PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION FOR ONTARIO BY STANLEY N. SCHATZ.
INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION OF P.R. P. R. AND GROUP GOVERNMENT.

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PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION FOR ONTARIO
Proportional Representation for Ontario is the most important issue in Provincial Politics today. A Government-sponsored Bill establishing a new system of voting had been anticipated early in the present session of the Legislature, but such legislation only now appears, to be hastily disposed of in the usual rush of the session's closing days. In view of such important pending legislation the time is admittedly opportune for setting forth certain facts and considerations involved in such proposals, and this article is accordingly presented.

Its aim is to summarize the subject of Proportional Representation, both for the general body of electors, vitally interested as they are in any change in their constitutional system, and also for those more actively engaged in political affairs and reforming leadership.

Before proceeding to an outline of the history of the rise of this system of voting we insert here a short definition of Proportional Representation, (hereinafter more conveniently referred to as "P.R.")), reserving a more exhaustive discussion of the objects and claims of its advocates for a later chapter. The most clear and concise definition is one taken from a pamphlet published by the P.R. Society of Canada in December, 1920, and reads as follows:

"P.R. - the representation in proportion to their voting strength of all political parties in our legislatures, and of all particular groups of citizens in our municipal councils and other elected bodies."

As the primary object of this article is in regard to the application of the system to the Province of Ontario in the election of members of the Provincial Legislature, reference to its use in municipal elections is confined to Chapter on "Examples and use of P.R."
There are said to be some three hundred systems of P.R. in existence and the ingenuity of inventors shows no sign of exhaustion. The unkindest thing that a proportionalist can do is to invent a new system and unfortunately the joys of paternity often outweigh the call of an ascetic devotion. The only system seriously proposed for Ontario, and in fact the best of the three hundred existing ones, is that having the Single Transferable Vote. Details of this method are taken from the appendix to "Electoral Reform" by Oscar M. Wihl, B.A., LL.B.

"As the method of election advocated in the foregoing pages is that of P.R. with the Single Transferable Vote, the following simple explanation has been added for the benefit of those who are unacquainted with the system. For any who desire to pursue the study of the subject in detail, "Proportional Representation" by John H. Humphreys will provide a clear, interesting and complete exposition. The various systems of carrying out the method of proportional representation are fully dealt with in that work. Here we concern ourselves solely with the method of the single transferable vote, as this is the most suitable for British political conditions.

1. Multi-member constituencies.

The first requisite is the redistribution of the electorates into constituencies returning 3, 5, 7, or 9 members. The only limit to the number of members is the practicability of conducting the election. Theoretically the larger the number of members the more mathematically exact the representations will be. The constituencies will be arranged according to the best local divisions. While they will differ in size, some returning 3, others 5, others 7 members, and so forth - the value of the vote is standardized by allotting a member in each constituency to the same population figure. The question of the actual number of representatives has to be answered by consideration of matters quite outside the system of proportional representation.
2. The quota.
The minimum number of votes necessary to elect a representative is called the quota, and is determined as follows: — Suppose we have a constituency at an election in which 48 persons vote and all their ballot papers are in order. (48 is chosen for simplicity's sake; it may be any number whatever.)

(a) Suppose, further, that only one member has to be elected. Then a candidate who gets half of the votes, plus one, must be elected, for

$$\frac{48}{2} + 1 \text{ gives } 25 \text{ (the quota)}$$

and this leaves only 23 to the other candidate or candidates.

(b) Suppose, secondly, that two members are to be elected. Then the candidates who get one third of the valid votes, plus one, must be elected, for

$$\frac{48}{3} + 1 \text{ gives } 17 \text{ (the quota)}$$

and if two candidates each get 17, (or a total of 34) only 14 votes are left to opponents.

(c) For the third case, suppose that three members are to be elected. In this case the candidates who get one fourth of the votes, plus 1, must be elected, for

$$\frac{48}{4} + 1 \text{ gives } 13 \text{ (the quota)}$$

and 3 candidates, each with 13 votes, absorb 39 votes and leave only 9 for their rivals.

So we have the general rule for determining the quota, viz: Divide the number of valid votes cast by the number of members to be elected plus one, and add one to the result.

3. The ballot paper.
On the ballot paper the names of the candidates appear in alphabetical order. A column of blank spaces on the left hand side is provided for the elector to mark. At the foot are printed the instructions. These
3. The ballot paper — cont'd.

