AN ANALYSIS OF CRISIS DECISION-MAKING:

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, 1898
AN ANALYSIS OF CRISIS DECISION-MAKING:
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR CASE, 1898

by

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

This paper has two related goals: (1) to examine the impact of crisis, in general, and stress, in particular, on certain aspects of foreign policy-making; and, (2) to understand the motivations underlying the actions of American decision-makers within the political environment of 1898. The data is derived through a content analysis of documents written by certain "key" American decision-makers during the sixteen weeks prior to the outbreak of the Spanish American War in 1898.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In a sense this research project is in large part due to Dr. Gilbert R. Winham for several reasons. Initially it was his suggestion to use the Spanish-American War situation as a case history which sparked my interest in this project. More important, however, was his aid in developing the potentials of this thesis through the liberal offerings of his time, experience and research materials. His insistence saw the finished project submitted on time. I trust I, as a student, have not disappointed his expectations because as a mentor and teacher he certainly has not disappointed mine.

I must also thank Dr. Henry J. Jacek for his valuable comments on the methodological aspects of the study, as well as the members of my thesis committee for their time.
PREFACE

It has been a splendid little war; begun with the highest motives, carried on with magnificent intelligence and spirit, favored by that fortune which loves the brave.1

In this way a leading American politician of the 1890's summarized the events of the Spanish-American War. The war was indeed splendid for most of the excited American populace far from the battle areas. Few of them, however, dreamed how different the United States would be afterward due to the events of 1898. It is significant, however, that the dramatic events of 1898 have generally been overlooked in favour of the gaudy diplomacy of Teddy Roosevelt and the cataclysm of World War One. The principle purpose of this study, therefore, is to trace the unfolding of American foreign policy of President W. McKinley and his advisors immediately prior to the Spanish-American War, to relate it with the psychological phenomenon of stress and as far as possible to explain the reasons why their policies took place.

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Chapter I

CRISIS DECISION-MAKING: THEORY

Why do you make me read such stuff? Can you see me consulting a history book in a crisis? Not I! At such moments what counts most is flair, a cool head, courage, resolution and nimble wits....

M. Delcassé's statement is revealing. It is revealing because it forces one to consider two interesting aspects in the study of international policy making: the rationale and value behind historical analysis and the effects of crisis on foreign policy decision-making.

Although the practical politician is unlikely to run to a political science text book upon the commencement of a crisis the use of the historical case upon which to base one's study of crisis decision-making does contain certain logic. The historiographer E. H. Carr stated, "The assertion that men learn nothing from history is contradicted by a multitude of observable facts. No experience is more common." 2

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2 E. H. Carr quoted in Eayrs, p. 46.
In other words, the student assumes the existence of patterns, repetitions or close analogues in the history of human affairs. It is obvious that historical particulars, such as methods of warfare, change from generation to generation, but it can be reasonably argued that basic human feelings, emotions, decisions and the methods of coping with their consequences have not changed radically over time. R. North writes, "Historical situations offer the advantage of an algebra book with answers in the back."\(^3\) Considering that man's sole means of assessing, deciding, and, to some extent, predicting events is by the study of past situations, it seems logical that the study of crisis decision-making should commence, in part, by historical analysis. Had Delcassé and his generation of diplomats been cognizant of the various psychological dimensions of crisis which we are about to study one wonders if the First World War could not somehow have been avoided.\(^4\)

**Decision-making under stress**

Delcassé's second insight is the major interest of this research project. This paper, as intimated in the Introduction, has two related goals: (1) to examine the im-

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pact of crisis, in general, and stress, in particular, on certain aspects of foreign policy-making; and, (2) to understand which elements within the political environment of 1898 were of primary concern in the perceptions of the American decision-makers and thus, in part, contributed to a stressful situation. The data is derived through content analysis of documents written by key American decision-makers during the sixteen weeks prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898.

The initial interest in 'crisis' situations has resulted from the observation of recurrent crises and their implications in contemporary international relations. Awareness of this term among policy makers, the news media and the interested public testify to the topical interest of this phenomenon. In fact, C. Hermann states, "Crises seem to appear frequently enough to permit systematic study and are of such nature that they not only permit but also warrant investigation." 5 Judging by the recent literature in the social sciences, there is a newly awakened interest in crisis studies. Using different units of analysis, individual, or-

5 Charles F. Hermann, "Some Consequences of Crisis which Limit the Viability of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly, 8 (1963-64), p. 63. Charles McClelland, referring to the inordinate nature of crises in international politics, suggests that they "are perceived vividly as the avenues that are most likely to lead into extensive or general nuclear war"—"Decisinal Opportunity and Political Controversy: The Quemoy Case," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6 (1962), 211.
ganizational or societal, numerous studies have been published considering the concept of 'crisis' a useful framework within which to consider the reactions of persons etc. to a wide range of events.6

In spite of the potential value of studying crises, little distinction has been made between the concept of crisis and a number of seemingly related terms (i.e., stress, conflict, tension, panic, catastrophe, disaster). These terms, like crisis, also have many meanings. Many studies have considered these concepts together, if not simultaneously and synonymously.7 Charles Hermann has repeated that the term crisis is used less frequently than are these sister terms.8 Some of these distinctions appear to be due, in part, to the usage of different disciplines.9 Psychologists are inclined to employ concepts such as anxiety, threat or stress;10 sociologists and political scientists use such


7 Ibid., p. 16.


10 See F. E. Horvath, "Psychological Stress: A Review
terms as panic and crisis. Recently some efforts have been made to describe crisis in terms of an occasion for decision.

Crisis has been separated, however, from some of the concepts above by the stimulus and response model, developed by Osgood and Mowrer. In developing his revised "two-factor" approach to behavior, O. H. Mowrer introduced two intervening or "mediating" variables between the environmental stimulus and the behavior of the subject. According to the Mowrer model:

Thus, where Behaviorism restricted itself to the simple, one-step S-R formula, we are...

---


here confronted by the necessity of postulating minimally, a two-step, two-stage formula: \( S \rightarrow r \rightarrow s \rightarrow R \), where \( S \) is the danger signal, \( r \) the response of fear which is conditioned to it, and where \( s \) is the fear, experienced as a drive, which elicits (after learning) response, \( R \).

Using this conceptualization for a crisis situation it can be conceived that crisis is a stimulus \( S \) to which certain kinds of behavior, such as stress, anxiety, panic, are possible responses \( R \). The intervening variables, crucial, since they reveal the perception and the intention of the individual, will be considered separately in the following discussion.

The perception of the environmental event \( r \), in our case, of a crisis situation has been characterized as a decision situation including three dimensions: (1) a threat to high-priority values, (2) presents a restricted amount of time in which a response can be made, and (3) is unexpected or unanticipated. These three dimensions of

14 Mowrer, p. 77.

15 In other words, we have:
\[
S = \text{environmental event (in our case, crisis)} \\
r = \text{perception of event} \\
s = \text{intentions, triggered by the perception of } S \\
R = \text{response, motivated by perceptions and intentions regarding the environmental event.}
\]

16 This three-fold concept of crisis, based on a number of case studies of political decisions, was initially drawn up by Robinson, "The Concept of Crisis in Decision-Making," in Series Studies in Social and Economic Sciences.
crisis have been found to exist in other crisis studies within the social sciences.\textsuperscript{17} Both the involvement of major values and the limitation of time available for response have been indicated as aspects of crisis by Lasswell,\textsuperscript{18} and Hamblin.\textsuperscript{19} Eliot has defined crisis as:

A stage in any given interactional process where a person or a group is involved in a problem which has proved insoluble by whatever habits, customs or routine practices have been depended upon, and attention is suddenly focused upon the impasse...the competition or thwarting of motives, goals, habits and attitudes, or roles, creates bodily tensions demanding intelligent choice, direction by the ego, and conscious mobilization of accessible resources to resolve the tension.\textsuperscript{20}

Few definitions have incorporated the element of surprise

\textsuperscript{17} One helpful review of the traits of crisis used in psychological and sociological investigations is Ken Miller and Ira Iscoe, "The Concept of Crisis: Current Status and Mental Health Implications," \textit{Human Organization}, 22 (1963), 195-201.


\textsuperscript{20} K. Eliot quoted in Miller and Iscoe, p. 195.
or the unanticipated quality of a crisis situation. An assertion of the importance of this dimension, however, is made by R. La Piere, who states that only when phenomena are unpredictable can they be defined as crisis.

Finally, it is to be noted in discussing the perception of the event (r), the individual's role in defining the situation is emphasized. La Piere notes:

No circumstance, however unusual, is a crisis unless it is so defined by human beings. The individual involved must be aware of the danger which is present or he must believe that danger is present.

Several problems appear with the working definition of crisis presented above. Criticisms have been leveled at the response-time dimension. For instance, Robinson and Snyder emphasize the relative value that time may have in different problems for decision. What is a short time for one problem or one decision-maker may be more than ample for another.

21 See Howard H. Lentner, "The Concept of Crisis as Viewed by the United States Department of State," mimeo., Western Reserve Institute, 1967, 46, who presents briefly the responses of F. S. O.'s to a questionnaire item regarding the element of unexpectedness.


23 Quoted in Miller and Iscoe, p. 195. This aspect is discussed more fully in Chapter III.

24 James Robinson and Richard C. Snyder, Decision-
The second problem concerns the fact that the criteria for determining when a crisis exists are not precise. In some ways they are close to those for psychological stress and indeed the criteria are intertwined.25 This problem is also due to the fact that the concept of stress has been used with so many different meanings that there no longer seems to be one thing called "stress". That stress can be considered a feature of crisis can not be doubted. Using the 1914 Case, R. C. North states, "High stress is almost universally characteristic of international crisis situations (and) tends to have a crucial effect upon the decision-making patterns of the leadership involved."26 Thus our primary task is to separate the concept of stress from its parent, crisis.

Like crisis, stress has many meanings.27 The most common usage of stress is probably that formulated by Lazarus and Baker on the basis of previous studies: "thwart-
ing some motive state or potentially thwarting, resulting in effective arousal." Margaret Hermann, using this concept in Inter-Nation Simulation, defines stress as, "... in stress an individual perceives that a situation (stimulus) threatens to obstruct or actually obstructs a goal which he is motivated to achieve." Obviously these definitions closely parallel one of the dimensions of crisis referred to above. However, Robinson states:

The difficulties with using stress and crisis synonymously center upon the unidimensional character of the concept of stress. As a block or threat to goals, stress is only one of the major characteristics of crisis....

In the present context, therefore, stress will be differentiated as a characteristic of the individual's response to a crisis. Returning to the Mowrer model, stress can be conceptualized as those perceptions which have been triggered by one of the dimensions of a crisis situation, and result in certain affective behavior.

What is perhaps of most interest to us in this

28

29
Margaret G. Hermann, Stress, Self-Esteem, and Defensiveness in an Inter-Nation Simulation (China Lake: Project Michelson, 1965).

30
Robinson, Crisis Decision-Making, p. 16.
study is the wide range of possible indicators of stress that can be listed and applied in our study. As Horvath has pointed out, the knotty problem of an operational definition of stress is less crucial when one studies a situation "which seems obviously stressful to most individuals."\(^{31}\)

It is clearly evident from the citations and bibliography presented elsewhere that a vast literature on stress has accumulated. Even allowing for a high degree of selectivity, the list of relevant writings is imposing. Over the past fifteen years, research suggestions and problem- or policy-oriented proposals have grown in number and sophistication.\(^{32}\) This large quantity of material in part signifies the importance of the topic of stress to the social sciences. For example, the entire theory of deterrence is based on a premise that responses will be carefully thought out and arrived at by a dispassionate assessment of the potential costs and gains. This immediately raises an obvious question. Is this assumption of detached calculation valid in all situations? Does it hold when decision-makers are under high stress? Several political scientists, for instance, using a content analysis of diplomatic documents, have un-

\(^{31}\) Horvath, p. 208.

covered an apparent change in requirements (or standards) for war held by Germany and Austria-Hungary. There is evidence that, prior to the crisis in the summer of 1914, those governments strongly wished to avoid war until their military capabilities placed them in a more favorable position with respect to their potential enemies. As the stress upon the official decision-makers increase—reflected in the increased amount of affect in their statements—the objective of avoiding immediate hostilities was abandoned. How can this happen? Why do serious situations sometimes not develop into violent conflict while not so serious ones do? What manifestations are there of stress which affect decision-making behavior? What are the dominant dimensions along which decision-makers under stress evaluate situations? To understand these questions we must first understand the concept of stress.

Basically, some degree of stress is generally considered an integral and necessary part of motivation in that it generates search behavior. Many studies have revealed a curvilinear relation between stress and performance: at moderate levels, increased anxiety aided performance, but


34 Holsti, p. 365.
at higher levels similar increases disrupted the decisional process. On the basis of a series of experiments, H. G. Birch determined that intermediate—rather than high or low motivation—was most conducive to efficient solution of both insightful and non-insightful problems. Postman and Bruner, in their analysis of the effects of stress on perception, point out the pathological consequences which inhibit or retard productive behavior should too great a degree of stress be in evidence:

Perceptual behavior is disrupted, becomes less well controlled than under normal conditions, and hence is less adaptive. The major dimensions of perceptual function are affected: selection of percepts from a complex field becomes less adequate and sense is less well differentiated from nonsense; there is maladaptive accentuation in the direction of aggression and escape; untested hypotheses are fixated recklessly.

Productive work can thus be said to take place in an environment of "uncertainty without anxiety." While some of the

35 See Horvath, pp. 205-210, for a review of this literature.


experimental studies concerning stress have been criticized on both conceptual and methodological grounds, the general conclusion that high stress is dysfunctional across a wide spectrum of types of behavior appears unassailable. 39

In attempting to understand more closely the concept of stress, O. R. Holsti formulated several hypotheses culled from the literature on stress and applicable to a research design concerning the 1914 situation. These hypotheses are:

Hypothesis 1. As stress increases in a crisis situation:
(a) time will be perceived as an increasingly salient factor in decision-making
(b) decision-makers will become increasingly concerned with the immediate rather than the distant future.

Hypothesis 2. As stress increases, decision-makers will perceive:
(a) the range of alternatives open to themselves to become narrower
(b) the range of alternatives open to adversaries to expand. 40

In other words, Holsti discovered that both in the experimental literature of psychology as well as the decision-making

39 Other behavioral consequences to which stress has been experimentally related include: deterioration of verbal performance; increased rate of error; stereotyped responses; disorganized activity; problem-solving rigidity; diminished tolerance for ambiguity; and a reduction in the focus of attention, both across time and space, see Horvath, op. cit.

literature the factors of perceived time and perceived alternatives were treated as 'key' factors which affect individual and group performance, particularly when engaged in complex tasks. The ultimate findings of his own research supported this conclusion. 41

Considering solely the area of foreign policy decision-making the importance of the dimension of stress is readily apparent. Time is most likely to be perceived as important because of the advantages, perceived or real, which may accrue to the party able to act first. The contemporary dilemma which accompanies this fact was outlined by Holsti:

Technology has provided the capacity to respond with weapons of almost incalculable speed of delivery, thus often cutting available decision-time to almost nothing. At the same time the potency of these weapons has created one of the crucial paradoxes of the nuclear age: the very decisions which, because of their potentially awesome consequences, should be made with the greatest deliberation, must often be made under the most urgent pressure of time. 42

As well, related to the degree of time pressure is the search for alternatives. Various studies suggest that time pressure can enhance the rate of performance and creativity; however, most of the evidence also indicates

41 Holsti, "Perceptions," pp. 79-120.
42 Ibid., p. 80.
that beyond a moderate level such pressure becomes dysfunctional. This is important in foreign policy decision-making, an area of extraordinary complexity, requiring "feats of memory and inference."\textsuperscript{43} Time pressure on complex decision-making, however, has been discovered to be particularly harmful.\textsuperscript{44} One study has shown that under increased time pressure, normal subjects produce a schizophrenic-like type of error,\textsuperscript{45} while another has shown that, although a moderate increase in time pressure can increase team productivity, an increase from low to high pressure has an adverse effect.\textsuperscript{46} Mackworth and Mackworth found that increasing the number of decisions required in a given period of time by a factor of five lead to a fifteen-fold rise in decision errors.\textsuperscript{47} Further, studies have shown that the

\textsuperscript{43} Holsti, "Perceptions," p. 82.

\textsuperscript{44} Jerome S. Bruner, J.J. Goodnow, and George A. Austin, A Study of Thinking (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956), p. 147.


pressure of time increases stereoty whole, 48 disrupts problems-
solving, 49 and narrows the focus of attention. 50

The close relationship of crisis and stress vis à vis
the time element deserves some mention. C. Hermann, as we
noted before, has included perceived pressure of time as one
of three defining characteristics of crisis; 51 Holsti, how-
ever, has included the time element in his hypotheses con-
cerning stress. Clarifying this point somewhat Holsti writes:

There actually appears to be a two-way inter-
action between time and stress. On the one
hand, the common use during crisis of such
 techniques as ultimata and threats with built-
in time deadlines is likely to increase the
stress under which the recipient must op-
erate. On the other hand, added increments
to the stress level tend to distort percep-
tions of time. The expression that "a
watched pot never boils" is a common way
of expressing the relationship between stress
and distorted time perspective. 52

When decision time is at a premium, estimates of
multiple outcomes attached to a particular course of action
are likely to be less extensive. 53 Further, conditions of

48 Birch, op. cit.
49 Bruner, op. cit.
50 Horvath, p. 274.
52 Holsti, "Perceptions," p. 82
great stress see the increased concern for the immediate rather than the distant future; the uncertainty of a severe crisis making it exceptionally difficult to follow outcomes of an interaction situation far into the future. Moreover, if potentially severe penalties are perceived to be an inherent part of the situation the belief that the more distant future will have little meaning unless a solution is found for the immediate problems is likely to prevail.

The literature on stress also reveals a relationship of stress with the search for alternatives. This interest in the effect of stress on alternatives utilizes an assumption contributed by decision-making theory: when the decision-maker is faced with a decision, he is motivated to search for an alternative, but that only a few of the theoretically possible options will be considered.

