NATIONALISM

AND

LANGUAGE CONFLICT IN QUEBEC
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SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

The thesis, in opposition to dominant approaches in the literature, attempts to delineate a new theory on nationalism which is grounded in ongoing ideological and socio-economic changes in Quebec society. Language conflict is treated as a particularly relevant and approachable variable in the components which fuse to create the ideology nationalism. The discussion centres on class as a source of ideological elements in nationalism, and suggests ways in which nationalist ideology and nationalist proponents interact both within Quebec and in the larger system of modern monopoly capitalism. The conclusion drawn is that nationalism reflects not only national consciousness, but class consciousness too. Hence, those characteristics of class conflict which typify relations between classes can also be seen in the relations between class nationalists and among the state, the dominant class and class nationalists.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1973, Alex MacLeod observed that the debate over the relationship between class and nationalism had raised issues so critical as to create an "unresolved dilemma of the Quebec left" (A. MacLeod, 1973: p.3). Despite apparent unity of the left provided by the Parti Quebecois, MacLeod detailed various points of contention between neo-Marxists and proponents of an ethnic consciousness view of nationalism. Whatever the analytic persuasion, however, he maintained that

Nationalism is becoming a greater and greater instrument of political mobilization and no one can afford to ignore it. (A. MacLeod, 1973: p. 3)

In outlining the debate on the Quebec left, MacLeod pinpointed a split over subjective and objective definitions of 'nation'. When nation is defined subjectively, the tendency has been to perceive the problem of nationalism in ethnic terms (see Chapter 1 for a thorough discussion). When, on the other hand, nation is defined objectively as a reflection of a particular mode of economic production, and organization, nationalism is reduced to a bourgeois phenomenon.

MacLeod critically examined both positions and found them lacking, but offered no concrete resolutions to the problems he has identified. He concluded that

The solutions are not readily at hand, and will not be found until a more adequate analysis of the Quebec situation becomes available or until one force of the left overwhelmingly dominates the other. For the moment the debate goes on. (A. MacLeod, 1973: p. 14)
It is apparent from most recent accounts of nationalism that particular approaches to the problem recur and that particular analytic trends can be identified. Using current treatments as a guide, the problem of the relationship of class to nationalism emerges as a central point of contention among various authors and perspectives. This point of conflict is in fact based on fundamental differences found between 'subjective' and 'objective' definitions of nation. When moving beyond theory into analyses of concrete instances of nationalism, these fundamental differences result in both theoretical and pragmatic confusion. This holds as true for nationalism in Quebec as for any other example.

As MacLeod noted, the debate over class in relation to nationalism is still ongoing. In 1975, Jean-Marc Piotte, a former writer for Parti Patrie who once advocated an ethnic consciousness approach to nationalism, endorsed a more rigid Marxist approach, declaring that "there will not be a specifically Quebecois socialism" (J.M. Piotte, 1975: p. 34). The left in Quebec continues a confusing ideological debate as one side attempts to dominate the other, much as MacLeod predicted. With a singular exception (see Leon Dion, 1975) there have been no attempts on the left to create a new "more adequate analysis of the Quebec situation" (A. MacLeod, 1973: p. 14).

This thesis is an attempt to respond to MacLeod's plea for analyses which reflect the specificity of Quebec experience. As he points out, the utility of current approaches is problematic, most importantly because the models of nationalism which they construct deal inadequately with specific realities. Consequently, in order to avoid this same problem it is imperative to deal with class in relation to nationalism, at least
for the time being, in an open-ended way, fitting the theory to the facts.

The central focus of this thesis will be an exploration of the nature of the relationship between nationalism and class in Quebec over the years 1960 to 1975. In an attempt to clearly delineate this relationship, the thesis emphasizes a variable of particular importance in the case of Quebec: language. The isolated existence of French language on the North American continent provides a focus for the discussion of nationalism (although not at the expense of other factors, should they prove relevant). Language, then, will serve as both a theoretical and practical means of identifying, describing and analyzing the relationship of class to nationalism in Quebec.

Current approaches to Quebec nationalism have theoretical antecedents stretching as far back as 1700. The first Chapter of the thesis explores both ongoing trends of thought and their theoretical roots in order to arrive at a sound understanding of dominant positions regarding the relationship of class to nationalism. Language is then discussed in order to demonstrate the necessity of employing the concept 'nation' in a manner that recognizes both internal cohesion (nation) and internal differentiation (social class). I will argue that current approaches fail to take this into account. Hence, the thesis is directed towards an investigation which recognizes and employs this duality.

Chapter Two develops more concretely this idea of duality - cohesion and differentiation. As dual forms of consciousness (national and class) are outlined, the role of language in the development of these consciousnesses is also explored. National consciousness is treated as a necessary condition for nationalism, but, through a discussion of
particular examples, will be defined as qualitatively distinct from nationalism. This is an absolutely critical distinction running throughout the thesis. Finally, the problem (which permeates ongoing discussion) of the relation of class to nationalism will be restated as a problem which involves not two but five variables: class, class consciousness, nation, national consciousness, and nationalism. Consequently, nationalism is defined in such a way as to leave the nature of the relationship between these variables open to investigation. That is, it is this relationship which becomes the problem.

Chapter Three descriptively details the development of nationalism in Quebec over the period 1960 to 1975 and establishes sound working knowledge of the social and economic fabric of the time. Particular attention will again be paid to language because of its relation to class consciousness and national consciousness, its role as a focus of conflict over this period, and its accessibility as a variable when considering Quebec.

The last Chapter will address and present a solution to the problem, defined in Chapter 2 now with the advantage of the weight of evidence. Relating the problem of the relationship of class, nation and nationalism to the realities of the Quebec experience, the full nature of this relationship can be detailed and defined. Once this has been accomplished, issues directly related to this newly determined relationship (in essence, a completed definition) may be explored. Again, because of the tangible nature of language, these considerations will largely, although not totally, centre on this variable.
The virtue of the approach which has been outlined is that it does not theoretically constrain the investigation to the point of dictating the admissibility of evidence: this open-ended approach permits a better grounding of theory in reality. Reality, shapes more of the parameters of the discussion than does theory. And it is this, rather than the reverse, which satisfies the first of MacLeod's options: the discovery of "a more adequate analysis of the Quebec situation".
CHAPTER ONE

Nations: The Weaknesses of Current Analyses of Nationalism

1) Nation and Nationalism in Popular Theory

Any attempt at arriving at a sensible understanding of the phenomenon nationalism must first establish a reasonable set of definitional parameters. Confused academic rhetoric, interdisciplinary interest in the phenomenon, and the popular use of relevant terminology have all contributed to a lack of sustained consensus regarding the meaning of words such as 'nation' and 'state'. However, this is not a problem confined to today. Historically, analysts concerned about nationalism have contributed to this confusion through both inconsistency in application of the terms as well as disagreements as to their meanings. Indeed, the most important differences in the way analysts relate class to nationalism stem from these confusions. Having inherited this problem, it is necessary to trace back the meaning of such words and situate the inconsistencies in meaning in their proper contextual roots.

Nationalism is generally conceded to be a modern phenomenon, dating from the French Revolution and Rousseau's tract on the nature of sovereignty.

When Rousseau identified, for the first time, the "nation" with the "people", nationalism became an ideology of the "people", that is, of the middle classes.

(Symmons-Symonolewicz, 1970: p. 3)
The extension of what Bendix (1974) would refer to as citizenship rights to previously non-politically-involved segments of nation-state populations firmly implanted in the corpus of western political philosophy the identification of political organization with the national collectivity. The credo of national will as the apex of individual will was transformed into the political configuration of nation-state. While one can question whether all thinkers tended to run the 'state' and 'nation' together, the dominance of concern over European experience generally led to an emphasis on "great" nations such as France and later Germany (see A. Smith, 1973: p. 29, for a critique of Europocentrism). The formulation and popularity of this philosophy are both indicated by the strength and frequency of intellectual debates regarding the nature of the 'nation' which characterized eighteenth and nineteenth century intellectual life.

This debate can be simplistically reduced to two dominant strains of thought. On the one hand, emerging from and modifying the Hegelian tradition, and characterized most strongly by Marx and Engels, is an inconsistent and confused political recognition of the 'nation' and a vacillation regarding its rights. On the other hand is a more rigid definition of the 'nation' and increasing defence of its rights.  

1) The Hegelian School

Hegelian philosophy stresses the necessity of the formation of a state in order that nations might fulfill their obligations to history. That is,
...a people may exist merely as a nation but in that condition, it is incapable of contributing to the development of world history.
(H. Davis, 1967: p. 1)

Hegel employed an evolutionary perspective which saw dialectic movement over history to over 'higher' social forms. Thus, it demanded positive national input into world historical development. This contribution is conceived as possible only in a situation where a state apparatus can intervene to create harmony among the conflicting elements in a society. Thus:

...part of Hegel's idea was that peoples which have proved themselves unable over a period of time to build a state will never be able to build one.
(H. Davis, 1967 p: 2)

Nations must form states, or cease to be nations. This was, in essence, the formulation of the concept "historyless peoples" - communities of people who, because they could never create a state could never contribute to an evolutionary historical dialectic. Stateless nations, then, by implication, did not necessarily have to be considered as viable entities nor were their rights perceived as inviolable.

The principal problem with the Hegelian position is the nature of what constitutes a 'nation'. Insistence on a positive historical contribution means that, essentially, only nations which can be "world-historical" (H. Davis, 1967 p: 2) are nations proper. Almost any other community of peoples must be prefixed 'savage' or 'unimportant'. The Hegelian perspective, then, is dependent to a large degree on previous historical conditions shaping political realities, and, for all intents and purposes, the word 'nation' can easily be considered co-terminous with the concept 'nation-state'. And, as later Hegelians would
demonstrate in support of various nationalist movements (such as German unification), it is as easily applied to large populations striving to establish or extend a state apparatus. Lacking a clear, non-historically dependent understanding of 'nation', the Hegelian school tended to vacillate over questions of particular minority rights in their insistence on an evolutionary development of history.

ii) Marx and Engels

The revolutionary socialist doctrine of Marx and Engels was influenced by Hegelian philosophy, although Marx, in 1848, formally broke from the Hegelian school. Perhaps due to an awareness of the complexity of the problem, neither Marx nor Engels was to delineate a clear theory on the 'nation'. Tom Nairn (1975) argues that Marx and Engels were constrained by history.

If they could not put together a tolerable theory about nationalism, nobody could, or did. Historical development had not at that time produced certain things necessary for such a theory.

(T. Nairn, 1975: p. 2)

Nevertheless, in speaking around the issue, certain consistencies emerge in their work.

Latter day Marxists are fond of quoting Marx and Engel's assertion that the workers have no country (The Communist Manifesto), although there may be recognition of the fact that proletarian struggles may assume a temporary national character by virtue of the struggle being conducted against a national bourgeoisie (see G. Bourque and N. Laurin-Frenette, 1973, p. 190, and T. Nairn's critique, 1975, p. 21).
Popularized and vulgarized, this is commonly assumed to deny the validity of 'nation' as a concept. In actuality, Marx and Engels responded to environmental conditions which saw the expansion of bourgeois-controlled capitalism occur with little reference to nation-state boundaries. Inasmuch as capitalism had become internationalized, Marx and Engels assumed that class conflict and the potential for the growth of a revolutionary proletariat had become internationalized as well.

Early Marx's thought demonstrates the need he saw for the evolutionary development of capitalism within nation-states so that truly revolutionary conflict between the bourgeoisie, their instrument the state (see C. Wright Mills, 1970: p. 92) and the proletariat might emerge. Situating revolutionary potential in the capitalist system itself, Marx and Engels contend that

Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.
(Marx and Engels, 1970: p. 43)

The evolution towards revolutionary action on the part of the proletariat was, then, initially situated within the nation-state. In fact, early in Marx's writing, the revolution is seen as inevitably to begin among the most advanced capitalist nation-states in Europe. The unusually sharp distinction of nation and state inherited from the Hegelian school provided Marx and Engels with a clear analytic perspective on the relation between the bourgeois state and 'nation' in a larger sense. The nation, under capitalism, was characterized by bourgeois control and incipient class conflict, and was the result of a long history of
economic relationships culminating in bourgeois domination.

Marx argued that the nation-state was a necessary condition of this capitalist stage of technological and economic activity. The vast productivity of capitalism could only be organized if large territories were politically united and centralised with an efficient network of communications. Nationalism therefore served the economic interests of the capitalists, but for that reason the nation-state could only help to intensify the oppression of the proletariat.

(A. Smith, 1973: p. 55)

The state, in this system, became the centre of class domination and exploitation. Given the eventual demise of the state with revolutionary proletarian action, the nation, theoretically, would no longer exhibit these characteristics. It would be classless and therefore stateless as class distinctions and need for coercion disappeared.

The internationalism envisaged by Marx and Engels is, in essence, based on intercourse among nations without the exploitive aspects of the state (see H. Davis, 1967: Chapter 1) In this particular sense, then, Marx and Engels retained throughout their theoretical analyses a strong sense of 'nation'. However, their view of the 'nation' was coloured by the Hegelian school, and therefore there is a continued confusion over just what constitutes a 'nation'.

Marx particularly held to the view of an historic evolution of the nation-state based on a series of exploitive economic relationships. The Hegelian influence was particularly strong with reference to an evolutionary dialectic, and Engels himself was a strong proponent of the view of 'historyless peoples' (he formulated some particularly pithy diatribes against the pan-Slav movement). An evolutionary perspective made imperative an impatience with reactionary elements
retarding positivistic capitalist growth. It is most probably this reason which sustained, first, an analytic fascination and insistence on the spread and introduction of capitalism to all nation-states in order to bring about the eventual downfall of capitalism, and, second, an equation of the word 'nation' with nation-state. Current political entities were nations, and only in exceptional cases were politically unconstituted aggregates considered nations (such as Poland).

Like Hegel, Marx and Engels were both influenced by the current 'state of affairs': given nation-state arrangements appear to have shaped their perceptions of what constituted a 'nation'. In their analysis, says Rosdolsky (1965: pp. 330-337), the term 'nation' refers to the people of a sovereign state, while 'nationality' is used in perjoratively categorizing Hegel's 'historyless peoples'. 'Nationality', then, is used by Marx and Engels to refer to aggregates with similar language and cultural backgrounds, but who do not form political communities. Moreover, notes Davis (1967: p. 24)

Marx and Engels approved of the "national" struggle of the workers in a certain sense, but disapproved of the "nationality"...

...he (Marx) tended to agree with Engels in thinking of the many struggling nationalities of Eastern Europe as so many 'ethnographic monuments' doomed to slow extinction. It followed then that only the nation-states of Western Europe...were worthy of consideration... the issue of nationality could only serve to divert attention from the real problems of humanity.

(A. Smith, 1973: p. 55)
As capitalist expansion continued, however, Marx and Engels came to approve of national liberation struggles. Imperialism did not result in the export of revolution but rather in the extension of capitalist exploitation (and of nationalism, argues Nairn (1975)), a situation which Marx, Engels and later Marxists came to condemn morally. Moral condemnation of exploitation (and Marx was not an idealist) had to play a secondary role to that of capitalist expansion. Despite any immorality, capitalism, Marx argued, had to expand so as to spread the contradictions into as many areas as possible, facilitating class polarization and eventual revolution. Insistence on this evolutionary model made it difficult for Marx and Engels to do anything but vacillate with regards to "nationality" struggles - occasionally feeling sympathetic, but more apt to denounce them as 'analytic wrenches in the works'. Thus, they could support a multi-nationality Poland (seen as progressive) and, at the same time react negatively to the pan-Slav movement (seen as a strengthening of reactionary Russia). At all times, the principle of self-determination was to remain secondary in importance (despite the democratic humanitarianism of peers). All new political developments were judged by Marx and Engels

...to be in the light of the contribution they made to the dialectic development of society towards its goal, which for them was communism. (H. Davis, 1967: p. 40)

Where nationality was problematic, it could be ignored, and stress on 'nation' was always equated with class struggle. Internationalism was, in fact, based on 'nation', but nation transformed in meaning and content with the end of class and state domination.
Although theories of nation emanating from Hegel, Marx and Engels are confusing and socio-historically dependent (if not at times snatched out of the thin air by latter day commentators), they have been interpreted and re-interpreted throughout the last century by Marxist analysts attempting to come to grips with the forces of nationalism in the twentieth century. Because Marx and Engels never did develop a full theory of the nation, Marxist approaches to the ideology of nationalism are based on interpretations of less than adequate theory. The problems endemic to such analysis are in faithfully representing this theory and in advancing the analysis to correspond to new socio-historical conditions. Some of the difficulties will be discussed below when current Marxist analyses are discussed with reference to nationalism.

iii) Cultural Perspectives on the Nation

In contrast to Hegel, Marx and Engels, beginning at the turn of the nineteenth century, there emerged the start of a philosophic trend which sought to define the 'nation' in a less historically-contingent manner. At times the defence of personal nationalist feelings, 'nation' was to be understood as transcending political boundaries and economic relationships. As such, it was to share with the Hegelian and Marxist schools a divorce of the concepts "nation" and "state", but certainly not for the same reasons. Whereas Marx perceived the state as a coercive element, this school was to see the state not necessarily as a tool of oppression, but also as an instrument for sustaining cohesion.
a) Johann Gottfried von Herder

Kenneth Minogue notes (1967: p. 57) that Herder "supplied nationalism with its theory of the nation". Writing out of the philosophic tradition emerging following the French Revolution with its emphasis on community and general will, Herder strove to define the nation within the parameters of community, and developed the conception of VOLK.

The VOLK is not simply the people of a country, but a metaphysical entity defined as THAT WHICH produces a particular language, art, culture, set of great men, religion and collection of customs.  
(K. Minogue, 1967: p. 57)

The concept VOLK was to move philosophical discussion of national variations out of the realm of local aberrations assumed by earlier rationalists, and into the scope of man influenced, not only by universals, but by particulars. In so doing, Herder made an excellent case his historical relativism.

At the core of Herder's analysis was a high regard for national characteristics such as language and culture. Stressing unique culture as a particular response to historical relationships between a people and its social environment, he espoused the belief that the national purity of language and culture should be retained as a buffer to the destruction of national creativity.

The indispensability of maintaining purity follows from Herder's belief that a VOLK that abandons its language destroys its 'self', that is to say, its people lose their main contact with reality, and become mere imitations of foreign models, lost to all vitality, spontaneity and identity.  
(K. Minogue, 1967: p. 61)
Herder constantly stressed this importance of language, positing it as

'... the organ of social activity and co-operation, as the bond of social classes and a means for their integration...'

(J. Herder, quoted in K. Minogue, 1967: p. 60)

The implications of such an assertion are important in that it posits an awareness of language as a variable at play in the relationship between nations, and, furthermore, in the relationship between national social classes.

Herder, particularly due to this aspect, was to strongly influence an entire generation of German nationalists, setting up the framework for an 'organic' concept of nation. (A. Smith, 1973: p. 12)

While he himself did not tender a deep political analysis, the concept VOLK and the pre-eminent role of language were seized as rationalizations for German unification and the idolatry of German culture.

Herder did make clear, however, his view with regards to the distinction between nation and state, saying

The most important State is a community with its own national character.

(J. Herder, quoted in K. Minogue, 1967: p. 62)

Multi-national states were perceived as artificial constructs, imposing the destruction of national lives on the nations involved. In essence, then, Herder's cultural definition of the nation and demand for its recognition and integrity was of great significance in arguing for the nation and state being coterminus - the control and influence of the state extending only to national boundaries, allowing political configurations expressive of the VOLK.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the intellectual environment of Germany was characterized by conflict between a conservative tradition in the social sciences, liberals and socialists. Weber, writing out of this background, and himself a cautious nationalist, attempted the critical integration of these various schools into a new sociology, variously being influenced by each one of them in turn. In so doing, he arrived at a scheme which attempted to take into account the interplay of causal factors in whatever phenomenon he examined, always with an emphasis on the ever-increasing rationalization of life over time.

He construes social dynamics in terms of pluralistic analysis of factors, which may be isolated and gauged in terms of their respective causal weights.

(H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, 1965: p. 65)

It was natural, given the force of nationalism as a dynamic ideology in the nineteenth century, that Weber should come to grips with the question of the nature of 'nation' and 'state'. But, like all social commentators, he could not avoid the influence of drifts of current thought, in this case, with the inherited perspective on 'nation' passed down through German nationalists. Furthermore, finding in Marxist analysis what he considered to be a too rigid defence of a monolithic causal factor, his own inclination was to define 'nation' in terms of a complexity of factors.

Weber categorically delineated the terms 'nation' and 'state' when he commented that
...'nation' is, first of all, not identified with the 'people of a state', that is, with the membership of a given polity.

Further, he suggested that 'nation' cannot be defined in terms of empirical factors. Rather, he argues that "the concept belongs in the sphere of values" (M. Weber, 1965: p. 172) because it demands a specific "sentiment of solidarity".

He constructs a typology of variables which, in various combinations, may lead to 'nation' - language, religion, ethnicity, common political destiny, and common blood. He posits much of the reason for the existence of national sentiment in the cultivation of prestige and status, and, in the end, resolves the dilemma of state in relation to nation in this manner:

One might well define the concept of nation in the following way: a 'nation' is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, a nation is a community which tends to produce a state of its own.

Here, the demarcation between 'nation' and 'state' is clear: the 'nation' exists independent of the state, although it may create a state. The stress is on 'a community of sentiment'. This distinction between nation and state is demonstrated by Weber's assertion that the state is an instrument which acts on the behalf of the nation.

The state is valued as the agency which guarantees security, and this is above all the case in times of external danger, when sentiments of national solidarity flare up, at least intermittently.
(M. Weber, 1965: p. 177)

In other words, the state is a means for protecting the integrity of the nation. Furthermore, unlike Hegel or Marx, Weber does not insist
on the existence of 'state' while defining 'nation'. The causal factors listed above are all cited as contributing factors, but Weber clearly states he does not consider 'nation' to be a cultural community, although he is using culture here in a limited sense, referring to art and literature. When, however, language, religion and mores (implied in Weber's use of the word ethnicity) are combined, he can be interpreted as clearly advocating a sense of nation based, to a large extent, on common cultural bonds (culture used in a more contemporary sociological way). In this sense, although much more complex in his recognition of the play of factors, Weber emerges as the intellectual heir-apparent, although with considerable modification, to Herder.

Unlike Herder, though, Weber took a much deeper look into the nature of the state.

...we have to say that a state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.

(M. Weber, 1965: pp. 77-78)

He was aware of coercive authority, and cognizant of the rationalizing capabilities of ideologies. He maintained that the state could, although not necessarily, advocate the interests of particular segments of the population (see M. Weber, 1965: p. 212), although he was more prone to see the state apparatus as a means of control and co-ordination.

Weber represents one of the first attempts to logically and coherently work out the problem of nation as a non-geopolitical formulation. While he did not advance this analysis to consider nationalism, as a dominant thinker in the early social sciences, his cultural perspective on the nation and its separation from the state (although the two can
co-exist in nation-states) was to have considerable impact.

c) Weber Re-Visited

Weber's cultural perspective on the nation has been popularly received among a large proportion of present-day commentators, although the acceptance seems to have occurred with individual modifications.

H. Deutsch lists the following people as, at one time or another, holding to this value-derived perspective, noting that

...we have...found a good deal of structural correspondence between these isolated pieces of knowledge or insight. Qualitative rather than quantitative, unsuited thus far to measurement, they seem yet to add up to a pattern.

(K. Deutsch, 1966: p. 27)

He cites John Stuart Mill, Otto Bauer, Professor K.C. Wheare, Edmund Burke, Benjamin Disraeli, Sir Ernest Barker, and J.V. Stalin, to name but a few. While certainly not all these individuals have directly followed from Weber, many have been influenced by this conception of the nation which Weber helped to popularize.

Kenneth Minogue, finding the complexity of the issue to be tied too tightly to nationalist advocacy, merely states:

I shall not now nor later attempt anything as exact as a definition of 'nation'. But what one can say with confidence is that most nationalists have demanded that the nation should have some kind of pre-political unity.

(K. Minogue, 1967: p. 11)

The cultural position, despite Minogue's uncertainty, is best summed up in A. Smith's work (1973: pp. 16-19). He argues against a STATIST definition of nation because, for nationalists
The state may provide a protective shell for the nation, it may be a sine qua non for realising the destiny of the nation, but in their eyes it is not to be confused with the nation. What interests a nationalist...is the regeneration of a community...

(A. Smith, 1973: p. 18)

Smith suggests the adoption of an ETHNICIST position which defines the nation as

...a special type of ethnic group, one in which the population is economically and politically homogeneous and territorially fixed.

(A. Smith, 1973: p. 18)

Implicit in this definition is the notion of a community of values generated culturally. It is here that the differences between approaches to 'nation' are most evident. From Marx and his later interpreters come definitions of 'nation' as one consequence of the objective economic relations of capitalist production. From the Weberian school emerge approaches which emphasize a subjective sharing of culture which leads to a community of values. Moreover, there is a clear rejection of the notion of nation as being rooted in the economic relations of production. Weber states that the "emotional fervour" surrounding national sentiment "does not, in the main, have an economic origin"


The intellectual split in the nineteenth century between socialists and liberals continues to dominate thinking on the nature of 'nation' to this day. The only point of agreement seems to be a recognition of a division between nation and state, although arguments continue as to the nature of the concepts individually.

Essentially, the disagreement centres on whether the nation can properly be considered a structural phenomenon dependent on economic
and political configuration (the Marxist school) or whether, indeed, it stems from the realm of culture (the Weberian school). Moreover, because each position contains important implications regarding the relation of class to nation, there are important consequences for the treatment of nationalism. What are the relations between nationalist ideology, national integration and national cohesion, and national class structures which follow from each view of nation?

These questions can be more readily explored through an examination of the theories of nationalism which are derived from the two dominant approaches to nation. Modern approaches can, therefore, be traced back to their antecedents so that problems arising out of definitional disagreements (which were found to be so confusing initially) might be resolved.

2) **Theories of Nationalism**

i) **Cultural Approaches**

The cultural view of nation operates on the premise that the national population shares particular values and culture leading to a consensus regarding the existence and maintenance of the 'nation' (hereafter referred to as national integrity). Implicit in this view is the consideration that national values supercede more specific values shared merely by segments of the population, such as class consciousness, sexually-based values, *et cetera*. National values may be interpreted as a particular configuration of various other values, that is, a
national 'way of doing things' (for example, family patterns, education or political configuration) or as values pertaining more clearly to the nation alone (for example, language loyalty). The existence of pre-eminently important national values implies a solidarity of sentiment and a recognition of the nation as a collectivity.

Kenneth Minogue recognizes this fact when he notes that

The nationalist grievance must be collective. And the collectivity must be the nation. Irish peasants and gentry felt all manner of grievances against English rule for centuries, but they felt these grievances as an oppressed class, or religious community, or locality.


Qualifications are added which indicate that nations may be internally differentiated.

Nationalism is a set of ideas...a form of self-expression by which a certain kind of political excitement can be communicated from an elite to the masses.


But this qualification does not contradict his view of nationalism as embracing all units of a nation: Minogue merely sees the impetus coming from ideas transmitted to intellectuals who pass them on to the rest of society en commune.

Symmons-Symonolewicz adds to this by suggesting that

It is paradoxical, however, to argue that a nationalism represented largely by the middle classes and not yet embraced by the peasantry is not a genuine one. All nationalisms, like all other ideological movements, are led by economic elites.

