A COMPARISON OF GLOCK'S DIMENSIONS OF RELIGIOSITY,
THE WAYS OF YOGA AND THE MECHANISMS OF SACRALIZATION
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THE WAYS OF YOGA AND THE MECHANISMS OF SACRALIZATION

By

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INTRODUCTION

Aims and Assumptions:

In this paper I intend to study comparatively the process in and through which a certain set of symbols or meaning structures acquire the quality of sacrality. It is our assumption that the dimensions of religiosity postulated by Glock and the ways of Yoga enunciated in ancient Hindu religious literature are concerned with this process of transition from the profane to the sacred. This emphasis on the process accounts for the use of the concept of sacralization as a dynamic concept over and against the concern with the static and frigid separateness of the sacred as expressed in the sociological literature which uses Durkheim's conceptualization. In this sense this study is an implicit critique of Durkheim. Durkheim's insistence on the separateness and antagonism between the sacred and the profane leads to an underestimation of the conflicting and yet complementary relationship between the sacred and the profane. Ours is an attempt to emphasise the dialectical relationship between the sacred and the profane and to bring out its implication for understanding both the emergence of sacredness through the process of sacralization as well as subsequent objectifying, separating characteristics. To this end the present work draws heavily upon the theoretical formulations of Mol.
Mol recognizes the dialectical relationship between the sacred and the profane and discerns four mechanisms of sacralization characterizing the fluid transition from profane to the sacred. The mechanisms of sacralization recognized by him are the following: (1) objectification (the projection of order in a beyond where it is less vulnerable to contradictions, exceptions and contingencies of the mundane and the temporal); (2) commitment (the emotional anchorage in the various, proliferating, foci of identity); (3) ritual (the repetitive actions, articulations and movements which prevent the object of sacralization being lost sight of); (4) myth (the integration of the various strains in a coherent, short-hand symbolic account). Herein it is claimed that the mechanisms of sacralization seem to synchronize with Glock's dimensions of religiosity on the one hand and the ways of Yoga on the other. It is our assumption that the mechanisms of sacralization provide us with the conceptual and theoretical framework for comparing religious phenomena in two different socio-cultural contexts.

However, caution needs to be taken to emphasise that ours is not a claim for perfect correlation between the mechanisms of sacralization and the dimensions of religiosity as well as the ways of Yoga. We grant that there is a possibility that two or more of the dimensions or ways of Yoga combined together constitute some cluster of phenomena comparable to any one of the mechanisms. Similarly, any one of the dimensions or the
yogas may be found to have collapsed conceptually what we have described as different mechanisms. To this extent ours is also a task of conceptual clarification. Thus the task that we set for ourselves is rendered doubly difficult. For, we have also to see whether the conceptual scheme that we borrow from Mol is large enough to account for the differences as well as the similarities between the dimensions of religiosity discerned by Glock and the ways of Yoga.

Glock's conceptualization of the dimensions of religiosity takes place in an institutional frame of reference where the emphasis is on the need to understand the extent of the psychological or social benefit of religious commitment by discerning the role of religious institutions in the process. Glock postulates five dimensions of religiosity to measure and explain the degree and direction of religious change in modern America. They are the following: (1) experiential dimension (it is concerned with religious feelings giving expression to the affective relationship supposedly established between the divine and the individual); (2) the ritualistic dimension (emphasis here is on the reinforcement of commitment to a certain system of beliefs through rituals); (3) the ideological dimension (it is constituted by expectations that the religious person will hold to certain beliefs as the cornerstone of his religious life); (4) the intellectual dimension (it is assumed that the religious person will be informed and knowledgeable about the basic tenets of his faith and its
sacred scriptures): (5) the consequential dimension (it encompasses the secular effects of religious belief, practice, experience, and knowledge on the individual). These dimensions, in Glock's scheme, provide a frame of reference for analysing the religious phenomena and assessing religiosity. The significance of this approach to the problem under investigation lies in its emphasis on a multidimensional rather than unilateral treatment of the problem.

We will pay some special attention to certain problematic areas in Glock. One problem that needs careful consideration is the question of saliency of a belief system as expressed in Glock's discussion of ethicalism. While his findings on Catholic church members fit well into our scheme emphasizing a close relationship between the sacred and the profane and the sacred acquiring further leverage for sacralization through the commitment link, his theoretical formulations on protestant bodies is unable to explain why ethicalism and orthodoxy can be mutually exclusive roots of religious identity. Then there is the question of ambiguous and vague use of the term "commitment." Glock uses the term "commitment" in a rather comprehensive sense to include any and all dimensions of religiosity. This dilutes the value of the term as an analytical tool for understanding the complex phenomenon of religiosity. Closely related is the question of the double/facedness of the concept of commitment and its occasional use in a restricted and specific sense that is contrary to Glock's earlier formulations. Attention is also drawn to Glock's failure
to perceive the dialectic between the integrative/expressive and the adaptive/instrumental symbol systems. He unwittingly grants the instrumental/adaptive symbol system an independent role in the interpretation of reality. We will try to bring out the implications of this for deciphering the mythic symbolism and its role in sublimating the basic conflicts of human existence.

In Yoga the complexities of the religious symbol system appear in its dialectical frame of reference. Theoretical formulations of Yoga literature tend to agree with our own theoretical scheme. Herein it is claimed that for Yoga too instrumental reason has a conflicting and yet complementary relationship with the expressive integrative symbol system. The emphasis in Yoga is on the integration of human personality through the realization of a communion or rapport with the Supreme Being. There are at least four ways in and through which it is claimed that such rapport can be accomplished: (1) Jnana Yoga (it lays emphasis on knowledge culminating in wisdom as the way leading to communion with the Supreme Being); (2) Bhakti Yoga (it recognizes the significance of the emotive content of the belief system and takes into consideration the role of emotional factors in the integration of human personality); (3) Tantra Yoga (the Tantra aims at the integration of dynamic (sakti tattva) and static (siva tattva) aspects of human personality through ritual practices); (4) Karma Yoga (it lays emphasis on the volitional side of human nature. Action performed in the spirit of detachment from the fruit thereof becomes
sacred and is freed from its disruptive influence on human personality). Yoga does not consider these various ways as mutually exclusive. Recognizing the significance of different aspects of human personality, the different ways of Yoga are complementary to each other. They require a coming to terms with the instinctual drives of human personality through a harmonization of passion and reason. They aim at self integration through the organized maturity of the normal human personality. And by offering an orderly interpretation of reality they appear to minimize the effects of disorder, discrepancies and chaos that the individual seems to encounter in the world.

While taking note of the general congruence between the ways of Yoga and the mechanisms of sacralization we will also concern ourselves with specific problems that we may encounter within the theoretical framework of Yoga literature. The purpose of this investigation will be to examine the viability of our hypothesis in specific terms. Thus we will have to ask if the complexity and multifacedness of the notion of knowledge in Jnana Yoga justifies our placing it on the expressive/integrative side of the symbol system. In the context of Bhakti Yoga we have to examine how Sradha (emotional commitment to the divine) is transformed into Prema (the passionate love for God). What are the implications of this change in emphasis for the motivational orientation of the committed in terms of the priority setting function of commitment? We also have to enquire why Kundalini
Yoga, which lies on the side of expressive integrative symbol system and tends to stabilize identity, has at the same time contributed to the sacralization of a permanent state of liminality within Hindu society. It is indeed significant that the Kundalini Yoga, boldly affirmative in its methodological approach to the world and one’s involvement therein, has been problematic for the believer. We will have to enquire whether the attitude to Kundalini Yoga in Hindu society is an indication of a social rejection of a pathological condition directly resulting from anomie (Kundalini Yoga in its extreme form goes against the norm of other/worldliness).

In addition to specific issues we will also address ourselves to two general issues. First, we will have to ascertain whether both for Glock and Yoga identity consolidation or integration is the central issue. Whether sacralization is conceived by them as a process which, by providing individuals with an interpretation of existence, tends to resolve the problem of meaning and thereby consolidates identity. This will bring us to the problem of the nature of the religious symbol systems. Herein it will be argued that both Yoga and Glock juxtapose the integrative/expressive aspect of the belief systems against the instrumental/adaptive symbol systems. While claiming that the two systems tend to agree on the inadequacy of the instrumental reason in resolving the meaning of existence and guaranteeing identity consolidation, we must also guard against any undue
minimization of the divergences and differences in the theoretical formulations of Glock and Yoga on the one hand and that of Mol on the other.

It is against this background that we will discuss the problem concerning the capacity of the sacred to participate in the profane and thereby further sacralize. To this problem Glock addresses himself in his formulation of the consequential dimension of religiosity. However, Glock thinks that the acts of the mundane world which are informed and determined by religious injunctions are the only consequences that follow from the belief in the sacred. To us however the consequential dimension of religiosity will be an assertion of the fact that the objectified or transcendent point exercises its capacity for further sacralization. Acts of the mundane world then become meaningful precisely because they acquire a quality of sacrality in the process of being informed and determined by the transcendent point. It is in this vein that Karma Yoga argues that an action performed in the right spirit, that is in the spirit of a sacrifice to the Lord, without any desire for the fruit thereof, does not constitute bondage. Any mundane action, performed in the spirit of detachment, becomes a sacrifice, a rite, sacred in nature. Thus, Karma Yoga promises the freedom for the spirit in and through work, if we accept subjection of our whole being to that which is higher than the separating and limiting ego.
It is apparent then that the leverage for sacralization that we have ascribed to the transcendent point is the basic assumption of Karma Yoga. However, while we have ascribed this leverage of sacralization to the transcendent point, we find that the mechanisms of sacralization formulated by Mol needs to be extended and broadened in scope to incorporate a mechanism corresponding to Glock's consequential dimension of religiosity or the way of action laid down by Karma Yoga. In our view Glock has been unable to work out the problem of religious consequences in tune with the dialectic of sacred and profane. But his insights are essentially correct in seeing the conceptual advantage in the consequential dimension of religiosity. Yoga, of course, insists on the dialectic of sacralization and provides in Karma Yoga an excellent occasion for deciphering this dialectic.
Our critique of Durkheim's theory of the sacred does not intend to call into question the basic formulations of Durkheim. Our critique consists not in renunciation of the basic sociological perspective that Durkheim employed in his study of the religious phenomena. Rather, in Durkheim we recognize the rudiments of those basic insights, which provide us the basics of the analytical tools and conceptual framework that will enable us to develop a theoretical model suitable to pursue our own concern. Later, in this chapter we will identify those rudimentary elements in Durkheim, which are crucial to our understanding of the problem, and point out their analytical or heuristic advantages which Durkheim may have recognised, but left unexplored for unknown reasons. Suffice it to say at this point that our critique of Durkheim does not take the course of Evans-Pritchard\(^1\) or Spiro\(^2\) and host. of others, who have asked for a total rejection of Durkheim and consequent re-evaluation of his contribution to Sociology of Religion. On the contrary, it is through re-construction of Durkheim that we will attempt to bring

to the fore the pitfalls involved in the mainline Durkheimian analysis and the singular advantage of Mol's framework.

A. Nature of the Sacred

Functional indispensability of religion as the repository of institutionalized beliefs and ritual practices guaranteeing cohesiveness of the social whole remains our own cue to the religious orientations of mankind. As with Durkheim, our point of departure is the acceptance of the primacy of integrative symbol systems over and against the instrumental utilitarian dimension of human behaviours. Durkheim's understanding of the integrative consequences of religious beliefs and practices and the place of the sacred in the scheme of things are incontestable in its depth and clarity. We can hardly disagree with Nisbet when he remarks:

Of all concepts and perspectives in Durkheim the sacred is the most striking and, given the age in which he lived, the most radical. His use of the sacred to explain the cohesive nature of the society, the constraint that society exercises upon man, the origins of culture and even of human thought must surely rank as one of the boldest contributions of a positivist non-believer.¹

The significance of the concept of sacred and its contribution to the Sociology of religion in providing both

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an analytical tool and a perspective can not be underestimated.

We share with Durkheim certain fundamental perspectives of the Sociology of Religion, most important of them being a deep appreciation of a religious symbol system giving vent to the expressive orientation of mankind. Durkheim was unequivocal in his estimation of the fundamental difference between the critical reason and the expressive-integrative symbol system. He deprecated the tendencies of the "theorists who have undertaken to explain religion in rational terms" for perceiving religious rites only as "external translation of a system of ideas without any intrinsic value". To him religious behaviour was essentially integrative and was necessarily expressive in providing a channel for meaningful action. According to Durkheim the essence of religion consists not in what it says about things, but what it does towards making action possible, life endurable. To quote him:

The believer who has communicated with his god is not merely a man who sees new truths of which the unbeliever is ignorant, he is a man who is stronger. He feels within him more force, either to endure the trials of existence, or to conquer them.

Critical reason is unjustified in dismissing religion

5. Ibid., p. 464.
as simply a tissue of superstitions, expendable once men are correctly informed. Contrary to the expostulations of critical rationalists Durkheim maintained that the "unanimous sentiment of the believers of all times cannot be purely illusory." 6

Significance of this perspective for the history of Sociology of Religion is beyond doubt. In a certain sense it agrees with Pareto's assertion that religion transcends the realm of "logico-experimental" experience. 7 A somewhat similar evaluation of the religious symbol system led Max Weber to assert that charismatic phenomena lie "specifically outside the realm of everyday routine and the profane." 8 It is the extraordinary as opposed to the everyday, the sacred in contrast to the profane. The independent value of religious symbol systems has been recognized by Talcott Parsons and Kingsley Davis. It is in this vein that Davis maintains that "the tendency towards secularization


8. Ibid., p. 22.
probably cannot continue to the point where religion entirely disappears. Secularization will likely be terminated by religious revivals of one sort or another."

Of course this perspective in the sociology of religion has not remained unchallenged. One vocal opposition to the functionalist theory of the integrative indispensability of the religious symbol system comes from Milton Yinger who recognized that there are secular alternatives to religion. Yinger questions the capacity of religion to perform this integrative function without the aid of other factors, effects of which he considers extremely important for the efficacy with which religion performs an integrative function.10 O'Dea has recently expressed his concern over functionalist tendency to "emphasize the conservative functions of religion and neglect its creative and potentially revolutionary character."11

Now, the problem with these critiques of functionalist theories of religion lies with their underestimation of the dialectical relationship between the expressive/integrative and adaptive/instrumental symbol systems. Malinowski and Parsons12 have drawn our attention to this basic dialectic

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in which the way out from the impasse created by Durkheim's dichotomy between sacred and profane lies. Indeed our theoretical reconstruction of Durkheim has to proceed from here. However, before we do that it may be desirable that we try to appraise Durkheim's concept of the sacred and some of the standard criticisms levelled against it. This will serve the double purpose of showing where both Durkheim and his critics have gone wrong and in what sense our theoretical formulation takes the theory of the sacred beyond the attacks of these critics and also undermines the weaknesses in Durkheim's theoretical formulation.

Crucial for Durkheim's understanding of religious phenomena is the absolute opposition between the categories of the sacred and the profane. The opposition between the two is fundamental and final. As he put it:

The division of the world into two domains, the one containing all that is sacred, the other all that is profane, is the distinctive trait of religious thought .... The fact of contrast between sacred and profane is universal.13

The difference between the sacred and the profane is grounded in the very structure of things. The two worlds of sacred and profane are not only different from each other, but are of two different classes or order. The

difference is furthermore accentuated by the heterogeneity of the two which leads to an unresolvable antagonism.

The heterogeneity is even so complete that it frequently degenerates into a veritable antagonism. The two worlds are not only conceived of as separate, but as even hostile and jealous rivals of each other ......... The sacred thing is par excellence that which the profane should not touch and cannot touch with impunity. The two classes can't even approach each other and keep their own nature at the same time.14

Thus according to Durkheim the fact of contrast between the sacred and the profane is the primary datum for the study of religious life in any society. This is the minimum irreducible element of religious life and must constitute the point of departure for any scientific study of the religious phenomena as a social fact.

B. Critiques of Durkheim

It is to this aspect of Durkheim's thought that the severest criticism of Durkheim relates. J. Goody has observed that Durkheim's dichotomy between sacred and profane does not stand the test of empirical research. Goody's criticism of Durkheim is primarily based on his conviction that the operational criteria of the sacred - 'things set apart and forbidden' are too vague and that, since there

are no sufficient criteria in Durkheim's scheme of things to justify using the sacred-profane dichotomy, one might legitimately opt for any dichotomy such as 'good' and 'bad', 'high' and 'low', 'black' and 'white'.

Reflecting similar concern for Durkheim's selection of the sacred-profane dichotomy Evans-Pritchard made the following observation on the basis of his own research on primitive religions:

My test of this sort of formulation is a simple one: Whether it can be broken down into problems which permit testing by observation in field research, or can at least aid in the classification of observed facts. I have never found that the dichotomy of sacred and profane was of much use for either purpose.

Pursuing his criticism further in this direction Evans-Pritchard suggested that the dichotomy itself is misconceived given that the sacred and the profane "are so closely intermingled as to be inseparable."

Both Goody and Evans-Pritchard have attempted to attack the problem at the centre of Durkheim's formulation.