The rate of search for satisfactory alternatives is in part due to the belief that (1) the environment is benign, and (2) that options in fact exist. But it is in the nature of crisis that most, if not all, alternatives will be nega-

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54 Holsti, "Perceptions," p. 83

55 Ibid.

tively valued by decision-makers. March and Simon have developed a typology of perceived choices--good, bland, mixed, poor and uncertain.\textsuperscript{57} It seems reasonable to assume that most perceived alternatives in a crisis will be of the last two types. Or, as Holsti states, "crisis decision-making will be characterized primarily by avoidance--avoidance, rather than approach-approach or approach-avoidance choices."\textsuperscript{58}

The quest for alternatives may also be related to the origin of the crisis stimulus. R. C. Snyder has suggested that more options will be considered when the decision is anticipated rather than occasioned by the environment.\textsuperscript{59} However, crisis decisions, as discussed before, are by definition unanticipated.\textsuperscript{60} Thus the crisis environment will itself restrict the rate of inquiry and as the crisis deepens and stress increases, search behavior will be further constricted. For example, Snyder and Paige discovered that in the Korean crisis only a single alternative course of action was considered:

\textsuperscript{57} March and Simon, p.114.
\textsuperscript{58} Holsti, "Perceptions," p. 83.
\textsuperscript{60} See page 8.
Empirically, however, the decision-making process in the Korean case was not characterized by the consideration of multiple alternatives at each stage. Rather a single proposed course of action emerged from the definition of the situation...61

As perceived options are reduced to only those with potentially high penalties considerable dissonance was found to be created.62 One method of dissonance reduction was to perceive that the only open choices which offer a way out of the dilemma lay with the other party. In other words, only the other side can prevent the impending disaster. Holsti, as an example, quotes the correspondence between the Kaiser and the Czar, in which Wilhelm frantically writes, "the responsibility for the disaster which is now threatening the whole civilized world will not be laid at my door. In this moment it still lies in your power to avert it."63 The dissonance between what the decision-maker does (pursues policies that are acknowledged to lead to war) and what he

61 Snyder and Paige, p. 245. See also March and Simon, p. 154.


63 Quoted in Holsti, "Perceptions," p. 83. Schelling has shown at the other extreme it may be advantageous to maneuver oneself into "a position in which one no longer has an effective choice over how he shall behave or respond" in order to make the "outcome depend solely on the other party's choice" - see T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 137-138.
knows (that war leads to destruction) is reduced any absolv-
ing himself from responsibility for the decision. This
phenomenon has been described by L. Festinger:

It is possible, however, to reduce or even
eliminate the dissonance by revoking the
decision psychologically. This would con-
sist of admitting to having made the wrong
choice or insisting that really no choice
had been made for which the person had any
responsibility. Thus, a person who has just
accepted a new job might immediately feel he
had done the wrong thing, and, if he had it
to do over again, might do something different.
Or he might persuade himself that the choice
had not been his: circumstances and his boss
conspired to force the action on him.64

This process may also be related to the general inability
of individuals to perceive effectively the dilemma of
others. This inability to perceive the true situations of
others in a crisis has been discovered in terms of motives,65
capabilities,66 and military strength.67

The tendency under stress to reduce the number of
alternatives perceived is obviously a dangerous factor for

64 Festinger, pp. 43-44. (Underlining mine).

65 K. E. Boulding, "National Images and International

66 Raymond A. Bauer, "Problems of Perception and the
Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union,"

67 S. F. Huntington, Arms Races, in Carl Friedrich and
individuals concerned with foreign policy decision-making. Even in formulating policy under "normal" conditions decision-makers are confined to what Herbert Simon has termed "bounded rationality". Simon states:

The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world—or even for a reasonable approximation of such objective rationality.

In other words, a rational decision-maker perceives and considers only a segment of the full range of possibilities for acting. This fact, however, is aggravated in a crisis situation by the simplification of the cognitive structure. When the maximum degree of complexity is required in order to understand the full problem at hand, and thus, allowing one to measure the options and filter the imagined consequences of each, the opposite actually occurs in a crisis. H. Cleveland writes:

For the problem of decision-making in our complicated world is not how to get the problem simple enough so that we can all understand it; the problem is to get our thinking about the problem as complex as humanly possible—and thus approach the

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68 Every policy to some extent is a risk and thus creates stress.

complexities of the real world around us.\textsuperscript{70}

Finally, added to the above two pathological dimensions of stress can be added a third—deterioration of health.\textsuperscript{71} There is evidence that for participants involved in crisis, personal exhaustion and physical risk increase. During the crisis of 1898 the London \textit{Times} reported of McKinley, "The President is said to show signs of overwork."\textsuperscript{72} The President's secretary remarked in his diary, "He appeared to me careworn...did not look well, and his eyes had a far-away, deep-set expression in them."\textsuperscript{73} During the Cuban crisis of 1961 an Assistant Secretary of State was reportedly involved in an automobile accident at 4 o'clock in the morning while driving home after several exhaustive days of around-the-clock work on the crisis.\textsuperscript{74} Obviously, physical exhaustion affects in some measure the number of alternatives likely to be considered, as well as the judgment of percep-


\textsuperscript{71} Horvath, pp. 203-205.

\textsuperscript{72} London \textit{Times}, March 24, 1898.


\textsuperscript{74} Robinson, \textit{Crisis Decision-Making}, p. 43.
tions during a time of crisis. Snyder and Paige emphasize that decision-makers, tending to have insufficient information on which to operate, must follow value premises more heavily than is otherwise the case in top-level decision-making. Having no experience in crisis management, since every crisis can to a certain extent be considered unique and non-routine, and experiencing physical exhaustion, their innate ability to direct events will to some extent be impaired.

This discussion has emphasized two primary dimensions of a stress situation which are potentially dysfunctional for effective decision-making—perception of time and perception of alternatives. Certainly, these two factors are found to be consistently important in the fields of psychology and decision-making literature of political science. Holsti's case study and various laboratory simulation studies have supported their importance in decision-making. However, as Holsti concludes, "ultimate importance


76 Snyder and Paige, op. cit.

77 T. W. Milburn states "...the actions of any particular decision-maker, if we know his role and the situation as he perceives it, can be explained in terms of relatively few variables"—"The Concept of Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues, 17-18 (1961-62), p. 5.
for the student of international politics must, however, be further established in case studies of actual foreign policy decisions.\textsuperscript{78} This, then, is the intention of this project using the Spanish-American War situation of 1898 as our focus.

\textsuperscript{78} Holsti, "Perceptions," p. 116. "The evidence from historical situations is far less systematic—particularly in the realm of foreign policy"—than other areas of political science - Holsti, p. 86.
Chapter II

THE CUBAN REBELLION AND UNITED STATES REACTION

Part 1: The Rebellion Commences

Introduction

In the end far more than half the territory of the United States was the spoil of Spanish empire, rarely acquired with perfect propriety. To sum up the story in a single word, Spain had immense influence over the United States; but it was the influence of the whale over its captors—the charm of a huge, helpless and profitable victim.¹

This historical view of American relations with Spain was expressed by Henry Adams at the turn of the century. A study of the documents and histories of the period prior to the war with Spain in 1898, drives home the conviction that the war with Spain, declared April 21, 1898,² was, from the point of view of technical diplomacy, an un-


² A state of war was actually declared April 25 retroactive to April 21 when the American blockade of Cuba was ordered by President McKinley.
necessary war. A careful study will show that Spain had, by April 10, yielded so much to the requests of the United States as to the direction of affairs in Cuba, that, given time and patience, the practical independence of Cuba or its annexation by America could have been secured without recourse to war.

On the other hand, it is difficult to see how the war could have been prevented. The diplomats might have arrived at a peaceful solution of the Cuban question; but the currents of domestic politics, the awakening of "bumptious nationalism" and the stirrings of humanitarian sympathy had made the American people eager for armed intervention. These were fed as well by the fact that large American property interests and naturalized American citizens had suffered severely by the continued disorders in Cuba. The newspaper press of the time, dubbed the "yellow press", inflamed popular passion until almost any lie received currency. Finally at the head of the nation was a President who certain contemporary historians have referred to as "a kindly soul in a spineless body," "a well-intentioned bungler," and a

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person "unpracticed in the art of living up to his con-
victions."  

From a broad point of view the results attained from the war were immense. With the Spanish-American War and the resulting Treaty of Paris the United States took its place among the great powers of the world. Although the Spanish-American War did not itself make the United States a world power, the nation already had the potential for such status, the war and treaty did prove to Americans that the United States was in reality a world power. It served notice that Europe must reckon with American force in its own dealings. A. L. Dennis writes, "It made the nation feel like a world power. Other disputes had stirred our patriotism; the Spanish-American War put it to the test." The Washington Post in a perceptive editorial of 1898 remarked:

5 H. Wayne Morgan, America's Road to Empire: The war with Spain and overseas expansion (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. xi.


8 Ibid., p. 65.
We are face to face with a strange destiny. The taste of empire is in the mouths of the people even as the taste of blood in the jungle. It means an imperial policy, the Republic renascent, taking her place with the armed nations.\(^9\)

Although territorial expansion was commonplace to United States' development long before 1898, the Spanish-American War brought in its wake a new kind of expansionism, which lay largely outside the American experience. Now Americans were extending themselves to "distant extra-hemispheric colonies...abandoning a strategy of defense hitherto limited to the continent and its appurtenances, in favour of a major strategic commitment in the Far East.\(^{10}\) Symptomatic of the new mood of the nation Josiah Strong, one of the heralds of the "new" imperialism, wrote, "It is manifest that the Anglo-Saxon holds in his hands the destinies of mankind, and it is evident that the United States is to become the home of this race, the principle seat of his power, the great center of his influence.\(^{11}\) In total, The Spanish-American War forced Americans to face up to the inevitable fact that it could no longer merely look inward.


\(^{11}\) Josiah Strong, Our Country (New York, 1885) p. 179.
The days of "a nation of happy beings"\textsuperscript{12} engrossed with the economic and political exploitation associated with western settlement were numbered by the natural by-product of the war--Drang nach Westen\textsuperscript{13}--an increased attention in the Pacific and territories beyond America's borders. This residue of the war, consisting in part of an interest in foreign trade, an adequate navy, a colonial empire, the necessity of an isthmian canal, influenced American foreign policy for at least three decades, mandating a new type of "spread eaglelism"\textsuperscript{14} and effecting such policies as Teddy Roosevelt's "Big Stick" and "international policepower," the Platt Amendment and the accompanying shift to an interventionist policy,\textsuperscript{15} the Taftian concept of "Dollar Diplomacy" and the "Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine" of F.D.R.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{12} Samuel Flag Bemis quoted in Plesur, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{13} Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins press, 1936), p. 23.

\textsuperscript{14} Plesur, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{15} The Platt Amendment guaranteed to the United States a right to further interventions in Cuba should the United States desire them. The Amendment played an important role in the metamorphosis of the Monroe Doctrine from opposition to European intervention in American affairs to justification for United States intervention in Latin America, see David F. Healey, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), p. 212.

\textsuperscript{16} de Conde, p. 356.
The war, "Bridged the gap between the idea of non-intervention in Latin America by European powers and the policy of intervention by the United States."\textsuperscript{17} Thus, although the conflict was small in scope, large consequences ensued when peace resumed between Spain and the United States.

\textbf{The Rebellion}

How was it that the United States went to war with Spain? The answer is full of complex uncertainties. Many of the old familiar explanations have long since broken down under careful historical research and many new interpretations have been added. Basically, historians have attributed it to the desire to stop the seemingly endless revolution which was shattering Cuba. Cuba had witnessed a rapid succession of revolts against Spanish rule, of which there were eight in the period between 1823-1855, followed by a prolonged conflict known as the "Ten Year's War" 1868-1878, and the "Little War" in 1883. Each time the insurrectionists and Spanish forces had fought to an unsatisfactory "peace of exhaustion".\textsuperscript{18} On February 4, 1895 war had again broken out, attributable to the economic, political and social problems existing in the late 1890's.

\textsuperscript{17} Healey, p. 213.

\textsuperscript{18} Frank B. Freidel, \textit{The Splendid Little War} (Boston: Little Brown, 1958), p. 4.
Economically it began with a world-wide depression in 1893, followed by an American tariff law in 1894, which abrogated the reciprocity treaty which had guaranteed Cuban sugar a favoured position in the American market. Raising the duties on raw sugar, the backbone of Cuba's economy, to a level forty per cent higher than under the previous tariff, the new law aggravated further an already depressed Cuban economy, the prime supplier for U.S. sugar imports, wrecking its sugar market and bringing crushing poverty to the island. As well, the crisis can be attributed to Spanish colonial authorities' restrictive, mercantile tariff policy which was designed to protect primarily the interests of monopolistic Spanish merchants and shippers in the Cuban trade. To the resulting higher prices for Cuban consumers and added difficulty in marketing Cuban exports abroad, was added a high local tax burden and inefficient bureaucracy. With the collapse of the 1892 boom in the Cuban economy, plus the smouldering discontent over the failure of Spain to keep its promises of fiscal reform and political autonomy, frustrated rising expectations resulted in revolution. 19

The social and political complications in nineteenth century Cuba saw the slow alienation of the native creole

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19 For a standard account of these events, see French Ensror Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain, Diplomacy (New York, 1909), pp. 538-50.
leaders from the privileged newcomers who came from Spain in endless succession to rule the last remnant of the Spanish empire in the Western hemisphere. The former slave population, emancipated in 1878, being free wage labourers, now had the danger of being dispensed with when they were not needed. Considering the seasonal nature of the sugar and tobacco industries and the corresponding shifts in the amount of labour required planters were able to cut costs by laying off a large fraction of the labour force each slack season. Thus with a disenchanted and an unemployed-rootless class the 1895 revolt came at the right time to win mass popular allegiance.

Direct American involvement in the Cuban situation came primarily through large business investments in the island. With the liquidation of slavery the sugar estates increasingly felt the rise in the cost of labour. The planters, however, in attempting to remain financially solvent were caught in an economic undertow. Obviously, the answer to their problem lay in increased mechanization of production, made possible through the benefits of industrialization. Many planters, however, had been hard hit by the recent wartime destruction of property and were, as a result, in no position to make large new capital investments. Others, who annually purchased their necessities on credit from mercantile houses in Spain or New England, were unable to pay their debts. As well during this same period Cuban
cane sugar was hard pressed in the world market by the competition of European sugar beet, whose production was subsidized by the governments of most of the continental powers. Thus with a mounting debt burden, a shortage of local capital, oppressive Spanish regulations the Spanish planters found it increasingly difficult to survive, and an perceptible increase in foreign ownership appeared in the sugar industry.

The productive capacity of the U.S. at this time was almost an independent factor in American foreign policy. Artificially stimulated by the Civil War and only temporarily checked by the depressions of the 1870's and early 1890's American output of manufacturers and farmers products had leaped upward, decade by decade (no fewer than 676,000 inventions were patented at Washington between 1860 and 1890) until it seemed that "the Great Republic might die of a surfeit, smothered in its own yield." With the frontier settled and free land gone business opportunities within the country began to dwindle. The great industrial

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20 Healey, p. 8.


corporations feeling the need for new markets and materials in which to pour their capital looked outward. In the late 1890's, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Thomas B. Reed, described the U.S. as "a billion dollar country." Such mammoth wealth obviously sought egress beyond its shores. America was "breaking out" as one historian put it. Cuba, located less than 100 miles from the Florida Keys and under 600 miles from the mouth of the Mississippi could be considered a natural appendage to the U.S. With its lack of local capital as well as its strategic location within the Gulf, a value accentuated by the interests of Ferdinand de Lesseps and French financiers in an isthmian canal, as well as British economic dominance over the desirable markets elsewhere in Latin America, Cuba looked increasingly interesting to the American investor. The early American historian Wolf von Schierbrand wrote: "Growth beyond the borders came to be regarded as not mere whim, not something desirable, but something absolutely necessary to safeguard the further national development and to preserve America from the cause of ill-balanced production." 

23 Plesur, p. 16.
24 Ibid., p. 216.
In the days of pre-Keynsian economics this fact cannot be too much overstressed. Thus aided by U.S. governmental pressure the too-active producers entered the Cuban scene.

The insurrection, as the previous struggles, was brutally fought on both sides. The revolutionists led by Maximo Gomez ignoring the usual rules of warfare, inaugurated a scorched earth policy, plundering and destroying loyalist property, and burning sugar plantations, many of them owned by the Americans. The Cubans aimed to drive the Spaniards from the island by exhausting Spain's resources. Utilizing guerrilla warfare, rarely attempting to face the Spanish armies in pitched battle, the insurrectos' terrorization campaign made the economic situation more hopeless, swelled the ranks of the indigent workers from whom the rebels were chiefly recruited and effectively crippled the operations and revenues of the insular government.

In attempting to make headway against Gomez's tactics the Spanish government in February 1896 sent General V. M. Weyler to Cuba with orders to crush the rebellion through harsh methods. In instituting his terrorization campaign Gomez had hoped this would force the civil population either into the revolutionary ranks or into the garrisoned towns, where they would starve and possibly turn on the Spanish.\footnote{27}{Thus, even before concentration was ordered, large numbers of labourless people had assembled in the towns in search of work and food.}
fight fire with fire Weyler appropriated this strategy and instituted a policy infamously known as the reconcentrado policy. Designed to control the rebels who appeared as peaceful farmers by day and raiders at night, Weyler ordered the entire population moved into the garrison towns. Supplies or inhabitants found in the countryside were destroyed, presumed to aid the insurrectos and thus fair game for the army. 28

These actions, added to the actions of Gomez, virtually ended the normal economic and social life of Cuba's 1.6 million inhabitants. Although no more drastic than similar measures used by other commanders at other times in fighting guerrilla forces, and no more brutal than the tactics of the rebels themselves, Weyler's policy does rightfully earn him the nickname "Butcher." Although the reconcentrado policy was consciously planned and executed little effort was made to provide for the sudden increase in the population of the towns. The full horror of the rebellion cannot be overstated. "The rebellion," M. Wilkerson writes, "had no parallel in history in savage destructiveness up to that time. The great increase, caused by this order (reconcentration), of demoralized,

28 The edict of reconcentration stated: "Any individual found outside the lines in the country at the expiration of this period, shall be considered rebels and dealt with as such," from Horatio Ruben, Liberty: The Story of Cuba (New York: Brewer, Warren, and Putnam, 1932), p. 294.
poverty-stricken, and shiftless humanity, crowded with the
dreck of their slight belongings into the small Cuban towns,
could, in the inability of the Spanish government to fur-
nish them food, but result in appalling mortality." In
certain provinces the annual death rate during the rebellion
rose to approximately 300 persons per 1,000, or nearly one-
third of the population. In Havana, and its suburb, Regla,
reconcentration prompted 62 deaths per day, the majority
due to starvation, in 1898, up from 6 deaths per day in
pre-rebellion days. In total the Cuban Census of 1899
estimates that nearly 200,000 people died as a result of
the rebellion. By 1898 Cuba was reduced to misery while
the two combatants were gripped in a bloody deadlock. It
was a situation which could not but affect in some measure
the American public with an already jaundiced attitude to

29 Marcus M. Wilkerson, Public Opinion and the
Spanish-American War (New York: Russell and Russell,

30 Chadwick, pp. 505-507.

31 The last census was in 1887 and gave 1,631,687
as the population in that year. The report of the census
of 1899 says: "The number of inhabitants was certainly not
overstated." The latter census taken in October 1899 gave
a population of 1,572,797. "It is probable, therefore, that
the direct and indirect losses by the war and the reconcen-
trado policy, including a decrease of births and of immig-
ration, and an increase of deaths and emigration reached a
total of not far from 200,000." Census of Cuba, 1899,
p. 72. See also Chadwick, p. 493.
Spain and a fear that yellow fever would spread from Cuba to the southern states.

Economically the rebellion effectively ruined, what was practically Cuba's one support, the production of sugar. One to understand the destruction which followed the reconcentrado edics, has but to note the fact that production fell from 1,004,264 tons in 1894-95 to 225,221 in the following year. The $76 million of imports from Cuba to the United States in 1894 had fallen to $40 million in 1896 and $18 million in 1897. The exports from the United States to Cuba were in 1898 but $8 million, a third of what they were from years before. The continuance of the struggle not only meant ruin to the island but shocking waste of capital and production from the American investor. This effect on business by the rebellion did not escape the American entrepreneurs who had recently poured capital into an ailing Cuban economy.

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32 Wilkerson, p. 492.

33 Chadwick, p. 487.

34 For a discussion of the Cuban Revolution from various points of view, see Edwin F. Atkins, *Sixty Years in Cuba* (Cambridge, 1926), Chapters 12-18, for the American sugar planter's description of events. (Atkins was the largest single owner of Cuban sugar properties and had originally pioneered the penetration of American investment there). Frederick Funston, *Memories of Two Wars* (New York, 1911), W. Millis, *The Martial Spirit* (New York: Literary Guild of America, 1931), Robert P. Porter, *Industrial Cuba* (New York,
Part 2: Enter America

President Cleveland's warning in his last annual message December 7, 1896, that the time might come "when a correct policy and case for our interests" as well as broad humanitarian motives might force direct American involvement in Cuba, presaged a delicate situation for the incoming McKinley Administration. While the situation had grown increasingly worse in Cuba, it had also grown into a major public issue in the United States. Hofstadter has called this effect "the psychic crisis of the 1890." The situation in the U.S. was prompted by four factors: the Cuban "junta," the "yellow press," the "jingoes" in Congress, and the "temper of the times". Since the American press and people had long been interested in the periodic revolts in Cuba, the insurrectionists found it relatively easy to arouse American feelings against Spain. From the first, due primarily to the Alliance incident, in which a Spanish gunboat fired on an American steamer which

1899) for the economists' view of Cuban events, and Gonzala de Quesada and Henry D. Northrop, The War in Cuba, or the Great Struggle for Freedom (New York, 1896) for a pro-Cuban view of affairs.


