

THE WHITE-COLLAR WORKER GOES ON STRIKE

A STUDY IN UNION-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF UNION IDENTIFICATION AMONG WHITE COLLARS.

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AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNION IDENTIFICATION
AMONG WHITE COLLARS

By

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

This thesis is a piece of empirical research concerned with the study of union-management relationship in conflict situation in the 'X' Company in Southern Ontario, Canada. The analysis centres on the causes or accumulation of causes of friction and the processes which led to the aggressive conflict in the plant. It also concerns the roles played by the participants throughout the conflict situation. The thesis illustrates how the draftsmen in a strike were transformed by it, and how the meaning and the purpose of unionism to the strikers is changed by, indeed grew out of, the struggle in which they were engaged with their employers. The study is also concerned with the adjustment of social relationships in the plant after the strike. All proper names used in this study are pseudonyms.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Problem - - - - -	1
Methodology - - - - -	7

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 16

Union-Management Relations - - - - -	16
Introduction - - - - -	16
What Is a Strike - - - - -	16
The Structural Conflict Model - - - - -	17
Summary - - - - -	21
Human Relation Approach - A Critical Analysis - -	21
Industrial Relations: The Other Face- - - - -	24
The Impact of Environment on Human Relations in Industries	32
The Function of Social Conflict - - - - -	33
Conclusion - - - - -	35
Strikes in Canada and The United States - - - - -	37

CHAPTER 3: THE WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN CANADA AND UNITED STATES 39

Introduction - - - - -	39
Who Are The White-Collar Workers - - - - -	40
Unionization of White-Collar Workers in Canada - -	41
Unionization of White-Collar Workers in United States.	45
Why do white-collar workers join or resist unions in Canada and United States- - - - -	49
Summary - - - - -	52

CHAPTER 4: PRELUDE TO THE CONFLICT 54

CHAPTER 5: THE HISTORY OF THE STRIKE 78

The drama - - - - -	79
The second phase of the strike - - - - -	88
The final phase: Peace Negotiations - - - - -	100
The Battle Strategy: An analysis of the history of the strike - - - - -	106

	Page
CHAPTER 6: THE CAUSES OF THE STRIKE	109
Introduction - - - - -	109
An analysis of the Management and Workers View - -	109
The Role of 'Broken Promises' and the Departmental	
Manager - - - - -	114
Communication - - - - -	117
CHAPTER 7: A NEW PATTERN OF RELATIONS AND NEW ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE	119
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION	130
APPENDIX - - - - -	134
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY - - - - -	145

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Problem

The thesis is concerned with the study of industrial conflict in the form of a strike which took place at an 'X' Company in Southern Ontario, Canada, toward the end of 1966. The strike was a legal one which was called after the due process of negotiations and in accordance with the Ontario Labor Relations Act.

The strike was a unique one. It was not the strike normally staged by the blue-collar workers who are used to hardship in the factories or in the assembly line. It was a white-collar's strike, the first of its kind in Southern Ontario. It had not been so common in Canada and particularly in Ontario for white-collar workers to take militant action against their employers.

However, recent events in Canada* are proving that the white-collar worker is no longer contented with the existing state of affairs in management-labor relationship with particular reference to wages and working conditions.

Traditionally the white-collar worker's wage has been relatively higher than that of the blue-collar worker. Today things are different due, in part, to the technological innovations and partly to the new challenge to the managerial paternalistic philosophy by the white-collar group. Again, in some industries the wage parity between

* Events referred to here relate to the recent strikes by the Teachers and Municipal workers in Quebec and that of the Draftsmen in Westinghouse in Hamilton. These strikes took place in the first half of this year.

the two categories of workers (the blue-collar, and white-collar) is disappearing or has already disappeared, and in others the factory workers earn more than the men in white collars. This reversal in income represents a status-threat to the white-collar workers who have regarded their relative social standing as a ground for higher remuneration rather than as a reward in itself. Consequently some of them have come to develop collective consciousness which is a vehicle for a collective action against management. The white-collar workers want their own share of the industrial boom characteristic of the Canadian economy since the nineteen sixties.

The strike was also unique in that for any strike to succeed, the striking union must be in a position to close the plant, or prevent the plant from operating while the workers are on strike. This was not the case as regards the draftsmen's strike. They were relatively weak in membership, only seventy-two in number. They were the only organised workers in the plant prior to the strike. Many of the employees in the plant remained unorganised and that constituted a real threat to the success of the strike. It was just before the strike that the steelworkers of the same plant, six hundred and thirty in number, organised themselves into a union and were negotiating for the first time with the Company. The unwillingness of the United Steelworkers of America to honor the strikers' pickets prolonged the strike - a strike that should not have lasted for twelve weeks under other circumstances. Yet notwithstanding these difficulties, the draftsmen came out victorious in their struggle with management from their own point of view.

When the settlement was finally made, the terms of the agreement were worked out, not in the city where the strike took place, but in fact in New York City, not by the Draftsmen Association and the Company branch in the city where the strike took place. The union negotiators and the Company representatives met on Friday, December 9, and agreed to accept the agreement, already reached in New York. This was a very unusual procedure for reaching a settlement in industrial dispute.

One of our objectives is to present the facts of the case and to narrate in some detail the events which took place before and during the strike.

Secondly, the purpose would be to examine, the dispute which led to the strike, to discover its causes or accumulation of causes. In other words, we try to answer the question: Why did the draftsmen take strike action against their employers at the time they did?

Thirdly, it is intended to analyse the consequences, 'manifest' and 'latent', arising out of the industrial struggle between labor and management in this plant. The thesis will illustrate the role played by the draftsmen of the X Company as members of the Draftsmen's Association of Ontario, before and during the strike.

The view appears to be that from time to time each labor union is impelled to abandon the existing state of affairs and adventurously seek improvement for its members by a dangerous voyage. The source of this impulse is no doubt easily found in the political constitution of the union, whose leaders must continuously justify their appointments.

Having launched their boat, the leaders cannot turn back but must get somewhere with it.¹

The thesis will then illustrate the roles played by the Executive Committee, the Policy Committee which later became the Strike Committee, and the Union consultant. Here the roles were very crucial and strategic. Their function was to transform individual discontents into a collective or shared reaction; to lead and direct union membership so that systematic efforts to remove the roots of dissatisfaction may be made and thereby ameliorate the work conditions of the Draftsmen. It will be central to our thesis to illustrate how the draftsmen in a strike were transformed by it, and how the meaning and the purpose of unionism to the draftsmen is changed by, indeed grows out of, the struggle in which they were engaged with the management.

We are concerned with it because it involved human beings caught up in a struggle during which their lives and livelihood stood a great test. The story of the strike illustrates its effects upon the individuals qua individuals and as members banded together by a common cause, and the effects on the management and union organisation. The account throws light upon the tactics of the union officials, the influence or social pressures that led some workers to join the union, to become strikers or strike breakers. It is our intention to throw light on the understanding of the process by which a local union which was characterised by the apathetic attitude of the members before the negotiation of a new contract which led to the strike action, was reorganised, was made

1. Carl M. Stevens "Strategy in Collective Bargaining Negotiation" New York, McGraw Hill Book Company Inc. 1963.

effective as an instrument of collective bargaining and as a labor machinery for power struggle. This study, then, is a study on the behaviour of individuals in groups - what they believe, how they react, how they adjust to a conflict situation and its aftermath.

The thesis will show how management after the uncomfortable struggle with the union felt the need to alter its formerly unyielding position and expectations and to become more sensitive to the vital need dispositions of the white-collar workers and how it tried to readjust its relationship with the union organisation.

We will show in our study how the management of the X plant and the Union negotiation committee tried to reach an early settlement to their industrial conflict. The thesis will throw light upon the way in which it was to the interest of the two parties to arrive at a satisfactory contract of service, though attempts made toward this direction failed to bear immediate fruit. It will also throw light on why the strike was used as the last mechanism for adjusting the authority relations in the plant. It is of interest to see how an unwanted strike could be forced upon the draftsmen by their employers who sought to frustrate collective bargaining.

Those who conceive of the strike as anti-social and disruptive weapon to production, may see in this strike how it served as a sanction to compel concessions, and stabilised the social structure by clarifying the identity of the power-holding groups at strategic points in the industrial social system.

Though one of our objectives is to present for the reader salient drama of the story, more is needed if this study is to be justified as an important social science work. As B. Karsh has noted:

"Facts do not speak for themselves; they have no instinsic meaning or value. They take their meaning and their value from the way they are bound together with theory. That is, facts become meaningful as they are lifted from the level of the fortuitous and related to the more abstract. Facts, as empirically verifiable observations, are never gathered at random. For the scientists, facts are the meaningful products of efforts to relate them to a point of view. Science seeks to structure facts in some consisten~~t~~ fashion so that an orderly relationship is established between and among the facts." 2

Consequently, this study is guided and directed by the existing theories of collective behaviour and social conflict, and the contributions of a number of sociologists in industrial relations. The work of Blumer, Warner and Low; Kerr, Boulding, Chamberlain, Knowles, Coser and Sheppard are principal contributions.

2. Bernard Karsh, "Diary of a Strike": Urbana University of Illinois Press; (1958) p. 2-3.

METHODOLOGY

Before I undertook this research, involving a local union on strike, I had already engaged myself in the study of a Railroad (Transit) Union in Hamilton. The object of the study was to find out how a local union in Canada is organised and to learn something about how its leaders, the actives and the rank-and-file members conceive of their union. The study, then, was directed toward throwing some light on what unionism meant to the members at the local level; and finally what kind of relationship did exist between the union and management.

But after six weeks of intensive work involving interviews with the union officials I came to a conclusion that the best way of understanding the working mechanism of a local union as representative of the labor movement in Canada was to conduct a study of the union when it was involved in a conflict situation with the management.

Consequently, I intimated my intention to my thesis supervisor, informing him that I would rather conduct a study of a local union on strike. After some clarification of some points at issue, my supervisor phoned the secretary of the Local and District Labor Council asking him whether any local union was on strike. The secretary replied that there was, and gave us the name of the union and Company involved and advised us to contact Mr. Sam Land, the Vice-President of the Draftsmen's Association.

We decided without hesitation that I should undertake this research, more especially because this strike presented a rare opportunity

to study the dynamic process of the trade union movement, and also because it was an opportunity to study the white collar employees engaged in an overt industrial warfare. There has never been any study of a strike involving white-collar or semi-professional workers as a piece of sociological work in Canada and this study was to be the first of its kind.

The following day I got in touch with Mr. Land and explained to him my objectives of the study. Four days later, I went to his house for an exploratory talk about the strike. The strike was then almost in its last phase, and negotiations for settlement were underway. However, before it ended, I was able to visit the X plant at Victoria Avenue North to take a first-hand look at the situation.

Mr. Land gave me the impression that the strikers would co-operate with me, especially the union officials including the Chairman of the union, Mr. Anderson and the Treasurer, Mr. Goldent in any way they could so that I could complete the study. Mr. Land was personally very enthusiastic about the study; and he did everything possible to encourage me to undertake the research.

In my first meeting which lasted for almost four hours, Land described in some detail the history of the union since its organisation ten years ago, of the negotiation for the contract in dispute and finally the history of the strike so far. He also gave me his personal file containing records of some of the important events during the strike, and the bulletins issued by the union officials to membership, newspaper cuttings and cartoons.

Before I left, he advised me to get in touch with the union chairman and the treasurer. I got in touch with the chairman first, and spent about three hours each on two occasions to gain more insight into the conflict - to learn the 'why' and 'how' of the events during and before the strike. During these initial conversations, I was made to understand the bitterness and hostility of the strikers against the Company and their determination not only for a showdown but also for victory in their industrial combat. I also learned about the hostilities which existed between the strikers and the strike breakers, the bitter experience of the United Steelworkers of the same plant crossing the strikers' picket line. Anderson showed as much enthusiasm about the proposed study as Land.

I felt it was desirable to learn the views of Management about the strike; but I did not make any contacts with any of the Company officials until the strike was over. In fact I made my first contact with the Personnel Manager two months after the strike was over. Even then he was very reluctant to discuss about the strike with me because, the Company was still negotiating its first contract with the Steelworkers union and it was thought that the time was not opportune to start reviving the memories of the strike. However, Mr. Cook, after I explained to him that the work was only for my M.A. thesis and that the study might not be published, agreed to talk in brief about the strike. He told me the management's view of the strike, and how the strike affected the Company. Conversation about the strike and the union lasted for one hour. Later, I contacted the Personnel Manager again, this time

by telephone - this was two months after the first meeting. The conversation we had was in a form of questions and answers which I recorded almost verbatim.

I had, also, three interviews with the union consultant, each interview lasting on average three hours. Since he was the union spokesman throughout the negotiations with the Company representatives Mr. William Deck had a thorough knowledge of the background of the whole conflict. He understood completely my purpose as a graduate student in the university and apparently appreciated the value which we saw in studying the strike as a dynamic process in the labor-management relations. In addition to being a very capable union spokesman, and adviser, Deck is a highly articulate person with long experience, able to see the significance and the purpose of this study, and to discuss them with minute clarity.

By the time I had these series of interviews with the union officials and the union consultant and the Personnel Manager, we had enough information to define a series of problem areas around which to construct a preliminary interview guide. The interview guide was revised three times before it was used in the final study. We decided to eliminate or add some questions on the pretest in the light of additional information we gathered from the rank and file members - ten of them in number. The final questionnaire contained 50 questions. (For the Questionnaire used in this study see Appendix)

Most of the questions were open-ended, designed to elicit qualitative responses - the experiences which the participants had and their feelings about them. The questions were carefully examined to

avoid the possibility that the wording might lead into more than one interpretation.

Because of the limited time and finance, we found it impossible and difficult to interview the whole population of the participants, so we sent out the questionnaires to fifty seven of the draftsmen (This is because 15 out of the original 72 draftsmen who went on strike resigned from the Company and we couldn't get their addresses from the union officials) by post, enclosing a stamped envelope for the return of the answered questionnaires.

Notwithstanding that the workers were informed about the objective of the study by letter and the confidential nature of their answers to the questions, almost all of them with the exception of the union officials, refused to answer and return the questionnaires. This unexpected attitude of the strikers almost brought the study to an end. Many of them were afraid that the result of the study, if published, would affect their already strained relationship with management.

Fortunately, with the co-operation of the union consultant, and the relentless effort of the new Chairman of the union, Mr. Goldent, in persuading the workers to answer and return the questionnaires, some of the workers, thirty in number which formed approximately 43% of the employees responded to our request. The responses came, however, after we had written four letters to the workers appealing to them to co-operate.

Unfortunately there was no way for us to find out whether the 30 respondents constituted a representative sample of the population. This, I must admit, is one of the weak points of the study. However,

our unstructured interviews had led us to conclude that the majority of the draftsmen appeared rather similar to each other on several variables, such as age, educational background, sex and marital status etc. and had all taken part intimately in a collective action and had all shared the same kinds of conflict experiences. Thus our interest was directed on finding patterns of experiences in terms of quality, not of quantity.

I made some attempts to interview some or all the five strike breakers; but was not successful. There was no way for me to come in contact with them either personally or by correspondence. The union officials who provided me with the addresses and telephone numbers of the strikers, did not have the addresses nor the phone numbers of the strike-breakers, nor would the Personnel Manager of the X plant allow me to talk to these workers around or in the plant.

All information about the strike-breakers was given to me during the exploratory study by the rank-and-file members whom I interviewed or whom I had discussions with about the strike.

Interview data and data collected from the questionnaires could not give us the total picture necessary to describe the subject of study. A great deal of information came from Anderson's complete union file of all matters relating to events of the strike and also from Sam Land's personal files, containing information about the strike. These files, which were made available to me, contained about 150 documents of various kinds; including official correspondence between the chairman and the Company, the union officials and the general membership, the union

officials and other local and international unions, weekly and monthly reports of the strike events.

In addition, Anderson gave me in writing details of all the minutes taken during the negotiation meetings with the Company before and during the strike; while Goldent gave me a thorough description of his tour, together with Anderson, to New York City and the meeting they held with the affiliated international union officials in U.S.A. The information I got from Goldent gave me a lucid insight into how the contract which was finally negotiated brought the strike to an end.

We also obtained and analysed two complete files of the local and Provincial newspapers for references to strikes in general in Canada, and for references to the draftsmen's strike in the city in which the strike took place. Thus the research data were collected by means of unstructured interviews, questionnaires, and direct observation and not the examination of strike records.

The objectives of the study are specified with sufficient precision to ensure that the data collected were relevant to the questions raised.

There are two major ways of relating a given study to a larger body of knowledge. One, obviously, is to examine the research and the thinking that has already been done on the given research problem or problems related to it; and to plan the study so that it ties in with existing work at as many points as possible. The second is to formulate the research problem at a level sufficiently abstract so that findings from the study may be related to findings from other studies

concerned with the same concept.³ In this study we employed the two methods outlined above.

Since the questions asked all related to the respondent's total experience with respect to this participation as a striker, we analysed the questionnaires, as an integrated whole, and the categories of responses were derived from the interview and questionnaire data empirically. We analysed our data in terms of quantitative measures in order to establish the modal distributions with respect to such things as percentages of members who took part-time jobs during the strike; percentage of members who before the strike were just friendly with each other and who became very friendly after the strike, and also the percentage of those who favoured the items of the new contract.

The result of these quantitative measures are for the most part presented in modal terms rather than as precise statistical results. This was done because, in the first place, we are concerned with the quality of behaviour and secondly because the number of the respondents (30 out of the 72 strikers) was relatively small in size. This method led us to the conclusion that what we could not describe and defend in qualitative terms would be no better described nor defended when presented as measures of statistical significance between variables. The quantitative manipulations we made were intended to give us an idea to understanding behaviour and relationships, rather than as statistical proofs of our findings.

3. Selltitz et. al. "Research Methods in Social Relations". Holt, Rinehart & Winston. New York. 1966. p: 44.

This method is quite defensible and in accord with all the studies done on strikes as an aspect of social conflict and collective behaviour. - A. W. Gouldner "Wildcat Strike";⁴ Warner & Low "The Social System of the Modern Factory: The Strike: A social analysis";⁵ Bernard Karsh "Diary of A Strike".⁶

The study went through six drafts before its final form was fixed. The first draft was read by Deck, the union consultant and Mr. Glass, the Personnel Manager, for factual accuracy. Deck made certain suggestions which were incorporated into the study, while Glass made no comments.

The second weakness in this study, I must admit, is that there is the inevitable tendency to analyse the events leading to the strike and the history of the strike mainly, though not wholly, from the workers' point of view. The weakness was inevitable because we could not get the full co-operation of the management. However, most of the information collected was supported by official correspondence between the union and management on the one hand, and between the Conciliation officials and the two parties in dispute on the other hand.

The interpretations of the data and the analysis of the data were purely my own though I had advice at many points.

4. A. W. Gouldner "Wildcat Strike" Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1966.

5. W. Lloyd Warner & J. O. Low. "The Social System of The Modern Factory, The Strike: A Social Analysis" New Haven: Yale University Press. (1959)

6. Bernard Karsh "Diary of A Strike"; Urbana University of Illinois Press (1958).

CHAPTER 2

Review of the Related Literature.

Union-Management Relations.

Introduction.

The relations between management and workers are of central importance in the field of modern industry. With unionization, workers have become incorporated in organisations. The relations of workers to management become increasingly led by, directed by, mediated by and expressed through such trade union organisation.

What is a Strike?

Kenneth Boulding defines a strike as "an overt withholding of labor on the part of the work-group. When tension between work group and an employer reaches some limit of toleration, overt conflict breaks out, usually in the form of a strike. The strike is not only a rational economic phenomenon, it is in part a release of tensions and anxieties, but it is also a drama, something that brings excitement and a sense of high purpose into otherwise humdrum lives. The labor movement appeals to the heroic as well as to the economic man."¹

The essence of the strike lies in the behaviour of human beings acting together; it involves groups and their relationships between and among each other, it requires planning and organisation, the strategy,

1. Kenneth E. Boulding "Conflict and Defence, A General Theory", Harper Torchbooks. (1963) pp. 216-217.

and tactics of collective action; it involves the forging of new forms. It is not merely a cessation of work in pursuit of an economic goal; it represents an instance of social conflict in the form of a corporate refusal to participate in the previously accepted social institutions. From its collective nature, the strike derives its power of coercion and the motives upon which it rests.²

The Structural Conflict Model.

The union-management relations are based both on conflict and co-operation of the two parties. "The union is dependent upon the enterprise and at the same time is in conflict with it. The relationship of dependency and conflict with the management is the core of union action".³ However, this study addresses itself from the point of view of conflict model of the social system in industries without neglecting the alternative and/or complementary imparative- the equilibrium model.

Warner and Low maintain that:

"If social science is to be of any worth to us it must be capable first of all of adding significance and meaning to human behaviour which will give us deeper insight into human life and explain more fully than common-sense knowledge why human beings act the way they do".⁴

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2. Bernard Karsh "Diary of a Strike", op. cit. p. 3
 3. Arnolds Tannenbaum "Unions" in Handbook of Organisations (ed.) James G. March. (Rand McNally 1965). pp. 710-756.
 4. W. Lloyd Warner & J. O. Low. "The Social System of the Modern Factory, The Strike: A Social Analysis" op. cit. p. 6.

