

METAPHOR, LANGUAGE, AND THINKING TIME

Metaphor, Language, and Thinking Time:
Rejuvenating Northrop Frye's Concept of Metaphor
Via Gustave Guillaume's Thinking Time

By

Carson Howlett, B.A.

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AUTHOR: Carson Howlett

SUPERVISOR: Professor Jeffery Donaldson

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This thesis is an experiment in using Northrop Frye's concept of metaphor, as articulated in *The Great Code, Words With Power*, and *On Religion*, to illuminate how the habit of language can remind us that our cultural paradigms are always created and we have the ability to think above them. The thesis will begin by explaining how Frye utilises Giambattista Vicos' ideas of "Verum Factum" and the "three stages of history" to formulate his ideas on metaphor. It will then be argued that Gustave Guillaume's ideas on language, in particular "thinking time," can illuminate for the reader a new concept of how thinking about language can remind us of our creative imagination. The part of imaginative thinking that Frye refers to as "ecstatic metaphor." Finally, Samuel Butler's book *Life and Habit* will be utilised to demonstrate that with practice, and the proper thoughts on language, one can consistently think beyond that which has been created for them.

Preface

I would like to thank these people in particular. Tara Lindsey Braatz, for providing the proper amount of caring. The boys, Heretic and PR, for there unwavering devotion to libation. Dr. Travis Kroeker and Dr. Ellen Badone for reading the thesis and providing commentary. Finally, a special thanks to Dr. Jeffery Donaldson. Without his dedication to editing, reading, and forcing me to become a better writer, this thesis would not exist.

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1. Introduction

The greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor.

It is a sign of genius, since a good metaphor
implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in
dissimilars.¹

The initial impetus for concerning my self with the power of metaphor lies in the foggy terrain of my childhood. My father was a minister in the Protestant mode and twice on Sundays² we were treated to his orations from the pulpit. While I am sure that his sermons were well done, I spent most of my time perusing the Bible for quotations with which I could perplex my dad on the way home. Those that offered the best chance for a concerned response were always the metaphorical ones.

Sitting next to my father on the way home and saying, “Is Jesus a door?”³ would guarantee that the ride would not be a silent one. The great thing about my father’s responses, considering that I was still a minor, was that he would engage the esoteric concerns of Jesus’ sayings, while tethering his responses to the literal sense of the Biblical word. His answers were always energetic but left me with the feeling that he was holding something back. Still, the feeling that there was more depth to these biblical statements was the planting of the metaphoric mustard seed. The seed was there; however, it would be in my second year of University before it would have a reason to germinate.

¹ Aristotle, *De Poetica*, 12

² My father was always the pastor in more than one church and in my teen years he became the District Secretary for the Canadian Bible Society: which meant some Sundays we would get the pulpit hat trick.

³ In John 10:9 Jesus is quoted as saying “I am the door.”

In that second year, I was fortunate to take a Religion class with Dr. Joe Velaidum. It was in this class that I was introduced to the writings of Northrop Frye. In reading Frye I became acquainted with a concept of metaphor that was never mentioned in the post-church chats. The concepts of metaphor introduced in *The Great Code, Words With Power, Frye on Religion* and *Myth and Metaphor* were ideas that I wanted to explore. This past Christmas I purchased *The Great Code* for my father in the hope that he would share my enthusiasm. I am still awaiting his energetic thoughts on Frye's metaphoric interpretation of the Bible.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore Northrop Frye's concept of metaphor as what Frye called identity in difference and, with the aid of the French linguist Gustave Guillaume and Samuel Butler's idea of unconscious habit, show that Frye's concepts regarding metaphor can articulate a rejuvenated conception of language's role in counter-logical thought. Recent books such as Caterina Nella Cotrupi's *Northrop Frye and the Poetics of Process* show that Frye's works should not be relegated to the dustbin of literary-critical history and offer "concrete indications that Frye's influence evinces a tenacity that should not be disregarded."⁴

It is the goal of my thesis to illuminate how Frye's multi-faceted idea of metaphor, when viewed through Guillaume's linguistic lens offers the thinker the potential or unconscious ability to make the act of metaphorical thinking what Samuel Butler would call a habitual one.⁵ It is in the realm of the habitual act that humankind can lift itself

⁴ Cotrupi, Nella. *Northrop Frye and the Poetics of Process*. 4.

⁵ Samuel Butler's *Life and Habit* will play an integral role in joining Frye's metaphorical thought to Guillaume's linguistic endeavours.

beyond the constraints inherent in language and provide the potential to liberate their thinking in the fullness of metaphor.

In Frye's thinking, metaphor comes from a place in the unconscious where the speaker has yet to formulate a distance between himself and nature. Within metaphor there is an easy joining of the self with nature or the subject with the object. For example, Eldrick Woods is a Tiger. Now certainly it is counter-logical to think that Ms. Woods bore a Tiger. However, the 'genius' of metaphor exists in its ability to make the counter-logical plausible.

The simplicity inherent in the Biblical statement "Joseph is a fruitful bough" belies a complexity that short-circuits or challenges the reader's ability to reason in their usual manner.⁶ The formula that is often used for such statements as "Joseph is a fruitful bough" is simply $A = B$. What this statement ultimately comes down to be, is the formula $A \text{ is not } A$. Logically, $A \text{ is not } A$ makes no sense. $A \text{ is } A$, and $B \text{ is } B$. Clearly, the sentence indicates that $A = B$, yet the two aspects of one identity violate the permanent separation of the subject and object.

This separation presents the constraints that are inherent in the language structure as a vehicle for description. One of the important consequences of a person making room in his thinking for the counter-logics of metaphor is that now everything is potentially equal to everything else. Since, with metaphor's $A = B$ formula, now there is nothing in the language rules that states that anything cannot be everything. It is within this contradiction where Frye's language of the spirit offers the opportunity to extend ourselves beyond the

⁶ Genesis 49:22 is one of Frye's favourite examples of metaphor in the Bible.

restraints of culturally justified definitions and ideological paradigms. It is via metaphor—in both usage and understanding—that we have the chance to view our life and our responsibilities as more than just “reactions” to what has been made for us. We become participants in it.

Northrop Frye on Religion Frye informs us “the language that lifts us clear of the merely plausible and the merely credible is the language of the spirit.”⁷ It is within the language of spirit that Frye’s metaphorical vision is no longer divided, or contained, by the constraints inherent in language, what Frye refers to as the subject/object split. Frye consistently informs us that our subjective reasoning is constantly responding to that which we make and culturally that makes the subject/object dichotomy impossible to overcome.⁸ We are born into a pre-made world, we are taught to respond to that world; thus, we are trapped by that world.

Linguistically, metaphor, with its ability to alchemize A and B, becomes the unconscious playground where both the subject and object are unified in what Gustave Guillaume understands as the ‘potential’ of language.⁹ This is an important concept and we will illuminate it thoroughly in later chapters. For now, think of ‘potential’ as the ability of a speaker to say anything. Through this unification, the extraordinary powers inherent in metaphorical thinking cease to be dulled by the cultural expectations deep-seated in society’s conventions.

⁷ Frye, Northrop. *Northrop Frye on Religion*, 182.

⁸ Frye utilises Giambattista Vicos’ concept of ‘Verum Factum’ throughout his works. For a fuller understanding of Vico’s influence on Frye’s thought consider Ian Balfour’s *Northrop Frye*, 69 or Timothy Bahti’s ‘Vico and Fye: A Note’ *New Vico Studies* 3, 119 – 29.

⁹ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Scientific of Language*.

Through the habit of “metaphorical thinking” the speaker or listener can move beyond the subject/object dichotomy and allow himself the chance for a new understanding of metaphorical thought as it pertains to unconscious potential.¹⁰ Frye’s own definition of the term “unconscious potential” enlarges on Guillaume’s thinking, in that such potential leads to the truest knowledge. Such knowledge is represented by the freedom of thought contained in the subconscious utilization of the counter-logical metaphor.

Frye refers a number of times to the importance of unconscious thought in his writings. He writes, “all genuine and achieved knowledge is unconscious knowledge.”¹¹ He illuminates the idea that all consciousness is concerned with assimilating new ideas with ones that are already culturally ingrained or previously assimilated. The knowledge of progress is problematic for Frye because it only progresses, or is discerned in relation to a cultural bias. In other words, it becomes formulated within the paradigms of the human-made world. In the case of progress, Frye would concur with the author of Ecclesiastes, who informs us, “there is nothing new under the sun.”¹²

The repetition, a repetition that is mistaken for newness if one is unaware of Frye’s thoughts on discerning progress in culture, is present in physical reality. However, that presence in reality as it is created by a culturally biased humanity is not present in the entity of unconscious habit. Frye, in a thought that owes its genesis to his reading of Samuel Butler,¹³ suggests that the idea of knowledge beyond these restraints and paradigms is

¹⁰ This concept of metaphoric potential will be examined in relation to Samuel Butler’s *Life and Habit* in subsequent chapters.

¹¹ Frye, Northrop. *Myth and Metaphor*. 368.

¹² Bible. *The Student Bible*. 683.

¹³ Frye himself admits as much in *Myth and Metaphor* page 141.

affirmed in “the spontaneity at the end of experienced learning.”¹⁴ Once the rigours of practice remove the conscious effort from between the performer and his instrument, the sense of a knowledge not affected by a pre-made or experienced world is attainable. In that realm, art can step out of its historical determinations and effectively become something ‘new.’

In chapter two, we will look at how Frye utilizes Vico to examine metaphorical thinking in the history of human language. In his own construal of the issue, Gustave Guillaume states:

The science of language inevitably leads us back to ideas on human thought, because linguistics is knowledge, not of the physical universe within which man dwells and of which he is a part, but of a mental universe—tongue—that dwells within him. It is in the victorious confrontation of tongue with the universe he inhabits that gives man his relative autonomy within it.”¹⁵

If the thinking individual did not construct his own thoughts, they would not exist. For Guillaume, it is essential for man to know how far he has advanced in the assembly of his own thought. Concerning progress, Guillaume states, “Without language man would not know.”¹⁶ He means this on a level beyond the physical realm. Progress, on the physical level, is a progress of man through history. Progress, on the non-physical level, collides with history—as languages do evolve—but it is also a representation of an entity within discourse that is not restrained by the physical elements in the world. It has unlimited potential.

¹⁴ Frye, Northrop. *Myth and Metaphor*. 150.

¹⁵ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 145.

¹⁶ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 145.

I believe that understanding/examining Guillaume's concept of "thinking time" in relation to Frye's world of metaphorical vision and Butler's ideas on habit will help us to comprehend society beyond the constructs of culturally solidified ideological paradigms. Guillaume understands the language system as potential rather than actual; the potential of language, for Guillaume, is largely subconscious and extends far beyond what direct observation can reveal. Thus, Guillaume's ideas can be utilised to illuminate Frye's metaphorical vision and the potential inherent in his metaphorical concepts, and help us to progress beyond the constraints inherent in language.

In *On Religion*, Frye states, "the function of literature is to keep the metaphorical habit of thinking in identities alive."¹⁷ For Frye, and Western culture, the book that exemplifies this function is the Bible. Concerning the Bible, Frye suggests that the impression of ultimate identity that one associates with Religious material is essentially a feeling of urgency regarding the need to connect to the mystical via metaphor. Once the thinker understands how language can show us the potential of the counter-logical to our everyday reality, the thinker may be able to utilise this concept to illuminate to him/her a deeper Biblical message.

The message is, that the Bible's use of metaphor is greatly extended from the spoken or written language and is not a dated or dead concept. Perhaps, as Frye states, "the metaphorical structure in the Bible can be extended also, moving back to recapture some of the existential force that the metaphor once suggested."¹⁸ If the imaginative machinery of the modern thinker can be re-structured to realise that they create every time they 'think' in

¹⁷ Frye, Northrop. *On Religion*. 358.

¹⁸ Frye, Northrop. *On Religion*. 358.

language, then they may be able to get a closer sense of the ‘ultimate’ identity that binds humankind’s true vision.

It is a vision that can be realised if one understands that metaphorical language can become a habit. Once we move metaphor into the realm of habit, it can provide a way to extend our thoughts beyond culturally inflated paradigms and show us that our primary concerns do not have to be culturally biased. Rather, those concerns can be about conscious representations of language’s ability to remind us of our unlimited potential.¹⁹

¹⁹ Guillaume’s concept of language’s potential will be explained in chapter 3.

2 Preliminary Considerations

2.1 Welcome to Metaphor

I have wanted in late years to go further
and further in making metaphor the whole of thinking.²⁰

The interesting things to note about the Robert Frost quotation is how someone so familiar with metaphor realised at this late stage that he should give metaphor a more central role, or go further, in making metaphor central to thinking. Frost is not concerned with the realities of descriptive language; rather, he wants to make A is B the “whole of thinking.” The tacit role of metaphor, for Frost, is a reality of language, or knowledge, that becomes a largely subconscious idea and extends far beyond what direct observation can reveal.

