THE SOCIAL AS ETHICAL: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS EMANATION IN EROTIC LIFE
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ITS EMANATION IN EROTIC LIFE

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ABSTRACT

The question raised in this thesis is the mutuality of human social being and ethical conduct. A display of the literature reveals that the social -- both traditionally and in modern usage -- has a constraining effect upon people's lives.

However, to some theorists, the social is an intermediate ground wherein people realize the fundamental purposes of their labour. At the heart of this, there is a presuppositions of some good for which people labour. The realization of this is an experience of freedom rather than enslavement. However this realization does not become complete until it is fully understood. This understanding consists of a transformation (of this realization) from a purely abstract intellectual realm to an experiential realm wherein the insight becomes practicable. The practice of insight lies within the ethical sphere because it is a form of conduct which aims at the good.

Value judgments are those speeches wherein sociologists finally confront ethical problems. Value judgments can not be analyzed alone; an understanding of them is impossible without an understanding of the facts which they (value judgments) presuppose. Facts and value judgments are the peculiar language of modern science; however they need not be the only speeches in which a person can exercise the ability to speak. This thesis displays that the ethical sphere originates elsewhere (than from the language of modern science.)
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This thesis is dedicated to my friend and teacher, Daniel C. Foss, who first raised the topic of ethics; by his very example, he communicated the necessity for pursuing this way.
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis represents an attempt both to conduct inquiry and to develop the concepts of the social and the ethical. This attempt is possible because I treat these two concepts problematically. One might ask how and why I chose to equate these two concepts; today, the notions of social and ethical are antithetical. Following the tradition of value neutrality, some sociologists exclude the moral realm from their definitions of the social. The meaning of social no longer designates any qualities that are peculiarly human; I refer the reader to films like "Baboon Behavior" in which anthropologists analyze animals' "social" characteristics. What I intend to do here, then, is restore the social to its human context; this thesis is a display of this. This task is, in some senses, accomplished when the social is shown to be a moral concern. Traditionally, ethics is grounded in the premise that humans seek the good (Aristotle, 1953:25); social life, therefore, can not be separated from the search for the good.

I am not trying to define the concepts of the social and ethical as much as I seek to capture their form; that is, what is beyond their assigned usages (convention) that gives the possibility for their use.\(^1\) It is impossible to capture, reproduce, or contain the form, but through my labour I "hint" at the form. Therefore, my

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\(^1\) See Paul Friedlander, *Plato - An Introduction* for his discussion of Plato's development of the forms in Chapter One, "Eidos."
effort (this thesis) is grounded in the mediation between the form and convention. This, then, is the essentially dialectical nature of this thesis.

If this thesis is dialectical, then it is also a dialogue. Thinking is a dialogue that one has with one's self, and also, with others. The Platonic dialogues show the importance of conversation (both with self and other) to thinking and theorizing. This thesis developed through a conversation in a twofold sense. First, I did not have a rigorous plan for it (the thesis), but I had a rough idea of what I wanted to do. One thought, when developed, seemed to make the way for another. An idea does not exist in isolation; thinking is possible through the relation of one idea to another. Although the different topics in this thesis may seem to be scattered and without unity, they are all meant to draw upon and show the organizing idea of the social as ethical. The order is not imposed upon the topics externally, but developed as an intrinsic feature of their (the topics') unity in dialogue. So far, the work that I have described is dialogic in the sense of a conversation with self; now I will speak of the actual dialogue with others that was involved in the writing of this thesis. Once I had decided upon my general idea, I turned to a committee of sympathetic listeners, Victor Marshall, Berkeley Fleming, and Peter McHugh. I began with a series of experimental papers which were a motley lot of ideas and attempts at formulation. These were given to the committee members for comments and criticism. After we discussed the difficulties and strong points in the papers, I continued to develop, organize and clarify my thoughts. In this way, this thesis
emerged through a continuing dialogue with my committee members during the course of the year.

Since theorizing is a dialogue, it follows that I hear the speeches of others in a particular way. One may ask how I have used other theorists speeches as references within this thesis.

In the essay, "The Tradition and Individual Talent", T. S. Eliot writes that an individual piece of literature can only be understood through its relationship to all other works. The relationship of one work to another occurs within the tradition. The tradition composes a simultaneous order and existence of all literature, and all literature is united through the tradition (Eliot, 1925:41). A piece of work receives its meaningful identity from the tradition. The tradition refers to the purpose of speech; it is concept of community which does not account for private motivations.

The idea of the tradition needn't be confined to an analysis of literature. As a sociologist, I transform it in order to make sense of the work I do. Therefore, I understand courses of action, ideal types and various speeches through their relationship to the tradition. In this way, I hear them as attempts to express what is at the source of life, what is beyond life, what is unknowable; there is no form of life that can not be thought to be without a purpose.

In this passage from his journal, Henry David Thoreau draws upon a fundamental duality to show his commitment to expression.

I have been breaking silence these twenty-three years and have hardly made a rent in it. Silence has no end. Speech is but the beginning of it. (Thoreau, 1961:22)
Thoreau has portrayed the human's being in the world: man bridges the gap between himself and silence through speech. By speaking, in this fashion, one tries to know himself in light of the unknowable; as Thoreau points out, there is no end to this. There are no conclusions. Silence (the unknowable) will never be broken, but the attempt to overcome silence (to know the unknowable) is eternal. The speech that attempts to break silence finally reflects silence because it is only through silence that it can be heard.

To return to my work in this thesis: when I refer to certain theorists, I move them. I hear them in relation to the timeless labour of expression; therefore, I read a theorist in a way that he (perhaps) never intended. I do not do an exegesis of theory (i.e., a "true" reading) because such a concern generates private interests, and forgets the community of the tradition. I try to show one way in which a theorist may be read by drawing out the speech beneath his speech; therefore, sociologists are not "speaking" in this thesis as much as I am speaking through them, and exhibiting my commitment to labour.

In the book, *Theorizing*, Alan Blum explains his (similar) orientation to work:

Since this is not a work on the history of thought no claim is meant for the exegetical fidelity of my remarks concerning the various views of historical authors. Ultimately, I am making reference to my view through the various distorted readings of these authors. The distortional character of all reading and speaking must be kept in mind, not as a problem to be corrected, but as a method of affirming the commitment of the reader/speaker. It is through the distortions that the reader will discover - if he takes the time - the commitment for which this work speaks. This is not to say that I refuse
responsible for what I say about works, but that the reader must center his attention on how I could say it as a method of preserving the intelligibility of the work. That I could only show how I can speak by creating a tension in the speech of other works as the medium for such a display indicates not uncontrolled violence but only the fact that speech in the service of what is beyond words, can only affirm itself through a similar reconstruction of other authors, (1973:vii).

Up to this point, I have given my reasons and ideas for working on this thesis. This introduction is a conclusion in the sense that it shows the command I have of this thesis. I can see the organizing unity of this work through which all of its sections gain significance; I also wished to demonstrate that there are no conclusions to this thesis because they (conclusions) would kill the dialogic spirit which fostered it. If anything, this work is meant to open issues, not close them; in this way, this thesis must be seen for what it is, a preliminary step in thinking.

In the next few pages I will give a brief summary of the three chapters in order to provide the reader with a rough outline of this thesis.

In the first chapter, I examine Durkheim's early social theory; I do this in order to grasp a conventional sociological grammar and to provide a point of difference to my formulation of the social as ethical. Once the essential differences between the two (formulations) are displayed, one begins to see a contrast. The peculiar nature of each formulation must be present in the contrast; therefore, contrast is useful as a way to better understand the issues. In the first chapter, then, I reconstruct and analyze Durkheim's concepts of social facts and currents. According
to Durkheim, social behavior is behavior that has been inherited through a process of socialization: people become like the social milieu because they have been "moulded" by it. There is an absolute division between the person and the social milieu; this contributes to the a-historicalness of social facts and social acts. Social people do not create their behaviors; therefore their lives are mechanical, hopeless, and resourceless. Because Durkheim's system is founded in violence, I show how it fosters a need for self-preservation among members. This need (for self-preservation) generates a utilitarian society.

Following Durkheim, I examine ethnomethodology to show how, in some ways, it employs similar concepts of social behavior and membership. The social may be as constraining to some ethnomethodologists as it is to Durkheim, but ethnomethodology does not generate a static social form. It displays how people make their lives what they are; like Durkheim, ethnomethodology begins with the fact of the collectivity (of social members). Ethnomethodology concludes that society is constantly achieved and re-achieved through members' activities; the method (for members' activities) is problematic. Ethnomethodology is practical in the sense that is implies a certain "life-fullness"; by this, I mean that ethnomethodologists review activity from an active perspective not providing much contrast to "society".

In the concluding section of the first chapter I re-pose the problem of membership and introduce a different way to think about it. I used Karl Marx's work, "On the Jewish Question" to develop these points, the origin of Civil Society (membership) and its antithesis, community.
Civil society is the collective of aggregates, who, threatened by engulfment, turn to private interests as a way of self-preservation. On the other hand, in community, people begin dialogue, the examination of their equality. This is an occasion for me to recapitulate my purposes: the thesis is an attempt to begin community through theorizing. In conclusion, the first chapter is a kind of preliminary speech that both gives the purpose and gives the way to what follows in the rest of the thesis.

The second chapter, "On Sensuous and Erotic Forms of Life" is organized by the questions: How can we think of the social if not as a constraint? How can the social be formulated as a person's realization of his humanity? and, How is the social person also an ethical person? For purposes of conceptual clarification I introduce the sensous and erotic forms of life; the difference between them lies in the way the actor uses nature. Nature pertains to what is self-evident, obvious, and objectified like a fact. Sensuous life styles itself after what it perceives; it perceives nature. Sensuous life, therefore, is lived in accordance with nature. I introduce one form of sensuous life, nostalgia, to show how sensuous life uses nature. I draw this example (of sensuous life) from the film, American Graffiti; it (the example) is one version of nostalgia. Sensuous life can be identified by its passivity (in regard to nature); therefore, I show the transformational character of erotic life, for the purposes of contrast. In erotic life, man labours--not for a product, but for self-expression. Dialectically, labour mediates between the human and the ideal. Erotic life is social life: they are united through the concept of labour. This formulation holds for the ethical sphere; if,
through the social, humans are given the impetus to work, then, ethically, they must complete their understanding of labour with a commitment to it.

I used Simmel's writing, "The Transcendent Character of Life" in order to develop the ethical: man is at all times bounded. As an ethical agent, he must overcome the boundary (labour). No sooner is one boundary overcome than another one is met; man's labour is perpetual. Fellini's film, Nights of Cabiria, is an example which conveys the persevering character of the ethical person.

In the third chapter, "On Facts and Value Judgments", I analyze the ethical problem in sociology. I do this to show how facts and value judgments may be used erotically—as an example of social and ethical work.

In the first section I introduce value as the priority of an actor; a sense of value enables a person to differentiate and distinguish between activities so that he (the person) can decide upon an action. Therefore, a value-free position is impossible. Value is also a way in which an actor refers to the good of his activity, providing it (activity) with a certain intelligibility. This is a way to approach certain courses of action, and show why this type of formulation is more desirable than one which views morality as a system of fixed rules. Following this, I reconstruct Marx's notion of exchange value, demonstrating how it is relevant to some modern uses of value (i.e., where phenomena are objectified and measured against a fixed standard).

In the second section I analyze the contextual meanings of facts and value judgments. Facts are primarily a language; they are of a definite character, and hence, they shape a definite course of action, i.e., positivism. Because the facts are "objective" they nurture the
conception of value-free inquiry. In order to display the ambiguities of this enterprise (value freedom) I analyze Herbert Gans' article, "The Positive Functions of Poverty." In the concluding section on the facts, I draw upon the novel, Frankenstein, to demonstrate the monstrous qualities of purely factual knowledge.

Value judgments follow the facts in the sense that they present a person with an opportunity to say something about the facts. Value judgments also follow the facts in so far as they do not violate the peculiar usage of the facts; value judgments shape positivistic courses of action such as the securing of "personality" and other pluralistic practices. My main point in this chapter is to show how facts and value judgments are not different; insofar as they are complements of each other, they are generated by a common world view (modern science); the third chapter is a display of this.
CHAPTER ONE

THE SOCIAL AS A CONSTRAINT

I. Early Durkheim

This thesis is an attempt both to formulate and inquire into the nature of the social. I first want to make Durkheim's rendition of the social problematic in order to provide the way for some other alternatives. This reading of Durkheim is not intended to be an exegesis of what he "really meant"; it is simply a demonstration of one of the possible ways in which Durkheim can be read. The points of relevance to this section are as follows:

1. There may be a tendency among sociologists to think of the social as having a constraining effect upon people's lives.

2. Durkheim's early writing in some ways may suggest this.

I wish, also, to acknowledge the point which Timasheff makes in Sociological Theory:

Some of Durkheim's interpreters have attributed to him the conception of a collective mind as objective reality--an untenable position from the viewpoint of modern social science--and Durkheim's terminology and many of his assertions justify this interpretation. But others claim that this analysis of collective mental and moral phenomena approaches in some respects the role of culture in social life. (1957:108)

This point has been raised in order to show that even among social scientists, there is no correct reading of Durkheim. I want, however, to
do justice to his theory.

In The Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim's chief concern is the extrapolation of social facts. However, in order to determine what a social fact is, he must first define what is meant by social. The first chapter of the Rules is entirely devoted to what are to be considered social phenomena. This chapter is of prime concern for what I intend to do in this thesis. I want to see what is behind this version of the social, how it works, and what kind of world it portrays.

Durkheim begins by depicting the social as a milieu which exists in its own right. In order for sociology to have its proper subject matter, the social must have a character of its own, distinct from anything that could be considered psychological or biological. To what, then, do these designations of the social refer? The social is exhibited in certain practical activities:

> When I fulfill my obligations as brother, husband, or citizen, when I execute my contracts, I perform duties which are defined, externally to myself and my acts, in law and custom. (Durkheim, 1964:1)

The social is more than these specific activities, it is the element that is common to all such activities. Durkheim's definition of the social approaches a concept of custom if we think of custom as certain ways of behaving that are peculiar to a people and taught to the individual through some kind of a socialization process. If the individual who learned the customs taught these behaviors to his children, they would endure through time.

We can think of at least two ways in which custom could be maintained:
1. Here the customs of the past are invoked in the present with a sense of their worth. That is, the people who are using these customs know why they are acting in these ways, and what it is about the custom that is worth preserving.

2. or,

We can imagine a people who practice customs for the simple reason that, "Things have always been done this way." Here, custom affords them some ease because every situation has, in a sense, been taken care of before it even occurs. (If there is a rule handy for every occasion, one needn't encounter the situation in the moment).

1. See Max Weber for a more explicit account of these behaviors in "The Typos of Social Action". The reflexive use of customs, depicted in the first example is, according to Weber, "rational orientation to an absolute value...involving a conscious belief in the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other form of behavior entirely for its own sake, and indepently of any prospects of external success." (1947:115).

The second example of the unreflexive use of custom is like Weber's 4th type of social action, "traditionally oriented through the habituation of long practice." (Ibid)
II Social Behavior as Habit

Durkheim's portrayal of social behavior borders on the second version of custom. By this I mean that he emphasizes a social order wherein individuals inherit similar ways of acting, similar institutions, etc. Take, for example, the education of the child as he depicts it.

To confirm this definition of the social fact by a characteristic illustration from common experience, one need only observe the manner in which children are brought up... All education is a continuous effort to impose on the child ways of seeing, feeling and acting, which he could not have arrived at spontaneously. From the very first hours of his life, we compel him to eat, drink, and sleep at regular hours; we constrain him to cleanliness, calmness and obedience, later, we exert pressure upon him in order that he may learn proper consideration for others, (etc.) ...

...If, in time, this constraint ceases to be felt, it is because it gradually gives rise to habits and to internal tendencies that render such constraint unnecessary. (Durkheim, 1964:pp.5-6)

We have been given the dynamics of education as Durkheim sees it: certain behaviors are drummed into the child in a repetitious fashion until these behaviors are part of the child. These behaviors that are taught to the child come to him from a source other than himself. That is, parents, teachers, (others) instruct him in these ways of behaving "which he could not have arrived at spontaneously." In the preceding passage, Durkheim stresses the dualism in education: the child could not have learned alone, but only by the aid of the people who have taught him. Later, he goes on to say that these teachers are merely intermediaries and representatives of the social milieu. In the society that Durkheim has constructed, education occurs not between people, but between a person
and the social milieu.¹

To recount: the behaviors that the child learns come to him from without, brought by others who have been taught the same things in a similar fashion. These others are "merely intermediaries and representatives of the social milieu which tends to fashion him (the child) in its own image." (Durkheim, 1964:6)

The education of the child continues in this fashion until the division between the child and the behaviors ends. The behaviors have been impressed upon the child so thoroughly that the child becomes the behaviors. Once the child is the behaviors, his education has been achieved. The child no longer has need of the teacher because the child is like the teacher—a reflection of the social milieu that has fashioned him. The child could now conceivably be a teacher.

For Durkheim, the success of education centers around how well the habit takes: it must be engrained in the person. Habit is really the union of social facts and the person. If the social milieu fashions the person in its image, then habit is the process of impression by and submission to it (the social milieu). The more the child gives himself over to this mysterious force, the better his education will be.

Although Durkheim invokes the notion of habit, it is really a specialized usage of the word that is intelligible only in the world that he has built for us. Habits are the results of interaction between the

¹ In the article, "A Historical and Comparative View of Socialization Theory and Research", John A Clausen points out that, for Durkheim, "Education" is synonymous with "socialization". See Clausen, (ed.), Socialization and Society, 1968:54.
individual and the social milieu; a habitual person always brings with himself the same anticipations and responses to the situations that he identifies with habit.

In the example of the education of the child, we see the workings of the absolute division between the social milieu and the people who act by it (the division between man and the thing). What are the consequences of this division?
III. The A-Historicalness of Social Facts

Although the habits that are performed by individuals are social acts (in Durkheim's terms) because they originate in the social milieu, they are not human acts. This is to say that they are a-historical, if we understand history in this way:

1. The active struggle that the human being has with other mysterious elements throughout the course of his life.
2. The person involved in historical struggle is in relationship with these elements. This person is, in a certain sense, equal to these forces (in his understanding of them and their place).
3. The saga of human beings and history contains neither the idea of man as victor or victim, but man in the process of engagement with these elements. ¹

Why is Durkheim's theory a-historical? His people do, in fact, redo certain behaviors that are given them by the social milieu, and perpetuate them by instructing others in these ways. However, it is not

¹ This formulation of the historical may seem vague; it is, in the sense that "mysterious elements" can not be defined, and this is why I have referred to them. The tension between the see-able and the unseeable is ever present in the Platonic dialogues and always reinvoked. For instance, in the dialogue, "The Theaetetus," Socrates refers to the "uniniate" of philosophy as "those who believe that nothing is real save what they can grasp with their hands and do not admit that actions or processes or anything invisible can count as real." (Cornford, trans, in Hamilton and Cairns, Plato ed., 1961: pp 860-61). He does this in order to better hint at the invisible, or mysterious and provide the way for thinking of it. Therefore, I am making the point that people do not just lead mundane physical lives that can be recorded and contained by the facts. There is an element of mystery that can be taken into account as part of the human struggle.
as if these people, for all their milling about, have had any part in creating their actions. The social gives them their beginning; it makes them human, so to speak (Durkheim's version of a human). The social milieu makes people people through the stamping process. We meet, head-on, the mechanicalness of this theory. Socialization is like an assembly line production. It begins with an individual who is nothing (in terms of his behaviors), the mold (of the behaviors) is applied to him, and he takes on the dimension of social facts. Humanity is pooled somewhere from beyond humanity (the social milieu), and, in this sense humanity is lost to us. It is lost because we wish, by invoking the term humanity, to preserve the nature of humanity by remembering the nature of the struggle between man and the incalculable forces.

