MARRIAGE TERMINATION IN PRELITERATE SOCIETIES
A CROSS-CULTURAL EXAMINATION
OF MARRIAGE TERMINATION IN
PRELITERATE SOCIETIES

By
LESLEY LOIS NOONAN, B.A.

A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University
April 1979
TITLE: A Cross-Cultural Examination of Marriage Termination in Pre-literate Societies

AUTHOR: Lesley Lois Noonan, B.A. (Sociology and Anthropology) (McMaster University)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. R. Brymer

NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 114
ABSTRACT - This is a cross-cultural examination of aspects of selected social structures found in preliterate societies. It seeks a correlation between these structures and termination of marriage. The results were not conclusive but the paper suggests many further avenues of investigation, the most fruitful of which appears to be the degree of severance of women from their natal groups at the time of marriage. The sample is drawn from the HRAF.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## I  STATEMENT OF PROBLEM AND THEORETICAL ORIENTATION  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Composition of the Family</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic Organization</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-Marital Residence</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Settlement Pattern</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Division of Labour</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Gods</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Part 3: Summary</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## II  OPERATIONALIZATION OF MAJOR CONCEPTS  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Design of the Inquiry</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method of Collecting Data</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampling Procedure</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Hypotheses</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridewealth</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Organization</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Union</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Marital Residence</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement Pattern</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of Labour</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Gods</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## III  ANALYSIS OF THE DATA  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bridewealth</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Union</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Organization</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Marital Residence</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement Pattern</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of Labour</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Gods</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV CONCLUSION

The Gibbs and Ackerman Theories 90
Bridewealth 95
Type of Union 97
Post-Marital Residence 98
Settlement Pattern 100
Subsistence 103
Division of Labour 104
High Gods 105
Summary 107

APPENDIX A 109
APPENDIX B 110
APPENDIX C 111
APPENDIX D 112
BIBLIOGRAPHY 114
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1   Bridewealth by Marriage Termination  Page 71
TABLE 2   Type of Union by Marriage Termination  72
TABLE 3   Household Organization by Marriage Termination  74
TABLE 4   Location of Post-Marital Residence by Marriage Termination  76
TABLE 4a  Patrilocal and Matrilocal Post-Marital Residence by Marriage Termination  77
TABLE 5   Settlement Patterns by Marriage Termination  79
TABLE 6   Type of Subsistence by Marriage Termination  81
TABLE 7   Division of Labour by Marriage Termination  82
TABLE 8   High Gods by Marriage Termination  84
TABLE 8a  High Gods Involved with Morality by Marriage Termination  85
CHAPTER I

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM AND THEORETICAL POSITION

In this thesis, my basic problem is to list the effect of a number of social and cultural practices on the stability of marriage. Generally, it will list selected variables from comparative social structures in the light of the regular availability of termination of marriage. This I believe is a somewhat different approach from the usual sociological studies reviewed below. My interest in this area stems from the present concern with the increasing incidence of marital breakdown and the contemporary feeling that the world view of marriage and the family is changing. This feeling is strongly supported by William Goode in his World Revolution and Family Patterns (1963).

Further, marriage as an institution has been repeatedly studied by sociologists, often in connection with the family and its attendant problems, from a "let us increase the chances for success" orientation. However, more recently, it would appear that sociologists are genuinely concerned with the increasing lack of stability of Western marriage and are seeking some answers. Perhaps one of the reasons for this is that "[m]arriage, separation, divorce and widowhood are demographic events that influence the course of population growth (Laing and Krishman, 1976:217). This is a pattern that fits well with the sociological approach.
Historically, our sociological beliefs were that a marital arrangement was contracted for life, and termination of marriage, under circumstances other than the death of one spouse, constituted a failure. This rationale derives from Western philosophy and argues that life-long marriage is the only acceptable pattern. Many traditional sociological texts do contain a chapter on divorce, indicating, in some cases, that sociologists too, viewed divorce as failure or disorganization (W. J. Goode, 1963; H. T. Christensen, 1964).

Traditional American sociologists were preoccupied with the structure and function of the family, drawing heavily on the anthropological "kinship" concept, and with the "success" of marriage. A prominent example of this is Talcott Parsons who organized his theories concerning the American family-kinship-system around the structural-functional level of analysis (1955:v). "The process by which non-kinship units become of prime importance in a social structure, inevitably entails 'loss of function' on the part of some or even all of the kinship units" (1955:9). He does not envision a "decline of the family", but rather a new type of family structure. Loss of some of the functions of the family implies changes in the concept of the family as it was perceived and one of these changes is the growing acceptance of divorce and re-marriage.

Classical American sociologists also made a concerted effort to preserve the "ideal" form of marriage. Counseling and courses relating to marriage were popular. Robert Winch in The Modern Family (1952), equated sex with love and stated that
"the task of marital counselling is to train spouses not to frustrate, but to gratify each other" (1952:691). Winch also believed that "the sociologist is in the practice of looking for causes of dissolution of social structure in its functions - especially in the decline and loss of its functions" (1952:699). He saw a utopian form of the family in the early, largely agricultural farm family that came close to being a self-sufficient economic unit. A shift to working away from the home decreased the self-sufficiency and at least one function of the family was altered. Paul Glick, along with Hugh Carter, set out the important trends in "demographic aspects of marital behaviour in the United States in recent decades" in their *Marriage and Divorce* (1970). This is intended to be another guide for marriage counselling.

Courses in "marriage and the family" stressed the "successful" aspects of the institution as mentioned above. Two typical examples of the texts are Robert Blood's *Anticipating Your Marriage* (1955) and Paul Landis' *Making the Most of Marriage* (1955). Bredemeier and Stephensen summed up the main focus of the American sociologists' orientation as they understood it and as they taught it (1962:208):

In general, studies of marital 'happiness', 'adjustment', and production of marital 'success' are in accord with the factor of homogeneity, socioeconomic positions, length of courtship, and age of marriages.

Some sociologists were, however, realistically facing the changes in the American attitude toward marriage. One of them was William Goode who quite simply stated that marriage "caused" divorce (1960:403). He recognized that "..., although a raise in our divorce
rate cannot be viewed as a simple index of social pathology or even personal disorganization it is without a question an index of social changes" (1960:404). He saw divorce "as a large-scale solution for marital conflict" that was a "relatively recent" phenomenon in Western society (1960:405). Here was a new perspective for American sociologists - how to deal with all the complications, inherent in the family and the kinship system, that marital conflict and divorce bring with them. Goode concentrated on the problems arising from marriage termination, notably in his publication *After Divorce* (1956). Works such as this, plus Paul Bohannan's *Divorce and After* (1968) and The World of the Formerly Married by Morton Hunt (1966), pointed out the American lack of guidelines for, and the lack of assimilation of, the role of divorce.

Further guidelines have been appearing more recently in connection with remarriage. The author of one such study is Godfrey Ellis. He sees marital instability "as an important area of concern in social science and, consequently, new books which provide some measure of understanding or guidance are to be encouraged" (1978:436).

The problems arising from the high incidence of remarriage and the difficulties encountered in trying to define the emerging family roles has intrigued one very recent writer, Davidyne Mayles. In her timely book, *Rewedded Bliss* (1977), she applies the term "synergistic" to the new form of the family. Her new concept of the family is the result of marriage, divorce, and remarriages. She uses the term "synergistic" for this evolving type of family because the total is greater than the sum of its parts. "The synergistic
family is a family formed after divorce and remarriage, where one or both partners already have children and one parent is not the biological parent of the other's children" (1977:9). The book also offers practical counselling for people considering remarriage.

From the foregoing it does not appear that marriage, as the basic unit of organization for procreation, among other functions, is disappearing, but that marriage to the same spouse for life is disappearing. In the centre of this arena we must deal with divorce. Subsumed under all of the above is, of course, the North American right to happiness and to the free choice of a mate fostered by the concept of "romantic" love.

Empirically there is little adherence to the rule of one marriage per individual terminated by death of a spouse. Increasingly, couples are ending their marriages while still paying lip-service to the normative rule.

In summary, then, sociologists see divorce as a fault in our social structure. Western rules and expectations are changing over time, but the inherent feeling that something is wrong is still apparent in sociological studies.

Studies of divorce by anthropologists are relatively rare and the approach is somewhat different. Margaret Mead feels that: "the American marriage ideal is one of the most conspicuous examples of our insistence on hitching our wagons to a star"; further, she goes on to state, that "it is one of the most difficult marriage forms that the human race has ever attempted, and the casualties are surprisingly few, considering the complexities of the task" (1972:324).
The sociologists are trying to find out what has gone wrong. At least one prominent anthropologist believes that it was never right.

However you choose to regard it, "[t]he stability of marriage -- how frequent divorce is and how it affects the transaction and other relations between a husband and wife's groups -- is an important variable" (Keesing and Keesing, 1971:195). In the early twenties Edward Westermarck in his exhaustive work, The History of Human Marriage, wrote the following:

It is a widespread idea that divorce is the enemy of marriage and, if made to easy, might prove destructive to the very institution of the family. This view I cannot share. I look upon divorce as the necessary remedy for a misfortune and as a means of preserving the dignity of marriage, by putting an end to the unions which are a disgrace to its name (1922:377).

The investigation of other societies may indicate my empathy with Westermarck. E. Adamson Hoebel, in his examination of Man in the Primitive World, concludes: "Only a small proportion of marriages among primitives are for life" (1958:313), and Pitts pointed out that 'Murdoock (1950) mentioned that more than half of the primitive societies for which he had data seemed to surpass the United States in divorce rates" (1964:77). Nevertheless, one must be realistic about the Western institution of marriage. Paul Bohannan agrees with William Goode that "[i]n American society, divorce is always considered an admission of failure" (1963:114). Divorce is not necessarily seen as a failure in other societies. Hoebel feels that in general "divorce does not entail such difficulties among the primitives as it does with us" (1958:314). And Bohannan adds: "When a society copes with marital conflict by changing the structure of the relationships
divorce becomes an institutionalized element" (1963:114) and termination of individual marriages may not indicate social disorganization.

Anthropologists study the institution of marriage in all its different forms and in contrasting social structures. This should enable them to hypothesize about the stability of the different forms and their relationship to other social practices within the society. In comparison, sociologists usually restrict themselves to the study of one form of marital union (monogamy), and in a very general way, to one society (the Western "melting pot").

I believe that the stability of marriage is affected by the rules of the social structure and the cultural practices of a society. I intend to test certain of these rules in connection with divorce. Some societies allow, and do not condemn, divorce. What other features do these societies have in common?

The purpose of this thesis will be to discover which features of the social and cultural patterns in other societies, are found in conjunction with the legitimate possibility for termination of marriage. My belief is that these features-in-common may help us to view present-day termination of marriage from a wider perspective.

In order to accomplish this task several steps are necessary, and to this end I present an outline of the rest of the thesis. Briefly, in Chapter I, I shall present my theoretical and logical arguments ending with a statement of hypothesis. Chapter II describes the operations I have devised to test these hypotheses. Chapter III is devoted to my analysis of the data and Chapter IV will contain my conclusions.
In more detail, Chapter I proceeds as follows: First I will review the theoretical position on marital stability, as stated by Evans-Pritchard and Gluckman and subsequently argued by Schneider and Leach. Then I will present the rationale implicit in these theories. Second, I will review other structural and cultural considerations from theoretical and empirical positions in an attempt to illustrate that certain practices may lend themselves more readily to termination of marriage than others.

The most widely used cross-cultural set of survey materials is the Human Relation Area Files, and the standard base line for its use is George Peter Murdock's *Social Structure* (1949). "From these files it is possible to secure practically all the existing information on particular topics in any of the societies covered in an insignificant fraction of the time required for comparable library research" (*Social Structure*, Paperback Edition 1965:vii). Murdock, in his preface to *Social Structure*, says: "It is the result of a conscious effort to focus several disciplines upon a single aspect of the social life of man - and his family and kinship organization and their relation to the regulation of sex and marriage" (1965:vii). Because I will ultimately make use of this excellent material in testing my hypotheses, I will include in each section a review of Murdock's definitions and positions on the different social practices.

Finally, I will present a summary of my contentions so far, and suggest a series of hypotheses stipulating a relationship between certain aspects or practices of the society and the availability of termination of marriage.
Some clarification of the theoretical position on marital stability resulted from a lengthy and complicated exchange of correspondence among David Schneider, Max Gluckman and E. R. Leach. Generally the debate involved resolving different conceptual taxonomies, different levels of analysis and different cause-effect relationships. As it relates to my problem, it is outlined below.

In April of the year 1953, a letter, written by Schneider and printed in the journal *Man*, initiated an exchange of opinions that continued at least until 1961. In his initial letter, Schneider attacked earlier statements attributed to E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1934; 1951) and accused Gluckman (1950) of possibly perpetuating the same fundamental difficulties. The exchange began with the subject of marital stability and the influence of the social practice of the transfer of bridewealth in relation to kinship. Originally Evans-Pritchard appears to have made two conflicting statements in discussion of the Nuer society: (1) bridewealth has a stabilizing action on marriage, and (2) payments do not give stability - i.e., they are "recognition of stability". Evans-Pritchard also seems to have concluded that the fear of repaying bridewealth is not a very powerful sanction on marriage, and stability does not rest on bridewealth but on "affection" between spouses and families.

At this time, Gluckman replied to Schneider re-stating only his own position on the above observations. Leach entered the controversy later in an attempt to bring the taxonomy under tighter control.
Gluckman also took exception to Leach's remarks. In June, 1954, in a further letter to the journal, Leach explained that he was merely trying to clarify the descriptive terms used by Gluckman in order to make a comparative study of the subject feasible. After what appeared to be a personal exchange with Gluckman, Leach attempted to sort out the differing positions in his book, *Rethinking Anthropology* (1961). The following is an outline of the pertinent points of the exchange.\(^1\)

Primarily, Schneider pointed out that marriage is not only a conjugal relationship (spouse to spouse), but it also has affinal implications, i.e., kinship expectations must be met. Evans-Pritchard's error seemed to be with his conclusion that it is the inhibitory action of "moral values" sanctioned by censure that gives stability to marriage. Schneider took exception to Evans-Pritchard's statement because there appeared to be no distinction between jural and conjugal relations (no divorce) but weak conjugal relations (considerable separation). Therefore, in this case, "stable marriage" cannot refer to both jural and conjugal relations. It would seem that Evans-Pritchard is saying that his term "stability" refers to the jural bonds because they are stable and divorce is rare, and that broken conjugal relations are quite apart from the question of stability. Also, the bridewealth payments would appear to inhibit divorce as a jural element. The result appears

\(^{1}\) Until I come to Leach's book the page references are all from the journal *Man* where the earlier references to the works of Evans-Pritchard and Gluckman may be found. The numbers in the Bibliography indicate the specific letters in the "Correspondence" section of *Man*. 
to be that Evans-Pritchard ignored the conjugal relations. A further aspect to be considered, according to Schneider, is that "stability" may also mean that the rules remain unchanged over a long period of time or "stability" may refer to the unchanging nature of the expectations (1953:55). I use the term "stability" hereafter to mean the absence of divorce.

