AN UNEXPECTED PROVINCE: ROMAN ASIA 133-128 B.C.
AN UNEXPECTED PROVINCE:
A HISTORY OF THE EARLY YEARS OF THE ROMAN PROVINCE
OF ASIA FROM 133 B.C. TO 128 B.C.

By

MICHAEL SNOWDON, B.A.

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ABSTRACT

This study follows the early years of the Roman province of Asia from the death of Attalus III, the last king of Pergamon, to the final defeat of Aristonicus and the annexation of the territory in 128. Despite the volume of scholarly work on facets of this subject, there remain gaps in our knowledge and a comprehensive study on the topic as a whole is required. The bequest of Attalus III was one of the more extraordinary events in Republican history, but it was not without cause. The first chapter focuses on the history of Roman-Pergamene relations, the character of Attalus III, and his will, in order to put the broader study into context. The second chapter deals with the crucial year 133 BC, when Aristonicus began his remarkably successful bid for the Pergamene crown, and the Roman Senate decided to grant freedom to the entire former kingdom. The third chapter deals with recently published epigraphic material from Metropolis, Pergamon, Caria and Phrygia to sort out fine, but important issues of chronology that help to explain Rome’s eventual annexation of the territory. The chapter concludes with a discussion of when and why Rome chose to annex the former kingdom.
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ABBREVIATIONS

A list of commonly cited epigraphical and reference works follows, including both monographs and journal articles. Abbreviations for ancient authors and their works follow those in the Oxford Classical Dictionary; journals generally follow those recommended by L'Année Philologique. Other abbreviations found in the text are employed following the first use of the fully referenced source and can be easily found fully referenced in the bibliography.

**AE**  
*L'Année épigraphique* (Paris 1888 – )

**Allen, Attalid Kingdom**  

**AM**  
*Mitteilungen des Deutschen archäologischen Instituts: Athenische Abteilung* (Athens 1876 – )

**ANRW**  
H. Temporini (ed.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* (Berlin 1973 – )

**CAH**  

**CIG**  
*Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (Berlin 1825-1877)

**CIL**  
*Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* (Berlin 1863 – )

**Claros**  

**Denk. aus. Lyk**  

**EA**  
*Epigraphica Anatolica*

**F. d' Amyzon**  
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<td><strong>OGIS</strong></td>
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Map 1: Asia Minor 129
INTRODUCTION

When King Attalus III of Pergamon died in the spring of 133 BC\(^1\) he left behind a remarkable testament naming the Roman people as heir to his kingdom. Shortly thereafter, a certain Aristonicus emerged, claiming to be Attalus’ half-brother, who wanted the Pergamene kingdom for himself. Aristonicus, who took the royal title ‘Eumenes III’, immediately set about gathering followers and recovering his *paternum regnum*. For nearly two years he controlled the Lydian and Mysian hinterlands and the Ionian coast until he suffered a major naval defeat off the coast of Cyme and was forced back into the hinterland where he survived for another year until he was captured by Roman troops. Rome, for its part, had been slow to learn of the revolt and did not send an army to recover its inheritance until Aristonicus had well established himself; when Roman legions finally did confront Aristonicus and his forces, it took them three years and the lives of two consuls to subdue him. By 128, though, the uprising had been quashed and Manius Aquillius (the third Roman consul in Asia) along with ten Roman legates were assigned to organize the former Attalid kingdom into the Roman province of Asia. Such is a basic outline of the early history of Roman Asia and yet no sentence in it is without contention. The purpose of the following study is to identify, clarify and (where appropriate) modify arguments on the early history of Roman Asia, from the death of Attalus III to the completion of the war against Aristonicus (*ca.* 133-128).

\(^1\) All dates referred to are in BC, unless otherwise noted.
The evidence for this topic has long proven itself difficult to command; comprised primarily of oblique references, epitomes, coin hoards, and fragmented inscriptions, its nature is disparate, ambiguous and contradictory. For this reason, the publication of a recent inscription from Ionian Metropolis is significant.\(^2\) It refers to a previously unknown *senatus consultum* published shortly after the bequest of Attalus III as well as the names of Roman commanders in Asia and a previously unknown battle in the region. Likewise, inscriptions from Pergamon (Menodoros Decree) and modern Çamlidere (Apollonios Decree) have just recently been published and shed further light on the topic. In addition to these new inscriptions, several older and crucial epigraphic sources have had their traditional readings and interpretations come under question but have yet to be treated in a full length study. Among these are the *SC Popillianum* (*RDGE* 11), which has recently been re-examined by M. Wörrie and found to contain the name of the consul for 132; the Diodorus Pasparos texts (*IGRP* IV, 292-294), which C. Jones has shown to date far later than traditionally thought; and the *SC Licinianum* (*NIP* nos 1 & 2), a second copy of which indicates a more likely date of 132 than 116.

The ambiguity of the evidence, and the increasing number of epigraphic texts uncovered from Asia Minor, has made the early history of Roman Asia a popular topic among students and scholars. It has not only been treated as a singular event in Roman history, but many have also used it and its constituent parts in various thematic studies. Badian and Harris, for example, argue that the annexation of the province demonstrates

\(^2\) B. Dreyer and H. Engelmann, *Die Inschriften von Metropolis* (IK 63) (Bonn 2003), *hauptseite* text.
their respective approaches to the nature of Roman imperialism;³ Sherwin-White, Gruen and Kallet-Marx use the surrounding events to study the nature of Roman relations with the East;⁴ Carcopino and Stockton are very interested in the original bequest and the settlement of the territory in their studies of the Gracchi;⁵ and Rostovtzeff, Dumont, Vogt, and many others use Aristonicus’ revolt to discuss larger issues of slaves, servile revolts and ‘socialist’ movements in the ancient world.⁶

Several detailed studies have been published on the earliest years of the province. The first was by M. Foucart in an article for *L’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* at the turn of the twentieth century. Since then, only F. Carrata Thomes’ short 1968 monograph, C. Miletta’s unpublished dissertation, and F. Daubner’s recent (2003) detailed publication based on his dissertation have addressed the topic as a whole.⁷ Daubner’s work is particularly important and the type of detailed study one expects from

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a German dissertation, but his work was unfortunately in print before the publication of
the highly significant inscription from Metropolis. Smaller studies are more typical of
this rather broad topic and frequently focus on the character of Attalus III or Aristonicus,
the nature of the latter’s revolt, or the evidentiary material of the era. Studies of these
sorts have become increasingly frequent in the past quarter century, fuelled by the
continual discovery of new material evidence from Asia Minor.

The paucity of comprehensive works and the proliferation of narrower studies
have created a bottleneck, of sorts, in the scholarship. Narrow studies are, by nature,
narrowly focused so that it is often difficult for an author to do much more than argue
his/her own point in a confined context; the volume of these studies has made it difficult
for students and scholars to be well informed on the various arguments and evidence
without an extensive research commitment. A comprehensive study of the subject is now
required. The earlier studies of Foucart and Carrata Thomes were valuable in their era,
but sources have since been re-interpreted by modern scholars and new evidence has


emerged since their studies were published. Even the more recent surveys by Mileta and Daubner have not been able to evaluate some of the most recent evidence and arguments.

The best approach to this topic has always been to follow the historical narrative, and this study is no different. In order to avoid a straight chronicle of events, what follows is segmented into (admittedly artificial) stages so that the narrative is clear, but also to provide a thorough analysis of the sources, questions, and arguments. The first chapter begins with a historical review of Roman-Pergamene relations of the second century, detailing Rome’s non-committal approach to the East and strong relations with the Attalid dynasty; also discussed here is the figure of Attalus III, whose character deserves much rehabilitation, and the contents and motive of his famous testament. The second chapter is devoted to the events of the crucial year 133, both at Pergamon (following the uprising and early successes of Aristonicus) and Rome (uncovering the earliest actions of the Senate). The latter is particularly important because the Senate’s reaction to the will is one of the areas in which our new Metropolis inscription contradicts the traditional view of a sluggish Senate. The third chapter focuses on the Senate’s actions to secure the Attalid kingdom down to the final campaigns of M. Aquillius and his subordinates. This chapter deals largely with sorting out the narrative provided by the literary and epigraphic sources and addressing when and why Rome chose to annex the territory. Particularly interesting here is the new evidence for the Commission of 132 and a close analysis of Strabo’s account of the Battle of Cyme that demonstrates the likelihood of a later date (131) than is traditionally held.
Through this study, we will draw several important conclusions. The first is that Rome did not fail to act quickly on news of Attalus’ will; as we will see, the Senate took quick action in 133 to approve Attalus’ will and (remarkably) to set free all of the cities formerly under his aegis. The Romans did not, furthermore, enter the war as it was winding down, but faced Aristonicus when he was at his most powerful – before the Battle of Cyme. Also significant is the consistency between Rome’s reaction to Attalus’ bequest and its previous treatment toward the East. The aforementioned act of freeing the Attalid cities is consistent with the spirit of distance and respect with which Rome had operated in the East for over a century. The motive of Attalus’ bequest, moreover, does not have any indication of Roman involvement but was a derivation of a Hellenistic practice fostered by Pergamene-Roman relations of the second-century. Finally, the Roman decision to annex was a late one; it was made only after significant resources had been expended, and was as much about a post-war settlement as it was about Attalus’ bequest.

What follows is a comprehensive review and analysis of the development of the province of Asia from the death of Attalus III to the conclusion of the war against Aristonicus. The topic is filled with questions of chronology and an unsecured narrative of events. Yet within these years lies also a microcosm of Roman thought and action. The value of this study, it is hoped, goes beyond answering just the chronological and narrative questions of the first decade of the province of Asia and serves also as purposeful to future discussions of themes like Roman imperialism, provincialization, development of the East, and other such discussions to which this subject is often applied.
CHAPTER I:

Roman-Pergamene Relations to the Death of Attalus III
and the Bequest that brought Asia Minor to Rome

The bequest of Attalus III is among the stranger occurrences in Republican
history; from a modern perspective, it can seem without sound cause or reason. Yet, the
bequest, while extraordinary, was not the arbitrary act of an unbalanced mind. A review
of the events leading up to the reign of Attalus III provides important clues concerning
his motivations for leaving his kingdom to Rome. Throughout the second century,
relations between the two states remained strong as Rome tended to limit its affairs in the
East but frequently sided with Pergamon in major disputes. As a result, when Attalus,
childless, looked for an heir for his possessions and the protection and well-being of his
people he turned to the ally of his grandfather, father, and brother. This act was not
without precedent; Ptolemy VII Physcon had done the same thing nearly twenty years
earlier, and Hellenistic tradition used king-to-king bequests for the protection of property
and the rearing of children. A re-evaluation of the material on Attalus III, moreover,
suggests a deeply devoted son, religious monarch and victorious general whose
reputation has suffered the same fate as Nero, Domitian, Commodus, and others
representing the last of a dynasty. Attalus' bequest was an extraordinary act, but not
necessarily an arbitrary one.

Relations between Rome and Pergamon began slightly before the second-century
when Attalus I, as a member of the Aetolian League, aided Rome in the First Macedonian
War against Philip V. Pergamon, at the time a modest but emerging kingdom in Asia Minor, was recognized by Rome for its contribution to the war and was included among the signatories of the Peace of Phoenice (205).\(^1\) Attalus I (r. 241-197), whose reign was concerned chiefly with stabilizing his kingdom following the expansion made under his predecessor, Eumenes I (r. 263-241), employed his relationship with Rome for the security of his kingdom – a precedent followed by his successors.\(^2\) In 201, for instance, he persuaded the Senate of the aggression of Philip V of Macedon against his kingdom and received reparations; by 199, he was a leading voice among the chorus who had urged Rome into a second war with Philip (199-196).\(^3\) Under Eumenes II (r. 197-159), Pergamon remained a strong ally of the Roman people, contributing forces to the campaigns against Nabis of Sparta (195 and 192) and Antiochus III of Syria (192-189), and aiding the campaign of Cn. Manlius Vulso against the Galatians (189).\(^4\) As an

\(^1\) ab rege foederi adscripti: Livy 29.12.13-14. There does not seem to have been any formal treaty between the two cities before the Peace of Phoenice, but it is possible that there had been an informal amicitia as early as Rome’s first dealing with Philip V in 215, when Rome was busy with Hannibal and needed all the allies it could acquire. See Allen, Attalid Kingdom, 69.

\(^2\) On the reigns of the Attalid dynasts, see the large excursus in Strabo’s Geographia (13.4.1-2); for modern interpretations, see: E. Hansen, The Attalids of Pergamon\(^2\) (Ithaca 1971); McShane, The Foreign Policy of the Attalids of Pergamum (Urbana 1964); and Allen, Attalid Kingdom (Oxford 1983).

\(^3\) I.e. Harris, War and Imperialism, 212-218; Gruen, HWCR II: 535-537. To what degree Pergamon influenced Rome’s decision to go to war with Philip V again in 199 is debated. It seems very likely that Rome felt the need to punish Philip for his previous aggression after the war with Hannibal had been concluded and Pergamon’s claims of injury at the hands of Philip likely seemed a righteous enough casus belli to satisfy the lex fetialis.

\(^4\) Forces against Nabis in 195: I.Perg 60, 61; and 192: Livy 35.25-30, 35-37.3; I.Perg 63. Eumenes was an ardent supporter of the war against Antiochus, whose western expansion to regain old Seleucid territory threatened his kingdom directly: Polyb. 21.8.10, 13.15; Livy 36.20.7-8, 41-45; 37.18-19, 33-36; I.Perg 64. Vulso’s campaign against the Galatians was little more than a personal mission for glory and booty (Polyb. 21.33-40; Livy 38.12.38), but the Galatians were a perennial problem for Pergamon and Eumenes was no doubt very content with Vulso’s methods. See recently J. Grainger, “The Campaigns of Cn. Manlius Vulso in Asia Minor” AS 45 (1995), 23-42.
acknowledgement of Pergamene loyalty and friendship as well as the kingdom’s increasing importance in the East, Rome granted Pergamon the lion’s share of Seleucid territory in the settlement of Asia following the victory over Antiochus III (189), giving the Attalids control over most of western Asia Minor. With this gift of Asian territory, the Romans hoped to establish a lone power in the region with which they could deal and which, in political terms, owed something to them. It should be noted, though, that although Rome no doubt held a moral sway over Pergamon, there does not appear to have been any rigid client-king status. In practice, Rome’s concern for the East extended only as far as its own security and those of its citizens, which it saw best served by having control of Asia vested in Pergamon – whose loyalty had been proven and whose ambitions did not threaten Roman security.

Pergamon prospered in its new position of power, owing both to Roman support and a Roman indifference to the minutiae of Eastern affairs. In the 180s and 170s, Eumenes II further extended his kingdom, gaining territory in northern Phrygia, Bithynia, Cappadocia, Galatia and Pontus and making alliances with the Achaean League, Crete,
and Antiochus IV among others.\textsuperscript{7} By the Treaty of Apamea (188) Rome had shown its unwillingness to rule directly or manage the region, and although it reluctantly used its good offices as the basis for conflict resolution in the East, it was not interested in committing resources to compel obedience.\textsuperscript{8} The four year conflict (183-180) between Eumenes II and Pharnaces of Bithynia, for example, saw Rome send three different embassies at the request of one combatant or the other, only to have their decisions disregarded in favour of combat.\textsuperscript{9} As the major power in the region in terms of both territory and allies, and the practical guardian of Hellenistic peace, Pergamon had an influential position with the Senate, a position that Eumenes exploited to his kingdom’s advantage, as had his father Attalus before him. To that end, when a dangerous anti-Pergamene alliance emerged in the East by 171, Eumenes petitioned the Senate for aid.\textsuperscript{10} Since the Senate’s chief goal in the East was stability and its primary tool was Pergamon,

\begin{itemize}
\item Phrygia and Bithynia (184): \textit{I. Perg} 225; Galatia, Cappadocia and Pontus (180): Polyb 23.9.3; 25.2; Achaean League (185): Livy 32.8.9-10; Creto (183): \textit{Syll.}\textsuperscript{1} 627; Antiochus IV (175): App. Syr. 45; \textit{OGIS} 248.

\item See here Gruen, \textit{HWCR}, 96-131, who concludes that Rome was unwilling to serve as the Hellenistic ‘High Court’, despite Eastern wants. Even he, though, is forced to admit that Rome was willing to entertain its judiciary role, rare though it was, particularly in political disputes. Aside from the Eumenes-Pharnaces conflict, L. Scipio was sent to the East in 186 to settle the dispute between Eumenes and Antiochus (Livy 39.22.10, citing Val. Antias), Ap. Claudius dealt with an internal Cretan dispute in 184 (Polyb. 22.15); Roman commissions and embassies to Rome became more frequent after Pydna (167), though they continued to remain non-committal and rather impotent. See recently, S. Ager, \textit{Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World, 337-90 B.C.} (Berkeley 1996), 26-29.

\item Polyb. 23.9.3; 24.1.1-3, 5.1-15; 25.2; Livy 40.2.6-8, 20.1; Diod. 29.22.

\item Political dynamics changed quickly against Eumenes after 180: Rhodes turned on him after his blockade of the Hellespont in 180 (Polyb. 27.7.3-6), eventually turning the Achaean League against him and rescinding the honours he had received earlier in the century (Polyb. 27.18, 28.7). Prusias (Bithynia) forged an alliance with Perseus (Macedonia) through dynastic marriage (Livy 42.12), while Perseus himself solidified an alliance with the Seleucids by marrying Laodice, daughter of Antiochus IV (Polyb. 25.4.8-10; Livy 42.12.3-4; App., \textit{Mith.} 2).
\end{itemize}
Rome came to the defence of Eumenes, defeating Perseus and his allies in the third Roman war with Macedon (171-167). This was the same mindset with which they had helped Attalus I in the 190s and which characterized Roman-Pergamene relations until the death of Attalus III in 133.

Some comments must be made about the tension that characterized Roman-Pergamene relations in the 160s since this period is often overemphasized as the beginning of soured relations between the two states.\(^{11}\) According to the sources, shortly before the conclusion of the Third Macedonian War, Eumenes met secretly with representatives of Perseus, and in exchange for two thousand talents, he allegedly promised to withdraw his support for further Roman aggression and to persuade the Senate to deal with the Macedonian king leniently.\(^{12}\) In response to these allegations, Eumenes sent his brother, Attalus (II), to Rome to plead his innocence only to have some high-ranking men of the Senate offer Attalus his crown.\(^{13}\) As if to make their intentions clear, the following year (167) the *patres* refused an audience to Eumenes, even though he had already landed in Italy.\(^{14}\)

Despite Polybius’ record, both the alleged bribe from Perseus and the offer to overthrow Eumenes are dubious; they are reports of events that occurred behind closed doors. They were likely intended to explain the Senate’s political rebuff of Eumenes in

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\(^{12}\) Polyb. 29.5-9; Livy, 44.24.1-10, 25.1-2, 5-12; App., *Mac.* 18.1

\(^{13}\) Polyb. 30.1.5-10; Livy 45.19.1-20.3.

\(^{14}\) Polyb. 30.18.1-7, 19.6-11.
167 and the various charges against him that Rome entertained in the latter half of the 160s. The Senate’s decision to refuse to hear Eumenes, in turn, was the product of a variety of factors, ranging from battle fatigue to embarrassment, bravado, and even uncertainty. The charges against Pergamon, moreover, never produced anything substantive. The numerous embassies (166-160) led and encouraged by Prusias II alleging Attalid misconduct produced Roman investigative commissions but never any official condemnation or rebuke. In fact, Eumenes was highly praised by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus following his tour of the East in 160. Even the Roman-sponsored treaty between Pergamon and Galatia (166), which many claim was a punishment against Pergamon, is not clearly anti-Pergamene. True, it removed Galatia from Pergamene control, but Galatian independence was valid only if it did not act aggressively outside its borders – that is, the treaty secured peace for Pergamon from perennial Galatian attacks.

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17 Polyb. 30.30.7. See also Polybius’ own laudations (32.8) on the life of Eumenes, whom he praises as the best of his contemporaries for his industry, energy, grace, honour and management of his kingdom.

18 Polyb. 30.28, 30.6-7. Many have seen the treaty as evidence of Rome’s continued action against Eumenes by emphasising that it removed Galatia from Pergamene control and granted it autonomy. Polybius (30.19.12) saw it as the Senate’s way to embarrass Eumenes; cf. Magie, _RRAM_, I:23; Hansen, _Attalids_, 124. While the treaty did remove Galatia from Pergamon, the emphasis should be on the conditions of the peace: the Galatians could maintain their independence so long as they did not cause trouble beyond their borders. Rome was securing Pergamon from future attacks by the incessantly belligerent Gauls and limiting Galatian expansion in Asia Minor. If this were a treaty directed against Pergamon, Rome would have responded to the Galatian complaints of Pergamene encroachments in 163-2. The point is rightly made by Gruen, _HWCR_, II:577. Polyb. 30.30.2.
Despite the tensions of the 160s produced by Eumenes’ designs and ambitions for his kingdom, Roman-Pergamene relations did not break nor did Rome turn its back on the Attalid kingdom.

Following the death of Eumenes II in 159, his brother Attalus II (r. 159-138) ascended the Pergamene throne and managed to strengthen relations with Rome and once again to capitalize on their friendship. Attalus II had served as his brother’s ambassador to Rome no less than six times and was well known and, by all indications, well liked by the Senate.\(^\text{19}\) His relationship with Rome was similar to his brother’s in the 180s and 170s; it was characterized by his exploitation of the aid and latitude the Senate was willing to extend him.\(^\text{20}\) In his twenty-one year reign, he managed to establish dependents on the thrones of Cappadocia (157), Syria (153), and Bithynia (149), to extend his sphere of influence to include Galatia, Pamphylia and Pisidia, and to establish colonies at Philadelphia (Lydia) and Attaleia (Pamphylia).\(^\text{21}\) All of these were carried out

\(^{19}\) Embassy in 182: Polyb. 24.5.1-8; Diod. 29.22; in 172: Livy, 35.23.10; in 168-7: Polyb. 30.1-3; Livy 45.19; in 164: Polyb. 31.1.4-6; in 161: 31.32.2; and in 160: 32.1.5-6. In 182, he arrived to lavish a reception and in 167 he was offered the throne of Pergamon; in his last embassy to Rome the Senate received him with great ceremony and voted him many kindnesses (philanthropoi).

\(^{20}\) Consider Polybius’ comment (32.12) that Attalus’ restoration of Ariarathes IV to the throne of Cappadocia was the first example of his principles and policy: ‘Ότι Ἄτταλος ὁ ἀδελφός Εὐμένους παραλαβὼν τὴν ἐξουσίαν πρῶτον ἔξηγεν δείγμα τῆς αὐτοῦ προαιρέσεως καὶ πράξεως τὴν Αριαράθου καταγωγῆν ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν (‘Upon succeeding his brother Eumenes, Attalus at once gave an example of his principles and policy by restoring Ariarathes to his throne.’).

\(^{21}\) Cappadocia: Polyb. 32.12; Syria: Polyb. 33.18.1-5; Strabo 13.4.2; Justin 35.1.6-11; Bithynia: Polyb. 36.14; App., Mith. 4-7; Strabo 13.4.2; OGIS 327; Galatia: 31.1.3, 32.1-3; Pamphylia and Pisidia: OGIS 751; Philadelphia: Strabo 12.8.18; 13.4.10; Attaleia: Strabo 14.4.1
without interference or condemnation by Rome. When Prusias II of Bithynia, for example, attacked Pergamon (156-154) the Senate hesitated to get involved, but when Attalus’ allegations were verified it committed Rome to Pergamon’s cause and sent no less than four envoys in a matter of months to settle the dispute; the eventual treaty made clear that Rome held Prusias culpable. To his credit, Attalus reciprocated Rome’s goodwill by contributing arms and troops to both the Achaean and Macedonian wars and the siege of Corinth. By the end of Attalus’ reign, relations were warm enough for Scipio Aemilianus to repose in the Pergamene capital after concluding his mission in the East (139).

Some have suggested that Attalus II’s strong relation with Rome was a product of his supplications to the Senate. This was not the case. The only evidence for this suggestion is a correspondence between Attalus and the High Priest of Pessinus, which is said to reveal the hesitancy of the Pergamene king to act without Roman approval.

Attalus confesses to Attis that:

22 To this list should also be added Attalus’ defence of his Thracian possessions against Diegulis, leader of the Thracian Caeni (Diod. 33.14; Strabo 13.4.2; Justin, Prol. 36) and OGIS 330, which mentions a war against Thrace in the fifteenth year of an unknown king.

23 In chronological order, Rome sent a commission of two (Polyb. 32.16.5), three (Polyb. 33.1.2), ten (Polyb. 33.7.3-4, 12.2), and three (Polyb. 33.13.4-5). On the treaty see, Polyb. 33.13.8-10.

24 Achaean War and Corinth: Paus. 7.16.8; Pliny, NH 35.24; Macedonian War: Strabo 13.4.2.

25 Strabo 14.5.2; Diod. 33.28b; Polyb, Fr 76 = Ath 6.273a; Justin 38.8.8. See also H. Mattingly, “Scipio Aemilianus’ Eastern Embassy” CQ n.s. 36 (1986), 491-495.

26 Typical here is Hansen, Attalids, 141, who claims that Attalus “advanced the vassalage of Pergamon”.

14
At first few shared this opinion (to consult Rome), but afterwards as days passed and they [his council] considered it, it became more apparent to us, and it seemed that to rush forward without them [i.e. the Romans] held great danger; for to us, if we should succeed, would come envy, removal of gains, and wretched suspicion, which gathered around my brother (Eumenes II), and if unsuccessful would come open ruin. For (if we were to fail) they would not pay attention, but it would be seen as sweetly done, because we carried out these designs without them. But now, even if – may it never happen – we are bested in our endeavour, because each action was done with their approval we would receive their help, and because it was done with the goodwill of the gods, we would recover our losses. 27

There is more here than supplication in Attalus’ words; in fact there is conscious and weighed political manoeuvring. The significance of this letter is that neither Attalus nor the majority of his advisors had even considered seeking Roman approval, and, furthermore, that he was submitting to their counsel only because it was profitable to his kingdom. 28 Attalus II, like Attalus I and Eumenes II, administered his kingdom at arm’s length from the Roman Senate, seeking its counsel or approval only when diplomacy or

27 OGIS 315iii = Wells, RC no. 61, II. 10-20: δι᾽ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὀλίγοις μετατέθηκεν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ἄλλαις καὶ ἄλλαις ἡμέραις ἡδέως δὲ διασκοποῦσαν ἔπετετο μᾶλλον ἡμῶν, καὶ τὸ προπετευὸν δὲν ἐκείνων μέγαν ἔδεικε κύνδυον ἔχειν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιτυχοῦσαν φόδον καὶ ἀφαίρεσαν καὶ υφοψίαν μοχθηράν, ἢν | καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἄδελφου ἔσχοσαν, καὶ ἀποτυχοῦσαν ἄρσιν | πρόδηλον. οὐ γὰρ ἐπιστραφείσθη ἐκείνους, ἄλλ’ ἡδέως δίψεθαί, δεὶ ἄνευ ἑαυτῶν τηλικῶν ἐκνομέωθε. νῦν δὲ, ἢν καὶ, ῥ | μὴ γίνοιτ’, ἐλασσωθώμεν ἐν τοῖς, μετὰ τῆς ἐκείνων | γνώμης ἔκαστα πεπραγμένας ὀψαλαθίας τεῦξεθαί καὶ ἀδιαμαχείσθαι μετὰ τῆς τῶν θεῶν εὐνοίας.

28 Sherwin-White, “Roman Involvement in Anatolia, 167-88 B.C.” JRS 67 (1967), 64. This is particularly true when we consider that this document dates to the earliest years of Attalus’ reign (1597), after which Attalus maintained a remarkably independent foreign policy. Contra: Magic, RRAM I:27; Hansen, Attalids, 132; Hopp, Untersuchungen, 68-69. On the date of the inscription see, Wells, RC, 250; Sherk, RGEA, 28; Sherwin-White, RFPE, 39, who argue for various dates in the mid-150s.
self-interest called for it. The Senate, for its part, continued its traditionally passive
approach to the East, concerned only with its own security. Even after the annexation of
Macedonia and the subjugation of Achaea, there is no solid evidence that Rome had any
designs of stronger control in the East – even after 146, many Achaean cities remained
‘free’ cities as did entire territories in Asia Minor.  

It has been clear in our historical narrative thus far that Rome took a very
relaxed approach to Asia Minor, interfering only when solicited and leaving no evidence
of any attempts to steer directly the course of events in its favour.  

About the events of Attalus III’s reign (r. 138-133) we have almost no substantive
information, but what survives suggests a continuation of the policy seen under his
predecessors. Attalus played an active role in government as early as the mid-140s,
learning his governing style from his uncle, Attalus II. We know from an Elaean
inscription that he managed to wage a successful war sometime during his reign, though
we do not know precisely when or against whom. There is no mention of the war in
Roman sources, which could mean either that it was insignificant or that it was carried

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29 On Achaean cities: Livy 45.17; Caria and Lycia in Asia Minor: Livy 44.15.12, and below, p.
101, n. 109.

30 Even those scholars who insist that Rome did have an imperialist mentality in the second
century concede that it consciously avoided annexation until well into the first century. See, for example,
M. Rostovtzeff, SEHHW, 70-71 and E. Badian, RILR2, 1-15, with bibliography.

31 The lone reference to an otherwise unknown war is found in an honourary decree from Elaea:
OGIS 332, I. 21-24: γενέσθαι δὲ καὶ ἐπιγραφάς, ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ ἁγίασματος "Ὁ δήμος βασιλέα Ἀτταλοῦ
Φιλομήτορα καὶ Εὐεργέτην θεοῦ βασιλέως Εὐμένου Σωτῆρος Ἀρετῆ[ς] ἐνεκέν καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας τῆς κατὰ
πόλεμον, κρατήσαντα τῶν ὑπενναντίων" (‘And there shall be an inscription for the statue, “The People
[dedicate this] for King Attalus Philometor and Euergetes, son of the deified King Eumenes Soter, because
of his virtue and bravery in the war and the conquest of our enemies.’).
out without Roman knowledge. If it is the former, it would suggest that Rome’s passive policy toward Asia continued; if it is the latter, it could imply that Rome was again being kept in the dark by an Attalid.\footnote{Here we might recall the letter of Attalus to Attis, above n. 27.} Such is the evidence for the events of Attalus’ reign; slight though the evidence may be, nothing suggests a change in Pergamene-Roman relations or a fundamental shift in Rome’s Eastern policy. From this perspective, Attalus’ decision to bequeath his kingdom to a foreign state, and indeed Rome’s acceptance of the territory, is unexpected and extraordinary. Attalus appears to have governed successfully and Rome showed no desire for any formal obligations in the East. It should not, however, seem so strange that Attalus chose Rome as his heir. By 133, Rome and Pergamon had over seven decades of solid relations; Rome had proven itself to be a valuable ally to the Attalids, giving them much of their territory, investing them with control of the region, aiding them diplomatically and militarily when needed, and not influencing their foreign and domestic affairs. More than any neighbouring kingdom or state, Attalus III trusted Rome.

