CARGO CULT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN TRANSITIONAL MELANESIA

By

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A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University
December 1970
SCOPE AND CONTENTS: In this paper I make a distinction between cargo cults, which are usually incompatible with economic development, and cargo movements, which may have the characteristics of cargo cults but which may be compatible with the goals of economic development. I suggest that all cargo cults have begun as cargo movements and propose that one of the variables which might influence the change from movement to cult is that of indigenous and European values of time. This proposal is tested with reference to cult and movement in Manus, of the Admiralty Islands, and Kalili, on the north-west coast of New Britain.
"Bluntly, cargo cult is one of the great barriers that impede the advancement of the people. It must go if progress is to be achieved. But the changing of men's minds is a slow process; a step forward in the changing is the recognition and admission on our part that intricate belief systems such as cargo cult exist. You cannot fight with your head in the sand."

(in Lawrence, 1964: viii)

J.K. McCarthy
District Officer
Territory of Papua and New Guinea
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INTRODUCTION

Cargo cults in New Guinea have been an impediment to economic development for the better part of a century. As such, they are one of the most pressing problems of a territory which is now attempting to integrate itself with a modern cash economy, a necessary step for eventual self sufficiency.

There is much confusion about Cargo cults. Many people do not know what they are. Those who do know, disagree among themselves. Resultantly the administration of New Guinea is sometimes in a quandry as to how to react to them.

In this paper I have tried to draw what I see as distinctions between Cargo cults, which are usually atavistic and as such incompatible with economic development, and Cargo movements, which may have characteristics of Cargo cults but which are compatible with the goals of economic development.

I suggest that all Cargo cults have begun as Cargo movements, and propose that one of the variables which might influence the change from movement to cult is that of indigenous and European values of time. A transitional Melanesian society which is successful in a Cargo movement leading to further economic development will, I propose, maintain traditional Melanesian time in the pattern-maintenance and integrative subsystems, while assimilating European long-term future time in the economy and polity. A society which chooses Cargo cult
will not only maintain Melanesian time values, but will so heighten the awareness of Melanesian time as to make it a part of the Cargo cult ideology.

I am concerned in this paper with transitional Melanesia, those peoples who have experienced white contact, either direct or indirect, but who have not yet completely accepted a modern cash economy, for it is only with these peoples that Cargo cults occur.

I make the assumption that the assimilation of a western cash economy by Melanesians is inevitable. Although this may not necessarily be good, it is what we have to work with. To survive, Melanesia will be forced into the world economy; the only alternative is to keep Melanesians in a zoo. Since this is so, I am concerned with ways to implement what I see as eventually necessary culture change. Cargo cults are not compatible with economic development; they do not aid the native in coping with his problems of culture contact. Cargo movements are a viable means of integrating the Melanesian into the world economy.

I have borrowed from Burridge (1960) the distinction between simply the material goods sought by a Cargo cult or Cargo movement, cargo with a small 'c', and the plethora of symbols and meanings associated with the Cargo cult or Cargo movement, Cargo with a capital 'C'.
DESCRIPTION OF CARGO CULT

In the year of 1885 on the island of Fiji, one Navosavakandua was seized by white police and incarcerated. The crime, for which he himself expected the death sentence--cargoism. Navosavakandua was the leader of a cult called the Tuka cult, and his crime was the preaching of a millenial doctrine. It had been mystically revealed to him that the ancestors were to return to Fiji, the faithful would enter Mburoto Kula, the Glorious Paradise, the old lands would be restored, the shops would be filled with calico, tinned goods, and other European goods, and the shite government officials, traders, and missionaries would be driven into the sea. Navosavakandua's Tuka cult is the first reported instance of the phenomenon of Cargo cult, which later was to flourish among transitional peoples of Melanesia.

One of the most well-known Cargo cults was first reported in 1919 by F.E. Williams, who published a full report on "The Vailala Madness" in 1923. Describing one of the cultists, Williams writes that:

He continually rolled his eyes and uttered exclamations, which the onlookers said were unintelligible to them. When taken inside, he stood peering up into the roof. Subsequently he became quiet and went down among the people, where he seemed to bear a leading part in the dancing that was going on. (1923: 5)

This demonstration as 'madness' was known by the natives themselves as "head-he-go-round," described as a sensation "all-a-same
ginger beer". (Ibid: 8) In addition to individual and group possession, the cult followers used "a pole of considerable length and weight, with a knob on the end which usually shows that the pole has been used in the manner of a battering ram". (Ibid: 33) This pole, developed from traditional divinatory techniques, was carried by as many as six men and was used primarily in cases of theft or similar offences, when the pole would take on a life of its own and, after much maneuvering, would eventually point out the guilty party.

Why all this interest in ferreting out guilt? Because when all the villagers had become morally pure, a large steamer crewed by their ancestors would visit them. This ship would be loaded with gifts of European goods—tobacco, calico, knives, axes, tinned goods, and the like. This cargo was to be allotted to various villages, and the people would know which was theirs by markings on the packages. In earlier versions of the belief, the steamer was to have on board a consignment of rifles which were to be used to drive the whites out of the district.

The spirit crew of this steamer, ancestors and deceased relatives of the Vailala natives, would no longer have black skin; rather they would be white. But these new white men would stand in a much different relationship to the natives than the whites they currently knew, for rather than being exploitative strangers, the whites would now be their friends, and as friends would stand in a morally equal relationship with them.
These ancestors were to be contacted by the use of flag poles. Williams states:

The main function of the flagpole has been mentioned: there are certain individuals who can receive messages from the dead through its agency. A group of men singing vigorously at the foot of one of these poles were unable to explain, or, I believe, understand what they were singing: something came down the flagpole into the ground, up into the belly of the leader, and thence into and out of his mouth; all the rest were following his lead. (Ibid: 23)

Another feature of this cult was the erection of special cult houses, ahea uv (hot houses). These usually stood in the center of the village, but were not much different from the ordinary dwelling house; and their function might have been missed by the casual visitor. The houses were closed and were used only by cult members, to whom Williams refers as "Automaniacs". (Ibid: 4) These houses were used as places of communication with the dead. In order to contact the spirits, the leader would sit on the verandah of the ahea uv (imitating the white man?) until he felt certain sensations in his belly which indicated the presence of the departed ones.

In addition to the ahea uv, tables and benches were constructed for mortuary feasts. The feasts themselves were traditional; the addition was the white man's way of sitting at the feast. Williams notes that men would "endure" sitting at a table only for these special feasts. (Ibid: 19)

Although I would take a few grains of salt with Williams' analysis of the Vailala Madness (He speaks, for instance, of the "mental instability of the natives". Ibid: 13), the facts of the cult man-
Ifestation are indisputable. (1) From the Vailala Madness we can see a general pattern of Cargo cult activity which has persisted in Melanesia to the present day. First, there is a message or revelation to a prophet from ancestral spirits. This message will contain promises of a millennium, usually including both spiritual bliss through a return to 'the good old days' of the mythical past and material goods of European origin, the vaunted cargo. The promise of a millennium will be made good only if certain actions are taken and certain beliefs either instilled or restored. These actions usually involve a series of complex rituals which must be carried out before the millennium will come.

1. I was interested to find a native analysis of Williams' report of the Vailala Madness written by Albert Maori Kiki of Orokolo. "Williams seems to think that the main purpose of the Vailala Madness was to obtain cargo. Cargo may have come into it, but the main purpose of all this strange behaviour was an attempt to contact the dead. Elma people believe that when Iko first went and found the land of the dead, where all the dead people go and live, he dropped a mirage behind him, so that no living person would ever be able to find him. During the Vailala Madness, people believed that they might be able to break through this mirage if they could go through some kind of cleansing process by destroying all their magic and ritual objects and by confessing to crimes, real or imaginary.

Williams claims that the disease died out because the government arrested the leaders. But the old people of Orokolo claim that the villagers themselves turned against them. Those not affected by the madness took revenge for the seduction of their wives, and they performed powerful magic that killed the leaders of the movement. (Kiki, 1968: 102)
DEFINITION OF CARGO CULT

The term 'Cargo cult' has come into acceptance without, it seems any real agreement on any of the most basic of definitions—Cargo cult is Cargo cult because it is a cult (here we run into additional problems) and because it is somehow or other concerned with what in New-Melanesian is called kago.

The literature is not too helpful to the neophyte working his way through the morass of material published on Cargo cults. One wonders at times if indeed there is any such thing as Cargo cult. There are many different forms of social movements which have been classed as Cargo cults. (cf. Brown, 1968) It might actually be possible to separate these movements, such that no one would be like any other, in which case the whole concept of Cargo cult would be meaningless. But such splitting would of itself serve no useful purpose.

