EDUARD BERNSTEIN'S REVISIONIST CRITIQUE OF MARXIST THEORY AND PRACTICE

EDUARD BERNSTEIN'S REVISIONIST CRITIQUE OF MARXIST THEORY AND PRACTICE

By

Deborah Ann Findlay, B.A., B.S.W.

A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Master of Arts

McMaster University

September 1981

MASTER OF ARTS (1981) McMaster University
(Sociology) Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: Eduard Bernstein's Revisionist Critique of Marxist Theory and Practice

AUTHOR: Deborah Ann Findlay, B.A., B.S.W.

SUPERVISOR: Dr. Bruce Curtis

NUMBER OF PAGES: vi; 153

ABSTRACT

Eduard Bernstein formulated the theoretical premises expressing the movement toward revisionist practice, which was taking place in European socialist parties during the late 19th century. Bernstein was a member of the German Social Democratic party which was a particularly strong and important member of the Second International conference. During that time, a split in the socialist movement became evident, including within the German Social Democratic party. One stream continued to adhere to the principles of orthodox Marxist theory, while the other was revisionist--prepared to accept and design revisions of Marxism, drawing upon other sources of socialist theory.

Bernstein himself moved gradually from taking an orthodox Marxist stance to a revisionist one, partially due to a number of outside influences. In addition, he began by questioning whether the empirical, historical conditions of his era corresponded any longer with the traditional Marxist approach. Bernstein did not see economic trends proceeding in the same manner as the orthodox Marxists, did not foresee any necessary breakdown of capitalism, or any need for revolutionary means to obtain the goal of a socialist society. He concludes by criticizing a number of bases of Marxist theory, particularly the over-reliance on a Hegelian teleology, which produces misleading results. Bernstein criticized the

retention of Marxist theory therefore, as an unquestionable dogma, holding rather that it should be utilized as a useful tool for historical and sociological analysis, and revised according to changes in social relations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to all those who influenced the writing of this dissertation. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Bruce Curtis. His direction and words of encouragement were always very helpful. I would also like to express my appreciation for the work of Dr. Cyril Levitt. His comments were an invaluable aid in formulating much of my own thought. Thirdly, many thanks to Dr. Carl Cuneo for all of his recommendations and suggestions.

I am also indebted to Karl Kinanen, who gave an infinite amount of support during the writing of this work. His patience and encouragement were greatly appreciated.

Mrs. Jacqueline Tucker has generously given of her time and effort in the typing of this thesis, and I would like to thank her for that.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

In order to examine the components and characteristics of what is referred to as the doctrine of socialist "revisionism" it is essential to understand fully this political approach as it was influenced by Eduard Bernstein. One must return to Bernstein to examine how revisionism has shaped and developed political theories and practices of the twentieth century. Bernstein was the first to express fully and openly the nature of and basis for revisionist or reformist tendencies during the era in which he lived. Bernstein's change from the earlier position of an orthodox Marxist can be seen in the articles he wrote during the 1890's, especially those in "Die Neue Zeit". Bernstein's thoughts are encapsulated in his major summarizing book, Evolutionary Socialism, published in 1899 while he was a member of the S.P.D. (German Social Democratic Party). He received strong criticism from both within and outside the Social Democratic Party for that writing. Critiques by such well-known colleagues of that time, as Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky, were directed at Bernstein.

> "In taking these positions Bernstein was doing little more than describing and approving the actual behaviour, as distinct from the programmatic declarations, of the German Social Democratic movement and other Western socialist parties."[1]

His book sheds considerable light on the political, economic, and philosophical aspects of the era in which he lived.

Bernstein was also involved in a practical sense with the problems of that day, as he played a very active role politically. He had originally joined the "Eisenacher" socialist party in 1872, which joined forces with the "Lassallean" socialist to form the S.P.D. in 1875.[2] Both were socialist parties existing in Germany prior to 1875. Bernstein worked politically from 1872 to 1878 and was in close contact with Bebel and Liebknecht. Meanwhile, he was also an employee of the Berlin branch of the Rothschild bank.[3] He apprenticed at the age of sixteen in a bank and had a lack of formal university training, yet Bernstein did become an outstanding intellectual in the movement.[4] In 1875 the S.P.D. developed the "Gotha Program", and Bernstein later edited the party's official newspaper, Zurich's, "Sozialdemokrat". He was living at that time in Switzerland due to the repressive, anti-socialist laws enforced in Germany from 1878 to 1890. It was during the winter of 1878-79 that Bernstein actually began to take a Marxist political approach, after reading Engels' Herr Eugen Dühring's Umwälzung der Wissenschaft.[5] With regard to the S.P.D.,

> "Only when the party again enjoyed legal status was the work taken up in earnest, to culminate in the Erfurt program of 1891, which served the reorganized Social Democratic Party until the collapse of the German Empire."[6]

Bernstein, with Karl Kautsky, wrote this program for the S.P.D.

Bernstein left for London, England in 1888, due to the existing political situation in Europe. While residing there, he was in close contact with Friedrich Engels and was greatly influenced by him.

At that time, the S.P.D. was the primary organizer of the working-class movement.

> "In contrast to England, the trade-unions in Germany played a negligible part in the foundation of the working class movement. The so-called "Free trade-unions" had been established by the socialist parties in the 1860's primarily as recruiting agencies for the practical labor movement."[7]

This relationship between the S.P.D. and the unions persisted until the end of the 1800's, when the relatively weak position of the unions changed and they gained increasing support from the workers.

The practical political needs of the German Social Democratic Party changed in accordance with the more prosperous social and political conditions in Germany. The S.P.D., the leading socialist party in Germany at that time, was also prospering and growing in strength. This was so despite the restrictions placed on party activities, and led to the exile of many of the leaders including Bernstein, through the Anti-Socialist legislation in effect from 1878 to 1890.

> This law prohibited all, social-democratic, socialist, or communist associations, assemblies, and publication, and imposed other disabilities on the labour movement."

Despite this handicap, the S.P.D. had deputies elected to the Reichstag for the first time in 1884, where they were protected by parliamentary immunity, and the S.P.D. increased the number of votes it received in all but one election.[8] In fact, in 1883-84, the state lessened the degree of implementation of the law and the party further grew in

strength. This repressive state legislation had the effect on the party of forcing it to use illegal tactics to preserve its very existence, and contributed to the heightening of the revolutionary views of the S.P.D. during the 1880's.[9]

While emphasis was placed upon revolutionary theory during the late 1800's, the S.P.D. was simultaneously placed in a contradictory practical position by the conditions in Germany. The dominant Prussian state continued to be an authoritarian monarchy, originally based on the feudal landed aristocracy, but continuing to support its financially weak East Elbian aristocratic Junkers. The German state continued to express the interests of this class, rather than of the bourgeoisie which had gained political power in other European nations at that time. Prussia held the power over a state-divided empire, prior to German unification, and it took the form of "monarchical constitutionalism" or a parliamentary framework. Marx referred to the Prussian state as a combination of parliamentary forms and feudalism.[10] Even by the late 1880's, the political situation had changed little. This resulted in an economically growing, but politically ineffective bourgeoisie. Germany was in the anomalous position in Europe, of having a gap between its advanced industrial conditions and historically "backward" political ones. (relative to England or France subsequent to the 1848 revolutions). As Engels noted, large-scale industry and the class struggle developed simultaneously in Germany--before the

bourgeoisie had even acquired political power.[11]

Once Bismarck's anti-socialist laws were lifted, capitalist accumulation took place rapidly, there began a period of economic prosperity, and the time was"fruitful for the revisionist tendencies in thought and outlook."[12] Bernstein, as did some other members of socialist parties in Europe, attempted to give a critique of Marxism as he perceived it. Bernstein, particularly, attempted to apply the theory to the practical realities, which had developed after the time of Marx.

> "... Marxist theory, as its adherents recognized was singularly appropriate to the historical moment. By its distinction between the objective historical conditions necessary to achieve socialism and the subjective will, of the proletariat required to bring it about, Marxism made possible a reconciliation of the revolutionary rancor engendered in the Social Democratic rank and file during the persecution, and the need for a reformist tactic in a fundamentally non-revolutionary period."[13]

Bernstein responded to this need and his work and writings are attempts to resolve it. Bernstein criticized the whole of Marxism, including the theory of value and Marx's economic concepts, the state, and the use of the Hegelian dialectic. His re-thinking and application of Marxist theory, though partially a product of the conditions and needs of that particular historical period, came under attack while it represented the revisionist tendencies growing at that time in Germany. In addition to members of the S.P.D. mentioned earlier, some of this criticism also came from the "Austro-

Marxists" (such as Hilferding, Otto Bauer, Adler, and Renner), who were very involved in the Second International, and whose thought also influenced the socialist movement in Germany.[14] Generally, whether originating within the S.P.D. or beyond the borders of Germany, the critiques were definitely negative in tone.

This has contributed to the definition of revisionism today in negative, ambiguous terms.

> "Bernstein's revisionism was a strong current in the pre-world War I socialist movement. Latter-day "revisionism" is a series of turbulent eddies in contemporary communism. Both have their sources in Marxism."[15]

There is much confusion between these very different uses of the term, and especially so, since "revisionism" is also commonly interchanged with the word "reformism". Actually, those who adhere to Marxist orthodoxy see theirs as the correct interpretation, while all others are revisionists.[16] Revisionism can also be defined as,

> "... the re-establishment of contact between theory and practice, the abandonment of myths for the reality, and an open analysis of the contradictions within the collectivist system, instead of their concealment."[17]

Revisionism generally includes a view of the state as separate from civil society, reform as more desirable than revolution, and stresses the need for democracy and universal suffrage. The emphasis is also placed upon the possibilities of economic stability, rather than breakdown.

Interestingly, while Bernstein was being condemned for

his views and his book, the S.P.D. was following precisely those policies and was moving ever more strongly in the direction of becoming a "reformist" party, rather than a revolutionary working class party. This demonstrates the close connection between the conditions and events occurring during that period, and Bernstein's political formulations. This may also be due to the tendency for political parties to move further to the right when they have achieved electoral success or are about to achieve such success. Examination of these developments and the content of "revisionism" is an exploration of the links between the issues of Marxist theory and practice in that period, and those of today. Many of the major problems addressed by Bernstein are still being debated, though the circumstances in the world have changed since then.

Such an examination aids in providing a historical and relative perspective to the present issues, for example, the prevalence of political reformism in North America today, and dogmatic, Marxist-Leninism in the Soviet Union. Soviet Marxism can be seen as partially the historical product of the orthodox stream of Marxism. This perspective is essential in order to gain a thorough understanding of the development of the present political, economic, and social structures. It also aids in ascertaining how political or social practices can encourage the development of

certain theories. This is one example of the continuity of the issue of the relation of Marxist theory to practice, important in Bernstein's "revisionism" and until today. This continuity and lack of resolution of the problems, make a study of the development, content, and impact of "revisionism" still very relevant. In reference to revisionist socialism, Gay states that,

> "It is the only important challenge to Marxism that developed in German Social Democracy, and it takes its place beside Fabianism as one of the major modern philosophies of peaceful change towards Socialism."[14]

To understand the differences then between Marx's theories and Bernstein's revisions of them, it is necessary to examine Bernstein's views on the theory of value and economic trends, the role of the state, the issue of reform versus revolution, and philosophical framework. Each of these will be examined in the following chapters, which chronologically follow the order of Bernstein's own investigations of the problems.

In the first chapter, on Bernstein's critique of Marx's theory of value and his economic assertions, I examine Bernstein's own approach. It seems to me that Bernstein takes too many aspects of Marx's theory of value to be heuristic abstractions. Yet at the same time there is much of importance in Bernstein's approach. He recognizes that Marx's theory may <u>not</u> be sufficient in itself as a full analysis of the capitalist economy. To demonstrate this, Bernstein refers to the marginal-utility school as one theory that

could help round out Marx's approach. Bernstein's balancing of other aspects against a one-sided use of Marx's theory of value is what I see as the greatest usefulness of this particular area of his critique. In addition, I believe Bernstein is correct in asserting that one cannot base the necessity of socialism on the fact that in a capitalist society, the worker doesn't receive full value for the products of his work. Even in a socially-managed economy, such would never be able to be the case.

Again, when he deals with the emerging economic trends, Bernstein attempts to counter-balance dogmatic interpretations of Marx's work. He sees Marx's original views as also being incomplete. I agree with Bernstein, that there are more factors in reality than Marx gives credit to in his presentation. One aspect where this is particularly true is in Bernstein's dealing with the issue of the polarization of classes. Marx saw a trend towards a polarization of the working and capitalist classes, but Bernstein was prepared to consider also the possibility of a growing middle class. In this respect, it seems Bernstein was correct. Bernstein observed a blurring of class divisions. Some of this was due to the differentiation of industries and work, which Bernstein recognized. There has become greater specialization in jobs, though simultaneously some homogenization and overlaps in income levels. Bernstein then is correct in his assertion that socialism can as little be based on the trend

to polarization of classes, as it could be on the fact that the worker does not receive full value for his work. Another basis for the call to socialism must be found.

Bernstein did not give enough emphasis however to the possible results of industrial monopolies and the extent to which these would develop. He saw large industries as not necessarily absorbing smaller ones. The empirical evidence of the 20th Century has proven Bernstein wrong in this regard. He also did not see a universal capitalist crisis as necessarily occurring. Although there has not been a final crisis of capitalism, the fact that there have been some very serious crises, weakens Bernstein's argument in this respect. He does state that cartels may regulate the economy somewhat, which is an important point. Factors such as the growth of cartels and state intervention do appear to have stabilized the capitalist economy for a period of time, since the 1930's. Bernstein's main point here is a valuable one--that one cannot depend upon a general crisis to aid the working-class in coming to the forefront. It is not possible to base a theory upon this belief, when one cannot predict coming events. The historical specificity of Bernstein, for example, seeing credit working differently under differing circumstances, allows for more flexibility, with less teleology and speculation. Here is where Bernstein makes a valuable theoretical contribution.

In the next chapters on the state and revolution and

reform, I look at Marx's and then Bernstein's views on these issues. It should be remembered that they were writing under very different conditions. Marx's thought reflects the fact that he lived and studied during a time of great social class tensions, when the British state was reluctant to intervene. Bernstein, in contrast, was writing when there was less class antagonism, better working conditions, and state intervention in the form of Bismarck's welfare measures. Revisionist critiques were to bring Marx's theory in line with the legal, parliamentary practice of the S.P.D. in the 1890's. This is still applicable today where the party system of parliamentary democracy is in effect. There is still not full across-class democracy, but there is little interest in these societies in revolutionary means and theories either. In Marx's view, there is little room for a socialist society to emerge from a state which is a modern, passive excrescence of civil society. Such a view leaves little space for active intervention on the part of the state in the class structure. Marx stresses the abstraction of the state, and the formal legal equality which adhere to its "citizens". There exists a contradiction however between this formal political equality and the inequalities of class which exist in civil society. Due to its being merely passive, the state is not capable of eliminating those inequalities of class conflict. It acts formally for all interests, but in reality or in concrete terms, it acts in favor of different class interests. The state can regulate

and change the forms of class antagonisms, but it cannot affect the content. To look at this, Marx deals with both the abstract, state in general and the concrete, historically specific state. In contrast, Bernstein deemphasizes in places the class aspects of the state and stresses its general interest. He sees the state as more independent or autonomous from civil society than does Marx and so sees state intervention as capable of a transformation to a socialist society. Capitalism, to Bernstein, could develop to socialism through legal struggle. However, this is not possible if one accepts Marx's thesis that the state is only a passive excrescence of civil society. Both Marx's historical study of the state and empirical reality indicate that Marx is correct on this point. Bernstein separates civil and political society, though this is only an apparent separation, so misses the importance of Marx's theory of fetishism on this point. The fetishized, formal state disguises civil society, of which it is actually the excrescence. Bernstein does not see that the state does not have its own active content and is not really separate from civil society.

Bernstein stresses the need for universal suffrage and democracy, perhaps too much so. Democracy is a necessary prerequisite for socialism, but Bernstein does not adequately explain the contradiction between political equality and social inequality, or how democracy would eliminate that con-

tradiction. To Marx the state is an abstraction, but to Bernstein the citizens are the state and can eradicate class conflict to some extent. He sees it as necessary to fight within the state for reforms for the working-class, with the possibility of a classless state in view. For Bernstein, a connection between liberalism and social democracy was necessary, and may have even been appropriate under the particular social conditions of his time.

However, Bernstein does not deal directly with Marx's views on the state and does not deal adequately with the problem of what a social democratic party should do about the social inequalities of civil society. Social democratic parties have difficulty gaining power at all in North America, and when they are in power it does not seem that state intervention eradicates those inequalities, as Bernstein would assert. Even though this is the situation, it is true that Bernstein is correct in seeing that the time for revolution on a large scale is past. Most in North America and Western Europe choose to take the parliamentary route to political change, even if this means little social change. So Bernstein did unify the theory with the prevailing non-revolutionary socialist practice. One example is the increasing reformism of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation or C.C.F., the social democratic party in Canada. For a number of reasons this party gradually became more reformist between 1930 and 1960, when it finally united with labour to become the New

Democratic Party. The existence of social democratic nations today shows that reform through the state is insufficient. It has not eliminated class antagonisms or transformed the social relations of civil society. None have achieved a truly socialist society, as Marx conceived of it. In essence then, Marx's view of the state still stands correct in the light of 20th Century developments. However, it seems that a revolutionary approach to change is outmoded, leaving Bernstein's reformist tactics a necessary alternative to be considered.

Marx thought that with an actual revolution, the economy must be broken down, but Bernstein pointed out the possibility of a counterrevolution if there was no healthy economic base. Bernstein was likely correct in this regard, as a functioning economy is essential to any society, whether capitalist or socialist. It also seems that Marx did not give enough weight to the possibility of counter-revolutions occurring. Bernstein possessed the foresight to recognize some of the non-creative powers of revolution. He also saw that the choice between reformist and revolutionary means depends to a great extent upon the particular circumstances. His approach provides much flexibility and historical specificity in employing either method of social change.

However, he does not fully recognize that reform is not just the slower means of change, but that it is closely tied

to one's view of the state and civil society. Bernstein stresses the positive accomplishments of the state, such as reforms, which Marx also recognizes but does not see as being of as much importance. As Marx argues, reforms do not actually transform the content of civil society. In the event of a classless civil society, Bernstein asserts that a state would still be required for management purposes, and that it would likely be extended rather than "wither away". In the light of recent evidence it again seems that Bernstein was correct on this point. In most social democratic nations today, a great expansion of the state's power and arenas of intervention have taken place.

Marx's notion of a dictatorship of the proletariat, which is connected with the revolutionary aspects of his theory, is debated by Bernstein. Such a notion was a regression to Bernstein, as to him democratic ends and means could not be separated. The democratic process was slower, but more effective in obtaining socialism for Bernstein. It certainly is much slower than the revolutionary means, but it has not yet been proven to be a more effective means. Bernstein may have been too optimistic about achieving socialism through reformist means, as history has not demonstrated a clear example where this has been the case. However, Bernstein was correct about the unlikelihood of mass revolutionary change in advanced democratic nations as well. That situation has not occurred in the western world either.

The last chapter contains a discussion of the influence of Lange and the neo-Kantians on Bernstein. Bernstein called for a return generally to their critical approach, in order to dispel the burden of tradition and dogma from socialist theory. The chapter focuses on Bernstein's criticism of Marx's ambivalence concerning his scientific method and the use of an a priori teleology. Bernstein sees this as a product of Marx's reliance on the Hegelian dialectic and he criticizes the effect that the use of this dialectic had on Marx's economic and political conclusions. In addition, Bernstein attempted to give more autonomy to ideology and ethics. He saw ethics and value judgements increasing in importance in reality, which can be seen to be true today. Value judgements continue to be relevant at the present level of technological and economic development. Choices must be made regarding the allocation of resources, which have ethical issues as their basis. What Bernstein saw was that the theory then must take this into account. One cannot have a purely scientific basis for socialism.

Where Marx's teleology is strongest, is where his theory is least reliable. Bernstein was correct in criticizing this aspect of Marx's work, as it led to his predictions of a proletariat revolution and an inevitable breakdown of capitalism. Neither have occurred, indicating that Marx's use of the Hegelian dialectic is currently inappropriate. The

dialectic did correspond to the realities of the middle of the 19th Century, but no longer does so. Adhering to such outmoded concepts can only serve to injure the socialist movement, as it will not be responding or acting in accordance with current realities. Holding inflexibly to the Hegelian dialectic also led to the political conclusion that the class struggle would increase in intensity. It obscures the fact that cooperation between classes can also be important in historical change. The class struggle has changed in form and character since the 19th Century when the Hegelian dialectic was appropriate. New categories are needed now to fit the requirements of the 20th Century.

REFERENCES

1. Hook, Introduction to Evolutionary Socialism, xiv.
2. Ibid, xi.
3. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 79.
4. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 21.
5. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 79.
6. Schorske, German Social Democracy, 4.
7. Ibid, 8 and 9.
8. Simon, Germany in the Age of Bismarck, 67.
9. Schorske, German Social Democracy, 3.
10. Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, 19.
11. Engels, The Role of Force in History, 97.
12. Bottomore and Goode, Austro-Marxism, 232.
13. Schorske, German Social Democracy, 4.
14. Bottomore and Goode, Austro-Marxism, 2 and 3.
15. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 61.
16. Labedz, Revisionism, 9.
17. Labedz, Revisionism, 18; Cited, François Fejtö, Etudes, Paris, Jan. 1960.

