A COMPARISON OF GLOCK'S DIMENSIONS OF RELIGIOSITY,

THE WAYS OF YOGA AND THE MECHANISMS OF SACRALIZATION

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By

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INTRODUCTION

Aims and Assumptions:

In this paper I intend to study comparatively the process in and through which a certain set of symbols or meaning structures acquire the quality of sacrality. It is our assumption that the dimensions of religiosity postulated by Glock and the ways of Yoga enunciated in ancient Hindu religious literature are concerned with this process of transition from the profane to the sacred. This emphasis on the process accounts for the use of the concept of sacralization as a dynamic concept over and against the concern with the static and frigid separateness of the sacred as expressed in the sociological literature which uses Durkheim's conceptualization. In this sense this study is an implicit critique of Durkheim. Durkheim's insistence on the separateness and antagonism between the sacred and the profane leads to an underestimation of the conflicting and yet complementary relationship between the sacred and the profane. Ours is an attempt to emphasise the dialectical relationship between the sacred and the profane and to bring out its implication for understanding both the emergence of sacredness through the process of sacralization as well as subsequent objectifying, separating characteristics. To this end the present work draws heavily upon the theoretical formulations of Mol.

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Mol recognizes the dialectical relationship between the sacred and the profane and discerns four mechanisms of sacralization characterizing the fluid transition from profane to the sacred.The mechanisms of sacralization recognized by him are the following: (1) objectification (the projection of order in a beyond where it is less vulnerable to contradictions, exceptions and contingencies of the mundane and the temporal); (2) commitment (the emotional anchorage in the various, proliferating, foci of identity); (3) ritual (the repetitive actions, articulations and movements which prevent the object of sacralization being lost sight of); (4) myth (the integration of the various strains in a coherent, short-hand symbolic account). Herein it is claimed that the mechanisms of sacralization seem to synchronize with Glock's dimensions of religiosity on the one hand and the ways of Yoga on the other. It is our assumption that the mechanisms of sacralization provide us with the conceptual and theoretical framework for comparing religious phenomena in two different socio-cultural contexts.

However,caution needs to be taken to emphasise that ours is not a claim for perfect correlation between the mechanisms of sacralization and the dimensions of religiosity as well as the ways of Yoga.We grant that there is a possibility that two or more of the dimensions or ways of Yoga combined together constitute some cluster of phenomena comparable to any one of the mechanisms.Similarly, any one of the dimensions or the

yogas may be found to have collapsed conceptually what we have described as different mechanisms. To this extent ours is also a task of conceptual clarification. Thus the task that we set for ourselves is rendered doubly difficult. For, we have also to see whether the conceptual scheme that we borrow from Mol is large enough to account for the differences as well as the similarities between the dimensions of religiosity discerned by Glock and the ways of Yoga.

Glock's conceptualization of the dimensions of religiosity takes place in an institutional frame of reference where the emphasis is on the need to understand the extent of the psychological or social benefit of religious commitment by discerning the role of religious institutions in the process. Glock postulates five dimensions of religiosity to measure and explain the degree and dirdction of religious change in modern America, They are the following: (1) experiential dimension (it is concerned with religious feelings giving expression to the affective relationship supposedly established between the divine and the individual); (2) the ritualistic dimension (emphasis here is on the reinforcement of commjtment to a certain system of beliefs through rituals);(3) the ideological dimension (it is constituted by expectations that the religious person will hold to certain beliefs as the corner storie of his religious life); (4) the intellectual dimension (it is assumed that the religious person will be informed and knowledgeable about the basic tenets of his faith add its

sacred scriptures): (5) the consequential dimension (it
encompasses the secular effects of religious belief, practice,
experience , and knowledge on the individual). These dimensions,
in Glock's scheme, provide a frame of reference for analysing
the religious phenomena and assessing religiosity. The significa-
nce of this approach to the problem under investigation lies in its
emphasis on a multidimensional rather than unilateral treatment
of the problem.

We will pay some special attention to certain problematic
areas in Glock. One problem that needs careful consideration is
the question of saliency of a belief system as expressed in
Glock's discussion of ethicalism. While his findings on Catholic
church members fit well into our scheme emphasising a close
relationship between the sacred and the profane and the sacred
acquiring further leverage for sacralization through the commitment
link, his theoretical formulations on protestant bodies is unable
to explain why ethicalism and orthodoxy can be mutually exclusive
roots of religious identity. Then there is the question of
ambiguous and vague use of the term "commitment". Glock uses the
term "commitment" in a rather comprehensive sense to include any
and all dimensions of religiosity. This dilutes the value of the
term as an analytical tool for understanding the complex phenomenon
of religiosity. Closely related is the question of the double/
facedness of the concept of commitment and its occasional use
in a restricted and specific sense that is contrary to Glock's
earlier formulations. Attention is also drawn to Glock's failure

to perceive the dialectic between the integrative/expressive
and the adaptive/instrumental symbol systems. He unwittingly
grants the instrumental/adaptive symbol system an independent
role in the interpretation of reality. We will try to bring out
the implications of this for deciphering the mythic symbolism
and its role in sublimating the basic conflicts of human existence

In Yoga the complexities of the religious symbol system
appear in its dialectical frame of reference. Theoretical
formulations of Yoga literature tend to agree with our own
theoretical scheme. Herein it is claimed that for Yoga too
instrumental reason has a conflicting and yet complementary
relationship with the expressive integrative symbol system. The
emphasis in Yoga is on the integration of human personality
through the realization of a communion or rapport with the Supreme
Being. There are at least four ways in and through which it is
claimed that such rapport can be accomplished: (1) Jnana Yoga
(it lays emphasis on knowledge culminating in wisdom as the
way leading to communion with the Supreme Being); (2) Bhakti
Yoga (it recognizes the significance of the emotive content of
the belief system and takes into consideration the role of
emotional factors in the integration of human personality);
(3) Tantra Yoga (the Tantra aims at the integration of dynamic
(sakti tattva) and static (siva tattva) aspects of human
personality through ritual practices); (4) Karma Yoga (it lays
emphasis on the volitional side of human nature. Action performed
in the spirit of detachment from the fruit thereof becomes

sacred and is freed from its disruptive influence on human
personality). Yoga does not consider these various ways as
mutually exclusive. Recognizing the significance of different
aspects of human personality, the different ways of Yoga are
complementary to each other. They require a coming to terms
with the instinctual drives of human personality through a
harmonization of passion and reason. They aim at self integration
through the organized maturity of the normal human personality.
And by offering an orderly interpretation of reality they
appear to minimize the effects of disorder, discrepancies and
chaos that the individual seems to encounter in the world.

While taking note of the general congruence between the
ways of Yoga and the mechanisms of sacralization we will also
concern ourselves with specific problems that we may encounter
within the theoretical framework of Yoga literature. The purpose
of this investigation will be to examine the viability of our
hypothesis in specific terms. Thus we will have to ask if the
complexity and multifacedness of the notion of knowledge in Jnana
Yoga justifies our placing it on the expressive/integrative
side of the symbol system. In the context of Bhakti Yoga we have
to examine how Sradha (emotional commitment to the divine) is
transformed into Prema (the passionate love for God). What are
the implications of this change in emphasis for the motivational
orientation of the committed in terms of the priority setting
function of commitment ? We also have to enquire why Kundalini

Yoga, which lies on the side of expressive integrative symbol system and tends to stabilize identity, has at the same time contributed to the sacralization of a permanent state of liminality within Hindu society. It is indeed significant that the Kundalini Yoga, boldly affirmative in its methodological approach to the world and one's involvement therein, has been problematic for the believer. We will have to enquire whether the attitude to Kundalini Yoga in Hindu society is an indication of a social rejection of a pathological condition directly resulting from anomie (Kundalini Yoga in its extreme form goes against the norm of other/worldliness).

In addition to specific issues we will also address ourselves to two general issues. First, we will have to ascertain whether both for Glock and Yoga identity consolidation or integration is the central issue. Whether sacralization is conceived by them as a process which, by providing individuals with an interpretation of existence, tends to resolve the problem of meaning and thereby consolidates identity. This will bring us to the problem of the nature of the religious symbol systems. Herein it will be argued that both Yoga and Glock juxtapose the integrative/expressive aspect of the belief systems against the instrumental/adaptive symbol systems. While claiming that the two systems tend to agree on the inadequacy of the instrumenta reason in resolving the meaning of existence and guaranteeing identity consolidation we must also guard against any undue

minimization of the divergences and differences in the theoretical
formulations of Glock and Yoga on the one hand and that of Mol
on the other.

It is against this background that we will discuss the
problem concerning the capacity of the sacred to participate
in the profane and thereby further sacralize. To this problem
Glock addresses himself in his formulation of the consequential
dimension of religiosity. However, Glock thinks that the acts
of the mundane world which are informed and determined by
religious injunctions are the only consequences that follow from
the belief in the sacred. To us however the consequential
dimension of religiosity will be an assertion of the fact that
the objectified or transcendent point exercises its capacity
for further sacralization. Acts of the mundane world then become
meaningful precisely because they acquire a quality of sacrality
in the process of being informed and determined by the transcendent
point. It is in this vein that Karma Yoga argues that an action
performed in the right spirit, that is in the spirit of a
sacrifice to the Lord, without any desire for the fruit thereof,
does not constitute bondage. Any mundane action, performed in
the spirit of detachment, becomes a sacrifice, a rite, sacred
in nature. Thus, Karma Yoga promises the freedom for the spirit
in and through work, if we accept subjection of our whole being
to that which is higher than the separating and limiting ego.

It is apparent then that the leverage for sacralization
that we have ascribed to the transcendent point is the basic
assumption of Karma Yoga. However, while we have ascribed this
leverage of sacralization to the transcendent point, we find
that the mechanisms of sacralization formulated by Mol needs
to be extended and broadened in scope to incorporate a mechanism
corresponding to Glock's consequential dimension of religiosity
or the way of action laid down by Karma Yoga. In our view Glock
has been unable to work out the problem of religious consequences
in tune with the dialectic of sacred and profane. But his
insights are essentially correct in seeing the conceptual
advantage in the consequential dimension of religiosity. Yoga,
of course, insists on the dialectic of sacralization and
provides in Karma Yoga an excellent occasion for deciphering
this dialectic.

CHAPTER I

FROM SACRED TO SACRALIZATION

Our critique of Durkheim's theory of the sacred does not intend to call into question the basic formulations of Durkheim. Our critique consists not in renunciation of the basic sociological perspective that Durkheim employed in his study of the religious phenomena. Rather, in Durkheim we recognize the rudiments of those basic insights, which provide us the basics of the analytical tools and conceptual framework that will enable us to develop a theoretical model suitable to pursue our own concern. Later in this chapter we will identify those rudimentary elements in Durkheim, which are crucial to our understanding of the problem, and point out their analytical or heuristic advantages which Durkheim may have recognised, but left unexplored for unknown reasons. Suffice it to say at this point that our critique of Durkheim does not take the course of Evans-Pritchard[1] or Spiro[2] and host of others, who have asked for a total rejection of Durkheim and consequent re-evaluation of his contribution to Sociology of Religion. On the contrary, it is through re-construction of Durkheim that we will attempt to bring

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1. E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Theories of Primitive Religion.

2. Melford Spiro, "Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation" in M. Banton, ed., Anthropological Approaches to the study of Religion, pp. 85-126.

to the fore the pitfalls involved in the mainline Durkheimian analysis and the singular advantage of Mol's framework.

A. Nature of the Sacred

Functional indispensability of religion as the repository of institutionalized beliefs and ritual practices guaranteeing cohesiveness of the social whole remains our own cue to the religious orientations of mankind. As with Durkheim, our point of departure is the acceptance of the primacy of integrative symbol systems over and against the instrumental utilitarian dimension of human behaviours. Durkheim's understanding of the integrative consequences of religious beliefs and practices and the place of the sacred in the scheme of things are incontestable in its depth and clarity. We can hardly disagree with Nisbet when he remarks:

> Of all concepts and perspectives in Durkheim
> the sacred is the most striking and, given
> the age in which he lived, the most radical.
> His use of the sacred to explain the cohesive
> nature of the society, the constraint that
> society exercises upon man, the origins of
> culture and even of human thought must surely
> rank as one of the boldest contributions
> of a positivist non-believer.[3]

The significance of the concept of sacred and its contribution to the Sociology of religion in providing both

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3. Robert N. Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition,
    p. 243.

an analytical tool and a perspective can not be underestimated.

We share with Durkheim certain fundamental perspectives of the Sociology of Religion, most important of them being a deep appreciation of a religious symbol system giving vent to the expressive orientation of mankind. Durkheim was unequivocal in his estimation of the fundamental difference between the critical reason and the expressive-integrative symbol system. He deprecated the tendencies of the "theorists who have undertaken to explain religion in rational terms" for perceiving religious rites only as "external translation of a system of ideas without any intrinsic value".[4] To him religious behaviour was essentially integrative and was necessarily expressive in providing a channel for meaningful action. According to Durkheim the essence of religion consists not in what it says about things, but what it does towards making action possible, life endurable. To quote him:

> The believer who has communicated
> with his god is not merely a man
> who sees new truths of which the
> unbeliever is ignorant, he is a man
> who is stronger. He feels within
> him more force, either to endure
> the trials of existence, or to
> conquer them.[5]

Critical reason is unjustified in dismissing religion

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4. Emile Durkheim, <u>The Elementary Forms of The Religious Life</u>, p. 463.

5. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 464.

as simply a tissue of superstitions, expendable once men
are correctly informed. Contrary to the expostulations of
critical rationalists Durkheim maintained that the
"unanimous sentiment of the believers of all times cannot
be purely illusory."[6]

Significance of this perspective for the history of
Sociology of Religion is beyond doubt. In a certain sense
it agrees with Pareto's assertion that religion transcends
the realm of "logico-experimental" experience[7] A somewhat
similar evaluation of the religious symbol system led
Max Weber to assert that charismatic phenomena lie "specifically
outside the realm of everyday routine and the profane."[8]
It is the extraordinary as opposed to the everyday, the
sacred in contrast to the profane. The independent value
of religious symbol systems has been recognized by Talcott
Parsons and Kingsley Davis. It is in this vein that
Davis maintains that "the tendency towards secularization

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6. Emile Durkheim, Op. cit., p. 464.

7. Cited by Thomas F. O'Dea, The Sociology of
   Religion, p. 20.

8. Ibid., p. 22.

probably cannot continue to the point where religion entirely disappears. Secularization will likely be terminated by religious revivals of one sort or another."[9]

Of course this perspective in the sociology of religion has not remained unchallenged. One vocal opposition to the functionalist theory of the integrative indispensability of the religious symbol system comes from Milton Yinger who recognized that there are secular alternatives to religion. Yinger questions the capacity of religion to perform this integrative function without the aid of other factors, effects of which he considers extremely important for the efficacy with which religion performs an integrative function.[10] O'Dea has recently expressed his concern over functionalist tendency to "emphasize the conservative functions of religion and neglect its creative and potentionally revolutionary character."[11]

Now, the problem with these critiques of functionalist theories of religion lies with their underestimation of the dialectical relationship between the expressive/integrative and adaptive/instrumental symbol systems. Malinowski and Parsons[12] have drawn our attention to this basic dialectic

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9. Kingsley Davis, Human Sociology, p. 529.

10. J. Milton Yinger, Religion, Society and the Individual, pp. 58-59.

11. Thomas O'Dea, Op. cit., p. 17.

12. See Hans Mol, The Sacralization of Identity, Manuscript, 1974, p. 4.

in which the way out from the impasse created by Durkheim's
dichotomy between sacred and profane lies. Indeed our
theoretical reconstruction of Durkheim has to proceed from
here. However, before we do that it may be desirable that
we try to appraise Durkheim's concept of the sacred and
some of the standard criticisms levelled against it. This
will serve the double purpose of showing where both Durkheim
and his critics have gone wrong and in what sense our
theoretical formulation takes the theory of the sacred
beyond the attacks of these critics and also undermines
the weaknesses in Durkheim's theoretical formulation.

Crucial for Durkheim's understanding of religious
phenomena is the absolute opposition between the categories
of the sacred and the profane. The opposition between the
two is fundamental and final. As he put it:

> The division of the world into
> two domains, the one containing
> all that is sacred, the other all
> that is profane, is the distinctive
> trait of religious thought ....
> The fact of contrast between sacred
> and profane is universal.[13]

The difference between the sacred and the profane is
grounded in the very structure of things. The two worlds
of sacred and profane are not only different from each
other, but are of two different classes or order. The

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13. Emile Durkheim, Op. cit., p. 52.

difference is furthermore accentuated by the heterogeneity

of the two which leads to an unresolvable antagonism.

> The heterogeneity is even so
> complete that it frequently
> degenerates into a veritable
> antagonism. The two worlds are
> not only conceived of as separate,
> but as even hostile and jealous
> rivals of each other ....
> The sacred thing is par excellence
> that which the profane should
> not touch and cannot touch with
> impunity. The two classes can't
> even approach each other and
> keep their own nature at the
> same time.[14]

Thus according to Durkheim the fact of contrast

between the sacred and the profane is the primary datum

for the study of religious life in any society. This is

the minimum irreducible element of religious life and must

constitute the point of departure for any scientific study

of the religious phenomena as a social fact.

B.   Critiques of Durkheim

It is to this aspect of Durkheim's thought that the

severest criticism of Durkheim relates. J. Goody has

observed that Durkheim's dichotomy between sacred and profane

does not stand the test of empirical research. Goody's

criticism of Durkheim is primarily based on his conviction

that the operational criteria of the sacred - 'things set

apart and forbidden' are too vague and that, since there

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14. Emile Durkheim, Op. cit.,   p.   52.

are no sufficient criteria in Durkheim's scheme of things
to justify using the sacred-profane dichotomy, one might
legitimately opt for any dichotomy such as 'good' and 'bad'
'high' and 'low', 'black and 'white'.[15] Reflecting similar
concern for Durkheim's selection of the sacred-profane
dichotomy Evans-Pritchard made the following observation
on the basis of his own research on primitive religions :

> My test of this sort of formulation
> is a simple one: Whether it can be
> broken down into problems which permit
> testing by observation in field
> research, or can at least aid in
> the classification of observed facts.
> I have never found that the dichotomy
> of sacred and profane was of much
> use for either purpose.[16]

Pursuing his criticism further in this direction
Evans-Pritchard suggested that the dichotomy itself is
misconceived given that the sacred and the profane
"are so closely intermingled as to be inseparable."[17]

Both Goody and Evans-Pritchard have attempted to attack
the problem at the centre of Durkheim's formulation.

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15. Jack Goody, "Religion and Ritual: the
    definitional problem", British Journal of
    Sociology, Vol. 12; 1961, pp. 143-64.

