THE GERMAN PEACE UNION: ORIGIN AND SUPPORT
THE GERMAN PEACE UNION: ORIGIN AND SUPPORT

By

PETER WILLIAM EDGINGTON, B.A.

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Supervisor: Dr. T. Alexander Smith

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I also express my gratitude to my friend Michael Goldsmith, B.A. who patiently collected data on my behalf in Europe.
The aim of this thesis is an enquiry concerning the sources of support for the Deutsche Friedens-Union (German Peace Union, DFU). Several factors are presented, which may contribute towards an explanation why a minor party emerged in 1960, and what determined the sources of its support. Three types of support for the DFU are discussed: (1) organizational support from other parties and pressure groups in 1961-65; (2) electoral gains in the 1961 Federal Election; and (3) the federal leadership as represented in the 60 member Bundesvorstand (Federal Executive Committee, F.E.C.) of the DFU.

Data on the DFU are limited. Available works by students of German politics only occasionally devote a paragraph to the DFU. However, a survey of all relevant material produced since 1961 may uncover more information. Most of the data employed in this thesis are derived from sources close to the DFU, and presumably biased in its favour. The party kindly provided the author with copies of Ausweg, the party paper, covering the period 1962-66, as well as an assortment of party literature. The author posted a
questionnaire (see Appendix I) to the 60 members of the 1965 F.E.C. of whom 35 (58.3 per cent) responded. A second questionnaire was mailed to those respondents who had not been members of a political party prior to joining the DFU, and 80 per cent of them were returned. Also, the data exclusively concentrates at the federal level of the DFU's affairs restricting the scope of this thesis to the national level of the party's activities.

Limited data determined that on occasions suggested rather than verified conclusions are offered, and also the strictly delimited scope of this thesis.
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I

THE ORIGIN OF THE GERMAN PEACE UNION

The DFU was established in December 1960. The party entered into an electoral alliance with at least five other minor parties, and it gained the support of a number of pressure groups. In the 1961 Federal Election the DFU gained nearly 610,000 votes. It appealed to the electorate as the party of peace, the party opposed to nuclear weapons and NATO politics which endangered the peace of Europe and prevented the reunion of Germany. The DFU advocated a neutral Germany as a means towards the relaxation of tension in Europe, which would reduce the danger of war and bring about the eventual reunification of Germany. This Chapter attempts to answer two questions. (1) Why was the DFU founded in 1960? (2) What determined the nature of the party? An answer to these questions may contribute towards an understanding of the sources of the DFU's support.

The author suggests that the following factors contributed towards the origin of the DFU:

1. The existence of issue-orientated individuals. Intense adherence by individuals to political values makes them issue-orientated. The values in question, among others, were pacifist and anti-militarist convictions, and determined opposition to nuclear weapons and support for neutrality. Issue-orientated political behaviour results from intense feelings about issues, and the degree of intensity is determined by the importance of the value to the individual. 1 Issue-orientated persons differ

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from institution and candidate-orientated party supporters in that their focus of party choice are issues.

2. The emergence of a representative gap by 1960 among mainly left-wing parties. The given values which since the early 1950's had been represented by the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and various minor parties, were by 1960 no longer supported by the DFU or a minor party acceptable to the

suggest intensity of involvement in the DFU. As the party was only a few month old in 1961, the author suggests that this intensity of DFU supporters was not directed at the party as an institution but at the DFU the representative of the given values. A larger ratio of DFU voters were also party members than were found among other parties, suggesting greater involvement by the average DFU supporter. The ratio of members to voters were approximately: DFU 1:10, SPD 1:16, CDU 1:50. Also a greater proportion of DFU voters cast their first and second vote for the DFU, compared to the voters of other minor parties. Out of 1,000 votes for each party, 670 cast both votes for the DFU; 344 for the GDP; and 806 for the DHP and S37. A first vote is wasted on a minor party as it elects constituency candidates which a minor party fails to do because it lacks the density of support in individual localities. Because of this more minor than major party voters cast their first vote for another party to prevent it being wasted. Karl Schwarz explains the high degree of parallel voting among DFU voters as being due either to their lack of understanding that the first vote would be wasted, or because they were unusually concerned with the prestige of the party preventing them from voting for another party. Karl Schwarz, "Wahlbeteiligung und Stimmeabgabe der Männer und Frauen nach dem Alter bei der Bundestagswahl", Wirtschaft und Statistik, Heft 2 (February 1962), 2.

eventual supporters of the DFU. This representative gap was mainly created by existing and defunct left-wing parties ceasing to represent the given values still enjoying support, rather than by a changing environment creating a need for new policies which other parties failed to meet. This implies that groups of potential DFU supporters existed, which the party attracted by representing the given values.

3. The intolerance of intra-party opposition to the official party line which went contrary to the given values. In the early 1950's the Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU) and the Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU) refused to accept opposition to the party line. This contributed towards the establishment of the Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei (GVP) and the Bund der Deutschen (BdD) which were uncompromising advocates of the given values. The author suggests that intolerance of intra-party opposition in the SPD to its policy alignment away from the given values contributed towards the establishment of the DFU, by forcing opposing SPD followers to seek an alternative party which advocated neutrality and opposed nuclear weapons.

4. The dissolution of minor parties which supported the given values, namely the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) and the GVP. A majority of the followers of both parties realigned their support to the SPD. The dissolution of the two minor parties deprived the issue-orientated individuals of an alternative party to support when in 1960 the SPD ceased to advocate the given values. This applies to both former KPD and GVP followers and alienated SPD supporters.

5. The unacceptability of right-wing minor parties as alternative parties in 1960. Nationalist and right-radical parties continued to represent some of the given values after 1960. However, an aversion towards right-wing parties by potential DFU supporters made them unacceptable alternative parties.

6. The political circumstances of 1960-61 required the establishment of a new party to encourage the cooperation of the diverse supporters of the given values. This eliminated as a possible alternative party the ineffective, left-radical BDD.

The policies advocated by the DFU after 1960 were not new policies, but policies whose basic tenets dated back to the
early 1950's. The division of Germany after World War II resulted in the question of German reunification; the Cold War resulted in the question of Germany's security and her future role in international relations. The three questions were inseparably united in the problem of Germany's future. West Germany's political parties were divided into two conflicting camps by different approaches to this problem. One approach favoured West Germany's integration into the Western alliance, and a policy of strength towards Communism. The second approach concentrated on German neutrality, and opposition to a military solution to Germany's problem. Both approaches date back to the early 1950's, and the DFU represented the second approach.

The solution to Germany's problem through Western integration and a policy of strength towards Communism dominated West Germany's defence and foreign policies in the

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4 The major acts of West Germany's integration into the Western system of alliances were: (1) membership of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952); (2) the planned membership of European Defence Community; (3) membership of NATO (1955); and (4) membership of the Common Market in 1957.
period 1949-61. These policies were closely associated with Chancellor Adenauer, and with a few exceptions the CDU/GSU was supported by the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) until 1956, by the Deutsche Partei (DP) and the Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrech teten (BdHE, later known as the GB/DB). Adenauer took a simple view towards the Soviets: he considered them motivated by a desire to spread Communism everywhere they could, and especially anywhere they could control it. He believed they reacted only when confronted by firmness, determination and power. He also believed that the West could build concerted strength on a scale which would leave the Soviets behind and induce them, out of their relative weakness, to evacuate their exposed positions in East Germany.5

Concern over Soviet aggression and subversion, and the realization that West Germany's sovereignty, her national re-acceptance and economic recovery would be quickest achieved by her becoming a trusted and indispensable ally, made Adenauer a willing ally of the West. By her economic, political and military integration into the Western system of alliances, the Federal Republic would gain security, the support of the Western powers for unification, and the Republic's contribution to the strengthening of the Western bloc would eventually lead to reunion. The rationale of Adenauer's policies had several important implications. (1) West Germany had to rearm which the Soviet Union and her satellites would consider a threat to themselves.

(2) By siding with the West, the Federal Republic sided against Eastern European Communism, and became an integrated part of the Cold War divisions. The Soviet Union would not voluntarily abandon East Germany, especially if by doing so she would strengthen the Western bloc. (3) Believing that the Soviet Union only respected strength, Adenauer opposed West German initiatives for reunion. (4) The same belief also removed considerations for reunification through a compromise between the interests of East and West Germany. Reunification was to be brought about without compromise at the expense of the Western social and political systems.

Support for the 'reunification through neutrality' approach was diverse. For example, opposition to West German rearmament and western integration in the early 1950's came largely from a peculiar alignment of militarists, pacifists, nationalist opponents of European integration and neutralists who feared that military alignment with the West would prevent any Soviet agreement to the reunion of Germany. 6

The same diversity was found among parties which spanned from the extreme right to the extreme left. The extreme right was represented by the neo-Nazi Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP) and Deutsche Reichspartei (DRP) which since the early 1950's favoured a "neutralist policy...on the grounds that such a

course would most likely lead to the re-establishment of national unity." Nationalist parties such as the Nationale Partei Deutschlands (NPD) and the Gesamtdeutsche Union (GDU) "insisted that West Germany's self-interest required neutrality in the cold war and opposed defensive agreements or close economic ties with the Western world." The 'Christian' GVP, which was established in 1952, uncompromisingly opposed rearmament and supported German neutrality before it disbanded in 1957. The Catholic Zentrum Partei (ZP) was a more moderate opponent of Adenauer, and ceased to operate as a party in 1961. The moderate left-wing SPD opposed Adenauer's rearmament and integration policies since the early 1950's; weakened in its opposition from the middle 1950's; renewed its opposition in 1957-59 under the impetus of the nuclear controversy; and adopted

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8 Cromwell, 285.

9 Kitzinger considered the GVP as a party inspired by 'Christian principles'. Kitzinger, p. 53. See also Wilhelm Hommson, Deutsche Parteiprogramme, (Muenchen: Olzog Verlag, 1960), pp. 777-81. The author categorizes both the GVP and ZP as left-wing parties. The GVP's social and economic policies were based upon the concept of fellowship rather than competition. This concept, although based upon Christian norms, stands close to Socialism and would not be accepted by right-wing parties. Also, the ZP associated itself with the group interests of the working classes.
the major CDU/CSU policy tenets in 1960. The extreme left was represented by the ineffective BDJ, which as a Communist front organization, opposed Adenauer from 1953, and became an electoral ally of the GVP in 1953 and of the DFU in 1961-65. Until 1956 the left radical KPD opposed the Federal Republic's rearment and western integration. It considered the Republic's integration into the Western alliance as an imperialistic capitalistic plot which was incompatible with German reunion in peace, security and democracy, for Germany could not be reunited through a 'policy of strength'.

Support for the 'reunification through neutrality' approach cannot solely be explained as support for a formula for reunion. Most of the parties advanced ideologies or images which attracted support in their own right. Also, the formula for reunion was made up of policies which attracted votes, irrespective of their part as a plan for reunion. For example, the DRP gained agrarian votes because it rejected West German membership of the European Economic Community, which was disadvantageous to some farming interests. Opposition to conventional and later to nuclear armament was inspired by fear of war, concern for democracy (it was argued that the Hitlerite generals would gain

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in influence), and dislike for military conscription whether on moral grounds or out of self-interest. While reunion itself was a desired goal, the benefits gained from reunion may also have enhanced support for it. For example, some right-wing organizations saw neutralism as a means of playing off East against West to the advantage of Germany. Some nationalists and right-radicals also felt that West Germany's movement away from the western democracies would cause the collapse of German democracy and usher in a more 'rational' system of government. 11 Communists - the KPD, the East German regime, and the Eastern bloc - saw a neutral Germany more open to their influence and possibly under their control. Also, it would seriously weaken NATO and with it the Western defence structure. Since the early 1950's the East German regime tried to coordinate the opposition to Adenauer's defence and foreign policies by establishing a series of front organizations. Several nationalist parties were Communist fronts which East German agents tried to use to coordinate the opposition of the old Army Corps and other nationalist elements to German rearmament. However, Communist agents interpreted German disarmament as applying to West Germany alone, resulting in the withdrawal of support from these organizations by the nationalist elements. 12 Another

12 Cromwell, 290-93.
front organization was the left-radical B&DD which in 1961 entered into an electoral alliance with the DPV. The Communists also encouraged the non-Communist opponents of Adenauer’s defence and foreign policies to believe that their approach to reunion indeed would work. 13

Although the 'neutrality' camp was diverse in its party composition, several policy tenets were shared by most of the parties:

1. The military, political and economic integration of the two Germanies into the Eastern and Western systems of alliances would align East Germany and West Germany into the respective Cold War camps preventing reunion.

2. Germany’s rearmament – first conventional, then nuclear – would increase tension in Europe cementing Germany’s division.

Also, the SPD, GVP and B&DD considered rearmament as a threat to West German democracy. However, by 1957 the Bundeswehr was

13 For example, a Soviet note of 1957 read: "The Federal Republic is now faced with the choice: either it renounces its NATO policy and its war preparations and establishes the unity of Germany gradually by peaceful means, or else it continues its present political course, pregnant with extreme danger for the population of Western Germany, and takes responsibility for the maintenance and accentuation of the division of Germany." At the same time Otto Grotewohl repeated the proposal for reunion of the East German regime: "A confederation between the two German states with a consultative All-German Council was the only path to peace and reunion; only such a confederation could implement a common policy which would allow both German states to withdraw from military alliances, to renounce atomic weapons, and to secure the withdrawal of foreign troops." Kitzinger, pp. 253-54.
accepted as an established fact, and the controversy centred around nuclear arms, whether the Bundeswehr should be a voluntary or conscript force, and over the proposed Emergency Laws whose aim it was to put the Republic on a speedy war-footing in instances of international crisis.

3. German reunion would have to be based on a Peace Treaty between the belligerents of World War II and a European Security Pact. Both were only possible if the USSR agreed to cooperate with its former wartime allies. A neutral, disarmed or minimally armed Federal Republic, and the parity of East German interests in a unified Germany were three prerequisites for Soviet agreement. Adenauer's policy of strength towards the USSR would only further alienate her. The SPD only accepted East German parity in 1959 and then only for one year.

4. With the exception of the KPD, the problems of Germany's post-war frontiers were passed over.

5. The two Germanies had considerable initiative at their disposal to start discussions on German reunion.

At a later stage of this Chapter, it is attempted to show that although the DFU was a new party in 1960, programmatically it was about a decade old continuing the basic policy tenets enumerated above. It is now attempted to show how a represent-ative gap of the given values emerged among political parties, which the DFU tried to fill in 1960.
After the 1949 Federal Election, Adenauer's proposed reuniting of the Federal Republic, her planned participation in the European Defence Community and her membership of the European Coal and Steel Community began the conflict between the two basic approaches to Germany's future. The FDP, SPD, ZP, GDU, NPD, SRC and DRP opposed Adenauer's defence and foreign policies as did trade unions, youth movements, pressure groups and large sections of public opinion. The Chancellor was also opposed within his own party. However, this intra-party opposition was discouraged, and expulsions and resignations from the CDU/CSU occurred. From among these ex-CDU/CSU members emerged some of the most prominent leaders of the GVP and BDID.

The GVP and BDID were founded shortly before the 1953 Federal Election; entered into an electoral alliance with each other; and uncompromisingly opposed rearmament and supported neutrality. At the same time the SPD modified its opposition to Adenauer's defence and foreign policies by agreeing to support a West German contribution towards Western defense, if no

14 "Between November 1950 — when a new German army first became an issue — and June 1956 — by which time an independent army had been established — opposition to it in twenty-one public opinion polls ranged between 49 per cent and 33 per cent and support between 46 per cent and 31 per cent." Deutsch and Edinger, p. 29.


16 See Chapter III.
European Security Pact could be agreed upon. The SDR was banned in 1952, eliminating a right-radical member of the 'neutralist' camp.

In the 1953 Federal Election the GVP/FDP gained support at the expense of the CDU, FDP, BHE, KPD, SPD and DP. 17 Support for the GVP at the expense of other neutralist parties may perhaps be explained by its uncompromising demand for neutrality and disarmament. Also, middle-class and religious antagonism towards the SPD, may have gained the GVP support from alienated CDU/CSU and FDP followers. 18

In the period 1953-57 fundamental changes occurred within the camp of Adenauer's opponents. In its 1953 election programme, the SPD was prepared to support West Germany's military contribution to the defence of the West, if no European Security Pact could be arranged. By 1957 the party was prepared to vote for West Germany's membership of NATO until a Security Pact could be arranged. Also, the SPD agreed to West Germany's membership of the European Economic Community. However, the SPD still continued


18 In 1957 when the GVP merged with the SPD, the latter saw it as "the first sign of a new era in which at least a bridge would be built between Social Democracy and (the) church-going middle-class." Kitzinger, p. 54.
to oppose conscription. At a time when differences in defence and foreign policy became blurred, the controversy over nuclear weapons redrew a distinct line between the two major parties. Before the 1957 Federal Election the CDU/CSU was known to favour atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr, or some West German control over the deployment of such weapons. The SPD, DP, DDP, GDU and DFP opposed this CDU/CSU aspiration.

While the controversy over nuclear weapons was raging, the conventional military forces of the Federal Republic were finally accepted, though the argument continued whether these forces should be based on conscription or voluntary service. Also the proposed Emergency Laws were opposed for it was felt that the need for national war-readiness, which was embodied in these laws, would endanger democracy and individual rights which had been guaranteed under the Basic Laws.