For Schneider, the dilemma is how, in the same population (Nuer), one may have (1) stable conjugal with stable jural relations, (2) less stable conjugal with stable jural relations. He feels that Evans-Pritchard's error is that he is confusing the "actor" with the "structure". The "actors" perform differently but the "structure" remains the same. The "actor" is equated to "affections", "goodwill", and kinship. The structure refers to the rules. Therefore, if bride-wealth is not a factor, but affection between spouses is, then Evans-Pritchard solves a structural problem by using the motivations of some actors. What about the other sets where conjugal relations are broken? Nevertheless Schneider concludes, in this case, that bride-wealth is important because the jural bonds are fixed by the nonreturnability of bridewealth or that something else, not covered, inhibits divorce (1953:56).

In summary, "stability" may be taken in terms of the rate of change in "rules" or "expectations" are conformed to. Stable marriage may mean stable jurally, stable jurally and conjugally, or stable only conjugally. Schneider believes that American sociologists equate stable marriage to conjugal stability (happy marriage versus broken
home). He accuses Gluckman of equating stable marriage to jural stability only and ignoring the conjugal aspects. Therefore, low divorce rate is a statistic; "some do" and "some do not". When considering only the jural aspects of marriage, you must account for the rate. Divorce rate is a consequence of persons' actions and cannot flow directly from the social structure. But the rate does not equate with emotions. As soon as it becomes a "rate" emotions become irrelevant, but the problem is not exclusively with the structural relations. There are two considerations involved: motivations (actors) and structure (in which they act). Therefore, in order to clarify a position, the problem might be restated as a "structural" problem: What structural considerations bear on the divorce rate? Schneider thinks that Gluckman took this approach. Specifically, Schneider concludes that it is insufficient to say that "bride-wealth" stabilizes marriages or that "stable marriage permits bridewealth" because:

1) both are true under certain conditions
2) neither are true generally
3) conditions for each are not adequately specified (1953:57).

Gluckman, in his defense, presented his hypothesis for the Zulu and Lozi only, from his study of their kinship systems. He pointed out that these were societies with a peasant subsistence economy. From his observations, the Zulu appeared to have an absence of divorce and the Lozi had a high divorce rate. One difference he discovered was in their lineage (descent) systems. The Zulu had an agnatic lineage system (descent through the male only); where there was complete and final transference of a woman into her husband's group and from whence her children obtained all their legal rights. Gluckman describes this
practice as "Marked Father Right" which in essence means strong patri-lineality. The Lozi, meanwhile, had a cognatic or bilateral lineage system where the wife remained a member of her natal group and from whence came the legal rights of her children (1953:141). What appeared to Gluckman to be the structural difference acting on the divorce rule was a difference in descent. Divorce was found in conjunction with a descent rule that continued to recognize a wife's natal bonds after the marriage.

Gluckman further stated that he was quite aware of the differences between conjugal and jural stability, even if he did not make himself clear. He intended to deal only with jural stability. This was made easier simply by his choice of examples. The Zulu had neither jural divorce nor breach of conjugal relations (members of a legal family always lived together). The Lozi had high instability both jurally and conjugally. Here personality factors were not a complicating element. However, he insisted upon distinguishing between the two rates bearing on marital stability: the rate for jural divorce and the rate for conjugal separation (1953:142).

In reference to Evans-Pritchard's simple formulation that "bridewealth stabilizes marriage", Gluckman felt that the hypothesis needed more testing. He stated that the amount of goods transferred and the divorce rate tend to be directly associated (1953:142), but both are rooted in the kinship structure, i.e. whether the wife joins the husband's group exclusively and her children obtain their legal status there or whether the wife keeps her natal ties and the children
obtain their jural status through the mother. All of these structural rules are related to bridewealth or the absence of bridewealth payments. The bridewealth rules Gluckman hypothesized as follows: it is rare divorce which allows high marriage payment, rather than high marriage payment which prevents divorce.

Gluckman made it clear that he was looking at "what structural considerations bear on the divorce rate" and that this requires a consideration of several societies (1953:142). Also, in a later rejoinder to Leach, he made it clear that what he set out to do was "a comparative analysis of divorce rates among the Zulu and the Lozi". He "set out a hypothesis that divorce would be rare in patrilineal societies and more frequent in bilateral and matrilineal subsistence societies" (1954:67). Using the comparative method, Gluckman believed the correlation of marriage payments and marriage stability to be wrong. However, "any set of events can be classified together if it helps solve a problem" (1954:67).

Edmund Leach (1961), in his attempt to clarify Gluckman's three hypotheses, laid them out, with Gluckman's approval, as follows (1961:115):

(1) Divorce is rare and difficult in societies organized on a system of marked Father Right and frequent and easy to obtain in other types.

(2) The frequency of divorce is an aspect of the durability of marriage as such, which in turn is a function of the kinship structure.
(3) (And quite subsidiary to (1) and (2)) The amount of goods transferred (in bridewealth payments) and the divorce rate tend to be directly associated, but both are rooted in the kinship structure. Leach interpreted (1) to mean "that as we moved along this scale from Marked Father Right to Extreme Matriliney the probability of frequent and easy divorce increases while the probability of quantitatively large bridewealth payments decreases, the causal factor being the type of descent structure".

Gluckman's final word is footnoted in Leach's book:

I do not believe that the kind of bridewealth is simply related to agnatic descent, since it is affected by so many other factors. What I do believe is that it is unusual for there to be high marriage payment in a system with unstable marriage, and therefore, high marriage payments are unusual in non-agnatic systems (1961:115).

Also, "In any reformation of his hypothesis, he (Gluckman) would avoid the expression 'Father Right'".

Leach's own work focused on descent and covered three Burmese societies with a large number of significant variables in common. From his work, he concluded that it was the particular differences that then became the functionally discriminating factors and that "two entirely different categories of unilineal descent systems" should be recognized. The first category is one in which "the ongoing structure is defined by descent alone and marriage serves merely to create 'a complex scheme of individualization' within that structure". The second category consists "of those societies in which unilineal descent is linked with a strongly defined rule of 'preferred marriage'. In this latter case, "complementary filiation" may come to form part of the "in-law" structure. Leach felt that in the past there has perhaps been an 'exaggerated
emphasis upon the principle of descent as the fundamental principle of social organizations in all relatively 'homogeneous' societies" (1961:122).

Concerning Leach's own observations, as they relate to marital stability, he is citing "an exemplification of Professor Gluckman's second hypothesis" (1961:120). Looking at the divorce rate as an aspect of the durability of marriage related to the kinship structure, he found that where the wife's sibling link was never broken and where the affinal link (marriage) became ineffective the couple divorced. Where there is no divorce, i.e. the marriage is deemed unbreakable, the wife's sibling link becomes ineffective (1961:120).

In summary, it would appear to me that even the anthropologists are only looking at stable marriage and that the incidence of divorce is simply a measure of that stability. Divorce is a concept the same as marriage is a concept and it is not merely a statistic or a rate by which to measure the stability of marriage. This concept is incorporated in the rules of all societies. It is recognized in the social structure and the details are spelled out. As Leach pointed out, unfortunately "[t]he 'structural' ties deriving from marriage between members of different corporations have been largely ignored or else assimilated into the all-important descent concept" (1961:122). Some of the rules bearing on the structural ties deriving from marriage, and divorce, include rules for regulating bridewealth, rules for location of residence, and rules for the division of labour. I intend to test these structural ties relating to marriage and divorce,
plus certain other features that appear to be related to the problem but not mentioned in the initial argument.

A word of caution from the past should be inserted here.

The message comes from Westermarck:

The existence of marriage does not depend on laws ... if marriage is not an artificial creation but an institution based on deep-rooted sentiments conjugal and paternal, it will last as long as these sentiments last. And should they cease to exist; no law in the world could save marriage from destruction (1922:377).

However, let me make it clear once again. I am looking at jural practices at this time, while still being fully aware that there is another dimension to the problems of marriage and divorce; conjugal practices. From the data available and from the restrictions I have placed on this investigation, jural practices only, will be considered. The area of conjugal relation requires further data and further interdisciplinary study.
The structural features noted above have been thoroughly discussed by George Murdock in his text *Social Structure* (1949; 1965) and have been coded by him in his *Ethnographic Atlas* (1967). A review of the literature would be incomplete without some consideration of Murdock's position. The Murdock references are drawn entirely from these two well-known sources. Murdock's work began in the 1940's although, in some cases, the final compilation and presentation of data came much later. This puts him chronologically earlier than the other authors quoted below. It is necessary to keep this sequence in mind, disregarding his publication dates, in order to do justice to Murdock's tremendous groundwork. One of the structures he discusses thoroughly is the consideration exchanged at the time of marriage: bridewealth.

**BRIDewealth - Mode of obtaining a wife**

In his definitive work, *Social Structure*, Murdock discusses the "mode of obtaining a wife". This is the rule by which a man acquires the rights of a woman. Murdock himself divides the modes into "two major classes: those with and those without consideration" (1965:19). Those "with consideration" include the paying of bride-price, bridewealth and bride service from the male kin plus dowry from the female kin. He does not concern himself with the classic
argument of whether a woman is purchased as a man would purchase a
cow, nor with the relative amount of exchange. What I would ask is
how many societies, normatively, require some form of exchange for
the rights in a spouse and how many do not?

It is necessary that we understand the "true function" of
brideprice as defined by Murdock. Here, brideprice is the cover
term used to indicate any form of consideration. "A brideprice
is more than a compensation to parents for the loss of a daughter
who leaves the home when she marries. It is commonly also a guaran­
tee that the young wife will be well treated in her new home" (1965: 21). In many societies women may return to their parents if not
satisfied with the arrangements and males may have to forfeit their
financial investment. This would appear to constitute termination
of marriage.

"In the primitive world the formal exchange of goods of
value for the offspring a woman is expected to produce is the nor­
mal, or most usual, method of getting a wife" (Hoebel, 1958:302).
Brideprice (bridewealth), bride-service, and dowry are often con­
siderations necessary to obtain the rights in a woman. The main
distinction to be made here is that brideprice and bride-service
indicate that the male or the male's kin, pays, while dowry is the
reverse: the female, or the female's kin, pays. Jack Goody feels:
"It is rather dowry . . . that one would specifically associate
with restrictions on polygyny, divorce and remarriage, for it is
this transaction that would tend to complicate the dissolution of a conjugal union" (1976:92).

Goody's research led him to believe that dowry was associated with monogamy and a premium on low divorce because the type is difficult to duplicate and difficult to dissolve. This is at least representative of Africa. In Europe and Asia there was high polygyny along with brideprice. In such societies, where divorce is common, affinity is temporary and fragile (1976:61-62).

The literature presents a number of possibilities for the investigation of the relationship between brideprice and divorce. Evans-Pritchard says that bridewealth does and does not reflect the stability of marriage. Gluckman observed that high bridewealth linked to strong patrilineality prohibited divorce. Conversely, matrilineal descent allowed for the possibility of divorce. Leach splits the hairs a little finer. He agreed that with patrilineality (agnatic descent) there was a prohibition on divorce, but under bilateral (cognatic descent) where the wife's natal group remained a strong influence, divorce is allowed. Murdock, I believe, feels that the possibility of having to return bridewealth prohibits divorce. Goody would like to distinguish between who pays the bridewealth in order to anticipate the possibility for divorce. When the female's kin pays (dowry) in association with monogamy, the likelihood of termination of marriage is less because the payment may have to be returned. This is close to Murdock's position.
How these considerations, or the lack of them, affect the stability of marriage have been prominent in the discussions in the literature for some years now. The discussions revolve around patrilineality, matrilineality, descent, and degree or amount of payment made by whom. It therefore becomes obvious that brideprice is thought to have some effect on the stability of marriage and it would be useful to find out simply whether marital stability is affected when there is no consideration of this type connected with the contract.

I believe that the evidence is weighted in favour of some restriction on divorce in conjunction with the practice of bride-wealth. If this is on a sliding scale, from high to low payments, relating directly to no divorce at one end and towards easy divorce at the other, then no consideration at all at the time of marriage would indicate the possibility for frequent and easy divorce. I also feel that the form of the union (composition of the family) is an important variable on its own. Goody's theory on dowry as it relates to monogamy leads directly into such an examination and adds another dimension to the problem of divorce.
COMPOSITION OF THE FAMILY - Form or type of union

In considering the composition of the family, it must be recognized that marriage "is a complex of customs centering upon the relationship between a sexually associating pair of adults within the family" (Murdock, 1965:1). According to Murdock, it "defines the manner of establishing and terminating such a relationship, the normative behaviour and reciprocal obligations within it, and the locally accepted restrictions upon its personnel" (1965:1).

Speaking of marriage in general, Hoebel said, "... marriage is the institution that defines the interpersonal relationships that determine the form and pattern of the mating pair in the association we know as the family" and "marriage is, therefore a culture complex" (1958:301).

The composition of the basic marital unit may be either monogamous or polygamous. This is a very neat division for investigation. Monogamy is the pattern of the Western world. Polygamy has two main variations: polygyny - one male with two or more females and polyandry - one female with two or more males (rare). As pointed out above, Margaret Mead feels that monogamy is a very difficult form to practice. Ester Boserup lists some of the features of the monogamous option in agricultural societies that may help in making some predictions regarding the availability of termination of marriage. Monogamy is usually found with male farming, with plough cultivation, where women do less work than men and dowry is paid by the wife's family. The wife is entirely
dependent on the husband for economic support and he is obligated to support her and the children (Goody, 1976:34). Goody states that monogamy is rare until you get to the more advanced societies. It is difficult to repeat these "funded" marriages because "the spouses have to commit their property in order to get a partner of high standing" (Goody, 1976:51).

On the other hand the polygynous form of polygamy was much more common. "Clearly the divorce of a wife in order to secure an heir by a second spouse is unnecessary where polygyny or concubinage is allowed, since one can simply add to one's holding of women without having to discard any of the existing complement" (Goody, 1976:72). Hoebel felt that the case for polygyny could be found in social and practical motives: higher status, richer, better clothes and food, and more production of crafts especially if they were marketable (1958:325). Also, "[t]he biological factor of childbearing and child nursing ... contributes to polygyny" (1958:330). This leads us to a description of polygyny from Ester Boserup's work. Here we find female farming. With shifting farming, most of the work is done by women and the bridewealth is paid by the husband. The women are hardworking, receiving limited support from the husband. They have considerable freedom and some economic independence (Goody, 1976:34).

Jesse R. Pitts interprets Murdock's sample of societies (1949) rather differently. He concludes that although the greater portion
of marriages permitted polygyny (193 out of 238) there was less than 20% incidence of the practice. "In general, since the sex ratio is close to 1:1 (except in war-like tribes) and because most men find the breadwinning for one woman and her children quite enough to occupy their time, monogamy will be the dominant form of marriage, even in societies which make of polygyny the preferred form" (1964: 69).

Monogamy versus polygyny - which form was preferred and which form was practiced? It would appear that monogamous unions were difficult to terminate; however, it would also appear that termination of polygynous unions was not necessary to fulfill the basic need of acquiring heirs.

I feel that with the polygamous form of union the loss of a member through divorce would be less disruptive than it would be in the monogamous situation. Although with polygamy the termination of marriage may not be "necessary", the vacated portion of the role, husband or wife, could be assimilated by other labour already present. What appears more important from this portion of the literature is the linking of monogamy, dowry, advanced technology, less female labour and less female independence with a prohibition on divorce; the type is difficult to repeat (Goody, 1976:51). On the other side of the picture we find in combination: polygamy, male bridewealth payment, simpler technology, more female labour and more female independence. Do these variables lead to a greater frequency of the possibility of divorce? I will investigate the level
of technology (subsistence) and the rules for the division of labour, but first I will examine the household in which the spouses operate. The other variables follow from the domestic organization.