This deeper insight into human life can best be found in conflict situations as W. F. Whyte put it:

"The most effective way of bringing out the salient characteristics of a system of human relations is to focus attention on the frictions and inco-ordination that arise within it." 5

Warner and Low further contend that:

"The best of all possible moments to achieve insight into the life of the human being is during a fundamental crisis when he is faced with grave decisions which can mean ruin and despair or success and happiness for him. In such crisis men reveal what they are and often betray their innermost secrets in a way they never do and never can when life moves smoothly. If this is true for the study of men as individuals, it applies even more forcefully to the study of men in the social system. It is when hell breaks loose and all men do their worst and best that the powerful forces which organise and control human society are revealed." 6

Labor-Management relations are punctuated with conflict.

Conflict between organised labor and management is more than an expression of irrationality or ill will. Given a rational reaction of each party to the other and mutual good will, conflict is still inherent in this modern industrial society. The desires of parties are more or less unlimited. Wages can never be as high as workers desire or profits or salaries as high as owners or managers might wish, the power to make those decisions lying within the orbit of an economic enterprise is also infinite.

5. W. F. Whyte "Human Relations in the Restaurant Industry" New York McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1948.

6. Warner L. Low "The Social System of the Modern Factory". op. cit. p. 1.

Given the survival of both parties they must share it in some fashion, and neither can ever be entirely happy with the distribution, for, so long as the other has any power at all, it can make satisfactory decisions.⁷

Management seeks freedom to exercise its authority as it deems fit and freedom for business profit. It strives to maintain possession of authority to direct the business at its discretion. Organised workers seek an improved position to determine at their own discretion the terms on which they will accept continued employment. Organised workers' penetration of managerial function constitutes a threat to the logical goals of management and a direct challenge to its authority and discretion.⁸

A. V. Gouldner states that the stability of worker-management relationships ordinarily rested on a set of shared expectations which the men in one group had concerning their own rights and privileges, and the degree to which those in the other group conformed to these expectations in their daily activities.⁹

Thus

labor-management conflict flows inevitably from the unsatiated desires of men, the relationship of managers and managed, the need to adapt to changed conditions in one fashion or another and the drive for institutional separateness and the strike is the most common and most obvious and dramatic of all symptoms and they provide the simplest heads under which to collect information. However, unrest finds expression in strikes only if workers have some social cohesion and tradition of common action.¹⁰

7. Clark Kerr "Industrial Conflict and its Mediation" American Journal of Sociology., 1954-55, Vol. 60, pp. 230-245.

8. Neil Chamberlain "The Union Challenge to Management Control" New York 1948

9. A. V. Gouldner "Wildcat Strike". op. cit. p. 17.

10. K. G. J. C. Knowles "Strikes and other Symptoms of Unrest" in American Journal of Sociology; 1954, Vol. 60. p. 214.

Ralph T. Seward contends that: "One of the chief causes of industrial conflict is, on the one hand, with discretion - the ability to make choices - which is a prime function of management; on the other, with a function of protection of establishing limits on, or guideposts for, the exercise of management's discretion - and this is clearly a basic function of a union".¹¹

"Each attempt of the unions to gain more for their members, either materially or functionally, from management is understandably construed by the latter as a threat to its prerogatives. Of course, these prerogatives have been slowly subjected to a process of sharing with, or surrendering to, the employees by collective bargaining.

"Two points of relevance should be made here:

"(1) The collective bargaining as a 'peaceful' alternative to strikes can be effective only if the power and the right to strike is maintained by the workers.

(2) The collective bargaining involves primarily a relationship between two formal, organised collectives, with their common and conflicting goals, values, tradition, expectations, and means of satisfying these." ¹²

On the mundane level, we found that a labor organisation is committed to its membership to 'deliver the goods' e.g., higher wages, shorter hours, better working conditions, etc. It is not just a matter of more as much as it is a quest for security on the part of the employee. In certain periods, when security is relatively out of danger, aspirations for a higher standard of living manifest themselves at least in Canada and the United States.

11. Ralph T. Seward "Arbitration and The Functions of Management" in Industrial & Labor Relations Review 1962, p. 235.

12. Harold L. Sheppard "Approaches to Conflict in American Industrial Sociology" in British Journal of Sociology. 1954. Vol. 5. 324-341

Such forces, plus the dynamic one resulting from the spread of a democratic ideology wherein workers demand the right to be consulted and participate in decisions affecting their daily work-lives, and the right to appeal against decisions, run up against the value-system and structural position of managers and employees.

Summary

From the point of view of conflict theory, in every social organization some positions are entrusted with a right to exercise control over other positions in order to ensure effective coercion; it means, in other words, that there is a differential distribution of power and authority. Differential distribution of authority invariably becomes the determining factor of systematic social conflicts. The structural origin of such group conflicts must be sought in the arrangement of social roles endowed with expectations of domination and subjection. Differentiation of groups engaged in such conflicts follows the lines of differentiation of roles that are relevant from the point of view of the exercise of authority.¹³

Human Relation Approach- A critical Comment.

For the Human Relations experts social harmony appears to be one of the factors adduced to account for industrial stability.

Mayo and many of his associates expected the atomization of society as a result of industrialization. Industrialization, they thought, would lead to disintegration of traditional social groups such as the

13. Ralf Dahrendorf. "Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society" Stanford University Press. (1966) p. 165.

family, village community and religious groups. They predicted the disappearance of the intermediary bodies between the state and the individual as mass society evolved. Hence they saw the mission of the new social unit, the factory, as providing a new home, a place of emotional security for the atomised individual. Management was expected to provide the needed social and emotional shelter, and in return it would be rewarded with a devoted, hardworking and satisfied labor force.¹⁴

Not that the Human Relations experts are oblivious of the inherent built-in-conflict in authority relations; but they are optimistic that such conflict need not be inevitable; that by the training of personnel in human relations, such conflict naturally disappears giving way to industrial peace. Co-operation, for them, would be achieved by careful manipulation of the workers by the employers.

"By providing an unrealistic 'happy' picture, by viewing the factory as a family rather than as a power struggle among groups with some conflicting values and interests as well as some shared ones, and by seeing it as a major source of human satisfaction rather than alienation, Human Relations comes to gloss over the realities of work life. Worker dissatisfaction is viewed as indicative of lack of understanding of the situation rather than as symptomatic of any underlying real conflict of interests."¹⁵

14. A. Etzioni "Modern Organisations" Prentice-Hall; Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. pp. 46-47.

15. Ibid. p. 42.

The structural-functional approach opposes the Human Relations approach by Elton Mayo and his school. Harold Sheppard has stated that: "While the human relations experts plead for co-operation, they never tell us anything concerning the basis for co-operation between the two organised entities involved. Co-operation for what? Towards what goals? At what price to each side? This brings us inevitably into the matter of power issues, values, and interest, in the sphere of labor-management relations".¹⁶

And Amitai Etzioni also contends that:

"The major analytical rather than ideological criticism of the Human Relations approach is that it tends to focus on a narrow range of variables and to study them without taking others into account. It often fails to relate the findings on the variables studied in a particular study to those examined elsewhere. Thus the Human Relations people tend to devote much attention to informal relations among workers and between workers and supervisor but little to the formal ones, or to the articulation of formal relationships with informal ones."¹⁷

16. Harold L. Sheppard. "Approaches to Conflict in American Industrial Sociology". in *British Journal of Sociology* 1954. Vol. 5 pp. 324-341.

17. A. Etzioni "Modern Organisations" op. cit. p. 46.

Industrial Relations: The Other Face: The union-management
co-operative relationship

I do not intend to simplify the relationship by maintaining that labor-management relationship is always a conflict relationship. The conflict model represents only one aspect of industrial relations. There is also some co-operation between management and labor unions; both sides share some basic business values. In Canada as in the United States, both employers and the workers accept the basic values of capitalism as an integral part of the social structure; conflict arises from superstructural issues such as the distribution of profits, and the right of control over the working conditions.

Stuart Jamieson,¹⁸ writing in 1957, stated that "Up to the last few years Canadian employers generally have been even less willing than their counterparts in the United States to recognise and make concessions to unions, though their opposition has been expressed less violently on the whole. For a number of reasons, also, they have generally been in a stronger position to resist union demands. Canadian workers, for their part, by and large have been less willing or able than American workers to organise and strike for their objectives. Hence, on the surface at least, labor relations in Canada's major industries in previous decades, with some notable exceptions, have had the appearance of being unilaterally controlled by employers and, compared to the United States, stable and harmonious. Strikes and lockouts were relatively few.....And where they have occurred, there has generally been less violent conflict between workers and employers."

18. Stuart Jamieson "Industrial Relations in Canada". MacMillan of Canada, Toronto; 1966 p. 6.

Jamieson argues that the use of professional strike-breakers, labor spies, and other spectacular features of industrial warfare in the United States in previous decades have been absent from the Canadian scene; again with several notable exceptions. Government policy in Canada, moreover, has on the whole put more emphasis on the prevention of strikes or lockouts than has been true in the United States.

"External weakness and dependence upon other nations, coupled with her internal divisions, appear to have made a permanent imprint on the Canadian character. There is, for instance, a strong penchant to accept compromises and avoid violent conflicts over matters of interest or of principle - a factor that notably affects the character of industrial relations in Canada."¹⁹

Since World War II, the Canadian workers have enjoyed higher wages and steadier employment, together with numerous 'fringe' gains. These gains were not achieved without a good deal of industrial conflict, despite new and elaborate legislative restrictions imposed on strikes and lockouts. Industrial disputes during and immediately after the war reached an all-time high.

By 1957 trade unionism and industrial relations in Canada appeared to have reached a new equilibrium of sorts. This might be the result, in part, of greater maturity among organised labor and employers. After several years of continued growth and significant collective bargaining gains, in the midst of over-all economic expansion and the

19. Stuart Jamieson "Industrial Relations in Canada" Macmillan of Canada, Toronto; 1966 p. 9

aegis of protection legislation, trade unions in Canada were on the whole more secure than ever before. Employers in most industries and enterprises of major importance, whether from necessity or choice, have become resigned to the prospect of having to deal with unions as a necessary and integral factor in the industrial scene. Most lockouts and strikes in the years following the second World War were carefully planned actions for clearly thought-out and realisable goals. They had been undertaken only as a last resort, in most cases, after protracted negotiation or long-drawn-out conciliation procedure.

Evidence above has shown that before the change in the pattern of industrial relations in Canada (in some major industries) following the recent industrial boom (from 1960 onwards), the relationship had been characterised as relatively harmonious and co-operative.

A good example of the existence of co-operation between union and management could be found in the study of 'Union Participation in Plant Decision-Making' by Milton Derber et. al.²⁰ In this study, the authors pointed out that one of the most significant issues in industrial relations since the end of World War II has been the scope and depth of union participation in decision-making at the plant level. The union participation in the decision-making without any consequential loss of managerial prerogatives, is the core of union-management co-operative relationship

William F. Whyte in his 'Pattern For Industrial Peace',²¹ throws light on how co-operation could be achieved between union and management.

20. Milton Derber, et. al. "Union Participation in Plant Decision-Making" in *Industrial & Labor Relation Review* 1961-62. p. 83-101.

21. William F. Whyte "Pattern For Industrial Peace". Harper Bros. Publishers, New York. (1951) pp. 67-113; 198-204.

Whyte's study in the Chicago plant of Inland Steel Container Company illustrates a case where union-management relationship which was previously characterised by conflict gave place for a co-operative relationship. Before co-operation was achieved there was no communication up from the bottom to let management know what the score was. Management simply relied upon terrorizing the worker to make up for all the deficiencies in management planning and organization. Such a dictatorship naturally gave rise to underground opposition with its accumulative effective strike action. But during the next contract negotiations both sides feared another strike and both sides wanted to avoid the strike. In the discussion of the grievance procedure - which was the main point at issue - management and the union built up a pattern of meeting problems that augured well for the peaceful settlement of the contract. The peaceful settlement was achieved by the fact that both sides showed restraints and were able to avoid emotional explosions and personal recriminations.

Here were a group of men, deadlocked, facing a strike and yet able to express the firm respect for each other that they had built out of the hard but cleanly fought negotiations. They had created an atmosphere favourable to settlement.

According to the contract, management was not required to consult the union either on technological changes or on lay-off. Nor did management intend that such problems should become matters of joint determination. Nevertheless, management, while retaining the initiative in those areas, carried out its plans in a close consulting and

co-operative relationship with the union.

Whyte contends that union-management that are able to work together harmoniously have, in fact, developed a general understanding of their individual functions and of the way those functions may be fitted together. Whyte further poses this question: "Can that understanding be arrived at through prior discussion or can it only evolve on the basis of the experience of the parties? We often find that groups of people are able to work together when they give their attention to practical problems but are unable to get along when they discuss the principles underlying their relationships." *

In the study referred above, that experience was well illustrated. It was seen that it was one of the great strengths of the negotiators on both sides of the table that they were able to avoid discussions of abstract principles and instead concentrated on specific problems. Furthermore, the parties were able to adjust their functions somewhat differently step by step in the process of acting on those problems. They evolved a different relationship and a more mutually satisfying one on this problem to problem basis. The parties would not be where they were if they had sought in advance to reach a general decision on the division of functions and responsibilities.

Adjustment on this issue apparently must come through an evolutionary process. But does that evolution involve management constantly giving ground to the union? That is the fear of many management people, and that fear quite naturally impels them to try to draw the line somewhere and take up a strong defensive position behind that line.

* William F. Whyte: Pattern For Industrial Peace
op. cit. p. 200.

Such a point of view is a product of American-Canadian history in industrial relations. Unions in the mass production industries of these countries were relatively new phenomenon. They sprang up with aggressive attacks upon management's prerogatives in one field after another. However, an equilibrium has been achieved in many cases; but it tends to arise in terms of a rather general understanding among the parties as to how they fit together rather than from any specific line of demarcation.

Helen Baker²² has stated that:

"Where management has admitted the possibility of different sphere of workers' loyalties to the union and the company, other types of changes in staff organisation are likely to result. Thus even outside the direct areas of current negotiations, management may find it wise as a preventive measure or even positively advantageous to consult the union concerning contemplated changes in policies or procedures. By the same token, the union may serve as a more effective medium of communication than the direct line organization or the posted bulletin."

And Whyte also maintains that:

"Where reciprocity develops between union and management, management is able to get help on its problems through the union. The union assumes some responsibilities for the welfare of the enterprise. Through consultation and joint action, management can be seen reaching goals that could have been impossible on a unilateral basis. By taking the union leaders into management's confidence on important matters, management increased the confidence the members and leaders had in management. Consultation and joint action greatly strengthened the economic effectiveness of the management organisation." 23

22. Helen Baker, "Company-Wide Understanding of Industrial Relations Policies: A study in Communications". (Princeton: Industrial Relation Section; Princeton University, 1948). in *Industrial Relations and The Social Order* by William E. Moore; The Macmillan Company. (1951) p. 329.

23. William F. Whyte "Pattern for Industrial Peace". op. cit. p. 200.

This proposition is supported by a research done in England by Scott, Banks, Halsey and Lupton on "Technical change and Industrial Relations".²⁴ The authors found in this study that industrial relations in the Steel Industry had been characterised from the early years of its establishment by an endeavour to resolve disputes by negotiation, conciliation and arbitration rather than by recourse to more drastic measures, and by a recognition, on the part both of management and unions, of each other's difficulties and needs. Very few disputes in the industry have been occasioned by a proposal to introduce a technical change. The historical emphasis on conciliation and arbitration in the steel trade led to the early establishment of standing joint machinery for all 'process workers'. The procedure of the Board Joint Committee in cases of conflict is an admixture of conciliation and arbitration, and its spirit stemmed from the desire to avoid conflict if the issue could be settled peacefully.

There was no legal sanction behind its decision; but the force of custom and tradition was so strong as to constitute a sufficiently powerful moral injunction upon the parties to accept the decision. There were many meetings between management and the unions about wages. The techniques of production were discussed at great length and in the minutest detail also. The lay officials who attended those meetings; being operatives themselves, maintained their prestige and that of their unions and formed a vital channel of communication between workshop and conference room. The firm gained considerable insight into the problems of the operatives and a chance to explain their policy and problems.

24. Lupton et. al. "Technical Change and Industrial Relations". Liverpool University Press. 1960. Chapt. 3.

Finally, another case illustrative of co-operative relationship between union and management was done by Joel Seidman,²⁵ et. al. In the 'Bell System' the telephone workers were overwhelmingly favourable toward their employer. There was often enthusiastic praise for the company, expressed in superlatives such as, "It's the most wonderful place in the world; I like it". The workers were grateful to be associated with a large and powerful corporation, without the apprehensions prevalent among factory workers that the company's power could be a threat to them. They likewise appreciated the pension and other benefits; plus the fact that they were reasonably assured of steady work, even during business recessions. Still others emphasized the ease with which they were extended credit because they were telephone company employees.

The great majority of operatives believed that the company selected employees for advancement according to impartial, objective standards, including ability, performance, and length of service. Many of the leaders of the local believed that their union activity, far from hurting their opportunities for promotion, improved their chances of being offered supervisory positions.

In addition, the Bell System had made a conscious effort to be a benevolent employer; it had been concerned with a pension system, vacation and sick-leave provisions, good treatment by supervisors, attractive restrooms and lunchrooms, recreational facilities; and the like. It had provided opportunities for advancement by its policy of promotion from within the industry, and had tried to sell itself to its employees and to the general public as a progressive, if not a model, type of employer.

25. Joel Seidman et. al. "Telephone Workers" in Man, Work and Society. (ed) S. Nosow. W. Form. Basic Books, Inc. Publishers. New York. 1962. pp. 497-503.

The Impact of Environment on Human Relations in Industries.

We must view the impact of the environment in comparable terms, asking questions that require us to make comparisons of cases. Economists Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegal²⁶ address themselves to the question - to what extent do human relations appear similar in the same industry in different regions of the world? On the interindustry propensity to strike, they showed that the degree of harmony between management and labor in a given company could hardly be interpreted entirely in terms of the human relations skills of the people immediately involved because there are characteristic labor relations patterns within a given industry. Furthermore, those patterns transcend national boundaries. In the coal industry, for example, there has been a long history of strife in many countries throughout the world; while the clothing industry has been relatively free from strife.

Kerr and Siegal sought to explain these differences in terms that are essentially sociological. In the strife-prone industries, they point to the homogeneity of the work force and its separation from other types of people. They were saying that if you have large numbers of workers doing much the same job and experiencing much the same conditions and, in addition, living close together and isolated from management people and other types of workers, then under these conditions you tend to get a militant work group in frequent conflict with management. Conversely; if the workers in a given plant carry on a wide variety of jobs and live scattered throughout the community, they tend not to stick together in militant attacks on management, and we see relatively little strife. In

26. Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegal "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike - An International Comparison" in A. Kornhauser, R. Dubin, and A. M. Ross (eds) Industrial Conflict. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc. 1954. pp. 189-212.

effect, they were showing how the technology, the distribution of jobs, and the social ecology of the community affect interpersonal relations on the jobs.

On the whole, the industrial relation in America and Canada is characterised by both conflict and co-operation. As the union matures, as it gains strength, and as the standard of living rises and moreover, as the workers enjoy a good amount of security and wages, a tendency towards co-operation between union and management emerges. Until recently the white collar unions had maintained considerable co-operation with their management. All told, industrial relations in Canada since 1960 have been marked by conflict. Both the white collar workers and blue collar workers are anxious to get their respective share of the present industrial profits. The direction of the pendulum may change, but who knows when?

The Functions of Social Conflict.

Industrial society, quite generally, is highly disposed in favor of law and order. Aggressive conflicts between capital and labor are considered both undesirable and largely unnecessary. It is often suggested that carefully devised mediation machinery administered by skilled practitioners can be effective in greatly reducing such conflict. This is particularly the image of the strike held by management, and also by the Human Relations experts.

Industrial conflict is viewed by many social scientists of the older generation and by most Human Relations writers as basically undesirable. The Human Relations people seek therefore to promote industrial harmony.

Alan Page²⁷ in a letter to the editor, *Hamilton Spectator*, 17 October stated that "The strike weapon by unions should and ought to be condemned, terming strikes anti-social because they substitute force and violence for reason and logic. In all too many strike situations, there are flagrant violations of the laws of this country. The impact of strikes on communities is so serious that an alternative has to be found". Mr. Page further argues, listing other objectives to strike action, that strikes create serious social inequalities by enabling an organised minority to improve their economic conditions at the expense of fellow workers.

This view is contradicted by the structuralists. They rather point to the many important social functions of conflict, including its positive contributions for the organisational system itself and object to any belief to emerge, whose confrontation may lead to a test of power and adjustment of the organisational system to the real situation, and ultimately to organisational peace. If glossed over, Etzioni argues, conflict and its concomitant latent alienation will seek other outlets such as withdrawal which in the end are disadvantageous to both worker and organisation.²⁸

The strike appears most obviously as a conflict manifestation. But its function is more than this. Within the framework of the Canadian bargaining system it is primarily a tool for resolving conflict. This may appear paradoxical. But as Kornhauser et al.²⁹ has put it:

27. *Hamilton Spectator*, October 17th. 1963 (ed). Bas Korstanje; Labor Correspondent.

