

MAURICE GEORGES PALEOLOGUE

THE DIPLOMATIC CAREER
OF
MAURICE GEORGES PALEOLOGUE;
A STUDY IN THE OLD DIPLOMACY

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I

INTRODUCTION

The 'Old Diplomacy' of the pre-1919 era has been a subject of both criticism and praise. It has been criticized for dividing the world into armed camps and leading it into the worst war then known to mankind. After the war it was displaced by the 'New Diplomacy' which was to lead mankind into peaceful days in a world ruled by the people. Yet the old diplomacy has also been praised by many for preserving the peace until, in 1914, war was forced on mankind by deep-seated social, economic and political causes. Since 1945, indeed, it has appeared in retrospect as much more efficient and useful than our present flamboyant and ill-mannered method of carrying on international relations.

Too often, however, in any study of diplomacy the part of the professional diplomat is neglected and in consequence the subject has been distorted. Before 1914 the professional diplomat was especially important^{and} though today he is ignored by the general public and often by governments themselves, his position still remains an important one. Many of our present difficulties in this area may be due to failure to use capable professional diplomats effectively. Today heads of State convene in comfortable settings in at-

tempts to solve the world's problems to their own satisfaction, and roving amateur diplomats take the responsibilities of the world on their own shoulders. Yet the unsung hero of international relations is still the professional diplomat.

The purpose of this study is to make an historical examination of the 'Old Diplomacy'. In particular French diplomacy and the career of Maurice Georges Paléologue (1859-1944), a brilliant though somewhat enigmatic example of the career diplomat, will be examined.

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II

DIPLOMACY AND THE DIPLOMAT BEFORE 1919

In late nineteenth-century Europe, there existed a collection of sovereign states whose official relations were governed by rules and procedures that had grown up over the centuries. The system under which diplomatic relations were conducted between 1870 and 1919 was known as the 'Old Diplomacy'. In it were involved the Great Powers, France, Germany, England, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, an aspirant to Great Power status, and numerous small powers. Determining the relations among these various states was the basic concept of power, the ability of a state to wage war, which ability was affected by many factors including geographical or strategic position, resources, manpower and economic development. Also influential in regulating the relations among states in the nineteenth century was the principle of 'balance of power'.

States pursuing contrary aims will, it is urged, nevertheless not go to war if they are confronted by forces equal to their own. In that case, it is supposed, they will prefer to find some peaceful way of settling their differences. The balance may be 'complicated', in the sense that there may be several weights pulling against one another, or "simple", in the sense that there may be only two. The latter was the case during the years preceding the Great War.¹

¹G. L. Dickinson, The International Anarchy 1904-1914. (London, 1926), p. 2.

The actual relations of the Powers were conducted by the foreign services of the various countries, which were finally recognized as distinct branches of the public service by the Congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle. "A definite profession had been established, possessing its own hierarchy and rules, destined...to evolve its own freemasonry and conventions."¹

The 'old Diplomacy' an outgrowth of French diplomatic practices, has been described by Nicolson as:

courteous and dignified...continuous and gradual; [and] it attached importance to knowledge and experience; it took account of the realities of existing power; and it defined good faith, lucidity and precision as the qualities essential to any sound negotiation."

Its weakness can be traced

to evil foreign policy rather than to faulty methods of negotiation. It is regrettable that the bad things they [the diplomats] did should have dishonoured the excellent way in which they did them.²

The old diplomacy operated under certain conditions which gave it its peculiar character, and which have changed since the War of 1914-1918. Europe was then the centre of world attention and power, and the importance of every event was measured by its effect on Europe. Though Asia and Africa were important, they were not of the same central importance

¹Harold Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method (London, 1954), p. 92.

²Ibid., p. 72.

in deciding international relations, nor before 1897 were these peripheral nations, the United States and Japan, France, Germany, England, Austria-Hungary, and Russia were the Great Powers of the world because of their wide interests, financial strength and military might. The Small Powers exercised very little influence in international affairs and then only in proportion to their ability to offer a strategic or economic advantage to the Great Powers. The result was that there was some measure of certainty in international affairs, as the Great Powers accepted the responsibility of maintaining peace among the Small Powers and supervising their conduct. Their intervention in the affairs of the Small Powers was an accepted practice. The best example of successful intervention is perhaps the London Peace Conference of 1913 at which the Great Powers were able to force a peace on the Small Powers in the Balkans and thus prevent a general European war from breaking out.

The 'New Diplomacy', the diplomacy practised after 1919, in contrast to the old diplomacy, adopted the American principle of equal rights which was popularly interpreted to mean that the opinions and votes, as well as rights, of the small Power were equal to those of the Great Power. Such a view might seem unrealistic to some in view of the relative strength of the Great and Small Power.

