the First Principle, stressing the teaching of 'dependence' of which we have spoken, Taittirīya 2 continues with the words: "Verily, different from and within that which consists of the essence of food is the self that consists of life (ātma prānamayas)" (Taittirīya, 2:2:1; Radhakrishnan; op. cit.) These words swiftly take the shape of a repeated formula, which moves hierarchically through "the self consisting of mind" (ātma manomayas), "the self consisting of understanding" (ātma viññāna-mayas), concluding with these words:

"Verily, different from and within that which consists of understanding is the self consisting of bliss. By that this is filled. This, verily, has the form of a person. According to that one's personal form is this one with the form of a person. Pleasure is its head; delight the right side; great delight the left side; bliss the body, Brahman the lower part, the foundation. /28 (Taittirīya, 2:5:1; Radhakrishnan; op. cit.)

In this way does Taittirīya embark upon an ever more adequate hierarchy of understandings or languages regarding the nature of the self, arriving once more at the conclusion that such is of the nature of the supra-mundane, of ānanda', which, we are told by 2:7:1, is one with Brahman. "In ānanda", says Radhakrishnan, "earth touches heaven and is sanctified". (Radhakrishnan; op. cit., p. 547). In ānanda, the world of limits is no more.

From here it is an easy approach to the doctrine expressed by the word 'Māya'; for, whether this doctrine appears in explicit form at an early or a later date, the understanding already adduced of the meaning of 'Brahman' clearly entails the doctrine of 'Māya'. Brahman
has expounded as 'satyasva satya', as the Ultimate Explanation of all that is. Hence, any exposition of the nature of reality which is less than an exposition of the nature of Brahman, is less than adequate; from which it follows that all 'bounded-individual'-language is less than ultimate, is less than an adequate account of the nature in question. Hence, all directly descriptive talk about the world of things falls short of the truth - and that this is the case is expressed in the Upanisads in the doctrine of 'māya'.

Now, at the present stage of the argument, this is true of Brahman alone, and not of the ultimate referent of person-language; because, at this present stage, the ontological ties, central to Upanisadic teaching, which do link this 'ultimate-referent' (ātman) with Brahman have not been seen to be forged. Let us, however, take a brief look at scriptural evidences:

'It is out of this (Being; bhūtam, i.e. Brahman) that the Maker sends forth all these - the Vedas, the sacrifices, the rituals, the observances, the past, the future, and all that the Vedas declare. And it is in this that the other (the soul) is bound up through Maya''.

'Know that Nature (prakṛti) is Maya, and that the wielder of Maya is the Great Lord. This whole world is filled with beings that are parts of Him.' (Śvetāsvatara, 4:9:10; Sarma; op. cit.)

These references do seem to indicate the usual equation of 'Māyā' with 'illusion' to be inadequate. 'Māyā' seems clearly to refer here to the 'capacity' of Brahman to 'create', to initiate that which can be viewed as a world of bounded things, as a world whose language is 'I-It' language. It is, however, quite as clear that so 'viewing' does not befit the true nature of the situation; and illusion enters only when the
"I" so viewing mistakes the understanding he expressed in this language for that which is ultimate and adequate to the true and proper nature of the referent in question. It remains an empirical question whether the viewer does so mistake the truth. In other words, 'Māyā' is a doctrine which can be expressed, though not independent of the possibility of illusion, yet independent of its necessity. The central teaching of 'Māyā' as put forth in the Upaniṣads, has not, therefore, to do with 'illusion', but rather more simply to do with the meaning of 'creation' as applied to Brahman, both as a reference to this 'capacity' to 'create' (Śvetāśvatarā, 4:9; 6:10), and, by an obvious extension, as an epithet for the created world (Śvetāśvatarā, 4:10); for, that is, the referent of 'I-It'-language, whatever its ontic status is thought by the viewer to be.

(iii) Further Implications: Since I intend only to deal briefly with the next three implications, I place them under a single head. Once again, their likeness to Buber's argument and its implications will, I trust, be obvious.