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It remains now to look more carefully at the last of the Attalid dynasts, whose actions are at the very centre of this investigation. Attalus III is often seen as an eccentric and bloodthirsty monarch, and, as such, his testament is taken to be a product of an unstable mind. The evidence for his character, however, is certainly not entirely negative; the epigraphic account reveals a devout son and brother, a victorious general,
and an honoured king. It is the vitriolic literary account that provides the bloodthirsty characterization. When we take into account this positive epigraphic tradition, it becomes clear that Attalus was not an extraordinarily malicious king; he was a deeply pious man to his family and their cult, and raised on Hellenistic teachings, which manifested themselves most famously in his love for horticulture and toxicology. A careful study of Attalus’ character and the character of his reign reveals that the reason for his eventual bequest cannot have been an unstable mind; the kingdom Rome received came freely from a royal bequest made *compos mentis*.

Attalus III was born *ca.* 168 to Eumenes II and his wife Stratonice, and was therefore in his early 30s when he ascended the throne in 138/7 and in his mid-thirties when he died in 134/3. As the direct heir of Eumenes II, Attalus III was the rightful heir of the Pergamene throne and thus, strictly speaking, his uncle (Attalus II) reigned as

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33 *OGIS* 319, l. 16; no. 329, l. 40; no. 331iv, l. 46 no. 332, ll. 22, 24, 45; no. 331ii, ll. 18; iii, ll. 32, 39 45-6; *AM* 29 (1904), 170ff; no. 14, ll. 9; Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, no. 15, ll. 40; no. 24, ll. 2-3; *I Eph* 200; *Denk. aus Lyk.*, no. 75, ll. 4-5; (?) *OGIS* 264, ll. 18-19; Polyb. 33.18.1-2; Strabo 13.4.2; Livy, *Per* 59; Florus 1.35.2; Plut., *Mor.* 184 B, 489 F. *Contra*: Justin 36.4.1: *rex Attalus...ab Eumene patruo acceptum regnum* (‘King Attalus...accepted the kingdom from his uncle Eumenes’); Eutropius 4.18, *Attalus rex Asiae frater Eumenis* (‘Attalus, King of Asia, brother of Eumenes’). Both of these sources, however, are epitomes and their reliability should be judged accordingly. The dispute over his parentage is needlessly pedantic as the preponderance of the evidence naming him the son of Eumenes and Stratonice should indicate. See Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 189-194.

34 Polybius (33.18.2) refers to Attalus as a παῖς in 152, meaning that in that year he cannot have been older than 15 (Greek reckoning) or 18 (Roman reckoning) years old. παῖς carries a technical definition of “a male child before his enrolment in a deme and his consequent entry into civic life”, that is, before the age of seventeen or eighteen. See, Aristophanes of Byzantium fr. 37-66 (Slater); Hippocrates, *Opif. Mundi* 36.105; M. Golden, “Pais, ‘Child’ and ‘Slave’” *L’Antiquité Classique* 54 (1985), 91-98. There is no true Latin equivalent (*puer*?), but the age range is similar to the Romans’ recognition of seven as the end of *infantia* and 13-17 as the adoption of the *toga virilis*. See most recently, B. Rawson, *Children and Childhood in Roman Italy* (Oxford 2003), 134-145.
regent (ἐπίτροπος) for his nephew.\textsuperscript{35} Yet, Attalus II ruled well past his nephew’s coming of age by any reckoning, and this raises the question whether Attalus III was reluctant to assume the Pergamene throne. In short, the answer seems to be no. Part of the reason for not claiming his birthright must stem from his uncle’s aptitude and success at governance. As discussed above, Attalus II was an immensely successful ruler who managed to extend his kingdom and sphere of influence, restore relations with Rome, consolidate his own royal power, and turn Pergamon into the leading Hellenistic city in the East. While his uncle remained king, however, Attalus III appears to have become active in the administration of the kingdom in the latter part of his reign – perhaps a product of the elder Attalus’ exceptional age.\textsuperscript{36} The evidence for this participation comes from a royal letter to the boule and demos of Cyzicus, dating to 142.\textsuperscript{37} Not only was the royal correspondence written by the younger Attalus, but it states that he was consulted by his uncle on the appointment of hereditary priests.\textsuperscript{38} Other epigraphic evidence from

\textsuperscript{35} The term is found in Strabo, 13.4.2: ἐπίτροπον δὲ κατέστησε [Εὐμένες] καὶ τοῦ παιδὸς νέου τελέως ὄντος καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν ἀδελφῶν Ἀτταλῶν (‘Eumenes established his brother Attalus as guardian of his young child and of his kingdom’), and κατέλαμπε [Εὐμένες] δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῷ ἐπιτροπευθέντι Ἀττάλῳ (‘Eumenes left his kingdom to Attalus, who had been under guardianship’); cf. Dittenberger’s reconstruction of OGIS 264 (ll. 17-19): [ἐπεθάνε [Εὐμένες] κατα]λείπων τὴν [μὲν βασιλείαν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ υἱῷ] Ἀττάλωι, κατ’ ἐπιτροπῆν δὲ ἐκείνωι.

\textsuperscript{36} Attalid kings typically employed kinsmen in their council, just as Eumenes II, for example, had co-ruled with Attalus II shortly before his death. See Allen, Attalid Kingdom, 129-135. Attalus II would have been in his 79\textsuperscript{th} year in 142, our first example of Attalus III’s active role in government.

\textsuperscript{37} OGIS 33 iiii = Wells, RC no. 66.

\textsuperscript{38} Line 7: Ἀτταλὸς ὁ θείος μου σὺν καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ γνώμῃ (Attalus, my uncle, with my approval’), and line 14: τηλικουσίων κάγῳ καὶ Ἀτταλὸς ὁ θείος μου (‘So thought my uncle and myself’). The ends to which we can take this evidence are admittedly short. The priest in question, Sosander, was an Attalid kinsman (συντρόφος, συγγενής) and based on other surviving epigraphic material Attalus III was unusually concerned with religious affairs, so that the elder Attalus might have deferred such a minor issue to his nephew. On Attalus’ extraordinary concern for religion see Hopp, Untersuchungen, 109f, and below, n. 51.
the reign of Attalus II refers to "Attalus son of Eumenes" (i.e. Attalus III), in consultation with Attalus II, as a **locus** of authority in the state.\(^{39}\) The evidence that we have for his minority, limited though it is, reveals at the very least that Attalus was presented officially as having and exercising some authority in Pergamon, and that what authority he did exercise was in line with the policies of Attalus II and in no sense radical. It suggests, furthermore, no eagerness on Attalus' part to ascend the throne during his uncle's regency-turned-reign, and implies only contentment with the arrangement.

Thus far, the actions of Attalus III have in no way seemed extraordinary, which is radically different from the traditional characterization of his reign. How, then, did Attalus carry himself during his brief five year reign as king of Pergamon? Diodorus tells us that his reign was one of such cruelty and bloodshed that he was hated not only by everyone subject to him but also by the neighbouring peoples as well. Beset by paranoia, records Diodorus, Attalus carried out a purge of the Pergamene aristocracy, employing mercenaries to kill his generals, governors, advisors and friends, along with their families.\(^{40}\) Justin, epitomizing Trogus Pompeius, repeats the accusations found in

\(^{39}\) *OGIS* 264, ll. 16-21; no. 319, ll.15-17; no. 329, ll. 40-41; no. 331 iii, ll. 7, 14; Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, no. 15, ll.36-41; no. 24, ll. 1-3; Denk. aus Lyk., no 75, ll. 4-5. Collected in Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, Appendix I, nos. 28-36. *OGIS* 331iii and Allen, no. 24, in particular state that a decision was made with the approval of Attalus III while Attalus II was still king.

\(^{40}\) Diod. 34-35.3: Ὅτι κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἀττάλου ὁ βασιλεὺς προσφέρετος διαδεδεγμένος τὴν ἀρχήν ἄλλοτρίαν ἔσχε διάθεσιν τῶν προβεβασιλευκότων, καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι χρηστήστηκαν καὶ φιλανθρωπίας χρώμενοι ταῖς βασιλείαις ἐνευδαμόνησαν ὁπῶς δὲ γενόμενος ὁμός καὶ μιαφόνος πολλοῖς τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν βασιλείαν τεταγμένων ἁνεκέστοις συμφορᾶς καὶ σφαγῶς περιέβαλε. τῶν δὲ πατρῶν φίλων τοὺς δυνατωτάτους ὑποπτεύοντας ὡς κατ᾽ αὐτὸν τὰ βουεσαμένους, ἐκρίνε δὲν ἄπαντας ἐκπολέμησεν, ἐπιλεξάμενος οὖν τῶν βαρβάρων μισθοφόρων τοὺς ἁγιωτάτους εἰς φόνον, ἀπλήστους δὲ εἰς χρημάτων περιουσίαν, τούτως ἐν τινιν ὀικήμασι κατέκρυμεν ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις, τῶν δὲ φίλων τοὺς ὑποπτευμένους μετεπέμπτο. παραγεγομένων δὲ τῶν φίλων ... πάντας ἀπέκτεινεν, ἐξὸν ὑπηρέτας ὀικείους τῆς ἱδιας μιαφονίας. εὐθὺς δὲ τέκνα καὶ γυναίκας τούτων προσέταξε τῆς αὐτῆς τιμωρίας.
Diodorus but adds also that he became reclusive following the deaths of his wife and mother and took to malicious pharmacology, learning to mix noxious brews and even testing them on his own friends. The veracity of these allegations has come under increased scepticism in the last thirty years, and many now emphasize their anecdotal nature. Despite this, these texts cannot be dismissed outright; although Diodorus and

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Justin 36.4.1-3: *Per eadem tempora, quibus in Syria regni mutatio inter novos reges alternabatur, in Asia rex Attalus florentissimum ab Eumene patruo acceptum regnum caedibus amicorum et cognatorum suppliciis foedabat, nunc matrem anum, nunc Beronicen sponsam maleficiis eorum necatam configens. Post hanc scelestam violentiae rabiem squalidam vestem sumit, barbam capillumque in modum reorum submittit, non in publicum prodire, non populo se ostendere, non domi laetiora convivia inire aut aliquod signum sani hominis habere, prorsus ut poenas pendere manibus interfactorum videretur. Omissa deinde regni administratione hortos fodiebat, gramina serebat et noxia innoxiiis permiscebat, eaque omnia veneni suco infecta velut peculiare munus amicis mittebat.* (‘During the same time in which the Syrian kingdom was alternating among new kings, in Asia King Attalus polluted a most flourishing kingdom he had received from his uncle Eumenes (II) with the killing of his friends and the executions of his relatives, pretending sometimes that his old mother, and sometimes his wife, Berenice, had been destroyed by their wicked contrivances. After this atrocious outburst of rage, he assumed a poor dress, let his beard and hair grow as if under prosecution, never went abroad or showed himself to the people, held no feasts in his palace, and behaved in no respect, indeed, like a man in his senses – so that he seemed to be paying penalty for his crimes to the Manes of those who had been murdered. Abandoning, then, the government of his kingdom, too, he dug about in his garden, mixed grasses, combining noxious and harmless ones together, and sending them all indiscriminately, infected with poisonous juices, as special presents to his friends.’). Veturius (4.1) refers to Attalus’ wife as ‘Arsinoe’ not Berenice.

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Justin/Trogus likely used different sources, their stories must be part of the same tradition that emerged after Attalus’ death. Ascertaining the source or the reason for that tradition is guesswork at best, but there is no reason to expect, *prima facie*, that the tradition has much to do with the ‘truth’. For epigraphic sources do not suggest any sort of public malice, either foreign or domestic, against Attalus III. Quite the contrary is found, in fact, as inscriptions reveal that he was honoured with statuary and annual feasts by his people, was acclaimed a victorious general, and helped his kingdom’s cults with tax exemptions and asylum rights for temples. A closer examination of the material will reveal that the ‘truth’, skewed though it is from both sources, must reside closer to the latter than the former.

Diodorus’ report on Attalus’ brutal accession to power is probably an embellishment by the author in order to explain the eventual uprising of Aristonicus.

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44 The exact date of composition for Diodorus’ work is unclear, but the last event mentioned was the foundation of a colony of Roman citizens at Tauromenion after the inhabitants were expelled by Octavian in 36 BC (16.7.1). Trogus likely composed his work sometime around the turn of the millennium (ca. AD 2). See J.M. Alonso-Núñez, “An Augustan World History: The ‘Historiae Philippicae’ of Pompeius Trogus” *G&R* 2nd series 34 (1987), 59-61.

45 An honourific inscription from the Elaean *demos* (*OGIS* 339) records that Attalus was given a pair of bronze statues (II. 7-9) bearing inscriptions lauding his virtue, bravery, prudence and munificence (II. 21-26) as well as establishing his cult in the Temple of Asclepios Soter (I. 8) and declaring for him an annual festival (II. 15; 38-39) with processions (I. 15), sacrifices (I. 17; 38-39) and prayers for his health, safety, victory and strength (I. 30-31). Interest in his mother’s cult (Zeus Sabazios): *OGIS* 331 III; in his kin: *OGIS* 331 IV; asylum for native Persian cult: *OGIS* 333; tax exemptions for Temple of Apollo: Wells, *RC*, 69.
whom he had previously discussed in light of the ‘slave crisis’ of the 130s.\(^{46}\) Attalus III had ruled in conjunction with his elderly uncle as early as 142, which means that he had worked with his uncle’s advisors for five years without incident before assuming the crown, making it unlikely that he would have needed to purge the aristocracy of enemies.\(^{47}\) It is possible that upon his accession Attalus felt the need to remove potential threats, as many kings no doubt felt they had to, but this need not be considered either widespread or extraordinary. Justin’s report, too, probably has a kernel of truth: that Attalus became reclusive after the death of his wife and mother is not so difficult to believe, nor is it difficult to imagine that after their deaths he turned his focus to his scientific studies to the detriment of his duties of government. Certainly, Attalus’ extended mourning period, if Justin is to be believed, was longer than the four months that custom likely dictated.\(^{48}\) Yet Justin is not specific whether Attalus was formally mourning his family during his social reclusion, and the prospect seems unlikely. Attalus’ reaction, though at odds with social norms, should more likely be seen as part of a natural human reaction to loss – one that he was able to indulge in at the cost of his

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\(^{46}\) Diod. 34/35.2.26 (below, p. 41, n. 21); so Hopp, *Untersuchungen*, 119.

\(^{47}\) The one exception to this is the crucifixion of the dissident grammarian Daphidas, whose distich against the Pergamene kings is often attributed to Attalus III. Strabo 14.1.39: πορφορέοι μύλωπες, ἀποτρινήματα γάζης / Λοσιμάχου, αὐτῶν ἄρχετε καὶ βρυγίης. (‘Purpled with stripes, mere filings of the treasure of Lysimachus, ye rule the Lydians and Phrygia’. Loeb transl.). But see Braund, “Three Hellenistic Personages: Amynander, Prusias II, Daphidas” *CQ* 32 (1982), 350-7, who cautions that the events surrounding Daphidas do not certainly date to Attalus III.

\(^{48}\) A third century BC inscription from Gambreion (*SyI* 1219 = *LSAM* 16), just 25 kms south-east of Pergamon, for instance, sets the temporal limits for mourning at four months for men and five months for women. *Contra*: Herodotus (6.58), who indicates that the public mourning for a royal death in Asia was just 10 days, although his passage directly concerns a royal death in Sparta.
reputation. Attalus, moreover, had been raised on the polymath of Hellenistic teachings, including science, so that (as Rigsby points out) his obsession with pharmacology and toxicology is not a queer character flaw, but a continuation of Hellenistic tradition.\footnote{Noted also by Hopp, Untersuchungen, 117-118. On Greek mourning practices, see recently K. Derderian, Leaving Words to Remember: Greek Mourning and the Advent of Literacy (Boston 2001).}

Justin’s claims of mindless murder, though, must certainly be narrative embellishment; the very survival of Aristonicus to conspire later casts doubt on his characterization of Attalus as a paranoid killer. Aristonicus must surely have shown some hint of interest at Attalus’ throne before his death, which a paranoid psychopath (as Justin characterizes Attalus) would not have overlooked. In stark contrast to this perspective, the epigraphic evidence reveals a king devoted to his own cultic issues and those of his state. He followed the Attalid tradition of apotheosizing his predecessors and took great interest in his mother’s native cult.\footnote{K. Rigsby, Asia Provincia, 123. For the sources on Attalus’ pharmacological and toxicological studies see Hansen, Attalids\textsuperscript{2}, 145, nn. 60-71.} There is, admittedly, one piece of epigraphic evidence for unorthodox behaviour on Attalus’ part, namely a Pergamene decree comparing him to a god (σώννας η τόι θεώι).\footnote{Apotheosis: AM 33 (1908) 376-79, no. 1. This decree dating to Attalus’ reign refers to the priest of the “deified Philadelphoi”, who are now generally considered to be the brothers Eumenes II and Attalus II. Hansen, Attalids\textsuperscript{2}, 142-143; Hopp, Untersuchungen, 109, n. 12. Mother’s cult: OGIS 331iv. This devotion to his mother’s native cult is surely in part what earned Attalus his appellation ‘Philometor’. Hopp has suggested that his focus on her cult and his own cultic actions were an attempt to be remembered after his death. This argument seems ex post facto based on his early death at thirty-five, which he of course surely could not have predicted, and is probably more reflective of true religious conviction and devotion to his mother. Hopp, ibid, pp. 113, in fact suggests that Attalus had general cultic enthusiasm.} Allen, though, has demonstrated
that this was the natural progression of the Attalid ruler cult begun three generations earlier; and in any case, it is methodologically unsound to conclude from this lone inscription that Attalus was a maniacal and self-obsessed individual as presented in the literary texts.\textsuperscript{53} It is more likely that there were some internal problems during Attalus’ reign that forced him to respond with force and that in the final years of his life he appeared more reclusive, to the detriment of his state. Rigsby is probably correct in his belief that Attalus has suffered the same fate as other final dynasts, whose history was written by their usurpers; in Attalus’ case, tales of murder and intrigue were created and personality quirks and moments of weakness were embellished, most likely by pro-Aristonicus supporters to swell support for the usurper.\textsuperscript{54} Attalus, by all rights, was \textit{compos mentis} on his death in late Spring 133. His mother and his wife had predeceased him by a few years and Attalus had neither re-married nor produced any offspring, natural or otherwise.\textsuperscript{55} Thus, in an established Hellenistic tradition, Attalus left his kingdom, his personal property by Hellenistic legal practice, to another ‘kingdom’ –

\textsuperscript{53} Allen, \textit{Attalid Kingdom}, 145-158, 155-156. The assertion by Badian, Review of Hopp, \textit{Untersuchungen}, that the use of “extravagant honorary inscriptions to counterbalance the hostile portrait in the literary sources...is as naïve as it would be to use the official laudations of Comrade Stalin in his lifetime, or his official pronouncements, to counterbalance the other evidence” (p. 201), is overly antagonistic and misguided. Badian, more than most, is aware of the Hellenistic tradition of ruler worship and the complexities of the epigraphic habit. The typicality of the honours noted in \textit{OGIS} 332 has been shown by L. Robert in \textit{BCH} 108 (1984), 472-89; 109 (1985), 468-81. Rigsby, \textit{Asia Provincia}, 123, adds that that the accolades are perhaps “rather chaste and conservative on the score of royal cult”.

\textsuperscript{54} Rigsby, \textit{Asia Provincia}, 126.

\textsuperscript{55} It is interesting that Attalus never re-married or at the very least had an illegitimate child to continue his familial dynasty. Part of the answer is surely his early death, having had a sexagenarian father and an octogenarian uncle.
Rome. More needs to be said on the motive of the bequest but before proceeding, we must review what precisely Attalus included in his will.

Attalus’ famous will is mentioned a score of times by over a dozen different ancient authors. All but two of these authors state that Attalus bequeathed his kingdom to Rome; the exceptions, Sallust and Porphyrio, claim that Rome forged the will after his death, a claim credible enough that it cast doubt on the veracity of the will up to the late nineteenth century. An inscription unearthed by Fränkel in the 1880s has now,
though, demonstrated its existence. Although the inscription does not explicitly mention Attalus’ will (διάθηκη), it does state that after his death he granted freedom to the city of Pergamon and increased their civic territory and that these acts had to be ratified by Rome; this can only be a reference to Attalus’ last will and testament.\(^{60}\) Claims, therefore, that Rome fabricated the will after Attalus’ death are no longer valid; however, there does remain the question of Roman influence on Attalus’ decision. Admittedly, there is no strong evidence to suggest a positive or a negative response, but the Senate’s slow (vis-à-vis Ti. Gracchus) and surprised reaction to Rome’s inheritance – the focus of the next chapter – would suggest that Attalus made his will without any formal pressure from Rome.\(^{61}\) Any influence on Attalus would have come from individuals – senators seeking glory from an Asian command, or businessmen wanting to exploit the territory financially. Harris believes that Attalus was surely influenced by his Roman friends, among whom he includes Scipio Aemilianus (who received gifts from Attalus while on campaign in Numantia in 134) and Ti. Gracchus (whose father had praised Eumenes II following his mission to the East c. 165).\(^{62}\) But while Attalus surely maintained his father’s friendships at Rome, there is no solid evidence for influence peddling, and the testimony is especially weak in that he misinterprets the context of Horace’s passage (See Nisbet and Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace: Odes, book ii* [Oxford 1978], 295).

\(^{60}\) *I. Perg 249 = OGIS 338, ll. 3-7: ἐπεὶ] βασιλεὺς Ἀτταλός Φιλομήτωρ καὶ Εὐεργήτης μεθιστάμενος ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πολέμωσεν τῇ μεταφράσας ἡμῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐν προσφοράς αὐτῆς καὶ πολέμου ἐπικυρωθησάτω ἡν ἀπὸ τὴν διαθήκην ἐπὶ τὸν ᾿Ρωμαίων ("[Since] King Attalus Philometor and Euergetes, who has left the realm of mortal men, left behind our city as free, having included in it even what he judged as the community countryside, (though) it is necessary that the will be ratified by the Romans").

\(^{61}\) Liebmann-Frankfort, "Valeur juridique", 85.

suggestion that Ti. Gracchus had any direct influence on the contents of Attalus’ will is highly speculative and fodder only for conspiracy theorists; Gracchus was as surprised as most at the good fortune Attalus’ will presented him.63

There is, furthermore, the question of whether Rome was even aware of Attalus’ will. Plutarch states that upon Attalus’ death a Pergamene envoy, Eudemus, brought the will with him to Rome, making rather clear that Rome had no prior knowledge of it.64 Yet some scholars suggest that Rome was not only aware of the will but that a copy of it must have been kept at Rome, drawing a comparison with Ptolemy Physcon (discussed below), who had made Rome his heir and remitted a copy to them for safekeeping.65 There is a problem with the comparison, however, as Physcon, at the time childless like Attalus III, left his territory (Cyrene) to Rome in order to protect himself from his ambitious brother, Ptolemy VI Philometor, king of Egypt.66 Attalus did not make his will to protect himself from Aristonicus, whose stirrings began after Attalus’ death and who, if he had known Attalus’ territory went to Rome, would surely not have asserted his spurious claim and faced war with a far superior enemy — Aristonicus, we shall see, was


64 TiGr 14.1: Ἑπεὶ δὲ τοῦ Φιλομήτορος Ἀττάλου τελευτήσαντος Ἑδημος ὁ Περγαμηνὸς ἀνήνεγκε διαθήκην ἐν ἐκ κληρονόμος ἐγέρατο τοῦ βασιλέως ὁ Ῥωμαίων δήμος. (And when Attalus Philometor died, Eudemos of Pergamon brought over his will, in which the Roman people had been recorded as heir by the king.’). On Rome’s ignorance of Attalus’ will: Hansen, Attalids, 149; Magie, RRAM I: 32; II: 781, n. 94; Braund, “Royal Wills”, 22; Sherwin-White, RFPE, 83, who intimates that Rome knew of the will, but not its particulars; Gruen, HWCR II: 599.


66 On this ‘Insurance Policy Theory’, see below n. 81.
an opportunist, not a fool. Because Plutarch is so clear on the point and the comparison between Attalus and Physcon is problematic, we should operate on the assumption that Rome did not have a copy of the will, although the question cannot be answered with any certainty unless further evidence is discovered.

We turn, then, to the content of Attalus’ will. Despite the numerous references to it in ancient texts, no source, unfortunately, states what precisely Attalus bequeathed to the Romans. On the contents of the will we must rely on chance references from the literary and epigraphic texts and the precedent of a royal bequest in the will of Ptolemy Physcon. A passage from Florus allegedly contains a short excerpt from Attalus’ will, but this brief passage is fraught with difficulty and its authenticity has rightly been questioned. In Attalus’ will we would expect to find Hellenistic testamentary formulae and legal practices, but the phraseology in Florus instead mimics Roman tradition. The passage is frequently accepted by scholars on the basis that its phraseology is consistent with a passage from the Elder Seneca (Contra. 2.7.7), who, in the scenario of the ‘foreign merchant’, presents a sample will containing the phrase, “omnium bonorum meorum,

67 See Braund, “Royal Wills”, 49-50, who rejects the ‘insurance policy notion’ as a viable motivation for the wills of Attalus III, Ptolemy XI Alexander II of Egypt (d. 80/79) and Nicomedes IV of Bithynia (d. 74). Contra: Liebmann-Frankfort, “Valeur juridique”, 85; Sherwin-White, RFPE, 81.

68 It is uncertain whether the will belongs to Ptolemy VII or VIII Euergetes II and he is thus simply referred to as Physcon. Physcon’s will: ed. pr. Oliviero, la stele di Tolemeo Neoteros, re di Cirene (Bergamo, 1932) = AE (1932), 80 = SEG IX 7. English translation in Sherk, RGEA, no. 31. Recent discussions: Braund, “Royal Wills”, 16-21, and Gruen, HWCR II: 702-708.

69 Florus 1.35.2: Attalus rex Pergamorum, regis Eumenis filius, socii quondam commilitonisque nostri, testamentum reliquit: “Populus Romanus honorum meorum heres esto. In bonis regis haec fuerunt.” (Attalus, King of Pergamon, son of King Eumenes, once our ally and supporter in war, left a will which said, “Let the Roman People be heir to my estate: the following possessions now constitute the royal property.”). On the acceptance of the passage see, for example, Hopp, Untersuchungen, 128, who refers to Cardinali, Aristonico, 277. For a refreshing dissentient discussion of Florus’ passage see Braund, “Royal Wills”, 22.
omnis pecuniae meae sola heres esto.”\(^{70}\) The phraseology is undoubtedly the same, and both concur with a standard Roman testamentum, i.e. ‘Titius heres esto’ (Gaius, Inst. 2.117), but this only confirms that Florus’ passage cannot be a Latin copy of Attalus’ Hellenistic will.\(^{71}\) Attalus’ testament would have been closer to the phraseology of Ptolemy’s will (καταλείπω ἡμαίοις τὴν καθήδυσάν μοι βασιλείαν; ‘I leave behind to the Romans the kingdom left to me’), which emphasises the act of the deceased with an active verb and makes the heir the indirect object – this is not the case in Florus’ formulation.\(^{72}\) Florus’ passage, thus, cannot be a Latin translation of a Greek original. This fact, though, does not exclude it from careful study, for the information itself is consistent with other ancient sources.

The volume of ancient literature recording Attalus’ will, when taken together, gives a clear picture of the basic contents of the will. Attalus bequeathed to the Romans not only his kingdom (regium, βασιλικά, ἀρχή), including its subject cities and their land (agri, χώρα) – thus excluding temple lands and free Greek cities – but he also left to Rome his own personal wealth (pecunia, gaza Attalici, βασιλικά χρήματα) and property

\(^{70}\) The entire will reads: omnium bonorum meorum, omnis pecuniae meae sola heres esto, quia corrumpi non potuit, quia tot sollicitationibus expugnari non potuit, quia tam fideliter pudicitiam custodivit (‘let her alone be the heir of all my possessions and all of my money, since she could not be corrupted, nor could she be conquered by so many temptations, since she guards modesty so faithfully.’).

\(^{71}\) Attalus, of course, would have composed his will in Greek just as Ptolemy had.

\(^{72}\) SEG IX 7, ll. 13-14. The Roman formula emphasizes the heir and the goods bequeathed with an imperative verb; the testator is only mentioned in relation to the goods he is bequeathing (meorum bonorum, pecuniae meae).
The will no doubt included the royal treasury, the king’s personal belongings, royal domains, forests, shops and slaves, presumably even the *agri Attalici* in both the Thracian Chersonese and Aegina. There appear also to have been provisions in the will that some Pergamene cities be left free. The Pergamene inscription excavated by Fränkel, mentioned above, reveals that upon his death Attalus granted *eleutheria* to his capital city and its surrounding country land (*πολε[τική] χώραν*) while Ephesian *cistophori* reveal that Ephesus likely earned its ‘free’ status from Attalus as well. The freedom of these cities is almost a moot point in practical terms, because, as we will see, a recently published inscription from Metropolis demonstrates that the Roman Senate freed many, if not all of the cities of Asia Minor within months of learning of Attalus’ will. Regardless of our unfortunately myopic view of Attalus’ testament, it is clear that

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73 *Regium*: Hor, *Carm* II 18.5; ἀρχή: App, * militia* 62; χώρα: *OGIS* 338, 1.6; pecunia: *Livy, Per* 58, Orosius 5.8.4, *de vir ill.* 64.5; βασιλικά χρήματα: Plut, *Ti.Gr.* 14; bona: Sen, *Contr.* 2.7.7, *Florus* 1.35. A large number of cities within the Attalid kingdom were granted their freedom in the Treaty of Apamea, including Lampascus, Dardanus, Ilium, Alexandria, Cyme, Smyrna, Clazomenae, Erythrae, Notium, and these would not have been included in the will (above, n. 5).

74 Hansen, *Attalids*, 149. *Cicero, de leg. agr.* 2.50, refers to the Thracian Chersonese as Roman public land (*agri publici*). Aegina had been sold to Attalus I in 210 for 30 talents by the Aetolian League and was ruled by the Attalids as a personal possession. *Livy* 27.19.10; *Paus.* 8.42.7; *OGIS* 281; *IG* IX ii, p.L.