Shortly before the 1957 Federal Election, two of Adenauer's most persistent critics disbanded. In 1956, the KPD was banned, and a large proportion of its followers aligned themselves to the SPD. Other Communists failed to vote in 1957 or

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20 Kitzinger, pp. 100-197.
21 Childs, p. 99.
invalidated their ballots in protest against the banning of the KPD. It has been suggested that as many as 300,000 former KPD followers voted for or became members of the DPU in 1960-61. In May 1957 the GVP disbanded, recommending its members to support the SPD. A majority of the GVP followers appear to have followed the advice of the party leadership. For some years a group of GVP supporters had been of the opinion that their opposition to Adenauer as a minor party was ineffective. "The dispute over atomic weapons provided a bridge for its members to the SPD: here was an urgent issue on which, despite other differences of opinion, the members of the GVP could identify themselves with the Social Democrats". The BdD, the GVP's 1953 electoral ally, contested the 1957 Federal Election independently gaining only 60,000 votes. This electoral failure may have been largely due to the fact that "the banned Communist Party certainly did not regard the League (BdD) as a possible successor to itself." In the 1957 Federal Election

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24 Childs, p. 99.

25 Kitzinger, p. 53.

26 Ibid., p. 191.
the 'neutralist' camp gained the support of the FDP, which in 1956 had withdrawn from Adenauer's coalition government.

After the 1957 Federal Election, the anti-nuclear movement, the Kampf den Atomtod was established. This movement gained the assistance of the SPD and FDP, of trade unionists and intellectuals. Two years later the SPD and the FDP published their respective 'German Plans' for reunion. The SPD's 'German Plan' is of interest in that the party rejected some of its own policies held since the 1950's, and that it came out in clear opposition to Adenauer's policy on several important points.

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28 Until 1959 the SPD, as the CDU/CSU and FDP, had insisted that German reunion must come about in 'freedom', that is, the Federal Republic's governmental, economic and social system would be imposed upon the East Germans. To ensure of this, reunification must come about through an All-German election which would favour the more numerous West Germans. Now the SPD accepted the idea that reunion should come about through a confederation between the two Germanies, which would lead to an eventual fusion of the two states. Through the confederation the interests of the East German regime would be secured. The SPD also favoured a nuclear free zone in Central Europe, and envisaged German reunion after a Peace Treaty had been signed and while the confederation was still in existence. As such the SPD now accepted the principle that the German peoples were not only represented by the Federal Republic but also by the East German regime. A Peace Treaty during the transitional period of the confederation would also recognize the sovereignty of the East German state. This would ensure that the latter would have gained an important objective, but could still refuse, at a later date to go through with reunion. The FDP's German Plan was similar to that of the SPD, however it envisaged the signing of the Peace Treaty, after the fusion of the two German states had occurred. Hartmann, p.163
Also, the DFU claimed that its own programme for German reunification had been strongly influenced by the SPD's 'German Plan' of 1959.\textsuperscript{29} A few months after its publication of the 'German Plan', the SPD rewrote its fundamental party programme at Bad Godesberg. Apart from officially casting aside Marxist interpretations of economic and social justice and accepting the 'Social market economy' of Dr. Erhard, the SPD recognized the need for national defence, and ceased to oppose military conscription. However, the party continued to oppose the nuclear policy of Adenauer, as it had done in its 'German Plan'.\textsuperscript{30}

Only a year after the publication of the 'German Plans' the FDP and SPD had disowned them. The SPD's justification for this act was that the worsening of East-West relations (the Second Berlin Crisis) had outdated its initiative for German reunion.\textsuperscript{31}

By the middle of 1960, with but a matter of difference in emphasis, the SPD and FDP had adopted the foreign, defence and reunification policies of the CDU/CSU. In his speech to the Bundestag in July 1960, Wehner, on behalf of the SPD, accepted full commitment to NATO and the EEC, and the need for modern


\textsuperscript{30} Childs, p.134.

\textsuperscript{31} Hartmann, p.163.
weapons. Also, "a resolution was passed by the Hanover party convention which whittled down the blunt rejection of German production, stationing, or use of atomic weapons contained in the otherwise tame enough Bad Godesberger Programme of the previous year." The policy realignment by the SPD is largely explained by its desire for office, which had so far escaped it by static electoral support. The SPD's acceptance of the 'Social market economy', was aimed at increasing its vote by appealing to the accepted values of the majority of the electorate. The attempt by the SPD to shed itself of the image of favouring Communism, should be seen in the same light. This image which was fostered by the SPD's opponents and which was closely connected to its foreign and defence policies, consisted of two related aspects:

First, there was a wing in the SPD favourable to Communism and to the East German regime which would gain in influence if the party won, and second, that the policies of the SPD, especially with regard to negotiations with the USSR and the creation of some kind of neutralized, reunited Germany would lead inevitably to a Soviet take over in West Germany.


To cast off the first part of its image, the SdD expelled those of its members who were in personal contact with East German Communists. To shed the image that the SdD would endanger the security of the Federal Republic, the party was determined to "assure the German people that it too would fight Communism with military means and would rely, as Adenauer had done, on the US-NATO deterrent to preserve German security." Opponents to the official party line were expelled, or they resigned. These policy changes by the SdD in 1960 were considered by the DFU as the cause of its origin. It has been estimated that approximately 425,000 SdD voters of 1957

34 In 1958-59 62 SdD members were expelled, mainly for this reason. Chalmers, p. 221.

35 Ibid.

36 In the late 1950's an organization was founded with the name Zentralausschuss ausgetretener und ausgeschlossener Sozialdemokraten, (the Central Committee of Social Democrats who had resigned or were expelled).

37 Renate Riemann and Karl Graf von Westphalen, Dem Volke die Wahrheit, dem Frieden der Sieg, (Koeln: Presseferat der Deutschen Friedens-Union, n.d.), p. 3. Hereafter cited as Wahrheit und Frieden. As was stated above, the SPD in 1959 also cast aside its last 'Marxist vestiges' concerning economic and social values. While this may have alienated SPD followers, it does not appear to have caused the origin of the DFU. The latter did not pursue Marxist domestic policies. See also Chapter IV for the reasons why DFU leaders cut their links with the SPD.
voted DFU in 1961.\footnote{Peter H. Merkl, *Germany: Yesterday and Tomorrow*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p.321.} Indeed, the SPD feared losing votes to the DFU, especially from its newly acquired KPD followers, and for this reason it tried to have the DFU banned as a Communist front organization.\footnote{"DFU: Rot und Rosa", *Der Spiegel*, 35 (1961), 20. Hereafter cited as Spiegel.}

At the same time as the SPD aligned its policies to those of the CDU/CSU, the FDP followed suit. Another member of the 'neutralist' camp, the ZP, failed to fight the 1961 national election. Opposition to Adenauer's foreign and defense policies which dated back to the early 1950's was never more badly represented by the parties in the post-war era. In 1953 the SPD, KPD, GVP, BdD, ZP, GDU and DRP formed the diverse 'neutralist' camp. In 1960 the same camp comprised the nationalist GDU and NPD, the neo-Nazi DRP, and the Left-radical BdD: four minor parties which in past elections could only gain about 3 per cent of the votes cast.\footnote{For example, in the 1957 Federal Election. Kitzinger, p.6.} One of the weakest parties was the BdD which gained only 60,000 votes in 1957. Though electorally very weak, the right-wing party adherents of 'neutralism' remained by 1960 more intact than the left-wing party adherents, which is especially poignant as in 1953 the left-wing parties could
attract about 35 per cent of the votes cast.\textsuperscript{41} Why did the future DFU supporters not vote for or become members of the neo-Nazi DRP, the nationalist CDU and NPD, or the left-radical BdB? Why was the DFU founded, and what contributed to its nature?

Aversion for right-wing parties among the potential DFU followers, appears to have prevented the right-wing parties from providing the role of the alternative party. For example, in 1965 the DRP and the Deutsche Gemeinschaft (DG) united to form the Aktionsgemeinschaft Unabhängiger Deutscher (AUD) which pursued similar policies to those of the DFU.\textsuperscript{42} The latter refused to enter into an electoral alliance with the former because it had been officially classified as 'right radical'.\textsuperscript{42} In its 1961 Election Programme the DFU also included a demand for the denazification of highly placed Bonn officials, which was not calculated to endear the DFU to right-wing parties which in post-war years had continuously opposed the 'persecution' of former NSDAP followers. However, the DFU tried to attract the support of right-wingers, but on an individual basis, and in 1965 it entered into an electoral alliance with the Deutsche Volkspartei.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{41} Werner Kaltefleiter, "Wachler und Parteien in den Landestagswahlen 1961-65", Zeitschrift fuer Politik XII, 9 (1965), 240.


\textsuperscript{43} Spiegel, 24. See also Richards, 583.
The left-radical BdD may have been eliminated as an alternative party for similar reasons, which caused the establishment of the DFU. Two factors seem to have affected the establishment and the nature of the DFU. First, opposition to nuclear weapons, support for neutrality, and so forth, were, as we have seen, less well represented by parties than at any other time since the early 1950's. Second, the potential support for the DFU was diverse, and the limited representation of their values made the founders of the DFU willing to sacrifice some of their goals, to create a party which could attract maximum support. The aim of the DFU was to attract diverse elements so that they may co-operate through that party. If this could not be brought about, the diverse opponents of Adenauer would split up into different parties, every one politically impotent. On the other hand, by attracting diverse support the DFU may achieve 5 per cent of the vote which is necessary for parliamentary representation.

DFU literature frequently refers to the fact that it represented the co-operation of diverse groups and individuals, and that this collectivity of effort was made possible by the willingness of its diverse supporters to bury their differences and unite on a common goal. Apart from their initial willingness to

co-operate, the DFU did much to encourage this state of affairs with the aid of three tactics.

The first tactic was to establish a party which was not associated with a historical ideology. Ideology may make the party unattractive by historical association (e.g. Communism, Socialism, National Socialism) to the potential supporter without a definite ideology of his own, and repulsive to a potential supporter committed to a competing ideology. DFU literature emphasises the 'restrictive' nature of ideological commitment, and the East German regime (in the context of attracting support) seems to have acted according to this assumption. Because of the electoral failure of the BJD in 1957, the East German regime gave instructions to the underground KPD in the Federal Republic to establish another left-wing party for the 1961 Federal Election. However, in July 1960 the SPD announced its policy changes in the Bundestag. The Ulbricht regime changed its plan of establishing another left-radical party. Instead, the organizations under its influence were encouraged to support the DFU. Ulbricht believed that the diverse opponents of nuclear weapons could travel a distance

45 For examples of ideological liabilities see Chalmers, pp.221-24; and Lorenz Knorr and Carl Backhaus, Briefe an einen Sozialdemokraten, (Frankfurt: Lorenz Knorr, n.d.) p.20.

46 Wahrheit und Frieden, p.24.
along the same road. A new party would not encourage this, if it was committed to a sectional, particular ideology. The DFU tried to create the image of an all-embracing national opposition party; an historical ideology would create the image of a sectional party. Another factor may also be added which demanded the creation of a new party. All the minor parties in the 'neutralist' camp, including the BdB, had proven themselves electoral failures. A new party does not have the psychological liability of past electoral failures.

A second tactic (closely related to the first) employed was the essential - non-essential approach to the party programme. The essential planks, among others were neutralism, opposition to nuclear weapons and anti-militarism in general. These planks would gain the party its support. On the other hand, economic and social planks were not necessary in the pursuit of the essential policies and were emptied of controversy. It appears, they were designed not so much to attract, but not to distract potential support for the party. An example of this approach was the drafting of the election programme at the

47 Spiegel, 21.

48 The DFU refers to this form of programme as a minimum programme. Wahrheit und Frieden, p.24. The NPD, another alliance of parties, had to adopt the same method by making its policy platform as narrow as possible to avoid points of controversy, and to bring together diverse support. Richards, 578-79.
Election Conference at Wiesbaden in July 1961. The "conglomerate of the bourgeoisie and proletariat, professors, noblemen, comrades... and trade union officials put forward conflicting domestic policies which had to be watered down. Renate Riemcke carefully had all Socialist and even class conscious tenets eliminated" from the election programme.49

The result was a welfare policy which did not differ at all from the other parties.50 That there was a conflict over economic policy is confirmed by a member of the DFU's Directorate who urged the opponents of Adenauer's defence and foreign policies to put aside their differences concerning social policy and unite in support of the DFU.51

A survey of the DFU's major policy statements in 1960-61 shows what the party considered its essential function. It shows that although the DFU was a new party its policies were of long standing. That is, the DFU advocated policies which formerly had found expression in the SED, KPD, ZP and GVP: the DFU was appealing to an existing group of potential followers without a party to support.

49 Spiegel, 23.

50 Ibid. The two major DFU policy statements are the Wiesbadener Appell pp.1-12, and the Grundsatze einer deutschen Politik 1962, (Bundesverstand der DFU, 1962), pp.3-12.

1. It opposed the acquisition of nuclear arms by the Federal Republic, and proposed the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Central Europe, as had been previously done by the SPD, SED, and PDS.

2. It advocated neutrality as the path towards German reunification, according to the model of Austria. As we have seen, neutrality had been supported by numerous parties since 1950.

3. It saw reunification occur through a Peace Treaty and an initial confederation between East Germany and West Germany, which would lead to the eventual fusion of the two states. A European Security Pact would ensure the safety of Germany and its neighbours. In this policy aspect, the DFU acknowledged, as we have seen, indebtedness to the SPD's 'German Plan' of 1959.

4. It accepted the Bundestag, but wanted it organized as a 'defensive force'. However, it continued to oppose military conscription and the Emergency Laws as a danger to German democracy, as had the SPD, SED and PDS.

5. It shared the conviction of former 'neutralist' parties that the two Germanies held much initiative in bringing about German reunification.

As far as the author is aware, the DFU seems to have differed from the majority of 'neutralist' parties in that only it and the KPD prominently emphasized the need for the denazification of high-ranking state officials. The DFU also differed

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52 For example, the SPD did not deal with this topic in its 1957 election program. Kitzinger, p. 191.
from the 'other' neutralist parties in that it failed to express an opinion on West German membership of the European Economic Community. It is not known why this was so. However, this may well represent a compromise between conflicting groups within the DFU, in which it was decided to by-pass the problem. For example, in 1957 the BDD opposed West German membership of the 'Common Market'.

Other forces within the DFU may have been unwilling to accept the BDD's stand on the European Economic Community. The DFU also failed to face squarely the problem of Germany's post-war frontiers. In its 1961 Election Programme the party avoided the subject, however, in its *Zur Deutschland - Frage* the DFU briefly stated that Germany could not reclaim her lost territories. This policy was included in the 1965 DFU Election Programme. It appears that not only on economic and social policies, the DFU leadership had to compromise. The DFU's fundamental policies, it appears, were also based upon a degree of compromise, although generally they were drafted in positive language in defiant opposition to the major parties with whose social and economic policies the DFU did not quarrel.

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53 Kitzinger, p.191.


55 *Wahlprogramm der DFU fuer die Bundestagswahl 1965*, (Bundesvorstand der Deutsche Friedens-Union, H.6.), p.5.
A third tactic employed by the DFU was concerned with certain aspects of its organizational structure, which were designed to encourage the co-operation of diverse forces in a type of 'National-Front' party. The DFU designed a network of advisory committees (Beiräte) at the various levels of its organizational structure, and their equivalent at the national level, the Unions-Rat. Membership of the advisory committees does not require membership of the DFU, and their expressed function is to unite in co-operative action individuals and organizations sharing the DFU's goals.\(^{56}\) The advisory committees appear to have served two other purposes. First, it allowed organizations and individuals to co-operate with the DFU, although their close association with the party may have been undesirable for its image (e.g. prominent Communists and agitators). Second, the advisory committees may also have served to bring about close co-operation between groups which did not want to fuse organizationally. In a party comprising diverse interests, individual interests may desire to retain their identity intact, while joining the others in pursuit of a number of common interests. Another organizational device employed by the DFU was that of dual party membership. That is, a DFU member could remain a member of another party, so long as it shared the DFU's aims. For example,

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\(^{56}\) Organisation-Statut, Section II, Paragraph 6.
a member of a local electoral group may not have joined the DFU had he or she to make a choice between the two parties. While he or she may nevertheless have voted DFU in a national election, the DFU would have been deprived of a potential party activist and a personal contact between itself and the electoral group.

In this Chapter the author tried to indicate some of the determinants of the DFU's origin. How given values (neutralism, opposition to nuclear weapons, and so forth) had been represented since the early 1950's by diverse parties ranging from the extreme left to the extreme right; how through the dissolution of parties (KPD, GVP, ZP) and policy changes (SPD) the given values ceased to be represented by a left-wing party with the exception of the BfD; how the latter and the right-wing parties were disqualified as possible alternatives to the future DFU followers; and how the circumstances of 1960 caused the establishment and the nature of the DFU. The survey also gives some indications of the possible sources and nature of the DFU's largely issue-orientated supporters.

1. Since the early 1950's the given values had been supported by organizations and individuals with diverse ideological backgrounds. The DFU's followers may also have derived from heterogeneous sources. The leadership of the DFU seem to have acted on this assumption which is portrayed in the party's election programme and aspects of its organizational structure which were, it appears, designed to meet the needs of a diverse party following.
Past events showed that diverse elements could co-operate.
The GVP was a collection of heterogeneous groupings, and despite
difference with the SPD it could merge with that party in 1957.
The left-radical KPD assisted West Germany's conservative,
nationalist elements in the pursuit of the same aims.
2. However, an aversion existed between the politically 'left'
and 'right'. This aversion and the continued representation of
the given values by right-wing parties, may have ensured limited
right-wing support for the DFU. The author suggests that the
DFU mainly represented the left-wing, and the DRP, NPD and GDU
mainly the right-wing opponents of the reunification, defence
and foreign policies of the major parties.
3. Communist support for the DFU appears to have been strong.
In the post-war years Communists had been consistent in their
support of the given values. When the KPD was banned in 1956
and the SPD abandoned the given values in 1960, the DFU was
assured of large scale support from former KPD followers and
Communist influenced organizations.
4. It appears, that DFU voters and members were mainly recruited
at the expense of the SPD which over the years had collected
around itself large groups of issue-orientated individuals whose
parties had disbanded or had been banned.