(a) That Persons are 'born', not made: Once more, the Upaniṣadic conclusions to this effect are based, not upon any such independent argument as was advanced earlier in expounding Buber, but upon the dogma, written as indelible fact upon the hearts of its seers, that Ātman is Brahman, that the ultimate referent of person-language is the ultimate explanation of all there is. From this it clearly follows that Ātman cannot be manufactured, or the end product of any factual development. This point is expressed (and earlier argued) in the above locution, meant to indicate the ultimate referent to have no beginning in time, to be, in
Buber's language, without "co-ordination". Upanisadic idiom expresses the same thing by saying he is "unborn" (ajas):

> The knowing Self is never born, nor does it die. It sprang from nothing, and nothing sprang from it. It is unborn (ajas), eternal, everlasting, and primeval. It is not slain when the body is slain.¹³⁰ (Katha, 1:2:18; Sarma; op. cit.)

And Brhadāranyaka 4:4:22 begins, "He that consists of knowledge among the senses, he is verily the great unborn Self (mahan aja atman)" (Sarma; op. cit.) Finally, with one of those brilliant sparks of inspired utterance which virtually embody the entire teaching, the seer declares, "This undemonstrable and constant being can be realised as one only. The self is taintless, beyond space, unborn (aja), great and constant".¹³¹ (Brhadāranyaka, 4:4:20; Radhakrishnan; op. cit.)

(b) That 'the approach to self-knowledge' means 'the approach to wakeful awareness from pre-wakeful awareness' and, that 'self-development' is a process of discovery, not of creation:

These two final implications may be taken as one. Both conclusions have been mentioned in speaking of Buber; that they flow as well, and first of all, from Upanisadic teaching is obvious. For if the 'self' here mentioned is the Ultimate, and if he is 'ajas', he, as the ultimate referent, must be all-knowing. Hence, any approach to knowledge can never be more than movement from the dark of a pre-wakeful consciousness, into the daylight of a wakeful one. "Whoever", says Brhadāranyaka, "has found and has awakened to the self that has entered into this perilous, inaccessible place (the body), he is the maker of the universe, for he is the maker of all. His is the world; indeed he is the world itself".¹³² (Brhadāranyaka, 4:4:13; Radhakrishnan; op. cit.)
This is the great unborn Self (mahān ajātma) who is undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, Brahman. Verily, Brahman is fearless. He who knows this becomes the fearless Brahman. (Bṛhadāranyaka, 4:4:25; Radhakrishnan; op. cit.)

In other words, self-knowing means, awakening to the undying reality of being 'mahān ajātma'. "That eternal (nityam) which rests on the self should be known. Truly there is nothing beyond this to be known. By knowing the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the mover (of all), everything has been said. This is the three-fold Brahman (tri-vidham brahman)." (Svetāsvatara, 1:12; Radhakrishnan; op. cit.).

There is to be found in Mundaka an excellent illustration of the second of these implications - namely, that self-development is 'discovery'; that the quest for self-knowledge is a quest of the self by the self, a quest for the ultimate referent of person-talk by its surrogate of the moment. Mundaka enjoins us with these words:

"Taking the Upanisad as your bow, as your great weapon, fix on it the arrow sharpened by devotion, and then, drawing it with a mind concentrated on That, hit the target of that Eternal, O friend", "Aum is the bow, one's own self is the arrow and Brahman is said to be its aim. It should be hit by a man who is undistracted. And like the arrow he should become one with It. (Mundakopanisad, 2:2:3-4; Sarma; op. cit.)

Here, as earlier remarked, the quasi-paradoxical fact that the end of this quest is one with the ultimate referent of words about the quester, is beautifully portrayed in yet another gem of inspiration. That self-development is discovery of the person one truly is, could perhaps not be put more forcefully, nor more simply, than by comparing the person one truly is with an arrow at one with its target. The 'arrow:target' union is, in other words, the 'atman:brahman' union.
"It is the realisation of our own nature that is called emancipation. Since we are all already and always in our own true nature, and as such, emancipated, the only thing necessary for us is to know that we are so. Self-knowledge is therefore the only desideratum which can wipe off all false knowledge, all illusions of death and rebirth."

(S. Dasgupta; 'A History of Indian Philosophy', Vol. I; pp. 58-59)

And in these few words, Dasgupta has, in his own way, well expressed both aspects of this, our final implication. His statements also show how this discussion gears in with the end of every religious system, an end conveyed in the words 'salvation', 'mokṣa' or 'mukti'.