CHAPTER ONE

Bernstein's Economic Views and Critiques Of Marx's Theory of Value

Bernstein was one of the very few revisionists in Germany who dealt with Marx's theory of value. He examined it during his period as an orthodox Marxist, but then came to deal with it in the light of new economic and social changes. Bernstein examined Marx's theory and what it meant in relation to the current trends, using empirical evidence and statistics. He noted that some of the facts contradicted the theory of value, where-upon he proceeded to give a critique of the theory, in spite of the fact that there are some weaknesses in his interpretation of it. Gay mentions that revisionism was timely, as it was not tied to dogma and allowed flexibility in its description of the development of capitalism, for example, by taking into account the upswing in the economy.[1] This change of approach on Berstein's part can be seen in debates in which he engaged in Die Neue Zeit. There he was influenced in his thinking by some of those whom he was actually attacking. One of those was a bourgeois liberal, Gerhard von Schulze-Gaevernitz, who published "Zum sozialen Frieden" and then "Der Grossbetrieb", where he stated that Great Britain was on the way to peace with a lessening of the class struggle and higher standards of living. In response,

Bernstein asserted that Marx said, that still did not decrease the surplus-value. Bernstein discusses these articles in his "Carlyle und die sozial-politische Entwicklung Englands" (Die Neue Zeit, 1891) and in "Technisch-ökonomischer und sozial-ökonomischer Fortschritt" (Die Neue Zeit, 1893), respectively. Another article which Bernstein reviewed in "Der neueste Vernichter des Sozialismus" (Die Neue Zeit, 1893) was Julius Wolf's "Sozialismus und kapitalistische Gesellschaft." There, Wolf refutes Marx's theory of the reserve army and Gay comments that Bernstein does not criticize his content or claims, so much as his methodology. Bernstein's doubts about Marx's theory were increased in 1894 by the debate in the German social democratic party regarding the agrarian question. In addition, the long period of economic prosperity and the publication of Volume Three of Capital with its solution to the problem of the profit rate, served to reinforce Bernstein's questioning.[2]

It is important throughout to refer to Marx's work and theories when dealing with Bernstein's revisions. This is necessary in order to highlight the theoretical and practical differences between the two approaches. In his book, Evolutionary Socialism, Bernstein first of all, criticizes Marx's theory of value. He sees value, abstract labour, and surplus value as all being purely "formulas" or abstractions. Again, to Bernstein, the concept of total social surplus value is an abstraction. It is just as much an abstraction as is the concept of value in the marginal-utility school. Bernstein sees both that school and Marx as oversimplifying their concepts.

For example, Bernstein criticizes Marx's view of commodities as consisting of human labour alone. He does not see Marx as demonstrating the existence of surplus labour, but rather sees his theory as useful for illustrating that particular concept. He also sees it as generally helpful in analysing the workings of the capitalist economy, but sees it as being overused by followers of Marx. For example, Bernstein believes that the theory of value cannot serve as a measure of exploitation of the working-class, yet this is what one is led to by dealing with Marx's rate of surplus value as one of exploitation. Basically, Bernstein is refuting scientific socialism. He states that one can't call for socialism on the basis that the worker does not receive full value for the products of his work.

Bernstein then moves on to examine economic tendencies, such as the distribution of wealth. He agrees with Marx that the general tendency is toward increased exploitation and more centralization of capital and industry. But again he believes that Marx's portrayal of the situation is incomplete. It is not that clear-cut, according to Bernstein, as there are mitigating factors which may in reality affect the developments. Bernstein argues that, in opposition to Marx, socialism does not depend on a decrease in social wealth, but on an increase of it. It doesn't necessarily depend on the concentration of wealth or a decreasing number of capitalists. Bernstein, in

this way, removes the teleological basis from Marx's socialist development. He argues that there is no necessary historical process which would lead to socialism. Bernstein also observed incomes and industries becoming more differentiated, which added to his own viewpoint. In addition, he saw an increase in production and questioned what happened to that increase. He concludes that one possibility is a growing middle class, and that therefore, socialism cannot be based on the trend to a polarization of classes.

Bernstein also examines trends in industry, seeing the number of large industries growing along with small and medium-sized ones. He discusses the possibility of a universal economic crisis and the factors that could affect that. For instance, he sees credit as working differently under varying circumstances, not necessarily as creating worse crises. Cartels could act as possible regulatory mechanisms, so that an inevitable universal capitalist crisis was primarily speculation. Bernstein thought that this was an important issue, as one cannot expect the working-class to fulfill a certain future role, as Marx did, based on a speculative general crisis. He saw it as important to consider the possibility that such a crisis may not occur.

Bernstein criticizes the emphasis on objective aspects and the teleology in Marx's work and tries to demonstrate these problems through his critique of the theory of value and doctrines such as the necessary collapse of capitalism. As Angel says, the originality of Bernstein is his emphasis upon

the counter-currents, the adaptability of the system. He criticizes Marx for not seeing that reforms can oppose the depressive tendencies of capitalism, not seen by Marx due to his reliance upon a priori conceptions.[3]

> "While there is no intention of arguing that Bernstein was right throughout, the point remains that his work, whether right or wrong, does not merely rest on a logical misunderstanding."[4]

As proven by his writings in Die Neue Zeit, Bernstein was most familiar with orthodox Marxism, and intentionally and consciously created his critique of Marx's theory. It was not simply an unconscious transformation on Bernstein's part.

As is the case with Marx's theory of value, the controversies concerning economic concepts go back to opposed sociological conceptions of the nature of modern capitalist society.[5] They are certainly not only economic theories, unrelated to people and issues to which they refer. For instance, Bernstein himself recognized this when he said that the problem of wages is never purely left to an economic explanation, rather it is a sociological problem--

> "Das Lohnproblem ist ein sociologisches Problem, das sich niemals rein okonomisch wird erklaren lassen."[6]

Bernstein then quotes from Volume One of Marx's Capital as evidence. Bernstein says a few years later, in Evolutionary Socialism, that he agreed with the fall of the profit rate, over-production, crises, concentration and centralisation of industrial capital and increase in the rate of surplus-value, as facts. However, when Marx's statement disagrees with reality,

Bernstein says it is not because it is false, but rather the statement is incomplete. He sees that Marx either ignored or abandoned factors that influenced the contradictions and development of capitalism.[7]

However, as Colletti notes, Bernstein separates the forms or spheres within capitalism, including that of the economy, and thereby misses their unity and interrelations. Therefore, to Bernstein, the economic system is totally autonomous--a view which is criticized by Colletti and related by him to Bernstein's adoption of Kantian "contrarieties" or real opposites as opposed to the Hegelian dialectic, employed by Marx, where there is a unity of contradictions.

This tends to prevent Bernstein from dealing with the forms of social relations of production. Rather than asking the same questions as Marx regarding the labour-capital relation, Bernstein regresses to the level, on this issue, of the classical political economists. Although Bernstein recognized that for Marx, the content of value is labour, he still shared the limitations of the political economists.

> "...it never posed the problem of why that content assumes this particular form, why human labour takes on the form of value of things, or, in short, on the basis of what historical-social conditions the product of labour takes the form of a commodity"..."They believed, in other words, that there could be no production in society without this product being production of commodities, that in all societies the product of human labour must necessarily assume this form."[8]

Here we see Colletti's critique of revisionist economics which sees it as a regression into the Ricardian past and the link

with his criticism of Bernstein's methods of analysis. This opinion of Colletti is substantiated by Roman Rosdolsky, who states that bourgeois relations of production are reified and appear as natural relations. Marx saw that commodity production was historically specific and required scientific explanation, not acceptance as is the case with the political economists and Bernstein.[9] As with the economists, this approach led in revisionist theory to a concentration upon the moments of circulation and exchange, rather than capitalist production.

Both abstract labour and its expression, value, became abstractions for Bernstein, beginning with the view of abstract labour as merely "labour in general" or a mental construct. Value becomes real use-values "in general". Colletti states that,

> "The defect of this interpretation of 'abstract labour' lies not only in the fact that--if abstract labour is a mental generalization--it is not clear why what this labour is supposed to produce is something real--value; but also in the fact that this opens the door to the transformation of value itself into an abstract generality or idea as well."[10]

And this is precisely what Bernstein did.

Marx himself makes clear that abstract labour is not merely a mental abstraction. In the Grundrisse he says that,

> "...this abstraction of labour as such is not merely the mental product of a concrete totality of labours."[11]

He recognizes regarding the reduction to homogeneous labour, that,

> "This reduction appears to be an abstraction; but it is an abstraction which takes place daily in the social process of production. The conversion of all commodities into labour-time is no greater abstraction nor a less real process than the chemical reduction of all organic bodies to air."[12]

> Value, for Marx, is "a mere congelation of homogeneous human labour, of labour-power expended without regard to the mode of its expenditure."[13]

This abstract human labour, represented by the value of a commodity, is not however, a heuristic abstraction for Marx. It is a necessary process in order to see the inter-dependence of all elements of the reality and their common character. Marx therefore, accepts the abstraction not for itself, but as a means of analysis for concrete research.[14]

However, Bernstein misses this vitally important point in Marx's theory of value, the explanation of how individual, private labour is equalized in a commodity economy although the labour is actually qualitatively different and unequal.

> "'Abstract' labour, in short, is alienated labour, labour separated or estranged with respect to man himself."[15]

Then this labour is separated from the original owner or worker as abstract labour, yet is evidently very much a real substance, not a "mental" generalization as Bernstein conceived of it. Bernstein stated in Die heutige Sozial - demokratie in Theorie und Praxis, that one should not forget that value is an abstract representation, a concept of our thoughts, and that it is not a thing that anyone can see, touch, or taste.[16] Rosa Luxemburg was one of the first to note this point:

> "In defense of Marxist economic theory Luxemburg makes the shrewd point that the word "abstraction" is a Schimpfwort for Bernstein. Thus to the Revisionist Marx's law of value is an "abstraction" of equal validity with the marginal theory of value. But, Luxemburg exclaims, "Bernstein has quite forgotten that this Marxist abstraction is not an invention but a discovery. It exists not in Marx's head but in our commodity economy"."[17]

Colletti sees that Bernstein did not theoretically grasp the difference between the law of labour time as it exists in all societies as opposed to its existence in a capitalist society. In the latter, this labour-time appears in a fetishistic manner-- "as an intrinsic quality in the products themselves, as the "value" of a "thing"." Colletti states that this confusion of two separate concepts "is the root of modern revisionism."[18] In a capitalist commodity economy, there is in actuality, no clear division between the socially-necessary labour time and surplus labour time.

Bernstein still notes this exploitation of labour in capitalism, although he does not consistently distinguish between value and price and saw the theory of value as being a false abstraction. Bernstein also questions this theory, believing that, "Value theory, in short, is useful but not universal."[19] In addition to its universal applicability, Bernstein sees the theory of value as having had some negative effects;

> "...labour value is nothing more than a key, an abstract image..."But this key refuses service over and above a certain point, and therefore it has become disastrous to nearly every disciple of Marx."[20]

Not only value and abstract labour are heuristic abstractions for Bernstein, but surplus value as well. He states that,

> "...at the moment when labour value can claim acceptance only as a speculative formula or scientific hypothesis, surplus value would all the more become a pure formula--a formula which rests on an hypothesis."

Bernstein does not think that the rate of surplus value should be characterized as the rate of exploitation. To prove his point, he notes that the best placed workers are in trades with the highest rates of surplus value.[21]

Bernstein's break with Marxism is evident on this point of surplus value. As Gustafsson notes, for Bernstein, the economic aspects of the theory of surplus value were only for abstract examination. As soon as it comes to the application, it immediately becomes an ethical problem.[22] Both the notions of value and surplus value are based on the struggle between classes and their opposed relations to the means of production. Bernstein and other revisionists almost abandoned this concept of class in their de-emphasis of within-class solidarity and stress on their sub-divisions. They were criticizing orthodox Marxism's oversimplified view of the concept of "class".[23] This is an important critique in the light of twentieth century changes in class structure and the general lack of a militant proletariat and breakdown of capitalism, the logical outcomes of Marx's concept of two major polarized classes. Marx provided a theoretically scientific basis for this class struggle through

his theory of surplus value or exploitation.

> "Bernstein wollte nicht ausdrücklich sagen, daß es keine Ausbeutung gebe. Er wollte vielmehr sagen, daß diese nicht durch Marx' Theorie erklärt würde und daß sie auch keiner Erklärung bedürfe. Es ist sehr deutlich, daß Bernstein in diesem Punkt Sombarts und Schmidts Kritik und deren Zusammenfassung, nämlich Croces Kritik, also Vorlagen für seine Arbeit benutzte."

He thought that the capitalists would simply appropriate from another class if not the proletariat--the only alternative is to increase production.

> "Bernsteins Akkumulations theorie war somit von Grund auf dieselbe, wie die von Malthus, Sismondi und den russischen Narodniki."[24]

Bernstein's theory of accumulation was basically the same as that of Malthus, Sismondi, and the Russian Narodniki. Bernstein and the revisionists, then criticized the basis of the theory of surplus value and separated themselves from that theory, the Marxist theory of class development, and that of a necessary breakdown of capitalism.

Bernstein said that socialism can not actually be founded on such a theory of exploitation or surplus value. The fact alone that wage-workers didn't receive full value for the products of their work, is not a scientific foundation of socialism or communism.[25] Bernstein quotes from Engels' preface to Marx's, Poverty of Philosophy which states that for Marx, his demands for socialism were based on the necessary collapse of the present mode of production, and says,

> "A scientific basis for socialism or communism cannot be supported on the fact only that the wage worker does not receive the full value of the product of his work."[26]

Here we can see again the great gap between Marxism and revisionism which does not recognize any need for a theory of surplus value or for a "scientific socialism", although it recognized the existence of exploitation. Rather, Bernstein utilized ethics and empiricism as the basis for socialism, similar to the English Fabians.[27] Bernstein found that Volume Three of Capital's solution to the value-price relation (published in 1894), "led him to doubt the validity of the whole Marxist theory of value." While he questioned it, the orthodox Marxists kept the "objective" theory of value which stayed away from the problems of demand (until Volume Three) and showed that exploitation was an integral part of capitalism.[28]

Bernstein and Böhm-Bawerk criticized Marx for reverting to traditional economics in Volume Three, and Angel sees this contradiction in Marx as due again to his use of Hegelian methodology. He notes that the theme of Capital was constructed a priori, in the revolutionary era. Marx scientifically investigates, but "il y introduit les résultats tout prêts de sa thèse a priori..."[29] Bernstein himself was influenced by a new value theory developed in the twenty years preceding the publication of Marx's third volume. It was that formulated by the Austrians Böhm-Bawerk, Menger, and Weiser, as well as separately by the English economist, W.S. Jevons. It is interesting to note that Jevons' theory was used by the Fabians with whom Bernstein was familiar. Value, in this theory, was not only based on labour used in production or the cost of production, but was

also a function of utility or the cumulative desires or demands of individual buyers--"marginal utility theory".[30] What Bernstein attempted to do then was to combine these two theories of value. He saw both as being somewhat incomplete, and the possibility of the two being complementary to each other. Regarding the utility school and the theory of value, Bernstein said that,

> "Actual relations lie at the foundation of both; but both are built up on abstractions"..."At the outset, Marx takes so much away from the characteristics of commodities that they finally remain only embodiments of a quantity of simple human labour; as to the Böhm-Jevons school; it takes away all characteristics except utility."[31]

Bernstein evidently recognizes the great complexity of the issue, and sees it as incorrect to consider one aspect but not the other.

To Bernstein, both could be included--

> "Economic value is androgynous: it contains the element of utility (use value, demand) and the cost of production (labour-power)."[32]

This middle position between the theory of value and marginal utility theory was actually not only taken by Bernstein, but also by the whole of revisionism, including Croce, Sorel, Tugan-Baranowski, and so on. Gustafsson notes that Croce, as Bernstein, also maintained that the economic categories of Marx were abstractions. Croce's formula on the relation of the theory of value actually went back partly to an earlier formula of Georges Sorel, whose critique of Marx was in parts, parallel to that of Croce. Almost all of Bernstein's major

points are found again in Sorel's work. The major difference between Bernstein and these predecessors, is that Bernstein not only found value to be a thought-construct, but he tried to underpin or corroborate this viewpoint with his theory.[33]

Bernstein, then, attempted to criticize Marx's theory of value and surplus value in order to demonstrate some of the problems with those theories, such as the Hegelian method and the teleological economic predictions which it led Marx into. The intentions of his critique are evident in his statement in Evolutionary Socialism regarding the relation of Stiebling's works on the rate of exploitation to the third volume of Capital:

> "An analysis of the controversy which was entered into over the essays of Stiebling could very well serve as an illustration of some of the contradictions of the Marxist theory of value."[35]

This criticism of Marx's teleological predictions is seen throughout Bernstein's work on the theory of value and his economic studies, but is particularly evident when he attacks the deterministic interpretation of Marx's theory of breakdown, as an inevitable grand crisis, contributing to a proletariat revolution. In Evolutionary Socialism, Bernstein recognizes that,

> "We can only investigate what elements of modern economy work in favour of crises and what work against them. It is impossible to pre-judge *a priori* the ultimate relation of these forces to one another, or their development." He asserts that, "...there is no urgent reason for concluding that such a crisis will come to pass for purely economic reasons."[36]

He wanted to show that the tendencies in capitalism that according to Marx, the proletariat would make possible did not function with the force that Marx assumed. Therefore, there would be no breakdown of capitalism or proletarian revolution for Bernstein.[37]

The way in which Bernstein does this is through a comparison of empirical evidence of economic and social developments since Marx's time, with Marx's theoretical statements. In other words, he attempts to demonstrate that the bases upon which Marx's theories are built, are empirically false. For example, Bernstein argues that there is no polarization of classes or absolute immiseration of the working-class or proletariat. Colletti believes that Bernstein did not recognize the importance of Marx's theory of fetishism and therefore, did not read this part of Marx's theory as Marx intended it. He then misses Marx's conclusion regarding the theory of exploitation--that

> "...capitalist appropriation is not exclusively or primarily an appropriation of <u>things</u>, but rather an appropriation of subjectivity, of working energy itself, of the physical and intellectual powers of man."[38]

However, Bernstein makes it clear that he has studied the question of absolute versus relative immiseration, and concludes that Marx did not imply only a <u>relative</u> immiseration of the workers. Bernstein notes that in <u>Capital</u>, Volume One, Marx speaks of "a constantly decreasing number of millionaires" and the growth of "the man of misery, of oppression." Bernstein says that,

> "One can ground the catastrophe theory on this contrast, but not on the moral misery caused by the intellectually inferior managers who are to be found in every counting house--in every hierarchical organisation."[39]

It seems here that Bernstein supports an objective, but not a purely subjective basis for a relative "immiseration" and breakdown theory. In addition, he views it as a notion which is simply no longer applicable, an "altogether outworn idea that the realisation of socialism depends on an increasing narrowing of the circle of the well-to-do and an increasing misery of the poor."[40] The time for such developments had already passed by Bernstein's day. He saw absolute pauperization as applying only to early capitalism.[41] Bernstein reflected and verbalized questions posed by the changes that occurred during his epoch of capitalism.

The more capitalism is modified in actuality, the more Marx's laws needed to be qualified.

> "Bernstein's qualifications of the Marxist concentration-of-wealth theories had widespread ramifications in the field of Socialist tactics. These tactics, of course, also rested on the Revisionist modification of the Marxist impoverishment and crisis theories."[42]

Obviously, the tactics must change if one does not necessarily foresee an approaching breakdown of capitalism, and even sees a stabilization of it, as was the case with Bernstein.

Rather than a polarization of classes and immiseration of the proletariat, Bernstein observed that capitalism actually was leading to the differentiation of class relations, despite the increase in the rate of surplus value. He argued

that the distribution of incomes and wealth was not becoming concentrated into fewer hands and that the number of property holders was not decreasing. Here however, Bernstein fails to adequately distinguish between the owners and controllers of capital, citing the rise in corporation shareholders as proof against the notion of class polarization. What this meant for Bernstein then, was that the middle class was not disappearing as was predicted, and that exploitation needed to be measured in ethical, not in economic terms.[43] Bernstein himself stated that economic collapse would be soon if society had developed as socialist theory assumed, but,

> "Far from society being simplified as to its divisions compared with earlier times, it has been graduated and differentiated both in respect of incomes and of business activities."[44]

Since he saw production steadily increasing, Bernstein asked where this surplus product went. He felt that it must either be directed in the form of more wealth to the proletariat, exist fewer capitalists, or exist "a numerous middle class". Bernstein stressed the latter possibility, not seeing a polarization of classes. He stated,

> "If the collapse of modern society depends on the disappearance of the middle ranks between the apex and the base of the social pyramid, if it is dependent upon the absorption of these middle classes by the extremes above and below them, then its realisation is no nearer in England, France, and Germany to-day than at any earlier time in the nineteenth century."[45]

Again critical of Marx's analysis of "class", Bernstein demonstrates that the middle classes need not necessarily become

"proletarianized" and join the working-class at all. In fact, he saw precisely the opposite development occurring. There was no reason why the middle classes could not become more "bourgeois", and actually, Bernstein did not see the new middle class of white collar workers, office and sales clerks, and government employees as being revolutionary.[46]

Bernstein was certainly not opposed to this increasing production and wealth in society, and improved standard of living. What needed to be changed in accordance with this economic development then, was socialist theory. Socialism, for Bernstein did not depend on decreasing social wealth but rather on its increase and development. He stated,

> "If the activity and prospects of social democracy were dependent on the decrease of the "wealthy", then it might indeed lie down to sleep. But the contrary is the case. The prospects of socialism depend not on the decrease but on the increase of social wealth.
>
> Socialism, or the social movement of modern times, has already survived many a superstition, it will also survive this, that its future depends on the concentration of wealth or, if one will put it thus, on the absorption of surplus value by a diminishing group of capitalist mammoths."[47]

Bernstein then, views socialism in a broad framework, encompassing many more socialist theories than only Marxism. This is one of the reasons for his ability to revise the theory in accordance with historical developments. Bernstein does not hold Marxist theory, including its economic assertions, to be sacred dogma.