In the next three chapters it is attempted to trace in more
detail the sources of support for the DFU. In Chapter II the
DFU's organizational support from other minor parties and
pressure groups is discussed.
II

ORGANIZATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GERMAN PEACE UNION

In the period 1961-65 the DFU was in permanent alliance with five other minor parties and in temporary coalition with several others. Also, the DFU was supported by a number of pressure groups, including organizations opposed to nuclear weapons, peace movements, an intellectual circle, clerical organizations, a humanistic group, and newspapers and periodicals.

The DFU's party allies in 1961-65 were the Dresner Wachlervereinigung, (WV), the Deutsche Demokratische Union (DDU) of the Saar, the Demokratische Wachler Union (DWU) of North-Rhine-Westphalia, the BöD, and the Vereinigung unabhaengiger Sozialisten (VUS). The former three parties were local parties, the latter two were national parties. This permanent alliance of six parties may have been larger. For example, in the 1964 Land Election of Baden-Wuerttemberg the BöD and the Vereinigung fuer Frieden und soziale Sicherheit (VFS) supported the DFU. 

Also, the DFU fought at least one communal election in coalition with a number of electoral

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1 "Die Zeichen der Zeit erkennen: DFU waehlen", _Hausar_, III, 3 (1964), 23.
groups. Available information only shows that a coalition existed at a given time between the DFU, the VfS and a number of electoral groups; it does not indicate a permanent relationship, although this should not be excluded. The DFU was in temporary alliance with one local and one federal party: the Demokratische Wählerverband Niedersachsen which was declared illegal in 1961 (one member of the DFU's F.K.G. had been a member of the party) and the newly established, neutralist Deutsche Volkspartei in 1965. The DFU also could have been in alliance with at least one other party, namely the Unabhängige Wählergemeinschaft (UWG) of Lower Saxony.

2 During the communal elections of Baden-Württemberg in 1965 the DFU shared a list with an established local party in Emslingen. In Stuttgart a coalition with a prominent city councillor and a local electoral group was established. In Ludwigsburg some DFU candidates were placed on the list of a local party. Otto Hoefft, "Nach den Gemeinderatswahlen", Ausweg, IV, 12 (1965), 23-24.


5 A member of the DFU's F.K.G. supported the UWG in local elections and is a member of its leadership. The UWG is a coalition of several local electoral groups in Lower Saxony, and published its own election programme in 1960. Wolfgang Treue, Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861-1961, (Gottingen: Husterschmidt Verlag, 1961), p. 51. Apart from the member of the DFU's Federal Executive Committee there is no other evidence of a link between the DFU and UWG. If it could be established...
Data suggests a permanent relationship between the NV, DDU, DWU, BdD, VUS, and the DFU in 1961–65. The DFU was established in December 1960, and the VUS, which had been set up in the previous month, offered "support and cooperation to the proposed union (DFU) of the opponents of nuclear weapons." Prior to the 1961 Federal Election the VUS, DWU, DDU and "V were already assisting the DFU. A leader of the VUS and DDU joined the DFU in late 1960 or early 1961, and both were members of the Federal Executive Committee (F.E.C.) in 1965.

Also, three members of the VUS's Central Committee stood as DFU candidates in 1965. Dr. Erwin Gieseking, the Chairman of the DDU, was a DFU list candidate in the Federal Elections of 1961 and 1965. Wilhelm Elbes, a former Chairman of the BdD, was a list candidate of the DFU in the 1961 election.

that the U3G contested independently the Federal Elections of 1961 and 1965, then the party would not have been an ally of the DFU, but if it did not, the U3G could have been a supporter of the DFU. Unfortunately, election results available are not detailed enough for this purpose.

7 Spiegel, 25.
10 Landeslisten, 27.
11 Wiesbadener Appell, p. 11.
Joseph Weber, the present Chairman of the BÜD, and at least another 16 candidates sponsored by the BÜD were placed on the DPU election list for 1965. The Deputy Chairman of the BÜV was a list candidate in the same election.

The grouping together of several parties into an electoral alliance is a frequent modus operandi of German minor party politics, aimed at overcoming the weakness of every member through collective action. While the rationale is the case behind the grouping of minor parties, the nature of the relationships may differ. Unfortunately, little data are available to throw light upon the relationships between the DPU and its party allies.

13 Ibid., 28.
14 In 1951 the ZP and Bayernpartei formed the Federalistische Union. The GVP and BÜD entered into an electoral alliance in 1953. In 1960 the ANB and DP amalgamated to become the Gesamtdutsche Partei (GDP). The Nationalliberale Partei Deutschlands (NDP) is a fusion of the DM and splinter groups of the DP and GDP. The AUP is the grouping together of the DG and the Deutsche Freiheits Partei (DFP). Both the NDP and the AUP were founded shortly before the 1965 Federal Election. The minor party vote had drastically declined from 27.9 per cent in 1949 to 5.7 per cent in 1961. In 1949 eight minor parties gained parliamentary representation, in 1961 none. With dwindling electoral support the minor parties attempted to pool their resources and support to increase their chances of electoral success.
The alliance appears to have been between autonomous parties. "The DfU is a partner of the Dfu-Union (Unionspartner)," wrote one F.S.D. member. "The BöD is in an electoral alliance (Wahlschlussverbindnisse) with the DFU," wrote another F.S.D. member. 15 The co-operation of separate organizations is also underlined by the formal electoral agreements between the DFU and its party allies. For example, in preparation for the Land Election of Bremen in 1963, the VUS, WV and BöD agreed not to issue their own election lists but to place their candidates on the DFU list. After an unsuccessful campaign, the candidates of the four parties agreed to co-operate as a working group between elections. 16 For the Land Election of Baden-Wuerttemberg in 1964 the BöD placed its candidates on the list of the DFU. 17 Another indicator of autonomy are the titles, among others, of Weber (Chairman of the BöD) and of Gieseking (Chairman of the DDU). These titles indicate the existence of leadership structures, which are not part of the leadership hierarchy of the DFU.

15 Letter from Franz Paul Schneider to the author (5 August 1967).
There is little evidence as to the power relationship between the parties. How much influence the local parties have in relationship to the national parties, or the DFU's pressure group allies have in relation to the parties; to what degree the DFU controls the affairs of the DFU itself; or to what extent it expects to influence the internal affairs of its allies; to what degree the alliance represents a fusion of separate parties; and to what degree it is a permanent electoral coalition which was necessitated by the need to fight a federal, land or local election almost every year. However, data suggests that the parties of the alliance were institutionally tied together in two distinct ways. First, some of the parties co-ordinated their activities with the DFU through that party's advisory committees - the Beiræto and the Unions-Rat - which, as we saw in Chapter I, were designed for this purpose. 18 To sit on these committees does not require DFU membership. However, these advisory committees have no constitutional authority within the DFU, as they are not part of the DFU's internal command-structure. They are an organizational appendix to facilitate the cooperation of independent organizations. Second, some of the parties were

18 For example, Joseph Weber, Chairman of the 3ØD, sat on a DFU Beirat and the Union-Rat.
linked to the DFU through its F.E.C. For example, a leader of the VUS and DFU sat on the F.E.C. placing the latter parties in a constitutional position to influence the DFU's internal affairs. The practice of dual party membership makes possible dual leadership roles. Dual party membership may also represent a degree of fusion of the separate parties.19

The DFU leadership could call upon the assistance of the approximately 60,000 members of the six parties of the permanent alliance.20 This represents a larger membership than that of another contemporary alliance of parties, namely the NPD, whose membership has been estimated at between 23-25,000.21

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19 Some of the DFU's institutional arrangements are similar to those of the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), which was established in 1965 as an electoral alliance. It comprises the DRP, Land organizations of the DP, and individual members of the GDP, as well as pressure groups and local electoral groups. The NPD practises dual membership, that is, a NPD member can remain a DRP or DP member. Also, the members of the several parties are represented on the national executive of the NPD. Richards, 576.

20 Letter from Arno Behrisch to the author (3 February 1967), 2.

Of the five parties which gained more than 1.0 per cent of the vote in the 1965 Federal election, the DFU had the most favourable ratio of members to voters. 22

In the period 1961-65 a number of pressure groups were affiliated to the DFU. The basic relationship between pressure groups and minor parties is circumstantial and functional. If major parties block the representation of minority interests, pressure groups like voters may turn to a minor party to gain access to party politics. 23

22 The approximate ratio of members to voters was: CDU 1:50; FDP 1:16; PDP 1:30; NDP 1:16; and DFU 1:10. Calculations are based on Ibid., Wolfgang Hartenstein and Klaus Lepelt, "Party Members and Party Voters in W. Germany", Acta Sociologica, VI, 1 (1962), 45, and Wirtschaft und Statistik, Heft 10 (October 1965), 662.

23 The Frankenischer Kreis supported several established parties before 1960. In 1961 it affiliated itself to the DFU because the established parties had ceased to represent the policies which originally had gained them the Kreis's support (see above). Another example are the anti-militarist V1, IÖK and DFG which are affiliated to the War Resisters' International whose aim it is to "seek legal recognition of conscientious objection to military service and the abolition of conscription." The DFU continued to oppose conscription, and the Emergency Laws which would allow the state to impose wide-ranging military obligations upon the population. Heinrich Hannover, a VK leader, addressed the 1965 DFU Congress with these words: "I am not a member of the DFU, and I would not even vote for the party were it not uncompromisingly opposed to the Emergency Laws." Heinrich Hannover, "Zu den Notstandsgesetzen", Dokumentation: Bundeswahlkongress der DFU, 1965, (Köln: Deutsche Friedens-Union, n.d.), pp. 15-24.
Circumstances favoured the DFU in 1961. The party continued to advance policies which the major parties had ceased to support. The pressure groups may have been reluctant to support a minor party if an influential major party advocated similar policies. The DFU did not have to compete with major parties, which may have gained it an unusual amount of pressure group support.

In the absence of other evidence, the criteria of organizational support for the DFU are: 24 (1) the association of pressure group leaders with the DFU, which may indicate official sanction of assistance; and (2) the leaders and members of pressure groups who were also DFU leaders may fulfil a representative function. 25

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24 By organizational assistance is meant support from a pressure group, not from individuals who are members of a pressure group whose leadership is indifferent or opposed to assistance for the DFU. The German Trade Union Movement disassociated itself from the DFU, Spiegel, 26. However, trade unionists may represent an important source of support for the DFU, among whose national leaders there are at least 13 trade union members. The DFU enjoys individual and not organizational trade union support.

25 "In Western systems, a basic criterion of eligibility (for leadership) is representativeness. Political careers are launched and impelled by some significant group that chooses a candidate as its agent, spokesman, or symbolic trustee. Representation is achieved by articulating a group interest." Jester G. Selligman, "Elite Recruitment and Political Development", Journal of Politics, XXVI (1964), 617. "Many of its (SDP) party leaders... appeared like a stage army of the governing bodies of a host of sports, cultural, and other organizations which, whether rightly or wrongly, would in Britain be labelled fellow-travelling." Uwe Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 109. Hereafter cited as Kitzinger.
The limited information available and the circumscribed value of the criteria employed suggest rather than verify the existence of a relationship between the DFU and some of the pressure groups.

Six members of the Federal Executive Committee (F.E.C.) of the DFU were also members of the Fraenkischer Kreis. The Kreis describes itself as 'above' party and the organ of left-orientated intellectuals in opposition. It suggests to its 'friends' to vote for specific parties in national elections. 26 This electoral support is neither intended for one party alone, nor does it appear that the Kreis could provide any party with an electoral monopoly of its 'friends'. For the Federal Elections of 1953 and 1957 27 (the Kreis was not established in 1949) the Kreis recommended to its 'friends' to vote SPD, FDP and BdB. 28 For the Federal Elections of 1961 and 1965 the DFU alone was suggested by the Kreis

26 Letter to the author from Professor Franz Paul Schneider, Secretary of the Fraenkischer Kreis (5 August 1967). Hereafter cited as Schneider.

27 "Some 300 writers, actors, and artists of the Franconian Circle (Kreis) published an appeal six days before the election which went further than the SPD but which was obviously designed to aid the party." Kitzinger, p. 148.

28 Schneider, 2.
leadership. 29 This seems to have been the result not of a change of policy but of changing circumstances. The DFU (in alliance with the B6D) now alone represented the aims of the Kreis. However, when the SPD and FDP once more provide alternative policies to the CDU/CSU they would be again recommended to the 'friends' of the Kreis. Most 'friends' voted DFU in 1961 and 1965, but a minority continued to vote for the SPD and FDP. 30 Professor Schneider suggests several reasons for this state of affairs. Some of the Kreis's 'friends' continued to consider as progressive the foreign policy of the two parties; others refused to 'waste' their votes on a minor party. Still others intended to strengthen the inner opposition of the SPD. 31

The three West German organizations affiliated to the War Resisters' International (WRI) appear to have supported the DFU. 32 Seven members of the F.E.C. were members of the Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner (IdK). Heinrich Werner, the Executive Officer of the DFU, was a member of the Federal

29 Ibid., 1.
30 Ibid., 2.
31 Ibid.
Executive Committee of the IDK in 1961, 33 and he was the IDK
delegate at the 1963 WHI Conference in Stavanger, Norway. 34
Pfarrer Herbert Guenneberg (IDK), the West German representative
on the WHI Council, 35 stood as election candidate for the DFU
in 1965. 36 Four P.E.C. members were past members of the
Verband der Kriegsdienstverweigerer (VK). 37 The lawyer
Heinrich Hannover, a member of the Federal Executive Committee
of the VK, 38 defended Lorenz Knorr in a case of libel involving
several generals of the Reichswehr and Bundeswehr in 1965. 39
Hannover also addressed the Election Congress of the DFU that
same year as a guest speaker. 40 This address may indicate a

Hereafter cited as Spitzenkandidaten.

34 Heinrich Werner, "Pazifismus im Atomzeitalter", Ausweg,
II, 7 (1963), 20.

35 Eyvind S. Tow, ed., Yearbook of International Organisations,

36 Landeslisten, 27.

37 A former VK district chairman stated in his questionnaire
that membership of the VK and DFU was not possible. The reasons
for this are not known, but it could be an attempt by the VK
to keep 'above' politics in form if not in spirit.

38 Heinrich Hannover, Der totale Notstandsstaat, (Offenbach:

39 Heinrich Hannover, An das Bundesverfassungsgericht, (n.p.,

40 Heinrich Hannover, "Zu den Notstandsgesetzen", Dokumenta-
ation: Bundestahlkongress der DFU, 1965, (Koeln: Bundesvorstand
link between the DFU and the VI, if unofficially. Four F.W.C. members were members of the Deutsche Friedens Gesellschaft (DFG), including the cleric Gottfried Wondersleb, the DFU delegate in St.Vener. 41

The Bruderschaften (brotherhoods of the Protestant clergy), with a membership of 1,200 and led by former Kirchenpräsident Nienstedt had strong links with the DFU, 42 and they strongly supported the annual Easter Marches of the opponents of nuclear weapons. 43 However, little support for the DFU appears to have come from West Germany's Catholic clergy. 44 The 1961 Election Appeal of the DFU was signed by 140 clergymen, including two Catholic priests. 45 As many as sixteen clergymen


44 A small book, in the form of an imaginary letter to a Catholic priest, shows the two reasons (according to the DFU) why the Catholic clergy is reluctant to support the DFU: the association of Communists and Left-Socialists with the DFU (p. 3), and the Communist threat to Christianity (p. 16) which would be increased by being 'soft' towards Communism. Hans Wirtz, Von der Verantwortung eines Christen, (Koeln: Deutsche Friedens-Union, n.d.).

stood as election candidates for the DFU in 1965, as against four for the CDU/CSU and three for the SPD. 46 In 1965 five clerics were members of the F.E.C. and one of the five was a member of the DFU's Directorate and its Executive Officer. 47

The humanistic Humanistische Union appears to have joined the clerics in support of the DFU. Two F.E.C. members were also members of the Humanistische Union, and the DFU considered it as as one of its affiliates. 48 However, one writer doubts the validity of the frequent assertion that the pressure group stands close to the DFU. 49

There are several links between the DFU and the Kampagne fuer Abruestung. Ausweg publicized the annual Easter Marches organized by the Kampagne fuer Abruestung. 50 Two members

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47 Spitzenkandidaten, 13.


49 Martin Greiffenhagen, "Die Intellektuellen in der deutschen Politik", Der Monat, XX (February 1968), 41.

of the P.E.W. were members of this organization, and another P.E.W. member had been a leader (Vorstand des Bürgerausschuss) of the defunct Kampf den Atomtod in the late 1950's. One of the DFU's national leaders wrote that the DFU was founded by the determined opponents of nuclear weapons. 51 Two other organizations opposed nuclear weapons and were in support of the DFU in 1961 - the Streitender Kongress aller Gegner gegen die atomare Aufrüstung in der Bundesrepublik, (one P.E.W. member was a founder member of the organization), and the Zentralausschuss der Landbevölkerung gegen den Atomtod. 52 Auer has not mentioned the two organizations in the period 1962-65 which may indicate that they are now defunct. Wilhelm Lehrfeld, the Speaker for the Kampagne fuer Abrüstung in the Saar, and Pfarrer Guenneberg, organizer of one of the several columns of the 1963 Easter March, stood as a DFU candidate in the 1965 Federal Election. 53

The Westdeutsche Frauenfriedens-Bewegung (WFB) was linked to the DFU from 1961 54 to 1965. Professor Klara-Maria Fassbinder, a member of the WFB, sat on the DFU Executive

51 Wahrheit und Frieden, p. 57.
52 Spiegel, 25.
53 Landeslisten, 27.
54 Spiegel, 25.
Committee of North-Rhine-Westphalia and was a candidate in the Federal Elections of 1961 and 1965. Ingeborg Kuester, a WFB executive, was a member of the DFU Executive Committee of Lower Saxony and stood as an election candidate in 1965. Jutta Brandstetter, a member of the WFB Presidium, stood as an independent candidate for the DFU in the 1965 election. Two members of the F.E.C. were also members of the WFB.