At its most basic, metaphor is a rhetorical trope or a figure of speech, where a comparison is made between two seemingly unrelated objects without using ‘like’ or ‘as.’ It is a transference of one object’s characteristics onto another. However, it is not to be confused with the other species of metaphor; simile, metonymy, personification, allusion, and antonomasia. For the purpose of this thesis, it is best to think of metaphor in the basic form mentioned above, or the concept that $A = B$.²¹

Frost does not want the only representation of metaphor to be restricted by linguistic qualifications such as dormant, extended, root, actual, compound or complex metaphor.

²⁰ Frost, Robert. *Education by Poetry*, 1931.

²¹ One active theory of metaphor states that a metaphor consists of two main parts: the tenor and the vehicle. The tenor is the subject to which the metaphor is applied. The vehicle is the metaphorical term through which the tenor is applied. These two parts come together to reach a point of similarity known as a ground. The tenor/vehicle theory is only one of several ‘accepted’ theories. For others, research Max Black or Paul Ricoeur.

These definitions only trap metaphor in a style of language that restricts its potential. Frost's concept of metaphor extends to the entirety of thought. It is the sublime rhetoric of Longinus, the poetic understanding of Vico, and a springboard to what Northrop Frye considers the key to knowledge beyond the boundaries of culture; identity in difference.

As language develops historically beyond the stage where 'this is that' there comes an inherent distrust in anything that cannot be empirically confirmed. Frye basis his notion of languages historical development on Vico's three stages of history. This concept will be explained fully on page fifteen. Suffice to say, as humankind moves through and changes within history, their ability to utilise language as a tool representing thoughts also alters.

In the earliest stages of language, we create words to signify 'things.' As language develops, it no longer relies entirely on the poetic notion of identity in difference; rather, it becomes about transparency in empirical truth. While Frost spent his productive years writing poetically for an audience educated in the descriptive phase of language, eventually he decides to go further in his understanding of poetic language as the entirety of thinking. Even if most of his readers could not understand its potential.

The structure of society, language, and the world that humankind has created becomes the yardstick that measures thinking. In a scientific society, truth is based on empirical provability.²² If one thinks beyond that structure, via metaphor, into the infinity of thought, then, that structure's ability to affect perception weakens.²³ The ones who think

²² One could use the word scientific, descriptive, demotic or vulgar here. The point is that as language and society develop they eventually grow into a society that bases facts on their empirical provability. This development will be examined further in chapter 2.2.

²³ Just a reminder to the reader that the 'infinity of thought' refers to the principle that what underlies the allowances we make for metaphoric thinking is the recognition that anything can be equal to anything else. Thus, that is where the notion of the infinite, or of unlimited possibility, comes in.

metaphorically are the ones who make it possible to move beyond the thoughts that they have and have been given.

In *On Religion*, Frye casually mentions, “there is a distrust of metaphorical thinking.”²⁴ Frye is referring to how biblical metaphors hinder literal interpretation or, how literal interpretation presently—because we are in a descriptive language phase—supersedes biblical interpretation. However, at the linguistic level, society’s distrust of metaphoric thinking emphasises the concern that when society bases its discourse in the descriptive language phase, a questioning of the A = B essence of metaphor is as inherent as it is needed. The need for all statements to be empirically provable being the cornerstone of the descriptive language phase.

Simply, A cannot be B in a descriptive language. In descriptive language, identification with empirical truth is the whole of its purpose and the simile becomes the accepted form of metaphorical representation. If A is B is counter-logical, then saying A is like B, can make the metaphoric statement more palatable. It lessens the non-logic inherent in the comparison. The simile’s utilisation of the word like allows metaphor to remain a part of a descriptive language’s discourse, without challenging the cornerstone thought in that language system that everything must be empirically or logically plausible.

The infinite possibilities of language inherent in metaphor make it an unfamiliar way of thinking to the descriptive mind. For example, a story with grand metaphorical leaps is merely a lie in descriptive language. It may be an entertaining lie; but, if you cannot prove your story within the bounds of empirical evidence, it is not true to a descriptive

²⁴ Frye, Northrop. *On Religion*. 398.

listener. The goal of descriptive, or scientific language, is to transfer information that explains the how or why something works. Its goal is generally not to be entertaining. Consequently, and not to pigeonhole the scientific community, I doubt that most scientists find poetry anything but entertaining. Certainly, they would not find poetry a useful addition to their ‘findings.’

In an attempt to explain the aversion that a society tethered to the descriptive phase of language has to the potential of metaphor within language, Gustave Guillaume utilises the concept of an anastasis. In this quotation, an anastasis is a raising up of one’s understanding of their lucidity so as to be equal with their knowledge. Guillaume writes:

The human mind runs the risk of losing its lucidity when it encounters the infinite. At that extreme point, it has to operate an anastasis within itself, a resurrection of its expiring lucidity. The linguist, extraordinarily privileged in this regard, is able to follow this anastasis as an observable event, etched in the structure of language.²⁵

The descriptive discourser may understand that there are infinite possibilities in language; however, without the lucidity, or proper feeling for things, he will never rise above the awareness of the infinite possibility of language into the knowledge of it. He will never understand how to utilise the knowledge effectively. The infinite possibility of language, for our purpose, represents the ability of metaphor to exemplify physically language’s infinite possibilities. The total phenomenon that is language—both its unconscious structure and its physicality in discourse—allows the speaker the ability to unconsciously create or expand the linguistic structure itself. Accordingly, every time a metaphor is

²⁵ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 22.

utilised in discourse, the speaker and listener is reminded that the entity of language has the ability to be counter-logical.

In order to illuminate the importance of metaphor in descriptive discourse, we have to be able to base our Fryean thoughts in scientific language. Guillaume, by noticing the etching of thoughts in the structure of language, provides this service. Guillaume's thoughts will expand beyond the linguistic structure into an area of unconscious understanding; however, the key is that he begins within a scientific framework.

There is a presumption in the scientific community that only what is directly observed is knowable. Accordingly, there is neither scientific reason nor practical justification for denying the existence of the English language—or any language—because the “total phenomenon” of it is not directly observable.²⁶ The inference is that the theoretical is ‘less knowable.’ John Hewson in *The Essential Guillaume: A Critical Explication* states, “empirical fact and theoretical fact cast light upon each other; neither could said to be known or knowable without the other, neither assumes its real significance except in a dynamic theory of knowledge, neither in short is understandable in and by itself.”²⁷

If we are going to understand Frye's concept of metaphor, and what Robert Frost means by the “whole of knowledge,” we need Guillaume to provide a scientific explanation of the unconsciousness of language. We will observe how Guillaume places the “total phenomenon” of language beyond the parameters of human-made histories in an

²⁶ Guillaume calls the combination of tongue and discourse the total phenomenon of language. Certainly discourse is empirical; however, tongue is theoretical and the totality of language exists in the unconscious.

²⁷ Hewson, John. *The Essential Guillaume: A Critical Explication*. IV.

unconscious state and compare that with Frye's theory of metaphor as identity in difference.

The thrust of this thesis will be explaining how Frye's sense of ecstatic metaphor germinates in the poetic stage of language and reaches its apex with sublime ecstatic thought. Sublime ecstatic thought will be shown to be a form of language that allows the unconscious potential of all forms of language to be realised in the observable state of discourse.²⁸ However, first, we have to continue considering what Frye's concept of metaphor looks like.

²⁸ Tongue and discourse being utilised in the Guillaumean sense; which will be explicated further in chapter 3.

2.2 Frye's Concept of Metaphor

Metaphor is an effort to extend our being into the external world. To break down the wall between subject and object and start currents of verbal energy flowing between them.²⁹

Northrop Frye admits, “that the theory of metaphor is very complex, or has been made so by exuberant philosopher-critics, I want to explain its basic principle very simply.”³⁰ The initial thrust of this thesis will be to illuminate what Frye’s “simple” explanation of metaphor entails. It is an explanation that germinates with *Fearful Symmetry*, finds a voice in *Anatomy of Criticism*, expands through *The Great Code, Words With Power*, and remains a consistent/insistent theme throughout the remainder of his works. As Robert Denham notes, “in Frye’s view of language, metaphorical meaning is identified with literal meaning.”³¹ In this case, Frye is deriving his sense of ‘literal’ from its etymological roots in the letter. Therefore, a literal reading is one that looks “inward” towards the letter and its relations, rather than outward towards objects. In his view of linguistic meaning Frye interchanges primary and literal meaning liberally and both are understood as the metaphorical meaning.

In what he considers the point of view of natural language, Frye observes, “literal meaning has always been regarded as the descriptive, denotative meaning: the literally true is the same as the descriptively accurate.”³² Yet, in the early chapters of two of Frye’s

²⁹ Frye, Northrop. *On Religion*. 101

³⁰ Frye, Northrop. *Notebook 44*, 706.

³¹ Denham, Robert D. *Interpenetration as a Key Concept in Frye's Vision*, 150.

³² Denham, Robert D. *Interpenetration as a Key Concept in Frye's Vision*, 150.

seminal works,³³ he identifies the metaphorical meaning with the literal meaning. Frye states, “the centripetal aspect of a verbal structure is its primary aspect.”³⁴ Essentially, if the reader thinks quickly of a line from any poem they are familiar with, they will understand that the primary aspect of ‘what words do’ is hang together to form a verbal structure. Hence, one solitary word has no meaning beyond simply signifying an object.

For Frye, all verbal structures have a centripetal and a centrifugal aspect³⁵ that directly relate to the reader’s ability to “accept every word given us without question.”³⁶ The primary meaning, arising as it does from the interconnection of words, is the metaphorical meaning as well. If the reader’s understanding, both centripetal and centrifugal, is limited to her place in culture, or if she does not understand the importance of the verbal structure, then her ability to think metaphorically is as culturally limited as is her ability to understand a text in its primary metaphorical sense.

This commitment to metaphorical understanding makes Frye’s concept of metaphorical meaning crucial to understanding the ‘truth’ of the human condition as well as the archetypal books that try to define it. “All religions are one,”³⁷ notes Frye. The Bible, the Koran and the Analects are examples of books whose metaphorical meanings addresses the spirituality of a ‘true’ existence and should be understood beyond the entombment of culturally biased descriptive or scientific language’s ‘is this true?’

If Frye’s concept of metaphor is going to enable us to understand spiritual writings, or the spirit in writing, beyond the centripetal and centrifugal meanings, then we have to

³³ *The Great Code and Words With Power*.

³⁴ Frye, Northrop. *The Great Code*. 60.

³⁵ This key aspect in understanding Frye’s anatomy of language will be explained in chapter 3.

³⁶ Frye, Northrop. *The Great Code*, 60-1.

³⁷ Frye, Northrop. *Notebook 53*, 30.

look at how Frye constructs his metaphoric ideas. Frye's metaphorical vision gets its impetus from Giambattista Vico's³⁸ concept of the "three ages in a cycle of history: a mythical age, or age of gods; a heroic age, or age of an aristocracy; and an age of the people."³⁹

Frye takes these three phases and suggests that they represent three types of verbal expressions or languages.⁴⁰ Frye denotes them as "the hieroglyphic, the hieratic and the demotic."⁴¹ Vico refers to them as the poetic, the heroic and the vulgar. Language develops from a point where subject and object are symbiotic through a stage of allegorical understanding, which eventually leads to the separation of the subject/object in what is referred to as the descriptive phase.

The hieroglyphic/poetic phase of writing is where the subject/object split is not imperative to 'understanding' the intended sign. In fact, the subject/object split has not developed, or is not relevant to discourse in the poetic form of 'first' language. This concept becomes a key factor in Vico's three linguistic formulations as well as in Frye's vision of metaphor as inherent truth.⁴² In this phase, language evinces no overt mental separation of the object/world and the subject/person. Frye notes, there is a "feeling that subject and object are linked by a common power or energy."⁴³

³⁸ For commentaries on the acknowledgement of Vico's influence by Frye, see Domenico Pietropaolo, *Frye, Vico, and the Grounding of Literature and Criticism* 95-6 and Ian Balfour, *Northrop Frye* 69.

³⁹ Frye, Northrop. *The Great Code* 5.

⁴⁰ Language being utilised in the French sense that makes it possible to express similar ideas in different languages.

⁴¹ Frye, Northrop. *The Great Code* 5.

⁴² Vico felt that "men communicated by signs before they could talk." (Frye, *The Great Code* 5.)

⁴³ Frye, Northrop. *The Great Code* 6.

Humankind's language, in the poetic phase, reinforces the experienced reality of the existing world and the unconscious reality of a poetic world. Language serves as a reminder, both conscious and unconscious that all is one and one is everything. Metaphor, for Frye, becomes the area where personal and natural objectifications are the same thing and "Gods are ready made metaphors."⁴⁴ For example, Thor is the God of Thunder and represents the ideal unification of language/nature and subject/object. In the poetic phase, the orator is not speaking metaphorically. The object, thunder, as represented by Thor, is a mythic presence. Later, after the subject/object split has become integral to language, we think he is speaking metaphorically.

