THE LETTER FROM ANTIOCHUS III TO ZEUXIS

(JOS. AJ 12.147-153)

AND ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT

By

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Abstract

This thesis sets forth to prove that the letter from Antiochus III to Zeuxis preserved by Josephus (AJ 12.147-153) is authentic. The authenticity of the letter has been the subject of much scholarly debate, all of it focussed on the style and vocabulary of the text itself. Since this approach has failed to provide a compelling argument, this thesis will use a different approach, and attempt to fit the letter as a whole into its historical context. The underlying premise is that, in the absence of a compelling argument for forgery, if the letter matches the general historical context in which it was produced, then it should be considered authentic.
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Introduction

In the twelfth book of the *Jewish Antiquities*, Josephus digresses from his narrative of Antiochus III’s conquest of Coele Syria to introduce three documents of that same king that deal with the Jews.¹ He produces these as proof of the “friendship” which Antiochus III held toward the Jews within his kingdom.² The third document in the set, a letter from Antiochus III to his viceroy Zeuxis, is introduced as one in which Antiochus bears witness to the “piety and loyalty” of the Jews. With the introduction, the whole passage reads:

`Ἐγραψε δὲ μαρτυρῶν ἡμῖν ἐυσέβειάν τε καὶ πίστιν ἡνίκα νεωτερίζοντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν Φρυγίαν καὶ Λυδίαν ἐπύθετο καθ’ ὅν ἦν καίρων ἐν ταῖς ἀνω σατραπείαις, κελεύων Ζεύξιν τὸν αὐτὸν στρατηγὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα φίλων πέμψῃ τινὰς τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐκ Βαβυλῶνος εἰς Φρυγίαν. γράφει δὲ οὕτως: “Βασιλεὺς Αντίοχος Ζεύξιδι τῷ πατρί χαίρειν. εἰ ἔρρωσαι, εὖ ἄν ἔχοι, ὑγιαῖν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς πυνθανόμενος τοὺς ἐν Λυδίᾳ καὶ Φρυγίᾳ νεωτερίζοντας, μεγάλης ἐπιστροφῆς ἡγησάμην τούτῳ μοι δειοῦσαι, καὶ βουλευσαμένῳ μοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων τί δὲ ποιεῖν, ἔδοξεν εἰς τὰ φθορία καὶ τοὺς ἀναγκαιοτάτους τούποις τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Μεσοποταμίας καὶ Βαβυλωνίας ἱουδαίων οἶκους δισχιλίους σὺν ἐπισκευῇ μεταγαγεῖν. πέπεισμαι γὰρ εὖν οὕτως αὐτοὺς ἔσσεθαὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων φύλακας διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἐυσέβειαν, καὶ μαρτυρουμένους δ’ αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων εἰς πίστιν οἶδα καὶ προθυμίαν εἰς ἄ παρακαλοῦνται· βουλομαί τοῖν, καίπερ ἐργώδους ὄντος τούτους μεταγαγεῖν, ὑποσχόμενος, νόμιμος αὐτοὺς χρῆσατο τοῖς ἱδίοις, ὅταν δ’ αὐτοὺς ἀγάγης εἰς τοὺς προειρημένους τόπους, εἰς τε οἰκοδομίας οἰκῶν αὐτοῖς δῶσεις τόπον ἕκάστῳ καὶ χώραν εἰς γεωργίαν καὶ φυτεῖν ἀμπέλων, καὶ ἀτελεῖς τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς καρπῶν ἄνησες ἐπὶ ἐτη δέκα. μετερεύθησαν δὲ καὶ, ἀρχὴς ἀν τοὺς παρὰ τῆς γῆς καρποὺς λαμβάνωσι, ὅταν εἰς τὰς τῶν θεραπόντων διατροφὰς· διδόσω δὲ καὶ τοῖς εἰς τὰς χρείας ὑπηρετοῦσι τὸ αὐταρκεῖς, ἄν τῆς παρ’ ἡμῶν τυγχάνοντες φιλανθρωπίας, προθυμότερος παρέχωσιν αὐτοὺς περὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα. Πρόνοιαν δὲ ποιοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐθνοῦς κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, ὅπως ὅποιοι ἐνοχληθήται.

He (Antiochus III) wrote, bearing witness to our piety and loyalty. When he learned of the disturbances in Lydia and Phrygia while he was in the upper satrapies, he commanded Zeuxis, his official and among them (officials) one of his closest friends, to send some of our people from Babylon to Phrygia. He wrote as follows: “King Antiochus to Zeuxis, his father, greetings. If you are well, then that is good, I am well myself. As I have learned that those in Lydia and Phrygia are creating disturbances, I consider this to require a serious response on my part; after taking council with my friends about what to do, I have decided to move two thousand Jewish households, with their possessions, from Mesopotamia and Babylonia to the fortified communities and most important places. For I believe they will be loyal guards of our territory because of their piety to god, and I know that testimony about their loyalty and eagerness to do what is commanded has been given by my ancestors. Therefore, I wish, although this is a troublesome matter, to transport them, since I have promised it, and for them to use their own laws. And when you bring them to the aforementioned places, give to each of them a place to build a house, and land for cultivation and for growing vines, and exempt them from taxes on the produce of the land for ten years. And until they can harvest their crops, let them measure out grain to feed their servants. Let sufficient support also be given to those engaged in service, so that, since they have received benefits from us, they will more eagerly support our affairs. And give as much forethought as possible to their nation, so that it is not troubled by anyone

On its surface, the letter is an order (prostagma) from a king to one of his officials. In this case, it is an order to establish colonies of Babylonian and Mesopotamian Jews in Lydia and Phrygia. Superficially, there is little that is suspicious in this. Royal orders in the form of a letter to an official are a well-known phenomenon, and the use of Jewish colonists by one of the Hellenistic monarchies is not without precedent. Despite that, some scholars believe that this letter is the invention of a later

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Jewish author, from whom Josephus appropriated it. This too seems natural enough, since Josephus is using it to prove a point about Jewish loyalty. Antiochus III certainly never set out to offer proof of Jewish piety and loyalty, and the fact that this letter seems to do so makes it suspect.

The authenticity of this letter, and of the other documents attributed to Antiochus III by Josephus, was a subject of considerable debate in the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries and even before. Elias Bickerman traced the beginnings of that debate back as far as the sixteenth century. Many scholars refer to the letter as evidence, and sometimes comment briefly on its authenticity. There have been four major discussions of the letter’s authenticity, that is, works that make this topic an end in itself. These are the studies of Bickerman, Schalit, Willrich, and Gauger.

These discussions have not brought about any sort of consensus on the authenticity of the letter. Even Gauger’s exhaustive study was not readily accepted. This uncertainty raises significant problems in the way that this document is used, and not used, as evidence for studies on other topics. For example, Bickerman, in his *Institutions des Seleucides*, uses the letter as an example of the typical decision making procedure of

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4 E. Bickerman, “Une question d’authenticité: Les privilèges juifs,” in *Studies in Jewish and Early Christian History II* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980) 24-43. These arguments were by-products of the tendentious debate over the authenticity of the documents in the books of Maccabees.

the Seleucid court. Similarly, both Bouché-Leclercq and Bengston use it to establish Zeuxis’ role within the Seleucid administration of the late third century BCE with no reference to whether the document is authentic or not. By contrast, Beloch refuses to use the letter as evidence. He acknowledges that the document runs counter to the argument he is constructing about patterns of Hellenistic colonisation, but simply dismisses the evidence as “eine plume Fälschung” without any discussion of the topic. Both approaches, the seemingly blind acceptance and rejection of the document, are unproductive and undermine the arguments built upon them.

The document enjoys a unique place in discussions of colonisation and settlement patterns. The letter is the only source that directly outlines the process of founding a colony. As such, the letter is a potentially invaluable piece of evidence for those interested in Seleucid colonisation and Hellenistic colonisation in general. Cohen, in his book on the subject, acknowledges this and uses the document extensively, but he shies away from arguing that the letter is authentic. Instead he gives a lengthy footnote, citing

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6 E. Bickerman, *Institutions des Séleucides* (Paris; P.Geuthner, 1939), 189. This is, perhaps, less of a problem in Bickerman’s work, since his discussion of the authenticity of these documents preceded this book, though it is not mentioned.


8 K. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, vol 4.1 (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1925), 266. Beloch’s argument is that the colonists used by Hellenistic monarchs are almost exclusively Greek. The use of Jewish colonists by Antiochus III would, of course, undermine that argument, as does his use of colonists drawn from the central Iranian tribe of the Kardakes to populate another settlement. See below, page 45.

some of the bibliography on either side, before stating that, even if the document is forged, what is laid out in the letter must still adhere to the standard practice.\(^{10}\) He takes a similar approach to the document in his much later work on Hellenistic colonisation, treating the settlements themselves as genuine, even while he allows that the letter may not be.\(^{11}\) Similar arguments were made by Schürer, Tarn, and Bengston.\(^{12}\) The approach is attractive, but it is in no way obvious that this letter is accurate in most of its details and that these colonies are genuine if the letter is a forgery. In all of these cases, the letter is taken as valid simply because it is the only piece of evidence which can explain a given phenomenon. It is the only document that explains something of the origins of the Jewish Diaspora in Asia Minor, and the only piece of evidence that bears directly the process of founding a colony. This dilemma is part of the motivation for this study. This document could be very valuable evidence, but it would be dangerous, and poor methodology, to simply assume that the evidence is valid because it is so valuable.

There have been several works that make the authenticity of the letter a topic of discussion in its own right. Willrich made one of the first large-scale cases for forgery. The lynchpin of his argument is that the letter fails to name the specific locations to

\(^{10}\) Ibid., 6.


which the Jewish colonists were to be sent. Wellhausen dismissed the letter with the same argument. Willrich argues that this is out of keeping with standard practice in such documents, which is to be as specific as possible in order to avoid confusion. He also argues that a forger would want to avoid giving any specifics, since specific data would make it easier to discover the falsification. After making his brief case for forgery, Willrich argues that the letter was forged in the late-first century BCE, and modelled on the colony of Babylonian Jews settled in Batanaea by Herod I. Finally, he notes that there was no historical context of disturbances in Lydia and Phrygia, and that this detail was also borrowed from Herod’s colony.

Not everyone agrees, however, that absence of specific place names is necessarily problematic. Even Bevan, who also doubts the authenticity of the letter, cannot agree with Willrich, saying that if forged, the forger managed to copy the standard style and content of these letters perfectly. Tcherikover took issue with Willrich’s argument more directly, saying that the omission of specific place names was perfectly reasonable. Accepting Josephus’ statement that the letter was composed during Antiochus’ campaign in the upper satrapies, Tcherikover reasons that Antiochus did not

15 Willrich, 20, 23.
16 Ibid., 23.
17 Ibid., 23.
name specific places because he did not know the specifics of the situation and preferred
to leave that to his lieutenant in Asia Minor. He also allows that Bickerman’s earlier
defence of the letter’s authenticity is still convincing.

Of the two large-scale defences of the letter’s authenticity, the earlier one is that
of Bickerman. His arguments are mostly negative, and focus on the *cui bono* question,
which is largely ignored by both Gauger and Willrich. He argues that a forged letter from
a Seleucid king would have been of little value in Asia Minor after Antiochus III
evacuated the region; the Roman senate did not respect privileges or charters granted by
the Hellenistic kings, which means that the forger could only have intended to use it to
impress the Attalid kings. But the Attalids, too, would have little reason to respect
Seleucid decisions or to be pleased by a reminder of how loyal their subjects were to their
former kings. While Bickerman allows that some details of the language, such as the
use of the singular rather than the royal we, may have been changed in transmission, he
rejects the notion that the document was altered for “propaganda” purposes. The letter
has very little value in this direction. Documents invented for this sort of purpose usually

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21 Ibid., 30.
22 Eumenes II makes it quite clear that he does not consider Seleucid grants valid
in his letter to the people of Toriaion (See below, page 82 ff.). This is not to say that an
Attalid would not, upon gaining control of new territory, grant a community the same
privileges it had enjoyed under the Seleucids as a way of ensuring loyalty (see below
page 48-51), only that a document outlining privileges granted by Antiochus III could not
guarantee that those privileges would continue under another regime and still less that
they would be reinstated if allowed to lapse in the interim.
23 Bickerman, “Une Question d’authenticite,” 35.
come with stories invented to drive the message home and put the document in context.\textsuperscript{24} The Zeuxis letter lacks any such details and without Josephus' assertion that this is meant to show Antiochus III's favour for the Jews, it has little obvious "propaganda" value. After establishing that the document was not altered intentionally, Bickerman says that the stylistic oddities could be explained if the letter were written by Antiochus III's son of the same name and attributed to the father on the analogy of the other letters.

Schalit made a more recent and lengthier defence of the letter's authenticity. His discussion is also the first to include a commentary on the whole text of the letter.\textsuperscript{25} Shalit takes a more positive approach to proving the letter's validity than does Bickerman. He argues that, superficially, the style and the structure of the text fits with what could be expected in a letter of this sort and that any of the specific phrases in the letter that may have seemed suspect are also legitimate.\textsuperscript{26} Among other points, he says that Antiochus' statement that he is convinced of the Jews' loyalty διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐσεβείαν is acceptable. He allows that Holleaux's emendation to τὸ θεῖον is reasonable, and that this phrase has several parallels in Hellenistic decrees, but says that such an emendation is not necessary, since Hellenistic kings were perfectly willing to refer to the god of the Jews simply as ὁ θεός.\textsuperscript{27} He also points out that there are parallels for connecting Jewish piety to Jewish loyalty and discusses the role of Jewish soldiers in the Hellenistic armies. Schalit assumes that the settlers in question are some of Antiochus'
veterans, and he offers evidence for use of Jewish soldiers, even though they are never named in the list of contingents for Antiochus’ armies in Livy and Polybius.  

Most recently, the letter has been the subject of an exhaustive study by Gauger in his doctoral dissertation and a later article. He devoted half of his dissertation to proving that the Zeuxis letter was a fabrication and the other half to doing the same for the treaty between Rome and the Jews presented in the first book of Maccabees. Gauger’s argument against the authenticity of the letter is built almost entirely on the basis of peculiarities in style and language, and differences from the familiar, inscribed, royal letters collected by Welles. In the letter, Antiochus speaks in the first person singular. Gauger points out that the use of the singular, rather than the royal we, is without parallel in Seleucid royal correspondence, and also that the opening “health-wish” is anachronistic and did not come into use until the next century. The real crux of his argument rests on the fact that Antiochus addresses Zeuxis as his “father.” This is also without precedent in Seleucid royal correspondence of the time and, he argues, is out of place at any time for addressing someone who is not at the same time the chief official of the kingdom, a close friend, and much older than the king. He argues that Zeuxis does not fit these criteria, and that, even if he did, Hellenistic kings did not begin referring to

28 Schalit, 295-301.
29 J-D. Gauger, Beiträge zur Jüdischen Apologetik (Cologne: Peter Hanstein Verlag, 1977), 135-6 and 139ff. At another point in his dissertation, Gauger concedes that there is one example of the singular style, used by Antiochus the son in a letter to Magnesia on the Maeander (RC 32). Gauger also concedes, in a later article, that the “health-wish” has precedents as well.
30 Ibid., 83ff.
31 Ibid., 83-133.
their officials as πατὴρ, or even συγγενής, until the second century BCE. Antiochus III’s son, also named Antiochus, who served as co-regent would fit the age criteria, but Gauger argues that he did not have the personal relationship with Zeuxis, or the authority to act on such an important matter.32

Gauger presented his argument on this point twice, first in his monograph of 1975 and again in article in *Hermes* from 1993.33 In his monograph, Gauger argued for a date of composition in or after the second century BCE.34 In his later article, Gauger acknowledged that his assertions about the formula of the health wish, and about Zeuxis’ position in Asia Minor were incorrect, but reasserted his belief that the “father” address is a clear sign of forgery.35 He also further refined his estimate for the date of composition to sometime around 80 BCE.36 The emphasis on Jewish loyalty makes the document fit best with Jewish apologetic of that period, and that a piece of apology that invokes Antiochus III would be of little benefit after 63 BCE, when the Seleucid line died out.37 The question that is never clearly addressed in either work is the one focussed on by Bickerman, that of *cui bono?* Gauger narrowed the forger down to someone from Asia Minor from the early first century BCE, but never clearly outlined what use the forger

32 Ibid., 141-2.
34 Gauger, *Beiträge*, 146.
36 Ibid., 68.
37 Ibid., 69.
could have made of this document in a region that had been outside of Seleucid control for over a century.

All of the discussions outlined above, whether assailing or defending the authenticity of the letter, have focussed on matters internal to the letter itself: specific words and phrases, peculiarities of style, or what is omitted.\textsuperscript{38} This thesis sets forth to do the reverse; since all of the internal peculiarities have been examined and discussed to no avail, it will focus on what one might call the “external” features of the letter.\textsuperscript{39} It will return to a superficial of the letter as an order from a king to one of his officials to found colonies in Asia Minor to deal with local disturbances. As such, if the letter accords with the historical context of Antiochus III’s reign, that will suggest that it is authentic.

The first chapter will deal with the Seleucid administration and how a letter such as this would fit into that administration. This document purports to be an order from the Seleucid king to one of his officials; in this case, that official is Zeuxis son of Kunagos, who is introduced by Josephus merely as one of Antiochus’ strategoi and one especially close to him.\textsuperscript{40} The question here, and the question which Gauger fails to discuss while dealing with the address of the letter, is whether the sending of such a letter as this to this particular individual, was consistent with the pattern of Seleucid administration in Asia Minor. The focus of this section, rather than strictly on the address of the letter, will be on what is known of the career of Zeuxis outside of the letter. The letter expects a lot

\textsuperscript{38} The only exception is Bickerman, who questions the omission of a contrived back-story to go along with the letter.
\textsuperscript{39} This is Schalit’s terminology, 292.
\textsuperscript{40} AJ, 12.148.
from its recipient; it assumes that he will have the authority to give orders and act freely in two of the biggest administrative divisions of Asia Minor, and to deal with other matters as well. In examining Zeuxis’ career, we shall see that, as viceroy (ὁ ἀπολελειμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιόχου ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιτάδε τοῦ Ταύρου πραγμάτων) of Asia Minor, he was the man to whom a letter such as this would be sent. He had the authority to deal with administrative matters that required him to act in more than one satrapy, which no other official in Asia Minor had. We also have at least one clear parallel for an administrative act like the one in the letter, where Zeuxis was the only person contacted by the King in order to implement a policy for the whole of Asia Minor.

The second chapter will move beyond the administrative process to look at the content of the order. At its base, the letter gives a detailed order to Zeuxis to found a colony or colonies in Asia Minor. It is not possible to try to fit this letter into what we know of the actual procedure of Seleucid colonization, since this is the only document that relates to the process. Instead, the methodology will be to compare the colonies ordered by this letter to what we know of Seleucid colonization, and, in particular, Antiochus III’s other known colonies. What is laid out in the letter, in terms of the land grants, their diversity, and the tax exemptions has close parallels to arrangements made for the other two colonies known to have been founded by Antiochus III. The use of ethnically homogenous colonists to secure a troubled area also has precedents in Antiochus’ colonial policy. These parallels, and the way that the order matches the Seleucid administration, make it very likely that the document in question is genuine.

