Dakota Expansion and the Fur Trade
TRADERS OF THE PLAINS: THE EUROPEAN FUR TRADE
AND THE WESTWARD EXPANSION OF THE DAKOTA OR
SIOUX INDIANS

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ABSTRACT

Over the years a considerable body of literature has developed which concerns itself with the westward expansion of the Dakota. Close examination of the ethnohistoric record indicates a consistent link between the Dakotas' involvement in the fur trade and their westward expansion.

Exception is taken, here, to previous explanations of Dakota population movements developed by Hickerson. Hickerson has argued that the Southwestern Chippewa were able to evict the Dakota from the forest areas about the Upper Mississippi because of the Chippewas' position in the fur trade. Close examination of the ethnohistoric record indicates that Hickerson's approach to Chippewa-Dakota relations, known as fur trade colonialism, was based upon substantial misinterpretation of the record.

Evidence from the ethnohistoric record shows that Hickerson's division of Chippewa-Dakota relations into a peaceful period from 1679-1736 characterized by Chippewa middleman control over the fur trade and a warlike period after 1736 during which Chippewa forces were able to evict the Dakota from the Woodlands was inappropriate to the facts. Evidence from the ethnohistoric record indicates that the general nature of Chippewa-Dakota relations was hostile throughout the period and that the Dakota were able to obtain European trade goods from a variety of
sources independent of Chippewa middlemen.

Rather than being evicted from the Woodlands by the Chippewa, the Dakota were attracted to the Plains by the economic potential of a middleman trade position there. The spread of horses onto the Plains from the Southwest and the availability of European trade goods from the Northeast and Southeast created a situation in which the Dakota could profit from the exchange of these exotic products at trade rendezvous. There exists a strong correlation between Dakota westward expansion and changes in these trade relationships.
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Of course, the final responsibility for the ideas expressed in this thesis lies with the author.
CHAPTER I

SETTING THE STAGE

Over the years anthropologists and ethnohistorians have produced a massive array of literature on the culture history of the Dakota or Sioux Indians. Much of this literature, in turn, has been devoted to the question of the motivation behind the Dakota's westward expansion. Upon reviewing this body of literature, I was struck by the fact that many of the conclusions advanced by various authors appear to have been based on inaccurate interpretations of the ethnohistoric record or, on an apparently narrow view of the range of events which influenced Dakota history. After attempting to digest this body of literature, I felt the need to try a different explanation for the Dakota's westward expansion. I make no claim that this interpretation is definitive; rather, I advance it as an alternative which appears to agree with a wider range of the available facts.

Various Interpretations

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a major change in native population took place in what is now
central Minnesota and western Wisconsin. The Siouan Dakota inhabitants of this region moved south and west toward the Plains while Algonquian Chippewa groups moved in from the north and east to replace them. One of the most common interpretations of this population change emphasizes the expulsion of Dakota groups by firearm-bearing Chippewa groups. This interpretation has characterized the writings of Warren (1974) (who traced his heritage from both Chippewa and Mayflower ancestors); Neill (1974), and Hickerson (1962, 1965, 1970) among others.

The above interpretations have been challenged by others like White (1978), who feel that the attractive force of the Plains was decisive in provoking Dakota movements.

Thus, neither the Ojibwas nor the Crees drove the Sioux out onto the prairies. Instead, the potential profits of the region's abundant beaver and the ready food supply provided by the buffalo herds lured them into the open lands (White 1978:322).

Authors such as Jenks (1900:1045) and Swanton (1930:160) have borrowed from both poles of interpretation in order to explain Dakota movements. According to Swanton, westward movement of the Dakota

...was the result of attractive as well as repulsive forces, the acquirement of horses and fascination of bison hunting no less than the pressure of the Chippewa and their fuller equipment with firearms (1930:160).
It is worth noting that both the attractive and the repulsive forces which Swanton mentions stem from post-Columbian European contact. In the case of the former, this contact involved the assimilation by Indians of European equestrian technology; and in the case of the latter, the development of the fur trade.

My own research into the ethnohistoric record of the Dakota suggests that the opposition of the developing fur trade and the acquisition of equestrian technology advanced by Swanton (1930:160) is ill-advised. Instead, my research indicates that the Dakotas' accommodation to the effects of white contact involved the integration of the fur trade and equestrian transportation along the lines of that advanced by Jablow (1951) for the Cheyenne. One of the prerequisites for advancing this thesis is the involvement of the Dakota in the fur trade. In order to establish this involvement, it is necessary to deal with the explanation of Chippewa-Dakota relations developed by Hickerson (1962, 1970, 1974). Following an introduction to Hickerson's ideas in this chapter, I will deal with this problem to a greater extent in Chapters II and III. After having established the Dakotas' involvement in the fur trade, I will go on in Chapter IV to examine the role of Dakota trade activities in their westward expansion.
Hickerson's Interpretation

One of the most significant and widely published authors dealing with Chippewa-Dakota relations is Hickerson (1962, 1965, 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974). However, his published works contain many errors which result from his improper use of the ethnohistoric record. I will, therefore, review Hickerson's major arguments and then present some objections to them.

According to Hickerson (1962, 1965, 1970), conflict between Chippewa and Dakota groups in the eighteenth century led to the establishment of an unoccupied buffer zone in the forest-prairie ecotone. Hickerson has argued that this buffer zone developed through the interaction of Chippewa-Dakota warfare and ecological conditions which promoted an abundance of white-tailed deer within the buffer zone. Since both the Dakota and Chippewa were portrayed as dependent upon white-tailed deer for food and hides, a situation of sporadic warfare was maintained to prevent the over-exploitation of this resource.

The train of events during the years from 1679 to 1760, which Hickerson claims led to the establishment of the buffer zone, forms the nucleus for his study of Chippewa-Dakota relations. During the first part of this period to 1736, Hickerson has interpreted Chippewa movements in terms of peaceful relations with the Dakota and in terms of
Chippewa control of the fur trade in central Minnesota and western Wisconsin.

The main reason Chippewa were able to move westward was a peace and alliance they had made with once hostile Siouan Dakota tribes living south and west of Lake Superior; the alliance involved the exchange of French merchandise by the Chippewa for fur and privileges of entry into the relatively rich hunting grounds of the Dakota (Hickerson 1970:65-66).

However, according to Hickerson, warfare broke out between the Chippewa and Dakota in 1736. The cause of this warfare was supposedly French attempts to bypass Chippewa middlemen so as to deal directly with the Dakota.

In effect, the Chippewa of Chequamegon, bypassed by the French, no longer had access to game areas and trade fur; hence, they were obliged either to survive on the meager game resources afforded by the barren boreal forest region surrounding western Lake Superior, in addition to the fish they took out of the Lake, or to attempt to expand into new areas, perhaps into the very areas they had been entering as allies of the entrenched Dakota population (Hickerson 1970:66).

Two major premises can be drawn from Hickerson's interpretation of Chippewa-Dakota relations. The first of these premises is that the Chippewa were able to control Dakota access to trade goods before the third decade of the eighteenth century. The second premise is that the Chippewa could manipulate this control to maintain peaceful relations
with the Dakota. Both of these premises are emergent from Hickerson's interpretation of fur trade relations in North America. The fullest explanation of Hickerson's views is given in his article "Fur Trade Colonialism and the North American Indians" (1973). In this article Hickerson portrays the fur trade in North America as a monolithic force on which the Indians came to be dependent for survival, e.g., access to trade goods. Hickerson (1973:15) argues that because of this dependent situation, North American Indian groups, such as the Dakota and Chippewa, were the pawns of European fur trading interests and were not allowed to participate in the making of policies which affected their lives. Because the Dakota and Chippewa, supposedly, had no control over the areas they occupied, Hickerson would classify them as colonials.

Hickerson assumes that peaceful conditions were maintained between the Chippewa and Dakota during the period from 1679 to 1736 (Hickerson 1962:65-67, 71; 1979:65-66; 1971:178; 1974:45). Supposedly, this period of peace had important ramifications for the Chippewa. Hickerson interprets this period of peace as facilitating a florescence of Chippewa culture (1971:178). Also of importance was the dependent assumption, as suggested above, that such peaceful relations had a causal factor. According to Hickerson, "...the alliance involved the exchange of French merchandise by the Chippewa for fur and privileges
of entry into the relatively rich hunting grounds of the Dakota" (1970:66). Thus, control of the Dakotas' access to French trade goods was supposedly manipulated by the Chippewa to gain use of the Dakotas' rich hunting territory. According to this interpretation of history, the expansion of French trade frontiers in the second and third decades of the eighteenth century disrupted the French-Chippewa-Dakota trade arrangement by bypassing the Chippewa to deal directly with the Dakota. No longer having the necessary control of trade to gain vital access to the Dakotas' game-rich territory, Chippewa hunters presumably resorted to warfare in an attempt to drive the Dakota inhabitants from their hunting territory (Hickerson 1962:68-71; 1965:47; 1970:66).

Although Chippewa war parties were able to force the evacuation of Dakota villages from central Minnesota and western Wisconsin, according to Hickerson, they were not able to permanently occupy the buffer zone, control of which was still disputed between Dakota and Chippewa war parties. While both Dakota and Chippewa forces hunted in this debated zone, they did so at considerable risk. According to Hickerson's interpretation, this risk kept the game resources of the buffer zone from being overexploited (Hickerson 1965:62).
Objections to Hickerson's Interpretation

Although Warren's *History of the Ojibwa Nation* poses a number of problems for ethnohistorians, his portrayal of Chippewa-Dakota warfare between 1679 and 1736 provides an interesting contrast to the picture given by Hickerson's works on the subject. The broad period of peace which Hickerson claims existed between Chippewa and Dakota Indians is broken by numerous intervals of warfare and peace in Warren's account. Furthermore, the pattern of warfare suggested by Warren's collected oral history is more or less reflected in the ethnohistoric record. This alternation of periods of warfare and peace appears to have occurred before 1679 and to have continued until 1736 and after. Hickerson, himself, acknowledges that Chippewa-Dakota warfare was not even a universal phenomenon in the years following the establishment of the buffer zone (1962: 13; 1970:80).

One of the problems in dealing with Hickerson's treatment of Chippewa-Dakota warfare is the heterogeneous composition of both groups. Hickerson tends to deal with Chippewa-Dakota relations as though each were a homogeneous ethnic group. Unfortunately, such was not the case. The ethnohistoric record contains numerous examples of warfare between some Dakota groups and some Chippewa groups while other groups were at peace, as well as instances of
hostilities between factions of the same ethnic group. Equally unfortunate is the lack of consistent identification of the different factions of Dakota and Chippewa in the portion of the ethnohistoric record examined by the author. Because of the fragmentary nature of the ethnohistoric record, little more than a broad outline of the divisive nature of Chippewa-Dakota relations can be presented.

The impossibility of maintaining peaceful relations between all Chippewa and all Dakota factions, as suggested by White for a latter period (1978:332), would have made the supposed broad period of peace lasting from 1679 to 1736 all but impossible. In fact, the ethnohistoric record bears out the fragmentary nature of any Chippewa-Dakota peace during this period. While it is possible that trade between some Chippewa and Dakota factions existed in the face of recurrent hostile activities, as did the Dakota-Arikara trade relations of a latter time (Jablow 1951:52-53), there is no reason to expect that these peaceful interludes were ever more than temporary and local in effect.

Hickerson's assumption that the Dakota were dependent upon Chippewa middlemen for access to trade goods between 1679 and 1736 is also suspect. An examination of the ethnohistoric record shows that numerous French establishments existed in or within reach of Dakota-controlled territory during this time. In addition, the
illicit trade activities of French *coureurs de bois* suggest an additional avenue of access to trade goods. Finally, there are strong indications of a flourishing non-Chippewa middleman trade network extending from English trade centers in New York, Pennsylvania, and Carolina which the Dakota were tapping to obtain European products. However, it must be recognized that although Chippewa middlemen may still have played an important role in supplying the Dakota with trade goods, the availability of alternate sources of supply removes any basis for assuming a dependent Dakota position. Given this situation, it becomes impossible to maintain the existence of a causal linkage connecting Chippewa middlemen and peaceful relations with neighbouring Dakota groups.

During the latter part of the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century, the Dakota were experiencing significant cultural and economic changes. The period, as a whole, shows a growing movement and orientation toward the Plains. In fact, at the time of the supposed outbreak of Chippewa-Dakota hostilities in 1736, only a small portion of the Dakota were still living in central Minnesota and western Wisconsin (NYCD 9:1055). Changes in warfare and economics resulting from the introduction of firearms and the adoption of equestrian transportation appear to have made life on the Plains more desirable to the Dakota. In addition, the development of Dakota trade fairs appears to
have made such a move economically advantageous.

The economic success of Dakota trade fairs appears to offer some explanation for the maintenance of a Dakota presence near the buffer zone. It was only through Dakota occupation of this region that access to European trade goods could be assured. That hostilities should continue between Dakota and Chippewa groups in this situation is not surprising. Given the position of the easternmost bands of Dakota as middlemen to more westerly groups within a Plains-oriented trade fair complex (Jablow 1951:42) and the position of the Chippewa in the forests to the north, it is not unreasonable that the forest-prairie transition zone should become a region of debated ownership and control.

Places and People

The location of the various Dakota groups during the early historic period has been implied by Hickerson (1962:66; 1970:66) to be isolated from the major fur trade routes as a consequence of his arguments for Chippewa middleman control of trade. Such a view is patently incorrect. During this period, their territory stretched from the Upper Mississippi to the Middle Missouri and beyond. It included portions of the St. Lawrence, Hudson Bay, and Mississippi-Missouri watersheds. Dakota territories thus touched on three of the major water transportation
Map 1

Place Names Referred to in Text

1. Green Bay
2. Keweenaw Peninsula
3. La Pointe
4. Fox River
5. Wisconsin River
6. Fond Du Lac River
7. Upper Mississippi River
8. Minnesota (St. Peter's River)
9. Red River of the North
10. Sheyenne River
11. James River
12. Missouri River
networks of North America.

The Chippewa group (also called Ojibwa) most often mentioned here is usually referred to as the Southwestern Chippewa today (See Ritzenthaler 1978:744). The Dakota or Sioux groups mentioned here are not so easily distinguished. During the historic period, before their military subjugation, the Dakota comprised three great divisions; each of which spoke a different dialect. The Santee division of the Dakota was the easternmost division and was in closest contact with the Chippewa. The Santee, who spoke "Dakota", encompassed the Sissetons, Wahpetons, Wahpekutes, and Mdewakantons (Hanson 1975:3). The Santee, in their culture, closely resembled the Central Algonquian tribes (Howard 1966:4). The Middle Dakota or Wiciyela division spoke "Nakota" and was comprised of the Yankton and Yanktonai. The Middle Dakota division was located between the Santee and the Teton, who were the most westerly division. The Teton spoke "Lakota" and encompassed the Oglala, Brule, Hunkpapa, Blackfoot, Miniconjou, Sans Arc, and Two Kettles (Hanson 1975:3-4). However, Dakota lore and early historic evidence indicates that before their formation into three divisions, they were composed of "seven council fires".

While I will refer to these three divisions together as the Dakota, they do not appear to have constituted a tribal entity. However, a sense of unity did persist.
Map 2
Approximate Dakota Territory Ca. 1680

Map 3
Approximate Dakota Territory Ca. 1850
Mekeel has stated: "They fought other people, but ordinarily not each other" (in Lowie 1963:212). To complicate things further, French chroniclers before 1760 often referred to a "Sioux of the East" and a "Sioux of the West". It generally seems that the Sioux of the East were those along the Mississippi and Minnesota Rivers who traded regularly with the French, while the Sioux of the West were those living a more nomadic life on the prairies to the west.
CHAPTER II

CHIPPEWA-DAKOTA WARFARE: 1660-1760

Nature of Warfare

The point was made in the introduction that Hickerson's application of a model of fur trade determinism (hereafter referred to as fur trade colonialism) to Chippewa-Dakota relations between 1679 and 1760 was inappropriate. I intend to show that the presumed relationship between the fur trade and Chippewa-Dakota warfare which Hickerson (1962, 1970, 1974) has portrayed is not reflected in the ethnohistoric record.

Before attempting to assess Chippewa-Dakota warfare, it is necessary to define the use of the term "warfare" as employed here. Kellogg (1968:356) has described Dakota-Chippewa warfare as a situation of omnipresent potential for violence. Similarly, Hickerson describes the latter period of Chippewa-Dakota warfare, from 1767 to 1805, as a situation of omnipresent potential for violence.