(K. Symmons-Symonolewicz, 1970: p. 3)

He suggests, here, that given time, nationalism is likely to filter down and embrace all social classes in a society. This is emphasized by his 'social movements' approach to nationalism which stresses the actual extension of nationalist ideology and grievances to all segments of a
Minogue and Symmons-Symonolewicz are representative of a large school of writers who view nationalism as a collective phenomenon--as an ideology which transcends internal national differentiations. (That is, national sentiment can be mobilized so that nationalism becomes a shared mass ideology. The problem of this position will be discussed below.) Therefore, since internal divisions are not viewed as problematic, a prime focus of their discussion is the external relationships the nation must negotiate and respond to as nationalism takes hold.

This view necessitates an analysis of nationalism as a reaction to these external conditions.

Nationalism, they argue, may be

...justly considered a "positive and creative response" to the shattering impact of culture contact and conflict, to the threat of cultural annihilation.
(K. Symmons-Symonolewicz, 1970: p. 18)

...it is a political movement depending on a feeling of collective grievance against foreigners.

The jump from national values and culture to the defence and/or promotion of culture and values implicit in such a perspective is situated in Weber's work on the prestige value of national sentiment. In the face of some sort of external interference, there is a response characterized by collective mobilization of a belief in national worth: the nation, because it is both subjectively real and valued, must be defended. Nationalism, then, is most often perceived as a reaction or response to external relations by this school of writers.

Many typological variants have emerged from this school, but they
almost all impuTe to nationalism this reactive characteristic based on the defence of national integrity.

A further broad similarity can be seen when these particular theorists point to varieties of nationalism ranging from the American revolution to fascist Germany. There is an awareness that nationalism, as a response, may be conditioned by local events and socio-historical realities into experientially different phenomena, which, nevertheless, all fall into the category nationalism. Nationalism, then, is conceived of as being shaped by other ideologies. Symmons-Symonolewicz puts it quite succinctly. Nationalism, he says,

...consists only of some constitutive ideas and beliefs centring around the idea of the nation and its rights in relation to other nations. (K. Symmons-Symonolewicz, 1970: p. 40)

Essentially, then, it can combine into a potentially unlimited number of ideological combinations, each of which can be termed nationalism. 7

These, then, have, in very general terms, been the outcome of treatments of nationalism stemming from the value-derived definition of the nation. First, that nationalism is a collective response, second, that it is a reaction to external conditions and, third, that it may vary in expression given particular socio-historical conditions.

There is an important weakness to be noted (briefly at this point, but later in greater detail) with regards to this perspective. The light treatment of internal differentiation (class) of nations by this sort of analysis forces a consistently monolithic view of the nationalist movement concerned which often is at odds with reality (as the Quebec experience proves). Consequently, elements in this analysis
must be employed with caution, particularly the transcending quality
of national sentiment (cultural values) or the insignificance of internal
differentiation.

A particularly significant analysis of Quebec nationalism recently
addressed itself to these questions. The work of Jacques Dofny, Marcel
Rioux and Fernand Dumont has initiated in Quebec an intellectual debate
on the nature of the relation of class to nation.

Unlike many cultural approaches, the Rioux/Dofny school admits
the existence of a strong internal differentiation. They argue that
class and nation may respectively serve as the source for the growth
of class and national consciousness. However, they see in Quebec a lack
of class consciousness. This becomes the problematic in their analysis:
why has there been little, if any, development of class consciousness?

Their answer is that there has been a continual transcending
(and, consequently, inhibiting) of class consciousness by national
consciousness in Quebec's history. This, they further argue, is due to
the tendency of "les Quebecois" to perceive themselves as collectively
disadvantaged vis-a-vis English Canadians (a fact which is more than
adequately documented - see Chapter Three). This collective disadvantage
is termed "ethnic class" and is the source of a national (ethnic)
consciousness which supercedes internal, class-based consciousness. 8

Rioux and Dofny explain it this way.

On the one hand this socio-cultural entity considers
itself and is considered to be a total society or a
nation, and in this sense the problem of social classes
ressembles that in any other society in the process of
industrialization and urbanization; on the other hand,
French Canadians also regard themselves and are
considered to be a recognizable ethnic minority which
plays the same role within Canada...as a social class plays within a total society.
(M. Rioux and J. Dofny, 1964: p. 309)

On peut dire que c'est l'interaction entre ces deux situations de fait et la prédominance de l'une ou l'autre conscience à un moment donné qui explique la physionomie de chaque époque, les alliances et les luttes idéologiques qui apparaissent au Québec. En somme, Dofny et moi avions tendance à dire que la conscience ethnique avait prévalu au cours de l'histoire, empêchant la conscience de classe de se former et la masquant quand elle avait tendance à apparaître.
(M. Rioux, 1965: p. 101)

The "ethnic class" explanation rests on the assumption that nation is a culturally determined construct. That is, 'nation' is the result of shared, subjectively apprehended cultural values and a community of sentiment, which may embody, but is not determined, by objective relationships.

The Rioux/Dofny position treats class consciousness and national consciousness as functionally distinct phenomena. When one is strong, the other is weak. It is at this point that problems with this approach can be seen. Rioux's arguments are inadvertently weakened by his own research. While attempting to demonstrate the importance of national consciousness, he suggests the emergence of a consciousness with a class-specific base.

Après avoir interviewé une centaine de ces jeunes, je constate que la conscience nationale est beaucoup plus vive que la conscience de classe...qu'elle est beaucoup plus un phénomène de classe moyenne que de classe ouvrière ou paysanne...
(M. Rioux, 1965: p. 107)

Certainly a national consciousness transcending class consciousness would not be "un phénomène de classe moyenne"! This contradiction is
reinforced by recent events in Quebec which suggest the existence of both national and class consciousness together (see Chapter 3, and Chapter 4 for a possible explanation). In fact, class consciousness and national consciousness may coexist. Rioux and Dofny's contention that one supercedes the other can, at least, be brought into serious question.

As MacLeod points out (1973: p. 4) the Rioux/Dofny approach is interpretive only, for they "deplore" the situation they have identified which inhibits the growth of class consciousness. There is a tactical commitment stemming from the Rioux/Dofny position - support for resolution of national issues so that national consciousness will no longer impede the development of class consciousness.

This analysis, and its political strategy helped to initiate the ongoing debate on the Quebec left. The analysis provides a unique reworking of a cultural approach to the nation. This reworking, claim Marxists, tends to obscure the real issues, and much of what Marxists are writing about nationalism and class in Quebec is in response to the Rioux/Dofny school. 9

ii) Marxist Approaches to Nationalism

The root of Marxist approaches to nationalism is the recognition that the ideology, as historically manifested, is intrinsically tied to class interest, particularly that of the bourgeoisie. However, the long-accepted tenet that nationalism and socialism are antithetical is admittedly questionable. Note two modern Marxist commentators writing in regard to Quebec:

9
The national territory, the national state, the national language, the national heritage can be national 'in the bourgeois sense of the term', serving the interests of the dominated classes only if bourgeois domination has been abolished. We are now in a position to state that a 'non-bourgeois' nationalism...can exist. (G. Bourque and N. Laurin-Frenette, 1972: p. 190)

This assertion must be seen in the light of the historical development of Marxist thought on nationalism.

In Marx's early writings (H. Davis, 1967: pp. 8-9) there is an underlying assumption that free trade would continue, thus creating the maximum potential for the impoverishment of the proletariat and, consequently, for conflict as the degree of exploitiveness in the productive relationship increased. As an assumption, it is key to appreciating Marx's contention that capitalism would flourish, expanding with such speed as to make conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat inevitable on a world wide basis. History, however, indicates that protectionism won out, and wages did not deteriorate as Marx had predicted. Instead, neo-mercantilism, or economic nationalism as Davis calls it, became the doctrine of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Wages improved and conflict, while still a factor in class relations, never reached the revolutionary proportions Marx had indicated.

For Marxist analysts, this turn of events became a crucial variable in coping both intellectually and tactically with questions of nationalism. Capitalist expansion into under-developed countries was no longer, as Marx had often characterized it, the best vehicle for economic development. (Tom Nairn's work on this point is instructive.
See 1975: pp. 6-9). Modern analysts have moved even further in their defence of national liberation movements than Marx might have ever done himself (Marx, for example, had fully supported the American annexation of California and subsequent aggression against Mexico\(^\text{10}\)).

Dominant Marxist thought on nationalism, however, must be seen in light of the contributions made by Lenin who, with the advantages of hindsight, tendered a set of considerations which integrated, for the first time, the principle of self-determination into Marxist thought (H. Davis, 1967 (a): p. 164).

Lenin, in the debate prior to the Russian Revolution over the necessity of development towards socialism via 'stages of capitalism', suggested, first, that anti-imperialist battles would not retard capitalist development. In fact, they would compel "capitalism to use more civilized and technically developed methods" (H. Davis, 1967 (a): p. 166). At the same time "he deplored its [nationalism's] growth in the European proletariat as distracting the workers from the international struggle" (H. Davis, 1967 (a): p. 167). He developed a 'progression' approach to nationalist development, expanding Marx's approach to capitalist development. The first epoch was characterized by Lenin as the ascendency of the bourgeoisie and subsequent breakdown of feudal society (nationalism proving a progressive force); the second epoch, by bourgeois domination and its transformation into a reactionary element and the coincident expansion of imperialism (nationalism as a negative force) (H. Davis, 1967 (a): pp. 171-172).

The formation of national states under an emerging bourgeoisie, Lenin contended, was progressive — "to achieve complete victory for
commodity production the bourgeoisie must capture the home market"
(H. Davis, 1967 (a): p. 173). As the bourgeoisie became consolidated,
however, "the bourgeois national framework of states had become a
hindrance to the free development of the productive forces" (H. Davis,
1967 (a): p. 174). Imperialism, then, while progressive, became not
only the highest, but the last stage of capitalism.

Lenin supported self-determination when, and where, it was
progressive (that is, aiding the positive development of nations). Thus,
an anti-imperialist movement which would lead to the victory of a local
bourgeoisie over collaborating feudal forces was characterized as a
movement which should be supported by the proletariat in both the
imperialist and imperialized nations.

Lenin stated flatly, and repeated many times, that the
Social Democrats of the large countries have a bounden
duty to right every form of national oppression, and to
support the right of every nationality to self-determination.
Marx and Engels had not gone this far.
(H. Davis, 1967 (a): p. 177)

Thus, all nationalist movements, for Lenin, had to be judged in terms of
the individual circumstances.

Finally, Lenin subscribed to Marx's nation-based socialist
internationalism.

The overthrow of the bourgeoisie will tremendously accelerate
the collapse of every kind of national partition without
decreasing, but on the contrary, increasing millions of
times, the "differentiation" of humanity, if we are to understand by this the wealth and variety of spiritual life, trends
of ideas, tendencies, shading.
(Lenin, quoted in H. Davis, 1967 (a): p. 184)

Lenin's work is reminiscent of Marx particularly in his
confusion over the term 'nation'. This quotation above seems to impute
a cultural, or value-derived, definition of nation, and Lenin did subscribe to Stalin's strongly cultural characterization of the term.\textsuperscript{12}

A nation...is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup, manifested in a community of culture.  
(Stalin, quoted in H. Davis, 1967 (a): p. 169)

Davis suggests this be read nationality to correspond to Hegel's 'historyless peoples'. But, then again, at other times, Lenin seems to be unsure of this definition, and returns to a perception of nation as a political configuration. He cannot see why, for example, under socialism, nations would want to be separate entities. Thus, right throughout all varieties of Marxist analysis, there is a definitional paralysis. At least a few have tried to come to grips with the problem.

An excellent example of an updated Marxist approach is G. Bourque and N. Laurin-Frenette's work in \textit{Social Classes and Nationalist Ideologies in Quebec, 1760-1970} (1973). Writing in response to M. Rioux and J. Dofny, they use a classic analysis to arrive at the point where they suggest the very real possibility of a true 'proletarian nationalism'.

The key to Bourque and Laurin-Frenette's work is their view of the 'nation' as a consequence of capitalist relations of production. Implicit in this view is a class structure characterized by exploitation. Hence, ideology is seen as serving the promotion of particular class interests. Nationalism is no exception.

For Bourque and Laurin-Frenette, national consciousness has always been class consciousness (1973: p. 186). In fact, the Rioux/Dofny position itself is described as class-based by these authors.
The concept of ethnic class...merely serves as ideological coating for the independent struggle led by a new faction of the petite bourgeoisie. (1973: p. 192)

Bourque and Laurin-Frenette detail these three forms of class-based nationalisms: a conservative form, a dynamic/independentiste type, and a socialist oriented nationalism based on the principle of national liberation (1973: p. 193). The conservative (elite) and dynamic (bourgeois) options are outlined and justified as theoretical models with regards to Quebec history. The third option, that of a socialist nationalism, is linked theoretically to the working class, but Bourque and Laurin-Frenette argue that it has not yet emerged in Quebec.

That a so-called working class nationalism has not developed is due, the authors suggest, to the fact that Quebec's working class has, generally, no ideology of its own, and, specifically, no sense of developed national consciousness (1973: p. 203). By national consciousness, Bourque and Laurin-Frenette mean a specifically proletarian sense of nation (although they never state what this is beyond being non-bourgeois).

We can only state the possibility that an ideology specific to the dominated classes in Quebec may come to exist, and that it would contain non-bourgeois nationalist elements, linked to the economic, political, and cultural interests of the dominated classes. (1973: pp. 203-204)

Marxists have to come to grips, however, with certain realities, such as working class support for the "Parti Quebecois type of nationalism which corresponds fundamentally and directly to the interests of the technocratic faction of the French-Canadian petite bourgeoisie" (Bourque and Laurin-Frenette, 1973: p. 205). They do so in the following
As we have pointed out, since the dominated classes in Quebec do not have their own ideology or political formation, they can express their discontent and frustration only by throwing their weight at random into the electoral balance of bourgeois democracy. This is a game of desperation, if ever there was one... 
(1973: p. 205)

This is the essential weakness in their argument.

The weakness of a purely Marxist analysis of the situation is that its protagonists tend to force reality into their own particular rigid framework. The ethnic dimension of Quebec consciousness cannot be explained away as easily as they would have us believe. 
(A. MacLeod, 1973: p. 9)

There are, in fact, in Quebec forms of national consciousness among the working classes (see Chapter 3). The doctrinaire insistence on an objective, economically derived definition of the nation by Bourque and Laurin-Frenette leads to inadequate explanations of working class political and economic activity which contain national dimensions.

The Rioux/Dofny approach, I have argued, is weakened by their view of class consciousness and national consciousness as functionally opposed to each other...that is, one existing at the expense of the other. In contrast, Marxists see the two phenomena as one and the same thing: national consciousness is class consciousness. But, their view of nation does not allow them to grapple with particular realities. Economism neglects working class national consciousness. Consequently, Bourque and Laurin-Frenette excuse away working class behaviour rather than seeing it as expressive of national consciousness. They respond with dogma rather than data.
With these critical evaluations in mind, it becomes imperative to develop a workable conception of the nation. Utilizing an important variable borrowed from the cultural approach to the nation (language), both this and the Marxist approach can be judged with regard to new evidence. I will argue that while both approaches have particular merits, there are also shortcomings which necessitate, in the end, a broader definition of nation which pays attention to both cohesion and differentiation.

3) **Language in Relation to 'Nation'**

Value-derived (consensus) perspectives on the 'nation' stress 'solidarity of sentiment' and culture. To more adequately explore the possible nature of 'nation', therefore, an examination of language (as a cultural component and transmitter) will permit a better evaluation of this perspective.

i) **Language and Culture: Holistic Functions of Language**

To definitively characterize culture is to attempt the impossible. Not only does one encounter radically opposed analyses of what culture is, but one finds qualitatively differing definitions within schools of thought. To avoid confusion, however, I will define culture as the body of socially-situated knowledge developed and transmitted from generation to generation as the human race has reacted to and manipulated its environment. Within culture, then, can be located human means of
communication (that is, language, and its derivatives, speech and writing). Language, then, is above all else, one component in a complex of variables composing culture, but, at the same time, qualitatively differentiated from these other variables in that language is the primary mode of cultural transmission.

Culture is common to all humanity, but no one culture is global in scope. The problems cited by people adjusting to 'foreign' societies bear mute witness to this. Customs, norms and values vary from area to area, as do modes of social organization. Inasmuch as historical experience and development varies from one group of people to another, so, too, do resulting cultures. This argument in no way suggests the means by which such differences may, or may not, be sustained over time.

Interest in cultural variation was mirrored in the development of structural linguistics, which sought to identify underlying structural regularities of language. As a dominant school of thought in modern linguistics, the influence of structuralism has been great. On the one hand, there has been a growing attempt to find universals of language structure. On the other, the identification and research techniques employed by structuralists have been used for ends as diverse as the identification and explanation of cognitive variation. The work of B. Whorf is particularly instructive here.

Whorf argues that

It was found that the background linguistic system (in other words, the grammar) of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade. Formulation of ideas is not an independent process, strictly rational in the old sense, but is part of a
particular grammar, and differs, from slightly to
greatly, between different grammars. We dissect
nature along lines laid down by our native languages.
(B. Whorf, 1973: pp. 212-213)

In essence, Whorf argues that language structure actually shapes cognitive
development. This has since been tagged linguistic relativity theory,
and has become a contentious language issue. There is little corroborative
research on the question, and it yet remains a challenge to linguists.
Nevertheless, Whorf does attempt to point the way to an understanding
of the relationship between language and its unique culture.

The greatest part of current linguistic debate centres on
language structure. Noam Chomsky has moved in revolutionary directions,
pointing to possible universals as opposed to Whorfian specifics.

Chomsky has argued, in his most recent publications, that
the general principles which determine the form of grammatical
rules in particular languages, such as English, Turkish or
Chinese, are to some considerable degree, common to all human
languages. Furthermore, he has claimed that the principles
underlying the structure of language are so specific and so
highly articulated that they must be regarded as biologically
determined; that is to say, as constituting part of what we
call human nature.
(J. Lyons, 1974: p. 11)

This type of debate is important to my own investigation in that
 universals or relativity both have far-reaching implications for the
relationship between language and other cultural components. It should
be recognized, however, that the structural focus tends to ignore, or, at
least minimize, the importance and contribution of meaning, that is,
the symbolic content of language. Even given Chomsky's universal
structures, both at the grammatical and biological levels, the develop-
ment of meaning is still centred in the social world. It is here that
language and culture must, at least initially, be examined.
J. Lyons suggests that

The vocabulary of a language will, of course, reflect the characteristic pursuits and interests of the society which uses it.

(1974: p. 21)

The range of meaning, or vocabulary, of a language, then, reflects (not to be confused with correlation) culture. The impetus for this stance has come, in the main, from the work of symbolic interactionists. George Herbert Mead's analysis of symbols and socialization stresses, among other things, that symbols must be shared and that, as H. Gerth and C. W. Mills point out (1964: p. 82), shared symbols are the result of "co-ordinated activity".

Language is, at its meaning level, a set of shared symbolic representations. As a prime vehicle of communication, it permits the give and take of information only as long as all those participating employ the same set of symbols. Thus, as a language evolves, it is an

...inventory of the concerns and interests of those who employ it at any given time. If any portion of this inventory reveals features not present in other portions, this may be indicative of particular stresses or influences...

(J. Fishman, 1972: p. 104)

Or, as another commentator puts it,

It is posited that the principles of referential classification embodied in lexical usage in a given speech community bear some relation to their relative utility in communication in that community and to the frequency with which the distinctions implied by them are of crucial significance. This, in turn, it is posited, may be a function of the ways in which a people's social interactions and their activities in relation to their natural and man-made environments are organized.

(F. Lounsberry, 1970: p. 56)

Language, then, is culture-specific, as it were - reflective of particular
cultural perceptions and priorities. Furthermore, language is, at the same time, culture's most easily identified symbol, transmitting (shaping or concerning) a particular set of cultural perceptions and values in the socialization process. 

Language, given these parameters, fulfills a cohesive function vis-à-vis any particular cultural group. It reinforces "we-ness", differentiating the group in question from its neighbours. (This, of course, would hold true only where there is sustained use of the language in question.)

The appeal of this view of language to observers of nationalism who see nation in a cultural sense, is that it demarcates cultural groups and national groups in an empirically sound manner, making it easier to identify 'real' nations. History, however, has shown the various claims to 'nation' status in situations where various languages have competed (for example, various emerging African nations). (Although, as nationalism develops in these instance, attempts to unify through a strict language policy aimed at establishing marginal homogeneity typically results.) Lack of language homogeneity has not deterred claims to 'nation'-hood. At the same time, in nationalist movements where language homogeneity has existed (Quebec and Flanders in Belgium, for example), language has consistently erupted as a contentious issue. So, we can say with some degree of certainty that language (as a reflection of group needs and priorities) is, first, a critical element in the creation and maintenance of distinct cultural groups and, second, an important (but not necessary) variable in the establishment of claims to nation status.
Through transmission and delineation of culture, language provides the necessary, but not sufficient, medium for the expression of 'solidarity of sentiment' which cultural views of the nation depend on. Differing languages do, indeed, reflect and reinforce distinct cultures. Moreover, in the modern era, differing languages might even retard the 'massification' of society so aptly described by Marcuse.

Language, then, has a holistic function: that of buttressing cultural cohesion and distinctiveness - an observation consistent with cultural conceptions of the 'nation'. Inasmuch as such perspectives depend on the existence of a solidarity of sentiment, language helps provide that solidarity.

ii) Language and Culture: Differentiation Functions of Language

To end the analysis of language here would be premature in the extreme. While language leads to cultural cohesion, it is also a prime vehicle of differentiation within cultural groups.

Language, as has been demonstrated, reflects particular cultures. These cultures are imbedded in and derived from interaction - in both small groups as well as in the larger society. But societies are not homogeneous - they are characterized by internal differentiation. Language, reflective of culture at large, is also reflective and supportive of these lines of differentiation.

The advent of sociolinguistics - the study of language in its social setting - has established a new trend in the application and modification of linguistic theory. Interest has been refocussed onto
speech and its relation to 'traditional' sociological concerns such as stratification. Language is first, and foremost, characterized as a social phenomenon, and a heavy accumulation of evidence now indicates that speech varies greatly in terms of other variables such as setting, sex, social class, status, et cetera. In fact, it would not be a careless assertion to suggest that, for as many social variations one can cite, one will find shifting speech habits.

Remembering the previous discussion regarding 'nation' as a class-based phenomenon, it is interesting to note that sociolinguists are more than prepared to acknowledge language differentiation along social class lines. W. Labov (1970) cites phonetic variations among New Yorkers according to social class. Labov is not alone in his contention that linguistic variation is related to social stratification. Perhaps the most influential (although highly controversial) work in this area has come from Basil Bernstein. His work in British schools has led him to develop a fairly sophisticated scheme of language differentiation between social classes.

There are two keys to Bernstein's work. The first is his assumption that class position determines the nature of the language to which one will be exposed. These types, or codes, are defined by predictability.

They can be defined on a linguistic level in terms of the probability of predicting for any one speaker which syntactic elements will be used to organize meaning. In the case of the ELABORATED code, the speaker will select from a relatively extensive range of alternatives and therefore the probability of predicting the pattern of organized elements is considerably reduced. In the case of the RESTRICTED code the number of these alternatives is often severely limited and the probability of predicting the pattern is greatly increased.

[B. Bernstein, 1973: p. 93]
The second key to Bernstein's work is the extension of codes defined by predictability into corresponding types of cognitive structures and orientations (determined by class position).\textsuperscript{18}

On a psychological level, the codes may be distinguished by the extent to which each facilitates (elaborated code) or inhibits (restricted code) the orientation to symbolize intent in a verbally explicit form. (B. Bernstein, 1973: p. 93)

The process at work goes somewhat as follows. Role relations, patterns of socialization, et cetera, are largely (although never entirely) shaped and determined by social class. These relationships and processes are reinforced by particular language varieties or codes which reflect these same relationships and processes.

Bernstein identifies a restricted code peculiar to the working class, while the middle and upper classes, have access to both restricted and elaborated codes\textsuperscript{19}. For example, a restricted code (high predictability) inhibits "individuated responses" in order to "reinforce the FORM of the social relationship" while an elaborated code "facilitates the construction and exchange of 'individuated' symbols" (B. Bernstein, 1973: p. 94). What this translates into is that lower class people cannot as easily individuate verbally\textsuperscript{20}. Consequently, Bernstein would argue, their cognitive orientation is towards the social group, and not the individual experience. (Put more simply, the restricted code is less complex than the elaborated code.)

Implicit in this approach is a hierarchichal ordering of verbal behaviour and, by consequence, cognitive orientation. As you move up the social stratification system, the broader and more finely differentiated is the available verbal, and cognitive, repertoire. In fact, the middle class has access to a more "complex conceptual hierarchy for the
organization of experience" (1971, p. 130). All members of a society have access to restricted code, but, in Bernstein's opinion, middle class children are more readily exposed to the elaborated code, permitting them to view speech as an "object of special perceptual activity" (1971: p. 130), and making them less subject to the cognitive regulation inherent in the syntactical structure of the restricted code. Social class, therefore, is reinforced.

There are several criticisms that can be levelled at Bernstein's work. First, his methodology is suspect, particularly with regard to inferences he draws regarding cognition. For example, he uses hesitation phenomenon (pauses in speech) as an indication of more complex verbal planning, rehearses lower class children in a discussion situation so that they will not be intimidated, and then concludes that when they do not hesitate in the test situation, they are not verbally planning. This is in contrast to middle class children who do hesitate, but who were not rehearsed. Certainly the rehearsal of the interview beforehand may have been an operant factor in reducing lower class hesitation, but Berstein ignores this methodological flaw. While this might be one of the more blatant of Berstein's methodological pitfalls, it does cast aspersions on his findings, particularly when they play such a large role in supporting his theoretical arguments.

As a second point, Bernstein's work is full of unsubstantiated, stereotyped assumptions regarding roles and kinship patterns within social classes. The importance of these arrangements for his work demand a burden of proof which Bernstein does not provide.
Most important, however, Bernstein slips from description of codes to cognition without effectively demonstrating the relationship between them. He assumes a relationship much more than he proves it. This weakness is inherited by later advocates of this same approach (see the discussion on Mueller which follows).

The value of Bernstein's work lies in the fact that he does detail verbal differentiation which correlates with social class (although cognitive differentiation should be approached with caution). This has particular importance in the later discussion of Quebec and the growth of joual as a language type particularly reflective of the working class.

Mueller (1973) has taken Bernstein's argument further. With reference to lower class restricted code, he notes

...the language...spoken by a person reinforces his social location...The categories of his language allow for a grasp of the here and now, but they do not permit an analysis, hence a transcendence of his social context. Seen politically, this language reinforces the cohesion of a group which shares a specific code, but it can prevent the group from relating to society at large and to its political institutions... cognitively speaking...he lacks the reference points necessary to perceive the objective reasons for his condition and relate it to the structure of the society in which he is living.

(C. Mueller, 1973: p. 55)

Mueller uses this argument to explain the apparent political passivity of the lower classes. Using the contentious issue of the relationship of code to cognition, he suggests that the lower classes are incapable of apprehending their relationship to larger groups and social events. As I have already suggested, this is an inadequately founded conclusion.
Despite this weakness, common to Labov, Bernstein and Mueller (Labov, by the way, takes issue with Bernstein's cognitive work, see 1970: p. 305) is the recognition that language at least reflects and tends to reinforce social stratification, in much the same way as it does with culture. It is reasonable, then, to argue that 'sentiments of solidarity' based on internal social differentiation can be just as effectively sustained via language as those of a wider cultural basis. (Language, then, is a means to class, as well as national, consciousness.) Essentially, language serves not only holistic functions, but also serves to differentiate. If this is the case, common language, and by implication, culture, can no longer be viewed as a source of national sentiment without taking into account the fact that, while shared language engenders similarities, it plays an equal role in creating and sustaining differences within the national society.