In citing the mechanicalness of Durkheim's theory, I wish to point out the simplicity to which the interaction between the human the incalculable forces is reduced. Because the interaction operates like a machine, it is all very defined and clear-cut. There is no dynamic relationship of man to this force. Thus, Durkheim has explained what is the most mysterious (the relationship of man to this force) by way of what is the least mysterious (the mechanism). Moreover, it is not as if the inhabitants of Durkheim's society are responsible for making their lives. They are puppets of the destiny which the social milieu provides for them: the behaviors are pre-existent, the individual needs only to be born into them.
That this society is a-historical implies that there is no theory of action, and, consequently, no theory of use. Action is the business of making history, depicted earlier on. By this definition of action, I wish to stress the part that the individual person plays in making history, and his knowledge of his own historicalness: the fact that he, like others, engages in this struggle with these incalculable forces which is timeless.

Action is, in one sense, usage. Usage is the human activity that ends the division between man and the thing. When a person puts something into use (that is, approaches it with insight to make the thing serve some purpose) he does not stop at the thing. It no longer constrains him with what it is. It is through use that a person achieves something other than what he began with, an expression reflective of his relation to the thing. It is in usage that we find the story of human history.

1. Durkheim says of the thing: "Indeed, the most important characteristic of a thing is the impossibility of its modification by a simple act of the will...It requires a more or less strenuous effort due to the resistance that it offers." (1934:29)

2. In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein speaks of the importance of knowing usage, which embraces the idea of a language game, and consequently opens the concept of a form of life. I intend to develop this more explicitly in Chapter Two.
IV. The Hopelessness of Life With Social Facts and Currents

Hopelessness will be thought of here as the feeling that a person has that things will always be the same. Hopelessness informs us of a kind of life that is lifeless: there is no sparkle in it of what could be. Someone who is hopeless might always be asking himself, What's the use? In this way, the hopeless person projects the end of an act to a time before its beginning, and kills the possibility of the act ever being enacted. The hopeless person tells himself that he knows what will result before he even does anything, so why bother doing anything? Anyway, he might reason, the state of affairs that could be brought about by this activity would be no different from the present state of affairs, so what would be accomplished? The person without hope keeps himself within his sense of helplessness by not realizing the chance he might have for doing something different.

The way in which Durkheim has formulated his theory of life with the social milieu gives the people who live in this society a life without hope. How is this?

1. The set-up of the system.

The social milieu that makes people what they are is beyond them. It cannot be comprehended theoretically. It is a mysterious force, unlike them, that controls their lives. However, Durkheim allows these people to know the social environment physically: "...We realize that these feelings (social influences) have been impressed upon us to a much greater extent than they were created by us. It may even happen that they horrify us, so much were they contrary to our nature." (1934:5)
They know that something is acting upon them, and they know when this happens -- due to the coercion that they feel from this force. Although people might have the feeling that something is controlling their lives, they have no idea of what this could be. They are helpless in the face of it. Moreover, there is nothing that they can rely on to get them out of this mess: the world is composed only of others like them and this force.

2. Innovation is not provided for.

Given the blueprint of social facts and currents as they are, and the individual's relation to them, there is no sense of how an individual could imagine (or make) his life in another way. Durkheim (1934:3) states that innovation, while not impossible, always meets the resistance of social facts and currents. In saying this, however, he has not given us any more of a clue for the possibility of innovation. If people's behaviors come to them from without -- by the social realm -- and, if this realm is constant and unchanging, how then could change occur?

Humans inherit their ways of acting, thinking and feeling from the social source, and their actions return to this realm (like the reflection in a mirror). The actions must return to the social realm because they must be given again to others: succeeding generations fall right into the lap of this system. With everything so mapped out in this fashion, how could change, if it ever happened, be explained? The insight essential to the individual
who innovated would have to come to him from someplace other than the
social milieu. This insight could not occur to this individual alone
since his knowledge originates in this milieu. There seems to be no
place left in this world for this (the insight of innovation) to occur.

Consequently, there is no action. Nothing is available to members
for the overthrow of the system. Social facts, by stifling out the least
form of resistance, perpetuate their existence, and that of the social
order.
V. The Violence of Social Facts and Currents

The system with which we have been presented engenders a violent form of life. This is founded in the language of coercion, resistance, pain and punishment that Durkheim uses. For instance,

Here, then, is a category of facts with very distinctive characteristics: it consists of ways of acting, thinking and feeling, external to the individual, and endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they control him. (1934:3)

As stated earlier, social facts and currents make people according to their image: for this to occur, these people must give themselves over to these ways of acting, thinking, and feeling. Thus there is founded a system of rule and submission to rule which is the social order.

Besides the fact that they oppress, social facts are omnipresent:

I do not feel the pressure that they exert upon me (social currents). But, it is revealed as soon as I try to resist them. Let an individual attempt to oppose one of these collective manifestations and the emotions that he denies will turn against him. Now, if this power of external coercion asserts itself so clearly in cases of resistance, it must exist also in the first mentioned currents although we are unconscious of it. (Durkheim, 1934: pp. 4-5)

The social milieu is one with the individual (in harmony) until he decides to break with it: then, it causes him pain. The individual becomes aware of its presence. Although the social milieu is unnoticeable most of the time, it retains a capacity for being noticed. This happens (it is noticed most readily) when it is violated. In this way, the social milieu resembles the fierce God of the Old Testament who was always there
watching the Jews -- but most present when they sinned.

The individual must go along with the social facts in order to avoid pain or punishment. He would not want to offer any resistance to them because he would most likely suffer for it. From the beginning of this society (which we can think of as humanity’s relationship to the social facts) there is no discourse with the social facts: it is suppressed by them. Conformity is the result of this. But, I am also talking about the genesis of a utilitarian society in which people would have practical motives for their behaviors. These motives would most likely center around the avoidance of pain. If we are afraid of being stung, we act carefully with the bee, lest we incite it. The people in Durkheim’s society would gage their actions by a similar standard. Humans live with others lawfully, Durkheim tells us. They do so, not so much out of respect for the law, but in the fear of what happens to the one who usurps the law (the deviant).

But, aside from describing the society characteristic of Durkheim’s theory, I want to ask, What makes for the violence of the system? What is the rationality behind it?

1. I have formulated Durkheim as utilitarian unlike those who read him as refuting utilitarian thought. However I have formulated utilitarianism as a course of action rather than a movement in the history of political thought. See Parsons, The Structure of Social Action for a detailed account of the latter.
Durkheim states:

It is generally accepted today that most of our ideas and tendencies are not developed by ourselves, but come to us from without. How can they become a part of us except by imposing themselves upon us? (1934:4)

What we can point to here first is the absolute division between the individual and the social facts and currents; second, the imposition of these things upon a person. The first idea gives way to the one that follows it.

Before anything can happen in Durkheim's world, the inhabitants of it, and the social milieu must have something in common. This is achieved in the idea of the relationship between them. Because social facts and currents are forces beyond their manifestations in individuals, they are mysterious. What is mysterious, and therefore, not readily understood has a power over men: they can be awed by this force, inspired by it, or afraid of it. Durkheim chose to see the relationship between humans and the social facts as a balance of power. If one is mysterious, and therefore more powerful, the other will be weaker and dependent. The stronger impresses itself upon the weaker -- this is the necessary condition for socialization. It stands to reason that there must be something by which men are social in nature, something through which men find community with other men. To carry this argument still further, there must be some value to this process of socialization -- there must be something good about people finding
themselves in community with others. Durkheim, however, does not tell us what is good about socialization: we might be unimpressed with his references to the law. Because the desirability of life with the social order is never fully pursued, there must still be some explanation for why life with the social order happens. This explanation is found in the idea of the violence of it. Humans live with the social order because if they don't they are punished for it. Since no one really likes being punished it is natural for everyone to live in the social order. Moreover, because the social milieu is mysterious, and therefore, not readily understood, it is pre-verbal (it can not be reasoned or explained). Humans, in their pre-consciousness, can not make sense of this presence beyond; therefore, it fits that the relationship that they have to it will be pre-verbal. What is more primitive than the method of teaching someone through violence? All the person (taught) would ever learn would be avoidance (think of the way people train their dogs).

I mentioned before the idea of the division between the human and the social. Social facts remain what they are at all times. They become part of a person, but they still stay what they are. No process of mediation comes between humans and social facts because the division between them would no longer be able to be maintained. A social fact becomes part
of a person the way a brick becomes part of a house -- it is like a transplant. In this way, social facts are things that can be described, pointed to and measured, even when they are present in the individual. By imposing themselves upon a person, they manage to become part of a person without every being integrated into the life of that person. But isn't this, then, the gap in Durkheim's theory -- the idea of the human labouring with the incalculable forces couldn't be imagined -- so, the next most logical relationship was grabbed at -- that between the powerful, and the powerless?
VI. Ethnomethodology and Social Currents

Ethnomethodology is considered one of the newest and most controversial developments in modern sociological theory. My purpose in analyzing it here is to show the extent to which it depends upon Durkheim's conceptions of social structure, society, and behavior. Thus, ethnomethodology is a modern example of the social understood as a constraint.

What is ethnomethodology? The term, ethnomethodology, refers to the phenomena of how common sense knowledge of the "whatever" (whatever he needs to do what he has to do) is available to a member for practical actions and decision making. (Garfinkel - paraphrased- in Hill, Crittenden, 1968:8). In other words, ethnomethodologists want to study the ways in which humans undertake a course of action for everyday affairs, and, in the course of this action, the kinds of concepts that the actors are using in order to carry out their tasks.

In Garfinkel's words:

Matters of fact and fancy and evidence and good demonstration about the affairs of everyday activities are made a matter for seeing and saying, observing for observation and report. That means that talk is a part of this. Talk is a "constituent feature of the same setting that it is used to talk about." It is available to a member as a resource for his use as well as something that while using and counting on, he also glosses. (Garfinkel in Hill, Crittenden, 1968:8)

Ethnomethodology focuses on how people interact with whatever they happen to be interacting with (other people, or the knowledge required for certain practical activities) in order to carry out their actions. Therefore,
structures are being used at the same time that they are being authored. Ethnomethodologists think of these phenomena as "observable-reportable" which is to say that the features of observing and reporting are a continuous way of orienting to the world. The actor has the ability to know what is going on at the same time that he is able to converse in and with this background.

Theoretically, ethnomethodology ends the idea that an actor's theory (the knowledge he has of how things are) is separate from his practice (how he acts with the knowledge of how things are). Instead, it can be thought that the actor does what he knows. His knowledge of society is not separate from his movements in society: what he knows is what he is doing.
VII. The Uses of Social Structure

The notion of the "common sense member" is important to ethnomethodology. Its studies center around an actor who embodies societal procedures. By invoking the concept of membership, ethnomethodologists refer to the fact that everyone (every societal member) knows what is going on around him: everyone knows not only how to talk, but everyone knows what he and others are talking about. Consequently everyone knows what he and others are doing in the sense that what he knows constitutes and is constituted by what he does.

Unlike Durkheim, the ethnomethodologists would argue that members are in the process of making society through their actions. Society does not exist as a static form; it is not independent of the methodology that people are making use of to get by in it. However, while the society may not be independent, ethnomethodologists still have a sense of the society as separate - at the same time that it is intrinsic. Members use common sense constructs which they inherit as a resource -- a general kind of stock of knowledge.¹ In the idea of the resource, we confront the notion of the collective. The collective is prior to membership, but the existence of the collective is the pre-requisite for membership. Would the thought

¹. In Studies in Ethnomethodology, Garfinkel acknowledges Schutz's contributions to sociological theory. See page 37.
of membership be possible without the idea of the whole to which the member belonged? The idea of the common sense member reflects the structure of the society and further structures it: society is the whole that exists and the member is a component of this whole.

Both Durkheim and the ethnomethodologists begin after the fact of the collectivity. Their concern is not the primordial question of "How can this be?"; instead, it is the second question of, "How in fact is this the case?" However, in both theories, the assumption of the collective or the whole serves as the explanation for how society is possible. What organizes society is its shared (by members) features: society is what no one can deny.

If society is what no one can deny, then it also serves as the underpinning of constraint: membership is constraining in the sense that it is all that anyone can be or do. Society is structured by membership because through it (membership) all the prerogatives for action are given: they exist as collective rules. Ethnomethodologists, may, like Durkheim stress the pain of violating membership. Durkheim uses this as a fact, a proof of the existence of social facts and currents. But an ethnomethodologist may make this claim as a way to procure deeper knowledge of societal procedures.

Procedurally, it is my preference to start with familiar scenes and ask what can be done to make trouble...The operations that one would have to perform to produce and sustain bewilderment, consternation and confusion: to produce the socially structured affects of anxiety, shame, guilt, and indignation should tell us something about how the structures of everyday activities are ordinarily and routinely produced and maintained... Obversely, a knowledge of how the structures of everyday activities are routinely produced should permit us to tell how we might proceed for the effective production of desired disturbances. (Garfinkel, 1967:pp 37-38.)
Garfinkel may, at first glance, appear to be offering us a model for the scheme of order and disruption. This model provides the ethnomethodologist with his method—without it, he finds out what he wants to know; he uncovers the dynamics of social situations. While the member wants to avoid questioning how things work, the ethnomethodologist creates problems in the working that put it to the test. He makes problems in order to gain knowledge of how societal procedures are used by members for the purpose of their maintenance.

Garfinkel may, in fact, seem to be giving us a tautology: "Disrupt everyday happenings so you will know them. Knowledge of everyday happenings is what enables you to disrupt them". However, if this were the case what would be the point of doing ethnomethodology? It would be a useless exercise in positive knowledge. The charge of tautology isn't applicable if the (afore-quoted) passage is read as depicting the ethnomethodologist both as a member and non-member. He is a non-member in the sense that he tries to make member's activities noticeable and "interesting". Membership is, for members, not "interesting" (i.e., not an occasion for inquiring about membership). The ethnomethodologist suspends membership at the same time that membership retains its positive character (as the primary feature of everyday life) it is used to show what it isn't (disruption). Therefore, by virtue of what it (membership) is, it also includes the display of what it can't be as a way of further defining what it is. Through the use of non-membership, a more detailed account of membership is possible because it (membership) is now see-able. The membership with which ethnomethodologists begin is not the same as that with which they end because it has taken on the different character of accountability through its very analysis. The use of non-membership, however, is a tease because the ethnomethodological analysis returns to membership as its pervading organizational theme.
VIII. The Social Order as Moral Order

In this section I want to examine some of the political claims of ethnomethodologists that are stated in some theoretical accounts.

In the Studies in Ethnomethodology, Garfinkel (1967:35) states that, "for sociologists, the moral order 'without' is a technical mystery." He continues to explain that, "From the point of view of sociological theory, the moral order consists of the rule governed activities of everyday life. A society's members encounter and know the moral order as perceivedly normal courses of action--familiar scenes of everyday affairs, the world of daily life known in common with others and others taken for granted.

"They refer to this world as the 'natural facts of life' which for members are through and through moral facts of life. For members not only are matters so about familiar scenes but they are so because it is morally right or wrong that they are so." (Ibid)

In this passage Garfinkel does not equate the member's concern with the sociologist's concern. The member's predominant interest lies in living and maintaining his life in a particular way, and it is a matter of morality to the member that his life be achieved in this manner. The sociologist proceeds with the same moral order (as the member); however because the moral order is, for the sociologist, a technical mystery, he is interested in finding out how life can be lived in the way that it
Now, I hear these statement's of Garfinkel's as confused: although technically suspending society (the moral) in an attempt to question society, he nevertheless returns to society and thus a moral order. Thus, the point of inquiry is not to show what is at the root of the assumptions that make society (as we know it) possible. All we have is membership (societal assumptions) as any prevailing order. Questions are asked (within ethnomethodology) in order to show how - methodologically - assumptions are made. Therefore, the assumptions of the prevailing moral order are never questioned as assumptions, (i.e., there is no attempt to discern their goodness, badness or value). This has implications in the sense that although we learn how the assumptions are made, we don't know anything but the assumptions (society) and so become, with our knowledge, master technicians of society (of assumptions). It is not a problem that the social order is the moral order because morality is left at a very naturalistic level; therefore the thought is not possible (within ethnomethodology) that

1. The moral order which Garfinkel speaks of is not initially to be confused with the rationality for achieving that order. Garfinkel clearly distinguishes between scientific and lay rationalities. In the sense that rationalities are 'different' for the scientist and the layman, but are available for procuring a moral (social) order, I would think of rationality as different from the moral order (an assumption) in the sense that it is some kind of a method. What Garfinkel argues then is that the method (rationality) makes the moral order and hence, the particular method makes all the difference in what is perceived as the moral (social) order. Garfinkel is suggesting that scientific rationalities are not adequate for accounting for member's behavior and suggests that rationalities be treated as empirically problematic material. Therefore, the rationality can not be separated from actor's behavior and is, in the same way, accountable as a course of action. (Garfinkel, 1967: pp. 262-283)
morality is something other than the usual assumptions we make in the process of using societal procedures.

But, if we wish to distinguish between the natural and moral orders, and if the natural order is what it is, then the moral order must be founded in the idea that "It could be otherwise." If we think of the natural order as the moral order, then, in one sense we are dulled because no options (for better living) are open to us. Garfinkel has depicted everyday life as mundane: the idea of man entering into struggle with incalculable forces (what Durkheim was getting at) is not an issue. The spark that gives birth to creativity, therefore, is non-existent; it is present neither in everyday life nor sociological theory.

Musil, in the novel The Man Without Qualities captures the sense of what I am suggesting:

It is reality that awakens possibilities and nothing could be more wrong than to deny this. Nevertheless, in the sum total or on the average, they will always remain the same possibilities, going along repeating themselves until someone comes along to whom something real means no more than something imagined. It is he who first gives new possibilities their meaning and their destiny; he awakens them. (1953:12)

The idea of "reality awakening possibilities" never achieves anything out of the ordinary because it is only based on practical insight. The inspired person in this case need not know anything new or different from what everyone else knows. But, the "someone who comes along" in the
instance above is the one who does not maintain that reality is confined to practicality. Reality does not dictate to this person: he is not intimidated by the fact of the fact. Reality does not coerce him with what is, because he can see clearly outside of it. It (reality - the state of affairs) could just as easily be what it isn't, and what could be could be what is. This person is not afraid to imagine, and what he can imagine is not immediately ruled out because it isn't real: it is alive with what it could be.