(iv) That 'person-knowing'-language is non-relational: The most important, 'authentic', or 'real' awareness-state, is that state in which the wakeful-awareness mentioned above has the content - 'the self is Brahman', that is, 'my person is truly the ultimate'. This awareness-state is therefore a state beyond descriptive-language; hence, a state or condition beyond relation. Its logic accommodates that of relation-talk without itself being accommodated by this latter logic. That is, 'Atman-Brahman'-language is 'non-relation'-language.

Upanisadic doctrine does, however, take this conclusion further than it will permit: and here I trespass upon the outskirts of the next chapter, which will suggest a criticism of the general tenor of this doctrine. Part of the speculative periphery of Upanisadic teaching has to do with the fate of the less adequate languages when, by contrast with the more adequate ones (and especially Brahman-language), they are faced with their inadequacy - this revelation is said to end their usefulness. And whenever the teaching is based upon some form of hierarchy, which is
more often than not, this latter conclusion tends to be assumed - i.e., there seems always to lurk the suggestion that the earlier members of the hierarchy are necessarily superceded in some deep ontological way by the latter members.

In the above debate between Prajāpati and Indra, the four 'states' spoken of could be linked with four 'degrees of awareness'. And of course, this linkage is frequently forged by the Upanisads (instance, Māndukya 3-7; Maitri 7:11:7-8; Praśna 4; and almost the entire Mundaka).

Of these, the last in time would be the 'wakeful-awareness' above, and the first in time (though, properly understood, the referent here is atemporal), that which misleadingly is called 'turiya', or 'fourth awareness-degree'. This, being Brahman, defies all effort to be clad in words.

Now, in the teaching-sequence, and, as we have seen, even in the vocabulary used to name these 'awareness-degrees', the order is quite the reverse of this temporal one. There is, therefore, every reason to expect the teaching to view the sequence as writ, also to be a sequence of ontological adequacy, such that only 'turiya'-language suffices for the awareness possible of Brahman. In which case, any wakeful-awareness of the Union spoken of in 'turiya'-language will be precluded as impossible. Through the confusion I will shortly mention, wakeful-awareness is linked with the realm of relation-language, and hence shares its fate.

I do not, for the moment, claim there to be more than a tendency to conclude in this way about these awareness-degrees; and perhaps even the tendency is not in the Upanisads, though I believe it to be. For
example, note the occasions within Upanisads like Brhadāranyaka, when
the virtues of asceticism and the sanctity of the 'sannyāsin' are extolled,
precisely because each bespeaks a thirst for total retreat. But certainly
the conclusions in question are assumed by later schools to be more than
even mere tendencies, when they weave them quite definitely into the
fabric of their doctrine. Hence, within the Yogic and monastic traditions
of Brahmanism, we find a stress upon total retreat from worldly conditions.
For if the teaching is that 'turiya' suffices to Brahman-knowing,
dreamless sleep' less so, 'dream-awareness' much less so, and 'wakeful
awareness' least of all, total retreat from those domains within which
these kinds of awareness operate is clearly an act of paramount wisdom.

Nevertheless, total retreat from all forms of awareness, save
one, cannot follow from Upanisadic teaching; because, as we have seen,
that the self is Brahman is a discovery: and if this can be talked about,
and the Upanisads themselves bear witness to such talk, then it must be
a discovery of wakeful-awareness. That is, to speak of it at all entails
that 'discovery' here means, 'elevation to wakefulness of what was pre-
wakeful'. To talk at all entails wakeful-awareness: and to talk of self-
discovery, doubly so.

The error hidden here issues from a twofold confusion:
(i) one which conflates 'degress of awareness' with 'states of being' by,
no doubt, mistaking the language of one for the language of the other;
and (ii) another which muddles talk about 'increasingly more adequate
understandings' with talk about 'temporal priority of awareness-degrees'.
Indeed, it ought now to be clear that even the phrase 'awareness-degrees'
lends to this confusion, and would tend to beg the question, were it not
clear that no more need be meant by our phrase than - 'awareness-modes'.

For though it is part of the confusion that the Upaniṣads do tend to consider these 'awarenesses', increasingly more adequate to Brahman-knowing, the teaching demands only that they be considered different modes, ranked to show the inadequacy of the various bounded worlds to the task of Brahman-knowing. Each of the first three modes do, at least sometimes, take certain bounded worlds as their object: and that Brahman-knowing does not amount to knowledge of these worlds is the only point of the hierarchy in question. However, due to the above confusions, the mere fact of this hierarchy has led to the simple error, that, because, for instance, wakeful-awareness is sometimes of bounded things, it must therefore always be of bounded things; which is a simple non sequitur.