16. Evans-Pritchard, Op. cit., p. 65.

17. Ibid., p. 65.

However, in the formulation of their own attack they are
misled in their evaluation of Durkheim's theoretical genius
and miss the very point of the analytical potential of
the concepts of sacred and profane. As against Goody it
needs to be pointed out that Durkheim clearly stated his
criterion for selecting the sacred-profane dichotomy as
the crucial variable. To him the ethical dichotomy of 'good'
or 'bad' or the supposedly neutral dichotomy of 'high' or
'low' etc. are only derivative of a more fundamental dichotomy
observable in the realm of religious phenomena. His full
scale analysis of religious phenomena in the "Elementary
Forms" was preceded by his earlier concern with the problem
of structural differentiation and the role played by
religion in it. His ground for granting the primacy to
religious phenomena was that :

> They are the germ from which all the
> others are derived, or at least almost
> all the other are derived. Religion
> contains in itself, from the beginning,
> but in a diffused state, all the elements
> which in dissociating, determining
> and combining with each other in a
> thousand ways, have given birth to
> the diverse manifestations of the
> collective life. It is from myths and
> legends that science and poetry have
> separated .... law and morality were
> born from ritual practices. One cannot
> understand our representation of the world
> and life, if one does not know the
> religious beliefs which were their
> first form.[18]

18. Emile Durkheim in the Preface of Volume II
of L'Annee (cited by Robert N. Bellah,
"Durkheim and History", American Sociological
Review, Vol. 24; 1959, p. 455.)

It will be remembered that Durkheim's formulation
of the sacred-profane dichotomy occurred in his analysis
of the Australian clan and its religious life which he
portrayed as the social analogue of the unicellular
organism, the basic structural type from which all other
social structures have differentiated. Bellah has rightly
observed that "thus Durkheim is interested to discover in
religion, ... that undifferentiated whole from which
the elements of social life gradually differentiated."[19]
Under these circumstances even to suggest that one might
legitimately opt for any dichotomy such as 'good' and 'bad'
or 'high' and 'low' etc. is to give primacy to the derivative
over the primary or, in other words, to put the horse
before the cart. The criterion for the selection of the
sacred-profane dichotomy over against any other category
is neither vague nor ambiguous. The criterion for the
selection of the sacred-profane dichotomy is determined
by the very nature of the subject under investigation. To
ask for any other criterion for the preference of the
categories of sacred-profane in the study of religious
phenomena is very much like asking what is the criterion
for a nuclear physicist to choose the atomic structure of an

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19. Robert N. Bellah, "Durkheim and History",
    American Sociological Review, Vol. 24,
    1959, p. 455.

element as the point of departure for his study instead of the chemical properties of the element.

The objection that the analytical potential of the sacred-profane dichotomy is undermined by the fact that in reality the sacred-profane is closely fused together is of a more serious order. It is important to note that even in the primitive society evidence is not lacking to support the contention that the demarcation between the profane and the sacred was sometimes rather fluid.[20] However, while generally sympathetic to the idea of interdependence of sacred and profane we find it difficult to accept Evans-Pritchard's formulation of the problem. The objection raised by Evans-Pritchard purports to undercut Durkheim's formulation in two ways. First, the dichotomy itself is misconceived precisely because the sacred in Durkheim's sense is not perceptible in the empirical field; and second, since the conceptual formulation is not supported by the elements of empirical reality its value as an analytical tool in the study of religious phenomena is seriously jeopardized.

On the first point, instead of altogether denying the possibility of the existence of the sacred in Durkheim's

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20. Eliade, Mircea, <u>Myths, Dreams and Mysteries</u>, p. 136.

sense, I tend to agree with Mol when he observes that "the sacred in Durkheim's sense will only occur when the crystallization of specific primitive tribal pattern is left undisturbed for generations and when the strength and cohesion of tribal identity is a sine-qua-non for survival."[21] The fault does not lie with the dichotomy as such, but with Durkheim's reluctance to specify conditions under which the dichotomy will be observed to be operative in its purest form. Given the basic dialectic between the adaptive-integrative symbol systems it is quite possible for religious symbols to continue to exist intact over a long period of time if the need for adaptation has been at its minimum during the period. So far as the analytical potential of the conceptual framework of Durkheim is concerned, it is our contention that the analytical potential of Durkheim's formulation of the sacred is not contingent upon a total corroboration of the concept of the sacred in the observable reality. To us the concepts of sacred-profane are purely an ideal-typical construction. In the context of Durkheim's formulation of the sacred in the explanation of religious structure of the Australian clan we suggest that the Australian clan be considered as an example of a social type in which the sacred in Durkheim's sense was perceptible. Taking his results at a sufficient

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21. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 7.

level of generality, then, we find them validly applicable
to the 'single-celled' type of society; all more complex
societies must have descended from some society of this type.
Viewed from this angle Durkheim's theoretical explications
are taken at once out-side the range of Evans-Pritchard as
well as others who would reject Durkheim's propositions on
the ground that the Australian totemism is not, in any case,
the most primitive form of religion.

Lest the impression be gotten that we intend to defend
Durkheim in toto, we wish to record our basic reservations
about it. It has been our concern up to this point to
demonstrate how the standard criticisms of Durkheim are
misconceived. These critics have failed to comprehend the
full import of Durkheim's formulation and therefore have
contented themselves with objecting to that which is only
peripheral and obvious. The dichotomy between the sacred
and the profane is there in Durkheim; and its significance
for his theoretical formulations cannot be denied. But equally
important is the fact that though Durkheim might have under-
rated the intermingling of sacred and profane, he nevertheless
recognized their interdependence. However the problem lies
with his reluctance to explicate this interdependence of the
sacred and the profane and to pursue his analysis in this
direction. A charge that sticks to Durkheim most is not one of
commission, but one of omission. In his formulation of the

problem he paid special attention to the conflicting aspects
of the sacred and the profane and left the problem of their
complementarity largely unexplored. To be fair to Durkheim
it must be noted that Durkheim even granted the possibility
of passage of a being from the realm of the sacred to the
profane and vice-versa. Durkheim does not think

> That a being can never pass from one
> of these worlds into the other; but
> the manner in which this passage is
> effected, when it does take place,
> puts into relief the essential duality
> of the two kingdoms. In fact it
> implies a veritable metamorphosis.[22]

Thus he ignores the specific problem of the mechanisms
through which such passage is effected and how this
veritable metamorphosis takes place. He underestimated the
significance of this passage or the process of the transition
from one realm to another and emphasised the rigidity or
separateness of the sacred and profane. Because of Durkheim's
obsession with the rigidity and separateness of the sacred
and his reluctance to pursue the problematic of the change
that characterises religious phenomena, we feel that the
Durkheimian sociology of religion tends to be a historical,
non-comparative and static.

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22. Emile Durkheim, Op.cit., p.54.

C. In Defense of Durkheim

Despite the sincerest attempts of Swanson[23] and Bellah[24] to salvage Durkheim's conceptualization from the criticism formulated above, it nevertheless remains open to searching examinations on this count. Following Durkheim's lead Swanson has tried to explicate, in more concrete terms than Durkheim, the specific ways in which what he calls 'social relationships' give rise to belief in the 'supernatural'.

His conceptualization takes place in terms of the 'constitutional arrangements' and 'primordial conditions' in broadly political structures, and particularly in those that he calls 'sovereign groups.' The argument in its simplest form maintains that where social structures or processes are for any reason not directly or transparently available, men tend to represent these opaque experiences to themselves in symbolic form. Any symbolism from this point of view is that mode of perceiving and articulating experience that obtains when conscious awareness is absent. Now the rationalistic bias and evolutionary overtones of this explanation are obvious. With the increase in man's capacity for conscious articulation

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23. G.E. Swanson, _The Birth of the Gods_.

24. Robert N. Bellah, _Op.cit._, p. 452-73.

of these opaque experiences the need for symbolic

representation will diminish. True, Swanson goes beyond

Durkheim in recognizing the role of the confused and

incoherent nature of our awareness in providing an answer

to the question 'why' the symbolic modes in which men represent

society to themselves should take the religious forms that

they do. But in Swanson as in Durkheim, there is a residue

which is left unexplained. Though a homomorphic or even

isomorphic correspondence might be claimed between groups and

political structures on the one hand and supernatural beliefs

on the other, as Swanson maintains, there is a hiatus at the

point where we ask for an account of the process whereby the

one gets transformed into the other. It is a narrower gap than

we find in Durkheim, but it is obstinately present all the

same.

Defending Durkheim's formulation of the sacred as

collective representation Bellah maintains that the fundamental

point of Durkheim's theory is that while collective

representations arise from and reflect the 'social substratum',

they are, once in existence, "partially autonomous realities"

which independently influence subsequent social development.[25]

According to Bellah, the greatest contribution of Durkheim

lies in his recognition of the value of collective representation

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25. Robert N. Bellah, Op.cit., p.459.

(sacred included), as an element analytically independent of the social system. In a sense we find this interpretation of Durkheim quite agreeable. But this does not resolve the theoretical gap in Durkheim's formulation. Though a dominating role is attributed to the sacred as the collective representation functioning as the matrix and determinant of all that is "best in us", we are given very little idea as to how this process of formation actually work. There is repeated assurance that sacrality is a quality not intrinsic to sacred objects, but is derived from the society's mode of representing itself symbolically, but we are not told how this complex feat is accomplished. In particular, Durkheim does not supply any very convincing account of why it is that the symbolic modes in which men represent society to themselves should take the religious forms that they do. While agreeing with Durkheim that religious symbol systems meet the functional need of integration we note that technically no mechanism is specified by Durkheim by which the need for solidarity gives rise to or causes religion. His exclusive concern with the symbolic nature of the sacred and its integrative consequences for the society remains confined to an analysis of the structure and function of the religious symbol systems once they have assumed an objectified transcendental character. Not surprisingly then he finds a remarkable similarity and regularity of pattern in the structural arrangement of the

sacred and profane in different religious traditions. Merits
of his findings notwithstanding, one difficulty that we
encounter in his scheme is that methodologically it cannot
explain why it is that belief systems assume different forms
in different cultural contexts. It fails to come to grips
with what happens on the way to the transcendent. What is
there which perpetuates the emergence of the sacred in
different stages of historical development and why are there
differences in the degree of sacrality ? How are we to view
the different historical responses giving rise to belief as
divergent as Hinduism and Buddhism on the one hand and
Judaic-Christian tradition on the other. Even more important,
what is there that distinguishes universal religions from the
primitive religions. And does this variability of religion
not subsume the question of generalization that is the ultimate
concern of sociological theorizing ?

Indeed, Durkheim was not the only one to have ignored
these issues and to have concerned himself primarily with
the separating, objectified transcendent character of the
sacred. Rudolph Otto maintained that the numinous is perfectly
sui generis and is irreducible to any other category. The
Holy is a pre-eminently living force by itself, it is "wholly
other", that "which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual,

the intelligible, and the familiar"[26] Phenomenologists of religions like Van der Leeuw and Mercea Eliade have not failed to notice the significance of this "otherness" enwrapping religious symbols. Van der Leeuw brings to our notice the significance of the radical opposition between the unusual and powerful on the one hand and the ordinary and everyday on the other. Thus, "sacred" according to Van der Leeuw, is "what has been placed within boundaries ... ... the completely different, the absolutely distinct."[27] Eliade, too, in the same vein characterises the sacred as a reality of a wholly different order.[28] Robert Lowie in his study of Primitive Religion visualizes the sphere of sacred or religious as that of the "extraordinary," totally different from the everyday sphere of the "ordinary".[29] And Max Weber regards the realm of charisma as "specifically outside the realm of everyday routine and the profane sphere".[30] It is

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26. Rudolph Otto, The Idea of the Holy,(cited by Thomas O'Dea, <u>The Sociology of Religion</u>, p. 22.)

27. Van Der Leeuw, <u>Religion in Essence and Manifestation</u>, Vol. I, pp. 47-48.

28. Mircea Eliade, <u>The Sacred and the Profane</u>, pp. 9-10.

29. Robert Lowie, Primitive Religion, (cited by O'Dea, <u>The Sociology of Religion</u>, Op.cit., p. 22

30. Max Weber, <u>The Theory of Social and Economic Organization</u>, pp. 358-59.

extraordinary as opposed to the everyday, sacred in contrast to the profane. The objectifying, separating characteristic of the sacred has received the lion's share in the scholarly treatment of religious phenomena.

D. The Process of Sacralization

These studies have contributed a great deal towards the understanding of religious phenomena and the value of their findings cannot be ignored. But they have their limitations too, to some of which we have drawn attention earlier. Somehow they have missed the importance of the less obvious and more latent secralization process. It is our contention that a more meaningful approach, impregnated with greater analytical potential and theoretical value, consists in looking at the process of sacralization instead of the state of sacredness. We will be using the term sacralization to designate that process whereby a certain set of symbols acquire the quality of sacrality and become enwrapped with the "don't touch" sentiments. The conceptual advantages of this concern with the process ... are manifold. It is only by concentrating on the process that we can discern the mechanisms which facilitate the transition from the profane to the sacred. Process in itself consists of the possibility both of the profane becoming sacred as well as the capacity of the sacred to participate in this process by making the profane sacred. Obviously, this

concern with the process of sacralization brings out the
dialectical relationship between the sacred and the profane.
We grant that in this dialectic of the sacred and profane,
religion reveals its integrative bias, but neverthless it is
precisely the process of sacralization which more readily
conveys the 'dialectical emergence of the integrative
complement'. We find that both Durkheim and Evans-Pritchard
are far from clear on this point and no wonder that "their
conceptual frame of reference is inadequate to both account
for the emergence of sacredness in our time and for their
objectifying, separating characteristics once they have
emerged."[31]

As pointed out earlier, sacralization assumes a dialectical
relationship between the sacred and the profane. It is true
that the opposition between the two is very pronounced as
indeed a host of scholars have noted. But, it appears to us
that there is an equally strong element of complementarity
that characterizes their relationship. Exclusive concern
with the separateness of the sacred barred this perspective
from us, and a significant aspect of their relationship
remained hidden. However, the shift in emphasis from the
state of sacrality to the process of sacralization opens up

31. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 8.

a new vista on the relationship between sacred and profane
and reveals to us the complex character of their mutuality as
well as opposition, and its implications for the sociology
of religion. Mol has drawn our attention to this dialectic
in his explication of the theory of sacralization and has
provided a clue to certain basic concerns of the sociology
of religion :

> both (sacred and profane) conflict and
> complement, both differ profoundly
> and are very relevant for one another,
> both can grow in reaction to one
> another and can even undermine one
> another. The point where the function
> of each is minimised is never equilib-
> rated and always under strain. And yet
> the more the one can maximize its
> function at the expense of the other
> the greater the tendency towards
> restoring the impossible, hypothetical
> balance in the opposite direction will
> become.[32]

It seems to us that the limitations of Durkheim and many
others, who have neglected the process of sacralization,
relates to the assumptive foundations of their methodology.
One such limitation refers to the very point of departure
that Durkheim chooses for his study. In selecting primitive
culture as the field of their study of religious phenomena
scholars assumed that the patterns of religious beliefs in
primitive culture would reveal to us the simplest undifferentiate

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32. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 262.

form of the sacred. Given their evolutionary bias they
failed to perceive that it is precisely in the primitive
culture that the sacred is present in its full blown rather
than embryonic form. It is to this bias built into their
methodology that our attention is drawn in the following
observation :

> As the scholars dealing with past and
> primitive societies have led the way
> in the analysis of the sacred, their
> definition in terms of its ideal type
> or full blown form have been accepted
> rather uncritically, all the more so
> as it goes right against the grain of
> evolutionary biases and assumption of
> scientific superiority in the west to
> entertain the thought that something
> in primitive cultures is mature but
> embryonic in modern ones![33]

In our emphasis on the process of sacralization we are
extending the scope of our analysis to include both primitive
and modern, past and present. While we do not claim that
our conceptual apparatus is comprehensive enough to account
for all that needs to be accounted for, we certainly hope that
it will be able to dissipate some perplexities perceptible
on the religious canvas of the modern world. For example,
the parallel tendencies of revival in the strength of sect-like
religious groups in north America on the one hand and the

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33. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 262.

decreasing influence of church organizations of some previously influential denominations on the laity on the other provides an occasion to test the analytical potential of the sacralization theory. According to the sacralization theory the first tendency is an indication of the fact that in the modern world sacralization is as viable as ever, while the latter tendency, instead of indicating that the sacred is waning, only suggests that in certain areas sacralization is bypassing the church organizations. Similarly when Srinivas proposes the hypothesis of Sanskritization and Westernization to explain the changes in caste structure of India, he is attesting to the fact that new foci of identity are being sacralized in different contexts and that the sacralization process with its built-in mechanisms for the incorporation of change is able to cope with these tendencies by making use of the available cultural resources. It is our assumption that the emphasis on the sacralization process rather than the separateness of sacred is more appropriate for analysing changing situations.

It is against this background that we have to view the main task of the present work and the relevance of the sacralization theory to the main concern of this study. It is our assumption that in some ways both Glock and Yoga seem to be concerned with discerning the ways or mechanisms of the

process in and through which a certain symbol system or meaning structure acquires the quality of sacrality. We notice that Durkheim's conceptual apparatus with its insistence on the separateness of the sacred falls short of the comprehensiveness of a theoretical scheme which concerns itself with the process of sacralization. Of course, we take due congnizance of Durkheim's recognition of the intermingling of the sacred and profane and recognize in his concept of contagion of sacred the rudiments of sacralization theory. But, we are equally aware of his failure to pursue his analysis in this direction. It is precisely at this point that the theory of sacralization comes to our aid. A comprehensive treatment of the sacralization will constitute the subject matter of the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE MECHANISMS OF SACRALIZATION

The main thrust of argument in the preceding chapter was to explicate the grounds for distinguishing sacralization from the sacred and bring out its analytical possibility. The process of sacralization emerged as an autonomous realm, analysable in its own right. It is our assumption that the analysis of this process contitutes an important sociological enterprise. It is to this task of analysis that we direct our attention in the present chapter. The analysis will concern itself both with articulating the functional orientation of the sacralization process as well as the mechanisms of the process.

A.   The Dialectic of Sacralization

Crucial to the notion of sacralization is the assumption that there is a dialectic between sacred and profane, and that this dialectic in some way coincides with the dialectical relationship that exists between the integrative/emotional and differentiating/rational processes[1] It may be observed that the functional orientation of sacralization is primarily directed towards a balancing of the integrative/adaptive aspect of symbol system. Paradoxically, sacralization itself plays a biased role in this balancing act, but nevertheless

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1.   Hans Mol, the Sacralization of Identity, Manuscript, 262.