To conclude: An early work of Durkheim's and some ethnomethdological writings have been analyzed to show their similarity. This is reflected in:

1. the structure of society -- membership
2. the constraint of membership -- structure
3. the violence common to the structure

Now, I want to consider the deeper structure of this society. What is the deeper structure, and what is the problem of the deeper structure?
IX. The Resource as Technical Achievement and the Upshot of Practical Theorizing

What stands behind membership and makes it possible is the resource. This is the deeper structure of membership. Ethnomethodologists speak of it in a sophisticated manner: The resource is a kind of background knowledge that is there for a member's use at the same time that he doesn't always use it. This idea comes across more clearly in Garfinkel's talk about the jurors he was interviewing:

I was interested in such things as jurors uses of some kind of knowledge of the way in which the organized affairs of the society - operated as knowledge that they drew on easily; that they required of each other, At the same time that they required it of each other, they did not seem to require this knowledge of each other in the form of a checkout. They were not acting in their affairs as jurors as if they were scientists in the recognizable sense of scientists. However, they were concerned with such things as adequate accounts, adequate description, and adequate evidence. They wanted not to be "common-sensical" when they used notions of common sensicality. They wanted to be legal, They would talk of being legal. At the same time they wanted to be fair. If you pressed them to provide you with what they understood to be legal, then they would immediately become deferential and say, "Oh well, I'm not a lawyer, I can't really be expected to know what's legal and tell you what's legal. You're a lawyer after all." (Garfinkel in Hill, Crittenden, 1968:6)

The jurors do not have a rigorous method for the job they are doing as jurors. It can not be enumerated and delineated as is the case with the scientists. But it is a real method: it gets things done: it enables them to play juror. The idea of the resource goes beyond this particular instance of the jurors to something all members use in their everyday lives for getting all kinds of things done. The resource provides for the intelligibility of their thoughts, utterances, and actions.

The resource is available for any situation; it gives an explanation for the activities done within those situations. The resource is not locatable in concrete individuals; it is something beyond them. But, it is something
that they can point to when asked to give an account of themselves (their behavior). It works like this, "Well, I can say this because everyone knows it." In this way, the resource is a kind of general knowledge that exists somewhere and is at everyone's disposal.

Durkheim's concepts of social facts and currents work in a similar way. They can be thought of as a resource. The following passage shows this:

Collective habits are...inherent not only in the successive acts they determine...but they are given permanent expression in a formula which is repeated from mouth to mouth, transmitted by education, and fixed even in writing. (Durkheim, 1934:7)

Here, Durkheim is speaking about actions that everyone does, and the assumptions that underlie and make possible these actions. These behaviors are available to people in a permanent way--in an abstraction. The formula (the abstraction) exists apart from individuals as a kind of tradition: it receives a life of its own through its abstract quality.

The most important feature of the resource is that it serves people as an explanation. It is what members can cite when they are asked what they are doing. They can appeal to a reason on the grounds of its familiarity. Because it is shared by all members the resource's validity is found in its characteristic of organizing the collective. This is brought out in what Durkheim has to say about social currents:

There are other facts without such crystallized form which have the same objectivity and the same ascendancy over the individual. These are called social currents.

1. When the explanation becomes a justification, it can be understood as a "legitimation". See Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality.
Thus, the great movements of enthusiasm, indignation, and pity in a crowd do not originate in any one of particular individual consciousnesses. They come to each one of us from without and carry us away in spite of ourselves...

Thus, a group of individuals, most of whom are perfectly inoffensive, may, when gathered into a crowd, be drawn into acts of atrocity. (1934:5)

The social currents can work here as a rationalization: they give a member (and a theorist) a cause for activity which removes the burden of the act from the actor. Everyone knows about mob violence: so, when the person who has committed an atrocious act is asked about it, all he has to do is point out the nature of the mob. The common knowledge of mob behavior serves as the rationale in this instance. By using social currents (i.e., the mob feeling) as an excuse, the person involved takes responsibility for his action from himself and gives it to the resource. In the society described by Durkheim, this is a common feature: the deeper structure of membership, the resource (social facts) takes over for actions that are undertaken by members. It becomes a means for the explanation of members activities. If, as Durkheim contends, people are just reflections of the social milieu, then theoretically the milieu (or the resource) is the real actor in society.

In the type of society that has been depicted, emphasis is placed on the fact that things get done (i.e., the idea that society is achieved). For Durkheim, this concern is displayed in his use of concepts like "habit" and "customs". These are certain activities that not only indicate to us a people's social nature, but that also, somehow, fulfill human destiny. Ethnomethodologists seem to make a similar point when they claim that in
society, members do things "for all practical purposes." By moving through everyday life in certain ways, people succeed in maintaining reality. The actions of members are practical in the sense that they are complete--particular activities are always being accomplished in such a way that nothing more is aimed at than their (the activities) accomplishment.

Practical society is not necessarily the society where courses of action can be understood according to means-ends formulation. ¹ A means-ends type of model reduces the complexity of achieving society to a simple formula. For example, the whole point of "Agnes"² is lost if our understanding of her is something like, "He took hormones in order to become a woman." Through the course of the account of Agnes, it is shown that her means are also her ends. The assumptions that Agnes was relying on to secure her femaleness were at the same time what had to be secured to be female (i.e. the assumptions were for Agnes woman's assumptions, and therefore indicative of womanhood). By making the right assumptions, Agnes was able to become a woman; "womanhood" was more or less contained in those assumptions.

Ethnomethodology is practical in the sense of lifefulness rather than other-liveliness. By this I mean that activity is viewed from no other perspective than the perspective of activity; the point of activity is the accomplishment of activity so that activity (society) is continuous. This

¹. See Garfinkel, Chapter 8 in Studies in Ethnomethodology on this point. He explains that a "means-ends" model, while it is a scientific rationality is not necessarily members' rationality and is therefore inadequate in terms of accounting for members' behavior.

². The following discussion assumes the reader's familiarity with Chapter Five, "Passing and the Managed Achievement of Sex Status in an 'Intersexed Person' Part 1", in Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology.
idea (of the constant achievement of activity) comes across in the work of a linguistic technician such as Schlegoff. At the ISA meetings in July, he was asked why he worked on the display of (linguistic) "Repair" (with Harvey Sacks). Schlegoff stated that it (repair) was important because it was a kind of system that enabled one person to interrupt another (person) in conversation to tell him that his pants were on fire.

This can be heard as an instance of a theoretic practical interest. There is a certain fascination in "repair", i.e., in the way in which things get done in society. Linguistic usage is ingenuous because almost every situation in everyday life can be accounted for by a rule peculiar to it (that situation). Thus, if one person can interrupt an other to tell him that his pants are on fire, the member displays that somehow he knows rules for priorities, for what it is better to do in a particular situation. It is better to interrupt someone to tell him his pants are on fire than to be polite and let the person continue speaking and sustain burns: politeness shifts from a matter of honoring someone's right to speak to knowing when that speech can be violated. And it is this type of knowledge (membership) which enables activities to continue in their seemingly routine fashion. While, in point of fact, "repair" includes the non-routine as a display of the routine.

In this sense, ethnomethodology stresses those accomplishments which are continually achieving society; therefore activities have no other significant consequences than the achievement of society. For examples, with Agnes, the problem is how Agnes managed to be a woman, and not why: what Agnes did was not a topic for scrutiny. The idea of non-convention (ethnomethodological non-membership) is not formulated; it is not present in life as a viable contrast to societal procedures.
(in life) as an available methodology which enables the ethnomethodologist to affirm conventionality. Theorizing remains at the practical level because activities are re-viewed and their achievement is described.

To recount: The Durkheimian society is maintained because people inherit knowledge for everyday affairs from a resource. The resource is more of an actor than the people in the sense that, as a rationale, it begins to control their activities. The ethnomethodological usage of resource deviates from this: instead of being used by ethnomethodologists to theoretically justify the reasons for activities, it is stressed as (a mysterious) something prior to speech which members invoke to speak. In this sense, it can be heard as a reference to some deeper reasoning members do while acting. But, it is not within the ethnomethodological context that the resource be given a character of its own in order to control human actions.
X. Membership and the Emergence of Civil Society

In the concluding section of this chapter, the problem (membership) is posed again, and its resolution is sought. The idea of the resolution does not imply the end of the problem; such a position would kill the life of the issue by ending any dialogue that could be directed towards it. The resolution is simply meant here as an alternative way of thinking about the problem.

Karl Marx, in his writing, On the Jewish Question, confronts the problem of civil society and analyzes it. While doing this, he points to the antithesis of civil society, community. I find Marx's work different from Durkheim and the ethnomethodologists on this point: for Marx, the facticity of the prevailing, social order did not necessarily imply that it was the moral order. Marx can be thought of as more of a teacher in this respect—he did not just offer an account of what is (which is itself oppressive), but sought to show how humans need not be constrained by it (what is). A spirit of Oughtness was part of his work.

The questions to keep in mind that organize this section are:

1. How is membership like civil society?
2. What are the consequences of membership?
3. What is the antithesis of membership (civil society)?

Practical society: the state of rationality and necessity
...Security is the supreme social concept of civil society.
(Marx, 1967:236)

Civil society can be understood as membership: the self-perpetuating collective which fosters itself in practical need. The lives of members are organized to fulfill the needs of the society in order to maintain it. The lives of members are therefore sacrificed to the collective: this must be the case before members can be fashioned by the collective (socialized).
What is the basis of civil society? The basis of civil society, Marx tells us, is the egoistic man.

In civil society man is active as a private individual, treats other men as a means, reduces himself to a means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers.

(Marx 1967:225)

The egoistic man, the private individual makes himself the limit of his activity. By this I mean that he thinks of himself as embodied, secured and known. The egoistic man orients to himself as a complete person; his needs are justified simply because they are his needs. Because he makes himself the limit of his life, the activities of the egoistic man are a method. They are a way for him to assert himself. Because activity is a method to him, and not an end itself, it is a mere tool. An activity, therefore, does not have any significance until it procures a concrete goal.

The egoistic man robs himself of his existence in this sense: because he is never fully in the present but waiting for self-assertion (i.e., the satisfaction of his needs) he is a method himself. His actual "real" existence is a method to an image of his projected "complete" self. The complete self is the self which no longer needs; it can live in self-sufficiency. This is an irony in the life of the egoistic man because the needs of self-gain never end. When one thing is secured, the need for another replaces it; this is the psychology of greed. The egoistic man, then, deals with others because they may prove useful to him, to his purposes. He may look at another and see nothing but himself; in one way, the egoist has no respect for anything because he can not understand how anything is of its own nature.¹

But how does egoism follow from membership? How is the egoistic man the plaything of "alien powers"?

¹ John O'Neill is "Public and Private Space" formulates privatization within a similar context:

"This loss of a common world separates society into a corporate hierarchy and a multitude of individuals who are turned in upon themselves in the competition to maintain occupational status and at the same time other-directed in their attempt to rationalize their loss of community in pursuit of the good life--family-style. (1972:36)"
Membership may at first seem to be the loss of the individual to the collective, but I want to show how membership is the making of individuals. Membership does not honour human interests in the sense that it stifles, and makes everyone the same. If a person has any desire to maintain himself, he may resist the collective. Because members are threatened with the seeming loss of self by collective interests, they may act in such a way as to secure themselves. Members secure themselves by becoming private individuals. They posit their "uniqueness" as a difference from others who, in so far as they are members, are like them (private individuals). A person who has been socialized receives certain behaviors from the social milieu, but who is not to say that through the concept of his "individuality" this person is transforming these behaviors (that he has received) into his own "private practices"? It is feasible that with knowledge that this person has as a resource, he fashions a self image. In fact, this is probably the only way "individuality" can be explained within a structure such as membership. Therefore, we can image a collective composed of "individuals" who, despite their differences, contribute to its autonomy.

There is no real relationship among members in the collective; as I will explain later, they have no sense of community. A reification (on the part of members) is going on there; the structure is beyond them, untouchable; nevertheless, it is something by which they all abide. Members do not act within the system; they are within it. As Marx (1967:240) points out, the egoistic man is "the passive and given result of the dissolved society." That is, it is almost as if the life of the egoistic man has been caused by things external to him. The egoist has done nothing
with his experience because he has no self with which to organize experience. Thus, life in civil society (membership) can be characterized by the person's surrender to the prevailing structure.

Marx introduces community as the antithesis of civil society, and I alluded to it above as "real relationship". What is community and why is it a more desirable form of life than membership?

Community is described by Marx (1967:218) as the beginning of human emancipation where people meet "in critical, scientific, and human relationship." Through community, people speak (relate) with each other in order to approach what is unknown rather than to re-view, again, the known, the given, the unproblematic. Community begins when the prevailing order is questioned in a way that includes the display of one's self as praxis. However, membership is necessary to community in the sense that community needs something to see, something with which to begin, something to question. Community can be distinguished from membership because it is the display of an awareness of something other than membership, which is critical of membership. The point of community is a movement towards what is other than membership, but this otherness is not locatable in a place (such as utopia). It is what is desired but what is not achieved—because to make the unknown "known" would be a relegation of it (the unknown) to membership. Hence, when everything is membership and there is no sense of otherness, there is no community. Community, then is a reference to how we bring ourselves to situations in our lives and what we do with them. It is my contention in this thesis that community is an expression of humanity in a special way—in the way that new avenues and inroads of existence are opened to the one who questions—by the nature of the questions. Therefore
I can not really say what community is--I can only attempt to do it; this thesis, is meant to be the display of this idea of community as its organizing agent rather than the definition of the ideal community, or a product of it.
CHAPTER TWO

THE SENSUOUS AND EROTIC FORMS OF LIFE

In the first chapter I described and analyzed Durkheim's early social theory and Garfinkel's formulation of ethnomethodology. I found that they were similar in some ways: both theorists portrayed the social as arising in a common structure, the collective or membership. I showed how, in some ways, membership evokes the image of an egoistic, civil society. In "On the Jewish Question" Karl Marx posed the problem of civil society and displayed its antithesis, community. Community, as the beginning of dialogue and critique, is the alternative to the mundane, rule-governed lives of members.

Now, in this chapter, I wish to proceed with these questions in mind:

1. How can we think of the social -- if not as a constraint?
2. What, then, are the implications of a human's social being?

For purposes of conceptual clarification, it is beneficial to present two different examples of possible forms of life. These examples are contextual presentations of A. sensuousness and B. eroticism. They are organized by the form of life. Before I analyze the peculiarities of sensuousness and eroticism, I want to explain the meaning of the concept of form of life.
I. On Forms of Life

The form of life is a kind of methodology, the theorist's tool. It has a place within the sociological tradition: both Simmel and Weber employed similar models in their work. Simmel referred to it as the "form" and Weber used the "ideal type". I will refer to their writings in this section to explain the form of life; at the same time, I will include my deviations and differences from their concepts.

The form of life can be illustrated by way of its different features. I will organize the analysis in this section according to these three specifications:

1. The form of life is metaphorical.
2. The form of life is a hypothetical construction.
3. The form of life is both the tool and the display of understanding.

The form of life is metaphorical. It depends on a grammar for its construction, and it depicts some experiential event; in this sense, it depends on a medium, the concrete, external world. However, the form of life (as a construction) is possible because it is an abstraction from experience: it is a display of the peculiar qualities of that experience that make it "that experience" and not some other. The form of life is metaphorical in the sense of the Greek, metapherein, to carry over (Webster, 1970:893). It is the way of the metaphor to tap the commonness (or source) of events and to preserve the life of that commonness beyond the specific events themselves. Thus, the metaphor is a kind of construction that bridges the duality of the material and the essential worlds.¹

¹ See On the Beginning of Social Inquiry (McHugh et al., 1974:10) on this point regarding theorizing: "These papers should be read as examples of our method."

To think of work as an example of method is to imply that theory and practice are not distinct. It is to end the conventional divisions between theory, method, and product and to display how the three are inextricably bound within any reflexive endeavor. A piece of work is an example, therefore, in the sense that it is also metaphorical. This is also the case with the form of life.
I want to stress that a metaphor is not only descriptive although description is, to a certain extent, part of it. This follows, then, for the form of life; it is not complete simply with the observation and description of an experiential event. Simmel (1950:21-2) wrote,

If society is conceived of as interaction among individuals, the description of the forms of interaction is the task of a science of society in its strictest and most essential sense. (emphasis, mine)

The form of life begins as an observation of an experiential event and as a depiction of the event's sensuous features. However, the form of life also includes a display of the essential qualities that underlie that event. This is what I mean by the abstract nature of the form of life; abstraction is the theorist's tool. It is through abstraction that the theorist gets right at the heart of the event: "To analyze is ... to address the possibility of any finding, puzzle, sense, resolution, answer, interest, location, phenomenon, etcetera, etcetera. Analysis is the concern not with anything said or written but with the grounds of whatever is said -- the foundations that make what is said possible, sensible, conceivable." (McHugh et al, 1972:2)

The heart of the event provides for the life of the event; this (the life) is hidden by its (the event's) sensuous features, but it is the intrinsic feature of any event. In the analysis of the form of life, the order of that form is discerned. The order is the deeper structure that organizes the event and puts limits upon it, to make it what it is. It is more than a rule; it is precisely what cannot be captured by a rule.

In displaying the form of life, the theorist is, finally, turned back

1. I mean that the form of life is not yet a form of life. I do not mean the form of life ever contains or fully represents what (the event) it tries to capture.
upon himself. By confronting the possibility of any event, he is at the same time, encountering his own possibility as a speaker. The display of an other's grounds includes the display of one's own grounds as part of it: to uncover the possibility of another's speech is to show one's own possibility. This is the communal nature of formulating work because both (the theorist and the event) are united -- through their existence by the same possibility.

The form of life is hypothetical. It depicts the possible way of life of a possible actor. Weber (1947:89) points out when he explains the use of "meaning":

The term may refer ... to the theoretically conceived pure type of subjective meaning attributed to the hypothetical actor ... in a given type of action. In no case does it refer to an objectively 'correct' meaning or one which is true in some metaphysical sense.

The form of life is meant as conjecture, not fact. It does not dictate the social order; if anything, it shows that the social order is not a structure, but a complex of different ways of life and usages. The form of life is not a binding stereotype; it depicts the possible way of life of a possible actor. The notion of possibility is not restrictive; it follows, then, that actors use any number of different forms of life throughout the courses of their lives. Therefore, it is best not to think of the form of life as embodied by an individual person, but to think of it as Weber recommends, as "a possible course of action." Because it is a course of action, and not an actor, the form of life is open to an actor's

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1. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein says, "To imagine a language is to imagine a form of life." (P. 8e). Later, he makes the point: "There are countless kinds (of language games),... And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all, but new language games come into existence, and others become obsolete,..." (P.11e). I have quoted this to better make the point about the flexibility of the form of life as a form.
election. The actor, a social being, is free to choose a way of life: he
is not determined by a form of life that imposes itself upon him.