28. A. Etzioni "Modern Organisations" op. cit. p. 44

29. A. Kornhauser et. al. 'Industrial Conflict'. op. cit. pp. 16-17.

"In the event that voluntary negotiation fails to produce agreement, either party may invoke a penalty in the form of loss of employment to workers through the lock-out or loss of production of the employer through the strike. A strong motive-power to negotiate agreement results from the threat of such loss. And in the case where a stoppage is undertaken, the strike again functions to bring about agreement, for only by agreement can the risks of remaining unemployed and unproductive be ended."

"In continuous union-management relations there is a tremendous pressure for rapid resolution of present conflict issues so that the relationship between the parties can have a basis for continuity."

The strike, then, is the mechanism which produces that increment of pressure necessary to force agreement when the differences are persistent and do not yield to persuasion or argument around the bargaining table.

"Whether social conflict is beneficial to internal adaption or not depends on the type of issues over which it is fought as well as on the type of social structure within which it occurs.

"Internal conflicts which concern goals, values, or interests that do not contradict the basic assumptions upon which the relationship is founded tend to be positively functional for the social structure."

Such conflicts tend to make possible the adjustment of norms and power relations within groups in accordance with the felt needs of its individual members or sub-groups."

"Internal conflicts in which the contending parties no longer share the basic values upon which the legitimacy of the social system rests threaten to disrupt the structure".³²

32. Lewis Coser: The Functions of Social Conflict in Coser & Rosenberg, Sociological Theory. p. 176.

STRIKES IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

In Canada and the United States there have been many studies on strikes but, with few exceptions, the treatment is either historical or statistical. Bernard Karsh writes that:

"Social and social psychological studies of strikes are few indeed - namely - W. L. Warner and J. O. Low - "The Social System of the Modern Factory, the Strike A Social Analysis" and A. W. Gouldner's "Wildcat Strike" ³³

Bernard Karsh himself has published a book on "Diary of a Strike". These represent the few empirical strike studies as aspects of social behaviour.

Karsh maintains that:

"Most of such studies (with the exceptions outlined above) seek to shed light upon the causes of strikes without an adequate analysis, if any at all of the individuals and groups who do the striking. Since the strike is first and foremost a form of human behaviour acted by individuals in groups, their causes are social as much as, if not more than economic or historical." ³⁴

Besides, "strike statistics", K.G.J.C. Knowles argues, "are limited in scope and necessarily somewhat inaccurate, incomplete, and ambiguous in character. There are greater difficulties in classifying strikes, as is done in Britain and other countries; according to their apparent main 'cause or object'. Any such classification must be somewhat subjective, since not only do most strikes break out on a multiplicity of issues, the relative importance of which may change in the course of the strike, but the main issue on which the strike is fought may turn out to be more or less irrelevant to the real cause of discontent."³⁵

33. Bernard Karsh "Diary of a Strike" op. cit. p. 2.

34. Ibid p. 2

35. K.G.J.C. Knowles: "Strikes: A Study in Industrial Conflict" (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952): pp. 210-211.

And also John Meredith states that:

"No impartial student of strikes can fail to be impressed by the lack of correlation between the precipitating cause of the strike and the amount of feeling necessary to lead to such drastic action. The choice of a bone of contention whether in industrial life or in personal relations or anywhere else in society, may often be almost accidental" 36

The strike threat (since 1960) is being used in Canada more often and with more effect than at any time since the troubled years immediately after World War II; however, the number of man-days lost each year has been, on average the same.

Garry Smith³⁷ reported that the year 1966 was the worst in two decades for labor disputes in the Canadian city where the research reported on this paper was carried out. Nearly 20,000 workers were involved in strikes or lockouts there during 1966, although some lasted only a few days. In that city alone, there were 25 work stoppages recorded in city and district. This is below 1965's 38 work stoppages; but many of those in 1965 involved only a few workers and several were back on the job in an hour or two.

Although no official statistics are available for a comparison with previous years, a rough estimate puts the average number of work stoppages in the last decade at about 10 or 12. The statistics show it was a long hot summer for labor-management relations as 18 of the 25 work stoppages occurred in the June-September period. The incident affecting the most city workers was the four-day wildcat walkout at the Steel Company of Canada's Hilton works, spreading to other Stelco plants in the city,

36. John Meredith "Psychological Aspects of Strikes" Penguin Parade Second Series, (1948) p. 48

37. "Strikes and Lockouts" in Hamilton Spectator. December 21st, 1966.

it meant some 1,500 steelworkers were off their jobs, and another 1,000 construction, cartage and service employees were affected.

The longest work stoppage was the 86 day general truck driver's strike that began January 20th and was not concluded until May 2nd. It affected 600 Teamster Union members in the city area. Soon, it was eclipsed by the strike of some 120 employees of Quigley Construction Company which began September 16th. It was at this critical period of labor unrest in the city as well as in the whole of Canada especially in Ontario and Quebec that about 72 draftsmen at X Company walked out for 12 weeks. It began in September and ended two weeks before Christmas.

In Financial Post under the Headline 'Strike misery mounting' published on 8th of January, 1966 it was stated that the prospect then was for new turbulence in Canadian labor relations. The very determined revival of auto union demands for so-called wage parity with United States workers suggested a major battle in the making.

Certainly, the strike heritage of 1965 made it clear that the relative tranquility of the early 1960's had evaporated. At the end of the year 1965, the number of strikes and lockouts in Canada during 1965 reached an unprecedented high of 501. This total, comprised of 478 work stoppages which began during the year and 23 which were in effect as the year began, represents an increase of almost 50 per cent over 1964.

A. V. Gouldner has stated that "Social scientists of the most varying standpoints agree that human action can be rendered meaningful only by relating it to the context in which it takes place. The meaning and consequences of a behaviour pattern will vary with the contexts in which it occurs." 38


38. A. V. Gouldner "Wildcat Strike" op. cit. p. 12

Thus I have found it necessary and desirable to relate the draftsmen strike within the context in which it took place. This will also help us to understand the general atmosphere of labor-management relationship during the period of industrial boom, it will enable us to understand latent and extraneous causes of the strike at the X plant.

Table 1
STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN CANADA, 1945-1965

YEAR	STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS BEGINNING DURING YEAR	STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN EXISTENCE DURING YEAR			
		STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS	WORKERS INVOLVED	DURATION IN MAN-DAYS	
				MAN-DAYS	PER CENT OF ESTIMATED WORKING TIME
1945.....	196	197	96,068	1,457,420	0.19
1946.....	223	226	138,914	4,515,030	0.54
1947.....	231	234	103,370	2,366,340	0.27
1948.....	147	154	42,820	885,790	0.10
1949.....	130	135	46,867	1,036,820	0.11
1950.....	158	160	192,063	1,387,500	0.15
1951.....	256	258	102,793	901,620	0.09
1952.....	213	219	112,273	2,765,510	0.29
1953.....	166	173	54,488	1,312,720	0.14
1954.....	155	173	56,630	1,430,300	0.15
1955.....	149	159	60,090	1,875,400	0.19
1956.....	221	229	88,680	1,246,000	0.11
1957.....	238	245	80,695	1,477,100	0.13
1958.....	251	259	111,475	2,816,850	0.25
1959.....	201	216	95,120	2,226,890	0.19
1960.....	268	274	49,408	733,700	0.06
1961.....	272	287	97,959	1,335,080	0.11
1962.....	290	311	74,332	1,417,900	0.11
1963.....	318	332	83,428	917,140	0.07
1964.....	327	343	100,535	1,580,550	0.11
1965.....	478	501	171,870	2,349,870	0.17

From Canada, Dept. of Labor; Economic & Research Council Branch in
"Strikes and Lockouts"



CHAPTER 3

The White-Collar Workers And The Labor Movement in Canada
And United States

Introduction.

Arnold Tannenbaum defines unions as organizations designed to protect and enhance the social and economic welfare of their members.¹

In a recent appraisal of American trade unionism, Daniel Bell, following the theories of John R. Commons and Selig Perlman, makes the distinction between unionism as a social movement and 'market unionism'. The social movement is an ideological conception, shaped by intellectuals, which sees labor as a part of a historical trend that challenges the established order. Market unionism, on the other hand, is an economic conception, a delimiting role and function, imposed by the realities of the specific industrial environment in which the union operates.²

"It is the social movement concept of unionism that links it with left wing political groups, while market unionism limits activities to collective bargaining. Inasmuch as American unions have an ideology it is that of 'laborism', that is, the goals of general improvement of wages and working conditions through bargaining with employers and through legislative activity. This "pale ideology" of market unionism makes it possible to speak of the labor movement, but it is scarcely a sufficient ideology to speak of a social movement bent in some way on transforming the society."³

1. Arnold Tannenbaum "Unions" in Handbook of Organisations (ed) James G. March, Rand MacNally (1965) p. 710.

2. Daniel Bell, in Galenson & Lipset, (eds) "Labor and Trade Unionism"

3. John Porter "The Vertical Mosaic" University of Toronto Press (1966) p. 314.

C. Wright Mills states that "objective circumstances of the work situation influence the white-collar employees' psychology when they are confronted with the idea of joining a union. By and large, these are not "different from those affecting the organisability of wage-workers, and include: strategic position in the technological or marketing processes of an industry, which conditions bargaining power; unfair treatment by employers, which creates a high state of grievance; a helpful legal framework, which protects the right to organise; a profitable business but one in which labor costs form a small proportion of the cost of production, which means that higher wages will not severely affect total costs; relative permanency of employment and of labor force, so that organization may be stable".⁴

Who Are The White-Collar Workers?

This group of workers can be divided into distinct categories.⁵ First, those in the white-collar industry of finance which embrace, banks, trust companies, insurance firms and real estate. This group employs 128,000* or four per cent of the labor force. Trade unions have had very little success in the organization of these employees.

Secondly, there is the public service group which, on the Federal scene, employs about 163,000* eligible employees and, provincially, about 173,000.* Union organization will receive and is receiving a considerable membership boost in this area with the introduction of collective bargaining to the public service and crown corporations.

4. C. Wright Mills "White Collar" New York University Press (1966) pp. 304-305.

5. C. J. Connaghan "White-Collar Unionism in Canada" in Cost and Management. Journal of the Society of Industrial and Cost Accountants of Canada. (May 1966) p. 225.

* All the figures given under "Who are the White-collar Workers?" refer to Canada alone.

Thirdly, there is the retail trade, which includes supermarkets and similar organizations. The unions have had some success in this area.

Fourthly, there is the white-collar group in industry where unions have had their greatest success. These workers are found in offices directly associated with production facilities; and those who work side by side with production workers.

Unionization of White-collar Employees in Canada.

In the public service field, there is overwhelming acceptance among civil servants of the need for union organisation and collective bargaining. Two out of every three men and women in the public service-federal-provincial and municipal- have some form of organization. In this category approximately 163,000 salaried employees of the federal government; the 173,000 employees of the several provincial governments and the several thousands for which there is not yet an accurate figure who work for crown agencies and public bodies such as Hydro Commissions.⁶

C. J. Connaghan⁷ contends that in little more than a decade, some ~~three million white-collar workers~~ have become the hope and despair of Canadian trade unions. Long taken for granted by management and largely ignored by labor, they now find themselves in a position of being wooed by both.

For the unions, the salaried people represent their last and best hope for future expansion.

6. Royden Morris and Mike Michealson (eds) "Can Management Cope with The Challenge of White-Collar Unions"? in Office Administration, August 1966 A Southam Business Publication.

7. C. J. Connaghan "White-Collar Unionism in Canada. op. cit. p. 224.

Industry, no less than labor, is concerned about the attitudes of white-collar employees. Many companies are conscious of errors they made in the past, particularly during the decades before and after the Great Depression. They hope to prevent a resurgence of the union movement which would affect white-collar workers. In Canada in 1911 there were 133,000 union members, blue-collar and white-collar alike. In 1965 there were 1.6 million. Since 1964, union membership has been showing some increase. An increase in membership of 6.4 per cent occurred between 1964 and 1965, the largest percentage increase since 1956.

Union membership in Canada at the beginning of 1966 stood at an all time high of 1,736,000. This is 30.7 per cent of all non-agricultural paid workers in January 1966 and 24.5 percent of the total labor force. The increase in union membership from 1965 to the end of 1966 was 147,000 or 9.3 per cent. This is also the highest percentage increase in any single year since 1952 when a gain of 11.4 was registered.⁸

At the beginning of 1965, white-collar members affiliated with the Canadian Labor Congress totalled 176,000 or 15 per cent of the total C.L.C. membership. Between January and May of 1965, the C.L.C. claimed that its affiliates had signed an additional 10,000 white-collar members. Since the end of the 1950's; however, total membership in the unions has not been keeping pace with the labor force which is fast expanding due to the technological developments in many economic enterprises.⁹

8. Department of Labour, Economic & Research Council: Canada. 1966. p. vii

9. C. J. Connaghan op. cit. p. 224.

In absolute numbers, some of the organised white-collar employees have recorded an increase in membership. In Ontario 4,000 retail employees were organised in 1966. The Retail Clerks, International Association recorded an increase of 4,100 members or 34 per cent, and the Canadian Federation of Public Service Employees reported an increase of 37 per cent over the 20,000 members reported in 1965. The American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada increased by 16,695 from 800 in 1960 to 17,495 in 1966; Office and Professional Employees' International Union AFL-CIO-CLC recorded an increase in membership by 2,591 from 1960 to 1966. The Retail trade, Wholesale and Department Store Union increased by 1,000 over seven years (1960-66).¹⁰ The Ontario Federation of Teachers, and the Nurses Associations have also recorded some increases since they were organised. The number of white-collar workers attracted to unions are interested in organizing themselves, for example, the teachers, nurses, and the radiologists in the province of Quebec. The Ontario primary and secondary school teachers certainly are and have been successful in compelling school boards to bargain. The registered nurses want collective bargaining and are moving towards it with deliberate speed because they feel that it is one of the effective ways that they can regain lost prestige which has come about in part from sub-standard pay and working conditions.

Other components of the professional field already strongly organised are seeking to change their status. Professional engineers are active in this field and have approached the government several times seeking to have special legislation passed to provide a method for

10. Labour Organisations in Canada; 1960, 1965, & 1966. op. cit.

collective negotiations. The medical profession is seeking changes. Indeed, 75 medical doctors on the staff of the City of Montreal applied in 1966 for certification to the Quebec Labor Relations Board.

Again white-collar unionism gained a territorial foothold in Cornwall late in 1965, when a textile firm, Courtaulds (Canada) Limited signed an agreement for its office workers with the Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA). In less than a year, the office employees of three other manufacturing companies in the Cornwall area had followed Courtauld's example in seeking union certification. The Courtaulds pact, the first white-collar agreement in Canada for TWUA, covers 142 office, clerical and technical employees.¹¹

Although there has been a remarkable growth in the white-collar union membership since the 1960's this group still forms about 15 per cent or less of the total trade union membership in Canada. Also, organised white-collar still represents a small fraction of the total white-collar potentials in Canada. C. J. Connaghan reports that out of a potential of three million members, only one-twelfth of that number have been able to organise by 1966.

However, white-collar trade unions are not something new in Canada. Like their counterpart in the United States, they have a long history of existence. The Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Telegraph and General Workers has been represented office workers for more than sixty years, as has the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks.

11. Royden Morris & Mike Michæelson. op. cit. p. 224.

White-collar workers in the pulp and paper industry have been unionised for many years. The civil servants, federal and provincial, has a long history of having formed associations, of having grievance procedures and so forth. It is only within the past decade, however, that the industrial union, traditionally blue-collar oriented, have made a concerted effort to organise the white-collar group. The one exclusively white-collar union is the Office Employees International Union'. This union, which cut across industry in general and was once described as 'the sleepest affiliate of the CLC', has raised its membership from 5,500 in 1962 to 6,500 in 1964.

Among the industrial unions, the two most active organisers are the United Steelworkers of America, who have made gains in the steel and mining industries, and the United Automobile Workers in the automotive industry.

Unionization of White-Collar Workers In America

Since the white-collar unionisation in Canada follows almost the same pattern as those of their counterpart in the United States, I think it necessary, therefore, to give a brief account of white-collar unionisation in America.

In America the white-collar sector makes up a substantial and an increasing proportion of the union potential. In 1960 the total union potential amounted to 47 million workers a little under three quarters of the employed work force. Of this the white-collar group accounted for 44 per cent, as compared with 39 per cent in 1950.

Of the white-collar workers, an estimated 2.7 million, or 13 per cent, are union members. Also estimates show that there are currently 2.8 million white-collar union members, comprising 15 per cent of the 18.6 million total union membership in national and international and un-affiliated local unions.*

All told, almost one out of three persons in the work force was part of the overall white-collar potentials that confronts the American labor movement. The data clearly indicate that, if the union movement is to be successful in the future, it must organise white-collar employees as well as blue-collar workers.

Unionisation in the heterogeneous white-collar sector is characterised by multiple contenders, including manual unions, in some key fields. Most unionization has taken place among 'peripheral groups' as compared with the proportion in the more 'pure' white-collar occupations. Here the potential is largely untapped, organising resources are few, and major concentrations, such as office workers in downtown business districts, are left.

Solomon and Burns¹² stated that professional workers in the entertainment services are highly organised, and there is substantial unionization in the smaller fields comprised of reporters, air pilots and technicians in radio communication. Important unionization efforts exist in two large fields, engineers and scientists and schoolteachers,

12. Benjamin Solomon & Robert Burns; "Unionization of White-Collar Employees" in Labor: Readings on Major Issues. (ed) Richard Lester pp. 130-155 Random House Books, New York.

* Figures on American white-collar unionism are from Benjamin Solomon and Robert Burns' "Unionisation of White Collar Employees"

but on a scale that is small compared to the size of these fields.

There is limited organizing activity in the professional nursing fields.

Out of a total of 1.8 million schoolteachers in 1961, almost 1.5 million worked in public elementary and secondary schools in 31,700 school districts. An estimated 600,000 of the public school teachers are concentrated in 800 to 900 school districts in cities of about 25,000 or more population. The American Federation of Teachers (AFT), the chief union in this large occupation, had a membership of 70,000 in early 1962.

Though the jurisdiction is vast, the future extension of unionism among teachers will be decisively influenced by the headway the AFT is able to make in a small number of large school systems. A high proportion of AFT membership has historically been concentrated in large northern and western cities, but most of these locals have not been able to win a majority of teachers as members. While the union has gained steadily during the post-World War II years, its progress has been slow despite the favourable climate for new organization provided by inflationary pressures and demand and supply conditions.

White-collar membership lags numerically far behind that of blue-collar unionization. As far as can be determined from evidence, they are not organised and operated in a manner comparable to trade unions, an example is the unknown number of local government employee associations.

Many or all the members of professional associations such as the National Education Association, the American Association, or the National Society of Professional Engineers are salaried employees. In one way or

another, such associations have become involved in the problems of earnings and employment conditions affecting their salaried employee members. Nevertheless, these organizations usually not only oppose unionism in their professional fields but also reject a policy of collective bargaining on their part with employers.

White-collar membership is concentrated in a number of larger unions, which is typical of the union movement generally. The seven unions with over 100,000 white-collar members each have about half (1.4 million) of the total number of organised white-collar workers. These unions are illustrative of the heterogeneity of the white-collar unions in the following fields: retail trade, musicians, railway clerks, telephone industry office workers and telephone operators, post office clerks, and post office letter carriers. The seventh union (United Steel Workers) is an industrial union that has organised many office workers and plant clerical workers.¹³

The data and discussion have brought out major structural characteristics of present-day white-collar unionism in Canada and the United States. Though strong in a few fields, unionization of white-collar employees on an overall basis has made small headway in major sections of this vast sprawling potential. The strongly organized fields and the large white-collar unions tend to be found in the peripheral instead of the core white-collar fields. Many blue-collar unions have some white-collar members, and a number of these unions are relatively important contenders in key, though still lightly organised, white-collar fields.

13. Ibid p. 140

Why do white-collar workers join or resist unions in Canada and United States.

Why office workers join unions.

As Connaghan¹⁴ has rightly pointed out, there is no simple answer to this question. People join unions for a variety of reasons. A different set of factors and circumstances is operative in each situation before a union is formed. Here are some of the reasons why office workers join unions.

- (1) Economic Reasons. The narrowing of the gap in wage structure between the white-collar and blue-collar employees represents a status-threat to the former occupational group. In order to maintain the status-quo in the economic and social scale prior to automation, the white-collar employees are forced to join the union. Groups of white-collar workers have come to realise lately that through collective action, they can increase their share in the industrial profits.
- (2) Social Origins of the white-collar employees. Until the Second World War, white-collar workers had tended to come from lower-middle class or middle class families. Invariably they tended to identify themselves with management and to regard unions as institutions designed solely for blue-collar workers. They feared that to join a union would mean loss of status. Today, however, many of the white-collar employees have grown up in a union home environment. Because of this, union membership no longer holds a social stigma. Consequently, office workers are no longer afraid to join on the grounds that it is not socially acceptable.

