THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY

IN

NORTHERN IRELAND

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND: A BACKGROUND TO CATHOLIC - PROTESTANT DIVISIONS

By

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We had fed the heart on fantasies,
The heart's grown brutal from the fare;
More substance in our enmities
Than in our love . . .

W. B. Yeats - "The Stare's Nest by My Window"

. . . it is not the truth which matters in Northern Ireland, but what people believe to be the truth.

Brian Faulkner - in Irish Times, 5 January 1972

Abstract

This thesis attempts to apply an interpretive analysis to the background to the escalation of social conflict in Northern Ireland during the 1960's. The problem is analysized from a perspective that emphasizes the socially and historically constructed nature of 'reality'. The 'social construction of reality' perspective used stresses that in order to understand how people come to act as they do, it is necessary to grasp the frame of reference of the actors. An explanation is then built up using the actor's definitions of the situation. This thesis argues that people in Northern Ireland acted toward intersubjectively constructed definitions of reality and that these are key factors in the explanation of social conflict in Northern Ireland. Although it is argued in this thesis that social conflict in Northern Ireland is not simply religious warfare, it is held that the categories of Protestant and Catholic are still the relevant terms by which to analyze the problem. The significance of the terms Catholic and Protestant with respect to the present social conflict in Northern Ireland is, in large part, derived from their historical relationship. This phenomenon is investigated as the origins of the politico-ideological groups presently engaged in conflict in Northern Ireland are traced to Ireland's colonial past. I attempt to show how various cognitive constructs, values, beliefs and structures from the past were sedimented through the historical process of reality construction and how they persisted as subjectively relevant up until present time.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis attempts to test the usefullness of an interpretive sociological perspective for the analysis of political life. Towards this end a sociological perspective derived from the major perspectives of Symbolic Interactionism and Phenomenology will be applied to the situation of social conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. In 1972 after fifty years of self government the parliament of Northern Ireland was suspended and direct rule from Westminster was introduced. The existence of a separate state of Northern Ireland was once again in question. Since its genesis in 1920 the government of the regime in Northern Ireland has ruled a divided community. The majority of the Roman Catholics in the state had never accepted the regime's legitimacy. By 1972 the state was no longer a viable political entity. The social conflict of the previous decades escalated into open violence and warfare. What had begun in the 1960's as a simple request for civil rights led to developments that threatened the existing political and social structure of Northern Ireland. The state itself appeared threatened with anihilation, either through some form of unification with the Republic of Ireland or complete political integration with Great Britain. The period to be analysed will be the years leading up to political arousal and I will not therefore be concerned with events since 1970.

A central theme of this thesis is the relationship between what will be termed subjective and objective reality. Major schools of sociological thought - Subjectivism and Positivism have traditionally emphasized either one side of this relationship or the other. Both these positions in their epistemological concerns have treated the problem of the relationship between what we hold to be knowledge and the object about which we have knowledge - "reality". The cognitive relationship between subject and object has emerged as problematic in the history of Western thought since the Greeks.[1] These apparently contradictory positions occur again and again in the development of philosophy and their influence is decisive in the emergence of different sociological approaches.

The tradition of metaphysical dualism, with its radical dichotomization of subject and object, has also tended to shape sociologists' conception of the nature of their problem, or object of inquiry. Hence, this determines what is conceived of as an appropriate paradigm. Compromise on inherently opposed interpretations of the nature of reality, and by implication on theories about the nature of man and society, poses great problems. So sociologists have tended to choose and have justified their emphasis on one or other dimension of reality by linking their approach with one of 'the founding fathers' of sociology.

In this thesis I will use a perspective that is neither exclusively positivistic nor subjective but one that does

justice to the seemingly paradoxical nature of social reality. By paradoxical I mean what Berger and Luckmann suggest about the nature of society when they say that "It is precisely the dual character of society in terms of objective facticity and subjective meaning that makes it reality sui generis".[2]

In analysising conflict in Northern Ireland I will employ a dialectical approach to society within which I link objective and subjective reality. The basic postulate of this sociological perspective is that both social reality and knowledge are intersubjectively constructed. The main perspective used in this thesis is an interpretative one that claims that it is necessary to grasp the frame of reference of the actor in order to understand how people come to act as they do.[3] An explanation can be then built up using the actor's definitions of the situation. The phenomenological sociological method of constructing accounts and analysing actions by using the typification schemes of the social actors is an appropriate method for an interpretive sociology.

However, this thesis also attempts to go beyond a pure subjective analysis. First, I put the present situation in a historical context and point to unintended consequences of past generations' actions. Second, I relate subjective and objective reality. Zeitlin has argued that a concern with objective reality is not inconsistent with an interpretative framework,

> Under no circumstances, Weber emphasized, should the concept of "intersubjectivity"

> be taken to mean that the relationships among men have no objective consequences for them. For these relationships do, of course, affect the quality of their being, their life chances, even whether they shall live or die. The intersubjective world assumes, in certain historical circumstances, an "objective" quality so that men act and follow patterns "as if" the patterns were iron inexorable laws. To understand this phenomenon one must study history, economics, social stratification, relations of power and domination, etc .... [4]

The term objective social reality as used in this thesis refers to the social world as viewed from the sociological frame of reference of an observer. This must be distinguisehed from the social world as viewed and experienced by the actor.[5] Furthermore, the 'social construction of reality' perspective employed in this thesis sees objective social reality as the outcome or product of intersubjective and collective action, and this reality need not correspond with the subjective intentions of the actors that created it.

In this thesis I will argue that the people of Northern Ireland have acted towards subjective and intersubjective definitions of the situation, and that this was a more important determinant of action than objective reality. The unfortunate thing about Northern Ireland was that so often large numbers of people came to share the same socially constructed mis-interpretations of reality. Grasping the frame of reference or orientation of the social actors shows that their actions are neither unintelligible, irrational or insane. Rather I will show how they were appropriate to the situation as it was seen by the people involved, but that these perceptions did not always correspond to objective reality.

I will be primarily concerned with one aspect of reality related to Catholic and Protestant divisions - politic-ideological reality. This is a key theme in most chapters. In chapter two I will trace the origins of the two politic-ideological groups presently engaged in conflict to Ireland's colonial past. I will show how various cognitive constructs, values and beliefs from the past were sedimented through the historical process of reality construction, and how they persisted as subjectively relevant up until the present time. We will also see how various groups' subjective misinterpretation of history legitimates various political activities. The period under consideration in chapter two also includes the development within Ireland of two major antagonistic ideologies shared by the two opposing groups of Catholics and Protestants. The state of Northern Ireland may be seen as the expression of these two groups' inability to realize their ideological demands within a common 'world'; so Ireland was divided. The patterns of Catholic-Protestant relationships established in colonial days were sedimented to provide 'rigid' almost unrevisable structures in the politico-ideological life of succeeding generations.

In chapter three I investigate the economic and objective realities behind two related divisions in Ireland - the division of Ireland into two states, North and South, and the social divisions between Catholics and Protestants. I conclude that while there is some economic rational for the former separation there is little for the latter. I point to the non-class bases of political movements and of Catholic and Protestant conflict

in Ireland.

Chapter four relates objective and subjective reality. The phenomenologically derived sociological perspective used posits a dialectical relationship between man and society. This dialectic is never actually broken, but it may be lost to consciousness in the sense that man does not recognize that the social world is a human product and is sustained by men. This non-dialectical mode of cognizing introduces a false rigidity into the social world. Social reality assumes the character of law-like objectivity. At the level of history the distortion of the real relationship between man and history may result in a situation like that in Northern Ireland, where history appears to dominate man and the sectarian pattern of Catholic-Protestant relationships seems destined to endless repetion. I will also show in this chapter that certain objective and conceptual structures in Northern Ireland appeared fossilized and highly resistant to change in the 1960s. This overly rigid feature of social life in Northern Ireland explains the potentially 'revolutionary' nature of social change - a potential not realized.

Finally, chapter five treats group-specific socialization patterns and their role in perpetuating Catholic-Protestant divisions in Northern Ireland. I will analyse the significance of group boundaries and their relationship to identity and sacred cosmologies.

Integrative themes throughout the thesis are the non-class basis of conflict, and the argument that the ideological

basis of the state of Northern Ireland was a continual source of conflict. A third major theme is the relationship between man and history.

I will now discuss some aspects of the objective reality surrounding the problem in Northern Ireland. It will immediately become obvious that even at the level of the existence of political boundaries and legitimacy of states there is not subjective agreement on definitions of reality.

Geographical and Legal Realities

Ireland and Britain are geographical terms referring to the two major islands that made up the United Kingdom from 1800 to 1920. Ireland, as the term is used here, refers to a physical entity, without prejudice to political boundaries or question of national identity. The partitioning of Ireland by the British 'Government of Ireland Act', and the subsequent recognition of partition in the Anglo-Irish treaty[6] of 1921, resulted in the creation of two states in Ireland. Northern Ireland, which was composed of the six North-Eastern counties of Ireland, remained part of the United Kingdom. A parliament and administration of its own was set-up.[7] The remaining twenty-six counties of Ireland was given[8] Dominion status as the Irish Free State. Its parliament changed its status to that of a Republic in 1948.

The Republic of Ireland is often referred to by such terms as, the South, Eire[9] or Ireland. Northern Ireland is commonly called the North, Ulster, or the Six Counties.

Ambiguities with Respect to Political Realities

There are conflicting definitions of reality on the political status of Northern Ireland. In international law, the North and Great Britain are considered as one entity. Although for most purposes the South's government recognized the North[10] as part of the United Kingdom, it did not do so on a 'de jure' basis. In international law the ultimate authority in Northern Ireland is the Westminister parliament. In Irish constitutional law it rests with the Dublin Dail (Parliament). Article two of the 1937 constitution reads as follows, "The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas..." Article three of the same constitution leaves one in no doubt.

> Pending the reintegration of the national territory, and without prejudice to the right of the Parliament and Government established by the constitution to excercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory ... [11]

The ambiguity over the political status of Northern Ireland can be explained by pointing out that to many it is an illegitimate state.

> In 1920, despite the opposition of all Irish representatives (including those who wanted union with Britain and always supported the London Government), the British Parliament arbitrarily passed a law which was euphemistically described as a bill for the better Government of Ireland. This act imposed partition on Ireland ... That was the start of a political propaganda battle of nomenclature. Opponents of partition have consistently refused, ever since 1921, ... to accept the official name of the northern state ... [12]

The Problem of Legitimacy

The South's[13] interference in the affairs of the

North has hardly exceeded beyond the level of rhetoric;[14] however, this alone presented problems for the government of the North which was having difficulty legitimating its right to rule there. The power to rule in the North came to rest in the institutions of the state. However, I shall show in this thesis that it is doubtful as to whether there was a legitimate authority in the Weberian sense here. I shall show that, given the political allegiences of its population, the state was inherently unstable.

Questions of the legitimacy of political actions are often settled by appealing to the wishes of the majority. There is no such simple solution to the political conflict that divides Northern Ireland. If one considers Northern Ireland's population, then Protestants are in the majority. If one considers the population of Ireland as the relevant and authentic reality involved, then Catholics are in the majority.[15]

Politico-Geographical Entities as the Basis for Legitimacy

Historically and Ideologically Republicans and Nationalists are committed to a notion of Ireland as the symbolic universe[16] legitimating their political sovereignty.[17] I shall show that this is an ambiguous political reality.

Northern Politicans have used the geographic concept of the province of Ulster[18] on which to ground their right to rule. Again, this is an ambiguous reality.

> From 1921 a distinction has to be made between the historic province of Ulster, comprising nine counties, and the six north-eastern counties that were combined to form the political unit of Northern Ireland.
>
> (Moody: 1974:25)

Much to the irritation of many Irish people, Northern and British politicians refer to Northern Ireland as Ulster Some authorities see in the increasing use of the term Ulster, a type of emerging distinctively Northern Irish nationalism[19]

Demographic Realities

In 1971 the population of Ireland was calculated to be 4,499,000. The population of the NOrth was 1,528,000 inhabitants. The population of the South was 2,971,000, almost twice that of the North.[20]

Religious divisions are reflected in the partition of Ireland. Ninty-six percent of the population of the Republic is Catholic. Sixty-five percent of the North is Protestant[21], the remaining thirty-five percent being Catholic. Therefore, the population of the island is almost seventy-five percent Catholic. The following table depicts the religious composition if the population of Northern Ireland.

Northern Ireland: Percent of population by religious profession

1961

Religion	Population	Percent
Roman Catholic	497,547	39.4
Presbyterian	413,113	29.0
Church of Ireland	344,800	24.2
Methodist	71,865	5.0

There are also regional and local patterns in population distribution by religion in Northern Ireland. Many of these

trace directly back to the Seventeenth century plantation of Ireland by English and Scottish colonisers.[23] Colonization was most extensive and successful in the counties of Down and Antrim, and these areas today still display strong Protestant majorities in their population. This colonial heritage partly explains why Protestant farmers are over represented in the richer farming areas in the East of Northern Ireland. Catholic farmers are found more frequently in the counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh, where the land is poorer.

Towns and villages also display a pattern of religious compsotition that is not representative of the population as a whole. They are often either predominantly Catholic or predominantly Protestant.[24]

Recognition of a Problem

Late in the nineteen sixties the Northern Ireland political situation became defined as a problem.[25] Once so defined, its explanation required a label. These labels vary from claiming that it is a religious war, a colonial problem, a case of racial conflict or simply an example of mass insanity. Fifteen years ago there was no problem, the North was a non issue. Yet, as I shall show in this thesis, the 'problem' in Northern Ireland has existed, objectively speaking, for decades. Mueller explains this relationship between language and reality:

> Man can be conscious of something if he knows a name for it and if he can place it within his linguistic and conceptual framework ... only when thoughts and concepts are expressed through language do they exist. (1973:15)

The definition of Northern Ireland as a problem is very recent. Blumer (1971) describes social problems as the outcome of a process of collective definition.

> ... a social problem exists primarily in terms of how it is defined and conceived in a society instead of being an objective condition with a definitive objective make-up. The societal definition, and not the objective of a given societal condition, determines whether the condition exists as a social problem. The societal definition gives the social problem its nature, lays out how it is to be approached, and shapes what is to be done about it. (Blumer: 1971: 61)

Just as what is seen as a social problem is not necessarily the result of an intrinsic malfunctioning of a society, neither are all social evils seen as social problems. Northern Ireland's government repeatedly claimed until recently that there was no 'problem' with respect to the political status and treatment of Catholics in that state. Yet 'objectively' there was.[26]

If the problem in Northern Ireland is to be studies, then the emergence or career of the problem must be identified an analysed. That is, the emphasis must be on looking at the process through which the problem was created and recognised.

Conflict is Denied

Historically, social conflict in Northern Ireland was largely ignored or denied. On the occasions when it became impossible to ignore it, 'outsiders' or external causes were often invoked by Northern politicians.

> Stormont spread and encouraged the belief that the campaign was being carried out solely by the IRA of the twenty-six counties from places south of the border. ... IRA operations in other parts of the six-counties were played down. (Edmonds: 1971: 212).

So conflict in Northern Ireland was often described as an invasion from the south. Edmonds maintains this was often done deliberately.[27]

The denial of conflict can be seen to function as a political strategy in Northern Ireland. In spite of the fact that the Catholic population questioned or denied the legitimacy of the state's existence, [28] the Home Secretary confidently stated that "Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom ... it exists because of its desire to be part of the United Kingdom".[29] So, the government had a vested interest in portraying Northern Ireland as a stable society to the rest of the world.[30] Hall and Hewitt suggest that

> Conflict and differential interests are denied because they are held to separate people from one another, to distrub social tranquility, to lend plausibility to the spectre of manipulation, exploitation and evil intent, and in fact to threaten the social order itself.
> (Hall and Hewitt: 1970: 20)

Where conflict cannot be denied, Northern politicans explained the problem in terms that did not question the basis of the social order, or the legitimacy of the state.[31]

A Problem is Recognised

In 1969, after a year of civil rights marches, Northern Ireland became the scene of widespread civil disorder and violence. During the first year of the civil rights movement there had been no fatalities. In 1972, over three hundred people were killed. It became widely accepted that there was a major problem in the North, although there was little consensus with respect to definitions of the nature and cause

of the problem.[32]

Media accounts tended to describe the violence and conflict in Northern Ireland in terms of Catholics and Protestants. There are two problems with their accounts. First, certain elements of the situation escape the media's concept of violence. Among these are the activities which are labeled 'enforcement of law and order'. The pursuit of peace ...

> ... naturally led them (the police), when the emergency arose, to have recourse to such methods as baton charges CS gas and gunfire ...
> The use of Browning machine guns (by the police)... was a menace to the innocent as well as the guilty, being heavy and indiscriminate in its fire:[33]

On August ninth, 1971, the Northern Irish government ordered 342 suspected terrorists 'lifted' at dawn, and interned without trials.[34] I shall argue in this thesis that to explain social conflict in Northern Ireland by simply referring to the various terrorist groups will result in a distorted picture of the situation. I shall show that the institutions of the state were also sources of conflict and violence.[35]

The second difficulty with labeling the problem as one of Catholic-Protestant conflict is that it gives the impression that it is a case of religious strife. This is not the case. Social conflict in Northern Ireland is not simply religious warfare.[36] However, I am committed to the view that 'Catholic' and 'Protestant' are the relevent terms by which to analyse social conflict in the North. These categories need clarification and explanation.

Catholics and Protestants: The Terms Defined

The terms Protestant and Catholic in Northern Ireland

do not simply refer to Church membership. They refer to the two major groups or communities that constitute the population. Magee (1974) states,

> The words Protestant and Catholic are used (as) ... they are used in Northern Ireland to represent the majority and minority communities. It is difficult to find more accurate labels to identify the two communities locked in conflict there.[37]

The terms also identify the "ins" and "outs" of the political system.[38] However, religious group boundaries cross-cut economic class divisions.[39] That is, one finds social conflict carried on between working class Protestants and working class Catholics.

I have suggested that Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland form two major groups. That is, that they are real social entities, characterized by common objective realities or conditions,[40] as well as possessing consciousness of kind. This means that each person shares a strong 'we feeling' with members of his group.

The literature on Northern Ireland supports this. A survey conducted by Rose (1971) reveals strong group awareness.

> Northern Ireland people talk of the Protestant community or the Catholic community. Even a village of less than a thousand people will be divided into two communities, that is social groups whose religion gives them a strong sense of belonging together and being set apart from those who differ in their religion. (Rose: 1971:184).

Shared religion and political attitudes and values in common unite members of each of the groups in Northern Ireland. However, inter-group conflict also tends to strengthen group solidarity (Coser 1956) and group consciousness (Dahrendorf 1959)

Social conflict has increased group integration in Northern Ireland.[41] Some authors have suggested that there developed among the Protestant population something akin to 'a seige mentality in response to their perception of themselves as being under a continual threat from the Catholics.[42]

The significance of the terms Catholic and Protestant with respect to the present social conflict in Northern Ireland is, in large part, derived from their historical relationship.

> I am convinced that the distinct communities indicated by the terms Catholic and Protestant are the prime realities of the situation. This is not the same as saying that religion is the main factor. Religious affiliation in Ireland is the rule of thumb by which one can distinguish between native gaelic stock and those who came from Scotland and England. (O'Brien: 1974: 16).

Historically this division corresponds to the relationship between oppresser and oppressed, exploiter and exploited.[43] The origins of the cleavage date back to the seventeenth century colonization (Plantation) of Ireland by England.[44]

> From the beginning of the colony, religious categories were absolutely basic and inescapable, and this continues to be true. Religion in Ulster was, and is, important for its own sake ... But religious denomination was the hallmark of, differing cultures and communities. Catholics belonged to the community that was of Gaelic stock, that had suffered defeat and (unjustly they believe) dispossession, that had been forced into a mould of political impotence and of social and economic inferiority, that looked for deliverance to the overthrow of English power in Ireland ...
>
> Conversely, Protestants ... belonged to the community that was colonial in origin, was economically and politically dominant, and that saw itself as the loyal British population, defending its superior culture against rebellious, priest-ridden, and barbarous natives ... attempts to ... destroy its British inheritance of civil and religious liberties (Moody: 1974:9)

While I accept Moody's statement quoted above that religious categories are critically important, this does not explain how, after three hundred years after colonization and fifty years of an independent parliament in Northern Ireland, religious categories still structure the political world.

A Phenomenological - Symbolic Interactionist Approach to the Problem[45]

Many accounts[46] of social conflict in Northern Ireland recognizes the historical dimension of the problem. That is, they include a brief account of Northern Ireland's past, and then proceed to tackle the problem in the present. I should like to suggest that these approaches, despite superficial appearances, are ahistorical. They do not offer an account of the process through which the past influences the present in Northern Ireland.

As an alternative approach to social conflict in Northern Ireland, I shall analyse the problem from a perspective that emphasises the socially and historically constructed nature of reality.[47] I am, therefore, not interested in history for its own sake, but to the extent that it is a living element in the present. That is, I am interested in describing and analysising the role of history in shaping ideas and structures that are related to divisions and social conflict in Northern Ireland. My problem could be defined in symbolic interactionist terms as an analysis of the career of sectariansim in Northern Ireland.[48]

Briefly, I shall treat the problem as a case of a non-dialectically socially constructued reality.[49] That is, I will argue that the social relations, and corresponding typifications of social actors, that characterized the early experiences of settlers and native relationships were internalized by succeeding generations as objectively real. However, as the objective features of Catholic and Protestant relationships changed, consciousness or definitions of reality did not.[50] I am, of course, referring to politico-ideological reality.[51] The problem could be described as one of cultural lag, but this is a label, not an explanation. Both the process of how this happened and the subjective significance of social heritage in Northern Ireland must be considered.

Non dialectical modes of cognising, where historically derived social typifications and stereotypes are internalized in an unrevised and unquestioned fashion, produce mythical thinking.[52] Typifications are not checked with or related to present reality. The problem, as I see it, in Northern Ireland, was among other things; one of labeling.[53]

In analysing reality as socially constructued we can see that part of the problem in Northern Ireland derives from altnerative definitions of reality. I will show that a major source of conflict stems from the discrepancy between legal boundaries and socially perceived ones, between constitutional definitions of entities and the existence of real community divisions. Objective and legal definitions of the situation do not always correspond with the social actors' and his

group's intersubjectively meaningful ones. Many deny the legitimacy or existence of institutional boundaries that claim to divide men from those with whom they feel a natural sense of unity.[54] Thus many Catholics in Northern Ireland still feel a sense of unity with the rest of Ireland. On the other hand, Protestants in Northern Ireland, would resist any attempt to merge them with the Catholics in the South.[55] There are both structural and conceptual barriers to political integration, or even political stability in Northern Ireland.

I shall show that the problem stemming from structural political realities in Northern Ireland can be explained by analysing the process through which the state was founded on sectarian divisions. I will argue that the state of Northern Ireland depended on Catholic-Protestant estrangement for its political stability. The conceptual barriers to overcoming Catholic-Protestant estrangement derive from the continued existence of two separate groups in Northern Ireland, which give rise to alternative sub-universes of meaning. I will show how the two groups perpetuated inherently antagonistic politico-ideological realities, or symbolic universes.

> Like all social edifices of meaning the subuniverse must be 'carried' by a particular collectivity, that is the group that on-goingly produces the meanings in question and within which these meanings have objective reality.[52]

The existence of a major political-ideological cleavage greately increases the problem of establishing a stable symbolic canopy for the entire society. It also fails to provice consensus on a universe of meaning within which

discussion could take place. Existing sociological research on Northern Ireland supports this. Rose found that there was a "predisposition of Ulster Protestants and Catholics to live together as long as politics is not involved."[53] He emphasized the role of national identity and group loyalty in explaining social conflict and added that "... the things that correlate with basic political outlook in Northern Ireland are few. Moreover, the most important thing - religion - is about a matter that is ultimately not of this world."[54] Hickie and Elliot concluded that,

> ... the clearest thing that comes out of any study of Northern Ireland is that there is only one real conflict and because this is a conflict about values, it results in a polarization rather than an active conflict which could be beneficial to the society.[55]

FOOTNOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. Natanson, M. (ed.) Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader, (1963) Intro., pp. 1-26.

2. Berger, P.L., and Luckmann, T., The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, (1967) p. 8.

3. Weber, M., The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (1964) pp. 87-123.

4. Zeitlin, I., quoted in McNall, S.G. and Johnson, C.M., "The New Conservatives: Ethnomethodologists, Phenomenologists, and Symbolic Interactionists", Insurgent Sociologist, V (No. 4, Summer 1975) pp. 52-53.

5. Schutz, A., "The Social World and the Theory of Social Action", Collected Papers II. (1970) p. 3-19.

6. This treaty marked the end of the War of Independence (1919 - 1921).

7. This parliament had limited powers. See chapter 3, pp. 35-36.

8. The I.R.A. did not recognize Britain's right to create a Free State, and did not recognize the treaty. In their eyes the Second Dail (Parliament) of 1918, which had never been dissolved, was the only legitimate authority in Ireland. Thus the I.R.A. came to regard both the Dublin and Belfast parliaments as illegitimate.

9. Though Eire is the Gaelic for 'Ireland', it came to be used by both Northern and British politicians to refer to the Twenty Six Counties.

10. It was not until 1974 that the denial of the North implicit in the 1937 Constitution was effectively retracted by the then Prime Minister's official recognition of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom.

11. Cited in de Paor, L., Divided Ulster, (1971), p. 111.

12. Edmonds, S., The Gun the Law and the Irish People, (1971) p. 22.

13. By this I mean the government in the South. The I.R.A., however, on occasion did interfere.

14. de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 110.

15. The terms 'Catholic' and 'Protestant' refer to political categories. See p. 14.

16. See chapter 2.

17. The political rhetoric of Nationalists and Republicans reveals the extent to which 'Ireland' and 'a nation's right to self-direction' justified their actions. See, for example, de Paor, L., op. cit., pp. 84-85.

18. Moody, T. W., The Ulster Question: 1603-1973, (1974) p. 25.

19. Magee, J., Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict, (1974) p. 12.

20. Fitzgerald, C., Towards a New Ireland, (1972) p. 64.

21. The term 'Protestant' is a gloss. Colloquially, the term includes Presbyterians, Methodists and members of the Church of Ireland.

22. Taken from de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 143.

23. Mueller, C., The Politics of Communication, (1973) p. 15.

24. Blumer, H., "Social Problems as Collective Behaviour" in (eds) Lindesmith A.R., Strauss A. and N. Denzin. Readings in Social Psychology (2nd edition) (1975) p. 61.

25. See chapter 4.

26. Edmonds, S., op. cit., p. 212.

27. Ibid.

28. This is widely supported in the literature. For a detailed discussion see Rose, R., Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective, (1971) chapter 4. An indication of this tendency can be gleaned from election results in which, of average, no more than 5% of Catholics supported the Unionist Party. Unionism had become synonymous with the regime.

29. From a speech by the Home Secretary to the House of Commons, October 25th, 1967. Quoted in Magee, J., op. cit., p. 61.

30. Questions of security in Northern Ireland were matters in which the Westminister parliament could interfere. Furthermore, as I will show in chapter III, Northern Ireland was seeking foreign investment in the 1960s. Capital would not be attracted to politically unstable areas.

31. Hall, P. and Hewitt, J., "The Quasi-Theory of communication and the Management of dissent", Social Problems, XVIII (Summer, 1970) p. 20.

32. Republicans believe that the British presence in Ireland and Partition lie at the root of the problem. Many Northern Ireland Unionist politicans believe that Republicans caused the problem. The accusations mount endlessly.

33. From the Report of the Scarman Tribunal, 1972. Quoted in Magee, J., op. cit., pp. 74-75.

34. Magee, J., op. cit., p. 142.

35. See chapter IV.

36. Magee, J., op. cit., pp. 1-2.

37. Ibid., p. 1.

38. See chapters III and IV.

39. Objectively, both groups have different origins, different religions, a limited tendency towards economic differences, and one group is systemtically deprived of political power.

40. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 184.

41. See chapter IV, p. 11.

42. See, for example, O'Brien, CC., States of Ireland, (1972) p. 39.

43. Ibid., p. 12.

44. See chapter II.

45. Ibid.

46. Moody, T.W., op. cit., p. 9.

47. See chapter I.

48. By sectariansim I mean a very strong commitment to one's group, as defined by religious persuasion. As we shall see, this involved a strong element of opposition to the other group.

49. By this I mean characterized by none-dialectical consciousness.

50. See chapter IV.

51. See chapter I, p. 14 and chapter IV, pp. 33-42.

52. Berger P.L. and Luckmann, T., op. cit., p. 85.

53. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 215.

54. Ibid., p. 326.

55. Elliot, R. and Hickie, J., Ulster: A case study in Conflict Theory, (1971), p. 81.

CHAPTER 1

THE PERSPECTIVE

The perspective used in this thesis holds that knowledge and social reality is constructed. This is not an entirely new position. From Vico[1] we learnt that man constructs his world historically. Kant emphasized the activity of the mind in knowing. Like modern-day phenomenologists, he claimed that it is not the world 'out there' that we know, but that we experience phenomena. Kant held experience to be mediated by the apriori categories of the mind.[2] Modern phenomenologists do not posit the existence of inherent structures of the mind, but speak in terms of conceptual categories or typification schemes of consciousness. To a greater or lesser degree they return the individual's responsibility in determining knowledge to society. Society is seen as providing the conceptual categories (through language or symbolic systems) through which experience is mediated, interpreted, and organized. Alternatively, or concurrently, society may ascribe the individual a certain social position with its attendant perspective.[3]

Symbolic Interactionists and Phenomenologists vary in the degree of independence from society they ascribe to the individual. While it may be agreed that knowledge is dependent on a perspective, there is disagreement over the extent to which the individual is the ultimate source of this perspective.

In this thesis I will explore the usefulness of an approach

based on symbolic interaction and phenomenology, in understanding a macro-sociological political process. It is my belief that a purely structural analysis of social conflict in Northern Ireland cannot deal adequately with the subjective meaningfulness of the situation, while an over-emphathetic perspective fails to realize the coerciveness of "social facts". In an ahistroical application, neither approach can treat society as both objectively real and subjectively created.

The level of analysis and the time period to be considered can be important factors in the shaping of perspectives. That is, in their micro-sociological application, one side of society's dialectical character tends to be stressed by symbolic interactionists. As Hall points out, "The image of man, as represented by Blumer, Goffman and Stone is that of creator of his own world. At a macro-sociological level, society can still be conceived of as socially constructed. However, this does not imply that man is free to create it in any manner; rather, man may be seen as reconstructing society in an almost predetermined manner.[5] Society makes man.

The use of a dialectical and historical approach to society[6] overcomes the limitation of an over-subjectivist or over-objectivist bias. Historically, men collectively produce society. Biographically, man is largely produced by society.

Although the dialectical relationship between consciousness and reality (society) is perhaps most truly realized at the level of history, this relationship should be seen as existing at every moment in the sense that society is always a process.

The Perspective: Basic Concepts

A symbolic interactionist-phenomenological based sociology views reality as socially constructed. Blumer, for example, states that "Human beings act towards things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them".[7] Meaning, as he sees it, "derives from or arises out of, the social interaction one has with one's fellows".[8] He also holds that "The 'worlds' that exist for human beings ... are composed of 'objects' and ... these objects are the products of symbolic interaction."[9] Society itself is seen as a process of symbolic interaction.

Berger conceives of the socially constructed reality in dialectical terms. He explains that,

> Society is a dialectical phenomenon in that it is a human product, ... that yet continuously acts back upon its producer. Society is a product of man. It has no other being except that which is bestowed upon it by human activity and consciousness. There can be no social reality apart from man. Yet it may also be stated that man is a product of society ... Society was there before the individual was born and it will be there after he has died. What is more, it is within society as a result of social processes, that the individual becomes a person, that he attains and holds onto an identity ... Man cannot exist apart from society. The two statements, that society is the product of man and that man is the product of society, are not contradictory. They rather reflect the inherently dialectic character of the societal phenomenon.[10]

As in symbolic interactionism, there is an emphasis placed on the notion of emergence, and on the processual view of social life.

Berger and Luckmann identify the three moments that characterize the essential dialect of the construction of social reality as externalization, objectivation, and internalization. Externalization is seen as an anthropological necessity, while internalization is seen as the process of becoming social.

> Externalization is the ongoing outpouring of human being into the world, both in the physical and mental activity of men. Objectivation is the attainment by the products of this activity ... of a reality that confronts its original producer as a facticity external to and other than themselves. Internalization is the reappropriation by men of this same reality, transforming it once again from structures of the objective world into structures of the subjective consciousness. It is through externalization that society is a human product.[11]

Because the collective objectivated products of men's externalization confront later generations as objective and opague reality, they may have a coercive or constraining influence. The dialectical process results in man constructing a 'taken for granted reality'. A great deal of human action is routine, "once meaning is agreed upon, conduct can flow along lines of custom, tradition, and ritual.[12]

The processes involved in society's construction are typification and institutionalization. Schutz identifies typifications as cognitive constructs, organized by criteria of relevence, or interests.[13] A social actor's biography

may determine what elements of the situation are (perceived as) relevant to him. Societally taken for granted reality is made up of ready made constructs which allow men in everyday life an adequate understanding of others in order to interact. When typifications of actors and actions are reciprocally shared, institutionalization is said to have taken place. Social structure can be conceived of as the sum total of these institutionalized typifications, and the recurrent patterns of interaction established by means of them.[14]

Thus in Northern Ireland the beliefs and relationships of previous generations may be understood to have been institutionalized and sedimented in a non-dialectical fashion so that they became objectively real, 'coercive' and unrevisable elements in the world of succeeding generations. That is, the actions of past generations appear to have destroyed the ability of those living in the present to create their own political worlds.

The Social Construction of Reality: A Process Characterized by Consensus and Conflict

Symbolic interaction and phenomenologically informed sociological perspectives are usually associated with a view of society that emphasizes consensus.[15] However, the perspective need not be taken to necessarily imply happy agreement in the social construction of reality. Rather than being based on cooperation, unequal power may decide whose

definition of reality becomes imposed (institutionalized) as the "real" or dominant one.[16] Reciprocal typifications which characterize institutions imply knowledge of social expectations, but it cannot be assumed that these are accepted as legitimate by all of a population.[17] Institutions may rest partly on outer conformity. In analysising such a situation one needs to know the physical and social means of exerting power.

Rather than stressing the collective and consensual nature of socially constructed worlds, society may be seen as a "negotiated order". Strauss describes this order as follows

> (In the negotiated order) ... relations ... are... a blur of conflict, cooperation, and compromise initiated and guided by cross-cliques. The resulting negotiative context understandably is something rather complex ... the work arrangements and personal relations which evolve within this negotiative context constitutes a considerable proportion of what reasonably be called the social order.[18]

The symbolic interactionist approach therefore, should properly concern itself with power relations. The state of Northern Ireland itself may be understood to have been the outcome of a long process of negotiation, and the institutionalized reality carried the 'marks' of past and present Catholic-Protestant conflict and power-struggle.

Institutionalized Inequality

The concept of institutionalized inequality may be useful in discussing the allegations and evidence of discrimination against the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. Rather

than arising out of a personal conspiracy against any one side, discrimination may be seen as an inevitable consequence of value laden institutions, produced through negotiation.

> The success of one group allows them to impose structural limitations on the ability of the other group to compete or negotiate. The successful group organizes the institutions of the society for their own purposes and values so that less powerful are consistently screened off from access, skills, resources. The situation perpetuates itself ...[19]

Given the institutionalization of rigid stereotypical definitions of Catholics, discrimination is not perceived as such, but as a necessary and justifiable course of action, in order to ensure the continued existence and stability of the state. This should be appreciated in order to understand how such explanations as that offered below by the Prime Minister from 1942-1963 (quoted below) are both subjectively legitimate and rational.[20]

> Interviewer: Have the persistent allegations of discrimination against Catholics in the North worried you?
>
> Lord Brookborough: Yes, one does not like the ideas, but I would like to make this plain. The Nationalists, always say there is discrimination against the Roman Catholic. Well there is no discrimination against Roman Catholics, qua Roman Catholics, because they worship in a different way. What there is is a feeling of resentment that most, and let me emphasize the most, that most Roman Catholics are anti-British and anti-Northern Ireland. This is nothing to do with religion at all. But there is this feeling of resentment that here is a man who is out to destroy Northern Ireland if he can possibly do so. That I think is it. They say why aren't we given more higher positions? But how can you give somebody who is your enemy a higher position in order to allow him to come and destroy you?

Interviewer: Are you not talking in terms that might have been true in the 1920s?

Lord Brookborough: No, I'm sure it still holds. I'm perfectly certain that if they got the chance they would push Northern Ireland into the Republic,

Interviewer: Is it not the democratic right of anyone in Northern Ireland to be a nationalist or anti-partitionist?

Lork Brookborough: Yes, absolutely his democratic right.

Interviewer: And therefore to expect completely equal treatment from the state?

Lord Brookborough: Well, its very difficult to answer that, but surely nobody is going to put an enemy where he can destroy you?

Interviewer: Even if he is going to use constitutional methods to do it?

Lord Brookborough: No, I wouldn't.

Unintended Outcomes of Meaningful Action

Symbolic Interaction and phenomenologically informed sociological perspectives tend to offer explanations of social reality that emphasize subjective meaning. Understanding is couched in terms of the actors' definition of reality. Although I take this to be an integral part of my analysis of conflict in Northern Ireland, I will show that it is also necessary to look at 'unintended consequences' of social action. All the implications of action are not necessarily there in the original project, neither does subjective meaning exhaust all the possible meaning of an act or situation. Lichtman writes,

> Human action can be understood neither independently of the meaning which the actor gives it, nor simply identified with his own interpretation ... Activity has an objective structure which is often discrepent with its intended meaning... Human beings can only act towards the world on the basis of some "understanding", but it does not follow from this that their activity, or the world, possesses the character which they "understand" it to have.[21]

> Human beings who believe that human nature requires constant warfare and social violence cannot be said to harbour the real possibility of mutual cooperation and love. But a given view of the world may itself be mistaken... We need also to inquire into the origin of this mistaken view and the social function which it in fact serves.[22]

In the chapter on the historical process of reality construction I inquire into the origin of certain ideas about the world that exist and pertain to social conflict in Northern Ireland. In a subsequent chapter on alientation, I examine the interests and function these serve.