In the poetic phase, language has yet to incorporate the concept of you or I as inherent to the formation of words. The feeling that "the subject and object are linked by a common energy or power"⁴⁵ fades as the subject himself becomes an integral part of the concept of language. Guillaume will insist that the axial consonant shift, where a consonant separates the subject from his action in the middle of a word, solidifies the formation of the subject as present in discourse. The axial consonant shift takes place as language moves—Guillaume refers to this as the 'transitus'—from tongue to discourse.⁴⁶ Tongue is the system of language, and discourse is what is produced by the use of the system.⁴⁷ In the non-physical tongue, there is no concept of the subject. The word is represented as it is

⁴⁴ Frye, Northrop. *The Great Code* 7.

⁴⁵ Frye, Northrop. *The Great Code*. 6

⁴⁶ A further explication of these terms, as they are utilised by Guillaume, can be found in Chapter 3.1.

⁴⁷ The connection, and differences between Ferdinand Saussure and Gustave Guillaume's linguistic structures will be illuminated later. For now, Guillaume's concepts of tongue and discourse equate to Saussure's concepts of langue and parole.

unconsciously known. In the ‘transitus’ or “thinking time”⁴⁸ certain words are completed by the subject and it is in this microsecond of time that we consciously add the subject—ourselves—to the meaning of the word.

There is a successivity in language as it moves from tongue to discourse, and in both there is a link between an entity of speech and an entity of thought. For Guillaume, however, a difference in them needs to be emphasised. In tongue, the link between mental content and speech is a link that occurs on the level of ideas. Speech, which is in itself physical, does not actually get beyond the mind. Therefore, at this level, speech is thought of while it is in a non-physical state. It is a representation of its physical self that has yet to be uttered. In Fryean terms, tongue at the non-physical or unconscious level is in a state of metaphor because it has yet to split the subjective from the objective. It can still represent nature and humankind as meshed by a common energy. The words—perhaps thought—of tongue are not physically represented and therefore still unify the subject with the object.

I will repeat this thought as it is a key component in my argument. It is at this stage, at the non-physical or unconscious level, that Frye and Guillaume are most closely linked. They are linked in the relationship between metaphor and tongue. The idea, that in the condition of radical metaphor— $A = B$ —where the subject and object are still joined, Guillaume’s concept of tongue, where the total phenomenon of language does not have the ability to physically represent the subject/object split that Frye’s and Guillaume’s ideas are symbiotic. In a way, the physicality of discourse, or observable language, has yet to impose itself upon unconscious thought.

⁴⁸ Again, more about thinking time, a key Guillaumean concept, will be found in Chapter 3.1.

On the level of discourse, the physically observable and quantifiable level, the story is different. The subject/object split is tacit if not tangible. The link between mental content and speech remains mental—as it does in tongue—but, in a way that the physical nature of speech emerges actualized and represented in time. For Guillaume, tongue is considered pre-conscious. Speech, thus, has left its mental condition and has become a representation of the subject. Speech has a body, a perceptible reality that is no longer merely a mental representation of itself. It is not that discourse has cancelled out tongue; rather, it has realised it. The potential inherent in tongue has been realised in the physical expression of discourse. In discourse, the subject/object split is observable.

For example, in Latin the word ‘fero’ means “I carry.” In Sanskrit the word bharami also means “I carry” and exhibits the same axial consonant shift. Once the tongue⁴⁹ is composed of wholly constructed words then it is just a matter of time before the axial consonant integrates the subject object split into the words themselves. In this case—fero—the r separates the subject from the action of carrying. As the phases change, the subject object split becomes an integral part of language itself.

Guillaume writes:

The axial consonant separates the notional ideation linked with the basic phonemic group ‘fero’ from a transnotional ideation. This transnotional ideation stems, in variable proportions depending on the language, both from what has been inherited and what has been reconstructed in the semiological, physical component of the world and also in its meaning, its non-physical component.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Tongue representing the non physical, inherent structure of a particular language not the literal tongue of the speaker.

⁵⁰ Guillaume, Gustave, *Foundation for a Science of Language*. 40

The physical—also referred to as the written or as discourse—and the non-physical—also known as tongue, unconscious structure, or *langue* to Saussure—components in language are a crucial element of Guillaume’s work. In his linguistic model the time between the physical and non-physical, or conscious and unconscious is illuminated by the idea of “thinking time.”⁵¹ Simply, “thinking time” is the time that it takes the mind to realize an image within time. Guillaume’s work and its usefulness in the examination of Frye’s metaphorical concepts will be detailed more fully in chapter two. For now, the key idea is that nature is not only separate in the words, but that the separation has become essential to the structure of language itself.

The hieratic/heroic phase is mainly allegorical and here Frye starts to understand that with allegorical interpretation humankind begins to develop the subject object split in everyday correspondence. While the placing of Guillaume’s axial consonant separation into an exact historical time is impossible, it begins to permeate the language in this phase. Frye writes, “In this second phase language is more individualized and words become primarily the outward expression of inner thoughts or ideas.”⁵² No longer are words and nature symbiotic; now, language has begun to persuade the human condition away from its natural environment.

In the same way, words (signifiers) do not represent ‘this is that,’ they are now specifying that ‘this is put for that.’ The first phase of language is founded on metaphor and is inherently poetic. The second phase, which Frye ascribes to Plato’s utilisation of

⁵¹ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundation for a Science of Language*. XIII.

⁵² Frye, Northrop. *The Great Code* 7.

logic, becomes metonymic and “retreats from the poetic into the dialectical, a world of thought separate from and in some respects superior to the physical world of nature.”⁵³

The demotic/vulgar is the third phase of language and Frye states that it begins “roughly in the sixteenth century.”⁵⁴ It is during this phase that the subject object split becomes the essence of everyday correspondence. With the emergence of John Locke’s “Tabula Rasa”⁵⁵ language now becomes a conveyance for direct, descriptive concepts. No longer does A = B dominate the linguistic terrain; rather, A is like B, or the truth of a given description is situated in empirical evidence. In the third phase, scientific inquiry becomes the norm and metaphysical questions are regarded as impossible or simply unmeaning. Frye writes:

In the first, or metaphorical, phase of language, the unifying element of verbal expression is the “god,” or personal nature-spirit. In the second phase the conception of a transcendent “God” moves into the center of the order of words. In the third phase the criterion of reality is the source of sense experience in the order of nature, where “God” is not to be found, and where “gods” are no longer believed in.⁵⁶

In the third phase, the concepts of God and ‘truth’ are entombed in a spiritually dysfunctional language. Essentially, there is no place for God, or universal truth, in a language consumed by and, at the same time, upheld by its reliance on empirical scrutiny.

The difficulty with society’s reliance on descriptive language is the loss of “the experience of the sublime, an experience rooted in the paradox of self as distinct from, yet

⁵³ Frye, Northrop. *The Great Code* 8.

⁵⁴ Frye, Northrop. *The Great Code* 13.

⁵⁵ The concept that we are born a blank slate and therefore all ‘thought’ is a result of sense perception.

⁵⁶ Frye, Northrop. *The Great Code*, 15.

connected to, the larger whole – part of and yet apart from the cosmos.”⁵⁷ In the demotic/vulgar or descriptive phase, self-conscious reflection becomes the dominant – almost only—mode of linguistic interaction. The bridge between ‘real’⁵⁸ consciousness and nature is obscured by the cultural paradigms which shape our world and subsequently create a third reality. In Saussurian thinking, this ‘reality,’ that resides between the signifier and the signified, acts as the essential verbal structure.⁵⁹

To Frye, this reality, or what stands for reality is too at the forefront of our consciousness. Perhaps, it is too logical.⁶⁰ It is too mired in the understanding of a reality that we have, in fact, created for ourselves. Metaphor, with its inherent counter-logicality is the essence of language, or the “essential figure of which all others are variants.”⁶¹ While the Saussurian linguistic model coincides, or is a result of, the demotic phase, metaphoric thinking comes from “a less conscious part of the mind which is nonetheless linguistically structured.”⁶²

While the earliest phase of language is entirely poetic, Frye suggests that “every form of speech can be reduced to metaphor.”⁶³ As language moves through the phases, society creates an envelope between itself and nature. This concept of an envelope between

⁵⁷ Cotrupi, Caterina Nella. *Northrop Frye and the Poetics of Process*. 98.

⁵⁸ The ‘real’ consciousness being the one that is not caught in the paradox of Verum Factum. Butler’s piano player will be utilised in a later chapter to illuminate ‘real’ consciousnesses as opposed to the self-consciousness that is trapped in the subject object conundrum.

⁵⁹ The second chapter will look closely at how Saussure’s and Guillaume’s linguistics hinder/abet Frye’s metaphorical vision

⁶⁰ Gustave Guillaume’s linguistic vision will be utilised in chapter two to reinforce this concept of less conscious language. The idea being that the ability to think metaphorically is known, not taught.

⁶¹ Frye, Northrop. *Myth and Metaphor*. 33.

⁶² Frye, Northrop. *Myth and Metaphor*. 33–4.

⁶³ Frye, Northrop. *Myth an Metaphor*. 216.

nature, and ourselves, which Vico entitled *verum factum*, grows as metaphoric thinking becomes influenced by society's structures and paradigms.⁶⁴

⁶⁴Vico's "*verum factum*" means that we only understand reality as that which we have created. For example, when you wake up, your only conscious reaction or ability to understand is based on things that have been created by humankind. Everything in your room, including the potted houseplant, is constructed. Thus, your reality is based not in the natural world, but in a world that has been pre-made for you.

2.1 The Royal Metaphor

This is Like That

We are not amused!⁶⁵

As language moves through history, the distinction between nature and us grows, and metaphor becomes less important, the idea of the royal metaphor confirms society's structures and paradigms. Royal metaphor gains its foothold in the self-consciousness of society in the hieratic/heroic phase. The 'simple' and counter-logical metaphor of the hieroglyphic/poetic phase, where $A = B$, becomes entangled in the logical notion that A is never truly B; rather, it is like –or is akin with– B. This seemingly simple swerve in thinking leads to the classification of *things*. In the classification of A is/with B, society starts to "identify an individual with its class;" this results in an extremely powerful and subtle form of metaphor⁶⁶ what Frye calls the royal metaphor.

The power of the royal metaphor lies in its ability, via a figurehead, to represent society as a single body.⁶⁷ That is, what the Queen of England believes is what all of the English citizens believe. Certainly, the Queen is an individual. Yet, the Queen as a metaphorical representation of her society belies a sense of cohesion that ties the individuals to their particular culture. Frye writes, "We are born, we said, with a pre-existing social contract out of which we develop what individuality we have, and the interests of that society take priority over the interest of the individual."⁶⁸ If in the hieroglyphic/poetic phase, metaphor unites the subject/object split, the royal metaphor

⁶⁵ The Queen utilizing the concept of royal metaphor to show that England is not pleased.

⁶⁶ Frye, Northrop. *The Great Code*. 87.

⁶⁷ It should be noted that royal metaphors are not restricted to figureheads. They are a particularly strong embodiment of the concept.

⁶⁸ Frye, Northrop. *The Great Code*. 101.

allows humanity to create an area within language where society and the individual are united. In other terms, we are the cultural box and are in the cultural box at the same time. The individual may believe they are a counterpart to their society; however, that would be a misunderstanding of the *verum factum* principle. Believing you are separate from your cultural identity means you do not realize the effect that your surroundings had, and have, on your logic.

The underlying dilemma in Frye's royal metaphor is that it obscures the initial metaphorical purpose that shows the similarity in dissimilars. Royal metaphor becomes a linguistic vehicle, which contains the sublime creativity inherent in metaphor, within the structure that society has itself pre-created. Once society is amid the demotic/vulgar/descriptive phase of language, society extends that phase into the entirety of thought. No longer does the possibility of metaphor tempt the imagination to "generate new metaphors for synthesizing disparate aspects of reality that burst conventional assumptions about the nature of things."⁶⁹ Instead, it has become a linguistic tool, which reinforces a society's ability to contain the common imagination of its populace within its own structure. Consequently, linguistic dreams are no longer of Blakean proportions, but are limited to the imagination's interpretation of society's creations.

Since the world is fallen,⁷⁰ Frye argues that the essence of an imaginative humanity lies in our ability to make the "most" of the fallen world, not the "best" of it. Making the best of the fallen world leaves man in a state where he is confined by the structures of that

⁶⁹ Ricoeur, Paul. *Figuring the Sacred*. 8.

⁷⁰ Frye interprets the Fall in Genesis as the point in time where humankind establishes the subject/object split. Therefore, the separation from nature that Adam and Eve experienced upon their exile from the Garden is a physical as well as a linguistic one.

same chaotic world. Thus, Blake's problem with Lockean thinking is that Locke "extends the involuntary action into the higher regions of the imagination and tries to make perceptive activity subconscious."⁷¹

The result is that Locke's guinea sun⁷² leaves human imagination lost in the web of conformity. The extraordinary powers that are inherent in metaphorical or visionary thinking are contained by society's conventions. The structure of the society reinforces metaphors that reflect the society itself. In this way, metaphoric thinking is not so much dulled as it is contained. Frye states, "The only possible cure for the original sin of this Selfhood of the natural man is vision, the revelation that this world is fallen and therefore not ultimate."⁷³

The key, or at least one of the keys to Frye's concept, is contained in his idea of the three ways to view the world: the world of vision, the world of sight, and the world of memory. In the first, we see what we want to see; in the second, we see what we have to see; in the third, we see nothing.⁷⁴ The 'nothing' is a way for the mind to imagine the world as an entity that is not imprisoned by our consciousness or restricted by what the mind has seen. The physicality of the world does not hinder our unconscious ability to experience it as an infinite possibility. The way we 'see' the world, ideally as a created and creative world of vision, should then become a part of our unconscious consciousness.