14. J. Connaghan op. cit. p. 224-240

(3) Automation and its effects on the psychology of the white-collar workers. With many organizations currently changing to total system and advanced office automation concepts, the old paternalistic attitudes breed a sense of insecurity and frustration in the employee. Again, at this age of automation, the white-collar workers suffer alienation, traditionally regarded as a working class phenomenon. Thus the psychological reasons for joining a union concerns the individual's feelings of basic worth, his need for dignified treatment, and the freedom from fear of loss of job. This is no more than a desire to be treated fairly and to have his grievances put right. The white-collar workers have come to believe that the union meets their psychological needs better than management.

As we have pointed out above, not all the white-collar workers join unions. Claude Jodoin, President of the Canadian Labor Congress, addressing more than 200 labor council delegates, union leaders and representatives in Toronto, May 11-12, 1967 said that "Not all the unorganised are organisable: they include professional and managerial staff, domestic servants, doctors' receptionists as well as employees of very small firms".

Even with union growth in the last five years, Jodoin pointed out, the number of unorganised in Canada had increased from 3,000,000 to 3,900,000, many of them white-collar workers. There are 1,200,000 in the service sector, about 800,000 in retail-wholesale, about 900,000 in manufacturing, 180,000 in transportation, storage and communication still unorganised in Canada.

The question then is: Why have many white-collar workers refused to organise?

Dick Bruner¹⁵ argues that the overwhelming majority of salesmen, typists, file clerks and professionals will not join because they feel differently from blue-collar workers about their jobs, because they are afraid it will hurt their advancement, and because the face of the labor movement seems to them crude and exploitative.

Workers in small shops are harder to round up than their brothers who share anonymity with hundreds or thousands in big plant or office.

Today, there is no movement among white-collar workers that even remotely parallels that surge of the 1930's among the industrial workers when the CIO first declared that it would "organize the unorganised". The reason, simply, is that white-collar workers are different. They are different because they do have a kind of dignity as part of their occupations. But this is not to say that office workers and departmental store clerks have suffered no indignities. Of course they have suffered too, but some (not all) seem to prefer to swallow these in silence.

Another reason why some groups of white-collar workers cannot be organised is due to the fact that many of their complaints about working conditions are focussed against particular management personnel rather than against a basic company policy. This makes it difficult for an organiser to find a common denominator which he can exploit in an organizing campaign. This was not the case in the plant studied which made organising of the union less difficult.

15. Dick Bruner "Why White-Collar Can't Be Organised" in Man, Work and Society (eds) Nosow & Form. Basic Books Inc. Publishers, New York. 1962. pp. 188-196.

The white-collar worker thinks in terms of his skill, which he can carry with him from employer to employer. He has invariably some training, perhaps some talent, invested in it. He is likely to be just as concerned about what he contributes to the job as he is about how well the job pays. Moving to another job, incidentally, is the way some white-collar workers solve their working problems. Their skill gives them a certain independence and enables them to talk to the boss person to person.

Summary.

All in all, the determination to join or reject the union depends largely upon how the white-collar worker defines the industrial situation. If the working conditions are favourable; if the increase in wage of the blue-collar worker in the same plant does not represent a status-threat; the white-collar worker tends to be disposed to reject the union. We have seen in this study that where the white-collar workers do not work along side the blue-collar workers; they tend to reject the union; e.g. Office workers, Department Store clerks, Stenographers, and file clerks.

On the other hand, where the white-collar worker suffers the same kind of alienation as the blue-collar workers, and views the working conditions as hopelessly inadequate to his economic and psychological needs, he is motivated to join the union and to take collective action against management.

In Canada as in the United States, the white-collar workers who have organized themselves into unions seem to have taken a relatively

similar stand on the question of their status in the labor movement.

All have declared themselves to be bona-fide trade unions with the express purpose of bettering the economic position of their members.

All have relied heavily on negotiating and arbitration machinery for the settlement of disputes, and have tended to eschew the strike weapon as a normal instrument of collective bargaining.

CHAPTER 4

Prelude To The Conflict

"When management resists the efforts of workers to establish collective bargaining or to further their interests through collective bargaining, a strike, representing an overt eruption of indigenous conflict, may occur".¹

Introduction: The Theory of Collective Bargaining.

The traditional method of dealing with unions is to meet with their representatives. Usually the initiative is taken by the representatives, who request meetings on behalf of their members to complain, or to request more benefits, or to change working conditions. Management is on the defensive.²

Labor unions and management attempt, through collective bargaining, to reach agreement over wages and conditions of employment. Since gains to labor rarely accrue without some accompanying monetary or psychological loss to management, and vice versa, the collective bargaining relationship can be characterised as a situation in which the interests of the parties are opposed.

"The ability of either party to obtain benefits requires the other party to concede these benefits - that is to give up something of value. A party must be forced or coerced into the relinquishment."³

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1. Peter F. Drucker; "The New Society", (New York, 1950) p. III
 2. Financial Post, April 29, 1967.
 3. Bevars Dupre Mabry. "The Pure Theory of Bargaining" in Industrial & Labor Relations Review Vol. 18 (1964-65) p. 480.

Either party, management or labor must estimate the ability of the opponent to cause him pain, in order to assess realistically what he will have to sacrifice to obtain a benefit. On the part of the management it is motivated to relinquish a valuable item when the pain of the loss is less than the pain accompanying not relinquishing it. Conversely, the ability of the union to win concessions from management is dependent upon that party's ability to reward or punish the opponent.

Again in looking for the latent causes of strikes, when collective bargaining machinery is broken down as was the case in the plant, it seems to be the consensus of industrial relations experts that there is more to human behaviour than meets the eyes; that, for example, strikes are something due not so much to the wages, or working conditions overtly complained of as to a diffuse feeling of grievance caused by the perception that the employer is arrogant and arbitrary.⁴

In this chapter, we are going to narrate in some detail events which took place during the collective negotiations between the X Company and the Draftsmen Association, and how attempts made by one party to arrive at a fair settlement was thwarted by the other party's unwillingness to negotiate. The events will lead us to the explanation of why the strike was inevitable, as the last mechanism for the settlement of the manifest differences of interests; though the strike could have been avoided if the opposing parties had engaged themselves on problem-solving issues rather than battling on principles of rights and responsibilities.

4. Everett Hagen "Some Implication of Personality For The Theory of Industrial Relations". in Industrial & Labor Relation Review Vol. 18, 1964-65.

Prior to the period of negotiation for a new contract, the union, though legally certified as the sole bargaining agent for the draftsmen, draftsmen trainees, draftsmen specifiers, existed for all intents and purposes as a 'Company Union'. It lacked adequate membership to give it strength it vitally needed if it had to achieve anything for the members. Although the union had been organized for ten years, it never had been able to break through to a decent agreement with management. Time after time during the previous negotiations, the Company had forced the union to accept the agreement as written by the management, as the union never felt strong enough to resist. The weakness of the union was well known to the management. Consequently, management had never bargained in any real sense.

Mr. J. Anderson, the former chairman of the union reported to me that:

"We have been the legal certified bargaining agent for ten years. But during that entire period the Company has never really engaged in genuine collective bargaining. They merely go through the motions and then lay down the law. They tell us what they insist goes into the agreement. We have never felt any strength or had the leadership to bargain with them. You will get an idea of how things were from the fact that people were even afraid, or considered it useless, to put in a grievance. In ten years we only had one grievance, and it was not satisfactorily settled. The issue, therefore, ^{is} the determination of our people to stand together and begin to make our organization effective in dealing with the Company".

The problem for the Executive Committee of the Draftsmen union was then how to get all the men to join the union. At the same time the Committee recognized that to attract members into joining, the union must be prepared to fight for recognition by the Company. This meant that the union must awaken from its long slumber and become militant,

ready to 'deliver the goods' to the members by challenging the management at the forthcoming negotiations for a new contract of service. The committee must have to prove to the draftsmen that the union was about to do something positive for them. To do this, the committee made a judicious decision in choosing Mr. William Deck as the union consultant and spokesman at the negotiation table. The union officials recognized Mr. Deck as a militant and experienced labor organizer, capable of leading the draftsmen.

A general meeting was called on 18 January. It was an 'open' meeting. All the draftsmen were invited to attend - members and non-members alike. It was in this meeting that Deck was introduced as the union bargaining spokesman. After the introduction, Deck made a speech to the draftsmen, explained to them the aim of the general meeting which in effect was to discuss the proposals to be put forward to management during the forthcoming negotiations and how the union was prepared to face squarely with management's authoritative attitude toward the draftsmen and not allow them to 'brow-beat' the workers any longer.

Deck assured them that the time when draftsmen were at the mercy of the Company would never be over if draftsmen continued to allow themselves to be intimidated by the Company. A start had to be made sometime in standing up to the Company. Issues concerning the working lives and income of the draftsmen would have to be fought, first of all at the negotiating table; and then by whatever actions proved necessary; otherwise draftsmen would forever depend upon the whims of the Departmental or Personnel Manager of the Company.

The speech appears to have worked like a 'pep pill'. All the draftsmen present in the meeting which took place on the 6th of March. By the time the negotiation began all but four of the draftsmen had become not only members, but active members of the union.* All felt it was time the management should accord the draftsmen proper recognition, time to deal with them and to bargain with them as an effective bargaining unit; they felt it was time they were no longer 'to be fooled around and pushed around' by management" Many of them (59% of the respondents) complained that they had had some grievances which they, as individuals, dared not bring forward for fear of being fired or becoming unqualified for promotion. As one of the respondents told me that once he had a grievance and had wanted to file it for action, the Personnel Manager, Mr. Cook threatened that if the grievance was filed he, the aggrieved, would never get another rise. The aggrieved draftsman was forced thus to withdraw his grievance. Other complaints included ambiguous job-classification, low wages, and most importantly, unfulfilled promises by the Departmental Manager, and worse of all the attitude of the Personnel Manager of 'take it or leave it'.

The speech given by the union consultant did not create new grievances, nor did it revive old ones. In effect his talk was to transform these individual dissatisfactions into a collective one, to channel them through union reaction, the union, long neglected as a labor organization, was suddenly to become the champion of the draftsmen's cause.

* Information obtained from the Secretary/Treasurer minute file.

Those workers who joined the union after the January meeting gave reasons why they did so. Following are some of the responses to my inquiry as to why they joined at this time:

"The draftsmen are not well paid and wanted to do something about it by concerted action; I felt as a group we would be able to obtain benefits we normally wouldn't get as individuals qua individuals I felt it would give me a feeling of security;.....Conditions indicated the need for a strong union; For some years it appeared to be ineffectual because of the small membership and inexperienced leadership; The opportunity to exercise some control over my future;..... The union was gaining strength under the new leadership and had decided to get things straightened out;..... Felt that a showdown between union and company was coming to a head and I wanted to help myself and the union realise our goals etc." *

The meeting of the 18th January followed by another meeting on March 6th won the union leaders the strength they needed badly in order to face the management at the bargaining table. They could then have the confidence of the general membership and thus speak with a collective voice. All they needed then was to get the management to the negotiation table and talk. Consequently, and in accordance with the Agreement** and within the Ontario Labor Relation Act, they notified the Company on March 3rd that they wanted negotiations to commence for a new contract of service.

Negotiations did not take place until March 23rd. The union consultant, who was also the union spokesman during the course of

* These quotations represent the answers given by 28 of the 30 respondents to the above question. See Appendix Question 1 (ii).

** Agreement is used here in a legal sense to mean the Contract of service.

negotiations, presented, on behalf of the union Negotiation Committee, the Union's proposals to be incorporated in the new contract. The proposals included: higher wages for all the draftsmen, recognition of Shop Stewards, payment of overtime; the security on the job for the draftsmen in the event of the Company's move to Burlington etc.

In this meeting nothing tangible was achieved. What took place instead, the union spokesman alleged, was a lengthy speech given by the Company representative who was also the Personnel Manager. He was reported to have spoken at length on how the Company had always been catering to the general interest of the draftsmen, and how the wages were comparatively higher than that of other draftsmen in other other Companies in the area. From then on both parties engaged themselves in 'diplomatic' conflict.⁵

Two meetings were held after March 23; the third meeting was held on April 21. In this meeting Cook was reported to have asked the Union Committee to sign the very same agreement that was operative before with absolutely no changes in it, and with no changes in wages, and wage structure. At the end of this meeting it became clear to the union officials that the Company was not ready to do anything more for the draftsmen.

5. Clark Kerr⁵ has distinguished diplomatic conflict from aggressive conflict. The former is represented by collective bargaining and grievance processing in which the respective parties employ verbal persuasion. The latter involves actions such as strikes and lockouts intended to coerce or compel accession from the opposing party. These two forms of conflict are not unrelated, since the actual or implicit threat of coercion may play a significant role in the diplomatic deliberations between the parties.

Clark Kerr "Conflictual Behaviour: Industrial Conflict and its Mediation" in American Journal of Sociology, 1954, Vol. 60 pp. 230-245.

On April 22nd, the Negotiation Committee issued a bulletin which thundered that it was becoming clearer each day that "sooner or later the Company must realise that the organised draftsmen meant what they said." It also stated that "it was not too soon to start getting ready".

On Wednesday, April 23rd, the Chairman of the Union wrote to the Department of Labour for appointment of a Conciliation Officer under Section 13 of the Labour Relation Act. On Tuesday April 26th, a letter from the Deputy Minister of Labour acknowledged receipt, and application for a Government Conciliation Officer was granted. Mr. J. R. Roger was appointed as the Conciliation Officer.

On Friday May 13th, Mr. J. R. Roger came down to the city to confer with the parties and to endeavour to effect a collective agreement between them. The meeting started at 10 a.m. The Conciliation Officer to his amazement discovered that not one single item of the proposal put forward by the Union had been discussed with the Company. He advised that the meeting be adjourned and reconvened a month later. In the meantime the Company was to meet with the Union to try to effect some of the Union's proposals.

Other meetings were held on June 1st and June 8th. Discussions centered on the improvements in the grievance and lay-off procedures. It was reported to me by the union officers that as usual it was another 'just-so' talk with no agreement in sight. The opinion of the Management

was that the Union's demands including the ten percent wage increase for the first year of the Agreement were fantastic and beyond the reach of any reasonable negotiation. To the Management, the Union's proposals did not express the real interests of the Draftsmen but rather a means whereby a few power-hungry individuals, sought to maneuver themselves into positions of leadership. The Management felt that the Draftsmen were well paid, and some of them even overpaid. With reference to a possible move of the Plant to Burlington, the Management dismissed the fears of the workers as unfounded and only agreed to "discuss" the matter after the new contract had been signed by both parties. For the draftsmen, this issue was very crucial, because many of them feared that they might lose their seniority rights and/or even their jobs, should the Company move to Burlington. The Management made no effort to explain the Company's intentions to the draftsmen. Had this been done at the appropriate time, the fears of the draftsmen might have been dispelled. The attitude of the Company throughout these meetings with the Union Officials seemed to be that the draftsmen were happy people who did not seriously want anything better than what they had before the negotiation for a new contract. The Company thus implied in their statement that the draftsmen had been satisfied until they engaged the services of a consultant who was accused of being a Communist by Mr. Cook, the Personnel Manager. To the Company it was the Union Consultant who had stirred up discontent among the draftsmen, this opinion held by the Company affected their whole attitude during the negotiations before and during the strike.

In effect the Management misinterpreted the general ill feelings and frustration shared by almost all the draftsmen. Thus the draftsmen determined to show the Management that it was they themselves who were not contented with things and were determined to win long delayed improvements in their department.

On Monday June 13th, the Conciliation Officer met the two parties at the Holiday Inn at 10 a.m. Neither the Company nor the Union would budge in the demands and counterdemands. The Management maintained the stand that nothing was wrong in the old contract whereas the Union Officials wanted major changes and improvements in the new contract.

On the same day, a special Union meeting was called. Deck told the members how efforts made by the Negotiation Committee to persuade the Company to make concessions and accept the necessary proposals set forth by the Union had borne no fruit because the Company would not budge in any way to come into any real agreement with the bargaining committee. A strike vote was taken and there was a 100% vote in favour of a strike action, should no agreement be reached with the Company. The Policy Committee of eight senior members was appointed to act as an advisory body with the Bargaining Committee. This body also was to act as a channel through which the Bargaining Committee could understand the general feelings of the members. The struggle was imminent, members were by then waiting for the decisions of the Ministry of Labour on the desirability of convening the Conciliation Board to translate their decision into action.

On Thursday, June 16th, the Chairman of the Union wrote to the Personnel Manager that the Association was prepared to resume negotiations

upon receipt of the Ministry of Labour's report on the matter of convening a Conciliation Board. In the letter the Chairman further stated that the union was quite willing to re-enter negotiations any-time before the Report arrived, if, in the Company's opinion this would result in meaningful collective bargaining. He stated that the union's aim was to reach a basis for agreement which the Association Committee could, in good conscience, recommend for acceptance to the members.

Meanwhile on Friday June 17th, Mr. J. T. Barry, the National Organiser, Canadian Council of A.F.T.E., Locals; wrote to Mr. J. Wood, President, A.F.T.E. in Washington D.C. informing him, on behalf of the Draftsmen Association, that the negotiation at X Company, had broken down, and a vote had resulted in 100% in favour of strike action. In the letter it was further stated that:

"The Company had not agreed to change the existing collective Agreement to any of the proposals submitted by the bargaining unit. Negotiation Committee, and the parties are consequently so far apart that the Conciliation Officer is recommending to the Provincial Minister of Labor that a Conciliation Board should not be set up..... It is hoped that the Executive Council of A.F.T.E. will endorse the action of the bargaining unit in question, and start the necessary machinery for moral and financial support to group members."

On Monday June 20 th, the Company replied to the Union Chairman's letter. The letter stated that

"while the Company is not opposed to any such meeting, in view of the bargaining position adopted on behalf of the Association to date, the Company's impression is that no useful purpose would be served in meeting as you have suggested.....On the other hand, should there be an realistic change in the Association's position the Company would be prepared to meet with you at a mutually convenient time".

The letters from the Company and the Union illustrate the bargaining tactics adopted by each party. The Union Officials expressed willingness to negotiate with a possibility of reaching an agreement and at the same, determined not to reduce certain of the union's demands including the ten percent increase in wage.

The Company, on the other hand, the union spokesman alleged, had always shown unwillingness to negotiate, and had always felt that management was in the position to know and determine what was right for the draftsmen. The management did not anticipate that the strike action was imminent, their impression was that their draftsmen would not have the courage nor the strength to strike. Management's impression might have arisen from the stereotyped view that generally 'white collar workers are happy and satisfied people'. Management's unwillingness to negotiate and anti-union attitude was shown in the following approach of theirs: (The Personnel Manager was reported to have told the union negotiators at the bargaining table)

"We pay wages and salaries that are high enough, therefore we are not willing to make any salary increases now; however, if during the life of the agreement we decide to raise the pay of our plant employees, and if the Draftsmen then approach us, we will likely grant you similar increases, since we don't discriminate against you merely because you have a union". *

It was really this anti-union attitude with its consequent contempt which drove the Draftsmen to action. They wanted nothing less than a show of power with the Company. They resented being 'treated like children' by

* Deck, the union spokesman, and Anderson, the union chairman, supplies me with this information. Also in my interview with the Personnel Manager, I got the same impression of the management's alleged attitude toward the union.

the Company as one of the strikers told me but rather felt they deserved to be treated like respectable adults in the plant. They were determined to force the Company to recognise their bargaining unit and to 'extract' from them respect that was due to anybody who works for a living. They were determined to achieve a settlement that would meet their most pressing needs both with regard to salary matters and with regard to strengthening the Agreement.

There was a long interval before another meeting was arranged, and by then a second Conciliation Officer Mr. V. E. David stepped in. The meeting took place on Monday, August 8th, at 10.30 a.m., in a board room, sixth floor, Department of Labor Building, 8 York Street, Toronto. The union was represented by the union consultant and other Executive members. As before the Company made no offers on job-classification, salary increase, Seniority, overtime payments, grievance procedure, automatic progression. They insisted that the old contract should form the basis for the new Agreement. The union officials refused to accept this term. The meeting ended with both parties remaining far apart in their stand as ever before.

The Department of Labor made another attempt to settle the dispute apparently entering into a critical stage. Consequently, a meeting was called by another Conciliation Officer Mr. B. D. Royland on Wednesday, August 31st. In this meeting the union Negotiation Committee presented revised proposals. Their main proposals included the following:

1. Strengthening job security. This had to do with the announced move to Burlington and with regard to Supervisors and others doing their work; also improved protection in the event of lay-off;

2. Improved overtime provisions, and no compulsory overtime.
3. Strengthened grievance procedure. The right of an employee to have the assistance of his steward without being 'hamstrung' by management.
4. 'Check-off' dues by management.
5. Wages. Company to supply Draftsmen with all necessary information regarding classifications. An 18 months Agreement. 10% increase retroactive to May 1st for all time worked; and another 10% nine months from then to all employees. Automatic progressions - instead of complete reliance on the management's good will for upgrading.
6. Seniority rights.