Bernstein tries to show the lack of a necessary break-

down or polarization by proving the stabilization of capitalism. He looked at the empirical evidence and saw a growing economic prosperity in many areas. This included his notion that there was no decrease in the number of small businesses--

> "...the large industry does not continuously absorb the smaller and medium industries, but that it is growing up beside them."[48]

Bernstein perceived a parallel development of both then, in contrast to Marx's stress on the growing predominance of big business and industry or monopolies. For Bernstein, it was possible to have both large enterprises and a democratic society. "La concentration des entreprises va ainsi de pair avec la décentralisation du capitalisme."[49] This concludes the simultaneous occurrence of a more centralized credit system as well. He saw that credit would aid in stabilizing capitalism while decentralization would lead to its becoming more democratic. The drive towards a monopoly system was viewed by Marx as increasing concentration of both property and industry. However, Bernstein separated these two:

> "...rather it leads, through joint-stock companies, to a diffusion of property, a multiplication of the number of capitalists, a growth in the number of those who share in the benefits of the modern 'social enterprise'. Since the number of capitalists increases rather than diminishes, Marx's discussion of concentration and accumulation of wealth at one pole of society is contradicted and invalidated."[50]

Bernstein refuted Marx's tendency towards a decrease in the number of capitalists, since he tried to base his possibility of socialism on the need for more social wealth and therefore

for more capitalists. Rosa Luxemburg recognized however that Bernstein defined "capital" and "capitalist" differently from Marx. In addition, Colletti criticizes Bernstein's empirical work. An instance of this is on page 47 of his book Evolutionary Socialism, where in order to deduce conclusions with regard to changes in the concentration of capital, Bernstein examines changes in income tax figures. However, he looks at a period of only 13 to 15 years--Saxony from 1879 to 1894; Prussia from 1892 to 1907 and from 1895 to 1908. A broader historical perspective would be helpful in order to determine a "historical tendency", as Marx did.[51] With regard to Bernstein's assertion of the ongoing survival of small and medium-sized enterprises, as opposed to primarily the growth of large, concentrated firms, there is the same problem. He quotes data and percentage increases in the number of large, small, and medium-sized businesses, from 1882 to 1895--a period of just thirteen years. He also dismisses some evidence to the contrary by stating that the "expansion of large industries represent only one side of social development."[52] Bernstein uses the evidence available during a properous period though, to refute Marx's thesis of the tendency in capitalism towards a concentration and accumulation of capital.

Bernstein recognized cartels or trusts as another stabilizing factor and an attempt within capitalism to solve the problem of being forced by competition to expand production or be dissolved, and was in this sense, in advance of his

colleagues in the Second International.

> "Cartels, credit, the improved system of communications, the rise of the working class, insofar as they act to eliminate or at least mitigate the internal contradictions of the capitalist economy, hindering their development and aggravation, ensure for the system the possibility of unlimited survival."[53]

In Bernstein's view, cartels and the regulation of production they allowed signified,

> "...the advent of a new, so to speak, regenerated capitalism which had learned to correct its old faults (anarchy) by 'regulating itself' and hence was capable of indefinite survival."[54]

He sees cartels and credit as possible positive influences with respect to decreasing economic crises--the beginning of a self-regulating economy and therefore no objective necessity for a breakdown in capitalism.

Bernstein argues with Rosa Luxemburg's view that credit can worsen crises and states that,

> "We have seen that the credit system to-day undergoes less, not more, contradictions leading to the general paralysis of production, and so far, therefore, takes a minor place as a factor in forming crises"..."I have recognized its capacity to influence the relation of productive activity to the condition of the market so far as to diminish the danger of crises."[55]

This is particularly important in the light of Bernstein's critique of Marx's theory of breakdown. Bernstein made the astute point that it was more important to consider the possibilities of cartels and trusts, than to simply assume or prophesy their impotence. The question of whether they can defer or stop crises,

> "...becomes a question full of importance as soon as expectations of any kind as regards the movement for the emancipation of the working classes are made dependent upon the question of the general crisis. For then the belief the Kartels are of no effect against crises may be the cause of very disastrous neglect."[56]

When Bernstein looks at socialism's dependence upon Marx's prediction of a breakdown of capitalism, he recognizes the political and tactical importance of examining empirical effects of cartels.

Revisionism actually placed quite a bit of weight upon the economic struggle of the working-class, especially the trade union work. Along with that, Bernstein saw trading cooperative systems as necessary for socialism, as he saw it impossible to socialize all small businesses. This view of Bernstein's was likely partially a product of his contact with the Fabians in England. The Fabians had raised the meaning of the trade-union movement and the consumers cooperatives.

> "Von den Fabiern übernahm Bernstein die Auffassung von den Gewerkschaften als den Baumschulen der Demokratie. Das Interesse der Fabier an der Kommunalisierung verschiedener Unternehmungen und Institutionen ("gas-and-water-socialism") inspirierte nicht nur ihn, sondern auch andere deutsche Sozialdemokraten."

Bernstein supported the Fabians' "municipal socialism" as an alternative to capitalism.[57]

In reading Beatrice Webb's and Franz Oppenheimer's work on the cooperatives, Bernstein found that the workers' production cooperatives were not terribly successful, but it

was otherwise with the consumers cooperatives.[58]

As Bernstein stated, "The trade unions concern themselves with the profit rate of production as the cooperative stores concern themselves with the rate on the sale of goods."[59] The trade unions were indispensable to the emancipation of the working-class for Bernstein and actually in imitation of the Fabian Webbs, Bernstein called the trade unions the democratic element of industry:[60]

> "The trade unions are the democratic element in industry. Their tendency is to destroy the absolutism of capital, and to procure for the worker a direct influence in the management of an industry."[61]

There was a problem of the relation between the SPD and the trade unions though, beginning with the 1893 Cologne Party Congress. Part of this was due to union recruitment of workers regardless of their political attitudes and their apparent participation in capitalism. From 1905, the unions aided in keeping the SPD in its revisionist leanings, though,

> "The unions did not create the Revisionist movement. The leading Revisionists were intellectuals, not union leaders"..."In the climate of opinion in which Revisionism was born, the general prosperity and the structure of the SPD were of far greater importance than the anti-revolutionary "Economism" of the German labor movement."[62]

Once Bismarck's anti-socialist laws were lifted, the industrialization process took place rapidly, there began a period of economic prosperity, and the time was "fruitful for the revisionist tendencies in thought and outlook".[63] Following the economic depression which existed during the period of 1873 to 1895, the relatively weak position of the unions

changed and they gained increasing support from the workers, partially through guaranteeing workers some security. In fact, they came to advocate political neutrality and, "By 1900, the trade-unions had ceased to justify their existence as recruiting stations for the political party."[64] They virtually forced the SPD into the position of attempting to hold onto workers' support--one of the numerous factors which led to their development of revisionist policies.

There was a marked increase in German prosperity during the 1800's, with a great industrial expansion during the 1850's and 1860's, with many historians referring to the years from 1849 to 1873 as consisting of a trend to an Industrial Revolution. By 1871, Germany was even the second coal-producing country in the world. Railroads were nationalized in the latter part of the 19th century, Germany began to export capital after the Franco-Prussian war (1870-71), and generally reflected prosperous economic growth overall throughout the century.

Despite a recession in Europe, sometimes referred to as Europe's "Great Depression" from 1873 to 1896, Germany experienced constant growth and expansion of its industry and commerce. This included iron, steel, chemical and electrical industries (especially in the 1880's and 1890's) with the amount of overseas trade increasing.[66] Gay summarizes the reasons for Germany's economic prosperity as: the strengthening of the German state due to unification, giving aid

to industry and commerce, railroads, highways and shipping, and the 1879 Protective Tariff desired by agrarians and industrial magnates, resulting in more trade, industry, and agriculture. In addition, Germany's late economic start allowed it to learn from Britain's errors. Gay also recognizes Germany's physical and cultural state of readiness for development--its timber, iron and coal deposits, and educated and skilled labour force. These conditions gave rise to the major boom of 1895 till the first World War, in which revisionism emerged.[67]

This increasing prosperity in the late 19th century then, furnished Bernstein with the evidence needed to support his thesis that capitalism was stabilizing economically, not leading to a breakdown or large crisis. This prosperity of course affected Bernstein's development, particularly since as noted, he dealt with a fairly short period of time. In fact, perhaps this led Bernstein and the revisionists at times too far in the opposite direction from Marx--to an overly-optimistic view of the strengths of capitalism.

> "The effect of prosperity upon German social democracy was twofold: it sapped the proletariat's will to revolt by making nonsense of the revolutionary professions of the Erfurt Program, and it gave grounds for theoretical skepticism regarding several of Marx's basic tenets."[68]

It led to a more evident gap between the theory and practice of the SPD and led the revisionists such as Bernstein to question certain of Marx's theories. For Bernstein, as was

shown, this led to his critique of Marx's theory of value and surplus value, and his doctrine that progress depends on the deterioration of social conditions. Bernstein saw that the latter theory did not affect the working-class movement, but rather asserted that the class' actions are actually dependent on and in favor of the growth of social wealth. Bernstein particularly stressed the problems with this teleological theory of Marx for socialism, the theory that there is a necessary historical development of the class struggle, and the consequences it had for parties in deciding their tactics. The question of reformist or revolutionary strategies for socialist parties was dependent not only on their view of whether or not there was a pending economic crisis, but also on their notion of the state. What they believed they could or could not achieve through the existing state of course affected their conclusions of the tactics which should be utilized to achieve a socialist society. This is why it is necessary to turn now to a comparison of Bernstein's and Marx's theories of the state.

REFERENCES

1. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 298.

2. Ibid, 70 and 72.

3. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 227 and 224.

4. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 190-1.

5. Ibid, 212.

6. Bernstein, "Zur Theorie des Lohngesetzes und Verwandtes" 1890-91, in Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Sozialismus, 71:
"The wage problem is a sociological problem, that does not allow itself to be explained in purely economic terms."

7. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 42.

8. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 77

9. Rosdolsky, The Making of Marx's "Capital", 557.

10. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 80.

11. Marx, Grundrisse, 104.

12. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 24.

13. Marx, Capital, 38.

14. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 207.

15. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 84.

16. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 210.

17. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 265: Luxemburg, Reform or Revolution, in Gesammelte Werke, Volume 3: "Gegen den Reformismus", 73.

18. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 91.

19. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 183.

20. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 38-9.

21. Ibid, 30 and 38-39.

22. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 111.

23. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 205-6.

24. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 119 and 122-3.

> "Bernstein did not want to say explicitly that there was no exploitation. On the contrary, he wanted to say, that this was not explained through Marx's theory and that it also required no explanation. It is very clear, that Bernstein on this point used as a pattern for his work, Sombarts and Schmidts critique and their summary, that is, Croces critique."

25. Ibid, 21.

26. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 39.

27. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 183-4.

28. Ibid, 180.

29. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 216.

30. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 180.

31. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 34.

32. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 181-82:

> Bernstein, "Arbeitswert oder Nutzwert?", NZ xvii, 2(1899), 548-49.

33. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 120, 326, and 119.

34. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 92.

35. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 214.

36. Ibid, 93.

37. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 123.

38. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 102.

39. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 176.

40. Ibid, 175.

41. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 223.

42. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 190 and 174.

43. Gneuss in Labedz, Revisionism, 37 and Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 169-172.

44. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 49.

45. Ibid, 50 and 72.

46. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 209.

47. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 48.

48. Ibid, 62.

49. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 222.

50. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 99.

51. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 47.

52. Ibid., 64.

53. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 54.

54. Ibid, 61.

55. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 87.

56. Ibid, 93.

57. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 321 and 138:

> "Bernstein took over from the Fabians the view of the trade unions as the nurseries of democracy. The interest of the Fabians in the communization of different enterprises and institutions (gas-and-water socialism), inspired not only him, but also other German social democrats."

58. Ibid, 123.

59. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 135.

60. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 124.

61. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 139.

62. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 134 and 140.

63. Bottomore and Goode, Austro-Marxism, 2 and 3.

64. Schorske, German Social Democracy, 15.

65. Henderson, The Industrial Revolution on the Continent, 46, 62, 69 and 73.

66. Ibid, 69.

67. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 122.

68. Ibid, 121.

CHAPTER TWO

Marx and Bernstein on the State

Marx on the State

The examination of the approaches to the issue of the state on the part of Marx and Bernstein, will be limited primarily to their views on the state in general, in this chapter. Due to the amount of material regarding their views of reform and revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the withering away of the state, those aspects will be dealt with in the subsequent chapter. However, it is important to bear in mind that all of these areas are closely interconnected with Marx's and Bernstein's views of the state in general, and are interdependent. Therefore, some of the implications of their more general approaches will be noted throughout this chapter, as well as some of the origins of their views.

In any discussion of Bernstein's view of the state and political practices, it is essential that Marx's approach to the same points be contrasted with it, for it was Marx's theory that Bernstein was attempting to revise and Marx was the single most important influence on Bernstein's own intellectual development. In Bernstein's work, there was always the unmistakable influence of the ideas of Marx and Engels. Peter Gay states that Bernstein was indebted to Marx and Engels for some notions, and when Bernstein dissented from them, he would

explain the reasons for those disagreements or revisions. Therefore, it is vitally important to "refer to Marxism in detail when we analyze Revisionism."[1] Only through such a comparison does it become clear that there are major basic differences between the two theoretically, and that the implications for political practice are divergent. However, it is essential to note that both Marx and Bernstein presented theories and views of the state that were wholly in line with the political practices prevalent during the time of their writing. Therefore, both were involved in separate developments of a unified theory and practice within working-class movements. Such a unity has not always and currently does not exist in many of the Socialist or Communist parties, so it remains a vital issue in the area of social change. For example, the theory and practice within Bernstein's own party, the SPD, was not unified around the turn of the century. The party still maintained a revolutionary theory while moving towards reformism in practice.

Marx and Bernstein therefore were closely attuned to the dynamics of their eras, though they lived under differing socio-economic and political conditions. This acute perception of their situations contributed to that ability to develop a theoretical and practical unity. However, for this to be achieved in Bernstein's case, it required a "revision" of Marx's theory. This is because the conditions and working-class movement in the 1890's had changed a great deal from those in the mid-1800's when Marx was formulating much of his approach.

Under these new conditions, Marx's original theory no longer coincided with the changed economic conditions and political practice. This was true of much of the western world then, though I will be concentrating upon an examination of the German situation, which was in the limelight at that time of the second international--the time when Bernstein "revised" Marx's theory most clearly, in an attempt to reunite the gradually-diverging theory and practice.

An example of the very different conditions under which Marx and Bernstein developed their theories is the contrast in economic conditions and relations of production, which affected the deduction each made regarding the tactics of practice needed to institute change in a socialist direction. Marx had been in the position to see the period of early industrialization in England, the most fully-developed capitalist nation in the early to mid-19th Century. He observed the most negative aspects of the wage labour-capital relation, generally unrestrained by social legislation. Marx saw the growing social class antagonisms and tensions, the reluctance of the British state to intervene in that area, and the difficult conditions of living and work of the British working-class. In contrast to this situation, Bernstein's views of the state were influenced by the apparent lessening of the acute tension between working and capitalist classes in the late 1800's, the growing economic prosperity, and the enactment of social legislation pertaining to conditions and relations of production, by the state. In Britain, for instance, regulation began with

the limits on working hours for children and women, and the ten-hour working-day (the struggle for which Marx discusses in Capital, Volume 1, Chapter 10). The SPD was faced with the dilemma of whether or not they should press for democratization of the state, essentially a bourgeois, reformist measure, but one which was seen as necessary before further progress in terms of class struggle and socialism could be made. It is evident then that the specific conditions in Germany made it especially difficult for the German socialists to remain consistent between practical political decisions and revolutionary theoretical views of the state and the working-class party in relation to it. When the Anti-Socialist legislation ended in 1890, the change for the SPD from an illegal to a fully-parliamentary party, further exacerbated this dilemma of the division between theory and practice, as tactical problems then became a practical and immediate issue for the SPD. It was partly this increasing gap for the SPD, which led to Bernstein's development of Revisionist theory, bringing it into line with the increasingly reformist, parliamentary practice of the party. This was confirmed in the party's "Erfurt Program" of 1891, where the legal and parliamentary path was chosen as the means of obtaining its power and goals.

This reformist approach to the state became part of Bernstein's revisionist theory, and contrasted with the more revolutionary approach of Marx's original theory. This is due to a number of factors, including their views of the state

and political society in general, the specific socio-economic and political conditions of their respective eras, and the influence of other people and different theoretical approaches upon Marx and Bernstein. What resulted was a very central difference between the two, regarding the tactical debate: reform versus revolution.

I will discuss some of the features of each view on the state and demonstrate some of the roots of each of those theories, which created the more specific reform/revolution divergence. One of the difficulties that arises with regard to Marx's approach, is that he concentrates more upon the "anatomy of civil society" than upon a theory of the state or political society. However, it is possible to develop from reviewing a number of Marx's writings, a definite notion of Marx's approach.

In approaching Marx's treatment of the issue of the state, it is first of all essential to recognize that to Marx, the modern state is not separate from the class struggle, but rather, is situated <u>in</u> that struggle. It is necessary to differentiate between the basis of the state and its form in general--a form that presents itself as taking the appearance of "universality" or the general will of the people it "governs". In reality, however, this is achieved by the state's abstraction from the concrete content, which is actually outside the state. In a modern, capitalist society, that consists of those class differences which separate people in civil, as opposed to political, society. Marx expresses this aspect of the nature of the state when he says in <u>The Holy Family</u> that,

> "...the modern state has as its natural basis civil society and the man of civil society, ie., the independent man linked with other men only by the ties of private interest and unconscious natural necessity..."[2]

It is important to note that although this chapter concentrates upon Marx's and Bernstein's views of the state in order to highlight Bernstein's revisions in that area, to Marx the state was not his central concern. He consistently stressed the fact that civil society was primary, with the state being an excrescence of civil society. The state is wholly formal and therefore, cannot have civil society as its content. Marx states in The German Ideology that,

> "The material life of individuals, which by no means depends merely on their "will", their mode of production and form of intercourse, which mutually determine each other--this is the real basis of the state and remains so at all the stages at which division of labour and private property are still necessary quite independently of the will of individuals. These actual relations are in no way created by the state power; on the contrary they are the power creating it."[3]

Therefore for Marx, civil society is the active force. The state is merely its passive excresence. Marx points out the importance of empirical observation in bringing out "the connection of the social and political structure with production", and the fact that the political state emerges out ot the latter.

> "The social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they really are; ie. as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will."[4]

It is not only a question of emphasizing the importance of civil society, but of methodology:

> "Technology discloses man's mode of dealing with Nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from them. Every history of religion even, that fails to take account of this material basis, is uncritical. It is, in reality, much easier to discover by analysis the earthly core of the misty creations of religion, than, conversely, it is, to develop from the actual relations of life the corresponding celestial forms of those relations. The latter method is the only materialistic, and therefore the only scientific one."[5]

When this method is not followed, Marx sees the result being a reversal of the active civil society and passive state relation. Marx criticized Hegel for doing precisely that--

> "He does not want the actual universal, the political state, to be determined by civil society, but rather civil society to be determined by the state."[6]

In his Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right", Marx also expands on this point:

> "Family and civil society are the presuppositions of the state; they are the really active things; but in speculative philosophy it is reversed. But if the Idea is made subject, then the real subjects--civil society, family, circumstances, caprice, etc.--become unreal, and take on the different meaning of objective moments of the Idea."[7]

To avoid falling into Idealism, then, Marx holds it as necessary to utilize the materialist method whereby the state comes to be recognized as the passive product of civil society. This is an essential component of Marx's approach to the issue of the state.

Marx states in The German Ideology that class struggles

are actually the basis of the state:

> "...all struggles within the State...are merely the illusory forms in which the real struggles of the different classes are fought out among one another."[8]

It is important to note that this has not always been the case however--the state as a "parasitical excrescence" emerged with the division of labour at a certain degree of economic development.[9] Marx sees the state as becoming an autonomous entity when property became separated from the natural community, and private property came to dominate man's economic relations. "Through the emancipation of private property from the community, the State has become a separate entity, beside and outside civil society."[10] In addition, from a historical perspective, Marx states that,

> "The atomism into which civil society is driven by its political act results necessarily from the fact that the commonwealth, the communal being, within which the individual exists, is reduced to civil society separate from the state, or in other words, that the political state is an abstraction of civil society."[11]

Marx states that, "The abstraction of the state as such belongs only to modern times because the abstraction of private life belongs only to modern times."[12] This is due to the fact that, historically, this is a recent development--actually only since the predominance in society of the bourgeoisie:

> "Civil society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie; the social organisation evolving directly out of production and commerce, which in all ages forms the basis, of the State and of the rest of the idealistic superstructure, has, however, always been designated by the same name."[13]

This is a historically-specific approach to modern bourgeois society on Marx's part, then. He also deals with the state in general, where the content is the same, as well as specific national states where forms may differ. For example, in comparing the North American and Prussian states, Marx says the content of law and state is the same, "the republic is a mere state form."[14]

The class separations and inequalities exist despite the formal, legal equality in modern political society, whereby all "citizens" are granted the same juridical rights, privileges, and obligations. What this means is that formally the state acts on behalf of all members of society, but due to continually conflicting class interests, it concretely acts in favor of one class interest or another, depending upon the specific circumstances. It affects the form the class struggle takes, but the state does not eliminate that struggle from the sphere of civil society. Civil society may be defined as the sphere of private, competing interests in the organization of production of a society where the mode of production of capital is general and dominant, necessarily entailing separate public and private spheres. As Krader describes,

> "By civil scoety is meant a distinct kind of human society, one which is internally divided, being composed of mutually opposed classes of people. The abstract sum of many particular societies, civil society is counterposed to historically concrete societies which make it up..."[15]

Marx himself refers in The German Ideology to civil society as being the commercial and industrial life which is interna-

tionally asserted as "nationality" and "inwardly must organise itself as state"[16]--the latter being wholly formal.