Phenomenological View of the Historical Process

One of the primary concerns of phenomenological sociology is the illumination of the natural attitude of the life-world.[23] The natural attitude refers to the 'taken for granted', the world which we take as real. Natanson explains,

> The "taking as real" which is involved here is not a matter of inference or formal prediction but an initial seeing and grasping, a perceptual seizing of the object or event as real, and as real for all of us.[24]

Schutz sees the life-world as primarily a social, or intersubjective world. It is the world as lived in, experienced, and appreciated by "common-sense men carrying on the cognitive and emotive traffic of daily life".[25] The world 'taken for granted' forms the basis for action, it is characterized by

shared typifications and ideal type constructs which form the matrix for the possibility of social life. According to Kersten, the 'taken for granted', common-sense world is

> ... a non-scientifically categorized and conceptualized world, penetrated by inter-subjective, socially derived and istributed meanings of many kinds conferred on it by members of the community living in that world.[26]

Phenomenologists see the past as a dimension of the social world. That is, they see the intersubjective world as historically grounded, carrying the marks of our predecessors.[27]

The cultural world exists through tradition, in that we are continuously building on sedimented meaning from the past, which enters our consciousness as taken for granted reality. For phenomenologists, the whole of the cultural present implies the past, therefore,

> ... to make the origins of any present cultural formation evident is to disclose or reperform in substantially like ways the production of sedimented meanings.[28]

History, for the phenomenologists, and as it is treated in this thesis, involves the tracing the origins of meaning structures given in the present to their origins.

For phenomenological sociologists, man's experience of his world is a communal affair, not private. The world that makes sense to me is largely a product of my relationship with others.[29] The world we live in is a cultural and a historical one, where the past forms part of the common 'stock of knowledge at hand'.[30]

The stock of knowledge at hand largely contains conceptual

rules, typifications and constructs that are both socially approved, and socially derived. The life (cultural) world thus has priority over the individual. That is, sedimented meaning structures may exercise a constraining effect on the individual. Much of what we take to be knowledge does not originate in personal experience, but is socially transmitted. The life world does not consist of pure objects, but is a world interpreted, apperceived and apprehended in a certain way. According to Gurvitsch, it is the cultural world of each specific socio-historic group.[31]

> ... the schemes of apperception and apprehension play a determining role in and for perception. They contribute essentially towards making the things encountered such as they appear in perceptual experience.[32]

These cultural formations act as determining influences in that, projects depend on the categorization and typification that govern their production. Projects, and therefore action, depend on the meaning and relevance structure of the life-world, to a great extent. Schutz argues that,

> It can be further shown that at least one aspect of the biographically and situationally determined systems of interest and relevences is subjectively experienced in the thinking of everyday life as a system or motives for action, of choices to be made, of projects to be carried out, of goals to be reached.[33]

People are born in to pre-existing worlds which are 'carried' by members of their group or significant others. Thus previously established structures and beliefs may become very real and meaningful elements in the life experience of new members. In chapter five I analyse how one's biographical

experiences as a member of either the Catholic or Protestant community function, through socialization processes, as determinants of political beliefs and loyalties.

The Phenomenological Interpretation of History

A phenomenological view of history does not see it as treating facts, but interpretations and accounts of facts. It recognizes that historical interest is a function of time or a scheme of relevence.[34]

> History for the person in the street is know and interpreted within a subjective schema. History's deeds and events are refracted through the prism of relevence, and the emergent qualities are the fragments which constitute the individual's historical awareness.[35]

Awareness is always relevence directed, so the question for phenomenologists becomes, not what is significant for history but what is historically significant for the subject. Therefore, in looking at history in Northern Ireland, the emphasis is not on history itself, but on interpretations and the significance of history in the present.

In recognizing that human existence has a socio-historical dimension, phenomenologists are interested in socio-historic cultural facts as they enter into consciousness and define and determine it.[36] Consciousness is seen as the ultimate ground for awareness and knowledge, and is essentially characterized by intentionality.

History as a Dialectical Process

As already stated, Berger and Luckmann (1966) argue for the interpretation of history as a dialectical process.

That is, an analysis of social conflict in its historical dimensions in Northern Ireland would require

> ... a systematic accounting of the dialectical relation between the structural realities and the human enterprise of constructing reality - in history.[37]

However, historical analysis raises many problems. Many functionalist, evolutionary, and utopian theories may be seen as having a deterministic conception of the historical process. Carr (1964) and Arendt (1961) warn that such a deterministic approach to history reduces it to teleology.[38] For Arendt it implies a confusion of meaning and ends. The retrospectively imposed 'logic' of history cancels out meaning into a chain of purposes. That is, the end product of history becomes confused with the meaning of history.[39]

The use of the dialectic does not necessarily avoid the tendency towards determinism which a view of society as an ongoing concern may bring. There are many problems concerned with using the dialectic as an intellectual tool for understanding history. For example to claim it is a characteristic of objective historical reality may make it a causitive factor by which history develops. In this thesis I accept the dialectic as a process of social change, and as a characteristic of certain relations. As a process it remains open.[40]

A dialectical conception of history recognized its objective and subjective dimensions. Man is both the subjective creator of history, and the product of inherited objective reality. Marx suggests this when he says,

> Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please. They do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.[41]

Weber also, in considering the question of necessity and causality in relation to historical research, suggests the rejection of both materialist and idealist interpretations of history. He argues that they both accomplish equally little in the interest of historical truth.[42]

A phenomenology of history does not commit itself to a theory of history, in the sense that it posits no historical laws. Such phenomena have no foundation in the human experience of social reality.[43] History is seen as an open, indeterminate process of objectification in which social reality is constructed.[44]

For the phenomenologists, as in this thesis, the concern is not with objective truth. Rather, history ...

> ... provides the myth which justifies the present, but the present is also a necessary culmination of where history has brought us to.[45]

Historical Understanding

A historical perspective may provide an alternative understanding of social reality. Mannheim, according to Wolff, holds that full understanding of a cultural phenomenon or object.

> ... requires three kinds of understanding: that of its objective meaning which is given immediately; that of its expressive meaning; and that of its documentary meaning.[46]

Events acquire a new significance when placed in a historical perspective.

Like the phenomenologists, Dilthey suggests that the subject matter of history is life in its temporal dimension.[47] Although Dilthey stresses the centrality of subjectivity in understanding the human or social world, he argues that historical understanding transcends the narrowness and subjectiveness of individual experience. It links the part to the whole, the discrete to the continuous. Events are understood in their mutual dependence.[48]

> Life seen as a temporal succession of events which effect each other is historical life. It is only possible to grasp it through the reconstruction of the course of events in a memory which reproduces not the particular events, but the system of connections and the stages of its development. ... What memory accomplishes when it surveys the course of a life is achieved in history by linking together the expressions of life which have become part of the objective mind, according to their temporal and dynamic relationship. This is history ...[49]

For the phenomenologists, historical reflection "strips any cultural world of the matter of course character which it has for those who simply live in it".[50] It shatters the taken-for granted reality of everyday life. Thus, in Northern Ireland, the apparent 'objectiveness' of political worlds and the reality of certain beliefs and attitudes may be experienced as less 'objective' by realizing that reality is tenuously grounded in the consciousness of man and may be, at minute, denied and so destroyed. For this to happen in Northern Ireland men must abondon their myths which sustain

political realities. The world must be experienced to some extent, as an open process, so that men are freer to create a new reality rather than inherit a rigid one from the past. This process of constructing social reality would involve the destruction of many existing structures.

Mythical Thinking: A Non-Dialectical Approach to History

Collingwood (1961) identifies myth as a pseudo history. Although as an activity it resembles history in that it looks at the past, myth is not concerned with temporal human relation. The mythical conception of the world is a closed one. Myth does not seek to answer questions about reality, but to reaffirm and repeat what is already believed. Myth is a -temporal in that it has no conception of different dimensions of time.[51] Both present and future lack an open indeterminate character (in consciousness), in that sense myth is timeless.

> Hence, when a myth is couched in what seens a temporal shape, because it relates events one of which follows another in a definite order, the shape is not strictly speaking temporal, it is quasi temporal: the narrator is using the language of time succession as a mteaphor to express relations which he does not conceive as really temporal.[52]

I have already argued that everyday thinking is influenced by sedimented meaning structures from the past. Kersten (1970) offers a phenomenological account of myth. Kersten argues that where the 'stock of knowledge' in society provides a common frame of reference for mutual understanding, a mythical stock of knowledge provides invarient structures of reality. Typical beliefs and constructs are inherited unrevised from

the past. Reality is seen through, and compared to the past. Nothing novel is recognized.[53] Reality is perceived in its similarity to what went before. Ideal-type constructs remain tied to rigid concrete past experience, or fixed beliefs about the past. Myth must be repeated. Therefore, the meaning of what is happening in the present is compressed into the greatness of the past. The future becomes sharply defined before hand.[54] The contours of the past are imposed on the future, the present is "de-thematized", and deliberately overlooked.[55] Kersten also suggests that the fusion of past and future is the root of the timelessness of myth.

Such mythical thinking must be seen as non-dialectical. Thought is not realted to (present) reality. Conceptual constructs are reified. Reality is over determined. The actuality of the past gets a privileged position.[56] Ambiguity or discrepencies are overlooked where the past provides rigid proto-typical ideations. What is happening, and will happen, becomes seen in terms irrevokably determined by the past.

Reification

Myth, as described above, can be seen to be founded on a way of thinking about the world. Myth is essentially symbolic and imitative. As a mode of cognizing it comes close to reified thought. The process of reification is a specific form of the objectivation provess in which social relations gain the character of relations between things.[57] Both deny man his role as creator of his world. Both, as non-dialectical

ways of thinking and being in the world reduce man to an object in the historical process, or universal scheme of things. Abrendroth describes reification as follows,

> Our current historical situation thus makes it clear again and again that social institutions - social economic conditions which produced men's social process of production, political organizations (e.g. the state) and legal norms, but also political theorems - raise themselves ad independent powers over those human beings who have created them. ... As long as this situation exists, it will be a continuous task to make man master of his own history.[58]

Ideology

Ideology is a key concept in this thesis. I have describe social conflict in Northern Ireland as politico-ideological. This concept must be defined, and its use clarified. Following Mannheim (1936) I use the concept of ideology to indicate the total weltanschauung of an age or group.

> Here we refer to the ideology of an age or a concrete historico-social group, e.g. of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and compositions of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group.[59]

Mannheim suggests that ideas expressed by a subject should be regarded as functions of his existence and group membership.

> This means that opinions, statements, propositions, and systems of ideas are not taken at face value but are interpreted in the light of the life-situation of the one who expresses them.[60]

The total conception of ideology therefore calls into question the subject's total world-view (weltanschauung), including his conceptual system, and attempts to understand these as an

outgrowth of the collective life in which he participates.[61]

I will argue that the two major groups in Northern Ireland carry two different politico-ideological thought systems, which have provided them with alternative modes of experiencing and interpreting reality.

Ideology, as used in this thesis, does not imply conscious, deliberate, or calculated deception and distortion by the holders of these beliefs and world-views. As a concept ideology posits no causal connection between interests or social situation and the perspective associated with the group. Rather, total weltanschauung relates to the collective life of an individual in a group, in a particular historical period.

Holzner (1972) is close to Mannheim when he suggest that ideological knowledge is grounded in the individuals experience of collective life, his group.

> Religious beliefs, social or political faiths, most legitimating values rest on epistemologies and frames of reference fundamentally different from those centrally constitutive of the world of empirical work. In this domain of reality construction certainty is not usually based on the experience of mastering objects, but rather on the experience of meaningful identity in the context of social loyalties and acceptaces...[62]

Ideology, which is tied to social identity, is sharply contrasted by Holzner to the empirically based knowledge of work, or science.[63]

Mannhein and Holzner, however, may differ on their conception of the relationship between 'interest' and ideology. Holzner argues,

> By "ideology" we mean a limited aspect of the interpretative order of faiths and beliefs, namely those reality constructs and values which serve to legitimate the claims for power and prestige and the activities of groups and their members. Ideologies are, thus, legitimating symbolizations.[64]

This interpretation of ideology seems closer to Mannheim's "particular conception of ideology". This conception of ideology operates primarily with a psychology of interests.[65] To the extent that "legitimate" as used by Holzner refers to deception, or is causally related to interests, it differs from Mannheim's total conception of ideology and the concept used in this thesis. To the extent that the concept of "legitimate" is used as Berger and Luckmann (1966) define it, Holzner and Mannheim appear more in agreement.

According to Berger and Luckmann legitimations explain, justify and render plausible the institutional order and social reality.[66]

> Legitimation as a process is best described as a "second order" objectivation of meaning. Legitimation produces new meanings that serve to integrate the meanings already attached to disparate institutional processes. The function of legitimation is to make objectively available and subjectively plausible the "first-order" objectivations that have been institutionalized. While we define legitimation by this function, regardless of the specific motives inspiring any particular legitimating process, it should be added that "integration" in one form or another, is also the typical purpose motivating the legitimators.[67]

Legitimations have cognitive and normative dimension. That is, they imply values and knowledge.[68] They tell the individual how and why the world is as it is, thus implying and directing how he ought to act.

For Berger and Luckmann symbolic universes are the highest and most encompassing level of legitimation. Symbolic universes ...

> ... are bodies of tradition that integrate different provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality, ... symbolic processes are processes of signification that refer to realities other than those of everyday experience. ... The sphere of pragmatic application is transcended once and for all ... [In the symbolic universe] all the sectors of the institutional order are integrated in an all-embracing frame of reference, which now constitutes a universe in the literal sense of the word, because all human experience can now be conceived of as taking place within it.[69]

The symbolic universe is conceived of as the matrix for social reality, biographically and historically. Identity and social position are legitimated by this social construct. All realms of conceived of possibility and actuality are integrated and explained within this meaningful totality.[70] So defined, symbolic universe, as a concept seems close to Mannheim's definition of weltanschauung.

The application of the concept to the empirical context of Northern Ireland requires some minor clarification. First, I shall show that there are two major schemes of ultimate meaning or symbolic universes in Northern Ireland. Second, symbolic universes can be understood as legitimating "interests" in the broad sense of the word. By 'explaining' the world, symbolic universes may justify it, or legitimate the claims to power and bases of identity that the universe carries.

Berger and Luckmann argue that the 'narrower' definition

of ideology should be poroperly applied "When a particular definition of reality comes to be attached to a concrete power interest."[71] However, although power interests are attached to "ideologies" in Northern Ireland, the latter, narrow definition of ideology is not adequate. The concept of interest is too narrow, and the relationship between interest and thought (ideology) is problematic. The concept fails to confer the sense of overarching significance and meaning that is attached to social conflict in Northern Ireland. Thus I use the "total conception of ideology" or weltanschauung and symbolic universe interchangeably.

Given the centrality of the power struggle to social conflict in Ireland, it would be distortive to subsume it as an incidental element of the ideological struggle. I therefore describe social conflict in Northern Ireland as politico-ideological.

Ideology: A Non-Dialectical, Reality - Trancendent Mode of Cognizing

As already shown, Berger and Luckmann argue that symbolic universes are transcendent integrative frames of reference.[72] Mannheim also defines ideologies as reality -transcendent.

> In the course of history, man has occupied himself more frequently with objects transcending his scope of existence than with those immanent in his existence and, despite this, actual and concrete forms of social life and have been built upon the basis of such "ideological" states of which were incongruent with reality.[73]

> Contrasted with situationally congruous and adequate ideas are the two main categories of ideas which transcend the situation -ideologies and utopias.
> Ideologies are situationally transcendent ideas which never succeed de facto in the realization of

> their projected content. Though they often become the good-intentioned motives for the subjective conduct of the individual, when they are actually embodied in practice their meanings are most frequently distorted.[74]

For berger (1967) and Berger and Pullberg (1966) ideology, as a form of false consciousness, is a non-dialectical mode of cognizing. More properly, the dialect between thought an reality is lost to consciousness.[75]

Conclusions

In the preceeding sections I have outlined the basis of a sociological perspective that sees reality as socially and dialectically constructed. The construction of social reality is conceived of as a process in which power and the ability to create, impose and act towards one's definition of the situation is very important. This process is one in which man is both producer and product, historically and biographically.

The life-world is conceived of as primarily an intersubjective world that is historically grounded. That is, it is greatly influenced by our predecessors. Man is both the subject of history, and the product of inherited objective reality.

Myth and Ideology are defined as two non-dialectical modes of cognizing. The mythical mode of thought ensures that the past is (seen to be) repeated, while ideological ways of thinking transcend reality. Both are world views that are discrepent with empirical reality.

The implications of the perspective as outlined for the study of Northern Ireland are many. First, Ideologies in Northern Ireland are social products. If one is to understand their meaning one has to understand the history of their production.

Likewise, structural and conceptual divisions between Catholics and Protestants are largely the outcome of the historical process of sedimentation, of tradition. One must therefore inquire into the process through which history influences ideas and structural reality in Northern Ireland. One needs to understand how history, or interpretations of history, legitimates different political activities.

The social construction of reality was described as a process characterized by both consensus and conflict. I have argued, and will document in the next chapter, that Northern Ireland, as a social reality, was a negotiated order in which inequality became institutionalized. On many occasions I will point to the non-dialectical mode in which various processes occured. Strictly speaking the social construction of reality is always a dialectical process, but this dialectical may be lost to consciousness thus causing alienation and reification. I will discuss these issues in chapter four. However, I shall use the term non-dialectical loosely to apply this process of non-dialectical consciousness.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. See Collingwood R. G. The Idea of History (1961) pp. 63-71.

2. See Merlan, P., "Alienation of Marx's Political Economy and Philosophy", in Natanson, M. (ed.), Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essays in the Memory of Alfred Schutz, (1970), p. 195-212.

3. See, for example, Holzner, B., Reality Construction in Society, (1972)

4. Hall, P., "A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis of Politics", Social Inquiry, XXXXII (3-4) p. 37.

5. For an account of sociologists' concern with social determinants of behaviour see Dawe, A., "The Two Sociologies", British Journal of Sociology, XXI (1970) pp. 207-213.

6. I am referring to Berger and Luckmann's framework, not that of Marx.

7. Blumer, H., Symbolic Interactionism, (1969) p. 2.

8. Ibid., p. 2.

9. Ibid., p. 10.

10. Berger, P., The Sacred Canopy, (1969) pp. 3-4.

11. Ibid., p. 4.

12. Denzin, N., "Symbolic Interactionism and Ethnomethodology: A Proposed Synthesis", American Sociological Review, XXXIV (1969) pp. 922-934.

13. Schutz, A., "The Dimensions of the Social World", Collected Papers II; (1970) pp. 22-63.

14. Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., The Social Construction of Reality, (1967) pp. 52-76.

15. Meadian social psychology tended to stress this dimension of social life.

16. Berger and Luckmann recognize the existence of conflict in the social construction of reality but do not develop it fully.

17. Goffman's works clearly demonstrate this.

18. Strauss, A.R., "Organizational Negotiations" in Readings

in Social Psychology (second edition) (eds.) Lindesmith, A.R., Strauss A. and N. Denzin (1975) p. 268.

19. Hall, P., op. cit., p. 45.

20. Quoted in Magee, J., Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict, (1974) pp. 92-93.

21. Lichtman, R., "Symoblic Interactionism and Social Reality: Some Marxist Queries", Berkeley Journal of Sociology, XV (1970) p. 77.

22. Ibid.

23. See, for example, Natanson, M., "Alfred Schutz on Social Reality and Social Science", in Natanson, M. (ed.) Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essay in Memory of Alfred Schutz, (1970) pp. 101-103.

24. Ibid., p. 103.

25. Ibid., p. 102.

26. Kersten, F., "Phenomenology, History, Myth", in Natanson, M. (eds.), Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essays in Memory of Alfred Schutz, (1970) p. 237.

27. Schutz, A., The Phenomenology of the Social World, (1967) pp. 207-214.

28. Kersten, F., op. cit., p. 238.

29. This is very close to the symbolic interactionist position.

30. Kersten, F., op. cit., p. 239.

31. Gurvitsch, A., "Problems of the Life World", in Natanson, M., (ed.) Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essays in The Memory of Alfred Schutz, (1970) p. 52.

32. Ibid., p. 51.

33. Schutz, A., "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences", Collect Papers I: (1970) p. 60.

34. See Natanson, M., "History, Historicity, and the Alchemistry of Time", in Nathanson, M. (ed.), Literature, Philosophy and the Social Sciences, (1968).

35. Natanson, M., "History as a Finite Province of Meaning". In Natanson, M. (eds.), Literature, Philosophy and the Social Sciences, (1968) p. 175.

36. Gurvitsch, A., op. cit.,

37. Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., op. cit., p. 186.

38. Carr, E.H., What is History? (1964) pp. 103-132.

39. Arendt, H., Between Past and Future, (1961) p. 79.

40. A non-deterministic position on history is taken by Collingwood, R.G., The Idea of History, (1961).

41. Quoted in McLelland, D., The Thought of Karl Marx, (1971), p. 125.

42. See Giddens, A., Capitalism and modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the writings of Marx, Durkheim and Weber (1971) p. 133. It is also interesting to note that although Weber accepted Delthey's historocist methodological concern with Verstehen he rejected the Dilthean historical relativism.

43. Kersten, F., op. cit., pp. 239-243.

44. Ibid.

45. Leach, E., Levi Strauss, (1970) p. 15.

46. Wolff, K., From Karl Mannheim (1971) p. XIX. Mannheim was deeply influenced by both Weber and Dilthey. Like Weber, Mannheim came to rejeet the extreme relativisim of Dilthey's approach. The influence of German Historicism, and Dilthey in Particular, was most marked in Mannheim's earlier intellectual career. Mannheim was also deeply influenced by phenomenological methodology. The documentary method of interpretation' of modern day Ethnomethodologists traces directly to Mannheim.

47. Dilthey, W., Patterns and Meaning in History: Thoughts on History and Society, (1962). Schutz strongly opposed the historicism of Dilthey. Both Dilthey and Schutz were concerned with the investigation of 'meaning structures'. Both agreed that the subject matter of the social sciences required a methodology different to that of the natural sciences. Both offered an 'interpretative' approach. However Schutz sharply distinguishes his phenomenological interpretive method of constructing ideal types to the intuitive or empathetic method advocated by Dilthey. See for example, Schutz A. The Phenomenology of the Social World. (1967(7) p. 240.

48. Ibid., pp. 89-94.

49. Ibid., p. 73.

50. Gurvitsch, A., op. cit., p. 53.

51. Goody, J. and Watt, I., "The Consequences of Literacy", in Lindesmith, A.R., Strauss, A.L. and Denzin, N. (eds.). Readings in Social Psychology, (1975) p. 102.

52. Collingwood, R.G., op. cit., p. 15.

53. Kerstein, F., op. cit., p. 245 ff.

54. Kersten, F., Ibid.

55. Kersten, F., Ibid.

56. Kersten, F., Ibid.

57. See chapter IV.

58. Quoted in Israel, J., Alienation: From Marx to Modern Sociology, (1971) p. 269.

59. Mannheim, K., Ideology and Utopia, (1936) p. 56.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., p. 57.

62. Holzner, B., op. cit., p. 143.

63. Holzner, B., op. cit., chapter X.

64. Ibid., p. 144.

65. Mannheim, K., op. cit., p. 57.

66. Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., op. cit., p. 93.

67. Ibid., p. 92.

68. Ibid., p. 93.

69. Ibid., p. 95-96.

70. Ibid., p. 96.

71. Ibid., p. 123.

72. Ibid., p. 95-96.

73. Mannheim, K., op. cit., p. 192.

74. Ibid., p. 194.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL PROCESS OF REALITY CONSTRUCTION

> Peoples perception of the 'truth' or reality, even if it is objectively incorrect, and their reaction to the truth being shown to them are social facts of at least equal importance as the truth itself. If people believe and act upon their folk-lore and myth and stereotypes as obviously they do, then it is absolutely necessary to have a thorough knowledge of their ignorance either if we want to explain their behaviour as disinterested social scientists or to change it as committed ones.[1]

Introduction

In this chapter I want to trace Catholic and Protestant structural and psychological social divisions in Northern Ireland to their historical origins. I will show how consciousness was externalized and objectivated into political and ideological reality, and show how the social relations that characterized an earlier historical period became objectivated into the institutions in Northern Ireland. I will analyse the role of history in shaping politico-ideological reality of Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland.

Secondly, I will argue that both groups' mythical interpretations of history legitimate their existence and their actions. As with the individual, identity integrates the discrete experiences of his biography (past), so in the North, the myths called history allow each group a sense of continuity with the past. Their "reflective consciousness superimposes the quality of logic on the institutional order".[2] History

existing as if objectively real for each group, reinforces the objectivated and institutionalized political relations and beliefs.

The Nationalist Version of History's Use of Myth

The nationalist version of history is usually recounted as the story of Ireland's fight for freedom, and her unceasing struggle to once again become a separate entity from England.[3] This view of the past is not a rigorous or intellectual one,

> but draws its inspiration from folk memory, ballads, commerations and a selective and emotionally taught version of Irish history.[4]

Folk music in Ireland was strongly influenced by the "rebel ballad", which glorifies the physical-force rejection of English rule in Ireland.[5] Poetry again reinforces this theme as in the typical lament for dead patriots. It recalls gallant but futile uprisings, immortalizes the 'undaunted' courage of the Gael, and promises eventual success. The appeal has typically been on emotional grounds, moral (or ideological) grounds, seldom on pragmatic or utilitarian bases.[6] "... the romantic Ireland ... glowing not only from the Pearse poems and his Irish-Ireland school, but from the poetry of Plunkett and MacDonagh",[7] embodies the patriotic spirit which drove them and others to rebellion and execution by the British in 1916. W. B. Yeats,[8] in poetry and drama, recognized a particularly sinister side of Irish nationalism; its cult of blood sacrifice, which so inspired Pearse[9] and seems characteristic of today's IRA:

> What was special about Pearse was the intensity of his commitment to a sacrificial form of nationalism, his vision of the past as a long chain of sacrificies, and his imaginative understanding of the power over the future which further sacrifices could exert. He was determined himself to be part of such a blood sacrifice, inspiring other blood sacrifices, as the Fenians had done.[10]

What is important about this for my work is that tradition is central to Irish Nationalism. This tradition of political separatism from Britain was sedimented in diverse cultural formations. Specific interpretations of history and a rigid attachment to an unrevised vision inherited from the past are characteristic of both Irish republicanism and nationalism

> The militant Irish Republican Movement, has continued almost unchanged: the goal is the same, an Ireland both Free and Gaelic without cant or compromise, ...
>
> Steeped in their own history, traditionalist to the core, Irish Republicans have largely misinterpreted the past.[11]

One point must be clarified here. Historically, there are two forms of nationalism in Ireland, differing less in ideology than tactics. One aspired to achieving independence from Britain through parliamentary means, the other, through militarism or physical force. The IRA[12] is obviously in the tradition of the latter. Of them Bell says,

> Worse than misreading history, the Irish Republicans have often transformed tactics into principles, waging the struggle on the level of techniques enshrined in the past rather than struggling on a new road.[13]

> Increasingly as failure's shadow lenghtened, gradually after 1923 the use of physical force grew to be more important than the ultimate aim: the campaign was more valid than the victory.[14]

However, the support for militant republicanism has always

been numerically exceedingly small in Ireland;[15] its most influential political role has perhaps been indirect. Its members' activities reaffirmed and re-articulated the mythical view of history that was central to political life in Ireland; it revealed the brutality, immorality and injustice of British rule in Ireland.[16]

Nationalist and republican ideologies were grounded on and legitimated by mythical misinterpretations of history. Myth, as a symbolic process, reaffirms the message about the ideal. As a form of non-dialectical thinking it ensures that present and future are seen in terms determined by the past. To the extent that it offers a definition of reality that is incongruous with reality it may function as a self-fulfilling-prophesy.

As in the rising of 1916, the myth can be seen as an important component of the movement. Myths move men,[17] and this was realized by the leaders of that rebellion, who feared that Irish revolutionary zeal would be lost due to growing material prosperity under British rule.[18] However,

> More important than the dream of a great blow for Ireland, a new generation's contribution to an Irish-Ireland free of the Saxon would be gone; without such a gesture the slow absorption of Ireland into Great Britain would continue ... Ireland desperately needed a glorious failure to awaken the latent revolutionary tradition.[19]

Myth is a symbolic process of reality construction,[20] but to

be effective in creating an image of the ideal in men, it must be repeated. It was not a glorious failure that was needed in 1916, but an affirmation of the reality that they myth carried.[21] In its repetition myth renews itself, so founded on myth the rebellion of 1916 recreated a myth.

> ... 1916 came to have a significance for most Irish people that transcends that of all previous revolts against British rule. This last rebellion had been intended to create a new myth, and so in fact it did. But this myth ... simultaneously had the effect of creating an even deeper division than that which had formerly existed between the nationalist and unionist tradition.[22]

Mythical interpretations of reality, and their repetition and reaffirmation in political rituals[23] are central to an understanding of Protestant politico-ideological reality and action also. I shall refer to this political creed as 'Unionism'. Before examining the role of myth in Unionism it is necessary to clarify the extent to which the ideologies and political creeds in Northern Ireland might be conceived of as forms of religions.

Politico-Ideological Conflict: Religious Conflict or Not.

The similarities between nationalism, Unionism, and religion are marked. In all cases myth, ritual and symbolic practices unite those who believe. Typically, there is a prime concern with the ideal, or sacred.[24] For Berger and Luckmann, religion is a symbolic representation of the institutional order in its totality.[25] As such, religion appears as an institutionalized expression of ideological reality, or the symbolic universe.

Fallding (1974) in discussing the 'inclusive' definition of religion suggests the concept should recognize the religious character of many phenomena:

> As for the other "isms", one is never sure how inclusively such terms are applied, but it seems possible for "humanism", "nationalism", and comparable terms to be used with the same sacredness as we found in nazism and communism-in which case they designate religions.[26]

In the analysis of social conflict in Ireland it becomes impossible to isolate religion and politics because of their historical intertwining. Both can be seen as significant themes, spanning spheres of reality. Religious symbols functioned as political symbols. However, this does not suggest that they were really referring to the same reality, or that politics were invoked for the sake of religion, but that they are both of ultimate intersubjective importance. Fallding expresses the similarity here:

> I am wanting to call them religious because they exceed political concerns and glow with a supernatural light. Of course, like Arendt, I am thinking of them as very pervasive movements in thought and society and not simply as the forms of government or political strategies these produce.[27]

The nationalist expression of this 'religious' dedication to their ideal is clearly articulated by Mac Swiney,

> It is a spiritual appeal, then, that primarily moves us. We are urged to action by a beautiful ideal. The motive force must likewise be true and beautiful. It is the love of country that inspires us ...[28]

The Protestants saw their cause as equally 'sacred', and like the nationalists shows a typical religious concern with sacrifice.

> When we see the men of Ulster filled with that noble spirit of self-sacrifice in behalf of liberty which fired their ancestors, displaying more than any other men today their patriotic devotion ... we cannot hold aloof ... It means that we are ready to make any sacrifice to avert the greatest of calamities.[29]

The various political 'creeds' in Ireland can be interpreted to have been part of the symbolic system that governed a group's life, and provided its members with a shared definition of their total reality.[30]

Many of the concepts that apply to the study of religion, such as myth, ritual,[31] and sacrifice, have their parallel in the study of political ideologies in Ireland. Patriots were promised immortality in song and verse. Religion and nationalism (orange and green[32]), can be understood as conceptually interlinked legitimations of ideal universes of meaning. However, nationalism or unionsim must <u>not</u> be seen as religious movements in disguise. Both refer to ideals and reality-transcending aspirations that, unlike religions, are capable of realization <u>within</u> the material world.

THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF POLITICO-IDEOLOGICAL REALITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND

As the sub-title suggests, I will investigate the origins of various political traditions and ideologies, showing how the historical pattern of sedimentation of social and political reality accounts for a great many of the features of Catholic-Protestant conflict in Northern Ireland today.

The Myth of Ancient Nationhood

Republican and nationalist movements have repeatedly legitimated their activities and beliefs by appealing to the Irish "tradition of nationhood"[33] and to the concept of an indivisible island. However, the belief that Ireland was a political entity[34] until the English came is not substantiated by historical records. It was, and still is, a politically useful myth that arises out of the beginning of Irish nationalism in the late nineteenth century. Since then, claims to national independence and unity have emerged as potent political themes.[35]

Ireland, at the time of the first major interference from England via the Norman warlords in the twelfth century, was divided into many small kingdoms or "tuathas". These were continually at war with each other.[36] Perhaps the main sources of unity, to the extent that it can be said to have existed, were a common language - Gaelic, and a common religion- Christianity.

By the reign of Henry VIII, in England, Normans had replaced many Irish chieftans as rulers, expecially on the east coast. On the whole they adopted Irish customs and language and made very little difference to the mass of the inhabitants' way of life.

The concept of nationhood is a modern one, and the notion of a political entity of Ireland is probably two centuries old.[37] Clans, not nations were the political reality in early centuries of Ireland-England relationships. However, republicans

and Nationalists trace it further back:

> The movement for an Irish Ireland, Free and Gaelic, at times seems to stretch back over a thousand years into the celtic twilight.[38]

An IRA view adds that conflict is part of the ancient struggle: "Yes, there is reason for it all! For seven hundred and fifty years in generation after generation, we have suffered ..."[39]

The Historical Origins of The Association of Power and Religion in Ireland

I will show in chapter 4 that religion and class, rather than class and politics, run together in the present conflict in Northern Ireland[40]. I will now briefly outline the origins of this phenomenon. As will be shown later, the combination of religion and politics largely expalins the insoluable and persistent character of social conflict there.

During the sixteenth century religious changes which accompanied the English reformation were introduced into Ireland as part of a plan of Anglicisation. Using the religious issue, English monarchs broke the power of their anglo-Irish lords. The religious wars of the Reformation in Europe were also clearly associated with political power struggles.[41] Religious oppression that accompanied the reformation established an enduring pattern in Irish history.

> ... while the mass of Irishmen, thought their church was proscribed, remained invicibly catholic. So the cause of Gaelic independence became linked with the cause of catholicism ...[42]

The fight against rule from Rome, which characterized the sixteenth and seventeenth century reformation Europe, is still a central theme in the present day conflict in Northern Ireland. The major political slogan and rallying cry of unionism or the Protestant cause was and is traditionally "Home rule is Rome rule". Paisley[43] embodies this politico-religious tradition among Protestants in the North.

> I am loyal to the principles of the great Protestant Reformation and refuse to barter my heritage for a mess of ecumenical pottage. I am loyal to the Queen and the throne of Britain, being Protestant in terms of the revolution Settlement. I am loyal to Ulster, the Ulster of our Founding fathers.[44]

The traditional association of religion and politics is established. It is seen as a legacy from the reformation.

England Legitimates Rule in Ireland; a Legacy from Feudal Days.

From the time of Henry VIII, the link with the English sovereign, and later Britain, has legitimated various claims to rule in Ireland. During his reign England first began to establish effective rule in Ireland. Rather than enter into open conflict with his lords in Ireland, who were of dubious loyalty, Henry chose the role of Feudal King. To some lords he offered protection in return for their allegiance. They surrendered their lands to him; he restored it. In this manner the King of England became the "King of Ireland". From this period also stems the association of loyalty to England and Protestanism, for English rulers, or those appointed by the English monarchs, were generally Protestants.

Ulster: the Last Gaelic Stronghold, and the Genesis of the Problem

Ironically, Ulster was the last stronghold of Gaelic resistance. With its fall, centralization of rule from Dublin, subject to and enforced by England, was officially complete. This event marked the genesis of Catholic-Protestant conflict in Northern Ireland:

> The historical roots of the modern Ulster problem can be traced to the early seventeenth century when the province was first brought under English control and colonized by Protestant settlers.[45]

Until the seventeenth century, English colonization of Ireland had generally been through the introduction of landlords and upper class English to replace Gaelic and rulers of Norman descent. The majority of the population, peasants or tenants, were little affected by this. The colonization of the North introduced a new phenomenon. There occurred widespread introduction there of a practice already begun on a very small scale in the South - the plantation:

> But the plantation ... meant a social revolution in Ulster, a clean sweep of all the traditional property rights of the occupying Irish. Only a small number of Irishmen were continued as landowners under the scheme, and the whole area thus owned was only a small fraction of what was granted to the newcomers. The great mass of Ulster Irish remained on their former lands, but degraded to the status of tenants-at-will.[46]

English and Scottish colonists settled in Ulster. They differed from the natives in religion and language.[47] However, as many planters were Scottish, they and the native

Irish came from the same genetically mixed stock.

> ... whatever their ethnic origins, they were easily distinguishable from the Gaels, ... by the fact that they spoke a dialect of English and were protestant in religion ... During the critical seventeenth century they were repeatedly reinforced by fresh migrations ...[48]

The significant feature of the Ulster colonization that distinguished it from earlier and later colonization was that it involved mass displacement of the native population from their lands, as well as a change in ownership.[49] The settlers differed from the natives in language, religion, law, custom, economy, thought and art.[50] The settlers built manor-houses, established towns and villages, and the new 'society' took root.

Institutionalization of Fear and Hostility

I shall here trace the origins of various elements that characterize Catholic-Protestant relations in Northern Ireland today.

First, there is the sense of fear and hostility between both groups. The Catholic community has a long-standing sense of grievance towards the Protestants; they in turn see themselves as having been under a continuous threat from the Catholics.[51] This can be partly understood by inquiring into the historical process through which social reality was objectivated.

> ... it has to be recognized that the colony was established in an atmosphere of ferocious hatred and bitterness ... the mass of the Ulster Irish could regard the plantation in no other light than as a monstrous injustice ... This in turn provoked no less ferocious counter-activities from the colonists and induced in them a siege mentality

that became one of their dominant characteristics.[52]

O'Brien[53] is convinced that the historical legacy of the siege mentality is of political importance today. It is embodied in political slogans such as "not an inch".[54] He suggests it fluctuates:

> Here, I am concerned with the place of this movement in the history the Ulster Protestant siege-mentality; first as apparently breaking down that mentality: and then as re-establishing it.[55]

What needs to be explained is how fear of Catholics became institutionalized among the Protestant community. "That fear was there from the beginning. At different times it faded away, only to return. It is there now."[56]

We can see how the early social divisions, with their attendant attitudes of fear and hate, became reified in the institutionalization of Protestant-Catholic relationship, thus becoming self-perpetuating. As a non-dialectical mode of cognizing and objectivation, reified institutions deny the indeterminate character of the future.[57] According to Magee (1974), "From the very beginning there was fear as the early colonists were ever conscious of the dispossess natives as enemies biding their time."[58]

The two communities remained bitterly divided. Natives and settlers in the North can be understood as having established reciprocal typifications of a high degree of anonymity with respect to each other on certain issues and relevances.[59] The barriers of religion, language and other cultural factors would have increased the tendency towards rigid and stereotype

typifications, rather than typifications built on sensitive understandings of each other as individuals.[60] de Paor's account of the attitudes of the Protestant colonizers supports this. They saw their relationship with the Catholics as a struggle for 'freedom religions and laws' over ... popish superstition and Gaelic Barbarism".[61]

Reified institutionalized legitimations and typifications from the reformation are still found in the structure of everyday life consciousness in Northern Ireland today.