We must be careful, however, to recognize that there is no one valid model for Cargo cults, and that any generalizations concerning them must be most tenuous. As Peter Worsley warns, in the new introduction to his historical compendium, The Trumpet Shall Sound:

The cults are not simple systems of thought, nor are they unitary systems of thought which contain no internal problems of interpretation and choice. A whole spectrum of organizational choices and alternatives presents itself....There is not a single cult with a single internally consistent and un-
equivocal body of belief, but whole sets and series of diverse and often competing attempts to institutionalize particular ways of acting out what different interpreters of the beliefs read as the implications of these beliefs for action. (1968: lxii)

Howard Kaminski, summarizing the work of Sylvia Thrupp's conference on Millenarian Dreams in Action, states that it is equally impossible to find a causative determinant:

If we bear in mind the kind of causative factors that were considered at the conference--anxiety, sense of deprivation, social suffering, etc.--we must admit that in no case is it even remotely possible to deduce the movement from any single factor, any group of factors, or any definable degree of intensity of such factors. (in Thrupp, 1962: 215)

Several writers, nevertheless, have attempted to draw from the vast body of material on the subject, common characteristics attributable to the Cargo cult. Raymond Firth, although he has not found Cargo cults in Tikopia (and lucidly explains why this is so) attempts to define the phenomenon of Cargo cult so that he can talk about its non-existence.

It seems to me fairly obvious to assume that cargo cults tend to arise as a result of several factors in operation together: a markedly uneven relation between a system of wants and the means of their satisfaction: a very limited technical knowledge of how to improve conditions; specific blocks or barriers to that improvement by poverty of natural resources or opposed political interests. What constitutes a cult is a systematized series of operations to secure the means of satisfaction by non-technical methods. (Firth, 1955: 130)

This is the traditional economists' definition, and assuming that we accept traditional economists' definitions, this one works. The
trouble with it, as far as I am concerned, is that it is difficult to impose the idea of a Western economy and the terms used to analyze Western economy upon non-western peoples with non-western economies. 'Non-technical' is an ambiguous term. Given Firth's definition, we must assume that every non-technical means of satisfying certain wants is going to be Cargo cult. As only one example, suppose that group A wants guns. It does not have the technology to manufacture guns. So in a 'systematized series of operations' it proceeds to steal guns from whites who have them. Are they then members of a Cargo cult?

Or let us take another example. Whereas the word 'technical' has certain connotations for Westerners, it might have entirely different connotations for a Melanesian. What would Firth do with the statement made by Lawrence (1964: 29) that "Thus man (the Garia) regarded religion as above all a technology".

A more viable definition of Cargo cult is made by Stanner, (1953: 63-4) who abstracts six "elements structured into cult form". I have taken the liberty of condensing Stanner's presentation; the following points are his words but not his sentences.

1. Leadership: Cargo cults have leaders who are usually not traditional headmen; these leaders are of unusual personality. These leaders are men.

Further study has shown that Cargo cults have been led by women as well as men, but Stanner should not be faulted on this point. His observation of the lack of traditional headmen as cult leaders is most interesting. It might be argued from this point that Cargo cult leader-
ship is always attained by men unable to gain traditional status, either through a breakdown of traditional means of attaining leadership or inability of the leader to operate within the existing framework. Stanner's third criterion of cult leaders as having 'unusual personality' seems to be redundant. Definitionally, a leader will differ from his followers and hence will be unusual.

2. Contact with the spirit world: Contact is made through visions, dreams, swoons, fits, seizures, symbolic deaths and restorations, all seen as invariably mystical.

It should be noted, however, that these mystical contacts with the spirit world are by no means limited to participants in Cargo cult activities. Rather, this type of spiritualism is quite characteristic of indigenous Melanesian religions.

3. Orders, charters, etc.: Participants are given systematic instruction with sanctions against non-participation. Sanctions include positive moralistic exhortations and/or negative iconoclastic demands such as the abandonment of old ways.

This point is well taken, primarily because it is fairly all-encompassing. I think we might say that these orders, charters, etc., are strong indications of a desire for change, and this point, rather than the mechanism of indication of this desire, should be the one emphasized.

4. Prophecies: The prophet will predict the arrival of a ship or plane sent by the spirits or ancestors with a cargo of non-traditional wealth for the natives. Sending of money is not reported.

These prophecies are what give the Cargo cults their millenarian aspect. It should be noted, however, that although Cargo cults have been described as millenarian (Lanternari, 1963; Worsley, 1968), there is no
reference to the millenarian period of 1000 years. On the contrary, cargo is predicted for the immediate future. That the cargo is composed of non-traditional wealth is important in terms of its indication of a desire for economic and consequent social equality with the possessors of this non-traditional (European) wealth. Later work has shown Stanner to be wrong as far as the omission of money as cargo is concerned. As only one example, Burridge (1954: 245) reports the mystical arrival of a five pound note as a precursor to much more European cash cargo.

5. Mass demonstrations: Common features are allegedly hysterical or eccentric actions. The most common of these actions seems to be a kind of possession or trance either by one member of the group or simultaneously by many, which is akin to the 'shaking' of many other mystical sects such as the Shakers of the American Northwest coast or the Shaking Quakers of Germany, England, and America.

6. Symbolic Europeanism: European articles and forms of organization are widely used. Stanner calls this a kind of wish fulfillment, or achievement by fantasy. It might also be argued that the reason for symbolic Europeanism is that the indigenous religions are materialistic, involving the use of ritual which, when properly performed, will automatically ensure the cooperation of the spirits. Symbolic Europeanism may be seen as an attempt to copy European ritual which, to Melanesian thinking, should produce European goods.

Jarvie, in his superb philosophical analysis, The Revolution in
Anthropology, elaborates on the points of Stanner, noting, however, that "I stress different things from Stanner, and express them very differently". (Jarvie, 1964: 64)

1. Leadership: In the question of leadership, Jarvie emphasizes that the cult is usually founded and led by a single prophet, an important point overlooked by Stanner. For Stanner's "unusual personality", Jarvie substitutes "charismatic personality", noting that this is merely a descriptive term and should not be equated with the often rejected notion of "charisma" as an explanatory device. Jarvie notes that the leaders (his term is "prophets") have no special social standing in the society prior to the cult.

2. Education of prophets: Jarvie's second point might be subsumed under the first. "Prophets are, like everyone else in their society, hardly educated and often seriously misinformed about the workings of Western society outside of Melanesia." (Ibid: 65) I might add to this that most prophets, it seems, have had more contact with Western society than their followers; quite often a cult prophet will have worked for Europeans, through the missions, the government, or the plantations. As a result of this contact, he will be in a position of closer contact than his followers, and therefore has the advantage of appearing to understand the workings of Western society better than his followers.

3. European ritual: Jarvie's third point is virtually the same as the sixth point made by Stanner--all the cults borrow European "rituals" of one sort or another, both secular and religious. This
point is a bit arbitrary; we recognize as cults only those which bor-
row European ritual. Jarvie rightly does not belabor the point that
when European ritual is used, European ends are expected.

4. Beliefs: "The new beliefs are grafted onto older local be-
liefs." This is much the same point made by Stanner when he speaks of
contact with the spirit world. The emphasis of Jarvie's statement be-
longs on the word 'local' which is conspicuously absent in Stanner's
presentation.

5. The millennium: Cargo cults predict the coming of a millennium
in the near future. This millennium will include material things in
the form of non-traditional (European) goods as well as spiritual re-
genation, including change in the black-white power structure. The
time factor is significant; there are no reports of millennial prophecies
for the distant future.

6. Cult manifestations: Jarvie speaks of "organized activity";
Stanner of "mass demonstration". Both agree on symptoms of "mass
hysteria" as well as more organized, or formalized, activity such as
the building of warehouses, air-strips, wharfs, etc.

7. Place: A point not mentioned by Stanner: "They nearly al-
ways take place in colonialized areas which are economically under-
developed, highly isolated, politically acephalous and, on the whole,
not given to violent resistance to white rule." (Ibid: 66) Jarvie
explains away Berndt's (1952) report of a cult in the New Guinea
Highlands which occurred before white contact, by a simple diffusion
of ideas and behaviour. I disagree with Jarvie on only one point:
almost all of New Guinea is characterized by economic underdevelopment, isolation, lack of chiefs, and passive resistance to white rule. I would prefer the more simple statement that Cargo cults occur only among transitional peoples.

8. Christian influence: Jarvie's last point, also unmentioned by Stanner, is that there have nearly always been attempts to Christianize the natives by the missionaries. Again I would question the usefulness of this statement as a distinctive characteristic of Cargo cults. It seems to me from a limited reading in Melanesian area ethnology that the missions are quite ubiquitous. Perhaps more to the point would be a statement that cults always occur as a result of white contact, either direct or indirect, and that the missionaries are often the whites doing the contacting. Although first contact is often made by patrols, these are temporary, with a limited exchange of ideas between natives and whites, whereas the missionaries are often the first whites actually in contact with the natives.
STANDARD DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CULT AND MOVEMENT

Many writers do not differentiate between Cargo cult and Cargo movement. Burridge, for instance, says: "Cargo movements... also called Cargo cults..." (1960: xv) Harding calls Cargo activities in Sio "cargo movements". (1967: 1) Lawrence calls similar activities in the Southern Mandang District "cargo cults". (1964: 1)

I am more inclined, however, to accept the views of those who do choose to distinguish Cargo cult from other similar social movements. This distinction is no mere academic compartmentalization, but may serve a useful purpose in the analysis of and reaction to Cargo cults.