Negotiation centred on grievance procedure and lay-off procedure which involved seniority rights. The Company demanded that there would be a time limit for any grievance to be filed. This meant that no grievance filed more than 30 days after the original issue should be passed for arbitration. The union refused to accept this. The Company also demanded that in case of lay-off, efficiency and technical skill would be major factors in determining which of the draftsmen would be called back. The Union wanted length of service to be the determining factor. The meeting ended without either party conceding to certain demands of the other. The Conciliation Officer found out that it was unnecessary to institute a Conciliation Board, and on Thursday September 8th, the Department of Labor notified the Company and the Association by letter to that effect. This meant by law a strike would be legal one week later if no settlement was made between the two opposing parties.

As soon as the Minister's letter arrived, the Chairman of the Union telephoned the Personnel Manager, and also wrote to him proposing that the union and company should meet to try to settle the dispute and avert the impending strike. No meeting was held until Thursday, September 15th. At this meeting the Company demanded that if the employees were going to strike they should give notice in advance. Deck for the union replied that the union wanted to talk and that the union wanted to avoid a strike if the Company would make it possible. Late that afternoon the Company made its first offer of a salary increase. They offered a slightly changed salary structure with increases of \$15. a month to the lower paid grades, up to \$25. a month to the highest grades. In the second year there would be a 2% increase in the wage structure with a 3% wage increase to all employees. This would be repeated for a third year. The Company did not agree on the retroactive pay. In addition the Company demanded that an employee be excused from doing overtime only if the Company considered his reasons satisfactory. This meant that overtime would no longer be voluntary.

Two meetings were held on the 16th, and Sunday 18th, of September just before the strike began. At the meeting held on the 16th three items were agreed upon by both parties. They were: on the Title of the Union; request that Supervisors should not do the Draftsmen work and finally that in case of firing a worker the management should justify their action.

At this meeting the Company's spokesman was Mr. Ray Edward, a Toronto lawyer. Minutes before the meeting began the Chairman of the union received a telephone call from a member of the Policy Committee

at the Office informing him that the men wanted to know if they should take their personal belongings home with them. The Chairman advised that they might as well do so since no settlement with the Company seemed possible. The members were advised to stay by their telephones over the weekend in the event an emergency meeting was necessary. When the Company representatives entered the meeting room they were already aware that the Draftsmen had packed their belongings. They thought, however, that the workers were just using this as scare tactics to force a better offer from the Company.

The meeting held on Sunday, September 18th was very crucial. The Company's wage structure remained as it was; but some slight gesture was made towards automatic increases above the minimum. The same \$15 a month wage increase to the lower grades of Draftsmen, but the highest grades would go up by \$30 a month provided these increases did not bring an employee's wage above the maximum of his job grade. One year later and again on the Second anniversary there would be 4% increases. That brought the total salary increases to 13% in three years. Mr. Edward also mentioned briefly that there might be increases to selected individuals based on merits, but he did not give full details. There would be no retroactive pay. The Company on the other hand, demanded as before that an excuse for not doing overtime must be a 'reasonable' one, and that the lay-off procedure would follow the principle of technical skill and experience rather than length of service with the Company. On the question of a move to Burlington, the Company agreed to discuss the matter during the life time of the new contract with the Union Officials.

After an adjournment, Deck on behalf of the Union negotiation committee made a last desperate attempt at reaching a settlement by offering to accept a one year contract with a 10% wage increase while dropping virtually all the rest of the Union's previous demands. In doing so they hoped that the last offer would take the Company 'off the hook' as regards the latter's negotiations with the United Steelworkers Association and would allow them to re-open negotiations again in a few months hence to reach settlement on the remaining union's demands.

From their point of view this was rather risky since if the larger factory unit accepted less than the Draftsmen Association considered fair on any important issue the Draftsmen would have little hope of obtaining more. But on balance, they thought it worth the risk of a strike action. The Company refused to accept the proposition. Mr. Edward after a long-drawn argument stated emphatically "This is not a bargaining position. There is very little left". Deck asked him to explain what that meant and reminded him that the Draftsmen had already taken a strike vote. Mr. Edward replied that there was nothing left to bargain for. The Company made it clear that the Draftsmen had an ultimatum: 'Take it or leave it' an attitude in which the management was reported to have indulged for past years with success. This time, however, the Draftsmen were determined to test strength with management. The meeting ended at 9 p.m.

Straight from the meeting the union representatives met the general membership. The Company's offer was then presented to the members and explained item by item. When that was done and the questions that

followed had been answered a secret ballot was taken. The result was that not a single Draftsman in attendance abstained or voted for the Company's offer. Deck made the last attempt to dissuade the workers from taking strike action. He pointed out the dangers and risks they had to face if they were still bent on going on strike. Some of these difficulties included the inability of the draftsmen to close the plant, or prevent the industry from normal operation, the unpredictability of the reaction of the Steelworkers in the plant, the fact that at the time of the strike the draftsmen were the only organised workers in the plant; the possibility that the Company could divert most of their drafting jobs to the parent plants in the U.S.A. and finally the relative lack of the union's fund. The workers were not shaken; their minds had already been made up; there was no turning back.*

After the members had taken the strike vote Deck telephoned the Company's lawyer, Mr. Edward at the Holiday Inn at about 10 p.m. informing him that the Draftsmen had decided to withdraw their services as from the next day, but offered to re-open negotiations. Sometime later Mr. Edward telephoned back, and instead of agreeing for another meeting informed the union consultant to notify the employees that they and their families' medical, hospital, surgical and life insurance coverage would be immediately cut-off. The Draftsmen had no other choice but to accept the company's terms or withdraw their labor against all possible odds.

The negotiations which began on March 23rd ended on Sunday, 18th of September. Twelve meetings, including four with the assistance of the Department of Labor were held. The Management and Union were as wide apart on the day of the strike as when negotiations first began.

* Source: Secretary/treasurers' general minutes file

The Analysis of the Collective-Bargaining

In this chapter we have tried to narrate in some detail the process of collective bargaining in this plant, and under what conditions the negotiators failed to arrive at a workable contract acceptable to both parties. The failure of the two parties to arrive at a compromise was followed by the immediate withdrawal of labor services by the union.

However, in order to understand and be able to interpret human behaviour in this plant more is needed than mere description of events. Thus more important from the sociological point of view is the analysis of the events within the general theory of union-management collective bargaining in Canada and the United States.

It is a long-established postulate that union-management relationship is dramatised at the collective-bargain table. Here issues of principles, prerogatives, and rights of management and labor become very crucial, touching the fundamentals of the relationship.

We have found in this plant how management has resisted the efforts of the union to break through what the former naturally claims to be within the managerial functions and legal rights.

The history of the union-management relationship in this plant revealed the fact that for many years in the past, management has exercised the right to determine unilaterally workers' wages and general working conditions; and when the union was formed eleven years ago; they succeeded in transforming it into a 'Company Union'.

Before the crisis, the management was working under the assumption that all legitimate interests of the employees could be protected adequately by management itself. The union could do nothing which management, with its greater technical skill and more reliable information, could not do better. This was the view expressed to me by the Personnel Manager in my first interview with him. He claimed that the Company usually compared wages paid to other employees in related firms in the area and then made sure that its employees did not get lower wages.

The management in this frame of mind accepted the union because it is, for one thing, legally obligatory. They continued, however, to regard it as an alien front against which management must protect itself at every turn. "They try to build dikes against the advance of union influences, to resist the area of collective bargaining, to resist union-intrusion on 'managerial prerogatives'".⁶

Consequently, no serious attempt was made to enlist the confidence of the union officials in the decision-making as regards employees' wage structure, job classification and the working conditions in the plant. This situation tended to generate rather paternalistic and authoritarian attitudes on the part of employers, expressed in an unwillingness to entrust power and responsibility to labor representatives to the degree customarily called for in collective bargaining agreements.

Events as described in this chapter make it clear that this paternalistic outlook was not destined to continue in this plant forever,

6. Lloyd G. Reynolds, "Labor Economics & Labor Relations". Fourth edition. Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs; New Jersey. p. 152.

especially in a country where the traditional values of freedom, equality and democratic principles form the basis of the economic and political system. For the union leaders the paternalistic philosophy of the Company must be challenged making way for the acceptance of the union's participation in the decision-making by the powerful Company.

In this prevailing mood, the union attacked the managerial assumption of omniscience in labor relations as an effort to undermine the union and a denial of true collective-bargaining, "because", as Lloyd Reynolds put it, "it does seem to reflect a view that management is capable unilaterally of setting fair terms of employment, and that there is no constructive role for union pressure".⁷

However, the determination of the union officials to break through to a 'decent' agreement and management's strong resistance to it helped in widening the gap of disagreement and thereby blocking any ground for any possible accommodation as a basis for peaceful settlement. Many management people in Canada as in the United States see in this unions' effort to share in the managerial functions, a deliberate policy of union encroachment on managerial prerogatives. They ask themselves where the process will end, and whether they may not be forced eventually to abdicate control of the plant.⁸

In this plant issues were fought, not on problem-solving basis, but rather on matters of principles and rights. This made accommodation of differences difficult. William F. Whyte⁹ rightly contends that:

7. Ibid. p. 151

8. Ibid. p. 150

9. William F. Whyte, "Pattern of Industrial Peace" op. cit. p. 199.

"Principles are precisely those things which people hold to with the greatest emotional heat. We often find that groups of people are able to work together when they give their attention to practical problems but are unable to get along when they discuss the principles underlying their relationship".

And Robert Dubin¹⁰ also argues that "Under circumstances of power parity between the parties, the weapon of conflict is largely neutralised as the parties focus attention on the substance of the issue between them."

This contest involved power struggle on both sides with different manifest interests. Each side was suspicious of the other's intentions and thereby mutual confidence was lacking. Irwin Ross on "Who Wins a Strike"¹¹ contends that the ability to reach a peaceful settlement depends on a large measure of mutual confidence, understanding and easy communication". Thus in this plant, this lack of mutual confidence was very crucial in the determination of the course of the dispute and its outcome. Cook was very suspicious of the intentions of the union spokesman right from the start of negotiation. He made no effort to hide the fact that he would have preferred to have negotiated with the union leaders instead of with an outsider whom he personally considered as a communist. The general impression in some managerial quarters at that time was that the Communists were beginning to win back their place in the union movement, and that they were up to their old tricks, causing as much trouble as possible for everyone. According to this theory, the Communists, who were all but driven from the union movement in the McCarthy era, were back and were beginning to make their influence felt.¹²

10. Robert Dubin "A Theory of Conflict & Power in Union-Management Relations" in Industrial & Labor Relations Review. Vol. 13 July 1960. p. 511.

11. Irwin Ross "Who Wins a Strike" in Reader's Digest. September 1967. p. 98

12. Financial Post. August 28th 1965

On the labor side, the union spokesman and the union leaders told me that the management representatives refused to make their stand clear until when the negotiation broke down. This, they alleged, made them suspicious of the Company's intention at the bargaining table.

It is too narrow a view if we regard management's opposition to unionism and union demands simply in terms of self-interest and more stubbornness. The general outlook of management toward the trade unions in Canada must be taken into account.

Canada's degree of industrialization, her heavy dependency upon foreign trade and capital, her extreme specialization in the production of a few types of raw materials and semifinished goods with which to pay for a large volume and variety of imports, all have rendered the Canadian economy highly vulnerable to seasonal and cyclical fluctuation in price, income, and employment originating in foreign markets.

This fact in itself has tended to exert a modifying influence on labor-management relations in Canada, to, among other things, stiffen employer resistance against recognizing or making concessions to unions.¹⁴ It also helps to account for certain attitudes which influence the process of collective bargaining. But this is not to deny that some management resistance to union demands can be simply ill-informed or short-sighted.

14. Ibid. pp. 13-14.

It is central to my analysis that had the parties to the dispute concentrated their energy and effort on substance touching the basic fundamentals of the union-management relationship rather than on principles, and had each party won the confidence of the other; and finally had each been able to exercise some restraints and tried to be accommodative, appreciating the problems of the other, a ground for settlement might have been found which could have made the strike unnecessary as an alternative to conciliation by peaceful negotiation. Communication between management and union of each other's problems and needs forms the basis of industrial co-operation. In this plant studied, such communication was minimal, thereby making peaceful negotiation difficult.

CHAPTER 5

The History of The Strike.

"If conflict breaks out in a group that has consistently tried to prevent expression of hostile feelings, it will be particularly intense for two reasons. First, because the conflict does not merely aim at resolving the immediate issues which were denied expression previously and are apt to emerge at this occasion. Second, because the total personality involvement of the group members makes for mobilization of all sentiments in the conduct of the struggle". 1

The strike at the X plant began on one bright sunny day, Monday, September 19th. It lasted for 12 weeks. There were three marked periods: The first three weeks of the strike may be considered the initial phase. This was characterized by certain aspects of management strategy, by low morale of the workers and by lack of funds to carry on the industrial battle.

The second phase (fourth to ninth week of the strike) was marked by the rise and fall of the morale of the workers; wide publicity given to the strike by the local press, two negotiation meetings which produced no positive results; the union leaders' successful attempt to maintain unity in the face of difficult situations confronting the Draftsmen, and the divisive tactics employed by management. This was designed to separate individuals from groups, general membership from the union negotiation committee members, the union from the union consultant, who was branded

1. Lewis Coser. "The Functions of Social Conflict" op. cit. pp. 151-156.

a communist. These tactics used by management included the sending of the supervisors to talk to the workers individually, the advertising in the local paper for the employment of new Draftsmen, and writing of letters to individual employees appealing to them to abandon their union spokesman and come back to work because, the management alleged, the former was not acting for the overall interests of the employees and the spread of discouraging rumours.

The third and final phase marked a more determined move to end the strike by both the union and the Company. Two more meetings, bringing the total meetings held during the strike to four, were held on the 4th and 9th of December. These meetings were, however, preceded by an unusual maneuver. The union officials had talks in New York with the President of the International Union of Engineers, and acting on behalf of the Draftsmen Association was able to arrive at a negotiable contract with the X Head Office in New York. The compromise arrived at in New York became the basis for a new contract of service.

The Drama

On Sunday, September 18th a night just before the strike began, the workers elected the Picket Marshal who was asked to direct workers on the picket lines. The Policy Committee of the union became the Strike Committee whose responsibilities were to plan the union strategies and at the same time act as a channel of communication between the Executive Committee and the general membership.

On Monday September 19th, the white collar workers, seventy-two in all, abandoned their white shirts and ties, and instead of sitting

comfortably in their offices, resigned themselves to 'hanging around' the X plant to prevent any strike breakers and to symbolise to other companies working in collaboration with the X Company that a strike was on against the Company.

The workers' first disappointment came when the Steelworkers, over six hundred in number, crossed their picket line. It was a very bitter experience, because most of the Draftsmen thought mistakenly that the Steelworkers of the same Company would honor their picket-line so as to force the Company to negotiate with them. Unfortunately for the Draftsmen, the Steelworkers' union had just been certified by the United Steelworkers of America and they were currently negotiating their first contract with the Company and consequently they were reluctant to walk out in sympathy with the striking Draftsmen because they feared such action would jeopardize their bargaining position for a contract of service with the Company.

Comfort, however, came later in the day to the strikers when the Truck Drivers belonging to the Teamsters Association refused to cross their picket line. It was thereafter that the strike began to have some meaning to them. The refusal to cross their picket line gave them some boost in their struggle.

That same day, the Secretary-Treasurer of the Draftmen's Association of Ontario Local 164 A.F.T.E.-C.L.C. in Toronto issued letters to all the Branch chairmen, Branch treasurers, of the Association which read as follows:

"Dear Fellow Member,

This is to advise all Brances of Local 164, that the Draftsmen's Association of Ontario has called an official strike of the draftsmen employed at the X Company, Southern Ontario, and the draftsmen labor has been withdrawn as of midnight, September 18th, 1966.

The strike has resulted in a breakdown of negotiations in respect of revisions to the existing Collective Agreement, after the draftsmen had been through the Conciliation machinery.

As there are seventy two draftsmen on strike, this entails considerable financial sacrifice on the part of this group of your fellow members; consequently all avenues must be explored for financial assistance.

Appeals have been issued to the Ontario Federation of Labor, the Canadian Labor Congress, American Federation of Technical Engineers, Washington, but whilst it is anticipated that hlep will be forthcoming from these areas, it will not be sufficient to cover the needs of the draftsmen on strike.

The purpose of this letter is to request Branches to arrange for subscriptions from individual members as voluntary donation fund. The striking draftsmen have greatly publicised the role of the white collar union member, and are carrying the torch for unorganised draftsmen in the Province of Ontario, as well as for those draftsmen organized into the ranks of the Draftsmen's Association of Ontario.....

Thanking you for your anticipated co-operation on behalf of your fellow members at X plant.

Yours fraternally,.....

In the first week of the strike, nothing dramatic occured except for the fact that the draftsmen on duty picketed at the plant trying to prevent the Truck Drivers from crossing the picket line. They sometimes played games like football, cards, or just sat down watching the ladies passing by. Those who picketed during the evenings and at nights usually sat in their cars singing and telling tales in order to get their minds off the difficult situation.

Meanwhile, union officials were busy making contacts, by correspondence with other local and international unions whose help was needed to make the strike a success and also writing to Contracting Drafting firms, informing them of their situation and trusting that the Company did not use their offices and Draftsmen to work against the strikers.

On Friday 23rd September, the Chairman of the union, Mr. James Anderson, wrote to the Regional Director of the United Automobile Workers, in New York City informing him of the strike and appealing to him for his full cooperation in seeing that the Company could not use their drafting and drafting specifying employees in the U.S.A. to crush their employees in the city, in their fight with the X Company.

Also within the first week, a bulletin was issued by the Draftsmen Association, Westinghouse Branch, to all their Draftsmen. The bulletin read thus:

"In the face of a 'no board' conciliation officer's report, hopes for a last ditch settlement were smashed on Sunday when the Company finally decided to collectively bargain and offered a meagre 4% annual increase, no retroactive pay, and in addition to a demand for compulsory overtime.

We must assist the Draftsmen's cause at X plant with all the support we can give them in the best tradition of organised workers. Also give your moral support by visiting their picket lines and show them that you are behind them all the way."

After the bulletin was issued to all the Draftsmen at the Westinghouse plant, many of them co-operated with their fellow striking draftsmen both morally and financially. During the lunch breaks many of them used to stand along with the strikers on the picket lines.

Occasionally they remained on the picket lines after work.

Like every other strike, the first pressing problem facing the union officials was how and where to collect strike funds, for no strike could possibly survive without any money coming forth to the strikers. The Company made the situation more difficult for the strikers by cutting off their fringe and insurance benefits. On Friday, the Personnel Manager of the Company wrote to the union chairman demanding that if the Company should continue coverage under the Life and Medical Insurance Plans and the Ontario Hospital Plans, the Draftsmen Association, on behalf of its Local 164 would pay to the Company \$1,260.00 immediately, the cost of providing welfare coverage for striking employees to the 31st of October, 1966.

In his letter Mr. Cook said:

"On Monday, September 19th, your Association and the employees whom you represent decided to go on strike against the Company. You have requested information as to how employee benefits can be continued for its duration. The Company, for its part, has no desire, by cancelling employees' participation in the Company's welfare coverage, to add to the unnecessary hardship this strike is imposing on employees and their families.

Therefore, the Company is prepared to arrange for continuation of welfare coverage subject to the following:

- (a) It is understood that the Association and striking employees will observe all the laws of our Province and Country. It follows that employees who report for work, and other persons who have business with the Company, must be permitted their lawful access to the Company's premises

The Company will expect to hear from you without delay in order to minimize any loss of protection for the employees involved."

The Draftsmen were, however, able to get some funds quickly from contributions made by the other office workers in the plant - the Westinghouse draftsmen and the Steelworkers&women employees - and thus were able to pay the required amount of \$1,260. demanded by the Company. This payment, Anderson told me, surprised the Company, who thought that it would be very difficult for the strikers to provide such a large amount within a very short time. It also gave the Company the impression that their draftsmen meant business and would not yield easily. Once the battle had joined, neither side could surrender without first testing each other's strength; it becomes a matter of who would cry 'uncle' first. As one of the strikers put it: 'You can feel sorry for yourself or even for your opponents; it does not help much. You're caught in the tide and must swim with the current'.

From the second week of the strike, the draftsmen extended their fighting strategy. Their picket line spread from the X Plant to the shipping docks where constructed products of the plant were being shipped out; on the building sites where the finished products were being erected and around the X warehouses on James Street North.

On Monday 26th, the union chairman wrote to the Personnel Manager advising that so far as the Association was concerned, they were willing and ready to meet the Company representatives at a mutually convenient time, for the purpose of trying to arrive at a settlement.