75 There is some debate on this reconstruction. Fränkel, *I.Perg* 249, restored line 6 as προορίσας αὐτής καὶ πολε[μίαν] χώραν, ἣν ἐκρίν[εν]; Dittenberger, *OGIS* 338, restores it as προορίσας αὐτής καὶ πολε[μίαν] χώραν, ἣν ἐκρίν[εν]; Foucart, *Formation d’Asie*, 300, attempted to reconcile the document with *Livy* (*Per* 59) and suggested προορίσας αὐτής καὶ πόλε[ς καὶ] χώραν, ἣν ἐκρίν[εν]. The reconstruction by Dittenberger is surely correct given the context, namely, Attalus III granting to his capital city, their surrounding countryside, and making the entire entity free.

76 Rigsby, *Provincia Asia*, 40-42, has shown that the era denoted on the coins must represent a local civic era and that the era must be the result of a positive action (i.e. bequest) and not simply a negative action (i.e. the death of Attalus III). For a detailed discussion of the *cistophori* see F.S. Kleiner, “The Dated Cistophori of Ephesus” *ANSMN* 18 (1972), 23-30.

77 See below, pp. 57-59.
Attalus bequeathed the vast majority of his kingdom to Rome in an unprecedented act of foreign policy; what remains to be concluded is why.

As was the case with the contents of his will, no ancient author suggests what Attalus' motivations were for bequeathing his territory. Despite this fact, modern authors have not failed to propose their own ideas. An exhaustive list need not be provided here, but there are three general categories into which the theories fall: 1) Attalus was merely recognizing and formalizing the *de facto* power of Rome in the East, whether out of contempt or compassion for his people; 2) he desired to stay a socio-economic conflict within his kingdom; 3) he was reacting to Aristonicus' swelling power and trying to remove any chance of him ruling. None of these categories seems to capture the complexities of the circumstances, and they might each be refuted in turn. Those who assert that Attalus was recognizing *de facto* Roman power underestimate the power of Pergamon and wrongly assume that Rome sought to expand its control into Asia. Pergamon was more than powerful enough, following the highly successful reigns of Eumenes II and Attalus II, to defend itself against malcontents in the region; in any case,

78 An extensive list can be found in Gruen, *HWCR* II: 593-4, n. 94.
Rome was reluctant to assume any obligations in the East, choosing instead to have Pergamon maintain the status quo at its own discretion. Those who propose the outwardly ‘Marxist’ interpretation, less popular in recent times, lack any material evidence for social turmoil in Pergamene society; they work backwards from Aristonicus’ uprising, assuming (incorrectly) that he was motivated by a desire to better the conditions of slaves and other malcontent Pergamene citizens. The third category, the ‘insurance policy theory’, is the most appealing of all the suggestions, but its foundation is based solely on the comparison between the wills of Attalus and Physcon, and lacks concrete evidence in Attalus’ case. As we will see in the next chapter, Aristonicus, although perhaps inwardly contemplating the idea of becoming king, does not appear to have taken any action against his half-brother before his death.

Attalus’ decision to bequeath his territory is part of a larger Hellenistic tradition of royal bequests dating back to the mid-third century BC. Independently of Rome, a practice evolved among (Hellenistic) Anatolian kings to arrange for external guardians for their young children in the event of their deaths. These guardians were allies and close relations of the kings, often fellow kings or entire cities. In due course, Rome, as a powerful state, was integrated into this tradition, as the *populus Romanus* was the friend

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82 The term was coined by Braund, *Royal Wills*, 49-50, and is used to represent the idea that a king caught up in domestic intrigues would leave behind his territory to a third party, thereby making his death unprofitable to his killer; cf. Physcon’s will (lines 6-11): “May it be mine with the goodwill of the gods to avenge righteously against those who have organized against me an unholy design and have chosen to deprive me not only of my kingdom, but even of my life...I leave to the Romans the kingdom left to me.”

83 Much of what follows is based on the often-overlooked paper by D. Braund, “Royal Wills”, presented to the British School at Rome (*PBSR* 1983).

84 The first instance is illustrated in the will of Nicomedes I of Bithynia (ca. 255), who appointed five external guardians for his children. See Braund, “Royal Wills”, 44-45.
and ally of many an Anatolian king.\textsuperscript{85} It is, in part, as an extension of this \textit{tutela} practice that royal wills, including Attalus', developed.\textsuperscript{86} The bequest of territory, a step further than guardianship, in turn, stems from the Hellenistic practice of childless testators looking for a successor among their friends.\textsuperscript{87} For a king to think of his territory much like a father thought of his son is not a difficult mental leap. By bequeathing his kingdom to Rome, Attalus thought that he was doing what was best for his people. In this sense, scholars who argue that Attalus was hoping that his territory would be treated as Greece had in 167 are partly right but accord more precision to Attalus' motivation than necessary – Attalus was leaving it up to Rome to decide the best course. Attalus, though, perhaps somewhat nervous about giving Rome such power, had taken some precautions for his favourite cities, Pergamon and Ephesus at least, by granting them freedom in his will. The choice of Rome was likely encouraged by both a moral debt, owing to its numerous benefactions to the Attalid dynasty for over three quarters of a century, and the undeniable supremacy that Rome exercised in the East. That a tradition and precedent has been found for Attalus' will should remove the unease felt by scholars that Rome actively encouraged the shape of his will; for it has been the lack of a precedent that seems to have bothered scholars most about the entire affair. Having now established the

\textsuperscript{85} Braund, "Royal Wills", 51: "Thanks to the legendary role of the Trojans in the foundation of the city, Rome was very much a part of this phenomenon (sc. common legendary or historical ancestry). Further, the notion of a familial link between Rome and her kings also existed on a metaphorical level. So, when a king looked beyond his family to his friend, the \textit{populus Romanus}, as his successor, he was looking to a friend who might even be deemed part of the family."

\textsuperscript{86} Braund chooses not to emphasis this connection, although it is perfectly valid as a part of an organic development from the guardianship of a child to the adoption (possession) of a child to the possession of a territory, the metaphorical child of a childless king.

\textsuperscript{87} Sherwin-White, "Anatolia, 167-88", 67; Braund, "Royal Wills", 51.
historical context, shape and motive for Attalus' bequest, the focus of the next chapter will be on its repercussions, in both Pergamon and the political theatre at Rome.
CHAPTER II

133 BC: The Impact of Attalus’ Will at Rome and the Accomplishments of Aristonicus’ Campaign in Asia Minor

The purpose of this chapter is to follow the history of the province of Asia through the crucial year of 133. It was in this year that Attalus III died and left behind the will that granted his entire kingdom to the Roman people; it was also in this same year that Aristonicus, a half-brother of Attalus III, claimed his right to the Pergamene throne and began a de facto revolt against Rome. There are, then, two theatres that need to be considered in this discussion, Rome and Pergamon; as such, the chapter has been divided into two distinct sections. The first deals with Aristonicus and the development of his revolt. Particularly disputed issues here include his character and motivation, the timing of his uprising, the nature of his support, and the progression of his revolt from the Anatolian hinterland to the cities of the western littoral. The second section of this chapter deals with the arrival and impact of Attalus’ will at Rome. News of the will coincided with the land reforms instituted by Ti. Gracchus and reaction to the bequest must be discussed in light of the politically charged atmosphere in Rome. One of the most important questions to be answered here is what the Senate had initially planned to do with the former Attalid kingdom, and how its decision fits into the larger discussion of Roman imperialism. To shed new light on this question, we will look closely at a recently published inscription from Ionian Metropolis (20 km north of Ephesus across the Cayster River), which reveals that the Senate had passed a decree granting “freedom” to
all the cities of the former Attalid kingdom. This senatorial decree is consistent with Rome’s non-committal approach to the East already discussed. A careful study of the year 133 BC is crucial to understanding the development of the province of Asia as events at Rome and Pergamon set in motion a series of actions that would shape the decision to settle a new province nearly a decade later.

We begin in the Pergamene theatre with the shadowy character of Aristonicus. By all accounts, he was the illegitimate son of Eumenes II by an Ephesian courtesan and thus the half-brother of Attalus III. The sources are silent on whether or not he had been officially acknowledged by the royal family, but at the very least, there is no sign that he had been in any way involved in the running of the kingdom. After the death of Attalus III, though, Aristonicus assumed the royal name of ‘Eumenes III’ and minted his own coins in the hinterland of eastern Lydia bearing his new royal title – BA(σιλευς) EY(μενες). It is also now clear from the Metropolis decree – to be discussed in more detail – that Aristonicus was first involved in the restoration of the Hellenistic stater of King Eumenes II, which had been put to rest in the 140s BC with the death of the last Attalid, Attalus III.

1 Literary sources for Aristonicus: Livy, Per. 59; Strabo 14.1.38; Diod. 34.2.26; Plut., Flam. 21.6; App., B.C. 1.18; Mith. 62; Tac, Ann. 4.55, 12.62; Florus 1.35.4-5; Justin 36.4.6; 37.7.1; Val. Max. 3.2.12; Vel. Pat. 3.4.8; Frontinus, Strat. 4.5.16; Orosius 5.10; Eutropius, Brev. 4.20. There are many epigraphic sources relating to Aristonicus’ uprising, but only a few that explicitly name him: Syll II 694, ll. 16-17 (Elaea); H von Gaertringen, HGE no. 111, ll. 4-5 (Pergamon); SEG 36 no. 555, ll. 8-10 (Kassope); I.Metr, hauptseit, ll. 15-16 (Metropolis); EA 3, pp. 157-165 (= SEG 34 no. 1198) (Gordos); (?) I.Eph 202, ll. 1-2 (Ephesus).

2 The recent argument of R. Sanders, “The Identity of Αριστονικος... (I Eph. 202)” AncW 3 (1997), 51-54, identifying ‘Αριστονικος in I.Eph. 202 as Aristonicus is overly speculative, as noted in SEG 47, no. 1625. Dozens of common Greek names begin with the stem Aristo- and Aristonicus in any case seems inconsistent with the traces of a ‘delta’ reported by Rigsby, “The Era of the Province of Asia” Phoenix 33 (1979), 45-46 (= SEG 29, no. 1096).

3 The identification of the cistophori coins bearing the legends BA EY with Aristonicus (‘Eumenes III’’) was first made by E.S.G. Robinson, “Cistophori in the Name of King Eumenes”, NumChron 14 (1954), 1-8; see now F. S. Kleiner and S.P. Noe, The Early Cistophoric Coinage (New York: American Numismatic Society, 1977), 103-106. F. Collins, “Eutropius and the Dynastic Name Eumenes of
detail below — that Aristonicus carried out an elaborate crowning ceremony for himself early in his uprising (περιτεθεικότος ἐπεισώ ὁ βασιλεύς). Unfortunately, it is impossible to precisely date these events. Appian provides the best chronological identification, but even this is vague and states only that Aristonicus’ uprising began sometime around the death of Ti. Gracchus in the early summer of 133; the Metropolis inscription is equally difficult because the order of events appears to have been manipulated for propagandistic purposes, although it is clear that the crowning ceremony occurred very early in the uprising.

Ancient authors are surprisingly quiet on the character of Aristonicus, concerning themselves largely with the validity of his pedigree. Florus, however, describes him as “a high-spirited young man of royal blood” (regii sanguinis ferox iuvenis), and there seems to be no good reason to disagree with him — Aristonicus’ successes during his four year reign are ample illustration. By contrast, modern historians frequently pass their own judgements on Aristonicus and characterize him under various rubrics: to some he is a proto-socialist reformer who took up the cause of the slaves in Asia Minor and sought to

the Pergamene Pretender Aristonicus”, AncW 4 (1981), 39-43, has demonstrated that the name ‘Eumenes III’ is also recorded by Eutropius (4.18 and 4.20).

4 I.Metr, 1. 17.

5 App., B.C. 1.18: Καὶ τάδε μὲν ἦν, ὃτε Ἀριστόνικος Ῥωμαῖος περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιλέμει τῆς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ (‘These things [s.c. Ti. Gracchus’ death] took place at the time when Aristonicus was contending with the Romans for the government of Asia’). Ti. Gracchus died during the tribunate elections for 132, which Appian records (B.C. 1.14) happened in the summer (θέρος δ’ ἦν ἧδη καὶ προγραφαλ δημάρχων ἐς τὸ μέλλον).

6 See below, p. 56.

7 Florus 1.35.4. Compare Magie, RRAM I:148, who generally comes down hard on Aristonicus but is forced to admit that he was “a man of boldness and ability”; cf. F. Collins, The Revolt of Aristonicus (Diss. Univ. of Virginia, 1978), 75: “exceptionally brave and enterprising”.

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create a utopian community of the Sun;\(^8\) to others he is a Pergamene nationalist who sought to repel the Romans from his dynastic right;\(^9\) to others still he is an ambitious pretender to the throne, who capitalized on turmoil in the kingdom in order to claim the Pergamene throne after Attalus' death.\(^{10}\) Aristonicus’ character is complicated by the fragmentary nature of the evidence surrounding his supporters and his goals, the ambiguity of which accounted for his early success but ultimate failure. Aristonicus, though, was above all a claimant to throne of Pergamon, one in a long line of Hellenistic “pretenders” most recently seen in Andriscus (pseudo-Philip) of Macedonia but stretching as far back as Heracles, “son of Alexander”, who appeared mysteriously at Pergamon in 309.\(^{11}\) Aristonicus was an opportunist, who capitalized on an excellent opportunity for power and advancement, but whether his motives were noble or not is difficult to assess.

Who, then, was this man able to rally to his cause? Perhaps surprisingly, Aristonicus appealed to many elements of society, as a beacon for both the discontented and the conservative. For although Aristonicus’ support was said in antiquity to have

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\(^{10}\) This has become the more accepted view. See especially Magie, *RRAM* I:148-9; Gruen, *IIWCR* II:593-7.

come chiefly from rebellious slaves and revolutionaries — a group to whom we shall return shortly — to many Aristonicus surely represented the *status quo*. As ‘Eumenes III’ he attracted to his side men who relied on the monarchy for their positions, status and livelihoods — included among these were portions of the upper class, sometimes narrowly defined as the ‘court party’, residents and workers of royal lands, and the army. Support from the upper classes is largely adduced from a famous Pergamene decree of 133 (*OGIS* 338), which advises those who have left the city, or intend to leave the city, that “their rights and their property will fall to the state”.  

The reference to property confiscation and revocation of citizenship must be directed at the upper (propertied) class and the threat reveals a fear of, or reaction to, an upper-class instability caused by Aristonicus’ uprising. In particular among this group would have been the friends (*philoi*, *suntrophoi*) and kinsmen (*suggeneis*) of the royal family, royal advisors (*anagkaioi*) and ministers of the cities and *topoi*, the so-called ‘court party’, who naturally turned to Aristonicus as the dynastic successor of Attalus III.

The same Pergamene decree suggests also that Aristonicus had an influence on the military classes around Pergamon. Lines 10-19 of the inscription record that the

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12 *OGIS* 338, ii. 27-30: ἐγκαταλέσασιν ὑπὸ τῶν καίρων τῆς [πελευθερίας] τοῦ βασιλέως ἃ ἐγκαταλέσασιν τῷ πολιτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ, ἔνας αὐτῶς καὶ[ί] | αὐτῶς ἀτίμους τε καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου ὑπάρχουσα τῆς | πόλεως (“Those who left up to the precise time of the death of the king or leave from the city or countryside, these men and women, are to be both stripped of their rights their things fall to the state.”).  


14 F. Collins, *Revolt of Aristonicus*, 77-78. For the role of these groups of men see variously the royal correspondence of the Attalid dynasty recorded in *Wells*, *RC*, 188-279, nos. 46-69. On their position in the Attalid government see Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 129-135.
Pergamene boule granted citizenship status to many of the ‘military class’, including the soldiers in the city and the countryside (τῶν στρατιωτῶν τοις κατοικοῦσιν τήν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν), settlers registered in the garrisons (τοῖς ἀναφερομένοις ἐν τῶι φρουρίῳ καὶ τῇ πόλει τῇ ἄρχαι ταῖς κατοίκοις), the guardians (παραφυλακίας) and other mercenary troops (ἄλλοις ἐπικούροις). The most obvious reason for this grant is that these men were susceptible to the call of Aristonicus, and the Pergamene demos had to offer them citizenship status to ensure their loyalty. The successes of Aristonicus further suggest that he had the support of the military. His victories on land and at sea suggest that he had not only the support of at least part of the Attalid army, but also the naval fleet and its sailors. As part of his troops, Aristonicus, not unlike his predecessors, had Thracian mercenaries, who were no doubt keen on the de facto anti-Roman stance of Aristonicus’ revolt. This appearance of anti-Romanism also drew entire cities to him, just as Justin records of Phocaea. Even more cities would have quickly come to his side, we are told, were it not for their fear of Rome. The cities that did support Aristonicus were generally those of the hinterland in eastern Mysia, Lydia and Caria, and the territory of Phrygia. Cities like Thyateira, Apollonis, and Stratonicea were the heart of Aristonicus’

15 On the translations of these classes see LSJ, s.v.; Dittenberger, OGIS 338, s.v.; Sherk, RGEA no. 39.


17 Frontinus, Strat. 4.5.16; Val. Max. 3.2.12; Oros., ad Pag. 5.10.3. See also Potter, “Where did Aristonicus’ Revolt Begin?” ZPE 74 (1988), 293-295.

18 Justin 37.1.1

19 metu Romanorum: Justin 36.4.7.
support and the centres of his minting program; they were ‘monarchist’ centres, whose
ruling citizens were Greco-Macedonians dependent on the Attalid crown.\(^{20}\)

In contrast to the support from ‘conservatives’, slaves and the impoverished
formed a large part of Aristonicus’ following. Indeed, much has been made about
Aristonicus’ use of slaves; many ‘Marxist’ scholars have suggested that his uprising was
part of the larger slave revolts of the 130s and that Aristonicus was a social reformer who
sought to ameliorate the conditions of slaves and the poor.\(^{21}\) Aristonicus’ use of slaves,
therefore, needs to be qualified; without a doubt he used them, Diodorus tells us as
much,\(^{22}\) but they became a strong element of his movement only after his military
setbacks on the coast, and he was a part of the ‘slave crisis’ of the 130s only in so far as
he used its momentum to his own advantage. Slave revolts were a major problem in the
Mediterranean in the 130s, most profoundly in Sicily, but also at major slave centres like
Delos and Athens, yet there is no clear evidence of any wide-spread social unrest in the

León, “Aristonicos: Basileus Eumenes III” *Hispania Antiqua* 13 (1987), 135-157; Florus, 1.35.4:
*Aristonicus...urbs regibus parere consuetas partim facile sollicitat* (‘Aristonicus...easily won over some
of the cities which had been accustomed to obey kings.’).

\(^{21}\) The best example of the ‘Marxist’ hypothesis is Vogt, *Ancient Slavery*; see also M. Rostovtzeff,
*SEHHW II.*801f. Recent scholarship on this aspect of Aristonicus’ revolt has focused on the
‘Heliopolitanai’, which Strabo (14.1.38) reports as the name given by Aristonicus to his followers and
corresponds to a utopic treatise by a certain Iamblus. Most recently, the Polemaios decree (Col. 2, line 37)
from the sanctuary of Claros refers to a δουλῶν πόλις, which some have suggested might be the ‘City of
the Sun’, but might also refer simply to a campaign against slaves in the city. See Africa, “Aristonicus,
Blossius and the City of the Sun”, *passim*; Roberts, *Claros*, 37-38 (with notes); and C. Eilers, *Roman
Patrons of Greek Cities* (Oxford 2002), 134.

\(^{22}\) Diod. 34.2.26: τὸ παραπλησίου δὲ τέγονε καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καρποὺς,
Ἀριστονίκου μὲν ἀντιποιομένῳ τῆς μὴ προσηλκύσεις βασιλείας, τῶν δὲ δουλῶν διὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν
dεσποτῶν κακουχίας συναπονοημένων ἐκείνων καὶ μεγάλως ἁτυχίας πολλὰς πόλεις περιβαλόντων
(‘Similar events took place throughout Asia at the same period, after Aristonicus laid claim to a kingdom
that was not rightfully his, and the slaves, because of their owners’ maltreatment of them, joined him in his
mad venture and involved many cities in great misfortune.’).
Attalid kingdom *ca.* 133. The only evidence we have for slave and lower-class discontent is Attalus' erratic behaviour and an Amyzon inscription recording the crucifixion of a slave; the former has been shown in the previous chapter to be vastly overestimated, and the latter is indicative of daily life and hardly suggests mass unrest. Aristonicus did use slaves, but Strabo (14.1.38) is equally clear that he solicited their support only after he had lost control of the coastal theatre and moved inland, probably in late 131. To these slaves he certainly offered freedom, and to the dispossessed he must certainly have offered some amelioration; any more specific suggestion is mere guesswork. Aristonicus thus had a range of supporters, broadly falling into one of either 'conservatives' ('court party', army, hinterland cities) looking to keep the status quo or 'revolutionaries' (slaves and resourceless) looking for change. Although this broad appeal brought many different groups into his camp, it made a long-term focus impossible. He simply could not deliver both continuity and change, and as his revolt progressed and his supporters became aware of this fact, the Roman side became the more attractive position.

The early progression of Aristonicus' uprising was swift to the point that when a Roman investigative commission arrived in early 132, he already controlled a large part

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24 *F. d’Amyzon*, no. 261.

25 Roberts, *F. d’Amyzon*, 261, "un épisode de la vie quotidienne".

26 Strabo, 14.1.38 (below, p. 90, n. 72).

27 The claim, for instance, by Delplace, "contenu social et économique", 44, that Aristonicus was offering land reform to acquire support is completely without evidence and a dubious conclusion.
of the kingdom. By the end of 133, in just six months or so, Aristonicus appears to have secured his power-base in the Anatolian hinterland, secured or otherwise seriously threatened the Ionian coastal cities, and perhaps even personally attacked Mysian cities in the north.

Some of Aristonicus’ earliest actions were likely taken in the Pergamene hinterland. Strabo states that he first ‘fell upon Thyateira, Apollonis, and other fortresses”, and there is no reason to disbelieve him. This region, as we have just seen, was filled with prospective supporters from both sides of the spectrum. His contentment with the loyalty of the region, and his early action there, is confirmed by the evidence of his royal coins. To legitimate his ‘reign’ and fund his endeavours, Aristonicus minted a royal coin series, which lasted the length of his four year ‘reign’. His second, third and fourth year coins carry the ethnics of hinterland cities: Thyateira, Apollonis, and Stratonicea, respectively. The first year in his series has always proven difficult to identify, but it seems more likely that the coin Kampmann discussed over twenty-five years ago is the elusive ‘Year A’, rather than the troublesome BA ΣΥ AP series so often suggested. The latter probably originated from the city of Blaundos and, in any case, dates to the 150s and not the 130s. Kampmann’s coin, bearing the title BA EY, the
ethnic ΘΥΑ(τειρα), and (possibly) an ‘A’ in the lowest curl of the left snake, is the more attractive choice. Although the identification of the alpha is controversial and the ethnic of Thyateira on both coins might suggest the coins date to the same regnal year, the unique die cast of the coin demonstrates that it was struck in a different year from the beta coins. Here then, it seems that Aristonicus’ first and second year coins were both minted in Thyateira, which Strabo says is the city he first fell upon – one of the reasons that he moved the minting operation to Stratonicea in his third year was, as we will see, because Thyateira was attacked by a Roman led Greek force. If Kampmann’s analysis is correct – and it seems likely that it is – then Aristonicus was in Thyateira before the end of his first year in September 133, and probably much earlier given that his coins needed time to be designed, struck, and distributed. The placement of a mint, furthermore, presupposes control of the region, and Aristonicus’ choice of Thyateira for his first and second year minting operation demonstrates the security and safety he felt in this region.

31 Kampmann, “Aristonicos à Thyatire”, 38-42. As noted recently by C.P. Jones, Review of *I.Metr.*, the claim by S. Bussi, “La monetazione di Aristonico”, *RIN* 98 (1997), 109-122, that this coin belongs in Year ‘delta’ (4) of Aristonicus’ series is unconvincing. Bussi’s dating, furthermore, is based on that assumption that Aristonicus attacked Thyateira after the Battle of Cyme in (supposedly) 133; but see below, pp. 90-95, for comments on Strabo’s chronology and a date of 131 for the Battle of Cyme.

32 Kampmann, “Aristonicos à Thyatire”, 40-41.

33 Below, p. 79.

34 The Pergamene calendar was not synchronized with the Roman calendar; it was likely based on the Macedonian calendar, which reckoned the year as beginning at the autumnal equinox (ca. 21 September) rather than 1 January. Therefore Aristonicus’ regnal years ran from Oct-Oct, beginning with 134-133. See Samuel, *Greek and Roman Chronology: Calendars and Years in Classical Antiquity* (Munich 1972), 125-127.
Despite Aristonicus’ control of the hinterland very early in his uprising, it is possible that he began his revolt from outside the region. Strabo’s report, for instance, that he “fell upon” Thyateira (παραεισέπεσεν εἰς Θυατείρα) suggests that he was not initially in the area. There are, in fact, other examples in the literature of Aristonicus’ uprising that similarly express the idea that he invaded from without; aside from Strabo, there is Justin (Asiam invasit), Orosius (Asiam pervaserat), and now the inscription from Metropolis (Αριστονίκου δὲ παραγεγονότος). D. Potter has suggested that Aristonicus actually began his uprising from Thrace and “invaded” the Attalid kingdom, and he is perhaps correct.

An inscription from Sestos, a city on the Thracian Chersonese, reveals that the city feared a Thracian attack because of “sudden and grievous circumstances” following the death of Attalus III – surely a reference Aristonicus’ sudden uprising.

Similarly, an inscription from Cyzicus, situated in northern Mysia along the Propontis littoral, records that the city sent a representative to the Roman governor of Macedonia, M. Cosconius, when it was beset with war (περιστάντως πολέμου) and surrounded.

35 Strabo 14.1.38. A review of the TLG reveals that Strabo’s παραεισεπεσεν is a hapax legomenon; the verbs ἵσπιτω and παραπιτω are often used to mean ‘attack’ (LSJ s.v.), particularly in conjunction with the preposition εἰς, however in this case, where we have both prefixes, the παρά might suggest a movement from somewhere. It is clear that to move against somebody, with the sense of motion toward, implies that one is coming from somewhere else.

36 Strabo 14.1.38; Justin 36.4; Orosius 5.10; J.Metr. ii. 15-16. On Metropolis see the comments by C.P. Jones, Review of J.Metr., 481, “the verb means more than simply ‘appeared’: in Hellenistic Greek it is often accompanied by a phrase indicating ‘from’ or ‘to’,” suggesting that “the pretender had ‘come’ from somewhere else”. This pattern was first noticed by D. Potter, “Where did Aristonicus’ Revolt Begin?”, 293-295, who cites only Justin.

37 See above note.

38 OGIS 339, ii. 16-18: τῶν τε βασιλέων εἰς θεοὺς μεταστάντων καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐν ἐπικινδύνωι καρπῶι γενομένης διὰ τοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν γειτνιώντων θρακίων φόβου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐκ τῆς αἰρνιδίου περιστάσεως ἐπιστάντων χαλεπών.
Here the polemos must refer to Aristonicus’ uprising because the appeal to a Roman governor rather than Attalus III presupposes the latter’s death; again, it likely occurred early in the uprising because a second appeal was subsequently sent to the Roman Senate, which had already acted by 132.

Regardless, though, of where precisely Aristonicus began his revolt, he soon gained control of the Lydian interior beginning with Thyateira, followed thereafter by Apollonis and Stratonicea among others. After securing the hinterland, he set about gaining control over the wealthier Ionian coastal cities, carrying out strikes along the western coast from Myndos in the south to perhaps even Pergamon in the north. Some cities, like Phocaea, went willingly to the would-be king. These cities were not insignificant, as Appian suggests when he has Sulla give a speech to “leaders of the cities of Asia” in which the dictator rebukes their cities for having given aid to Aristonicus for

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40 Lines 11-18.

41 See n. 27.

42 For more detailed discussions of Aristonicus’ progress along the Asian coast see Collins, Revolt of Aristonicus, 74-88; L. and J. Robert, Claros, pp. 29-35.

43 Justin 37.1.1: Capio Aristonicus Massilienses pro Phocaensibus, conditoribus suis, quorum urbem senatus et omnem nomen, quod et tunc et antea Antiochi bello infesta contra populum Romanum arma tolerant, deleri iussuerat, legatos Romanam decrepatum misere veniamque his a senatu obtinuere (‘After Aristonicus had been captured, the people of Massilia sent ambassadors to Rome to intercede for the Phocaeans their friends, whose city and even name the senate had ordered to be destroyed, because, both at that time and previously in the war against Antiochus, they had taken up arms against the Roman People’.).
four years. Although he is vague on the identities of the cities, it is nevertheless clear that Rome felt a great many of them had freely capitulated to Aristonicus. To be fair, however, those who did not side with Aristonicus by choice were compelled. Florus specifically records Myndos, Samos and Colophon as taken by force, while Aelius Aristides records Aristonicus’ attack on Smyrna, and Strabo notes his occupation of Leucae. An inscription from Elaea, furthermore, records the efforts of the demos against Aristonicus, which suggests that the city, if not taken, was certainly harassed by him. Likewise, it is even possible that he approached the gates of Pergamon; an epigram from the Attalid capital gives thanks to Athena for her protection when “the great army of Aristonicus approached”. According to Justin, in fact, Aristonicus had so
many successful battles against uncooperative cities that he seemed to be a legitimate king. In sum, we have evidence that Aristonicus attacked and (we might also assume) occupied in some manner the following coastal cities (see Map 1): Myndos, Colophon, Smyrna, Erythrae, Leucaea, Phocaea, Elaea, Gordos, Cyzicus, Sestos, and perhaps also Pergamon and Karaoba. It should be noted that many of these were ‘free cities’ by 133 and were probably recorded by ancient authors because of this extraordinary status; this list, therefore, no doubt represent only a small fraction of the total number.

The number of cities attacked, captured, or occupied was significant, but we must be clear that we cannot say with certainty that all of these cities were attacked in 133. It is likely, in fact, that some of these attacks belong to the years 132 and 131. Strabo records that after a loss to the Ephesians at the Battle of Cyme Aristonicus was confined to the interior of the former kingdom, and the event therefore serves us a *terminus ante quem* for events on the coast. The traditional date for this battle is late 133, but, as we will discuss below, this stems from our misinterpretation of Strabo’s text and the battle

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48 Justin, 36.4.7: *Cum multa secunda proelia adversus civitates... fecisset iustusque iam rex videretur.*

49 Myndos: Florus 1.35.4 (noting also the island of Samos); Colophon: Florus 1.35.4; *Claros, Mennipos* col. I, ll. 14-17; Smyrna: Strabo 14.1.38; A. Aristides 19.1; *I.Smyrna* (IK 28.2), 609 (?); Erythrae: *IGRP* 4.1537; Leucaea: Strabo 14.1.38; Phocaea: Justin 37.1.1; Elaea, *Syll*5 694; Pergamon: H. von Gaertringen, *HGE*, no. 111; *OGIS* 338 (?); Karaoba (Mysia): *TAM* 5.1.444 (?); Gordos: *SEG* 34, 1198; Cyzicus: *IGRP* 4.134; Sestos: *OGIS* 339. Compare inscriptions from Halicarnassus (*CIG* 2.2.2501) and Methymna (*SEG* III, 710), which record giving aid to the Romans but do not appear to have been directly attacked by Aristonicus (below, pp. 91-92, nn. 64-65).