Because common language is so often cited in cultural definitions of the 'nation' as a legitimation for claims to 'nation'-hood, I have chosen to examine it with reference to the creation and maintenance of consensus. This analysis has revealed a failure by such perspectives to recognize internal differentiation. This, in turn, calls into question any definition of 'nation' which stresses reference to consensus without reference to such splits. This will constitute the primary focus for a redefinition of 'nation' in Chapter 2.
iii) **The Role of Language in Nationalist Movements**

To this point, I have stressed language as it relates to value consensus, both holistically - using unique cultures as the units of analysis - and differentially - using internal differentiations (such as social class) as the units of analysis. It was suggested that language can lead to 'solidarity of sentiment' in both cases, but depending on the unit of analysis, this either validated or seriously challenged value-derived perspectives on the 'nation'.

Beyond using language as an operationalization of a particular perspective, it becomes a variable in both trends of thought on nationalism (both Marxist and cultural). Whether or not language is used by nationalists to legitimate their claims is quite a separate issue from the analyst using language as a variable. However, when, and if, it is seized upon as an issue, theoreticians cope with it in ways peculiar to their perspective.

Marxist theories on nationalism stress its class nature and its role in deflecting the class struggle. Language, as an issue in nationalist movements, receives much the same treatment. Language concerns are generally seen as bourgeois, and appeals for language integrity by nationalists are viewed as distorting the 'real' interests of the proletariat.

Given the variable application of the term 'nation' in Marxist though, common language is generally conceded to be part of the proper equipment of a nation-state, and Marxist attitudes to language have to be interpreted with this in mind. Language, as a contentious issue,
therefore is subject to the provisions of positive nationalism. If the nationalist movement is progressive, and if language demands are progressive in this same manner (seeking the destruction of feudal relationships, for example), Marxist support would be evident. Language, as all variables, is treated within a consistent, evolutionary Marxist framework. That is, it becomes contentious only if it deflects this evolutionary growth.

For cultural perspectives on the 'nation', language is somewhat more complex an issue. While modern theorists would not go so far as equating common language to 'nation', they generally admit that where there is a dominated language group (and, by implication, cultural group), nationalism is one of the possible outcomes, with language used as one of a number of possible justifications. This, of course, is based on seeing language as a common denominator yielding cultural cohesion. It is at this point that it is necessary to examine language in its integrative function. Marxist analysis, as will be shown, would be wise to do the same thing.

a) **Integrative Functions of Language**

It is a truism that for interaction to occur, there must be communication. Language, particularly speech, is a critical variable in this process.

For consensus theorists (and history tends to prove this), it is only with urbanization, industrialization, and 'democratization' of society that language becomes potentially conflictual.
A pre-industrial, rural, and predominantly illiterate society can easily accommodate peacefully any number of language groups as long as the members of its educated elite share a lingua franca. (W. Simon, 1967: p. 89)

As urbanization occurs, increased interaction among members of a society creates the potential for language conflict if one language (most often the previous lingua franca) receives preferential status with regard to political, economic or educational institutions. With access to such institutional areas blocked for one group due to language, there is pressure exerted on them to either accept non-involvement or to become bilingual. Socio-linguists have termed this phenomenon the functional creation of language domains (institutionalized 'appropriateness' of a particular language in given situations) and have paid little attention to the related political and economic issues until recently.

R.F. Inglehart and M. Woodward (1967) have suggested recently that situations where political solutions to language conflict are sought emerge only when language is perceived as the critical variable in the determination of economic inequality (p. 375) between cultural groups operating within nation-state communities. This view is now quite readily accepted, particularly because common language is held to be one of a number of variables necessary to institutional participation. Language becomes, then, a causal factor as well as an issue in the emergence of nationalist claims. Such a position is important in determining the breadth of actual issues - economic claims are easily correlated to language conflict. For such theorists, the question is never which is more important - language or economy - for variables tend to be viewed as clustering and interdependent.
Structurally, language loss is often perceived as the initial phase of cultural assimilation. (For example, the lack of internal nationalist movements in the U.S.A. can be explained through successful assimilation initiated by the need to speak English, its reinforcement in the public school system, leading to eventual language loss.) The threat of assimilation will often cause the emergence of language claims as a means to forestalling the process. Particularly with regards to its symbolic value, language is an accessible 'rallying point' for nationalist sentiment - at least, many analysts so claim. Minogue (1967), for example, stresses both the symbolic element as well as the need for a distinct language as a barrier to outside influences (see his Chapter 5).

Where language is claimed as a basis for nationalist demands, cultural theorists maintain analytically that a language group, en masse, is discriminated against. Lack of shared language in a political and economic community leads to structural inequalities between groups which are, in turn, translated into nationalist demands.

This type of analysis, of course, assumes a structural homogeneity among the language group experiencing domination. But it has been shown that language serves within the realm of values both holistic and differentiation functions. It is questionable whether domination and frustrated institutional entry is a situation experienced throughout the nation in similar ways (given internal differentiation). Even post-nationalist attempts at standardizing languages in new nation-states where language was not an original issue must cope with this fact in deciding which language will be standardized.
Instead, and Marxist analysis should take heed, it would reflect reality far better to see the integrative functions of language reflecting this same duality: internally facilitating or inhibiting institutional entry along class dimensions. Particular segments of the population might feel more dominated given social class aspirations, et cetera. This permits a more accurate identification of class interests which consensus theorists ignore.

In addition, it is extremely important to keep in mind that, within the realm of values and solidarity of sentiment the elements common to all language group members predate the development of class structures characteristic of modern society. (See S. Ryerson, 1972 for a discussion of this, p. 224) Given social class differences, however, this 'solidarity of sentiment' is open to startling and far-reaching modification. It does, though, provide a coercive mechanism for the mobilization of nationalist sentiment on a large scale.

This discussion of language has revealed shortcomings in both Marxist and value-derived (cultural) approaches to the 'nation'. There has now been established a fairly strong duality to be explored: cohesion vs differentiation (or, more specifically, solidarity or community of sentiment and class-based sentiment.) The following section will respond to this factor through the elaboration of a definition of class, and the outlining of the principle problems to be explored in the definition of 'nation' and nationalism in Chapter 2.
4) **Class VS National Solidarity**

Language, it has been shown, reflects and reinforces differences between cultures and within cultures. Traditionally, consensus theorists have employed the analytic benefits of the former; and Marxists, while rarely focussing on language per se, would more readily agree with the latter viewpoint. In essence, though, a theory of the 'nation' and nationalism must incorporate this duality. Having already elaborated descriptions of cultural and societal wholes, it is necessary to more closely examine internal differentiation to balance the picture.

i) **Class**

Social class has become a popular variable in sociological analysis, provides the basis for a large part of the debate in the discipline, and yet is too often 'taken for granted' definitionally. Before any study which assumes any form of class analysis can be undertaken successfully, a definition must be tendered due to the popularity yet confusion over the term.

L. Coser and B. Rosenberg (1969) note in their introduction to a series of readings on class that

...there is nevertheless a common understanding that class pertains to hierarchical position in the social order and differential distribution of prestige based on that position.

(p. 377)
This 'tacit agreement' is questionable: interpretations vary so widely, and at some times with such small gradations of qualitative difference, that, unlike the previous discussion, 'schools' of thought are much more difficult to ascertain.

Both Marx and Weber commented extensively on class. Weber in much clearer conceptual terms than Marx. Both have influenced the development of theories of class, so a quick review is necessary.

Marx, although he never clearly defined class, employed it as the basis for a large proportion of his work. Above all else, Marx made clear the objective reality of class. Classes arose out of economic relations and the relationship of people to the modes of production at any given point in time. This explanation does not pretend to be detailed or complex. What is crucial to our understanding is that class rests ultimately on "an economic foundation, the mode of production, which itself consists of the forces of production and the relations of production" (C. Anderson, 1974: p. 46). Class is essentially a complex system of economic relationships which are explicitly antagonistic. Antagonistic because in capitalist society, this relationship is essentially exploitive. (See Charles Anderson, 1974, Chapters 1, 2, and 3 for a good, simple discussion of basic Marxist theory.) From this complex conception of class, Marx derived further concepts such as class consciousness (individual subjective awareness of class membership and interest in relation to other classes) and false consciousness (faulty individual identification, or lack of any identification at all).

Marx's analysis is crucial for several reasons. First, class
is identified objectively and, second, class is perceived as conflictual. Each of these elements has influenced, to varying degrees, current attempts to arrive at workable definitions of class.

Max Weber, in attempting to avoid what he characterized as monocausal interpretation, also perceived class as economic in derivation, but he added dimensions with which Marx did not deal as extensively.

In our terminology, "classes" are not [my emphasis] communities; they merely represent possible, and frequent, bases for communal action. We may speak of a "class" when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, in so far as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labour markets.


To this economic definition Weber added status groups: "every typical component of the life fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of honour" (M. Weber, 1967: p. 184). Subsumed under status was lifestyle. (This is an important line of distinction from Marx, for it shifts the focus of class further into the social realm than did Marx's work. See footnote 23.) While both Marx and Weber perceived class objectively, Weber was less likely to impute inherent conflict.

There is here in Weber's work less of the critical anti-Marx stance he is commonly assumed to take. Both were writing in defense of objective criteria. But dominant approaches today find their roots in Weber's status concerns, and certainly his work on status has contributed heavily to functionalist theories of stratification. Functional stress on equilibrium and values has influenced a large proportion of current
sociological work, particularly that empirical research concerned with prestige and occupational relationships. Essentially, in the functionalist viewpoint

As a functioning mechanism a society must somehow distribute its members in social positions and induce them to perform the duties of these positions.

(K. Davis and W. Moore, 1969: p. 404)

This perspective views class as functional and consensual, and posits mobility between classes. Systems conflict is not seen as inherent in the system, but caused by imbalances which can be accommodated.

This position is at odds with conflictual models, which, although they vary tremendously, have all, in some respect or another, been influenced by Marxist thought. Indeed, the dominant debate over class seems to centre on class as either consensual or conflictual, objective or subjective: proponents vary from classical Marxists to rigid functionalists.

With reference to the previous discussion, Marx clearly outlined the conflict inherent in capitalist society. Although the degree of impoverishment he predicted has perhaps not been realized, the mobility, pluralism and egalitarianism functional theorists impute to social stratification do not exist. (A whole school of sociology has garnered evidence to this effect: see, for example, W. Clement (1975), and L. Johnson (1974).) What becomes clear is that gaps in the economic positions and privileges of modern society are increasing due to the antagonisms in the Canadian class structure. Only an objective, conflict definition of class can deal adequately with this phenomenon.

Therefore, classes are to be understood as embodying "relationships
of property and work, in the context of a mode of production" (S. Ryerson, 1973: p. 224). which are antagonistic and result in differential access to the exercise of power. This definition allows the relational nature of class structures to be investigated. It also permits a class typology more reflective of particular socio-historical conditions, stresses antagonism and suggests the manipulation of instruments such as the state for the maintenance of such relationships.

With this definition in mind, we can examine the difficulties of applying a conflict concept of class to a phenomenon, which, in part, depends on solidarity of sentiment, or consensus: the 'nation'.

ii) Class and Cultural Views of Nation

Initially, it might appear that a definition of class which posits antagonism cannot be used in conjunction with cultural views of the 'nation'. This is true if, and only if, a cultural perspective disregards internal differentiation such as that suggested in the discussion on language.

As we have seen, Marxist analysis tends to downplay a cultural or consensus view of the nation, preferring 'nation' to be coterminous with political boundaries (and reflective of the growth of national markets which serve bourgeois interests). The cultural school, on the other hand, suggests that national consciousness erases class issues in favour of the national question. Each perspective, in essence, treats the other position's focus as irrelevant, if not non-existant. If,
however, "nation" in a consensus or cultural sense (with modifications) and class are treated as co-existing, some of these problems can be overcome. Chapter 2 establishes the framework for investigating the relationship of class to nationalism in Quebec, and the first step is a redefinition of nation which admits the duality of cohesion and differentiation within the nation (which the previous discussion of language indicates is necessary).

5) Unresolved Issues

Section 1 of this Chapter suggested how theories of nationalism have developed in reference to definitions of the 'nation' as a cultural or class-specific phenomenon. Section 2 elaborated this distinction through a consideration of language in its holistic and differentiation value functions, and its integrative role in traditional nationalist theory. The conclusion was that, seeing language as a facet of culture, it served to both unify and internally differentiate using national societies as the units of analysis.

In contrast, Section 3 established a working definition of class, and suggested that a conflict view of class can be compatible with a modified interpretation of a cultural view of the 'nation'. (This will be fully explored in Chapter 2.)

The essential problem, then, with regard to MacLeod's "Unresolved Dilemma of the Quebec Left" is the relationship between nation and national consciousness (or 'solidarity of sentiment') and class and class consciousness when nationalism arises. What is the nature of this
relationship given a definition of nation which posits both cohesion and differentiation.
NOTES

1. A classic example here is the case of Marx and Engels. See the discussion below.

2. It is from this second school of thought that a more properly cultural definition of the 'nation' has emerged which, at this time, can be employed to different ends than its earliest proponents would have suggested. Given the socio-historical conditions of the unification of Germany, this original cultural definition of the 'nation' was employed to justify the policies of Bismarck in Germany and Manzini in Italy. So, as one might expect, it is at this level that disagreements with socialists was most strong, tactical commitment being the point in question.

3. This sharp line of demarcation between nation and state was to influence greatly the theoretical perspectives of Marx and Engels.

4. Hegel's conception of 'historyless peoples' is still echoed today in current attempts to create typologies of nationalism. Understanding 'non-historic' nations among Third World countries undergoing nationalist transformations is the best example (see Symmons-Symonolewicz, 1970: Chapter 1). Such analyses attempt to cope with nationalism in situations where there is not a long pre-state formation, history, or community of culture, or even common language.

5. C. Wright Mills (1970) does not argue that the state is always the instrument of the bourgeoisie. Rather, it is the instrument of one class - the dominant class. As modes of production shift, so, too, does the dominant class. However, under capitalism, this class is the bourgeoisie.

The state is seen as an instrument of one class and, in advanced capitalism, of a class that is in economic decline. The class of which the state is the coercive instrument is no longer economically progressive, no longer functionally indispensable, and yet it still holds power. It must, therefore, act increasingly by coercion.

(C. Wright Mills, 1970: p. 92)

In addition, it might be noted that, despite this role of the state as an instrument of the dominant class, in its attempts to coerce, the state strives both to contain and minimize conflict as well as preserve the status quo. Potential conflict exists between the bourgeoisie and the state when these functions constrain bourgeois activity. Despite
this, state interests generally are defined by bourgeois interests.

6. See Note 7.

7. Symmons-Symonólewicz here provides the basis for the analysis of variants of nationalism. However, the insistence on a collective set of mobilizing values blinds him, as all authors of this school, to potential variants of nationalism within the nation, rather than just from nation to nation.

8. The collective disadvantage of 'les Québécois' vis-à-vis English Canadians is well documented. What is questionable about the Rioux/Dofny position is their explanation that this disadvantage leads necessarily to collective perceptions which supercede other forms of consciousness (see this argument expanded below).

9. The Rioux/Dofny approach is constrained by a time element. Their work preceded the recent radicalization of Quebec labour, so their analysis lacks the benefit of hindsight.

10. H. Davis characterizes this as a "setback for Marxism from which it has not yet fully recovered" (H. Davis, 1967: p. 29).

11. This characterization of the nation is repeated in M. Rodinson's work (1968: pp. 131-149).

Ce processus est couronné par la formation d'un véritable marché national qui caractérise la nation... (p. 144)

12. It is worth noting that Stalin's work; Le marxisme et la question nationale et coloniale is still a 'guiding light' for Marxists concerned with the question of nationalism. M. Rodinson (1968: p. 137) notes it is an inferior piece of work. Furthermore, Stalin was probably to a large degree influenced by his own biography. He was part of a large, nationally conscious minority of Georgians.

13. For example, Marxists are likely to view culture as a bourgeois creation with the potential of being proletarianized. In contrast, mainstream analysts are more likely to view it as a transcendent accumulation of mankind's achievements.

14. This definition is probably an accumulation of definitions garnered throughout my reading and research, but which differs from any particular definition in its attempts to, for the moment, allow either a class, or non-class specific interpretation.

15. Another excellent example of the trend towards the identification of 'universals is found in Osgood's work on the semantic differential. He has identified three connotative dimensions universally underlying language: evaluative (good/bad), activity (active/passive) and power (weak/strong). Research has, to this point, validated his observations.
16. A good example is kinship terminology which varies widely cross-culturally, according to "the recognition of different dimensions of distinctive features" (F. Lounsbury, 1973: p. 57).

17. This should not be interpreted to mean that a particular culture will have its own uniquely differentiated language. Dialects, for example, would transmit the same type of culture-laden perceptions. (See J. Fishman, 1972: Chapter 4.4)

18. The similarity to Whorf's work should be noted here.

19. See Bernstein (1973) for a fuller explanation of code characteristics.

20. It has been suggested to me that Bernstein's work meshes nicely with the large American literature on the 'culture of poverty' and 'language deprivation' (which reached its apex with the Headstart Program). But, as W. Labov (1973: pp. 179-215) points out, this literature is based on a faulty appreciation of the nature of 'lower class' language. He convincingly demonstrates that, although there are quantifiable differences between middle and lower class speech, these differences do not indicate lower levels of logic or verbosity. On the contrary, it has been the tendency of analysts to measure working class speech behavior (although he uses black ghetto dwellers) against standard English (that is, middle class speech in most cases) as well as the use of interview situations which structure defensive verbal responses which has led to conclusions regarding lower levels of speech behavior among the lower classes or ghetto dwellers. Labov argues convincingly for an appreciation of such speech variants as non-standard varieties, not as intrinsically inferior modes of speech.

21. There runs through Mueller's work an equation of elaborated code to the code one must have in order to participate in modern political culture. It is assumed to be a 'better' form. Implicit in this view is the value assumption that abstraction and complexity are not only necessary, but desirable. Rather than leading to passivity, consistent reinforcement of lower class position via the restricted code might lead to an insupportable gap in objective realities and dominant ideology. This, at least, is worthy of consideration.

22. Much of the difficulty in using a Marxist conception of class lies in advancing the socio-historical analysis. Particularly, for modern theorists, this involves, among other things, solving the riddle of tertiary sector workers.

23. Marx's concept of class had political and ideological dimensions, but these dimensions should not, I think, be confused with determinants. Marx was certainly aware of these other social dimensions but, in contrast to Weber's work, they were not nearly as broad or deep in their scope. His work did not stretch as far into the social realm of prestige and status and, consequently, is more tightly rooted to economic factors.
24. Leo Johnson's work (1974) provides useful data for examining this trend. Using average income (1946 to 1971), earned income received by decile (1946 to 1971) and purchasing power by decile (1946 to 1971), Johnson effectively demonstrates that

Since 1951 not only has there been a decline in the portion of new income received by the lower fifty per cent of earners, but this decline appears to be occurring at an accelerating rate, and to be reaching higher and higher in the ranks of income earners.

(L. Johnson, 1974: p. 5)

25. Like many others, I have had difficulty in finding a good definition, so I have resorted to a modification of Ryerson in an attempt to answer the needs of my analysis.
Nationalism, National Consciousness and Class Consciousness: The Case of Quebec

1) Duality and the Nation: A Redefinition of Nation

Chapter 1 has indicated the necessity of maintaining in any analysis of the 'nation' a duality which recognizes both national cohesion and internal differentiation. The perusal of the literature on language, culture and class suggested mechanisms by which this duality occurred and could be reinforced.

The dominant approaches on the left to nationalism in Quebec fail to do this. Although the Rioux/Dofny analysis sees the validity of dealing with both class and national consciousness, the two phenomena are seen to exist in an antagonistic relationship to one another: one form dominates historically at the expense of the other. Marxists, in contrast, define national consciousness as class consciousness which, in essence, invalidates national consciousness and reduces national questions to dogmatic economism.

Before an adequate analysis of the relationship of class to nationalism can be developed, it is necessary to define 'nation', retaining and recognizing the importance of duality.
solidarity of sentiment) and internal differentiation must be taken into account. Then, and only then, can the relation of class to nationalism be explored.

The definition of 'nation' which I have evolved draws from both Marxist and cultural positions in an attempt to overcome the weakness in each. In order to satisfy the criterion of duality (cohesion and differentiation), a cultural definition must contain an explicit appreciation of internal differentiation, while a Marxist view must be broadened to include a sense of the larger national collectivity.

Consequently, nation is defined as

...a human collectivity which shares a common culture, or a common fund of significant experiences and interests, and conceives of itself as a nation...
(K. Symmons-Symonolewicz, 1970: p. 1)

and which has a system of class relationships characteristic of the dominant modes of production.

Nation, by this definition, is both a collectivity transcending class divisions and a collectivity with important internal conflicts. Neither side of this duality, however, should be seen as more important or significant. On the contrary, this duality is dynamic. Both elements (cohesion and differentiation) are under continual modification in response to socio-historical specificities.

There are several points which should be noted here, initially the subjective nature of cohesion. A nation is a nation because its members conceive of themselves in such a way. Understanding this is essential in order to do justice to historical reality. Nations exist, appear and/or are created on the basis of a self-legitimizing process.
A nation may exist

...even where one or other of the 'objective' [territory, language, etc.] elements in nationhood are weak or absent. On this account, if we can show that most of the members of the units of Tanzania, Ghana or Palestine possess a strong and fixed desire to belong to a Tanzanian, Ghanaian or Palestinian nation, then those nations have come into existence.

(A. Smith, 1973: pp. 21-22)

Self-definition is the critical component of nationhood. Long historical roots are not necessary where common interests exist. But when such roots are available, they become (as in the case of Quebec) important components for national self-identification. In this process, language can become, for national members, a particularly important variable, both lending actual cohesion (on the basis of common language) as well as providing justification for defining one's group as a nation.

A second point of interest is the fact that nations do not have to be defined in terms of what they might constitute at some future point in time. For example, a group need not strive for political unity before being called a nation. Political dimensions are a quite separate issue having to do with mobilized and directed national consciousness (this is discussed in greater detail below).

The third point to note is that the internal differentiation of nations varies socio-historically on the basis of the dominant modes of economic organization. (Classes have already been defined in Chapter 1 as structural consequences of the mode of production in a society.) Language, then, while it feeds national solidarity is still also an important variable in creating and sustaining internal differences.
The advantage of this definition of the nation is that it identifies both the solidarity and differentiation characteristic of nations, thus establishing the framework necessary for investigating the relation of class to nationalism. What emerges from this approach is a clear understanding of the fundamental relationship of class to nation. Nations are not necessarily separate from class, but, rather, composed of classes and characterized by the conflict inherent in class relationships. At the same time, there is a cohesion and solidarity which, minimally, unites all classes and which operates through a common national consciousness. (In the case of Quebec, this is enhanced by language.) Nations and classes, then, co-exist.

It is one thing to establish this relationship between class and nation. It is quite another thing to move beyond it to explore the relation of national consciousness to class consciousness. The next section describes these forms of consciousness and outlines certain parameters of their relationship to one another.

2) National Consciousness and Class Consciousness

The Rioux/Dofny school has provided an excellent argument for considering national consciousness and class consciousness as variants of the same phenomenon: group consciousness. They suggest that both go through four identifiable stages of development: consensus of attitudes, beliefs, et cetera; growing "we" awareness; organization into mobilized groups; and, seizure of power. (M. Rioux and J. Dofny, 1971: p. 309)
I would add that at any point in this development there might be a failure, thus retarding, or even ending, the growth of consciousness. It should also be recognized that the mechanics of any of these stages would vary from situation to situation. So, while these are functionally distinct phenomena, they develop in similar ways. While the growth of consciousness (subjective awareness of shared objective reality) in class is a concept Marxists would not dispute, the growth of national consciousness, because it is seen as deflecting working class consciousness, is analyzed by Marxists as a promotion of bourgeois class interests (and, when embraced by the working class is viewed, at best, as false consciousness). The phenomena are not functionally differentiated by Marxists.

I have already suggested that the nation conceived of as an historical-cultural solidarity of sentiment (particularly when reinforced by distinct language, as in Quebec) implies a set of values and interests common to all national members. Class, on the other hand, differentiates the nation internally, and common class language, reflective of differing class realities and daily existence implies a set of values and interests common to all class members. For every person in a national society, therefore, there are (within the parameters of this discussion) two potential forms of consciousness: national and class. Since consciousness (as the subjective apprehension of shared objective reality) is enhanced by language (although not only by language), in all instances, there exists the potential for the emergence of class and national consciousness!

Certain conclusions may be drawn about the relation between these
two forms of consciousness. I have argued that the Rioux/Dofny position inaccurately reflects the situation of Quebec. There is at least evidence (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) that class and national consciousness are both operating in French Canadian society. Rioux and Dofny's argument that the two forms of consciousness are mutually exclusive is highly suspect. In the same critical vein, the Marxist argument that national consciousness is class consciousness erases national consciousness as a concern: but it does exist!

I am suggesting here that the two forms of consciousness can and do co-exist. This is not an answer to the question of what constitutes the relationship between class and nationalism, however.

Returning to Rioux and Dofny's developmental scheme, there is a clear point of distinction to be made between the stages in the growth of consciousness which they detail. The stages of (1) consensus of attitudes and (2) a growing "we" awareness are quite different than those of (3) organization into mobilized groups and (4) seizure of power. Consciousness, I suggest, pertains to the first two stages; mobilization of consciousness to achieve power (or, perhaps just change) pertains to the last two stages².

At the level of consciousness alone, co-existing forms are quite compatible. But when consciousness is mobilized, the relationship between the mobilized forms of consciousness becomes problematic. With mobilization, conflicting allegiances are called into play.

For example, although the working class and middle class share a national consciousness, mobilization by the middle class on the basis of national interest may imply a set of economic programmes quite at
odds with the class interests of the working class. The key to understanding this problem is an appreciation of the fact that consciousness and mobilized consciousness are two quite separate phenomena. Mobilized national consciousness is no longer national consciousness: it is nationalism. The problem is the relationship of class consciousness to national consciousness: it is the relationship of class consciousness to nationalism.

K. Symmons-Symonolewicz (1970) has provided a framework for defining nationalism. He notes (p. 40) that nationalism

...consists only of some few constitutive ideas and beliefs centring around the idea of nation and its rights in relation to other nations.

While he is inaccurate in calling this nationalism (his definition is more properly styled national consciousness) he does go on to argue that these "few constitutive ideas" must combine with other programmes for action to create the synthesis necessary for the emergence of nationalism. The strength of his position is his recognition that "ideas centring around the idea of nation" cannot by themselves be a sustaining ideology: they must combine with others.

To return to the terms used in this thesis, national consciousness is not, on its own, an ideology. Ideology may be distinguished from consciousness on the basis of mobilization towards some end, which implies the inclusion of programmes for action (whether these be geared to change or maintenance of the status quo). Hence, national
consciousness must combine with other prescriptions for action before it becomes nationalism.

Nationalism, therefore, can be defined in the following way. Nationalism is national consciousness mobilized with a view to achieving or maintaining particular social arrangements (economic, political, social, or cultural). Thus, for example, national consciousness can be fused with a variety of political doctrines: democracy, fascism, or even anarchy.