Under the old diplomacy similar professional diplomatic

services were established throughout Europe and a common mind and identity were formed among professional diplomats as they associated with one another in foreign capitals, underwent similar experiences, and came to desire the same kind of world. Similar backgrounds and educations laid the basis for a professional freemasonry and thus effective negotiation. The corporate nature of the profession also brought the charge that diplomats formed a class of their own which carried out its own intrigues while remaining indifferent to the cares of the peoples of the world. "The old diplomatist has not been fairly treated by posterity. If he failed to foresee the war, he is, and with full justice, called a fool; if he did foresee the war, then he is, quite unjustly, considered a knave."¹

Most of the practitioners of the old diplomacy had wealthy backgrounds. The expenses of the balls, dinners and entertainments that were an inevitable feature of their activities usually exceeded the salaries paid them and therefore demanded considerable personal wealth. Then again diplomacy was traditionally the kind of work performed by aristocrats. The majority of European diplomats were professional or career diplomats who had entered the foreign service by examination though some of the important ones were successful politicians with diplomatic ability and some had not entered government

¹Harold Nicolson, Lord Carnock (London, 1930), p. ix.

service by examination. The aristocratic background or prominence of the diplomat often meant that he had valuable international ties and acquaintances, not to mention sources of information, before entering the foreign service.

The new diplomacy lost natural loyalty and association among professional diplomats as the common background, education and outlook disappeared. Foreign services drew upon a broader section of the population, and in addition, agreement among postwar diplomats was made difficult because of different outlooks. The different state systems - democratic, communist or fascist - made agreement difficult and left little in common among diplomats except the quest for survival. Furthermore, under the new diplomacy the professional diplomat has often been replaced in negotiation by the professional politician who for all his political experience is not always a good diplomat. Special education and experience are needed by the diplomat as his work and methods differ from those of the politician in parliament. The old diplomacy at least partially realized this need.

One of the most important characteristics of the old diplomacy was its practice of negotiating in secret and after the First Great War this practice was branded as malicious by a general public following President Wilson's lead. Sound negotiation was aided by confidential and continuous methods without sudden interruption by inflamed national sentiment.

Such interruption often occurs under the new diplomacy by virtue of mass communication, large open conferences, or well publicized talks between heads of state which, because of the prestige of the participants, are bound to affect national feelings strongly. Under the old diplomacy compromises could be made among professional diplomats fully informed as to the background and interests of their respective countries. Often diplomats were personal acquaintances of one another. Then again time was not always pressing and negotiations could be postponed and resumed at a later time without public recrimination. Certainly secretiveness was encouraged by the confidential nature of the negotiations and many states entered into commitments which they did not divulge. In 1914 for example the French Assembly was unaware of the secret clauses of the Franco-Russian Alliance and Sir Edward Grey did not disclose to the British Cabinet the nature of the military arrangements made between the French and British General Staffs.

Today, in contrast, diplomatic negotiations are carried out in full view, so that their wisdom may be assessed by the electorate. But there is no certainty that the public will always be interested or knowledgeable enough to bring useful pressure to bear on international relations. In addition the large public conferences now held cost considerable money and time, and they allow little opportunity for com-

promise except when they are supplemented by confidential negotiations.

The old technique certainly had its faults and the professional negotiator was often tempted to overlook the fact that in a democracy the final decision lay with the vast majority who did not know the facts as he did and whom he did not always bother to inform. Then again, the character of the negotiator under the old régime might be weak, causing him to disclose only agreeable rather than accurate information. He might even conclude that the best action was no action, hoping that the important issues would settle themselves.

In the pre-war period the diplomat had much freedom of action because of the inadequate communications system. Today the improvements in this area have made it possible to reduce considerably the range of action permitted to the representation abroad. Sometimes the scope allowed the diplomat under the old system meant that he pursued a personal policy with the advantage of timing and opportunity, though this freedom was dangerous in proportion to the skill and character of the agent. For most diplomats, however, this was not the case as they were "so terrified of exceeding their instructions or of assuming an initiative that might embarrass their home governments, that they adopted a purely passive attitude, missed opportunity after opportunity, and spent

their time writing brilliant reports on situations that had entirely altered by the time their despatches arrived."¹

¹Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, p. 82.

III

FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY: ITS MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION

The process for formulating foreign policy is generally the same from one sovereign state to another. A state's foreign policy is determined by the government in power, usually by the cabinet or ministry and especially by the foreign minister with the aid of the civil servants of the foreign department or foreign office. The influence of the permanent officials of the foreign office may be great or small depending on the character and strength of the government and of the minister. The foreign ministry does exercise some influence, however, at all times as the guardian of the traditions of a country's foreign policy and through the very nature of its organization and bureaucratic strength. Often the personnel of the foreign ministry and foreign service are chosen by the same means and in the course of their careers serve in both capacities. The old analogy of the body with its brain and central nervous system and the multitude of nerve-endings has often been used to describe the relationship between the foreign ministry and the foreign service, the former performing the part of the brain and nervous system and the latter that of the nerve-endings.

French diplomacy before 1919 may be regarded as an

example of the old diplomacy at work. The French foreign office had clear aims and methods which were implemented successfully. Indeed the diplomacy of France was the least changed of any great power after 1919. Though the formation of foreign policy was mainly in the political sphere, the professional diplomats, especially the great ones that France had in her service at that time, had much to do with its formulation.