⁷¹ Frye, Northrop. *Fearful Symmetry: A Study of William Blake*. 22.

⁷² Locke's "Guinea Sun" is utilised to show how imagination is restricted by 'blank slate' thinking. This thinking is mocked by William Blake in *A Vision of the Last Judgement* when he writes, ""When the Sun rises, do you not see a round disk of fire somewhat like a Guinea?" Oh no, no, I see an innumerable company of the Heavenly host crying, Holy, Holy, Holy, is the Lord God Almighty.""

⁷³ Frye, Northrop. *Fearful Symmetry: A Study of William Blake*. 58.

⁷⁴ Frye, Northrop. *Fearful Symmetry: A Study of William Blake*. 26.

The unconscious or subconscious memory is different from our objective memory because it is not a direct response to our created reality. The sense of objective memory as something that is a response to our environment aligns with Blake's negative view of Lockean memory. Blake dislikes the Lockean view because the 'Tabula Rasa' or 'blank slate' is always filled up, and is thus a response to, a world already created, already out there. This type of objective memory never has the access to a higher view or vision of a better more imaginative world.

In Guillaumean linguistic terms, sight corresponds with discourse and is how we see the language physically written or spoken. Vision corresponds with tongue and is the unlimited structure of language as it exists prior to the transition into discourse. Memory, unconscious memory in this case not memories of events, corresponds with the total phenomenon of language because they are utilised before the subject/object split. Unconscious memory houses the unconscious potential of language that comes from the entity of tongue but is not influenced by discourse. The total phenomenon of language is understood, studied, and viewed in discourse; however, in the creative act it is not consciously influenced by it. This view of the world is something that we learn through metaphor. In a way, Frye wants us to think metaphorically as the way to educating our minds.

If as a habitual act we learn to think metaphorically, then what govern our perceptions and decisions are acts of identification. This leads to a fluid and flexible way of thinking that becomes a part of our imaginative unconscious. For example, if I said to you that something like a paper clip is like love, you may not immediately identify any sense in

the statement. However, if I continue and state, “they both hold the world together,” you now have a new vision of both a paper clip and love. In metaphoric thinking, I would not have to explain the non-logic in the statement. The listener would unconsciously understand that “they both hold the world together.”

In this imaginative world of creative metaphors, there is no conscious perception of right and wrong, there is only the ability to create without restraint. In a sense, a world of metaphorical vision is one that is reflective, creative, and does not allow for absolute judgement in any person. The reason there is no absolute judgement in any single person is that the created world is the judgement. What you create, either beyond or within society’s restraints, is what you leave behind and thus, what you leave behind is what you were. The implication is that in metaphoric thinking one creates without absolute judgement. Consequently, the allowances that one makes for metaphoric thinking already imply within them that everything is potentially something else, i.e. not itself. Therefore they are always open to question, change, and no thought is confined to cultural or judgemental biases.

The decisive act, then, in Frye’s world of metaphorical vision is the ability to attain the unconscious stage of perfect knowledge, or fluid imaginative thinking. For this shift over to a discussion of the role of the unconscious in metaphoric thinking, we need Samuel Butler. In *Life and Habit*, he notes that “the longer the practice the more knowledge—or, the less uncertainty; the less uncertainty the less power of conscious self-analysis and control.”⁷⁵ By going over something so many times the act becomes habit. No longer is the performer, or orator confined by the act of playing/speaking, he/she is now free to be truly

⁷⁵ Butler, Samuel. *Life and Habit*. 13.

imaginative. She has moved beyond the restraining configuration of notes, past thoughts and even the idea of structure itself. The unconscious consciousness, or the awareness of the state of subconscious thoughts existence, becomes a representation of the truest thing that a person can create in the physical world.⁷⁶

The creative potential that can be realised in metaphor may not be lost; however, it is gathering moss. As language moves through history and the poetic stage becomes the descriptive phase, languages idea of metaphor as a representation of “this is that” switches to simile. Once simile becomes the accepted form of metaphor,⁷⁷ the counter-logical concept that A is B begins to fade. The abrupt notion that A is B becomes the playful idea that A is like B. The addition of the word like to the metaphorical equation allows the descriptive language phase to retain the idea of metaphor without challenging scientific languages need to fulfill empirical requirements.

At this point, we must turn our discussion of metaphor to the area where Frye believes, Butler knows, and Frost understands that we are able to return to a less conscious, yet more aware—in a non-structural sense—part of the mind. What Frye refers to as the ability to think of metaphor as the imaginative, erotic, and ecstatic.

⁷⁶ This is a synopsis of the fuller argument that takes place in Chapter 3.

⁷⁷ Refer to page 8 for more information on the switch to simile.

2.3 Ecstatic Metaphor

Tropes are great by nature and Metaphors
contribute to sublimity and that
emotional or expressive passages for the most
part delight by means of these.⁷⁸

If royal metaphor reinforces the ‘verum factum’ or the created essentials of a temporal society, then the ecstatic metaphor is where the thinker is elevated or lofty in thought.⁷⁹ In *Words With Power*, Frye distinguishes three types or levels of metaphor; “the imaginative, the erotic, and the existential or ecstatic.”⁸⁰ The imaginative level is where the doors of perception⁸¹ are opened and we get a glimpse of something beyond the simple words of the poem or story. The erotic level is where the reader realises that the experience of reading is no longer contained by time lines or categories created by the subject/object split. As we move up the levels, the gap between identity and difference lessens until we reach the ecstatic stage. Ecstatic metaphor reminds the reader or speaker that the subject/object split is a result of language’s movement through both historical time and the microsecond of “thinking time.” In regard to the ecstatic phase, Frye states, “we have a sense of presence, a sense of uniting ourselves with something else.”⁸²

Within us is the ability to return to the symbiotic relationship between nature and our self. The elevation can take place in the relationship between the reader/text, the

⁷⁸ Longinus. *On the Sublime*. 53.

⁷⁹ Ecstatic as defined by the *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*. 328.

⁸⁰ Denham, Robert. *Interpenetration as a Key Concept in Frye’s Vision*. 151.

⁸¹ This statement is utilised by William Blake in *Heaven and Hell*; “When the doors of perception are cleansed, man will see the world as it is; infinite.”

⁸² Frye, Northrop. *Words With Power*. 85.

viewer/art or the speaker/listener. This elevation does not occur in the physical world per se; rather, it takes place in the certainty of the unconscious consciousness. The imaginative idea may result in, but is not wholly limited or contained by, an explanation on the level of discourse, or written language. It may be revealed via a piece of art or a well-crafted metaphor; however, linguistically the imaginative idea receives its genesis in “thinking time.”⁸³

The importance of this statement in regards to Gustave Guillaume will be illuminated in chapter two. Suffice to say:

The effectiveness of the operations of this intuitional mechanics as attested in the structures of language, where the results of these operations can be seen, proves conclusively that within us there is an order of activities over which we have no conscious control. And the purpose of these subconscious activities is to increase not our knowledge but our lucidity, that lucidity without which the acquisition of knowledge would be impossible.⁸⁴

Guillaume utilises language to explain his idea on lucidity; however, the physical results of “thinking time” may manifest themselves via music, writing, or the technological arts. The manifestation is a relation between human consciousness and its natural environment that passes beyond the ordinary common sense based on the permanent separation of subject and object. The subject feels the art at the imaginative level and ‘is’ the art at the ecstatic stage.

In *Myth and Metaphor*, Frye restates the essence of Vico’s wisdom: “reality is in the world we make and not in the world we stare at.”⁸⁵ The world of objects, of phenomena, is

⁸³ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. XV.

⁸⁴ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 21.

only made meaningful by the extent to which our words and thoughts make a meaning for them. The operation of ecstatic metaphor is to remind us that imagination does not have to be subservient to reason. Writing or thinking, much like the playing of a musical piece, does not have to progress through reason.⁸⁶ It may begin reasonably enough;⁸⁷ however, in the purest form of art, unconscious action leads the way. The artist who reasons during the euphoric height of improvisation is risking the loss of the ecstatic flow from their unconscious. Reason has no place in the subject's 'feel' for their creation.⁸⁸

Frye, via Vico, perceives in the operation of metaphor the ability to “undercut the conventional dichotomy of reason versus imagination, but also those of man versus nature, knower versus known, subject versus object.”⁸⁹ The purpose of imagination is to provide a glimpse of, or into, something that we cannot objectify. The ecstatic metaphor reminds us that there is an imaginative freedom inherent in something as culturally controlled as discourse. Imagination and metaphor allow the subject to burst traditional conventions about the nature of things.⁹⁰ Metaphor provides the speaker, reader, and listener a chance to renew their sense of self. The renewed sense of self comes from ecstatic metaphor's ability to project our thoughts upward where they are free of language's cultural need to be scientific in nature.

⁸⁵ Frye, Northrop. *Myth and Metaphor*. 122.

⁸⁶ Derrida in *On Grammatology* page 271 insists that all writing progresses through reason. This insistence, along with the idea that written language appeared before spoken is a distinct area of tension between Frye and some of the French linguists. For more on the tension inherent in Frye and Derrida read Garry Sherbert's article 'Frye's Double Vision: Metaphor and the Two Sources of Religion' in the volume *Frye and the Word*. 59-76.

⁸⁷ 'Reasonably' being used in the sense that in the practice/repetition phase of learning, a person is using her reason or logic to understand how their consciousness is affecting their actions.

⁸⁸ 'Feel' being utilised not in the artist's emotional response to the finished piece; rather, to the sense they have as their performance overpowers the perceived line between subject and object.

⁸⁹ Cotrupi Caterina Nella. *Northrop Frye and the Poetics of Process*. 75.

⁹⁰ Ricoeur, Paul. *Figuring the Sacred*. 8.

The concept of ecstatic metaphor as a process to uplift thought becomes dated as humankind's religious reasoning moves from the given physical environment to the world constructed by humanity.⁹¹ In the world constructed by humanity, the subject/object split remains at the forefront of consciousness and thought becomes elevated only in reflecting upon the self. Because of royal metaphorical thinking, the modern reader's understanding of literature, or language, is as a relationship between herself and the world she has created. For Frye, "literature always assumes, in its metaphors, a relation between human consciousness and its natural environment that passes beyond the ordinary common sense based on permanent separation of subject and object."⁹²

The power of a book such as the Bible lies in its ability to make the reader a different person after he/she has read, understood, and incorporated her understanding into her thinking. For example, if she takes the words of Jesus literally, or understands them in the centripetal/centrifugal sense, they should allow her to incorporate some concept of the "Golden Rule" into her life.⁹³ If she does not understand the sense of ecstatic metaphor, then that change happens in cultural time and is not a reflection of the sublime change that is possible in metaphoric understanding. The change is as visible as it is viable on the surface and may be good for them and those around them; however, their knowledge about the change is still based on a centripetal/centrifugal understanding of a created reality. A book, not her perceptions about 'how' she thinks about the book's contents, has resulted in the change.

⁹¹ The enlightenment is a major contributor to this shift in reasoning. For more on Frye's thoughts concerning this movement read 'Pistis and Mythos' in *On Religion*. 1-7.

⁹² Frye, Northrop. *Words with Power*. 71

⁹³ A key component of Jesus' teaching, the Golden Rule is, "do unto others as you would have them do unto you." (Matthew 7:1).

The personal change has taken place in the temporal setting of manufactured creations and not in the process by which one may understand one's relation to the physically visible and the visualized. Frye states, "the ordinary waking consciousness is not creative."⁹⁴ The ordinary consciousness is overly focussed on that which humankind has created—in this case the Bible—and not on how understanding the operation of metaphors within the Biblical text can enlighten the reader to a deeper understanding of the creative process in them.

In the New Testament, Jesus discusses a metaphorical way to heaven that resonates with a tacit knowledge of the sublime.⁹⁵ In essence, Jesus is the way to another type of life beyond the one that the reader perceives at present. The problem, in the descriptive language phase, is that the reader's ordinary waking consciousness is compelled to place the sayings of Jesus within the limits of his temporal world. Frye addresses the paradox:

Jesus' metaphors of a way come mainly from the more exoteric parts of his doctrine, addresses to a public still immersed in a time-world, where it seems appropriate to suggest extensions of time (the next world or the after-life).⁹⁶

With regard to ecstatic metaphorical thinking, the reader who places the sayings of Jesus into a time and space structure is unable to elevate himself above or outside his world/culture. The reader may understand that Jesus' parables are metaphoric; however, his cultural limitations hinder an elevated understanding. Moreover, he may wonder when the Kingdom of God will be physically visualised on earth.

⁹⁴ Frye, Northrop. *Words with Power*. 81

⁹⁵ The New Testament Gospels are rife with passages concerning the way. For example: John 14: 1 – 7.

⁹⁶ Frye, Northrop. *Words with Power*. 94.