41 Cohen, *Seleucid Colonies*, x.
Since the policy laid out in the order matches the colonial policies of Antiochus III, and the way that the order is issued and transmitted matches the Seleucid administrative system, this is a letter that could have been sent. There are no major grounds for dismissing it based on its content. The final matter is to find a historical context for the letter. The letter itself advises us of the situation, saying that it was motivated by Antiochus learning that τοὺς ἐν Λυδίᾳ καὶ Φρυγίᾳ νεωτερίζοντας. The final chapter will set out to attach some specific meaning to this. First it will consider what is meant by νεωτερίζοντας, second, who the τοὺς ἐν Λυδίᾳ καὶ Φρυγίᾳ were, and third, point out one possibility for an actual location of the settlements.

All together, this will make a strong case for authenticity. The basic content of the letter offers no reason to suspect forgery, and the peculiarities in style can be explained as the result of it being transmitted through various hands even before it reached Josephus. The seemingly strange emphasis placed on Jewish piety and loyalty an be explained as part Antiochus’ efforts to court the enduring support of his new settlers, and when read with in mind, this need not be suspicious.
CHAPTER I:

AJ 12.147-153 and the Seleucid Administration

The most forceful attack on the authenticity of the letter from Antiochus to Zeuxis recorded in AJ 12.147-153 focuses on the greeting formula alone, and largely ignores the content of the letter.¹ This is misguided, as the letter in question is more than simply a personal letter; it is, in Seleucid terms, a πρόσταγμα, an order sent from the king to an official.² As such, the letter can and should be analyzed not merely in terms of its wording and its greeting, but as an administrative act as well. The question then becomes, does this administrative act fit the pattern of Seleucid administration in general, and particularly, the Seleucid administration as it existed under Antiochus III. Many of

¹ Gauger, Beiträge, 92-3, 113. The letter is extraordinarily warm in its address. Antiochus addresses Zeuxis as his father, which is exceptional. According to Gauger, who devotes a lengthy chapter to a study of every instance of someone being addressed as father known from the ancient world, the “Vateranrede” was an honour that would be reserved only for the leading man of the kingdom, and even then usually someone with a close personal relationship to the king as well. It was also only used for people who were older than the king, but this is something of a dead end. It is impossible to accurately estimate Zeuxis’ age, we know only that he was most active between roughly 220 and the battle of Magnesia in 190 BCE. He may have been the same age as Antiochus, and only around fifty years old in 190, or he may have been as much as fifteen or twenty years older than the king, and in his mid sixties for the battle of Magnesia.

² Πρόσταγμα is the usual word used in Polybius to mean a royal order, and was used in much the same sense by the Seleucid administration. J. Ma, Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 122. Also, M. Holleaux, Études d’ épigraphie et d’histoire grecques, vol. 3, Lagides et Séleucides, (Paris: Boccard, 1942), 205.
the same questions that have been addressed in previous studies will still apply in this analysis; whether Zeuxis was important enough to be addressed as father, and whether Zeuxis had the authority needed to carry out the task at hand are related questions. What follows breaks down roughly into two sections, the first of which will outline Zeuxis’ career from his first appearance in Polybius, to the point at which he attained full authority over Asia Minor, attempting to establish whether Zeuxis had both the longstanding relationship with the king and the exceptional authority to be addressed in this way, and, perhaps more importantly, to ascertain when Zeuxis became the viceroy of Asia Minor. The second part will break the letter down into an administrative act, and establish whether Zeuxis did indeed have sufficient authority to carry out the task that he was given.

Gauger’s argument against the authenticity of the document focuses on the time-frame of Zeuxis’ career. He argues that when the letter was sent, Zeuxis was only the satrap of Lydia and as such unworthy of such a warm address. He does not argue that Zeuxis never attained a more prominent position in the Seleucid administrative hierarchy, only that he had not done so by 205, when he assumes the letter was sent.3 This confuses the issue not only of Zeuxis’ career, but also of the system of Seleucid administration in Asia Minor, and Gauger is not alone in his mistaken conclusions.4

3 Gauger, Beiträge, 112-113
4 S. Sherwin-White and A. Kuhrt, From Samarkhand to Sardis a New Approach to the Seleucid Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 42-43, use Zeuxis and Molon, two men who were clearly given extra-ordinary commands, as examples of satraps in the Seleucid system. Bengston, Die Strategie, 91 ff; and Ma, 123 ff., both recognize that Zeuxis was far more than just satrap of Lydia.
Discussing these sorts of generic titles, like “satrap” and “strategos” is unproductive as a means of assessing the authority of a given individual, as it has long been recognized that there is no consistency in terminology.\(^5\) It is not uncommon for the same official to have different titles, even in the same source, or for titles to be completely counter-intuitive.\(^6\) There is confusion as to Zeuxis’ title as well, as Polybius refers to him as satrap of Lydia at the end of his career, but Josephus, in his introduction to the letter, identifies Zeuxis as Antiochus’ “strategos and among the strategoi, one of his closest friends.”\(^7\) A generic title like this, even where we know of one, is not secure evidence for the authority or influence of the person who bears it, so of the two parts of Josephus’ description of Zeuxis, strategos and particularly close to the king, his place as a dear friend of the king more informative. “Friend of the king” was the most common name for any long-term official, it was not necessarily their only title, but it often subsumes whatever other title an individual might bear.\(^8\) In addition, the term


\(^6\) W. Tarn, “Seleukid Parthian Studies,” *Proceedings of the British Academy* 16 (1930): 133, gives as examples the shift between the title of eparchos and strategos that both Diogenes, the governor of Susiana, and the governor of the Persian gulf undergo from Polybius 5.46.7 to 5.48.14. Tarn takes this to mean that even Polybius did not think that such titles carried any significance beyond showing that the official bearing it had authority over a specific piece of the kingdom.

\(^7\) AJ 12.147. Polybius refers to Zeuxis as a Satrap when he is sent to Sardis to negotiate the treaty of Apamea with the Romans (Polybius, 21.16). Bengston, *Die Strategie*, 115-125, and H. Bengston, *Die Hellenistische Weltkultur* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1988), 103, argues that governors of provinces are always called strategoi, but there is not enough evidence to support this.

encompassed all officials, both those present at court and those administering distant parts of the empire. For example, the governor of the city of Alinda in Caria at the end of the third century was Chionis. In an inscription set up by the Amyzonians in his honour, he is described as φίλος ὑν τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τεταγμένος ἐπ᾽ Ἄλινδων ("being a friend of the kings and the one put in charge of Alinda"). The two participles, being a friend of the king and being put in charge of Alinda, were evidently of equal importance, or perhaps friend of the king was the more part of the description, as it is given priority. This is even more noteworthy because the man in charge of Alinda occupied a very important place in the Seleucid administration, since Alinda was one of the most heavily fortified and defensible towns in the area.

Being one of Antiochus' particular friends suggests two things about Zeuxis, first that he was very high up in the Seleucid administration, and second that there was a prior relationship of some importance and duration. If we can prove such a relationship, that would explain the Vateranrede in the letter, and go far toward explaining why Zeuxis is invested with so much authority by Antiochus.

Zeuxis enters history during the rebellion of Molon in 222. When Molon had forced the first pair of generals sent against him from the field and was advancing

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11 Arrian, 1.24.
12 Molon was the governor of the satrapy of Media when Antiochus took the throne, and soon after he was appointed to be the general commander of the eastern
towards Seleucia on the Tigris, he was prevented from crossing the river by Zeuxis, who seized all of the riverboats. Later, Zeuxis was left in command of the camp of the royal forces when the third commander sent by Antiochus to deal with Molon, Xenoetas the Achaean, crossed the river to offer battle Zeuxis and was later forced to withdraw from the field when the royal army was defeated. It is difficult to know what Zeuxis’ official position was at this time. Bevan assumed that he was the satrap of Babylonia, but on closer examination this is untenable. In the years before 212, Polybius only ever mentions Zeuxis in a military capacity and never gives him a title, such as satrap of Babylonia. By way of contrast, he usually does give attach titles to men like Pythiades, called the governor (ἐπαρχός) of the area along the Persian Gulf, and Diogenes the governor (ἐπαρχός) of Susiana, in conjunction with whom Zeuxis is mentioned.

Zeuxis could not have been the governor of Babylonia. Polybius has a list of how the eastern satrapies were distributed after the revolt. Diogenes was transferred to the empty governorship of Media, which can only be considered a promotion from the much smaller Susiana. He was replaced in Susiana by Apollodorus, and the royal secretary Tychon was given command of the Persian Gulf province. That we hear nothing of Babylon should imply that there was no change of governor. Zeuxis, however, did not

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13 Polybius, 5. 45.
14 Ibid., 5. 46. Zeuxis was left in command along with Diogenes the governor of Susiana.
16 Polybius 5.46.
17 Ibid., 5.54.
remain in the area. He appears in a military capacity during Antiochus' second campaign in Coele Syria in 219. It is possible that he was superseded as governor of Babylonia, and Polybius does not mention it, just as he does not mention who replaced Alexander in the satrapy of Persis, but it seems unlikely given his exemplary contribution to the campaign against Molon. He saved Seleucia on the Tigris for a time, and was the second in command of Xenoetas. He offered excellent advice, which swayed the king during the conference at Libba, and in the final battle with Molon he commanded the left wing along with the chief minister Hermias. After such service Zeuxis would not have been removed from his position as satrap of Babylonia and effectively demoted to being a member of the king’s general staff.

Zeuxis, then, was not one of Antiochus’ satraps in the 220s, but he was still able to act on his own initiative, and he was put in a position of authority equal to one satrap and above another. In the Seleucid kingdom, the administrative hierarchy was not necessarily dominated by official post or title. Royal support, and royal sanction for one’s actions, was the true source of power and authority for the officials of the kingdom.

The truth of this, as far as the reign of Antiochus III is concerned, is obvious even from what we know of the revolt of Molon. Antiochus twice sent commanders to deal with Molon. These were men with no formal position, who were able to enter provinces with

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18 Ibid., 5.60.
19 Though this was undoubtedly Pythiades, whose province was taken over by Tychon.
20 Polybius, 5.43 and 5.5.46.
21 Ibid., 5.51 and 5.53.
their own governors and assume control of the forces in the area. In the case of Xenoetas, he not only took command of the forces in the area, but also was able to command the governors of other provinces to come to his aid.

Zeuxis’ authority during the crises of the rebellion, then, is evidence not so much of his high position in the administrative hierarchy, as of his confidence in the king’s support. It is possible, even likely, that Zeuxis had been one of Antiochus’ “friends” even before Antiochus became king. While Seleucus III was king, Antiochus was sent to the east as commander of the Upper Satrapies. Antiochus would not have travelled to the east alone; any particularly prominent figure collected their own circle of friends who often travelled with them. Xenoetas again serves as an excellent example of this practice, since Polybius makes it quite clear that several of his friends followed him to the east.

Since Antiochus was acting as a viceroy of the eastern provinces during his brother’s reign, it follows quite naturally that he had his own circle of friends, both to advise him and to handle administrative responsibilities. Zeuxis must have been one of these friends, as he makes his first appearance in the east shortly after Antiochus left, and was fully confident of the king’s favour. If Zeuxis had any official position, he was

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23 Bengston, *Die Strategie*, 79-80, argues that giving the heir an important role such as this was general Seleucid practice, beginning with Seleucus I sending Antiochus I to the east as his co-regent (Appian 11.10).
24 Herman, “Court Society...,” 216.
25 Polybius, 5.46.
26 In addition to his actions while Antiochus was still in the west, during the conference at Libba he is the only man with enough courage to speak out against the advice of Hermias (Polybius, 5.51).
most likely an officer of whatever military forces Antiochus had with him while he was in the east. This can explain where Zeuxis appears, as well as how. Zeuxis first appears in the neighbourhood of Seleucia on the Tigris, which is where Antiochus was most likely to have resided as viceroy of the eastern provinces, while his brother was king.\textsuperscript{27} One possibility is that Zeuxis commanded the garrison of the citadel in Seleucia on the Tigris; this was a position of considerable importance and authority, and it would explain why Zeuxis is mentioned jointly with the city-governor Diomcdon in defending the city from Molon.\textsuperscript{28} Such military officers were not beneath royal notice; a letter from Antiochus to his officers and troops in Asia Minor suggests that these were men of some consequence, as does the fact that the citizens of Amyzon felt obliged to publish a decree in honour of a local army commander named Olephandros.\textsuperscript{29} This would explain why he appears in a military capacity, likely with a small force of his own, and why Antiochus trusted him with command of the right wing in the decisive battle against Molon. It also explains why he was confident of the support of the king, enough so to act without the support of the satrap, since it was not unusual for a commander to act on orders received from the king directly, without reference to the governor of the province in which he was stationed.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{27} Bengston, \textit{Die Strategie}, 80.
\textsuperscript{28} Cf. Alexis, the \textit{άκροφύλαξ} of Apamea, who seems to be a person of considerable importance (Polybius, 5.48, 5.50).
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Fouilles d'Amyzon} no. 19 = Ma, document 13.
\textsuperscript{30} Sherwin-White and Kuhrt, \textit{Samarkhand to Sardis}, 49-50. The letter from Antiochus mentioned above is good evidence for this, since Antiochus writes directly to the troops to give his orders about respecting the sanctuary at Labraunda.
After the rebellion of Molon, Zeuxis was clearly not the governor of Babylonia, or of any other province in the Seleucid empire. The only thing that we know of his career in the period between the defeat of Molon and re-conquest of Asia Minor in 214 is that in 219, during the assault on Seleucia in Pieria, Zeuxis led one of the three divisions of Antiochus’ army.³¹ Beyond this, nothing is known for certain of his career until he appears as the governor of Sardis and Asia Minor after the defeat of Achaeus. It is likely that Zeuxis became one of the king’s more prominent friends, or rather returned to that position, after being left behind in the east when Antiochus went to claim the diadem. It is also possible that Zeuxis was promoted to the post of army secretary. The former secretary, Tychon, was made the governor of the Persian Gulf province following the defeat of Molon, which would have left this important post vacant.³² If Zeuxis was given this post it would explain why he was accompanying Antiochus’ army and at the same time why he does not figure prominently in what is left of Polybius’ narrative.

Zeuxis’ role in putting down the rebellion of Molon, and in leading the assault on Seleucia in Pieria, is all that is known of his career before 213, but we know more about his activities in Asia Minor after that date. Even within this period, there is more evidence for his career near the end of the second century. There are only three documents from the period before Antiochus returned from his great eastern campaign. Two of the documents are fragmentary letters from Antiochus to the people of Sardis. In the first, Antiochus restored use of the gymnasium, which had been commandeered by the garrison, to the city as well as remitting some of their tax burden. More importantly,

³¹ Ibid., 5.60.
³² Ibid., 5.54.
at least for this study, he granted the city use of lumber from the forests of Taranza for rebuilding projects, to be used καθ' ἄν συνκρίνῃ Ζεῦξις ("according to whatever Zeuxis decides"). At the end, Zeuxis’ position of authority is re-affirmed by Antiochus saying γεγράφαμεν περὶ πάντων πρὸς Ζεῦξιν καὶ Κτεσικλῆν ("I have written about all of these matters to Zeuxis and Ktesikles"). There is another, very similar, letter from Antiochus to the city of Sardis in the same year, in which Antiochus grants the city a supply of oil for the gymnasium and reduces the burden of billeting soldiers, and again he finishes with, καὶ περὶ πάντων γεγράφαμεν πρὸς Ζεῦξιν (‘I have also written to Zeuxis about all this’). Zeuxis and Ktesikles can hardly be anything other than the strategos in charge of

33 SEG 39.1283:

"You will repay this in three years, and cut wood for the rebuilding of the city, and bring it down from the forest in Taranza according to what Zeuxis decides. We also remit the twentieth which was added to the civic tax, and we arrange to restore to you the gymnasium which you used before, and we have written about everything to Zeuxis and Ktesikles. And those about Metrodoros will report to you about these very things.

Farewell year 99 (213) fifth of Xandikos."

34 P. Gauthier, *Nouvelles Inscriptions de Sardes II*, (Paris: Librarie Droz, 1989) document 3 = Ma, document 3 = SEG 39.1285, line 12. Ma, 288, suggests that καὶ Κτεσικλῆν could be restored in a line below Zeuxis, but this is uncertain as nothing survives beyond the fourth letter of Zeuxis’ name.
Lydia and Sardis, and a financial official, possibly a dioketes. Zeuxis is more likely to have been the former, not only because he is given priority within the pair of names, and perhaps mentioned alone in the second inscription, but also because Zeuxis soon achieved a pre-eminent position in Asia Minor, and Ktesikles is known only from these two inscriptions.

Later in his career, Zeuxis was firmly in control of Asia Minor as the king’s representative. The fragments of Polybius’ narrative of Philip V’s expedition to Asia Minor make this clear enough. In 202/1 Philip had been successful in the field for the most part, besieging Attalus I in Pergamum at one point, but he was suffering from a lack of supplies. During this crisis, while plundering the countryside for what he could get he asked for assistance from the Seleucids. According to Polybius he did not send the request to Antiochus, as one would expect, but made his appeal for support “according to the agreement,” directly to Zeuxis. This implies one of two things, either that both Polybius and Philip were able to recognise that Zeuxis had enough authority over affairs in Asia Minor that a message sent to him was as good as a message sent to Antiochus, or

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35 Dioiketes and oikonomos are the two lower level financial officials. The oikonomoi tend to be involved in the management of single royal estates, the dioiketai seem to have broader duties. See J. Grainger, A Seleukid Prosopography and Gazetteer (New York: E.J. Brill, 1997), 803; C. Roueche and S. Sherwin-White, “Some Aspects of the Seleucid Empire: the Greek Inscriptions from Failaka in the Persian Gulf,” Chiron 15 (1985), 31; Bickerman, 129.

36 This is how Bengston (Die Strategie, 93) describes the governor of Lydia and man in charge of Asia Minor, since they only have this extra authority when the king is absent.

37 Polybius, 16.1.8: διεπέμπετο πρὸς Ζεύξιν, παρακαλών αὐτὸν ὁτὸν χορηγῆσαι καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ συμπράττειν κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας (“He sent to Zeuxis, asking that he furnish him (Philip) with corn, and that he aid in the rest, according to the agreement”).
that the agreement specifically named Zeuxis. Indeed, if Zeuxis' authority did not extend to all Asia Minor he would hardly have been able to assist Philip while the Macedonian king campaigned in Caria.

