SOCIOLOGY OF THE NEW DEAL AND A NEW DEAL FOR SOCIOLOGY
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NEW DEAL FOR SOCIOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

An attempt was made in this thesis to explore some of the relationships between New Deal politics and sociology in post-1930 America. It was argued that uncritical acceptance of the logic of domination embodied in New Deal politics prevented sociologists from confronting the central problems of freedom and reason in an industrialized society-world. Using pre-defined categories for investigation and accepting a methodology that embodied the logic of domination, sociologists translated moral and political questions into administrative and methodological questions.

From this perspective, sociologists have performed a vital service to the development of the theory and practice of the modern business state, although this is not to say that sociologists have had a profound impact on anyone besides themselves. The sociologists role was that of a state-builder in that the ideology of the state was covertly supported in a maze of scientific rhetoric and slogans which, in effect, hid ideology from sociologists and thus ended debate within the discipline. As moral and political lines of thought were excluded from debate (but not the content of sociological work), the way was opened for increased participation in state and corporate sponsored projects and in the training of properly trained civil servants.

The importance of sociology in the New Deal was not whether it was right or wrong but in the way questions were addressed and answered--the way the problem of liberty and order in a highly industrialized world was evaded

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Chapter One; INTRODUCTION

Sociological accounts of the development of the discipline typically try to describe substantive and methodological issues as distinct and separate. This distinction has been maintained by using traditional Building-Block notions of scientific development or with Kuhn's paradigmatic formula for progress. Each embraces the idea that methodology or scientific education acts as a guardian which assures faithful forward movement. Whatever noble intentions lie behind these conceptual frameworks, the results remain inadequate. Because methodological and substantive areas of study get separated, there exists an inability to see the history of sociology in an historically grounded or critical fashion.

The purpose of this study is to explore the meaning of sociological concepts of power and social conflict in the context of expanding corporate structures during the New Deal era of American history and to address the problem of how and why these concepts withstood criticism. That is, how were the images of social problems in the Recovery Program of Franklin Roosevelt's administration received by members of the sociological religion? What methodological tools and principles were used to substantiate the final results of sociological thinking? Why did widespread complacency overtake the discipline? For the purpose of this study, representatives of the logic of domination in Roosevelt's New Deal
will be defined as those who played the most influential roles in setting up the institutions that aimed at combating social crisis. This list includes members of the Brains Trust and Thruman Arnold as well as George Swope and H.I. Harriman, among others. Sociologists examined included Elton Mayo, Robert Merton, and George Lundberg, among others. Each of these individuals was selected on the basis of his position in the American Sociological Society, his influence in renovating sociology, his professional reputation and/or his clearly formulated position. Other sociologists could undoubtedly have been chosen (among others Paul Lazarsfeld and Sam Stouffer stand out) but Mayo, Merton and Lundberg hold special significance in that each formulated a novel, widely accepted, way of addressing social research. Mayo, for instance, made Industrial Sociology and actual participation in corporate affairs a legitimate concern for sociologists. Merton did much to renovate functionalism by rescuing it from the theoretical abstraction of his former teacher, Talcott Parsons. And George Lundberg spent several years making operationalism a part of sociology. Each of these approaches to social knowledge carries the added significance that they represent major (accepted and widely used) perspectives in current sociology. The point then is that the history of sociology in the New Deal is not just an account of some remote era but a description of the foundations of present sociological thinking.

One non-sociologist, James Burnham, was included on the grounds that his arguments on the managerial thesis found
their way into sociology, forming the foundation of socio-
logical vocabularies of power. One European sociologist, Ralf
Dahrendorf, was included on similar grounds. To be sure, he
was not responding to American pressures. Rather, he was
trying to come to grips with Marxism in a different social
context. Nevertheless, Dahrendorf's influence on American
sociology was profound. His theory of social conflict was
accepted, indeed virtually unquestioned, by American writers,
especially functionalists. One major writer in American
sociology called Dahrendorf's work "one of the most important
efforts to reorient the approach of modern sociology...a major
contribution to social theory." Actually, there was little
reorientation in post-Dahrendorf theories of social conflict.
Instead, his notions neatly complemented prevailing function-
alisits notions by maintaining themes of order, stability, and
consensus. The writer was European, but still, the ideas
were central to post-1930 American sociology.

The major argument of this essay is that the employ-
ment of sociologists in large corporate bureaucracies during
the post-1930 period in the United States shaped their social
perspectives. Integrated into organizational America, some
sociologists proffered ideas and methodologies that reflected
and reinforced, not scrutinized, the rationales in New Deal
philosophy. Keep in mind that the aim of this essay is not
to show that sociologists merely responded to historical events.
To state such a direct causal relationship would require more
evidence than this writer could muster in this context. A
better argument would be that a relationship existed whereby the logic of domination in society (the instrumental reasons and justifications behind Roosevelt's New Deal) was central to the social perspectives of many prominent sociologists. Note, moreover, that this logic of domination had roots in corporate organizations and the need for social engineering, not Max Weber.

The Problem and Its Setting

The New Deal image of an organizationally controlled and operated society was built upon psychological and socio-historical foundations. Psychologically, a fear of social unrest moved some who ran large corporations and many in government to seek more effective means and rationales for establishing organizational controls to stabilize a troubled social order, thus preserving social peace and harmony. As Rexford Tugwell (one of Roosevelt's closest aids in 1932) remarked: there must be an "orderly revolution" in the theory and practice of American government. Otherwise, the United States faced "a violent overthrow of the whole capitalist structure."

The major part of this so-called revolution involved the creation of a new collectivist theory of society and an ever-expanding federal government with which to lay the groundwork for a managed economy.

Historically, the classical American community was rooted in small family enterprise and limited governmental organization. Also, there was a steadily expanding frontier
where individuals could establish new communities and new life-styles if the need arose. These conditions, in time, rapidly diminished as urban populations increased, as corporate organization became concentrated and widespread, and as good free land disappeared. The need for more efficient organizational techniques to manage public and private life of an expanding population of workers was fast becoming apparent. The institutionalization of an organizational model during the New Deal represented a logical outcome of these developments.

Even with these foundations however, the creation of a new ideology and state was no simple task. Classical American ideology impressed people with the virtues of independence and self-sufficiency. Monopoly and large-scale governmental projects were not the ideal form of social organization from this point of view. And though traditional beliefs had undergone significant modification prior to 1930, New Deal reformers still had to devote a large amount of energy to set the mood for the New Deal state. What New Dealers tried to convince people of, in short, was that the Great Depression reflected the impoverishment of classical individualism and laissez-faire economic theory. Individualism was good, New Dealers suggested, only in so far as it was controlled. Benevolent organizations (corporation, state and union) emerged as sought after forms of social organization by most reformists.

Chapter II examines in detail some of the problems encountered by administration officials and large industrialists.
in changing the official theory and structure of American institutions from 1932 to 1941. Much of the focus was on bids for power wearing the garbs of a democratic humanism. In rhetoric, for instance, the National Industrial Recovery Act set down guidelines for the humanization of economic relationships. Collective, democratic control (by those with special skills) of the means of production would guarantee job security and proper management of people/resources which, in turn, would stabilize the social order and thus prevent the possibility of another stock market crash like the one in 1929. In practice, however, the act granted extraordinary powers to large industrialists which enabled them to enjoy the benefits of a government fostered and government enforced cartel-type situation. This form of "feudalists" organization entailed a proliferation of organizational controls which would legalize such abusive practices as price-fixing, monopolistic reciprocation and government aid to ailing industries. Needless to say, many large industrialists and financiers supported Roosevelt's bid for power under the NRA.

The Supreme Court decision that the NRA was unconstitutional forced Roosevelt and those connected with his administration to pursue other means to control and cartelize economic activity. One example involved an attempt to pass a proposal that would pack the Supreme court with Justices favorable to liberal government; another sought to appease the left (and destroy Huey Long) with a 'soak the rich' tax proposal; and in still another attempt Roosevelt tried to use the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department to punish and threaten businesspersons when they became uncooperative. The concluding episodes of the struggle for a sound New Deal policy never came until the outbreak of World War II. Roosevelt was given expanded, war-time, executive powers (similar to those under the NRA) to manage the economy which allowed him to re-establish mechanisms to further monopolize and coordinate industry, especially war-related industry. This laid the groundwork for what is today often called the "welfare-warfare" state (Marcuse's term).

During and after these years of policy struggle, the character of American sociology was stable. There was little debate over that which was intensely debated in other sectors of society. A nice scientific consensus was reached which dissolved all debate. Indeed, the reformist tendencies of sociologists in the early part of the century were rejected in favor of an orientation that was both scientistic and administrative in character. That is, it was scientistic in that the rhetoric of sociologists largely defined the discipline as a value-free, socially detached activity; and it was administrative in that sociologists rarely focused on the nature of political and economic organization in a highly industrialized world and how this relates to problems of individual freedom and choice—instead focus was centered on issues of personality, communications, and properly constituted authority. In 1932, William F. Ogburn, acting president of the
American Sociological Society, addressed his colleagues with these words:

Sociology as a science is not interested in making the world a better place in which to live, in encouraging beliefs, in spreading information, in dispensing news, in setting forth impressions of life, in leading the multitudes, or in guiding the ship of state. Science is interested in only one thing, to wit, the discovery of new knowledge. (6)

The divergence from the reformist perspectives of earlier sociologists was particularly apparent in the emerging vocabularies of power and in the popular methodologies of the post-1930 period. The sociologists' vocabulary of power generally fostered a conceptual fog that denied the possibility of social violence through organizational techniques, that is, the possibility that one class could unduly use organizations to expropriate life from the people of another class. Functionalists, for instance, argued that social violence was not in the perview of sociology. Authority, hierarchy, and class were pictured as "universal necessities." And there also existed a belief that ability, training, and talent were naturally correlated with social position in the stratification order. For many functionalists it logically followed that the proper focus of sociology ought not be the negative aspects of power but the positive consequences of status relationships (what power accomplishes for society as a whole (social order)); and one might make the further suggestion that this logically meant asking questions of how sociology can help to better streamline the effectiveness of authority.
Similar perspectives to those of functionalists can be found in the writings of those embracing the Human Relations approach to the study of organizations. The Human Relations scholar put him/her self on the factory floor in order to seek information with which to better facilitate adaptation to factory conditions. In this setting the sociologists' vocabulary necessarily reflected and reinforced official definitions of social reality. Elton Mayo, for one, would consider this type of study as ideal because it aimed at rooting the individual in social space and routine activity. It fosters effective social conditioning which, roughly translated, was tantamount to freedom. The faith in the humaneness of the organizational framework of New Deal America and the wholesale acceptance of the supposed virtues of large-scale social planning looms large in the sociological literature.

Substantial support for these orientations, and the vocabularies which complement them, was generated in the writings of 'managerial revolution' theorists. One of the more popular theorist, James Burnham, proffered an image of modern society as a managerial meritocracy. Capitalists, Burnham argued, had been emasculated by the growing organizational and technical requirements of the process of production. Power was passing, or had already passed, into the hands of a group (managers) who owed their privileged position in society to professional acumen, administrative ability, and strategic location inside the corporation. A cursory examination reveals that this image of managerial society was firmly rooted
in a vocabulary that denied the possibility of alternative explanations. By definition, in other words, the conclusions were pre-fabricated in the initial definitions of concepts. The important point, however, is that such an image and such a vocabulary found its way into sociology in post-1930 America and formed the foundation of most theorizing on power and social conflict. This problem is consider in Chapter III.

The lack of reformist (and radical) reactions within sociology and the related tendency to adopt an administrative orientation toward social affairs was also due, in part, to the widespread appeal of various methodological perspectives. Each of these perspectives tried to fill the gap between social autonomy (objectivity) and value involvement with theoretical appeals to a Weberian tradition and with scientific claims for unaccountability (value non-involvement). (see Chapter IV)

The appeal to Max Weber was commonplace. He was respected as one of the early sociologists who had solved the problem of values in social research through the "value-relevance" doctrine. This suggestion is ungrounded for Weber's sociology embraced at least three lines of argument that were counter to the interpretation of New Deal sociologists. First, Weber firmly underlined the requirement that knowledge be recognized as a relativistic description of the world. Knowledge, the scientific type included, was believed to rest ultimately in the irrationality of values. To be sure, this introduced serious questions into Weber's science since it recognized the potential
weakness of a science practiced by a sect social accountants. But to be guided by a blinded empiricism would have worst consequences.

Aware of the relativistic nature of scientific knowledge, Weber followed a second line of argument that suggested the need for a critical outlook on prevailing social institutions. In many areas of life, customs, beliefs, and long-standing practices confront the sociologist as truth, fact, or the best way of doing things. Weber believed that these conventions deserved special critical attention from scientists. Refusal to do this, acceptance of ethical imperatives as self-evident truths, was viewed as an act of mental indolence in Weber's sociology.

Finally, the real solution to the value dilemma was not to forget values but to explore precisely this realm. Noble lies, ideology, subjectively shared meanings were central to the sociological endeavour. In pursuing this kind of study, sociologists not only clarified what choice exists for people in general, but also, refined analysis by broading the scope of information considered. Alternative points of view would not get left unstated.

An examination of scientific claims for social unaccountability (value non-involvement) centered around two related issues: 1) the methodological socialization of sociologists that fostered the development of partial theoretical perspectives, and 2) the manner in which sociologists justified their uncritical co-operation in corporate and state
operations. More than anything else, methodology provided the basis for a cognitive link between the humanist tradition in American thought and the centralization, de-individualization, and militarization, in a word "feudalization," of the rapidly growing corporate state. This in turn fostered a partisan sociology.

It is interesting that sociological socialization (on an individual level) and 'progress' (on a discipline level) involved an increasing de-politicization and a de-valuation of the ideas in the study of social life. From Elton Mayo to George Lundberg and Robert Merton this tendency can be found as moral and political questions get transformed into methodological and administrative ones. There were three general approaches through which this change occurred.

One approach viewed existing conditions as the result of natural laws in historical motion. These laws were not thought to be under any human control (individual or collective) since they were not of human making. Under these circumstances, the best any sociology can do is to try to understand these natural laws in order to facilitate human adaptation to them. Once understood, this inevitability effectively discounted alternative world views, critical theory and thus de-politicized social theory. Values, then, could be disregarded and those who held alternative beliefs could be categorized as disturbed people, insufficiently socialized.

Another approach described scientific knowledge in
terms of objective truths. From this point of view, knowledge founded on sound methodology possessed universal validity regardless of the social setting. This anti-relativistic framework demarcated observable phenomenon from perception, feeling, and subjectivity, and then, denied the scientific reality of the latter. The significance of this is that science takes on a transcendental character which, translated to meet the practitioners' situation, means that scientists cannot be held accountable for the products of their labor. Indeed, this is seen as a problem of the businessperson, the politician, or the general. Research findings, moreover, have no moral or political meaning using this perspective.

Still another approach that neutralized the value implications of scientific work can be deciphered in attempts to examine the social foundations of science and the social role of the scientists. In some societies, so the argument goes, objectivity and scientific autonomy cannot be achieved due to pressures from an overpowerful state. Nazi Germany, for example, destroyed scientific autonomy by imposing political criteria for truth on science. In liberal orders, however, this was not seen to be the case. The ethos of modern science, the guiding principles of scientific activity, were not believed to be in conflict with the underlying ethos of liberal democracies. In fact, they coalesced to assure social detachment. Therefore, the problem of objectivity boiled down to this: since liberal democratic societies (like New Deal America)
make no impositions on scientists' integrity, objectivity can be maintained as long as the sociologist uses the correct tools, procedures, and prescriptions embodied in his methodology. Given the right attitude, the right method, and the right social situation, problems of a value or political nature can be safely disregarded.

Taken together then sociological vocabularies and scientific methodology fused in the post-1930 period in American society to create an apologetic sociology which more resembled the ideology of New Deal administrators than the ideas of classical sociologists such as Max Weber. Too few have taken time and energy to view the development of modern sociology in its socio-historical context. Too many have been content to waste time paying lip service to Weber simply to de-scrutinize and de-politicize sociology. The relationship between New Deal politics and progressive sociology has gone unstated for too long.

Methodology

Methodology simply consist of the art "of raising questions that are 1) answerable by observation, and 2) whose answers feed back into theory with which they are logically related, indeed, from which they are derived." The basic argument of this study is that the political philosophies and economic policies of the New Deal Recovery Programs are reflected and reinforced by the writings of many prominent sociologists. Therefore, the most general question for this
inquiry is: What were the relations between the styles of thought employed by apologists of the Recovery Program of 1933 on the one hand and various prominent sociologists on the other?

Because of the vague and ambiguous meaning of the term political philosophy, discussion of definitions will necessarily precede the presentation of a more refined set of questions for analysis.

Political philosophies involve descriptions of the use of power to achieve goals in various societal (institutional) contexts. Such descriptions represent the beliefs and, at times, the desperate hopes of a people concerning how they perceive their activities relating to one another, and what these relationships mean for individuals and for society as a whole. Reduced to its basic elements, a political philosophy offers a more or less integrated and coherent picture of 1) an ideal, or an ethic, around which notions of good and evil, right and wrong, justice and injustice are gauged, 2) directives or prescriptions for institutions and institutional methods which are intended to establish the ideal as reality, and 3) an ideology, a set of assumptions concerning how and why certain institutions operate. Ideologies can function to justify, or perhaps legitimize is a more popular term, existing institutional relationships; they can also function to challenge the status-quo in favor of other arrangements. A diagram depicting the relationship between the elements
of a political philosophy can be found in figure one. Note that ideals and ideologies have no necessary connection with one another and that institutions can gain justification from ideologies that are dissassociated from ideals. Note also that the description which political philosophies offer often turn out to be mirages.

Figure One: A graphical representation of the relationships between the three elements of a political philosophy.

Following is a set of questions with which the descriptions of power offered in Roosevelt's Recovery Program on the one hand and in several major areas of sociology on the other were examined. I should point out that these questions are rather loosely adhered to. They form a loosely knit framework in which some questions are more relevant for some writers than for others.

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<th>Ideal</th>
<th>Nature of an ideal society? The place of women and men in it? Definitions of individualism?</th>
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<td>Institutions (directives)</td>
<td>Members of organizations and institutions in the ideal society? This involves a discussion of the organizational model and its implications for social planning and social control.</td>
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Notes

1 For those interested in a more complete discussion of the shortcomings in Building-Block and Kuhnian theory, I have prepared a short paper at the back of this essay. See Appendix I: A Research Note on the History of Sociology.

2 This comment was made by Seymour M. Lipset and can be found on the cover of the paperback edition of Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, (Stanford University Press: Stanford California, 1959).


4 See Joel Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State, (Beacon Press: Boston, 1972), and James Weinstein, The Liberal Ideal of the Corporate State, (Beacon Press; Boston, 1969).

5 Keep in mind that support of Roosevelt's bids for power was not universal. Indeed, several conservatives opposed the NRA on principle and when the promise of a business controlled government faded, or seemed unlikely, other 'more sophisticated' businesspersons withdrew their support.