Returning from this excursus into criticism, to the centre of the present section, let us take a second look at the thought of Martin Buber. This time I will borrow from a source in which he directly attacks the Upaniṣads through reference to the 'awareness' doctrine spoken of above. We must take this second look, because the present implication - that talk, adequate to persons, must be non-relational talk - embodies a doctrine which, for the first time, fails to find parity among any of Buber's opinions: 'not only so, but it quite explicitly contravenes his viewpoint.

Buber voices his dislike of mystical teachings, among which he numbers the Upaniṣads, in a doctrine implicit in these words: "Genuine conversation, and therefore every actual fulfillment of relation between men, means acceptance of otherness... Men need, and it is granted to them, to confirm one another in their individual being by means of genuine
meetings. He continues:

Our fellow men, live round about us as components of the independent world over against us, but in so far as we grasp each one as a human being he ceases to be a component and is there in his self-being as I am; his being at a distance does not exist merely for me, but it cannot be separated from the fact of my being at a distance for him. . . . Relation is fulfilled in a full making present when I think of the other not merely as this very one, but experience, in the particular approximation of the given moment, the experience belonging to him as this very one. (Buber; op. cit., pp. 70-71)

Briefly put, he is saying this - a human being achieves personhood, only in being seen to be an experiencer of the same stuff and order as, yet irrevocably over against, some other human being with whom, in so becoming, he communes.

"Man wishes to be confirmed in his being by man, and wishes to have a presence in the being of the other. The human person needs confirmation because man as man needs it. An animal does not need to be confirmed, for it is what it is unquestionably. It is different with man: Sent forth from the natural domain of species into the hazard of the solitary category, surrounded by the air of a chaos which came into being with him, secretly and bashfully he watches for a Yes which allows him to be end which can come to him only from one human person to another. It is from one man to another that the heavenly bread of self-being is passed." (Buber; op. cit., p. 71)

These few quotations sketch Buber's teaching upon the nature of persons in clearest outline. And, directly applying this teaching to Upanisadic thought, he is led to interpret the aforementioned doctrine of awareness in the following way. I quote at length, for these few passages, contained in 'The Knowledge of Man', enshrine his only explicit critique of Upanisadic teaching.
Sleep appears here as the way out of the sphere in which man is divided from the kernel of being to that in which he is united with it. The way leads beyond the freedom which unfolds in dreams to unity. This unity is that of the individual self with the Self of being: they are in reality a single self. Their disunion in the waking world is then the great illusion. We become independent of the waking world in dream and yet remain still imprisoned in it; in deep sleep we become free of it and thereby of illusion, which alone divides the personal self from the Self of being - an inference, to be sure, which was first conclusively drawn in later, more specifically philosophical teachings. According to them, the existence of man in the world is the existence of a world of appearance, a magical deception. But since the identity of the self can be reached only in an absolute solitude, such as deep sleep, the existence between man and man is also ultimately only appearance and illusion.\(^{(35)}\) (Buber; op. cit., p. 95)

And although these slurs upon "magical deception", "appearance and illusion", whether or not they correctly interpret 'Maya', say little more than he himself already has said, in distinguishing man's illusive individuality from his realness in communion, yet does he launch an attack upon that which the Upanisads teach as their basis - the identity of Atman with Brahman.

The man who adheres to the teaching of identity may, of course, when he says 'Thou' to a fellow man, say to himself in reference to the other, 'There are you yourself', for he believes the self of the other to be identical with his. But what the genuine saying of 'Thou' to the other in the reality of the common existence basically means - namely, the affirmation of the primally deep otherness which is accepted and loved by me - this is devalued and destroyed in spirit through just that identification. The teaching of identity not only stands in opposition to the belief in the true being of a common logos and a common cosmos; it also contradicts the arch reality of that out of which all community stems - human meeting.\(^{(36)}\) (Buber; op. cit., pp. 95-96)

And in a conclusory statement of impeccable clarity, he avers that,
When taken seriously in the factual, waking continuity of intercourse with one another, the ancient Hindu 'That art thou' becomes a postulate of an annihilation of the human person, one's own person as well as the other; for the person is through and through nothing other than uniqueness and thus essentially other than all that is over against it. (Buber; op. cit., p. 96)