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it does aim at restoring a balance between adaptive/integrative symbol systems. We have noted in the previous chapter that the sacralization process falls squarely on the side of integrative/identity side of symbol systems. But the built-in-strain of the dialectic is continually directed towards a balancing of the integrative and adaptive elements. But to expect that this balancing is ever complete and that it leads to a state of equilibrium of sacred and profane is to miss the very point of dialectic. We have noted that the relation-ship between the sacred and profane, as Mol observes, is such that "both conflict and complement, both differ profoundly and are very relevant for one another, both can grow in reaction to one another and can even undermine one another"[2]. In effect there is a constant strain between the two and any attempt to maximize the function of one at the cost of the other inevitably leads to further tilt in the opposite direction. It is precisely for this reason that the need for sacralization is an ever present fact. To us then sacralization appears to be an inevitable process with built-in-mechanisms for minimizing the disadvantages of infinite adaptability of symbol systems. It is in this vein that Mol observes :

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2. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 262.

> Sacralization is a sort of brake applied
> to unchecked infinite adaptations in
> symbol systems for which there is
> increasingly less evolutionary necessity
> and which becomes increasingly more
> dysfunctional for the emotional security
> of personality and the integration of
> tribe or community ... sacralization is
> to the dysfunctional potential of symbol
> systems what anti-bodies are to the
> dysfunctional cancerous, possibilities
> in physical systems.[3]

A necessary corrolary of the proposition that there is

a dialectic between adaptive/integrative symbol system is

that the more advanced the conditions of differentiation

the greater is the need for integration. In other words,

at any stage of historical development a society experiencing

advancement in its capacity for adaptation will also put an

increasing demand on its integrative symbol systems. This

is the perspective that we consider to be crucial for an

understanding of religious phenomena in the modern world.

Undermining this perspective would necessarily lead to

underestimation of the integrative potential of the sacralization

process and its implication for deciphering the complexities

of the religious situation in the modern context. Further,

it is our assumption that lack of appreciation for this

perspective necessitates employment of concepts like secularizatic

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3. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 262,

for explaining phenomena which otherwise would remain
unaccountable.

Scholars with as divergent approaches as Richard Fenn
and Robert Bellah are equally susceptible to the charge of
neglecting this perspective in their explanation of religious
phenomena. Working on the assumption that the forces of
differentiation and adaptation are capable of completely
undermining the forces of integration Fenn argues "that
conditions of advanced differentiation make it unlikely, if
not impossible, for cultural integration to develop around
any set of religious symbols."[4] Though Bellah does not share
Fenn's strategically dysfunctional definition of religion,
he too seems to be primarily concerned with the functional
orientation of religious symbol system only in terms of its
differentiating potential.[5] But as Mol points out:

> Unless the identity and the differentiation
> side of the evolutionary process are
> continually paired and juxtaposed, either
> rationalistic or irrationalistic biases
> will inevitably creep into the analysis...
> To us the dialectic between differentia-
> tion and identity (integration) consists
> of both attraction and repulsion, mutual
> need and basic conflict... Yet there is
> much give and take in the battle and
> therefore viable religious orientations
> and organizations develop sophisticated
> mechanisms to deal with change.[6]

4. Richard K. Fenn, "Toward a New Sociology of Religion" in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol.11, No.1, March 1972, p. 16.

5. Robert N. Bellah, "Religious Evolution", American Sociological Review, Vol.29, 1964, pp. 358-74, see Mol's discussion of this aspect of Bellah, Op.cit. pp.22-7

6. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 26-27.

The point of the argument is that it is in the dialectical

emergence of this integrative complement that we find a clue

to the capacity of any religious symbol system to protect

identity, a system of meaning or a definition of reality on

the one hand and to modify, obstruct or legitimate change

on the other. In this way Mol links the question of

sacralization with the need for identity defense.

A Sociology of Religion operating on the assumption that

the forces of differentiation-adaptation will ultimately

supplant the forces of identity-integration faces an

unresolvable predicament. Sociological studies of recent

trends in American religious life have made conflicting claims

as to the religious situation in modern America. On the one

hand we have the evidence of an increase in the strength of

evangelical and sect-like religious groups[7] and, on the other

hand, it has been observed that secularization is the order

of the day[8]. Operating within the framework of secularization

theory, either as a process of gradual decline in transcendental

belief, as Lipset would have it[9], or a process whereby the

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7. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, American Piety:
    The Nature of Religious Commitment, 1970.

8. William H. Whyte, The Organization Man, 1956.

9. S.M. Lipset, "Religion in America: What Religious
    Revival ?", Columbia University Forum, II: 2,
    Winter, 1959.

religions and religious institutions become part of the world,[10] as many others seem to suggest, it would be difficult to account for the growth and growing strength of sect-like religious groups. The problem is rendered more difficult if we underestimate the dialectic of differentiation/integration. Given our understanding of the dialectic, we are not surprised that with advancement in the conditions of differentiation, the need for identity puts an equally strong demand on the integrative forces. As a result, those centres of identity foci which are strongly wedded to the general framework of the integrative symbol system gain in contrast with those which side with the forces of differentiation by adapting to the changes in the environing conditions.[11] Any analysis which concentrates only on the fact that the traditional religious institutions have become more world like is bound to overlook the equally important phenomenon which attests to the fact of ever on-going process of sacralization. Since the analysis is bound up with its own rationalistic biases, it fails to perceive the continued operation of the sacralization process. Moreover it also fails to take note of the fact that secularization "is the outcome of differentiations outrunning the capacity of religious organizations to integrate

10. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 29.

11. Ibid, p. 34.

them in the traditional frame of reference with the result
that on all levels identities and systems of meaning are
becoming sacralized bypassing the organizations."[12] Thus the
emphasis on the dialectical perspective of sacralization
theory and its functional orientation in terms of the ever-
present integrative need is important for a theory that would not
flutter at the first encounter with the complexities of
empirical reality. Mol's contribution lies precisely in this
recognition of the dialectic and the significance of the
integrative complement of the symbol system for the
differentiating/adaptive aspect of it. While Bellah stops
at pointing out the significance of the differentiating
potential of the religious symbol system, Mol goes beyond to
argue that a differentiating perspective of religion is
incomplete when it is not counterbalanced by the identity
perspective.

With these observations about central tenets of
sacralization theory we now turn our attention to the actual
mechanisms of the sacralization. Mol recognizes four
mechanisms of sacralization :

(1) Objectification (the projection of order in a beyond
where it is less vulnerable to the contradictions, exceptions

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12. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 5.

and contingencies of the mundane and the temporal);

(2) Commitment (the emotional anchorage in the various, proliferating, foci of identity);

(3) Ritual (the repetitive actions, articulations and movements which prevent the object of sacralization being lost sight of);

(4) Myth (the integration of the various strains of human existence in a coherent, short-hand symbolic account).

B.   Objectification

Mol defines objectification as "the tendency to sum up the variegated elements of mundane existence in a transcendental point of reference where they can appear more orderly, more consistent and more timeless"[13]. Thus the function of objectification is to project a conception of reality, a system of values or a meaning structure in a transcendental realm. This serves the double purpose of guaranteeing the incorruptibility of the transcendental order as well as providing a point of reference in terms of which the corruption the contingencies, the chaos and the inconsistencies of the mundane realm come to be interpreted and appropriated. This relativization of the mundane in terms of the transcendent seem to be a necessary condition for the emotional security

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13. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 13.

and preservation of identity. A certain conception of order, pattern or structure is a minimum prerequisite for the consistency of behaviour and motivational orientation behind such behaviour. The transcendental point provides the ground for this conception of order where it seems to be lacking.In and through objectification the transcendental point retains its dialectical character. Thus, "in this transcendental point of reference order could appear less arbitrary, less vulnerable to contradictions, exceptions and contingencies. Therefore the arbitrary, the unexpected, the frustrations and contingencies could be absorbed and 'digested' as not altogether meaningless, but as part and parcel of an orderly world."[14]

A theory insisting on a dialectical relationship between the sacred and profane and thereby ascribing to the objectified point of reference a leverage for further sacralization entails both the closeness and the separateness of the mundane and the transcendental. The capacity of the objectified point of reference to further sacralize depends on the possibility of the transcendental point of reference remaining different from and yet reflecting the profane. It is for this reason that Mol thinks that the objectified point of

14. Hans Mol, Op.cit., 265.

reference should remain both open and vague. Thus, "successful and surviving religions have generally counterbalanced a strong sense of awe and commitment to their conceptual apparatus with a deliberate vagueness of the same."[15] To Mol's understanding of the objectified point of reference and its social function the idea of this vagueness of the transcendental is extremely important. Given the integrative need of the society that the sacralization process meets, any clearly defined and extremely well-articulated system of meaning or conception of reality will lack the flexibility that is needed to perform the legitimation of change and at the same time provide the stability necessary for the acceptance of change. It is to Mol's credit that objectification emerges as a positive category as opposed to the hitherto emphasised dysfunctional aspect of it in the sociological and philosophical literature under the category of reification. Thinkers like Feuerbach, Marx, Fromm and Peter Berger are most influential among those scholars who tended to look at reification as the alienating aspect of religion precisely because from their point of view it undermined self-fulfillment

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15. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 269.

and self-realization as the ultimate goal of life.[16]
Reification from their point of view implied a complete
separation and consequent subjection of man the creator
to his own creation. Given this understanding of reification,
any commitment to or acceptance of it was considered
extremely detrimental to man's essential nature as freedom.
Mol draws our attention to the rationalistic and scientific
biases of these approaches to objectification. As he
points out :

> The bias of those who use and have
> used the reification concept
> unfailingly consists in their
> assumptions that their perception
> of reality is the only 'real' one,
> whereas the reifiers on the other
> hand treat as 'real' what in actual
> fact is very unreal. Yet the result
> of this influential theorizing has
> been the view that alienation is
> the eroder of self-realization
> (as a summum bonum) rather than
> that alienation is the severance
> of the individual from any
> sacralized identity.[17]

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16. For a detailed discussion of reification theory
    see Thomas F. O'Dea's discussion of the problem
    of projection in The Sociology of Religion ,
    Prentice Hall, 1966, pp. 30-33 and Mol's
    discussion of reification in Sacralization of
    Identity, Manuscript, Op.cit., pp. 273-74.

17. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 274.

The champions of the reification concept have neglected the contribution that objectification has made to the growth of abstract thought through the process of differentiation. One must underscore the point that "individualism (and an increasing amount of independence and freedom of the self) has gone hand in hand with the extent and quality of objectification."[18] Objectification ensured complete separation of the transcendental point as the repository of order and meaning, and the further the process continued the more independent the individual felt to pursue his mundane goal without jeopardizing the sense of security that it derived from the transcendental point of reference. "Consequently the risks of potential disorder through more individualism and differentiation could be taken with greater confidence. In final resort a cosmic and relevant system of meaning and order was assumed to be invulnerable to this possible danger".[19] The significance of the transcendental point of reference for the differentiating and adaptive potential of the symbol system was assumed by Weber in his analysis of Calvinism and its consequences for the subsequent economic changes in the direction of rational economy. To Mol the transcendental point of reference provides the Archimedean point for cultural and social differentiation in any society. This provision is the independent contribution of the religious symbol

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18. Mol, Op.cit., p. 271.

19. Ibid., p. 271

system to the evolutionary process. However, the fulcrum

or the point of leverage that the transcendental point

has may be too close to the mundane to permit further

differentiation or instrumental manipulation. Similarly,

if the corresponding institutional support for the fulcrum

at the mundane level is not strong enough then the commitment

link between the mundane and the transcendental point may

easily be severed. Thus, according to Mol the relationship

between the transcendental point and the profane is always

under strain. It is for this reason that Mol ascribes an

important place to commitment in his definition of the

objectification and its functional orientation. Thus he

writes : "Whether or not objectification is seen as cultural

liability or an asset depends, I submit, on whether or not

the commitment component is prominent in the definition of

the use of the term."[20] Further he states, "objectification

has always been impotent to sacralize unless it was

accompanied by emotional commitment. The separateness of

the sacred had to be embodied in feeling of awe and loyalty,

if it was to have any sacralizing effect."[21] It is to this

aspect (commitment) of the sacralization process that we

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20. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 273.

21. Ibid, p. 275.

now turn our attention.

C. Commitment

The emotional component or the feeling aspect of the sacralization process defines commitment. Commitment is defined as the focussed emotion or emotional attachment to a specific focus of identity.[22] Thus, it is the anchoring of emotions in a salient system of meaning. Inevitably, then, commitment reinforces identities, systems of meaning and definitions of reality. The reinforcing process is seen as guaranteeing consistency and predictability of motivation and behaviour. Thus it has a stabilizing effect on systems of meaning and actions and thereby ensures personality integration and social cohesion. In a nutshell, commitment refers to identity consolidation, as do the other "mechanisms".

The most significant contribution of commitment to the sacralization process consists in its capacity to sacralize a system of meaning or conception of reality through emotional attachment. Hence Mol's use of commitment must be distinguished from such uses which either undermine this aspect of commitment or dilute the analytical potential of the concept by using it in a rather vague and ambiguous way.

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22. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 277.

Though both Glock and Virginia H. Hine recognize the
identity integrating and therapeutic effect of commitment,
they have failed to come to grips with the primacy of the
emotion attaching element of commitment. Glock and Stark
have used the term to describe a complex of religious
phenomena of belief, practice, experience, knowledge and
consequence.[23] To our understanding of the sacralization
process all these elements, though operationally closely
related, play an independent role in the sacralization
process and are analytically distinct. Similarly, Mol has
rightly questioned the validity of Virginia H. Hine's
observation about the identity-altering and bridge-burning
aspect of commitment.[24] Mol succinctly remarks that "it is
rather inconsistent, to say the least, to talk in one breath
of the concept (commitment) as integrating and in the next
breath as altering."[25] Mol draws our attention to the fact
that identity/alteration and identity/integration are rather
two different processes. The former consists of emotional

23. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Religion and
    Society in Tension, 1969.

24. H. Virginia Hine, "Bridge Burners: Commitment
    and Participation in a Religious Movement" in
    Sociological Analaysis, Vol.31, No.2; Summer 1970,
    pp. 61-66; cited from Mol, p. 280.

25. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 280.

detachment from one identity and subsequent attachment to another. It is this process of identity change that is involved in conversion and charisma. But in the case of commitment only the emotion   attaching element is present.

The distinction drawn between the two processes is extremely significant. It is in this distinction that we find grounds for considering commitment only as a mechanism of sacralization even though the emotional-attaching element is present in charisma and conversion too. It is important to remember that charisma and conversion, through emotional stripping of a set of identity or meaning structure, actually desacralize a certain conception of reality. They tend to negate and downplay emotionally the previous frame of reference or system of meaning. Commitment on the other hand is primarily affirmative and identity consolidating. The significance of the emotional component or the feeling aspect of the sacralization process has been recognized by a host of scholars. Intensity of emotion and the depth of feeling with which the sacred is approached determines to a great extent the effect it has on personality integration and identity consolidation. Thus if commitment is to have any "sacralizing, integrating, centring effects, it has to be strong commitment."[26] It is precisely in this sense that

26. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 281.

Kierkegaard advocates the leap of faith and Tillich asks
for a total surrender. Otto has capitalized upon the feeling
dimension of religion in his definition of the holy. The
point that emerges from these approaches to commitment is
that the feeling dimension in enforcing religious sentiments
does not operate in a vacuum. A certain assumption as to
the focus of emotional attachment is a necessary prerequisite
for commitment. To think of a commitment without a system
of meaning or conception of reality, however vaguely defined,
is as ill-concieved as the suggestion that a system of belief
or meaning structure is self-sustaining without requiring
any initial commitment to it.[27] In this context Mol's
distinction between negative commitment and lack of commitment
is extremely well taken. Herein it is pointed out that the
lack of commitment or undercommitment causes anomy or
alienation precisely because the focus of identity is either
too weak or too well diffused to muster strong commitment.
Negative commitment on the other hand may have an integrative
consolidating consequence for the individual or the group,
precisely because it revolves round a certain well defined
system of meaning. Modern youth's opposition to the

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27. Mol has drawn our attention to the hollowness
of the rationalist assumption that rationalism
can sustain itself without recourse to commitment.
See Hans Mol, Op. cit., p. 287.

establishment, social significance of Yahweh's
vindictiveness and irreconcilability for the Jewish
religion are few of the examples of a negative commitment
having integrative and identity consolidating consequences.
The concept of commitment comes very close to the phenomenon
described by terms such as awe and reverence, collective
effervescence, faith and peak experiences. While agreeing
that awe and commitment may normally be used interchangeably,
Mol distinguishes between the two by asserting that "awe
is more appropriately used for the feeling state in a full
blown sacred system of stable, often non-western societies;
commitment is the sentiment generally used in relation to
the emerging, embryonic, proliferating, sacred systems of
modern industrial societies."[28] To what degree this
conceptual distinction between awe and commitment in terms
of the difference in degree of intensity or stage of
evolutionary development serves any useful purpose or is
based on a closer scrutiny of the empirical reality is a
point about which we have some reservation. We will come
back to the problem at a later stage in this essay. However,
at this point we tend to agree with Mol's perceptive
observation about the sacralizing potential of commitment

28. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 281.

and its affinity with such other concepts which insist on
the integrative consequence of the feeling or emotional
dimension of religious consciousness.

The most significant contribution of the theoretical
scheme under investigation consists in its ability to bring
out unequivocally the priority-setting function of commitment
and its relevance for modern pluralistic societies. Arguing
against the basic presupposition of the rationalistic and
intellectualistic denunciations of commitment on the ground
of its dysfunctional consequences for the individual and
the society, Mol clearly shows how a certain amount of
irrational commitment to their conception of reality provides
the efficacy of the rationalist arguments, Deceptively the
rationalists lead themselves to believe that the power of
their argument is solely cognitive and not emotive/contagious.[29]
Just as the often unacknowledged initial commitment to a
rationalist system of meaning sets their priority in this
context, so does commitment to any set of meaning.
Intellectualistic biases of anthropologists like Lévi-Strauss
and Levy-Bruhl prevented them from seeing the viability of
emotive and expressive orientations of a system of meaning

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29. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 289.

and action.[30] Thus Mol observes, " although man has become

more capable of dealing in abstractions the need for

integration, emotional anchorage has in no way diminished."[31]
The problem of modern society is not that need for commitment

has disappeared and that it has lost its sacralizing capacity.

What has happened is that in pluralistic societies the

actual competition between a large variety of identity foci

has created dilemmas of commitment. But its consequences

are in no way detrimental to the priority-setting function

of commitment. As Mol observes :

> In this complex of identity foci,
> ultimate systems of meaning and
> more concrete religious-organizational
> ones have to compete with hosts of
> others. The necessity for competition
> in pluralistic societies can have a
> negative effect in that certain foci
> of identity lose out in the battle,
> but also a positive effect in that
> the surviving ones have become
> stronger through their capacity to
> elicit strong commitment.[32]

Significance of this perspective will become abundantly

clear when we have occasion to dwell upon the empirical

findings of Glock and Stark on the religious situation

in America.