> ... a Protestant believes in standing on the ground of our forefathers and the Reformers and willing to shed our blood for the glorious cause of the gospel.[62]

> Being convinced that the enemies of Faith and Freedom are determined to destroy the State of Northern Ireland, and thereby enslave the people of God, ...[63]

A letter to the UDA Bulletin shows an extreme example of the prevalence of indiscriminate stereotypes in present day Northern Ireland. The term nationalist is equated with Catholic in the North.

> I have reached the stage where I no longer have any compassion for any nationalist, man, woman or child ... It's them or us. Why have [our men] ... not started hitting back in the only way the nationalist bastards understand? That is ruthless, indiscrim inate killing ... If I had a flame-thrower, I would roast the slimy excreta that pass for human beings...[64]

An accompanying reply said, "Without question most Protestants would agree with your sentiments ... we do."[65]

The fears and prejudices of the early days of colonization were transmitted to succeeding generations.

> The seventeenth century struggle between colonists and natives was marked by atrocities on both sides, the memory of which proved enduring ... which provided the settlers with myths and legends to bolster their morale in centuries to come.[66]

A phenomenological account of history does not posit a metaphysical concept of group memory or collective mind. However, it does account for intersubjectively and historically shared typification among a group, such as Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland.

First typifications can be seen to have come to be shared by people facing a similar situation. For the colonizers and natives, we can understand how common relevances organized their respective conceptualizations of the world.[67] Sallach argues,

> Social disruptions affect large numbers of members simultaneously. Wars and depressions, for example, have similar consequences for entire classes of societal members. Thus it becomes important to examine specifically and historically, the way in which groups and classes share consequences, the way prior interpretive schemes increase the likelihood that a given group or class will respond in a collective manner.[68]

Second, as already stated, typifications are largely socially derived. "Reality" and "knowledge" is often inherited.[69]

The Genesis of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Northern Ireland.[70]

As Sallach (1973) argues above, prior interpretative schemes increase the likelihood of self-fulfilling prophecies. This is a common phenomenon in the North even today,[71] as in its political past.

Historical accounts tell of how the protestant settlers lived in anticipation of a native uprising. Expectations were fulfilled and ideologies reinforced, and so justified, when in 1641 the Catholics rebelled. This event was interpreted in terms of preconceptions. In such a rigid manner of cognising, expectations and stereotypifications become self-fulfilling. Empirical events, through interpretation in terms of a rigid perspective, become explained in terms of this world view. Discrepancies and anomalies are not perceived, so the perspective is not revised; rather, misinterpretations of reality ensure commitment to it. The events of 1641 were interpreted in terms of assumptions about the 'barbarous' nature of the Catholics:

> The policy of the Irish leaders was directed against strong points held by the government in Ulster, not against dispersed colonists. But their followers burning with a long damped sense of wrong drove out the planters from the homes they had established on confiscated land and murdered many of them. There was no wholesale or concerted massacre of the planters but in the confusion of the time combined with the willingness of the colonists to believe that their worst expectations had been in full measure fulfilled it became an established conviction that the Ulster Catholics had risen and slaughtered the Ulster Protestants to plan, a plan worse than that of St. Bartholomew. Fear and hatred were intensified, and lent added bitterness to the vengeance which was exacted by Cromwell's puritans.[72]

Sedimented meanings from the past serve as important components of the intrinsic and imposed relevance structure of people in Northern Ireland. Past societies produce and bestow typification schemes by which future generations may come to organize their world -- unquestioningly taken for

granted. Myth is central to this process in Northern Ireland. Here is Paisley's account of the events outlined above, which he chose to recount in the 1969, a period of tense Catholic-Protestant relationships:

> In 1641 the Roman Catholic Church decided to exterminate the Protestants in Ulser, and there took place one of the most barbarous and bloody massacres in Irish history. It was led by the priests of the Roman Catholic Church and the rivers of Ulster ran red with Protestant blood. In the town of Portadown the River Ban was so choked with Protestant bodies that the Roman Catholics could walk dry-shod across the river.[73]

I shall identify other social mechanisms that perpetuated historically derived prejudices later.

I have pointed to the origin of the traditional relationship between power or politics and religion in Northern Ireland. As shown in chapters 3 and 4, this has remained characteristic of Ulster's political life.[74] I will now outline the origins of class ambiguities with respect to politics in Northern Ireland today. That is, I shall identify the origin of what many authors see as Ulster's central political problem; the sectarian division of the working class.

The Origins of the Sectarian Division of "Objective Classes" in Northern Ireland

I use the term "objective" class to refer to a group of similar socio-economic position, but who lack 'class' or subjective consciousness of them selves as a group. Such a category may also be referred to as a "class in itself".[75]

The colonization of Northern Ireland was different from the colonization of the rest of Ireland in that it introduced

into the country English and Scottish settlers of all objective social classes. These were Protestants. However, Protestants in the rest of the country were almost exclusively members of the upper class. According to Moody (1974) colonists (Protestants) of all objective classes experienced themselves as a community. He argues that "the colonists were no mere landowning superstructure but comprised real communities ..."[76]

Political identification, therefore, was in terms of religion not class. Whether or not this political unification of different objective classes, according to their religious persuasion, should be termed "false consciousness", is not relevant. In fact, conflict in both Ireland and England during the seventeenth century, although overtly religious, concealed class conflict and a power struggle between different economic and ideological groups. Religious denomination since that time became the badge distinguishing exploiter from exploited, the victor from the vanquished.[77] Hall (1972) suggests that the simplication of political complexities to facilitate the mobilization of support is an important political strategy. Certainly, to simplify Catholic-Protestant conflict in Ireland into seeing it as religious warfare is a gross distortion.

Some factors relevant to an understanding of present day conflict in Northern Ireland emerge clearly at this point.

First, during this period of early colonization Catholic-Protestant relationships were firmly established as mutually antagonistic, as were their respective definitions of politico-religious reality.

Second, Protestants, generally formed the ruling class in Ireland. Only in Ulster did you have 'objective' lower class Protestants.

Third, Politics appeared as determined by, or associated with religious persuasion, rather than class. As shown in chapter 4, religion still appears to function as a social determinant of politics in the North today. In that chapter I also link the subjective identification of religion and politics to "objective" or social structural realities.

Conclusion .

In this section I have pointed to the origins of social and sectarian divisions in Northern Ireland. I have identified the roots of the ideological and structural features of the present conflict. Most significantly, I have located the origin of the traditional association between religion and politics, and the tendency for politics to cross-cut or transcend objective class divisions.

HISTORICAL SEDIMENTATION: PROTESTANT IDEAS AND STRUCTURES

In this section I will discuss how some phenomena already identified as relevant to understanding social conflict in Northern Ireland were reinforced and reaffirmed, thus hardening the "objectiveness" of the socially constructed world. The past can influence the present only to the extent that ideas from the past, or the consequences of man's actions in the past, are transmitted. That is, the past, to be influential, must be a living feature of the life-world.

The Significance of History

For Protestants, perhaps the symbolically most significant event in history was the defeat of the Catholic King James II of England by the Protestant King William of Orange at "The Battle of the Boyne".

> The Seige of Derry and the Battle of the Boyne (12 July 1690) not only ensured William III's succession to the throne of Britain and provided the colonists with their own set of enduring folk memories; they also established in Ireland a Protestant ascendancy which holds sway until modern times and is only now coming under challenge in Northern Ireland. If one is to understand the 'siege mentality' of many Ulster Protestants, and the emotive force of slogans such as 'Remember 1690' the experience of the colonists in the seventeenth century cannot be ignored.[78]

However, in chapter 4 I shall argue that the term 'Protestant ascendancy' is distortive in that the Protestant working class can be seen to have only an 'illusion' of power.

The historical tradition of the battle of the Boyne is transmitted in legend, verse and song.[79] It has become the focus for the Protestant or 'orange' myth.[80] The 'message' of the myth is reaffirmed in annual parades and ceremonies. It is significant that the anniversary of the battle of the Boyne is the national holiday of the North, and that the symbolic colour of the state is 'orange'.

Sedimented experience is constitutive of the political worlds in the North. The sedimentated experiences of both collectivities can be understood as having become part of the general stock of knowledge of both groups. We can see that by the end of the seventeenth century general patterns in political cognitive activity had crystallised. Of those days

O'Brien says:

> The Catholics were dispossessed and loyal to the Pope. The Protestants held the land and were loyal to the crown. Applying the opinion that each section had of the other, the entire population was made up of heretics and traitors.[81]

Today, sedimentated conceptual political categories appear to have been little revised. The influence of history on ideas is marked. A statement given to the Dublin Sunday World reveals this:

> We are a highbred race decended from men ... who colonized Northern Ireland ... For four hundred years we have known nothing but uprising, murder, destruction, and repression. ... What is happening now mirrors similar events in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. ...
>
> Once more in the history of our people we have our backs to the wall, facing extinction by one way or another. This is the moment to beware, for Ulstermen in this position fight mercilessly till they or their enemies are dead.[82]

Apart from demonstrating the role of the past in shaping ideas, we can see that such political statements reveal a mythical mode of cognising.

Mythical Thinking in Northern Ireland

I have already identified myth as a certain non-dialectical mode of cognising where the contours of the past are imposed on the interpretation of the present or the future. Edelman's (1971) development of this concept with specific reference to political myth is of particular relevance to Northern Ireland. For Edelman

> The word "myth" signifies a belief held in common by a large group of people that gives events and actions a particular meaning; it is typically socially cued rather than empirically based.[83]

He adds that

> It is therefore not the substantive nature of a particular political issue that determines whether a granslation into myth will occur, but rather the mode of cognising or of apprehending any issue. The polar opposite modes are, on one hand, tentativeness in reaching conclusions and systematic care to check hypotheses against empirical observation and, on the other hand, apprehension through social suggestion, generating beliefs not susceptible to empirical check or revision. In the second mode ... what is mythical and unobservable is publically affired and believed, for it evokes social support.[84]

This 'mythical' mass definition of one's opponent, not as complex social beings ... but as objects embodying a particular abstract function ... [such as] aggression, evil,"[85] or domination is a feature of political life in the North. Lord Brookborough, Prime Minister from 1942-1963, exemplifies this tradition:

> Catholics are out to destroy Ulster with all their might and power. They want to nullify the Protestant vote, to take all they can out of Ulster and then see it go to Hell.[86]

I have shown how selective interpretations of history legitimate such stereotypification of 'political' others. Both groups' mythical categories of thought were non-dialectically institutionalized in Northern Ireland.

Collectively and Historically Objectivated Typifications

Phenomenological sociology recognizes that peoples' definitions of reality are often shifting, dynamic and fluid. It also recognizes that they may be consistent and accurate portrayals of the 'objective' state of affairs. Indeed, the root relation of fear and resentment between Catholics and Protestants was justified, and hardly discrepent with 'objective' reality. However, these typification schemes were reaffirmed

generation after generation,[87] so that, as Schutz would argue, members of the life world took for granted what others believed. Having been reaffirmed, typifications became an integral part of the 'taken for granted reality'. So much so that even when the 'original objective' reality on which they were based changed, conceptual systems remained unchanged.[88]

This source of social continuity rests on some assumptions about the life-world. Schutz suggests that,

> All this presupposes our faith that things will continue to be as they have been so far, that what our experiences of them has taught us will also stand the test in the future.[89]

However, the failure to continuously test, question and compare typifications and definitions of others against 'objective'[90] reality can be identified as a non-dialectical mode of cognising.

The Orange Order: The Formal Institutionalization of Ideology

For hundreds of years the transmission and sedimentation of Catholic and Protestant politico-ideological meaning structures vis a vis each other continued.[90] The concept of ideology should be used here, for modes of thought implied more than mere political position or attitude, but rather a total way of integrating and experiencing the world.[91]

The Orange Order was a formally institutionalized mechanism for perpetuating 'ossified' or reified historical Catholic-Protestant relationships and sectarian ideology. By this I mean that this organization institutionalized the social

relations of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, in a non-dialectical manner.

> The Orange tradition which gave a kind of moral to the subjugation of Catholics had, therefore, a special attraction to the Protestant peasantry ...
>
> The colour orange was adopted as a symbol of Irish protesant patriotism that became associated with memories not only of King William's victories but also with the earlier struggles of the 'protestant colony'.[92]

Senior (1966) goes on to say,

> The Orange tradition was associated closely with the maintenance of what was called the 'protestant ascendancy'...
>
> ... the 'lower orders' of protestants ... as a result of the penal code, had become a kind of plebian aristocracy, Latent fears of Catholic domination could be aroused among them in any part of Ulster...[93]

Economic competion for land, and later jobs, in the industrial city of Belfast, was common between Catholics and Protestants. However, the function or concern of the Orange Order appears to have been primarily religious, political, and according to some authorities largely sectarian. Boyd (1969) argues,

> But why is bigotry carried on so relentlessly, like a heriditary disease, from generation to generation? The answer probably lies in the continued existence of the orange lodges.[94]

A commission in 1857 reported that,

> The Orange system seems to us to have no other practical result than as a means of keeping up the Orange festivals and celebrating them, leading as they do to violence, outrage, religious animosities, hatred between classes and, too often, bloodshed and loss of life ...[95]

Although the Orange Order was founded in 1795, the Orange

sentiment or Ideology dates further back, as Senior suggested. Today it exists as a religious fraternal and political body to which all unionist members of parliament must typically belong. Membership requires a politico-ideological commitment.

> ... a member is pledged by his oath ' to avoid countenancing (by his presence or otherwise) any act or ceremony of Popish worship'. Throughout its history, the Order has seen itself as the primary institution opposing Catholicism and Catholic influence in Ulster.[96]

This order existed until very recently as a symbol and as partly the means of institutionalized Protestant power.

In 1968, a survey estimated the membership of the Orange order at thirty two per cent of the adult male Protestant population.[97] Since the increase of overt conflict in the North, this percentage is reported to have increased, as have the number and intensity of violent incidents associated with the celebration of Orange festivals. Orange parades can be seen to function as 'ritual reaffirmations of symbolic realities'. The most important of these being the annual Orange twelfth of July parade. The 'message' of this ritual was "explained" in a recent letter to the Belfast Telegraph.

> Orangemen that day not only commemorate a very significant military and political victory, but a great deliverance from Roman slavery in much the same way as the Jews each year commemorate their deliverance from bondage in Egypt.[98]

What is significant about the Orange order in the context of this chapter is that it has remained the fullest expression of traditional Protestant solidarity and Protestant ascendancy. Its influence on the present situation stems from two main factors. First, it perpetuated the 'Orange ideology' and anti-catholic

sentiment. Second, it has traditionally been intimately connected with political power in Ulster. This tradition is expressed by Lord Craigavon, the North's first Prime Minister. He, like all subsequent prime ministers, was a member of the Orange order.

> I have always said that I am an Orangeman first and a politican and member of this parliament afterwards ... All I boast is that we are a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State.[99]

From this we see that the institutions of the state carried a definition of political reality from which Catholics were automatically excluded.

Since 1971, the influence of the Orange order on the course of events has become much less than that of the Protestant paramilitary organizations; "the Protestant Backlash".[100]

Derry: Scene of Catholic-Protestant Hostilities 1689, 1968

The official name of Derry since 1613 has been Londonderry. Although the ancient Irish name of Derry is generally applied to the city throughout Ireland, some Protestants and the British in general use the official title. The term Londonderry is a politically emotive one.

In 1689 the Protestant population of Derry withstood a lengthy siege by Catholic forces. Their victory is celebrated each year by the Apprentice Boys' parade around the walls of the city. Both the parade and ecological structure of the city reenact the traditional mythical scenario. Catholics live outside the ancient city walls. Protestants parade around the walls, symbolically keeping the menacing Catholics out.

According to O'Brien, Derry is a symbol of the Protestant spirit of Ulster, "Derry City is a Protestant Holy City ... (it is) at the center of Ulster Protestant iconography religion and patriotism".[101]

This might partly explain why Derry, which on demographic grounds, given that its population was predominantly Catholic, was not included in the Free-State.

In 1968, a civil rights march in Derry met with severe repression by the forces of "law and order".[102] Rather than the events in themselves, it was the media coverage more than anything that was probably responsible for the emergence of world-wide recognition that Northern Ireland had a 'political problem'.

The symbolic significance of Derry largely explains the intensity of the violence and social conflict associated with events of political relevance there. The march or parade is a traditional symbol of dominance in Northern Ireland. In 1968, the Civil Rights Association adopted a strategy that seemed to have been an international feature of the civil rights movement of the nineteen sixties, the 'protest march'. However, in Northern Ireland, parades symbolised another reality. The Catholics had 'adopted' a traditional[102] Protestant symbolic gesture. The result was explosive.

Finally, although the forces of law and order attempted to control and limit civil rights marches, the control of Protestant marches seemed 'politically dangerous'. In 1969, after months of severe conflict, it was widely believed that if the annual Derry Boys' parade was held it would cause violence. Civil rights

marches were banned on such grounds.

> (Prime Minister) Chichester-Clark himself believed that the feelings of the Protestants about the sanctity of their traditional parades was so strong that the Apprentice Boys, the Orange Order, and the entire Unionist party would rise and crush him if he banned the Derry parade. That, at least, was the message he gave Harold Wilson... [103]

As expected Derry erupted in disorder on that occasion, this time more seriously than before. The violence spread to Belfast, and by the fifteenth of August sectarian conflict was so intense in Northern Ireland that the British Government sent troops to Northern Ireland to 'return' peace to the province.

Conclusion

In this section I have identified the historical sedimentation of various structural and conceptual features of Protestant or Unionist politico-ideological reality. I have pointed to the symbolic significance of places, dates, events, and political gestures. I have also indicated that there is a tendency to translate political issues into myth, and to simplify complex situations into a basic dichotomy of 'them and us', good and evil.

Finally, the role of the Orange order in transmitting the sedimented political experiences of previous generations of Protestants into the general 'stock of knowledge' has been examined. Furthermore, the Orange order provides the link between the conceptual reality of Orange, Protestant or Unionist ideology, and the objective reality of political structures of Protestant domination in Northern Ireland.[104]

HISTORICAL SEDIMENTATION: CATHOLIC IDEAS AND STRUCTURES

I shall now outline the origin and process of transmission of various features of the nationalist or Catholic politico-ideological reality in Northern Ireland.

The Historical Roots of Institutionalized Catholic Inequality

Catholic political and economic inequality is one of the main issues of political conflict in the North. The Civil Rights Association was founded in order to rectify this perceived situation. The objective reality of this claim is discussed in chapters three and five. I shall now inquire into the roots of this phenomenon.

By the eighteenth century the British conquest and Protestant supremacy in Ireland seemed complete. The victors enacted the 'penal laws' which denied civil and religious liberties to Catholics. Significantly, this codified in an enduring manner Catholics' underlying status. The consequences of labelling a group as inferior, and as outside of respectable society are still felt today.

> The penal laws were to some extent a defense mechanism, and it was hoped that, if they were strictly administered, the degraded and impoverished Catholics would never be in a position to rise again. Especially in Ulster, where Protestants were the most numerous, religion became the criterion whereby a man civil rights and economic opportunities were determined.[105]

Under the penal laws the Catholic majority in Ireland was prohibited from voting, holding certain types of property, renting land except on short leases, holding public office and entering liberal professions and so on. While neither designed explicitly to stamp out the natives' religion, n'or convert them, the penal

laws ensured that Catholics as a group were excluded from obtaining significant amounts of property or political power.[106] That is, Catholics formed the lower objective economic class in Ireland. As already shown, the ruling class in Ireland was Protestant and the penal laws ensured it remained so. Protestants in Ulster, however, also 'objectively' belonged to the lower class. The bulk of the land of Ireland was Protestant owned[107]. If the penal laws reinforced the identification of opposed classes in terms of religion it also increased the attachment of the peasantry to the Catholic church. According to Beckett,

> ... in the absence of an intelligent professional middle class [of Catholics] ... political leadership passed naturally to the clergy. The great political power of the Roman Catholic Church in modern Ireland can be traced directly to the effectiveness of the eighteenth-century penal codes.[108]

Political Unification of Protestants

I have already indicated that there were class differences among Protestants. As used in this thesis, the term Protestant refers to a political category rather than a religious or class grouping.

During the eighteenth century the ruling class was typically Anglican or of "the Established" church. Dissenters such as Quakers, Hugonots and Presbyterians were also discriminated against[109] although to a lesser extent than Catholics. Unified Political Protestantism finally hardened in the nineteenth century. Along with the reaction to the rebel uprising of 1798, events of the subsequent half century completed the social construction of

the political category of political protestantism.

> Then the removal of the remaining greviances of Presbyterians, the evangelical movement which was militantly anti-Catholic, and the influence of divines such as Henry Cooke and hugh Hanna, blurred the sectarian divisions between Episcopalians and Presbyterians and created the concept of political Protestantism.[110]

The Origin of the Republican Myth

Just as events of a hundred years earlier are central to the Protestant mythical mode of political thought, so the events of 1798 are the focal point of Republican mythology. The period at the end of the eighteenth century is often described as the period in which 'Irish nationalism awoke'[111], suggesting that somehow this spirit was inherent, although inactive, in Irishmen. Rather, consciousness such as nationalism should be seen as emerging through a dialectical interplay between man and 'objective' or social reality of the specific historical period. Nationalism should not be divorced from its social situation.

Agrarian Unrest: Class Warfare, Sectarianism or Nationalism?

Associated with increasing pressure on land during the third decade of the eighteenth century, there developed in Ireland oathbound secret societies. The motive behind their formation was largely economic.[112] They were generally designed to limit Landlord power and protect tenants from exploitation. This lends the character of class-warfare to the agitation.

In the North, however, where Catholics and Protestants were in competition for land, agrarian unrest had a clear

sectarian element. Catholic and Protestant sectarian groups sprang up in response to each other. They legitimated their existence by claims of defense. Ulster Protestant tenant farmers had enjoyed certain privileges over their Catholic counterparts due to a land-tenure system called the "Ulster Custom", and of course the effect of the penal laws. However, the gradual lifting of some of the restrictions imposed on Catholics resulted in Protestants in rural areas seeing the rapidly increasing Catholic population as a threat to life and livlihood.[113]

> Underlying the fear of the catholic peasantry acquiring arms was the economic motive suggested in the Steelboy petition, as the catholics, by bidding against the protestants for leases, threatened protestant living standards. Searches for arms soon became a pretext which disguised a terrorism designed to drive catholics out of Ulster.[114]

A third element, that of nationalism or republicanism, further confuses the picture. That is, there occurred during this period a movement called the United Irishmen, the birth of Republicanism. This historical event is indespensible to an understanding of the IRA, and the republican ideology.

The United Irishmen

As the North began to experience increasing economic development the interests of some of the colonists came into contradiction with those of the mother country. As with the American colonists,whose success encouraged them, the middle class and propertied[115] colonists began to chaff at the restrictions placed on them especially for the benefit of British trade.

> The Presbyterians ... in many parts of Ulster formed a majority of the population and made a substantial contribution to the wealth of the province ... at first there was little sympathy between Presbyterians and Catholics, but late in the eighteenth century, when the impoverished and degraded 'papists' could no longer be regarded as a threat to their security, radical Presbyterians were prepared to accept their help in an attempt to subvert the system of privilege on which that Protestant ascendancy rested.[116]

The ideology of this movement was very influenced by the French revolution.[117] Its cause was legitimated by appeals to the 'rights of man'. The leaders of this movement exemplified a radically liberal position with respect to politics and religion, maintaining that the two ought to be kept separate.[118]

The Society of United Irishmen was founded in 1791 by middle class radicals, mostly Presbyterian. Its aims were to unite those of different religions under the common name of Irishmen to achieve independence for Ireland, democratize parliament, and end discrimination.

However, in spite of its appeal to Irishmen to unite, liberalism was a feature of urban rather than rural areas. Support for the cause and its leadership originally tended to be middle class. According to Moody (1974), Catholics flocked to the movement, attracted by its anti-ascendancy position rather than its appeal for unity among Protestants and Catholics.[119]

Finally, the 'revolutionary' movement among Catholics was marked by a counter-movement among Protestants. Some Protestants who were previously associated with the liberal tradition could not support the 'treasonable' position of the developing United

Irishmen. More seriously, the revival of the Orange tradition in Ulster was a direct response to the perceived Catholic threat. Unlike the sectarian agrarian societies the "Orange Society combined Protestant tenants with land-owners in a secret organization for the defence of protestant ascendancy."[120]

Historical accounts show that sectarian bigotry was encouraged by political leaders.[121] Strategically, it was in the interest of the ascendency to keep the lower (objective) class from forming a 'class in itself', which would have made the rebellion dangerous. The movement was split by sectarian divisions and failed. "By the act of union of 1800 Ireland was merged juridically in the United Kingdom and given representation in the parliament of that kingdom."[122]

Three points emerge clearly from this period. First, we can now attempt to answer the question about the importance of different social factors in social conflict in the North. As with the present conflict, class, nationalism, and sectarianism were intertwined. The revolt against the ascendancy appears to have been class-conflict. But as O'Brien points out

> The trouble with that was that the landlords were almost all Protestant. There are times when it is hard to tell class war from religious war or tribal war, and hard even for those involved to be sure which it is they are at.[123]

However, the United Irishmen introduced a nationalist or republican theme into the situation that remains a feature of political life in Ireland today.

Secondly, the extension of Catholics political rights resulted in the act of union with Britain being seen as a safe-guard of Protestant ascendancy in Ireland. In the joint parliament, Nationalists or Catholics would remain a politically impotent minority. The link with Britain is still viewed as the safe-guard of unionist (Protestant) ascendancy in the North today.

Finally, sectarian divisions were reaffirmed. Equally significant is the birth of the Orange proletariat and Protestant ruling class alliance. This pattern will be seen to re-emerge over and over again.

The Republican Myth

It is from the words and ideals of the leader of the United Irishmen that todays IRA draw their Inspiration. This leader was a Protestant called Wolfe Tone. Annually, the ceremonial expressions of the IRA ideology was in graveside orations at Bodenstown, burial place of Tone. The patriotic utterances of such symbollically significant occasions capture something of the IRA world view. All Republicans of course are not members of the IRA, but I am concerned here with ideology rather than organization and political activity. Typically, the IRA pledge themselves 'to continue the struggle until their country is free.' For Republicans the source of the problem, and the enemy, is not the Protestant community but the British in Ireland. This definition of reality is a product of their misinterpretation of the past being imposed on the present, a form of mythical thinking. The IRA[124] ideology is closely linked to that of Wolfe Tone. His aims were,

> To subvert the tyranny of our execrable government, to break the connection with England ... and to assert the independence of my country- these were my objectives. To unite the whole people of Ireland ... to substitute the common name of Irishmen in place of the denominations of Protestant and Catholic and Dissenter ... these were my means.[125]

As shown the movement was not characterized by the unification of all Irishmen, but sectarian divisions prevailed. However, Tone's declaration has become part of the 'nationalist myth which tends to exaggerate the rapprochment between Catholics and Protestants.[126] This explains why "theoretically" Republicanism is not sectarian. Mac Stiofain, of the Provisional IRA argues:

> People say our campaign in Northern Ireland is sectarian. I deny this ... members of the UDR and the RUC ... are shot because they're active agents of Britain Imperialism[127]

The IRA believes it is fighting in the interests of all Irishmen. Those that are not Irish but British should leave.[128] The IRA's obsession with the 'British enemy' is obvious below.

> We declare our allegience to the 32-County Republic ... overthrown by force of arms in 1922 and suppressed to this day by the existing British-imposed Six-County and 26-County partition states.[129]

Again

> The Irish Resistence Movement renews its pledge of eternal hostility to the British forces of Occupation in Ireland ... [We] look forward ... [to] the final and victorious phase of the struggle for the full freedom of Ireland.[130]

Republicans tend to structure the political world in terms of the categories of Irish and British (English). Protestants, as we saw, generally organize political reality through the constructs

of Catholic and Protestant.[131] Ideologically, Unionists and Republicans are engaged in a different battle.

In practice, however, the Nationlist and Republican appeal has been 'sectarian'.

> Nationalism claimed to be non-sectarian and many of its heroes (Tone, Mitchell, Butt and Parnell) were Protestants; but generally speaking Nationalism was, and continues to be, the political creed of most Irish Catholics. Its primary aim was to secure the repeal of the Act of Union so that Ireland might enjoy self-government, but Nationalists did not always agree on the form that self-government should take, or even on the means that might be used to obtain it.[132]

Although Nationalists and Republicans differed, and differ, on tactics and the type of "home rule", they are united on the more general level of rejecting British Rule in Ireland.

Ideology

The time period discussed, rather than being seen as an account of three hundred years of Irish history, may usefully be seen as a stage of development. That is, what we have been looking at was the process of development of weltanschauungen or ideologies.

I have identified the origins and growth of nationalism, and this ideology's crystalization as a predominantly Catholic-based movement. I have shown the roots of Orangeism. I pointed to the cross-class Protestant alliance that characterized the opposition, first to Catholics in the early days of colonialism, and second to Nationalism at the end of the eighteenth century. The outgrowth of this was that hence-forth, a combination of

Protestants of both upper and lower objective classes, were united in their opposition to Nationalism, which to them signified Catholic power. They came to share a common ideology which held the link with Britain as sacred. This ideology will be referred to as Unionism.[133]

The final stage of crystalization of ideologies and objectivation of reality will be discussed in the next section. But first it is necessary to examine the nature of ideology in Ireland.

Ideology can be understood as an outgrowth of the collective life in which the individual participates.[134] As we have seen, ideologies 'developed' in Northern Ireland. They were not simply transmitted unmodified or unaltered from one generation to the next, unaffected by the changing socio-economic and political situation in which the groups found themselves.[135] However, for certain modes of cognizing there may be a basic continuity with the past. Certain principles and ideals by which the world is, or ought to be organized may remain unchanged for long period of time. Mannheim argues that

> Both conservative and progressive groups of various kinds inherit ideologies which somehow have existed in the past. Conservative groups fall back upon attitudes, methods of thought, ideas of remote epochs and adapt them to new situations; but newly emerging groups also take up at first already existing ideas and methods, so that a cross section through the rival ideologies combating one another at a given moment also represents a cross section through the historical past of the society in question.[136]

History, however, is more than the mere passive unfolding of potentialities. The 'meaning' of socially held principles or ideas may change for each generation to a greater or lesser extent. The degree to which human thoughts and beliefs are accepted as unquestioned and reified principles must be empirically established. This phenomenon may be associated with particular modes of cognizing.

According to Mannhiem the conservative style of thought sees what "is", the status quo, as the norm. It sees the present state of affairs as what ought to be. Progressive thought considers and judges the actual by reference to what ought to be, how the present diverges from the ideal.[137]

> Whereas progressive or liberal thought considers the actual by reference to the possible in terms of the normative, conservativism, on the contrary, sees 'the actual as the product of real factors' and understands 'the norm in terms of the actual' ... And while progressive thought derives the significance of the particular ultimately from a utopia of the future or from some higher norm, conservativism takes it from the past ...[138]

The ideologies that crystalized during the nineteenth century in Ireland among the Catholic and Protestant population both contained significant elements from the past.[139]

> ... the basic aims of different social groups do not merely crystallize ideas into actual movements of thought but also create different antagonistic Weltanschauungen and different antagonistic styles of thought.[140]

In the North, Catholics and Protestants interpret reality today in terms of these antagonistic ideologies developed in the past.

This process of emergence of thought and its externalization into objective reality culminated in the creation of the state of Northern Ireland in 1920'.

In the sense that the Catholic orientation towards the political world, when translated into conduct, threatens to shatter the status quo, it may be called Utopian. During the nineteenth century and to the present time in Northern Ireland, independence from Britain has been a dominant theme of Nationalism.

In that the Protestant ideology wishes to preserve the status quo through the continuation of Unionist rule and the link with Britain it may be called conservative. As I will show in chapter four, both Catholic and Protestant modes of thought are reality transcendent. Mannheim sees both utopian and ideological states of mind as being incongruent with reality.[141] However, given th problems associated with distinguishing between these two orientations, I shall refer to them both loosely as ideological.

ULTIMATE OBJECTIVATION

In this section I shall discuss the culmination of the long period of negotiation between Catholics and Protestants over politico-ideological definitions of reality. I shall point to the precarious nature of the socially constructed reality of Northern Ireland. As Strauss et al argue,

> Pushing our logic to its extreme, we might even argue that the very idea of a "nation" or society is only a fiction and that if the sociologists subscribe to this common sense fiction rather than viewing a nation or a society as an exceedingly complex arena (with attendent exceedingly complex negotiations) he may fall into the deadly trap of merely studying the fiction as if it were a fact.[142]

Secondly, I will point to the final emergence of politico-ideological categories which still function to structure the political arena in which conflict in Northern Ireland occurs. These 'categories' refer to two related realities. The categories exist conceptually, in ideology. They also exist "existentially'. By the latter I mean that they refer to real living 'flesh and bood' groups.

In this section I will be primarily concerned with ideological factors related to the partition of Ireland and the creation of two states, a Protestant and a Catholic one. In chapter three I shall investigate the material and economic realities behind the division of Ireland, and look at the relationship between ideology and these "objective" conditions.

The Emergence of the Political Categories of Unionism and Nationalism

I have looked at the origin of these categories; now I shall look at the final emergence of a developed and "crystalized" form of the ideologies of Unionism and Nationalism, and at the groups who carried these antagonistic ideologies.

The 'National demand' according to Lyons (1973) remained the essential political question, a perennial source of conflict in nineteenth century Ireland.[143] The 'demand' was a fundamentally separatist one, aimed at breaking "the connections with England, the never-failing source of ... (Ireland's) political evils."[144]

The political definition of the situation encoded in the Act of Union became progressively less acceptable to the Irish Catholic masses as Nationalist consciousness developed. The first mass nationalist movement was led by Daniel O'Connell. Although it was a 'non-sectarian' nationalism, it was generally supported by Catholics. Its crowning success was 'Catholic emancipation', the right for Catholics to sit in parliament as Irish representatives.[145] O'Connell's mass movement for repeal of the Act of Union finally failed in 1843.

The growth of political power among Catholics evoked a counter response from the Protestants.

> Ulster presbyterians and episcopalians haunted by the nightmare of a catholic ascendancy replaying protestant ascendancy, composed their differences and joined forces in fervent and steady support of the union, and in implacable hostility to nationalism.[146]

The abortive rebellion by the Young Irelanders in 1848,[147] the Fenian rising of 1867, and the extention of the franchise 1872, all served to heighten Protestant fears of Catholics as a growing political force in Ireland. The Young Irelanders, as with other nationalist movements in Ireland, was well within the tradition of mis-interpreting history for political ends.

> The history of Ireland as interpretated to the people by the Young Irelanders through the medium of their paper, the Nation, and through other forms of popularization, was simplified and sentimentalized - at times,indeed, silly - but it generated a myth of Ireland which was not confined to their own small circle but was widely received by the people.[148]

The Young Irelanders, the Fenians, the IRB of 1916 and the IRA of today can be seen as being in direct lineal descent. All these movements have been characterized by a reality that fell short of the ideal. From the United Irishmen in 1798, to the IRA in 1972, the utopian transformation has not occurred, yet the struggle continues, little changed.[149]

Nationalism in Ireland was accompanied by growing Catholic-Protestant tensions in the North, and increased resentment between Catholics and the landlord, Protestant ascendancy in the South. Perhaps more that any other factor, the famine of 1845-1848 heightened attachment to the nationalist cause.

> Yet while the immediate effect of the 'great hunger' was to impose an overwhelming burden of suffering upon an impoverished people and defenceless people, it may well be that its most profound impact on Irish history lay in its ultimate psychological legacy. Expressed in its simplist terms, this legacy was that the long-standing and deep-rooted hatred of the English connection was given not only a new intensity, but also a new dimension ... the old bitterness of a depressed peasantry against an alien and often ruthless landlord class was reinforced by resentment towards a government which ... had shown itself manifestly inadequate ... this hatred, this bitterness, this resentment were carried overseas, and especially to America ... [150]

The general election of 1885, the first election fought under the reformed franchise, shows that the solid mass of Catholic opinion favoured 'Home-Rule'. Home-rulers won 85 of the 103 Irish seats at Westminster. In Ulster, home-rulers won 17 of the 33 seats, giving them a slight majority over the Unionists who won 16 of the Ulster seats. This pattern remained until 1918.[151]

In Ireland, especially in Ulster, Protestants united against

Home-Rule.[152] According to Lyons, differences among Protestants became insignificant:

> ... the moment the supposed threat from Roman Catholicism took visable shape in the development of a dynamic Home-Rule movement in the 1880s. Thereafter, the tendency of most Northern Protestants was to close ranks against the common enemy: since Catholics reacted in the same way, the sectarianism which has bedevilled politics in the province from that day to this became inevitable.[153]

Of the evangelical movement that accompanied the heightening of Protestant 'political consciousness', in the North, Lyons adds,

> This heightening of religious fervour contributed inevitably to the intensification of sectarian rivalry within the province which in time overflowed into politics, especially after Home-Rule had emerged as a real challenge to the status quo. From this followed two consequences, each of them profoundly influencing not just Ulster but all Ireland. First, because Protestantism was increasingly identified with the maintenance of the Union ... between 1885 and 1914 parliamentary contests ... tended to be straight fights between ... Nationalist and Unionist parties ... But the second consequence of the increasing identification of Protestansim with Unionism was even more important. The Orange Order ... [was] revived, evoking from the Catholic side a similar enthusiasm for a counter-organization, the Ancient Order of Hibernians. Orangeism, in its new incarnation... provided a rallying-point for Protestant Unionists regardless of denominational, social or economic differences.[154]

In 1912, a home-rule bill was passed by the British house of commons, and appeared certain of becoming law. However, this hope was threatned by an 'Unionist rebellion' in 1914, which was openly encouraged by the British conservative party.[155] The outbreak of the second world war 'suspended' official negotiation. The rebellion of 1916 and the brutal British reaction, coupled with the delay in introducing Home-Rule, led to heightened

Nationalist demands. This 'growth of political consciousness' was accompanied by the rapid rise to power of the more radically Nationalist Sinn Fein party, whose elected representatives declared an independent parliament for Ireland in 1919.

By the second decade of the twentieth century the developed categories of Protestant and Catholic which structure the political life world to this day in Northern Ireland, had emerged. The antagonistic ideologies of Unionism and Nationalism were fully developed.

The Social Construction of Northern Ireland

So massively real were the ideologically separate worlds of Catholics and Protestants that by 1918 it was evident that there was no way that commonly agreed upon political universes of meaning could be shared. The competing ideologies were mutually contradictory. Unionists wished to preserve the link with Britain while to Nationalists, this alliance was illegitimate. To the Westminster parliament 'partition' appeared the most feasible solution.