Now, as noted earlier (see Section 1), this argument begs many of the questions at issue. For, if the "uniqueness" a person is said to be "nothing other than" is some quality of that being which marks it off from other beings (assuming this notion has sense, which I doubt), then not only is the supposed conclusion that such a being is "thus essentially other than all that is over against it" true by definition, and hence unargued for, but the being spoken of is an individual and not a person - for this being is here defined in terms of the possibility of comparison with "all that is over against it". Such a being is the subject, thought of as an 'It'; as one half of the 'subject:object' situation, in which each half is defined in terms of the other, and hence, in each case, determined by 'space:time' boundaries.

However, if the "uniqueness" of the being referred to means the incomparableness of this being, then Buber's supposed conclusion does not follow. Nothing can then be over against it. To speak of it as 'incomparable' is simply to speak of it as 'transcendent', to talk in a language whose logic is not of bounded things. It can be compared with nothing, because, in one sense, it is nothing (no-thing; nirguna; amūrta), whilst, in another sense, it is everything (saguna; mūrta).

The logic of language about it encompasses all other logics, without itself being encompassed by any of these. "The mūrta (formed) Brahman", says J. N. Rawson, "is just the universe of which the formless Brahman
constitutes the Reality of reality \((\text{satvasya satvam})^n\)". (J. N. Rawson; 'The Katha Upanisad'; p. 37). Hence, in accepting the implication which Buber shuns, the Upanisads seem to embody an authentic and informative notion of the 'uniqueness' of the person.

(v) Finally, in drawing these chapters together some mention is needed of the teaching earlier confessed to be unproven - namely, that the ontology which applies as the defined meaning of 'Brahman' applies also to the ultimate referent of person-language, that this latter referent is truly the Ultimate Explanation, in every sense, of all there is. This can, I believe now be established simply; for all the moves necessary have been made. Let us now bring them together.

To regard a person as a bounded individual is not to regard him in a proper light; for a person is a subject, not an object. And if so, no grounds remain to assume him conditioned by the logic of boundaries: a person, therefore, is at once non-spatial and non-temporal. In which case, nothing in logic prohibits the referent of person-talk from being the Ultimate. That the former might be the latter is an open possibility.

Now, if talk about the Ultimate can proceed, if, that is, it is sensible talk, then the Ultimate must in some way be known. For, since the logic of Ultimate-talk must accommodate all others, without itself being so accommodated, this logic is qualitatively other than the logic of any other language. It can therefore be understood only by someone who has, in the appropriate way, been confronted by this other 'quality'; who has, that is, been confronted by this "incomparableness" - where "confronted" merely means "given to know", and need not denote a relation.
However, being the Ultimate Explanation and Source of Dependence of the whole world, the Ultimate, or Brahman, cannot be known as one dependent part among other dependent parts of the whole world. It cannot be open to interpretation in terms of that which it explains and hence transcends. So it must be self-luminous, that is, understood in a way which is non-worldly, and which can yet be broken upon, or revealed in, the world (śruti): it can be spoken of ("addressed") by beings who, though inadequately, can be said to be worldly. It is known only by grasping its own shining forth, only by partaking in this shining forth: for being the 'fullness of Being', nothing is over against it, nothing can stand apart to grasp it as 'the other'. Hence, from the standpoint of what it is to 'be' in the world, 'knowing' him means 'being' him, in that sense of knowing in which 'knowing' myself to be the person I am means being the person I am.

I am aware of at least two oddities in talking like this: first, that such talk may seem to destroy the paradigm of our use of the verb 'to know', which entails the 'knower:known' dichotomy as a real relation; and second, that using the pronoun 'it' may appear to suggest the referent to have, in Buber's term, "co-ordination". I think there are at least partially satisfying ways of dispelling these oddities.