DOMESTIC ORGANIZATION - Household

The two types of family composition are arranged into two major forms of domestic organization: independent (nuclear) or extended. The independent household stands alone whether it be monogamous or polygamous. The extended household includes more than one generation (excluding dependent children) or more than one "family" whether it be monogamous or polygamous. Murdock prefers the term "nuclear" to independent. Our terms may be different but our definitions coincide: 'The 'nuclear family', consists typically of a married man and woman with their offspring' (1965:1). Here the referent is the family of procreation that does not include in its form other generations or other kin of the married pair. The extended family or household organization does include consanguinal kin other than dependent children. This larger group operates as a family domestic unit.

Christopher Lasch, writing for the New York Review of Books (1975) has the feeling that sociologists have been working on a conception of the family that suggests "the transition from the extended to the nuclear family"; specifically, the monogamous nuclear family (November 12, 1975:33). This approach, he believes,
is inadequate and should be avoided. Both forms have been around for a very long time. Pitts found the small independent family equated with simpler hunting and gathering. This same form resembles the modern industrial family in that it has a "limited need for family labour" and a "common physical mobility" (Pitts, 1964:101).

The following pertinent observation is from Paul Bohannan:

It is obvious that the form of the household may have important bearings on the degree of trauma experienced by the children of divorcing parents. In American society, with its monogamous marriage and with its domestic group based on the nuclear family, the trauma is considerable. Where households are based on extended families, the trauma is less devastating; so it is among polygynous families. And it can be relatively slight in large extended polygynous families (1963:117).

The argument of numbers holds for household organization as well as for the composition of the family unit. The loss of one, from many, is less disruptive than the loss of 100% of a specific role. For example, the loss of the woman in an independent family situation leaves the role vacant. In the extended family situation there are other females available to fill the gap, at least temporarily. I agree with Bohannan that the trauma of divorce could be relatively slight in extended polygamous families. Therefore the possibility for termination of marriage could be expected to be higher when the type of union is polygamous and the organization of the household is extended.

Other members of the kinship network supplying support, may not be entirely within the household but nearby. It has been hinted
above that where the female maintains her natal bonds the likelihood of divorce is greater. This introduces the question of where the couple will reside after marriage. I sense that the rules for post-marital residence may have some bearing on the possibility for a termination of marriage.

POST MARITAL RESIDENCE

I agree with Murdock that: "Rules of residence reflect general economic, social and cultural conditions" (1965:17). The rule brings together, in one locality, a group of related people for mutual support. "Neolocal residence is the only rule that definitely militates against the development of such large aggregates of kinmen" (1965:18). Residence rules are important because the spouse who does not have to relocate his family of procreation has the advantages of familiar "physical and social surroundings". "The other spouse, however, must break with the past in some measure, and establish new social ties" (1965:18).

Where a couple resides after marriage is important to the stability of the marriage. We are all familiar with our indigenous mother-in-law jokes. But in a subsistence economy the proximity of parents may have an entirely different effect. For instance, Pitts reported, following Murdock, "that brideprice is much more frequent when the rules of residence for the new couple are patrilocal, especially when the bride is removed from her local community" (1964:
67). He also stated: "When marriage is patrilineal and patrilocal, the integration of the inmarrying wife with the husband's family is more complete and more exclusive of her ties to her family of orientation . . ." (1964:82). Roger and Felix Keesing take this one step further: "When a girl's tie to her natal (birth) group is severed or greatly weakened when she marries, divorce is uncommon". Conversely, they state: "When her affiliation to her natal group remains strong, she may enter into several successive marriages" (1971:195). Does this mean that a society that maintains strong parental ties to their daughters is more likely to allow termination of marriage? Does this security and proximity of female kin really have a bearing on the stability of marriage? It would appear that there is some indication here that the location of the post-marital residence has an influence on marriage termination.

There are several indications that when women remain closer to their families of origin, divorce is available in the structural rules. Where the post-marital residence is patrilocal, divorce is rare. Therefore, a termination of marriage would be found in conjunction with matrilocal post-marital residence. Is this residence shifting or nomadic or is it found within a relatively permanent settlement? This, of course, depends on the type of subsistence and can hardly be discussed separately. This takes us beyond the kinship variables.
SETTLEMENT PATTERN - Subsistence

Murdock uses the sociological term "community" when discussing the organization of social groups into settlement patterns. The concept of "community" defines for us "the maximal group of persons who normally reside together in face-to-face association" (1965:79). People rarely, if ever, choose to live in "isolated families". The organization of community offers certain advantages. Murdock lists some of these advantages such as gratification through social intercourse, cooperative food gathering techniques, insurance against temporary incapacity, protection through numbers, specialization and division of labour (1965:80). Few, if any, families were totally self-sufficient regarding social or moral support or provision of subsistence.

The type of settlement pattern is related to the ecological offerings of the area. The following examples of settlement adaptations are explained by Murdock. Gathering, hunting or herding economies usually require a migratory community organization referred to as a "band". Agriculture, however, may be practiced in a more permanent location unless, or until, the land becomes exhausted. "Fixed residence is also consistent with a fishing economy and even with a hunting economy under exceptional conditions where game is plentiful and non-migratory" (1965:80). The more fixed settlement patterns may form a "village" or at least a "neighbourhood" with some focal point.
Settlement patterns and the type of subsistence activity are generally inseparable. Simplistically, hunting, gathering and pastoralism (herding or animal husbandry) require a nomadic or semi-nomadic settlement pattern while the activities of fishing and agriculture lend themselves to more permanent arrangements. The type of subsistence activity practiced by a society sets the pattern for other aspects of the social structure. Hoebel wrote to this effect: "An elemental feature of every culture is a complex of techniques for production, consumption and distribution of food" (1958:198). "Collecting and gathering is the rudest and the most primitive technique for the acquisition of food" (1958:180). While "hunters always rely to some extent upon berries, nuts and roots to round out their diet... they are distinguished from collectors or gatherers in that they are predominantly predatory carnivores in their subsistence habits" (1958:184). Hoebel does not deal with fishing specifically, but he does, however, classify whaling with hunting: hunters of the waters. Hunters, gatherers, and people following a pastoral type of existence tend to be nomadic while fishermen are more sedentary. In this respect, they resemble agriculturalists.

Hunters and gatherers often live in bands, each "exploiting a territory". These "loosely knit clusters of families are able to organize up when necessary" (Keesing and Keesing, 1971:134). Their main feature is flexibility; being able to cope with changing seasons, organizing to hunt large animals, but still being able to forage individually.
"Pastoralism", on the other hand, "is an adjustment to ecological factors on the part of advanced primitives" (Hoebel, 1958: 180). As man became food producer, "[he] radically transformed his environments and his relations with them" (Keesing and Keesing, 1971: 138). Keesing and Keesing equate pastoralism with "shifting cultivation" as examples of "modes of ecological adaptation". In the Keesings' ordering of subsistence activities, they put pastoralism closer to incipient agriculture in the light of man's degree of control over his food production although the settlement pattern of technology, makes "a more sedentary mode of life possible" (1971:141). Agriculturalists are able to maintain more elaborate and permanent homes.

The Keesings are very concerned with the relationship between the types of food-producing technologies and man's degree of control over this commodity. "The technologies of . . . hunters and gatherers are highly limited in terms of the control they give men over their environment and the efficiency with which investments of energy yield a return". Man adjusts to an environment "changing his patterns of living to follow the cycles of an ecosystem" (1971:136). "Lee and DeVore (1968) usefully summarize the social and political implication of ecological pressures among hunters and gatherers. The relationship of men to resources is very fragile and largely beyond direct human control" (in Keesing and Keesing, 1971:137).
Hoebel does not contradict the Keesings' ideas concerning degree of control:

People who subsist by collecting and gathering roots, berries, seeds, and insects are for the most part directly dependent upon what the natural environment offers for the taking. People who have acquired the techniques of planting, cultivating, and harvesting crops, or the husbandry of animals and who have mastered methods of cooking or otherwise changing the chemico-physical substance of natural products, so as to make them more useful or more desirable as foods are less directly dependent upon the natural offerings of their physical environment (1958:177).

Although this variable is not specifically linked to divorce in the literature presented, there is a rationale for the choice. It was alluded to above, under Composition of the Family, and will be emphasized below under Division of Labour. The settlement pattern is directly related to the type of subsistence and the division of labour is related to both.

Monogamy is rare until you get to the more advanced societies possessing agriculture and advanced technology (Goody, 1976:51). The men perform most of the subsistence activity in a situation where they have more control over the environment and its products. It is agreed that men do almost all of the hunting in that type of society but the subsistence is rounded out and guaranteed by the gathering of berries, roots, etc., by the women.

Obviously it is difficult to separate these variables but Murdock has provided the data for just such a breakdown in his Ethnographic Atlas and I intend to test them separately because
fishing and herding (pastoralism) present particular problems. Hunting, gathering, and herding are more typically found with shifting settlement patterns. Fishing and agriculture lend themselves to more permanent arrangements. However, when looking at the degree of control over the source of subsistence, the activity of fishing is closer to hunting and gathering in that they have less control over the source. Herding is then aligned with agriculture, having more control.

Given what we have already discovered in connection with the type of technology, it appears that as the technology became more complex the tools shifted to the hands of the men and women became more dependent. Also, the location of the household became more permanent. Along with the above, the possibility for termination of marriage decreased. Permanent settlement patterns and advanced technology are also associated with monogamy and dowry in the literature. With this evidence, I assume that where the settlement pattern is less permanent the chances of the structure providing for divorce are greater. And when the subsistence activity exerts less control over the environment, the chances for divorce are increased. None of the above, however, can be disassociated from a consideration of the division of labour. References to who performs the greater part of the subsistence activity appear again and again.
DIVISION OF LABOUR - Subsistence

"Since cooperation, like sexual association, is most readily and satisfactorily achieved by persons who habitually reside together, the two activities, each deriving from a biological need, are quite compatible" (Murdock, 1965:7).

"A division of labour between the sexes has long been recognized by economists, sociologists, and other behavioural scientists as (1) the original and most basic form of economic specialization and exchange, and (2) the most fundamental basis of marriage and the family . . . " (Murdock and Provost, 1973a:203). And insofar as it is fundamental to the basis of marriage, so should it be fundamentally related to the dissolution of marriage.

Among the basic functions of the conjugal family is the cooperative division of labour between the male and the female (Hoebel, 1958:318). Of particular interest is the division of labour as it relates to subsistence activities. Briefly, referring to Goody's material, you will recall that more complex agriculture, i.e. plough cultivation, is men's work, while simpler agricultural systems, i.e. hoe cultivation and shifting farming often involve more women's work (1976:64). Murdock and Provost drew similar conclusions from their studies: "Where agriculture is simple or extensive, these operations and the associated tasks, such as pottery making, tend to be performed by females, but with the increase in complexity or intensity they tend to be assigned increasingly to males" (1973a:215). The development of technology appears to make the difference.
Hunting we take for granted as part of men's domain, and Murdock and Provost reinforce this belief. Listed among the strictly masculine activities were hunting large aquatic fauna, hunting large land fauna and trapping (1973a:208). On the other hand, gathering is women's work and the gathered food supplements the hunters' diet. Recall that Hoebel states that hunters round out their diets with gathered foods (1958:184). And the Keesings informed us that "roots, fruits, nuts and other vegetable foods collected by women provide the staple base needed for survival" (1971:136).

Judith Brown states that, due to childcare responsibilities: 'Women are most likely to make a substantial contribution when subsistence activities have the following characteristics: the participant is not obliged to be far from home; the tasks are relatively monotonous and do not require rapt concentration; and the work is not dangerous, can be performed in spite of interruptions, and is easily resumed once interrupted" (1970:1074).

George C. Homans in The Human Group looks nostalgically at the preliterate or oldfashioned division of labour. He claims that the emotional tie between husband and wife is firmly founded on the activities they contribute to the common enterprise (1950:277). However, divorce was not unknown, even under these idyllic conditions.

It appears that where the society has less control over food source, as in gathering societies and in those with shifting or incipient agriculture, the women do the greater part of providing
for subsistence. And with the other less complex activities - hunting and fishing - the subsistence is rounded out by female activities. Only with the more advanced technology of agriculture and perhaps with herding, do the men provide the greater part of the nourishment. From what I have learned so far, I assume that with the first group (simpler technology and less control over the food base) the chance for termination of marriage is greater. But I would be remiss if I limited my investigation to terra firma. What cultural influence on the problem of divorce stems from the interaction with High Gods? Finally, but not without merit, some consideration of the role of religion should be undertaken.

HIGH GODS

Murdock does not discuss religion or apparent religious practices in his Social Structure. This is understandable as religion is in the realm of culture and this area of non-empirical knowledge cannot strictly be classed as a feature of the social structure. However, Murdock does provide us with a definition of a High God in his Ethnographic Atlas:

A High God is defined, following Swanson, as a spiritual being who is believed to have created all reality and/or to be its ultimate governor, even though his sole act was to create spirits who, in turn, created or controlled the natural world (1967:52).

At least throughout our recent history, religion has played a very visible role in the institution of marriage. John Saliba observed: "Generally speaking anthropologists see five major functions,
or needs, which religion serves, namely, explanatory, emotional, social, validating, and adaptive" (1977:181). Accordingly, religious beliefs and practices are related to social solidarity and social control, and the support of basic institutions (Saliba, 1977:183). Looking at the institution of marriage in relation to other social structures that are concerned with social solidarity and social control, brings the religious practices of a community into focus. Robert Nisbet relates the "sacredness of marriage" to both adaptation and validation: "The sacredness of marriage arose from its relation to mankind's survival need of high birth rates . . . and as a result, marriage became a major element in most of the world's religions" (1970:256).

However, the question remains whether "religion is something 'sui generis', consisting of attitudes, beliefs, and practices which are uniquely different and above the rest of human life, or whether it is just one dimension of life, engulfed and inseparable from, the rest of culture" (Saliba, 1976:186). If "separate and above", does this have a different effect on the stability of marriage than if it is "just one dimension of life"? Gods which were placed "above" would appear to be less active in human affairs, although not necessarily absent, while Gods which were "inseparable from the rest of culture" would appear to be very active in human affairs.

"In times and places where human communities badly needed children for the adults they would become, a broken marriage had implications only too obvious" (Nisbet, 1970:256). Nisbet's studies led him to conclude that there was an "ancient and still
widespread abhorrence of divorce" (1970:256). Nevertheless, he was
forced to admit, in spite of his ethnocentricity, that it was not true
that divorce was unknown in ancient societies as well as among
primitive people today. "Divorce rates among the latter can be very
high. But so are the rates of remarriage and remating" (1970:256).
Despite Nisbet's notion of widespread abhorrence of divorce, the
"sacredness of marriage" was violated.