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30. For a detailed discussion of the intellectualistic
     biases and consequent underestimation of emotional
     component in the theoretical formulations of these
     anthropologists please see Mol's discussion of
     the issue on pages 286-91

31. Mol, Op.cit., p. 292.

32. Ibid, p. 298.

D. Ritual

The sacralizing potential of ritual has been recognized by many scholars. Durkheim acknowledged the capacity of rites to sacralize :

> A rite can have this character; in fact,
> the rite does not exist which does
> not have it to a certain degree.... If
> the Vedic sacrifice has had such an
> efficacy that ... it was the creator of
> the gods, and not merely a means of
> winning their favour, it is because it
> possessed a virtue comparable to that
> of the most sacred beings.[33]

When Jung maintains that in the rite of the Mass "the Eucharist transforms the soul of empirical man"[34] he is attesting to the essentially sacralizing function of rites.

What does the rite do to sacralize a system of meaning ? In Mol's formulation of the problem again the integrative, identity consolidating dimension of the sacralization process becomes the pre-eminently important contribution of ritual practices. Thus, he writes:

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33. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of
the Religious Life, p. 52.

34. C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion : East
and West, the collected works of C.G. Jung,
p. 273.

> Ritual maximises order, reinforces
> the place of the individual in his
> society and strengthens the bonds
> of a society vis-a-vis the individual.
> Through repetitive, emotion-evoking
> action, social cohesion and personality
> integration are reinforced - at the
> same time that aggressive or socially
> destructive actions are articulated,
> dramatized and curbed.[35]

By representing sameness in action the rites consolidate the sameness of a system of meaning. Each ritual activity involves, in some way or other, a re-commitment to memory of a system of meaning. Ritual as the repetitive enactmant of a certain system of meaning tends to strengthen the 'don't touch' sentiment in the same way as sometimes personal habits through constant repetition become so meaningful for the individual that he never thinks of changing them. In both cases the fundamental need for identity is expressed in one's acceptance of the invincibility of the system of meaning constituting the motivational orientation of repetitive actions. It is to this identity consolidating function of ritual activity that Durkheim draws our attention in his observation that "through (ritual) the group periodically renews the sentiment which it has of itself and of its unity; at the same time, individuals are strengthened in their social nature."[36]

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35. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 16.

36. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, p. 375.

Mol recognizes the grain of truth contained in this and many
other observations concerning the group strengthening aspect
of ritual activities.   The observation that in and through ritual
activities   "the raw energies of conflict are domesticated
into the service of social order"[37] is an important one. Mol
is in agreement with these approaches which look at ritual
as a therapeutic fact and recognise its contribution to the
cohesion of culture and society.   Thus he writes :

> They (rituals) restore, reinforce or
> redirect identity. They restore
> through re-committing to memory a
> system of meaning, through re-absorbing
> individuals in the common fabric...
> They reinforce through superimposing
> the constraint of social expectations,
> through linking the past with the
> present ... They redirect through
> surrounding stressful situations
> with emotional support...[38]

In his analysis of rituals Mol pays some special
attention to the restoring aspect of the integrative function
that ritual performs. The identity restoring function of
rites assumes special significance particularly when the
individual or the group suffers a severe blow in the form
of bereavement or experiences shattering existing relationships

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37.   Victor W. Turner, "Symbols in Nembu Ritual", Emmet,
       Dorothy and MacIntyre, Alasdair (editors),
       Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis,
       p. 172.

38.   Hans Mol, Op.cit., p 315.

through, for instance, rearrangements in family relations such as marriage. In these moments of crisis rituals become particularly relevant. These rites dealing with transition from one stage in a life cycle to another have been called rites of passage by Van Gennep. While agreeing with Van Gennep that rites of passages are primarily concerned with the transition or the change from one moment of meaningful existence to another, with an intermediary stage of meaninglessness, Mol looks at the transition in terms of identity rather than status changes as is implied in Van Gennep's formulation. In this interpretation of the rites of passage it is not just the status change, but both reinforcement and change of systems of meaning, identities, and definitions of reality which are central variables. In this theoretical scheme the rites of passage are regarded as instances of one of the sacralization mechanisms concerned with change in structured identities. It is in this very sense that the rites of passage in different religions are different from conversion and charisma. In the latter case the new identity is more voluntary and pathbreaking and less embedded in existing cultural expectations. The difference between the two is one of structured versus unstructured change.[39]

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39. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 307-9.

E.   Myth

In the social scientific literature one finds a certain
kind of ambivalence towards mythic conciousness and its
relationship to human consciousness in general. It has been
maintained that the function of myth is to mellow the harshness
of reality and thereby make it more acceptable.[40] More sympathetic
treatment of the subject too has attempted to heighten its
closeness to the primitive mind and its needs, implying that
mythic consciousness is a basically inferior kind of consciousness.
A recent example of this ambivalence in the sociology of religion
is Thomas F. O'Dea, who while accepting the emotional saliency
of mythic symbolism feels that "we may divide the intellectual
expression of religion into two major modes, the mythic and the
rational. Myth is the primordial form of the intellectual
expression of religious beliefs and attitudes.[41] The source of
this ambivalence is the general disregard of the dialectic of
the expressive/integrative and rational/adaptive-symbol systems.
The ambivalence creeps into some social scientific theorizing
because of their awareness of the expressive need of life on
the one hand and their rationalist bias denying the contribution

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40. Sigmund Freud, _The Future of an Illusion_, 1964.

41. Thomas F. O'Dea, _The Sociology of Religion_,
        p 41.

of non-discursive thought to our understanding on the other
hand. However, dialectical thinking looks at myth as a
synthetic emergence of symbol systems in which the thesis
of integrative and the antithesis of instrumental symbols
are reconciled into a new synthesis of mythic symbol. Herein,
it is suggested that, though myth lies on the expressive-
integrative side of the symbol system by its very nature it
has to depend on the rational/instrumental symbol system, for
the repetitive presentation and the representation through
which it performs its integrative function. It is in the realm
of mythic symbolism that the conflict and the complementarity
of the rational/adaptive and emotional/integrative symbol
system is to be clearly noted. Thus, "myths sacralize through
the emotional anchorage of integrative reconciliations, but
they can do so only through the presentation of the binary
opposition with instrumental symbolism."[42]

The dialectical character of myth consists not only in
the conflict and complementarity of the rational-integrative
symbol system. It also consists in the very content of the
mythic narration. Citing from the Indian mythological tradition
Mol shows how the essence of myth lies "in the union of the

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42. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 335.

incompatibles of chaos and order, creation and destruction, evolution and dissolution.[43] The idea that a basic binary opposition is the central theme of all myths is asserted by Lévi-Strauss. He maintains that each improvisation of the mythical messages by making use of materials at hand, is ultimately logically constructed out of binary opposition.[44] Mol looks at theology as dealing with this basic binary opposition in a rather more abstract way than in the myths of the primitive people. The basic opposition of sin and salvation is the central theme in Christian theologizing and preaching. The element of this binary opposition between sin and salvation may be present either in concrete or in abstract form, but its universal presence is easily discernible. "Very concretely Adam, the Fall, Pharaoh, Goliath, the scapegoat, any moral aberration, pork, the tower of babel or the crucifixion may represent sin. Or more abstractly, sin may be represented under the guise of man's disobedience, self-sufficiency, anxiety, predicament, confusion, arrogance, hell, etc. Vice Versa paradise, exodous, Boaz, the Messiah, God, Mary, the millenium,

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43. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 323.

44. Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, p. 226.

the resurrection, righteousness, grace, angels may represent salvation."[45]

It seems to us that the thesis proposed by Mol in his assertion of the dialectical emergence of myth as a synthesis of integrative/adaptive symbol systems and his recognition of the centrality of the binary opposition in the structure of mythic symbolism and its theological counterpart goes a long way in explaining the structural similarities in myths drawn from various sources and of varying contexts. There is a certain amount of congruence between this position and that of Lévi-Strauss. Both agree that mythology is not just an outlet for repressed feelings and that myths are in general characterized by the dialectic of order and disorder. However, the fundamental difference between Mol and Lévi-Strauss lies in Mol's recognition that the dialectic of order-disorder is not one of nature (disorder) and culture(order) as Lévi-Strauss maintains, but one of the order-disorder dialectic within culture itself. "After all man's autonomy, sin, etc. is a threat to the social, cultural rather than natural order. It is not nature which is by definition disorderly, and chaotic, and culture which is orderly and systematic."[46] Mol has correctly located the binary

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45. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 328.

46. Ibid., pp. 328-29

opposition and dialectic of order/disorder within the socio-cultural realm where the primordial experiences of the basic conflicts of human existence takes place. Whether they represent a primitive mind's articulation of this basic experience in a more concretized form or whether they are articulated, transmitted and assimilated on the level of abstract discourse as is the case with most theological preaching and narration, myths always tend to dramatize the basic conflicts of human existence.

Assertion of the centrality of binary opposition in mythic symbolism and theological explications enables Mol to explain the greater success of evangelical/sectarian religious groups in modern western society. Effectiveness of sectarian sermons lies precisely in their express concern with the basic themes of sin and salvation, disorder and order, rational autonomy and faith. Mythic narration or theological preaching may use a variety of characters drawn from different sources relevant to changing contexts, but the nature of the basic truth reiterated in these different versions remains constant and unchanging. It is in the constancy and continuity of a basic truth through the ever changing narration of it that the distinctiveness of myth and sectarian preaching lies. Moreover, it is precisely this aspect of myth that serves the integrative need. The function of mythic narration is to reinforce a certain meaning structure or definition of reality. Thus, myths ;

are the surface shorthand for much
more basic experiences of human
individuals and group ... They
provide the fitting contour for
existence. They hold arbitrariness
and chaos at bay and reinforce
identity ... They are narratives,
tales or speculation, which
sacralize meaning and identity ...
they firmly outline and anchor the
definition of what life and its
relationships are all about.[47]

47. Hans Mol, _Op.cit._, p. 316.

CHAPTER III

DIMENSIONS OF RELIGIOSITY AND THE MECHANISMS OF SACRALIZATION

In this chapter we will attempt to ascertain the
validity of the proposition that the mechanisms of sacralization
are congruent with the dimensions of religiosity postulated
by Glock for an empirical study of the religious phenomena
in America. Here we will concern ourselves with determining
the degree and range of congruence between the two conceptual
schemes. The purpose of this exercise in comparison between
the two conceptual schemes is twofold: first to test the
claim of generality and cross-cultural validity made by Mol;
and secondly to see if, and in what way, Glock's conceptual
scheme differs from that of Mol and to what degree the difference
between the two warrants a reorientation of Mol's theory of
sacralization.

A.   Religion and Integration

The proposition that the mechanisms of sacralization
seem to synchronize with Glock's dimensions of religiosity
appears to be based on a more fundamental assumption as to
the centrality of the problem of identity consolidation or
integration in Glock's study of the religious situation in
present day American Society. Problems of identity together
with the question of meaning and the purpose of human existence
are intricably related with the functional orientation of the

sacralization process as enunciated by Mol. For Glock too,

religion, by providing individuals with an interpretation of

existence, performs the invaluable task of resolving the

problem of meaning.[1] Thus, echoing basic Durkheimian insights,

he writes :

> Religion, or what societies hold to be
> sacred, comprises an institutionalized
> system of symbols, beliefs, values,
> and practices focused on questions of
> ultimate meaning... By this (ultimate
> meaning) is meant those matters pertaining
> to the nature, meaning and often, purpose,
> of reality - a rationale for existence
> and a view of the world.... In particular,
> things will be regarded as sacred as
> they provide, or symbolize, solutions
> to questions of ultimate meaning.[2]

Given this understanding of the functional orientation

of religious symbol systems, it is not surprising that

Glock juxtaposes the integrative/expressive aspect of belief

system against the inadequacy of the instrumental reason in

providing a viable explanation of the meaning of human

existence." In a world whose purpose cannot be ascertained by

reason, religion stands ready with an explanation, however

partial it may be, to fill the vacuum".[3] However, it is

surprising that after having noted this difference between the

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1. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Religion and Society in Tension, 1969, p. 5.
2. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op.cit., 1969, p. 4-5
3. Ibid, 1969, p. 26.

instrumental reason and the expressive symbol system
(in Glock's terminology, value orientation), Glock should
grant the instrumental reason the primacy and significance,
that he has, in providing a contour of existence through the
rational appropriation of reality. We will take up this
problem in more detail in the section dealing with the
knowledge dimension of religiosity. Suffice it to say at
this point that from our point of view Glock's postulation
and explication of the knowledge dimension of religiosity is
not consistent with his assertion of the primacy of expressive
symbol system (value orientation).

While we note a considerable amount of agreement in the
assumptive foundations of the theoretical schemes under
investigation, we must qualify our assertion of the agreement
by pointing out the differences between the two. It is
important to note that while Glock recognizes the integrative
orientation of religion he finds it convenient to maintain that
this orientation of the religious symbol system is only
derivative and secondary to what he calls value orientations.[4]
Glock makes an analytical distinction between value orientations
with supernatural referent (religious perspectives) and value

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4. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op.cit.,
    1969 , p. 11.

orientations without supernatural referent (humanist
perspective)[5] It seems to us that Glock is forced to make
this distinction precisely because he remains tied to the
traditional definition of religion in terms of supernaturalism.
While Glock is prepared to accept that the two perspectives
represent the same basic phenomena, he considers them as two
alternative forms of representation of reality. Genuinely
convinced that supernaturalism is a necessary component in
any definition of religion, Glock is led by the logic of his
argument to postulate this distinction. However, Mol's
definition of religion in terms of "sacralization of identity"
is not beset with this problem. Both humanist and non-humanist
perspectives or value orientations (expressive symbol systems
in Mol's terminology) with or without supernatural referrent
can be brought under one rubric of identity consolidation.
Mol in his definition of religion dispenses with the supernatural-
ism. Still his definition remains narrow enough to bring under it
all the phenomena that have been defined religious in terms
of supernatural referent . On the other hand this definition
is large enough to account for sacredness that, according to
Glock, invests the so-called humanist perspectives. Thus in
Mol's formulation of the problem the conceptual distinction

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5.   Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op.cit.,
       1969 , p. 11.

so tenuously held by Glock becomes expendable. This
conceptual economy and the consequent analytic implications
of the obliteration of the unnecessary conceptual distinction
deserve due recognition.

In the beginning of this section we maintained that
Glock's postulation of dimensions of religiosity is related
to the problem of identity consolidation. It is true that in
Glock's scheme this aspect of the religious value orientation
does not receive an explicit and unequivocal treatment. But,
this does not preclude the possibility of this aspect of
religious orientation being the unacknowledged assumption of
his discussion. As a matter of fact Glock is at great pains
to dissociate himself from the general assumption as to the
functional indispensability of religion for social integration.[6]
But this conscious effort on his part is not in tune with the
unconscious and valid assumption regarding the integrative
implications of the religious orientations for both the
individual and the primary group that he belongs to. Thus,
arguing against the general social-psychological assumption
that religious experience is problematic and pathological
Glock observes that religious experience is not problematic
but is simply conformity to the norms of relatively stable
social groups"[7] Further, in his discussion of the social

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6. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op.cit., 1969, p. 171.

7. Ibid, 1969 , p. 154.

contexts of religious experiences he proposes the hypothesis
that the intensity and frequency of religious experiences
are directly related to the cohesiveness and solidarity of
the church membership. From his analysis of the empirical data
pertaining to the question Glock makes some significant
observations. The intensity and frequency of religious
experiences among more conservative and fundamentalist religious
groups is explained by the fact that "their congregation
serves as the primary source of informal social relations".[8]
Equally significant is the observation that among liberal
denominations a minority subgroup, which constitutes a socially
integrated community of believers, displays a greater propensity
for religious experiences. Thus the frequency and intensity
of religious experiences are "the property of an integrated
subculture".[9] We find that these findings of Glock confirm
our assumption as to the centrality of the identity consolidating
functions of religious orientations. It is   true that Glock
did not pursue this aspect of his analysis to its logical
conclusion and probably downplayed the integrative implications
of religious symbol systems. But reasonable conclusions can be

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8. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op.cit., 1969, p. 163.

9. Ibid, 1969, p. 164.

drawn in this regard from the reasonably clear empirical
evidences that he puts forth in support of his own theoretical
formulations. With these observations regarding Glock's
basic theoretical assumptions and their relevance to our own
understanding of the religious pehenomena we now turn our
attention to a comparison of the dimensions of religiosity and
the mechanisms of sacralization.

B. Objectification and the Ideological Dimension

Objectification as a crucial factor in the sacralization
process has been defined as the "tendency to sum up the
variegated elements of mundane existence in a transcendental
point of reference where they can appear more orderly, more
consistent and more timeless."[10] In and through objectification
a transcendental point of reference is supposed to retain its
dialectical character. A theory insisting on a dialectical
relationship between the sacred and profane and thereby
ascribing the objectified point of reference as a leverage for
further sacralization entails both the closeness and the
separateness of the mundane and the transcendent.[11] With this

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10. Hans Mol, The Sacralization of Identity,
     Manuscript, p. 13.

11. Ibid, p. 265.

cursory summary of the essential tenets of objectification

we may now turn our attention to the belief dimension of

religiosity to ascertain if there is any reasonable degree of

congruence between the two. For Glock the transcendental

frame of reference is the crucial factor in the belief

system of any religious perspective. Here, the supernaturalism

acknowledged by Glock essentially plays the same role that

objectification plays in our scheme. Conceptualized in terms

of transcendentalism the belief dimension is considered by

Glock as a particularly necessary aspect of religiosity.

He maintains unequivocally that "it is only within some set of

beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality of the nature and

intention of the superantural, that other aspects of religion

become coherent."[12] To be sure, in this theoretical scheme the

term "belief" is used in a comprehensive way to include

warranting beliefs (supernaturalism implying existence of

the divine realm), purposive belief (belief in original sin,

the possibility of salvation etc.) and the implementing belief

(proper conduct of man towards God and towards his fellow man

for realization of the divine purpose). It is precisely this

comprehensiveness of the belief structure that further confirms

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12. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, <u>Op.cit.</u>, 1969,
    p. 16.

our basic assertion of the dialectical relationship between the sacred and the profane.

Apart from the general assertion of a transcendental point of reference being the core of a religious systems two eminently significant tenets of the objectification process need to be brought out. In our scheme of things objectification, in sacralizing any symbol system, is directly related to the emotional component of the objectified point of reference, and its openness and vagueness. True, the separateness of the sacred and the profane is a primary requisite for the order and security of any cultural system and the transcendental point of reference anchoring it. However, the separateness enwrapped with 'don't touch' sentiments also remains the emotional anchorage for the relevant (corresponding) archetypes and features of the mundane world. A theory insisting on a dialectical relationship between the sacred and the profane and thereby acknowledging the objectified point of reference as a leverage for further manipulation of the mundane entails both the closeness and the separateness of the mundane and the transcendent.