point out that the elector has one vote and one vote only. He exercises this vote by placing the figure 1 in the space opposite the name of the candidate he prefers above all the others. He may then place a 2 opposite the name of the candidate he prefers second best — a 3 opposite to his next choice and so on. But it must be remembered that although he marks these preferences he has only one vote. This will become clear if we consider a marked ballot sheet and its effect. Suppose an election in S.E. Blankshire with three members and seven candidates. The effective part of the ballot paper will be as follows; the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, indicating a voter's preferences.

```
4 Atkinson, Walter.
3 Carron, Robert.
2 Fulton, Hugh.
1 McKie, Stewart.
3 Roberts, John.
1 Unwin, Mark.
1 White, George.
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A ballot paper marked as above is an instruction to the returning officer. Mr. John Bull, the particular voter who has marked this ballot paper, says by so doing, "I instruct you, Mr. Returning Officer, to give my vote to McKie; if he does not require it for his quota, then give it to Carron; if he gets his quota without my vote, then give it to Roberts; and if he doesn't need it, then let it go to Atkinson". The ballot paper is then exhausted — preferences subsequent to that candidate are not considered. How all this is effected we shall see in the next paragraph.

4. The first count.

Every valid ballot paper counts one for the candidate marked 1 upon it. The total of the ballot papers gives the total of the votes cast and upon this the quota is calculated as above described. Every candidate who on this count receives a quota is declared elected.
5. Transfer of Votes.

Upon the first count it will be found that some of the candidates have received more votes than the quota. They only require the quota for election and the process now occurs of transferring the votes in excess of the quota - the surplus - in accordance with the voter's instructions. This process is carried out in strict accordance with mathematical proportion. An example will make it clear. In the S.E. Blankshire election, of which we have a ballot paper above, the quota was found to be 700. On the first count Carron has been marked 1st on 1000 ballots. Therefore, he is elected -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st votes for Carron</th>
<th>1000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is to be done with this surplus? All Carron's 1000 ballots are analyzed and we find the following result:

- Atkinson marked 2nd on 200 papers
- McKie " " " 300 "
- Roberts " " " 400 "
- No 2nd preferences marked on 100 "
- 1000 "

Thus there are 900 preferences indicated but we have only 300 surplus votes to distribute. The proportion is therefore given as follows. If 300 are given from 900, how many are given from 200, from 400, from 300, respectively? The result is as follows, fractions of votes being neglected:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Votes transferred to Atkinson</th>
<th>Votes retained by Carron</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atkinson</td>
<td>66 plus 134</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberts</td>
<td>133 plus 287</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKie</td>
<td>100 plus 200</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papers with no 2nd preferences</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>701</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The extra vote over the quota is made up of fractions neglected in apportioning the preferences to Atkinson and Roberts. Also note that the figures in the "transferred to" column give the proportion to the figures in the "retained by" column of 300 to 900, or of the "surplus" to the "total number of second preferences". If the sur-
5. Transfer of Votes - Cont'd.

Surplus is greater than or equal to the number of second preferences, no proportion sums are necessary as obviously all the second preferences can be transferred.

6. Elimination of candidates.

When all the surpluses have been distributed, it may be that the requisite number of candidates have not received the quota. In this case the candidates at the bottom of the list, i.e., the candidate who has received the smallest number of first preferences or who has been marked last on the smallest number of ballots, is eliminated. His papers are analyzed, sorted according to the second preferences shown, and these preferences are added to the votes already given to the respective candidates. These processes are continued until the requisite number of members is declared elected.

A prevalent confusion of thought exists in supposing that "Proportional representation and the familiar term "Representation by Population" are synonymous. In case the above working explanation of P.R. has not dispelled any such delusion of the reader, we add a distinguishing definition of "Rep. by Pop." It is the right to elect one member to the Legislature or Parliament, by a certain number of people, this number being determined by division of the total population to be represented by the number of representatives to be elected, whereas P.R. is the proportional representation in that legislature of various shades of opinion throughout the constituencies.

HISTORY OF P.R.

"In the third and fourth decades of the present century, a remarkable wave of democracy culminated in our Western civilization. In the United States, property and educational qualifications were very generally removed from the suffrage. In France, and more especially in Switzerland, the franchise was made nearly universal. In England and Germany, while the suffrage was not extended to the wage-receiving classes, yet the spirit of the times liberalized the constitutions through the Reform Bills of 1832 and 1854 in England, and the representative parliaments of 1848 in Germany."

"Proportional Representation" - John R. Commons.
The modern political parties date from those decades. Popular suffrage introduced a radical change in the nature of the representative system. Politicians began to bid for the labor vote. A few pioneering minds saw the inevitable outcome, and set about a philosophical study of the foundations of representation. It was not accidental that the years 1844 in America and 1846 in Switzerland mark the first attempts of individual minds to inquire into the true basis of representation. Mr. Thomas Gilpin published at Philadelphia, in the former year, his prophetic work, of which little notice was then taken, "On the Representation of Minorities of Electors to act with the Majority in Elected Assemblies." In 1846 Victor Considerant, the distinguished leader of the socialist school of Fourier, addressed an open letter to the Grand Council of Geneva, entitled, "De la Sincérité du Gouvernement Représentatif, ou Exposition de l'Élection Vériquique." In this brochure M. Considerant proposed independently a plan of election almost identical with that of Thomas Gilpin. Each voter was to cast one vote for a party, and then to indicate the names of the candidates of his party whom he preferred. The proportion of representatives to which each party should be entitled was to be determined by the rule of three, and the successful candidates by the order of their preferences. Something akin to this plan had been suggested some twelve years before by Considerant's master, Charles Fourier; and its publication in 1846 preceded by one year the wide extension of the suffrage in Geneva. There was as yet no feeling of serious need for it, and it therefore lay dormant for fifteen years. In 1861 it was revived by M. Antoine Morin in two pamphlets - "Un Nouveau Système Électoral" and "De la Représentation des Minorités".

"In 1864, at the August election, the city of Geneva was the scene of violent outbreaks and bloodshed, resulting from the political strife of the Conservative and Radical parties. The following September, Professor Ernest Naville published his first brochure addressed to the federal council and the Swiss people.
Professor Naville's numerous publications afford a complete history of proportional representation to the present time (1996).

"In 1867 it was formed l'Association réformiste de Genève, composed of Professor Naville and six associates. But the time was not yet ripe for a popular appreciation of the principles of proportional representation; nor, indeed, had a plan been perfected which would appeal to the public. In 1876 the national Association Suisse pour la Représentation Proportionnelle was organized, with branches at Berne and Geneva. In 1891, following serious outbreaks in the Italian canton of Ticino, the Free List was adopted, and from this canton the idea spread rapidly to the others. The French Protestant canton Neuchâtel adopted it in 1891; the large canton of Geneva in 1892; the Catholic Fribourg, for municipal elections, in 1894; the German Catholic Zug in 1894, which combined the "free ticket" with cumulative voting; finally the German Catholic Solothurn in March, 1895, the first to introduce the Droop quota (the votes divided by the number of representatives increased by one). But some cantons and cities have rejected it - Basle, the German Catholic Lucerne and St. Gall.

"In a small decentralized country, like Switzerland, a political reform is more readily accomplished than in a large one. England and America, however, have actually preceded Switzerland by twenty to twenty-five years in the adoption of certain forms of minority representation. Doubtless the crudity and comparative failure of those primitive forms were important factors in blocking their progress and prejudicing the public against more doctrinaire tinkering without a practicable basis. In 1854, in the discussion of the second Reform Bill, Lord John Russell moved in Parliament, on the suggestion of Professor Fawcett, that, in the newly created electoral districts returning three members, no elector should vote for more than two candidates."
"In 1854 Mr. James Garth Marshall published at London his "Majorities and Minorities; Their Relative Rights," wherein he proposed for the first time the cumulative vote which has been so popular in English and American reforms. The limited vote of Lord Russell, however, did not find legislative enactment until twenty-three years after its first proposal; and the cumulative vote was first employed in 1870. Two events prepared the way for this adoption. The first was the discussion inaugurated by Mr. Thomas Hare in 1859, when he published his volume entitled "The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal," which was followed in 1862 by John Stuart Mill's profoundly philosophical "Considerations on Representative Government." Mr. Mill speaks of Thomas Hare as a "a man of great capacity, fitted alike for large general views and for the contrivance of practical details;" and of his plan as "among the very greatest improvements yet made in the theory and practice of government."

"In 1867, when the Reform Bill which granted the ballot to the artisans in towns was being adopted by Parliament, Mr. Mill, as member for Westminster, moved an amendment embodying the essential features of Mr. Hare's scheme. The motion did not prevail; but at a later session the limited vote of Lord John Russell was adopted for all parliamentary constituencies returning three members, known as "three-cornered constituencies." It will not be surprising to the reader who has followed the description of the limited and cumulative votes in the foregoing pages to learn that it was the manipulation of this limited vote which first introduced into England the American political machine. Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and the Liberals of Birmingham proceeded to organize thoroughly their following, in order to secure not merely two but the three candidates of their constituency."
HISTORY OF P.R. Cont'd.

"In 1870, when the English government began its wide extension of free schools, the cumulative vote was introduced in the election of the new local boards of education. This was by way of concessions to the supporters of private and sectarian schools, who wished to retain their hold in the distribution of public funds, and in the administration of their schools.

"With this Act the progress of proportional representation in England ceased. When the suffrage was extended in 1884 to agricultural laborers, an attempt was again made to introduce the reform, but after considerable discussion the amendment was defeated. The next year was organized the English Proportional Representation Society, of which Sir John Lubbock is president, and several of the members of Parliament are members. The society advocates the Hare system in constituencies electing five to fifteen representatives.

"In the United States, the work of Thomas Gilpin followed close upon the Act of Congress of 1842, which for the first time took the control of elections for congressmen from the several States, and provided, among other things, that the single-membered district should be universal.

"Not until the period following the Civil War was there any noticeable discussion of the principles of representation, although the writings of Mr. Hare and Mr. Mill were widely read in the U. S. In 1869 and 1870, amendments to the constitution were proposed in both the Senate and House of Representatives but both were defeated. However, some States adopted some various kindred systems, e.g.—the State of Illinois in 1869 adopted a Committee report dividing the State into fifty-one districts for the election of 153 Representatives.
"The action of the New York legislature and the veto by Governor Hoffman in April, 1872, of the bill providing for the cumulative vote in the election of aldermen in New York City, mark the highest point attained in America in the discussion of minority representation. The Personal Representation Society of New York had appeared before the constitutional convention of 1867, to urge the adoption of the Hare plan. Mr. Horace Greeley, as a member of that convention, had moved an amendment requiring the cumulative vote in the election of senators and representatives. After considerable discussion it was defeated by a vote of 93 to 20. Later an amendment requiring minority representation in the election of directors of private corporations was defeated by 71 to 32. It remained for a Republican legislature, desirous of breaking the hitherto impregnable Tammany majority in New York City, in 1872 to provide, in an Act creating a new charter for that city, that the board of aldermen should be elected by the cumulative vote in five districts of nine aldermen each. The discussion in the legislature and in the press attracted national attention, but the bill never came into effect.