50 Of these cities, the following are regarded as “free” by 133: Myndos, Samos (*Syll*5 588; *Livy* 33.20.11), Cyzicus (Polyb. 25.2.13), Colophon (*Livy*, 38.39), Erythrae (*OGIS* 223), Smyrna (*OGIS* 228 & 229), and Pergamon (*OGIS* 338). In general see Magie, *RRAMII*: 958, n. 75; the index in Bernhardt, *Imperium und Eleutheria* (Diss. Hamburg, 1971) and *idem, Polis und römische Herrschaft*, 28-33.
more likely occurred in late 131.\(^{51}\) As such, we have no longer to assume that all of Aristonicus’ coastal action happened in 133 — a significant part of it, to be sure, but not all of it.\(^{52}\) Aristonicus was no doubt still making gains and occupying cities into 132 and 131.

Justin suggested that Aristonicus was so successful that he “appeared to be king”, and this indeed seems true.\(^{53}\) Cities appear to have sent embassies to Aristonicus as if he were a legitimate locus of authority. One such embassy, as Eilers has recently suggested, is recorded in the Colophonian inscription in honour of Menippos.\(^{54}\) The inscription records that before his various embassies to Rome Menippos went on many trips ‘to the Attalid kingdom and not a few (other) cities’ (πρεσβείας τετέλεκεν...πολλὰς δὲ εἰς τὴν Ἀτταλικὴν βασιλείαν καὶ πόλεις ὁυκ ὀλίγας).\(^{55}\) As Eilers has noted, τὴν Ἀτταλικὴν βασιλείαν is an unusual formulation, and if Menippos had travelled to Attalus III we would expect him to be named directly.\(^{56}\) Instead, it seems possible that the term is being used to describe a praise-worthy embassy to an embarrassing individual — Aristonicus — who held power in the Attalid territory. A similar such circumstance can be found in the

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\(^{51}\) See below, p. 90-95.

\(^{52}\) See below, pp. 78-83.

\(^{53}\) Above, n. 47.

\(^{54}\) Eilers, \textit{RPGC}, 125-6.

\(^{55}\) Claros, Menippos, col I, ll. 14, 16-17.

\(^{56}\) For example: \textit{OGIS} 339 (Sestos), ll. 25-27: ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς περιστάσεσιν ἀνήρ ἀγαθὸς ὁν διατετέλεκεν περὶ τὸν δῆμον, ἱερεὺς τε ἀποδειχθεὶς τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀττάλου ἀξίως ἀνεστράφη τοῦ δήμου; \textit{I.Priene} 111, l. 112: [--- ἐ πρῶτερο[ν] εἰγράζετο βασιλεύς Ἀττάλος, οὗτε διακατέχει ὁ δήμος ἡμῶν.
recent Metropolis inscription, which praises Apollonios for, *inter alia*, “undertaking to speak and do all things against him who would bestow the crown upon himself (Aristonicus)”, which very well might have included travelling on embassy to him to voice his concerns.\(^5^7\) Such embassies to Aristonicus demonstrate the perceived legitimacy of his claim to the throne – even if it was maintained by the sword. In 133, a very successful year for Aristonicus, the former Attalid cities had no indication that Rome was coming to their aid and were forced to follow tradition and appeal to Aristonicus as their king.

It is clear that Aristonicus had achieved significant military victories and gained control of much of the former Attalid kingdom before he was defeated by the Ephesians at Cyme and forced to retreat inland. Within the first year of his revolt, he controlled coastal cities from Elaea to Myndos with his naval fleet; his Thracian allies were advancing from the north and besieging cities in Mysia; and a secure base was established in the hinterland of Asia Minor where he was minting his own royal coins at Thyateira. It is uncertain exactly how much of his coastal campaign he had accomplished before a Roman commission arrived in the spring of 132, but he no doubt surprised the Roman legates to the point where they were forced into the extraordinary position of playing a military role. It was not until the arrival of a consular army in 131, led by P. Crassus Mucianus, that Aristonicus was finally forced to give up his control of the coast.

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\(^5^7\) *I. Metr*, ll. 17-18: πάντα καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράσσειν ὑπέστη κατὰ τοῦ περιτεθεικότος ἑαυτῶι βασιλείαν ποιρᾷ τῆν τῶν κοινῶν ἐνέργειῶν Ῥωμαίων κρίσιν.
His success in 133 was remarkable, and the Roman Senate was likely unaware that most of it had taken place.

We turn now to Rome, where the news of Attalus’ death and his testament were brought to Rome by a Pergamene embassy, led by a certain Eudemus, in the spring of 133. Immediately, Attalus’ bequest became entangled in the politics surrounding Tiberius Gracchus’ land reform legislation. In the previous months, Tiberius had passed his controversial lex agraria and in so doing, had dangerously stretched the limits of constitutional convention, the Senate’s tolerance and his own appearance as would-be king. Just before Eudemus’ arrival, the Senate had increased political tensions by granting his land commission only a nominal budget with which to carry out its mandate, thus rendering it essentially impotent. For Tiberius, therefore, news of Attalus’ bequest could not have come at a more opportune time – Attalus’ fortune could easily fund his

58 Plut., TiGr. 14.1 (above, p. 28, n. 64). Although Plutarch provides only the name of Eudemus as Pergamene envoy, it would indeed be unusual if he were not accompanied by a retinue of subordinates. On Eudemus see also I.Perg no. 245, a Hellenistic decree which refers to a Βάκχιον Εὐδήμου (fr A, l. 4), perhaps the son of our envoy.

59 This included circumventing the Senate with his lex agraria and disposing of his colleague, M. Octavius. For a general list of loci antiqui see A.H.J. Greenidge and A.M. Clay, Sources for Roman History, 133-70 B.C. (Oxford, 1960), 1-7.

60 Each of the three commissioners was granted 9 obols per day, Plut., TiGr. 13.3. The motion was presented by Tiberius’ cousin, P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica (cos. 138), who led the assassination against him and who eventually led the five presbeutai sent to Asia to assess the territory in late 133 (below, pp. 68-69).
program without the need to supplicate himself to the Senate for funds. Tiberius wasted no time in seizing his opportunity; he immediately (εὐθὺς) sponsored, and had passed by the assembly, a law to divert Attalid moneys to support his land reform commission. Even more audaciously, he arrogated from the Senate the issue of the Attalid cities, insisting that it was the right of the populus Romanus, as heir, to decide their fate. The details of this second motion are obscure, but Tiberius’ financial straits strongly suggest that he feared that the Senate would free the cities and deprive the populus (sc. his

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61 There has been a great deal of speculation about the possible clientela relationship between the Attalids and the Sempronii based on the interactions between Eudemus and Ti. Gracchus found in Plutarch (TiGr. 14.1-2). The typical view is represented by Badian, FC, 173-4, but recent authors have rightly questioned the significance of these ties; see Astin, Seipio Aemilianus, 212-13; Gruen, HWCR II. 599, n. 112; Kallet-Marx, Hegemony, 103, n.29. Plutarch reports only that Eudemus was seen offering a diadem and purple robe to Tiberius, which need not imply that he resided with the tribune, but only that he paid him a social visit. See Syll2 656, II. 25-26, which recounts how ambassadors from Teos went to the atria of Senators to plead their case.

62 Plut. TiGr. 14.1: εὐθὺς ὁ Τιβέριος δημαγωγῶν εἰσήλθεν νῦν δὲ τὰ βασιλικὰ χρήματα κομισθέντα τοῖς τὴν χώραν διαλαχάνουσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπάρχοι πρὸς κατασκευὴ καὶ γεωργίας ἀφορμήν (‘At once, Tiberius courted popular opinion and presented a motion so that the royal money, when it arrived, should be given to the citizens who received a portion of the public land, to aid them in stocking and tilling their farms.’); Livy, Per. 58: Deinde, cum minus agri esset quam quod dividii possit sine offensa etiam plebis, quoniam eas ad cupiditatem amplum modum sperandi incitaverat, legem se promulgaturum ostendit, ut his, qui Sempronia lege agrum accipere deberent, pecunia quae regis Attali fuisse, dividereetur (‘Then, when there was less land than could be divided up without offending the commons, because he had stirred them up to be greedy enough to hope for a large amount, he presented a law before the Assembly, so that the money which had belonged to king Attalus would be divided among those who ought to receive land under the ‘lex Sempronia’ .’); de vir. ill. 64: Tullit ut de ea pecunia quae ex Attali hereditate erat ageretur et populo dividereetur (‘(Tiberius) passed a law concerning the money which had come from the bequest of Attalus so that it would be directed and divided among the people’); Oros. 5.8.4: Gracchus grattam populi pretio adipetens legem tulit, uti pecunia, quae fuisse Attali, populo distribueretur (‘Gracchus, seeking the favour of the people for a price, passed a law so that the money, which had come from Attalus, would be distributed among the people’). Appian, our other major source on Ti. Gracchus, does not mention the lex de Attali pecunia, omitting the events from the dismissal of Octavius to Tiberius’ final assembly shortly before his death. The assertion, though, by Carcopino, Autour des Gracques, 306-09, that Appian’s silence is evidence that such a law was never motioned or passed has been rightly rejected by the majority of scholars. On the Senate’s control over the treasury and foreign affairs, see Polyb. 6.13.

63 Plut. TiGr. 14.2: Περὶ δὲ τῶν πόλεων, δοια τής Ἀττάλου βασιλείας ἦσαν, οὐδὲν ἔφη τῇ συγκλήτῳ βουλευθῆσθαι προσήκειν, ἀλλὰ τῷ δήμῳ γνώμην αὐτοῦ προσήκειν (‘And as concerned the cities of the Attalid kingdom, he (Tiberius) said that it did not belong to the Senate to deliberate about them, but that he himself would present a motion before the People.’).
commission) of a substantial revenue source. The analysis of this second motion has
never proceeded further than this cautionary assumption, but the new Metropolis
inscription allows us to confirm this hypothesis and make further comments on the
Senate’s actions surrounding the Attalid bequest.

The recently published inscription unearthed from Ionian Metropolis sheds some
light onto the Senate’s debate over the Attalid cities, as well as its role in the crucial
summer months of 133. The inscription is an honourific decree for a certain
Apollonius, son of Attalus, grandson of Andron, who is praised, inter alia, for his
character and work on behalf of the city, particularly in his efforts while leading a
regiment of young men in a Roman-led campaign against Aristonicus. The significance
for our purposes here is what the decree reveals about the events between the death of
Attalus III and Apollonius’ command of the neaniskoi:

νόν τε τοῦ μὲν Φιλομήτωρος βασιλέως μεταλλάξαντος, Ῥωμαίων δὲ τῶν κοινῶν
ἐνεργετῶν τε καὶ σωτηρῶν ἀποδότων, καθάπερ ἐδοξάσθησαν, τὴν ἔλευσιν τοῖς πρῶτοι ταυσομένοις ὑπὸ τὴν Ἀττάλου βασιλείαν, Ἄριστονίκου δὲ
παραγεγονότος καὶ βουλουμένου παραιτεῖθαι τὴν ἀποδοτικὴν ἡμῖν ἔλευσιν ὑπὸ τῆς συγκλήτου, πάντα καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράσειν ὑπὲρ ταῦτα κατὰ τοῦ περίπεθεικότος
ἐαυτοῦ βασιλείαν παρὰ τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ἐνεργετῶν Ῥωμαίων κρίσιν,
ἀντιλαμβανόμενος γνησίως κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Δήμου πρόθεσιν τῆς ἔλευσινς
γενομένης τῆς χρῆσις διὸ ἀποσταλῆται νεανίσκους εἰς τὴν | περὶ θυσία
στρατοπεδεῖαν οἱ Δήμος ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς ἑκτικὼς τὰ Ῥωμαίων πράγματα καὶ τὴν πρὸς
αὐτοὺς φιλίαν τε καὶ συμμαχίαν, καὶ μετὰ τῆς μεγίστης χαρᾶς ἀποδεξάμενος τὴν
ἔλευσιν, βουλουμένος τε τὴν ἱδίαν ἀφέσειν καὶ εὐνοικαῖν ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις
καυροῖς, ἢν ἐχει πρὸς | τὰ δημόσια Ῥωμαίων πράγματα ἐναποδείκνυθαι,

64 On Metropolis, see Strabo 14.2, who states that it was situated between Ephesus and Smyrna,
120 stadia from the former; R. Merić, Metropolis in Ionien: Ergebnisse einer Survey-Unternehmung in den
Jahren 1972-1975 (Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie, 142 [1982]), 1-21, esp. 11-20, and idem,
The passage thrice states that after the death of Attalus III (Philometor) the Metropolitans were granted their freedom (ἐλευθερία). Precisely who gave the freedom to them is also made clear: the verb δογματίζω in line 14 is clearly evidence of a senatus consultum (δόγμα συγκλήτου), as is the κρίσιν in line 18, and if the matter were still in doubt the ύπο τῆς συγκλήτου of lines 16 and 17 is explicit. The Metropolis inscription, therefore, reveals that sometime after the death of Attalus III a senatus consultum was passed at Rome granting freedom to the Metropolitans as well as “to all those previously subject to the kingdom of Attalus” (πάσιν τοῖς πρότερον τασσομένοις ύπὸ τὴν Ἀττάλου βασιλείαν, l. 15). This motion must have been what the patres were debating when Tiberius arrogated the issue of the Attalid cities from them. Tiberius’ motion was likely never

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65 Lines 13-24: “And now after the death of king Philometor, the Romans, (our) Common Benefactors and Saviours, have given back, exactly as the Senate decreed, “freedom” to all those previously arranged under rule of Attalos. When Aristonicus appeared and wanted to snatch away the freedom given back to us by the Senate, (Apollonios) undertook to speak and do all things against him who would bestow the crown upon himself contrary to the decree of the Romans, (our) Common Benefactors, helping lawfully toward the freedom according to the will of the People. When it became necessary to send off our youths to the camp near Thyateira, the People having chosen from the beginning the side of the Romans and their friendship and allegiance, and with the greatest joy receiving back their freedom, and wanting (to show) their own choice and loyalty in these urgent circumstances, which they were able to exhibit for the Roman republic, they elected as leader of the expedition of youths Apollonios, son of Attalos, grandson of Andron.”

66 Compare also line 33, τῆς ἀποδεδομένης ἐλευθερίας. Three times in the inscription “freedom” is said to have been “given back” (ἀποδίδωμι), perhaps referring to the integration of Metropolis into the chora of Ephesus in the third century, which, in turn, became part of the Attalid territory by the Treaty of Apamea in 188. Dreyer, ἸνΜετρ., 28-29, n. 72. See also Merić, Metropolis in Ioniē, 14-16.

67 For the phrase δόγμα συγκλήτου as a direct translation of senatus consultum see Sherk, RDGE, p. 15 (no. 6); for the use of the verb δογματίζω to designate a senatorial decree see the examples in ἸΜετρ., 29, n. 75, to which might be added Sherk, RDGE, nos. 14 (lines 12, 20, 96), 16 (line 53) and 23 (line 54). The term κρίσιν can be a synonym for δόγμα and in any event need not be considered a technical word, but merely a reference to the “decision” or “judgement” of the Romans (see ἸΜετρ. 29, n. 76, for examples).
ratified, and this *senatus consultum* was passed after his death in late June or July 133.  

The decree, however, does more than elucidate Tiberius’ legislation; with its content (ἐλευθερία) and its scope (πᾶσιν), it adds a new layer of complexity to Rome’s response to the Attalid bequest, particularly in the crucial year of 133.

In terms of a *terminus post quem*, the *senatus consultum* granting freedom to the cities of the former Attalid kingdom must follow the death of Attalus III, which the Metropolitan inscription confirms by recording the freedom “after the death of king Philometor” (νῦν τε τοῦ μὲν Φιλομήτορος βασιλέως μεταλαξαντος, l. 13). This *terminus* can be pushed back even later if we assume, with good reason, that news of Attalus’ death did not reach Rome until the arrival of Eudemus in the late spring or early summer of 133. Establishing a *terminus ante quem* from the information provided by the inscription is more difficult. Based on the formulation of the decree (lines 15-18), it seems that the freedom decree was passed before Aristonicus rose in revolt. Lines 15-16 record that: “Aristonicus appeared and wanted to snatch away the freedom given back to us by the Senate” (Αριστονίκου δὲ παραγεγονότος καὶ βουλομένου παραιτεῖσθαι τὴν ἀποδεδομένην ἦμῖν ἔλευθερίαν ὑπὸ τῆς συγκλήτου), suggesting that the Senate passed its decree before Aristonicus began his uprising. Similarly, lines 17-18 state that Aristonicus “crowned himself contrary to the decree of the Romans” (κατὰ τοῦ περιτεθεικότος ἐαυτῷ βασιλείαν παρὰ τὴν τῶν κοινῶν εὐεργετῶν Ῥωμαίων κρίσιν),

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68 On Tiberius’ death see the following note.

69 Plut, *TiGr*. 14.1. Eudemus must have arrived before Tiberius’ death during the tribune elections for 132, which Appian places in the summer of that year (above, n. 5).
again intimating that Aristonicus rose in revolt after the Senate had passed its decree. This chronology, however, is suspect. If the chronology of the Metropolis inscription were followed faithfully, it would require Attalus to have died, news of his death to have travelled to Rome, his bequest to have been manipulated by Gracchus and have been passed by the Senate, news of the subsequent SC to have travelled back to Asia Minor, and finally disseminated to the Ionian coastal city, all before Aristonicus rose in revolt. While this is possible, it seems highly unlikely. It is more likely, as Dreyer notes, that the Metropolitans have altered slightly the chronology of events to make their cause seem more just. The decree presents the Metropolitans as nobly fighting against Aristonicus, whose claim to the throne they invalidate not by questioning his pedigree, but by making it appear as though he is acting against the legitimate holders of power in the former Attalid territory – the Romans.

A definitive terminus ante quem is thus difficult to assert. As such, it is tempting to associate the senatorial decree mentioned in the Metropolis decree with the well-known senatus consultum Popilianum. This decree concerns instructions given to ‘strategoi setting out for Asia’ to the effect that nothing was to be carried out contrary to the acts of the Attalids up to the day before the death of Attalus III. It was passed in late 132, during the consulship of C. Popillius – the relator – and represents the Senate’s

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70 Dreyer, I. Metr. 28-9.

71 Sherk, RDGE 11 = OGIS 435 (below, p. 77, n. 31). The question is posed by Dreyer, I. Metr., 83: “Es ist die Frage, ob dieses SC in Zeile 14 bis 16 angesprochen wird, mithin das SC des neuen Dekretes auf den Herbst 132 datiert werden kann.”
mandata to P. Crassus, who would set out with two Roman legions the following year.\textsuperscript{72} This is the first known decree passed by the Senate after Attalus’ death, and it would be convenient if the freedom mentioned in the Metropolis inscription could be seen in the \textit{SC Popillianum}. Unfortunately, this is not the case. There is no indication, either explicit or implicit, that the decree concerns the freedom of the former Attalid cities, nor whether the cities have already been freed – unfortunately, the \textit{SC Popillianum} provides no help determining whether freedom had or had not been granted before its publication in the autumn or early winter of 132. Without a major event to anchor our decree, it seems best to follow the chronological spirit of the Metropolis text: the senatorial decree concerning the freedom of the Attalid cities belongs to the events immediately surrounding the initial uprising of Aristonicus and his crowning ceremony, shortly after the death of Attalus III.\textsuperscript{73} The late 132 date of the \textit{SC Popillianum} is too late after the events of Aristonicus’ uprising (14-18 months) to be considered a \textit{terminus}. The freedom granted to the Metropolitans and other Attalid cities was, therefore, part of a separate senatorial decree, preceding the \textit{SC Popillianum}, and passed in the summer of 133.

The exact content of this senatorial decree (we might now call it the \textit{SC de libertate civitatum Attalicarum}) is obscure apart from two basic elements: a) it concerned a granting of the status of ‘\textit{eleutheria}’ (freedom); b) this status of freedom was given to all (\textit{πασι}) those cities previously under Attalid rule. The scope of the decree, covering

\textsuperscript{72} The decree is now firmly dated to the autumn or winter of 132 (for more precision see, p. 89, n. 57). The question of the decree’s date has centred around the identification of the \textit{relator} recorded in lines 3 and 11, who has now been shown by M. Wörrle, “Pergamon um 133 v. Chr” \textit{Chiron} 30 (2000), 566-571 and pl. 4, to be Publius (not Gaius) Popillius, cos. 132.

\textsuperscript{73} Dreyer, \textit{I.Metr}, 83.
all former Attalid cities, is remarkable, and here again it seems possible that the Metropolitans have embellished the senatorial decree – in this case its scope, in order to make their efforts appear more considerable (fighting for the freedom of all Attalid cities) and the actions of Aristonicus all the more vile and infelicitous (snatching away freedom from all Attalid cities). Yet what little evidence we have suggests otherwise. Note that the *lex portoria Asiae*, dating to the Neronian era but containing passages from the earliest laws of the province, clearly divides the former Attalid kingdom into four segments – royal lands (*basilica chora*), tribes (*ethnai*), peoples (*demoi*), and ‘free cities’ (*poleis eleutherai*) – and there is no mention of ‘un-free’ or subject cities. This is, admittedly, arguing ex silentio, but it is nevertheless difficult to explain why the tax law explicitly states ‘free cities’ rather than just ‘cities’; both subject and free cities alike paid the *portoria* so there is no technical reason to differentiate between the two. This passage is almost certainly a part of the original settlement for Asia, issued shortly after the foundation of the province, and seems to corroborate the scope of the *SC de libertate*

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74 H. Engelmann and D. Knibbe, “Das Zollgesetz der Provinz Asia: Eine neue Inschrift aus Ephesos” *EA* 14 (1989), 1-206 = *SEG* XXXIX, 1180 §10 ll. 26-28: ὁ κατὰ γῆν εἰσάγων ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις προσφέρῃς ἵνα ἐν τελῶνιν πρὸ τῆς χώρας τῆς τῆς ἐλευθέρων πόλεων ἡ ἐνών ἡ ἐκκλήσια ἡ ἐπάρχει, ἐπὶ τοῦ τελῶνου ἡ ἐπίσημος τρόπου, δεὶ τὸν τελωνίον ἐξεύθεντος χώρις δόλου ποιηθοῦ προγεγραμμένος ἑνὶ (‘anyone coming in by land must register and declare (their goods) in those *topoi* in which a customs house exists for the former royal territory or free cities or tribes or People, and to the *telonos* or *epitropos*, who should record (the payment) at the customs house when the collection is done without any grievous deceit.’). Note the comment by Knibbe, who argues that this is a verbatim excerpt from the tax code issued by Rome when the Attalid territory was integrated into the Roman empire (*EA*, p. 73): “Damit dürfte ein lange Diskussion beendet sein; man wird schließen dürfen, daß Attalos III. allen Städten seines Reiches in seinem Testament die Autonomie zugesichert hat.

recorded in the Metropolis decree.\textsuperscript{76} One should also recall a noted passage from Livy’s \textit{Periochae}, which states that all of Asia was to be left free after it had been bequeathed by Attalus.\textsuperscript{77} Scholars who have been made uneasy by the nature of epitomes have traditionally treated this passage cautiously,\textsuperscript{78} yet the \textit{Periochae} passage appears to corroborate the \textit{senatus consultum} noted in the Metropolis inscription, suggesting that all the cities of the former Attalid territory were granted their freedom. In this instance, it would appear that Livy’s epitomator has recorded the shadowy image of the Senate’s freedom decree, which Livy surely recorded in his original work. It therefore seems best to accept the language of the Metropolis decree and understand the grant of ‘freedom’ to apply to many, if not all, of the former Attalid cities.

The question remains whether the \textit{SC de libertate} represents the Senate’s ratification of Attalus’ will or the Senate’s independent judgement about the status of Asia; that is, did the impetus for the large scale grant of \textit{eleutheria} come from Attalus, or the Roman Senate? Among those who have hypothesized that many cities were freed by

\textsuperscript{76} That these lines date back to the earliest settlement of Aquillius is \textit{communis opinio}, e.g., Engelmann & Knibbe, \textit{EA} 14 (1989), 71-74, 164; Nicolet, “\textit{Le Monumentum Ephesenum et la délimitation du portorium d’Asie}” \textit{MEFRA} 105 (1993), 929-959; \textit{cf.} lines 69-72 which also refers to the earliest settlement of the province; S. Carrelli, “Alcune osservazioni sul portorium Asiæ” B. Virgilio (ed), \textit{Studi Ellenistici} VIII (Pisa-Rome 1996), 176-180.

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Per.} 59: Aristonicus Eumenis regis filius Asiam occupavit, cum testamento Attali regis legata populo Romano libera esse deberet.

Attalus’ will, the answer is unquestionably the former. The Metropolis decree, however, undermines this common assumption; it is clear that the Metropolitans attributed the grant of freedom to the Senate - there is no sign of gratitude given to Attalus III. Like the scope of the decree, this part of the Metropolis inscription is also corroborated by literary evidence. For Appian twice records that the Asian cities were given to Rome: the first in a speech from Mark Antony to representatives of the ‘Hellenes’ and the ἑθναὶ of Asia; the second in a similar speech from Sulla to Greek representatives gathered in Ephesus. If the cities were given to Rome then their status too must have been left up to Rome, and, as such, their freedom must have been granted by the Senate’s wishes and not according to Attalus’ will.

Freeing cities, furthermore, was certainly nothing new to the Romans, and in fact corresponds well to their practice of avoiding obligations in the East discussed in the previous chapter. The second century has several notable examples: Quinctus Flamininus’ decree at the Isthmian Games (197), the Treaty of Apamea (188), the reorganization of Macedonia and treatment of Illyria (167), the pronouncement of Gallic independence (166), the pronouncement of freedom to many Greek cities after the Achaean War (146), and

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80 B.C. 5.4.16: ὁμιᾶς ἡμῖν, ὦ ἀνήρες Ἑλληνες, Ἀττάλος ὁ βασιλεὺς ὑμῶν ἐν διαθήκαις ἀπέλιπε (Your king Attalus, O Greeks, left you to us in his will’); Mith. 62 (above, n. 43).
perhaps others after 146 recorded in the lost books of Livy.\textsuperscript{81} Even more significant is Rome’s response to a similar bequest from Ptolemy Apion, King of Cyrene, in 96: “the Senate decreed that the cities of that kingdom should be free”.\textsuperscript{82} Here again the information is not without ambiguity, but it seems that Apion indeed left his cities to Rome according to the formulation of his father’s (Ptolemy Physcon) will, which did not include any sort of freedom clause for his cities, and the lack of evidence to the contrary.\textsuperscript{83} With the testimony of the Metropolis decree, and other supporting evidence, it now seems clear that not only were many, if not all, of the Attalid subject cities freed in 133, but that the decision to do so was made by the Roman Senate, acting independently of Attalus’ will.

Why would the Roman Senate make such a decision? Presumably, if the Senate had been dead-set against freeing the cities it would not have done so, irrespective of Attalus’ wishes. The immediate answer would seem to be related to Aristonicus’ uprising; by granting them freedom, Rome instantly endeared the majority of Attalid poleis to its side and demonized Aristonicus, who had “snatched away the freedom returned by the Roman Senate”. Yet these events are so chronologically close to one another that it is questionable

\textsuperscript{81} Isthmian Games: Polyb. 18.44.2; Livy 33.30.1-2; Apamea: Polyb. 21.46.2-10; Livy 38.39.7-12; Macedonia: Livy 45.22.3, 29.4, 33.3; Diod. 31.8.1-6; Plut. Aem. Paull. 28.3; Illyria: Livy 45.26.12; Galatia: Polyb. 30.2, 28; Livy 45.44.21; Diod. 31.14; Greece: Syll\textsuperscript{2} 684 = RDGE 43, ll. 15-16; Bernhardt, “Der Status des 146 v. Chr. unterworfenen Teils Griechenlands bis zur Einrichtung der Provinz Achaia” Historia 26 (1975), 150-163; Gruen, HWCR II.523-27.

\textsuperscript{82} Livy, Per. 70: Ptolemaeus Cyrenarum rex, cui cognomen Apionis fuit, mortuus heredem populum Romanum reliquit, et eius regni civitates senatus liberam esse iussit. See also Justin, 39.5 and Tac., Ann. 14.18. For a review of Apion’s will see S. Oost, “Cyrene, 96-74 BC” CPh 58 (1963), 11-25, and more recently D. Braund, “Royal Wills”, 23-24, both of whom note that the notion that Apion freed the cities in his will is “only an unsupported hypothesis” (Braud, 23) and suggest it was more likely senatorial action. Apion’s testament is the next known ‘royal will’ following Attalus’.

\textsuperscript{83} See Bernhardt, Polis und Herrschaft, 287-88; Braund, “Royal Wills”, 23-24.
whether the Senate even knew of Aristonicus’ uprising when it ratified Attalus’ will and passed the SC de libertate. At best, this might be a secondary reason.

Upon receiving the unexpected news of Attalus’ will, the Senate likely fell back on its tried and tested practice of avoiding formal obligations. This practice has been extensively discussed and need not be re-tread here. It remains only to be said that throughout the second-century Rome frequently avoided formal annexation in favour of granting independence, securing friendships and allegiances, and exercising an informal influence as hegemon over client kingdoms. It is true that the recent annexations of Africa and Macedonia (146) stand in contrast to this trend, but both of these territories had been given ample opportunity to live in libertas and concordia so that when they revolted for what proved to be the final time, Rome no doubt felt compelled to annex them for reasons of foreign security.

A less significant, though certainly relevant, reason for the grant of freedom was the state of affairs in Rome in and around 133. By the time Attalus’ testament had reached Rome in the late spring or early summer of 133, military campaigns were being carried out in Numantia, Sicily, and Italy, which had caused a shortage of grain and manpower in the state. These over-stretched resources, coupled with the tension, and ultimately violence,

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84 See in passim Badian, RILP²; Harris, War and Imperialism; Gruen, HWCR; above, Chpt 1.