In which instance was it most readily violated: when the
Gods were "sui generis" or when the Gods were an active part of
everyday life? I see some indication for the assumption that where
High Gods are absent or not active in daily life of the society, the
possibility for termination of marriage is greater.
It is my contention that the social structures or cultural practices of differing societies have a bearing on the stability of marriage considered as a set of jural relations. From the spadework of others, I have selected certain practices that I feel bear testing. The termination of dissolution of marriage is permitted in some societies and not in others. What observations can be made from a comparative study of social structures in relation to their rules governing termination of marriage:

I chose to put to the test the following independent kinship variables:

1. The rule for obtaining a wife: are goods or services exchanged or not?
2. The rule for type of union: monogamous or polygamous?
3. The rule for domestic or household organization: independent or extended?
4. The rule for post-marital residence: patrilocal, ambilocal, neolocal or matrilocal?

In addition to the kinship variables, I am interested in three general background variables related to marital termination: religious practices, division of labour, subsistence activities, and settlement patterns.
Hypotheses:

Obviously, sociologists see marital breakdown as disruptive and anthropologists are most interested in what promotes stability. I am interested in the concept of divorce. It is not always regarded as disruptive and many, many societies provide for divorce in their social structures. The question is: in conjunction with what other social practices? What aspects of some social structures allow, comfortably, for a realignment of spouses?

At this point I hypothesize that termination of marriage (divorce) is more probable where:

1. there is no consideration in connection with marriage (no bridewealth payment).
2. the type of union is polygamous.
3. the household is extended.
4. the post-marital residence is matrilocal.
5. the settlement is impermanent (shifting, migratory or nomadic).
6. the control over subsistence is less (simple technology).
7. the women perform the greater portion of the subsistence activity.
8. the High Gods are neither present nor active in the daily life of the society.
From the literature reviewed in Chapter I, I formulated certain hypotheses concerning the relationship between marriage termination and the payment of bridewealth, the type of union, the organization of the household, the location of the post-marital residence, the level of subsistence, the settlement pattern, the division of labour, and certain religious practices. In order to test these hypotheses, I have taken a quantitative approach that requires a body of cross-cultured data. First I will present my reasoning for the application of quantitative analysis to this problem, and then I will describe the cross-cultured data retrieval system - the Human Relations Area Files, from whence I obtained the necessary data for this investigation.

When analyzing the quantification method of research, J. Clyde Mitchell made two astute observations:

The 'anthropological method' has tended to be taken as synonymous with the intensive study of small communities through participant observations without the use of quantitative methods.

By contrast, sociological methods are assumed to involve schedules, questionnaires, and statistical procedures (1967:17).

Therefore, as has been becoming more popular, I chose to use the
sociological method and to apply it to anthropological data. According to Mitchell: "The value of systematic quantification is that it insures that the 'negative' cases, which are important in any analysis, are not overlooked" (1967:21). Of specific importance to this study are Mitchell's comments. Quantification, he points out, has an important part to play when honing hypotheses, especially in connection with certain aspects of the social structure (1967:23).

We can illustrate this by referring to Gluckman's well-known hypothesis linking marriage stability with patriline and low stability with matriline and bilaterality (Gluckman, 1950). When Gluckman made his observations, he did not test his hypothesis against quantitative data. As John Sirjamaki has already pointed out, "... the established practices by which societies control the association of the sexes in marriage and the family ..." lend themselves very well to cross-cultural studies (1964:33). The situation is summed up by Sirjamaki as follows: sociologists and anthropologists "employ the comparative (institutional) method to invest their family studies with cultural content and historical meaning" (1964:48). And simply, J. A. Barnes, specifically studying the frequency of divorce, chose the quantitative method as he felt it was better expressed in this manner (1967:47).

After proceeding with this approach to my problem I discovered that Charles Ackerman had already taken a similar approach to differential divorce rates in 1963. These rates, he observed, had been subjected to both anthropological and sociological research. He, too, felt that 'anthropological research has emphasized various aspects of kinship
structure, and sociological research has been largely concerned with homogamy and assortive mating" (1963:13). He also used the HRAF for his cross-cultural data. Here we go our separate ways. Ackerman organized his social structures into two groups that he saw as representative of "conjunctive" and "disjunctive" affiliations. The social structures and cultural practices I have chosen to examine stand alone with no attempt made to infuse them with further meaning.

The data required for a quantitative and comparative analysis of social structures has, in part, been coded and made available by Murdock. With these data Murdock claims: "By simple counting he [the researcher] can ascertain the approximate incidence and distribution . . . of social and cultural phenomena in which he may have a special interest" (1967:3).

Collected in these Files is a wide range of literature pertaining to the selected representative cultures. The actual pages from the books, articles, manuscripts and theses have been filmed and transferred to 4" x 6" microfiche cards. These cards are arranged systematically by culture and then by culture trait or subject.

The literature itself is derived from many original sources. Each File bears a letter from A to Z indicating this source. For example, E stands for "ethnologist", while Z indicates that the material was gathered by a sociologist. In between there are missionaries, travellers, historians, etc. Each of these letters is followed by a number from 1 to 5, assessing the quality of the data. These evaluations were not taken into account for this research.

 Initiated in 1937 as part of the Institute of Human Relations at Yale University, the Cross-Cultural Survey has built up a complete file of geographical, social, and cultural information extracted in full from the sources and classified by subject, on some 150 human societies, historical and contemporary as well as primitive (Murdock, 1965:vii).

From these roots the HRAF evolved. Each culture or cultural unit is defined in the *Outline of World Cultures* (OWC, Murdock, 1972 revised). These cultural units are only a sample of the total cultures of the universe and were selected on the basis of maximum geographical dispersal and adequacy of literature (Lagace, 1974:25). The cultural units are arrived at in the following manner in the OWC:

1. The world is divided into eight major geographical regions or areas.

2. These are subdivided, usually on a political basis, into subregions with their component cultural units.

3. Within these subregions specific cultural units are defined. These units may be countries, or culture-bearing population units; cultures, societies, tribes, ethnic groups, etc. (Lagace, 1974:25).

Thus, we arrive at the individual Files, each representing a country or a culture-bearing population unit. "Each File contains a complete, page-order, text copy of every source included in that File, plus
a series of numbered category divisions within which all pages dealing with a particular subject are brought together" (Lagace, 1974:1). The numbered category divisions are defined and classified according to a system which is explained in the Outline of Cultural Materials (OCM, Murdock, 1971 revised). Marriage termination is one such category division.

Murdock is also responsible for the Ethnographic Atlas (1967) in which some of the data are available in an alphabetically coded form. Murdock's Atlas was initiated in 1962 as a regular feature of the journal Ethnology and the entries were subsequently compiled under separate cover. Herbert Barry III, in association with Murdock, Robert Textor and Jerome Lisovich, took these data, plus the data on 307 other societies for which the data had been compiled, and made this information available in punch card format for use with machine calculations.

I used all of the sources described above and the difficulties with these materials will be discussed below.

I think it only fair to point out that since my basic research was completed, McMaster University has acquired (Summer, 1978) considerably advanced materials that should enable any future research "to test out, in at least a preliminary fashion, a very wide variety of hypotheses" (Textor, 1967:viii). George O. Spindler, in his foreword to Textor's volume, says:
Textor's volume permits a scholar to check many of his hypotheses with impressive ease. There will no longer be any excuse for loose statements about the association (or lack of it) between, for instance structural complexity and independence training, . . . matrilineality and frequency of divorce . . . (1967:viii).

It would seem that the data on marriage termination have been coded by Textor. This material was not available to me. (See Appendix A.)

I used Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas for the more detailed definitions of the various categories of each coded variable relating to the different social structures.

Nevertheless, even without Textor's Summary, these data have much to offer the researcher and with these data sources I tested my hypotheses. Chapter II contains my presentation of the operations I have devised in order to perform these tests. It continues with a design of the inquiry, the method of gathering data along with some criticisms of the data, a description of my sampling procedure and my working hypotheses.
Design of the Inquiry

The format of the inquiry is relatively unsophisticated. By simply setting up cross-tabulations, where possible in two by two tables, I intend to count the number of societies presenting a specific social structure and then to examine the correlation with their rules for termination of the marriage. Harold Driver believes that statistical tests designed for simple random samples can be used for non-random, judgmental samples (1973:337). This type of quantification should present some answers to the problems bandied about in the literature.
Method of Collecting Data

The data for the independent variables to be tested in conjunction with marital stability are available on computer tape. The information is taken from the HRAF, originally coded by Murdock in the Ethnographic Atlas. Further societies were added by Barry, bringing the total to 1170 societies with information accessible on computer tape. This, of course, is all done in coded form. Barry provides a brief description of the variable categories in his Code Book that accompanies the program. Murdock's complete definitions, as presented in his Atlas, made it possible for me to collapse or recode where it was necessary for my purposes.

The problem with working back and forth from the Atlas material and the HRAF, where the marriage termination data are available but not coded, is in the different designations of the societies. Murdock originally classified the societies by region, giving them one upper case letter, one lower case letter, and a number in the Atlas. The HRAF designate the individual societies by two upper case letters and a number. The punch card system simply uses a four-digit number. It is necessary, therefore, after ascertaining the societies desired for the sample from the punch card system, to correlate the societies by name with the HRAF. By going through all the HRAF, I was able to

---

1 For example: The Kung Bushmen are listed as Asl in the Atlas, as F121 or FX10 in the HRAF, and as society #0001 in the punch card system.
ascertain which units had marriage termination data available. This was indicated on the top of the microfilm card by a category number. According to the Outline of Cultural Materials, a #586 means these data are present.

All the data in the Files are taken from original sources and, as already mentioned, the sources vary in their reliability. It is possible to rate the reliability of the source if it is desired. Ackerman recognized this weakness with the data: "The researcher can only use the data as given - or stop his research". He continued in "the hope that the ethnographic data are neither wholly meaningless nor wholly incomparable" (1963:15). I must do the same.

However, greater difficulties than these persist with the data. The societies included by Murdock are understandably limited to those that are reasonably well documented. "It is impossible to draw a sample from all human societies as no such list exists" (Drive, 1973:333). And Murdock's selection is biased as he readily admits. The smaller representation from the Circum-Mediterranean region, particularly Europe, is in part due to Murdock's limitations: "The author acknowledges no special competence in this area and has included only a small and unrepresentative fraction of the many adequately described societies . . . " (Murdock, 1967:2). As Driver points out, if you select a sample from all the societies adequately described, it is at least operational (1973:333).

The coding of the categories also presents a judgmental
decision, but not entirely on Murdock's part. Much of the coding was done by others and a consensus was required before it was acceptable. This leaves us with the problem of the ethnic units (societies) that are inevitably counted. "The classic objection to this method is that one is counting a mixed assemblage of cherries, olives, apples ... and pumpkins" (Driver, 1973:330). A common answer to this criticism, according to Driver, is that all the things counted are plant foods and are comparable on this general level (1973:330). Anthropologists and social scientists are still not happy with ethnic units. However, if we accept the wide variation that everyone knows exists in ethnic units and add variables describing the most obvious kinds of variation, Driver feels that we can proceed.
Sampling Procedure

I selected from the total 1170 societies the number having similar jurisdictional levels. Such use of a variable is suggested by Driver. Murdock defines jurisdictional levels as the "areas over which power is extended". The coding indicates the number of jurisdictional "levels" or areas over which power extends beyond or transcending the local community for each society (1967:52). This provides a measure of political complexity ranging from stateless societies through petty and larger chiefdoms or their equivalent, to larger states. The data is coded as follows:

1. no levels beyond the local community.
2. one level beyond the local community: parish.
3. two levels of jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local level: district.
4. three levels beyond the local level: province.
5. four levels beyond the local level: nation-state (Code Book, 8).

These are, in future, referred to simply as levels.

Because I wish to exclude, as far as possible, Western influence, my sample includes only those societies that were relatively unorganized when reported. My assumption is that they were also pre-literate. This portion of the sample was therefore limited to societies having a jurisdictional level of one or two. They were organized only so far as being classed as a parish. The total was 442 societies.
The other necessary criteria for a society to be included in the sample was the availability of marriage termination data. This data, as mentioned above, was not available to me in coded form. This was probably a blessing in disguise. John Roberts made the observation that follows:

If a researcher uses data previously coded by another comparativist for one variable and then correlates it with a second variable newly coded by himself . . . the relationship is likely to be less biased than if one person did all the coding (quoted in Driver, 1973:448).

Initially I listed all the societies from the HRAF bearing a code #586. This meant that marriage termination data was available. These totalled 183 societies. I then compared the two lists, checking the societies by name. If more than one society from the coded computer list (selected on the basis of levels) was representative of the same culture area or culture type and marriage termination data was available for both, I selected the first name. Societies representative of similar culture types are indicated in the HRAF. This procedure eliminated, to some extent, the inclusion of similar or very closely related cultures. Comparison of the two lists produced 86 societies that fit my basic criteria. What remained to be done at this point was the coding of the marriage termination data, if adequate, relating to these specific societies.

Coding from original texts is a very time-consuming business. I read all the records pertaining to marriage termination for each society and then made a decision, where the information appeared to
me to be adequate, as to whether or not termination of marriage was practiced. If an ethnographer reported that divorce was no longer allowed since the arrival of priests or some form of Western influence, I assumed that divorce had been practiced prior to contact. In many cases it was reported that divorce was prevalent in the first few years of marriage (among the young) or prior to the arrival of children. These societies I classified as allowing marriage termination. In the cases where divorce was reported as "rare", or some such equivalent term, I classified the societies as not allowing divorce. The final sample totalled 74 societies with the proper jurisdictional levels and marriage termination data that I could adequately and honestly code. The ultimate coding resulted in a "yes" or "no" in regard to their marriage termination preference. This information I then punched into an empty column in Barry's punch card system and it then became available for cross-tabulation.

Murdock's division of the world into eight major geographical regions or areas plus my elimination of societies with similar cultures resulted in a sample that is fairly representative of a world population. The weakness of Murdock's Circum-Mediterranean data is of little consequence due to the high jurisdictional levels of most of these areas. The final sample appeared as follows:

- Africa: 12 societies
- Circum-Mediterranean: 4 societies
- East Eurasia: 14 societies
- Insular Pacific: 13 societies
- North America: 13 societies
- South America: 18 societies

For a complete description of the boundaries of each area, see Appendix C.
After collecting and coding the data on termination of marriage, it was necessary to recode Murdock's cumbersome variables to suit the simplicity of this study. His variables pertaining to the social and cultural features that I am interested in are far too complex and detailed. In all cases it was imperative that I define the taxonomy and realign the categories under more general headings. His explicit definitions are found in the Ethnographic Atlas. Once these are recoded it is not difficult to transfer the recoding to Barry's punch card system for use with a computer program.

Murdock's classification of the variables are coded by upper case letters. The punch card system data are identified by a numeral. In the following presentation of the independent variables, the first page reference in the bracket may be found in Murdock's Atlas. The second page reference within the bracket is directed to the Code Book accompanying the punch card system by Barry. Each heading under the Working Hypotheses is my designation of the variable. If different, Murdock's classification follows. The first set of categories listed under the variable headings are Murdock's complete definitions which enabled me to justify my recording. The second set of categories uses the coding description taken from the punch card system. It is obvious that these do not contain enough information to recode directly from here. It is absolutely necessary to seek out Murdock's
original intention. The punch card system variables, as presented, have already been realigned in order to show clearly the reorganization of the variable.

Presented here are Murdock's categories for the variables I have selected plus the punch card version and my recoding.