Within the context of environmental and historical conditions and events, French foreign policy was formed. Traditionally before 1789 foreign affairs had been the prerogative of royalty and diplomacy and international law dealt chiefly with the dynastic ambitions of royal families. Foreign policy was the personal affair of the king and constitutional checks which applied to his freedom of action in the domestic sphere did not extend to the foreign sphere. The monarch and his advisers made war and peace freely until the Great Revolution of 1789. This tradition of monarchical control was transformed into the tradition of executive control of foreign affairs since the nature of foreign affairs does not lend itself to handling by assembly or judicial body. This latter tradition carried on into the bourgeois democracies wherein the executive was made responsible to the legislature and the electorate.

Executive control of foreign policy remained in

France after the founding of the Third Republic and the establishment of the 1875 constitution which gave the President of the Republic control over treaty negotiation and ratification, though he was bound to inform the Chambers of the negotiations as soon as the interest and security of the state allowed. Yet in reality no great power was left the President in foreign affairs and he was limited mainly to personal influence. All his orders had to be cosigned by a minister who thus assumed the political responsibility for the act.

Ordinarily, the Chambers' action in foreign affairs took the form of approval or criticism after the fact accomplished by a vote of confidence or lack of confidence in the government. Though certain types of treaties had to have the approval of the Chambers, the Chambers also had the power of the purse through their budget commissions which could investigate the work of the Foreign Ministry annually. The Senate and Chamber Commissions on Foreign Affairs prepared reports on treaties and other matters and kept in constant touch with the Foreign Ministry through the rapporteurs d'information. The secrecy, technical character, and the general lack of interest in foreign affairs usually meant that the Cabinet or Council of Ministers was left in control of foreign policy.

The Cabinet exercised the main executive control over foreign affairs, though the Minister for Foreign Affairs

had the greatest weight as he or his subordinates initiated and carried out all treaty negotiations, with the Cabinet assuming the responsibility for the results. Within the Cabinet the Foreign Minister presented his proposed policies which were informally discussed and questioned by the other Cabinet Ministers especially if the proposed policy affected their departments, as it often did. Usually, however, he was left great scope in his office as domestic politics preoccupied the other ministers. The consensus of opinion of the Cabinet members decided the policy to be followed and once it was decided upon the foreign policy was defended by the Cabinet as a unit except on rare occasions. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was usually questioned only if large sums of money were expended or a crisis resulted.

The role of the President of the Council of Ministers in foreign affairs depended on personal and political considerations. He rarely lost power on a question of foreign policy and in the Third Republic often held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. Most of the time the Foreign Minister worked alone through the Foreign Ministry and the Diplomatic and Consular Services. The only limits on his decisions until after they were made were the traditions of the foreign office, the influence of the permanent staff, the national interests of France, and shifts in public opinion. The latter were not greatly influential in France.

Usually foreign ministers who had gained experience and proved their ability were retained through several ministries thereby giving considerable continuity to French foreign policy despite the rapid changes of Ministries during the Third Republic. Théophile Delcassé had the longest continuous service in the Foreign Ministry, serving from June 28, 1898 to June 17, 1905 for a total of eighty-four months.

Théophile Delcassé played a decisive role in formulating French policy in the years of his service, partly because the political situation gave him more or less a free hand. He was the chief proponent of the Entente of 1904 between France and Britain, his principal aim being "to undermine the schemes of Germany, to enlarge French prestige in Europe, [and] to expand French colonial territories in North Africa. He inherited from his predecessors the Franco-Russian Alliance and the desire for an Anglo-French understanding."¹ He accomplished much. Under him the Alliance with Russia was strengthened; Italian resentment against French occupation of Tunisia was placated; and an entente was concluded with Britain in 1904. It was Delcassé who set France on the course she was to follow until 1914.

The Cabinet and Foreign Minister were assisted in the making of foreign policy by the permanent members of the

¹David Thomson, French Foreign Policy (London, 1944), p. 3.

Foreign Ministry and Foreign Service. The important officials of the Ministry such as the Political Director advised the Foreign Minister who often was unfamiliar with foreign affairs on entering office. The hand-picked members of the Minister's Cabinet who were drawn from the permanent officials of the Foreign Ministry advised the Foreign Minister. The Ambassadors and Ministers abroad through their despatches gave valuable information and advice on the basis of which the Foreign Minister at the centre of communications could devise France's policy.

Once decided upon, foreign policy then passed from the political sphere into the diplomatic sphere for implementation by the machinery of the Foreign Ministry and the Diplomatic and Consular Services of France which operated on much the same lines as the diplomatic machinery of other countries.

The largest and most important division of the French Foreign Ministry was the Political and Commercial Division whose chief acted as head of the Ministry under the Foreign Minister until the office of Permanent Secretary-General was created in 1920. It had fourteen subdivisions, some of which were organized geographically for the receipt of information from French agents abroad.

The Cabinet of the Minister, a small staff of personal assistants picked usually from the staff of the Foreign

Ministry by the Foreign Minister upon attaining office handled the correspondence and audiences of the Foreign Minister and provided liaison between him and the permanent officials at the ministry. Public relations were handled by the Information and Press Service of the Cabinet. One section supplied information to the journalists. Another section compiled a bulletin from the foreign press for the officials of the ministry, the diplomatic and consular officials abroad, ministers and Chamber Commissions. Still another section produced bulletins on local affairs and sent them abroad to French officials and on request made detailed studies of special questions.