There are also several inscriptions that show that Zeuxis' authority extended over much of Asia Minor. His activities in Caria are well attested, particularly from the neighbourhood of Amyzon. In a decree of 202 in honour of Chionis, the governor of Alinda, the people of Amyzon refer to Zeuxis as "the man in charge of affairs" (ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων).38 In a similar decree from 201, this time in favour of Menestratos, the epistates of the temple of Artemis, Zeuxis bears the same title.39 The post of ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων was perhaps the most important in the Seleucid kingdom, aside from the king. It is usually used to denote what might be called a first minister, or Reichskanzler,40 and some scholars connect Zeuxis' authority over all Asia Minor to his taking on this title for the first time in 203 BCE.41

All of this perhaps focuses too much on these generic titles, which as said above and seen here, were variable, and as such they are weak evidence for the competence of a given official. It is more useful to focus on what the content of these documents can tell us about Zeuxis' position and authority. The decrees for Menestratos and Chionis taken together are quite illustrative. In the decree for Chionis, governor of Alinda and friend of

38 Fouilles d'Amyzon, no. 14 = Ma, document 9, lines 7-8.  
39 Fouilles d'Amyzon, no. 15 = Ma, document 10, lines 8-9.  
41 H. Malay, "Letter of Antiochus III to Zeuxis with two Covering Letters (209 B.C.)," EA 10 (1987), 11. Gauger, 92-3 and J. and L. Robert, 176, both think that Zeuxis' power over all Asia Minor is linked to becoming ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων.
the king, he is praised for always assisting the embassies that the town has sent to Zeuxis. This suggests two things, first that Zeuxis was above Chionis in the administrative hierarchy, and second, at this point Zeuxis was the highest-level official to whom the town could or would appeal. That Chionis was giving assistance to these embassies should mean that they had already approached him with their petition, and that he either would not grant their request or did not have the authority to do so. The help that he gave them was most likely a letter to Zeuxis introducing both them and the situation, and perhaps suggesting a course of action.

A similar level of authority is suggested by the decree in honour of Menestratos. Menestratos, the epistates of the temple of Artemis, is praised for writing to Zeuxis “about the continuous goodwill that the people have, both towards the kings and towards Zeuxis.” This suggests that, at the local level, Zeuxis is important enough to be put on the same level as the kings, likely because the kings were so very far away, and Zeuxis had almost complete authority to act in their stead. Menestratos is also praised for writing to Nikomedes and to Chionis, the governor of Alinda. Nikomedes gets no title, but a decree in honour of him was found on the same block as the decree for Menestratos. In this case it might be safe to assume that Nikomedes was the overall governor of Caria

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42 Fouilles d’ Amyzon, no. 14 = Ma, document 9, lines 6-9.
43 C. Bradford Welles, Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period: A Study in Greek Epigraphy (Chicago: Ares Publishers, 1934), introduction.
44 Fouilles d’ Amyzon, no. 15 = Ma, document 10, lines 9-10, ὑπὲρ τῆς εὔνοιας ἢν ἔχων διατελεῖ εἰς τοὺς βασιλεῖς καὶ εἰς τὸν Ζεὔξιν.
45 Ma, 127.
at this time, and that the people to whom Menestratos wrote were in descending order of authority.

The Pamkçu Stele, a collection of three letters relating to the appointment of a high priest for all Asia Minor, can shed some light on when it was that Zeuxis first attained authority over all things in Asia Minor.\(^{46}\) The main component is a letter from Antiochus to Zeuxis, which is transmitted down the chain of command from Zeuxis to Philotas and then from Philotas to Bithys, along with covering letters for each move. Furthermore, we know from the first two letters that Zeuxis was resident at Sardis, which, were he only the governor of a single province, would make him the governor of Lydia. This stele was found in Mysia, and Philotas and Bithys cannot be anything other than Mysian officials. Most likely Philotas was the \textit{strategos} in charge of Mysia, and Bithys was one of his subordinates, so at the time that this stele was inscribed Zeuxis had authority not only over Lydia, but over Mysia as well.\(^{47}\) Zeuxis, then, was likely the first and only man contacted directly by the king for the purposes of naming a new high priest for all Asia Minor. This means that at the time of the inscription Zeuxis was already in charge of the entire region, and not just Lydia, else he could not have given orders to officials in other satrapies. The inscription is dated to the one hundred and third year of

\(^{46}\) SEG 37.1010.

\(^{47}\) J. Ma, \textit{Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 291. Malay, 11 n.1, suggests that the two men were actually officials in the service of the Lydian satrapy, but this would put them very far afield, and in essence it assumes that the Seleucids had no independent satrapy of Mysia. In suggesting this Malay also ignores the arguments of Bengston, whom he cites, which suggest that the Governor of Lydia often exercised authority over the other Satrapies and their officials as well.
the Seleucid era, or 209, so by this time at least it would seem that Zeuxis had authority over places outside of his own satrapy of Lydia.

The agreement between Zeuxis and the people of Philippeis from the year 197, provides a useful terminus ante quem for when Zeuxis was put in charge of Asia Minor.

The inscription begins:

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Basiileuonton 'Antiocho kai 'Antiocho
tou vioou e i kai p' Gorpiaioi' epi toisade
sunethento Zeuxis te o apoleleimemenos -
po tou basileos 'Antiocho epi tvn epitade
tou Taurou pragmaton kai Filippheis...
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The inscription gives us what appears to be Zeuxis’ full and specific title, ὁ ἀπολελειμμένος υπό τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιόχου ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιτάδε τοῦ Ταύρου πραγμάτων ("the man left behind by king Antiochus in charge of affairs on this side of the Taurus mountain range"). He was left behind by king Antiochus, singular. Whereas after the son of Antiochus III, also named Antiochus, had been made co-regent, probably by late 209, official documents usually give the impression of the two acting jointly as king.

This document itself opens with the dating formula Ἁσιλευόντων Ἀντιόχου καὶ Ἀντιόχου τοῦ υἱοῦ (while Antiochus and Antiochus the son were kings).49 Similarly, in even earlier inscriptions, such as the decree by the people of Amyzon in honour of Menestratos, the formula reflects the fact that there are two kings.50 So, since Zeuxis was

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48 SEG 36.973, lines 1-5. “When Antiochus and Antiochus the son were kings, in the hundred and fifteenth year (197), in the month of Gorpiaius. On these terms Zeuxis, the man left behind by king Antiochus in charge of affairs on this side of the Taurus, and Philippeis agreed....”

49 Ibid.

50 Fouilles d’Amyzon, no. 15; Ma, document 10, line 1.
given command of all Asia Minor by a single king Antiochus, it must have been done
before Antiochus the son was made co-regent, as only makes sense, since the king would
have no need to make Zeuxis his viceroy when his son could easily fill the role.

This date can be refined even further by looking again at the Pamkçu Stele.

Antiochus writes to Zeuxis to inform him that Nikanor is to be made the high priest of the
temples ἐπέκεινα τοῦ Ταύρου ("on the far-side of the Taurus"). This letter was sent in
209, when Antiochus was already in the Upper Satrapies, where Asia Minor would seem
to be on the far side of the Taurus mountain range, rather than the near-side. So, if
Zeuxis' domain is designated as the near side of the Taurus, Antiochus was still in Asia
Minor when Zeuxis was given the position. The only time when Antiochus was in the
west, and before his son was co-regent, is immediately after the re-conquest of Asia
Minor, before Antiochus left for his campaign against Armenia in 211. Indeed,
ἀπολειμμένος itself implies much the same thing; the only time that Zeuxis could have
been "left behind" in Asia Minor by Antiochus was when he was leaving for Armenia.

Zeuxis was indeed the most powerful Seleucid official in Asia Minor by the time
that the letter was composed, and the one to whom any major order from Antiochus

51 SEG 37.1010, lines 29-30.
52 The strangeness of using "near-side of the Taurus" to describe Asia Minor was
first pointed out by Schmidt (H.H. Schmitt, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Antiochos’
des Grossen und Seiner Zeit (Weisbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1964), 159). Schmidt
thought it unlikely that an empire centred in Syria would describe Asia Minor that way,
and attributed it to Polybius. However, since both ἐπιτάδε τοῦ Ταύρου and ἐπέκεινα τοῦ
Ταύρου appear in inscriptions from the reign of Antiochus III, it seems likely that the
formula varied on the basis of where the king was at any given time (Ma, 125-6).
would be sent. This and his longstanding relationship with the king make it possible, even plausible, that Antiochus thought highly enough of him to address him as “father.”

What remains to be established, and is in fact more telling for the document’s authenticity, is whether the task that he was set, in the letter reported by Josephus, was within his competence as an official.settling colonists from Babylonia and Mesopotamia would have required three things from Zeuxis. First, he would need enough authority over military matters to organize an escort for the colonists through Asia Minor to their end destinations, which Antiochus acknowledged could be a troublesome matter. He also needed the ability to interact with communities in Asia Minor on the level of offering them specific privileges and tax exemptions, something usually reserved strictly for the king, and to oversee the transfer of royal land to the ownership of the new colonists. Finally, in order to settle these colonists in Lydia and Phrygia, he would need the authority to send orders to other governors as well. His position as the “man left behind by king Antiochus in charge of affairs on this side of the Taurus” is enough to make it clear that he had that authority, which the Pamkçu stele only confirms.

Zeuxis first appears in the Seleucid administration in a military context as one of Antiochus’ officers, but, in the normal course of events, the governors (be they satrap or

\[ 53 \text{AJ 12.150.} \]

\[ 54 \text{Bengston, } \textit{Die Strategie}, \text{ passim, argues that this general command of Asia Minor was a continuous feature of Seleucid Administration. He names six different holders of the office, beginning with Patrocles under Antiochus I (Memnon of Herakleia, books 13-14, section 9= FGH III.434) and ending with Zeuxis. Zeuxis is by far the best attested of all of them, and as such, with two exceptions, comparison with the others can tell us little about Zeuxis.} \]
strategos) of a province were not entrusted with high military authority. This is most plainly displayed in the rebellion of Molon at the start of Antiochus’ reign. At least two satraps of the eastern provinces were involved, but they seem to have been leading only relatively small forces, and the idea of giving one of them the supreme command was never even considered. Instead Antiochus sent three commanders from Syria to Babylonia to deal with the revolt, and eventually came himself.

There is good evidence that as viceroy of all Asia Minor Zeuxis was an exception to this, and he certainly had enough military authority to organize an escort for colonists travelling through any part of Asia Minor. Zeuxis’ immediate predecessor as viceroy, Achaeus, offers a useful parallel in this situation. Achaeus certainly was left with significant standing military forces, since he was to continue Seleukos III’s plan to recover all of the territory in Asia Minor that had been lost to the Attalid monarchy. He was militarily quite active even in the first three years of his posting while he remained loyal to Antiochus, gaining back enough territory to re-establish an independent satrapy of Mysia under the new strategos Themistokles.

We know that Zeuxis himself had military authority that extended beyond the borders of Lydia from his dealings with Philip V. In 202 Philip V of Macedon was

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56 Pythiades, governor of the Persian Gulf province, and Diogenes, governor of Susiana, both appear with the second army sent against Molon, but they are summoned by the general on the scene and do not seem to have brought many troops (Polybius, 5.46). In fact, the city governor of Seleucia on the Tigris seems to have more troops and more authority (Polybius 5.48).
57 Polybius, 5.40.
58 Schmitt, 161.
59 Ma, 57.
campaigning against the Attalid possessions on the coast of Asia Minor and, despite success in the field, he was desperate for supplies.\textsuperscript{60} At this point, while campaigning in Caria, Philip sent a request to Zeuxis for both supplies and military support, “according to the agreement.”\textsuperscript{61} That Philip could send such a request to Zeuxis implies two things: first that Zeuxis was recognized as the man in overall control of Asia Minor, and hence the man to whom one must send a message even to get something done far away from Sardis, and second that Zeuxis’ authority was more than simply administrative. That it was Zeuxis who received the request directly is, in fact, somewhat surprising, since both Antiochus III and his co-ruler Antiochus were back in the western half of the kingdom, and one might have expected Philip to approach them first. Philip’s request, and Zeuxis’ compliance, however half-hearted it may have been,\textsuperscript{62} both assume that Zeuxis had the power to direct troops and to organize supply trains anywhere in Asia Minor. The authority to organize a supply train is not necessarily the same thing as complete licence to undertake any military action that he should desire, but it is enough to organize and protect a convoy of colonists who would be passing through both Lydia and Phrygia, and other parts of Asia Minor as well. Zeuxis’ aid to Philip provides a clear parallel for this much of the task assigned to him by the letter.

The letter in question also calls for Zeuxis to interact in some ways with existing or newly formed communities, and to handle the transfer of royal land to the ownership of the new colonists. Resident in Sardis as the viceroy of all Asia Minor, Zeuxis was the

\textsuperscript{60} Polybius, 16.1.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 16.1.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 16.1.
only subordinate official to whom Antiochus would have addressed such a letter. The process of transferring royal land to the ownership of a private person in the Seleucid holdings in Asia Minor was centred on Sardis. This is in part because the official land registry records for Asia Minor were housed in Sardis, as a letter from Antiochus II to his viceroy of Asia Minor, Metrophanes, makes quite clear. The letter deals with a sale of royal land, and Metrophanes is instructed to record the sale in the royal records at Sardis, as well as to set up five different stelai recording the sale, one of which was also at Sardis in the temple of Artemis. Apart from merely housing the records of land transfers, the actual administrative act centred on Sardis as well. A letter from the king ordering the gift or sale to be made would be sent first to the governor of Lydia, who was also the viceroy of Asia Minor. After that, the viceroy would arrange for the legal survey and “description of property” to be carried out by a local official, who would also mark the boundaries of the land which was changing hands. Information about the property and the transfer of ownership would then be sent back to Sardis, so that it might be entered into the official records. So, as far as transfers of royal land to the new colonists were concerned, Antiochus would have little choice but to send his request to Zeuxis.

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63 A fact only noted by Bengston, *Die Strategie*, 97ff.
64 *RC* 18, lines 28-29. W. L. Westerman, “Land Registers Under the Seleucids,” *Classical Philology* 16 (1921), 13, construed Metrophanes to be the governor of Hellespontine Phrygia, but the letter makes it clear that he was actually in Sardis, and yet had authority over Hellespontine Phrygia.
65 *RC* 18, lines 28-29, καὶ τὴν ὀνήμαν ἀναγράψαι εἰς τὰς βασιλικὰς γραφὰς τὰς ἐν Σάρδεσιν.
66 Westerman, 13; *RC* 18, lines 34-35.
The letter also required Zeuxis to interact with some of the communities in Asia Minor, either existing communities into which new settlers were being introduced, or completely new communities. Zeuxis was to grant the communities formed by the Jewish colonists certain privileges: the right to live by their own laws, and a tax exemption for ten years, and a grain subsidy.67 This was usually the exclusive domain of the king, but several inscriptions show that it was also within Zeuxis’ authority. Zeuxis was able to conclude a treaty of friendship with the people of Philipeis on his own initiative, even at a time when both Antiochus III and his son as co-regent were in the area, and could have received embassies from that city.68 Zeuxis' arrangements for the city of Herakleia offer a close parallel for the grants that he would need to make to the Jewish colonies.69 Ambassadors from the city approached Zeuxis asking for a remission of taxes on account of the city’s poverty. Zeuxis decided to offer the city freedom from billeting, tax exemptions on grain, bee-hives and all produce of the land for a set amount of time, tax exemption for a festival, and perhaps to make arrangements for combining the populations of outlying communities into the polis of Herakleia.70 These arrangements are similar to the ones that Zeuxis was asked to make for the Jewish colonists, and the fact that he is able to do them here means that they in no way exceeded his competence. Perhaps the most interesting thing about this document is that Zeuxis' decisions were not the final word on the subject. Zeuxis gave his favourable answers to

67 AJ, 12.150-151.
68 SEG 36.973, lines 2-7.
69 SEG 37.859 = Ma document 31.
70 καὶ οἱ δήμοι καὶ οἱ οἰκηταὶ συναχθῶσιν (SEG 37.859 = Ma, document 31, col. III line 10), seems to suggest this (Ma, 343 note 3).
the ambassadors in the form of recommending that they send another embassy to Antiochus, telling them what requests they should make. The published version of the exchange consists of Zeuxis’ responses in this form, and a far briefer letter from Antiochus in which he confirms all of the privileges granted by his viceroy, τὰ τε ὑπὸ Ζεῦξιδος συγχωρηθέντα κυροῦμεν (“we ratify what was granted by Zeuxis”).  

Antiochus ratifying the decision is less an indication that Zeuxis lacks the authority to make these arrangements than a sign that Antiochus preferred to maintain the appearance that he alone was the source of all such favours. In fact, this practice explains some of the stylistic differences between the letter preserved in Josephus and royal letters that survive in inscriptions. The letter preserved by Josephus was likely never meant to be inscribed and displayed in this fashion; rather, the king would send brief letters to each new settlement, confirming the arrangements made by Zeuxis for each one.

There is nothing in the letter from Antiochus to Zeuxis about the Jewish colonies that is in any way out of keeping with Antiochus’ administration of Asia Minor and Zeuxis’ place within it. By 211 BC Zeuxis was at the head of the Seleucid administration of the west as viceroy of Asia Minor, and his working relationship with Antiochus was already well into its second decade. As such, the warm address and Josephus’ description of Zeuxis as one of Antiochus’ closest friends, are in keeping with general practice even as those who question the document’s authenticity define it. Perhaps more importantly, as an administrative act, or πρόσταγμα, the letter fits perfectly into the broader context of Antiochus III’s administration of Asia Minor. As viceroy, Zeuxis would be the recipient

71 SEG 37.859 = Ma document 31, col. 1 line 9.
of any orders from Antiochus that had to do with Asia Minor, as occurred also in the Pamkçu stele. The various actions required of Zeuxis, to oversee transfers of royal land to the colonists, to arrange a military escort, and to guarantee privileges to a community all have their parallels elsewhere in his career.
CHAPTER II:

_AJ_ 12.147-153 and Seleucid Colonisation

In the previous chapter we established that the letter from Antiochus III to Zeuxis fits the general pattern of Seleucid administration in that Zeuxis had the authority necessary to carry out his task and the prestige to be addressed warmly by the king. The question remains as to whether the content of the order is also plausible. If the letter is authentic, or at least on the whole authentic if slightly altered, then the Jewish settlements created by this letter should match the pattern of Hellenistic colonisation at large, and more specifically, should be similar to the other known colonial ventures of Antiochus III. If the Jewish settlements do fit the patterns of Hellenistic colonization in general, and the colonial ventures of Antiochus III, then we can use both of these patterns to fill in some of the details for this settlement which are not in the letter.

A general pattern for Hellenistic colonisation, and Hellenistic colonisation of Asia Minor, can be established even without drawing on _AJ_ 12.148-154. Indeed this broad outline fits well with what is set out in the letter to Zeuxis, though the letter is unique in being the only surviving document relating to the foundation of a colony.¹ The first item of note is that the colonies, or one sort of colony at any rate, were concentrated in Lydia.