...In some limited regions, truces, which in only rare instances lasted for more than a year or two, permitted safe occupancy of normally dangerous zones. Even in rare cases where truces lasted several years, however, there were bound to be
instances of hostility, even if amounting only to the breaking of traps or killing the enemies' dogs, actions that always resulted in a state of alarm.... (Hickerson 1970:80).

An examination of the ethnohistoric record between 1660 and 1760 indicates that the above description of warfare is also applicable to those years, even though Hickerson (1962:65-67; 1970:66,71; 1974:35-43) has characterized Chippewa-Dakota relations as peaceful between 1680 and 1736 and warlike afterward. Evidence from the ethnohistoric record, however, indicates that those years were fragmented by Chippewa-Dakota hostilities.

Thus, the century lasting from 1660 to 1760 can be described in terms of Dakota-Chippewa warfare. During that period we can expect short intervals of peace in which hostility, though subdued, was present. Nor will those intervals of peace be universally accepted as such by all Dakota or Chippewa.

Chippewa-Dakota Relations: 1660-1736

Evidence of Chippewa-Dakota relations about and before 1660 is limited. That which is available, although not conclusive, suggests that the relationship was peaceful until about 1665. Certainly, the Jesuit Relation of 1657-58 contains indications of this peaceful attitude between some Dakota and an Algonquian group which was in time absorbed
into the Chippewa. In enumerating the names of recently discovered nations this Relation states that:

The seventh, called the Poualak, or 'Warriors' contains thirty Villages, situated West by North from St. Michel. The eighth lies to the Northwest, ten days' journey from St. Michel, and has fully 40 Villages, inhabited by the Nadouechiouek and Mantouek.

The ninth, situated beyond the Nadouechiouek, thirty-five leagues or thereabout from lake Alimibeg, is called Nation of the Assinipoualak, or 'Warriors of the rock' (JR 44:247-249).

Hodge (1959(2):1096,1123) has identified the Poualak and the Nadouechiouek as Dakota groups. The Assinipoualak were the Assiniboine, and, finally, the Mantouek have been identified as Algonquian by Warren (1974:91-93) and Hodge (1959 (1):956, (2):1086). If Father Gabriel Dreuillettes' information, on which this part of the Relation of 1657-58 was based, is reliable, a Dakota group named the Nadouechiouek and an Algonquian group named the Mantouek were living together in some semblance of harmony. Furthermore, the nation composed of the Nadouechiouek and Mantouek is differentiated from the Siouan Poualak and Assinipoualak.

Radisson's account of his Mississippi voyage states that the Dakota and Pauoestigonce fought together against the Iroquois sometime about 1660 (Adams 1961:102). The Pauoestigonce, who were allied with the Dakota, were identified by Radisson as the "nation of the Sault" (Adams 1961:93), probably the Salteur, who have been identified by
Hodge (1959(2):1130) as Chippewa. Perrot reports this group as living at Chequamegon and Keweenaw and maintaining peaceful relations with the Dakota from 1661 to 1665 (Blair 1969(1):173,181; WHC 16:20,26). It seems that this peaceful state had existed for some time, since Perrot's memoir refers to the Chippewa as having defeated an Iroquois war party and having returned in triumph to Keweenaw and Chequamegon "...where they long dwelt in peace..." (WHC 16:26). The Blair edition states: "They dwelt there in peace always...." (1969(1):181).

Hostilities broke out between the Dakota, and the Huron and Ottawa, who were living at Chequamegon and Keweenaw, about 1670 (JR 56:115-117; Blair 1969(1):188). The result of these hostilities was that the Huron and Ottawa abandoned this location. Unfortunately, no mention is made of the Chippewa. However, this break appears to have also disturbed relations between the Chippewa and Dakota; for in 1679 Duluth met with the Dakota and their enemies, among which were the Chippewa, to establish peace (Margry 6:20-34; Kellogg 1967:329-334). According to Hickerson, this was the beginning of a 56 year period of peace between the Dakota and Chippewa.

The approach used by Hickerson was to cite evidence for the establishment of a peace from Margry and Blair and then to gloss over the years from 1679 to 1736 with a minimum of attention. Hickerson managed to condense the
events of those years into a single sentence in one study.

The peace was made, the land was trapped, and the Dakota and Chippewa, the former living in the Minnesota forest and prairie country, the latter with their main village at Chequamegon where they did a little farming, a lot of fishing, and a good deal of trading, remained at peace and as allies until the year 1736 (1970:66).

Unfortunately, more attention to detail is needed in order to achieve an accurate picture of those years. In fact, the intervening years were hardly as uniformly peaceful as Hickerson claims.

This lack of homogeneity is reflected in the ethno-historic sources which Hickerson claims to have consulted. It seems that data was selectively used by Hickerson, in various cases, to develop a mythical 56 year period of peaceful coexistence between the Chippewa and Dakota. For example, Hickerson cites La Potherie to illustrate these peaceful conditions:

...the others have gone away to two localities on Lake Superior, in order to live on the game which is very abundant there. Those who left their natal soil made an alliance with the Nadouassioux, who were not very solicitous for the friendship of any one whomsoever; but, because they could obtain French merchandise only through the agency of the Sauteurs, they made a treaty of peace with the latter by which they were mutually bound to give their daughters in marriage on both sides. That was a strong bond for the maintenance of entire harmony (Blair 1969(1):277 in Hickerson 1962:66).
It is instructive to contrast the passage taken from La Potherie with a similar passage given by Warren.

Five generations ago, shortly after the Ojibways residing on the shores of Lake Superior had commenced to obtain firearms and ammunition of the old French traders, a firm peace existed between them and the Dakotas, who then resided on the head waters of the Mississippi and the midland country which lay between this river and the Great Lake....It appears, however, impossible, that these two powerful tribes should ever remain long in peace with each other. On this occasion the war-club had lain buried but a few winters, when it was again violently dug up, and the ancient feud raged more fiercely than ever (1974:175-178).

While the first part of Warren's account is in general agreement with the passage from La Potherie, significant differences arise in the second part. The peace which was established is not pictured by Warren as a long one lasting 56 years, but instead, is described as being of short duration, lasting only a few years.

Since oral narratives of the type collected by Warren are not generally considered as sound as other forms of data, further confirmation must be sought in the ethno-historic record. A letter written by Duluth in 1684 from Michilimacincac indicates that a number of Chippewa had been involved in an attack on the Dakota the previous year.
...I received notice that the Folavoine, who was an accomplice in the murder and robbing of the aforesaid two Frenchmen, had arrived at Sainte Marie du Sault with fifteen cabins of Sauteurs who had, con­jointly with the Gens des Terres, made an attack on the Nadouecioux last spring; and that he believes himself in safety, on account of the number of allies and relatives whom he had there (WHC 16:114-115).

Duluth also goes on to cite another incidence of warfare in the same letter, this time committed by the Dakota against a Chippewa.

The advices that I received daily concerning the number of savages of his own tribe whom Achiganaga was gathering at Kiaonan [Keweenaw] under pretext, he said, of going to war this spring against the Nadouecioux, to avenge the death of one of his relatives, a son of Onenous.... (WHC 16:117).

Although Achiganaga was an Ottawa, the father of the boy who was killed was a Chippewa.

The discrepancy between La Potherie's account of Chippewa-Dakota relations and the hostilities reported by Warren and Duluth appears to be the result of La Potherie's reliance on data supplied by Perrot. Citing internal evidence, Kellogg (1968:265-266) claims that Perrot's memoirs were written with the intention of demonstrating the efficacy of diplomatic measures over military intervention in controlling the recalcitrant Fox Indians. With such a purpose in mind, the lack of any mention of Chippewa-Dakota hostilities becomes more understandable. The failure
of French diplomatic activity in effecting a lasting peace between the Dakota and Chippewa would have reflected unfavourably on Perrot's argument concerning the Fox. This appears to be a reasonable motive for Perrot's suppressing Chippewa-Dakota hostilities in his memoir.

Chippewa faith in French diplomacy received another setback in 1689. In that year Duluth and Perrot led a delegation of Algonquian chiefs to Montreal for a grand council. Unfortunately, their arrival in Montreal was preceded by an Iroquois attack on a nearby settlement. This affair, known as the Lachine Massacre, probably undermined the faith of the Chippewa delegates in the French-inspired peace concluded by Duluth ten years before (Smith 1973:38; WHC 16:134; Kellogg 1968:244-245).

Chippewa-Dakota relations appear to have remained unstable and tending toward hostilities for the next few years. In 1693, Le Sueur was sent to maintain peace at Chequamegon (Margry 6:55). The primary motivation for this peace mission appears to have been the maintenance of French trade contacts with the Dakota:

Lesueur, another voyageur, is to remain at Chagouamigon and to endeavour to maintain the peace lately concluded between the Sauteurs and the Scioux. This is of the greatest consequence, as it is now the sole pass by which access can be had to the latter Nation, whose trade is very profitable... Lesueur, it is hoped, will facilitate the Northern route for us by means of the great influence he possesses among the Scioux (NYCD 9:570).
Significantly, reference is made to a recent peace between the Dakota and Chippewa. By 1693, the peace concluded by Duluth in 1679 would have been fourteen years old. It is unlikely that this same peace would have been described as recent. Therefore, a new peace would appear to have been concluded since Duluth's effort. Also of interest is the indication that peace hinged on the Dakota rather than the Chippewa.

Fort Le Sueur (or Fort Bon Secours) was built in 1694, on the Upper Mississippi within Dakota territory, as a further effort to establish peace (Shea 1861:90). A maneuver of this type directly contradicts Hickerson's explanation for Chippewa-Dakota warfare. Instead of producing peace, a French fort on Dakota territory should have resulted in warfare, as Hickerson has claimed occurred in the 1730s (1970:66).

Whether Fort Le Sueur was successful in achieving its objective remains uncertain. One report for 1696-97 states that a particular Miami band had been attacked by both Dakota and Chippewa warriors (NYCD 9:672). It is unclear, however, whether both groups were members of the same war party. The attack on the same band of Miamis by both groups may have been coincidental since the report states that: "Affairs were in great confusion throughout all those countries, and different Nations allied to us seemed disposed to wage war among themselves."
Direct references to Dakota-Chippewa relations between 1696 and 1718 are lacking in the ethnohistoric record. However, it would be a mistake to consider such negative evidence as indicative of a lack of activity. Rather, this lack of information appears attributable to a lack of qualified reporters. A combination of a glutted beaver market and the ascendancy of an anti-imperialist faction in Canada resulted in the withdrawal of licenses for the western fur trade (Kellogg 1968:158-159,257-258; Innis 1977:67-69). Although the French occupation of Louisiana between 1698 and 1702 (Giraud 1974:31) opened new avenues of trade, little information on Chippewa-Dakota relations was reported. Possibly this lack of comment was the result of remoteness from the Chippewa villages on Lake Superior.

Although there appears to be little direct evidence of Chippewa-Dakota hostility between 1696 and 1718, continued hostility can be inferred from the relations of these two groups to the Fox Indians. Wedel (1974:164) describes the Fox as one of the Dakotas' chief enemies at the beginning of the eighteenth century. However, Winchell, in examining the next few years' events, detected a growing ambivalence on the part of the Dakota toward the Fox. He believed that the Dakota were "...with characteristic non-fidelity, sometimes fighting against the Sauk and Foxes, and sometimes with them against the Ojibwa and French" (Winchell 1911:529).
This ambivalent feeling appears to have continued for a number of years. In 1714, Charlevoix (5:305) mentions that the Dakota often joined with the Fox. At the same time, it seems that the Fox and Chippewa were usually hostile (Kellogg 1968:299). In fact, three canoes of Fox Indians were attacked by the Chippewa outside Detroit in 1712 (WHC 16:268). By 1717, the Dakota appear to have been inclined more toward the Fox. In that year Charlevoix (WHC 5:85) refers to an alliance between the two groups.

Relations between the Fox and Dakota appear to have solidified by 1718. The French presence at Chequamegon and Kaministiquia had been re-established at that time and Dakota-Chippewa hostilities are again directly mentioned. In 1718, the Dakota killed seventeen Indians near Kaministiquia. This attack so alarmed the Chequamegon Chippewa that they began to prepare to go to war against the Dakota. When two officers from La Pointe, Pachet and Linctot, attempted to censure the Dakota for the attack, they discovered that the Dakota had formed an alliance with the Fox and were implacable (Neill 1890:112; Margry 6:508-509). Apparently, by this time, two hostile alliances had formed; the first between the Indians at Chequamegon and Kaministiquia and the second between the Fox and Dakota. The net result of these two alliances was evidently a continuation of Chippewa-Dakota warfare.

Hostilities between the Fox and Chippewa were still
current in 1724. At that time the French were anxious to establish a reconciliation between the two tribes so that trade could be reopened with the Dakota (WHC 16:441-442). Although there is no direct reference to Chippewa-Dakota warfare in 1724, attempts by the French to conclude a peace between the Chippewa and Dakota a few years later indicate continued hostility (WHC 3:158, 165-166). An extract from a letter written by Longueil at Quebec in 1726 describes the situation.

In the beginning of this month, I received a letter from Sieur De Linctot, commanding at La Pointe, wherein he gives me advice from the Sauteurs (Chippeways) who are come down expressly on account of arrangements he has made to establish peace between the Sioux and the Sauteurs. He has caused the Sioux prisoners to be returned, which has put them on good terms with the Chippeways, and the Sioux have asked for a missionary. He has sent two Frenchmen to them (WHC 3:158).

The French achieved their objective and established Fort Beauharnois, complete with the requested missionary, on Lake Pepin in 1727 (Shea 1861:167-175). However, they do not appear to have been able to maintain a stable relationship with all the Dakota groups and abandoned the post the following year (WHC 17:42). The post was abandoned because the Western Dakota favoured the Fox against the French (WHC 17:27,37).

Evidently, the French expeditions against the Fox
in 1730 (WHC 5:104-108) and possible Fox attack on the Dakota altered the Dakotas' attitude toward the Fox (WHC 17:117,206). With the temporary removal of the threat posed by the Fox, Fort Beauharnois was re-established in 1731 (WHC 17:135-140). This post was intended to both renew trade with the Dakota and to allow the westward continuation of La Verendrye's explorations (WHC 17:140; Burpee 1968:85). It seems that the Dakota and Chippewa were also at peace during this time, as La Verendrye mentions hearing of a joint war party lurking near the Assiniboine River in 1733 (Burpee 1968:139). Reports of a new alliance between the Fox and the Western Dakota groups in 1736 suggests another shift in the Dakotas' attitude, probably inspired by the Chickasaw defeat of a major French expedition in that year which had wide ranging repercussions in the Northwest (WHC 17:259).

Chippewa-Dakota Relations: 1736-1760

Hickerson (1962:69-71; 1970:71; 1974:43-45) has argued that 1736 was the dividing point in Dakota-Chippewa relations between Chippewa commercial imperialism and conquest imperialism. However, an examination of the ethnohistoric record does not reveal such an abrupt shift in relations. Just as periods of peace and hostility alternated in the years before 1736, so did they afterwards.
Hickerson has asserted that warfare between the Chippewa and Dakota in 1736 heralded an era of expansion by conquest for the Chippewa of Chequamegon and Kaminishtiquia (1962:65-72; 1970:66; 1973:30; 1974:45). However, by 1736 the Dakota inhabiting the woodland areas south and west of Lake Superior were only a small part of the Dakota population. A French census of 1736 lists only 300 warriors for the woodlands region as opposed to 2,000 warriors for the prairie and parklands region (NYCD 9:1055). It would thus appear that a population movement of the Dakota preceded 1736. Warfare in the woodlands region between the Chippewa and Dakota thus appears to have occurred on the fringe of Dakota territories at this time, certainly not in the areas of highest population concentration.

As Hickerson has pointed out, it is clear that relations between the Chippewa and Dakota were hostile in 1736. The catalyst in producing this particular instance of hostility was the massacre of twenty-one Frenchmen on Lake of the Woods by both Woods and Prairie Dakota in 1736 (Burpee 1968:262-266; WHC 17:277-278). However, the real reason for Chippewa-Dakota warfare, according to Hickerson (1970:66), was the advance of the French trade frontier in the 1730s. This advance, which gave the Dakota direct access to French traders, supposedly destroyed the Chippewas' middleman position and forced them to fight for what they had previously gotten through trade (Hickerson 1974:45).
Although the Dakota and Chippewa had renewed active conflict in 1736, attempts were already being made by 1738 to resolve the crisis (WHC 17:278-279, 310). The situation had calmed down by 1739 so that conditions were peaceful enough for the re-establishment of posts, probably including Fort Beauharnois which had been abandoned in 1737 (WHC 17:36; JR 69:39). This peaceful situation would seem to have included both the Chippewa and Dakota, for both groups participated in the French campaign of that year against the Chickasaw (Stone & Chaput 1978:605).