The advantage to such a definition is that it posits that variation from nationalism to nationalism is situated not in national consciousness, but in the other components of the ideology. Hence, nationalist ideologies as seemingly diverse as fascism and Third World liberation are covered by this one definition with variation explained by the view of social utopia nationalists have.

A recent publication by Léon Dion (1975) supports this view of nationalism. Dion sees the ideology as a mix of "l'idéologie sociale" and "l'idéologie nationale" (p. 25). He defines nationalism as

...l'ensemble des représentations faites par référence à une collectivité spécifique particulière, appelée peuple ou nation, définie par un amalgame de traits... témoignant du sens d'une solidarité d'appartenance et destin souvent en face d'autres collectivités jugées étrangères ou ennemies ainsi que par des projets concernant l'organisation de la vie culturelle, économique et politique jugés convenir à cette collectivité.

(L. Dion, 1975: p. 16)

What he essentially argues is that national consciousness ('national ideology') does not contain any particular ideas regarding the organization of society – only that it take place within the national
framework. The component of nationalist ideology which does contain such ideas is a 'social ideology' emerging from secondary collectivities (as opposed to the primary collectivity, the nation). Thus

Le nationalisme, en tant qu'idéologie, vise à rassembler dans une perspective totalisante divers schémas idéologiques particuliers - ceux des classes sociales et des grandes collectivités secondaires...
(L. Dion, 1975: p. 17)

It is clear that Dion sees national ideology (or national consciousness, to use my own terms) as insufficiently broad for providing a central framework around which to organize nationalist activity. This framework emerges only when fused with a 'social ideology'. Like Symmons-Symonolewicz, Dion argues that national consciousness must be synthesized with other ideological perspectives before nationalism can be said to exist.

Seeing nationalism as mobilized national consciousness is crucial to exploring the relationship between class and nationalism. The mobilization of national consciousness is, in essence, its fusion with other ideological components. Only as these other elements are brought into synthesis with national consciousness does nationalism emerge.

This notion can be concretized through an example from Quebec, the fleur-de-lis. The fleur-de-lis has long been a symbol strongly attached to the identification of Quebec as a nation. It glorifies the French connection and symbolically reflects a long history of conflict between English and French on the North American continent. Its presence is a constant reinforcement of a "we" consciousness among the Québécois. As a symbol, it is part of a Québécois national consciousness: any Québécois can look at the fleur-de-lis and be a party to this consciousness.
When, however, this same fleur-de-lis is used in separatist parades, it symbolizes far more than Quebec nationhood. It is now attached to a particular set of political and economic programmes which are derived not from national consciousness, but national consciousness mobilized with particular ends in view. The national consciousness found throughout society is manipulated by the inclusion of the fleur-de-lis as a symbol in separatist activity.

This example clarifies the critically important distinction between national consciousness and nationalism. The fusion (as national consciousness is mobilized) with other ideological perspectives to create nationalism raises a new set of questions which can now be asked. Essentially, what are the sources of these other ideological perspectives which join in the synthesis to create nationalism?

Students of nationalism have long attempted to categorize nationalism as good or bad, revolutionary or reactionary, or progressive or conservative. The source of this variation is situated in the factors which affect the mobilization of national consciousness; not in national consciousness itself. Dion recognizes this when he states that

...à chaque changement dans la perception de la situation parmi les collectivités secondaires, correspond un rajeunissement du contenu de l'idéologie nationale.
(L. Dion, 1975: p. 17)

Change finds its source in the secondary collectivities, not in national consciousness. Furthermore, among these secondary collectivities, Dion cites class (p. 17).

If nationalism is a mobilization of national consciousness via fusion with other ideological perspectives, then class now enters
our analysis as a potential source for these other perspectives.

The central problem this thesis explores is the relationship of class to nationalism in Quebec, utilizing language as a variable of investigation. The discussion to this point has clarified a number of factors. First, class and nation and their respective forms of consciousness co-exist. (Chapter 3 will provide empirical proof for this assertion.) Second, nationalism has been defined as national consciousness mobilized with particular ends in view via synthesis with other perspectives to create the ideology. Whereas the source of national consciousness is already understood to be the nation; the sources of these other ideological elements have not been elaborated. Dion's suggestion that secondary collectivities are the base for 'social ideology' raises the issue of class as a potential source for these ideological perspectives. The problem for investigation can now be succinctly stated: is class and class consciousness a significant variable in the mobilization of national consciousness to create the synthesis 'nationalism'.

On the one hand, if empirical investigation indicates class is not a significant factor in this synthesis, then the problem MacLeod identified on the Quebec left is a rather fruitless wast of time. If, on the other hand, class is involved in this synthesis, it is necessary to discover the importance of the role it plays. Before answers to these questions can be determined, however, certain parameters for the empirical investigation must be established. Most important among these is the nature of the class structure of Quebec.
4). Monopoly Capitalism and Class

In Chapter 1, class was defined in relation to the dominant modes of production in society. In order to detail the nature of the class system, it is necessary to establish a working knowledge of the economic fabric of Quebec. Briefly, Quebec can be described as part of a larger system of monopoly capitalism. But this, by itself, tells us little about the class system. Certain features, peculiar to Quebec, have created a system of class relationships equally unique.

The first and probably most significant feature is the degree of foreign domination of the economy. Quebec has always provided an attractive climate for foreign investment, for reasons varying (in early years) from a cheap labour force to later, attractive government incentives.

Beginning in the 1920's, principally because of her wealth in non-ferrous metals and water resources, Quebec became a source of primary materials for American imperialist capital. Since the last war, American investments have tended to invade many different sectors of production.

(G. Bourque and N. Laurin-Frenette, 1972: p. 191)

The result by 1960 was that American and Anglo control of industry characterized the Quebec economy, particularly in the areas of resource development and manufacturing. French Canadian ownership had slowly been pushed back into centres of light industry, such as wood and leather, (S.H. Milner and H. Milner, 1973: p. 34), and the agricultural and service sectors of the economy. These French Canadian controlled areas of the economy represent sectors of non-monopoly control, but as will be demonstrated, they do not necessarily dictate the parameters of
conflict in Quebec.

Comparatively, in 1961, French-Canadian-controlled manufacturing interests employed 21.8% of the manufacturing labour force but contributed only 15% to the total value added of this sector. The corresponding figures for Anglo-controlled industry were 46.9% of the manufacturing labour force and 42.8% of the value added total; and, for foreign-controlled industry, the figures were 31.3% of the labour force and 41.8% of the value added. Table 1 provides a very good indication of the degree of foreign investment in Quebec in 1961. It was true that

If 'les Québécois' predominate in the primary sector (due to agriculture) and in the tertiary sector (due to service industries), one must still underline the fact that in the secondary sector (industrial production), their absence is notable. 'Les Québécois' control only 20% of this activity. (PQ Publication, 1970: p. 18) (my translation)

That much of this control centred in the manufacturing and finance sectors is extremely important, as these are key development sectors in any economy.

By 1969, the situation had not improved. Table 2 indicates that the 10 most important industrial employers (according to the number of employees) were, with 1 exception, non-Québécois controlled. In the same year, 50% of banks, Caisses Populaires, and savings banks and 80% of insurance companies were foreign-controlled (PQ, 1970: p. 19). This is an important point because these financial institutions act as capital pools which can and do, to a large extent, help shape investment and development.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishments Controlled</th>
<th>French Canadians</th>
<th>Other Canadian</th>
<th>Foreign Interests</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>No. of Establishments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agriculture</td>
<td>91.3%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mining</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Manufacturing</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Construction</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Transport and communications (Private)</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Wholesale Trade</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Retail Trade</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Finance</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Services</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15,153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excludes forestry, fishing, trapping and the public sector.

Source: G. Raynauld, 1973: p. 150
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ten Most Important Industrial Employers in Quebec, 1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employees</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Electric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion Textile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian International Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domtar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Bathurst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ncranda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombardier, Ltee.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Canada: English Canada


(my translation)
One important consequence of foreign domination is the relatively small proportion of "big" French capitalists (with, of course, important exceptions such as Paul Desmarais of Power Corporation). Those that do exist are dependent, to a large extent, on Canadian and American capital. As a corollary, most 'advancement' for the Quebecois is restricted to the managerial ladder in the private sector, or the public sector. This tendency is reflected and enhanced by the changing occupational structure of Quebec. (See Table 3)

The increase (absolutely and relatively) in white collar occupations, intellectuals (as Brunelle calls them) and professionals is characteristic of a society with an emphasis on service and delivery of goods. While industrial production is still important, there is a shift towards the bureaucratic and technocratic organization of non-productive sectors, with productive sectors dominated, as demonstrated, by non-Québécois. This might be interpreted as the creation of a super-structure which facilitates both the penetration of monopoly capital and the growth of 'consumer' society.

Brunelle (1975: pp. 69-70) argues that much of this expansion is occurring at lower occupational levels, with most white collar work non-differentiated from blue collar jobs in the economic process: they are functionally the same form of work, though the content may differ. Together, blue and white collar workers form the working class. Brunelle goes on to distinguish intellectual workers from white collar workers on the basis of both autonomy and advanced levels of remuneration, but cautions that this is a fine line of distinction. Some occupations, such
### TABLE 3


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(,000)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>(,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Workers</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>84.8%</td>
<td>1,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Blue Collar</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
<td>856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-White Collar</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectuals*</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators, directors</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1,446</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1,715</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: D. Brunelle, 1975: p. 745 (my translation)

*Included in this category are specialists, technicians, teachers and clerics.
such as teaching, might, under certain circumstances, form part of the working class (1975: p. 71). The final criteria, he argues, is the occupation in relation to its role in the larger capitalist system: does it dominate labour?

Brunelle's work meshes nicely with aspects of Hubert Guindon's (1967: pp. 33-59) analysis of the new middle class. The new middle class, argues Guindon, arises in response to the administrative needs of colonial regimes (although his analysis can be seen in the light of economic forms of domination too – not just political forms). Essentially, then, it is a class which organizes and services.

In the process of developing urban social bureaucracies, the need for functional specialization and training brought the new generation in contact with the various specialized social, human, biological and economic sciences of industrialized society. (p. 45)

Guindon's new middle class parallels, in many ways, Brunelle's intellectual workers and, also, portions of his category "administrators". It is a group specific to bureaucratized society, providing organizational and service functions, but at a higher level of autonomy and authority than white or blue collar workers.

Where Guindon and Brunelle part company, however, is in the relative importance of growth in the new middle class. Guindon's category is less exacting than Brunelle's and seems to include a large proportion of Brunelle's white collar workers. So, while Brunelle and Guindon agree with regards to absolute growth, Brunelle distinguishes white collar work from intellectual work. The growth rate of white collar work from 1951 to 1971 is 97%. Over the same time period, the growth rate for intellectuals is 144% (D. Brunelle, 1975: pp. 74-75). At the same time,
white collar work as a proportion of the entire labour force has increased 12%, while intellectual occupations increases its proportion by about 5.5% (See Table 3). If, as Brunelle argues, white collar work is not all that different than blue collar work, there is an important difference in the two approaches to class in Quebec. While this growth is undifferentiated for Guindon, for Brunelle it means similar growth at two levels in society: the working class and the middle class.

Guindon's view of the new middle class is weak precisely for these reasons. It does not do adequate justice to the wide range of differentiation within the expanding sectors of society. Brunelle's approach comes closer to capturing this reality.

From this discussion come the justifications for the following analysis of the class structure of Quebec. Quebec's class system is characterized, first, by a working class composed of both wage and salaried labourers, and white collar workers, specifically those within large bureaucratic organizations. Second, there is a growing middle class, technocratic and lower managerial in character. Third, people in higher levels of administration and management (which would include individual capitalists) compose a bourgeoisie with a vested interest in the status quo. The fourth group, professionals, are more problematic. Depending on the sector in which they work, at what level of autonomy and authority, and in what relation to the larger society as a whole, they can be considered working class, middle class or bourgeois. For example, an assembly plant doctor will be performing a role in the production process quite different than that of a lawyer for a large
corporation. In the first case, the doctor is involved in a (perhaps not very lucrative) service, situating him in the middle class, while the lawyer may perform administrative functions of a sufficiently high order to place him in the bourgeoisie.

The above is not intended as an exhaustive description of class in Quebec. Rather, it attempts to provide a basic, workable scheme for use in the analysis of Chapters Three and Four. It does, however, reflect the dominant features of class in Quebec - to do any more is beyond the scope of this enquiry. (For example, the bourgeoisie might be broken down into elites that are defined, but the problems that are involved in identifying who is an elite member are too complex to be undertaken here.)

The class system of Quebec has emerged as a structural response to the growth of monopoly capitalism. Classes, moreover, do not exist in a vacuum, but are in continual interaction with one another. One of the central features of capitalism is the antagonistic nature of these relationships. Class consciousness, when mobilized into class action, brings this antagonism into focus. Therefore monopoly capitalism, as a system of economic organization, must seek to minimize conflict if the status quo is to be maintained. Bourgeois interests are essentially the defining interests of monopoly capital. In addition, the state generally (while not always) acts as an agent for these interests, in that it, too, has a vested interest in minimizing conflict. Both the middle class and working class are alienated, to varying degrees, from the exercise of
effective power in society. Their class interests are not necessarily best served by the status quo.

Certain hypotheses regarding mechanisms for minimizing conflict can be drawn from these considerations. The first is that the bourgeoisie will seek to legitimate its claim to power. Second, where legitimation fails, co-optation may be attempted. Co-optation refers to incorporation by one class or another class's demands, leadership or ideology in an attempt to end conflict. And, where co-optation does not succeed, direct confrontation may result. The nature of the response by those who exercise power depends on the nature of the class demand. If it is only mildly disruptive to the status quo, it may be painlessly co-opted, but if it is highly disruptive, the chances for confrontation will increase.

In terms of the larger question of the relation of class to nationalism, if class is found to be a source of the perspectives which combine with national consciousness, the relations between those in power and nationalists will, to some extent, reflect the relations between classes. Consequently, the same mechanisms for minimizing conflict may become operant.

The final issue to be discussed before beginning the empirical investigation is that of language. I have already used language as a theoretical justification for adopting a view of nationalism as mobilized national consciousness. Language acts both holistically and differentially, indicating that national consciousness and class consciousness co-exist. Language can now be used as a focus for investigating nationalism in Quebec - language demands have been a critical issue in every instance
of nationalism in Quebec.

5) Language and Language Conflict as Variables in the Analysis of Quebec Nationalism

Traditional approaches to language and nationalism fail to recognize the fact that nations are internally differentiated. Apparent discrimination against language group members is viewed as affecting all members of the population equally. Based on this faulty assumption, arguments tend to run in the following way.

Language differentiates national groups and is a highly loaded symbol of national integrity. Beyond this, however, language, as a primary mode of communication, facilitates or hinders participation in institutional areas which discriminate along the lines of language. When institutional entry is blocked due to language, social stratification based on language culture and ethnicity soon follows.

If institutional resistance continues, the disadvantaged language group, if they wish to participate, must become bilingual or accept non-involvement. Fears of assimilation may arise, and this, coupled with linguistically determined stratification, will lead eventually into either assimilation or a position of resistance which is characterized by nationalist demands for language equality of opportunity. Inhibited mobility due to language discrimination becomes a leading principle for the nationalist.

There is a problem with this orientation. It ignores the possibility that although 'discrimination' may appear to occur along
lines of language, this may merely be symptomatic of a larger condition, such as the bourgeoisie's advantage in maintaining a split labour market. Language discrimination would effectively help create labour pools at any level where discrimination was practised, helping shape the occupational structure. Because such approaches stem from an undifferentiated view of the nation, any possible class orientation to institutional blockage is avoided in the analysis.

In opposition, I would suggest that the institutional arenas conducive to inter-group interaction would be subject to the demands of monopoly capitalism. That is, institutions in a period of monopoly capitalism, unlike institutions of pre-capitalist society, require both a cadre of white collar workers as well as a skilled middle class technocracy. It is in these areas that language would become a potentially conflictual issue due to occupational competition. In other sectors, such as manual labour, dominant ethnicities (such as the English in Quebec) are less likely to control or even desire entry, thus minimizing, to some extent, interaction, competition, and conflict. Traditional arguments regarding blocked ethnic mobility must be re-examined with regard to the question of whether only particular segments of the subordinate group feels and/or experiences language discrimination.

Language has been demonstrated to be not only an effective cultural demarcation and means for reinforcing national self-identification, but, due to its visibility, it often carries a heavy symbolic loading. This last characteristic lends language the particularly important feature of being an element common to all national members as part of a
national consciousness. Therefore, it has an appealing mobilization potential for nationalists.

Just as language is a component of national consciousness, it can be used to the same ends with regards to social class.

A language variety specific to the working class (such as "joual" in Quebec) could, through active attempts to use and legitimate it, supplant mainstream manipulation of language via the media and education. By opposing language standardization, a unique and significant vehicle would be created to enhance class consciousness.

However, even without such 'legitimization' campaigns, the very fact that class differentiation with regard to language exists is, in itself, significant for any analysis in that it reinforces and reflects the internal national differentiation. The objective relations of classes within the nation become more easily recognized when languages vary, particularly for the working class. Language serves as a mechanism to achieving recognition of both internal and external forms of domination.

S.H. Milner and H. Milner (1973: p. 25) argue effectively that the success of monopoly capitalism is contingent on an ever-increasing proliferation of goods and services which ultimately obscures class relations at a subjective level. In a situation where

...the mass of the population is of a different ...nationality and culture than the foreign investors...the class lines so closely parallel these other divisions that the creation of "new needs" does not conceal the inequality and class distinctions. The lower classes of the society become aware of their common position vis-a-vis the imperial power. This, we suggest, helps them come to understand their class relationship vis-a-vis their indigenous ruling class who serve the needs of American capital.
Where language differences obtain between dominant and subordinate nations, then, particularly in the case of the working classes, recognition of inter-national and, subsequently, intra-national dominance/subordinance may be facilitated.

In using language as a variable of analysis of nationalism in Quebec, then, the analyst should be sensitive to the following issues. First, language may or may not be a factor (it may just be a symptom) in institutional blockage. Second, if it does relate to blockage, there may be a class base to the experience of this blockage. Third, language may be a justifying and mobilizing factor for nationalists. Last, language, although it relates to national consciousness, might also be used as an effective tool to creating and sustaining class consciousness, which, depending on the relation of class to nationalism, may hinder or help the nationalist cause.

6) Nationalism, National Consciousness and Class Consciousness

This chapter has outlined the problem for analysis and suggested issues which bear directly on the empirical investigation. Nationalism has been defined as national consciousness mobilized with particular ends in view, these ends being contingent on the components which fuse with national consciousness to create the ideology. The justification for this definition lies in the contention that national consciousness and class consciousness co-exist. Hence, the point at which class in relation to nationalism becomes an issue is in situating the source of the additional
components which are synthesized with national consciousness.

The empirical investigation must, therefore, address itself to two issues: the co-existence of class consciousness and national consciousness, and the identification of the source of non-national components of nationalist ideology in Quebec.

The first of these issues (the co-existence of class and national consciousness) is already partly resolved. The very fact nationalism exists indicates national consciousness. Class consciousness, however, is more problematic. I will attempt to indicate its existence essentially in two ways. First, I will detail particular class actions and class relations, and, second, I will examine the policy decisions of particular organizations (such as political parties and labour unions) with a view to determining the degree to which they promote particular class interests.

The second issue (ideological sources) will be explored through an examination of nationalist ideology and of the nationalists themselves. Nature of class support will be one variable considered. Then, the components of the ideology which do not come from national consciousness (such as economic and social programmes) will be explored, and I will attempt to determine what, or whose, interests they serve. This will constitute the bulk of Chapter Three. Chapter Four will draw conclusions from the data in Chapter Three with reference to the theoretical concerns raised in this chapter. Whether, indeed, class is an important factor in transforming national consciousness into nationalism remains, for the time being, an unanswered question.
Notes

1. It should be pointed out that these two forms of consciousness should not be interpreted as ideology. The distinguishing criteria between consciousness and ideology is mobilization. See the discussion of nationalism below.

2. Certainly, these two stages enhance consciousness. Mobilization does not erase consciousness. On the contrary, it strengthens and directs consciousness.

3. Quebec's 'cheap labour force' had particularly unique features which made it attractive to foreign investment. Clerical influence over early national unions and repressive attitudes and legislation by the state combined, initially, to create, for a period, a labour situation relatively non-volatile in nature. This, coupled with Quebec's natural resources, provided a unique inducement to foreign capital penetration.

4. While this holds true for English Canadians, they have historically reached, proportionally, higher levels of management than Quebecois whose advancement is often restricted due to language. (See Chapter 3)

5. Brunelle, it should be pointed out, bases his work, to a large extent, on H. Braverman's analysis in Labour and Monopoly Capital, 1974.

6. Brunelle's distinction between the working class and intellectuals (who, I argue, form a middle class) on the basis of autonomy is rooted in the degree of domination they experience. That is, technocratic levels are similar to the working class in that they work for wages or salary, but they also perform supervisory and organizational tasks which dominate over labour. As I have pointed out, this is a distinction which must be employed with care given to socio-historical specificities.

7. See Note 6.

8. One of the problems is the position of the unemployed. Intuitively, I would suggest their inclusion in the working class on the basis that (for a large number) their status as unemployed is rooted in the marginal character of the jobs they perform.
CHAPTER 3

Quebec: The Growth of National Consciousness
and Class Consciousness

In Chapter 2, I have suggested the nature of the problem which this chapter will empirically explore. Nationalism has been defined as national consciousness mobilized with particular ends in view. These ends are rooted in perspectives which fuse with national consciousness to create nationalism. Class has been defined as a potential source for these additional perspectives. Therefore, this Chapter will describe the growth of national and class consciousness over the period 1960 to 1975. Central to this examination, with regard to class consciousness, are the nature and extent of class action, relations between classes, and the promotion of class interests by organized sectors of society such as labour unions and political parties. With regard to national consciousness, the following points will be explored: the characteristics of nationalist support and the nature and focus of the nationalist ideology. Finally, in Chapter 4, through an examination of the data presented in the following discussion, the sources of non-national components of the ideology will be delineated so that, eventually, the influence of class on nationalism might be explored.
The vehicle for the examination just outlined is a descriptive narration of events in Quebec during the 1960's and 1970's. Consequently, I have concerned myself more with chronology than tracing a particular development throughout the entire period. Nevertheless, key trends are made clearly visible so as to facilitate later discussion.

The reader should also be advised that this is not an exhaustive analysis. It does not pretend to cover all the socio-economic developments in Quebec over this time period. Rather, it is most concerned with ideological change. Consequently, reference to socio-economic conditions is made only when they are significantly related to ideological development. Hence, there may be omissions, but these should not necessarily be viewed as weaknesses in the presentation: they are merely situated beyond the scope of this particular enquiry. (see S.H. Milner and H. Milner (1972), M. Rioux (1970), and M. Rioux and Y. Martin (1971) for descriptions of patterns of change in Quebec society since WWII. Also see D. Posgate and K. McRoberts (1976) for recent developments.)

1) Pre-1960 and the Defeat of Conservative Ideological Hegemony

The year 1960 represents a crystallization of past events which set Quebec on a new path of development. The long reign of Duplessis and the Union Nationale was brought to an end with the election of Jean Lesage and the provincial Liberals, who promised to institute a "rattrapage" (catching up) under the slogan "maîtres chez nous" (masters in our own house). Of equal significance was the coincident deconfessionalization
of the national Catholic unions, a turn of events which, it turned out, set the stage for increased strike activity and radicalization over the next decade. Quebec, it seemed, was on the threshold of a new destiny which stood in polar opposition to conditions which prevailed until 1960. These developments can be fully appreciated only when seen as part of a larger history of Quebec.

During the 1930's, Quebec society was characterized by a pervasive, tradition-rooted ideology of conservative nationalism. Fostered by the Church, the ideology stressed, among other things, the non-involvement of the French in industrial development. Through analysis of the exploitive nature of capitalism, clerical authority deplored the participation of les Quebecois in industry, and maintained that the survival of Quebec as a nation was dependent on the retention of French Canadian culture via Catholicism. Thus

Because the ideology espoused by this elite saw no role for the French Canadian in big business, it condoned the activities of the ruling Liberal party, whose economic program seems to have been little more than selling Quebec to foreign investors at a cheap price. Foreign capitalists were encouraged by the government's minimum of restrictions and control over such matters as public utility rates, corporate financing and the sale of securities... Groups and individuals seeking guarantees for adequate wages, and union organizing were opposed as threats to economic stability.

The 'non-involvement' the Church asked of its constituents actually created an interesting paradox: it allowed the penetration of foreign (English Canadian and American) into the Quebec economy under the auspices of a French government. Paradoxically, this same government could not afford to alienate the Church by appearing to advance the
cause of the English. The situation required a minimal public appearance
of collusion between the English and the Quebec government. Taschereau
and the Liberals, however, had trouble maintaining the necessary low
profile in their dealings with English and American companies.

In permitting the entry of English Canadian and foreign capital
into Quebec in such great amounts, and through the advantageous habit of
acquiring directorates in these same English Canadian and foreign
companies, Liberal involvement in foreign controlled enterprise reached
levels which the Church found to be insupportable.

It seems as if the innumerable directorates held by
Taselereau and his cabinet ministers on the boards of
large banks and companies with operations in Quebec,
alienated the Church...(they) were now too tightly
connected with the English corporate world and thus not
sensitive enough to the demands of the Church.

This conflict of interest soon became a political albatross. The Church
began to question whether the Liberals were so tightly tied to the
English corporate elite that the problems engendered by the Depression
could no longer be dealt with in the best interests of French Canadians.

In 1936, a coalition of dissident Liberals and Progressive
Conservatives, elected as official opposition, forced public scrutiny of
government accounts. The graft and corruption which surfaced provided
the impetus for the subsequent election of Duplessis and this new party,
the Union Nationale. A shrewd politician and strategist, Duplessis
learned quickly how to walk the line between foreign investment entice-
ments and Church support. It was under his regime that conservative
nationalism reached its apex.
By fostering programmes which benefitted rural areas, and through repressive legislation which effectively minimized activity in spheres which threatened the dominance of conservative ideology, Duplessis maintained the firm support of the clerical elite. One need only look as far as the Padlock Law, instituted in 1937, for evidence of repression. Any building were 'communists' (this definition was vague and, in fact, applied to anyone opposing the regime) were consorting, could be locked and closed down with no warning given. At the same time, Duplessis encouraged the growth of foreign investment in Quebec.

In order to attract the steel companies, the Union Nationale...negotiated a paltry one-cent-a-ton tariff on ore carried out of Quebec...As a result, American capital came into Quebec on its own terms...

(R. Chodos and N. auf der Maur, 1972: p. 5)

American and English Canadian capital was appreciative of the low wages Quebecois labourers would accept, and Duplessis was more than prepared to quash any attempt to change this state of affairs.

The repressive atmosphere was heightened by firm clerical control of the ideological apparatus of Quebec. All education (generally classical in orientation) was directed by the Church, and ideological control was extended as far as into union structure (the Confederation des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada (CTCC)) through the requirement that each union local have its own priest ("aumônier"). Thus,

The traditional elite, viewing the world of big business as the exclusive domain of the materialistic Protestants, built an almost impenetrable ideological shield between the masses of Quebecois and the foreign economic elite.

