AN ANALYSIS OF CRISIS DECISION-MAKING:

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, 1898

AN ANALYSIS OF CRISIS DECISION-MAKING:

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR CASE, 1898

by

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

   This paper has two related goals: (1) to examine
the impact of crisis, in general, and stress, in particular,
on certain aspects of foreign policy-making; and, (2) to
understand the motivations underlying the actions of
American decision-makers within the political environment
of 1898. The data is derived through a content analysis
of documents written by certain "key" American decision-
makers during the sixteen weeks prior to the outbreak of
the Spanish American War in 1898.

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part due to Dr. Gilbert R. Winham for several reasons.
Initially it was his suggestion to use the Spanish-
American War situation as a case history which sparked my
interest in this project. More important, however, was
his aid in developing the potentials of this thesis through
the liberal offerings of his time, experience and research
materials. His insistence saw the finished project sub-
mitted on time. I trust I, as a student, have not dis-
appointed his expectations because as a mentor and teacher
he certainly has not disappointed mine.

I must also thank Dr. Henry J. Jacek for his valu-
able comments on the methodological aspects of the study,
as well as the members of my thesis committee for their
time.

PREFACE

It has been a splendid little war; begun
with the highest motives, carried on with
magnificent intelligence and spirit,
favored by that fortune which loves the
brave.[1]

In this way a leading American politician of the
1890's summarized the events of the Spanish-American War.
The war was indeed splendid for most of the excited American
populace far from the battle areas. Few of them, however,
dreamed how different the United States would be afterward
due to the events of 1898. It is significant, however, that
the dramatic events of 1898 have generally been overlooked
in favour of the gaudy diplomacy of Teddy Roosevelt and the
cataclysm of World War One. The principle purpose of this
study, therefore, is to trace the unfolding of American
foreign policy of President W. McKinley and his advisors
immediately prior to the Spanish-American War, to relate it
with the psychological phenomenon of stress and as far as
possible to explain the reasons why their policies took place.

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[1]
Ambassador John Hay to Col. T. Roosevelt of the
Rough Riders quoted in Frank B. Freidel, The Splendid Little
War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1958), p. 3.

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Chapter I

CRISIS DECISION-MAKING: THEORY

> Why do you make me read such stuff? Can
> you see me consulting a history book in a
> crisis? Not I! At such moments what counts
> most is flair, a cool head, courage, resolu-
> tion and nimble wits....[1]

M. Delcassé's statement is revealing. It is reveal-

ing because it forces one to consider two interesting as-

pects in the study of international policy making: the

rationale and value behind historical analysis and the

effects of crisis on foreign policy decision-making.

Although the practical politician is unlikely to

run to a political science text book upon the commencement

of a crisis the use of the historical case upon which to base

one's study of crisis decision-making does contain certain

logic. The historiographer E. H. Carr stated, "The asser-

tion that men learn nothing from history is contradicted by

a multitude of observable facts. No experience is more common."[2]

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[1] Former French Foreign Minister Delcassé quoted in
J. Eayrs, Fate and Will in Foreign Policy (Toronto: CBC
Publication, 1967), p. 45.

[2] E. H. Carr quoted in Eayrs, p. 46.

In other words, the student assumes the existence of patterns,
repetitions or close analogues in the history of human affairs.
It is obvious that historical particulars, such as methods of
warfare, change from generation to generation, but it can be
reasonably argued that basic human feelings, emotions, deci-
sions and the methods of coping with their consequences have
not changed radically over time. R. North writes, "Historic-
al situations offer the advantage of an algebra book with
answers in the back."[3] Considering that man's sole means of
assessing, deciding, and, to some extent, predicting events
is by the study of past situations, it seems logical that
the study of crisis decision-making should commence, in part,
by historical analysis. Had Delcassé and his generation of
diplomats been cognizant of the various psychological dimen-
sions of crisis which we are about to study one wonders if
the First World War could not somehow have been avoided.[4]

Decision-making under stress

Delcassé's second insight is the major interest of
this research project. This paper, as intimated in the
Introduction, has two related goals: (1) to examine the im-

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[3]
R. C. North, Perception and Action in the 1914
Crisis, in John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith (eds.), Image
and Reality in World Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1967), p. 45.

[4]
See O. R. Holsti, "The 1914 Case," American
Political Science Review, 59 (1965), 365-378.

pact of crisis, in general, and stress, in particular, on certain aspects of foreign policy-making; and, (2) to understand which elements within the political environment of 1898 were of primary concern in the perceptions of the American decision-makers and thus, in part, contributed to a stressful situation. The data is derived through content analysis of documents written by key American decision-makers during the sixteen weeks prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898.

The initial interest in 'crisis' situations has resulted from the observation of recurrent crises and their implications in contemporary international relations. Awareness of this term among policy makers, the news media and the interested public testify to the topical interest of this phenomenon. In fact, C. Hermann states, "Crises seem to appear frequently enough to permit systematic study and are of such nature that they not only permit but also warrant investigation."[5] Judging by the recent literature in the social sciences, there is a newly awakened interest in crisis studies. Using different units of analysis, individual, or-

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[5] Charles F. Hermann, "Some Consequences of Crisis which Limit the Viability of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly, 8 (1963-64), p. 63. Charles McClelland, referring to the inordinate nature of crises in international politics, suggests that they "are perceived vividly as the avenues that are most likely to lead into extensive or general nuclear war"--"Decisional Opportunity and Political Controversy: The Quemoy Case," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6 (1962), 211.

ganizational or societal, numerous studies have been published
considering the concept of 'crisis' a useful framework within
which to consider the reactions of persons etc. to a wide
range of events.[6]

In spite of the potential value of studying crises,
little distinction has been made between the concept of
crisis and a number of seemingly related terms (i.e., stress,
conflict, tension, panic, catastrophe, disaster). These
terms, like crisis, also have many meanings. Many studies
have considered these concepts together, if not simultaneous-
ly and synonymously.[7] Charles Hermann has repeated that the
term crisis is used less frequently than are these sister
terms.[8] Some of these distinctions appear to be due, in
part, to the usage of different disciplines.[9] Psychologists
are inclined to employ concepts such as anxiety, threat or
stress;[10] sociologists and political scientists use such

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[6]
See James A. Robinson, Crisis Decision-Making (China
Lake: Project Michelson, 1967), for "an appraisal of con-
cepts, theories, hypotheses, and techniques of analysis"
currently found in crisis studies.

[7]
Ibid., p. 16.

[8]
Charles E. Hermann, Crisis in Foreign Policy Making:
A Simulation of International Politics (China Lake: Project
Michelson, 1965), p. 23.

[9]
Hermann, "Some Consequences," pp. 63-64.

[10]
See F. E. Horvath, "Psychological Stress: A Review

terms as panic and crisis.[11] Recently some efforts have

been made to describe crisis in terms of an occasion for

decision.[12]

Crisis has been separated, however, from some of

the concepts above by the stimulus and response model,

developed by Osgood and Mowrer.[13] In developing his re-

vised "two-factor" approach to behavior, O. H. Mowrer

introduced two intervening or "mediating" variables bet-

ween the environmental stimulus and the behavior of the sub-

ject. According to the Mowrer model:

> Thus, where Behaviorism restricted itself to
> the simple, one-step S-R formula, we are

of Definitions and Experimental Research," in L. von
Bertalanffy and A. Rapoport (eds.), General Systems Year-
book, IV (Ann Arbor: Society for General Systems Research,
1959), pp. 203-230.

[11]
The long-standing use of crisis by political scien-
tists is reflected in E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis,
1919-1939 (New York, 1934) and in the recent interaction
approach of C. A. McClelland, "The Acute International Crisis,"
World Politics, 14 (1961), 182-204.

[12]
See R. C. Snyder and G. D. Paige, The United
States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: the applica-
tion of an analytical scheme, in J. N. Rosenau (ed.), Inter-
national Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press,
1961), pp. 193-208.

[13]
See Charles E. Osgood, Behavior Theory and the
Social Sciences, in Roland Yound (ed.), Approaches to the
Study of Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1958), pp. 217-244; and O. H. Mowrer, Learning Theory and
Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960).

here confronted by the necessity of pos-
tulating minimally, a two-step, two-stage
formula: S-r: s-R, where S is the danger
signal, r the response of fear which is
conditioned to it, and where s is the fear,
experienced as a drive, which elicits
(after learning) response, R.[14]

Using this conceptualization for a crisis situation it can
be conceived that crisis is a stimulus (S) to which certain
kinds of behavior, such as stress, anxiety, panic, are
possible responses (R). The intervening variables, crucial,
since they reveal the perception and the intention of the
individual, will be considered separately in the following
discussion.[15]

The perception of the environmental event (r), in
our case, of a crisis situation has been characterized as
a decision situation including three dimensions: (1) a
threat to high-priority values, (2) presents a restricted
amount of time in which a response can be made, and (3) is
unexpected or unanticipated.[16] These three dimensions of

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[14]
Mowrer, p. 77.

[15]
In other words, we have:
S = environmental event (in our case, crisis)
r = perception of event
s = intentions, triggered by the perception of S
R = response, motivated by perceptions and in-
      tentions regarding the environmental event.

[16]
This three-fold concept of crisis, based on a
number of case studies of political decisions, was initially
drawn up by Robinson, "The Concept of Crisis in Decision-
Making," in Series Studies in Social and Economic Sciences,

crisis have been found to exist in other crisis studies within the social sciences.[17] Both the involvement of major values and the limitation of time available for response have been indicated as aspects of crisis by Lasswell,[18] and Hamblin.[19] Eliothas defined crisis as:

> A stage in any given interactional process where a person or a group is involved in a problem which has proved insoluble by whatever habits, customs or routine practices have been depended upon, and attention is suddenly focused upon the impass...the competition or thwarting of motives, goals, habits and attitudes, or roles, creates bodily tensions demanding intelligent choice, direction by the ego, and conscious mobilization of accessible resources to resolve the tension.[20]

Few definitions have incorporated the element of surprise

No. 11. (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, 1962), and developed by Hermann, Crisis in Foreign Policy Making.

17
    One helpful review of the traits of crisis used in psychological and sociological investigations is Ken Miller and Ira Iscoe, "The Concept of Crisis: Current Status and Mental Health Implications," Human Organization, 22 (1963), 195-201.

18
    H. D. Lasswell, Style in the Language of Politics in H. D. Lasswell, N. Leites, et al., Language of Politics, revised edition (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 23.

19
    R. L. Hamblin, "Group Integration during a Crisis," Human Relations, 11 (1958), 67.

20
    K. Eliot quoted in Miller and Iscoe, p. 195.

or the unanticipated quality of a crisis situation.[21] An

assertion of the importance of this dimension, however, is

made by R. La Piere, who states that only when phenomena are

unpredictable can they be defined as crisis.[22]

Finally, it is to be noted in discussing the per-

ception of the event (r), the individual's role in defining

the situation is emphasized. La Piere notes:

> No circumstance, however unusual, is a
> crisis unless it is so defined by human
> beings. The individual involved must be
> aware of the danger which is present or
> he must believe that danger is present.[23]

Several problems appear with the working definition

of crisis presented above. Criticisms have been leveled at

the response-time dimension. For instance, Robinson and

Snyder emphasize the relative value that time may have in

different problems for decision. What is a short time for

one problem or one decision-maker may be more than ample for

another.[24]

21
See Howard H. Lentner, "The Concept of Crisis as
Viewed by the United States Department of State," mimeo.,
Western Reserve Institute, 1967, 46, who presents briefly
the responses of F. S. O.'s to a questionnaire item regard-
ing the element of unexpectedness.

22
R. T. La Piere, Collective Behavior (New York,
1938), pp. 438-439.

23
Quoted in Miller and Iscoe, p. 195. This aspect
is discussed more fully in Chapter III.

24
James Robinson and Richard C. Snyder, Decision-

The second problem concerns the fact that the criteria for determining when a crisis exists are not precise. In some ways they are close to those for psychological stress and indeed the critera are intertwined.[25] This problem is also due to the fact that the concept of stress has been used with so many different meanings that there no longer seems to be one thing called "stress". That stress can be considered a feature of crisis can not be doubted. Using the 1914 Case, R. C. North states, "High stress is almost universally characteristic of international crisis situations (and) tends to have a crucial effect upon the decision-making patterns of the leadership involved."[26] Thus our primary task is to separate the concept of stress from its parent, crisis.

Like crisis, stress has many meanings.[27] The most commong usage of stress is probably that formulated by Lazarus and Baker on the basis of previous studies: "thwart-

Making in International Politics, in Herbert Kelman (ed.), International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 440-442.

[25] Hermann, Some Consequences, p. 65.

[26] Robert C. North, "Decision-making in Crisis: an introduction," Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI (1962), 1967.

[27] See the excellent review of the literature by Horvath.

ing some motive state or potentially thwarting, resulting

in effective arousal."[28] Margaret Hermann, using this con-

cept in Inter-Nation Simulation, defines stress as, "... in

stress an individual perceives that a situation (stimulus)

threatens to obstruct or actually obstructs a goal which he

is motivated to achieve."[29] Obviously these definitions

closely paralel one of the dimensions of crisis referred to

above. However, Robinson states:

> The difficulties with using stress and crisis
> synonymously center upon the unidimensional
> character of the concept of stress. As a
> block or threat to goals, stress is only one
> of the major characteristics of crisis..."[30]

In the present context, therefore, stress will be differen-

tiated as a characteristic of the individual's response to

a crisis. Returning to the Mowrer model, stress can be

conceptualized as those perceptions which have been triggered

by one of the dimensions of a crisis situation, and result

in certain affective behavior.

What is perhaps of most interest to us in this

28
    R. S. Lazarus and R. W. Baker, "Personality and
Psychological Stress: a theoretical and methodological
framework," Psychological Newsletter, 8 (1956), 21-32.

29
    Margaret G. Hermann, Stress, Self-Esteem, and
Defensiveness in an Inter-Nation Simulation (China Lake:
Project Michelson, 1965).

30
    Robinson, Crisis Decision-Making, p. 16.

study is the wide range of possible indicators of stress

that can be listed and applied in our study. As Horvath has

pointed out, the knotty problem of an operational definition

of stress is less crucial when one studies a situation "which

seems obviously stressful to most individuals."[31]

It is clearly evident from the citations and biblio-

graphy presented elsewhere that a vast literature on stress

has accumulated. Even allowing for a high degree of selec-

tivity, the list of relevant writings is imposing. Over

the past fifteen years, research suggestions and problem-

or policy-oriented proposals have grown in number and

sophistication.[32] This large quantity of material in part

signifies the importance of the topic of stress to the so-

cial sciences. For example, the entire theory of deterrence

is based on a premise that responses will be carefully thought

out and arrived at by a dispassionate assessment of the po-

tential costs and gains. This immediately raises an obvious

question. Is this assumption of detached calculation valid

in all situations? Does it hold when decision-makers are

under high stress? Several political scientists, for instance,

using a content analysis of diplomatic documents, have un-

[31]
    Horvath, p. 208.

[32]
    Richard S. Lazarus, James Deese and Sonia F. Osler,
"The Effects of Psychological Stress Upon Performance,"
Psychological Bulletin, 49 (1952), 293-317.

covered an apparent change in requirements (or standards)

for war held by Germany and Austria-Hungary.[33] There is

evidence that, prior to the crisis in the summer of 1914,

those governments strongly wished to avoid war until their

military capabilities placed them in a more favorable posi-

tion with respect to their potential enemies.[34] As the stress

upon the official decision-makers increase---reflected in

the increased amount of affect in their statements---the

objective of avoiding immediate hostilities was abandoned.

How can this happen? Why do serious situations sometimes

not develop into violent conflict while not so serious ones

do? What manifestations are there of stress which affect

decision-making behavior? What are the dominant dimensions

along which decision-makers under stress evaluate situations?

To understand these questions we must first understand the

concept of stress.

Basically, some degree of stress is generally con-

sidered an integral and necessary part of motivation in

that it generates search behavior. Many studies have re-

vealed a curvilinear relation between stress and performance:

at moderate levels, increased anxiety aided performance, but

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[33] D. A. Zinnes, R. C. North and H. E. Koch, Jr., Capability, Threat and the Outbreak of War, in J. N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 469-482.

[34] Holsti, p. 365.

at higher levels similar increases disrupted the decisional

process.[35] On the basis of a series of experiments, H. G.

Birch determined that intermediate--rather than high or low

motivation--was most conducive to efficient solution of

both insightful and non-insightful problems.[36] Postman

and Bruner, in their analysis of the effects of stress on

perception, point out the pathological consequences which

inhibit or retard productive behavior should too great a

degree of stress be in evidence:

> Perceptual behavior is disrupted, becomes
> less well controlled than under normal
> conditions, and hence is less adaptive.
> The major dimensions of perceptual func-
> tion are affected: selection of percepts
> from a complex field becomes less adequate
> and sense is less well differentiated from
> nonsense; there is maladaptive accentuation
> in the direction of aggression and escape;
> untested hypotheses are fixated recklessly.[37]

Productive work can thus be said to take place in an environ-

ment of "uncertainty without anxiety."[38] While some of the

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[35]
See Horvath, pp. 205-210, for a review of this
literature.

[36]
H. G. Birch, "Motivational Factors in Insightful
Problem-Solving," Journal of Comparative Psychology, 38
(1945), 295-317.

[37]
Leo Postman and Jerome S. Bruner, "Perception Under
Stress," Psychological Review, 60 (1948), 314-323.

[38]
Kurt Back, "Decisions Under Uncertainty: Rational,
Irrational, and Non-Rational," The American Behavioral
Scientist, 4 (1961), 14-19.

experimental studies concerning stress have been criticized

on both conceptual and methodological grounds, the general

conclusion that high stress is dysfunctional across a wide

spectrum of types of behavior appears unassailable.[39]

In attempting to understand more closely the concept

of stress, O. R. Holsti formulated several hypotheses culled

from the literature on stress and applicable to a research

design concerning the 1914 situation. These hypotheses are:

> Hypothesis 1. As stress increases in a crisis
> situation:
> (a) time will be perceived as an increasingly
>   salient factor in decision-making
> (b) decision-makers will become increasingly
>   concerned with the immediate rather than
>   the distant future.
>
> Hypothesis 2. As stress increases, decision-
> makers will perceive:
> (a) the range of alternatives open to themselves
>   to become narrower
> (b) the range of alternatives open to adversaries
>   to expand.[40]

In other words, Holsti discovered that both in the experi-

mental literature of psychology as well as the decision-making

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[39]
Other behavioral consequences to which stress has
been experimentally related include: deterioration of verbal
performance; increased rate of error; stereotyped responses;
disorganized activity; problem-solving rigidity; diminished
tolerance for ambiguity; and a reduction in the focus of
attention, both across time and space, see Horvath, op. cit.

[40]
Ole R. Holsti, "Perceptions of Time, Perceptions of
Alternatives, and Patterns of Communication as Factors in
Crisis Decision-Making," Peace Research Society (Internation-
al) Papers, 3 (1965), p. 86.

literature the factors of perceived time and perceived alternatives were treated as 'key' factors which affect individual and group performance, particularly when engaged in complex tasks. The ultimate findings of his own research supported this conclusion.[41]

Considering solely the area of foreign policy decision-making the importance of the dimension of stress is readily apparent. Time is most likely to be perceived as important because of the advantages, perceived or real, which may accrue to the party able to act first. The contemporary dilemma which accompanies this fact was outlined by Holsti:

> Technology has provided the capacity to respond with weapons of almost incalculable speed of delivery, thus often cutting available decision-time to almost nothing. At the same time the potency of these weapons has created one of the crucial paradoxes of the nuclear age: the very decisions which, because of their potentially awesome consequences, should be made with the greatest deliberation, must often be made under the most urgent pressure of time.[42]

As well, related to the degree of time pressure is the search for alternatives. Various studies suggest that time pressure can enhance the rate of performance and creativity; however, most of the evidence also indicates

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[41]
Holsti, "Perceptions," pp. 79-120.

[42]
Ibid., p. 80.

that beyond a moderate level such pressure becomes dys-
functional. This is important in foreign policy decision-
making, an area of extraordinary complexity, requiring
"feats of memory and inference."[43] Time pressure on com-
plex decision-making, however, has been discovered to be
particularly harmful.[44] One study has shown that under
increased time pressure, normal subjects produce a schizo-
phrenic-like type of error,[45] while another has shown that,
although a moderate increase in time pressure can increase
team productivity, an increase from low to high pressure has
an adverse effect.[46] Mackworth and Mackworth found that
increasing the number of decisions required in a given per-
iod of time by a factor of five lead to a fifteen-fold rise
in decision errors.[47] Further, studies have shown that the

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[43]
Holsti, "Perceptions," p. 82.

[44]
Jerome S. Bruner, J.J. Goodnow, and George A. Austin, A Study of Thinking (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956), p. 147.

[45]
George Usdansky and Loren J. Chapman, "Schizo-phrenic-Like Response in Normal Subjects Under Time Pressure," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 60 (1960), 143-146.

[46]
Pauline N. Pepinsky, Harold B. Pepinsky and William B. Pavlik, "The Effects of Task Complexity and Time Pressure Upon Team Productivity," Journal of Applied Psychology, 44 (1960), 34-38.

[47]
N. H. Mackworth and J. F. Mackworth, "Visual Search for Successive Decisions," British Journal of Psychology, 49 (1958), 210-221.

pressure of time increases stereotypy,[48] disrupts problem-solving,[49] and narrows the focus of attention.[50]

The close relationship of crisis and stress vis à vis the time element deserves some mention. C. Hermann, as we noted before, has included perceived pressure of time as one of three defining characteristics of crisis;[51] Holsti, however, has included the time element in his hypotheses concerning stress. Clarifying this point somewhat Holsti writes:

> There actually appears to be a two-way inter-action between time and stress. On the one hand, the common use during crisis of such techniques as ultimata and threats with built-in time deadlines is likely to increase the stress under which the recipient must op-erate. On the other hand, added increments to the stress level tend to distort percep-tions of time. The expression that "a watched pot never boils" is a common way of expressing the relationship between stress and distorted time perspective.[52]

When decision time is at a premium, estimates of multiple outcomes attached to a particular course of action are likely to be less extensive.[53] Further, conditions of

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[48] Birch, op. cit.

[49] Bruner, op. cit.

[50] Horvath, p. 274.

[51] See Hermann, "Some Consequences," p. 64.