Maintenance of a peaceful state was impossible in 1739. Both the Dakota and Chippewa had war parties operating by 1740 (WHC 17:329-330, 360-362). Another attempt to establish peace was made in 1742 when a number of Indian tribes, including the Chippewa and Dakota, sent delegates to Montreal (WHC 17:401,403,407). However, the Chippewa delegates appear to have had a more cynical reason for attending the conference. According to information given by Father Coquart:

...it was intended to make a descent on the Sioux...that the result, nevertheless, of the different councils held was that the Saulteur of point Chagouamigon who went down this summer to Montreal to confirm the peace which they had made with the Sioux were to amuse them during part of the winter by living on good terms with them, so that the Sioux, considering themselves to be at peace and having no suspicion, shall all of a sudden find their enemies on their hands (Burpee 1968:383-384).
Although French officials were forewarned of the attack, they were unable to prevent it (WHC 17:427-428).

Officially, the Chippewa and Dakota were still at peace in 1744 (WHC 17:441-442). However, despite the official status of the two groups, hostile acts still continued. A realistic appraisal is reported in a letter from Beauharnois to the French minister:

...it is rather difficult to Prevent the hatred they have borne one another for a great many years from manifesting itself occasionally by slight acts of Treachery which they commit Amongst themselves and which happen at the very moment they are supposed to be reconciled judging by appearances and by their mutual promises (WHC 17:442).

Although conditions such as those described above can hardly be called peaceful, neither are they descriptive of an attempt to conquer territory. Yet Hickerson (1974:45) persists in describing Chippewa behaviour during this period as an attempt to "...conquer by arms the country they had been entering as allies of the entrenched Sioux population." Peace is also reported between the Dakota and the Chequamegon Chippewa in 1746 (NYCD 10:37; Winchell 1911:533) and 1750 (WHC 18:63,77-9).

Although the Chequamegon Chippewa were officially at peace with the Dakota in 1750 and 1751 according to French officials, other Chippewa groups did not consider
themselves bound by the same agreement. The Chippewa of Sault Ste. Marie, for example, refused to accept this peace and were reportedly planning to attack the Dakota in 1751 (WHC 18:101).

According to Hickerson (1962:12,65-72; 1970:66), the Chippewa groups which moved inland from Lake Superior and fought against the Dakota were those from Chequamegon and Kaministiquia. However, the warfare of Chippewa groups from Michipicoten, Sault Ste. Marie, and Lake Ontario (WHC 17:325,362; 18:84-5,101) against the Dakota is inexplicable in terms of Hickerson's colonialist interpretation. This is especially true in the case of the Sault Ste. Marie Chippewa, mentioned above, who attacked the Dakota in spite of the official peace between the Chequamegon Chippewa and the Dakota. There appears to be no evidence that these groups were dependent upon access to hunting grounds within Dakota territory.

In 1760, toward the end of the French regime in Canada, a group of twelve hundred Indians including Chippewa, Cree, and Dakota, are reported as coming to aid in the defense of Quebec (WHC 18:212-213). It would seem that some form of rapprochement would have had to precede any such joint effort. Therefore, Chippewa-Dakota relations at the end of the French regime in Canada appear to have been something less than completely hostile.
Warfare and Fur Trade Colonialism

Although Hickerson has attempted to explain Chippewa-Dakota relations in terms of their involvement in the fur trade using a colonialist perspective, his interpretation is not supported by actual events. His division of relations into a period of commercial imperialism and a period of conquest do not adequately reflect the realities of the situation in terms of either peace or warfare.

The period of commercial imperialism supposedly lasting from 1680 to 1736 was not marked by peaceful coexistence as Hickerson has claimed. Supposedly, peace was maintained through the middleman position of the Chippewa who supplied trade goods needed by the Dakota in exchange for access to vital hunting territories (Hickerson 1962: 65-66; 1970:66; 1973:30; 1974:45). The pattern of hostilities is similar to that described by Hickerson for the warfare of later years (1962:13; 1970:80). Such warfare is described as limiting access to hunting territories during this latter period. If so, similar conditions would have prevented Chippewa access to Dakota hunting grounds, except for brief incursions between 1680 and 1736. A situation of this type is contrary to the conditions posited by Hickerson for the same years.
Firearms and Warfare

The role of the gun in warfare has significant implications for Chippewa-Dakota relations between 1660 and 1736. It has been generally argued that the possession of guns gave Indian groups a significant advantage in warfare over other groups without guns (Lewis 1973:46-49; Secoy 1953; Giannettino 1977; Mandelbaum 1979:37). If this is the case, it is difficult to explain the existence of Dakota-Chippewa warfare during a period when, according to Hickerson (1962:65-66; 1970:66), the Dakota were dependent upon the Chippewa for European trade goods, including guns. In fact, Dakota-Chippewa warfare did exist. It is not to be expected that the Chippewa would arm their enemies (Giannettino 1977:23); therefore, two alternative explanations suggest themselves. The first possible explanation is that the Dakota had other trade sources. As this question lies outside the scope of the present chapter, it will be dealt with in the next chapter. The other alternative is that the possession of firearms was not critical to the conduct of Chippewa-Dakota warfare.

Perrot's account of an attack on the Dakota by a combined force of Huron and Ottawa sometime between 1657 and 1660 demonstrates that the possession of firearms was not a critical factor:
...The Hurons, so rash as to imagine that the Scioux were incapable of resisting them without iron weapons and firearms, conspired with the Outaouas to undertake a war against them, purposing to drive the Scioux from their own country in order that they themselves might thus secure a greater territory in which to seek their living. The Outaouas and Hurons accordingly united their forces and marched against the Scioux. They believed that as soon as they appeared the latter would flee, but they were greatly deceived, for the Scioux sustained their attack, and even repulsed them;... (Blair 1969(1): 164).

The device which enabled the Dakota to overcome the advantage derived by the Huron and Ottawa from their guns was a system of alliances with other villages, for Perrot goes on to state that:

...if they [the Huron and Ottawa] had not retreated, they would have been utterly routed by the great number of men who came from other villages to the aid of their allies (Blair 1969(1):164).

Another combined war party made up of Huron, Ottawa, Sauk, Fox and Potawatomi also met with a serious defeat when they attacked the Dakota in 1671-72 (Blair 1969(1):189). Perrot reports that this group was well armed with firearms and ammunition and contained over a thousand men. The Dakota use of mutual alliances appears to have provided a successful answer to the threat posed by the use of firearms in warfare.

The use of firearms in woodlands warfare does not
appear to have been considered a critical element as late as 1732. An attack on a Fox village by a group of Iroquois and Huron in that year was decided by hand to hand combat:

...The Chiefs told the Young men not to amuse themselves by shooting; they made them lay down their guns, and with a tomahawk in one hand and a Dagger in the other they forced the Reynards back into their Village; they Pursued them so closely and so great was the Carnage that 70 of the Reynards were killed on the spot, and 14 were made prisoners; 80 women and Children were also killed, and 140 of them were captured (WHC 17:150).

The evidence cited above indicates that the mere possession of firearms did not automatically give superiority in warfare between 1660 and 1736. Thus, Chippewa-Dakota warfare could possibly have been conducted on a viable basis despite differential access to firearms.
CHAPTER III

ACQUISITION OF EUROPEAN TRADE GOODS BY THE DAKOTA

The Problem

The scheme of fur trade colonialism applied by Hickerson (1962, 1970, 1973, 1974) to Chippewa-Dakota relations assumes that the Chippewa were able to control the flow of trade goods to the Dakota. He cites this as the cause for peaceful relations between the two groups from 1680 to 1736: "The Chippewas brought European commodities inland to the Sioux in exchange for peltry and hunting privileges" (Hickerson 1970:45). The supposed destruction of Chippewa middleman trade in the 1730s as a result of the expansion of the French trading frontier has been cited by Hickerson to explain the outbreak of Chippewa-Dakota warfare in 1736 (1962:69-70; 1973:30).

Reference to the ethnohistoric record in the previous chapter has hopefully demonstrated that the assumed link between Chippewa middlemen and Dakota consumers did not guarantee peaceful relations. In fact, evidence of Chippewa-Dakota warfare between 1680 and 1736 directly contradicts Hickerson's interpretation of relations
between the two groups during those years. The apparent reason for Hickerson's lack of success in predicting actual Chippewa-Dakota relations lies in his assumption that the Chippewa controlled the Dakotas' acquisition of trade goods. However, that assumption is most likely incorrect. Between 1680 and 1760 the Dakota were generally able to maintain access to alternative supply sources. These alternate sources of trade goods can be divided into three categories: (1) French trading posts, (2) unlicensed or illegal trade by coureurs de bois, and (3) trade with non-Chippewa Indian middlemen.

Early Trade Contacts

The first acquisition of European trade goods by the Dakota has yet to be documented. However, by shortly after the middle of the seventeenth century, the ethnohistoric record refers to two sources of Dakota trade contacts. The first of these trade contacts likely occurred via the Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi, although the Spanish settlement of Santa Fe cannot be ruled out as a source of trade goods. Acquisition of trade goods from the south is referred to in the Jesuit Relation of 1659-60:

Now we know that, proceeding Southward for about three hundred leagues from the end of Lake Superior, of which I have just spoken, we come to the bay of St. Esprit,
which lies on the thirtieth degree of latitude and the two hundred and eightieth of longitude, in the Gulf of Mexico, on the coast of Florida; and in a Southwesterly direction from the same extremity of lake Superior, it is about two hundred leagues to another lake, which empties into the great South Sea. It is from one of these two coasts that the Savages who live some sixty leagues to the West of our lake Superior obtain European goods, and even say that they have seen some Europeans there (JR 45:223).

The Indians referred to are evidently the Dakota, who are described as living sixty leagues west of Lake Superior on a map of the lake given in the Jesuit Relation of 1670-71. Probably trade from the south was accomplished through an already established native trade network. The presence of this network is attested to by the discovery of beads and ornaments made from the shells of Gulf coast marine molusks at late Woodland sites on the Upper Mississippi and Missouri Rivers (Winchell 1911:495; Howard 1953:130).

The second area of Dakota trade contact was with the French settlements on the St. Lawrence River. It probably began shortly before 1660 with the voyages of Radisson and Grosillers (Adams 1961:79-160). Although it is possible that the Dakota received some trade goods from this source through Indian middlemen or other coureurs de bois at an earlier date, the amount of these goods was probably small (Blair 1969(1):159-160). The Dakota contacted by Radisson and Grosillers appear to have been a
woodlands group. The Jesuit Relation of 1659-60 (45:237-239) describes them as a separate nation from Dakota living on the prairies.

The familiarity of the Dakota with firearms prior to 1679 appears indicative of early trade contacts. Secoy (1953:42) has referred to a Dakota victory over an attacking group of Huron, Ottawa, Fox, Sauk, and Potawatomi (Blair 1969(1):189) in 1671-72 as evidence for early acquisition of firearms by the Dakota. He claims that such a victory would only have been possible if the Dakota had been armed with guns, as were their attackers. However, his evidence is merely conjunctural, as Perrot's account of the battle, which Secoy cites, contains no mention of the Dakota using firearms.

The Jesuit Relation of 1673-74 (58:257-263) provides a more convincing example of Dakota acquaintance with firearms. This account describes the massacre of ten Dakota who had been brought to Sault St. Marie in an effort to establish peace. At this conference, a group of Cree and Mississaugas resolved to massacre the Dakota in an effort to sabotage the peace efforts. Perceiving their intentions, the Dakota proceeded to defend themselves with some guns, which they found by chance, killing or wounding forty of their attackers before they were overwhelmed. The success of this group of Dakota in using guns would argue for prior experience in view of the complex procedure required to load the guns
of that period (Secoy 1953:101-102).

French Trading Posts

Hickerson has claimed that the French trading frontier expanded to include the Dakota in the late 1720s and 1730s (1962:67-72; 1970:66; 1974:42-43). While French trading posts were established on Dakota lands during those years, it would be more appropriate to consider this effort as a reestablishment of the French presence in the area. During the years from 1683 to 1702, Duluth, Perrot, and Le Sueur maintained trading establishments near or on Dakota lands. The evacuation of French trading posts from the Northwest by order of a royal ordinance in 1696 signalled a withdrawal from Dakota territory. However, this was a general withdrawal, including trading posts at Chippewa villages on Lake Superior as well.

Franquelin's map of 1688 (Kellogg 1968: frontpiece) shows a Fort St. Croix on the portage between the Bois Brule and St. Croix Rivers. Both Kellogg (1968:225) and Neill (1974:441) attribute the establishment of the post to Duluth. It was probably established in the fall of 1683 when Duluth travelled from Green Bay to Lake Superior in an attempt to pacify the Dakota and open a passage from Lake Superior to the interior (WHC 16:111). If Duluth's intention was to establish peaceful relations between the
Dakota and Chippewa, his efforts would pose a serious contradiction to Hickerson's thesis. Since Fort St. Croix straddled the boundary between Chippewa and Dakota territories, it would pose a threat to any aspirations of the Chippewa to act as middlemen. Hickerson (1962:69-70; 1973:30) has argued that a similar threat to Chippewa middlemen in the 1730s resulted in warfare. It would be illogical to assume that such a threat to the Chippewa middleman position in 1683 would be viewed passively, while a similar threat in the 1730s produced warfare.

The John K. Bear Winter Count of the Yanktonai Dakota refers to their first contact with a white man in 1684 (Howard 1976:21). It is probable that, because of their more westerly location, this group was contacted later than were the Santee Dakota (Shea 1861:102). Howard has suggested that this 1684 contact occurred at one of the posts established by Perrot on the Mississippi in 1683 (Howard 1976:21). Winchell (1911:526) has claimed that a Fort Perrot was established on the Upper Mississippi in 1683. This post is marked on a map entitled Warren's Distribution of the Ojibways or Anishinaubay in Minnesota, dated 1852, where it is labeled "Grand Encampment" (Winchell 1911:583). This may be the post mentioned by La Potherie as located near the Dakota (Blair 1969(2):33). No mention of this post is made on the Franquelin map of 1683, so it would appear to have been abandoned before the map was made.
The white man referred to by the John K. Bear Winter Count may have been either Duluth, Perrot, or an unknown coureur de bois. The Dakota counted their years as "winters", that is, from the first snow of one year to the first snow of the next (Howard 1976:16). In this case the John K. Bear Winter Count for 1684 may refer to either Duluth's expedition of 1683 or the post established by Perrot in 1683.

Fort Perrot appears to have been pillaged by the Dakota (Blair 1969(2):33). This event probably took place in 1684 when Perrot was in the east fighting against the Iroquois (Blair 1969(1):232-243). Although La Potherie attributes the pillaging of the fort to the lack of men to defend it, most of them having been withdrawn to fight the Iroquois, there appear to have been other reasons. In 1682, La Salle was complaining of the competition afforded to his own establishment in the Illinois country by traders operating through Green Bay (WHC 16:109-110). An accusation against La Salle by Perrot indicates that La Salle's protests were not limited to letter writing:

...the news which were received through the voyageurs, who reported that men of Monsieur de la Salle were making trouble for the Frenchmen who went [up there relying] on their permits from Bay des Puans as far as the Illinois; and that they even carried away the property of the traders (Blair 1969(1):243).
It may be that the pillaging of Fort Perrot was influenced more by competition between French traders than by Dakota hostility (Charlevoix 3:246).

The next post established by Perrot on the Upper Mississippi appears to have been Fort Trempealeau (Nute 1930:384; Kellogg 1968:231-232). This post is labeled "Butte D'Hyvernement" on Franquelin's map of 1688 (Kellogg 1968: frontpiece) and Warren's map of 1852 (Winchell 1911: 583). Both Kellogg and Nute have assigned a date of 1685 for the establishment of Fort Trempealeau. Warren's map of 1852 gives the post a date of 1688, possibly using the date of the Franquelin map for the post's establishment. Apparently Fort Trempealeau was used only as a wintering post and was abandoned by Perrot in the spring of 1686 (Kellogg 1968:232).