"The trouble is", says Stanner (1958: 7), "that all sequences of events studied by anthropology are 'movements' in being direction- al towards ends mediated by objects." So all cults are movements. But the obverse is not at all true. Judy Inglis, reacting to Stanner, states one set of limitations.

Within the rag-hag collection of so-called 'nativistic movements' I should wish to limit the name 'cargo cult' to those in which European-style wealth is sought by certain actions, performed at the behest of a prophet, and intended to influence the spirits. 'Movement' has been widely used to group together a wide variety of phenomena and within this group distinctions may and should be drawn. (1959: 155)

Although Inglis' limitations are good, the criterion I would isolate as unique to Cargo cult is that of the influence of the spirits. Paula Brown (1969: 165) supports this view when she notes that of the six points mentioned by Stanner as characteristic of
Cargo cult, all but that of contact with the spirit world are also characteristic of other social movements.

Margaret Mead (1964: 196) also sees a necessary distinction between Cargo cults and "another innovative form of social behaviour which may be called a 'movement'." Her criteria of Cargo cult are much the same as those of Inglis and Brown. "Cargo cults depend on supernatural means of bringing about an immediate utopia, and thrived on dreams, visions, and suggestability. In contrast, movements depended on politico-economic means of realization." (Ibid: 198)

It should be noted that this "supernatural means of bringing about an immediate utopia" does not necessarily imply a differentiation between cult and movement on the basis of religious versus non-religious means. There are many religious movements which cannot be classed with cargo cults. A religious movement may, in this case, use entirely pragmatic means to satisfy this desire for utopia. If, on the other hand, a religious movement bases itself on the premise that ends (in this case specifically Cargo) are to be achieved entirely through supernatural means, then I would feel justified in calling it a cult. There is an additional problem here—in what sense do we use the word 'entirely'? Certainly every Cargo cult has certain ritualized activity which is intended at least in part to be communication with the supernatural. It might be argued that this activity is then pragmatic, in which case ends are attained by a combination of supernatural and human means. I would resolve this question by noting that cult activity, the human means, is always directed
intransitively towards the supernatural, and it is always recognized that the supernatural and not the human element is that which is ultimately responsible for the satisfaction of desired ends.

There is, then, one distinction widely recognized in the literature on Cargo cults: a cult will utilize supernatural means whereas a movement will use pragmatic means to attain similar ends. Stanner, re-analyzing his own data, elaborates on this theme and provides us with a secondary criterion for the distinction.

I have suggested that the distinction be made by visualizing the cult as the activity of a combination or a coalition. These are the forms which one or the other side, or the sides severally, may assume in an association. We cannot use the word 'group' operationally unless combinative and associational groups are distinguished. What especially characterizes cult groups is that, because of the nature of the alter and the object, no association can form. The group's activity is, so to speak intransitive and must therefore be symbolic and expressive, not manipulative or functional. (1958: 9)

Burridge (1960: 32) makes much the same point: "Let us say that the participants of a Cargo movement (I would substitute the more particular term 'cult') are attempting to find particular and relevant symbols which will express certain conflicts and the ideal solutions to them."

The intransitive nature of the Cargo cult is less valid as a means of actually determining the state of mind of a given people which will be reflected in their activities. How, in the field, would it be possible to decide whether an action is symbolic or manipulative? The question becomes more acute when we realize
that an action which is seen as symbolic for a European may not necessarily be so for a Melanesian. For this reason, although I find Stanner's distinction valid, it seems to have a more appropriate place in post-facto analysis.

By noting that the ends of Cargo cult and Cargo movement are similar, I have restricted my own concept of movement. It is certainly possible to find socio-political movements in New Guinea (Mead would call them "modernization movements" (1964: 197)) which have goals far removed from those of Cargo cult. But it is fairly easy to distinguish these movements from Cargo cults. A confusion arises only when cult and movement have similar goals. Those movements which have the goals of Cargo cult might best be described as Cargo movements to distinguish them from other movements with dissimilar goals.

I have thus far found in the literature one working tool for making the distinction between Cargo cult and Cargo movement. The importance of this distinction becomes evident when we realize that many Cargo cults have been confused with Cargo movements, not only by anthropologists but by government officials, who have at times taken steps to repress Cargo movements when in actuality these movements might have been compatible with government programs of economic development. I shall have occasion to examine more fully the ramifications of one such confusion, Father Miller's "Cult", later in this paper. But first I would like to look at another means of
making the cult/movement distinction which I have not found specifically mentioned in the literature of Cargo cults. I think that Stanner's distinction has little predictive use. The distinctions of Inglis, Mead, and Brown might be used in a predictive way, but it appears that their usefulness will be greatest after incipient cult symptomology occurs. I would like to find a way of determining the cult inclinations of a given people before any cult manifestations take place.

In the following chapters I attempt to define an alternative means of differentiating between Cargo cult and Cargo movement which might be of use in predictive analysis. I apply the theories of Hoselitz, Parsons, and Shils to arrive at another formulation of the cult/movement distinction utilizing a difference between traditional and traditionalistic actions as reflected in normative and ideological behaviour in Cargo cult and Cargo movement.
TRADITION AND TRADITIONALISM

A widely held assertion, which may be traced back to Max Weber, is that it is possible to distinguish between economically underdeveloped and economically advanced countries on the basis of their reliance on tradition as opposed to rationally organized economics. For instance, Firth, Fisher, and Macrae, in their study of the social implications of technological change, state that "technical (and associated economic) progress is a necessary concomitant of the movement in time from affective behaviour to rationality..." (in Braibanti and Spengler, ed. 1961: 83) Tradition as affective behaviour is thus seen as a retardant to economic growth; the assumption is made that to have a developed country, affective behaviour must be replaced by rational behaviour. This assumption may, however, be questioned when applied to a transitional society. Tradition may at times be an aid to the development of an economically advancing society; rationality may be detrimental.

Weber defines "traditionalism" as "the psychic attitude-set for the habitual workday and the belief in the everyday routine as an inviolable norm of conduct". (1968: 296) This statement indicates two different kinds of action. The first is what Weber would call habitual behaviour; the second implies a raising of the concept of habit to a more self-conscious level, that of normative behaviour.

Edward Shils, in his essay "Tradition and Liberty" (1958) has
pointed out that normative behaviour can itself be refined, again using the criterion of a greater degree of self-consciousness of the action. He thus proposes a distinction between tradition and traditionalism, indicating how the latter may arise from the former.

Traditionalism is the self-conscious, deliberate affirmation of traditional norms, in full awareness of their traditional nature and alleging that their merit derives from that traditional transmission from a sacred origin... It does not discriminate between the workable and unworkable, and it regards all elements of the tradition it praises as equally essential.

Traditionalism is not only hostile to liberty, it is also radically hostile to tradition... (1)

(Shils, 1968: 161)

As an example of this distinction between tradition and traditionalism, we might look at M. Eliade's (1962) analysis of the place of "cosmic regeneration" in cargo cults. A traditional theme which is fundamental to Melanesian religions is the annual celebration of the return of the dead and a concomitant concurrent cosmic renewal. In addition to the return of the dead, this festival of the New Year includes a ban on work, offerings to the dead on platforms (often taking the form of a banquet in honor of the dead) and a collective celebration which often includes forms of sexual license.

Here we have many of the elements of Cargo cult activity—the waiting for the dead, the destruction of gardens and domestic animals for funeral feasts, and offerings to the dead, the orgiastic celebrations, and the refusal to work. The only major ritual element

1. Shils' traditionalism can be viewed in the same light as Linton's "nativism" (Linton, 1943) and Wallace's "revitalism" (Wallace, 1956). Shils differs from both of these only in the importance he ascribes to sacred origin as a sanction for the elevation of a body of norms from traditional to traditionalistic behaviour.
lacking is the destruction of European goods, which would not have existed in the traditional world. Eliade states:

Apart from syncretic and Christian elements, all Melanesian micro-religions share the same central myth: the arrival of the dead is taken as the sign of cosmic renewal. The Cargo cultists have simply taken this traditional religious theme and have amplified it, charging it with new values and with a prophetic and millenarist intensity. (Eliade 1962: 237)

Bert Hoselitz has seized on Shils' definition of traditionalism to score a point against Weberian analysis, pointing out that traditionalistic norms are actually rationalized as deriving their validity from some sacred source in the past. "But a system in which traditionally determined ends are consciously held, is still traditional in Weber's sense, for the major requirement of such a system is that it is clearly oriented to a formulated goal, or to a set of values which are clearly formulated and logically related." (Hoselitz, 1961: 86) Traditionalism, as Shils notes, is not merely the acceptance of traditional norms because they might aid in the solution of a given set of problems, but rather the appeal to these norms because of their age and concomitant ideological superiority. This is tradition for the sake of tradition, tradition as ideology, a set of rationalized principles which derive their authority from past history raised to the degree of sophistication or formalization so as to become sacred in the eyes of the members of that society.