[52] Holsti, "Perceptions," p. 82

[53] Snyder and Paige, pp. 193-194.

great stress see the increased concern for the immediate
rather than the distant future; the uncertainty of a severe
crisis making it exceptionally difficult to follow outcomes
of an interaction situation far into the future.[54] Moreover,
if potentially severe penalties are perceived to be an in-
herent part of the situation the belief that the more dis-
tant future will have little meaning unless a solution is
found for the immediate problems is likely to prevail.[55]

The literature on stress also reveals a relation-
ship of stress with the search for alternatives. This in-
terest in the effect of stress on alternatives utilizes an
assumption contributed by decision-making theory: when the
decision-maker is faced with a decision, he is motivated to
search for an alternative, but that only a few of the theo-
retically possible options will be considered.[56]

The rate of search for satisfactory alternatives is
in part due to the belief that (1) the environment is benign,
and (2) that options in fact exist. But it is in the nature
of crisis that most, if not all, alternatives will be nega-

[54]
Holsti, Perceptions," p. 83

[55]
Ibid.

[56]
James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958).

tively valued by decision-makers. March and Simon have
developed a typology of perceived choices---good, bland,
mixed, poor and uncertain.[57] It seems reasonable to assume
that most perceived alternatives in a crisis will be of the
last two types. Or, as Holsti states, "crisis decision-
making will be characterized primarily by avoidance---avoid-
ance, rather than approach-approach or approach-avoidance
choices."[58]

The quest for alternatives may also be related to
the origin of the crisis stimulus. R. C. Snyder has suggested
that more options will be considered when the decision is
anticipated rather than occasioned by the environment.[59]
However, crisis decisions, as discussed before, are by
definition unanticipated.[60] Thus the crisis environment
will itself restrict the rate of inquiry and as the crisis
deepens and stress increases, search behavior will be fur-
ther constricted. For example, Snyder and Paige discovered
that in the Korean crisis only a single alternative course
of action was considered:

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[57]
    March and Simon, p.114.

[58]
    Holsti, "Perceptions," p. 83.

[59]
    R. C. Snyder, Deterence, Weapons Systems and
Decision-making (China Lake: Project Michelson, 1961), p. 80.

[60]
    See page 8.

> Empirically, however, the decision-making
> process in the Korean case was not charac-
> terized by the consideration of multiple
> alternatives at each stage. Rather a
> single proposed course of action emerged
> from the definition of the situation...[61]

As perceived options are reduced to only those with

potentially high penalties considerable dissonance was found

to be created.[62] One method of dissonance reduction was

to perceive that the only open choices which offer a way out

of the dilemma lay with the other party. In other words,

only the other side can prevent the impending disaster.

Holsti, as an example, quotes the correspondence between

the Kaiser and the Czar, in which Wilhelm frantically writes,

"the responsibility for the disaster which is now threaten-

ing the whole civilized world will not be laid at my door.

In this moment it still lies in your power to avert it."[63]

The dissonance between what the decision-maker does (pursues

policies that are acknowledged to lead to war) and what he

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[61]
Snyder and Paige, p. 245. See also March and
Simon, p. 154.

[62]
Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
(Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1957), p. 43.

[63]Quoted in Holsti, "Perceptions," p. 83. Schelling
has shown at the other extreme it may be advantageous to
maneuver oneself into "a position in which one no longer has
an effective choice over how he shall behave or respond" in
order to make the "outcome depend solely on the other party's
choice" — see T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 137-138.

knows (that war leads to destruction) is reduced any absolving himself from responsibility for the decision. This phenomenon has been described by L. Festinger:

> It is possible, however, to reduce or even eliminate the dissonance by revoking the decision psychologically. This would consist of admitting to having made the wrong choice or insisting that really no choice had been made for which the person had any responsibility. Thus, a person who has just accepted a new job might immediately feel he had done the wrong thing, and, if he had it to do over again, might do something different. Or he might persuade himself that the choice had not been his; circumstances and his boss conspired to force the action on him.[64]

This process may also be related to the general inability of individuals to perceive effectively the dilemma of others. This inability to perceive the true situations of others in a crisis has been discovered in terms of motives,[65] capabilities,[66] and military strength.[67]

The tendency under stress to reduce the number of alternatives perceived is obviously a dangerous factor for

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[64] Festinger, pp. 43-44. (Underlining mine).

[65] K. E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3 (1959), 120-131.

[66] Raymond A. Bauer, "Problems of Perception and the Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 5 (1961), 223-229.

[67] S. F. Huntington, Arms Races, in Carl Friedrich and Seymour Harris (eds.), Public Policy, 1958 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).

individuals concerned with foreign policy decision-making.

Even in formulating policy under "normal" conditions

decision-makers are confined to what Herbert Simon has

termed "bounded rationality".[68] Simon states:

> The capacity of the human mind for formulat-
> ing and solving complex problems is very
> small compared with the size of the problems
> whose solution is required for objectively
> rational behavior in the real world--or even
> for a reasonable approximation of such ob-
> jective rationality.[69]

In other words, a rational decision-maker perceives and con-

siders only a segment of the full range of possibilities

for acting. This fact, however, is aggravated in a crisis

situation by the simplification of the cognitive structure.

When the maximum degree of complexity is required in order

to understand the full problem at hand, and thus, allow-

ing one to measure the options and filter the imagined

consequences of each, the opposite actually occurs in a

crisis. H. Cleveland writes:

> For the problem of decision-making in our
> complicated world is not how to get the
> problem simple enough so that we can all
> understand it; the problem is to get our
> thinking about the problem as complex as
> humanly possible--and thus approach the

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[68]
    Every policy to some extent is a risk and thus
creates stress.

[69]
    Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1957).

<u>complexities of the real world around us.</u>[70]

Finally, added to the above two pathological dimensions of stress can be added a third--deterioration of health.[71] There is evidence that for participants involved in crisis, personal exhaustion and physical risk increase. During the crisis of 1898 the London <u>Times</u> reported of McKinley, "The President is said to show signs of overwork."[72] The President's secretary remarked in his diary, "He appeared to me careworn...did not look well, and his eyes had a far-away, deep-set expression in them."[73] During the Cuban crisis of 1961 an Assistant Secretary of State was reportedly involved in an automobile accident at 4 o'clock in the morning while driving home after several exhaustive days of around-the-clock work on the crisis.[74] Obviously, physical exhaustion affects in some measure the number of alternatives likely to be considered, as well as the judgment of percep-

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70
H. Cleveland, "Crisis Diplomacy," <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, 41 (1963), p. 638.

71
Horvath, pp. 203-205.

72
London <u>Times</u>, March 24, 1898.

73
G. Cortelyou quoted in Margaret Leech, <u>In the Days of McKinley</u> (New York: Harper, 1959), p.173.

74
Robinson, <u>Crisis Decision-Making</u>, p. 43.

tions during a time of crisis.[75] Snyder and Paige emphasize

that decision-makers, tending to have insufficient information

on which to operate, must follow value premises more heavily

than is otherwise the case in top-level decision-making.[76]

Having no experience in crisis management, since every crisis

can to a certain extent be considered unique and non-routine,

and experiencing physical exhaustion, their innate ability

to direct events will to some extent be impaired.

This discussion has emphasized two primary dimensions

of a stress situation which are potentially dysfunctional

for effective decision-making---perception of time and per-

ception of alternatives.[77] Certainly, these two factors

are found to be consistently important in the fields of

psychology and and decision-making literature of political

science. Holsti's case study and various laboratory simu-

lation studies have supported their importance in decision-

making. However, as Holsti concludes, "ultimate importance

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[75]
S. I. Cohen and A. G. Mezey, "The Effects of Anxiety on Time Judgment and Time Experience in Normal Persons," Journal of Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry, 24 (1961), 266-268.

[76]
Snyder and Paige, op. cit.

[77]
T. W. Milburn states "...the actions of any partic- ular decision-maker, if we know his role and the situation as he perceives it, can be explained in terms of relatively few variables"--"The Concept of Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues, 17-18 (1961-62), p. 5.

for the student of international politics must, however,

be further established in case studies of actual foreign

policy decisions."[78] This, then, is the intention of this

project using the Spanish-American War situation of 1898 as

our focus.

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[78]
Holsti, "Perceptions," p. 116. "The evidence from historical situations is far less systematic---particularly in the realm of foreign policy"---than other areas of political science - Holsti, p. 86.

Chapter II

THE CUBAN REBELLION AND UNITED STATES REACTION

Part 1:   The Rebellion Commences

Introduction

> In the end far more than half the territory
> of the United States was the spoil of
> Spanish empire, rarely acquired with perfect
> propriety. To sum up the story in a single
> word, Spain had immense influence over the
> United States; but it was the influence of
> the whale over its captors---the charm of a
> huge, helpless and profitable victim.[1]

This historical view of American relations with

Spain was expressed by Henry Adams at the turn of the cen-

tury. A study of the documents and histories of the period

prior to the war with Spain in 1898, drives home the con-

viction that the war with Spain, declared April 21, 1898,[2]

was, from the point of view of technical diplomacy, an un-

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[1]
Henry Adams, History of the United States of
America (9 vols, New York, 1903), Vol. 1, p. 340.

[2]
A state of war was actually declared April 25
retroactive to April 21 when the American blockade of Cuba
was ordered by President McKinley.

necessary war. A careful study will show that Spain had, by April 10, yielded so much to the requests of the United States as to the direction of affairs in Cuba, that, given time and patience, the practical independence of Cuba or its annexation by America could have been secured without re-course to war.

On the other hand, it is difficult to see how the war could have been prevented. The diplomats might have arrived at a peaceful solution of the Cuban question; but the currents of domestic politics, the awakening of "bumptious nationalism"[3] and the stirrings of humanitarian sympathy had made the American people eager for armed intervention. These were fed as well by the fact that large American property interests and naturalized American citizens had suffered severely by the continued disorders in Cuba. The newspaper press of the time, dubbed the "yellow press", inflamed pop-ular passion until almost any lie received currency. Finally at the head of the nation was a President who certain con-temporary historians have referred to as "a kindly soul in a spineless body,"[4] "a well-intentioned bungler,"[5] and a

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[3] Milton Plesur, Looking Outward: American Attitudes toward Foreign Affairs in the Years from Hays to Harrison. (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester, 1954), p. 217.

[4] Samuel Elliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 799.

person "unpracticed in the art of living up to his con-victions."[6]

From a broad point of view the results attained from the war were immense. With the Spanish-American War and the resulting Treaty of Paris the United States took its place among the great powers of the world.[7] Although the Spanish-American War did not itself make the United States a world power, the nation already had the potential for such status, the war and treaty did prove to Americans that the United States was in reality a world power. It served notice that Europe must reckon with American force in its own dealings. A. L. Dennis writes, "It made the nation feel like a world power. Other disputes had stirred our patriotism; the Spanish-American War put it to the test."[8] The Washington Post in a perceptive editorial of 1898 remarked:

5
H. Wayne Morgan, America's Road to Empire: The war with Spain and overseas expansion (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. xi.

6
Barbara W. Tuchman, The Proud Tower: a portrait of the world before the war, 1890-1914 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966), p. 145.

7
A. L. P. Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy (1896-1906) (New York: Dutton, 1928), p. 64.

8
Ibid., p. 65.

We are face to face with a strange destiny.
The taste of empire is in the mouths of the
people even as the taste of blood in the
jungle. It means an imperial policy, the
Republic renascent, taking her place with
the armed nations.[9]

Although territorial expansion was commonplace to
United States' development long before 1898, the Spanish-
American War brought in its wake a new kind of expansionism,
which lay largely outside the American experience. Now
Americans were extending themselves to "distant extra-hemis-
pheric colonies...abandoning a strategy of defense hitherto
limited to the continent and its appurtenances, in favour
of a major strategic commitment in the Far East."[10] Symp-
tomatic of the new mood of the nation Josiah Strong, one
of the heralds of the "new" imperialism, wrote, "It is
manifest that the Anglo-Saxon holds in his hands the des-
tinies of mankind, and it is evident that the United States
is to become the home of this race, the principle seat of
his power, the great center of his influence."[11] In total,
The Spanish-American War forced Americans to face up to the
inevitable fact that it could no longer merely look inward.

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[9] Quoted in Alexander de Conde, A History of American
Foreign Policy (New York: Scribner's, 1963), p. 356.

[10] Richard Hofstadter, Cuba the Philippines, and Mani-
fest Destiny in the Paranoid Style in American Politics and
Other Essays (New York: Vintage, 1964), p. 148.

[11] Josiah Strong, Our Country (New York, 1885) p. 179.

The days of "a nation of happy beings"[12] engrossed with the

economic and political exploitation associated with western

settlement were numbered by the natural by-product of the

war--Drang nach Westen[13]-- an increased attention in the

Pacific and territories beyond America's borders.   This

residue of the war, consisting in part of an interest in

foreign trade, an adequate navy, a colonial empire, the

necessity of an isthmian canal, influenced American foreign

policy for at least three decades, mandating a new type of

"spread eaglelism"[14] and effecting such policies as Teddy

Roosevelt's "Big Stick" and "international police power," the

Platt Amendment and the accompanying shift to an interven-

tionist policy,[15] the Taftian concept of "Dollar Diplomacy"

and the "Roosevelt corrolary to the Monroe Doctrine" of F.D.R.[16]

12
   Samuel Flag Bemis quoted in Plesur, p. 2.

13
   Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins press, 1936), p. 23.

14
   Plesur, p. 9.

15
   The Platt Amendment guaranteed to the United States
a right to further interventions in Cuba should the United
States desire them.   The Amendment played an important role
in the metamorphosis of the Monroe Doctrine from opposition
to European intervention in American affairs to justifica-
tion for United States intervention in Latin America, see
David F. Healey, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902 (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), p. 212.

16
   de Conde, p. 356.

The war, "Bridged the gap between the idea of non-intervention in Latin America by European powers and the policy of intervention by the United States."[17] Thus, although the conflict was small in scope, large consequences ensued when peace resumed between Spain and the United States.

The Rebellion

How was it that the United States went to war with Spain? The answer is full of complex uncertainties. Many of the old familiar explanations have long since broken down under careful historical research and many new interpretations have been added. Basically, historians have attributed it to the desire to stop the seemingly endless revolution which was shattering Cuba. Cuba had witnessed a rapid succession of revolts against Spanish rule, of which there were eight in the period between 1823-1855, followed by a prolonged conflict known as the "Ten Year's War" 1868-1878, and the "Little War" in 1883. Each time the insurrectionists and Spanish forces had fought to an unsatisfactory "peace of exhaustion".[18] On February 4, 1895 war had again broken out, attributable to the economic, political and social problems existing in the late 1890's.

17
Healey, p. 213.

18
Frank B. Freidel, The Splendid Little War (Boston: Little Brown, 1958), p. 4.

Economically it began with a world-wide depression in 1893, followed by an American tariff law in 1894, which abrogated the reciprocity treaty which had guaranteed Cuban sugar a favoured position in the American market. Raising the duties on raw sugar, the backbone of Cuba's economy, to a level forty per cent higher than under the previous tariff, the new law aggravated further an already depressed Cuban economy, the prime supplier for U.S. sugar imports, wrecking its sugar market and bringing crushing poverty to the island. As well, the crisis can be attributed to Spanish colonial authorities' restrictive, mercantile tariff policy which was designed to protect primarily the interests of monopolistic Spanish merchants and shippers in the Cuban trade. To the resulting higher prices for Cuban consumers and added difficulty in marketing Cuban exports abroad, was added a high local tax burden and inefficient bureaucracy. With the collapse of the 1892 boom in the Cuban economy, plus the smouldering discontent over the failure of Spain to keep its promises of fiscal reform and political autonomy, frustrated rising expectations resulted in revolution.[19]

The social and political complications in nineteenth century Cuba saw the slow alienation of the native creole

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[19] For a standard account of these events, see French Ensor Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain, Diplomacy (New York, 1909), pp. 538-50.

leaders from the privileged newcomers who came from Spain

in endless succession to rule the last remnant of the

Spanish empire in the Western hemisphere. The former slave

population, emancipated in 1878, being free wage labourers,

now had the danger of being dispensed with when they were

not needed. Considering the seasonal nature of the sugar

and tobacco industries and the corresponding shifts in the

amount of labour required planters were able to cut costs

by laying off a large fraction of the labour force each

slack season. Thus with a disenchanted and an unemployed-

rootless class the 1895 revolt came at the right time to

win mass popular allegiance.

Direct American involvement in the Cuban situation

came primarily through large business investments in the

island. With the liquidation of slavery the sugar estates

increasingly felt the rise in the cost of labour. The

planters, however, in attempting to remain financially sol-

vent were caught in an economic undertow. Obviously, the

answer to their problem lay in increased mechanization of

production, made possible through the benefits of industrial-

ization. Many planters, however, had been hard hit by the

recent wartime destruction of property and were, as a re-

sult, in no position to make large new capital investments.

Others, who annually purchased their necessities on credit

from mercantile houses in Spain or New England, were unable

to pay their debts. As well during this same period Cuban

cane sugar was hard pressed in the world market by the competition of European sugar beet, whose production was subsidized by the governments of most of the continental pwers.[20] Thus with a mounting debt burden, a shortage of local capital, oppressive Spanish regulations the Spanish planters found it increasingly difficult to survive, and an perceptible increase in foreign ownership appeared in the sugar industry.

The productive capacity of the U.S. at this time was almost an independent factor in American foreign policy. Artificially stimulated by the Civil War and only temporarily checked by the depressions of the 1870's and early 1890's American output of manufacturers and farmers products had leaped upward, decade by decade (no fewer than 676,000 inventions were patented at Washington between 1860 and 1890[21]) until it seemed that "the Great Republic might die of a surfeit, smothered in its own yield."[22] With the frontier settled and free land gone business opportunities within the country began to dwindle. The great industrial

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20
Healey, p. 8.

21
Thomas C. Cochran and William Miller, The Age of Enterprise (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 58.

22
David M. Pletcher, The Awkward Years (Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1962), p. xii.

corporations feeling the need for new markets and materials
in which to pour their capital looked outward. In the late
1890's, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Thomas B.
Reed, described the U.S. as a "billion dollar country."[23]
Such mammoth wealth obviously sought egress beyond its
shores. America was "breaking out" as one historian put
it.[24] Cuba, located less than 100 miles from the Florida
keys and under 600 miles from the mouth of the Mississippi
could be considered a natural appendage to the U.S. With
its lack of local capital as well as its strategic loca-
tion within the Gulf, a value accentuated by the interests
of Ferdinand de Lesseps and French financiers in an
isthmian canal, as well as British economic dominance over
the desirable markets elsewhere in Latin America, Cuba
looked increasingly interesting to the American investor.[25]
The early American historian Wolf von Schierbrand wrote:
"Growth beyond the borders came to be regarded as not mere
whim, not something desirable, but something absolutely
necessary to safeguard the further national development and
to preserve America from the cause of ill-balanced production."[26]

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[23] Plesur, p. 16.

[24] Ibid., p. 216.

[25] Pletcher, pp. 1-18.

[26] Wolf von Schierbrand, America, Asia and the Pacific
(New York, 1901), p. iv.

In the days of pre-Keynsian economics this fact cannot be too much overstressed. Thus aided by U.S. governmental pressure the too-active producers entered the Cuban scene.

The insurrection, as the previous struggles, was brutally fought on both sides. The revolutionists led by Maximo Gomez ignoring the usual rules of warfare, inaugurated a scortched earth policy, plundering and destroying loyalist property, and burning sugar plantations, many of them owned by the Americans. The Cubans aimed to drive the Spaniards from the island by exhausting Spain's resources. Utilizing guerrilla warfare, rarely attempting to face the Spanish armies in pitched battle, the insurrectos' terrorization campaign made the economic situation more hopeless, swelled the ranks of the indigent workers from whom the rebels were chiefly recruited and effectively crippled the operations and revenues of the insular government.

In attempting to make headway against Gomez's tactics the Spanish government in February 1896 sent General V. M. Weyler to Cuba with orders to crush the rebellion through harsh methods. In instituting his terrorization campaign Gomez had hoped this would force the civil population either into the revolutionary ranks or into the garrisoned towns, where they would starve and possibly turn on the Spanish.[27] To

27
     Thus, even before concentration was ordered, large numbers of labourless people had assembled in the towns in search of work and food.

fight fire with fire Weyler appropriated this strategy and instituted a policy infamously known as the recon-centrado policy. Designed to control the rebels who appeared as peaceful farmers by day and raiders at night, Weyler ordered the entire population moved into the garrison towns. Supplies or inhabitants found in the countryside were destroyed, presumed to aid the insurrectos and thus fair game for the army.[28]

These actions, added to the actions of Gomez, vir-tually ended the normal economic and social life of Cuba's 1.6 million inhabitants. Although no more drastic than similar measures used by other commanders at other times in fighting guerrilla forces, and no more brutal than the tactics of the rebels themselves, Weyler's policy does rightfully earn him the nickname "Butcher." Although the reconcentrado policy was consciously planned and executed little effort was made to provide for the sudden increase in the population of the towns. The full horror of the rebellion cannot be overstated. "The rebellion," M. Wilkerson writes, "had no parallel in history in savage destructiveness up to that time. The great increase, caused by this order (reconcentration), of demoralized,

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28

The edict of reconcentration stated: "Any in-dividual found outside the lines in the country at the ex-piration of this period, shall be considered rebels and dealt with as such," from Horatio Ruben, Liberty: The Story of Cuba (New York: Brewer, Warren, and Putnam, 1932), p. 294.

poverty-stricken, and shiftless humanity, crowded with the
wreck of their slight belongings into the small Cuban towns,
could, in the inability of the Spanish government to fur-
nish them food, but result in appalling mortality."[29] In
certain provinces the annual death rate during the rebellion
rose to approximately 300 persons per 1,000, or nealy one-
third of the population. In Havana, and its suburb, Regla,
reconcentration prompted 62 deaths per day, the majority
due to starvation, in 1898, up from 6 deaths per day in
pre-rebellion days.[30] In total the Cuban Census of 1899
estimates that nearly 200,000 people died as a result of
the rebellion.[31] By 1898 Cuba was reduced to misery while
the two combatants were gripped in a bloody deadlock. It
was a situation which could not but affect in some measure
the American public with an already jaundiced attitude to

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[29]
Marcus M. Wilkerson, Public Opinion and the
Spanish-American War (New York: Russell and Russell,
1967), p. 492.

[30]
Chadwick, pp. 505-507.

[31]
The last census was in 1887 and gave 1,631,687
as the population in that year. The report of the census
of 1899 says: "The number of inhabitants was certainly not
overstated." The latter census taken in October 1899 gave
a population of 1,572,797. "It is probable, therefore, that
the direct and indirect losses by the war and the reconcen-
trado policy, including a decrease of births and of immig-
ration, and an increase of deaths and emigration reached a
total of not far from 200,000." Census of Cuba, 1899,
p. 72. See also Chadwick, p. 493.

Spain and a fear that yellow fever would spread from Cuba to the southern states.