Following the abandonment of Fort Trempealeau, Perrot established Fort St. Antoine on Lake Pepin and Fort St. Nicolas at the mouth of the Wisconsin River. Both of these posts are marked on Franquelin's map of 1688. Perrot was ordered to return by Denonville, but managed to avoid obeying the order on one pretext or another until the spring of 1687 (Blair 1969(1):244-245). Perrot participated in Denonville's campaign against the Iroquois in 1687 (Blair 1969(1):244-245). Following the conclusion of the campaign Perrot went to Montreal to purchase new supplies of merchandise and learned there of the loss of the furs he
Map 4

French Posts on the Upper Mississippi

1. Fort St. Croix 1683
2. Fort Perrot or Grand Encampment 1683-84
3. Fort Trempealeau or Butte D'Hivernement 1685
4. Fort St. Nicholas 1686 or 1687
5. Fort St. Antoine 1686-89
6. Fort Bon Secours 1694
7. Fort Le Sueur 1695
8. Unnamed post on Mille Lacs Lake 1695
9. Fort L'Huillier or Fort Vert 1700-02
10. Fort Beaucharnois 1727-29, 1731-37
11. Fort Linctot 1731
12. Fort Marin 1739, 1750-56
had stored at Green Bay to a fire (Blair 1969(2):25). He was one of the Frenchmen who returned to the Dakota country in 1688 (Blair 1969(2):27-28). In 1689, Perrot took formal possession of the Upper Mississippi region for France at Fort St. Antoine (Winchell 1911:526; NYCD 9:372). Evidently the French continued to trade within Dakota territory. Perrot mentions meeting a canoeload of French traders coming down from the Dakota country in 1690 while in route to establish a post south of the mouth of the Wisconsin (Blair 1969(2):65; WHC 16:151).

Green Bay, rather than Chequamegon, appears to have been the major entry point for the Dakota trade between 1683 and 1690. Duluth began his voyage to pacify the Dakota in 1683 from Green Bay. Le Sueur also appears to have entered the interior from Green Bay at the beginning of his career in 1683 (Shea 1861:95; McWilliams 1953:45-46). In addition, the Jesuit mission of De Pere at Green Bay was used by Perrot and other traders as a warehouse for pelts (Blair 1969(2):25). Although French trade with the Dakota was not viewed favourably at this time by the Indian groups around Green Bay, they apparently were not able to prevent it (Blair 1969(2):17-20,28). Some idea of the magnitude of this trade can be gained from the fact that at least forty Frenchmen were involved in the trade in 1688 (Blair 1969(2):27).

Following on the heels of Perrot's efforts, Le Sueur
established the next series of posts on Dakota territory. Le Sueur was no newcomer to the Dakota trade (Wedel 1974: 159), but his earlier experiences were probably those of a voyageur. Between 1694 and 1702, Le Sueur or his men were responsible for the establishment of four different posts on Dakota lands. In 1693, Le Sueur was sent to Chequamegon to maintain peace between the Dakota and Chippewa (Margry 6:55; NYCD 9:570). The post at Chequamegon was only part of the peace effort, the other part involved the establishment of a post among the Dakota on the Mississippi (Shea 1861:90).

The statement of merchandise which Le Sueur carried to Chequamegon in 1693 included five fusils, 75 pounds of balls, 56 pounds of powder, 38 pounds of goose shot, 200 gunflints, 5 pistols, and other items intended as gifts for the Dakota and Chippewa (Wedel 1974:159). Evidently the trade goods which Le Sueur took to Chequamegon far exceeded the amount of official presents (Wedel 1974:160).

Delisle's 1702 map of the Mississippi River shows two French forts near the mouth of the Chippewa River (Riviere de Bon Secours) (Wedel 1974:168; Giraud 1974:50). The fort marked on the Wisconsin side of the Mississippi probably refers to Fort St. Antoine established by Perrot in 1686 (Kellogg 1968: map facing p. 242; Giraud 1974:50; Wedel 1974:160). The fort on the west side of the Mississippi, opposite the mouth of the Chippewa River, is labeled Fort
Bon Secours on the Franquelin map of 1697 (Wedel 1974: 167) and Delisle's 1700 map of North America.

In 1695 Le Sueur established Fort Le Sueur, probably on Prairie Island in the Upper Mississippi (Clark 1910-11:98). The stated purpose of this fort was to establish peace between the Dakota and Chippewa. According to La Harpe's version of Le Sueur's journal:

What gave rise to this enterprise so far back as the year 1695, was this. Mr. Le Sueur by order of the Count de Frontenac, Governor General of Canada, built a fort on an island in the Mississippi more than 200 leagues above the Illinois, in order to effect a peace between the Sauteurs (nations who dwell on the shores of a lake of five hundred leagues circumference, one hundred leagues east of the river) and the Scioux, posted on the Upper Mississippi. The same year, according to his orders, he went down to Montreal in Canada, with a Sauteur chief named Chingouabe and a Sciou named Tioscate.... (WHC 16:177-178; Shea 1861:89-90).

As mentioned previously, such French efforts to maintain peace between the Chippewa and Dakota contradict Hickerson's interpretation of the role of Chippewa middlemen in maintaining peaceful relations (Hickerson 1962:69-70; 1973:30).

Le Sueur had intended to return to the Mississippi in 1696; however, the death of the Dakota chief, Tioscate, whom he had intended to escort, deprived him of an excuse to return (WHC 16:178; Shea 1861:91). While Le Sueur was absent in Montreal, the traders remaining at Fort Le Sueur
were harrassed by Indians from Green Bay and, as a result, some of the traders returned to Montreal. The remaining associates of Le Sueur abandoned the post, joined with other traders, and ascended the Mississippi to establish a post, probably near Mille Lacs Lake (Wedel 1974:161). This last post was probably the result of the expedition made by Charleville (Neill 1890:3; Winchell 1911:527; Winsor 1895:58).

Le Sueur's return to the Dakota country was prevented for a number of years by the royal ordinance issued in 1696 which revoked all licenses for the western fur trade. Violation of the ordinance was to be punished by condemnation to slavery in the galleys (Kellogg 1968:257). Le Sueur continued to plan future operations in the Upper Mississippi region despite the ban on the fur trade. In view of the surplus of beaver, which was one of the causes of the royal ordinance of 1696 (Innis 1977:67-72), Le Sueur switched his interests in the Upper Mississippi from the fur trade to mining and obtained royal permission to mine and trade in furs, other than beaver, in 1697 (Margry 6:62-64). However, on his return to Canada, his ship was captured by the British and Le Sueur destroyed his commission in order to keep it from the British (Winchell 1911:528; Wedel 1974:161). He obtained another commission in 1698, but was prevented from implementing it by officials in Canada (Wedel 1974:161). Nothing daunted, Le Sueur
obtained permission to enter the interior via the Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi, where his relative by marriage, d'Iberville, had established a post at Biloxi Bay (Shea 1861:91; Wedel 1974:161). The stated objective of the expedition was to mine a deposit of bluish-green clay on the Blue Earth River which was represented as containing large amounts of copper (Shea 1861:91,105; McWilliams 1953:50).

Le Sueur arrived at the Blue Earth River in 1700 and established Fort L'Huillleur, also known as Fort Vert (Shea 1861:101; McWilliams 1953:48). It would appear that Le Sueur had more on his mind than mining non-existent copper (Wedel 1974:162), as the Andre Penicaut narrative reports that Le Sueur obtained more than 400 beaver robes, each composed of nine skins (McWilliams 1953:51). In 1701 Le Sueur left Fort L'Huillleur to return to the Gulf of Mexico with his cargo, leaving the post in charge of thirteen Frenchmen. On his departure, he promised ammunition from the Illinois settlements. A boat and crew with 2,000 pounds of ammunition were dispatched but, unfortunately, the cargo was lost. Another attempt was made to supply the post, but evidently failed, for the men at Fort L'Huillleur, in 1702, buried their trade goods and abandoned the post due to a lack of ammunition (McWilliams 1953:54-55, 62).

Following the abandonment of Fort L'Huillleur in 1702, no French posts are known to have been established
on Dakota lands until Fort Beauharnois was built in 1727 (Shea 1861:172). Although Fort Beauharnois was well organized for trade and included a blacksmith among its staff (WHC 17:10-15,57), it was plagued with trouble by the Fox (WHC 17:37). This trouble led to the abandonment of the post by its commandant, De Boucherville, and twelve others, including Father Guignas in 1728 (WHC 17:37). Evidently a cadet, La Jemerais⁶ remained in command of the post until 1729 when he abandoned it (WHC 17:66-68,77).

A post among the Dakota was considered a vital requirement for establishing a peace between the Dakota and the Cree and Assiniboin which would allow western exploration through the Boundary Waters region (WHC 17:140,144, 156). Accordingly, a new Sioux Company was formed in 1731 to carry on the trade at Fort Beauharnois (WHC 17:135-139). Linctot, the commandant, set forth in 1731 and built Fort Linctot, where he wintered, moving upstream in the spring to the site of Fort Beauharnois (WHC 17:186-189). It is probable that a new Fort Beauharnois was built on higher ground to eliminate flooding (WHC 17:77-78). St. Pierre took over command of the post from Linctot in 1734, Linctot remaining as second in command (WHC 17:166,273). The post was abandoned and burned in 1737 as a result of Dakota-Chippewa hostilities (WHC 17:264,269-274).

Some idea of the volume of trade conducted at Fort Beauharnois can be gained from the correspondence of 1735.
In a letter dated October 26, 1735, Hoquart claims that the combined production of Verendrye's posts in the west and the post among the Dakota was nearly 100,000 beaver skins (WHC 17:230). In another letter to Maurepas, Beauharnois gives La Verendrye's production for that year as 600 packages of peltries, probably not all of them beaver (Burpee 1968:205-206). Assuming standard 90 pound packages and an all beaver content, data taken from Coues (1965a(1):285) suggests that each of these packages contained about 70 beaver pelts. Thus, Verendrye's 600 packages contained approximately 42,000 beaver pelts. This leaves a total of 58,000 beaver pelts as the production of the Dakota post in 1735.

A Fort Marin is claimed by Kellogg (1968:339) and Nute (1930:384) to have been established in 1739 opposite the mouth of the Wisconsin River. However, the documentary evidence for this post's existence is slim. In 1739 Marin reports that conditions were favourable for the re-establishment of posts, but makes no mention of a fort at the mouth of the Wisconsin. In any case, the Dakota were apparently without a post in 1742 when they requested a French officer, and by intimation, a post (WHC 17:397). A French officer named Lusignan was reported wintering with the Dakota in 1745 (NYCD 10:37), but by 1747 the Dakota were trading at La Baye on Green Bay (WHC 17:452).

The evidence for a second Fort Marin is more con-
elusive. Marin is reported to have wintered at Lake Pepin in 1750-51 (WHC 18:78). Evidently, he established the fort at this time, as per his orders (WHC 18:63,66). His son took over the post in 1752 (WHC 18:158), abandoning it in 1756 (WHC 18:184).

In summary, the establishment of French posts among the Dakota falls into three periods: (1) 1683-1702, (2) 1727-39, and (3) 1750-56. The period of longest duration was from 1683 to 1702. Duluth, Perrot, and Le Sueur maintained trading posts within or near Dakota territory for about nineteen years. This occurred during the period which Hickerson has claimed that Dakota-Chippewa relations were characterized by peaceful middleman trade (1962:65-68; 1970:66; 1973:29-30; 1974:36-43). Logically, the opportunity for the Dakota to have traded directly with French traders should have obviated any middleman profit advantages for the Chippewa.

The interval between 1739 and 1750, when the Dakota were without a French post, also poses a problem for Hickerson's interpretation of Chippewa-Dakota relations. If warfare was triggered by the expansion of the French trading frontier into Dakota lands, then warfare should have ceased when the French posts were withdrawn about 1739. Hickerson attempts to explain the continuation of warfare by stating that:
The Chippewa of Chequamegon might have reinstated peace with the Dakota in view of the withdrawal of direct trade by the French at Lake Pepin. But we must hypothesize that the expansion to the west of the Canadian French, which actually represented an effort on their part to compete with new trading cliques formed in the recently established Louisiana colony who were attempting to open trade along the Missouri River, was an irreversible commercial movement. The Chippewa could not depend upon the permanency of the withdrawal of Canadian French trade from the upper Mississippi, and the momentary alleviation of their loss of commercial hegemony was not sufficient to appease a general sense of the disruption of commerce (1962:70).

It has been argued, above, that a considerable threat to Chippewa middleman aspirations had existed previously between 1683 and 1702. Therefore, in view of Hickerson's hypothesis, it should come as no surprise that Chippewa-Dakota relations were hostile throughout the period of the French Regime.

**Coureurs de Bois**

In addition to trade conducted through legitimate French trading posts, it seems that the Dakota also received a substantial amount of trade goods through an illicit trade conducted by French *coureurs de bois*. Although the French term "coureurs de bois" or its English equivalent "bush-ranger", has been used in a number of ways, its use here will be limited to those Frenchmen who operated outside...
the legal structure of the fur trade as established in Canada (Kellogg 1968:367; WHC 16:202).

Unfortunately, the *coureurs de bois* left little behind in the way of documentation specifically related to their trade with the Dakota. Possibly, their roving lifestyle contributed to this lack of evidence. However, it seems probable that the outlaw status of *coureurs de bois* was a more effective restraint on any journalistic inclinations. The harsh punishment given *coureurs de bois*, such as condemnation to slavery in the royal galleys (Kellogg 1968: 257), would make it imprudent to leave incriminating evidence lying about.

Despite harsh punishments, it seems that it was easier to enact restrictions on the conduct of the fur trade in Canada than to enforce them against the encroachments of the *coureurs de bois*. The inability of the Canadian officials to keep the *coureurs de bois* in check is attested to by the numerous amnesties granted them in 1682, 1703, 1709, and 1737 (WHC 16:109,252; 17:275). As early as 1672, Frontenac wrote to Colbert that:

...peace is to be maintained in this Country by preventing the disorders of the Coureurs de bois....their number augmenting every day, as M. de Courcelles may inform you, despite of all the ordinances that have been made, and which I have, since coming here, renewed with more severity than before. Their insolence, as I am informed, extends even to the formation
of leagues, and to the distribution of notices of rendezvous; threatening to build forts and repair toward Manatte and Orange [Manhattan and Albany], boasting that they will be received and have every protection there. They have begun last year to carry their peltries thither, which essentially prejudices the Colony.... (NYCD 9:90).

The coureurs de bois, at times, even resorted to arms to force a passage when opposed, as they did at Michilimackinac in 1737 (WHC 17:274).

The difficulty of arresting errant coureurs de bois was described by Du Chesneau in 1681 when he stated that:

It is not easy to catch either the one or the other, unless we are assisted by disinterested persons; and if favored but ever so little, they easily receive intelligence, and the woods and the rivers afford them great facilities to escape justice.... All the means employed by the King and yourself, my Lord, to keep these vagabonds within their duty, and the orders transmitted on this subject, are not only the best, but they are even full of goodness and indulgence for those wretches, did not people take upon themselves the liberty to explain them away, to amplify them, and not follow them, only insomuch as their application accords with the private interest of those who explain them (NYCD 9:153).

There is little evidence that the Canadian officials were any more successful in dealing with the problems of illegal trade in latter years. Despite attempts to control the coureurs de bois, their activities remained a problem throughout the period of the French regime.
Contact between *coureurs de bois* and the Dakota is recorded as far back as 1681 (NYCD 9:153), although it probably has greater antiquity. In the years after 1681, the *coureurs de bois* developed a considerable amount of trade with the Dakota. This trade appears to have involved contact between the Dakota and *coureurs de bois* operating from sources of supply as diverse as the French colonies of Canada and Louisiana and the English settlements in New York and Carolina. Furthermore, Dakota-*coureurs de bois* trade activities continued during periods when legitimate trading was withdrawn from the Dakota territories. Thus, the activities of *coureurs de bois* were a highly significant factor in the Dakotas' acquisition of European trade goods.