Following this model, we now have three forms of traditional behaviour—Weber's "attitude set for the habitual work day" or habit, Shils' traditional behaviour corresponding to Weber's "norm of conduct"
or norm, and Shils' traditionalism which Hoselitz prefers to call ideology. Hoselitz grades these by the criteria of 1) the degree of self-consciousness, 2) the degree of formalization, and 3) the degree of normative weight. To complete his model according to these criteria, he proposes one more term, usage, to describe behaviour which would be habitual except for a greater normative weight. We now have the following table:

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<tr>
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<th>Habit</th>
<th>Norm</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
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<tr>
<td>Habit</td>
<td>not normative</td>
<td>not self-conscious</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usage</td>
<td>normative</td>
<td>not self-conscious</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norm</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>normative</td>
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(Hoselitz 1961: 87)

It should be noted that Hoselitz' criteria are not necessarily independent. For instance, a greater degree of self-consciousness will be associated with a greater degree of formalization. Also, these criteria must be seen not as definitive closed categories but rather as relative to each other with a certain amount of overlapping.

Since neither habit nor usage are self-conscious actions, the distinction which most concerns us is that between norm and ideology, which is virtually the same as the distinction between tradition and traditionalism. Although Hoselitz' table indicates that both normative and ideological behaviour have normative sanctions, we should keep in mind that an ideology will have greater normative weight than a norm. Also an ideology will have a higher degree of self-consciousness than a norm. But our primary means of distinguishing a norm from an ideo-
logy is on the basis of the degree of formalization or ritualization. This distinction relates to the degree of "ultimate reality" (Ibid: 88) associated with either form of behaviour.

Non-formalized normative self-conscious action is action based on a traditional norm which does not necessarily form part of a systematic complex of purposive action deriving its validation from the past, whereas formalized action is part of such a complex. (Ibid: 89)

Although it has been widely held in the theory of economic anthropology that tradition is incompatible with economic development, this is not necessarily always the case. Tradition will at times perform the important function of stabilizing a society in the process of westernization, and will thus tend to decrease the effects of social disorganization which might otherwise lead to such diverse reactions as apathy and withdrawal, warfare, and millenarianism.

Traditional norms are usually accompanied by well-defined sanctions, such that the strength of a given norm may be easily determined by any member of the society. The individual in a given society will be more encouraged to act on his own initiative if he knows what the results of his actions will be, or at least what the sanctions for or against his actions are. In this manner, traditional norms will actually encourage individual economic initiative.

Hoselitz proposes that it might be possible to utilize Parsons' differentiation of the subsystems of a society(1) to determine the place of tradition in a transitional society. The stabilization to

1. For a discussion of Parsons' subsystems, see Parsons and Smeltzer, 1956: 46-51.
which we have just referred is virtually the same as "latent pattern maintenance and tension management," the function of Parsons' Pattern Maintenance subsystem. The other Parsonian subsystem within which the maintenance of traditional values will be compatible with economic development is the Integrative subsystem, the function of which is integration.

Parsons' remaining subsystems are the Economy, with an adaptive function, and the Polity, with a goal-gratification function. The retention of traditional values in these subsystems may be detrimental to a society attempting to integrate itself with the Western world. It might be postulated that an ideal situation would be the maintenance of traditional values in the pattern maintenance and integrative subsystems, combined with the adoption of European values in the economy and polity. We shall have occasion later in this paper to test more specifically the assumptions here set forth.

It may be argued that a traditionalistic ideology, as opposed to traditional values, is always adverse to economic development. The all-embracing nature of traditionalism does not lend itself to compatibility with developmental schemes; traditionalistic ideology is an either/or proposition. And naturally a return to the glorious past finds no place for assimilation of new economic trends.

During a period of rapid social change, especially when a group feels itself to be in a crisis situation, it is not surprising to find a total rejection of that which is seen as causing the crisis, the imposition of new ideas from without. Human memory has a surprising
capacity to remember the good parts of the past while forgetting the less desirable aspects of the period. In a crisis situation, the present is seen as undesirable and the past is remembered as 'good', so a solution to the present may be sought by an elevation of the norms of the past such that they take on redemptive power. This is the place of traditionalistic ideology.
TRADITION AND TRADITIONALISM AS FURTHER MEANS OF
DISTINGUISHING CARGO CULT FROM CARGO MOVEMENT

With the distinction of tradition and traditionalism, we have
a further means of distinguishing between Cargo cult and Cargo
movement. A Cargo cult will involve traditionalistic behaviour,
whereas a Cargo movement will involve normative action.

But how, one might ask, is it possible to call a Cargo cult
traditionalistic when the focus of the cult is on non-traditional
European goods? The answer is to separate means from ends. We
are concerned with behaviour, with actions indicative of a given set
of values. Indigenous values, norms, and institutions are used as
means in Cargo cult. And if certain ritual is introduced, it is
accepted within the traditional framework, as has been done for thous-
ands of years. Men of Peri, coastal Manus, have for years used the
rituals of the Usiai, inland Manus. Peri villagers have institutions
for the introduction of these new rituals. If the new ritual worked,
it was kept. If it did not work, it was discarded in favor of one
which did work. The Melanesians simply had to change rituals to
produce behaviour indicative of Cargo cult. Even the ends of Cargo
cult are changed not so much in kind as in degree. From Eliade’s
analysis of the Melanesian New Year, we see the ends of Cargo cult
as being also traditional—paradise on earth. The difference is
that with the coming of the Europeans, God became white instead of black and heaven expanded to include the goods of the European, as well as the Melanesian.

Cargo cults and Cargo movements have at times been equally condemned by authorities, often because of failure to distinguish between the two. As a result, certain Cargo movements have been suppressed, whereas they might have been quite compatible with the goals of a development-minded administration. On the other hand, Cult activities have often not been recognized as such, with the result that an administration has sometimes found itself in the embarrassing position of aiding the development of a Cargo cult or similar millenarian movement.

We have distinguished ideological from normative action primarily on the basis of the degree of formalization or ritualization involved. If we apply this criterion to Cargo cult we have a further means of distinguishing cult from movement.

Now comes the difficult part. Are we just playing with words or does the distinction actually mean something. Without field work to test the hypothesis, only tentative conclusions can be drawn from the work of others who may or may not have been aware of the precision we intend for their language.

Schwartz' (1962) study of the Paliau Movement in Manus is a prime example of the judicious use of the distinction between cult and movement. Schwartz finds seven different phases of the Paliau
Movement, two of which are cult phases and five of which are movement phases. A complete check of our criteria on all seven phases would take more space than we have at our disposal, but we might take a look at the contrast between the "initial movement phase" and the "first cult phase" to see how well our criteria fit.

The Initial Movement Phase was certainly not traditionalistic—there was no appeal to the sacredness of the past as an ideological program. There was no increase in ritual activity and no ritualization of normative acts.

It is in the section of his (Paliau's) program dealing with economics that we are able to establish that he was not simply a cult leader proclaiming the imminence of the millennium when the desired state of equivalence with the white man would be attained through supernatural means, but was attempting to formulate a culture-wide program for change. Religion was only one part...In addition to living in accordance with the true religion, it was still necessary that they work together to develop their economic potential. (Schwartz 1962: 264)

Here we see not an ideology but a program of directed social change. Action was not symbolic and expressive; it was manipulative. Paliau wanted Cargo. And he knew that the best way to get it was with money. So he set out with his followers to earn the money to buy Cargo. The money would come from native-run stores, from native transportation companies, and from native-run plantations. They would buy their own cargo; God would not give it to them. All God would do was to make them better men, to prevent them from fighting among themselves, from lying and stealing.

In the First Cult Phase, or the Noise, things changed drastically.
As happened to Yali, the leader of the Rai Coast Rehabilitation Scheme in the Mandang District of New Guinea, the words of Paliau became distorted as they were passed from mouth to mouth. Manus Islanders had a difficult time relating Paliau's initial steps of the movement with the goals eventually and distantly to be attained.

Thus a program for cultural transformation extending through time and change to the final intensely valued goal was short-circuited. The time, the work, and the uncertainty that Paliau's plan would entail disappeared as the people were possessed by the intense desire for the realization of the longed-for goal. The practical means toward immediate ends became magical, ritual means towards the realization of the ultimate. The supernatural means and the rationale for the transformation of the program were drawn from the rich and ready substratum of native belief.

(Ibid: 266-7).

Here we have all our stated elements of Cargo cult—a high degree of formalization and self-consciousness indicative of ideological behaviour, the supernatural means of obtaining Cargo, and a change from manipulative to symbolic action. With the Noise, Paliau's program ground to a halt as village after village joined the cult. The Noise was a giant step backwards in the economic development of the area. Reversion to traditionalism resulted in temporary chaos as people destroyed material goods, followed the advice of oracles, and rejected the program of the movement.

In the case of Manus, the Noise was short-lived, spreading from village to village quickly but dying within a few days to a few weeks as prophecies of the imminent arrival of the cargo went unfulfilled. With the cessation of the Noise, Paliau was able to step into the
breach to re-establish some of the means of the "newfela-fashion" movement (Ibid: 227).