17. Ibid., p. 65.
However, in the formulation of their own attack they are misled in their evaluation of Durkheim's theoretical genius and miss the very point of the analytical potential of the concepts of sacred and profane. As against Goody it needs to be pointed out that Durkheim clearly stated his criterion for selecting the sacred-profane dichotomy as the crucial variable. To him the ethical dichotomy of 'good' or 'bad' or the supposedly neutral dichotomy of 'high' or 'low' etc. are only derivative of a more fundamental dichotomy observable in the realm of religious phenomena. His full scale analysis of religious phenomena in the "Elementary Forms" was preceded by his earlier concern with the problem of structural differentiation and the role played by religion in it. His ground for granting the primacy to religious phenomena was that:

They are the germ from which all the others are derived, or at least almost all the other are derived. Religion contains in itself, from the beginning, but in a diffused state, all the elements which in dissociating, determining and combining with each other in a thousand ways, have given birth to the diverse manifestations of the collective life. It is from myths and legends that science and poetry have separated .... law and morality were born from ritual practices. One cannot understand our representation of the world and life, if one does not know the religious beliefs which were their first form.18

It will be remembered that Durkheim's formulation of the sacred-profane dichotomy occurred in his analysis of the Australian clan and its religious life which he portrayed as the social analogue of the unicellular organism, the basic structural type from which all other social structures have differentiated. Bellah has rightly observed that "thus Durkheim is interested to discover in religion, ..., that undifferentiated whole from which the elements of social life gradually differentiated." 19

Under these circumstances even to suggest that one might legitimately opt for any dichotomy such as 'good' and 'bad' or 'high' and 'low' etc. is to give primacy to the derivative over the primary or, in other words, to put the horse before the cart. The criterion for the selection of the sacred-profane dichotomy over against any other category is neither vague nor ambiguous. The criterion for the selection of the sacred-profane dichotomy is determined by the very nature of the subject under investigation. To ask for any other criterion for the preference of the categories of sacred-profane in the study of religious phenomena is very much like asking what is the criterion for a nuclear physicist to choose the atomic structure of an

element as the point of departure for his study instead of the chemical properties of the element.

The objection that the analytical potential of the sacred-profane dichotomy is undermined by the fact that in reality the sacred-profane is closely fused together is of a more serious order. It is important to note that even in the primitive society evidence is not lacking to support the contention that the demarcation between the profane and the sacred was sometimes rather fluid. However, while generally sympathetic to the idea of interdependence of sacred and profane we find it difficult to accept Evans-Pritchard's formulation of the problem. The objection raised by Evans-Pritchard purports to undercut Durkheim's formulation in two ways. First, the dichotomy itself is misconceived precisely because the sacred in Durkheim's sense is not perceptible in the empirical field; and second, since the conceptual formulation is not supported by the elements of empirical reality its value as an analytical tool in the study of religious phenomena is seriously jeopardized.

On the first point, instead of altogether denying the possibility of the existence of the sacred in Durkheim's

sense, I tend to agree with Mol when he observes that "the sacred in Durkheim's sense will only occur when the crystallization of specific primitive tribal pattern is left undisturbed for generations and when the strength and cohesion of tribal identity is a \textit{sine-qua-non} for survival." The fault does not lie with the dichotomy as such, but with Durkheim's reluctance to specify conditions under which the dichotomy will be observed to be operative in its purest form. Given the basic dialectic between the adaptive-integrative symbol systems it is quite possible for religious symbols to continue to exist intact over a long period of time if the need for adaptation has been at its minimum during the period. So far as the analytical potential of the conceptual framework of Durkheim is concerned, it is our contention that the analytical potential of Durkheim's formulation of the sacred is not contingent upon a total corroboration of the concept of the sacred in the observable reality. To us the concepts of sacred-profane are purely an ideal-ideal-typical construction. In the context of Durkheim's formulation of the sacred in the explanation of religious structure of the Australian clan we suggest that the Australian clan be considered as an example of a social type in which the sacred in Durkheim's sense was perceptible. Taking his results at a sufficient

level of generality, then, we find them validly applicable to the 'single-celled' type of society; all more complex societies must have descended from some society of this type. Viewed from this angle Durkheim's theoretical explications are taken at once out-side the range of Evans-Pritchard as well as others who would reject Durkheim's propositions on the ground that the Australian totemism is not, in any case, the most primitive form of religion.

Lest the impression be gotten that we intend to defend Durkheim in toto, we wish to record our basic reservations about it. It has been our concern up to this point to demonstrate how the standard criticisms of Durkheim are misconceived. These critics have failed to comprehend the full import of Durkheim's formulation and therefore have contented themselves with objecting to that which is only peripheral and obvious. The dichotomy between the sacred and the profane is there in Durkheim; and its significance for his theoretical formulations cannot be denied. But equally important is the fact that though Durkheim might have underrated the intermingling of sacred and profane, he nevertheless recognized their interdependence. However the problem lies with his reluctance to explicate this interdependence of the sacred and the profane and to pursue his analysis in this direction. A charge that sticks to Durkheim most is not one of commission, but one of omission. In his formulation of the
problem he paid special attention to the conflicting aspects of the sacred and the profane and left the problem of their complementarity largely unexplored. To be fair to Durkheim it must be noted that Durkheim even granted the possibility of passage of a being from the realm of the sacred to the profane and vice-versa. Durkheim does not think that a being can never pass from one of these worlds into the other; but the manner in which this passage is effected, when it does take place, puts into relief the essential duality of the two kingdoms. In fact it implies a veritable metamorphosis. 22

Thus he ignores the specific problem of the mechanisms through which such passage is effected and how this veritable metamorphosis takes place. He underestimated the significance of this passage or the process of the transition from one realm to another and emphasised the rigidity or separateness of the sacred and profane. Because of Durkheim's obsession with the rigidity and separateness of the sacred and his reluctance to pursue the problematic of the change that characterises religious phenomena, we feel that the Durkheimian sociology of religion tends to be a historical, non-comparative and static.

C. In Defense of Durkheim

Despite the sincerest attempts of Swanson and Bellah to salvage Durkheim's conceptualization from the criticism formulated above, it nevertheless remains open to searching examinations on this count. Following Durkheim's lead, Swahson has tried to explicate, in more concrete terms than Durkheim, the specific ways in which what he calls 'social relationships' give rise to belief in the 'supernatural'.

His conceptualization takes place in terms of the 'constitutional arrangements' and 'primordial conditions' in broadly political structures, and particularly in those that he calls 'sovereign groups.' The argument in its simplest form maintains that where social structures or processes are for any reason not directly or transparently available, men tend to represent these opaque experiences to themselves in symbolic form. Any symbolism from this point of view is that mode of perceiving and articulating experience that obtains when conscious awareness is absent. Now the rationalistic bias and evolutionary overtones of this explanation are obvious. With the increase in man's capacity for conscious articulation

of these opaque experiences the need for symbolic representation will diminish. True, Swanson goes beyond Durkheim in recognizing the role of the confused and incoherent nature of our awareness in providing an answer to the question 'why' the symbolic modes in which men represent society to themselves should take the religious forms that they do. But in Swanson as in Durkheim, there is a residue which is left unexplained. Though a homomorphic or even isomorphic correspondence might be claimed between groups and political structures on the one hand and supernatural beliefs on the other, as Swanson maintains, there is a hiatus at the point where we ask for an account of the process whereby the one gets transformed into the other. It is a narrower gap than we find in Durkheim, but it is obstinately present all the same.

Defending Durkheim's formulation of the sacred as collective representation Bellah maintains that the fundamental point of Durkheim's theory is that while collective representations arise from and reflect the 'social substratum', they are, once in existence, "partially autonomous realities" which independently influence subsequent social development. According to Bellah, the greatest contribution of Durkheim lies in his recognition of the value of collective representation.

(sacred included), as an element analytically independent of the social system. In a sense we find this interpretation of Durkheim quite agreeable. But this does not resolve the theoretical gap in Durkheim's formulation. Though a dominating role is attributed to the sacred as the collective representation functioning as the matrix and determinant of all that is "best in us", we are given very little idea as to how this process of formation actually work. There is repeated assurance that sacrality is a quality not intrinsic to sacred objects, but is derived from the society's mode of representing itself symbolically, but we are not told how this complex feat is accomplished. In particular, Durkheim does not supply any very convincing account of why it is that the symbolic modes in which men represent society to themselves should take the religious forms that they do. While agreeing with Durkheim that religious symbol systems meet the functional need of integration we note that technically no mechanism is specified by Durkheim by which the need for solidarity gives rise to or causes religion. His exclusive concern with the symbolic nature of the sacred and its integrative consequences for the society remains confined to an analysis of the structure and function of the religious symbol systems once they have assumed an objectified transcendental character. Not surprisingly then he finds a remarkable similarity and regularity of pattern in the structural arrangement of the
sacred and profane in different religious traditions. Merits of his findings notwithstanding, one difficulty that we encounter in his scheme is that methodologically it cannot explain why it is that belief systems assume different forms in different cultural contexts. It fails to come to grips with what happens on the way to the transcendent. What is there which perpetuates the emergence of the sacred in different stages of historical development and why are there differences in the degree of sacrality? How are we to view the different historical responses giving rise to belief as divergent as Hinduism and Buddhism on the one hand and Judaic-Christian tradition on the other. Even more important, what is there that distinguishes universal religions from the primitive religions. And does this variability of religion not subsume the question of generalization that is the ultimate concern of sociological theorizing?

Indeed, Durkheim was not the only one to have ignored these issues and to have concerned himself primarily with the separating, objectified transcendental character of the sacred. Rudolph Otto maintained that the numinous is perfectly *sui generis* and is irreducible to any other category. The Holy is a pre-eminently living force by itself, it is "wholly other", that "which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual,
the intelligible, and the familiar.\textsuperscript{26} Phenomenologists of religions like Van der Leeuw and Mircea Eliade\textsuperscript{27} have not failed to notice the significance of this "otherness" enwrapping religious symbols. Van der Leeuw brings to our notice the significance of the radical opposition between the unusual and powerful on the one hand and the ordinary and everyday on the other. Thus, "sacred" according to Van der Leeuw, is "what has been placed within boundaries ... the completely different, the absolutely distinct."\textsuperscript{27} Eliade, too, in the same vein characterises the sacred as a reality of a wholly different order.\textsuperscript{28} Robert Lowie in his study of Primitive Religion visualizes the sphere of sacred or religious as that of the "extraordinary," totally different from the everyday sphere of the "ordinary."\textsuperscript{29} And Max Weber regards the realm of charisma as "specifically outside the realm of everyday routine and the profane sphere."\textsuperscript{30} It is

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Rudolph Otto, The Idea of the Holy, (cited by Thomas O'Dea, The Sociology of Religion, p. 22.)
  \item \textsuperscript{27} Van Der Leeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifestation, Vol. I, pp. 47-48.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, pp. 9-10.
\end{itemize}
extraordinary as opposed to the everyday, sacred in contrast to the profane. The objectifying, separating characteristic of the sacred has received the lion's share in the scholarly treatment of religious phenomena.

D. The Process of Sacralization

These studies have contributed a great deal towards the understanding of religious phenomena and the value of their findings cannot be ignored. But they have their limitations too, to some of which we have drawn attention earlier. Somehow they have missed the importance of the less obvious and more latent sacralization process. It is our contention that a more meaningful approach, impregnated with greater analytical potential and theoretical value, consists in looking at the process of sacralization instead of the state of sacredness. We will be using the term sacralization to designate that process whereby a certain set of symbols acquire the quality of sacrality and become enwrapped with the "don't touch" sentiments. The conceptual advantages of this concern with the process ... are manifold. It is only by concentrating on the process that we can discern the mechanisms which facilitate the transition from the profane to the sacred. Process in itself consists of the possibility both of the profane becoming sacred as well as the capacity of the sacred to participate in this process by making the profane sacred. Obviously, this
concern with the process of sacralization brings out the dialectical relationship between the sacred and the profane. We grant that in this dialectic of the sacred and profane, religion reveals its integrative bias, but nevertheless it is precisely the process of sacralization which more readily conveys the 'dialectical emergence of the integrative complement'. We find that both Durkheim and Evans-Pritchard are far from clear on this point and no wonder that "their conceptual frame of reference is inadequate to both account for the emergence of sacredness in our time and for their objectifying, separating characteristics once they have emerged." 31

As pointed out earlier, sacralization assumes a dialectical relationship between the sacred and the profane. It is true that the opposition between the two is very pronounced as indeed a host of scholars have noted. But, it appears to us that there is an equally strong element of complementarity that characterizes their relationship. Exclusive concern with the separateness of the sacred barred this perspective from us, and a significant aspect of their relationship remained hidden. However, the shift in emphasis from the state of sacrality to the process of sacralization opens up

a new vista on the relationship between sacred and profane and reveals to us the complex character of their mutuality as well as opposition, and its implications for the sociology of religion. Mol has drawn our attention to this dialectic in his explication of the theory of sacralization and has provided a clue to certain basic concerns of the sociology of religion:

both (sacred and profane) conflict and complement, both differ profoundly and are very relevant for one another, both can grow in reaction to one another and can even undermine one another. The point where the function of each is minimised is never equilibrated and always under strain. And yet the more the one can maximize its function at the expense of the other the greater the tendency towards restoring the impossible, hypothetical balance in the opposite direction will become.  

It seems to us that the limitations of Durkheim and many others, who have neglected the process of sacralization, relates to the assumptive foundations of their methodology. One such limitation refers to the very point of departure that Durkheim chooses for his study. In selecting primitive culture as the field of their study of religious phenomena scholars assumed that the patterns of religious beliefs in primitive culture would reveal to us the simplest undifferentiated

form of the sacred. Given their evolutionary bias they failed to perceive that it is precisely in the primitive culture that the sacred is present in its full blown rather than embryonic form. It is to this bias built into their methodology that our attention is drawn in the following observation:

As the scholars dealing with past and primitive societies have led the way in the analysis of the sacred, their definition in terms of its ideal type or full blown form have been accepted rather uncritically, all the more so as it goes right against the grain of evolutionary biases and assumption of scientific superiority in the west to entertain the thought that something in primitive cultures is mature but embryonic in modern ones!33

In our emphasis on the process of sacralization we are extending the scope of our analysis to include both primitive and modern, past and present. While we do not claim that our conceptual apparatus is comprehensive enough to account for all that needs to be accounted for, we certainly hope that it will be able to dissipate some perplexities perceptible on the religious canvas of the modern world. For example, the parallel tendencies of revival in the strength of sect-like religious groups in north America on the one hand and the

decreasing influence of church organizations of some previously influential denominations on the laity on the other provides an occasion to test the analytical potential of the sacralization theory. According to the sacralization theory the first tendency is an indication of the fact that in the modern world sacralization is as viable as ever, while the latter tendency, instead of indicating that the sacred is waning, only suggests that in certain areas sacralization is bypassing the church organizations. Similarly when Srinivas proposes the hypothesis of Sanskritization and Westernization to explain the changes in caste structure of India, he is attesting to the fact that new foci of identity are being sacralized in different contexts and that the sacralization process with its built-in mechanisms for the incorporation of change is able to cope with these tendencies by making use of the available cultural resources. It is our assumption that the emphasis on the sacralization process rather than the separateness of sacred is more appropriate for analysing changing situations.

It is against this background that we have to view the main task of the present work and the relevance of the sacralization theory to the main concern of this study. It is our assumption that in some ways both Glock and Yoga seem to be concerned with discerning the ways or mechanisms of the
process in and through which a certain symbol system or meaning structure acquires the quality of sacrality. We notice that Durkheim's conceptual apparatus with its insistence on the separateness of the sacred falls short of the comprehensiveness of a theoretical scheme which concerns itself with the process of sacralization. Of course, we take due cognizance of Durkheim's recognition of the intermingling of the sacred and profane and recognize in his concept of contagion of sacred the rudiments of sacralization theory. But, we are equally aware of his failure to pursue his analysis in this direction. It is precisely at this point that the theory of sacralization comes to our aid. A comprehensive treatment of the sacralization will constitute the subject matter of the next chapter.
CHAPTER II

THE MECHANISMS OF SACRALIZATION

The main thrust of argument in the preceding chapter was to explicate the grounds for distinguishing sacralization from the sacred and bring out its analytical possibility. The process of sacralization emerged as an autonomous realm, analysable in its own right. It is our assumption that the analysis of this process constitutes an important sociological enterprise. It is to this task of analysis that we direct our attention in the present chapter. The analysis will concern itself both with articulating the functional orientation of the sacralization process as well as the mechanisms of the process.