He consistently emphasizes the importance of economic and social relations of production in constituting the state. For example, Marx states that "political power is precisely the official expression of antagonism in civil society."[17] In fact, Marx says that,

> "...the state is held together by civil life... therefore, it is natural necessity, the essential human properties, however estranged they may seem to be, and interest that hold the members of civil society together; civil, not political life is their real tie."[18]

In contrast to the Social Contract theorists, Marx does not view the state then as binding individuals together to form a "society"--the "atoms" of civil society are not in actuality, "atoms" at all.

It is important to note that Marx did not develop his views of the state and civil society in an intellectual vacuum, but rather in response to a number of approaches and facts. One of these was the influence of Hegel.

It is not possible to do justice to Marx's critique of Hegel here, but Marx still retained much of the influence which Hegel had upon him throughout his writings, such as his notion of the dialectic. Some of the relation between Marx's and Hegel's views of the dialectical relation of the state and civil society can be seen in Marx's Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right', when Marx states that to Hegel, the opposition of the state versus civil society is fixed; the

state resides outside civil society, not within it. Marx says that with this opposition, Hegel actually describes the current (then) empirical state of affairs.[19]

Through Marx's detailed study and critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right', he dealt with this same issue of the state and civil society, as had Hegel and Rousseau.

> "Marx came to appreciate fully the nature of the problem through his reading of The Philosophy of Right, in which Hegel struggles with the same problem and through his historical research into the genesis and nature of the modern state. It is no mere coincidence that one of the first works he examined and excerpted at Kreuznach in the course of his critical analysis of the Philosophy of Right was Le Contrat Social."[20]

In that critique, Marx combined his criticisms of Hegel's philosophical doctrine with a critique of the existing political and social order. Marx himself states that,

> "The criticism of the German philosophy of right and of the state, which was given its most logical, profound and complete expression by Hegel, is at once the critical analysis of the modern state and of the reality connected with it, and the definite negation of all the past forms of consciousness in German jurisprudence and politics, whose most distinguished and most general expression, raised to the level of a science, is precisely the speculative philosophy of right."[21]

Marx had also made such a critique when working the year prior to the writing of the Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right' with the Rheinische Zeitung, before it was suppressed in 1843.[22] Specifically, Marx attacked the Prussian monarchical state, of whose deficiencies he was painfully aware. Far from being the realization of rational freedom and political reason, which Marx saw as the required basis of any state, he perceived

the concrete Prussian state as being based on the egoism of narrow, private interests.[23] Evidently, this practical familiarity of Marx with the particularly repressive political conditions in Germany, partially contributed to the development of his outlook on the state. In addition, the U.S. state was important to Marx as the best example of the bourgeois state, as the most highly-developed form. Marx's study of the 1848 French Revolutions, culminating in his work, The Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850, was another influence due to empirical factors. In this case, it particularly affected Marx's approach to the issue of reform and revolution, which will be explored in the following chapter.

Because Marx sees the state as being based on relations of production and civil society, he is able to assert that it is based on the characteristics of them--such as competition and "freedom of labour". In other words, the relatively recent historical formality of juridical equality and freedom, arises out of the economic relations of a society based upon production of commodities. In an exchange of commodities, including the sale of the worker's labour-power to the capitalist, both parties to the contract are juridically equal. Otherwise, the contract would be considered invalid.

As Rubin states, civil law and the notion of "free contract", the **equality** of commodity producers, is an essential feature of the capitalist economy. It connects in an obvious manner, directly, the legal and State systems with the economy, where the commodities are equalized through the equality of

their producers.[24] This equality of the producers and their freedom of "free will" in entering the contract is characteristic of civil society. Krader states that,

> "The history of freedom in civil society is the history of the development of the form of freedom and equality in exchange and contract, and is opposed to the development of the substance of freedom, whereby the wants are met."[25]

However, in concrete terms, the labourer is only juridically equal to or as free as the employer with whom he is contracting. This is because the worker's commodity, his capacity to labour, is really only such in appearance; in reality, it is a "state of need"--he must sell his labour-power in order to reproduce and maintain himself.[26]

Marx deals with this contradiction between civil society's inequalities and political society's formal equality by looking at the genesis of the modern state. Its illusory general interest provided the unifying commonality that was lost with the original alienation of property from the community and the state from civil society, yet the state has in reality remained an institution of a class society.

Marx also sees jurisprudence as being the expression of economic relations, much as the state. In fact, Marx says that, "Legislation, whether political or civil, never does more than proclaim, express in words, the will of economic relations."[27] Historically, "Law has here taken the place of privilege"... the "public system is not opposed by any privileged exclusivity."[28] As law exists at present, it

> "...is synchronous with the formation of the state"..."The relationship between law and the state is not problematic, for both are social excrescences arising under certain conditions of social production, disappearing at another stage."[29]

Marx has shown that in the modern society, reality is inverted--the state uses law and expresses it as being in the general interest of the society, to guarantee and protect the right of people to private and public property and competitive, individual interests. Lucio Colletti states in this regard, that:

> "Paradox reigns therefore: the general will is invoked to confer absolute value on individual caprice; society is invoked in order to render a social interests sacred and intangible; the cause of inequality among them (private property) can be acknowledged as fundamental and absolute. Everything is upside down."[30]

Therefore it is possible to see that state guarantee of legal equality and freedom is consistent--both are part of the "formal" aspect of society, arising from

> "...the formal equality of individuals engaged in the exchange of exchange-values in societies based upon the production of exchange-value, i.e. commodities."[31]

For this to be the situation, relations based upon commodity production where equivalence is the prime characteristic must be generalized to most of that society. In Capital, Marx refers to value as converting "...every product into a social hieroglyphic."[32] For products of labour to possess a common quality of value or homogeneous, congealed labour-power, that labour must be equalised. As Marx states in his discussion

of the two-fold character of labour,

> "The equalisation of the most different kinds of labour can be the result only of an abstraction from their inequalities, or of reducing them to their common denominator, viz., expenditure of human labour-power or human labour in the abstract."[33]

The same process of abstraction was described previously as being characteristic of the state, in order to arrive at a similar, formally-equalized, commonality. The abstract state is a suitable institution to Marx as is

> "Christianity with its cultus of abstract man", "...for a society based upon the production of commodities, in which the producers in general enter into social relations with one another by treating their products as commodities and values, whereby they reduce their individual private labour to the standard of homogeneous human labour..."[34]

This fetishistic treatment of commodities disguises the social relations of labour, the inequalities of civil society, that are actually the content of these exchanged products--an example of Marx's simultaneous use of both logic and history.

The equivalence of commodities (containing the same socially-necessary, average amount of labour-time) exchanged by their juridically-equal owners, and that of the state, as pointed out earlier, are new forms of the original bonds of individuals with their community--social relations which now appear "...as what they are--thingly relations of persons and social relations of things." "The social bond among individuals has become mediate and abstract."[35] Basically, their social bond is now in the form of the modern state which recognizes them as equal citizens, in contrast to their actual class differences--class differences, because Marx refers to in-

dividuals in a social sense, as "class individuals". The individual himself in fact, embodies the separation of civil society and political society--class characteristics and conflicts, in opposition to his formal, juridical self. For Marx, the process of abstraction dialectically unites these forms, civil and political society.

Money, as the universal equivalent, is actually abstracted from its true content--concrete, social labour, one of the sources of real wealth, nature being the other source. In exchange of commodities, the contract between the two owners of commodities requires that people recognize each other as abstract, legal entities (as discussed earlier).

This process of abstraction (a form, which can never dispense with its content) has its subjective and objective corollary in the state and citizenship. The subjects of the labour that produces those commodities must be "citizens" universally with equal rights and privileges, with the freedom to enter contracts such as those required in the exchange of commodities, in the modern, "representative" state. The state is abstracted from the needs and capacities of individuals who comprise the state and civil society. This process is characteristic however only of modern society, as commodity production does not necessarily require the constitution of citizenship in all ages.[36]

The state, is the externalization of the public sphere of civil society (composed of public and private spheres) and therefore derives mediately, not immediately, from civil soci-

ety or opposed social classes.[37] Krader explains that the state is,

> "...the organ of the public sphere that arches over the opposition between the social classes regarding the distribution of the socially necessary and the socially surplus product."[38]

and is

> "...the concrete organ for the regulation and control of these oppositions"[39]

--namely between social classes as well as within the class that extracts surplus value. For the latter reason, we can see why it is necessary for the state to act in the interests of collective capital or the ruling class, rather than on behalf of individual capitalists. This implies of course that the capitalist class has internally competing interests and does not act as a unified, "conspiratorial" whole. Marx refers to this aspect of the state in The German Ideology:

> "...the practical struggle of these particular interests, which actually constantly run counter to the common and illusory common interests, necessitates practical intervention and restraint by the illusory "general" interest in the form of the state."[40]

He saw that the state acted to unite in a sense, the members of a class and therefore regulate within and between social classes of civil society.

Because the state is in an asymmetrical relation with civil society and affects the organization of its production and reproduction, the state can influence the forms though not the basic content of class conflict--again, within and between classes.

One example of state action being viewed by Marx as affecting production and indirectly, reproduction, yet leaving the inequalities of civil society intact, is in Capital when he refers to the legislated limits on the working hours of women and children. In one way, the state was limited in that it virtually was forced to legislate for a "normal" working-day to ensure the continued reproduction of the working-class, in the interests of both the workers and the capitalists collectively, as mentioned earlier. The immediate interests of individual capitalists had to be sacrificed in this instance, for the benefit of the capitalist class as a whole. Changes in the role in the family of working-class women and the greater well-being of the children changed the structure and form of working-class life and reproduction significantly. However, the changes did not include any elimination or destruction of the bases of class conflicts or inequalities by the state, through its legislation.

After having summarized the nature of the abstracted state in general for Marx, it is necessary to connect this with the more concrete, historically-specific forms of the state. Only in this way can it be seen how the state's relation to civil society and its social classes affect its actions and policies in specific cases. Krader explains that,

> "The state as an abstract form does not vary during the course of civil society, whereas the concrete states vary in their historical forms, as theocratic, aristocratic, democratic, etc."[41]

Marx deals with both the abstract and concrete or specific

states throughout his writings, but emphasizes that it is important to be specific with respect to particular nation-states. He criticizes Max Stirner in The German Ideology for confusing or equating the Prussian state with the state in general, and therefore, for not maintaining a dialectic of theory and history. Marx says that, "...the 'state' is Stirner's illusion about the Prussian state, which he confuses with the state in general."[42] In contrast to Stirner, Marx deals with the German or Prussian state as it was at that time, referring to it as appearing abnormally autonomous.

> "Thus, the state built itself up into an apparently independent force, and this position, which in other countries was only transitory--a transition stage--it has maintained in Germany until the present day."[43]

He connects this peculiarity however to relations of production and civil society--the character of the division of labour, as well as the ineffectiveness of certain social classes.[44] As noted earlier, one of the politically impotent classes in German society at that time, was the bourgeoisie. Marx in fact stresses in The German Ideology, that empirical observation must bring out "in each separate instance..." "the connection of the social and political structure with production."[45] Marx then applied this approach in his writings on the Prussian state and German society, as well as to the British situation, in Capital.

However, Marx's references to the modern state "in general" from the backdrop of his analyses of specific situations, so that one cannot actually separate the two completely.

They must remain for Marx in the dialectical relation of abstract (the state in general) and concrete (the specific state). Both aspects of the state must be considered simultaneously as they are one and the same in concrete instances.

For example, Marx looks at the specific case of the English state's enactment of factory legislation. The state acted neither entirely as an instrument of the English bourgeois class, nor as a completely autonomous, neutral institution unaffected by conflicting interests in civil society. This is why Marx was able to see the Factory Acts' enactment, "...by a state that is ruled by capitalist and landlord"[46] as non-contradictory, despite the benefits accruing to the workers as a result of that legislation. With the aid of the landed aristocracy-working class coalition, the state was able to take the form of universality, and simultaneously act out of necessity and the interests of the working and capitalist classes.

This persistent division in modern society between civil inequality and political equality, is also demonstrated as Marx points out, by the English state's manner of dealing with the Factory Acts, once legislated. Basically, the state declared those welfare measures to be essential but did not provide the means for enforcing the content of that legislation.

In addition, the inequalities present in the civil society can counteract or weaken the state's welfare measures.[47] As Marx says in reference to the English example,

> "What strikes us, then, in the English legislation of 1867, is, on the one hand, the necessity imposed on the parliament of the ruling classes, of adopting in principle measures so extraordinary, and on so great a scale, against the excesses of capitalistic exploitation; and on the other hand, the hesitation, the repugnance, and the bad faith, with which it lent itself to the task of carrying those measures into practice."[48]

From this, it is possible to recognize Marx's analysis of a specific example as not existing in a theoretical vacuum, but rather as a concrete example and test of his analysis of the state in general, an expression of the dialectic of theory and history. In this instance, it is the relation of the actual division between civil and political societies (of actual inequality as opposed to formal equality), to the activities of the state in England. Those were also both juridically equal in proclamation as opposed to inegalitarian actions through social agencies, the concrete forms of the abstract state.

Bernstein on the State

Bernstein was a socialist who had to deal with very different historical conditions from those that Marx had faced in the mid-19th Century. By the end of that era, the economic and political realities had changed enormously. This change contributed to Bernstein's revisions of Marx's theoretical and practical conclusions, after having thoroughly studied those theories and the new social conditions. In addition, Bernstein was influenced by many different approaches and people, than was Marx during his time. It is important in

comparing the two theories, to examine the influences on Bernstein while looking at his views of the state. Only in this way is it possible to ascertain the origins of Bernstein's approach.

Bernstein's reading of Engels' Anti-Dühring in the Vorwärts, from January of 1877 to July, 1878 (aimed at the growing importance of Dühring in German social democracy), apparently influenced Bernstein in the direction of Marxism, including originally, Marx's views of the state.[49] Gustafsson states that this text brought Bernstein to Marxism by the Winter of 1878-9, when he acted as Private Secretary for Karl Höchberg in Lugano, Switzerland. During the 1870's in Germany, there were actually three major socialist influences--those of Marx, Lassalle, and Dühring. A form of narrow Marxism actually became dominant by the time of the Second International, but it was certainly not uncontested, particularly in Germany.[50]

Numerous influences later altered the direction of Bernstein's intellectual and political development, such as the socialist approaches of Lassalle, the English Fabians, and Engels. In addition to such factors of course, Bernstein was conducting his own studies on more empirical and economic questions. Gustafsson sees that after 1891, there was a very gradual shift on the part of Bernstein away from orthodox Marxist notions. Despite the predominance of Marx's theories during the 1890's in Germany, there still existed a number of others, primarily of a reformist nature. Some of these were

Georg von Vollmar, the academicians or "Katheder-Sozialisten", and Lassalle. It is important to keep in mind that other European socialist movements contained a number of reformists as well, such as Jean Jaures in France.[51]

Some of the changes in Bernstein's views dealt with his theory of the state, for example, his contention that capitalism could develop into socialism through legal struggle. Bernstein began with issues of an economic nature (such as questions regarding the possibility of polarization of the bourgeois and proletarian classes or disappearance of the middle classes), how far in the future realization of socialism was likely to be, and appropriate tactics or methods for implementing features or different forms of socialism. In addition, Gustafsson notes that, "dem Kommentar und der Nachschrift zur deutschen Ausgabe der 'Geschichte der französischen Revolution von 1848' von Louis Héritier, die Bernstein 1895 oder 1896 verfaßte", was an important step in the formulation of Bernstein's approach to the state, particularly with regard to the issue of reform and revolution, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. In this study of Héritier's book, Bernstein was on almost every point, in opposition to the 1895 publication of Marx's work, The Class Struggles in France.[52]

Lucio Colletti connects the practical political needs of the S.P.D. to that party's notion of the state and that of Bernstein. "The revisionists at least possessed a theory of the relationship of the 'working people' to the

State, although this theory was in no way a Marxist one."[53] After the recall of Bismarck's anti-socialist laws in 1890, the S.P.D. needed to make basic decisions about how they were going to utilize their growing parliamentary strength. The S.P.D. seemed even by 1885, "prepared to reform a system which they totally opposed in principle". Some evidence for this is the drafting of a Workmen's Protection Bill by Bebel and the S.P.D., introduced in the Reichstag in 1885.[54] In other words, the tactical problems of which Engels wrote in the Introduction to The Class Struggles in France 1848-1850, became then an important, practical and immediate issue to the S.P.D. and were dealt with by Bernstein for that reason. In March of 1895, the party organ Vorwärts published excerpts from Engels' Introduction, where Engels referred to the methods of struggle used against the established order in 1848 as outdated. Engels stated that technical and military advances had in fact strengthened the position of the ruling classes.[55] Gustafsson notes actually that Bernstein's reading of Engels' observations led to his conclusion that the Industrial Revolution on the continent after 1848 was a new situation for the socialist workers' movement. Engels' introduction was a major starting point for Bernstein's revisionism.[56] In his introduction Engels stated that:

> "Die Geschichte hat aber auch uns unrecht gegeben, hat unsere damalige Ansicht als eine Illusion enthüllt. Sie ist noch weiter gegangen: Sie hat nicht nur unseren damaligen Irrtum zerstört, sie hat auch die Bedingungen total umgewälzt, unter denen das Proletariat zu kämpfen hat. Die Kampfweise von 1848 ist heute in jeder Beziehung

> veraltet, und das ist ein Punkt, der bei dieser Gelegenheit näher untersucht zu werden verdient ...Die Geschichte hat uns und allen, die ähnlich dachten, unrecht gegeben. Sie hat klargemacht, daß der Stand der ökonomischen Entwicklung auf dem Kontinent damals noch bei weitem nicht reif war fur die Beseitigung der kapitalistischen Produktion...Die Rebellion alten Stils, der Straßenkampf mit Barikaden, der bis 1848 überall die letzte Entscheidung gab, war bedeutend veraltet."[57]

Bernstein was frequently historically-specific in his writings, since the German S.P.D. was existing in quite a different socio-political milieu than those of other European socialist parties. Referring to this problem of tactics in general, Bernstein stated in his book, Evolutionary Socialism, that

> "At a given moment, therefore, one can probably set up general political principles of social democracy with a claim that they apply to all countries, but no programme of action applicable for all countries is possible."[58]

In the specific case of Germany, Bernstein emphasizes the need for political rights of universal suffrage and participation. He saw them as important gains for the S.P.D. to work towards:

> "The conquest of political power necessitates the possession of political rights; and the most important problem of tactics which German social democracy has at the present time to solve, appears to me to be to devise the best ways for the extension of the political and economic rights of the German working classes."[59]

Bernstein wanted a "civic" society, where all citizens had equal civic rights, as a basic progression in Germany. His reasoning behind this statement emerges in the following passage:

> What is the struggle against, or the abolition of, a civic society? What does it mean specially in Germany, in whose greatest and leading state, Prussia, we are still constantly concerned with first getting rid of a great part of feudalism which stands in the path of civic development? No man thinks of destroying civic society as a civilised ordered system of society. On the contrary, social democracy does not wish to break up this society and make all its members proletarians together; it labours rather incessantly at raising the worker from the social position of a proletarian to that of a citizen, and thus to make citizenship universal. It does not want to set up a proletarian society instead of a civic society, but a socialist order of society instead of a capitalist one."[60]

Revisionist interpretation of Marx's economic views contributed to the S.P.D.'s decision at Erfurt (1891), to choose legal, parliamentary means of obtaining their power and goals.

> "...the naturalistic objectivism which is the counterpart to this concept of 'economic evolution' had its counterpart in the dissolution of the Marxist theory of the State."..."The theory of the State in the Marxism of the Second International was the theory in Engels' Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884)."[61]

In this work, Engels arrives at a theory of the State "in general" or the abstract state, rather than a view of the state in a particular, modern society. What this contributed to is an ahistorical approach to the concept of the state on the part of the S.P.D. This separation resulted in a view of the form of the state as consciously produced by the ruling class and therefore emphasis was placed by the S.P.D. on the need for the gaining of power within the State system by individuals (though Bernstein argued with this). Power also was no longer considered to have a necessary class character

to it, nor was the state. The structure itself was no longer necessarily seen as needing to be changed since it was not intimately related to class interests, a contrast to Marx's dialectical approach.

Pierre Angel says that Bernstein utilizes Engels' view of the origin of the state as containing both positive and negative characteristics, as proof that the state should not be seen merely as an instrument of oppression. However, Bernstein does note that Marx and Engels relapse at times into that view, for example, in Anti-Dühring, where Engels calls the state a simple organ of repression. Bernstein's explanation for such relapses is that they underestimated peoples' capacity through democracy to change the state and exclude dictatorship. Bernstein's emphasis then, is not upon the class interests of the state, but rather the "universal will" aspect. Angel states that for Bernstein, "L'État n'y est plus au service d'une classe, mais obéit a l'intérêt général."[62] --the state is no longer at the service of one class, rather it obeys the general interest.

Colletti emphasizes the origins of the S.P.D.'s and some of Bernstein's views in Engels' works in his introduction to Marx's Early Writings:

> "Engels and Lenin, however, tend noticeably to attribute such characteristics to the state in general. They fail to grasp fully the complex mechanism whereby the state is really abstracted from society--and hence the whole organic, objective process which produces their separation from one another. Because of this

> they do not perceive the intimate connection between such separation and the particular structures of modern society. The most obvious consequence of the confusion is their marked subjectivism and voluntarism, based on their conception of the state as a 'machine' knowingly, consciously formed by the ruling class in deliberate pursuit of its own interest."[63]

What Bernstein picked up from these notions and carried on, was the reference to the state in general, rather than Marx's notion of the modern, representative state, and the lack of a consistent dialectical relation between theory and history; the general and the particular. This approach, to Colletti, is closely connected to Bernstein's economic views and the practical political policies which later emerged as revisionism.