Several West German publications supported the DFU in the period 1961-65. An attempt is made to distinguish between newspaper and periodicals which provided publicity for the DFU as a party, and those which may only have supported the DFU indirectly by sharing the same views. The difference is important, for the DFU was lacking in publicity for the party. Similar aims to those of the DFU, without reference to the latter, appear to have been frequently publicized by illegal Communist

55 Ibid.
56 Landeslisten, 27.
57 Spitzenkandidaten, 27.
58 Ibid., 13.
59 In 1962, the DFU complained of a campaign of silence against it by the news media (Wahrheit und Frieden, p. 24) and in 1965 it was felt by some of its members that the party was better known abroad than at home. Werner, p. 33.
literature distributed in the Federal Republic, and by publications of some of the DFU's pressure group allies.

One publication which gave much encouragement and publicity to the newly established DFU were the Blaetter fuer deutsche und internationale Politik which are published by the Deutscher Klub 54. Four members of the latter organization were members of the F.E.C. Three of the four were on the Editorial Board of the Blaetter: Riemeck, Schneider, and von Westphalen, who also was the Business Manager of the Deutscher Klub 54. The following F.E.C. members have written for the Blaetter: Riemeck, von Westphalen, Toennies and


61 For example, the VK (author, Heinrich Hannover; place of publication, Offenbach; undated) published several papers concerning the Emergency Laws which are one of the DFU's major policy: Der totale Notstandsstaat, Zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes ueber den zivilen Verteidigungsfall and Zur Frage einer Notstandsverfassung.


63 Ibid., 155-56.

64 Ibid., 155-62.
Opitz. 65 The weekly ultra-left Andere Zeitung of Hamburg provided the DFU with publicity, 66 and its chief editor, Gerhard Gleissenberg (VUS), was a member of the Hamburg Beirat of the DFU. Another newspaper which, it may be assumed, provides news coverage for the DFU, is the mouthpiece of the BdD, the Deutsche Volkszeitung. 67 The editor of the newspaper was a member of one of the Beiräte, 68 and one of its publishers stood as a DFU candidate in the 1965 Federal Election. 69 A periodical which provided publicity for the DFU is the Stimme der Gemeinde. 70 It is closely associated with Pastor Niemoeller, and one of its publishers was an independent DFU candidate in 1965. 71 Albert Berg, a member of the F.E.C. and


66 For example, the Andere Zeitung published answers to a series of letters in which Social Democrats asked why they should vote DFU. Some of the replies are reprinted in Lorenz Knorr and Carl Backhaus, Briefe an einen Sozialdemokraten, (Frankfurt: Lorenz Knorr, n.d.).

67 Spiegel, 24.
68 Ibid.
69 Spitzenkandidaten, 25.
70 In the Stimme Herbert Werner refuted Niemoeller's argument that the opponents of Adenauer's Cold War policy should register a protest by casting void ballots, and suggested instead support for the DFU. Heinrich Werner, "Emigration oder Opposition, Stimme der Zeit, 3 (1965), 1-4.
71 Spitzenkandidaten, 31.
the VUS, was publisher of the Sozialistische Hefte which most likely gave press coverage to the DFU. Other newspapers and periodicals were considered by the DFU as its supporters, but it is not known if they provided the DFU with news coverage, or whether they only pursued the same policies as the DFU without publicizing the latter. They were the Frankfurter Zeitung, Junge Kirche, Werkschaft and Flacne. 72

The Spiegel enumerated other pressure groups which supported the DFU in 1961. There are no other data available concerning these organizations which are: the Weltfriedensbewegung (one F.E.C. member was a member of the pressure group), the Liga fuer Menschenrechte (two F.E.C. members), the Weltfriedensrat, the Schwelmer Kreis, and the Friedenskommittee der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (which was banned as a Communist front organization in 1961). 73

The limited evidence presented suggests that a relationship existed or could have existed between the DFU and respective pressure groups. It does not, however, show the nature of the relationship, though the support for the DFU

72 Werner, p. 37.
73 Spiegel, 85.
from pressure groups appears to have been coordinated. The limited evidence may also have provided an incomplete list of pressure groups: some organizations which assisted the DFU may have been excluded while others which may not have supported the DFU are included.

Of the DFU's organizational allies many were apparently Communist influenced. It appears, this was more the case among the DFU's party allies than among its pressure group affiliates. Since its origin in 1953, the BdD seems to have been under Communist influence. In 1953 the GVP was criticized for entering into an electoral alliance with the BdD, on the grounds that the latter was a Communist front organization. In 1957 "it was generally assumed that the

74 Spiegel, 25. The suggestion of coordination of support is based on evidence that some F.D.C. members were also members or leaders of more than one pressure group which all assisted the DFU. For example, in 1961 Professor Fassbinder was a member of the Staendiger Kongress aller Gegen die atomare Aufruestung in der Bundesrepublik, the Schweizer Kreis, the DFG and the JFIII. Spiegel, 25. A member of the F.D.C. was a member of the IdK, "WP, the Kampagne fuer Abruestung and the Frankenischer Kreis. Two other F.D.C. members were members of the Frankenischer Kreis and the Deutscher Klub 54. Another F.D.C. member was a member of the Weltfriedenerrat and the Frankenischer Kreis. This multi-membership of pressure groups suggests that they were a closely knit group of organizations.

inspirations, if not also the finance, of this party was supplemented from East German sources..." 76 And, as we saw in Chapter I, in 1960 the East German regime was dissatisfied with the ability of the DdD in representing Communist interests in the Federal Republic. The DDU had been established in the Saur as a successor party to the KPD, 77 and in 1960 the DDU sent two Communists to the Land Legislature. 78 Little is known of the WV and DJWU, but they like the DDU and DWN (an ally of the DFU which was banned in 1961 as a Communist front organization) 79 may well have been KPD successor parties in their respective localities. At least three VUS leaders were in personal contact with East German Communists (a member of the DFU's F.E.C. who was also a VUS leader, was expelled from the SPD for this reason). 80

76 Kitzinger, p. 191.
78 Spiegel, 25.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., 21.
Also, the policy statements of the VUS were similar to the policy guideline of the East German regime. Among the DFU's pressure group allies Communist front organizations also appear to have been frequent. However, there is some evidence that at least some of the pressure groups were not Communist influenced. For example, the Bruderschaften have not been linked with Communist influence. Also, a survey of the Blätter fuer deutsche und internationale Politik suggest that while the Deutsche Klub 54 favoured a more reasonable attitude on the part of the Federal Republic towards the East German regime, it was no admirer of Communism.

The party and pressure group allies of the DFU seem to have differed in that the former were ideologically homogeneous, while the latter, in part, were divided by a basic approach to human existence and, apparently, found common ground in the

81 Ibid.

82 The Spiegel enumerated several pressure group allies of the DFU of which most are considered Communist front organizations by the Federal Government: Friedenskomitee der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Westdeutsche Frauen-Friedensbewegung, Schwelmer Kreis, Fränkischer Kreis, Staendiger Kongress aller Gegen gegen die atomare Aufrüstung in der Bundesrepublik, Zentralausschuss der Landbevoelkerung gegen den Atomtod, and Deutscher Klub 54. Spiegel, 25.

83 Dahm, 429-50.

84 Wueneschmann, 155-62.
aims of the DFU. At least three of the DFU's party allies were KPD successor organizations, that is, they continued as the KPD under different names, enjoying the latter's homogeneous support. The BdD and the VUS may well have had close affinity with Communist aspirations which extended beyond the limited goals of the DFU. Among pressure groups a divergence of fundamentals is apparent in some instances. For example, the humanist and clerical organizations were divided on the source of human morality—the one considered it man-made, the other God-ordained. Also, the clerical organizations were in alliance with anti-clerical organizations (e.g. Communists, and left-radical Socialists).

Sociological differences may also be found between the organizations. On the one hand, the DDU, Wv, DiU and VUS may well have relied largely on working class support; while the Bruderschaften, Fraenkischer Kreis and Deutscher Klub 54 were composed of mainly upper-middle class individuals, such as intellectuals and clerics.

In 1961-65 the DFU was in permanent alliance with at least five other minor parties and in temporary coalition with several others. The DFU was in affiliation with a large number of pressure groups, most of which presented the public image of being anti-militarist, pacifist or opposed to nuclear arms. Some of the pressure groups were divided by fundamental values, but united on the DFU's goals. Communists
provide perhaps the largest share of the DFU's organizational support. Protestant clerics, but not Catholic priests, are also frequently found among the DFU's followers, as are intellectuals.
III

ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR THE DFU IN 1961

An attempt is made here to trace the electoral support for the DFU in the 1961 Federal Election. The major task of this chapter is to determine at which parties' expense the DFU derived its second votes or Zweitstimmen. But first another variable which may have influenced support for the DFU is discussed, and a brief summary of the characteristics of the DFU voter is attempted.

In Chapter I it was suggested that the DFU's following rested primarily on the emergence of a representative gap by 1960 among mainly left-wing parties who for several reasons ceased to oppose the reunification, defence and constitutional policies of Chancellor Adenauer. It was also suggested that the eventual DFU members and voters had been issue orientated for lengthy periods of time before 1960, and that the party therefore could tap an existing pool of supporters. After the DFU had been established and shortly before the 1961 Federal Election, an event occurred which may also have influenced support for the DFU. On 13 August, some five weeks before the national elections, the East German regime began erecting the Berlin Wall, bringing to a climax an intensifiééd East-West confrontation dating back to July 1960. At least one
prospective DFU election candidate considered the party as irrelevant in a period of intense crisis; and "most of its respectable followers abandoned it at that time, or even before; and it probably ended with only the support of the hard-core Communists remaining in West Germany." Possible losses may have occurred because of an increase in anti-Communism during periods of crisis which may have affected a party smeared as a Communist front-organization, and which in a period of Communist threat advocated compromise and understanding with Communist regimes. Programmatically the DFU may also have suffered: a slight swing towards NATO rather than away from it was expressed by public opinion, and the desire for neutralism


3 The popularity rating of the USSR was the following. In 1959, 7 per cent of the population had a "very good or good opinion" of the Soviet Union, and 33 per cent had an "average" opinion. Under the impact of crisis the group very favourably disposed towards the USSR dropped to 2 per cent; and those of "average" disposition to 23 per cent.

4 For an example of the SPD's attitude towards the DFU, see above.
usually suffers slightly in periods of East-West stress.\(^5\)

The crisis of the Berlin Wall may also have benefitted the DFU. It brought to a head discontent with the CDU/CSU and produced the anti-Adenauer vote against the Chancellor who had acted indecisively during this period of crisis. The FDP and to a lesser degree the SPD gained from the anti-Adenauer vote. Also, CDU/CSU voters aligned themselves to minor parties in 1961, comprising 14 per cent of their collective vote.\(^6\) The minor parties may have benefitted both from a negative anti-Adenauer vote, but also by providing alternative policies to Adenauer's reunification policy. Hartmann suggests that the Berlin crisis encouraged disenchantment with Adenauer's reunification policy\(^7\) against which the DFU and right-wing parties provided an alternative in 1961.

In the 1961 Federal Election the total minor party vote once again was reduced in relation to the previous national election and stood at 5.7 per cent of the second votes cast.\(^8\)

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\(^5\) Trust in NATO increased from 80 per cent in 1959 to 83 per cent in July 1960. In November 1959 support for neutrality stood at 24 per cent; under the impact of crisis (July 1960) it dropped slightly to 22 per cent.


\(^8\) 27.9 per cent of the votes were cast for minor parties in 1949, 16.5 per cent in 1953, and 40.7 per cent in 1957.
**TABLE I**

Election results of the minor parties in 1961*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Second Votes</th>
<th>Per cent of total vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFU</td>
<td>609,918</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>870,756</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRP</td>
<td>262,977</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSW</td>
<td>25,449</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,796,100</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Wirtschaft und Statistick, Heft 10 (October 1961), 570.

Of this declining minor party vote of 1,791,100 the DFU gained about one third (609,918 votes), making it the second most successful minor party in 1961, with about 260,000 votes behind the conservative GDP, and about 350,000 votes ahead of its next rival, the neo-Nazi DRP. (Table I)

Kaase's short study of voter realignment in 1961 divides the combined minor party vote into four categories: (1) 58 per cent were constant minor party voters who voted for a minor party in 1957 and 1961; (2) 22 per cent had voted either for the CDU or SPD in 1957; (3) 10 per cent were newly enfranchised voters; and (4) 10 per cent were non-voters in 1957.  

9 Kaase, 29.
Though over half the minor party vote comprised constant minor party followers, it appears that the DFU gained relatively little support from these voters. The realignment pattern of minor party voters gives support to this contention. Forty-two per cent of the 1957 minor party vote realigned itself to a major party in 1961. Also, the constant minor party voters did, apparently, not realign to any great extent among minor parties. For example, of 68 DP supporters of 1957, 55 per cent planned to vote for the party again (now the GDP); 32 per cent intended to vote for one of the three major parties; and 14 per cent refused to divulge their intentions. With a drastic reduction of the minor party vote, and the apparent ability of the established minor parties to retain the support of the constant minor party vote, there remained a relatively small margin of assistance for the DFU from constant minor party voters. It appears that the DFU gained most of its votes at the expense of the major parties, especially the SPD. Evidence for this suggestion is provided at a later stage in this chapter.

According to Kaase 10 per cent of the minor party vote comprised newly enfranchised Germans. There is no data to indicate how many of these estimated 180,000 voters supported the DFU, which in comparison with other minor parties did not have any

special appeal to the younger voter (age group 21-30 years), which included the newly enfranchised elector. (see Table II)

The DFU may have gained substantial support from the non-voters of 1957, because it fulfilled a specific need. This may especially be the case with the voters who had lost their parties of interest either through voluntary or legal dissolution before the 1957 Federal Election, and who found in the DFU an acceptable alternative. For example, some Communists in the Saar sat out the 1957 Federal Election, but voted DFU in 1961.11

A fifth category of minor party supporter not included in Kaase's survey were the protest voters of 1957 who cast void ballots. One such group were former KPD followers who cast void ballots to protest against the banning of the KPD. Stiefbold reaches this conclusion because of the sudden increase of void ballots in 1957 in those areas where the KPD up to 1956 had electorally been most successful.12 These former KPD supporters may have behaved in the same way as their fellow Communists, who sat out the 1957 election or voted SPD, in voting DFU in 1961.

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12 Ibid., 407.
Three demographic characteristics of the DFU voters are available. The DFU vote comprised approximately 53.5 per cent of men and 46.5 per cent of women. With the exception of the GDP, the minor parties attracted more male than female votes. (Table II). The difference between male and female support for the DFU is not as great as with the DRP (17 per cent in favour of males), but at nearly 7 per cent it is more pronounced than with the other minor parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>male</th>
<th>female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFU</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRP</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other minor parties</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Wirtschaft und Statistik, Heft 10 (October 1964), 234.

Approximately 13 per cent (compared to 11-15 per cent for other minor parties) of the DFU's voters were between 21 and 29 years of age; about 63 per cent (compared to 56-66 per cent for the others) were aged between 30 and 59 years;
TABLE III

Age of minor party voters in the 1961 Federal Election:
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age groups in years</th>
<th>DFU</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>DRP</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21-29 years</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-59 years</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and more years</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Wirtschaft und Statistik, Heft 10 (October 1964), 237.

and 24 per cent (20-30 per cent for the other minor parties) were 60 or more years old. In every age group the DFU's support was somewhere in the middle, lacking extremities in both high or low percentages in comparison to the other minor parties. (Table III)

Table IV shows that in none of the Laender did the DFU manage to achieve 5 per cent of the vote. This lack of concentration of support in any one Land shows why the DFU has so far failed to gain representation in a Land parliament. In three Laender the DFU gained more than 3.0 per cent of the vote; and in four Laender it gained less than 2.0 per cent. Its greatest percentage of the poll was in the smallest but highly industrialized and urbanized Laender, namely, Bremen.
Hamburg and the Saar. The former two Laender were located in North Germany and were predominantly Protestant; the latter was situated in south-west Germany and was mainly Catholic. The DFU gained its smallest percentage of the vote in mainly rural Laender: Bavaria, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony. The former two Laender were predominantly Protestant and in North Germany. The geographical position and the predominantly religious affiliations of the Laender does not appear to have affected the percentage of the DFU's votes in these Laender. Urbanization, resulting from industrialization, seems to have been a variable in favour of the DFU. In other words, the DFU seems to have gained its highest percentages of the poll in those Laender where the SPD, and formerly the KPD, had also done well electorally. However, when the DFU's support is measured in numbers rather than percentages, it had to rely most heavily on the most populous Laender in which it had gained either a very low or an average percentage of the vote. For example, nearly half the DFU's votes derived from North-Rhine Westphalia, Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. This is especially the case of North-Rhine Westphalia where nearly one out of every DFU votes were cast in the 1961 Federal Election (Table IV). And here again, more votes were cast for the DFU in the highly industrialized Laender of
Baden-Wuerttemberg and North-Rhine Westphalia than in rural Bavaria.  