The hypothetical character of the form of life also refers us to
its authorship. Weber points out that, ...Meaning is attributed to a
hypothetical actor in a given type of action. Meaning is given by the
theorist, in this instance, to the hypothetical actor. The form of life
does not exist independently of the theorist's formulation of it. By this
I mean that is is the theorist who brings the form of life into the world.
Although the theorist takes the example from what he notices is happening in
the environment, he must make the example intelligible. Therefore, the
theorist is, in a certain sense, an author of a display of a particular
event, phenomenon, etc. He makes certain phenomena visible as theoretical
problems; moreover, he is responsive to the life of the phenomenon because
he seeks to show how it is grounded.

The form of life is used for purposes of understanding. In this
sense, it is a kind of methodology which unites theory and practice. The
form of life is not a way to understanding; it must exemplify understanding
itself. Understanding begins when we realize that no event or phenomenon
is given in immediacy or self-evident. Through understanding we realize that
an event (or phenomenon) is of a certain nature: therefore, it is necessary
to discern the nature of something before it can be known. Understanding
is the insight necessary to knowledge; it it a continuous movement in that
direction.
II. The Form of Life and the General Problem of Society

The form of life reflects the general problem of sociology. How is this? In "The Field of Sociology", Simmel wrote:

Existence we hear is an exclusive attribute of individuals, their qualities and experiences. Society by contrast is an abstraction. Although indispensable for practical purposes and certainly very useful for a rough and preliminary survey of the phenomena that surround us, it is no real object. It does not exist outside and in addition to the individuals and the processes among them. (1950:4)

Simmel explains that the major premise in which sociology is grounded -- the notion of the individual's existence within society -- is also the major reason for sociology's refutation as a science. In its attempt to make the courses of action of real individuals intelligible it explains the real (individuals) through use of the unreal; that is, the abstract concept of society. Individuals are not only depicted in terms of their physical bodies, but also in terms of the other elements that figure into their lives. These other elements are not immediately given through sense perception. The consideration of humans interacting with the non-physical reflects the whole of social life.

The form of life exemplifies the sociological tradition in so far as it depicts a concrete course of action and makes reference to the (non-physical) origins of that action. The form of life shows the unity of the two in the one (form). If the form of life is understood as a methodology, it is subject to the same criticism that sociology receives when it claims to be science: it is not strictly empirical. The theorist uses abstractions, and, to some,
this denotes a loss of security, the security of the real physical world. But abstraction makes the understanding of a course of action possible because it touches the essential of that example, those qualities which make it what it is. Thus, the form of life shows how any event, phenomenon or course of action is contingent upon certain underlying features for its existence.
III. The Sensuous Form of Life

One who wishes to explain the theoretical background of the form of life must show how it utilizes both a concrete real world, and another wordliness, not given in immediacy. The form of life captures the union of the physical and the non-physical, and, in this sense, it reflects social life. Sociological theorizing notes that humans live their lives in conjunction with abstract premises. In the following sections of this chapter I will elaborate upon this through the development of the sensuous and erotic forms of life.

Both the sensuous and erotic forms of life focus upon the direct relationship of man to nature. I found Karl Marx's "Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844" very helpful in this area, and I will be drawing upon it throughout these sections.

The examples of sensuous and erotic life should provide us with a framework in which to formulate a human's social being and the implications of it. Thus, the examples of sensuous and erotic life give conceptual clarification to the organizing theme of this chapter.

As I stated earlier, the direct relationship of man to nature is the focal point for both sensuous and erotic life. The question that organizes their difference is,

How does man relate to nature in each case?

I will begin with the formulation of sensuous life. In this section I will develop both a notion of sensuous life and an example of a sensuous practice.

The worker can make nothing without nature, without the sensuous, external world. It is the material wherein his labor realizes itself. (Marx, 1967:290)
Marx makes the point that humans live with nature. In their lives, they come into contact with the physical realm, with matter. Without the material world, labour would be impossible. Labour needs something for its practice to touch; it needs something to effect. Moreover, labour needs a medium through which the change that it brings about can appear. If the social order is a complex of different forms of life, then there must be innumerable ways in which humans can approach nature. Now, one of those ways will be considered.

In the above quote, Marx suggests to me a sensuous way of life. A sensuous life is a life in which the form appears similar to "the sensuous, external world." Sensuous life is, more or less, a physical kind of life; it is lived in accordance with nature. However, the concept of sensuous life refers us to the fact that it takes a man to live sensuous life. Sensuous life is possible only with a certain recognition that man has of nature. Nature is evinced through perception, through the senses. It takes a human, using his faculties which make him a sensual being, to live sensuous life.

Sensuous life presupposes a certain distance from nature in so far as a human perceives something, and, through reason, knows that it (what is perceived) is external to him. Marx noted that this is not so with animals:

The animal is immediately one with its life activity, not distant from it. The animal is its life activity. Man makes his life activity into an object of will and consciousness. (1967:294)

The animal, unlike man, can not acquire any distance from its life because it lacks reason. The animal can not recognize any feature of
its life as a feature of its life because all the animal is is its life.

It is always one with its life.¹

¹. Therefore sensuous life is not a brutal form of life -- insofar as the brute is like an animal:

"...His behaviors are not thought to be displays by a rule-guided actor -- the brute is not thought to be socially responsible ... Insofar as his activity is in Weber's terms, behavior rather than action." (Blum and McHugh, 1971)
IV. Nostalgia as a Sensuous Practice

I want to display a sensuous practice because it will provide an example of sensuous life, and make the analysis of sensuous life more understandable. The recent trend of nostalgia can be thought of as a sensuous practice: I want to show how. The film, American Graffiti, is organized by the theme of nostalgia: within the confines of this paper, the film will provide an occasion for the depiction of nostalgia.

American Graffiti is a recollection of sorts; when we watch the film, we recall (with fondness or amusement) the hot rods and bobby socks of the late fifties/early sixties. We are taken back to a small town in California, to what almost everyone was doing on a Friday night. We cruise up and down the main street, chucking moons out of car windows, while listening to the radio, blaring rock n'roll, interrupted from time to time by "Wolfman Jack", a disc jockey who epitomized the wisdom of the time. We visit a high school dance, stop for hamburgers at a drive-in where the waitresses are on roller skates. Then, we're off on a search for some illegal booze with which we can fitfully end the night.

What is happening when we see this film if we become nostalgic? How is nostalgia a way of experiencing the world? And, finally, how can nostalgia as a mode of experiencing inform us about sensuous life?

When viewing American Graffiti, we travel back to a place that has only changed because of time, and we identify with a set of past practices. The medium which invokes nostalgia (the film) gives us something to become nostalgic about at the same time that it serves as the vehicle of travel: it provides the shock through which we remember. It reminds us; in presenting us with this picture of life in the past, it enables us to go back. For this reason, we can think of American Graffiti as a bus to itself,
a kind of nowhere travel.

The person who becomes nostalgic must, for those moments, forget as much of the present as he needs to be at ease with that past time again. However, the present can not be forgotten completely because nostalgia is the offsetting of the past to the present. Becoming nostalgic, we do not just see what it was like then, but then in comparison to the sophistication of now. Thus, we can be amused by or fond of past antics. Nostalgia needs the contrast between "now" and "then" which allows for the recognition of the past in the present. In one way, nostalgia overcomes time: it overcomes, in immediacy, what time has changed. But, at the same time, it preserves time: time is divided into the categories of past and present. For nostalgia's purposes, clear lines of distinction are first drawn between the past and the present; later, those lines are blurred when the sensibility of nostalgia is achieved. For this reason, there is a kind of vagueness to the experience of nostalgia: nostalgia is usually thought of as a feeling or sentiment. It may be a pain or a longing. The nostalgic person is within this fog.

As I mentioned earlier, the contrast between past and present time makes for the fascination of nostalgia. For example, the practices depicted in American Graffiti are both strange and familiar. Although, when we see them, we have lost, for the moment, the security of the typification of those practices, we know that if we stayed with the film long enough (where it has taken us), we would indeed begin to typify those practices again. Nostalgia reawakens our knowledge of the past; it informs us that the past
is still a part of us.¹

When we watch *American Graffiti*, if we are nostalgic, the potentially boring or mundane becomes exciting, the news of the moment. The limits of everyday life seem to have been transcended, if what was once habit is now adventure. Nostalgia is successfully unreflective; it keeps those who are involved in it from contemplation of what it depicts. If we are nostalgic, we cannot really think about the value of life in the past because we are too interested in having the time again as it really was before. We are busy recreating the past, and trying to make that recreation perfect. Nostalgia involves a concern for accuracy: a nostalgic event, such as *American Graffiti*, may be subject to criticism depending upon its accuracy. It may have been considered a good film by some because it was a true to life account of the rock n' roll era.

In order to see *American Graffiti* nostalgically, we must abandon ourselves to the film. By this I mean that nostalgia bids one to let down the barriers of distance: one forgets himself, for the moment, and lets the film take over in order to bring him back. In his essay "The Homecomer", Schutz remarks upon the implications that distance has for one's concept of home. This notion can also be applied to the experience of nostalgia.

Home means one thing to the man who has never left it, another thing to the man who dwells far from it, and still another to him who returns. (1970:108)

¹. Alfred Schutz, in his essay, "The Homecomer" analyzes a phenomenon similar to nostalgia, the experience of homecoming. Nostalgia, however, is not the achievement of a permanent state, as is a homecoming. Nostalgia is essentially fanciful. Nostalgia retains its interesting character in a way that homecoming does not: "To the homecomer, home shows -- at least in the beginning -- an unaccustomed face ... The homecomer's attitude differs from that of a stranger: He expects to return to an environment of which he always has had -- and so he thinks -- still has intimate knowledge and which he just has to take for granted in order to find his bearings within it. (1971: pp.106-197, Vol.II)
Nostalgia can be likened to going home in so far as it is a return to the familiar; therefore, distance is a feature necessary to the idea of nostalgia. Distance gages how one sees. If we abandon ourselves to the medium in order to become nostalgic, we aim to become the person who has never left home. But, it is only because we have been away from home that we are able to return. Because we were once at home (i.e., the person who has never left) the limits of our distance from it could dissolve, and we could return there again, as we were before. Nostalgia is the desire to return to a particular time (or state of nature) as if it had never been left. Realistically, nostalgia is possible only as the view of the person who has left home.

Although nostalgia distinguishes times (i.e., knowing the past as the past, and the present as the present), in the experience of nostalgia, the differences between present and past are blurred. This blurriness is present in the feeling of abandonment a person may have to the medium; watching American Graffiti, as we are meant to watch it, we become the adolescents of 1962. Watching American Graffiti is driving up and down Main Street all night. Any sense of ourselves as otherwise is forgotten. What we need to see that film nostalgically (the rationality that makes it intelligible) is what the teenagers of '62 needed in order to live their lives in that way.

Earlier in this section, the unreflexive character of nostalgia was mentioned; however, a technical reason was given for this feature (i.e., persons who are nostalgic are too busy recreating the past to worry about what was really going on). Now I wish to explore this point a little further; reflexivity kills nostalgia, or the experience of nostalgia is impossible to one who is reflexive (to one, who, in a certain sense, wishes to evaluate the past).
Alfred Schutz, in his essay "The Homecomer", makes this point about a person's capacity for returning home, which can also be read as a person's ability to become nostalgic:

A young man lives for years in a small town, a regular fellow, liked by everybody, but in an occupation which, honorable as it is, does not give him any chance to prove his worth. Quite possibly, he himself was not aware of what he could perform. The war gives him such an opportunity. He makes good and receives the reward he deserves. Can we expect, can we wish that such a man could come home not only to family and sweetheart but also to his place behind the cigar counter? (1971:117)

This passage raises the ethical question: can we wish the person who has done more or better than what he was doing at home to return home? A person who has learned something other than home, a learning through which he is able to evaluate his former position can not return home, to what he was before. It would be a lie to himself if he did, because in becoming aware of his former situation, he has something more than the rationale for that situation which enables him to see it. On the other hand nostalgia is similar to the homecoming of the person who has not made good. Nostalgia is the desire to return to the past because nothing better has been achieved. Although nostalgia is possible only as the dream of the person who has left home, it refers to a physical distance: the nostalgic person has never really left home (the past); he has never really left home in his heart. The manner in which life was lived in the past is the only way that person knows how to live. Moreover, the present is an impediment to that past life, which, through the experience of nostalgia, can be overcome for as long as the nostalgic mood lasts. Thus, the reasoning behind nostalgia makes it compelling: life was good then, if it is recreated, the good will be now. The time was good then, and the time was
the practices of the people. In redoing the time, we become like those people, we become good. Nostalgia is the dream for the perfect state which is equated to past practices -- and present practices, if the present practices are a recreation of the past. Nostalgia is impossible without this idea of the goodness of the time. For instance, even if "hard times" are longed for, what is basically being sought is the goodness of the struggle that hard times bring. Think of Archie Bunker's song, "Those were the Days.": "Didn't need no welfare state ... Everybody pulled his weight ... Those were the days."

Nostalgia fosters a kind of backward hope, something with the resolve of, "Well, the past was not in vain, even if the present is." It is a practice which makes its goal (former times) something which has already been lost (the past). Nostalgia is doomed before it begins because it can never really have the time again ... only its recreation in fantasy. 1

1. I am depicting nostalgia as a movement towards an idyllic time. Because, in nostalgia, a surplus of goodness is imputed to the past, the present, must be less good. A dissatisfaction with the present, then, gives one the impetus to recall. Nostalgia, as I am formulating it, is a very strong experience which calls for the surrender of the nostalgic person. Nostalgia is not a flirtation with the past which is available to anyone who enjoys (something like) American Graffiti.

The following (edited) poem portrays the essential features of the movement I am trying to capture:

Miniver Cheevy, child of scorn,
Grew lean while he assailed the seasons;
He wept that he was ever born,
And he had reasons.

Miniver loved the days of old
When swords were bright and studs were prancing;
The vision of a warrior bold
Would set him dancing.

Miniver sighed for what was not,
And dreamed and rested from his labors;
He dreamed of Thebes and Camelot,
And Priam's neighbors.

Miniver Cheevy, born too late,
Scratched his head and kept on thinking;
Miniver coughed, and called it fate,
And kept on drinking.

Edwin Arlington Robinson
(Untermeyer, ed., 1953: pp 411-12)
To Recount:

Nostalgia has been shown to be a fanciful practice in which the past is longed for and recreated. Nostalgia is unreflexive: past practices are reconstructed without evaluation. However, a certain goodness is imputed to the past which provides for the possibility of nostalgia. A person is nostalgic who has no sense of life other than in the past.

What is it that makes nostalgia a sensuous practice?

Nostalgia is a description in the sense of a photo-copy. The picture that it presents to us of the past is warranted by the existence of the past as an objective reality. Thus, someone who was nostalgic might tell us that he was so "because of the time" -- the time itself inspires nostalgia. This person might not think of himself as imputing value to the past, and therefore authoring his particular (nostalgic) view of it.

"Nostalgia is sensuous because the object of its description, "time" is for nostalgia's purposes, the state of nature. It is external, given in immediacy, and an object of certainty. (Marx: 1967:240). In sensuous life, people have not realized that nature is for use. Usage shows how the human worker is in a particular relation to nature. By this I mean that the worker has a sense of how he works: his labour does not just leave nature as it is, but, for him, labour is a transformation through which expression is achieved. The worker has a distance from nature that the sensuous person does not. How is this?

One who lives sensuously (or physically) thinks of nature as the perfect resource. Nature is a source of inspiration for humans (in the example of nostalgia; we can see how in American Graffiti, 1962 served as the inspiration
for the film). Nature is perfect because it is sufficient: it exists and provides for itself. Nature does not need humans for the purposes of its survival: it would continue without them. However, humans need nature because it is the sustenance of their material lives. Sensuous persons read their need for nature slavishly: because nature is perfection, in the sense that it is complete and does not need, sensuous persons wish to duplicate nature. They wish to become like nature themselves. Since nature is the only available resource in sensuous life, it is all that is relied upon in the duplication of itself. Consequently, nature is the only thing that sensuous persons have to show for their efforts. (This, too, was shown in the example of American Graffiti -- the experience of the past was all that a person had to know in order to return to the past). The sensuous practice of description is based on the idea that man is not nature. Because he is not nature, however, man is missing something. This pitfall (of missing something) is overcome when man gets as close to nature as possible. He thinks that he becomes nature in his duplication of it. Behind sensuous life, then, there are these notions of loss and recovery. Man seeks what is lost (nature); in his becoming what has been lost, he regains it (the state of nature).
V. The Erotic Form of Life

In this section, I will be referring to the "erotic" in its classical or Greek sense. For a detailed account of the difference between the concepts of modern and classical love, the reader is referred to Georg Simmel's writing on the subject, "Eros, Platonic and Modern" (1971: pp. 235-247). In this article, Simmel explains that for the Greeks, love transcended mere sensuality. "Plato saw that love was an absolute vital power, and that the way of understanding would therefore have to lead through love to the ultimate ideals and metaphysical potencies." (Simmel, 1971:236).

Therefore, the erotic can be thought of as an intermediate force, coming between man and ideals, which propels the soul to contemplation and reflection. For the purposes of this paper, I will be using the erotic in this sense: as a reference to the human struggle to contemplate the meaning of things. The erotic, as an active form of life, will be developed in contrast to the sensuous form of life, in which humans are engaged in the process of duplicating nature, rather than putting it to use.

Erotic life presupposes sensuous life; "the sensuous external world" is a necessary feature of erotic life. In erotic life, people are aware of nature. However, how people are aware of nature points to the difference between sensuous and erotic life. Erotic persons put nature to use -- they work with it. Erotic life arises in activity. This activity is not a routine copying of nature, as in the sensuous projects of nostalgia and description. Erotic life is a kind of intermediate state; by this I mean that it shows how humans live between nature and spirit. Dwelling in this intermediate state, erotic persons understand labour qualitatively: they know that labour is the relationship of humans to nature whereby they
aim at the expression of spirit through themselves. Spirit can be thought of as the prerequisite for all life, that which breathes possibility. Therefore, spirit is the mysterious other force upon which the relationship of humans to nature is contingent. Erotic persons show through their labour that their labour has a purpose: its purpose is to show how, in life, spirit must be expressed. In erotic life, a person has a sense of self which is displayed in the attempt to transform nature. In erotic life, nature speaks when it is given a voice (or a purpose) by man. Therefore, nature can not exist as a thing apart from man with a separate life. It is man who generates, or is responsible for, a conception of nature when it is put to use.
To Recount:

Nature is transformed through work; it does not remain an immovable object. Nature provides the material with which humans work to bring forth and show the purpose of labour, the underlying spirit.