(S.H. Milner and H. Milner, 1973: p. 132)
The seeds of destruction of this conservative nationalism lay in an inherent internal contradiction: preaching the need for docility and acceptance of the given social hierarchy, it simultaneously condemned the exploitive nature of Protestant capitalism which forged the hierarchy. Ideological opposition began to centre in three separate factions: labour, the middle classes, and in parts of a new intelligentsia.

i) Labour Before 1960

The CTTC (Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada) was formed under the auspices of the Catholic Church in 1921 in response to and as a buttress against growing international unions, with their 'socialist' orientations (anything 'socialist' being perceived as destructive of Quebec society). (Paradoxically, despite a birth rooted in a defensive posture, the CTCC would become a crucial element in the eventual destruction of conservative nationalism.) Clerical control was assured by an aumônier who ran each local:

"...a priest whose duty it was to educate its members on their Catholic duties in their roles as trade unionists..."  
(CNTU, 1972: p. 14)

Part of this Catholic duty was a ban on strikes and a corporatist view of society. Until 1949, relations between the CTCC and international unions were characterized by divisiveness and repression. The stage for more cordial relations was set in 1946 by the election of militant Gérard Picard to the CTCC presidency and the ideological freeing from the 'non-strike tenet' by the publication of Pope Pius XI's "Quadragesimo
Anno". No longer was the CTCC merely a conservative alternative to international unions: it was becoming apparent that the broader interests of labour were becoming issues both labour structures could address.

In 1949, the strike at Asbestos mobilized the CTCC in tandem with international unions, particular elements of the clergy and a new intelligentsia in the first of soon-to-be-repeated labour actions against both business and the Duplessis regime, whose anti-labour legislation was becoming increasingly violent and repressive. 3

In fact, the CTCC was radicalizing so quickly that in 1954 Michel Chartrand

...pointed out...that the CTCC would break off relations with French Canadian "Nationalists", who, "defended the French language while starving those who used it".  
(CNTU, 1972: p. 19)

The first signs of a coherent economic analysis among the national unions were beginning to emerge. This radicalization, however, was probably as much opposition to a particular set of repressive laws and legislation as an ideological shift.

Duplessis' and the Church's attempts to maintain an ordered, hierarchical, 'moral' society in defense of French existence were proving to be antithetical to the best interests of labour (who were underpaid in relation to their English counterparts as well as working, in many cases, in conditions that could only be called appalling). By the time of Duplessis' death in 1959, the CTCC, viewing the contradictions between working and pulpit reality, had detached itself from clerically-inspired nationalism. It was now beginning to employ an economic analysis which would require another ten years before crystallizing into a firm ideological stance.
The tight ideological control exerted by the Church over this period resulted in the failure of the educational system to prepare the French for entry into the economic structures of Quebec. This lack of preparation was tied to the conservative nationalist belief in Quebecois non-participation. Classical colleges were adequate for the production of lawyers and priests (callings not at odds with conservative ideology) but they could not produce individuals for positions in the emerging technocracy essential to a rapidly burgeoning, industrialized economy. The result was a growing, displaced middle class of liberal professionals which became increasingly vocal with regards to the failure of the Union Nationale to locate them within the economy.\(^4\) For example, Duplessis' nationalist stance had resulted in a failure to use federal funds for the development of post-secondary education, an area of jurisdiction jealously guarded by the Quebec government.

Even adequate training did not guarantee participation, for there was yet another block to the full economic participation of the middle classes. More often than not, companies operating in Quebec brought along their own management staff, and if they did not, made it clear that they would not hire French-speaking personnel: the preference was quite obviously for English-speaking, or, at least, bilinguals. Even if an individual overcame educational stumbling blocks, then, they were still confronted with the problem of employment. Partly in response to middle class grievances, the Church responded with expanding social
welfare programmes (see H. Guindon; 1960: p. 248), but Duplessis, the Union Nationale, and the Church were evidently finding it more difficult to justify the reality of Quebec society in terms of their conservative nationalism.

iii) The Intelligentsia

Despite the ideological stranglehold exercised by the traditional elite, there emerged over this period active centres of criticism in Quebec. As the gap between reality and the goals of conservative nationalism widened, there emerged small, but vocal, groups of critical intelligentsia who began a synthesis of the resentment centred in labour and the middle class.

Worthy of note is Cité Libre, a journal which actively espoused changes in the status quo during the 1950's. It was an expose of and challenge to the Duplessis regime. Through the delineation of a non-nationalist stance which valued the integration of a culturally-unique Quebec into broader Canadian society, Cité Libre writers argued for the displacement of traditional authority and the revamping of the educational system. (I am not arguing a position of pre-eminent importance for Cité Libre. It is hard to judge the extent of its impact, but it is a particularly instructive example because certain writers, notably P.E. Trudeau, have gone on to assume positions of power which have helped shape the nature of French-English conflict in recent years.)

Towards the end of 1956, the new intelligentsia attempted to bring together all the activists and intellectuals who opposed Duplessis to begin a campaign of political education
which would result in the defeat of the Union Nationale in the 1960 election.
(S.H. Milner and H. Milner, 1973: p. 163)

From the initial meeting arose Le Rassemblement, a coalition of dissidents which, although it lasted for less than two years, contributed heavily towards organizing the growing opposition to Duplessis. Members of this intelligentsia-activist coalition, because they were situated in various sectors of society, helped to crystallize and synthesize the discontent centred in what might, under different circumstances, be called opposing factions. For example, Jean Marchand (later a member of the Federal Cabinet) was actively instrumental in shaping the ideological shift necessary for the deconsecionalization of the CTCC.

It is this social intercourse among intellectuals, dissidents and activists that is important. Although it can be successfully argued that the new intelligentsia, labour and the middle classes, were opposing a particular regime as opposed to articulating coherent ideologies, the importance of the ideological criticism of the 1950's cannot be minimized. Without the public articulation of alternatives to labour and middle class frustrations, it is doubtful whether the provincial Liberals would have responded as decisively with policy changes in the 1960's. In a very real sense, the situations of labour and the growing middle classes of the three decades prior to 1960 were elaborated upon and given a much-needed impetus by the intellectual sector. Further, and of equal importance, was the eruption of public debate over Quebec's future directions; the stage had been set for the growth of varying nationalist perspectives in the 1960's.
2) The Lesage Regime

The defeat of the Union Nationale in 1960 by the provincial Liberals was greeted by all frustrated elements of Quebec society as the dawn of a new era.

There was a sense that suddenly all barriers were removed, everything was now possible, energies would be directed positively - toward building Quebec - rather than pent up or used to defend its past and myths.


Quebec, for so long moulded by conservatism, embarked on a plan of rapid modernization under the leadership of Lesage. Of critical significance was the transfer of educational authority from the Church to the State through the establishment of a Department of Education in 1964. But Lesage did not respond at the educational level alone. The Liberal government instituted in 1961 alone

...a hospital insurance scheme, an Economic Planning Council, a Department of Cultural Affairs, including an office of the French Language, and an Arts Council.

(A. Larocque, 1973: p. 78)

While responding to a new set of economic needs, Lesage responded to the intellectual climate and initiated a quasi-nationalist approach to relations with the federal government under the banner of a "special status" for Quebec within the confederal structure. The battle was waged over the distribution of fiscal monies.

Quebec found it simply did not have the power to institute nor the revenue sources to pay for many of the integral reforms of the Quiet Revolution, and its leaders did not like the idea of having to get Ottawa's approval and perhaps revisions on many of these programs.

While this was an extension of the fiscal battles Duplessis had waged, the orientation differed due to its aggressive demands that Quebec have the means to modernize firmly under Quebeccois control as well as shifting the internal distribution of monies. Table 1 indicates the successful redistribution of fiscal powers culminating under Lesage. (Perhaps the best indicator of Lesage's success is to be seen in the "opting out" program the federal government finally granted at Quebec's urging.) Of more importance is the changing redistribution of provincial spending in this same period, reflective of new priorities.

During the Lesage administration, Quebec's annual budget grew from 600 million to two billion dollars; health, education and welfare replaced roads and agriculture as top priorities.
(A. Larocque, 1973: p. 78)

These changes must also be seen in the light of a shift in responsibility and power from the private to the public sector. The state, under Lesage, became an increasingly active participant in determining the social and economic fabric. Despite this quasi-nationalist stance, however, the Liberal regime had, perhaps unwittingly, sewn the seeds of its own destruction for the policies they introduced became the focus of a nationalist debate unprecedented in Quebec's history.


Despite the rapid economic growth and restructured institutions the Liberals introduced, the intellectual ferment which had helped bring them to power in 1960 did not terminate, but continued to grow. The
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Federal Gov't.</th>
<th>Provincial Gov't.</th>
<th>Municipal and School</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>57.2%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PQ Publication, 1970: p. 69

(my translation)
wide spectrum of thought represented in Le Rassemblement, resulted, finally, in a renaissance of criticism. Spokesmen from this previous era followed different routes: some entered the Liberal party, some (for example, René Lévesque) entered the Liberal cabinet. Others, however, whose previously more nationalist or more left persuasions had been temporarily forgotten in the battle against the Union Nationale, revived their analyses of Quebec society, much to the chagrin of the Liberals.

The most important elements of this group were nationalists from the emerging middle classes and intellectuals from the left. Arguing, at least initially, that the Liberal reforms did not adequately put control of Quebec under the auspices of French Canadians, solutions to this problem were to be sought on one hand via the secession of Quebec to form a separate state, and, on the other, through economic rearrangement which put management of the economy firmly into the hands of the growing French technocracy. Socialist analysis went a step further by arguing for a total restructuring of an independent economy. This group was represented by the short-lived Parti Socialiste du Québec (PSQ) formed in 1962. The PSQ's literary arm, Parti Pris, became a centre for discussion of the legitimization of joutil (Quebec French emerging from the lower classes) as a language of literary expression...a language reflective of the political, economic and social domination of the English.

The major expression of national consciousness was the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN), founded in 1960, which attracted an entire spectrum of separatists, united initially over the issue of independence for the nation of Quebec. By 1962, right and left factions
split the organization over a resolution that it become a political party. When the motion was defeated, the conservatives formed a new organization and political party, the Parti Républicain de Québec (PRQ), leaving the RIN to become increasingly left in its orientation. In 1963, when the RIN finally did decide to organize politically, the PRQ was dissolved, only to find that its more conservative approach no longer carried influence in the new RIN party. The final confrontation came over the election of a new president. The conservative element

...labelled the opposition candidate Pierre Bourgault, socialist and anti-clerical, failing to understand that among at least some sectors of the Quebec population these adjectives no longer were synonymous with sin and evil.

(S.H. Milner and H. Milner, 1973: p. 177)

Bourgault was elected and, as a result, the RIN split once more, with the conservatives forming another new party, the Regroupement Nationale (RN), who became identified, in some respects, with the earlier conservative nationalism of the 30's and 40's.

The Liberals had opened the floodgates of nationalism. In fact, their quasi-nationalist stance resulted in perhaps the most vivid of nationalist symbols with the nationalization of electric companies under the direction of René Lévesque in 1963. In the 1966 election, the RIN received 5.5 per cent of the vote and the RN received almost 3 per cent. RIN and RN votes tended to pull support at the expense of the Liberals. It was the Union Nationale under Daniel Johnson which gained political control in Quebec as a result of the separatist showing. For the next few years, the UN would follow an uneasy path between nationalism (for example, the creation in 1967 of the CEGEP school system) and federalism
which managed, for awhile, to guarantee a shaky political equilibrium. By 1968, the Liberals had consolidated their losses, and, depending on the electoral support of the English in Quebec, had become federalist in their outlook, as evidenced by the expulsion of 'indépendentiste' René Lévesque.

1968 represents one of the most significant dates in regards to the evolution of national consciousness (and, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, of class consciousness) in Quebec. Lévesque moved quickly, uniting all major separatist parties under his leadership of the Parti Québécois (PQ)

4) The Quiet Revolution and its Impact on Quebec's Economy and Social Structure

The years 1960 to 1966 (the Quiet Revolution) were characterized by government attempts to integrate into the economy French-speaking Québécois who, up to this point, had experienced frustration and blocked entry. John Porter's work in The Vertical Mosaic indicates the ethnic bias in Quebec's stratification system in 1961. (See Table 2) Porter did not include the managerial occupational group in his reporting. Table 3, using the 1961 Census data, gives us the same information for this group that Porter found for the other occupational groups.

Even where French Canadians entered occupations of higher status, in 1961, language, too, had become a dominant factor in shaping the stratification profile of Quebec.
### TABLE 2

Occupational Levels of French and British Male Labour Force in Quebec, 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Level</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Quebec Labour Force</th>
<th>Percentage Over- or Under-Representation</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional and Financial</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>+7.1</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>+5.2</td>
<td>- .7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Service</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>- .4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and Unskilled</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>+1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Others</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>-.5</td>
<td>- .1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*, p. 94

### TABLE 3

Percentage Over- and Under-Representation of French and British Male Labour Force in Quebec Engaged in Managerial Occupations, 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Total Quebec Labour Force</th>
<th>Percentage Over- or Under-Representation</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>+5.8</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1961 Census of Canada, Vol. 3
Table 4 indicates that as education increases, there is little change in the ratio of bilinguals to monolinguals in the British ethnic group, but a steady, consistent increase in this ratio among the French ethnic group. The table suggests that pressures to become bilingual are stronger for French-speaking persons than either English or Other ethnic groups (for every educational level) and that, as education increases, so, too, does the level of bilingual activity among the French. Since higher educational levels are generally accepted as leading to higher occupational levels, the data in Table 4 can be interpreted not only as education becoming a means to obtaining higher occupational standing, but as education acting as a vehicle to the sensitization for the need to speak English at these levels. Says Lieberson, with reference to this table:

Achievement of higher socioeconomic status among the French appears to require a knowledge of English whereas status and ability to speak French are unrelated for the British.

(S. Lieberson, 1970: p. 140)

Pressures and incentives for becoming bilingual are reflected in the unequal distribution of income over socio-linguistic groupings (Table 5).

Comparing income distribution by official language permits a ranking by language as follows: English only, Bilingual, French only and Neither tongue. Thus, there appears to be a linguistic basis for discrimination in addition to the ethnic dimension Porter identified. This can be interpreted as suggested in Chapter 2 as a split labour market working to the advantage of the dominant group (the English).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Elementary 1+ Years</th>
<th>High School 1-2 Years</th>
<th>High School 3-5 Years</th>
<th>University 1+ Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: S. Lieberson, *Language and Ethnic Relations in Canada*, p. 140
TABLE 5

Total Income by Official Language and Sex, Montreal Metropolitan Area, 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Language</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English Only</td>
<td>$5536</td>
<td>$2561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Only</td>
<td>$3246**</td>
<td>$1867**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilingual</td>
<td>$4954</td>
<td>$2515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Tongue</td>
<td>$2195</td>
<td>$1290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Workers</td>
<td>$4720</td>
<td>$2328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The generally narrower range of income distribution for women can be attributed, probably, to discrimination by sex of placement in the working world.

** Mean income for all workers is greater than for both men and women, French Speaking only.

Source: S. Lieberson, Language and Ethnic Relations in Canada, p. 169
In the case of Quebec, ethnic and linguistic discrimination tend to reinforce the dominance of the British ethnic group and their language, English. This can be demonstrated through a comparison of income for ethno-linguistic groups. (Table 6) From Table 6, it is possible to construct a rank ordering of ethno-linguistic groups according to income (Table 7).

Table 7 details discrimination with regards to income distribution in Quebec based on language and ethnicity. On the basis of ethnic divisions, the British receive generally higher incomes than both the French and Other ethnic groups. Within ethnic groups, language appears to bias income distribution so that speaking English is related to higher income. It should not be too surprising that the language of the dominant ethnic group should be the language of higher income levels. The evidence that bilinguals (implying at least a minimally 'acceptable' use of the English language) fall into medium income ranges for their ethnic group, and that those with no effective use of English fall into the lowest income levels, bears this assumption out. The one case where this ordering does not hold is for other ethnic group bilinguals who earn more than those who speak English alone. This may be due, in part, to so-called entrance status (high (ranks 3 and 5 in Table 7) or low (ranks 7 and 8)) when they immigrate which forces contact with the lower classes of the host society, but this question is not of any great importance here. Rather, it is more instructive to note that for this group, speaking English is an asset (compare to Other-French speaking only) and that within the ethnic hierarchy, the Other ethnic group is consistently advantaged with
### TABLE 6

Effect of Ethnic Origin and Official Language on Male Income After Standardizing for Occupation and Education (Montreal) 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Origin</th>
<th>English Only</th>
<th>French Only</th>
<th>Bilingual</th>
<th>Neither</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>$5124</td>
<td></td>
<td>$5041*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3448</td>
<td>$4385</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$4185</td>
<td>$3260</td>
<td>$4535*</td>
<td>$2682</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Both British and Other-ethnic groups who are bilingual have higher mean incomes than French bilinguals.

Source: S. Lieberson, *Language and Ethnic Relations in Canada*, p. 171
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethno-Linguistic Group</th>
<th>Mean Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. British - English Speaking Only</td>
<td>$5124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. British - Bilingual</td>
<td>$5041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Other - Bilingual</td>
<td>$4535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. French - Bilingual</td>
<td>$4385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Other - English Speaking Only</td>
<td>$4185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. French - French Speaking Only</td>
<td>$3448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Other - French Speaking Only</td>
<td>$3260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Other - Neither French nor English Speaking</td>
<td>$2682</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
reference to their French counterparts. (For example, an Other ethnic bilingual earns more than a French bilingual.)

The situation we have described of linguistically reinforced ethnic biases within the Quebec stratification system is drawn from 1961 Census of Canada data. The evidence all points to the dominant economic positions circumscribed by English ethnicity and English language: the Quiet Revolution set out to change this through the integration of the French into the economic life of Quebec. In essence, the Quiet Revolution was a politically-guided response to the perception of blocked participation and mobility among the middle class. The success of the attempts to erase this situation can be gauged only with reference to another factor: ideological perceptions of the centres of control.

The economic ramifications of the Quiet Revolution must be seen in the light of the dominant ideological perception of where economic control lay. Two questions can be asked: first, did the Quiet Revolution effectively integrate les Quebecois into the economic life of the province, and; second, did this integration, if it occurred, make an effective difference in the control exercised over economic destiny.

As discussed previously, the Liberals undertook and directed a massive modernization of Quebec society in 1960. Through educational reform, and increased government participation in the economy, "Quebec built up an infrastructure of a modern capitalist society." (S.H. Milner and H. Milner, 1973: p. 167) Characteristic of these developments was the increased role of the state. The changes which occurred institutionally were supposed to result in highly increased French participation in the
control of Quebec's economic life via entry to positions in key decision-making sectors currently controlled by the British and dominated by the requirements of speaking English.

Consequently, it would first of all be instructive to ascertain whether success was achieved within the parameters defined by the architects of the Quiet Revolution themselves. Did the institutional changes they created improve the position of the French vis-à-vis the dominant ethnic group? In other words, when operationalized, was there an improved access to higher occupational and income levels, and was the French language no longer an impediment to mobility.

There appears to be a tacit understanding perpetuated by the media among English Canadians that the situation of the French has generally improved.  

A French-speaking businessman described the phenomenon this way: "My eldest son, now 26, is a committed separatist. Among other reasons, he claims that not one of his graduating class was able to land a head office job in Montreal on graduation. To him, the only answer to the problem is separation from the rest of English Canada. His brother who graduate last year thinks his brother is a has-been. He argues there are more jobs open to the French than the English."  

(Financial Post, March 31, 1973)

This assertion can be severely questioned as to its accurateness.

As already demonstrated, at the outset of the Quiet Revolution, bias in the stratification system of Quebec fell along ethnic and linguistic lines. The date closest to the end of the Quiet Revolution (1966) from which updated statistics regarding occupational distribution and ethnicity can be contained is from the 1971 Census. Replicating John Porter's work for 1961 yields the results of Table 8.
### TABLE 8

**Occupational Levels of French and British Male Labour Force in Quebec, 1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Quebec Labour Force</th>
<th>Percentage Over- or Under-Representation British</th>
<th>Percentage Over- or Under-Representation French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>- .8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Employees</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>- .5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salesmen</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>- .3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Occupations</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>- .4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communications</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>- .7</td>
<td>+ .8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers in Secondary Industry</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>-8.4</td>
<td>+1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers in Primary Industry</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>- .8</td>
<td>- .1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Error due to rounding

**Source:** *1971 Census of Canada, Vol. 3*
Comparing Table 8 to Tables 2 and 3 (which show roughly the same data for 1961) several things are immediately apparent. First, categories on the two tables are not the same. Porter's categories (which, from all evidence he collapsed himself) are based on Census categories which changed from the 1961 Census to 1971 Census. The occupational classification manual of the Census is based on changes in occupational stratification in the Canadian Classification and Dictionary of Occupations published in 1971 for the first time. Overhauled coding systems and occupational descriptions cause 1971 classifications to differ considerably from those employed in the 1961 Census. There is, however, sufficient similarity to allow a description of general trends from Tables 2 and 3 to Table 8 (although insufficient comparability to allow a reclassification of Porter's categories).

Comparing the Tables broadly, there has been an expansion in the tertiary sectors from 1961 to 1971. This would suggest that, indeed, there has been an expansion of the French ethnic group into this sector. It follows, then, that general levels of underrepresentation have also declined in these sectors. There is, in the 1971 data, significant underrepresentation in the categories Administration and Professionals, more equal participation in the categories Salesmen, Office Employees and Transportation and Communications, and heavy overrepresentation in Labourer categories in both Primary and Secondary industry. Generally, then, there has been some improvement in middle to upper occupational levels, but not enough to indicate pure mobility. Rather, as Dofny and Caron-Audy (1969) suggest, while there are good indications of
individual mobility due to structure, the French, as a group, are still underrepresented.

Lorsqu'ils réfèrent à leur ethnie, les Canadiens français font partie d'une groupe d'autant plus sous-privilégié qu'il est très largement majoritaire. (p. 298)

Mobility based on structural requirements is open to shifting sets of priorities, the nature of which are open to modification by those who control personnel decisions (of particular importance when referring to split labour markets). Hence, this type of mobility is not necessarily an adequate measure of social equalization.

Dealing with gross categories such as those of Table 9 tends to obscure the fact that, within these categories, there are differential levels of influence and status. For example, Administrators subsumes both accountants and administrators in health, business, finance, et cetera. It is questionable whether any of these positions carry the same influential input into key economic decision-making apparatus. Office employees, too, covers everything from supervisors to stenographers and mail clerks, another example of differential status within one occupational grouping. Changes in representation for broad categories may reflect changes in certain segments of the category only.

The Census breaks its occupation by ethnicity data into subheadings only: it does not report with any great specificity. Table 10 breaks down Office Employees for 1971 (this data is not available for 1961), and indicates the over- and under- representation by ethnicity. The findings suggest that any changes in representation over the grosser category may not reflect a real difference in improved integration over
the whole category. Rather, it may be a case of over-representation of a sub-group within the category. Table 10 indicates that the French are still under-represented in all categories but Reception, Information, Mail and Message Distribution Occupations. The improvement in the category Office Employees may reflect merely a change in this one sub-group, tending to skew the finding of improved representation.

There is evidence to support this contention among statistics gathered for the Gendron Commission in 1969. I have already produced evidence of bias (that is, ethnic and linguistic) in Quebec's stratification system. Since language and ethnicity co-occur and because language reinforces an already biased stratification system, where language discrimination occurs, one can assume ethnic discrimination. (I should point out here the analytic distinction between language discrimination and educational qualification. Despite the improvements in education over the 1960's, it is apparent, from the data, that language is still an operant variable in the stratification system of Quebec. The fact that speaking French and 'inferior' education historically co-occurred in the case of Quebec would, under 'normal' conditions, mean that improved education would erase apparent language discrimination. Since it hasn't, one can safely assume that language differentiation is tied, historically to capitalist development in Quebec - perhaps with the creation and maintenance of a split labour market.) Figure 1 indicates the unequal distribution of higher management jobs in 1969. As salary increases, the percentage of French speaking persons (see note to Figure 1) declines, indicating the differential access to and distribution of more influential jobs. Further, as in 1961, there still exists in 1969 strong pressure to
### TABLE 9

**Occupational Distribution of Office Employees in Quebec Male Labour Force, 1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Quebec Labour Force</th>
<th>Percentage Over or Under-Representation</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Office Employees*</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>+4.1</td>
<td>-.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Stenographic and Typing Occupations</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>+.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Bookkeeping, Account-Recording and Related Occupations</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
<td>-.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Office Machine and Electronic Data-Processing Equipment Operators</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>+.4</td>
<td>-.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Material Recording, Scheduling and Distributing Occupations</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>+1.3</td>
<td>-.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Library, File and Correspondence Clerks and Related Occupations</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>+.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Reception, Information, Mail and Message Distribution Occupations</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>+.2</td>
<td>+.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Other Clerical and Related Occupations</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These are Census Sub-headings which still obscure internal differentiation (such as supervisory duties)

Source: 1971 Census of Canada, Vol. 3
speak English, a circumstance still mitigating against the promotion of non-bilingual Quebecois. See Figure 2.

The data in Table 10 indicates that as the sector of work is more immediately tied into the productive end of the economy (that is, in manufacturing) and finance, the use of French on the job decreases. Within sectors, the higher status occupations tend to be related to a decreased use of French. Obviously, despite the improvement in under-representation in higher status occupations, there is still a strong bias working both ethnically and linguistically against the French. In fact, it could tentatively be concluded that changes in the percentage of under-representation are due only to changes at the lower end of each occupational category employed in the Census.

Derived from Table 10 are some important points to keep in mind for the discussion in Chapter 4. First, professionals in personal and social services tend to use French a very large proportion of the time; so, too, do labourers in primary and secondary sectors. These are points essential to the understanding of nationalist and, consequently, language, movements in Quebec.

With regards to our earlier question of the degree of success stemming from the Quiet Revolution measured in terms of the goals of its architects, the response must be that while the reforms of the Quiet Revolution did make some improvement, it was improvement which, at best, operated most effectively at middle occupational levels. The data in Chapter 2 regarding class structure indicate the enormous growth at levels where exercise of effective control over the economy
FIGURE 1

Personnel Recruited for Head Offices

French Speaking Persons* ———

English Speaking Persons

*By French and English speaking, what is meant here is the principal language of the individual, not ruling out the possibility of bilingualism.

Source: Gendron Commission Report (Vol. 1), p. 120
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Administrators</th>
<th>Professionals</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Other Professionals</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Service Employees</th>
<th>Transport, Communications Employees</th>
<th>Foremen</th>
<th>Labourers in Secondary Sector</th>
<th>Labourers in Primary Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Industry</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Utility Services</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal and Social Services</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gendron Commission Report (Vol. 1) p. 34
are highly unlikely.

More important, the Quiet Revolution could not ever fully realize the goal of becoming "Maitres chez nous" because the so-called revolution was more concerned with participation than control - with modernization than repatriation. As long as the focus was participation, questions of dependency and penetration of foreign control remain unanswered.

Paradoxically, then, the Quiet Revolution created the conditions for its own defeat by providing a modern superstructure attractive to and essential for foreign investment (English Canadian and otherwise). When the success of the Quiet Revolution is measured against exercise of real control of the economy it becomes clear that the changes engendered from 1960 to 1966 merely facilitated continued external control through the creation of the necessary tertiary frameworks. Even entry of French-speaking personnel into upper management would not be evidence of effective control, despite a more equal stratification system or the perceptions on the part of those who experience mobility that, indeed, they are gaining access to control of the economy. The basic relationship of dependency to foreign centres would not be altered.