Examinations for entrance into the foreign service were begun as early as 1856 when student consuls were required to take them. All other appointments required certain educational qualifications or a number of years in the lower ranks. In 1877 entrance examinations were required for the appointment to the rank of attaché in the central administration and for secretaries of the third class. These examinations were given annually by a board of examiners and candidates had to have the equivalent of a *Licenciée* lettres to be eligible. The exams were made competitive in 1880 and from the same competition the lower positions in foreign service were filled. By a decree of 1907 a single examination was held annually for entrance to the diplomatic and consular

services. A probationary three months' period was given at the foreign ministry to successful applicants during which instruction was given. Some exceptional diplomats such as Bompert, Barrère, and Paul and Jules Cambon entered the foreign services without examinations and attained the highest posts.

Foreign policy is formed in one framework of certain general conditions. These conditions include a country's geographical position, historical traditions, economic interests, political tendencies and relations with foreign countries. As the balance of power between states changes, these factors vary in strength from time to time.

France's geographical position has been a factor in her foreign policy since France took recognizable form, and it has been a factor making France's position in Europe vital to the balance of power. The natural defences of the Atlantic on the west and the English Channel on the north balance the natural defences of the Pyrenees and the Western Mediterranean to the south. The frontier adjoining the Low Countries, the Meuse and the Saône is, however, vulnerable and it has been to the countries on this border that France has had to pay particular attention for her national security.

The defeat of France by Prussia in 1870 saw France's power and position in Europe considerably changed. Her eastern frontier became more vulnerable with the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine by the newly formed German Empire and

for the first time France had a powerful nation on this, her least defensible of frontiers. Henceforth the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine became a factor and source of irritation in Franco-German relations and their recovery a national aim. The humiliating defeat of 1870 damaged France's prestige and lost her the dominant position in Europe which then went to Germany. Another new nation formed in 1870 with the unification of Italy potentially threatened the French position in the Mediterranean. Yet it was not only France's external relations which were weakened; internally the bases of her great power status had not increased in strength in proportion to those of other European powers. Her population increase lagged behind that of the other European nations and her industrial output remained low in comparison to that of Britain and Germany; eventually that of the United States also surpassed hers. Relations with Germany tended to dominate French foreign policy out of fear lest Bismarck urge a preventive war against France and popular support for French policy was readily gained by the war scares of 1875, 1877 and 1885, and the inept diplomacy of Kaiser William before 1914.

Revenge and military preparedness received emphasis in France in the face of the German military menace and the Italian rivalry. As the second military and naval power on the continent, France had to consider carefully the policies of Germany and Britain. Between 1870 and 1890 the aim of Germany was to isolate France from allies. Bismarck

successfully achieved this aim by concluding a treaty with Austria in 1879 and by the Dreikaiserbund or Three Emperors' League which provided for consultation in the event of differences arising among them and for a time kept Russia out of France's reach. But Russia's rivalry with Austria in the Balkans made the system of isolating France tenuous. Eventually Germany allowed the Reinsurance treaty to lapse and France was given the opportunity to conclude an alliance with Russia in 1893. The Franco-Russian Convention of December 1893 provided mutual security to both France and Russia, as each promised to engage Germany in a two-front war as speedily as possible if either were attacked.

In view of the lack of conciliation with Germany, France deemed a rapprochement with Britain also necessary. Britain, however, kept a free hand in her classic manner in Europe though not in the Far East where she concluded an alliance with Japan to contain the Russian advance in the Far East. There even was the possibility of Anglo-German rapprochement but eventually German sabre-rattling and Britain's perilous isolation in the Boer War made Britain more amenable to French overtures, though not to the extent of concluding an alliance.

IV

MAURICE PALEOLOGUE, FRENCH DIPLOMAT:

CAREER TO 1907

French diplomacy, indeed the old diplomacy in general, is best understood and kept in perspective by an examination of the professional diplomat, the central figure in the method of diplomacy used to implement the foreign policies of the period. Sometimes his instructions allowed great opportunity for personal initiative in carrying out the policy of his country; sometimes little, but always some as he tried to act in the best manner possible in the existing circumstances. He was in the best position to understand those with whom his duties brought him into touch and the only one on hand to deal with any unexpected occurrences. In any event, he and the system of diplomacy were severely condemned for helping to precipitate the First World War. He was charged with forming a class of his own, being indifferent to public opinion and the popular welfare and manipulating world politics for his own gratification. The environment of parties, balls and splendour in which he lived was criticised along with the activity of negotiation and intrigue which he carried out in absolute secrecy. The popular imagination saw all this as reeking with evil.