Economically the rebellion effectively ruined, what was practically Cuba's one support, the production of sugar. One to understand the destruction which followed the recon-centrado edics, has but to note the fact that production fell from 1,004,264 tons in 1894-95 to 225,221 in the following year.[3] The $76 million of imports from Cuba to the United States in 1894 had fallen to $40 million in 1896 and $18 million in 1897. The exports from the United States to Cuba were in 1898 but $8 million, a third of what they were from years before. The continuance of the struggle not only meant ruin to the island but shocking waste of capital and production from the American investor.[33] This effect on business by the rebellion did not escape the American entrepreneurs who had recently poured capital into an ailing Cuban economy.[34]

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[32]
Wilkerson, p. 492.

[33]
Chadwick, p. 487.

[34]
For a discussion of the Cuban Revolution from various points of view, see Edwin F. Atkins, Sixty Years in Cuba (Cambridge, 1926), Chapters 12-18, for the American sugar planter's description of events. (Atkins was the largest single owner of Cuban sugar properties and had originally pioneered the penetration of American investment there). Frederick Funston, Memories of Two Wars (New York, 1911), W. Millis, The Martial Spirit (New York: Literary Guild of America, 1931), Robert P. Porter, Industrial Cuba (New York,

Part 2: Enter America

President Cleveland's warning in his last annual
message December 7, 1896, that the time might come "when
a correct policy and case for our interests" as well as
broad humanitarian motives might force direct American
involvement in Cuba, presaged a delicate situation for the
incoming McKinley Administration.[35] While the situation had
grown increasingly worse in Cuba, it had also grown into a
major public issue in the United States. Hofstadter has
called this effect "the psychic crisis of the 1890."[36]

The situation in the U.S. was prompted by four
factors: the Cuban "junta," the "yellow press," the
"jingoes" in Congress, and the "temper of the times". Since
the American press and people had long been interested in
the periodic revolts in Cuba, the insurrectionists found it
relatively easy to arouse American feelings against Spain.
From the first, due primarily to the Alliance incident, in
which a Spanish gunboat fired on an American steamer which

1899) for the economists' view of Cuban events, and Gon-
zala de Quesada and Henry D. Northrop, The War in Cuba, or
the Great Struggle for Freedom (New York, 1896) for a pro-
Cuban view of affairs.

[35]
James D. Richardson, ed., A compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (10 vols.,
Washington, 1896-1899), x, 120.

[36]
Hofstadter, p. 148.

it supposed to be bent on a filibustering errand six miles out from Cuba,[37] the revolution received much attention from the general public, generally slanted against Weyler-ian tactics in Cuba.[38] As well, capitalizing on traditional American sympathy for the underdog, American distrust of European institutions, and colonial imperialism[39] as well as on the American memory of their own revolutionary beginn-ings[40] the Cubans established revolutionary committees, or juntas, in the U.S., with general headquarters in New York, in order to spread propaganda, raise funds, and to recruit and outfit filibustering expeditions.[41]

The influence of the "yellow press" on the American people in stirring up opposition to Spain is difficult to determine and can only be approximated. Initiated in 1897

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[37] Filibustering expeditions were boats loaded at American ports with arms and men in order to supply the rebels. This activity was considered illegal since it violated the neutrality laws of the United States.

[38] de Conde, p. 339.

[39] Plesur, p. 44.

[40] Rubens, p. 222.

[41] For details, see George W. Auxier, "The propaganda Activities of the Cuban Junta in Precipitating the Spanish-American War, 1895-1898," Hispanic American Historical Re-view, XIX (August, 1939) 286-305.

in the New York _Journal_ and advertised as the "New Journalism" the policy was one of aggressive reporting aimed at bringing to light unusual incidents to be exploited in building circulation. Success spells emulation and soon vicious rivalries developed among the newspapers of Boston, New York, Chicago and San Francisco, each attempting to outdo the other with a more striking display of news. The contest was especially bitter between the _World_ and the _Journal_, which had developed into a fight for supremacy in the field of New York journalism conducted by Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst. Both newspapers by early 1898 had a circulation exceeding the 800,000 mark.[42] Realizing that nothing sells newspapers like war the Cuban situation seemed tailor-made for purposes of a circulation battle. Resorting to one of the surest methods of striking a responsive chord among their readers—the support of the underdog—sensational publications put emphasis on topics most likely to find ready appeal, stressing Spanish atrocities against Americans, non-combatants and defenseless prisoners. Many reports of Spanish atrocities were exaggerated and in some instances fabricated or run as straight news when in actuality their sources were dubious "junta" accounts or rumors. As, Wilkerson in _Public Opinion and the Spanish-_

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[42] Wilkerson, p. 7.

American War states, "There was no subtlety in the means
employed by sensational newspapers to build favourable
sentiment for the Cubans."[43] The American public, there-
fore, was being given war propaganda "an insidious thing.
Once started it gains momentum with success until truth
and rational thought are left stranded upon the reefs of
discord and strife."[44]

Most historians generally consider the influence of
the sensational New York press to have been considerable,
not only by reason of the example set other newspapers, and
the size of its own circulation but also because of the
widely distributed news service and the lack of alternative
sources of information. In the age of gas lights, the
American people had no other source of information con-
cerning Cuban events except what was revealed by the press.
Even the conservative press which refused to print "jingo"
sentiments and severely denounced the radical press aided
in spreading these sentiments. Since many Congressmen made
frequent references to newspaper accounts of atrocities,
their only real source of information, these speeches were
duly reported by the conservative press since charges made

[43]
        Wilkerson, p. 28.

[44]
        Joseph E. Wisan, The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in
New York Press, 1895-98 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1934), p. 31.

by the press were given authority when they were repeated

by members of Congress. Further, by 1897 virtually all of

the important New York papers (except the _Sun_) were members

of a strong co-operative news gathering organization, the

Associated Press, and their news became available to the

association for transmission to other member papers. Beside

the A.P. reports the syndicated service of New York news-

papers offered further coverage of the insurrection to

other newspapers. For example, the New York _Herald_ sold its

news service to the Boston _Herald_, the Chicago _Times-Herald_

and the _San-Francisco Chronicle_. The fact that such service

included illustrations was an important item in presenting

a full picture of Spanish atrocities. Thus when the New

York publications sent correspondents to Cuba there was

made available to nearly every paper in the country through

the A.P. and syndicated services as much news of the Cuban

insurrection as was available to the New York Press. Con-

sidering the unavoidability of the sensational press as well

as the nature of their reports being written to produce res-

ponse, it seems evident that the feeling against Spain was

intensified.[45]

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See Ernest R. May, _Imperial Democracy: The Emer-
gence of America as a Great Power_ (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, 1961), p. 71 which argues the importance
of the yellow press. See also William E. Leuchtenburg,
"The needless War with Spain," _American Heritage_, VIII
(February 1957), p. 34, which stresses the same point and

To a great extent Congress reflected the attitudes of the yellow press with every session. The years after 1895 witnessed the introduction of numerous resolutions providing for the recognition of Cuban independence, the recognition of Cuban belligerency, or some kind of U.S. intervention. One practice by Congressmen was the frequent use of "yellow journals" as the basis for resolutions and speeches.[46]

> Whether or not the practice of using
> newspaper accounts of Cuban "oppression"
> in congressional debates indicates the
> influence of the press on members of
> Congress, or merely that these members,
> realizing its potential power over their
> constituency, were utilizing it to
> strengthen their own position can not
> be ascertained.

In any case, Congressional extremism was a fact with which the Executive would have to deal.

Finally, the advent of the late 1890's saw a new philosophical universe become popular based primarily on Social Darwinism. Darwin's findings in The Origin of the Species, when applied to human society supplied the philosophical foundation for the theory that war was both in-

offers an excellent summary of the causes of the war.

[46] Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2nd Session, XXXI, February 9, 1898, p. 1578, saw the bitter exchange between Senators Hale and Mason regarding the latter's frequent use of newspaper accounts in his speeches.

[47] Wilkerson, p. 55.

herent in nature (survival of the fittest) and enobling.
B. Tuchman writes: "Darwinsim became the White Man's
Burden. Imperialism acquired a moral imperative...it was
the _right_ and _duty_ of the nobler, stronger superior race to
extend its rule over inferior peoples, which in the American
view meant over colonies.[48] To Albert Beveridge this meant,
"We are a conquering race...we must obey our blood."[49] Ex-
pounded in many guises ranging from Bergson's élan vital
to the writings of Leslie Ward, William Graham Sumner and
Nietzsche, the mood saw a decline in religion replaced by
patriotism and nationalism.[50] Tuchman writes: "Nationalism
absorbed the strength once belonging to religion. Where
people formerly fought for religion now they would presum-
ably do no less for its successor."[51]

The culmination of Darwin's theory was reached in
the writings of Captain A. T. Mahan, President of the Na-
tional War College. Mahan's thesis was that power, force
and ultimately war were the prime factors which decide a
nation's fate; dependence on other alternatives, such as

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[48]
    Tuchman, p. 249.

[49]
    Quoted in Tuchman, p. 246.

[50]
    An excellent study of Social Darwinism at the turn
of the century is Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in
American Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[51] Tuchman, p. 250.

arbitration were merely "illusions".[52]   Primarily because
of Mahan's great influence (Teddy Roosevelt "read it straight
through"[53]) the development of an American navy, the acqui-
sition of Hawaii, Cuba and an isthmian canal were raised
to issues of strategic national importance.[54]   By 1896 the
Navy had constructed four battleships.   As Tuchman states:

> The policy which these ships expressed,
> though far from being generally accepted
> at once, represented a fundamental change
> in direction-outward.... The object was
> therefore to be supreme in these waters
> (and this meant a fleet capable of protect-
> ing the America coasts by taking offensive
> action against enemy bases anywhere from
> Newfoundland to the Carribean.[55]

The bellicosity of the press and Congress as well as the
prevailing mood of the nation were portents of things to
come in 1898.[56]

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[52]
   See A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon
History, 1660-1783 (New York: Sagamore Press, 1957), and
The Interest of America in Sea Power (Boston, Little, Brown,
1897).

[53]
   Tuchman, p. 131.

[54]
   See Mahan, The Interest.

[55]
   Tuchman, p. 132.

[56]
   Both Hofstadter and May, pp. 268-269 attribute
the eventual war to this growing aggression impulse cul-
minating in moral and public hysteria, "It was these forces
already in operation that had most to do with bringing war
in April 1898" - see May, p. 271.

Events of January 1 to April 22, 1898

> As 1898 began, God was in His heaven,
> William McKinley was in the White House,
> and all seemed right with the world."[57]

McKinley's assumption of the Presidency and the first

year of his Administration was accompanied by a lessening

of tension between Spain and the U.S. This was due to

several related factors. First, a new liberal Spanish

government under Sagasta had come to power in October with

the assassination of the conservative premier, Canovas.

Although turning down McKinley's offer of "the good offices

of the President" it did however inaugurate reforms in Cuba:

it substituted General Weyler for General Blanco,[58] granted

Cubans political rights guaranteed by the Spanish constitu-

tion, reformed the electoral laws of Cuba, and promised

eventual home rule, or autonomy. Second, the American

attitude toward filibustering expeditions, which had been

lax due to the refusal of the courts to prosecute on tech-

nicalities those vessels impounded, had hardened. After

the decision of the Supreme Court in the Horsa case greater

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[57]
Pletcher, p. xii.

[58]
This substitution, although satisfying the "yellow
journals", was militarily a self-defeating move since "Gen-
eral Weyler was relieved just when he was close to restoring
order...the Cuban insurrection flared up again providing
the imperialists in the United States with the excuse for
...war. Had Canovas lived, the excuse might not have been
available" -- Tuchman, p. 99.

risk was necessary to smuggle men and munitions into Cuba.
While filibustering did not stop altogether, the Spanish
Government could no longer complain with such substantial
basis as before that American laws applicable to the situa-
tion were not enforced. Third, those persons of Cuban ex-
traction and U.S. citizenship apprehended for alleged
complicity in the insurrection were being released and
expelled from the island until Minister to Spain Woodford
could write from Madrid December 7, 1897 that the Spanish
minister of state informed him that "no citizen of the U.S.
now remained imprisoned in the Island of Cuba."[59] Fourth,
claims filed with the Department of State against Spain for
failure to honour alleged contracts were substantially
settled. These complaints originated due to Weyler's 1896
embargo on the exportation of tobacco from the island which
failed to take into account contracts made before the decree
was promulgated. Finally, Spain's conciliatory disposition
and Weyler's dismissal softened, for the time being, the
"yellow press'" histrionics. This fading interest of the
press was measured using the average number of column
inches per week concerning the Spanish-Cuban situation in
the New York Times. While 1897 had seen certain weeks
averaging 20-30 columns of space, primarily placed on pages

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[59] Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1898, p. 645 (Noted as For Rels hereafter).

one and two, the average number of column inches in the
first three weeks of 1898 never totalled more than one-half
column, usually displayed on page 3 to 7. With McKinley's
first annual message recognizing Spain's new efforts and
urging Americans to give her "a reasonable chance" to effect
satisfactory changes, repudiating intervention ("I speak not
of forcible annexation for that cannot be thought of. That
by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression"[60])
the situation seemed less tense than it had been the three
years before.

    With the lessening of tensions between the United
States and Spain a surge of optimism as to the future course
of events prevailed in Washington and Madrid. Forceful in-
tervention had been momentarily disavowed. Although the
distressing chore remained of aiding the reconcentrados
this was to be accomplished by peaceful intervention in the
form of a monetary gift by the American government to Cuba
and an appeal by the President to "the people in every city
and town" for donations.[61] From Minister to Madrid Wood-
ford came the optimistic words: "...I do begin to see
possible ways by which (we can) avert war."[62] It is at this

60
    Richardson, x, 131.

61
    For Rels., p. 655.

62
    Ibid., p. 665.

point that we propose to begin our study into crisis decision-making using the "1898 Case." While prior to January 1, 1898 it can be said that the Spanish-Cuban situation had only distant crisis value vis à vis American decision-makers and the general public, in the 112 days between the 1898 New Year and declaration of war, Americans, through the direct loss of American lives and possessions, met totally different demands. The Havana riots, the incident of Dupuy de Lome's ill-fated letter; the destruction of the Maine and the subsequent report following it; the Proctor speech; the efforts made by Spain to meet American demands; the final urge to war—these events, bringing into play forces which existed prior to 1898, would force Americans to face a situation more personally than theretofore. For the researcher they provide clearly identifiable stages as the crisis began to take on definite proportions.

Although 1898 began optimistically, hopes were soon doomed by events. The rebels refused to accept anything less than independence arguing that the Spanish concession of autonomy had been manufactured primarily for U.S. consumption and was solely "a makeshift device for gaining time."[63] The war, thus, continued. On January 12 Spanish loyalists in Cuba, who violently opposed any form of home rule pro-

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[63] de Conde, p. 342.

ferred by the Liberal regime in Madrid to the native Cubans

because of the threat to their preferred position, rioted

in the streets attacking pro-autonomy newspaper offices.

Fearing attacks on Americans Fitzhugh Lee, the American

Consul-General in Havana, suggested:

> If demonstrated he (Blanco regime) can not
> maintain order, preserve life, and keep the
> peace, or if Americans, and this their
> interests are in danger, ships must be sent,
> and to that end should be prepared to move
> promptly.[64]

Even though tension in Havana eased and Lee advised

against sending warships to the city, the second-class battle-

ship Maine entered Havana's harbour on January 25. Although

rationalized on both sides as "an act of friendly courtesy"[65]

the visit, nonetheless displayed the increasing willingness

of the U.S. to intervene directly in the Cuban situation.

A further increase in tension between Spain and the

U.S. occurred on February 9 when Hearst's Journal published

a private letter written by Enrique Dupuy de Lome, the

Spanish Minister in the U.S. to a friend in Cuba. The

Spanish Minister, not appreciating McKinley's efforts to

avoid intervening in Cuba wrote two interesting sections:

> ...it (McKinley's annual message) shows once
> more what McKinley is, weak and a popularity
> hunter, besides being a would-be politician
> who tries to keep a door open behind him while

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[64]
Senate Documents, No. 207-237, p. 83.

[65]Ibid., p. 84.

remaining on good terms with the jingoes of
his party....

It would be very advantageous to take
up, even if only for effect, the question
of commercial relations....66

The fact that a Spaniard had dared criticize an American

President, particularly in contemptuous terms, and the fact

that commercial negotiations going on at that time were only

"for effect", overshadowed the fact that it was a private

letter written to a private individual, the contents of

which were disclosed by surreptitious means. Although de

Lome quickly resigned the jingoes and yellow press were

once again whipped up into a fury.

The sensation of the de Lome affair was short-lived

for it was followed a week later by a second event which

dwarfed it into comparative insignificance. On the night

of February 15 the Maine was blown up killing 260 men. The

mystery of the explosion never being indisputably determined

and the rumors that arose as a result presented excellent

opportunities for the sensational papers to lay the blame at

Spain's doorstep.[67] "Remember the Maine" incited public

opinion[68] until Secretary of the Navy Long commented that

66
For Rels., pp. 1002-1022.

67
Although laying no blame the naval court of in-
quiry did establish that a submarine mine had destroyed the
vessel.

"The slightest spark is liable to result in war."[69]

The histrionics over the loss of the _Maine_ were, on March 12, accompanied by a vivid eyewitness description of the still desperate situation existing in Cuba in a speech made by Senator R. Proctor to Congress. Because of Proctor's conservative and respected background those who generally dismissed the yellow journal interpretation of events were influenced by him. This was particularly noticeable in respect to the business community. Realizing that only American intervention could terminate the Cuban situation and hence a fluctuating stock market, the New York _Times_ reported:

> Senator Proctor's speech converted a great
> many people in Wall Street, who have here-
> tofore taken the ground that the U.S. had

68
  See Wilkerson, 121-132, for the misrepresentations of this incident in the press. The average number of columns given over to the _Maine_ incident in the New York _Times_ was approximately 30-35 in the week following the _Maine_ and usually displayed on pages one to four. At this time headlines were used increasingly. Wilkerson, p. 101, states: "Although the _World_ and _Journal_ had used striking headlines for months, the sinking of the _Maine_ may be said to fix definitely the beginnings of the practice on the part of most American newspapers of utilizing heavy type across several columns in displaying significant news, a practice which developed as the Spanish-American War progressed.... Increasingly headlines such as "Army on War Footing" and "Spanish Navy on the Move" headed despatches with very little substance or credibility (even in the conservative New York _Times_) as early as mid-March.

69
  Quoted in de Conde, p. 344.

no business to interfere in a revolution
on Spanish soil.70

Because of these events a gradual hardening of
official opinion occurred. Autonomy for Cuba did not seem
to work out successfully; the condition of the island
grew worst; measures for the relief of the population were
ineffective; and in general the outlook was discouraging.71
Woodford pessimistically wrote from Madrid:

> I see nothing ahead except disorder,
> insecurity of persons and destruction
> of property. The Spanish flag cannot
> give peace. The rebel flag cannot give
> peace. There is but one power and one
> flag that can secure peace and compel
> peace. That power is the United States,
> and that flag is our flag.72

Day's letter in reply, reflecting concern over the domestic
situation and specifically that over the actions of Congress,
stated:

> You should know and fully appreciate that
> there is profound feeling in Congress,
> and the gravest apprehension on the part
> of the most conservative members that a
> resolution for intervention may pass both
> branches in spite of any effort which can

70
    New York Times, March 18, 1898.

71
        See Secretary of State Sherman's letter to Wood-
ford summarizing the Administration's view of the effect-
iveness of Spain in ending the war and aiding the population,
For Rels., pp. 666-669.

72
        For Rels., p. 689.

be made. Only assurance from the President
that if he fails in peaceful negotiations he
will submit all the facts to Congress at a
very early date will prevent immediate
action on the part of Congress.[73]

Public opinion chose to show itself in favour of armed

intervention by burning McKinley in effigy and hissing or

destroying McKinley's picture in theaters.[74]

Cognizant of these pressures McKinley commenced to

force the issue with Spain. On March 28 the American

Minister in Madrid presented the Spanish government with a

virtual ultimatum. It suggested:

1. An immediate armistice, freely
granted by Spain, to last until October 1,
both sides to accept McKinley's good
offices.
2. A final end to reconcentration
and Spanish relief for Cuba.
3. If peace terms were not reached
by October 1, McKinley as arbitrator would
settle the Cuban problem.
4. McKinley would approach the Cuban
rebels directly for their participation in
this plan if Spain first agreed.[75]

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[73]
For Rels., pp. 685-688. The threat of Congress-
ional action is shown in a conversation between the in-
fluential Republican Senator and the Under Secretary of
State: "Day, by_____, don't your President know where the
war-declaring powers is lodged? Tell him by_____, that if
he doesn't do something Congress will exercise the power."
Quoted in M. Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York:
Harper, 1959), p. 184. For a careful, sympathetic analysis
of McKinley's dilemma, see May, pp. 129-130.

[74]
H. W. Morgan, William McKinley and His America
(Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1963), p. 367.

[75]
For Rels., p. 711-712.

Assistant Secretary of State Day made clear in a subsequent

telegram that, "Full self-government with indemnity would

mean Cuban independence."[76]

Anxious to avoid war the Spanish government gave a

qualified assent to two of the demands. It ordered the end

of the concentration camp policy in all parts of Cuba but

would grant an armistice only should one first be demanded

by the rebels.[77] The issue of the armistice, which the

rebels, confident of ultimate American intervention, would

not ask for, made the reply unsatisfactory. Woodford

gloomily forecast this meant "the continuation of this des-

tructive and now needless war."[78] The Spanish government

was, however, in a great predicament. If the Spanish

administration did not accept McKinley's demands in full,

war appeared certain; if it conceded all, an angry public

or the army "which was still the controlling factor in

Spanish politics" and "a real danger"[79] would probably over-

[76]
For. Rels., p. 713.

[77]
It was this point according to Leech, p. 180
which was the casus belli of the war. See also Ernest B.
May, ed., The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander
in Chief (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1960), p. 95
and May, Imperial Democracy, pp. 153-159.

[78]
For. Rels., p. 727.

[79]
Ibid., p. 728.

throw the dynasty. Ensuing Spanish appeals to the various

Great European powers for a monarchical front, except for

the offer of their good offices in a joint note to McKinley[80]

were of no avail. In his reply McKinely spoke of fulfilling

"a duty to humanity" and would concede nothing. The German

foreign minister von Bulow, in reply to Spain's plea for

help, bluntly said:

> You are isolated because everybody wants
> to be pleasant to the United States, or
> at any rate, nobody wants to arouse
> America's anger; the United States is
> a rich country against which you simply
> cannot sustain a war.[81]

On April 9 Spain, on her own initiative, ordered an

end to hostilities in Cuba, thus meeting virtually all of

McKinley's demands except American mediation. Woodford wired

the next day:

> I hope that nothing will now be done to
> humiliate Spain as I am satisfied that
> the present government is going, and is
> loyally ready to go, as fast and as far
> as it can. With your (McKinley's) power
> of action sufficiently free you will win
> the fight on your own lines.[82]

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[80]
    For. Rels., pp. 740-41 (for note and McKinley's
reply).