A. The Dialectic of Sacralization

Crucial to the notion of sacralization is the assumption that there is a dialectic between sacred and profane, and that this dialectic in some way coincides with the dialectical relationship that exists between the integrative/emotional and differentiating/rational processes. It may be observed that the functional orientation of sacralization is primarily directed towards a balancing of the integrative/adaptive aspect of symbol system. Paradoxically, sacralization itself plays a biased role in this balancing act, but nevertheless

1. Hans Hol, the Sacralization of Identity, Manuscript, 262.
it does aim at restoring a balance between adaptive/integrative symbol systems. We have noted in the previous chapter that the sacralization process falls squarely on the side of integrative/identity side of symbol systems. But the built-in-strain of the dialectic is continually directed towards a balancing of the integrative and adaptive elements. But to expect that this balancing is ever complete and that it leads to a state of equilibrium of sacred and profane is to miss the very point of dialectic. We have noted that the relationship between the sacred and profane, as Mol observes, is such that "both conflict and complement, both differ profoundly and are very relevant for one another, both can grow in reaction to one another and can even undermine one another". In effect there is a constant strain between the two and any attempt to maximize the function of one at the cost of the other inevitably leads to further tilt in the opposite direction. It is precisely for this reason that the need for sacralization is an ever present fact. To us then sacralization appears to be an inevitable process with built-in-mechanisms for minimizing the disadvantages of infinite adaptability of symbol systems. It is in this vein that Mol observes:

Sacralization is a sort of brake applied to unchecked infinite adaptations in symbol systems for which there is increasingly less evolutionary necessity and which becomes increasingly more dysfunctional for the emotional security of personality and the integration of tribe or community... sacralization is to the dysfunctional potential of symbol systems what anti-bodies are to the dysfunctional cancers, possibilities in physical systems.3

A necessary corollary of the proposition that there is a dialectic between adaptive/integrative symbol system is that the more advanced the conditions of differentiation the greater is the need for integration. In other words, at any stage of historical development a society experiencing advancement in its capacity for adaptation will also put an increasing demand on its integrative symbol systems. This is the perspective that we consider to be crucial for an understanding of religious phenomena in the modern world. Undermining this perspective would necessarily lead to underestimation of the integrative potential of the sacralization process and its implication for deciphering the complexities of the religious situation in the modern context. Further, it is our assumption that lack of appreciation for this perspective necessitates employment of concepts like secularization.

for explaining phenomena which otherwise would remain unaccountable.

Scholars with as divergent approaches as Richard Fenn and Robert Bellah are equally susceptible to the charge of neglecting this perspective in their explanation of religious phenomena. Working on the assumption that the forces of differentiation and adaptation are capable of completely undermining the forces of integration Fenn argues "that conditions of advanced differentiation make it unlikely, if not impossible, for cultural integration to develop around any set of religious symbols." Though Bellah does not share Fenn's strategically dysfunctional definition of religion, he too seems to be primarily concerned with the functional orientation of religious symbol system only in terms of its differentiating potential. But as Mol points out:

Unless the identity and the differentiation side of the evolutionary process are continually paired and juxtaposed, either rationalistic or irrationalistic biases will inevitably creep into the analysis...

To us the dialectic between differentiation and identity (integration) consists of both attraction and repulsion, mutual need and basic conflict... Yet there is much give and take in the battle and therefore viable religious orientations and organizations develop sophisticated mechanisms to deal with change.


The point of the argument is that it is in the dialectical emergence of this integrative complement that we find a clue to the capacity of any religious symbol system to protect identity, a system of meaning or a definition of reality on the one hand and to modify, obstruct or legitimate change on the other. In this way Mol links the question of sacralization with the need for identity defense.

A Sociology of Religion operating on the assumption that the forces of differentiation-adaptation will ultimately supplant the forces of identity-integration faces an unresolvable predicament. Sociological studies of recent trends in American religious life have made conflicting claims as to the religious situation in modern America. On the one hand we have the evidence of an increase in the strength of evangelical and sect-like religious groups and, on the other hand, it has been observed that secularization is the order of the day. Operating within the framework of secularization theory, either as a process of gradual decline in transcendental belief, as Lipset would have it, or a process whereby the


religions and religious institutions become part of the world, as many others seem to suggest, it would be difficult to account for the growth and growing strength of sect-like religious groups. The problem is rendered more difficult if we underestimate the dialectic of differentiation/integration. Given our understanding of the dialectic, we are not surprised that with advancement in the conditions of differentiation, the need for identity puts an equally strong demand on the integrative forces. As a result, those centres of identity foci which are strongly wedded to the general framework of the integrative symbol system gain in contrast with those which side with the forces of differentiation by adapting to the changes in the environing conditions. Any analysis which concentrates only on the fact that the traditional religious institutions have become more world like is bound to overlook the equally important phenomenon which attests to the fact of ever on-going process of sacralization. Since the analysis is bound up with its own rationalistic biases, it fails to perceive the continued operation of the sacralization process. Moreover it also fails to take note of the fact that secularization "is the outcome of differentiations outrunning the capacity of religious organizations to integrate

them in the traditional frame of reference with the result that on all levels identities and systems of meaning are becoming sacralized bypassing the organizations.\textsuperscript{12} Thus the emphasis on the dialectical perspective of sacralization theory and its functional orientation in terms of the ever-present integrative need is important for a theory that would not flutter at the first encounter with the complexities of empirical reality. Mol's contribution lies precisely in this recognition of the dialectic and the significance of the integrative complement of the symbol system for the differentiating/adaptive aspect of it. While Bellah stops at pointing out the significance of the differentiating potential of the religious symbol system, Mol goes beyond to argue that a differentiating perspective of religion is incomplete when it is not counterbalanced by the identity perspective.

With these observations about central tenets of sacralization theory we now turn our attention to the actual mechanisms of the sacralization. Mol recognizes four mechanisms of sacralization:

(1) Objectification (the projection of order in a beyond where it is less vulnerable to the contradictions, exceptions

and contingencies of the mundane and the temporal);

(2) Commitment (the emotional anchorage in the various, proliferating, foci of identity);

(3) Ritual (the repetitive actions, articulations and movements which prevent the object of sacralization being lost sight of);

(4) Myth (the integration of the various strains of human existence in a coherent, short-hand symbolic account).

B. **Objectification**

Mol defines objectification as "the tendency to sum up the variegated elements of mundane existence in a transcendental point of reference where they can appear more orderly, more consistent and more timeless". Thus the function of objectification is to project a conception of reality, a system of values or a meaning structure in a transcendental realm. This serves the double purpose of guaranteeing the incorruptibility of the transcendental order as well as providing a point of reference in terms of which the corruption the contingencies, the chaos and the inconsistencies of the mundane realm come to be interpreted and appropriated. This relativization of the mundane in terms of the transcendent seem to be a necessary condition for the emotional security

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and preservation of identity. A certain conception of order, pattern or structure is a minimum prerequisite for the consistency of behaviour and motivational orientation behind such behaviour. The transcendental point provides the ground for this conception of order where it seems to be lacking. In and through objectification the transcendental point retains its dialectical character. Thus, "in this transcendental point of reference order could appear less arbitrary, less vulnerable to contradictions, exceptions and contingencies. Therefore the arbitrary, the unexpected, the frustrations and contingencies could be absorbed and 'digested' as not altogether meaningless, but as part and parcel of an orderly world." 14

A theory insisting on a dialectical relationship between the sacred and profane and thereby ascribing to the objectified point of reference a leverage for further sacralization entails both the closeness and the separateness of the mundane and the transcendental. The capacity of the objectified point of reference to further sacralize depends on the possibility of the transcendental point of reference remaining different from and yet reflecting the profane. It is for this reason that Mol thinks that the objectified point of reference (14. Hans Mol, *Op.cit.*, 265.)
reference should remain both open and vague. Thus, "successful and surviving religions have generally counterbalanced a strong sense of awe and commitment to their conceptual apparatus with a deliberate vagueness of the same."\(^{15}\) To Mol's understanding of the objectified point of reference and its social function the idea of this vagueness of the transcendental is extremely important. Given the integrative need of the society that the sacralization process meets, any clearly defined and extremely well-articulated system of meaning or conception of reality will lack the flexibility that is needed to perform the legitimation of change and at the same time provide the stability necessary for the acceptance of change. It is to Mol's credit that objectification emerges as a positive category as opposed to the hitherto emphasised dysfunctional aspect of it in the sociological and philosophical literature under the category of reification. Thinkers like Feuerbach, Marx, Fromm and Peter Berger are most influential among those scholars who tended to look at reification as the alienating aspect of religion precisely because from their point of view it undermined self-fulfillment.

and self-realization as the ultimate goal of life. 16
Reification from their point of view implied a complete
separation and consequent subjection of man the creator
to his own creation. Given this understanding of reification,
any commitment to or acceptance of it was considered
extremely detrimental to man's essential nature as freedom.
Mol draws our attention to the rationalistic and scientific
biases of these approaches to objectification. As he
points out:

The bias of those who use and have
used the reification concept
unfailingly consists in their
assumptions that their perception
of reality is the only 'real' one,
whereas the reifiers on the other
hand treat as 'real' what in actual
fact is very unreal. Yet the result
of this influential theorizing has
been the view that alienation is
the eroder of self-realization
(as a summum bonum) rather than
that alienation is the severance
of the individual from any
sacralized identity. 17

16. For a detailed discussion of reification theory
see Thomas F. O'Dea's discussion of the problem
of projection in The Sociology of Religion,
Prentice Hall, 1966, pp. 30-33 and Mol's
discussion of reification in Sacralization of

The champions of the reification concept have neglected the contribution that objectification has made to the growth of abstract thought through the process of differentiation. One must underscore the point that "individualism (and an increasing amount of independence and freedom of the self) has gone hand in hand with the extent and quality of objectification." Objectification ensured complete separation of the transcendental point as the repository of order and meaning, and the further the process continued the more independent the individual felt to pursue his mundane goal without jeopardizing the sense of security that it derived from the transcendental point of reference. "Consequently the risks of potential disorder through more individualism and differentiation could be taken with greater confidence. In final resort a cosmic and relevant system of meaning and order was assumed to be invulnerable to this possible danger." The significance of the transcendental point of reference for the differentiating and adaptive potential of the symbol system was assumed by Weber in his analysis of Calvinism and its consequences for the subsequent economic changes in the direction of rational economy. To Mol the transcendental point of reference provides the Archimedean point for cultural and social differentiation in any society. This provision is the independent contribution of the religious symbol


19. Ibid., p. 271
system to the evolutionary process. However, the fulcrum or the point of leverage that the transcendental point has may be too close to the mundane to permit further differentiation or instrumental manipulation. Similarly, if the corresponding institutional support for the fulcrum at the mundane level is not strong enough then the commitment link between the mundane and the transcendental point may easily be severed. Thus, according to Mol the relationship between the transcendental point and the profane is always under strain. It is for this reason that Mol ascribes an important place to commitment in his definition of the objectification and its functional orientation. Thus he writes: "Whether or not objectification is seen as cultural liability or an asset depends, I submit, on whether or not the commitment component is prominent in the definition of the use of the term." Further he states, "objectification has always been impotent to sacralize unless it was accompanied by emotional commitment. The separateness of the sacred had to be embodied in feeling of awe and loyalty, if it was to have any sacralizing effect." It is to this aspect (commitment) of the sacralization process that we

now turn our attention.

C. Commitment

The emotional component or the feeling aspect of the sacralization process defines commitment. Commitment is defined as the focussed emotion or emotional attachment to a specific focus of identity.\(^{22}\) Thus, it is the anchoring of emotions in a salient system of meaning. Inevitably, then, commitment reinforces identities, systems of meaning and definitions of reality. The reinforcing process is seen as guaranteeing consistency and predictability of motivation and behaviour. Thus it has a stabilizing effect on systems of meaning and actions and thereby ensures personality integration and social cohesion. In a nutshell, commitment refers to identity consolidation, as do the other "mechanisms".

The most significant contribution of commitment to the sacralization process consists in its capacity to sacralize a system of meaning or conception of reality through emotional attachment. Hence Mol's use of commitment must be distinguished from such uses which either undermine this aspect of commitment or dilute the analytical potential of the concept by using it in a rather vague and ambiguous way.

Though, both Glock and Virginia H. Hine recognize the identity integrating and therapeutic effect of commitment, they have failed to come to grips with the primacy of the emotion attaching element of commitment. Glock and Stark have used the term to describe a complex of religious phenomena of belief, practice, experience, knowledge and consequence.\textsuperscript{23} To our understanding of the sacralization process all these elements, though operationally closely related, play an independent role in the sacralization process and are analytically distinct. Similarly, Mol has rightly questioned the validity of Virginia H. Hine's observation about the identity-altering and bridge-burning aspect of commitment.\textsuperscript{24} Mol succinctly remarks that "it is rather inconsistent, to say the least, to talk in one breath of the concept (commitment) as integrating and in the next breath as altering."\textsuperscript{25} Mol draws our attention to the fact that identity/alteration and identity/integration are rather two different processes. The former consists of emotional

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detachment from one identity and subsequent attachment to another. It is this process of identity change that is involved in conversion and charisma. But in the case of commitment only the emotion attaching element is present.

The distinction drawn between the two processes is extremely significant. It is in this distinction that we find grounds for considering commitment only as a mechanism of sacralization even though the emotional-attaching element is present in charisma and conversion too. It is important to remember that charisma and conversion, through emotional stripping of a set of identity or meaning structure, actually desacralize a certain conception of reality. They tend to negate and downplay emotionally the previous frame of reference or system of meaning. Commitment on the other hand is primarily affirmative and identity consolidating.

The significance of the emotional component or the feeling aspect of the sacralization process has been recognized by a host of scholars. Intensity of emotion and the depth of feeling with which the sacred is approached determines to a great extent the effect it has on personality integration and identity consolidation. Thus if commitment is to have any "sacralizing, integrating, centering effects, it has to be strong commitment." It is precisely in this sense that

Kierkegaard advocates the leap of faith and Tillich asks for a total surrender. Otto has capitalized upon the feeling dimension of religion in his definition of the holy. The point that emerges from these approaches to commitment is that the feeling dimension in enforcing religious sentiments does not operate in a vacuum. A certain assumption as to the focus of emotional attachment is a necessary prerequisite for commitment. To think of a commitment without a system of meaning or conception of reality, however vaguely defined, is as ill-conceived as the suggestion that a system of belief or meaning structure is self-sustaining without requiring any initial commitment to it. In this context Mol's distinction between negative commitment and lack of commitment is extremely well taken. Herein it is pointed out that the lack of commitment or undercommitment causes anomy or alienation precisely because the focus of identity is either too weak or too well diffused to muster strong commitment. Negative commitment on the other hand may have an integrative consolidating consequence for the individual or the group, precisely because it revolves round a certain well defined system of meaning. Modern youth's opposition to the

27. Mol has drawn our attention to the hollowness of the rationalist assumption that rationalism can sustain itself without recourse to commitment. See Hans Mol, Op. cit., p. 287.
establishment, social significance of Yahweh's vindictiveness and irreconcilability for the Jewish religion are few of the examples of a negative commitment having integrative and identity consolidating consequences. The concept of commitment comes very close to the phenomenon described by terms such as awe and reverence, collective effervescence, faith and peak experiences. While agreeing that awe and commitment may normally be used interchangeably, Mol distinguishes between the two by asserting that "awe is more appropriately used for the feeling state in a full blown sacred system of stable, often non-western societies; commitment is the sentiment generally used in relation to the emerging, embryonic, proliferating, sacred systems of modern industrial societies." To what degree this conceptual distinction between awe and commitment in terms of the difference in degree of intensity or stage of evolutionary development serves any useful purpose or is based on a closer scrutiny of the empirical reality is a point about which we have some reservation. We will come back to the problem at a later stage in this essay. However, at this point we tend to agree with Mol's perceptive observation about the sacralizing potential of commitment.

and its affinity with such other concepts which insist on the integrative consequence of the feeling or emotional dimension of religious consciousness.

The most significant contribution of the theoretical scheme under investigation consists in its ability to bring out unequivocally the priority-setting function of commitment and its relevance for modern pluralistic societies. Arguing against the basic presupposition of the rationalistic and intellectualistic denunciations of commitment on the ground of its dysfunctional consequences for the individual and the society, Mol clearly shows how a certain amount of irrational commitment to their conception of reality provides the efficacy of the rationalist arguments. Deceptively the rationalists lead themselves to believe that the power of their argument is solely cognitive and not emotive/contagious. Just as the often unacknowledged initial commitment to a rationalist system of meaning sets their priority in this context, so does commitment to any set of meaning. Intellectualistic biases of anthropologists like Lévi-Strauss and Levy-Bruhl prevented them from seeing the viability of emotive and expressive orientations of a system of meaning.

and action. Thus Mol observes, "although man has become more capable of dealing in abstractions the need for integration, emotional anchorage has in no way diminished. The problem of modern society is not that need for commitment has disappeared and that it has lost its sacralizing capacity. What has happened is that in pluralistic societies the actual competition between a large variety of identity foci has created dilemmas of commitment. But its consequences are in no way detrimental to the priority-setting function of commitment. As Mol observes:

In this complex of identity foci, ultimate systems of meaning and more concrete religious-organizational ones have to compete with hosts of others. The necessity for competition in pluralistic societies can have a negative effect in that certain foci of identity lose out in the battle, but also a positive effect in that the surviving ones have become stronger through their capacity to elicit strong commitment.

Significance of this perspective will become abundantly clear when we have occasion to dwell upon the empirical findings of Glock and Stark on the religious situation in America.

30. For a detailed discussion of the intellectualistic biases and consequent underestimation of emotional component in the theoretical formulations of these anthropologists please see Mol's discussion of the issue on pages 286-91.