The division of Ireland in the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, and the acceptance of this in the Anglo-Irish treaty that followed the 1919-1921 Irish war of Independence, did not solve the problem. The contradictions remained. The new state of Northern Ireland contained within its boundaries the tensions of opposed positions. The institutions of the state functioned as the reification of antagonistic social relations.[156] Traditional divisions continued to estrange members of the new 'society'. To conceive of Northern Ireland

as having been a political entity is fictitious.[157] To understand this argument and those of the next three chapters, it is necessary to look at the ideological foundations of the state of Northern Ireland.

The Ideological Foundations of Northern Ireland

I shall briefly investigate the types of political consciousness that dominated in the creation of Northern Ireland.

In the mythology of Orange and Green, Nationalism and Popery, Unionism and Protestantism tended to become simply equated. To Northern Protestants, self-government for Ireland appeared synonomous with Rome (Catholic) rule.[158]

> Traditionally, it has been hard for those outside Ireland ... to realize the intensity and passion of the Unionists' cry that Home-Rule meant Rome Rule. Their insecurity sprang partly from the realization of their numerical inferiority over the country as a whole ... but most of all from the evidence, which seemed to them convincing, that the Catholic Church was already a power in nationalist politics.[159]

If Protestants opposed Home-Rule on religious grounds, they also opposed it on political grounds. The political ends, however, are 'ultimately significant' for those involved, not mere politics. The popular leader, Sir Edward Carson states,

> ... I will tell ... (those) who think we are a lot of babies playing a kind of game for some political party. We do not care about political parties, excepting in so far as they support the Union. That is our political part. We sink our Radicalism, our Socialism, we sink anything. We will not have Home Rule.[160]

Carson sees the situation as one where the Unionists are threatened with being driven "out of a community in which they are satisfied into a community which they loathe, hate and detest."[161] As the Protestant Bishop of Down and Connor saw it, "... men, true men, must be prepared to hold together in defense of their alters and their hearts, and to face all dangers."[162] The appeal is emotional and religious. The mode of cognising shows little concern with 'pragmatic considerations'; costs, consequences, and benefits. The course of action for them (as we shall also see with the extreme nationalists) is indubitably right.

> We are determined, under no circumstances, under no conditions, regardless of consequences and regardless of suffering, even for one moment to submit to a Home-Rule Parliament in Dublin.[163]

According to Edelman's definition, this way of thinking about the world characterizes mythical thought. It is non-dialectical The consequences of a reality objectivated in such a manner are discussed in chapter four. The immediate result was the creation of Northern Ireland.

Perhaps the most formidable evidence of Protestant political consciousness that prevailed in the construction of social reality lies in The Ulster Covenant. In 1912, almost half a million men and women in Ulster signed - some in blood.[164]

> Being convinced in our conscience that Home-Rule would be disastrous to the material well-being of Ulster as well as the whole of Ireland, subversive of our civil and religious freedom, destructive of our citizenship, and perilous to the unity of the Empire ... humbly relying on God whom our fathers in days of stress and trial confidently trusted, hereby pledge ourselves in solemn Covenant in this time of our threatened calamity to stand by one another ... to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule

> parliament in Ireland ... we solemnly ... pledge ourselves to refuse to recognize its authority. In sure confidence that God will defend the right...[165]

Political expressions in the South show patriots there were similarly committed to realizing their dreams. The following extract comes from the Proclamation of the Irish Republic of 1916. Although the rebellion received little popular support at the time, within three years this proclamation was formally ratified by the popularly elected parliament of 1919.[166]

> Irishmen and Irishwomen! In the name of God and of the dead generations from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through us summons her children to the flag and strikes for her freedom ... In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty: six times during the past three hundred years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right ...[167]

The appeal is to tradition, to the emotions and sentiments. It refers to a fundamental right of a nation. However, it seems to show little concern for those Irishmen and women who opposed its ideology. The style is mythical. In that it fails to appreciate the ambiguities associated with the empirical category of the Irish nation, the proclamation reveals a reality transcendent mode of thought. Like the IRA today, the ideological mode of thought structures the world according to categories of Irish and British, which are not adequate for dealing with the complexities of 'real' world. Ideologically, the proclamation of 1916 was not sectarian, but its consequences were.

Given the Unionist commitment to unity with Britain, and their rejection of what Catholics saw as their democratic and moral right, we can see how "facts", "truth", and "justice" are subject to the frame of reference employed.

The Solution

The "negotiated" state of Northern Ireland,[168] included the most industrially and economically developed part of Ireland. Apart from ideology, political and material considerations lay behind the actual location of the border.[169] The debates of the Ulster Unionist council reveals the rationale involved in the choice of territory,

> [the state] ... was intended to include as large an area as possible while at the same time keeping within the total area a comfortable working majority for the union, a majority in fact of two to one.[170]

The political viability of the social order established in the South also tended to dominate political decisions made there, those who considered themselves true Republicans felt that their ideology was compromised by the political regime of the Free-State. In 1919, the first Dail (parliament) had declared its commitment to the Republic.[171] Cathal Brugha stated:

> Deputies, you understand what is asserted ... that we are now done with England. Let the world know it and those who are concerned bear it in mind.[172]

In 1921 Irish representatives accepted "The Treaty", which provided for the partition of Ireland and the establishment of a Free State rather than a full Republic for all Ireland.

> The treaty caused an intensely emotional controversy in the Dail and all over the country ...
>
> ... against (the treaty) ... the all-or-nothing Republican leaders, all rowing with a tide of romantic tradition, the Treatyites were unable to drive home their arguments adequately. They couldn't argue with complete success against the voices from the graves, ...[173]

The result was civil war in Ireland, not between Protestant and Catholic,[174] but between those who accepted the treaty, and those who would push on to the full Republic ... without a democratic mandate.

> The anti-treaty section's failure to win wide-spread support from the population was itself symptomatic of a deeper malaise ... (Republicans) had a policy, indeed - to assert in arms the indivisible republic. Unfortunately, for them, it was a republic which was more invisible than indivisible, and the sincere and moving idealism with which its champions sought to evoke it roused little echo in a war-weary country ...[175]

Although the majority of the population of Ireland rejected, and continue to reject Republican militarism, Republican aspirations for a free and united Ireland, independent from Britain, formed the ideological foundation of the political regime in the South.[176]

The Unionists legitimated their right to rule in the North by appealing to their unity with Briain. Unionists claimed to be "loyal". Bonar Law, leader of the British conservative party, proclaims that,

> I can imagine no length of resistence to which Ulster can go in which I should not be prepared to support them, in which in my belief they would not be supported by the overwhelming majority of the British people.[177]

The belief in the unity and integrity of the British Empire may have provided reassurance in a time of uncertainty, but it denied the reality of millions of subjects who saw this unity as immoral. The appeal to Ulster is also ideological. Ulster's population contained 890,108 Protestants, and 690,134 Catholics.[178]

However, ideological interpretations of the world were indubitable, the 'cause' was ultimately important,

> They may tell us, if they like, that this is treason. It is not for men who have such stakes as we have at issue to trouble about the cost. We are prepared to take the consequences and in the struggle we shall not be alone, because we have the best in England with us.[179]

The Consequences

As I will show, the construction of the "Protestant" state of Northern Ireland, with a one third CAtholic minority, was not a realistic decision. The minority's religion was equated with a treasonable political position. They were seen and treated as a threat to the state. Many of the institutions of the state came to reflect this consciousness. Social divisions were reinforced and hardened as reality copied myth. Political, educational, recreational and other social institutions can be seen as the objectivation of estranged social relations, as the society remained divided along religious lines. The basis of the social order did not rest on consensus, but on the ability of one group to impose its definition of reality on the situation.

> As long as Catholics resided in Northern Ireland, they were expected to comply with the regimes laws. Their support was neither sought nor obtained ... entirely consistent with the Orange version of Irish history.[180]

The Catholics in Northern Ireland also remained imprisoned in their ideology, displaying social and political apathy. They regarded partition as unjust, but appeased active political consciousness with dreams of re-unification.

> Over and above their particular grievances, though vitally connected with them, the greater part of the Catholic community suffered from a sense of national frustration. ... they had been forced [into] ... Northern Ireland. However they might in practice resign themselves to the new regime, their sense of national identity remained ...[181]

The externalized political reality of Unionists' consciousness prevailed. The humanly produced institutions reflected and perpetuated social divisions. Antagonistic social relations were institutionalized, so that the state's political apparatus carried objectivated in it a definite world-view and conception of its population's allegiances.

Institutions are the products of externalized consciousness, and they in turn shape consciousness. I shall show in chapter 5 how politico-ideological definitions of reality were reproduced in Northern Ireland, through various socialization processes, however, institutions, by definition, imply historicity and control. They limit man's potential to create reality because they provide ready-made definitions and configurations of reality, produced through a historical process. The state of Northern Ireland came into being in a time of virtual civil war.

The crystalized ethos of the state (via institutions) reflected that reality, and continued to re-create that reality. These institutions, among other things, represented and mediated the objectivated aggregates of what different groups held to be 'knowledge'. It was taken as fact, as unquestionable social knowledge, for many, that 'Catholics were out to destroy the state'. Reality was constructed in a manner that ensured that Catholics remained politically subordinate. Institutionalized definitions of reality changed little. The North retained - barely below the surface - a near para-military regime. Unlike Britain and the South, the police force - the RUC., and their part-time reinforcement - the B special- remained armed. The state permanently 'suspended' constitutional safeguards of civil and political rights.

> The power of these para-military police forces were greatly enlarged by ... (the special-powers) Act... renewed annually until 1933 when a similar but permanent act replaced it.[182]

Thus, a "state of emergency" became normal in the North - institutionalized fear and expectations of a political threat from the minority. If justified during the early years of the state, I shall show that it was not a realistic or adequate definition of the situation in later decades.[184] However, the 'official' interpretation of 'reality' functioned as a reification. Indeed, it might be argued that Unionist politicians had become too comfortable with established 'reality', after fifty years of uninterupted Unionist political power, to

perceive of any reasons to revise definitions of the situation.

Normal politics based on dialogue and compromise had never been possible in the North. I will show that this feature of Ulster's political life remained, and will remain as long as the traditional categories of politics and religion run together. Dialogue will not be possible while Catholics' prime political aspirations are nationalist, and while Protestants see that their principle political interests lie in "defending" Unionism. According to the traditional definitions of these positions, each opinion categorically excluded the other. What was there to talk about? Unionism and Nationalism were the negation of each other.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. Hiller, P., "Social Reality and Social Stratification", The Sociological Review, XXI (1973) p. 93.

2. Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., The Social Construction of Reality, (1967) p. 64. (For a practical example of this phenomenon, see Bell, J. Bowyer, The Secret Army: A History of the I.R.A. 1916-1970, (1972) pp. 437-446).

3. See p. 46 in this chapter.

4. Magee, J., Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict, (1974) p. 27.

5. Ibid.

6. O'Brien, Connor Cruise, "Ireland Will Not Have Peace", Harper's, CCLIII (no. 1519, December, 1976) p. 37.

7. Bell, J. Bowyer, op. cit., p. 20.

8. See, for example, Cathleen ni Houlihan, (1902).

9. O'Brien, Connor Cruise, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

10. Ibid.

11. Bell, J. Bowyer, op. cit., pp. 438-439.

12. After the failure of the 1956-1962 campaign the 'physical force' men in the I.R.A. gave way to a more leftwing intellectual leadership who declared the intention of creating a thirty-two county Irish Socialist State. However, some traditional Republicans did not go along with the socialist leadership, especially in 1969 when working-class Catholic areas in Belfast found themselves without guns for defense. Residents expressed their disappointment in the I.R A. by daubing 'I.R.A. - I RAN AWAY' on walls. A new branch of the I.R.A. - the Provisionals - grew up, claiming to be defending the community. They are extremely traditional and tend also to be sectarian. Thus, after 1969 there are two rival I.R.A.'s - the 'Officials' and the 'Provisionals'.

13. Bell, J. Bowyer, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

14. Ibid., p. 442.

15. O'Brien, Connor Cruise, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

16. The rebels of 1916 became martyrs for the cause. See Bell, J. Bowyer, op. cit., p. 25.

17. Sorel, G., Reflections on Violence, (1950) chapter IV.

18. BEll, J. Bowyer, op. cit., p. 19.

19. Ibid., p. 17.

20. See chapter V.

21. See Douglas, M., Purity and Danger, (1970) chapter V.

22. Fitzgerald, G., Towards a New Ireland, (1972) p. 12.

23. Note the importance of annual parades, traditional songs, and slogans in political life in Northern Ireland.

24. See p. 98-100.

25. Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., op. cit. p. 76.

26. Fallding, H., The Sociology of Religion, (1974) p. 28.

27. Ibid.

28. MacSwiney, T., Principles of Freedom, (1921) pp. 13-14.

29. The Protestant Bishop of Down and Connor, quoted in the anonymous The Complete Grammar of Anarchy, (1912) pp. 15-16.

30. See chapter V.

31. See chapter V.

32. To some extent, Unionism may be seen as a form of Nationalism.

33. See, for example, the 1916 Proclamation of Independence.

34. There were periods during which the country acgieved a degree of integration, but most generally there existed intense internal rivalries. For a discussion of the problems relating to the defining of the Irish nation, see O'Brien, C. Cruise, States of Ireland, (1972) chapter III.

35. See p. 41 ff.

36. Irish school history text-books stress the internal divisions in explaining the military success of the Normans in Ireland.

37. The Rebellion of 1798 can be seen as the first nationalist rising. Radically liberal Presbyterian colonizers had developed a form of nationalism. However, subsequent to the failure of the rising, Irish nationalism tended to be a Catholic-supported cause.

38. See Bell, J. Bowyer, op. cit., p. 437.

39. An I.R.A. man, quoted in Bell, J. Bowyer, op. cit., p. 239.

40. See chapters III and IV.

41. They were associated with, among other things, the breaking of the political power of the Holy Roman Empire.

42. Moody, T.W., The Ulster Question: 1603-1973, (1974) p. 3.

43. Self-styled Moderator of the 'Free Presbyterian Church'. He was also to become a Member of Parliament of both Westminster and Stormont. Paisley had considerable support:

> Defining Paisleyism at its broadest - at all costs to endeavour to keep Northern Ireland Protestant - would classify slightly more than half the protestants in the Province as Paisely-ites. Defining Paisleyism as support for the man as a potential political leader, shows a lower, but still substantial following. A survey by National Opinion Polls in 1967 found that 32% of Protestants said they usually agreed with what Paisley said.

Rose, R., Governing Without Consensus, (1971) p. 255.

44. Paisely, quoted in Rose, R., op.cit., p. 227.

45. Magee, J., op. cit., p. 30.

46. Moody, T. W., op. cit., p. 5.

47. This language difference has gone; for the majority of the people in Ireland, English is the first langugae. Catholics, however, generally learn Gaelic at school.

48. Moody, T.W., op. cit., p. 7.

49. See de Paor, L., Divided Ulster, (1971), p. 12.

50. Ibid., p. 11.

51. Protestant political slogans show a preoccupation with a sense of threat: 'No surrender'; 'Not an inch'; 'Ulster will fight'.

52. Moody, T.W., op. cit., pp. 6-7.

53. O'Brien, C. Cruise, States of Ireland (1972) ch's VIII & IX.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid., p. 39.

56. Ibid., p. 36.

57. See chapter I.

58. Magee, J., op. cit., p. 32.

59. Schutz, A., Collected Papers II (1970) pp. 20-63.

60. This is a key theme in Murray Edelman's treatment of cognizing and political arousal: see his Politics as Symbolic Action, (1971). See also chapter IV.

61. de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 16.

62. Quoted in Boulton, D., The U.V.F. 1966-1973: The Anatomy of Loyalist Rebellion, (1973) p. 35.

63. From the "Loyalist News", quoted in Dillon, M. and Lehane, D. Political Murder in Northern Ireland, (1973) p. 51.

64. Boulton, D., op. cit., p. 152.

65. Ibid., p. 153.

66. Fitzgerlald G., op. cit., p. 1. See also de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 16.

67. For a discussion of the phenomenon in recent times, see chapter IV.

68. Sallach, D., "Class Consciousness and the Everyday World in the Work of Marx and Schutz", Insurgent Sociologist, III (no. 4; Summer, 1973) p. 35.

69. See, for example, Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., op. cit., pp. 67-72.

70. For a theoretical discussion of this phenomenon, see chapter IV

71. See chapter IV.

72. de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 10.

73. Pailsey, quoted in Marrinan, P., Paisley: Man of Wrath, (1973) pp. 193-194.

74. At the level of national identity, Catholicism has become associated with Irishness in the eyes of some.

75. I drop the use of "in itself" in treating recent events, for, as Rose has shown, Northern Irish people had class awareness.

76. Moody, T.W., op. cit., p. 6.

77. de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 11.

78. Magee, J., op. cit., p. 34.

79. See de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 16.

80. See McHugh, V., Myth and Violence in Northern Ireland, (Unpublished M.A. Thesis: 1977).

81. O'Brien, Connor Cruise, States of Ireland, (1972) p. 35.

82. Dillon, M. and Lehane, D., op. cit., pp. 281-282.

83. Edelman, M., op. cit., p. 14.

84. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

85. Ibid., p . 60.

86. Quoted in Magee, J., op. cit., p. 4.

87. Ritual can be seen to have been a key process here. In objective terms the intermittent and futile native uprisings were sufficient to reaffirm fears.

88. See chapter IV.

89. Schutz, quoted in Sallach, D., op. cit., pp. 34-35.

90. I am not suggesting that idealogical reality was totally unchanging generation after generation, or that it was independent of changes in the socio-historical situation. See pp. 35-38.

91. See Berger, P. and Luckmann, T. on symbolic universes: op. cit. pp. 92-128.

93. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

94. Boyd, A., Holy War in Belfast, (1969) p. 203.

95. Quoted in Boulton D., op. cit., p. 14.

96. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 257.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Quoted in de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 105.

100. Moody, W.T., op. cit., p. 58.

101. O'Brien, Connor Cruise, States of Ireland, (1972) p. 176.

102. See Magee, J., op. cit., p. 117.

103. Boyd, A., Brian Faulkner and the Crisis of Ulster Unionism, (1972) pp. 15-16.

104. Unionism does not form a monolith ideology; it is composed of different social types of political actors. While Unionists in general value such things as the link with Britain, they were found by Rose to be divided into two main types - 'Ultras' or 'Loyalists', who constitute 58% of the Unionist population, and 'Moderates' or 'Fully Allegiants', who make up the remainder. See Rose, P., op. cit., pp. 224-225.

105. Magee, J., op. cit., p. 2.

106. The penal laws were not designed as a form of religious persecution in the strict sense of the term. See Magee, J., op. cit., p. 35.

107. Becket, I., quoted in Magee, J., op. cit., p. 36.

108. Ibid.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid., pp. 37-38.

111. See Senior, H., op. cit., p. 107.

112. Ibid., p. 4.

113. See de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 21.

114. Senior, H., op. cit., p. 8. It was after a Catholic-Protestant 'encounter' in 1795 that the Orange Order was founded.

115. This marks the growing tensions in Northern Ireland between the industrial class Presbyterians and the Anglican land-owners.

116. Magee, J., op. cit., p. 36.

117. In the era of the French Revolution, radically liberal Presbyterians found the inequality in Ireland intolerable. Theyagitated for the emancipation of Catholics and a democratic solution to Ireland's problems. This remarkable liberal tradition was to lose ground in the following decades.

118. See Senior, H., op. cit., p. 26; Magee, J., op. cit. pp. 36-37; Moody, T.W., op. cit., p. 11.

119. Moody, T.W., op. cit., p. 12.

120. Ibid.

121. See Senior, H., op. cit., p. 67.

122. Moody, T.W., op. cit., p. 12.

123. O'Brien, Connor Cruise, States of Ireland, (1972) p. 40.

124. Whether there is any real relationship between the 'sectarian' practices of the Provisional I.R.A. and the ideals of Tone is questionable.

125. Quoted in Magee, J., op. cit., p. 37.

126. Ibid.

127. Quoted in Sweetman, R., "On Our Knees": Ireland 1972, (1972) p. 156.

128. Ibid.

129. Quoted in Bell, J. Bowyer, op. cit., p. 431.

130. Ibid., p. 395.

131. See my discussion of political rhetoric in Chapter IV.

132. Magee, J., op. cit., p. 43.

133. Unionism can be seen as an integrative frame of reference for different interest groups the most significant of which, for this thesis' purpose, was organeism or the Loyalist or Ultra perspective.

134. Mannheim, K., Ideology and Utopia, (1936) p. 57.

135. The problematic nature of this relationship is discussed in Chapter IV.

136. Mannheim, K., in Wolff, K. (ed.) From Karl Mannheim, (1971) p. 112.

137. Wolff, K., Ibid., p. xliii.

138. Ibid.

139. I am concerned here with the ideologies of Republicanism, Orangeism, Nationalism and Unionism.

140. Mannheim, quoted in Wolff, K., op. cit. p. xlii.

141. Mannheim, K., Ideology and Utopia, op. cit., p. 192-194.

142. Strauss, A. et al., quoted in Hall, p., "A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis of Politics", Sociological Inquiry, XXXXII (nos. 3-4; 1972) p. 42.

143. Lyons, F.S.L., Ireland Since the Famine, (1973) p. 15.

144. Ibid.

145. In the short term the real beneficiary of Catholic Emancipation was the Catholic church, not the Catholic masses. See Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 19.

146. Moody, T.W., op. cit., p. 14.

147. This movement was influenced by movements such as Mazzini's in Europe at that time.

148. de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 5.

149. It was little changed in ideological terms until the 1960s - if even then. See Bell, J. Bowyer, op. cit., pp. 437-446.

150. Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 16.

151. Moody, T.W., op. cit., p. 22.

152. There were 2-3 Unionists seats in Dublin during this period.

153. Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 23.

154. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

155. See de Paor, L., op. cit., pp. 56-78.

156. See Chapter IV.

157. However, as we shall see, the Belfast area was economically 'separate' or largely independent of the rest of Ireland.

158. The relationship between the Catholic Church and the political life in Ireland during this period was exceedingly complex. See Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., pp. 18-23.

159. Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 288.

160. Quoted in The Complete Grammar of Anarchy (Anonymous), (1918) pp. 20-21.

161. Ibid., p. 8.

162. Ibid., p. 16.

163. Carson, quoted in The Complete Grammar of Anarchy, p. 23.

164. Wallace, M., Northern Ireland: 50 Years of Self-Government, (1971) p. 66.

165. Ibid.

166. See de Paor, L., op. cit., pp. 86-87.

167. Edmonds, S., The Gun, the Law, and the Irish People, (1971) p. 50.

168. The outcome of the whole process of negotiation was unintended. Neither side wanted a divided Ireland.

169. See Chapter III.

170. de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 93.

171. See Edmonds, S., op. cit., p. 63.

172. Ibid.

173. Ibid., pp. 118-119.

174. It might be argued that something akin to civil war between Catholics and Protestants existed in the North.

175. Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 463.

176. This ideal was not realized in either political or economic dimensions.

177. Quoted in de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 67.

178. Edmonds, S., op. cit., p. 37.

179. Carson, quoted in de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 67.

180. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 92.

181. Moody, T.W., op. cit., p. 43.

182. de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 100.

CHAPTER III
MATERIAL AND ECONOMIC REALITIES BEHIND DIVISIONS AND CONFLICT IN IRELAND

Introduction

In this chapter I will investigate two aspects of the economic realities of Catholic-Protestant relationships in Ireland. As we have seen, the partition of Ireland was closely connected to divisions within Ireland between Catholics and Protestants. The first dimension of economic realities to be discussed will therefore be the material and economic factors involved in partition. The second aspect of the problem to be discussed is the economics of present day Catholic-Protestant estrangement. Hitherto, I have shown that Catholic-Protestant lines of demarcation refer to politico-ideological categories, I shall now determine the extent to which these terms also refer to economic realities.

Both discussions will, of necessity, be brief. I shall limit my concern to those economic factors that are relevant to Catholic-Protestant conflict in Ireland. The first section will deal with the period from the Famine (1845-1848) to partition (1921). The second time period considered will include a short analysis of the changes in the economic structure of Northern Ireland since its creation, its relationship with Great Britain, and objective economic class differences between Catholics and Protestants in the nineteen sixties.

Both periods display important similarities and differences. First, I will show that in both periods political affiliation does not appear to simply reflect economic interests, in that political divides cross-cut class lines, and are found to coincide with religious divisions. Secondly, divisions in Ireland cannot be understood if they are seen as externally imposed. Thirdly, I will show how politics in the first period was inextricably bound up with sectarianism and political ideology, and that Northern Ireland was characterizrd by the failure of labour politics and class-based movements to emerge significantly.[1] This theme is taken up again in chapter four in relation to the period from 1921 until the present. Its relevance to an explanation of social conflict is explored there. Finally, in both chapters three and four it will emerge that beliefs about situations, subjective interpretations of reality, become perhaps more important in influencing action than objective reality.

The important differences that can be seen between the present situation and that of previous Catholic-Protestant conflict will unfold throughout the subsequent chapters. Most generally, I shall argue that economic issues are less clearly defined in the present conflict. That is, the present conflict appears even less related to real class interests. Secondly, Unionism, or the category of political Protestantism, suffers from serious internal divisions[2], their unity appearing to

derive largely from their opposition to certain proposals, principles, ideas or groups. Simply put, at a general level a common threat or enemy acts as an integrative factor.[3]

THE ECONOMIC REALITIES BEHIND PARTITION

In this section I will look at the economic situation in Ireland from the Famine of 1845-48 to the partition of Ireland in 1921. In doing so I will examine those economic factors which were related to the Home-Rule movement and the opposing Unionist movement.

Regional Inequalities

During the nineteenth century, regional inequalities within the United Kingdom increased. Although wealth per capita rose in absolute terms, relatively speaking the gap between the richest and the poorest of the four nations of the United Kingdom increased.

In the 1850's Ireland's per capita wealth was about 27 per cent that of England's, in 1921 it had fallen to twenty per cent.

These figures, however, require cautious interpretation. Ireland during this period had a largely agricultural economy and a low level of industrialization. The following table of the comparative per cent of the work force engaged in agriculture reveals this.

The low valuation of many agricultural holdings in Ireland together with the fact that owners consumed a high proportion of what they grew further depressed official statistics of Irish per capita wealth.[6]

Table III.1

Personal Wealth in the United Kingdom, 1851-1921[4]

(£ per capita tax assessments)

	1851	1871	1891	1921
England	11.1	15.2	18.1	45.8
Wales	7.2	9.5	11.7	30.2
Scotland	7.9	12.0	15.1	50.5
Ireland (32 counties)	3.0	4.9	8.4	9.2

TABLE III.2

Labour In Agriculture in the United Kingdom, 1851-1911[5]

(Per cent of Work Force in Agriculture)

	1851	1881	1911
England	27	10	8
Wales	34	13	10
Scotland	30	14	10
Ireland (32 counties)	53	54	40

> Just how small many of these holding were may be judged from the fact that twenty-four per cent of all holdings in the country in 1845 were between one and five acres in size and approximately another forty percent were between five and fifteen acres.[7]

There was a slight increase in the size of holdings in the post famine period. However, as little as twenty-six percent of all holdings of more than one acre were over thirty acres in size, whereas farms between five and thirty acres constituted fifty-eight percent of the entire total of holdings of more than one acre. The typical farm, being that on which the majority of the agricultural population depended, was between fifteen and thirty acres. At the same time holdings of over thirty acres accounted for over three quarters of the land of Ireland by 1881.[8]

During the period 1851-1921 the number of farm labourers fell sharply. This 'landless' class was among the poorest of all objective economic classes in Ireland. Therefore the decline of this class can be seen as both the cause and effect of growing rural prosperity in post Famine Ireland. In 1841, it is estimated that seventy per cent of the rural population as a whole consisted of laboureres, small holders of less than five acres, and the less prosperous rural artisans.[9] By 1911, the 1,326,000 farm labourers among this estimate had fallen to 277,000 in number at most.[10] These changes in the population came about partly through death, disease, and heavy emigration, and therefore conceal a heavy toll in human suffering

Rural Crisis

Nineteenth century Ireland underwent a rural crisis of which the Famine was the most obvious manifestation. Although some Nationalist explanations lay Ireland's political relationship with Great Britain at the root of the cause of rural poverty, the situation is not unambiguous.

First, the contention that the land tenure system caused rural poverty in Ireland is problematic. It cannot be claimed that the tenure system alone encouraged extreme subdivision and mass dependency on the potato for food. Both these factors tend to be found as features of the period immediately prior to the Famine. Also, these tendencies were limited generally to certain economic categories in particular labourers and cottiers, and to certain geographical areas. Tenant farmers were far less effected by the Famine.

Secondly, population factors are important in explaining rural crisis in Ireland. The rapid population growth in the pre-Famine period coupled with the lack of industrialization made crisis virtually inevitable. Between 1735 and 1785, the population is estimated to have risen by thirty three per cent, or from three million to four. By 1841, it had risen by a hundred and five per cent to over eight million.[12]

Apart from its enormous cost in human suffering, the Famine had profound effects on the social structure of Ireland.

First, it brought about a very marked increase in emigration rates from Ireland. This trend towards emigration

continued, so that the population in Ireland has been almost continuously declining since the Famine. The population of the area that became Northern Ireland has risen slightly since 1891.

> During the last two centuries the population of every country of the Western World has grown faster than before with one exception -- Ireland. Today the population of Ireland is about four and one quarter million, little bigger than it was two hundred years ago. [13]

In the period during and immediately after the Famine the population is estimated

TABLE III.3

Population in Ireland, 1845-1911[14]

Year	Population
1845	approx. 8.5 million
1851	6,552,385
1871	5,412,377
1891	4,704,750
1911	4,390,219

Secondly, the Famine simplified the socio-economic composition of rural Ireland by the near extinction of the cottiers and the decline in the number of labourers. This process continued over the subsequent decades. This trend also reflects changes in the type of farming away from tillage towards a more pastoral economy.[15] Without such a simplification

of the social structure of rural Ireland, the agrarian unrest of the 1870s and 1880s could hardly have been so readily "solved" by the mere transference of land ownership to the tenant farmers.[16]

The Land War

The land war, as it is known, was a period of intense tenant-farmer - landlord opposition. The farmer's key weapons were such tactics as the boycott, with holding rents, and other militant action to prevent re-leasing after evictions. The land-war, as a movement, grew out of the unification of tenant farmers in the Land League, an organization designed to protect tenant-farmers.

> ... the Land War ... between 1879 and 1882, laid the foundations for the ultimate revolution in land tenure whereby over the next thirty years the tenant was enabled to become owner of the farm he worked ... [this development] was to be of fundamental importance in the development of Irish nationalism.[17]

Another authority argues that the out-break of the land war was just as much due to the great increase in national and democratic consciousness as it was to the economic depression during which agrarian conflict came to the fore.[18] The same authority suggests that growing rural prosperity in post Famine Ireland actually exacerbated unrest, rather than diminishing agrarian conflict.[19]

The Land League, as a movement, contained elements of a nationalistic political consciousness. Its slogan, "the land of Ireland for the people of Ireland", expressed and

heightened political consciousness through economic warfare. As Cullen argues,

> Political hostility to the landlords inevitably was leading to the attribution to them of a role of political and economic oppression, a picture that became more clearly defined as political conflict sharpened ... However, given the growth of political hostility, a partisan account of preceding rural history was inevitable. Nor did historians in any way moderate the polemical presentation. In fact, they served to make the picture more unrealistic.[20]

What it is important to note here is that it is not the absolute or objective economic situation that is important in understanding the land war, and later the Home Rule movement. Rather, the perceived situation and its relationship to the ideal and expectations is important. Agitation in Ireland for economic and political reforms occurred when things had greatly improved. Also, it should be stressed that political and economic issues reinforced each other.

The land reform movement became associated with the Home Rule movement, which supported the cause of legislative independence for Ireland. Through an unhappy alliance of Parnell[21] and Davitt,[22] the land-war took a parliamentary road to reform. Fenianism, or militant Republicanism, was undergoing a similar experience.

> [The Home Rule movement] ... came to have decisive though indefinable and ambiguous connections with the Fenian rank and file, most notably in the great land agitation of 1879-82. In a sense the revolutionary movement was captured by the constitutional movement working through a militant and independent Irish party in parliament.[23]

While the land struggle had of course a rural base among lower objective classes, the Home Rule movement drew its support both from these categories and from the lower and middle classes in the towns. Socialist accounts may see that the "revolutionary" land struggle was safely contained, and that its real class nature was contaminated by Nationalism. Thus de Paor argues,

> The most significant indication, however, that revolution had been contained, and the independence movement successfully diverted into a relatively 'safe' struggle for power within a basically unchanged colonial system, was the winning over ... of the Irish Catholic bishops to a qualified support for the nationalist movement.[24]

de Paor suggests that the struggle for power rather than class struggle, within a little changed system characterized the nationalist's Home Rule campaign against Britain. This is not the equivalent to saying that economics and religion were not important. They were; however, Lyons maintains that,

> Economic stresses and religious rivalries, although an essential part of the developing pattern in post-Famine Ireland, remained nevertheless a subordinate part, affecting, but themselves even more affected by, the unremitting struggle to maintain the Union on the one side, and on the other side to destroy it ... those who were for the status quo and those who were against it.[25]

The status quo in question was the distribution of power between Ireland and Britain, not the economic system.[26] There were indeed elements within the nationalist camp that threatened the economic and property arrangements in Ireland. The land war was associated with an animated attack on property. The land League's leader did advocate nationalization of the land rather than a system of private property. However, the "revolutionary"

movement in Ireland was predominantly Nationalist and Separatist.

The changes in the composition and social structure of rural Ireland in the post Famine period had profound effects on the political potentials of the population.

> The old order before the Famine had rested upon a powerful, still confident aristocracy on the one hand and upon an impoverished and insecure peasantry on the other. But whereas economic circumstances before 1850 had conspired to produce a rural proletariat, improved conditions in the second half of the nineteenth century, combined with the rudiments of education and the ability to accumulate a little capital, had begun to transform that proletariat into a bourgeoisie. Indeed, it is even possible that the very effectiveness of the land war of the 1870s and 1880s, and the tenacity with which the tenants sustained it, may have been as much a reflection of their improved status as of their desperation.[27]

The economic issues of the agrarian movement were largely 'settled'[28] by a series of Acts beginning in the 1880s, which provided tenant farmers with capital with which to buy out their holdings, and so become farm owners.

Consequences

Several important developments followed agrarian crisis in Ireland. First, the 'men of no property' became fewer in numbers. The failure of this objective class to develop into a revolutionary force may provide an explanation for the economically conservative nature of the political rebellion in the twentieth century. Second as Lyons (1973) argues, the rural proletariat may have been fast becoming a rural bourgeoisie,[29] the agreement on economic demands was followed by increased constitutional agitation for political independence. Thirdly, in spite of the economic issues involved in the land war, it was not characterized by unity between Catholics and Protestant

tenant farmers in their common opposition to landlords.

> The league met this breach of tenant-farmer solidarity by opening a campaign in Ulster to win over the Protestant farmers to the common anti-landlord cause, and to persuade them to set aside religious prejudice. By this time Ulster already had a number of active tenant-right associations but on the whole they went their own way, and the appeal for solidarity failed.[30]

Ulster Protestant Farmer's dissent from the Land League should not be seen as imply religious prejudice. Protestants were reluctant to join the movement because of the associations between the land war and the Home Rule movement. Another factor was that Ulster's tenant farmer -- landlord relationship was not in general marked by the hostility found in this relationship in the rest of the country. Ironically, conflict between tenant and landlords resulted in the creation of even stronger unity between Protestant farmers and their landlords.

> ... the agrarian revolution that was turning Ulster farmers, protestant and catholic, into peasant proprietors, was itself both an expression of, and a stimulus to, that very nationalism to which Ulster protestants were so fervently opposed. Agrarian revolution, which in the rest of Ireland undermined protestant ascendancy, served in Ulster to strengthen the union with Britain by removing the only grounds of estrangement between protestant farmers and the landed aristocracy.[31]

Economic Decline in Nineteenth Century Ireland

The Nationalists' account of Ireland as having been continually economically retarded through its association with Britain is exceedingly problematic. To begin with, interest in Ireland's economic history and relationship with Britain tended to correlate with periods of heightened political agitation, and there was a propensity towards polemical or

partisan interpretations of the situation.[32] This is true of the political Sinn Fein movement,

> Ample historical arguments, sanctioned even by the authority of independent scholarship, were now available for use in the Sinn Fein case for political and economic autonomy. It is significant that most of the general works on Irish economic history appeared at the peak of the political struggle between 1918 and 1921. The subsequent decline in interest was in keeping with the marked political motivation of study of the subject in the previous two hundred year.[33]

Cullen continues: "our knowledge of Irish economic history is based largely on premises selected during the political agitations of the late nineteenth century."[34]

It is also noteworthy that serious economic demands did not become a significant feature of the Home Rule movement until relatively late in its career.[35] Even before the emergence of the Home Rule movement's association with demands for protectionist economic policies, opposition to it was manifestly conspicious among Northern Protestants.[36]

Although the Nationalist case may be an over-statement, there is no doubt that Ireland, relative to Britain, was indeed disadvantaged and suffered economic decline in the nineteenth century.

> It is, of course, true that by English standards Ireland was backward indeed, but so was every other country in Europe. England at this time was unique. English living standards were higher and the rate of growth of the English economy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries faster than anywhere else.[37]

However, as we shall see, Ireland's proximity to an industrially exceedingly economically advanced neighbour is relevent in explaining industrial decline in Ireland.

It was commonly felt in twentieth century Ireland that the Act of Union of 1800, which in effect created a free trade area within the United Kingdom, was largely responsible for Ireland's economic problems. Several issues must be explored.

Contrary to the Nationalist opinion which holds that the Union was imposed on Ireland through a mixture of force, deception, and trickery, against the economic interests and the will of the Irish, the Act of Union is remarkable for the lack of serious opposition to it on economic grounds. Indeed, if Green is correct,a belief that the 'common market' arrangement would be of mutual advantage prevailed. Green argues that

> A sense of reciprocal advantage had now begun to replace the belief that one country could only prosper at the expense of another. The younger Pitt and his colleagues no longer viewed Ireland as a dangerous competitor. On the contrary, they regarded the creation of a free trading area for the whole British Isles as a positive gain.[38]

Secondly, the main impetus for the Union was political.