**Bridewealth**: Mode of Marriage: the prevailing mode of obtaining a wife (47,3). Listed are Murdock's possible approaches to the question of bridewealth in the order in which they appear in the Atlas:

- **B** Brideprice or bridewealth, i.e. transfer of substantial consideration in the form of livestock, goods, or money from the groom or his relatives to the kinsmen of the bride.
- **D** Dowry, i.e. transfer of a substantial amount of property from the bride's relatives to the bride, the groom, or the kinsmen of the latter.
- **G** Gift exchange, i.e. reciprocal exchange of gifts of substantial value between the relatives of the bride and groom, or a continuing exchange of goods and services in approximately equal amounts between the groom and his kinsmen and the bride's relatives.
- **O** Absence of any significant consideration or bridal gifts only.
- **S** Bride-service, i.e. a substantial material consideration in which the principal element consists of labour or other services rendered by the groom to the bride's kinsmen.
- **T** Token brideprice, i.e. a small symbolic payment only.
- **X** Exchange, i.e. transfer of a sister or other female relative of the groom for the bride.
My concern is with whether some form of bridewealth is paid or exchanged and conversely with when the practice is absent. Therefore the following recoding of the categories is necessary. Recall that the numerals refer to the punch card system that was actually used with the computer program. The letters are from Murdock's Atlas.

1. Brideprice or bridewealth  B
2. Brideservice  S
3. Token Brideprice  T
4. Gift Exchange  G
5. Exchange  X
6. Dowry  D
7. Absence of any consideration  0

The recoded independent variable pertaining to the practice of bridewealth then appears as follows:

1. (1,2,3,4,5,7) Some form of consideration
2. (6) Absence of any significant consideration

Household Organization: Family Organization: the prevailing form of domestic or familial organization (47,3). Note here that the categories for independent families also provide the data for the type of union. This is not so for the extended situation which will be dealt with later under the heading Type of Union. For the moment, I am only interested in the data pertaining to the household organization. The punch card system denotes this column as the prevailing form of domestic organization.
E Large extended families, i.e. corporate aggregations of smaller family units occupying a single dwelling or a number of adjacent dwellings and normally embracing the families of procreation of at least two siblings or cousins in each of at least two adjacent generations.

F Small extended families, i.e. those normally embracing the families of procreation of only one individual in the senior generation but at least two in the next generation. Such families usually dissolve on the death of the head.

G Minimal extended or "stem" families, i.e. those consisting of only two related families of procreation (disregarding polygamous unions), particularly of adjacent generations.

H Independent nuclear families with monogamy.

I Independent nuclear families with occasional or limited polygyny.

J Independent polyandrous families.

K Independent polygynous families, where polygyny is general and not reported to be preferentially sororal and where co-wives are not reported to occupy separate dwellings or apartments.

L The same as K except that co-wives typically occupy separate quarters.

M Independent polygynous families, where polygyny is common and preferentially sororal, and where co-wives are not reported to occupy separate quarters.

N The same as M except that co-wives typically occupy separate quarters.

The realignment of this variable based on the punch card system appears as follows:

1 Independent nuclear families with monogamy  M
2 Independent nuclear families with occasional or limited polygyny  N
3 Independent polyandrous families  O
Independent polygynous families (a-d)
4 (a) Preferentially sororal, co-wives occupy separate dwellings
4 (b) Not preferentially sororal, co-wives do not occupy separate dwellings
5 (c) Preferentially sororal, co-wives do not occupy separate dwellings
5 (d) Not preferentially sororal, co-wives occupy separate dwellings

6 Minimal extended (stem) families
7 Small extended families
8 Large extended families

This variable, in regard to household organization, divides itself very neatly:

1 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) Independent household organization
2 (6, 7, 8) Extended household organization.

Type of Union: Family Organization (47, 3).

As mentioned above, the categories for the type of union in the independent situation are included in Family Organization. However, in the punch card system these data occupy separate columns and are re-numbered as follows:

1 With monogamy
2 With occasional polygyny
7 Polyandrous families
4 Polygynous families (a-d)
   (a) Preferentially sororal etc.
6 (b) Not preferentially sororal etc.
3 (c) Preferentially sororal etc.
5 (d) Not preferentially sororal etc.

Therefore, in the independent situation we have:

1 (1) monogamy
2 (2, 7, 4, 6, 3, 5) polygamy.
It is necessary to examine separately the type of union in the extended situation and then recombine the two in order to provide the data on the type of union for the total sample. The punch card system provides these data separately defined as the "Marital composition of the component familial units in extended families":

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monogamy</th>
<th>Occasional or limited polygyny</th>
<th>Preferentially sororal polygyny, co-wives do not occupy separate dwellings</th>
<th>Preferentially sororal polygyny, co-wives occupy separate dwellings</th>
<th>Preferentially non-sororal polygyny, co-wives do not occupy separate dwellings</th>
<th>Preferentially non-sororal polygyny, co-wives occupy separate dwellings</th>
<th>Polyandry (one society EE4:239, Tibetan) or no extended family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Monogamy</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Occasional or limited polygyny</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Preferentially sororal polygyny, co-wives do not occupy separate dwellings</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Preferentially sororal polygyny, co-wives occupy separate dwellings</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Preferentially non-sororal polygyny, co-wives do not occupy separate dwellings</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Preferentially non-sororal polygyny, co-wives occupy separate dwellings</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Polyandry (one society EE4:239, Tibetan) or no extended family</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now in the extended situation we can ascertain the same information for the type of union as was available for the dependent families. Regarding the type of union in extended families, we have:

1. (1) monogamy
2. (2,3,4,5,6) polygamy

Post-Marital Residence: Marital Residence: The prevailing profile of marital residence (48,4). This is referred to as the "prevalent marital residence" in the punch card system. The following are Murdock's Atlas categories:

A Avunculocal, i.e. normal residence with or near the maternal uncle or other male matrilineal kinship of the husband.

B Ambilocal, i.e. residence established optionally with or near the parents of either the husband or the wife, depen-
11 Patrilocal
13 Virilocal (without localized unilineal kin groups)
32 Avunculocal (with or near maternal Uncle)
24 Ambilocal, bilocal or utrolocal (optionally with or near either parents)
25 Ambilocal with option between patrilocal (or virilocal) and avunculocal
35 Ambilocal with option between uxorilocal and avunculocal
26 Neolocal
31 Matrilocal
33 Uxorilocal (without matrilocal and matrilineal kin group)
99 Non-establishment of a common household

More generally, these categories become:

1 (11,13,32) Patrilocal
2 (24,25,35) Bilocal or ambi local
3 (26) Neolocal
4 (31,33) Matrilocal
5 (99) No common household.

A 2x2 table is not possible at this point, but I can extract the separate categories that interest me in relationship to divorce and obtain the picture I require for testing. The five categories were maintained in order to arrive at the overall picture for the total sample.
**Settlement Pattern:** the prevailing type of settlement pattern (51,8).

Reproduced first are Murdock's categories:

- **B** Fully migratory or nomadic bands
- **H** Separated hamlets where several of which form a more or less permanent single community
- **N** Neighbourhoods of dispersed family homesteads
- **S** Seminomadic communities whose members wander in bands for at least half of the year but occupy a fixed settlement at some season or seasons, i.e. recurrently reoccupied winter quarters.
- **T** Semisedentary communities whose members shift from one to another fixed settlement at different seasons or who occupy more or less permanently a single settlement from which a substantial portion of the population departs seasonally to occupy shifting camps, during transhumance.
- **V** Compact and relatively permanent settlements, i.e. nucleated villages or towns
- **W** Compact but impermanent settlements, i.e. villages whose location is shifted every few years.
- **X** Complex settlements consisting of a nucleated village or town with outlying homesteads or satellite hamlets. Urban aggregations of population separately indicated since column 31 deals with community size.

The coding for the variable - settlement pattern as transferred to the punch card system is very straightforward. There are eight possible categories:

1. Fully migratory or nomadic bands
2. Semi nomadic communities
3. Semi sedentary communities
4. Compact but impermanent settlements
5. Neighbourhoods of dispersed family homesteads
6. Separated hamlets, forming a single community
7. Compact and relatively permanent settlements
8. Complex settlements
These fall nicely into two main categories:

1. (1, 2, 3, 4) Nomadic or shifting settlements
2. (5, 6, 7, 8) Permanent settlements.

Now it is possible to address the question of whether or not the type of settlement pattern has a correlation with the termination of marriage.

**Subsistence: subsistence economy (46, 2)**

Murdock explains in his Atlas that:

A set of five digits indicates the estimated relative dependence of the society on each of the five major types of subsistence activity. The first digit refers to the gathering of wild plants and small land fauna; the second refers to hunting, including trapping and fowling; the third to fishing, including shellfishing and the pursuit of large aquatic animals; the fourth to animal husbandry; the fifth, to agriculture. The symbols are defined as follows:

- 0) Zero to 5% dependence
- 1) 6 to 15% "
- 2) 16 to 25% "
- 3) 26 to 35% "
- 4) 36 to 45% "
- 5) 46 to 55% "
- 6) 56 to 65% "
- 7) 66 to 75% "
- 8) 76 to 85% "
- 9) 86 to 100% "

The above appear in separate columns in the punch card system.

The punch card system also provides a new code in a single variable in which the type of subsistence activity is recorded. However, because normatively, societies participate in more than one activity, there was overlapping and the same society was listed more than once. It was, therefore, necessary to use Murdock's
five original variables from which the new code was drawn in order to establish the dominant mode in each case. These original data were also used to determine the division of labour under each type of subsistence.

Each of the five variables: Gathering, Hunting, Fishing, Pastoralism (Animal Husbandry), and Agriculture, is divided into ten categories (0-9) representing a percentage of concentration on a certain activity. From this it was possible to arrive at a dominant mode of subsistence for each society and classify them as predominantly Gatherers, Hunters, Fishermen, Pastoralists or Agriculturalists.

The dominant mode was taken as simply the mode of activity that took a greater percentage of the subsistence activities than any other single mode. In the rare case where two activities occupied equal roles and these each equalled the other for the highest percentage figure, I selected as dominant the activity as the one that was coded under the new single code in the punch card system.

It was not possible to use a preset percentage figure with this variable to ascertain the dominant mode of subsistence activity and each individual society has to be assessed separately (see Appendix D).

Having arrived at the dominant mode of subsistence for each society I considered the variable under two main classifications according to the dictates of the literature:
Those societies having little or no control over the main food source: Gathering, Hunting, Fishing

Those societies having a greater control over the main food source: Pastoralism, Agriculture.

**Division of Labour:** Sex difference in the above technological or economic activity (54,12).

The following are Murdock's original categories:

- **D** Differentiation of specific tasks by sex but approximately equal participation by both sexes in the total activity.
- **E** Equal participation by both sexes without marked or reported differentiation in specific tasks.
- **F** Females alone perform the activity, male participation being almost negligible.
- **G** Both sexes participate, but females do appreciably more than males.
- **I** Sex participation irrelevant, especially where production is industrialized.
- **M** Males alone perform the activity, female participation being negligible.
- **N** Both sexes participate, but males do appreciably more than females.
- **O** The activity is absent or unimportant in the particular society.
- **P** The activity is present, but sex participation is unspecified in the source consulted.

For my requirements, these unwieldy categories were recoded following the punch card system:

1. Males alone **M**
2. Males appreciably more **N**
Differentiation but equal participation: D
Equal participation without marked differentiation: E
Females appreciably more: G
Females alone or almost alone: F
Sex participation irrelevant: I
Activity is present but sex participation is unspecified: P
Activity is absent or unimportant: O

Categories 7, 8 and 9 were eliminated as they did not apply
to this study. The categories from one to six then fell into three
main divisions that would answer my needs:

1 (1,2) Males perform the task the most
2 (3,4) Equal participation in the task
3 (5,6) Females perform the task the most.

See Appendix D for the details of each society in relationship
to their type of subsistence activity.

High Gods (52,9)

The presence or absence of a High God does not necessarily
indicate the degree of involvement with religious practices of a
society. However, there is room for the assumption that His or Her
presence or absence may affect the attitude towards marriage termina-
tion. This is the only variable available in connection with religion
in Murdock's data and it was therefore used to test the hypothesis.
As noted earlier, religious practices are not included in Murdock's
Social Structure and, therefore, further explanation of his
intention is impossible.
Murdock’s definitions of his categories are:

A  A high god present but otiose or not concerned with human affairs.

B  A high god present and active in human affairs, but not offering positive support to human morality.

C  A high god present, active, and specifically supportive of human morality.

O  A high god absent or not reported in substantial descriptions of religious beliefs.

These are rearranged following the punch card system as High Gods:

1  Absent or not reported
2  Present but not active in human affairs
3  Present and active in human affairs but not supportive of human morality
4  Present, active and specifically supportive of human morality.

These break down quite naturally to answer my query regarding the society's involvement with High Gods. If one supposes that only the "morality" portion of the classification is relevant to marriage termination, then one to three would be combined and four would stand alone. However, I chose to dwell on the "active" participation in human affairs and recoded the variable:

1  (1,2) High Gods absent or not active
2  (3,4) High Gods present and active.

This was a judgment decision on my part and I believe it fits my intention.

I now have an operational form for each variable ready for machine calculation. The marriage termination data was entered on
the prepared punch cards and from the SPSS (1970) a cross-tabulation program was selected.

The operational form of the variables appears as follows:

**Dependent Variable**
- Marriage Termination: No/Yes

**Independent Variable**
- Bridewealth: No consideration/Some consideration
- Household Organization: Independent/Extended
- Type of Union: Monogamous/Polygamous
- Post-Marital Residence: Patrilocally/Bilocally/Ambilocally/Neolocally/Matrilocally/No common residence
- Settlement Pattern: Nomadic or shifting/Permanent
- Subsistence: Less control over food source/Greater control over food source
- Division of Labour: Male/Equal/Female
- High Gods: Absent, not active/Active
Summary

The categories for the independent variables are cumbersome and in some instances even boring. They are included in the body of the text so the reader will be fully aware of the rationale behind my recoding. The material is now fully operational and Chapter III will present the results of the cross-tabulations that were processed through the computer. As already mentioned an SPSS program was selected for this purpose.
In this chapter I will present the findings of each cross-tabulation separately, including the relevant table. Accompanying this will be my analysis of these data and some discussion of the findings. Chapter III will conclude with a general summary of the findings. Chapter IV will contain a thorough discussion of the implications of this analysis.

**Bridewealth**

Concerning the payment or exchange of bridewealth in connection with obtaining a spouse, I concluded that non-payment or no consideration exchanged, would be found in conjunction with termination of marriage. An examination of Table 1 does not support this hypothesis. Overall, some form of consideration exchanged is generally the rule. Of the 74 societies studied, 74.3% required bridewealth in connection with marriage.
Table 1: Bridewealth by Marriage Termination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bridewealth Consideration</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marriage Termination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = .14339$ with 1 degree of freedom $\text{significance} = .7049$

These data illustrate that there is no significant difference between the two populations in connection with marriage termination, contrary to what I had predicted earlier. Approximately the same proportions of both categories allow marriage termination. The slight difference that does appear between the two populations regarding marriage termination is not even in the direction predicted. Of those societies with some form of bridewealth, 76.4% allowed divorce. In those societies where there was no bridewealth consideration, 68.4% allowed divorce. The findings would appear to refute the theorists who claim that the payment of bridewealth places a restriction on termination of marriage. Here it seems that the payment or non-payment of bridewealth is not related to whether or not a society allows divorce. In connection with this independent variable, the literature examined in Chapter I left me with little doubt that some correlation would appear.