32. Ibid, p. 298.
D. Ritual

The sacralizing potential of ritual has been recognized by many scholars. Durkheim acknowledged the capacity of rites to sacralize:

A rite can have this character; in fact, the rite does not exist which does not have it to a certain degree. If the Vedic sacrifice has had such an efficacy that... it was the creator of the gods, and not merely a means of winning their favour, it is because it possessed a virtue comparable to that of the most sacred beings. 33

When Jung maintains that in the rite of the Mass "the Eucharist transforms the soul of empirical man" 34 he is attesting to the essentially sacralizing function of rites.

What does the rite do to sacralize a system of meaning? In Mol's formulation of the problem again the integrative, identity consolidating dimension of the sacralization process becomes the pre-eminently important contribution of ritual practices. Thus, he writes:


34. C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion: East and West, the collected works of C.G. Jung, p. 273.
Ritual maximises order, reinforces the place of the individual in his society and strengthens the bonds of a society vis-à-vis the individual. Through repetitive, emotion-evoking action, social cohesion and personality integration are reinforced — at the same time that aggressive or socially destructive actions are articulated, dramatized and curbed.35

By representing sameness in action the rites consolidate the sameness of a system of meaning. Each ritual activity involves, in some way or other, a re-commitment to memory of a system of meaning. Ritual as the repetitive enactment of a certain system of meaning tends to strengthen the 'don't touch' sentiment in the same way as sometimes personal habits through constant repetition become so meaningful for the individual that he never thinks of changing them. In both cases the fundamental need for identity is expressed in one's acceptance of the invincibility of the system of meaning constituting the motivational orientation of repetitive actions. It is to this identity consolidating function of ritual activity that Durkheim draws our attention in his observation that "through (ritual) the group periodically renews the sentiment which it has of itself and of its unity; at the same time, individuals are strengthened in their social nature."36

Mol recognizes the grain of truth contained in this and many other observations concerning the group strengthening aspect of ritual activities. The observation that in and through ritual activities "the raw energies of conflict are domesticated into the service of social order" is an important one. Mol is in agreement with these approaches which look at ritual as a therapeutic fact and recognise its contribution to the cohesion of culture and society. Thus he writes:

They (rituals) restore, reinforce or redirect identity. They restore through re-committing to memory a system of meaning, through re-absorbing individuals in the common fabric... They reinforce through superimposing the constraint of social expectations, through linking the past with the present... They redirect through surrounding stressful situations with emotional support...

In his analysis of rituals Mol pays some special attention to the restoring aspect of the integrative function that ritual performs. The identity restoring function of rites assumes special significance particularly when the individual or the group suffers a severe blow in the form of bereavement or experiences shattering existing relationships.


through, for instance, rearrangements in family relations such as marriage. In these moments of crisis rituals become particularly relevant. These rites dealing with transition from one stage in a life cycle to another have been called rites of passage by Van Gennep. While agreeing with Van Gennep that rites of passages are primarily concerned with the transition or the change from one moment of meaningful existence to another, with an intermediary stage of meaninglessness, Mol looks at the transition in terms of identity rather than status changes as is implied in Van Gennep's formulation. In this interpretation of the rites of passage it is not just the status change, but both reinforcement and change of systems of meaning, identities, and definitions of reality which are central variables. In this theoretical scheme the rites of passage are regarded as instances of one of the sacralization mechanisms concerned with change in structured identities. It is in this very sense that the rites of passage in different religions are different from conversion and charisma. In the latter case the new identity is more voluntary and pathbreaking and less embedded in existing cultural expectations. The difference between the two is one of structured versus unstructured change.39

E. Myth

In the social scientific literature one finds a certain kind of ambivalence towards mythic consciousness and its relationship to human consciousness in general. It has been maintained that the function of myth is to mellow the harshness of reality and thereby make it more acceptable. More sympathetic treatment of the subject too has attempted to heighten its closeness to the primitive mind and its needs, implying that mythic consciousness is a basically inferior kind of consciousness. A recent example of this ambivalence in the sociology of religion is Thomas F. O'Dea, who while accepting the emotional saliency of mythic symbolism feels that "we may divide the intellectual expression of religion into two major modes, the mythic and the rational. Myth is the primordial form of the intellectual expression of religious beliefs and attitudes." The source of this ambivalence is the general disregard of the dialectic of the expressive/integrative and rational/adaptive-symbol systems. The ambivalence creeps into some social scientific theorizing because of their awareness of the expressive need of life on the one hand and their rationalist bias denying the contribution


of non-discursive thought to our understanding on the other hand. However, dialectical thinking looks at myth as a synthetic emergence of symbol systems in which the thesis of integrative and the antithesis of instrumental symbols are reconciled into a new synthesis of mythic symbol. Herein, it is suggested that, though myth lies on the expressive-integrative side of the symbol system by its very nature it has to depend on the rational/instrumental symbol system, for the repetitive presentation and the representation through which it performs its integrative function. It is in the realm of mythic symbolism that the conflict and the complementarity of the rational/adaptive and emotional/integrative symbol system is to be clearly noted. Thus, "myths sacralize through the emotional anchorage of integrative reconciliations, but they can do so only through the presentation of the binary opposition with instrumental symbolism."\(^{42}\)

The dialectical character of myth consists not only in the conflict and complementarity of the rational-integrative symbol system. It also consists in the very content of the mythic narration. Citing from the Indian mythological tradition Mol shows how the essence of myth lies "in the union of the

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incompatibles of chaos and order, creation and destruction, evolution and dissolution. The idea that a basic binary opposition is the central theme of all myths is asserted by Lévi-Strauss. He maintains that each improvisation of the mythical messages by making use of materials at hand, is ultimately logically constructed out of binary opposition. Mol looks at theology as dealing with this basic binary opposition in a rather more abstract way than in the myths of the primitive people. The basic opposition of sin and salvation is the central theme in Christian theologizing and preaching. The element of this binary opposition between sin and salvation may be present either in concrete or in abstract form, but its universal presence is easily discernible. "Very concretely Adam, the Fall, Pharaoh, Goliath, the scapegoat, any moral aberration, pork, the tower of babel or the crucifixion may represent sin. Or more abstractly, sin may be represented under the guise of man's disobedience, self-sufficiency, anxiety, predicament, confusion, arrogance, hell, etc. Vice Versa paradise, exodus, Boaz, the Messiah, God, Mary, the millenium, paradise, exodus, Boaz, the Messiah, God, Mary, the millenium,..."


44. Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, p. 226.
the resurrection, righteousness, grace, angels may represent salvation." 45

It seems to us that the thesis proposed by Mol in his assertion of the dialectical emergence of myth as a synthesis of integrative/adaptive symbol systems and his recognition of the centrality of the binary opposition in the structure of mythic symbolism and its theological counterpart goes a long way in explaining the structural similarities in myths drawn from various sources and of varying contexts. There is a certain amount of congruence between this position and that of Lévi-Strauss. Both agree that mythology is not just an outlet for repressed feelings and that myths are in general characterized by the dialectic of order and disorder. However, the fundamental difference between Mol and Lévi-Strauss lies in Mol's recognition that the dialectic of order-disorder is not one of nature (disorder) and culture(order) as Lévi-Strauss maintains, but one of the order-disorder dialectic within culture itself. "After all man's autonomy, sin, etc. is a threat to the social, cultural rather than natural order. It is not nature which is by definition disorderly, and chaotic, and culture which is orderly and systematic. 46 Mol has correctly located the binary


46. Ibid., pp. 328-29
opposition and dialectic of order/disorder within the socio-cultural realm where the primordial experiences of the basic conflicts of human existence takes place. Whether they represent a primitive mind's articulation of this basic experience in a more concretized form or whether they are articulated, transmitted and assimilated on the level of abstract discourse as is the case with most theological preaching and narration, myths always tend to dramatize the basic conflicts of human existence.

Assertion of the centrality of binary opposition in mythic symbolism and theological explications enables Mol to explain the greater success of evangelical/sectarian religious groups in modern western society. Effectiveness of sectarian sermons lies precisely in their express concern with the basic themes of sin and salvation, disorder and order, rational autonomy and faith. Mythic narration or theological preaching may use a variety of characters drawn from different sources relevant to changing contexts, but the nature of the basic truth reiterated in these different versions remains constant and unchanging. It is in the constancy and continuity of a basic truth through the ever changing narration of it that the distinctiveness of myth and sectarian preaching lies. Moreover, it is precisely this aspect of myth that serves the integrative need. The function of mythic narration is to reinforce a certain meaning structure or definition of reality. Thus, myths;
are the surface shorthand for much more basic experiences of human individuals and group ... They provide the fitting contour for existence. They hold arbitrariness and chaos at bay and reinforce identity ... They are narratives, tales or speculation, which sacralize meaning and identity ... they firmly outline and anchor the definition of what life and its relationships are all about. 47

CHAPTER III

DIMENSIONS OF RELIGIOSITY AND THE MECHANISMS OF SACRALIZATION

In this chapter we will attempt to ascertain the validity of the proposition that the mechanisms of sacralization are congruent with the dimensions of religiosity postulated by Glock for an empirical study of the religious phenomena in America. Here we will concern ourselves with determining the degree and range of congruence between the two conceptual schemes. The purpose of this exercise in comparison between the two conceptual schemes is twofold: first to test the claim of generality and cross-cultural validity made by Mol; and secondly to see if, and in what way, Glock's conceptual scheme differs from that of Mol and to what degree the difference between the two warrants a reorientation of Mol's theory of sacralization.

A. Religion and Integration

The proposition that the mechanisms of sacralization seem to synchronize with Glock's dimensions of religiosity appears to be based on a more fundamental assumption as to the centrality of the problem of identity consolidation or integration in Glock's study of the religious situation in present day American Society. Problems of identity together with the question of meaning and the purpose of human existence are intricably related with the functional orientation of the
sacralization process as enunciated by Mol. For Glock too, religion, by providing individuals with an interpretation of existence, performs the invaluable task of resolving the problem of meaning. Thus, echoing basic Durkheimian insights, he writes:

Religion, or what societies hold to be sacred, comprises an institutionalized system of symbols, beliefs, values, and practices focused on questions of ultimate meaning. By this (ultimate meaning) is meant those matters pertaining to the nature, meaning and often, purpose, of reality - a rationale for existence and a view of the world. In particular, things will be regarded as sacred as they provide, or symbolize, solutions to questions of ultimate meaning.

Given this understanding of the functional orientation of religious symbol systems, it is not surprising that Glock juxtaposes the integrative/expressive aspect of belief system against the inadequacy of the instrumental reason in providing a viable explanation of the meaning of human existence. In a world whose purpose cannot be ascertained by reason, religion stands ready with an explanation, however partial it may be, to fill the vacuum. However, it is surprising that after having noted this difference between the

instrumental reason and the expressive symbol system (in Glock's terminology, value orientation), Glock should grant the instrumental reason the primacy and significance, that he has, in providing a contour of existence through the rational appropriation of reality. We will take up this problem in more detail in the section dealing with the knowledge dimension of religiosity. Suffice it to say at this point that from our point of view Glock's postulation and explication of the knowledge dimension of religiosity is not consistent with his assertion of the primacy of expressive symbol system (value orientation).

While we note a considerable amount of agreement in the assumptive foundations of the theoretical schemes under investigation, we must qualify our assertion of the agreement by pointing out the differences between the two. It is important to note that while Glock recognizes the integrative orientation of religion he finds it convenient to maintain that this orientation of the religious symbol system is only derivative and secondary to what he calls value orientations. Glock makes an analytical distinction between value orientations with supernatural referent (religious perspectives) and value

orientations without supernatural referent (humanist perspective). It seems to us that Glock is forced to make this distinction precisely because he remains tied to the traditional definition of religion in terms of supernaturalism. While Glock is prepared to accept that the two perspectives represent the same basic phenomena, he considers them as two alternative forms of representation of reality. Genuinely convinced that supernaturalism is a necessary component in any definition of religion, Glock is led by the logic of his argument to postulate this distinction. However, Mol's definition of religion in terms of "sacralization of identity" is not beset with this problem. Both humanist and non-humanist perspectives or value orientations (expressive symbol systems in Mol's terminology) with or without supernatural referent can be brought under one rubric of identity consolidation. Mol in his definition of religion dispenses with the supernaturalism. Still his definition remains narrow enough to bring under it all the phenomena that have been defined religious in terms of supernatural referent. On the other hand this definition is large enough to account for sacredness that, according to Glock, invests the so-called humanist perspectives. Thus in Mol's formulation of the problem the conceptual distinction

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so tenuously held by Glock becomes expendable. This conceptual economy and the consequent analytic implications of the oblation of the unnecessary conceptual distinction deserve due recognition.

In the beginning of this section we maintained that Glock's postulation of dimensions of religiosity is related to the problem of identity consolidation. It is true that in Glock's scheme this aspect of the religious value orientation does not receive an explicit and unequivocal treatment. But this does not preclude the possibility of this aspect of religious orientation being the unacknowledged assumption of his discussion. As a matter of fact Glock is at great pains to dissociate himself from the general assumption as to the functional indispensability of religion for social integration. But this conscious effort on his part is not in tune with the unconscious and valid assumption regarding the integrative implications of the religious orientations for both the individual and the primary group that he belongs to. Thus, arguing against the general social-psychological assumption that religious experience is problematic and pathological Glock observes that religious experience is not problematic but is simply conformity to the norms of relatively stable social groups\(^7\). Further, in his discussion of the social

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contexts of religious experiences he proposes the hypothesis that the intensity and frequency of religious experiences are directly related to the cohesiveness and solidarity of the church membership. From his analysis of the empirical data pertaining to the question Glock makes some significant observations. The intensity and frequency of religious experiences among more conservative and fundamentalist religious groups is explained by the fact that "their congregation serves as the primary source of informal social relations". Equally significant is the observation that among liberal denominations a minority subgroup, which constitutes a socially integrated community of believers, displays a greater propensity for religious experiences. Thus the frequency and intensity of religious experiences are "the property of an integrated subculture". We find that these findings of Glock confirm our assumption as to the centrality of the identity consolidating functions of religious orientations. It is true that Glock did not pursue this aspect of his analysis to its logical conclusion and probably downplayed the integrative implications of religious symbol systems. But reasonable conclusions can be

drawn in this regard from the reasonably clear empirical evidences that he puts forth in support of his own theoretical formulations. With these observations regarding Glock's basic theoretical assumptions and their relevance to our own understanding of the religious phenomena we now turn our attention to a comparison of the dimensions of religiosity and the mechanisms of sacralization.

B. Objectification and the Ideological Dimension

Objectification as a crucial factor in the sacralization process has been defined as the "tendency to sum up the variegated elements of mundane existence in a transcendental point of reference where they can appear more orderly, more consistent and more timeless." In and through objectification a transcendental point of reference is supposed to retain its dialectical character. A theory insisting on a dialectical relationship between the sacred and profane and thereby ascribing the objectified point of reference as a leverage for further sacralization entails both the closeness and the separateness of the mundane and the transcendent. With this


cursory summary of the essential tenets of objectification we may now turn our attention to the belief dimension of religiosity to ascertain if there is any reasonable degree of congruence between the two. For Glock the transcendental frame of reference is the crucial factor in the belief system of any religious perspective. Here, the supernaturalism acknowledged by Glock essentially plays the same role that objectification plays in our scheme. Conceptualized in terms of transcendentalism the belief dimension is considered by Glock as a particularly necessary aspect of religiosity. He maintains unequivocally that "it is only within some set of beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality of the nature and intention of the superantural, that other aspects of religion become coherent." To be sure, in this theoretical scheme the term "belief" is used in a comprehensive way to include warranting beliefs (supernaturalism implying existence of the divine realm), purposive belief (belief in original sin, the possibility of salvation etc.) and the implementing belief (proper conduct of man towards God and towards his fellow man for realization of the divine purpose). It is precisely this comprehensiveness of the belief structure that further confirms

our basic assertion of the dialectical relationship between the sacred and the profane.

Apart from the general assertion of a transcendental point of reference being the core of a religious systems two eminently significant tenets of the objectification process need to be brought out. In our scheme of things objectification, in sacralizing any symbol system, is directly related to the emotional component of the objectified point of reference, and its openness and vagueness. True, the separateness of the sacred and the profane is a primary requisite for the order and security of any cultural system and the transcendental point of reference anchoring it. However, the separateness enwrapped with 'don't touch' sentiments also remains the emotional anchorage for the relevant (corresponding) archetypes and features of the mundane world. A theory insisting on a dialectical relationship between the sacred and the profane and thereby acknowledging the objectified point of reference as a leverage for further manipulation of the mundane entails both the closeness and the separateness of the mundane and the transcendent.

It is in this vein that Glock relates the question of saliency of a belief system with the range and degree of
religious conviction. Not surprisingly then he finds that ethicalism is directly related to orthodoxy among Catholics. But among the Protestant bodies this relationship is not pronounced. While his findings on Catholic church members fit well into our scheme, emphasising a close relationship between the sacred and the profane and the sacred acquiring further leverage for sacralization through the commitment link, his empirical research on Protestant bodies apparently baffles our theoretical formulations.