In erotic life, people understand that work is a secondary activity. This is so because work is essentially a relation. It is the process between man and nature which would be impossible without either. Erotic persons labor because they understand the purpose of labour: they understand how nature is to be used so that it does not dominate humans (which would be a reification). Erotic life is poor: labour is nothing of itself, it depends upon the forces of nature and spirit. However, labour never contains these forces upon which it depends: labour can only show them (nature and spirit) as they are. Labour is never complete: it only alludes to its purposes.¹

Because it is a truly human activity, labour is all, and the best, that humans can do. Through labour, humans get a sense of how they exist: they are the go-between of nature and the deeper purpose of life.

If in sensuous life, men seek to recover a perfection that has been lost (the state of nature), it is in erotic life that they work with the idea of perfection as the beginning and end of their activity. A passage from Plato's symposium will help to illustrate this point:

The spirit being of an intermediate nature bridges the gap between men and gods, preventing the universe from falling into two separate halves. (1951:81)

¹. Simmel noted that, "For the Greek love can be an intermediate state between having and not having. As a logical consequence of this therefore, love would have to be extinguished once this state of possession is reached." (1971:245). Thus, Simmel described the erotic tension between having and not having. This is similar to the tension of labour in erotic life: labour is a continuous process of expression which never can fully contain that which it is expressing. If work achieved perfection it would cease to be a human activity: there would be nothing to work for.
Before humans, Socrates contended in his example of the gods, there is perfection. The idea of the god is best understood as what is prior. It is before life, that which gives life. Consequently, the purpose of an erotic activity (one that bridges the gap between men and gods) is to show how it (the work) is done in the light of this priorness. Perfection is nothing but itself; it does not have any qualities of a greater or less degree because it is impossible to conceive of something being more or less perfect than another. Therefore, perfection can be thought of as an allusion to the unchanging. Because people live their lives through the flux of change, through activity which brings about and shows change, the idea of prior perfection is most alien to human nature. A human being is most unlike a god. Humans are the workers; before them, in the idea of the unchanging, is that which never worked. Yet, in erotic life, work is done in the wake of what is prior. The promise found there (in the idea of this priorness) is labour’s deepest motivation. In erotic life, human work is not drudgery: it is not routine or a dull repetition of nature. Through erotic life the human workers come to realize that they have a place in the world.
VI. Erotic Life and Social Life

In the last section, the erotic form of life was developed. Labour was shown to be the very heart of erotic life; this is not unlike Karl Marx's analysis of labour in which labour is considered one of the most important features of human existence. I cite the following passage in order to formulate the idea of man the worker as a social being. More specifically: the social can be understood as arising in erotic life. How is this?

Even when I carry out scientific work, an activity which I can seldom conduct in association with other men, I perform a social act. The human significance of nature only exists for the social man because only in this case is nature a bond with other men, the basis of his existence for others, and their existence for him. (Marx: 1963: pp. 157-158)

Erotic life is social life; Marx sets it out. The social is the common ground from which humans begin labour: through this social ground those of similar vision behold the possibility in nature. That is, what can be done with nature in order to better show humanity. Crude matter, the concrete medium that, by its nature is resistant to movement (because it is distinct and separate from humans) is used for the purposes of expression. In social life, a person displays praxis as far as he has reached out to touch a thing. Furthermore, where labour bridges the gap between men and gods, the workers overcome the alienating division between the human and the

1. The following passage from Lady Chatterley's Lover illustrates more fully the point I am making about the human relationship to nature in erotic (social) life:
"...The wood was her refuge, her sanctuary... To get away from the house, and everybody... But it was not really a refuge, a sanctuary, because she had not connexion with it. It was only a place where she could get away from the rest. She never really touched the spirit of the wood itself... if it had any such nonsensical thing." (Lawrence, 1960:21)
absolute. In social life, nature is not an affront to man because nature is not given the power (by man) to intimidate and silence him. This is in direct contrast to the relationship of man to nature in sensuous life. There, because humans have nothing to say about nature, they simply recopy it, and fancy that reproduction to be their different speech (different from nature).

By good activity, however, I do not mean domination, the unequal relationship of man to nature, wherein man is the controller. When dominating in this way, man asserts his ego by making everything subject to himself: he ravages nature, not respecting it. 1

In social (erotic) life, humans need not make reified typifications, either, putting off reflection until some technical failure occurs in everyday life. While reified typifications are symbolic of a life that has been dulled, it is in social (erotic) life that one awakens so that even what was unthinkable (or typified) before can be spoken of.

Accordingly, the analysis of nostalgia would have been impossible if it had been treated sensuously, because the sensuous treatment of nostalgia would result in nostalgia. It was because nostalgia was treated erotically (i.e., with the intent to display its life) that it became a topic for analysis. Nostalgia was given an "interesting" character by the analysis which made it problematic; whereas, if it had been reified it would be uninteresting, and remain self-evident.

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1. A point about man dominating nature is made in a conversation between characters in Lady Chatterly's Lover. The statement about the midlands refers to the effects of the mines. "...The driving power of the machine (is) hate..." "Absolutely, but also it seems to me a perfect description of the whole of the industrial idea. It's the factory owner's ideal in a nutshell; except that he would deny that the driving power was hate. Hate it is all the same, hate of life itself. Just look at these Midlands if it isn't plainly written up." (Lawrence, 1960:40)
Social life ends both the division and the motive that is usually attributed to labour. Marx noted that even when he was engaging in science, an activity which could be done alone, he performed a social act. To be social, a person need not have another around, although this could just as easily be the case. The reason why a person works is more important, and as Marx points out, this (the reason) provides for the social nature of the task. In the conventional relationship of producer to consumer, the first thinks that he works for the sake of the other, and vice-versa. However, in erotic life, humans come to terms with the purpose of labour, and work for this purpose in any task. The social is, in this sense, the beginning and the end of labour. Because it gives the insight of what good work is, it makes it possible, opens it to people. Engaged in the act of labour, the worker acknowledges the insight which fosters his labour. Each task is not an end, but expressive of the purpose that the labourer attempts to show through all his work.

There is trust among people in erotic life because "nature is a bond with other men, the basis of his existence for others and their existence for him." Through the social people find a common basis for life: they have a reason to work, and this reason is something that can be shared with others. Social life fosters collaboration. As equals, social men speak, wrestling nature from itself, and directing it towards an expression of the perfection before. The social is the place where activity is made good.
VII. The Social As Ethical

In the last section, a version of the social was formulated: a human's social nature arises in erotic life wherein the purpose of labour is understood: the worker is the social person. Up to this point, forms of life have been described. Now I will carry them further to the philosophy of life they entail. Because I do not intend to separate sociology from philosophy in this section, it is no accident that I will be using some of the theoretical insights of Georg Simmel. Simmel was an unusual theorist, a controversial figure in his time because he did not always conform to the precedents set by academics. One contemporary of his remarked,

There is not doubt that Simmel, thanks to his extensive and many sided knowledge and the penetrating energy of his thought, is the only man capable of lifting sociology from the level of mere data collecting and general reflection to the rank of a truly philosophical undertaking.

(cited by Levine in Simmel, 1971: pp. XIII-IV)

Max Weber also noted that Simmel's ultimate interests were directed to metaphysical problems, to the meaning of life. (Levine ed., Simmel, 1971:XLVI).

In "The Transcendent Character of Life" Simmel expressed man's position in the world as standing at every moment between two boundaries. A boundary is something alien that stands in the way of man. However, Simmel did not stop the analysis with that simple observation. He noted that "The unified act of life includes both the state of being bounded, and the transcendence of the boundary." (1971:356) I read this as a presentation of a human's social situation: the boundary is present for a person so that it may be stepped over; after one boundary is stepped over a new one
will always be encountered. Thus, human existence or "social being'' is
grounded in continuous labour (labour can be understood as the overcoming
of boundaries). In the erotic form of life, for example, nature was shown
to present the obstacle that a person was continuously transforming through
work.

The eternalness of labour is the challenge of social life; it
(the eternalness) is not a cause for despair but the very reason for human
existence. "That we do not simply stand within these boundaries, but by
virtue of our awareness of them have passed over them -- this is the sole
consideration which can save us from despair over them, over our limitation,
and finitude," (Simmel, 1971:358). Simmel carried this consideration of
social life a step further:

There must be something at hand to be overcome, but it
is only there for the purpose of being overcome. So,
also, as an ethical agent, man is the limited being
that has no limit. (1971: 359)

The totality of human social life does not only lie in labour
(overcoming boundaries). By thinking of people as ethical agents, Simmel
has extended the social to its next logical sphere, the sphere of necessity.
Not only is it human nature to be social (to labour to overcome obstacles)
but it is an ethical duty: it is a matter of a person's honesty to himself
to at all times be himself.

In conventional usage, a persons' social nature, and ethical duty
are usually separated. However, if through the social, humans receive the
impetus to work, then, through the ethical, they must complete the under-
standing of labour by a commitment to it. I am saying that a person can not
be social without being ethical in this sense: one cannot be labouring with a real purpose unless he is also committed to that purpose. Through the ethical sphere, then, the worker completes the social sphere: the insight of social life is made into reality when it becomes a duty to labour for this insight.

In this section, I am speaking of the ethical sphere as a general form of life. It is conceivable that an ethical (and therefore, social) person would be displaying these spheres in any task that he undertook. We can imagine an ethical craftsman as well as an ethical theorist. Therefore, the social and the ethical spheres are to be found in the disposition of the actor, rather than in any specific task.

A person acts in these social and ethical spheres so that activity is an end. By this I mean that one does not act according to a means/end model. In the means/end typology of action, an activity is not always meaningful. For instance, if I do \( x \) in order to get \( y \), \( x \) is merely instrumental to \( y \). Doing \( x \) does not mean anything until \( y \) is achieved: \( x \) derives its meaning from \( y \). However, in the social and ethical spheres, activity is not divided into means and end. It is an end itself. By this I mean that the activity is complete because of the purpose that fosters it: therefore, it doesn't matter what the outcome is. This will be made clearer in the next section.

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1. Max Weber (1947:114) includes this as a specific "type of social action": "...in terms of rational orientation to an absolute value (veritarian); involving a conscious belief in the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, entirely for its own sake and independently of any prospects of external success,"
VIII. Nights of Cabiria -- An Illustration

The Fellini film, Nights of Cabiria better illustrates the point I am trying to make: that in the ethical (and consequently the social sphere), activity is an end.

Cabiria is the story of a prostitute in Rome. The film opens as Cabiria is being robbed and thrown into the river by her former lover. Cabiria survives the assault and resolves not to be taken again. Her cynicism is a way in which she protects herself: by maintaining a cynical attitude about life, she can hide behind a hardened exterior and never have to put herself forth to meet another again. Cabiria's turning to cynicism after the betrayal by her lover can be understood as a resolve never to risk herself again. She lives her life determined that nothing will ever touch her again: nothing will move her.

It is ironic that Cabiria is a prostitute, and that her work as such is particularly unerotic. Although, for all practical purposes, she appears to be having many relationships, in reality, she is involved in none. As a prostitute, she gives herself to another as a possession; she remains guarded and secure. Her value to another is transformed to money: it is something with a completely objective content which remains distant from both parties (both she and her client). Cabiria knows exactly how she gives herself to another and how she is taken. It is a flat exchange: a relationship where nothing of the person need be given at all.

The film depicts some of Cabiria's escapades in the night as she works. Cabiria enters a theatre one night while a hypnotist is on stage.

1. In the article "Prostitution ", Simmel (1971: pp. 122-23) shows how money can completely alter the human tone of a relationship.
He convinces her to join the show and give herself over as a subject. Cabiria is hypnotized: she is put into a tender love scene in a garden where she talks sincerely to a lover. Cabiria talks openly to him, revealing many things about her character, to which in everyday life she would never admit. When she comes out of the spell, and hears the jeers of the audience, she realizes how she has been taken advantage of and humiliated. That she can suffer on account of such exposure shows us that she is not as hardened as she pretends.

After the show, Cabiria meets a man, Oscar, who has waited around to tell her how deeply he was moved by her conversation in the garden. He tells her that people are usually so closed but that once in a while, a rare person comes along who opens his heart and inspires one to live better. He tells Cabiria that she was his inspiration. Cabiria is close to rejecting him, but her curiosity is roused. For some reason, when he asks her to meet him the next day, she accepts. The story unfolds as Oscar woos Cabiria: she is at first reluctant to give herself again. However, her fear is slowly overcome: Cabiria comes into her own happiness and trust, in the thought that someone can love her for herself. Eventually, Cabiria sells all she owns, and goes to Oscar with her dowry to be his wife. On the eve before they marry, they take a walk in the forest. A changes comes over Oscar, his face darkening, his manner, grave, but Cabiria is too happy to notice. When finally, she does see, she cries out: we feel the agony of her betrayal. Oscar runs off with the money, and Cabiria sinks to the ground, begging to die. Some hours later, she awakens, and walks out of the forest, wiping her eyes. A band of young people is walking up the road, singing, dancing and laughing. Cabiria is in the midst of them, still wiping here eyes, still hurt. One boy begins to dance around her.
Cabiria hesitates, then looks up and smiles. That is the end of the film.

Cabiria's smile is the triumphant note upon which the film ends. The smile informs us that Cabiria has survived this episode, and that she will continue. Cabiria may go on to be taken advantage of by another, but the point to be made is that she will go on. This is at the heart of the film: it does not focus on her specific adventures, but the spirit in which Cabiria undertakes these adventures. Cabiria's strength lies in her ability to interact with others in an honest and trusting way. She does not depend upon a specific outcome of those interactions. The willingness of Cabiria is what puts her into the ethical sphere: an act is important as an end itself because through the activity, Cabiria is showing herself.

Thus, Cabiria is ethical whether she is jilted or not. In this way, I am trying to show the ethical sphere not as dogmatism, but as a general value that could underlie any task.

Therefore, the rejection of ends is possible because an ethical action is done with an understanding of its intrinsic goodness. An ideal fosters an ethical act which provides it with this goodness; an ideal can not derive its worth from something immediate because an ideal may endure through time while particular experiences never do (unless they are 'idealized' by the subject). Thus, what is of an ideal nature can not be transformed to the level of immediacy and retain its ideal nature. An ethical act which

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1. This is not to say that it isn't nice if something good happens -- but, it is to say that Cabiria doesn't have a pragmatic motive.

2. It is interesting to recall that "Kant stated as a moral law that man is never to be used as a mere means, but is always to be perceived and treated as an end in himself." (Simmel, 1971:122) Note Simmel's usage of "mere means" which implies a certain incompleteness in the treatment of another rather than giving a person his full due (or all his possibility).
remains ethical must then be motivated by an ideal. An ethical person, like Cabiria, shows a unity with the world in this way: her sense of self is such that she realizes that the self is bound to anything she does. Any activity, then, can be an occasion for showing how one is with one's self. If she treats an other as a means, then, she herself is reduced to a means, because that (the reduction to means) is a feasible course of action to herself. What is only first possible for the self is capable of being transformed into an activity aimed at an other. 1

In this chapter I have stressed both the sameness and difference of social and ethical conduct. The social provides the insight through which humans realize the necessity of labour which is expressive of humanity. This insight does not become real until it is ethical -- that is, until it is actualized by a commitment on the part of a labourer, and becomes practice. An ethical act is done for the sake of its own value and not for any external ends. Now, in the next, and concluding, chapter, I will examine some specific concepts of value, and ethical problems within sociology proper.

1. George Herbert Mead (perhaps) shows the reflexivity of behavior when he speaks of the self being able to "take the role of the other." Because the self begins activity, it is only possible to act towards an other as one would first act towards one's self.
CHAPTER THREE

THE ETHICAL PROBLEM IN SOCIOLOGY

In the preceding chapter, a human's social existence was formulated as an ethical duty. Social existence arises in erotic life, while sensuous life was developed as the predecessor of erotic life. In sensuous life, labour consists of the reproduction of nature; whereas, in erotic life, it (labour) is transformational.

Now, in this chapter; I want to go on to analyze the ethical problem in sociology: this problem becomes evident in the idea of a value-free sociology. I will analyze it here because this problem is an intrinsic part of this paper: if I am contending that the social person is also an ethical person, then it stands to reason that I am not advocating a value-free position; in fact, just the opposite. Therefore, in the following section, value will be developed as the generating feature of forms of life. I will then go on to explain other usages of the concept of value, both in social theory and modern life.
I. Notes on Value

In this section, the concept of value will be formulated relative to its usage in the previous chapter, On Sensuous and Erotic Forms of Life.

Any form of life is fostered by a concept of value. In that earlier section, On Forms of Life, the multiplicity of various forms of life was stressed. This is to say that human beings employ innumerable usages throughout the process of their lives (i.e., a person could be bureaucratic in one instance while being an ecologist the next). The adaptation of a form of life is a matter of an election on the part of an actor (forms of life do not come to one from without). A form of life is fostered by a concept of value in the sense that value makes the choice between different forms of life possible. Value enables humans to decide upon their courses of action.

For instance, take the sensuous and erotic forms of life. In sensuous life, men gage their activities by their notion of nature. Nature is the value to which humans are ascribing which enables them to live out their sensuous lives. In erotic life, however, people live according to the idea of transforming nature. Value is present to them in the notion they have of their activity. This is all fine and dandy; however, the reason for presenting the sensuous and erotic forms of life was to show how the latter (erotic) is a more theoretical form of life than the former (the sensuous). Thus, erotic persons might be aware of the way they impute value to their activities, whereas a sensuous person might not be. When asked what ruled his life, or made it what it was, the sensuous person would conceivably imply, "Nature." (i.e., An example, like this, was given in the Nostalgia section. If a person were asked the reason for being nostalgic, the response would be, "the time"). By this, he would show how he was failing to see how he, as a theoretical being, was placing nature
first (imputing value to it). Instead, he would be citing nature as a cause of his activity, thereby taking the responsibility for his particular way of life from himself.

The recognition of value is therefore necessary before any activity can be undertaken; moreover, it is only through the recognition of value that humans can differentiate one activity from the next. Sensuous persons live sensuously and not erotically because they value nature, rather than thinking of it (nature) as relative to their labour. Therefore, value refers to the basic reason by which actors gage their activities: this reason is their rationality for acting. Value is not motivation, but it can be thought of as what motivates. This is not a behaviorist assumption because no values exist until people think them to be so. Therefore, the recognition of value is a kind of reflexive process.
Among theorists, Max Weber wrote most extensively on the problem of value-free sociology. I consulted his writings on the subject because they provided a wealth of information relative to the ethical problem in sociology. Although Weber is usually thought of as maintaining a value-free position, he could not have denied value and said something following that denial. If Weber's value-free position is accepted as unproblematic, then he can be formulated as a nihilist, one who says nothing. That would be the equivalent of saying that Weber, as a theorist, had done nothing whereas the corpus he has left behind certainly speaks to the contrary. What I am saying, then, is given the definition of value in the previous section (value being what is necessarily prior to any activity), Weber, in that he acted (or theorized) could certainly not have done so and denied value. Without a concept of value which first guides a person in his selection of what he wishes to speak about, there is nothing to speak about. How else could the human act of choice be possible? Furthermore, something enabled Weber to tackle the problem of ethical neutrality, and not some other problem. By this I mean that I understand Weber as a discriminating theorist: thus, he had to have some notion which enabled him to author "The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality", and not, "The Meaning of Garbage." Weber can be understood as placing all value on a value-less stance which is not to say that he is without value. In so far as in his methodological writings, he was trying to make a point, I would contend that Weber can not be heard as value-less.