Before 1914 the French diplomatic service included many outstanding figures such as the Cambon brothers and Barrère, but for the purposes of this study the less known but important Maurice Georges Paléologue, Ambassador to Russia from 1914 to 1917, has been chosen. The career of Paléologue has not been adequately investigated, rather he has usually been mentioned only in passing, either in praise or criticism, in works dealing with the origins of the First World War. He was admittedly brilliant, but always has been something of an enigma to authors who touch on his part in the events leading to the War. Yet because he was an enigma and is criticized for helping bring on the War by encouraging Russia to take a firm stand against Austria-Hungary, Paléologue is an interesting and useful subject of study.

In a study of Paléologue's life and career there are possibilities of supporting the charges against the old diplomacy of either ineffectiveness in preventing the War or of secretly bringing it on. In contrast there are also the possibilities of showing the old diplomacy as effective, efficient, and enlightened in dealing with the realities of a situation and making the best of it in the best interests of the world. Moreover, through the study of Paléologue's career the significant features of the old diplomacy and the diplomat can be illustrated. He was a bachelor who devoted the bulk of his early life to diplomacy. In addition, he had

an aristocratic background and in the great tradition of French diplomacy possessed considerable literary ability. His interest in history and his wealth of culture acquainted him with the best aspects of diplomacy.

The sources for the study of his life, career and thought are not as extensive as one would like them to be but what there is is revealing. The sources for his thought are more extensive than those for his actions. Besides his articles and works there are the French Diplomatic Documents which contain many of his despatches and telegrams, and which illustrate to the full Paléologue's native ability with a pen. Then again, there are secondary works and memoirs dealing with the First World War, which refer to him and his actions. In this connection Albertini's The Origins of the War of 1914 is most informative regarding his actions in 1914.

Maurice Georges Paléologue was born January 13, 1859 in Paris to an aristocratic family of Greek lineage perpetuating the name of the great Byzantine Emperor, Paléologus. In his youth he had the honour and pleasure of accompanying M. Renan, the great French philologist, historian and critic, to Italy and by association with this man and the influence of Italy his nimble mind acquired an appreciation of history, literature and art. He received a classical education at one of the best schools in France, the Lycée Henri iv, where he

made the acquaintance and friendship of Raymond Poincaré, future Premier and President of France. This friendship was to be very fruitful when the careers of these two men crossed in the crisis of 1912-1914. As was customary for those aspiring to diplomatic careers, Paléologue after graduating from the Lycée attended the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques.

After graduation from the Ecole, Paléologue entered the French diplomatic service by examinations in 1880, the year when such exams were made competitive. He began his life as a diplomat at a time when the European situation in general was not critical. The Russo-Turkish War had been concluded by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 and Franco-German relations were not as strained in 1880 as they had been at various times in the 1870's but the real trouble spot of Europe remained the Balkans and Turkey.

Austria-Hungary and Russia competed for the control of the Balkans, though both were members of the Three Emperor's League originally formed by Bismarck to isolate France in 1872 and revised on January 18, 1881 for the same purpose but also to remove the difference between Russia and Austria as much as possible by safeguarding the Straits and protecting both powers.¹ Rumania and Serbia were allied with Austria-Hungary, who, however claimed the right to annex Bosnia and

¹W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe (London, 1956), p. 304.

Herzegovina. Turkey was weak but still the centre of trouble in the Balkans. She almost entered upon war with Greece in 1880 but the intervention¹ of the Great powers prevented her. Other trouble spots were on the periphery of the European centre of world events although affecting the relations of the Great Powers. In Afghanistan, Anglo-Russian relations were strained as were Anglo-French relations in Egypt and Franco-Italian and eventually Anglo-German relations in Africa. Yet there was no general European conflict in view and the European powers especially France, Russia and Germany simply vied for the best diplomatic positions. An alliance² was a possibility between Germany and England, in 1898, 1899 and 1901 but Germany's embarkation on an imperial policy in Africa ended the prospects for it. France was the least successful of the Powers in the 1880's as she became estranged³ from England when she refused to support the British intervention in Egypt to restore order, and from Italy when she occupied Tunisia with the sanction of Germany and Britain.

¹Ibid., p. 190.

²R. Albrecht-Carrié. A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna (New York, 1958), pp.228,229,251.

³"Since 1815, Great Britain and France had always been in close relations with each other; the phrase entente cordiale was used to express their reciprocal attitude in the reign of Louis Philippe." R. B. Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy 1815-1914 (London, 1933), p. 255. Britain had conspired with France in carrying out financial reform in Egypt in 1879-1880 and established Franco-British Dual Control over Egypt. Britain supported the proposal of French possession of Tunisia in return for French acceptance of Britain's control of Cyprus.

France was still smarting from her defeat at German hands in 1870 and Germany was strengthening her position by an Alliance with Austria in 1879, the Alliance with Italy and Austria in 1882.