7 The work of Elton Mayo followed this approach.

8 Here, I refer explicitly to George Lundberg.

9 This refers to Robert Merton's Functionalism.


for a similar discussion of the definitions of a political philosophy, see C. Wright Mills, *The Marxist*, (Dell Publishing Co.: New York, 1963), introduction.
Chapter Two; THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NEW DEAL

The fundamental ideas and stupendous growth of American sociology since 1930 can best be understood as a response to the problems and promises created by 1) the failure of the market in 1929 and the ensuing depression, and 2) the rise of the New Deal administration. From these historical events rose a need for new methods with which to control a people and an economy, a need for knowledge to maintain the stability necessary for a highly corporatized (monopolized) organizational society. And with this need emerged an ever willing corps of sociologists interested in applying their knowledge to the social and/or administrative problems of the day. The adoption of a "service orientation" had far-reaching ramifications that permeate even the most abstract intellectual elements of sociological theory and methodology. Starting, in this chapter, with the socio-historical transformations, these innerconnections between thought (science) on the one hand and society (ideology) on the other will be briefly sketched.

During the 1920's, the spirit of the American people was high. In government, the Republican party had taken credit for any prosperity which may have existed by calling itself the "prosperity party" and then promised permanent prosperity by positing in the collective American mind the notion that the nation had entered a new, qualitatively different, stage of
economic evolution where misery and suffering could no longer exist. In 1929, at the peak of prosperity, the Committee on Recent Economic Changes could confidently state; "...that something distinctly different from our former experience is taking place... (and that) the strength and stability of our financial structure, both governmental and commercial, is of modern growth."

Even after the initial crash in the stock market, it would have been difficult for anyone, except perhaps a prophet of doom, to predict that the nation was entering the worst depression in its history. When the rivals of bigness, J.P. Morgan and J.D. Rockerfeller, sent delegates to the offices of Morgan's firm to uncover just what the crisis was all about, the consensus, after two days of meetings, was that "no houses were in difficulty and... many of the quotations on the stock-market do not fairly represent the situation." Andrew Mellon, then secretary of the treasury, shared a similar opinion: he saw "nothing in the situation that is either menacing or warrants pessimism... (and had) every confidence that there will be a revival of activity in the spring." The unexpectedness of the collapse in the market boggled the minds and spirits of many Americans leaving desperate hopes that 'prosperity was just around the corner.' As one New York investment firm (Merrill, Lynch & Co.) saw it, the crash was just "a break to buy good securities."

As the depression worsened, the popular faith in laissez-faire individualism dwindled. In its place rose an
organizational image of society that had undergone noticeable growth since 1900 at least. This image of society had many versions in the form of comprehensive plans to cure societal ills, but each shared certain basic tenent. First, there was a belief in some sort of centralized co-ordination of the economy, complete with provisions for giving 'security' to industry. Second was the proposition that energy to regulate the economy should be expended through group, not individual, initiative and that these groups must consist of specialists. Organized intelligence coupled with sufficient power to regulate would naturally lead to the 'good society.' Third was the belief that the antitrust statues should be amended to allow greater degrees of co-operation. Amending these laws, which were hopeless anachronisms anyway, would curtail the practices of cut-throat and predatory competition. Monopolies, it was felt, were evil only when forced to compete. Finally, it was generally argued that allowing greater co-operation would stimulate recovery and discourage future depressions. It would help Americans to take hold of their destiny by removing businesspersons from the vicissitudes of the marketplace. The images of social reality emanating from these basic tenents would find their place, as laissez-faire images would be dealt their final death blow, in New Deal politics.

Before going on, it should be pointed out that these ideological shifts from laissez-faire and merchantile, to corporate images of reality are reflected in concrete, institu-
tional transformations that began before (around 1870), but cumulated in, New Deal America (1933-?). In government especially, manpower and spending undergo fantastic increases in relation to the general population and the Gross National product. These increases coupled with advanced techniques for gathering, processing and transmitting information increased the potential for government to act as a strong central regulating mechanism in the economy which, in turn, generated support for the theories of the state-organization builders in the Roosevelt Regime. In figure 2 and figure 3, a statistical history reveals the changing character of government since the turn of the century. The ever increasing size and financial clout of government is a salient feature of New Deal political experience.

The New Dealers and Their Recovery Program

Franklin Roosevelt's presidential victory in 1932 reflected a political unrest that had cumulated through three winters of depression. By March 1933, when he took office, banks in the United States had closed, stopping financial transactions and symbolizing the desperate state of the economy; unemployment estimates ran from 13,300,000 to 17,900,000, figures which represent near half of the labor force; and families were loosing their homes through foreclosure at a rate of a thousand a day. Midwest farmers had acted frequently in open rebellion and hunger riots had become commonplace in large urban centers. Many had looked to government for relief from these
Figure Two: Relative Increases in the size of the general population and in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>YEAR</th>
<th>% of government employees in non-farm labor force</th>
<th>Government expenditures as % of Gross National Product</th>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>1950 24.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure three: Tabulation on the growing influence of the State in the American Economy.


1 excluding the military.
but little, if anything, was done by the Hoover administration. For Hoover, relief was not the responsibility of federal government but of private charity and/or local governments.Depressions were pictured by him as natural phenomena that occurred regularly and disappeared naturally due to self-generating forces of recovery inherent within the capitalist system. If relief was to be given, Hoover believed, it should be given to industrialist and financiers, not workers, because this would mean increased activity and thus economic benefits for all. Not until the summer of 1932 was any relief provided. The Emergency Relief Act of 1932 authorized setting up a $300 million loan fund administered by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. This fund was designed in accordance with Hoover's philosophy to provide money (at an interest) to supplement state and local relief funds. At the close of the year only a miserly $30 million had been spent on relief. To appreciate the plight of the needy, it seems worth noting that earlier in 1932 the RFC lent $90 million to Chicago Republic Bank and Trust Company of which RFC chairman and vice-president was an officer. These actions and inactions served to aggravate the conditions of social disorder which set the stage for the New Deal.

In his inaugural address, Roosevelt rejected the proposition that depressions are natural and the principle of local responsibility for relief. "We are stricken," the new president declared, "by no plague of locust." Denouncing the
unscrupulous practices of the money changers who had "fled the high temple of our civilization," Roosevelt suggested that it was now time to put away collective fears in a co-operative effort, in a New Deal, to put men to work and develop safeguards "against a return of the evils of the old order... an end to speculation with other people's money." Moreover, if congress could not handle the task on their own, "broad executive powers to wage war against the emergency" would have to be legislated. Whatever specific course was to be taken it clearly included large-scale governmental action on a federal level.

The overwhelming majority with which Roosevelt won the 1932 election was also a clear popular mandate to give him, and the group of young intellectuals known as the "brains trust," some of the war-time like power they requested. It was a plea for the federal action which Hoover was so hesitant to give. In a special session that convened on March 9, an acquiescent congress ratified more legislative proposals than had ever been approved in a similar period in American history. This legislation, among other things, granted unparalleled powers in areas as diverse as banking reform, federal work projects, conservation, housing and art exhibitions. But still more federal authority was felt necessary if the economy was to be stabilized let alone stimulated. On June 16, a general plan to put the economy into order was worked out. It embodied the ideas of trade associationists, democratic collectivists,
labor unionists, and economic planners and was composed in vague terminology so that in practice its implementation would depend on the preconceptions of its administrators. Yet, despite the act's vagueness, its intent was clear enough: to centralize the co-ordinating forces of the economy in Washington. After signing the National Industrial Recovery Act, Roosevelt stated:

History will probably record the National Industrial Recovery Act as the most far-reaching legislation ever enacted by the American Congress.... Its goal is the assurance of a reasonable profit to industry and living wages for labor with the elimination of the piratical methods and practices which have not only harassed honest businessmen but also contributed to the ills of labor. (13)

That the new president should appraise the NIRA in these terms is an indication of its central importance in the administrations recovery program. For the next couple of years, the National Recovery Administration, hereafter referred to as the NRA, would function as the agency through which the prescriptions set out in the NIRA would be interpreted and enforced. What follows is not a documentation of the agency's history but an analysis of the political philosophy upon which the NRA rested.

**NRA Examined**

The image of society embraced in the recovery administration in the Roosevelt Regime in 1933 was a subtle intertwining of old-time agrarian idealism, emphasising the virtues of self-help and individualism, with organizational practical-
ity, demanding an ethic of self-sacrifice and economic de­
pendency. The agrarian idealism was manifested mostly in
language. New Deal symbolisms included such progressive-like
phrases as 'economic cannibalism,' 'economic royalist,' 'money
changers,' and 'industrial pirates.' To a large extent, this
symbolism was part of an effort to demonstrate the compata­
bility of NRA principles with traditional American ideals;
it was an attempt to maintain a fragile Roosevelt coalition
of businesspersons, planners, populists, and laborers.

In practice however, ideals emerged which expressly
contradicted, or were modifications of, traditional notions
of individualism and co-operation. The image of an independent
yeoman was replaced with that of a co-operative, highly social­
ized, man and woman. Images of the best way to jorganize,
motivate, and operate the industrial system also underwent
profound modifications. The ideal of interaction in a com­
petitive market between small entrepreneurs was subjugated to
an ideal of a co-operative relationship between large cor­
porate--and state--organizations in an administered market.
That is, notwithstanding the agrarian rhetoric, union, monopoly,
and state emerged as sought after forms of social organization
in New Deal society.

Central to the NRA was a two-fold theme: 1) that co­
operation was a better organizing principle than competition,
and 2) that centralized planning--control--was the best means
for achieving this co-operative state. Senator Robert F.
Wagner, a major proponent of the recovery bill, was especially skillful at blending these themes with traditional American thought. He described the administrations' actions as a far-reaching departure from the philosophy that the government should remain a silent spectator while the people of the United States, without plan and without organization, vainly attempt to achieve their social and economic ideals. It recognizes that planlessness and disjointed efforts lead to waste, destruction, exploitation and disaster...This trend in thought and action is accompanied a sidening concept of business—-that all business is affected with a public interest. (14)

Then, after recognizing the new philosophy, he continues:

"Competition is not abolished; it is only made rational... business may not compete by reducing wages below the American standard of living...Competition is limited to legitimate and honorable bids in the market and real gains in technical efficiency." The real living issue in purifying the productive process was, for Wagner, how to best regulate it.

A socially uncontrolled industrial system was pictured in undesirable terms by other new dealers. "Consider," Rexford Tugwell declared, "how in ungoverned allegiance to the eighteenth century dogma of free-competition they nearly wrecked us." Order and stability, or lack of it, was the central problem in modern industrial society. And of course, control order, stability roughly meant planned abundance while disorder and anarchy meant waste, exploitation and frustration. Furthermore, fear of bigness, whether in government or in business was now (1933) a misplaced issue. Large-scale organizations
were not only desirable, but natural, outgrowths of modern technology and served noble purposes as long as they were "governed to assure the general well-being." Fair-minded regulation—control—of large scale organization was the principle purpose of the NRA. A. A. Berle Jr. put it cogently while addressing an audience at Columbia University: the NRA, he said, "is endeavoring...to make the tremendous collective organizations we have built up...change from a dubious master...into a faithful and honored servant."

Acceptance of acentrally co-ordinated organizational economy represents a significant modification in capitalist thought which extends, necessarily, to changes in the definition of individualism. In the traditional image, several selfish, self-seeking individuals interact in a market that transmutes their self-interest into a social harmony. But implicit with the organizational image is an existential imperative that negates the notion of the selfish man, or woman. That is to say, in an ever expanding organizational economy, techniques for ordering mental and physical life result. Coordination of people and materials becomes a problem of first-rate significance. What is required is differentially specialized individuals who can carry out related tasks independently and then combine their efforts to produce one single group action. A highly co-operative, highly socialized human, not the selfish self-seeker, become the ideal person. This is the individual who, through his contributions to the organization,
can climb the ladder from busboy to president—the new individualistic myth. He/she is the heart and backbone of the new establishment.

The innovation of NRA principles into American political experience was, Rexford Tugwell suggest, a choice between "an orderly revolution...and a violent overthrow of the whole capitalist structure." The NRA allows the president (who "is not a dictator but more like a 'city manager,' whose laws are not irrevocable") the "experimental attitude."

Tugwell and other new dealers emphasised this approach because, for them, the NRA was a sort of 'pragmatic experiment' for seeking solutions to the problems of 'economic instability' and class warfare. Fear of social unrest motivated new dealers to seek executive powers to handle the impending disaster. Thus, one major directive was for trust—power—to be placed in the hands of the executive branch where knowledgeable experts would provide a firm guiding hand in running the country. Tugwell stated:

Power must be entrusted to the best executives we can summon...Instead of a government of fixed, immutable forms, we must put our trust again in a government of human beings, who entrusted with genuine power and leadership...and who, if those executives fall, displace themselves and choose others. (21)

Abolishment of the legislative by the executive branch "may be temporary," Tugwell tells us, but if the 'orderly revolution' proves to be successful "the power may be renewed."

What the 'orderly revolution' originally set out to
accomplish was the alleviation of two crucial problems. First, an attempt to improve business relations through implementation of codes of fair-competition was made. This effort aimed at discouraging 'cut-throat,' and 'preditory' competition which was felt to be the evil that had caused the depression. It also sought to put a bottom under prices and thereby create a situation in which further decline could be prevented and an end could be put to the pervasive psychology of despair. The second problem the NRA confronted was a worker population with insufficient purchasing power to consume the products of the economy. This situation, in one sense, was an artificial one. There was no crop failure, indeed, food was destroyed while hungry onlookers were kept away by police. Sheep were ran over cliffs because they were too expensive to feed and impossible to market. Houses were destroyed and some just left vacant while people slept in the streets. To solve this problem, the new dealers endeavored to increase wages through minimum hourly and weekly rates while protecting wage differentials above the minimum.

One of the major figures who helped formulate the principles upon which the 'orderly revolution' would confront these problems was Donald Richberg, a labor representative in the Recovery Administration. Richberg's position in the debate over how the economy was to be organized, over what institutional methods to utilize, was typical of many administrators. Hugh Jonson, the NRA chief, no doubt choose him for the
job precisely for this reason. For Richberg, the menace in the new economic order was the "old economic theory that increased labor cost bring a corresponding increase in prices." This theory is "just as dead as the dodo" for him, "although some of the dodo economist continue to misguide college student and gullible businessmen with sophisticated arguments supported by misapplied statistical data." Rather, Richberg argued, "overhead cost" can be lowered "through co-operative effort" and thus "we eliminate the waste of unfair competition" and stimulate "an even greater rise in the standard of living."

Mr. Richberg also supported, in principle, the concept of "industrial self-government," stating that it serves "wholly desirable purposes." Under a system of self-regulation, businesspersons could willingly limit their freedom (profits?) for the benefit of all through the implementation of a new set of industrial laws. Richberg stated:

If we are to establish industrial law and order which will preserve the freedom of men whose character, industry and capacity will advance the general welfare and restrain the freedom of greedy self-seekers...we must write a host of new distinctions between honest, fair business methods and dishonest, unfair practices. (28)

According to this mode of co-operation, future organizations could develop along industrial lines; that is, they could develop in the direction of ever expanding corporate and state monopolies. Such organizational proliferation would be under the restraints of the industrial laws and the
political policemen of the NRA. In this way and only in this way, Richberg felt, economic interest could be forced to serve the public interest. This was very much in keeping with New Deal philosophy. As president Roosevelt pointed out several times, the New Deal was essentially an attempt to place "human rights" above "property rights." Yet, in this scheme, individuals also come under increasing restraints from corporate and state associations. This implication does not prove to be a problem for Richberg. For, he rejected as "unreasoned criticism" the proposition that NRA regulations would lead to a "destruction of liberty." The NRA codes did not destroy freedom but preserved it by setting up the parameters, the limits, in which the industrial process could be humanized. After all, he argues, "...every professor, if he understands the elementary principles of social and political science, must realize that a plea for unbridled freedom is pure nonsense."

Similar types of arguments were developed by businesspersons influential in the NRA but one important qualification need be added: they were much more particular about who would be responsible for the large-scale management of industry in the NRA. From their perspective, business experts selected by, not elected by, businesspersons were better qualified for the task than the "old bogies" of bureaucracy.

This line of argument was expressed in the writings and speeches of, among others, H.I. Harriman (president of the
United States Chamber of Commerce), Gerald Swope (president of General Electric), and Fred Kent (Director of American Bankers Association). At a meeting of the United States Chamber of Commerce early in the New Deal, Harriman and Swope denounced the existing economic system as "antiquated." They solidly supported Roosevelt's bid for control of industry. Swope then interjected the very crucial question: It is not "shall it be done" but "by whom shall it be done?" He was, of course referring to large-scale management and control of industry.

Swope's plan was simply to end the "destructive competition" that had marked American business by urging "co-operation of allied industries" through trade associations. He envisaged a time in the future when "a national economic council might adjust all the needs of capital, workers, and consumers to the end that all would have a secure place in the social scheme." Likewise, the 'Kent plan' was a proposition to place management powers in the hands of big businesspersons while government served as an insurance agent. Specifically, Kent called for a resumption of industrial activity at the scale prevailing in 1927 while the government would guarantee loss to industry. This, Kent believed, was favorable because it would 1) re-establish industry, 2) minimize the cost to government, and 3) leave no 'scar' in legislation after the need was over.

Eventually, the various conceptions of how the NRA
would be administered resulted in a policy deadlock, yet, it was not a deadlock over whether industrial self-govern-
ment was proper but of how much of it was proper. Labor re-
presentatives such as Sidney Hillman and John L. Lewis are
recorded to have supported the idea of industrial self govern-
ment. One major source of United States labor history
recounts that under the NRA "recovery was to be gained through
the self-organization of each industry..." At the same
time, the New Deal in general is referred to as a "people's
movement" and a "high point in democracy;" the new president
is depicted as a "world figure because he moved to meet the
people's needs." Another indication of the popularity of the
industrial self regulation thesis can be found in an article
of Rexford Tugwell's. Tugwell, one of the most ardent ad-
vocates of government control of industry, said: "...it is
better that industry shall try for itself to find the road to
continuity." In short, Washington was pictured as a branch
plant of New York by the New Dealers, serving as a disciplinary
agency to penalize those who engage in so-called recalcitrant
business practices. The NRA undertook "frankly to operate
within a profit economy." It aimed at streamlining exis-
ting relationships, not creating new ones.

Perhaps the most fundamental assumption of the new
dealers involved their image of power in American society. In
1932, A. A. Berle Jr. co-authored a book with Gardner Means
entitled The Modern Corporation and Private Property. In this
book two arguments are presented. First, from governmental calculations, stockholder's reports and sales and assets figures, Berle & Means found that a structural transformation had taken place in American society. A dual economy had evolved. The old economy of small proprietors and partnerships still existed and still operated in accordance with the principles of the competitive market. But a second economy, consisting of a handful of supercorporations, was becoming increasingly important in terms of the proportion of the economy they dominated. One, among other, instances revealed by the writers was that 130 firm had captured a striking 82% of all corporate assets. Their data unequivocably indicated that an inexorable trend toward an economy dominated by a few corporate concentrations was well under way. In a later publication, Berle described this concentration as so great that it would make feudal social structure look like a "sunday school party."

From the facts of economic concentration, Berle and Means developed a second theme which has gained much... popularity since its initial promogulation. This theme suggest that the increased size of the modern corporation caused serious modifications in the forms of economic relationships between managers and owners in the second economy. Diffused stock ownership coupled with increased delegation of duties to managers (experts) meant that many of the perogatives of the old-time capitalist were diluted. Owners, so the argument...
goes, had become functionless; their sole activities revolved around ratifying managerial decisions and clipping coupons. According to Berle and Means, control was, or should be, transferred to a "purely neutral technocracy." This is because managerial-technocratic motives are presumed to be more socially responsible, more benign, than those of the self-seeking capitalists of yesteryear and hence the chances of class warfare could be lessened.