To better illustrate the point that I am attempting to make, let us take, for an example, the idea of teaching that Weber offers in "Science as a Vocation."
If we are competent in our pursuit, we can force the individual to give himself an account of the ultimate meaning of his conduct.  

Weber's notion of teaching would be impossible without some qualifying notion (value) which gave Weber a sense of the definition and function of a teacher. The relationship of teacher and student is not equal because the teacher and student do not interact with the same purposes. The student is there to learn, and the teacher is there to let the student learn (Heidegger, 1968:15). By this, I do not mean to concretize "teacher" and "student" into roles: the teacher can be thought of as a student, in the same way that a student can also teach.

To return to Weber, and this specific example: in the above quote, he has set up the difference of the relationship between teacher and student. The teacher is the one who gets the student to take account of his own conduct. The teacher is, in one way, beyond the student, in the spirit of why this should be done, i.e. why learning is important. Without a sense of value (that is, without the idea of why "taking account of conduct" is beneficial) the teacher could not impress the student with the need for doing this: he could not make it real. The teacher's task is to communicate to the student the necessity of knowing himself, for what it is worth, and the teacher must instill in the student the desire to undertake such an activity. Therefore, for what has been done with this example, we can see that Weber had certain priorities which molded the nature of his task. These priorities, especially in the definitions of teacher and student, display the underlying values which fostered his work. When Weber's work is analyzed in this way, it is impossible to hear him as value-free.
III. A Socratic Paradigm of Value

Value is a way in which actors make sense of an activity by referring it (the activity) to some notion of its good (or purpose). The sense that the actor has of value, then, makes his activity intelligible. How is this? Let us take a capitalist and use him in an example as an ideal type. The capitalist is usually portrayed as orienting to profit in his life. The capitalist however does not really orient to profit, but to the good which he equates with profit. This is to say that the capitalist is gaging his life by his values. This becomes clearer in the Socratic dialogue the Meno wherein Socrates and Meno are talking.

Socrates: And do you believe that those who suppose that evil things bring advantage understand that they are evil?
Meno: No, that I can't really believe.
Socrates: Isn't it clear then that this class, who don't recognize evils for what they are, don't desire evil, but what they think is good, though, in fact, it is evil; those who through ignorance mistake bad things for good obviously desire the good.

(Plato, 1936:124)

The capitalist, in the afore-mentioned example equates profit to the good it brings him. In this way, he thinks that the good of the thing is the thing: he objectifies the good, instead of realizing that it is his concept of value by which he is making the thing good. By thinking as he does, that the good is the thing, this person has detached himself from the part he plays in authoring the world: he does not see how he is making things (situations) the way they are. Instead he thinks that they come to him from without (i.e. profit brings good).
Any activity is begun with a sense of its value, the idea that the actor has of its good. If a person did not have a sense of the worth of an activity which he was about to undertake, why would he bother doing it. Therefore, the question I am asking is what is the motivation for activity if it is not some idea that the actor has of the activity's worth? Now, this point will be carried still further: the notions that people engage of the value of their activities can be heard as reflective of a primary sense of good. The desire through which people show their concern for the good is an ethical desire: the whole idea of ethics is grounded in the notion that humans seek the good. (Aristotle, 1953:25)
IV. Durkheim and Morality

In this section I want to show how Durkheim's notion of morality differs from the Socratic version. Durkheim would not agree with a definition of the ethical as a kind of general disposition of the actor to which his actions are relative. According to Durkheim, morality was regulatory, composed of a system of rules and founded in notions of authority and the spirit of discipline, (Durkheim, 1961: pp. 24-35). Durkheim applied this system in his formulation of a typical actor, the transient.

Transients...are always suspect. They disdain all customary behavior, they resist limitations...they feel some compulsion to remain free. (Durkheim, 1961:22)

Because morality is so binding for Durkheim, the point I wish to make is that, as a theorist, he is unable to display the transient's ethical desire (or the good of the transient's life). To show the good of the transient's life would be to show the rationale of the transient that grounds his particular style of life. For Durkheim, the transient is "morally incomplete", but my point is that we needn't think of him in this fashion. The good of the transient's life is reflected in his idea of freedom. Freedom for the transient is manifest in his desire not to stay in any place for too long a time. Thus, if the transient were immobilized, he might, conceivably, lose his freedom. Perhaps freedom for the transient is a matter of having a sound body, one capable of movement. His dependence on these physical conditions for his freedom (having a sound body) can be shown to be his unfreedom because the transient's freedom is contingent.

This is an example of theorizing which deepens according to the Socratic paradigm. Through such an analysis, the transient is described,
not judged. Because his behaviors are thought to stem from a rational principle, the transient is understandable as a character.

Again, I want to show how with Durkheim, morality is binding because it is something like the Ten Commandments.

Morality is basically a constant thing...A moral act ought to be the same tomorrow as today.
(Durkheim, 1961:27)

When morality, as defined above, is thought to consist of concrete practical directives which state what a person ought to do, the ethic becomes locatable in some definite behavior. For instance, one ought always not to commit suicide. If we subscribe to this, then we can decide who is a good person, and who is evil according to whether the person in question has committed suicide or not. The ethic, then, is thought to be contained in the concrete (act) of committing or not committing suicide. Such a situation seems to leave the actor without motive. Morality becomes empirical in nature because a good act can be differentiated from a bad act on grounds of the particular act itself. However, if we go by the formulation of value as a kind of general disposition of the actor by which he begins any activity, we can imagine an ethical person who does not follow some definite rules that "prescribe behavior." (Durkheim, 1961:23). For example, the person who commits suicide may be doing it in order to prevent the taking of many more lives. These actions are relative to the prior disposition of an ethical commitment (i.e., to prevent needless suffering).

An example of something like this prior disposition of the actor is presented by Kierkegaard in The Fear and Trembling. He tells the story of Abraham and his son Isaac. Abraham was ordered by God to kill his son, and offer him to God as sacrifice. Kierkegaard offers many different readings of this predicament: Abraham can kill Isaac and be considered a madman, or
else he can disobey God and be revered as a loving father. On the other hand, Abraham could portray himself as a madman to Isaac, making Isaac think that his murder is a purely arbitrary act on the part of his father; hence Isaac's faith in God would not be shaken (i.e., Isaac could easily think God unreasonable for demanding his death, and consequently, no longer consider him a god). Kierkegaard is trying to make one point beyond all this seeming relativity, and that is that although Abraham's actions may appear purely relative and arbitrary, they are not. Whether Abraham kills Isaac or not, the action is finally contingent upon God. God is the prior absolute value to which Abraham's actions are relative. I have told this story here in order to show how morality can be understood in ways other than commandments which regulate behavior, (Durkheim model). An actor could be acting differently in situations, so that his actions would appear arbitrary, but they could conceivably be grounded in an absolute prior value to which he (the actor) was committed despite the differences of his actions.
V. Exchange Value and Modern Usage

First, I wish to run through the accounts in the previous sections of this chapter: Value has been analyzed -- generally -- as a disposition through which the actor gages activity. Value generates forms of life -- what people subscribe to as important will, in a certain sense, be what they are styling their lives after. According to a Socratic paradigm, showing value (what people think of as the good of their activity) is a way to display the rationale of an actor. It is also a portrayal of actors as ethical agents because they are shown to be desiring some good in their lives. Using some passages from Moral Education I showed how Durkheim "fixed" morality into concrete recommendation. The setbacks of this method were then considered: any glimmer of relativity in certain activities might be considered immoral. By using an example from Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, I wanted to show how this needn't be the case.

Now, in this section, I want to concentrate on Marx's notion of exchange value, in order to show how, in the modern usage of "subscribing to values", a similar concept of value is engaged. Although in Capital, Marx differentiated between use value and exchange value, I am mainly concerned with the analysis of exchange value as a kind of distortion of value. In this section I will first present Marx's thoughts on the subject in order to get the sense of exchange value. Following that, some examples of the modern practice of "subscribing to values", will be shown to work similarly to concepts of exchange value.

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1. This analysis of value is open to the possibilities that the rationale may be a rationalization, that the value may be an ideology, and that the form of life may "generate" the value. However, I think that the (general) nature of the discussion here precludes these possibilities in so far as the display of them would be included in specific "forms of life".
In *Capital*, Marx demonstrated the concept of value is tied to the commodity. Value is what remains common to every commodity after human labour is abstracted from it. (Marx, 1973:51). This characteristic of value -- that it is separate from the commodity, but, at the same time, a constant measure in relation to it, makes the exchange of one thing for another possible. Thus, "The exchange values of a given commodity exchange something equal." (Ibid). In capitalistic society, value is a leveler: all things are reduced to it. At the same time that a commodity is something, it is nothing. By this seeming paradox, I mean that a commodity is, in capitalistic society, non-existent unless it has some value attached to it. The value serves to inform people that the commodity is worth something. The commodity is apart from labour, its product; in a certain sense, then, if the product of labour has all value, labour (as an activity) has none. The poverty of capitalistic society lies in its practice of taking value from labour (the activity) and giving it to the commodity (the product of labor).

If value is abstracted from labour, in the sense that there is no good to activity as an activity, then it (value) is wrenched from its human context. Value is not an intrinsic feature of a task, so that in capitalistic society, an activity (labour) is not an end itself. A capitalist works in order to receive value from a product. Therefore, work is a means. Whereas humans are still engaged in seeking a value or a good, they orient to it as if it comes to them from without.

Because "exchange values exchange something equal" all labour seems equivalent to the capitalist. By this I mean that any kind of work, no matter what it is, can be thought of as mercenary: all workers seem to be working for the same thing -- the value that the product of their labour brings them.
Besides showing how value is abstract and after labor, Marx depicted the uninteresting character of the capitalist's work.

The labour that forms the substance of value is homogeneous human labour, the expenditure of a uniform labour power. Each of these units is the same as any other: it has the character of the average labor power of society that it requires for producing a commodity: No more time than is needed on the average.

(Marx, 1974:46)

The capitalist's work is uninteresting because, in order to procure value, all labour is amassed into a labour force and made part of an average. The average stands beyond the amassed labour force, and takes the value from labour, appropriating it (value) to itself (the average).

The average makes meaningful work impossible because, as Marx says, "No more time is needed (for any task) than on the average." The quality of labour is decreased in order to procure value. By having to work this way, a person can not hope to achieve anything more than the average through his work. For the capitalist, then, value is not a part of his labor; it is what he is working for. Thus, value is distinct from labour whereas we can imagine other forms of life, where value is an integral feature of an activity.
To Recount:

In capitalistic society, value is a kind of leveler to which all things become equivalent. The product of labour is more important than the process because the product procures value. The process is simply amalgamated into an "average" so that equivalent values (exchange values) will be accessible to it (labour). Because all labour needs only to be as good as the average, there is no sense, in capitalistic society, of one task being more important than the other. If all tasks are thought of as the same and can be measured by standard exchange values, then work is uninteresting and unexpressive for the capitalist.

Now, in this section, I want to show how the modern practice of "subscribing to values" employs a usage similar to that of exchange value.

"Subscribing to values" is the practice of comparing nature, phenomena, events, etc., to a pre-existent standard. The standard (or value) is distinct both from nature and the person who uses it; however the standard enables the speaker to secure nature. Nature is secured through evaluation because an evaluation presupposes knowledge of the nature of the thing being evaluated. A thing that is secured is a thing that is thought of as being "known". Once a thing is known (in the sense of evaluated) it can be dispensed with. The speaker (the person evaluating) can leave that particular phenomenon and go on to evaluate another. The practice of "subscribing to values" resembles an exchange in this way: by referring any number of things to the pre-existent standard a person can

1. "To evaluate is to make reference to standard and community by arguing for a necessary connection between object and decision of evaluation; the necessary connection makes reference to one of positivism's natural laws." (McLuagh et al., 1974:77)
leave one thing behind and take up, just as easily, with another. Moreover, through use of the standard, different phenomena can be compared with each other. What makes for this exchange of phenomena, I think, is a situation similar to exchange among capitalists: that is, the actual distance of the standard (value) from both the phenomenon and the speaker. It is an idea of the essent which is removed and separate from the thing in which it appears. Value is essential to the capitalist. By their very natures, value, the evaluating subject, and the (evaluated) phenomenon are distinct. This distinction is carried a step further so that they (the three) are absolutely separated; they (value and the phenomenon) are made into "things" and people relate to them as products. The products are there simply for the taking; the consumer (the evaluating subject) does the taking. Labour is the act of applying a standard to a thing; choice is based upon the most beneficial combination of value and product. This is not a very vital way of life because all it assumes is a human adaptation of things to some pre-existing values. All humans have to do is match up the values to the things; it is rather mechanistic. This schema should become clearer in the following example:

A humanist adopts certain "humanistic" values which are somehow available to him; therefore, anything "inhuman" is not thought of too highly (by the humanist). A functionalist is "off the wall" (according to the humanist) because the functionalist stresses systems first, people second. Once the humanist learns what functionalists usually do, the humanist is (more or less) finished with them. A functionalist, who the humanist had not yet encountered, could, nonetheless, be dismissed by the humanist because the humanist reasons that he knows what functionalists do (i.e. garbage).1

1. Take me for an example. For reasons like this I never bothered (or felt the urge) to read Talcott Parsons,
Values are, in this sense, very accessible: they are available to anyone who wishes to use them; they come from a source other than the person. It is not as if a person, living this way, has anything to think out for himself. The standards, which come from without, tell one how and what to think; they are recommendations for a method. This involves a certain surrender of the person's authority. A person who adopts a system of values, in this fashion, gives himself over to them, and is moulded by them accordingly.

1. It is almost as if we know beforehand what the SDS will say about Banfield, or how certain feminists will react to Nietzsche.

2. By authority, I mean a person's responsibility as a speaking and thinking being.

3. Strangely enough, this modern usage resonates back to the Durkheimian society of social facts and currents depicted earlier.
To Recount:

One modern usage of value has been shown to be similar to value in capitalistic society. Values are standards which people use to judge the worth of particular phenomenon. It is through value that phenomena can be compared and exchanged. This is the case in modern usage and capitalistic society because value is essentially abstract in character: it is separate from activity rather than being an integral part of it. In the modern practice of "subscribing to values", actors adopt a system of pre-existent values which seem to make their decisions for them. Values speak for people (in the way that accusations of "rhetoric" and "slogans" usually refer to). But, if values are speaking for people then it follows that the people are not too involved in what they are doing; they are like capitalists only utilizing their resources in an average sort of way.
VI. On Facts and Value Judgments

This section is an indexical analysis of facts and value judgments. By this I mean that I will be analyzing them as types of speeches (grammatical constructions) which are invoked in particular contexts. I wish to examine those contexts. Although I refer to Max Weber's writings on the subject in this section, I deviate from his discussion. I do not purport to be giving an accurate account of Weber's thoughts. Many think Weber's argument is rooted in a particular political context, the situation of the German university at the time. I do not think the problem of facts and value judgments is confined to that one context; the debate conjures up other, broader issues. In this section I will be both describing facts and value judgments, and formulating some implications of the argument. Although I am using some of Weber's works (among others), I wish to be heard independently of them.
VII. Facts: The Definite Character of Their Usage

The word, fact, is derived from the past participle of the Latin verb, facere, to make or do, (Webster: 1970:501). A fact is rooted in a mode of finality. It (a fact) is understood as something that has been done or accomplished in the world; a fact is something that is supposed to be evident and complete. It is in a certain sense without history because when a fact is cited, it is done so in the mode of finality: we are told a fact without having to know how it came to be so. This is to say that the existence of a fact is usually unproblematic because the fact, for all practical purposes, refers to something that is definitely known. The fact is grounded at a physical level, in appearance; something can be designated a fact because "it is."3

The pervading "isness" of the facts can be heard in the following quote, from Max Weber:

The primary task of a useful teacher is to teach his student to recognize facts -- I mean facts that are inconvenient for their party opinions. (Weber, 1946:147)

Weber's usage of the facts, here, depends upon the notion that facts exist, no matter what people happen to think about them. They (the facts) can not be wished or argued away. Although an undesirable situation may exist, if it is a fact, it is, whether it is desirable or not. It

1. Facts are grammatical constructions: they are depicted as a kind of language which accounts for nature, phenomena, and events in the world. This usage is developed more precisely later.
2. I am not speaking of a physical genesis, the evolution of how the particular phenomenon that the fact cites came to be, but how the idea of the fact as fact was generated.
3. Wittgenstein noted this, which may be addressed to the problem of the "isness" of the facts: "From its seeming to me -- or to everyone -- to be so, it doesn't follow that it is so." (1969:26). Rather than saying that the facts are, then, I would prefer to say that the facts denote what seems to be so to everyone,
follows then, that, if it is a fact, it must be acknowledged. From the manner of their usage, then, facts are thought to form a reality independent of humans: they exist prior to people. It is up to people to unearth and recognize the facts.  

The definite character of the facts seems to account for the particular coercion implicit to the use of the facts as a grammar. How are the facts coercive? In our everyday lives, we are often called upon to recognize the facts "for what they are." Although a person may be free to argue the truth value of a particular fact, the idea of the facts as "facts" is not challenged. Therefore, a person is compelled to speak (use the grammar of) the facts in a certain way which is prescribed by the definition of the fact. Because the fact notes a definite event, facts are used in a context of certainty. Therefore, facts make reference to the conception that there are certain things which are undeniable. Once something has been designated a fact, it is not to be doubted: a fact is exempt from inquiry. In a form of life which values the facts, the facts are a standard in conversation which have to be maintained. (Think of the frustration of trying to argue a point with someone who insists, "This is a fact; you can't deny it.").

A fact is a speech that has no author; however, this is reflective merely of its usage. There would be no facts without a selection on the

1. Later on in this chapter I will show how this is not necessarily the case.  
2. Facts may be thought of as the results of inquiry, but that is a particular type of inquiry -- inquiry which is after the facts. By making reference to inquiry here I mean it as a reflection that is outside the facts. Such an inquiry might consider the question, "How is it that the facts are conclusive?" For an example of this see Wittgenstein, On Certainty.
part of a man in his acknowledging, pointing to, and use of the facts. Therefore, the use of the facts is not merely a matter of humans recognizing the facts: because they (the facts) are speeches, they are authored by men. The recognition of the facts is really a selection. In this way, the facts are a kind of two-fold phenomenon: when using the facts, humans do the taking notice of what they have noticed. Through the facts, humans take notice of phenomenon, nature, events in the world. Facts, then, are the notings of nature's accomplishments. Because they are the notings of nature's accomplishments, the facts exist contingently: they are dependent upon a speaker, the person who chooses to think, "These are the facts" of a particular phenomenon at a given moment. This is the irony of the facts. For, while the facts are usually cited as determinants of the "objective reality" of the world, by recalling that they are grammatical constructions which are authored by people, they have been shown to be what some would consider "subjective" in nature. The facts depend upon the decision of the actor who voices them for their existence. They are a matter of his judgment and said under his domain.