In the course of his early diplomatic career from 1880 to 1907, Paléologue held positions in various parts of Europe and the world. In these offices he was faced with certain problems which were part of the large issues such as Franco-German and Franco-Russian relations. It was a coincidence that Paléologue's first diplomatic mission was in the country in which his last diplomatic mission was to be carried out and which was to raise controversy about his name. He was introduced to Franco-Russian relations on this mission, relations which were later to occupy much of his skill and time. He recorded this mission in his diary:

Je venais d'entrer aux affaires étrangères; on m'avait attaché au cabinet du ministre, qui était alors le vénérable Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, l'ancien ami de Thiers, le nestor du Sénat français. Le dimanche 13 mars, nous apprîmes l'assassinat de l'empereur Alexandre II, que les nihilistes poursuivaient depuis quatre ans d'une haine féroce. La disposition du tsar posait de graves problèmes devant l'Europe. Ne risquions-nous pas de voir se renouveler contre la France républicaine le pacte monarchique de 1873, la fameuse alliance de trois empereurs? ... Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, fort inquiet à cet égard, écrivit à notre ambassadeur le général Chanzy, et je fus chargé de porter la lettre en la complétant de quelques précisions verbales.¹

Paléologue arrived in Russia on March 17 and completed his mission. The admirable description of Russia that he gives in

¹ M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay (Paris, 1947), p. 289.

his diary at this time forecasts that written later during his Embassy in Russia.

Shortly afterwards Paléologue was introduced to Franco-German relations which were also to occupy much of his career. He became Secretary of Embassy in Tangiers where the experience and knowledge that he obtained aided him in understanding the Moroccan crises which so seriously involved France with Germany. After two years in Tangiers he served as Embassy Secretary in Rome where he gained an insight into Italian affairs and then he was sent to China where, besides becoming acquainted with Far Eastern politics, he became an authority on Japanese and Chinese art.

In 1886 Paléologue was recalled to Paris where he became better acquainted with France's general diplomatic position. He was posted to the reserved affairs section of the political affairs division of the Ministry, a kind of intelligence branch which was responsible for certain police investigations and certain confidential contacts in the Ministry of War. In his new position Paléologue was brought into close contact with army intelligence and during his annual call-up as a reserve artillery lieutenant from 1891 onward he was posted to the offices of the intelligence service in the Ministry of War. Since the reserved affairs section was the repository for the secret diplomatic documents of France Paléologue came to know fully the character of French diplomatic negotiations.

In 1893 Paléologue was made chef-adjoint du cabinet du ministre or associate chief of the Minister's personal staff. The President of the Council of Ministers in 1893 was Casimir-Périer who at the same time was Minister for Foreign Affairs. He came to rely on Paléologue's advice both then and later after their professional relations had come to an end.

The danger to Franco-German relations formed the background to the problem of the Dreyfus case which came to occupy Paléologue's attention for the next few years. In October of 1894 he was delegated by Gabriel Hanotaux, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, to follow the Dreyfus case on behalf of his department. Théophile Delcassé upon taking over the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1898 reaffirmed these instructions regarding the Dreyfus case. He was to remain in close contact with the Army General Staff but was to avoid anything that might entangle the Foreign Ministry.

Following the instructions of Hanotaux carefully Paléologue was present at the military degradation ceremony of Captain Dreyfus on Saturday, June 5, 1895. He stood in his lieutenant's uniform beside Colonel Sandherr who conducted the ceremony. To Paléologue the case that the Intelligence Department had against Dreyfus seemed good. He had a natural aversion to Jews and the way Dreyfus meekly accepted the public humiliation of the degradation ceremony confirmed his

guilt in Paléologue's mind. He was, however, against anti-semitism on principle and along with Hanotaux opposed the holding of the original trial on diplomatic grounds. Since Germany was involved in the case and the probable result would be the revival of enmity among the populations of the two countries, the case was particularly dangerous diplomatically.

In November 1896, Paléologue was made director of the reserved affairs section of the Foreign Ministry by Hanotaux. This section received its fullest development under him. In this office secret despatches were in his charge and he was often called upon by the Minister and diplomats for any information regarding them. How much and how little information was given out regarding the secret documents in his possession was left to his own discretion.

Paléologue was therefore in a good position during the Dreyfus case to be acquainted with the full details of it especially as he acted as observer for the foreign ministry and as liaison between his Minister and the intelligence service of the army and the police. It was Paléologue who gave to Major Henry, later disclosed as the forger of the bordereau in the Dreyfus case, access to some of the secret documents of the Foreign Ministry since the Major was a member of army intelligence.

Though at first of the opinion Dreyfus was guilty,

Paléologue soon began to entertain doubts, especially over the alleged documents held by army intelligence pointing to Dreyfus's guilt. After talking with Barrère on a visit to Rome in 1898 he decided that the Kaiser could not possibly be involved in the Dreyfus case by a letter allegedly written by him mentioning Dreyfus as a German agent. Paléologue concluded that it was beneath the Kaiser's dignity to write such a letter and that the letter purportedly held by army intelligence must be spurious. He was well aware that an aroused public might bring on war and he wished to avoid giving Germany a diplomatic victory which would almost certainly result from the pursuance of a charge against the Kaiser since no proof could be had. He explained his position and doubts to Delcassé who agreed.