"The State of Pennsylvania has experimented with the cumulative and limited votes in various directions. On March 4, 1870, the legislature provided by special act for the cumulative vote in the town of Bloomsburg, the home of Senator Buckalew, for all officers of two or more incumbents. In June, 1871, the act was extended to all elections of members of town councils throughout the State. This was repealed in 1873. By a provision of the Constitution of 1874, the limited vote is applied in the city of Philadelphia to the election of police magistrates.

"These various experiments with crude forms of minority representation furnish in part an explanation of the entire subsidence of the movement since 1874. To have extended the cumulative or limited vote after the exhibitions of their shortcomings in three States was not to be expected. Indeed, the only places where minority representation now remains are in the States of Illinois and Pennsylvania,"
HISTORY OF P.R. Cont'd.

where it is incorporated in the Constitutions. Doubtless at the first general re-
vision of these Constitutions it will be dropped.

"In 1893 the American P.R. League was organized and the "P.R. Review"
was launched".

Since the beginning of the present century, the advocates of P.R., as
well as those of many other faddist and idealistic schemes, have been particularly
active. But their activities have not produced the results desired and prophesied
in most instances and it is certainly obvious that the political millenium did not
accompany any of the introductions of P.R.

For the purpose of this article it is not necessary to follow the for­
tunes of P.R. in various European and Australasian countries, but suffice it to say
that a perusal of such reports inspires not only doubt but disbelief as to the
efficacy of the systems.

"The proportional movement in Canada is of more recent origin, but the
transferable vote before its introduction in legislation had been adopted by the
Toronto District Labour Council (1898) for the elections of officers and delegates,
and this example had been followed by a few other voluntary organizations during
later years. Recently the movement has shown a remarkably rapid growth. In 1916
a plebiscitary vote of the citizens of Ottawa asked for P.R. for municipal elections,
but the Ontario Legislature refused to take action. But in the same year the
Legislature of Alberta took a different line and passed Acts permitting the citizens
of Calgary and Edmonton to amend their municipal charters so as to allow elections
to be held by P.R. Calgary took advantage of the Act; the first municipal P.R.
elections were held there in December 1917, and the process has been repeated in
December 1918 and 1919."
"In the following year (1917) the Legislature of British Columbia passed an Act (Municipal Proportional Representation Act, 1917) allowing municipalities after plebiscite to use P.R. In 1918 the Act was applied in the townships of New Westminster, Nelson, Million and West Vancouver. In the present year (1920) the Act has been adopted by large popular majorities in Victoria and Vancouver; the first elections will take place in January 1921. The rules used are in effect identical with those which, as mentioned below, are used in the United Kingdom.

"In 1919 Saskatchewan followed the example of Alberta and British Columbia and passed an Act permitting the adoption of P.R. by popular vote for municipal elections.

"Lastly, in 1920 P.R. advanced from municipal to parliamentary elections; the Manitoba Electoral Act applied the system to parliamentary elections in the City of Winnipeg, returning ten members in a single constituency". X

A discussion of the results of these attempts is found in a later chapter.

X - J. Fischer Williams, - P.R. in Modern Legislation.
The claim that every section of the people is entitled to representation appears at first sight so just that it seems intolerable that a method should have been used all these years which excludes the minority in each electorate from any share of representation; and, of course, the injustice becomes more evident when the electorate returns several members. But in view of the adage that it is the excellence of old institutions which preserves them, it is surely a rash conclusion that the present method of election has no compensating merit. We believe there is such a merit — namely, that the present method of election had developed the party system. Once this truth is grasped, it is quite evident that the Here system would be absolutely destructive to party government, since each electorate would be contested, not by two organized parties, but by several groups. For it is precisely this splitting into groups which is causing such anxiety among thoughtful observers as to the future of representative institutions. (a)

Old establishments, like the British Constitution, said Edmund Burke, "are not often constructed after any theory; theories are rather drawn from them." In setting out on an endeavour to understand the principles underlying political representation, the saying expresses exactly the course which should be followed. The inquiry is the more necessary as, although representation more than anything else in the domain of government distinguishes the modern from the ancient world, the ideas which prevail as to the part it has played, is playing, and is destined to play on the world's stage are not merely easy, but extremely inaccurate. The intimate connection of representation with the progress which has followed its introduction is so little recognized that the most advanced democracies are now willing to listen to any proposal to return to direct government. In spite of the fact that the nineteenth century has witnessed the triumph of the historical method in most fields of social inquiry, the dangers of a priori speculation on political institutions are as much in evidence as when Burke wrote.

(a) T.R. and H.P.C. Ashworth - Preface to P.R. applied to Party Government"
If we would understand, then, the meaning of representative institutions, it is in the gradual development of the "mother of parliaments" that we must seek for the most reliable information. We must be careful, however, to leave out of sight those features of the growth of the British Constitution which are merely the expression of transitory social conditions, and to confine our attention to the landmarks which bear directly on the inquiry. The subject is best divided into two stages; the first characterized by the origin of representation; and the second by the division into parties, and the creation of cabinet government.

Rightly to understand the conditions which led to the introduction and development of the representative principle, we must look back to the period immediately following the signing of the Great Charter by the tyrant King John.

The Charter reaffirmed the ancient principle that free Englishmen should not be taxed without their consent, and representation was the natural outcome of that provision. A brief glance at the social conditions of the time is necessary to understand why this was so. First, it must be remembered that the true political unit of ancient times was the city or local community. England at that time was a collection of local communities, having more or less a corporate life. Then, again, there were three estates of the realm - the clergy, the lords, and the commons - who were accustomed to confer with the King on public affairs. The stage which marks the birth of representation was when these different estates and communities were asked to tax themselves to relieve the necessities of the King. It was obviously impossible that the consent of every freeman should be obtained, hence the duty had to be deputed to agents. Now, the idea of agency was not unknown in the ancient world, but that agents should have power to bind those for whom they acted was something entirely new. It was necessary, however, that they should have this power, and it suited the King's convenience that they should exercise it. Already, in the earliest writ of which we have knowledge, summoning each
shire to send two good and discreet knights, it was provided that they should be chosen in the stead of each and all. This happened in 1254, and in the following year the clergy were also summoned for the same purpose of granting aid to the King. In the meantime the merchants and trade guilds in the cities were growing rich. The King cast longing eyes on their possessions, and wished to tax them. So we find that in 1264 Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, issued the celebrated writ summoning each of the cities and boroughs to send two of its more discreet and worthy citizens and burgesses. This is sometimes regarded as the beginning of the House of Commons, but it was really not until the fourteenth century that these several assemblies, each of which up till then taxed itself separately and legislated in its own sphere, coalesced into the present Houses. First the lower clergy fell out, and, with the Knights, citizens, and burgesses, were merged into the House of Commons; and the higher prelates with the earls and barons, formed the House of Lords.

This, then, is the first stage of representation. What was the nature of this new force which had come into the world and was destined to so profoundly affect the whole course of human affairs? One result of immense importance is apparent at a glance. It solved a problem which had baffled the ancients—that of the rationalization of local communities on a free basis. But it is generally assumed that the only difficulty overcome was that of size; that the representative assembly is a mere substitute for the larger assembly of the whole nation. Starting with this assumption, it is claimed that the representative assembly should be a mirror of the people on a small scale, and the more faithfully it reflects their faults as well as their virtues, their ignorance as well as their intelligence, the more truly representative it is said to be. It is even asserted that with the modern facilities for taking a poll, representative government might be dispensed with and the people allowed to
Democracy, we are assured, means that every man should exercise an equality of political power. Now, if this conception is correct, we should at once insist that every law should be submitted to a direct referendum of the people; that legislators should be mere agents for drawing up laws; and that the executive should be directly responsible to and elected by the people. But if representation is not a mere substitute for the direct action of the people this idea as to the true line of democratic progress falls to the ground. The whole question, therefore, hinges on what representation is and what are the principles underlying it.

Looking back to the history of its introduction, we have seen that it was only in proportion as the deputies of the local communities were not regarded as delegates or agents that they became representatives. Professor E. Jenks has written an interesting article in the "Contemporary Review" for December, 1898, in which he advances the theory that representation is a union of the ideas of agency, borrowed from the Roman law, and of vicarious liability from barbaric sources. As to the latter he points out that in Anglo-Saxon times the only way for the King to control the free local communities was to exact hostages till crimes were punished or fines paid. In England, where these ideas were combined, constitutional monarchy was firmly established; but, in France, Germany, &c., in whose medieval parliaments the idea of agency prevailed, and where in consequence the parliamentary idea was weak, absolute monarchy held its ground. When Edward I. desired for purposes of his own to emphasize the unlimited liability of political representatives, and insisted that they should have "full and sufficient power to do what of common council shall be ordained", he probably never realized that a body having power to bind the shires and towns was a formidable institution, or that the trembling hostages would become in time haughty plenipotentiaries. But whatever may have been the social conditions which gave rise to the idea, it is certain that it was the power of binding those to whom they owed their selection which enabled the representatives to re-
sist the encroachments of the monarchy on the liberties of the people. At first they were not legislators, but merely sought to uphold the ancient laws. They presented petitions to redress their grievances; but in time these petitions became demands; and they refused to grant the King's subsidies till the demands were complied with. It was, therefore, this first stage of representation which enabled the people to start that long struggle against the power of the King and nobles which has ended in complete self-government; may, more, it was necessary that they should pass through this first stage before they could learn to govern themselves. Yet we have seen that if we apply the modern ideas on representation the start could never have been made. In what respects, then, did these early representative institutions differ from the modern conception as a reproduction of the people on a small scale? One obvious difference at once suggests itself. The representatives were not average members of the communities; they were the most influential; they were selected because of their special fitness for the work to be done; they were leaders of the people, not followers; they did not take inspiration from the people, but brought it to them; and having selected these men the people deferred to their judgment to act for them and protect their interests. Here, then, we arrive at the first principle involved in representation, which is leadership.

But there is another and still more important difference between a representative assembly and a primary assembly of the people. It is this: that a representative cannot be a violent partisan of a small section of his constituents; he must be in general favour with all sections. Therefore a representative assembly is composed of moderate men, representing a compromise of the views of their individual supporters. Moreover, the representatives appeal to the people to sink their minor differences for the general welfare. This feature is very prominent in the early parliaments. The local communities were arrayed as a united people against
The principle which is here apparent is that of organization. In the first stage of English parliamentary history we may say at once that these two principles - organization and leadership - were most conspicuous. The people, sinking all minor differences, formed one united party; and recognised that their struggle against the party of prerogative depended on the ability, influence, and integrity of their deputies.