1. Weber makes note of this point when he discusses how the social sciences get their subject matter: "But the problems of the social sciences are selected by value-relevance of the phenomena treated ... It should only be recalled that the expression "relevance to values" refers simply to the philosophical interpretation of that specifically scientific 'Interest' which determines the selection of a given subject matter and the problems of an empirical analysis." (1949:pp. 21-22) Thus, sociology's subject matter (the facts) is a selection on the part of those who have scientific interests.

2. This argument is not meant to reduce the facts to solipsistic speeches, i.e., the private speeches of private individuals, which are unintelligible to others. Quite to the contrary, because they have a certain usage, all members conceivably agree upon this usage of the facts. Schutz defined this practice of agreement as Intersubjectivity. "Yet, the world of my daily life is by no means my private world, but is from the outside an intersubjective one, shared with my fellow-men, experienced and interpreted by others; in brief, it is a world common to all of us." (1971:312)
The point was made earlier that the facts are grammatical constructions, and therefore, human speeches. The facts are not equivalent to nature. Although an animal lives in nature, it can not know the facts. However, the fine difference between nature and the facts may be blurred because the authorship of the facts is glossed over. By this I mean that facts are usually considered determinant of an objective reality more than they are thought to be a particular kind of speech. Thus, the facts may become synonymous with nature in their usage. For instance, the work of the naturalist, Henry David Thoreau is described in this way:

Usually he carried a notebook and a little "spy-glass", his purpose being as he said, "to see what I have caught in my traps which I set for facts."

(Bode, 1967:12)

In the aforementioned example, Thoreau does not differentiate between what he "sets his traps for," nature or the facts. The facts are representative of the happenings that he will spot within the context of nature; the facts, then, seem to be a way in which humans capture nature.
VIII. The Facts and Sensuousness

Facts may underlie a sensuous form of life. How is this? First of all, the facts are useful to a sensuous course of action, such as nostalgia. If nostalgia is defined as the re-creation of the past, then the facts are an aid to the technical work of re-creating the past. The facts preserve the features of life in the past; they (the facts) are the records of any happening. For instance, in the current wave of nostalgic films, there is a concern for accuracy on the part of the filmmakers. In American Graffiti, the soundtrack was "authentic": the real songs of real rock n'roll artists were used. The facts of that time, were what the researchers needed in order to know all the songs that were popular then. Having the "real thing" is an important part of a nostalgic film; in this way, there is a guarantee that the setting will remind people of the past. The "real things" are available to people through the facts which only need to be researched.

Moreover, in sensuous life, nature is emphasized as a kind of perfect resource. The facts, on the other hand, are used by people to capture nature. A sensuous person would think it a fact that nature is. At the same time that he values nature, then, he is giving credence to the truth value of the facts. The two (nature and the facts) seem almost to go together hand-in-hand. Facts are, like nature, certain. Through a fact, the evident is stated; the facts preserve nature in a kind of tradition for those who seek recourse to nature.

In sensuous life, nature is perfect because it provides for itself, its wonders can not be matched by men, etc. Because of their similarity to nature, facts are like perfect speeches; anything that isn't a fact might,
in certain circles, be frowned upon or considered unimportant. For instance, this is a pervading theme in some sociological literature; this sentiment is expressed in some of Weber's methodological writings: the facts are essential to science in a way that value judgments are not.¹ Weber says that although the choice between God and the Devil should be made (a value judgment), it should not be done in the lecture hall. (Weber, 1949:16). The lecture hall is the place for serious learning, i.e., for recognizing the facts.

¹ Value judgments will be developed more rigorously later on; however I am using Weber's definition of a value judgment as "a practical evaluation of the unsatisfactory or satisfactory character of phenomena to our influence." (1949:1)
IX. The Ambiguity of Value-Free Science

In this section, I want to develop a form of life which may be peculiar to science, but does not speak for the discipline of science in general. This "type of science" refers to a positivism which underlies some scientific pursuits in so far as "the facts" are a language essential to science. By this I mean that if the facts are being used -- true to their use --, then they must also be effecting the situations in which they are used. Since facts are a kind of language which presupposes certainty, they shape positivistic courses of action. Thus, a form of life based upon a principle of certainty, may be so because it makes the facts its own special language.

Although I will be referring to some of Weber's writings because he does express some positivistic principles, my comments are not meant to be representative of Max Weber. Throughout the course of his career, Weber employed innumerable concepts which aided his formulation of science. Although the ones I wish to analyze may have helped him to define science, they do not form the totality of science. Therefore, in the section that follows, I am investigating a miniscule part of the pursuit called science.

In the essay, "Science as a Vocation", Weber describes a non-evaluating science:

Science does not give an answer to the only question important for us, what shall we do, and how shall we live? (1949:143)

Science, in the sense that it is non-evaluating, is unreflexive: if no evaluation occurs within science, the strict study of the facts, then a person engaged in science has no sense of what he was doing in a political
way. By this I mean that this person would have knowledge of the particular task in which he was engaged, but he would be unable to see the implications of that task in the over-all context of his life. It is not an intrinsic feature of science that the good or evil of the practice is considered within the course of action called science. Although one could argue that a person does reflect when he makes value judgments, I would contend that the practice of evaluating is "unscientific" by some standards, and therefore, not a part of science. Thus, if a private individual were reflexive in his scientific pursuits, it would be his decision to be so, and not necessarily something whose importance was communicated to him in the laboratory.

The problem of value-free science has its origin in a deeper issue, the separation of science from politics. The separation of science and politics divides the professional being from the personal being, and they are supposedly the same person! It is not unlike a bureaucratic practice.1 In a society where specialization is valued in this way, a person involved in both pursuits (science and politics) is thought to lead two different lives. This is absurd because it discounts self as the locus point of every activity, the self that is common to every activity. Instead, humans have different selves which are defined by their different activities.

Weber, however, informs us that this separation of science from politics was not always the case:

And this (roughly, the practice of science) in turn seemed to open the way for knowing and for teaching how to act rightly in life, and above all, how to act as a citizen of the state; for this question was everything to the Hellenic man whose thinking was political throughout.

(1946:141)

1. Weber noted: "...In general bureaucracy segregates official activity as something distinct from the sphere of private life." (1946:197)
Science was not something the Greek did outside and distinct from the rest of his life; it was through science that one learned how to live well. The corpus of scientific knowledge was then probably very different from what it appears to be today. Science, most likely, was not just limited to the language of the facts. It seems a characteristic of the facts that a knowledge based on them (the facts) alone would refer to a reality apart from men, objective reality. Knowledge based on the facts alone could not touch the core of a person's life unless he paused himself to reflect upon it (knowledge) and somehow integrate it into his life.

Science, in the Greek sense, would harbour evaluating questions rather than put them off: analyzing the good or evil of practices auspiced under science would be an intrinsic feature of science itself, the duty of an individual. Weber makes this statement (of the difference of science for the Greeks) in the context of a historical argument, to show how science had changed through the ages. Science is relative to its use: it (science) is what people make of it. If science is relative to its use, then there is no one meaning of science that is maintained despite its different uses. I don't mean that all scientific study should look the same throughout the ages, but I do mean that science should have a common purpose which would endure through time, and which would be a part of every scientific knowledge seems ambiguous to us today: moderns are constantly worrying about how new discoveries will be used. For instance, nuclear power may be

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1. The Socratic dialogues and other writings of Plato are examples of ancient science; both Simmel and Weber make this point in different articles. It is interesting to note the shift in usage; today, the writings of Plato are considered philosophy.
2. Science peculiarly divides the activity of knowing and reflecting whereas it is possible to think of them as similar pursuits.
harmful or beneficial to life, depending upon its use. Strangely enough, this decision is out of the hands of scientists and into the hands of political leaders. The split between science and politics is evident in this example: science, which is value-free can not decide; instead it gives its product to those who "subscribe to values" (the politicians), and lets them decide what to do with it.

The ambiguity of scientific knowledge also holds for certain sociological endeavors. Take, for example, the article, "The Positive Functions of Poverty" by Herbert J. Gans. In the abstract of this article, Gans explains:

Mertonian functional analysis is applied to explain the persistence of poverty, and fifteen functions which poverty and the poor perform for the rest of American society, particularly the affluent, are identified and described. Functional alternatives ... are selected, but the most important alternatives are ... dysfunctional for the affluent since they require some redistribution of income and power. (AJS, Vol. 78, 2:275)

Gans describes some of the functions of poverty:

First, the existence of poverty makes sure that "dirty work" is done...

Second, the poor subsidize, directly and indirectly many activities that benefit the affluent...

Fourth, the poor buy goods which others do not want and thus prolong their economic usefulness, such as day old bread, fruits and vegetables which would otherwise been thrown out, etc. (Gans, op. cit., pp. 278-79)

This article is like nuclear energy because its original purpose is so highly ambiguous, when it is given to people as a product, it can be used for any purpose. Its point (the purpose that organizes the article) is purely relative: it can be read as a joke, as an indictment against the system, or as a rationalisation for the maintenance of poverty. Gans states
that the analysis in the article is neutral. (Op. cit., 287). Thereupon, he denies that the article appears in any particular context, as if it were written with no intention on his part. Through this denial, then, the author does not assume responsibility for his work: responsibility is delegated to the reader, because the reader is the one who must give it (the article) a context, by making something out of it (or by deciding upon a course of action). In an instance such as this, the sociologist observes certain features of life, but removes himself from the issues that these features entail. In one sense, he talks about life, while denying human purpose, the ability to say something, to take a stand in life.
X. The Problem of the Monster

The problem of the monster is the next logical step which follows the ambiguity of ethically neutral science. In this section, I will analyze the novel, *Frankenstein*, for the resemblance it bears to some positivistic pursuits in science. I will be drawing upon the work of Stephen Crafts, which, in some ways is relevant to this theme.

The unreflexivity of certain scientific practices is portrayed by Mary Shelley in the novel, *Frankenstein*. The monster, Frankenstein, is the embodiment and result of non-evaluating science. The novel, in that it focuses upon the monster as an implication of the value-free scientist, restores the value-free scientist to a political context. The import of *Frankenstein* is: a person's whole education can not consist of science alone; there must also be a political education which can guide the scientist in his pursuits.

Victor Frankenstein, the scientist, wished to pursue nature to her hiding place, to discover the cause of life (Shelley, 1965:53). Frankenstein supposed that the mysteries of life could be unveiled. In fact, he mentions that he had no reservation when it came to exploring these mysteries of life, with which others, out of respect or superstition, would not dare tamper (Shelley, 1965:50). The novel portrays the difference in the character of Frankenstein as he moves from being a student (one who searches) to becoming god-like (one who knows). Frankenstein learns the supreme secret of nature; he learns the cause of life. But, knowing the cause of life is not sufficient, Frankenstein must be a god: he succeeds in giving life to an inanimate form.

Frankenstein's knowledge is a knowledge based on the facts. It is
absolute, in the sense that facts are thought to give truths, bits of certain information. Frankenstein seeks to dominate nature (Crafts: 97).

How is it that a knowledge based on the facts may lead a person to domination? Through the facts, people capture nature, in so far as the facts are a language which note nature's accomplishments. When enough facts are compiled about nature, then nature will be contained through the facts. Nature is then in hand, and, when nature is in hand, domination is possible. (Crafts: 97). Domination is possible because people who possess absolute knowledge of nature, have risen above nature. Knowing every fact of nature, they can exert their influence upon nature because they are now other than nature: they have stepped beyond nature.

In one way, Dr. Frankenstein achieved the positivistic principle which Max Weber spoke of in "Science as a Vocation":

> It (the increasing intellectualisation and rationalisation) means ...that principally there are no mysterious, incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted...

(1946: 139)

This is a principle which perhaps guides and motivates certain positivistic courses of action within science. Of course, it is an impossible task because it suggests the infinite; people, who are mortal, are incapable of capturing the infinite nature of the universe. Therefore, it is fitting that this principle should become a reality in a piece of fiction such as Frankenstein; however, in so far as the novel gives an account of what could happen if the universe were mastered by calculation, it can be read as telling us something about wisdom of this principle.

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1. I would note, perhaps unlike a positivist that nature is more than mere facts; nature evades us with the mystery of life.
2. This is an infinite task, therefore impossible. It is not stated here as fact, but as conjecture.
Stephen Crafts, in the article "Frankenstein: Camp Curiosity or Premonition?" concentrates upon the importance of Frankenstein as a reminder of the unwisdom of certain scientific principles. In this article, he cites Herbert Read in order to differentiate between the two types of knowledge which are contrasted in Frankenstein.

Intellect begins with the observation of nature, proceeds to memorize and classify the facts thus observed, and by logical deduction builds up the edifice of knowledge properly called science. Sensibility, on the other hand, is a direct and particular reaction to the separate and individual nature of things.

(Read quoted in Crafts: 96)

Intellect is knowledge based on the facts, which, because it is so external, remains separate from a person. The facts are an "objective language" which need not --- consciously --- involve a person in their creation; thus, a knowledge such as intellect does not demand a human response from a person. Intellect is a body of knowledge, possible by accumulation of the facts and memorisation. I said that intellect does not demand a human response -- such as reflection -- because in order to know (intellectually) one need only commit the facts to memory. Knowledge based on accumulation of the facts does not include analysis of the facts (for their meaning) as an intrinsic feature of it. Intellect's use of the facts returns us to the idea that facts capture nature; from this, domination is a possible course of action.

Sensibility, on the other hand, preserves the mysterious quality of the nature of things: it can be likened to an erotic activity. Phenomena are dealt with in a human way. By this I mean that a person is
resourceful enough to react to something, mindful of its purpose. For instance, the ground of the rock's existence is also the ground of human existence. Both are. The person who understands this uses the materials that are offered him by the sensuous world accordingly; that is, with a mind not to violate those materials.¹ A person who knew sensibility would not want to dominate a thing by taking its nature from it. Instead, he would bring himself to the nature of this thing, wishing to learn from it; a learning that would conceivably enrich the self, and could not be separated from the whole of life. This person can not remove himself from his knowledge because sensibility is a reaction: it demands that humans restore the rationality, the immanent purpose to things by their awareness and display of it.²

Frankenstein is the drama between intellect and sensibility. Frankenstein is the scientist, the intellect, who through his knowledge destroys sensibility, the human response to the world (Crafts:97). The novel shows that although Frankenstein pursued his work with a strange passion, he was detached from it. Frankenstein had no sense of his work until he beheld the monster, the outcome of his labor. Its hideousness is a complete and utter surprise to him. Frankenstein, while pursuing a certain course of action, was at the same time, ignorant of its implications. He had separated his work from his life. This separation of life from work remained peculiar to him, because, as the story deposes: Frankenstein

¹. Something like what I am speaking about has been expressed by Georg Simmel (1971:236): "The world view of the Greek was based on the idea of being, of a unified real cosmos, the self-contained plastic representation of which he revered as divine. Even where his thinking led to the universal principles of movement, of relativity, of dualism, still the ultimate form and the ultimate yearning of his intellectual world view was determined by the immutable all encompassing, self-sufficient, and intelligible Being."

². Henry David Thoreau, both a naturalist and a poet, is one person who succeeded in doing this.
comes to regard the monster as the source of his problems. Thus, he is ignorant to a point; he fails to see his place in the turn of events, because he exempts himself from his actions. As a character, Frankenstein is neutral to the drama: he is a one-sided being who is totally apolitical.

Crafts explains it in this way:

A further irony lies in the common confusion of creator and the creature, for it was Victor Frankenstein who created a monster. The figure of horror has been projected by man to a product, a process repeated from the novel. It is Frankenstein who deserts his monster and thus brings about the rampage that is synonymous with the figure of the monster. A similar tendency exists today in the one-dimensional bias to distinguish between subject and object in the way that value-free inquiry establishes evasion of responsibility as technological modus operandi.

(Crafts: 96)

Victor Frankenstein was unreflective in his work because he failed to make his activity an ethical topic. That is, he failed to look at his activity in the context of its good or purpose. His work was a means, but to what end? This was something he did not foresee until the end (the monster) was upon him. Thus, Frankenstein's activity was irresponsible: even when the holocaust of the monster was upon him, he continued to evade responsibility for his acts, by thinking of it as the monster's fault.

Crafts sees this predicament, the confusion of purpose, analogous to value-free inquiry. The monster is a kind of objective reality in which people tinker, but, in the end, abandon. Thus, the actor views himself as
an individual subject who works upon an object that is given; both subject
and object are thought to be given in such a way that existence is not
problematic. A person need not be responsible for (responsive to) nature,
because it always existed, and he had no role in bringing it about. The
ethically neutral person can wander through life as a dilettante; in one
way, he has no stake in what he does. Moreover, the evasion of responsibility
in some scientific pursuits may generate a mania of activity. Ethical
neutrality can be understood as the failure to see a limit to activity;
activity is limitless because without a guiding sense of value, discrimination
is impossible. Because of its lack of discrimination, value-free science
resembles childhood. A child is an undisciplined member. The child is
undisciplined because, through his innocence (lack of experience) he has
no faculty with which to judge the difference of things. To the child,
everything looks the same; anything will be fair game. A scientist, such
as Frankenstein, then shows us his innocence when he undertakes a course
of action in which anything is possible: it isn't the possibility that's
important, as much as the object is (the anything). Like a child, he seeks
a toy.
XI. On Value Judgments

In this section I want to analyze value judgments in a way similar to the analysis of the facts in the preceding section. I will be drawing upon Weber's writings in order to make reference to the definition and different usages of value judgments. By conducting an indexical analysis I want to show how value judgments are types of speeches that follow -- and complement the facts.

A value judgment is in Weber's terms: "a practical evaluation of the satisfactory or unsatisfactory character of phenomena subject to our influence." (1949:1). A value judgment is a statement that is made after phenomena have been designated phenomena; presumably, after scientific method has yielded the facts. The value judgment follows facts and description; it presupposes them, but it does not describe. A value judgment evaluates: when a value judgment is made, a feature of nature is isolated, rated by some standard, and judged accordingly. ¹

A value judgment is not a descriptive speech -- it does not purport to capture or report upon nature. However, the usage of the value judgment tells us something about the nature of description: description does not speak in the way that a value judgment does. In so far as a description is a reproduction of nature, it gives an idealized version of nature to man, and nothing else. It is not the place of description to offer an opinion; the facts are statements of nature -- they say nothing about nature. That is, the facts offer us no insight but to tell us what is. The facts do not speak in the way that value judgments do: value

¹This formulation resembles the practice of "subscribing to values" which was formulated in the previous section of this chapter. However, the point of interest in that discussion was the notion of value as a pre-existent standard, and not the practice of making value judgments.
judgments are the comments after nature.