However, a closer examination of the situation presents a somewhat more congenial picture. Here too Glock's analysis tends to reinforce our emphasis on the centrality of the objectification process in sacralization of any symbol system though Glock himself seems to be unaware of this possibility, and therefore unable to explain why ethicalism and orthodoxy can be mutually exclusive roots of religious identity. The point of the issue is that the transcendental frame of reference need not always operate within the framework of supernaturalism. It is at this point that our definition of


sacralization via objectification without taking recourse to supernaturalism has a definite heuristic advantage over Glock's conceptualization. Thus the transcendental frame of reference instead of being the dwelling place of supernatural conceptions becomes the realm where the variegated elements of mundane existence appear more orderly, more consistent and more timeless. The success of ethicalism among a section of Protestant bodies has to be understood in terms of a change in the very structure of the transcendental point of reference over the centuries. Glock's reluctance to discern this genuine change and his insistence that a Christianity working under the aegis of Ethicalism is a spurious Christianity emanates from his failure to pursue his studies in the direction already implied in his theoretical formulations. Credit has to be given to Glock for his recognition that the locus of a commitment may be a belief, a value, or a norm and that "any deep and ultimate commitment is regarded as defining what is sacred to the individual whether or not he also regards it as grounded in divine or supernatural authority." The implication is not that


one should aim at commitment without ideology, as is sometimes asserted by certain sections of liberal Christianity. Rather, the implication is that a system of values or norms can as much become the locus of commitment as the divine or supernatural, if and when the system of norms or values acquires an ideological character through objectification.

However, Glock's failure to see ethicalism on the same footing as supernaturalism and the consequent inability to see the same commitment link operating behind ethicalism are further reflective of another heuristic advantage that our scheme has over Glock. True, for Glock the transcendental frame of reference remains the crucial factor in the belief system of any religion. But in his search for a more concretely identifiable index of transcendentalism Glock is pushed to emphasise out of proportion the warranting beliefs at the cost of purposive and implementing beliefs. This concretization of the transcendental point of reference diminishes the research value of the index since the vagueness and the openness of the transcendental point of reference is lost.

C. Commitment and the Experiential Dimension

Glock uses the term commitment in a rather comprehensive sense and thus dilutes the value of the term as an analytical tool for understanding the complex phenomenon of religiosity. However, what we are concerned with here is not an argument
regarding the use of the term commitment in such a comprehensive sense. What we are looking for is whether there is any concept in Glock's scheme which essentially stands for the same cluster of phenomena that comes under the category of commitment in our scheme. Besides, it will be profitable to inquire if Glock has used the term commitment in both the broader generalized context of religiosity as such and a more concretely identifiable context of emotional attachment to any specific foci of identity.

In Glock's scheme the feeling dimension of religiosity essentially performs a function similar to that of commitment in our scheme of things. Glock prefers to call it the experiential dimension of religiosity whereby an affective relationship is established between the divine and the individual. According to Glock, "Religious experiences are all of those feelings, perceptions, and sensations which are experienced by an actor or defined by a religious group or a society as involving some communication with transcendental authority."\(^7\) The establishment of this affective relationship facilitates the identity consolidation by offering an anchorage or focus for such emotionally charged elements within human

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experience as concern, trust, faith and fear. Variation in the degree of commitment is actually reflective of the intensity of one or all of these elements deemed necessary to characterize the experiential dimension of religiosity.

Glock mentions four types of religious experiences through which a certain belief system is reinforced. These are: Confirming Experience, Ecstatic Experience, The Responsive Experience and Revelational Experience. All these types of religious experiences tend to consolidate any specific frame of identity built around certain sets of beliefs or interpretations of reality.

Glock's account of the emotional or feeling dimension of religiosity is in accordance with our assertion of the significance of the commitment link for the belief system. The hypothesis that the emotive content of the belief system tends to reinforce the systems of meaning and interpretations of existence is confirmed by Glock's empirical findings. No wonder that Glock notes that some Churches attach immense significance to the structured context within which well-organized and institutionalized mechanisms are employed to generate and channel pre-dispositions for salvational experiences.

No less important is the fact that these experiences are conceived of as guaranteeing a certain amount of consistency and predictability of the behaviour of participants. It is this urge for predictability and consistency of motivation underlying a sacralized perspective that accounts for the churches of Nazarenes and the Assemblies of God counting only 'born again Christians' as members of the church; and understandably many fundamentalist bodies require such an experience as a necessary qualification for full membership in the group.\textsuperscript{20}

In arguing for the saliency of the emotive component for the individual motivations and patterns of behaviour no attempt is being made to undermine the significance of other dimensions. It is recognized that the experiential dimension of religious commitment is inextricably bound up with the other dimension and must be treated within this more general context. However, the importance of emotional attachment to a set of beliefs, values or norms in clarifying one's priorities and thereby guiding one's conduct, can hardly be minimized. It is precisely this congruence in the basic stance on the identity consolidating function of the feeling dimension of the sacralizing

process that enables us to read a meaning and orientation in Glock corroborating Mol's insight in this regard.

Then there is the question of the double-facedness of the term "commitment" in Glock's scheme. The section dealing with the specific nature of commitment unequivocally asserts that it reinforces a system of meaning or identity. Thus a strong commitment is defined as one which is held to be unalterable. Any sacrifice will be endured in order to withstand a threat to the commitment.²¹ It is surprising that having defined commitment in these terms Glock even uses the term in the rather comprehensive sense including any and all dimensions of religiosity (belief, practice, experience, knowledge, consequence).

In his discussion of the nature of commitment Glock uses the term in a rather restricted sense, which is more congenial to us; and there happily he places it on its own footing by distinguishing it from any system of norms, values or beliefs that might become the locus of any commitment.²² A belief system is not conceived here as contained within the precincts of commitment, but as a point outside it towards


which commitment is directed. Thus different systems of symbols and meaning structures influencing motivation and behaviour patterns are conceived as different foci of commitment. Moreover, they sometimes seem to be conflicting with each other in providing a locus for the commitment of an individual or a society.

In the beginning of this section we raised the question of double-facedness of the concept of commitment in Glock's conceptualization. We have attempted to show that Glock's discussion of the experiential dimension of religiosity revolves around the emotional attachment to a specific focus of identity (in this case the Divine) and its saliency for human behaviour guaranteeing predictability and consistency. Similar concerns are reflected in his discussion of the nature of commitment where it is used in the context of its priority setting function. The use of the term in this restricted and specific sense stands in agreeable relationship to Mol's conceptualization of the problem.

D. Ritual and the Ritualistic Dimension

Congruence between this specific dimension of religiosity in Glock and the corresponding mechanism of sacralization is unequivocal. Conceptualization of this component in both the paradigms leads to similar assumptions, operates within the similar context of identity consolidation and expresses similar
convictions about its functional priority. However, this high congruence in the conceptual and functional orientation of two schemes need not undermine the distinguishing feature of and specific heuristic advantage of one or the other.

First for the compatibilities. Ritual is assigned the function of articulating and reiterating a system of meaning.\textsuperscript{23} It is through this that religion acquires truly social character. According to Glock ritual generally requires a gathering of persons for participating in the same religious activities. Such social circumstances offer means and avenues for a collective reaffirmation of the meaning and sacredness of the belief system. Social meaning and context of ritual consist in its ability to sacralize those beliefs and values which are considered by society to be vital and crucial for its existence. Thus, "prayers, confessions etc. in diverse ways interpret reality and reconcile man to the environment in which they are embedded."\textsuperscript{24}

For Glock: "through rituals religions reinforce commitment to their systems of beliefs about the nature and intentions of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Hans Mol, \textit{Op. cit.}
\end{itemize}
the supernatural.\textsuperscript{25} In other words, the identity consolidation and integration with a sacralized system of meaning is accomplished through ritualistic activities by repeatedly reminding the individual of the holy realm and thereby strengthening his faith in that realm. This 'repetitive, sentiment arousing and unifying activity' has been recognized by Mol to be the independent contribution of ritual to the sacralization process.\textsuperscript{26}

However, assertion of this functional priority of ritual in terms of the identity consolidation through repetitive activity does not undermine the essential dependence as well as bearing of this element on other elements involved in sacralization. Thus, while we note that ritual can accomplish its task only through heavy reliance on commitment, Glock points to the subordination of ritual to the belief dimension of religiosity. Essential to ritual is a commitment to a system of meaning, or identity referent, which it tends to reinforce and strengthen. This, however, need not be the case vice-versa. Glock's concern that regular participation


\textsuperscript{26} Hans Mol, \textit{Op.cit.}, p. 11.
in the ritualistic activities of the church may not be a satisfactory index for measuring the saliency of a belief system is not unfounded. Commitment to a certain system of belief, structure of meaning or identity may be maintained without giving them expression in one's ritualistic orientations. But participation in a specific set of ritual practices without commitment to the corresponding belief system is possible only at the expense of the strengthening of the faith and consolidation of identity.

These considerations as to the saliency of belief systems for the ritual practices led Glock to incorporate a conceptual distinction between ritual practices and devotionalism, the former connoting formal and social aspect and the latter connoting informal and private aspect of religious practices. The distinction corresponds broadly to Mol's distinction between the relationship of ritual to personal identity on the one hand and social identity on the other. However, Glock's conceptualization of devotionalism has the added heuristic advantage of explaining the marked difference between Catholic and Protestant church participation.

Within the narrow confines of a researcher's concern with a specific empirical situation it works as an excellent analytical tool. That Catholics exhibit a tendency towards greater participation in public religious practices reflects the heavy emphasis placed on ritual commitment by the Catholic church. On the other hand, the fact that Protestant churches generate greater private religious practices confirms Mol's crucial hypothesis that a cluster of forces of instrumentality, rationality, scepticism, differentiation etc. "creates the necessity for its own counterbalance in emotionally anchored meaning, integration and identity." It is precisely in this sense that devotionalism may be interpreted as that aspect of ritualism which tends to sacralize and reinforce personal identity, structures of meaning and integration.

Glock's distinction between the formal and informal form of ritualism is of immense help in measuring the level of religiosity. But it falls short of the comprehensiveness of the scale of ritualism implied in Mol's conceptualization. True, Mol's scheme is not concerned with the immediate empirical problem; but its emphasis on a generalized theory of sacralization enables it to deal with and explain the significance of such widely divergent concepts as the rites of passage dealing with change in structural contexts on the one hand and rites of rebellion performing integrative functions through ritual expression of commonly felt hostilities on the other. Thus the heuristic advantage of Mol's scheme
emanates from its assertion of both reinforcement and change of systems of meaning, identities and definitions of reality as central variable as against Glock's recognition of the reinforcement variable.

E. Myth and Religious Knowledge

We stated earlier that ours is not an attempt to find one-to-one correlation between the dimensions of religiosity and the mechanisms of sacralization. The statement needs to be reiterated in the face of the conspicuous absence of the term myth in Glock's terminology.

Myth in our scheme "is the emotion-laden assertion of man's place in a world that is meaningful to him, and his solidarity with it ... It is a celebration of a primordial reality rendered actively present." By providing a short-hand access to a basic experience in a symbolic way it enables individuals to sublimate the basic conflicts of human existence and thereby reinforce social identity. As a symbol system it is a product of the dialectical relationship between the integrative and instrumental symbols, though myth as a product of this synthesis falls more on the side of expressive/integrative

symbolism. It is precisely this primacy of the expressive/integrative function of mythic symbolism that accounts for its durability and constancy. Relativization of discordance through emotional sublimation of a basic conflict is possible because of its capacity to arouse a common commitment and to anchor a system of meaning emotionally. Thus the basic binary opposition or the reality of primordial discordance between sin and salvation and their emotional sublimation on a symbolic level are the central variables that go to constitute a mythic symbol system.

Glock would hardly disagree with this. Rather his empirical findings only add to our theoretical formulations. However his conceptualization suffers from lack of clarity and runs into insurmountable difficulties. While Glock is extremely sensitive to the integrative/expressive aspect of religious symbolism he fails to perceive the dialectic between the two symbol systems and unwittingly grants the instrumental/adaptive symbol system an independent role in the interpretation of reality. This is abundantly clear in his discussion of religious knowledge as a separate dimension of religiosity through which an individual supposedly appropriates the religious reality.29

Glock maintains that "the knowledge and belief dimension are clearly related since knowledge of a belief is a necessary precondition for its acceptance." To be fair to Glock it must be noted that belief need not follow from knowledge, nor does all religious knowledge bear on belief. But on the other hand it is impossible to conceive of a situation where religious belief can exist without a certain amount of religious knowledge. Operating on this assumption Glock finds that the religious situation in America is a bundle of contradictions. For, if the knowledge and belief dimensions are clearly related and knowledge of a belief is a necessary precondition for its acceptance, then how is it that religious groups such as Catholics and southern Protestants rated highly orthodox on the belief dimension, but are rated low on religious knowledge dimension?

The answer to Glock's dilemma lies in Mol's significant distinction between the expressive/integrative symbol system on the one hand and the adaptive/instrumental system on the other through which reality is interpreted and appropriated. It may be interesting to investigate the nature of indexes developed for measuring religious knowledge on the one hand and theological orthodoxy on the other. It is the nature of the indexes and what they purport to measure that gives a clue to the importance of assigning the integrative/expressive symbol system primacy in measuring religious knowledge. Ten Commandments, passages from scripture and names of Old Testament
prophets do not give expression to the binary opposition central to the mythic interpretation of reality. Nor do they, when articulated through the instrumental reason have the capacity to emotionally sublimate the basic conflicts of human existence.

On the other hand the orthodoxy index proposed for measuring theological orthodoxy matches up with the components of mythic symbolism. First and foremost, in the myth of Jesus, an index is developed to measure not whether believing Christians have heard of the name of Christ (which was the aim in the case of Old Testament prophets), but to measure the degree of belief in the Saviourhood of Christ. Thus, he is assumed to be at the synthesising apex of the theological perspective.

Secondly, when Glock's empirical findings conclude "that there is a general relationship between belief in original sin and theological conservatism underlying these data," Glock confirms our postulation of a basic binary opposition being the central tenet of mythical symbolism.


A theology operating with the paradigm of this binary opposition of sin and salvation, and their 'synthesis in the Saviourhood of Christ is bound to be occupied with the traditional concepts of Christian theology and tend to offer more viable and secure emotional anchorage for the basic conflicts of human existence through symbolic sublimation. No wonder then that the Lutheran Protestant groups and Roman Catholic rated low on the religious knowledge scale tend to occupy a high place on the theological orthodoxy index operating on the assumption of discordance and conflict between sin and salvation, disorder and order, rational autonomy and faith inherent in the cultural subsystem.

It was a mistake for Glock to have collapsed the transcendentalism with the Saviourhood of Christ and the relationship to sin and salvation to form a unilinear index for measuring the belief dimension of religiosity. No doubt mythic symbolism leads to objectification, but they are two distinctly different mechanisms having value in their own right. It would have been appropriate, if Glock had tried to see the dialectical relationship between the expressive/integrative symbol system implied in his discussion of religious belief and the adaptive/instrumental symbol system implied in his dimension of religious knowledge. That would have secured a firmer basis for postulating the place of religious knowledge in the sacralization process. True, the basic binary opposition
that is at the heart of mythic symbolism stands in need of the rational/instrumentive symbol system for its mediation. But the emotional sublimation of this binary opposition transcends the realm of rational/instrumental symbol system. Myths accomplish this task precisely by making use of the instrumental symbol system through repetitive presentation and representation and it is the degree and extent of this capacity for repetitive presentation and representation which Glock attempts to measure as the knowledge dimension of religiosity. But in measuring this no clue is available to the degree of emotional sublimation through intuitive apprehension of a basic conflict situation. This is the problem to which Glock has partly addressed himself in the section dealing with the belief dimension of religiosity. It has been our concern to demonstrate that though Glock has not brought out the independent value of mythic symbolism as a separate dimension of religiosity, nevertheless in his scheme it remains an extremely plausible index to theological orthodoxy.
CHAPTER IV

YOGA AS INTEGRATION AND ITS WAYS

Modern philosophical and phenomenological literature concerned with religious issues abound with studies of Yoga and its techniques. Some brilliant attempts have been made at a viable psychological explanation of Yoga and its implications for understanding the constitution of human personality. We share these concerns in so far as we do not dismiss Yoga as a bundle of lopsided, half baked esoteric ideas. It is our assumption that any system of meaning or value orientation constituting the frame of reference for the motivational orientation of its adherents is a sociologically analysable phenomenon. Yoga, in our view is no exception in this regard. Accordingly in the present study of the Yoga techniques we will attempt to discern whether the sacralization process and its mechanisms have their correlates in a religious symbol system developed in a socio-cultural context other than that of the West. Our analysis in the preceding chapter had been fruitful and had a salutary effect on the theoretical framework developed in

the first part of the thesis. However, the scientific value and heuristic utility claimed for the conceptual scheme under investigation depends on its cross-cultural applicability and a generality that can account for varieties in the historically and culturally conditioned responses to the ever-felt need for sacralization. Our analysis of the ways of Yoga is another step in this direction.