36 Hofstadter, p. 148.
it supposed to be bent on a filibustering errand six miles out from Cuba, the revolution received much attention from the general public, generally slanted against Weylerian tactics in Cuba. As well, capitalizing on traditional American sympathy for the underdog, American distrust of European institutions, and colonial imperialism as well as on the American memory of their own revolutionary beginnings the Cubans established revolutionary committees, or juntas, in the U.S., with general headquarters in New York, in order to spread propaganda, raise funds, and to recruit and outfit filibustering expeditions.

The influence of the "yellow press" on the American people in stirring up opposition to Spain is difficult to determine and can only be approximated. Initiated in 1897

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37 Filibustering expeditions were boats loaded at American ports with arms and men in order to supply the rebels. This activity was considered illegal since it violated the neutrality laws of the United States.

38 de Conde, p. 339.

39 Plesur, p. 44.

40 Rubens, p. 222.

41 For details, see George W. Auxier, "The propaganda Activities of the Cuban Junta in Precipitating the Spanish-American War, 1895-1898," Hispanic American Historical Review, XIX (August, 1939) 286-305.
in the New York Journal and advertised as the "New Journalism" the policy was one of aggressive reporting aimed at bringing to light unusual incidents to be exploited in building circulation. Success spells emulation and soon vicious rivalries developed among the newspapers of Boston, New York, Chicago and San Francisco, each attempting to outdo the other with a more striking display of news. The contest was especially bitter between the World and the Journal, which had developed into a fight for supremacy in the field of New York journalism conducted by Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst. Both newspapers by early 1898 had a circulation exceeding the 800,000 mark. Realizing that nothing sells newspapers like war the Cuban situation seemed tailor-made for purposes of a circulation battle. Resorting to one of the surest methods of striking a responsive chord among their readers—the support of the underdog—sensational publications put emphasis on topics most likely to find ready appeal, stressing Spanish atrocities against Americans, non-combatants and defenseless prisoners. Many reports of Spanish atrocities were exaggerated and in some instances fabricated or run as straight news when in actuality their sources were dubious "junta" accounts or rumors. As, Wilkerson in Public Opinion and the Spanish—

42 Wilkerson, p. 7.
American War states, "There was no subtlety in the means employed by sensational newspapers to build favourable sentiment for the Cubans."\(^4\) The American public, therefore, was being given war propaganda "an insidious thing. Once started it gains momentum with success until truth and rational thought are left stranded upon the reefs of discord and strife."\(^4\)

Most historians generally consider the influence of the sensational New York press to have been considerable, not only by reason of the example set other newspapers, and the size of its own circulation but also because of the widely distributed news service and the lack of alternative sources of information. In the age of gas lights, the American people had no other source of information concerning Cuban events except what was revealed by the press. Even the conservative press which refused to print "jingo" sentiments and severely denounced the radical press aided in spreading these sentiments. Since many Congressmen made frequent references to newspaper accounts of atrocities, their only real source of information, these speeches were duly reported by the conservative press since charges made

\(^4\) Wilkerson, p. 28.

by the press were given authority when they were repeated by members of Congress. Further, by 1897 virtually all of the important New York papers (except the Sun) were members of a strong co-operative news gathering organization, the Associated Press, and their news became available to the association for transmission to other member papers. Beside the A.P. reports the syndicated service of New York newspapers offered further coverage of the insurrection to other newspapers. For example, the New York Herald sold its news service to the Boston Herald, the Chicago Times-Herald and the San-Francisco Chronicle. The fact that such service included illustrations was an important item in presenting a full picture of Spanish atrocities. Thus when the New York publications sent correspondents to Cuba there was made available to nearly every paper in the country through the A.P. and syndicated services as much news of the Cuban insurrection as was available to the New York Press. Considering the unavoidability of the sensational press as well as the nature of their reports being written to produce response, it seems evident that the feeling against Spain was intensified.45

45 See Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), p. 71 which argues the importance of the yellow press. See also William E. Leuchtenburg, "The needless War with Spain," American Heritage, VIII (February 1957), p. 34, which stresses the same point and
To a great extent Congress reflected the attitudes of the yellow press with every session. The years after 1895 witnessed the introduction of numerous resolutions providing for the recognition of Cuban independence, the recognition of Cuban belligerency, or some kind of U.S. intervention. One practice by Congressmen was the frequent use of "yellow journals" as the basis for resolutions and speeches. Whether or not the practice of using newspaper accounts of Cuban "oppression" in congressional debates indicates the influence of the press on members of Congress, or merely that these members, realizing its potential power over their constituency, were utilizing it to strengthen their own position can not be ascertained.

In any case, Congressional extremism was a fact with which the Executive would have to deal.

Finally, the advent of the late 1890's saw a new philosophical universe become popular based primarily on Social Darwinism. Darwin's findings in The Origin of the Species, when applied to human society supplied the philosophical foundation for the theory that war was both in-

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46 Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2nd Session, XXXI, February 9, 1898, p. 1578, saw the bitter exchange between Senators Hale and Mason regarding the latter's frequent use of newspaper accounts in his speeches.

47 Wilkerson, p. 55.
herent in nature (survival of the fittest) and ennobling.

B. Tuchman writes: "Darwinism became the White Man's Burden. Imperialism acquired a moral imperative...it was the right and duty of the nobler, stronger superior race to extend its rule over inferior peoples, which in the American view meant over colonies." To Albert Beveridge this meant, "We are a conquering race...we must obey our blood." Ex- pressed in many guises ranging from Bergson's elan vital to the writings of Leslie Ward, William Graham Sumner and Nietzsche, the mood saw a decline in religion replaced by patriotism and nationalism. Tuchman writes: "Nationalism absorbed the strength once belonging to religion. Where people formerly fought for religion now they would presumably do no less for its successor."

The culmination of Darwin's theory was reached in the writings of Captain A. T. Mahan, President of the National War College. Mahan's thesis was that power, force and ultimately war were the prime factors which decide a nation's fate; dependence on other alternatives, such as

48 Tuchman, p. 249.

49 Quoted in Tuchman, p. 246.

50 An excellent study of Social Darwinism at the turn of the century is Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

51 Tuchman, p. 250.
arbitration were merely "illusions".\footnote{52}{ Primarily because of Mahan's great influence (Teddy Roosevelt "read it straight through"\footnote{53}{}) the development of an American navy, the acquisition of Hawaii, Cuba and an isthmian canal were raised to issues of strategic national importance.\footnote{54}{ By 1896 the Navy had constructed four battleships. As Tuchman states:

The policy which these ships expressed, though far from being generally accepted at once, represented a fundamental change in direction-outward.... The object was therefore to be supreme in these waters (and this meant a fleet capable of protecting the America coasts by taking offensive action against enemy bases anywhere from Newfoundland to the Carribean.\footnote{55}{}}}

The bellicosity of the press and Congress as well as the prevailing mood of the nation were portents of things to come in 1898.\footnote{56}{}

\footnote{52}{ See A. T. Mahan, \textit{The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783} (New York: Sagamore Press, 1957), and \textit{The Interest of America in Sea Power} (Boston, Little, Brown, 1897).}

\footnote{53}{ Tuchman, p. 131.}

\footnote{54}{ See Mahan, \textit{The Interest}.}

\footnote{55}{ Tuchman, p. 132.}

\footnote{56}{ Both Hofstadter and May, pp. 268-269 attribute the eventual war to this growing aggression impulse culminating in moral and public hysteria, "It was these forces already in operation that had most to do with bringing war in April 1898" - see May, p. 271.}
Events of January 1 to April 22, 1898

As 1898 began, God was in His heaven, William McKinley was in the White House, and all seemed right with the world. 57

McKinley's assumption of the Presidency and the first year of his Administration was accompanied by a lessening of tension between Spain and the U.S. This was due to several related factors. First, a new liberal Spanish government under Sagasta had come to power in October with the assassination of the conservative premier, Canovas. Although turning down McKinley's offer of "the good offices of the President" it did however inaugurate reforms in Cuba: it substituted General Weyler for General Blanco, 58 granted Cubans political rights guaranteed by the Spanish constitution, reformed the electoral laws of Cuba, and promised eventual home rule, or autonomy. Second, the American attitude toward filibustering expeditions, which had been lax due to the refusal of the courts to prosecute on technicalities those vessels impounded, had hardened. After the decision of the Supreme Court in the Horga case greater

57 Fletcher, p. xii.

58 This substitution, although satisfying the "yellow journals", was militarily a self-defeating move since "General Weyler was relieved just when he was close to restoring order...the Cuban insurrection flared up again providing the imperialists in the United States with the excuse for...war. Had Canovas lived, the excuse might not have been available" - Tuchman, p. 99.
risk was necessary to smuggle men and munitions into Cuba. While filibustering did not stop altogether, the Spanish Government could no longer complain with such substantial basis as before that American laws applicable to the situation were not enforced. Third, those persons of Cuban extraction and U.S. citizenship apprehended for alleged complicity in the insurrection were being released and expelled from the island until Minister to Spain Woodford could write from Madrid December 7, 1897 that the Spanish minister of state informed him that "no citizen of the U.S. now remained imprisoned in the Island of Cuba." Fifth, claims filed with the Department of State against Spain for failure to honour alleged contracts were substantially settled. These complaints originated due to Weyler's 1896 embargo on the exportation of tobacco from the island which failed to take into account contracts made before the decree was promulgated. Finally, Spain's conciliatory disposition and Weyler's dismissal softened, for the time being, the "yellow press" histrionics. This fading interest of the press was measured using the average number of column inches per week concerning the Spanish-Cuban situation in the New York Times. While 1897 had seen certain weeks averaging 20-30 columns of space, primarily placed on pages

59 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, p. 645 (Noted as For Reis hereafter).
one and two, the average number of column inches in the first three weeks of 1898 never totalled more than one-half column, usually displayed on page 3 to 7. With McKinley's first annual message recognizing Spain's new efforts and urging Americans to give her "a reasonable chance" to effect satisfactory changes, repudiating intervention ("I speak not of forcible annexation for that cannot be thought of. That by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression" 60) the situation seemed less tense than it had been the three years before.

With the lessening of tensions between the United States and Spain a surge of optimism as to the future course of events prevailed in Washington and Madrid. Forceful intervention had been momentarily disavowed. Although the distressing chore remained of aiding the reconcentrados this was to be accomplished by peaceful intervention in the form of a monetary gift by the American government to Cuba and an appeal by the President to "the people in every city and town" for donations. 61 From Minister to Madrid Woodford came the optimistic words: "...I do begin to see possible ways by which (we can) avert war." 62 It is at this

60 Richardson, x, 131.
61 For Rel., p. 655.
62 Ibid., p. 665.
point that we propose to begin our study into crisis decision-making using the "1898 Case." While prior to January 1, 1898 it can be said that the Spanish-Cuban situation had only distant crisis value vis-à-vis American decision-makers and the general public, in the 112 days between the 1898 New Year and declaration of war, Americans, through the direct loss of American lives and possessions, met totally different demands. The Havana riots, the incident of Dupuy de Lome's ill-fated letter; the destruction of the Maine and the subsequent report following it; the Proctor speech; the efforts made by Spain to meet American demands; the final urge to war—these events, bringing into play forces which existed prior to 1898, would force Americans to face a situation more personally than theretofore. For the researcher they provide clearly identifiable stages as the crisis began to take on definite proportions.

Although 1898 began optimistically, hopes were soon doomed by events. The rebels refused to accept anything less than independence arguing that the Spanish concession of autonomy had been manufactured primarily for U.S. consumption and was solely "a makeshift device for gaining time."63 The war, thus, continued. On January 12 Spanish loyalists in Cuba, who violently opposed any form of home rule pro-

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63 de Conde, p. 342.
ferred by the Liberal regime in Madrid to the native Cubans because of the threat to their preferred position, rioted in the streets attacking pro-autonomy newspaper offices. Fearing attacks on Americans Fitzhugh Lee, the American Consul-General in Havana, suggested:

If demonstrated he (Blanco regime) can not maintain order, preserve life, and keep the peace, or if Americans, and this their interests are in danger, ships must be sent, and to that end should be prepared to move promptly.64

Even though tension in Havana eased and Lee advised against sending warships to the city, the second-class battleship Maine entered Havana's harbour on January 25. Although rationalized on both sides as "an act of friendly courtesy"65 the visit, nonetheless displayed the increasing willingness of the U.S. to intervene directly in the Cuban situation.

A further increase in tension between Spain and the U.S. occurred on February 9 when Hearst's Journal published a private letter written by Enrique Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish Minister in the U.S. to a friend in Cuba. The Spanish Minister, not appreciating McKinley's efforts to avoid intervening in Cuba wrote two interesting sections:

...it (McKinley's annual message) shows once more what McKinley is, weak and a popularity hunter, besides being a would-be politician who tries to keep a door open behind him while

64 Senate Documents, No. 207-237, p. 83.
65 Ibid., p. 84.
remaining on good terms with the jingoes of his party....

It would be very advantageous to take up, even if only for effect, the question of commercial relations....

The fact that a Spaniard had dared criticize an American President, particularly in contemptuous terms, and the fact that commercial negotiations going on at that time were only "for effect", overshadowed the fact that it was a private letter written to a private individual, the contents of which were disclosed by surreptitious means. Although de Lome quickly resigned the jingoes and yellow press were once again whipped up into a fury.

The sensation of the de Lome affair was short-lived for it was followed a week later by a second event which dwarfed it into comparative insignificance. On the night of February 15 the Maine was blown up killing 260 men. The mystery of the explosion never being indisputably determined and the rumors that arose as a result presented excellent opportunities for the sensational papers to lay the blame at Spain's doorstep. Although laying no blame the naval court of inquiry did establish that a submarine mine had destroyed the vessel.

66 For Relg., pp. 1002-1022.

67 "Remember the Maine" incited public opinion until Secretary of the Navy Long commented that
"The slightest spark is liable to result in war." 69

The histrionics over the loss of the Maine were, on March 12, accompanied by a vivid eyewitness description of the still desperate situation existing in Cuba in a speech made by Senator R. Proctor to Congress. Because of Proctor's conservative and respected background those who generally dismissed the yellow journal interpretation of events were influenced by him. This was particularly noticeable in respect to the business community. Realizing that only American intervention could terminate the Cuban situation and hence a fluctuating stock market, the New York Times reported:

Senator Proctor's speech converted a great many people in Wall Street, who have heretofore taken the ground that the U.S. had

68 See Wilkerson, 121-132, for the misrepresentations of this incident in the press. The average number of columns given over to the Maine incident in the New York Times was approximately 30-35 in the week following the Maine and usually displayed on pages one to four. At this time headlines were used increasingly. Wilkerson, p. 101, states: "Although the World and Journal had used striking headlines for months, the sinking of the Maine may be said to fix definitely the beginnings of the practice on the part of most American newspapers of utilizing heavy type across several columns in displaying significant news, a practice which developed as the Spanish-American War progressed.... Increasingly headlines such as "Army on War Footing" and "Spanish Navy on the Move" headed despatches with very little substance or credibility (even in the conservative New York Times) as early as mid-March.

69 Quoted in de Conde, p. 344.
no business to interfere in a revolution on Spanish soil.70

Because of these events a gradual hardening of official opinion occurred. Autonomy for Cuba did not seem to work out successfully; the condition of the island grew worst; measures for the relief of the population were ineffective; and in general the outlook was discouraging.71 Woodford pessimistically wrote from Madrid:

I see nothing ahead except disorder, insecurity of persons and destruction of property. The Spanish flag cannot give peace. The rebel flag cannot give peace. There is but one power and one flag that can secure peace and compel peace. That power is the United States, and that flag is our flag.72

Day's letter in reply, reflecting concern over the domestic situation and specifically that over the actions of Congress, stated:

You should know and fully appreciate that there is profound feeling in Congress, and the gravest apprehension on the part of the most conservative members that a resolution for intervention may pass both branches in spite of any effort which can

70 New York Times, March 18, 1898.

71 See Secretary of State Sherman's letter to Woodford summarizing the Administration's view of the effectiveness of Spain in ending the war and aiding the population, For Rels., pp. 666-669.

72 For Rels., p. 689.
be made. Only assurance from the President that if he fails in peaceful negotiations he will submit all the facts to Congress at a very early date will prevent immediate action on the part of Congress.\footnote{For Rels., pp. 685-688. The threat of Congressional action is shown in a conversation between the influential Republican Senator and the Under Secretary of State: "Day, by____, don't your President know where the war-declaring powers is lodged? Tell him by____, that if he doesn't do something Congress will exercise the power." Quoted in M. Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 184. For a careful, sympathetic analysis of McKinley's dilemma, see May, pp. 129-130.}

Public opinion chose to show itself in favour of armed intervention by burning McKinley in effigy and hissing or destroying McKinley's picture in theaters.\footnote{H. W. Morgan, William McKinley and His America (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1963), p. 367.}

Cognizant of these pressures McKinley commenced to force the issue with Spain. On March 28 the American Minister in Madrid presented the Spanish government with a virtual ultimatum. It suggested:

1. An immediate armistice, freely granted by Spain, to last until October 1, both sides to accept McKinley's good offices.
2. A final end to reconcentration and Spanish relief for Cuba.
3. If peace terms were not reached by October 1, McKinley as arbitrator would settle the Cuban problem.
4. McKinley would approach the Cuban rebels directly for their participation in this plan if Spain first agreed.\footnote{For Rels., p. 711-712.}
Assistant Secretary of State Day made clear in a subsequent telegram that, "Full self-government with indemnity would mean Cuban independence."{76}

Anxious to avoid war the Spanish government gave a qualified assent to two of the demands. It ordered the end of the concentration camp policy in all parts of Cuba but would grant an armistice only should one first be demanded by the rebels.77 The issue of the armistice, which the rebels, confident of ultimate American intervention, would not ask for, made the reply unsatisfactory. Woodford gloomily forecast this meant "the continuation of this destructive and now needless war."78 The Spanish government was, however, in a great predicament. If the Spanish administration did not accept McKinley's demands in full, war appeared certain; if it conceded all, an angry public or the army "which was still the controlling factor in Spanish politics". and "a real danger"79 would probably over-

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{76} For Rel., p. 713.

{77} It was this point according to Leech, p. 180 which was the casus belli of the war. See also Ernest B. May, ed., The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1960), p. 95 and May, Imperial Democracy, pp. 153-159.

{78} For., Rel., p. 727.

{79} Ibid., p. 728.
throw the dynasty. Ensuing Spanish appeals to the various Great European powers for a monarchical front, except for the offer of their good offices in a joint note to McKinley were of no avail. In his reply McKinley spoke of fulfilling "a duty to humanity" and would concede nothing. The German foreign minister von Bulow, in reply to Spain's plea for help, bluntly said:

You are isolated because everybody wants to be pleasant to the United States, or at any rate, nobody wants to arouse America's anger; the United States is a rich country against which you simply cannot sustain a war.