Value judgments are important in this respect: they give humans back their voice. Value judgments give humans a voice over nature in that, by making a value judgment, a person has something to say about nature. Value judgments restore a person to his place in the world, as a speaker. When a person speaks a value judgment, he expresses himself: the activity shows us that he is thinking something about something. The person who speaks value judgments is not silenced by nature; that is, he is not orienting to the facts as the only possible way of speaking in the world. Nature can silence man in this way: if nature is thought of as perfect, then the facts will be valued. The facts will become what is spoken. This does not alter the situation, however, that as a form of speech, a value judgment has a kind of lowly status. A value judgment is subordinate to nature, to scientific work. A value judgment is possible only after there is something concrete to talk about. But, a value judgment is demeaned. A value judgment is not considered as important as the facts are. Where science's ideal is to show the facts, then value judgments are not considered an essential part of labor: they are extraneous to it. Value judgments are left as a personal decision of the actor; they are not fundamental to scientific work.

What is the rationality behind this subordination of value judgments? If nature is thought of as perfect,¹ then facts will be valued because they duplicate nature. Humans need not have anything to say about perfection--because what can be said about perfection? The concept of perfection

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¹. This was depicted earlier as the rationale of sensuous life.
excludes from it any rehabilitative attempts: perfection can be made no better than it is. If the facts are thought of as speeches that begin to approach this perfection, then any other speech will be superfluous in this world because there is no need for it. A value judgment may appear insignificant in the light of perfection (perfect speeches, facts). For instance, think of a no-nonsense type of job like police work. A detective will question people as to what they saw, what happened; he wants the facts. He is not really interested in hearing what they have to say about the state of affairs. The detective doesn't need intervention between himself and the facts: he seeks a direct path to the facts with nothing interfering.

My point through all this is that the very idea of a value judgment reflects humanity. A value judgment can be heard as a reminder that it is important to speak in a way that does more than describe. Description, in that it is the capturing and subsequent report of nature is nothing itself; it does not exhibit a character other than nature. When a person makes a value judgment, he displays that he is not nature because he has something to say about nature. This person has some resources by which to evaluate nature, and therefore, when he makes a value judgment shows the difference between nature and himself.

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1. This argument presupposes a certain type of cop, like Joe Friday in Dragnet who says, "Just the facts, ma'm", to a woman who wants to tell him more, wants to tell him what she thinks. That's his way of telling her to shut up, that he doesn't want to hear it; he doesn't want to hear anything but the facts. On the other hand, Columbo is different, a more playful cop. Columbo knows usage -- he is quite willing to hear an opinion because he has the notion that anything could be a clue; even a value judgment could be a possible fact. He is not, like Joe Friday, just rooted to the ostensive definition.
XII. The Division and Completion of Facts and Value Judgments

Value judgments evaluate nature in a way that secures the division between man and nature. To some extent, a person must be thinking that nature is in hand in order to make a value judgment. How is nature in hand? Nature is captured through the facts; value judgments presuppose this. That is, they more or less leave the existence of the facts unproblematic, proceed with the existence of the facts and judge them according to their desirability. The facts lead the way into value judgments.¹ A phenomenon must be known before it can be judged; in this respect, one who makes value judgments takes a positive course of action in that he must assume an attitude of certainty toward the phenomena in order to judge it. In so far as a value judgment is a pronouncement upon a phenomenon, it may signal the end of inquiry toward that phenomenon. Thus, through value judgments one orients to a world which is immediately given. Value judgments signal a parting with phenomena, rather than the practice of addressing the origins of phenomena — which occurs in phenomenology or analysis.²

In the sense that value judgments perpetrate a division between man and nature, they are not erotic. As stated earlier, value judgments more or less let nature stand as it is: they add to nature by attaching a comment to it. To say that I like or dislike something does not necessarily mean that I have done anything with it (i.e., that I have thought about it.) Because value judgments are pronouncements (decisions or conclusions about nature), they do not include a display of their genesis. Thus, they do not

¹. I say this now as a technical feature of their usage; later I will show how facts call for value judgments in order to create a complete language.
². For an example of this, see the section on Nostalgia. Nostalgia is drawn out in a way to show its dynamics. This is different from a value judgment of nostalgia which would simply be to say, "I don't like nostalgia."
ordinarily show or make reference to the labour which was taken to produce them.

Whereas value judgments leave nature as it is, we can see a direct contrast to this in erotic life. An erotic activity, in so far as it puts nature to use, moves it (nature): there is a relationship there, the dynamics of which resist objectification. Because it is a process, erotic activity defies a systematic approach: it can not be captured by a causal law. In erotic life, actors live with the mystery of nature -- nature which is transformed through activity. Therefore, nature is not thought of as objectified -- that is, something that humans can never hope to touch because it is absolutely separate. Erotic people make nature lively; in one way, nature is as good as dead until they notice it. ¹

Not only do facts and value judgments perpetrate a division between man and nature, but as types of speeches their use is contingent upon a division of labour in language. Facts cite what is, while value judgments say what is or is not desirable about what is. Therefore, each one has a different function, a job to do within language. This usage is stressed in Max Weber's writings on methodology: he argued primarily for the distinction to be made between facts and value judgments. That is, facts should not be confused with value judgments and vice-versa (Weber, 1949:2)

Facts and value judgments are the fundamental grammars of a world that does science. They compose a "complete language" within this world in so far as they each cover half of a whole; that is, the facts cite the objective, and value judgments speak subjectively. ² Because reality is based

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¹. In the spirit of this, Thoreau wrote: "It takes a man to make a room silent." (1961:7)
². See McHugh et al, 1974 pp. 9-10 on the difference between complete and incomplete versions of work (and language).
on the facts, there is a need (in this world) for opinion, that which enables people to attend to reality, outside of those activities which are auspiced by science. Facts and value-judgments, then, presuppose a world that is both objective and personal. An objective course of action is pursued in science; the remnants (activities which are not scientific) fall within subjectivity, and value judgments cover the subjective speaking.

In this way, I wish to stress the similarity of facts and value judgments rather than their difference. In so far as they emanate from the same world view, facts and value judgments can be understood as complements of each other. The facts call for value judgments in so far as the object presupposes a subject which predicates it; conversely, the subject which predicates needs something to predicate, an object.  

1. We saw how these categories stick, in sensuous life, albeit differently. Nature is the subject to sensuous people — it predicates them. Since they want to be like nature, they fashion themselves after nature; they are objects of nature. Sensuous life is really a very primitive step, Humans take another step with science (modern technology). Scientific method is a way to gain control of nature; humans are no longer objects, but subjects. They make nature what it is; now nature is the object.
XIII. The Personality and Value Judgments

In this section I want to analyze the use of value judgments in the context of the personality. This is an aspect of value judgments to which Weber alludes in "The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality"; however it is not fully developed. I want to develop the problem of personality and value judgments here in a way that Weber did not. Weber is read as objecting to the use of value judgments in the classroom because the teacher who made value judgments would be retarding the level of scientific inquiry, and would also be impressing inexperienced students with his "personal opinions". In other words, this would contribute to the decline of scholarship.

I think that Weber's objection to the use of value judgments can be read as evocative of some issues other than the specific classroom situation. In this section the analysis of value judgments will be developed in these ways:

1. The movement of the value judgment from the ethical to the personal sphere.
2. The superficial character of the personality and charisma.
3. The value judgment oriented to as a possession.
4. The value judgment as a token of uniqueness and the fodder of pluralism.

Weber argued against the superficial nature of some value judgments, those which had become "mere personal opinion." Although the value judgment is perhaps meant to be a responsible judgment on the part of a person who, after much thought and through the process of mediation with a value (here, in the sense of a resource), decides upon a particular course of action, this sense of it is forgotten. The value judgment, like the one that is
engraved in the "rights of the teacher's personality" (Weber, 1949;4), becomes a matter of mere caprice. The mere fact that a value judgment is spoken by a particular speaker is enough justification for its being spoken. In this way, the ground of the value judgment shifts. Originally, the value judgment refers to a process of deliberation between a human and the sense of value, a resource other than himself. Perhaps an illustration will better get the point across:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{sense of value} & \text{I} & \text{choice} \\
\hline
\text{ground of value judgment} & & \\
\end{array}
\]

However, when the value judgment becomes a matter of the personality, the process behind it resembles something like this:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{I} & \text{choice} & \\
\hline
\text{ground of value judgment} & & \\
\end{array}
\]

The only ground of the value judgment depicted in the last illustration is "I". The original sense of value is dissolved into the ego so that "I" is the supreme value. The power of the ethic (or value) to speak to something enduring in man is obliterated. Instead, the value judgment is representative now only of its speaker who fancies himself the source of his speech.

The personality is the sanctuary of the value judgment: as long as the value judgment is a token of the personality, it is a kind of protected speech. Weber points this out in the following statement,

One cannot, because it is a value judgment, refute this point of view.¹ (1949;4)

¹. Some read Weber as saying this in the sense that arguing a value judgment is like trying to argue with someone about religion or politics. It is impossible because value judgments can not be reflected upon. I am trying to find out why this is so.
Why is the value judgment irrefutable? Because personality can not be violated. Personality is something like the right of a person to be a person, the right to himself. The personality is where a person finds his experience as a being. If the value judgment is thought to be grounded in the personality, to challenge it is bad taste. It is bad taste in this sense; if the value judgment is read personally, then a challenge to it will be read as a personal assault. To refute a value judgment is to put into question a person's right to his personhood. To think of a value judgment as irrefutable is a way to remedy this problem: if value judgments are not challenged, no one's personhood is being threatened. Here we find the origin of polite society; the development is such that value judgments are exempt from critique. This is like an agreement among capitalists not to steal (outright, at least). It's not that they (capitalists) don't want to be greedy, but precisely that possession is the binding force of their lives, which makes them honour it as they do when they agree not to steal.

What is revolting about this development of personality is its superficial character. It echoes Weber's concept of charisma.  

The natural leaders have been holders of specific gifts of body and spirit; and these gifts have been believed to be supernatural, not accessible to everybody,  

(1946:245)

The personality is a charismatic figure, a natural. It is almost as if his magnetism is explained by nature; which is to say that it really cannot be explained, there is not logic to it. Instead, nature is cited as a cause which glosses the problem because it implies that charisma is

1. Although Weber's concept of charisma is relational, i.e., between leader and followers, I do not think that this excludes my consideration of the pre-charismatic state.
2. The play on words is intentional.
given. It seems to me that in the concept of charisma which is something like instant personality, it is implied that one does not have to work to achieve personhood. The gloss which refers to charisma: it is a mystery, and not accounted for. But the gloss is an example of the kind of accounting done to explain charisma.

1. The "working toward personhood" alludes to character which I would think of as antithetical to charisma. Character is a working towards one's self, something like an ethical commitment.
XIV. Possession and Value Judgments

The value judgment that is grounded in the personality, to a certain extent, becomes the personality. Because a value judgment posits the speaker's personhood in the world, the value judgment is thought of as no different from that speaker. The point was brought out earlier that to refute a value judgment is unthinkable, for it is to question a speaker's very being in the world. Moreover, the value judgment can be oriented to as a possession: it can be to the speaker a little piece of what he has of himself. If a value judgment is a holding, then to have it taken away (refuted) is to lose a piece of the personality.

In the book Asylums, Erving Goffman speaks of a similar way of orienting to self in the world, when he portrays the inmate's trauma upon admission to a total institution.

The admission procedure can be characterized as a leaving off and taking on ... Leaving off, of course, entails a dispossession of property, important because persons invest self-feelings in their possessions. Perhaps the most significant of these possessions is not physical at all, one's full name.

(1961:18)

A possession is a possession because of the boundaries placed upon it which enable it to be isolated and viewed as a product. A possession can be had in a way that activity can not be -- because activity is not limited by boundaries which make it a thing. Activity is a process, and if we think about it, a mystery, because it is not concrete like a thing. Movement is an essential feature of activity, and it is precisely the movement of activity which is the mystery that resists objectification. On the other hand, the product, or the result of activity, because of the lines drawn around it in order to isolate it and see it as such, is
concrete. It can be had or grasped by the senses.

Products are important to a sensuous form of life; a product can be possessed. Through ownership of the product, a transformation occurs wherein the possession is made into a feature of the self. As Goffman demonstrates, a possession need not be physical; however, when something is oriented to as a possession, it does become physical in the sense that it is concretized.

A possession gives security to its owner. Take, for example, a society which lives by possession, i.e., capitalism. In capitalistic society, the owner is usually considered powerful because he possesses the most, in terms of material things. However, the owner is weak because of his attachment to his possessions. Possession is a peculiar relationship to a thing. It is the need for a thing into which a person can read his being. The owner who reads his being into the thing gives his being over to the thing. The possession is given a life by the owner that diminishes his own. As Karl Marx noted, "The more men give to god, the less they have of themselves." (1967:290).

A value judgment that is oriented to as a possession is a speech which has been transformed into a product. The value judgment holds the speaker in his speech; the speaker must be orienting to his words as his property. As a thing apart from him with a life of its own, the possession gives him back his life through its existence. In this way, a sensuous person knows that he is in the world because he can locate his possessions in the world. His possessions tell him that he is in the world because they are in the world. To this form of life, one's self is bound in what one values, and not in the realization that one can value.
A value judgment is usually spoken in a way which emphasizes the boundaries placed upon a product. For instance, think of this one: "The staff of a mental institution is there for the good of the inmates, and that's my opinion". The value judgment appears here as a conclusion, a result of some kind of process within the individual. When it is spoken in this fashion, no reference is made to its formulation. An opinion stands alone; it signals the end of a conversation, rather than the beginning of one. But, as the point was made earlier, a linguistic construction such as the value judgment or opinion signals the end of dialogue; it loses the dialogue.

A value judgment can be formulated as a speech that is alienated from the practice of speaking. It seems to come from nowhere because it appears as a conclusion. At the same time that a value judgment is expressing something, it is putting an end to speech; it speaks in order to silence. This feature is the immanent contradiction within the structure of the value judgment.

To Recount:

A value judgment has been analyzed as a type of speech whose usage may be contingent upon an objectification. Moreover, the objectified value judgment becomes a possession when its boundaries are transformed into the boundaries of its speaker's ego. That is, the difference between the owner (the speaker) and his property (the value judgment) seem to fade. A value judgment itself is a bounded speech -- perhaps capable of being objectified because it is more the product or result of some kind of dialogue than dialogue itself. In this way, a value judgment can be formulated as a kind of schizophrenic construction, a kind of speech that silences.
XV. Value Judgments and Pluralism

In this section I want to examine pluralism as a consequence of the unrestrained use of value judgments. Pluralism is a return to the problem of value freedom; pluralism is more or less the collective expression and embodiment of all views. It (pluralism) may be understood as value freedom because in order to be the enumeration of everything, it can not leave out anything. Pluralism does not have any discrimination about it. Although it may be a collection of evaluations, a pluralistic position is itself non-evaluative; therefore, pluralism shows a kind of irony in its use of value judgments. Despite its use of value judgments (what is necessary in order to collect them), it (pluralism) is, in the final analysis, a denial of basic value itself.

How are value judgments the fodder of pluralism?

The value judgment that is made to speak for the personality is dependent upon the notion of its own unique character. That is, the idea goes with it (the value judgment) that there is nothing else like it in the world. A value judgment posits the individual viewpoint of an individual speaker in the world. The fact that there are many different value judgments leads to the search for all value judgments. This is so because one has the idea that each value judgment must be represented before any action in the wake of value judgments can be initiated (i.e., thinking, covering). Max Weber eventually expressed this sentiment:

If one wishes to turn the university into a forum for the discussion of values, it becomes a duty to permit the most unrestrained freedom of discussion of fundamental questions from all value positions. (1949:6)

However, this is an impossible task because all value positions can never
be known. The very uniqueness of every value judgment defies a count. But, it is the impossibility of this task which gives the rationale for Weber's final position (i.e., that silence is preferred over the discussion of values at the university). The helplessness of not knowing how to talk about value judgments leads to the silence about them. By this I mean, to a pluralist, the analysis of value judgments is impossible. The pluralist sees the difference of every unique value judgment, and not the commonality that all value judgments might share beyond their seeming difference. The pluralist might think that the only way to talk about value judgments is to make them.

In response to Weber's insistence that all value judgments must be represented before the discussion of values can occur, Gouldner retorts:

But this is too pious by far. Even Socrates never insisted that all views should be at hand before the dialogue could begin. (1962:200)

What is there to the frustration that Gouldner has expressed? Is it just a personal complaint that he has with Max Weber, or can it be read as referring to some general problem with pluralism? Perhaps the problem can be pointed to like this: If you started out to count all things, you wind up with nothing.

Pluralism, the unrestrained collection and embodiment of all views, fails to organize its speech. Speech is organized by what is essential to it. This idea of the essential is what stands behind the appearance of phenomenon that makes for its possibility. It is a mystery, but it is also the mystery that is worked into essential thinking. There is something beyond mere appearances which understanding must comprehend.
The pluralist, on the other hand, is unorganized in this way: the pluralist is entranced by the fact that there are different sides to the coin. This difference is taken as conclusive of the separateness of each side of the coin. The idea of the coin as a coin is blasted because the pluralist sees the existence of the coin only in terms of its two sides. Each side is made a rule in itself. Pluralism places the essent in its many different appearances so that it (the essent) is lost. For instance, think of the thinking about value judgments. The pluralistic position which Weber expresses calls for the presence of all values before value discussion can begin. Value discussion would have to be a debate within different value spheres that would weigh the desirability of one value against another. The idea of value in general that permeated all conceptions of value would never, in such a discussion, be taken into account. Thus, the essential is found scattered in every different form, rather than being common to every possible form of value.

As Gouldner points out, Socrates did not have to be aware of every issue in order to be well-informed. This is because Socrates was not helpless in the face of many different issues; he knew how to speak in a way that did not let the deep underlying issues slide by. In the dialogues, he spoke, not seduced by the many different appearances of an issue, but gleaning the general from the particular.

The unrestrained use of value judgments makes way for the laissez-faire: any value is valid simply because it is a value. The fact that it (value) is authorizes it. The pluralist does not evaluate because he collects and embodies all views. I would think of this as Weber's dilemma,
and perhaps understand the pluralism which he demonstrates as a result of the unscientific treatment of value judgments. That is, when Weber stipulates that value judgments can only be treated evaluatively, he shows the failure to treat them as any other phenomenon about which science conducts inquiry. In one way, I have been trying to demonstrate that facts and value judgments need not create a bind for the social scientist, that the social scientist need not understand facts and value judgments as the only types of speeches available to him. Instead, I am saying that facts and value judgments are inventions and features of a particular form of life as much as any other phenomenon which the sociologist might care to examine.
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