This image of power blends notions of economic concentration—progress—with images of a beneficent and benevolent corporation (Berle later used the delightful term "corporate soul"). The manager and the technocrat become the main actors in history. The popular formula which emerged was this: the right amounts of knowledge (thoughtful planning) and centralized control (genuine power) were the key ingredients for achieving the 'good society' of planned abundance and little or no social misery.

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of this image of power in the legitimization of the NRA and subsequent political developments in America. With the managerial theory, questions of power could be relegated to a position of secondary importance. That is, the grimmer aspects of power were masked in a democratic, pluralistic opportunism. Terms such as 'separation of ownership and control,' pluralistic participation and breakup of family capitalism tended to obfuscate issues of monopoly, class, imperialism,
racism and the state. Sociology, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters, was in the forefront of the dissemination of this democratic opportunism.

The Berle image of power also facilitated a modification in the way social order and social change were viewed. No longer did economic developments have to be left to the vicissitudes of the marketplace, or to the violence of class warfare. In the 'good society' social change and order were pictured as hinging upon technological factors; and, conveniently, the new masters—the managers and technocrats—were particularly adept at manipulating these factors. In this society, then, social change and order could be created and controlled by experts. Future depressions could be prevented and progress assured through maintaining the proper balance within technology. This viewpoint was expressed by President Roosevelt when he stated that the NRA represent "a supreme effort to stabilize for all time the many factors which make for the prosperity of the Nation..."

Continuities and Discontinuities in the Recovery Program

In the summer of 1933, there was widespread consensus favoring, or at least temporarily supporting, Roosevelt's Recovery Program. The program was designed in a broker fashion in that vague terminology and flamboyant rhetoric produced the effect that diverse sectors of the economy could believe that the act was tailor made to fit their specific needs. Under
the famous Section 7a of the NIRA (a clause which granted the legal right for workers to bargain collectively with their employer), labor was under the impression that the NRA was a charter of a new economic order in which labor and trade associations could jointly attempt to humanize the productive process. For big business, however, it meant something different. It represented an economic and legal legitimization of an industrial feudalism (they called it a 'business commonwealth') where trade associations could manage the economy in the most efficient (monopolistic, profitable) manner. Although the NIRA directly stated that there was no intent to foster the growth of monopoly, this was effectively contradicted in section 5 where antitrust laws were, in effect, suspended. This gave an additional degree of legality and security to the business feudalism. For small businesspersons, the Recovery Program offered two things. First, it meant enforcement of unfair competition codes (unfair competition meaning that which crushes small business); and second, it offered price protection that allowed various groups to cartelize their activities (druggist are a good example). Farmers even benefited from price stabilizing mechanisms set up under the AAA (Agriculture Adjustment Act). Thus the State was to act as a broker of interest group powers. In fact, the Recovery Program was so seductive that the American Socialist Party all but died during the 1930's as former socialists took on jobs in Washington and voted Democrat.
This is not to say however that New Dealers remained unchallenged. Several conservative businesspersons were finding Roosevelt’s programs increasingly distasteful. One of them, John J. Raskob, a retired chairman of the Democratic party and active vice-president of the DuPont organization, voiced his dissent in a letter to R.R.M. Carpenter, retired president of DuPont. In this letter Raskob told a story of how several servants had left his employment for government work that offered better pay. Outraged, Raskob suggested that Carpenter organize a campaign that would "come out openly with some plan for educating people to the values of encouraging people to work; encouraging people to get rich."

With no effective Republican voice in early New Deal politics and increasing disillusionment with ever expanding governmental programs, Raskob’s plea soon became the plea of many conservative thinking Americans. In the summer of 1934, a group of these men chartered an organization in Washington under the title of the American Liberty League. The stated purpose of the League was to "fight radicalism, defend property rights and uphold the constitution of the United States."

The method to accomplish this was thought to be educative; that is, it was the aim of the League to teach the necessity of respect for the rights of persons and property, the duty of government to encourage and protect individual and group initiative and enterprise, to foster the right
42

to work, earn, save, and acquire property and to preserve the ownership and lawful use of property when acquired. (49)

Among the supporters of the League were some of the industrial and financial titans of the nation. Wall street representatives referred to the league as "a nucleus of a new force of conservativism" and as "the answer to those who have been urging the formation of a national organization of security holders." And again, Victor Paradise, a stock partner in Jelke & Co., felt that the League deserved "hearty congratulations... [(and)] the united support of all right thinking Americans regardless of party affiliation."

One of the League's initial task was to provide a 'non-partisan' survey of New Deal policies. Yet, it is difficult to see how this was possible. To Liberty Leaguers the New Deal, by definition, represented a trend in politics that undermined the economic foundations of and the motive structure of the capitalist system. Their task was not to provide a reasonable evaluation of the New Deal but to educate people to the values of laissez-faire and social darwinist philosophies. Their aim was to tackle that 'man in the white house.'

The Liberty League's peculiar blend of 'non-partisanship,' then, consistently turned out to be anti-New Deal. For instance, the NRA was seen as "economic and political quackery," and as a "legislative monstrosity;" the AAA, Leaguers felt, would turn farmers into peasants; the Public Utilities Holding Company Act was a "calamitous blow;" and the TVA was
a step toward socialism; and the Potato Control Act reflected another step "toward socialism;" et cetera. The Leaguers encouraged employers to disregard Section 7a of the NIRA as they viewed it unconstitutional to let workers bargain collectively. And the League also strongly opposed Roosevelt's proposed tax program in 1935. 'Soak the Rich' tax programs were believed to be generally injurious to American civilization in that they aimed at punishing economic elites which were natural expressions of superior quality and ability in people. For the Leaguers, the New Deal had no justifications either in terms of ideals, institutions, or ideologies. It destroyed the natural order by setting class against class.

For a time, members of the League believed that their crusade to re-establish American values would sweep the country. Confident, Mr. Shouse, at the Bankers Club in New York, stated that the League "has frequently been referred to as a representative of conservative thought in the country. I maintain that a better definition ... is the assertion that it represents the constructive thought in the country." At one point, there was even talk of the League running a third party candidate in the 1936 presidential elections. Yet, while the League was probably the most important conservative critic in the 1930's and undoubtedly played a significant role in deepening the schism between administrators and businesspersons, the extant ambitions of some Leaguers never came to pass. At its
peak, the League had only 150,000 members despite a rigorous membership drive.

In addition, much criticism of the Liberty League was generated by liberal magazines such as the *New Republic*. This criticism centered around three issues: the origins, the financing & membership, and the goals of the Liberty League. First, as George Soule noted, the League had its origins in the unpopular Sentinals, an organization formed in 1922 to oppose women's suffrage and later (1924) to fight child labor amendments. The Sentinals, throughout their history, not only opposed attempts to provide governmental protection to women and children, but also, the sick, the aged, the infirmed, the laborer, and the small businessperson. They objected on the grounds that such action threatened the "fundamental principles of the constitution whereby a dual system of national and state governments was established." Second was the issue of membership and financing. The League was supported and manned largely by the most wealthy and reactionary of big business, DuPonds prominent among them. Leaguers felt that the fact that they were wealthy had nothing to do with their being in the League. Finally, the League came under attack for its dubious goals. That is, the freedom which League members subscribed to was a freedom that entailed 1) the right of employers to deal with employees individually, and 2) the right of business to be free of any regulation. This Hooverian definition of freedom had little place in American
after 1933, for, as one observant editor of the New Republic noted:

One man's liberty may be another man's prison... Everything they [(the Leaguers)] want—to prevent us from gaining the social freedom we need—is the liberty of the tyrant, which means bondage to subject. Liberty is meaningless aside from: the purposes for which it is exercised and the persons to whom it offers protection. (62)

Confronted with these problems, what support the League initially had won would soon begin to dwindle. In fact, the Leaguer were such an unpopular alliance of big businesspersons that the Republican party asked them not to endorse their presidential candidate. 63

It should be noted that, beginning in 1935, the precarious state of Roosevelt's coalition became more problematic. For example, in addition to criticism from the Liberty League the recovery program was dealt a severe blow when a handful of Supreme Court Justices ruled that both the NRA and the AAA were unconstitutional. This put the Social Security Act and the Wagner National Labor Relations Act in jeopardy of a similar fate. To save the New Deal, Roosevelt reacted with a bold plan to 'pack' the Supreme Court with members sympathetic to liberal government. The plan included increasing the number of Justices from nine to fifteen and a special provision for Justices over seventy years of age in order that "a constant and systematic addition of younger blood" can "vitalize the courts..." Unfortunately for Roosevelt however, this plan led to much bitter debate, winning him more enemies than
supporters. The repugnant flavor of the 'packing' plan blunted further drive for social reform under the New Deal by creating a schism within the Democratic party and in other reformist quarters and by alienating Roosevelt's middle-class support which in 1936 gave him the most striking presidential victory in American history.

Another influence, from the left this time, on the precarious state of the administrations's coalition was the emergence of Huey Long's 'Share the Wealth Movement,' Dr. Townsend's 'Old Age Revolution,' and Reverned Charles Couglin's radio campaign against Roosevelt. Aware of the potential political threat Roosevelt referred to Huey Long as "one of the two most dangerous men in the country" and told an emissary of William Randolf Hearst that (in 1935):

I am fighting communism, Huey Longism, Coughlinism, Townsendism; I want to save our system, the capitalist system; to save it is to give some heed to world thought of today. I want to equalize the distribution of wealth. (67)

Once again, Roosevelt's attempt to save the New Deal would cost him dearly in support. In an attempt to 'steal Huey's thunder,' Roosevelt developed a proposal for tax reform, the 'Soak the Rich' plan of 1935. This plan received almost unanimous condemnation from business. This coupled with Roosevelt's refusal to disperse sit-down strikers in 1936 created a most unco-operative relationship with businesspersons which, in turn, symbolized collapse of visions of a co-operative self-state regulated economy that had thrived under the NRA.
With Tugwell, Moley and Berle out of the administration, with the NRA and the AAA declared unconstitutional, and with businesspersons antagonistic toward the administration, Roosevelt sought new methods to sanction industry and finance through the Antitrust division of the Justice Department. To many Americans, it appeared that Roosevelt altered the basic philosophy of his administration (hence all the talk of a second New Deal). Yet this was a deceptive position. Still, notions of a government fostered and government regulated monopolistic economy guided the new, 'new dealers' until the outbreak of World War II. For Franklin Roosevelt, this approach offered an instrument to discipline, not destroy, 'economic royalist' who dabbled with 'other people's money' and also rallied support from old-line progressives (and hence a new coalition). The antitrust approach to handling, or appear to be handling, monopoly while actually fostering its growth was a deeply engrained part of American experience. Teddy Roosevelt, the famous trust-buster, used the approach to punish what he considered to be 'evil' corporations. And Woodrow Wilson provided 'demonstration prosecutions' which theoretically were intended to deter unethical practices throughout the corporate world. FDR's radical rhetoric, the commissioning of the Temporary National Economic Committee Reports, and the revival of antitrust legislation in 1938 were all part of this tradition.
The image of social problems and problem solutions held by Truman Arnold, new head of the Antitrust division, further corroborates the assertion that antitrustism in 1938 was a continuation of pre-existing New Deal policies. Arnold believed that there exist two economies in the United States, one economy of organized industry and another consisting of small unorganized business, farmers, and laborers and consumers. Economic troubles had risen in recent times because these two economic worlds worked at cross-purposes with one another; they did not co-operate. As Professor Arnold put it: "In the first world, great organizations keep up prices and lay off labor. The labor so laid off has no power to purchase...consumer... goods." For him, as for Berle, Richberg, et al., the New Deal was essentially an attempt to arrest economic malaise by providing money, purchasing power, to the second world. Yet, this orientation had one flaw in that it could not succeed as long as "organized industry maintains and raises prices faster during periods of adjustment than government supplies temporary purchasing power. That process drains away the money from those who receive it...and stops circulation...by failing to distribute goods and by laying off men who should be consuming what industry produces." Thus, once again, the problem is reduced to one of how to control, but not disrupt, the industrial system.

Truman Arnold preferred a decentralized government and economy to a centralized monopolistic one but he apparently faced reality and accepted the latter as inevitable. He remarked:
We may as well admit that monopolies controlled by an efficient centralized government really interested in the production and distribution of goods can be used to advance business recovery. They stifle free and independent enterprise but they lend themselves to the army system of control. (73)

Antitrustism was simply an instrument in the arsenal of this army system of control; enforcement was "not a moral problem," for Arnold, not a crusade as it had been in the past, rather, it was a "problem of continuous direction of economic traffic."

Although Arnold's antitrust campaign was the most impressive in American history, its success was short-lived. With the emergence of World War II, president Roosevelt, once again, was granted widespread authority to manage the production process. Wrapped in the flag, and hence unimpeded by popular revolt, businesspersons willingly entered into another alliance with Roosevelt, an alliance which would be much more longlasting. Truman Arnold saw the implications of the war clearly. In a letter to a Scripps-Howard columnist, he remarked:

> If some combination is imperative to the interest of national defense, it is a reasonable combination which requires no waiver of the law to get this result, fine. However, I fail to see any possibility of the things we are now prosecuting standing the test. (75)

Arnold concluded this letter by noting that the president was in full agreement with this position.

As entry into World War II became inevitable, institutional arrangements were made which increased the participation of supercorporations in the economy (many of which had strong ties with the Reich). For example, Walter Adams and
Horace Gray cited that between June 1940 and September 1944, a total of $175 billion in prime contract was awarded to a total of 18,359 corporations. Of this number, the top 100 corporations received two-thirds (117 billion dollars); the top thirty-three corporations received over half of the total; and the top ten received some thirty percent of the total. This spending pattern was a reflection of the new economic relationships that had emerged and would continue emerging till present day, but more important, it revealed that the assimilation of a new image of society and a public legitimization of corporate feudalism into American political practice was complete. It represented an acceptance of and an acquiescence to the institutionalization of New Deal Philosophy.

This chapter has attempted to describe a series of issues and debates important for substantive (institutional) socio-economic transformations in New Deal America. The major focus was on the triumphs and defeats experienced by the New Dealers in the Roosevelt Regime in the 1930's and how these experiences relate to past political praxis in general and Hoover's regime in particular. The outcome of a decade of debate was found to be widespread acceptance of a political philosophy that metaphorically can be described as a version of corporate feudalism. The New Deal was:

1) a trend, historical drift if you like, toward a government fostered and protected monopolization of economic relationships.
In this trend, administrative methods to control the economy and the people become popular in the guise of a democratic opportunistic language. 2) A wide-scale tendency to adopt a collectivistic ethic. Co-operation is pictured as a better organizing principle than competition. Group replaces individual initiative. Power becomes manifest through benevolent institutions rather than through self-seeking capitalists. And, it should be noted, this is always expressed in the democratic opportunistic language mentioned above. 3) A new image of a happy, co-operative, self-sacrificing individual who experiences his/her world through pre-planned, organizational relationships. Social planning, in economic, educational, and recreational realms, becomes the accepted means to humanize the human condition. Put differently, the New Deal aimed to humanize man through bureaucratic regulation. And finally, 4) the New Deal was characterized by a tendency toward an ever increasing interpenetration of the State (legitimate, coercive control systems) and the Economy (productive oriented, alienative control systems) in both public and private spheres.
The term 'prosperity' is used hesitantly for the following reason: a careful, conservative study calculated that in 1929, the height of the so-called prosperity, the 'basic necessities' for an average family would cost around $2,000 per year. At that time, some 60% of all American families were below this level. Maurice Leven and others, America's Capacity to Consume, (Brookings Institution: Washington D.C., 1934), p. 56.


for an excellent discussion of this development see either James Weinstein, The Liberal Ideal of the Corporate State, (1969), or Joel Spring, Education and the Rise of The Corporate State, (1972).

some of the many plans will be touched upon later in this chapter.

William Appleman Williams, The Contours of American History, (Quadrangle Books: Chicago, 1966); here Williams discusses some of these philosophies in the context of the developing United State.

Roosevelt discusses these conditions briefly in The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, (Random House: New York, 1969), Volume II, p. 16; unemployment estimates are those of the National Industrial Conference Board and the National Research League respectively, quoted in Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor, (Random House: Toronto, 1972), p. 42 (footnote); and docu-


10 David Shannon, ibid., p. 35


14 73rd Congressional Session, Unemployed, Hearings on S 1712 and H.R. 5755, before the Committee on Finance.

15 ibid., (italics mine).


17 ibid., (italics mine).


19 Rexford Tugwell, "Ideas Behind the New Deal."


21 Tugwell, op cit.

22 ibid.


24 ibid., also C.L. Dearing and others, *The ABC of the*


26 ibid.

27 ibid.

28 ibid.

29 ibid.


31 ibid., (italics mine), for a more extensive presentation of Swope's proposals, see Gerald Swope, The Swope Plan, (Business Bourse: New York, 1931).


34 ibid., (Hawley).


36 ibid., p. 274-5.


38 Dearing and others (1934), p. 38.

40 Ibid., p. 29.


42 Berle & Means, op. cit.

43 Ibid.

44 Public Papers, Volume II, 246.

45 Dearing and others (1934), 16-20.


50 Among the members are the following: Irene and Lammont DuPont, E.T. Weir (steel), Will Clayton (Texas cotton broker), Alfred Sloan (president of General Motors), Ed Hutton (president of General Foods), Howard Pew (president of Sun Oil), William Knndsen (General Motors), Joseph E. Widner (Philadelphia Transportation magnate), Sewell Avery (Montgomery Ward), and Georg Huston (president Baldwin Locomotives);


52 Ibid.

53 For an interesting discussion of the League's philosophy see George Wolfskill, "The American Liberty League and That Man in the White House," in Bernard Sternsher (ed.) The New Deal: Doctrines and Democracy, (Allyn & Bacon Inc.: Boston, 1966), 5-23; This article is an excerpt from his book The Revolt of the Conservatives,


J. Shouse was the chief organizer of the League. He was the highest paid political organizer in America at the time. The selection just cited is quoted in George Wolfskill, loc. cit., p. 21.


see ibid., where Soule lists some of the major contributors.


ibid., p. 109-115.

Rexford Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt, (Penguin: Baltimore, 1969), p. 349; when Tugwell asked Roosevelt whether Rev. Coughlin was the other dangerous man, Roosevelt replied: "Oh no,...the other is Douglas Mac Arthur.

quoted in Piven & Cloward (1972).

for example, John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Trust was viewed as 'evil' and thus busted. Of course, there is the rumour that the real reason was that J.D. did not provide sufficient funding for Teddy's coffers. But whatever the
the reason, the only real consequence of this 'bust' was to give Rockefeller several smaller companies in place of one big one.


70 Surprisingly, the consumer, the obvious 'forgotten man' in New Deal politics, makes several overt appearances in Arnold's analysis. In his *Bottlenecks of Big Business* (Reynal & Hitchcock: New York, 1940) for instance, the importance of the consumer is outlined on the first page.


72 ibid.

73 ibid.

74 ibid.


76 a case in point is General Motor's close association with their German affiliate Opel. Through their respective plants, G.M. produced arms for both sides during World War II and when the Opel plant was bombed by American planes, the U.S. government reimbursed G.M. of America for the loss. Several interesting questions arise concerning the nature and the boundaries of the benevolent corporation—and how they thrive on human self-destruction. See Ramparts (February 1973) for a more detailed discussion of the above story.