This lack of a notion of how the modern state is separated from society results in a lack of understanding of its abstraction and fundamental nature, very much as the theory of fetishism was under-valued. Bernstein's acceptance of the sphere of political society or the state as "given", autonomous, and neutral, led to his perception of the various forms in capitalist society, but he did not question whether there was a unity. Such an acceptance of these spheres as separate and for example, the separation of law and economics as two separate spheres or sciences,

> "...is traced back by Marx to the division into economic or 'civil' society and 'political' society or the State, a phenomenon specifically characteristic of modern capitalist society."[64]

This view of the nature of the state as independent was also common to the Austro-Marxists--they saw state intervention

as capable of leading the way to socialism through an organized economic system. They tended to support reformism as opposed to revolution, due to their notion of "the possibility of using existing State machinery to accomplish the transition to a socialist society."[65]

Both Rosdolsky in The Making of Marx's'Capital' and Colletti in, Marx's Early Writings, agree that the revisionists missed the entire question of the abstraction of the state from man's needs and potential abilities. This was not part of the revisionist theory of the relation of the state to the workers. Bernstein separates completely the different spheres of society, due to the apparent separation of civil and political society in modern "bourgeois" society. Bernstein then accepts that situation as well, demonstrating his inability to see the significance of Marx's theory of fetishism on this point.

Marx, in his later writing in Capital, examined the social relations underlying economic categories and commodities in capitalist society. He began with the economic categories of value (supersensuous or social) and use-value (sensuous or natural), which comprise the two-fold character of commodities. He saw that products are exchanged in this society and deduced that they must be embodiments of what all commodities have in common--abstract, homogeneous human labour. This human labour must be "congealed" in a commodity in order to become "value". This then means that just as commodities have a two-fold character, likewise does the labour that is

embodied in them--concrete labour producing (use-value) and abstract labour (value). The notion of the differences of the labour of private individuals being abstracted to be represented as social labour, its opposite, is seen by Marx to underlie the equivalent form of value (which he posited from the relative form of value). We see from this then, how Marx moved from examining (1) exchange-value/use-value to (2) concrete labour/abstract labour, to (3) private labour/social labour--a process whereby Marx shows the social character of the commodity, as the human labour entailed in its production, as well as its relation to nature. Marx saw that this dialectical relation of natural and social became divided in the commodity society, so that the separation of private and social labour, use value and exchange value (separation of form and content), coincided with the separation of civil from political society (the state). It is also possible to see a correlation between Marx's treatment of abstract and concrete labour in his theory of value, and his methodology in relation to the state where he deals with both the abstract state and concrete states in particular--Marx's combination of both logic or theory and history. Social labor is a necessary presupposition of the fetishism of commodities, as,

> "The Fetishism of commodities has its origin, as the foregoing analysis has already shown, in the peculiar social character of the labour that produces them."[66]

Therefore, fetishism (the representation of commodity exchange as taking place between things, rather than human agents), actually arises from the structure of the commodity economy--

it is not an illusion.[67] Since commodities do not exist as such, due to any natural properties, Marx explains with regard to these products of human relations:

> "There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things."[68]

This process of materialization or objectification of social relations is the part of Marx's concept of fetishism more specifically called "reification".

The alienation of both the product and the social surplus from the actual producers of them, is part of the distortion of the exchange relation whereby living labour comes to be processed as "dead, crystallized labour". This is one of the connections between Marx's earlier-developed concept of alienation and the related, but different, notion of fetishism. Man's alienated relations (from his product, life activity, and other men), are here shown to be expressed as social relations between things, the commodities.[69]

It should be clarified too that the commodity itself is not a fetish, as the commodity remains a social relation. Actually, it is expressed as a fetish, as not taking place through human agents. The human must also be reified first in order to have a commodity relation at all. Krader explains that the reification takes place through both exchange and the law, where the formal side of the person becomes thingly. Exchange is a formal contractual relation that takes place between two "equal" persons (e.g. in the buying and selling of labour-power as a commodity), and therefore is

a legal relation. Man becomes only a "formal" being who entering the exchange relation between juridically "equal" persons, alienates his labour-power and the resultant products. Marx had already described in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and The German Ideology, how the "free will" that is ascribed to the persons entering the contract is only a formal freedom, much as the state is wholly formal, and therefore an illusion characteristic of modern society where form and content, state (as representative of only formal "general will") and civil society are separated. This is only the form of freedom; the substance of freedom is actually the satisfaction of human wants.

Marx's criticism of the classical economists' neglect of the realm of production in favour of an analysis of the sphere of exchange or distribution (and their ignorance of the problem of why the value of a product represents labour), is related to this aspect of reification or fetishism:

> "To what extent some economists are misled by the Fetishism inherent in commodities, or by the objective appearance of the social characteristics of labour, is shown, amongst other ways, by the dull and tedious quarrel over the part played by Nature in the formation of exchange-value."[70]

Marx then reaffirms his conclusion that exchange-value is wholly social, since it is simply the social way of expressing the quantity of labour in an object or the magnitude of value. This two-fold character of the commodity resulted from the indirect relation between producers in exchange. Torrance

notes that exchange-value hides the use-value under it and that this is the alienation of man implicit in the alienation of private property--with the product's capacity to satisfy human needs.[71] Rubin sees that this reification of labour in value is in the end, the most important conclusion of the theory of fetishism.[72] It is the answer to the question which Marx asked, but which the economists never recognized. As the social exchange-value hides the use-value of the commodity, the fetishized, formal state disguises civil society of which it is actually the excrescence.

The views of the economists came about, according to Marx, primarily due to those indirect relations of producers (material relations) and their reification, being substituted for the original, direct, social relation. The person is then determined by that indirect, material relation. Krader explains that the mystification of the material relations of people and the social relations of things is that those indirect relations are taken as direct relations. The relations are indirect in these two ways:

> "First, in material relations as persons bearing character masks, and second in the social relations of things. The indirect relation alone is not the fetishization of the human being, it is the elimination of the direct individual relations and their substitution by the normal, material relations that contributes to such a fetishization."[73]

Marx also states that these commodities take on the needs and powers that actually belong to man, gain an independent existence, and dominate men. This is referred to as the personification of things. Marx's expression in 1844 of the notion

that the state in modern society was estranged from men and appeared to be independent and above them, even confronting him as an "alien power", is very similar to his notion of personification and fetishism then.

Marx had developed a Hegelian dialectical view of civil society and the state (political society), rather than a state in isolation. To Marx, abstraction is the process which unites these forms. However, Bernstein's lack of a dialectical method in his theory, on the other hand, leads him to consider the state and civil society as separate, without any unity. He does not consider as Marx did in developing his theory of fetishism, the state as a wholly formal excrescence of civil society. The separation of spheres then that Bernstein perceives as an actual separation, is not so in reality and is a fetish--the state does not have its own active content. The state only <u>appears</u> separate or autonomous from its base, civil society, much as commodities appear independent of the men who produced them.

Hegel had confronted the problem of how

> "...the state can overcome the manifold contradictions of 'civil society'."..."On the one hand there is the separation of private interests from each other; on the other, the private interest of <u>each</u> is constantly opposed to the interest of <u>all the others</u> together, in such a way that a general separation between private interests and 'the public interest' takes place. These are two faces of the same problem."[74]

Here we see Hegel's dialectical approach, which leads into his, and Marx's, view that these divisions then emerge as a division between modern civil society and its private interests, and

the state. This, to both Marx and Hegel, is a contradiction which demands a solution. However, Bernstein does not view this separation as a contradiction, but accepts the separation of the spheres as given, rather than as a historical product. Hegel and Marx, in contrast, refer to the unity which was once present in the classical antiquity epoch in particular, which emphasizes the historically specific character of the present condition.

Since Bernstein does not recognize the problem, or the unity which existed at one time in society, he naturally, as an extension of this omission, then also does not deal with Marx's solution to the problem which was important to Marx, Hegel, Rousseau, and many others. Bernstein views and treats the state as independent of the social relations of production or civil society (with all of its divisions and competing, private interests) as the content of the state. The "general interest" which the state is to represent is actually formal in Marx's view.

> "The moment of unity or community has to be abstract (the state) because in the real, fragmented society a common or general interest can only arise by dissociation from all the contending private interests."[75]

Marx had shown that in the modern society, reality is inverted--the state uses law and expresses it as being in the general interest of the society, to guarantee and protect the right of people to landed property and competitive, individual interests. Marx recognized that private property comes to preside over civil society and therefore becomes the subject while man

becomes the predicate--an inversion which forms part of the beginning of Marx's theory of fetishism.

> "The social side of human beings appears as a characteristic or property of things: on the other hand, things appear to be endowed with social or human attributes."[76]

Colletti demonstrates how Marx's theory of fetishism is connected to his theory of the state, and that this theory of fetishism is also a vital part of Marx's critique of political economy and his theory of value. Since they are all closely tied, one can see why Colletti considers Bernstein's omissions in the theoretical area (for example, assuming autonomy of the state) as consistent with and linked to other sections, such as his lack of a theory of fetishism. Colletti considers the latter point to be a vitally important aspect of Marx's work and therefore its omission as having a great effect on the evolution of Bernstein's theory and the development of revisionism. Marx's processes of fetishism, abstraction, and subject/predicate inversion are very real occurences, not only with respect to the nature of the relation of the modern state and civil society, but also the theory of value. However, to Bernstein, abstraction has the connotation of a heuristic concept.

The operation of exchange of commodities as values, by individuals, is the equalization process of differing types of human labour. Colletti states,

> "To the separation between public and private, between society and the individual (analysed in the Critique) there corresponds the economic separation between individual labour and social labour. Social labour too must exist in its own right, must become 'abstract labour' set over against concrete, individual work. The latter is represented in Marx's economic analysis by 'use value' and the former by the objectified 'value' of commodities."[77]

Hence, Marx's inversion once again--in this case, concrete work becomes the predicate of abstract labour which actually should be the predicate.

Colletti links these various theoretical aspects together, when he states,

> "At this point, the full importance of the Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State becomes plain. The criticism of Hegel in that work is--as we saw--the key to Marx's subsequent criticism of the bourgeois economists. It is no less vital to the understanding of his views on the modern representative state. And it is the prelude to all his later studies, up to and including his famous analysis of the fetishism of commodities and capital."[78]

Colletti believes that Bernstein misses these interconnections, the theory of fetishism, and the question of abstraction as being the unity within the theory of value and between civil society and the state. Therefore, he is criticizing Bernstein for theoretically weak analyses. However, Colletti on the other hand, does not fully recognize the significance and historical need for the revisions made by Bernstein of Marx's theory. The inner structure of Bernstein's theory was in itself quite internally consistent.

As noted earlier, this issue of the separation of civil and political society is closely connected with the simultaneous

existence of social inequality and political equality, in the modern society. Man here is both a "bourgeois" with individualistic, asocial interests and a citizen of the political society. This condition is considered to be a permanent contradiction by Bernstein, since he dealt with the state as an autonomous entity. Colletti sees Bernstein as situating the contradiction with the state however, between the state and capitalism, rather than considering the state to be an integral part of a historically specific capitalist society.

Colletti sees Bernstein as not considering fully the equality-inequality issue as dealt with by Marx, and before him by Rousseau. In contrast to Rousseau's stress on the importance of direct democracy and popular legislation, Bernstein draws upon the libertarian and utilitarian notions of James and J.S. Mill, in the formation of his preference for representative democracy. Peter Gay recognizes the importance of such a notion for Bernstein's own development:

> "With this conception of a representative democratic state, organized on the basis of social and economic equality, Bernstein made his final break with orthodox Marxism."[79]

Bernstein's notions have some basis in common with the liberal democratic and natural-law philosophers. Natural law theory takes a trans-historical approach to man as possessing a specific human nature before he becomes a social being. Man is a person and a "moral subject" before he becomes a part of a historical and social process. Society becomes a means of protecting what are seen as the original rights and the

property of each individual--

> "...'innate' and 'inalienable' rights which he derives not from society and therefore from his historical relations with the species, but from a direct transcendental investiture."[80]

This "liberal" notion of inalienable rights emerged as a proclamation of the 1789 bourgeois French Revolution. Law, the state, and the "social contract" exist, according to natural-law theorists such as Locke, and Kantian theories, to formally protect and regulate those individual, private rights, not to unite men with each other or create a real society. Colletti states that freedom is only from society in this instance. The concept here is that man is more fully realizing his true essence when in the state of nature, rather than actualizing his potential humanity in society, as Rousseau and Marx believed. Due to this view, to Rousseau, the social contract means giving up original, natural freedom for a new social mode of living where man can realize his potential, whereas the natural-law theorists saw the contract as a positive, rational realization of the natural-legal order.[81] One of the implications of this difference is the notion that is consequently held with regard to the nature of the state.

Colletti explains that Locke for example, saw the state as perpetuating the competing, private interests of civil society by protecting those rights of individuals, but was also a neutral institution. Hegel however, saw the two spheres as separate and contradictory.

> "The Philosophy of Right contains a resolute attack on Locke's type of contractualist and natural-right theory. Hegel reproaches this tradition above all with perceiving the state as a means to an end, the means of guaranteeing private rights. It was, in his view, unable to grasp the fact that the state (the 'public interest', the universal properly so called) was no mere means, but rather the end."[82]

Marx then proceeds to criticize Hegel's solution to the contradiction, as mentioned earlier, but this does demonstrate the break from the liberal-natural law approach, the approach which greatly influenced Bernstein in his intellectual development.

Kant, and the neo-Kantians who were the dominant philosophical influences in Germany during Bernstein's time, also may have affected Bernstein's view of the state. Rousseau criticizes the conflict of private interests and competition, but, "In Kant, we find praise of competition, of mutual unsociability and the resulting desire for 'honour, power, and wealth'..."[83]--(ungesellige Geselligheit or unsocial sociability). Therefore the state to Kant would need to guarantee such actions and natural, individual "rights". Colletti states that as the formulator of theoretical revisionism, Bernstein "sees the modern representative State as expressing the 'general interest'..."[84]

Bernstein's political views are partially the expressions then of the influences on Bernstein of Kant, Engels, and natural-law, liberal democratic theory. This is clearly stated by Colletti when he says that,

> "The appeal to the inalienable 'rights of man' proclaimed by the French Revolution; the emphasis on natural law underlying Bernstein's 'ethical' socialism; his exaltation of 'liberalism', which he sees as the soul of modern democracy, to the extent of reducing the latter to the 'political form' of liberalism (die Demokratie ist nur die politische Form des Liberalismus)..."[85]

Bernstein viewed the liberal stress on political rights as essential, particularly in Germany as we saw earlier, in order to make the working-class movement there become a broader, more class-conscious, socialist movement.[86] He states that the socialist movement is due to the influence of the French Revolution and the conceptions of right subsequently accepted by the workers' movement. He refers to the Democratic Constitution of the 1793 French Revolution, as "permeated with Rousseau's spirit", declaring the minimum of freedom and inalienable rights of man:

> "The Constitution of 1793 was the logical expression of the liberal ideas of the epoch, and a cursory glance over its contents shows how little it was, or is, an obstacle to socialism."...There is actually no really liberal thought which does not also belong to the elements of the ideas of socialism."[87]

Bernstein places heavy emphasis upon the need for democracy or these rights--

> "...democracy is a condition of socialism to a much greater degree than is usually assumed, i.e., it is not only the means but also the substance."[88]

Here it is possible to see again the lack of a Hegelian dialectical approach on Bernstein's part to the interrelation between the form of the state and civil society, as its content. He does not recognize the more vital differences between so-

cialism and feudalism or liberalism however, in the realm of production relations and social labour. Instead, Bernstein's treatment of the state and social labour as two autonomous elements is conveyed when he states that liberalism politically is the preliminary to the "socialism of production". Bernstein says, "...

> "...one might call socialism, 'organizing liberalism', for when one examines more closely the organisations that socialism wants and how it wants them, he will find that what distinguishes them above all from the feudalistic organisations, outwardly like them, is just their liberalism, their democratic constitution, their accessibility."[89]

Bernstein does recognize the original, historical class interests of liberalism, but continues to see it as having close ties to socialism:

> "It is true that the great liberal movement of modern times arose for the advantage of the capitalist bourgeoisie first of all, and the parties which assumed the names of liberals were, or became in due course, simple guardians of capitalism. Naturally, only opposition can reign between these parties and social democracy. But with respect to liberalism as a great historical movement, socialism is its legitimate heir, not only in chronological sequence, but also in its spiritual qualities, as is shown moreover in every question of principle in which social democracy has had to take up an attitude." ..."The security of civil freedom has always seemed to it to stand higher than the fulfilment of some economic progress."[90]

Bernstein does not attempt then to solve the issue of the separation of the political state and civil society, and cannot explain the contradiction between political equality and social inequality. Colletti states that Bernstein does not perceive the original unity or the process of abstraction,

as dealt with for instance, by Marx. Therefore Bernstein's approach to political theory contributes to his conclusions regarding the necessary political practices--reformism, emphasis on universal suffrage and democracy, and so on. Bernstein had to conclude, due to his valuable practical insights, that the state could fully "represent the people" and resolve class conflicts. "...the republic is, for Marx, by no means the resolution or supersession of the basic antagonisms. On the contrary, it provides the best terrain for them to unfold and reach maturity."[91] For Bernstein, though, struggle against and within the state are one and the same. Hence, the German S.P.D.'s reformist practices led to particular theories and theoretical stances led to more practical differences, both in means and in goals. Bernstein remained consistent in his ideas and practice, uniting the theory with the party practice, according to the altered historical conditions.

Bernstein's notion of positive, progressive possibility through democratic state systems is one point where Bernstein's theory is very close to that of "liberal democracy". Colletti shows that this is the political strategy that Bernstein observed as being in force at that time in the S.P.D. and that he also necessarily concluded was appropriate for the party at that time--one which is a product of his methodological, political, and economic views theoretically and empirically. It is quite obvious at this point that such faith in democratic

means is still prevalent today, particularly in North America--one of the ways in which Bernstein's work and revisionism remains relevant, not superseded.

What is democracy to Bernstein and what is its relation to the S.P.D.? Bernstein defines democracy as:

> "...an absence of class government, as the indication of a social condition where political privilege belongs to no one class as opposed to the whole community."[92]

Bernstein also states that the conquest of democracy and the formation of its political and social organs is absolutely necessary in order to achieve socialism, and that as distinct from the institutions of feudalism, those of modern society are more flexible and therefore can be changed and developed, and do not need to be catastrophically destroyed.[93] In this case then, Bernstein sees the role of the S.P.D. as being

> "...to organise the working classes politically and develop them as a democracy and to fight for all reforms in the State which are adapted to raise the working classes and transform the State in the direction of democracy."[94]

Thus, here is demonstrated Bernstein's concentration upon the process of democracy as the "means and content" of socialism. It also demonstrates Bernstein's view of the state as autonomous and neutral. The relation here to the issue of form versus content is evident once more. One question that arises with regard to Bernstein's notions of democracy and the state is whether further development of modern institutions negates the content of an institution such as the state--civil society or the class struggle. Even in his definition of democracy, Bernstein conveys his assumption that it is possible to have

a state in existence with no class character--"an absence of class government"--without the Marxist notion of a necessary annihilation of the state as more than just a technical body, separate from the class conflicts to which it is closely connected. Bernstein's view of socialism as requiring political democracy is evident in the phrase he uses, "...the more the worker, by the influence of socialism, moves from being a proletarian to a citizen."[95] Bernstein not only connects socialism with democracy, but initially equated democracy with liberalism. Bernstein sees the goal of socialism as more democratic institutions, but his definition is connected with that of bourgeois democracy--with no existing abstraction or need to unite political and civil society. As Colletti states,

> "Marx's conception is rather that the drive of modern society towards full suffrage and electoral reform is one expression of the tendency towards overcoming the separation between state and society (though an indirect one, since it occurs in terms offered by the separation itself) and so towards the dissolution of the state."[96]

As stated earlier, for Marx the state in general is an abstraction. To Bernstein and the liberal theory however, the citizens are the state and therefore it is possible for the state to become free of any class character and class conflict and eradicate it.

Bernstein stated openly as the goal of the S.P.D.:

> "Social democracy has to-day in Germany, besides the means of propaganda by speech and writing, the franchise for the Reichstag as the most effective means of asserting its demands."[97]

The theoretical views of liberal democracy, and the Fabians in

particular, led him in this direction. In this respect, the Fabians influenced Bernstein during the years he spent in England, after his exile from Switzerland, and helped lead to Bernstein's relating of socialism to liberal reformism and democracy. Some of the intellectual sources of the Fabians were the utilitarian, liberal traditions of Jeremy Bentham and J.S. Mill.[98] The Fabians, not the Marxists, comprised the majority of socialists in England at that time. The extent of this influence of the Fabians upon Bernstein's theories has been debated, but after examining the evidence in detail, including Bernstein's own comments, correspondence, and a comparison of the ideas in each approach, Gustafsson concludes that Bernstein's thoughts were on crucial points influenced by Fabianism. He states that this does not mean exhaustively, or that they are direct equivalents however. Gustafsson also points out that there were many socialists internationally, who were then thinking in a similar manner.[99]

An example of this relation is that Fabian ideology is recognizable in Bernstein's "Nachwort zur deutschen Ausgabe" of the Webbs' "History of Trade Unionism" (October, 1895), as well as in Bernstein's first article, about the Fabians, in his series, "Probleme des Sozialismus". This ideological basis consisted of an evolutionist socialism (although it began as a bourgeois reform movement), with the beliefs that socialism had no definite time frame and that a socialist society would not be established through a catastrophe or revolutionary change.[100]

The tendency to permeate "liberalism with socialism" was part of the Fabians' politics. It seems, "Auch Bernstein empfahl eine Annäherung zwischen der Sozialdemokratie und dem Liberalismus"--Bernstein also recommended a rapprochement between social democracy and liberalism. Bernstein had many ideas that were closely connected with those of the liberal, F.A. Lange. Höchberg, whom Bernstein worked for in Lugano, was a student of Lange. Indeed, Gustafsson states in his examination of revisionists in many European countries, that other revisionists actually came out of a tradition of Liberalism and later returned to it, eg. Croce.