The existence of a trade between *coureurs de bois* and the Dakota in 1681 has been mentioned above. However, the system of trade employed in Canada up to 1696 (Innis 1977:67) makes it difficult to distinguish between authorized and unauthorized trade in the ethnohistoric record for those years. Nevertheless, Perrot's reference to French traders on the Upper Mississippi (Blair 1969(1):245), similar comments by La Potherie (Blair 1969(2):65,70), and references to French traders who joined Le Sueur's men in 1695 (Winchell 1911:527; Neill 1890:3) all indicate a large volume of French trade within Dakota territories. Probably some of this trade was of an unauthorized nature. In either case, it is apparent that the Dakota had access to French trade
goods up to the withdrawal of posts in 1696. It is in the years after 1696 that the coureurs de bois' activities became more apparent in supplying the Dakota with trade goods.

French attempts to regulate the fur trade on a merchantilistic basis often proved counterproductive. This was the case with the royal ordinance of 1696. The intent of the ordinance was to reduce the flow of beaver in order to cope with a glutted market (Innis 1977:67). Unfortunately for the fermiers, the ordinance's effect was quite different (Crane 1916:6; Kellogg 1968:268). The actual effect of the ordinance was predicted in a document entitled "Narrative of the most remarkable Occurrences in Canada 1696, 1697".

Will it be possible to prevent the disbanding of our Coureurs de bois?—who, being themselves deprived of a trade to which they have been accustomed from their infancy, will, most assuredly, leave without permission, despite the orders of King and Governor. If any escape, notwithstanding all the care taken to prevent them, who will be able to arrest them in the woods when they will be determined to defend themselves [and] to carry their peltries to the English? (NYCD 9:673-674; WHC 16:169).

Instead of limiting production of beaver, the royal ordinance of 1696 and restrictions on the purchase of castor gras in 1706 (Innis 1977:80) transferred trade in these items to illegal channels.

Although the champions of the royal ordinance of
1696 believed that the Indians would come from the interior to trade at Montreal (Charlevoix 5:77-78), they were mistaken (WHC 16:266). This mistake is reflected in a speech delivered by Onanguisset, a Potawatomi chief, about 1696.

Father! Since we want powder, iron, and every other necessary which you were formerly in the habit of sending us, what do you expect us to do? Are the majority of our women who have but one or two beavers to send to Montreal to procur their little supplies are they to intrust them to drunken fellows who will drink them, and bring nothing back? (NYCD 9:673).

The lack of trade by the Indians with Canada is explained in a letter from d'Aigremont to Ponchartrain, dated 1710.

When these Indians will be obliged to go to a great distance to get their necessaries, they will always go to the cheapest market; whereas, were they to obtain their supplies at their door, they would take them, whatever the price may be (WHC 16:266).

This tendency on the part of the Indians to avoid the long and hazardous trip to Montreal created a favourable situation for the coureurs de bois, who acted to fill the vacuum.

These coureurs de bois appear to have been motivated, in part, by the same desire to trade at the cheapest source of supply (Buffinton 1922:341). These cheaper sources of trade goods were the English settlements in New York and Carolina. The relative cheapness of trade at Albany
compared to Montreal is demonstrated in a table dated 1689, where a list of trade goods including guns, powder, and lead were shown to be about two and a half times more expensive at Montreal than at Albany (NYCD 9:408). The same table also includes a comment stating that:

The English do not discriminate in the quality of the Beaver; they take it all at the same rate, which is more than 50 per cent higher than the French, there being, besides, more than 100 per cent difference in the price of their trade and ours (NYCD 9:409).

Although trade with the English entailed serious risks for the coureurs de bois, it should be remembered that they were already operating under threat of condemnation to slavery in the royal galleys if they were captured by the Canadian authorities (Kellogg 1968:257).

By 1700, a considerable number of coureurs de bois were conducting their trade through Albany. A memorial presented to Bellomont by two French coureurs de bois indicates the volume of this trade.

We, Jean de Noyon and Louis Gosselin, come to place ourselves under your Excellency's protection, in the hope that you will allow us to live and trade with King William's subjects in the town of Albany, and grant us the same rights and privileges as others enjoy, in which case we submit ourselves with promise of fidelity to the laws of the government.
We are commissioned by our comrades to assure you, if our request be granted, that twenty-two, all fine young men, will come to Albany next February.

And after that we promise to bring in the month of September of the year 1701, thirty brave fellows to the said town of Albany, all laden with peltry.

And finally, we oblige ourselves further in good faith to bring, in the aforesaid month of September, on our return from hunting, ten or twelve of the principal Sachims of the Ottawawa Nations. Dated in New York this 26th October 1700 (NYCD 4: 797).

Although the passage cited above refers to the Ottawa, a note added by Bellomont to the bottom of the memorial indicates that this was a generic term used to identify all of the nations living to the north and west.

Trade between Albany and the coureurs de bois appears to have still been going strong between 1718 and 1724 (NYCD 4:415; 9:883). An entry dated for the second of September, 1725 in Wraxall's abridgement of the New York Indian records indicates that 52 canoes and 100 persons had brought in more than 788 bundles of skins to Albany (Wraxall 1968:160). It is probable that some of these skins came from the Dakota, especially in view of reports of trade between coureurs de bois and the Dakota in 1722 (Margry 6:518). Winsor (1895:176-177) claims that Hocquart, the Intendant of Canada, acknowledged that the Dakota country was tributary to the English post at Oswego.
Unfortunately, Winsor did not reference the memoir. Since Hocquart was Intendant from 1728 to 1748, Winsor could be referring to the state of affairs at any time during those years.

The English of Carolina also appear to have had a hand in the commerce of the Upper Mississippi. An extract from a letter of the directors of the Company of the Colony of Canada, dated 1701, states that:

The Company having been informed, in the month of July last, that the coureurs de bois and even the Savages had undertaken to open up commerce among the English of Carolina, and on the lower Mississippy, that they might carry thither their peltries.... (WHC 16:208-209).

The company evidently expected that the Dakota would be involved in this trade for they proposed building a post among them to forestall such an eventuality (WHC 16:209).

The Company of the Colony of Canada seems to have had considerable trouble with the coureurs de bois. Not the least of this trouble was the tendency of the Company's agents to join their ranks. In 1701 twelve of their men, with four canoes loaded with merchandise, escaped to the Indians. Surrey (1916:317) notes that since most of the merchandise was brandy, "they presumably were well received by the savage." By 1706 the Company was bankrupt, partially as a result of such defections (WHC 16:208; Surrey 1916:317).

Furs were by no means the only item traded by the
coureurs de bois to the English at Carolina. Apparently there was a considerable market for Indian slaves there as well. This trade has been documented in a letter from Ramezay and Begon to the French Minister in 1715:

Sieur de la Pierre, ..., has informed Sieur de Ramezay that about 100 Frenchmen, who secretly went up to Michilimakinac two years ago, after consuming the wares of the merchants who had equipped them, went to the Thamarois on the Mississippi river, where 47 were already established. He reports that they are living there at their ease; ... They get as many savage slaves as they wish, on the River of the Missouris, whom they use to cultivate their land; and they sell these to the English of Carolina, with whom they trade (WHC 16:331-332).

Although, as Secoy (1953:71) has indicated, it is uncertain that the Dakota were dealing in slaves at this time, such activity can be inferred from the activities of neighbouring groups. Slave trading has been reported for the Dakota in the 1760s. According to Carver's journal,

These bands of the Naudowessee are some of them 300 strong. They hold continual wars with the Chippeways and the Illinois Indians and the Pawnees on the Missure and the Asnibboils. From the two last they bring a great many slaves every year which they exchange with the traders for such things as they want. They have been known to give a slave for one gorget made only of sea shells (Parker 1976:100; see also 104,138).

Given the involvement of surrounding groups in the slave trade, and later Dakota involvement in this trade, it is
reasonable to expect this involvement in the earlier years of the trade as well.

While the role of Indian slavery in the Upper Mississippi region has not received much attention from ethnohistorians, it appears to have played a considerable role in trading. Captives taken in war were used by French traders and Indian groups as peace offerings (WHC 16:192, 321, 340; Surrey 1916:97,226; NYCD 9:610). Slaves were also sold as a source of labour in lower Canada (WHC 16: 31,295; Kellogg 1968:327; Secoy 1953:56). Attempts to utilize Indian slaves as a labour source in the Louisiana colony were not markedly successful (Surrey 1916:229-230). However, the colonists appear to have carried on a limited trade with the West Indies, exchanging Indian slaves for Africans at the rate of two African slaves for three Indians (Surrey 1916:228-229). According to Surrey, Bienville rationalized the trade in the following way:

Bienville informed the crown that the reason for such an arrangement was to put the Indians where they would be unfamiliar with the country and, therefore, could not run away. On the other hand, he asserted, "negroes in Louisiana would not dare to, because the Indians would kill them" (1916:228).

One of the Indians to suffer this fate was Kiala, the anti-French leader of the Fox, who was sent to Martinique about 1734 (WHC 17:210).
In addition to the English settlements, the coureurs de bois also managed to obtain trade goods through Montreal after the withdrawal of congees. Although such activities were illegal, the coureurs de bois developed a number of strategems to subvent official scrutiny of their trading activities. One of the most successful strategies for obtaining trade goods involved the use of Indians as agents. This practice is illustrated in a letter from Champigny to the French Minister in 1698:

For it is indubitable that as long as there are any Frenchmen present, except only the missionaries, this trade will be continued by means of the savages, who are now trained to go down to the colony with the beavers of the Frenchmen, and to bring back merchandise—which they do very cleverly, appearing to act for themselves (WHC 16:175).

Perhaps it was from similar sources that the French-Canadian traders obtained the goods which they traded to the Dakota (McWilliams 1953:46-49). This trade was evidently risky, as Penicaut frequently refers to traders being pillaged by the Dakota (McWilliams 1953:47,49).

Some Montreal merchants were also in collusion with the coureurs de bois to supply them with trade goods at Michilimackinac. These merchants were accused of sending trade goods to the coureurs de bois there in 1708 (WHC 16:259). By 1716 the methods of supplying merchandise had advanced to the point that the French Council of Marine
was complaining that the merchants were maintaining warehouses there for the coureurs de bois (WHC 16:339-340). With the establishment of trading posts in the upper country following the Treaty of Utrecht, coureurs de bois began to acquire trade goods from these sources. The post at Green Bay appears to have been an important source of trade goods in 1744 (WHC 17:445-446). A letter from Beauharnois to Maurepas in 1746 specifically mentions the relationship between coureurs de bois trading between Green Bay and the Dakota.

The man named Augé, one of the partners in the post at the Bay [Green Bay], has been killed by a Wild rice Indian. His misconduct and drunkenness have been the cause thereof. He, it was, who supplied goods to the Coureurs de bois, who afterwards retired to the Scieux. Sieur de Lusignan, who spent last winter among this tribe has meanwhile ordered these Coureurs de bois to return. They gave him to understand that they were ready to obey and follow him; they even set out, but either on reflection, or rather on learning that they would be arrested at Missilimakinac, they turned aside and abandoned Sieur de Lusignan (NYCD 10:37).

The illegal trade with these coureurs de bois evidently continued in spite of official disapproval. The new lease for the post in 1747 specifically orders the arrest of the coureurs de bois (WHC 17:453-454).

Soon after the establishment of the French colony in Louisiana, Canadian officials became disturbed about competition for the Dakota trade from that quarter.
Referring to Le Sueur's activities, they informed the
Minister of the Marine that it was better to let a few
beaver pelts escape to the English than to put them in
the hands of persons who would carry them to Louisiana
(Margry 6:68-69; Surrey 1916:314). Unfortunately for the
Canadian officials, a large proportion of the fur trade
of the Upper Mississippi continued to find its way down to
Louisiana. Although the last of Le Sueur's party left in
1702, coureurs de bois, operating out of Illinois an-
Louisiana, continued to frequent the Dakota country.

The La Harpe version of Le Sueur's journals mentions
meeting two different parties of Canadians on the Upper
Mississippi who were descending the river to the Illinois
settlement from the Dakota country (Shea 1861:93-94).
Apparently a considerable number of coureurs de bois
passed the Illinois villages during the same years to
trade at Biloxi. In a letter dated 1700, Calliers mentions
having sent Tonty, the younger, to bring in the coureurs de
bois from Michilimackinac. However, he returned with only
20; the remaining 84 having decided to follow another group
of 30 who had gone down to Biloxi in 10 canoes loaded with
furs which they traded to d'Iberville. Calliers also
mentions another group of 10 canoes going down somewhat
later (WHC 16:201-202). Many of the coureurs de bois
remained in Louisiana and when, in 1718, the Illinois country
was annexed to Louisiana, (Kellogg 1968:303) obtained
congees to trade with the Dakota, supplying them with guns, powder, and lead (Margry 6:510). However, the Dakota territory north of the Wisconsin River continued to be disputed between Canada and Louisiana (Kellogg 1968:303-304).

**Middleman Trade After 1696**

Hickerson (1962, 1970, 1973) has claimed that the Chippewa were the principal suppliers of trade goods to the Dakota before 1736. However, as has been mentioned previously, this notion involves a peculiar historical distortion. Although a scattering of references to Dakota-Chippewa middleman trade do exist in the ethnohistoric record, they are largely concentrated about 1680 (Margry 6:30; Blair 1969(1):277-278). Very few references to middleman trade between these two groups exist for the later years, particularly after 1696.

Contrary to what would be expected if Hickerson's understanding of Chippewa-Dakota relations for the forty years following 1696 was accurate, there appears to have been no upsurge in Chippewa-Dakota trade relations to compensate for the loss of French posts within Dakota territory. Instead, Chippewa-Dakota relations were at best guarded and more often were hostile. If it is accepted that the Dakota required access to trade goods for survival, they must necessarily have had other means of obtaining
them than through Chippewa middlemen. The illegal trade conducted by coureurs de bois, which has already been mentioned, supplied some of these trade goods. However, other Indian groups beside the Chippewa also conducted a considerable middleman trade with the Dakota after 1696.

From a strictly economic basis, the existence of middleman trade between the Dakota and other Indian groups located closer to sources of supply should come as no surprise. The markup on French goods sold to the Indians of the Upper Mississippi region was large enough to attract competition from Indian middlemen. Ray and Freeman have demonstrated that Hudson's Bay Company traders to the north during the eighteenth century could charge up to a fifty percent advance over standard prices before driving their customers away to other markets (1978:161). Prices charged by French traders on the Upper Mississippi were as much as one hundred percent higher than the prices charged in Montreal for the same goods (WHC 17:83-86). Since the Indians of this area were familiar with the Montreal market on the basis of various diplomatic visits, it is probable that they would react similarly to the Indian groups studied by Ray and Freeman and seek cheaper markets. To compound the situation, prices for many trade goods at Albany were less than the cost of similar items at Montreal (WHC 297).11

While the argument advanced above is dependent
upon a form of economic maximization behaviour, such behaviour was occasionally noted among Indian groups in the Mississippi basin. Marquette noted that the Illinois Indians would give in trading "hardly any more than do the French". In fact they acted so much like skilled traders that Marquette felt compelled to say mass immediately after dealing with them. (Surrey 1916:98; JR 59:175).

Although abundant references to Dakota-Fox hostility exist for the seventeenth century (Blair 1969(2):19; WHC 16:144,150,161), there is little evidence to warrant the projection of this relationship into the eighteenth century. Instead, a more amicable relationship developed between the Fox and Dakota which waxed and waned according to the fortunes of diplomacy and trade. In this sense, Kellogg's understanding of Fox activities is interesting, particularly as it involves the Dakota. She has viewed the period of Fox River brigandage from 1680 to 1710 as inspired by the desire of the Fox to control the Dakota trade (1907:185). The period of more open hostility to the French which followed was based upon Fox aspirations to form a confederacy spanning the tribes from the Iroquois of New York to the Dakota (Kellogg 1907:185; WHC 17:xiii).

As late as 1696, Frontenac promised the Fox that: "No more powder and iron will be conveyed to the Scieux, and if my young men carry any thither, I will chastise them severely" (NYCD 9:675). Within a context of Dakota-
Fox warfare, such a maneuver would have been militarily advantageous to the Fox. However, Fox-Dakota relations became more friendly shortly afterwards. Motivations for this change in attitude were apparently both political and economic. Later references to Fox-Dakota trade and alliances indicate that the Fox may have been more interested in establishing middleman trade with the Dakota than in prohibiting them from gaining access to European weapons. By 1727 French documents were complaining that the Fox "...would not let a single Frenchman pass to the Scioux since it would diminish their Trade" (WHC 17:8). Initially, the profitability of middleman trade with the Dakota may have been uppermost in the thinking of the Fox, as they derived considerable profits from the tolls they and their allies levied on French traders using the Fox-Wisconsin River route to the interior from Green Bay (Kellogg 1907:157; WHC 5:96-97). However, from about 1714 on, political motivations seem to have become more important.