In the latter part of January 1898, Casimir-Périer sought Paléologue's advice on a legal point in connection with the Dreyfus case. He had been requested to appear at the Zola trial as a witness. In 1894 he had learned that secret documents had been illegally given the Dreyfus Court to support the prosecution when it was almost collapsing and he had no doubt that the documents had brought about a conviction. Périer had only learned of this action from General Mercier after the verdict had been given. Since this knowledge had been given to him in confidence as the President of the Republic he asked Paléologue whether the President's non-responsi-

bility imposed on him the duty of keeping silent about the knowledge confided in him while he was in office. Paléologue thought that General Mercier's action had been a crime, that the conviction was therefore null and void, and that no matter how imperative the rule of non-responsibility Casimir Périer would not be able to keep silent indefinitely. He advised, however, that the Assize Court trying Zola was not competent enough to receive the disclosure and that the situation would be so inflamed that Périer would have to explain himself under the worst possible conditions. Then again it was Zola who was on trial and not Dreyfus. If Zola were acquitted, the 1894 trial would have to be reopened immediately, and if he were not acquitted it would have to be reopened later anyway and then the highest court in France, the Cour de Cassation, could receive his evidence as it alone was entitled to relieve him of the constitutional duty of secrecy.

Delcassé delegated Paléologue in 1899 to appear in the Dreyfus case as the representative of the Foreign Ministry before the Cour de Cassation, the court of appeal, from January to June; and then at the Court-Martial at Rennes, from July to September. He presented to each court the secret documents that they wished to see and answered the questions that they put to him, being careful, however, out of respect for the processes of the law not to give his personal opinions

or conclusions unsolicited. All were not as scrupulous, however, for in the course of the trials, Paléologue saw many rules of law being broken and some poor handling by the lawyers. He followed the Dreyfus case to its conclusion with the clearing of Dreyfus's name on July 12, 1906 all the while presenting secret documents as they were requested.

In 1901 Paléologue was promoted from the position of Embassy Secretary and editor for the political department to the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. He was named assistant sub-director or deputy director of political affairs at the Foreign Ministry with special responsibility for the reserved affairs section and in 1903 he became Director of the Russian Department of the Foreign Ministry. In his new positions and rank Paléologue worked closely with Delcassé who was the Foreign Minister until 1905 and he became fully acquainted with Delcassé's views on foreign affairs. He also became a close friend of Delcassé who valued his advice.

Franco-German relations still remained a major problem for Paléologue after the Dreyfus case. On November 5, 1904 Delcassé sent him to London to carry three secret notes¹ of Prince Radolin, German Ambassador to France, which had been intercepted by the French Foreign Ministry. The three notes related to a prospective European war. Included was an invitation of the German Emperor William for Russia to join

¹D.F.2 V, 434.

Germany in combination against Britain. This invitation followed the Dogger Bank affair of October, 1904 in which the Russian fleet sailing through the North Sea allegedly mistook harmless British trawlers for Japanese men-of-war and fired on them. France had amiably settled the issue and Paléologue arrived in London to get Paul Cambon's impressions of the notes and to have him communicate their contents to the British Foreign Secretary if he believed it would be useful. When he returned to France his despatch to Paul Cambon indicated his anxiety over the Radolin notes:

Ce qui me fait considérer dès aujourd'hui la situation comme inquiétante, c'est que le prince Radolin, malgré ses précautions de langage, a parlé non pas spontanément mais d'après des instructions formelles. Il semble même ressortir de nos renseignements secrets que ses déclarations à l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne ont été approuvées par le chancelier allemand. Quant à un échange de vues préalable entre Berlin et Pétersbourg, je ne saurais l'admettre: la confiance des rapports qu'entretiennent M. Delcassé et le comte Lamsdorf rend presque invraisemblable un pareil échange.¹

In the same despatch Paléologue appraised the German scene. He saw an impulsive and indiscreet William II of Germany offering Russia an opportunity to recover prestige lost in the Manchurian War by joining Germany in a war against Britain. France would then be forced to choose between an ally, Russia, and a friend, Britain. France's joining a Russo-German combination would mean the loss of her colonies and commerce to Britain in the event of war, but the conditions necessi-

¹D.F.2, vi, 146.

tating the Franco-Russian Alliance still ruled and because of the superior numbers of German troops on the continent France would always have to sacrifice Britain for the Russian Alliance. Paul Cambon agreed with Paléologue's summary. It exemplified the realistic approach of Paléologue and French diplomacy in general. For his realism Paléologue was often severely criticised later during his Russian Embassy. As early as 1905 Paléologue's forebodings of a coming war were well known. Delcassé in a despatch relates how the Grand Duke Paul has "les impressions assez sombres qu'avait exprimées quelquefois devant lui, au sujet de la guerre, un agent du ministère des Affaires étrangères (c'est M. Paléologue)."¹

On April 22, 1905 Delcassé sent his trusted friend Paléologue on a very important mission to Berlin affecting Delcassé personally. After six years of running the foreign affairs of France with little trouble or interference from his colleagues, Delcassé was criticised for his firm policy toward Germany which his colleagues feared would result in war. The acute tension between him and his colleagues in 1904 made Delcassé complain bitterly to Paléologue on March 29. When he expressed his desire to Paléologue to resign his office in view of the situation, his friend showed him that such a course would be unwise. "The whole network of ententes and friendships which you have so patiently

¹D.F.2, vi, 146.

built up would be immediately destroyed....Under the present circumstances, your resignation would be a diplomatic disaster. You do not have the right to retire."¹

Eventually Paléologue's view prevailed.