### TABLE IV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Zweitstimmen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schleswig-Holstein</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>17,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>43,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niedersachsen</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>50,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>12,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordrhein-Westfalen</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>188,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hessen</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>65,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rheinland-Pfalz</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>29,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Wuerttemberg</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>95,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayern</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>87,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saarland</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>18,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Republic</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>609,918</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Wirtschaft und Statistik, Heft 10 (October 1961), 570.

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13 *Wirtschaft und Statistik, Heft 10 (October 1961), 570.* Also, the DDU, a successor organization of the KPD, gained 5 per cent of the vote in the 1960 Land Election of the Saar and sent two deputies to the Land parliament. Werner Kaltefleiter "Wahler und Parteien in den Landtagswahlen 1961–65", *Zeitschrift fuer Politik*, XII, 3 (1965), 240.
For the remainder of this chapter we will be concerned with the question of electoral support for the DFU at the expense of other parties. Even a partial answer to this question requires an approach extending over two time-periods: (1) political realignment in favour of the DFU between the Federal Elections of 1957 and 1961; (2) political realignment of DFU voters prior to and in 1957. By going back only as far as 1957 we reach the conclusion that the DFU gained its votes from the SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP, GDP, DRP, DG, SSW (Table V) Aktion 61, and perhaps also from the defunct ZP. Two important parties are excluded, namely the KPD and GVP. By going back beyond 1957 these two parties are included, explaining the nature of the DFU's vote more fully and correctly. For example, it has been estimated that the SPD lost about 475,000 votes to the DFU, and it has also been estimated that nearly 300,000 former KPD followers also voted DFU in 1961 (see below). As we saw in Chapter I, shortly before the 1957 Federal Election a majority of the former KPD and GVP support aligned itself to the SPD. The author suggests that the SPD losses of 1961 cannot be fully understood without considering that in 1957 large groups of former KPD and GVP followers had aligned themselves to the SPD. At the beginning of this chapter it was concluded (based on the post-1957 time-span) that the DFU vote was largely derived at the expense of the major parties, notably the SPD. However, if one draws together the evidence of the two time-spans
### TABLE V*

Distribution of Erststimmen by 1,000 voters who cast their Zweitstimme for the DFU in 1961 Federal Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>number of Erststimmen per 1000</th>
<th>DFU vote (minimum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>31,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRP, DG, SSW</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFU</td>
<td>870</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoiled</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Wirtschaft und Statistik, Heft 10 (October 1962), 79.

** Ninety-eight of 1,000 voters who cast their Zweitstimme (second vote) for the DFU 'split their ticket', and cast their Erststimme (first vote) for another party. The 'split ticket' shows the party of second preference. The second vote is normally cast for the party of first choice, the first vote for the party of second preference. The first vote gives some indication at which parties' expense the DFU gained some of its votes in 1961. (1) the voter who only cast his first vote, for example, for the SPD in 1961 may have cast both votes for the party in 1957, which represents an actual loss to the SPD. (2) the newly enfranchised voter, or one who had supported a third party in 1957, deprived the SPD of potential support by casting his second vote for the DFU. The argument of potential and actual losses is based on the assumption that had the DFU not contested the 1961 election, the party of second preference would have been the party of first and only preference. The sample of 1,000 second votes for the DFU claims to be representative of all the second vote support for the party. However, the split ticket voter is not representative of the sources of support for the DFU at the expense of other parties, for in 1961 they represented only 9.4 per cent of the total DFU vote. The majority of DFU voters cast both votes for the party in 1961 and consequently no trace remains of their second preference. But as the sample of 'split tickets' is approximately representative, 51 voters who in 1961 cast their first vote for the SPD represents a loss of about 31,110 potential or actual second votes for the SPD.
in question, it appears that the DFU gained a large part of its support at the expense of the SPD, and that a large percentage of this vote had in the past sustained other minor parties. That is, the DFU did not attract into the 'political wilderness' consistent major party voters, but relied chiefly on voters who in the past had shown their willingness to support minor parties.

The DFU's vote of 1961 was derived from voters who had (and some still partly) supported parties which between them had spanned the 'Left'-'Right' continuum of West Germany's political divisions: 14

KPD - has been estimated as high as 300,000 votes. A majority of these may have voted SPD in 1957, others sat out that election or spoiled their ballots. Some of the DFU's organizational allies were Communist influenced parties and pressure groups. (see Chapter II).

BdD - ally of the DFU; gained 60,000 votes in the 1957 Federal Election.

SPD - has been estimated as high as 475,000 voters, including, among others, former KPD and GVP followers. The latter had been disbanded shortly before the 1957 Federal Election. Some former SPD support came with the DFU's alliance to the VUS.

GVP - in alliance with the BdD, the GVP gained over 400,000 votes in the 1953 Federal Election. The GVP disbanded in 1957, suggesting its members to vote SPD.

ZP - lost substantial support to the GVP in 1953. The party failed to contest the 1961 election.

14 Data for the present summary of the parties from which the DFU gained support, is presented at a later stage of this Chapter.
CDU/CSU — lost support to the GVP and BöD in 1952/53. After 1957 the party may have alienated further followers by its nuclear policy and disenchantment with Adenauer's reunification policy. DFU gained at least 12,000 possible CDU votes.

FDP — gained at least 9,150 possible FDP votes.

GDP — (formerly DP and BHE) gained at least 2,440 votes.

DRP — gained at least 2,440 possible DRP, DG and SSW votes.

SSW

Aktion 61 — some support.

Now it is attempted to enumerate the above parties in some detail, and the support the DFU may have derived from them.

Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland

The DFU seems to have gained most of its support at the expense of the SPD, which lost both regular and newly acquired members and voters. But the SPD's numerical loss to the DFU is not known. According to Kaase, only six per cent of the minor parties' second votes in 1961 (about 180,000) were cast for the SPD in 1957.\(^{15}\) Merkl, however, suggests that the SPD lost about five per cent of its voters of 1957 (roughly 475,000) to the DFU in 1961.\(^{16}\) The two figures are too far apart to be reconciled. Merkl's figures may be more reflective of the numerical support the DFU derived at the expense of the SPD.

\(^{15}\) Kaase, p.29.

Over the years the SPD had attracted voters who were most likely to support the DFU from the CDU/CSU, FDP, KPD and GVP, and a group within the SPD had fought a rear guard action against the SPD's gradual conformity to the policies of the coalition governments. In 1960 when the SPD suddenly aligned its policies to those of the CDU/CSU it lost supporters who had voted for the SPD because of its opposition to the foreign, defence and reunification policies of the Adenauer governments, and Social Democrats who had been in more comprehensive agreement with the SPD. The DFU considers that its origin lies in the changes of the SPD's policy, and Ulbricht was on the opinion that the SPD would suffer electoral losses because of its change of policy, an opinion which was shared by the SPD leadership. Kaase's study concludes that 17 per cent of the 1961 minor party vote had supported the CDU in 1957. While the CDU is another source of support for the DFU, many of its votes did not originate, it seems, from this quarter. The attitudes of the SPD and CDU towards the newly established DFU indicate that the SPD was the major loser.

17 Spiegel, 27.

18 Kaase, p.29.

19 Also in the 1965 election campaign the SPD said that a vote for the DFU was a vote for Strauss. The SPD and FDP declared their intentions to keep Strauss out of the government, but this could only be done if the CDU/CSU failed to gain an absolute majority, for without it it could not ignore the FDP, and an FDP/SPD coalition was possible. The point of importance here is the calculation that a DFU voter would otherwise vote SPD. Michael Steed, "Four Elections of 1965", "Government and Opposition, I (1965-66), 310.
The SPD indulged in a smear campaign against the newly established DFU, accusing it, among other things, of being a tool of Communism and a danger to democracy. Furthermore it suggested to the government that there was sufficient evidence available concerning the DFU's subversive potentialities to have it banned. Interior Minister Schroeder did not agree, although the evidence of Communist infiltration is available (see below). It appears that the actions of the SPD were not inspired by fear for democracy, but by awareness that the DFU would attract the party's left wing and its newly acquired Communist vote. The government parties appear to have been aware of the same thing, but were unwilling to oblige the SPD.20

The VUS is a case study of the political realignment of a group of former SPD supporters which benefitted the DFU. As we saw in Chapter I, the SPD tried to change its public image after its 1957 election defeat. Largely for this reason, Social Democrats who had been in touch with East German Communists were expelled from the party. In 1958-59 sixty-two expulsions occurred, the majority for 'Eastern contacts'.21 One of those expelled from the SPD, was Albert Berg who became a VUS leader and sat on the DFU's national executive committee. The SPD

20 Spiegel, 21.  
also adopted the Bad Godesberger Programme, and discarded its 'German Plan'. Some resignations and expulsions from the SPD occurred. Some of the latter Social Democrats united in the Zentralausschuss ausgetretener und ausgeschlossener Sozial- 
demokraten (The Central Committee of Social Democrats who had resigned or were expelled), which on 5/6 November 1960 founded the VUS. Shortly afterwards, the VUS joined into an electoral alliance with the DFU. 22

Unfortunately, little information is available concerning the composition of the SPD's electoral losses. However, the author suggests that it was composed of former KPD and GVP followers, as well as Social Democrats, and the former supporters of a number of other parties.

Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands

It has been estimated that about half the DFU voters consisted of former KPD followers. 23 It seems that a large number of these Communists realigned themselves to the DFU in 1961 after voting for the SPD in 1957. After the banning of the KPD in 1956 a majority of its supporters had aligned to the SPD. 24 As we have seen the SPD feared that the DFU would

22 Spiegel, 22.


attract its newly acquired Communist vote in 1961, and had tried to have the DFU banned. Some former KPD followers failed to vote in 1957 or spoiled their ballots, but, according to Stiefbold, voted DFU in 1961.25

Several sources of evidence indicate that the DFU enjoyed substantial Communist support. In Chapter II, it was shown that Communist influenced minor parties and pressure groups were directed by the East German regime to support the DFU in a form of national-party comprising the diverse opponents of the Federal Republic's foreign, defence and reunification policies. Also, former KPD leaders encouraged their followers to assist the DFU. An enquiry by the Verfassungsamt of the Federal Republic shows that 252 DFU functionaries were Communists or suspected Communists, as against 150 non-Communist functionaries.26 Three members of the DFU's Directorate publicly admitted that the party enjoyed Communist support, though two of them were not too happy about this state of affairs.27

25 Stiefbold, 401-02.
27 Ibid., 22.
The Gesamtdeutsche Partei (GVP) was founded in late 1952 and entered into an electoral alliance with the BöD for the 1953 Federal Election. No anti-Communist campaign was undertaken against the GVP, which has been described as a 'Christian' party, but the GVP's relationship with the BöD was criticized both inside and outside the party, for the latter was considered closely related to Communism. Though the alliance gained electoral support at the expense of most parties, its votes amounted to only 318,475.

During the last three years of the GVP's existence the party was divided into two camps. One camp wanted to continue functioning as a minor party in their opposition to German rearmament and in their support for German neutrality; the

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28 Kitzinger considers the GVP a party based upon Christian convictions. Dr. Heinemann, the leader of the party and a former CDU minister, was a President of the Synod of the Evangelical Church. Also, in Heinemann's words the GVP's clerical support consisted of "at least three leading Protestant Church dignitaries, fifteen professors of theology and hundreds of pastors". Uwe Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1960), pp. 53-54.

other camp wanted to join a major party to gain a voice in the Bundestag.\textsuperscript{30} Shortly before the 1957 Federal Election, the nuclear controversy provided the background which made it possible for the GVP, despite differences, to recommend its followers to support the SPD. Dr. Heinemann, a former CDU minister, and Frau Wessel, a former leading personality in the ZP, led a majority of the GVP's followers over to the SPD.\textsuperscript{31}

As was shown in Chapter I, in 1960 the SPD abandoned the policies which had originally attracted GVP support and caused the disbandment of that party. Dr. Heinemann and Frau Wessel nevertheless remained in the SPD. However, evidence suggests that some former GVP supporters deserted the SPD for the DFU, that is, some of the same individuals and organizations which had supported the GVP also assisted the DFU. Protestant clerics strongly supported the GVP and DFU (see Chapter II); the BdD was an electoral ally of the GVP and BdD; the Fraenkischer Kreis assisted the GVP and DFU (see Chapter II); and of the nine members of the DFU's national executive who had been affiliated to the GVP in 1953, eight voted SPD in 1957, and all joined the DFU in 1960/61.


\textsuperscript{31} Childs, p.99.
Adenauer's defence, foreign and reunification policies were opposed within the CDU/CSU from the early 1950's onwards, resulting in expulsions and resignations. The CDU also lost some votes to the GVP in 1953. Opposition to Adenauer's foreign policy was considered by the CDU/CSU not only an attack on policy but also an assault on the criterion of CDU orthodoxy. Opposition was discouraged and foreign policy became a question of party discipline.32

In the early fifties opposition revolved around Adenauer's rearmament and Western integration policies. Expulsions occurred but not on a mass scale. Catholic women who belonged to Communist influenced peace organizations were expelled from local party groups. Wilhelm Elfes, who was associated with Communists, was expelled in 1951. The same fate befell prominent CDU members who had associated themselves with non-Communist neutralist organizations.33 Some resignations occurred, notably Dr. Heinemann's. Two F.E.C. members resigned in this period, Maria von Kuehlmann, a member of the CSU Land Executive Committee, (1951), and Count von Westphalen, a member of a CDU district council (1952). Elfes, Heinemann, von Kuehlmann and von Westphalen became prominent leaders of


33 Heidenheimer, pp.211-212.
three minor parties whose reason for existence was opposition to Adenauer's policies. Heinemann became leader of the GVP; Wilhelm Ellefs eventually became chairman of the BöD; von Kuehlmann and von Westphalen are members of the Directorate of the DFU. In the 1953 Federal Election the CDU lost some votes to the GVP. An average of 4.3 per cent of voters who cast their second vote for the GVP cast their first for the CDU.\textsuperscript{34}

After the 1957 Federal Election, Adenauer attempted to implement his nuclear policy. This caused further opposition within the CDU/CSU resulting in some more expulsions,\textsuperscript{35} and may also have had electoral repercussions in the 1961 Federal Election among CDU/CSU voters who were alienated by Adenauer's nuclear policy. It is also possible that the DFU may have gained some votes from CDU/CSU voters, who after the erection of the Berlin Wall became disenchanted with Adenauer's policy for German reunion.\textsuperscript{36} In the 1961 Federal Election the DFU gained at least 12,000 possible CDU/CSU votes and most likely more. (see Table V)

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Hirsch-Weber, p.331.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Heidenheimer, p.212.
\item \textsuperscript{36} See p.69.
\end{itemize}
Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)

Little information is available concerning possible support for the DFU at the expense of the FDP. The DFU considered the FDP as an important source of potential support for the 1965 Federal Election; and the FDP during the 1961 election campaign apparently went out of its way to create the impression that a vote for the DFU was a 'wasted' vote by posting placards with the message that a vote for the DFU was a "wastepaper-basket vote". This attitude by the FDP suggests that it may have considered the DFU a threat to its own meagre support, though this does not necessarily follow. Some of the policies of the FDP after 1957 suggest the possibility that some FDP supporters, as some SPD voters, may have felt betrayed by the rapid switch in policy on the part of the FDP. It and the SPD supported the Kampf den Atomtod movement against Adenauer's plan to arm the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons. In 1959 the FDP published a plan for German reunification which was similar to that of the SPD, to which the DFU programme is indebted. By 1960 the FDP, as the SPD, had cast aside these policies. It may be possible that some FDP supporters reacted to the policy switch, as had SPD members and voters.

37 Lorenz Knorr and Carl Backhaus, Briefe an einen Sozialdemokrat. (Frankfurt: Lorenz Knorr, n.d.) pp.18-20.
Evidence for actual support for the DFU is limited. In 1961 the DFU gained 9,150 votes from electors who cast their first vote for the FDP which implies some actual or potential electoral losses for the FDP. (Table V)

**Nationalist and right-radical support for the DFU**

The DFU derived some members and voters from the nationalist and right-radical elements of the Federal Republic. Nationalist parties like the Nationale Partei Deutschlands and the Gesamtdeutsche Union; and right-radical parties like the Soziale Reichspartei and the Deutsche Reichspartei (DRP) opposed West German integration into the western alliance as a serious obstacle to German reunion, and advanced the policy of German neutrality between East and West.\(^38\) After the 1961 Federal Election, a group broke away from the DRP and established the Deutsche Freiheits Partei (DFP). In alliance with the right-radical Deutsche Gesellschaft (DG) it founded the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Unabhängiger Deutschen (AUD) in 1965. Its programme was similar to the DFU, but the latter refused to enter into an electoral alliance with the AUD because of its right-radical background.\(^39\)


camps provided a potential source of support, but the DFU had to compete for the support with parties of the two respective camps. This the DFU appears to have done by placing nationalists and right-radicals on its election lists for 1961.\footnote{Spiegel, 24.}

While the DFU refused to enter into an electoral alliance with the AUD, it did accept individual right-radicals as members, officers and candidates. In 1960, two right-radical groups, the \textit{Zur Sammlung der Reichstreuen} and \textit{Aktion 61}, proposed to establish an electoral alliance. The project did not materialize in part because of the death of Karl Heinz Priester, a former leader of the Hitler Youth. A neutralist group of \textit{Aktion 61} joined the DFU.\footnote{Richards, 577.} Georg Ebrecht, a former SS General, was chairman of the DFU District Committee of Kempton/Sonthof/Lindau where he stood as a DFU candidate in the 1961 Federal Election. Gerhard Bednarski, editor of the defunct neutralist \textit{Der Ruf} and connected with the DRP's \textit{Reichsruf}, and Erwin Pape, a former functionary of the right-radical anti-semitic \textit{Bund der Nationaler Studenten} (the student branch of the DRP), stood as DFU candidates in Lower Saxony,\footnote{Spiegel, 24.} where the neo-Nazi \textit{Socialist Reichspartei} had scored political breakthroughs in Landtag elections in 1951.
It is not known if the DFU gained electoral support from associates of the Zur Sammlung der Reichstreuern or Aktion 61, but it is possible that it attracted voters away from the DRP in 1961. It appears that the DRP was divided between the official conditional approach and the unconditional all-out approach towards neutrality of a group within the DRP. In 1962 it lost supporters who in turn founded the DFP. In 1965 the DFP and another party formed the AUD with a neutrality policy similar to that of the DFU. In the same year, the DRP and the splinter groups of other parties formed the National-demokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) which did not advocate neutrality. The presence of two former DRP associates, Pape and Rednarski, among DFU election candidates suggests that some DRP followers may have been dissatisfied with official policy. Perhaps it also suggests that there may have been a change of heart among the DRP leadership concerning neutrality, causing some of their followers to realign their support to the DFU. The latter may also have attracted some votes from the DG (see Table V), however there is no further evidence.