77 *Monopoly in America*, (MacMillian: New York, 1955), p. 102; for information concerning spending policies and disposal of war plant policies for both the second World War and the Korean War, see pp. 101-141.
Chapter Three: SOCIOLOGY ON POWER AND SOCIAL CONFLICT

The development of modern industrial institutions during the years of struggle for a sound New Deal policy was both reflected in and reinforced by the writings of many prominent sociologists. In the expanding corporate-bureaucratic state, the need for social knowledge gave impetus to the rise of a new style in sociological theory and research. This style was (and still is) oriented toward providing 'services' to those who dominate American institutions in exchange for generous financial support. Sociologists, implicitly and often explicitly, offered promises for a happier, more sophisticated, more docile worker-citizen and formulated programs for the harmonization and pacification of a discontented population. These promises and programs were couched in a democratic-opportunistic language and were morally-politically immunized with a cult of detachment and objectivity. To put it bluntly, the rise of the New Deal gave rise to, provided a foundation for, New Deal Sociology.

From its very genesis in America, sociology was involved in the development of corporate images of social reality. One writer, among others, has argued that many crucial aspects of the writings of the discipline's founding fathers (Small, Giddings, Sumner and Ward) can be interpreted as ideological justifications for corporate capitalism. It should be pointed
out, moreover, that these early sociologists were reformers, with a reformistic ethic and a reform oriented audience. They wanted to establish a "systematic, rational and empirical" study of society in order to "control a corrupt world." From their perspective, corporate expansion, under the 'right direction,' offered one way to humanize a most dangerous social order. And "sociocracy" (Ward's term) was their ultimate reformist ideal. Thus, while they were apologists, they were not apologists of the simple sort--they were not completely unaware of historical alternatives.

An analysis of the writings of many New Deal sociologists on the other hand revealed a divergence from this reformist ethic toward a perspective displaying many commonalities with New Deal ideology. This style of sociology can better be characterized as administrative in orientation. Its authors aspired to serve the corporation and the state so as to make each a more efficient, smooth running operation. Accordingly, much of what these men wrote can be viewed as a theoretical consolidation and practical application testifying to corporate and state virtues. In other words, "sociocracy" (society run according to sociological and ethical principles) was translated into "statecraft" (sociologists providing knowledge to those who dominate social institutions for whatever purposes they deem necessary).

The influences of the growing corporate and state institutions on sociology during the middle years of thiscentury
can be observed on two fundamental levels of analysis. At one level, sociological concepts often turn out to be mere reassertions of prevailing societal definitions in that they are not categories of thought open to empirical, ethical, or any critical reflection. At the second level of analysis, methodologies typically tend to support these prevailing societal definitions by circumscribing what is legitimate concern for research. In this and the following chapters, the congruence between social and sociological thought since 1930 in the United States will be examined.

The Mirage

At the foundations of all societal analysis, there exists, implicit or explicit, a conception of how power relationships evolve and operate in a given society. Nowhere is the sociological mirage as reliant for its persuasiveness as it is here.

Since the 1932 publication of Berle and Means' pioneering work, there has been widespread interest in the managerial thesis in sociological quarters. The continuation of this interest has been selective in that while sociologists have celebrated and elaborated the theme that increased size in the modern corporation has led to serious modifications in the forms of relationships between managers and owners, there has been relatively little attention given to their theme on corporate concentration and centralization, or its implications.
In fact, the sociological mirage, more often than not, tends to dismiss the importance of concentration and centralization by citing the diffusion of stock ownership throughout the population, the growth in technology, and the death of finance (hence family) capitalism. This particular version of the managerial thesis has not only gained the status of 'sociological fact' in recent years but has also become what is probably the most popular description of power in America during the twentieth century. It forms the foundations of the pluralists' theory of participatory democracy, a theory that fills both popular and scientific journals; and it forms the foundation of theories of meritocracy. There seems to be no end to its uses or its popularity.

One of the major figures who helped develop the popularized version of the managerial thesis was James Burnham, a self-confessed member of the Trotskyits organization the Fourth International. In his now famous book, The Managerial Revolution, Burnham described the central fact of the 1941 social and political situation as a divorce of legal ownership and control in the large corporations. This divorce, he suggested, had given control over to a group of men who owe their privileged societal position to professional training, administrative ability, and strategic location inside, rather than legal ownership outside, the corporation. For Burnham, the changing character of society reflected a profound transformation in economic, political and cultural realms of contemporary
life that mirrored the drive for social dominance by these new managerial men, this new ruling class. It represented what could only be termed a 'social revolution' or perhaps an 'orderly revolution.'

Burnham's importance for sociology lies not so much in his attempt at historical prediction as in the way he eventually defined his concepts and developed his arguments. His contentions are characteristically highlighted by a simple and appealing writing style; yet, in the final analysis, there exists little, if any, solid substantive support for what he says. Indeed, because of the way he defines his categories, there is little chance for support to be found, for his definitions preclude looking at those things which most need looking at. Further consider, for instance, his description of power in modern industrial society.

After reviewing Berle and Means' 1932 work, Burnham congratulated their analysis as "most suggestive" and "indirectly a powerful confirmation of the theory of the managerial revolution," but he adds, "as it stands it is not carried far enough for our purposes." Specifically, Burnham objected to the way Berle and Mean operationalized "management in the sense of direction of the process of production" and "management in terms of 'profit, selling, financing, and so on.'" Burnham's attempt to rectify this apparent omission lies at the crux of his theory of power.
Burnham's theory of power begins with the proposition that new forms of social organization were evolving which differed from any in the past. The increased size and division of labor in the new industrial and state organizations necessitated technical management of men and resources, which in turn led to the increased size and absolute indispensibility of the new managerial class. Everywhere corporate exploitation was replacing individual capitalist exploitation. Like the New Dealers, Burnham pictured the new class of managers as the prime actors in history. Their power and their importance, of course, was derived from expertise and indispensibility. Burnham's categorization of managers into four groups (based on respective function) goes far toward defining these changes and discounting alternative explanations.

Burnham's first group was simply referred to as 'the managers.' These are the important men, the ones involved in organizing persons, material and equipment in the "Great United States Corporations" and in government. Managers, not scientists who are "merely highly skilled workers," concern themselves with production on a company, not manipulation on and industry, level. Managers rarely, if ever, involved their talents in so-called dishonest practices because of their strategic location. Indeed, they could not even if they wanted. Burnham wrote:

The organization and coordination of industry as a whole is carried on through the instrumentality of
'the market,' without deliberate and explicit management exercised by specific managers or indeed by anyone else. (13)

As if to rid himself of charges of being a 'conspiracy theorist' and as if to make his ideas more consistent with classic American ideology, Burnham described a type of society in which manipulation of the masses through administrative markets was most unlikely. Managers represented a free and independent category of men who did their job, limited only by the requirements of the productive process. The point of course is that the possibility of an economy administered through bureaucratic channels that create demand, control production, and administer prices is discounted.

The second and third group of managers were called the "finance-executives" and the "finance capitalists" respectively. These managers engaged in selling and profit operations (finance executives) or in merger, stock and other arrangements for tax or speculative reasons (finance capitalist). The 'finance wizards' appeared as lesser men in Burnham's society in that their primary purpose revolved around serving the needs of production, and hence the managers. As the managerial society matured, moreover, these financial groups would dwindle in size and eventually become part of group one, the managers. Conceptually, Burnham divides the financial process and the production process to rectify Berle and Means theoretical omission. In fact, he sets the ground work for the introduction of the fourth group of managers and with it the
sterilization of notions of economic power.

The fourth group in the typology included certain individuals who owned stock certificates in a given corporation, the owners. This group, by far, was the least important in Burnham's analysis. "The only right they possess with reference to the company is to receive...money when on occasion dividends are declared by the directors." Owners, Burnham posited, have an "entirely passive relation to the company." Or again, Burnham reiterates this proposition:

In most large corporations, which together are decisive in the economy, the bulk of stockholders have, as everyone knows, the passive relation to the company...With only the rarest exception they exercise no real control over the company. (19)

Burnham's position in the debate over who rules the corporation, then, is this: Owners, obviously, are assuming a role unconnected to the organization, a role of powerlessness and coupon clipping. The managers 'rise' to the dominant, all powerful, position. Or to paraphrase another managerialist (Ralf Dahrendorf): 'the managers have no capital but the capitalists have no function.' Such a conclusion is pre-formulated in the initial concepts and how these concepts are developed. The language of managerialism becomes so obvious that substantive investigation becomes superfluous.

Burnham completes the four-fold separation of managerial types by suggesting that the categories are mutually exclusive. In the past, he argued, the possibility of
overlap was real because the technological and organizational aspects of the production process were at a primitive level of development. To corroborate this, Burnham cited Henry Ford as an example of an individual who, in the past, overlapped in all four functional categories. By 1941 however, it (the overlap) "was seldom the case, especially in the most important sectors of industry. The four functions are much more sharply differentiated than in the past; and they are, as a rule, performed by different sets of persons."

Through definition then, power lies within certain organizational relationships which are autonomous in the sense that they are based on knowledge and expertise rather than family, social, or economic advantages. The Burnham category of absentee manager is an extremely powerful onesince an absentee manager (owner) is no owner at all because control is ownership and ownership without control is nothing. Also by definition, the rulers emerged in the disguise of indispensable managers rather than in the familiar garbs of the robber barons and economic royalist of America's Sixty Families. Growth of organizational (monopolistic) forms led to the downfall of this latter class and to the further development of a process whereby financial power increasingly would become harnessed to organizational need, the needs of the managers.

In this analysis, the grimmer aspects of power become relegated to a position of secondary importance. This serves
to obscure issues such as human liberation from authoritarian power relationships, imperialism, racism, financial power and the sociologist's relation to those who rule America. Burnham's image also provides a conceptual scheme that reinforces, indeed thrives on, the institutionalization of New Deal philosophy. This familiar formula emerges: power, social change, and social conflict are all technical matters that await the answers and attitudes of managers for social peace and harmony.

This image of power in America was 'built-into' the sociological mirage in an even more sophisticated way. The inability of sociologists to fully recognize this was not unrelated to their inability to significantly contribute to the transformation of social relationships or their inability to develop a critical theory of society.

During the 1940's the use of functionalism developed rapidly throughout the discipline. In 1942, Kingsley Davis published an account of social stratification in modern industrial society in an attempt to resolve some of the conceptual disputes over the nature of modern status structure. Professor Davis believed that the social structure could best be described in terms of a key concept, namely, "position." For him, a position referred to a "place in a given social structure." There are two types of positions: 1) a generalized place in an institutional system (status), and 2) a specific location in a "deliberately created organization" (office). Clusters of positions constituted a "station in
society, " according to Davis, and "masses of persons enjoying roughly the same station" create a "stratum."
To avoid the dangers of reification, Dr. Davis introduced individuals into his analysis through the notion of "role."
He acknowledged that individuals may perform the duties of a position differently (but within certain parameters of course). The manner in which the individual carries out the 'bits of behavior' required of his position constitutes his role.
Note that the idea of role scarcely says more than people behave according to positional norms. This lack of elucidation of human behavior, in turn, reinforces the idea that positions are all powerful (and that people are objects). 'Role' is a necessary complement to positional analysis if you don't want to talk about people.

With these fundamental concepts, functionalists tried to offer an image of stratification that was at once theoretically sound, societally generalizable and empirically applicable. In 1945, for instance, Professor Davis attempted to extend his analysis in an article published jointly with Wilbert E. Moore. This famous article contained a three-fold theme concerning how and why functionalists should view stratification. First, Davis and Moore believed that since "no society was classless or unstratified," inequality and stratification must somehow be a "universal necessity." Logically, "...society must somehow distribute its members in social positions and induce
them to perform duties." And only through preferential treatment of some and less favorable treatment of others could motivation be induced. This "distribution," they suggested, becomes "a part of the social order and thus gives rise to stratification." Or again:

If the rights and prerequisites of different positions in a society must be unequal then the society must be stratified because that is precisely what stratification means. Social inequality thus is an unconsciously evolved device which societies ensure that the most important positions are conscientiously filled... (29)

Thus, the first theme served as a rationalization of the inevitability of inequality in society in general and in organizations in particular. It offered a confused description and definition of prevailing relationships, not analysis. It defined prevailing injustices in desirable terms.

The second theme put forth by Davis and Moore was that "positions" which "convey the best reward," necessarily "a) have the greatest importance for society and b) require the greatest training and talent." Rather than question a harmony between stratification and importance-training-talent, Davis and Moore asserted its reality. Thus an image of a meritocratic, somewhat democratic, achievement oriented society appeared with which to reinforce the organization model involved in New Deal philosophy. Specialization and centralization merged during organizational growth to confuse the irresponsible capitalists of the early 1900's and to allow their power to shift into the hands of the persons who command
the new organizational networks.

Finally, the theme that power accrued only to those in particular organizational relationships (positions) received Davis and Moore's support. "Rewards," they said, "are built into positions." In this way power analysis becomes a form of positional analysis which puts emphasis only on overt, so-called legitimate expressions of power in organizations. People are obscured since focusing on 'roles' is scarcely more than looking at positions. The possibility of a bureaucratic dictatorship or even of a ruling-class hardly presents itself. Extra-organizational, or hidden organizational, forms of influence (examples: bribes, friendly conversations, dinner dates, family connections, C.I.A., black magic, bank influence or propaganda) get excluded from the sociologists' analysis. Functionalism as method and functionalism as theory merge to obtain similar ends: namely, focusing the energies of sociologists on legitimate forms of power that contribute "to the existence of a given unity," that is, on the purely positive aspects of mundane everyday pre-planned, standardized exchanges within the organizational machine.

While the Burnham-functionalist position was in vogue, other similar perspectives were developed. Shortly after World War II, Peter Drucker described the past fifty years as a transitory period between employer and employee society. This argument goes far in complementing the new
vocabularies of power. For example, consider the importance Drucker attributes to organizational forms of power. Drucker wrote: "in the qualitatively, socially, and morally decisive realm" of society—that is, the large corporation—"people, while they work for a 'boss,' do not work for an employer. The boss is himself an employee who works for a boss—and so does the next boss and the next and the next." For Drucker, this meant that society could best be described in terms of a hierarchical system in which persons related to one another on purely impersonal lines. Interaction in organizations (corporation, state & union) was "ruled by status," Drucker explained. Moreover, he anchored the status an individual carried solely in "social function or position."

For instance, the new ruling group in employee society, the managers, derived

its authority and responsibility squarely from function, that is, from its status relationship to the organization, and not from anything it possesses such as property, birth, inherited magical power or military force. (37)

The problem of the modern world and of sociology was to understand how "...position...power...and responsibility rest solely on indispensable function."

As the popularity of the sociological mirage became more widespread, so did a conceptual fog that denied the possibility of social violence. Sociology fostered a mirage that celebrated a New Deal organization image of men and women in society who were indeed unequal, but, who were better off
than they might be because the organizational structure allowed power and reward to find its path, through positions, to the best of possible qualified men. Of course, as the importance of the expert increased, the influence of the ordinary layperson on crucial affairs would diminish, putting him or her under greater amounts of discipline, organization, docility, and education. But again, knowledge and technology, state, corporation and union, held a promise for a happier, democratic-pluralistic, future of planned abundance: a New Deal image of the first significance. This image is described while other images are denied. Note Robert K. Merton's explanation of the growth and public recognition of unions during the 1930's:

The growing requirements of work discipline, deriving from technological integration, go far toward explaining the strategic role of the 'big union'... It is far more expedient or efficient to deal with unions than large masses of unorganized workers... industry has come to learn that discipline is often more effectively achieved with the aid of unions. (39)

And Robert Faris, while president of the American Sociological Society, gave a lucid expose of the sociologists' concept of social class.

In the light of modern research knowledge...is there any justification employing such an expression as 'the class system' of this country? To such a question we should at least be ready to answer a flat 'no'! (40)

These definitions of class and power not only submerged the individual deeper into the organization and fostered a neglect of man and many aspects of power phenomena but also
influenced the way in which concepts of social order and change (crisis) were described in New Deal sociology. Burnham wrote that historical developments had emasculated the capitalist-owner class and functionalists held that organizations had become strict power structures in and of themselves. This tied the individual to power positions and groups within an incoherently stratified organization in which the major orientation was the maintenance of the organization through role behavior. Therefore, exploitation in the corporate form took on different meanings than the private exploitation involved in laissez-faire capitalism. Let's now consider the influence of these definitions of power on notions of social change and conflict.

One of the major writers who influenced the various sociological outlooks on social order and conflict was Elton Mayo, the founding father of Industrial Sociology. Mayo's position in the debate over the nature of social order and change can best understood in relation to that of his French intellectual ancestor, Emile Durkheim. Both men were interested in establishing a scientific sociology that emphasised order and stability and that taught respect for authority in general and corporate collectivism in particular.

According to Durkheim, conflict and change were a pathology in the social body that disrupted the interrelationships of the parts (organs) of society. The ultimate result
of such disruption and change was a hopeless condition of normlessness (anomy) where individuals, estranged from social supports (social controls), were more likely to exhibit pathological behaviors such as suicide. This formalization of the ethical character of society (moral authority) may have differed from that of Bonald, Burke and Maistre in that it did not succumb to supernatural explanations of society but, scientific generalities notwithstanding, Durkheim still sought to create a sociology that aimed at salvaging a particular social order. Durkheim's defense of the French collectivist, corporate state was reflected in his appraisal of individualists social movements and in what he saw the task of sociology to be. "Individualism," whether socialists or laissez-faire, was "above all emotion." The demand that government be reduced to nothing was "not based on laws scientifically induced." "Socialism," Durkheim repeated, was "not a scientific formalization of social facts; it is itself a social fact of first importance." For him, socialism represented a symptom of a pathology in society, a "collective cry of distress." And in this regard, the task of sociology was "not only to diagnose ((this)) evil" but also to "find appropriate remedies." Put differently, Durkheim saw science (sociology) as a valuable weapon in the fight against the social evils involved in individualist philosophies, be they socialist, laissez-faire, or anarchist.
These images loom large in the writings of Elton Mayo (as they do in Rexford Tugwell's work). When reviewing the works of some classic scholars of social thought, Mayo commented that their major contribution was in the discovery that:

Human societies are governed by natural laws which we could not alter, even if we wished, since they are not of our own making. Moreover, we have not the least interest in modifying them, even if we could; for they are good, or at any rate, the best possible... the duty of individuals and governments is to strive to regulate their conduct by them. (46)

Furthermore, we need not feel oppressed by these laws.

They are in no way opposed to human liberty; on the contrary, they are expressions of relations which arise spontaneously among men living in society... (47)

In 1933, Mayo articulated a viewpoint on social problems that essentially agreed with that of those in the Chicago school of sociology (Park, Burgess, Shaw, et. al.). He argued that contemporary city life suffered from a condition of social disorganization. People, Mayo suggested, were finding themselves in a situation lacking social supports (controls). Unlike the solidary community of the past, the contemporary city could be characterized as an atomistic conglomerate of lonely people who could not communicate. Hierarchy (authority) was undermined when, in densely populated areas, peer groups conformed to group, rather than authoritative norms. And heterogeneity in urban life made it difficult to impose any long-lasting sets of social controls on the populace. The
problem Mayo described was this: How can the social controls that will quiet the seeds of social disorganization be discovered and enforced?