> The Union, as we well know, was pushed through for reasons of security. The government of the day, faced with an external and even an internal threat from revolutionary France, was convinced that the continued existence of two parliaments could only lead to disaster. Full equality within the United Kingdom was offered in return for the sacrifice of the Irish parliament. It seemed a workable solution. Once Irish Catholics had become a permanent minority in a larger unit the practical objection to giving them equal political rights would have gone.[39]

If outside parliament there was no strong or concerted opposition to the Union, it must be remembered that inside parliament, Ireland was represented by either the upper class landed aristocracy or middle class Protestants.[40] However, it is significant that the Catholic bishops and Catholic upper and middle classes also approved of the Act of Union in the mistaken belief that Catholic emancipation would immediately follow.[41]

In a similar vein Cullen (1969) attacks this nationalist conventional economic wisdom. He argues that economic factors in Ireland were largely independent of non-economic political or religious factors. He suggests that political resentment in late nineteen and early twentieth century Ireland obscured an adequate and realistic assessment of the situation. Green (1969) concurrs with Cullen in laying the cause of industrial decline in nineteenth century Ireland outside both the political and the fiscal spheres. Green notes that limited natural resources and the inevitably close relationship between the Irish and the British economy, suggest that industrial decay may have been almost inevitable, especially given the economic orthodoxy of the day.[42] The decline of many native industries can be better accounted for by looking at such factors as improved transport methods which were rapidly creating a single market economy in the United Kingdom, rather than looking at the lifting of protectionist tariffs within the Union.[43]

Several points demonstrate this. First on the passing of the Act of Union Irish tariffs were already too low to ensure exclusion of English products. Secondly, England manufactured goods of higher quality and lower cost than Ireland,

> The reduction of transport costs with the coming of cross-channel steamer services and the development of the railway system would have made it increasingly difficult to protect small Irish industries whose only base was the domestic market.[44]

Finally, protective tariffs were gradually lifted over a twenty year period in some Irish industries, in an attempt to allow them to become competitive.

The emerging picture is exceedingly complex. If Ireland suffered from free trade it would have also suffered without it through more expensive imported goods and also because her exports, which depended overwhelmingly on the British market would have been facing high tariffs. This continued to be the paradox of Ireland's economic relationship with Britain. The costs of this relationship were high, but the costs of foregoing it seemed higher.

The picture that emerges is one that shakes the nationalist myth of the centrality of political factors to Ireland's economic situation. Cullen summarizes the results of more recent research,

> In the last analysis only two things stand out with certainty, first, Ireland was within the largely domestic technology of the eighteenth century a highly developed and rapidly expanding economy. Secondly, its proximity to the leader

> of the Industrial Revolution and the dramatic reduction in transport costs in the nineteenth century in conjunction left its small-scale and domestic industries vulnerable in a more fiercely competitive age. ... This of course conflicts with what became the orthodoxy of Irish economic history in the late 1870s and 1880s. But the orthodoxy that emerged at that time reflected the economic malaise of the period and its acceptance was secured in the powerful upsurge of political feeling, which in time undermined both the land system and the Union.[45]

The Nationalist argument is no doubt correct when it recognizes the profound effect Britain had on the Irish economy. However, in their demands for political independence they mistakenly ascribed the political sphere greater influence in economic matters than the situation warranted. Heightened political consciousness was associated with misinterpretations (ideological) of reality. Also, as evidenced by the emergence of serious economic grievences and polities only very late in the Home Rule movement, the movement should be seen as primarily a political one.[46]

Rising Prosperity in Ireland

The post-Famine period was one characterized by growing prosperity and increased political and agrarian agitation. From the mid 1860s agriculture had been prospering. Towns thrived as commercial centres. The growth of the banking system reflects this increasing wealth.

> In 1850 the total number of banks doing business in the whole of Ireland was 165; by 1870 the total was 304. ... and by 1919 this had gone up to 809, and whereas in 1840 the banks together held despoits and cash balances amounting only to about five-and - a half millionpounds by 1910 this figure had been multiplied almost ten times.[47]

The next crisis in agriculture came at the end of the 1870s, and this occasioned a great increase in agrarian conflict. Three years of poor harvest from 1877-1879 were accompanied by falling prices for crops due in part to increased North American imports. Industrial depression in the late 1870s, occurring as part of the decay of a world wide boom in Industry, further exacerbated Ireland's economic problems. The economic distress of the 1880s is evidenced by an increase in the emigration rates.

Economic recovery was evident in the 1890s. Farm prices rose. Rural prosperity continued into the first two decades of this century.

> The first world war, and especially the two years after it, were the most hectic period of agricultural prosperity in Ireland's history ... Agricultural prices trebled from a base figure of 100 in 1911-13 to 288 in 1920. The rise was roughly paralleled by bank deposits. The terms of trade favoured Ireland, export prices rising more rapidly than import prices. The value of exports exceeded imports in seven of the eight years between 1914 and 1921 ... The combination of high earnings in agriculture and some shortage of imported goods meant high prosperity for the trader ... Farmers, traders and manufacturers did well.[48]

It should be added that wages did less well from this prosperity as wages lagged behind rising prices. The tensions that had existed between landlored and tenant several decades earlier now appeared to exist between farmer and farm-labourer. The latter category were numerically exceedingly small compared to those who had opposed landlords.[49] This is not a period

in which the creation of protectionist tariffs would have been advantageous, yet it is the period during which the Nationalist struggle reached its climax. As we shall see, forces other than economic ones were at play.

Industrial recovery was also obvious in this period. This was especially evident in export industries such as distilling which came to rely on a larger market than the domestic one in order to enjoy the economies of scale that made it competitive with foreign products. The crisis of 1870s - 1880s aroused an interest in industrial development in Ireland. However,

> Interest in Irish industrial revival in the 1880s had not in general been protectionist ... However, much of the support for the industrial and political movements came from the trading classes in the towns who, like their counterparts in England, were sceptical of the benefits of protective tariffs.[50]

Protectionism was an important element of the Sinn Fein economic policy. However, when this party came to power in 1918, it was largely because of its radical Nationalist position.[51] As indicated in chapter two the Home Rule movement had achieved enormous political success among the Catholics in 1885. Indeed, when political rebellion came in 1918, the Nationalist movement had almost the total support of the Catholic population, irrespective of class differences.[52] Despite the great increase in prosperity in Ireland, ideological demands arising out of the alternative world-view provided by Irish Nationalism were forcefully externalized, objectivated, and finally "officially" institutionalized in the form of a

new reality -- the Irish Free State. This creation of a state should not be seen as the simply expression of economic interests for the reality behind it was in large part of a non-material one. It was, rather, a shared symbolic universe in which was vested 'sacred' national identities. As already shown, appeals to absolute and inalienable rights legitimated the objectivation of these values. In somewhat eulogistic words, Lyons states,

> For the minority to be transformed into a (rebellious) majority, as happened in Ireland between 1916 and 1918, many strange things ... would have to happen. Yet although as we shall later see, the British government by its own infirmities and errors of policy contributed much to the transformation, it did not contribute everything. The key to change was to be sought, as always, in Ireland itself. That men were found in sufficient numbers to fight a long war of independence between 1919 and1921, and that the population as a whole was prepared to endure stoically, if passively, the reprisals which the war brought in its train, suggests that more than the pursuit of economic well-being, more than the love of a quiet life uncomplicated by any emotion more profound than the itch to add field to field, was involved in the last act of the drama. The impulse to fight ... had its roots in a tradition of insurrection and a spirit of resistance which, however irrational, were too strong and too deeply implicit in the history of the country to be ignored. The embers of Irish identity ...[53]

Lyons, in pointing to identity has isolated a key factor. This issue will be further explored in chapter five.

Indeed, this sense of national identity "owed much of its strength - perhaps even its existence - to the language movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries".[54] The aim of this movement, and others, although not overtly

political, had been to reawaken in Irishmen pride in their past and self respect.[55] The ritual expression of the ideal in the rebellion of 1916 became central to this Irish sense of identity, an identity that could not be shared by Protestants.

> The fact is that the men of 1916 created a myth, or refurbished the old one, in terms that have subsequently proved divisive between North and South. 1916 today stands as a psychological barrier between Protestant Ulster and the predominantly Catholic rest of Ireland. What to a majority of the people has become sacred, is to Northern Protestants today an alien and even hateful tradition.[56]

So significant was the growing prosperity in Ireland during the first decades of the twentieth century, that Nationalist leaders were afraid that the revolutionary impetus might be lost. Indeed, the Westminster government's policy of concession and reform in Ireland became known as an attempt to "kill Home Rule with kindness." However, what the rebellion of 1916 demonstrated clearly was that this policy was a facade.

> ... it cannot be denied that simple repression remained a standard instrument of British rule in Ireland throughout the whole period of the Union. Even as late as 1887 Lord Salisbury's administration could pass a 'permanent' coercion act intended to build irrevocably into the law of the land restrictions upon agitation which had hitherto been regarded as exceptional responses to exceptional situations.[57]

Herein lies the meaning of the idea of consciousness emerging dialectically. Nationalist consciousness in Ireland developed out of opposition to and in response to British intransigence and coercion.[58]

The industrial recovery of the period after 1890 tended to be characterized by large scale industrial firms, especially in export industries. Industrial output accounted for a third of the total output (including agriculture) of the country. However, the bulk of industrial output rested on a narrow base, that is on a small number of large industries. This was largely concentrated in the Belfast region and, to a lesser textent, around Dublin. Roughtly one third of net industrial output and two thirds of total industrial exports including food and drink originated in the North East of Ireland.[59] In the rest of the country industry was more thinly spread, catering more for the local market. In the country as a whole, agriculture remained by far the most important sector of the economy.

Thus far I have been concerned largely with the economic circumstances surrounding the Home Rule movement. Although economic issues were involved in, and created by the movement, I have argued that they were subservient to politico-ideological ones. The massive reality behind the creation of the new political reality of The Free State was an inter-subjectively shared definition among Catholics (Nationalists) of how the world ought to be. The emergent reality, as I will show, did not correspond to the ideal, but rather was a product of a process of opposition (or negotiation) between Catholics, Protestants, and Britain.

I will now investigate the economic realities behind the resistance to Home Rule, and their relationship to Protestant joint action to preserve the Union with Great Britain.

Industrialization in the North East of Ireland

Economic differences between the North East and the rest of Ireland in the nineteenth century were marked. The North was far more industrially advanced. It is not necessary to attempt an explanation of this phenomenon here.[60] Among other industries the Belfast area was the centre of ship-building and linen. Its shipbuilding had gained from the close integration of the North's economy with that of Industrial Britain when, for example, pressure on the Mersey-side yards brought increasing business to the Belfast yards.[61] It is argued that proximity of the North to English supplies of coal and steel and to large English markets helped promote the industrialization of the North. During the nineteenth century Northern Irish industries developed extensive trade in markets outside the United Kingdom.

> The key to the prosperity of the north-east was in its dependence on foreign markets. Even in the eighteenth century the linen industry relied on the English market, and foreign markets became absolutely vital in the nineteenth century. This helps to explain why, in the nineteenth century, Ulstermen were determined to keep close links with England, when the rest of the country was demanding self government ...[62]

Another important feature of industrialization in Belfast was that its industries were not of a kind to stimulate development outside the North East. They provided little forward or backward linkage to the rest of the Irish economy.

Simply put, the North east was not an integral part of the Irish economy.[63]

To speak of the North East may be deceptive. Apart from Belfast and its immediate surroundings, the rest of Ulster was more like the rest of Ireland -- economically speaking. Yet if dependence on foreign markets was the North East's strength it was also its weakness, for it made that area very vulnerable to fluctuations in world trade.

It is difficult to know where to draw lines of regional division within Ireland at that time. If the North East or Lagan valley constitutes an advanced industrial region, there is also the case for re-drawing that line to include the East coast of Ireland in general:

> Historians have lately begun to suggests that there were really two economies -- a maritime and a subsistence economy, increasingly differentiated since the eighteenth century. The former, it is argued, existed mainly along the eastern coastal fringe from Belfast to Cork ... and in this there had developed a cash economy tied to that of England by trade, traffic of people and growth of credit--in short, an outward-looking community which was a part, even if a peripheral part, of a wider world.[64]

Lyons adds,

> ... the economic supremacy of the maritime sector ... rested securely upon a near monopoly of commerce and manufacturers. In the achievement of this supremacy both Dublin and Belfast played major roles, but whereas the capital remained primarily a financial sector and an essential link in the import and export trade of the country, it was of course the northern city -- more precisely the Lagan valley which it dominated -- that provided Ireland's one example of large-scale industrialization.[65]

These facts may partly explain why neither Protestants nor Catholics wanted the parition of Ireland. Unionism, as a

movement, stood for the union of all Ireland with Britain. The Home Rule movement agitated for independence for all Ireland. Fitzgerald (1972) argues that few in Ireland believed that partition would be more than a temporary measure.[66] Vocational and religious bodies had organized on an all Ireland basis. Dublin had long been the administrative centre of the country. Many felt that, on economic grounds, the North would not survive alone. However, as I have shown, the North was far more intensively industrialized than the South, and it had divergent economic interests.

In summary, approximately two thirds of Ireland's total output came from agriculture, and a third from industry. It is further estimated that one third of net industrial output, came from the Belfast region. Of this Belfast's region also accounted for about two thirds of Ireland's total industrial exports.[67]

Urbanization

The following table shows relative growth in urban populations in Ireland between 1841 and 1911.

TABLE III.4

Urbanization in Ireland, 1841-1911[68]

	Year	Ireland	Six Counties	Twenty-six Counties
Urban Population	1841	1,215,000	213,000	approx.1,000,000
	1911	1,250,000	603,000	920,000
Rural Population	1841	7,000,000	1,500,000	5,000,000
	1911	3,000,000	650,000	2,250,000

As shown, the growth in urban population in the North was greater than the rest of Ireland. This can be partly explained by the rapid growth of Belfast. The following table compares Belfast and Dublin.

TABLE III.5

Population of Belfast and Dublin, 1821-1911[69]

	Belfast	Dublin
1821	37,277	185,881
1841	75,308	232,726
1851	100,000	258,000
1881	208,000	--
1911	approx. 400,000	approx. 400,000

It is evident that Belfast was growing faster than Dublin. This trend did not continue however.

Belfast was the most prosperous of Irish towns, and

> ... it was one of the prosperous cities of the British Isles. Wages had kept pace with those in British cities, and there was little unemployment. Workers in fact were better off than in most industrial cities because the linen industry gave employment to their womenfolk. However, the inhabitants paid a heavy price. They lived in rows of mean, hastily built houses, over-hung by a constant pall of industrial smoke, and they worked long hours in factories that were dangerous and unhealthy.[70]

Depending on one's point of view, workers in the North were as well off or as badly off as any in industrial Britain. Given that by 1911 thirty one per cent of the North's population lived in urban centres, as against fifteen percent in the South, these conditions affected large numbers of people.

Urbanization and Sectarianism

It is important to note that as the percentage of Catholics in the population of Belfast grew, so also did sectarian conflict. In the late eighteenth century, sectarianism was a feature of rural Ulster. Belfast was characterized, at least among the middle classes, by a radically liberal position on religion and politics. However by 1850 the Catholic population of Belfast had risen to over thirty per cent. The city experienced frequent outbreaks of violence between Catholics and Protestants. Catholics were generally the lower strata of the population, and there was serious competition between Catholics and Protestants for jobs. Other changes had also taken place since the eighteenth century. Important political rights had been extended to Catholics so that Home Rule (or Rome Rule) then appeared as a realistic possibility. It is significant that violent antagonism existed between Catholics and Protestants before Home Rule was a serious threat. In Belfast

> By 1850 the proportions of catholics was 35 per cent - alarming even to liberal minded protestants ... Always they came in at the lowest economic levels; and the lingering effects of the old penal code, one of which was a very high rate of illiteracy, saw to it that few prospered enough to move from these sectors ...

> The proximity of two groups of industrial workers of conflicting sects along the Falls Road and the Shankill Road led to periodic conflicts, more particularly around the twelfth of July.[71]

Later in that century, however, sectarian rioting was associated increasingly with rising political demands for Home Rule. When

> ... the Nationalists in 1885 won seventeen of the thirty-three Ulster seats and practically every seat in the other provinces, thereby indicating the overwhelming popular support for Home Rule ... [but] Home Rule was defeated [in Westminster] ... for four months ... there were fierce sectarian riots in Belfast during which thirty-two people were killed.[72]

That only Northern Ireland was characterized by sectarianism may be accounted for by the relative proportions of Catholics and Protestants in the population in the North, and by the fact that Irish Nationalism[73] was not anti-Protestant, but anti-British.

Opposition to Home Rule

In chapter two we looked at the political and ideological factors involved in Protestant opposition to Home Rule. I will now investigate the economic realities of this anti-Nationalist movement.

The Unionist party was founded in 1886 to lead parliamentary resistance to Home Rule. In the South, those remaining landlords and Protestants, who were generally of the upper class, supported the Union. However, with the extension of the franchise and the land reform Acts, Protestant ascendancy had lost its institituional framework.

In the North, the land struggle had taken a different course than in the South. As a result the landed aristocracy there retained greater political power, influence, and land. Secondly, given Protestant predominance in economic life in the North, the property relations of industrialization provided the Protestant ruling class with the means of retaining wealth and power.

The Unionist party was the conservative party of Ireland closely associated with the British conservative party. Election results from 1885 onwards demonstrate the complete polarization of political life in Ireland between Nationalist Catholics and Unionist Protestants. The divide was between North and South and, within Northern Ireland, between Catholics and Protestants.

Mass support for the Unionist movement came from the Protestant working class and farmers. When property reallocations and the new franchise in the South had broken the Protestant ascendancy, the Union with Britain became the last bastion of Protestant power in Ireland. Within the Union, Catholics would remain a powerless minority. Under Home Rule, they would be a majority. Home Rule posed several threats to the existing power and property relations in the North in the twentieth century.

On the Nationalist side industrialists, socialists, private property owners, and those without property, had supported the cause or fought against the British and the symbols and institutions of British Power in Ireland. The

result was a minor redistribution property[74] and later of political power. Those who benefited from the status quo in the North - ruling class Protestants -- did not welcome the possibility of transformation. Secondly, the threat of Home Rule reinforced the Protestant landed ascendancy's position of power and high esteem in the countryside. They became leaders of the people.[75] Thirdly, Northern Industrialist feared Nationalist protectionist policies for those industries that depended on export trade.

The fourth potential source of threat to the existing property and power relations in the North was, of course, that of class conflict. However, even though the North was objectively ripe for the advancement of new politico-economic issues of labour against capital, the reactionary sectarian politics of worker against worker prevailed. Protestant labour and capitalists united in resistance to Home Rule. Paradoxically, the Northern Protestant workers became the staunchist defenders of the status quo. Connolly, Ireland's most active labour organizer in the first two decades of this century, stated:

> According to all Socialist theories North East Ulster, being the most developed industrially, ought to be the quarter in which class lines of cleavage, politically and industrially, should be the most pronounced and class rebellion the most common.
>
> As a cold matter of fact, it is the happy hunting ground of the slave-driver and the home of the least rebellious slaves in the industrial world.[76]

There were occasions when it appeared that class consciousness in the North might influence the course of events. For example, in 1907, Larkin organized a dockers strike which temporarily united Catholics and Protestants. In 1911, Connolly achieved similar success among the mill girls in Belfast. However, the old pattern of sectarian divisions re-asserted themselves, shaping the impending construction of new political realities, North and South. Indeed, as Edwards (1970) sees it, "Belfast capitalism found it advantageous to exploit any working-class divisions that might exist in the interest of weakening labour organization."[77]

Although economic issues were involved in Protestant workers' opposition to Catholics, it should not be argued that economic concerns determined their actions. If economic issues were the dominant concern of the day, there should have emanated some serious demand from the Protestant workers for a fairer redistribution of wealth. In spite of labourer leaders' attempts to organize class opposition to the establishment, class interests appear to have been deflected by sectarianism. Protestant workers and small farmers jointed with industrial capitalists and the old landed aristocracy against Home Rule. To understand this 'reality' whose significane transcended class differences,[78] it is necessary to discuss the Orange Order, the Unionist party and Protestant ideology, with reference to class.

Unionism

Sectarianism had long been a feature of life in Northern Ireland. In certain areas and during particular periods it seemed to disappear, only to re-appear at a subsequent stage of political or economic strife. In chapter two, I identified its origins, and its institutionalization in the Orange Order in 1795.[79] Orangeism had traditionally a broad proletariat base. Moreover in times of political crisis it received the open support of the Protestant ascendancy in the North. This occurred both in 1798 and in the 1820s when O'Connell's movement for Catholic emancipation threatened the established order. The existence of Orange lodges provided a ready made framework for organizing Protestant political support. Of this period de Paor argues that "The real Protestant ascendancy, the men of property, wealth, and power, had taken positions of control or influence in the federation of oath-bound lodges..."[80]

Politicans, however, did not create sectarianism but found that using the existing divisions between Catholics and Protestants was a useful force in mobilizating opposition to Home Rule.[81]

> In the many outbreaks of religious turbulence, from the hey-day of Henry Cooke until the close of the nineteenth century, Belfast laid the foundations of that communal segregation and intolerance that is characteristic even of its modern population. The original fermenters of religious riots were clerical fanatics but they prepared the way for Unionist politicans who, in 1920 ... were made masters in Ulster and became the government of Northern Ireland.[82]

According to Edwards, between threats to the establishment from Catholics, the Orange lodges "became objects of upper-class derision".[83]

If the Orange Order had fallen into 'disrepute' until the 1880s:

> The introduction of Gladstone's Home Rule Bill gave the Order a membership which was to transform it completely, to make it a highly respectable and exceedingly powerful religious political organization.
>
> The whole influence of the Order was to be on the side of continuing union with Great Britain on the existing pattern.
>
> The Orange Institution, ... had a vision and a mission.[84]

Protestants, of course, did not see themselves as sectarian. This is not a trivial point if one is to understnd the Protestant ideology. Rather, they saw themselves as defending a constitution and link with Britain, that, in their eyes, guaranteed liberties. Many Protestants believed that they were resisting tyranny by the Roman Catholic church.[85]

Neither should it be assumed that the Orange Order was the only sectarian organization in the North. On the Catholic side there was, for example, The Ancient Order of Hibernians (A.O.H.). However, the A.O.H. lacked anything like the same significance or force of the Orange Order.[86]

Unionists used the social divisions which were perceived as most real by people in the North to achieve political ends. As we have seen, these social divisions did not correspond to objective class divisions but to religious ones. Boyd says,

> The Unionist party, which today dominates Northern Ireland, was created in 1886, from a combination of industrialists, Tory land owners, Orangemen, Liberals who feared Home Rule in Ireland, and Protestant working people from the shipyards, mills, factories and farms.[87]

The lower class Protestants provided the Unionist movement with mass support; the upper classes provided money and leadership.[88] Specific class interests were served by this alliance. Capitalism, which was highly developed in the North, received no dangerous challenge. Although Belfast in the 1880s had witnessed a great growth in trade unions and labour organizations, by the twentieth century. Protestant workers, through Unionism, became politically conservative. The working class in effect upheld and fought to defend the existing power and property relations. The objective category of working class lost its potential relevance in spite of attempts by labour leaders to make them meaningful.[89] Thus handbills issued by labour organizer Jim Larkin in 1907 read,

> ~~Not as Catholics or Protestants, as Nationalists~~ or Unionists, but as Belfast men and workers stand together and don't be mislead by the employers' game by dividing Catholics and Protestants.[90]

However, subjective definitions of reality, articulated and heightened by political and religious leaders, not objective economic reality, prevailed.

> As the Home Rule issue came into prominence ... Protestant demagogues and their upper-class friends found more urgency in maintaining a permanent state of conflict [among Catholic and Protestant workers] and extreme feelings of bigotry hardened on both sides to something like the intensity which still obtains today.[91]

By playing on fears and beliefs about Catholics held by Protestants in the North, conservative leaders ensured that the world was not redefined in class terms, and that the 'safe' categories of religion were used to structure the life-world of the population in the North.

> Unionism has always been the political creed of the Tory establishment in Ulster, and was now, through the use of the Catholic bogey, being used to make Tories out of the Protestant Proletarians.[92]

Unionism, therefore, served the interests of both the old landed aristocracy and the modern industrialists in that it supported existing power structures, deflected any threat to capitalism from organized labour, and protected Northern Industrialists from Nationalist economic policies. That Unionism also served some British interests is evidenced by the British conservative party support for the movement.

However, effective opposition to Home Rule in the end came from Northern Ireland, when the British parliament accepted the notion of Home Rule for Ireland.[93] The Liberals had had a policy supporting Home Rule for Ireland since the final decades of the nineteenth century. In 1893 a Home Rule bill passed the House of Commons, but was defeated in the House of Lords.

> In 1912, a new home-rule bill ... passed the house of commons and seemed certain (the veto power of the house of lords having been removed by the parliament act of 1911) of becoming law in 1914. It was at this juncture that unionist defiance in Ulster, uninhibitedly encouraged by the British conservative party, defeated and thereby discredited constitituional nationalism, and gave revolutionary nationalism the opportunity it had long awaited.[94]

The British intention to implement the decision of its parliament was clear, and the 'loyalits' of Northern Ireland prepared to resist in the name of the unity of the British Empire.

Thus we have seen that the Unionist movement subjectively, and at the most general level, represented Protestant fear and rejection of what they saw would be a papist state. Again, it should be stressed that resistance to Home Rule did not have a class base, but functioned to serve specific class and power interests.

Opposition to Home Rule in the North enhanced the case for armed rebellion in the South. Rebellion, in keeping with the Nationalist world-view, was against the British, in the name of all Irishmen. The appeal, as I said earlier, overlooked the massive reality of a millon and a half Protestants who did not see the British as the enemy, and who were totally alienated by the 'cause'.

The outcome of the process of negotiation between Britain, Nationalists, and Unionists, was the institutionalization of both politico-ideological realities in the 'new states'. But Unionism, and its institutional political form, the state of Northern Ireland, rested on sectarian divisions between Catholics and Protestants. Without this split there would have been no state of Northern Ireland. The 'political entity' of Ireland could not contain the emerging antagonistic ideologies of Irish Nationalism and British allegiance.[95] The partition of Ireland may be regarded as the physical expression of two

alien ideologies. Those who did not share conceptual realities found they could no longer inhabit the same 'physical world'. While the division of Ireland may be regarded as an expression of, or the outcome of a process of externalization of the ideal, it did not reflect the ideal. Nationalists attempted to make their world 'not- British'; Unionists attempted to make their world 'not-nationalist' or 'not Catholic'. Both failed to realize their ideal. If the labelling of the North as a "Protestant state" reassured Protestants of the purity of their sacred world[96], the label also transcended the ambiguities of situation. Within the state of Northern Ireland one third of its population was Catholic. To label the state as Protestant dismissed this minority into theoretical non-being. In the next chapter I shall show that their political existence in Northern Ireland came close to this status of non-being.

There is much to suggest that had Catholic and Protestant workers not been divided, but had perceived themselves as having common interests, then Ireland would not have been partitioned. No doubt the political reality that would have emerged would have been radically different. It might be suggested that, to the extent that the worker did not recognize his 'real objective interests', he was falsely consciousness. However, the subjective reality was that, to the people involved, national identity, religion, political autonomy were of ultimate significance. That the politic-ideological mode of cognizing involved presented

the actors with a definition of reality that is at variance with what the 'observer' sees to have been reality, does not detract from the fact that these interpretations provide the subjective matrix of the world within which the actors experience themselves as living.

Conclusion

In this section I have outlined relevant features of the economic background to political conflict in post Famine Ireland. I have pointed to the interests served by the Home Rule and the Unionist movements. I also looked at the economic interests of the different objective classes involved, and rejected a theory of economic determinism.

The picture that emerges is one that accepts that economic issues were important, but that they did not inevitably lead to partition. Fitzgerald summarizes this succinctly:

> The divergent economic interests of the north-east vis-avis those of the rest of Ireland thus played an important but perhaps not a determining role in the division of Ireland in 1920, although in the absence of strong politico-religious forces working for such a division, the regional economic differences would be most unlikely to have lead to any such division.[97]

Movements were animated and legitimated by more 'ultimate' values. Nationalism influenced perception of economic facts. These "facts" then acted back on and reinforced political consciousness. There was not a causal relationship between objective reality and consciousness, but a dialectical one, with each shaping, and in turn being acted upon by the other. As suggested, the perception of economic realities were on

occasion subservient to and used for ideological ends. In chapter four, I will discuss the breaking of this relationship, which Berger and Pulberg (1966) identify as "alienated consciousness".

In Ireland the dominant politico-ideological consciousness influenced interpretations of reality. When subjectively perceived reality becomes independent of objective reality, as may be suggested in the case of Catholic and Protestant workers this may be called alienated or false consciousness, Ideology, not a more realistic assessment of class interests, dominates.[98]

There were also economic differences between North and South. The North East was far more industrialized than the rest of Ireland. The nature of its economic base was to ensure that its industrialists' interests would not be well served by the economic doctrines that were gaining popularity in the South. One cannot prove that political leaders were en masse insincere, but their appeal to ideology often legitimated specific interests.

Thus we reject economic determinism as a model of explanation of the development in Ireland. We would also reject as inadequate any model that cannot include subjective interpretations of reality as facts in their own right, and as being as important as any other category of facts.

The claim that it was British imperialism that caused the partition of Ireland is also rejected. Partition was never a deliberate strategy of the British government, but was seen as a solution to the 'Irish question'.[99] Although political

conflict in Ireland can be traced back to its colonial roots, by the 1910s political opposition was no longer simply between a foreign ruling class and a native exploited class. Ireland had developed internal divisions and antagonistic political ideologies among Irishmen.

This is not equivalent to saying that Britain's role was unimportant. The weight of British strength forced Nationalists in the South to accept what they and Catholics in the North saw as an injustice. Britain imposed the 'solution'. Britain supported the existence of the new state. The British parliament remained sovereign in Northern Ireland. Section 75 of the government of Ireland Act reads

> Notwithstanding the establishment of the Parliament of ... Northern Ireland ... or anything contained in this Act, the supreme authority of the parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected and undiminished over all persons, matters and things in [Northern] Ireland.[100]

However, as Magee explains

> In practice, however, the parliament and government of Northern Ireland were given considerable autonomy in administering the internal affairs of the province, and there developed a convention that Westminister would not legislate except by invitation in respect of those matters for which responsibility had been transfered to the Northern Ireland Parliament.[101]

The creation of a new 'objective' division in Ireland did not erase the older, subjectively perceived boundaries between Catholics and Protestants, between British and Irish.

SINCE PARTITION

This section will include a brief discussion of the

economic situation in Northern Ireland since partition. As the significance of various economic factors and their relevance to my explanation will be discussed in the next chapter, this section will take the form of a short description of economic reality.

Industrial Decline and Growth in Northern Ireland

We have seen how Belfast's economy was built on textiles and shipbuilding. During the first world war Northern Ireland experienced 'boom conditions'.[102] However, by the mid twenties severe depression set in. In 1923 unemployment reached 18 per cent of the insured workers. Linen producers experienced excess capacity, for the industry had outgrown world-demand. Shipbuilding suffered from the drastic reduction in world trade in the depression. The vulnerability of the North's dependence on the world market with respect to fluctuations in trade has been pointed out. As such a large proportion of her products were exported, the North suffered badly in the depression of the 1920s and 1930s.

> Incomes in the north were more closely dependent on industry, and the north's industries, export oriented, were highly sensitive to international conditions. It is likely that incomes in the north ... fell in real terms these years. In Belfast 20,000 were unemployed in linen in 1930. Shipbuilding fell sharply. By 1931 one-quarter of the insured workers in the North were unemployed.[103]

By 1938, it is estimated that nearly thirty eight per cent of the insured population was unemployed. The North had the highest unemployment level in the United Kingdom.[104]

Linen and shipbuilding had a reprieve during the second world war, but were never again to recover their former importance in the economy of Northern Ireland. In the post war period the structure and ownership of Ulster industry was radically transformed. "A variety of engineering electrical, and textile undertakings have been attracted to the region ... by grants and cheap factory sites."[105] A substantial amount of new investment in the post war period has come from foreign capital. In their dependency on foreign investment, the North and South are alike ... in their vulnerability.

> As both states are small economies, expansion on the desired scale is feasible only in the context of exporting a major part of any additional output; that in effect means that both states are highly dependent on trends in international trade and investment and vulnerable to any changes that adversely affect these trends.[106]

In order to achieve a wider industrial base in the North, and growth of an industrial sector in the South, Ireland has become very dependent on the inflow of international capital or foreign investment.

We have already seen that Unionism rested on an alliance of landed aristocracy, business interests and the orange order. Structural changes within Northern Ireland's economy had made this alliance increasingly precarious.

> After the war it gradually became clear that the structure of Ulster industry, and with it the structure of power in Northern Ireland, was changing, as the late nineteenth-century style of capitalist enterprise, with a few great family firms closely integrated into the Tory establishment, gave way to advanced capitalist 'managerial' style of international enterprise ...

> Again, gradually the tendency which has been common in the advanced capitalism of the western world in general manifested itself in Northern Ireland - the tendency for industry and population to shift into great agglomerations and conurbations, draining economic and social life slowly from peripheral areas.[107]

Changes within the traditional structure of political power and economic importance were occurring, and were increasingly beyond the control of the rulers of Northern Ireland. The landed elite tended to lose power as the agricultural sector of the economy became relatively less important. However, they still retained considerable influence in the politico-ideological sphere.[108] Traditional industries declined and new business interests arose. New industries, especially foreign owned ones, further threatened the status quo in Northern Ireland in that they did not carry the tradition of religious segregation or discrimination in their employment patterns. Also capital tended to avoid politically unstable areas. The coalition of different class interests within Unionism came under greater strain. However, in spite of the forces which might separate them, this union of diverse interests still remained united by the common enemy - the determination never to allow Catholics to take over.[109]

The industrial development Act, 1945, the Capital Grants to Industries Act, 1954-62, and the Industrial Development Act of 1966 which provided a system of grants loans and subsidies gave the Northern government increased power over the economy.[110]

Rose (1971) suggests that a concern with economic planning was a significant index of change in Northern Ireland. It was based on the recognition of the need to transform 'old Unionism' into 'modern Unionism'. This transition became part of government policy under Prime Minister O'Neill.

> The installation of Captain Terence O'Neill as Lord Brookborough's successor in 1963 began a new phase in Northern Ireland politics ... From an international perspective O'Neill's programme was hardly novel. In Northern Ireland terms, however, O'Neill was an innvoator, even a revolutionary ...[111]

The extension of Britain's welfare policies to Northern Ireland can be understood to have had complex effects. This will be further discussed in subsequent chapters. In financial terms it resulted in a state of affairs where Northern Ireland's welfare services are subsidized from Great Britain.[112]

However, Rose argues that it is a mistake to claim that Northern Ireland is financially dependent upon Britain.

> It is often mistakenly stated that Northern Ireland is financially dependent on Britain. This misstates the case. To be precise one must say that the present standard of living of the people of Northern Ireland depends in part upon financial grants from the British government. The sum is substantial by any reckoning, but it is not in a literal sense 'vital'. Even without British grants, the per capita income of Ulster would be higher than that in the Republic of Ireland.[113]

This subsidy was estimated at £165-170 million for the 1971-72 period.[114]

Catholics and Protestants: A Comparison

In the light of our previous discussion it is necessary to discuss the extent to which the current conflict between

Catholics and Protestants might be termed class conflict. Relative to Britain, the significance of agriculture and of the rural population in Northern Ireland is high. Compared to the South it is low. In 1968, it was estimated that 12 per cent of the workforce was engaged in agriculture. This level of agricultural employment is similar to such modern industrial societies as West Germany and Sweden.[115]

Rose (1971) used a scheme for classifying people derived from that established by the British Registrar General's office. Respondents were classified into four groups according to the work of the head of the household. The following table relates religion and class.

TABLE III.6

Religion and Class[116], 1968

(Percent and Population)

	Protestant	Catholic	Total
Business and Professional	16%	9%	14%
Lower middle class	29	24	27
Working class	48	58	52
Residual class	6	9	7

differential index = 13%

The table reveals a limited tendency for Protestants to have a higher occupational class than Catholics. Rose found that religion not class, correlated with attitudes or loyalty to

the regime of Northern Ireland.

> In so far as class differences are more important than religious differences, then Ulster people of the same class should have more similar regime outlooks than people of different classes but the same religion. The data from the Loyalty survey clearly reject this hypothesis. The difference between middle class and working class Protestants in support of the constitution is only four per cent, and three percent in endorsement of an Ultra (loyalist) position. Similarly, among Catholics, there is only a two per cent difference across classes in support for the consititution, and a five per cent difference in readiness to demonstrate against the regime.[117]

This theme of the relationship among religion, politics and class will be further discussed in the next chapter. It is important to clarify that Catholic-Protestant conflict is not simply between objectiver rich and poor groups in Northern Ireland. The following compares weekly family earnings among Catholics and Protestants in 1968.

TABLE III.7

Reported Weekly Family Earnings, 1968[118]

	Protestant	Catholic	Total
		(percent)	
	%	%	%
Up to £10	16	21	18
£11 - £15	18	23	20
£16 - £20	19	23	21
£21 - £25	16	13	15
£26 - £30	9	8	9
£31 per week +	18	7	14
don't know; won't say	5	4	5

Differential index=15%

Economic differentials, contrary to what is often claimed, are limited.[119] It is true however, that Catholics were over represented in the bottom income groups, and under represented in the upper income groups.

At the same time it would be incorrect to argue that Northern Irish people have no concept of class or do not perceive economic distinctions. They do. Rose found that 81 per cent of those interviewed could locate themselves in the socio-economic structure. He suggests that there was a high degree of class awareness.[120] However, as we have seen to some extent in this chapter and chapter two, class factors were not those to which they attached an ultimate significance. Class was not used to structure the politico-ideological world within which Protestant-Catholic conflict is taking place. This will be demonstrated more clearly in the next chapter.

Conclusion

In chapter two I identified the historical origin of certain subjectively relevant categories which structure politico-ideological reality in Northern Ireland. In chapte three, I looked at objective or economic categories which an observer may perceive as structuring life in Northern Ireland. The subjective reality of Catholic-Protestant conflict did not appear to correspond to these objective divisions.

In chapter four I will further develop the theme of identifying subjective categories that are relevant in structuring politico-ideological worlds in Northern Ireland. I will look at the relationship between what may be termed subjective and objective reality, and consider the consequences deriving from the mode of cognizing involved.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. Ideological issues remained central to political life in the South also. By the late 1950s there was a move towards a greater concern with economics. In this chapter I deal with Northern Ireland, but it should not be assumed that politics in the South represented the best interests of the workers.

2. For a good discussion of the emerging class divisions within Unionism, see Boulton, D., The U.V.F.: An Anatomy of Loyalist Rebellion, (1973).

3. By the 1970s this 'unity' was showing signs of disintegration, making political settlements more difficult.

4. Taken from Rose, R., Governing Without Consensus (1971) p. 67. Even with 'cautious interpretation' the figures are indeed indicative of Ireland's poverty.

5. Ibid., p. 63.

6. Ireland's agriculture in some respects did not rise above subsistence level. See Lyons, F.S.L., Ireland Since the Famine, (1973) pp. 148-149: "As late as 1908 ... out of the six leading crops the proportion of the produce sold for cash exceeded thirty percent in only three instances ... in the case of other crops grown the traditional practice was to consume on the farm the greater part of what had been produced."

7. Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 41.

8. Ibid., p. 50.

9. See Cullen, L.M., An Economic History of Ireland Since 1660, (1972) p. 111.

10. Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 53. The impoverished condition of this group is well described by Lyons.

11. These remain a contentious issue in Irish economic history. For reference to the literature on such issues see Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit. pp. 26, 35, 39. Here I rely on Cullen's interpretation of these facts but it is proper to add that there are alternative interpretations. Cullen points out that the farming class survived the disaster relatively well compared to labourers. See Cullen, L.M., op. cit., pp. 110-136.

12. Cullen, L.M., op. cit., p. 118. See also Drake, M., "Population Growth and the Irish Economy", in Cullen L.M. (ed.), The Formation of the Irish Economy, (1969) pp. 65-76.

13. Drake, M., op. cit., p. 65.

14. Cullen, L.M., An Economic History of Ireland Since 1660, (1972) pp. 134-135.

15. Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., pp. 47-48.

16. The economic friction between landlord and tenant was replaced by that between farmer and labourer. Had the latter group been more powerful, a "settlement" involving a greater redistribution of property may have been arrived at -- as leaders such as Michael Davitt advised.

17. Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 26.

18. Cullen, L.M., in "Irish Economic History: Fact and Myth", in Cullen, L.M. (ed.), The Formation of the Irish Economy, (1969) p. 121.

19. Cullen, L.M., The Irish Economy Since 1660, (1972) p. 139.

20. Cullen, L.M., in "Irish Economic History: Fact and Myth", in Cullen, L.M. (ed.), The Formation of the Irish Economy, (1969) pp. 121-122.

21. Charles Stuart Parnell was a Protestant landlord and parliamentary leader of the Home Rule movement.

22. Michael Davitt, a Lancashire mill-worker and son of a Mayo tenant farmer and Fenian convict, was a leading force in the Land War. He fought for the "man of no property" and strongly advocated nationalization of the land.

23. Moody, T.W., The Ulster Question 1603-1973, (1974) p. 21.

24. de Paor, L., Divided Ulster, (1971) p. 56. de Paor suggests that Protestants' fears of the Catholic Church were exaggerated but not unjustified. For a detailed discussion of the role of the Catholic Church during this period, see Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit.

25. Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 28.

26. By this I mean that Home-Rule, in spite of superficial appearances, became an 'economically' conservative movement.

27. Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 50.

28. In reality economic issues were not settled but class tensions between labourers and farmers increased. However, these did not develop into a national movement.

29. See Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 50. See also de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 56.

30. Ibid., p. 55.

31. Moody, T.W., op. cit., p. 20.

32. See Cullen, L.M., "Irish Economic History: Fact and Myth", in Cullen, L.M. (ed.) The Formation of the Irish Economy, (1969) pp. 120-121.

33. Ibid., p. 121.

34. Ibid., p. 122.

35. By economic demands here I am referring to the demand for protectionist economic policies that were not in the interests of Northern Irish industrialists. These demands were central to the Sinn Fein party's policies. They first became an issue in the election of 1905. It was not until 1918, however, after the 1916 rebellion, that Sinn Fein "wiped the Nationalist political party off the map".

36. See Boyd, A., Holy War in Belfast, (1969).

37. Drake, M., op. cit., p. 69.

38. Green, E.R.R., "Industrial Decline in the Nineteenth Century", in Cullen, L.M. (ed.), The Formation of the Irish Economy, (1969) p. 90.

39. Ibid., p. 89.

40. In 1829 Catholics gained the right - with severe property restrictions -- to sit in Parliament.

41. Ibid. However, it did not. The disestablishment of the Church of Ireland (and the removal of compulsory tithes) did not occur until 1869. The first election run on a democratic or reformed franchise was not until 1885. See de Paor, L., op. cit., pp. 54-57.

42. Green, E.R.R., op. cit., pp. 92-96.

43. See Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., pp. 58-60.

44. Green, E.R.R., op. cit., p. 94.

45. Cullen, L.M., "Irish Economic History: Fact and Myth", in Cullen, L.M. (ed.), The Formation of the Irish Economy, (1969) p. 124.

46. The economic policies of the first government of the Free State demonstrate clearly how economic reality was little changed by changes in the political sphere.

47. Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 59.

48. Cullen, L.M., An Economic History of Ireland Since 1660, (1972) p. 171.

49. Ibid., p. 172. Cullen argues that unemployment among agricultural labourers supplied the I.R.A. with recruits. This may also account for "leftist tendencies" among some of the I.R.A. at that time.

50. Ibid., p. 164.

51. This reflected a growing disillusionment with constitutional nationalist parties. See Moody, T.W., op. cit., p. 23.

52. It is very likely that a similar argument to the one I am about to put forward concerning Unionism could be made about Nationalism. That is, that it led to the alienation of the Catholic working class and did not represent their best interests. Like Unionism, Nationalism embraced many groups, from militant Republicans to Constitutional Nationalists. The Civil War in Ireland represents a split in this alliance.

53. Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., pp. 32-33.

54. See Fitzgerald, G., Towards a New Ireland, (1972) p. 12.

55. Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 30.

56. Fitzgerald, G., op. cit., p. 12.

57. Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 31.

58. The swing towards a more radically nationalist party after the execution of the leaders of the 1916 Rebellion demonstrates this phenomenon.

59. Cullen, L.M., An Economic History of Ireland Since 1660, 1972) pp. 160-162. Cullen clearly demonstrates the industrial superiority of the Belfast region.

60. For a discussion of this phenomenon see Goldstrom, J.M., "The Industrialization of the North-East" in Cullen, L.M. (ed.), The Formation of the Irish Economy, (1967) pp. 101-102.

61. Ibid., p. 106.

62. Ibid., p. 108.

63. Ibid., pp. 111-112.

64. Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 55.

65. Ibid., p. 60.

66. Fitzgerald, G., op. cit., p. 14.

67. Cullen, L.M., An Economic History of Ireland Since 1660, (1972) pp. 160-162.

68. Compiled from Lyons, F.S.L., op. cit., p. 46.

69. Compiled from Moody, T.W., op. cit., p. 15, and Cullen, L.M., An Economic History of Ireland Since 1660, (1972) p. 166.

70. Goldstrom, J.M., op. cit., pp. 107-108.

71. Magee,J., Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict, (1974) pp. 42-43.

72. Ibid., p. 44.

73. In practice however, nationalism in the North East, as for example under the leadership of Joe Devlin tended to become sectarian. See de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 84.

74. I have already pointed to the economically conservative nature of this movement.

75. The alliance between Ulster's landed ascendancy, big industrialists, and the British Conservative Party provided leadership for the Unionist movement. See de Paor, L., op. cit., pp. 57-79.

76. James Connolly, in Beresford Ellis, P., (ed.), James Connolly: Selected Writings, (1973) p. 263.

77. Edwards, E. Dudley, The Sins of Our Fathers, (1970) p.132.

78. As I have pointed out, the analysis might well be extended to the South.

79. Through the Orange Order sectarianism became a feature of Unionism.

80. See de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 43-44.

81. See, for example, Sir Randloph Churchill in Ulster: de Paor, L., op. cit., pp. 57-58.

82. Boyd, A., op. cit., p. 157.

83. Edwards, E. Dudley, op. cit., p. 80.

84. Magee, J., op. cit., p. 40.

85. Ibid., and de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 44.

86. de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 61.

87. Boyd, A., op. cit., p. 87.

88. Money came from England also. Lord Rothschild subscribed £10,000 to the cause. Waldorf Astor and Rudyard Kipling gave £30,000 each. See de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 75.

89. It could be argued that this applied to Ireland a whole, to a large extent.

90. Larkin, cited in Edwards, E. Dudley, op. cit., p. 163.

91. Edwards, E. Dudley, op. cit., p. 137.

92. de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 59.

93. Ibid., pp. 63-96.

94. Moody, T.W., op. cit., p. 23.

95. It is difficult to estimate how much the Unionist position was one of loyalty to Britain and how much a fear of "Rome-rule".

96. Likewise, to call the South a 'Republic' may give an illusion of purity and independence from Britain that does not exist in reality. See Chapter V, p. 28 ff.

97. Fitzgerald, G., op. cit., p. 7.

98. It is difficult to estimate the degree to which Catholics and Protestants were not acting in their best interests during this period -- but it emerges more clearly in the recent period.

99. See Magee, J., op. cit., p. 49.

100. Quoted in Magee, J., op. cit., p. 57.

101. Ibid., pp. 57-58. The Westminster government kept its jurisdiction over security, external trade, and certain financial aspects of government.

102. Goldstrom, J., op. cit., p. 109.

103. Cullen, L.M., An Economic History of Ireland Since 1660, (1972) p. 176.

104. Ibid., p. 184.

105. Goldstrom,J.M., op. cit., p. 109.

106. Cullen, L.M., An Economic History of Ireland Since 1660, (1972) p. 185.

107. de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 107.

108. For example, Prime Ministers Lord Brookborough, Captain O'Neill and Major Chichester-Clark came from landed families.

109. See de Paor, L., op. cit., pp. 131-132.

110. See Rose, R., op. cit., p. 67. Against Rose's position one might argue that the Northern Ireland Government's control over its economic affairs was limited by a number of factors, including its dependence on foreign investment, and Britain's centralized tax-system.

111. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 97.

112. de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 128. See also Elliot, R.S.P. and Hickie, J., Ulster: A Case Study in Conflict Theory

113. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 119.

114. Fitzgerald, G., op. cit., pp. 56-57.

115. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 279.

116. Ibid., p. 280.

117. Ibid., p. 280-281.

118. Ibid., p. 289.

119. The median weekly family income of both Protestants and Catholics was estimated by Rose to have been £16-£20. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 289.

120. Ibid., p. 285.

121. Ibid., p. 286.

CHAPTER IV

ALIENATION AND REIFICATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND

> Should an anthropologist or sociologist be looking for a bizarre society to study I would suggest he comes to Ulster. It is one of Europe's oddest countries. Here in the middle of the twentieth century, with modern technology transforming everybody's lives, you have a medieval mentality which is being dragged painfully into th eighteenth century by some forward looking people. Anyone who belongs to the twentieth century, politically or any other way is a revolutionary.[1]

Introduction

In Northern Ireland it appears that history is master of man, and that the society has fallen headlong into its past with respect to Catholic-Protestant relationships. I will now consider this theme and also identify other aspects of rigidity in structural and conceptual political reality in Northern Ireland. The themes of non-class determinants of conflict between Catholics and Protestants, and of non-dialectical modes of cognizing and ideology present in previous chapters, are more fully developed here. The key concepts are alienation and reification.

Introduction to the Perspective

Hegel is seen as having first made the term alienation philosophically important, although "alienation" has an older linguistic and intellectual background.[2] The intellectual root of alienation, as the term will be used in the perspective to be outlined, traces back to Kant's transcendental philosophy. Kant, through Fichte and Schiller, greatly

influenced Hegel and Marx.[3] Kantian epistemology challenged objectivity in science. Knowledge (experience) is mediated by the categories of the mind. We cannot know the objective world (noumena), but merely phenomena. Failure to realize the subjective dimension in knowledge, in this scheme, alienates consciousness from itself. Here alienation means the subject does not recognize his own work or his own property.[4] The theme is that consciousness has lost something by not recognizing itself in its objects. The introduction of objectivity or otherness into consciousness is seen as necessary to becoming self conscious and to overcoming alienation.

> The world of objects which consciousness posits as different from itself serves as the other without the recognition of which no self consciousness is feasible ... To become self conscious, consciousness must become conscious of its non-self.[5]

Consciousness is alienated through not recognizing its own role in the world.

These themes can be recognized in the following approach to alienation. The phenomenologically informed approach to social life used in this chapter has its basis in what is sees as the anthropological condition of man. Like Marx, it denies that man has any essential nature. Theorists like Berger and Luckmann (1967) incorporate social psychological (especially Median) theories, and certain Marxian categories

into a dialectical and phenomenologically derived sociology.[6] Not all phenomenological sociologists use the dialectic (for example Schutz (1970) Holzner (1972) do not) and are thus not as adequate for the approach to alienation and reification used in this chapter.

Man's compusion to externalize himself is seen as an anthropological necessity. Men collectively externalize themselves to produce a human world - society. This embodied subjectivity attains the status of objective reality in the social structure through the process of objectivation, when it becomes part of the collectively available world. This world is internalized in socialization to become a constitutive part of the subjective consciousness.[7] Berger says,

> Another way of putting this is to say that man produces "otherness" both outside and inside himself as a result of his life in society. Man's own works, insofar as they are part of a social world, become part of a reality other than himself.[8]

The objectivation process is a human necessity, an integral dimension of the social construction of reality. Where the process does not lead to a recognition or re-appropriation of this "otherness", the process is called alienation.

> There are ... two ways in which [objectivation] may proceed -- one, in which the strangeness of the world and self can be reappropriated ... by the "recollection" that both the world and self are products of one's own activity -- the other, in which such reappropriation is no longer possible, and in which social world and socialized self confront the individual as inexorable facticities analogous to the facticities of nature.

> The latter process may be called alienation ... Put differently, alienation is the process whereby the dialectical relationship between the individual and his world is lost to consciousness.[9]

Marxists would agree that broken dialectic leads to alienation but would replace consciousness with a more material and existential category, for example, the proletariat. Concrete man is alienated.

Berger and Pullberg contend that alienation occurs when man's dialectical relationship to his world is lost to consciousness. The unity of producer and product is broken when man forgets that he (collectively and historically) built and continues to sustain the world.[10] Alienated consciousness is an undialectical consciousness, and the alienated world is seen as a product of false consciousness. This is so because man continues to be co-author of the world that paradoxically denies him. Man and social reality never actually become thing-like facticities. They only appear or function as such. As in the Marxian scheme, man does not become totally an object, in that there is the potential for the development of revolutionary consciousness -- of de-alienation.

Reification

In this perspective, undialectical processes are seen as introducing a false rigidity into the world, through producing reification.

> By reification we mean the moment in the process of alienation in which the characteristic of thing -hood becomes the standard of objective reality ... reification is objectification

in an alienated mode.[11]

The human world is transformed in consciousness into non-human dead objectivity. An "overwhelming sense of otherness" is attached to human, social objects (meanings). Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, and so man is alienated from his world through reified and reifying thinking. The process of objectification means the possibility of reification is never far away, but is not inevitable. Thus Lefebvre's notion of a continual process of alienation and de-alienation seems realistic in this perspective.[12] Man is alienated when the real relationship between man and his world is reversed in consciousness. Reification is one such type of 'false consciousness'.

False consciousness leads to alienation. Religion, philosophy, ideology or science may give a false interpretation of the world. In this perspective, ideologies give rise to alienation.

Reification, as false consciousness, exaggerates the objective, external and coercive aspects of social reality (structures and ideas). Social phenomena appear as objects. Definitions of reality become fixed and ossified. Kuhn (1970) describes theoretical reification in science. Scientific paradigms become fossilized and coercive, and are abandoned in a revolutionary dialectical process. Because man is denied his active role in creating reality, reality comes to dominate him. Man becomes as "as if" object in society and in consciousness through reifying

theories.[13] Institutions become totally coercive. The "state", the "economy" and the "movement", are all such reifications when they come to transform man into an object and where they gain a supra-human or ultimate status. Where they dominate man, consciousness is reified and man is alienated.

Reification and Alienation in Northern Ireland

I will now apply this perspective to certain aspects of political life in Northern Ireland. As it is, of course, impossible to treat the whole of the political situation, I will limit my concern to certain aspects of political life in Northern Ireland which may be central to an interpretative understanding of the outbreak of overt conflict between Catholics and Protestants in the 1960's.

Most generally I will be concerned with certain aspects of reification and rigidity in politico-ideological life in Northern Ireland. I will argue that ideologies 'mystify' and 'dehumanize' the world. More particularly, I will argue that, essentially, reification introduces a false rigidity and coerciveness into the objectivated world in Northern Ireland, and thus dehumanizes it. I will show how man appears and functions as a mere object in an institution or system.

Secondly, I will point to the rigidity of certain subjective categories of relevance and group divisions, and to the fixed nature of Catholic-Protestant relationships

that formed an important part of the basis of the political order. This inflexibility will be used in explaining the 'revolutionary' impact of change in the 1960's.

Thirdly, I will suggest that ideologies perpetuating Catholic-Protestant estrangement had become institutionalized in a reified manner, and were not easily subject to revision. Having become hardened into 'dogmas', they denied the world as an open process, and appeared to determine the future. In Northern Ireland, reified definitions of political reality became self fulfilling prophecies.

Fourth, man apprehends other men as objects where the typification schemes and symbolic systems through which man interprets the world become non-dialectically related to reality and falsely concrete. Two examples of this are stereotypical and mythical thinking. Such thinking is often characteristic of political legitimations in Northern Ireland.

Fifth, "roles may become reified by detaching them from human intentionality and expressivity and transforming them into an inevitable destiny for their bearer."[14] The Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (U.V.F.), for example, see themselves in such predestimed terms. Determinism is reifying.

Sixth, legitimations in Northern Ireland dehumanize the world by their appeal to transcendent, supra-human realities. The appeal to God, Ireland, forefathers, sacred heritage or one's place in the historical scheme of things, introduces a trans-empirical rigidity into the world.

Legitimations explain and justify the world, and so stabilize it. An over extension of this process may lead to reification. Berger has noted that religion, as a legitimation, is a notable type of false consciousness, and has always had an enormous alienating propensity.

> ... within a sociological ... frame of reference... the ultimate epistemological status of these reports of religious men will have to be rigorously bracketed ... As such, they must be analysized as are all other human meanings, that is, as elements of the socially constructed world. Put differently, what ever else the constellations of the sacred may be "ultimately", empirically they are the products of human activity and human signification -- that is, they are human projections ... It follows that insofar as these meanings imply an overwhelming sense of otherness, they may be described as alienated projections.[15]

The term "real interest" will be used to refer to practical realities of everyday life, to economics, housing, jobs and so on. In phenomenological sociology the term "real interests" is not used. The approach suspends judgement on questions about the ultimate nature or ontological status of objects. It holds that experientially or phenomenologically there are many realities.[16] However, of these multiple realities it attributes the primordial reality to the reality of everyday life, as opposed to an over-riding preoccupation with ultimate transempirical supra-human concerns or alienating projections.

POLITICO-IDEOLOGICAL REALITY, A SOURCE OF ALIENATION AND REIFICATION

In this section I will look at political alienation and reification in Northern Ireland using the perspective and concepts outlined. I will argue that ideologies are a

major source of alienation for both Catholics and Protestants. Political domination of the Catholics by various institutions will emerge as having been obvious and at times blatently coercive. Less obvious is the 'domination' and alienation of Protestants by certain aspects of the politico-ideological life of the state that appears to have gained an autonomy, or 'escaped'. By this I mean that at one level, the Protestant community, like the Catholics, appears as an object or pawn in a political system that has gained autonomy. Contrary to what is popularly believed, I will argue that the political system in Northern Ireland did not work to the advantage of the vast majority of the Protestant people.

Lukacs and Goldmann argue that Marx's description of the reifying power 'in the autonomization of the economic' which makes thing-like relationships of human relations in the economic sphere, is paradigmatic of fetishism of relations that may also occur in the political sphere.[17] I will show that the state dominated Catholics and denied them political power.

I have already argued that the state can be understood as an institutionalized expression of historical Protestant-Catholic estrangement. The institutionalization of this relationship in a reified manner then acts back to recreate traditional divisions. The dialectic relationship between man and the institutionalized reality is broken. Institutions make man. Man becomes an object of, not a producer of, the

political system. How this occurred in Northern Ireland will be discussed in the following sections.

Every historical social order has an underlying configuration of meaning which provides a taken-for granted orientation for its members. If this totally determines man and cannot be revised, we may say it is ossified and reifies man.

The Ideological Basis of the State

The notion of an underlying configuration of meaning is important in looking at political life in Northern Ireland. We have seen that the ideological basis of the state emerged out of the existence within Ireland of two mutually antagonistic political ideologies. Perhaps the most basic meaningful structure on which the state rested was that of Catholic-Protestant divisions. This is important. I am pointing to the inherent Catholic-Protestant estrangement in the ideological rationale for the state.

Changes in economic structure since the creation of the state, had partly eroded the economic rational for the state. For example, within the European economic community politically separate areas became economic free trade areas.

However, as I will show, support for the state rested on ideological grounds, as did opposition to it. A key theme will be that the ideological basis of the state became a continual source of conflict, for the basis of order lay less in economic than in opinions and beliefs about others.[18]

Ideologies in Northern Ireland led to political alienation. Ideologies created political alienation in that mundane, everyday-life political issues were transcended and Utopian and ideological goals replaced them. Secondly, the inherently antagonistic nature of the dominant ideologies inevitably led to continued sectarianism and Catholic-Protestant estrangement.

The Political Relevance of Catholic-Protestant Divisions

The continued existence of the political status quo has to a large extent rested on the perpetuation of Catholic-Protestant divisions. Political restructuring of Northern Ireland on lines other than religious persuasion would have, I shall argue, threatened the political order, perhaps even the existence of the state. As we have seen, Unionism united a combination of different class interests under the guise of Protestantism. Catholic-Protestant division were central to Unionism and were therefore perpetuated. Bernadette Devlin points to the consequences of the fact that in Northern Ireland political allegiance followed religious persuasion, not class interest.

> Discrimination against Catholics within the system helps widen the division between the working class, and has effectively been used by the Orange Order -- manipulated leaders of the state. The tragedy of the situation is that by aligning themselves with those who work against their interests but share their religion, the working class of my country, Protestant and Catholic, perpetuate their own misery.[19]

The 'leaders', of course, were the Unionist party and the less powerful Nationalist party, both of whom recruited support along religious lines. Despite efforts in the late 1960's by the left, the labour party and the civil rights movement, to politically redefine Northern Ireland in non-sectarian terms, class politics did not emerge. Class, or politics based on economics, threatened the existing political parties and powers with destruction. Thus religion and politics in Northern Ireland remained inextricably linked. The political arena was structured and populated by sacred issues and causes. According to Berger religion provides emensely alienating forms of sacred legitimations for the social order.

> We can now identify more accurately the quality that permits religion to do this -- to wit, the quality of its alienating power. The fundamental 'recipe' of religious legitimation is the transformation of human products into supra- or non-human facticities ... The human nomas becomes a divine cosmos, or at any rate a reality that derives its meanings from beyond the human sphere. Without going to the extreme of simply equating religion with alienation ... we would contend that the historical part of religion in the world-building and world-maintaining enterprises of man is in large measure due to the alienating power inherent in religion.[20]

The rigidity and sectarian distortion of human political relations in the Unionist regime in Northern Ireland made it doubly alienating.

Political parties in Northern Ireland perpetuated Catholic-Protestant estrangement.

> Parties in Ulster emphasize traditional religious and racial antagonisms in order to enact a rigid loyalty from their supporters. They intensify a sectarian bitterness which civilized opinion deplores; and in so doing they force the judgement of the electors into the service of their prejudices... The main criticism, therefore ... [is] that it subordinates every vital issue, whether of social or economic policy, to the dead hand of sectarian strife.[21]

Although written in 1936, this has not lost its relevance.

The Common Enemy

The tone of Unionist politics established in the early struggle remained in many important respects unmodified until the 1960's. Lacking a class basis of unity, Unionist politicans mobilized support and ensured group coherence and solidarity by expressive symbols of group identity; that is, for example, by appealing to 'Protestants'. Equally significant was the belief in a common enemy, which had a strong integrative effect. de Paor ascribes this factor singular importance in uniting Unionists. He notes that given

> The nature of the situation in Northern Ireland ... [it] demanded permanent one party rule -- the Unionist party as a whole had within it at all times disparate elements ... united only in their determination never to let the Catholics take over.[22]

By defining the Catholic minority as traitors, Unionist political supremacy was ensured, Catholics and Protestant were opposed and so the working class divided. According to Edelman the choice of the enemy reveals an important political process;

> Because enemies, whether demonstrably harmful or not, do help marshall political and psychological support for their adversaries, the choice or definition of who the enemy is reflects an anticapation of which choice of enemy will most potently create and mobilize allies. The operation ... of this form of social and symbolic interaction in the choice and perception of enemies is the critical political fact in conflict escalation among masses of people and the key to explanation of the dynamics of the process.[23]

This theme will be returned to in discussing civil unrest and the civil rights movement in the 1960's. We shall see that the explanations offered by Unionist and Loyalist indeed stressed the presence among them of a 'traditional' enemy. The following quotation was part of the Unionist politicans' solution to unemployment in Northern Ireland during the nineteen thirties. In identifying the Catholics as the enemy it deflects attention from the economic situation, and unites the Protestant electorate.

> Thinking the whole thing out carefully ... I recommend those people who are loyalists not to employ Roman Catholics, ninety-nine per cent of whom are disloyal ... You are disenfranchising yourselves that way. You people who are employers have the ball at your feet. If you don't act properly now before we know where we are we shall find ourselves in the minority instead of the majority.[24]

Mass definitions of the minority as a monolithic group by Unionist politicans predispossitioned Unionists towards seeing Catholics in reified terms, and towards interpretating any Catholic movement as a threat. Such rigid definitions introduced a false conreteness into the political arena. Catholics were seen as the embodiment of treasonable or evil political beliefs

not diverse and complex human beings.

The Common Cause

The intertwining of religion and politics, the overriding concern with ideological issues and the perceived need to defend against 'the enemy' fossilized or reified political life in the North. The definition of the minority as a threat arose out of the existence of competing ideologies and as we will see had little foundation in everyday life. Boyd describes this preoccupation with 'the enemy' as a fetish.[25] However, a common ideological cause as well a common enemy also united Protestants. Rose argues that the constitution is the major political issue in Northern Ireland. Groups organize about the best way to defend or oppose it Thus Northern Ireland's political life operates within a dichotomous division about the constitituion.[28]

Boyd suggests the common enemy and the common cause are related.

> Northern Ireland has been known for a long time as a place where Catholics and Protestants -- in political terms, Nationalists and Unionists -- cannot live together in peace.
>
> Members of the Orange Order ... have an abnormal fear of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland. Against Catholics they have devised their own magical rigmarole of music; banners incantations and ritual.
>
> These fetishes pass for politics in Northern Ireland because the Orange Order and the Unionist Party are interwoven ... their common purpose is to maintain Protestant power and to keep Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom.[27]

Rose (1971) persuasively argues that both Catholics and Protestants are integrated by a commitment to their respective common concerns which both communities hold as near sacred, such as religion and National identity.[28] He adds that both Catholics and Protestants, by their own standards, see themselves right, and uncompromisingly so.[29]

The Rewards for Loyalty?

It is often argued that the Protestant community benefited from Unionist rule in Northern Ireland. However, for many it offered few tangible benefits, and through the use of sectarianism it allowed no political alternative to emerge. Thus political life remain reified and alienated by sectarian ideologies. The section on the failure of labour politics in the North will demonstrate this. Unionism represented a collective ideology, and misrepresented working class economic interests.

> Moreover, thousand of Protestants, as well as Catholics, are the victims of Unionist misrule. They, too, suffer from unemployment and poor housing.[30]

Devlin argues that the Unionist system provided the protestant majority with just enough rewards, or the illusion of rewards, to ensure their loyalty.

> At the bottom of the social pyramid with nothing to lose, the Catholic working man doesn't really fear the Protestants; but the Protestant working man, who has very little, feels the need to hang onto his Protestant identity in case he loses what little he has. He fears the Catholic because he knows that any gain made by the minority will be his loss.[31]

Indeed, competition for employment and housing between Catholics may be seen as distracting the working class from seeing the source of the problem in the overall shortage of such goods in the prevailing economic system.

de Paor argues that the real threat to the regime came from Protestant workers who needed to be kept to Unionism if the establishment was to survive. Fearing the workers distraction by economic issues, sectarian fears were deliberately employed.[32] Northern Protestants were relatively disadvantaged vis a vis the rest of the United Kingdom. Average unemployment in the North was at least three times higher than in the United Kingdom.[33] The state suffered from a shortage of even bad housing. Working class housing conditions were especially bad.[34] Protestant and Catholic segregated housing areas were frequently described as "ghettos". In fact, many of the socio-economic benefits accruing to citizens of Northern Ireland, as in social welfare and education, were the outcome of its relationship with the Westminster parliament and were introduced independently of the wishes of the Unionist party on occasions. For example, Unionist members of parliament at Westminster opposed the Labour government's welfare legislation in 1948.

In spite of the fact that the Unionist party appears to have been misrepresenting the interests of the Protestant workers, it still received political support from these workers. To understand this phenomenon it is necessary to return to a consideration of ideology.

Ideology and the Unionist Party

I have argued that the Unionist regime's stability and survival relied less on economics than on the perpetuation of Catholic-Protestant divisions and ideological concerns. Ideologies function to alienate man from the world of practical everyday life.

One of the simplest ways to rally Unionist voters was to make constitutional or ideological issues central; for example, to campaign on issues such as the border. Ideological issues maintained Unionist supremacy, but were a continual source of alienation and reification in the political life of the state. Moody observes that,

> Democracy in Northern Ireland was regarded by the majority as realized in 'a protestant parliament for a protestant people' ... Instead of a real party system, based on differences of social policy and principles and assuming alternations of the party ... in power, parliamentary life in Northern Ireland was sterilized into the perpetual rule of one party. This 'Ulster Unionist Party', closely connected with the Orange Order, included all varieties of 'loyalists' ... and justified its monopoly of power by the continuing need to defend the state against the danger of subversion by the 'disloyal' minority.... For this frozen situation Catholics were themselves partly responsible because they could never agree frankly to accept the constitution of Northern Ireland.[35]

False consciousness and the alienating power of Nationalist ideology will be discussed in a later section. In many respects Unionism and Nationalism are alike. Toryism in Northern Ireland came under the guise of Protestansim or Unionism, Nationalist and Republican parties have been aptly labeled Green Tories, in that they are largely concerned with ideological issues and do not represent working class interests,

but alienates them from a concern with mundane and practicle goals.

Just as 'right' and 'left' may be seen as relevant political labels where economic issues predominate, Protestant and Catholic are relevant terms by which to describe politico-ideological conflict in Northern Ireland.

Ideology and Party Allegiance

Although Northern Ireland is a multi-party system, Rose argues that most parties can be readily located within three major types, Orange, Green and 'secular' or those parties that appeal to both Catholics and Protestants. Labour is the most important example of this third type and will be discussed later. The Unionist party was the largest party in Northern Ireland. The party is seen to stand for the British connection, and to a lesser extent Protestantism.[37] The vast majority of Protestants identified with Unionism. However, within this group there were differences in the degree of commitment to the regime. Rose[38] identified two main types. First, there were "Ultras' or loyalists. Within the Protestant population of Northern Ireland as a whole, as within Unionism, Rose found just over a majority of Protestants approved of 'any measures' to keep the state Protestant.[38]

> Protestants were asked whether they thought it would be right to take any measure necessary to keep Northern Ireland a Protestant country. Colloquially, keeping the country does not mean expelling the Catholic third of the population, but maintaining a Protestant monopoly of power in the regime. The reference to violence is clear.[39]

The ultimately sacred nature of their political world to Protestants is obvious. The reasonsgiven were 'defense of Protestantism and the British connection', and opposition to Catholicism and the Republic.

Secondly, there were the fully allegiant Protestants. This group would not endorse non-parliamentary or militant methods for political ends. In their willingness to comply with the constitutional methods, this group would accept important reforms.

Nationalists are seen as standing for a united Ireland. Rose found that only thirteen per cent of Catholics supported the use of violence towards the abolition of the border, an ideal towards which most Catholics aspired.[40]

Neither the Unionist party nor the Nationalist party was seen by people in Northern Ireland as standing for economic benefits, but were associated with such concers as the British connection, a united Ireland, Protestantism and Catholicism.[41]

The Failure of Labour Politics

In this chapter I am suggesting that the political life of Northern Ireland tended to be reified and that ideology alienated man from his real interests in that constitutional, ideological and 'ultimately sacred' concerns, distorted certain aspects of politics. A brief look at the career of labour politics will illustrate this.

Although Northern Ireland was industrialized its politics did not follow the usual pattern of modern indust-

rialized Western nations. The labour party was largely irrelevant up until the late 1960's.

Secondly, religion, not class, correlated with politics and in political allegiances between classes of the same religion.

Labour politics had never done well in the North and was extremely vulnerable to more sectarian forms of politics. Where labour drew ...

> Unionist votes, they were liable to lose them back to the official unionists whenever danger appeared to, or was made seen to, threaten the Protestant cause ... Thus in 1969 ... jobs, houses and food were not in the end the issue on which the workers of Belfast voted, but the threat of Rome.[42]

Labour itself did not present a united front. The movement was splintered on the issue of partition. The Northern Ireland Labour party (N.I.L.P.) had connections with the British Labour Party and it accepted the constitution. Republican Labour, of course, did not. Rose notes:

> The chief division among working-class parties has concerned national identity. One Labour tradition in Northern Ireland insists upon the solution of the province's problems by closer integration with the United Kingdom ... The second mixes Irish Republicanism and Socialism...[43]

Labour's success has been limited. In 1958 the N.I.L.P. won four setas in the Stormont parliament. By 1965 it had lost two of these.

Unions, on the other hand, had a greater success in combating the sectarian divide which influenced a great deal of Ulster's socio-political and economic life. There

was a considerable amount of segregation in employment in the North. In spite of this unions deliberately tried to remain secular. Rose points out the high rate of unionization and its secular character in the North.[44] However, de Paor interprets its success in this area as largely due to definite efforts made to keep (Traditional) politics (and thereby religion) out of the union movement.[45] Thus sectarianism, a man made reality appeared to dominate men in Northern Ireland and prevent political alternatives from emerging. Sectarianism appeared as a coercive and constraining force determining the nature of political life of Protestants an Catholics, rather than allowing men to create their worlds. The present generations appear as mere reifications, objects or pawns in the structures and belief systems institutionalized by their fore-fathers.

POLITICAL REIFICATION OF CATHOLICS

In this section I will point to certain aspects of the reification of Catholics in the political system. I will argue that politically, Catholics tended to be treated as objects in a system in a manner that ensured continued Unionist rule, and in this sense were denied a human significance. The political meaning of Catholics in Northern Ireland was that of a minority that were seen to pose a threat to the regime. Catholics appear to have been treated according to the needs of the political system. The stability of the Unionists rested largely on politicans' ability to

unite Protestants, irrespective of class, at the polls, and on keeping the threateningly large minority politically powerless. Rose states that

> The exclusion of Catholics from sharing executive power in Northern Ireland is matched nowhere else in the Western world. The nearest equivalent was the exclusion of American blacks from senior posts in America Federal government ... In Northern Ireland ... the leaders of the Unionist regime [have not] given any public sign of wishing to share any executive power with Catholics.[46]

As 'objects' of the political system, Catholics' allegiance was neither sought nor gained by the Unionist regime.

The Electoral System

Certain practices in Northern Ireland functioned to politically dominate Catholics, perpetuating their status as 'political objects'. For example, the allocation of houses in Northern Ireland was often determined by politico-religious considerations.

To understand this it is necessary to look at the electoral system and the franchise there. The population elected three bodies. First, they elected local governments and these largely controlled housing in their area. Second, the people elected fifty-two members of parliament to the Stormont assembly. In spite of a ratio of two to one among Protestants and Catholics in the population, representation in parliament showed a ratio of ten to twelve non-Unionists against forty to forty two Unionists. This rigid pattern established in the early days of the state remained unchanged.

In fact, the outcome of elections was so taken for granted that there was normally an extraordinary large number of uncontested seats ... rising from 40 percent of seats normally, to 70 per cent on occasions.[47] Third, the population elected twelve members of parliament to Westminster. The Westminster parliament by convention did not interfere in Northern Ireland's internal affairs.

The Unionist party had been in government in Northern Ireland since 1920 and the regime had become synonomous with this party. Political gerrymandering and ward-rigging functioned to ensure Protestant or Unionist political dominance. The franchise was a means of manipulating the political system. Not until 1969 did Northern Ireland adopt universal adult franchise and abolish plural voting in local government. There was a property requirement in local government elections. A voter had to be a house owner, tenant or property owner of valuation of not less than £10. Limited companies had up to six extra votes. Given the disadvantaged position of Catholics in housing and property ownership, the franchise was a useful source of political domination.

There was also manipulation and control of ward boundaries. In 1969, the Cameron Commission found that the 'limited franchise' and gerrymandering favoured the Unionists.

> The basic complaint in these areas is that the present electoral arrangements are weighed against non-Unionists. ... we show that the complaint is abundantly justified.
> ... [in] the realities of the local situation in Northern Ireland ... it is obvious that local politics in these areas have always turned on questions of sectarian control and influence.[48]

The technique involved in gerrymandering was to draw constituency or ward boundaries in such a way as to "spread your support as thin as you dare over as many seats as possible, while you crowd your opponents support into as few seats as possible".[49] Derry is one example of the success of this technique. The ratio of Protestant to Catholic representation on the local council was two to one, yet in the population the ratio of Catholics to Protestants was two to one.

Political domination of the Catholic and anti-Unionist population could also be practised in elections to the House of Commons at Stormont, for this electoral system also allowed business/plural voting. Constitutional boundaries were also weighed in favour of Unionists.

> The Stormont electoral system allows for manipulation in several ways, and the business premises vote in itself gave a bonus of votes to unionism, since the business and professional class in the community was predominately not only Protestant but reliably Unionist.[50]

Elections to Westminster from Northern Ireland used the same basis for franchise as did Britain, - one man one vote. Thus the following comparison gives evidence of the extent of the disenfranchisement in the Northern Irish electoral system.

TABLE IV.1

Number of Electors, 1967[51]

Parliament	Number of electors
Westminster	909,841
Stormont	933,724*
Local Government	694,483**

* This includes extra property votes and votes given to graduates of Queen's University.

** Also includes extra property votes so the number here is larger than the no. of voters.

Thus public housing became politically important in Northern Ireland. Houses meant votes. Who received houses and where were crucial political concerns.

To disenfranchisement must be added the manipulation of ward boundaries, the Special Powers Act, the exploitation of fears, the use of sectarianism and ideology to keep the electorate divided along religious lines and polarized on ideological issues. All these things ensured that Catholics remained powerless and dominated in political life in Northern Ireland. They were not creators of the political system, but objects in it.

Ideology and the Alienation of Catholics

Catholic political apathy and non-involvement in the state may be seen as a loss of the dialectical relationship between man and his world. This can be understood by

realizing how Nationalist political ideology alienated the Catholic community from an involvement in his political world.

Reunification of Ireland formed the basic political goal and the raison d'etre of the Nationalist party. Within the political framework of Northern Ireland this was an unrealistic and a totally ideological aspiration. Moreover, this demand was a projection towards a future reality -- a dream of eventual utopia. When in the civil rights movement Catholics engaged their world dialectically, and demanded an immediate transformation of their world, the effect was reality-shattering.