> "Die Grenze zwischen Revisionismus und dem sozialpolitisch orientierten Liberalismus war tatsächlich fließend."[101]

There are, then, many points of correspondence between the socialism of the Fabians and that of Bernstein, demonstrating that Fabianism certainly did influence Bernstein during his time in England and in spite of his close connection with Engels.

Bernstein was influenced in addition by the general system of Ferdinand Lassalle, after both Bernstein's turn towards Marxism and the development of his revisionist views. Lassalle's theories continued to influence Bernstein through the development of his revisionist approach to socialism. One of Lassalle's major points, for example, that had this effect was his stress on the need for universal suffrage and political democracy.[102]

Bernstein's view of the state certainly differed in many

ways from that of Marx. Bernstein, for example, did not deal with the state as a form, as an excrescence of civil society, or recognize a need for a unity of political and civil society. This leads to the issue then of the future survival or destruction of both the forms and the content of the modern state, particularly for those concerned with the achievement of a socialist society or social change. Social democratic parties, for instance, must deal with this issue to determine their tactics in relation to the state and the process of social change. Bernstein's notion, including his view of the contradiction between the state and capitalist society as a self-dissolving one, led to his conclusion that strategies of state intervention in the economic system and reforms were appropriate for the social democratic parties of western Europe. This is obviously a different conclusion of tactics for social change and the working class than the notions held by Marx of the need for revolutionary change. The issue of reform versus revolution has been central to socialist parties for the past century and has been closely connected with their views of the state.

Bernstein explains that, in his view, constitutional legislation

> "...is stronger than the revolution scheme where prejudice and the limited horizon of the great mass of the people appear as hindrances to social progress, and it offers greater advantages where it is a question of the creation of permanent economic arrangements capable of lasting; in other words, it is best adapted to positive social-political work."[103]

He sees the possibilities of positive change through reforms increasing with the development of political democracy. Bernstein compares the political views of Proudhon with those of Marx in the Civil War in France, and sees these two antagonists meeting in liberalism and in their programs which stress,

> "...autonomy as the preliminary condition of social emancipation, and with showing how the democratic organisation from the bottom upwards is depicted as the way to the realisation of socialism..."[104]

However, Bernstein takes a more reformist conclusion from the notion of need for democratic developments than did Marx. For example, in his critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Marx says that the French (of the 1848 Revolutions) saw that, "in true democracy the political state disappears."[105] For Marx, this meant that no longer would the state exist.

In comparison, Bernstein states:

> "...It appears to me doubtful if it was necessary for the first work of democracy to be such a dissolution of the modern state system and complete transformation of its organisation as Marx and Proudhon pictured (the formation of the national assembly out of delegates from provincial or district assemblies, which in their turn were composed of delegates from municipalities) so that the form the national assemblies had hitherto taken had to be abolished. Evolution has given life to too many institutions and bodies corporate, whose sphere has outgrown the control of municipalities and even of provinces and districts for it to be able to do without the control of the central governments unless or before their organisation is transformed. The absolute sovereignty of the municipality, etc., is besides no ideal for me." ..."But beside it, those other assemblies and representative bodies will attain an ever greater importance, so that Revolution or not, the functions of the central assemblies become constantly narrowed, and therewith the danger of these assemblies or authorities to the democracy is also narrowed."[106]

One of the rights of citizenship that was most important to Bernstein was that of the extension of the vote, since it composes part of the content of that citizenship.(an abstraction as a legal person and subjective aspect of the state for Marx). Marx, in contrast, looked not at the content of rights with an eye to their extension, as much as the structure and nature of rights, or the right to own property and the state, an objectification of property. Property, for Marx, entails the relation of the citizen to the state.

Bernstein's attempt to reconcile the S.P.D.'s reformist practice with theory, and consequent revision of Marx's theoretical notions, led to that debate of reform and revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the withering away of the state. This includes today, as well, for both Soviet orthodox Marxism and the revisionist approach which took hold more strongly in the West.

Bernstein observed that social conditions had changed considerably since the time of Marx's writing and of the 1848 French Revolutions, which had influenced Marx's views on reform and revolution. Marx had actually also achieved a unity, in his era, of a theory of the working-class appropriate to the socio-political conditions of the mid-19th Century. Bernstein then attempted to revise the theory to fit the conditions of the late 19th Century, a different historical period with different processes of social change.

These changed economic, social, and political conditions then demanded a revision of the tasks and strategies of social

democratic parties, in addition to revised views of the state and civil society, the role of the working-class and trade unions, political rights, and the potentialities of democracy and reforms. Although other European socialist parties were in a similar position to the S.P.D. with regard to practice, Bernstein was the first to see fully the need for such a revision in theory, to bring it in direct line with the party's practice--a unity which would result in a cohesive and politically-strengthened social democratic party. This demonstrates the reasons for Bernstein's assertions in a liberal democratic manner, that it was most advantageous for the proletariat to work within the given state system and struggle for the generalization of the vote to all people in a society, where that had not already been gained. Bernstein was able to utilize the theoretical influences available to him (Marx and Engels, Lassalle, the Fabians, and so on) in order to construct a unification of theory with the prevailing socialist practice and socio-political conditions.

REFERENCES

1. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 85.
2. Marx, The Holy Family, 11.
3. Marx, The German Ideology, 329.
4. Marx, The German Ideology, 46.
5. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, 372-3.
6. Marx, Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right", 91.
7. Ibid, 8.
8. Marx, The German Ideology, 54.
9. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 241.
10. Marx, The German Ideology, 79.
11. Marx, Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right", 79
12. Ibid, 32.
13. Marx, The German Ideology, 57.
14. Marx, Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right", 31.
15. Krader, Dialectic of Civil Society, 15.
16. Marx, The German Ideology, 57.
17. Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, 212.
18. Marx, The Holy Family, 120-1.
19. Marx, Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right", 49.
20. O'Malley, Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right", xl.
21. Marx, Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right", 136-7.
22. O'Malley, Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right", xxvii.
23. Ibid, xxv.
24. Rubin, Essays on Marx's Theory of Value, Chapter 10.

25. Krader, A Treatise of Social Labor, 85.
26. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 94.
27. Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, 147.
28. Marx, The Holy Family, 116.
29. Levitt, Karl Marx on Law, State, and Collectivity, 15
30. Colletti, Introduction to Karl Marx--Early Writings, 37.
31. Levitt, Karl Marx on Law, State, and Collectivity, 17.
32. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, 74.
33. Ibid, 73.
34. Ibid, 79.
35. Levitt, Karl Marx on Law, State, and Collectivity, 20.
36. Notes from Kay, Geoffrey--Lectures, January to April, 1980.
37. Krader, A Treatise of Social Labor, 267 to 273.
38. Ibid, 39.
39. Krader, Dialectic of Civil Society, 12.
40. Marx, The German Ideology, 47.
41. Krader, A Treatise of Social Labor, 267.
42. Marx, The German Ideology, 402.
43. Ibid, 195.
44. Marx, The German Ideology, 395 and 195.
45. Ibid, 46.
46. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, 239.
47. Mishra, Marx and Welfare, 297 and 302.
48. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, 494.
49. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 103.

50. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 89-90
Notes: "Peter Gay nennt diese Arbeit überhaupt nicht. Pierre Angel übergeht sie mit einigen wenigen Zeilen."; Gay does not name this work at all. Angel goes over it in a few lines.

53. Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, 65.

54. Lidtke, The Outlawed Party, 214 and 218.

55. Zeman in Labedz, Revisionism, 106.

56. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 100 and 78.

57. Engels, Marx-Engels III Studienausgabe-Geschichte und Politik I, 226, 228, and 233:
"History has proved us wrong, has revealed our views of that time to be an illusion. It went further: It not only demolished our errors, it had totally revolutionized the conditions, under which the proletariat fought. The class struggle of 1848 is today, in every respect antiquated, and this is one matter that deserves to be more closely examined, due to this occurence...History showed us and everyone, who thought alike, to be wrong. It made clear, that the situation of economic development on the continent at that time by far was not ripe for the removal of capitalist production...The old style of rebellion, street-fighting with barricades, that since 1848 gives the last determination everywhere, is considerably outdated."

58. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 166.

59. Ibid, xxx.

60. Ibid, 147-8.

61. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 105.

62. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 242, 243, and 245.

63. Colletti, Introduction to Karl Marx--Early Writings, 45-6.

64. Colletti, Marxism and Hegel, 180.

65. Bottomore and Goode, Austro-Marxism, 39.

66. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, 72.

67. Rubin, Essays on Marx's Theory of Value, xxiii.

68. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, 72.

69. Krader, A Treatise of Social Labor, 196-7.

70. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, 82.

71. Torrance, Estrangement, Alienation, and Exploitation, 94.

72. Rubin, Essays on Marx's Theory of Value, xxix.

73. Krader, Dialectic of Civil Society, 233-4.

74. Colletti, Introduction to Karl Marx--Early Writings, 31.

75. Ibid, 35.

76. Ibid, 37.

77. Ibid, 39.

78. Ibid, 40.

79. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 246 and 250.

80. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 150.

81. Ibid, 150-1 (G. Solari, Studi storici di filosofia del diritto, Turin, Italy, 1948).

82. Colleti, Introduction to Karl Marx--Early Writings, 31-2.

83. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 161

84. Ibid, 107.

85. Ibid, 103.

86. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 167

87. Ibid, 150-1.

88. Ibid, 166.

89. Ibid, 153-5.

90. Ibid, 148.

91. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 108.

92. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 142.

93. Ibid, 163.

94. Ibid, xxvii.

95. Ibid, 170.

96. Colletti, Introduction to Karl Marx--Early Writings, 44-5.

97. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 194.

98. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 105-7.

99. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 179

100. Ibid, 324.

101. Ibid, 322; "The boundary between Revisionism and social-politically oriented Liberalism was in reality fluid."

102. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 89.

103. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 218.

104. Ibid, 160.

105. Marx, Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right", 30-1.

106. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 159-160.

CHAPTER THREE

Reform Versus Revolution

Those different views of the state, as outlined, conditioned for Marx and Bernstein their divergent conclusions regarding the means to the end of socialism--reform or revolution. Their concepts of the state led each to his own conclusions regarding these strategic or tactical considerations and the relation of the working-class movement to the state. Affecting those conclusions are the notions and definitions of democracy as discussed. The theories themselves emerge from the interaction of their views on the state, reform and revolution, and economics.

The development of Bernstein's questions regarding orthodox Marxism, his analysis of the current historical realities, and his observations of the divergence of theory and practice in the German social democratic party, opened Bernstein to influences, such as those that contributed to his views on the state. These factors and issues, combined with his questioning of the orthodox Marxist approach to reform and revolution, led Bernstein to revise the whole of Marxist theory. This is why the question of revolution is so important to Bernstein's revisions--

> "Wenn die Zeit der Revolution vorbei war, so mußten auch die Bedingungen der Revolution vorbei sein, denn Revolutionen werden ja nicht aus dem Nichts geschaffen. Marx und Engels hatten gelehrt, daß

> Revolutionen eine notwendige Folge von unversöhnlichen Klassengegensätzen seien. Bernstein mußte daher untersuchen, ob das richtig war."[1]

Labedz[2] and Angel note that the theory of revolution is particularly important for revisionism and constitutes Bernstein's most fundamental difference from Marx and Engels. "C'est en fonction de la revolution que se determine le system revisionniste."[3] Bernstein himself states that the theory of revolution was responsible for the difference between the theory and practice of the S.P.D. He refers to the two main currents in socialism--one reformist, constructive, and evolutionary; the other, destructive, conspiratorial, and terrorist.[4] In socialism, there was always a strong, non-Marxist ideological tradition (in England's Fabianism and France's Proudhon and Louis Blanc, for example), one with which Bernstein was very familiar. The social reformist politics of the 1890's in Germany, confirmed Bernstein's impression that his revisionist socialism was in harmony with the S.P.D.'s practice and that it interpreted and gave expression to a new era. Gustafsson states that,

> "Die Praktiker Vollmar in Deutschland und Millerand in Frankreich legten daher schon 1891 bzw. 1896 kurze Zusammenfassungen der reformistischen Politik vor. Vollmars Reformismus erhielt in Paul Kampfmeyer und der 1895 gegründeten Zeitschrift "Der Sozialistische Akademiker" ein erstes theoretisches Komplement."[5]

This contributed to Bernstein's views on the state and theory of reform.

His views on reform emerged also from his analyses of the economic situation in Germany during the 1890's. Bernstein's assessment of Marx's economic theory naturally led to his assessment of Marx's political assumptions of socialism. This is shown in Bernstein's essay, "Utopismus und Eklektizismus" and developed in "Die sozialpolitische Bedeutung von Raum und Zahl" (April, 1897). His figures demonstrated to him the growing flexibility of the modern industrial world, an idea that had been stated by Sorel a year earlier in his essay in the "Sozialistische Monatshefte". Bernstein agreed with Brentano as well, that cartels and trusts signified the stabilization of capitalism.[6] He saw them as a modifying influence on the frequency of economic crises and argued therefore against the likelihood of a great, general crisis.[7]

In fact, Bernstein thought that such a well-functioning economy was a necessary prerequisite to a successful revolution. This is in direct contrast to Marx, who believed that with a true revolution, the economy must be broken down. To Bernstein, without a flourishing, healthy economy, a revolution could only lead into a counter-revolution.[8] Bernstein here seems to place more emphasis upon counter-revolutions than did Marx. Bernstein's economic questions and conclusions, then, as outlined in the first chapter, are closely interrelated with his concepts of reform and revolution.

Prior to 1891 actually, there was not an obvious difference between his views and those of Marx. However, from 1891 on,

a dissonance became evident between Bernstein, and Engels and Bebel, who stated that Bernstein's articles weren't revolutionary enough in tone. Even in the spring of 1891, there is an early example of Bernstein's emerging revisionist approach, as he wrote that there was a possibility of peaceful socialism in England, as the material and cultural standard of living of the working-class had increased,class opposition was decreasing, and freedoms, such as of the press, were legislated.[9] Bernstein's view is not surprising in light of the fact that in Germany and internationally, reformism still had a strong appeal during the 1890's.(for example, Georg von Vollmar, Lassalleanism, and "Katheder-Sozialisten" or academicians).

Bernstein rejected Lassalle's nationalism and tendencies towards dictatorship, and did not share Lassalle's disillusionment with the liberals (which led Lassalle actually to attempt an alliance with Bismarck and reactionary Junkerdom, against their common enemy, the bourgeoisie). Bernstein was influenced quite early on,though, by Lassalle's stress on political democracy and universal suffrage, not only in the formation of his views of the state, but also concerning reform and revolution. Bernstein and Lassalle,in addition, both had an ethical base to their theories, taking socialism from Marx's realm of necessityto a "goal to be striven for as an act of will."[10]

Bernstein then criticized Marx's notions as he developed his own revisions. For instance, he saw Marx as attaching too much importance not only to revolutions as such, but also to the creative force of revolutionary power in the "modern" society.

In addition, he viewed Marx's theory as an attempted synthesis between the concept of emancipating struggle, borrowed from revolutionaries, and from socialists, his analysis of economic and social conditions--an uneasy, contradictory union for Bernstein.[11] Marx developed primarily the objective aspects of his theory of revolution. For Marx, revolution was caused firstly by a necessary contradiction between the forces and relations of production at a particular stage. He states in his preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, that,

> "At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or--what is but a legal expression for the same thing--with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed."[12]

Bernstein argued with Marx's stress on revolution, as he thought that a revision of that theory was necessary, in order to correspond to the demands of a new historical period. The 1895 publication of Engels' introduction to Marx's Class Struggles in France demonstrated to Bernstein that Engels also thought such a revision of the old "barricade" revolution theory was necessary. Gneuss also notes that Bernstein draws upon, in Evolutionary Socialism, letters which show Engels' departure from Marxist orthodoxy much earlier. Those include letters to Joseph Bloch (September 12, 1890), Conrad Schmidt (October 27, 1890), and Heinz Starkenburg (January 25,

1894).[13]

Bernstein felt that he was now dealing with an essentially non-revolutionary society, and therefore had to revise the theory accordingly, revisions that eventually brought it into line with the S.P.D.'s practice by 1900. He thought that in a nation where privileges of a minority no longer constitute an insurmountable obstacle to social progress, violent revolution becomes a senseless phrase and revolutionarism only an affectation.[14] Bernstein saw a need to do this historically-specific theoretical revision, as to him, the choice between reform and revolution is dependent to a great extent upon the particular circumstances. Reform, to Bernstein, is simply the slower, more effective form of change. Specifically, Bernstein states that,

> "Whether the legislative or the revolutionary method is the more promising depends entirely on the nature of the measures and on their relation to different classes and customs of the people."[15]

This view of Bernstein's, then, leaves much room for flexibility in applying either reformist or revolutionary means of social or political change.

Marx deals with the notion of reform in Capital, Volume one, Chapters 10 and 15, the role and possibility of reforms through working-class action, within a capitalist mode of production. According to Marx, such reforms were definitely likely, through the class conflicts in civil society resulting in sufficient power on the part of the working-class to affect the state. For example, Marx accepted this possibility with

regard to welfare reforms and factory legislation in England in 1867. These were reforms which he viewed in a positive light, as advances towards the well-being of the workers. But it is not explicit to what extent Marx conceived of these reforms as being part of a gradual, peaceful development of socialism or how these legislated reforms would affect the separation of civil and political societies with their class antagonisms and inequalities. He refers to many effects upon capitalist production itself due to the widespread extension of factory legislation: the creation of large-scale industry and concentration of capital, more direct and open dominance of capital, and the destruction of small industries which previously could act as supports for those not employed in the mainstream of the economic system. As Marx states in summation,

> "By maturing the material conditions, and the combination on a social scale of the processes of production, it matures the contradictions and antagonisms of the capitalist form of production, and thereby provides, along with the elements for the formation of a new society, the forces for exploding the old one."[16]

In Marx's work on the Factory Acts, it is evident that he saw those reforms not only as being <u>possible</u> within the capitalist form of production, but even as possessing a potential for revolutionary change. In fact then, Marx saw the legislation as <u>deepening</u> the contradictions and gaps between classes, and civil and political society, rather than alleviating them. However, since Marx generally imposed no logic of necessary development upon the human historical process, one must question his conclusion regarding the effects of the

factory legislation. Surely he pointed out one possible tendency which could result, but history has indicated that many intervening factors can just as well lead to reforms transforming class antagonisms for a period of time. For example, Marx refers to factory legislation as intensifying the labour process and forcing technological development. With this further development of the means of production, however, it is possible that there could result a larger social product which through welfare reforms could be re-distributed to the extent that the state and civil society contradiction would allow at any particular time and place. This process could result in a higher standard of living for all classes, having a very different effect from the tendencies which Marx viewed as most likely. Again, if one does not attribute a necessity in history to Marx, his analysis does not preclude either a prolonged class struggle leading to an extensive development of a welfare society within the structure and relations of modern society, not only a minimal development.

However, this indicates a fundamental problem in Marx's work--his ambiguity concerning the question of the necessity of historical developments. He may have come to these oversimplified conclusions regarding the effects of reform, partially due to his reliance upon a Hegelian, teleological view of history. In different parts of his works, this teleology is evident, while in others, Marx states that there is no logic of historical development, and argues with

Hegel and his "Absolute Idea" on that point. What this refers to is precisely Marx's view of the historical necessity of a "proletarian" revolution, as opposed to an evolutionary development towards socialism. An example of Marx's ambivalence on this question, is his criticism of teleology in many places, including in The Poverty of Philosophy:

> "To say now that all former centuries, with entirely different needs, means of production, etc., worked providentially for the realisation of equality is, first of all, to substitute the means and the men of our century for the men and the means of earlier centuries and to misunderstand the historical movement by which the successive generations transformed the results acquired by the generations that preceded them."[17]

In other writings, on the other hand, he lapses into a reliance upon teleological methods himself. This can be seen in The Communist Manifesto where Marx states that,

> "What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable."[18]

In fact, Labedz comments that after the failure of the 1848 Revolution, Marx still rationalized his belief in the imminence of a socialist revolution. A decade later, though, Marx provided a different time schedule, saying that the productive forces have to fully develop in a social order before it disappears.[19]

According to Marx's analysis of 19th century capitalist production, a "full" application of a welfare society in the sense of a society based on human need is an impossibility in that mode of production. This is due to its being totally

antithetical to its basis of production and distribution. The form of the class struggle may be changed for Marx by the state's legislation of reforms, but the content of conflict remains and often limits the concrete enactment of those reforms. Therefore, Marx did not place a major emphasis upon the need for or role of reforms, but rather on more revolutionary changes. At the same time, he stressed the need to be historically specific with regard to each set of circumstances to be analyzed.

Much of this difference between Marx's stress on revolution and Bernstein's on reform comes out of their different views of the state, as elaborated earlier. For example, the dialectical relation of state and civil society for Marx contributed to his view that reforms would not allow for fundamental change. However, for Bernstein, the separation of state and civil society meant that for him, struggle within and against the state are one and the same. Bernstein criticized Marx's reliance on revolutionary violence as "Blanquism", as well as for overrating the state's role as an "executive committee for the bourgeoisie", neglecting its positive accomplishments. Although Bernstein acknowledged this aspect, his general approach to the state allowed him to integrate that theory with his favoring of evolutionary change.