In the first place, I have argued the use of 'knowing' which entails a real relation to be plainly inapplicable. Also, however, I have argued that 'Ultimate'-language is sensible language, that the referent of this language is not merely real, but the only being properly deserving of the epithet 'real'. In which case, if one chooses to call these affirmations 'knowledge', and the word one uses seems scarcely crucial,
the 'knowing' here implied cannot be the 'knower:known' dichotomy kind of 'knowing'. If, that is, by 'knowledge', we allow ourselves merely to mean, 'the referent of true statements', and, by 'knowing', 'acquiring, or having, the ability to make these statements', then we are in possession of a theory of knowledge which no longer entails this dichotomy. And it may be, as I think it is, that this 'dichotomy' use, which entails a real relation, is derived from and secondary to this wider use I have suggested we allow ourselves.

Secondly, the pronouns used in speaking about 'the Ultimate' are not used as they would be were they used of objects. They are used as personal pronouns are used, and are meant in some way to evoke a certain understanding, in some way to affect a certain disclosure. They are not meant to describe or picture something essentially other than oneself as speaker. 'Talk about' the Ultimate is not a language use which entails the 'dichotomy' sense of 'knowing': it is, in fact, the Ultimate talking, the Ultimate shining forth. For the Ultimate shows itself, and is not shown. And if these words have been understood, they will have served their purpose and no longer be necessary. They are like the ladder Wittgenstein speaks of in his 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus', which, once used, is needed no more.

Hence, and this finally concludes the argument, if Ultimate-language or Brahman-language is understood, or can be sensibly voiced, the voicer, that is, the ultimate referent of person-language (atman), is the Ultimate, is Brahman. In other words, the ontology which applies as the defined meaning of 'Brahman' has now been shown to apply as well
to the person, and Upanisadic methods of teaching upon the assumed
basis of the 'Atman-Brahman' equation, fully vindicated. The missing
link, therefore, is now in place.
CHAPTER V
CRITICISM AND CONCLUSION

In bringing to a close this discussion of the Upanisadic doctrine of persons, I have opened the way to criticism of a certain tendency hidden in the heart of this doctrine. In moving towards a general conclusion, I want first of all to look into this tendency in more detail.

Perhaps no passage better conveys the inclination in question than the few words of Mundaka 3:1:5.

"This self within the body, of the nature of light and pure, is attainable by truth, by austerity, by right-knowledge, by the constant (practice) of chastity - Him, the ascetics with their imperfections done away, behold." (Mundaka 3:1:5; Radhakrishnan; op. cit.)

Or again, from Maitri:

'O Revered One, this body is like a cart without intelligence. To what supersensuous being belongs such power by which such a sort of thing has been made intelligent, or in other words, who is its mover? What you know, O Revered One, tell us that. Then he said to them. 'He, who is reputed as standing aloof amidst qualities, like those of vigourous chastity, he indeed, is pure, clean, void, tranquil, breathless, mindless, endless, undecaying, steadfast, eternal, unborn, independent. He abides in his own greatness. By him this body is set up as possessing intelligence or in other words, this one, verily, is its driver.' (Maitri 2:3-4; Radhakrishnan; op. cit.)

The two points, central to the new dimension I want to give the criticism, are patent: (i) that the ultimate referent of person-talk is not the body, but within it as the "Inner Controller"; and (ii) that, therefore, the pathway or knowledge of this referent leads away from the place of
this body, into the place of 'sannyāsa'.

Now, in phrasing the teaching in these terms, the rṣis have, I believe, caught themselves in the web of their own multi-logical systems. For these terms reflect the general tendency I have spoken of to regard all hierarchic teaching methods as exercises in ontology - as hierarchies expressing ever more adequate ontologies. But this neither is nor need be so. And when one language is deputed to say more about, and hence be more adequate to, the matter in hand, this greater adequacy need merely be in the sense of, enabling a heightened wakeful-awareness of this subject matter. And this "subject matter" may or may not be 'how things are', may or may not be the nature of satyasya satyam; the question at issue may or may not be one in ontology.

Take, for instance, Katha 1:3:10-11:

"Beyond the sense there are the essences ('arthaś'; i.e., 'innate concepts'), beyond the essences there is the mind ('manas'), beyond the mind there is the understanding ('buddhi'), and beyond the understanding there is the great soul ('ātma mahan').

Beyond the great soul there is the unmanifest ('avyakta'), and beyond the unmanifest there is the spirit ('purusa'). Beyond the spirit there is nothing - that is the end, that is the highest reach. (Katha 1:3:10-11; Sarma; op. cit.)