85 Numantia: Scipio Aemilianus had taken up the campaign there during his consulship in 134 and was still campaigning into the spring of 133 – for sources see MRR I.490, 494; Astin, Scipio Aemilianus, 125-160; Sicily: Rome was still working to suppress the surprisingly successful slave revolt led by Eunus, which had limited the grain supplies from that province, and was not suppressed until 132 – for sources see MRR I.497-8; Dumont, Servus, 197-270; Italy: in 133 an uprising of 4000 slaves near Minturnae is recorded, which required the appointment of two consulares with special imperium – see Oros. 5.9.4; Obs. 27-27b; Badian, “Tiberius Gracchus and the Beginning of the Roman Revolution” ANRW I.1 (1972), 684, n. 46. In general, see P.A. Brunt, Italian Manpower, 426-434, esp. Table XIII (432-433).
associated with Ti. Gracchus and his reform program, must have made the Senate’s decision to grant a broad gift of freedom to the Attalid cities quite simple. While the Senate was unaware that a military operation would ultimately be needed in the region, the *patres* no doubt wanted to avoid the controversy and complications associated with annexing a territory – that the action opposed the designs of Ti. Gracchus and his supporters surely helped to make the decision more popular.

In light of the resources spent combating insurgents in Spain, Sicily and Italy, some might question whether the Senate intended the ‘freedom’ of the former Attalid kingdom to include freedom from tribute. As some have suggested, Roman *libertas* (*ἐλευθερία*) did not necessarily ensure *immunitas* (*ἀφετορία*). This finer point of Roman foreign affairs is far from *communis opinio*, but our example deserves attention if only because this case will undoubtedly be used in future debates on the subject. Though we cannot know for certain the original designs of the Senate, a few points can be raised against the idea that *immunitas* was excluded from the grant of freedom. First, while the Metropolis decree no doubt refers to a senatorial decision, it is nevertheless a Hellenistic honourary decree and not a true copy of the *senatus consultum*; as such we cannot conclude that the term ‘*eleutheria*’ is being used in the Roman sense rather than the Hellenistic sense, which traditionally includes freedom

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87 Looking at the later organization of the province by Aquillius is fruitless since his arrangement was part of a post-war settlement and was both a punitive measure against combatant cities and a means of recuperating the expense of war.
from taxation.\textsuperscript{88} It should also be noted that a grant of immunity would be in keeping with the motive of the decree, which was to limit Roman obligations over the territory — the collection of taxes required a network of Roman \textit{publicani} in the region and the Senate’s attention in Rome to hear disputes; the collection of tribute, moreover, created a tacit moral obligation to help the region should it be attacked. It is likely, furthermore, that Rome was not entirely aware of the wealth of the Attalid territory, if indeed it was as prodigious as is often assumed.\textsuperscript{89} Rome was no doubt aware of the riches of the Pergamene kings, but no commission was sent to the region until 132, and the Senate was therefore likely unaware of exact values at the time the \textit{SC de libertate} was published.\textsuperscript{90} It must be emphasised that this decree represents the Senate’s reaction to the will before any investigative commission had been sent and without any knowledge of the future struggles in the territory; as such, we must imagine that the Senate planned to continue the arms-length approach to the region that it had followed since the end of the third century. In the summer of 133, the Senate followed its \textit{status quo} and took a cautious approach to its new territory: the cities were declared free and (probably) immune.

News of the Senate’s decree was transmitted to the region by a commission of five legates (\textit{pente presbeis}).\textsuperscript{91} At the head of this commission was the Pontifex Maximus and

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\textsuperscript{88} Gruen, \textit{HWCR} 1:133-142.
\textsuperscript{89} Kallet-Marx, \textit{Hegemony}, 117-121, questions the size of the Asian revenue recorded by Cicero (\textit{imp. Cn. Pomp.} 14; \textit{Flacc.} 91; \textit{Verr} 3.12).
\textsuperscript{90} Noted also by Badian, \textit{RILR} \textsuperscript{2}, 48.
\textsuperscript{91} 14.1.38: \textit{ἐπειτα πρέσβεις Ῥωμαίων πέντε ἤκον} (‘And then came five Roman ambassadors’). The chronology presented by Strabo has caused needless concern. Strabo places the arrival of this
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65
chief opponent of Ti. Gracchus, P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio (cos. 137), whom the Senate wanted out of Rome in the aftermath of Tiberius’ death.\textsuperscript{92} There is some controversy over when precisely this commission left, owing to the claim by Plutarch (\textit{TiGr} 20.3) that Nasica was one of the investigators who interrogated Blossius, Tiberius’ Stoic advisor, in early 132.\textsuperscript{93} Plutarch, however, has no doubt confused Nasica with C. Laelius (cos. 140), a staunch anti-Gracchan who led the witch-hunt against his supporters in 132, and whom Cicero (\textit{de Amic.} 37) and Valerius Maximus (4.7.1) record as the lead investigator. The Metropolitan inscription corroborates this earlier (winter 133) departure date, since it is clear that the \textit{demos} knew of its freedom very early in Aristonicus’ uprising. Leaving in late 133, moreover, would have permitted the Senate’s decree to act (though it had not been the intention of the Senate) as a draw to the Roman side against the illegal, insurrectionary and tyrannical ‘pretender’, Aristonicus. Yet as we have seen, by the time news of their freedom had reached the Attalid cities, Aristonicus’ uprising had achieved remarkable success. As Eumenes III, he had managed to gain the loyalty of many social groups, establish a strong backing in the eastern hinterland of his new kingdom, and make significant headway into the Ionian coast. Rome was unaware of the scope of his success and the legates sent out by the Senate were to be surprised when they reached Pergamon in early 132.

\textsuperscript{92} Plut., \textit{Ti.Gr.} 20.3; 21.2; Val. Max. 5.3.2e; \textit{de vir. ill.} 64.9; Pliny, \textit{N.H.} 7.120; Cic., \textit{Flacc.} 75; \textit{de Rep.} 1.6.

\textsuperscript{93} For a summary of the controversy, see Gruen, \textit{HWCR} II.600-601, n.115.
CHAPTER III: 
Roman Action in Asia 132-129 BC

For the sake of clarity, let us review briefly what has been discussed so far. In the summer of 133, Aristonicus proclaimed himself king of Pergamon despite the will of Attalus III, which dictated that the Attalid Kingdom fell to the populus Romanus. Beginning near the Thracian border, Aristonicus immediately gained control of the Lydian interior starting with Thyateira. Once secured, the region was easily maintained since Aristonicus presented himself as ‘Eumenes III’, the legitimate successor to Attalus III, and the rightful dynastic king of the Pergamene realm. Accompanied by former soldiers, Macedonian settlers, royal administrators, the lower classes, and other malcontents, Aristonicus set about striking coins in the region bearing the name ‘Eumenes’ to mark his royal assent - even performing a crowning ceremony to legitimize further his claim. As the new ‘king’ no doubt realized, if his reign was to last he had to convince, or coerce, the coastal cities into accepting his royal claim. He thus turned his attention to the Ionian coast, apparently convincing Phocaea and other cities accustomed to the rule of kings to support him. Those who did not support him willingly were forced to do so. Beginning in the south, Aristonicus worked his way up the coast securing, in turn, various cities from Myndos to Sestos. It is difficult to say how much of this was carried out in 133 and how much in 132, but Rome’s reaction and the distances covered suggest that not all of it belongs to 133.
One major goal in this chapter is to create a comprehensive narrative that is consistent with our evidence. To this end, we shall take a close look at the troublesome passage of Strabo regarding the Battle of Cyme, and suggest a much better, and later, date for the event. Another objective is to identify and (more importantly) analyze what action was taken against Aristonicus by Rome. Here we will look in depth at the various missions sent to Asia, including the 132 commission (noted briefly at the end of the previous chapter) and the legionary commands of 131, 130, and 129. By examining these, we will see that Rome was unaware of the scope of the uprising until at least the end of 132, after which it sent, in a timely fashion, troops to quell it. Contrary to the suggestion of some, though, the Senate’s motive was not greed or annexation; the orders to the consuls were clearly to maintain the status quo in the region, but settle the situation quickly. The decision to annex the kingdom came much later, after Rome had begun its campaign against Aristonicus; the eventual settlement was as much one of post-war as inheritance. Recently published inscriptions from Asia Minor as well as new analyses of existing inscriptions and literary texts fuel these discussions. Like the previous chapters, here the evidence allows us to follow the Roman process in great detail: from legates raising local troops, to the orders given to Roman commanders, to the hardships of local communities contributing supplies. Such detail helps us to understand the frustration of the Senate at the length and cost of the war, and the subsequent organization of the territory by Aquillius.

As noted in the previous chapter, the Roman Senate dispatched a legatio of five men at the end of 133 in reaction to Attalus’ will. About this legatio we know very little;
we know that it occurred and who led it. The major puzzles are identifying its other members and sorting out exactly its purpose and accomplishments. We begin with the first problem, aided by the new evidence of the Metropolis inscription. The leader of this legation was P. Scipio Nasica (cos. 137), whom Plutarch says was shuffled quickly out of the Capital following his leading role in the murder of Ti. Gracchus and whose name is recorded on an inscription uncovered in Pergamon. The remaining four members of this group cannot be identified with any certainty, but the new Metropolis inscription provides some clues and we might suggest some potential candidates. The decree records the praenomina of three Roman presbeutai who are most likely members of this legatio: Publius, Gaius and Appius. Publius is surely P. Scipio Nasica, but with nearly four dozen Gaii holding magistracies between 167-110, there can be no reasonable identification with ‘Gaius’. With only three Appii in the same time period, however, an identification with ‘Appius’ holds more promise. Of the three known Appii, Ap.

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1 Plut., TiGr. 21: σῦ γὰρ ἀπεκρύπτοντο κατὰ τὰς ἀπαντήσεις οἱ ἔνθρωποι τὴν δυσμένειαν, ἀλλ’ ἐξηγοινοντο καὶ κατεβόν ὅπου προστόχοιεν, ἐναγὴ καὶ τύρανναν καὶ μεμιακότα φόνῳ σώματος αὐσόλου καὶ έρωθ τὸ ἁγιότατον καὶ φρικωδέστατον ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν ἵππων ἄποικαλόντες. οὕτω μὲν ὑπεξῆλθε τῆς ἱπταλίας ὁ Νασικᾶς, κατὰπερ ἐνδεδεμένος ταῖς μεγίσταις ἱερουργίαις (‘for men never concealed their hatred when meeting this man, but they were incensed and cried out at him wherever he happened to be, cursing him as a tyrant and one who, by the murder of an inviolate and holy person, the holiest and most awe-inspiring of temples in the City. So Nasica snuck out of Italy, though he was bound there by most important holy functions.’); cf. Val. Max. 5.3.2; de vir. ill. 64.9. Pergamene inscription: IGRF 4.1681 = ILS 8886: [P. Cornelius P. f. Scipio] Nasica [legatus Pontifex Maximus] | [Π. Κορνήλιος Σκιπιών] Ποιόλυ Νασίκας πρεσβευτῆς ἀρ[χερεῦς μέγιστο]. The inscription is probably the grave stele of the consularis, who we know died while on this embassy.

2 Engelmann, I. Metr., transcribes the third name as Παπόντος (Papios), an obscure Roman nomen not heard of after the third century BC; but as Eilers has noted (Review of I. Metr., JRS, forthcoming), it is strange for the inscription to record two praenomina and a nomen. The present emendation to ‘Appius’ (Ἀπίου) is equally possible, requiring the transposition of the first pi and alpha, and is consistent with the previous two praenomina. Contra: Jones, Review of I. Metr., 469-485, who argues that ‘Papos’ (Παπός) is a Greek commander. For more on the association of these individuals with Nasica’s legation, see below, pp. 75-79.
Claudius Pulcher (cos. 143), the father-in-law of Ti. Gracchus, should immediately be rejected – as the only recorded member of the commission, Scipio Nasica (cos. 138) must surely have been its most senior member, and, in any case, Pulcher’s involvement in the Gracchan land commission and his antipathy toward Nasica as leader of Tiberius’ assassins would have prevented his participation. Equally unlikely is Ap. Claudius Centho, a prae tor of 175, who would have been at a very advanced age in 132. The ‘Appius’ mentioned in the Metropolis inscription is most likely Ap. Claudius (RE 11), who was appointed consul suffectus in 130 following the death of L. Cornelius Lentulus. Little is known of him, but Münzer (RE) suggested that he was a member of the Claudii Pulchri and a first cousin to Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 143). That he was suffect consul in 130 means that he must have held the praetorship no later than 133 and was therefore probably a praetorius when he joined the legation. Aside from P. Nasica, Ap. Claudius and ‘Gaius’, L. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 144) and M. Cosconius (procos. Macedonia 135-133) have also been suggested as possible members of the legation. The latter is a particularly good candidate because of both his familiarity with the conflict early on (it will be recalled that as governor of Macedonia he supplied aid to Cyzicus in early 133)

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3 A.E. Astin, The Lex Annalis before Sulla (Brussels 1958), 31-44, has argued that the same values laid out in Sulla’s legislation were in effect during the second century (under the lex Villia of 180) – viz. 39 was the minimum age for a praetor. If, therefore, Appius Claudius was 39 years old when he held the praetorship in 175, then he would have been 82 years old in 132. On this Ap. Claudius see also Polyb. 33.13.4-10; App., Mith. 3; and MRR I.450, 451 n. 3.

4 Cassiod.; Obseq. 28; restored by Degrassi in Fast. Cap.; MRR I.502

5 This is consistent with his position in the Metropolis Decree second to Nasica, who was of course the senior consularis

and the discovery of an inscription in his honour from Erythrae on the Ionian coast.\(^7\)

Erythrae (opposite Chios, in Ionia) lies in no way close to Sestos, where Cosconius is known to have acted, and his presence in the city is perhaps due to his involvement in Nasica's commission.

We turn now to the second major puzzle with the commission: defining its objectives and accomplishments. Unfortunately, for this problem the literary sources are largely silent. Strabo is the only author to record the commission and the only information he provides is its number (pente), office (presbeis), and relative chronology (preceding Crassus' campaign of 131).\(^8\) Fortunately, here our discussion is aided by epigraphic evidence. Three inscriptions in particular, from Pergamon, Synnada, and Metropolis, provide valuable pieces of information. The inscriptions from Pergamon and Synnada both show that the commission was concerned with, and carried out, political and diplomatic activities; the Metropolis inscription, for its part, reveals an interesting martial role played by the legati.

Wörrle has recently published a Pergamene inscription that contains a substantial amount of information about the former Attalid capital immediately following Attalus III's death.\(^9\) For our purposes, the significant passage is what happened after

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\(^7\) IGRP 4.1534: ὁ δήμος Ἀρκάδων Ἑράκλης Σπείρας καὶ Ἀντίπατρος Κουρτσίος Ἀδριανοῦ τῆς Ἐρυθραίας (The people honour Marcus Cosconius, son of Gaius, a Roman, on account of his courage and goodwill toward the city'). On Cosconius' aid to Cyzicus, see above, p. 45.

\(^8\) Strabo 14.1.38 (see below, n. 72). The rank of these men is consistent with the rank recorded on P. Scipio Nasica's grave stele (above, n. 1).

“circumstances brought about democracy”. We are told that the honourand, Menodoros, was appointed as synedros and afterwards was elected to the ‘bouleuterion set up according to Roman law’ (ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν Ῥωμαικὴν νομοθεσίαν βουλευτηρίωι). Wörle has argued, rightly, that this new political system established at Pergamon was done so under the auspices of Nasica’s commission. In other words, the inscription alludes to the activities of the 132 legation. The only other possibility is to identify this law with M’. Aquillius and his ten legates, but this is unlikely because Menodoros’ interaction with these men is explicitly recorded later in the inscription. The pente presbeis were thus administratively and diplomatically engaged at Pergamon, helping the city establish a government outside of a monarchical system. This sort of activity by a

10 Lines 11-17: μεταπεσόντων τε τῶν πραγμάτων εἰς δημοκρατίαν ἑτεροτονήσαντος τῶν ἁριστῶν ἄνδρων κατεστήθη καὶ Μηνόδωρος καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν Ῥωμαικὴν νομοθεσίαν βουλευτηρίωι γενόμενος διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα εὐνοίαν πολλά τῶν συμφερόντων ξυγήρησαν ἄξιον ἦν καὶ καθαράν ἐκτιθεμένος κρίσιν, γενόμενος δὲ καὶ ἐμπροσθείοις καὶ ἐξέτασις χρείας ἐκτένει καὶ φιλότιμον ἐκατὸν παρέσχετο ὑπὲρ κίνδυνον [δ]ὲ περιθεμένος οὕτε κακοπαθῶν οὕτω δαπάνην ἐκόλαξαν (‘And when circumstances brought about democracy and the People elected councillors from the best men even Menodoros was appointed, and afterwards taking part in the bouleuterion set up according to Roman legislation, because of his goodwill for the fatherland he worked with many of the gathered men, continually setting out sound and exact judgement. He was even eager both in embassies and other services, exhibiting his own ambition and setting neither danger nor distress nor cost of illustrious things over it.’). The term in line 11 is surely an allusion to the death of Attalus III.

11 Wörle, ‘Pergamon um 133’, 565-571. His suggestion, though, that this might be part of the lex provinciae for Asia has rightly been questioned by P. Gauthier, Bull Ep. 2001, no. 366.

12 Lines 18-22.

13 P. Gauthier, Bull Ep 2001, no. 366, p. 556, “dans lequel les représentants des cités de l’ancien royaume purent apporter aux legati information et requêtes en vue de l’établissement du nouvel ordre romain”. An inscription from Sestos (OGIS 339 = L.Sestos no. 1), which records how the honourand “eagerly received the embassy from the strategoi dispatched by the Romans into Asia and the presbeutai who are being sent” (τὰς τε προσβεβαιος ἀνεδέχετο προδόθως τοὺς στρατευόμενος ὑπὸ Ῥωμαιῶν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ τοὺς πεμπομένους προσβεβυτάς, II. 20-22) cannot be used as a parallel. The strategoi are undoubtedly those consuls who were sent to defeat Aristonicus and the identity of the presbeutai must be Aquillius’ ten legati in 129. The placement of the presbeutai after the strategoi (were they Nasica’s colleagues we would expect them to be placed first according to chronology)
legatio is not unique. A similar action was taken by L. Aemilius Paulus while leading his legation in Macedonia in 167; Paulus helped to organize a constitution of Macedon, including the selection of synedroi to the local senates.\textsuperscript{14}

The actions of the pente presbeis were not wholly confined to Pergamon and the immediate environs; a revised reading of an inscription from Synnada, situated just north of the Maeander River in central Phrygia, suggests that the commission granted something of value to this city, and perhaps other cities in the eastern part of the former Attalid kingdom.\textsuperscript{15} The text contains a senatus consultum, which is traditionally believed to concern the Roman re-acquisition of Phrygia (119 or 116) after the death of Mithridates V in 120. This interpretation, however, suffers from several textual and contextual difficulties including: the Senate’s motive for annexing Phrygia, especially (in the case of the 116 date) so late after Mithridates’ death; the identification of the relator, Licinius, as a praetor despite the need for two names in the lacuna of line 6; the similarity in language with the SC Popillianum (132); and its presence on the same stone as this earlier senatorial decree. A second copy of this inscription discovered nearly 30 years

\textsuperscript{14} Livy 45.32.

\textsuperscript{15} For a more detailed analysis of this problem, see Appendix 1. R.M. Ramsay, Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia, Part II, JHS 8 (1887), 496 = OGIS 436 = IGRP 4.752 = RDGE no. 13 = NIP no. 1. The stone was originally discovered by Ramsay on his travels through the region in the 1880s, but was subsequently lost until it was re-discovered by Drew-Bear (much more heavily damaged) and republished in his Nouvelles Inscriptions de Phrygie in 1978. On this inscription see especially Drew-Bear, Three Senatus Consulta concerning Asia in Historia 21 (1972), 75-87, where he identifies the first five lines of this inscription as lines 6-10 of the SC Popillianum (OGIS 435 = RDGE no. 11).
ago\textsuperscript{16} does not help to solve any of these difficulties, but in fact adds two more problems because of the presence of τῆς Ἀσίας where [Μιθριδάτης] has been traditionally restored.\textsuperscript{17} This poses some problems because (a) the name of the king at issue is no longer certain and (b) the Romans would not have referred to the portion of Phrygian territory that Mithridates controlled as “Asia”, which \textit{ca. 116} (the traditional date of the document) was the name for the entire province.\textsuperscript{18}

These difficulties require a new approach to the document, and this new approach suggests that the decree concerns Nasica’s commission. The second copy of the inscription gives us our starting point by disproving the association of the decree with Mithridates. The decree, though, clearly concerns the acts of a former king, who must have some relationship with Synnada, ‘Asia’, and the \textit{SC Popilianum}. To this end, it seems very possible that the \textit{SC Licinianum} concerns the death of Attalus III (who ruled over Synnada, and whose kingdom became the province of Asia), and the settlement of his territory. The only difficulty with this interpretation is the restoration of C. Licinius Geta (cos. 116) as the \textit{relator} of the motion in line 6 of the first inscription. A closer look at the text of the original copy of the inscription, however, reveals the possibility of a

\textsuperscript{16} Drew-Bear, \textit{NIP} no. 2.

\textsuperscript{17} Thus \textit{OGIS} 436, ll. 8-9: ὃςα βασιλεύς Μιθραδάτης έγραψεν ἢ ἔδωκεν τισιν ἢ ἀφεὶ[κεν, ἵνα ταῦτα κύρια μείνη ὅτω καθὼς] ἐδωρῆσατο εἰς ἑσχάτην ἡμέραν. Compare \textit{NIP} no. 2, ll. 5-7: ὃςα Μιθραδάτης (?) περὶ τῆς Ἀσίας ἔγραψεν ἢ ἐδω[κεν τισιν ἢ ἀφεῖκεν, ἵνα ταῦτα κύρια μένῃ ὅτω] καθὼς ἐδώρησατο εἰς ἑσχάτην ἡμέραν...).

\textsuperscript{18} These problems were identified by Kallet-Marx, \textit{Hegemony}, 241 n.77, who suggested that “it is attractive therefore to suppose that the \textit{senatus consultum Licinianum} also concerned the Attalid kingdom,” but did not explore the possibility further.
misreading of this name. Rather than reading an alpha as the first letter of line 6 we can instead read a lambda, a common error in Greek epigraphy, in which case our Licinius is not a [G]aius ([Γ]ΑΙΟΣ), but rather a [Pub]l[ios ([ΠΟ]ΒΛΙΟΣ); instead of the consul of 116 we have the consul of 131, P. Licinius P. f. Crassus Dives, who left Rome with an army bound for Asia Minor in late spring of his consular year. Likewise, the [deka] presbeutai who are generally thought to be those who accompanied M'. Aquillius in 129-126 should in fact be the [pente] presbeutai led by Nasica. Thus the senatus consultum is not a decree confirming the validity of Mithridates’ last acts and those of Aquillius’ legates, but the acts of Attalus III up to his death and whatever measures were carried out by Nasica’s commission.

The discovery of the stones in central Phrygia suggests that Nasica’s commission had done something in the region. If they had not, why were the inscriptions set up in the city? What actions were taken is not revealed and we are therefore left to speculate on the particulars. It seems likely that the commission granted some sort of benefit to the city. It is possible that whatever was granted to Synnada, and probably other cities in

19 NIP no. 1, ll. 6-7: [- - Γ]άιος Λικίννιος Ποσλίου | [υίς Γέτας υπατοι (?)].

20 Drew-Bear has included photographs of the stones appearing in his work; the stone in this case (pl. I.1) is broken diagonally through the disputed letter giving the impression of a horizontal hasta (making an ‘A’ into a ‘N’). A comparison with other alphas in the photograph, though, clearly shows that no other alpha was inscribed with a diagonal hasta; all of them are carefully drawn with a perfectly horizontal hasta. The text from the second inscription (NIP no. 2, pl. I.2) corresponding to this section is missing.

21 NIP no. 1, line 10: [περί τε τῶν λοιπῶν ἵνα κρίνωσιν οἱ πέντε (?)] πρεσβευταί εἶς Ἀσιαν διαβάντες; NIP no. 2, ll. 7-8: [περί τε τῶν λοιπῶν ἵνα κρίνωσιν οἱ πέντε (?)] πρεσβευταί εἶς Ἀσιαν διαβάντες.

22 The date of this decree should now be identified as early 131; that is, before Crassus left for Asia Minor, but after the presbeutai (minus Nasica, who had died in Pergamon) returned to Rome in late 131. For more on this, see below, pp. 86-87.
turn, was part of the standard responsibilities of investigative commissions to investigate charges and settle significant disputes. A similar grant was made by Sulla a generation later, who, as a legatus, had given considerable rights to the Temple of Amphiaraus in Oropus.\textsuperscript{23} It is, of course, also possible that the grants had something to do with Aristonicus' uprising. As we will see below, it is now clear that Nasica and his colleagues raised a local army and faced Aristonicus, and it is possible that any benefits given by the legati were intended to entice locals to sign up. This would be particularly needed in the Phrygian hinterland, where, as we have seen, Aristonicus' support was strongest. It remains entirely speculatory, of course, whether the Romans would have had to entice support from the Asian Greeks (rather than \textit{vice versa}), but the location of the stones in Aristonicus' heartland makes this at least possible.

As alluded to already, the third inscription – from Metropolis – reveals that the commission was forced to play a martial role against Aristonicus. Like the inscription from Synnada, this interpretation comes from a revised reading of the text and we will, therefore, have to look at the inscription in some detail. We will recall that the decree records that Apollonius made every effort against Aristonicus, including commanding a contingent of \textit{neaniskoi} in a campaign near Thyateira, at the head of which were Publius,

\footnote{\textit{SC de Oropiis}, \textit{RDGE} 23. Sherk summarizes that the inscription "tells us that Sulla, in fulfillment of a vow, had once given to the Temple of Amphiaraus in Oropus a considerable amount of land which was to be inviolable. In addition, all the revenues of the city, the surrounding territory, and the harbours of the city were to be turned over to the god Amphiaraus,...After Sulla's return to Rome from the East this grant was confirmed by the Senate in a \textit{senatus consultum}" (p. 136).}
Gaius and Appius.\textsuperscript{24} Unfortunately, Apollonios was killed in the struggles around Thyateira, and at the time of the inscription the \textit{demos} of Metropolis had decreed that his bones should be recovered 'as soon as the \textit{presbeutai} sent by the Senate have made a turn against Aristonicus and brought stability to the region'.\textsuperscript{25} There are, therefore, two places in the text where identifications can be made with contemporary Romans. Dreyer has assumed that they are different groups. He has proposed that Publius, Gaius and Appius are members of the army of P. Crassus Mucianus, which arrived in 131; the name 'Publius', he argues, refers to the consul and the other two names are his subordinates. These men (argues Dreyer) were in charge of a Roman-led 'allied force' that was defeated at Thyateira and ultimately driven back to the coast where Crassus was later captured and killed. The second group of \textit{presbeutai}, those whom the \textit{demos} is eagerly awaiting, Dreyer identifies as M. Perperna and his entourage, who replaced Crassus as commander of the Roman army after the latter's death, and who was responsible for defeating Aristonicus in mid-130.\textsuperscript{26}

These identifications have fundamental problems.\textsuperscript{27} First, it would be highly unusual, in the case of Crassus, for a Roman consul to be named without his rank and

\textsuperscript{24} Lines 26-27: \textit{λαβών τοὺς ὀποταγέντας ἐστωτὰς νεανίσκους καὶ ἀφικόμενος πρός Πόπλιον καὶ Γάτον καὶ ΠΗΠΠίον τοὺς ἄντας | ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατεύματος.}

\textsuperscript{25} Lines 42-44: καὶ σπεύσαι | περὶ τῆς τῶν ὅστων ἀνακομιδῆς, ὡς ἂν τάχιστα οἱ παραγεγονότες ἀπὸ συγκλήτου πρεσβευταὶ διὰ τὴν ἑδαπὸ ἄνδρεῖαν καὶ ἀρετὴν ποιημένου τὴν κατὰ Ἀριστονίκου τροπὴν εἰς εἰρήνην καὶ εὔνοιαν καταστήσωσιν τὰ πράγματα.

\textsuperscript{26} Dreyer, \textit{I.Metr.}, 66-78, esp. 71-73.

\textsuperscript{27} Cf. Jones, \textit{Review of I.Metr.}, 480: "Dreyer's dating of the text to the spring of 130 involves several assumptions not warranted by the text: that the army near Thyatira is mainly a Roman one; that it has been in difficulty; that Crassus as its commander can be named without any distinction between him
ignobly lumped together with his subordinates in a formal decree. Second, and even more difficult to explain, is why Perperna, as a Roman consul, would be explicitly referred to as a presbeus, corresponding the Roman rank of legatus. Roman ranks are typically discriminated in civic decrees, as a contemporary Bargylian inscription shows; it clearly distinguishes between the consul (strategos hypatos), lieutenant (strategos antistrategos) and legate, the latter of which is without any identification at all. A copy of the orders given to Crassus and Perperna (SC Popillianum), furthermore, explicitly refers to these men as strategoi; an inscription from Priene also clearly refers to Perperna as strategos (consul or general) and, similarly, strategos anthypatos (proconsul). Unless the Metropolis decree is unique, it is extremely unlikely that Crassus or Perperna should be identified with anyone in lines 26 or 43.

Dreyer was obviously making the identifications fit what he though was the most likely scenario, which for him was driven by the battle near Thyateira. It is interesting that he actually raised the possibility that the group of presbeutai in line 43 could be Nasica’s commission, but eliminated it because he believed that the military action

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28 See Dreyer, I.Metr., 73, who argues unconvincingly for the Metropolitans’ ignorance of Roman rank. On the translation of the rank of presbeutai, see Mason, Greek Terms, 153-155.

29 Jones, Review of I.Metr., 479, who notes also the similarities between the Bargylian and Metropolitan decrees; I.Lasos 612 = SEG 44 no. 867, ll. 14-17, 22-28. On the rank of the legate, Q. Caepio, see TAM 5.528.

30 See below, p. 86.

31 RDGE 11 (SC Popillianum), ll. 6-7, 16-17: ἐντολαὶ ἡδονὴ λαμβάνει τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἡσίαν πορευόμενοι στρατηγοῖς. I.Priene 109, ll. 92-92: πο[δημί]ας πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν στρατηγὸν Μάρκου Περπέρας τοις Μαντέας στρατηγὸν ἀνθύπατο[ν εἰς Πέργαμον]
around Thyateira was carried out under the command of Publius Crassus in 131. As Jones points out, though, this is not what the text says. No Roman army is mentioned, the text states only that Greek combatants were placed under the command (ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατεύματος) of three Romans: Publius, Gaius and Appius. This sort of arrangement was not uncommon. A similar situation is described in a contemporary decree from Maeonia, where a local Greek contingent led by a Sardisian, Hephaestion, was ordered by the Roman legate Q. Caepio to defend a local Lydian fortress.\(^{32}\) Clarifying this point removes the troublesome *terminus post quem* (131) established by Dreyer and removes any objections to the identification of the men in lines 26 and 43 with Nasica and his colleagues.