It is in this vein that Glock relates the question of saliency of a belief system with the range and degree of

religious conviction.[13] Not surprisingly then he finds that
ethicalism is directly related to orthodoxy among Catholics.
But among the Protestant bodies this relationship is not
pronounced.[14] While his findings on Catholic church members
fit well into our scheme, emphasising a close relationship
between the sacred and the profane and the sacred acquiring
further leverage for sacralization through the commitment
link, his empirical research on Protestant bodies apparently
baffles our theoretical formulations.

However, a closer examination of the situation presents
a somewhat more congenial picture. Here too Glock's analysis
tends to reinforce our emphasis on the centrality of the
objectification process in sacralization of any symbol system
though Glock himself seems to be unaware of this possibility,
and therefore unable to explain why ethicalism and orthodoxy
can be mutually exclusive roots of religious identity. The
point of the issue is that the transcendental frame of
reference need not always operate within the framework of
supernaturalism. It is at this point that our definition of

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13. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op.cit., 1969,
    p. 25.

14. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, American Piety:
    Nature of Religious Commitment, 1970, p. 73.

sacralization via objectification without taking recourse to supernaturalism has a definite heuristic advantage over Glock's conceptualization. Thus the transcendental frame of reference instead of being the dwelling place of supernatural conceptions becomes the realm where the variegated elements of mundane existence appear more orderly, more consistent and more timeless. The success of ethicalism among a section of Protestant bodies has to be understood in terms of a change in the very structure of the transcendental point of reference over the centuries. Glock's reluctance to discern this genuine change and his insistence that a Christianity working under the aegis of Ethicalism is a spurious Christianity emanates from his failure to pursue his studies in the direction already implied in his theoretical formulations. Credit has to be given to Glock for his recognition that the locus of a commitment may be a belief, a value, or a norm[15] and that "any deep and ultimate commitment is regarded as defining what is sacred to the individual whether or not he also regards it as grounded in divine or supernatural authority."[16] The implication is not that

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15. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op.cit., 1969 , p. 176.

16. Ibid, p. 27.

one should aim at commitment without ideology, as is sometimes
asserted by certain sections of liberal Christianity. Rather,
the implication is that a system of values or norms can
as much become the locus of commitment as the divine or
supernatural, if and when the system of norms or values
acquires an ideological character through objectification.

However, Glock's failure to see ethicalism on the same
footing as supernaturalism and the consequent inability to see
the same commitment link operating behind ethicalism are
further reflective of another heuristic advantage that our
scheme has over Glock. True, for Glock the transcendental
frame of reference remains the crucial factor in the belief
system of any religion. But in his search for a more concretely
identifiable index of transcendentalism Glock is pushed to
emphasise out of proportion the warranting beliefs at the cost
of purposive and implementing beliefs. This concretization of
the transcendental point of reference diminishes the research
value of the index since the vagueness and the openness of
the transcendental point of reference is lost.

c. Commitment and the Experiental Dimension

Glock uses the term commitment in a rather comprehensive
sense and thus dilutes the value of the term as an analytical
tool for understanding the complex phenomenon of religiosity.
However, what we are concerned with here is not an argument

regarding the use of the term commitment in such a comprehensive sense. What we are looking for is whether there is any concept in Glock's scheme which essentially stands for the same cluster of phenomena that comes under the category of commitment in our scheme. Besides, it will be profitable to inquire if Glock has used the term commitment in both the broader generalized context of religiosity as such and a more concretely identifiable context of emotional attachment to any specific foci of identity.

In Glock's scheme the feeling dimension of religiosity essentially performs a function similar to that of commitment in our scheme of things. Glock prefers to call it the experiential dimension of religiosity whereby an affective relationship is established between the divine and the individual. According to Glock, "Religious experiences are all of those feelings, perceptions, and sensations which are experienced by an actor or defined by a religious group or a society as involving some communication with transcendental authority.[17] The establishment of this affective relationship facilitates the identity consolidation by offering an anchorage or focus for such emotionally charged elements within human

17. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op.cit., 1969 , p. 42.

experience as concern, trust, faith and fear.[18] Variation in
the degree of commitment is actually reflective of the
intensity of one or all of these elements deemed necessary
to characterize the experiential dimension of religiosity.

Glock mentions four types of religious experiences
through which a certain belief system is reinforced. These
are: Confirming Experience, Ecstatic Experience, The
Responsive Experience and Revelational Experience. All these
types of religious experiences tend to consolidate any
specific frame of identity built around certain sets of
beliefs or interpretations of reality.

Glock's account of the emotional or feeling dimension
of religiosity is in accordance with our assertion of the
significance of the commitment link for the belief system.
The hypothesis that the emotive content of the belief system
tends to reinforce the systems of meaning and interpretations
of existence is confirmed by Glock's empirical findings. No
wonder that Glock notes that some Churches attach immense
significance to the structured context within which well-
organized and institutionalized mechanisms are employed to
generate and channel pre-dispositions for salvational experiences.[19]

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18. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op.cit.,
    1969 , p. 42.

19. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op.cit.,
    1970 , p. 47.

No less important is the fact that these experiences are
conceived of as guaranteeing a certain amount of consistency
and predictability of the behaviour of participants. It is
this urge for predictability and consistency of motivation
underlying a sacralized perspective that accounts for the
churches of Nazarenes and the Assemblies of God counting
only 'born again Christians' as members of the church; and
understandably many fundamentalist bodies require such an
experience as a necessary qualification for full membership
in the group.[20]

In arguing for the saliency of the emotive component
for the individual motivations and patterns of behaviour no
attempt is being made to undermine the significance of other
dimensions. It is recognized that the experiential dimension
of religious commitment is inextricably bound up with the other
dimension and must be treated within this more general context.
However, the importance of emotional attachment to a set of
beliefs, values or norms in clarifying one's priorities and
thereby guiding one's conduct, can hardly be minimized. It is
precisely this congruence in the basic stance on the identity
consolidating function of the feeling dimension of the sacralizing

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20. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op.cit.,
    1970 , p. 47.

process that enables us to read a meaning and orientation in Glock corroborating Mol's insight in this regard.

Then there is the question of the double-facedness of the term "commitment" in Glock's scheme. The section dealing with the specific nature of commitment unequivocally asserts that it reinforces a system of meaning or identity. Thus a strong commitment is defined as one which is held to be unalterable. Any sacrifice will be endured in order to withstand a threat to the commitment.[21] It is surprising that having defined commitment in these terms Glock even uses the term in the rather comprehensive sense including any and all dimensions of religiosity (belief, practice, experience, knowledge, consequence).

In his discussion of   the nature of commitment Glock uses the term in a rather restricted sense, which is more congenial to us; and there happily he places it on its own footing by distinguishing it from any system of norms, values or beliefs that might become the locus of any commitment.[22] A belief system is not conceived here as contained within the precincts of commitment, but as a point outside it towards

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21.   Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op.cit.,
        1969 , p. 175-6.

22.   Ibid, p. 176.

which commitment is directed. Thus different systems of symbols and meaning structures influencing motivation and behaviour patterns are conceived as different foci of commitment. Moreover, they sometimes seem to be conflicting with each other in providing a locus for the commitment of an individual or a society.

In the beginning of this section we raised the question of double-facedness of the concept of commitment in Glock's conceptualization. We have attempted to show that Glock's discussion of the experiential dimension of religiosity revolves around the emotional attachment to a specific focus of identity (in this case the Divine) and its saliency for human behaviour guaranteeing predictability and consistency. Similar concerns are reflected in his discussion of the nature of commitment where it is used in the context of its priority setting function. The use of the term in this restricted and specific sense stands in agreeable relationship to Mol's conceptualization of the problem.

D. Ritual and the Ritualistic Dimension

Congruence between this specific dimension of religiosity in Glock and the corresponding mechanism of sacralization is unequivocal. Conceptualization of this component in both the paradigms leads to similar assumptions, operates within the similar context of identity consolidation and expresses similar

convictions about its functional priority. However, this
high congruence in the conceptual and functional orientation
of two schemes need not undermine the distinguishing feature
of and specific heuristic advantage of one or the other.

First for the compatibilities. Ritual is assigned the
function of articulating and reiterating a system of meaning.[23]
It is through this that religion acquires truly social character.
According to Glock ritual generally requires a gathering of
persons for participating in the same religious activities.
Such social circumstances offer means and avenues for a
collective reaffirmation of the meaning and sacredness of the
belief system. Social meaning and context of ritual consist
in its ability to sacralize those beliefs and values which
are considered by society to be vital and crucial for its
existence. Thus, "prayers, confessions etc. in diverse ways
interpret reality and reconcile man to the environment in which
they are embedded."[24]

For Glock: "through rituals religions reinforce commitment
to their systems of beliefs about the nature and intentions of

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23. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op.cit.,
     1969 ; p. 81.

24. Hans Mol, Op. cit.

the supernatural.[25] In   other words the identity

consolidation and integration with a sacralized system of

meaning is accomplished through ritualistic activities by

repeatedly reminding the individual of the holy realm and

thereby strengthening his faith in that realm. This

'repetitive, sentiment arousing and unifying activity' has

been recognized by Mol to be the independent contribution

of ritual to the sacralization process.[26]

However, assertion of this functional priority' of

ritual in terms of the identity consolidation through

repetitive activity does not undermine the essential dependence

as well as bearing   of this element on other elements involved

in sacralization. Thus, while we note that ritual can accomplish

its task only through heavy reliance on commitment, Glock

points to the subordination of ritual to the belief dimension

of religiosity. Essential to ritual is a commitment to a

system of meaning, or identity referent which it tends to

reinforce and strengthen. This, however, need not be the

case vice-versa. Glock's concern that regular participation

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25. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark,
     Op.cit., 1969 , p. 8.

26. Hans Mol, Op.cit., p. 11.

in the ritualistic activities of the church may not be a
satisfactory index for measuring the saliency of a belief
system is not unfounded. Commitment to a certain system of
belief, structure of meaning or identity may be maintained
without giving them expression in one's ritualistic orientations.
But participation in a specific set of ritual practices without
commitment to the corresponding belief system is possible
only at the expense of the strengthening of the faith and
consolidation of identity.

These considerations as to the saliency of belief
systems for the ritual practices led Glock to incorporate a
conceptual distinction between ritual practices and
devotionalism, the former connoting formal and social aspect
and the latter connoting informal and private aspect of
religious practices.[27] The distinction corresponds broadly to
Mol's distinction between the relationship of ritual to
personal identity on the one hand and social identity on the
other. However, Glock's conceptualization of devotionalism
has the added heuristic advantage of explaining the marked
difference between Catholic and Protestant church participation.

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27. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark,
      Op.cit., 1969 , p. 15.

Within the narrow confines of a researcher's concern with
a specific empirical situation it works as an excellent
analytical tool. That Catholics exhibit a tendency towards
greater participation in public religious practices reflects
the heavy emphasis placed on ritual commitment by the Catholic
church. On the other hand, the fact that Protestant churches
generate greater private religious practices confirms Mol's
crucial hypothesis that a cluster of forces of instrumentality,
rationality, scepticism, differentiation etc. "creates the
necessity for its own counterbalance in emotially anchored
meaning, integration and identity." It is precisely in this
sense that devotionalism may be interpreted as that aspect of
ritualism which tends to sacralize and reinforce personal
identity, structures of meaning and integration.

Glock's distinction between the formal and informal
form of ritualism is of immense help in measuring the level
of religiosity. But it falls short of the comprehensiveness
of the scale of ritualism implied in Mol's conceptualization.
True, Mol's scheme is not concerned with the immediate empirical
problem; but its emphasis on a generalized theory of
sacralization enables it to deal with and explain the
significance of such widely divergent concepts as the rites
of passage dealing with change in structured contexts on the
one hand and rites of rebellion performing integrative
functions through ritual expression of commonly felt hostilities
on the other. Thus the heuristic advantage of Mol's scheme

emanates from its assertion of both reinforcement and change
of systems of meaning, identities and definitions of reality
as central variable as against Glock's recognition of the
reinforcement variable.

E. Myth and Religious Knowledge

We stated earlier that ours is not an attempt to find
one to one corelation between the dimensions of religiosity
and the mechanisms of sacralization. The statement needs to
be reiterated in the face of the conspicuous absence of the
term myth in Glock's terminology.

Myth in our scheme "is the emotion-laden assertion of
man's place in a world that is meaningful to him, and his
solidarity with it ... It is a celebration of a primordial
reality rendered actively present."[28] By providing a short
hand access to a basic experience in a symbolic way it enables
individuals to sublimate the basic conflicts of human existence
and thereby reinforce social identity. As a symbol system
it is a product of the dialectical relationship between the
integrative and instrumental symbols, though myth as a product
of this synthesis falls more on the side of expressive/integrative

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28. Thomas O'Dea, quoted in Mol,
Op.cit., p. 17.

symbolism. It is precisely this primacy of the expressive/
integrative function of mythic symbolism that accounts for
its durability and constancy. Relativization of discordance
through emotional sublimation of a basic conflict is possible
because of its capacity to arouse a common commitment and to
anchor a system of meaning emotionally. Thus the basic binary
opposition or the reality of primordial discordance between
sin and salvation and their emotional sublimation on a symbolic
level are the central variables that go to constitute a mythic
symbol system.

Glock would hardly disagree with this. Rather his
empirical findings only add to our theoretical formulations.
However his conceptualization suffers from lack of clarity
and runs into insurmountable difficulties. While Glock is
extremely sensitive to the integrative/expressive aspect of
religious symbolism he fails to perceive the dialectic between
the two symbol systems and unwittingly grants the instrumental/
adaptive symbol system an independent role in the interpretation
of reality. This is abundantly clear in his discussion of
religious knowledge as a separate dimension of religiosity
through which an individual supposedly appropriates the religious
reality.[29]

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29. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark,
     Op.cit., 1969 , p. 142-62.

Glock maintains that "the knowledge and belief dimension are clearly related since knowledge of a belief is a necessaary precondition for its acceptance." To be fair to Glock it must be noted that belief need not follow from knowledge, nor does all religious knowledge bear on belief. But on the other hand it is impossible to conceive of a situation where religious belief can exist without a certain amount of religious knowledge. Operating on this assumption Glock finds that the religious situation in America is a bundle of contradictions. For, if the knowledge and belief dimensions are clearly related and knowledge of a belief is a necessary precondition for its acceptance, then how is it that religious groups such as Catholics and southern Protestants rated highly orthodox on the belief dimension, but are rated low on religious knowledge dimension ?

The answer to Glock's dilemma lies in Mol's significant distinction between the expressive/integrative symbol system on the one hand and the adaptive/instrumental system on the other through which reality is interpreted and appropriated. It may be interesting to investigate the nature of indexes developed for measuring religious knowledge on the one hand and theological orthodoxy on the other. It is the nature of the indexes and what they purport to measure that gives a clue to the importance of assigning the integrative/expressive symbol system primacy in measuring religious knowledge. Ten Commandments, passages from scripture and names of Old Testament

prophets[30] do not give expression to the binary opposition central to the mythic interpretation of reality. Nor do they, when articulated through the instrumental reason have the capacity to emotionally sublimate the basic conflicts of human existence.

On the other hand the orthodoxy index proposed for measuring theological orthodoxy matches up with the components of mythic symbolism.[31] First and foremost, in the myth of Jesus, an index is developed to measure not whether believing Christians have heard of the name of Christ (which was the aim in the case of Old Testament prophets), but to measure the degree of belief in the Saviourhood of Christ. Thus, he is assumed to be at the synthesising apex of the theological perspective.

Secondly, when Glock's empirical findings conclude "that there is a general relationship between belief in original sin and theological conservatism underlying these data.", Glock confirms our postulation of a basic binary opposition being the central tenet of mythical symbolism.

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30. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op.cit., 1969 , p. 158.

31. Ibid, p. 59.

A theology operating with the paradigm of this binary opposition of sin and salvation, and their synthesis in the Saviourhood of Christ is bound to be occupied with the traditional concepts of Christian theology and tend to offer more viable and secure emotional anchorage for the basic conflicts of human existence through symbolic sublimation. No wonder then that the Lutheran Protestant groups and Roman Catholic rated low on the religious knowledge scale tend to occupy a high place on the theological orthodoxy index operating on the assumption of discordance and conflict between sin and salvation, disorder and order, rational autonomy and faith inherent in the cultural subsystem.

It was a mistake for Glock to have collapsed the transcendentalism with the Saviourhood of Christ and the relationship to sin and salvation to form a unilinear index for measuring the belief dimension of religiosity. No doubt mythic symbolism leads to objectification, but they are two distinctly different mechanisms having value in their own right. It would have been appropriate, if Glock had tried to see the dialectical relationship between the expressive/ integrative symbol system implied in his discussion of religious belief and the adaptive/instrumental symbol system implied in his dimension of religious knowledge. That would have secured a firmer basis for postulating the place of religious knowledge in the sacralization process. True, the basic binary opposition

that is at the heart of mythic symbolism stands in need of
the rational/instrumentive symbol system for its mediation.
But the emotional sublimation of this binary opposition
transcends the realm of rational/instrumental symbol system.
Myths accomplish this task precisely by making use of the
instrumental symbol system through repetitive presentation
and representation and it is the degree and extent of this
capacity for repetitive presentation and representation which
Glock attempts to measure as the knowledge dimension of
religiosity. But in measuring this no clue is available
to the degree of emotional sublimation through intuitive
apprehension of a basic conflict situation. This is the
problem to which Glock has partly addressed himself in the
section dealing with the belief dimension of religiosity.
It has been our concern to demonstrate that though Glock has
not brought out the independent value of mythic symbolism as
a separate dimension of religiosity, nevertheless in his
scheme it remains an extremely plausible index to theological
orthodoxy.

CHAPTER IV

YOGA AS INTEGRATION AND ITS WAYS

Modern philosophical and phenomenological literature
concerned with religious issues abound with studies of Yoga
and its techniques. Some brilliant attempts have been made
at a viable psychological explanation of Yoga and its
implications for understanding the constitution of human
personality[1]. We share these concerns in so far as we do not
dismiss Yoga as a bundle of lopsided, half baked esoteric
ideas. It is our assumption that any system of
meaning or value orientation constituting the frame of
reference for the motivational orientation of its adherents
is a sociologically analysable phenomenon. Yoga, in our view
is no exception in this regard. Accordingly in the present
study of the Yoga techniques we will attempt to discern whether
the sacralization process and its mechanisms have their
correlates in a religious symbol system developed in a
socio-cultural context other than that of the West. Our
analysis in the preceding chapter had been fruitful and had
a salutary effect on the theoretical framework developed in

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1. See Yoga: Immortality and Freedom by Mircea Eliade,
   1958; Western Psychotherapy and Hindu Sadhana by
   Hans Jacobs, 1961 and The Text Book of Yoga
   Psychology by R. S. Mishra, 1963.

the first part of the thesis. However, the scientific value and heuristic utility claimed for the conceptual scheme under investigation depends on its cross-cultural applicability and a generality that can account for varieties in the historically and culturally conditioned responses to the ever-felt need for sacralization. Our analysis of the ways of Yoga is another step in this direction.