Without quantitative analysis, Gluckman and Evans-Pritchard both perceived a connection between bridewealth and the stability of marriage. How that relationship was arrived at was more complex than
this examination pretends to be. Nevertheless, I did expect to find some correlation. Schneider, I believe, also saw a relationship in this area. Perhaps closer attention should have been paid to two conflicting observations made in Chapter I. First, the divorce rate is generally high in primitive societies. Second, bridewealth is the normative rule for obtaining a spouse. If both these statements are true, then one should not expect to find the correlation I was seeking. The intervening literature may be misleading.

Type of Union

I assumed, in this connection, that termination of marriage would be more readily found in those societies practicing or condoning polygamy. Separations in monogamous unions appear to be more disruptive. Analysis of these data, presented in Table 2, do not support this assumption. Generally, polygamy was the preferred type of union. This type was representative of 79.7% of the societies examined.

Table 2: Type of Union by Marriage Termination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marriage Termination</th>
<th>Type of Union</th>
<th>Monogamous</th>
<th>Polygamous</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Monogamous</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polygamous</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 1.72$ with 1 degree of freedom, significance = .20
Here again there is no significant difference between the two populations in respect to termination of marriage. Polygamous unions do not appear to have a significantly greater incidence of divorce as I had hypothesized. Although the differences here are in the expected direction, I cannot say that the type of union is an indicator of the possibility for marriage termination. Although some 78.0% of the societies preferring the polygamous type of union allowed divorce, the results were not conclusive.

If, as Mead suggested, monogamy is such a difficult type of union, perhaps I should have anticipated the relatively high divorce rate with this type. There are, however, so many other factors to be considered when formulating an hypothesis. Primarily, we have the American tradition of monogamy and no divorce. Added to this, we have the effect of divorce on the rearing of children – one of the functions of marriage. Also to be considered is the effect of the loss of a spouse in relatively self-sufficient families – families practicing simple subsistence techniques and the "classic" rural American family. Admitting that monogamy in conjunction with an extended family organization alleviates some of these difficulties, this type of relationship was not considered at this time.

Polygamy, on the other hand, may allow the acquisition of co-wives without the necessity of divorce. Here then are other factors to be considered in addition to those mentioned above. The society may restrict the number of wives under general rules, and for
economic reasons. Or the kinship structure may dictate or limit the group from which a spouse may be chosen. An in-depth investigation of this area should take these other factors into consideration. I elected to let the variable stand alone and found that there was a slight indication that the direction selected had some merit. There is a tendency, although not significant, to find a correlation between polygamy and marriage termination.

**Household Organization**

In the extended family organization there is, by definition, more labour available to fill the domestic and subsistence roles. Although this does not include the sexual role, the departure of one spouse should not be as dysfunctional in the extended situation as it would be in the independent (nuclear) situation. The analysis of these data in Table 3 did not support my assumption that termination of marriage would more frequently be found in connection with the extended family format.

**Table 3: Household Organization by Marriage Termination**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marriage Termination</th>
<th>Type of Household</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Extended N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = .02908$ with 1 degree of freedom  

significance = .8646
Of the preliterate societies examined, 62.2% preferred an extended family organization. However, there was no significant correlation between this population and the possibility for termination of marriage. The difference between the two groups in relationship to divorce is so slight that any comment, even on the direction, would be in error. Seventy-three point nine percent of the societies with extended family organizations and 75.0% of the societies with independent family organizations allowed termination of marriage.

If, as Lasch pointed out, there is no lineal progression from extended to independent household organization, then one would expect to find both forms represented in a sample of preliterate societies. Also, if the raising of progeny is a major function of the family, then it might be expected that where divorce is extremely traumatic for the children, it would be prohibited. This would appear to be the case in independent and monogamous households. Bohannan and I agree that divorce would be less traumatic in extended households, and even less so in extended households practicing polygamy. My hypothesis seemed sound. However, the relationship between the type of union and the type of household was not explored. There are four possible combinations that could, in the future, each be examined separately in association with divorce.

From these results I cannot make a statement on the influence of the type of household on the frequency of divorce, despite my belief that the extended situation should lend itself more readily to
a possibility for termination of marriage.

Post-Marital Residence

As was pointed out in Chapter I, Roger and Felix Keesing believed that when female links with parents or natal kin groups are weakened by her removal from that environment upon marriage, "divorce is uncommon". When societies are structured in such a way that the female's natal ties are not weakened as a result of marriage, then divorce is more common. I assumed this to be true. However, given that there are other possible choices of post-marital residence location, this hypothesis is more difficult to test. Generally the results were not significant. Table 4 presents the data on the four major locations of post-marital residence that appeared in the sample.

Table 4: Location of Post-Marital Residence by Marriage Termination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marriage Termination</th>
<th>Location of Post-Marital Residence</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local % N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>70.0 35</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>30.0 15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 50</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 1.50889 \text{ with 3 degrees of freedom} \quad \text{significance} = .6802 \]

Number of missing observations = 1

In order to accommodate all the societies in the sample, it was necessary in Table 4 to consider four possibilities for location
of post-marital residence. The most popular option was in relationship to patrilineal kin groups (68.5%), followed by a post-marital location chosen in relationship to matrilineal kin (19.2%). Taken together, ambilocal and neolocal choices totalled only 12.3%. Analysis of these results for the total sample were not significant. Although the differences are in the hypothesized direction, I cannot say that the results are in any way conclusive. But when the post-marital residence is selected in relationship to the female's kin, the possibility for termination of marriage is 85.7%. When the choice is made in reference to the male's kin group, the possibility for divorce is only 70.0%.

If we examine only the two categories of interest here, matrilocality and patrilocality, the results approach significance to a slightly greater degree. Table 4(a) indicates that, while the dominant pattern is to allow marriage termination, matrilocal societies allow it with greater frequency than patrilocal societies. In this instance, matrilocal and patrilocal refer to the location of the post-marital residence.

Table 4(a): Patrilocal and Matrilocal Post-Marital Residence by Marriage Termination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marriage Termination</th>
<th>Patrilocal</th>
<th>Matrilocal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 1.34 \text{ with 1 degree of freedom} \quad \text{significance} = .25 \]

Number of missing observations = 11 (societies fell into other categories)
By selecting for analysis only the two possible locations for post-marital residence that relate to my hypothesis, the results appear to be in the direction predicted as before, but the significance of .25 is somewhat less marginal. This would lead me to believe that there is perhaps some correlation in this area and that the variable is important enough to warrant further analysis.

**Settlement Pattern**

I assumed that when the settlement pattern is nomadic or shifting the possibility for termination of marriage is greater. The literature indicated that monogamy was associated with more permanent settlements and this leaves polygamy in association with less permanent settlements. Recall that monogamous unions were supposed to be more stable. Based on this logic, I observed the frequency of permanent and less permanent settlements in relationship to divorce. Analysis of Table 5 provides us with data that actually show the two populations to be very similar in their approach to marriage termination. The total sample produced only 37.8% of the societies organized around a shifting or nomadic settlement pattern. The preference (62.2%) is for some permanent arrangement.
Table 5: Settlement Patterns by Marriage Termination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marriage Termination</th>
<th>Settlement Patterns</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Nomadic/Shifting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = .02908$ with 1 degree of freedom significance = .8646

A correlation between a nomadic/shifting settlement pattern and the possibility for termination of marriage was what I was seeking, but the results are not significant. The differences between the two populations and the possibility for divorce are so minimal that there is almost no indication that the variable is working in one way or the other. Marriage termination is possible in 76.1% of the societies with permanent settlement patterns and in 71.4% of the societies with nomadic/shifting settlement patterns.

The settlement pattern variable can become very complicated. It can be influenced by, or be directly the result of, the type of subsistence. But one must begin somewhere and these relationships were not investigated for this paper. As with Household Organization, there are many possible combinations. For example, a pastoralist or herder moving from one feeding ground to another, following the seasons, may have considerable control over his food source while a fisherman living in a permanent settlement may have less. Nevertheless, there seemed to be a feeling throughout, perhaps ethnocentrically, that somehow permanent settlements are "better". I sense, from the litera-
ture, a progression here that is similar to the extended family-independent family progression and the polygamy to monogamy progression. There are many facets to this variable that bear further testing.

Unfortunately I found nothing in this present exercise that would support my hypothesis that there was a relationship between the lack of permanence in a settlement pattern and the possibility for divorce. Equally, there is nothing in the findings to indicate that termination of marriage is significantly more likely when the settlement pattern is more permanent. This variable does not seem to produce a relationship between settlement pattern and stability of marriage.

Subsistence

In selecting this variable I felt that, as with shifting/nomadic settlement patterns, there would be a greater possibility for divorce when there was less control over the dominant mode of subsistence activity. These were both associated with polygamy and greater dependence on female labour in the literature. These are in turn coupled with less stable marriage. Therefore, I hypothesized that termination of marriage would be most likely to be found in societies with simpler approaches to, or less control over, food production such as gathering, hunting and fishing societies. This did not prove to be the case. Appendix I provides the data for Table 6. The sample
elicited 71.6% of the societies having a greater degree of control over their subsistence. These are the pastoralists and agriculturalists. The gatherers, hunters and fishermen comprised only 28.4% of the total sample.

Table 6: Type of Subsistence by Marriage Termination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marriage Termination</th>
<th>Control over Dominant Source of Subsistence</th>
<th>Less (Gathering, Hunting, Fishing)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More (Pastoralism, Agriculture)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N 39</td>
<td>N 16</td>
<td>N 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 73.6</td>
<td>% 76.2</td>
<td>% 74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>N 14</td>
<td>N 5</td>
<td>N 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 26.4</td>
<td>% 23.8</td>
<td>% 25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N 53</td>
<td>N 21</td>
<td>N 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 100.0</td>
<td>% 100.0</td>
<td>% 100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = .0 with 1 degree of freedom significance = .99

The subsistence variable presents complexities similar to and related to the Settlement variable as outlined above. It also interacts with the Division of Labour variable. I did not find it profitable to consider each type of subsistence individually due to the small size of the sample.

Obviously these findings are not significant. The only conclusion that can be drawn from these data is that the two populations - societies having more control and societies having less control over their subsistence, are relatively similar in their approach to the termination of marriage. The differences give no indication of direction. Societies having more control offered a 73.6% possibility for divorce while societies having less control over their dominant food
source offered 76.2% possibility for divorce. As always, the possibility for marriage termination, in general, is high.

**Division of Labour**

In this variable I am interested in which sex performs the major portion of the dominant subsistence activity. I expected that when the women provided the greater portion of the necessary labour that the possibility for marriage termination would be greater. As previously noted, female labour is linked to a simpler technology and the possibility for marriage termination is expected to be more frequent under these circumstances. My hypothesis did not stand up to the test. As Table 7 shows, 50% of the labour required for the dominant mode of subsistence is provided by males. In 32% of the societies, it was reported that labour was shared equally. In only 18% of the sample is female labour responsible for the dominant subsistence activity. When we isolate male labour and combine the equal participation with female labour the results show a 50/50 division.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7: Division of Labour by Marriage Termination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distribution of Labour</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage Termination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 3.164 \text{ with two degrees of freedom} \]

significance = .20

Number of missing observations = 2

*For the dominant mode of subsistence only.*
When we combine equal participation and female labour we can see that 66.7% allow divorce. However, the direction, although not significant, is opposite to that expected. The tendency is toward a greater possibility for marriage termination when males dominate the labour scene in connection with the dominant mode of subsistence activity.

Societies do not subsist on a single food source. For example, hunters rounded out their diet with berries and roots. With the males off hunting, the females were responsible for balancing the diet. Therefore, looking at only the dominant food source in connection with the division of labour now appears to be inadequate. The information is available for an examination of the division of labour in connection with secondary and even tertiary food sources. This would provide an interesting study. Another approach would be to break down the agriculture variable into its three levels - incipient, intensive and extensive, and see if it held true that the simpler technology/female labour hypothesis was valid.

In spite of the fact that females appeared more independent in connection with simpler technology, where they provided the greater portion of the labour for the main subsistence activity, it would seem that the possibility for divorce may be greater when males provide the labour "alone or almost alone".
High Gods

The final variable, the importance of High Gods in the structure of a society, is analyzed in relationship to its effect on marriage termination. My hypothesis was that the absence of active or involved High Gods in a social structure would increase the possibility for termination of marriage. These data did not prove my hypothesis to be true. Table 8 presents these data. Surprisingly, 74.6% of the societies examined did not report active or involved High Gods. Some anthropologists believe that the concept of religion and Gods had a strong role to play in primitive social structures.

Table 8: High Gods by Marriage Termination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marriage Termination</th>
<th>Involvement of High Gods</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Active &amp; Involved</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 0.00181 \text{ with 1 degree of freedom} \quad \text{significance} = 0.9661 \]

Number of missing observations = 7

There do not appear to be any significant differences between the proportion allowing divorce and the proportion prohibiting divorce in these two populations. Where High Gods are not involved, 74.6% of
the societies offered a possibility for marriage termination, but
70.6% of the societies involved with High Gods also allowed divorce.

Nothing is to be gained from these data as they stand. A
realignment of the categories - concentrating on morality alone,
and grouping non-involved, involved and active High Gods (not
concerned with morality) also did not produce significant results.
Table 8a provides these recoded data. Only 13.4% of the societies
reported High Gods involved with morality. I expected perhaps that
this 13.4% would have a much greater incidence of prohibition on divorce.

Table 8a: High Gods Involved with Morality by Marriage Termination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Gods Involved with Morality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage Termination</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 0 \]

Number of missing observations = 7

An analysis of Table 8a offers little more confirmation. Both
populations allowed divorce almost equally. With or without High Gods
involved in the morality of a society, the possibility for termination
of marriage is 77.8% and 72.4% respectively.

By Murdock's definition of High Gods there is also the possibility of Lesser Gods who could represent an active element of a
society's religious institutions. However, there are no data readily
available relating to Lesser Gods. As a result, this aspect of social
structure was not investigated as part of this study. My research does
not exclude a connection between religion and marriage termination but
only between the involvement of High Gods and marriage termination.

Summary

This analysis, although not significant, has brought to the
surface many questions that require answers. On this basis alone it
has been rewarding. I believe these variables to be important to a
degree far beyond this initial investigation.

Even at the present level of inquiry, particularly concerning
the controversial topic of bridewealth, it is surprising that these
data produced no significant results supporting a correlation between
that social practice and marriage stability. Even more disconcerting
is the fact that the slight difference between the two populations is
not in the direction predicted. Neither did the analysis of the vari-
able relating to division of labour produce a result in the direction
predicted. However, the rationale for this hypothesis was much weaker
than for the hypothesis relating to bridewealth.

The variables representing the type of household organization,
the settlement pattern, the dominant subsistence activity, and the
involvement with High Gods indicated that in these areas the popula-
tions were very similar in their approach to marriage termination.
Given the complexity of these variables, perhaps this is not surprising.
Other factors must be considered in future research.

The variables relating to the type of union and the location of the post-marital residence produced slightly more rewarding, although not significant results. Here there was some indication that the hypotheses were formulated accurately. However, the present approach is far too simplistic for the intricacies of these variables. Actually this statement holds true for all the independent variables and is a major conclusion to be drawn from this preliminary research.
In this thesis, I have tested the influence of several variables on whether or not a society allows for the termination of marriage. While the differences were in the predicted direction in two cases, by and large there was no relationship.