The French thinker Paul Ricoeur would note that such a reader has failed to realise how metaphor challenges the cultural assumptions created by language.⁹⁷ Ricoeur, in *Figuring the Sacred*, establishes the concept that “a metaphor is first and essentially an ‘odd’ predication that transgresses the semantic and cultural codes of a speaking community.”⁹⁸ The metaphor works to intertextualize the thinker with his concept of how he thinks. He may wonder, why do I think that that particular metaphor is illogical or counter-logical? This type of thinking leads to the ability to think beyond the cultural box. The Kingdom of God is no longer a representation of the thinker’s idealized culture, obviously, a utopia that resembles the one in which they have been born. Rather, it can become the notion that the Kingdom of God is another type of thinking, beyond the perceptions of the thinker’s present reality.

So how do the readers prepare themselves to allow their ordinary waking consciousness to get out of the way? Better yet, how can they begin to understand that their ordinary waking consciousness is in the way? The goal is to get a glimpse of something that we cannot objectify. Frye asks and answers the question concerning exactly what we are trying to glimpse?

Glimpse of what? To try to answer this question is to remove it to a different category of experience. If we knew what it was, it would be an object perceived in time and space. And it is not an object, but something uniting the objective with ourselves.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Ricoeur Paul. *Figuring the Sacred*. 160.

⁹⁸ Ricoeur Paul. *Figuring the Sacred*. 161.

⁹⁹ Frye, Northrop. *Words with Power*. 83.

Readers have to prepare themselves to understand that the time between imagination and its resulting discourse is a time frame that can be utilised to generate new metaphors. Ideally, metaphor becomes a tool for synthesising aspects of reality that challenge or burst the traditional assumptions about the way things are or were.

The key for our imaginative human being resides in our ability to rely on our subconscious to direct us. In Guillaume's linguistic terms, the reality of language is largely subconscious and extends far beyond what direct observation can reveal. Guillaume realised that reaching this hidden part is attainable only by analysis, by reflecting on observed data. The observed data, to a linguist, is the transition of language from tongue to discourse. What is observable or able to be reflected upon, is the written or spoken word. Guillaume speaks of observation and reflection in terms of their results—seeing and understanding—or in terms of their objects—the perceivable and the conceivable.¹⁰⁰

The linguist, thus finds himself in the position of operating between the perceivable and the conceivable in his effort to understand what he sees and to see what he understands. The importance of observation would be lost without the accompaniment of reflection. Guillaume is convinced that, on the mental side, the majority of language is subconscious and he realised that reaching this hidden part can only be achieved through analysis, by reflecting on observed data. In a sequence that mimics the time it takes for the speaker to achieve the transition from thought to discourse, the observer must take the time to reflect on his data before he can realise its potential. The extent of time may differ, microseconds

¹⁰⁰ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. XII.

in the unconscious transition, and days, weeks, or years in the reflection between the observed and what has been seen; however, there is the element of time in both.

The fact that, for Guillaume, something is potential before it is actual leads us to his concept of ‘thinking time.’ ‘Thinking time’ is the micro-stretch of time that it takes for language to become actual. For Guillaume, the time it takes for the speaker to shift his thoughts from tongue to discourse is the time when he has access to the ‘total phenomenon of language.’ Understanding this concept in its fullness, along with Frye’s ecstatic metaphor will illuminate the idea that humans are constantly re-defining their understanding of the temporal world in language. Therefore, the potential for every body to ‘understand’ their reality beyond the constructs of their traditional assumptions and inherent values can occur unconsciously, rhythmically and without overt physical effort. Frye finds the sublime, and its resulting ability to inform us of our true ‘reality,’ in metaphor, and Guillaume enhances the concept within his theory of linguistic movement. We shall now look at the intricacies of Guillaume’s thought.

3.1 Guillaume's Linguistics

Well there is no doubt that Guillaume's approach to
language is different.¹⁰¹

Gustave Guillaume's linguistic theories, as presented in *Temps et Verbe* or *Time and Verb*, have been accused in the Anglo-Saxon world of being rather "eccentric, arcane and at times almost occult."¹⁰² These accusations, along with Guillaume's shyness and disinclination to publishing, have created not only his aura of eccentricity, but also areas of opportunity for the burgeoning scholar. The fact is, that his work has only garnered modest academic or public scrutiny. There have been pockets of interest, most notably the Canadians John Hewson, Walter Hirtle and Rebecca Posner. Yet, for the most part, the Ferdinand Saussures and Noam Chomskys of the linguistic academic world have been favoured over Guillaume. Is Guillaume too different to be useful?

Before we delve into the scientific intuition inherent in Guillaume's linguistic approach, we have to explain how he differs from the more accepted linguistic stance of Ferdinand de Saussure. The difference may seem subtle, but it is as intricate as it is important. The Saussurean model of language maintains that *langue* and *parole*¹⁰³ are different entities. In the structural stage of language—*langue* for Saussure, *tongue* for Guillaume—Saussure believes that there are certain distinctions that are necessary and inherent to human thought. For Saussure, these inherent distinctions are indispensable. For Guillaume, the distinctions, when looked at considering space and time, "revealed that

¹⁰¹ Posner, Rebecca. *Can Guillaume Teach Us a Lesson?* 83

¹⁰² Binnick, Robert. *Tense and Aspect in Indo-European Languages: Theory, Typology, Diachrony*. 1

¹⁰³ Note that Saussure's *parole* is Guillaume's discourse and Guillaume's *tongue* is Saussure's *langue*.

these distinctions formerly considered universal and necessary (such as the noun/verb distinction) are not found in all languages.”¹⁰⁴ This case for inherent distinctions is what allows Saussure to claim that *langue* is a steady-state system.

For Saussure, *langue* is, at each instant of its existence, a synchrony of relationships. It is a steady-state system whose reason for existing is found within itself. The fact that it is organized and has its own laws cements the ‘steady-state’ argument in the Saussurian model. The problem, is that “a good descriptive grammar based entirely on synchrony, without any appeal, however slight, to diachrony, to history” can never explain the growth of language. A pigeon language would be unthinkable.¹⁰⁵

The Guillaumian model presents “tongue and discourse as different temporal aspects of an experiential continuum that he calls the act of language.”¹⁰⁶ For Guillaume, tongue is an underlying system that conditions discourse. For Saussure, parole is the observable system that forms, changes and influences *langue*. A diagram will clear up the terminology.¹⁰⁷

| | | | | | |
|--------------------|---|---|--------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| Saussure’s model: | <i>Langue</i> | = | <i>Langue</i> | + | <i>Parole</i> |
| Guillaume’s model: | <i>Language</i> (Total phenomenon) ¹⁰⁸ | = | <i>Tongue</i> (Theoretical) | + | <i>Discourse</i> (Empirical) |

Guillaume sees language as a ‘total phenomenon’ that is not divided into the subject object or conscious natural split. In Guillaume’s model, tongue is permanently present within us in

¹⁰⁴ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 27.

¹⁰⁵ For more explication on creole, pigeon or newly created forms of expression see Steven Pinker’s *The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language*.


¹⁰⁶ Hewson, John. *The Essential Guillaume: A Critical Explication*. V.

¹⁰⁷ If confusion still exists concerning the difference between *langue* and tongue, consider examining the chart and re-reading the beginning of chapter 3.1.

¹⁰⁸ Hewson, John. *The Essential Guillaume: A Critical Explication*. IV.

a state of potentiality. Discourse is the empirically quantifiable aspect of language that is present in us in a state of actuality. The difference with Saussure is that “the Saussurean dichotomy is a dualism, and secondly, the Saussurean term *langue* designates a static bundle of oppositions, a view that needs to be modified because language is an activity, a dynamism.”¹⁰⁹ The time it takes for language to move from the potential to the actual—thinking time—is the non-static, or moving activity that separates Guillaume from Saussure.

The Guillaumean concept of language is “tongue plus discourse.” Therefore, discourse, in this sense, does not require a paragraph or elongated oration. “Any connected articulated language is discourse in the Guillaumean sense.”¹¹⁰ The fundamental key to understanding Guillaume is a clear grasp of the tongue/discourse distinction. Tongue is the system and discourse, as an entity, is what is produced by the exploitation of this system. A diagram followed by a concrete analogy will illuminate the Guillaumean distinction.




In *The Guillaumean Tradition in Canadian Linguistics* John Hewson utilises a concrete analogy of what Guillaume means by the tongue/discourse distinction. Using a child’s construction kit as his model (such as Leggo blocks that we should all be familiar with), Hewson explains that the blocks themselves are an analogy for tongue, and the

¹⁰⁹ Hewson, John. *The Essential Guillaume: A Critical Explication*. V.

¹¹⁰ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. XX.

¹¹¹ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. XXI.

constructions that the child makes are an analogy for discourse. The following figure should be compared directly with the figure above.¹¹²



The fundamental difference between Saussure and Guillaume is that Saussure would define language as a set of sentences. Accordingly, a Saussurean linguist utilising the Leggo block analogy would reverse the location of the completed model and the construction set. He would find the completed model—the observable—and then deconstruct it into separate parts—the subconscious tongue. The analogy makes it clear that Guillaume does not consider tongue to be a set of sentences, but rather a set of related parts that can be fitted together to form an infinite variety of sentences. For Guillaume, the entity of tongue is utilized in constructing sentences. For Saussure, discourse is deconstructed to illuminate tongue.

Guillaume notes that the interpretation of language as a “total phenomenon” is not his entirely. In reference to Saussure he writes, “this interpretation, which is my own, is not found in Saussure’s book, but even though it does not appear explicitly, it is implied throughout.”¹¹⁴ Guillaume suggests that when the book is viewed as a whole, the idea is there, implicitly. It is interesting to note that Guillaume’s reading of Saussure mimics Frye’s reading of the bible as a whole, where “the metaphor of Messiah, everything is

¹¹² Hewson, John. *The Guillaumian Tradition in Canadian Linguistic*. 164.

¹¹³ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. XXI.

¹¹⁴ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 35.

united in Christ”¹¹⁵ is implied and tacit when the Bible is understood metaphorically. Where Guillaume veers from the Saussurean path is when he introduces time into the linguistic equation. “One factor which the Saussurean formula fails to consider, but which should be very carefully taken into account in any linguistic question, is the factor of time.”¹¹⁶

A verb used for contingent or hypothetical action, an action that is viewed hypothetically when observed by Guillaume, illuminates his concept of ‘thinking time.’

Guillaume notes:

use of the French subjunctive which opposed it to the indicative had led him to reflect on how we think the possible and the real. He saw that to represent some event as possible by means of the subjunctive mood, the speaker must somehow give it precedence, must somehow think it prior to thinking it as real by means of the indicative mood. And the only time within which he could postulate that the subjunctive precedes the indicative was the “thinking time” required by the mental process of representing a verb. This insight led him to imagine the system of mood as essentially a single, subconscious operation of thought which can be held up at successive moments, each such interception giving rise to the formal (grammatical) meaning that characterizes one of the moods of the French verb.¹¹⁷

For Guillaume, everything in language –and I would add thought—is a process that requires time, even if it is a micro-stretch of time, to become actual. In a sense, it takes time to think, just as it takes time to walk and it takes time to ‘see’ art or literature entirely before one can understand its truth or significance.

¹¹⁵ Frye, Northrop. *On Religion*. 179.

¹¹⁶ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 35.

¹¹⁷ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. XIII.

So in the glimmer of time it takes language to become actual, what happens?

Scientifically or descriptively speaking Guillaume writes:

And so we may perceive and understand that speech is one thing at the deep level of tongue and something else at the surface level of discourse. Non-physical at the level of tongue, it becomes physical at the level of discourse, provided that discourse does not remain internal. This transformation is the one we have to take note of during the functioning of language, and when we study speech.¹¹⁸

Still, beyond the scientific explanation of language, there exists a mental representation of the language as total phenomenon.

In his 1991 book, *Consciousness Explained*, Daniel C. Dennett, in what is clearly a scientific definition of language, describes how words are uttered by postulating a ‘boss’ of words that he calls the “conceptualiser.”¹¹⁹ In Dennett’s book, the microsecond of time that it takes for the speaker to move the total phenomenon of language from tongue to discourse is described as a decoding of information in the head. He calls this decoding “mentalese.”¹²⁰

The conceptualiser gives the command and from the vast possibilities in language, the minions or production team—utilizing mentalese—decides which words will be spoken. There appears to be no reflection from the subject other than to decide to speak and turn the process over to the conceptualiser. However, Dennett argues that the conceptualiser is an illusion, and he believes that there are individual processes going on that we then

¹¹⁸ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 38.

¹¹⁹ Dennett, Daniel C. *Consciousness Explained*. 233.

¹²⁰ Dennett, Daniel C. *Consciousness Explained*. 231.

unify under the heading conceptualiser. Still, for our purposes, it shows that Dennett understands that speech is preconscious and then conscious.