[81]
    von Bulow quoted in Orestes Ferrara, The Last
Spanish War: Revelations in "Diplomacy" (New York:
Paisley, 1937), p. 127.

[82]
    For Rels., p. 747. May, p. 168, points out that
the American Minister in Madrid should have realized that
all Spain sought was time. Although it must be admitted

McKinley, despite his personal desire to avert war,
obviously did not feel he had freedom of action. Senator
Elkins, a close friend of the President, said of Spain's
final capitulation, "It comes late. Had it come a few days
ago, I think we could have averted war."[83] On April 11
McKinley sent Congress his message recommending forcible
intervention. He had prepared this six days earlier but
had delayed delivering it until Americans in Cuba were
evacuated. He spoke "in the name of humanity, in the name
of civilization;" said he had exhausted every effort to
relieve the intolerable conditions in Cuba; and asked Congress
for authority to use the Army and Navy to end hostilities
there, in effect a request for war. In two brief paragraphs,
added to the end of a speech covering nine printed pages, he
mentioned Spain's surrender on the points that were ostensibly
the causes for war.[84]

After one week of debate Congress passed a joint
resolution which declared Cuba independent and authorized
intervention. The president signed the resolution on April
20. Spain, in desperation, after receiving a three-day ul-

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that on April 5 Woodford did send Day a telegram pleading
that "If you can give still me time...I will get you the
peace which you desire so much," For Rels., p. 736.

[83] Quoted in Morgan, America, p. 374.

[84] The full text is in Richardson, x, 139-150.

timatum to remove their forces from Cuba, declared war on
April 24. Congress, the next day, declared war to have
existed since April 21 when McKinley had established a
blockade and delivered his ultimatum.[85] The Spanish-Am-
erican War commenced with Admiral Dewey's victory in Manila
Bay May 1 and lasted ten weeks.[86]

Why did this unnecessary war come about when lead-
ing statesmen on both sides did not want it? Such a question
cannot be answered categorically, but some factors that may
be reckoned with are intuitively obvious. It is the pur-
pose of this project to see if the considerations felt to
be important intuitively hold up under empirical analysis.
To McKinley, viewing events in retrospect three years later,
"It is Manifest Destiny,"[87] and "I did all that in honor
could be done to avert the war, but without avail"[88] seemed
to rationalize his actions. Perhaps, as William James wrote:

[85]
For a concise history of these events, see Chadwick,
pp. 572-587.

[86]
For a history of the war, see Russell A. Alger,
The Spanish-American War (New York, 1901) for an account
by the much maligned Secretary of War, and J. B. Atkins
The War in Cuba (London, 1898).

[87]
McKinley to his secretary George Cortelyou quoted
in Tuchman, p. 145.

[88]
Quoted in de Conde, p. 347.

> It is instructive to find how near the
> surface in all of us the old fighting
> spirit lies and how slight an appeal will
> wake it up. Once _really_ awake, there is
> no retreat.[89]

In any case, our interpretation of the forces which brought

the American leadership to commence "an idiotic performance

...a disgraceful picnic"[90] must wait the analysis of a later

chapter.

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[89]
   Quoted in Tuchman, p. 139.

[90]
   An American general quoted in Freidel, p. 48.

Chapter III

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

Our hypotheses presented in Chapter One must now be
given an empirical interpretation. In discussing the method-
ology and data to be utilized, three aspects will be considered:
first, the suitability of the Spanish-American War situation
as a setting in which to base our study; second, the ra-
tionale behind our choosing those decision-makers and docu-
ments which were utilized in this exercise; and, third,
the research procedures as they directly pertain to this
study.

Why the 1898 crisis?

The selection of the 1898 crisis as a setting in
which to attempt quantitative analysis of the impact of
crisis induced stress on certain aspects of foreign policy
decision-making was based on several considerations. The
available documents relating to the outbreak of the war is
readily accessible for a preliminary study of this kind.
Also, those documents available regarding this situation
are unclassified. The most important material relating to
the events of 1898 published by the United States government
can be considered unquestionably authentic.[1] The omitted

or incomplete despatches--held back while passions and charges
due to the war's maladministration ran high--have been super-
seded or re-added to the available published collection.

As well, no investigation in regard to crisis
decision-making has been carried out in this particular his-
torical case. This fact is more important than just its
virgin charms. The earlier discussion emphasized the
disparate and non-overlapping character of current work.
Although the majority of crisis decision-making studies
have used the 'case study', virtually no explicit effort has
been made to test similar hypotheses with the same methods
using different case studies. James A. Robinson states:

> Until a much larger effort is launched to-
> ward replication of theories and applications
> of different methods to the same theory,
> our knowledge will be relatively super-
> ficial and not, in principle, much more
> adequate than the personal judgment and
> experience of people who have lived through
> crises or observed them firsthand.[2]

Thus, as cited previously, an attempt will be made to rep-
licate O. R. Holsti's hypotheses of "The 1914 Case" con-
cerning the effects of stress upon: "(1) the manner in
which decision-makers perceive time as a factor in their
formulation of policy; and (2) the contrasting ways in

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[1]
Margaret Leech, _In the Days of McKinley_ (New York:
Harper, 1959), p. 610.

[2]
James A. Robinson, _Crisis Decision-Making_ (China
Lake: Project Michelson, 1967), p. 53.

which they view policy alternatives for their own nations, and for their adversaries."[3]

Further, there exists in the historical literature considerable confusion as to which factors contributed to a stressful situation in the perception of the decision-makers. The war, as was intimated in Chapter Two, "small in scope yet large in consequences,"[4] has been the subject of many historical debates. Was it preventable? Did public opinion and the "yellow press" or the need of diplomacy force the conflict? What role did Congress play in pressuring McKinley? Was the war accidental or part of a larger and more conscious design? Was American interest in Cuba the object of economic motives or Christian humanitarianism? This project was thus set up to consider these and other areas of historical interest. In this way, it is hoped, clarification of the current historical muddle can be partially achieved concomitant with a replication of crisis decision-making hypotheses which were significant in a previous case study of World War One.

Finally, the crisis is an excellent example of war through escallation. Although a chaotic situation existed

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[3] Ole R. Holsti, "The 1914 Case," American Political Science Review, 59 (1965), 365-378.

[4] M. Wayne Morgan, America's Road to Empire (New York: John Wiley, 1966), p. ix.

since 1865 in Cuba, it was in a time span of only four

months during which the crisis hardened and during which

certain escallatory steps, easily recognizable today, took

place, i.e., the Havana riots, the infamous de Lome letter

(having much the same consequences of the Zimmerman telegram

of World War One) and the destruction of the battleship

USS Maine. In other words, there exists a tight time span

for research purposes of 112 days. Moreover, it can be

easily said that the American government was more than ill-

prepared to consider a war with what could still be consider-

ed a major European power, having a sizeable ocean-going

fleet. Frederick T. Jane, British naval expert, although

predicting an ultimate American triumph, especially if the

two fleets met in massed combat, did forewarn his American

audience that the Spanish fleet under Admiral Topete was

capable of rendering serious damage, especially if it were

employed in quick and devastating attacks on East Coast

shipping and cities. Jane concluded, "...then the patriotic

citizens of the United States may well come to rue the day

that the meddling finger of Uncle Sam was thrust into the

hornets' nest of Cuba."[5] To add to their military problems

the American army in 1896 was also outnumbered by the

Spanish garrison in Cuba 4:1. H. W. Morgan writes:

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[5] Quoted in Frank B. Freidel, The Splendid Little
War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1958), p. 43.

> The Army which McKinley commanded, in
> time honoured fashion, was wholly unpre-
> pared and pathetically small. Congression-
> al penury, a long period of peace, and
> American distrust of professional armies
> and belief in the citizen soldier combined
> to give the country an army hardly large
> enough to police the remaining frontier
> or stage a good parade.[6]

The question, therefore, comes immediately to mind why an
ill-prepared nation would go to war when no apparent hos-
tility from abroad existed, and when the odds in favour of
winning a war over an island populated by "a mongrel race"[7]
seemed stacked against that nation? Obviously, such reasons
will be related to the context of given situations and will
change as these situations change. Can we say, then, that
the Spanish-American War case will be of use to us as a
sample study in crisis decision-making. In answer we must
quote Arnold Wolfers:

> In many conflict situations when individuals
> are confronted with great threats or depriva-
> tions, behavioral patterns will tend to be
> similar.[8]

6
Morgan, p. 66.

7
Although the humanitarian aspect of the situation
in Cuba was a large factor in American intervention, it
must be noted that racism against Cubans was also rampant
at the time -- see David F. Healey, The United States in
Cuba, 1898-1902 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1963), pp. 209-210, which quotes the New York Evening Post,
February 25, 1898.

8
Arnold Wolfers, The Actors in International Politics
in W. T. R. Fox (ed.), Theoretical Aspects of International

In other words, in spite of the diversity of the actual
components of a crisis situation, it can be safely
assumed that general propositions can be made about the
crisis decision-making that will be applicable to most
cases.

The selection of decision-makers

In using the decision-making approach to achieve
our goals two important contributions from its disparate
and voluminous literature accrue to this study. Although
open to many criticisms this approach does guide us in
thinking of the nation as an "actor" in the international
system. Figuratively, the activity of the nation is the
sum of the activity of its individuals. Realistically,
however, although many persons are responsible for direct-
ing the course of a nation, the decision to commit the
nation to act is the work of a few. C. Hermann has pointed
out that, especially in response to a crisis stimulus, there
is a tendency toward contraction of authority in the organ-
ization.[9] Contraction of authority is illustrated in the
hypothesis formulated by Snyder and Paige based on their
study of the decision of the United States to take military

Relations (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press,
1959), pp. 83-106.

[9] For an excellent discussion of the effects of crisis
upon the organization, see Charles F. Hermann, "Some Con-
sequences of Crisis which Limit the Viability of Organizations",
Administrative Science Quarterly, VIII (1963), 61-82.

action in Korea:

> When crucial choices are forced on an
> organization from the environment, the
> decisional subsystem will be characterized
> by smaller decisional units.[10]

Janowitz, also, found that as a military situation takes

on aspects of a crisis "the more feasible it becomes for

officer personnel to claim that new problems are outside

their jurisdiction and require directives from higher

authorities."[11] Added to these facts is the general dis-

interest manifested by the public regarding foreign policy

decisions.[12] Should the public seem to arise out of its

stupor, as is claimed occured with the American public vis

à vis the Spanish-Cuban situation, the reactions of those

decision-makers responsible to them are worthy of study.

L. M. Sears, for instance, writes, "In the case of the

Spanish-American War, the activity of the State Department

was an expression of the popular will, rather than the

routine conduct of a chancellery."[13]

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[10]
    R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and B. Sapin, (eds.),
Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New York: Free Press, 1962),
pp. 206-249.

[11]
    Op. cit., p. 88.

[12]
    Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign
Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), pp. 80-84. See
also James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
(New York: Random House, 1968)) for an excellent study of
the relationship between the mass public and decision-
makers.

One researcher has conceptualized the relationship between decision-makers and those who are not immediately involved in the decision-process by viewing the nation as "a pyramid of individuals with the key decision-makers located in the apex of the pyramid. The cut-off point between decision-makers and non-decision-makers (being) an uncertain boundary which fluctuates with time and with the content of the decision."[14] For purposes of a project such as this the immediate difficulty confronts the researcher in attempting to draw a distinction between decision-makers and non-decision-makers. Where is the dividing line to be in the Spanish-American War situation-pyramid containing those key decision-makers who influenced the events of 1898? The problem for the research is to decide which individuals to fit into the various key decision-making roles, and which individuals to exclude.

The importance of focusing on the decision-maker as the actor in the situation, the second benefit to accrue from the decision-making approach, must be briefly mentioned. As the decision-making approach developed political scientists

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[13]
Louis M. Sears, John Sherman, in Samuel F. Bemis (ed.), The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (New York: Pageant, 1958), IX, 3-20.

[14]
Gilbert R. Winham, An Analysis of Foreign Aid Decision-making: The Case of the Marshall Plan. (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1967), p. 28.

became increasingly concerned with the perspectives and situational definitions of the researcher. Without neglecting the analysis of organizations and institutions the basic premise underlying this approach is that, "nation-state action is determined by the way in which the situation is defined subjectively by those charged with the responsibility for making choices."[15] K. Boulding has summarized this point succinctly:

> We must recognize that the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the 'objective' facts of the situation, whatever that may mean, but to their 'image' of the situation. It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behavior.[16]

Charles B. Marshall wrote:

> The state is only man. It is not super-man. The institutions of political life do not add to the dimensions of the human mind. They have no insights denied to individuals. They produce no wisdom beyond the compass of man's mind. The intelligence operating in the lines of decision and execu-tion is but human intelligence. It has the inherent attributes of contingency, fallib-ility, and subjectivity.[17]

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[15]
Snyder, Bruch and Sapin, p. 212, see also p. 37.

[16]
Kenneth Boulding, "National Images and Internation-al Systems, " _Journal of Conflict Resolution_ 3 (1959), p. 120.

[17]
Quoted in James Eayrs, _Fate and Will in Foreign Policy_ (Toronto: C.B.C. Publications, 1967), p. 32.

Although the state is habitually personified it is in fact

only certain specific individuals who are empowered to

commit the resources of their state in the pursuit of

foreign policy goals. Thus to understand the actions of

the state one needs to understand the motivation of the

decision-makers responsible to or for that state.[18]

How then was our problem in choosing those decision-

makers relevant to the 1898 crisis solved? In our study it

was immediately obvious that the selection of the key per-

sonalities would to a great extent be intuitive. Poring

over the literature in the social sciences for a systematic

method of weighting the influence of decision-makers in a

foreign-policy-making situation proved futile, except for

one original exception. It is understood that to a great

extent this problem depends upon the amount of data which

one is able to efficiently handle. Understanding this

limitation this researcher proceeded to cull the historical

materials in order to formulate his final list. While it

was ultimately impossible to separate, in an absolute sense,

the most important decision-makers, it was possible to

delineate approximately eight key persons who proved to

18
Also, "by reducing international behavior to the
behavior of individuals, it is possible to draw on the
principles of psychology to derive new hypotheses" - Dean
C. Pruitt, Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of
International Action, in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.), Inter-
national Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 314.

be undeniable by all accounts essential to the decision.

The boundary was extended by further following the "Four

Step process" formulated by G. R. Winham.[19] In choosing

these remaining decision-makers it must be reiterated that

the boundary between decision-makers and non-decision-

makers is one of degree, and a plausible argument could

always be made for including an additional personality or

replacing one person with another in the decision-making

group.

Taking into consideration the delineation of the

time period mentioned in Chapter Two, the selection of the

most important decision-makers was accomplished in four

steps. First, an attempt was made to select the most

important _formal_ decision-making positions in the making of

United States foreign policy regarding the Spanish-Cuban

situation between January 1 until April 22, 1898. The

selection of these positions was confined to the Republican

Administration since it is acknowledged that the Administra-

tion in power has greater weight than the Congress in foreign

policy making.[20] W. E. Miller and D. E. Stokes write:

> ...the reliance he (the Congressman) puts on
> the President and the Administration suggests

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[19] Winham, pp. 30-36.

[20] See for example, James A. Robinson, _Congress and
Foreign Policy Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and
Initiative_ (Homewood: Doresey, 1962), pp. 14-15.

that the calculation of where the public
interest lies is often passed to the
Executive on matters of foreign policy.[21]

As one Secretary of State put it, "The President makes

foreign policy. This is not the real story but it serves

very well if one wishes to deal with the matter in five

words."[22] L. M. Sears refers to the absence of inter-

party co-operation in 1898: "The present day knows little

of the almost religious fervour that characterized the

party allegiance of the generation which followed the

Civil War."[23] Our decision to include in the selection

certain Congressional committee chairmen was guided by the

various events occurring within the designated time period

which contributed to the added importance, influence and

thus inclusion of these persons. For example, the passage

of the significant $50,000,000 appropriation for "national

defense" obviously involved the chairman of the Senate

Appropriations Committee.[24] The positions chosen, and

their incumbents during the 112 day period, are indicated

on Table II-1.

[21]
Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constit-
uency Influence in Congress," American Political Science
Review, 57 (1963), p. 56.

[22]
Dean Rusk quoted in James Eayrs, p. 22.

[23]
Sears, p. 3.

[24]Leech, p. 169.

TABLE II-1

FORMAL DECISION-MAKING POSITIONS

Administration

President	McKinley
Vice President	Hobart
Secretary of State	Sherman
Under Secretary of State	Day
Secretary of the Treasury	Gage
Secretary of War	Alger
Secretary of the Navy	Long
Attorney-General*	McKenna/Griggs
Minister (Ambassador) to Spain	Woodford
Consul General to Havana	Lee

Congress

Senate:

Chairman, Foreign Relations Com.	Davis
Chairman, Appropriations Com.	Allison
Chairman, Naval Affairs Com.	Hale

House:

Speaker	Reed
Chairman, Foreign Affairs Com.	Hitt
Chairman, Sub-Committe on Cuba	Adams
Chairman, Ways and Means Com.	Dingley
Chairman, Naval Committee	Boutelle

*McKenna held office until Jan 20, 1898; Griggs assumed office the same week.

The second step involved corroborating the above list with an authoritative history of the period prior to the Spanish-American War. Although several accounts exist which relate the various diplomatic manoeverings which took place, no one account treats well the internal decisional process. Fortunately, an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation was obtained which synthesized those various major interpretations into one account. This is John L. Offner's President McKinley and the Origins of the Spanish American War.[25]

Of the above list (Table II-1) Offner does not refer once to Vice-President Garret A. Hobart in any major decision-making capacity, nor does he mention Nelson Dingley Jr. or Lyman J. Gage in any important capacity dealing with the Spanish-Cuban situation; furthermore, he makes only few references to Joseph McKenna, John Griggs, Eugene Hale, and Charles Boutelle, while all other names received numerous references. Finally, although the office of the Speaker of the House, termed by B. Tuchman "no less consequential than the Presidency,"[26] was a post of tremendous influence, still possessing all the powers which in the 1910 revolt against Joe Cannon were transferred to the committees,

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[25] John L. Offner, President McKinley and the Origins of the Spanish-American War (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1957).

[26] Barbara Tuchman, The Proud Tower (New York: MacMillan, 1966), p. 125.

the potential personal influence by the Speaker, Thomas B.
Reed, on William McKinley was negated by Reed's animosity
for the President. Offner notes that ever since McKinley's
Convention success in 1896 at which Reed was ingloriously
trounced, the two had never again spoken directly to each
other.[27] For this reason Reed's influence as a decision-
maker was lessened for our purposes even though his Con-
gressional power was at a zenith and his views regarding
the course of American policy toward the Spanish-Cuban
situation ran parallel with McKinley's. This fact does,
however, explain the importance of alternative represen-
tatives of the White House's views in Congress as well as
alternative sources of Congressional advice _vis à vis_
the President. McKinley having no "kitchen cabinet" or
"hidden persuaders"[28] thus relied heavily on his Con-
gressional friends---friendships going back to his Governor
and Congress days.[29] Offner for these reasons delegates
much influence to Charles Grosvenor, Stephen Elkins, and
Nelson Aldrich.

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[27] Offner, p. 105. Although Reed's "forensic artistry"
aimed at McKinley was not silenced. The statement has been
described to Reed that, "McKinley has no more back bone than
a chocolate eclair."

[28] Charles G. Dawes, _A Journal of the McKinley Years_
(Chicago: Lakeside, 1950), p. xvi.

[29] Leech, p. 175.

Nelson Aldrich.

The above findings support the obvious conclusion that a listing of the most important formal positions is not by itself adequate in selecting the most important decision-makers in a given decision. On the basis of Offner's work Hobart, Reed, Dingley and Gage were eliminated and McKenna, Griggs, Hale and Boutelle were considered weak candidates.

The third step in the selection process was to count the number of times a given decision maker's name appeared during the four-month period in the New York Times and in the London Times in all matters concerning the Spanish-Cuban situation. The London Times was used to give a foreign and perhaps less closely associated view of events occurring in Washington and abroad. These numbers were tabulated on the assumption that the more a person is mentioned in a leading newspaper in connection with a given decision, the greater the likelihood that he was influential in making that decision. This "importance" indicator can be justified in that whether a decision-maker's name is included or omitted from the press copy depends on the judgment of newsmen who "by their training are especially capable in gauging a man's 'importance' in relation to public events."[30] Macauley stated quite correctly that "The only

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[30]
Winham, p. 33.

true history of a country is to be found in its news-
papers."[31] Newsmen also have an atypical perspective, in
that they are reporting a decision when it is taking place,
and thus their interpretation may differ from that of the
historian, who sees events only in retrospect. The tabula-
tion of these names is presented in Table II-2.

The decision to utilize this 'importance' indicator
encountered an immediate obstacle since no comprehensive
Index has been published for either newspaper for the
period prior to 1900.[32] Although deathly tedious the
decision to count names page by page did have three un-
expected advantages. First, of course, the 'importance'
indicator was obtained. Secondly, it submerged this re-
searcher into the 'mood' of the times which L. F. Richard-
son[33] considered of some importance in a nation's decision
to go to war. Thirdly, the names were counted in relation
to the actual story content, a factor which by using solely
the Index system would have been omitted. It was discovered
that certain names, although tentatively qualifying as "key"

[31]
Quoted in Palmer's Index to the Times Newspaper
(London), 1898 (Vaduz, Kraus Reprint Ltd., 1965), p. i.

[32]
Although Palmer's Index to the London Times was
available, upon closer investigation was found inaccurate
and oversimplified for our purposes.

[33]
Lewis Frye Richardson, "War Moods," Psychometrika,
13 (1948), 147-202.