Now, the "ever beyond" tendency of this language suggests that, whenever 'indriya' (sense), 'artha', 'manas', 'buddhi' and 'avyakta' languages are used in speaking about the person ('purusa'), not only do they in each case advert to a specific object peculiar to the specific logic governing the language in question, they also, collectively, ever more adequately represent the Ultimate. Hence, when all languages but 'purusa'-language are so used, they are assumed to be governed by a logic which is that of
non-persons. A similar assumption was made by the Western Idealists when, wielding a far simpler distinction between 'body' and 'mind', they affirmed only 'mind' (Absolute Spirit)-talk to be about persons-proper. But both are assumptions merely, perhaps based on the above tendency to assume most substantives, and especially most proper names, to refer to some bounded object.

Now, it clearly is false to imagine talk of a person's 'body' (or 'senses', or 'mind', or 'buddhi') must necessarily be other than talk of that person; that it might, in other words, refer to other than this person. On most occasions, our referent will obviously be this person. For example, when that which is the referent of body-language about me moves, such that the referent of personal pronouns used in my regard can be held 'responsible' for this movement, this movement is clearly movement of my person. When I kick, kiss or speak to you, I, the person I am, have kicked, kissed or spoken to you. And had something other than the referent of person-talk about me done these deeds, they would not then be traceable to my body, mind, etc. This would be compulsive or machine behaviour, over which I cannot be said to wield control. There is, for instance, a form of psychopathic behaviour which is non-personal; similarly, insanity before the Law is a mitigating plea.

So then, if I can be held 'responsible' for any piece of behaviour, the referent of personal pronouns used of me is the subject of this behaviour. And most bodily behaviour, as well as most psyche ('manas', 'buddhi', 'prāṇa', 'atman', etc.) behaviour is quite properly spoken of in these personal terms. Without delving more deeply for the moment, we
can put the distinction we want between body (etc.)-proper behaviour which is personal behaviour, and talk about which is person-talk, and body (etc.)-as-object behaviour, which is non-personal, by distinguishing a person's body from his corpse. A person's body is not a material object. But to expand upon this, we take two further examples from the Upanisads.

Once or twice in the Upanisads, the tradition does tend to make something like the above distinction. Instance, the later Kausitaki-Brahmana Upanisad 4:20 which, informs Ranade, "tells us how the various bodily sense are dependent on the self and how the self is immanent in the whole body." (R. D. Ranade; 'Constructive Survey of the Upanishads'; p. 134)

Then in this life-breath (prāna) alone he (atman) becomes one. Then speech together with all names goes to it. The eye together with all forms goes to it. The ear together with all sounds goes to it. The mind together with all thoughts goes to it. And when he awakes, then, as from a blazing fire sparks proceed in all directions, even so from this self the vital breaths proceed to their respective stations; from vital breaths, the sense powers; from sense powers the worlds. This very life-spirit, even the self of intelligence has entered this bodily self to the very hairs and nails. Just as a razor might be hidden in a razor-case or as a fire in the fire-place, even so this self of intelligence has entered his bodily self up to the very hairs and nails. (Kausitaki-Brahmana Upanisad 4:20; Radhakrishnan)

Now certainly, as Ranade notes, though in words which assume the body-as-object meaning of this term, and hence overlook its personal sense, this passage "leads to the view that the soul fills the whole of the body, a doctrine which is not unlikely to have led to the Jaina doctrine that as large as the body is, even so large is the soul - that the soul of the elephant is as large as the body of the elephant, whilst the soul
of the ant is only as large as the body of the ant." (Ranade; op. cit., p. 134) And certainly, this vaguely approaches the notion that, in referring to the body of a person, one eo ipso refers to the person. But even so, as with Jaina doctrine, so here - the language is entirely in the material mode; that is, though the self is here believed to be "immanent in the whole body", still do the authors strain to view this "body" somehow as a container, a material receptacle which, in a strange way, has the non-material self in every part of it. And mostly, even this degree of approach is not made to our distinction, and orthodoxy tends, perhaps more misleadingly than through some fault of its own, in the direction of the confusion spoken of.