The central importance of this question is underscored in Mayo's idea of freedom, and in turn, his notion of social collaboration. Mayo wrote:

Very few (political and economic theorists) seem to have any conception of the extent to which a 'free life' is based, and must be, upon effective social conditioning. The fact that practically every habit is also a discipline in social collaboration is ignored in academic studies. Success in work and living depends on: first, the development of routine relationships with other people; and second, the development of intelligent understanding. (49)

Social and individual problems arose in society because social conditioning was simply too random. The development of routine relationships was "too often omitted," Mayo declared, and the development of understanding "runs off the rails." To further corroborate this diagnosis, Mayo gave some anecdotal explanations. Listen:

While in Australia, Mayo had the opportunity to work with a number of trade unionists on behalf of management (which is where most New Deal sociologists think they ought to stand). In these contacts, it was Mayo's job to teach the values of a 'free' life and the virtues of effective social collaboration so that the workers themselves might benefit very much. Problems inevitable arose and Mayo, in his confident style, pinpointed the problem.
Among the union members, there developed two factions. The first faction consisted of the "more responsible and more moderate" men who "sat in the front rows." The other faction was composed of the "irreconciliable, extreme left" who "haunted" the back rows. In his appraisal of this situation, Mayo characterized the latter faction in the following terms: They had 1) a "lack of friends," 2) "no capacity for conversation," 3) "revolutionary" rather than "reformists" reactions to events, 4) a "feeling that the world was a hostile place," 5) "tremendous and unreasoned drive," and 6) "considerable ability" (misplaced of course). These men, in Mayo's language, lacked the proper skills in social collaboration.

Another example cited by Mayo involved a radical carpenter who could not take orders, until one day, when his personality underwent a profound transformation. From that point on, the carpenter had only the standard-type problems in living a free and successful life. Also almost as an aside, Mayo discussed Hitler and his mother as examples of how social conditioning can 'run off the rails.'

The important thing about these examples is that, conceptually, social conflict is described in personal-pathological terms and power is never questioned. Moreover, sociology implicitly (?) involves itself as an instrument of social CONTROL in order to achieve social harmony and hence happiness. Mayo wrote:
...the intelligent development of civilization is impossible except upon the basis of effective social collaboration ((social control, centralized planning)) and that such collaboration will always be dependent upon semi-automatic routines of behavior made valuable by personal association and high sentiment... Here, then, is the problem for the sociologists and the administrator. (52)

Mayo's theory of sociological involvement was directly related to his notion of "managerial attitudes" and "social skills" in that focus was centered on issues of authority, communication and personality in the analysis of and proposed solutions for social problems. The major reason that social harmony was not established in modern society was that a discrepancy existed between the social and technical skills used in social production. That is, while the natural sciences had attained advanced techniques in developing methods of control and succeeded in uncovering natural laws about the physical universe, the social sciences remained at a rather primitive level--unable to extract natural laws and hence control human behavior. This imbalance was viewed by Mayo as the major cause of the crises of his historical period--that is, the Great Depression, fascism, and World War II. "If our social skills had advanced step by step with our technical skills," Mayo declared, "there would not have been another European War..." Once again, the problem of sociology emerges: how can a 'practical sociology' develop the correct 'social skills' and 'managerial attitudes' for social peace and harmony?
From the discussion thus far, it should be clear that Mayo's Human Relations orientation to the study of organizations had difficulty in picturing social conflict as an important social reality. It was a sociology of social order and a sociology of social control. For this reason, Mayo received sharp criticism. Not all sociologists however accepted the charge that their work was inherently conservative or that it lent itself to the uses of state control. This was the position of many functionalists, Robert K. Merton prominent among them.

In his attempt to illuminate the potential for a functional analysis to remain independent of any ideological orientation and to explain such phenomena as social conflict and change, Merton introduced two concepts—dysfunctions and functional alternatives (functional equivalents or substitutes). In regard to the problem of social change, Merton wrote:

Though functional analysis has often focused on the statics of social structures rather than the dynamics of social change, this is not intrinsic to that system of analysis. Furthermore,

In its more empirically oriented and analytically precise forms, functional analysis is often regarded with suspicion by those who consider an existing social structure as eternally fixed and beyond change. This more exacting form of functional analysis includes, not only a study of the functions of existing social structures, but also a study of their dysfunctions for diversely situated individuals, subgroups or social strata, and more inclusive society. It provisionally assumes, as we shall see, that when the net balance of the aggregate of consequences of an existing social structure is clearly dysfunctional, there develops a strong and insistent pressure for change. (57)
The other aspect of Merton's innovation (functional alternatives) refers to the range of possible variation as to how a function can be fulfilled. For instance, given the need for an institution that explains ultimate reality and also provides an effective means for social control, Merton suggests a religious organization, regardless of denomination, can fulfill the need. In this way, Merton sees functionalism as ideologically neutral since it makes no prescription as to the "best" way to satisfy a functional requirement. "It unfreezes the identity of the existent and the inevitable."

Despite the addition of these concepts, Merton still was unable to handle problems of social change and conflict. Conflict, for him, was essentially a malfunction of the social system; it was a peripheral phenomena, a dysfunction, that disrupted the "normal" state of consensus in society; and given the right social management, conflict was wholly unnecessary. Thus, Merton's major contribution with respect to functional analysis of conflict was merely to introduce the terms into functionalism. Ten years passed before any other functionalist ventured a systematic treatment of social conflict.

In 1957, over a decade after World War II, Lewis Coser examined some functions of social conflict in the process of social change. He wanted to demonstrate the positive potential for conflict to prevent an organization from becoming static and eventually disintegrating. That is, a social system was
ever in need of conflict to provide a stimulus for innovation and creativity. In his words:

Conflict within and between groups in a society can prevent accommodations and habitual relations from progressively impoverishing creativity. The clash of values and interest, the tension between what is and what some groups feel ought to be, the conflict between vested interest and new strata and groups demanding their share of power, wealth and status have been productive of vitality; not for example the contrast between the 'frozen world' of the Middle Ages and the burst of creativity that accompanied the thaw that set in with Renaissance civilization. (59)

Conflict could contribute to positive social change in yet another way, Coser argued. For example, labor unions can pressure management to elevate wages, to make cost-saving innovations and/or to improve working conditions. In this way, conflict not only provides an impetus for new innovations and discoveries but also provides direct stimulus for technical and economic realms of an organization. Thus the first function of social conflict was that it provided a necessary condition for the instigation of positive social change, progress.

Coser's second theme as to how conflict can function for the social system was related to an important "aspect of group formation: group belongingness is established by an objective conflict situation...((and))only by experiencing this antagonism, that is by becoming aware of it and by acting it out, does the group establish its identity." The sense of common purpose arising from the conflict situation functions to produce social solidarity, shared sentiment, and hence it
stabilizes social relations.

Coser's theory of social conflict was interesting in that it simultaneously maintained themes of social order and social conflict. Conflict was described as an institutional means whereby groups with similar values act to gain claims to "status, power and scarce resources." Attention focused only on positive or integrative social conflict because of the nature of consensu prevalent in most modern industrial societies. Consequently, Coser's study neatly complements the works of Mayo, Burnham, and Drucker as well as other functionalists. Coser does not dispute the nature of power in western society; his analysis of organization forms of conflict lends itself to being a search for the right formulas involved in social skills and managerial attitudes.

In this theory, conflict becomes associated with competition and change was associated with progress. Only once did Coser even consider the possibility for conflict to be destructive. And there, he recognizes this type of conflict only as a symptom of a 'poorly integrated society.' Moreover, such societies should face conflict, rather than suppress it in order to allow the expression of dissatisfaction. This expression of dissatisfaction ("tension release mechanisms") would inevitably lead to the "formation of new groupings within society" and hence "the emergence of transvaluations"—positive social change.
Another way that American sociologists (mainly functionalists) maintained an apparent mastery of social conflict was through the writings of a European social scientist named Ralf Dahrendorf. In 1959, Dahrendorf published a theory of social conflict that tried to assimilate the concepts of Karl Marx (class and class struggle) with the more refined methodology of positional-functional analysis. The influence of this work was widely felt in that attention was diverted from notions of cohesion, stability, and harmony (inherent in the Human Relations and functionalists types of sociology) to notions of coercion, conflict and change. It resulted in alerting many sociologists to the deficiencies of their previously held philosophies.

The first step in this achievement was to distinguish between two views as to how societies cohere. The first view, "the integration theory of society," saw social order resulting "from a general agreement of values, a consensus which outweighs all possible or actual differences in opinion." The second view was the "coercion theory of society." That is, coherence and order were "founded on force and constraint, on domination of some and subjection of others." By making this distinction, and by classifying himself as a "conflict theorist," Dahrendorf attempted to free himself from the ideological bias implicit in the "integration theory of society."

Dahrendorf's dissatisfaction with the integration perspective, however, was not sufficient to lead him to a
wholesale rejection of its values. Rather, one of his major contributions was to proffer a theory of conflict which was essentially compatible with functionalism and other forms of New Deal sociology. Upon closer examination therefore, his escape from the functionalist dilemma was an apparent escape. This inability to transcend the ranks of the integration theorists was reflected in how he defined his concepts.

Ralf Dahrendorf believed in a social conflict model with a dichotomy of social roles with a social structure (imperatively co-ordinated system). From a conflict perspective, the binary aspect of his model was a necessity since the division of positive and negative dominance roles was a fact of social structure. Next, using the authority of Max Weber, Dahrendorf distinguished between power and authority, claiming that the latter was the proper study of sociology. That is, Dahrendorf's concept of power resembled the functionalists image of power as deriving from organizational position. This allowed Dahrendorf to give a sociological account of conflict inherent in the authority structure in a manner consistent with modern functional social science.

A supposed advantage of Dahrendorf's theory was that it put social conflict in an historical perspective. For example, he explained a conflict situation as involving the following steps: First, the carriers of positive and negative dominance roles form two great quasi-groups (recruiting grounds) with opposite latent interest. Latent interest
referred to "orientations of behavior which are inherent in social positions with necessarily being conscious to their members." One would expect, for instance, the interest of the dominance group to favor the status-quo and the subject group to favor change.

The second stage occurred when the opposing quasi-groups organize themselves into groups with manifest interest. Manifest interest referred to "orientations in behavior which are articulate and conscious to individuals, and which oppose collectivities of individuals in an imperatively co-ordinated system." Here organization of groups such as parties, and unions can be found, all with highly formulated programs and ideologies.

The third stage occurred when the interest groups engage in conflict as to the preservation or change of the status-quo. Dahrendorf introduced a number of empirical variables which interact to produce the form and intensity of the conflict situation.

The final stage of conflict occurred when the conflict of interest transforms itself into social change. Once again, the speed, kind, et cetera are dependent upon the empirical variables mentioned in the previous stage.

These ambitious theoretical formulations notwithstanding, Dahrendorf's theory of class conflict was unable to treat the concept of class struggle in any meaningful was, outside of New Deal definitions of reality. Mostly because Dahrendoff
sucumbed to the officially sanctioned notion of a separation of ownership and control, class conflict was based on non-economic, non-familial, non-alienative factors.

Dahrendorf wrote:

The social rights of citizenship which are widely recognized in contemporary societies include old-age pensions, unemployment benefits, public health insurance, and legal aid, as well as minimum wage and, indeed, a minimum standard of living. 'Equal participation in the material and intellectual comforts of civilization...is the undisputed basic material right of our social constitution.' Where established rights guarantee this kind of equality for every citizen, conflicts and differences of class are, at the very least, no longer based on inequalities of status in a strict sense of this term. From the point of view of legal privileges and deprivations, every citizen of advanced industrial societies has an equal status, and what social differences there are arise on the undisputed basis of this fundamental equality...the extended citizenship rights of post-capitalist society represent a reality that forcefully counteracts all remaining forms of social inequality and differentiation. (67)

According to this view, the term class must have its foundations in organizational structures of society. A "class," Dahrendorf argues, "signifies conflict groups that are generated by the distribution of authority in imperatively coordinated associations." Revolutionary change, in fact, is precluded by definition. Moreover, in several places in his book, the idea that the term class or coercion was inapplicable appeared. The applicability of the word 'class' or 'coercion' was purely "a terminological problem. Substantively, conflict theory would have been just as well off without these words and outlooks since their historical usage had
the potential to create confusion in young minds. The term class and the conflict theory of society were subscribed to by Kahrendorf for "heuristic purposes" only.

This chapter has attempted to describe a series of issues and debates important in the sociological descriptions of past and recently developed stratification systems in America. The major focus was on the managerial and functional theories of power and how these theories were unable to deliver anything but a New Deal, administrative, image of social conflict. The theoretical portrait offered by sociologists was found to resemble the New Deal version of 'corporate feudalism' in several respects. It should be pointed out, however that sociologists described this new state in even more optimistic terms than the apologists of the Recovery Program did, although they did it much more indirectly.

The sociological mirage described: 1) power as belonging to great organizations (government & corporate) in the form of privilege and duty. Recent technological growth emasculated the evil capitalists and gave the monopoly on authority to those with expertise in benevolent organizations. 2) A collectivistic ethic. Group is superior to individual effort. Value was placed on respect for authority and social conditioning. Co-operation in organizations was the key-note for social as well as individual well-being. 3) An image of a happy individual, of the free man/woman, as the one who is
well-trained, properly behaved and docile. This person is an employee who experiences his/her world through pre-planned organizational operations. Social planning was essential to social collaboration. Education was the path to freedom. And finally 4) the sociological mirage described the increasing interpenetration of state (legitimate coercive control systems) and economy (productive, alienative control systems) in both public and private life as progress, as desirable, or at least as the best of possible worlds.
Notes

1. This statement will be further substantiated in chapter IV.


4. Coser, ibid., p. 16.


7. Burnham defines a social revolution in the first chapter. The 'orderly revolution' phrase, of course, refers to Rexford Tugwell's characterization of the New Deal (see chapter II).

8. This is not to say that Burnham's work is useless. On the contrary, it offers one of the most interesting and well written books that sociologists have to read. The problem of Burnham's argument is simply that it lacks any real support. This leaves one unconvinced and lends the book to various interpretations and uses (apology). This argument also, as I argue, employs a circular language (managerialism is a name is necessary) that precludes the possibility of examining two important lines of argument: 1) that managers can use their organizational positions to manipulate the masses for bureaucratic efficiency, and 2) that a ruling class can consciously use managers and organizations to manipulate and exploit the masses. Today, a great deal of literature suggest that this is an especially crucial issue. One writer, for instance, found that in the top 300 corporations an equal number seem to be management and owner controlled. The rest are in question.


10 ibid.

11 ibid., p. 78 & 125.

12 ibid., p. 80.

13 ibid., p. 83.


15 ibid., p. 87.

16 ibid., p. 84.

17 ibid., pp. 84-5.

18 ibid., p. 84.

19 ibid., p. 85.

20 It should be pointed out that Henry Ford was a good example for Burnham to use. Ford, unlike the other Super-Rich, failed to protect much of his wealth from the then new inheritance laws. As a consequence, Ford looked as if he was losing his fortune which is exactly what Burnham would have us believe.

21 Burnham, op. cit., p. 85.

22 ibid., pp. 92-3.


24 ibid., p. 309.

25 ibid., p. 310.

27 ibid.

28 ibid.

29 ibid.

30 This issue was the subject of an extended debate with Melvin Tumin, see Tumin (1953), Davis (1953), Moore (1953), Buckley (1958), Davis (1959), and Tumin (1963).

31 Moore and Davis (1945), op cit.

32 John K. Galbraith's notion of 'countervailing powers' and Berle's idea of 'people capitalism' in 20th Century Capitalist Revolution, also Parsons (1940).


34 ibid., p. 358.

35 ibid., Parenthetically, it should be noted that according to Drucker, large organizations were the only realm of society worthy of sociological inquiry.

36 ibid., p. 358 (footnote).

37 ibid., p. 359.

38 ibid.


41. Mayo acknowledges his debt to Durkheim in several places. The importance of this connection is looked at in an essay by Harold L. Sheppard, "The Social and Historical Philosophy of Elton Mayo," Antioch Review, 1950, 399.

42. Ernie Virgint's M.A. thesis on the rise of sociology in France makes this point clearly. (McMaster University)


44. ibid., p. 158

45. ibid.


47. ibid., pp. 37-8.


50. ibid., p. 335.

51. the following examples can be found in ibid.

52. ibid.

53. the notion of "social skills" and "managerial attitude" is developed throughout the Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization.

54. ibid.

55. ibid.

56. see Harold Sheppard, loc. cit.

58 ibid., p. 106.


60 ibid., p. 204.

61 ibid., pp. 204-5.


63 ibid., pp. 156-165.

64 At a later date, Dahrendorf seems to have re-examined this distinction and found it inadequate, see "On the Origin of Inequality Among Men," in Lee Rainwater (ed.), Inequality and Justice, (Aldine Publishing Co.: Chicago, 1974).

65 Dahrendorf, op. cit., p. 165-173.


68 ibid., p. 204.

69 ibid., p. 201-205.

70 ibid., p. 201.
Chapter Four: OBJECTIVITY IN SOCIOLOGY

The growth of the New Deal (and research possibilities) and the increased acceptance of an organizational model within sociological circles was accompanied by the promulgation of new utilitarian justifications for sociology. The demand for objective, scientific social research by government agencies and industrial management led many sociologists to accept more sophisticated rationales for sociological involvement in "social problems (?)". This is not to say that sociologists offended their scientific integrity with the grit of mundane everyday life, but, that New Deal sociologists often worked on 'practical' problems while simultaneously denying any involvement in this social reality. Theirs was a purely transcendent, amoral, ahistorical non-reality in reality; their accounts of social events, likewise, were believed to be detached renderings of what really happened out there--nothing more and nothing less. The problem of this approach, of course, was that ultimately one had to face the prospects that even a failure to make an explicit value commitment was, in itself, an acceptance of a given, prevailing set of value positions. This, in effect, accepted the existent as the inevitable, and hence the best possible, reality. In this form, methodology merely served to mask morality.
The Influence of Max Weber

Much of this methodological justification for sociological unaccountability rested on the writings of the German social thinker Max Weber. Weber, in his day, pointed out that a tension existed in professional sociology, a tension between the humanitarian concerns of its practitioners and the mores of the profession, and science, at large. To overcome this tension, New Deal sociologists added, Weber adopted the doctrine of 'value-relevance' whereby the scientists must remain ethically neutral in his work, saving all moral judgements for his out of work hours, that is, for the 'citizen' half of the scientist. This self-induced schizophrenia where one must play two roles simultaneously and adopt a claim for unaccountability under a professional ideology can be found throughout the writings of New Deal sociologists.

Most New Deal sociologists, however, simply used Weber's authority as an eminent scholar to assert their aloofness from historical events while actually involving themselves in them very deeply. They implied, incorrectly, that professor Weber had worked out a suitable solution to the problem of values in scientific work and that it was merely their duty to follow the strictures. The discovery of truths would naturally follow. Professor Weber was much more sophisticated than this. While he may, at times, have pretended to have solved this value dilemma and hence become a super-sociologist, this was never deeply imbeded in his work; for, Weber never ceased confronting
the centrality of this problem and was forever trying [un-
successfully] to reconcile, indeed maybe even succumbing to,
the schizoid reality of the "citizen-scientist;"

Because of the vast importance of Max Weber in regard
to this tension, a fundamental understanding of his approach
is a first step in any attempt to look at the development of
the New Deal conception of a self-winding, value-free,
autonomous social science.