> "But Bernstein never departed from his idea of the state as a center of coercive power--over people as well as things. 'The state is a product of development. Its form at any time is partly determined by the past. It is impossible to jump out of the state: we can only hope to change it.'[95,20] (Der Sozialismus einst und jetzt, page 90).

Bernstein draws upon Engels' preface to Marx's The Class Struggles in France as evidence that Engels too saw a role for a legal, socialist party in educating the working-class for democracy.[21]

In addition, as mentioned regarding Bernstein's formation of his views on the state, a decisive point for the formulation of those on reform and revolution was his commentary on Louis Heritier's Geschichte der französischen Revolution von 1848 (that Bernstein wrote in 1895 or 1896). In that writing, Bernstein gave a very different interpretation of the events of 1848 than did Marx. For Marx, Louis Blanc's (a moderate socialist) reformist ideas were pure utopianism, while the Blanquisten (of Auguste Blanqui) were the truly revolutionary party. Bernstein, however, refers to the latter as bloodthirsty terrorists. Bernstein saw the February, 1848, revolution as announcing the era of European democracy, but for Marx, the June revolution was a foreboding of the society of modern class struggles between bourgeoisie and proletariat. On the other hand, Bernstein refers to it as a conflict between rival party leaders and deemphasizes the class struggle. Marx and Engels stressed the importance of the Paris Commune as a working-class government. Bernstein considered this to be only an "episode".

What Bernstein's analysis meant to him, was a demonstration of the futility of all revolutionary struggles. It also, then, led to the views on reform and revolution which Bernstein developed.[22] These were views of the situation

current to his own era, but as Gustafsson notes, Bernstein was stating his views in the form of a historical commentary--

> "Er sagte Blanqui. Aber er meinte das, was bei Marx blanquistisch war, genau wie Sorel in seiner Kritik der "Jakobiner" in Wirlichkeit die zeitgenossischen revolutionären Sozialisten meinte."[23]

Even the abolition of classes for Bernstein didn't necessarily lead to the abolition of the state (as is the case for Marx, since the state is an excrescence of civil society), but could be accomplished rather through the state. The state, to Bernstein, was required then in order to maintain those achievements, and therefore is in contrast to Marx and Engels' notion of the "withering away of the state" with socialism and classless civil society. Angel states that Bernstein was skeptical on this point, as he felt there would always be a body of specialized functionaries and organs of control. In fact, Bernstein saw that socialism may actually extend, not restrain, the state.[24] "He and his fellow Revisionists, therefore, saw nothing but Utopian speculation in Engels' 'withering away of the state'."[25]

To Bernstein, Marx's "dictatorship of the proletariat" was simply another example of Marx's "irrational Blanquism"[26] or irrational revolutionary violence. Angel states that, in a letter of 1852 to Weydemeyer, Marx describes his notion of this dictatorship:

> "Ce que j'ai fait d'original a été de démontrer: 1) que l'existence des classes est uniquement liée à certaines phases hisoriques de la production; 2) que la lutte de classe conduit nécessairement à la dictature de prolétariat; 3) que cette dictature elle-même ne constitue que la transition

vers la formation d'une société sans classes."[27] However, this inevitable, necessary development was not an essential part of the move toward socialism or a classless society for Bernstein. The fact that the end and the means were one for Bernstein precluded the desirability of a non-democratic social order. For Bernstein, the aim of class struggle was democracy, to be guaranteed with the help of parliamentarism. Therefore, a proletarian dictatorship was purely a historical peculiarity and reversion. "Für Bernstein war die Dictatur des Proletariats ein Atavismus."[28]--for Bernstein, the dictatorship of the proletariat was an atavism. While Bernstein disliked the non-democratic connotations of such a dictatorship, he also noted the efficiency of slower, more evolutionary means of social change. He recognized that democracy would not mean the immediate abolition of social classes, although it stresses the need for the elimination of class rule. Rather, democracy would teach the art of compromise among the various classes and they would learn to cooperate with each other.[29] Bernstein felt that such an evolutionary, democratic process was a slower, but more effective, long-lasting means of achieving socialism, than through a dictatorship of the proletariat. In addition, in Evolutionary Socialism, Bernstein makes the comment that this notion is obsolete. This is because all social democrats, by that time, were already working towards socialism through the parliamentary arena and direct legislation. Bernstein asks,

> "Is there any sense, for example, in maintaining the phrase of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" at a time when in all possible places representatives of social democracy have placed themselves practically in the arena of parliamentary work, have declared for the proportional representation of the people, and for direct legislation--all of which is inconsistent with a dictatorship."[30]

In other words, social democratic parties had already moved in practice, away from such a revolutionary concept. The social conditions which gave rise to Marx's notion no longer existed, and therefore, Bernstein saw that it was absurd to cling to an outmoded concept from another era--one which would now be impossible to put into action. Labedz notes such a process in more recent years when he says that those who are ready to acknowledge the "non-revolutionary" character of industrial societies moved toward dropping the theoretical premises (much as Bernstein had to abandon the notion of the "dictatorship of the proletariat"). Those who sought to preserve the revolutionary aspects of Marx's theory even had to invert that doctrine by dealing to a greater extent with Third World or non-industrial societies.[31] The latter also demonstrates the need for theoretical revisions in the light of changing historical developments.

Such a move on the part of Bernstein was not apparent early in his career, however, as Dühring, for example, was important in German social democracy before Marx's work had much impact. Bernstein did not escape such influence, having used Dühring's 1872 Cursus der National-und Sozialökonomie. What this impact of Duhring's led to, however, was Engels'

response to Dühring, published in the Vorwärts from January, 1877 to July, 1878. "It created Engels' Anti-Dühring which, as we have already noted, brought Bernstein into the Marxist fold."[32] In addition, this new trend was of course evident in the whole of the S.P.D., with its Erfurt Program of 1891. As with Bernstein's view of the state, his approach to reform and revolution were shaped not only by the early influences of Dühring, Engels, and Lassalle, but also by the later ones of the Fabians during the years in England, and the German trade-unions. As Gay states, the main Fabian influence on Bernstein was the relating of socialism to reformism, a reinforcement of opinions that Bernstein was already arriving at. For both the Fabians and Bernstein, the area for non-violent action was seen to be expanding--

> "Socialist institutions, so the theory runs, begin to permeate capitalism even while the latter system is at its height."[33]

No longer was there seen to be any need for the revolutionary action which Marx had prescribed. No longer would socialism require a total break with the existing social order. Gustafsson notes that to the Fabians, social democratic struggle was and should be principally parliamentary, and the influence of socialism would gradually be extended through the state, the growing meaning of democracy, communes, trade unions, and consumer co-ops. These aspects were more or less also the message that Bernstein was trying to put across.[34] He saw much potential for the democratic means of achieving socialism, perhaps even being overly optimistic in that regard.

Bernstein's approach was also very similar to that of German trade-unions, except that he did support the political mass strike, in contrast to the unions' stance on that issue. However, Bernstein made clear that he felt it needed to be utilized as a defensive, last-resort measure or to extend democratic, suffrage rights, not as a work stoppage to gain wage increases. In fact the debate over the issue of the mass strike led to a clearer picture of the relations between trade unions and the S.P.D. after 1900, than there had been in the past.[35] These relations, and changes in them also had their effects then upon Bernstein's move toward a more evolutionary, than revolutionary, approach to social change.

It is possible to see, then, the importance of a variety of influences upon Bernstein in the gradual development of his views on reform and revolution, such as Engels, the Fabians, and Louis Héritier. Bernstein's approach arose out of his study and critique of Marx's theories and emerged as part of an interaction among his views on reform, the state in general, and economic trends and theory. Bernstein was responding not only to the influences upon him, but also to the realities of the historical period which he perceived as having changed since the time of the development of Marx's theories. The new historical conditions to Bernstein, were suited to reformist, democratic socialist practice, rather than revolutionary tactics, the era of which had passed. This attempt on Bernstein's part to be historically specific and express the nature of his era, opened him to those influences which

affected his theoretical stances.

REFERENCES

1. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 78. "When the time of revolution is past, so must also the conditions of revolution be past, for revolutions of course cannot be created out of nothing. Marx and Engels taught that revolutions were a necessary succession of irreconcilable class antagonisms. Bernstein therefore had to examine whether that was correct."

2. Labedz, Revisionism, 13.

3. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 249.

4. Ibid, 253.

5. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 315-317. "The activists Vollmar in Germany and Millerand in France presented hence already 1891 and 1896 respectively, short summaries of the reformist politics on account of Vollmars reformism found in Paul Kampfmeyer and "The Socialist Academic," founded in 1895, a first theoretical complement."

6. Ibid, 253.

7. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 90-1.

8. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 97.

9. Ibid, 85-6.

10. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 94, 89-90, 69.

11. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 255.

12. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 11.

13. Gneuss, in Labedz, Revisionism, 35.

14. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 255.

15. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 217 and 218.

16. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, 503.

17. Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, 173.

18. Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, 79.

19. Labedz, Revisionism, 13.

20. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 223 and 249.

21. Ibid, 224.

22. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 90-95.

23. Ibid, 100.
"He said Blanqui. But he meant that, what was Blanquist to Marx, exactly as Sorel in his critique of the "Jacobins" in reality meant the contemporary revolutionary socialists."

24. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 247.

25. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 249.

26. Ibid, 248.

27. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 246; Cited from N.Z., xxv, 11, 2.
"What I originally did was to demonstrate:
1) that the existence of classes is uniquely linked to different historical phases of production;
2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat;
3) that this dictatorship itself constitutes only the transition towards the suppression of all classes and towards the formation of a society without classes."

28. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 321.

29. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 245 (quote from Bernstein, Voraussetzungen, 180).

30. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 146.

31. Labedz, Revisionism, 11.

32. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 103.

33. Ibid, 107, 109, and 220.

34. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 180.

35. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 237 and 243.

CHAPTER FOUR

Philosophical Framework

Not only did Bernstein revise Marx's economic assertions and theory of value, his concepts of the state and political tactics, but finally, Marx's philosophical position as well. The most important point Bernstein made in this regard was his refutation of the need for as great a reliance as with Marx, on the Hegelian dialectic. This critique however, arose out of his empirical economic and political studies and criticisms, as he searched for the philosophical basis behind Marx's conclusions. Bernstein was not anti-philosophical as say, the Fabians, who reduced socialism to a series of political and social measures without a unification of theory and practice. Rather, Bernstein criticized and revised specific aspects of Marx's use of the Hegelian dialectic and the effects that it had upon his economic and particularly, political concepts. As Peter Gay comments,

> "His philosophical case against Marxism was really an afterthought; it was appended to his attempt to refute Marxist conclusions on empirical grounds. He distrusted metaphysical structures as Utopian constructions and suspected abstract thought of leading to unwarranted results. The world to him was 'a complex of ready-made objects and processes'."[1]

Bernstein had definite empiricist leanings, though he was not a positivist.

Marx and Engels were influenced greatly by Hegelian thought. Many of Marx's works reflect this influence, including

those he wrote in response to the "Young Hegelians". Even though Marx criticized aspects of Hegelian philosophy, his work always retained important parts of its influence upon him.

Bernstein saw political and economic revisionism as needing to be completed through a philosophical doctrine different from that during the time of Marx and Engels. He recognized that in contrast to them, he was living not during a period of economic despair and depression, but a time of prosperity. Since there was apparently no coming breakdown or any need for a collapse of capitalism, Bernstein believed that philosophically, other driving forces behind socialism should be sought.[2]

Colletti criticizes the Second International and Bernstein's approach to the connection between man's labour and his cognition. He states that Marx's theory is divided by them into autonomous, component parts, without seeing the interrelations of those parts.

> "The main consequence of this 'factorial' approach, which runs more or less openly through all the Marxism of the period as the common basis for arguments as diverse as those of Bernstein and Plekhanov, is the divorce of 'production' and 'society', of materialism and history, the separation of man's relation with nature from the simultaneous relations between men. In short, the result is an incapacity to see that without human or social mediation, the very existence of labour and productive activity is inconceivable."[3]

Colletti sees them as missing Marx's view of man as <u>both</u> a part of nature and a thinking, active being. Rather, for Colletti, their deterministic and materialist view consisted of man only as part of an objective, natural process. Unlike

Feuerbachian or mechanistic materialism, Marx included the active part of human consciousness and practical activity in changing nature, as an important category in his theory of knowledge. Man is both created by and creator of his circumstances.[4]

However, Bernstein recognized this aspect of Marx's theory through his study of Marx's work and actually, his criticism of the mechanistic materialism strain of the Second International is central to Bernstein's view, due to its tactical and political implications. Bernstein's views cannot be lumped with the misinterpretations of the Second International. He was in fact responding to those errors that he perceived. One reason for this may have been in order to stress the determinism of Marx's theory in places, leading to a teleology. Bernstein states that,

> "To be a materialist means first of all to trace back all phenomena to the necessary movements of matter. These movements of matter are accomplished according to the materialist doctrine from beginning to end as a mechanical process, each individual process being the necessary result of preceding mechanical facts."..."The application of materialism to the interpretation of history means then, first of all, belief in the inevitableness of all historical events and developments."[5]

Bernstein's aversion to absolute determinism then is clear in this quote, as he does not adhere to a belief in inevitable events, such as the necessary breakdown of capitalism. He recognizes that a strength of Marx is his stress on economic factors in his interpretation of history, but is against calling it the materialist conception of history, as it then be-

comes confused with other types of materialism, including mechanical materialism. Bernstein continues:

> "Philosophic materialism, or the materialism of natural science, is in a mechanical sense deterministic. The Marxist conception of history is not. It allots to the economic foundation of the life of nations no unconditioned determining influence on the forms this life takes."[6]

Bernstein, then, does not confuse Marx's materialism with the mechanistic conception adhered to by the Second International, and criticizes the latter as a misinterpretation. Bernstein is perceptive with regard to Marx's approach. He notes that in Marx's theory of history, Marx gives little attention to the subjective aspects in the form of the will of men. That will and consciousness becomes subordinated to the material movement, but is not equated with mechanistic materialism.[7] The latter for Bernstein, imposed a necessary direction upon history through stages of production modes. Gustafsson agrees that Bernstein tends to equate modern materialism with the mechanistic materialism of the 18th century, although he is conscious of the differences between the two. He sees this as occurring, as Bernstein wished to give those subjective factors such as ideology and ethics more margin for independent manifestation than was the case in other types of materialism. Bernstein demanded a supplement, through ideological factors, of the mechanistic materialism that others took as their viewpoint. Another reason for this is that the neo-Kantians who gained strength during Bernstein's time, debased Marx's materialism, perhaps due to a recognition of its revolutionary

implications. They required the struggle for equality and justice as the motor force in their theory.[8]

What Marx did in his work was to integrate both factual and value judgements, or science and ideology.

> "The counterposing of causality and finalism reappears here in the form of an opposition between factual and value judgements, between science and ideology. Science 'observes'; it has no options to suggest for human action. Between the objective and impartial factual observations of science and the finalities of the will, there is a radical distinction. From the indicative premises of science one cannot draw conclusions which are determinant of, and binding for, action"..."And yet the conviction that there can be a body of scientific knowledge acquired independently of any evaluation, clearly reveals the naive positivism underlying this line of thought and its inability to recognize that the role of finalism in scientific research is, at least, in one aspect, the very role of deduction."[9]

What Colletti is referring to is the notion that theory logically comes prior to empirical facts to some extent in scientific research, as one must have a framework with which to begin; all researchers inevitably make initial assumptions to some degree. However, one must make the empirical facts eventually take priority, in the sense that the theory must be altered if it does not agree with the facts. Value judgements or ideology are part of scientific research, but are controlled by empirical verification of them, as was Marx's method.

> "This is precisely the link between science and politics, between knowledge and transformation of the world, that Marx accomplished in the historical-moral field."[10]

Bernstein does not negate this union in Marx's work, but rather

extends it. He did not see the historical facts for example, economically, as fitting the prevalent theory, so he argued that there was a need to transform the theory. In addition, Bernstein attempts to give ideological factors more weight than did Marx and Engels. He refers to Engels' view that changes in methods of production and exchange are the "final causes of all social changes and political revolutions". Bernstein's response is to stress the need to be aware of other forces as well, even those of lesser degrees. In fact, he says that Marx and Engels gave more modifying power to non-economic factors in their later writings, a natural development of most theories which begin in an exaggerated form. Therefore, it is necessary to use the theory in its most developed form. The use of non-economic factors as well is particularly important to Bernstein when a theory is used, as Marx's has been, to make predictions about future developments.

> "This must be kept quite particularly in view when it is a question no longer of simple research into earlier epochs of history, but of foretelling coming developments, if the materialist conception of history is to be of use as a guide to the future."[11]

Marx's theory was not only scientific, but also contained an a priori teleology. But to Bernstein, socialism was not solely "scientific socialism", due to its inclusion of value judgements, a moral basis. He wanted to claim a greater space of man's value judgements or ethical thinking than Marx's theory provided. For Marx, ideology and ethical systems were primarily

a reflection of man's social production that was transformed as production relations are altered.[12] This reintroduction of ethics actually fits very well with Bernstein's political theory, for as Angel notes, ethics have the advantage of justifying the collaboration of different social classes on the basis of ideas of justice and truth.[13] Bernstein's notions of the class struggle and of democracy leaves room for such a collaboration based upon ethics. Bernstein does not, however, advocate such an emphasis upon or use of ethics for purely philosophical reasons. He saw the importance of ethics and value judgements as actually increasing in reality and therefore requiring an appropriate, new theoretical framework. Bernstein states,

> "...the point of economic development attained to-day leaves the ideological, and especially the ethical, factors greater space for independent activity than was formerly the case. In consequence of this the interdependency of cause and effect between technical, economic evolution, and the evolution of other social tendencies is becoming always more indirect, and from that the necessities of the first are losing much of their power of dictating the form of the latter."[14]

This is evidently a process that Bernstein perceives as occurring historically, in reality--a process that needed to be taken into account theoretically. This is what he attempted to do, to continue and extend the unity of theory and practice to which Marx had adhered.

A purely "scientific socialism" was not possible to Bernstein, as he saw that science was useful to socialism but socialism was not a science in itself. He stated that Marx

and Engels' socialism was scientific to the extent that it dealt with the process of economic development, but that it also included important non-scientific elements (value judgements).[15] It is again when the non-scientific elements come into play that Bernstein questions Marx's conclusions:

> "For the general sympathy with the strivings for emancipation of the working classes does not in itself stand in the way of the scientific method. But, as Marx approaches a point when that final aim enters seriously into the question, he becomes uncertain and unreliable"--"a slave to a doctrine."[16]

Bernstein criticizes value judgements when they are not adjusted to the theory when needed, when a teleological dependence enters into the picture. Bernstein criticizes those who try to uphold the theory in the face of contradictory, empirical facts. The a priori teleology, Bernstein views as being partly a residue of Utopianism. It is a residue that is contained in the dualism of Marx's work--

> "...a dualism which consists in this, that the work aims at being a scientific inquiry and also at proving a theory laid down long before its drafting; a formula lies at the basis of it in which the result to which the exposition should lead is fixed beforehand."[17]

This is the major problem which Bernstein sees in Marx's work, and one which he views as being the result of Marx's reliance on the Hegelian dialectic as a method.

In order to criticize the concept of socialism and admit ideology instead, Bernstein separates Marx's theory into two autonomous parts, negating the dialectical relation Marx had created. The interrelation of men as products of their environment, along with their will and ability to effect change

and create history, is dealt with by Marx, but Bernstein separates the essential connection of the two in Marx's view of the historical process and man's relation to man and to nature. Marx's approach is the simultaneous existence of both causation or materialism and finality (teleology) or history. Finalism or teleology takes the subject, for example, the idea, as a priori to and a causation of the goal, and "the effect is an end", whereas in efficient causality, "the cause precedes and determines the effect and therefore there is a "product of objective, material causation". These two processes are inversions of each other and it "is the secret of and key to historical materialism in its double aspect, of causation (materialism) and finality (history)."[18] This is particularly evident in Marx's treatment of the labour process as both finalism and efficient causation, a realization of or objectification of the worker's idea as well as a taking into account of the nature of the materials to be utilized.[19]

Bernstein's critique of this dialectical union was reinforced by the influence of Kantian philosophy. With reference to Kant, Colletti states that: "He explicitly theorizes the difference between the ethical sphere and the cognitive-scientific sphere." Kant criticized the ontological argument, due to seeing a "qualitative gulf" between the conditions of being and those of thought."[20] These are some of the roots of Bernstein's separation of science and ideology and his introduction of ethical idealism, as opposed to Marx's Hegelian dialectic.

Bernstein moved that dialectical method from the core to the periphery of Marxism, the method that had led Marx to see man as a whole, make the leap from philosophy to the social and political order, and see "society as historically bound and deeply involved in contradictions."[21] Marx admired in Hegel his change from a fixed system of concepts to one of perpetual movement of reality, as well as his attempt to surpass the contradiction between external reality and thought. For Hegel, nature forms a coherent whole of inter-dependent parts, reality is complex and in constant evolution, though not a gradual and regular process as it was for the revisionists. To the revisionists, evolution however is not due to the struggle of contradictions as it is to the Hegelians.[22] History is not always a process of violent breaks and changes, but rather often evolves slowly and imperceptibly.

This Hegelian method of Marx is what Bernstein saw as creating the errors in Marx's predictions, his retaining a priori Hegelian concepts which forced him to come to set conclusions of the necessity of a violent breakdown of capitalism and institution of socialism. Bernstein did not wish to ignore those errors in Marx's theory and retain the method, as he believed that it was the dialectical method itself which led to those errors. The primary reason for this was that the methodology and the theory no longer corresponded to empirical reality.[23] History had progressed, so that the needs and character of Bernstein's era were seen as different to those of Marx's time and therefore required a different

theoretical schema.