There is no need to enter into that long struggle between the nation and the monarchy which followed. We pass on, then, to the time when the parliaments, having wrested a share of power, began to split up into parties. It was natural that when power became divided two parties should arise; one upholding the authority of the Parliament against the King; and the other favouring the divine right of Kings. The Puritans and Cavaliers in the troublous times of Charles I. were the earliest signs of this tendency. The Long Parliament, which met in 1640, was divided on these lines; the misdemeanors of the King brought on civil war; the parliamentary troops defeated the royal troops after a bloody struggle; and the King was brought to execution.

The succeeding events were full of instruction. The Parliament attempted to govern the nation - or rather, we should say the House of Commons did, for the House of Lords was abolished. But it proved quite unfit for the purpose. It was thoroughly disorganized, and rent by violent factions. The anarchy which ensued was ended by a military despot, Oliver Cromwell, who entered the House of Commons in 1653 with his soldiers. The Speaker was pulled from his chair; the members were driven from the House; and Cromwell was proclaimed dictator. It is strange, indeed, that the lesson which is to be drawn from this event, and which has been repeated in France time after time since the Revolution, has not yet been learned: the only escape from continued political anarchy is despotism. But the weakness of despotism is that it ends with the life of the despot. Cromwell's son was forced to abdicate
and the monarchy was restored. The same division of parties in the Parliament continued and they began to take the names of Whigs and Tories. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the dissensions of these two factions again threatened to make government impossible. In administration the evil was felt most; the union of ministers of both parties was proving unworkable. So fickle did legislation become that no one could say one day what the House would do the next. It was at this crisis, and about the year 1693, that William III., who cared more for a strong administration than for political differences, created what is known as cabinet government, and, as Professor Gardiner says, "refounded the government of England on a new basis". Recognizing that power should not be separated from responsibility, he affirmed the principle that the ministers of state should be selected from the party which had a majority in the House of Commons. But the time was not yet ripe for the complete application of this principle. Early in the eighteenth century Sir Robert Walpole set the example of resigning when he no longer possessed the confidence of a majority of the House of Commons; but in the latter half of the century the great Earl of Chatham introduced again the practice of selecting ministers irrespective of party. Despite the fact that he was supported by the personal influence of George III., the attempt failed. A succession of weak ministries followed; and out of the confusion the modern division of Liberals and Conservatives emerged. Thus it was not until the beginning of the present century that the doctrines of the solidarity of the Cabinet and its complete independence on a majority of the House of Commons were thoroughly developed in their present form. England, now grown into the United Kingdom, had at last, after six centuries of strife, won her national independence, and for one brief century has enjoyed a full measure of self-government.
THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATION - Cont'd.

How do the conditions presented by the nineteenth century differ from those of the fourteenth? And how is the problem of representation affected? We have seen that the great forces which animated the nation in the fourteenth century were organization and leadership. Have these forces ceased to operate? Assuredly not. In the fourteenth century we had a united people organized under its chosen leaders against the encroachments of the King and nobility on its national liberty. In the nineteenth century the people have won their political independence, but the struggle is now carried on between two great organized parties. The principle of leadership is still as strong as ever. The careers of Pitt, Peel, Palmerston, Beaconsfield, and Gladstone attest that fact. The one great difference between the fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries is that instead of one party there are two. The problem of representation in the fourteenth century was to keep the people together in one united party, and to allow them to select their most popular leaders. Surely the problem is different in the twentieth century. The requirements now are to organize the people into two great parties, and to allow each party separately to elect its most popular leaders.

Why should there be two parties instead of one in order that the people should be able to govern themselves? To answer this question we must start at the beginning, and consider what is the problem of popular government. The best definition is that it is to promote the general welfare - to reconcile or average the real interests of all sections of the community. Now, if the people could agree what is best in the interests of all, unity of action might certainly be obtained; but even then the problem would not be solved, for the people are not infallible. The greater part of the problem consists in finding out what is best in the interests of all, and no amount of mere abstract speculation can solve this part. So diverse and so complex are the interests to be reconciled, do interwoven and interdependent one with another, that the problem of securing a just balance is incapable of solution
Why should there be two parties instead of one in order that the people should be able to govern themselves? To answer this question we must start at the beginning, and consider what is the problem of popular government. The best definition is that it is to promote the general welfare - to reconcile or average the real interests of all sections of the community. Now, if the people could all agree what is best in the interests of all, unity of action might certainly be obtained; but even then the problem would not be solved, for the people are not infallible. The greater part of the problem consists in finding out what is best in the interests of all, and no amount of mere abstract speculation can solve this part. So diverse and so complex are the interests to be reconciled, so interwoven and interdependent one with another, that the problem of securing a just balance is incapable of solution by anything short of omniscience. But in any case the people cannot be always got to agree to one course of action. Therefore the people cannot govern themselves as one united party. The only workable basis is, then, the rule of the majority, and the problem of popular government is how to ensure that the majority shall rule in the interests of all.

Party government provides the best known means of solving this problem. The only way of finding out what is best for the whole people is by the incessant action and interaction of two great organised parties under their chosen leaders; each putting forth its energies to prove its fitness to hold the reins of government; each anxious to expose the defects of the other. This healthy emulation as to what is best for all, with the people to judge, is the real secret of free government. The two parties are virtually struggling as to which shall be king. Each is striving to gain the support of a majority of the people; and the grounds on which it appeals for support are that the measures it proposes are the best for the country, and that the men it puts forward are the best men for passing those measures
into law and carrying on the administration of the country. This constant agitation and this mutual competition to devise new measures, and to bring forward new men, prevent stagnation. Both sides of every leading public question of the day are presented in the rival party policies, and the people are invited to decide between them. The forces on which the parties rely to move the people are enthusiasm for measures and enthusiasm for men - party and personality, or, in other words, organization and leadership. It is in opposing these forces to counteract the selfish and anti-social passions that party government acquires its virtue. By appealing to their higher nature it induces the people to subordinate their class prejudices to the general welfare, and by setting before them definite moral ideals, and appealing to them by the force of personality, it raises the character of public opinion, and moulds individual and national character to an extent that is seldom appreciated. Here, then, is the key of human progress. Direct democracies may hold together so long as there are external enemies to induce the people to sink their differences in the common interest, or so long as there is a slave caste to do the menial work, as in the ancient democracies; but representative democracy offers the only hope of welding together a free people into a united whole. The unrestrained rule of the majority under direct democracy must degenerate into the tyranny of the majority. Instead of the equality of political powers which it promises, the minority is deprived of all power. Representative democracy, on the other hand, deprives the people of the personal exercise of political power, in order to save them from the free play of their self-assertive passions, but still leaves to every man an equality of influence in deciding the direction of progress. Thus every man is induced to express his opinion as to the direction of progress; and the party policy is the resultant direction of progress of all the party electors, and therefore represents their organized opinion. The party representing the organized opinion of the majority has, rightly, complete control of the direction of progress so long as it remains in a majority. But,
THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATION - Cont'd.

although deliberation is the work of many, execution is the work of one. Hence, the creation of a small committee of the party in power - the cabinet — associated with the leader of the party, who becomes for the time being the Prime Minister, the cabinet ministers being jointly responsible for the control of administration and the initiation of measures for the public good. But an organized minority is quite as essential to progress as an organized majority - not merely to oppose, but to criticise and expose the errors of the party in power, and to supplant it when it ceases to possess the confidence of the country. Hence progress under party government may be compared to a zigzag line, in which the changes in direction correspond to changes in ministry. By this mutual action and alternation of parties every vote cast has, in the long run, an equal influence in guiding progress. The only justification for majority rule sanctioned by free government is that when two parties differ as to what is best for the whole people the majority shall prevail, and party government tends to realize this condition. But direct government by the people offers no check whatever on the power of the majority, which is as absolute as that of the Czar of Russia. As Calhoun, the American statesman, writes in his "Disquisition on Government," 'the principles by which constitutional governments are upheld, is compromise, that of absolute governments is force'. Now, the significance of party government as a guarantee of free government lies in this: that party policies represent a compromise of what every section composing each party supposes to be the interests of the whole people; and the parties are engaged in fighting out a compromise of the real interests of every section of the people.

Lest it be thought that in this panegyric on party government we have been indulging in a wild flight into the regions of speculative politics, we hasten to add that the ideal condition we have pictured has never been reached, but the British Parliament has most nearly approached it.
We are not so blind as to contend that the present system is perfect. Everyone recognizes that there are defects in a democratic responsible government. But we believe that nothing better exemplifies the genius for practical politics than the history of British electoral reform. It is the story of the gradual introduction of comparatively slight alterations into a system essentially sound, but which in its growth and development required grafting here an excision there, - reform founded upon the basis of actual experience. There has been no sudden revolution, such as P.R. system demands, but rather a cautious amelioration of conditions which were obviously wrong. Thus no shock is administered to the framework of the system which serves its purpose well. The outstanding characteristic of British electoral reform has been to make moderate changes as they are constantly needed, rather than radical upheaval. This undoubtedly forms the essence of wise statesmanship.

And further, lest any should think that we base our opinions of party government on too ancient facts, we quote the following from the "Review of Reviews" for December, 1922, - "If we would understand the chaos into which Britain has plunged by the collapse of the Coalition and the selection of Andrew Bonar Law to succeed David Lloyd George as Prime Minister, we must glance for a moment at the historic background of the stage where the immediate drama is proceeding. Since the days of Queen Anne, the British Parliament has been divided into two parties, as distinct as the Democrats and the Republicans; and it is this duality which has for the moment broken down, so exposing the country to the kind of government groups which is to be seen in France and Italy. Amid the confusion, then, the real question is whether the Two Party System should or should not be restored.

If the British Empire is to continue, there must be a stable administration. By the Two Party System, such an administration was assured. If the "ins" became unpopular, there were the "outs" ever ready to take their place. So