On April 9 Spain, on her own initiative, ordered an end to hostilities in Cuba, thus meeting virtually all of McKinley's demands except American mediation. Woodford wired the next day:

I hope that nothing will now be done to humiliate Spain as I am satisfied that the present government is going, and is loyally ready to go, as fast and as far as it can. With your (McKinley's) power of action sufficiently free you will win the fight on your own lines.

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80 For Bels., pp. 740-41 (for note and McKinley's reply).


82 For Bels., p. 747. May, p. 168, points out that the American Minister in Madrid should have realized that all Spain sought was time. Although it must be admitted
McKinley, despite his personal desire to avert war, obviously did not feel he had freedom of action, Senator Elkins, a close friend of the President, said of Spain's final capitulation, "It comes late. Had it come a few days ago, I think we could have averted war." On April 11 McKinley sent Congress his message recommending forcible intervention. He had prepared this six days earlier but had delayed delivering it until Americans in Cuba were evacuated. He spoke "in the name of humanity, in the name of civilization;" said he had exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable conditions in Cuba; and asked Congress for authority to use the Army and Navy to end hostilities there, in effect a request for war. In two brief paragraphs, added to the end of a speech covering nine printed pages, he mentioned Spain's surrender on the points that were ostensibly the causes for war.

After one week of debate Congress passed a joint resolution which declared Cuba independent and authorized intervention. The president signed the resolution on April 20. Spain, in desperation, after receiving a three-day ultimatum on April 5 Woodford did send Day a telegram pleading that "If you can give still me time...I will get you the peace which you desire so much," For Belg., p. 736.

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83 Quoted in Morgan, America, p. 374.

84 The full text is in Richardson, x, 139-150.
timatum to remove their forces from Cuba, declared war on April 24. Congress, the next day, declared war to have existed since April 21 when McKinley had established a blockade and delivered his ultimatum. The Spanish-American War commenced with Admiral Dewey's victory in Manila Bay May 1 and lasted ten weeks.

Why did this unnecessary war come about when leading statesmen on both sides did not want it? Such a question cannot be answered categorically, but some factors that may be reckoned with are intuitively obvious. It is the purpose of this project to see if the considerations felt to be important intuitively hold up under empirical analysis. To McKinley, viewing events in retrospect three years later, "It is Manifest Destiny," and "I did all that in honor could be done to avert the war, but without avail" seemed to rationalize his actions. Perhaps, as William James wrote:

85 For a concise history of these events, see Chadwick, pp. 572-587.

86 For a history of the war, see Russell A. Alger, The Spanish-American War (New York, 1901) for an account by the much maligned Secretary of War, and J. B. Atkins The War in Cuba (London, 1898).

87 McKinley to his secretary George Cortelyou quoted in Tuchman, p. 145.

88 Quoted in de Conde, p. 347.
It is instructive to find how near the surface in all of us the old fighting spirit lies and how slight an appeal will wake it up. Once really awake, there is no retreat. 89

In any case, our interpretation of the forces which brought the American leadership to commence "an idiotic performance ...a disgraceful picnic" 90 must wait the analysis of a later chapter.

89 Quoted in Tuchman, p. 139.

90 An American general quoted in Freidel, p. 48.
Chapter III

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

Our hypotheses presented in Chapter One must now be given an empirical interpretation. In discussing the methodology and data to be utilized, three aspects will be considered: first, the suitability of the Spanish-American War situation as a setting in which to base our study; second, the rationale behind our choosing those decision-makers and documents which were utilized in this exercise; and, third, the research procedures as they directly pertain to this study.

Why the 1898 crisis?

The selection of the 1898 crisis as a setting in which to attempt quantitative analysis of the impact of crisis induced stress on certain aspects of foreign policy decision-making was based on several considerations. The available documents relating to the outbreak of the war is readily accessible for a preliminary study of this kind. Also, those documents available regarding this situation are unclassified. The most important material relating to the events of 1898 published by the United States government can be considered unquestionably authentic. The omitted

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or incomplete despatches—held back while passions and charges due to the war's maladministration ran high—have been superseded or re-added to the available published collection.

As well, no investigation in regard to crisis decision-making has been carried out in this particular historical case. This fact is more important than just its virgin charms. The earlier discussion emphasized the disparate and non-overlapping character of current work. Although the majority of crisis decision-making studies have used the 'case study', virtually no explicit effort has been made to test similar hypotheses with the same methods using different case studies. James A. Robinson states:

Until a much larger effort is launched toward replication of theories and applications of different methods to the same theory, our knowledge will be relatively superficial and not, in principle, much more adequate than the personal judgment and experience of people who have lived through crises or observed them firsthand. 2

Thus, as cited previously, an attempt will be made to replicate O. R. Holsti's hypotheses of "The 1914 Case" concerning the effects of stress upon: "(1) the manner in which decision-makers perceive time as a factor in their formulation of policy; and (2) the contrasting ways in

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which they view policy alternatives for their own nations, and for their adversaries."

Further, there exists in the historical literature considerable confusion as to which factors contributed to a stressful situation in the perception of the decision-makers. The war, as was intimated in Chapter Two, "small in scope yet large in consequences," has been the subject of many historical debates. Was it preventable? Did public opinion and the "yellow press" or the need of diplomacy force the conflict? What role did Congress play in pressuring McKinley? Was the war accidental or part of a larger and more conscious design? Was American interest in Cuba the object of economic motives or Christian humanitarianism? This project was thus set up to consider these and other areas of historical interest. In this way, it is hoped, clarification of the current historical middle can be partially achieved concomitant with a replication of crisis decision-making hypotheses which were significant in a previous case study of World War One.

Finally, the crisis is an excellent example of war through escalation. Although a chaotic situation existed


since 1865 in Cuba, it was in a time span of only four months during which the crisis hardened and during which certain escalatory steps, easily recognizable today, took place, i.e., the Havana riots, the infamous de Lome letter (having much the same consequences of the Zimmerman telegram of World War One) and the destruction of the battleship USS Maine. In other words, there exists a tight time span for research purposes of 112 days. Moreover, it can be easily said that the American government was more than ill-prepared to consider a war with what could still be considered a major European power, having a sizeable ocean-going fleet. Frederick T. Jane, British naval expert, although predicting an ultimate American triumph, especially if the two fleets met in massed combat, did forewarn his American audience that the Spanish fleet under Admiral Topete was capable of rendering serious damage, especially if it were employed in quick and devastating attacks on East Coast shipping and cities. Jane concluded, "...then the patriotic citizens of the United States may well come to rue the day that the meddling finger of Uncle Sam was thrust into the hornets' nest of Cuba."\(^5\) To add to their military problems the American army in 1896 was also outnumbered by the Spanish garrison in Cuba 4:1. H. W. Morgan writes:

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The Army which McKinley commanded, in
time honoured fashion, was wholly unpre-
pared and pathetically small. Congression-
al penury, a long period of peace, and
American distrust of professional armies
and belief in the citizen soldier combined
to give the country an army hardly large
enough to police the remaining frontier
or stage a good parade.6

The question, therefore, comes immediately to mind why an
ill-prepared nation would go to war when no apparent hos-
tility from abroad existed, and when the odds in favour of
winning a war over an island populated by "a mongrel race"? seemed stacked against that nation? Obviously, such reasons
will be related to the context of given situations and will
change as these situations change. Can we say, then, that
the Spanish-American War case will be of use to us as a
sample study in crisis decision-making. In answer we must
quote Arnold Wolfers:

In many conflict situations when individuals
are confronted with great threats or depriva-
tions, behavioral patterns will tend to be
similar.8

6 Morgan, p. 66.

7 Although the humanitarian aspect of the situation
in Cuba was a large factor in American intervention, it
must be noted that racism against Cubans was also rampant
at the time - see David F. Healey, The United States in
Cuba, 1898-1902 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1963), pp. 209-210, which quotes the New York Evening Post,
February 25, 1898.

8 Arnold Wolfers, The Actors in International Politics
in W. T. R. Fox (ed.), Theoretical Aspects of International
In other words, in spite of the diversity of the actual components of a crisis situation, it can be safely assumed that general propositions can be made about the crisis decision-making that will be applicable to most cases.

The selection of decision-makers

In using the decision-making approach to achieve our goals two important contributions from its disparate and voluminous literature accrue to this study. Although open to many criticisms this approach does guide us in thinking of the nation as an "actor" in the international system. Figuratively, the activity of the nation is the sum of the activity of its individuals. Realistically, however, although many persons are responsible for directing the course of a nation, the decision to commit the nation to act is the work of a few. C. Hermann has pointed out that, especially in response to a crisis stimulus, there is a tendency toward contraction of authority in the organization. 9 Contraction of authority is illustrated in the hypothesis formulated by Snyder and Paige based on their study of the decision of the United States to take military


9 For an excellent discussion of the effects of crisis upon the organization, see Charles F. Hermann, "Some Consequences of Crisis which Limit the Viability of Organizations", Administrative Science Quarterly, VIII (1963), 61-82.
action in Korea:

When crucial choices are forced on an organization from the environment, the decisional subsystem will be characterized by smaller decisional units.\(^1\)

Janowitz, also, found that as a military situation takes on aspects of a crisis "the more feasible it becomes for officer personnel to claim that new problems are outside their jurisdiction and require directives from higher authorities."\(^2\) Added to these facts is the general disinterest manifested by the public regarding foreign policy decisions.\(^3\) Should the public seem to arise out of its stupor, as is claimed occurred with the American public vis-à-vis the Spanish-Cuban situation, the reactions of those decision-makers responsible to them are worthy of study. L. M. Sears, for instance, writes, "In the case of the Spanish-American War, the activity of the State Department was an expression of the popular will, rather than the routine conduct of a chancellery."\(^4\)


One researcher has conceptualized the relationship between decision-makers and those who are not immediately involved in the decision-process by viewing the nation as "a pyramid of individuals with the key decision-makers located in the apex of the pyramid. The cut-off point between decision-makers and non-decision-makers (being) an uncertain boundary which fluctuates with time and with the content of the decision."\(^{14}\) For purposes of a project such as this the immediate difficulty confronts the researcher in attempting to draw a distinction between decision-makers and non-decision-makers. Where is the dividing line to be in the Spanish-American War situation-pyramid containing those key decision-makers who influenced the events of 1898? The problem for the research is to decide which individuals to fit into the various key decision-making roles, and which individuals to exclude.

The importance of focusing on the decision-maker as the actor in the situation, the second benefit to accrue from the decision-making approach, must be briefly mentioned. As the decision-making approach developed political scientists


became increasingly concerned with the perspectives and situational definitions of the researcher. Without neglecting the analysis of organizations and institutions, the basic premise underlying this approach is that, "nation-state action is determined by the way in which the situation is defined subjectively by those charged with the responsibility for making choices."15 Kenneth Boulding has summarized this point succinctly:

We must recognize that the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the 'objective' facts of the situation, whatever that may mean, but to their 'image' of the situation. It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behavior.16

Charles B. Marshall wrote:

The state is only man. It is not superman. The institutions of political life do not add to the dimensions of the human mind. They have no insights denied to individuals. They produce no wisdom beyond the compass of man's mind. The intelligence operating in the lines of decision and execution is but human intelligence. It has the inherent attributes of contingency, fallibility, and subjectivity.17

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15 Snyder, Bruch and Sapin, p. 212, see also p. 37.
16 Kenneth Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3 (1959), p. 120.
Although the state is habitually personified it is in fact only certain specific individuals who are empowered to commit the resources of their state in the pursuit of foreign policy goals. Thus to understand the actions of the state one needs to understand the motivation of the decision-makers responsible to or for that state.18

How then was our problem in choosing those decision-makers relevant to the 1898 crisis solved? In our study it was immediately obvious that the selection of the key personalities would to a great extent be intuitive. Poring over the literature in the social sciences for a systematic method of weighting the influence of decision-makers in a foreign-policy-making situation proved futile, except for one original exception. It is understood that to a great extent this problem depends upon the amount of data which one is able to efficiently handle. Understanding this limitation this researcher proceeded to cull the historical materials in order to formulate his final list. While it was ultimately impossible to separate, in an absolute sense, the most important decision-makers, it was possible to delineate approximately eight key persons who proved to

18 Also, "by reducing international behavior to the behavior of individuals, it is possible to draw on the principles of psychology to derive new hypotheses" - Dean C. Pruitt, Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action, in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.), International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 314.
be undeniable by all accounts essential to the decision. The boundary was extended by further following the "Four Step process" formulated by G. R. Winham.\footnote{Winham, pp. 30-36.} In choosing these remaining decision-makers it must be reiterated that the boundary between decision-makers and non-decision-makers is one of degree, and a plausible argument could always be made for including an additional personality or replacing one person with another in the decision-making group.

Taking into consideration the delineation of the time period mentioned in Chapter Two, the selection of the most important decision-makers was accomplished in four steps. First, an attempt was made to select the most important formal decision-making positions in the making of United States foreign policy regarding the Spanish-Cuban situation between January 1 until April 22, 1898. The selection of these positions was confined to the Republican Administration since it is acknowledged that the Administration in power has greater weight than the Congress in foreign policy making.\footnote{See for example, James A. Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative (Homewood: Dorsey, 1962), pp. 14-15.} W. E. Miller and D. E. Stokes write:

...the reliance he (the Congressman) puts on the President and the Administration suggests
that the calculation of where the public interest lies is often passed to the Executive on matters of foreign policy.21

As one Secretary of State put it, "The President makes foreign policy. This is not the real story but it serves very well if one wishes to deal with the matter in five words."22 L. M. Sears refers to the absence of inter-party co-operation in 1898: "The present day knows little of the almost religious fervour that characterized the party allegiance of the generation which followed the Civil War."23 Our decision to include in the selection certain Congressional committee chairmen was guided by the various events occurring within the designated time period which contributed to the added importance, influence and thus inclusion of these persons. For example, the passage of the significant $50,000,000 appropriation for "national defense" obviously involved the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee.24 The positions chosen, and their incumbents during the 112 day period, are indicated on Table II-1.

22 Dean Rusk quoted in James Bayrs, p. 22.
23 Sears, p. 3.
24 Leech, p. 169.
TABLE II-1
FORMAL DECISION-MAKING POSITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
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<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>McKinley</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vice President</td>
<td>Hobart</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>Sherman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Under Secretary of State</td>
<td>Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of the Treasury</td>
<td>Gage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of War</td>
<td>Alger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary of the Navy</td>
<td>Long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney-General*</td>
<td>McKenna/Griggs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister (Ambassador) to Spain</td>
<td>Woodford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consul General to Havana</td>
<td>Lee</td>
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<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Senate:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chairman, Foreign Relations Com.</td>
<td>Davis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Appropriations Com.</td>
<td>Allison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Naval Affairs Com.</td>
<td>Hale</td>
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<th>House:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Reed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chairman, Foreign Affairs Com.</td>
<td>Hitt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Sub-Committee on Cuba</td>
<td>Adams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Ways and Means Com.</td>
<td>Dingley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Naval Committee</td>
<td>Boutelle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*McKenna held office until Jan 20, 1898; Griggs assumed office the same week.
The second step involved corroborating the above list with an authoritative history of the period prior to the Spanish-American War. Although several accounts exist which relate the various diplomatic maneuverings which took place, no one account treats well the internal decisional process. Fortunately, an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation was obtained which synthesized those various major interpretations into one account. This is John L. Offner's *President McKinley and the Origins of the Spanish American War.*  

Of the above list (Table II-1) Offner does not refer once to Vice-President Garret A. Hobart in any major decision-making capacity, nor does he mention Nelson Dingley Jr. or Lyman J. Gage in any important capacity dealing with the Spanish-Cuban situation; furthermore, he makes only few references to Joseph McKenna, John Griggs, Eugene Hale, and Charles Boutelle, while all other names received numerous references. Finally, although the office of the Speaker of the House, termed by B. Tuchman "no less consequential than the Presidency," was a post of tremendous influence, still possessing all the powers which in the 1910 revolt against Joe Cannon were transferred to the committees,


the potential personal influence by the Speaker, Thomas B. Reed, on William McKinley was negated by Reed's animosity for the President. Offner notes that ever since McKinley's Convention success in 1896 at which Reed was ingloriously trounced, the two had never again spoken directly to each other.²⁷ For this reason Reed's influence as a decision-maker was lessened for our purposes even though his Congressional power was at a zenith and his views regarding the course of American policy toward the Spanish-Cuban situation ran parallel with McKinley's. This fact does, however, explain the importance of alternative representatives of the White House's views in Congress as well as alternative sources of Congressional advice vis à vis the President. McKinley having no "kitchen cabinet" or "hidden persuaders"²⁸ thus relied heavily on his Congressional friends—friendships going back to his Governor and Congress days.²⁹ Offner for these reasons delegates much influence to Charles Grosvenor, Stephen Elkins, and Nelson Aldrich.

²⁷ Offner, p. 105. Although Reed's "forensic artistry" aimed at McKinley was not silenced. The statement has been described to Reed that, "McKinley has no more backbone than a chocolate eclair."


²⁹ Leech, p. 175.
The above findings support the obvious conclusion that a listing of the most important formal positions is not by itself adequate in selecting the most important decision-makers in a given decision. On the basis of Offner's work Hobart, Reed, Dingley and Gage were eliminated and McKenna, Griggs, Hale and Boutelle were considered weak candidates.

The third step in the selection process was to count the number of times a given decision maker's name appeared during the four-month period in the New York Times and in the London Times in all matters concerning the Spanish-Cuban situation. The London Times was used to give a foreign and perhaps less closely associated view of events occurring in Washington and abroad. These numbers were tabulated on the assumption that the more a person is mentioned in a leading newspaper in connection with a given decision, the greater the likelihood that he was influential in making that decision. This "importance" indicator can be justified in that whether a decision-maker's name is included or omitted from the press copy depends on the judgment of newsmen who "by their training are especially capable in gauging a man's 'importance' in relation to public events." 30 Macauley stated quite correctly that "The only

30 Winham, p. 33.
true history of a country is to be found in its newspapers. Newsmen also have an atypical perspective, in that they are reporting a decision when it is taking place, and thus their interpretation may differ from that of the historian, who sees events only in retrospect. The tabulation of these names is presented in Table II-2.

The decision to utilize this 'importance' indicator encountered an immediate obstacle since no comprehensive Index has been published for either newspaper for the period prior to 1900. Although deathly tedious the decision to count names page by page did have three unexpected advantages. First, of course, the 'importance' indicator was obtained. Secondly, it submerged this researcher into the 'mood' of the times which L. F. Richardson considered of some importance in a nation's decision to go to war. Thirdly, the names were counted in relation to the actual story content, a factor which by using solely the Index system would have been omitted. It was discovered that certain names, although tentatively qualifying as "key"

---


32 Although Palmer's Index to the London Times was available, upon closer investigation was found inaccurate and oversimplified for our purposes.

## TABLE II-2

REFERENCES TO DECISION-MAKERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LONDON TIMES*</th>
<th>OFFICIAL References</th>
<th>NEW YORK TIMES*</th>
<th>OFFICIAL References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>McKinley</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>McKinley</td>
<td>1796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodford</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Lee</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Woodford</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherman</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Day</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Alger</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitt</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sherman</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reed</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Reed</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alger</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Grosvenor</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodge</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Hale</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allison</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Cannon</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hale</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Proctor</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dingley</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Hitt</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldrich</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Foraker</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grosvenor</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Boutelle</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adams</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Allison</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elkins</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Adams</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thurston</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Elkins</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoar</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Thurston</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proctor</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Davis</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannon</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aldrich</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gage</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Gallinger</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallinger</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hanna</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hobart</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Frye</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woolcot</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chandler</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanna</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lodge</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chandler</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hobart</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dingley</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griggs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Jan 1 – April 22

*Jan 1 – April 15
decision-makers due to their membership in the Republican Party in Congress, and, more important, measuring high on the importance index, could hardly be termed decision-makers in association with the President. As was mentioned in Chapter Two two bitter factions existed within the Administration's own Republican Party regarding the Cuban situation, those backing the President in his restrained foreign policy and those wishing immediate intervention, dubbed "jingoes." These factions were so irreconcilably hostile that fear existed that the painfully built Republican coalition would be destroyed. 