In an attempt to discover a unique subject matter in
the social world, and hence a basis of a sociology, Weber made
a split between the realm of facts and the realm of values.
"The tension between the value spheres of science and the
value spheres of 'the holy,'" Weber suggested, "is unbridge-
able." In making this distinction, Weber may have intended
to either emulate or appease those within the ranks of the
positivist tradition. But whatever the intention, the result
was to retrieve sociology from the, then popular, religious
writings of, among others, Bonald, Burke, Maistre, or even
Durkheim. Yet, to get back to the question at hand, what is
a statement of fact and what is a statement of value? Why must
they remain separate?

According to Weber, the fundamental difference was
that facts can somehow be empirically demonstrated of "determin-
ed through mathematical or logical relations or the internal
structure of culture values " whereas values were not so tan-
gible in this sense. Values were viewed as humanly realized
images of the world which rested upon presuppositions not open to empirical reflection. Weber believed, however, that values were a central element of culture in general and science in particular. He wrote:

it is the destiny of a culture which has tasted the fruit of the tree of knowledge to know that we cannot read the meaning of earthly existence in the result, however perfect, of our exploration of this existence, but that we must be capable of creating this meaning ourselves, that 'conceptions of the world' can never be a product of advanced empirical knowledge and that consequently the supreme ideals that influence us most strongly can only be actualized in the struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred for others as ours are for us. (4)

Thus, Weber's position was this: values were expressions of individual and/or group faith, not knowledge, but values nevertheless were a central element of empirical knowledge. A fundamental dichotomy between reason and value existed in Weber's science whereby all ultimate action rested in the irrationality of values. An understanding of this paradoxical kind of relativism was crucial for scientists since value discussions could be of the "greatest utility." Such discussion could aid in 1) the explication and elaboration of the value positions of others as well as the investigators own values (note that the validity of this type of inquiry is not like that in science proper. "It does not use the techniques of an empirical science and it produces no new knowledge of facts. Its 'validity' is similar to that of logic."), 2) the "deduction of implications" that follow
from certain value positions and factual considerations, and
3) the "determination of factual consequences which the
realization of certain practical evaluations" may have in
being tied to certain means or undesired repercussions. In
short, "when correctly conducted, it ((value discussion)) can
be extremely valuable for empirical science in the sense that
it provides it with problems for investigation."

This methodology pictured values as central to
science but science unable to validate normative knowledge. It
was a methodology that involved inquiry into knowledge, but
knowledge without facts--truths. Science, if it was to avoid
dogmatism, could not give a monopoly to any one value system.
Given the turbulent times in which Weber wrote (a time charac-
terized by a multiplicity of value systems, industrial revo-
lution, memories of the French revolution, and Marx ), one
can appreciate the demand that the sociologist take a certain
degree of responsibility, both to his student and his col-
leagues, not to transform statements of value (ideology) into
statements of fact (official ideology). In the classroom,
for instance, Weber "deemed it irresponsible to exploit that
circumstance." "For the sake of objectivity and the freedom
of his students, Weber fought against the 'Treitsckes' ((or
anyone else)) who cloistered academic halls with political
propaganda."

This is not to say that Weber was a professor seeking
order out of disorder by using an apolitical science. For him,
there was simply no scientific validity to value orientations, including his own political liberalism (often tinged with extreme nationalism). Indeed, an acceptance of existing cultural values as ethical imperatives was viewed as an act of mental indolence. In *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Weber remarked:

> what we must vigorously oppose is the view that one may be 'scientifically' contented with the conventional self-evidentness of very widely accepted value judgements. The specific function of science, it seems to me, is just the opposite: namely, to ask questions about these things which convention makes self-evident. (12)

This was no prescription that social science should deal only with empirical data while neglecting the precarious realm of political ideologies, cultural values, and subjective meanings. On the contrary, as Weber explained in another context, this realm of "social action" was precisely the subject matter of sociology.

It is important to note that Weber also considered the terms 'means' and 'ends' as suitable categories for discussions about the "ultimate elements of human conduct." Using these terms, Weber described a practical sociology that could have meaning for individuals and groups in at least two ways. First, scientists could offer an examination of the appropriateness of certain 'means' to achieve a desired 'end.' This examination could take place in terms of 'social cost' or 'probability of success.' In these terms, the 'ends' themselves would come under indirect scrutiny and therefore science
could become useful in providing a source of ideas to those interested in examinations of alternative courses of action (and inaction) in social policy. Weber put it this way:

Science can make him ((anyone (either sex) interested in social events)) realize that all action and naturally, according to the circumstance, inaction imply in their consequences the espousal of certain values—and herewith—what is today so willingly overlooked—the rejection of certain others. (15)

Thus, although "the act of choice itself is his own responsibility," science practitioners could make explicit what choices existed for people under certain circumstances.

The second way in which science could offer insight into social policy problems was through a clarification of the context and meaning of certain ends. Scientific inquiry into value judgements, moreover, need not be in terms of prevailing definitions of reality. It can "also judge them critically." Such critical inquiry could be carried out along lines that focus on a clarification of the final results a policy and an end may have for individuals and society as a whole. In other words, science could help human beings better understand their life conditions by increasing their awareness of the ultimate standards of value which he does not make explicit to himself, or which he must presume to be logical. The elevation of these ultimate standards... to the level of explicitness is the utmost that scientific treatment of value judgements can do without entering into the realm of speculation. As to whether the person expressing these value judgements should adhere to these ultimate standards is his personal affair, it involves will and conscience, not empirical knowledge. (18)
At this stage in the discussion, it should be clear that Weber saw science in the classical sense as a way of knowing in which cultural frames of reference such as liberalism and socialism must always remain open to scrutiny and that the presuppositions upon which cultural frames of reference rest must not infiltrate science as facts. Such actions could only result in dogmatism and Weber (sometimes seemingly reluctant) strongly opposed this. At the same time, however, the social sciences differed from the natural sciences in the sense that they deal explicitly with the realm of subjective meanings and meaning complexes which direct social action. Thus, in laying the groundwork for a new and respectable science of sociology, Weber introduced the problem that sociology might not escape the realm of subjectivity, evaluation and emotion. This possibility of a contradiction between a science of fact and a science of social action was never resolved, merely bypassed, in Weber's sociology.

One final point. For Weber, the mere compilation of facts with no relation to evaluation (values) could only yield a meaningless science. Without aligning itself to evaluative ideas, science would not only prove to be intellectually unsatisfying but also scientifically worthless. "The object of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that empirical data are always related to these evaluative ideas which alone
make them worth knowing." No one can escape values. And no science "is absolutely free from presuppositions... no science can prove its fundamental value to the man who rejects these presuppositions." The promise of science in Weber's sociology was not just a technical promise but also a human promise. "If we are competent in our pursuit," Weber wrote, "... we can force the individual or at least help him, to give himself an account of the ultimate meaning of his own conduct." The choice between making a value judgement or not was no choice at all; choice was central to science.

In summary, much of Weber's sociology can be seen as an attempt to blend the best of the empirical, operational, and verifiable with the subjective, emotional and ideal. In its essentials, Weber left three lines of thought as to how a sociology could operate in an 'objective' way. First, Weber underlined the importance of recognizing the relativistic nature of knowledge. Perception and reality were dichotomized in such a manner that truth, in the sense of ultimate reality, was unobtainable since all knowledge ultimately rested in the irrationality of values. Without this distinction, without this relativism, methodology could run the risk of transforming itself into a kind of scientific morality. Second, Weber emphasised the idea that scientists had an obligation to remain skeptical of even the most hallowed features of social institutions. Indeed, the aim of science was to question precisely those things that convention dictated as self-
evident. Or again, "fundamental doubt," Weber wrote, "is the father of knowledge." Third was the prerequisite that sociologists present alternative value positions, not just the one he/she happens to favor. The objective was to describe the consequences each position has for the organization of concrete and conceptual reality. This, in turn, would make choice more central and realistic.

Followed along these lines, Weber thought that sociology could take a form that fostered a careful handling of concepts so that even data was related to ideas carefully. The point in this was that a groundwork for a new science was laid where, ideally, a certain kind of "intellectual honesty" could prosper free, at least in large measure, from distortions arising out of personal bias and political ideology; but, where a study of personal inner-existential events was not sacrificed to an objective, one-dimensional, detached rendering of an official version of what was really happening in the outer-experiential-structural reality.

The Mirage and Its Method

Despite frequent references to Weber in post-1930 American sociology, a divergence from his perspective developed in a number of important respects. The 'divergence' solidified as 1) many sociologists image of themselves as pure scientists became entrenched, and 2) an organizational-corporate model of the benevolent society gained popularity with administrators,
politicians, sociologists, and others who lived their lives through the new bureaucracies. The nature of the divergence can be understood along the following lines: 1) there was a trend toward legitimating only work done in an empiricist manner. This work, through definition, was carried out in a way that essentially agreed with and reinforced official morality. To further ensure this, the Professional, equipped with methodology as his/her watchdog, manned the institutional positions such as editors of journals, presidents of professional organizations, heads of applied research bureaus, and chairmen of departments, where censorship (gatekeeping) could be easily exercised. 2) Consequently, the concern over the relativistic nature of knowledge was translated into a concern over method. Things were as they appeared. The dichotomy between what was and what was perceived was smashed. The search for real truths was on. The issue of choice between alternative value positions and courses of action was abandoned. And methodology was such that it could serve any official morality in any country for whatever purposes deemed necessary by the local high and mighty. Moreover, since the concern over the uses of knowledge was viewed as a problem of values and since values were outlawed in the 'new' science, even more discretion was given to the powerful. 3) Finally, there was a habit of thought developed that depreciated the value of reflective and critical thinking on even the least hallowed features of social institutions. In education, this habit was reinforced
through sequences of methodology (morality) and statistics courses, by the emphasis placed on getting research grants, by the increased number of applied research bureaus that aimed at developing techniques with which to better condition people to existing conditions, and by the increased participation in professional organizations. This methodology, in short, provided a scientistic framework in which to couch societal definitions and reinforces societal irresponsibility. Reference to Weber was mere disguise.

North American sociologists, then, have not been too concerned about omitting values from their work. By not considering values, attention was shifted from a relativistic concern with knowledge to a search for facts (truths) and from ideological inquiry to inquiries into reality, whatever that may be. This feature of modern sociology was 'built-into' three methodologies made popular during the 1930's and 1940's; namely, Mayo's Industrial Sociology, Lundberg's Operationalism, and Merton's Functionalism.

Elton Mayo

In chapter three in connection with his image of social conflict, Mayo's position on the problem of values in social research was touched upon. Mayo, remember, believed that a socially uncontrolled industrial system was undesirable because people left to their own resources would be unable to experience a free and independent life. Freedom was, in large measure, based upon effective social control. Consequently
a sociologist need not worry about the value implications of his work as long as it contributed to the better integration of people into this free existence. An engineered freedom, large-scale social planning, was an ideal in Industrial Sociology. Individualism was rejected in favor of corporate collectivism. Not for instance that engineering social space was a major objective in the famous Hawthorne studies in which Mayo played an integral role. Throughout his writings, this type of study appeared as an example of the ideal sociological orientation.

The argument that sociology was a science involved in human adaptation and social control was given further substance in Mayo's musings on social evolution and natural laws. Present conditions, Mayo believed, were the logical product of natural laws in historical motion. These laws were neither good nor bad; hence, values were not involved in existing conditions or sociological acceptance of these conditions. If men and women held dissident points of view, they must simply be categorized as privatized individuals who cannot communicate, which reflects the fact that they had not developed the right skills in social collaboration. They were, metaphorically, infested with a pathology of the mind. Their causes and ideas, likewise, were hopeless because they were based on a misreading of the natural laws of society. An objective sociology, therefore, would endeavour to better understand natural laws and social evolution with the intention of using this knowledge
to better facilitate human adaptation to unpleasant conditions and hence happiness.

To put it another way, for Mayo society was moral. Social facts were an historical result of natural laws which were beyond human control because they were not of human making. If an alternative moral or social point of view became troublesome to prevailing conditions, it should be controlled, if not completely eradicated. "Value-free" sociology could help in this by teaching people the values of a peace-loving, co-operative existence. It could, in Mayo's terms, help develop the proper techniques of 'social collaboration' and social management. It could teach conformists about their contributions to society and force people with different beliefs to realize that their ideas disorganized social harmony and social control which, in turn, endangered social, and hence individual, happiness.

The development of science and society were inseparable. Reluctance to more fully develop 'social skills' and managerial attitudes, that is, reluctance of social scientists to bring social factors into line with technological factors, was the primary cause of present (1930-1945) social crisis (Depression, fascism, and World War II). In his Industrial Relations approach to studying organizations, Mayo sought to make sociology useful to government and corporations (or at least to those who run the organizations). This involvement
(purpose) rationalized the adoption and celebration of a 
managerial vocabulary (examples: efficiency (profit, author-
itarian control), freedom (social control), happiness (work, 
commodities) and management (absolute hierarchical authority, 
paternalism) in his sociology. As sociology brought itself 
into line with these social conditions and this vocabulary, 
moreover, sociologists would gain their objectivity.

For Mayo, the only impediment to the development of 
social science, and hence a more peace-loving, co-operative 
population, was insistent clinging to value-laden, "traditional 
thoughtways." Value freedom, from this point of view, meant 
little more than wholesale acceptance of an ideology espousing 
the virtues of the new forms of social organization climaxing 
in the New Deal—the corporate organization of private property.

George Lundberg: Operationalism

George Lundberg was perhaps the most active proponent 
of operationalism in American sociology during the 1930's and 
1940's. He occupied positions of the faculty of many of the 
major universities in the United States and served as president 
of the American Sociological Society for several years.

The rise of Lunberg's scientific sociology was not only 
paralleled by a fantastic increase in the organizational forms 
of control over the economy and society in general, but also, 
by the the rise of similar types of thinking in other social
disciplines, most notably, behaviorism in psychology, operationalist in sociology and Behaviorists in psychology (who were also operationalists in their own right), for instance, shared the belief that objective methods ought to be used to study overt human, and sometimes not so human, behavior. Both wanted to "free" the scientist from any special obligation in determining the 'ends' for which scientific knowledge was to be used. Faith was place in highly sophisticated data-processing technology, standardized statistical techniques and scientific method to keep scientists on the right track and to reveal errors. The problem of whether values must be separated from facts, moreover, was pictured as a pseudo-problem since, it was believed, values were expressed in overt human behavior and hence were eventually amendable to scientific analysis through survey or counting techniques. The subjective realm was conceptualized as a "way-station" on the road to overt observable behavioral acts. The separation between the world of facts and the world of values, then, was illusory and only served to obscure social analysis. Clearly, the theoretical formalizations of behaviorism and Lundberg's sociology differed in many important respects, but still, the commonalities are striking.

Lundberg's sociology began with a diagnosis of social problems in general and current ones like the Great Depression and World War II in particular. Like Mayo, Lundberg believed that
The preference for prescientific thoughtways regarding our social relations has given rise to a fundamental and disastrous cleavage in our culture, for our social predicaments are what they are precisely because we have adopted and applied science to our relations with the physical world. (26)

Expanding this diagnosis into a more general, law-like, formulation, Lundberg relied on his positivist predecessor Auguste Comte. Societies evolve, Lundberg and Comte contend, through three stages of knowledge: metaphysical, theological and scientific (positivistic). As long as the numerous institutions of a given society subscribed to a common belief system in evolution, a relative lack of social problems—universal peace—should follow as a rule. Should, however, different sectors of society embrace differing belief systems, conflict, crisis, and general uneasiness would result. Consider, for instance, modern America. While the instruments of production—destruction increasingly become scientific in principle and in operation, the majority of the people have not yet assimilated a scientific ethos (remaining in the religious stage of evolution). Thus, when translating diagnosis into prescription, Lundberg noted that "... certain social problems have arisen as a result of the development of science and in our struggle with these problems only science can save."

Scientific management of human populations was a consistently subscribed to ideal in Lundberg's thought. Other methods of melioration could yield only failure. Lundberg wrote;
Most people prefer to believe that a political party, a 'new deal,' or especially a world organization is the solution (to social-global problems). ... I am pointing out that they cannot of themselves avail unless an underlying body of knowledge is developed and employed which will be comparable to that which underlies engineering, navigation, and medicine. The ablest and most devoted leader cannot lead without the charts and instruments relevant to the task at hand. (28)

According to Lundberg, science and sociology in particular were historically developed techniques of human adaptation. As such, sociology needed to adapt to existing conditions (value positions) and remain objective so as to better aid in the process of getting people into society, into organizations. Note, for instance, in the above quote, Lundberg's implicit acceptance of the principle of leadership and his uncritical acquiescence with the paternalistic authoritarianism of post-World War II American institutions. This, however, was of no count for Lundberg. As an agency of social adaptation, sociology aimed at developing scientific knowledge to 1) bring social science in line with natural science (in ability to control), and 2) reorganize society along scientific lines (hence alleviate social problems).

As a science of human adaptation, Lundberg's sociology can save. This, however, was only possible in so far as sociologists embraced a more scientific ethos. This ethos rested on the following tenents: 1) all phenomena were subject to natural laws, 2) the aim and method of social science was not different from that of the natural sciences, but, "a
branch of the same trunk," and 31) social scientists dealt only with overt, observable behavior, not subjective wonderings. The thought that emerged from these tenents was that sociology ought to escape the traps laid by 'pre-scientific' thoughtways by adopting and practicing the unified method of approach to social problems. The lack of unified method in sociology, "our divided loyalty," Lundberg declared, "is precisely what gives our critics legitimate grounds for complaints."

Stuart Dodd, one of Lundberg's more ambitious, research oriented colleagues, saw putting these principles into actual research as involving two fundamental features. First, it meant that sociologists ought to rest their findings in a system of operationally defined concepts. The method of operationalism involved relating concepts to empirical data in such a way that the materials and procedures relevant to certain findings be clearly expressed so that other interested people might replicate and verify the original study. This fundamental requirement was justified in terms of a need for reliability. Reliability, ability to repeat procedures several times and come up with the same results, was one of the major criteria for truth in Lundberg's science. Thus, the second feature of operationalism in practice was the two-fold requirement that sociologists' system of operational definitions "covering some field of knowledge should be parsimonious
in number" and should have its reliability measured by some statistical index experimentally derived from repeated independent "applications of the definition to the class of entities it defines." In this way, Dodd attempted to incorporate Lundberg's ideas (really Percy Bridgeman's) on operationalism in clear, rigorous methodological prescription. Whatever the reasons given at various points, the result was to rigidly separate the observable from the subjective, denying the reality of the latter, and therefore absolutely demarcating the study of facts from the study of values.

During the 1930's criticisms and manifestos of operationalism were commonplace. Debate sometimes centered on the issue of whether rigorous methodological controls acted to deter a full understanding of and critical insight into social events. That objective method could elicit subjective-symbolic meaning was a proposition not subscribed to by all. In 1936, Lundberg addressed the question--how do we 'get at' symbolic mechanisms?--as it pertained to social psychology.

As he mused on this question, Lundberg entered an interesting discussion on what he saw the relationship to be between methodology on the one hand and insight-understanding on the other. Specifically, Lundberg did not believe a distinction between the two could be made on the grounds that methods ultimately seek understanding and insight as an end.
"Quantitative techniques are merely the more refined, easily used tools by which we gain insight and understanding."