The *presbeutai* in line 43, therefore, are surely the *pente presbeutai* referred to by Strabo and identified as Nasica’s commission. The only other possible identification is with Aquillius’ *decem legati* (129), and this can be ruled out because the inscription clearly states that the *presbeutai* had some sort of interaction with Aristonicus (ποιησάμενοι τὴν κατὰ Ἀριστονίκου τροπήν), which Aquillius’ legates could not have had because Aristonicus had been captured and transported back to Rome before their arrival in 129.\(^{33}\) As we have already noted, the three individuals in line 26 are also members of Nasica’s commission. Dreyer had assumed that they were different groups, but there is nothing to suggest this. Furthermore, since we have identified the *presbeutai* in line 43 with the 132 commission, the names in line 26 must be either contemporaneous

\(^{32}\) TAM 5.528; Jones, Review of *I. Metr.*, 480.

\(^{33}\) Strabo 14.1.38 (below, n. 72); cf. Florus 1.35.6, Orosius 5.10, Justin 36.4.9-12.
with, or earlier than, this commission; they must also be subsequent to Attalus III’s death. Because there is no evidence of any Romans officials in Asia between Attalus’ death in the spring of 133 and Nasica’s commission in (at the latest) the spring of 132, it seems reasonable to assume that these men are members of the commission, and that the ‘Publius’ is P. Scipio Nasica himself.

Having now established that the Metropolis decree refers to Nasica’s commission, we might note that the commissioners’ efforts near Thyateira were quite significant. The date of the battle (132) is consistent with numismatic evidence that reveals a shift in minting locations. In the autumn of 132 – the beginning of his third regnal year – Aristonicus moved his minting operation from Thyateira to Apollonis. It seems probable that the assault on Thyateira recorded in the Metropolis inscription led to the move. Although the inscription suggests that Aristonicus was successful in his defence of Thyateira, we might imagine that the embattled city was no longer suitable for housing his treasure and minting his coins. He therefore moved his operation twenty or so kilometres northwest to the more secure city of Apollonis.

It would appear, then, that Nasica and his colleagues were forced to assume a military role upon their arrival in the former Attalid kingdom, not only commanding the Metropolitans and their allies, but also meeting and even engaging Aristonicus in battle. This sort of martial role for a legatio is rare, but not without precedent; in extraordinary

34 Above, pp. 43-44.
35 On the autumn date, above p. 44, n. 33.
36 The inscription does not say whether or not Apollonius and his men achieved victory, and its absence from an honourary decree suggests that they did not.
circumstances *legati* could assume military command.\(^{37}\) A generation or so before Nasica’s legation (168), C. Popillius had been sent by the Senate to settle a dispute between Antiochus and Ptolemy, but events did not proceed smoothly and he was forced to gather several ships under his command to rescue plundered ships;\(^{38}\) likewise, a generation after Nasica’s commission the younger M’. Aquillius, who was sent as an ambassador (*legatus*) to restore Nicomedes of Bithynia and Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia to their respective thrones, ended up commanding troops in the (failed) defence of Bithynia against Mithridates VI (89-88).\(^{39}\) It is quite possible too that Nasica’s own father, P. Scipio Nasica (cos. 162 and 155), had been a *legatus* when he was forced to raise an impromptu Achaean force to halt the Macedonian advance after negotiations had failed.\(^{40}\)

Despite the evidence for this extraordinary military role, it cannot have been the commission’s original purpose to suppress Aristonicus. The Senate was probably unaware of the scope of his uprising when the commission set out in the winter of 133. If the Senate had expected a fight, they would have sent an army with a *strategos* and not a handful of *presbeutai*. Nasica and his fellow commissioners were sent to the former


\(^{38}\) Livy 44.19.13; 29.1-5: *quibus poterat Popilius aut suis aut Eumenis navibus succeerbat*. See *MRR* I.430.

\(^{39}\) App., *Mith.*, 11-17; Justin 38.3.4, 4.4-5; *MRR* II.35-36, 43.

\(^{40}\) Zon. 9.28: τὸν Σκιπίωνα τὸν Νάσικαν ἐπέμψαν ἐφηνηκώς πως τὰ ἔκει διοικήσοντα; *cf.* Livy, *Per* 50. Broughton, *MRR* I.459, records the elder Nasica as *tribunus militaris* without comment but there is no evidence for his rank and it is equally, if not more, likely that he was sent to negotiate as a *legatus*. So Gruen, *HWCR* II.433.
Attalid territory as an investigative commission; as was typical of such legations, their mandate was no doubt to investigate charges, examine the situation and take the necessary measures to establish order. In the aftermath, the legati were forced to carry out extraordinary measures to protect Roman allies and possessions.

While the legati spent most of 132 gathering information on the situation in Asia Minor, and possibly sending back to Rome intermittent updates, the Roman Senate was also made aware of the situation in Asia through various embassies from cities in the region. Early in Aristonicus’ uprising, Machaon, a leading citizen of Cyzicus, and the same individual who had earlier convinced M. Cosconius to intervene on behalf of his city, travelled to Rome on his own “to make clear the uprising around the city”. Machaon was apparently well received because he is praised for soliciting a benevolent response from the Senate and one consistent with the goodwill between Cyzicus and the Roman people. This embassy to Rome cannot be dated with precision, but it must postdate the initial plea to Cosconius in the spring of 133 and predate the arrival of any Roman force, which Machaon is subsequently praised for joining; the
assurances given to Machaon by the Senate probably involved a commitment of troops at the beginning of the 131 campaigning season.\textsuperscript{45}

Similar embassies are recorded in decrees from Gordos (Mysia) and Claros, although in both cases the dates are less certain. From Gordos an unknown son of Anaximimbrotos is recorded as taking a leading role in the war against Aristonicus and travelling to Rome in the public interest in order to keep the \textit{demos} in the good graces of the Romans.\textsuperscript{46} The decree from Claros in honour of Menippus states that it was shortly after Attalus' death that the honourand made the first two of his five embassies to Rome, through which he succeeded in 'protecting the city’s privileges'.\textsuperscript{47} As Kallet-Marx has noted, the chief 'privilege' of the city must have been the freedom it received from Rome in the Treaty of Apamea (188) following the war against Antiochus III (though it might also encompass the civic privileges accompanying the freedom-status in the \textit{SC de libertate}).\textsuperscript{48} If it does include the latter then the second embassy must post-date the occupation of Colophon by Aristonicus in 132 – in either case, the first embassy surely came shortly after Attalus’ death when Aristonicus threatened the city.\textsuperscript{49} No great degree

\textsuperscript{45} Contrast Canali di Rossi, \textit{Ambascerie}, p. 253, who suggests that Nasica’s commission is the result of the plea of this embassy.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{SEG} 34 no. 1198, II. 8-13: καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἀριστονίκον ἐνθαρακτίζει τοὺς πολέμους πρωταγωγούν καὶ προσεχθέντος περὶ τῶν κοινής τοῖς συμμετοχῶν τοῖς δήμους ἐν ταῖς 

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Claros}, Menippus, Col. I., II. 20-22: διὸς μὲν ὑπὲρ ἀρκετῆς τῆς πόλεως εἰς ὅτι μὴν πορευθηκείς καὶ τηρήσας ἀθραστὰ τῷ δήμῳ φιλάνθρωπα. Canali di Rossi, \textit{Ambascerie}, no. 298.


\textsuperscript{49} Attack on Colophon: Justin 37.1.1; Embassy as early as 133: Kallet Marx, \textit{Hegemony}, 103; Eilers, \textit{RPOC}, 129-130. Canali di Rossi, \textit{Ambascerie}, 254-256, identifies the date of the embassy as "ca. 83.
of precision can be applied to the dating of these three embassies, but all three likely fall between the period from the death of Attalus III to the first Roman campaign in the region (ca. 133-131). The Senate no doubt received embassies from other cities of the former Attalid kingdom, particularly ‘free cities’, like Cyzicus and Colophon, which sought aide against the assaults of Aristonicus; these embassies must have come intermittently throughout 133, 132 and 131, after which point a Roman legion landed in Asia Minor.

The commission returned to Rome likely at the end of 132 with a report on Aristonicus’ success in securing the western coast of Anatolia.\textsuperscript{50} As military commanders, the \textit{legati} had achieved some success, forcing Aristonicus to move his minting operation from Thyateira to Apollonis after combatting his forces near Thyateira, but they were in no way capable of stopping his momentum. In response to the Commission’s report and the petitions of those who had sent embassies, the Senate decided to send a military force to the region. Thanks to the settlement of the Sicilian slave revolt and the uprising in Numantia the previous year, men were available for the overseas campaign.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{50} It is of course possible that they merely sent a report of their actions to the Senate at the time, and that they stayed in the region until Crassus arrived in 131, but it seems more likely that at least part of the commission returned to deliver a report to the Senate in person.

\textsuperscript{51} Collins, \textit{The Revolt of Aristonicus}, 61, has suggested that these men might have been the legionnaires who had recently fought in Sicily because of the relatively easy nature of their recent campaign and their position along the route to Asia Minor. Brunt, \textit{Italian Manpower}, 429, has suggested that 2 legions were allotted to the campaign against Aristonicus. Compare Orosius 5.10: \textit{cum instructissimo [Crassus] missus exercitu}.
The Roman campaign proper against Aristonicus began rather inauspiciously as problems with the command of the mission immediately surfaced and caused delays. According to Cicero (Phil. 11.18), there was a struggle over who should command the army between the two consuls of 131, P. Crassus Dives Mucianus and Lucius Valerius Flaccus; the former was a prominent supporter of the Gracchi and Pontifex Maximus, the latter was a priest of Mars (flamen Martianus). The people were so divided over the appointment that even the great general Scipio Africanus, a privatus at the time, received two votes in the comitia tributa. Ultimately, Crassus took command of the mission after threatening to fine his colleague if he deserted his priestly duties. At least one ancient historian, though, suggests that his motives were far from religious; Justin writes that the consul was driven to seize the command by blind avarice, and was more intent on Attalid booty than the military campaign. Crassus, though, had his supporters, like Gellius Sempronius Asellio and others, who praise him for his wealth, nobility, eloquence, jurisprudence and piety. Crassus’ motives likely involved a mix of glory, fame, wealth and duty, but the dispute over the command of the army gives the first

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52 Phil. 11.18: Cum Aristonico bellum gerendum fuit P. Licinio L. Valerio consulibus. Rogatus est populus, quem id bellum gerere placet. Crassus consul, pontifex maximus, Flacco collegae, flaminem Martianum multam dixit, si a sacris discessisset: quam multam populus Romanus remisit, pontifici tamen flaminem parere iussit. Sed ne tum quidem populus Romanus ad privatum detulit bellum, quamquam erat Africanus, qui anno ante de Numantinis triumpharat; qui cum longe omnis belli gloria et virtute superaret, duas tamen tribus solas tuitt. Ita populus Romanus consuli potius Crasso quam privato Africano bellum gerendum dedit.

53 On the proposal of Scipio see the comments by Astin, Scipio Aemilianus, 234, and Mattingly “Scipio Aemilianus and the Legacy of Attalus III”, 117-119.

54 36.4.8: [Crassus] qui intentior Attalicae praedae quam bello...inconsultae avaritiae.

indication of the Roman willingness to fight in Asia and the proposal of the recently-victorious Scipio Africanus suggests that a quick victory was desired.

Crassus’ mandate is slightly clearer to us than what had been given to the legati who preceded him. Without any evidence, we would assume that he was charged with suppressing Aristonicus, likely for the sake of the now free cities of Anatolia; but a Greek copy of a senatorial decree, the so-called SC Popillianum, reveals that the Senate was also concerned with maintaining the status quo as much as possible. This senatorial decree has long been a contentious item in discussions on the early history of Roman Asia. It has variously been dated to 133, 132 and post-129 and has been thought to address groups including Nasica’s commission, Crassus’ army and later provincial governors. 56 Thanks to Wörrie’s re-reading of the document, and (the first) published photograph of the squeeze, it is now certain that the document belongs to the latter half of 132, and, as such, addresses Crassus and subsequent generals (strategoi). 57 As Wörrie has now demonstrated, the name of the relator of the motion is not [G]aius Popillius, an assumed praetor of 133, but [Pub]lius Popillius the consul of 132. 58 The date can be narrowed down to sometime in November or December of 132 according to the [---


57 Other changes to the text must be made according to the discovery of a second copy of the inscription by Drew-Bear, NIP no. 2, pp. 5-8: μενή for ἤι in both lines 9 and 16, and ἐδώκαν for βασιλείς in ll. 13-14.

58 This reading had already been hypothesized by Mattingly, ‘Scipio Aemilianus and Attalus III”, 118.
\[\varepsilon\mu\beta\rho\tau\omicron\nu\in\text{ line 5, which based on the line length can only be restored with 2 (No-) or 3 (}\Delta\epsilon\kappa-\text{) characters.}^{59}\]

The decree gives orders (\[\varepsilon\nu\tau\omicron\omicron\alpha\iota\]) to “those \textit{strategoi} setting out to Asia” that the acts of Attalus III up to his death and the dictates of his will are to remain valid and are not to be meddled with.\(^{60}\) The plural ‘\textit{strategoi}’ here implies that the \textit{entolai} are for any Roman officials proceeding to Asia in the future – the term ‘\textit{strategos}’ having quite a wide semantic range – and clearly includes the coming expedition of Crassus and any potential successors.\(^{61}\) The term in no way implies, as some have argued, the creation of a Roman province or the intention of sending annual governors.\(^{62}\) In fact, the decree very clearly illustrates Rome’s unwillingness to make any sort of administrative changes to the territory, instead relying completely on the Attalid system.\(^{63}\)

In addition to this \textit{senatus consultum}, we now have the emended and re-dated \textit{SC Licinianum} to help us understand the Senate’s orders to Crassus.\(^{64}\) This decree, which confirms the actions taken by Attalus up to the day of his death and (more significantly

\(^{59}\) More specifically, the possibility of ‘November’ or ‘December’ allows for any date between 16 October (\textit{ante diem septemdecem Kalendas Novembres}) and 31 December, the end of the consular year.

\(^{60}\) Below, n. 63.

\(^{61}\) On the Latin equivalent of the Greek ‘\textit{strategos}’ see H. Mason, \textit{Greek Terms}, 155-162.

\(^{62}\) Contrast: Mattingly, ‘Scipio Aemilianus and Attalus III’, 118, who suggests that it pertains to future governors as well.

\(^{63}\) \textit{RDGE} 11, lines 7-10: \textit{t}ί\textit{ν}ε\textit{ς} \textit{ἐν}τ\textit{ο}λ\textit{α}ι\textit{α} \textit{ἐ}ξ\textit{ο}ν\textit{τ}α\textit{ι}τ\textit{ς} \textit{τ}ο\textit{ς} \textit{ἐ}ι\textit{ς} [\textit{Ἀ}τ\textit{α}λλα\textit{ι}ν πο\textit{ρ}ε\textit{υ}ο\textit{μ}ε\textit{ν}ο\textit{ν}ις} \textit{στρατ\textit{η}γο\textit{ν}}\textit{ις}, \textit{ὅ}\textit{σα} \textit{ἐν \[\varepsilon\nu\omicron\omicron\alpha\iota\] \textit{τ}ή\textit{s} \textit{Ἀ}τ\textit{τ}άλ\textit{l}ο\textit{υ} τ\textit{ε}λ\textit{ε}τ\textit{η}\textit{ς} ὧ\textit{π}ό \textit{τ}ῶ\textit{n} [\textit{βασιλεῖων} \textit{δ}ι\textit{k}ω\textit{ρ}υ\textit{θ}\textit{η} \textit{ἐ}δ\textit{ω}ρ\textit{θ}\textit{η} \textit{ἀ}φ\textit{ε}θ\textit{η} \textit{ἐ}ξ\textit{ημ}ι\textit{ω}\textit{θ}\textit{η} \textit{ὅ}π\textit{ως} τ\textit{α}\textit{τ}ά\textit{τα} \textit{κύρια} (‘there were orders to those \textit{strategoi} setting out to Asia, so that whatever was set straight, given, exempted, or punished in Asia up to the death of Attalus (III) by the kings so that these things shall remain authoritative.’). The same is repeated in lines 13-18.

\(^{64}\) See above, p. 72-74 and Appendix.
here) all other decisions taken by the *pente presbeutai*, was published after the return of Nasica’s commission in the consulship of P. Licinius Crassus (131). Its publication, therefore, must fall somewhere between 1 January 131 and when Crassus led his men off to Asia, likely sometime in late spring or early summer of the same year. The *SC Licinianum* survives in two inscriptions; in both, it immediately follows the text of the *SC Popillianum*, and it is almost certain that it stands as an addendum to the earlier decree.65 This accounts for the remarkable similarity in language and phraseology between the two decrees.66 The *SC Popillianum* had provided instructions that everything done by Attalus was to remain valid and that the terms of his will were to remain inviolate, but because of the administrative actions taken by Nasica and his colleagues, these terms had to be enlarged. The *SC Licinianum* therefore provides that everything done up to the death of Attalus should remain valid, *as well as* what had been arranged by Nasica and his colleagues the previous year. Crassus’ orders, and indeed all those *strategoi* who followed him, were to protect the legal and administrative *status quo* of the region except where the Roman legates had made appropriate changes.

When Crassus arrived in Asia in 131 Aristonicus still controlled at least some of the Ionian coast – although the consul’s ability to successfully reach a safe harbour suggests that Aristonicus’ power along the coast was not absolute. As we have seen, Crassus has been variously described by the ancient sources, but neither side has attributed him with any degree of military acumen; on the contrary, he failed to capture


66 See Appendix, p. 120.
Aristonicus and managed to be killed during the campaign. Nevertheless, he brought with him a very well trained army (*instructissimus exercitus*), augmented with troops supplied by the kings of Pontus, Bithynia, Cappadocia and Paphlagonia, and managed at the very least to push Aristonicus back from the coast. 67

The major battle of his campaign, though, was no doubt a siege at Leucae, for which purpose he requisitioned supplies from Mylasa and perhaps a boat from Halicarnassus and other provisions from seaboard communities. 68 According to Strabo, Leucae was one of the first cities to declare its support for Aristonicus and was the last city that he occupied before being forced from the coast – the city was no doubt one of Aristonicus’ chief coastal strongholds. 69 It is perhaps because of the city’s importance to Aristonicus that Crassus’ siege was protracted and his command prorogued into the year 130. Although the actual outcome of the assault is unknown, it seems likely that Crassus

67 Crassus’ army: Orosius 5.10. Troops from foreign kings: Eutropius 4.20 (*infinita regum auxilia*); Orosius 5.10; Justin 37.1.1

68 Mylasa: Gellius, *N.A.*, 1.13.11-13: *Is cum in consulatu obtinerat Asiam provinciam et circumsedere oppugnareque Leucas pararet... scripsit ad magistratum Mylattensium, sociorum amicorumque populi Romani, ut ex malis duobus, quos apud eos vidisset, uter maior esset, cum mittendum curaret* (‘When Crassus obtained the province of Asia and prepared to besiege and attack Leucae... he wrote to the magistrate of the Mylattenses, the allies and friends of the Roman people, to take care to send him the larger of two masts, which he had seen in the city of the Mylattenses.’); Halicarnassus: *CIG* 2.2.2501: οἱ παρακληθέντες ἐπηγείλαντο δωρεάν τῇ πόλει [π]λήρω[σ]ιν τῆς νεός ἀποστελλομένης πρὸς τὸν Πύλιον ύθαλ. Κράσσου ὧπατον καὶ τοὺς [πε]μφθέντας πρὸς τοὺς τόπους τῆς Ἀσίας κατὰ τοὺς λόγιας τὴν εἰρήνην (‘Those summoned proclaimed a gift to the city, (namely) the requisitioned ship sent off for Publius Val. Crassus, consul, and men sent for the *topoi* of Asia against those who destroyed the peace.’). Crassus’ *nomen* has obviously been confused with that of his colleague’s, L. Valerius Flaccus. Cf. the inscription from Methymna on the island of Lesbos (*SEG* III.2 1929, no. 710) in which the city joined Rome in an Asian war and gave to them the things necessary for their own protection (κοινωνοῦντις τοῦ συνεκτός αὐτός ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πολέμου καὶ εἰς τὰ θεῖα εἰσφέροντα πολλα καὶ μεγάλα ἀναλόματα ἀνθρωποί δέντρα δέντρα δέντρα τῷ πολροῦν, ll. 11-14) – it seems natural that the resources asked of an island state would be naval assets.

69 Strabo 14.1.38.
was unsuccessful. Leucae was the city from which Aristonicus was forced to flee after being defeated in a naval battle off the coast of Cyme by an Ephesian fleet. It was, therefore, still in Aristonicus’ possession until the Battle of Cyme, which must have taken place after the city had successfully repelled Crassus’ assault. Strabo reports, furthermore, that Crassus was killed in the region around Leucae and a defeat in a siege of Leucae would account for his retreat (decendens ex Asia) at the time of his death.

Here we must digress shortly and address one of the major difficulties in reconstructing the war against Aristonicus: identifying the date of the ‘Battle of Cyme’, which has been variously reported as either late 133 or 131. Our only source for the naumachia is Strabo, who records that Aristonicus was defeated in a naval battle off the coast of Cyme by an Ephesian fleet and subsequently forced into the interior, where he famously assembled his Heliopolitai. Immediately following this, he reports that Aristonicus first fell upon Thyateira, then Apollonis and subsequently other fortresses.

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70 Strabo 14.1.38.

71 Strabo 14.1.38. On the location of Crassus’ death see also: Frontinus 4.5.16 (inter Elaeam et Myrinam in hostium copias incidisset); Val. Max. 3.2.12 (inter Elaeam et Myrinam exceptus). On his retreat: Vel. Pat. 2.4.1. Note also Orosius’ comments (5.10.4) that Crassus’ army deserted him after many of their number had been killed (exercitu post plurimam caedem in fugam acto).

72 Μετά δὲ Σμύρναν αἱ Λευκή καὶ πολίχνιον, δ’ ἀπέστησεν Ἀριστονίκος μετὰ τὴν Ἀττάλου τοῦ Φιλομήτορος τελευτήν, δοκῶν τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν βασιλεῶν καὶ διανοούμενος εἰς ἐαυτὸν ποιεῖται τὴν ἀρχήν· ἔνειδεν μὲν οὖν ἔξεσεν, ἠπτηθεὶς ναυμαχία περὶ τὴν Κυμαίαν ὑπὸ ἔφεσιν, εἰς δὲ τὴν μεσόγαιαν ἔντον ἡθοριοι διὰ ταχέως πλῆθος ἀπόρων τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ δούλων ἐπ’ ἐλευθερία κατακεκλειμένων, οὕς Ἡλιοπόλιτας ἔκάλεσε. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν παρασείπεσεν εἰς θυσεῖα, εἶτ’ Ἀπολλωνίδα ἔσχεν, εἶτ’ ἄλλων ἔφετο φρουρίων· οὐ πολύν δὲ διεγένετο χρόνον, ἀλλ’ εὔθυς αἱ τε πόλεις ἔπεμψαν πλῆθος, καὶ Νικομήδης ὁ Βιθυνός ἐπεκουύρησε καὶ οἱ τῶν Καππαδόκων βασιλεῖς. ἔσπετα πρέσβεις Ρωμαίων πέντε ἤκου, καὶ μετά ταύτα στρατιὰ καὶ ὑπατος Πόπλιος Κράσσος, καὶ μετά ταύτα Μάρκος Περεπρένας, δ’ χαὶ κατέλυσε τὸν πόλεμον, ζωγραφία λαβὼν τὸν Ἀριστονίκον καὶ ἀναπέμψας εἰς Ῥωμιν. ἔκεινος μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον, Περεπρέναν δὲ νόσος διέφθειρε, Κράσσος δὲ περὶ Λεύκας, ἐπιθεμένων τινῶν, ἔσπεσεν ἐν μάχῃ. Μάνιος δ’ Ακύλλιος, ἐπελθὼν ὑπάτος μετὰ δέκα πρεσβευτῶν, διέταξε τὴν ἐπαρχίαν εἰς τὸ νῦν ἐτί συμμένον τῆς πολιτείας σχῆμα (‘After Smyrna one
Aristonicus' occupation of Thyateira and Apollonis can be dated numismatically since he minted coins bearing the ethnics of the cities, ΘΥΑ(τείρα) and ΑΙΠΟ(λλωνις), in his Year beta (Oct 133-Oct 132) and Year gamma (Oct 132-Oct 131) respectively. Based on Strabo and the numismatic evidence, then, it would appear the Battle of Cyme must date to late 133.

This interpretation, however, suffers from a number of drawbacks, not the least of which is that it compels us to believe that Aristonicus gathered his military assets and achieved his considerable military successes along the Asian coast (discussed in Chapter 2) in a single campaigning season. Also problematic to this interpretation is the Year alpha coin published by Kampmann, which carries the ethnic of Thyateira; Aristonicus’ first year (‘alpha’) began in October 134 and ended in October 133, which dates the coin, and demonstrates that he must have controlled Thyateira before the autumn of 133.

comes to Leukae, a small town, which after the death of Attalus Philometor was caused to revolt by Aristonicus, who was reputed to belong to the royal family and intended to usurp the kingdom. Now he was banished (from Leucae) after being defeated in a naval battle near the Cymaean territory by the Ephesians, but he went up into the interior and quickly assembled a large number of resourceless people, and also of slaves, invited with a promise of freedom, whom he called Heliopolitae. Now he first fell upon Thyateira unexpectedly, and then got possession of Apollonis, and then set his efforts against other fortresses. But he did not last long; the cities immediately sent a large number of troops against him, and they were assisted by Nicomedes the Bithynian and by the kings of the Cappadocians. Then came five Roman ambassadors, and after that an army under Publius Crassus the consul, and after that Marcus Perpernas, who brought the war to an end, having captured Aristonicus alive and sent him to Rome. Now Aristonicus ended his life in prison; Perpernas died of disease; and Crassus, attacked by certain people in the neighbourhood of Leucae, fell in battle. And Manius Aquillius came over as consul with ten lieutenants and organized the province into the form of government that still now endures.’


74 Collins, Revolt of Aristonicus, 182. Ferrary, “Rome et les cités grecques d’Asie Mineure au 1er siècle” in Bresson, et al. (eds.), Les Cités d’Asie Mineure occidentale au 1er Siècle (Bordeaux, 2001), 98 n. 31, has again raised this point when voicing his concerns over Strabo’s overly-schematic passage.

75 On these dates, see above p. 44, n. 33.
In contrast to the naval blitzkrieg presented by Strabo is the more appealing idea that Aristonicus' coastal campaign developed gradually. We have already seen in Chapter 2 that he attacked (Bargylia, Erythrae, Elaea, Sestos) and occupied (Leucae, Myndos, Colophon, Samos, Phocaea, Smyrna) numerous cities along the coast, and the length of this naval campaign is probably what Justin had in mind when he wrote that Aristonicus proceeded without check until at last he appeared a 'true king'.\textsuperscript{76} We have seen, furthermore, that there are numerous examples of heavy Roman action along the coast in 131: Gellius' recount of an angry Crassus besieging Leucae, Halicarnassus' donation of a vessel to Crassus, and Crassus' death somewhere between Myndos and Elaea have all demonstrated that Crassus was involved in a major siege at Leucae in 131, where he was defeated and forced to carry the campaign further north in the following year.\textsuperscript{77} This evidence directly contradicts the claim that Aristonicus was relegated to the interior after 133. Based on this evidence, we should suggest that the Battle of Cyme took place in late 131 as part of, or shortly after, the assault on Leucae. Magie has plausibly suggested that Crassus carried out a combined land and sea campaign from the south, laying siege against Leucae, which forced Aristonicus into a counter attack in which Crassus was killed but his navy was victorious.\textsuperscript{78} In contrast to this more appealing series of events, the only pieces of evidence used to support the earlier 133 date

\textsuperscript{76} See above, pp. 47-48, esp. n. 47.

\textsuperscript{77} Gellius, \textit{N.A.} 1.13.11; \textit{CIG} 2.2.2501; Frontinus, \textit{Strat.} 4.5.16; Val. Max. 3.2.12; Strabo, 14.1.38; perhaps also Eutropius 4.20.1.

\textsuperscript{78} Magie, \textit{RRAM} I.150-1, II.1040, n. 16. See also Collins, \textit{The Revolt of Aristonicus}, Appendix VI, pp. 181-186.
for the Battle of Cyme are the *cistophori* of Aristonicus and the interpretation of Strabo. It is clear from the discussion above that the coins contradict the idea that Aristonicus captured Thyateira in late 133/early 132; instead he captured it a full regnal year earlier (134-133) at the beginning of his uprising. It thus remains to revisit Strabo’s text.

The major difficulty with Strabo’s excursus on the Aristonicus war is its chronology. This difficulty has been noted numerous times thus far and here it must be qualified. Strabo, for instance, cannot be correct in stating that Aristonicus assaulted and occupied Thyateira, Apollonis and other fortresses, faced heavy opposition from nearby cities as well as the armies of the Anatolian kings all before the arrival of Nasica’s commission in early 132 (especially given his attention in the coastal region, which Strabo does not mention). In order to preserve the integrity of Strabo’s commentary, we ought to look at his excursus as a series of parallel narratives. First he presents the actions of Aristonicus from 133 down to 129 and then the actions of the Romans from Nasica’s commission (132) to Perpema’s victory (129). The independent strains

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79 On the difficulty of Strabo’s chronology see Mileta, “Eumenes III. und die Sklaven”, 57-58.

80 This idea was suggested by Vogt, “Pergamon und Aristonicos” *Atti del terzo congresso internazionale di epigrafia greca e romana* (Rome, 1959), 50 (= *Sklaverei und Humanität* [Wiesbaden, 1965], 65), in response to what he saw as Carrata Thomas’ corruption of Strabo’s chronology; although he noticed the dualistic construction of the passage, he nevertheless failed to notice its impact on the chronological position of the Battle of Cyme. See also Vavřinek, “Aristonicus of Pergamum”, 118-119.