As a prime example of the lack of discrimination between secular means of movement activities leading towards economic development and the sacred means of cult activities leading towards atavism, I would refer to Dorothy Billings paper on "The Johnson Cult of New Hanover" (1969). This is a work of descriptive anthropology in which we are quite lost insofar as terminology is concerned. The word 'cult' is constantly used to describe the movement, and we infer that this cult is a Cargo cult by the following statement.

Outstanding contributions to the study of cargo cults have been made by several anthropologists, and it is instructive to consider New Hanover against some of the generalizations that have been put forward. (Billings 1969: 14)

But reading further, we discover that:

Ritual acts were not characteristic of the cult.  
(Ibid: 14)

...the supernatural was not much talked of.  
(Ibid: 15)

All cultists interviewed...seemed to believe that cargo comes about through work of a practical sort rather than through ritual actions.  
(Ibid: 16)

By these three statements we see that the Johnson Cult was not a Cargo cult according to our definition. If we put the shoe on the other foot, we can see that it was a Cargo movement, utilizing traditional norms in a most pragmatic way to achieve soundly reasoned ends. The people of New Hanover were tired of the Australian administration and wanted to change to American administration. So they did the most logical thing--
when election time came around, instead of voting for the Australians, they voted for the Americans. When the Australians would not allow their votes, they did the next logical thing—they refused to pay their taxes.

As for the cargo, there was no question of its supernatural origin or supernatural means of delivery. New Hanoverians had had contact with the Americans during the war and they knew that the Americans paid better wages than the Australians. But they were willing to work for their cargo. Their action was functional, not symbolic.

Let us reserve the word 'cult' for movements which have at least a modicum of connection with the supernatural. The Johnson 'Cult' is a political movement in the strongest sense of the word.

The Johnson Cult was put down by the Australian administration by jailing its members for non-payment of taxes. The administration also made demonstrations of strength like the shooting of coconuts off trees or the throwing of smoke bombs. They even shot and wounded one of the natives. Although Billings states that the administration was dealing with a 'cult', I would give them more credit. They were a colonial power out to stop a revolution.

If we follow the progress of the Johnson Cult, we discover that an American priest, Father Bernard Miller, invited the 'cultists' to form a co-operative movement, the Tutukuvul Isakul Association (T.I.A.). This co-op, composed of former 'cult' members, had a rule requiring all members to pay the Australian Council tax so they could stay out of jail and support the movement. The T.I.A. was violently opposed by
the Australian administration, which called it "Father Miller's Cult". Here we can see a confusion on the part of the administration. Father Miller's Cult was not a cult. It was a co-operative Cargo movement which by the end of 1968 had planted over 40,000 coconut trees, had collected over $12,000 for capital investment, and had elected its own representative to the House of Assembly.

It would be interesting to know more about the reasons for the administration's opposition to the T.I.A. Billings infers that this opposition stems from the roots of the T.I.A. in the Johnson Cult. Also there was native opposition to the T.I.A. by natives who had not voted for Johnson of America and consequently had been left out of the association. As Billings says: "Non-cultists never tired of reporting strange cultist beliefs to the Australian Administration officers". (Ibid: 18)

If we delete the loaded words from Billings account, it still appears that the administration was mistaken concerning the 'cult' nature of the Johnson Cult and, more importantly, the T.I.A. The T.I.A. is concerned with economic development; so is the Australian administration—same goals, opposing organizations. From the armchair it is interesting to speculate on what would have happened if the Australian administration had considered the T.I.A. as a Cargo movement instead of a Cargo cult.
TIME AS A VARIABLE IN CULT AND MOVEMENT DIFFERENTIATION

I have discussed the differences between tradition and traditionalism, between cult and movement, and between norm and ideology. And I have proposed that traditional normative action in the pattern-maintenance and integrative subsystems within the context of Cargo movements may well be conducive to economic development, whereas traditionalistic activity in these subsystems will in almost all cases be detrimental to native economic development. I also have noted that while maintaining traditional values in the pattern-maintenance and integrative subsystems, a Cargo movement might have its best chance of success if it combined these traditional values with the assimilation of European values in the economy and polity subsystems.

Traditionalistic or cult values are all embracing, such that a separation of the values of a given society into the subsystems of that society is not possible; traditionalistic activity and values are operative in all subsystems.

Given this proposed model, the next logical step is to test it. Is it possible to find a difference in the value systems of cult and movement oriented societies, a difference which will be reflected in the actions of the people of these societies? If so, is it possible to utilize this differentiation such that the positive aspects of Cargo movements, as opposed to the negative elements of Cargo cult, may be shared by a greater percentage of the population? In an attempt
to answer these questions, I propose to look at the values of time in Cargo cults and Cargo movements.

I will first make an assumption. In my perusal of Cargo cult literature it seems that virtually every Cargo cult has been preceded by a Cargo movement. This is an important statement insofar as it intimates that Melanesians have always attempted to obtain cargo by pragmatic, or at least the traditional combination of pragmatic and ritual, means before resorting to the more extreme means of Cargo cult. Melanesians have tried to get cargo utilizing normative action; sometimes this has failed and they have resorted to ideological action.

I take as a further presupposition that Cargo is not concerned with cargo, but rather is concerned with a moral relationship between whites and natives. This is the theme of Mambu by Burridge (1960). Cargo is not only European goods, but, in addition and more importantly, is symbolic in the same way that the transfer of material goods in Melanesian cultures is symbolic of the relationship of the parties engaged in the transaction. For the Melanesian, the symbolic aspects of material goods are not usually separated from the goods themselves.

Time values can be traditional, traditionalistic, or introduced. Introduced time, for Melanesia, is primarily European time. As we shall see, there is an enormous difference between Melanesian and European time, and this difference coincides with the difference between Cargo cult and Cargo movement. If our model works, those societies most inclined towards economic development will have assimilated European time values in the economy and polity subsystems.
while maintaining traditional Melanesian time in the pattern-maintenance and integrative subsystems. Cult societies will operate on Melanesian time exclusively and will so formalize Melanesian time values as to make them ideological.

It is only in transitional societies that traditional values in the pattern-maintenance and integrative subsystems will still be used with profit. As a society becomes more westernized, Melanesian values in any subsystem will eventually become detrimental to the economic growth of that society and will have to be discarded in favor of complete westernization. (1)

Before I proceed, I should explain what I see as the difference between European time and Melanesian time. When I speak of time, I assume that time has value and it is that value with which either a European or a Melanesian will be concerned. I borrow from Ralph Piddington the distinction between fact and value: the knowledge that a thing exists and the evaluation of that knowledge.

In the knowledge of any situation, the value of the situation is that aspect of the knowledge which can vary without rendering the knowledge false. Any element in the knowledge of a situation which cannot vary without rendering the knowledge false refers to fact and not to value. (Piddington, 1932: 314)

Time exists in and of itself as fact, but is made meaningful to a given culture only insofar as the fact of time is made relevant by an evaluation thereof.

The European mentality is geared from the first moments of adult conceptualization to think of himself and his world in terms of its

1. Scarlett Epstein illustrates this case in her study of "The Role of the Tolai Big Man in Political and Economic Development". (1970)
history. Time is measurable, it can be segmented, it can be controlled and manipulated. And since the European has (or at least thinks he has) a fair measure of past time, he is easily able to project his thoughts into future time. To the European, the past extends for thousands of years. The future may extend just as far, because the sense of history which the European has been taught from his early youth allows him to see the history of the future. He can see that his son will be living when he is dead, and that he should be making provisions for his son when he is dead.

But even more than this, a man knows the projected length of his lifetime, and can plan his life according to an ordered scheme, such that an action done in the present may show results twenty, thirty, or forty years hence. European causality, also notably lacking in Melanesia, can be seen as a function of European history.

Darwin was able to take the European sense of history and propose his theory of evolution. And this sometimes misunderstood theory was soon thereafter (with the death of God) responsible for the now-pervasive feeling of the common man in the Western world that there is a new god—Progress. (I went to the supermarket and counted thirty-seven products marked 'new' on one aisle.)

As a result of history, the European does not have to see the result of his endeavors appearing immediately. A European, for instance, will make a monetary investment to show long-term increase, secure in the knowledge that in a measurable length of time he will see the results of his investment. Maybe he will lose his money, but if he does so time
is not taken into account as a dependent variable.

The European can measure not only years, but days and parts of days as well. He has a clock and will plan his days according to the clock. He has a calendar and thus has a means of planning things in future days relative to each other.

So the European utilizes what I would call 'macro-time', the history of the past and the projection of the past into the finite future, and 'micro-time', the segmentation of the span of his life into precisely measurable units—days, hours, minutes.

Time for the Melanesian takes on an entirely different aspect. The Melanesian does not have the European sense of history. His past rapidly disappears in the welter of generalized and timeless spirits and ancestors. And since there is no finite past, the future is equally vague.