Considering the historical primacy of the President in the supreme position in foreign affairs as well as the President's great freedom in seeking advice, the importance of "like-thinking" individuals being recruited by the Chief Executive rather than the more hostile elements in his party is logical. One cannot overlook such animosity and friendship between the Chief Executive and certain individual Congressmen reported in the

34 Leech, p. 175.

35 The "jingoes", in fact, had shaped the 1896 Republican platform which read "We believe that the government of the United States should actively use its influence and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the Island" - see Kirk H. Porter, National Party Platforms (New York: Harper, 1924), p. 205.

Press, regardless of how high or low these persons placed on the *Times* list. For example, Senator J. B. Foraker (Ohio) although moderately high on the *Times* list was described by the London *Times* as "a permanent thorn in the President's side,"\(^{37}\) while Senator N. W. Aldrich although low on the *Times* list was several times mentioned to be "one of the President's nearest advisors."\(^{38}\)

Cognizant of these two bitterly opposing views within the Republican Party it was decided for logical reasons to exclude those decision-makers who appeared on the *Times* list but who violently and unquestionably opposed or attacked the President or his policies. These were W. Morgan, J. Foraker, W. Chandler, J. Gallinger, G. F. Hoar, J. Thurston, C. Davis and W. Frye.

A more sophisticated measure was therefore necessary not only to substantiate the winnowing down of the above names from the gross *Times* list, but also to see if a clear indicator could be found which would separate the wheat from the chaff, or as the press of the day called the President's advisors "his friends" from his opposition. Both newspapers were therefore culled for specific references to the number of times persons involved with the Spanish-Cuban situation conferred directly with the President.

\(^{37}\) *London Times*, April 2, 1898.

\(^{38}\) *New York Times*, March 18, 1898.
dent. This was done on the rationale that those who vehemently opposed the President would not be regularly sought after for advice. Indeed as Table II-3 indicates only one of the seven "jingo" deleted from our consideration was reported to have consulted directly with the President. W. Frye appeared on Table II-3 primarily because he was a late convert to a more extreme position on foreign policy. Obviously, Table II-3 further guides our choice in making up our final list of key decision-makers who could be positively considered.

**TABLE II-3**

**NEW YORK TIMES AND LONDON TIMES: SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO DECISION-MAKERS CONFERRING WITH MCKINLEY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Under Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Secretary of the Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allison</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Chairman, Senate Appropriations Com.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alger</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Secretary of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hale</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Chairman, Senate Naval Affairs Com.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grosvenor</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elkins</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitt</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Com.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldrich</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griggs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Attorney General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adams</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chairman, House Sub-Committee on Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boutelle</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chairman, House Naval Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannon</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dingley</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chairman, House Ways and Means Com.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanna</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodge</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gage</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Secretary of the Treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bliss</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Secretary of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frye</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKenna</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Attorney General/Justice of the Supreme Court.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The final step in selecting the key decision-makers was to prepare a final list based on the above-named indicators. Eight persons, as mentioned earlier, were considered unambiguous candidates for the final list because they appeared important on the basis of all the indicators. These were William McKinley, John Sherman, William Day, John Long, Russel Alger, Stewart Woodford, Fitzhugh Lee, and F. Hitt. The choice of Congressman Hitt along with the obvious Administration candidates can be further substantiated by the London Times examination of his influence:

Mr. Hitt is no jingo. He is chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; a close friend of the Speaker, and intimate with the President. His speech was preceded by conferences with the President. Mr. Hitt must have had authority to use facts not known to the public.39

The choice of Sherman can be criticized if one were to look solely at a series of New York Times' editorials aimed at removing this ancient political patriarch from the office of Secretary of State:

How long must the country put up with the humiliation forced upon it and persisted in even in the fact of the risk of serious misunderstanding at some inconvenient moment, of the maintenance at Washington of the pretension that we have a Secretary of State?

39 London Times, January 21, 1898.
Yet it is known at the National capital that the Secretary...is physically infirm, that age and long service have abated his vigor and his interest in affairs, and this has been permitted for so many months, that it excites little or no comment when great concerns of State are not even communicated to him.40

Although it is not likely that Sherman controlled the details of Spanish policy more than sign the notes submitted to his judgment by capable subordinates to ignore Sherman would have been self-defeated on two counts. First, according to Sears, "It is manifestly impossible to determine just where Sherman's contribution ended and other men's began."41 Second, to ignore Sherman would mean having to ignore a large number of communications which, although not written by him, were signed by him. Thus it was decided to retain his name on the final list.

The remaining positions on the final list were filled by comparing the relative standings of the other men on the three indicators. Allison and Hale were both included on the basis of their formal position and high ranking on Table II-3 and moderate ranking on Table II-2. Adams was included because of his position on the House Sub-Committee on Cuba as well as on the basis of Offner's account, Aldrich, Elkins and Grosvenor were selected on

40 New York Times, February 17, 1898.

41 Sears, p. 14.
the basis of Offner's account and because of their moderately high ranking on Table II-3. Grosvenor, also was referred to as, "One of the President's nearest friends," and "whose intimate relations with the Administration gave significance to his remarks," by the press of 1898.

Hanna, Cannon, Proctor, McKenna, Griggs and Boutelle were eliminated due to low rankings on Table II-2 as well as weak mention by Offner of the last three names.

Thus the final list that was used is summarized in Table II-4.

### TABLE II-4

**FINAL LIST OF DECISION-MAKERS AND POSITIONS HELD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>McKinley</td>
<td>Allison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherman</td>
<td>Hale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td>Elkins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alger</td>
<td>Aldrich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Hitt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodford</td>
<td>Adams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee</td>
<td>Grosvenor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Chairman, Senate Appropriations Com.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>Chairman, Senate Naval Com.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Secretary of State</td>
<td>Senator (W. Va.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of War</td>
<td>Senator (R.I.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of the Navy</td>
<td>Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Com.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister to Madrid</td>
<td>Chairman, House Sub-Committee on Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consul-General to Havana</td>
<td>Congressman (Ohio).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42 *London Times*, April 9, 1898.

43 *New York Times*, March 8, 1898.
The Source Material Used

Having selected the fourteen decision-makers on the basis of the number which could be efficiently handled as well as according to the four steps outlined above it was necessary to decide which speeches and other types of communications of these men were to be analyzed. This was done by taking all the communications of these men available, dealing primarily with the Spanish-Cuban situation. These were found in seven major sources:

- Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898.
- J. D. Richardson's, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. XIV.
- Senate Documents, Nos. 207-237, 55th Congress, 2nd Session ("Destruction of Battleship Maine and other Senate Documents" and "Cuban Correspondence")
- Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2nd Session, Reports, United States Foreign Relations, Vol. 7 ("Diplomatic Relations with Foreign Nations" and "Affairs in Cuba")
- and one hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

These sources, although obviously not totally inclusive, can be said to represent the majority of recorded content, readily available, by the fourteen men, on the Cuban-Spanish situation.

The advantages of using only the above seven sources were that they provided uniformity, avoided the problem of

\[44\] Leech, p. 610.
questionable authorship of content, and provided an amount of material large enough to be handled easily with the resources and time available to the researcher. As well, these seven sources represent the primary official communications which took place at the time. Private communications which would normally be available in similar circumstances are unavailable in any case due to the paucity of letter writing and speech making by the decision-makers. For example, George B. Cortelyou, Assistant Secretary to the President, wrote:

"Generally speaking, President McKinley did not write letters on important government matters. When occasion arose members of Congress or others interested were asked to call at the White House, where the matter would be discussed. He excelled in private correspondence and personal interview but avoided letter writing whenever possible, and where letters had to be written he wrote them with great caution and circumspection." 45

McKinley's personal biographer met this same problem and wrote, "...as a rule, McKinley did not commit to paper his plans and purposes, nor his innermost thoughts and aspirations. He much preferred a meeting, face to face, and a confidential talk." 46 Margaret Leech wrote a similar complaint, "...there is little information bearing on his


46 Quoted in Index, p. v.
policies as President, still less that reveals the inner thoughts and notions of the man; ..."47 Furthermore, distrust of the press which was rife with "jingoism" also forced the decision-makers to be unusually guarded in their statements. Minister Woodford telegraphed to Washington, "I have carefully refrained from newspaper interviews since my appointment to this post and have avoided all occasions for public speech."48 Thus another usual source of communications was unavailable for purposes of this project.

It is questionable, in summary, whether obtaining access to unpublished papers etc. would have yielded much further information beyond that which was already available.

Although no research utilizing content analysis can avoid the problem of incomplete information—data which goes unrecorded such as informal private conversations—the sources used do have other advantages. The diplomatic despatches, although once classified, are readily available in For Rels. and various Senate Documents. As once classified information they contain many perceptions of the

47 Leech, p. 610. One boon, however, must be noted — "There was no systematic ghost writing in the White House until Warren Harding employed that leisurely method, and McKinley's extreme caution forbade his using anyone else's text...." from H. W. Morgan, William McKinley and His America (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963), p. 323.

authors' own feelings and motivations as well as their feelings regarding the international situation, which possibly would not have been made had the communications been open to the public. For example, Woodford, writing to McKinley as early as March 17, stated, "I am thus, reluctantly, slowly, but entirely a convert to the American ownership and occupation of the island...I have lost all hope for a peaceful resolution."\(^{49}\)

To a great extent, therefore, it is felt that these confidential despatches represent the "true" feelings of the decision-makers rather than the generally stilted qualities of public communications. Furthermore, those public speeches which were used, primarily spoken by Congressmen, were made by individuals who spoke infrequently and temperately compared to the average legislator regarding the Spanish-Cuban problem. This fact again supports our decision to include them in our final list of decision-makers. Considering the President's conservative temper, intemperate, headline grabbing speeches would not have been congruent with his general character nor policy. The London Times stated, "The President's advisers are, as the President himself, of conservative temper. Nothing will be done hurriedly; no decision will be taken lightly..."\(^{50}\)

\(^{49}\) For Rela., pp. 685-688.
sensationalism did not seem the main motivation behind those Congressional decision-makers chosen, it may be assumed that genuine feelings appear in their communications. If any manipulation did occur by these Congressmen it would be to plead for co-operation with the President's policy not the reverse. Considering this, plus the fact that the decision to go to war evolved in the gaze of the mass public over the entire period under consideration due to "yellow" and conservative press coverage one can safely assume manipulation was minimal and that our data sources are representational of the reason why American decision-makers declared war.

In any case, the selection process described above produced 269 "communication units," i.e., speeches, telegrams, letters and committee testimony, and these served as the basic units for the content analysis. Each individual speech, telegram, etc. constituted a separate unit. In the case of Congressional hearings and debates units were composed of all communications about the Cuban-Spanish situation for a given day. In preparing the data for analysis, each unit was labelled according to the day and month the unit was communicated, the type of unit, (diplomatic despatch or Congressional speech, floor debate), the originator

50 London Times, March 10, 1898.
and the recipient of the unit, and whether the originator represented Congress or the Administration. Since each unit was counted as one, but were of lengths varying from 10 words to over 10,000 words, the total number of words per decision-maker, as well as the division between public speech and diplomatic despatch, were tabulated, to render a more sophisticated count per person. This tabulation is given in Table III-1. In this form the material was ready to be analyzed.

Research procedure used

Content analysis should begin where traditional modes of research ends.51

Our analysis of crisis decision-making in the 1898 situation will employ the technique of content analysis. This procedure, developed greatly since 1952, when Bernard Berelson reviewed and codified the field in his book, Content Analysis in Communications Research,52 has been well defined by P. J. Stone as, "any research technique for making inferences by systematic and objectively identifying specified characteristics within the text."53


52 Bernard R. Berelson, Content Analysis in Communications Research (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Total No Com Units</th>
<th>Total Words (t/f)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>McKinley</td>
<td>8 (2/6)</td>
<td>13,530 (270/13,260)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherman</td>
<td>25 (25/-)</td>
<td>6,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td>44 (44/-)</td>
<td>4,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long</td>
<td>1 (1/-)</td>
<td>2,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodford</td>
<td>108 (108/-)</td>
<td>34,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee</td>
<td>66 (65/1)</td>
<td>9,450 (4330/5120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alger</td>
<td>0 --</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Sub-total)</strong></td>
<td><strong>252 (247/?)</strong></td>
<td><strong>71,130 (4600/18380)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allison</td>
<td>1 (-/1)</td>
<td>1,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hale</td>
<td>7 (-/1)</td>
<td>6,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldrich</td>
<td>1 (-/1)</td>
<td>2,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elkins</td>
<td>2 (-/2)</td>
<td>10,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitt</td>
<td>1 (-/1)</td>
<td>3,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adams</td>
<td>2 (-/2)</td>
<td>7,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grosvenor</td>
<td>3 (-/3)</td>
<td>3,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Sub-total)</strong></td>
<td><strong>17 (-/17)</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,640</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>269 (245/24)</strong></td>
<td><strong>106,770 (4600/18380)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(telegrams/formal speeches)*
viously, as with all research methods, difficulties do exist in this constantly developing technique which limit its applicability for empirical research. Recently such articles by Mueller,54, Winham55 and Mitchell56 have cogently discussed several of these drawbacks.

Two particular points of discussion have been the related assumptions of inference and frequency. Stone, for instance, considers the inference assumption "the most important and perhaps the most controversial element" of his definition, since inference is presented in his definition as the raison d'être of content analysis.57 Content analysis as a "technical procedure" is typically concerned


55 Gilbert R. Winham, "The Use of Quantitative Indicators in Foreign Policy Analysis," Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Calgary, Alberta, June, 1968.


57 Stone, p. 5.
with the middle phase of a three-step communication process: (1) various motives produce (2) a message that is (3) intended to express these motives and/or to produce various effects upon a designated audience.\(^{58}\) In analyzing the message (2) it is hoped that some inference can be made regarding the motives which gave rise to that message (1). In placing prime attention on the message, therefore, it is assumed further that (a) important things are communicated; and (b) that the more important things are communicated frequently.\(^{59}\)

The assumption between the message and the antecedent variables or underlying dimensions being measured has been both criticized and defended. Criticisms, such as those leveled by A. George, discredit the broad model of communication in favour of one distinguishing the instrumental or manipulative from the representation model of communication, arguing that the purposes for which messages are designed determine the meanings that can be assigned to specific words.\(^{60}\) Cognizant of this problem, it is still safe to infer motivations from the content analyzed mess-

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58 Mitchell, p. 236.


60 Alexander L. George, Propaganda Analysis (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1959). The danger of manipulation of communications being a factor in our study was discounted for reasons explained on page 90.
Words and sentences are important human artifacts, as products of social experience, they serve as the everyday media for much thought and communication; what people say and write is a basic source of evidence about individual and social processes.

For the behavioral scientist, this is raw data, collected from appropriate sources and consisting of words and punctuation marks recorded on paper. Through the analysis of these data, he can often learn much about the personality and preoccupations of the writers and the socio-cultural processes in which they are involved.

The second related assumption is that of frequency. Although researchers such as Zinnes and Holsti have used this assumption without question, others more critical have noted the possibility that the frequency of certain themes do not indicate how decision-makers feel about an objective situation but, rather, indicate acceptance of generalized group norms; also, important issues, if well publicized, may not be mentioned often. G. Winham, defending this...

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62 Stone, pp. 3-4.


64 Holsti, op. cit.
assumption, argues that frequency can count as a measure of "intensity of an attitude" or "the amount of concern" or "attention devoted to a topic," only if a proper research design is constructed to achieve this goal. He concludes, "In the long run, however, this procedure is only a palliative, and, if the researcher is convinced that the important issues are not communicated, he should choose a more appropriate technique than a qualitative content analysis." 66

In reviewing previous research, Pool concludes that such inferences are, in fact, often reasonable:

The assumption that the frequency of statements provides a good index of intensity of attitude is probably reasonable for a large class of cases. By "attitude" here, of course, we mean the attitude expressed in the body of the text, not the covert feelings of the author. Even with this limitation, the assumption boldly spelled out sounds absurd, because it is perfectly clear that frequency is only one of a variety of devices by which feeling is expressed. But the experience of more than one analyst who has tried refinements in measuring intensity has been that nothing much is added by other measures than the frequency one. 67

As stated at the beginning of this section content analysis is only a secondary choice for the researcher.


66 Winham, pp. 8-9.

67 Pool, Trends in Content Analysis, p. 194.
Obviously, since we are dealing with a historical situation which took place over seven decades ago, other, more exact research avenues are closed to us. However, content analysis has been used in the past with some success. The various members of the "Stanford group" show that content analysis has definite potential in contemporary political research. For making inferences about political attitudes, beliefs, or behavior, the more direct methods of survey analysis are preferable. However, as suggested above, these methods are often impossible to use, and when they cannot be employed content analysis, using the indicator of communication, is often the most satisfactory substitute. In his critique of content analysis Mueller writes, "As for the contribution of content analysis to international relations theory, it seems clear that the method has proved itself worthy at least in certain areas—especially that of crisis behavior."  

With the construction of the categories, or primary units of analysis, one is ready to begin the content analysis procedure. The process of constructing categories is gen-

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68 This group, consisting of O. R. Holsti, D. A. Zinnes, R. C. North and M. G. Zaninovich, co-authored *Content Analysis: a handbook with applications for the study of international crisis* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), and are responsible for numerous articles concerning crisis decision-making using World War One documents.

69 Mueller, p. 15 (emphasis mine).
erally considered to be the most important stage in content analysis. It is the step in which the data are tied to theory and it serves as a basis for drawing inferences. As B. Berelson has indicated, "Content analysis stands or falls by its categories. Since the categories contain the substance of the investigation, a content analysis can be no better than its system of categories." \(^{70}\) Eleven basic categories were developed tapping themes of perception (i.e., statements which define, or perceive a situation, event or object related to the Spanish-Cuban situation). These eleven categories of perception and their code designation are as follows: \(^{71}\)

1. Threat external (TE)
2. Threat interval (TI)
3. Alternatives (A)
4. Means/Solutions acceptable (M)
5. Time (T)
6. Policy consequences/Outcome (O)
7. Rationale (R)
8. Capability (C)
9. Complexity/Difficulty (D)
10. Proximity (P)
11. Threat to Spain (TS)

The 1898 documents once coded totalled 106,770 words. Twenty percent of the coding was carried out by a research assistant, the remainder by the author. The coding procedure netted a total of 1635 thematic units from 269 documents that

\(^{70}\) Berelson, pp. 147-148.