81 *String 1* (Aristonicus): Μετὰ δὲ Σμύρναν αἰ Λευκαὶ πολισίν, δ ἀπέστησεν Ἀριστόνικος μετά τὴν Ἀττάλου τοῦ Φιλομήτρος τελευτήν, δοκῶν τοῦ γένους εἶναι τῶν βασιλέων καὶ διανοούμενος εἰς ἑαυτὸν ποιεῦσαι τὴν ἄρχῃ· ἐνετέθην μὲν οὖν ἐξέπεσεν, ἡττηθεὶς ναυμαχίᾳ περί τὴν Κυμαίαν ὑπὸ Ἐφεσίων, εἰς δὲ τὴν μεσογαίαν ἐνιὸν ἡμέρας διὰ ταχέως πλῆθος ἀπόροις τὰ ἀνθρώπων καὶ δοῦλων ἐπὶ ἐλευθερίας κατακεκλημένων, οὐδὲ Ἡλισσολίτας ἐκάλεσε. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν παραειδότησεν εἰς θυετείρα, εἰς Ἀπολλωνίδα ἔσχεν, εἰς ἄλλων ἐφιέτο φρουρίῳ· οὐ δὲ διεγέρνετο χρόνον, ἄλλη εὐθὺς αἱ τὰ πόλεις ἐπεμψαν πλῆθος, καὶ Νικομήδις ὁ Βιβυνὸς ἐπεκουρήσε καὶ οἱ τῶν Καππαδοκῶν βασιλεῖς; *String 2* (Romans): ἔσχεν εἰς Ρωμαῖον πέντε ἡκον, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα στρατιά καὶ ὑπατὸς Πόπλιος Κράσσος,
converge again with a quick report of the fates of the leading individuals followed by the actions of M'. Aquillius and his legates (129-126). This passage is not unique in its chronological confusion; in the same Book (14), Strabo’s historical digression from Coracesium is almost incomprehensible as a straight historical narrative. Here again he seems to be organizing his story into blocks of information (i.e. Tryphon and the Syrians, collapse of order in Cilicia, the slave trade, Syrian enemies, Roman conquest of Cilicia).

A closer look at the text of the Aristonicus excurses supports this hypothesis of a segmented historical narrative. In fact, the textual evidence suggests a three part division rather than just the binary division suggested above. In our passage, Strabo thrice uses the adverbial phrase μὲν οὖν: first to introduce his historical digression; second to mark the transition from Aristonicus’ flight inland to his exploits in the interior; and third to mark the transition from the events of the war to the fates of the major individuals involved. The first use, as just noted, marks the point where the historic digression begins and the third, as noted above, marks the point where the individual historic strands converge. It therefore

82 Re-convergence: ἐκείνος μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ διεσωμητηρίῳ κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον, Περηπέραν δὲ νόσος διέθητο, Κράσσος δὲ περὶ Λεύκας, ἐπιθεμένων τινῶν, ἔπεσεν ἐν μάχῃ Μάνιος δ’ Ἀκύλλας, ἐπελθὼν ὑπὸ τοῦ μετὰ δέκα προσεβευτῶν, διέταξε τὴν ἐπαρχίαν εἰς τὸ νῦν ἐτί συμμένον τῆς πολιτείας σχῆμα.

83 Strabo 14.5.2.

84 He begins with a digression on Tryphon, the Syrian rebel-turned-king (142-137), and continues in turn to discuss: Cilician pirates and the collapse of order; the slave trade and the island of Delos; (returns to) the Cilician pirates; enemies of Syria; Parthian control of Cilicia; Armenian control of Cilicia; Roman conquest of Cilicia and defence of its late action. Note that the digression from Tryphon begins τοῦτον μὲν οὖν ἀντίχοιχος ἀ δημητρίῳ, and his discussion of Coracesium ends with ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν ἐν παρεκβάσει διὰ βραχέων εἰπεῖν. See below.
seems likely that the second use of the phrase (μὲν οὖν) also marks a point where the author has segmented his discussion (it also carries further significance as we will see below). The term (μὲν οὖν) is thus being used as a literary device to mark for the reader those points where Strabo is beginning a completely new historical thought. This entire trinal narrative would thus be framed by the parallel use of the adverbial phrase μὲν οὖν. If this is the case, then Strabo’s discussion of the Battle of Cyme and Aristonicus’ flight to the interior exists outside the chronological framework of the uprising.

It is generally assumed that Aristonicus’ loss at Cyme preceded his assault on Thyateira and Apollonis because it came first in Strabo’s text. Yet this is not exactly what Strabo is saying. He makes very clear in his second ‘historical bloc’ that first (πρῶτον) Aristonicus fell upon Thyateira and Apollonis and then other fortresses. Strabo is presenting this discussion in a very segmented fashion, filled with historical asides as he thinks of them, and in the case of his thoughts on Leucae, those are completed with Aristonicus’ retreat into the mesogeia. Mesogeia is not intended to be an antecedent of Thyateira and Apollonis, but a completely separate idea; Strabo has completely changed his direction of thought from Aristonicus’ flight inland to Aristonicus’ initial actions in the uprising when he fell upon the Lydian cities. There is a parallel for this in Book II (3.8),

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86 Compare Duek, “Historical Exempla in Augustan Rome and their Role in a Geographical Context” in Deroux (ed), *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* (Brussels 2000), 178: “It is possible that when engaged in the description of a geographical site, Strabo would spontaneously attach to it famous historical events which were at the back of his mind, without carrying out conscious historiographic research.”
the only other instance of \( \pi \rho \omega \tau \omicron \nu \ \mu \varepsilon \nu \ \omicron \nu \), where Strabo uses the phrase at the beginning of a new section to identify a completely new thought. This new interpretation does not require any temporal subordination of Aristonicus’ occupation of Thyateira to the Battle of Cyme, and we are no longer bound to contort the evidence in order to make the Battle of Cyme fit into 133. It can now be easily placed in late 131 where it more naturally fits with all of our other material evidence.

Despite this defeat in the waters off Cyme, the assault on Leucae, and his withdrawal to the interior, Aristonicus’ support did not immediately dissolve. As Crassus limped his way up the coast, he likely tried to suppress resistance where he could. He is said to have died somewhere between Myrina and Elaea, well north of Leucae, after fighting a series of battles that had forced his army into disarray (inordinate actie). The date of his death has variously been recorded as *extremo anni tempore* (Justin 36.4.6), *decedens ex Asia proconsul* (Vell. Pat 3.2), and *in Ap. Claudio M. Perperna coss.* (AUC 622) (Jul. Obs. 28), any or all of which place it in 130, after his defeat at Leucae. It would appear that Crassus was working his way up the coast from Leucae to the safety of

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87 2.3.7-8: Κράτητα δ’, εἰσάγοντα τὴν ἑτέραν οἰκουμένην, ἦν οὐκ ὄδεις Ὄμηρος, δουλεύειν ὑποθέσει: καὶ ἐδει, φησί, μεταγράφειν οὕτως "ἡμέν ἀπερχόμενον Ὄμηρον," ὅτιν ἄπε τοῦ μεσημβρινοῦ περικλήνοντος. [8] Προτότον µὲν οὖν οἱ πρὸς Ἀιγύπτῳ Ἀθηναῖς καὶ αὐτοὶ δίχα διαφοράντων (But says Poseidonius, Crates, in introducing into the discussion the question of a second inhabited world, about which Homer knows nothing, is a slave to a hypothesis, and, says Poseidonius, the passage in Homer should have been emended to read: “both where Hyperion departs,” meaning where he declines from the meridian. (8) Now, in the first place, the Ethiopians that border on Egypt are themselves, also, divided into two groups’, Loeb transl.). There are four other examples of this phrase (µὲν οὖν Προτότον) in Strabo (1.1.7; 1.1.11; 16.2.4; 16.2.13) but in these cases, Προτότον is part of a numerical series.

88 Crassus’ death: Frontinus 4.5 (‘between Myrina and Elaea’); Val. Max 3.2 (‘between Smyrna and Elaea’); Strabo 14.1.38 (‘in the neighbourhood of Leucae’). Disarray of the army: Justin 36.4.8. This scenario is suggested by Magie, *RRAM* I.1.50; II.1.39-40, n. 15.
Pergamon, until eventually his army was overwhelmed and he himself perished in early 130.

The death of a consul was not an event to be taken lightly, and indeed it seems to have been met with some apprehension in Rome. For when news of Crassus’ death reached Rome, Marcus Perperna, one of the consuls of 130, wasted no time and immediately sped off to Asia to assume command of the army (raptim... pervolavit; celeravit). It is unclear precisely when Perperna arrived in Asia, but a suggestion of late spring 130 does not seem unreasonable – Crassus had been killed as proconsul early in 130 and we should allow at least a month, if not more, for Perperna to have arrived, even if his journey was as fast as the wind. Crassus had managed to achieve some progress against Aristonicus and his supporters, but had not been able to capture Aristonicus himself. The satisfaction of his capture came to Perperna (though the honour would be stolen by his successor). Perperna, we are told, caught Aristonicus off-guard and defeated him in a pitched battle in the hinterland. Aristonicus subsequently withdrew to Stratonicea, where he was surrounded and besieged by the Roman consul and forced to surrender after becoming emaciated.

89 Orosius 5.10.1; Eutropius 4.20.2. On Perperna see MRR I.501-502.

90 Dreyer, I.Metr., 78.

91 Orosius 5.10.4-5: Perpena consul, qui Crasso successerat, audita morte Crassi et clade exercitus Romani raptim in Asiam pervolavit, Aristonicum recenti victoria feriatum in improviso bello adortus nudatumque omnibus copiis in fugam vertit; cumque Stratoniceum urbem, ad quam ille configerat, obsidione cinxisset, trucidatum fame ad deditionem coegit; Eutropius 4.20.2: postea Perperna, consul Romanus, qui successor Crasso veniebat, audita belli fortuna ad Asiam celeravit et acie victum Aristonicum apud Stratoniceum civitatem, quo configerat, fame ad deditionem conspexit; cf. Livy, Per 59; Strabo 14.1.38; Florus 1.35.6: I.Priene 108, II. 225-227: Μαάρκου Πεπένα Μαάρκου υιόν κατά τῶν ἔναντία | τῇ συγκλήτῳ προ[ε]λομένων ἐπιτιθέειν καὶ νικήσαντος ἐνδοξώς καὶ κυριεύσαντος τῶν πολεμών (‘Marcus Perpena, son of Marcus pursued those acting contrary to the Senate, famously defeating and then gaining mastery over the enemy’); SEG 36, no. 555.8-11: δὲ στρατηγὸς ἦνε Μάαρκος στρατὸν | ἐπ'
There has been some debate over whether this Stratonicea was the one in Mysia or Caria, but it now seems clear to be Stratonicea-on-the-Caicus in southern Mysia, the very same city from which Aristonicus minted his final cistophoric series (Year delta). Following his defeat, Aristonicus was sent back to Rome where tradition holds he was strangled in prison by an order of the Senate.

Following Aristonicus’ capture, Perperna managed to gather the remaining Attalid treasure (gaza) from the claimant’s hoard and ship it back to Rome. As Adams has commented, this account suggests that Aristonicus managed to hold on to the Attalid treasure for over three years of campaigning, thus depriving Rome of a significant portion of their inheritance until Aristonicus’ final defeat. This might have made the auction of Attalid wares earlier in 132 even more valuable. Aside from the shipment of Aristonicus’ cistophori,

92 This has been the consensus among scholars since Robinson identified Aristonicus’ coin series in 1954. See, for example, Broughton, “Strattonicea and Aristonicus”, CPh 39 (1934), 252-254; Magie, RRAM I.153; II.1042, n. 21; Sherwin-White, RFPE, 86; Daubner, Bellum Asiaticum, 125; Jones, Review of I.Metr., 484. Contra: Holleaux, Études II.193.

93 Orosius 5.10; Eutropius 4.20.2; Strabo 14.1.38; SEG 36 no. 555; cf: Vellius Paterculus 2.4.1 and Sallust, Hist 4.69, who state that Aristonicus was led in Aquillius’ triumph in 126 – though this need not be mutually exclusive with his death in prison after Aquillius’ triumph.

94 Justin 36.4.9.


96 Pliny, N.H. 33.53.149: *Tum enim haec emendi Romae in auctionibus regis verecundia exempta est urbis anno DCCXI* (‘For at that time [death of Attalus III] all scruples entirely disappeared in regard to buying these articles at the royal auctions at Rome – the date was the 622nd year of the city (132 BC)’). It is admittedly difficult to place much faith on this passage, but there seems to be nothing standing against the possibility that Nasica’s commission managed to send back some of Attalus’ more liquid assets for sale at Rome. Note also a fragmentary passage from Varro (fr. 58): *ex hereditate Attalica aulea clamides pellae plagae <vasa> aurea.*
and the Attalid fortune back to Rome, Perperna also appears to have carried out some administrative functions from Pergamon, including something of consequence for Priene.\(^97\)

Tacitus makes a passing mention that he had granted certain sanctuary rights to temples and sacred lands, and an inscription from Priene seems to suggest (the text is very mutilated) that a certain Herodes travelled to Perperna to gain something of consequence for his city.\(^98\)

Unfortunately for Perperna, he was not able to enjoy his victory over Aristonicus or achieve much as an administrator, for he died of disease (\textit{ex morbo}) at Pergamon shortly after his conquest.\(^99\) The war against Aristonicus had now claimed the lives of two Roman consuls.

Despite the successes against Aristonicus’ supporters by P. Crassus, and his final defeat and capture by M. Perperna, it was M’. Aquillius whom Appian describes as the ‘subduer of Asia’ (\textit{ό τὴν Ἀσίαν ἔλων}).\(^100\) To judge from Justin’s account of the uprising, Aquillius would have been very glad that his name had become associated with the conquest of Asia. For Aquillius had envied the good fortune that Aristonicus’ defeat had

\(^97\) On his placement in Pergamon see Eutropius 4.20.2 and \textit{I. Priene}, no. 108, I.228. This latter inscription from Priene and \textit{I. Priene} 109, ll. 93, suggest that Perperna did something for the city, but nothing is specifically mentioned.

\(^98\) Tacitus, \textit{Ann.} 3.62: \textit{et memorabantur Perpennae, Isaurici multaque alia imperatorum nomina qui non modo templo sed duobus milibus passuum eandem sanctitatem tribuerant; I. Priene} 109, ll. 92-95: \textit{πάλιν χειροτονθεῖς θεωρός ἔπεστάλη - -καὶ ἰπ[η]μ[ή][θ][ε]ς πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν στρατη[γ]ήν Μάρκον Περπέρη][ναν Μάρκου στρατη[γ]ήν ἀνθυπατ[α]τ[ο]ν εἰς Πέργαμον ἄτερ] [δ[ι][φ][ωνίου καὶ [ἔ]λεγ[α]του ο[δ][μ][ν][ο]ν] (‘Having been voted back again \textit{theoros} he was sent off…and he travelled off toward the same general Marcus Perperna, son of Marcus, consul, into Pergamon without money allowance and oil not only…he behaved famously…’). The reconstruction of εἰς Πέργαμον is based on Eutropius (4.20.2) and Orosius (5.10.5), who record that Perperna spent time in Pergamon, where he picked up a disease and died.

\(^99\) Strabo 14.1.38; Orosius 5.10.2; Eutropius 4.20.1; Justin 36.4.11.

\(^100\) B. C. 1.3.22. On Aquillius see \textit{MRR} I.504, to which should be added a fragment from Asconius (24C) suggesting that Aquillius had held a quaestorship and aedileship before his praetorship. See F.X. Ryan “The Quaestorship and Aedileship of M’. Aquillius (Cos. 129)” \textit{Hermes} 124 (1996), 115-116.
brought to Perperna, and made all efforts to hurry to Asia and take Aristonicus from Perperna’s hands.  

Upon arriving in Asia, Aquillius’ principal tasks were to eliminate the remaining resistance and organize the territory into an administrative system. The latter is outside the scope of this study, but the former – the ‘mopping-up’ operation as one scholar has called it – deserves some attention. The literary accounts provide us with almost no evidence for Aquillius’ military actions in Asia, ancient historians are focused instead on his organization of the province and his subsequent legal troubles; the epigraphic record, however, has several notable mentions of the consul and his men and demonstrate that despite Aristonicus’ capture, large areas of resistance remained and required a lengthy campaign to suppress. Because, furthermore, of the local character of these inscriptions, Aquillius’ efforts (and Roman practices in general) appear far more dynamic than the annalistic tradition presents.

A well-documented inscription from Bargylia, a coastal city in central Caria, records that Aquillius campaigned in Mysia Abbaitos and the surrounding region. The

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101 Justin 36.4.10: *Quod aegre ferens successor eius M’. Aquilius consul ad eripiendum Aristonicum Perpennae, veluti sui potius triumphi munus esse deberet, festinata velocitate contedit.*


103 Florus (below, n. 106), however, relates the cruel, though expedient, quality of Aquillius’ military practices, but unfortunately says nothing of any real substance. Despite being granted a triumph (*Fast. Triumph.*) on his return, Aquillius was brought up on charges *de repetundis* for allegedly receiving a bribe from Mithridates V to whom he gave ‘Greater Phrygia’ in the settlement of the province. See: Ps. Ascon (Greenidge & Clay, *Sources*, p. 25); App., *Mith. 12, 57; B.C. 1.3.22; Cic., *Div. Caec. 69; pro Font.* 38; Alexander, *Trials*, no. 23.

104 REA 19 (1921), 1-19 = *Iasos 612 = SEG 44, no. 867, ll. 13-15, 19-20: Μανίου τε Ἀκουλλίου τοῦ Ἄρτυμου στρατηγοῦ ἀναζεύχαντος ἐπὶ[!] Μυσίας | τῆς καλουμένης Ἀβ[β]κείδος εἰς τὸ ἄνω τόπους... καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ποταμοί τοὺς εὑρείματα καὶ τὰ χωρία|ματα πάντα| δοκοῦντα εἶναι δυσόλιτα |κατὰ| κράτος λαβόντος* (*And thereupon Manius Aquillius, a Roman strategos, broke camp for Mysian Abbaïtia, to those places further inland...and he had many great successes, and all of the fortress*
region was a part of the ‘mesogeia’ that formed Aristonicus’ core support and appears to have given Aquillius some trouble - the forested and mountainous nature of the region no doubt proved advantageous to the natives and a very difficult obstacle to Aquillius’ regimented troops. The inscription demonstrates that Aquillius levied local auxiliary troops to augment his own forces for combat against those “fortresses thought hard to conquer”, and though he had great success in conquering and gaining control over the region, he was forced to resort to disreputable (infama) measures. It is unclear exactly how long this northern campaign lasted, but the resort to ‘unnatural’ means to suppress it suggests that Aquillius might have been frustrated at its duration. The Bargylion decree, furthermore, refers to the “return of the soldiers” (l. 34) only near the end of the text, following the actions of Cn. Domitius and Q. Caepio (below), which again suggests a later date – 128 at least.

Aside from the northern hinterland, where we might expect to find Aristonicus’ supporters, Caria also seems to have been a locus of dissent. This is a more surprising location for Aristonicus’ supporters, because the cities of Caria had been ‘free cities’ dating thought to be hard to conquer he seized and ruled’). Briant and his colleagues, “une inscription inédite”, 257, have suggested that ξυρώπωνα might correspond to the urbes mentioned by Florus (1.35.7) as difficult to suppress (below, n. 106).


106 Florus 1.35.7: Aquilius Asiatici belli reliquias confecit, mixtis - nefas! - veneno fontibus ad deditioinem quarandam urbiun. Quae res ut maturam, ita infamem fecit victoriam, quippe cum contra fas deum moresque maiorum medicaminibus inpuris in id tempus sacrosancta Romana arma violasset (‘Aquillius brought about an end to what remained of the Asiatic war after having mixed poison – a monstrous thing! - into the springs of an number of cities in order to compel surrender. This act, although it proved expedient, thus rendered the victory disreputable, since he, contrary to the laws of the gods and the customs of our ancestors, by resorting to unclean drugs, had outraged Roman arms which up to now had been held sacrosanct.’).


108 On this point, see especially Briant et al., “Une inscription inédite de Carie”, 257-259.
back over thirty years (167), when they along with Lydian cities had been removed from Rhodian control. Nevertheless, the Bargylian inscription records that when Aquillius left for Mysia he left behind his lieutenant (ἀντιστράτηγος), Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, to manage the remaining troops and “whatever dangers might come”. There has been some question on the nature of Domitius’ command because of a frustratingly positioned break in the text that makes unclear whether he was ἀντιστράτηγος ἐν τῇ [χώρᾳ], or [Καρπίᾳ], or even [Λυδίᾳ], or [Ἰωνίᾳ]; a clear restoration here would identify where Domitius was serving and therefore where unrest was still strong. ‘The (nearby) territory’ (chora) is the generally accepted restoration and seems to be the best for the simple reason that it is hard to imagine why Domitius would be mentioned in a Bargylian decree if he were not in the region.110

Domitius himself eventually left the region, perhaps with a contingent of men, and gave command to the Roman legate Quintus Caepio, who was clearly beset with yet more unrest, since he was forced to issue another levy of the Bargylians for more troops.111

109 Polyb. 30.5.12; Livy 34.15.1; 35.25.6; App., Syr. 44; Mith. 62.


111 I.Jasos 612, II.21-27: [Κόντος Καπίων — δια[δεξάμενος τὴν ἐν[κεχειρία[μένην τῇ | ἐβαίνε | ἀρχήν, πλῆθος [κανὸν | στρατιώτων ἔζητε], τὴν δύναμιν] ταυτὸν ἀναληφόμενος [ἐνστάντος | τῇ πάλιν τῷ δολέμοι, συνε[βαίνεν ὑ[λ]εθεῖσαι τὴν πόλιν | ἡμῶν] βαρέως διὰ τὸ [ἐκ] τῆς Κόντου | Ἐπίταγης κατὰ τὸ συνέκει[σ] | Ρωμαίος ἡμᾶς συστρατευκέναι, ἐξαπηστάλθη δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου | καὶ ὑπογράφθη στρατιῶτας εἰς τὸν πόλεμον καὶ πλείους, ἐπ[ή] κολουθηκέναι [ὅτι ἀποριάν] | (‘Quintus Caepio succeeded to the command from Gnaeus, and sought a sufficiently large number of soldiers, which force he took into the field; and when war again broke out, it happened that our city was heavily burdened by our continuous campaigns with the Romans in accordance with the requisition from Q. Caepio, they were sent off by the people and (more) soldiers were registered for the war and other things, and a difficult time followed thereafter.’). Notice that the fragments of the text have been re-arranged since Holleaux’s 1919 publication (REA 21, pp. 1-19), and the line breaks have changed accordingly. On
Another Bargylian decree, perhaps in honour of the same man as the first Bargylian decree, records περιστάντοι κινδύνοι in the region that are also likely related to the revolt of Aristonicus.\(^{112}\) If we consider, furthermore, a Maonian decree outlining Caepio’s arrangement for the defence of a Lydian fortress to be contemporary with the Bargylian decree, then the size of the threat faced by Caepio was substantial.\(^{113}\) Here again, the duration of time is unclear, but it certainly must have gone beyond 129 and well into 128.

The instability extended even into central Caria; a recently published inscription from Çamlidere records how the city pleaded with Aquillius to rescind his requisitions because the *chora* was beset by unrest (περίστασιν τῆς χώρας).\(^{114}\) It appears that Aristonicus’ capture of Myndos on the southern Carian coast was not an aberration but part of a trend throughout Caria and even the rest of Asia. Perhaps Plutarch (*Flam.* 21.10) was correct when he wrote that Aristonicus “filled all of Asia with war and rebellion”\(^{115}\). The continuous rebellions in this region are even more significant when we consider that Aristonicus was not directly involved in them; he had been, we will recall, captured by

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\(^{113}\) *TAM* 5.1.528, II, 1-10: [--]ηγών καὶ Χοιρομε[---]τῶν καὶ Ταρσιανῶν τῶν πρότε[---]γον ὑπὸ Διοκλῆ[---]ν Στρατηγῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ στρατιῶται οἱ δια[---]γέντες εἰς τὸ χωρίον ἑπέρ | [Ἡρακλίτιονος Ἀλκαίου Σαρδῆ][σι][---] τοῦ κατασταθέντος | [ὑπὸ] Κοιντοῦ Σεργίου [Γαρθίου] | [ὑπὸ Καίπειονος πρεσβευτο[---]υ] | [Ῥωμαίων ἐπὶ τῶν ὑφιστῶν ὑπὸς] (“The hegemons of the [-]enoi and Choirom[---]t and Tarsiano[---], who were previously under the command of the *strategos* Diokles, and the (local) soldiers who were drawn up in the fortress (dedicate this) on behalf of Hephaiostion, son of Alcaios of Sardis, who was set in charge of the fortress by Quintus Servilius Caepio, son of Gnaeus, a Roman legate.”).

\(^{114}\) P. Briant, et al, “une inscription inédite”, 241-259 (see pp. 249-252 on the question of the identification of the modern Çamlidere with the ancient city of Piginda or Bargasa)

\(^{115}\) Plut, *Flam.* 21.10: τοῦτο μὲν Ἀριστονίκος ὁ τοῦ κιθαροῦ, διὰ τὴν ἑυμενοῖς δόξαν ἐμπλήρας ἀπάσαν ἀποστασέων καὶ πολέμων τὴν Ἀσίαν.
Perperna before Aquillius arrived in Asia. His actions, therefore, seem to have served as a catalyst for local unrest – even among the free cities of Caria – and Aquillius and his troops were forced to spend a significant amount of time pacifying the former kingdom.¹¹⁶

The extent and duration of Aristonicus’ uprising should not be underestimated; Rome faced Aristonicus first in 132 (with Nasica’s commission) and they were still suppressing malcontents five years later in 128. The spread of unrest to Caria, furthermore, reveals that the Aristonicus’ uprising had developed beyond what might have been considered a ‘civil war’ into a war that lasted longer than the various wars against Macedonia. The Senate was no doubt shocked by these events, and Romans clearly did not forget about the audacity of the region – as scornful speeches from Sulla and Mark Antony (50 and 100 years later) indicated.¹¹⁷

By the time the dust had settled in the former Attalid kingdom, the situation had changed from 133. Rome could not longer view the region as a novelty to be dealt with graciously, but as a land over which it had lost lives, money, and dignitas. As such, the original designs for the region, a ‘free’ territory loosely under the hegemony of the Roman Empire, was abandoned. The original benevolence (or perhaps indifference) of the Senate gave way to practicality, and a grant of freedom likewise was replaced by annexation. When this decision was made is unclear; it was certainly not in 133, but anytime thereafter is possible. Despite,

¹¹⁶ See the comments by Bursalis, “Colophon and the War against Aristonicus”, 197: “Aristonicus, while tactically withdrawing inland, set the whole of Asia on a sort of socio-revolutionary fire that cannot have failed to show its results at different places”. Compare the decrees from Bargylia, Çamlidere, and Halicarnassus, which do not mention Aristonicus directly, but refer only to “war (polemos)”, “disorders (peristasis) of the city and countryside”, and “those who destroyed the peace”, respectively.

¹¹⁷ Above, p. 60, n. 79.
though, the range of possible dates (132-128), a later one seems more likely. Rome had originally planned to allow the cities of the former kingdom to govern themselves, and it is unlikely that they would change this decision quickly. Even when the Senate learned of Aristonicus’ revolt in 132 and first sent troops in 131, it was likely under the impression that it was suppressing what was essentially a civil war. Crassus’ death in 130 no doubt served as a pivotal moment in the Roman conception of the war; the death of a consul was not taken lightly. Paterculus, writing under the reign of Tiberius, records that Aristonicus’ death was the penalty for having killed Crassus.\textsuperscript{118} If we are to define an exact moment when the decision to annex the province was made, then this seems to be a probable time. But if, as seems more likely, we are to consider the decision to annex the territory as a long deliberative process, then Crassus’ death is merely the beginning of that process, and the final decision came with the capture of Aristonicus and the dispatch of M’. Aquillius.

The question of why Rome chose to annex the territory seems almost to need no answer. Rome had fought a five-year war against many cities in the territory, and these cities could not return to their freedom. The Senate needed to make restitution for the deaths of Roman citizens, including two consuls, and the resources it had spent. The decision to annex was the product of Aristonicus’ resiliency, and the organization of the province was a post-war settlement. The Attalid kingdom, furthermore, had attractive features. Despite its size, it was well organized with a basic infrastructure of communication, administration, and justice; its culture was Hellenistic; its people were accustomed to paying taxes; and Rome already had a

\textsuperscript{118} Vel. Pat. 2.4.1: \textit{capite poenas dedit, cum initio belli Crassum Mucianum, virum iuris scientissimum, decedatorem ex Asia proconsulem intermisset} (‘Aristonicus paid with his life for having put to death at the very outset of the war the celebrated jurist Crassus Mucianus, proconsul of Asia, as he was leaving the province.’).
solid reputation in the region.\footnote{On the character of the Attalid kingdom, see especially: McShane, Foreign Policy; Hansen, Attalids$^2$; Allen, Attalid Kingdom.} All of these factors made Aquillius' organization of the former kingdom an easier task than might at first have been expected. Despite its general non-committal practice, after a long investigative review of the former kingdom and five years of fighting in country, Rome could hardly pass up the opportunity to extend its eastern borders with such promise. The settlement laid out by the proconsul and his legati modified, but did not radically change, the existing system. Attalid laws were protected and became provincial laws (i.e. SC Popillianum); Hellenistic roads were paved and widened to become Roman roads;\footnote{See, French, Roman Roads and Milestones of Asia Minor II.1-2 (BAR no. 392, 1988), II.2.428; S. Mitchell, “The Administration of Roman Asia from 133 BC to AD 250” in Lokale Autonomie und römische Ordnungsmacht in der kaiserzeitlichen Provinzen vom 1. bis 3. Jahrhundert, W. Eck, ed. (Munich 1999), 17-21, esp. Table 1.} royal taxes were redirected and became Roman vectigal.\footnote{Vel. Pat. 2.38.5; Lucilius, Bk. 26, frag. 671-2M/650-1W/656-7K; SEG 39 1180 (lex portoria Asiae) = EA 14 (1989), II. 22-28; contra: App., B.C. 5.4.} Although Rome had not wanted to annex it, the former Attalid kingdom rather easily became the Roman province of Asia.
CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to present a complete and comprehensive history of the first years of the Roman province of Asia, from the death of Attalus III to the end of the war against Aristonicus. In order to put the topic into context, we began with a review of Roman-Pergamene relations in the second-century BC. Undoubtedly, the evidence has demonstrated a strong relationship between the two states, as Rome frequently came to the aid of the Attalids and tended to side with them in disputes. The Senate appears to have relied on the kingdom to maintain the status quo in the region, preferring to deal with Asia Minor in the characteristic distance and reserve with which they dealt with the rest of the Greek East.