James Chalmers, an early missionary to the Vailala Region, advises his readers in the last of the nineteenth century that:

Delay is dangerous with the natives, and the work of today left until tomorrow, the everlasting tomorrow which never comes, and wearies the soul out of all strength and doing. I would get rid of tomorrow if today were only long enough!

(Chalmers, 1887: 47)

Peter Lawrence is a bit more precise in his analysis of the time values of the Garia.

Not only the whole mythology but even individual myths reflect the absence of the idea of time depth. There was no suggestion of a gradual advance from a rudimentary to a more elaborate way of life. Events of antiquity were events of the present and would be events of the future as well.

(Lawrence, 1964: 32)

1. In Polynesia, with its long genealogical memory, until 1961 there had been reported only a single outbreak of Cargo cult activity.

(Crocombe, 1961: 40)
Burridge says much the same thing for the Tangu:

> Since the Tangu lack durable records and are, for practical purposes, non-literate, living memory and the present are the only criteria for accuracy. (Burridge, 1960: 68)

And Mead reports from Old Peri:

> The intensely crowded life of any Manus generation existed between two voids; it was tacitly assumed that the past had always been like this and the future would always be, and at the same time both past and future were seen as continuously unpredictable because each depended upon combinations of events and no combination could be accurately predicted. (Mead, 1956: 68)

From these and other similar accounts, we can see that the European sense of macro-time just does not exist for the Melanesian. This lack of history makes it very difficult for a Melanesian to understand European developmental schemes which call for long-term planning. Conversely, the European, embedded in his own culture, has a difficult time understanding why the Melanesian is so short-sighted and refuses to make plans further ahead than the immediate future.

The Melanesian lack of macro-time means also that the Melanesian has neither theories of progress nor evolution. Both presuppose change through time, and if there is no time through which a thing can change then it will be understood as not changing. The phrase from the Catholic Gloria, "...as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be..." may well have more meaning for a Melanesian convert than for the European priest.

1. Evolution has been seen by some Cargo cult leaders as the 'secret' key to the European ritual attainment of cargo. See, for example, Lawrence; discussion of Yali (Lawrence, 1964: 173-78).
Melanesia lacks European macro-time; it also lacks European micro-
time. Because there are no clocks, there is no reckoning of hours,
minutes, or seconds. Mead noted the contrast between European and
Melanesian day time when she returned to Manus after an absence of
twenty-five years.

When everybody was scattered or concerned about
their own affairs, these bells (at twelve and one
o'clock) were often irregular or forgotten al-
together....

(Mead, 1956: 222)

When they were doing traditional work, the European clock had little
meaning.

...but when there was village work on (demanded
by the European administration and/or Paliau)
then people remembered and watched the clock...
Timing was regarded as one of the great inventions
of the European world.

(Mead: 222)

Melanesians come closest to European micro-time in the calculation
of future days. Here we do find a definite reckoning, counted, for
instance, by the number of knots in a rope. All concerned parties
might be given a rope with a certain number of knots and each would
untie one knot per day until the appointed day of "no knots" was reached.
Or a man might plan a future event and announce the days remaining with
a beat on a slit gong for each day before the event. But there is a
limit to the number of days that can be counted this way.

Mead, who was quite concerned with time values, kept track of the
number of times a slit gong would be beaten in Old Peri to calculate
time. The highest number she heard was forty-two. (Ibid: 65) In
Kandoka, where the slit gong is also used, the Luci language has room
for numbers up to ninety. Any more than ninety is just a lot. So
even if a man wanted to plan further ahead he would not have been able to count past ninety days. (David Counts, 1969: 126)

Calculation of Melanesian micro-time may vary from place to place as we have seen in the above examples. It is frustrating not to have definite figures available for many of those societies which have chosen Cargo cult. If such figures were available, I would postulate that without fail the time of the prophesied millennium would fall within the limited period of micro-time recognized by a given society. If the date of a Cargo prophesy is further ahead than the Melanesian micro-time span for a given society, then we can be fairly sure that we are dealing with a Cargo movement utilizing European macro-time rather than a Cargo cult.

Of vital importance to European micro-time is the calculation of days relative to each other by use of a calendar. The Melanesian has no such device. The closest he will come is recognition of the cycles of the moon or seasons of the year. But there is no way, in Melanesian time, of determining future dates precisely in a fixed sequence. The European timetable, vital to the running of the European economy, is unknown in traditional Melanesian time.
EXEMPLIFICATION OF TIME DIFFERENCES

I stated previously that virtually all Cargo cults have been preceded by Cargo movements. A Cargo movement will operate on European time, Melanesian time, or both.

Those Cargo movements which operate exclusively on European time will obviously have the best chance of success in development. But if a Melanesian society has become so acculturated as to have completely accepted European time, then it seems that it can no longer properly be classified as transitional. Cargo cults occur only in transitional societies.

We might take as an example the Tolai, "generally regarded as the economically most advanced people of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea". (Epstein, 1963: 289) Epstein distinguished four phases of Tolai economic growth—transition, agricultural investment, investment trial, and tertiary investment. Of these, we are concerned with the difference between transition and agricultural investment, for in the latter three stages the natives are in the process of obtaining their cargo by pragmatic means, utilizing the European economy.

The transitional period started with white contact and shell money economy (1870) and extended to the acceptance of a "modern cash economy" (1896) which marked the beginning of the agricultural investment period. (Ibid: 294) During the transitional period there were several periods of unrest, including attempts to kill European settlers and
regain possession of lost lands.

The agricultural investment period was marked by a rapid expansion of coconut cultivation, which involved long-term investment by Tolai growers. Most interesting to me is Epstein's note that European time begins to be used in the economic system. "It is during this period", she states, "that natives first became aware of 'time' as an element in the productive process, and the first clocks and watches appear in their homes." (Ibid: 305) Accordingly, there have been no recent reports of Cargo cults among the Tolai.

Those Cargo movements which have failed, and by failure I mean degeneration into Cargo Cults, have failed because they were attempting to attain European goals while operating on Melanesian time. When this situation exists, frustration is bound to occur because the goals of a Cargo movement will be long-range goals, goals which can be properly understood only if there is a concomitant understanding of the time values accompanying these goals. I shall illustrate this shortly with reference to the Manus and Kaliai Cargo cults.

A transitional society is one in the process of assimilating those European values which will eventually lead to the acceptance of the European cash economy. I have postulated that the assimilation of European time values in the economy and polity with the maintenance of Melanesian time values in the integration and pattern-maintenance sub-systems is going to be most conducive to Melanesian development. The assimilation of European time in the economy and polity will be primarily the assimilation of European macro-time, the sense of history notably
lacking in Melanesia. It seems far more important in the transitional period that macro-time be assimilated because without a sense of the long-term future there is no incentive for native economic development. What is the sense of planting a coconut tree that will begin to bear seven years later if there is no appreciation of a future which will extend for seven years. When a Melanesian has grasped the European values of macro-time, he can plan ahead, not only for himself, but for his children as well. He can recognize a future which will exist even though he may not be alive.

As I am concerned primarily with Melanesian economy (which cannot really be separated from the polity), I shall not attempt an analysis of time values in the integrative and pattern-maintenance subsystems. To treat the subject properly would entail an entirely different paper. I would point out, however, that both pattern-maintenance and integration have functions situated primarily in the present, and therefore European macro-time will be of little importance. It might be argued that eventually European macro-time will be assumed in these subsystems, but that the introduction of European time values in these subsystems is not a necessary requirement for the adoption of cash cropping.

A difficulty might arise in trying to determine when a Cargo movement is using European macro-time in the economy and polity. If we look at the values of a movement leader, we may find that although he is operating on European time, his followers might be using Melanesian time. The Paliau movement is a case in point. Although Paliau had successfully incorporated European time into his value system, many of
his followers had not, with the result that there were two separate Cargo cult eruptions during the course of the movement.

If, instead of using the overall leader of the Cargo movement as our guide, we turn to leaders on the local level, we have a more accurate representation of the values of the Melanesian on the grass roots level. Paliau was not in intimate contact with many of his followers; there was much confusion as to what his doctrine, goals, and ideals were. His lieutenants, however, operated on the village level and were directly dependent on the villagers for support. Therefore, their values had to be more in line with those of their supporters, thus giving a more realistic picture of the actual villager's attitudes.

So instead of looking at men like Paliau, or Yali, or Tommy Kabu, or Mambu for an indication of the degree of acculturation of the people participating in a Cargo movement, we should look at the local big men and other leaders.

Since there are seldom established political offices in Melanesian societies, and leadership is achieved rather than ascribed, the big man must depend on popular support for the attainment and maintenance of his position. "The mark of a successful leader is that he can convince others that they are not followers but partners in an enterprise."

(Salisbury, 1970: 331, quoted by Epstein, 1970: 4)(1)

Two other types of local leaders also depend on popular support for the attainment of their status. One is the Cargo cult leader, who

1. For further discussion of the Melanesian Big Man see Sahlins, 1963 and Epstein, 1970.
will have followers only as long as his doctrine is accepted. (Rejection of the Noise on Manus was accompanied by the murder of the prophet, Wapei. Schwartz, 1962: 270) The other type of local popular leader, in areas which have local councils, is the local councilman, elected by his fellow villagers.