"So well recognized is this idea that it has been the custom to refer not only to "His Majesty's Government" but to "His Majesty's Opposition". A cabinet in office has always been confronted by what has been called a "shadow Cabinet" which the King could summon to his assistance if necessary. Doubtless a section of one party would sometimes bolt. But the dissentients would always join the other party rather than form a new party of their own. It was thus that Peel and Gladstone led the Conservative Free Traders into the Liberal fold eighty years ago. And it was thus that, in 1886, Joseph Chamberlain and John Bright, who disagreed with Gladstone over Home Rule, led the Liberal Unionists into the Conservative fold. In both these cases, a party was split, but in both cases the Two Party System was preserved."

In the debate upon P.R. in the Canadian House of Commons on April 4th, 1921, Mr. W. Cockshutt, member for Brantford, amid the applause of the House, expressed our sentiments. Such countries as Galicia, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Balkan States, and Brazil were cited as examples for Canada to follow in matters of government. 'Mr. Cockshutt said —"The British system has grown up under a thousand years of parliamentary reform. We have the British system in Canada; they have it very largely in the United States, and I say, with all deference to the ten countries my honorable friend has named, that they cannot show any one of these three countries, Great Britain, Canada or the United States, anything about up-to-date responsible government".

Before we reject this system that has endured through the storms of war and the consequent periods of unrest, that has survived industrial revolutions and economic crises, that has been the bulwark of British freedom, let us glance at the alternative which inevitably follows such repudiation.
THE GROUP SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.

The first and most obvious reply to a defence of the party system of government is that it does not exist today. Those who are forever seeking some defect in the existing order of things in order to support some new scheme of their own; those who are eternally anxious to condemn and despise the past as well as to criticize the present; all such, would with their usual fanatical ardour pounce upon a eulogy of the party system as a ridiculous anachronism, and of course their reason, (if such it could be called) is that there are not two parties in any Legislature today, but several groups.

We admit that there are members in the Legislature who could not be classified as belonging to either the Liberals or Conservatives, since these are the two parties whose names are connected with the party system. But we maintain that this is no proof of the absence of the party system and party government. It is admitted that the presence of certain members who do not claim membership in any party is a step towards the dissolution of the party system. Nevertheless, the principle remains the same in that on one side of the House is a body of members capable of forming a government from its own ranks, a government that commands the support of the majority of the House, a government that is able to bring in progressive measures and to perform the duties of administration without fear or favour.

It matters not how many groups oppose the government: it matters not how diverse the opinions that criticize, so long only as there remains one united whole to carry on as a government, so long there then remains the party system.

It hardly need be explained that the group system is a condition of affairs where it is necessary to form a government from groups, i.e., bodies of members which can each only contribute to the support of the government and no one of which is independent of the others. As soon as this condition arrives, legislatures become "free-for-alls" and stable efficient government is no more.
To further answer those who claim the group system is with us now we would quote Premier Drury - "I believe in the necessity of a party system. History proves it. The group system with the group cabinet contains too many possibilities of bargaining for selfish purposes between different factions. Good government requires administration by one party and a check by another party in opposition. The county council succeeds because it is so close to the electors that they themselves are the opposition. But in provincial and federal government the people are too far removed and organized party opposition is essential. Group government is not permanent. New needs arise and the conditions which inspired the principles of a party cease to exist. When that happens such principles mean nothing, the party becomes sluggish and lethargic, in time it too ceases to exist."

The same views are expressed in "Saturday Night", a paper noted for political insight and fair minded criticism - "What might be termed the "Agrarian Revolt" which is now at a white heat in this country, and also in the United States, is in no way dissimilar to what took place on this Continent nearly fifty years ago. During the last years of the Civil War there was unprecedented prosperity among the United States farmers, and this was reflected very largely in Canada. Anything that a Canadian farmer could raise he could sell at high prices either in the United States or in Europe. This led to increasing the value of farm lands in both countries as well as higher personal expenditures and much speculation. Then it was that a reaction set in. The United States abrogated the reciprocity treaty with Canada, which was a hard blow, much the same as we are now experiencing through the high tariff measures put through at Washington during the former session of Congress. These depressions varying in severeness from year to year, lasted into the 'seventies and early 'eighties, while as late as 1894, there was much discontent among the farming communities, which led to the formation of the Patrons of Industry in Ontario, under the leadership of Joe Haycock and J.W. Mallory"
THE GROUP SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT - Cont'd.

"Our troubles then were very much like our troubles now, lack of markets. Not only were we largely shut out of the United States field as a market for our products, but we found Europe poor and unable to buy freely. Then as now there were complaints against the railways and the banks and other financial institutions. Everything was wrong. People sought cures of all sorts, then as now, but there was no cure until world prosperity once more held sway." (a) 

These opinions are based upon knowledge of British political history and refer only to countries where the British two party system and the present method of election are in use. But in other countries, with different electoral and governmental systems, there is a different story to tell. A normal example of what would happen in Ontario under P.R. is shown in Italy where the group system prevails.

"In the course of a few months, Italy has changed four cabinets. One of these, the first Facta cabinet, lived for only one hundred and fifty days. The cabinet which preceded it, that of Signor Bonomi, lived for eight months. All these governments have the same origin, they are all the result of a coalition formed of the same parties, they are defeated by the same majority, and fall for the same reason. They resemble a rotation of deputies to power, more than a change of government; and this explains the lack of interest of the Italian public in the constant changes. I will endeavor to give a simple explanation of this parliamentary phenomenon.

"The House of Representatives is divided into thirteen political groups of very different proportions. These groups - save for the Communists, who are very few in number, and the Socialists - have taken and continue to take part in the formation of the cabinets. But none of them is strong enough to form a ministry alone, and it is always necessary to resort to a coalition of several groups. Thus we have cabinets in which are men of various principles, of different tendencies, and having various political interests. (a)"Saturday Night" - April 14th 1923.
"At the head of the cabinet must be placed a man of conciliating nature and intentions, whose chief task invariably is that of preventing too violent clashes among his ministers. In fact, though head of the government and leader of the majority, he has no power to change either his cabinet or his majority, through the impossibility in which he finds himself of radically changing the political composition of the Coalition. Thus he is bound to the will—and one might say to the caprice—of the groups forming the Coalition, who keep the cabinet in a constant state of uncertainty because they are almost all in a position to leave the cabinet and thus defeat it.

"Of these groups the strongest is the Catholic Center. There are more than a hundred deputies in this party, which forms a fifth of the whole House, and not much less than a third of the constitutional deputies. In view of its power, it is practically impossible to form a cabinet in which the Catholic Center does not form part. Though representing a minority it ends by absolutely deciding the life of the cabinets. This position makes it the arbiter of the parliamentary situation, just as the German Catholic Center has been and is the arbiter in the Reichstag.

"The new cabinet is not different from that which was defeated a few months ago. Signor Facta has only changed some ministers who had been particularly criticised and has given up the office of Minister of the Interior, which he held together with the Premiership. A strong tendency in favor of the formation of a ministry from the Left was manifest in the House, but all attempts to form such a ministry were futile. The Socialists, after sending Signor Turati to the Quirinal to convince the King that a Democratic-Socialist cabinet would be advisable, and after having proclaimed a general strike, had to accept the return of Signor Facta with a coalition ministry."
The ministerial crisis has therefore been solved with a curious contradiction. Signor Facta was defeated in the House because the deputies considered him too conservative, and the House indicated a desire for a ministry from the Left. Signor Facta now returns as Premier with a ministry even more conservative than the previous one - because all attempts to form a cabinet from the Left failed, and no statesman felt that he could assume the responsibility before Italian public opinion of forming a Social-Democratic cabinet". (a)

We would almost feel it necessary to apologize to the reader for inserting so many quotations, were it not so obvious that strength is added to an argument by relevant authoritative opinions. The following excerpts have been made as brief as possible to yet retain their value.

"Hon. Mr. Meighen, M.P., in a Canadian Press despatch from Winnipeg, November 16th, is reported to have said: 'Group Government would result in log-rolling, dickering and bargaining; the worst possible form of administration'.

"Hon. Senator Davenport, in the "Outlook", writes, (August issue): 'For the moment we are through with experiments - political, social, economic. The probable futility of any considerable third-party movement is obvious, entirely aside from the academic argument in favour of great unity and national single-mindedness, which results from two parties facing each other, as over against a system of log-rolling, coalition groups".

"The "Outlook": 'We regard the idea of Proportional Representation and 'group' government as interesting in themselves, but not of much practical consequence.

(c) "Review of Reviews" - October 1922.
32.

"Department of Government, Harvard University: 'We believe that the desirability of Proportional Representation depends in part, not upon general principles, but upon local conditions'.

"The Providence "Journal", in a long article against the European system, says: 'In Europe these "groups" are sometimes able to control the Government by combinations - the "bloc". Ministries are thrown down and new ones set up overnight by reckless manoeuvring of allied minorities, to the destruction of stability of government and the embarrassment of sound national purposes.

"The Halifax "Chronicle", July 7th, 1920, describing "group" government, states: 'It is earnestly hoped that the people will profoundly and patriotically consider these facts (foregoing facts against the European system) in view of the efforts now being made to stampede the public in the direction that has got Manitoba in such a deplorable muddle.....The "group" system on the European continent has been anything but satisfactory. They (the groups) are generally classified as they sit -"right," "left", "centre", tapering off, respectively, from extreme conservatism to extreme radicalism.....The door would be thrown open to all sorts of "dickering", compromise and corruption. A government so formed would, in the nature of things, be neither stable nor trustworthy, and it would be practically without responsibility'.

Lest any should feel that such an exhaustive study of the party and group systems of government is irrelevant, the next chapter is devoted to a review of the claims of P.R. advocates and their relation to groups and the true principles of representation.

(a) Report of Legislative Committee on P.R. 1921, Page 4.
P.R. AND GROUP GOVERNMENT.

From the P.R. League Leaflet No. 11 of April, 1922, we quote as follows - "The purpose of proportional representation is to elect a legislative or policy-determining body truly representative of all who vote to elect it, each like-minded group among the voters receiving the same share of the members elected that it has of the votes cast."

With all due deference to P.R. advocates, we assert that this object is ludicrous and impracticable - "Each like-minded group" - like-minded on what? Is it possible to find a group of voters whose opinions on every question that enters into politics are identical? At an election is every minor question given consideration and the votes split up according to the extent to which each candidate supports one pet whim of the voter and opposes another?

Such a proposal is based on the chimerical idea that public opinion is something to be divided into fractions, like a mathematical quantity. It is absurd to suppose that an assembly of delegates from a hodge-podge of whims and hobbies will represent the sum total of public opinion on the national questions that should and must be considered by a legislature. With Burke, we maintain that "Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors of different and hostile interests: which interests each must maintain as an agent and advocate against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation with one interest that of the whole; where not local purposes; not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good resulting from the general reason of the whole".

Then we would have a representative assembly composed of moderate judicious men who represent an average of the views of their constituents, and not an array of delegates from numerous factions.