The term Yoga has been used to denote a variety of phenomena, closely resembling in form and structure the classical Yoga formulated in ancient Sanskrit literature of Brahmanic tradition. Besides the "classic" Yoga expounded and formulated by Patanjali in his Yoga-Sutras, there are countless forms of "popular" nonsystematic Yoga; there are non-Brahmanic varieties of it, described in Buddhist and Jaina literature; and above all there are Yogas whose structures are "magical" and have been closely identified with Aghoris and Kapalikas who profess the tantric variety of Yoga in its extreme form. All these variants of Yoga, despite certain similarities in ritual structure and belief orientation, are considerably divergent. Unique in their own right they deserve detailed study separately. However, in the present context, it is not possible to analyse these diverse forms of Yoga to

discern the extent and scope of the applicability of our model. For the purpose of the present study, we will confine ourselves to the theoretical and practical formulations of Yoga in the mainline Brahmanic tradition.

In ancient Sanskrit writings Yoga is described as a Darsana, which literally means a 'point of view' or a 'perspective' as it is a system of coherent affirmations, co-extensive with human experience, which it attempts to interpret in its entirety. Purusa (the self, consciousness) and Prakriti (not-self, the world) are the two categories in terms of which Yoga attempts to explain the "why" of human existence. The contingencies and contradictions, of human life (pain and suffering) have their source in the relationship between Purusa and Prakriti, which is one of opposition and cooperation. Crucial for this interpretation of reality is the dialectical understanding of the phenomena. The dialectic consists of the essential duality of Purusa and Prakriti and a simultaneous complementarity between the two. The opposition between the two is built into the nature of things; but at the same time the things of nature are a product of their cooperation.


4. In this context Yoga accepts the Samkhya metaphysics in toto. For a clear exposition of Samkhya doctrine of Purusa and Prakriti and its relevance for Yoga see *Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought* by S. N. Dasgupta, Calcutta, 1930 and *A History of Indian Philosophy* by the same author, Cambridge, 1955.
For Yoga, world (prakriti) is real (not false, as it is for example, for Vedanta). Nevertheless, if the world exists and endures, it does so precisely for the sake of Purusa. The innumerable forms of the cosmos, as well as their processes of manifestation and development, according to Yoga, exist only in the measure to which the self (Purusa) identifies itself with not-self. It is precisely in this identification with not-self that self's heterogeneity and profanity lies. Consequently, a rejection of the profane life, is considered as a necessary prerequisite for the sacred mode of being that constitutes the essence of Purusa or self. As Eliade: puts it

Solidarity with a desacralized world, participation in a profane nature. Neti; Neti; cries the sage of the Upanisads: No no! thou art not this; nor art thou that! In other words: you do not belong to the fallen cosmos, as you see it now; you are not necessarily engulfed in this creation: necessarily that is to say by virtue of the law of your own being.5

Here as elsewhere, Eliade and host of other scholars have clearly noted the opposition between Purusa and Prakriti, the sacred and the profane. But their complementarity has

remained somewhat dormant in these approaches to Yoga. It needs to be pointed out that Yoga is basically soteriology making use of this dialectic of sacred and profane for the final deliverance of the self, which consists in the dissociation of the self from the not-self and realization of its essential identity. It is in the soteriological orientation of Yoga that the dialectic of sacred and profane in our sense is to be located. For according to yoga the more man suffers, i.e. the greater his solidarity is with the profane cosmos, the greater is the tendency to move to the opposite. Yoga unequivocally recognizes the conflicting and yet complementary relationship between the sacred and the profane. Emphasis here is not on the state of sacredness and its mode of being; it is primarily concerned with the transition to or the mode of becoming sacred.

A. Yoga as Integration

It is our assumption that the problem of identity consolidation or self-integration remains the concern of Yoga in its diverse forms. True, Yoga is a comprehensive term which has been used to refer to a variety of ideas and practices ranging from the systematic formulation of Yoga philosophy in the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali to a kaleidoscopic variety of magical practices. However, despite the use of the

term in varying contexts it has retained its original meaning, etymologically derived from sanskrit root yuj meaning 'to bind together', 'hold fast', 'yoke', etc. Diversity of opinion may occur as to what needs to be bound together, or to what one has to hold fast, or where the yoke lies. Whether it is communion of the Self with Isvara that motivates the aspirant' or the restoration of 'wholeness' of self by uniting the Siva and the Sakti in Kundalini that drives the incumbent on the path of Yoga, the ultimate end of all Yogas is self-integration or the restoration of the self. It is to this self-integrative aspect of Yoga that a modern interpreter of Yoga draws our attention:

Yoga thus literally means union ... It implies union of the mind with the inmost centre of one's own being, the self or atman-union of the conscious mind with the deeper levels of the unconscious- resulting in the integration of personality. That is indeed the chief objective of Yoga.

The basic assumption of Yoga is that an integrated self is essentially sacred. The purpose of Yogic techniques is to unify the spirit, to do away with the dispersion and automatism that is supposed to characterize

8. Ibid., p. 21
profane consciousness. Self integration implies bringing home to the self the fact of the essential duality of the self and not-self. Meaninglessness and arbitrariness that infest human existence and constitute pain and suffering have their source in the forgetfulness of the self's essential freedom from the not-self, in its alienation from the ground of its own existence. Alienation of the self consists in its identification with not-self. Understandably then, the bringing together of self, the 'bond' in which the action of binding is to result, presupposes, as its preliminary condition, breaking the "bonds" that unite spirit to the world. Detachment from one focus of identity must precede attachment to another focus. It is in this emphasis on the detachment and attachment that the sacralizing function of Yoga techniques lies. In the traditional interpretation of Yoga this detachment element has been over-emphasised; other-worldliness of Yoga in particular and Indian philosophy in general had been a favourite passtime of scholars of the 19th and first-half of the twentieth century. However, the identity perspective that we are employing in this study has the advantage of bringing to the fore the primary of the attachment or integrative element of Yoga techniques. It is equally important to note that the Yogic experience is different from conversion in the sense that it is not a detachment from one sacralized perspective and attachment to another that is implied here.
Rather it is detachment from a profane and attachment to a sacred mode of life that distinguishes Yogic experience from the more traumatic conversion experience. Moreover, the new focus of identity is not considered as altogether new. Rather it is restoration of one's identity or realizing one's true identity. One might suggest that the success of Yoga in certain segments of the modern west resides in this very orientation of Yogic teachings. It is not accidental that modern protagonists and propagandists together (including Indian philosophers, swamis and gurus) have emphasised the non-theistic aspect of Yoga philosophy. From this point of view Yoga is the universal religion, for it is not a religion centred around a conception of personal god. It is equally understandable despite these expostulations why Yoga has not been able to make inroads into the committed segments of Christian population. Yogic techniques are not developed to suit the needs of a conversion mechanism. They can be successful only where 'the sacralized identity' is already grounded in the secured foundation of tradition, or where the


'sacralized identity' does not have to compete with an already 'sacralized' and thereby secured identity. Success of Yoga in the non-committed, unanchored, the 'lost' youth of the modern west is to be accounted for by the fact that it is eminently suited for identity integration where the emphasis is on dissociation from a profane existence, an existence which is utterly meaningless and full of contradictions.

In Yoga the complexities of the religious symbol system appear in its dialectical frame of reference. Theoretical formulations of Yoga literature tend to agree with our own theoretical scheme. For Yoga too instrumental reason has a conflicting and yet complementary relationship with the expressive-integrative symbol system. The emphasis in Yoga is on the integration of human personality through the realization of a communion or rapport with the Supreme Being. There are at least four ways in and through which, it is claimed, that such rapport can be accomplished: (1) Jnana Yoga (it lays emphasis on knowledge culminating in wisdom as the way leading to communion with the Supreme Being); (2) Bhakti Yoga (it recognizes the significance of the emotive content of the belief system and takes into consideration the role of the emotional factor in the integration of human personality).

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(3) Tantra Yoga (the Tantra aims at the integration of dynamic (sakti tattva) and static (siva tattva) aspects of human personality through ritual practices): (4) Karma Yoga (it lays emphasis on the volitional side of human nature. Action performed in the spirit of detachment from the fruit thereof becomes a sacred act and is freed from its disruptive influence on human personality). Yoga does not consider these various ways as mutually exclusive. Recognizing the significance of different aspects of human personality different ways of Yoga are complementary to each other. They require a coming to terms with the instinctual drives of human personality through a harmonization of passion and reason. They aim at self-integration through the organized maturity of the normal human personality. And by offering an orderly interpretation of reality they appear to minimize the effects of disorder, discrepancies and chaos that the individual seems to encounter in the world.

B. Jnana Yoga and Objectification

The corresponding concept to objectification in Yoga is the way of knowledge or Jnana Yoga. It would seem to be a contradiction to claim that any concept emphasising knowledge as a way to ultimate union with the supreme is comparable to the objectification process. The contradiction would appear to be more telling if we use the term knowledge in its current
connotation with the instrumentive/adaptive symbol system. However in order to understand the way of knowledge one has to keep in mind that knowledge here refers to a state of being. To know is to be in a particular state of being. It is that state of being which coincides with intuitive awareness of the essential nature of things. As Bahm puts it:

As one proceeds along the path of knowledge, after distinguishing all differences between things experienced, he progressively realizes their lack of ultimacy and withdraws his attention from them as distractions preventing him from enjoying the ultimate intuition. The path of knowledge leads beyond knowledge to a Yogic intuition in which awareness and being are identical. 12

The mystic overtones of Yoga reflected in this position notwithstanding, we can clearly discern that it corroborates Mol's distinction between the expressive and the adaptive aspects of the symbol system. Yogic awareness of the ultimate nature of things coincides with the coming to terms with the essence of one's own being. The goal of Jnana Yoga is not to manipulate the structures of the psyche or categories of thought to enable the self to adjust and adapt to the changes in the environing conditions. Its aim is to develop that frame of mind which enables the self to come to terms with

itself despite the contingencies, contradictions and arbitrariness of existence.

Thus, while for Mol objectification serves the purpose of minimizing the disruptive influence of the meaninglessness of existence on the self, Jnana Yoga proposes the mechanism of discrimination (viveka) and the expressive longing for freedom (mumuksta) to protect the self from the onslaughts of mundane existence. The scheme involving the dialectic of discriminative reason (viveka) and mumksta (expressive orientation) confirms Mol's crucial hypothesis about the conflicting and yet complementary relationship between the discursive/adaptive reason and the expressive/integrative symbol system. Thus the path of knowledge includes a quest for knowledge both of self and objects as ordinarily experienced and of self and object as they ultimately are. Discrimination (viveka) is that mode of understanding which is employed by the self to comprehend the distinction between the self and the not-self. Discrimination (viveka) means clear understanding of the distinction between the real and the unreal, the permanent and the transient. Once this distinction is brought home to the self through discursive reasoning and rational analysis it gives rise to the longing for freedom, which for Yoga implies withdrawing (vairāgya) from the world of not-self to the self.\(^\text{13}\)

Through a clear understanding of the distinction between

the Purusa (Being) and Prakriti (Becoming), the permanent and the transient, a breach with the immediacy of the things temporal, transient and contingent is accomplished. A breach with immediacy is considered as an essential condition of the spiritual quest. One might suspect that this breach with immediacy implies a complete rupture between the mundane and the transcendent. However, Jnana Yoga has a different explanation to offer. Jnana Yoga does not aim at the negation of the mundane. Rather, it is the realization that the mundane cannot provide the ground for its own existence, that it draws its being and meaning from the transcendent that constitutes the goal of Jnana Yoga. The mundane perceived in its own right is full of contradictions, arbitrariness and cannot defend its purpose and meaning. Perceived in the context of the transcendent the contradictions, arbitrariness and the contingencies of the mundane acquire a new meaning and purpose. Transcendent is the meaning and purpose of this mundane existence. It is for the sake of Purusa that Prakriti exists. It is this realization that the way of knowledge aims at.

We have argued in the section dealing with objectification that its function is to guarantee the incorruptibility of the

transcendental order as well as to provide a point of reference in terms of which the corruption, the contingencies, the chaos and the inconsistencies of the mundane realm can be interpreted and appropriated. Mol's greater emphasis on the latter aspect of objectification is not without significance. An extremely interesting example is presented by Gita in chapter XI when Krsna unfolds to Arjuna that dimension of Krsna which embraces the whole universe not excluding either of the parts of opposites, good and evil, beautiful and ugly, sweet and terrible, pleasant and painful. Arjuna who was initially reluctant to fight because he was appalled by the ugliness, the horrific vision of the ways of a world which prompt brothers to fight brothers and kinsmen to kill kinsmen, sees Krsna providing the meaning and purpose of human existence. The feeling that this all is not ultimately meaningless, that there is an order and purpose behind the arbitrary and the contingent enables the self to absorb and digest the frustrations and contingencies as not altogether meaningless, but as part and parcel of an orderly world. Through Viveka and Variragya, Jnana Yoga strengthens and consolidates one's belief in the transcendental order as the ground of the mundane existence. To our way of thinking the congruence between this dimension of Yoga and Mol's formulation of

of transcendentalism seems to be extremely well-founded.

As to the complexity and multifacedness of the notion of knowledge in Jnana Yoga and the justification for our placing the Way of Knowledge on the expressive/integrative side of the symbol system it may be noted that the Gita expounding the Jnana Yoga makes a clear distinction between wisdom (intuitive knowledge) and rational knowledge (discursive knowledge). Thus Krsna says: "I will declare to thee in full this wisdom (Jnana) together with knowledge (Vijnana) by knowing which there shall remain nothing more left to be known." Radhakrishnan candidly points out in this context that the instrumental reason has a conflicting and yet complementary relationship with the intuitive reason. We must not have merely the knowledge of the relationless Absolute and its various manifestations. However, though making an essentially correct point, Radhakrishnan because of his Vedantic bias reads Absolute for Purusa and the multiplicity as various manifestations of the Absolute instead of Prakriti. The significance of this distinction will become clearer once we try to understand the universe of symbolism within which the Yogic myths operate. Suffice it to note at this point

17. Ibid., p. 212.
that Yoga not only distinguishes the expressive/integrative orientation of the human mind from the instrumental/adaptive but also asserts their complementarity. As Krsna confirms:

But this most secret thing to thee
I shall declare, since thou
cavillest not. This theoretical
knowledge joined with practical,
knowing which thou shall be freed
from evil. 18

A jnana Yogi in his spiritual quest proceeds from the categories of the latter, but his aim is the supreme knowledge or wisdom which transcends discursive knowledge. No amount of rational analysis can resolve the problem of arbitrariness or meaninglessness of human existence. This can be accomplished only by knowing, i.e. intuitively realizing that the transcendent point is the meaning and purpose of existence. This realization requires that the aspirant must completely surrender himself to this realization. Thus, the man of wisdom, the Jnani, who knows, "he yields himself completely to the Divine... 19" This surrender enables the Purusa to realize the ultimate unity with the Isvara on the level of consciousness precisely because Purusa could transcend the quality only through his Sradha. Sradha (Commitment) is the

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19. Ibid., p. 212.
Link between the mundane and the transcendent and Bhakti is the natural outcome of the intuitive realization of the oneness with the Supreme on the level of consciousness. To this aspect of the problem we will address ourselves in the following section.

C. Bhakti Yoga: The Way of Commitment

The correlate to the mechanism of commitment in Yoga system is the Way of Devotion (Bhakti Yoga). Bhakti Yoga as a way leading to the union with the Supreme lays emphasis on the significance of the emotive content of the belief system. Elaborate and extensive discussion of the nature and orientation of the Bhakti Yoga is to be found in the Bhagavad-Gita. However, the earliest expression of the cult of devotion is to be traced to Rg. Veda where it is recorded as Sradha-Bhakti. Sradha, defined as faith or preferably commitment to believing in order to realize, is described as the necessary element in all ritualistic activities. To quote from the text:

20, Bhiksu, Bhakti Yoga, p. 21.
Sradha lits the fire, Sradha pours out the oblation; it is sradha that the god takes cognizance of in prayers; is she not then the spirit of the ritual? Yes she is the embodied spirit or goddess at whom the whole devotion is aimed; .... let her inspire the worshipper with the spirit of faith.

Later, in Mahabharata, of which Gita forms a part; it is stated that the sages, full of faith (Sradhadhanah) and self-controlled recognized Sradha as a mighty instrument; every man was indeed as powerful in his spiritual disposition as was his faith, the Sradha in him that according to Bhagvad-Gita was itself Man. Yo yat sradhah sa eva sah; we quote the text and its translation "every one is as his faith and truly is he of that faith". Nothing goes more to the real make-up of man but the commitment (Sradha) and the content thereof, the ideas that he has made his own by his commitment thereto. Bhakti Yoga asserts the basic antithesis between reason and commitment. In the later Bhakti Yoga Prema (Love) for the divine as an intense emotional commitment to the Supreme assumes a significant place in the Yogic scheme.


22. Bhagvadgita, cited by Bhiksu in Bhakti Yoga; p. 2.
Herein it is maintained that Prema defies description in terms of instrumental reason, and that it is a state of feeling rather than a state of intellect. Both knowledge and action are declared subordinate to it.