By examining the value systems in terms of the stated goals of these leaders on the village level who are in constant face-to-face contact with their followers, and who have no power other than that gained through popular support, we are in a position to judge whether or not the majority of people involved in a Cargo movement are using Melanesian or European time.

The Kaliai Census Sub-Division of the northwest coast of New Britain provides a testing ground for our statements concerning the relative appreciation of time in cult and movement societies. The Kaliai area has a long history of contact with the Europeans dating back to the German 'blackbirders' of the late nineteenth century. By 1905 or 1906 the Germans had appointed native administrators, luluais and tultuls. In 1906 Iboki Plantation was established, and has continued to operate on its original site until the present date. The Kaliai Mission became active in 1949, and has grown to include a school, a small hospital, and a trade store.

David Counts (1969: 10) notes that "in spite of a relatively long period of contact, no great social changes seem to have taken place". Masked ceremonies are still performed, shell money exchanges still take place, and the people still believe in the presence of bush spirits and
the efficacy of sorcery.

The Kaliai area can best be described as transitional—the European economy is beginning to make an impact but the people have not yet completely adopted a modern cash economy. The Kando-Laubori Copra Marketing Society was founded in 1960, but it appears that many people still do not understand its underlying principals.

In the early part of this year, a Cargo cult swept across much of the Kaliai area. Fr. Hermann Janssen, in a privately circulated report dated May, 1970, states that although a majority of the villages in the area surrounding the place of origin of the cult, Meitavale, joined the cult, there were others that chose not to do so.

Although recent ethnographic data on much of the Kaliai area is limited, we do have detailed reports by both David Counts and Dorothy Counts on Kandoka, one of the villages mentioned by Janssen which did not join this cult. Counts and Counts also visited Bibling Ridge, now reportedly a hotbed of Cargo cult activity. Both Kandoka and Bibling Ridge have attempted pragmatic means of attaining Cargo. But it seems that Kandoka has continued in its pragmatic quest, whereas Bibling Ridge has espoused the magico-religious means of Cargo cult. I think that the difference between the reactions of the two villages to the Cargo cult doctrine may be found in their relative appreciation and use of European time, especially the long-term future-oriented European macro-time.

Kandoka village had a fair understanding of European macro-time, illustrated by the attitudes of both the counselor of the village, PeiNa,
and the big man, Kolia. PeiNa, one of the leaders of the Gapu lumu (men's house) returned from twenty-five years of police work with ideas for the "modernization" of Kandoka. He was instrumental in the decision of Gapu lumu to try to de-emphasize traditional extended ceremonial exchanges and replace them with increased cash cropping, and to substitute cash for pula (shell currency) in their more limited remaining ceremonial exchanges. (Counts, D.E.A. 1968: 116) He helped the men of Gapu lumu to raise forty-four dollars to purchase a hot air copra drier from the administration. He himself was an active copra producer, an activity which certainly required long-term thinking, and his platform for council candidacy was that Kandoka needed to produce more copra so that more cash would flow into the village. (Ibid: 203) Also interesting is the fact that PeiNa helped his fellow Kandokan, Naloko, to turn in to government officials a man who preached Cargo cult doctrines while in a police uniform. (Counts and Counts, interview: 1970)

PeiNa was certainly no figurehead government official like many of the earlier government-appointed native officials. He was a powerful man in the traditional status system, sharing the leadership of one of the two village lumus, and was supported in his council candidacy by Kolia, the big man of the village and head of the other lumu. And he received seventy-four of eighty-five votes cast in his ward of the newly formed European-based council system. (Counts, D.E.A. 1968: 205) His views, therefore, can be taken as an indication of those of his fellow villagers.

Kolia's time values also incorporated European macro-time conceptualization and utilization. A strong indication of his time views is
expressed in a speech he made on April 17, 1967, to the Bibling Ridge
people urging them to join a proposed local government council.

What about your children? Look at all these children, all these babies—what about them? Are they going to have to live like your ancestors? That's what the election is about. It's about our children. To reject the council for these children—that's not right! (David Counts, 1967)

These sentiments would probably not have been expressed by a Melanesian leader before white contact. Kolia living a hundred years ago would probably have been concerned only with his personal fortunes, knowing that his wealth would probably be dissipated through ritual distribution upon his death. But with the understanding of European time, Kolia can see that when he is dead, the results of his endeavors will not be completely lost.

Kolia's feelings about the future, about the children, are echoed by many other inhabitants of Kandoka. An indication of this lies in their attitude toward their copra plantations as future-oriented investments. As Dorothy Counts states:

In public meetings in Kandoka much emphasis is placed on the fact that cash cropping is a long-term investment that will bring benefits to their children. Copra plantations that are planted today may not bring many significant changes in the material standard of living of the adults of Kandoka, and they realize and seem to accept this fact. (Counts, D.E.A. 1968: 119)

In 1967 Kandoka had an active and on-going copra co-operative run in conjunction with a native-run (albeit mission-sponsored) trade store. They owned 2579 coconut palms and proposals had been made to buy a ship so that they could transport their own copra to Rabaul. (Counts and Counts, 1966-67)
The attitudes of the leaders Peiga and Kolia, and the demonstration of support of their leaders by the acceptance of cash cropping by most of the villagers, indicates that Kandoka has come to terms with the importance of European macro-time, especially in the economy and polity. Since Kandokans can appreciate the European time values associated with economic development, they can realize that immediate fulfilment of their goals is unrealistic. Not only do they seem to recognize this fact, but they accept it. Resultantly, Janssen's reported cargo cult was not welcome in Kandoka.

European micro-time is beginning to be used in Kandoka, indicating that a change from transitional to agricultural investment periods may be in the offing. But in 1967 there was only one watch in the village other than that of the Counts, and day-to-day activities involving pattern maintenance and integration seemed to operate more on Melanesian than on European time. (Counts and Counts, interview: 1970) I wish I could discuss in greater detail the impact of the maintenance of traditional time, but additional data to do so is not available.

Whereas the people of Kandoka have to a great extent accepted European macro-time, the people of Bibling Ridge have not. We have indications of an attempted cargo movement in the moves of the villages of Benim, Angul, and Gigina from the interior bush closer to the Aria River and the government station. We can further deduce that the Bibling Ridge people were operating on Melanesian time when we discover that Cargo cult rumors began to spread after the move. Counts and Counts discovered the source of some of these Cargo cult rumors—a big man named
Aikele.

...when Aikele sent for knives, axes, and shovels to be paid for with his pension, he told people that he had sent a pas (letter) and God sent cargo... (Counts and Counts, 1966-67)

Given the pattern of Melanesian Cargo cults, it would be logical to assume that Aikele was concerned with immediate arrival of cargo, with traditionalistic Melanesian time. This assumption is, however, unsubstantiated.

We do have an indication of Aikele's perception of time in his attitude towards the Bibling Ridge Coconut Project. In 1963 the administration offered to start the Bibling Ridge people on their way to cash cropping with a gift of seed coconuts. At the urging of Aikele (and others) these coconuts were left to rot on the ground. It seems that if Aikele had assimilated the future-orientation that Kolia has grasped, he would not have urged his people to reject cash cropping.

Aikele's rejection of the government-sponsored cash cropping scheme goes hand-in-hand with his espousal of Cargo cult doctrines. Not only did he suggest that they reject the government project, but also he proposed that they return to their ancestral homes because cargo would not come unless they did so. This amounts to a rejection of the previous Cargo movement.

In 1967 the Bibling Ridge people again indicated their unwillingness to accept European time. I quoted Kolia's speech to the Bibling Ridge people earlier. Kolia was espousing not only the local government council, but also the long-term economic development which he thought the council would encourage. But the people of Bibling Ridge did not accept the council. They chose instead to continue with their traditional
economic patterns, and indicated the fact in no uncertain terms to the administration's representative, Patrol Officer Kelley.

You are a white man and you live as you want and we blacks are going to live as we want. (David Counts, 1967)

I find a good summation of the difference between Kandokan and Bibling Ridge time values in Dorothy Counts' statement:

The Kandokans and the Bibling Ridge people provide examples of marked contrasts in attitudes toward economic change. It was understood by the Kandokans that many of the material benefits to be derived from cash cropping would be enjoyed more extensively by their children than by themselves, and they considered their copra plantations to be investments in the future of their children. In contrast, the people of Bibling Ridge, who have attempted to attain material benefits through cargo cult activities, seem to be primarily interested in increased amounts of cargo for themselves. They do not seem to be greatly concerned with the future of their children, at least with reference to their place in modern society. (Counts, D.E.A. 1968: 216)

The Kalai material substantiates our thesis. Kandoka, which has accepted European macro-time in the economy and polity, has continued a Cargo movement which is leading to the further acceptance of cash cropping as a means of entering the modern cash economy. Resultantly, Kandoka has not accepted the Cargo cult doctrines preached by its neighbours of Bibling Ridge. The Bibling Ridge people have not satisfactorily come to terms with the prerequisite for a successful Cargo movement, the recognition and acceptance of European macro-time. And as would be expected, Bibling Ridge has wholeheartedly opted for a scheme utilizing the 'futurelessness' of Melanesian time, the Cargo cult reported by Janssen.