On Friday the Personnel Manager replied to the letter. In the letter he said that:

"We would have presumed, in any event, that the Association was prepared to meet, and of course the Company has been, and is, willing to meet. However, the stumbling block throughout all of our prior meetings has been the unrealistic and unreasonable demands made on behalf of the Association..... For any such meeting to be successful the Company feels that it will be necessary for the Association to modify its position so as to eliminate the unreasonable demands made in previous meetings".

With that reply no meeting was held for the next four weeks of the strike.

On Tuesday Mr. James Roberts, the International Secretary Treasurer of the American Federation of Technical Engineers wrote to Mr. Jean Fred, President, Local 989, United Auto Workers, AFL/CIO, New York on "behalf of the striking draftsmen in the city." A portion of his letter read as follows:

"Since September 19th the Draftsmen at the X plant in the city, have been ^{on} strike against the Company because of management's refusal to engage in good faith collective bargaining

I am writing to you to explain a threat made by X and to respectfully request support from you and your membership at X in your area.

"The Company has threatened to send out our work to Draftsmen in New York, Yonkers, and Harrison offices during our strike; and in addition, stated that an office in Hamilton would be rented and X personnel from across the border would be brought in to do some of the work of the strikers.....

"The use of United States labor to break a Canadian strike would be a grave injustice to our Canadian brothers in the labor movement."

A similar letter was sent to the Regional Director of the U.A.W. in New York on Thursday. The Draftsmen realised from the beginning that they needed the co-operation of the labor movement in their strike action against the Company, so most of the union officials' effort at the beginning and throughout the period of the strike was to make sure that no drafting

work was to be done by strike breakers in U.S.A. and Canada for the X plant.

Meanwhile, there was a rumour that the Office Overload at 143 James Street South, had hired a group of girls to do the clerical work that was normally done by the drafting specifiers. Promptly, the union chairman advised the Branch Manager there that he was to see that no drafting job was done by Office Overload. On Wednesday October 5th, a similar letter was written to the manager of Ian Martin Associates Ltd. in Southern Ontario.

On Monday a letter signed by the President of the Company was sent to all the employees. Apparently, that was an attempt to clarify the position of the Company vis a vis the striking employees. The letter claimed that the Company had made every reasonable effort to avoid the strike and achieve a peaceful settlement. It also claimed that it was a fact that in almost every area of the Draftsmen's demands regarding working conditions, the Company offered improvements at least equal to those negotiated by the same Association with other Companies. The letter concluded with the following statement:

"I regret that the inflexible and unrealistic position, as adopted on behalf of draftsmen by the Association, has resulted in this strike instead of affording the draftsmen the many improvements which the Company is prepared to make".

It was not until Monday, October 17th that the union officials issued bulletins to all the employees, denying the charges made by the Company that the strike was the result of the Association's 'unrealistic' and 'unreasonable' attitude at the bargaining table.

For the first three weeks, major assistance to the striking draftsmen had been given by the United Automobile Workers' Union in ensuring that no drafting work was performed by members of the U.A.W. at

the plants of the Company. Also the Teamsters' Union had honored the picket lines, and the freight handlers of the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship clerks was assisting by not handling the Company's products at the railway loading areas.

However, a major problem was still to be overcome. Because the Teamsters' Union workers honored the picket lines, the Company had to engage the services of the nonunion trucks and that enabled the Company to transport its finished products to the building sites where the equipment manufactured by the firm was being installed. The draftsmen, to overcome that problem, requested the co-operation of the appropriate Construction Workers' union but got little support.

No fresh talks were in sight as the draftsmen stayed away for the third week. Production continued at the Victoria Avenue North plant, as more than six hundred Steelworkers and other office workers crossed the picket line. There was no picket line trouble at the plant gates, but the Picket Marshal said that his men were 'getting more restless each day'. When the Company succeeded in hiring the non-union trucks, the morale of the strikers sank low, as the union chairman told me "It is starting to get a bit rough". There was a bit of boredom after mornings and end of lunch time each day. Hanging around in miserable weather was a bitter experience for the Draftsmen and by the end of the third week five of the strikers deserted their members and took up employment elsewhere. From the outset the prevailing mood of the strikers was one of grim determination rather than enthusiasm.

On Tuesday October 4th, the union's version of the causes of the strike was published in the local newspaper. The union chairman in the

report was quoted as saying that the union wanted to establish seniority rights in case of layoffs, to streamline the union grievance procedure and to establish new job classifications. They also wanted job security when the Company moved to its new Burlington site.

The Second Phase of the Strike

During the second phase of the strike beginning in the fourth week, strike funds began to increase. The draftsmen received their first strike pay cheque on Tuesday October 11th. It was a bit of encouragement to some of the strikers; but to others, especially the young married men with children, the pay was not sufficient to meet their financial requirements.

From the fifth week fifteen member strikers left the picket line to find employment elsewhere. Five others went back to work at the plant; four of these were not union members and they felt little obligation to continue to endure the hardship. One was a union man who was forced by circumstances to go back to work. His mother had just been admitted to the hospital for a cancer operation and money was needed to pay the hospital bill. Eighteen of the respondents took part-time jobs but continued to serve on the picket line either in the morning or in the evening sessions. Fifteen out of twenty three draftsmen who had been employed for more than three years at the plant did not take any part-time job. They were either serving at the picket line full time, or were engaged in organization of the battle against the Company, attending Policy and Strike Committee regular meetings. For this group, the strike was most crucial. These were the men who had experienced the greatest

frustration as a result of what they felt to be unfulfilled promises of pay rise or promotion. It might be said that they had chosen a life occupation, and wanted to make the most out of the job.

The strike, then in its fifth week had meant more than a few sacrifices for the draftsmen. And as the union chairman told me: "Yes, it isn't too often you hear of draftsmen going on strike, but this is something we believe in strongly and we're prepared to make sacrifices". To start with, the legal walkout by the seventy two draftsmen had only slightly disrupted the Company's operation. Referring to the crossing of the picket line by the Steelworkers, Mr. Anderson told me: "I can see their point of view, they feel a sympathy strike would hurt their bargaining position, but it certainly 'makes it rough' for us". Anderson also reported to me that the feelings were starting to run high among the men. "Most of it is caused by trucks driving across the picket line", he said. The drafting work, he said, was apparently being done by other office workers or was being sent to the Company's draftsmen in the United States.

Since it was a small union, strike funds were limited. However, the striking draftsmen had had contributions from a few unions, including collections from fellow draftsmen at Westinghouse and Dominion Glass, but a long strike meant a grim financial pinch. The union chairman was reported to have told the local newspaper reporter that:

Even if someone could add \$10,000 to our strike fund it wouldn't make the strike any shorter. What we want is to resume negotiations with the Company, but it doesn't look too optimistic now. The only other thing that could help us is to have the other Company workers go out on strike, and there is very little sign of that, either.

Anderson was also reported to have said that the draftsmen's main demands were not wages, but more security and improvements in working conditions. The draftsmen wanted seniority rights in case of lay offs, a streamlined grievance procedure and new job classification.

From this report, it appears that the employees demand has shifted from strong emphasis on higher wages to seniority, and security questions, including grievance procedure.

In the second phase of the strike the number of men on the picket line started to dwindle. This was because twenty draftsmen have already left to take other jobs, or look for one, a group of pickets have been assigned to other activities including necessary picketing elsewhere, and still others had been assigned to visiting other unions for financial and moral assistance.

On Tuesday, the strikers organized a strong picket line in front of the Pigott Building against Ian Martin Associates for alleged hiring by the Associates, of draftsmen to do strike breaking work for the X plant. A bulletin with the headline 'X' Draftsmen on Strike: Ian Martin Associates Doing Strike Breaking' was issued which was distributed to the public. Part of the bulletin read as follows:

"As skilled white collar workers we too have our daily needs for ourselves and our families. We too desire some security in return for our years of service. We also want some reasonable opportunity for advancement.

And we have our pride.

The owners of X Company in the United States do not seem to have much interest in their Canadian employees. They care little for our needs, for our attitudes as Canadians, or for our future.

Anybody taking X money to hurt us, is making our struggle that much harder. Such strike-breaking activities put them on the side of the U.S. absentee owners against the Canadian draftsmen.

That is why we are here - to draw attention to the strike-breaking activities at Ian Martin Associates in the Pigott Building.

We seek your understanding, co-operation and assistance."

The distributed bulletin, and the men on the picket line drew a large crowd in front of the building. Some of the passers-by shouted with the strikers "To hell with those who 'scabbed' against their fellow Canadian workers".

A sharp warning came from the Pigott Ltd. barristers and solicitors the following day, warning the draftsmen that any disputes between them and their employers did not concern Pigott Ltd., the owner and operator of the Pigott Building. The letter took exception to the fact that the union bulletin, by its repeated references to the fact that Ian Martin Associates are carrying on the alleged strike breaking in the Pigott Building led to a reasonable inference that those in charge of the Building condoned or were a party to the alleged improper activities, and that could consequently reflect adversely upon the reputation of Pigott Company Ltd.

The Ian Martin Associates firm later assured the union officials that the draftsmen hired to do the work for the X plant had been released.

The union consultant told me that at the meeting of 18th September he got the impression that the Company had no intention of considering the union's proposals for a new contract; so he started to negotiate for the services of the Chief Conciliation Officer, Mr. John Sheppard in Toronto with regard to the next meeting with the Company. Deck, the union consultant, thought that with the help of Mr. Sheppard, the Company might

be forced to shift their ground in some ways that would meet some of the urgent demands of the union. But meanwhile, the union officials were impatient. They had the impression that since the President of the Company had taken interest in their struggle with management, they might be able to achieve something from their meeting with the company scheduled on Thursday, October 20th. The union officials were under heavy and constant pressure from the general membership to effect immediate settlement.

Before the meeting of 20th October with the company representatives, one of the picketers told the union chairman that he had been approached by one of the drafting supervisors who told him that if the union was serious about re-opening negotiations, the union officials should phone the President Mr. Edward Hill. By the time the union chairman got the information, so had the men on the picket line and their hopes had arisen very high that the Company was serious about reaching an agreement.

The chairman immediately verified the story with the supervisor. Then he phoned the President. It was apparent that something was wrong because, the President denied any knowledge of such willingness on the part of the Company for any meeting with the union. However, after a short telephone conversation, the President suggested that the union chairman could talk to the Personnel Manager to arrange for a meeting, if the union so desired. That was how the first meeting since the strike came about.

At the meeting the Company representatives demanded that the union present a new set of contract proposals. The union officials replied that while they were prepared to negotiate on all items in dispute they were not prepared to lower their demands as a pre-condition to negotiation. At that point, the Company representatives were about, on the one hand, to stage a walk-out in protest, and on the other hand the union officials were completely disgusted and angry that nothing was about to be accomplished in that meeting. The union spokesman, however, saved the ugly situation and proposed that another meeting should be held in one or two weeks when the union would present new proposals. These were tactics designed to let the Company know that the draftsmen were not all that desperate to settle for anything, also, as the union consultant himself told me, this postponement was to enable him to contact the Conciliation Officer and persuade him to attend the next meeting. The Company officials suspected Deck's intentions and were not at all happy about this development. The Company still held the impression that without the outside interference of the union consultant, the union could have agreed to come to terms with management. The next meeting failed to produce any conciliatory effect. Matters were getting out of hand. Towards the end of the sixth and seventh week, the strikers were becoming very pessimistic and their spirits were running low because an end to the fight was nowhere in sight. Many of them had thought that the battle was going to be a matter of days or a few weeks.

To make matters worse for the draftsmen, the Company advertised for new draftsmen in the Toronto Globe and Mail and in the local newspaper.

The striking draftsmen thought that they had lost their battle and many became quite confused as to what other line of action to take. However despondent they were, they held their front and consoled themselves that they were fighting for a just cause..

While the union representatives were negotiating with the Company on Wednesday, the Draftsmen picketed the trucking company. They set up a picket line outside an east end trucking firm. They claimed that trailers owned by Smith Transport Co. of Glow Avenue were being hauled into the X plant by non-union trucks. The Smith Transport drivers refused to cross the picket line at the X plant; and when the draftsmen again staged another picket line at the Smith firm, the drivers refused to cross. A spokesman for the draftsmen said the trucking firm agreed to stop its trucks hauling goods into X plant.

In a report published in the local newspaper on Wednesday, Mr. Anderson still maintained that wages were not the key issue in the strike.

After the two fruitless negotiation meetings, the union officials thought it reasonable to call a general membership meeting to explain current matters as they stood then. The general membership felt that the union officials were withholding certain vital information from them. In order to remove any element of misunderstanding and suspicion, a general meeting was scheduled on Sunday, October 30th.

On Friday, October 28th, seventh week of the strike, the President of the Company wrote another letter to all the draftsmen explaining the Company stand as regards the meetings held on the 20th and 26th. The letter accused the union representatives of being responsible

for withholding agreement to end the strike; the letter also contained detailed evidence to prove the good faith which the Company had amply demonstrated to effect an early settlement. The letter stressed that the strike did not serve the best interests of the strikers or of the Company. It also pointed out that under Canadian laws, the draftsmen had the right to strike, but they also had the right to work and to have free access to their place of employment.

"For the Company's part, your jobs with the above improvements in salaries and working conditions continue to be available for those who wish to exercise their right to work. I sincerely regret the hardships which have been caused to you and your families as a result of this strike which the Company did everything reasonably possible to avoid. I urge you to review all the circumstances and satisfy yourselves that your own interests and those of your family are being considered by those responsible for continuation of the Strike"

This letter paradoxically helped to boost the morale of the strikers. Hope was not lost that the Company still needed them, as much as they desired to go back to work after a reasonable settlement was reached. The draftsmen's spirits began to revive once again. They came to realise that the Company advertisement for new draftsmen was a clever means of breaking the solidarity of the group rather than as an expression of the easy dispensability of the draftsmen by the Company.

At the meeting held on Sunday 30th October, Deck explained the whole situation as it existed at that time with regard to the union official's effort to persuade the Company to negotiate in good faith, and the unwillingness of the Company to do so. He also explained why he had asked that the meeting of the 20th October be postponed a week or so. Anderson and Goldent

told me that Deck's speech helped to revive the dropping spirits of the strikers and also to clear the doubts in their minds. The speech boosted the morale of the strikers once again, and they became more determined to carry their battle and to defy management's attempt to break the solidarity of the group.

They were also informed of the growing strength and the support they were getting from the Building Trade Council, the co-operation of the Teamsters, by refraining to cross the picket line. Deck concluded by telling the members that the President's letter was a tactical test and advised them that by a united action and solidarity within the group, they would meet this test. Anderson argued that the strike activities be intensified, and in order to cover their various picket lines, he solicited for the time of those members who up till then had been unable to give their time due to part-time employment they had taken. At the end of the meeting a vote of confidence on the union negotiators was passed.

On Wednesday November 4 the draftsmen set up a picket line at the construction site of the new Board of Education administration building at Main Street West and Bay Street North. The pickets halted work on the installation of an elevator. Members of the International Union of Elevator Constructors refused to cross the picket line.

Up to this time no progress had been made toward renewed negotiations.

On Friday the employees put up their pickets in front of the city senior citizen's apartments. The strikers halted the operation of work there. The twenty five union construction workers refused to cross the

picket line. The strikers protested against the installation of equipment manufactured by the Company at James Street North and Burlington Street.

At the X plant on Victoria Avenue North, about thirty employees paraded at the three entrances the same day, but some six hundred and thirty other X Company employees crossed the line. It was a bitter experience for their members to have other office workers crossing their picket line daily.

At a meeting of the Local and District Labor Council the previous night, a suggestion that the Steelworkers of the X plant should be asked to respect the draftsmen's picket line drew little support, although more financial support was promised. The Labor Council authorised a donation of \$50 to the draftsmen's strike fund and members of other unions promised to deal with the financial request as soon as was possible.

To help to the cause of the draftsmen, donations from other local unions were increasing in amount and size; consequently the strikers were getting more money and were better off than in the early phase of the strike.

After the picket at the city senior citizen's apartments, picketing was concentrated on the Shipping Docks, and at the gate to the X plant. But the union leaders intensified their contacts with the local and International unions in Canada and United States alleged to be doing drafting work for the Company, or the organised workers who refused to give full co-operation to the draftsmen by not honoring their pickets. Additional letters were sent to the Regional Director, U.A.W. in New York, and to the President of the Elevator Construction Union in Toronto, and

also to the International Representative, Local 490, of the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, in Harrison, New Jersey, soliciting their respective help in preventing the X plant from getting their drafting work done elsewhere.

Toward the end of the eighth week of the strike, the Company made another strong effort to break the solidarity of the draftsmen. On Friday 11th November, a letter from the Office was sent to all the employees on strike. The letter again accused the Draftsmen Association as being responsible for the long strike. This in effect meant that the Company was separating the Association from the members composing it, which, however, appeared ridiculous to the draftsmen.

Part of the letter read thus:

"In fact, no end to the strike is possible as long as those who speak, supposedly in your interests, continue to take and maintain positions which can only be regarded as irresponsible."

"It is inconceivable, for example, that it was your best interests that were being considered on October 20, when Mr. Deck, the spokesman for the Association, announced that he had nothing to say to the Company, but suggested another meeting a week or two later. This was after five weeks of strike and after the Association requested a meeting stating that Association demands would be modified at the bargaining table.

"It is further inconceivable that it was your best interests that were being considered by Mr. Deck and the Committee on October 26th when they presented a new proposal to the Company which was in excess of that made to the Company before the strike.

"These actions and positions have thus far caused you loss of two months salary with other hardships and indignities. They have also continued to deny you the many improvements which the company is prepared to make in salary and working conditions and which are available to all those who wish to exercise their right to work,

The letter ended with the following appeal: "You have the right and the obligation to yourself and to your family to satisfy yourself with all the answers."

However strong the appeal was, it made little impression on the employees. In an answer to the question (Question 19 in the questionnaire) "The Personnel Manager wrote you letters during the strike appealing to you to come back to work, accusing the union as being irresponsible and unable to cater for your interest.

(i) What did you think about such appeals ?

(ii) What did you do with those letters ?

Twenty of the thirty respondents said that such appeals made little or no impression on them. They knew the Company was not interested in the general welfare of their employees. Three of the respondents said that they became more bitter against the Company for thinking that the strikers were all a bunch of idiots. One of the respondents gave no answer to the question. But as the strike entered into its ninth week, the strikers became despondent again as no end of the strike was in sight. Anderson told me that the strikers were getting a bit restless, and urged the union committee to make a new move toward calling another conciliatory meeting with the Company.

In response to the Company letter, the Committee wrote to all the draftsmen to clarify the issues as they stood, and also requested a general meeting to be held on Sunday 20th November. At the meeting Deck alleged that the Company had no real intention to bargain with the union bona fide. It was revealed that the union officials were taking all

necessary steps for a resumption of negotiations and appeal was made to the members that the success of the strike depended largely on the strength of the union in the near future. The strikers were exhorted by union officials to hold fast and remain courageous because the Company would soon come to terms.

Mr. Brown Miller, President of Local 164 at Westinghouse and Mr. David Roberts, President of the O.F.L. were reported to have spoken encouragingly to the strikers, assuring them that the draftsmen at the Westinghouse and the Ontario Federation of Labor respectively would do all they could to fortify the strike. The members were also informed about some plans to send the chairman and the treasurer to the United States to contact Mr. Jim Korki, the President of local 488, I.U.E. in Harrison, New Jersey and the International Representative of I.U.E. Mr. Andress Gibson.

These contacts were found necessary and immediate because the draftsmen at the X Company at Harrison were alleged to be doing the drafting work formerly done in Hamilton. It was thought that if the union officials succeeded in persuading workers at Harrison and New York City not to do the drafting work, the end of the strike would be imminent.

The Final Phase: Peace Negotiations

On Monday 21st of November, Anderson and Mike Goldent (the union treasurer) left for New York City. The strike had entered into its final phase. The end of the strike was imminent. This was not yet known to the strikers but their spirits had begun to rise again at the hope of early settlement. The same day, while the chairman and the treasurer left for

New York, another bulletin was distributed to all Company employees.

The bulletin thundered:

"The striking draftsmen at X plant are stronger than ever. This was made clear at their meeting yesterday. At the beginning of their tenth week of strike the draftsmen show as much determination as during the first week. The main battle is carried by the strikers themselves, but outside support has helped make the strike much more effective. It has also enabled us to increase the weekly payments to the strikers and their families in addition to paying the full cost of hospital-medical-life insurance which the Company loaded on us.....Wages are a very big issue - the whole wage question. Also increases must go to all. Efforts to split us, efforts to buy scabs...these things will settle nothing, only negotiations in good faith can settle the strike."

The bulletin ended with "Our Fight Is Your Fight. Do Not Let Us Down".

This bulletin distributed to all employees was designed to prove to the Company that while the strike was in its tenth week, the spirits of the employees were high and their solidarity and determination unshaken.

While in New York, Anderson and Goldent held meetings with the Representatives of the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, John Korki and Andress Gibson. The draftsmen union leaders requested Korki and Gibson to use their good offices in preventing the draftsmen at the X company in New York City and Harrison from doing the strike job. This they hoped, would bring an earlier settlement with their employer. Andress Gibson informed the union officials of the past refusal by his union (I.U.E.) to do the drafting work from X branch plant in Southern Ontario, and assured them of their continued support in future.