The Liberal reforms, even if successful in their own terms (which, as I have argued, is questionable), could not radically reshape Quebec's stratification system or the exercise of economic control without full comprehension of the modes of economic control and attempts to shatter the foreign stranglehold on this control. In essence, internal stratification changes would amount to no more than a managerial re-organization, as it were, and I am inclined to believe that, rather than
shifting the locus of power and control, such re-organization is

...an alteration in the form and expression of...power in such a way as to make it more consonant with the long term interests of the ruling class in a period of technological change and organizational innovation. This is perhaps the last stage in the transition from laissez-faire to monopoly capitalism.

(S.H. Milner and H. Milner, 1973: p. 11)

Given these ideological oversights of the Liberals, it is not surprising to see the growing shift from secondary and primary sectors to tertiary sector occur at the same time as heavy foreign investment.

Prior to 1960, the Liberals and the Union Nationale had created attractive climates for foreign investment. Riding on the crest of a wave of conservative nationalism which forbade the entry of French Canadians into industrial enterprises, development capital flowed into a province where labour was actively repressed, creating a sufficiently large but cheap labour pool. The data in Chapter 2 on foreign investment illustrate this fact.

The patterns of foreign control of Quebec's economy were not substantially altered by the Lesage regime. In addition, other aspects of Quebec's economy which bore directly on the quality of life had become increasingly problematic.

Unemployment in Quebec over the 1960's was "consistently double that of Ontario" (PQ, 1970: p. 27 (my translation)), and the proportion of investment in Quebec compared to the rest of Canada decreased over this same time period.

What the Quiet Revolution and statism had done was modernize Quebec, but into a nation still characterized by foreign-domination:
the attempted (and partially successful) integration of the individual paradoxically sustained the conditions for continued lack of control over economic destiny. All that was left politically was for an enterprising individual to take advantage of the growing dissension over this foreign control.

5) Nationalist Ideologies from 1968 On

The combination of economic conditions outlined above became an increasingly important analytic focus for several elements in Quebec society by 1968. Upon his departure from the Liberals, René Lévesque and supporters (principally from the RIN) responded with the creation of the Parti Québécois (PQ) which united, at least temporarily, a fair majority of leftists and nationalists in a firm separatist stance.

The 'heir-apparent' role of the PQ to the RIN is readily visible. In 1966, the year the RIN and RN together garnered close to 10% of the popular vote, the platform of the RIN included "an increased role for the state, non-compulsory planning, administrative decentralization, and economic growth" (D. Latouche, 1973: p. 181). In 1968, on its formation, the PQ included in its platform these same elements, particularly a pre-eminent role for the state in the development of the economy. The PQ advocated the political separation of Quebec from Canada, the establishment of an economic common market with Canada, and the establishment of French Canadian control of the economy through such means as legislative control over industrial ownership. In addition,
the PQ formulated a strong stance with regard to language: they proposed that French be the only official language of Quebec.

...In giving the state (a separate state) the principle role in the development of society, the technocrats wish to assure their own power, at the same time as ensuring an instrument which will permit them to create a society they see as beneficial. This society will be relatively egalitarian: goods and services will be redistributed to the masses in order that they might have a relatively humane and worthwhile standard of living. The power will accrue to the technocrats - the only people capable of interpreting and meeting the needs of the mass.

(G. Fortin, 1969: p. 533)

(my translation)

Each of these aims was designed to ameliorate the economic conditions seen as problematic to Quebec: in particular, the lack of Quebecois control of the economy.

Concurrently, there was another element of Quebec society undergoing an ideological transformation: labour. While in the early 1960's there had been a fairly cordial relationship between labour and the government, labour began to organize more militantly with the increase of unemployment and the lack of improved working conditions. In 1968, average unemployment in Quebec was 6.6% (based on seasonally adjusted rated) compared to 3.6% in Ontario, 3.0% on the Prairies, and 5.9% in British Columbia. The only area of the country with more unemployment was the Atlantic Provinces, with 7.5% (Source: Annuaire du Quebec, 1971: p. 357). With some justification

Labour leaders argued that the Quiet Revolution was a bourgeois phenomenon that profitted mainly the middle class: they proposed a more extreme combination of nationalist and social forces to bring about a more genuine revolution.

(Thomson, 1973: p. 19)
The break came in 1968 when the CSN (the new name for the CTCC...Centrale des Syndicats Nationaux) issued its SECOND FRONT Communiqué, a formal declaration of a programme for social reform.

The Second Front Communiqué opened with a list of problems the CSN saw as critically important.

Obviously unemployment heads the list of social ills... the housing situation is critical...One of the most effective means of exploiting the popular classes is through an inordinate rise in prices...One thing is certain. It is that no matter what the circumstances have been, inflation, unemployment, etc., the great owners of goods have won hands down.

(CNTU, 1972: pp. 55-62)

The document then went on to delineate the sources of these problems: credit companies, exploitation of the consumer, democratic elections indirectly controlled by business and the media, professional fee structures, and pension funds, the use of which workers cannot control (CNTU, 1972: pp. 62-73).

The conclusion drawn was that labour must open a Second Front aimed at consumption and consumer action as well as engaging in traditional union activity. Strategies include strengthening the CSN's Family Budget Service in "the fight against usury" (CNTU, 1972: p. 80), the creation of political action committees (p. 81), the "development of a militant popular press" (p. 82), the development and radicalization of co-operatives (p. 87) and the "organization of groups of citizens and participation in their struggles" (for example, tenants' rights groups) (p. 89).

The Second Front was particularly significant because it committed the CSN to activity in fields in which, traditionally, unions
were not engaged. This involvement was called for on the basis of capitalist exploitation. It was a major ideological departure from the past and reflected the beginning of an increasing class consciousness situated not just in organized labour, but in the working poor in general. (The best measure of this success in recent years is to be found in the proliferation of citizens' groups, notably the Montreal Citizens Movement.) The CSN, for the first time, was beginning to incorporate into its ideological position a more rigid class analysis of Quebec society.

6. Relations Between the Parti Québécois and Labour

By 1968, it had become clear that, despite a quasi-nationalist stance, the Liberal party had committed itself to federalism and foreign investment, and that the Union Nationale was vacillating between federalism and nationalism, depending on the issue and/or public opinion. The real nationalist debate was to centre in the PQ, labour, and fringe organizations such as the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ).

The CSN, created as a conservative nationalist response, had retained a strong national consciousness despite its extrication from clerical domination. From 1968 to 1971, there was a fairly peaceful alliance between labour and the PQ: the threat to this alliance was to come from the grass roots of the CSN, and a coincident radicalization of the Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec (FTQ), the international union collective.
The Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission's findings were made public in 1968. The steady assimilation of immigrants to English in Quebec was now fully documented. The Conclusion of the Royal Commission was that

The predominant linguistic fact in Canada is the powerful attraction of the English language for people of other than British or French cultural backgrounds.

(Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1970, Book IV: p. 118)

In 1969, as a response, the St. Leonard School Commission ruled that only French language instruction would be available in the area, sending the large proportion of Italian immigrants in the area into a rash of accusations against the French.

In response, Bertrand's Union Nationale government introduced legislation permitting parents to choose the language of instruction of their children. Bill 63, as it was known, in effect appeared to guarantee the continued dominance of English (and, perhaps, eventual disappearance of French) as the favoured language in Quebec, which seemed to compound the problem of foreign domination and blocked mobility. Furthermore, this was the first provincial legislation ever which promoted English to an official status.

The PQ position was that immigrants to Quebec should be required to have their children educated in French. Delegates to the FTQ Congress of 1969 forced their executive to accept this same stand. The same thing occurred in the CSN. In 1966, a joint memorandum from the FTQ and CSN had stipulated that
Quebec should embark on an immense linguistic effort... to make the French language once again the current one... in the area of work... At the provincial level the only official language should be the language of the majority. (S.H. Milner and H. Milner, 1973: p. 189)

The decision to fight Bill 63 came from lower union levels: important indications that future radicalization might come from the bottom up rather than the top down. Opposition to Bill 63 was a united front which the Bertrand government ignored in pushing through the legislation, hence alienating a large proportion of 'les Québécois', a factor leading to his defeat in the election called in 1970. Significantly, the fight over Bill 63 represented the mobilization of national consciousness throughout Quebec society, the first solid proof (when taken in tandem with labour's radicalization) of both national consciousness and class consciousness being operant at the same time.

With public confidence shaken (with the singular exception of the English minority in Quebec), the election returned a refurbished Liberal party under a new leader who promised to defeat unemployment, Robert Bourassa. The waffling of Bertrand between nationalism and federalism had proven to be his weak spot, and the Liberals, assuming a quasi-federalist stance (their campaign slogan was "le Fédéralisme rentable" - profitable federalism) played on public opinion and manipulated the media, creating a strong "fear" campaign against the PQ, culminating in the Brinks "coup" on the eve of the election.

Not that the PQ had not been pragmatic. Sensing the potential 'fear' in the electorate of a formal separatist party, the PQ responded with assurances that not all that much would be changed. David Rockefeller
was quoted in PQ literature saying words "...to the effect that he did not
care whether Quebec separated or not, provided that it welcomed foreign
investment." (J. Laxer, 1973: p. 245) The PQ itself publicly reasoned
that

...businesses which have most strongly fought separatism
will pressure both the federal and Quebec government to
accomplish separation in an ordered, moderate, rational,
fashion - "Don't upset the applecart". These attitudes
will be justified for the same reason: the maintenance
of the economic axis necessary for these companies...
In fact, as a result, the principal adversaries of
independence will become its principal allies.
(PQ, 1970: p. 139)
(my translation)

However:
The scare campaign worked. The PQ kept its twenty-four
per cent of the vote, but most of the undecideds went
Liberal. In what became known in radical and separatist
mythology as "le coup d'etat électoral", the Liberals
won 72 of the 108 National Assembly seats, although their
share of the popular vote was reduced to 45 per cent from
the 47 per cent they had got in the 1966 elections, which
they lost. The PQ, with a quarter of the vote, only
managed seven seats...The discrepancy between the PQ's
popularity in the province and its tiny representation in
the Assembly was to grow into a major issue, convincing
people of the inequity of the electoral system.
(R. Chodos and N. auf der Maur, 1972: p. 18)

Although the unions had not endorsed the PQ (with a few local council
exceptions), much of the support came from working class districts.

In reference to this election, the Milner's note that (1973: pp. 200-201)

In general, union leaders and militants have unofficially
supported the Parti Québécois; the more politically
sophisticated have rationalized this position with the
comment "sure they're bourgeois, but they're all we've got"
...Nevertheless, the organization and decision-making
apparatus of the party is firmly in the hands of new
middle class elements...The main point, though, is that
it was the workers that provided the mainstream of support
for the left-nationalist Parti Québécois.
There have been some studies done which attempt to identify the base of PQ support for this election. C. Cuneo and J. Curtis (1974), using data gathered in 1968, have identified some of the determinants of separatist support. (Although separatist support might not necessarily be translated into PQ support, it is nevertheless a useful element for identifying trends.) They argue that

The common portrayal of separatist opinion as largely a new middle class phenomenon in the middle and late 60's receives only very qualified support in the data discussed here...Part of the new middle class, professionals and semi-professionals, were comparatively high in separatist support, but this was much less true for managers, officials, and proprietors.

(C. Cuneo and J. Curtis, 1974: p. 21)

The authors suggest that managers, officials and proprietors might be more tightly tied to Anglo interests (p. 21) (a comment consistent with Bourque and Laurin-Frenette's (1973) characterization of a split in the bourgeoisie). While their focus was essentially on the middle class, whose support generally (with exceptions) for separatism stem from non-economic and cultural concerns, Cuneo and Curtis indicate separatist support from the lower classes is due more to economic factors (possibly an indication of class consciousness?). 12

The 1970 election itself has been analyzed by R. Hamilton and M. Pinard (1976) and Jensen and Regenstreif (1970). Hamilton and Pinard's work indicates that despite PQ victory in strong working class sections of Montreal, these gains are more the result of Liberal and Union Nationale weakness than the PQ strength (p. 7). PQ support varies by age and income level, with better off, younger voters tending to vote PQ. However, the authors dismiss a 53% support of the PQ by those
under 35 with incomes under $6,000 because they are relatively less supportive than those with higher incomes. Nevertheless, 53% is a highly significant proportion. There was significant support for the PQ from the lower classes.

Jensen and Regenstreif (1970) argue that much of the basis for PQ support in the 1970 election emerged from national consciousness cutting across class lines. This is consistent with the fact that the election resulted, in part, from questions over language rights and Bill 63. Moreover, this finding, in conjunction with the Cumeo/Curtis assertion that separatist support in the working class is on the basis of economic issues, provides strong empirical backing for my contention that both class consciousness and national consciousness are operant in Quebec society. Rather than seeing these analyses as antagonistic, they can be interpreted as complementary.

While the PQ garnered the majority of its support from elements of the young and the middle class, significant support came from the working class. Reasons for support are more variable. Among the middle class, non-economic concerns were more salient, while, in the working class, there was likely a blend of national and economic concerns. It should be noted, however, that so-called non-economic concerns can have a strong economic thrust if promotion of culture and language facilitates entry to or maintains occupational advantage.

Bourassa's government was but six months old when the FLQ crisis occurred. Labour representatives, René Lévesque and certain journalists and professionals united in a "négociation" team, expressing sympathy
for the ends of the FLQ, but deploring the means - this a solidarity which was to prove shortlived. More important, it signalled a positive response to a socialist analysis on the part of labour: both the Laurentian and Montreal Central Councils of the CSN endorsed the FLQ manifesto.

Despite combined resentment to the repressive institution of the War Measures Act, it was in quite another area that the alienation of labour from the Parti Québécois was to begin.

October 1971 brought a strike to La Presse (owned by Power Corporation) whose staff had developed an independence of inquiry and an interest in political developments in Quebec, which, as the development turned nationalist and socialist, Power Corporation and its allies found more and more impossible to tolerate.


Editorial censorship had been mounting, and, when production staff contracts ended, La Presse refused to negotiate in good faith. They stalled long enough to force a strike by other La Presse unions (both CSN and FTQ affiliated) whose contracts weren't due to expire until 1972. (R. Chodos and N. auf der Maur, 1972: p. 92) La Presse locked out all employees, began to use 'scab' labour, and, in a move of solidarity, the CSN, FTQ and Centrale des Enseignants du Québec (CEQ - the large teachers' union) called for a mass demonstration. Montreal mayor, Jean Drapeau, re-introduced an anti-demonstration bylaw declaring fifty blocks around La Presse a 'forbidden' zone. However, the demonstration, 15,000 strong, filled with socialist slogans (for example "Capitalism equals unemployment, socialism equals work"), went on as planned. Police, perhaps provoked, charged on the crowd: one person later died
and labour leaders "declared their illusions shattered". (R. Chodos and N. auf der Maur, 1972: p. 98)

In response, the three unions formed a Common Front four days later in the Montreal Forum before a crowd of 20,000. Each labour leader "...vowed solidarity in the battle against 'the wealthy propertied capitalists'." (R. Chodos and N. auf der Maur, 1972: pp. 99-100).

This stance had been foreshadowed by the CSN - only a month earlier they had issued Ne Comptons que sur nos Propres Moyens.

Included in this document is a scathing analysis of the capitalist system and the exploitation of labour. The position of the working classes vis-à-vis Anglo and American bourgeoisies, the imperialist system, and the Quebec national bourgeoisie is clearly delineated. The solution proposed is socialist restructuring within the national framework: workers' control through the nationalization of the Quebec economy. In essence, the document is a plea for socialist activism within the nation of Quebec and, as such, it represents an interesting articulation of both class consciousness and national consciousness: it is a nationalism with a clear class intent.

For the FTQ, however, this was a new orientation. Their affiliation to the AFL-CIO had long inhibited the adoption of a socialist perspective. But in an address two months later by their president, Louis Laberge, the FTQ indicated this past image was shattered.

Laberge said Quebec was an oppressed, colonized, and violent society based upon profit for the few... (he) made it clear that socialism is the only road to... liberation.

(R. Chodos and N. auf der Maur, 1972: p. 102)
The *La Presse* demonstration strengthened union solidarity and weakened the alliance with the PQ. The PQ had absolutely refused to endorse the demonstration, and Lévesque only complicated the situation when he made

...comments to the effect that he would rather live in a South American banana republic than in a Quebec controlled by 'ranting and raving labour leaders'...


Lévesque's attitude enraged segments of the PQ, leftists and pragmatists both. Those of a left persuasion argued the PQ should be more responsive to labour, and those with a practical orientation realized alienation of labour minimized chances for electoral victory. The PQ found itself in an odd position: it had to court labour without alienating the support it already had, and had to develop a campaign platform persuasive to those potential supporters who were frightened by the idea of secession. As a result, the 1972 convention was a dynamic, problematic situation with policy decisions which tried to appease as many factions as possible. 14

On the question of separation, the PQ modified its position to the point of having separation decided by a national referendum. At the same time, it radicalized its economic proposals to include, among other things, nationalization of finance companies, and prohibition of foreign investment in key economic sectors. 15 Thus, there is evidence of PQ attempts to extend electoral appeal into 'non-independentiste' sectors as well as labour. However, the labour/PQ relationship was to remain shaky over the Common Front negotiations of 1972.
Prior to 1972, strike activity had (with the exception of 1971) increased at a consistent rate (see Table 11). This can be cautiously interpreted as increasing class conflict, despite the institutionalized nature of strike activity. In view of the labour activity in 1972, this interpretation is likely.

In 1972, the Common Front representing 210,000 unionized public and para-public employees in the three union centrals) asked for a weekly minimum wage of $100.00, job security and yearly 8% wage increases. The government refused, and the employees went on strike. After two weeks filled with newspaper reports of unhealthy hospital conditions and the like, Bourassa's government initiated Bill 19, forcing people to return to work. Finance Minister Garneau admitted that the government had to do something to "protect the economic structure of private enterprise" (S.H. Milner and H. Milner, 1973: p. 216). Laberge, Pépin (CSN) and Charbonneau (CEQ) were sentenced to one year prison terms for their involvement, along with 34 other union members. While advising people to return to work, the labour leaders were imprisoned along with the thirty-four other union members, sparking a series of spontaneous walkouts across Quebec, as well as the establishment of community control in several towns - the province was literally paralyzed as the grass roots dictated union policy.

Bourassa responded with a media play-up of union violence and "goon squads", and newspapers went so far as to suggest a "coup d'état". The labour leaders were persuaded by the government to appeal their sentences on the understanding that Bill 19 might be open to negotiation
# TABLE 1

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Source: *Annuaire du Québec*: 1971, p. 375  
*Annuaire du Québec*: 1972, p. 415  
*Annuaire du Québec*: 1973, p. 441  
*Annuaire du Québec*: 1974, p. 602
and amendment - with this, the general strike ended.

Throughout

The Parti Québécois was careful to stay firmly on the fence in the dispute. For every attack on the government's insensitivity was another, at least as strong, on the union officials' adventurism.


The 1973 election returned the Liberals to power once more. It is generally felt that the PQ drew a fair amount of labour support.

...Bourassa...claimed during the campaign that the vast majority of rank-and-file union members would support him on election day. It is interesting to note that out of the 1,000 delegates polled at the December 1973 convention of the Quebec Federation of Labour (FTQ), 76 per cent said they had voted for the PQ, while only 10 per cent admitted to having voted for the Liberals. These delegates were not top-level union bureaucrats, but presidents and secretaries of grass roots union locals. As for the working class as a whole, it is significant to note that the PQ share of the popular vote increased considerably during the election, particularly in working-class districts. So much for Bourassa's 'vast majority'.

(A. Bennett, 1973: p. 53)

The PQ garnered 31% of the popular vote, which translated into six seats in the National Assembly - the Liberals won 102 seats.

Pinard's and Hamilton's (1976) analysis of the 1973 election is interesting. Some of the trends they identify in the 1970 election are reinforced, particularly that of middle class support for the PQ. But there are provocative additions.

For example, the highest income Francophones in the Montreal area provide the least support for the PQ, while those in the $7,000 to $10,000 category give the highest support (p. 13). Of greater significance are the occupational bases of support. In Montreal, 47% of Professionals and Semi-Professionals, 63% of Clerical and Sales, and 59% of Blue Collar
categories support the PQ against 15% of Owners and Managers. In the rest of the province, the corresponding percentages are 63%, 23%, 32%, and 25% (p. 15). (The authors innovatively employ this distinction between Montreal and the rest of the province.) They go on to detail a collapsing of categories (which I find unclear) which results in 39% support among the middle class and 38% among the working class (p. 15). There has been, it would seem, an increase in working class support for the PQ despite formal tensions between the party and labour. This is reinforced by the tendency (p. 20) of union members to vote for the PQ.

With regards to the middle class, Pinard and Hamilton cite a split over PQ support between "professionals on the one hand and the managerial and clerical and sales group on the other" (p. 16). They are correct in pointing out lack of support among owners and managers (which reflect Cuneo's and Curtis' findings), but their inclusion of clerical and sales in the non-support group is not adequately demonstrated by their data: 63% of this group supported the PQ in Montreal!

Employing my own definitions of class, clerical and blue collar workers (the working class) give significant support to the PQ, as does the middle class (which seems to correspond to Pinard and Hamilton's Professional and Semi-Professional category). There is an effective split between the middle class and my category of the bourgeoisie (management and owners). This is, in part, reflective of the trend towards Liberal support among high income French Canadians.

I think the key to understanding the working class support for the PQ rests ultimately on Pinard's (1970) argument regarding protest voting. He argues that traditional one party dominance results in the
negative voting for alternative parties, and (using a highly suspect one variable indicator) suggests that working class politics in Quebec is not characterized by ethnic consciousness. He interprets third party voting (in this case, the PQ) as class conscious, and sounds a death knell for nationalist-oriented political parties in Quebec.

(Jensen and Regenstreif's (1970) study indicated the opposite...D. Latouche (1973) supports aspects of their argument.)

Rather than arguing the predominance of class consciousness over national consciousness, it is more fruitful to view the situation as a choice, for the working class, between particular economic approaches to the nation.

While Bourassa has waved the nationalist flag, his economic policy is at odds with the interests labour has recently articulated, particularly with regard to foreign investment.

The Bourassa style of government has been pervaded by a concern with creating a social, economic and political climate that would attract U.S. investment.

(D. Posgate and K. McRoberts, 1976, pp. 177-178)

By the 1973 election, labour had publicly declared its 'war' on the capitalist system, and the revamped PQ economic platform, while certainly not identical, was, among the alternatives, the closest to labour's position. But this economic justification does not erase the co-incidence of national consciousness between the PQ and the working class. While the PQ variety of nationalism might not coincide with the best interests of the working class, there are striking similarities between the PQ and labour on certain national issues, such as the French language. Economic motivation to vote for the PQ does not
necessarily mean that national issues are forgotten. In fact, the existence of tacit, implicit but non-articulated accord over national questions would facilitate economic motivations by providing, de facto, common ground. In this sense, the adoption by the PQ of a more radical economic programme may finally have moved working class nationalists from support of traditional parties to support for the PQ. Moreover, as in the middle class case, where so-called non-economic motivations can have an economic thrust, so too can economic motivations have a national thrust: economic change within a commonly understood framework - the nation.

The relationship between the two bodies - labour and the PQ - is, still at best, tenuous. The PQ does not fully represent labour, and it is still dependent on middle class electoral and membership support.

What is important to note is the coincidence of class consciousness and national consciousness in Quebec labour. Since 1973, there have been sustained strikes and further condemnations of the capitalist system in tandem with strong cultural stands. (This should not be interpreted to mean that relations between the two labour centres are always peaceful - witness the confrontation at James Bay and the findings of the Cliche Commission). This coincidence of class and national consciousness is nowhere clearer than in labour's response to Bill 22.

In 1969, as a result of the crisis over Bill 63, the Union Nationale commissioned an Inquiry on the Position of the French Language and on the basis of its recommendations and findings (some which have been presented above), Bill 22 came into existence.
The purpose of Bill 22 is to guarantee that: "French is the official language of the province of Quebec." (Title I, Article 1).
The Parti Québécois, the CSN, FTQ and CEQ have long endorsed precisely this position, but, when Bill 22 was presented, both the PQ and labour objected violently, with the bulk of their argument centring on the fact that Bill 22 actually protects the rights of English and makes French, at best, only a language of priority. The text of Bill 22 consistently makes allowance for English as an accompaniment to French. For example, Title III, Chapter 1, Article 8 states "Official texts and documents may be accompanied with an English version...". This provision, over the course of the Bill, applies to virtually every communication and document in which French is required, varying from collective bargaining agreements to advertising. The essence of the nationalist argument is that Bill 22 officially guarantees for the English in Quebec the favoured status they have enjoyed for so long.

In regards to labour, class consciousness and national consciousness are both at work shaping the nature of the response to Bill 22. Fernand Daoust of the FTQ says in reference to government plans to provide preferential contracts to industries which undergo a programme of francization:

Nos gouvernements ont beaucoup d'imagination lorsqu'il s'agit de trouver des prétextes pour gaver ceux-là qui exploitent, mutilent et assassinent les travailleurs québécois. Voilà encore un nouveau filon - la subvention linguistique.
(Parliamentary Debates of Quebec, 2nd Session, 3rd Legislature: B3881 - 3899)
M. Charbonneau of the CEQ adds

La CEQ demande le retrait du projet de loi 22. Ce projet de loi nous le ressentons comme une triple agression à notre égard: à titre de Québécois: le français est une condition de vie; à titre de travailleurs francophones: le français est véritablement une condition de travail des plus essentielles et; à titre de travailleurs de l'enseignement: le français est notre outil de travail et est l'objet de notre travail, pour une bonne part d'entre nous.

(Parliamentary Debates of Quebec, 2nd Session, 3rd Legislature: B3608-3632)

Clearly these statements reflect both a national and class consciousness.

The CSN has adopted a similar position.

Marcel Pépin (1974: pp. 630-644), writing in Action Nationale, documents the problems inherent in legitimizing the use of English. French is seen as an absolutely necessary condition for work and English becomes a "moyen de domination et de subordination aux mains du patronat" (p. 635). English further becomes a means to psychologically debasing the French worker, whereas French, when used by all workers, is not only the language of work but "un instrument de lutte sociale" (p. 639). Finally, he calls on workers to unite.

Il faut donc résister, et en tant que patriotes et en tant que travailleurs.

(p. 641)

Nowhere is the coincidence of national consciousness and class consciousness more striking than here.

Bill 22 has been passed and is currently enjoying its first year of official existence. As was the year 1960, Bill 22 is a watershed of sorts. F. Lalonde, Quebec Minister of State is quite pragmatic about it.
...Bill 22's cultural goal must be secondary to its political significance.

Mr. Lalonde admits that it was designed to deprive extremist elements and the Parti Québécois of one of their principal justifications for separatism. (Hamilton Spectator, July 5, 1975)

Bill 22 is the most far-reaching attempt ever to respond to and contain nationalist elements within Quebec society. In this way, it marks a turning point in Quebec politics. What Bill 22 does not do is respond to the growing class consciousness of the lower classes. Its success will be, not so much in how much discontent it concretely does away with, but with how long it can contain the discontent it currently obscures.

The breadth and depth of class polarization can be seen in the state's response to the recommendations contained in the Cliche Commission Report. The Commission was created to study and make recommendations regarding corruption in the construction industry union structure. The Commission also uncovered corruption in industry and government but, so far, legislation has (predictably) dealt only with unions. Among the legislation are provisions for updated union membership lists for the government along with statements regarding all union spending and income sources. Persons with criminal records are forbidden from holding union positions (and in the volatile Quebec labour climate, this is a strong, coercive measure).