TABLE II-2

REFERENCES TO DECISION-MAKERS

LONDON TIMES*		NEW YORK TIMES*	
Official	References	Official	References
McKinley	235	McKinley	1796
Woodford	75	Lee	623
Lee	56	Long	346
Long	43	Woodford	321
Sherman	31	Day	160
Day	19	Alger	104
Hitt	14	Sherman	102
Reed	13	Reed	91
Alger	11	Mason	90
Davis	11	Grosvenor	85
Lodge	9	Hale	85
Allison	8	Cannon	79
Hale	8	Proctor	73
Dingley	8	Hitt	71
Aldrich	7	Foraker	56
Grosvenor	7	Boutelle	54
Adams	6	Allison	46
Elkins	6	Adams	44
Thurston	6	Elkins	38
Hoar	6	Thurston	37
Proctor	5	Davis	36
Cannon	5	Aldrich	34
Gage	4	Gallinger	32
Gallinger	4	Hanna	30
Hobart	3	Frye	26
Woolcot	3	Chandler	25
Hanna	3	Lodge	23
Chandler	2	Hobart	21
Wellington	2	Dingley	15
Griggs	1	Hull	9

*Jan 1 - April 22   *Jan 1 - April 15

decision-makers due to their membership in the Republican

Party in Congress, and, more important, measuring high on

the importance index, could hardly be termed decision-makers

in association with the President. As was mentioned in

Chapter Two two bitter factions existed within the Admin-

istration's own Republican Party regarding the Cuban situa-

tion, those backing the President in his restrained foreign

policy and those wishing immediate intervention, dubbed

"jingoes."[34] These factions were so irreconciliably hostile

that fear existed that the painfully built Republican coali-

tion would be destroyed.[35] Considering the historical

primacy of the President in the supreme position in foreign

affairs as well as the President's great freedom in seek-

ing advice,[36] the importance of "like-thinking" individuals

being recruited by the Chief Executive rather than the more

hostile elements in his party is logical. One cannot over-

look such animosity and friendship between the Chief Execu-

tive and certain individual Congressmen reported in the

34
     Leech, p. 175.

35
     The "jingoes", in fact, had shaped the 1896 Repub-
lican platform which read "We believe that the government
of the United States should actively use its influence and
good offices to restore peace and give independence to the
Island" - see Kirk H. Porter, National Party Platforms
(New York: Harper, 1924), p. 205.

36
     Rowland Egger and Joseph P. Harris, The President
and Congress (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 31.

Press, regardless of how high or low these persons placed on the _Times_' list. For example, Senator J. B. Foraker (Ohio) although moderately high on the _Times_' list was described by the London _Times_ as "a permanent thorn in the President's side,"[37] while Senator N. W. Aldrich although low on the _Times_' list was several times mentioned to be "one of the President's nearest advisors."[38]

Cognizant of these two bitterly opposing views within the Republican Party it was decided for logical reasons to exclude those decision-makers who appeared on the _Times_' list but who violently and unquestionably opposed or attacked the President or his policies. These were W. Morgan, J. Foraker, W. Chandler, J. Gallinger, G. F. Hoar, J. Thurston, C. Davis and W. Frye.

A more sophisticated measure was therefore necessary not only to substantiate the winnowing down of the above names from the gross _Times_' list, but also to see if a clear indicator could be found which would separate the wheat from the chaff, or as the press of the day called the President's advisors "his friends" from his opposition. Both newspapers were therefore culled for specific references to the number of times persons involved with the Spanish-Cuban situation conferred directly with the Presi-

[37]London _Times_, April 2, 1898.

[38]New York _Times_, March 18, 1898.

dent. This was done on the rationale that those who

vehemently opposed the President would not be regularly

sought after for advice. Indeed as Table II-3 indicates

only one of the seven "jingoes" deleted from our consi-

deration was reported to have consulted directly with the

President. W. Frye appeared on Table II-3 primarily be-

cause he was a late convert to a more extreme position on

foreign policy. Obviously, Table II-3 further guides our

choice in making up our final list of key decision-makers

who could be positively considered.

TABLE II-3

NEW YORK TIMES AND LONDON TIMES: SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO
DECISION-MAKERS CONFERRING WITH McKINLEY

Official	Reference	Title
Day	22	Under Secretary of State
Long	14	Secretary of the Navy
Allison	12	Chairman, Senate Appropriations Com.
Alger	11	Secretary of War
Hale	8	Chairman, Senate Naval Affairs Com.
Grosvenor	7	Congressman
Elkins	7	Senator
Hitt	7	Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Com.
Aldrich	6	Senator
Griggs	6	Attorney General
Adams	5	Chairman, House Sub-Committee on Cuba
Boutelle	5	Chairman, House Naval Committee
Cannon	5	Senator
Dingley	5	Chairman, House Ways and Means Com.
Hanna	5	Senator
Lodge	4	Senator
Gage	4	Secretary of the Treasury
Bliss	3	Secretary of the Interior
Frye	1	Senator
McKenna	1	Attorney General/Justice of the Supreme Court.

The final step in selecting the key decision-makers was to prepare a final list based on the above-named indicators. Eight persons, as mentioned earlier, were considered unambiguous candidates for the final list because they appeared important on the basis of all the indicators. These were William McKinley, John Sherman, William Day, John Long, Russel Alger, Stewart Woodford, Fitzhugh Lee, and F. Hitt. The choice of Congressman Hitt along with the obvious Administration candidates can be further substantiated by the London Times examination of his influence:

> Mr. Hitt is no jingo. He is chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; a close friend of the Speaker, and intimate with the President. His speech was preceded by conferences with the President. Mr. Hitt must have had authority to use facts not known to the public.[39]

The choice of Sherman can be criticized if one were to look solely at a series of New York Times' editorials aimed at removing this ancient political patriarch from the office of Secretary of State:

> How long must the country put up with the humiliation forced upon it and persisted in even in the fact of the risk of serious misunderstanding at some inconvenient moment, of the maintenance at Washington of the pretension that we have a Secretary of State?

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[39] London Times, January 21, 1898.

> Yet it is known at the National capital
> that the Secretary...is physically infirm,
> that age and long service have abated his
> vigor and his interest in affairs, and this
> has been permitted for so many months, that
> it excites little or no comment when great
> concerns of State are not even communicated
> to him.[40]

Although it is not likely that Sherman controlled the details

of Spanish policy more than sign the notes submitted to his

judgment by capable subordinates to ignore Sherman would

have been self-defeated on two counts. First, according

to Sears, "It is manifestly impossible to determine just

where Sherman's contribution ended and other men's began."[41]

Second, to ignore Sherman would mean having to ignore a large

number of communications which, although not written by

him, were signed by him. Thus it was decided to retain

his name on the final list.

The remaining positions on the final list were

filled by comparing the relative standings of the other

men on the three indicators. Allison and Hale were both

included on the basis of their formal position and high

ranking on Table II-3 and moderate ranking on Table II-2.

Adams was included because of his position on the House

Sub-Committee on Cuba as well as on the basis of Offner's

account, Aldrich, Elkins and Grosvenor were selected on

[40]
New York Times, February 17, 1898.

[41]
Sears, p. 14.

the basis of Offner's account and because of their moderately
high ranking on Table II-3. Grosvenor, also was referred
to as, "One of the President's nearest friends,"[42] and
"whose intimate relations with the Administration gave
significance to his remarks,"[43] by the press of 1898.
Hanna, Cannon, Proctor, McKenna, Griggs and Boutelle were
eliminated due to low rankings on Table II-2 as well as
weak mention by Offner of the last three names.

Thus the final list that was used is summarized in
Table II-4.

TABLE II-4

FINAL LIST OF DECISION-MAKERS AND POSITIONS HELD

Administration

McKinley	President
Sherman	Secretary of State
Day	Under Secretary of State
Alger	Secretary of War
Long	Secretary of the Navy
Woodford	Minister to Madrid
Lee	Consul-General to Havana

Congress

Allison	Chairman, Senate Appropriations Com.
Hale	Chairman, Senate Naval Com.
Elkins	Senator (W. Va.)
Aldrich	Senator (R.I.)
Hitt	Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Com.
Adams	Chairman, House Sub-Committee on Cuba
Grosvenor	Congressman (Ohio).

42
    London Times, April 9, 1898.

43
    New York Times, March 8, 1898.

<u>The Source Material Used</u>

Having selected the fourteen decision-makers on the

basis of the number which could be efficiently handled as

well as according to the four steps outlined above it was

necessary to decide which speeches and other types of

communications of these men were to be analyzed. This was

done by taking all the communications of these men avail-

able, dealing primarily with the Spanish-Cuban situation.

These were found in seven major sources:

<u>Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the</u>
<u>United States, 1898.</u>
J. D. Richardson's, <u>A Compilation of the Messages</u>
<u>and Papers of the Presidents</u>, Vol. XIV.
<u>Senate Documents</u>, Nos. 207-237, 55th Congress,
2nd Session ("Destruction of Battleship Maine
and other Senate Documents" and "Cuban
Correspondence")
<u>Congressional Record</u>, 55th Congress, 2nd Session.
<u>Reports</u>, United States Foreign Relations, Vol. 7
("Diplomatic Relations with Foreign Nations"
and "Affairs in Cuba")
<u>The New York Times</u>, 1898.
and one hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.

These sources, although obviously not totally inclusive, can

be said to represent the majority of recorded content, readily

available, by the fourteen men, on the Cuban-Spanish situa-

tion.[44]

The advantages of using only the above seven sources

were that they provided uniformity, avoided the problem of

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[44]
    Leech, p. 610.

questionable authorship of content, and provided an amount

of material large enough to be handled easily with the

resources and time available to the researcher. As well,

these seven sources represent the primary official communi-

cations which took place at the time. Private communica-

tions which would normally be available in similar cir-

cumstances are unavailable in any case due to the paucity

of letter writing and speech making by the decision-makers.

For example, George B. Cortelyou, Assistant Secretary to

the President, wrote:

> Generally speaking, President McKinley did
> not write letters on important government
> matters. When occasion arose members of
> Congress or others interested were asked
> to call at the White House, where the matter
> would be discussed. He excelled in private
> correspondence and personal interview but
> avoided letter writing whenever possible,
> and where letters had to be written he wrote
> them with great caution and circumspection.[45]

McKinley's personal biographer met this same problem and

wrote, "...as a rule, McKinely did not commit to paper

his plans and purposes, nor his inner most thoughts and

aspirations. He much preferred a meeting, face to face, and

a confidential talk."[46] Margaret Leech wrote a similar com-

plaint, "...there is little information bearing on his

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[45]
        Quoted in Index to the William McKinley Papers
(Washington: The Library of Congress, Presidents' Papers
Index Series, 1963), p. vi.

[46]
        Quoted in Index, p. v.

policies as President, still less that reveals the inner
thoughts and notions of the man; ..."[47] Furthermore, dis-
trust of the press which was rife with "jingoism" also
forced the decision-makers to be unusually guarded in their
statements. Minister Woodford telegraphed to Washington,
"I have carefully refrained from newspaper interviews since
my appointment to this post and have avoided all occasions
for public speech."[48] Thus another usual source of commun-
ications was unavailable for purposes of this project.
It is questionable, in summary, whether obtaining access
to unpublished papers etc. would have yielded much further
information beyond that which was already available.

Although no research utilizing content analysis
can avoid the problem of incomplete information—data which
goes unrecorded such as informal private conversations—
the sources used do have other advantages. The diplomatic
despatches, although once classified, are readily available
in For Rels. and various Senate Documents. As once class-
ified information they contain many perceptions of the

[47]
    Leech, p. 610. One boon, however, must be noted —
"There was no systematic ghost writing in the White House
until Warren Harding employed that leisurely method, and
McKinley's extreme caution forbade his using anyone else's
text...." from H. W. Morgan, William McKinley and His
America (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963), p. 323.

[48]
    Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1898 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1901), p. 1020. Noted as For Rels. hereafter.

authors' own feelings and motivations as well as their
feelings regarding the international situation, which
possibly would not have been made had the communications
been open to the public. For example, Woodford, writing to
McKinley as early as March 17, stated, "I am thus, reluct-
antly, slowly, but entirely a convert to the American
ownership and occupation of the island...I have lost all
hope for a peaceful resolution."[49]

To a great extent, therefore, it is felt that these
confidential despatches represent the "true" feelings of the
decision-makers rather than the generally stilted qualities
of public communications. Furthermore, those public
speeches which were used, primarily spoken by Congressmen,
were made by individuals who spoke infrequently and tem-
perately compared to the average legislator regarding the
Spanish-Cuban problem. This fact again supports our de-
cision to include them in our final list of decision-makers.
Considering the President's conservative temper, intemperate,
headline grabbing speeches would not have been congruent
with his general character nor policy. The London _Times_
stated, "The President's advisers are, as the President
himself, of conservative temper. Nothing will be done
hurriedly; no decision will be taken lightly...."[50] Since

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[49] _For Rels._, pp. 685-688.

sensationalism did not seem the main motivation behind

those Congressional decision-makers chosen, it may be

assumed that genuine feelings appear in their communications.

If any manipulation did occur by these Congressmen it would

be to plead for co-operation with the President's policy

not the reverse. Considering this, plus the fact that the

decision to go to war evolved in the gaze of the mass

public over the entire period under consideration due to

"yellow" and conservative press coverage one can safely

assume manipulation was minimal and that our data sources

are representational of the reason why American decision-

makers declared war.

In any case, the selection process described above

produced 269 "communication units," i.e., speeches, tele-

grams, letters and committee testimony, and these served

as the basic units for the content analysis. Each individual

speech, telegram, etc. constituted a separate unit. In the

case of Congressional hearings and debates units were com-

posed of all communications about the Cuban-Spanish situa-

tion for a given day. In preparing the data for analysis,

each unit was labelled according to the day and month the

unit was communicated, the type of unit, (diplomatic des-

patch or Congressional speech, floor debate), the originator

50
London _Times_, March 10, 1898.

and the recipient of the unit, and whether the originator

represented Congress or the Administration. Since each unit

was counted as one, but were of lengths varying from 10

words to over 10,000 words, the total number of words per

decision-maker, as well as the division between public.

speech and diplomatic despatch, were tabulated, to render

a more sophisticated count per person. This tabulation is

given in Table III-1. In this form the material was ready

to be analyzed.

Research procedure used

Content analysis should begin where tradition-
al modes of research ends.[51]

Our analysis of crisis decision-making in the 1898

situation will employ the technique of content analysis.

This procedure, developed greatly since 1952, when Ber-

nard Berelson reviewed and codified the field in his book,

Content Analysis in Communications Research,[52] has been

well defined by P. J. Stone as, "any research technique

for making inferences by systematic and objectively identi-

fying specified charactertistics within the text."[53] Ob-

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[51] Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and Ithiel de
Sola Pool, The Comparative Study of Symbols (Stanford, Calif:
Stanford University Press, 1952), Hoover Institute Studies,
Series C:No. 1, p. 65.

[52] Bernard R. Berelson, Content Analysis in Commun-
ications Research (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952).

TABLE III-1

TOTAL NUMBER COMMUNICATION UNITS AND WORDS FOR DECISION-MAKER

Name	Total No Com Units (t/f)*		Total Words (t/f)*	
McKinley	8	(2/6)	13,530	(270/13,260)
Sherman	25	(25/-)	6,430	
Day	44	(44/-)	4,960	
Long	1	(1/-)	2,360	
Woodford	108	(108/-)	34,400	
Lee	66	(65/1)	9,450	(4330/5120)
Alger	0	-- --	0	
(Sub-total)	252	(247/7)	71,130	(4600/18380)
Allison	1	(-/1)	1,790	
Hale	7	(-/1)	6,020	
Aldrich	1	(-/1)	2,820	
Elkins	2	(-/2)	10,180	
Hitt	1	(-/1)	3,750	
Adams	2	(-/2)	7,670	
Grosvenor	3	(-/3)	3,410	
(Sub-total)	17	(-/17)	35,640	
Total	269	(245/24)	106,770	(4600/18380)

*(telegrams/formal speeches)

viously, as with all research methods, difficulties do exist

in this constantly developing technique which limit its

applicability for empirical research. Recently such articles

by Mueller,[54], Winham[55] and Mitchell[56] have cogently discussed

several of these drawbacks.

Two particular points of discussion have been the

related assumptions of inference and frequency. Stone, for

instance, considers the inference assumption "the most

important and perhaps the most controversial element" of

his definition, since inference is presented in his defin-

ition as the raison d'etre of content analysis.[57] Content

analysis as a "technical procedure" is typically concerned

53
    Philip J. Stone, The General Inquirer (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 5. As Berelson's p. 489, Stone's definition includes both measurement and analysis procedures, a shift in emphasis from the descriptive pur-poses prior to the 1950's.

54
    John E. Mueller, "The Use of Content Analysis in International Relations," Paper delivered at the National Conference on Content Analysis, University of Pennsylvania, November, 1967.

55
    Gilbert R. Winham, "The Use of Quantitative Indi-cators in Foreign Policy Analysis," Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Calgary, Alberta, June, 1968.

56
    Robert E. Mitchell, "The Use of Content Analysis for Expanding Studies," Public Opinion Quarterly, 31 (1967) 230-241.

57Stone, p. 5.

with the middle phase of a three-step communication process: (1) various motives produce (2) a message that is (3) intended to express these motives and/or to produce various effects upon a designated audience.[58] In analyzing the message (2) it is hoped that some inference can be made regarding the motives which gave rise to that message (1). In placing prime attention on the message, therefore, it is assumed further that (a) important things are communicated and (b) that the more important things are communicated frequently.[59]

The assumption between the message and the antecedent variables or underlying dimensions being measured has been both criticized and defended. Criticisms, such as those leveled by A. George, discredit the broad model of communication in favour of one distinguishing the instrumental or manipulative from the representation model of communication, arguing that the purposes for which messages are designed determine the meanings that can be assigned to specific words.[60] Cognizant of this problem, it is still safe to infer motivations from the content analyzed mess-

[58] Mitchell, p. 236.

[59] Winham, "The Use of Quantitative Indicators," p. 8.

[60] Alexander L. George, Propaganda Analysis (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1959). The danger of manipulation of communications being a factor in our study was discounted for reasons explained on page 90.

age.[61]   Stone states:

> Words and sentences are important human
> artifacts, as products of social experience,
> they serve as the everyday media for much
> thought and communication; what people
> say and write is a basic source of evidence
> about individual and social processes.
>
>   For the behavioral scientist, this is
> raw data, collected from appropriate sources
> and consisting of words and punctuation marks
> recorded on paper. Through the analysis of
> these data, he can often learn much about the
> personality and preoccupations of the writers
> and the socio-cultural processes in which
> they are involved.[62]

The second related assumption is that of frequency.

Although researchers such as Zinnes[63] and Holsti[64] have used

this assumption without question, others more critical have

noted the possibility that the frequency of certain themes

do not indicate how decision-makers feel about an objective

situation but, rather, indicate acceptance of generalized

group norms; also, important issues, if well publicized,

may not be mentioned often.[65] G. Winham, defending this

61
     See C. E. Osgood, The Representational Model and
Relevant Research Methods, in I. de Sola Pool (ed.), Trends
in Content Analysis (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois
Press, 1959).

62
Stone, pp. 3-4.

63
     D. A. Zinnes, Capability, Threat and the Outbreak
of War, in J. N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and
Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 469-482.

64
     Holsti, op. cit.

assumption, argues that frequency can count as a measure of "intensity of an attitude" or "the amount of concern" or "attention devoted to a topic," only if a proper research design is constructed to achieve this goal. He concludes, "In the long run, however, this procedure is only a palliative, and, if the researcher is convinced that the important issues are not communicated, he should choose a more appropriate technique than a qualitative content analysis."[66] In reviewing previous research, Pool concludes that such inferences are, in fact, often reasonable:

> The assumption that the frequency of statements provides a good index of intensity of attitude is probably reasonable for a large class of cases. By "attitude" here, of course, we mean the attitude expressed in the body of the text, not the covert feelings of the author. Even with this limitation, the assumption boldly spelled out sounds absurd, because it is perfectly clear that frequency is only one of a variety of devices by which feeling is expressed. But the experience of more than one analyst who has tried refinements in measuring intensity has been that nothing much is added by other measures than the frequency one.[67]

As stated at the beginning of this section content analysis is only a secondary choice for the researcher.

65
   Mueller, pp. 9-15.

66
   Winham, pp. 8-9.

67
   Pool, Trends in Content Analysis, p. 194.

Obviously, since we are dealing with a historical situation
which took place over seven decades ago, other, more exact
research avenues are closed to us. However, content analysis
has been used in the past with some success. The various
members of the "Stanford group" show that content analysis
has definite potential in contemporary political research.[68]
For making inferences about political attitudes, beliefs,
or behavior, the more direct methods of survey analysis
are preferable. However, as suggested above, these methods
are often impossible to use, and when they cannot be employed
content analysis, using the indicator of communication, is
often the most satisfactory substitute. In his critique of
content analysis Mueller writes, "As for the contribution
of content analysis to international relations theory, it
seems clear that the method has proved itself worthy at
least in certain areas--especially that of crisis behavior."[69]

Categories, coding and reliability tests

With the construction of the categories, or primary
units of analysis, one is ready to begin the content analysis
procedure. The process of constructing categories is gen-

[68] This group, consisting of O. R. Holsti, D. A.
Zinnes, R. C. North and M. G. Zaninovich, co-authored
Content Analysis: a handbook with applications for the
study of international crisis (Evanston: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1963), and are responsible for numerous ar-
ticles concerning crisis decision-making using World War
One documents.

[69] Mueller, p. 15 (emphasis mine).

erally considered to be the most important stage in content analysis. It is the step in which the data are tied to theory and it serves as a basis for drawing inferences. As B. Berelson has indicated, "Content analysis stands or falls by its categories. Since the categories contain the substance of the investigation, a content analysis can be no better than its system of categories."[70] Eleven basic categories were developed tapping themes of perception (i.e., statements which define, or perceive a situation, event or object related to the Spanish-Cuban situation). These eleven categories of perception and their code designation are as follows:[71]

    (1) Threat external (TE)
    (2) Threat interval (TI)
    (3) Alternatives (A)
    (4) Means/Solutions acceptable (M)
    (5) Time (T)
    (6) Policy consequences/Outcome (O)
    (7) Rationale (R)
    (8) Capability (C)
    (9) Complexity/Difficulty (D)
    (10) Proximity (P)
    (11) Threat to Spain (TS)

The 1898 documents once coded totalled 106,770 words. Twenty percent of the coding was carried out by a research assistant, the remainder by the author. The coding procedure netted a total of 1635 thematic units from 269 documents that

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[70]
    Berelson, pp. 147-148.

[71]
    See Appendix for a description of all the categories, and for examples of them.

were analyzed. Some of the units were then recoded to obtain further information not immediately apparent in the gross total of each category. For example, the themes of Time were recoded as to whether the immediate or distant future was perceived to be a factor in the situation by the decision-makers and if this concern changed over time.[72]

Finally, a brief comment must be made regarding the reliability in the coding process. Reliability in content analysis refers to the amount of agreement that exists between individual coders and/or between different time periods for one coder of the same material. Since this study employed two coders with, however, one coder doing eighty percent of the labour both coding results were tested. The importance of coding reliability must be briefly stressed. Obviously, the reliability of a study, should it be large, increases the academic worth of that study's findings. Secondly, reliability indicates the extent to which a study is replicable. Since only through replication can a theory be tested and found valid or invalid, this is a key aspect in developing the social sciences. M. Sidman states:

> The maturity of a science may be judged,
> in part, by the extent to which systematic
> replication establishes the reliability and
> generality of its data.[73]

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[72]See Appendix for recoding procedure.

[73]Murray Sidman, Tactics of Scientific Research (New York: Basic Book, 1960), p. 138.