From the nationalist camp the DFU gained support from the newly established, neutralist Deutsche Volkspartei with which it entered into an electoral alliance in 1965.43

43 Richards, 583.
Information regarding these two parties is almost completely lacking. In 1961, 2,440 voters who cast their second vote for the DFU cast their first vote for the GDP which suggests losses of potential or actual support to that party. (see Table V) In 1961 the ZP failed to contest the election, eliminating another party which had opposed Adenauer's defence, foreign and reunification policies. The DFU may have gained some ZP support because of the similarity of party programmes of the DFU and ZP. In 1952 the ZP had lost support to the GVP, including Frau Wessel. At least two former ZP officers stood as DFU candidates in 1961, of which one was also a member of the DFU's national executive.

In its 1961 Election Programme, the DFU referred to its supporters as Christians, Socialists, Liberals and Conservatives. Five years later Communists were also added. These references may also apply to political parties: the CDU/CSU and GVP, SPD, FDP and the right-wing minor parties. Whether this is the case or not, the limited evidence presented suggests that electoral

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46 Heinrich Werner, "Rechenschaftsberichte", in Dokumentation: Der Dritte Ordentliche Unionstag 1965, (Koeln: Bundesvorstand der DFU, n.d.), p.35.
support for the DFU was diverse, and not merely restricted to the remaining hard core Communists of the Federal Republic. Evidence also suggests that although the DFU's electoral support was diverse much came from parties left-of-centre. Although the DFU tried, as we saw in Chapter I, to present the image of a national rather than a sectional party, its electoral support shows that it was a 'left-wing' party which managed to attract some support from the 'centre' and the 'right'.

47 Barnes, 903.
IV

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE 1965 FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE DFU

In this chapter the members of the Federal Executive Committee of the DFU (F.E.C.) are considered in terms of two personal features: their party affiliations prior to joining the DFU, and some of their social characteristics. The 60 member F.E.C. is elected by the Party Convention for a two-year term, with the exception of the ten chairmen of the DFU Land organizations, who sit on the F.E.C. ex officio. The F.E.C. is invested with the leadership (Leitung) of the national party. From their midst the F.E.C. members elect the 12 member Business Executive Committee (B.E.C.), and the five member Directorate who are part of the B.E.C. Data on 62 per cent of the F.E.C. members shows that all, except two had joined the party within one year of its establishment in late 1960, and that most of them also held office at the Land, district or local levels of the DFU party structure.
(Appendix II)

1 Unfortunately, the author was unable to collect sufficient relevant data on the executive committees of other parties to place the DFU leaders in the context of West Germany's party leaders.

Evidence suggests that the post-war party affiliations of the F.E.C. members tended to be issue orientated. That is, their support — including the DFU — was largely determined by the pursuit of a number of values: German reunion, anti-militarism and so forth. Intense adherence by individuals to political values makes them issue-orientated, and the degree of intensity is determined by the importance of the desired value.  

Issues, not candidates, party images or habits are

\[3\text{ See Chapter I. One question in the questionnaire to the F.E.C. members was: "Were you during the following periods (1949-60; 1961-65) politically persecuted or socially discriminated against because of your political beliefs?" The author assumed that willingness to endure discrimination for one's values corresponds to a high degree of intensity. "Intensity of want or preference is a psychological phenomenon, which can only be measured approximately and indirectly by postulating that certain observable behaviour corresponds to a degree of intensity." Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p.101. For the period 1949-60, 21 per cent of the respondents replied positively; in the period 1961-65, 56 per cent responded positively. The sudden increase in discrimination (based on self-evaluation) does not indicate sudden issue orientation on the part of F.E.C. members. Prior to 1961 some F.E.C. members restricted their activities to the secrecy of the ballot box, or the relative obscurity of insignificant pressure groups. Also, before 1961 the values of the F.E.C. members had the respectability of being associated with one of the two major parties. However, in 1961 by becoming closely and publicly associated with the DFU, they were more open to discrimination. The latter may have been encouraged by the DFU's connection with Communist forces. Over half the DFU's national leaders were discriminated against in the period 1961-65 and accepted this cost in the pursuit of the programme of the DFU.} \]
the basic focus of party choice.  

There is evidence of a direct correlation between F.E.C. members' support for parties, and the policies of the parties concerned. In the period 1949-61 F.E.C. members' support for a party tended to cease when it advanced policies which were opposed to those values now advocated by the DFU. F.E.C. members should not have supported parties which advocated policies contrary to their individual values, if the suggestion is to be valid that they were issue-orientated.  

An attempt

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5 An intervening variable is the question of intra-party opposition, which could both hinder and speed up realignment in response to programmatic changes. For example, if intra-party opposition to the official party line is tolerated issue orientated persons may continue in support of a major party, rather than affiliate themselves to a powerless minor party, in the hope that a change of party policy could be brought about in favour of the issue orientated person's values. On the other hand, if intra-party opposition is impossible a party's programmatic changes away from the given values may encourage the realignment of party affiliations. This latter factor appears to have encouraged realignment among F.E.C. members in the early and late 1950's. A problem is to determine whether former SPD supporters among F.E.C. members were issue orientated for most of the post-war era, or if they had just lately adopted this position. With former CDU/CSU and FDP followers this is less the case as the conflict between party programme and individual values occurred in the early 1950's. With SPD supporters the difficulty arises because until 1960 the party advocated policies which tended to correspond with the values of the issue orientated individual. During this period of about a decade SPD followers could well have supported the party for lengthy periods without necessarily being convinced opponents of rearmament and so forth. In other words, the test of issue orientation among SPD followers only
will be made now to summarize the fate of the issues among political parties before 1960 which were advocated by the DFU in 1961-65. This is followed by a survey of the party affiliations of F.E.C. members in relation to respective parties' programmatic changes and consistencies in which the values of the F.E.C. members were involved.

In the period 1950-61 the CDU/CSU — assisted by the BHE and DP, and until 1956 by the FDP — consistently pursued the policies of West German rearmament and her integration into the Western system of alliances, as a means towards speedier national recovery, security and eventual reunion. Some months before the 1957 Federal Election, the controversy over nuclear weapons was initiated by the Chancellor's search for such weapons for the Bundeswehr. This was a logical

occurred in the late 1950's. This difficulty can be partly overcome by reference to the pressure group membership of F.E.C. members before 1959-60, which will indicate if SPD followers had been issue orientated before the 'test', and therefore for the most part of the post-war era. Of the 14 F.E.C. members who had only supported the SPD in 1949-60, seven had been members of the Fraenkischer Kreis or the Deutsche Klub 54 since the middle 1950's. One of the fourteen F.E.C. members had been a member of the pacifist DFG since the early 1920's; another had been a district chairman of the VK's predecessor organization in 1956; and another F.E.C. member was a member of the IdK and a leading personality of the now defunct Kampfden Atomtod. In Chapter II it was suggested that all the above mentioned pressure groups were affiliated to the DFU in 1961-65, pursuing in co-operative action similar goals.

6 See Chapter I for a more detailed discussion and evidence of the relationship between West German parties in 1949-60 and the policies which after 1960 were advocated by the DFU.
progression of the Chancellor's policy that western strength (and West Germany's contribution to it) would act as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, and force the USSR out of her eventual relative weakness to allow German reunion. Opposition to Adenauer's foreign and defence policies was found within the CDU/CSU, but was not tolerated. The most powerful opponent of the CDU/CSU was the SPD. It, however, weakened its opposition in the middle 1950's by conditionally accepting the need for rearmament and western integration; renewed its opposition in 1957-59 under the impetus of the nuclear controversy, in which it was supported by the FDP; and finally in 1960, followed by the FDP, adopted the major policy tenets of the CDU/CSU. At the same time the SPD became intolerant of intra-party opposition to the official party line, resulting in the expulsion and resignation of party members. These former SPD members, as well as the followers of other parties, had since the early 1950's supported German neutrality, and opposed her rearmament. They felt that the USSR would only allow the reunion of a Germany which did not represent a military threat to her, and which once united would not strengthen the Western bloc against the Eastern bloc. Some of Adenauer's opponents also felt that a rearmed Germany would endanger democracy as Hitlerite generals would gain in influence. Also, the pursuit of national war readiness, in the form of the Emergency Laws, would be an infringement on individual liberties, and clear
the way for a possible dictatorship. Neutralists, pacifists, those afraid of a nuclear holocaust, Communists who wanted to weaken Germany's relationship with the West, and others, supported the parties in opposition to Adenauer. The parties were the banned KPD, whose followers for the most part voted SPD in 1957; the GVP and BöD (founded in 1952-3) whose electoral alliance of 1953 was not repeated because the GVP disbanded in 1957 suggesting to its supporters to vote SPD; the ZP which failed to contest the 1961 Federal Election; and the nationalist NPD and CDU, and the right-radical DRP, which in 1961 still opposed the rearment and foreign policies of the CDU/CSU.

In response to Adenauer's rearment and alliance politics after the 1949 Federal Election, two F.E.C. members resigned from the CDU/CSU. Of these, one had joined the CDU in 1946 and resigned in 1952 in protest against Adenauer's 'pact politics', rearment, and the CDU's refusal to accept the economic guidelines of the Ahler Programme. The other F.E.C. member had joined the CSU in 1945, and resigned in 1951 over the policies of rearment and western integration. In 1951 one F.E.C. member joined the ZP, and another was expelled from the KPD in 1952 for reasons which are not known.

In the first federal election after Adenauer's policy initiations, the GVP (in electoral alliance with the BöD) entered its first and last national election as an uncompromising supporter of neutrality and opponent of rearment. One of the F.E.C. members who had resigned from the CDU/CSU in 1951,
became a member of the GVP. Another F.E.C. member who had voted CDU in 1949 voted GVP in 1953 because he objected to the CDU's rearmament policy which "will cement the division of Germany". One F.E.C. member who had voted FDP in 1949, now voted GVP. Another F.E.C. member, whose party affiliations of 1949 are not known, voted GVP. The latter also attracted 2 Zweitstimmen, and a Erststimme of three F.E.C. members who had voted SPD in 1949. The SPD, while losing three votes to the GVP, gained a Zweitstimme from an F.E.C. member who voted CDU in 1949, both votes from a former FDP voter, and the support of a newly enfranchised F.E.C. member.

In 1954 with the assistance of the FDP, DP and BHE, the CDU/CSU altered the Basic Law to make rearmament possible. In response one F.E.C. member resigned her seat in the Land Parliament of North-Rhine Westphalia, because she could not defend Adenauer's rearmament policy. However, she remained a CDU member until Adenauer's nuclear policy of 1957.

In 1956 the KPD was banned and one F.E.C. member lost the party he had been a member of since the early post-war years. Shortly before the 1957 Federal Election the GVP disbanded.

7 For the voting record, and party membership of 38 F.E.C. members during the federal elections of 1949, 1953, 1957 and 1961, see Table VI.

8 In Chapter I it was suggested that the occasional conditional opposition of the SPD to Adenauer may have lost it some support to the GVP alliance whose opposition to Adenauer's defence and foreign policies was unconditional.
recommending its followers to vote SPD. Of the seven F.E.C. members who had supported the GVP in 1953, six voted SPD in 1957. The seventh F.E.C. member sat out the election because "there was no party for me to support. The establishment of the DFU was a 'God-send'". The SPD also gained the votes of an F.E.C. member who had voted FDP in 1949 and 1953, both votes of a CDU follower who had only cast one vote for the SPD in 1953, and the votes of three SPD supporters who had cast one of their two votes for the GVP. Two newly enfranchised F.E.C. members also voted SPD. While the SPD's opposition to nuclear weapons made it possible for GVP followers to support the party, one F.E.C. member resigned from the SPD in 1957 because it had persistently weakened its opposition to conventional rearmament and western integration. This SPD supporter was the first F.E.C. member to cut his links completely with the SPD. The BÜD fought the 1957 Federal Election independently supported by one F.E.C. member whose previous electoral affiliations are not known.

After the 1957 election, while Adenauer was in the actual process of seeking atomic weapons, the F.E.C. member, who in 1954 had given up her parliamentary seat in protest against conventional rearmament, resigned from the CDU. The SPD and FDP supported the Kampf den Atomtod movement against nuclear weapons. In 1959 in their respective 'German Plans' the SPD and FDP went in complete opposition to the CDU's reunification
and foreign policies. However, one year later both parties had aligned themselves to the basic tenets of CDU policy.

It is not known exactly when F.E.C. members tired of the policy adjustments of the SPD. At least two F.E.C. members considered the Bad Godesberger Programme as the breaking point;⁹ while two other F.E.C. members considered Wehner's Bundestag speech of July 1960 and the Hanover Party Convention as the breaking point.¹⁰ Several F.E.C. members openly opposed the party line and were expelled from the SPD. One F.E.C. member who had only joined the SPD in 1958 was expelled in 1959 for opposing what he considered a desire for atomic weapons, and the SPD's adoption of the CDU's reunification policies. In the same year a member of the Hamburg Parliament was expelled for contacts with East German Communists. In 1961 two further F.E.C. members lost their membership cards: one for openly opposing the SPD's foreign and nuclear policies; the other for rejecting the party's military policy and attitude towards the question of the Emergency Laws. Seventeen former SPD followers gave the following reasons for ceasing to support

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⁹ At Bad Godesberg the SPD eliminated the last vestige of Marxist terminology from its fundamental party aims (the first drawn up since 1925) concerning social and economic questions, and adopted welfarism instead. In the military sphere the party accepted unconditionally the need for national defence, and ceased to oppose military conscription.

¹⁰ After refuting its 'German Plan,' the SPD unconditionally accepted NATO and the need for 'modern' weapons.
the party. They were the SPD's:11

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<td>Adoption of CDU foreign policy</td>
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These replies suggest that the SPD's defence, foreign and constitutional (Emergency Laws) policies caused former SPD supporters to cut their links with the party, rather than the latter's acceptance of West Germany's membership of the EEC, or its adoption of new social and economic values in the Bad Godesberger Programme. Although the latter was unpopular

11 For details of questionnaire see Appendix I. The terminology 'adopted CDU policy' was based on statements frequently used in DPW literature, the spirit of which has been confirmed by several independent students of German politics. (see Chapter I). The questions on the Bad Godesberger Programme, DDR and Eastern policies, nuclear policy and emergency legislation were only put to party members (of which seven replied). The remainder of the answers were supplied by former SPD voters. On the question of nuclear policy one F.D.P. member failed to answer.
among SPD members, it was its acceptance of the need for national defence, rather than its new domestic values which caused the unpopularity. One F.E.C. member who had been a ZP member since 1951 joined the DFU because he was in agreement with the party's policy, and presumably because the ZP ceased to function as a party in 1961.

In summary:¹² the CDU/CSU which initiated the policies now opposed by the DFU - and the FDP which supported Adenauer until 1956 - lost their support among F.E.C. members early in the post war era (of nine supporters in 1949, four remained in 1953 and one in 1957); failed to gain the affiliation of newly enfranchised F.E.C. members, or support at the expense of other parties; and failed to regain lost support. On the other hand, the SPD which until 1960 advocated policies similar to those of the DFU, generally retained its members and voters (of eleven followers in 1949, ten remained in 1957); gained newly enfranchised F.E.C. members (one in 1953 and three in 1957); regained lost support (the three SPD voters who in 1953 divided their votes between the GVP and SPD, cast both votes for the SPD in 1957); and gained votes from the CDU/CSU, FDP and GVP. The latter, renowned for its uncompromising stand for neutrality and opposition to rearmament, gained the affiliation

¹² For the realignment pattern of the F.E.C. members' party affiliations in 1949, 1953, 1957 and 1961, see Table VI.
TABLE VI


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of F.E.C. Members</th>
<th>Federal Elections 1949</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1961</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F/V</td>
<td>S/V</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>VUS/DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>dfu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>dfu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>(1958) SPD</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>spd</td>
<td>spd</td>
<td>spd</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>spd</td>
<td>spd</td>
<td>gvp</td>
<td>spd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>gvp</td>
<td>spd</td>
<td>spd</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>spd</td>
<td>spd</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>spd</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>GVP</td>
<td>spd.</td>
<td>dfu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>cdü</td>
<td>cdü</td>
<td>spd.</td>
<td>dfu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>cdü</td>
<td>gvp</td>
<td>spd.</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>cdü</td>
<td>cdü</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>fdp (fdp or spd.)</td>
<td>spd</td>
<td>spd</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>fdp</td>
<td>fdp</td>
<td>spd</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>fdp</td>
<td>fdp</td>
<td>spd</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/v</td>
<td>gvp</td>
<td>n/v</td>
<td>UWG/DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/v</td>
<td>GVP</td>
<td>spd.</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>gvp</td>
<td>spd.</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>*</td>
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<td>ZP</td>
<td>DFU</td>
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<td>DFU</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>KPD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>KPD</td>
<td>KPD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>n/v</td>
<td>n/v</td>
<td>DFU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(voting behaviour not known, not)</td>
<td>(members of a political party)</td>
<td>DFU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38 (63.3 per cent of F.E.C. membership)

Key:  * not enfranchised  n/v non-voter
- no information  SPD party member
spd voter
of F.E.C. members who had not voted in 1949, and members
and voters from the CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD. When the GVP
disbanded in 1957, six of the seven F.E.C. members who
had supported it, voted SPD. Another F.E.C. member stood
as an election candidate for the BCD in 1957. One F.E.C.
member was affiliated until 1961 to the ZP which failed to
contest the 1961 national election. Two F.E.C. members
were members of the Communist party: one till 1952 when he
was expelled, and the other until 1956. Three statements
by F.E.C. members explaining their party affiliations support
the author's suggestion that the F.E.C. members were issue-
orientated. The three F.E.C. members explicitly state what
the party affiliations of F.E.C. members suggest: that
support for a party ceased when it advocated policies which
were contrary to the values which the DFU represented after
1960.