Given the generations of strong relations between the Pergamene kingdom and the Roman republic, it is not surprising that Attalus III chose to bequeath his kingdom to Rome. It is unexpected, certainly, that he chose to bequeath his kingdom to a foreign power, but a closer look at Hellenistic royal wills demonstrates that it was not a bizarre act. Attalus appears to have extrapolated on the Hellenistic tradition of royal guardianship in which a king entrusts to a friendly foreign king the responsibility for raising and caring for his child; Attalus, childless, saw his kingdom and people just as a father sees his children, and Rome was certainly the friendliest foreign power the Attalid kingdom had ever had. He was not, in any case, the first to make such a will, although his was the first to be carried out. Understanding the context of this will, furthermore, is part of rehabilitating the historical character of Attalus III, whose personality and actions
have been shaped by the vitriolic writings of ancient authors. These ancient accounts may bear some elements of truth, but they must be offset by the epigraphic evidence that reveals a king devoted to the cults of his family, the memories of his brother, mother and wife, and the safety of his people. This new perception of Attalus reveals that the king was *compos mentis* when he made his will, and his bequest to Rome should be given due consideration as the act of a sound mind.

Through his will, Attalus gave most of his kingdom to the people of Rome, an act which set about a series of events that was to mark the history of the region for the next several years. We focused in the second chapter on the immediate aftermath of the publication of the will in both Pergamon and Rome. In the former, Aristonicus emerged shortly after Attalus’ death claiming to be the late king’s half-brother and quickly set about gaining control over the former kingdom. His supporters were a heterogeneous lot comprised of groups wanting continuity with the old Attalid dynasty and others desiring a change from their oppressed lives. His mass appeal allowed him to quickly gain control over the hinterland, and by the end of 133 he had worked his way to the coast and begun to gain control of the coastal cities. At Rome, the Senate’s reaction to the will was just as we might have expected – unwillingness to commit to formal obligations. The new inscription from Metropolis refers to a *senatus consultum* that was passed in the summer of 133; this *SC de libertate Attalicae civitatum*, as we have called it, decreed the freedom of all the cities of the former kingdom. By the end of the year, the Senate sent out a commission of five legates to bring news of the decree to Asia and to investigate
and settle any outstanding claims – perhaps even to learn more about rumours of a claimant to the throne.

For nearly five years, the Romans dealt with the uprising precipitated by Aristonicus. Many of the details of our study need not be retread here, but there were three significant conclusions that should be noted. The first is that the legation sent out in 132 did more than just investigate; when confronted by Aristonicus’ successes and the immediacy of the problem, they raised and led an army of local soldiers in a battle around Thyateira. The second is that the Battle of Cyme – the turning point in the war against Aristonicus – occurred in 131, not 133; narrative difficulties have always suggested that this was the case, and a careful analysis of Strabo seems to corroborate this earlier assumption. Finally, it is important to recall that the war extended into southern Caria, an area that had been free of Attalid control for a generation before Attalus III’s death. The extension of the uprising here suggests that Aristonicus’ revolt became a beacon for social malcontents, which, although Caria itself was not immediately annexed, brought Rome to the realization that the instability of the region required that the former kingdom be formally annexed.

Rome had never wanted to annex or ‘provincialize’ its inheritance from King Attalus – its first reaction had been to free the whole territory and let it sort itself out. But what worked in the case of a novel inheritance could not be maintained in a post war settlement. When precisely the decision was made to annex the territory is uncertain – certainly it occurred after the publication of the *SC de libertate* in 133 and probably even after the Senate first committed troops against Aristonicus in early 131. The death of the
consul P. Licinius Crassus in 130 was likely the catalyst for discussions of annexation, and the final decision was surely made before Aquillius and (more significantly here) the ten legates were sent out in 129. By the time Aquillius had finally suppressed the last of the insurgents, the organization of the province was more like a post-war settlement.

We should note briefly that the basic outline of the province was established by Aquillius after he had completed pacifying the region ca. 128. The territory was immediately reduced in size, which had the dual benefit of rewarding Rome's allies and creating a lean, profitable province in one broad stroke. By practice and expediency, the Attalid system of road networks, taxation and organization were adopted and formed the basic structure of the commercial, financial and administrative systems. To Aquillius' skeletal structure were later added the sinews of the province by senatorial decrees and formal laws until it was radically re-organized under Augustus. The organization was simple and efficient, building upon most of the existing infrastructure of the former kingdom and demonstrating no grand strategy one would expect if annexation had been a forethought.

Much of the focus of this study has been on fine, but important details of evidence and chronology. But the application of this subject to other thematic approaches in Roman history broadens its significance. Roman reluctance to annex the Attalid kingdom and the Senate's act of freeing the cities are part of the larger topics of Roman imperialism, Roman views of Greek culture and relations with the Greek East. Discussions on Aristonicus' revolt plays some part in the broader theme of slave revolts in the ancient world – even if it is by removing evidence. Even our new analyses of
epigraphic and literary material have opened up new possibilities for research: our re-
interpretation of the *SC Licinianum* should fuel discussion over when precisely Phrygia
was re-annexed by Rome; likewise, our discussion of Strabo might serve as an interesting
approach to the history and historiography of Strabo’s *Geography*.

This study has, hopefully, laid the groundwork for further work on the history of
the province. Our understanding of the settlement of the province and its history down to
the Mithridatic Wars is imperfect, despite the volume of epigraphic texts and literary
references. Before 100 BC, the province was not an assignment that brought with it much
military glory or other such benefits that made proconsular work desirable. The annual
actions of magistrates in the province must have been rather mundane – yet the action of
these magistrates contributed to the development of the province from the basic
settlement that Aquillius established. This first generation or so of the province provides,
perhaps, the closest example of ‘ordinary’ in Roman administration; it is a microcosm of
Roman thought and action on a variety of issues. Although Rome at first hesitated to
annex the territory, this unexpected province can provide a wealth of information on a
wide variety of topics in Republican history.
APPENDIX
The Date and Context of the SC Licinianum

An inscription unearthed from the ancient Phrygian city of Synnada (modern Arizli) records a *senatus consultum* confirming the legal validity of the final acts of a deceased king and other actions taken by Roman *presbeutai* in Phrygia. The inscription was originally discovered by W.M. Ramsay in the late nineteenth-century, but was subsequently lost and not recovered until T. Drew-Bear surveyed the Phrygian territory in the mid 1970s. Below is a copy of the inscription as it is re-published by Drew-Bear in his *Nouvelles Inscriptions de Phrygie*, the underlined letters represent those originally seen by Ramsay but now lost. For the sake of clarity, this will be referred to as ‘Inscription 1’.

![Inscription 1](image)

acturally the last lines of another *senatus consultum*, the famous *SC Popillianum de Pergamenis*, which deals with the arrangement of Pergamon shortly after it was bequeathed to Rome by Attalus III in 133.\(^2\) Along with his re-discovery of Ramsay’s stone, Drew-Bear has also unearthed a *second* copy of our inscription in Synnada, fractured on all four sides, but undoubtedly bearing the same inscription – complete with a copy of the *SC Popillianum* at the beginning. Here is a copy of that text in its expanded form based on the first stone, this will be referred to as ‘Inscription 2’:

\[\begin{align*}
1 & \quad [\text{το πρὸ μιᾶς ἡμίφρας π[ρ]ὶν ἦ Ἀτταλόν τελευτήσαι, δόρως ταῦτα κύρια μένῃ}] \\
2 & \quad [\text{στρατηγὸς τε ὁ εἰς Ἀσίαν πορεύομαι εἰς τὴν διασύνθησιν (?) ἄλλα ἑως}] \\
3 & \quad [\text{ἀπαντᾷ] κύρια[α] μένειν καθὼς ἡ σύν[κλήτος ἐπέκρινεν}] \\
4 & \quad [\text{τὰ Ἀπτάλου φυλάσσονται. Πε[ρὶ δὲν Γάιος Λικίννος Ποπλίου ὑίὸς Γέτας}] \\
5 & \quad [\text{στρατηγὸς] λόγους ἐποίησεν, περὶ [τούτου τοῦ πράγματος ὀὕτως ἔδοξεν· ἦσα Μίθρα}] \\
6 & \quad [\text{δότης περὶ τῆς Ἀσίας} \, \, \gamma[γ]γαραφεὶν ἦ ἐδω[κόν τισιν ἢ ἀφείκειν, ἵνα ταῦτα κύρια μένῃ ὀὕτω}] \\
7 & \quad [\text{καθὼς ἔδω]ρῆσατο εἰς ἐσχάτην ἡμέ[ραν, περὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἕνα κρίνωσιν ὅ[δεκα(?)])} \\
8 & \quad [\text{προσβεβ[ε][ν]ταί εἰς Ἀσίαν διαβάντες [----------------------]} \\
9 & \quad [\text{εὐτυχ[ε]ῖτε}]
\end{align*}\]

This second inscription appears to have been copied from an official correspondence ([εὐτυχ[ε]ῖτε, l. 9) and as such bears some textual differences to the first – lines 6 and 9 in particular – but these differences are minor and we should assume that

the text is the same.³ The major difference is the beginning of line 4 (τα Ἀττάλου φυλάσσεται), which does not correspond to either of the two texts of the SC Popillianum. The verb in the subjunctive suggests a clause beginning with ἢνα or ὅπως, and Drew-Bear has plausibly suggested that what we have is a purpose clause at the end of the correspondence indicating that whatever the Senate decreed was “so that the effects of Attalus might be protected”.⁴

Our focus, however, is on the second of the two senatorial decrees in these inscriptions – the so-called SC Licinianum. This senatus consultum has traditionally been dated to 116, during the consulship of Gaius Licinius Geta, whose name is restored as the relator of the motion in line 6 of Inscription 1.⁵ Drew-Bear, however, and other like-minded scholars, have argued against this traditional date and have proposed 119 instead; they believe that the decree was passed while Licinius was praetor, not consul.⁶ The purpose of this discussion is to suggest that neither of these dates is satisfactory based on historical context and textual evidence provided by the new second copy, and that a new, earlier date is more likely.

For the sake of clarity, let us review briefly the history surrounding the document in question. In 133, Attalus III died and left the vast kingdom of Pergamon to the Roman

³ See Drew-Bear, NIP, p. 8, n. 24 for examples.

⁴ Drew-Bear, NIP, 7.

⁵ E.g. Viereck, Sermo Graecus (Göttingen 1888), no. 29, p. 51; G. Lafaye, IGRP 4.752; Magie, RRAM I:169; see Drew-Bear, “Three Senatus Consulta”, 83-84, n.29.

⁶ E.g. Drew-Bear, NIP, p. 5; Gruen, HWCR II:604; McGing Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI EupatorKing of Pontus (Leiden 1986), 41-42; Kallet-Marx, Hegemony, 242; J. Ramsay, “Mithridates, the Banner of Ch’i”il-Yu, and the Comet Coin” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 99 (1999), 236-243, suggests an even earlier date of 123 based on a revised date of death for Mithridates V.
people in his will; unfortunately for Rome, Attalus’ half-brother, Aristonicus disagreed with his bequest and raised a substantial revolt that required five years and the lives of two Roman consuls to suppress. By 129, though, the uprising was quashed and Manius Aquillius along with 10 Roman legates were assigned to organize the former Attalid kingdom into the Roman province of Asia. This process lasted three years and was completed by 126. As part of the organization, Aquillius ceded portions of the former Pergamene territory to the Anatolian kings who had aided Rome against Aristonicus – one of those kings was Mithridates V, King of Pontus, who received the territory of ‘Greater Phrygia’. So in 126 Greater Phrygia became Pontic territory. Unfortunately for the Pontic kingdom, Mithridates V died shortly thereafter, most likely in 120, and Rome seized the opportunity to re-annex Phrygia into its provincia Asia. It is precisely this re-annexation that the SC Licinianum is traditionally held to concern. What we have, scholars argue, is the senatorial decree issued to the cities of Phrygia to the effect that all of the laws made by Mithridates V would remain valid, and anything outside the scope of his legislation would be decided by the deka presbeutai who had been sent to organize the region. The standard interpretation is that the decree was passed in 116, during the consulship of C. Licinius Geta, probably at the insistence of the publicani and Roman business class, who were anxious to exploit a new economic market and farm local taxes.

7 Justin 37.1.2; App., Mith. 57. On the geography of ‘Greater Phrygia’, see: Strabo, 2.5.31; 12.4.9, 5.2, 5.4, 8.1-2, 8.13; Magie, RRAM II.758, n. 56.
There is, however, a troubling problem with the date of 116—namely, if Mithridates V died in 120, why did Rome wait four years before annexing the territory? Why did it not take back Phrygia shortly after his death, while his son was only 9 or 10 years old? It makes little sense that the Senate would have waited the four years after the elder Mithridates’ death to reclaim the territory; four years during which his young son, Mithridates VI, only got older and his power only got stronger.

To alleviate this problem Drew-Bear, followed in turn by Gruen, Kallet-Marx and now J.R. Ramsay, have proposed that C. Licinius Geta was not consul when he presided over the senate, but rather praetor. In rare cases, when both consuls were out of the city or incapacitated, a praetor might preside over the Senate and in that capacity present motions for ratification. If this were the case, by virtue of the *lex Villia annalis* (180 BC), which required two full years between a man’s praetorship and his consulship, Geta could have held the praetorship as early as 119, just one year after the death of Mithridates V. This earlier date obviously removes the inexplicable four year gap created by a 116 date, but comes with its own set of problems.

The most common objection to Drew-Bear’s earlier date is the absence of any motive impelling the Senate to act. In 119, the Senate had no good strategic or political reason to renege on its gift to the Pontic kingdom – the affairs of the region had been settled by Aquillius and ratified by the Senate just seven years earlier (126) and there

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8 Ramsay, “Mithridates”, 237.

9 Hence Broughton, *MRR* I:526. It should be noted that the *SC Popilliamum* is no longer a comparandum for the practice of a praetor presiding over the Senate in place of a consul; the decree has now clearly been dated to the consulship of C. Popillius (133). See Wörle, “Pergamon um 133”, 567-568.
were no designs to extend Roman territory any farther east. Certainly, the suggestion of sheer opportunism rings rather hollow since the Senate was not prone to the annexation of territory on a whim (if at all) or any sort of impulsive action regarding foreign policy. In point of fact, any motivation to annex Phrygia in 119 must have come from the publicani and the business class, for the same reason they might have urged it in 116 — financial benefit.\footnote{Drew-Bear, “Three Senatus Consulta”, 81, although he notes the absence of any evidence to this point.} But unlike in 116, this cannot apply for 119. As one scholar has written, “in 119, so soon after the death of Gaius Gracchus and the purge of his supporters, it is hard to imagine the publicani wielding such great influence over foreign policy”.\footnote{Ramsay, “Mithridates”, 238.} In 119, the Optimates firmly controlled the Senate and they would not have been swayed into any action, much less a radical act of foreign policy, by the appeals of the business class. The claim of ‘annexation-by-opportunity’ is hollow and so the problem of motive remains.

An equally troubling uncertainty lies in the basic assumption that Licinius could have been praetor when he presided over the Senate. As mentioned above, by Roman practice a praetor could preside over the Senate when neither consul was present in the city or when they were both incapacitated. In strict historical terms, this poses a problem because of the two consuls for 119, L. Caecilius Metellus and L. Aurelius Cotta, only Metellus is certainly known to have been absent from Rome that year campaigning
against Illyrian tribes. In their defence, proponents of the 119 date point to a passage from Appian (*Illyr*. 10), which mentions that the Segestani were subdued by Cotta and Metellus, but it is not clear whether this was done separately or together, and Broughton is rightly sceptical of their co-operation. Thus, it is unclear whether Geta would have presided over the Senate. Concerns over motive and historical minutiae, while troubling, are not necessarily enough to condemn Drew-Bear’s hypothesis and indeed a substantive difficulty remains.

The more fundamental problem lies in the text itself - namely, if Licinius was praetor when the motion was presented, then how do we complete line 6 of Inscription 1, which requires two names? The δόγμα συνικλήτου at the end of line 5 does not correspond to the text of the preceding fragmentary decree (*sc. SC Popillianum*) – the lacuna that precedes it must be completed by the phrase ἀπαντὰ καθῶς ἢ σύνικλήτος ἐπέκρινεν (or sim.) according to the standard text of the *SC Popillianum* (*RDGE* 11, ll.18-19). The δόγμα συνικλήτου, then, must stand as a place marker to indicate the beginning of a new *senatus consultum* (*sc. SC Licinianum*) – this is a typical formula found throughout the *senatus consulta* collected by Sherk used to identify the beginning of senatorial decrees.

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12 App., *Illyr*. 10; Livy, *Per*. 62; Eutrop. 4.23.2

13 *MRR* I: 525.


15 Drew-Bear, *NIP*, p. 7. See, for example, *RDGE* 11, line 2; *RDGE* 15, line 20; *RDGE* 23, line 59.
The second copy of the inscription helps to confirm the restoration of two names. We have already noted that the τα Ἀττάλου φυλάσσεται that begins line 4 is not a part of the preceding SC Popillianum, but was added in by the author of the correspondence from which the text of the SC is drawn. The phrase probably acted as an explanatory comment to the recipient of the letter and we might imagine the lacuna completed by something like [διώκησε τα φιλανθρώπια] τα Ἀττάλου φυλάσσεται (‘The Senate decided this so that the benefactions of Attalus might be protected’). To sum up: in Inscription 1, the SC Popillianum covers lines 1-5 and ends somewhere in the lacuna preceding δόγμα συνεκλίτου, which serves to mark the beginning of the SC Licinianum covering lines 6-10; in Inscription 2, the τα Ἀττάλου φυλάσσεται in line 4 marks then end of the SC Popillianum (lines 1-4) and the πι, epsilon preceding the lacuna of the same line marks the beginning of the SC Licinianum (lines 4-9).

Since we know that the Πε[- - -] in line 4 of Inscription 2 is the beginning of the SC Licinianum, and we know that the SC Licinianum in Inscription 1 begins at line 6, then line 6 of Inscription 1 must begin with πι, epsilon. As Drew-Bear has indicated in his reconstruction of the text, these letters are undoubtedly the first part of the formulaic περὶ ὁν...λόγους ἐποίησατο ("concerning these matters X made a speech"), which is completed by the ἸΤΟ of line 7. The only thing that can come between the περὶ ὁν and

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16 Drew-Bear, NIP, p. 7.

the λόγους ἐποιήσατο is the name of the relator(s) of the motion. The lacuna in line 6 of Inscription 1, therefore, demands a second name. The second copy of our inscription, it is true, can carry the name of only one relator in the lacuna of lines 4 & 5, but we might recall that this second copy is transcribed from an official correspondence which is very likely to carry an abridged version of the SC — it should be recalled that it bears neither the date, nor the meeting location, nor the enumeration of witnesses that would have appeared on the official decree. In this case, the author of the correspondence (or the lapiscide) has elected to include the name of only one consul for the sake of brevity, a not uncommon choice because it serves its eponymous function and saves space. Yet, regardless of the number of names on the second copy, the fact remains that the text of Inscription 1 must carry the name of two relatores, a textual detail that closes the door to the possibility that the SC Licinianum was motioned by any praetor — there must be two names and therefore Licinianus must be a consul and be named along with a colleague in the text.

We are forced then to return to the original thesis that this decree was published in 116, during the consulship of Licinius. Yet, there still remains the troublesome four year gap between the death of Mithridates V and the consulship of C. Licinius Geta. So where are we to go from here? Fortunately, the text of Inscription 2 provides us a third possible

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19 For the standard formulation of a senatus consultum, see Sherk, *RDGE*, pp. 7-10. Ramsay, "Mithridates", 237, misses this point when he notes that Inscription 2 proves that a second name need not be supplied in Inscription 1.

20 *RDGE* 25.
date – one that satisfies the textual and historical idiosyncrasies of the document just as well, if not better, than 116 or 119.

We begin with an inconsistency between Inscriptions 1 and 2, noted by Drew-Bear and others, but never adequately explained. Inscription 2 clearly shows that the sigma at the beginning of line 8 of Inscription 1 belongs not to the name of “Mithridates”, but to the territory ruled by the king and now under consideration: τῆς Ἀσίας. Kallet-Marx has termed this an “embarrassing result” of Drew-Bear’s discovery of the second copy and indeed it seems he is right. He notes:

περὶ τῆς Ἀσίας is a strange way of referring to that portion of the former Attalid domain that had been given to Mithridates V at the conclusion of the war with Aristonicus (this portion would not have been Asia at all in the sense of Asia provincia)...

In other words, ‘Asia’ cannot possibly be a synonym for ‘Phrygia’; ‘Asia’ was the name of the Roman province and not the name of the territory over which Mithridates had control. In fact, to complete Kallet-Marx’s quote, “the restoration of Mithridates’ name is entirely conjectural.” There must, though, be a name as the subject of the verbs (ἐγραψεν, ἔδωκεν and ἀφεῖ[κεν]) in lines 8 and 9. The subject of the verbs, furthermore, must be of great importance since his dicta appear to have impacted many, and the Roman Senate has decreed that they not be disturbed – he must be a king. But if not King Mithridates of Pontus, then who?

It is interesting that both copies the SC Licinianum are preceded by the SC Popilianum, which concerns orders given to Roman magistrates regarding the former

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21 Kallet-Marx, Hegemony, 241. The phrase was noted by Drew-Bear (NIP, p. 6), but he chose only to remove the word βασιλεύς from line 6 in order to keep the line count consistent.
kingdom of Attalus III. The fact that these two documents follow one another, and that (in the case of Inscription 2) they were contained in the same imperial correspondence with Synnada suggests that these two senatorial decrees are somehow related. Also significant is the remarkable similarity of language used in both decrees. Both refer to deceased kings, things those kings had given (ἔδωκεν) or exempted (ἀφεῖκεν), the validity of laws (μείνη κυρία), their validity up to the day of the king’s death and the subsequent actions of presbeutai. Many have noted these textual similarities but have failed to suggest the most obvious conclusion. These two decrees both concern the same subject: the settlement of the region following the death of Attalus III. Attalus III had been king over the Phrygian territory and it was his kingdom that became the Roman province of Asia after his death. This suggestion removes any complication with the τῆς Ἀσίας in line 8 of Inscription 1. The lacuna is completed by the name of the king, Attalus, and περὶ to give us a perfectly reasonable sentence: [ὅσα Ἀττάλος περὶ τῆς Ἀσίας ἔγγραφεν ἦ ἔδωκεν τισιν ἦ ἀφεῖκεν] (‘Whatever Attalus wrote or granted or conceded concerning Asia...’). The suggestion that the SC Licinianum concerned the acts of Attalus and not the acts of Mithridates is not such a large leap. The Attalids had ruled Phrygia far longer than the Mithridateis so that if anyone’s acts were to have been validated it would have been those of the Attalids.

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22 K-M, Hegemony, “both copies of [the SC Licinianum] are preceded by a copy of the senatus consultum Popillianum regarding Attalus’ acts; it is attractive therefore to suppose that the senatus consultum Licinianum also concerned the Attalid Kingdom”

23 Sherk, RDGE, p. 76: “The phraseology reminds one of the clauses in the SC Popillianum de Pergamenis.”
The more difficult part lies in establishing a proper date and context for the decree. It is possible that we can return to the 116 date suggested above, but it remains problematic. The Senate might have decided, following its re-acquisition of Phrygia, to return to Attalid laws, but this seems unlikely. Aquillius had given the territory to Mithridates V probably in 128, which means that by 116 the territory had been under Pontic rule for thirteen years. It seems odd that the Roman Senate would restore Attalid laws to Phrygia after thirteen years of Pontic rule without so much as a mention of the Mithridatic rule. Surely if this was a decree to restore Attalid laws to Phrygia, then the Senate would have to void anything that Mithridates had done in the intervening period – which would have been a part of its decree. It is also problematic to assume that the *SC Licinianum* concerned the re-application of Attalid laws following the re-annexation of Phrygia because without the evidence of this decree we have no indication exactly when the Senate re-acquired the territory.24 The next best piece of evidence is Justin’s epitome of Trogus Pompeius (38.5.3), which records in a speech for Mithridates VI that the territory was taken away from the Pontic king *sibi pupillo*. But as Kallet-Marx has pointed out, the term *pupillus* in this context can just as likely refer to “child” as it can to “ward”, and the term was used in the later Republic as a synonym for ‘client king’; this latter meaning dates the re-annexation to anytime before 89.25 In any case, it seems unlikely owing the similarity in language and purpose that the *SC Popillianum* and the *SC*  


Licinianum were published any great distance apart. If they had been, we would surely see more variation in vocabulary and syntax.

The answer to the problem lies with the identification of the consul Licinius. All scholars have assumed that the first letter in line 6 of Inscription I is an alpha, and as such have never questioned the identification of the consul as Gaius Licinius Geta. A closer look at that first letter, though, reveals another possibility. Rather than an alpha, it is quite possible that the first letter is in fact a lambda — a misreading that is all too common in Greek epigraphy.26 At first glance, the partially mutilated letter might appear to be an alpha: it is clear that we are dealing with a letter with two feet and perhaps a horizontal hasta between them. If, however, we compare this ‘alpha’ in line 6 with the alpha in line 8, the two in line 9, and the four in line 10, it is clear that the one in line 6 is different: the horizontal hasta is not straight but arcs a-linearly up and to the right. It seems from the squeeze that the nature of the break of the stone is creating a cut that was not originally present. This reading is encouraged by the fact that the left vertical line of the letter appears not to continue after the horizontal hasta, suggesting a layer of stone has chipped off. We should note also that the feet of the letter preceding the disputed lambda/alpha appear remarkably similar to those of the pi in line 7, all three of which measure 5 mm between feet. Compare this with the gamma at the beginning of line 8: its hasta alone measures 7 mm and the distance from its foot to the following letter is 10 mm.

26 Note here the confusion over the praenomen of the relator in line 3 of the SC Popillianum (RDGE 11), above p. 57, n. 71.
Instead of reading \([\Gamma]\)AIOS ([G]AIOS) in line 6 of Inscription 1 we ought to instead read \([\Pi\Pi]\)AIOS ([POPI]AIOS), making our *relator* Publius Licinius, son of Publius. Since we have already determined above that our *relator* must be consul, a quick review of the consular fasti reveals only two possible identifications: P. Licinius P.f. Crassus Dives (consul of 205) and his grandson P. Licinius P.f. Crassus Dives Mucianus (cos. 131). Since our inscription must be dated after the *SC Popillianum* of 133, the elder Crassus Dives is not a valid option; this leaves only Publius Licinius P.f. Crassus Dives Mucianus (cos 131) – who is a very strong candidate for our Licinius. Publius Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus was consul of 131, and the first Roman consul to lead an army against Aristonicus after the death of Attalus III two years earlier. He thus fits all the internal criteria of our inscription: he is a Licinius whose consulship follows the *SC Popillianum* and the recent death of a king (Attalus III), and during his tenure Rome was certainly concerned with both “Asia” and Phrygia.

After identifying ‘Attalus’ instead of ‘Mithridates’, and ‘P. Licinius’ in place of ‘C. Licinius’, there remains a final identification to complete the picture. The *presbeutai* in line 9 of Inscription 1 (and restored in line 8 of Inscription 2) have naturally been assumed the 10 legates who traditionally helped to organize a territory.\(^{27}\) Most recently, they had been used by Aquillius to settle Asia after the war with Aristonicus. Indeed, we might identify these men with Aquillius’ legates were it not for the fact that they arrived in Asia *after* Crassus’ tenure as consul. The identification of Licinius as the consul of 131 leaves us another option. In the winter of 133, or even the spring of 132, a

\(^{27}\) Strabo, 14.1.38.
commission of five legati (presbeutai) led by P. Scipio Nasica were sent by the Senate to investigate the bequest given by Attalus.\textsuperscript{28} Unbeknownst to the Senate or the commission, Aristonicus had risen in revolt and achieved remarkable success in reclaiming the hinterland and the coast of the former kingdom. As a new inscription from Metropolis shows, this five-man legation was forced into the position of raising a local army to combat Aristonicus until the Senate could deploy a legion in Crassus' consulship.\textsuperscript{29} It seems very likely that these men are the presbeutai referred to in the \textit{SC Licinianum}. Rather than the deka traditionally restored in the lacuna we instead restore \textit{pente}.

So why, then, was the \textit{SC Licinianum} passed? And why was it virtually the same as the \textit{SC Popillianum} passed just eighteen months earlier? The answer appears to be that the \textit{SC Licinianum} was an addendum to the \textit{SC Popillianum}, published in the spring of 131 before Crassus set out for Asia Minor with his Roman army. This would explain not only the presence of both decrees on two different stones, but also the remarkable similarity in phraseology. The addendum was necessary because the five legates who had been sent out in 133 were forced to grant various benefactions to Asian cities – in this case Synnada – when they were unexpectedly assaulted by Aristonicus in 132 and required to levy an army of local troops. So the addendum states that everything that Attalus did before his death was to remain valid, but so too was whatever else granted by the \textit{pente presbeutai}. It is clear from the position of the presbeutai after the king, that

\textsuperscript{28} Above, pp. 70-72.

\textsuperscript{29} Above, pp. 76-79.
whatever they did was meant to supplement the acts of Attalus III, and this scenario fits quite nicely.

In reviewing the *SC Licinianum*, we have made some surprising discoveries, but the conclusions are not at all radical. The traditional theories on the date and context of this decree suffer from troubling historical and textual difficulties. In light of these, we reviewed the text in search of a new solution that posed fewer difficulties. Whereas previous authors had assumed that Mithridates was the regal subject of the verbs in lines 8-9 of Inscription 1, we instead suggested king Attalus III of Pergamon. This identification fits better with the phrase τῆς Ἀσίας from Inscription 2 and is consistent with the purpose and language of the preceding *SC Popillianum*. It seems unlikely, though, that there would have been any decree passed concerning Attalus’ final acts in the consulship of C. Licinius Geta, and, as such, we suggested that the identification of Licinius is incorrect. Rather than Gaius, a careful look at the squeeze of the text suggests the consular *praenomen* might be Publius, the result of misreading an *alpha* for a *lambda*. While we cannot be certain of this disputed letter, it bears a closer resemblance to other *lambda*’s just as the letter preceding it bears more similarity to other *pi*’s. The identification of P. Crassus Mucianus (cos. 131), moreover, fits very nicely with the era of the Attalid bequest since he served as consul just two years after the king’s death and as the first Roman general in the war against Aristonicus. The identification of the *presbeutai* as the five-man commission led by P. Scipio Nasica likewise fits this era. They had left for Asia just a year before Crassus’ consulship and it was their *acta* in Asia that were being ratified by the consul just before he left. There are no doubt problems
with what has been suggested here, but none that appear more overwhelming than the
suggestions made by others and certainly the evidence fits just as nicely, if not better, into
131 than 116 or 119.
MAP: Asia Minor

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