If the reliability, therefore, between coders is low, the
likelihood of replicating the study is also low, and, as
a result, content analysis loses all rationale as an
objective and systematic study of communication. Thirdly,
reliability between coders and between time periods with one
coder is also an indication of the validity of the category,
i.e., the extent to which the categories measure in the
text what the analyst claims to be measuring. One researcher
claims this aspect to be "critically important in testing
hypotheses by quantitative methods, for if variables are to
be related with any success they must first have been measured
correctly."[74]

Coder reliability in this project was measured in
two tests. First, using a standard formula which indicates
percentage of agreement[75] the author coded a document chosen
at random which had already been coded by the research
assistant, and then compared the results. The result was
a coefficient of 0.74. Second, the author alone coded two
given texts twice with a lapse of one week between the first

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[74]
Winham, Marshall Plan, p. 54.

[75]
The formula is $R = \dfrac{2(C_1 C_2)}{C_1 + C_2}$ where C_1 = first coding
and C_2 second coding. The term $(C_1 C_2)$ in the numerator
indicates the frequency of agreement between the first and
second coding. This formula can also be used to compare two
coders. See Robert C. North, et. al., Content Analysis, p. 49.

and two weeks between the second, and then compared the re-
sults. The result was an average coefficient of 0.93 (the
coefficient for the second test was understandably slightly
lower than the first 0.92 and 0.94). While there is no
positive way to evaluate the coefficient of reliability
in thematic coding these tests can be considered conservative-
ly reliable.[76]

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[76]
Winham, Marshall Plan, pp. 55-56.

Chapter IV

RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION

Introduction

Our interest in this study, as stated previously,
is aimed in two related directions: first, to attempt to
understand the psychological dimension of stress, a com-
ponent or output of a crisis situation, by examining its
effects on foreign policy decision-makers in the Spanish-
American War situation; and secondly, to understand the
motivations behind one specific historical episode, the
crisis which led to the Spanish-American War, 1898.

Foreign policy decision-making may be viewed as a
search for satisfactory alternatives from among the range
of those perceived by the decision-makers concerned. The key
concept to this approach are the perceptions of the decision-
makers, in other words, "the process by which decision-makers
detect and assign meaning to inputs from their environment
and formulate their own purposes or interests."[1] Using the

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1
    Ole R. Holsti, R. C. North, and R. A. Brody, Per-
ception and Action in the 1914 Crisis, in J. David Singer
(ed.), Quantitative International Politics: Insights and
evidence (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 128.

subjective perceptions of the decision-makers, that is, those revealed by the decision-makers themselves, a better indicator of the motivations of the decision-makers as well as the effects of stress affecting their ability to act effectively, is felt can be gained. "Objective" indicators, such as rising defense budgets, may not indicate that a particular decision-maker felt himself to be under the pressure of high-stress.[2] The essential point is that the actors' response, shaped by his perception of the stimulus, not necessarily by qualities objectively in the stimulus, is utilized in this study.

However, we are interested not only in what national decision-makers perceive, or say they perceive, about particular components of a crisis situation, but also what they

[2] "Objective" indicators, however, have other uses. The failure to conclusively establish the relationship between the writings of decision-makers and their actual decisions by a comparison of inferential or subjective data with independent or objective material has been pointed out as a weakness of content analysis (i.e., see Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communications Research (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952), pp. 74-75). O. R. Holsti, however, has defended his research by examining the relationship between perceptions and a series of "hard" indices presumed to be sensitive to international tension levels, e.g., the flow of gold, commodity futures, interest rates and prices of securities). Given fluctuations of financial indicators correlated with increases and decreases in international tension were used to check the validity of content analysis in the 1914 case. (see O. R. Holsti and R. C. North, "Perceptions of Hostility and Economic Variables in the 1914 Crisis," mimeo (Stanford University: Studies in International Conflict and Integration, 1963).

actually do (did). By establishing correlations between
our perceptual results and such actions as ultimata,
breaking of diplomatic relations, and the like, the hows
of the Spanish-American War will be clarified, in part, by
the whys, and, obviously, vice versa. This chapter, there-
fore, intends systematically to bring together for analysis
those perceptual and action elements found significant in
our research.

To achieve an understanding of the 1898 situation the
chapter is divided into three sections. Part one presents
composite data regarding each perception under considera-
tion as well as the total perceptions over time. Part two
presents data regarding the psychological phenomenon of
stress, in other words, the perceptions of threat, time
and alternatives, whose theoretical dimensions were outlined
in chapter one. Part three examines various perceptions of
American decision-makers vis à vis the Spanish-Cuban situa-
tion relating these with their actions during the crisis
illustrated in chapter two.

The data is divided into eight periods of fourteen
days, or two weeks, commencing with January 1st and ending
with April 22. It was felt that in order to examine in a
meaningful way perceptions over time approximately eight
periods should be used. The creation of either more or fewer
periods of time was found to present conclusions less easily
demonstrable for purposes of this project. The fact that

exactly 112 days were under consideration in our study lent
itself excellently to equal divisions of a multiple of
seven for each period and thus served comparison purposes
well.

Part One: Composite Data

The data was initially analyzed in its aggregate form,
that is, the perceptions of each of our eleven categories
were totalled and ranked in order. The order of frequency
totals held few surprises and revealed only a minimum of
answers to our questions. Table IV-1 shows that the theme
of external-threat seemed most pressing on the minds of the
American decision-makers, amounting to 20 per cent of the
total number of perceptions. However, of some interest is
the fact that no one perception can be considered to have
been significantly salient in the minds of the American
decision-makers, a fact that is indicated by the low frequency
of the threat category vis à vis the other categories. Table
IV-1 indicates that the difference in frequency between the
perception of rationale, the lowest of the top five cate-
gories, and the leading perception, external-threat, is only
130 thematic units or 8 per cent of the total frequencies of
all categories. Should the theme of external threat be
combined with the internal-threat theme, that is, totalling
the perceptions of threat felt to emanate from outside and
inside the nation, the single category of threat does not
rise significantly beyond the other five categories ranking

high on the table.

TABLE IV-1

TOTAL FREQUENCIES IN ELEVEN BASIC CATEGORIES OF PERCEPTION
OVER 269 COMMUNICATION UNITS

Category Name (Code)	Frequency	Per Cent*	
Threat External (TE)	329	20	
Alternatives (A)	296	18	
Means (m)	250	15	
Time (T)	201	12	
Policy Consequences (O)	198	12	
Rationale (R)	191	12	89%
Capability (C)	58	4	11%
Threat-Internal (TI)	53	3	
Difficulty (D)	22	2	
Threat-Spain (TS)	19	1	
Proximity (P)	18	1	
TOTAL	1,635	100	

*Percentage ratios of individual themes to total number
of themes.

The fact that our data shows that five categories
were perceived to be almost equal in salience indicates
several features worthy of mention. Of interest is the
fact that the perceptions of alternatives and time, men-
tioned in chapter one to be two of the primary indicators
of stress in the psychological literature, placed high on
Table IV-1. The importance of these two perceptions, con-
comitant with the importance of the perception of threat,
adds credence to our use of these indicators in the study
of stress. Our basis for the investigation of stress rests
primarily on the definition found reliable in other studies,

that is, stress occurs when certain goals or values are threatened or obstructed. One would expect <u>prima facie</u> the Spanish-American war situation to be stressful. It is not surprising, therefore, that the perceptions of alternatives and time, which previous research found to exist in stress situations, should appear in significant number in Table IV-1.

One obvious feature, immediately apparent in Table IV-1, is the sharp cut-off between the most salient perceptions and those perceptions considered of little importance by the decision-makers (the cut-off between the two amounting to 8 percent of the total frequencies or totalling over 130 thematic units). In other words, no perceptions were found to have <u>intermediate</u> salience. This perhaps is not surprising considering the somewhat esoteric quality of the less perceived categories--proximity, perceived threat to Spain, and difficulty. However, the low rank of the capability and internal-threat themes was to a certain extent unexpected and will receive mention below.

The data were next divided into eight periods of equal length to determine the trends of decision-makers' perception of overtime. The total frequencies of all perceptions were tabulated for the individual periods and is presented in Table IV-2.[3]

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[3] The total frequencies of each perception tabulated per period is presented in the discussion of each perception.

TABLE IV-2

TOTAL FREQUENCIES FOR ALL PERCEPTIONS OVERTIME

Periods	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Total Frequencies	237	70	119	23	216	315	262	392

*1 = J1-J14   2 = J15-J28   3 = J29-F11   4 = F12-F25
 5 = F26-M11   6 = M12-M25   7 = M26-A8   8 = A9-A22

Some explanation at this point must be presented regarding the high volume of perceptions in period one (January 1-14). Since relatively few potentially stressful incidents were recorded for this period (presented in chapter two as our rationale for commencing with the new year), one would expect a correspondingly lower number of perceptions. Although period one does include the Havana riots which to a certain extent caused concern for American decision-makers, this event can not account solely for the high number of perceptions. Table IV-2, periods 4-5 (February 12-March 11), shows that the periods of the de Lome scandal and the destruction of the Maine, which can be considered to have caused significantly more unease in the minds of American decision-makers than the Havana riots, do not total more than the J1-J14 period. One possible explanation of this feature is that major policy speeches regularly occur during this period of time in American politics. These communication

units consist of review statements summing-up events and as a result record an unusual richness of perceptions.

Although to some extent the high number of perceptions in the first period causes an inbalance when presenting the data overtime, in another respect this feature is a boon to our study. Primarily because of the significant number of perceptions in period one we have the opportunity to see dramatically if a shift occurred in the perceptions of decision-makers from early 1898, representing the general perceptions of 1897, and the perceptions held by decision-makers when the Spanish-American War eventually broke out. That trend analysis would show this shift is likely; however, the chance that a clear shift would be shown or that a change in perceptions had begun to occur early in 1898 and thus not be as easily recognized is equally possible. Because both the total number of perceptions for the first and last periods under consideration are significant the features valuable for comparison are much more easily demonstrated and explained. As our purpose here is only to present a very general outline of the data this feature will become more significant below when each of the recoded categories is presented overtime.

Part Two: Stress Data

For purposes of testing the hypotheses concerning the perceptions of time and alternatives as indicators of psychological stress the data of part two are organized

into three sections. Section one discusses the perceptions
of external-threat (TE) and internal-threat (TI) as dimen-
sions blocking or threatening certain values of the American
decision-making unit, and correspondingly believed to lead
to a stressful situation. Parts two and three discuss res-
pectively the two indicators of stress found significant in
the psychological literature--perceptions of time (T) and
alternatives (A).

Perceptions of threat (TI)

     As shown in the previous tables the category of
threat has been divided into two organizing themes for
purposes of this study--perceptions of threat, hostility,
or pressure coming from a source external to the United
States (TE), that is, from outside its geographic boundaries,
and from a source within the United States (TI). Given the
great amount of emphasis attributed to both external and
internal pressures on American decision-makers by historians
it was presumed that such an organizing principle would be
required.

     Various historians have attributed considerable
importance to the alleged influence of public opinion,
Congress and the press (our recoding units of internal-threat)
upon President McKinley and his administration. Alexander
de Conde found that, "American public opinion... as much
as any force apparently brought on the war...."[4] Margaret
Leech points out that "the belligerence of Congress and the

American people" were vital factors in McKinley's decision,[5] while R. Hofstadter and E. May attribute the pressures of the sensational press, and "moral and public hysteria" errupting into an "aggressive impulse" as affecting McKinley's decision.[6] In all, historians generally attribute primary importance to three basic sources of pressure in motivating the McKinely administration to war---public opinion, Congress, and the yellow press.

Contrary to the findings of historians, however, our data reveal that American decision-makers perceived little threat coming from sources internal to the United States. Table IV-1 shows that the total frequencies of internal-threat comprise only 3 percent of the total frequencies of all categories. In other words, although the results of our content analysis indeed reveal that decision-makers were influenced to some extent by internal-threat our data show that they were not influenced to the extent that historians might think, in so far as can be assessed by evidence from our content analysis.

4
    A. de Conde, A History of American Foreign Policy (New York: Scribner's, 1963), p. 347.

5
    M. Leech, In the Days of McKinely (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 180.

6
    R. Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics (New York: Vintage, 1964), p. 147.

The conclusion drawn from our data regarding internal-threat seems logical. For example, L. Markel in his study of public opinion, one dimension of our internal-threat category, states that in the United States "about 3 out of 10 voters are unaware of almost every even in American foreign affairs," that "65 out of every 100 voters will admit that they rarely discuss foreign affairs," and that "only 25 out of every 100 voters can be considered reasonably well-informed."[7] Although these findings represent a study of public opinion of more recent times, in general, it can be assumed that they hold true for the late 1800's, with only one major news media—the newspaper press—being of some importance in educating the population. Applied to the 1898 case, in other words, it can be assumed that fewer people than today were cognizant of the various ramifications of foreign affairs. As well, a small minority of historians does exist which feels that internal pressures, such as those emanating from the yellow press, have been greatly overrated.[8]

Although the total number of frequencies for internal-threat are less than expected its several dimensions do re-

[7] L. Markel, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1949), p. 9.

[8] See, for instance, H. W. Morgan, America's Road to Empire (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. x.

veal certain interesting features. In the first place,
the theme was recoded into three sub-categories referred
to above according to the source of the pressure. Table
V-1 shows that American decision-makers perceived the
majority of threat coming equally from the yellow press,
public opinion and the Congress.

TABLE V-1

SUB-CATEGORIES OF THREAT-INTERNAL ACCORDING TO
SOURCE

Sub-Category	Frequency	Percent
The yellow press	15	28
Public opinion	15	28
The Congress	15	28
Other	8	15
TOTAL	53	99

The fact that the yellow press, public opinion and
Congress were perceived equally as threatening by the decision-
makers is not surprising. The London Times, in attempting to
gauge the influence of the yellow press, concluded, "...fre-
quently it is well-nigh impossible to determine whether a
given expression is a reflection of public opinion or merely
an attempt to mold or create it."[9] Congress, as well, fed
the press with many sensational speeches and resolutions

9
London Times, March 7, 1898.

referred to as more "suitable to the bar room of Chicago or

the slums of Salt Lake City...,"[10] however, as was shown in

chapter two, this body also used the yellow press as a source

of information and frequently quoted extensively from it

regarding the Cuban situation. As with the yellow press

how is one to tell whether Congress led public opinion or

merely followed its dictates? This dilemma as to the rela-

tionship of each of these dimensions has prompted much dis-

cussion in the social sciences. For this reason it is not

surprising that these dimensions were perceived equally in

importance in the minds of the decision-makers.

The perceptions of internal-threat were next recoded

as to direction. Table V-2 indicates that decision-makers

perceived threat emanating from within the nation primarily

aimed at the sub-category of "peace". Summarizing the effects

of the sensational press, in this regard, the London Times

noted:

> Serious papers print little of this nonsense,
> but the question whether there will be war
> with Spain is discussed enough to familiarize
> the minds of the people with the idea of war.[11]

It can also be stated that although peace was the most salient

target perceived by decision-makers the volume of the sub-

10
   London Times, February 9, 1898.

11
   Ibid., March 7, 1898.

category "other" reveals that the perceptions of decision-
makers were not clearly defined as to the direction of
internal-threat.

TABLE V-2

SUB-CATEGORIES OF THREAT-INTERNAL ACCORDING TO
TARGET

Sub-Category	Frequency	Percent
Peace	22	42
Other	16	30
Decision-makers	15	28
TOTAL	53	100

Some concern, however, was registered over the
possibility that the executive power would be usurped by
Congress passing a war resolution over the President's wishes,
thus humiliating him and his party. The fact that certain
Republican Congressmen, led by Representatives Hopkins,
Lorimer and Smith, were meeting regularly in March and April,
1898, to plot this very thing was not unknown to the President.
The New York Times reported:

> ...there is a concerted effort to force the
> President's hand to take the Cuban question
> out of his hand, where it constitutionally
> belongs, and entrust it to Congress....
> All yesterday afternoon jingo Senators and
> Representatives consulted together. They
> sent word to the President that Congress was
> in rebellion, that his own party was in
> rebellion, that the country was revolting
> against him.[12]

This factor ostensibly would have weighted more heavily on the minds of the decision-makers had it not been for the tight grip over Congress by speaker Reed and various powerful conservative Senators.

In investigating the perceptions of internal-threat overtime several features are brought out which correspond with the historical data presented in chapter two. Table V-3 indicates that the press and public opinion were perceived to be the most constant sources of initiation by American decision-makers, exuding the greatest threat in the period after the Maine disaster aimed primarily at "peace."

Table V-3

PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT-INTERNAL ACCORDING TO SOURCE AND TARGET
OVERTIME

Category		Frequency							
Period		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
From:	Yellow Press		2	1		·7	3		2
	Public Opinion		1			1	3	6	4
	Congress			4				4	7
	Other			3		4			1
	TOTAL	0	3	8	0	12	6	10	14
To:	Peace		1	7		7		3	4
	Other					4	4	5	3
	Decision-Makers		2	1		1	2	2	7
	TOTAL	0	3	8	0	12	6	10	14

12
    New York Times, March 30, 1898.

The de Lome affair followed by the Maine disaster
provoked unprecedented jingoism in the press. For approxi-
mately three years the sensational newspapers had campaigned
vigorously for the cause of the rebels, but prior to the
Maine explosion their news, though arousing sympathy for the
Cubans, lacked those elements necessary to crystallize
American sentiment in favour of war. M. Wilkerson writes:

> For sometime a large part of the American
> public had indicated their opposition to
> Spain, but the spark needed to explode
> their pent-up feeling against Spanish
> "oppression" had failed to materialize.
> This spark was furnished in the Maine
> disaster.[13]

Table V-3 shows that the perceptions of threat coming from
the various internal sources were greatest in the period
after the Maine incident. Prior to its destruction only
11 perceptions of internal-threat were perceived to emanate
from inside the nation; after the explosion almost 80 per-
cent of the total perceptions were perceived. For instance,
decision-makers perceived of some significance the many
warlike resolutions presented in Congress in periods 7 and
8 (March 26 to April 22). April 5, Woodford, showing concern
over the effect of this belligerency on his attempts at
peaceful negotiations, telegraphed, "...can you prevent
hostile action by Congress?"[14]

13
  M. Wilkerson, Public Opinion and the Spanish-
American War (New York: Russell, 1967), p. 120.

Finally, two large increases in the last period
(April 9-22) should be noted. First, this period records
an increase of over 70 percent in the perceptions of
decision-makers in perceiving themselves as the major tar-
get of internal-threat (compared with the previous period).
The New York Times comments at this period:

> It was inevitable that the President's
> policy should be attacked, and attacked
> it is.... The Maine incident has failed
> them (jingoes) to declare war on Spain,
> so they declare war on the President
> instead.[15]

As well, the data of this period show that Congress was per-
ceived as the major source of internal-threat by the
decision-makers. McKinley, feeling that the Executive's
attempts at negotiations with Spain had entered a cul de
sac, had given the problem to an increasingly belligerent
Congress. The New York Times bitterly wrote of this move:

> The centre of political authority has been
> transferred to the other end of Pennsylvania
> Avenue. All the world flocks to the Capitol.
> Congress is now the Government. Congress
> troubles itself little about diplomacy. It
> pays no heed to Spain's concessions, and
> professes itself incredulous touching the
> armistice, distrustful of everything Spanish,
> and regardless of European opinion. To the
> average member of Congress the opinion of his
> constituents is more important than the opinion
> of England or France.[16]

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[14] For Rels., p. 734.

[15] New York Times, April 5, 1898.

[16] Ibid., April 13, 1898.

What conclusions may be drawn from the internal-threat data? Basically, it was found that the perceptions of threat emanating from sources within the nation were found to be somewhat less significant than historians have attributed to their various dimensions. Threat-internal was increasingly seen as salient, however, in the perception of decision-makers after the Maine disaster reaching a peak in the period immediately prior to the war.

Perceptions of threat (TE)

As shown in Table IV-1 the frequency of the per-ceptions of external-threat was greater than the frequencies of all other categories. The aggregate data, however, re-veal little. The data recoded better show the various dimensions comprising the external-threat theme. First, external-threat perceptions were sub-divided according to their source. Table VI-1 reveals that 82 percent of the total frequencies were perceived to emanate from the Cuban situation. This obviously is not surprising considering the fact that Cuba was the major point of contention between the United States and Spain. Spain was perceived occasionally as a source of external-threat but usually in relation to its military conduct in Cuba or its treatment of American embassy personnel in Madrid.

TABLE VI-1

SUB-CATEGORIES OF THREAT-EXTERNAL ACCORDING TO SOURCE

Sub-Category	Frequency	Percent
Cuban Situation	269	82
Spain	50	15
Other	10	3
TOTAL	329	100

Early in 1898 Secretary of State John Sherman notified the Spanish Government that the United States was profoundly disgusted with the situation in Cuba, writing:

> ...The President is bound by the higher obligations of his represtative office to protest against the uncivilized and inhuman conduct of the campaign in the island of Cuba. He conceives that he has a right to demand that a war, conducted almost within sight of our shores and grievously affecting American citizens and their interests throughout the length and breadth of the land, shall at least be conducted according to the military codes of civilization.[17]

This despatch indicates the importance of Cuba in the minds of the American decision-makers not only as a source of threat coming from outside the nation but also as to its targets. Table VI-2 indicates clearly the direction of the perceived external-threat.

The data in this breakdown show that American decision makers perceived 51 percent of the total perceptions of

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[17] Quoted in A. Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy (New York: Dutton, 1928), p. 66.

TABLE VI-2

SUB-CATEGORIES OF THREAT-EXTERNAL ACCORDING TO TARGET

Sub-Category	Frequency	Percent
U.S.	(124)	(38)
U.S.-Security	36	11
U.S.-Economy	36	11
U.S.-General	46	14
U.S.-Values	6	2
Peace	23	7
Cuba	(168)	(51)
Cuba-General	66	20
Cuba-Humanitarian	91	28
Cuba-Autonomy	11	3
Undefined	14	4
TOTAL	329	100

external-threat to be directed at Cuba. R. Hofstadter
writes that this tendency to overreact to the Cuban situation
can be understood in part through "the displacement of
feelings of sympathy or social protest generated in domestic
affairs; these impulses found a safe and satisfactory dis-
charge in foreign conflict. Spain was portrayed in the
press as waging a heartless and inhuman war; the Cubans
were portrayed as noble victims of Spanish tyranny, their
situation analogous to that of Americans in 1776."[18] In
Washington and New York, as well, the Cuban junta fed rumour
or information of the Cuban situation to the press and
Congress.