1. The F.E.C. member was not enfranchised in 1949,
but voted SPD in 1953 and 1957. "When the SPD
rejected its 'German Plan' at the Godesberger Congress,
I could no longer vote SPD. Until 1958 I was of the
opinion that once the SPD were strong enough, it would
be forced by its members to adopt a policy of peace
and understanding (towards Eastern Europe). However,
the opposite is true today, due to the SPD leadership."

2. The F.E.C. member voted CDU in 1949, and SPD in
1953 and 1957. "The persistent policy of rearmament
by the Federal Government drove me away from the CDU
and to the SPD. As it (SPD) came to look increasingly
like the CDU, I welcomed the establishment of a posi-
tively anti-militarist and democratic party."
3. The F.E.C. members voted CDU in 1949, CDU in 1953 and SPD in 1957. "The zigzag line (of his party affiliations) appears fickle. In truth, it is the pursuit of a political programme which first the CDU/CSU and then the SPD abandoned. The CDU, as is well known, voluntarily disbanded."

Another source of support for the author's suggestion that the F.E.C. members were issue-orientated, is the latter's pressure group membership prior to joining the DFU. About half the F.E.C. members belonged to pressure groups which advocated policies similar to those of the DFU some years before the party was founded: the Frankenischer Kreis, the Deutscher Klub 54, the IdK, VK, and DFG, the WD and Welfriedensrat as well as other peace, human rights and anti-militarist organizations. 13

Above, it was attempted to show why the F.E.C. members affiliated themselves to parties prior to joining the DFU. It is now attempted to show how they affiliated themselves to parties in the same period. For this task information is restricted to 39 F.E.C. members' political roles as voters (national level only), party officers, election candidates and public representatives.

Twenty of the 39 F.E.C. members had joined a party prior to DFU membership. Of these eighteen had been members

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13 Information on the F.E.C. members' pressure group affiliations is based on data derived from 40 F.E.C. members, or 66.6 per cent of the total membership. In Chapter II the pressure group membership of F.E.C. members was enumerated.
of a national party, and two of a Land party. Two of
the eighteen had been members of two national parties,
and a third had also joined a Land party. The length and
distribution of party membership was uneven, which can be
attributed to the issue-orientation of F.E.C. members and
to the dissolution of parties (GVP, KPD, ZP). Ten F.E.C.
members had joined the SPD (average length of membership
10.6 years); three the CDU/CSU (8.3 years); three —
including a former CSU member — the GVP (4.7 years); two
the KPD (6.5 years); one — a former SPD member — the VUS
(since 1960); and one had been a member of the ZP from 1951
to 1961. Five members of a national party were expelled —
four from the SPD in 1958-61, and one from the KPD in 1952.
Of the three F.E.C. members who had joined a Land party, one
was a member of the Wachlerverband Niedersachsen, which in
1961 was banned as a Communist front organization. The
other two F.E.C. members are still members of two respective
parties: the Demokratische Wachler Union of North-Rhine
Westphalia, and the Unabhängige Wachlerschaft of Lower
Saxony (formerly also a GVP member).

Thirteen, or 65 per cent, of the party members also
held official party positions. Among party members in general
it may be as low as 5-7 per cent. 14 Ten office holders

14 Douglas A. Chalmers, The Social Democratic Party of
Germany, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964),
p. 195. This figure only applies to the SPD, and as such
may not be representative.
occupied between them 16 intra-party positions: 12 in party organs at the higher levels of the respective party structures, and the other four at the lower levels.15 Six F.E.C. members were elected public representatives, three holding major legislative positions as federal and land legislators (of which there are about 1,600 in West Germany),16 and the other three minor elected offices as members of district and community councils (of which there are about 220,000 in the Federal Republic).17 Apart from the six elected public representatives, two other F.E.C. members had stood as candidates in national elections, and a third in a local election, while being members of a party. (see Appendix II)

Though 19 F.E.C. members had not joined a party before 1961, five of them had been active on behalf of a party. One F.E.C. member had stood as a candidate for the BdD in the 1957 Federal Election, another fought a local election (c.1953) for a local party, and a third F.E.C. member was active for the CDU in the 1949 Federal Election. A fourth

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15 The higher levels of the party structure are the Federal, Central, Land and District (excluding ZP) organs. The lower levels are the Kreis, Unter Bezirk, and Local organs. Of the latter there are about 9,100 in the SPD alone with about 45,000 party officers.


F.E.C. members had been adopted as prospective SPD election candidate for the 1961-62 series of local elections. And finally, a fifth F.E.C. member was active for the DFU after 1961 and joined the party in 1965 (see Appendix II). The remaining F.E.C. members, with the exception of one who had never voted before 1961 and several more who on occasions had abstained, were regular voters in national elections.

Although 18 F.E.C. members had supported a minor party (including a Land party) apparently few F.E.C. members had much experience in minor party politics or could be considered consistent minor party supporters. Six of the 18 F.E.C. members had only voted for a minor party in one Federal Election. Of the remaining twelve, one had been active on behalf of a minor party, nine had been party members, three had been party officers, five had been election candidates and two had been elected public representatives of a minor party. Nine F.E.C. members had been associated with a minor party for five years or less. Two of the nine had both supported a minor party at the local level and a federal party at the national level. Another two F.E.C. members had been officers of a major party before supporting a minor party. A fifth F.E.C. member had voted for a major party in 1949, 1953 and 1957, supported the DFU from 1961 onwards, and joined the party in 1965. There
is no information concerning four of the nine F.E.C. members other than that they had supported a minor party on certain occasions. Three F.E.C. members had regularly supported a minor party prior to joining the DFU. One of the three had been an officer of the ZP for ten years, and another of the GVP and UWG for about eight years. Neither had supported a major party. The third had been a member of the KPD for about twelve years, and a public representative for five years.

Data which unfortunately is restricted to 39 F.E.C. members (65 per cent of the total membership) suggests the following:

1. F.E.C. members' relationship with political parties in 1949-60 was issue-orientated: the issues were similar to those which the DFU represented after 1960. That is, F.E.C. members joined the DFU because it supported given values, as they had voted for or became members of other parties before 1960.

2. Half the F.E.C. members had been members of a party before joining the DFU. Of these party members 65 per cent had held official party positions, whilst among party members in general it may be as low as 5-7 per cent.

Experience in party affairs among these F.E.C. members was more frequent at higher levels of the party structure and in intra-party positions rather than as elected representatives.
3. About half the F.E.C. members were party activists before joining the DFU. 18

4. About half the F.E.C. members were apparently recruited into active party politics by the DFU. That is, the F.E.C. members who fulfilled only the role of voter, and the F.E.C. members who though party members, may not have been active on behalf of the party. 19

18 A party activist either takes part in the affairs of a party above minimal participation, which is defined as party membership, or is active for a party above minimal assistance, which is defined as voting. The concept of party activist is employed to differentiate between forms of political activity which is widespread — voting, party member, membership of voluntary organizations, and so forth — and a form of political activity which is restricted to a relatively small group of individuals in a polity. From this group, at least in major parties, the legislators and senior party leaders are recruited. Without further evidence, party membership itself does not indicate party activity, for the membership, as is frequently the case, could be nominal. Whether the father was a party member or not does not seem to have affected the frequency of party membership (a sign of predisposition towards party activity) among F.E.C. members prior to joining the DFU. Of 18 F.E.C. members who had joined a party before 1960, half had fathers who had been party members, and the remainder had not.

19 It is not known why the transfer from voter or passive party member to party activist occurred among these F.E.C. members. One possible explanation for this has been put forward by Levin in a more general context, who suggests that two aspects of political alienation — powerlessness (feelings of no influence upon political events) and meaninglessness (perception that no policy alternatives are provided for by existing parties — may increase political activity on the part of individuals. Murray Levin, "Political Alienation," in Eric and Mary Josephson, ed., Man Alone, (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 230-33.
5. For the most part, F.E.G. members were newcomers to, or had relatively little experience in minor party politics when joining the DFU. However, they (about 47 per cent) had shown a willingness to support a minor party before 1960.

6. The great majority of F.E.G. members were recruited at the expense of the SPD, which lost both regular and newly acquired members and voters.

Social Characteristics of F.E.G. members

Several items were included in the questionnaire to the 60 members of the F.E.G.: sex, age, geographical origin, social origin, educational achievements, social

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20 The model adopted for this purpose is Janowitz's, who divided West German society into four broadly defined strata (the so-called upper-middle class is included in the upper-middle class) which were categorized on a two-step basis. "First, it was assumed that social structure is basically differentiated by occupation and by relations to the means of production. Therefore, a person's occupation and his relation to the means of production could be used to distinguish between manual and non-manual occupations, that is, between the lower and middle classes. Second, within the lower and especially within the middle classes, differentiation into lower and upper strata, involves additional criteria, such as income, social prestige, and power. (pp. 9-10) The four strata are:

Upper-Liddle Class (comprises 4.6 per cent of population): professionals, managers and proprietors of larger establishments, and upper civil servants.

Lower-Liddle Class (38.6 per cent): minor officials, clerical and sales, smaller businessmen, independent artisans and farmers.

Upper-Lower Class (13.3 per cent): skilled workers and employed artisans.

Lower-Lower Class (38.6 per cent): semiskilled and unskilled workers, including farmhands.

Morris Janowitz, "Social Stratification and Mobility in West German American Journal of Sociology, LXIV, 1 (1958), 6-25."
class, occupation and military service. Fifty-eight per cent of the questionnaires were returned. Additional data were collected from DFU literature (see Table VII).

Table VII shows that F.E.C. members as a group occupied relatively prominent social positions. Almost two out of every three F.E.C. members belonged to the upper-middle class, including two members of the aristocracy. Two out of three were engaged in the more prestigious occupations. Over half the F.E.C. members were engaged in professional occupations with the teaching profession forming the largest single group (one out of every five F.E.C. members), and protestant clergymen were, perhaps, unusually strongly represented. More than half the F.E.C. members could be classified as intellectuals,21 supporting Greiffenhagen's contention that the DFU portrays the characteristics of a movement of intellectuals. 22 However, a sizeable minority

21 "I have considered as intellectuals all those who create, distribute, and apply culture, that is, the symbolic world of man, including art, science and religion. Within this group there are two main levels: the hard core or creators of culture — scholars, artists, philosophers, authors, some editors, and some journalists; and the distributors — performers in the various arts, most teachers, most reporters. A peripheral group is composed of those who apply culture as part of their job — professionals like physicians and lawyers. When Europeans speak of the intelligentsia, they mean all three categories." Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., 1963), p. 333.

22 Martin Greiffenhagen, "Die Intellektuellen in der deutschen Politik", Der Konst, XX (February 1968), 41.
of F.E.C. members lacked the social prominence of the majority. Nine per cent of them were working class, and 18 per cent lower middle class. Also, one out of every five F.E.C. members followed a white or blue collar occupation, and one F.E.C. member was a shopkeeper.

The average age of F.E.C. members was 51 years and 18 per cent were female. F.E.C. members were predominantly Protestant (63 per cent); one in five was a Catholic; and 17 per cent of them had officially relinquished their religious affiliations in adulthood. Seventy-eight per cent of the F.E.C. members were of middle-class origin, deriving from independent artisan and proprietary (27 per cent), civil servant (19 per cent), clerical (5 per cent) and farming (5 per cent) homes. The remainder of the F.E.C. members were the children of skilled and unskilled manual workers. The social origin of F.E.C. members is reflected in their educational achievements. Twenty-five per cent of them did not go beyond primary school. The remainder enjoyed a good or exclusive education: 11 per cent attended secondary school, 10 per

23 Percentages enumerated in the text are based on the sample of F.E.C. members of whom data are available. The sample = 100, ranging in size from 61 per cent to 100 per cent of the total F.E.C. membership. For details of data see Table VII.
cent institutions of higher education, and 48 per cent attended university. Seventy-nine per cent of the F.E.C. members were born in what is now the Federal Republic, and 21 per cent in Germany's 'lost territories'. Edinger and Deutsch suggest that the geographical origin of party leaders in the 'lost territories' contributes towards their strong desire for reunion. As only 21 per cent of the DFU's national leadership were born in East Germany, the Sudetenland or parts of present-day Poland, this variable does not explain the F.E.C. members' apparently strong desire for German reunion. About half the F.E.C. members served with the military. This suggests that military service may not be an important reason for explaining the recruitment of the anti-militarist DFU's national leaders.

A comparison of the 12 B.E.C. members and the remaining 48 F.E.C. members supports "the hypothesis that the social status of party leaders increases as one climbs the party ladder." A majority of F.E.C. members shared the socially


25 Gerald Pomper, "New Jersey County Chairman", Eastern Political Quarterly, XVIII (1965), 187. The 12 B.E.C. members (including the 5 member Directorate) are at the apex of the DFU's leadership structure. The F.E.C. is summoned by the Directorate, and may not meet frequently. The sheer size of the whole F.E.C. and its apparently infrequent meetings suggest that the smaller and full-time Directorate (and to a lesser extent the remaining 7 F.E.C. members) wield more authority in the party than F.E.C. members. Also, a survey of Ausweg shows that B.E.C. members are frequently publicized, while F.E.C. members are only infrequently mentioned.
prestigious characteristics of B.E.C. members (Table VII). However, a large minority of F.E.C. members who had not gone beyond primary school (32 per cent), with white or blue collar occupations (35 per cent) and lower-middle (23 per cent) and working (10 per cent) class status, results in the less prestigious social background of the F.E.C. members as a group.

Other differences are also found between B.E.C. and F.E.C. members. B.E.C. members were on average 5.5 years older; only 3 per cent of them were under 40 years of age (as opposed to 33 per cent of the F.E.C. members); and 42 per cent of the B.E.C. members were 60 or more years old (22 per cent among F.E.C. members). Women comprised 33 per cent of the B.E.C. members, and 18 per cent of the F.E.C. members. About twice as many B.E.C. and F.E.C. members (33 per cent against 15 per cent) were born in the 'lost territories' of Germany. Nearly three times as many B.E.C. members (in percentages) had relinquished their religious affiliations. Thirteen per cent more F.E.C. members had seen military service. However, this may be explained by the greater proportion of women among B.E.C. members. Proportionally the B.E.C. had four times as many members with proprietary and/or managerial experience as the remainder of the F.E.C., but both groups contained about the same percentage of professionals (see Table VII).
TABLE VII

Social characteristics of the F.E.C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>F.E.C. +</th>
<th>B.E.C. members</th>
<th>F.E.C. members</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>(4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Sample: 100%)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(12)</td>
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<td><strong>Age group</strong></td>
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<td>31-40</td>
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<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
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<td>51-60</td>
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<tr>
<td>60+ years</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>(5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Sample: 67%)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>(12)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Average age (1.1.1965)</strong></td>
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<td>55 years</td>
<td>49.5 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>(4)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>17</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sample: 67%)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentages are rounded. Data were derived from 35 returned questionnaires; Wahlprogramm der BFU, (Koeln: Bundesvorstand der BFU, 1965), pp. 17-18; Ausweg, IV, 7, (1965), 27-31; and "Spitzenkandidaten der BFU", Ausweg, IV, 8/9 (1965), 12-31.
### Characteristic
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>F.B.G. + B.E.G.</th>
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<th>F.B.G. members</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Professional and manager(^1)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>(6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proprietor</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Sample: 100%)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>99</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Upper-Lower</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Lower-Lower</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td><strong>Military Service</strong></td>
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<td>Served</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>(5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Did not</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sample: 60%)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 5 clerics, 3 lawyers, 4 doctors, 3 journalists, 7 headmasters and teachers, 5 academic professors, 1 researcher, 1 psychologist, 1 physicist, 1 veterinarian.