I would like to further substantiate the difference between Melanesian and European time and its relationship to Cargo cult by again
referring to Schwartz' analysis of the Paliau Movement of Manus. Schwartz distinguished seven phases of the Paliau Movement; these can be grouped into movement phases and cult phases. Movement phases utilize European macro-time, whereas cult phases use traditionalistic Melanesian time.

Paliau began the movement with a goal-culture of the "Newfela Fashion" (Schwartz, 1962: 227) The first two phases of the movement, the Local Phase and the Initial Movement Phase, had long-term future goals. The "Newfela Fashion" was not to be attained overnight, and Paliau tried to make this fact clear to his followers. He had a vision of native economic development, but this vision was of the future. Paliau's followers seem to have understood his goals, and seem to have incorporated them into their own outlooks. But whereas Paliau had had intensive contact with the European culture, and the European concept of the future, such was not the case with many of his followers. Perhaps they could understand his words, but the philosophy of goals which would not be realized for many years may have been beyond the scope of their conception.

The Paliau Movement illustrates a theme common to many Melanesian developmental schemes. The leader has a plan for long-term development and has the understanding of European macro-time necessary to implement his plans. Although the goals of the leader may be understood by his followers, the amount of time necessary to implement these goals may not be realized. Resultantly a schism occurs—followers attempt to gain the goals of the leader immediately.

This happened to Yali of the Rai Coast Redevelopment plan (Lawrence, 1964), it happened to Tommy Kabu of the Purari Delta (Mahler, 1961) and it happened to Paliau.
Wapei of Nirol had a dream. His dream said that there was a faster way of attaining the goals of the "Newfela Fashion" than that which Paliau proposed. Instead of the indefinite future of the Initial Movement, Wapei dreamed of a definite future, specifically the following Sunday. With Wapei's dream the Noise, or First Cult Phase, began. Soon other people were having dreams similar to those of Wapei, and the Noise spread rapidly from village to village, with a local prophet in each.

Tajan was one such local prophet. He had visited Wapei's village in a canoe, but was not allowed to land. Nevertheless he witnessed a 'miracle' performed by Wapei, a fire burning on his canoe which disappeared without a trace upon a command from Wapei. This 'miracle' was enough to convince him of the worth of the new cult, and he immediately left to spread the message to his own village, Mouk.

Mouk, however, was the village in which Paliau had set up his own headquarters. And Tajan of Mouk was one of Paliau's lieutenants. When Tajan returned to Mouk, it would seem that a confrontation should have taken place. Such did not happen. Instead, Paliau allowed Tajan to preach the new cult doctrine. And, most interestingly, "Paliau was also caught up in the Noise and experienced the guria (compulsive trembling) with the others". (Ibid: 272) But after several days Paliau left Mouk and went to Baluan, a Seventh Day Adventist stronghold which had barricaded itself against outside intrusion and introduction of the Noise.

The Noise stopped almost as rapidly as it began. Prophecies were made that the cargo would appear on a certain date. This date passed,
no cargo arrived, and cult followers became disillusioned. Wapei, the original prophet, was killed by his irate followers. Paliau returned from Baluan to regain leadership in Mouk and 'officially' declare that the Noise was at an end.

Wapei, Tajan, and other local prophets did not reject Paliau's goals; rather they used them as the basis of their own doctrines. The difference was in means, not in ends. Wapei merely hoped to short-circuit Paliau's program by substituting Melanesian time which he understood for European time which he did not understand.

As Schwartz notes:

There was a particular futurelessness about the cult....The time distance of the goal was set not in years or generations ahead, but a few days. No one was asked to work for the sake of his children....

(Ibid: 370)

This "futurelessness" is basic to Melanesian time values. By taking a recognition of Melanesian time and using it as the basis of a new ritual, Wapei was essentially creating traditionalism out of tradition.

Although Paliau's "Newfela Fashion" indicates that he had a fair understanding of European time, it seems that he was not past reverting to Melanesian time should it be discovered that it might work. But Melanesian traditionalistic time was proclaimed not by Paliau, but by his followers such as Wapei and Tirol, who, it seems, had little or no understanding of European time. It is notable that Paliau was not the leader of the cult, although he could have been had he chosen to do so. Rather, he let others try it out. When traditionalistic time failed, and Paliau's "Newfela Fashion" goals seem to indicate that he expected it to fail, he was able to re-establish his own program operating on
long-term European time. As Schwartz states:

He told them that the Noise had been true, that it had been sent by God, but that it had the tryim of the Devil in it. Wapei and the others had lied and misled the people into madness.... Thus without repudiating the validity of the beliefs on which the Noise was premised, Paliau declared it to be at an end. (Ibid: 273)

Melanesian time was certainly not abandoned completely after the First Cult phase. Although the Paliau Movement reasserted itself after the First Cult, there were still village leaders who were convinced that cult, and not movement, was the ultimate answer to their particular goals. These were men who still had not grasped the content of Paliau's message that economic development was a slow, demanding process which could promise nothing for the immediate future. As the Organizational Phase of the Paliau Movement gave 'day to the Plateau Stage, Paliau's goals came to be seen by these men as more and more distant, more and more European.

With the increased Europeanization of the time factor came a con-comitant unrest and reasserted desire for the immediate fulfilment of goals offered by Melanesian time. Those villages which joined the Second Cult were generally those which had the least prestige within the movement. There are many reasons for this lack of prestige, but by and large it was caused by a lack of success in adapting to the values of the movement. The village of Malei, for instance, was the first to experience the re-introduction of cult activities. Malei had a movement leader, Pondia, young, inexperienced, and virtually without power in the village political structure, which was controlled by the old big man, Kilopwai. Much the same holds true for Lowaja, the
other important village in the vanguard of the Second Cult. Pantret, the movement leader, had no tradition-derived legitimacy as a leader and no power within the village. Rather, the village leader was Petrus Popu, the old traditionally-minded luluai. The lack of acceptance of young forward-looking leaders would seem to indicate a lack of acceptance of forward-looking time, which in turn might be the reason for the low statuses of these villages within the movement.

Since these villages were losing prestige in the movement, Schwartz postulates that they might have tried to regain some of their lost status by acting as vanguard of the new cult. We can read into this that the lack of acceptance of European time was responsible for frustration, inability to attain European time-based goals while maintaining Melanesian time values, and consequent reversion to a new ideology, Melanesian traditionalistic time.

Schwartz finds that the Second Cult phase in Manus arrived just before the establishment of the Native Council. We can see the Native Council as a firm commitment to and legitimization of European time. And in this Schwartz sees one of the reasons for the Second Cult reaction.

...the Second Cult may be seen as an attempt by its adherents to attain the ultimate goal-culture through supernatural means and the agency of ghosts, and to do so before they resigned themselves to the slower and more arduous program of the Movement, to which they would be committed under pain of government-backed sanctions once the Council was legitimized. (Ibid: 381)

An analysis of the Second Cult shows much the same pattern as the First Cult, with one important difference. Whereas the First Cult embraced most villages committed to the Movement, the Second Cult acted
more as a separating factor: people were committed either to cult or movement. We see a more clear-cut definition of those leaders who had successfully assimilated European time values and those who had not. We might postulate from this that the final phase of the Paliau Movement, the Officialization Phase, will have a better chance of success, as it becomes evident that more and more of Paliau's followers have assimilated the European time values necessary to economic development.
CONCLUSION

By using time values as a variable in the difference between Cargo Cult and Cargo Movement, I have tried to indicate a difference between those New Guinea peoples who have been able to adapt to the European economy as opposed to those who have not been able to make this change and who instead have chosen to attain Cargo goals by means of Cargo cult activities. At the same time, I have supported Hoselitz' suggestion that tradition is not necessarily opposed to economic development in transitional societies.

Due to lack of data, I have been unable to check more fully into the ramifications of maintenance of traditional time in the pattern-maintenance and integrative subsystems. This is a project for future study.

Perhaps the time distinction between Cargo cult and Cargo movement might also be of use in future study as a means of further separating those people who have chosen the dead end of Cargo cult from those who have been identified wrongly with them but who, instead, have indicated an ability to adapt to the European economy in ways unrecognized by a government administration.

I have analyzed time values in a kind of post-dictive way. Insofar as I properly understand the material on the Kaliai and Manus people, the analysis works. But far more useful would be the utilization of this idea in a predictive way as a working tool in both the future study
of New Guinea and pragmatic efforts designed to ease the shock of
culture change and encourage constructive adaptation to the inevitable
imposition of the European economy. I see the conclusions reached in
this paper not so much as ends in themselves, but rather as propositions
to be studied in the field and checked with reference, not to books of
analysis by other anthropologists, but by reference to the people of
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