The targets of the Cuban situation were further
subdivided into political, economic and social dimensions.
Table VI-2 clearly indicates the humanitarian concern of
American decision-makers over the effect of the war on the
Cuban people (i.e., reconcentrados), totalling over 28 per-
cent of the total perceptions of external-threat. This
concern brought certain responses on the part of the McKinley
Administration. For example, H. Rubens, chief legal counsel
for the Cuban junta, writes of the emotional response of
McKinley when shown photographs of the Cuban reconcentrados:

> McKinley bent over them at the table, looking
> gingerly at them first; then he looked more

18
Hofstadter, p. 159.

closely;   finally, I noticed tears began
to course down his face.[19]

As well, the President took the initiative on December 24,
1897 by announcing that, "in deference to the earnest desire
of the government to contribute effective action toward re-
lief of the suffering people in the island of Cuba, arrange-
ments have been perfected by which charitable contributions
in money or the kind can be sent to the island by the bene-
volently disposed people of the United States."[20]

The economic deterioration of Cuba, perceived 20
percent of the total frequencies of the target sub-category,
also caused American decision-makers concern. This was
due to two reasons. Obviously the guerrilla tactic of des-
troying the sugar mills and plantations and the Spanish
reconcentrado order the Cuban economy was brought to a stand-
still. Lacking work and thus a source of income and not
allowed to leave the garrison towns to grow food the recon-
centrados were left to survive on the meager rations of the
Spanish authorities and inadequate donations from American
charities. Secondly, as the economy deteriorated, the
island's exports to the United States, her principal customer,
dwindled drastically. Imports from America declined as well
since Cuban importers failed to have the necessary buying

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[19]
    H. Rubens, Liberty (New York: Brewer, 1932), p. 338.

[20]
    For Rels., p. 655.

power. The consul at Santiago described the predicament of
the Cuban economy:

> (I) inclose herewith an order issued by
> command of General Maximo Gomez...forbidding
> the grinding of the sugar crops for the years
> 1897 and 1898. In this part of Cuba, so far
> as I can learn, all idea of making a sugar
> crop is entirely abandoned. I regret to say
> that the stoppage of industries, from present
> appearances, will not halt at the sugar crop,
> but coffee and other agricultural crops fall
> under the same ban. I had hoped that after
> the reconcentration order was revoked by the
> present action of the present administration,
> we would find no trouble in reinstating
> American industries; but it appears that all
> the benefits that should have accrued to our
> citizens are thwarted by the insurgents who
> refuse to allow them to return to their sugar,
> coffee, and other estates. The Pompo Man-
> ganese mines, owned by Americans, which
> would at the present time be a profitable
> investment if allowed to operate, are also
> being held up by the same power.
>
> . . . .
>
> It is beyond the power of my pen to describe
> the situation in eastern Cuba. Squalidity,
> starvation, sickness, and death meet one in
> all places. Beggars throng our doors and
> stop us in the streets. The dead in large
> numbers remain over from day to day in the
> cemetries unburied.[21]

The second largest perception according to the target
of external-threat is the United States, totalling 38 percent
of the total sub-category. This perception was also further
divided into four specific targets—United States—security-
—economy, —values, and —general. Table VI—2 shows that

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[21] Consul Hyatt, January 12, 1898, Senate Doc. 230,
55 Congress, 2 Sess., p. 38.

security and economy were perceived equally by decision-
makers as the most threatened targets within the American
sub-division. Obviously the large amounts of investments
in the sugar industry, primarily of American origin, were
injured by the tactics of both the guerrillas and the
Spanish, each trying to destroy the economic base of support
of the other. This factor did not go unnoticed by the
McKinley Administration whose members belonged to the elite
of the American business establishment. The great financial
and commercial interests of Hanna, Allison and Aldrich, des-
cribed as "bound to the government through mutual favours,"
were important lobbies close to the source of power.[22] For-
mer-President Cleveland most clearly stated America's economic
predicament in Cuba stating that American concern with Cuba
"was by no means of a wholly sentimental or philanthropic
character, since our actual pecuniary interest in it is
second only to that of the people and government of Spain."[23]

Although businessmen initially feared that a war
with Spain would prove too costly and unbalancing for an
economy recently emerging from a depression, this attitude
changed overtime. This factor is shown in Table VI-3(B)

22
S. E. Morison, The Oxford History of the American
People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 731-
732.

23
James Richardson, Messages and Papers of the
Presidents (Washington, 1899) X, 139.

presenting the perceptions of external-threat overtime.
The London Times, March 25, for example, reported the effect
in Washington of this new trend in the attitude of business-
men toward war:

> ...a gloomy feeling in Washington is the
> weakness of the conservative support given
> to the President. Businessmen are not
> doing all they might, say the President's
> friends. Some of the leading financiers,
> taking a purely business view, declare
> that they would prefer immediate war to
> months of uncertainty, anxiety and paralysis.[24]

In other words, businessmen as time progressed became increas-
ingly tired of the uncertain economic situation, fearing to
invest lest a recession suddenly occur, wiping out their
savings. The New York Times' financial section printed one
example of the resulting pressure on the administration to
end the Cuban situation and return a state of economic and
political normalcy to the country, in which a committee
composed of New York businessmen representing a large number
of firms throughout the country presented McKinley with a
petition which outlined their grievances:

> The destructive war in Cuba has continued for
> three entire years, with an actual average
> loss of import and export trade between Cuba
> and this country of $100,000,000 per year, or
> a total loss of $300,000,000 import and export
> trade since the beginning of the war. To
> this may be added heavy sums irretrievably

24
    London Times, March 26, 1898. This same week
saw the fear that a "crash" would occur due to the unsettled
political situation—March 25, 1898.

lost by destruction of American properties
or properties supported by American capital
in the island itself such as factories,
railways, tobacco plantations, mines and
other industrial enterprises, the loss of
the United States in trade and capital...
etc.[25]

Not surprisingly the petition ended by advising McKinley

to forcibly end the Cuban revolution.

In further investigating the data overtime concern-

ing the source and target of external-threat several interest-

ing features stand out. The "Proctor Speech" by Senator

Redfield Proctor, on March 17, reporting on the death and

misery he had seen in concentration camps in Cuba, seems to

have made an immense effect on the decision-makers. Table

VI-3(A), period 6 (March 12-25), shows 10 percent increase

in the perception of threat from Cuba. Proctor reported,

for example, that General ("Butcher") Weyler's cruelties

and the loss of the Maine did not move him as did "the

spectacle of a million and a half people the entire native

population of Cuba, struggling for freedom and deliverance

from the worst misgovernment of which I ever had knowledge."

Proctor's influence on the administration was corroborated

in the press which wondered whether his trip to Cuba had

been "official or voluntary" and noted his "long interviews

with the President."[26] Concern over the Cuban situation

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[25]
   New York Times, February 10, 1898.

[26]Ibid., March 25, 1898.

TABLE VI-3 (A&B)

PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT-EXTERNAL ACCORDING TO SOURCE AND TARGET OVER TIME

Category			Frequency					
Period	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
(A) From:								
Spain	2	1	11	7	6		8	15
Cuban Situation	62	12	26		38	49	18	64
Other	2	1		3	2	1	1	
TOTAL	66	14	37	10	46	50	27	79
(B) To:								
U.S.-Security	1		1	3		3	6	22
U.S.-Economy	6	3			2	12	2	11
U.S.-General	7	2	9	7	9		5	7
U.S.-Values			1				3	2
Peace	6		1		2	4	4	6
Cuba-General	13	1	2		13	21	2	14
Cuba-Humanitarian	16	5	23		20	9	4	14
Cuba-Autonomy	9	1				1		
Undefined	8	2					1	3
TOTAL	66	14	37	10	46	50	27	79

is shown also in a letter by Under-Secretary of State Day

to Woodford:

> The President's desire is for peace. He can
> not look upon the suffering and starvation
> in Cuba save with horror. The concentration
> of men, women, and children in the fortified
> towns, and permitting them to starve, is un-
> bearable to a Christian nation geographically
> so close to ours as Cuba. All this has shocked
> and inflamed the American mind, as it has the
> civilized world where its extent and character
> are know.[27]

Also to be noted are the two declines in the frequencies

of the perceptions of external-threat during the period of

the Maine disaster (February 12-25) and period 7 (March 26-

April 8). The lack of perceptions after the Maine disaster

is not surprising. Although the "jingo" press and extremist

elements in Congress favoured immediate war McKinley and

his advisors chose to suspend all opinions until an official

board of inquiry had investigated the mishap. The Nation,

February 24, wrote:

> The admirable conduct of the government officials at
> Washington renders the course of the sensational
> press in this city (New York) the more shameful
> by contrast.... It speaks well for the good
> sense of the masses that so little effect has
> been produced by all this stuff. It is evi-
> dent that a large proportion of the public re-
> fuses to take the sensational newspapers
> seriously.[28]

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[27] For Rels., March 25, 1898, p.712.

[28] Quoted in F. E. Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain (New York, 1909), p. 543.

The second lull in the perceptions of threat came
in the period of the Maine Report. During this period nego-
tiations between the Spanish government and Woodford took
place in an effort to achieve a peaceful settlement. Wood-
ford optimistically sent word, April 10, that the Spaniards
had yielded to the American demand for a prompt armistice,
and Woodford thought, that even the demand for independence
might still be met. Woodford wrote:

> I hope that nothing will now be done to
> humiliate Spain, as I am satisfied that
> the present Government is going, and loyally
> loyally ready to go, as far and as fast as
> it can.[29]

This optimism was dispelled however with American decision-
makers' distrust over the good intentions of Spain, shown
by an increase in the perception of threat coming from Spain
in Table VI-3(A). In presenting his message to Congress
McKinley chose to pass up his chance for one final states-
manlike act, an appeal for further delay, and advised war.

What conclusions may be drawn from this data which
enable us to continue our investigation as to stress? Prim-
arily we have established the fact that a substantial amount
of threat did exist. This threat was perceived to emanate
primarily from the Cuban situation aimed at two targets--
Cuba and the United States.

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[29]
For Rels., April 10, 1898.

The data so far presented show a greater number of perceptions of threat aimed at Cuba than at the United States. If this is the case one must question whether the perceptions of threat did indeed produce stress since no goals or values of the perceiving decision-makers apparently were involved. Threat perceived to be aimed at a target other than the perceiver is obviously less likely to produce stress.

The data was, therefore, re-examined. First, the targets of external-threat to the United States and to Cuba were investigated overtime. The data, presented in Table VI-4(A), show that over the eight periods the external-threat to Cuba (d) was overtaken by the threat to the United States (a) in the perceptions of American decision-makers. Graph VI-4(B) shows that as events developed to a culmination in war the perception of threat to the United States became increasingly salient while the perception of threat to Cuba declined in the importance of the decision-makers.

It must also be noted that while the target of Cuba fluctuated with events the perceptions of the United States as a target constantly increased at a stable rate overtime. Graph VI-1(B) clearly shows that while the threat to Cuba was considered a temporary and highly emotional perception, the perception of threat to the United States was less impressionable and fluctuating. "The nation was in a state of upset," writes E. May. "In some irrational way, the influences and anxieties of the age translated themselves

TABLE VI-4(A)

PERCEPTIONS OF THREATS TO U.S. AND CUBA OVER TIME

Period	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
(a) US (External)	14	5	11	10	11	15	16	42
(b) US (Internal)		3	8		12	6	10	14
(c) US (Peace)	6		1		2	4	4	6
TOTAL	20	8	20	10	25	25	30	62
(d) Cuba	38	7	25		23	30	6	28

GRAPH VI-4(B)

PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT-EXTERNAL TO U.S. AND CUBA OVER TIME

Perceptions

Threat to US ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
Cuba ⎯⎯⎯⎯

into concern for suffering Cuba."[30]

Further, the data of external-threat to the United
States were combined with the perceptions of internal-threat
(Table V-2) and the threat to peace (Table VI-2), both of
which can be considered related to the United States as a
target. This combination is possible since obviously foreign
and domestic considerations are closely interdependent.
Table VI-5 indicates that American decision-makers perceived
in total more threat (internal plus external) aimed at the
United States than aimed at other targets. As well, this
data examined overtime further substantiate that perceptions
of threat aimed at the United States were considered more
salient in the latter stages of the crisis than other tar-
gets of the perceptions of threat.

We may conclude that a considerably amount of hos-
tility was perceived to be directed against the United States
by the decision-makers. As well, threat perceptions regard-
ing the perceivers' nation were more frequent in the latter
stages of the crisis. From these two conclusions, we surmise
that the Spanish-American situation was stressful for American
decision-makers.

Perceptions of time (T)

For purposes of testing hypothese concerning percep-
tions of time 201 perceptions were derived from the decision-

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[30]
May quoted in Hofstadter, p. 147.

makers' documents. This total was classified according
to perceived reason for the importance of time and presented
in Table VII-1.

TABLE VII-1

PERCEPTIONS OF TIME: FREQUENCY AND TYPE

Period	A	B	C	D	Total
1	4		7	7	14
2	1	2	3		6
3	4	10	4		18
4		7	3		10
5	5	2	13	4	24
6	16	20	5	9	50
7	26	10	11	9	56
8	20	1	2	—	23
TOTAL	75	52	48	25	201
PERCENT	37	26	23	13	99

Time as a Factor in: A = the American situation

B = Spain/US relations

C = the Cuban situation

D = Spanish policy

The perceptions of time fall into four major cat-
egories according to the context in which time was found
to be relevant. The American situation, consisting of both

internal and external factors, was perceived as most salient

when decision-makers considered time, occurring 37 percent

of the total time perceptions. Of second importance was the

relevance of time vis à vis America's relations with Spain.

In other words, concern over the deterioration of Spanish/US

relations within a context of time occurred 26 percent of

the total number of time themes. It is to be noted that the

Cuban situation was perceived salient less than a quarter

of the total perceptions. This low volume of perceptions is

not surprising and corroborate our threat category conclusion.

Except for the emotional aspect the saliency of the Cuban

situation was small in the perceptions of the decision-makers.

Only when the Cuban situation was perceived to directly

affect the United States, shown in the perceptions of time

and threat, did American decision-makers perceive the

saliency of Cuba. Understandably, perceptions of time as

a factor in Spanish policy comprise only 13 percent of the

total time perceptions occurring primarily in periods 6 and

7 (March 12-April 8) when negotiations took place between

the United States and Spain.

Over time the time dimension corresponds to the

development of events within the crisis, falling into five

major action periods. In the initial period, January 1-28,

50 percent of the reference to time focus on the Cuban situa-

tion. The Havana riots and the corresponding danger to auo-

nomy were of primary concern at this time, dominating the

number of perceptions of the period (67 percent). This con-
cern was reflected in a telegram by Lee:

> If demonstrated (Blanco) cannot maintain
> order, preserve life and keep the peace,
> or if Americans and their interests are
> in danger ships must be sent, and to that
> end should be prepared to move promptly.
> Excitement and uncertainty predominate
> everywhere.[31]

Between January 29 and February 25, 70 percent of the
time perceptions concerned the de Lome affair and the Maine
disaster with the ramifications these incidents would have
vis à vis Spain. The de Lome affair brought the necessity
of the resignation of the offending minister with Day in-
structing Woodford, "You are...instructed to at once say
to the minister of state that the immediate recall of the
minister is expected by the President."[32] The Main inci-
dent brought the problem of reparations to the fore as well
as the necessity of a court of inquiry.

February 26 to March 11 attention was redirected at
the situation which had laid the scene for the Maine disaster
--the Cuban situation--comprising 57 percent of all time per-
ceptions within the period. Woodford wrote, "This question
comes to me each day with increasing force: Can Spain so
far crush the rebellion by the 1st of May as that the common

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[31] For Rels., January 13, 1898, p. 1025.

[32] Ibid., February 9, 1898, p. 1008.

sense of our people will see that the war then will be practically ended?"[33]

The period of March 12-April 8 saw a substantial increase in all sub-categories although perceptions of America's situation were of primary importance to the decision-makers comprising 40 percent of the total perceptions for the period. This concern was expressed by most of the decision-makers in Washington who feared the "intense" feelings of Congress and the public. Woodford, realizing McKinley's position, wired, "I do regard it as very essential (Spain) should see that the United States mean business, and mean it now.... I have urged the Spanish Government to act quickly, but to no avail. They do not sense the urgency of the situation."[34]

In the last period, April 9-22, over 80 percent of the perceptions of time deal with America's situation in the crisis. Congress and the procrastination of Spain were two opposing forces between which McKinley stood. April 11 McKinley chose the direction of Congress and advised forceful intervention.

These data may be used to test the hypotheses relating the stress of crisis to perceptions of time. It was hypothesized in chapter one that:

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[33] For Rels., March 9, 1898, p. 681.

[34] Ibid., March 29, 1898, p. 718

> As stress increases in a crisis situation,
> time will be perceived as an increasingly
> salient factor in decision-making.

If this hypothesis holds true for the Spanish-American crisis, as it did for the 1914 situation, the number of expressions in which time is perceived as salient should increase as the crisis deepens. Table VII-2 shows this increase takes place.

TABLE VII-2

TOTAL PERCEPTIONS OF TIME OVER TIME

Period	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Perceptions	14	7	17	11	24	50	56	23

Table VII-2 indicates, as well, a decrease in the number of perceptions in the last period in which Congress assumed responsibility of the Cuban problem.

> According to the second hypothesis:

> As stress increases in a crisis situation,
> decision-makers will become increasingly con-
> cerned with immediate rather the distant
> future.

Table VII-3 indicates our data to substantiate this. Of a total of 201 perceptions of time only 59 (29) percent) reveal a concern for the distant future.

What conclusions may be drawn from the 1898 data? Our analysis reveals that perceptions are important in decision-making. In the situation of high stress the deci-

TABLE VII-3(A)

PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMMEDIATE AND DISTANT FUTURE OVER TIME

Period	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Total
Immediate future	4	2	13	9	13	36	45	20	142
Distant future	10	5	4	2	11	14	11	3	59

GRAPH VII-3(B)

Perceptions

Periods

Immediate future ·········

Distant future ·· ———— ·

Threat-External ————————

sion-makers perceived that time was of crucial importance
and they acted on that assumption. In the culminating stages
of the crisis decision-makers increasingly perceived their
own position to be confined by time. Pressure from Congress,
distrust of Spain, fear of a danger to the United States of
a continuing war in Cuba saw McKinley ignore the concessions
of the Spanish government (all that he had demanded) and hand
the problem to a belligerent Congress advising war.

Perceptions of alternatives (A)

For purposes of testing hypotheses relating to per-
ceived alternatives 296 perceptions were recorded. These
were classified as perceptions of choice, necessity, closed
or impotence according to the following definitions:

> The "necessity" category includes all state-
> ments indicating that the author sees only
> one possible course of action in a given
> situation.
>
> The "closed" classification includes all
> statements indicating that some course of
> action is not possible.
>
> The "choice" category includes all statements
> in which the actor perceives more than one
> course of action is open.
>
> The "impotence" classification includes all
> statements indicating that some course of
> action is proceeding without the actor's
> control.

The initial hypothesis to be tested is:

> In a crisis situation, decision-makers will
> tend to perceive their own range of alterna-
> tives to be more restricted than those of
> their adversaries; that is, they will per-

ceive their own decision-making to be
characterized by <u>necessity</u> and closed
options, whereas those of the adversary
are characterized by <u>open</u> choices.

The 1898 documents are filled with such words as

"must," "compelled," "driven," and "impossible," these

occurring almost wholly when the author is referring to the

policies of his own nation. Table VIII-1 shows that American

decision-makers consistently perceived fewer options open

to themselves than to their adversaries.

TABLE VIII-1

FREQUENCIES OF SUB-CATEGORIES OF ALTERNATIVES FOR OWN NATION
AND ENEMY

	Choice	Necessity	Closed	Impotent	Total
Self:					
Perceptions	22	92	67	24	205
Percent	7	31	23	8	--
Enemy:					
Perceptions	18	34	33	6	91
Percent	6	11	11	2	--
			Total Percent 99		296

Further, it was hypothesized that:

As stress increases, decision-makers will per-
ceive the range of alternatives open to them-
selves to become narrower.

If the hypothesis is correct for the 1898 situation, the num-

ber of perceptions of alternatives divided into the "necessity,"

"closed," and "impotence" categories should increase in the latter days of the crisis. This data is presented in Table VIII-2(A). In order to better compare over time the number of closed to the number of open alternatives perceived available for one's own nation the necessity, closed and impotence sub-categories were combined into one in Grave VIII-2(B).

Several features are apparent in Graph VIII-2(B). After the initial glut of perceptions at the beginning of the year the number of perceptions decreased to nil by period four (February 12-25). Intuitively we would expect to find many "choice" alternatives in the early periods. This was not the case. Concern over the plight of Cubans plus the turmoil due to the de Lome and Maine incidents obviously created a stressful situation. The solution to both the internal and external problems lay simply in one course of action---an end to the war---autonomy thought the only feasible means to achieve this. Woodford wrote:

> Autonomy cannot go backward. It must go forward and its results must be worked out in Cuba. There is the storm center.[35]

The Maine incident, as with the other perceptions prompted a great flurry of perceptions particularly in the direction of the Cuban situation. The last three periods

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[35] For Rels., February 26, 1898, p. 664.

TABLE VIII-2(A)

FREQUENCIES OF SUB-CATEGORIES OF ALTERNATIVES FOR OWN NATION
OVER TIME

Category   Frequency

Period	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Choice	3		1			5		13
Necessity	11	5	4		9	28	14	21
Closed	9	1	5		13	10	13	16
Impotence	3	1			3	6	3	8
TOTAL	26	7	10	0	25	49	30	58

GRAPH VIII-2(B)

Perceptions

Periods

Closed alternatives – – –

Open alternatives ――――

Threat-External ············

(March 12-April 22) register almost 70 percent of all perceptions of alternatives for the decision-makers' own nation. Woodford writing to McKinley noted his conversation with the Spanish foreign minister:

> This awful condition of affairs in Cuba can not continue forever. End it at once--end it at once--end it at once, for no thoughtful American can tell how long the conscience and humanity of the American people can be held in check.
> ....
> I see nothing ahead except disorder, insecurity of persons and destruction of property. The Spanish flag cannot give peace. The rebel flag cannot give peace. There is but one power and one flag that can secure peace and compel peace. That power is the United States, and that flag is ours.[36]

The solution to the Cuban situation was perceived no longer to lay in Spain's plan of autonomy but in American intervention.

Finally, our last hypothesis regarding the effects of stress on the perception of alternatives must be discussed.

> As stress increases, decision-makers will perceive the range of alternatives open to adversaries or potential adversaries to expand.

As seen in Table VIII-3 our results do not substantiate this hypothesis.