According to Bhakti Yoga the experience of love (prema) for God is a state of intense feeling in which the integration with the Supreme is realized. Bhakti Yoga envisages man's direct encounter with the Divine in various ways. It may assume the form of perpetual living in the blissful presence of God (Samipya); living on the same plane of consciousness (Sālokya); being transformed into a perfect image of the Divine (Sarupya); and finally it may be a state of selfless service and self-offering at the feet of God (Seva). Thus in the Bhakti Yoga of the post-Vedic Sanskrit literature the emotional component of the religious symbol system becomes more pronounced. Herein, Sradha gives way to Prema; commitment is transformed into a passionate Love. Emotional attachment to the divine is conceived in terms of one's unmotivated and unconditional love of the divine. Paradoxically, it is

25. Ibid., p. 70.
this unconditional love for God that provides the motivational orientation to human existence, for all other loves are seen as inferior to this.

Aurobindo, a modern exponent of Yoga, has recognized the significance of the emotional component in the process of sacralization. Commenting on the nature of Bhakti Yoga he maintains:

... All is supported here by the primary force of the emotional union; for it is by love that the entire self-consecration and the entire possession is accomplished, and thought and action become shapes and figures of the divine love which possesses the spirit and its members.

Aurobindo goes on to explicate the theoretical refinement and conceptual clarity involved in Yogic understanding of the stages and levels of commitment. For Aurobindo Bhakti Yoga is a "turning of the human mind and the human soul; not yet divine in realisation, but feeling the divine impulse and attraction in it, towards that by which it finds its greater being." The emotional attraction or the emotional focussing towards the divine involves three stages of (1) adoration, (2) consecration and (3) sacrifice. Adoration wears the form

27. Ibid., p. 532.
of external worship and corresponds to something really felt within the mind, some genuine submission, awe or spiritual aspiration. Adoration leads to consecration i.e. self-purification of the self so as to become fit for divine contact. Consecration implies becoming like the divine. Consecration leads to a fullness of commitment implying a total devotion of all being of the aspirant to the Divine. This is described as sacrifice of love where the "bhakta (devotee) offers up his life and all that he is and all that he had and all that he does to the Divine." 28

In this context Aurobindo's suggestion that this self-surrender or sacrifice of the Bhakta may take an ascetic form prompting the individual to renounce all personal possessions and devote his time solely to prayer 29 confirms Mol's observation that "asceticism is usually a way of clarifying personal priorities and purifying one's loyalties." 30 Moreover it is important to remember that Mol too has recognized degrees of commitment and has distinguished 'awe' from commitment perse in terms of degree of intensity with which an object of reverence is approached. However, while Mol approaches the

29. Ibid., p. 534
problem in the context of the evolutionary stage of a society in which the sacralization is taking place, Aurobindo remains confined to the point of view of the individual responding to the demands of an already sacralized system of meaning.

It seems to us that the most significant point that Mol makes in his formulation of commitment relates to the priority-setting function of commitment and its relevance for the sacralization of a system of meaning or value structure. Yoga recognizes the importance of setting one's priorities for integration with the Supreme. Accordingly the Hindu Yogic philosophy insists on the inestimable contribution of Sradha in setting such priorities for spiritual realization. Hence, it is maintained that the Bhakti Yoga must be one pointed (ekanta), never attentive to anything else (anaaya); never adulterated (avyabhichari) etc.; for in the inner life that is a sacrifice (antaryajna), where the soul is the sacrificer, Sradha, oneness, non-divergence in the Will is the ultimate helpmate of the sacrificer, the Atman.31

It is the priority-setting function of the commitment link that on a different plane enables the hero (dhira) to perceive immense possibilities for the union with the Supreme in self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice is guided by the intense need

to find oneself in the company of the divine, whose constant companionship the devotee always desired, and the certainty born of commitment that death instead of being an end to life, is the beginning of a more meaningful life in the fellowship (Sakha) of the Divine.\(^{32}\) This goes to confirm Mol's hypothesis that sacrifice is a form of commitment which reinforces a system of meaning or identity by clarifying priorities.\(^{33}\) It is equally reassuring that the early Yoga philosophers recognize the dangers of non-commitment for the identity and meaning of existence when they warn that one must always guard against the evil of Asradhā\(^{34}\) (the absence of commitment).

D. Tantra Yoga: Sacralization Through Ritual

Tantra Yoga in the Yogic scheme operates on the basic assumption that the ritual aspect of the belief system is extremely important for the realization of spiritual communion. Most of the modern literature on Yoga distinguishes between Hatha Yoga and Tantra Yoga, the latter being the extreme form of ritualism in its most concrete aspect. However, in the


ancient Sanskrit writings they are placed together, Hatha Yoga being a part of Tantra Yoga.\textsuperscript{35}

The emphasis in Tantra is on the restoration of the wholeness of being\textsuperscript{36}. According to Tantra Yoga, the ultimate goal of all tantric ritual is the union of the dynamic and static aspect of personality. These two aspects are frequently described as the polar opposites of Siva (the timeless perfection) and Sakti (the dynamism of time).\textsuperscript{37} The two are united in the Kundalini and thus restore the 'wholeness' of the 'Being'. Symbolically it is represented as a sort of supreme marriage (mahamaitthumā) between the feminine and the masculine aspect of personality, between the principles of basic energy and pure existence. The same idea is expressed in the Yogic notion of the synchronization of breath or the respiratory rhythm when the Hatha Yogi attempts to realize 'totality' or 'wholeness' of existence by uniting the HA (the breath of the right nostril representing the sun) and THA (the breath of the left nostril representing the moon).

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 58.
In this dialectic of opposites the Yogi 'realizes' the state of 'sahaja' (the equilibrium) by transcending the dualities. And as Hevaraja Tantra points out: "the whole world is of the nature of sahaja - for sahaja is the quintessence (svarupa) of all." Thus the 'wholeness' or 'totality' accomplished in Tantra Yoga is both personal and cosmic.

Rites of Tantra affirm the need for intelligent and organized fulfilment of natural instinctual desires. It tends to undermine any basic antagonism between nature (society) and self, and self-mortification is considered contrary to the functional orientation of nature (society). Rites emanating from the Tantric theory of five M's such as wine (Madya), meat (Mansa), fish (Matsya), parched cereal (Mudra), and sexual union (Maithuna) are considered valuable aids to the vigorous growth and development of the spirit. According to Kundalinini or Tantra Yoga these represent different modes of manifestation of energy. The assumption is that any individual making profitable use of these for a union with the supreme power through consistent development


of the 'whole' of human personality, not in isolation from, but in harmony with the social existence, is the true Yogi. For the Tantra Yoga implies that "all these desires (finding expression and fructification in rites), ultimately come from the divine will. In the final analysis they are aids to the process of evolution and progress. The important thing is to fulfill them with that understanding, in a spirit of co-operation with the creative force of evolution ... The more a person co-operates with the evolutionary impetus, the more his desires are purged of the egoistic taint and are transmuted into the pure flame of aspiration for divine life". 40

There is more than one reason to place Tantra Yoga at par with the mechanism of ritual. Indeed its emphasis on the integrative/expressive orientation of repetitive non-logical action is the obvious common ground. Through an organized manipulation of the instinctual energy in Tantra, as Turner would put it, "the raw energies of conflicts are domesticated in the service of social order". 41 The function of Tantric rituals is to adapt and periodically re-adapt, to borrow Mol's


phrase, "the bio-physical individual to the basic conditions and axiomatic values of human social life." The essential factor underlying the Tantric practices is the belief that these rites cleanse or purify mundane or profane acts and in the process sacralize the acts themselves by superimposing certain constraints on them. Hence Maithuna (participation in a sexual act) for a Tantric Yogi is a rite and not a profane act; since the partners are no longer human beings, but 'detached' like gods, sexual union no longer participates on the cosmic plane. Ritual repetition of an act sacralizes it and the performance thereof instead of being constitutive of bondage leads to salvation. The tantric texts frequently repeat: "By the same acts that cause some men to burn in hell for thousands years, the Yogi gains his eternal salvation."

We have tried to see the degree to which Kundalini Yoga fits into our scheme of things. The problem of fit has been minimized by asserting the element of repetitiveness as well as the 'wholeness' that is accomplished through the expressive/integrative orientation of the repetitive non-logical action. However the minimization of the problem is not to our entire satisfaction. Indeed, though Kundalini Yoga lies on the side

42. Victor W. Turner, Symbols in Ndembu Ritual in Emmet, Dorothy and MacIntyre, Alasdair (editors), Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis, p. 177.

of the non-logical and tends to stabilize through emotional sublimation of the basic conflict of human existence, at the same time it has contributed to the sacralization of a permanent state of liminality within Hindu society. The paradox of the permanent state of liminality needs to be clarified by stating that throughout the history of Hindu society it is the Yogis with their expertise in Kundalini Yoga, who as a group have been considered as outside the boundaries of the social whole and threatening the cohesiveness of the society.

**E. Mythic Symbolism in Yoga**

A somewhat great difficulty plagues our attempt to analyse the Yoga system in terms of mythic symbolism. None of the Yogas noted by us can be identified as dealing with the role of Myth as a separate mechanism in accomplishing the ultimate goal of identification with the Supreme. Nevertheless, each and all of them postulate a system of mythic symbolism through which a specific interpretation of reality is interiorized and assimilated at the emotional level. Thus the basic function of emotional sublimation of the critical conflict situations of human existence is accomplished through mythic symbolism over and against adaptation through the instrumental symbol system. But at the same time the dialectical relationship between the instrumental symbolism on the one hand and expressive symbolism on the other is not undermined. We have noted earlier how Gita
proclaims the complementarity of these two facets of symbol system in the Yogic scheme of things.

What we consider critical for mythic symbolism holds true for Yoga in its totality. Of course the reference here is to the basic binary opposition or conflict which is emotionally sublimated on a symbolic level and constitutes the core of mythic narration. The binary opposition central to the theological formulations of all Yoga systems is the conflicting and complementing relationship between the Purusa (the principle of being, static, pure, consciousness, the witness) and Prakriti (the principle of becoming, change, that which veils consciousness and is witnessed).

In and through mythical reiteration this basic duality is presented to the seeker of ultimate self-integration. For Jnana yoga this basic conflict situation is mediated through the Myth of Isvara. The removal of Maya implies an intense separative perception of the great duality, Soul-Nature, Purusa-Prakriti. However at the synthesising apex of this duality stands Isvara, the supreme who in the first place was the cause of Maya causing a false perception of identification of Purusa-Prakriti, and who ultimately guarantees removal of this false perception. In Bhakti Yoga the myth of Isvara takes a somewhat different form, the binary opposition between Purusa and Prakiriti is felt so intensely that any attachment or love (Prema) for things of Prakriti (including one's dearmost) must give way to the ultimate love (Prema) of Iswara with utter
submission and total and unconditional surrender to the divine will. In Tantra Yoga, though Isvara becomes part of the binary opposition, the centrality of the realization of the wholeness or totality as the synthesising element at which the aspirant aims, is retained. In Tantra the Divine has two opposed yet inseparable aspects: the archetypal masculine (Siva), the archetypal feminine (Sakti). Siva is Pure Being, timeless perfection, eternal wisdom. Sakti is the power of Becoming, the creative energy of time, the joy and love of self expression. Function of maithuna (sexual rites) in Tantra Yoga is to highlight symbolically the integration of these principles; "the true sexual union is the union of the parasakti (sakti element) with Atman (the Siva element); other unions represent only carnal relations." 44

Two observations may be offered. First, the basic binary opposition is constantly present in the mythic symbolism employed by various Yoga. Secondly the distinctiveness of the myth lies in its constant reiteration and yet ever changing narration of a basic truth. It is the constancy of this basic truth underlying various ways of Yoga that provides the ground for the reinforcement of the definitions of reality and

structures of meaning that constitutes the uniqueness of the Yoga belief system. Yogic myths in various ways state and restate the binary opposition between Purusa and Prakriti with ultimate primacy of synthesising unity in Isvara.
CHAPTER V

THE DIALECTIC OF APPROPRIATION, CONSEQUENTIAL DIMENSION AND KARMA YOGA.

In our formulation of the process of sacralization in the first chapter we referred to the two pronged dialectic of the process: the making of the sacred and the sacred in its turn exercising its capacity for further sacralization. Our analysis in the preceding chapters has primarily been concerned with the first aspect of the sacralization process; the mechanisms of sacralization proposed by Mol and the corresponding dimensions of religiosity as well as the ways of Yoga related to the emergence of and sustenance of a transcendental order as the point of emotional anchorage. We found considerable analytical merit in the structure and the operations of the mechanisms involved in the process. This process of the emergence and sustenance of a certain set of symbols or a system of meaning with the antecedent qualities of separateness and transcendence we described as the process in and through which a system of meaning or value structure acquires the quality of sacrality. In the articulation of this dimension of the sacralization process we discerned the role played by the mechanisms of objectification, commitment, ritual and myth. And our analysis of the ways of Yoga and the dimensions of religiosity confirmed the hypothesis concerning the role of these mechanisms in the emergence of a transcendental
point of reference.

However in our explication of the process the second aspect of the sacralization process, i.e., the sacred exercising its capacity for further sacralization received little attention. The thesis of sacralization entails a dialectical relationship between the sacred and the profane, and one important moment in the dialectic is that the sacred is never completely separated from the profane. This point has been made earlier. However, what remains to be worked out is the way, or the mechanism through which the sacred extends its reign over the profane and moulds and transforms the profane into the sacred. It is to this aspect of the sacralization process that the mechanism of appropriation relates.

A. The Dialectic of Appropriation

We have maintained that through objectification and commitment man's need for an ultimate answer to the problem of meaninglessness is met and that they along with ritual and myth enable individuals to establish a relationship with the beyond or the sacred, as the ground of being or the meaning of existence. However, it is equally clear that most of life is lived in the sphere of the profane, the everyday, in the realm of the less than ultimate concerns, activities and relationships. How then is the demand of ultimacy to be related to the requirements of mundane existence? How is the response to and
relationship to the sacred to be integrated with the demands of the profane existence? And more important, what implications does such relationship have for the profane mode of existence and what consequences follow from such relationship for the profane?

Weber more than any one else has contributed towards enriching our understanding of the contribution made by the sacred to the profane world. In his analysis of the conditions for the emergence of Capitalism he clearly stipulated the transcendental ground for the Calvinist innerworldly asceticism. Weber pointed out that while 'the otherworldly asceticism' of the Catholic monk "necessitated a withdrawal from the sexual and family life, from property and class relationships, and from political participation, the Calvinist believed that all these activities, if properly regulated and co-ordinated, could contribute to the fulfilment of God's will, and form part of the glorification of God on earth which was man's supreme duty."2

O'Dea has made similar point in his articulation of the thesis of a dialectical relationship between society and religion. He has noted that the sect as a form of religious

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1. The point that Max Weber made is essentially correct in stating that a certain conception of the sacred has a specific kind of consequence for the mundane existence. Weber seemed to say that in the absence of a specific kind of ethic a specific kind of change is highly unlikely.

organization arises as a response to anomie, providing both new values and a new sense of community to its participants. He also noted a considerable overlap of religious and social stratification and pointed out how the world of the sacred tends to intermingle and become intertwined with the profane world. While on the one hand this enhances the strength and grip of the sacred on the profane it also devalues the sacred. A consequence of this devaluation of one specific locus of sacredness would be that a new locus of the sacred will emerge and will place demands on men's allegiance and commitment.

As Durkheim pointed out in his "Elementary Forms", the function of religion is to retard social change and maintain solidarity of existing groups and in so far as a particular religion cannot perform this function successfully, new groups will arise which in their turn will become sacred to their members. It is in this vein that he argued that Nationalism and Communism in modern society could become the successor religions to the various forms of Christianity precisely because no society can maintain itself which fails to provide its members a vision of an ideal form of life and a ritual


4. Ibid., p. 79.
expression of this ideal.  

Durkheim has enlightened us both with regard to the how of the relationship between the sacred and the profane and its consequences for the profane. He describes it as one of patterned alternation of sacred and profane modes of existence. According to Durkheim the ground for such a relationship implying an alternate mode of being to the entire exclusion of the other lies in the contagious nature of the sacred. To Durkheim's way of understanding the sacred is not only totally other but also totally contagion, i.e., it infests everything that comes in contact with sacredness. Durkheim pointed out how various religious interdictions are directed against this aspect of the sacred and how they are employed as a buffer against the sacred precisely because the coming together of sacred and profane is considered extremely dangerous for the profane. While we tend to agree with Durkheim that contagion is the intrinsic quality of the sacred and that it is through contagion that the sacredness is propagated and perpetuated we have some reservations about his 

7. Ibid., p. 360.
explanation of the implications or the consequences of such a relationship for the profane. From our point of view the coming together of the sacred and profane is built into the dialectic of the sacralization process and the consequent transformation of the profane into the sacred is not always detrimental to the interests of mundane existence.