At an election the votes should be cast in relation to some general policy of administering public affairs and the true function of minorities is to influence the main policies of the larger parties. In the House the national policy of the party governs - the policy decided upon as being in the best interests of the country as a whole, and based upon adequate considerations of all minority views, and although national interests are not subordinated to factional claims, yet there is always that political instinct against antagonising any substantial phase of public opinion.

"Is government a private industry or a public enterprise? All agree that government is of the people. Indeed most of the disputants assert that it is for the people, but a subtle difference in the use of the word "for" is perceptible. Some use "for" in the sense in which a skilful advertiser of merchandise announces that he is in business to "please" his customers; to work "for" them. Others use "for" in the sense that government is, in good faith, designed primarily for the benefit of all the people, made to order and sold at cost. But in regard to the central member of Lincoln's triad, government by the people, there is a great crunching of mighty words. Of course all parties agree with Lincoln, but they are unable to agree among themselves as to his meaning, or as to the attitude he would assume toward the divisive issues of today if he were alive among us.

"What is government by the people? -- -- Government is public co-operation, not a private co-operation, not a private industry; it is not an institution where a few turn out goods that certain people want and others do not. All men produce government; all men consume it." (a)

(a) D.J. Wilcox, Ph.D. - Government by all the people.
On the contrary we see the deplorable state of affairs that exists when these principles are forgotten or ignored, and such is the admitted policy of the P.L. system. We shall cite two examples — one showing the subversion of national ideals to local gain in elections, and the other illustrating its effect on the member after election.

"In the arsenal election in England, the dominant factor among the non-political voters was the future of the arsenal. Men and women clinging precariously to employment naturally looked to a soldier rather than a pacifist to maintain the supply of war material: but at Cardigan the Liberal revival was associated with the question of Ireland. At Dudley and Kirkcaldy, as the local correspondents testify, Ireland alone called thousands of electors to vote for Labor against the Government, and the Times representative at Penistone proclaimed that every day of the contest the interest in Ireland grew until it dominated the field. The Government tried to counter by revival of the cry "Make Germany pay". We could only conclude that an overwhelming majority (against the Government) had declared that it did not want Germany to pay." (a)

"What the French call 'esprit de clocher', the feeling for his native parish, closes his eyes to a national viewpoint. The deputy goes up to Paris, much as a business agent does, to see that his constituents secure their share of the finances and to bargain for favours. He agrees to support the ministry in return for patronage, a liberal supply of decorations, and promotion for his political backers. What time has he left for the study of national problems, had he the inclination? Rather he feels his duty done when he has emerged from the general melee of grabbing with his arms laden with trophies for his own particular constituents, quite regardless of the national welfare."

(a) Nation — March 12th 1923.
In answer to the foregoing arguments our P.R. friends will say that the present electoral system has for minorities certain illegitimate compensations. In an evenly balanced contest between two candidates, a determined body of enthusiasts may exercise an influence altogether out of proportion to their size. They may exact from an eager candidate as the price of their support, pledges which, even if dishonest in origin as not proceeding from a real conviction, may yet be honoured in observance, if only for fear of loss of vital support; and these small minorities may succeed in imposing on the community what the great body of voters may regard as fads.

Our reply is that an analysis of the voting in the Legislature on private members' bills will show that no such "fads" can be passed by only one member. The member may redeem his pledge to his constituents, he may bring their claims to the attention of his fellow legislators, but unless they are in favour of his bill, or are impressed with the merit of the proposal, it is consigned to the waste basket. It is rightly resurrected only when this minority has gained sufficient support from other sections of the electorate to warrant its re-introduction.

The member's conscience is clear — both because he has done his duty to his constituents in demanding investigation of their views, and also because in so doing he has done nothing that can be condemned. He is their representative and this is one point on which he represents them. The minority has the representation it deserves, and it is by no means illegitimate merely because all the supporters of the same candidate are not in accord with the policy of this particular few. The representative would not be able to support anything if he were guided by the entire approval of every voter in his constituency, or even of every voter that supported him.
PUBLIC OPINION AND BY-ELECTIONS.

The various special issues and questions that must be dealt with by a government are never all before the electorate at an election. Even if they were, we have referred to the impossibility of a voter indicating his views on them all, unless he can find one candidate who entirely agrees with that voter on every issue — and that is humanly impossible. But the fact remains that every issue that will arise during the session does not confront the electors at election time. How then can the members vote according to the mandates given them at the election? They cannot and do not! To logically follow the P.R. policy to its end, there should be a new election on every new problem — in fact on every bill presented in the House, as only in this way can "every shade of opinion" receive its due consideration.

We maintain that such a procedure is as unnecessary as P.R. is under any circumstances. Rather is it better to have two parties, representing two main principles of administration, two policies of government, contest an election. Then the majority vote indicates which principle is to govern in deciding all questions of public moment, and does not decide one point and leave the rest to chance and the humour of the member. When a member of a party is elected, he known what his constituents want him to do — i.e., follow the general policy of that party and as long as he is true to this mandate, he is a blameless representative.

Under modern conditions, however, the member is assisted in his task by being able to know what the electorate thinks on the problems of the day. This assistance comes through the Press. Every movement or considerable opinion has a part of the Press supporting it, and from the strength of this support is judged the strength of the views expressed. As a result consideration is given them which is conducive to the national welfare and prosperity, and the legislature is dynamically and not statically representative, as it would obviously be under P.R.
PUBLIC OPINION AND BY-ELECTIONS - Cont'd.

The Press as an indicator of public opinion is only equalled by the "by-election", and as we will show later, the by-election cannot exist under a P.R. system of voting. Two instances are sufficient to show of the value of by-elections as indicators of the trend of public thinking. After Hon. Arthur Meighen became Prime Minister of Canada, his majority in the House of Commons was reduced from 75 to 21 by a succession of by-elections. Such ominous results had the natural effect and the general election in 1921 was conclusive proof of the truth of their message. During the last years of the Lloyd George ministry in England, nearly every by-election was won by the Labour Party, and this only presaged the notable victory of the Labourites in the general election of last November. Even now Mr. Bonar Law is ill at ease because of the continued success of the Labour candidates at subsequent by-elections.

We thus conclude that it is not necessary to have an election to decide every problem that faces the legislature; neither is it necessary to ask every elector his views on every issue at election time. This conclusion we find expressed as follows on page 22 of the 1921 Report of the Ontario Legislative Committee on P.R.:

"Notwithstanding the fact that in Canada the Parliament is usually divided into two great parties over some national question under the British system, members feel that they are elected to represent the country's interests as a whole. Our Parliaments have always heeded public opinion. Example: Sir William Hearst and the O.T.A., or Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the S.A. contingents. In the past, "races", "creeds", or "classes" have always found ready defenders in our Parliaments without specially electing men to do so."
GERRYMANDERING.

Quite naturally the advocates of P.R. to gain support for their pet system must portray it as a panacea for all the ills of the present electoral system. Just how imaginative and unreliable their claims and assertions really are is admirably shown with reference to the evil of gerrymandering. Gerrymandering is the most stigmatized word in the host of political vituperations. Consequently we do not consider it at all irrelevant to insert the story of its origin.

"Elbridge Gerry was Democratic Governor of Massachusetts in 1812, when the Democrats were more than usually anxious to make the world safe for Democracy. Accordingly, we are told, the Democratic Legislature, in order to secure an increased representation of their party in the State Senate, districted the state in such a way that the shapes of the town forming such a district in Essex County brought out a territory of irregular outline. A man named Russell, the editor of the "Continent" had a map hanging in his office indicating this. Stuart, the painter, observing it, added a head, wings, and claws and said 'That will do for a salamander!' 'Gerrymander!' exclaimed Russell and the word became a proverb." (a)

The history of the use, or misuse of this trick since its inception is long and discouraging and we regret to conclude that even P.R. has not effected the glorious political regeneration in this respect that its supporters have so clearly foreseen. To prove that such a conclusion is not a mere obstinate self delusion we quote the following in regard to Ulster, - "P.R. was easily manipulated to serve party ends in Ulster. The Ulster Unionists, though nothing to boast of in political ideas, are experts in political machinery and they or their friends manipulated the unhappy machine of P.R. to such an effect that, though at least a quarter of the population of Belfast is Sinn Fein or Devlinite, the Unionists returned 15 out of the 16 members.

(a) New Statesman, January 4th 1921.
"The result of this skilful gerrymandering is that 341,239 Unionist votes elected 40 members, while 164,278 Nationalist votes elected only 12. Thus in practice P.R. does not even turn out to be proportional. The human being has once more beaten the machine. (a)

Every system has to be worked by human beings and will reproduce their ignorance as well as their knowledge, their passions as well as their reason, their greed as well as their altruism, their pettiness as well as their nobility of character. A representative system reproduces humanity - if it gives scope for finer brains and higher spirits, equally it will not hide or abolish the depravities of mankind. And when a system and its results are questioned the true standard of judgment should not be based on some ideal, unattainable Utopian excellence but upon conditions and facts of the present coupled with the record of venerable service.

Gerrymandering is a part of human nature and unless and until our election reform friends constitute themselves creators of a new humanity, their efforts to abolish gerrymandering through the use of P.R. will be hopelessly abortive.

(a) New Statesman, June 4th 1921.
For be it from us to speak disparagingly of the venerable
principles of Justice and Freedom, so loudly proclaimed by P.R. advocates.
"Justice and Freedom forever!" is our echo, but we prefer to test the working of
P.R. in actuality, before we conclude that Justice and Freedom will be the more
effectively perpetuated by such a means. Even if we could accept the theory
of P.R. we still have the most important phase to consider - the practical working of the system.

The ballot under P.R. becomes longer than the present one for
two reasons. First, the constituencies are enlarged to three, five, seven or
even nine or more times their present size and this entails a corresponding increase in the number of names to go on one ballot. Secondly, because so many small groups think they can elect a member, there will be an additional multitude of candidates. This difficulty is not shown, of course, by the model elections published by the P.R. Society. Their candidates are few and well known, and the numbers of votes cast in these model elections are always conveniently chosen "for simplicity's sake". Consider the difference when there are one hundred and eleven members to be elected from, say five hundred candidates by 1,153,567 voters as there were at the last election in Ontario in 1919.

A busy working man is faced with a list of names that looks like a page out of the Toronto Directory. He is asked to assign to each name its exact political value, according to his own preferences. If he is fortunate enough to find the name of the candidate he most prefers he, no doubt, is too exhausted to juggle names and numbers of choices any further. At the most the average voter will mark not more than three or four preferences, and seldom does a voter care who is elected, if his own particular choice is not. His first choice defeated, he cares not about some fractional transference of his successive choices and especially so when he has not had time to learn how they will be
There is another more dangerous probability. In Calgary it was noted that the first few candidates whose names appeared at the top of the ballot sheet were invariably elected by a very large number of first choice votes. The electors appeared to be unable to do otherwise than number the preferences from the top of the sheet downwards.