These variables were derived from a series of debates and studies in anthropology. The debates generally centred around the very definition of divorce or marriage termination itself, and the various sets of inter-related variables that seemed to be correlated with divorce. The studies were generally concerned with a very few societies which seemed to illustrate differences in these sets of variables.

In this thesis, I have tried to do two things. First, I have tried to tease apart the sets of inter-related variables, and break them down into their own component parts as comparatively simple variables. Then, I have tried to test the impact of these simple variables on a comparatively large number of societies. Briefly, my results reveal that, when taken singly, these variables have little or no effect on particular society's rules regarding termination of marriage. The possible exceptions are post-marital residence and type of union, in which the differences were in the expected direction although not statistically
significant. Polygamous societies were somewhat more likely to allow divorce, than were monogamous and matrilocal societies were more likely to do so than were societies with other residence rules.

It would seem that these results leave me with essentially two choices. I can argue that, singly, these variables do not work when tested upon a large number of societies and, consequently, that the theories should be rejected and/or recast. Or, I can argue that the issue of divorce is much more complicated than researchers have supposed and cannot be predicted by any one variable taken alone. The latter seems to be the general or preferred solution in the literature, where originally the variables were referred to as existing in complex sets of combinations and permutations. The difficulty with this position, however, is that it is empirically untestable in a comparative situation. Contrasting post-marital locality (four sub-types) by division of labour (three types) would give us twelve possible combinations; and with 74 societies there is the theoretical possibility that (with even distribution) between six and seven cases would fall into each of the twelve possible combinations. Such a number is then too small for quantitative analysis; i.e. it negates the original reason for doing the thesis in the first place. Nevertheless, one should presumably make some attempt to resolve this paradox and construct higher order categories that somehow handle the issues involved.

Perhaps we might follow the lead of two recently discovered studies that attempt this: those of Gibbs and of Ackerman. Rather than creating a series of combinations for types of societies, they
have attempted to create a continuum complex set between polar types, along which one could array a sample of societies. And interestingly enough, some of the themes making up their types have to do with the variables I found to be in the predicted direction of my hypothesis. I shall review their work, and then examine the relevance of their typologies for the variables used in my study.

The Gibbs and Ackerman Theories

Gibbs, doing research among the Kpelle of Central Liberia, observed that "marital instability was not uncommon." His goal was to develop an adequate theory that would elicit "which type of social or kinship structures generate high or low divorce rates" that would apply to both primitive and civilized societies (1964:196). To begin with, he coined the term "epainogamy" - the condition in which marriage is socially supported, praised, sanctioned and almost forced. Epainogamous societies are "tight societies that have kinship and marriage systems that incorporate three basic processes: first, they eliminate normative ambiguity; second, they reward conformity to norms; and third, they punish deviance from norms.

Gibbs sees two main features that eliminate normative ambiguity. The first is, by some procedure, to fix the locus of rights in a woman in her spouse or his lineage. The second revolves around ceremoniali-
zation of marriage - involvement of kin, ritualization, spelling out of expectations and sacrification.

To reward conformity, he suggests that some societies restrict valued rights to marriage. By restricting sexual access, reproductive rights and rights to a woman's labour to marriage, conformity to the norms is reinforced.

Punishment is meted out by shutting off access to valued ends and by subjecting spouses to control groups. This is most effective in societies where status is achieved by ascription. This is less easily sanctioned in societies where status is arrived at by achievement. However, in the latter case the fruits of a wife's labour may be very important. In "looser" or non-epaipogamous societies many of these processes would be weak or absent.

Gluckman's patriliney provided a starting point for Gibb's observations as well as mine. In Gluckman's hypothesis, recall that patriliney is associated with a low divorce rate and matriliney with a high divorce rate. Gibbs avoided the bridewealth implications and suggested that it was the concept of patriliney that was problematic. Leach, suggests Gibbs, is arguing that "the transfer of jural authority over a woman to her husband's lineage is not . . . an indication of a high degree of patriliney, but that 'retention' of these rights by the woman's own lineage is such an indication" (1965:197). The conclusion, then, is that extreme lineality, whether matriliney or patriliney, leads to unstable marriage. Here the jural rights in a woman are divided
between her own lineage and that of her husband. Therefore, in seeking structural indicators of marital stability, it is necessary to select variables that by their presence or absence affect the jural rights in a woman. I used the terms patrilineal and matrilineal only in connection with post-marital residence. The implication here is that the patrilineal residence location severs the female's natal ties.

My conclusion is that the patrilineal residence site would strongly reinforce the husband's jural rights in his wife. The choice of a matrilineal site might divide these rights or at least it might cause ambiguity. The only other variable I selected that might possibly represent an indication of involvement of kin, reinforcing the expectations, is bridewealth. However, this variable was not examined to a degree that would elicit the expectations or the institutionalization of this transaction.

Gibbs believed that the greater the "institutionalized" involvement of other individuals in the marriage, the less chance there is of marriage termination (1964:202). He arrived at the following conclusion:

... that the exogamous society is one in which marriage is stable because of the presence of a series of specific features of kinship and social organization which separately and jointly serve not only to define normative expectations in marriage sharply and unequivocally, but to sanction those expectations both positively and negatively (1964:203).

Ackerman, also beginning with the Gluckman hypothesis, was looking for a framework for interdisciplinary research. He suggested that the structural determinants of differential divorce rates could be found in the pattern of the spouses' affiliations (1963:13).
appears to be based on homogamy. He considers that common affiliations produce a low divorce rate. His initial study was based on 62 societies from the HRAF.

To test his theory, Ackerman assessed affiliations as either conjunctive or disjunctive. However, differences in the descent patterns of societies forced him to look for different mechanisms in each type that could be representative of conjunctive and disjunctive affiliations.

In bilateral societies, Ackerman concentrated on endogamy and exogamy. These could be further refined by adding the concepts of consanguinity and community. Consanguinity is represented in the population from which a man may select a mate. For example, with consanguine endogamy there would likely be a rule that restricted marriage to a woman no further removed than first or second cousin. This results in overlapping kin affiliations. Therefore, you would encounter strong conjunctive affiliations in societies that sanction consanguine endogamy. "The more alike the spouses are in such 'antecedent' factors as socioeconomic status, ethnicity, region of origin, education and religion, the less the probability that the marriage will result in divorce" (Ackerman, 1963:14). This is extended to parental similarities and homogeneity in "close friend-families" with incorporation of community endogamy.

In lineal descent societies, Ackerman looked for mechanisms that severed the affiliations of one spouse and incorporated them
in the other. This is similar to Gibbs' thinking. Where a society does not foster either the extension/inclusion principle or a severance/incorporation principle in relation to the affiliations of each spouse, you can expect conflict and a high divorce rate.

Ackerman concludes "that bilateral societies are 'not' characterized by high divorce rates generally. Further, patrilineal societies are characterized by low divorce rates generally" (1963:19). And Gluckman's concentration on descent is not sufficient, particularly in bilateral societies. It is necessary to dig much deeper to discover the factors that foster severance/incorporation and conjunctive affiliations. Many societies will present conflicting structures and it is necessary to discover the dominating features. Variables should be selected and examined with these covert factors in mind.

What are the implications of these two theories for this present study? Since my hypotheses did not stand up to testing, a different approach may be warranted in future research. Selecting variables as they appear on the surface in the literature, should only be a starting point as Gibbs and Ackerman have demonstrated. It is necessary to discover the basic function of a rule or ritual in order to assess its worth as an indicator of marital stability. It is possible that the true function of the location of the post-marital residence is to eliminate ambiguity in those societies that have a preferred patrilineal site. It is also possible that this variable has strong economic implications that are not even considered here. The practice of bride-wealth could also be governed by the above factors. The worth of this paper resides in its initial exposure of the selected variables as
will be emphasized again and again. I will now review each finding and conclude by suggesting an alternate approach to the problems encountered with these variables.

Chapter IV proceeds with a review of the implications surrounding each hypothesis. The first and most prominent variable, as indicated by the literature, was related to the payment of bridewealth.

Bridewealth

One of the conclusions of my investigation of some of the structural considerations that influence divorce is that the absence of bridewealth payment in connection with marriage is not a significant indicator of possible marriage termination. I found that more societies do require some form of consideration than do not. This, according to Hoebel (1958), is the most usual method of obtaining a wife in primitive societies. Overall, divorce is highly probably, as is most often admitted in the literature.

However, other arguments from the literature seem to have come to naught although there is still a strong indication from the authors quoted that bridewealth and marital stability are somehow connected. Evans-Pritchard (1967) began by stating, in general, that bridewealth had a stabilizing action on marriage. This I did not find to be the case. Neither was there any support for his second statement;
payments were a recognition of stability. In this research it was necessary, by its very nature, to consider jural regulations only. In this area, Evans-Pritchard believed that brideweight would inhibit divorce jurally. Schneider thought that possibly brideweight was important because jural bonds are fixed by the non-returnability of payment. I agree when he adds, "or is it something else?"

We do know that there are two main modes of obtaining the rights in a woman: some form of consideration or no consideration. On this basis alone there is no correlation with termination of marriage. What remains for further investigation are Gluckman's hypotheses regarding brideweight plus patrilineality as an indication of low divorce rate, and matrilineality as an indication of high divorce rate. Also, I have no data on the rules governing the repayment of brideweight when there is a jural separation. A third concept to be considered is the difference between dowry and the other forms of payment made by the male kin. From his African studies, Goody (1976) equated dowry with monogamy which in turn placed restrictions on polygamy, divorce and remarriage.

Preliminary investigation of the literature leads me to assume that no brideweight payment would pave the way for a greater frequency of termination of marriage. Quantitative analysis of these data seems to prove this incorrect. It would now appear to be important to know the amount of brideweight required and the rules governing its disposition in the case of marital breakdown. If the payment was high and entailed the cooperative efforts of a kin group to accumulate, then this group has a vested interest in the stability of the marriage.
Payment might possibly have to be returned. On the other hand, if the bridewealth is paid by bride service to the female's kin group, this would constitute a period of conflict for the male. Also, does the brideprice really compensate the family for the loss of a daughter as Murdock suggested, and thus perhaps completely sever the woman's natal ties, or is it the beginning of an extension/inclusion affiliation? These possibilities pose very interesting questions.

**Type of Union**

When considering the type of union as a separate independent variable, the findings of this research are not conclusive and do not prove my hypothesis that termination of marriage is more likely when the type of union is polygamous.

It is true that Margaret Mead believed that, in practice, monogamy is a very difficult type of union. But, pragmatically, the one male and one female need each other for the different services each provides to the unit. With polygamy, and all cases in this sample are of the polygynous type of polygamy (one male, multiple wives), the female role may be immediately replaced. Goody did postulate that there was no need for divorce when the society practiced polygamy. While there is merit in this observation, I found that the difference between monogamous and polygamous populations was not significant in regard to marriage termination.
It could be argued that both types of union - monogamous and polygamous - have aspects that would appear to inhibit divorce. In light of the new theories introduced, the type of union requires a more in-depth investigation. An examination of the ceremony itself might have implications for the stability of the marriage. To what extent does it incorporate the institutionalized involvement of others? To what extent does it incorporate religion or sacrilization?

The polygamous type of union also has many facets. Ackerman accepted the levirate as a strong indication of severance of affiliations. Here, on the death of a husband, the woman is taken as wife of the husband's brother or some other lineage mate. This should produce complete severance/incorporation. Sororal polygamy may or may not produce stability. In this case, women are required to share one man, which could be disruptive. However, I would also suggest that where co-wives reside in separate swellings, the possibility of conflict is lessened. It may depend on whether a society is epanogamous or not. Data for this type of examination are readily available.

**Post-Marital Residence**

There is more than one reference in the literature to female natal bonds and the stability of marriage. Gluckman thought that when there was a complete transference of a woman to her husband's group, there was no divorce. With these data I have not taken into considera-
tion the descent rules (unilateral/agnatic or bilateral/cognatic) in connection with marriage, but I have assumed that when the post-marital residence is located in relationship to the female's kin, then the female's natal bonds are not weakened. This gives the advantage to the female who is not required to relocate nor to readjust. Under these circumstances, the possibility for divorce was expected to be greater.

These data, to a degree, do support this hypothesis. The results are not significant when all possible post-marital residence options were considered. However, when I looked only at the two main options—patrilocal and matrilocal—there was a significant correlation between a matrilocal site and the possibility for termination of marriage.

The literature strongly supported this theory. When the bride is not removed from her natal group, those ties remain stronger as the marriage ties are weakened. Perhaps there is a kernel of truth, or apprehension, surrounding our 'mother-in-law' jokes.

Murdock felt that the rules of residence reflected 'economic, social and cultural conditions' and therefore it was an important variable. I would now suggest that the rules of residence are a strong indication of the severance/avoidance or of the extension/inclusion processes. The relative success of this hypothesis is due to the fact that it provides an indication of the processes that are taking place within a society. This still does not reveal whether or not a society is epigenogamous. This requires further investigation. However, I suggest that a society that approaches the residence rules with processes that eliminate normative ambiguity, that reward conformity to norms, and that punish deviance from norms and that also selects a patrilocal
post-marital residence, is going to have stable marriage. Conversely, a non-epainogamous society that favours a matrilocal post-marital residence will have a high incidence of marriage termination.

**Settlement Pattern**

Because other investigators observed a progression from polygamy to monogamy, and from simpler (female) to more complex (male) technology in juxtaposition with a progression from shifting to more permanent settlements, I assumed that divorce would be more frequent when the settlement pattern was shifting or nomadic. Monogamy and permanent settlement did not mitigate for a high divorce rate in the literature and thus my hypothesis was formed. This was in spite of a strong personal feeling that families organized on a shifting or nomadic basis might be more dependent on one another.

Since analysis of the data does not indicate that other interrelated variables have a significant correlation with termination of marriage, it could not be expected that the settlement pattern would do so either. It remains to be seen whether or not these variables are as inter-related as the literature would lead us to believe. Of particular interest would be a verification of the correlation between monogamy and permanent settlements versus polygamy and shifting/nomadic settlements. I suspect a hint of an earlier, more simplistic
anthropological approach here. Lasch (1975) referred to something similar when he cautioned against assuming a progression from extended to independent households; both forms have been around for a long time. I believe that the same type of error may have been committed in linking permanent settlements with monogamous unions. Organizations of these types have been practiced, side by side with nomadism and polygamy throughout history, and are not an indication of "civilization" as such. In more instances than not, provision for termination of marriage was included in the social structure.

There is no indication from this variable, on the surface, as to whether or not the society is epainogamous. Also, at least at this level, it is not an indication of conjunctive or disjunctive affiliations. I now believe that it is only important insofar as it is a reflection of the type of subsistence which in turn is closely related to the division of labour. Trying to keep these variables separate presented difficulties throughout the paper. I would no longer suggest looking for a correlation between termination of marriage and the type of settlement pattern as it was attempted herein. I leave further speculations to follow in the discussion of the next two independent variables - subsistence and division of labour.
Subsistence

Following Goody, I assumed that monogamy would be rare with a simpler technology such as hunting, gathering or fishing and would most commonly be found with agriculture and a more advanced technology, regardless of any fallacy in logic possibly committed. Monogamy was not supposed to correlate with termination of marriage. Here again too many theories appear to have arisen from the old idea of "primitive hordes" not "properly" formed into "one to one" unions. Anthropologists now believe this to be in error, but the memory lingers on.