Thwaites (WHC 17:xiii) has commented on attempts by the Fox to form a confederacy with the Iroquois in the east and the Dakota on the west. Such a confederacy would have provided a direct trade link with the English settlements in New York and access to the profitable Dakota trade. Colden (1973(9):418) claims that by 1715 the Fox had already entered into an alliance with the English
at Albany. The Chickasaw also appear to have been involved in the attempted Fox confederacy (WHC 5:85; Charlevoix 5:309), allowing access to the English settlements in Carolina as well.

Alliances between the Fox and the Iroquois and the Fox and Dakota are mentioned in the ethnohistoric record from 1714 to the 1740s on a fairly regular basis. These alliances between the Fox and other groups were usually interpreted by the French in terms of providing refuge to the Fox from French forces (Charlevoix 5:305; WHC 3:148,154,159; 16:417,468; 17:2,257-259,336,436). Thus the Fox obtained asylum in exchange for acting as middlemen to the Dakota.

Despite their hostility toward the French, Fox middlemen still received a considerable portion of their trade goods from French sources. The Fox War of 1716 appears to have been more of a trading expedition than a punitive one (except for the beaver) (Kellogg 1907:164-165). The proceedings of the French Council of Marine in 1716 gives Lovigny's interpretation of the expedition which he led.

He says that the French, who went up for this war, set out laden with merchandise, although none is needed for carrying on the war; and that they have carried thither more than 40 casks of brandy. The result is, that whenever French and savages come together there is an open hell; and Monsieur de Lovigny states that some Frenchmen have gone to trade with the Renard savages, of which all our allies complain (WHC 16:340).
Indeed, the French expeditionary forces even supplied the Fox with powder during the course of the war (WHC 16:441). Furthermore, in a letter to the Council of Marine in 1716, Governor de Vaudreuil gives as terms of the peace which the Fox must obey:

That they shall go to war in distant regions to get slaves, to replace all the dead who had been slain during the course of the war.

That they shall hunt to pay the Expenses of the military preparations made for this war; ... (WHC 16:343).

Unusual terms, but not necessarily unexpected, considering the equipage of the expedition.

Rivalry between Louisiana and Canada also fueled Fox trade and hostility. Writing in 1725 from Illinois, which was under the control of Louisiana, Du Tisne states that:

We are killed everywhere by the renards, to whom Canada supplies weapons and powder.... The Beaver in Their district cause this Great carnage among us; and we shall obtain no relief unless you give orders in regard to this affair (WHC 16:452).

Perhaps the Canadians saw this as a means of reducing competition from Louisiana.

It is clear from the preceeding that the Fox had adequate sources of trade goods with which to carry on a middleman trade with the Dakota. While trade might buy
the Fox asylum with the Dakota, this condition lasted only as long as it was profitable for the Dakota to continue it. Thus, the withdrawal of congees in 1696 was followed by a rapprochement between the Dakota and the Fox. When Fox hostility caused Boucherville and Guignas to flee Fort Beauharnois in 1728, the Dakota remained neutral, and later denied the Fox asylum in order to have the post re-established (WHC 17:53,60-64). The relationship between having a post on Dakota territory and the frustration of Fox ambitions was well understood by 1729 when Hocquart and Beauharnois wrote to the French Minister, in reference to Fort Beauharnois:

   The post would therefore be necessary in order to Maintain the sioux in these happy dispositions, to keep the Renards in check, and to frustrate the steps that they might take to win the hearts of the Sioux, who will always reject their proposals so long as they see the French among them, and so long as the post that we have Established there shall exist (WHC 17:78).

Apparently, the Dakota refrained from becoming involved in the perennial Fox-French hostilities any more than necessary, associating themselves with whichever side offered the best trading opportunities at any given time.
Chippewa-Dakota Relations and Fur Trade Colonialism

Hickerson has hypothesized a Chippewa-Dakota alliance lasting from 1680 to 1736 which "involved the exchange of French merchandise by the Chippewa for fur and privileges of entry into the relatively rich hunting grounds of the Dakota" (Hickerson 1970:66). When the French traders bypassed the Chippewa and began dealing directly with the Dakota, the Chippewa supposedly resorted to warfare to retain access to these hunting grounds. In Chapter II, the relatively continuous nature of Chippewa-Dakota warfare has been argued. Alone, this would place Hickerson's thesis under a cloud of doubt. To compound this factor, there exists relatively little evidence to support claims of extensive Dakota-Chippewa middleman relations.

Other sources than the Chippewa loom larger as suppliers of trade goods to the Dakota during the period of the French regime. During a large portion of the years in which the Dakota were supposedly dependent upon the Chippewa for trade goods, according to Hickerson, there were French trading posts operating on Dakota-controlled territory. In those periods when there were no legitimate French establishments on Dakota lands,
illicit trade conducted by *coureurs de bois* and Fox middleman trade acted to fill the gap.

As a result of extensive activities by other Indian traders, in addition to the Chippewa, throughout the period of the French regime, it is apparent that the Chippewa were relatively minor entrepreneurs in this area of middleman trade. Thus, the Chippewa would have been able to exert little influence to claim extensive hunting rights on Dakota lands.

In this case, fur trade colonialism, as described by Hickerson (1973), does not appear capable of explaining events in the region south and west of Lake Superior. While the Dakota may have been dependent upon European trading goods for survival, a colonial status does not follow as a necessary consequence of this condition. Instead, competition between the various trading interests kept any of these interests from exercising total control over the Dakotas. This same competition gave the Dakota enough latitude in their access to sources of European trade goods so that they could remain a significant and independent power.
CHAPTER IV

TRADE AND MOVEMENT

Chapters II and III demonstrate that Chippewa-Dakota hostilities were endemic between 1679 and 1736 and that the Dakota were not dependent economically upon Chippewa middlemen for access to European trade goods. Therefore, Hickerson's explanation for Dakota movements out of the Woodlands in the middle of the eighteenth century (1962, 1970, 1973, 1974), which was dependent upon these assumptions, is no longer adequate. As was indicated in Chapter I, an alternative explanation for Dakota movements can be more plausibly derived by integrating the effects of the European fur trade and the introduction of equestrian transportation with an understanding of trade relations within the Plains region.

Plains Trade Relations

With regard to the Missouri villages of the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara, Ewers (1968:18) has delineated three patterns of trade. These were the Aboriginal or Prehistoric, Protohistoric or Transitional, and Historic or Direct Trade patterns. The aboriginal pattern refers to a period of
trade in which the exchange of native objects was probably incidental to survival. The protohistoric pattern was transitional and spanned the period in which trade in traditional goods came to be dominated by trade in exotic European goods. The final historic pattern marks the period in which trade goods obtained directly from Europeans were absolute necessities for survival.

Ewers' perceptions of Missouri village trade activities may, with modifications, provide insight into Dakota trade activities. It is clear from archaeologic evidence that the inhabitants of the Northeastern Plains conducted widespread trade during the prehistoric period. There are also indications that this trade may have involved inhabitants of the area which was known to have been inhabited by the Dakota historically. In any case, mere proximity would have provided the ancestors of the Dakota with exposure to prehistoric trade patterns.

It is also apparent from the ethnohistoric record that the Dakota were heavily involved in the protohistoric trade pattern. However, while in retrospect, this so-called protohistoric pattern may seem transitional; in fact, it had a vitality of its own and continued for over a century. The protohistoric pattern of trade activity actually lasted from the opening years of the eighteenth century to about the third decade of the nineteenth century, ending only with changes in European trade interests. Because of this
pattern's long duration over a period for which historic documentation exists, it seems that "middleman pattern" might be a more descriptive term. It is true that the eastern Dakota groups did have access to European traders during this period. However, they did act as middlemen suppliers to the more westerly oriented Plains Dakota groups who reciprocated with horses and Plains products.

With the shift in the fur trade from beaver pelts to bison robes, which occurred in the 1830s, the Dakota middleman pattern seems to have come to an end. This period appears to correspond roughly with Ewers' (1968:18) direct trade pattern. Most Dakota bands traded directly with white entrepreneurs for merchandise in this latter historic period.

The significance of these three economic patterns is that each one appears to correspond with the utilization of a particular region. The Dakotas' participation in each of these patterns bears a strong relationship to unique economic opportunities in specific areas at a given time. Thus, the Dakotas' homeland at contact would have provided a strategic position in regard to prehistoric trade patterns in native Great Lakes copper and perhaps shell from the Mississippian cultures further downstream. In this same connection, the Dakotas' movement away from the Woodlands and towards the Plains occurred at about the same time that equestrian transportation was introduced
from the Southwest and European trade goods were available on their eastern frontier. I would suggest that this conjunction of events created an extremely profitable middleman situation for all of the Dakota groups, which may have influenced population movements. In addition, there appears to be some relationship between the shift to bison robes as a staple of the fur trade and the expansion of the Teton Dakota to the Plains west of the Missouri River.

However, if this relationship between trade opportunities and the occupation of a specific area does hold true, its force did not necessarily remain constant through time. There exists a quantum difference between the prehistoric period and the historic periods of trade activity. Archaeological evidence for trade in the prehistoric period consists of items that were largely of ceremonial or luxury value, with allowances for the existence of perishable items not always reflected in the archaeological record (Ewers 1972:2). During the historic periods Plains trade relations came to be dominated by the exchange of European trade goods and horses which had profound implications for the fabric of Plains life.

The acquisition of horses and European trade goods was a serious matter in the middleman and direct trade periods of trade activity (Secoy 1953). These exotic products were of critical importance for the survival of
the Dakota, both in an economic sense and in a military sense.

White (1978) has identified three stages in the westward movement of the Dakota. He states that:

This advance westward took place in three identifiable stages: initially a movement during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries onto the prairies east of the Missouri, then a conquest of the middle Missouri River region during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and, finally, a sweep west and south from the Missouri during the early and mid-nineteenth century. Each of these stages possessed its own impetus and rationale (1978:321).

I believe that the different patterns of economic activity mentioned already can provide at least a partial rationale for the three stages of western expansion referred to by White. The relationship for the Dakota between economic activity and the stage of expansion is reflected in Table 1.

TABLE 1
Schedule of Dakota Westward Expansion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Pattern</th>
<th>Stage of Expansion</th>
<th>Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prehistoric</td>
<td>Woodlands of Central Minnesota and Western Wisconsin with associated prairie fringe</td>
<td>Santee, Middle Dakota, Teton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prairie and Parkland east of Missouri River</td>
<td>Santee, Middle Dakota, Teton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle Missouri</td>
<td>Middle Dakota, Teton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Trade</td>
<td>South and West of Missouri River</td>
<td>Teton</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Prehistoric Trade

There is considerable evidence of prehistoric (aboriginal) trade activities in the prairie region near the woodlands of Central Minnesota. This evidence consists primarily of the presence of exotic shell ornaments, objects made from Great Lakes copper, and red Catlinite items. The location of the sites for which these items are reported suggests the involvement of the Dakotas' ancestors in this trade. The area inhabited by the Dakota at contact lies across the probable routes through which exotic shell, copper, and Catlinite items were transmitted. Thus, the Dakota are implicated in this trade.

Neuman (1975:79) has placed the Baldhill mounds, along the Sheyenne River, in the Sonota Complex. Trade, transmitted through Hopewellian societies, was a feature of the Sonota Complex (Neuman 1975:96). According to Neuman:

...evidence for trade between the Sonota Complex and other peoples, either directly or through intermediaries, is archeologically documented; and I propose that the trade relations are expressed here in at least three ways. First, the most obvious expression is the presence of diagnostic artifacts and/or raw materials foreign to the region. Secondly, the manifestation within the indigenous culture of specific cultural phenomena whose origins are determined to have priority outside the area. Thirdly, the appearance outside of the study region of diagnostic artifacts and/or raw materials presumed to be generic to the study region (Neuman 1975:93).
Neuman's dating (1975:96) indicates that such trade activities preceded European contact by at least one thousand years.

The investigations of Howard (1953) and Syms (1979) indicate a continuance of aboriginal trade activities in the prairie fringe to about the time of European contact or later. In referring to what Howard has called a manifestation of the "Southern Cult in the Northern Plains" and what Syms has identified as the "Devils Lake-Sourisford Burial Complex", Syms has stated that:

The known tools and traits are functionally specialized and present a high proportion of non-local materials. The sources, and their implications, of these materials must be considered. The two main categories are whelk shells from the Atlantic and Gulf Coast area and the Catlinite from Minnesota. Other categories are the Dentallium beads from the West Coast and copper from Lake Superior (1979:193).

Additionally, trade contacts are reflected in this burial cult's manifestation of cultural phenomena which have priority outside of the prairie fringe. According to Howard:

This manifestation may be either a peripheral extension of the Southern cult civilizations or an echo in a neighboring culture which had considerable trade with southeastern groups and thus acquires the use of whelk shell gorgets, mound building, and other traits (1953:137).
Clearly, this burial complex demonstrates trade contacts in two different ways: (1) the presence of exotic raw materials, and (2) the presence of cultural phenomena which have priority outside of the study area.

Another burial complex of interest here is the Arvilla Complex. Significantly, the Arvilla Complex and the Devils Lake-Sourisford Complex share a number of traits, such as short Columella beads, Natica shell beads, Dentalium beads, washer-shaped shell beads, bone bracelets, bone beads, and small globular vessels (Syms 1979:397; Johnson 1973). Based on these similarities, Syms has stated that:

The two burial complexes were obviously involved in the same or similar trade networks that provided the non-local shell and some of the similar shell forms, e.g. the notched trapezoidal form and the washer-shaped form. These similarities are to be expected since they occur adjacent to one another, being separated primarily by the Red River. However, there are marked differences in ceramic technology, pipes, the use of copper, the manufacturing of gorgets, and the use of items such as harpoons and beaver-incisor gouges (1979:289).

Taken together, both of these burial complexes indicate a pattern of prehistoric trade which spanned both sides of the Red River valley of the north and which depended upon contacts outside of the region.

The whelk shell used for gorgets, pendants, and
beads must have been traded through the Mississippian network. Syms suggests two possible trade routes: (1) through the Mississippi and Minnesota Rivers and westward to the Plains, or (2) up the Mississippi and across to the Missouri villages (1979:293-294). It is probable that either route would have involved crossing a portion of the territory which was inhabited by the Dakota at the time of historic contact.

The presence of items made from Catlinite and native copper is also indicative of the two trade routes suggested by Syms. The most direct route for the distribution of red pipestone from the quarry in southern Minnesota would not have been far removed from the above mentioned Mississippi-Minnesota River route. By the same token, the Fond Du Lac-Mississippi River route westward from the extremity of Lake Superior provides a probable channel for the distribution of native copper to the Plains area. Probably, the pipestone quarry was controlled by the peoples associated with Oneota ceramics, and recent archaeological discoveries indicate contact between Oneota peoples and the ancestors of the Dakota. The Fond Du Lac-Mississippi River route lies in the heart of the area claimed by the Dakota at contact.

Michlovic (1979) has identified the presence of ceramics on the east side of the Red River which exhibit traits indicative of Sandy Lake Ware, Oneota, and Mandan
ceramics. From the proximity of these traits in the Red River area, some form of contact between the groups associated with these ceramic traditions is to be expected. Sandy Lake Ware has been associated with the Dakota (Lugenebeal 1976) while Oneota ceramics have been associated with other Siouan groups, either Chiwere Siouan groups (Griffin 1936–36:180–181; Wilford 1945:38) or the Winnebago (Gibbon 1972). Mandan ceramics are usually associated with the Mandan-Hidatsa villages on the Missouri River (Wood 1967).

Trade contacts provide a reasonable explanation for the association of different ceramic traits in the Red River area. Syms has commented that:

The degree of trade that took place in the prehistoric and early historic periods has rarely been given adequate consideration... The development of interaction required groups to travel into and across the territories of others and to meet at multi-ethnic rendezvous (1979:294).

Such trade activities have been suggested by Michlovic (1976,1977) as responsible for the spread of stylistic traits across ethnic boundaries.