¹ G.M. Cohen, _The Seleucid Colonies_, x.
and Phrygia. The reason for this is unclear. It has been suggested that Lydia and Phrygia were used because the Seleucids had more land available in those two satrapies than anywhere else, but this is hardly a satisfactory answer.

The single most obvious thing that all colonies needed was land. Colonists were usually settled on part of the χώρα βασιλική, but not necessarily on a spot that was uninhabited. Colonists were just as likely to be settled on the spot of an existing community as land that was entirely vacant. Settlers were frequently either inserted into existing communities, as Seleucus II did with Smyrna, or in cases such as Dura, a new settlement would be established in the vicinity of an existing community, which would be in some way incorporated. The local population might be allowed to remain free and be the equivalent of metics, or in some cases when their land was reclaimed and redistributed they would become laoi, essentially serfs who were tied to the land, and

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2 B. Bar-Kochva, The Seleucid Army: Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 26, catalogues all of the communities that refer to themselves as κατοικίαν. He argues that all of these began as military colonies, and that the vast majority of them are to be found in Phrygia and Lydia. F. Collins, “The Macedonians and the Revolt of Aristonicus,” Ancient World 3.4 (1980), 83, also points out the high number of military settlements in Lydia, which he identifies as any place where the citizens refer to themselves as Macedonians. Whether all of these places were actually military colonies, or even colonies at all, is a subject of considerable debate. See for instance G.M. Cohen, “Katoikiai, Katoikoi and Macedonians in Asia Minor,” Ancient Society 22 (1991).


5 OGIS I 229.

traded as though they were a part of it.\(^7\) Land was distributed to settlers as \textit{kleroi}, but the size of these \textit{kleroi} and the conditions for holding them remain unclear. The Law of Succession from Dura-Europos has been taken to suggest that the Seleucids made \textit{kleroi} in some way inalienable, hoping to keep their colonists in place by this means.\(^8\) Despite that, it is clear that \textit{kleroi} could be sold. Mnesimachus makes parts of two \textit{kleroi} over to the temple of Artemis at Sardis,\(^9\) and even in Dura-Europos one Philip is able to sell part of his \textit{kleros} in the second century BCE, while the Seleucid law of Succession must still have been in effect.\(^10\)

There also seems to be a general pattern in the way that colonies were planted and peopled. The Seleucids used their colonies to control territory. They were used to protect against local unrest, to protect important lines of communication or in some instances simply to protect inhabited farmland.\(^11\) That the colonies were used in this way, to provide a royal presence in areas that were either troubled, or in some way distant from royal control, affected the way that they were set up. In the first case, it would seem that all new colonies were fortified in some manner, either by finding and fortifying a defensible location for a new colony, or if colonists were being added to an existing city, by giving them control of the citadel. Strabo points out that the two biggest flaws in the


\(^8\) Welles, Fink and Gilliam, 77.

\(^9\) Buckler and Robinson, inscription 1.

\(^10\) Welles, Fink and Gilliam, 89.

colony of Mazaca were the fact that it was situated in an area without natural defences and that it was unfortified, indirectly proving that fortifying a new settlement was standard practice.\(^{12}\) Ensuring the safety of a colony was not enough to ensure its usefulness. For a colony to be effective in controlling the local populations in the long term, the king had to prevent the colonists and their descendants from mixing too much with the native inhabitants, since that would surely end in the colonists being absorbed into the larger local population.\(^{13}\) There are two models for this. The first was to limit citizenship to the original settlers and their direct descendants, as was done at Dura-Europos. The other model, used twice in the colonies of Antiochus III as well as by other Hellenistic monarchs, was to use colonists derived from a single ethnic group. Antiochus does this not only in the case of the Jewish colonies in question, but also with the settlement of Kardakon Kome in Lycia, made up entirely of Kardakes. Josephus records another example of the process in Herod the Great’s colony of Bathyra, where he also settled a homogenous group of Babylonian Jews, hoping to use them to control the local population.\(^{14}\)

These are the general features of Hellenistic colonization, and the Jewish settlements created by the letter fit this broader pattern. That, in itself, does not prove the authenticity of the document. A clever forger would have been able to create a letter that reflects standard practice. A better test for authenticity is whether the settlements created

\(^{12}\) Strabo, 12.2.7.

\(^{13}\) Cohen, *The Seleucid Colonies*, 47.

fit the mould of the other colonies of Antiochus III. Only three colonizing ventures of Antiochus III are known, including the settlements outlined in this document.\textsuperscript{15} The other two are his re-foundation of the city of Lysimacheia in Thrace, and a colony known as Kardakon Kome in the area of Telmessus. The re-foundation of Lysimacheia is, on the surface, quite different from the other two, but is a useful comparison since it is known from three sources, the histories of Appian and Livy and an inscription, whereas the other two are known from only one source each.

Lysimacheia came to Antiochus’ attention at the start of the campaign season of 196, when he moved his forces from winter quarters near Ephesus to the Chersonese and then to Lysimacheia, which lay in ruins.\textsuperscript{16} According to Livy, it was when Antiochus arrived that he first conceived the desire to refound a city that was once so famous and located in such an advantageous position.\textsuperscript{17} This latter point probably alludes to its potential usefulness in helping to control raids from the Thracians in the north. There is no letter from Antiochus ordering the re-foundation of Lysimacheia which might be compared to the letter in Josephus. Such a letter would never have been written since Antiochus was himself present to carry out the task. The treaty that Antiochus concluded with the city at the time of its refoundation is the only comparable document and the terms of that treaty, along with what we know from Livy and Appian, show several similarities to the Jewish settlements. What differences exist are the result of practical

\textsuperscript{15} Cohen, \textit{The Seleucid Colonies}, 32. There is at least one more that could be added to this by analogy, and that will be discussed later.

\textsuperscript{16} Livy, 33.38.11.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. 33.38.11, \textit{cupido eum restituendi nobilem urbem et loco sitam opportuno cepit}.
differences in the circumstances of the two ventures, not a difference in philosophy. The Jewish colonies were new, small settlements meant to control local populations, whereas Lysimacheia was a large city that Antiochus intended to repopulate and rebuild for the express purpose of using it as one of the major centres of his empire and as a capital for his son Seleukos.  

There are some practical differences between this and Antiochus’ two other colonies. Antiochus made a point of repopulating Lysimacheia with the old citizens who had fled, and even ransomed those who had been enslaved to return them to the city, or so it recorded by both Livy and Appian. Both also allow that Antiochus supplemented the former inhabitants by bringing in completely new colonists as well. Collecting old inhabitants and returning them to their original city is not at all like the Jewish colony, but it is probably not what Antiochus was doing either. In this Livy and Appian may be reflecting Antiochus’ own claims. It was far more in keeping with the image that he wanted to project, that of a man reclaiming his ancestral dominions, to stress the continuity of the city of Lysimacheia. To put it another way, Antiochus had a better claim to the city won by Seleucus I than he did on a new city founded in territory that had never been securely under the power of his dynasty.

It seems entirely probable that Antiochus used a good number of fresh colonists, possibly drawn from elsewhere in his kingdom, as the Jews sent to Lydia and Phrygia

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18 John Grainger, “Antiochos III in Thrace,” *Historia* 45 (1996), 339. During the conference with the Roman envoys at Lysimacheia Antiochus states this as one of his reasons for rebuilding the city (Polybius 18.51).
were, to make up the city population. Lysimacheia was refounded in 196, around the same time that Antiochus founded the colony of Kardakon Kome in Lycia by moving a group of Kardakes from Syria to a newly acquired territory on the border of his kingdom. The settlers in Lysimacheia could have been people brought from the centre of the kingdom, or just as likely they could have been veterans discharged by Antiochus, since half the royal army was on the spot helping to rebuild the city. Either way it is unlikely that the new settlers were simply landless peasants who straggled in from all directions. If these had been landless peasants, there would have been no need to attract them with the prospects of the “advantages” that Antiochus was offering.

These advantages bear a striking similarity to some of the ones given to the Jewish settlers. Livy gives no specifics, but says only that Antiochus attracted new colonists with hope of *commoda*. Appian does give specifics, saying that the new colonists of Lysimacheia were to receive “κτσρα, ρραβατα και σίδηρον ἐς γεωργίαν,” “cattle, sheep and iron tools for agriculture.” One of the grants to the Jewish colonists neatly parallels this: Antiochus gave the settlers not only land, but also σιτον εὶς τὰς τῶν

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20 M. Segre, “Inserzioni di Licia,” *Clara Rhodos* 9 (1928), 208, dates the settlement to c. 197, only a year before Lysimacheia. The Kardakes were a tribe from central Iran, who served in Antiochus’ army at Raphia (J. Grainger, *A Seleukid Prosopography and Gazetteer* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 734).

21 This is how Briant envisions most settlers in Hellenistic colonies. Briant, *Colonisation I*, 66.

22 The new settlers were getting land which had recently been under the plough, and homes in a secure city which had been built for them by Antiochus’ army. This would surely be enough to attract the truly desperate, and we cannot assume that Antiochus was so magnanimous as to offer expensive gifts when there was no need.

23 Livy, 33.38.13.

θεραπόντων διατροφάς ("corn for the sustenance of their servants").

Piejko attempted to bring the parallel between the two phrases still closer, suggesting that σίδηρον in Appian was actually a corruption for σῖτον. This is tempting, but unlikely, and in any case the parallel would be imperfect, since σῖτον ἔς γεωργίαν would refer to corn for agricultural purposes, which must mean seed corn, and not a food subsidy, as we find in the Zeuxis letter.

The difference is only a matter of practicality and does not detract from the similarity of the two grants. The Jewish settlers were to be given a food ration only "until they are able harvest enough food from the land." This suggests that the Jewish colonists were being settled on land that was at least in part untilled, and as such it would be some time before the colony could sustain itself. At the same time they likely brought their herds and iron tools with them. They travelled with their whole households, and if these included their farm equipment it explains why Antiochus said moving them would be a troublesome matter. The new citizens of Lysimacheia received fertile land, which, if it was not currently under cultivation, had been so only a few years before, and could expect to be able to feed themselves by the time of the next harvest. Conversely, any herds, flocks, iron farming implements and anything else that might be considered moveable booty would have been taken by the Thracians who captured the city. So in

25 AJ, 12.152.
27 ἄρχρις ἀν τοῦς παρὰ τῆς γῆς καρποῦς λαμβάνωσι (AJ, 12.152.).
28 AJ, 12.150.
this situation Antiochus is seeing that both of his colonies are provided with what they need to survive and become self-sufficient.

There is no document similar to the Zeuxis letter in the case of Lysimacheia, since Antiochus was on the spot to deal with matters himself. When he restored the city, he formed a treaty with his new colony as though it were a free Greek city, no doubt as part of his policy of portraying himself as a liberator and restitutor of his ancestral lands.\textsuperscript{30}

The treaty and its peculiarities in both style and letter-forms have been the subject of some debate, and it seems that it is at least in part modeled on a previous treaty between the same city and Philip V of Macedon.\textsuperscript{31} The basic content of the treaty is interesting. It regulates what privileges and duties the city will have, the sort of thing usually established by a royal letter, or a letter from an official, and yet it has the form of an equal treaty. The first twenty-seven lines of the second fragment of the treaty cover Antiochus’ oath and his end of the bargain:

\begin{verbatim}
[ὅμνυώ Δία Γῆν Ὡλιν Ποσειδό]
[Δήμητρα Ἀπόλλω Ἀρη Αθηνᾶν]
[Ἀρείαν καὶ τὴν Ταυροπόλον]
[καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς πάντας]
[καὶ πᾶσας, ἥ μὴν ἐμμένειν ἐν τῇ]
[φιλία καὶ συμμαχία ἤν πεπόημαι]
[πρὸς Λυσιμαχεῖς μετὰ] τῶν ἐγγόνων
[αὐτῶν καὶ συμμαχήσω] καθότι συντέ-
[θείμαι καὶ διαφυλάξω τὴν πόλιν]
[ἐν ἔλευθερίᾳ καὶ] ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ
[αὐτόνομον οὖ]ποσαν καὶ ἀφρούρητον
[καὶ ἀφορολόγητον, καὶ ἐὰν τις πολεμῇ]
[τὴν πόλιν] τῇ Λυσιμαχέων, ἢ τῶς φρου-
[ρίως, ἢ τῇ χώρᾳ, βοηθήσω καθότι συν-
[τέθιμαι] χρώμενος λιμέσι τοῖς Λυσιμα-
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{30} Piejko, 162.
\textsuperscript{31} Piejko, passim; P. Frisch and Z. Tasliklioglu, 104.
[χέων ὃν]μητηρίοις, δι’ οὖς ἀν ἀποδείξω
[καὶ ὁ]περ ἐν τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ διέσταλ—
[μαι], καὶ οὖκ ἐγκαταλείψω τὴν συμ-
μακι[αν ἦν πεπ]όημαι πρὸς Λυσιμα-
χεῖς τρόπωι οὔθενι οὔδὲ παρεν—
[ρ]έσει οὔδεμια, ἐμμενόντων
[καὶ] αὐ[τ]ῶν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἐμὲ συμ-
μαχίᾳ. [ἐ]ορκοῦντι μέν μοι εὖ εἰη,
[ἐφ]ι[σ]ο[ν][κο][ν]τι δὲ τάναντία.32

[I swear by Zeus, the Earth, the Sun, Poseidon, Demeter, Apollo, Ares,
Athena Areia and the Tauropolos as well as all the other gods and
goddesses that I will hold] to the alliance [and friendship] which I have
made [with the people of Lysimacheia] and their descendents, I will make
this alliance as I have agreed, and I will maintain the city in freedom and
democracy, being autonomous, ungarrisoned and free from tribute, and if
ever someone should make war against the city of the Lysimacheians, or
against their fortresses or their territory, I will help, as I have agreed, using
the harbours and bases of the Lysimacheians, through whomever I appoint
and as I established in the treaty. I will not abandon the treaty that I have
made with the Lysimacheians in any way or by any pretext, while they
remain in alliance with me. And in keeping this oath may things go well
for me, and in breaking it the opposite.

Several similarities to the two other colonial ventures of Antiochus III, and to the
pattern of Hellenistic colonisation in general, are immediately apparent. The first is the
fortified nature of the settlement. Livy and Appian say that Antiochus used his army to
rebuild the walls of the city itself, but the φρούρια that Antiochus promises to defend
along with the city’s territory, are otherwise unknown.33 It is safe to assume that
Antiochus either built or rebuilt these fortresses in the outlying territory of the city, and
that they were a part of his plan for the community. The most obvious comparison is to
the situation of the Jewish colonists, who were to be transported εἰς τὰ φρούρια καὶ

32 I am using the text of the treaty as reconstructed by Piejko.
33 Livy, 33.38.13; Appian, Syraica ,1.
That is, they were to be settled in the forts and most important places of Lydia and Phrygia, and one would assume that these “most important places” were either already fortified or were fortified upon the arrival of the colonists.  

There are two other points in the treaty with Lysimacheia that have parallels in the Jewish colonies. The first is that Antiochus grants the city its autonomy, freedom, freedom from garrisoning and freedom from tribute. All of these things make up the standard vocabulary of city status, and are part of the system of grants and rewards by which the Hellenistic kings related to the Greek cities in their territory, and yet this treaty bears little resemblance to such treaties with other cities. It seems decidedly out of place, since, at the time the treaty was made, the city was likely nothing more than a few original inhabitants who were hastily formed into an assembly to ratify the treaty. This may be because it mimics the earlier treaty of Philip V with Lysimacheia, though this cannot tell us why Antiochus did not use the standard model. The treaty, it must be noted, is an odd hybrid. It is somewhere between how a king would relate to one of the foremost cities of his realm and the grants made to a new colony. In fact, the privileges given to the Jewish settlers are quite similar. The right to live by their ancestral laws approximates autonomy quite literally and carried the same symbolic weight. Just as the Jews coveted the right to live by their ancestral laws, Greek cities coveted autonomy as the sign of a free Greek polis. Like the new colony at Lysimacheia, the Jews received tax

34 Aj, 12.149.
35 The colony of Kardakon Kome was also fortified, as will be discussed later.
37 Piejko, 163.
38 Ibid., passim.
exemptions, only with a time limit rather than permanence. The ones for Lysimacheia were permanent simply because that is the way a king interacts with a favoured city. Similarly, the promise of democracy and freedom from garrisoning are part of the standard set of grants made to cities in the Seleucid kingdom. 39

Another colonial venture of Antiochos III was the village of Kardakon Kome, which is known only from a single inscription. The inscription was first published by Segre in 1938. 40 It does not record an order to found a colony, such as the one in Josephus; rather, it is a letter from the Pergamene king Eumenes II in response to a petition by οἱ κατοικοῦντες ἐν Καρδάκων Κώμῃ (“those settled in the village of the Kardakes”). 41 The body of the letter reads:

[βα]σιλείας Εὐμένης Ἀρτεμιδώρωι ἀνεγνώσθη μοι ὧ πογεγράφεις ἐν τῇ εἰσγραφῇ ἢ ἀναδεδωκαν οἱ κατοικοῦντες ἐν Καρδάκων κώμῃ ἔπει οὖν ἐξετάζων εὐρίσκεις αὐτοῦς ἀσθενῶς ἀπαλλάσσοντας τοὺς ἱδίους διὰ τὸ τὸν ξύλινον καρπὸν σπάνιον γίνε[σ]θαί καὶ τὴν χώραν λυ- πραν, σύνταξον τὴν τε χώραν ἢν ἥγοράκησαν παρά Πτολεμαίου, τὴν τε τιμήν οὐκ ἔδωκαν διὰ τὸ [το]ύς πλει[σ]-τοὺς διαρρυνὴν αὐτῶν, ἔτι ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἀργόριον μὴ πρά- ξαν καὶ ἔπει τῆς συντάξεως δεὶ διορθοῦσθαι αὐτοῦς ἐκάσ- του σωμάτως ἐνηλίκου ῥοδίας δραχμάς τέσσαρας οβολόν, ἀσ- θενοῦντες δὲ τοῖς ἱδίοις βαρύνονται, τὰ τε παραγγαφόμενα αὐ- τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ ἐκκαθεσκάτου ἔτους, ἐκ τούτων ἀφεῖναι, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑπτακαθαδ jaws ἔτους, ῥοδίας δραχμήν καὶ ὀβολόν καὶ [δ]- σους ἀν ἐπεισάγωνται ἐκ τῆς ὑπορίας ὑπάρχειν πάντων ἀτέ- λειαν ἐτῶν τριῶν, τοῖς δὲ τῆς ἐκκρυτησασιν πρότερον ἐκ τοῦ τό- που, νῦν δὲ βουλομένοις έπανελθεῖν, ἐπῶν διώκει· ἐπισκεύασαι δὲ καὶ τὸ προϋπάρχον αὐτοῖς πύργιον, ὀπως ἔχουσιν ὑπὸ-

39 Ma, 153 ff, argues that while these grants are standard practice, the grant of autonomy is merely symbolic and the cities receiving these grants were still subject.
41 Ibid., 190.
King Eumenes to Artemidoros. What you added into the letter that those who are settled in Kardakon Kome delivered is known to me. Since, in examining matters, you find them to be unable to discharge their debts privately because the produce of their orchards has become scanty and the land has become poor, see to it that the land which they bought from Ptolemy, and which they have not given the price for because most of their money has drained away, let them have it without paying the silver. And since by the arrangement it is necessary for them to pay four Rhodian drachmas and an obol for each person of age, and they are unable, and oppressed by private debts, release them from the things written here from the sixteenth year, and from the seventeenth make them pay one Rhodian drachma and an obol less than before. And whoever comes to settle from outside the colony is to be completely free from tribute for three years, and whoever migrated from the region earlier and now wishes to come back will be tribute-free for two years. And make ready for them the tower, which was built before so that they have a stronghold, and let them be provided with the other supplies for war, and pay the builder yourself. Year 17, four days away from the month of Dios.