In other words, insight was method, at least in part; method, in turn, was theory and, of course, method came prior to theory. To contrast the two was sheer academic heresy. As Lundberg put it: "as long as we obfuscate our thinking with such contrast, no progress toward the solution of real problems is possible."

In this methodology, a kind of all-or-nothing thinking appeared. It was all method and no theory, except the generalizations made from empirical investigations. There was little chance for blending algebraic and prosaic symbolisms or for serious value discussions. There was just time for doing research for those who provided research grants. The 'misconceptions' of critical theorists, or perhaps Lundberg would call them inheritors of pre-scientific thoughtways was that they

overlook that understanding logic, reason, et cetera which they properly advocate is itself a method, a technique of some kind... the insight and understanding which we seek is to be achieved only by further correlation. Correlation is not merely the name of a certain statistical operation... It is... the act of bringing under relation of union, correspondence, or interaction; also the conceiving of two or more things as related. (36)

From the discussion thus far, it should be clear that a tension existed in Lundberg's sociology. While he saw sociology as an objective, transcendental reality, he also
saw its justifications in terms of its social uses. How could a sociology be "value-free" and socially useful at the same time? If Lundberg had adopted Weber's type of relativism, perhaps he could have bypassed at least theoretically the problem of values. Perhaps, Lundberg misinterpreted Weber simply to justify operationalism. Anyhow, Lundberg's brand of relativism consisted of the belief that sociology could be useful in any regime--capitalist, socialist, or fascist--since all regimes needed facts to operate. Accordingly, scientific knowledge was not relativistic knowledge but absolute truth, universal validity. This type of relativism required a great deal of methodology, and also a great deal of faith. Otherwise, this tension would have continually been at issue.

In 1947, Lundberg presented another contribution to his continuing endeavour to make a socially useful, value-free science of human adaptation in a little book entitled *Can Science Save Us?*. Central to this book was a two-fold theme: one on values and the uses of knowledge and another on politics and authority. These themes, moreover, were not distinct. Rather, they were intermingled and meshed to produce what is probably the most value-laden scientistic manifesto in modern sociology. Listen.

Lundberg often spoke of the legitimate concerns of social scientists. Whatever these concerns were, Lundberg
emphasised, they ought to be pursued with the most objective of operational definitions and the most refined statistical techniques available. To adopt this type of objectivism was seen as being tantamount to eliminating value meanderings and subjective speculation from science completely. Objective, natural science-like, methodology was pictured as the best way to bypass, and hence transcend, the problem of values in social research. "The unified method of attack," which Lundberg so fondly spoke of, "must be that of modern natural science applied fully to human society, including man's thoughts, feelings, and 'spiritual' characteristics."

For Lundberg, then, the primary concern of the sociologists was to remain objective by using operationalism. Once this was achieved, attention could be focused on crucial problems in society in so far as the sociologists confined himself to the following three tasks: 1) development of reliable knowledge, 2) gauging what the masses of people want under given circumstances, and 3) planning administrative or engineering techniques of satisfying, most effectively and most economically, these wants.

The second theme in *Can Science Save Us?* constituted a methodological legitimation of social conditions including a prescribed acquiescence to existing logic of domination. It essentially argued that authority structures in any society were not to be questioned and that sociologists, equipped with
objective techniques, could contribute to streamlining methods of domination and authority. Lundberg wrote:

A lot of nonsense has been spoken and written about authority in recent years. We need to recognize that it is not authority as such that we need fear but incompetent and unwisely constituted authority. (40)

According to this line of thought, nothing was scrutinized because sociology aimed at perfecting, not objecting to, authority. One could question the effectiveness of authority but never the form it takes. When writing on modern industrial growth, for instance, Lundberg celebrated the technological developments which led to the "fundamental interdependence which dominates our lives." Yet, he was reluctant to mention any of the parallel developments in the social organization of industry and the polity, or, more important, the implications these developments had for the personal troubles of individual people. Rather than muse upon the problems of individual human beings in modern industrial society, Lundberg, with methodology as his protector, indulged in lengthy discussions of how the social scientists can operate in any political regime since all regimes needed facts to operate, to control the masses. Indeed, the scientific management of people was even pictured on a different level of analysis than issues such as values, historical developments, or human beings. Lundberg put it this way:

We have been dealing... with a matter which transcends in importance the ups and downs of
depression, contemporary politics.... That matter is man's struggle... to arrive at a method of approach in thought and action which will be relatively valid no matter what ends man elects to pursue and no matter through what forms of political organization it is directed. (43)

One final point. At all times, the sociologists was a hired hand, a loyal employee, in Lundberg's scheme. The idea of a free, critical intellectual was ousted in favor or an idea of an institutionally connected scholar-technician who accepted money from any legitimate source (corporation, state, union) in New Deal society regarding how to solve specific social problems. Given the right amounts of time and method and money, Lundberg thought sociology could go about finding solutions to all sorts of socially undesirable behavior. Perhaps, someday sociologists could displace even policemen since "the knowledge of how to improve human relations can come only from the social sciences."

Today, Lundberg might conceivable remark that such a utopia of sociological policemen could be wholly realizable if it were not for the "lack of reliable methods... that results in controversy, frustration and despair."

Robert K. Merton: Functionalism

One of the more respected and widely read functionalist of the post-1930 period of American sociology was Robert Merton. Unlike his former teacher Talcott Parsons, Merton believed that theorizing was advantageous only to a certain level, a level he referred to as 'theories of the middle range.'
Grand images couched in master theoretical systems were not useful, Merton believed, in scientific sociology at present stages of development. In this respect, Merton's efforts represented an attempt to make sociology more concrete-objective and to put sociologists in a more detached role.

The manner in which Merton developed his ideas on a value-free sociology was methodologically and philosophically more sophisticated than that of either Mayo, or Lundberg, although it must be borne in mind that all three modes of thought neatly complemented each other. Merton's sophistication derived partly from his interests in the sociology of knowledge which impressed upon him the importance of historical events and ideology in science. Yet, as will be demonstrated, Merton's theorizing, like that of Mayo and Lundberg, embraced an underlying current of thought that emphasised the autonomous nature of scientific knowledge, the infallibility of method, and the instrumental uses (and justifications) of sociology.

In 1937, Merton presented a paper at the American Sociological Society conference. It offered an analysis of the institutional foundations of science in 'so-called' liberal democratic societies on the one hand and totalitarian state regimes (especially Nazi Germany) on the other. What Merton tried to get at was the importance social pressures have on the autonomy of science. That is, the spread of state influence demanded increased loyalty to it, and consequently, an abandonment of the "norms of science" in so far as scientists
were obliged to accept politically imposed criteria for truth and worthiness. In Germany (post-1933), for instance, scientists had been required to accept, and teach, sentiments espousing the national and racial impeccability of 'Aryan' ancestry. Under circumstances like this, Merton wrote, "scientists are required to accept the judgements of scientifically incompetent political leaders concerning matters of science ... such politically advisable tactics run counter to the institutional norms of science." Or again:

Science, which has acquired a considerable degree of autonomy and has evolved an institutional complex which engages the allegiance of scientists, now has its traditional autonomy and its rules of the game--its ethos, in short--challenged by external authority. (49)

Such is Merton's critical appraisal of Nazi Germany.

When Merton focused his critical scrutiny on liberal democracies, however, the results were much less negative. "In a liberal order," Merton remarked, "the limitations of science does not arise in this fashion... For in such structures, a substantial sphere of autonomy... is enjoyed by non-political institutions." The ethos of modern science, in other words, was not in conflict with the institutional foundations of New Deal America. Indeed, they coalesced in happy harmony to assure a progressive, value-free, autonomous social science. How else could the fabulous success that social science has had in the western world be explained? Note that these beliefs rested on the idea that social relations, broadly speaking, in liberal orders were based on "cultural
norms" and "pluristic authority" whereas totalitarian regimes relied most heavily on political-economic centralization and military (including para-military) control.

In Merton's words:

In the totalitarian society, the centralization of institutional control is the major source of opposition to science; in other structures, the extension of scientific research is of greater importance. Dictatorship organizes, centralizes and hence intensifies sources of revolt against science which in a liberal structure remain unorganized, diffuse and often latent. (54)

In 1942, Merton revived the major thrust of his 1937 article. The primary difference in the two articles lies in where the greatest emphasis was placed. Rather than placing primary focus on Nazism, he looked at totalitarianism in general (Russia enters the picture) and the ethos of science in particular. And again, Merton argued that "science is afforded opportunities in a democratic order ((note the change from liberal to democratic)) which is integrated with the ethos of science." To be sure, this was not to say that science was only pursued in liberal democracies. It simply meant that these structures afforded science the essentials for the fullest in achievement and in social autonomy.

The ethos of science was pictured as an unqualified adherence to four guiding principles: universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. Universalism referred to the requirement that research findings be "subjected to preestablished impersonal criteria." "Objectivity,"
Merton wrote, "precludes particularism." Communist in the ethos of science did not refer to a particular form of social-economic organization but to the norm that research findings be made public. Communication was essential to the accumulation and hence progress of science. Secrecy was pictured as the antithesis of this scientific norm. Disinterestedness constituted a "distinctive pattern of institutional control... which characterized the behavior of scientists." In involved the "rigorous policing" that guides the scientific institution. Such control could perhaps be exercised through methodological canons, socialized sentiment or textbooks, but, whatever form it took, disinterestedness has "contributed to the integrity of men of science."

Thus, disinterestedness did not refer specifically to emotional detachment but also to a whole set of prescriptions and proscriptions that regulate scientists' minds. Merton remarked on this control system:

once the institution enjoins disinterested activity, it is to the interest of scientists to conform on pain of sanction and in so far as the norms are internalized, on pain of psychological conflict. (62)

The final principle guiding science was organized skepticism. This referred to the norm that scientists exercise a "suspension of judgement" until the problem at hand was subjected to "detached scrutiny." This was important, for most institutions demanded "unqualified faith" but science made "skepticism a virtue." To the extent that a society is democratic, Merton believed, the more the ethos of science will be un-
obstructed. As long as New Deal America remained the democratic place that Merton thought it was, the ethos of science would continue to assure progress and autonomy the social disciplines.

Despite his arguments on the social location of science, then, Merton did not dispel notions of a pure, self-correcting, autonomous social science. Rather, he analyzed the institutional location of Nazi science since he found it distasteful, while neglecting the social roots of science in New Deal America (probably because he liked it). One might even conclude that he criticised one in order that he might exonerate the other. Anyhow, Merton's belief in the infallibility of logic and the ethos of science constituted a substitute for the traditional belief in an ahistorical science which, in turn, constituted a public legitimization of New Deal society and its philosophical foundations. Failure to turn his six-gun analysis on his own society and his own sociology prevented a fuller understanding of the relativistic character of American sociology. It also provided a methodological rationale for sociological unaccountability and uncritical co-operation in state funded research in liberal democratic societies in general and New Deal America in particular.

In another context, Merton was making plans for a value-free theory of the middle-range. Early functionalists received charges of being ideologically conservative because
they made use of an organic analogy as a tool to conceptualize social events. Merton felt that contemporary functionalism need neither employ an organic analogy nor need it be an inherently conservative philosophy. Merton began his quest by examining the ideological accusations made upon functionalism. Luckily, this part of his task was made simple. He found both conservative and radical charges. The solution, then, must have been this: "The fact that functional analysis can be seen by some as inherently conservative and by others as inherently radical suggest that it may be neither one nor the other. It suggests that functional analysis may involve no intrinsic ideological commitment although, like other forms of sociological analysis, it can be infused with any one of a wide range of ideological values." That is, it was not the method that should worry us but the methodologists. Accordingly, the problem boils down to a problem of how to best educate eligible candidates to the virtues of the proper handling of functionalist's methodology (morality).

To further illustrate the ideological neutrality of functionalism, Merton introduced three concepts--functional alternatives (also see Chapter III, p. 79), dysfunctions, and latent functions. The notion of functional alternative permitted the functional analyst to see beyond prevailing conditions and beliefs. By cultivating a mental habit of looking for societal needs and not the specific manner in which these needs should be fulfilled, functionalism allowed sociologists
to consider various courses of action (not just one) in which to fulfill a functional requirement.

The notions of dysfunctions and latent functions operated in much the same way. The former helps to explain such things as social change. It helped the functionalists grapple with the fact that 'social systems were not always in a process of supportive internal reciprocation. A certain dynamic quality was supposedly added to functionalism, as well as a heightened degree of objectivity, with the introduction of the term dysfunction.

The idea of a latent function on the other hand helped functionalists recognize the possibility that certain apparently non-functional or dysfunctional phenomena were, in fact, very functional. Lewis Coser's work on the functions of social conflict provides a good example of how this concept could be applied.

Much of Merton's methodology on values, then, can be seen as an attempt to reconcile the contradiction in the statement that science is at once intricately intertwined in society and autonomous from it. Two currents of thought appeared which tried to engineer a reconciliation. The first involved a comparative examination of the institutional foundations of societies and how well the ethos of science was incorporated into these foundations. It argued that the ethos of science and the ethos of liberal democratic orders were compatible and thus the autonomy of science was preserved, at least for
the time being. The second current of thought involved
the functionalists' methodology proper. As Merton pointed
out in a recent publication, the introduction of the terms
functional alternative, dysfunction and especially latent-
manifest functions increased the powers of functional anal-
ysis so as to better move beyond prevalent social "beliefs,
practices, and judgements" without engaging in morality.
The role of the sociologist, accordingly, was unique and in-
dispensable in the appraisal of proposals for social policy,
but, it should be pointed out that much depended on how well
disciplined--educated--the sociologists really was. The
significance of the "right-attitude" coupled with reliable
method of approach for a value-free sociology was underlined
in the following passage:

the sociologists does not remain aloof from social
controversy, but in his capacity as sociologists--
rather than citizen--he takes a distinctive and
limited part in it. He introduces the pertinent
sociological truths so that substantive morality and
social policy governing the issues at stake can
take account of these truths... ((As sociologists))
he neither exhorts nor denounces, neither advocates
nor rejects. It is enough that he uncover the
great price they sometimes pay for their settled
but insufficiently examined convictions and
their established but inflexible practices. (67)

Summary

In this chapter, an attempt was made to describe
an important aspect of the sociologist's conceptual apparatus
during the post-1930 period in America--namely, methodology.
The major focus was on treatments of the problem of values
in sociological theory and research and how this treatment
served as a professional justification for uncritical acceptance of the New Deal philosophy (logic of domination). Also, reliance on Max Weber as an escape from the value dilemma was shown to be ungrounded. Because of the great emphasis placed on methodology and its rigorous application to "real" social problems, discussions of the place or importance of values in science or personal troubles were notably shallow, if not non-existent. The meanings which emerged from these methodological queries lacked any depth in persuasiveness and reflective sophistication, not to mention just plain common-sense. Thus, to paraphrase a critic of naturalism, 'when scientific methodology is transformed into an uncritical, uncompromising testimonial to its virtues, it only legitimate function becomes that of a watchdog.

It is noteworthy that the writings of Mayo, Lundberg, and Merton have received widespread acceptance in the sociological religion. Reduced to their basic common elements, value-free sociology consisted of two parts. First, a widely recognized quantitative methodology, complete with the 'right' technology (including sophisticated computers, incomprehensible statistical techniques, and generous research grants), were needed. The stated reasons for this technology varied but all can be related to 'the felt need to uncover consistent, objective data with which to control and hence predict human behavior in society. Scientific management of people remained a consistently held ideal throughout. Methodology, in this
respect, smashed individualism and independence.

Second, there was a notion that sociologists ought to remain in a clearly delineated, socially detached role. Never should one become involved (that is, never should one confront existing morality in a critical fashion) to the point where her/his objectivity is obscured. Merton put it nicely: he said that the sociologists ought to maintain a "detached concern." Choice of alternative course of action, in short, was not the domain of the sociologist but of the administrator, the businessperson, or the general.

The problem of this approach was two-fold. 1) Attention was shifted from a concern with knowledge about men in society to a compulsive pursuit of facts (truths) with universal validity and from relativistic ideological inquiries to investigations into reality, whatever that is. Without a framework that recognized the role of values and ideology in empirical knowledge, sociologists embraced a value-involved methodology which pre-fabricated conclusions in initial propositions. Science in sociology risked being transformed into religion in sociology. 2) By refusing to make a concerted effort to understand value-orientations, noble lies, ideologies, et cetera, sociologists unwittingly made an apriori legitimization of existing social arrangements in the name of objectivity. Why, for instance, did Industrial Sociologists assimilate managerial definitions of things such as efficiency, productivity, worker happiness, among others? Could these
partial theoretical perspectives not be expanded to include the workers' quality of life, or his independence in arranging the conditions under which he lives? Why must the myth that there must be kings and serfs be reproduced? Why has Industrial feudalism not been challenged? Enough. There is a certain irony in that amidst all this, the methodologist and the liberal sociologist (not necessarily muturly exclusive) tells his/her readers that sociology offers insight and heightens our awareness of alternative courses of action. Somehow, it is not hard to see how the acceptance of societal definitions and methodological blinders can make for a smoother running New Deal America (or Soviet Russia) but these outlooks also minimize the range of reflection and choice for man.
Notes


3 ibid.


6 ibid., p. 20.

7 ibid., p. 21.

8 ibid.


15 ibid., p. 53.

16 ibid.

17 ibid., p. 54

18 ibid.

19 ibid., p. 111.


21 ibid., p. 152.


23 during the 30's several connections with applied research bureaus were being formed. For instance, Robert Merton as head of the Bureau for Applied Social Research had connections through his friend and colleague Paul Lazarsfeld to the Rockerfeller funded Princeton Radio Project and to Samuel Stouffer and the Army office. See Paul Lazarsfeld, "An Episode in the History of Social Research; A Memoir," *Perspectives in American History*, Volume II (1968), (Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History; Harvard University).


28 ibid.


31 ibid.

32 ibid.


35 ibid.

36 ibid., p. 41.

37 Can Science Save Us?

38 ibid., p. 13.

39 ibid., p. 50.

40 ibid., p. 47.

41 ibid., p. 36.

42 ibid., whole book but especially pp. 47-50.

43 ibid., p. 56.

44 ibid., p. 81.
45 ibid., p. 101.


48 ibid., p. 595.

49 ibid., p. 596.

50 ibid., p. 595.

51 ibid., p. 602.

52 ibid., p. 596.

53 given Merton's suggestion coupled with recently uncovered data on corporate concentration and policing operations (C.I.A.), it stands to reason that Merton's analysis could serve as a powerful indictment against contemporary science and sociology.

54 op. cit., p. 602.


56 ibid.

57 ibid., p. 606.

58 ibid., p. 607.

59 ibid., p. 607.

60 ibid., p. 613.

61 ibid.

62 ibid.
Merton used the notion that science was too skeptical as an explanation of why people were hostile toward science during the 1930's.