An examination of each possible combination of categories between the two variables was not attempted. One could consider monogamy with "more control" and with "less control" over the food base. The same could be done with polygamy. But I now suggest that this would be a futile exercise. The original premise was in error. The assumption that monogamy is in some way synonymous with marital stability appears to be in error. A more profitable exercise would be to consider the types of societies that are usually found with hunting, gathering, agriculture, etc. If each type of subsistence activity correlated nicely with specific social structures, and these structures demonstrated the affiliation processes and the "tightness" of the society in regard to its own norms, then and only then could something useful be elicited from this variable in relationship to divorce. I gained nothing conclusive from the approach taken in this paper.
A lack of correlation between the independent variable and marriage termination holds true in the case of division of labour as well as in the above.

Homans (1950) wrote that the 'emotional tie' between a husband and wife is rooted in the activities they contribute to the common enterprise. Then, in theory, when subsistence is provided for equally, the possibility for divorce should be less frequent. But here I am equating, in part, emotions with a divorce rate. And where women are more independent insofar as they are able to provide the dominant food source, the possibility for divorce should be more frequent.

With the nexus of female labour, impermanent settlements, simpler technology and polygamy, I expected to find a greater probability for termination of marriage. However, as with the findings pertaining to settlement patterns and other related variables, nothing significant appeared in regard to division of labour. I now believe some literature to be misleading in these areas. Further research may not confirm a link between female labour, impermanent settlements and simpler technology. Of even greater interest, from my point of view, would be an examination of the total subsistence activities of a society and a tally made of the total contribution of each sex. It is quite possible, with these data, to make such an investigation.

However, there are many other approaches that can be taken to the question of the division of labour. If the fruits of the woman's labour, as well as the filiation of her children, remain with her kin
group, ambiguity could arise and cause marital disruption. However, if the rewards of her labour increase the status of the couple in an achievement-oriented society, then the pressure may be towards preserving the marriage. I feel the division of labour variable with all its ramifications to be very important, and it requires a thorough investigation both in the past and in the present.

**High Gods**

My conclusion from these data is that the presence or absence of High Gods in the human affairs of a society bears no relationship to the possibility for termination of marriage. For many reasons I believed this to be true and I still hold this belief. These data are inadequate to assess the role of religious or supernatural practices within a given society. The coded data should be disregarded and an assessment made by the researcher as was done with the marriage termination data.

Religious practices and beliefs, as reported by Saliba (1976; 1977), are involved with social solidarity and social control. Gibbs would insist that ritualization and sacralization of the marriage ceremony in particular, eliminates normative ambiguity. This approach to religion I would classify as "involved" not "sui generis". Attitudes and beliefs are not necessarily as regulatory as the ritual and the physical processes that tend to reinforce the norms. It is the influence
of High Gods only, as examined in this paper, that appears to bear no
correlation with termination of marriage. And if Nisbet's theory holds,
than religious practices should deter divorce simply because of the
society's need for children - for the adults they would become.

A closer look at the grounds or reasons given for termination
of marriage may reverse the picture entirely. Divorce may be the practi-
cal answer to a union that has not produced any offspring. In eighteen
of the 74 societies examined, divorce was specifically allowed on the
grounds of lack of offspring or it was allowed during the very early years
of marriage before children were produced by the young couples. The
grounds for divorce and the problem of issue may be another key to the
question of availability of marriage termination. However, this may
well be aside from any religious implications. The grounds for divorce
may be elicited from the original literature in the HRAF for many of
these societies and while I was not investigating the grounds at this
point, a future study of this milieu would be advisable.

I conclude with a strong recommendation that the problem of
the survival of the species through successful reproduction is closely
related to the divorce rate and that termination of marriage is more
probable in the absence of any issue rather than afterward.
Summary

In general, the hypothesis I formulated did not stand up to testing by quantitative analysis. The major conclusion I reached is to be very wary of theoretical statements that have not been tested by some rigorous method. Second, the possibility for divorce is always high in preliterate societies.

In my final assessment of these hypotheses I have leaned heavily on two theories that attempt to clarify some of the problems related to termination of marriage. One objective was to formulate theory that would be applicable to both "primitive" and "civilized" societies. The other objective was to increase interdisciplinary investigation in the problems relating to marital stability. Both approaches have considerable merit.

Specifically, I believe that the location of the post-marital residence in relationship to the female's kin gives some indication of the possibility for marriage termination and the question of whether or not there has been issue from a union should be thoroughly investigated. As for the other variables I selected - bridewealth, household settlement, division of labour and religion - further research along the lines I have indicated is recommended.
APPENDICES
Dear Professor Murdock,

During my undergraduate years at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, as a major in both Anthropology and Sociology, I began working with your Ethnographic Atlas. Now as I approach my M.A. in Sociology I require further information.

This necessitates a coding of the possibilities for marriage termination. I am most interested in comparing other aspects of societies that allow either easy marriage termination, infrequent marriage termination, or no termination of marriage at all. I must add that I found my own attempt at this coding somewhat unreliable.

Plus the above, some coding of the degree or complexity of bride price or bride service would be appreciated.

Perhaps this information has already been coded and I have missed it? I would appreciate very much any help you can give me as my thesis depends on it. I look forward to hearing from you.

Thank you.

Yours truly,

(Mrs.) Gladys Noonan

Dear Mrs. Noonan:

Professor George P. Murdock is now retired from the University of Pittsburgh and owing to poor health is no longer active in anthropology. However, there has been no additional codes to the ETHNOGRAPHIC ATLAS. I am enclosing several reprints that you might have some use for.

Sincerely,

Dolores Donohue
Managing Editor/ETHNOLOGY
## APPENDIX B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society Name</th>
<th>Punch Card Number</th>
<th>HRAF Number</th>
<th>Society Name</th>
<th>Punch Card Number</th>
<th>HRAF Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kung</td>
<td>0001</td>
<td>FX10</td>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>0167</td>
<td>OZ4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ila</td>
<td>0004</td>
<td>FQ6</td>
<td>Marquesas</td>
<td>0168</td>
<td>OX6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bambara</td>
<td>0012</td>
<td>FA8</td>
<td>Copper Eskimo</td>
<td>0169</td>
<td>ND8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katab</td>
<td>0014</td>
<td>FF38</td>
<td>Yokuts</td>
<td>0174</td>
<td>NS29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monguor</td>
<td>0036</td>
<td>AE9</td>
<td>Navaho</td>
<td>0182</td>
<td>NT13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santal</td>
<td>0042</td>
<td>AW42</td>
<td>Zuni</td>
<td>0183</td>
<td>NT23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andaman</td>
<td>0045</td>
<td>AZ2</td>
<td>Chorti</td>
<td>0186</td>
<td>SK6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iban</td>
<td>0053</td>
<td>OC6</td>
<td>Cagaba</td>
<td>0187</td>
<td>SC7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapaku</td>
<td>0057</td>
<td>OJ29</td>
<td>Tapirape</td>
<td>0190</td>
<td>SP22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truk</td>
<td>0060</td>
<td>OR19</td>
<td>Jivaro</td>
<td>0191</td>
<td>SD9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribriand</td>
<td>0062</td>
<td>OL6</td>
<td>Cayapa</td>
<td>0194</td>
<td>SD6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tikopia</td>
<td>0066</td>
<td>OT11</td>
<td>Abipon</td>
<td>0196</td>
<td>S14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gros Ventre</td>
<td>0075</td>
<td>NQ13</td>
<td>Bacairi</td>
<td>0197</td>
<td>SP7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarahumara</td>
<td>0083</td>
<td>NU33</td>
<td>Nambicura</td>
<td>0198</td>
<td>SP17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callinago</td>
<td>0087</td>
<td>ST13</td>
<td>Shilluk</td>
<td>0218</td>
<td>FJ23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mundurucu</td>
<td>0090</td>
<td>SQ13</td>
<td>Yap</td>
<td>0260</td>
<td>OR22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yahgan</td>
<td>0094</td>
<td>SH6</td>
<td>Yao</td>
<td>0304</td>
<td>FT7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mataco</td>
<td>0095</td>
<td>S17</td>
<td>Luo</td>
<td>0318</td>
<td>FL11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caraja</td>
<td>0099</td>
<td>SP9</td>
<td>Bhil</td>
<td>0328</td>
<td>SQ25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chagga</td>
<td>0107</td>
<td>FN4</td>
<td>Pawnee</td>
<td>0342</td>
<td>NQ18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>0108</td>
<td>FL10</td>
<td>Yucatec Maya</td>
<td>0345</td>
<td>NU10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fang</td>
<td>0109</td>
<td>FH9</td>
<td>Tehuelche</td>
<td>0349</td>
<td>SH5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogon</td>
<td>0113</td>
<td>FA16</td>
<td>Kol</td>
<td>0362</td>
<td>AW37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuer</td>
<td>0120</td>
<td>FJ22</td>
<td>Khasi</td>
<td>0365</td>
<td>AR7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siwans</td>
<td>0123</td>
<td>MR14</td>
<td>Manus</td>
<td>0373</td>
<td>OM6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lapp</td>
<td>0129</td>
<td>EP4</td>
<td>Goa Jiro</td>
<td>0391</td>
<td>SC13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwala</td>
<td>0132</td>
<td>MD4</td>
<td>Chirigano</td>
<td>0398</td>
<td>SF10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chukchee</td>
<td>0135</td>
<td>RY2</td>
<td>Tupinambia</td>
<td>0400</td>
<td>SO9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miao</td>
<td>0138</td>
<td>AE5</td>
<td>Tewa</td>
<td>0435</td>
<td>NT18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burusho</td>
<td>0139</td>
<td>AV7</td>
<td>Aleut</td>
<td>0458</td>
<td>NA6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lepcha</td>
<td>0140</td>
<td>AK5</td>
<td>Bella Coola</td>
<td>0471</td>
<td>NE6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toda</td>
<td>0143</td>
<td>AW60</td>
<td>Nootka</td>
<td>0473</td>
<td>NE11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanala</td>
<td>0144</td>
<td>FY8</td>
<td>Micmac</td>
<td>0504</td>
<td>NJ5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vedda</td>
<td>0145</td>
<td>AX5</td>
<td>Tlingit</td>
<td>0505</td>
<td>NA12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semang</td>
<td>0148</td>
<td>AN7</td>
<td>Amaran</td>
<td>0865</td>
<td>MP5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wogeo</td>
<td>0159</td>
<td>OJ27</td>
<td>Easter Island</td>
<td>1126</td>
<td>OY2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pukapukans</td>
<td>0166</td>
<td>OZ11</td>
<td>Tasmanians</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>0119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

1. **A** Africa, exclusive of Madagascar and the northern and northeastern portions of the continent.

   **C** Circum-Mediterranean, including Europe, Turkey and the Caucasus, the Semitic Near East, and the northern and northeastern Africa.

   **E** East Eurasia, excluding Formosa, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the area assigned to the Circum-Mediterranean but including Madagascar and the other islands in the Indian Ocean.

   **I** Insular Pacific, embracing all of Oceania as well as areas like Australia, Indonesia, Formosa, and the Philippines that are not always herewith included.

   **N** North America, including the indigenous societies of this continent as far south as the Isthmus of Tehuantepec.

   **S** South America, including the Antilles, Yucatan, and Central America as well as the continent itself.
## APPENDIX D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society Number</th>
<th>Proportion Spent on each Activity</th>
<th>Dominant Mode of Subsistence</th>
<th>Division of Labour*</th>
<th>Marriage Termination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0001</td>
<td>8 2 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0004</td>
<td>1 0 0 3 6</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0012</td>
<td>2 0 1 2 5</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0014</td>
<td>2 1 1 1 5</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0036</td>
<td>0 0 1 3 6</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0042</td>
<td>0 1 1 1 7</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0045</td>
<td>4 2 4 0 0</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0053</td>
<td>0 0 2 2 6</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0057</td>
<td>0 1 1 2 6</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0060</td>
<td>0 0 5 0 5</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0062</td>
<td>1 0 3 1 5</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0066</td>
<td>0 0 5 1 5</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0075</td>
<td>2 8 0 0 0</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0083</td>
<td>1 1 0 3 5</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0087</td>
<td>0 1 5 0 4</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0090</td>
<td>1 3 2 0 4</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0094</td>
<td>1 2 7 0 0</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0095</td>
<td>2 2 4 1 1</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0099</td>
<td>2 2 4 0 2</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0107</td>
<td>0 1 0 3 6</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0108</td>
<td>0 0 0 3 7</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0109</td>
<td>1 1 2 1 5</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0113</td>
<td>2 0 0 2 6</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0120</td>
<td>0 0 1 5 4</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0123</td>
<td>0 0 0 3 7</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0129</td>
<td>0 2 2 6 0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0132</td>
<td>1 1 0 8 0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0135</td>
<td>0 2 3 5 0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0138</td>
<td>0 1 1 2 6</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0139</td>
<td>0 0 0 4 6</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0140</td>
<td>0 1 0 3 6</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0143</td>
<td>1 0 0 9 0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0144</td>
<td>0 0 2 2 6</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0145</td>
<td>4 3 3 0 0</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0148</td>
<td>4 3 3 0 0</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0159</td>
<td>2 0 2 1 5</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0166</td>
<td>0 0 4 1 5</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0167</td>
<td>2 2 2 0 4</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0168</td>
<td>0 0 4 1 5</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0169</td>
<td>0 4 6 0 0</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society Number</td>
<td>Proportion Spent On each Activity*</td>
<td>Dominant Mode of Subsistence</td>
<td>Division of Labour*</td>
<td>Marriage Termination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0174</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0182</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0183</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0186</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0187</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0190</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0191</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0194</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0196</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0197</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0198</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0218</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0260</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0304</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0318</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0328</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0342</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0345</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0349</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0363</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0365</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0373</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0391</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0398</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0400</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0435</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0458</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0471</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0473</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0504</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0505</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0565</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1126</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1141</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* G - Gathering  
H - Hunting  
F - Fishing  
P - Pastoralism  
A - Agriculture  
M - Male  
E - Equal  
F - Female
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ackerman, Charles

Barnes, J. A.

Barry, Herbert, Ill

Blood, Robert O.

Bohanna, Paul

Bredemeier, H. D. and R. M. Stephenson

Brown, Judith

Carter, Hugh and Paul Glick

Christensen, H. T. ed.

Driver, Harold

Ellis, Godfrey

Gibbs, James L. Jr.
Gluckman, Max

Goode, William J.

Goody, Jack

Hoebel, E. A.

Homans, G. C.

Hunt, Morton

Keesing, Roger M. and Felix M. Keesing

Lagace, Robert O.

Landis, Paul H.

Lasch, Christopher
Leach, E. R.

Mayles, Davidyne

Mead, Margaret

Mitchell, J. Clyde.

Murdock, G. P.

Murdock, G. P. and Caterina Provost.

Murdock, G. P. et al.

Nisbet, Robert A.

Parsons, T. and Robert F. Bales

Pitts, Jesse R.
Roberts, John M.  

Saliba, John A.  

Schneider, David M.  

Sirjamaki, John  

Spindler, George O.  

SPSS  

Textor, Robert  

Westermarck, Edward  

Winch, Robert F.  