Further evidence of Catholic alienation from or non-involvement in the political system may be seen by noting that only in the 1960's did the Nationalist party agree to become the official opposition. More convincingly the support in 1955 for abstentionist Sinn Fein candidates by 23.5 per cent of the electorate demonstrates the Catholics alienation from the regime. They were willing to elect representatives who would not sit in parliament.[52]

Relative Deprivation

The basic insight of the concept of relative deprivation is that a comparison rather than an absolute state of affairs leads a person to feel relatively deprived. A person's attitudes, values or motives depend on the frame of reference

within which they are conceived. The referent may for example, be an idea, a person, a group or even expectations. A sense of relative deprivation therefore arises out of a comparison.[53] Titmuss rightly identified the need to investigate "the effect of recent social and economic changes on the relationship, attitudes, and deprivations of different social groups and their consequent patterns of social needs."[54]

Protestants in Northern Ireland form the reference group against which Catholics as a group feel relatively deprived. Rose found that 74 per cent of the Catholic community felt Catholics were discriminated against in Northern Ireland, as opposed to 74 per cent of Protestants who felt there was no discrimination against Catholics.[55]

Charges of discrimination were central to the civil rights movement, and a sense of relative deprivation rather than objective disadvantage motivated those who joined it.

> Discrimination against Catholics has been the most important issue of the civil rights movement. (The attempt to protest against economic disadvantages by Protestants as well as Catholics so far failed, for Protestants have not joined the nominally non-sectarian civil rights movement.)[56]

The extension of the British welfare state to Northern Ireland, with its ideology of equality and equal opportunity, may be seen as having introduced a new or changed set of expectation to the Catholic community. Magee claims that,

> The early years of O'Neill's administration saw the growth of the Civil Rights Association. Unlike the traditional Nationalist organizations, it ignored the 'Border' and demanded the same standards of equality and justice as prevailed in the rest of the United Kingdom.[57]

Although Catholics were discriminated against in the areas of housing and employment (Catholics were two and a half times more likely to be unemployed than Protestants) it wasn't until the 1960's that this formed the basis for a social movement. Edelman offers an explanation of this phenomenon:

> Perception of deprivation, then, like all perception is a function of social cues regarding what is to be expected and what exists; it does not correlate directly or simply with objective conditions or any particular measure of them.[58]

CHANGE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

I have argued that the political status quo in Northern Ireland rested on Catholic-Protestant divisions. I will now show, through analysis of the reaction to certain changes in the 1960's, the perceived sacredness of these divisions to many people in Northern Ireland. In chapter five I will show how group specific socialization patterns ensured the continuation of two sub-universes of meaning. Traditional cognitive systems tended to preserve historically relevant definitions of reality which prevailed as taken for granted in both communities.

I shall now look at four sources of change in the 1960's. First I will look at the ecumenical movement. Secondly, I will identify the perceived relevance of increased North-

South communication. Thirdly, I will treat O'Neill's attempt to transform the basis for political allegiance from ideology to economics. Finally, and most important, was the civil rights movement.

The Ecumenical Movement and Other Changes

The Ecumenical movement among christian churches encouraged dialogue among Catholic and Protestant clergymen in Ireland. Paisley led an angry protest. Boulton observes that

> The ecumenical controversy had special relevance to Northern Ireland. The great mass of people calling themselves protestants neither knew nor cared that the leadership of their churches had long abandoned classical Calvinism and the bible fundamentalism associated with the Reformation ... The significance of the ecumenical movement was that it made the difference evident in political terms: those who preached ecumenicism ... were selling out to Rome. Those who preached fundamentalism were making a stand for 'traditional Unionism'. This was one of the major objective factors behind the rise of Ian Paisley. For in Ulster ecumenism carried the threat of Catholic integration.[59]

I shall argue in chapter five that reaction to certain changes in Catholic-Protestant relationships may be seen as an attempt to preserve the internal structures of sacred cosmologies. In this section I am concerned to show how the rigidity in the face of change in Northern Ireland threatened it with revolution or destruction. Paisley fought to preserve traditional 'divinely ordained' divisions between Catholic and Protestant, North and South, as revealed in his abhorance of 'Romanists mingling in our crowds'. In his own

words he "hated God's enemies with a perfect hate".[60]

In 1965 the Prime Ministers of Northern Ireland and the Republic met to discuss areas of economic cooperation that would be to the mutual advantage of both states. O'Neill's policy was a novelty:

> No Northern Ireland Prime Minister had ever had official conversations with his opposite number in the Republic, nor had successive Prime Ministers there shown themselves ready to set aside their commitment to the eventual unity of the 32 counties for the sake of improved diplomatic relations in the present. ... (The meeting) had all the overtones and anxieties, in Irish terms, of a summit meeting between Russian and American leaders.[61]

Perhaps more than any other event this symbolized a revised version of Unionism in the 1960's. Rigidity in certain aspects of life in Northern Ireland was matched by a willingness or a recognition of the necessity to change in others in the 1960's. However, the transition from 'old Unionism' to 'modern Unionism' was to throw into sharp belief the tensions between the moderates and the right wing among its supporters. O'Neill may have been a 'liberal innovator' within a Northern Ireland context,

> Nevertheless, to those who under Unionist tutelage had learned to regard the Republic as an enemy state and Lemass as a puppet of the Pope. O'Neill was henceforth suspect as at best an appeaser and at worst a traitor.[62]

Unfortunately,

> ... his innovations came too slowly and too late to conciliate the catholics, and too fast and too soon for the hard-line unionists who eventually made [O'Neill's] position untenable.[63]

The whole system became threatened with destruction in the 1960's when there developed within the political arena an increased concern with economics and everyday life, rather than with ultimate historical and religious values. In the Unionist camp it came from O'Neill (Prime Minister 1963-69).

> In common with the rest of the British Isles, Northern Ireland began to show an active interest in economic planning in the early 1960's. This concern was by no means inevitable. Previous Unionist governments had no electoral needs to make economic policy the main feature of the party's programme, as it was inevitably successful in appealing for votes on constitutional grounds.[64]

In this transition from 'old Unionism' to 'modern Unionism', O'Neill sought to make the political regime fully legitimate by winning support from the Catholic community. O'Neill abandoned the sectarian tone of politics that many previous Unionist politicians had employed. The post World War II period had been relatively peaceful. There had been, in 1956, a violent threat to the regime in the form of an IRA. campaign but that died out largely because of lack of support.

> ... the real reason why the campaign failed was precisely the lack of nationalist unrest. Contrary to the IRA's own expectations, the northern Catholic population did not support the campaign. The IRA statement admitting defeat in 1962 acknowledted ... [that] 'the general public ... [had] deliberately been distracted from the supreme issue facing the Irish people -- the unity and freedom of Ireland'.[65]

Catholics also were moving away from traditional ideological solutions to their problems as I will show in the section on the civil rights movement. O'Neill proposed an alternative basis for support for the state. He attempted

to substitute economics for ideology. By this I mean that O'Neill sought support on a policy that emphasized economic issues.[66] Responses to O'Neill's actions were to reveal how rigid and reified social categories and group boundaries were in Northern Ireland. His attempt to win Catholic support cut across traditional religious divides and threatened to destroy part of the underlying political order (sectarian divisions) of the state. To redefine Northern Ireland in non-politico-ideological terms was to threaten those who were committed to, or found their interests served by the traditional Orange-Unionist ideology. This was in effect an attempt to redraw social boundaries; however, as I will argue in chapter five, this threatened to integrate antagonistic subjective categories and to destory sacred cosmologies. At first O'Neill's policies received little resistance, for many believed as he did that the old ideology of Unionism was irrelevant and archaic in a modern state. The noisy opposition of such people as Paisley seemed unimportant; however, it was to emerge as a powerful movement as the ambiguities associated with a period of change increased tension. In this process political leaders themselves played a role which they may have never intended. As Edelman puts it:

> Government affects behaviour chiefly by shaping the cognitions of large numbers of people in ambiguous situations. It helps create their beliefs about what is proper, their perceptions of what is fact, and their expectations of what is to come.[67]

The first serious indications of discontent came from Unionist right wingers. O'Neill's activities could not easily be reconciled within traditional definitions of the world and the interpretations and significance attached to his policies caused anxieties. Indeed, objectively it could be argued that O'Neill's policies did little or nothing to change the political standing of Catholics in the state until 1968-69 when the pressure of internal events and the British government forced some concessions from the Unionists. It was not simply a matter of all Unionists being opposed to reform, but that 'capitulation' to the Catholics would threaten the unity of the party and its supporters.

More important than events in themselves -- which would have at the most produced a very long gradual process of limited reform in the North was the interpretation of events. The quest for causes and truth in Northern Ireland is not a meaningful activity; rather it is necessary to understand how people came to act towards their perceptions and interpretations of the situation. In Northern Ireland the way many people perceived problematic situations, the meanings they ascribed to them, and the actions and solutions deemed adequate to handle the threat or problem, were often a function of collective or shared interpretations of the past, and of rigidly and historically derived typification schemes.

Paisely provided a reassuring and traditional definition of the situation that may have alleviated the anxieties of uncertainty, warning that the road to reform was the road to Rome:

> Consequently the mere rumour of reform would create reaction from the Protestant middle and working class in the form of Paisleyism, a movement which, in the Spring of 1966, had still appeared like the rumble of a distant drum. By the end of 1967, 20 per cent of the Protestant middle class and almost 40 per cent of the Protestant working class found that they 'usually agreed with what the Rev. Ian Paisley said'.[68]

And Boulton states,

> A public opinion poll showed the 200,000 of Ulster's million protestants considered themselves potential Paisely supporters ... Paisley's growing 'extremism' was in contrast to official Unionism's growing 'moderation' ... The classless coalition of Unionism began to break at the seams.[69]

Paisley's rise to power can be seen as partly due to his having filled the void left in the extreme Protestant position by the conciliatory approach towards Catholics which the Westminster forced on the Unionist party. As I pointed out, the Unionist movement in Ireland had a long history of using sectarian fears so that "When the ruling class was forced to moderate its position, Paisely was rightly able to scream betrayal; thus the Unionists found the tables being turned on them".[70] The reforms, such as those advocated by the civil rights movement, which may have prevented the present violent situation could not be introduced.

The Civil Rights Movement

The civil rights movement led to a process of polarization of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. An alternative to reality transcending ideologies of Nationalism and Republicanism was offered to the Catholic community by

the civil rights movement in the 1960's. It was concerned with fighting discrimination in housing, employment and politics. In the following section on political arousal the events of August 1969 will be used as an example of the role of perceptions and misinterpretations of reality in creating the situation. It was these events that occasioned the introduction of British troops into Northern Ireland and perhaps the 'internment' of Catholics in 1971 that hardened attitudes against the regime.

The civil rights movement in Northern Ireland was definitely reformist in character, but in context it became ironically a revolutionary crusade.

> McCann, one of the few Socialist revolutionaries to have survived the sectarian passions of Ulster politics, was once asked ... what he was doing involving himself in a lot of 'reformist' demands like one-man-one-job and one family one house. He replied: 'Because the transformation ... necessary to implement these reforms is a revolution'.[71]

The civil rights movement should have posed no threat to a Western democracy. It did not challenge the ideological legitimacy of the state. It did not raise the issue of reunification with the Republic of Ireland which had hitherto resulted in Catholics being labeled as enemies of the state. The Civil Rights Association drew its support from Catholics generally although some middle class Protestants were prominant in it and had been actively compaigning for equal rights for all in Northern Ireland. The civil rights movement drew mass support from Catholics which increased as the movement encountered resistance and opposition from the

forces of law and order in the state and from 'hardline' Protestants.[72] The police seemed unwilling or unable to protect civil rights marchers.

Although not directly threatening the state or the constitution, the civil rights movement was perceived and defined as doing so by 'official and unofficial interpreters of Unionist reality'. The minister for Home Affairs who controlled the implimentation of the special powers Act stated,

> There is all this nonsense about civil rights ... There are our old traditional enemies exploiting the situation. The civil rights movement is bogus and is made up of ill-informed radicals and people who see in unrest a chance to renew the campaign of violence.[73]

The Sunday Times team stated that it was a "basic act of misgovernment to allow that there was anything revolutionary in the set of demands that Civil Rights ... adopted as its programme."[74] However, the rigid definition of Catholics as disloyal, treasonable, hostile and determined to destroy the state had become an institutionalized version of the truth which many people believed. It justified their poor treatment in the state. The labelling of Catholics was to become a self fulfilling prophecy.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECIES

Merton's concept of self fulfilling prophecy can be understood to mean that "consciously or not, people seem capable of creating conditions that increase the likelihood that their prophecies or expectancies concerning the future

will actually occur."[75] I will show how interaction in Northern Ireland followed this pattern. I will briefly look at certain aspects of the civil rights campaign and the reaction to it as social movements. I will employ a perspective that emphasizes the rational and cognitive aspects of collective behaviour rather than the irrational and emotional. Action in Northern Ireland will be seen as appropriate responses to perceived situations.

Toch (1965) defined social movements as efforts by large numbers of people to solve collectively a problem they feel they have in common. They are seen as purposeful, aimed either at producing or resisting change.[76] Both the civil rights movement and what I shall term the 'loyalist' response may be seen in this light. Loyalists wished to preserve what they saw as sacred. A loyalist spokesman emphasizes their determination -- "We are determined to preserve our British tradition and British way of life. God help those who get in our way.". Social movements may be seen as having a goal and a career. Movements don't arise mysteriously but evolve in an understandable manner. Furthermore, like other social groups they may be seen as having an internal structure, a normative framework, a sense of commonness and shared values or ideology.

The civil rights movement gained the support of a variety of other organizations also demanding reforms in Northern Ireland. Its leadership was drawn from a wide

spectrum within the Catholic community, and to a lesser extent the Protestant community. Organization tended to be broadly based and was conducted by a variety of bodies ranging from Nationalist, Labour, Socialist, Republican bodies, from housing committees, social justice groups and so on. The movement had emerged from various middle-class political pressure groups who had had little success, into a mass movement. Various intellectuals such as the People's Democracy, a group of students and former students of Queen's University, endorsed and offered an articulate justification for the movement. Membership, being largely composed of Catholics, tended to be drawn from those who felt either relatively deprived or discontented with the Unionist regime. It included a variety of different interest groups united in their desire for change.

Leadership for the loyalist group also came from a variety of different interest groups including government members of parliament. As tension increased and positions polarized a vast array of Loyalist organizations emerged. The list is impressive. There emerged the Ulster Defense Association, Ulster Constitution Defense Committee, Ulster Protestant Volunteers and so on. The Ulster Defense Association formed an 'umbrella' type organization for different groups, but like the Catholic movement Protestant support for the regime was loosely structured, containing many internal differences. At the most general level its 'unity' depended largely on the common goal of defending

the existing order.

In both cases norms emerged; for example, it became progressively more unacceptable for Catholics and Protestants to live in close proximity, or to associate with those of the other religion. Sampson argues that:

> According to emergent-norm theory, following the crowd need not be based on a loss of individual uniqueness or critical sense, but rather on conformity to group pressures of which the individual is critically aware and knowledgeable.[77]

The career of both movements, of course, were linked as they emerged in close response to each other. Thus the civil rights movement by 1970 had emerged into a Catholic defense movement and a demand for radical political change.

Expectations in Northern Ireland functioned as self-fulfilling prophecies. Catholics had been defined as the enemy. The permanent state of emergency under the special powers Act is understandable when one realizes that the forces of 'law and order' saw the presence of Catholics in the State as a continual source of threat. This influenced what they saw as appropriate action. When disorder broke out in Derry and Belfast (August 1969) in connection with a civil rights march it was seen in a predictable but inaccurate manner. O'Brien observes that,

> ... it would even be an understatement to say that the police were <u>helping</u> the Protestants. The fact is that the police were <u>part</u> of the Protestant forces trying - as they saw it - to crush a Catholic insurrection that had begun in Derry and was backed by Dublin.[78]

Rose argues that the armed attacks on Catholics transformed the support for the civil rights movement into support for citizens' defense groups, and that in effect the police brought the gun back into Northern Ireland politics.[79] Thus expectations were fulfilled. Violence emanated from the forces of law and order also. Sampson acknowledges the frequency of this phenomenon,

> Violence and terror, however, are not of the movement only; the stable society resorts to violence and particularly to the use of terror to snuff out resistance and maintain its own control in the face of the threatening movement. The leadership of the movement in a hostile society, rather than being taken into the council chambers for discussion, are constantly wary of their very survival; they become conspirators leading a band of hearty freedom-fighters (their terms) against the fascist society (their terms) that seeks their removal.[80]

Interpretations of "News".

Shibutani argues that "rumor is a form of communication through which men caught together in an ambiguous situation attempt to construct a meaningful interpretation of it by pooling their intellectual resources."[81] It is a collective enterprise whose common objective is a satisfactory definition of a problematic situation. The distinctive characteristic of rumour as a collective transmission is that there is a relaxation of many of the conventional norms governing verification procedures and sources of information.[82] Any departure from normal in society requires reorientation. The search for knowledge therefore becomes a key activity in establishing a new working orientation towards the changing environment. If news or information is not available it

may develop spontaneously. Shibutani adds that,

> An appreciation of any rumour requires some knowledge of the sensitivities shared by the people and the manner in which they are mobilized to act.[83]

Furthermore, collective tension in times of ambiguity may also be anticipatory. As Shibutani says, "people who are waiting for something to happen become restless and especially attentive to anything thought to be connected with the anticipated event."[84]

Thus in Northern Ireland when news of the disorder in Derry on August the twelfth 1969 reached Catholics in Belfast they feared another program agains them. Protestants on the other hand believed they were facing an IRA rebellion. In the absense of reliable information people's working perspective became a function of sedimented (historical) experience and collective stereotypical beliefs. News became a function of expectations. Hastings reported,

> Despite the almost total lack of evidence of their effective presence in Belfast, it was being promptly reported in Ulster and in the South that armed I.R.A. men were coming North in large numbers to join the battle.[85]

This myth was both supported and reinforced by government sources of news. Beliefs about events are constructed in a manner that is gratifying and perceived as an adequate definition of the situation. Edelman stresses the emotional dimension of this process, and its role in influencing cognitive activity,

> ... a belief that others constitute a threat that cannot be limited through political negotiation ... [does not] encourage empathetic mutual role taking which enlarges understanding of the range of viable potentialities, such an emotion catalyzes engagement with a particular myth and limits the individual to a particular self conception.[86]

I will return to this theme in discussing the IRA.

It is important to note that in Northern Ireland beliefs about situations cannot be easily changed by contradictory claims, for both sides see the other side as lying. Hasting records,

> A few days after the Belfast holocaust, a Catholic ... heard a group of reporters discussing the police action in facing the Catholic in the Falls Road. 'What mob' he suddenly interrupted. 'There was never no mob -- the boys in blue just came in and tried to murder everyone in their beds!' He didn't care that eyewitnesses saw the facts differently, he didn't even want to listen. He was only sure, like every Catholic in Belfast, that he was the victim of a Protestant onslaught. Likewise Paisely, a little later when he was calling fire and brimstone on Catholics for attacking Protestant property; everyone asked how he could explain that almost every house destroyed in the riots was Catholic. Paisley thought for a moment, then replied with utter outward sincerity that Catholic houses were so jammed with stores of petrol bombs that even a spark would set them alight. His followers, trusted him implicitly.[87]

Although there was no political censorship in Northern Ireland some publications had a partisan readership. The Belfast Telegraph was widely read by both Catholics and Protestants. However, the Irish news had a Catholic readership, and the Newsletter a Protestant one. During the period of political tension in the 1960's a great many new publications and sources of distribution of news emerged, for

example the Protestant Telegraph which gave a partisan account of events to its public.[88] The Government also was an important source of information, as on occasions were the governments of Britain and the Republic.[89]

Myth

Sampson,[90] in discussing the final stage of polarization in the career of social movements that are threatening to society, says that at this stage people find themselves forced to chose. They are either for the movement or against it and

> ... myth making on all sides becomes a major undertaking. The movement develops its own myths and martyrs about as rapidly as does the large society. Each side sees its myths as true and its opponents' myths as clear lies. A battle for purity and idealism usually rages. As Killian suggests, efforts are mady by the movement's adherents to cloak themselves in a mantle of idealism and altruism.[91]

I will briefly discuss the concept of myth with reference to terrorist organizations in Northern Ireland. The emergence of these groups as important forces in political life takes us beyond the period of discussion so I will only briefly outline the origins of this process not the career of terrorism in Northern Ireland.

Edelman's suggestion that a sense of a certain kind of threat catalyzes engagement with a particular myth may explain the increased acceptance of traditional social myths in the North. Myth is used here to indicate a belief in a certain view of reality or version of history that gives

the holder an active role in relation to the achievement of the ideal. Within the alienation and reification framework outlined, myth can be seen to introduce massive 'otherness' and 'inevitability' into the human world through the reification of roles and ideological legitimations.

> Roles are reified by detaching them from human intentionality and expressivity, and transforming them into an inevitable destiny for their bearers. The latter then act in the false consciousness that they 'have no choice' -- because they are bearers of this or that role. Concrete actions become mere mimetic repetitions of the prototypical action.[92]

The IRA traditionally saw conflict as a 'mimetic repetition' of the past and call on Irish people to fulfill their historic roles.

> This is the age-old struggle of the Irish people versus British aggression. This is the same cause for which generations of our people have suffered and died. In this grave hour all Irish men and women ... must sink their differences, political or religious, and rally behind the banner of national liberation.[93]

Protestant politico-ideological justifications are in the same vein and demonstrate a preoccupation with the past,[94] with defending Protestantism, the state and their British way of life against the Nationalists and the church of Rome. Such 'freedom fighters' as the IRA and the Ulster Volunteer Force saw themselves as embodiments of historical or sacred roles. Commitment to the ideal legitimated the means to be used towards the 'good' or end. However, mythical thinking alienated them from present realities. They were destimed to replay the same roles as their forefathers. Berger explains,

> ... [The alienated] world then ceases to be an open arena ... but becomes instead a closed aggregate of reifications divorced from present or future activity ... In this loss of the societal dialectic, activity itself comes to appear ... as ... destiny or faith.[95]

The reification of roles produces a world in which actions are expressive of a commitment of supra human abstractions, for example, Ireland, Ulster, or British heritage. For the actor it is not he, but these abstraction that are engaged in killing. The Ulster freedom fighters claim, "The world is condemning us as murders, we call ourselves patriots. We are fighting for Ulster's freedom."[96]

Legitimations are explanations and justifications of the world and of action. In Northern Ireland the transcendant and semi-religious nature of the 'cause' dehumanizes the world of everyday life in that other than human reality appears to dominate. Legitimations take on a false autonomy and come to determine how Irish people believe they must act. Myths in Northern Ireland have enormous alienating power.

An important characteristic of myth is its ability to promote action and move large numbers of people who share it. Sorel defines social myth as those

> ... myths, which enclose within them, all the strongest inclinations of a people, a party or of a class ... and which given an aspect of complete reality to the hopes of immediate action by which, more easily than by any other method, men can reform their desires, passions, and mental activity.[97]

Sorel adds that,

> The myth must be judged as a means of acting on the present; any attempt to discuss how far it can be taken literally as future history is devoid of sense. It is the myth in its entirity which is alone important.[98]

Edelman points to the relationship between mythical modes of cognizing and acting and the adoption of rigid self conceptions and inflexible ways of relating to others. Thus myth should be seen to have both a cognitive and emotional dimension. Edelman[99] discusses two kinds of political myths. First, as in the Loyalist myth, an enemy who is plotting against the national interest and may need to be exterminated is identified. Alternatively, and this corresponds to the Nationalist myth, a divinely sanctioned order provides the ideal in the persuit of which deprivation, suffering or sacrifice are gratifying. Within such modes of cognizing categories such as the concept of man may only include those who are like oneself. This reduces outsiders to the status of lesser beings or non-people. Edelman refers to this phenomenon as pseudo-speciation, by virtue of which "to kill enemies is not perceived as murder ... and to degrade people defined as inferior is not perceived as oppression."[100] The political symbolic systems, especially language in Northern Ireland, facilitated this process. There is a wealth of stereotypic labels which can be seen

as providing a linguistic plausibility structure for the brutality of the terrorists or 'freedom fighters'. Mueller argues that ... "if a stereotype or a label is successfully attached to a group, the attitude of those confronting that group will be influenced accordingly ... Labels make the killing more acceptable."[101] The past provided many such emotive symbols and rigid typifications in Northern Ireland, and reality came to copy myth as the contours of the past were imposed on definitions of the present. History appeared to have made man.

The relationship between the various terrorist organizations which are numerically small and the rest of the society is ambiguous. Perhaps two things can be said. One, that shared general ideological beliefs by both the community and the terrorist group drawn from that community provided them with a mandate and licence to act. Two, given both communities' perceived need of defense, militants adopted the role of saviours or guardians. Protestant and Catholic community representatives have condemned the violence of terrorists, and the Catholic community has verbally attacked the violence of the British army. In very recent times the impressive support from both communities for the women's peace movement indicates the rejection of violence by many people, but in the absense of a political solution, and given the existence of irreconcilable ideologies, a power vacuum remains. It should be stressed that terrorist organizations did <u>not</u> cause the situation in Northern Ireland,

but they emerged as a response to the perceived problem.

Conclusion

In this chapter we looked at reifying and alienating political processes in Northern Ireland. These processes dehumanized and made falsely concrete the political life of the state. This rigidity made it almost impossible to introduce necessary changes in the 1960's. While it is commonplace to accept that Catholics suffered under the political system in Northern Ireland I have argued, that Protestants also suffered. The political system in Northern Ireland, appeared to have become an autonomous force determining the manner in which reality could possibly be constructed hence alienating man from his role as creator of a human world. The political system in Northern Ireland perpetuated Catholic-Protestant estrangement so that each generation appeared destined to endlessly repeat the sectarian battles of the forefathers.The real relationship between man and history appears to have been distorted in Northern Ireland, as the past came to dominate man.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. Devlin, B., The Price of My Soul, (1969) p. 53.

2. See Schacht, R., Alienation, (1971) Chapter I.

3. Ibid., Chapters I and II.

4. For a discussion of a theory of alienation derived from Kantian epistimology, see Merlan, P., "Alienation in Marx's Political Economy and Philosophy", in Natanson, M. (ed.), Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essays in Memory of Alfred Schutz, (1970) p. 197.

5. Ibid., p. 199.

6. Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., for example, in The Social Construction of Reality, (1967), posit a dialectical concept of social reality that sees a reciprocal creative relationship between man and society.

7. Ibid., Chapter II.

8. Berger, P., The Sacred Canopy, (1969) p. 85.

9. Ibid.

10. See Berger, P. and Pullberg, S., "Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness", New Left Review, XXXV (1966) pp. 56-71.

11. Ibid., p. 61.

12. See Mandel, E. and Novak, G., The Marxist Theory of Alienation, (1970) p. 37.

13. Henceforth, for the sake of convenience I shall refer to man as an object where he is reified. However, in reality man never becomes an object, he merely appears to be one.

14. Berger, P. and Pullberg, S., Op. cit., p. 67. This seems close to Sartre's notion of 'bad faith'.

15. Berger, P., op. cit., pp. 88-89.

16. See Schutz, A., "On Multiple Realities", Collected Papers I, (1970) pp. 207-259.

17. Berger, P. and Pullberg, S., op. cit., pp. 59-60.

18. Moore, R., "Race Relations in Six Counties: Colonialism, Industrialism and Stratification in Ireland", in Yetman, Norman R. and Steele, C.H., Majority and Minority: The Dynamics of Racial and Ethnic Relations, (1975) pp. 136-138.

19. Devlin, B., op. cit., p. 104.

20. Berger, P. op. cit., p. 89.

21. Mansergh, quoted in Wallace , M., Northern Ireland: 50 Years of Self-Government, (1971) p. 62.

22. de Paor, L., Divided Ulster, (1971) pp. 131-132.

23. Edelman, M., POlitics as Symbolic Action, (1971) p. 114.

24. Lord Brookborough, Prime Minister (1943-1963), in de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 106.

25. Boyd, A., Holy War in Belfast, (1969) preface.

26. Rose, R., Governing Without Consensus, (1971) pp. 217-218.

27. Boyd, A., op. cit., preface.

28. Rose, R., op. cit., Chapter VI.

29. Ibid., p. 217.

30. Boyd, A., op. cit., p. 193.

31. Devlin, B., op. cit., p. 58.

32. de Paor, L., op. cit., pp. 105-106.

33. Ibid., p. 127.

34. In 1961 it was estimated that 51% of all households in Northern Ireland lacked modern amenities such as a fixed bath and hot-water tap. See Rose, R., op. cit., p. 292.

35. Moody, T.W., The Ulster Question 1603-1973, (1974) p. 27.

36. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 224.

37. Ibid., pp. 192,224.

38. Ibid., p. 192.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid , pp. 193-194.

41. Ibid., pp. 224-229.

42. de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 142.

43. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 231.

44. Ibid., p. 281.

45. de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 151.

46. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 443.

47. See Magee, J., Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict (1974) p. 62.

48. Cited in Magee, J., Ibid pp. 80-82.

49. The Sunday Times 'Insight' team in Ulster (1972) p. 34.

50. de Paor, L., op. cit., pp. 108-109.

51. Wallace, M., op. cit., p. 53.

52. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 231.

53. See Runciman, W.G., "Problems of Research on Relative Deprivation" in Hyman, H. and Singer, E. (eds.), Readings in Reference Group Theory and Research, (1968) pp. 69-70.

54. See Runciman, W.G. Ibid., p. 73.

55. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 272.

56. Ibid., p. 271.

57. Magee, J., op. cit., p. 117.

58. Edelman, M., op. cit., p. 107.

59. Boulton, D., The U.V.F. 1966-1973: An Anatomy of Loyalist Rebellion, (1973) pp. 27-28.

60. Quoted in de Paor, L., op. cit., p. 152.

61. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 99.

62. Boulton, D., op. cit., p. 25.

63. Moody, T.W. op. cit., p. 32

64. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 97.

65. The Sunday Times 'Insight' team in Ulster, (1972) p. 21.

66. See Rose, R., op. cit., p. 99 and Chapter IX.

67. Edelman, M., op. cit., p. 7.

68. Boserup, A., cited in Elliot, R.S.P. and Hickie, J., Ulster: A Case Study in Conflict Theory, (1971) p. 86.

69. Boulton, D., op. cit., p. 60.

70. Elliot, R.S.P. and Hickie, J., op. cit., p. 128.

71. Quoted in Sunday Times 'Insight' team, op. cit., p. 40.

72. See Magèe, J., op. cit., pp. 115-121, and Elliot, R.S.P. and Hickie, J

73. Craig, in Rose, R., op. cit., p. 225.

74. Sunday Times 'Insight' team, op. cit., p. 49.

75. Sampson, E., Social Psychology and Contemporary Society, (1971) p. 80.

76. Ibid., p. 359. This is close to the position of Shibutani, T., (1966).

77. Ibid., p. 358.

78. O'Brien, Connor Cruise, States of Ireland, (1972) p. 181.

79. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 109.

80. Sampson, E., op. cit., p. 363.

81. Shibutani, T., Improvised News, (1966) p. 17.

82. Ibid., p. 23.

83. Ibid., p. 25.

84. Ibid., p. 50.

85. Hastings, M., Ulster 1969 (1970) p. 154.

86. Edelman, M., op. cit., p. 59.

87. Hastings, M., op. cit., pp. 152-153.

88. See Boulton, D., op. cit., Chapters III-VII.

89. Politicans in the Republic have repeatedly given misleading political cues to both Protestants and Catholics in the North - with severe consequences on occasions. See O'Brien, C. Cruise States of Ireland (1972), P. 187-200 and p. 208-242. For an example of the effect of British Government political cues on its Northern Irish public, see Magee J., op. cit., p. 188.

90. Sampson, E., op. cit., p. 363.

91. Ibid.

92. Berger, P. and Pullberg, S., op. cit., p. 67.

93. I.R.A. Manifesto 1956, Quoted in Wallace, M., op. cit., p. 87.

94. See, for example, Dillon, M. and Lehane, D., Political Murder in Northern Ireland, (1973) p. 281, See also Wallace, M., op. cit., pp. 88-89.

95. Berger, P., op. cit., p. 86.

96. Dillon, M. and Lehane, D., op. cit., p. 285.

97. Sorel, G., Reflections on Violence, (1950) p 125.

98. Ibid., p.126.

99. Edelman, M., op. cit., p. 15.

100. Ibid., p. 63.

101. Mueller, C., The Politics of Communication, (1973) p. 33.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND: A SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONIST-PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter looks at socialization processes in Northern Ireland, and more specifically at the political implication of these processes, to see to what extent these explain Catholic-Protestant social conflict. I will argue that subjectively relevent categories and such concepts as reference groups, identity loyalty and symbolic universes[1] are important in explaining Catholic and Protestant divisions in Northern Ireland. Explanation here refers to an interpretative analysis that takes into primary consideration the subjective meaning of phenomena for the social actors.

As we have seen, conflicting groups in Northern Ireland are organized around common definitions of the situation. These common beliefs, political attitudes, and definitions of the situation may be seen as derived from shared "worlds" or symbolic universes which are historically and intersubjectively prior to the individual. An analysis of socialization processes demonstrates the social origin of political beliefs and behaviour. Socialization processes, as features of formal and informal interpersonal situations recreate structural and conceptual (social psychological) divisions in society, and so explain the enduring existence of intersubjectively shared realities.

Individuals in Northern Ireland, on the basis of their ascribed religion at birth were socialized into alternative politico-ideological worlds.

Religion as a Social Determinant

Socialization can be seen as a process of socially distributing knowledge. It is commonly accepted in Symbolic Interactionism that men act towards their definitions of the situation, and that groups are formed on the basis of common perspectives or beliefs. In a temporal dimension we can see how in Northern Ireland the converse is a more accurate account of social processes. Following Shibutani's (1968) use of the concept of reference group as perspective, we can see how being born into one or other religious group largely determines one's political world-view. That is, I shall show how religious affiliation limits one's possible significant others, friends, peer groups or associates. I shall point to the politico-ideological consequences of this and their relevance to the present state of conflict.

Definitions of the situation and by implication one's attitude to and power relationship with the state,[2] are generally functions of religious group membership. Although it is a legacy of Ireland's colonial past, and to some extent historical accident, that religion and politics rather than politics and class run together, an investigation of the socialization processes in Northern Ireland explains how this comes about in each generation.

Theoretical Introduction

Before applying the Symbolic Interactionist - Phenomenologically informed perspective to the empirical context of Northern Ireland I will first clarify key concepts and briefly indicate their relevance to my problem. On moving from a general theoretical discussion of socialization I will divide the discussion into three sections. The first will deal with primary socialization in relationship to the family, the church, and education. The second section will consider the process of secondary socialization with respect to employment, and area of residence. Finally, I shall extend the analysis of socialization as processes creating and reinforcing Catholic-Protestant estrangement to an interpretation of the significance of social divisions. To do this I link the social proscriptions against and norms governing Catholic and Protestant interaction to the concept of sacred cosmologies.

Socialization

Socialization is commonly used to refer to the "process by which persons acquire the knowledge, skills, and dispositions that make them more or less able members of their society.[3] That is, how human 'raw material' becomes social. Individuals learn the expectations of their culture. Positivistic sociology generally emphasises the externality and constraint involved in this process. Social norms are seen not merely as learned and regulative of self but become constitutive of self.[4] Through socialization the social order is internalized, and

self control is seen as a reflection of social control. Socialization, as internalization, becomes the conceptual link between the individual and society. That is, between the social actor and the shared pool of meanings, values and expectations of his society.

Individuals in this view, are seen as mere "social reactors", conforming to social expectations.

> Accordingly, society must define the social meanings, relationships and actions of its members for them. And, because it is thus assigned priority over them, it must be in some sense self generating and self-maintaining.[5]

In this approach to society, order is seen as the norm and deviance the problem to be explained.

In the study of social conflict in Northern Ireland one cannot assume consensus on values and conformity to roles. The state of near civil war that erupted there in 1969 after years of apparent order indicates the extent to which reliance on a method of observation of behaviour and concentration on overt conformity may be distortive.
In this paper the phenomenological-symbolic interactionist concern with subjective meaning and interpretive processes is posed as an alternative method of inquiry and perspective for socialization. Instead of positing a unidirectional and harmonious relationship between man and society, Northern Ireland is seen as a society characterized by conflict, political deviance and antagonistic social relations. It was a social order that was realized largely through coercion.

It was also a society characterized by two communities who shared highly valued but antagonistic political and religious belief-systems, and who also differed from each other in cultural origin.

This paper will concentrate on one side of the dialectical social processes which Berger and Luckmann (1966) identify as "society in man" or internalization.[6] However, the troubled history of Northern Ireland with its rebellions, revolutions and political strife must be seen as expressions of attempts to men to control or change their worlds, that is, to construct reality.[7] The civil rights movement must be seen as the attempt by a minority to change their society rather than allow it to determine them, to act rather than be merely acted upon.[8] Man is both a social product and a social agent.

Symbolic Interactionist-Phenomenological Account of Socialization

Socialization may be seen as part of the biographical and historical process of constructing social reality, (Berger and Luckmann: 1966). The stock of knowledge and 'taken for granted reality' which the individual internalizes through social processes allows him to share in the sedimented past experiences of his group. The intersubjectively shared political world of significant others becomes meaningful reality for new members. The processes involved in making the intersubjective externalized world 'objectively' available are typification and institutionalization.

Symbolic interactionism, with its concern for inter-personal levels[9] of human behaviour gives us useful concepts for analysing the social relations in which socialization

occurs. Socialization may be seen as part of situated social interaction, occuring in both highly personalized and formal institutionalizes settings. The latter is of course more subject to social structural determinants. Although this is not the key distinction, primary socialization occurs largely in 'micro' situations while secondary socialization is greatly influenced by what might be termed 'macro' social variables.

Social Types

Given the societal level at which socialization is being discussed it is necessary to employ categories of social types. These are built on abstractions and generalizations from the actors' life-world. These subjectively relevant typologies are general labels and categories which organize social actors and their perceptions according to expected typical responses of others.[10] The recognition of differentiation made possible by the use of these constructs counteracts the tendency to describe socialization as a uniform mass process which might arise from treating only formal objective structural influences.

> Often, however, the differentiation built into the formal structure is not enough. First, it seems too gross an orientation. To the extent that meaningful interaction occurs among the recruits, it appears necessary to provide a mode of organizing responses to the recruits that falls in between treating each as a unique case, and treating all alike save for the minimal formal differentiations.[11]

Primary versus Secondary Socialization

Socialization can be seen as the process of learning one's culture which therefore

> ... allows men to be able to understand one another, to have behavioural expectations for one another, and consequently to orient their behaviour to that of others.[12]

One can distinguish two phases in this process, primary socialization and secondary socialization. While secondary socialization may be merely learning how to act appropriately in different social settings, primary socialization is the very process of becoming social, or acquiring a self.