When Antiochus was the King, in the year 119, and the month of Hyperberetaios...

This is a letter from an Attalid king to an established settlement in his territory, but there is reason to believe that this village was originally a colony founded by Antiochus III. First, at the bottom of the stele is the first line of a document issued when Antiochus III was king, in the Seleucid year 119 (193 BCE). The name of the settlement, the village of the Kardakes, also suggests a connection to Antiochus III. The Kardakes were a tribe from central Iran and it is difficult to imagine how they came to Lydia in a cohesive group, if they were not transplanted by the Seleucids. We know that a unit of 1000 Kardakes was part of Antiochus' army at Raphia, so he is known to have brought at
least some of them with him to the western end of his kingdom.\textsuperscript{42} The connection to the Kardakes, and the date of 119 Seleucid era are enough to assume that the original colony of Kardakes was planted by Antiochus III.

Kardakon Kome must have been founded by, or at least under, Antiochus III, and we have enough information to begin to speculate when and why as well. In 204 BCE Ptolemy, the dynast of Telmessus, was still a noteworthy figure, as his sister was made a high priestess in a Seleucid satrapy.\textsuperscript{43} By 189 BCE this was no longer the case; the treaty of Apamea makes that clear. It disposes of Telmessus and the land that had previously belonged to Ptolemy of Telmessus, handing it over to Eumenes.\textsuperscript{44} At some point between 204 and 189 Antiochus gained control over this area of Lycia, most likely during his campaign along the coast of Asia Minor in 197.\textsuperscript{45} This territory had been under the same dynasty for at least forty years, and Ptolemy, if no longer in direct power, was still active in the region if he could sell land to the Kardakes and expect payment. The loyalty of the local population to the new regime, and the threat of Ptolemy staging an uprising while he was busy in Thrace, were probably significant concerns for Antiochus, and are surely what prompted him to found the colony. This is identical to the reason for the founding of the Jewish settlements, and they follow a similar pattern of population transfer as well.

In both cases Antiochus moved an ethnically homogenous group from elsewhere in his

\textsuperscript{42} Polybius, 5.79.11.
\textsuperscript{43} Segre, 208.
\textsuperscript{44} Livy, 37.56.
\textsuperscript{45} Segre, 208.
empire to a region on the fringe of his authority to maintain control of the local population.

The colonial venture implied here is similar to the Jewish settlements in other ways. The estates that the Kardakes seem to possess, which we can assume are for the most part the kleroi granted to them when they settled in the area, are comparable to the allotments received by the Jewish settlers. The Kardakes complain that both their orchards and their other land have suffered a decrease in productivity, which suggests that their original kleroi included both land for trees and ploughland, or perhaps that they received allotments already planted with orchards. All of the other documents that we have for Seleucid colonisation also suggest that kleroi included a variety of land. The papyri from Dura suggest that the original settlers received lands suited to a variety of purposes. In a deed of sale from the second century BCE, one Philip agrees to sell his plot of land which is in the kleros of Conon, and all the things attached to it, which include fruit trees, farm buildings, gardens and one has to assume other land for cultivation. The inscription covering the transfer of the estate of Mnesimachus also suggests that the land he held from the king was varied. It included one large manor

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46 G. Cohen, The Hellenistic Settlements in Europe, the Islands and Asia Minor (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 331. In his entry for Kardakon Kome, Cohen directs his reader's attention to the Jewish colonies for comparison.

47 R. Billows, Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism (New York: E.J. Brill, 1995), 160-163. In order to make sense of the time frame this must be the case. There was not time to grow the trees from saplings, have productive orchards long enough to buy more land, have the orchards turn unproductive and become impoverished in the years between the foundation of the colony and the letter from Eumenes.

48 Document 15, in C. Welles, R. Fink and J. Gilliam. 89.
house or hall (αὐλή), which was detached from the original property before the sale.\textsuperscript{49} As well, the deed of sale speaks of permanent plants, which implies that the estate originally granted to Mnesimachus had both land for cultivation and land set aside for orchards or vineyards.\textsuperscript{50} All of the Seleucid foundations, at least in Asia Minor, seem to be the same in that colonists received land for cultivation of annual crops, and land reserved for more permanent plants, such as orchards and vineyards. The Jewish settlers were to receive a place for the building of a house, and a plot of land for cultivation and for the growing of vines.\textsuperscript{51}

Another aspect of the village of Kardakon Kome that is similar to the Jewish settlement is the fact that the settlement seems to have been fortified. As part of his decision for the town, Eumenes orders Artemidoros to refurbish the local fortress, or πύργιον. Similarly, when he resettled Lysimacheia, Antiochus not only used his army to quickly reconstruct the city walls, but on the evidence of the treaty, to restore or build several outlying forts as well.\textsuperscript{52} That is most likely what this πύργιον is, some sort of outlying fort. If it were merely referring to the town, or to a fortress within the town, Eumenes would have said as much. The outlying fort attached to the territory of a town that was surely walled can only be meant to extend the area over which the settlement could exert some control, or in other words to protect a larger area from local unrest.

\textsuperscript{49} Buckler and Robinson, Inscription 1, col. I lines 14-15.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 46.
\textsuperscript{51} εἰς τε οἰκοδομίας οἰκῶν αὐτοῖς δῶσεις τόπον ἐκαστῳ καὶ χώραν εἰς ψεωργίαν καὶ φυτεῖαν ἀμπέλων (AJ, 12.152).
\textsuperscript{52} Livy, 33.38.13; Appian, Syraica, 1.
This is precisely the same reason that Zeuxis was ordered to settle the Jewish colonists in forts and strategic locations.\textsuperscript{53}

One final point about the settlement at Kardakon Kome can be inferred from this inscription, and that is that the Kardakes seem to have received some sort of temporary tax exemption from Antiochus when they were first planted in Lycia. The treaty between Antiochus and Lysimacheia established the city as exempt from all taxes, and this was almost certainly part of what he used to draw in settlers. Eumenes II granted several financial concessions to the Kardakes. The first is that he allowed them to avoid paying the outstanding balance on the land that they bought from Ptolemy of Telmessus, perhaps in 193.\textsuperscript{54} He also reduced their annual head tax and remitted the outstanding balance of that as well. Finally he granted to his new settlers complete tax exemption for three years, and returning citizens received the same exemption for two years. It seems likely that in this case Eumenes is recreating, at least in part, the original circumstances of the colony's foundation.

This premise explains the tax exemptions, the rebuilding of the fortifications, the arrival of new settlers and return of old settlers. It also helps to explain two peculiarities in the inscription itself. The first is that at the bottom of the letter from Eumenes we have the beginning of a further document that speaks of things happening in 193 under Antiochus III. The second is that Eumenes makes reference to the results of an investigation undertaken by his official Artemidoros. Conducting such investigations

\textsuperscript{53} AJ, 12.149.  
\textsuperscript{54} Segre, 208. Segre assumes that the second document is somehow related to the purchase.
and including them in correspondence is highly unusual in Attalid documents.\footnote{Ibid., 192.} Segre assumes that the investigation was into whether the claims of the Kardakes were true or not. This does not seem likely. Including in a published response that a royal official had been sent to check and make sure that the city really was impoverished would be entirely graceless. It is more likely that the Kardakes cited certain concessions that had been made to them when they received their land from Antiochus III and asked that they be allowed to maintain them, as part of the agreement by which they held their land allotments. The second document here is the result of the investigation undertaken by Artemidoros to see if these were part of the original terms of the land transaction and the part that he “added” to the petition brought by the Kardakes.

The allowances that Eumenes makes may well have been consistent with the concessions that Antiochus had granted to the original colonists. This would have been a good way of securing the loyalty of the community: by symbolically re-founding it. It seems certain that times were not always so difficult for those in Kardakon Kome, else they would not have been able to afford to buy land from Ptolemy. They were originally given fertile land, with productive orchards. This would explain why their land was only tax-free for perhaps three years. These productive farms, coupled with tax breaks probably allowed them to produce enough surplus to afford to buy more land only four years after they first arrived.

To these three known colonial ventures of Antiochus III, there is perhaps one other that could be added. Josephus has a collection of three documents that he uses to
show the goodwill that Antiochus III had towards the Jews. The letter to Zeuxis is the third of these; the first is a letter from Antiochus to his governor Ptolemy.\(^56\) The first half of the letter outlines a series of gifts that Antiochus made to the temple in Jerusalem. Near the end of this letter, Antiochus outlines the measures that are to be taken to restore the city in general. In order to repopulate the city, and to keep the current inhabitants from leaving, Antiochus grants to those who are currently there, and to those who return to the city within the year, complete tax exemption for three years.\(^57\) As well, in a move highly reminiscent of his later resettlement of Lysimacheia, he gave orders that any former inhabitants who had been enslaved should be freed and returned.\(^58\) Jerusalem is not numbered among the colonies founded by Antiochus III, but there is little difference between his program for that city and how he dealt with Lysimacheia. Under the Seleucid system all newly won territory and any cities in it were placed in a sort of limbo until the king redefined the community’s status by a royal act.\(^59\) To Antiochus there was no difference between repopulating Lysimacheia and repopulating Jerusalem.

The Jewish settlement, or settlements as the case may be, do fit the general pattern of Hellenistic colonization, and the pattern of colonization under Antiochus III, as closely as it can be determined. Using the patterns established here in the analysis of the letter to Zeuxis should allow us to create a fuller picture of the Jewish settlements.

\(^{56}\) AJ, 12.138-144.

\(^{57}\) Ibid 12.144.

\(^{58}\) Antiochus orders Ptolemy to do this in a royal letter (AJ, 12.144), both Livy and Appian say that he did the same with Lysimacheia (Livy, 33.38.13; Appian, Syraica, 1).

\(^{59}\) Ma, 111.
The first question in this instance is whether we are dealing with one large settlement or several smaller ones. At first glance, the letter itself seems to suggest that the Jews will be placed in several settlements. The plurals τὰ φούρια and τοὺς ἀναγκαστάτους τόπους are used for the places to which the Jewish families are moved, and multiple settlements are also suggested by the fact that the colonies are in response to disturbances in two different satrapies. This is not conclusive proof that the Jews were settled in several different communities. As the treaty with Lysimacheia shows, it was not uncommon for a city to have several φούρια included in its territory. As well, the borders of Lydia and Phrygia were always fluid and ill defined, and it is conceivable that a single settlement in the Lycos valley, where the two satrapies meet, could be used to control a disturbance in an area where both Lydians and Phrygians were revolting.

So the letter itself cannot answer this question with certainty, but there are two other factors to consider. The first is the numbers of settlers involved. An accurate average for the size of colonies is impossible to find, but there is one very close parallel for which we have numbers. This is the colony of Bathyra which Herod the Great established in Trachonitis. This was also a colony made up of Babylonian Jews, mercenary cavalry and archers in this case. Herod set out to establish a village, “not falling short of a city in size,” and he did it using only six hundred mercenaries and their families. Cohen estimates that the total population of this village would have been

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60 AJ, 12.149.
62 κώμην πόλεως μέγεθος οὐκ ἀποδέουσαν (AJ, 17.23).
around 2500 people initially.\textsuperscript{63} If this was considered a large enough group to make the colony rival the size of a city, then it hardly seems likely that Antiochus would have settled a number four times greater in one place.

The second factor that speaks in favour of multiple settlements is the lack of any one place which could accommodate so many settlers. Perhaps the only city that counts as one of the most important places in Lydia and Phrygia, and would still be large enough to accommodate such numbers is Sardis. Sardis must be dismissed as the point of settlement for all of the colonists for the simple reason that it did not need them.\textsuperscript{64} Sardis was the centre of Seleucid administration of all Asia Minor beyond the Taurus mountain range, and if there had been any kind of disturbance in Sardis, it would have been named specifically, and more extreme measures than introducing new settlers would have been taken. As well, the new colonists would have served no purpose since the city had a large permanent garrison, and troops stationed in a nearly impregnable citadel to keep the population under control. Given the numbers involved, and that there was no city in the area which could accommodate all of them, it is unlikely that the Jewish colonists were all established in one settlement, and it is far more likely that they were placed in several settlements at various points within the two satrapies.

There were likely multiple settlements of Jews in Lydia and Phrygia, and a few things can be said about how they would have appeared. One thing that is known is that


\textsuperscript{64} P. Treblico, \textit{Jewish Communities in Asia Minor} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 38. Treblico argues that some of the colonists were sent to Sardis, and this is possible, but it cannot have been the whole lot of them.
the Jewish settlers were to be given plots of land. Not just single contiguous plots, but, as the letter makes plain, and as in all of the other colonies, the settlers would have received a piece of land for cultivation, a place within a walled community to build a house, and an area for growing some sort of specialized crop, in this case vines.\textsuperscript{65} It is impossible to say how much land they received, or whether it was already under cultivation, and this no doubt varied from settlement to settlement, and possibly from \textit{kleros} to \textit{kleros}. It is safe to assume that the plots of land were fairly substantial on the whole. The Jews coming from Mesopotamia seem to have been far from poor, ruined peasants. They came accompanied by their entire households, which evidently in some cases included slaves or some other sort of servants, whom Antiochus promised to feed.\textsuperscript{66}

The settlers received valuable \textit{kleroi}, but the question remains whether they were valuable for their size or their quality, and more specifically whether they received allotments of wasteland, or land that was inhabited and cultivated. In general, some colonies were established in areas where there was no prior habitation, but it was far more common for settlers either to be added to an existing community or to be placed near an existing community that would be joined to them.\textsuperscript{67} In the case of the Jewish settlements the latter is more likely, not least because new cities in the middle of nowhere would have been less useful in preventing rebellions. At least part of the land that the settlers received had been previously under cultivation. The settlers were granted ten

\textsuperscript{65} Billows, 159-162, argues that granting an area for special crops, whether it be trees, vines, or gardens was universal.
\textsuperscript{66} \textit{AJ}, 12.152.
\textsuperscript{67} Briant, Colonisation I, 63.
years in which the fruit of the land will be completely untaxed, but there is no similar stipulation for the produce of their vineyards, and we can expect that one would have been made, since the time was taken to differentiate between them elsewhere in the document. If the point of the tax exemption was to give the colonists a chance to establish themselves, then the fact that they paid tax on them suggests that they took over properly functioning vineyards. The question of the land for cultivation is perhaps more complex. The lengthy tax exemption and the fact that food is provided for their servants until they can get produce form their land suggests that at least part of their grain producing land was previously untitled, and would be unproductive for some time. Yet at the same time it is odd that a grain ration is only provided to the servants of the settlers. The settlers themselves must have had some other source of food, so perhaps part of their land was already productive.

The internal workings of a colony like this are largely unknown to us. If the settlers in whole or in part occupied land that had been cultivated by the previous inhabitants then it is unlikely that the two groups formed a single community. Aside from the natural resentment of losing ancestral lands to foreigners, it was in the Seleucid interest to keep the colonists from mixing with the locals. The previous inhabitants were likely attached to the lands of the new Jewish settlers as were the laoi of the

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68 They are each to have a χώραν εἰς γεωργίαν καὶ φυτείαν ἀμπέλων, but for the tax exemptions we hear only that they are to be ἀτελεῖς τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς καρπῶν (AJ, 12.151). That ἐκ τῆς γῆς καρποί refers to the produce of the land for regular cultivation is reinforced by the fact that the settlers are to receive a corn subsidy until τοὺς παρὰ τῆς γῆς καρποὺς λαμβάνωσι.”

69 Briant, Colonisation I, 68, laments our lack of knowledge and documentation on what he calls the “internal zone” of colonisation.
Mnesimachus document. These laoi seem to have been some sort of serf class, who worked the farms of the new landholders. So the settlements came prepared with an underclass of landless workers, making the lives of the settlers easier, and possibly helping to attract them in the first place.

There is one final matter about the internal workings of the settlements that should be addressed here. Antiochus makes a further grant of an unspecified nature to some of the settlers, specifically τοῖς εἴς τὰς χρείας ὑπηρετοῦσι ("those engaged in service"). The type of service is not defined, nor is the nature of the gift, except to say that it is "sufficient". Some have taken this passage to indicate that the settlers were still expected to serve in the Seleucid army. Military service, however, is not the only form of service that these settlers could have been providing. If Dura can be taken as a model, then Seleucid colonies may well have come equipped with a few royal offices and institutions in addition to local civic institutions. These could well have been the people responsible for running the local registry office, and they were being supplied with sufficient papyrus to meet their needs.

There are few salient points in the general pattern of Hellenistic colonisation. The way that the founder of the colony helped the colonists to establish themselves seems to be universal. The most common method was by granting tax exemptions. This can be observed in all of Antiochus III’s colonies, including the Jewish settlement. In some cases, such as the refoundation of Lysimacheia and the Jewish settlements, more specific

71 Cohen, The Seleucid Colonies, 7-8; Schalit, passim.
grants were made. Some things about the nature of the colonies also seem to be universal. First, all of the settlers seem to receive *kleroi* that include both land for the cultivation of annual crops, and land set aside for more permanent plants such as orchards or vineyards, as well as space for a house within the city. They were always fortified in some way, and in the case of those founded by Antiochus III they all included outlying forts as well. These three colonies were all intended to help control restless local populations, and the outlying forts were used to extend their radius of control. In order to maintain their effectiveness in the long term, in all three of his colonial ventures Antiochus endeavoured to keep his settlers from mixing with the local populations. The Jews and Kardakes were both homogenous groups, unlikely to mix with outsiders, particularly the Jews since they were allowed to live by their own laws. Likewise the grants of autonomy and freedom to Lysimacheia were intended to make the colony into a genuine Greek polis, which could be expected to exclude outsiders from citizenship on its own. The letter from Antiochus III to Zeuxis, if one reads beyond the opening salutation, is a simple order from a king to his official to found several new settlements. Since the details of the settlements in the letter so exactly match the pattern of Hellenistic colonisation, and of Antiochus III’s own colonial ventures, the case for forgery, and particularly for a relatively late forgery is seriously weakened.\(^{72}\)

CHAPTER III:  

The letter of Antiochus III to Zeuxis, which is preserved in the twelfth book of the Jewish Antiquities, conforms to what we know of Seleucid colonisation in general, and to what we know of Antiochus III's colonial ventures in specific. The letter, both in content and form, also fits into the general pattern of Seleucid administration, but can it be assigned to a specific historical moment? The letter itself gives some sense of its historical context; Antiochus tells us that he sent the letter "upon learning that those in Lydia and Phrygia were revolting" (πυνθανόμενος τούς ἐν Λυδίᾳ καὶ Φρυγίᾳ νεωτερίζοντας).¹ This chapter will seek to establish the context, considering first the meaning of νεωτερίζειν and its cognates and then who might have been involved.