Given a late prehistoric setting for Sandy Lake Ware (Cooper & Johnson 1964), Oneota (Wilford 1945), and Mandan (Wood 1967) ceramics, it is clear that the core areas of these ceramic manifestations would have covered the probable trade routes by which shell from the Gulf and Pacific coasts, Catlinite from southern Minnesota, and
copper from the Great Lakes was transported. Thus the Dakota, during the late prehistoric period, were probably involved in multi-ethnic trade rendezvous which were part of a larger Plains network of trade.

The involvement of the Dakota in this trade pattern is further reinforced by early French reports which place the Dakota in the prairie fringe. Thus the Jesuit Relation of 1659-60 places the Poualak, a Dakota group, in a country where wood is "scanty in Supply" (JR 45:239). The La Harpe version of Le Sueur's journal describes the Sioux of the West in the following terms:

They do not use canoes, cultivate the earth, or gather wild oats; they generally keep to the prairies between the Upper Mississippi and the River of the Missouris, and live solely by hunting (Shea 1861:103).

Such reports place the Dakota in a favourable position to participate in an aboriginal Plains trade network.

Hennepin reports, in 1680, the visit of four Indians from the west who travelled across a prairie region to visit the Dakota. Evidently, the Dakota group, which was holding Hennepin, were well acquainted with the language of these Indians, for they were able to furnish interpreters suggesting a significant degree of contact between the two groups. In addition, the four Indians from the west mentioned "many wild Bulls and Castors, which are greyer than
those of the North" (Thwaites 1974:266-268). The fur of the Missouri River area sub-species of beaver is a much lighter colour than the Canadian sub-species. Judging from this information, it would appear that these Indians were describing a region which fits the characteristics of the prairies between the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers.

Apparently, trade across ethnic boundaries had occurred in the Red River drainage basin for at least one thousand years before European contact. At a minimum, the Dakotas' ancestors were aware of this trade and, judging from their location at contact and from ceramic evidence, were probably involved in this trade. Therefore, I would suggest that, at the very least, the Dakota were aware of aboriginal trade networks between the Plains and Woodlands which provided a foundation for later middleman trade patterns.

**Middleman Trade**

Like Hanson (1975:4-5), I believe the available evidence indicates that middleman trade patterns were built upon an earlier foundation provided by prehistoric trade. This earlier foundation is reflected in the Dakotas' continuation of trade in aboriginal goods as late as the early nineteenth century. Tabeau's description of a Dakota trade rendezvous at this time is illustrative of such
exchanges. According to Tabeau:

All the other Titons, by different routes upon the east bank go into the heart of the prairies to a kind of market, where are found also every spring the Yinctons of the North and of the South, the Scissitons, some people of the Leaves and often some of the Lakes. This concourse is sometimes composed of a thousand to twelve hundred lodges, about three thousand men bearing arms. Much trading is done there. Each man brings different articles, according to the places over which he has sandered. Those who have frequented the St. Peter's River and that of the Mohens furnish guns, kettles, red pipes, and bows of walnut. The Titons give in exchange horses, lodges of leather, buffalo robes, shirts and leggings of antelope-skin (Abel 1939:121-123).

According to Tabeau, native products such as Catlinite and walnut bows were being exchanged for leather goods. However, it is significant that items introduced by Europeans were also being exchanged.

Authors such as Teit (1930:252-253) and Jablow (1951) have argued that the introduction of horses and European trade goods to the Plains area resulted in an efflorescence of trade activities among Indian groups. The widespread effect of these introductions has been noted by Jablow who stated that:

A concatenation of trade events stimulated surplus production among various tribes which were mutually interdependent for the acquisition of commodities. Inasmuch as the products were passed from group to
group, this surplus was produced for a market involving comparatively large numbers of tribes. This was an ever expanding process which, with the passage of time, developed ramifications and had repercussions radiating in all directions from the Plains, so that some Algonkian tribes, the eastern Dakota, the southwestern Plains tribes, the Mexican ranches, and the Plateau tribes were soon involved (Jablow 1951:23).

In viewing the spread of horses over the Plains and the introduction of European trade goods as trade events, Jablow has argued that from the standpoint of inter-ethnic trade relations, these phenomena "are in reality interacting and inter-dependent" (1951:11). Jablow has suggested that this relationship had been recognized earlier by Wissler (1914:15) when he wrote:

...the possession of this new means of transportation (the horse) and this new element of property would no doubt act as a cultural stimulant....We must not, however, too hastily conclude that the introduction of the horse during the seventeenth century was the chief cause of this. The presence of white traders on the continent must be considered. Firearms were soon in the hands of the tribes...then again the trade by which they were received created new demands, new wants, and so stimulated production... (in Jablow 1951:11).

Clearly, the interrelationship of horses and European trade goods in Plains trade has important implications for the Dakotas' role in middleman trade patterns. Basically, horses in Plains trade relations tended to be exchanged for European trade goods. Ethnohistoric
accounts from the first part of the nineteenth century tend to collaborate this position. Particularly, I refer to the Henry-Thompson Journals (Coues 1956b:384-385, 389-391) and Tabeau's Narrative (Abel 1939:158). In light of this evidence, the acquisition of horses by the Dakota would appear to be closely associated with their involvement in the European fur trade.

The rate of spread of horses in the Plains area may be tied to the influx of European trade goods in the region. Jacobsen and Eighmy have stated that:

...the correct interpretation of the main factor affecting rate of diffusion is the substantial reinforcement or advantage the horse held for Plains tribes rather than simply the supply of horses (1980:339).

While recognizing the obvious value and utility of horses for transportation and hunting, I believe that the value of horses for trading purposes to obtain European goods should not be overlooked. In this connection, I intend first to deal with the diffusion of horses to the Dakota and then explore the impact of this and European contacts on Dakota trading institutions.

Significantly, most studies which have concerned themselves with the diffusion of horses to the Plains have utilized the written evidence left behind by European explorers and traders. To a large extent, these scholars have relied upon what is euphemistically known as negative
evidence. These scholars have presumed that the first recorded mention of horses by literate Europeans marked the first acquisition of these animals by particular groups. Such an approach supposes that if horses are not specifically mentioned, for whatever reason, they are not present or do not exist there. Thus, according to Jacobson and Eighmy's interpretation of Ewers, the Teton and Yankton Dakota did not adopt horses until the 1760s (Jacobsen & Eighmy 1980:338). Wissler (1914:6) reports a date of 1740 for the first mention of horses among the Santee Dakota and a date of 1742 for the first mention of horses among the Teton Dakota. A review of Wissler's sources (WHC 18:353) indicates a correction of the acquisition date for the Santee to 1775.

However, there are native Dakota ethnohistoric sources which have often been overlooked. I refer specifically to the John K. Bear Winter Count (Howard 1976) and Battiste Good's Winter Count (Mallery 1893). These two Dakota Winter Counts, Yanktonai Dakota and Brule Dakota respectively, give a much earlier date for the first acquisition of horses among the Dakota than European reporters.

The presence of wild horses is reported by the Yanktonai Dakota in the John K. Bear Winter Count as early as 1692 (Howard 1976:22). However, the presence of wild horses in Dakota territory may not be related to the use
of equestrian transportation by the Dakota at this time. Haines (1938b:429) has argued that:

The initial obstacle to be overcome in converting the Indian to the use of the horse was his ignorance in the care and use of the strange animal.

In such a case, the presence of wild horses would probably have suggested dinner to the Dakota rather than a servant (Haines 1938b:429). Given this situation, the acquisition of equestrian transportation by the Dakota was probably dependent more upon the dissemination of the knowledge and skill to handle horses from already proficient groups than the physical presence of horses. One of the most likely mediums for the dissemination of this knowledge are inter-ethnic rendezvous.

By way of contrast to European reporters, the John K. Bear Winter Count lists a horse as being traded for a knife among the Yanktonai as early as 1707 (Howard 1976: 25). Battiste Good's Winter Count records the Brule as obtaining Omaha horses in 1708-09 and Assiniboin horses in 1709-10 (Mallery 1893:295). The close agreement between these two Winter Counts would tend to lend legitimacy to their reported dates. The significant difference between the dates assigned to horse acquisition by Dakota recorders and Europeans may be attributable to the European position on the edge of Dakota territories until quite late in the eighteenth century. Thus it appears probable that some
Dakota groups had obtained horses by the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Once the Plains Indians has obtained their first horses, by whatever means, it is clear that they did not rely solely on the capture of wild horses or natural breeding to maintain their herds. Authors such as Haines (1938a:114), Mishkin (1940:6), and Oliver (1962:18,36,63) have emphasized the importance of horse raiding to obtain larger herds. Mishkin has stated:

But the supposition that wild horses ever constituted a primary source of the Indians' herds is unfounded. According to all the evidence, raiding was everywhere the principal method of acquiring horses. There is no reason to suspect that Indian horses bred poorly; nevertheless natural increase of the herds apparently did not satisfy the Indian's needs and he was ever impatient to replenish stock (1940:6).

Jablow (1951), on the other hand, has emphasized the use of trade practices as a means of obtaining horses. In actual practice, it may be more appropriate to consider horse trading/raiding activities as part of the same complex. When visiting the Missouri River in 1811, Brackenridge recorded the following observation:

Their stock of horses requires to be constantly renewed by thefts or purchases: from the severity of the climate and the little care taken of the foals, the animal would otherwise be in danger of becoming extinct (1962:71).
The horse raiding/trading complex certainly appears to be present in the Teton Dakotas' relationship to the Arikara, where trading and raiding practices certainly appear as different sides of the same coin. In his narrative, Tabeau describes the situation quite clearly:

In this season, the Sioux come from all parts loaded with dried meat, with fat, with dressed leather, and some merchandise. They fix, as they wish, the price of that which belongs to them and obtain, in exchange, a quantity of corn, tobacco, beans, and pumpkins that they demand. They camp then near by on the plains, which they openly pillage without anyone opposing them except by complaints and feeble reproaches. They steal the horses and they beat the women and offer with impunity all kinds of insults (Abel 1939: 131).

It seems that the Sioux approached the camp only to be nearer the [Arikara] horses which they carried off every day (Abel 1939:133).

Clearly, the Dakota did not consider trading and raiding activities to be mutually exclusive, at least when dealing with the Arikara.

Perhaps one of the clearest descriptions of Teton-Arikara trade is that of Lewis and Clark who said of the Arikara that:

They maintain a partial trade with their oppressors the Tetons, to whom they barter horses, mules, corn, beans, and a species of tobacco which they cultivate; and receive in return guns, ammunition, kettles, axes, and other articles which
the Tetons obtain from the Yanktons of N. and Sissatones, who trade with Mr. Cammeron, on the river St. Peters. These horses and mules the Ricaras obtain from their western neighbors, who visit them frequently for the purposes of trafficking (Thwaites 1904-5(6):89).

The above description from the Lewis and Clark journals indicates the interdependent and wide-ranging trade contacts necessary for the Teton to obtain horses and European trade goods. Another informative description of this relationship is provided by Brackenridge, in 1811, who states that:

Nearly all of the nations of the N.W. side, are descendants of the Sioux, and at peace with each other, but with scarcely an exception, at war with those on the S.W. side. These nations have considerable trade or traffic with each other. The Sioux have for this purpose regular fairs, or assemblages, at stated periods. The same thing prevails with the nations on the S.W. side of the Missouri. Those towards the south, have generally vast numbers of horses, mules, and asses, which they obtain in trade, or war, from the Spaniards or nations immediately bordering on New Mexico. These animals are chiefly transferred to the nations N.E. of the river, by such of the southern tribes as happen to be on good terms with them, who obtain in exchange European articles, procured from the British traders (1962:71).

The geographic distribution of these contacts is represented on Map 5.

From the preceding, it should be apparent that one of the characteristics of Dakota trade activities in the middleman period was differential access to horses and
Map 5

Flow of Horses and Trade Goods
trade goods. In fact, this differential access to trade items carried down to the various Dakota groups. Such differential access among the Dakota has been reported as early as 1701. In speaking of Le Sueur's establishment on the Blue Earth River (Fort L'Huillier), La Harpe states that:

Mr. Le Sueur had foreseen that his establishment on the Blue river would not be relished by the Scioux of the East, who are, so to speak, the masters of the other Scioux and of the nations just named, because they are first with whom we traded, which has given them a good supply of guns (Shea 1861:102; WHC 16:186-187).

The disapproval of the "Sioux of the East" manifested itself on one occasion in the pillaging of two of Le Sueur's men (Shea 1861:103; WHC 16:188). About a month later Le Sueur was informed that all the "Sioux of the East" and some "Sioux of the West" had resolved to come to the French because of a threatened attack by the Cree and Assiniboin (WHC 16:189). While the cause of the proposed movement was ostensibly defensive, it should be noted that all of the "Sioux of the East" (less one band) planned to come. In view of Le Sueur's earlier misgivings (above), it seems that this movement may have had other motivations than purely defensive ones.

Clearly, the Eastern Dakota groups were willing to go to some lengths to preserve their control of European
trade goods vis-a-vis the more westerly Dakota groups. Apparently, the Eastern Dakota groups were successful as Carver's account of the Dakota slave trade in 1767 indicates. According to Carver:

These bands of the Naudowessee are some of them 300 strong. They hold continual wars with the Chippeways and the Illinois Indians and the Pawnees on the Missure and the Asnibboils. From the two last they bring a great many slaves every year which they exchange with the traders for such things as they want. They have been known to give a slave for one gorget made only of sea shells. This is done by the more remote bands who have no knowledge of Europeans and only trade with their brethren [of] the river bands who of late years have opened a trade with the French and English (Parker 1976:100).

It would seem that the Eastern Dakota groups derived considerable profits from their role as middlemen to the Western Dakota groups.

I would suggest that during the eighteenth century a situation developed in which the Eastern Dakota groups controlled access to European trade goods through their occupation of the Lake Pepin-Minnesota River area where European trading establishments were located. At the same time, the Western Dakota groups controlled access to the Arikara villages which were a primary center for acquiring horses. Generally speaking, these Western Dakota groups needed a supply of European trade goods to barter for horses from the Arikaras. Given these differential access
factors, I believe that a strong case can be made for the development of an institution known in ethnohistoric literature as the "Dakota Trade Fair" as a means of integrating these different factors.

Howard (1976:7) has portrayed Dakota trade fairs in terms of large annual Dakota gatherings at which trade between various groups was carried on. White (1978:322fn.) has stressed the social and religious nature of these annual gatherings as well. Nevertheless, economic factors still appear to have been an important reason for these gatherings. Brackenridge's 1811 description of these trade fairs sheds some light on the proceedings. According to Brackenridge:

There is no bargaining or dispute about price; a nation or tribe comes to a village, encamps near it, and after demonstrations on both sides of a thousand barbarous civilities, as sincere as those which are the result of refinement, one of the parties makes a general present of all such articles as it can conveniently spare: the other a short time after makes in return a similar present, the fair is then concluded by a variety of games, sports and dances (1962:71).

Through the medium of these trade fairs Santee and Middle Dakota groups could obtain horses, slaves, leather goods, and other Plains products from the Teton in exchange for European trade goods. The various Teton groups could in turn use surplus European trade goods to obtain horses and agricultural products from the Arikara villages. Some
of these horses could then be traded to the Santee and Middle Dakota by the Teton at the next annual trade fair. In effect, the result of the introduction of horses and European trade goods to the Dakota was to stimulate surplus production for trade purposes.

In terms of Dakota population movements, the economic advantage of these trade fairs would provide a reasonable motivation for the Teton to have moved westward to a point where they could control access to the Arikara villages from the east. In addition, the profitable nature of controlling the access of other groups to European traders in the Lake Pepin-Minnesota River area may have led the Santee groups to decrease their emphasis on the woodlands of central Minnesota and western Wisconsin. As indicated earlier, by 1736 French estimates indicated a population of only 300 men in the woodlands area but more than 2,000 men in the prairie area (WHC 17:247-248). It is probably no mistake that the area claimed by the Yankton and Yanktonai Dakota (the constituent groups of the Middle division) included the James River which was a favourite site for trade fairs (White 1978:322; Ewers 1968:16).

White traders began to extend their activities up the Missouri River from St. Louis in the 1790s. The expansion was a direct threat to the Dakotas' control of the flow of European trade goods to the Arikara villages. I would suggest that this threat to the Dakotas' established
trade fair system may have been an influence in the expansion of the Teton and some Middle Dakota groups into the Middle Missouri area. By controlling the Middle Missouri region, these groups may have hoped to control or limit the access of white traders to the Arikara villages.