The crucial difference between primary and secondary socialization lies in the notion of the genesis of the self. Primary socialization, as a concept, explains how selves and society develop processually in the individual. The concept of the "me", or social phase of the self in Meadian social psychology, explains the incorporation of society (the organized attitudes of the group) into the individual, through role playing.[13]

The internal dialogue between the "me" and the spontaneous phase of the self, the "I", allows the possibility of the individual constructing his actions rather than merely reacting in a predetermined manner. As in Mead's concept of mind, the self is the process that emeshes the individual in society.

> The mind is social in both origin and function, it arises in the social process of communication. Through association with the members of his groups, the individual comes to internalize the definitions transmitted to him through linguistic symbols, learns to assume the perspective of others, and there-

> by acquires the ability to think. When the mind has risen in this process, it operates to maintain and adjust the individual in his society; and it enables the society to persist.[14]

Primary socialization usually coincides with childhood socialization. As Berger and Luckmann (1967) distinguish primary and secondary socialization,

> Primary socialization is the first socialization an individual undergoes in childhood, through which he becomes a member of society. Secondary socialization is any subsequent process that inducts an already socialized individual into new sectors of the objective world of his society ... primary socialization is usually the most important one for an individual ... Every individual is born into an objective social structure within which he encounters the significant others who are in charge of his socialization. These significant others are imposed upon him. Their definitions of his situation are posited for him as objective reality.[15]

The existence of intersubjectively shared meanings and definitions of situations within a group explains how social participation can be seen to determine action. Meaning "crucially mediates and determines the way in which individuals respond to objects and situations".[16] An empirical examination of the process of socialization in Northern Ireland reveals the social origins and distribution of alternative meaningful schemes of orientation intersubjectively shared by members of the different political groups involved in the present conflict. By implication, the structural features which form the framework (albeit often not subjectively perceived) within which differential socialization takes place are revealed.

Primary Socialization

In this chapter I shall look at three social institutions involved in primary socialization, the family, the educational system and the church, to show the continuity between them with respect to socialization into political identity and political ideological world-view. Through the family a child growing up in Northern Ireland would typically be given his community's version of religious, political and historical truth, which at once gives him a sense of group-identity, of being located in the world, largely by setting him apart, consciously, from those of the other political ideology, which he sees as denying him.

Family

I will show how the sources of Catholic-Protestant estrangement were found externally in the structures of Northern Ireland, and internally in the structures of consciousness of its inhabitants. Both first came to influence the child through the family.

I will show how radical variations in political perspective were created through differential socialization in Catholic and Protestant homes.

Social structural influences on the process of primary socialization worked through the ecological features of the State, which reinforced the tendency to segregated and selective political socialization and social participation in childhood. Apart from the segregation of areas of residence along class lines, in Northern Ireland there was

also definite and deliberate segregation along religious lines. Catholics tended to live in one area, Protestants in another, so much so that the state has been likened to a series of Catholic and Protestant ghettos.

Education

We shall see that in Northern Ireland the education system was segregated along religious lines, and this division was in turn reinforced through differential curriculae in the school. It is the political significance of this differential content of socialization with respect to such subjects as history and Gaelic that we will investigate. The education of Catholics was largely under the control of the Catholic church, and that of Protestants was controlled by the state.

Again, I shall show that as with the ecological features of the state within which primary socialization took place, the structural features of the educational system tended to limit friendships and peer relationships, and even school sports, to members of the same religious community. The pattern of religious segregation could be detected at almost every level of society.

Religion

I shall show how because of the historically close connection between religion and politics in Ireland, religious categories are frequently employed to represent and describe political realities. That is, in a biographical context I shall show how religious affiliation becomes

equated with political identity.

Although the Rev. Ian Paisley exemplifies a tradition of intertwining religion and politics which has a long history in Ireland,[17] I will argue that religion's most important role in the present conflict lies in its ability to greatly strengthen group loyalty. In reinforcing 'in-group' ties it lent the group and its values an ultimate significance to which the 'out-group' posed a serious threat.

Briefly, through the study of primary socialization, I shall argue that the first barriers to social integration were located in the consciousness of a child through acquiring a notion of self in a Protestant or Catholic world. By showing how identity was lodged in these processes of primary socialization and relationships with significant others we can understand how commitment to ideology was strong, and how political and religious 'disloyalty' was rare.

Secondary Socialization

Briefly, I shall support my argument that secondary socialization in Northern Ireland was also segregated along religious lines which tended to reinforce commitment to the religious-political identity and maintain the same patterned lines of cleavage as were evident in primary socialization. Work in Northern Ireland tended to be segregated along religious lines. Ecological features of the state reflected and recreated Catholic-Protestant divisions. I shall show that there was a tendency for certain types of social relations to be limited to members of the same religion. The extreme

example was marriage. Mixed marriages were rare, and the transgressors were threatened with severe negative sanctions.

An analysis of the Meaning of Social Divisions

Finally, I shall argue that the carefully preserved divisions and classifications uphold cosmologies and a social order.[33] They express ideas about the ideal (world or social order). The logic of seemingly irrational behaviour and proscriptions can be understood in this light. That is, with reference to the total structure of political thought of the group. Limited social relations, prohibitions and highly valued social divisions protect group boundaries, and group integrity, thus recreating a social order and status hierarchy.

The wealth of political ritual in Northern Ireland can be seen as a process of socialization. It creates and reaffirms an image of (the ideal) society in man. Ritual is the social and symbolic recreation of political reality in Northern Ireland.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SOCIALIZATION

The Family Nexus

Through primary socialization the individual may be understood to internalize the "world" of significant others or his group as meaningful reality. Shibutani (1968) refers to the group that provides a frame of reference for organizing the perceptual experience of members as a "reference group". As a concept it summarizes differential associations and

and loyalties which influence interpretations of reality.[18] In Northern Ireland the reference group for identity, national identity, and ultimate political and religious values, would typically be drawn from one or other of the two religious communities. Devlin's autobiography provides an example of this phenomenon in a Catholic family. She tells of how she learned to see her political world:

> In our family we developed an unconscious political consciousness from listening to the story of our country. The first nursery rhyme I remember learning was:
>
> Where is the flag of England?
> Where is she to be found?
> Wherever there's blood and plunder
> They're under the British ground.[19]

Again, she recalls:

> But such political lessons as I learned as a child came in indirect ways, through poetry and history, until I went at the age of ten to a madly republican grammar school.[20]

Thus group specific socialization among Catholics ensured the continuation of political aspirations which could not be satisfied institutionally. Primary socialization partly explains why, in Northern Ireland, politics and religions rather than politics and class run together. The first barriers to integration, then, were located in the consciousness of a child through his acquiring a notion of 'self' in a Catholic or Protestant world. Through learning in folklore, myth, and song, a child learns who his political enemies were -- and who they still are.

In Northern Ireland historical categories have a continuing relevance for structuring the world meaningfully. Such labels and categories as Fenian, Taig, Papist, Orangeman and Loyalist are social types used by the social actors to organize the political arena and structure consciousness. A protestant child would typically internalize a world view and version of history in which his Protestant past and loyalty to the crown of England were ultimately meaningful principles for organizing political reality. As Elliott and Hickie put it,

> An awareness of Cromwell's massacres at Drogheda and Wexford and of the decisive Protestant victory at the Boyne ... is as much a part of the consciousness of belonging to ... the [Protestant] faith as being black is for an American Negro.[21]

Catholics and Protestants do not form undifferentiated groups with respect to political attitudes and degrees of commitment to political values. It is apparent how, through an accident of birth, a child growing up in Northern Ireland would be given a stronger or weaker version of its community's traditional ideology. Rose has identified five major types of social actors in Northern Ireland based on differing degress of commitment to or disaffection from the regime.[22] Boulton points to the strong political commitments among significant others in the biography of Gusty Spence, the founder of the Ulster Volunteer Force (U.V.F.) terrorist organization.[23] The following quotation from a Catholic bishop demonstrates a growing awareness that the content of socialization may encourage certain types of political action:

> In each generation since independence many young men of twenty have gone out again to kill and to die because they loved Ireland, but knew no other way of loving her, had been taught and shown no other way but the way of the patriotic songs.[24]

Since 1969 violence once again has become a strategy in the negotiation of a political order and, just as negotiation breeds further negotiation, it may be seen that violence breeds further violence. Violence has deep effects on the political socialization of children. Field states:

> Violence and terrorism do not politicize growing children ... they turn instead to taking violent action -- not towards political measures. They see politics as the spoils of the victor, rather than the product of shared participation.[25]

Catholic and Protestant children growing up in Northern Ireland have typically had alternative heads of state, alternative sets of patriotic songs, alternative versions of history and, most significantly, alternative definitions of the current situation and their corresponding sets of heroes and enemies. The following quotations from Belfast children in 1970 show the extent of acceptance of group truths:

> A 10-year-old Protestant boy believes, "Fenian shopkeepers sell poisoned things to Protestants to kill them off. I found poison in a lemonade bottle I got from one of them'. Similarly, a 7-year-old Catholic boy believes that a citizen is 'somebody in Belfast who drives his car with a gun beside him' and a 9-year-old Catholic, "If our Lord tried to stop a street fight the Protestants would kill him'. ... an 8-year-old Catholic boy ... [says] 'I don't like Northern Ireland 'cause it's got dirt and Proddy dogs and too many bombs and things'.[26]

Education

The educational system in Northern Ireland may be seen to have contributed to the maintenance of community divisions in two ways; through segregating structures, and through variations in the content of socialization. Since the 1920s, Northern Ireland has had a system of denominational schools. Catholics went to voluntary schools while Protestants generally attended state schools. The education of Catholics therefore tended to be in the hands of the Catholic church, though its power was limited to a certain extent by voluntary schools' reliance upon government funds. In 1968, state financial sponsorship of voluntary schools increased from 65 per cent to 80 per cent. In return for this there was to be Local Educational Authority representation on school management boards. The Catholic church hierarchy accepted this loss of power reluctantly,[27] and continued to reject any attempt at integrating schools. According to Dr. Philbin, the Bishop of Down and Connor,

> It is by the standards of the Gospel, not by those of the current wave of secularism that we must judge ourselves. In these days, particularly when anti-religious influences are growing in strength, we feel we can protect the faith of the next generation only through our schools.[28]

The result of this was that five sixths of the population was educated solely in Protestant or Catholic schools.[29]

Differential content of socialization in schools may be seen to have affected political allegiances. Protestant

children learned British history and received British legitimations of both England's involvement in Ireland and the Protestants' position of political dominance in the North. On the other hand, the opportunity to learn Gaelic, to play Gaelic games, and to learn native dancing, poetry and song, was almost exclusively available only to Catholic children. The result of segregated schools, according to Magee, was that

> Schools attended by protestant children have tended to concentrate on British history and include a British consciousness, with the result that the impression has been created that Gaelic culture is something that belongs to 'the other side'.[30]

Catholics received an Irish or Nationalist version of historical 'truth' and internalized a political world view that was at once different from and antagonistic to that of Protestant children. Thus children in each community were socialized into alternative political reference groups, and different historical figures became significant others:

> How you look at history, who your heroes are, depends on your education here. Do you see Irish history as a history of oppression or keeping down the rebellion? Do you see it as fighting for unity and freedom from Britain, or part of the U.K.'s history? One child's hero is another child's villain.[31]

Indeed, the Government was aware of the counter-definitions or reality and the threat to the legitimacy of the regime inherent in the education of Catholics. Devlin recalls that Catholic and Protestant children were given alternative

interpretations of the same historical events. She reports that the Ministry of Education attempted to control the use of certain texts in Catholic schools, saying that they were not to be used "because they were no more than sedition and treason in the name of history."[32] In Northern Ireland, however, history was not merely a subject taught at school, but an intrinsic and significant element of the structure of everyday life. From history both groups derived symbols of group identity and, by implication, political identity:

> Even the most naive visitor cannot fail to notice the strong evidence given by the Protestant community of loyalty to the British constitiution and flag and way of life, and by the Catholic community of belonging to the Irish nation. Public parades, flag flying and a garrulous tradition of public oratory all ensure that these loyalties remain overt. Such fierce loyalties derive from the unique historical background of Ulster. History is very much part of the present in Northern Ireland: discussions of massacres and battles, political pogroms that took place two or three hundred years ago, are a part of the everyday language of the Ulsterman.[33]

Paradoxically, the educational system was a source of both stability and change in Northern Ireland. The effect of the introduction of the British welfare legislation into Northern Ireland was to bring about changes in the social structure. The proportion of Catholic students attending Queen's University had increased from 5 per cent in 1908 to 22 per cent in the 1960's.[34] Changes in the social structure provided Catholics with a growing middle and educated class to articulate and direct criticism against the regime. It is significant that students during

the period of the Civil Rights Movement attempted to socialize Protestants and Catholics into an alternative political reality -- one that contained workers and bosses, not Catholics and Protestants. Thus, Queen's University, one of the very few non-denominational educational institutions, produced a political party -- the People's Democracy -- that challenged the traditional political structuring of Northern Ireland. By calling on Catholics and Protestants to unite, this political party attempted to escape sectarian divides. However, it was not easy to escape either the conceptual categories or the structures perpetuating Protestant and Catholic estrangement.

Religion

In Northern Ireland the importance of religion in society and the relatively very high rate of active participation in church membership suggests that religious categories would play a significant role in a child's location and definition of himself in the world.[35] It has been estimated that 95 per cent of Catholics attend weekly Mass, and 62 per cent of Protestants go to church at least once a month.[36] Furthermore, it has been estimated that 96 per cent of the population have the same religion as their parents.[37] In the 1961 census, only 384 of the 1,457,000 persons listed identified themselves as free thinkers, atheists or humanists.[38] The significance of this for politics is that, in Northern Ireland, religious affiliation tends to be equated with political loyalty. Religion has

reinforced social segregation. Magee notes that

> Societies and clubs are usually church-related, and even where not are frequently patronized by one religion only.[39]

Rose, however, in pointing to the ultimate form of legitimation that religion has provided for social divisions, has perhaps identified its most important political role:

> Ulster churches have an institutional interest in propagating their distinctive doctrines because they provide an explicit and transendental justification for the continued existence of each denomination.[40]

Apart from Ian Paisley, self-styled Moderator of the Free Presbyterian Church, few clergymen in Northern Ireland directly involve themselves in politics. Churchmen have been quick to point out that the present situation has little to do with theological issues, and that the activities of terrorists are markedly un-Christian. Paisley marks a deviation from this norm. However, he does fall within a historical tradition in Ulster where, in the 19th century, religious demagogues perpetuated and exacerbated sectarian tensions. Rose argues,

> ... Paisley desire[d] to maintain the connection between religion and politics that has for centuries characterized Irish politics. He does this not only in terms of traditional political values, but also in terms of Protestant fundamentalist values that he would argue are as relevant today as they were when Martin Luther nailed his 95 theses to the church door in Wittenburg in 1517. This fundamentalist, anti-ecumenical theology is not unique to Northern Ireland. Paisley's doctorate was conferred as an honorary degree by Bob Jones University ... South Carolina ...[41]

Significant Others, Identity and Politics

We have seen how various structural and interpresonal elements of the socialization process significantly influenced the content of socialization transmitted to both Catholic and Protestant children. Children growing up in Northern Ireland would internalize meaningful symbols of political or national identity, many of which were lodged in the two communities' alternative versions of history. Given the important nature of relationships with significant others in which primary socialization occurs, the existence of family and group loyalties would have made it very difficult for an individual to have abandoned the values and perspectives internalized through early social participation. As Shibutani argues,

> [The] extent to which the culture of a group serves as a matrix for the organization of perceptual experience depends on one's relationship and personal loyalty to others who share that outlook.[42]

A crucial question arises about the degree to which valued identity is vested or lodged in those relationships and processes which governed political socialization. As we have seen, in Northern Ireland political perspectives were shared by those with whom people had strong affectional bonds. Core identity may also be seen to have been lodged in early socialization. Denzin sees this self lodging process as one motivational feature of human conduct in that "Humans return to those interactional quarters where most features

of themselves have been lodged."[43] As Brim argues, this 'core identity' is likely to be lodged in the processes of primary socialization:

> Every person experiences some part of his personality that he feels is more truly his than are other parts ... It seems that there are ... certain groupings of self-other relationships ... that are highly determining of the individual's behaviour ... it appears that these would be primarily of the "I-me" type, in which the perception of one's self in relation to others has been laid down early and frequently, both from powerful figures such as parents and also from a broad and diverse group of human beings, so that these come to constitute his sense of identity.[44]

Therefore, given the nature of early socialization in Northern Ireland, one may understand how personal and political identity were closely intertwined. It is not surprising, then, that, as Magee states,

> In question about who they thought were 'people like us', most protestant children identified with England and most Catholic children with the Republic of Ireland.[45]

Rose supports his finding. He found that the vast majority of Catholics conceived of themselves as having an Irish national identity, whereas most Protestants saw themselves as having either a British or an Ulster identity.[46]

Political symbols of identity in Northern Ireland heighten Catholics' and Protestants' sense of estrangement. While the Union-Jack is a Protestant symbol of identity, it threatens the Catholic or Irish sense of identity. The use of political symbols can therefore have an explosive effect, as it did in 1964 when the displaying of an Irish Tricolour led to two days of sectarian rioting in Belfast.[47]

Holzner argues that certain beliefs are closely linked to identity:

> The apodictic reality which persons and groups ascribe to the content of their beliefs, convictions, faiths, we call the reality of the interpretative order. Its experiential base lies in the emotional intensity of loyalties and commitments ... Such modes of reality construction are tied to the person's structured identity; he finds and defines his own being and his place in the world through these beliefs.[48]

Commitment to group identity and solidarity is strong in Northern Ireland. However, by labeling themselves Catholic and Protestant, British and Irish, these groups are mutually exclusive. Integration of such opposing realities is impossible. To destroy these realities is to destroy indentity and threaten 'sacred' commitments. At the symbolic level and on the streets people can be understood to have been fighting for their 'very being'.

Secondary Socialization

Employment practices and patterns of segregated areas of residence may be seen to have reinforced the tendency towards Catholic and Protestant estrangement established through primary socialization. Segregation in employment, either because of tradition or religious discrimination was not uncommon in Northern Ireland. Some firms tended to employ Catholics, others Protestants. The East Belfast shipyards of Harland and Wolff employed around 10,000 men, of whom approximately 500 were Catholic.[49] Mackies and Sirocco engineering works in Belfast provide other such

examples. Other firms separated employees of different religions along departmental or sectional lines.

Historically derived patterns and deliberate interference often resulted in Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland living in separate residential areas. It is not surprising, then, that many children grew up in politico-ideological ghettos. How pervasive was this aspect of closed group experience? It was estimated that 57% of Protestants and 38% of Catholics were brought up in segregated areas. Only 34% of Protestants and 46% of Catholics grew up in generally mixed areas.[50] Hastings gives the following description of Belfast in 1969:

> ... 400,000 people live within the city limits and half the population of the whole province lives within twenty-five miles of its grimy, industrial sprawl. It is largely a Victorian creation that grew up around the huge shipyards and factories that came in the wake of the industrial revolution ... Catholics and Protestants live in their enclaves, each recognized as the territory of one sect or the other, in houses indistinguishable in their gloom.[51]

The Falls Road area, for example, was 91% Catholic; the Shankill area was over 90% Protestant.

The 1960's were years of change. Increased need for public housing put strains on the traditional patterns of segregated residence. Boundaries were beginning to weaken; traditional divisions were being threatened. Reaction was mixed, sometimes hostile. For example, in 1969 there was launched the Shankill Defense Association (S.D.A.) whose

> ... objective was the preservation of the Protestant purity of the Shankill by an insistence that redevelopment take place within the existing, time-hallowed borders of the 'loyalist' ghetto ...[52]

This group had connections with the proscribed terrorist U.V.F. and later with the paramilitary Ulster Defense Association (U.D.A.). Within weeks of its founding it had over a thousand members and had vigilante groups patrolling its borders. Catholic areas also formed 'defensive' residence committees and organized patrols. As conflict escalated there was a great deal of intimidation of those who lived outside their own religious group's residential boundaries. By 1972, greater rigid structural and ecological as well as conceptual divisions separated Protestants and Catholics than at any time since the 1930s.[53]

If community integration, as indexed by such things as mixed areas of residence, is taken as a measure of the rigidity or flexibility of conceptual categories and group boundaries, then one finds that political opinions polarized, the number of sectarian incidents increased, and traditional ideologies became increasingly dominant, as areas of residence became more and more segregated. Whereas in the early 1960s Belfast was an open and walkable city, by 1971 corugated iron barricades divided Catholic and Protestant areas, and marked off Catholic strongholds as "no-go areas" to the forces of law and order and Stormont rule. Sectarianism was again dominant as physical boundaries and

distance gave expression to social and conceptual boundaries which related to the two groups' alternative politico-ideological structuring of their worlds.

In a ghetto-structured society, friends, neighbours and communication networks based on personal relations were often decisive sources of information. The Shankill provides an example of this phenomenon. An independent survey estimated that 82% of all residents had relatives living in the areas, and that 45% of the men and 65% of the women had lived there all their lives.[54] Moreover, as conflict and tensions increased, in both Catholic and Protestant areas local radio stations were set up and local news sheets interpreted and transmitted 'the news' to the residents. Local, informal and personally related groups initiated or directed much of the grass-roots action that, in the years leading up to the suspension of Stormont, became as important, if not more important, than formal political decisions and action in deciding the future of Northern Ireland.[55]

Social Relations and Segregation

We have by now identified many of the structures and social mechanisms perpetuating social divisions in Northern Ireland. These phenomena could be expected to have led to limited social relations. Apart from Rose's survey, there is a shortage of reliable statistical data on this, though the literature supports the existence of divisions in social relations. Rose found that "the overall profile of social relationships shows a bias towards co-religionists, but not

to the point of exclusiveness."[56] Seventy-eight per cent of Protestants and 57% of Catholics said that most or all of their friends were co-religionists. Again, he found that 41% of Protestants belonged to exclusively Protestant clubs or organizations, while 19% of Catholics were in this category. Other literature in the area indicates that this tendency was most marked in connection with marriage and politics. This will be discussed in the next section.

Prior to the outbreak of overt conflict in the 1960's, relationships between Catholics and Protestants were not normally hostile. This can be understood by realizing that while ultimate legitimations and politico-ideological symbolic universes continued to divide Catholics and Protestants, they were not normally employed to regulate everyday interaction. While holding ultimately meaningful schemes of orientation towards this world and the next, people had developed working perspectives that allowed routine, mundane interaction to take place. Hasting argues that,

> ... in normal times Catholics managed to live [with Protestants] ... and vice versa without great friction. Perhaps the most significant factor, however, is that anywhere in Ulster, among friends neighbours or enemies, everybody knows each other's religion, and nobody ever really forgets it ... This very knowledge ensures that when trouble comes, both sides think they know who they can trust.[57]

Interaction over sacred issues, however, was always potentially explosive in Northern Ireland. Everyday, worldly

categories could be safely mixed, sacred categories could not. Ultimate legitimations and ideologies were not always used to explain the everyday world while the world did not appear problematic. The Northern Irish people were divided on issues that remained in the background until election time or political holidays and anniversaries. As conflict heightened, ideological issues and traditional differences came to the fore. Ultimately meaningful explanations were being used to explain more and more of everyday life and so once again the whole community became openly divided. The pragmatic working perspectives that had allowed interaction to proceed in the everyday working world, came to be seen as inappropriate in explaining the events from the mid 1960's on. Traditional explanations provided a more reassuring and intelligible interpretation of problematic events.

RULES OF CONTAGION AND SACRED COSMOLOGIES

So far we have looked at the continuation of social divisions as, in part, the result of segregating structures. We have also suggested that commitment to political ideologies was inextricably bound up with personal and group loyalty and relationships with significant others, be they dead patriots or living family.

Throughout this work I have repeatedly pointed to the existence and importance of social divisions. Relying heavily on the work of Douglas (1970) I will further explore the possible significance of a relationship between the

social order and classification schemes or meaningful social divisions. Douglas discussed the significance of certain types of social boundaries and categories. She is particularly interested in how certain boundaries, margins or interval lines of a cultural are held in relation by rituals of separation or pollution behaviour. Prohibition and rules of contagion or mixing she argues are not merely instrumental but often carry a heavy symbolic load, apart from which they cannot be properly understood. Men order their worlds and within this order certain categories must be kept separate.

In exploring the meaning of pollution or rules governing contagion, Douglas argues that the most useful definition of dirt is 'matter out of place', and that "our pollution behaviour is the reaction which condemns any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict cherished classifications."[58] I shall now consider this approach with reference to Catholic and Protestant divisions. It does not, of course, exhaust the total significance of this reality in Northern Ireland, but may be seen as one aspect of an interpretative analysis.

I have already discussed lines of division between Catholics and Protestants. These can be considered as demarkation lines governing what may be properly mixed and what must be kept sacred. Rules of contagion depend on the context, so that we may expect to find it completely permissible for Catholics and Protestants to "mix" in certain settings and not in others. According to Douglas, cherished

classifications, and by implication contagion beliefs, uphold cosmologies and a social order:

> Thus we find that certain moral values are upheld and certain social rules defined by beliefs in dangerous contagion ... It is not difficult to see how pollution beliefs can be used in a dialogue of claims and counter-claims to status. But as we examine pollution beliefs we find that the kind of contacts which are thought dangerous also carry a symbolic load. This is a more interesting level at which pollution ideas relate to social life. I believe that some pollutions are used as analogies for expressing a general view of the social order.[59]

What contacts were thought 'dangerous' and were negatively proscribed in Northern Ireland? Obviously, not all Protestant-Catholic contacts endangered the ideal order, or what I have referred to as politico-ideological universes of meaning. Rose's findings show that limits approximating to exclusion was associated only with politics and intermarriage. He found that

> The median Protestant and Catholic thinks it would make a difference to at least some of his friends and family if he 'turned' politically, and only 15% assert that it would make no difference.[60]

He also reveals that in 1968 at least eighty percent of the population felt that it would make a substantial difference to friends and family if they changed their religion. So the social sanctions against crossing religious or political lines were considerable. Magee adds:

> Both communities disapproved of mixed marriages, and they have been so rare that a social scientist has concluded that Protestants and Catholics 'can be considered as two endogymous societies' ... Mixed marriages consequently add to the other tensions and cause great distress to the families of the young people involved.[61]

The opposition to mixed marriages may be partly explained by the Catholic church's decree of Ne Temere, which directs that all children of a mixed marriage be brought up Catholic.

In practice, there was little 'pollution' of political categories either. Few Catholics voted Unionist, and it was estimated that as few as 0.5% of Protestants voted Nationalist.[62] In 1959 the question of Catholic membership in the Unionist party was raised and received support from the more liberal elements in the party. However,

> Within a few days, the Grand Master of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, Sir George Clarke, made a speech asserting that under no circumstances would the suggestion that Catholics be admitted to membership of the [Unionist] Party be countenanced or accepted by the Orange Order.[63]

In the Orange mythological view of the world, the categories or Catholicism and Unionism (interpreted as Protestantism) should not be mixed. This might also be suggested by the fact that the majority of Protestants were against attempts to integrate the Catholic and Protestant churches whereas the majority of Catholics supported them.[64]

In Republican mythology cherished classifications refer to the separation of British and Irish. "Pollution" or contagion cannot be tolerated -- it is an offense against the ideal. The following quotation from the Chief of Staff

of the Provisional I.R.A. reveals his commitment to sacred categories:

> What I want is a declaration of intent to withdraw by the British ... There would be no place for those who want their British heritage. They've got to accept their Irish heritage, and the Irish way of life ... you must get the British out.[65]

Rules of contagion for Republicans, therefore, are most significant with respect to the mixing of Irish and British, while they are not -- theoretically -- concerned with contagion from Protestants. The I.R.A. claims to speak in the name of all Irishmen, Catholic and Protestant. It unites these categories which the Protestants hold separate, but it punishes ruthlessly any mixing of the categories of British and Irish. Catholic girls who dared contaminate the sacred by associating with British soldiers have often been punished by having their hair shorn, or by being beaten. Irish collaborators with the British can, according to the I.R.A., be legitimately shot or tortured. Douglas suggests that:

> ... the only way in which pollution ideas make sense is in reference to a total structure of thought whose keystone, boundaries and internal lines are held in relation by rituals of separation.[66]

Thus we may understand that prohibitions or rules of contagion trace cosmic outlines and social order and express (albeit imperfectly) an idea of society. They aim to keep straight the internal lines of a society, to protect boun-

daries and the internal integrity of minority entities. From the point of view of Ireland as a whole, the Protestant population is a minority. From the point of view of the Northern Irish Protestants, the Northern Catholics are a minority. The border symbolizes Protestant group integrity and legally prohibits contagion from the Catholic South. This can be seen as an ultimate form of objectification of social rules of contagion.

Ritual may be seen as symbolic processes expressing and reaffirming commitment to cherished classifications (pollution beliefs):

> The ritual is creative indeed...ritual creates harmonious worlds with ranked and ordered populations playing their parts. The prohibitions trace the cosmic outlines and ideal social order.[67]

Life in Northern Ireland was rich in public ritual. Among the most arousing and socially significant of these rituals were the annual parades. These symbolic acts, many of which had a very long history, may be seen as having endured because to each generation they were meaningful: "... rites ... and ritual make manifest to men their selves and thus create their society".[68] In this manner rituals in the North can be seen as forces of socialization creating an image of (the ideal) society in man.

Ritual is central to symoblic processes:

> As a social animal, man is a ritual animal... [Friendship] has no existence without the rites of friendship. Social rituals create a reality which would be nothing without them ... it is impossible to have social relations without symbolic acts.[69]

From the careful attention to detail such as dates, songs, clothes and location shown on these ritual occasions, from the devotion displayed to their proper and timely performance, and the indignation shown when they were threatened with proscription, one must surely deduce that these rituals were of great social significance. In fact, they were to become more important as conflict escalated and both communities felt themselves under threat. Douglas suggests that rites both help to control and to create experience. There are things that could not be experienced without ritual. Douglas writes:

> Ritual focuses attention by framing; it enlivens the memory and links the present with the relevant past. In all this it aids perception. Or rather, it changes perception because it changes the selective principles. So that it is not enough to say that ritual helps to experience more vividly what we would have experienced anyway ... [ritual] comes first in formulating experience ... but modifies experience in so expressing it.[70]

In Northern Ireland the objective reality of Catholic-Protestant relationships appears to be less relevant to an explanation of social conflict there than is the symbolic or meaningful reality of this relationship to the people involved. It could be argued that in creating this reality, ritual, and especially social and public re-enactments of history, played no mean part.

Douglas has suggested that any complex of symbols can take on a 'cultural life of its own'. We might briefly consider the notion of the ideological life in the North as having achieved such an autonomy. The ideological life of the state does not appear now as linked to other elements of reality, for example to economic reality. Given that man lives in 'multiple realities' and that his experience is fragmented, ideology and ritual can be seen as functioning to unify experience and create a symbolically consistent universe, although the objective world is which he lives may contain many contradictions.

Conclusion

We have seen how socialization into alternative symbolic universes occurred in Northern Ireland. Interpretations of history may be seen as an integral element in the conceptual mechanisms of universe maintenance. However, symbolic universes can be seen as the most comprehensive forms of legitimation. Group history and individual biography are placed within this universe or all-embraching frame of reference. They are products of human consciousness which serve in the North to shape interpretations of empirical reality. Symbolic universes bestow ultimate significance on events of everyday life. They can shape and explain experiences such as perceived discrimination. They promote action in line with the ideal -- how things ought to be -- and they guide, integrate and legitimate behaviour. For the Protestant

community, they have justified the state's treatment of the minority. The absence of an ultimate reality-spanning legitimation mechanism in the North increased the tendency towards reliance on coercion. Such coercion appeared necessary and inevitable -- it did not contradict or outrage their notion of democracy. Unlike integrated societies, where the fundamental coerciveness of the established order lies not in its mechanism of social control, but in its power to constitute and impose itself as reality, Northern Ireland has continued to lack an ultimate shared interpretation of the universe. Each side posits an alternative reality that denies the legitimacy of the other. Alternative symbolic universes pose a problem as to whose definition of reality will be accepted. Mythologically, such conflicts are often solved by clashes of ancient gods. The victorious god could then establish his order. Historically, the clashes in the North between their gods -- their alternative symbolic universes -- have not been decisive enough to dispose of the rival or to integrate cosmologies.

CONCLUSION

I have tried in this thesis to explain the background to Catholic-Protestant estrangement in Northern Ireland. I must stress the limitations I have placed upon my treatment of the subject by approaching it through only one of the several possible perspectives. It has, of course, been necessary, due to the limitations inherent in a work of this nature, to confine myself to an investigation of only certain aspects of an exceedingly complex situation. However, I believe that it is against such a background of 'subjectively meaningful' but antagonistic worlds as I have described that recent political events and widespread terrorist activities must be understood.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. The terms 'ideology' and 'symbolic universe' are used interchangeably.

2. This is not intended as a reification. In that actors made reference to 'the state', claiming to be protecting or destroying it, it can be seen as having a reality in subjective consciousness. In objective reality, it would be more correct to speak of the specific political and legal institutions of the state. Protestants approved of the state, and were 'politically powerful'. Catholics, on the other hand, were politically impotent.

3. Brim, O.G. Jr. and Wheeler, S., Socialization After Childhood, (1966) p. 3.

4. See Dawe, A., "The Two Sociologies", British Journal of Sociology, XXI (1970) pp. 207-218.

5. Ibid ., p. 208.

6. I use the term 'internalization' more in accordance with the Symbolic Interactionist (Chicago School) notion of socialization than with the overly deterministic notion of the concept described above.

7. Mass movements may be seen as collective attempts by people to define and control their world through joint action. See chapter IV.

8. The Civil Rights Movement was both a rejection by Catholics of their condition in the state and a rejection of the traditional nationalist political responses into which they had been socialized. The Civil Rights Movement represented a radical break with the past at that time.

9. For a discussion of the usefulness of this perspective in political analysis, see Hall, P., "A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis of Politics", Sociological Inquiry, XXXXII (Nos. 3-4; 1972) pp. 35-75.

10. See Wheeler, S., in Brim, O.G. Jr., op. cit., p. 76.

11. Ibid., p. 75.

12. Hall, P., "A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis of Politics", Sociological Inquiry, XXXXII (Nos. 3-4; 1972) p. 37.

13. See Mead G.H., in Strauss, A. (ed.) George Herbert Mead on Social Psychology, (1964) pp. 209-228.

14. Meltzer, B., "Mead's Social Psychology", in Manis, J. and Meltzer, B. (eds.), Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology, (1972) pp. 13-14.

15. Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., The Social Construction of Reality, (1967) p. 133.

16. Meltzer, B. and Petras, J., "The Chicago and Iowa Schools of Symbolic Interactionism", in Manis, J. and Meltzer, B. (eds.), Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology, (1972) p. 47.

17. For one discussion of this phenomenon, see Boyd, A., Holy War in Belfast, (1969).

18. Shibutani, T., "Reference Groups as Perspectives", in Hyman, H. and Singer, E. (eds.), Readings in Reference Group Theory and Research, (1968) p. 113.

19. Devlin, B., The Price of My Soul, (1969) p. 39.

20. Ibid., p. 4.

21. Elliot, J. and Hickie, R.S.P., Ulster: A Case Study in Conflict Theory, (1971) p. 33.

22. See Rose, R., op. cit., Chapter V. Rose identifies two main types of Protestant social actors - 'Ultras' and those who are fully allegiant. Among Catholics there are those who 'support', 'oppose' and 'don't know' if they approve of the constitution.

23. Boulton, D., The U.V.F.: An Anatomy of Loyalist Rebellion, (1973) pp. 31-32.

24. Bishop Cathal Daly, quoted in Magee, J., Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict, (1974) p. 27.

25. Fields, R., A Society on the Run, (1973) p. 137.

26. Quoted in Rose, R., op. cit., p. 333.

27. For a detailed account of Northern Ireland's educational structures, see Wallace, M., Northern Ireland: 50 Years of Self-Government, (1971) pp. 103-112, and Fitzgerlald, G., Towards a New Ireland, (1972) pp. 46-52.

28. Quoted in Rose, R., op. cit., p. 335.

29. Ibid., p. 336.

30. Magee, J., op. cit., p. 9.

31. Taken from "Shared Schools Proposal Stirs Angry Debate in Ulster", The Globe and Mail (August 12th, 1976).

32. Devlin, B., op. cit., p. 62.

33. Elliot, J. and Hickie, R.S.P., op. cit., p. 29.

34. de Paor, L., Divided Ulster, (1971) p.131.

35. For a discussion of the significance of high rates of church-attendance with reference to the similarities that exist between the two communities in the North, see Fitzgerald, G., op. cit., Chapter V. See also de Paor, op. cit., p. 142.

36. Rose, R., op. cit., Chapter VIII.

37. Ibid., p. 329.

38. Ibid., p. 248.

39. Magee, J., op. cit., p. 5.

40. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 260.

41. Ibid., p. 254.

42. Shibutani, T., op. cit., p. 111.

43. Denzin, N., "Symbolic Interactionism and Ethnomethodology: A Proposed Synthesis", American Sociological Review, XXXIV (December, 1969) p. 923.

44. Brim, O.G. JR. and Wheeler, S., Socialization After Childhood, (1966) pp. 14-15.

45. Magee, J., op. cit., p. 9.

46. Rose, R., op. cit., Chapter VI.

47. Boulton, D., op. cit., p. 29.

48. Holzner, B., Reality Construction in Society, (1972) p. 143.

49. Kelly, H., How Stormont Fell, (1972) p. 87.

50. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 449.

51. Hastings, Max, Ulster 1969, (1970) p. 33.

52. Boulton, D., op. cit., p. 109.

53. Ibid., Chapter VIII.

54. Ibid., p. 109.

55. Ibid., pp. 108-.29. The whole book provides a very useful analysis of these processes.

56. Rose, R., op. cit., pp. 307-308. The survey was actually completed in 1968 before the political polarization of the two communities.

57. Hastings, Max, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

58. Doulgas, M., Purity and Danger, (1970) p. 48.

59. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

60. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 268.

61. Magee, J., op. cit., p. 7.

62. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 235.

63. Magee, J., op. cit., p. 98.

64. Rose, R., op. cit., p. 263.

65. Sean MacStiofain, quoted in Sweetman, R., On Our Knees; Ireland 1972, (1972) pp. 157-158.

66. Douglas, M., op. cit., p. 54.

67. Ibid., p. 89.

68. Ibid., p. 80.

69. Ibid., p. 78.

70. Ibid., pp. 79-80.

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