\(^{71}\) See Appendix for a description of all the categories, and for examples of them.
were analyzed. Some of the units were then recoded to obtain further information not immediately apparent in the gross total of each category. For example, the themes of Time were recoded as to whether the immediate or distant future was perceived to be a factor in the situation by the decision-makers and if this concern changed over time.72

Finally, a brief comment must be made regarding the reliability in the coding process. Reliability in content analysis refers to the amount of agreement that exists between individual coders and/or between different time periods for one coder of the same material. Since this study employed two coders with, however, one coder doing eighty percent of the labour both coding results were tested. The importance of coding reliability must be briefly stressed. Obviously, the reliability of a study, should it be large, increases the academic worth of that study's findings. Secondly, reliability indicates the extent to which a study is replicable. Since only through replication can a theory be tested and found valid or invalid, this is a key aspect in developing the social sciences. M. Sidman states:

The maturity of a science may be judged, in part, by the extent to which systematic replication establishes the reliability and generality of its data.73

72 See Appendix for recoding procedure.

If the reliability, therefore, between coders is low, the likelihood of replicating the study is also low, and, as a result, content analysis loses all rationale as an objective and systematic study of communication. Thirdly, reliability between coders and between time periods with one coder is also an indication of the validity of the category, i.e., the extent to which the categories measure in the text what the analyst claims to be measuring. One researcher claims this aspect to be "critically important in testing hypotheses by quantitative methods, for if variables are to be related with any success they must first have been measured correctly."^{74}

Coder reliability in this project was measured in two tests. First, using a standard formula which indicates percentage of agreement^{75} the author coded a document chosen at random which had already been coded by the research assistant, and then compared the results. The result was a coefficient of 0.74. Second, the author alone coded two given texts twice with a lapse of one week between the first

74 Winham, Marshall Plan, p. 54.

75 The formula is \( R = \frac{2(C_1C_2)}{C_1+C_2} \) where \( C_1 \) = first coding and \( C_2 \) = second coding. The term \((C_1C_2)\) in the numerator indicates the frequency of agreement between the first and second coding. This formula can also be used to compare two coders. See Robert C. North, et. al., Content Analysis, p. 49.
and two weeks between the second, and then compared the results. The result was an average coefficient of 0.93 (the coefficient for the second test was understandably slightly lower than the first 0.92 and 0.94). While there is no positive way to evaluate the coefficient of reliability in thematic coding these tests can be considered conservatively reliable.\footnote{Winham, Marshall Plan, pp. 55-56.}
Chapter IV

RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION

Introduction

Our interest in this study, as stated previously, is aimed in two related directions: first, to attempt to understand the psychological dimension of stress, a component or output of a crisis situation, by examining its effects on foreign policy decision-makers in the Spanish-American War situation; and secondly, to understand the motivations behind one specific historical episode, the crisis which led to the Spanish-American War, 1898.

Foreign policy decision-making may be viewed as a search for satisfactory alternatives from among the range of those perceived by the decision-makers concerned. The key concept to this approach are the perceptions of the decision-makers, in other words, "the process by which decision-makers detect and assign meaning to inputs from their environment and formulate their own purposes or interests."¹ Using the

subjective perceptions of the decision-makers, that is, those revealed by the decision-makers themselves, a better indicator of the motivations of the decision-makers as well as the effects of stress affecting their ability to act effectively, is felt can be gained. "Objective" indicators, such as rising defense budgets, may not indicate that a particular decision-maker felt himself to be under the pressure of high-stress. The essential point is that the actors' response, shaped by his perception of the stimulus, not necessarily by qualities objectively in the stimulus, is utilized in this study.

However, we are interested not only in what national decision-makers perceive, or say they perceive, about particular components of a crisis situation, but also what they

2 "Objective" indicators, however, have other uses. The failure to conclusively establish the relationship between the writings of decision-makers and their actual decisions by a comparison of inferential or subjective data with independent or objective material has been pointed out as a weakness of content analysis (i.e., see Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communications Research (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952), pp. 74-75). O. R. Holsti, however, has defended his research by examining the relationship between perceptions and a series of "hard" indices presumed to be sensitive to international tension levels, e.g., the flow of gold, commodity futures, interest rates and prices of securities). Given fluctuations of financial indicators correlated with increases and decreases in international tension were used to check the validity of content analysis in the 1914 case. (see O. R. Holsti and R. C. North, "Perceptions of Hostility and Economic Variables in the 1914 Crisis," mimeo (Stanford University: Studies in International Conflict and Integration, 1963).
actually do (did). By establishing correlations between our perceptual results and such actions as ultimata, breaking of diplomatic relations, and the like, the hows of the Spanish-American War will be clarified, in part, by the whys, and, obviously, vice versa. This chapter, therefore, intends systematically to bring together for analysis those perceptual and action elements found significant in our research.

To achieve an understanding of the 1898 situation the chapter is divided into three sections. Part one presents composite data regarding each perception under consideration as well as the total perceptions over time. Part two presents data regarding the psychological phenomenon of stress, in other words, the perceptions of threat, time and alternatives, whose theoretical dimensions were outlined in chapter one. Part three examines various perceptions of American decision-makers vis-à-vis the Spanish-Cuban situation relating these with their actions during the crisis illustrated in chapter two.

The data is divided into eight periods of fourteen days, or two weeks, commencing with January 1st and ending with April 22. It was felt that in order to examine in a meaningful way perceptions over time approximately eight periods should be used. The creation of either more or fewer periods of time was found to present conclusions less easily demonstrable for purposes of this project. The fact that
exactly 112 days were under consideration in our study lent itself excellently to equal divisions of a multiple of seven for each period and thus served comparison purposes well.

Part One: Composite Data

The data was initially analyzed in its aggregate form, that is, the perceptions of each of our eleven categories were totalled and ranked in order. The order of frequency totals held few surprises and revealed only a minimum of answers to our questions. Table IV-1 shows that the theme of external-threat seemed most pressing on the minds of the American decision-makers, amounting to 20 per cent of the total number of perceptions. However, of some interest is the fact that no one perception can be considered to have been significantly salient in the minds of the American decision-makers, a fact that is indicated by the low frequency of the threat category vis à vis the other categories. Table IV-1 indicates that the difference in frequency between the perception of rationale, the lowest of the top five categories, and the leading perception, external-threat, is only 130 thematic units or 8 per cent of the total frequencies of all categories. Should the theme of external threat be combined with the internal-threat theme, that is, totalling the perceptions of threat felt to emanate from outside and inside the nation, the single category of threat does not rise significantly beyond the other five categories ranking
high on the table.

TABLE IV-1

TOTAL FREQUENCIES IN ELEVEN BASIC CATEGORIES OF PERCEPTION OVER 269 COMMUNICATION UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category Name (Code)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per Cent*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat External (TE)</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternatives (A)</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means (m)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time (T)</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Consequences (O)</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationale (R)</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>12 89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability (C)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat-Internal (TI)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty (D)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat-Spain (TS)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity (P)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,635</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage ratios of individual themes to total number of themes.

The fact that our data shows that five categories were perceived to be almost equal in salience indicates several features worthy of mention. Of interest is the fact that the perceptions of alternatives and time, mentioned in chapter one to be two of the primary indicators of stress in the psychological literature, placed high on Table IV-1. The importance of these two perceptions, concomitant with the importance of the perception of threat, adds credence to our use of these indicators in the study of stress. Our basis for the investigation of stress rests primarily on the definition found reliable in other studies,
that is, stress occurs when certain goals or values are threatened or obstructed. One would expect *prima facie* the Spanish-American war situation to be stressful. It is not surprising, therefore, that the perceptions of alternatives and time, which previous research found to exist in stress situations, should appear in significant number in Table IV-1.

One obvious feature, immediately apparent in Table IV-1, is the sharp cut-off between the most salient perceptions and those perceptions considered of little importance by the decision-makers (the cut-off between the two amounting to 8 percent of the total frequencies or totalling over 130 thematic units). In other words, no perceptions were found to have *intermediate* salience. This perhaps is not surprising considering the somewhat esoteric quality of the less perceived categories—proximity, perceived threat to Spain, and difficulty. However, the low rank of the capability and internal-threat themes was to a certain extent unexpected and will receive mention below.

The data were next divided into eight periods of equal length to determine the trends of decision-makers' perception of overtime. The total frequencies of all perceptions were tabulated for the individual periods and is presented in Table IV-2.\(^3\)

\(^3\) The total frequencies of *each* perception tabulated per period is presented in the discussion of each perception.
TABLE IV-2

TOTAL FREQUENCIES FOR ALL PERCEPTIONS OVER TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Frequencies</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1 = J1-J14  2 = J15-J28  3 = J29-F11  4 = F12-F25
5 = F26-M11  6 = M12-M25  7 = M26-A8  8 = A9-A22

Some explanation at this point must be presented regarding the high volume of perceptions in period one (January 1-14). Since relatively few potentially stressful incidents were recorded for this period (presented in chapter two as our rationale for commencing with the new year), one would expect a correspondingly lower number of perceptions. Although period one does include the Havana riots which to a certain extent caused concern for American decision-makers, this event can not account solely for the high number of perceptions. Table IV-2, periods 4-5 (February 12-March 11), shows that the periods of the de Lome scandal and the destruction of the Maine, which can be considered to have caused significantly more unease in the minds of American decision-makers than the Havana riots, do not total more than the J1-J14 period. One possible explanation of this feature is that major policy speeches regularly occur during this period of time in American politics. These communication
units consist of review statements summing-up events and as a result record an unusual richness of perceptions.

Although to some extent the high number of perceptions in the first period causes an imbalance when presenting the data overtime, in another respect this feature is a boon to our study. Primarily because of the significant number of perceptions in period one we have the opportunity to see dramatically if a shift occurred in the perceptions of decision-makers from early 1898, representing the general perceptions of 1897, and the perceptions held by decision-makers when the Spanish-American War eventually broke out. That trend analysis would show this shift is likely; however, the chance that a clear shift would be shown or that a change in perceptions had begun to occur early in 1898 and thus not be as easily recognized is equally possible. Because both the total number of perceptions for the first and last periods under consideration are significant the features valuable for comparison are much more easily demonstrated and explained. As our purpose here is only to present a very general outline of the data this feature will become more significant below when each of the recoded categories is presented overtime.

Part Two: Stress Data

For purposes of testing the hypotheses concerning the perceptions of time and alternatives as indicators of psychological stress the data of part two are organized
into three sections. Section one discusses the perceptions of external-threat (TE) and internal-threat (TI) as dimensions blocking or threatening certain values of the American decision-making unit, and correspondingly believed to lead to a stressful situation. Parts two and three discuss respectively the two indicators of stress found significant in the psychological literature—perceptions of time (T) and alternatives (A).

**Perceptions of threat (TI)**

As shown in the previous tables the category of threat has been divided into two organizing themes for purposes of this study—perceptions of threat, hostility, or pressure coming from a source external to the United States (TE), that is, from outside its geographic boundaries, and from a source within the United States (TI). Given the great amount of emphasis attributed to both external and internal pressures on American decision-makers by historians it was presumed that such an organizing principle would be required.

Various historians have attributed considerable importance to the alleged influence of public opinion, Congress and the press (our recoding units of internal-threat) upon President McKinley and his administration. Alexander de Conde found that, "American public opinion... as much as any force apparently brought on the war...." Margaret Leech points out that "the belligerence of Congress and the
American people" were vital factors in McKinley's decision, while R. Hofstadter and E. May attribute the pressures of the sensational press, and "moral and public hysteria" erupting into an "aggressive impulse" as affecting McKinley's decision. In all, historians generally attribute primary importance to three basic sources of pressure in motivating the McKinley administration to war—public opinion, Congress, and the yellow press.

Contrary to the findings of historians, however, our data reveal that American decision-makers perceived little threat coming from sources internal to the United States. Table IV-1 shows that the total frequencies of internal-threat comprise only 3 percent of the total frequencies of all categories. In other words, although the results of our content analysis indeed reveal that decision-makers were influenced to some extent by internal-threat our data show that they were not influenced to the extent that historians might think, in so far as can be assessed by evidence from our content analysis.


The conclusion drawn from our data regarding internal-threat seems logical. For example, L. Markel in his study of public opinion, one dimension of our internal-threat category, states that in the United States "about 3 out of 10 voters are unaware of almost every even in American foreign affairs," that "65 out of every 100 voters will admit that they rarely discuss foreign affairs," and that "only 25 out of every 100 voters can be considered reasonably well-informed." 7 Although these findings represent a study of public opinion of more recent times, in general, it can be assumed that they hold true for the late 1800's, with only one major news media—the newspaper press—being of some importance in educating the population. Applied to the 1898 case, in other words, it can be assumed that fewer people than today were cognizant of the various ramifications of foreign affairs. As well, a small minority of historians does exist which feels that internal pressures, such as those emanating from the yellow press, have been greatly overrated. 8

Although the total number of frequencies for internal-threat are less than expected its several dimensions do re-

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veal certain interesting features. In the first place, the theme was recoded into three sub-categories referred to above according to the source of the pressure. Table V-1 shows that American decision-makers perceived the majority of threat coming equally from the yellow press, public opinion and the Congress.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The yellow press</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Congress</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
<td><strong>99</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fact that the yellow press, public opinion and Congress were perceived equally as threatening by the decision-makers is not surprising. The London Times, in attempting to gauge the influence of the yellow press, concluded, "...frequently it is well-nigh impossible to determine whether a given expression is a reflection of public opinion or merely an attempt to mold or create it."9 Congress, as well, fed the press with many sensational speeches and resolutions

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9 London Times, March 7, 1898.
referred to as more "suitable to the bar room of Chicago or the slums of Salt Lake City..." however, as was shown in chapter two, this body also used the yellow press as a source of information and frequently quoted extensively from it regarding the Cuban situation. As with the yellow press how is one to tell whether Congress led public opinion or merely followed its dictates? This dilemma as to the relationship of each of these dimensions has prompted much discussion in the social sciences. For this reason it is not surprising that these dimensions were perceived equally in importance in the minds of the decision-makers.

The perceptions of internal-threat were next recoded as to direction. Table V-2 indicates that decision-makers perceived threat emanating from within the nation primarily aimed at the sub-category of "peace". Summarizing the effects of the sensational press, in this regard, the London Times noted:

Serious papers print little of this nonsense, but the question whether there will be war with Spain is discussed enough to familiarize the minds of the people with the idea of war. It can also be stated that although peace was the most salient target perceived by decision-makers the volume of the sub-

10 London Times, February 9, 1898.

11 Ibid., March 7, 1898.
category "other" reveals that the perceptions of decision-makers were not clearly defined as to the direction of internal-threat.

TABLE V-2

SUB-CATEGORIES OF THREAT-INTERNAL ACCORDING TO TARGET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-makers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some concern, however, was registered over the possibility that the executive power would be usurped by Congress passing a war resolution over the President's wishes, thus humiliating him and his party. The fact that certain Republican Congressmen, led by Representatives Hopkins, Lorimer and Smith, were meeting regularly in March and April, 1898, to plot this very thing was not unknown to the President. The New York Times reported:

...there is a concerted effort to force the President's hand to take the Cuban question out of his hand, where it constitutionally belongs, and entrust it to Congress.... All yesterday afternoon jingo Senators and Representatives consulted together. They sent word to the President that Congress was in rebellion, that his own party was in rebellion, that the country was revolting against him.
This factor ostensibly would have weighted more heavily on the minds of the decision-makers had it not been for the tight grip over Congress by speaker Reed and various powerful conservative Senators.

In investigating the perceptions of internal-threat overtime several features are brought out which correspond with the historical data presented in chapter two. Table V-3 indicates that the press and public opinion were perceived to be the most constant sources of initiation by American decision-makers, exuding the greatest threat in the period after the Maine disaster aimed primarily at "peace."

Table V-3
PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT-INTERNAL ACCORDING TO SOURCE AND TARGET OVERTIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>From:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yellow Press</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Opinion</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>To:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-Makers</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The de Lome affair followed by the Maine disaster provoked unprecedented jingoism in the press. For approximately three years the sensational newspapers had campaigned vigorously for the cause of the rebels, but prior to the Maine explosion their news, though arousing sympathy for the Cubans, lacked those elements necessary to crystallize American sentiment in favour of war. M. Wilkerson writes:

For sometime a large part of the American public had indicated their opposition to Spain, but the spark needed to explode their pent-up feeling against Spanish "oppression" had failed to materialize. This spark was furnished in the Maine disaster.13

Table V-3 shows that the perceptions of threat coming from the various internal sources were greatest in the period after the Maine incident. Prior to its destruction only 11 perceptions of internal-threat were perceived to emanate from inside the nation; after the explosion almost 80 percent of the total perceptions were perceived. For instance, decision-makers perceived of some significance the many warlike resolutions presented in Congress in periods 7 and 8 (March 26 to April 22). April 5, Woodford, showing concern over the effect of this belligerency on his attempts at peaceful negotiations, telegraphed, "...can you prevent hostile action by Congress?"14

Finally, two large increases in the last period (April 9-22) should be noted. First, this period records an increase of over 70 percent in the perceptions of decision-makers in perceiving themselves as the major target of internal-threat (compared with the previous period). The New York Times comments at this period:

It was inevitable that the President's policy should be attacked, and attacked it is.... The Maine incident has failed them (jingoites) to declare war on Spain, so they declare war on the President instead.15

As well, the data of this period show that Congress was perceived as the major source of internal-threat by the decision-makers. McKinley, feeling that the Executive's attempts at negotiations with Spain had entered a cul de sac, had given the problem to an increasingly belligerent Congress. The New York Times bitterly wrote of this move:

The centre of political authority has been transferred to the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. All the world flocks to the Capitol. Congress is now the Government. Congress troubles itself little about diplomacy. It pays no heed to Spain's concessions, and professes itself incredulous touching the armistice, distrustful of everything Spanish, and regardless of European opinion. To the average member of Congress the opinion of his constituents is more important than the opinion of England or France.16

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14 For Rel., p. 734.
15 New York Times, April 5, 1898.
16 Ibid., April 13, 1898.
What conclusions may be drawn from the internal-threat data? Basically, it was found that the perceptions of threat emanating from sources within the nation were found to be somewhat less significant than historians have attributed to their various dimensions. Threat-internal was increasingly seen as salient, however, in the perception of decision-makers after the Maine disaster reaching a peak in the period immediately prior to the war.

Perceptions of threat (TE)

As shown in Table IV-1 the frequency of the perceptions of external-threat was greater than the frequencies of all other categories. The aggregate data, however, reveal little. The data recoded better show the various dimensions comprising the external-threat theme. First, external-threat perceptions were sub-divided according to their source. Table VI-1 reveals that 82 percent of the total frequencies were perceived to emanate from the Cuban situation. This obviously is not surprising considering the fact that Cuba was the major point of contention between the United States and Spain. Spain was perceived occasionally as a source of external-threat but usually in relation to its military conduct in Cuba or its treatment of American embassy personnel in Madrid.
Early in 1898 Secretary of State John Sherman notified the Spanish Government that the United States was profoundly disgusted with the situation in Cuba, writing:

...The President is bound by the higher obligations of his representative office to protest against the uncivilized and inhuman conduct of the campaign in the island of Cuba. He conceives that he has a right to demand that a war, conducted almost within sight of our shores and grievously affecting American citizens and their interests throughout the length and breadth of the land, shall at least be conducted according to the military codes of civilization.17

This despatch indicates the importance of Cuba in the minds of the American decision-makers not only as a source of threat coming from outside the nation but also as to its targets. Table VI-2 indicates clearly the direction of the perceived external-threat.

The data in this breakdown show that American decision makers perceived 51 percent of the total perceptions of

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TABLE VI-2

SUB-CATEGORIES OF THREAT-EXTERNAL ACCORDING TO TARGET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-Security</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-Economy</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-General</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-Values</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cuba</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba-General</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba-Humanitarian</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba-Autonomy</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Undefined</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>329</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
external-threat to be directed at Cuba. R. Hofstadter writes that this tendency to overreact to the Cuban situation can be understood in part through "the displacement of feelings of sympathy or social protest generated in domestic affairs; these impulses found a safe and satisfactory discharge in foreign conflict. Spain was portrayed in the press as waging a heartless and inhuman war; the Cubans were portrayed as noble victims of Spanish tyranny, their situation analogous to that of Americans in 1776." In Washington and New York, as well, the Cuban junta fed rumour or information of the Cuban situation to the press and Congress.