The difficulty of determining how to choose preferences is accompanied by mistakes in marking the ballot, when the voter has decided what he does want. This is a matter of detail that one would expect to be overcome after one or two experiences with P.R. ballots, but such is not the case. In Kalamazoo, Sacramento, and Winnipeg, the average loss through spoiled ballots is 7%. In Boulder, Cal., 364 ballots were spoiled out of 890 cast. At the third P.R. election in Ashtabula there were 13% spoiled - more than in any previous trial. In each of these instances the number spoiled would have been more than enough to have elected a candidate.

A further surprising feature of such elections is that "the proposition of spoiled ballots was as large in the thoroughly American districts as in those occupied by foreign born voters." (a) Not only ordinary Americans and foreign born voters make mistakes, but even University graduates. In regard to the election of Members of the British House of Parliament by the Universities in England, a special correspondent writes to the Canadian Press as follows - "One of the most interesting things about the university elections is that they are carried out according to the principle of proportional representation wherever there is more than one member to be elected. The universities are the only constituencies in Great Britain where this method of voting applies, and an Oxford don told me that it seemed too complicated for a large number of Oxford voters who spoiled their papers". (b)

(a) New Statesman.
(b) Toronto Daily Star, January 8th 1923.
PRACTICABILITY OF P.R. IN ACTUAL USE.

An amusing but only too true illustration of the mistakes that occur, even under the comparatively simple present electoral methods, is given by an incident in the South East Toronto by-election on October 23rd, 1922. One of the candidates was Trevor MacGuire, the Radical Labour leader. On coming from their polling booth, one foreigner said to his companion - "Well, Pete, who you vote for?" And Pete replied -"Oh, I vote for Meester MacGuire. He ees good mayor!" The explanation of the working of the system of P.R. given about might possibly appear very simple. In fact it could hardly be otherwise where the number of voters and the number of seats to be filled is so admirable in its simplicity. Consider the change in the situation when, instead of 48 ballots being cast as in the model election described above, there are 1,153,567 votes cast as in the last Provincial election in Ontario in 1919. Our objection is not based merely on the fact that we are overwhelmed by a somewhat discouraging-looking arithmetical computation. We have several authorities to show that a task of mathematical intricacy is thrust upon officials in this method of election more so than in the present simple one, when even here most amazing mistakes occur. From the Report of the Committee on Proportional Representation appointed by the present Government of Ontario we take the following - "In order to make Proportional Representation a success there must be the appointment of an efficient returning officer, election clerk, deputy returning officers and staff for counting ballots." In Winnipeg those employed in these positions were the chief actuary of an Insurance Company, a Professor of Mathematics from the University, and a staff of 51 chartered accountants and bank clerks. And is this a surprising necessity after reading the following extract from the story of the Winnipeg election -(a)-: "The calculators were then given the number of second choices marked for each candidate on Mr. Dixon's ballots, and they calculated the number of votes to be transferred to each candidate. That was done in this way.

(a) Ontario Legislative Committees' Report on P.R.
"Mr. Dixon received 11,586 votes, of which he must retain 4,312 and may transfer 7,724. He may, therefore, transfer 7,724 of his total number of votes. For instance, Mr. Ivens received 5,758 second choices, and of this number he received 5,758 x 7,724 or 5,616 votes. The remaining 2,142 ballots were retained to preserve Mr. Dixon's quota of 4,312. The calculators would, therefore, announce that Mr. Ivens would receive 5,616 of Mr. Dixon's ballots and Mr. Dixon would retain 2,142. The transfer clerks then took these ballots from Mr. Dixon, and after marking the figure 2 in a corner of the ballot to show in case of a recount that they had been transferred on the second count, placed them with Mr. Ivens original votes on the first table. This was carried on until the last candidate had received his share. This process was carried on 36 times before even 10 members were elected.

Now we do not mean to say that such a mathematical problem is insoluble, but we do defy any human being to interpret the result in terms of political views and policies. If it requires such expert mathematicians to produce the result of the election, how can any reasonable person expect the average elector to understand how he is represented by a candidate who stood fifteenth on his list of preferences? There might be a means of explaining it if he really were so represented, but nothing is more illogical or absurd than to claim that a voter has representation by a certain member who was his fifteenth choice, when his first and second, even unto his fourteenth choices were ignored and lost.

Furthermore how can a member, dependent upon thirty-six transfers of twenty-second preferences for his success, decide what particular "shade of public opinion" he should represent? It won't be "shade" for him - it will be absolute and utter darkness.
Election officials, even under the present simple system are not infallible. That would have happened had P.R. been in use in the Municipal elections in Toronto in January, 1923 when the following is reported on a recount by Judge O'Connell. "The most striking feature was the shocking state in which ballots were left by the election officials. The third subdivision counted, number 47, was an example of a sub in which the ballots were in a most deplorable state. Aldermanic board of control and mayorality ballots were all in a state of happy confusion. And when the recount was taken, it was discovered that Mr. Fleming's votes were counted as 46 and should have been 49. While Maguire votes were counted as 150, when the actual number of Maguire votes cast was 145. In the morning, too, the court encountered boxes in which the ballots had been mishandled. In subdivision 34, Judge O'Connell was faced with the prospect of piecing small fragments of paper together in order to confirm the D.R.O's opinion of what a bad ballot was. All the rejected had been torn to shreds by the D.R.O. The judge tried to do it, but finally gave it up as a bad job. Judge O'Connell expressed the opinion that some of the D.R.O.'s should be reported for their carelessness".

The final point where P.R. fails to meet the exigencies of political life is in by-elections. Suppose in a constituency electing five members, one dies. Nat is his place to be filled? An election cannot be held under the P.R. system since all the five members would have to be voted upon again. If all the members do not die or resign, the seat is vacant until the House is dissolved and a general election proclaimed. The importance and value of by-elections voted earlier in this article will preclude their abolition, and if P.R. is to be introduced, some remedy for this defect must first be found. Even Lord Hugh Cecil, one of P.R.'s ardent devotees admits its absolute failure in the matter of by-elections. None of the alternatives to abolition is satisfactory. One proposal is to have the constituency
PRACTICABILITY OF P.R. IN ACTUAL USE.

divided into wards, having one member represent each ward. This is nothing more than the re-adoption of the present system and is not in accord with P.R. principles. It has also been suggested that some prominent capable man be chosen by the remaining members of the Constituency for the balance of the term. There is no guarantee that the remaining members could agree on such an appointment, and in any event, such a proposal is alien to British principles of representation and an extremely dangerous experiment. Another proposal is that the old ballots be used again and another candidate elected by further transfers of preferences. Firstly, none of the former candidates may be available for reasons of death, removal, or refusal to accept the office. Further, the opinions of the voters may have changed greatly in the meantime and dissatisfaction would be aroused by using these old votes. The same objections apply to the final alternative of electing extra members at the general election and P.R. leaves us helpless in the face of the by-election.
Beyond the mere inherent defects of P.R. there are objections to its use in Ontario that appear only when the actual conditions of the Province are taken into account.

Ontario is composed of two main divisions - Old Ontario, stretching from Windsor to Montreal and from Niagara to Muskoka; and New Ontario from Muskoka northwards and westwards to the Province's boundaries. In Old Ontario, less than one tenth of the area of the Province, lives nine tenths or more of its whole population. Under P.R. the Province would have to be divided into not more than twenty two constituencies in order that each might elect five members of the 111 in the Legislature. This would mean that Northern Ontario, with one tenth of the population would be divided into two constituencies, and Old Ontario into twenty. Now consider the problem that faces a candidate in Northern Ontario. In one month he must campaign over one half of the Northern Province, i.e., 250,000 square miles of territory to bring his platform before 150,000 people. And it is no only one candidate who must do this, but fifteen or twenty more who are seeking one of the five seats. It is impossible for a candidate to adequately cover a territory three or four times as large as Old Ontario, and it is obviously more ridiculous to expect him to know the needs of such a huge riding in order to adequately represent it in the Legislature. The cost of such a campaign is an item that must not be overlooked. Even in Toronto at the present time it is difficult to find candidates for the Legislature due to the enormous expense involved.

The objection to such a large constituency is not only on the candidates part, but the electors are at a disadvantage in not being well acquainted with the candidates and consequently cannot vote intelligently. From the New Statesman of February 12th 1921, we quote an opinion on this point. "In regard
"to the real disadvantages of the system Mr (P.R.) a model election proves nothing at all. The name of every candidate in the list was a household word. Substitute a dozen practically unknown names and the position is obviously very different. And it is one of the inevitable features of this system that constituencies will be so large that very few of the electors will have a chance of getting to know much more about a candidate than his name and his label. That is one of the reasons why P.R. tends so greatly to enhance the power of the party managers, - the personality of the candidate ceases to count and the independent has no chance at all of being elected".

We contend that such a condition is most undesirable, and with Burke we agree that "the right of election was not established merely as a matter of form to satisfy some method and rule of technical reasoning. It is a right, the effect of which is to give to the people that man and that man only whom by their voices, actually not constructively given, they declare that they know, esteem, love and trust." Our views have nothing in common with those of Lord Hugh Cecil when he writes as follows - (a) - "With very large constituencies, the candidate would have to be content with visiting the principal towns and for the rest, communicating with his constituents by pamphlets, leaflets and articles in the local newspapers. I think it is not desirable that a candidate should speak in the schoolhouse of every little village or should attend flower shows and athletic gatherings wherever they may be held." This is a most obnoxious policy, and the more surprising that it comes from a British statesman. The very essence of good government is in the representative knowing his constituents, and gathering their opinions by social intercourse. Hilaire Belloc expresses this principle as follows - (b) - "We have already said that under a really democratic system of representation, members of

(a) Contemporary Review, December 1919.
(b) Hilaire Belloc - The Party System, page 121.
Parliament would be chosen freely by their constituents, probably in most cases from among their own number. In many cases they would be elected by acclamation. In others there might be a contest. But in the final resort it would be the man most thoroughly trusted by his fellow-citizens of that particular district who would become the member.

In discussing the difficulties of campaigning in New Ontario we adopted for the moment the present representation of those districts by ten members out of the 111 in the House. As a matter of fact under P.R. this representation would be decreased to five. At the last Provincial election 51,817 votes were polled in Northern Ontario and 1,152,567 throughout the whole Province. This proportion would give the Northern section five members out of 111. Such a change would be most disastrous in view of the current dissatisfaction of those districts over the neglect of the present Legislature to consider their needs more fully.

There is even talk of secession as is evidenced by the following -(a)-

"Argument favoring the creation of a separate Province in Northern Ontario was presented to the Young Men's Club of the Board of Trade at its regular weekly dinner last night by F.H. Keefer, K.C., President of the Fort Arthur Board of Trade. This latter body recently passed a resolution favoring the separation of Northern Ontario from the rest of the Province. Mr. Keefer approached the principal part of his argument by first refuting the claim that the advocacy of separation was disloyal. He stated that anything which would work for the good of the country generally could not be disloyal, and pointed to the advantages which had followed the division of counties. Ontario, as at present constituted, he continued, was unwieldy, and Northern Ontario was too far distant from the seat of Government."

(a) Toronto Globe, March 27th 1923.