The term Yoga has been used to denote a variety of phenomena, closely resembling in form and structure the classical Yoga formulated in ancient Sanskrit literature of Brahmanic tradition. Besides the "classic" Yoga expounded and formulated by Patanjali in his Yoga-Sutras, there are countless forms of "popular" nonsystematic Yoga; there are non-Brahmanic varieties of it, described in Buddhist and Jaina literature; and above all there are Yogas whose structures are "magical" and have been closely identified with Aghoris and Kapalikas who profess the tantric variety of Yoga in its extreme form.[2] All these variants of Yoga, despite certain similarities in ritual structure and belief orientation, are considerably divergent. Unique in their own right they deserve detailed study separately. However, in the present context, it is not possible to analyse these diverse forms of Yoga to

2.   Mircea Eliade, Op. cit., p. 4.

discern the extent and scope of the applicability of our model. For the purpose of the present study, we will confine ourselves to the theoretical and practical formulations of Yoga in the mainline Brahmanic tradition.

In ancient sanskrit writings Yoga is described as a Darsana, which literally means a 'point of view' or a 'perspective' as it is a system of coherent affirmations, co-extensive with human experience, which it attempts to interpret in its entirety.[3] Purusa (the self, consciousness) and Prakriti (not-self, the world) are the two categories in terms of which Yoga attempts to explain the "why" of human existence.[4] The contingencies and contradictions, of human life (pain and suffering) have their source in the relationship between Purusa and Prakriti, which is one of opposition and cooperation. Crucial for this interpretation of reality is the dialectical understanding of the phenomena. The dialectic consists of the essential duality of Purusa and Prakriti and a simultaneous complementarity between the two. The opposition between the two is built into the nature of things; but at the same time the things of nature are a product of their cooperation.

3. Mircea Eliade, Op. cit., p. 6.

4. In this context Yoga accepts the Samkhya metaphysics in toto. For a clear exposition of Samkhya doctrine of Purusa and Prakriti and its relevance for Yoga see Yoga Philosophy in Relation to other systems of Indian Thought by S. N. Dasgupta, Calcutta, 1930 and A History of Indian Philosophy by the same author, Cambridge, 1955.

For Yoga,world(prakriti) is real (not false, as it is
for example, for Vedanta). Nevertheless, if the world exists
and endures, it does so precisely for the sake of Purusa. The
innumerable forms of the cosmos, as well as their processes of
manifestation and development, according to Yoga, exist only
in the measure to which the self (Purusa) identifies itself
with not-self. It is precisely in this identification with
not-self that self's heterogeneity and profanity lies.
Consequently a rejection of the profane life, is considered
as a necessary prerequisite for the sacred mode of being
that constitutes the essence of Purusa or self. As Eliade:
puts it

> Solidarity with a desacralized world,
> participation in a profane nature.
> Neti; Neti; cries the sage of the
> Upanisads: No no! thou art not this;
> nor art thou that! In other words:
> you do not belong to the fallen
> cosmos, as you see it now; you are
> not necessarily engulfed in this
> creation: necessarily that is to
> say by virtue of the law of your
> own being.[5]

Here as elsewhere, Eliade and host of other scholars
have clearly noted the opposition between Purusa and Prakriti,
the sacred and the profane. But their complementarity has

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5. Mircea Eliade, *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

remained somewhat dormant in these approaches to Yoga. It
needs to be pointed out that Yoga is basically soteriology
making use of this dialectic of sacred and profane for the
final deliverance of the self, which consists in the
dissociation of the self from the not-self and realization
of its essential identity. It is in the soteriological
orientation of Yoga that the dialectic of sacred and profane
in our sense is to be located. For according to yoga the
more man suffers, i.e. the greater his solidarity is with
the profane cosmos, the greater is the tendency to move to
the opposite.[6] Yoga unequivocally recognizes the conflicting
and yet complementary relationship between the sacred and
the profane. Emphasis here is not on the state of sacredness
and its mode of being; it is primarily concerned with the
transition to or the mode of becoming sacred.

A. Yoga as Integration

It is our assumption that the problem of identity
consolidation or self-integration remains the concern of Yoga
in its diverse forms. True, Yoga is a comprehensive term
which has been used to refer to a variety of ideas and
practices ranging from the systematic formulation of Yoga
philosophy in the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali to a kaleidoscopic
variety of magical practices. However, despite the use of the

6. Mircea Eliade , Op. cit., p. 10.

term in varying contexts it has retained its original meaning,
etymologically derived from sanskrit root yuj meaning 'to bind
together', 'hold fast', 'yoke', etc.[7] Diversity of opinion may
occur as to what needs to be bound together, or to what one
has to hold fast, or where the yoke lies. Whether it is
communion of the Self with Isvara that motivates the aspirant
or the restoration of 'wholeness' of self by uniting the Siva
and the Sakti in Kundalini that drives the incumbent on the
path of Yoga, the ultimate end of all Yogas is self-integration
or the restoration of the self. It is to this self-integrative
aspect of Yoga that a modern interpreter of Yoga draws our
attention:

> Yoga thus literally means union ... It
> implies union of the mind with the
> inmost centre of one's own being, the
> self or atman-union of the conscious
> mind with the deeper levels of the
> unconscious- resulting in the
> integration of personality. That is
> indeed the chief objective of Yoga.[8]

The basic assumption of Yoga is that an integrated
self is essentially sacred. The purpose of Yogic
techniques is to unify the spirit, to do away with the
dispersion and automatism that is supposed to characterize

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7. Haridas Chaudhari, Integral Yoga, p. 21.

8. Ibid., p. 21

profane consciousness. Self integration implies bringing
home to the self the fact of the essential duality of the
self and not-self. Meaninglessness and arbitrariness that
infest human existence and constitute pain and suffering have
their source in the forgetfulness of the self's essential
freedom from the not-self, in its alienation from the ground
of its own existence. Alienation of the self consists in
its identification with not-self. Understandably then the
bringing together of self, the 'bond' in which the action of
binding is to result, presupposes, as its preliminary
condition, breaking the "bonds" that unite spirit to the world.
Detachment from one focus of identity must precede attachment
to another focus. It is in this emphasis on the detachment
and attachment that the sacralizing function of Yoga techniques
lies. In the traditional interpretation of Yoga this detachment
element has been over-emphasised; other-worldliness of Yoga
in particular and Indian philosophy in general had been a
favourite passtime of scholars of the 19th and first-half of
the twentieth century. However, the identity perspective that
we are employing in this study has the advantage of bringing
to the fore the primacy of the attachment or integrative
element of Yoga techniques. It is equally important to note
that the Yogic experience is different from conversion in the
sense that it is not a detachment from one sacralized
perspective and attachment to another that is implied here.

Rather it is detachment from a profane and attachment to a sacred mode of life that distinguishes Yogic experience from the more traumatic conversion experience. Moreover, the new focus of identity is not considered as altogether new. Rather it is restoration of one's identity or realizing one's true identity. One might suggest that the success of Yoga in certain segments of the modern west resides in this very orientation of Yogic techings. It is not accidental that modern protagonists and propogandists together (including Indian philosophers, swamis and gurus) have emphasised the non-theistic aspect of Yoga philosophy[9] From this point of view Yoga is the universal religion, for it is not a religion centred around a conception of personal god[10] It is equally understandable despite these expostulations why Yoga has not been able to make inroads into the committed segments of Christian population. Yogic techniques are not developed to suit the needs of a conversion mechanism. They can be successful only where 'the sacralized identity' is already grounded in the secured foundation of tradition, or where the

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9. Mircea Eliade, Op.cit., p. 73; Haridas Chaudhari, Op. cit., p. 22-23.

10. Haridas Chaudhary, Op. cit., p. 22-23.

'sacralized identity'   does not have to compete with an

already 'sacralized' and thereby secured identity. Success of

Yoga in the non-committed, unanchored, the 'lost' youth of

the modern west is to be accounted for by the fact that it is

eminently suited for identity integration where the emphasis

is on dissociation from a profane existence, an existence

which is utterly meaningless and full of contradictions.

In Yoga the complexities of the religious symbol system

appear in its dialectical frame of reference. Theoretical

formulations of Yoga literature tend to agree with our own

theoretical scheme. For Yoga too instrumental reason has a

conflicting and yet complementary relationship with the

expressive-integrative symbol system. The emphasis in Yoga

is on the integration of human personality through the

realization of a communion or rapport with the Supreme Being.[11]

There are at least four ways in and through which, it is claimed,

that such rapport can be accomplished: (1) Jnana Yoga (it lays

emphasis on knowledge culminating in wisdom as the way leading

to communion with the Supreme Being) : (2) Bhakti Yoga (it

recognizes the significance of the emotive content of the

belief system and takes into consideration the role of the

emotional factor in the integration of human personality) :

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11. Kenneth Soddy, Identity: Mental Health and Value
     Systems, p. 164.

(3) Tantra Yoga (the Tantra aims at the integration of dynamic
(sakti tattva) and static (siva tattva) aspects of human
personality through ritual practices) : (4) Karma Yoga
(it lays emphasis on the volitional side of human nature.
Action performed in the spirit of detachment from the fruit
thereof becomes a sacred act and is freed from its disruptive
influence on human personality). Yoga does not consider these
various ways as mutually exclusive. Recognizing the significance
of different aspects of human personality different ways of Yoga
are complementary to each other. They require a coming to
terms with the instinctual drives of human personality through
a harmonization of passion and reason. They aim at self-
integration through the organized maturity of the normal human
personality. And by offering an orderly interpretation of
reality they appear to minimize the effects of disorder,
discrepancies and chaos that the individual seems to encounter
in the world.

B. Jnana Yoga and Objectification

The corresponding concept to objectification in Yoga is
the way of knowledge or Jnana Yoga. It would seem to be a
contradiction to claim that any concept emphasising knowledge
as a way to ultimate union with the supreme is comparable to
the objectification process. The contradiction would appear to
be more telling if we use the term knowledge in its current

connotation with the instrumentive/adaptive symbol system.
However in order to understand the way of knowledge one has to
keep in mind that knowledge here refers to a state of being.
To know is to be in a particular state of being. It is that
state of being which coincides with intuitive awareness of
the essential nature of things. As Bahm puts it :

> As one proceedes along the path of
> knowledge, after distinguishing all
> differences between things experienced,
> he progressively realizes their lack
> of ultimacy and withdraws his attention
> from them as distractions preventing
> him from enjoying the ultimate
> intuition. The path of knowledge
> leads beyond knowledge to a Yogic
> intuition in which awareness and
> being are identical.[12]

The mystic overtones of Yoga reflected in this position
notwithstanding, we can clearly discern that it corroborates
Mol's distinction between the expressive and the adaptive
aspects of the symbol system. Yogic awareness of the ultimate
nature of things coincides with the coming to terms with the
essence of one's own being. The goal of Jnana Yoga is not
to manipulate the structures of the psyche or categories of
thought to enable the self to adjust and adapt to the changes
in the environing conditions. Its aim is to develop that
frame of mind which enables the self to come to terms with

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12. Archie J. Bahm, Yoga: Union with the Ultimate,
    p. 18.

itself despite the contingencies, contradictions and arbitrariness of existence.

Thus, while for Mol objectification serves the purpose of minimizing the disruptive influence of the meaninglessness of existence on the self, Jnana Yoga proposes the mechanism of discrimination (viveka) and the expressive longing for freedom (mumuksta) to protect the self from the onslaughts of mundane existence. The scheme involving the dialectic of discriminative reason (viveka) and mumksta (expressive orientation) confirms Mol's crucial hypothesis about the conflicting and yet complementary relationship between the discursive/adaptive reason and the expressive/integrative symbol system. Thus the path of knowledge includes a quest for knowledge both of self and objects as ordinarily experienced and of self and object as they ultimately are. Discrimination (viveka) is that mode of understanding which is employed by the self to comprehend the distinction between the self and the not-self. Discrimination (viveka) means clear understanding of the distinction between the real and the unreal, the permanent and the transient. Once this distinction is brought home to the self through discursive reasoning and rational analysis it gives rise to the longing for freedom, which for Yoga implies withdrawing (vairagya) from the world of not-self to the self.[13]

Through a clear understanding of the distinction between

13. Haridas Chaudhari, Op.cit., p. 62-64.

the Purusa (Being) and Prakriti (Becoming), the permanent and
the transient, a breach with the immediacy of the things temporal,
transient and contingent is accomplished. A breach with
immediacy is considered as an essential condition of the
spiritual quest.[14] One might suspect that this breach with
immediacy implies a complete rupture between the mundane and
the transcendent. However, Jnana Yoga has a different
explanation to offer. Jnana Yoga does not aim at the negation
of the mundane. Rather, it is the realization that the
mundane cannot provide the ground for its own existence, that
it draws its being and meaning from the transcendent that
constitutes the goal of Jnana Yoga. The mundane perceived
in its own right is full of contradictions, arbitrariness and
cannot defend its purpose and meaning. Perceived in the
context of the transcendent the contradictions, arbitrariness
and the contingencies of the mundane acquire a new meaning
and purpose. Transcendent is the meaning and purpose of this
mundane existence. It is for the sake of Purusa that Prakriti
exists. It is this realization that the way of knowledge
aims at.

We have argued in the section dealing with objectification
that its function is to guarantee the incorruptibility of the

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14. Haridas Chaudhari, Op. Cit., p. 63.

transcendental order as well as to provide a point of reference in terms of which the corruption, the contingencies, the chaos and the inconsistencies of the mundane realm can be interpreted and appropriated. Mol's greater emphasis on the latter aspect of objectification is not without significance. An extremely interesting example is presented by Gita in chapter XI when Krsna unfolds to Arjuna that dimension of Krsna which embraces the whole universe not excluding either of the parts of opposites, good and evil, beautiful and ugly, sweet and terrible, pleasant and painful. Arjuna who was initially reluctant to fight because he was appalled by the ugliness, the horrific vision of the ways of a world which prompt brothers to fight brothers and kinsmen to kill kinsmen, sees Krsna providing the meaning and purpose of human existence. The feeling that this all is not ultimately meaningless, that there is an order and purpose behind the arbitrary and the contingent enables the self to absorb and digest the frustrations and contingencies as not altogether meaningless, but as part and parcel of an orderly world.[15] Through Viveka and Variragya, Jnana Yoga strengthens and consolidates one's belief in the transcendental order as the ground of the mundane existence. To our way of thinking the congruence between this dimension of Yoga and Mol's formulation of

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15. Hans Mol, The Sacralization of Identity,
    Manuscript, p. 265.

of transcendentalism seems to be extremely well-founded.

As to the complexity and multifacedness of the notion of knowledge in Jnana Yoga and the justification for our placing the Way of Knowledge on the expressive/integrative side of the symbol system it may be noted that the Gita expounding the Jnana Yoga makes a clear distinction between wisdom (intuitive knowledge) and rational knowledge (discursive knowledge). Thus Krsna says: " I will declare to thee in full this wisdom (Jnana) together with knowledge (Vijnana) by knowing which there shall remain nothing more left to be known.[16] Radhakrisnan candidly points out in this context that the instrumental reason has a conflicting and yet complementary relationship with the intuitive reason.[17] We must not have merely the knowledge of the relationless Absolute and its various manifestations. However, though making an essentially correct point, Radhakrisnan because of his Vedantic bias reads Absolute for Purusa and the multiplicity as various manifestations of the Absolute instead of Prakriti. The significance of this distinction will become clearer once we try to understand the universe of symbolism within which the Yogic myths operate. Suffice it to note at this point

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16. Radhakrishnan, Ed. The Bhagvadgita, p. 212.

17. Ibid., p. 212.

that Yoga not only distinguishes the expressive/integrative
orientation of the human mind from the instrumental/adaptive
but also asserts their complementarity. As Krsna confirms :

> But this most secret thing to thee
> I shall declare, since thou
> cavillest not . This theoretical
> knowledge joined with practical,
> knowing which thou shall be freed
> from evil.[18]

A jnana Yogi in his spiritual quest proceeds from the
categories of the latter, but his aim is the supreme knowledge
or wisdom which transcends discursive knowledge. No amount
of rational analysis can resolve the problem of arbitrariness
or meaninglessness of human existence. This can be accomplished
only by knowing, i.e. intuitively realizing that the transcendent
point is the meaning and purpose of existence. This
realization requires that the aspirant must completely
surrender himself to this realization. Thus, the man of
wisdom, the Jnani, who knows, "he yields himself completely
to the Divine...["19] This surrender enables the Purusa to
realize the ultimate unity with the Isvara on the level of
consciousness precisely because Purusa could transcend the
duality only through his Sradha. Sradha (Commitment) is the

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18. Radhakrishnan, Ed. Bhagvadgita, _Op. cit.,_
    Chapter _IX_, p. 212

19. _Ibid.,_ p. 212.

Link between the mundane and the transcendent and Bhakti is the natural outcome of the intuitive realization of the oneness with the Supreme on the level of consciousness. To this aspect of the problem we will address outselves in the following section.

C. Bhakti Yoga : The Way of Commitment

The correlate to the mechanism of commitment in Yoga system is the Way of Devotion (Bhakti Yoga). Bhakti Yoga as a way leading to the union with the Supreme lays emphasis on the dignificance of the emotive content of the belief system. Elaborate and extensive discussion of the nature and orientation of the Bhakti Yoga is to be found in the Bhagvad-Gita. However, the earliest expression of the cult of devotion is to be traced to Rg. Veda where it is recorded as Sradha-Bhakti. Sradha, defined as faith or preferably commitment to believing in order to realize, is described as the necessary element in all ritualistic activities.[20] To quote from the text :

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20. Bhiksu, Bhakti Yoga, p. 21.

> Sradha lits the fire, Sradha pours
> out the oblation; it is sradha that
> the god takes cognizance of in
> prayers; is she not then the spirit
> of the ritual? Yes she is the
> embodied spirit or goddess at whom
> the whole devotion is aimed; ....
> let her inspire the worshipper
> with the spirit of faith.[21]

Later, in Mahabharata, of which Gita forms a part; it
is stated that the sages, full of faith (Sradhadhanah) and
self-controlled recognized Sradha as a mighty instrument;
every man was indeed as powerful in his spiritual disposition
as was his faith, the Sradha in him that according to Bhagvad-
Gita was itself Man. <u>Yo yat sradhah sa eva sah</u>; we quote
the text and its translation "every one is as his faith and
truly is he of that faith".[22] Nothing goes more to the real
make-up of man but the commitment (Sradha) and the content
thereof, the ideas that he has made his own by his commitment
thereto. Bhakti Yoga asserts the basic antithesis between
reason and commitment. In the later Bhakti Yoga Prema (Love)
for the divine as an intense emotional commitment to the
Supreme assumes a significant place in the Yogic scheme.