The Dakotas' methods for attempting to control the influence of white traders varied considerably from forcing traders to pay tolls for the right of passage to harassment and piracy (Loendorf, et al. 1976:47; White 1978:327-328). Writing to Alcudia in New Orleans, Carondelet states in 1796 that:

...it remains to oppose the Sioux, Sauteux, Osniboine [Assiniboine] and other nations that live to the North of the Missouri. These nations, trading with the English, make frequent raids on that river and rob and kill our traders when they meet them. Although it is true that the Company's forts and posts [factories-trading houses] will contribute in great part to keep those savages at a distance, one must consider that a single robbery committed in the course of a year will be sufficient to intimidate the traders and consequently to retard the Company's progress (Nasatir 1952:391).

In addition, the Santee and Middle Dakota groups who who frequented the trading establishments along the Minnesota River appear to have adopted the role of agents provocateurs in regards to the situation on the Middle Missouri. Tabeau's narrative, for example, is filled with
references to such activities. In one instance, after describing the Dakota trade fairs (already cited), Tabeau goes on to state that:

Although very often this general meeting produces disturbances among tribes already unfriendly, it serves more commonly for their reconciliation and for peace. The tribes of the St. Peter's River, more powerful although less numerous, but far more enlightened through their association with the white, became mediators among our fierce hordes and make them see the necessity of unity among them. It is certain that these Savages urge them above all to treat the French kindly as they are the only people from whom the redskins can derive real advantages. But, on the other hand, they strike a terrible blow at the peace of the traders of the Missouri by informing the Titons of the value of the merchandise upon the St. Peter's River and by exaggerating through vanity all the kind and generous hospitality that they receive there, so that some Bois Brules reproach Mr. Loisel for having brought to them neither onions nor mustard (Abel 1939:123).

Obviously, any interruptions in the activities of the Missouri traders would help to maintain the vitality of the Dakota trade fairs. Although the trade fairs were in decline by shortly after the beginning of the nineteenth century, they were still viable in 1809 (White 1978:327-328) and in 1811 when Brackenridge (1962:71) reports annual fairs.

The staple of the fur trade at the trading posts on the Minnesota River was beaver. According to Trudeau's
description of the Missouri in 1796:

The Sioux tribes are those who hunt most for the beaver and other good peltries of the Upper Missouri. They scour all the rivers and the streams without fearing any one. They carry away every springtime, from out of our territory, a great number of them, which they exchange for merchandise with the other Sioux situated on the St. Peter's and Des Moines rivers, frequented by the traders of Canada (Nasatir 1952:382).

Unfortunately for the Dakotas' attempts to achieve a stable adaptation to the effects of white contact, the fur trade underwent a significant change in the west. Beginning in the third decade of the nineteenth century, this change had significant ramifications for the future of Dakota trade fairs.

Direct Trade

Throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and the first two decades of the nineteenth centuries, beaver pelts were the staple of the fur trade. However, the reputed decline in beaver populations and fashion changes in the early 1830s created a demand for bison robes (Lewis 1973:29). The center for the trade in bison robes was not the trading establishments of the Upper Mississippi and Minnesota River posts which enjoyed superior transportation with the introduction of the steamboat there in 1833 (Lewis 1973:30).
The yearly number of bison robes, which were shipped down the Missouri River, grew from an average of 2600 between 1815 and 1830 to about 40,000 to 50,000 in 1833 (White 1978:330). This trade grew after 1833, for it has been estimated that the American Fur Company alone traded 70,000 bison robes annually between 1833 and 1843 (Lewis 1973:29). The effect of this massive shift in the fur trade was to undermine the established Dakota trading system. It was no longer as profitable for western Dakota groups to trade with their eastern relations for European trade goods. Instead, the Teton and Middle Dakota could do much better to trade directly with white traders on the Missouri, exchanging buffalo robes and pemmican for trade goods.

This growing emphasis on bison products as an item of trade had its effects on the population movements of the Dakota who depended upon them. This situation has been described by White who states that:

By the 1840s observations on the diminishing number of buffalo and increased Indian competition had become commonplace. Between 1830 and 1844 buffalo could be found in large numbers on the headwaters of the Little Cheyenne, but by the mid-1840s they were receding rapidly toward the mountains. The Sioux to a great extent simply had to follow, or move north or south, to find new hunting grounds. Their survival and prosperity depended on their success (1978:331).
Thus the expansion of the Teton Dakota to the south and west of the Missouri River in the nineteenth century was largely dependent upon the change in emphasis of the fur trade from beaver pelts to bison robes.

The decline of the American bison herds has also been pointed out by Ross (1850) who states that:

...Buffalo, the only inducement to the plains, are falling off fast. They are now like a ball between two players. The Americans are driving them north, the British south. The west alone will furnish them with a last and temporary retreat (in Roe 1970:396).

In addition, Roe (1970:386-387, 393-394) has emphasized that local fluctuations in the presence of the bison herds was a normal situation for the northern Plains. As a result, the expansion of Dakota hunting territories to the west appears to have been an effort to ensure a more consistent access to the bison herds which had assumed a more significant role in the Dakota economy. Whether due to regional movement or diminishing numbers of the bison herds, such moves by the Dakota became increasingly necessary as the bison robe trade assumed a more conspicuous role in the Dakota economy.

With the destruction of the economic base on which the Dakota trade fairs depended, the Santee and Middle Dakota groups operating out of the Upper Mississippi- Minnesota River area had to refocus their activities. It
seems probable that, as a result, the Santee Dakota increasingly turned their attention to the whitetail deer populations of the parklands belt. Another factor which may have influenced the Santee was an increased emphasis on farming which followed the wave of white settlement on the Upper Mississippi. Prescott records an attempt to encourage Dakota farming by the U.S. Indian Agent as early as 1829 (Parker 1966:126-128). Later, Prescott served as superintendent of farming for the Dakota from 1849 through 1856 (Parker 1966:211-236).

Trade and Dakota Expansion

The theme of trade activities occupies a consistent place in Dakota culture history, or at least, in what is known of it from archaeological investigations and the ethnohistoric record. Earlier in this chapter, I cited a passage from White (1978:321) in which he stated that each of the stages of Dakota expansion "possessed its own impetus and rationale." Trade activities would appear to have provided both an impetus and a rationale for Dakota expansion. While trade activities continued throughout the study period, their nature did undergo significant changes. Thus, there appears to be a correlation between changes in the nature of trade activities and Dakota expansionism.

The archaeologic literature examined in this
chapter has indicated a strong probability that the Dakotas' ancestors participated in a widespread multi-ethnic network of trade activities which incorporated the Plateau, the Plains, the Southeast, and the Great Lakes areas. These aboriginal trade activities would have provided the basis for the rapid diffusion of introduced horses and European trade goods to the Dakota. However, different groups enjoyed differential access to horses and trade goods. This differential access formed the basis for an efflorescence of Plains trade activities which provided a motive for Dakota expansion onto the Plains. Due to the Dakotas' occupation of the prairies between the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, they could control the flow of European trade goods to the Arikara earth lodge villages and the Dakota found this situation to be highly profitable. In order to protect this profitable trade, the westernmost Dakota groups found it necessary to move across the Missouri River. By the 1830s, the basis for Dakota middleman trade profits had vanished as the fur trade changed its focus in the Plains from beaver pelts to bison robes. This change which resulted in increased economic importance for bison hunting, forced the Teton Dakota to expand their territories in pursuit of the wandering bison herds. Thus, trade activities and population movement appear linked throughout Dakota history.
CHAPTER V

FROM PINE TO PRAIRIE

An Unassailable Description?

Perhaps in the last analysis Hickerson (1962, 1970, 1974) has been unable to improve upon the description of Dakota population movements given in Robinson's *A History of the Dakota or Sioux Indians*. Robinson states that:

...it will be seen that all theories relating to the immigration of Indian tribes are futile when the inducing cause can not be known.

After all has been said it is only definitely known that when white men found the Dakotas a considerable number of them still resided in the lake country, where wild rice was a large element in their living, while the Tetons, the Yanktonais and the Yanktons had already left the shelter of the timber and become buffalo hunters of the great prairie stretches (1967:19).

It is possible that, as Robinson suggests above, there are no absolutely reliable cause and effect statements in the ethnohistoric record which can explain Dakota population movements. The few cause-effect statements in the ethnohistoric record relating to Chippewa-Dakota relations and the fur trade pertain to specific and isolated situations.
In order to form a reliable portrayal of the past these statements require additional confirmation from the ethnohistoric record. As a consequence it would appear that Hickerson's attempt to produce explanations for generalized trends in Chippewa-Dakota relations from a few isolated cause-effect statements was at best inappropriate.

However, this historical ambiguity concerning Dakota movements does not rule out the potential for creating reasonable explanations for these movements. By critically examining the wealth of information available in the ethnohistoric record a reasonable explanation for Dakota movements can be constructed. As has been shown in the preceding chapters, there is a consistent thread of evidence throughout the ethnohistoric record which links Dakota population movements to the effects of European contact. It is not necessarily true that these European contacts had an overwhelmingly negative effect upon the Dakota, as Hickerson (1962, 1970, 1974) has argued. Instead, the Dakota were able to utilize many of the effects of European contact for their own purposes until at least the middle of the nineteenth century.
Fur Trade Dependence

In 1973, Hickerson published an article entitled "Fur Trade Colonialism and the North American Indians." In this article Hickerson asserted that the technological superiority of European trade goods created a fur trade dependent situation among North American Indian groups for access to the means of production (trade goods). Because of their dependency on the fur trade, Hickerson regarded North American Indian groups as colonial peoples who had lost "...control over the areas they occupied" (Hickerson 1973:15).

In accordance with this interpretation of the fur trade in North America, Hickerson (1962, 1970, 1974) defined Chippewa-Dakota relations in terms of their dependence on the fur trade. He then divided their historic period into a hostile period after 1736 which culminated in the evacuation of the Minnesota-Wisconsin Woodlands by the Dakota and a peaceful period before 1736 characterized by Chippewa middleman trade. In Hickerson's interpretation throughout both periods Chippewa-Dakota relations had their raison d'être in both groups' colonial status within the fur trade.

By way of contrast, a critical analysis of the ethnohistoric record for this period presents a significantly different view if Chippewa-Dakota relations. In Chapter II
evidence was presented which indicated that warfare was general between the Chippewa and Dakota before and after 1736. In addition, evidence showing the wide range of trade contacts available to the Dakota was presented in Chapter III. Furthermore, these Dakota trade contacts were independent of Chippewa middleman control.

Fur Trade Competition

One of the characteristics of Hickerson's approach to fur trade colonialism (1973) has been his depiction of the fur trade as a monolithic force with all that this implies in the way of monopolistic control. Instead, as I have indicated above and in Chapter III, the Dakota were able to maintain a wide range of competitive trade contacts. The competition for the Dakota trade from these diverse sources would certainly appear to have opened avenues of independent action to Dakota initiative.

It would appear from this evidence that Hickerson's interpretation of the fur trade's effect on the Dakota was inappropriate to the facts. Rather than creating a set of preconditions which forced the Dakota to evacuate the Woodlands in response to Chippewa pressures, the fur trade appears to have attracted the Dakota to the west.
Plains Trade Influences

Given the evidence presented earlier, there is a strong probability, almost a certainty, that the reason the Chippewa were able to move into central Minnesota and western Wisconsin from Lake Superior was that the attention of the Dakotas was directed elsewhere. Gianettino (1977), Waisberg (1978), and Jablow (1951) have all discussed the attractiveness which the middleman role had for the Cree and Assiniboin, the Ottawa, and the Cheyenne. With their access to European trade goods, it is reasonable to expect that the Dakota felt the same yearnings. However, other groups to the north, east, and south all had access to European trade goods by the eighteenth century and, presumably, had their own ambitions.

The prairie region between the Upper Mississippi and the Middle Missouri Rivers, however, offered the various Dakota groups an opportunity to assume the role of middlemen. Evidence from the archaeologic record, presented earlier, has indicated the existence of an aboriginal trade network between the Plains and central Minnesota. Furthermore, some Dakota groups had already penetrated the prairies to the west. Thus it is quite certain that the Dakota were no strangers to Plains trade. Their involvement in this aboriginal trade network would have established a foundation for later involvement in the middleman pattern.
Another factor which made the Plains at the beginning of the eighteenth century a more attractive arena for middleman trade was the introduction of equestrian transportation from the Southwest. As Jablow (1951:23) has argued, the conjunction of middleman suppliers of European trade goods from the north and east and horse raiding/trading groups from the south and west in the Plains created an efflorescence of trade activity. Primarily, horses were exchanged for European trade goods. This situation had enormous profit potential for the Dakota.

Ethnohistoric sources have indicated that the Eastern Dakota groups controlled access to European trade goods through most of the eighteenth century. However, the Western Dakota groups controlled access to the Arikara villages on the Missouri which were a major staging area for horses from the south. Between these eastern and western oriented groups there existed an institution which was known as the Dakota trade fair. At these trade fairs, horses and other Plains products were exchanged for European trade goods. Consequently, the Dakota trade fairs acted to integrate the Western Dakota groups' access to horses at the Arikara villages and the Eastern Dakota groups' access to European trade goods on the Upper Mississippi and Minnesota Rivers.

A threat to this established Dakota trading system came in the last decade of the eighteenth century with the
movement of European fur traders up the Missouri River. This movement appears to have been countered with a movement of Teton and some Middle Dakota groups into the Middle Missouri area. This expansion appears to have been somewhat successful in maintaining Dakota trade prerogatives in the area until the 1830s. Perhaps the Dakotas' intervention was successful until the 1830s because the trade in beaver pelts was still a major means of obtaining European trade goods.

But the 1830s saw a switch in the Plains fur trade from beaver pelts to buffalo robes. For reasons of transportation and location, the traders in the Upper Mississippi-Minnesota River area and the Hudson's Bay Company to the north were unable to compete with traders in the Middle Missouri area who operated out of St. Louis in this new trade. The economic basis for the Dakota trade fairs was destroyed and Teton Dakota groups began to deal directly with European traders for trade goods. By the 1840s the Teton were expanding their territory in pursuit of the bison herds which were now forming the basis of the fur trade.

In summary, what I have been establishing here is the close correspondence between opportunities developing from white contact, e.g., horses and European trade goods, and Dakota movements onto the prairies between the Upper Mississippi and the Middle Missouri, into the Middle Missouri area, and onto the High Plains south and west of
the Missouri River. The impetus for these movements can be traced to the involvement of the Dakota in the fur trade, or more precisely, to their varying involvements in different aspects of the fur trade over time. Each movement can be traced to an economic opportunity generated by the fur trade or a need to protect their economic position in the fur trade. Thus, middleman aspirations provide a reasonable motive for the Dakota occupation of the prairies and the desire to protect their position suggests a motivation for occupying the Middle Missouri area. The bison robe trade provides a reason for the movement onto the High Plains.

While I have argued here that Dakota expansion was related to their involvement in the fur trade, it is not certain that this was the response of an Indian group faced with no free alternative. Instead, I have argued that these groups observed and pursued trade advantage onto the Plains, not that they were pushed onto the Plains by fur trade dependent groups. The westward expansion of the Dakota appears to be consistent with a long history of reasonably uniform behaviour in perceiving and pursuing trade advantage.
The Mantouek appear to have been the Mundua of Lake of the Woods who were decimated by the Chippewa. The Mundua survivors supposedly became the Marten clan of the Chippewa.

French appellation for Algonquian groups living north of Lake Superior.

Poundage calculated at .75 lb/livre.

For an argument given in 1710 concerning the use of posts to maintain peace between various Indian groups see WHC 16:266.

For an earlier assessment of LeSueur’s motives see WHC 16:174.

La Jemerais later joined his uncle, La Verendrye, in the Boundary Waters region.

Merchantilism as used here implies an attempt to increase national wealth by maximizing exports while minimizing colonial imports.

Fermier—one having control over an aspect of the fur trade, in this case the export trade.

Castor gras—literally "fat beaver", refers to beaver pelts that have been worn to the point that the long guard hairs have been worn away exposing the underfur used as felting for beaver hats.

Congees—licenses to trade in furs, usually limiting the number of canoes and men that might be employed.

Significant amounts of French trade goods were imported from Albany, so differences in the quality of trade goods may not have been a decisive factor.

In 1702 Juchereau de St. Denis was allowed to pass after paying a toll of a thousand crowns’ worth of goods to let his canoes pass (Kellogg 1907:157).

Excluding the possibility of stray Vikings.
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