The Meaning of νεωτερίζειν

Antiochus decided to send Jewish colonists to Lydia and Phrygia πυνθανόμενος τούς ἐν Λυδίᾳ καὶ Φρυγίᾳ νεωτερίζοντας, which Marcus in the Loeb translates as "learning that the people in Lydia and Phrygia are revolting."² First and foremost we face the problem of trying to understand what Antiochus meant by νεωτερίζοντας. Marcus’ translation, “revolting”, is one possibility; given the context, though, it probably does not capture the sense of what Antiochus was saying. νεωτερίζειν is not the most common

¹ AJ 12.149 (Marcus’ translation).
² Ibid.
word for “revolt” in the sense throwing off the control of the king; ἀφιστάναι is far more common. For instance, when Molon rebels against Antiochus, he is said by Polybius to ἀφιστασθαι. Likewise, during the army mutiny at Apamea under Antiochus III, the Kyrrhestai, who go into open revolt are said to ἀπέστησαν, while the rest of the troops, who merely mutiny over pay, are said to engage in a stasis. νεωτεριζειν, while it can be used of political disturbances, at its base simply means to make, or even to plan or attempt, a violent change to the status quo. Even when it refers to political changes, it more often means preparing a change in internal government than an outright revolt from an overlord. “Revolution” would probably be a closer English translation than “rebellion” in most cases. It is even less likely that νεωτεριζειν would be used in this way to indicate a situation where those in Lydia and Phrygia were already in a state of rebellion against the king; that is almost entirely the domain of the perfect form ἀφίστημι.

The context is unlikely to be one where entire satrapies or regions were in open rebellion against royal authority, so in this case νεωτεριζειν must carry another meaning.

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3 Polybius, 5.41.
4 Polybius, 5.50.
5 For instance, Josephus uses it twice of those who plan changes to established religious practice (AJ 4.197 and 9.195).
6 Two of the three times that Diodorus uses the word are in reference to internal revolutions in Syracuse (Diodorus, 11.72.3, 11.86.5). Likewise, both times that Polybius uses it, it refers to violent change in internal government and not a rebellion (Polybius, 4.24.6, 5.29.5).
7 There are exceptions to the pattern. Appian uses it of revolt against Rome by the Spanish provinces (Appian, Foreign Wars, 8.39).
8 For instance, when Achaios hoped to make use of the fact that the Kyrrhestai were already in revolt to invade Syria. See Polybius, 5.57.
Internal revolution seems unlikely in this context, it seems especially unlikely to have occurred over two satrapies at the same time. There are several other possibilities for the meaning of the word. First, it can simply refer to someone attempting to make some sort of change to the status quo. This, of course, raises the question of exactly what the status quo was, and what Antiochus might consider to be a breach of it. The simple answer is that as far as the king was concerned, the status quo represented the world as it looked in the aftermath of the battle of Kouroupedion, with the Seleucid king in control of everything from India to Thrace. Antiochus spent most of his reign attempting to return the world to this state. His position is spelled out quite literally to the Roman envoys who demanded, in 196 BCE, that he evacuate Lysimacheia. Antiochus tells them that he has every right to claim this city in that it makes up part of his ancestral kingdom, since Seleucus I had claimed it after defeating Lysimachus in 281 BCE.9 This was also the goal of Antiochus' extended eastern campaign. It was intended to bring the previously lost eastern satrapies back under his control, forcing independent kings of these regions to accept his sovereignty and repay as tribute the revenues that he lost when they broke away.10 There is more to how Antiochus thought of the ideal state of his kingdom than merely its extent. Polybius says that by the end of Antiochus' great eastern expedition, he had brought not only the upper satrapies under his personal rule, but also all of the maritime cities and dynasts of Asia Minor.11 This too was part of the status quo, and

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9 Livy, 33.40.
10 He did this with Xerxes of Arsamosata, Arsaces of Media, Euthydemos of Bactria, and even Sophagesnos of India (Polybius, 8.23, 10.29, 11.39).
11 Polybius, 11.39.
anything that interfered with it might be referred to with νεωτερίζειν. This is again made explicit, in a way, in Antiochus’ dealings with Rome; he explains that he is willing to allow the cities of Smyrna and Lampascus, which had been resisting his forces, to have their autonomy, but only if they received it as a grant from him, and thereby acknowledged his authority.12 This is surely what Polybius meant when he wrote that Antiochus fulfilled his desire to bring everything under his “personal rule” (ιδίας ἀρχῆς): that everyone had acknowledged his personal authority, and all cities looked to him for favours and grants of status.

This sense of νεωτερίζειν could manifest itself in several ways. It is often used in contexts where “causing trouble” or “creating a disturbance” would be adequate translations. Appian, for instance, uses it both of armies and of trouble-makers within a city, and Polyaeus uses it in the same sense.13 Another meaning of νεωτερίζειν, which could be relevant here, is the way that it can sometimes refer to changing allegiance from one side to another. Again, the example comes from Appian, who again uses it both of an army and of a city.14

Who was involved in the disturbance?

12 Livy, 33.38.
13 When cornered by Fabius Pictor Hannibal puts 5,000 prisoners to death ἴνα μὴ εν τῷ κινδύνῳ νεωτερίζειν (Appian, 3.14). When Octavian sends Maecenas back to Rome because of τῶν νεωτερίζοντας and the result of this is that τινὲς παρακινοῦντες ἐκολόθησαν (“some of those causing disturbances were restrained”) (Appian, 5.12.112).
14 Appian, 4.12.89, 5.1.2.
Achaios?

So if the status quo is that all of Asia Minor is peacefully under the rule of the Antiochus, then who are the τοῦ ἐν Λυδίᾳ καὶ Φρυγίᾳ who are upsetting it, and how are they doing so? One candidate is Achaios, the initial viceroy of Asia Minor who actually did rebel against Antiochus III. In this case, those involved would be the citizens and communities of Lydia and Phrygia that sided with Achaios in his rebellion. νεωτερίζειν could refer to them supporting Achaios, which Antiochus might see as them abandoning his camp for the rival’s, even though he never had control of that territory to begin with. This is the possibility that other scholars have most often seized upon to explain the disturbance, but it can be dismissed.15 Immediately following Achaios’ rebellion which lasted until 212 BCE, Antiochus himself was present in Lydia and would not have needed to send a letter to organize a colony, he could merely have told Zeuxis in person.16 Also against this theory is the fact that Achaios’ rebellion is known to have encompassed much more of Asia Minor than just Lydia and Phrygia, so why would Antiochus choose only to send colonists to these satrapies?

Phrygians and Lydians?

If not Achaios, who? There are a few other possibilities for the source of the disturbances. It could have been native Lydians or Phrygians who were preparing rebellion against the established order of their own accord. They could not actually be in

15 Bengston, Die Strategie, 112; Schalit, 289. Achaios is also the only possibility considered (and refuted) by Gauger (Gauger, Beiträge, 54-5).
16 This is over and above what Josephus says of the chronology, that it happened while Antiochus was away in the upper satrapies.
revolt, but νεωτερίζειν can describe the activities of those who want to revolt, or are about to revolt. This answer is possible, but highly unlikely. First, it is doubtful that revolutionary feelings could be organized and rising all across two large satrapies at once, at least unaided. Cities and communities very rarely or never attempted the kind of revolt that led to independence; most often it was simply a matter of cities switching from the domain of one ruler to the next. This is possible, but it makes the Lydians and Phrygians less the cause of the disturbance, at least in the mind of Antiochus, than the power that is setting itself up as an alternative to Seleucid rule, as Achaios did.

Local Dynasts?

Another possibility is that these troublemakers are local dynasts within the Seleucid kingdom. Such rulers were of some consequence, enough to merit the direct attention of the king while he was away in the upper satrapies, as we can see from Polybius. In his fifth book, he talks about the destruction that Rhodes suffered from an earthquake in 225 BCE. Along with the princes of Pontus and Bithynia, Polybius mentions three dynasts of Asia who contributed to the rebuilding efforts: Lysanias, Olympichos and Limnaios.17

Limnaios is virtually unknown outside of this statement in Polybius, but the other two are known.18 The career of Olympichos is well attested by a series of inscriptions

17 παραπλησία δὲ τούτοις Προυσίας καὶ Μιθριδάτης, ἔτι δ’ οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν ὄντες δυνάσται τότε, λέγω δὲ Λυσανίαν Ὀλύμπιχον Λιμναίον (Polybius, 5.90).
18 Ad. Wilhelm, “Kleinasiatische Dynasten,” Neue Beiträge zur griechischen Inschriftenkunde, 1 (1911), 55-61. Nothing else is known of Limnaios himself, but a possible daughter and grandson of a Limnaios are known from two separate inscriptions in Asia Minor.
from Labraunda and Iasos. Inscriptions from the temple at Labraunda suggest that Olympichos first came to Caria as governor of the satrapy under Seleucus II and became an independent dynast at some point during the reign of Antiochus Hierax as independent king of Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{19} Especially pertinent here are three inscriptions from Iasos, recording three Rhodian decrees about an embassy from Iasos.\textsuperscript{20} Olympichos' activities seem to have disturbed the natural order within Caria, causing enough trouble that it could be described with νεωτεριζειν. The first of the three inscriptions is a copy of a decree read by the Iasian envoys to the Rhodian assembly. The Iasians asked for Rhodian assistance in stopping the depredations of a certain Podilos; they invoked their kinship with the Rhodians and ask them to take on the role of protector.\textsuperscript{21} The second decree records Rhodes' affirmative response to the request and largely mirrors the language of the original decree.\textsuperscript{22} The third decree, the most fragmentary, describes the Rhodian response. The Rhodians sent two ambassadors to Caria to negotiate an end to the hostilities and the payment of reparations for the damage done by Podilos, not with Podilos himself, but with Olympichos.\textsuperscript{23} Holleaux draws the obvious conclusion: that Podilos was Olympichos' subordinate.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{20} Wilhelm, 54; M. Holleaux, "Trois décrets de Rhodes," \textit{REG} 12 (1899), and M. Holleaux, "Curae Epigraphicae," \textit{REA} 5 (1902), 222-228.
\textsuperscript{21} Holleaux, "Trois décrets," decree A, lines 21-24, pp 21-22. The complete dossier is \textit{I. Iasos} 150.
\textsuperscript{22} Holleaux, "Curae Epigraphicae," 226, decree B.
\textsuperscript{23} Holleaux, "Curae Epigraphicae," 227, decree C, lines 39-44.
\textsuperscript{24} M. Holleaux, "Trois décrets," 29.
Judging from these documents, Olympichos had significant military resources, since his subordinate, Podilos, had enough strength to ravage the territory of Iasos. He also had a degree of legitimacy and independence, since the Rhodians were willing to send an embassy to him as they would to another polis or even to one of the major kings.\(^{25}\) The same legitimacy is implicit in his donation to the rebuilding of Rhodes twenty years earlier, which was both accepted and remembered by Polybius.\(^{26}\)

In these documents Olympichos bears some similarity to Xerxes of Arsamosata, Euthydemus of Bactria, or Artabazanos, against whom Antiochus campaigned merely because they existed as independent powers on land that lay within his ancestral kingdom. Indeed, Artabazanos was considered the most dangerous of these, not because he ever did anything directly contrary to Antiochus’ interests, but simply because he was the most active in general.\(^{27}\) They were independent powers that arose in places that were temporarily beyond the writ of any major power, and they caused trouble not by attempting actual rebellions but simply by acting on their own authority and looking after their own interests. Olympichos’ domain was centred in an area claimed by two major powers, and he seems to have been a problem for both simply by upsetting the status quo they had established between themselves. Olympichos’ centre of power was in Caria so it is impossible that he was one of those in Lydia and Phrygia who was creating a disturbance. Still, his career is pertinent to this study for one very important reason: it

\(^{25}\) The suggestion that he was answerable to Philip (Holleaux, trios Decrets, 33) seems unlikely. The embassy was sent to Olympichos, not Philip, and one must wonder what benefit Philip could possibly have derived from using Olympichos to annoy Iasos.

\(^{26}\) Polybius 5.90.1.

\(^{27}\) Polybius, 5.55.
demonstrates that these local dynasts were the sort of people who might cause a noticeable disruption (νεωτεριζέν) without engaging in an outright revolt.

Kardakon Kome and Ptolemy of Telmessus

It might be dynasts such as Olympichos, then, who lie behind the reference “those in Lydia and Phrygia.” A highly suggestive parallel is offered by the colony that Antiochus III founded at Kardakon Kome. This, as we know, was a village that he colonized with Kardakes, a central Iranian tribe, and settled in the territory of another dynast, the so-called Ptolemy of Telmessus.28

Ptolemy of Telmessus is an enigmatic figure. He was the son of Lysimachus, the king of Thrace, but he held the lands around Telmessus by a grant from Ptolemy III Euergetes.29 The nature of Ptolemy’s power in the area, and, more importantly, his relationship to the Ptolemaic and Seleucid monarchies is complex. What is clear is that he was recognized as the man in control of a substantial portion of Lycia, in and around Telmessus, from 240 BCE onward. In that year, he was granted the city of Telmessus and the surrounding area as a gift by Ptolemy III Euergetes. He proceeded to take measures to restore the city and levy taxes on the produce of its territory.30 The inscription recording this grant leaves the question of his status unclear. That he was in some way subordinate to the Egyptian monarchy is probable, if he received land from it as a gift, but the relationship is unclear. Eventually he became more than just a local

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28 See above, page 45.
official who had been granted an extensive estate, even if he had begun as such.\textsuperscript{31} At first glance, he seems to have had complete authority over Telmessus and its territory and to have acted in the fashion of a king in miniature, looking after the welfare of his possessions and remitting taxes.\textsuperscript{32} On closer inspection, his autonomy does not seem to be absolute, as he does not have complete freedom to levy taxes. The document does not mention any harbour or import taxes, only taxes on agriculture. This could suggest that Ptolemy of Telmessus had only limited autonomy over his territory, and held it much like any other private individual could hold an estate sectioned off from royal land. He was free to dispose of the produce of the land, and free to make improvements, but the harbour and customs dues were still collected by, and payable to, the royal administration. Inscriptions from this period of Telmessus use Ptolemaic dates, which suggests that some level of Ptolemaic control continued in the territory. Both the inscription recording the original grant and a more interesting dedicatory inscription are dated by the year of the Ptolemaic king. The dedicatory inscription honours a certain Leimon son of Antipatros, who is praised (inter alia) for being a friend of Ptolemy son of


\textsuperscript{32} \textit{OGIS} 55. This is how Bickerman envisions all dynasts, as kinglets with more or less complete autonomy who still act as administrators for the king who gave them their territory (Bickerman, \textit{Institutions des Seleucides}, 166). The truth of this is impossible to decipher, but it seems that at least some of these dynasts, Ptolemy and Olympichos included, did begin as royal delegates.
Lysimachus. For comparison, the city of Amyzon honoured a certain Chionis for being a friend of Antiochus III.

At some point, Ptolemy of Telmessus freed himself from his subordinate status vis-à-vis Egypt. In 204, relations between Ptolemy of Telmessus and his family on the one hand, and Antiochus III on the other seem to have been at their most cordial. In 204, or a little earlier, Antiochus III made Ptolemy’s daughter Berenike the chief priestess of the cult of his wife Laodike. Antiochus would not have given such an important religious post to the daughter of someone who was still perceived as a subordinate of the Ptolemaic kings. Beyond honouring his daughter, Antiochus refers to Ptolemy of Telmessus as his kinsman. That suggests that there was a connection between him and Antiochus, but Ptolemy could not yet have been a direct subordinate of the Seleucid throne at this time. Lycia, the area around Telmessus, and most of the coast of Asia Minor did not come back under Seleucid control until Antiochus’ campaign along the coast in 197. So Ptolemy was one of the more or less independent dynasts of Asia Minor for at least seven years, and probably substantially more.

It was sometime around 197 that Antiochus settled some of the Kardakes in the vicinity of Telmessus, in the holdings of Ptolemy son of Lysimachus. In order to offer a

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33 Segre, 183.
35 The original letter of Antiochus III about her appointment is not dated, and in any event indicates that she has already been made the high priestess, and that Antiochus is now notifying his subordinates of his decision. The cover letter of that subordinate is dated to the Seleucid year 108 (204), but Berenike could have been appointed earlier than that (\textit{RC} 36 and 37).
36 \textit{RC} 36, lines 19-20.
sound parallel to the Jewish settlements, the colony would have to be an attempt to rein in a local dynast who was causing trouble, or at least was considered untrustworthy. At first glance this would not seem to be the case with Ptolemy of Telmessus, since in 204 he was highly regarded by Antiochus. The difference may be that, in 204, Antiochus had not yet laid any plans to secure control of the entire coast of Asia Minor. In fact, he had probably already recognized (or was about to recognize) the claims of Philip V of Macedon to much of the coast.\textsuperscript{37} In these circumstances, Antiochus was no doubt perfectly willing to accept a high degree of autonomy for a local dynast in Lycia. In 204, by even loosely attaching the dynast of Telmessus to his camp, Antiochus could achieve a diplomatic victory, as he was gaining influence in territory that should belong to the Egyptian monarchy.\textsuperscript{38}

There is no record that Ptolemy son of Lysimachus ever caused trouble for Antiochus III, and as such there is no obvious reason for the foundation of the colony of Kardakon Kome in his territory. Still, a new settlement was established in his territory, and this did cause a shift in the area towards being more fully in line with Seleucid control. That the colony was settled in his territory, or at least bordering on his territory is obvious from some of the terms offered to the settlement by Eumenes. One of the terms is that the colonists will be allowed to forego payment on the land that they bought

\textsuperscript{37} The treaty was already in effect by 203/2 (Polybius, 16.1).