On Tuesday 22nd November, Anderson and Goldent flew back to the city with the assurance by Gibson (who was reported to be on good terms with the President of the X Company in New York City) that items of settlement would be worked out between him and the President of the X Company in New York City and thereafter the agreed items would be conveyed to X branch plant in Southern Ontario as the basis of settlement.

At the eleventh week of the strike, the Ontario Department of Labor stepped into the dispute. The department's conciliation services branch called together the Company and Union representatives in attempt to revive negotiations. A meeting was arranged to be held on Thursday, December 1, at 10.15 a.m., in a board room, sixth floor, Department of Labor Building in Toronto. That was the third meeting since the strike began.

At this meeting the Chief Conciliation Officer, Mr. John Sheppard and his Assistant Mr. David Street were in attendance. The union negotiators and the Company representatives were kept in two separate rooms. The union officials then outlined their new proposals and advised Sheppard of the items which the draftsmen felt were vital. After the separate meeting with the union officials, Sheppard and Street met the Company representatives in another room. Upon their return, they informed the union officials that there was no change in the Company's position. At this point, the union spokesman, Deck, briefed the Conciliation Officials of the propositions alleged to have been reached with the President and the International Representative of the I.U.E. and the Company headquarters in New York, which were supposed to be the basis of

settlement with their employers in Southern Ontario branch plant.

When the Conciliation Officers approached the Company spokesmen to find out if the Company in Southern Ontario were aware of the items worked out in New York, the latter denied any knowledge of the terms of settlement worked out in New York. No settlement was reached at the meeting. So matters were again at a deadlock. The Conciliation Officials advised the parties to go home and come back next Friday in order to effect an agreement.

Frustrated at this denial of knowledge about the items which had supposedly been settled in New York, Goldent flew back to New York to have another talk with Korki and Gibson. At this meeting Goldent was once more assured that the X Company in New York would be asked to communicate the propositions arrived at between them to the branch plant so that settlement could be reached by the next meeting scheduled on Friday on condition that the union consultant, who had been branded a communist, would not be present at the final meeting. Goldent arrived in Toronto just before the meeting began.

Prior to the final meeting Deck urged the committee that he be absent from the actual meeting room, but nearby for consultation purposes. With considerable reluctance the committee agreed.

After what seemed to be a hopeless start, with the drama of separating and bringing back face to face the parties to the dispute by the Conciliation officers, Mr. Sheppard asked the union officials if they would accept the agreement worked out in the United States to which they agreed. Sheppard then went back to the Company representatives and succeeded in getting them to make the offer to their employees.

Both parties were called together to work out the final details. A memorandum of agreement was then typed and signed by both parties and by Street for the Department of Labor.

The offer, while it ignored some items vital to the employees such as high wages and retroactive pay (the employees, after twelve weeks in the street got only one per cent increase in wage offer made before the strike), went some distance in recognising the position of unions and the right of collective bargaining. The result was to produce a change of heart in at least some of the strikers.

The appearance of what looked to some 'like an olive branch' stimulated the demand that the strike now be ended and a victory claimed. In the opinion of the Strike Committee the continuation of the strike would not justify the further loss of wages. The draftsmen had been successful in getting the Company to offer what the workers considered to be a reasonable seniority clause, a grievance procedure and a promised letter of understanding that in the event of a move to Burlington the organised draftsmen would have the first claim to representation. In addition the Company withdrew their demand for compulsory overtime and also agreed to a re-evaluation of the duties and classifications of the draftsmen and to turn the information over to the Union in six months after settlement. These job classifications could be the subject of a grievance which would be taken up to arbitration.

A general meeting of the strikers was held the next day, Saturday, December 10 at the Coral Room of the Knight Hall at Sanford Avenue and King Street. At the meeting, the memorandum of agreement was ratified by ninety per cent of the employees who were in favor of calling off the strike.

With the ratification of the agreement the twelve week strike came to an end. It had been marked with an impressive display of united and disciplined action on the part of the union. From the management point of view the employees had lost in their struggle; but from the union point of view the draftsmen were the victors.

In a letter Anderson wrote to Mr. Dave Brown, President of Ontario Federation of Labor, he said:

"We did not achieve nearly as much as we were seeking in the salary schedules, but were able to make very important improvements in many other areas of our contract. Most important of all, I think our group learned to be unionists in this twelve week period much more than any of us had learned in all our years before. We believe we have earned a place in the labor movement."

The Battle Strategy: An analysis of the history of the Strike

The ultimate aim of each side to the industrial crises, to which each directed its strategy, was, of course to make the other side capitulate and accept its demands. For the Company this meant that the draftsmen would return to their drawing tables under approximately the same working conditions and wages as those they had refused to accept just before the strike began.

For the draftsmen it meant that management would be forced to agree to their demands and increase wages, improve working conditions. For the union officials it meant that the union must be recognised by management and that management must be willing to shift ground and thus negotiate with the union bona fide, rather than with the individual draftsmen.

Each side organised itself and planned its strategies of offence and defence. The management's defence against labor was to take the offence. The labor defence tactics were centred around maintaining their unity and defeating management's office strategy of breaking up the group by emphasizing collective action for the achievement of collective goals. Here was a call for the development of collective consciousness which was maintained throughout the strike by the employment of rituals and ceremonial procedures in the form of picketing, the holding of regular meetings. The rituals and ceremonies symbolised the solidarity of the group.

The union officials achieved an undivided defensive organisation by means of those regular meetings, morale-building speeches by the union consultant, formation of policy and strike committees, and a regular flow

of information through the media of correspondence and bulletins between the union officials and the workers. The workers were made to feel as active participants in the game of industrial struggle. The workers having developed a consciousness of need felt themselves powerful and aggressive group against the Company. They took offence action against management in the grievance procedure and recognition of union steward; by picketing around the 'X' plant and various buildings and warehouses where the Company had business; by attacks against management in the local paper which infuriated the management the more because that particular company has an interest to protect itself from unfavourable publicity which otherwise would affect the award of future contracts by the public for the drafting and construction of new equipment; by drawing on the sentiments of nationalism accusing the management as representing the interests of the non-resident American owners of the enterprise at the expense of Canadian workers.

The union maintained that a support against the workers would amount to Canadians waging economic war against fellow Canadians for the benefit of the American owners.

The protracted battle brought with it a 'flattening out' of determination on both sides. Each was ready then to make concessions and to crystallize gains. As Coser has stated:

"Since power can often be appraised only in its actual exercise, accommodation may frequently be reached only after the contenders have measured their respective strength in conflict."

"Efforts at mediation or arbitration of antagonistic interests encounter the difficulty that the assessment of the actual power relations between the contenders can hardly be made before their relative power has been established through struggle. 2

And Georg Simmel also maintains that:

"The mediator can achieve reconciliation only if each party believes that the objective situation justifies the reconciliation and makes peace advantageous."³.

The difficulty of estimating power explains why the contending parties will frequently resort to 'trial by ordeal' in order to make an evaluation possible. "Because exact knowledge as to comparative strength can often be attained only by an actual trial, this may be the only means of satisfying each one that he is obtaining all the advantages he could command through coercion."⁴

3. The Sociology of Georg Simmel, trans. and ed. Kurt H. Wolff (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press; 1950). p. 147.

4. E. T. Hiller, "Principles of Sociology". New York: Harper Bros; 1933, p. 329

CHAPTER 6

The Causes of the Strike

Introduction.

The issues involved in a dispute are always interrelated, and to single out one as the primary issue is an arbitrary procedure. Moreover, the important thing is not what the issue was; but why the parties were unable to reach agreement on it. In order to discover the 'causes' of strikes, one must discover the kinds of circumstance in which agreement between the parties becomes impossible.

An Analysis of the Management and Workers View:

The Management's view of why the strike occurred.

In my interview with the Personnel Manager, Mr. Cook told me that the Company was fully aware of the general labor unrest and that was because of the industrial boom experienced throughout the country and more especially in the Province of Ontario; consequently labor determined to make good out of it. But he refused to believe that this unrest in the labor movement was the primary factor in explaining why the strike happened in 'X' plant.

Cook alleged that those who led the strike had vested interests. He was in fact referring to the "radical elements" in the union and especially the union consultant whom the management branded as a communist. William Deck was accused by management of forcing the employees to take militant

action against their employers, it was he, the accusation went on, who engendered the aggressive spirits in the minds of the workers. For without his being on the scene and forming a central figure in the dispute and were it not for the central part he had played, the management believed that the draftsmen would have been unlikely to have taken strike action.

Management had the view that their workers were happy and well paid and also sensible and dependable and appreciative of the goodwill of the Company and this had been proved by a long peaceful history that they would always reply on the discretion of management; and would never dream of striking.

Cook held the view that those who stirred the trouble were new employees of the Company, that is, those who had only two years or less of service with the Company, and who were impatient and thus failed to understand the Company's goodwill toward their employees. The Personnel Manager informed me that the management negotiated not with the union they had known in the past, but with an outsider who had little or no knowledge about the type of negotiation and working arrangements in the Company. The management had the impression that, the union consultant wanted, through the strike, to advance his own personality as a successful militant labor leader and with this view in mind misled the unwilling employees to strike against their once friendly employers.

However, Cook in answer to my question about grievances, agreed that the management had been aware of the existence of grievances among some of the draftsmen and claimed that the management had done their best to better the working conditions and to deal with the alleged grievances satisfactorily.

The management's view of the strike, I presume, coloured their whole attitude toward the union throughout the diplomatic and aggressive conflict. The management's view that the workers were happy and well paid and secondly the fact that they strongly believed that the employees would never go out on strike made it difficult for them to shift grounds and make some concessions to the workers' demands.

Unfortunately for both sides, management failed to realise the sensitiveness of their employees over the unsatisfactory working conditions. Management's indifference during the contract negotiations convinced the draftsmen including those who had some doubts in joining the union that management had no respect for their employees. This alleged disrespect together with the long outstanding personal grievances in the plant finally drove the draftsmen to the wall. They had no alternative other than to accept the status quo or to strike. The latter action was more appealing to them.

The Workers' View

The reason why the strike occurred on the part of labor could be traced back to the reasons why some of the workers joined the union just before the negotiation for a new contract began. Some of the reasons were: "The union is a necessary evil, but the best we have to fight injustice..... To prevent the Company from dictating to the workers To protect our jobs and our security..... No contract was ever negotiated, whatever the Company offered was generally accepted.... I personally believe that where possible all employees should belong to a union to avoid being unfairly treated by management..... A desire to

improve conditions for draftsmen, the opportunity to exercise some control over my future I thought it needed to be more aggressive in its dealings with the Company..... We had a weak contract A means of working together to improve wages and working conditions and to keep the Company's respect Collectively we might be able to force the Company to change their attitude about the treatment of employees." *

In these reasons given above lay the core of the causes of the strike by the employees. The reasons for joining the union presupposed the existence of long nourished grievances which the workers were determined to remedy either by peaceful negotiation or by aggressive action. Though a demand for higher wages was very crucial in the struggle the evidence was clear that economic factors were of prime importance, on the other hand, no evidence could show that the draftsmen were relatively underpaid or were living just on subsistent level. The wage question alone cannot help us to understand the strike. Other factors must be taken into consideration if we are to have a full explanation of why it occured and took the course that it did. Demand for higher wages was a symbol of something else - the fear of job insecurity and the lack of respect of management towards the union and the employees. The latent discontent was given expression in terms of higher wages which appeared more meaningful, and more tangible and measurable to the workers and the public to whom the strikers had to appeal for support during the strike. Also a fight for wage increase represents a fight for power of

* The answers outlined above constitute a qualitative representation of the responses given by 27 out of the 30 respondents in the survey to the question: "What made you join (the union) at the time you did. (See Question I (ii) of the Questionnaire at the Appendix)

control of the working conditions.

The power conflict view of the strike is an important one because it implies that workers' grievances were in the nature of an ideology, masking their underlying intentions. Behind each specific complaint such as low wages, vague job classification, lack of security, bad seniority clause in the previous contract etc., the power politics definition implied, there was a hint of a fundamental challenge to management status in respect of the latter's relationship with the employees. In this context the problem became not the modification of the existing conditions in the plant which elicited the strike, but rather the urgent need of proving to the management that the workers deserved respect and recognition and were not to be treated as children.

One of the crucial factors which centered on the wage demand was the men's anxiety about what would be the consequences of the proposed move of the plant to the suburb of the city. The draftsmen wanted assurance that if drafting work was moved, the workers would have the right to move with the job; the Company did not want to commit itself on this issue, but only promised to discuss the matter at the 'appropriate time'. The Company's attitude intensified the workers' anxiety about their security in the event of a move to the suburb. The Personnel Manager told me that the Company was fully aware that the proposed move would not take place within the life of the contract in question and therefore the management considered it unnecessary as an item in the negotiated contract.

The joint labor-management determination of the possible consequences of the transfer of the drafting work on the part of labor was

viewed by management as status-threatening abridgment of its prerogatives and was therefore resisted.

The determination of the workers to change the previous contract which they described as hopelessly inadequate, and to gain recognition by the management, forced them to take strike action.

The Role of 'Broken Promises' And The Departmental Manager.

The workers viewed the old Departmental Manager, Mr. John Smith, as one who could not be trusted, who made empty promises. Smith was alleged to have made many promises of wage increases, re-evaluation of jobs, and promotions to the employees especially to the senior ones. It was said that these had not been fulfilled. These broken promises engendered a sense of frustration in the minds of the workers.

A. V. Gouldner has stated that: "Since any human relationship is stable to the extent that the behaviour of each party is adjusted to the expectation of the other, and rewarded by his responses, it is clear that the broken promises had shaken the stability of the worker-management relationship at its very foundations".¹

Gouldner goes on to remark that when suspicion replaces an expectation that each party will perform its duty, when the management come to be viewed as dishonest and untrustworthy, then it becomes necessary for the workers to stage a showdown and to gain by battle what they have failed to gain through unfulfilled promises.²

The workers viewed their claims as legitimate, claims which the management had themselves acknowledged by virtue of the promises made, and which consequently all the more a justification for retaliation if later ignored or rejected.

1. A. V. Gouldner Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy. The Free Press Paperback (1964) p. 79.

2. Ibid p. 48

It was not, moreover, a single promise which the Company was held to have broken but indeed many promises. The union spokesman found there was a pile of grievances. What was important was the cumulative aspect. All that the workers needed was a capable leader or leaders who would lead the "revolt", and who would transform these individual discontents into a collective or shared one. They found the leadership in the person of the union consultant, a labor man who could speak on equal terms with the management's representatives without any fear of reprisal and who had the reputation of being efficient and dynamic in his role as labor representative in contract negotiations with management.

Following are some of the responses to my inquiry as to what impression the draftsmen had about the Departmental Manager and what justified such impressions.

"He is only interested in work output and not so much in employees' progress.....Always trying to please everyone at one time or the other, saying 'yes' to workers' requests.....which would give them a temporary psychological satisfaction about their job.....He did not care about the employees, ignoring the needs of the men as was shown in his overall behaviour towards the draftsmen..... Interested in seeming good before the management..... He is a two-faced idiot...Inadequate leadership by those in authority...You were not in the right job, you were not paid the wages for the job, you were doing...I was doing a job that was above my rating and the Departmental Manager did not do anything to remedy the situation"*

*Source: These complaints were representative sample of responses given by twenty three out of the thirty respondents. Three of the respondents did not answer the questions and four others claimed that since they had just been employed by the Company; they had not yet had any impression about the Departmental Manager, and the Company as a whole. (See Questions 33 (i) & (ii) and 34)

And as one of the former members of the Strike Committee, a Picket Captain, told me: "We were fed up with the negative attitude of the Company - the attitude of 'take it or leave it' ... As the Company expands and as "many more draftsmen were employed in the drafting department, the Head-in-charge proved incapable of handling the complexities arising from the administration".

One of the strikers summed up the general atmospheric unrest in the management-labor relationship with the following:

"There was a general feeling towards the Departmental and Personnel Managers. The draftsmen were of the opinion that both managers were not doing anything for the workers. They made empty promises and thus left the complainant more frustrated than when he complained."

In short, the grievances were experienced as long-nourished and deep-rooted. The existing grievance machinery was not adequate to handle the workers' grievances, thereby allowing the workers' aggression to mount to a point where it was transformed into action. The strike then became an expression of the workers' disappointments and frustration.

And as Warner and Low remark:

"The frustration of 'ambitious workers' trying to rise in the world and take their families with them are the source of common grievance against those above. The decreasing sense of worth and significance on the job felt by all workers adds to this feeling of being stopped by someone or something which is against them. 3

3. Warner & Low "The Social System of The Modern Factory." op. cit. p. 182.

Conflict appears as the product of group orientation in circumstances of frustration. The individuals or group caught up in a social situation in which 'normal' behaviour is ineffective become aggressive, hostile, and turns the social relationship into a conflict situation.⁴

Communication

One of the contributory and 'latent' causes of the strike was the lack of an adequate communication system between the management and the union. Communication between management and labor is one of the prerequisites to industrial co-operation. In the absence of an adequate communication system; the management had no way to understand and thereby appreciate the employees' needs. And instead of building up an effective communication system, the management preferred to base their relationship with their employees under the paternalistic philosophy of knowing what is best for their workers.

On the other hand, the union employees could not understand and appreciate the problems of their employers in a measure that would enable them to modify their union demands. Consequently, the workers were working on the assumption generally held by many employees and members of the general public, that: demands for higher wages and other benefits are usually justified and that management resistance to these demands is an indication of stubbornness, conservatism, or greed. If only

4. John Dollard et. al. 'Frustration & Agression. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939 where the general theoretical foundations of this model are developed; and Ross Stagner: Psychology of Industrial Conflict (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1956) where specific application is made of the model to industrial relations. Sociologists also make use of this model as in W. F. Whyte, 'Pattern For Industrial Peace.' 1951)

management would be liberal and broadminded, co-operation would be achieved. The reality is much more complicated and difficult.

Again, had the previous grievance procedure been made effective, the union employees could have found a safety valve in channelling their discontent to the top management. The grievance procedure could have served as a communication machinery, informing management about the current disturbances in the social relations. But as it was, the grievance procedure was rendered ineffective by the management attitude of 'take it or leave it', on the one hand; and on the other, the aggrieved worker's fear of dismissal by the Company.

The relationship between social relations and action can be described in the following way:

The existence of ineffective or inadequate communication system in complex organisations gives rise to development of social distance between the two opposing parties in authority relations. In industrial organisation such parties are management and employees. The social distance thus developed leads to an increase in the workers' anxiety and fear of job insecurity, which in turn forces the workers to take collective action against management.

A typical example of the consequences of a breakdown in communications between top management and office workers was found at the Courtaulds (Canada) Limited in Cornwall in 1966. Roy Bonneville, the President of the Textile Workers Union of America, reported⁵ that a breakdown in communications between management and office staff

5. This case is reported in "Can Management Cope with the Challenge of White-Collar Unions" (eds) Morris & Michaelson. op. cit. p. 21

precipitated the white-collar union breakthrough at Courtaulds. A number of years ago, Mr. Bonneville explained, a staff association had been formed and had made suggestions for improving comparative conditions of office workers as against clock-punchers. It failed to get results. Then a works council had been formed to take up matters with management. Promises had resulted but again, no action ever ensued on behalf of the office employees. It finally reached the point where office workers felt their status was becoming impossible.

The result of this situation was that the staff collectively opposed the management and fought a serious battle at the negotiation table to win their long outstanding demands. They would very likely have gone on strike if the management had refused to communicate.

CHAPTER 7

A New Pattern Of Relations And New Organisational Structure

"It has been a basic sociological postulate that conflict is one of the substances out of which society is built. It is a basic type of social interaction which produces or modifies communities of interests, unifications of individuals and groups, and organisations.

"Among other functions, conflict establishes the identity of groups within a social system by strengthening group consciousness, thereby contributing to the maintenance of the total social system through the creation of a balance between its various divergent interest groups.

"When an existing social structure is considered by its members as no longer able to provide for their needs, individuals with similar perceptions and objective positions constitute themselves into self-conscious interest groups, and, through conflict, either covert or overt, seek to modify the structure. New relationships are provided; new norms and identifications are yielded, new or modified goals, values, and interests are established, and new power relationships are found within and between groups." 1

The industrial organisation as a social system in Canada permits wide latitude for conflict to take place without destroying the basic interdependence of employee and employer.

There is no doubt that the strike has had a profound effect upon the workers' relationships with one another, with their employers, and with other union officials, local and international.

During and after the strike new relationships developed among the workers. They got to know more about each other. Their shared experience

1. Barnard Karsh "Diary of a Strike" op. cit. p. 135

on the picket lines, the rough and cold weather which they all endured together, shaped their understanding of one another. Loose friendship or acquaintanceship crystalised into an intimate one among some workers. They learned whom to trust or not to trust in crisis situations.