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21. Bhiksu, <u>Bhakti Yoga</u>, p. 22.

22. Bhagvadgita, cited by Bhiksu in
     <u>Bhakti Yoga</u>, p. 2.

Herein it is maintained that Prema defies description in
terms of instrumental reason, and that it is a state of
feeling rather than a state of intellect.[23] Both knowledge
and action are declared subordinate to it.[24]

According to Bhakti Yoga the experience of love (prema)
for God is a state of intense feeling in which the integration
with the Supreme is realized. Bhakti Yoga envisages man's
direct encounter with the Divine in various ways. It may
assume the form of perpetual living in the blissful presence
of God (Samipya); living on the same plane of consciousness
(Salokya); being transformed into a perfect image of the
Divine (Sarupya); and finally it may be a state of selfless
service and self-offering at the feet of God (Seva).[25] Thus in
the Bhakti Yoga of the post-Vedic Sanskrit literature the
emotional component of the religious symbol system becomes
more pronounced. Herein, Sradha gives way to Prema; commitment
is transformed into a passionate Love. Emotional attachment
to the divine is conceived in terms of one's unmotivated and
unconditional love of the divine. Paradoxically, it is

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23. Bhiksu, Bhakti Yoga, Op. cit., p. 79.

24. Haridas Chaudhari, Op. cit., p. 71,

25. Ibid., p. 70.

this unconditional love for God that provides the motivational
orientation to human existence, for all other loves are seen
as inferior to this.

Aurobindo, a modern exponent of Yoga, has recognized
the significance of the emotional component in the process
of sacralization. Commenting on the nature of Bhakti Yoga
he maintains :

> .... All is supported here by the
> primary force of the emotional union;
> for it is by love that the entire
> self-consecration and the entire
> possession is accomplished, and thought
> and action become shapes and figures
> of the divine love which possesses
> the spirit and its members.[26]

Aurobindo goes on to explicate the theoretical refinement
and conceptual clarity involved in Yogic understanding of the
stages and levels of commitment. For Aurobindo Bhakti Yoga
is a "turning of the human mind and the human soul ; not yet
divine in realisation, but feeling the divine impulse and
attraction in it, towards that by which it finds its greater
being".[27] The emotional attraction or the emotional focussing
towards the divine involves three stages of (1) adoration,
(2) consecration and (3) sacrifice. Adoration wears the form

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26. Sri Aurobindo, On Yoga, p. 535.

27. Ibid., p. 532.

of external worship and corresponds to something really felt within the mind, some genuine submission, awe or spiritual aspiration. Adoration leads to consecration i.e. self-purification of the self so as to become fit for divine contact. Consecration implies becoming like the divine. Consecration leads to a fullness of commitment implying a total devotion of all being of the aspirant to the Divine. This is described as sacrifice of love where the "bhakta (devotee) offers up his life and all that he is and all that he had and all that he does to the Divine."[28]

In this context Aurobindo's suggestion that this self-surrender or sacrifice of the Bhakta may take an ascetic form prompting the individual to renounce all personal possessions and devote his time solely to prayer[29] confirms Mol's observation that "asceticism is usually a way of clarifying personal priorities and purifying one's loyalties."[30] Moreover it is important to remember that Mol too has recognized degrees of commitment and has distinguished 'awe' from commitment per se in terms of degree of intensity with which an object of reverence is approached. However, while Mol approaches the

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28. Sri Aurobindo, On Yoga, p. 534.

29. Ibid., p. 534

30. Hans Mol, Op. cit., p. 294.

problem in the context of the evolutionary stage of a society in which the sacralization is taking place, Aurobindo remains confined to the point of view of the individual responding to the demands of an already sacralized system of meaning.

It seems to us that the most significant point that Mol makes in his formulation of commitment relates to the priority-setting function of commitment and its relevance for the sacralization of a system of meaning or value structure. Yoga recognizes the importance of setting one's priorities for integration with the Supreme. Accordingly the Hindu Yogic philosophy insists on the inestimable contribution of Sradha in setting such priorities for spiritual realization. Hence, it is maintained that the Bhakti Yoga must be one pointed (ekanta), never attentive to anything else (anaaya); never adulterated (avyabhichari) etc. ; for in the inner life that is a sacrifice (antaryajna), where the soul is the sacrificer, Sradha, oneness, non-divergence in the Will is the ultimate helpmate of the sacrificer, the Atman.[31]

It is the priority-setting function of the commitment link that on a different plane enables the hero (dhira) to perceive immense possibilities for the union with the Supreme in self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice is guided by the intense need

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31. Haridas Chaudhari, Op. cit., p. 24.

to find oneself in the company of the divine, whose constant companionship the devotee always desired, and the certainty born of commitment that death instead of being an end to life, is the beginning of a more meaningful life in the fellowship (Sakha) of the Divine.[32] This goes to confirm Mol's hypothesis that sacrifice is a form of commitment which reinforces a system of meaning or identity by clarifying priorities.[33] It is equally reassuring that the early Yoga philosophers recognize the dangers of non-commitment for the identity and meaning of existence when they warn that one must always guard against the evil of Asradha[34] (the absence of commitment).

D. Tantra Yoga : Sacralization Through Ritual

Tantra Yoga in the Yogic scheme operates on the basic assumption that the ritual aspect of the belief system is extremely important for the realization of spiritual communion. Most of the modern literature on Yoga distinguishes between Hatha Yoga and Tantra Yoga, the latter being the extreme form of ritualism in its most concrete aspect. However, in the

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32. Haridas Chaudhari, Op. cit., p. 111.

33. Hans Mol, Op. cit., p. 291.

34. Haridas Choudhary, Op. cit., p. 24.

ancient Sanskrit writings they are placed together, Hatha Yoga being a part of Tantra Yoga.[35]

The emphasis in Tantra is on the restoration of the wholeness of being.[36] According to Tantra Yoga, the ultimate goal of all tantric ritual is the union of the dynamic and static aspect of personality. These two aspects are frequently described as the polar opposites of Siva (the timeless perfection) and Sakti (the dynamism of time).[37] The two are united in the Kundalini and thus restore the 'wholeness' of the 'Being'. Symbolically it is represented as a sort of supreme marriage (mahamaithuna) between the feminine and the masculine aspect of personality, between the principles of basic energy and pure existence. The same idea is expressed in the Yogic notion of the synchronization of breath or the respiratory rhythm when the Hatha Yogi attempts to realize 'totality' or 'wholeness' of existence by uniting the HA (the breath of the right nostril representing the sun) and THA (the breath of the left nostril representing the moon).

35. Mircea Eliade, Op. cit., p. 227.

36. Haridas Chaudhary, Op. cit., p. 59.

37. Ibid., p. 58.

In this dialectic of opposites the Yogi 'realizes' the
state of 'sahaja' (the equilibrium) by transcending the
dualities. And as Hevaraja Tantra points out:"the whole
world is of the nature of sahaja - for sahaja is the
quintessence (svarupa) of all."[38] Thus the 'wholeness' or
'totality' accomplished in Tantra Yoga is both personal
and cosmic.

Rites of Tantra affirm the need for intelligent and
organized fulfilment of natural instinctual desires. It
tends to undermine any basic antagonism between nature
(society) and self, and self-mortification is considered
contrary to the functional orientation of nature (society).
Rites emanating from the Tantric theory of five M's such as
wine (Madya), meat (Mansa), fish (Matsya), parched cereal
(Mudra), and sexual union (Maithuna) are considered valuable
aids to the vigorous growth and development of the spirit.[39]
According to Kundalinini or Tantra Yoga these represent
different modes of manifestation of energy. The assumption
is that any individual making profitable use of these for a
union with the supreme power through consistent development

38. Mircea Eliade, Op. cit., p. 269.

39. Haridas Choudhari, Op. cit., p. 60.

of the 'whole' of human personality, not in isolation from, but in harmony with the social existence, is the true Yogi. For the Tantra Yoga implies that "all these desires (finding expression and fructification in rites), ultimately come from the divine will. In the final analysis they are aids to the process of evolution and progress. The important thing is to fulfill them with that understanding, in a spirit of co-operation with the creative force of evolution ... The more a person co-operates with the evolutionary impetus, the more his desires are purged of the egoistic taint and are transmuted into the pure flame of aspiration for divine life".[40]

There is more than one reason to place Tantra Yoga at par with the mechanism of ritual. Indeed its emphasis on the integrative/expressive orientation of repetitive non-logical action is the obvious common ground. Through an organized manipulation of the instinctual energy in Tantra, as Turner would put it, "the raw energies of conflicts are domesticated in the service of social order".[41] The function of Tantric rituals is to adapt and periodically re-adapt, to borrow Mol's

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40. Haridas Choudhari, Op. cit., p. 61.

41. Victor W. Turner, Symbols in Ndembu Ritual in Emmet, Dorothy and MacIntyre, Alsdair (editors), Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis, p. 172.

phrase, "the bio-physical individual to the basic conditions and axiomatic values of human social life"[42] The essential factor underlying the Tantric practices is the belief that these rites cleanse or purify mundane or profane acts and in the process sacralize the acts themselves by superimposing certain constraints on them. Hence Maithuna (participation in a sexual act) for a Tantric Yogi is a rite and not a profane act ; since the partners are no longer human beings, but 'detached' like gods, sexual union no longer participates on the cosmic plane. Ritual repetition of an act sacralizes it and the performance thereof instead of being constitutive of bondage leads to salvation. The tantric texts frequently repeat: "By the same acts that cause some men to burn in hell for thousands years, the Yogi gains his eternal salvation.[43]

We have tried to see the degree to which Kundalini Yoga fits into our scheme of things. The problem of fit has been minimized by asserting the element of repetitivenness as well as the 'wholeness' that is accomplished through the expressive/ integrative orientation of the repetitive non-logical action. However the minimization of the problem is not to our entire satisfaction. Indeed, though Kundalini Yoga lies on the side

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42. Victor W. Turner, Symbols in Ndembu Ritual in Emmet, Dorothy and MacIntyre, Alsdair (editors), Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis, p. 177.

43. Mircea Eliade, Op. cit., p. 263.

of the non-logical and tends to stabilize · through emotional
sublimation of the basic conflict of human existence, at the
the same time it has contributed to the sacralization of a
permanent state of liminality within Hindu society. The paradox
of the permanent state of liminality needs to be clarified by
stating that throughout the history of Hindu society it is
the Yogis with their expertise in Kundalini Yoga, who as a
group have been considered as outside the boundaries of the
social whole and threatening the cohesiveness of the society.

E. Mythic Symbolism in Yoga

A somewhat great difficulty plagues our attempt to
analyse the Yoga system in terms of mythic symbolism. None
of the Yogas noted by us can be identified as dealing with the
role of Myth as a separate mechanism in accomplishing the
ultimate goal of identification with the Supreme. Nevertheless,
each and all of them postulate a system of mythic symbolism
through which a specific interpretation of reality is interiorized
and assimilated at the emotional level. Thus the basic function of
emotional sublimation of the critical conflict situations of
human existence is accomplished through mythic symbolism over
and against adaptation through the instrumental symbol system.
But at the same time the dialectical relationship between the
instrumental symbolism on the one hand and expressive symbolism
on the other is not undermined. We have noted earlier how Gita

proclaims the complementarity of these two facets of symbol system in the Yogic scheme of things.

What we consider critical for mythic symbolism holds true for Yoga in its totality. Of course the reference here is to the basic binary opposition or conflict which is emotionally sublimated on a symbolic level and constitutes the core of mythic narration. The binary opposition central to the theological formulations of all Yoga systems is the conflicting and complementing relationship between the Purusa (the principle of being, static, pure, consciousness, the witness) and Prakriti (the principle of becoming, change, that which veils consciousness and is witnessed).

In and through mythical reiteration this basic duality is presented to the seeker of ultimate self-integration. For Jnana yoga this basic conflict situation is mediated through the Myth of Isvara. The removal of Maya implies an intense separative perception of the great duality, Soul-Nature, Purusa-Prakriti. However at the synthesising apex of this duality stands Isvara, the supreme who in the first place was the cause of Maya causing a false perception of identification of Purusa-Prakriti, and who ultimately guarantees removal of this false perception. In Bhakti Yoga the myth of Isvara takes a somewhat different form, the binary opposition between Purusa and Prakiriti is felt so intensely that any attachment or love (Prema) for things of Prakriti (including one's dearmost) must give way to the ultimate love (Prema) of Isvara with utter

submission and total and unconditional surrender to the divine will. In Tantra Yoga, though Isvara becomes part of the binary opposition, the centrality of the realization of the wholeness or totality as the synthesising element at which the aspirant aims, is retained. In Tantra the Divine has two opposed yet inseparable aspects: the archetypal masculine (Siva), the archetypal feminine (Sakti). Siva is Pure Being, timeless perfection, eternal wisdom. Sakti is the power of Becoming, the creative energy of time, the joy and love of self expression. Function of maithuna (sexual rites) in Tantra Yoga is to highlight symbolically the integration of these principles; "the true sexual union is the union of the parasakti (sakti element) with Atman (the Siva element); other unions represent only carnal relations."[44]

Two observations may be offered. First, the basic binary opposition is constantly present in the mythic symbolism employed by various Yoga. Secondly the distinctiveness of the myth lies in its constant reiteration and yet ever changing narration of a basic truth. It is the constancy of this basic truth underlying various ways of Yoga that provides the ground for the reinforcement of the definitions of reality and

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44. Mircea Eliade, Op. cit., p. 262.

structures of meaning that constitutes the uniqueness of the Yoga belief system. Yogic myths in various ways state and restate the binary opposition between Purusa and Prakriti with ultimate primacy of synthesising unity in Isvara.

CHAPTER V

THE DIALECTIC OF APPROPRIATION, CONSEQUENTIAL DIMENSION AND KARMA YOGA.

In our formulation of the process of sacralization in the first chapter we referred to the two pronged dialectic of the process: the making of the sacred and the sacred in its turn exercising its capacity for further sacralization. Our analysis in the preceding chapters has primarily been concerned with the first aspect of the sacralization process; the mechanisms of sacralization proposed by Mol and the corresponding dimensions of religiosity as well as the ways of Yoga related to the emergence of and sustenance of a transcendental order as the point of emotional anchorage. We found considerable analytical merit in the structure and the operations of the mechanisms involved in the process. This process of the emergence and sustenance of a certain set of symbols or a system of meaning with the antecedent qualities of separateness and transcendence we described as the process in and through which a system of meaning or value structure acquires the quality of sacrality. In the articulation of this dimension of the sacralization process we discerned the role played by the mechanisms of objectification , commitment, ritual and myth. And our analysis of the ways of Yoga and the dimensions of religiosity confirmed the hypothesis concerning the role of these mechanisms in the emergence of a transcendetal

point of reference.

However in our explication of the process the second aspect of the sacralization process, i.e., the sacred exercising its capacity for further sacralization received little attention. The thesis of sacralization entails a dialectical relationship between the sacred and the profane, and one important moment in the dialectic is that the sacred is never completely separated from the profane. This point has been made earlier. However, what remains to be worked out is the way, or the mechanism through which the sacred extends its reign over the profane and moulds and transforms the profane into the sacred. It is to this aspect of the sacralization process that the mechanism of appropriation relates.

A. The Dialectic of Appropriation

We have maintained that through objectification and commitment man's need for an ultimate answer to the problem of meaninglessess is met and that they along with ritual and myth enable individuals to establish a relationship with the beyond or the sacred, as the ground of being or the meaning of existence. However, it is equally clear that most of life is lived in the sphere of the profane, the everyday, in the realm of the less than ultimate concerns, activities and relationships. How then is the demand of ultimacy to be related to the requirements of mundane existence ? How is the response to and

relationship to the sacred to be integrated with the demands

of the profane existence ? And more important, what

implications does such relationship have for the profane

mode of existence and what consequences follow from such

relationship for the profane ?

Weber more than any one else has contributed towards

enriching our understanding of the contribution made by the

sacred to the profane world.[1] In his analysis of the conditions

for the emergence of Capitalism he clearly stipulated the

transcendental ground for the Calvinist innerworldly

asceticism. Weber pointed out that while 'the otherworldly

asceticism' of the Catholic monk "necessitated a withdrawal

from the sexual and family life, from property and class

relationships, and from political participation, the Calvinist

believed that all these activities, if properly regulated and

co-ordinated, could contribute to the fulfilment of God's will,

and form part of the glorification of God on earth which was

man's supreme duty."[2]

O'Dea has made similar point in his articulation of the

thesis of a dialectical relationship between society and

religion. He has noted that the sect as a form of religious

1. The point that Max Weber made is essentially correct
   in stating that a certain conception of the sacred
   has a specific kind of consequence for the mundane
   existence. Weber seemed to say that in the absence
   of a specific kind of ethic a specific kind of change
   is highly unlikely.

2. Betty R. Scharf, The Sociological study of Religion,
   p. 139.

organization arises as a response to anomie, providing both new values and a new sense of community to its participants.[3] He also noted a considerable overlap of religious and social stratification and pointed out how the world of the sacred tends to intermingle and become intertwined with the profane world.[4] While on the one hand this enhances the strength and grip of the sacred on the profane it also devalues the sacred. A consequence of this devaluation of one specific locus of sacredness would be that a new locus of the sacred will emerge and will place demands on men's allegiance and commitment. As Durkheim pointed out in his "Elementary Forms", the function of religion is to retard social change and maintain solidarity of existing groups and in so far as a particular religion cannot perform this function successfully, new groups will arise which in their turn will become sacred to their members. It is in this vein that he argued that Nationalism and Communism in modern society could become the successor religions to the various forms of Christianity precisely because no society can maintain itself which fails to provide its members a vision of an ideal form of life and a ritual

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3. Thomas O'Dea, The Sociology of Religion, p. 7.

4. Ibid., p. 79.

expression of this ideal.[5]

Durkheim has enlightened us both with regard to the how of the relationship between the sacred and the profane and its consequences for the profane. He describes it as one of patterned alternation of sacred and profane modes of existence. According to Durkheim the ground for such a relationship implying an alternate mode of being to the entire exclusion of the other lies in the contagious nature of the sacred. To Durkheim's way of understanding the sacred is not only totally other but also totally contagion, i.e., it infests everything that comes in contact with sacredness.[6] Durkheim pointed out how various religious interdictions are directed against this aspect of the sacred and how they are employed as a buffer against the sacred precisely because the coming together of sacred and profane is considered extremely dangerous for the profane.[7] While we tend to agree with Durkheim that contagion is the intrinsic quality of the sacred and that it is through contagion that the sacredness is propagated and perpetuated we have some reservations about his

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5. Betty R. Scharf, Op. cit., p. 25.

6. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of The Religious Life, p. 358.