\textsuperscript{38} The decision to make Berenike a high-priestess, which was probably at her or her father's request, is surely an example of Antiochus' great eastern expedition bringing τοὺς ἐπὶ τάξει τοῦ Ῥωμαίου δυνάμεως (the dynasts on this side of the Taurus) under his control (Polybius, 11.39).
from Ptolemy.\textsuperscript{39} That they were able to acquire land from Ptolemy at all underlines the point that he was still alive and active and could have angered Antiochus in some way. Indeed, at this point we see the same sign of Seleucid domination as with Ptolemaic domination, namely that the inscriptions now date by the Seleucid era.\textsuperscript{40}

We have no indication, beyond the colony, that Antiochus ever had a problem with Ptolemy of Telmessus; quite the contrary, he had honoured him at some point in the past. What then, was his motivation for settling a colony in the territory of this dynast? The problem almost certainly came up during Antiochus’ campaign along the coast of Asia Minor in 197. Unfortunately, very little is actually known about this campaign, but there are a few ways in which Ptolemy could have provoked the anger or mistrust of Antiochus III. The most likely moment of tension would be as Antiochus passed through, and laid claim to, Lycia during his campaign of 197. One of the few obligations that the Seleucids seem to have forced upon the dynasts in their territory was providing military support,\textsuperscript{41} and it is possible that Ptolemy somehow fell short of what was expected. In the end perhaps Antiochus simply did not trust a dynast who owed his territory to Ptolemaic generosity and took exception to his grants and concessions to Greek cities in Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{42} In any event, the foundation of the colony in his territory seems to have had the desired effect. There was no question as to whether the territory of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[39] Segre, 190ff.
\item[40] This is a reliable barometer, as after the treaty of Apamea documents are dated by the Attalid kings.
\item[41] Bickerman, 167.
\item[42] Compare Antiochus’ response to Roman demands for the freedom of Smyrna and Lampascus (Livy 33.38).
\end{footnotes}
Ptolemy of Telmessus was legitimately the possession of Antiochus, as it is specifically mentioned amongst his former holdings in the treaty of Apamea.\textsuperscript{43}

The Rebels in Lydia and Phrygia

Antiochus instructed Zeuxis to transplant 2000 Jewish families from Babylon to Anatolia 'because there are those in Lydia and Phrygia who are causing a disturbance' (τούς ἐν Λυδίᾳ καὶ Φρυγίᾳ νεωτερίζοντας). We can now begin to suggest who these people were. The dynasts of Asia Minor, who had been a traditional feature of the geopolitical make-up of Anatolia from the time of the Achaemenids, and whose existence and importance Polybius assumes, did cause trouble during the late third century. The problems caused for Iasos and Rhodes by Olympichos make that clear. Planting a colony in or near the territory of one of those dynasts as a safeguard also has a clear parallel in the reign of Antiochus III. Kardakon Kome, probably founded in response to some sort of problem with Ptolemy of Telmessus, provides a close parallel to what is proposed here for the Jewish colonists. The two share not only the general pattern of a homogenous group from the centre of the empire being settled in the territory of a dynast in Asia minor, but also have many practical details in common, such as the fortification of the settlement and nature of land allotments.\textsuperscript{44} Still, Olympichos was active in Caria, and Ptolemy son of Lysimachus was active only in Lycia, so neither of them can be the cause of the trouble in Lydia and Phrygia. There are numerous other possibilities,

\textsuperscript{43} Livy 37.56.  
\textsuperscript{44} See above, 53-55.
however, since Phrygia in particular seems to have more than its share of such dynasts, of whom the most notable are the Philomelids.

The Philomelid dynasty lasted for several generations and is known to us from a number of inscriptions and literary references. The family may have begun with one of the original companions of Seleucus I, a general named Lysias who appears in a passage of Polyaeus. When Seleucus needed to cut off Demetrius’ intended escape from his camp on Mount Taurus, he sent Lysias with a detachment of Macedonian troops to secure the passes. It is this Macedonian connection which prompted Holleaux to draw the connection between this general and the dynasts of Phrygia, as one member of the dynasty, another Lysias son of Philomelos, is mentioned in an honorary inscription from Delphi with the ethnic Μακεδῶν attached to his name. This is, perhaps, rather thin evidence for his origins, as claiming or trying to maintain Macedonian origins was something that all of the major monarchies, and many of the local dynasts, did.

Two inscriptions from Pergamum celebrate a victory of Attalus I over “Lysias and the generals of Seleucus.” Lysias’ separate position is suggested by the fact that he is

46 Wilhelm, passim and M. Holleaux, “Études d’histoire hellenistique I. ΔΥΣΙΛΣ ΦΙΛΟΜΗΛΟΥ,” REA 17 (1915) 237-8, collect all of the sources referring to this family.
48 Polyaeus, 4.9.5.
49 Holleaux, “Études d’histoire hellenistique,” 239.
51 OGIS 272, and OGIS 277 are identical. In whole, they read: [βασιλεύς Ἀτταλος] Διί [καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς α]πό τῆς [πρὸς Δωσιαν καὶ τοῦς Σέλευκον στρατηγοῦς μάχης].
not simply subsumed under the title of "generals of Seleucus," this must mean that, to
Attalus I, Lysias was both someone separate from the Seleucid administration, and
someone worthy of note. The next possible appearance of the family is in 225, with the
dynasts who donated to the reconstruction of Rhodes after a major earthquake. Polybius lists these as Lysanias, Olympichos, and Limnaios, but both Holleaux and
Wilhelm conjecture that Lysanias and Lysias are identical. Their argument is that it is a
very common to add or lose the extra syllable at the end, using the apparent
interchangeability of Pausias and Pausanias as their example. The stronger argument for
the identity of Lysias son of Philomelos and the Lysanias in Polybius is one based on
simple probability. Small dynasts were not uncommon in Asia Minor, and were perhaps
most numerous in the period between 246-213, while Seleucid control over central Asia
Minor was at its most tenuous and fragmented. Still, there is no reason to believe that
they were ever so plentiful that two different dynasts of the same or nearly the same name
existed in close proximity to each other.

The first appearance of the dynasty, as stated above, is in a triumphal inscription
of Attalus I. The inscription records a victory over Lysias in conjunction with the
generals of Seleucus II. Nothing is recorded about any such battle in any of the literary
sources, but the most likely context for the battle would be an attempt by Seleucus to
recover part of Asia Minor after Antiochus Hierax had been forced out by Attalus. If we

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52 Polybius, 5.90.
54 Wilhelm, 54.
55 Holleaux, "Études d'histoire hellenistique," 242. Crampa, 89, suggests a
similar date for Olympichos becoming an independent dynast.
assume that Seleucus did as all the other Seleucids and led his army along the road from Antioch to Apamea, then Attalus may well have met them in battle in the vicinity of Philomelion, though the same might be true of any place along the road east of Lydia. The cities of Lysias and Philomelion were certainly named after men called Lysias and Philomelos. It is also clear that they were given these names by powers independent from the Seleucid throne, as the Seleucids did not name cities after people outside of the royal family. If these cities were not connected to the Philomelids, then we would again have to assume that there were contemporary dynasts, of the same names, living in close proximity to one another.

The donation to Rhodes in 225 is an interesting piece of information in that it shows both the general prosperity of Lysias' fiefdom and his essential independence. It is also the last piece of information about his dynasty until 189, when Polybius mentions a Philomelos, who is no doubt the son of Lysias and grandson of Philomelos. This Philomelos was stirring up trouble and making his influence felt in the immediate aftermath of Antiochus' defeat. He decided to support the people of Termessus in their war against Isinda, and the people of Isinda, like the people of Iasos, called in outside help, in this case the Roman commander Gaius Manlius. We hear nothing about how Manlius dealt with Philomelos; we only know that he forced Termessus into an alliance and put an end to the hostilities. Presumably, Philomelos was cautious enough to avoid armed conflict with Rome, especially since he or one of his descendants was rich enough to make a donation to the temple at Didyma.

56 Jones, 49.
57 Polybius, 21.35.
This brings us to crux of the matter: do we know enough about the Philomelids to suggest that they may have been doing something that Antiochus, or his governors in Asia Minor, would describe with the verb νεωτεριζεν;? The answer is, of course, yes; at various times the dynasty exhibits two different behaviours that could provoke concern on the part of Antiochus. First, there is the matter of supporting one of the Greek cities of Asia Minor in its war against another, or otherwise attacking any of the cities. This seems to be a relatively common practice for these local dynasts. Not only did Philomelos do it, but also Olympichos did the same thing with Iasos,58 as did Achaios when he intervened in the war between Pednelissos and Selge (this only after abandoning the pretence of being a Seleucid official and making himself an independent dynast).59 Such behaviour was certainly unacceptable, and it provoked immediate intervention by the real power in the area in two of these three instances. In the case of Achaios, Antiochus only waited to complete his current campaign before he set off to attack him.60 There is no evidence of the dynasty causing any specific problem during the last years of the third century BCE, but it is reasonable to assume that they continued to engage in the same behaviours that they consistently display at other times.

In addition to their independent military activities, Antiochus may have considered the tendency of these local dynasts to play the role of benefactor to be a cause for concern. This was clearly a role that the Philomelids enjoyed filling: they made a

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58 Above, text with notes 21-25.
59 Polybius, 5.72.
60 Indeed, when Achaios made an abortive invasion of Syria, Antiochus paid it little mind, but, when he became the one to whom cities within Asia Minor sent embassies and requests, Antiochus acted quickly (Polybius, 5.87).
significant donation to the rebuilding of Rhodes, dedicated ten mules and their handlers at Didyma, and made enough of a contribution at Delphi to be honoured in an inscription as a benefactor of the temple. In a private individual, this sort of behaviour would be encouraged; in a dynast, especially one who had been completely outside Seleucid authority for decades and only recently brought back into the fold, this was dangerous. The role of benefactor is a role that only a king should play. In being a benefactor, a king not only signaled his power and resources, but also, much like aiding one party or another in a local war, obliged the receiving party to be friendly to the giver and his policies. Antiochus III made playing the role of benefactor a large part of his public image, as a decree of Iasos for him and his wife Laodike makes quite clear. The Iasians say of Antiochos that he:

[kα]θ' ὅλον τὸ βασιλεύειν νεομοικότος πρὸς εὐεργεσίαν
[...]θὰ ἀνθρώπων, τὴν δὲ ἡμετέραν πολιν πρῶτον
[τέ] ἐγ δούλειας ῥυσάμενος ἐποίησεν ἐλευθέραν. κτλ.

Having decided that the whole of being a king is ...(to give?) benefactions to men, he rescued our city from its earlier slavery and made it free. etc.

The idea that the whole point of kingship was to deliver these good deeds to people is what made the generous nature of the Philomelids a problem. In some ways, they already had the power of small-scale kings; when they added the appearance of having the

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61 Holleaux, “Études d’histoire hellenistique,” 239.
63 E. Gruen, “Introduction to Section 1,” in Images and Ideologies, 5, and Bringemann, 18.
64 SEG 26.1226 = Ma, document 26, lines 47-49.
generosity of a king, it was worrisome for Antiochus. More worrisome than the gifts to
temples was that the Philomelids almost assuredly did as Ptolemy of Telmessus was
known to do, and made grants of tax exemptions or otherwise changed the status of cities
in their territory, unless we are to assume that Lysias and Philomelion received nothing
but a change of name from their eponymous overlords.

To summarize thus far, Antiochus ordered Zeuxis to found Jewish colonies in
Asia Minor because he learned that τοὺς ἐν Λυδίᾳ καὶ Φρυγίᾳ νεωτερίζοντας, but this
probably does not actually mean that there is an open revolt against royal authority
happening throughout those two provinces. The cause of the disturbance is likely to have
been some of the local dynasts of Asia Minor, rather than Achaios. On this assumption,
the τοὺς ἐν Λυδίᾳ καὶ Φρυγίᾳ may be referring to the dynasts themselves, in which case
νεωτερίζειν probably refers these dynasts acting too much like independent kings in their
relations with nearby communities. Equally, ‘those in Lydia and Phrygia’ could refer to
the communities in question, who are turning to the local dynasts for either monetary or
military support, rather than to Antiochus. In this case, Antiochus would be using
νεωτερίζειν in the sense of changing sides. Though evidence is scarce, it seems that, in
Phrygia, the problematic dynasts included the Philomelid dynasty. For the Philomelids,
however, we may be able to say more than just that they may have done these things and
had a colony foisted upon them as a means of control.

The Philomelids and a colony at Toriaion
The final piece of evidence for Antiochus’ problems with the Philomelid dynasty is a letter from Eumenes II to the city of Toriaion. The ancient city of Toriaion was located in the extreme east of Phrygia, around fifty kilometres from Philomelion, which was the closest major centre, and was along the road from Philomelion to Ikanion (Iconium), and the city was within the probable sphere of influence of Philomelid influence. Toriaion is approximately fifteen kilometres closer to Philomelion than is Lysias, the other city named by the dynasty. For comparison, Toriaion is only fifty kilometres from Philomelion while Termessus, which marks the furthest known extent of Philomelid power, is almost one hundred seventy kilometres distant.

The letter reads:

'Αγαθή τύχη
Βασιλεὺς Εὐμένης Τοριατών τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν
χαίρειν· παρ’ ὑμῶν ἄνδρες Ἀντιγένης, [Β]ρέννος,
'Ηλιάδης, οὕς ἐπέμψατε συνυποσειμόνος μὲν ἦ-
民航 ἐπὶ τῶι καταπεπροχότας πάντα παρεῖναι ὑπι-
ἀνοντας εἰς τὸν τόπον ἐφ’ οἷς δὴ καὶ χαριστήρια τοῖς
θεοῖς ἀποδιδόντες π[ρο]σγάγετε τὰς καθηκούσας
θυσίας [δὲ] ἴσωσαντας δὲ δὴ ἢν εἰς τὰ ἡμέτερα πρά-
γματα ἔχετε εὐνοιαν ἐπιχωρηθῆναι ὑμῖν πολίτειάν
te kai νόμους ἰδίους καὶ γυμνάσιον καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἔστi
ἀκόλουθα ταύτα τε φιλοτιμότερον ἀπελογίσατο, καὶ
τὴν προβυμίαν ἔξηγησάμενοι, διότι πρὸς πάντα
ἀπεφυσάτως ἔχετε τὰ συμφέροντα ἡ[μ]ῖν. ἡξί-
ουν τε ἐπινεύσαι· χάριτας γὰρ τὰς ἐμοὶ προσεξιό-
σας παρὰ τοῦ πλῆθους ὑπάρξειν διὰ παντός, οὔτε[ὲ]
tῶν λυστελῶν ἐμοὶ οὔτε τ[ῷ]ν ἀναγκαῖον ἐμοὶ ἄρι[σ]-
tαμένων ὑμῶν. ἔγω δὲ ἐθεώρησαν μὲν οὐ εἰς μικρὰ

65 L. Jonnes and M. Ricl, “A New Royal Inscription from Phrygia Paroreios: Eumenes II Grants Tyriaion the Status of a Polis” EA 29 (1997), 7. The city is most commonly known as Toriaion or Tyriaion, though Eumenes calls it Toriaitai.
66 Ibid., 7.
67 Wilhelm, 54.
King Eumenes to the settlers in Toriaion, greetings. The men sent by you, Antigenes, Brennos, and Heliades, whom you sent to rejoice with us about having accomplished everything and being present at this place in good health- for which, in giving thank offerings to the gods, you made the proper sacrifices, whom you also sent to request, because you have goodwill toward our own affairs, that you be granted a constitution, and your own laws, and a gymnasium and other things consistent with these, they spoke eagerly about these things and after declaring the enthusiasm that you unhesitatingly hold for our advantage, they asked me to assent. For they said that fitting gratitude toward me will last forever and they will not turn away from what is advantageous or necessary for me. And I see that it is not a small matter to grant what is asked, but pertains to many matters of greater importance. For now any favour given to you by me will be secure, since I have gained authority rightly, because I got it from the Romans who prevailed in peace and war. But this is not the case with a favour granted by one without authority. Such a favour would truly be judged empty and deceitful by all. All the same, because of the goodwill that you have for me, and which you demonstrated at the right moment, I

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68 Jonnes and Riel, 3ff.
grant to you and those living with you in the outlying (fortified?) communities the right to combine yourselves into one community and to use your own laws. If you yourselves are satisfied by some of these, then send them to me, so that I can inspect them to see that they contain nothing contrary to your interests. And if not, tell us, and we will give you those who are capable of establishing both the council and the magistrates, and of distributing the people and dividing them into tribes, and of building a gymnasion and providing oil for the youths. About your city being recognized, I declared this myself at the beginning of the other letter. So try, since you have received such great honours from me, to show that you truly have good will through deeds on all occasions.

Toriaion first appears as a city in Xenophon, who refers to it as a polis. It is clear that it did not have the legal status of a polis, at least so far as Eumenes was concerned, and it also seems clear that at some point new settlers had been introduced to the community and it became a Seleucid colony. Jonnes and Ricl hang their argument that this was a military colony on Eumenes' address to the people of Toriaion. Eumenes sends his letter to Τοριαιτῶν τοῖς κατοικοῦντις, the settlers or inhabitants of 'the Toriaians', which Jonnes and Ricl regard as the equivalent of οἱ ἐν Τοριαίῳ κατοικοῦντες, or military settlers. This may not necessarily be the case, but the opening formula does suggest that the people of Toriaion, or at least those whom Eumenes is addressing, are settlers of some sort, and not autochthonous. Indeed, the very names of the emissaries confirm this. One, Brennos, has a Gallic name, and the two

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69 Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 1.2.
70 Jonnes and Ricl, 7.
71 Ibid., 8ff.
others have Greek names, in a community with a Phrygian name. Beyond this, it can be surmised that this area had a colony on the model of those discussed in the previous chapter, as it also seems to include fortified settlements in which the settlers live.

So, the settlement at Toriaion resembles a Seleucid colony in some ways, and this settlement was in the territory of the Philomelid dynasty. Two passages in the letter suggest both a connection between the city and Antiochus III, and that this was exactly the kind of colony described in the letter.


For now any favour given to you by me will be secure, since I have gained authority rightly, because I got it from the Romans who prevailed in peace and war. But this is not the case with a favour granted by one without authority. Such a favour would truly be judged empty and deceitful by all.

The one without authority can only be Antiochus III, since this passage is connected to a reference to the treaty of Apamea. That this subtle barb is included should mean that the community already enjoyed some favour from Antiochus, and this is why Eumenes now needs to present himself as the sole source of benefactions and legitimate grants of status. The reminder that grants from Antiochus were worthless probably means that Eumenes is either directly undoing, or in some way redoing something originally established by Antiochus.

73 Jonnes and Riel, 8.
The second passage is the real heart of the letter, it covers what Eumenes has granted to the envoys, and it offers us grounds for believing that this was one of the colonies founded according to the letter in Josephus. Eumenes concedes that both the people who sent the diplomats—the people of Toriaion proper—and those who live with them in fortresses can form one community. The χωρία are the first point of interest. The letter orders that the Jewish families be settled in the “fortresses and most strategic places” (φρούρια καὶ τοὺς ἀναγκαστὰς τόπους) in Lydia and Phrygia.74 χωρίον can be close enough to a synonym for φρούριον to make the parallel very tempting, especially given that Toriaion occupied a strategically valuable position on the road from Philomelion to Ikanion. Perhaps the unnamed and separate communities in these χωρία were actually the Jewish families settled there by Zeuxis. At any rate, it is clear that the people living in these settlements were both new-comers and outsiders, else they would have been represented in the embassy to Eumenes II, and Eumenes would not have dealt with them as two separate communities to be joined together by an act of the king. Indeed, that they only seem to be two communities, even though there are multiple forts, also suggests some sort of homogeneity or community among the outsiders, such as one might expect between nearby Jewish settlements.