Labour has responded angrily to this legislation. The CSN has titled their published response *Le gouvernement capitaliste contre le syndicalisme: organisons la résistance* (CNTU, 1975). In it the state
is characterized as "un gouvernement d'ennemis" (p. 26). Polarization of classes rather than subsiding in Quebec, is still a dominant feature, indicative of enhanced class consciousness on both sides.

As suggested in the introduction to this Chapter, the outline of the growth of national consciousness, class consciousness, and nationalism has been, in the main, descriptive. Chapter 4 analyzes this data with respect to the discussion and theoretical issues raised in Chapter 2.
NOTES

1. The opposition of the Church to the government can be seen as stemming both from fear of foreign and capitalist intervention. If foreign capital had entered Quebec without the assistance of the government, the Church would probably not have reacted so negatively. Since government was one of the few institutions French Canadians could acceptably be involved in, state collusion was perceived both as selling out to foreigners and as over-involvement in capitalist development. The Church much preferred to exert control through their own agencies (see H. Guindon, 1960). Participation in private sectors was far less acceptable than traditional involvement through Church and state institutions. Taschereau and his colleagues violated this tenet.

2. It should be noted here that the rigid hierarchical structure of the Church dictated a 'command from the top' of sorts. The collusion and/or tacit concord between state and clerical authorities was not necessarily pervasive. Rather, the ideological and dogmatic positions of highly placed officials was merely passed down through the Church structure.

3. While Asbestos is perhaps the most well-known strike of this era, other conflicts occurred with equally important results. For example, in 1947, the workers at the Ayers woollen mills in Lachine went on strike, and Duplessis, true to form, ordered violent reprisals by provincial police. It was following this confrontation that Madeleine Parent was sentenced to jail for two years on the charge of seditious conspiracy - a sentence Duplessis never enforced when the court clerk died. For a more complete description, see Charles Lipton, The Trade Union Movement of Canada 1827 - 1959, pp. 321-323.

4. See H. Guindon (1967) for an interesting analysis of the emergence of this new middle class. While his account does not differentiate the levels at which this new middle class operates, it is a good analysis of the structural responses in a society undergoing rapid industrial growth.

5. The expansion of Church programmes actually resulted from two factors. First, there was middle class agitation, but, second, as Church bureaucracy expanded, there was an actual need to incorporate lay people (particularly in education and hospitals) due to the increase in institutional scope. The dynamics of Church expansion can thus be situated both internally and externally.
6. D. Posgate and K. McRoberts (1976) have responded to D. Latouche's (1974) contention that, by percentages, Lesage's regime was only a continuation of Duplessis' fiscal distribution policies. In terms of the concentration of power and authority in the state, the Lesage administration did represent a radical departure from previous administrations. (D. Posgate and K. McRoberts, 1976: p. 117)

7. The election of 1962 was called by Lesage on the issue of the nationalization of electricity. M. Pinard (1969) argues that nationalization was, in fact, not a significant factor in the re-election of the Liberals. Earlier in his essay, he suggests voters might be influenced by socio-economic conditions directly affecting them. If this is true, nationalization might have been a hidden factor. That is, if the Liberal policy had been viewed as successful by the electorate up until 1962, nationalization (among those undecided over the issue) might have been seen as part and parcel of a larger economic policy - not as something specific, but as part of a quasi-nationalist stance acceptable to a proportion of the population. This would invalidate Pinard's suggestion that nationalization was, at best a tenuous political platform.

8. What is meant by dominant in this particular instance is the group which occupies positions which are the most prestigious, most-financially rewarding, and, as a corollary, are the most integrated into the decision-making arenas.

9. C.M. Lanphier and R.N. Morris (1974) argue that income differences between French and English in Quebec have diminished over the period 1961 to 1968, particularly in the higher paid professions. At lower income levels, the reverse holds true. There are problems with their approach, though. First, they use a $10,000 or more income category which inadequately explores income differentials between French and English (a point they themselves point out). Second, they employ occupational categories of great breadth which fail to discriminate, particularly at the managerial level, middle from upper levels of management. When occupation and income, then, are taken together, their results with regards to higher occupations are, at least, questionable. It might be more appropriate to see their data minimally supporting a view of equalization at middle levels of the occupational structure alone, a view not inconsistent with my own argument.

10. In 1964 Lesage had allowed public and para-public employees to affiliate with unions which did not support political parties - the CSN was non-politically affiliated and its membership ranks swelled from 80,000 in 1960 to 230,000 in 1970.
11. "The Royal Trust Company packed some securities into a Brinks truck and pointed it in the direction of Toronto - making sure a Montreal Gazette photographer was there to get pictures."
   (R. Chodos and N. auf der Maur, 1972: p. 17)

12. This is consistent with Pinard's (1970) contention that working class politics in Quebec can be interpreted as class conscious voting. If separatism is viewed as a means to achieving economic change, it would seem that both national and class consciousness is at work.

13. Arguments that these include students 'on their way up' or young people with a chance for getting ahead do not erase the fact that a good proportion of the working class supported the PQ.

14. The revamped programme of the PQ can be found in Prochaine étape...quand nous serons vraiment chez nous, 1972.

15. As argued in Chapter 4, the PQ, in many ways, typifies the managerial revolution ethic. Thus, the critique of the managerial revolution theory can be extended to the PQ - managerial reorganization does not, necessarily entail changes in the effective exercise of power.

16. Increased strike activity was not peculiar to Quebec, but the dimensions surrounding this growth were unique and stemmed from particular new ideological developments.
CHAPTER 4

Class and Nationalism in Quebec

1) Nationalism and Class in Quebec: the Relation of Class to Nationalism

In Chapter 2, the question to be explored in Chapters 3 and 4 was outlined: essentially, is class a source of the components which combine with national consciousness to create the ideology nationalism?

Nationalism, defined as national consciousness mobilized with particular ends in view, includes assumptions regarding the organization of society. I have argued that national consciousness does not contain these assumptions: they must come from other sources. Consequently, it is now necessary to identify these sources using the data presented in Chapter 3. This can be best accomplished through a careful analysis of nationalist ideology and nationalist support.

i) Nationalist Ideology in Quebec

The data presented in Chapter 3 indicate, over the period of 1960 to 1975, three dominant strains of nationalist ideology: the quasi-
nationalism of the Lesage regime, the separatist-statist ideology of the Parti Québécois (PQ), and the socialist-nationalist ideology of the Parti Socialiste du Québec (PSQ), Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) and labour. What is extremely interesting to note is the time sequence of the emergence of these various ideologies in relation to particular events or conditions prevalent in Quebec. In other words, the growth and extension of each ideology seems to correspond to particular socio-economic conditions. This will become clearer in the following analysis.

a) The Lesage Regime

The quasi-nationalist position of the Lesage regime was a response to a growing contradiction between the dominant ideology holding sway in Quebec over the 1940's and early 1950's and the realities of Quebec's social and economic fabric. Economic non-participation and repression were inadequate responses to displacement of the middle class and intolerable working conditions and wages among the working class. Significantly, the battle against conservative hegemony was waged by several forces in common, although admittedly, each fought for different reasons.

Much of the critique of the Duplessis era focussed on the need for modernization. Quebec, it was argued, was a nation requiring massive change. However, to effect this shift meant wrestling control of key social sectors from traditional authority. The Lesage government responded to these critiques by implementing the tool of state power and
authority, the aim of which was the integration of 'les Québécois' into their own modernizing economy. The result was state takeover of health, education and welfare and intervention into sectors of the economy. This, in turn, created bureaucratic superstructures which could begin to accommodate the previously displaced middle class. However, I would argue that the ideological bases of support for these events was not nationalism per se, but a profound belief in modernization. It was the means of implementing modernization which laid the groundwork for more specifically nationalist feelings.

Where, then, did Lesage's quasi-nationalist support come from? Electorally, over 1960 and 1962, the Liberal party received its greatest support from the middle classes (M. Pinard, 1969: p. 148). This suggests (particularly due to the significant working class support for the Union Nationale) that the election of the Liberals in 1960 was the result of perceptions among the middle class that the Liberal party, alone, could provide a political solution to their problems.

This view is reinforced by an analysis of the interests served by the policy decisions of the Lesage government. The creation of state agencies and bureaucracies incorporated only those with the skills and training to take advantage of the new positions: the middle class, not the working class. (This should not be interpreted to mean Lesage neglected the working class. On the contrary, benefits from new provincial schemes also aided them. However, when speaking relatively, it was the middle class which most openly and directly benefitted.)
This interpretation is supported by A. Breton (1964). He suggests that

...resources which could have been invested to increase the social income of the community have been used in the case of nationalization of electricity to buy new high income jobs for members of the French Canadian middle class and, in the case of the General Investment Corporation, to keep already existing high-income jobs for the same middle class.

(A. Breton, 1964: p. 385)

In other words, the quasi-nationalist policies of the Lesage regime corresponded most strongly to middle class interests.

The shift from quasi-nationalist stance to true nationalism occurs, over time (and at various junctures), as policy becomes legitimized or proposed on the basis of national consciousness and national integrity. The use of the state increasingly becomes identified as protecting and promoting the national interest so that, at some point for particular supporters, the ideology of modernization is transformed into nationalism. The distinction between quasi-nationalism and nationalism rests on the transformation from an ideological commitment to modernization to a commitment to control. At least two reasons can be cited for this.

First, there is a growing awareness that, although French Canadian participation in the public sector is improving, private sectors are still, comparatively, restrictive in the opportunities they hold for French Canadians. Consequently, analysis of ethnic discrimination begins to emerge. This perception leads to a heightened national consciousness.
Second, on the basis of national consciousness, legitimization of policies is best served by nationalism in an appeal to all national members. That is, the best means to modernization is through national self determination. Through the new model of the nation as a secular, technological society, the new middle class could use nationalism to legitimize its own class aspirations. The middle class seizure of control of French Canadian social institutions was no longer simply a projection of class aspirations; it was necessary to the épanouissement of the national collectivity. (D. Posgate and K. McRoberts, 1976: p. 103)

However, when national consciousness is mobilized, it is transformed, through the class position of its proponents, into a nationalism serving particular class interests...hence the benefits derived by the middle class from the Lesage regime.

It is important to understand that the seizure of control of the state apparatus and growing national consciousness operate in a dialectical manner. Nascent commitment to modernization leads to using the state as an instrument which leads to an increased and qualitatively heightened national consciousness which is then mobilized into nationalism. This mobilization appears to be largely on the basis of class interest. In this sense, the new nationalism (as the previous quasi-nationalism) is a middle class phenomenon (see H. Guindon (1967) for his argument on the new middle class and nationalism).

Initially, the Quiet Revolution had mobilized a collective belief in modernization behind the spearhead of the middle classes. While this group received the majority of benefits, there were other elements of Quebec society who could tacitly support the changes brought
about by Lesage. Portions of the French Canadian bourgeoisie (for example, small producers in business for themselves) benefitted from new government schemes inasmuch as they promised to make Quebec more self-sufficient and less dependent on foreign capital. Opportunities for advancement and extension of economic power, blocked by the dominance of foreign controlled companies, appeared to be potential outcomes of the new policy orientations which could prove advantageous to this element of the bourgeoisie.

The working class, too, could take advantage of improved health, education and welfare programmes. The unionization of public employees in the early 1960's swelled the ranks of organized labour. Thus, as long as the state and the working class did not come into conflict with one another, there could exist nominal support from the working class for the new nationalism. Aggravated social tension, however, soon called this relationship between the middle class and labour into serious question.

From the data in Chapter 3 and the analysis above, it appears that the quasi-nationalism and new nationalism under the Lesage reign were significantly middle class in orientation. That is, national consciousness was mobilized largely through a synthesis with elements of class ideology. In other words, the principal source of the additional elements in the ideology nationalism was class.

There are other interpretations. Charles Taylor (1965) has argued, for example, that the middle class, caught between new values of
modernization and negative feelings regarding French Canadian 'backwardness' sought to resolve the problem by making Quebec over into the new, positive image of a modern society. The middle class sought to improve their own identity. This, however, strikes me as an inadequate analysis. Although Taylor sees the prime motivation of the middle class as the attempt to improve their own economic standing, resolving identity issues can be interpreted, in contrast to Taylor's argument, as the erection of an ideological mask for the promotion of this same class interest. Making consumption of policy more palatable for the rest of society does not erase this class thrust. 'Identity crisis' is just one way of attempting to mobilize the collectivity behind middle class nationalism (see the discussion on co-optation below).

In conclusion, then, one can say with regard to nationalism under Lesage that class was a principal source of the components combining with national consciousness to create nationalism.

b) Separatist-Statist Ideology

The roots of separatist-statist ideology, particularly as manifested by the Parti Québécois are to be found in the new nationalism emerging under the Lesage government. A combination of factors led, over time, to an increasing alienation of segments of the new nationalist ranks.

The initial use of the state as an instrument to self-determination reinforced a commitment to increasing control by 'les Québécois' of their own economy, transforming modernization (quasi-nationalism) to
true nationalism. Paradoxically, however, (as I have argued in Chapter 3), this assertion of control did not address the real locus of economic power: the centres of foreign control. Despite government policy, foreign investment still poured into Quebec, unemployment soared and restricted access to positions in the private sector continued. The Lesage regime, and the Union Nationale following, although willing to employ the state apparatus, still operated with a commitment to the federal system. Hence there were still limits on the extent to which they would use their interventionist tool, even though the ignited nationalism of the middle class demanded increasing interference. The Quiet Revolution, it appears, had gone about as far as it was going to go.

The RIN and RN arose in response to this inadequacy. I have demonstrated in Chapter 3 the key role the RIN planned (as outlined in their political platform) for the state. Increased intervention was seen as the key to continued nationalist aspirations. The expulsion of René Lévesque from the Liberals and the creation of the Parti Québécois were the eventual political responses to this new nationalist agitation.

To what extent, then, is the PQ an extension of the middle class nationalism of the earlier 1960's? An important shift in the basis of middle class support seems to have taken place. Cuneo and Curtis (1974) and Hamilton and Pinard (1976), as discussed above, cite evidence of a split in middle class support of both separatism and the PQ which seems, generally, to run on the lines of professionals and semi-professionals (my term: bourgeoisie). This split parallels non-dependency and dependency on foreign (Anglo and American) capital.
Of primary importance to increased state intervention envisioned by the PQ is the creation of a politically independent Quebec. The spectre of separatism, I would argue, has caused those dependent on foreign investment (the bourgeoisie) to shift away from mild nationalist support earlier on in the 1960's to a firm support of federalism. (Bourque and Laurin-Frenette's (1972) analysis of this phenomenon is interesting. They characterize it as a split in the earlier bourgeois hegemony. My own tendency (as argued above) is to see this apparent hegemony as far less strong--more as temporary alliance.) The result has been a middle class/bourgeois parting of the ways, with political support going to the PQ and Liberals respectively.

This middle class support of the PQ is paralleled by PQ policy which, it appears, most benefits the middle class. Although the PQ platform contains elements favourable to the working class (such as guaranteed minimum income), these changes would be brought about under the auspices of bureaucracies staffed and directed by the middle class. In addition, from the data presented in Chapter 3, it appears that the PQ does not plan a radical shift in terms of the penetration of foreign capital. What is proposed is state capitalism: the basic system of class relations would remain unaltered. This is seen in the PQ's vacillation regarding the role and activity of organized labour.

The election tactics of the Parti Québécois in both the 1970 and 1973 elections serve to reinforce the view of the PQ as middle class in orientation. In both cases, the PQ spent a large proportion of its time guaranteeing that political separation would not engender
radical changes in the status quo. The only significant changes were that 'les Québécois' would have the only say in the disposition of fiscal revenue and the direction of the economy (on the basis of internal financing) and that there would be a guaranteed minimum income. Again, the clear middle class orientation of policy comes through.

In contrast, I have shown a significant level of support for the PQ coming from the working class (as well as similarities between the PQ and labour with regard to issues such as language). This support, as Cuneo and Curtis (1974) and Pinard (1969) suggest, is likely to stem primarily from economic motivations. However, I have also argued that tacit accord on national questions (such as language) leads to the apparent 'disappearance' of nation-based issues. This absence should not be interpreted as meaning national consciousness does not exist. Rather, because it does exist, it is the economic positions which the PQ formulates which decide eventual support or non-support. Support is on the basis of economic policy closer to the needs of the working class than that of other parties.

Nevertheless, working class support does not mean, in the end, that the PQ ideology represents this segment of the population. It is apparent that the PQ is primarily middle class in its orientation. Once again, class emerges as a significant source of the components blending with national consciousness to create nationalism.
c) Socialist-Nationalist Ideology

The first evidence of an articulate socialist-nationalist ideology was the formation of the Parti Socialiste du Québec (PSQ). *Parti Pris*, its literary arm, consistently argued the socialist restructuring of national society and called for left nationalist activism. The PSQ developed early in the 1960's, at a time when labour still tenuously supported the Quiet Revolution and, it is difficult to gauge whether *Parti Pris* had a significant impact on the later radicalization of Quebec labour.

M. Reid (1972), in his account of the 'partipristes', indicates that there was contact between them and the working class (most of them coming from, or living in, working class surroundings). However, it can be said with a fair degree of certainty that, because labour itself had not developed a strong sense of class consciousness in the early 1960's, the PSQ and its socialist-nationalist ideology was premature if the goal was class-wide education into a socialist-nationalist view of reality.

The relatively harmonious relations between labour and the state started to disintegrate after the unionization of public employees. By the mid-1960's, relations between the Quebec government and the public sector unions had changed from the initial "honeymoon period" to a growing conflict. As bargaining broke down, unions exercised their newly-granted rights in a rash of strikes. Frequently the Quebec government drew upon its legislative powers to end the strikes and impose its own settlement. In the process, union leaders began to see the Quebec government as no different from private employers. In fact, in the eyes of many, the Quebec government was very much at the service of private employers, resisting demands for higher wages largely in deference to the fear of private employers that if
such increase were granted there would be new pressure
on them to grant similar increases.

This increasing co-identification of public and private interest resulted,
in tandem with unimproved economic conditions, in the growth of an
increasing class consciousness, manifested in the Second Front, the
Common Front and recent policy orientations of Quebec labour. Significantly,
this class consciousness has resulted in the adoption of a socialist-
nationalist stance.

Labour's critiques are generalized as to the nature of capitalist
exploitation, but are specific as to the application of this model to
Quebec society (for example, the unique position of the Quebec bourgeoisie).
The solutions proposed suggest the nation as the unit in which change
should occur. Consequently, questions regarding nation are raised and
bear witness to the existence of national consciousness: this explains
labour's concern over the issue of language. But, again, this national
consciousness receives components stemming from the class consciousness
of the working class, leading, as in the case of the middle class, to
a unique variety of class nationalism.

d) National Consciousness, Class Consciousness and Class Nationalism

Each of the three nationalist ideologies above has received a
direction which is derived largely from class concerns. This implies
the co-existence of both national consciousness and class consciousness.
The validity of this assertion can be demonstrated through the example
of language conflict in Quebec.

Each nationalist movement has indicated the need for French to be preserved. For example, in the case of the Lesage regime, the nationalization of electricity was to be carried out with the intention of hiring French-speaking personnel. In the case of the PQ and labour, both have made public their desire to see French as the only official language of Quebec. This commonality running through each ideology is primarily due to common national consciousness. Being Québécois, there is a shared desire to maintain specific language and culture.

However, conflict over language is also perceived differentially according to the class components in the nationalist ideology. The argument that middle class support for separatism is motivated by cultural (or non-economic) concerns is evidence that language is perceived as part of national integrity. However, the PQ support for French as the only official language of Quebec has interesting class dimensions: it is the middle class which is most directly affected by the occupational need to speak English.

Data in Chapter 3 has effectively demonstrated the dual system of occupational discrimination - ethnic and linguistic - operative in Quebec. For the PQ, making French the only official language is a means to forcing an occupational redistribution - as non-French speaking personnel are pushed out of particular occupational areas, French-speaking people (no longer by necessity bilingual) can enter. It is the middle class which most directly benefit.
The history of the Parti Québécois' response to language legislation can be similarly documented. The party's stand in opposition to Bill 63 was based on the argument that permitting immigrants to choose their children's language of instruction worked both as an assimilative threat to French culture as well as a guarantee of the continued dominance of English in the economic realm. Too, their negative response to Bill 22 has been based on a similar rationale - it is perceived as making French a language of priority and, through the continual guarantees to English (such as in documents and occupational communication), is perceived as actually reinforcing the dominance of English in the realm of economics. Effectively, then, Bill 22 is viewed as a block to fluid mobility of the middle class.

The position of the Parti Québécois as a middle class expression of nationalism is particularly interesting in that language and ethnic (national) issues are the essential subjects to understanding party propaganda: the PQ is a proponent of an homogeneous analysis of Quebec society. Its critique is centred around a "we/them" or "French-English" definition of reality. And for good reason: it is this perception of reality which most accurately depicts middle class experience. The bulk of their class frustration is centred on English domination of areas where it is perceived that French should dominate.

In contrast, labour's analysis has dimensions which reflect additional concerns specific to working class reality.

The problem of language received particular attention in Parti Pris. The working class in Quebec speaks a variety of French which is
highly anglicized and specific to working class experience (joual).

Theoretical attempts at understanding the process of colonization of
language and practical attempts at using joual in literature emerged,
over the 1960's, in Parti Pris. These attempts led to an increasing
identification of the nationalist struggle with the socialist struggle
(although recently, partipristes such as Piotte have 'recanted', calling
Miron, a contributor to Parti Pris, notes Miron's explanation as follows.

> It was the disappointment in this attempt, the lack of
> comprehension in the English-Canadian socialist milieu,
> that made me see that Quebec must break out of this
> national repression to move toward socialism on its
> own path.

From Parti Pris writers came novels written in joual in attempts to
legitimize the language - a process which was seen as paralleling
national liberation.

...joual...is what happened to a language under
oppression, but not oppression from people who speak
the same language as the oppressed.

(M. Reid, 1972: p. 238)

The legitimization of joual was intrinsically tied to an analysis of
Quebec as a colonized nation speaking a colonized (i.e. Anglicized)
language. Hence, legitimation of joual came to symbolically represent
the legitimation of the nation.

The creation of the objective conditions for the
continuation of French in Quebec comes, then, to
this: the overthrow of capitalism, its objective
destroyer.

(M. Reid, 1972: p. 102)
To restore the language, one had to restore the nation.
(M. Reid, 1972: p. 50)

Joual, as a form of French, parallels external sources of domination and reinforces national identity. Joual, as a language uniquely tied to the working class, reinforces class and facilitates the recognition of internal domination. That national consciousness is found in the working class, then, can be explained both historically and through the role language plays in delineating class and national boundaries. Consequently, one would assume that language would be approached from a more general cultural/national perspective as well as from a framework which situates language within an analysis stemming from class consciousness.

All three labour centrals had, as early as 1969, endorsed a "French as the only language of work" policy. Early on, this position was justified principally on the basis of national existence - the battle against Bill 63 alongside the PQ was indicative of this.

Chapter 3 suggested that significant radicalization of labour starts to occur by 1970. The degree to which class consciousness has grown is clearly evident by the advent of Bill 22. Labour, like the PQ, attacks Bill 22 for its apparent legitimation of the dominance of English in Quebec, but situates this problem of economic dominance into a much larger framework of capitalist exploitation. The FTQ presentation to the Quebec government is indicative of this stance.

The FTQ maintains that forcing people to speak French at work is the only effective way of ensuring the continued existence of French because of the central position work occupies in the daily existence of
of people. Furthermore, and this is the most significant indication that class interest is working in tandem with national consciousness, the union maintains that Bill 22, which in effect legitimizes English and makes the work situation bilingual, is hardly an adequate response to decades of capitalist exploitation of French workers by foreign firms in a foreign language. (Debates of the Quebec Legislature, 2nd, 3rd)

So while there is resistance to Bill 22 which, on the surface parallels that which the PQ tenders, there is also the introduction of a unique, class specific perception - language as a factor in the process of capitalist exploitation. English is seen as one of several modes of colonial-capitalist domination (see M. Pépin (1974)).

The essential differences in approach to language questions, then, are rooted as much in class perspectives as in national consciousness: the PQ restricts its observations to English domination over the French; labour includes this form of external domination in its analysis, but adds dimensions of internal class conflict as well.

e) The Relation of Class to Nationalism

Having reviewed and interpreted the data, an answer to the question raised in Chapter 2 can now be offered. It appears, at least with regard to this period in Quebec's history, that class has been a consistently significant factor in the mobilization of national consciousness to produce nationalism. Both national consciousness and class consciousness are operant in the ideology nationalism. Consequently, I will hereafter refer to class nationalism in order to make this duality clear. The discussion below will attempt to clarify this point with regard to
the dominant approaches on Quebec summarized earlier in Chapter 1.

2) Class Nationalism and Dominant Approaches to Class and Nationalism

The theoretical perspective I am employing developed from critiques of both traditional and left approaches to nationalism. The differences between these approaches and the one I am suggesting should be clarified so as to facilitate further discussion.

Traditional analyses, it will be remembered, identify subordinate ethno-linguistic groups as being homogeneous (without internal differentiation). For example, in their article of 1967 (which breaks from tradition by situating language conflict in a broader framework of ethno-linguistic discrimination), Inglehart and Woodward provide a highly suggestive description of 'ambitious' ethnic group members who mobilize entire populations. Their view of the nation as an homogeneous construct leads to the following observation.

A special case of the linkage between social mobility and linguistic pluralism among transitional populations may exist when ambitious members of a minority group see the opportunity to make careers for themselves by fanning a large potential group into consciousness of its identity.


It is interesting that 'making a career' for oneself is viewed as merely being 'ambitious'. Furthermore, the authors' insistence on homogeneity requires that there be a 'fanning' into 'group consciousness' so that there is no distinction made, in the end, between group consciousness and individual ambition. Once consciousness is achieved, there appears to be no qualitative difference among national group members.
The problem here is the failure to see differentiation in the nation. Despite an interesting, but unwitting, description of class nationalism, the authors see nationalism as a mass phenomenon. In view of the data and analysis of nationalism in Quebec which I have offered, this is an untenable position.

Analyses such as the Rioux/Dofny and Marxist schools are better equipped to handle internal differentiation. However, as pointed out in Chapter 1, there are weaknesses in both approaches. The Rioux/Dofny position cannot adequately explain the distinctive lower class variants of nationalism because they cannot appreciate the coexistence of class consciousness and national consciousness, nor the mix of the two consciousnesses in the ideology nationalism. They see nationalism as the result of national consciousness alone. (Although there are suggestions of middle class interest at stake, they never carry through on this line of reasoning.)

I have argued that the Marxist approaches are weakened by their politically-derived definitions of the nation. While lamenting false consciousness, they are blind to the growing expression of lower class discontent and consciousness expressed through the vehicle of working class nationalism. The conclusions (G. Bourque and N. Laurin-Frenette, 1973: p. 203) that there is no nationalist sentiment emanating from Quebec's lower classes and that support from these classes for the PQ is merely an expression of discontent with other alternatives do not mesh with the facts. Marxists, quick to ascribe a bourgeois character to nationalism, admit to proletarian nationalism only when this
nationalism centres on a proletarianization of the nation-state. Proletarian nationalism must be class conscious and they do not see class consciousness developing in the Quebec working class. Hence, working class support of PQ goals is analyzed as a particular instance of false consciousness rather than as convergent aspects of fundamentally different class nationalisms. By failing to see class interests in working class nationalism, Marxists miss both emerging class consciousness and national consciousness. Surely this is an oversight of startling proportions.