7. Ibid., p. 360.

explanation of the implications or the consequences of such

a relationship for the profane. From our point of view the

coming together of the sacred and profane is built into the

dialectic of the sacralization process and the consequent

transformation of the profane in to the sacred is not always

detrimental to the interests of mundane existence.

In the first place it must be asserted that the purpose

of the interdictions is not so much to protect the profane

from the dangers of the contagion of the sacred, but to

maintain the intactness of the sacred. The sacred's coming

together with the profane does have some diminutive

consequences for the sacred. O'Dea has pointed out how the

embodiment of the sacred in the profane vehicle causes a loss

of sacredness. Referring to the consequences of a merging of

the ethical message with the religious message he maintained

that such an attempt to make the religious message relevant to the

everyday activities and the concern of people "involves the

risk of making everyday and prosaic what was originally a call

to the extraordinary".[8]

And yet the sacred cannot help extending itself to the

profane. It is intrinsic to the nature of the sacred that it

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8. Thomas O'Dea, Op. cit., p. 94.

appropriates and assimilates all that comes in contact with it. In the process the profane becomes sacred and the gradual diminution of the sacred occurs. As one value structure or system of meaning tends to become less relevant because of concretization of it which must take place in order that the sacred may exercise its power for sacralization, new value orientations or meaning structures come to be sacralized. The same mechanisms of objectification, commitment, ritual and myth remain as relevant for sacralization as ever. But the new systems of meaning or value structure too, once they have acquired the quality of sacredness in and through these mechanisms, do not remain totally confined to the transcendental locus. If it has to have relevance for human existence it must participate in the mundane life. This it does through the mechanism of appropriation.

It is precisely at this point that universal religions have specific advantages over other elements of culture. Universal religions not only have the privilege of sacralizing expertise within the specific cultural contexts, but they have done so in tune with the demands of the dialectic of integration/ adaptation, stability/change. Through prophecy, charisma, conversion etc. at different moments in the history of society changes are incorporated and assimilated at different levels. While conversion and other rites of passage enable the individual to cope with the moments of change in personal

identity charisma and prophecy are mechanisms developed for
the purpose of incorporating changes at the level of social
identity.[9] Because of this expertise in dealing with the
forces of change and adaptation, universal religions have
developed a certain amount of immunity to the diminutive
effects of appropriation. They tend to assert their relevance
even in the wake of continued onslaughts of the forces of
change. Mol has referred to this dialectic between the forces
of change and consolidation as the ground of the success of
universal religions in the history of human society: "The
survival of universal religions ... does not only depend on the
viability of the cultural identity which they sacralize, but
also on their capacity to mute as well as motivate individuals,
to constrain as well as co-opt recalcitrant groups, to reform
as well as reinforce the social whole".[10] The point of the
argument is that though sacralization through appropriation
entails . . subsequent devaluation of the sacred, this danger is
effectively counterbalanced in the context of institutionalized
religions. Just as an organism develops immunity to certain
bacterial infections through constant exposure to it over a

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9. Hans Mol, Manuscript: The Sacralization of Identity,
   p. 337.

10. Ibid., p. 339.

long period of time or an immunity in the organism is
developed through injection of the bacteria in the organism
under controlled conditions, so have institutionalized
religions developed immunity to the desacralizing potential
of sacralization through appropriation.

This however is not true in the case of the newly
emerging sacralizing catalysts. The plight of the Ananda
Marga movement in India is a case in point. The movement,
as long as it remained a religious movement offering a viable
alternative to institutionalized Hinduism, was able to draw
a considerable following from the rank and file of the
intelligentia who seem to be disenchanted with institutionalized
Hinduism. However the movement went astray and suffered
inexorable loss in prestige and following as soon as it moved
to appropriate the realm of politics in order to influence the
course of change in the country. On the other hand a modern
political party Jana Sangha, which claims to derive its
ideological strength from mainline Hinduism has not only grown
stronger in the last decade but has forced all the other leftist
parties to combine together against this formidable enemy.
The association of Hindu religious fervor with a political
party has contributed to the strength of the aforesaid political
group without jeoparadizing the character and strength of the
religious fervor. A similar point is made by Mol with regard
to the sacralizing potential of systems of meaning operating

with resources drawn from the traditional religious backgrounds.
Thus he observes that "the cemetery of discarded sacredness
may contain the graves of numerous causes, liberalisms,
rationalisms, but not the one of orthodox sectarianism".[11]
On the other hand the success of Communism in Russia and other
socialist countries in extending itself to the entire mode of
human existence is evidence to the effect that any system of
meaning which is able to develop immunity against the
desacralizing potential of appropriation remains intact in the
process of sacralization through appropriation. The analogy
of immunization of the organism under controlled laboratory
conditions holds true in this case. While such appropriation
of everydayness of human existence can take place on different
levels of economic, political and cultural or artistic sub-
systems, the consequence of such appropriation is always
integrative for the group. This is even more true in the
context of newly emerging sacred patterns of meaning structures
or value systems. Thus "without the daily routines, stable
hierarchies, the personal loyalties, the emotional satisfaction
of speaking on a similar wavelength our technocratic empires
would have succumbed long ago to the forces of rationality and
efficiency which produced them in the first place. Also semi-
sacred formulas such as "free enterprise", "democracy", "rational

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11. Hans Mol, Op. cit., p. 340.

skepticism" and "objectvity" have emerged at the heart of some
of the subsystems of modern societies, such as the economy,
polity and science".[12] How effectively these systems of meaning
tend to appropriate the entire realm of human existence is an
issue that cannot be settled on a theoretical level. Intensive
empirical investigation is required before any incontrovertible
conclusions can be drawn. However on impressionistic grounds
it may not be unfair to maintain that these semi-sacred
formulas too do not lag behind in placing their claims on the
every day mode of human existence. And it may not be without
significance to investigate the degree and extent of influence
that one's professional choice exerts on one's personal ethic,
mannerisms and other critical social choices.

The preceding discussions have been concerned with an
attempt to come to grip with the relationship of the sacred to the
profane once the sacred comes to acquire the objectifying,
separating characteristics. This mode of the dialectical
relationship we preferred to call the mode of Appropriation
and we attempted to bring out its consequences both for the
sacred and the profane. It remains to be seen, to what extent
the mechanism of appropriation is congruent with Karma Yoga
on the one hand and the consequential dimension of Glock on the
other. It is to this problem that we will address ourselves in

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12. Hans Mol, _Op. cit._, p. 338-9.

the following discussion.

B. Consequential Dimension of Religiosity

Glock recognizes the significance of a certain conception of sacred for the profane mode of existence. He is convinced that religious beliefs have certain consequences for the life of the adherent and that these consequences are extremely significant for an understanding of the core-meaning of one's religious life. Our attention is drawn to the universality of this dimension of religious orientation and its implications for mundane existence. Thus he writes that "though the implications of religion for practical conduct are stated very explicitly in some religions and very abstractly in others... there is agreement among religions that consequences follow or should follow from religious commitment".[13] Religious consequences for Glock relate to individual motivation and have direct bearing on the way that an individual will conduct himself in his everyday mode of being. These consequences have to do both with what the individual can expect to receive as a result of being religious and with what he is expected to give. Thus the consequential dimension of religiosity relates to the way or the mechanism through which

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13. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Religion and Society in Tension, p. 35

a certain conception of the transcendent becomes relevant to the mundane and thereby moulds and transforms the nature of the mundane.

Glock relates the consequential dimension of religiosity with the reward-responsibility aspect of human motivation.[14] He maintains that the individual actor's response to religious ideas and beliefs, his willingness to incorporate them in his life and the concern with which he might follow religious injunctions are prompted by expectations that such conduct will be rewarded in some way. While salvation, promise of eternal life reincarnation in higher social categories etc. constitute future rewards,individuals expect that in following a particular course of conduct, in living one's daily life and mundane activities in terms of religious injunctions one will experience peace of mind, freedom from worry, a sense of well being etc. These have integrative consequences for the self and are an effective antidote to the meaninglessness and contingencies experienced in mundane existence.

Glock makes an analytical distinction between religions largely integrated into the social structure and more institutionalized religions which have an existence in large measure independent of the social structure. It is suggested

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14. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op. cit., p. 35.

that in the former case, in Hinduism for example, religious injunctions and ideas are closely meshed with mundane existence and that   they have greater control over man's day-to-day dealings.[15] In this case, according to Glock, the consequences of religious ideas for mundane existence are well articulated and can be clearly discerned. On the other hand in a society where the religious institutions have an independent existence and are not well integrated in the social structure, religiously inspired imperatives are less likely to inform the conduct of daily life in explicit ways. In this case religion remains content with articulating the general standards and gives individuals enough latitude in interpreting these general guidelines in specific life situations.

It seems to us that Glock is essentially making a similar point   that we tried to articulate in our formulation of the mechanism of appropriation. The difference between our view and Glock's is that Glock confines himself to the reward-responsibility dichotomy in his formulation of the consequential dimension of religiosity and attaches greater importance to moral or ethical implications of religious consequences. The important task that he sets for himself in the study of the consequential dimension is "to know more about what it implies for morality,

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15. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Op. cit.,   p. 34.

for altruistic behavior, for the decisions people make as they move through the life cycle"[16] In our formulation of the mechanism of appropriation we attempted to show that the consequences of a certain conception of the transcendental point of reference may extend to such sub-systems as economy, polity and art. Moreover while the relationship between the sacred and the profane is conceived in our formulation in dialectical terms, for Glock it is basically causative. To Glock the actions of the world are determined by the religious injunctions and in so far as they are only consequences that follow from the belief in the sacred they have a causal relationship with the transcendental point. We will return to this point later.

C. Karma Yoga : The Path of Action

In Karma Yoga the dialectical relationship of the profane and the sacred emerges in its most pronounced form. For Yoga self-integration is the sacred mode of being; and in Karma Yoga the problem of self-integration is related to the problem of social-integration. Karma Yoga emphasises the significance of human volition and natural propensities for action and outlines

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16. Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark,
    Op. cit., p. 37.

a scheme of things in which the activities of the mundane world, day-to-day living acquire a new meaning and provide impetus for active participation in social process. Significantly Karma Yoga unequivocally declares inaction or withdrawal from the activities of the mundane world detrimental to the growth of human personality and disruptive for the social whole.[17] Mol has drawn our attention to the fact that "the integration/sacralization at the level of self or group may have a disintegrative/desacralizing effect on the wider social whole".[18] This dialectic of the individual-integration and social-integration is recognized by Yoga and Karma Yoga is an attempt to minimize the disruptive, disintegrative consequences of Jnana Yoga and Bhakti Yoga which inevitably lead to a self-centred conception of the sacred mode of being. Karma Yoga recognizes the dialectic of the conflict and complementarity between the parts (the individual) and the whole (the society), and accordingly exhorts the adherents to strive for a social integration through spiritual growth. In his exposition of Karma Yoga, Choudhary says :

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17. <u>Bhagvad Gita</u>, Tr. C. Rajgopalachari, P. 49.

18. Hans Mol, <u>Op. cit.</u>, p. 339.

> Spiritual action may mean self-less
> dedication to human welfare on the
> basis of one's free-development.
> To be true to one's own-self is the
> first pre-requisite of social
> service ... the Yogi of action
> (Karma Yogi) proceeds to promote
> human welfare in a spirit of non-
> attachment.   A true Yogi of
> action seeks to advance the cause
> of human welfare not as self-
> righteous or self-important bigwig.
> He acts as an humble instrument
> of the supreme Being which is
> the source of all higher values.[19]

In and through Karma Yoga sacredness is extended to the

human existence in its entirety. Religion, in order to be

relevant to the needs of meaning and order in mundane existence,

cannot remain content with articulating a totally other-worldly

mode of sacredness. Inner-wordly motivation is not a prerogative

of any one specific religious orientation; rather it is a

pre-requisite for the survival and successful operation of

any transcendentally grounded religion. It is not without

significance that even Buddhism, while exhorting the ideals of

renunciation in its extreme form, also developed the ideal

of Bodhisattva, the spiritual being who finds it extremely

desirable to postpone his own final deliverance in order to

be able to participate in the affairs of mundane existence.[20]

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19. Haridas Choudhary, *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

20. Edward Conze, *Buddhism: its Essence and
     Development*, p. 125-27.

Karma Yoga makes a distinction between three kinds of actions, performance of which are conceived as having a sacralizing effect on human existence. First of all, spiritual action may mean conformity to scriptural injunctions or the ethico-religious laws embodied in scriptures. In the second place, spritual action may mean selfless action performed in the best interest of society. According to Karma Yoga man advances beyond ritualism and ceremonialism when he realizes that true virtue lies in unmotivated acts of goodness. And finally spiritual action may mean selfless dedication to human welfare on the basis of one's free-development.[21] To be true to one's own self is the first-requisite of social service. Thus says Gita :

> Janaka and others attained perfection
> only through performance of actions.
> Looking even to the welfare of society,
> you should work (perform duties of your
> station). Whatever way of life the
> great men (enlightened ones) adopt, the
> other men copy; the standards he sets up
> is followed by the people ... Hence, the
> enlightened should toil with the motive
> of the social-welfare without any
> attachment.[22]

The basic presupposition, the uniting thread that runs through the above-mentioned threefold formulation of the path of action is the recognition that self-integration and social-integration

21.   Haridas Choudhary, Op. cit., p. 74-75.

22.   Bhagvad-Gita, ed. C. Rajgopalachari,
      III, 20-25 ; Op. Cit., p. 51-52.

stand in a dialectical relationship, the social control of the individual is indispensable and that though the self suffers precisely because of the experience of meaninglessness and anomie in social existence, it must cooperate with the social mode of being to realize its own goal of self-integration. Karma-Yoga, fully aware of the problematics of the "existential" situation and the resultant bewilderment, provides the ideal of fully sacred life, a life full of meaning and purpose. It gives solace to the man of action that life has meaning and value, and that meaning and value can be realized through participation in the world-process. The Karma Yogi does not encounter nothingness, is not occupied by uncanniness, and is free from confusions and bewilderment, because he knows that life itself imposes upon each individual specific obligations and that at every moment of his existence he has a duty that is defined by his existential situation. Karma Yoga does not emphasise renunciation of the world and worldly activities; emphasis here is on the performance of those activities with a mental attitude of non-involvement and non-attachment. Non-attachment in this context implies the sacrifice of personal aggrandizement at the altar of social good. Probably there is a grain of truth in Durkheim's proposition that the sacred is the mode of society's control on the conflicting interests of individuals. Karma Yoga is a classic case of a religious symbol system performing this function.

D.   Conclusion

Thus both the consequential dimension of religiosity and
Karma Yoga address themselves to the same set of questions.
What relevance does any religious symbol system have for the
day-to-day activities of human existence? Does a specific
belief system or interpretation of reality have any bearing
on the aspect of life which is normally defined as belonging
to the realm of profane ? In other words, to what extent does
a symbol system emotionally sublimate the conflicts and
discordance of human existence, instead of just tackling the
problem through emotional displacement on the transcendental
level, and thus attempting to minimize the conflict by entering
right into the heart of the mundane ? Both Glock and Yoga
assert the significance of the specific belief system and
interpretation of reality in providing a contour for day-to-day
human existence. To them, specifically, the implications of the
religious symbol system for the profane lie in its ability
to inform and mould the profane.

Of course, Mol would hardly disagree with this. His
theoretical formulations are greatly concerned with the
dialectical relationship between the profane and the sacred.
It is precisely this recognition of the dialectical relationship
that is reflected in his choice of the language of sacralization.
Given this context, the questions to which Glock and Yoga address
themselves in the language of consequences are no less relevant

to Mol. The difference, however, especially from Glock's
approach to the consequential dimension of religiosity, needs to
be stated. To Glock the actions of the mundane world have a
causal relationship with the transcendental belief system.
His concern is different from Mol as well as Yoga in precisely
this assertion of the causative relationship between the sacred
and the profane.

Keeping this distinction in mind we will approach   the
consequential dimension of religiosity in a rather different
way. Glock thinks that the acts of the mundane world which
are informed and determined by religious injunctions are only
the consequences that follow from the belief in the sacred.
To us however the consequential dimension of religiosity will
be an assertion of the fact that the objectified or transcendent
point exercises its capacity for further sacralization. Acts
of the mundane world then become meaningful precisely because
they acquire a quality of sacrality in the process of being
informed and determined by the transcendental point. It is
in this vein that Karma Yoga argues that an action performed
in the right spirit, that is in the spirit of sacrifice to the
Lord, without any desire for the fruit thereof, does not
constitute bondage. Any mundane action, performed in the spirit
of detachment, becomes a sacrifice, a rite, sacred in nature.
Thus Karma Yoga promises the freedom for the spirit in and
through world if we accept subjection of our whole being to that

which is higher than the separating and limiting ego.

It is apparent then that the leverage for sacralization that Mol ascribed to the transcendental point is the basic assumption of Karma Yoga. However, while Mol has ascribed this leverage for sacralization to the transcendental point, his mechanisms for sacralization are deficient in providing for this leverage. It is our contention that the mechanims proposed by Mol need to be supplemented by the incorporation of a mechanism corresponding to Glock's consequential dimension of religiosity or the way of action, i.e., Karma Yoga as laid down in Yogic schemes of things. True, Glock is unable to work out the problem of religious consequences in tune with the dialectic of sacred and profane, but his insights are essentially correct in seeing conceptual advantage in the consequential dimension of religiosity. Yoga, of course, insists on the dialectic of sacralization and provides in Karma Yoga an excellent occasion for deciphering this dialectic.

We have noted extensive agreement between the mechanisms of sacralization on the one hand and the dimensions of religiosity and the ways of Yoga on the other. We found Mol's conceptual tools eminently suitable for a comparative analysis of the sacralization process in two different cultural contexts. However, while we exhausted Mol's conceptual tools dealing with the process of sacralization there remained unexhausted categories both in Glock's paradigm and Yoga whose contribution to the

process of sacralization cannot be ascertained with the help
of the mechanisms proposed in the sacralization theory. It is
important to note that Glock's fifth dimension of religiosity,
namely the Consequential Dimension and the fourth way of Yoga,
sometimes declared the most important way, namely the Karma Yoga,
do not have their correlate in the mechanisms of sacralization.
It is our contention that these categories in the respective
theoretical schemes display a certain amount of congruence and
that they are unique in their own right and need to be incorporated
in Mol's scheme. It seems to us that these categories refer
to that aspect of the sacralization process whereby a system of
meaning or value structure after having acquired the objectifying,
separating characteristics of the sacred, extends itself to
the realm of profane and thereby contributes to further
sacralization. This mode of the dialectical relationship we
prefer to call the mode of appropriation. Appropriation is
the mechanism in and through which the sacred exercises its
capacity for further sacralization. Appropriation from our point
of view is that mode of dialectical relationship which enables the
sacred to appropriate or claim the realm of the mundane; the
consequence of this mode of dialectical relationship for the
profane is the inevitable transformation or metamorphosis into
a sacred mode of being.

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