Where the Hegelian system constructs a priori, it necessarily does violence to reality in Bernstein's view. Where the teleological aspects of Hegel's theory are carried over into the socio-political and economic spheres, Bernstein sees grave errors necessarily occurring. For example, Angel points out that, "L'apport hégélien les a rendus incapables de voir les erreurs du blanquisme."[24] In the political sphere, then, the hegelian schema renders one incapable of seeing the errors of Blanquism. As noted in the chapter on "Reform and Revolution", Bernstein sharply criticized the Marxist reliance on theories of revolution, tendency and error which he saw as being due immediately to a stress on the value of Blanquism, but more basically, as due to the Hegelian dialectic. This dialectical method, then, Bernstein perceived as causing many problems for socialist movements. Bernstein himself stated,

> "But the preconceived theories about the drift of the movement which go beyond such a generally expressed aim, which try to determine the direction of the movement and its character without an ever-vigilant eye upon facts and experience, must necessarily always pass into Utopianism, and at some time or other stand in the way, and hinder the real theoretical and practical progress of the movement."[25]

He does not see the problem as simply one for theory, then, but also for the actual socialist movement in reality. This is again particularly evident in the political realm where Bernstein aimed at the political Blanquism of the revolution, so admired by Marx. It was not the revolt itself that Bernstein

criticized, but rather this revolutionary view of a priori theory-- "Gerade diese revolutionäre Einstellung und nicht ihr Putschismus war es, was Bernstein kritisierte."[26] Blanquism was the theory of revolutionary power, from which Bernstein wanted to free Marxism. So long as the dialectic was in use, with its theory of development through struggle of opposites, it would be impossible to rationalize revisionism's political desire to reconcile social classes.[27]

That dialectical concern with contradiction led, to Bernstein, to a trap. This is why the Erfurt Program foresaw the disappearance of the middle class, and increasing exploitation and class struggle--definitely a Marxist approach. Bernstein later, in contrast, did not see the struggle of opposites as the basis of all historical change. "The cooperation of related forces is of great significance as well." Therefore, for Bernstein, class antagonisms would continue, but also diminish with time.[28]

This was a characteristic that Bernstein observed as a process in his era. It is important to note that Marx did not adhere to the correspondence theory of truth, truth did not depend on Hegelian categories of consciousness, but rather on objective reality and practice. Bernstein attempted to continue to extend Marx's general approach and to apply it to his own times. In Bernstein's view, the Hegelian dialectic did correspond during the mid-19th century. However, that objective reality has past and therefore, those categories of consciousness must also be left behind.

During Bernstein's time, there were a number of influences which aided him in making his critique of Marxist theory. One of these was the strong interest in Kant among a number of theoreticians in Germany--the neo-Kantians. Bernstein himself refers to the need for a critical spirit of someone like Kant, in order to reveal the useless "cant" in Hegelian dialectical terms which was predominant in the S.P.D. at that time and which led the party to hold onto outmoded, teleological concepts. Bernstein says,

> "...social democracy required a Kant who should judge the received opinion and examine it critically with deep acuteness, who should show where its apparent materialism is the highest--and is therefore the most easily misleading--ideology, and warn it that the contempt of the ideal, the magnifying of material factors until they become omnipotent forces of evolution, is a self-deception..."[30]

It is clear here that Bernstein criticizes again too great a reliance on materialism alone and on the Hegelian dialectic. He also reflects the philosophical, neo-idealist revolt at the end of the 19th century against positivism and materialism. Neo-Kantianism was the main tendency in that stream of thought.[31] This was particularly true of the 1870's in Germany with the revival of Kantian philosophy and epistemology. It included such neo-Kantians as Friedrich Albert Lange, Hermann Cohen, and Rudolf Stammler.[32] In fact, Bernstein recognizes the role of the neo-Kantians himself. He said in his Homage to Friedrich Albert Lange (in Die Neue Zeit) that the neo-Kantian movement was a reaction against the materialism inspired by the natural sciences in the middle of the century, as well as against the

excess of speculative philosophy.[33]

Marx and Engels thought that Kant's stress on "good will" independent of results, ideologically was in favour of the bourgeoisie, so did not advocate its usage.

> "Marx and Engels felt that Kant's sharp bifurcation of knowable phenomena and unknowable noumena led to political impotence by limiting the range of human reason and by separating thought from action."[34]

However, it was useful for Bernstein and in his political theories. He saw socialism as representing a moral good, in contrast to Marx, a view which was held by the neo-Kantians and Croce. Bernstein was in contact with both neo-Kantian members of the S.P.D. in 1898 and 1899, Ludwig Woltmann and Karl Vorländer.[35] The importance of Bernstein in relation to those who influenced him was that Bernstein was the first real leader in the S.P.D. to express the same sentiments. Conrad Schmidt and Ludwig Woltmann had questioned Marx's philosophical basis for socialism quite early (1896 and 1897), but neither of them had as great an impact because they were not strong leaders in the German social democratic party.[36] Bernstein's openness to neo-Kantian influence was a gradual development. One of the factors that led him in that direction was his reading of Cohen's introduction to F.A. Lange's work, History of Materialism in 1866, an important neo-Kantian influence. Cohen stated in that essay that socialism is grounded in the idealism of ethics and that Kant was the creator of German socialism. It was also a philosophy of political reconciliation of the working class and the existing state.

Lange himself called for the removal of the dialectic from Marxism. He stated that Marx recognized that past historical development was not as radical or symmetrical as in speculative construction, but that Marx then thought the other way about the future. In addition, it seems that another influence on Bernstein in this direction was that of Höchberg. The latter was actually a student of Lange, and Bernstein worked for Höchberg as editor of the Sozialdemokrat in Zurich. He said in his memoirs that Hochberg's opinion did have some meaning for him.[37] Bernstein's last work of importance in this domain was How is Scientific Socialism Possible?, published in 1901. However Kampffmeyer and Conrad Schmidt published works after that on the same theme. Schmidt published a work on Kant in the February 12, 1904 issue of Vorwärts.[38]

What Bernstein was suggesting, however, was not a literal return to Kant and Lange, but a return in spirit. He states in Evolutionary Socialism:

> "What I have in mind is the distinguishing union in Lange of an upright and intrepid championship of the struggles of the working classes for emancipation with a large scientific freedom from prejudice which was always ready to acknowledge mistakes and recognize new truths."[39]

What was needed was a Kant who could examine the S.P.D.'s inherited dogma of Hegelian dialectics and advocate the acceptance of the validity of ethical judgements. According to Bernstein, no longer should the party continue to maintain the theories of violent revolution, the dictatorship of the

proletariat, and the hopelessness or misery of the workers' position in this new era of changed circumstances.[40] The importance of traditions such as these, even for socialists, was criticized by Bernstein. This is what he felt a critic like Kant or Lange would be useful for dispelling:

> "For a party which has to keep up with a real evolution, criticism is indispensable and tradition can become an oppressive burden, a restraining fetter"..."Usually they prefer to take into account only such changes as are concerned with undeniable facts and to bring them into unison as far as can be with the traditional catchwords."[41]

What Bernstein's attitude demonstrates here is an example of Labedz's comment that revisionist philosophers have a healthy eclecticism, as opposed to a monolithic system-building of philosophy, yet are not too positivistic at the same time.[42] In this way, the revisionists attempted to avoid some of the dogmatic pitfalls that had emerged in numerous socialist parties by the time of the Second International. One of the reasons for this, as noted, was that in Bernstein's view the use of the Hegelian dialectic by Marx led to much of this teleological dogmatism and parties turning a blind eye to the empirical changes that had occurred since Marx's time.

> "To Bernstein, Marx's interpretation was a living thing, not a stereotyped model. It was 'above all a method of <u>understanding</u> history", as he once wrote to Kautsky,[64] and he objected, rightly, to a rigid application of Marxian terminology and categories. This procedure, he felt, put historical truth in a straitjacket in order to fit the infinite variety of life to a single scheme."[43]

Here again we can see Bernstein's opposition to any single theory or scheme as one that can be universally applied for

all time.

Bernstein's views and introduction of ethics and values into the theory of socialism was strongly criticized by the S.P.D. at the turn of the century. However, though it was repudiated, his revisionism was gradually integrated into the party's approach. By the time of the Bad Godesberg Congress in November, 1959, the S.P.D. was clearly revisionist. Its program at that time even begins with the enduring "fundamental values of socialism" as being those of freedom and justice.

> "From there, and not from any insight into purportedly inescapable laws of historical development, socialist policy in its various spheres of activity is deduced. The harnessing of socialism to the realm of what should be, the turn towards a philosophic idealism, for which Bernstein was one of the first to call, has thus been officially embodied in the programme of German social-democracy."[44]

Over the years, Bernstein's revisionist approach came to be accepted by the S.P.D., particularly after it became a legal party and assumed political power in Germany.

REFERENCES

1. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 162. Cited; Bernstein, Zur Geschichte und Theorie des
2. Sozialismus, 340.
2. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 111.
3. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 66.
4. Schaff in Labedz, Revisionism, 193.
5. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 6 and 7.
6. Ibid, 17 and 18.
7. Ibid, 9.
8. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 116 and 318.
9. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 75.
10. Ibid, 76.
11. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 10 and 11.
12. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 149-150.
13. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 191.
14. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 15.
15. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 159.
16. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 120-11.
17. Ibid, 209.
18. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 66-67.
19. Ibid, 67.
20. Colletti, Interview in the New Left Review, 10.
21. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 142-3.
22. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 198.
23. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 144.

24. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 203 and 205.

25. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 204-5.

26. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 118.

27. Ibid, 318.

28. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 145 and 147 Cited on 147; Bernstein, Zur Geschichte und Theorie des Sozialismus, 347.

29. Ibid, 144.

30. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 223.

31. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 315.

32. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 151.

33. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 193.

34. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 153.

35. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 111.

36. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 153.

37. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 112-115.

38. Angel, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand, 207.

39. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 224.

40. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 155.

41. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 200-1.

42. Labedz, Revisionism, 17.

43. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 161. Cited; Bernstein to Kautsky, May 11, 1928, Bernstein Archives.

44. Gneuss in Labedz, Revisionism, 41.

CONCLUSION

During the time of the Second International, in the late 1800's, the major opposition between orthodox Marxism and revision developed throughout Europe. "Der Revisionismus war somit eine internationale Erscheinung."[1]--revisionism was an international phenomenon. It was prevalent not only in Germany, but also in Italy, France, England, Belgium, and Russia. Bernstein emerged as a central figure in German socialism due to being a leading Marxist. In addition, he was of major note for his presentation of revisionism as a coherent theory.[2] This theory expressed that international revisionist movement and the practice as it was emerging in the German social democratic party.

> "Bernstein's Revisionism was the child of its time: the logical expression of the belief in progress which motivated wide circles in Europe before it was destroyed by the war. Its advent, as has been shown was inevitable: the Revisionists did not create the Reformist mood, but the mood, instead, called forth the theory."[3]

Bernstein was the one who openly expressed the character of that time in his theoretical revisions.

As with other socialist parties, as the S.P.D. came closer to gaining legal, parliamentary power, it became less revolutionary in practice. Bernstein recognized this and the fact that the party's revolutionary rhetoric had become merely a facade. Bernstein's revisions caused much debate at the time as many in the S.P.D. did not want to revise or remove any of Marx's framework, while Bernstein saw it as

necessary to adjust the theory to the new conditions and practice. Such an open declaration of reformism is an important issue for socialist parties, as they are often politically impotent while they maintain that they seek revolutionary means or ends. They require political power in order to institute any social change in a socialist direction, utilizing democratic means. This places socialist parties in a bind. For many in democratic societies, revolutionary means and ends are no longer seen as appropriate and, therefore, revolutionary rhetoric, while a product of their past tradition, serves only to further alienate them from those they are attempting to reach.

> "It will be admitted, then, that Bernstein's general political position is of great relevance to countries with genuine parliamentary institutions."[4]

The point is that perhaps in societies which already have acquired democratic institutions, Marx's theory with its emphasis upon revolutionary political measures simply no longer fits those circumstances. As the political and social relations change, so must also the theory that expresses those relations. Even in Bernstein's time, he recognized that democracy was the first objective. He stated that, "Everywhere there is action for reform, action for social progress, action for the victory of democracy."[5] Democratic reform, then, had become the predominant means of change in practice.

There is, on the other hand, always the problem of whether a socialist party which always adheres to democratic

procedures under all circumstances is forced to remain politically ineffective.[6] Bernstein's theory offers one plausible answer to the bind, as Bernstein saw the possibility of reform or revolution as dependent upon the varying circumstances. Each instance would have to be considered according to those particular conditions.

Much of this has still not been recognized by the socialist movements, however, as many of the issues Bernstein addressed still currently produce a schism in socialist parties. They do not always recognize that Marx's own conception of a dialectical relation between theory and practice or reality actually points to a need for modifications of the theory itself, as Bernstein attempted.[7] Many continue to debate the notion of impending breakdown of capitalism and there are varying interpretations of the evidence regarding economic trends and the class struggle. The effect of new class structures on the acuteness of that struggle, is open to debate. It is a question which is closely tied to the issue of a breakdown of capitalism. For Marx, the capital-wage labour relation and conflict would eventually lead to such a breakdown. This view was criticized by Bernstein as being the result of Marx's use of Hegelian dialectics and the teleology which he retained from that. Many today continue to maintain the same philosophical framework without being critical of some aspects of it.

Bernstein, however, did give a valuable criticism of

Marx's teleological, Utopian residue, part of his dialectic with science or facts. To Bernstein, this theoretical framework, not the movement itself, was recognized as the problem. Bernstein stated that Marx's picture of later stages of economic and class struggle development seemed insufficient, as in reality, historical revolution includes the emergence of new facts and forces all the time. The utopian aspects of Marx's doctrine led to Marx's ascribing to the working-class developments that might occur in the future, rather than taking them fully as they are. This led to a contradiction in Marx's theory, as he recognized the immaturity of the working classes and economic conditions at that point in time, yet the tactics and strategies that he advocated necessitate the maturity of both.[8]

Differing views of the state and civil society are still held, including their importance in relation to each other. This has become particularly evident with the growing predominance of the state in this society, and the central concern which it has become. This is true not only for socialist parties themselves, but also the theories of the intellectuals which tend to reflect the growth of the modern state into numerous areas. Related to this issue of the state is the continuing debate regarding the usefulness of reformist, parliamentary measures as opposed to a perceived need for more revolutionary stances, even in democratic societies. This split that existed in Bernstein's time still persists, if not

within socialist parties, then between social democracy and communist parties. The objects of Bernstein's critique, then, economic debates, the state, reform versus revolution, and Marxist theoretical framework are still very much alive.

Bernstein's form of socialism is most relevant as a consideration for such countries where there is much political stability and little propensity towards radical means or ends.

Another valuable application of Bernstein's views consists of his insight into the Soviet system. Bernstein had criticized Bolshevism as being a distortion of Marxism. He thought that the Bolsheviks had "brutalized" Marx's doctrine, for example by, ignoring Marx's economics by leaping ahead to socialism in a country like Russia where there were not advanced economic conditions.

> "In these last years then, Bernstein acted as a sort of Cassandra, warning against the dangers of a reactionary subversion of the Weimar Republic, warning against the Bolsheviks."[9]

Bernstein saw Bolshevik-Leninism utilizing the teleological concept of historical necessity and the laws of class struggle as a justification for violence. It also was used to rationalize the existence of a totalitarian dictatorship. Bernstein perceived that the desire for freedom and democracy was the main issue, rather than one of socialism versus capitalism. Democracy, for Bernstein, was a necessary prerequisite for socialism.[10]

It is interesting that the Soviets do not tolerate

revisionist views and uphold Marxist dogma in a way that Bernstein criticized. His assertions with regard to the problems of Marxist theory and practice are still very relevant then to the current situation. Labedz notes that the Soviets have too many vested interests to indulge in any revisionist criticism and that they are forced to cling to their dogmatic, revolutionary myths to uphold the legitimacy of their own regime. However, their views in the area of strategies and tactics have actually become revised in a gradual manner over the years. The revolutionary theory in this area has changed along with new conditions in the world, particularly since World War 2 with the Soviets' statement that there is a possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism. The development of new weapons and techniques for the taking of power induced more tactical flexibility on the part of the Soviets. For instance, they utilized more guerilla warfare tactics in Yugoslavia, while importing Russian leaders into eastern Europe, who imposed revolutionary ends without any revolution occurring as a means to that end. Labedz also states that the new regions for development of Communist influence--the underdeveloped nations--have also affected the use of different tactics. "...the conditions of a new balance of power" necessitated a revision of the Soviets' revolutionary theory, despite their criticism of revisionist changes in doctrine.[11] This is an application of Bernstein's critique which could be extended and receive greater attention.

In general, then, Bernstein's critique of Marx's theories possessed some internal problems but was usually quite consistent within itself. Revisionism has expressed aptly the general trends of the modern era, and has been strengthened by empirical support. However, as Peter Gay notes, there have been problems with Revisionism as well. For example, the Depression of the 1930's demonstrated that economic crises were still possible and World War I had disturbed the essential optimism of the Revisionist view.[12] Despite these setbacks, however, Revisionism has proven to be particularly suited to the political and social conditions of the modern western world and for that reason should be remembered in current analyses. In addition, it can serve as a valuable basis for critiques of Soviet-type orthodoxy and the problems associated with it.

REFERENCES

1. Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus, 127.
2. Ibid, 322.
3. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 302.
4. Ibid, 300.
5. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 199.
6. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 7.
7. Labedz, Revisionism, 10.
8. Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 208-9, 216, and 219.
9. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 295.
10. Hook, Introduction to Evolutionary Socialism.
11. Labedz, Revisionism, 24, 14, and 15.
12. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 299.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Angel, Pierre, Eduard Bernstein et L'Évolution du Socialisme Allemand. Paris: Librairie Marcel Didier, 1961.

2. Bernstein, Eduard, Evolutionary Socialism. New York: Schocken Books, 1961.

3. --------, Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Sozialismus, Teil I-III. Berlin: Ferd. Dummlers Verlagsbuch-handlung, 1904.

4. Bottomore, Tom and Goode, Patrick, Austro-Marxism. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1978.

5. Colletti, Lucio, From Rousseau to Lenin. New York and London: New Left Books, 1972.

6. --------, Interview in New Left Review Journal, #86. London: July/August, 1974.

7. --------, Introduction to Karl Marx--Early Writings. Toronto: Random House of Canada, Ltd., 1975.

8. --------, Marxism and Hegel. London: New Left Books, 1973.

9. Engels, Frederick, The Role of Force in History. New York: International Publishers, 1968.

10. Gay, Peter, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism--Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx. New York: Columbia University Press (In Canada: Toronto: Collier-Mac-Millan Ltd.), 1952, 1962.

11. Gustafsson, Bo, Marxismus und Revisionismus, Teil 1, Frankfurt am Main: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1972.

12. Henderson, W.O., The Industrial Revolution on the Continent. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1967.

13. Hook, Sidney, Introduction to Eduard Bernstein's Evolution-ary Socialism. New York: Schocken Books, 1961.

14. Krader, Lawrence, A Treatise of Social Labor. Assen/ The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1979.

15. --------, Dialectic of Civil Society. Assen/The Nether-lands: Van Gorcum, 1976.

16. Korsch, Karl, Marxism and Philosophy. New York: New Left Books, 1970.

17. Labedz, Leopold, Ed., Revisionism. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962.

18. Levitt, Cyril, "Karl Marx on Law, State, and Collectivity", Catalyst. Peterborough, Canada: Trent University, Volume #12, 1978.

19. Lidtke, Vernon L., The Outlawed Party--Social Democracy in Germany 1878-1890. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966.

20. Marx, Karl, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Chicago: International Library Publishing Co., 1904.

21. --------, Capital, Volumes 1 and 3. New York: International Publishers, 1967 and 1977.

22. --------, Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right". Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970 and 1978.

23. --------, Critique of the Gotha Programme. New York: International Publishers Co., 1966.

24. --------, Grundrisse. New York: Random House, Inc. (In Canada: Toronto: Random House of Canada Ltd.), 1973.

25. ------- and Engels, Frederick, Marx-Engels 111 Studienausgabe--Geschichte und Politik 1, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1966 and 1979.

26. --------, The Communist Manifesto. New York: Washington Square Press, 1972.

26. Marx, Karl, The German Ideology, Part 1. New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1970; Parts 2 and 3, Collected Works, Volume 5. New York: International Publishers, 1976.

27. --------, The Holy Family, Collected Works, Volume 4. New York: International Publishers, 1976.

28. --------, The Poverty of Philosophy, Collected Works, Volume 6. New York: International Publishers, 1976.

29. Mishra, Ramesh, "Marx and Welfare", The Sociological Review. Portsmouth Polytechnic, England: Ravelin House, 1975.

30. Mitchell, Alan, "Bonapartism as a Model for Bismarckian Politics", Journal of Modern History, Volume 49, #2.

31. O'Malley, Joseph, Introduction to Marx's Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right". Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970 and 1978.

32. Rosdolsky, Roman, The Making of Marx's "Capital". Frankfurt and London: Pluto Press Ltd., 1968 and 1977.

33. Rubin, Isaak Illich, Essays on Marx's Theory of Value. Montreal, Canada: Black Rose Books Ltd., 1973.

34. Schorske, Carl, German Social Democracy 1905-1917, The Development of the Great Schism. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1955.

35. Simon, W.M., Germany in the Age of Bismarck. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968.

36. Torrance, John, Estrangement, Alienation, and Exploitation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.