That few alternatives were perceived for Spain is not surprising. For three years Spain had committed the best of its youth, resources, and energy to the Cuban situation but to no avail. Sherman wrote:

TABLE VIII-3

FREQUENCIES OF SUB-CATEGORIES OF ALTERNATIVES FOR <u>ENEMY</u> OVER
TIME

Category	Frequency							
Periods	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Choice	5		1		4		5	3
Necessity	11	3	5		7	6	1	1
Closed	6	1	6		5	5	3	7
Impotence		1			2	3		
TOTAL	22	5	12	0	20	14	9	11

...even the Spanish army itself suffers
from this paralysis of means and supplies,
and if it be admittedly impracticable to
keep up the commissariat and pay the sol-
diers of Spain, it is not rational to suppose
that the condition of the unfortunate recon-
centrados can be materially relieved (by
Spain).[37]

According to the perceptions of American decision-
makers Spain had two alternatives--quit the island or face
defeat in a war with the United States. The perceptions of
"necessity," "closed" and "impotence" alternatives, therefore,
total more than 80 percent of the total perceptions for
Spain. Woodford wrote:

...they can not go further in open concessions
to us without being overthrown by their own
people here in Spain.

They want peace if they can keep peace
and save the dynasty. They prefer the chances
of war, with certain loss of Cuba to the over-
throw of the dynasty....

I do not think that they can make any more
direct concessions to us and retain their power
here.[38]

The data of this section corroborate Holsti's hypo-
theses that stress decreases the perception of alternatives
for one's own nation compared to those perceived available
for the adversary, as well as show that increasing stress
results in a constriction of perceived options. The percep-

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[37] For Rels., March 1, 1898, p. 668.

[38] Ibid., April 1, 1898, p. 729.

tion of more alternatives open to the adversary was not found significant in our data.

Part Three: Historical Data

To gain an understanding of the motivations of American decision-makers the data were coded according to four categories--perceptions of capability (C), means (M), rationale (R), and policy consequences/outcome (O).[39] In this way further insight into the thinking behind the policy-making of 1898 is possible.

Perceptions of capbility (C)

The category of capability consists of those themes which indicate the perception that the parties involved in the Cuban situation had or failed to have the capacity or potency to achieve a solution to the Cuban situation. The data are divided according to four sub-categories--two positive (indicating capability) and two negative (indicating perception of incapability). Table IX-1 indicates that the United States perceived itself moderately capable of solving the Cuban problem (19 percent). However, of greater significance are the perceptions of American decision-makers regarding Spain's inability to solve the problem, totalling 64 percent of the total capability perceptions. The incap-

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[39] The categories of proximity (P), difficulty (D), and perceived threat to Spain will not be discussed since the data are insignificant for purposes of forming conclusions.

ability when further subdivided indicates the primarily
American decision-makers felt the Spaniards were incapable
of winning the war (40 percent of total number of perceptions).
The United States never perceived itself incapable.

TABLE IX-1

PERCEPTIONS OF CAPABILITY AND INCAPABILITY FOR SELF AND ENEMY

	Frequency	Percent
Capability:		
United States	11	19
Spain	7	12
Incapability:		
Spain	(37)	(64)
—to win war	73	40
—to aid reconcentrados	11	19
—to protect US property etc.	3	5
Cuban rebels	3	5
TOTAL	58	100

Perception of means (M)

The data were coded further into the category of means
(i.e., perception that a certain technique is capable or in-
capable of achieving a solution to the Cuban situation).
Again the data were divided into positive and negative
dimensions showing that certain means were (+) or were not
(-) capable of setting the Cuban war. Table X-1 shows that
both peaceful and warlike means were equally perceived to
present a solution, while recognition of belligerency by

the United States and a guarantee of the Cuban debt were never thought feasible by American decision-makers (US-Cuba 18 percent) to solve the Cuban situation.

TABLE X-1

PERCEPTIONS OF MEANS FOR SELF AND ENEMY

Sub-Category	Frequency	Percent
Capable:		
US-Force	56	23
US-Peaceful	62	24
SP-Peaceful	35	14
Incapable:		
SP-Force	7	3
SP-Peaceful	39	15
US-Force	7	3
US-Cuba	45	18
TOTAL	250	100

Intuitively one would expect that as the crisis took on greater proportions that force would replace peaceful means as a way to solve Cuba's problems and that perceptions of Spain's inability by either force or peaceful means to solve the Cuban proble would increase. Table X-2 supports this assumption.

While American decision-makers had been optimistic in period 7 (March 26-April 8) that peaceful negotiations would avert a war between Spain and the United States (over 75 percent of all perceptions in this period) this attitude

TABLE X-2

PERCEPTIONS OF MEANS FOR SELF AND ENEMY OVER TIME

Period	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Capable:								
US-Force		4			2	2	3	45
US-Peaceful	15	1	12	1	3	8	15	6
SP-Peaceful	7	1	1		5		18	3
Incapable:								
SP-Force						2	1	4
SP-Peaceful	5		3		3	18	5	5
US-Force	2					3	1	1
US-Cuba	11	2				15	2	15
TOTAL	40	8	16	1	13	48	45	79

changed as the crisis progressed. The last period shows that over 50 percent of all perceptions concerning means saw force as the only way out of the Cuban quagmire.

Perceptions of rationale (R)

In investigating the rationale perceived by the American decision-makers in commencing war with Spain we are able to see more clearly the underlying motives prompting their actions. Table XI-1 indicates that the primary concern of American decision-makers was over the humanitarian aspect of the Cuban situation (i.e., the reconcentrados). The perception of a danger to American national-interest (i.e., economy, security, etc.) comprising 40 percent of the total perceptions of rationale was perceived a close second in importance.

TABLE XI-1

PERCEPTIONS OF RATIONALE

Reason for Action	Frequency	Percent
Humanitarian	80	42
National Interest	77	40
Duty	34	18
TOTAL	191	100

Perceptions of rational over time further elucidate certain points. These are presented in Table XI-2. The rationale regarding humanitarian concern over the Cuban people predominate in every period except the last in which national interest dominates in the perceptions of the decision-

TABLE XI-2

PERCEPTIONS OF RATIONALE OVER TIME

Period	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Humanitarian	20	3	1		10	14	13	19
National Interest	19	5			5	5	10	33
Duty	7	2	1	1	1	2	7	13
TOTAL	46	10	2	1	16	21	30	65

makers. The sub-category "duty" is of some interest. As the crisis gained momentum American involvement was not merely seen as an excuse to aid the Cuban people but was perceived as a duty which events had bestowed upon the American people. Senator Gray best described why this sense of duty existed:

> ...we might as well be ashamed of our own mothers as to attempt to deny or conceal the origin of our own free institutions. They sprang from revolution, they were achieved by our fathers with arms in their hands, and from that day to this there has never been a suggestion, wherever the flag of freedom has been unfurled, that the hearts of the American people did not go out in sympathy and encouragement to the people struggling to uphold it.[40]

Perceptions of policy consequences/outcome (O)

The category of policy consequences concerns the perception by American decision-makers that if certain action regarding the Cuban situation is or is not taken then certain effects will or will not follow. As can be seen from Table IV-1, perceptions of policy consequences occurred quite frequently in the documents (198 times, or 12 percent of the total number of units coded). In other words, American decision-makers tended to think in terms of contingencies, or of logical consequences of the situation, or their actions. Although at first glance the total number of frequencies seems to contradict our results of the perceptions of time (i.e., distant time or immediate time) in that

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[40] Leech, p. 182.

one would expect that decision-makers would be less likely to think in terms of future consequences of actions in a crisis situation a closer study of the data clarifies this discrepancy.

The first sub-division made was according to whether the United States perceived a consequence as a result of (i) United States intervening or not intervening, (ii) Cuban recovery or lack of recovery, and (iii) Spanish action or lack of action. These data are presented in Table XII-1.

TABLE XII-1

BREAKDOWN OF PERCEPTIONS OF OUTCOME BY CAUSE OF CONSEQUENCES

Sub-Category	Frequency	Percent
Consequence of U.S. action/non action	102	52
Consequence of Cuban recovery/non recovery	34	17
Consequence of Spanish action/non action	62	31
TOTAL	198	100

The data show that the United States policy makers generally viewed the Cuban situation and its consequences in terms of their own action or inaction. Spain and Cuba were correspondingly perceived to be incapable of correcting or alleviating the condition of Cuba.

The theme of policy consequences was further
broken down depending upon whether outcomes were perceived
to primarily affect the United States, Cuba, Spain or peace.
This is shown in Table XII-2.

TABLE XII-2

BREAKDOWN OF PERCEPTIONS OF OUTCOME ACCORDING TO NATIONS
AFFECTED

	Frequency	Percent
U.S.	83	42
Spain	31	16
Cuba	22	11
Peace	57	29
Other	5	2
TOTAL	198	100

The data indicate that the United States was most frequently
perceived to be affected by the consequences amounting to
42 percent of the total perceptions of outcome. Surprisingly
American decision-makers were also concerned with the general
dimension of peace, perceived 29 percent of the total outcome
perceptions. Both areas, totalling 61 percent of the total
perceptions of affect, indicate that the prime area of con-
cern for American decision-makers was the United States.

In breaking down the outcome category according to
(i) good or bad consequences and according to (ii) type of
consequences (military, political/social, economic) the
data contain no surprises.

TABLE XII-3 (A&B)

BREAKDOWN OF PERCEPTIONS OF OUTCOME ACCORDING TO GOOD/BAD
CONSEQUENCES AND TYPE OF
CONSEQUENCES

A. Sub Category	Frequency	Percent
Good	72	36
Bad	70	35
Neither	56	28
TOTAL	198	99

B.		Frequency	Percent
	Military	45	23
	Political/Social	138	70
	Economic	10	5
	Other	5	2
	TOTAL	198	100

Table XII-3(A) reveals no significant data, with consequences
perceived bad and good almost equally. Table XII-3(B), how-
ever, indicates the concern over the political and social
(humanitarian) upheaval in Cuba. This concern corroborates
with Table XI-1, regarding perceptions of rationale.

Chapter V

CONCLUSION

Although the data presented in this project lend

support to the hypotheses regarding stress forwarded in

chapter one, and, as well, show that certain particular per-

ceptions were of significance to those American decision-

makers chosen, it seems advisable to interpret the results

with great caution. It would be particularly hazardous to

conflude that other factors such as those of personality,[1]

ideology or organization play no significant role in a crisis-

war situation. A leader's personal values and dispositions

equally shape his perception of the situation which confronts

him, and his evaluation of the choices of action open to him.

Several studies, for instance, have shown the importance of

the relationship between "belief system," perceptions and

decision-making.[2] A decision-maker acts upon his image of

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[1]
    See, for example, the psychoanalytic study of
President Wilson by Alexander and Juliette George, Woodrow
Wilson and Colonel House (New York: Dover, 1963), and
Maurice L. Farber, "Psychoanalytic Hypotheses in the Study
of War," Journal of Social Issues, 11 (1955), pp. 29-36.

[2]
    For example, M. Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind
(New York: Basic Books, 1960), and R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck

the situation rather than upon "objective" reality, and it
has been demonstrated that the belief system—its structure
as well as its content—plays an integral role in the
cognitive process.[3]   O. R. Holsti writes:

> Within the broader scope of the belief-system-
> perception-decision-making relationship there
> has been a heightened concern for the problem
> of stereotyped national images as a signifi-
> cant factor in the dynamics of the interna-
> tional system.[4]

In emphasizing the psychological level of analysis
(individual or personality factors) we do not negate the
value, on the other hand, of the sociological level (organ-
izational factors).[5] The top foreign policy decision-
makers of a nation are not just men—they are men in so-
cially defined roles which may constrain their behavior.
In focusing on the individual and his perception as the

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and B. Sapin, Decision-making as an Approach to the Study
of International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1954).

[3] See K. E. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press, 1956) and Leon Festinger, A Theory
of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson,
1957).

[4] O.R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images:
a case study," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6 (1962),
p. 244.

[5] Richard C. Snyder, for instance, has attempted to
"embrace" these two levels of analysis in a single framework,
see Snyder and Glen Paige, "The United States Decision to
Resist Aggression in Korea," Administrative Science Quarterly,
3 (1958), pp. 341-378.

major unit of analysis the larger units, such as institutions

or nations, should not be neglected. O. R. Holsti et al write:

> The individual decision-maker within any large
> organization, including a nation-state, is
> embedded, of course, in a considerable number
> of more or less nesting and overlapping groups
> each with its own roles, statuses, expectations,
> and preferences. He also has carried with him
> into office a complex of personal habits,
> memories, attitudes, inclinations and predis-
> positions. In performing his decision-making
> role he is to one degree or another aware of
> pressures and limitations emanating from these
> sources, and also from public opinion and ex-
> pectation; the interests and policies of other
> components of his government; advice from
> military, scientific, and other specialized
> advisers; institutional memories; and the
> history and traditions of the organization.
> Essentially, then, the behavior of a decision-
> maker cannot be considered without reference
> to the organization of which he is a part.[6]

Ultimately there can be no purely psychological

theory of war or international relations, but only psycho-

logical factors within a general theory.[7] David Easton

states:

> ...the relevance of the human actors and their
> motivations and perceptions is limited by the
> roles they play (and the constraints imposed
> by those roles) in the larger societal process,
> and, moreover, by such givens of the interna-

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[6] Ole R. Holsti, Robert C. North, and Richard A. Brody, *Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis*, in J. David Singer, (ed.), *Quantitative International Politics*: insights and evidence (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 128.

[7] It has been proposed, in fact, that psychology be-longs at the "core" of the study of international relations—Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 506.

tional system as the distribution of power, the geographical location and international position of the state, economic conditions and demography.[8]

In other words, national leaders are individuals making policy choices for their nations in a complex of highly articulated group, organizational, societal, and inter-social systems. The eventual task of the behavioral scientist studying international politics is to gain understanding of how these various dimensions fit together and how they affect the choice behavior of individuals in leadership roles.

This study has encompassed an analysis of the processes of escallation from a relatively stable international situation to an unplanned war.[9] To what extent, then, are its findings relevant for the study of situations removed both in time and space? Do the concepts and findings in this

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[8] David Easton, Alternative Strategies in Theoretical Research, in Easton (ed.), Varieties of Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966), pp. 1-13, see also L. J. Carr, "A Situational Approach to Conflict and War," Social Forces 24 (1946), pp. 300-303, who writes, "When one asks what forces or influences change a situation, one has to take account not only of the interactions of human beings, but of biological process within the organisms and of geo-physical forces outside, some of which, such as sound, light and electricity, may function not only as situational, environmental factors but as situational processes themselves, p. 301.

[9] I am assuming naturally that a war requires more than one month's preparation to be considered 'planned'.

research have any relevance beyond the historical one of
illuminating a series of unique events? For example, James
A. Robinson has shown in a recent study using similar pro-
positions regarding alternatives that decision-makers them-
selves usually characterize their own activities in terms of
classical economic models of decision-making (reviewing all
alternatives in terms of classicial economic models decision-
making (reviewing all alternatives for the optimum one),
rather than in terms of the model suggested here. They often
apply the same model to the decision processes of other
states.[10] Holsti quotes John Foster Dulles as an example
of the tendency to assume totally calculated decision-making
on the part of an adversary, "The Russians are great chess
players and their moves in the world situation are, I be-
lieve, attempted to be calculated as closely and carefully
as though they were making moves in a chess game."[11] Theodore
Abel, also, in a comparative historical analysis, concluded
that:

> 1. The decision to fight, unless the opponent
>   abandons resistance without a struggle, is
>   not reached on the spur of the moment. In

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[10] J. A. Robinson, "'Short-Term' Deterrence Problems:
Crisis Decision-Making and Weapons Systems," mimeo (China
Lake: Project Michelson, 1964), pp. 7-8.

[11] Quoted in O. R. Holsti, "Perceptions of Time, Per-
ceptions of Alternatives, and Patterns of Communication as
Factors in Crisis Decision-Making," Peace Research Society
Papers, 3 (1965), p. 117.

every case, the decision is based upon
a careful weighing of chances and of anti-
cipating consequences.... In no case, the
decision precipitated by emotional tensions,
sentimentality, crowd behavior, or other
irrational motivations.

2. The rational, calculating decision is reached
for in advance of the actual outbreak of hos-
tilities.... The evidence shows that the
decision to wage war <u>precedes by one to five
years the outbreak of hostilities.</u>[12]

Our findings, however, indicate that the more intense

the interaction between Spain and the United States, the more

important it is to incorporate perceptual data into the

analysis. Holsti <u>et al.</u> put it in another way, "...in a

situation of low involvement one may be able to predict a

nation's action responses to environmental stimuli rather

accurately without recourse to the perceptions of its de-

cision-makers. On the other hand, in a period of crisis

marked by high involvement and rising intensity...the role

of perception becomes increasingly important."[13]

More specifically, our study revealed that the

manner in which the United States perceived the actions of

Spain was the crucial link between perception and action.

This perception of the of the intentions of Spain could be

said to have affected the perception of means considered

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[12]
Theodore Abel, "The Elements of Decision in the
Patterns of War," <u>American Sociological Review</u>, 6 (1941),
p. 855.

[13] Holsti <u>et al.</u>, p. 158.

necessary to resolve the situation as well as the capability of self and the enemy in resolving the crisis. Morevoer, American perceptions were found to be afffected to a significant degree by the phenomenon of stress in regard to the variables of time and alternatives. In duplicating, in part, the findings of Holsti's earlier study of the 1914 crisis by using a different historical episode these perceptions, found significant in both studies, have a greater credibility than heretofore.

The international system has been conceived in the form of a Chinese box. When the outher box is removed there is found next a related and smaller box (or sub-system), smaller boxes existing within smaller boxes, according to the systems strategy. In this research we have attempted to isolate and further verify one of the smaller boxes that rests inside the large expanse of international behavior and within the dimension of crisis specifically. As mentioned above, additional related sub-systems can be found without any question, each in turn related to a larger sub-system. We have chosen to study only one sub-system of the international system. Research of the Spanish-American War situation, is therefore, obviously incomplete. Other studies will be needed to tap other dimensions not touched by our research. Ultimately, the psychological dimension emphasized in this project will be related to other dimensions emanating from the fields of sociology, anthropology, etc., forming a

more comprehensive theory of behavior than heretofore in

existence. Charles McClelland's summary to his research

can be applied to this project as well:

> It might be best to think of the kind of
> inquiry that has been reported here as only
> a single strand which eventually will need
> to be woven with many other strands. The
> weaving should be done according to strict
> and orderly procedures. Thus, bit by bit,
> the wider context might be build, in the
> weaving of many strands.[14]

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[14]
Charles A. McClelland, Access to Berling: The Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948-1963, in J. D. Singer, (ed.), Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 185.

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APPENDIX

CATEGORIES, CODING AND RECODING GUIDE[*]

      The categories of PERCEPTIONS (i.e., any statement which defines, or perceives a situation, event, or object) are eleven in number. These are defined as follows:

I. Category of THREAT EXTERNAL (to the United States)(TE)

      Any statement which perceives a threat, hostility, or pressure coming from a source EXTERNAL to the United States

from	to
i. Spain	i. US-security
ii. the Cuban situation	ii. US-economy
iii. undefined/generalized/ other	iii. US-values
	iv. US-general
	v. peace (world, hemispheric, Cuban)
	vi. Cuban people
	vii. Cuba-other
	viii. undefined.

      On the first coding the THREAT them was taken as one category, and on recoding the sub-categories were examined.

Examples: "All thoughtful people realize that the Spanish in that Island by their repressive tactics are destroying the resources of the Island, weakening its productive power, and hindering commerce." Three units.

          "The movement of the Spanish flotilla can only be construed as threatening our coast...." One unit.

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[*] I have relied heavily on the excellent coding manual developed by Dr. G. Winham and used in his study of the Marshall Plan decision.

II. Category of THREAT INTERNAL (to the United States)(TI)

Any statement which perceives a threat, hostility or pressure coming from a source INTERNAL to the United States. Recoded they are as follows:

from	to
i. the "press"	i. peace
ii. the "public"	ii. US-decision-makers
iii. Congress	iii. undefined
iv. other	

Examples: "The sensational papers endanger the fragile strands of peace."

"The tide is strong and just resentment is at the point of overflow."

III. Category of TIME (T)

Any statement which perceives or expresses TIME to be a factor in the situation or expresses a sense of URGENCY about the situation.

The time category was recoded as t⋅ the perception of immediate or distant future as well as perceived reason for the importance of time.

Examples: "We must act now or thousands more will starve."

"The President's Message will not be sent to Congress until next Monday, to give the consul-general at Havana the time he urgently needs to ensure safe departure of Americans."

IV. Category of POLICY CONSEQUENCES/OUTCOME (O)

Any statement which perceives that if certain US/Spanish action regarding the situation is or is not taken, then certain effects will or will not follow; or any statement which perceives the consequences of US/Spanish action or non-action.

Perceptions of outcome are recorded in five categories: (i) perception of positive/negative consequences; (ii) nation primarily affected (i.e., benefitted/harmed) by consequences; (iii) consequence-type; (iv) perception of Spanish aggression or national interest, and, (v) whether the consequence occurs as a result of U.S. aid, or Cuba's recovery (with no mention of U.S. aid) or Spanish action.

Examples: "Without our aid there can only result the most miserable suffering..."

"If armistice is offered by the government of Spain the President will wait in delivering his message to Congress."

V. Category of RATIONALE (R)

Any statement which perceives that:

i. U.S. involvement (medical aid, military intervention) is necessary or desirable for a stated reason -x- i.e., humanitarian, strategic, economic, national interest, moral, etc. reasons;

ii. the U.S. has or should act toward Cuba out of -x- consideration; or

iii. the U.S. is interested in the Cuban situation for -x- reason.

Example: "The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade and business of our people."

VI. Category of PROXIMITY (P)

Any statement which perceives the nearness of Cuba to the United States.

Example: "Our Government and people can not see old men, women and children dying with starvation by our very shores and not help them...."

VII. Category of THREAT to SPAIN (TS)

Any statement which perceives a threat to SPAIN from the Cuban situation.

Example: "The war has not only destroyed Cuba but drained the Spanish treasury and endangered her dynasty."

VIII. Category of COMPLEXITY/DIFFICULTY (D)

Any statement which perceives the COMPLEXITY or DIFFICULTY of the situation

IX. Category of ALTERNATIVES (A)

Any statement which refers to perception of (i) choice

(more than one course of action); (ii) necessity (only one possible course of action); (iii) closed (some course of action not possible); and, (iv) impotence (some action proceeding without control) for either the U.S. or Spain.

X. Category of MEANS/SOLUTIONS ACCEPTABLE (M)

Any statement which expresses MEANS or TECHNIQUES of achieving a solution to the situation in Cuba for either Spain or the U.S.; or, which perceives that certain MEANS are incapable of achieving a solution to the situation by the US/Spain.

Examples: "Forcible intervention must be considered, now that all else has failed."

"...force will not achieve peace...."

XI. Category of CAPABILITY (C)

Any statement which perceives that either the U.S. or Spain has or fails to have the capacity or potency to achieve their respective objectives vis à vis the situation.

Examples: "There is but one power and one flag that can secure peace and compel peace. That power is the United States, and that flag is our flag."

"Spain can not give peace."