"It is time you knew that we are not prospering up there", he said, after showing the importance, to the rest of Canada, of the welfare of Northern Ontario. Lack of population was the chief difficulty, he said. The great natural assets of the district waited the coming of population. Lack of advertising the North country's opportunities was the cause to which the speaker attributed the failure to obtain new settlers in great numbers. Instead of spending a million dollars on commissions, the speaker thought the Government would do better to devote half of that amount to getting settlers for North Ontario."

Can we expect any other sentiments than these when we consider that half of Northern Ontario would only have representation equal to that of a foreign quarter in Toronto or Hamilton? We must not be taken to approve of representation only according to area or wealth, but we do maintain that Northern Ontario, with its mineral resources of talc, feldspar, arsenic, granite, corundum, graphite, silver, gold, iron, copper and nickel, with its huge timber reserves, with its rich hunting, trapping and fishing territory, - all this, we maintain is entitled to more representation than a "ward" of backyards filled with old iron.
EXAMPLES OF USE OF P.R.

The most cogent argument either for or against any proposal is the record of actual experience. Accordingly we cite here reports from various places of the use of P.R.

1. France

This system scrutin de liste with a partial admixture of P.R. — seems to us fantastic. It has certainly produced some surprising results. In one constituency of the Seine a candidate with 19214 votes was elected, two others with 84000 and 59000 respectively were not elected.

M. Leon Daudet, the fire eating Royalist, got in with 19686 votes. His opponent M. Tery, the well known editor of L'oeuvre, failed with 36000. In the whole of one Paris sector not a single Socialist was elected, though all on the list polled more than 110,000 votes.

2. Germany

P.R. on a system of party lists is from an arithmetical point of view, almost perfect, but it has its drawbacks. It reduces the personal relation between the voter and the candidates almost to a vanishing point and is thus apt to lower the intellectual standard required of the mass of candidates and introduces into the political arena something similar to the "Star" system of the theatrical world.

3. Australia

The application of a system of P.R. to the triple State representation of the Senate has been disastrous, intensifying all the evils of a party block vote. After the first candidate secures an absolute majority, his remaining ballot papers are thrown back into the count (not Ontario system) and his second preferences are added to the totals of other candidates. The result is that the candidate with the highest votes generally carries the two other candidates.

a - New Statesmen, November 22nd, 1919.
b - New Statesmen, May 29th, 1920.
c - New Statesmen, February 28th 1920.
3. Australia, Cont'd. on the same ticket with him. There will be only one Labour representative out of 35 members in the Senate while Labour polled 40% of the total vote in Australia.

4. Kalamazoo

The largest American city using P.R. in its municipal elections is Kalamazoo, having a population of 50,000. At its second election under this system on November 4th 1919, only 5997 votes were polled from a list of 20000 registered voters. The Kalamazoo Gazette, a publication friendly to P.R., explains this as follows - "The chief reason undoubtedly is the determination on the part of a very large part of the electorate not to try and understand the P.R. system of elections and to refrain from voting as long as that system is provided by the City Charter. That is foolish of course, but nevertheless is a very patent fact and one that the community must face. Our candid opinion after yesterday's election is that, so far as Kalamazoo is concerned, P.R. is a failure. We base this opinion on the fact that it repelled rather than attracted voters to the polls."

5. Ashtabula

The City of Ashtabula, Ohio, has had even a more discouraging experience. "After three elections under the Hare plan it might be supposed that the people of Ashtabula had become thoroughly accustomed to the system. That, however, is not the case. There remains a surprising amount of opposition to P.R. The objection is nothing short of a criticism of the whole theory of P.R. The ability of the Italians to elect a former saloon keeper, who was recently charged with murder, is a terrible shock to the sensibilities of many good people and the whole system is blamed."

Among those interviewed in Ashtabula were the City Manager, the City Clerk, two members of the Council, a former member of the Council, the Postmaster, the Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce and one newspaper editor. All these agreed irrespective of party, that the Hare system of P.R. had been unsuccessful.

5. Ashtabula, Cont'd.

They also all agreed that the Council had been able to accomplish nothing besides hold sessions, and that action had not been forthcoming.


In the second election in 1919 under this system in Boulder, Cal., there appears an example of the greatest danger consequent upon this system. Out of 1167 votes cast in one division there were 297 rejected as void. Again, out of 890 votes cast 364 were rejected for the same reason. The result is that this enormous percentage of void ballots has discouraged even the enthusiasts for the Hare system. A system that virtually disfranchises so large a number of voters can hardly be regarded as desirable. The result, when measured by the first essential of the whole Hare system—every vote counts, no votes wasted—leaves enormously much to be desired.

7. Winnipeg.

The most recent Canadian example of the use of P.R. is that of Winnipeg. In the 1920 elections for the Manitoba Legislature, the City of Winnipeg voted under the P.R. system. There were 41 candidates running for 10 seats and 47427 ballots were cast and the quota necessary to elect a candidate was 4312. Several aspects of this election have been referred to in a previous chapter but just here we note the following points. Firstly, that the Independent candidates were entirely eliminated from the contest, plainly demonstrating that a candidate must be supported by a fairly strong group of voters if his election is to be secured. Secondly, that there were 6362 votes cast for these 11 Independent candidates which obtained no representation. Besides this number there were 1887 voters lost their votes because they did not mark enough choices. This means that there were approximately sufficient votes wasted to have elected two candidates. Once again we conclude that this system is by no means as efficacious in procuring the representation of all the electors as its advocates so ardently insist.
CONCLUSION.

A review of the foregoing chapters reveals an astonishing list of defects in the supposedly ideal electoral system called proportional representation. First of all, we see that the underlying principle is not in accord with the theories of representation developed during centuries of British government. Unfortunately also for the P.R. plan, representative assemblies not only "represent", - they must also "govern", and this is a difficult task under the P.R. The working of the system itself involves an irritating procedure in voting and a mass of intricate detail in counting the ballots, all in a futile attempt to pacify a few fanatical electors. Furthermore Ontario conditions are hopelessly unsuitable for the use of P.R. This fact is borne out again by a reference to page 21 of the Legislative Committee's Report on P.R. - "The reason that P.R. is unsuitable for Ontario is because our British system Election Acts set out a method more intelligible and speedy than any other ever devised, as follows -

1. A citizen shall have one vote.
2. A vote shall be recorded by marking "X" after one candidate's name.
3. A constituency shall elect one member.
4. The candidate receiving the highest number of votes shall be elected.
5. The party electing the greatest number of members shall govern."

Mr. Michael Steele, one of the most prominent public men in Canada during recent years showed a remarkable grasp of the situation and of the issues at stake in adopting P.R. in a speech in the Canadian House of Commons on April 4th, 1921, some passages from which we quote verbatim;

"I believe that in the discussion tonight, and perhaps in the discussion generally on the question of proportional representation, the fact is lost sight of that we are endeavouring to substitute not only a different method of conducting elections, but also, unconsciously perhaps, to substitute a different method of government, for what has been the practice in the British Empire for many years. There is no system of election that is perfect. Proportional representation is not perfect, as is evident
CONCLUSION - Cont'd.

from the fact that there are, as some one has said, 257 varieties of it. My study has led me to believe that there are 300 varieties and none of them is entirely satisfactory. That also is evident from the fact that no two countries, at least so far as I know, have adopted the same system; each has a system varying from that of any other country. But I desire to get back to the good old British system. Ridicule it as we will, criticize it as we may, endeavor to substitute for it anything we choose, we cannot ignore the fact that the British system has built up the great Empire the world has ever seen, and that under that system the people of Great Britain have proven themselves the best governors that the world has produced. Not only has their own country been better governed than any other country, but their colonies and dependencies have enjoyed the same good government. The British have been more successful in colonizing the world and in governing their colonies than any other nation has been. That, to my mind, is pretty good evidence of the value of the system of government which they have been practising. But not only has this system proven its value in the British Empire, but the greatest Anglo-Saxon nation of the world, outside of our empire, the United States, practically uses the same system, with the exception that its executive is independent of Parliament, while in British countries the executive is really part of Parliament and subject thereto. Under the party system of Great Britain, it is essential that there shall be a strong executive. In Britain and in Canada the duties of the government are not only administrative but legislative; the governments of these countries govern as well as administer. If the only function of government were to administer, then I would admit that proportional representation might very well be used. But where Parliament and the Government must govern, it seems to me that it is absolutely necessary that the Government shall have a good strong majority so that they may not be dependent on any clique, or group, or set of men for their support, relying only upon those who consistently support them in their general policy. We have heard a great deal tonight about the evils of the present system and members being elected by minorities. Under the proportional representation system every elected member is a minority member.
CONCLUSION - Cont'd.

"Some criticism has also been made of the single member constituency. But one advantage of the single member constituency is that it provides one of the very things which advocates of proportional representation demand: it gives minority representation: if not representation to the minority in that constituency it gives representation to the minority in the country, and that is the minority that ought to be represented and is entitled to be represented. I believe that every man who is elected to the House of Commons of Canada is elected, first, as a supporter of the national policies which are best adapted to the needs of Canada. That is the first thing that he must support. The next thing that he must do is to represent the people of his constituency - not only those that voted for him but all the people of his constituency - and I say that in no country in the world, and never in the history of Canada, has there been such need as there is today for representative men with a national outlook who are prepared to stand by the policies which are developed and offered by this Dominion. In order to have that it is necessary for us to get away from parochial ideas, and petty policies, although they may please a section of one constituency - may please perhaps a section even of one province.

We need to get down to greater things, the more important things, the things that, to my mind, are today essential for the welfare of Canada. Let us elect men who will support the national policy of Canada. In order to bring that about it seems to me that we must retain the system that we have at present. But we cannot retain it if we adopt proportional representation, and if the people of each constituency divide into two, or three, or four or five or six classes; one class perhaps, or even two classes, with their ideas on great national questions, and the balance divided up as to whether a man should be a farmer or something else, whether he should be a labouring man or something else - supporting one man because he advocates a certain view which is not before the electors of the country at all but is merely held by some of the electors in his constituency - enough, the candidate thinks, to elect him.
"Now we cannot build up a great nation in Canada by adopting that method of electing our representatives to Parliament."

In considering electoral machinery we have to take into account not only the character of the assembly elected and its efficiency as a governing machine, but also the effect of the machinery on the elector himself: the extent to which it nerves and stimulates his mind, his imagination, his character; the extent to which it interests him in government and makes him a conscious contributor to an organic whole. Opportunities should be provided for the fullest and frankest discussion of local, county, Provincial and Dominion government, with criticisms from competent experts and explanations from department executives. "Less politics and more government" is a worthy slogan, but in the past the study of government has related too much to the organization of the facts of government, and not enough to its principles. Good citizenship must embrace varying phases of life, the building of character, the ability to make a living, community interest, appreciation of art and participation in national government.

In the study of national government it should be realized that the justice of all laws rests primarily on the integrity, ability and disinterestedness of the individuals enacting them, those construing them and those administering them, and that a mere alteration of electoral machinery cannot change the fundamental characteristics of a modern polity.