Orthodoxy is well served by Taittirīya 2:2:1-7, a passage with which we have already dealt, in another place, for another reason. The usual many-language, hierarchical teaching method is evidenced here, starting, as we have seen, with the "essence of food" which Ranade correctly observes to be "the physical parts of man" (Ranade; op. cit., p. 46), and which, within Upanisadic tradition simply means 'the body-as-object'. The method then proceeds through a series of phases, each of which is said to be "the embodied soul" of its immediate predecessor, which surrounds and contains this "soul" as a scabbard would a sword, as a sheath, its dirk, or a skin, its flesh and bone. Each of these successive embodied souls is introduced with the graphic formula - "different from and within". In other words, each phase in the series is said to be logically different from its forerunner, approaching ever more nearly that phase in which the Ultimate, called, on this occasion, 'ananda', is understood.
Hence, a material-mode logic is employed throughout, with no questions raised about its adequacy, to give the impression of a transition in fact from the physical realm of the first phase (ānana), to the elevated realm of the Ultimate (ānanda). It is an easy move from here to suggest that none but 'ānanda'-language is adequate to, or even possible of, person-talk. And quite as easy is the move to retreat from all realms in which any 'other than 'ānanda'-language is thereby believed to have exclusive coinage: ascetic isolation from the world is, in other words, obviously the outcome.

However, the theory behind this obvious outcome is quite inappropriate to the facts of person-language. For whilst it recognizes that all person-talk must be about the referent of 'ānanda'-expressions, it fails to see that 'other than 'ānanda'-language also performs, in person-talk, a task which is, indeed, no more descriptive than 'ānanda' expressions. And this non-descriptive task is, put briefly, to illustrate how a person can be referred to by indicating that to which, were the referent less than personal, the logic of some 'bounded-object'-language would apply: by, for instance, indicating bodies, which, were they less than personal, would be properly described as the objects we call 'corpses'.

It ought, therefore, to be clear that 'body (etc.)-expressions', used of persons, are not expressions whose logic is non-personal, clear, that is, that such language is not about objects. Much, of course, remains to be said about the logic of 'body-proper' and 'psyche-proper' expressions, but I cannot investigate this remainder here.

Finally, a word about what I consider to be the central error
here, namely - that the logical lineaments of the hierarchic-teachings concerning ever more adequate understanding of the cosmos, have been visited without demur upon the teaching concerning persons. The error could be put this way: that the logical foundations of the language expressing the cosmology have been uncritically imposed upon the language expressing the theory of persons. The result is the following quite misleading working principle: quite as arriving at a true understanding of the created and bounded world involves, to use a metaphor, 'retreat' from inadequate or partial understandings, just so, arriving at a proper understanding of the beings called 'persons' entails a real retreat from all conditions which can, in some way, be spoken of in non-personal terms. And this is clearly a non sequitur.

Of course, understanding the ultimate referent of person-language cannot entail a logic which is non-personal. But this metaphorical 'retreat' from all non-personal logics in no way involves real retreat from the world: and if, as the Upanisads teach, and as I have given reasons to accept, the only proper understanding of the world is a personal one, pursuit of the logic of person-talk will indeed involve effort to exhibit the fundamental error of all non-personal interpretations, if these are advanced as the ultimate word upon the matter. It will indeed involve effort to discredit the Materialist analysis of body-language, and the Behaviouralist analysis of psyche-talk. And since body and psyche behaviour are person behaviour, retreat away from their worlds will be retreat away from the referent of person-language; not as the Upanisads and (perhaps especially) later developments of Yogic thought tend to suggest, movement to this referent.
Hence we have traced a full circle to the second of the 'Two Arguments' adduced in concluding the Buber section - the argument affirming love to be necessary and crucial in the quest for a true and proper understanding of the ultimate referent in question. Now this argument makes a conceptual point only in the degree that it makes a claim about our use of the word 'love'. Otherwise, it is advanced for its persuasive force in swaying conviction towards the doing of love. For 'love' refers not merely to certain actions, but also to the fullness of Being. My intention is not solely to make an intellectual point, not solely to resolve a conceptual issue. But so far as it is, the conclusion offers no revelation, but points simply to a fact about the English language - that the word we use for the notion of dispelling estrangement is the word, 'love'. And the 'effort' mentioned above to show non-personal explanation always less than ultimate, will be the effort to so dispel estrangement. The approach, therefore, to a proper understanding of the ultimate referent in question will be the 'effort' which, I have argued in culminating the discussion of Buber, and once more add in bringing the discussion generally to a close, is the meaning we afford the active verb - 'love'.
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