Dennett broaches the subjective experience, and echoes Guillaume's thoughts on thinking time, as a consideration of "the mismatch of distance in semantic space."¹²¹ The subject adjusts the content of his speaking during the bridging of the semantic space between wanting to speak and speaking. During that time there is a back and forth process that changes and challenges, what is to be expressed. As the subject, or his conceptualiser decides what words will be uttered, the experience can be effected. Dennett writes: "words and phrases could actually change the content of the experience."¹²² The experience, in this case, is the discourse that is observable in the physical world. In a catch 22, what is experienced can be changed by discourse and the observed discourse can change how we view the experience of language. The Saussurean dichotomy between tongue and discourse becomes a recognizable part of Dennett's scientific linguistic explanation.

Since for Guillaume, tongue and discourse are greater parts of the total phenomenon of language, the catch 22 is avoided because it is a problem in the consciousness of tongue and discourse. It is not a problem in the total phenomenon of language because that entity resides in the subconscious. So, how do we understand the micro-stretch of time that it takes for language to pass from tongue to discourse in the Guillaumean model? The answer is found in the realm of intuition.

¹²¹ Dennett, Daniel C. *Consciousness Explained*. 247.

¹²² Dennett, Daniel C. *Consciousness Explained*. 247.

3.2 Guillaume's Intuition

Brue is blowing right on them, "Birth of the Blues,"
down jazzy, and when his turn comes to enter the tune
he comes up with a perfect beautiful new idea that
announces the glory of the future world¹²³

During a lecture dated February 14, 1957, Gustave Guillaume describes intuition:

The truth comes to us not only from reason, but also
from the heart; the heart gives knowledge of first
principles and reason, not being involved in them,
attempts to oppose them but to no avail... And it is the
knowledge from heart and instinct that reason needs for
support, as a basis for all its discursive activity.¹²⁴

If one intuitively knows a 'truth'¹²⁵ and recognises the importance and moral infallibility of this fact, then a potential action—in Guillaumean terms—becomes the acceptable way for them to iterate their intuitive sense of what is just. Intuition, then, does not require empirical justification to be known; however, in a poetic sense, it becomes explainable via the linguistic style in which the subject of intuition feels most comfortable.

Guillaume, in a passage that certainly echoes with the essence of Samuel Butler's *Life and Habit*,¹²⁶ expands his concept of intuition by noting that:

¹²³ Kerouac, Jack. *Desolation Angels*. 222.

¹²⁴ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 20.

¹²⁵ In a Kantian sense, one would understand a morally good or just maxim intuitively, even though they may not be able to prove it objectively.

¹²⁶ A fuller comparison between Frye's metaphor, Guillaume's intuition and Butler's habit will be undertaken in chapter 3.

All the workings of this intuitional mechanics are subconscious. Subconsciousness and intuition are much the same: the effectiveness of the operations of this intuitional mechanics as attested in the structures of language, where the results of these operations can be seen, proves conclusively that within us there is an order of activities over which we have no conscious control. And the purpose of these subconscious activities is to increase not our knowledge but our lucidity, that lucidity without which the acquisition of knowledge would be impossible.¹²⁷


So, what is intuition and in what conditions may it operate? For example, diving into a lake to save a drowning infant will certainly fall under the realm of lucid reaction. It is intuitively the right thing to do. The reactor does not consider the conditions of the lake, the chance of success or failure; rather, her/his subconscious takes over and she acts.

Writing about the drowning incident and the ‘reason’ for the ‘heroes’ actions neither explains nor justifies the action. Much like writing itself, the results of the action—in this case the saved child—indicates that the action took place. Explaining the conditions that lead to the intuitive action to save the child is not plausible under our current paradigms of knowledge. However, the fact that a mode of perception may exist which cannot be confused or explained with either sense experience or reason is not illogical. Jumping into the freezing angry water to save the child is not reasonable; however, it is not illogical either.

The difficulty for the subject, then, becomes describing in acceptable linguistic terms a perception –intuition—that cannot be justified within the same structures of language. In other words, one is trying to describe something that is mentally seeable, in the

¹²⁷ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 21.

actual saying of speech or writing. A diagram may help illuminate the movement from the mentally seeable to that which has been said, or is understood in the seeing.



Yet, where does “what has been said” fall along Guillaume’s present concept of operative time? For Guillaume, linguistic time is subjective, not objective, and is based on the movement of the mind’s thought forwards (ascending) in imagination and backwards (descending) in memory.¹²⁹

Operative time is a concept that advances on the movement, in the mind, of language from tongue to discourse. What Guillaume initially expressed as “thinking time” has been changed to represent the self’s understanding of the phenomenon of time. Operative time is a way to describe the actions that occur in the brain as it thinks about making tongue into discourse in a structure that the subject understands. As explained

¹²⁸ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 19.

¹²⁹ Binnick, Robert. *Tense and Aspect in Indo-European Languages: Theory, Typology, Diachrony*. 1

earlier, Daniel Dennett posits the mechanical conceptualiser to help explain this phenomenon. Guillaume writes:

Operative time involves the projection in homogenous, surface dimensions of a process previously undertaken and carried out in heterogeneous, historical dimensions.¹³⁰

Operative time in linguistics is the time that the mind is involved in deploying the system of language.

In his rendering of the future—or the ascending imagination—Giorgio Agamben in *The Time that Remains* debunks the schema of time as represented by a linear line between the past creation and future eschatology because it epitomises a human ‘time-image’ that is “too perfect.”¹³¹ Keep in mind, the idea that too perfect is fallible because it is a human construct and is generated from a time image that resides in the fallen state.

For Agamben, the preferred concept of time is not the ‘time image,’ but rather is illuminated by Gustav Guillaume’s idea of “operative time.”¹³² Operative time is described as “the time the mind takes to realize a time image.”¹³³ While Guillaume’s operative time concludes with a linguistic model that is three dimensional, Agamben places the concept of subjective time within objective time. In a sense, chronological time is never truly ours because it results from a representation of ourselves where we become spectators of our own existence.

¹³⁰ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 123.

¹³¹ Agamben, Giorgio. *The Time That Remains*. 65.

¹³² Agamben, Giorgio. *The Time That Remains*. 65.

¹³³ Agamben, Giorgio. *The Time That Remains*. 66.

In Guillaumean linguistic terms, “a grammatical system is essentially a mechanism in the mind which produces the several meaningful constituents of the system.”¹³⁴ That is, any of the minimal grammatical units of a language that constitute a word, or a part of a word—morphemes—arise at different moments in the operation of thought. The words are always present in the “entity of tongue”: their potential meaning is relegated by where it is going to be placed in the observable structure. How the speaker intends the words to be represented chronologically—in the past, present, or future tense—will determine which morpheme is unveiled in discourse. It is this ‘thinking or operative time’ “of a system which provides a necessary parameter for any language system.”¹³⁵

Subjective time gains expression as the time we have, the only time in which we are not constrained by our mind’s recourse to a construction of spatial order. Subjective time builds on the tension between events that are merely constructions of the events as experienced in time; events that are either unattainable owing to the fact that they are experienced in the past, or are unattainable because they tend to “infinitely defer themselves.”¹³⁶

The Guillaumean concept hinges on the idea that time “not being representable by itself, borrows its means of representation from space, and that it is clothed in a spatial representation, in the absence of which we would know time only as experience.”¹³⁷ If we only knew time as experience we would not really know it, as we could not truly experience the past. As tongue moves into discourse, it comes into being by converting

¹³⁴ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. XIII

¹³⁵ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. XIII

¹³⁶ Agamben, Giorgio. *The Time That Remains*. 70.

¹³⁷ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 6.

experience, which the human mind tends to get away from, into a representation, within which the human mind established itself.¹³⁸ It is an operation of the mind that reinforces the concept of the mind in reality. The totality of language exists in the subconscious, which is out of time; however, it utilises chronological ordering—the morpheme example above—to provide a representation of the mind’s experience of time.

The key for Guillaume’s concept of “thinking time” resides in our ability to rely on our subconscious to direct us far beyond what direct observation can reveal. In Guillaume’s linguistic terms, the reality of the total phenomenon of language is largely subconscious and while discourse is observable language it extends far beyond that direct observation. He realized that this hidden part, which occurs in the microsecond of thinking time, can be reached only by analysis, by reflecting on observed data. Guillaume speaks of observation and reflection in terms of their results –seeing and understanding—or in terms of their objects –the perceivable and the conceivable.¹³⁹

Therefore, the linguist must always be in transition between the perceivable and the conceivable in an effort to understand what he sees and to see what he understands. Linguistics, for the Guillaumean, is a two-way science. The linguist observes, reflects, and allows his intuition the freedom to analyse with imagination. Again, Guillaume’s concept of intuition is the underlying theme concerning the subconscious; however, the idea that something is potential before it is actual leads us to ‘thinking time.’

¹³⁸ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 7.

¹³⁹ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. XII

In just this action the individual's subconscious operation becomes a part of the actualized system of language or potential community. Again, linguistically, Guillaume notes, in reference to the transition from tongue to discourse, that:

It consists of a double movement, the first of which carries from the greatest extent possible for any notion (the universal) to the least extent possible (the singular); the second, following on the first in operative "thinking time," carries inversely from the least to the greatest extent."¹⁴⁰

To project this movement onto the concept of the actualized system of language, or potential community, involves the notion that in the deepest realm of human thought, the individual's potentials have their greatest possibilities. However, when they move to the singular and are acted out in linear time, they have the least extent possible. They are observable, and in being observable as an action in linear time, they are no longer potential. In a way, observing discourse can reveal to us that language has limitless applications; however, it can never show us the limitless potential of tongue.

Reflecting on the form of the movements from the universal to the singular Guillaume coined the term "binary tensor."¹⁴¹ This term, or mechanism, was utilised by Guillaume to "provide a representation of a variable relationship based on quantity."¹⁴² For our purpose, he utilised the binary tensor mechanism to depict the relation within the verb that expresses time as an infinite stretch and time as a finite stretch, the present. For example; the term 'I work' offers the idea that I will be busy for an infinite amount of time.

¹⁴⁰ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. XV

¹⁴¹ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. XVI.

¹⁴² Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. XVI.

The term ‘I worked,’ places my action on a temporal time line where my action has a beginning and an end.

In a sense, the action is contained by the notion of temporal time itself. Therefore, upon inversion, the subject’s activities, which are the least of their actions in actuality, are reflected upon in “thinking time” and become an active part of the potentiality of their next act. The act is ‘finished’ in reality; however, the ways of describing it in language are never finalised. Much like Frye’s ecstatic metaphor, the concept of “thinking time” echoes with the hopes of the potential acts that reflect the intuitive imaginative efforts of their subject in what one might consider the educated subconscious.¹⁴³

¹⁴³ Frye’s book *The Educated Imagination* is an explication of how literature, literary education and the sense of metaphor can lead to a different understanding of our political, social, or religious attitude. The reader should consider reading the first chapter, *The Motive for Metaphor*.

3.3 Guillaume's Potential

Everyone knows that on any given day there
are energies slumbering in him which the incitements
of that day do not call forth. Compared with what we
ought to be, we are only half awake. The human
individual usually lives far within his limits¹⁴⁴

Clearly William James is concerned with more than our potential as it relates to the physical activities of everyday living. He understands that humanity is far from maximising the spiritual, charitable and intellectual aspects of existence. In a similar manner, Guillaume realises that the system of tongue¹⁴⁵ is a system of potential and is opposed to the actuality of language that is found in discourse. Not unlike James' concept of unfulfilled potential, Guillaume contends that tongue maintains its potential every time we utilise 'thinking time' to create discourse. The potential remains unfulfilled every time the speaker thinks consciously and merely makes his discourse a reiteration of that which descriptive language has created.

In the micro-second of 'thinking time,' when the speaker is conveying his thoughts from an area of potential—tongue—to the domain of actuality—discourse—the speaker is partaking in a transitional operation. The descriptive thinker's discourse will more than likely lack any sense of flair. The metaphorical thinker, or someone who is attempting to make metaphorical thinking habitual,¹⁴⁶ has the potential to challenge the listener, himself

¹⁴⁴ James, William. *The Works of William James: Essays in Religion and Morality*. 131.

¹⁴⁵ Again, tongue to Guillaume equates to Saussure's *Langage* and reflects a concept of language as a potential and is opposed to discourse, which denotes language in use.

¹⁴⁶ The habitualising of metaphorical thinking will be examined in chapter 4.

and his cultural identifications with the words he has chosen. The state of language, or the “total phenomenon” of language, exists as a potential for Guillaume.¹⁴⁷ As language moves from tongue to discourse the permanent potential that exists in tongue becomes actualised in the state of permanent reality.

Guillaume writes:

Tongue exists in each one of us on a permanent basis prior to any act of expression. I speak and express myself by working from tongue. My speech, my discourse, is by nature momentary; on the other hand, tongue belongs to the non-momentary, the permanent within me.¹⁴⁸

The discourse of the habitually metaphorical thinker becomes a reminder that “the permanent within me,” the tongue, is never the same in consecutive moments. The transition from the unconscious potential in the total phenomenon of language to discourse provides a glimpse into the speaker's ability to create from the structure of tongue. A second attempt at discourse, for the metaphorical thinker, provides another opportunity to enhance his total phenomenon of language.

Guillaume describes the micro-second of thinking time as an “internal chronology” which he divides into two phases:

- A. an internal phase of potentiality, from the formative elements of the word to the constructed word;
- B. a final phase of actuality, from the word to the sentence, that is from the unit of the potential to the unit of the actual.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. XX.