When viewing the development of nationalist ideologies, then, the analyst must be prepared to clearly identify both common elements stemming from a shared national consciousness and unique elements derived from and reflective of the class interest which characterizes nationalist ideologies in Quebec.

The history of Quebec prior to 1960 is typified by the ideological hegemony exercised by the Catholic Church and other elements of the traditional elite. Central to this dominant ideology was a defensive posture with regards to French culture, language and religion and an attempt to maintain rigid, centralized control over community life. Thus, industrialization and urbanization, the primary vehicles to modernization, occurred against a backdrop of an historically pre-defined and popularized view of French Canadians as constituents of a nation in and of its own right.

Not only, then, do the Quebecois objectively (on the basis of history, culture and language) constitute a nation, but there also exists a strong historical tendency and precedent for subjective awareness of the
concept of Quebec as a nation. National consciousness is potentially resident in each citizen of Quebec by virtue of national membership alone. Furthermore, as I have already argued in Chapters 1 and 2, common language works to reinforce this potential. It should not be too surprising, then, to sometimes find support for nationalist goals across social classes. It is due to this that nationalism in Quebec often appears to be homogeneous. In reality, however, homogeneity is merely the existence of similar, cross-class goals.

Common threads of national consciousness, however, do not necessarily imply that nationalism based on these threads is in the 'national' interest. On the contrary, national consciousness has been mobilized, in the cases cited above, with class consciousness to create nationalism. Thus, the nature or characteristics of any particular nationalism can be seen as the result of the class interest with which national consciousness is united. Consequently, similar goals, such as the institution of French as the only official language, may create a tactical union between classes, although the reasons for the goal and its place in the overall ideology will probably vary by class interest. Finally, despite common goals, a single variant of nationalism, which, by definition expresses one class interest, can never, over the long term satisfy all class nationalisms. Even in instances where similar goals may exist, elements of the ideology which are present due to class interest will eventually bring into conflict (unless a long term co-optation occurs) the various classes involved.
The common threads of Quebec nationalism since the 1960's have stemmed from a national consciousness based on a concept of Quebec as a nation which has existed since and even before the British Conquest of 1759. It is the marriage of this concept to the class interests of classes emerging in a highly industrialized society which creates the new nationalisms of the middle class and working class and which consolidates and eventually minimizes the nationalism of the bourgeoisie. For each of these classes, the period since 1960 has been instrumental in the construction and/or destruction of nationalist ideology.

On the basis of the theoretical considerations of Chapters 1 and 2, and the data and analysis offered to this point, class has proven to be highly significant as a source for the perspectives which combine with national consciousness to create nationalism. Earlier, I suggested that if this was the case, certain characteristics of relations between classes would also be evident in the relations between nationalists and non-nationalists. The next section will explore these relationships.

3) Nationalist "Homogeneity": Legitimation and Co-Optation

Nationalism in Quebec, I am arguing, is modified by class, and class relations are characteristically conflictual. Hence, any instance of class nationalism espoused by those other than the dominant class (in the case of Quebec, the bourgeoisie and those monopoly capitalists operating in Quebec), whether middle class or working class in orientation, will have goals which conflict with those of the dominant class. Both middle class nationalism and working class nationalism are potentially
disruptive of the status quo. However, the degree to which they are disruptive depends, for the most part, on two factors: first, whether societal change is seen as change in form or content, and; second, whether change can be accommodated or contained by the dominant class.

These factors are interrelated. By form vs content change, I mean change which does not alter the existing exercise of power (form) as opposed to change which modifies existing power relations (content). When speaking of accommodating change, I refer to the dominant class' ability to incorporate change so as to have it affect form only, leaving content unaltered (and, incidentally, allowing them to remain the dominant class). The most effective mechanism for incorporating change is co-optation (see the discussion below). The nature of these factors should become clearer in the discussion which follows.

Not only should these factors be examined for the way they operate between class nationalisms and the dominant class, but they should also be regarded as operant in the relations between class nationalisms (for example, the PQ trying to obtain working class support). Before elaborating with regard to class nationalisms in Quebec, I will outline more carefully the mechanism of co-optation.

1) Legitimation and Co-Optation: A Questionable Homogeneity

One of the features of nationalism which has proven misleading for analysts of all persuasions has been the apparent existence of mass support for nationalist ideology. One of the virtues of the approach
I am outlining is that, in treating national consciousness and class consciousness as separate but co-existing phenomena, it is possible to isolate similar ideological threads running through various types of nationalism. In so doing, apparent homogeneity is exposed as convergent components in varying ideologies. There is not homogeneity - there is similarity amidst differences.

The thread of national consciousness common to all class nationalisms permits the identification of similar goals (as evidenced in the discussion on language conflict). These goals may allow the temporary alignment of divergent nationalist movements. Furthermore, they become tools for manipulation of nationalist sentiment through co-optation and legitimation.

Legitimation (in this discussion) refers to attempts to justify policy and conditions on the basis of appeals to common national consciousness. Co-optation is the incorporation of ideology and leadership of one group by another group in attempts to gain support and/or minimize conflict on the wider basis of both national consciousness and class consciousness. The two mechanisms can be contrasted in the following way: whereas legitimation does not require the modification of one's own ideological stance (assuming one's position to be based, in part, on national consciousness in the first place), co-optation actively alters one's own perspective. Hence, co-optation can only be used insofar as one's own interest is not violated. At this point, one other alternative becomes available: confrontation.
The manner in which legitimation, co-optation and confrontation are used varies from specific circumstance to circumstance. For example, the further apart the class interests involved, the more difficult it will be to create a sustained co-optation: eventually class interest will emerge in spite of common national consciousness.

These considerations are particularly important when viewing monopoly capitalist response to class nationalisms. If, for instance, co-optation of particular nationalist demands can occur without a significant alteration in the exercise of power, nationalism becomes a powerful tool for the co-optive maintenance of a 'peaceful kingdom'. It can be used to sustain power relations over time. This will become clearer in the discussion below.

Having established some of the mechanisms at work in the relations between class nationalisms and the dominant class, these can be employed to scrutinize recent events in Quebec. The following is not intended as an exhaustive treatment. It is included to indicate the important differences which emerge when using the theoretical model I have developed in contrast to other approaches.

4) Co-Optation of Class Nationalism in Quebec

i) Legitimation and Co-Optation Among Class Nationalisms in Quebec

Co-optation has been defined as the integration of ideology and/or leadership of one class nationalism by another. Whereas legitimation among class nationalisms can be interpreted to mean appeals to nation-based
realities such as national or language integrity, co-optation actively modifies one's own position. Among nationalists of different persuasions, both legitimation and co-optation are tactics which can be employed to create a large base of support.

We have already seen that nationalists under the Lesage regime sought to justify their position through claims that modernization was the key to the advancement of the French Canadian nation in toto. In much the same way, the PQ claims to represent Quebec as a whole through the argument of domination of other ethnic groups. These are good examples of legitimation: there is no internal modification of the nationalist ideology as it appeals to the common national consciousness resident in all 'Quebecois'.

When common linguistic goals, such as the defeat of Bill 22, are added to such appeals, the PQ creates a highly seductive electoral platform on the basis of legitimate, shared concerns. Nevertheless, the class interest being served should not be ignored, despite the fact that these claims tend to obscure the class orientation of the nationalist ideology in question.

However, despite common national concerns, the PQ has had to modify its ideological stance by incorporating elements of working class nationalism which go beyond national consciousness. In 1972, in order to maintain and improve working class electoral support, modifications in economic policy were undertaken, and co-optation has occurred.

Marxist claims that working class support for the PQ is evidence of false consciousness do not adequately describe this shift. Because
national concerns are, de facto, shared, it is the class thrust of working class nationalism which the PQ has tried to co-opt. I would argue that effective co-optation is a more realistic appraisal of the situation than false consciousness because co-optation, by definition, cannot adequately incorporate demands stemming from class consciousness. Interestingly, such an analysis augurs more fruitfully for the eventual success of working class goals. Imputing false consciousness implies tactics totally at odds with the situation. Since both national consciousness and class consciousness already exist, raising consciousness is a waste of time. Sustaining consciousness appears a more pragmatic approach. Intuitively I would suggest that contradictions in the class interests operating in the PQ and labour ideologies would eventually reach a conflictual level. This conflict is inherent through the mediating effect class consciousness has on national consciousness. The state capitalism the PQ espouses ineffectively addresses the grievances of labour - Quebec will still be tied into a larger system of exploitive monopoly capitalism. PQ co-optation of working class nationalism is not necessarily a deflection of the development of class consciousness. Rather, it is part and parcel of the evolution of socialist-nationalist ideology. Co-optation can be viewed as merely one of a number of future relationships between the PQ and labour. As long as class consciousness is maintained, co-optation, over the long run, is unlikely to be a long-lasting turn of events.
ii) Co-Optation and Monopoly Capitalism in Quebec

Chapter 2 has demonstrated that Quebec is a society whose class structure is intimately tied into an international system of monopoly capitalism. Because class nationalisms ultimately seek restructured power arrangements, legitimation and co-optation by the state and other institutions can be seen as attempts to deflect or satisfy the class consciousness in nationalist ideology. Recent events bear this out.

In Chapter 3, I argued that the Bourassa government has developed policy under the influence of two guiding assumptions: first, a belief in federalism, and; second, an obsessive desire to maintain and even increase foreign investment in Quebec. The public legitimations used by Bourassa have smacked heavily of national consciousness. For example, the development of the James Bay hydro project has permitted the penetration of vast amounts of foreign capital into Quebec. However, in making public the scheme, Bourassa unashamedly appealed to the national pride of the people of Quebec.

The development of James Bay is a project without precedent in the economic history of Quebec. It is a turning point in our history. James Bay is the key to the economic and social progress of Quebec, the key to the political stability of Quebec, the key to the future of Quebec.

(R. Bourassa, quoted in B. Richardson, 1972: p. 9)

In the same vein was his declaration that Bill 22 had saved French culture (Hamilton Spectator, November 25, 1974). These are clearly attempts to legitimize state activity on the basis of national consciousness which cuts across class lines.
The issue of co-optation, however, seems to rest on the relationship of national classes to the economic status quo - that is, to monopoly capitalists, the bourgeoisie, and the primary regulatory agent of the economy, the state. As these relationships vary, the degree, intent, and aim of co-optation will vary too. Co-optation of middle class nationalism may qualitatively differ from that of working class nationalism.

The existence of a strong middle class in Quebec actually works to the advantage of monopoly capitalism. It provides the necessary expertise for increased development, acts as a buffer to labour demands and provides a market for proliferating goods and services.

Certainly no power readjustment is the best that the system of monopoly capitalism can aspire to. On the other hand, when the middle class agitates for an increased share in the direction of the economy, this does not have to prove disastrous for monopoly capital. On the contrary, state capitalism still requires foreign investment, so that effective control still lies in the hands of monopoly and finance capitalists.

One of the best examples of this is the history surrounding the control over the James Bay Project. When James Bay was first announced, it was assumed by most observers that management of the project would be given to Hydro Quebec, the public corporation created in the early 1960's which had been a focus for nationalist pride since its inception. Bourassa, however, argued that:
It would be unrealistic to think that the human and technical resources of Quebec Hydro could alone suffice to implement the James Bay hydro-electric project.

(R. Bourassa, 1973: p. 104)

In order to co-ordinate the 'tangential' development, such as mines and forests, Bourassa proposed a co-ordinating body, the James Bay Development Corporation (JBDC) responsible for all development in the area. By establishing subsidiaries, such as the James Bay Energy Corporation (JBEC) (responsible for developing hydroelectricity), Bourassa attempted to keep control firmly under the auspices of the JBDC, and thus, the state.

Hydro-Quebec...must hold 51 per cent of the shares in this subsidiary and the corporation 40 per cent...

(B. Richardson, 1972: p. 43)

After the Parti Québécois exerted pressure, the subsidiary was to be headed by a directorate which was to include three members nominated by Hydro Quebec. This, the PQ hoped, would ensure that control of the JBEC would remain with Hydro Quebec. Upon receipt of Hydro Quebec's nominees, Bourassa rejected them all. Hydro's choice for president of the JBEC, Robert Boyd, was replaced by James Nadeau (president of JBDC) by Bourassa, and Charles Boulva, an employee of JBDC, was named by Bourassa to join Nadeau on the board of directors.

This choice indicated that Bourassa did not intend to entrust to Hydro Quebec a leading role in the development of James Bay, and renewed charges that behind the whole project was a desire to let private industry into the area...

(B. Richardson, 1972: p. 44)
Three members of Hydro Quebec were finally accepted as board members by Bourassa. The question as to whether Hydro Quebec was to exert an effective voice on the project came to a head over the choice of management firms.

In May, 1972, more concrete plans regarding choice of development sites were made public, and in August, 1972, Nadeau resigned as president of JBEC to be replaced by Hydro Quebec's choice, Robert Boyd.

The implications of this resignation must be drawn from the scenario surrounding the choice of dam sites. Hydro Quebec had always favoured the "southern complex of the Nottaway, Broadback and Rupert (NBR) rivers on the grounds that it is more economical" (R. Surette; et al., 1973: p. 28). Bourassa, in his May announcement, cited environmental reasons for the choice of a more northerly site: the LaGrande and Eastmain (LG) rivers. (Since the James Bay Project had been announced in 1971 "...the fact was that in the year after his political decision was made, $30,000,000 had to be spent on engineering studies designed to justify his decision...None of them dealt with environmental...effects" (B. Richardson, 1972: p. 47)). Before his resignation, Nadeau "himself...admitted that the real reason was mineral deposits" (R. Surette, et al., 1973: p. 28) The mineral wealth of the area was attractive, and Nadeau had professed a desire to let management be granted to Quebec firms. The facts are sketchy, but with Nadeau's resignation and Boyd's ascension to the JBEC presidency, the JBEC handed management over to Bechtel-Quebec Corporation (the Canadian branch of Bechtel Corporation, a firm of international stature) along with Lalonde, Valois, Lamarre,
Valois and Associates (a Quebec firm of questionable expertise). The complexity of interlocking directorates and past performances surrounding Bechtel makes it clear, that Hydro Quebec, finally granted control, opened the door for massive amounts of foreign capital and control with the choice of Bechtel. There seems to be good justification for the observation that:

In the folkloric atmosphere of Quebec city, it appears that the PQ and others had assumed that Hydro-Quebec's nationalism extended into its boardroom, whereas, in fact, it did not rise above the engineers and technocrats.

Hence, middle class control of a national institution, at least in the case of James Bay, has not resulted in an effective shift in power. Bechtel Corporation's ties with international finance are immense (there are ties with the Hanna, Morgan and Rockefeller groups): it can be assumed that the need for capital was a sufficient lever to the final determination of management control, a good argument against the effectiveness of middle class control of economic destiny. This, labour contends, is the ultimate problem with PQ ideology. Substitution of state capitalism for private capitalism will not alter these larger systems of power.

The Quebec state, already demonstrated as using legitimation, also employs co-optation in order to minimize conflict arising from class nationalist demands. The best example of this is the institution of Bill 22. The furor over Bill 63, and the continued awareness on the part of middle class nationalists that occupational distribution was not improving as quickly as it might has led to a perception on the
part of the Quebec state that political separation as a means to improving these conditions is becoming an increasingly popular alternative. Bill 22 has been introduced as a response to a central nationalist demand - that French be the official language of Quebec.

The contents of the Gendron Commission Report bear mute witness to the fact that there is a clear understanding that economic frustrations underly middle class language demands. Bill 22, by making French minimally the language of priority, attempts to occupationally integrate the middle class and to remove one of the prime justifications for separatism. (The recent policy of "cultural independence" under Bourassa can be interpreted in the same way: it is a tactic designed to 'pull the rug out from under' the PQ.)

In this same vein, it is interesting to note that the Financial Post sponsored a conference in the spring of 1975 for businesses interested in learning how to cope with Bill 22. Over-subscribed, the conference featured ministers from Quebec explaining how Bill 22 would improve corporate images in Quebec. So, it is also possible to identify this same attempt at co-optation as emerging from the world of business as well as the state.

The success of this co-optive attempt will be measured by the success it has in quelling middle class consciousness. If it integrates the middle class into positions of effective power, it may be successful. However, as suggested earlier, this is unlikely. For Bourassa, the last thing in mind is state capitalism. Therefore, assuming continued middle class grievance and sustained class consciousness, middle class nationalist
Ideology cannot be adequately responded to by fulfilling only those demands which centre on national consciousness. A more active integration of demands stemming from class consciousness in the ideology is necessary.

Unlike the middle class, whose furthest dreams of reorganization are not likely to be destructive of monopoly capitalism, working class nationalism receives from class consciousness an increasingly radical, socialist critique of capitalism. Consequently, co-optive attempts such as Bill 22 are even further removed from addressing the economics of class nationalism.

In the case of working class nationalism, the more critical perspective on capitalism is responded to by official sources, not with co-optation, but with confrontation. For example, the recommendations of the Cliche Commission Report provide for a broad system of controls on labour. Because co-optation is less likely to be successful over the long run with proponents of working class nationalism, the class consciousness in the ideology must be responded to directly so as to protect the status quo.

Co-optation and legitimation are 'double-edged' swords. The temporary deflection of class nationalism may appear to minimize conflict, but, over time, unless class consciousness dissipates, cannot adequately respond to the elements of class consciousness in nationalism, whether it be middle class or working class. From an analytic point of view, co-optation is an essential tool to the understanding of apparent nationalist 'homogeneity' and provides a base for a more realistic set of pragmatic political strategies than Marxist conceptions of false consciousness.
5) A Brief Reconsideration of Nationalism in Quebec

This chapter has argued that, in Quebec, nationalism is national consciousness mobilized via the addition of components which stem, primarily, from class and class consciousness. It has explored relationships between the dominant class, the state, class nationalists and among class nationalisms themselves. Early in the chapter, it was suggested that the development of class nationalisms is rooted in particular socio-economic conditions conducive to growing national consciousness and class consciousness.

It would seem that as perceptions of alienation from the centres of power increases, so, too, does class nationalism. Thus, as the Quiet Revolution fails, the middle class becomes more nationalistic, and as systems of foreign and internal domination remain unaltered, working class nationalism increases in intensity. In particular, class consciousness, as it mediates national consciousness, becomes increasingly problematic in the relations among ideological proponents.

Consequently, over the last few years, class issues appear with more frequency in labour history, and the Parti Québécois becomes less and less supportive of labour as their own class interest is threatened (for example, Lévesque's refusal to endorse the general strike of 1972).

This is not to say that national questions disappear. They merely become differentiated by the class thrust of the nationalist ideology.

On the one hand, Marxist approaches to 'nation', because of their political derivation, have consistently found Marx's nation-based
internationalism to be theoretically problematic. On the other hand, the Rioux/Dofny school, with their need to define priority of one form of consciousness over the other, have consistently failed to see the co-incidence of class consciousness and national consciousness. The work presented here suggests that a closer look at the definition of nation may help to resolve the dilemma of the Quebec left, as MacLeod so succinctly calls it.
NOTES

1. I refer to quasi-nationalism under the Lesage regime as a response to the tendency on the part of most analysts to see modernization under Lesage as nationalist ideology. I suggest that it is only with the policies of the Liberals - primarily the manipulation of state power and authority - that commitment to modernization is transformed into a commitment to control. This is the critical distinction between quasi-nationalism and nationalism.

2. Labour support for the Union Nationale can also be interpreted in this manner. Particular 'populist' orientations in the past may have meant tacit, unspoken support due to national consciousness.


4. Having defined the problem of the thesis as the relation of class to nationalism, I cannot define nationalism as influenced solely by class. However, I do think I have effectively demonstrated a very significant role played by class. In addition, I would intuitively suggest class is the major source of components combining with national consciousness to create nationalism. The point, however, is not necessarily to identify what these other components might be. Rather, it is to effectively demonstrate the inadequacy of current approaches.

5. The proletarianization of the bourgeois nation, by definition erases nation in Marxist terms. Politically-derived perspectives again fail to account for the cultural view of the nation.

6. For example, Bourque and Laurin-Frenette (1972) argue, in footnotes to their article, that apparent "radicalization" of labour should not be interpreted as class consciousness. They essentially see unions as co-opted bodies. My own argument suggests precisely the opposite.

7. See S.H. Milner and H. Milner, The Decolonization of Quebec, 1973, or M. Rioux, Quebec in Question, 1971, for excellent descriptions of the degree and breadth of this control.

8. The fact that this tendency was actually created and sustained by the elite does not invalidate it. On the contrary, the degree to which ideological channels were controlled by this elite is the best argument for understanding the popularization of an ideology of national awareness and defence of national existence.
9. The question of co-optation could be brought to bear at this point. There is an important distinction to be made here between co-optation which seeks both the reduction of conflict and broadening of popular support, and convergent goals arrived at for quite different reasons by different class nationalisms.

10. See M. Rioux (1971) Chapter 2 for a discussion of these roots.
CONCLUSIONS

The last fifteen years of Quebec's history are rich sources for social analysts. Rapid changes in all sectors of society have contributed to a dynamic and sometimes volatile social climate. It comes as no surprise, then, to discover the emergence of equally dynamic debates over the nature and sources of change and conflict in Quebec.

My thesis has focussed on a particularly important exchange of viewpoints: the nature of nationalism and, by implication, language conflict. The debate has centred on the relationship of class to nationalism, and has been dominated by two schools of thought: the "ethnic class" position, which I have called the Rioux/Dofny approach, and the Marxist position, represented by N. Laurin-Frenette and G. Bourque. Each of these perspectives derives its analysis of the relationship of class to nationalism from different views on the 'nation'. These definitions of nation, I have argued, are rooted in particular academic traditions: the Rioux/Dofny position employs a modified Weberian concept of the nation, while Marxist analysis, plagued by Marx's lack of a theory on nation, tends to use a definition of the nation which is co-terminous with nation-state (therefore, it becomes for Marxists, a consequence of capitalist development rooted in bourgeois class interest.)

These variant approaches to nation carry implicit assumptions regarding class. The "ethnic class" proponent sees nations and
classes as co-existing, but posits that they are conflictual. Hence, class consciousness and national consciousness exist in an antagonistic relationship: one dominates at the expense of the other. In contrast, Marxists, whose very conception of nation imputes class interest (bourgeois), see national consciousness as class consciousness: national consciousness is not disinterested. When applied to the case of Quebec, this approach denies the existence of consciousness (whether national or class in character) in the working class. Apparent national consciousness in the working class is styled "false consciousness" as the working class is manipulatively brought into the vanguard of middle class nationalism.

I have argued that both these positions inadequately take into account and describe the recent shift in ideological stances among nationalists in Quebec. While the weaknesses in both approaches are, themselves, different, the reasons for these weaknesses appearing in the first place stem from an identical shortcoming in both perspectives. Marxists and "ethnic class" proponents alike are theoretically constrained by assuming a relationship between class and nationalism. This assumption is then carried into the analysis, although the problematic has been definitionally done away with. In other words, by delineating the relationship between class and nationalism before doing the analysis, the relationship between class and nationalism is not really investigated. What is investigated is the selective interpretation of data which will prove the assumption. Class in relation to nationalism is no longer a problem: analytically proving an assumption becomes the issue.
What I have suggested as an alternative is leaving the relationship of class to nationalism an open-ended question. This has been accomplished in two ways. First, the definition of nation which I have used allows a potentially free interplay of factors associated with class: nations and classes are said to co-exist. Second, nationalism has been defined in such a way as to leave any number of potential relations with class open to investigation. Hence, the admissability of evidence is not constrained.

The outcome of this investigation (for details, see Chapters 3 and 4) has been to suggest an entirely new relationship between class and nationalism. Nationalism is now defined (at least for the case of Quebec) as national consciousness mobilized via the inclusion of ideological elements stemming from class to form a new ideology: nationalism. On the basis of data presented, there has been in Quebec in the last fifteen years, the evolution of two class nationalisms: that of the middle class and that of the working class. Each shares with the other particular ideological similarities stemming from common national consciousness, but each also differs from the other on the basis of ideological peculiarities stemming from the class interest in the particular nationalism.

The advantage of this approach lies in the fact that the relationship of class to nationalism remains a problematic throughout the data presentation: the lack of theoretical constraints permits a resolution to the problem based on the evidence. Moreover, the advantages thus obtained in attempting to describe nationalism in
relation to class also carry over into a discussion of the exercise of power in modern society.

Rather than resorting to prefabricated resolutions such as 'false consciousness', this newly-formed definition of nationalism permits a fresh look at relations between classes. National consciousness shared by all members of national society leads to consensus on particular national issues (for example, language). By virtue of this similarity, however, means to minimizing and (possibly) containing conflict also exist - both between class nationalisms and among the state, the dominant class, and class nationalists. This process is best effected through attempts to legitimate and co-opt, and is particularly interesting in that nationalism may become an effective tool for the maintenance, and even extension, of monopoly capitalist relationships. Responding to class nationalist demands (particularly in the case of the middle class) may effectively alter the form, but not the content, of existing relations of power.

Common national consciousness is, however, altered by differing class interest. Whereas legitimation does not necessarily imply the modification of ideology, co-optation requires the active incorporation of someone else's ideology. Therefore, co-optation may occur only to the point where one's own class interest is not violated: the state can actively co-opt only where existing relations of power are not effectively altered. What this means in practical terms is that class interest in nationalist ideology is likely to resurface in cases where co-optation cannot adequately respond to class-based demands in the
ideology. Particularly in the case of working class nationalism, confrontation is then employed to minimize and contain conflict.

Analytically, co-optation is an attractive alternative to false consciousness. Common concerns mobilize nationalists across class (although support for goals may be for varying reasons), so it is more appropriate to see apparent 'consensus' as temporary alignment among class nationalists. In any case, even though class conflict may be temporarily obscured, until class interests in the ideology are satisfied, conflict will re-emerge. By this scheme, resolution of national issues may even accelerate class conflict as class interests come increasingly into opposition.

The approach to class and nationalism I have outlined, then, makes two important departures from perspectives which currently dominate the literature. First, the answer to the problem of the relationship of class to nationalism is provided through an analysis of data, not through the selective interpretation of data which demonstrates a theoretically constraining set of assumptions. Second, it permits an identification of at least three mechanisms of control - legitimation, co-optation and confrontation - which can be descriptively detailed at various levels. The result is a more finely discriminated understanding of nationalism from which tactical plans might be derived.

Dominant perspectives, based on theoretical assumptions, ignore the development of class nationalism for various reasons (see Chapter 4). The result has been Alex MacLeod's (1973) "unresolved dilemma of the Quebec left". In asking for more adequate analysis of
the Quebec situation, MacLeod was responding to academic paralysis which has resulted in a debate which (albeit, interesting) seems to go nowhere but in circles. Both sides have invested time in advancing rhetoric and dogma, and no-one has, yet, divested themself of theoretical patriotism in an attempt to arrive at a better, and more pragmatic, understanding.

While I do not pretend to have found the ultimate solution, by responding to MacLeod’s challenge my thesis has made a first attempt to re-interpret nationalism in Quebec so as to better reflect reality. In so doing, I would hope others would be sufficiently persuaded that further attempts should be undertaken. But I would caution that others be prepared to respond to history being made and would, therefore, as much as possible, be also prepared to modify their theoretical allegiances. The ability to fit theory to reality is the essence of a much-needed and long called-for sociological imagination.
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