The strikers became a strongly unified group, set off by their common feelings and perceptions of the employers and the strike-breakers. The striking workers achieved a sense of solidarity through 'secular rituals' which included picketings, songs, slogans, regular meetings, and the playing of different kinds of games such as cards, football, and the throwing of stones against the truck drivers. The solidarity and the collective consciousness developed before the strike began, stood a great test of time in the face of many difficulties and temptations. The steadfastness of the workers through some of the most difficult and discouraging experiences won them the respect of each other.

During and after the strike the scope and frequency of interactions among the strikers increased. In answer to questions on the degree of friendship among workers. (See questions 23 and 24 of the questionnaire at the Appendix) Eighteen of the respondents became more friendly after the strike.

On the other side, the non strikers looked to each other for support against the antagonism of the striking workers. During the strike the strikers called the 'scabs' all sorts of names, such as "shameless creatures,....Men without conscience, Self-centred idiots". The strike-breakers, five of them, were carried by the Company van to work from

their residences every working day until the strike was over. The striking workers did everything possible to prevent the 'scabs' from working, and even threw stones at the van carrying them. Since all the non-strikers shared the same kind of rough experience they banded themselves together and rationalised their behaviour.

After the strike, however and in accordance with the Agreement reached during the settlement of the dispute, no overt recrimination was shown by the strikers against the non-strikers, at least in their roles as draftsmen. Consequently, the atmosphere in the Department remained calm. However, the strikers still considered the non strikers as enemies and viewed them with suspicion. Some refused to speak to them nor cared to have anything to do with them, others treated them with indifference while some advocated punitive action such as complete ostracism.

In answer to a question :What do you think about those who worked during the strike?" (see question 26 of the questionnaire)

21 of the respondents said:

"....I have very little respect for them, especially those in the bargaining unit... Now I thought they were just stupid, slow-witted idiots,...I don't think they've a conscience,....I've little contact with scabs, but I do not discriminate..I hate them.

....Spineless individuals who would kick a man when he is down...I have a very low opinion of them... They should be hanged by their necks..... I think they were about the lowest creatures on earth.. I believe they are completely lacking in moral fortitude, they saw a chance for a quick gain and took it shamelessly...*

One of the strikers summed up the general attitude against the non strikers with the following:

"I was disappointed in them especially those who went back to work after three or four weeks of the strike. I used to insult them indirectly if I could. Most other guys do the same calling them names and saying something to hurt them. I have no respect for them, and I try not to engage in any conversation when any of them was around".

After the strike, the Company found it necessary to make some changes in the Drafting Department. The old Departmental Manager, Mr. John Smith, was transferred to another Department in the plant and a new Manager, Mr. Alfred Cole, took his place. Cole appears to the workers to be more understanding and sympathetic with the draftsmen's cause. Since Cole was appointed as the Head-in-charge of the drafting department workers' opinion about the working conditions has changed for better.

Twenty seven respondents said that things had been improving in the department after the strike. Eight out of the thirty respondents have been promoted from one job grade to another and six of them are now made 'Group Leaders' in charge of Sections in the department. Sixty-five per cent of the workers now see the former 'empty promises'

* The rest of the respondents, nine in number said that it was the business of each employee to work or to strike. They gave no unfavourable opinion about the strike-breakers.

as being replaced with positive action. The remaining thirty-five per cent were still doubtful.

For the 65% of the respondents the bad relationship which had existed between the draftsmen and the old departmental manager has given place to a more friendly and informal relationship with the new manager. These are some of the things said about the New Manager and the Department after the strike by the workers:

".....The new Manager seems to be in the process of making positive changes that will improve things....He is good and so is his Assistant... Working conditions not yet satisfactory, but improving.....The new Manager has made sweeping changes, he is efficient and respected by the people who realise what he is trying to accomplish in face of great odds...The new man believes in getting things done....The strike did improve the positions of draftsmen....A change in management personnel appears to have improved the working conditions....There is now a better chance for advancement and recognition". *

After the strike Management made some re-adjustment in its relationship with labor. The Company, after many months of fruitless negotiations, was forced to bargain with the union executive. As the chairman of the union in his letter to other union officials after the strike said. "This is the first time in ten years that the Company has been compelled to negotiate with us and to show some respect for us". Mr. Anderson had previously accused the Company of treating the workers with contempt and disrespect.

The removal of the Departmental Manager and the appointment of a new one marked a victory for the draftsmen. The promotions and up-grading

* Source: Answers which are representative of the response to the Questions 37 (i) & (ii) and 50 (i) & (ii) (See Appendix)

of workers with increment in salaries immediately after the strike cannot be divorced from the effects of the strike itself. I am inclined to think that such promotions at the time it was made was designed to revive the confidence of the draftsmen with the Company. Grievance procedure took a new look after the strike. In my interview with the Personnel Manager, he told me that since the present 'Agreement' was reached, the Management has always tried to keep the letter of the contract especially as regards the grievance procedure. A worker can now, with the assistance of the union stewards, file a grievance which is subject to arbitration without any fear of reprisal by the superiors. Lewis Coser neatly summed up this process of change in human relations when he wrote:

"Conflict may initiate other types of interaction between antagonists; conflict acts as a stimulus for establishing new rules, norms, and institutions, thus serving as an agent of socialization for both contending parties. As a stimulus for the creation and modification of norms, conflict makes the re-adjustment of relationships to changed conditions possible." 2

In their demands for better working conditions, the union made some gains. Overtime was no longer compulsory, and in the event of a lay off of workers, technical skill, experience and length of service would have to be taken into consideration. The Company demanded that technical skill should be the governing factor for call back of workers after a period of lay off. In wages, the workers made little gains. The wage structure was improved by a one per cent increase above the mid-strike offer, but no retroactive pay. And in the event of a possible move to

2. Lewis Coser op. cit. p. 128

the suburb, the Company gave the workers letters of understanding. Above all, the union through the steadfastness and solidarity of the strikers throughout the strike, won the respect and recognition of the Company. Respect and recognition had always been the chief concern of the workers.

When the strike was over, the expectations of each party - labor and management - appeared to be clearly defined. Both sides know exactly their rights and obligations to each other.

The strike also won the Draftsmen's association a place in the Trade Union Movement. Before and during the strike, the Draftsmen union officials built up relationships with other local and international union officials, relationships which continued after the strike was over.

Mr. Ray Goodheart, President of the Teamsters' Union, in his speech to the general meeting of the draftsmen held after the strike said:

"You can take pride now. If the Trade Union Movement had any doubts about you, they are now dispersed, from now you can stand beside them and in some cases ahead. It is to your credit that you came through the way you did and did not succumb to management's devilish tactics".

In answer to a question by a member "Are we effective?" Goodheart replied that "because of the way you ran the strike, you are not more effective than a year ago".

And in a letter the President of the United Electric and Maintenance Workers Association wrote to Mr. Anderson at the end of the strike, Mr. John Green said that:

"As the first white collar group to successfully challenge anti-unionism in this city, the tremendous struggle of your members marks a stepping stone in Labor's forward march towards twentieth century conditions.

"The future struggles of other white collar groups for organisation and improved standards, indeed, the future struggles of all of us, have been made less difficult by the courageous example of you and your members".

Finally, and more important from the union point of view, the strike functioned to give the white-collar employees a new image of the union and the labor movement in general.

Many of the draftsmen were young, eighty per cent of the respondents being between 19 and 27 years old; and many of them entered the plant straight from High School. They had never belonged to any union and their parents were not particularly pro-union. When they were initially employed at the plant, they believed in individual achievement as a way of getting at the top, therefore the union had little appeal to them. Even those who registered as union members hardly attend the union meetings or paid their union monthly dues; neither did they vote or take their grievances to the union executive for possible action. This anti-union attitude and the low level of activity and manifest apathy of members can be interpreted as lack of employee identification with the union.

From the response to the question: Have you been a regular meeting attendant before March 1966? (For detail question see Appendix Question 4) we found that only four of the thirty respondents attended the general meetings regularly. Thirteen of the respondents attended at one time or the other but not more than two times in two years. Thirteen others did not attend any union meetings prior to March 1966. The union attendance record showed that only seven of the thirty respondents paid their union dues.

On the other hand, response to the question: Have you been a regular meeting attendant since March 1966? (for the detail question see Question 5, Appendix) showed that since March 1966 a greater percentage of the employees were regular meeting attendants. Fifteen out of the thirty respondents had never missed the union meetings; while the rest of them except one member, attended on average four or five union meetings. All the thirty respondents paid and are reported still paying their monthly union dues.

In response to my inquiry: Would it make any difference to you if the union disappeared now? If 'yes' what do you think you and the union members stand to lose without the union? (Appendix Question 47 (i) & (ii)); twenty-eight of the respondents answered in the positive and the other two in the negative to the first question. And to the second question, here are some of the responses:

"We lose our three years contract which we went on strike for.....As individuals we would be at the mercy of management once more.....We will lose everything gained through the strike action against management ...We will just stay at our present level and lag behind the rest of the organised draftsmen in the area.....In the next two years we would not be able to negotiate for a decent contract....The Company would have to dictate to the draftsmen as they used toThings would come back the way they were before the strike."

In response to another question: If you leave X Company for another company, would you prefer to join the union in that plant (Question 48 Appendix) Twenty-six of the respondents answered 'yes', one said it was not necessary and the other three were undecided.

In answer to the question: Generally what do you think of a union as a labor organisation now? (Question 49 Appendix) Twenty-six of the respondents felt that the union was a necessary and useful machinery through which the employees might have representation in decision-making affecting their working lives. However, five of the twenty-six respondents qualified their response with "The union is a good labor organisation so long as its demands are reasonable, and so long as it functions for the interest of the workers". Two of the respondents felt that a union was not necessary for human relations in industry. Two others gave no answer.

From the events as narrated in this study and the responses to the questions referred above, we have found that the union became significant and acquired new meaning to the workers when faced with conflict situations with management. The study has tried to show how the workers rallied round their union leaders and pledged their support. The strike helped the white-collar workers to define the union in instrumental terms, as machinery for the improvement of the workers' working conditions. As C. Wright Mills clearly put it:

"Unions are usually accepted as something to be used, rather than as something in which to believe. They are understood as having to do strictly with the job and are valued for their help on the job. They rest upon, and perhaps carry further, the alienated split off 'job' from 'life'. Acceptance of them does not seem to lead to new identifications in other areas of living." 3

It may not be overstatement to say that the union had been strengthened through the crisis. It did not come out of nothing. Management had planted the seeds and cultivated the grounds even as it tried to stamp out any union opposition to collective bargaining.

Without the strike or a threat to strike, the white-collar employees might never have developed the collective consciousness necessary for union existence as an effective organization, and as long as the union remained inactive, the workers would view it as unnecessary for the advancement of the employees.

Turning to a more general consideration of the effect of conflict upon group structure, Coser recalls that "Conflict makes group members more conscious of the group bonds and increases participation. Outside conflict has the same effect. It also mobilises the group's defenses among which is the reaffirmation of their value system against the outside enemy".⁴

All in all, the strike conflict developed certain identifications, established new patterns of behaviour and finally contributed to the building of the image of the union as a labor movement. Without the strike, union members might have received promotions but the fact is that the strike accelerated the process.

The finding of this study with regard to union identification among the workers after the strike was similar to the findings of Bernard Karsh's study of "Diary of A Strike" in the United States in 1958.

4. Lewis Coser op. cit. p. 90.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The study has attempted to throw light on the problem in union-management relationship as well as the problems faced by the white-collar workers when confronted with the choice of joining a union as a labor movement. The study has also tried to show how the strike strengthened the white-collar workers' sense of identification with the union and with labor movement generally.

With regard to the union-management relationship, we have seen in this case that it is not so easy and it takes time to build and maintain good relations, and that co-operation between management and labor requires the adjustment and/or accommodation on both sides.

As for the union organisation, we have seen in this study how the strike functioned as a vehicle for the building up of a new image of the local union among the strikers. The local union, which was characterized by the apathetic attitude of the members before the negotiation of a new contract which led to the strike action, developed into an effective instrument of collective bargaining and as a labor machinery for power struggle.

The analysis of the strike can lead us now into the following propositions.

- (1) Loyalty develops toward union organization usually through conflict, and conflict also leads to new identifications. In this study we have seen how the employees rallied round their union leaders and identified themselves with them in their cause against the Company. They came to believe that their past service and loyalty had very little value to their 'bosses'
- (2) Industrial conflict cannot only be understood in terms of economic determinism. Material presented in this study has indicated the probability that there was a conflict about status. The management attitude of 'take it or leave it' and the managerial paternalistic philosophy in their employee relations, represented to the workers a status-threat in the face of rapidly technological changes; therefore they were determined to force their employers to recognise the union and to give them through the collective bargaining process, an opportunity to participate in the decision-making affecting the workers' industrial lives.
- (3) White-collar unionism is growing in such numbers as to suggest that there is a genuine desire on the part of these employees to bargain collectively and that they prefer to meet with their employers to solve their problems rather than have the employers decide what is best for them. As the work milieu of the blue-collar worker has gradually moved closer to that of the clerical worker, so, paradoxically, has the environment of the office begun to adopt the assembly line techniques of the plant; consequently the white-collar worker suffers alienation of a kind similar to

that traditionally associated with the blue-collar workers. This office environment, changing rapidly through automation, is a natural breeding ground for uncertainty and fear of undefined status, and uncertainty and psychological alienation often force people to seek the security of collective action. Therefore, it may be expected that the institutionalization of collective bargaining in white-collar occupations has come to stay.

APPENDIX.

Questionnaire for the Members of the Draughtsmen at the X Company

1. (i) When did you join the union?

(ii) What made you join at the time you did?

(iii) When did you join the X Company ?

2. (i) What did you think of the union before the strike?

(ii) What made you think so?

3. Have you ever worked in a union plant before joining the
X Company?

(ii) If you did, were you a member of the union?

4. Have you been a regular meeting attendant before March last year?

(Mark X against any of these answers:-)

- ☐ a. never missed any meeting.
- ☐ b. missed one or two meetings.
- ☐ c. missed one-half of the meeting.
- ☐ d. almost all meetings missed.

5. Have you been a regular meeting attendant since March last year?

(Answer this question by marking X against any of the answers)

- ☐ a. never missed any meeting.
- ☐ b. missed one or two meetings.
- ☐ c. missed one-half of any meetings.
- ☐ d. missed almost all meetings.

6. (i) Before the strike did you ask the union to help you talk over your problems of any kind with the management?

(ii) If your answer is 'no', give reasons why you did not ask for the union's help.

(iii) Since the strike was over have you asked the union to handle your grievance, if you have any, against the management?

(iv) If your answer is 'yes' what has the union done about it?

7. (i) Was there anytime you could have filed a grievance but you didn't.

(ii) What was/were the nature of the grievance(s)?

(iii) What made you prefer not to file the grievance(s)?

8. The management had always thought that the Draftsmen were happy workers and well paid.

(i) Is the management right to think so?

(ii) Why do you think the management should have that impression about their draftsment?

9. What do you think caused the strike at the X Company?

List them according to their importance to you.

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____
7. _____

10. (i) Did you picket during the strike? _____

- (ii) If 'yes' how many weeks did you picket?

(Mark "X" against any of the following answers below.)

- ☐ a. under one week.
- ☐ b. one week to two weeks.
- ☐ c. up to 3 or 4 weeks.
- ☐ d. up to 5 to 9 weeks.
- ☐ e. throughout the strike period.

11. If you did not picket throughout the strike period which of the weeks didn't you picket or take part during the strike?
- _____
- _____

12. If you did not picket give reasons, also give reasons why you did not take any part during the strike. (Mark 'X' against any of the reasons given below.)

- ☐ a. because of illness.
- ☐ b. because you found temporary job(s) elsewhere.
- ☐ c. because of home commitments.
- ☐ d. because I hated the idea of hanging around in the cold weather.
- ☐ e. because I considered it a waste of time.
- ☐ f. others

13. If you did picket, which places (Mark 'X' against any of the answers below).

- ☐ a. around the X Offices.
- ☐ b. along the shipping docks.
- ☐ c. on the building sites where new elevators were being erected.
- ☐ d. around X warehouses on James Street North.
- ☐ e. other places.

14. (i) What part did you play during the strike besides being on the picket-line?

(ii) What did you normally do in those days you were on the picket-line?

15. What would you describe as a disappointment during the strike with regard to:

(a) the behaviour of fellow workers.

(b) the behaviour of the union leaders (Negotiation Committee) toward the general membership.

(c) the behaviour of management toward the union.

15. (d) the behaviour of other local union(s) toward the
Draughtsmen union at X Company

(e) other

16. Were you prepared for the strike financially? (in other words)

(i) Did you save some money against the strike?

(ii) If your answer is 'no' why did you vote to go on strike then?

17. How did you try to meet the hardship imposed on you by the strike
action?

18. (i) Was there anytime when your morale was low during the strike?

(ii) If 'yes' why and when was that.

19. The personnel Manager wrote you letters during the strike appealing to you to come back to work, accusing the union as being irresponsible and unable to cater for your interest.

(i) What did you think about such appeals?

(ii) What did you do with those letters?

20. The Chairman of the union wrote you also counter-appealing to you. What effect, if any, had such letters and bulletins issued by same on you?

21. Did the strike in any way change your opinion about the management?

22. If your answer is 'yes' what was your opinion about the management:

(i) before the strike?

(ii) after the strike?

23. How friendly were you with the other fellow workers (draughtsmen) before the strike? Mark 'X' against any of the following answers. In answering this question bear in mind the number of people whom you have been friendly with, as compared with the number of friends you have since the strike.

- ☐ a. very friendly.
- ☐ b. fairly friendly.
- ☐ c. friendly.
- ☐ d. not friendly.

24. How friendly are you with fellow workers after the strike? Mark 'X' against any of the listed possible answers below:-

- ☐ a. very friendly.
- ☐ b. fairly friendly.
- ☐ c. friendly.
- ☐ d. not friendly.

25. What are the sacrifices involved in going on strike? Answer this question from your personal experience.

26. What do you think about those who worked during the strike?

27. How do you feel about them now?

28. Do you think that your strike had been a success in terms of:-

- ☐ a. wage increase.
- ☐ b. union security (with reference to check-off, and a move to Burlington).
- ☐ c. principle of seniority.
- ☒ d. job classification
- ☐ e. recognition of Shop Stewards.
- ☐ f. overtime.
- ☐ g. others . . .

Place a 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. next to each of these list above according to their respective importance to you.

29. If the union has achieved anything by striking, what factors do you think made it possible, for example.

- ☐ a. outside help from other local unions (Mention the local union(s) and what they contributed)
- ☐ b. the solidarity of the strikers or some of them.
- ☐ c. Individual contribution(s), you may mention personalities.
- ☐ d. others

Place a 1 next to any of the factors you consider most important, and a 2 before the next most important, etc.

30. If you consider you did not win all your demands from the management what factors do you think made it so? (Rank according to their importance, i.e. place a 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. to the possible answers listed below according to each contribution.)

- ☐ a. the company's ability to employ other draughtsmen in Canada and the U.S.A. to do her drafting job.
- ☐ b. misunderstanding between the strike committee and general membership (if any)
- ☐ c. unreasonable attitude of management to engage in collective bargaining in good faith with the union leaders.
- ☐ d. the inadequate co-operation in the labor movement.

31. (i) Name those local unions in Hamilton and elsewhere in Canada and the U.S.A. who made your strike a difficult and prolonged one. _____

32. (ii) What part did each of them play which made your strike a difficult one. _____

33. (i) What went on in your department or section which you did not like before the strike? _____

- (ii) How did it affect you as a Draughtsman? _____

- (iii) Has anything been done to remedy the situation which you didn't like since the strike was over? _____

34. What did you think of your Departmental Manager before the strike?

Mark 'X' against the appropriate statement below:-

- ☐ a. interested in his draughtsmen's welfare?
- ☐ b. Don't care about them
- ☐ c. Make empty or unfulfilled promises (i.e. his promises were/are unreliable)
- ☐ d. Mention others

(ii) In what ways did he show that?

35. (i) Did you think that the Company recognised your ability with regard to promotion and seniority before the strike.

(ii) Have you been promoted since the strike?

(iii) If your answer is 'yes' what is the nature of the promotion?

(iv) Do you think that the promotion represents the correct assessment of your ability?

36. If your answer to question 35 (i) is 'no' what do you think the Company could have done for you instead?

37. Do you feel that working conditions are satisfactory in the plant where you work since the strike was over?

(ii) If 'yes' what made you feel so?

For the purpose of our Survey I need to have a rough indication of your personal history. Would you mind telling me about the following:-

38. Are you married or single? _____
39. Number of children. _____
40. Age. _____
41. Place of birth. _____
42. Religion. _____
43. Place of birth of father _____ and mother _____.
44. Education, last grade in school completed. _____
45. Father's occupation. _____
46. Has your father been a union member? _____
47. (i) Would it make any difference to you if the union disappeared now? _____

(ii) If 'yes' what do you think you and the union members stand to lose without this union? _____

48. If you leave x company for another company, would you prefer to join the union in that plant? _____
- _____

49. Generally what do you think of a union as a labor organization? _____
- _____
- _____
- _____

- 50 (i) Do you think that the strike has improved the position of the Draughtsmen? _____

(ii) If your answer is 'yes' in what way? _____

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