¹⁴⁸ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 5.

¹⁴⁹ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 82.

For the sake of clarity, the transition goes from the words to the thought expressed. The important thing to note, in relation to the unconscious habit of Butler, is that the speaker or the listener may consciously observe the operations in stage B. The more deep-seated, or to Butler, unconscious operations in stage A cannot be observed. By the time stage B appears in the objective world¹⁵⁰ stage A has already happened; thus, it is too late for conscious observation to relate stage A to what has been created. In Fryean terms, stage A happens in the unconscious, before the subject has a chance to confine it to the subject/nature split. Therefore, in Guillaumean terms, the total phenomenon of language as a mental operation is “established permanently on the level of potentiality.”¹⁵¹

In relation to Frye’s ecstatic metaphor, the total phenomenon of language resides beyond, or on the outskirts, of that which we have created. Once human language becomes a possibility, then it naturally begins the process of becoming tongue. Language also wants to become discourse to reinforce its own existence in the created reality of the speaker.¹⁵² The essence of time in language contains its potential as it progresses, akin to how royal metaphor and ecstatic metaphor are relegated to poetic talk as they progress through history.¹⁵³ The urge for humanity, in both descriptive language and the transition from tongue to discourse, is to contain things in our conscious creations. Since tongue and the total phenomenon of language are situated prior to the limen of consciousness, if we are to access the ‘truth’ in them, then we have to understand how metaphorical thinking can

¹⁵⁰ Discourse appears in the objective world via writing or speaking.

¹⁵¹ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 84.

¹⁵² For more on the importance of time and its effect on the reality of language, re-read pages 46, 47 and 48.

¹⁵³ Poetic talk being misunderstood in a descriptive language phase as empirically unsound and therefore not purposeful.

become habitual. This will allow us to make metaphorical thinking a part of our everyday thinking.

Frye suggests that we have to understand the “spontaneity at the end of experienced learning.”¹⁵⁴ Once we understand language as a system of representations that have been formulated over thousands of years, we understand that language is “deliberately founded.”¹⁵⁵ You may wonder, what does language’s being deliberately founded have to do with whether or how we think metaphorically? Simply, it does not. The progression of language from a deliberate tool to express the human mind on the chronological time line to a descriptive entity is not the problem. The tendency of scientific or descriptive language to hide metaphor’s ability to challenge our logic is. If we can think metaphorically or illogically, then we can begin to access the potentiality of language beyond discourse, through tongue and into the unconscious state of the ‘total phenomenon’ of language. In that realm, the effect of our cultural envelope loses its ability to contain us in a subject/object understanding of our world.

¹⁵⁴ Frye, Northrop. *Myth and Metaphor*. 150.

¹⁵⁵ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. 129.

3.2 Movement and Truth

We know the truth, not only by the reason,
but also by the heart.¹⁵⁶

The fact that Guillaume's concepts concerning operative time, subjunctive mood and the psychomechanics of language have been mostly ignored means they are fresh for new applications. At first the Guillaumean concepts may seem in opposition, or at least not closely related, to Frye's metaphorical ideas. In fact, however, they are symbiotic. Frye speaks of literature, or language, as being understood by the reader as a relationship between himself and the world he has created.¹⁵⁷ This concept is underdeveloped for Frye and he states:

Literature always assumes, in its metaphors, a relation between human consciousness and its natural environment that passes beyond the ordinary common sense based on permanent separation of subject and object."¹⁵⁸

The result of this view of metaphor, for Frye, is that language and subsequently literature has created a double image for humankind. The image is that of humanity in nature and humanity in its created envelope (Vico's *verum factum*).

Gustave Guillaume, as a mentalist, anti-positivist, and follower of Einstein's theories brings to language a comparable double image to the one utilised by Frye. As a mentalist, he believed that the mind could be dealt with as a scientific substructure and that psychomechanisms¹⁵⁹ are as vital to linguistic science as the workings of the atom are to

¹⁵⁶ Pascal, Blaise. *Thoughts*. 1.

¹⁵⁷ As explained earlier this is a result of the descriptive language phase and royal metaphor and is not the ideal situation for educated literature.

¹⁵⁸ Frye, Northrop. *Words with Power*. 71

¹⁵⁹ Psychomechanisms are the linguistic patterns and functions of the mind.

physical science. His methodology involves both the empirical and the imaginative in such a way that he does not need to make a choice between the ‘observable’ and the ‘unobservable.’ Akin to Frye’s “A is B,” Guillaume’s methodology encompasses and integrates both the observable (A) and the unobservable (B) within a single view. Accordingly, Guillaume does not believe the metaphysical speculation that the only reality is the directly observable. For example, such a view makes the notion of magnetism or gravity absurd. The idea of gravity resides in our imagination, yet the effects of a rock falling on our foot makes gravity all too real.

The idea, like Frye’s metaphorical view, is counter-logical, counter-conceptual and in the empirical sense, logically absurd. Simply put, to someone raised in the descriptive language phase, the unobservable and the observable cannot be the same thing. If science is more than observation, then imagination has to play a role in scientific discovery. For Guillaume, as well as Frye, science and imagination are equal; imagination is not subservient to reason.

Hewson writes, “scientific methodology is in this way continuously circulating between the theoretical and the empirical.”¹⁶⁰ The observer must look at his results and subject them to a continuous treatment of imaginative and thorough appraisals during the testing stage of the experiment. This movement gathers evidence that proves or disproves the theory. The circular motion from the imaginative to the observable is akin to Frye’s notion of centripetal and centrifugal force in reading literature. . Viewing Frye’s intentional fallacy argument and contrasting it with Stanley Fish’s idea that the best reader understands

¹⁶⁰ Hewson, John. *The Essential Guillaume: A Critical Explication*. III.

the value of the work at the level of temporal experience will abet Guillaume's "moment of understanding."

In a sense, this 'seeing' or moment of understanding occurs in the deepest thought recesses of our mind in what Guillaume calls "thinking time." To uncover the universal truth that art represents, the individual must potentially consider every act of art under the same imaginative umbrella. It is from this consideration that each individual, and thus the community as a whole, can rise above the constraints of value judgements. Thus, the realization of the genuine human being occurs through her ability to transfer potentiality as understood in her imaginative thinking, or 'thinking time,' onto chronological/historical or present time.

In this sense, the reader must overcome his need to place their subjective reasoning—himself—into everything he has read. They also need to realise that the author's intentions regarding his writing may only indicate a portion of what the work has come to represent. The initial thrust of Frye's 'reading' argument is the rejection of criticism that is guilty of the intentional fallacy.¹⁶¹ Frye does not completely exclude the author's intention; rather he notes that the author may have included creative thoughts in his work that were unbeknownst to him. Approaching the text with a conceptual framework, consisting of the theories of Modes, Symbols, Myths, and Genres—the cornerstone of Frye's argument in *Anatomy of Criticism*—the critic can interpret the work as it relates to more than just the author's intention. In other words, the critic does not just pull out of the work what the author was aware of putting in but also extracts the elements

¹⁶¹ Science deals with the intentional fallacy by realizing that the subject becomes a part of the experiment, or affects the experiment, whether they believe they do or not.

of the various modes, genres, symbols, and myths that relate to knowledge that is explicit to the culture of the author, reader, and his social group. In absorbing the material, the reader has a commitment to his imaginative abilities.

This imaginative movement or ability, at first glance, may seem unattainable or unimportant in everyday life. However, the Guillaumean potential of language is realised in discourse whenever the speaker or writer chooses to act. The imaginative element may not be 'seeable' in the actual timeline or mundane everyday conversations, yet there is the potential in every act of discourse to create beyond the conscious control of the subject.

A well-spoken and newly created metaphor, in Frye's ecstatic sense, is an example of the speaker utilising language to remind himself that he is not enveloped in a stagnant form of discourse. The metaphor serves as a reminder to the speaker and the listener that the realities of their existence—again *verum factum*—are not constant but are merely actualities waiting for the act of potential. How do we verify this potential? Potential is verified every time a subject thinks metaphorically or acts unconsciously.

Therefore, the goal for a potentially aware human being—at least to Frye's way of thinking—is to train the mind to be unconsciously metaphorical. Again, Samuel Butler notes:

the more the familiarity or knowledge of the art, the less is there consciousness of such knowledge; even so far as that there should seem to be almost as much difficulty in awakening consciousness which has become, so to speak, latent,—a consciousness of that which is known too well to admit of recognised self-analysis while the knowledge is being exercised—as in creating a consciousness of that which is not yet well enough known to be properly designated as known at all.¹⁶²

Once a person has trained her mind to think in an unconsciously metaphorical way, her effect on the world can begin to transpire on the imaginative level. Unlike the scientist, who is constantly aware of the limits of his own knowledge, in that he is constantly testing his results, the metaphorical thinker is not trapped in a state of active consciousness. They are free to create a world that is not limited by the conformity of consciousness, and thus the world they leave behind is the truest thing that they can in fact leave. It is a representation of a world that is not affected by their conscious, thinking mind.

For example, building a great house provides an envelope that protects your family from nature. It is also a daily reminder, in the active consciousness, that your family and nature are separate. The house is an action that reinforces the concept that our reality is always a reaction to that which we have created. To return to our thoughts on the person who unconsciously rescued the drowning child, if that child grows up to procure peace in the Middle East,¹⁶³ then the unconscious action of illogically jumping into a raging lake has resulted in a world not limited by the conformity of religious warfare.

Linguistically, the problem, at least for a Saussurian thinker, would be that in the concrete structure of speech, where there is a speaker and a listener, the metaphorical vision

¹⁶² Butler, Samuel. *Life and Habit*. 6.

¹⁶³ While we are imagining we may as well imagine large.

would get lost in the transition from one to the other. Therefore, what the speaker leaves behind is not the version of their imaginative world, but rather the listener's version. Scholar Fredric Jameson writes in, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*:

When common sense suggests that the relationship of langue to parole is something inside ourselves, in the individual consciousness, a relationship between the immediate sentence I happen to have pronounced, and my power to construct sentences, my interiorized store of linguistic forms in general. Yet it is possible to break the circuit of discourse in a different place and to come up with a more methodologically suggestive model. This is the originality of Saussure, who separates the parole of the speaker from the langue of the person who understands him, for whom parole is the active, langue the passive dimension of speech.¹⁶⁴

While the Saussurian argument hinges on a collective consciousness¹⁶⁵ in order to assure its methodological foundation, our model of metaphorical vision hinges on the consciousness of the individual. In the language of Guillaume the consciousness of the individual is where the total phenomenon of language resides. In a sense, what we leave for judgement is not any one particular vision, but rather the ability to visualize in an unconsciously metaphorical way. Whether the langue of the person who understands the speaker is unconsciously metaphorical is not the point; the point is that it can be. Just as the belief in art can be above all self-conscious knowledge.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Jameson, Fredric. *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*. 26.

¹⁶⁵ Jameson refers to Durkheim's attempt to separate out the personal and individual from the objective and social as being consistent with Saussure's distinction between langue and parole (Jameson 27).

¹⁶⁶ Butler, Samuel. *Life and Habit*. 42.

Describing Guillaume's thinking from 1929 on, John Hewson says, "Guillaume's scientific work might be characterized by the motto 'think operatively.' For him, everything in language is process."¹⁶⁷ Understanding the language entity requires that the thinker have a view of the process that produced the system. If the thinker can make his understanding of the system habitual—meaning that thinking operatively remains deeply engrained in the thought process—then, he can understand visualization in the unconsciously metaphorical way. For Guillaume, "even when we are not using our language, it resides in the depths of the mind as an organized set of possible processes, as a programme ready to be activated by the thinker/speaker."¹⁶⁸

To expand this idea of the habit of unconscious metaphorical thinking we have to look to a book that was initially published in 1878. The book, written by Samuel Butler and titled *Life and Habit*, has fallen in and out of favour and has been described as being written by an "amateur who blundered into a scientific controversy"¹⁶⁹ without really knowing what he was talking about."¹⁷⁰ While that may or may not be true—and the last one hundred and fifty pages of the book are overly scientific for a noted humorist—the initial one hundred pages are of a unique interest to this thesis. It is among these pages that Butler discusses his idea that complete learning is unconscious learning, and we must examine Butler's concepts if we are going to understand the concept of imaginative 'truth' as a relevant or attainable idea.

¹⁶⁷ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. XIII.

¹⁶⁸ Guillaume, Gustave. *Foundations for a Science of Language*. XIV.

¹⁶⁹ The controversy being between Darwin and Lamarck and concerns whether knowledge or conscious act plays any part in evolution. Darwin is clearly in the no camp. For more on this subject from Butler read *Luck or Cunning?*.

¹⁷⁰ Frye, Northrop. *Myth and Metaphor*. 142.

4.1 Unconscious Knowledge

Archery, is therefore, not practiced solely for hitting a target; the swordsman does not wield the sword just for the sake of outdoing his opponent; the dancer does not dance just to perform certain rhythmical movements of the body.