2 4 owners of larger businesses (two were also graduate scientists), 1 shopkeeper, 1 self-employed gardener, 1 publisher, 1 manager, 2 editor/journalists (one had been also a party bureaucrat until 1960; the other was a member of the Bundestag, 1949–61).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>F.E.G. +</th>
<th>B.E.G.</th>
<th>F.E.G.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Father's Occupation</td>
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<td>(8)</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proprietor and</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>independent artisan</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>and official</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>White and blue</td>
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<td>collar worker</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(11)</td>
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<td>Educational Achievements</td>
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<td>Higher Education</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(44)</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The F.E.C. and B.E.C. members also differed in other respects. Generally B.E.C. members not only possessed more social prestige than F.E.C. members, but they also tended to have more individuals among them with substantial political experience, and perhaps also political prestige. Though in the B.E.C. as among F.E.C. members there were individuals who had not held a party office prior to joining the DFU (see Appendix II). The only former Bundestag representative and two of three former Land deputys who sat on the F.E.C. were also B.E.C. members. Also, the former Federal Secretary of the 'Falken', as well as two former Land executive committee members, and two of three former Bezirk executive committee members sat on the B.E.C. The B.E.C. also differed from F.E.C. members in that only among its members are found individuals who held executive positions in the publishing business. 26

26 One B.E.C. member was until 1960 the Chief Editor of the Junge Gemeinschaft; another was the former managing director of the Oberfränkischer Druck und Verlagsgesellschaft and Chief Editor of the Oberfränkische Volkszeitung. Today he is the manager of the Westdeutsche Verlag. The latter two B.E.C. members direct the DFU's Ausweg. One B.E.C. member is the publisher of the Sozialistische Hefte; another B.E.C. member publishes the Frauenbriefe. And a fifth of the 12 B.E.C. members was a publisher of the Blätter fuer deutsche und internationale Politik, and is today a member of the journal's advisory committee as are two other B.E.C. members.
There is little evidence concerning the variables which determined the recruitment of F.E.C. members. However, three variables—social prestige, political experience (and perhaps political prestige), and influence in publishing circles—may have in part influenced the selection of B.E.C. members. Another variable, applying to F.E.C. members in general, may have been their representing on the national executive the interests supporting the DFU. Another variable may have been the desire to select a leadership with the right public image, by excluding some of the real leaders of the F.E.C. because they may be an electoral liability. 27 Undoubtedly Communists were influential in the affairs of the DFU. For example, more than half the DFU functionaries were Communists or suspected Communists (see Chapter III) who were frequently found in the DFU's less publicized Beiräte or advisory committees. However, in the F.E.C. itself (sample of 38 F.E.C. members) only two former KPD members are found (Table VI), and three possible Communists.

27 For example, the right-radical NPD prefers non-Nazis in its offices which are subjected to publicity, as they would better represent the democratic image of the party. Fred H. Richards, "Die nationale Opposition in der BRD 1965", Deutsche Studien, XVI (1965), 581.
Who was the typical F.D.C. member? He was, in his early 50's, of Protestant religion, born in West Germany into a middle class home. He enjoyed a good education, was a member of the upper-middle class, would be described as an intellectual, and he pursued a relatively prestigious occupation. His post-war party affiliations were issue orientated. Prior to joining the DFU in 1960, he was either very actively involved in party politics as a party officer or election candidate, or very little. But whether he was a party activist or not before 1960, he had had little experience in minor party politics, though he was most likely associated, however briefly, with a minor party at one time or another. The last party he supported before joining the DFU was most likely the SPD.
CONCLUSION

The DFU was founded in December 1960 at Stuttgart in West Germany. Following a frequent modus operandi of German minor party politics, the DFU entered into an electoral alliance with at least another six minor parties, and established a relationship with peace movements, organizations opposed to nuclear weapons, an intellectual circle, clerical groupings, a humanist organization and newspapers. The DFU opposed the Federal Republic's defence, foreign and constitutional policies as a threat to peace and democracy, and as a hindrance to German reunion. Its major policies were support for German neutrality, opposition to NATO and atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr, and protest against constitutional changes. In the 1961 Federal Election the DFU gained nearly 610,000 votes or 1.9 per cent of the votes cast. In the 1965 national election the DFU's vote dropped to 1.3 per cent, but electorally it remained the second most successful minor party. To date the DFU has only managed to fill about 50 of the 220,000 council seats in the Republic's local government structure, and it is not represented in either the Federal or Land parliaments.

The DFU's origin and support seem to have depended on it filling a representative gap created by left-wing
parties. Although a new party in 1960, the DFU's major policies were a decade old, having previously been advocated by the KPD, SdD, SPD, ZP, GVP, KPD, CDU, SdP and DSt. These parties, ranging from the extreme left to the extreme right, and the DFU shared a fundamental opposition to the Republic's military, political and economic integration into the Western system of alliances, and her military policies ranging from conscription to nuclear armament and emergency laws. These policies had been instituted by the CDU/CSU, and had been supported by the FDP (except in 1956-60), the DHE and the DP. The representative gap was not created by a changing environment requiring new policies which other parties failed to meet, but by the dissolution of three left-wing parties (ZP, KPD and GVP) and the SPD's adoption of the CDU/CSU's defence, foreign and constitutional policies. By 1960 only one left-wing party remained, namely the SdD which was considered incapable of attracting the future DFU followers. Three right-wing parties remained intact, but an aversion between Left and Right prevented them from filling the role of alternative party.

For three reasons the SPD fundamentally contributed to the rise of the DFU. First, when in 1960 the STD adopted the major tenets of the CDU/CSU's defence, foreign and constitutional policies, opposition to the latter was
almost absent among the remaining political parties. This state of affairs may have encouraged diverse groups to combine in the DFU to maximize the impact of their opposition, rather than splitting up into several parties of which every one would be politically impotent. Second, in 1967 the SPD had attracted a majority of the followers of the defunct NDP and GVP. When the SPD adopted CDU/CSU policies, its alienated followers not only were a large bloc of potential DFU followers, but they were also without an established and acceptable party to support. Third, while attempting to adopt CDU/CSU policies so as to be electorally competitive, the SPD refused to tolerate intra-party opposition to the official party line. This made opposition within the SPD impossible and/or fruitless, encouraging opposition to the SPD by creating a new party. ¹

The existence of a representative gap among left-wing parties, the continued functioning of right-wing parties, as well as antagonism between Left and Right, caused the DFU to rely mostly on the issue-orientated former followers of left-wing parties. About two out of every three DFU voters in 1961 had voted SPD in 1957. This large group of supporters included among others former GVP and NDP affiliates as well as Social Democrats. Communists seem

1 The intolerance of intra-party opposition to Adenauer's rearmament and alliance policies in the CDU/CSU contributed towards the establishment of the GVP and NDP.
to have represented the largest single group of DFU supporters. Nearly half the DFU vote had previously supported the KPD. Most, perhaps all, of the DFU's party allies were Communist front organizations, as were some of its pressure group affiliates. Also, nearly two-thirds of the DFU's functionaries were actual or suspected Communists. Unfortunately, the data are not available to determine whether the DFU was Communist-controlled, or if its leadership was based upon co-operation between Communists and non-Communists. If the latter was the case more information is needed relating to the balance of influence between the two forces.2

However, while a majority of the DFU's followers seem to have come from left-wing groups, its support was nevertheless diverse. The DFU's advisory councils and dual party membership were designed to accommodate a diverse following. The same was the case with the DFU's domestic

2 The break-up of several Communist front organisations in the 1950's was due to the fact that West German agents interpreted German disarmament differently from the organisations nationalist supporters. This seems to suggest that Communists had to consider the aspirations of their non-Communist affiliates if the two groups were to act together. The case of the GVP suggests that Communists and non-Communists were prepared to co-operate to a degree. In 1963 the non-Communist GVP entered into an electoral alliance with the SdD, a Communist front organization. The latter contributed towards election expenses. When the question of finance was raised, the GVP leadership expressed the opinion that it did not care from where the money came so long as there were no strings attached to it.
programme which was designed to prevent a sectional party image. Had the DFU relied exclusively on left-wing support, it may well have drafted a left-wing domestic programme. However, as its supporters were divided on economic matters, the DFU's domestic policies did not associate themselves with a group interest, but were drafted in a minimal, non-ideological manner so as not to detract support. The DFU gained votes at the expense of most parties, and its left-wing support was not homogeneous. In 1961 the DFU gained votes from the CDU/CSU, FDP, GDP, DRP and DG as well as from the SPD. Also, among the DFU's organizational allies were found parties and pressure groups which had traditionally been antagonistic towards one another: Communists and non-Communists; Communists and Social Democrats; Christians and Humanists; anti-clerics and Protestant clerics. The active support of the latter for the DFU may represent an unusual phenomenon in German minor party politics. Only the DFU and the defunct GVP seem to have shared this characteristic, and the former had inherited the clerical support of the latter. Clerical support for the DFU in 1961-65 and for the GVP in 1953-57 suggests that 'liberal' Protestant clerics were earlier and more politically
active than Edinger and Deutsch suggest. 3

The DFU referred to its supporters as Christians, Social Democrats, Communists, Liberals and Conservatives. 4 Barnes and his colleagues described the DFU’s support as consisting of the remaining core of Communists in the Federal Republic. 5 The evidence presented in this thesis favours the DFU’s description of its support, with the proviso that it tended to derive largely from the Left. While the conclusion of the Michigan group underlines an important characteristic of the DFU’s followers, it also implies a homogeneity of support which the author did not find.

One important question was not answered in this thesis because of lack of data and the scope of the task. What


functions did the DFU perform for its supporters? An answer to this question may tell us why the DFU attracted support although electoral success was most unlikely.

One suggestion is that some DFU supporters were not primarily concerned with electoral success. For example, in the Federal Republic intellectuals tend to establish and support minor parties as effective propaganda vehicles to influence the politics of other parties, rather than to compete for a share of political power. This is a pressure group rather than party politics, and with the absence of a comprehensive domestic programme, the DFU gives the appearance of a thinly disguised pressure group. Greiffenhagen considers the DFU as a possible 'intellectual's pressure group', and as we saw, about half the members of the largely upper-middle class, issue orientated F.D.C. were intellectuals with no previous record of party activity prior to joining the DFU. Also, Social Democrats may have viewed the DFU as a means of public opposition to SPD policy from without once intra-party opposition had been discouraged. While the latter may be described as 'constructive' protest voting (it is assumed that the Social Democrats

7 Ibid., 42.
were willing to return to the fold of the SPD after policy changes), the DFU may have also gained negative protest votes. For the latter and for 'intellectual' politics, electoral success by the DFU may not have been considered essential. On the other hand, Communists may have viewed the DFU as a means to gain parliamentary representation. However, propaganda value and the need to compete in Federal Elections to retain its followers who may become alienated by inactivity, may have also prompted the underground KPD to support the DFU. The author suggested that the DFU derived most of its support from issue-orientated individuals whose values it represented. This valid but broad assumption needs refining and re-enforcing with the aid of the above enumerated variables, and with others. For example, the role of 'transition party', that is, an electoral stepping stone for voters who due to socialization are prevented from directly realigning their support from one recognized enemy camp to another. Only such an embracing survey will satisfactorily show why the DFU attracted the individuals and organizations which this thesis attempted to enumerate.

---

APPENDIX I

Questionnaire to the 60 members of the DFU's F. E. C.

Wenn Ja oder Nein als Antwort steht, bitte das Betreffende NICHT durchstreichen.

zum Beispiel: Sind Sie Mitglied der DFU? Ja/Nein
Sind Sie Mitglied der CDU/CSU? Ja/Nein

1. Geburtsdatum...................... Geburtsort......................
Geschlecht.........................

2. Welche der folgenden Bildungsanstalten haben Sie besucht?
   i. Volksschule Ja/Nein; ii. Mittelschule (Gymnasium, Realschule, Handelschule) Ja/Nein; iii. Hochschule (Universität, Technische-, Pedagogische-, Kunst-, oder Musikhochschule) Ja/Nein.

3. Beruf..............................

4. Jährliches Einkommen..........

5. Konfession (Betreffendes unterstreichen)
   Evangelisch; Katholisch; Methodist; Baptist; Quäcker;
   Konfessionslos; Andere Religionsgemeinschaft.............

6. Geburtsort des Vaters..............................
   Sein Beruf..........................................................
   Seine Parteizugehörigkeit.................................

7. Haben Sie die Militärdienst geleistet? Ja/Nein

8. Sind Sie irgendwann in den folgenden Zeitabschnitten wegen Ihrer politischen Überzeugung politisch verfolgt oder gesellschaftlich benachteiligt worden?
   1933-45 Ja/Nein ; 1949-60 Ja/Nein ; 1961-65 Ja/Nein
9. Datum Ihres Beitritts in die DFU.

   i. Auf Landesebene.
   ii. Auf Bezirksbene.
   iii. Auf Ortsbene.

11. Haben Sie fuer die DFU kandidiert? Ja/Nein; Wenn Ja -
   i. Bundestagen Ja/Nein; ii. Landtagswahlen Ja/Nein; iii. Lokale Wahlen Ja/Nein.

12. Haben Sie fuer eine andere Partei kandidiert? Ja/Nein
   Wenn Ja - Welche Wahlen.

13. Sind Sie, seit 1945, Mitglied einer der folgenden Parteien gewesen?
   i. SPD von ........... bis ...........
   ii. CDU/CSU von ........... bis ...........
   iii. FDP von ........... bis ...........
   iv. irgend eine andere Partei (bitte, Namen der Partei und Period der Mitgliedschaft)
      ...........................................
   v. Haben Sie in dieser Partei ein Amt innegehabt? Ja/Nein
      Wenn Ja - Welches Amt...

   i. eine den Frieden foerdernde Organisation.
      ..........................................
   ii. eine Organisation fuer Voelkerverstaendigung.
      ........................................
iii. eine Organisation zur Wahrung der Menschenrechte

iv. eine Organisation, die bewusst zur politischen Bildung des Volkes im demokratischen Sinne beitragen will.

15. Sind Sie Mitglied einer Gewerkschaft? Ja/Nein

   Wenn Ja- Haben Sie, oder hatten Sie, ein Amt in der Gewerkschaftsorganisation inne? Ja/Nein

   Wenn Ja- Welches Amt.................................

16. Warum sind Sie aus der Partei ausgetreten, der Sie angehörtet, bevor Sie in die DFU eintraten? Aus welchen Gründen?

   i. wegen der begehrten atomischen Wiederaufrüstung? Ja/Nein
   ii. wegen der DDR-Politik? Ja/Nein
   iii. wegen der Osteuropa-Politik? Ja/Nein
   iv. wegen NATO-Politik? Ja/Nein
   v. wegen der EWG-Politik? Ja/Nein
   vi. wegen der Wirtschaftspolitik? Ja/Nein
   vii. wegen der sozialen Politik? Ja/Nein
   viii. wegen dem begehrten Notstandsgesetz? Ja/Nein
   ix. wegen anderen Gründen?

17. Wenn Sie früher Mitglied der SPD gewesen sind, welche besondere Veränderungen im Parteiprogramm, in der Zeit von 1953 bis 1965, haben Sie veranlasst, aus der Partei auszutreten?

   i. Annahme des Prinzips der gemeinsamen Außenpolitik? Ja/Nein
   ii. Annahme des Prinzips der gemeinsamen Verteidigungspolitik? Ja/Nein
   iii. Wirtschaftliche Aspekte? Ja/Nein
   iv. Sozialpolitische Aspekte? Ja/Nein
   v. wegen der Annahme des Bad Godenberger Programms? Ja/Nein
   vi. wegen anderen Gründen?
Fragebogen für P.K.P. Mitglieder, die nicht vorher in einer politischen Partei gewählt waren

Sie haben Sie gewählt?

Zutreffendes unterstreichen

<table>
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<th>ERSTSTIMME</th>
<th>ZWEISTIMME</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>einmal</td>
<td>einmal</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Bundestagswahl 1949

CDU/CSU SPD FDP KPD

Haben Sie früher eine andere, hier nicht angegebene, Partei gewählt? (den Namen der Partei bitte angeben)

Bundestagswahl 1953

CDU/CSU SPD FDP / KPD GVP

Haben Sie früher eine andere, hier nicht angegebene, Partei gewählt?

Bundestagswahl 1957

CDU/CSU SPD FDP

Haben Sie früher eine andere, hier nicht angegebene, Partei gewählt?

Bundestagswahl 1961

CDU/CSU SPD FDP DP

Haben Sie früher eine andere, hier nicht angegebene, Partei gewählt?

Wenn Sie früher für eine Partei gewählt haben, welche Veränderungen im Parteiprogramm in der Zeit 1957-61 haben Sie veranlasst, in die DP inzutreten?

i. Annahme des Prinzips der gemeinsamen Außenpolitik? Ja/Nein
ii. Annahme des Prinzips der gemeinsamen Verteidigungs- politik? Ja/Nein
iii. Wirtschaftliche Aspekte? Ja/Nein
iv. Sozialpolitische Aspekte? Ja/Nein
v. wegen NATO? Ja/Nein
vi. wegen EWG-Politik? Ja/Nein

Bitte, Ihre Anmerkungen
APPENDIX II

Party membership, party activity and voting behaviour of F.E.C. members in the period 1945-65

Key:
- ECH = executive committee member
- C = chairman of party organization
- DC = deputy chairman of party organization
- EC = election candidate
- /H = party member
- /V = voter in the 1949, 1953 and 1957 Federal Elections
- N/V = non-voter in the above Federal Elections

A. Period prior to DFU membership

<table>
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<tr>
<td>1. Arno Behrisch</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Albert Berg</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Gertrud Bienko</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Dr. Sophie Kirchhof</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Lorenz Knorr</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Hira von Kuehlmann</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Prof. Dr. Renate Riemeck</td>
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<td>No.</td>
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<td>21.</td>
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<tr>
<td>22.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.K.G. member</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>24. Prof. Ernst Roettger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Horst Schatte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Prof. Dr. Franz Paul Schneider</td>
</tr>
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<td>27. Ernst Schwiethal</td>
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<td>28. Fritz Trunz</td>
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<td>29. Prof. Eckardt Vogt</td>
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<td>31. Hilde Westphal</td>
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**B. Period of DFU membership**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F.U.C. members</th>
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<td>1.</td>
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<td>16.</td>
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* Numbers correspond to those given to individual F.U.C. members in Section A.
<table>
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