Another part of the text is also relevant here and may perhaps allude to a Jewish presence at Toriaion:

συνχώρω καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ τοῖς μεθ’ ὑμῶν συνοικοῦσιν ἐν χωρίοις εἰς ἑν κοίτες καὶ πολιτείαις συνταξιὸν ἔλεγχε τὸ ἔθνος, καὶ νόμοις τε χρῆσθαι ἴδιοις, οίς εἰ μέν τισιν αὐτοὶ εὐφρεστεῖτε, ἀνενεγκαθε ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς ὑποκτενεῖτε ἐπικρίνωμεν πρὸς τῷ μηθέν

74 AJ, 12.149.
I grant to you and those living with you in the outlying (fortified?) communities the right to combine yourselves into one community and to use your own laws. If you yourselves are satisfied by some of these, then send them to me, so that I can inspect them to see that they contain nothing contrary to your interests.

Eumenes grants the newly combined community the use of their own laws. This could be a privilege that they previously held, probably as a grant from Antiochus III, which Eumenes is now granting in his own right. Antiochus promised the right to use their own laws to the Jewish settlers, and Eumenes is perhaps seeking to make it very clear that even though this right is continuing after Antiochus' defeat, it continues only because it is his will. The way in which the grant of αὐτονομία is phrased may also suggest a Jewish presence. Eumenes says that the two communities can combine and use their own laws and that "if they themselves are satisfied by some of these laws, then they can send them to him for inspection, to make sure that there is nothing contrary to their interests." Both αὐτ[οί] εὐφερεστεῖτε (line 28) and τοῖς ὑμῖν συμφέροντι (line 30) seem to be in direct reference to the envoys, and by extension the original settlement of Toriaion, rather than to both groups. It also suggests that they may have trouble agreeing upon what laws to use, and that Eumenes was not confident in their ability to choose good laws. The explanation for this is probably that the two communities, Toriaion and the one made up of outlying forts, were using substantially different laws. This is why Eumenes foresaw a compromise by which only some of the laws would be used. Here again, an outlying community using Jewish law would be a perfect fit. If it were Jewish law, it could also explain why Eumenes wanted to inspect their laws before they were put into action; he
may have been unfamiliar with Jewish law, and he wanted to make certain that what was agreed upon was acceptable. The other explanation for his interest also suggests that the community made up of the outlying forts was a Jewish community, or at least one that was completely distinct from Toriaion itself. Eumenes may have been worried that the people of Toriaion would intentionally choose laws that excluded their Jewish neighbours, and he may have been concerned to prevent his new polis from being torn apart at the moment of its formation.

In the end, there is nothing in the letter from Eumenes that offers direct proof that some of the Jewish colonists in the letter to Zeuxis were settled in the neighbourhood of Toriaion, but there is much to suggest that this was the case. Any Jewish colonists in the area would have been a separate community, using their own laws and living in fortified settlements. The letter from Eumenes does imply that there were just such communities in the vicinity of Toriaion. It is unfortunate that Eumenes’ letter is a response to a delegation sent only by those living in Toriaion proper, and as such does not deal with the outlying communities directly, else these suspicions could be confirmed directly. In addition, these communities fit the letter from Antiochus to Zeuxis in one other way; these settlements were placed by Zeuxis in an area where they could help to rein-in a family that was upsetting the status quo in Phrygia.

If we assume that at least some of the Jewish colonists were settled in this area and used to control the Philomelid dynasty, the document can help us to explain two other historical points. The first is the timing of the disappearance and re-emergence of the Philomelid dynasty. We have three pieces of evidence for Philomelid activity in the
time between 240 and 213, two of which, the inscription from Delphi and the donation to Rhodes, show the Philomelids acting independently, and being seen to act independently from the Seleucids. After this, in the period when they were hemmed in by new colonies, there is nothing until immediately after Antiochus’ defeat in 189. In 189, the Philomelids reappear trying to extend their influence in a way that was unacceptable to Antiochus III. So this interpretation of Eumenes’ letter neatly explains their absence and reappearance.

This interpretation also explains two of the known stops on the Apostle Paul’s journey through Galatia, those of Iconium (Ikanion) and Pisidian Antioch. Iconium/Ikanion was on the border between Phrygia and Lyconia, and was the nearest large centre to Toriaion. Jewish colonists settled in the area of Toriaion, and probably further east and nearer to Iconium as well, could easily have formed the nucleus of the Jewish community that Paul finds there in Acts 14.1. This is especially likely if we allow for normal migration to the larger centre over the course of two and half centuries. To take this one step further, assuming that the colonies were meant to contain the activities of the Philomelids, then it must be assumed that some, and probably a significant number, of the colonists were settled either in or near the two cities named by that dynasty, Lysias and Philomelion. Philomelion is in the southeast of Phrygia, less than twenty-five kilometres distant from Pisidian Antioch. Here again, Jewish settlements used by Antiochus to control overly-active dynasts could explain the presence of the large Jewish community that Paul finds in Pisidian Antioch.\(^75\)

In the end, the Philomelid dynasty is not likely to have been the object of all of the Jewish colonists, since they are not known to have ever been active in Lydia. As well, if Antiochus were only worried about one man, or even one family, he would not have used the plural τούς ἐν Λυδίᾳ καὶ Φρυγίᾳ. Who the others were who were causing disturbances, and who was causing a disturbance in Lydia, must remain unknown. Only one other dynast from the area is known to have been active during Zeuxis’ tenure as viceroy. That is the ethnically Lydian Moagetes, who controlled a collection of cities in the area of Cabaleis. Little is known about him other than that he also came into contact with Roman forces in 189, and was that he was known to both Polybius and Livy as a wealthy and powerful, but treacherous, local dynast. This may make him a promising candidate to be one of those named in the letter, but in the absence of further evidence nothing more can be said.

In the end, the impossibility of picking out all of those in Lydia and Phrygia who were causing trouble has little bearing on the question of the letter’s authenticity. It is possible to establish more precisely what Antiochus meant when he said that those in Lydia and Phrygia were νεωτεριζον. It need not have been anything so grand as a large scale rebellion, it could have been something as simple someone upsetting the status quo, either by trying to extend their influence by force of arms, or by perception of strength and euergetism. The independent dynasts of Asia Minor frequently engaged in both of these activities, and are probably the sort of people that Antiochus meant. The case of Ptolemy of Telmessus offers a clear precedent for Antiochus’ use of fortified colonies to

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76 Polybius 21.34; Livy 38.14.
control these local dynasts. Finally, the Philomelid dynasty can be held forth as a very likely candidate for being one of those mentioned in the letter to Zeuxis, and, in the letter of Eumenes to Toriaion, we can see a possible example of one of the colonies founded by Zeuxis. This is enough to establish that there was a historical context in which the letter could and would have been sent, and greatly undermines any argument for forgery.
Conclusion

The goal of this thesis has been to see if the letter from Antiochus III to Zeuxis preserved in the twelfth book of the *Jewish Antiquities* accords with the history of the reign of Antiochus III, working under the premise that if it did, then the letter was likely to be genuine. It focussed on what one might call the “external features” of the letter, rather than on individual details and phrases, as that approach has been used often in the past with little profit. This has been the first detailed attempt to place the letter within its broader historical context.

The letter in question is an order from a Seleucid king to one of his officials, and the first chapter set forth to see if this order fit in with what we know of the Seleucid administration. This particular order demands much from the official who received it. Antiochus orders Zeuxis to transport Jewish colonists from Mesopotamia and Babylonia to Lydia and Phrygia, and to grant those colonists plots of land, tax exemptions and other benefits, things which go beyond the powers of a normal satrap in the Seleucid system.\(^1\) Sending orders to an official in the form of a letter was common practice, and this letter is a fair match in terms of general style, opening with a description of the problems and the king’s deliberations, followed by the actual order.\(^2\) The letter also fits the chain of command within the Seleucid system. By 209 BCE at the latest, Zeuxis had taken his place as Seleucid viceroy of Asia Minor, an established post that carried nearly unlimited

\(^1\) *AJ*, 12.147-153.
authority. As such, he had all of the authority he needed to be able organize population transfers and land grants within Lydia and Phrygia. All Antiochus really needed to do to organize something in Asia Minor was send an order about it to Zeuxis, as he did with the appointment of a high-priest for all of Asia Minor. So, the letter does not demand anything unusual from Zeuxis, but follows the usual chain of command. Indeed, Zeuxis is perhaps the only official to whom such an order could be sent. As viceroy of Asia Minor, he was also the satrap of Lydia and had his residence in Sardis, which also housed the Seleucid land registry. Transferring land to new colonists could only have been done with the aid of the officials under Zeuxis’ command. There are also parallels for Zeuxis granting concessions, such as land grants, to communities in Asia Minor, whereas there is no precedent for this with other Seleucid officials. As an order, the document fits the pattern of Seleucid administration so perfectly as to suggest its authenticity.

The letter is an order to found several colonies in Lydia and Phrygia, and it gives some information about how this was to be done. The aim of the second chapter was to determine if the orders for founding these settlements matched with what was known of the other colonies founded by Antiochus III, and with Seleucid colonisation in general. Antiochus’ other colonies share a few common points. The colonies all include a fortified settlement, they are populated by groups ethnically distinct from the peoples around them, and they also receive some tax exemptions to help with starting up. The land grants, where anything is known about them, also have one thing in common: they always include land intended for varied purposes. In any settlement for which we have

4 Malay, 7.
such information, the settlers received grants that included plough-land, space for a house within the settlement, and land for trees or vines. All of these details are also present in the instructions given in the letter. In fact, one of Antiochus' other colonies, that of Kardakon Kome, seems to be almost identical to the settlements created by the letter. It settled a people from the Iranian tribe of the Kardakes in Asia Minor, and set them up in almost exactly the same way. They had a fortified village, land for cultivation and orchards, and temporary tax exemptions, while the Jewish colonists received land for building a house in the fortified settlements, land for ploughing and vineyards, and ten years of tax exemptions.5 Again, the document so closely matches what is known of Seleucid colonisation that it strongly suggests that this letter, and these settlements, are authentic.

The letter accords with what we know of the Seleucid administration, and with the pattern of Seleucid colonisation, so there is nothing there to indicate forgery. The final chapter addressed the problem of identifying a specific historical context in which the letter would have been sent. The document speaks of unrest in Lydia and Phrygia at a time when Antiochus was away in the upper satrapies.6 The chapter first addresses the question of what these disturbances may have entailed and their root cause. They probably were not armed revolts, but more likely were simply unrest, or some sort of shift in power within the satrapies. The most likely root cause of such disturbances is interference by one or more of the local dynasts of Asia Minor. There is enough evidence to suggest that these people could and did attract the attention of the Seleucid king, and

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5 AJ, 12.151.
6 AJ, 12.149.
indeed, one of the other colonies of Antiochus III, that of Kardakon Kome, was settled in or near the territory of one of these local dynasts. Of the dynasts of Lydia and Phrygia, the family of the Philomelids are the most likely to be the source, or one of the sources, of the disturbance. They had a large sphere of influence in Phrygia and were very active both militarily and in euergetism. They disappeared for a long time under Antiochus III and reappeared as an active military power to which cities looked for protection as soon as Antiochus was defeated by the Romans.\(^7\) Several of the Jewish communities in Asia Minor were in the vicinity of their known centres, and one inscription hints at a possible colony, matching those in the letter, placed by Antiochus within their sphere of control.\(^8\)

All of that makes it highly likely that this letter and these settlements are authentic. Beginning from there, looking at exactly what the document was intended to do, how it came to be in the hands of a Jewish historian, and how the settlements were intended to function, can explain some of the "peculiarities" of the document.\(^9\) The process that produced this document and culminated in the installation of Jewish communities in Lydia and Phrygia probably involved Zeuxis. Zeuxis was an active viceroy of Asia Minor, and while Antiochus was campaigning in the east, Zeuxis was probably concerned with asserting Seleucid control over the areas of Asia Minor from which it had been absent. While doing this, he, or more likely one of his proxies, encountered something that seemed like a challenge to the Seleucid order. It may have

\(^7\) Polybius, 21.35.
\(^8\) Jonnes and Riel, 3ff. See above, page 86.
\(^9\) Willrich considered accounting for how it came to be in Josephus’ hands crucial to establishing its authenticity (Willrich, 18).
been a recalcitrant dynast, one refusing to accept his superior authority in some way, or possibly it was brought to his attention that several of the communities in Lydia and Phrygia were looking to local dynasts for the sort of favours which should only come from the royal administration. Or again, perhaps it was something as simple as a local conflict escalating to a level that Zeuxis considered dangerous for the order of the satrapy. Whatever the immediate cause was, Zeuxis would eventually have received a message detailing the bad behaviour of these dynasts, either from one of his proxies, or from a community complaining about their depredations.\footnote{As the Iasians did in the case of Podilos. See above, pages 71-72.} Zeuxis then would have decided that this was a matter for concern and resolved that several well-placed colonies could help to contain the problem. He probably then forwarded a copy of the original message about the dynasts, which would be especially likely if it were a community complaining, along with his own proposed solution, and waited for assent and further orders.\footnote{J. and L. Robert, \textit{Fouilles d'Amyzon}, 176.}

The document we have in Josephus was most likely Antiochus' response to Zeuxis' initial communication. It was not meant to be the last word on the colony, or to be the sort of letter that would be inscribed on stone and set up in the new community. It lacks too many specifics for that.\footnote{As noted by Wellhausen, 225, n.7.} Antiochus most likely left the details to Zeuxis' discretion, assuming that his viceroy was much better informed than he was. Once everything had been arranged, including transferring land to the settlers, and establishing the new communities and their (temporarily) tax exempt status, Antiochus would have
sent a letter confirming those grants, as was done with the city of Herakleia.\textsuperscript{13} It would have been this letter of confirmation, if anything, which would have been inscribed and displayed in the community.\textsuperscript{14}

If this letter were not intended to be inscribed and displayed in the new settlements, it raises the question of how it came to be in Josephus' hands and makes it seem even more odd that Antiochus used language so complimentary to the Jews.\textsuperscript{15} Antiochus probably composed this particular letter with two purposes in mind. The first purpose was private; it was meant to give royal assent to Zeuxis' plan of founding settlements in troubled parts of Asia Minor. The second purpose was public; the letter was also intended to be used in attracting settlers.

Probably there was work involved in recruiting the settlers. It is unlikely that Zeuxis already had a group of settlers selected before he informed Antiochus of his plan. The settlers that this document references were still living in Babylonia and Mesopotamia. Antiochus ordered that they be collected from two different satrapies, suggesting that he did not have a body of settlers prepared either. A copy, or copies, of this letter was probably sent to whatever official or officials were given the task of enrolling colonists. These officials would have made the letter public in order to make joining the settlements seem more attractive. Once the letter had been made public, it is

\textsuperscript{13} See above, pages 36-37.
\textsuperscript{14} That the tax exemptions were only temporary was no bar to displaying a royal letter. The letter of Eumenes II to Kardakon Kome offers a very close parallel. Segre, 190-192.
\textsuperscript{15} These are the same details that other authors have pointed to as being the reason for, or possibly the result of Jewish forgery. That is, these are the only points in the letter that could possibly have been in some way gratifying for Jews of a later period.
not difficult to imagine that Jewish record keepers or historians kept a copy. If we imagine that this was the purpose of the document, it explains the somewhat odd blend of general and specific within the letter. Antiochus laid out specifics of tax exemptions, and what sorts of farms the settlers would receive without giving details of location and size. The intent was to make the settlement seem as attractive as possible before all of the details had been worked out. The guarantee of land, the use of their own laws, the promise to provide supplies for those engaged in public service, and the final order to protect them from molestation at the hands of their neighbours, all make perfect sense in this context.16

A few other minor points in the letter, which have seemed suspicious in virtue of being too complimentary to the Jews, can be explained by looking at how the colonies were successful, and how they were intended to buttress Seleucid control. First, it should be noted that the settlements were successful as settlements, that is, they survived and grew. When the apostle Paul passed through Phrygia in the first century CE he found thriving Jewish communities in the area, communities for which there are no alternate explanations than Seleucid colonisation.17 That the settlements lasted and thrived as Jewish communities makes them a success story in that sense. They also seem to have been successful in preventing serious trouble in Lydia and Phrygia for Antiochus. The Philomelids, and other dynasts of Lydia and Phrygia only appeared again after Antiochus III had been defeated by the Romans. In fact, they appear almost immediately after Antiochus’ defeat, even before the treaty of Apamea had been negotiated. This should

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17 Schurer, 12-13.
indicate that they were still present, and had some strength, but that it was not being used in ways that threatened to upset the Seleucid order.

The ways in which they will have buttressed Seleucid control in Asia Minor can help to explain why the letter seems so complimentary to the Jews of Babylonia and Mesopotamia. The most obvious way that the colonies helped to control the area was by making independent military action more difficult. They probably were not intended to provide armed resistance, but rather to be in the way. A local dynast, or even a local city, would not dare to take action if it meant crossing the territory of the new settlements, as that could provoke a response from the Seleucid army. Antiochus laid that out quite clearly in the final order that Zeuxis do what he can to ensure that the settlements are not troubled by anyone. They also reinforced the Seleucid order in more subtle ways. If part of the problem was that some of the cities in Lydia and Phrygia were too much under the sway of independent dynasts, then communities of Seleucid loyalists, who looked directly to the king for guidance and assistance, could help to reassert the traditional order. This is perhaps what Antiochus is getting at when he tells Zeuxis that he is providing some of the citizens with supplies, “so that, since they receive benefactions from us, they will be more zealous for our cause” (Ἴνα τῇς παρ’ ἡμῶν τυγχανοντες φιλανθρωπίας, προθυμοτέρους παρέχωσιν αὐτούς περὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα). The settlements would function best if they remained distinct and separate from the communities around them, and Antiochus provided for that. By allowing the communities to use Jewish law

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18 Πρόνοιαν δὲ ποιοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἔθνους κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἐνοχληται (AJ, 12.153).
19 AJ 12.152.
he no doubt hoped not only to please his settlers, but also to keep them from mixing too much with the nearby communities using Greek laws. In connecting loyalty to Antiochus to piety, Antiochus could hope both to reinforce the strength of Jewish religion as something that keeps them separate, and to use their religion to keep their loyalty.

This discussion can only amount to probability on either side, but the probabilities have begun to mount on the side of authenticity. The document fits the historical context perfectly. Sending an order like this to Zeuxis, and allowing him to take care of everything is entirely in keeping with what we know of the Seleucid chain of command, and has precedents. All of the information about the colonies in the document accords with the general pattern of Seleucid colonization, and of Antiochus III’s other colonies. There are hints of unrest in Lydia and Phrygia that would motivate the founding of fortified settlements, and there is evidence of colonies and later Jewish communities near the centre of that disturbance. All of this makes it very likely that the document is genuine, and some of the more suspicious, “apologetic” points and phrases in the document can be explained, and would have served a purpose for Antiochus.
Bibliography