Robert Merton, "Manifest and Latent Functions," in **Social Theory and Social Structure**.
Chapter Five: CONCLUSIONS

The problem of reconciling individualism and collectivism, liberty and order was admittedly an old one but the creation of a highly integrated industrial state in a country that long cherished individualistic and democratic ideals presented the problem in an especially acute form. It is not surprising then to find that during the New Deal there were various favorable and unfavorable opinions toward the "new" industrialism. On the one hand, virtually everyone, farmers, laborers, artists, small businesspersons and corporate representatives included, pictured the New Deal and the adoption of a collectivistic ethic with some degree of pride. The ideal of a democratically operated organizational society of self-sacrificing, co-operative individuals coupled with the ideal of a secure managed society of planned abundance somehow made the reality of large-scale social and economic planning palatable. The promise of a business operated and controlled economy, in a word "business commonwealth," made the New Deal even more attractive to others. On the other hand, the New Deal was viewed with regret. It undermined the very foundations of laissez-faire economy which the country was founded upon and it placed ever increasing restraints on the social activities of men and women. To many Americans, the replacement of the traditional freedom of the small town
and countryside with the regulated freedom of the urban center and the corporation was a sad occurrence. The apparent need for large-scale social planning and organizational controls was generally accepted as self-evident but the implementation of this alternative was not always greeted with enthusiasm.

Except in sociology. In the formative years of American sociology (1870-1920), there was some sense of historical rootedness in the characteristics of the time. Social disorder was not simply viewed as a problem of insufficient socialization or as an administrative problem, although such administrative controls were often proposed as a solution to the corruption in the economy. The point is that the sociologists' activity, at that time, was aligned with moral and ethical standards and that personal choice was central to the sociological endeavour. Sociologists sought to improve society. And "sociocracy" (Ward's answer) was just one way to do this.

In more recent years, however, the sense of historical rootedness has left the discipline, leaving the barren wasteland that C. Wright Mills has called "abstracted empiricism" and "grand theory." Through the use of pre-formulated and pre-defined categories, not many sociologists have carried out work about the salient features of the modern historical period—the problem of reason and freedom in a highly industrialized world.
What I have tried to document in the foregoing pages, then, is the thesis that sociologists in the post-1930 period in the United States developed theories and methodologies that served to neutralize the problem of liberty and order and to extol the virtues of state and corporate organizations. The relationship between New Deal politics and sociology is one in which sociology protects the political regime from sociological criticism by translating moral and political questions into methodological and administrative questions. Some sociologists accomplished this by misinterpreting the writings of classical thinkers such as Max Weber. Others made pretentious presentations of the reasons why sociologists, using a scientific framework, ought not be held accountable for their work or its uses. Still others, such as Robert Merton, tried to revise the writings of earlier writers (Karl Mannheim, Karl Marx, and Max Weber) to formulate a sociology of knowledge compatible with modern liberal democracy. These three attempts failed to introject either reformist or radical ideals into sociology. They essentially complemented an administrative sociology which legitimized and celebrated the existing social order.

What this means is that there was a consistency between the styles of thought employed in the New Deal and in sociology. Note that I am not here interested in imputing motives; this is simply a pattern in sociological writings that sociologists seem to mask. Accordingly, what might be
for future research directions is to consider the question of whether sociologists with New Deal ideology were concretely connected with institutional positions in the new, rapidly growing business state. For one example, one might argue that the institutional ties that Merton had to the Applied Bureau of Social Research and that Mayo had to the Hawthorne plant shaped their social perspectives. From this type of inquiry, one might convincingly argue that the ideological stance taken by many sociologists was a consciously assumed one, dictated by the requirements of their job.

But even from the perspective of this paper, it seems clear that sociologists have performed a vital service to the development of the theory and practice of the modern state and thus to those who dominate American institutions. This is not to say that the ideals expressed by sociologists have had a profound effect on anyone outside the sociological religion. Rather, the service rendered by sociologists consists in the non-ideological, uncritical and inconspicuous character that the discipline has assumed.

To put it another way, in a society troubled by the threat of social disorder and potential "disaster," in a growing state which had no firm ideological foundation on which to justify its existence, and in a collective conscience that had long cherished a tradition of democratic and individualist ideals, sociologists proffered a conceptual mirage, supported by scientific claims for legitimacy, that refused
to consider these competing ideals (liberty and order), Good and bad were operationalized to suit the sensibilities of those who ran large social organizations in that goodness and justice roughly translated to mean that which contributes to the solidarity and longevity of New Deal America and evil referred to that which undermines these things. From their detached social roles, sociologists did much to reproduce New Deal images and reality by not recognizing these positions as ideology. To see them as ideology would have meant that one would have to engage in debate with those of other persuasions and hence introject some degree of personal choice into sociological practice. To deny science as ideology, on the other hand, would have removed the sociologist from the forum of debate and therefore dissolved such debate. From the point of view of the ambitious career oriented scholar, to adopt the latter view would guarantee a continual flow of financial support and prestigious positions in the new organizations; to adopt the former point of view would have meant futility, frustration, uncertainty and fear.

The sociologists' role in the New Deal era of American history was not that of an institutionalized critic but that of a state-builder. The ideology of the state was not overtly but covertly supported in a moze of scientific rhetoric which, in turn, effectively operated to end ideological debate within the discipline. As moral and political lines of thought were excluded from debate (but not from the content of their work), the way was cleared for increased participation in
state and corporate sponsored projects and in the training of properly versed civil servants. The importance of sociology, then, did not lie in whether it was right or wrong but in the way (and what) questions were addressed and answered—the way the problem of liberty and order in an industrial age was evaded. That reason and freedom have been abandoned ideals is a fact of New Deal sociology, a fact recognized by too few writers.

Without the ideals of freedom and reason, the promise of a liberating sociology is nonsensical. The two are not mutually exclusive. The collapse of a sociology of liberation gives rise to a sociology of domination, statecraft. Several years ago one writer restated the problem of reason and freedom in modern social science and thus the important relationship between sociological work and politics thusly:

The moral and the intellectual promise of social science is that freedom and reason will remain cherished values, that they will be used seriously and consistently and imaginatively in the formulation of problems. But this is also the political promise of what is loosely called Western culture. Within the social sciences political crises and intellectual crises of our time coincide; serious work in either sphere is also work in the other... Any contemporary political re-statement of liberal and socialist goals must include as central the idea of a society in which all men would become men of substantive reason, whose independent reasoning would have structural consequences for their societies, and thus for their own life fates. (4)
Notes


2 See ibid., especially pages 165-176.

3 Ibid., Mills is one of the few. Herbert Marcuse is another.

Appendix One: A RESEARCH NOTE ON THE HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY

Rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, sociological accounts of the development of the discipline typically try to explain recent trends through one of two strategies: namely, Building-Block theories and the theory of Thomas S. Kuhn. The most common strategy, up until a few years ago, was the Building-Block theory, or some variation of it. Scientific history is described as going through various stages in which pre-systematic, systematic yet not scientific, and scientific thought are demarcated. Briefly, the first type of thought subsumes all types of folklore, mythology and other 'primitive' notions about the world which occupied the minds of men and women until relatively late in history. The second type of thought refers to much of what is nowadays considered classical sociology, including the theories of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, and sometimes Karl Marx. The last, scientific sociology, was reached somewhere around the 1920's and 1930's and can be found in its most advanced form in the United States. In the recent issue of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Albert Reiss J. described the transition to scientific sociology thusly:

As sociology evolved in the United States, there developed an almost obsessive concern with its status as a science. There were those who would make it one and those who argued it could not be one. Polemics on each side may have been equally heated but it was a somewhat unequal contest because the 'scientific'
group vindicated its position by fostering a strongly empirical tradition that increasingly succeeded in quantifying social data and inventing techniques of investigation. Their opponents, on the other hand, had little to offer but time-worn appeals to philosophical and historical traditions. (2)

With empirical data in hand, the Building-Block theorist proffer the notion that "knowledge gained through scientific investigation is cumulative," that each bit of empirical research compiled adds to the vast storehouse of social knowledge which someday will appear just as impressive, or moreso, as the the natural sciences. Of course knowledge did not always progress in this additive manner. The pre-science states of development were characterized by endless debate which went nowhere because of a lack of consensus on the 'right' method to solve problems. If sociology was to be scientific, George Lundberg suggested, it must have a unified method; the lack of reliable method in any scientific endeavour "results in controversy, frustration, and despair."

While this image of the history of ideas undoubtedly possesses many advantages for the science-practitioner, it has several inadequacies. The most striking is that it implies science exists as a transcendent philosophy which can safely disregard studies of science as a relativistic form of knowledge. Faith is placed in highly sophisticated technology and method to reveal errors rather than critical debate or ideological study. Indeed, these latter activities were often upon as academic heresy. Following are just a few consequences which researchers must confront when embracing the Building-
Block approach; 1) the philosophy of the scientist is transformed into a celebration of his methodology and hence an unexamined method. 2) Attention is diverted from investigations of the sources of knowledge to compilations of outcomes of scientific research; and 3) adopting this image of history to a large extent determines one's image of science itself. It supports the popular view of science as some sort of transcending, amoral, truth-seeing institution free from social-historical influences just as a faith in the integrity of political candidates supports the theory of a self-correcting, checks and balance American democracy.

The second approach for explaining recent trends in scientific thought has been articulate by Thomas S. Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. While not a sociologist by profession, Kuhn's ideas have generally been welcomed. Robert Friedrichs, for one, has hailed his work as a fabrication that has "stirred a revolutionary reappraisal of the life history of science among both historians and sociologists." Others with interests ranging from political sociology to theory construction have given similar salutations.

Kuhn's innovation hinges on three concepts—paradigms, scientific revolutions and anomalies. The first roughly refers to what is popularly conceived of as a theory or model except an important qualification need be added. A paradigm is that set of ideas, postulates, theorems, et cetera which
commands almost exclusive respect as an accurate description of reality from a given group of scientists. "It need not, in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted." The fundamental requirements are credibility and communal commitment.

Second is the notion of 'scientific revolution.' With this, Kuhn makes a significant departure from the Building-Block tradition. While he concedes that the everyday activities of researchers (normal science) is "a highly cumulative enterprise," he adds that there comes a time in the course of scientific development when there occurs "non-cumulative ... episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in part or in whole by an incompatible new one." These latter changes (revolutions) carry important consequences such as a transformation of the rules, criteria, instrumentation and epistemology of a discipline not to mention the effects these changes have on the consciousness of its practitioners. The important point, however, is that not all history is cumulative. This realization can potentially call into question that affinity between the terms progress and history which manifest itself so clearly in the writings of Building-Block theorists.

Finally, the term anomalies is used to explain how scientific revolutions gain their impetus. As a paradigm nears completion, during the normal science process, a number of problems emerge which appear to contradict, or cannot be
explained by the older paradigm. At first, anomaly observations are disregarded because they "cannot be used to explain the paradigm." Yet, these observations inevitably increase in number and in frequency which, in turn, sends a discipline into full-scale crisis. At this time, the normal research process is disrupted by attempts to uncover the source of the anomalies. The rules of scientific investigation come under scrutiny just as the whole conceptual apparatus does. Eventually, the anomaly is solved by the introduction of a new paradigm, a new set of rules and a whole new reality for the science-practitioner. The researcher, then, returns to the traditional task of puzzle-solving while the adventurous philosopher, the imaginative wits and fools who thrived in the chaotic upsurge retire, like Sleeping Beauties, for another hundred years or so when the process repeats itself.

Kuhnian historiography has commanded a great deal of respect within sociological circles because it supposedly transcends a number of limitations inherent within conventional approaches. 1) It, as was mentioned, helps destroy the tendency of historians of science to identify the terms science-history and cumulative progress. 2) It allows us to examine science in human terms, that is, as a social product, and hence 3) it suggest a 'new' approach to the sociology of knowledge. These three advantages, if valid, would certainly justify meriting Kuhn's analysis as a major break-through in contemporary historiography. However upon closer examination
all three advantages dissolve, revealing themselves to be more apparent than real. Each provides a more sophisticated rationale with which to sustain an image of an idealized science, a reified science free from critical scholarship. It, in short, succumbs to the same pitfalls as does the Building-Block approach. Let's follow up on this accusation briefly.

1) In a chapter entitled 'Progress through revolutions' Kuhn answers the question, "Why is progress a prerequisite reserved almost exclusively for the activity we call science?" by suggesting that the "term science is reserved for the fields that do progress in obvious ways." He then says that questions concerning the definitions of progress do not "respond to an agreement on definition." But if the natural sciences serve as precedent, then these questions will no longer concern anyone until a consensus is reached within the group (that is, when they no longer have doubts) about their past and present accomplishments. Doubts about progress are expressions of immaturity within a discipline. The term progress is indistinguishable. Consider, for instance, this psychological reduction in the following question-answer dialogue:

Q. What is PROGRESS?
A. PROGRESS is that development characteristic of science.

Q. What is that development characteristic of science?
A. PROGRESS of course.
To decipher Kuhn's terminology is to uncover the striking similarities between his won and Building-Block definitions of progress. If we take progress to infer a development to a higher, more advanced, stage of growth, then for Kuhn, progress can be found on at least three levels: a) at the grand or epoch level, b) during normal science, and c) at paradigm junctions.

For Kuhn, the history of a discipline can be logically divided into "what the historian might call its prehistory as a science and its history proper." In its history proper, development can be explained paradigmatically. For instance, in physical optics the paradigmatic pattern "is not... characteristic of the period before Newton's work," and anyone "examining a survey... before Newton may well conclude that through the field's practitioners were scientists, the net result was something less than science." At this grand or epoch level, then, Kuhn's ideas coincide with other views in the positivist tradition in that science is not viewed as an event in history but history is viewed as a precondition for science.

Cumulative progress is characteristic of 'normal science.' This is so because under a paradigm scientists commit themselves to a particular set of beliefs which help him/her define and operationalize academic reality. With the development of a paradigm, research activity becomes less and less random which means greater specialization and professionalisation. This
trend can be disadvantageous in that it leads "to an immense restriction of the scientist's vision" but it simultaneously "leads to a detail of information and to a precision of observation-theory match that could be achieved in no other way." Research activity, then, is at the same time static and dynamic--static when compared with large paradigmatic change (revolution) and dynamic in the sense of cumulative change within the context of a paradigm. Limitation and specialization merge to produce an "immensely efficient" progressive communal enterprise.

There remains only one level where a faith in progress seems to be questioned and it is here that Kuhn's claim to transcend Building-Block theory rests, namely, at the point where one paradigm is transplanted by another. Again, Kuhn conforms to expectations. Paradigms are cumulative episodes in that each introduces constructive as well as destructive features. Each allows a scientist "to account for a wider range of... phenomena or to account with greater precision for some of those previously known." Thus, Kuhn's contribution is to add another piece (paradigm) to the Building-Block puzzle. Ideas still beget ideas and knowledge gained through scientific investigation is still cumulative.

This brings us to Kuhn's sociology of knowledge. It should be pointed out that there is seeming credence in suggesting that Kuhn has helped many sociologists recognize the
conventional and communal nature of science. Early in his book, he emphasised that observation and experience "cannot alone determine a particular body of scientific beliefs." Other factors such as the "authority of teacher and text, not... evidence" compel science student to accept theories and follow along. Moreover, "an apparently arbitrary element, compounded of personal and historical accident, is always a formative ingredient of the beliefs espoused by a given scientific at a given time." From these suggestions, it is clear that science is, at least in part, a social construct in which rules, criteria, instrumentation and epistemologies are mutable expressions of a given group of scientists at a particular place in social time and space. Consequently, factors such as credibility (which roughly comes to mean persuasiveness), authority and even historical circumstance assume considerable weight in the development of an academic discipline, and thus, must be taken into account by the historian science.

The clear and intriguing parallels between Kuhn's notion of a mutable scientific community and the notions expressed by Mannheim, Merton, and Mills when dealing with the sociology of knowledge have led many sociologists to accept, with Robert Friedrichs, the proposition that Kuhn's outlook "stands in the highest tradition of the sociology of knowledge." Derek Philips has gone so far as to say that Kuhn's analysis is more profoundly relativistic and sociological than either
Mannheim, Merton or Mills. What Friedrichs and Philips have failed to see is that no matter how compelling Kuhn's approach may seem, Kuhn himself is reluctant to engage in an investigation of the socio-historical factors which influence science from outside the scientific institution. While "immensely important" such study "necessarily leads to the historical and critical elucidation of philosophy, and those topics are here barred."

The inability for Kuhn to provide a framework for the sociology of knowledge is also revealed in his belief that external (socio-historical) factors have little substantive consequence for the development of a scientific discipline and hence can be safely disregarded, or as Kuhn would put it: "issues of that sort are out of bounds for this essay." The principle importance of external factors is merely "... determining the timing of breakdown, the ease with which it can be recognized and the areas in which... the breakdown first occurs."

It should be noted that in taking this ahistorical position Kuhn makes two fundamental assumptions which had the effect of making his position consistent with those within the ranks of modern science-technology. First, he maintains a certain amount of faith in the proposition that the sciences can be rigidly separated from "fields like medicine, technology, and laws of which the principle raison d'être is social need". Because of scientific specialization and
the "insulation of the scientific community from society..."
the scientist need not choose problems because they urgently
need solution, and without regard for the tools available to
solve them." The implication seems to be that pure science
obeys different laws than applied science, especially when
it comes to a consideration of the effects of socio-historical
factors on the intellectual content of a discipline.

This brings us to Kuhn's second assumption. Traditionally,
scientists in America have held a firm belief that scientific
method is self-correcting. It is felt that the 'natural laws'
of scientific logic will ensure intellectual progress for
those who remain faithful adherents of the strictures. Coupled
with a belief in value-neutrality, what is created is a
doctrine espousing the ultimate infallibility of science.
Now, Kuhn has done much to damage this doctrine by suggesting
that criteria are but conventions, that paradigms come prior
to rules (logic) and that validity is not absolute, but
consensual. Given these discrepancies, Kuhn must adopt an
equivalent belief.

In accomplishing this task, Kuhn endeavours to show
that the virtue of science lay not in methodology but in ed-
ucation. Science education, Kuhn believes, is "narrow and
rigid... But for normal science work... the scientist is al-
most perfectly equipped... ((and any loss}) due to rigidity
accures only to the individual." In the end, science still
retains its reified image of infallibility because "a
scientific community is an immensely efficient instrument for solving the puzzles or problems that paradigms define."

As a sociology of knowledge, then, Kuhnian theory has a dual meaning: one theoretical and one practical. Theoretically, it means scientists have a chance to meditate and discuss the importance of social processes on the development of their discipline. This gives science both an aura of worldliness and an impression of anti-authoritarianism. Practically, it precludes the chance for an investigation of these processes, especially in a historical perspective. When Kuhn's "immensely efficient" scientific community embraces the outlook outlined above, neither history nor philosophy can have any relevance. The Kuhnian tragedy, like the Building-Block one, is this: thinkers are left with an uncritical, unexamined and unconvincing methodology. Such is the practical side of Kuhnian historiography.
Notes

1. These three categories correspond to the theological, metaphysical, and the positive (scientific) stages of knowledge which are used by Comte, Lundberg and others in the positivist tradition. For a discussion of the impediments posed by "traditional thoughtways" see George Lundberg, Can Science Save Us?


9. Ibid., p. 52

10. Ibid., p. 92.

11. Ibid., p. 35.

13 Kuhn, op. cit., p. 160.
14 ibid.
15 ibid., p. 161.
16 ibid., p. 21.
17 ibid.
18 ibid., p. 13.
19 ibid., p. 64.
20 ibid., p. 65.
21 ibid., p. 66.
22 ibid., p. 4.
23 ibid., p. 80.
24 ibid., p. 4.
25 Robert Friedrichs (1972; 10).
27 Kuhn (1970; 80).
28 ibid., p. 69.
29 ibid.
30 ibid., p. 19.

33. ibid.
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