The targets of the Cuban situation were further subdivided into political, economic and social dimensions. Table VI-2 clearly indicates the humanitarian concern of American decision-makers over the effect of the war on the Cuban people (i.e., reconcentrados), totalling over 28 percent of the total perceptions of external-threat. This concern brought certain responses on the part of the McKinley Administration. For example, H. Rubens, chief legal counsel for the Cuban junta, writes of the emotional response of McKinley when shown photographs of the Cuban reconcentrados:

McKinley bent over them at the table, looking gingerly at them first; then he looked more

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18 Hofstadter, p. 159.
closely; finally, I noticed tears began to course down his face.\textsuperscript{19}

As well, the President took the initiative on December 24, 1897 by announcing that, "in deference to the earnest desire of the government to contribute effective action toward relief of the suffering people in the island of Cuba, arrangements have been perfected by which charitable contributions in money or the kind can be sent to the island by the benevolently disposed people of the United States."\textsuperscript{20}

The economic deterioration of Cuba, perceived 20 percent of the total frequencies of the target sub-category, also caused American decision-makers concern. This was due to two reasons. Obviously the guerrilla tactic of destroying the sugar mills and plantations and the Spanish reconcentrado order the Cuban economy was brought to a standstill. Lacking work and thus a source of income and not allowed to leave the garrison towns to grow food the reconcentrados were left to survive on the meager rations of the Spanish authorities and inadequate donations from American charities. Secondly, as the economy deteriorated, the island's exports to the United States, her principal customer, dwindled drastically. Imports from America declined as well since Cuban importers failed to have the necessary buying


\textsuperscript{20} For Rels., p. 655.
power. The consul at Santiago described the predicament of the Cuban economy:

(I) inclose herewith an order issued by command of General Maximo Gomez...forbidding the grinding of the sugar crops for the years 1897 and 1898. In this part of Cuba, so far as I can learn, all idea of making a sugar crop is entirely abandoned. I regret to say that the stoppage of industries, from present appearances, will not halt at the sugar crop, but coffee and other agricultural crops fall under the same ban. I had hoped that after the reconcentration order was revoked by the present action of the present administration, we would find no trouble in reinstating American industries; but it appears that all the benefits that should have accrued to our citizens are thwarted by the insurgents who refuse to allow them to return to their sugar, coffee, and other estates. The Pompo Manganeese mines, owned by Americans, which would at the present time be a profitable investment if allowed to operate, are also being held up by the same power.

It is beyond the power of my pen to describe the situation in eastern Cuba. Squalidity, starvation, sickness, and death meet one in all places. Beggars throng our doors and stop us in the streets. The dead in large numbers remain over from day to day in the cemeteries unburied.21

The second largest perception according to the target of external-threat is the United States, totalling 38 percent of the total sub-category. This perception was also further divided into four specific targets—United States—security—economy, values, and general. Table VI-2 shows that

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21 Consul Hyatt, January 12, 1898, Senate Doc. 230, 55 Congress, 2 Sess., p. 38.
security and economy were perceived equally by decision-makers as the most threatened targets within the American sub-division. Obviously the large amounts of investments in the sugar industry, primarily of American origin, were injured by the tactics of both the guerrillas and the Spanish, each trying to destroy the economic base of support of the other. This factor did not go unnoticed by the McKinley Administration whose members belonged to the elite of the American business establishment. The great financial and commercial interests of Hanna, Allison and Aldrich, described as "bound to the government through mutual favours," were important lobbies close to the source of power.\(^22\) Former-President Cleveland most clearly stated America's economic predicament in Cuba stating that American concern with Cuba "was by no means of a wholly sentimental or philanthropic character, since our actual pecuniary interest in it is second only to that of the people and government of Spain."\(^23\)

Although businessmen initially feared that a war with Spain would prove too costly and unbalancing for an economy recently emerging from a depression, this attitude changed overtime. This factor is shown in Table VI-3(B).


\(^{23}\) James Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington, 1899) X, 139.
presenting the perceptions of external-threat overtime.

The London *Times*, March 25, for example, reported the effect in Washington of this new trend in the attitude of businessmen toward war:

...a gloomy feeling in Washington is the weakness of the conservative support given to the President. Businessmen are not doing all they might, say the President's friends. Some of the leading financiers, taking a purely business view, declare that they would prefer immediate war to months of uncertainty, anxiety and paralysis. 24

In other words, businessmen as time progressed became increasingly tired of the uncertain economic situation, fearing to invest lest a recession suddenly occur, wiping out their savings. The *New York Times* financial section printed one example of the resulting pressure on the administration to end the Cuban situation and return a state of economic and political normalcy to the country, in which a committee composed of New York businessmen representing a large number of firms throughout the country presented McKinley with a petition which outlined their grievances:

The destructive war in Cuba has continued for three entire years, with an actual average loss of import and export trade between Cuba and this country of $100,000,000 per year, or a total loss of $300,000,000 import and export trade since the beginning of the war. To this may be added heavy sums ir不可retrievably

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24 *London Times*, March 26, 1898. This same week saw the fear that a "crash" would occur due to the unsettled political situation—March 25, 1898.
lost by destruction of American properties or properties supported by American capital in the island itself such as factories, railways, tobacco plantations, mines and other industrial enterprises, the loss of the United States in trade and capital... etc. 25

Not surprisingly the petition ended by advising McKinley to forcibly end the Cuban revolution.

In further investigating the data overtime concerning the source and target of external-threat several interesting features stand out. The "Proctor Speech" by Senator Redfield Proctor, on March 17, reporting on the death and misery he had seen in concentration camps in Cuba, seems to have made an immense effect on the decision-makers. Table VI-3(A), period 6 (March 12-25), shows 10 percent increase in the perception of threat from Cuba. Proctor reported, for example, that General ("Butcher") Weyler's cruelties and the loss of the Maine did not move him as did "the spectacle of a million and a half people the entire native population of Cuba, struggling for freedom and deliverance from the worst misgovernment of which I ever had knowledge." Proctor's influence on the administration was corroborated in the press which wondered whether his trip to Cuba had been "official or voluntary" and noted his "long interviews with the President." 26

Concern over the Cuban situation

26 Ibid., March 25, 1898.
TABLE VI-3 (A&B)

PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT-EXTERNAL ACCORDING TO SOURCE AND TARGET OVER TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<td>Cuban Situation</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>U.S.-General</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>66</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
is shown also in a letter by Under-Secretary of State Day to Woodford:

The President's desire is for peace. He can not look upon the suffering and starvation in Cuba save with horror. The concentration of men, women, and children in the fortified towns, and permitting them to starve, is unbearable to a Christian nation geographically so close to ours as Cuba. All this has shocked and inflamed the American mind, as it has the civilized world where its extent and character are known.\textsuperscript{27}

Also to be noted are the two declines in the frequencies of the perceptions of external-threat during the period of the Maine disaster (February 12-25) and period 7 (March 26-April 8). The lack of perceptions after the Maine disaster is not surprising. Although the "jingo" press and extremist elements in Congress favoured immediate war McKinley and his advisors chose to suspend all opinions until an official board of inquiry had investigated the mishap. The Nation, February 24, wrote:

The admirable conduct of the government officials at Washington renders the course of the sensational press in this city (New York) the more shameful by contrast.... It speaks well for the good sense of the masses that so little effect has been produced by all this stuff. It is evident that a large proportion of the public refuses to take the sensational newspapers seriously.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{27} For Rels., March 25, 1898, p.712.

\textsuperscript{28} Quoted in F. E. Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain (New York, 1909), p. 543.
The second lull in the perceptions of threat came in the period of the Maine Report. During this period negotiations between the Spanish government and Woodford took place in an effort to achieve a peaceful settlement. Woodford optimistically sent word, April 10, that the Spaniards had yielded to the American demand for a prompt armistice, and Woodford thought, that even the demand for independence might still be met. Woodford wrote:

I hope that nothing will now be done to humiliate Spain, as I am satisfied that the present Government is going, and loyally ready to go, as far and as fast as it can.29

This optimism was dispelled however with American decision-makers' distrust over the good intentions of Spain, shown by an increase in the perception of threat coming from Spain in Table VI-3(A). In presenting his message to Congress McKinley chose to pass up his chance for one final statesmanlike act, an appeal for further delay, and advised war.

What conclusions may be drawn from this data which enable us to continue our investigation as to stress? Primarily we have established the fact that a substantial amount of threat did exist. This threat was perceived to emanate primarily from the Cuban situation aimed at two targets—Cuba and the United States.

29 For Rel., April 10, 1898.
The data so far presented show a greater number of perceptions of threat aimed at Cuba than at the United States. If this is the case one must question whether the perceptions of threat did indeed produce stress since no goals or values of the perceiving decision-makers apparently were involved. Threat perceived to be aimed at a target other than the perceiver is obviously less likely to produce stress.

The data was, therefore, re-examined. First, the targets of external-threat to the United States and to Cuba were investigated overtime. The data, presented in Table VI-4(A), show that over the eight periods the external-threat to Cuba (d) was overtaken by the threat to the United States (a) in the perceptions of American decision-makers. Graph VI-4(B) shows that as events developed to a culmination in war the perception of threat to the United States became increasingly salient while the perception of threat to Cuba declined in the importance of the decision-makers.

It must also be noted that while the target of Cuba fluctuated with events the perceptions of the United States as a target constantly increased at a stable rate overtime. Graph VI-1(B) clearly shows that while the threat to Cuba was considered a temporary and highly emotional perception, the perception of threat to the United States was less impressionable and fluctuating. "The nation was in a state of upset," writes E. May. "In some irrational way, the influences and anxieties of the age translated themselves
TABLE VI-4(A)

PERCEPTIONS OF THREATS TO U.S. AND CUBA OVER TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) US (External)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) US (Internal)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) US (Peace)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Cuba</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GRAPH VI-4(B)

PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT-EXTERNAL TO U.S. AND CUBA OVER TIME

![Graph showing perceptions over time]

Perceptions

Threat to US  ————
Cuba  ————
Further, the data of external-threat to the United States were combined with the perceptions of internal-threat (Table V-2) and the threat to peace (Table VI-2), both of which can be considered related to the United States as a target. This combination is possible since obviously foreign and domestic considerations are closely interdependent.

Table VI-5 indicates that American decision-makers perceived in total more threat (internal plus external) aimed at the United States than aimed at other targets. As well, this data examined overtime further substantiate that perceptions of threat aimed at the United States were considered more salient in the latter stages of the crisis than other targets of the perceptions of threat.

We may conclude that a considerably amount of hostility was perceived to be directed against the United States by the decision-makers. As well, threat perceptions regarding the perceivers' nation were more frequent in the latter stages of the crisis. From these two conclusions, we surmise that the Spanish-American situation was stressful for American decision-makers.

**Perceptions of time (T)**

For purposes of testing hypotheses concerning perceptions of time 201 perceptions were derived from the decision-

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30 May quoted in Hofstadter, p. 147.
makers' documents. This total was classified according to perceived reason for the importance of time and presented in Table VII-1.

**TABLE VII-1**  
PERCEPTIONS OF TIME: FREQUENCY AND TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
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<tr>
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<td>PERCENT</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Time as a Factor in:  
A = the American situation  
B = Spain/US relations  
C = the Cuban situation  
D = Spanish policy

The perceptions of time fall into four major categories according to the context in which time was found to be relevant. The American situation, consisting of both
internal and external factors, was perceived as most salient when decision-makers considered time, occurring 37 percent of the total time perceptions. Of second importance was the relevance of time vis à vis America's relations with Spain. In other words, concern over the deterioration of Spanish/US relations within a context of time occurred 26 percent of the total number of time themes. It is to be noted that the Cuban situation was perceived salient less than a quarter of the total perceptions. This low volume of perceptions is not surprising and corroborate our threat category conclusion. Except for the emotional aspect the saliency of the Cuban situation was small in the perceptions of the decision-makers. Only when the Cuban situation was perceived to directly affect the United States, shown in the perceptions of time and threat, did American decision-makers perceive the saliency of Cuba. Understandably, perceptions of time as a factor in Spanish policy comprise only 13 percent of the total time perceptions occurring primarily in periods 6 and 7 (March 12-April 8) when negotiations took place between the United States and Spain.

Over time the time dimension corresponds to the development of events within the crisis, falling into five major action periods. In the initial period, January 1-28, 50 percent of the reference to time focus on the Cuban situation. The Havana riots and the corresponding danger to autonomy were of primary concern at this time, dominating the
number of perceptions of the period (67 percent). This concern was reflected in a telegram by Lee:

If demonstrated (Blanco) cannot maintain order, preserve life and keep the peace, or if Americans and their interests are in danger ships must be sent, and to that end should be prepared to move promptly. Excitement and uncertainty predominate everywhere. 31

Between January 29 and February 25, 70 percent of the time perceptions concerned the de Lome affair and the Maine disaster with the ramifications these incidents would have vis à vis Spain. The de Lome affair brought the necessity of the resignation of the offending minister with Day instructing Woodford, "You are...instructed to at once say to the minister of state that the immediate recall of the minister is expected by the President." 32 The Maine incident brought the problem of reparations to the fore as well as the necessity of a court of inquiry.

February 26 to March 11 attention was redirected at the situation which had laid the scene for the Maine disaster --the Cuban situation--comprising 57 percent of all time perceptions within the period. Woodford wrote, "This question comes to me each day with increasing force: Can Spain so far crush the rebellion by the 1st of May as that the common

31 For Rels., January 13, 1898, p. 1025.

32 Ibid., February 9, 1898, p. 1008.
sense of our people will see that the war then will be practically ended?"33

The period of March 12-April 8 saw a substantial increase in all sub-categories although perceptions of America's situation were of primary importance to the decision-makers comprising 40 percent of the total perceptions for the period. This concern was expressed by most of the decision-makers in Washington who feared the "intense" feelings of Congress and the public. Woodford, realizing McKinley's position, wired, "I do regard it as very essential (Spain) should see that the United States mean business, and mean it now.... I have urged the Spanish Government to act quickly, but to no avail. They do not sense the urgency of the situation."34

In the last period, April 9-22, over 80 percent of the perceptions of time deal with America's situation in the crisis. Congress and the procrastination of Spain were two opposing forces between which McKinley stood. April 11 McKinley chose the direction of Congress and advised forceful intervention.

These data may be used to test the hypotheses relating the stress of crisis to perceptions of time. It was hypothesized in chapter one that:

33 For Rel. , March 9, 1898, p. 681.
34 Ibid., March 29, 1898, p. 718
As stress increases in a crisis situation, time will be perceived as an increasingly salient factor in decision-making.

If this hypothesis holds true for the Spanish-American crisis, as it did for the 1914 situation, the number of expressions in which time is perceived as salient should increase as the crisis deepens. Table VII-2 shows this increase takes place.

**TABLE VII-2**

**TOTAL PERCEPTIONS OF TIME OVER TIME**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table VII-2 indicates, as well, a decrease in the number of perceptions in the last period in which Congress assumed responsibility of the Cuban problem.

According to the second hypothesis:

As stress increases in a crisis situation, decision-makers will become increasingly concerned with immediate rather than the distant future.

Table VII-3 indicates our data to substantiate this. Of a total of 201 perceptions of time only 59 (29) percent) reveal a concern for the distant future.

What conclusions may be drawn from the 1898 data? Our analysis reveals that perceptions are important in decision-making. In the situation of high stress the deci-
TABLE VII-3(A)

PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMMEDIATE AND DISTANT FUTURE OVER TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate future</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distant future</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GRAPH VII-3(B)

Perceptions

![Graph](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distant future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat-External</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sion-makers perceived that time was of crucial importance and they acted on that assumption. In the culminating stages of the crisis decision-makers increasingly perceived their own position to be confined by time. Pressure from Congress, distrust of Spain, fear of a danger to the United States of a continuing war in Cuba saw McKinley ignore the concessions of the Spanish government (all that he had demanded) and hand the problem to a belligerent Congress advising war.

**Perceptions of alternatives (A)**

For purposes of testing hypotheses relating to perceived alternatives 296 perceptions were recorded. These were classified as perceptions of choice, necessity, closed or impotence according to the following definitions:

The "necessity" category includes all statements indicating that the author sees only one possible course of action in a given situation.

The "closed" classification includes all statements indicating that some course of action is not possible.

The "choice" category includes all statements in which the actor perceives more than one course of action is open.

The "impotence" classification includes all statements indicating that some course of action is proceeding without the actor's control.

The initial hypothesis to be tested is:

In a crisis situation, decision-makers will tend to perceive their own range of alternatives to be more restricted than those of their adversaries; that is, they will per-
ceive their own decision-making to be characterized by necessity and closed options, whereas those of the adversary are characterized by open choices.

The 1898 documents are filled with such words as "must," "compelled," "driven," and "impossible," these occurring almost wholly when the author is referring to the policies of his own nation. Table VIII-1 shows that American decision-makers consistently perceived fewer options open to themselves than to their adversaries.

TABLE VIII-1

FREQUENCIES OF SUB-CATEGORIES OF ALTERNATIVES FOR OWN NATION AND ENEMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Necessity</th>
<th>Closed</th>
<th>Impotent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Percent</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further, it was hypothesized that:

As stress increases, decision-makers will perceive the range of alternatives open to themselves to become narrower.

If the hypothesis is correct for the 1898 situation, the number of perceptions of alternatives divided into the "necessity,"
"closed," and "impotence" categories should increase in the latter days of the crisis. This data is presented in Table VIII-2(A). In order to better compare over time the number of closed to the number of open alternatives perceived available for one's own nation the necessity, closed and impotence sub-categories were combined into one in Grave VIII-2(B).

Several features are apparent in Graph VIII-2(B). After the initial glut of perceptions at the beginning of the year the number of perceptions decreased to nil by period four (February 12-25). Intuitively we would expect to find many "choice" alternatives in the early periods. This was not the case. Concern over the plight of Cubans plus the turmoil due to the de Lome and Maine incidents obviously created a stressful situation. The solution to both the internal and external problems lay simply in one course of action—an end to the war—autonomy thought the only feasible means to achieve this. Woodford wrote:

Autonomy cannot go backward. It must go forward and its results must be worked out in Cuba. There is the storm center.35

The Maine incident, as with the other perceptions prompted a great flurry of perceptions particularly in the direction of the Cuban situation. The last three periods

35 For Bels., February 26, 1898, p. 664.
TABLE VIII-2(A)

FREQUENCIES OF SUB-CATEGORIES OF ALTERNATIVES FOR OUR NATION OVER TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessity</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impotence</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GRAPH VIII-2(B)

Perceptions

Closed alternatives

Open alternatives

Threat-External
(March 12-April 22) register almost 70 percent of all perceptions of alternatives for the decision-makers' own nation. Woodford writing to McKinley noted his conversation with the Spanish foreign minister:

This awful condition of affairs in Cuba cannot continue forever. End it at once—end it at once, for no thoughtful American can tell how long the conscience and humanity of the American people can be held in check.

* * * * * * *

I see nothing ahead except disorder, insecurity of persons and destruction of property. The Spanish flag cannot give peace. The rebel flag cannot give peace. There is but one power and one flag that can secure peace and compel peace. That power is the United States, and that flag is ours.

The solution to the Cuban situation was perceived no longer to lay in Spain's plan of autonomy but in American intervention.

Finally, our last hypothesis regarding the effects of stress on the perception of alternatives must be discussed.

As stress increases, decision-makers will perceive the range of alternatives open to adversaries or potential adversaries to expand.

As seen in Table VIII-3 our results do not substantiate this hypothesis.