In the first place it must be asserted that the purpose of the interdictions is not so much to protect the profane from the dangers of the contagion of the sacred, but to maintain the intactness of the sacred. The sacred's coming together with the profane does have some diminutive consequences for the sacred. O'Dea has pointed out how the embodiment of the sacred in the profane vehicle causes a loss of sacredness. Referring to the consequences of a merging of the ethical message with the religious message he maintained that such an attempt to make the religious message relevant to the everyday activities and the concern of people "involves the risk of making everyday and prosaic what was originally a call to the extraordinary". 8

And yet the sacred cannot help extending itself to the profane. It is intrinsic to the nature of the sacred that it

appropriates and assimilates all that comes in contact with it. In the process the profane becomes sacred and the gradual diminution of the sacred occurs. As one value structure or system of meaning tends to become less relevant because of concretization of it which must take place in order that the sacred may exercise its power for sacralization, new value orientations or meaning structures come to be sacralized. The same mechanisms of objectification, commitment, ritual and myth remain as relevant for sacralization as ever. But the new systems of meaning or value structure too, once they have acquired the quality of sacredness in and through these mechanisms, do not remain totally confined to the transcendental locus. If it has to have relevance for human existence it must participate in the mundane life. This it does through the mechanism of appropriation.

It is precisely at this point that universal religions have specific advantages over other elements of culture. Universal religions not only have the privilege of sacralizing expertise within the specific cultural contexts, but they have done so in tune with the demands of the dialectic of integration/adaptation, stability/change. Through prophecy, charisma, conversion etc. at different moments in the history of society changes are incorporated and assimilated at different levels. While conversion and other rites of passage enable the individual to cope with the moments of change in personal
identity, charisma and prophecy are mechanisms developed for the purpose of incorporating changes at the level of social identity.\(^9\) Because of this expertise in dealing with the forces of change and adaptation, universal religions have developed a certain amount of immunity to the diminutive effects of appropriation. They tend to assert their relevance even in the wake of continued onslaughts of the forces of change. Mol has referred to this dialectic between the forces of change and consolidation as the ground of the success of universal religions in the history of human society: "The survival of universal religions ... does not only depend on the viability of the cultural identity which they sacralize, but also on their capacity to mute as well as motivate individuals, to constrain as well as co-opt recalcitrant groups, to reform as well as reinforce the social whole."\(^10\) The point of the argument is that though sacralization through appropriation entails subsequent devaluation of the sacred, this danger is effectively counterbalanced in the context of institutionalized religions. Just as an organism develops immunity to certain bacterial infections through constant exposure to it over a


10. Ibid., p. 339.
long period of time or an immunity in the organism is developed through injection of the bacteria in the organism under controlled conditions, so have institutionalized religions developed immunity to the desacralizing potential of sacralization through appropriation.

This however is not true in the case of the newly emerging sacralizing catalysts. The plight of the Ananda Marga movement in India is a case in point. The movement, as long as it remained a religious movement offering a viable alternative to institutionalized Hinduism, was able to draw a considerable following from the rank and file of the intelligentsia who seem to be disenchanted with institutionalized Hinduism. However the movement went astray and suffered inexorable loss in prestige and following as soon as it moved to appropriate the realm of politics in order to influence the course of change in the country. On the other hand a modern political party Jana Sangha, which claims to derive its ideological strength from mainline Hinduism has not only grown stronger in the last decade but has forced all the other leftist parties to combine together against this formidable enemy. The association of Hindu religious fervor with a political party has contributed to the strength of the aforesaid political group without jeopardizing the character and strength of the religious fervor. A similar point is made by Mol with regard to the sacralizing potential of systems of meaning operating
with resources drawn from the traditional religious backgrounds. Thus he observes that "the cemetery of discarded sacredness may contain the graves of numerous causes, liberalisms, rationalisms, but not the one of orthodox sectarianism".\(^\text{11}\)

On the other hand the success of Communism in Russia and other socialist countries in extending itself to the entire mode of human existence is evidence to the effect that any system of meaning which is able to develop immunity against the desacralizing potential of appropriation remains intact in the process of sacralization through appropriation. The analogy of immunization of the organism under controlled laboratory conditions holds true in this case. While such appropriation of everydayness of human existence can take place on different levels of economic, political and cultural or artistic subsystems, the consequence of such appropriation is always integrative for the group. This is even more true in the context of newly emerging sacred patterns of meaning structures or value systems. Thus "without the daily routines, stable hierarchies, the personal loyalties, the emotional satisfaction of speaking on a similar wavelength our technocratic empires would have succumbed long ago to the forces of rationality and efficiency which produced them in the first place. Also semi-sacred formulas such as "free enterprise", "democracy", "rational

skepticism and "objectivity" have emerged at the heart of some of the subsystems of modern societies, such as the economy, polity and science. How effectively these systems of meaning tend to appropriate the entire realm of human existence is an issue that cannot be settled on a theoretical level. Intensive empirical investigation is required before any incontrovertible conclusions can be drawn. However on impressionistic grounds it may not be unfair to maintain that these semi-sacred formulas too do not lag behind in placing their claims on the every day mode of human existence. And it may not be without significance to investigate the degree and extent of influence that one's professional choice exerts on one's personal ethic, mannerisms and other critical social choices.

The preceding discussions have been concerned with an attempt to come to grip with the relationship of the sacred to the profane once the sacred comes to acquire the objectifying, separating characteristics. This mode of the dialectical relationship we preferred to call the mode of Appropriation and we attempted to bring out its consequences both for the sacred and the profane. It remains to be seen, to what extent the mechanism of appropriation is congruent with Karma Yoga on the one hand and the consequential dimension of Glock on the other. It is to this problem that we will address ourselves in

the following discussion.

B. Consequential Dimension of Religiosity

Glock recognizes the significance of a certain conception of sacred for the profane mode of existence. He is convinced that religious beliefs have certain consequences for the life of the adherent and that these consequences are extremely significant for an understanding of the core-meaning of one's religious life. Our attention is drawn to the universality of this dimension of religious orientation and its implications for mundane existence. Thus he writes that "though the implications of religion for practical conduct are stated very explicitly in some religions and very abstractly in others... there is agreement among religions that consequences follow or should follow from religious commitment".\(^\text{13}\) Religious consequences for Glock relate to individual motivation and have direct bearing on the way that an individual will conduct himself in his everyday mode of being. These consequences have to do both with what the individual can expect to receive as a result of being religious and with what he is expected to give. Thus the consequential dimension of religiosity relates to the way or the mechanism through which

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a certain conception of the transcendent becomes relevant to the mundane and thereby moulds and transforms the nature of the mundane.

Glock relates the consequential dimension of religiosity with the reward-responsibility aspect of human motivation. 14 He maintains that the individual actor's response to religious ideas and beliefs, his willingness to incorporate them in his life and the concern with which he might follow religious injunctions are prompted by expectations that such conduct will be rewarded in some way. While salvation, promise of eternal life, reincarnation in higher social categories etc. constitute future rewards, individuals expect that in following a particular course of conduct, in living one's daily life and mundane activities in terms of religious injunctions one will experience peace of mind, freedom from worry, a sense of well being etc. These have integrative consequences for the self and are an effective antidote to the meaninglessness and contingencies experienced in mundane existence.

Glock makes an analytical distinction between religions largely integrated into the social structure and more institutionalized religions which have an existence in large measure independent of the social structure. It is suggested

that in the former case, in Hinduism for example, religious injunctions and ideas are closely meshed with mundane existence and that they have greater control over man's day-to-day dealings.\textsuperscript{15} In this case, according to Glock, the consequences of religious ideas for mundane existence are well articulated and can be clearly discerned. On the other hand in a society where the religious institutions have an independent existence and are not well integrated in the social structure, religiously inspired imperatives are less likely to inform the conduct of daily life in explicit ways. In this case religion remains content with articulating the general standards and gives individuals enough latitude in interpreting these general guidelines in specific life situations.

It seems to us that Glock is essentially making a similar point that we tried to articulate in our formulation of the mechanism of appropriation. The difference between our view and Glock's is that Glock confines himself to the reward-responsibility dichotomy in his formulation of the consequential dimension of religiosity and attaches greater importance to moral or ethical implications of religious consequences. The important task that he sets for himself in the study of the consequential dimension is "to know more about what it implies for morality,

\textsuperscript{15} Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, \textit{Op. cit.}, p. 34.
for altruistic behavior, for the decisions people make as they move through the life cycle.\textsuperscript{16} In our formulation of the mechanism of appropriation we attempted to show that the consequences of a certain conception of the transcendental point of reference may extend to such sub-systems as economy, polity and art. Moreover while the relationship between the sacred and the profane is conceived in our formulation in dialectical terms, for Glock it is basically causative. To Glock the actions of the world are determined by the religious injunctions and in so far as they are only consequences that follow from the belief in the sacred they have a causal relationship with the transcendental point. We will return to this point later.

C. \textit{Karma Yoga: The Path of Action}

In Karma Yoga the dialectical relationship of the profane and the sacred emerges in its most pronounced form. For Yoga self-integration is the sacred mode of being; and in Karma Yoga the problem of self-integration is related to the problem of social-integration. Karma Yoga emphasises the significance of human volition and natural propensities for action and outlines

a scheme of things in which the activities of the mundane world, day-to-day living acquire a new meaning and provide impetus for active participation in social process. Significantly Karma Yoga unequivocally declares inaction or withdrawal from the activities of the mundane world detrimental to the growth of human personality and disruptive for the social whole.\textsuperscript{17} Mol has drawn our attention to the fact that "the integration/sacralization at the level of self or group may have a disintegrative/desacralizing effect on the wider social whole".\textsuperscript{18} This dialectic of the individual-integration and social-integration is recognized by Yoga and Karma Yoga is an attempt to minimize the disruptive, disintegrative consequences of Jnana Yoga and Bhakti Yoga which inevitably lead to a self-centred conception of the sacred mode of being. Karma Yoga recognizes the dialectic of the conflict and complementarity between the parts (the individual) and the whole (the society), and accordingly exhorts the adherents to strive for a social integration through spiritual growth. In his exposition of Karma Yoga, Choudhary says:

\textsuperscript{17} Bhagvad Gita, Tr. C. Rajgopalachari, P. 49.

Spiritual action may mean self-less dedication to human welfare on the basis of one's free-development. To be true to one's own-self is the first pre-requisite of social service... the Yogi of action (Karma Yogi) proceeds to promote human welfare in a spirit of non-attachment. A true Yogi of action seeks to advance the cause of human welfare not as self-righteous or self-important bigwig. He acts as an humble instrument of the supreme Being which is the source of all higher values. 19

In and through Karma Yoga sacredness is extended to the human existence in its entirety. Religion, in order to be relevant to the needs of meaning and order in mundane existence, cannot remain content with articulating a totally other-worldly mode of sacredness. Inner-wordly motivation is not a prerogative of any one specific religious orientation; rather it is a pre-requisite for the survival and successful operation of any transcendentally grounded religion. It is not without significance that even Buddhism, while exhorting the ideals of renunciation in its extreme form, also developed the ideal of Bodhisattva, the spiritual being who finds it extremely desirable to postpone his own final deliverance in order to be able to participate in the affairs of mundane existence. 20


Karma Yoga makes a distinction between three kinds of actions, performance of which are conceived as having a sacralizing effect on human existence. First of all, spiritual action may mean conformity to scriptural injunctions or the ethico-religious laws embodied in scriptures. In the second place, spiritual action may mean selfless action performed in the best interest of society. According to Karma Yoga man advances beyond ritualism and ceremonialism when he realizes that true virtue lies in unmotivated acts of goodness. And finally spiritual action may mean selfless dedication to human welfare on the basis of one's free-development. To be true to one's own self is the first-requisite of social service. Thus says Gita:

Janaka and others attained perfection only through performance of actions. Looking even to the welfare of society, you should work (perform duties of your station). Whatever way of life the great men (enlightened ones) adopt, the other men copy; the standards he sets up is followed by the people ... Hence, the enlightened should toil with the motive of the social-welfare without any attachment.

The basic presupposition, the uniting thread that runs through the above-mentioned threefold formulation of the path of action is the recognition that self-integration and social-integration

stand in a dialectical relationship, the social control of the individual is indispensable and that though the self suffers precisely because of the experience of meaninglessness and anomie in social existence, it must cooperate with the social mode of being to realize its own goal of self-integration. Karma-Yoga, fully aware of the problematics of the "existential" situation and the resultant bewilderment, provides the ideal of fully sacred life, a life full of meaning and purpose. It gives solace to the man of action that life has meaning and value, and that meaning and value can be realized through participation in the world-process. The Karma Yogi does not encounter nothingness, is not occupied by uncanniness, and is free from confusions and bewilderment, because he knows that life itself imposes upon each individual specific obligations and that at every moment of his existence he has a duty that is defined by his existential situation. Karma Yoga does not emphasise renunciation of the world and worldly activities; emphasis here is on the performance of those activities with a mental attitude of non-involvement and non-attachment. Non-attachment in this context implies the sacrifice of personal aggrandizement at the altar of social good. Probably there is a grain of truth in Durkheim's proposition that the sacred is the mode of society's control on the conflicting interests of individuals. Karma Yoga is a classic case of a religious symbol system performing this function.
D. Conclusion

Thus both the consequential dimension of religiosity and Karma Yoga address themselves to the same set of questions. What relevance does any religious symbol system have for the day-to-day activities of human existence? Does a specific belief system or interpretation of reality have any bearing on the aspect of life which is normally defined as belonging to the realm of profane? In other words, to what extent does a symbol system emotionally sublimate the conflicts and discordance of human existence, instead of just tackling the problem through emotional displacement on the transcendental level, and thus attempting to minimize the conflict by entering right into the heart of the mundane? Both Glock and Yoga assert the significance of the specific belief system and interpretation of reality in providing a contour for day-to-day human existence. To them, specifically, the implications of the religious symbol system for the profane lie in its ability to inform and mould the profane.

Of course, Mol would hardly disagree with this. His theoretical formulations are greatly concerned with the dialectical relationship between the profane and the sacred. It is precisely this recognition of the dialectical relationship that is reflected in his choice of the language of sacralization. Given this context, the questions to which Glock and Yoga address themselves in the language of consequences are no less relevant
to Mol. The difference, however, especially from Glock's approach to the consequential dimension of religiosity, needs to be stated. To Glock the actions of the mundane world have a causal relationship with the transcendental belief system. His concern is different from Mol as well as Yoga in precisely this assertion of the causative relationship between the sacred and the profane.

Keeping this distinction in mind we will approach the consequential dimension of religiosity in a rather different way. Glock thinks that the acts of the mundane world which are informed and determined by religious injunctions are only the consequences that follow from the belief in the sacred. To us however the consequential dimension of religiosity will be an assertion of the fact that the objectified or transcendent point exercises its capacity for further sacralization. Acts of the mundane world then become meaningful precisely because they acquire a quality of sacrality in the process of being informed and determined by the transcendental point. It is in this vein that Karma Yoga argues that an action performed in the right spirit, that is in the spirit of sacrifice to the Lord, without any desire for the fruit thereof, does not constitute bondage. Any mundane action, performed in the spirit of detachment, becomes a sacrifice, a rite, sacred in nature. Thus Karma Yoga promises the freedom for the spirit in and through world if we accept subjection of our whole being to that
which is higher than the separating and limiting ego.

It is apparent then that the leverage for sacralization that Mol ascribed to the transcendental point is the basic assumption of Karma Yoga. However, while Mol has ascribed this leverage for sacralization to the transcendental point, his mechanisms for sacralization are deficient in providing for this leverage. It is our contention that the mechanisms proposed by Mol need to be supplemented by the incorporation of a mechanism corresponding to Glock's consequential dimension of religiosity or the way of action, i.e., Karma Yoga as laid down in Yogic schemes of things. True, Glock is unable to work out the problem of religious consequences in tune with the dialectic of sacred and profane, but his insights are essentially correct in seeing conceptual advantage in the consequential dimension of religiosity. Yoga, of course, insists on the dialectic of sacralization and provides in Karma Yoga an excellent occasion for deciphering this dialectic.

We have noted extensive agreement between the mechanisms of sacralization on the one hand and the dimensions of religiosity and the ways of Yoga on the other. We found Mol's conceptual tools eminently suitable for a comparative analysis of the sacralization process in two different cultural contexts. However, while we exhausted Mol's conceptual tools dealing with the process of sacralization there remained unexhausted categories both in Glock's paradigm and Yoga whose contribution to the
process of sacralization cannot be ascertained with the help of the mechanisms proposed in the sacralization theory. It is important to note that Glock's fifth dimension of religiosity, namely the Consequential Dimension and the fourth way of Yoga, sometimes declared the most important way, namely the Karma Yoga, do not have their correlate in the mechanisms of sacralization. It is our contention that these categories in the respective theoretical schemes display a certain amount of congruence and that they are unique in their own right and need to be incorporated in Mol's scheme. It seems to us that these categories refer to that aspect of the sacralization process whereby a system of meaning or value structure after having acquired the objectifying, separating characteristics of the sacred, extends itself to the realm of profane and thereby contributes to further sacralization. This mode of the dialectical relationship we prefer to call the mode of appropriation. Appropriation is the mechanism in and through which the sacred exercises its capacity for further sacralization. Appropriation from our point of view is that mode of dialectical relationship which enables the sacred to appropriate or claim the realm of the mundane; the consequence of this mode of dialectical relationship for the profane is the inevitable transformation or metamorphosis into a sacred mode of being.
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