The mind has first to be attuned to the Unconscious.¹⁷¹

Earlier, we noted how the decisive act in Frye's metaphorical vision is the ability to attain the unconscious stage of perfect knowledge or fluid imaginative thinking. In Guillaume, we showed that he believes 'thinking operatively,' or understanding the process that generates language, can change the way we think and speak. In *Life and Habit*, Samuel Butler states, "the longer the practice the more knowledge—or, the less uncertainty; the less uncertainty the less power of conscious self-analysis and control."¹⁷² All of these thoughts direct us to an area, or understanding, of the thought process that through repetition can change the way we view our created surroundings.

Metaphorical thinking can provide us the chance to view our life and our responsibilities as more than just reactions to our cultural paradigms; however, not everyone is as skilled as the unconscious archer in Herrigel's *Zen*. The question, then is how can metaphorical thinking be understood, recognized, or made useful in a world that we have created? The ability to practice something until one melds the line between subject and object is a result of repetitious practice, requiring an amount of time that most people

¹⁷¹ Herrigel, Eugen. *The Method of Zen*. 13.

¹⁷² Butler, Samuel. *Life and Habit*. 13.

do not possess.¹⁷³ Yet, most people can and do speak¹⁷⁴ and it is in the realm of language that the speaker can realize her ability to think beyond the boundaries of scientific or descriptive language. She can logically think counter-logically.

In his prophetic¹⁷⁵ book *Life and Habit*, Samuel Butler contends; “When our knowledge has become perfect, we no longer notice our consciousness nor our volition.”¹⁷⁶ Undoubtedly, Herrigel’s archer has no conscious knowledge that he has become the arrow. If he were aware of that fact, then the rational part of his thinking would negate his potential to erase the subject object split. As a result, he would not become the arrow; rather, he would be thinking that it is illogical for the subject to become an arrow. Logic dictates, and we should recognize the mimicking of metaphor’s counter-logical argument, that A, the archer, cannot become B, the arrow. It is through practice and repetition that the archer allows his unconscious knowledge to become the arrow. It is the same way, yet somewhat easier, to understand the counter-logical metaphorical statement that love is a paper clip.¹⁷⁷ After all, it is easier to speak metaphorically, than it is to hit the target with the bow and arrow consistently.

¹⁷³ The Zen moment in archery is when the archer becomes the arrow, the target, the bow and remains themselves.

¹⁷⁴ There are records of ‘feral’ children who are unable to speak a known language; however, they do make sounds and attempt to communicate via gestures and noises. For more information read Douglas Candland’s *Feral Children and Clever Animals*.

¹⁷⁵ Northrop Frye contends in *Reflections on Life and Habit* that “many aspects of the luck or cunning controversy have been put out of date by new discoveries about the DNA molecule and the transmission of genetic codes, and many of the things that Butler says should now be read as remarkably prophetic insights into these developments.”

¹⁷⁶ Butler, Samuel. *Life and Habit*. 11.

¹⁷⁷ It does not take much time or practice to think of the statement “love is a paperclip,” and the counter-logical statement opens the speaker and the listener to the imaginative idea—beyond descriptive languages inadequacies—that both a paper clip and love hold the world together.

In a classic example of unconscious knowledge resulting in recordable action, Butler reminds us that a piano player at one point in her learning had to be aware of every note played. Akin to the speaker, who begins talking or writing by carefully thinking about her discourse,¹⁷⁸ eventually speaking or writing becomes such a part of her unconsciousness that she may have difficulty remembering exactly what she has uttered. In relation to the piano player, Butler writes, concerning a particularly spirited piano performance that went beyond the restraints of the written piece:

So complete would the player's unconsciousness of the attention he is giving, and the brain power he is exerting appear to be, that we shall find it difficult to awaken his attention to any particular part of his performance without putting him out.¹⁷⁹

In the early learning stages of piano playing the student would have to be aware of learning every note. As she progresses, and certainly not all piano players will ascend to the uppermost tier of excellence, the player unconsciously forgets the learning that allowed her to excel.

Butler continues, utilising writing as a prime example of the unconscious knowledge of writing flowing from the writer's pen even as her immediate conscious attention is occupied elsewhere:

The formation of each letter requires attention and volition, yet in a few minutes a practised writer will form several hundred letters, and be able to think and talk of something else all the time he is doing it.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ In the Guillaumean sense.

¹⁷⁹ Butler, Samuel. *Life and Habit*. 4.

¹⁸⁰ Butler, Samuel. *Life and Habit*. 6.

The ability to multi-task is certainly nothing out of the ordinary in today's world. Even the least conscious person can eat, converse on a cell phone, all while supposedly paying attention to the road. The beauty, or possibly perfection, of unconscious knowledge is when someone says something unique while performing the other tasks. Butler's writer or our speaker, in the unconscious realm of activity, has the potential to create via the skill of the conscious being distracted, allowing the unconscious to create unhampered. The resulting speech may not have the same recognition as the improvising piano player; however, the ability to create beyond the structure of everyday discourse resides in the spontaneous unconsciousness of every human.

Butler notes that all of the main business of life is executed unconsciously or semi-unconsciously.¹⁸¹ The "main business" for Butler consists of breathing, oxidizing our blood, and swallowing. The main point being, that the individual does not perceive the action of the brain. When she is engaging in acts that she has already perfected, she does not rationalize or consider the intricate brain function that accompanies each movement. Obviously, no one who has not perfected the art of swallowing is long for this life. In the same manner, when discoursing, nobody rationalises the intricate oral functions that are allowing speech to occur. She unconsciously speaks, thus, every act of discourse contains the opportunity to attune one's self to the unconscious state in a similar manner to Herrigel's archer.

¹⁸¹ Butler, Samuel. *Life and Habit*. 53.

In *Myth and Metaphor*, Northrop Frye states, “that A is B is the basic form of verbal structure, perhaps the essential figure of which all the others are variants.”¹⁸² He continues, stating that metaphor is created or comes from a less conscious part of the mind, which is none the less linguistically structured.¹⁸³ The beauty of the metaphor is that it exemplifies a content of language that is not logical. Harkening back to Aristotle on poetics, Frye notes, “the ability to think metaphorically is the distinguishing mark of the poet, what he must be born with, and is the one thing that he cannot learn from others.”¹⁸⁴ The unconscious is a form of distilled intelligence, or intelligence moving so rapidly that we can no longer perceive the details. A well-formed metaphor, either written or spoken, is a reminder to both the speaker and the listener that the created world is merely a place for exploration.

Since metaphor is the microcosm of language itself, because it bridges the gap between consciousness and nature via the essential configuration of A is B, metaphoric discourse can represent the “total phenomenon” of language.¹⁸⁵ Frye writes, “metaphor is a subject identifying with something that is not himself.”¹⁸⁶ The counter-logic of metaphor provides an area where we can identify with hope in the unseen and the illogical.

Butler notes, “practically, we see that the vicarious experience, which seems so contrary to our common observation, does nevertheless appear to hold good.”¹⁸⁷ Art and discourse, in all their forms, are constantly allowing us to understand that we can drop

¹⁸² Frye, Northrop. *Myth and Metaphor*. 33. This is the type of thinking that has been explored in the earlier chapters. Frye contends that all forms of language derive from humanity’s need to describe their objective world in subjective terms.

¹⁸³ Frye, Northrop. *Myth and Metaphor*. 33.

¹⁸⁴ Frye, Northrop. *Myth and Metaphor*. 34.

¹⁸⁵ Refer to chapter 3 for a discussion on Guillaume’s concept of the “total phenomenon” of language.

¹⁸⁶ Frye, Northrop. *Myth and Metaphor*. 226.

¹⁸⁷ Butler, Samuel. *Life and Habit*. 49.

unconscious thoughts into the time line of the objective world. In the “Darkling Thrush,” Thomas Hardy writes a poem concerning a man out for a walk on the eve of a wintry day. As he ponders the desolation:

An aged thrush, frail, gaunt, and small,
In blast-beruffled plume,
Had chosen thus to fling his soul
Upon the growing gloom.
So little cause for carolings
Of such ecstatic sound
Was written on terrestrial things
Afar or nigh around,
That I could think there trembled through
His happy good-night air
Some blessed Hope, whereof he knew
And I was unaware.¹⁸⁸

The beauty of art is that, when performed or viewed by a metaphoric thinker, the performer becomes as free from structure as Hardy’s “Darkling Thrush.” The unconscious beauty of the thrush’s song and his nonchalant attitude towards the bleak reality of nature on a chilly evening certainly are aligned with our thoughts on thinking habitually. We may never play the piano like a virtuoso, or hit the target perfectly; however, vicariously and metaphorically we can understand that our unconscious potential resides beyond the created reality of our everyday place in time.

¹⁸⁸ Hardy, Thomas. *The Darkling Thrush and Other Poems*. 23.

5.1 Conclusion

Yes, metaphor.

That's how the whole fabric of mental interconnections

holds together. Metaphor is right at the bottom of

being alive.¹⁸⁹

The initial goals of this thesis were to rejuvenate or add to Frye's concept of metaphor as he presents it in *The Great Code, Words With Power, Myth and Metaphor* and *Northrop Frye on Religion*. I also wanted to look at a way of thinking that was beyond the descriptive phase that seems to have enveloped us culturally and shaped our thought processes on a daily basis. This led to the idea that via metaphoric thinking humanity can overcome its culture restraints even though they are found and reinforced in everyday discourse. If people can become habitually "aware," in the Butlerean sense, then they will be on their way to understanding their place and the effect of their actions in the reality in which they reside.

Through metaphor and its ability to elevate us beyond the structures that underlie all our verbal signifiers, humanity has the ability to become something that is no longer 'just' reacting to our creation; or our cultural envelope in Fryean terms. The physicality of our existence will always be played out in the history of time, culturally construed social situations and buildings that not only separate us from the natural world but create a false sense of 'natural.' However, if we can make metaphorical thinking, or the habit of it, part of our existence then our thoughts do not have to be trapped in any cultural paradigms or

¹⁸⁹ Capra, Fritjof. *Uncommon Wisdom: Conversations with remarkable people*. 76-77.

ideologies. Metaphor can become a tool for synthesising aspects of reality that challenge or burst the traditional assumptions about the way things are or the way things have to be.

The essence of metaphor is identity in difference, A is B. Understanding how identity in difference affects language and our ability to use metaphor in a positive way offers us the chance to create unconsciously, beyond paradigms and in the linguistic mode, on a daily basis. As a consequence of metaphoric thinking, we have the chance to create every time we engage in discourse.

The transition from tongue to discourse, as Guillaume has shown us, happens in a microsecond of time. That microsecond of time is where we have the ability to return to a phase¹⁹⁰ when the subject/object split was not the essential structure in language. What Butler illuminates is that there are two kinds of memory: one unconscious and conscious. Conscious memory is actualized memory. In that sense, it is always observable and always plays itself out in time. Therefore, the effect of our creations always plays a role in our conscious memory.

Unconscious memory is potential memory. Linguistically, the nanosecond that our brain takes to utilise tongue to create discourse is an act of the ‘total phenomenon of language’ and is not inhibited by time lines or other culturally created ideologies. Metaphor, with its counter-logical logic, then, becomes a place where we can express the concept that we are not entirely constrained by the empirical evidence required to make descriptive language meaningful.

¹⁹⁰ In the Fryean sense explained in chapter one.

In *Myth and Metaphor*, Frye states, “all religions are one.”¹⁹¹ Because of this statement, Frye shows that he understands that behind all the structures of religion there is a commonality. In essence, religion is expressed ritually; however, behind the tradition is a search for that which defines our existence. It would be fair to make the same assessment with regard to language. In the unconscious transition from tongue to discourse, all languages are the same. In the descriptive phase, they are an attempt to signify exactly what it is that we have created to define our existence. To the habitually metaphoric thinker they can be utilised to express something beyond our creations. Metaphoric thinking, like the essence of religion, is a way to express something that is not objectifiable.

Butler makes the claim that “if I could think to you without words, you would understand me better.”¹⁹² This thought underlies Butler’s concerns regarding language. In discourse, the listener may misinterpret what the speaker formulated in the unlimited language of the mind. That which Guillaume calls tongue. This miscalculation of terms affects the meaning in ‘real’ time and negates the potential inherent in the ‘total phenomenon’ of language.

The habitually metaphorical thinker, one who has practiced counter-logical thinking until she understands it on the unconscious level,¹⁹³ may not be able to bridge the distance between tongue and discourse. However, she can provide the listener an opportunity to discover that she is only thinking descriptively. The metaphor challenges the listener to move beyond the logic of descriptive language’s parameters. Metaphor also challenges the

¹⁹¹ Frye, Northrop. *Myth and Metaphor*. 366.

¹⁹² Butler, Samuel. *Life and Habit*. 83.

¹⁹³ Akin to how a Thrush knows to sing.

speaker to utilise his tongue in a way that represents the potential of the ‘total phenomenon’ of language. Thus, metaphor becomes a tool with which we can escape from a language that has moved into a phase where it is merely reinforcing the phase itself. We may be trapped in Vico’s descriptive phase of language; however, we have the ability to know we are, and change our understanding of our thinking accordingly. Then, we will no longer live in a world that we have created; rather, we will live in a world that we ‘know’ we have created.

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