That few alternatives were perceived for Spain is not surprising. For three years Spain had committed the best of its youth, resources, and energy to the Cuban situation but to no avail. Sherman wrote:
### Table VIII-3

**Frequencies of Sub-Categories of Alternatives for Enemy Over Time**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Periods</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessity</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impotence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
...even the Spanish army itself suffers from this paralysis of means and supplies, and if it be admittedly impracticable to keep up the commissariat and pay the soldiers of Spain, it is not rational to suppose that the condition of the unfortunate reconcentrados can be materially relieved (by Spain).\textsuperscript{37}

According to the perceptions of American decision-makers Spain had two alternatives—quit the island or face defeat in a war with the United States. The perceptions of "necessity," "closed" and "impotence" alternatives, therefore, total more than 80 percent of the total perceptions for Spain. Woodford wrote:

\ldots they can not go further in open concessions to us without being overthrown by their own people here in Spain.

They want peace if they can keep peace and save the dynasty. They prefer the chances of war, with certain loss of Cuba to the overthrow of the dynasty\ldots.

I do not think that they can make any more direct concessions to us and retain their power here.\textsuperscript{38}

The data of this section corroborate Holsti's hypotheses that stress decreases the perception of alternatives for one's own nation compared to those perceived available for the adversary, as well as show that increasing stress results in a constriction of perceived options. The percep-

\textsuperscript{37} For 	extit{Rela.}, March 1, 1898, p. 668.

\textsuperscript{38} 	extit{Ibid.}, April 1, 1898, p. 729.
tion of more alternatives open to the adversary was not found significant in our data.

Part Three: Historical Data

To gain an understanding of the motivations of American decision-makers the data were coded according to four categories—perceptions of capability (C), means (M), rationale (R), and policy consequences/outcome (O). In this way further insight into the thinking behind the policy-making of 1898 is possible.

Perceptions of capability (C)

The category of capability consists of those themes which indicate the perception that the parties involved in the Cuban situation had or failed to have the capacity or potency to achieve a solution to the Cuban situation. The data are divided according to four sub-categories—two positive (indicating capability) and two negative (indicating perception of incapability). Table IX-1 indicates that the United States perceived itself moderately capable of solving the Cuban problem (19 percent). However, of greater significance are the perceptions of American decision-makers regarding Spain's inability to solve the problem, totalling 64 percent of the total capability perceptions. The incap-

---

39 The categories of proximity (P), difficulty (D), and perceived threat to Spain will not be discussed since the data are insignificant for purposes of forming conclusions.
ability when further subdivided indicates the primarily American decision-makers felt the Spaniards were incapable of winning the war (40 percent of total number of perceptions). The United States never perceived itself incapable.

TABLE IX-1
PERCEPTIONS OF CAPABILITY AND INCAPABILITY FOR SELF AND ENEMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incapability:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>(37)</th>
<th>(64)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-to win war</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-to aid reconcentrados</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-to protect US property</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban rebels</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perception of means (M)

The data were coded further into the category of means (i.e., perception that a certain technique is capable or incapable of achieving a solution to the Cuban situation). Again the data were divided into positive and negative dimensions showing that certain means were (+) or were not (-) capable of setting the Cuban war. Table X-1 shows that both peaceful and warlike means were equally perceived to present a solution, while recognition of belligerency by
the United States and a guarantee of the Cuban debt were never thought feasible by American decision-makers (US-Cuba 18 percent) to solve the Cuban situation.

**TABLE X-1**

**PERCEPTIONS OF MEANS FOR SELF AND ENEMY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capable:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Force</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Peaceful</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP-Peaceful</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incapable:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP-Force</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP-Peaceful</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Force</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Cuba</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>250</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intuitively one would expect that as the crisis took on greater proportions that force would replace peaceful means as a way to solve Cuba's problems and that perceptions of Spain's inability by either force or peaceful means to solve the Cuban problem would increase. Table X-2 supports this assumption.

While American decision-makers had been optimistic in period 7 (March 26-April 8) that peaceful negotiations would avert a war between Spain and the United States (over 75 percent of all perceptions in this period) this attitude
TABLE X-2
PERCEPTIONS OF MEANS FOR SELF AND ENEMY OVER TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capable:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Force</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Peaceful</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incapable:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP-Force</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP-Peaceful</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Force</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Cuba</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
changed as the crisis progressed. The last period shows that over 50 percent of all perceptions concerning means saw force as the only way out of the Cuban quagmire.

Perceptions of rationale (R)

In investigating the rationale perceived by the American decision-makers in commencing war with Spain we are able to see more clearly the underlying motives prompting their actions. Table XI-1 indicates that the primary concern of American decision-makers was over the humanitarian aspect of the Cuban situation (i.e., the reconcentrados). The perception of a danger to American national-interest (i.e., economy, security, etc.) comprising 40 percent of the total perceptions of rationale was perceived a close second in importance.

TABLE XI-1
PERCEPTIONS OF RATIONALE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Action</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Interest</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>191</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perceptions of rational over time further elucidate certain points. These are presented in Table XI-2. The rationale regarding humanitarian concern over the Cuban people predominate in every period except the last in which national interest dominates in the perceptions of the decision-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Interest</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
makers. The sub-category "duty" is of some interest. As the crisis gained momentum American involvement was not merely seen as an excuse to aid the Cuban people but was perceived as a duty which events had bestowed upon the American people. Senator Gray best described why this sense of duty existed:

...we might as well be ashamed of our own mothers as to attempt to deny or conceal the origin of our own free institutions. They sprang from revolution, they were achieved by our fathers with arms in their hands, and from that day to this there has never been a suggestion, wherever the flag of freedom has been unfurled, that the hearts of the American people did not go out in sympathy and encouragement to the people struggling to uphold it. 40

Perceptions of policy consequences/outcome (2)

The category of policy consequences concerns the perception by American decision-makers that if certain action regarding the Cuban situation is or is not taken then certain effects will or will not follow. As can be seen from Table IV-1, perceptions of policy consequences occurred quite frequently in the documents (198 times, or 12 percent of the total number of units coded). In other words, American decision-makers tended to think in terms of contingencies, or of logical consequences of the situation, or their actions. Although at first glance the total number of frequencies seems to contradict our results of the perceptions of time (i.e., distant time or immediate time) in that

40 Leech, p. 182.
one would expect that decision-makers would be less likely to think in terms of future consequences of actions in a crisis situation a closer study of the data clarifies this discrepancy.

The first sub-division made was according to whether the United States perceived a consequence as a result of (i) United States intervening or not intervening, (ii) Cuban recovery or lack of recovery, and (iii) Spanish action or lack of action. These data are presented in Table XII-1.

TABLE XII-1
BREAKDOWN OF PERCEPTIONS OF OUTCOME BY CAUSE OF CONSEQUENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consequence of U.S. action/non action</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequence of Cuban recovery/non recovery</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequence of Spanish action/non action</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data show that the United States policy makers generally viewed the Cuban situation and its consequences in terms of their own action or inaction. Spain and Cuba were correspondingly perceived to be incapable of correcting or alleviating the condition of Cuba.
The theme of policy consequences was further broken down depending upon whether outcomes were perceived to primarily affect the United States, Cuba, Spain or peace. This is shown in Table XII-2.

**TABLE XII-2**

**BREAKDOWN OF PERCEPTIONS OF OUTCOME ACCORDING TO NATIONS AFFECTED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>198</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data indicate that the United States was most frequently perceived to be affected by the consequences amounting to 42 percent of the total perceptions of outcome. Surprisingly American decision-makers were also concerned with the general dimension of peace, perceived 29 percent of the total outcome perceptions. Both areas, totalling 61 percent of the total perceptions of affect, indicate that the prime area of concern for American decision-makers was the United States.

In breaking down the outcome category according to (i) good or bad consequences and according to (ii) type of consequences (military, political/social, economic) the data contain no surprises.
TABLE XII-3 (A&B)
BREAKDOWN OF PERCEPTIONS OF OUTCOME ACCORDING TO GOOD/BAD CONSEQUENCES AND TYPE OF CONSEQUENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Sub Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B.</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political/Social</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table XII-3(A) reveals no significant data, with consequences perceived bad and good almost equally. Table XII-3(B), however, indicates the concern over the political and social (humanitarian) upheaval in Cuba. This concern corroborates with Table XI-1, regarding perceptions of rationale.
Chapter V

CONCLUSION

Although the data presented in this project lend support to the hypotheses regarding stress forwarded in chapter one, and, as well, show that certain particular perceptions were of significance to those American decision-makers chosen, it seems advisable to interpret the results with great caution. It would be particularly hazardous to conclude that other factors such as those of personality, ideology or organization play no significant role in a crisis-war situation. A leader's personal values and dispositions equally shape his perception of the situation which confronts him, and his evaluation of the choices of action open to him. Several studies, for instance, have shown the importance of the relationship between "belief system," perceptions and decision-making. A decision-maker acts upon his image of

1 See, for example, the psychoanalytic study of President Wilson by Alexander and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (New York: Dover, 1963), and Maurice L. Farber, "Psychoanalytic Hypotheses in the Study of War," *Journal of Social Issues*, 11 (1955), pp. 29-36.

2 For example, M. Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind* (New York: Basic Books, 1960), and H. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck
the situation rather than upon "objective" reality, and it has been demonstrated that the belief system—its structure as well as its content—plays an integral role in the cognitive process. 3 O. R. Holsti writes:

Within the broader scope of the belief-system-perception-decision-making relationship there has been a heightened concern for the problem of stereotyped national images as a significant factor in the dynamics of the international system. 4

In emphasizing the psychological level of analysis (individual or personality factors) we do not negate the value, on the other hand, of the sociological level (organizational factors). 5 The top foreign policy decision-makers of a nation are not just men—they are men in socially defined roles which may constrain their behavior. In focusing on the individual and his perception as the


5 Richard C. Snyder, for instance, has attempted to "embrace" these two levels of analysis in a single framework, see Snyder and Glen Paige, "The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea," Administrative Science Quarterly, 3 (1958), pp. 341-378.
major unit of analysis the larger units, such as institutions or nations, should not be neglected. O. R. Holsti et al. write:

The individual decision-maker within any large organization, including a nation-state, is embedded, of course, in a considerable number of more or less nesting and overlapping groups each with its own roles, statuses, expectations, and preferences. He also has carried with him into office a complex of personal habits, memories, attitudes, inclinations and predispositions. In performing his decision-making role he is to one degree or another aware of pressures and limitations emanating from these sources, and also from public opinion and expectation; the interests and policies of other components of his government; advice from military, scientific, and other specialized advisers; institutional memories; and the history and traditions of the organization. Essentially, then, the behavior of a decision-maker cannot be considered without reference to the organization of which he is a part.6

Ultimately there can be no purely psychological theory of war or international relations, but only psychological factors within a general theory.7 David Easton states:

...the relevance of the human actors and their motivations and perceptions is limited by the roles they play (and the constraints imposed by those roles) in the larger societal process, and, moreover, by such gives of the interna-


7 It has been proposed, in fact, that psychology belongs at the "core" of the study of international relations--Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 506.
tional system as the distribution of power, the geographical location and international position of the state, economic conditions and demography. 8

In other words, national leaders are individuals making policy choices for their nations in a complex of highly articulated group, organizational, societal, and inter-social systems. The eventual task of the behavioral scientist studying international politics is to gain understanding of how these various dimensions fit together and how they affect the choice behavior of individuals in leadership roles.

This study has encompassed an analysis of the processes of escalation from a relatively stable international situation to an unplanned war. 9 To what extent, then, are its findings relevant for the study of situations removed both in time and space? Do the concepts and findings in this

8 David Easton, Alternative Strategies in Theoretical Research, in Easton (ed.), Varieties of Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966), pp. 1-13, see also L. J. Carr, "A Situational Approach to Conflict and War," Social Forces 24 (1946), pp. 300-303, who writes, "When one asks what forces or influences change a situation, one has to take account not only of the interactions of human beings, but of biological process within the organisms and of geo-physical forces outside, some of which, such as sound, light and electricity, may function not only as situational, environmental factors but as situational processes themselves, p. 301.

9 I am assuming naturally that a war requires more than one month's preparation to be considered 'planned'.
research have any relevance beyond the historical one of illuminating a series of unique events? For example, James A. Robinson has shown in a recent study using similar propositions regarding alternatives that decision-makers themselves usually characterize their own activities in terms of classical economic models of decision-making (reviewing all alternatives in terms of classical economic models decision-making (reviewing all alternatives for the optimum one), rather than in terms of the model suggested here. They often apply the same model to the decision processes of other states. Holsti quotes John Foster Dulles as an example of the tendency to assume totally calculated decision-making on the part of an adversary, "The Russians are great chess players and their moves in the world situation are, I believe, attempted to be calculated as closely and carefully as though they were making moves in a chess game." Theodore Abel, also, in a comparative historical analysis, concluded that:

1. The decision to fight, unless the opponent abandons resistance without a struggle, is not reached on the spur of the moment. In


every case, the decision is based upon
a careful weighing of chances and of antici-
pat ing consequences. . . . In no case, the
decision precipitated by emotional tensions,
sentimentality, crowd behavior, or other
irrational motivations.

2. The rational, calculating decision is reached
for in advance of the actual outbreak of hos-
tilities. . . . The evidence shows that the
decision to wage war precedes by one to five
years the outbreak of hostilities.12

Our findings, however, indicate that the more intense
the interaction between Spain and the United States, the more
important it is to incorporate perceptual data into the
analysis. Holsti et al. put it in another way, "... in a
situation of low involvement one may be able to predict a
nation's action responses to environmental stimuli rather
accurately without recourse to the perceptions of its de-
cision-makers. On the other hand, in a period of crisis
marked by high involvement and rising intensity...the role
of perception becomes increasingly important."13

More specifically, our study revealed that the
manner in which the United States perceived the actions of
Spain was the crucial link between perception and action.
This perception of the of the intentions of Spain could be
said to have affected the perception of means considered

12 Theodore Abel, "The Elements of Decision in the
Patterns of War," American Sociological Review, 6 (1941),
p. 855.

13 Holsti et al., p. 158.
necessary to resolve the situation as well as the capability of self and the enemy in resolving the crisis. Moreover, American perceptions were found to be affected to a significant degree by the phenomenon of stress in regard to the variables of time and alternatives. In duplicating, in part, the findings of Holsti's earlier study of the 1914 crisis by using a different historical episode these perceptions, found significant in both studies, have a greater credibility than heretofore.

The international system has been conceived in the form of a Chinese box. When the outer box is removed there is found next a related and smaller box (or sub-system), smaller boxes existing within smaller boxes, according to the systems strategy. In this research we have attempted to isolate and further verify one of the smaller boxes that rests inside the large expanse of international behavior and within the dimension of crisis specifically. As mentioned above, additional related sub-systems can be found without any question, each in turn related to a larger sub-system. We have chosen to study only one sub-system of the international system. Research of the Spanish-American War situation, is therefore, obviously incomplete. Other studies will be needed to tap other dimensions not touched by our research. Ultimately, the psychological dimension emphasized in this project will be related to other dimensions emanating from the fields of sociology, anthropology, etc., forming a
more comprehensive theory of behavior than heretofore in existence. Charles McClelland's summary to his research can be applied to this project as well:

It might be best to think of the kind of inquiry that has been reported here as only a single strand which eventually will need to be woven with many other strands. The weaving should be done according to strict and orderly procedures. Thus, bit by bit, the wider context might be build, in the weaving of many strands. 14

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APPENDIX

CATEGORIES, CODING AND RECODING GUIDE*

The categories of PERCEPTIONS (i.e., any statement which defines, or perceives a situation, event, or object) are eleven in number. These are defined as follows:

I. Category of THREAT EXTERNAL (to the United States)(TE)

Any statement which perceives a threat, hostility, or pressure coming from a source EXTERNAL to the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>from</th>
<th>to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Spain</td>
<td>i. US-security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. the Cuban situation</td>
<td>ii. US-economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. undefined/generalized/other</td>
<td>iii. US-values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>iv. US-general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>v. peace (world, hemispheric, Cuban)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vi. Cuban people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vii. Cuba-other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>viii. undefined.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the first coding the THREAT them was taken as one category, and on recoding the sub-categories were examined.

Examples: "All thoughtful people realize that the Spanish in that Island by their repressive tactics are destroying the resources of the Island, weakening its productive power, and hindering commerce." Three units.

"The movement of the Spanish flotilla can only be construed as threatening our coast...." One unit.

* I have relied heavily on the excellent coding manual developed by Dr. G. Winham and used in his study of the Marshall Plan decision.
II. Category of THREAT INTERNAL (to the United States) (TI)

Any statement which perceives a threat, hostility or pressure coming from a source INTERNAL to the United States. Recoded they are as follows:

from to
i. the "press" 1. peace
ii. the "public" ii. US-decision-makers
iii. Congress iii. undefined
iv. other

Examples: "The sensational papers endanger the fragile strands of peace."

"The tide is strong and just resentment is at the point of overflow."

III. Category of TIME (T)

Any statement which perceives or expresses TIME to be a factor in the situation or expresses a sense of URGENCY about the situation.

The time category was recoded as to the perception of immediate or distant future as well as perceived reason for the importance of time.

Examples: "We must act now or thousands more will starve."

"The President's Message will not be sent to Congress until next Monday, to give the consul-general at Havana the time he urgently needs to ensure safe departure of Americans."

IV. Category of POLICY CONSEQUENCES/OUTCOME (O)

Any statement which perceives that if certain US/Spanish action regarding the situation is or is not taken, then certain effects will or will not follow; or any statement which perceives the consequences of US/Spanish action or non-action.

Perceptions of outcome are recorded in five categories: (i) perception of positive/negative consequences; (ii) nation primarily affected (i.e., benefitted/harmed) by consequences; (iii) consequence-type; (iv) perception of Spanish aggression or national interest, and, (v) whether the consequence occurs as a result of U.S. aid, or Cuba's recovery (with no mention of U.S. aid) or Spanish action.
Examples: "Without our aid there can only result the most miserable suffering..."

"If armistice is offered by the government of Spain the President will wait in delivering his message to Congress."

V. Category of RATIONALE (R)

Any statement which perceives that:

1. U.S. involvement (medical aid, military intervention) is necessary or desirable for a stated reason - i.e., humanitarian, strategic, economic, national interest, moral, etc. reasons;

2. the U.S. has or should act toward Cuba out of consideration; or

3. the U.S. is interested in the Cuban situation for reason.

Example: "The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade and business of our people."

VI. Category of PROXIMITY (P)

Any statement which perceives the nearness of Cuba to the United States.

Example: "Our Government and people can not see old men, women and children dying with starvation by our very shores and not help them..."

VII. Category of THREAT to SPAIN (TS)

Any statement which perceives a threat to SPAIN from the Cuban situation.

Example: "The war has not only destroyed Cuba but drained the Spanish treasury and endangered her dynasty."

VIII. Category of COMPLEXITY/DIFFICULTY (D)

Any statement which perceives the complexity or difficulty of the situation

IX. Category of ALTERNATIVES (A)

Any statement which refers to perception of (i) choice
(more than one course of action); (ii) necessity (only one possible course of action); (iii) closed (some course of action not possible); and, (iv) impotence (some action proceeding without control) for either the U.S. or Spain.

X. Category of MEANS/SOLUTIONS ACCEPTABLE (M)

Any statement which expresses MEANS or TECHNIQUES of achieving a solution to the situation in Cuba for either Spain or the U.S.; or, which perceives that certain MEANS are incapable of achieving a solution to the situation by the US/Spain.

Examples: "Forcible intervention must be considered, now that all else has failed."

"... force will not achieve peace...."

XI. Category of CAPABILITY (C)

Any statement which perceives that either the U.S. or Spain has or fails to have the capacity or potency to achieve their respective objectives vis-à-vis the situation.

Examples: "There is but one power and one flag that can secure peace and compel peace. That power is the United States, and that flag is our flag."

"Spain can not give peace."