Après le retrait de sa démission, le 22 avril, M. Delcassé avait demandé à M. Paléologue de se rendre à Berlin. Il s'entendrait avec M. Bihourd au sujet de la préparation d'un Livre Jaune qui démontrerait la fausseté de la thèse: 'L'Allemagne tenue dans l'ignorance complète de la politique marocaine'. Surtout il examinerait sur place les combinaisons et les manœuvres qui pouvaient encore s'offrir à M. Delcassé. M. Paléologue arriva à Berlin dans la soirée du 23, et fut de retour à Paris dans l'après-midi du 26.²

He spoke at Berlin with the French Ambassador M. Bihourd and the French military and naval attachés and reported these conversations to Delcassé in the afternoon of April 26. He gave his opinion that Germany would fight unless Delcassé changed his ground and since Germany refused direct negotiations he advised trying to reach Germany through the good offices of Russia, England or Italy. "Sur le terrain où vous êtes placé, vous ne devez pas espérer un succès contre l'Allemagne; car, sur ce terrain, elle ira jusqu'à la guerre, et l'opinion française ne vous suivra pas."³

Delcassé accepted Paléologue's advice and informed

¹Charles W. Porter, The Career of Théophile Delcassé (Philadelphia, 1936), p. 200.

²D.F.2, vi, 334.

³M. Paléologue, "La Démission de M. Delcassé en 1905," Revue des Deux Mondes, III (1931), 761-802.

Rouvier, President of the Council, of his peaceful intent. He then sought out Paléologue's opinion on the best intermediary through which to negotiate with Germany. Paléologue preferred the King of Italy who was intelligent and accessible whereas the Emperor of Russia was neither, besides being very poorly disposed toward England. He believed that the actual difference with Germany was only one episode in a long premeditated plan and gave his reasons in summary.

1. The strange warning of a coming European war to the King of the Belgians, 28 January, 1904.

2. The suggestive confidences of a German diplomat 4 February, 1904.

3. The role played by Emperor William II at Petersburg and Tokio to bring on a war between Russia and Japan.

4. Documents lifted from Berlin by treason revealing the Schlieffen plan, January-April 1904.

5. The intrigue of Emperor William of Germany with Emperor Nicholas of Russia against England confided to the Marquis del Meni, Spanish Ambassador by Prince Radolin, November, 1904.

6. The theatrical show of Emperor William at Tangier, 31 March, 1904, at which time Paléologue asked if France could count on English military support and Lansdowne advised France to try to get along with Germany though France's diplomatic position was good, for England could not commit her forces in advance.¹

Besides investigating the German problem Paléologue was kept occupied by other diplomatic duties. In addition to being the President of the Commission secrète de Instructions de guerre, he was occupied in conferences with the Sûreté générale on ensuring the safety of the Spanish King on his proposed visit, conferences on the secret armaments

¹Ibid.

of Germany with the chief of intelligence of the War Ministry, and conferences on the overture¹ of England toward an alliance with France.

In 1905 Delcassé at last resigned since he had lost all support from his colleagues in the Council of Ministers for his policy of resisting Germany. Germany had achieved a diplomatic victory at France's expense by forcing her to get rid of Delcassé but Paléologue "who was a sincere admirer of Delcassé's diplomacy remained in charge of his old functions".² Paléologue carried on his friendship with Delcassé and often visited him in order to discuss foreign affairs with him. Delcassé was of the opinion that an English alliance was the only course that France could take to strengthen her position against Germany. Paléologue agreed but saw the circumstances that warranted it as much more perilous than Delcassé:

Oui, nous devons, de plus en plus, nous orienter vers l'alliance anglaise. Je ne crois pas cependant que le péril de guerre en soit conjuré...Selon vous, l'attitude du Kaiser n'est qu'un bluff. Soit! Mais il est devenu le prisonnier de son attitude; il s'est interdit à lui-même les moyens de rapprochement, la possibilité d'une retraite. C'est là que réside, pour moi, tout le danger. Guillaume nous a enfermés dans une impasse; mais il s'y est enfermé avec nous.³

In order to reconcile his and Delcassé's views Paléologue

¹Ibid.

²Porter, p. 269.

³M. Paléologue, "La Démission de M. Delcassé en 1905", Revue des Deux Mondes, 111 (1931), 761-802.

proposed a formula acceptable to both. "L'Alliance de l'Angleterre ne nous garantirait pas contre une offensive de l'Allemagne; mais elle nous permettrait d'y résister."¹

Paléologue's pessimistic outlook on Franco-German relations was very apparent in 1905 when he acquainted the new Chief of Staff, General Brun, with the diplomatic situation, pointing out that Germany's policy in Morocco was to harass France by turning the Sultan against her. He did believe, however, that peace could be preserved if the President of the United States intervened; but as yet the President was not fully acquainted with the situation.

In any event, in case of immediate hostilities with Germany, Russia would be unable to fulfil the terms of her alliance with France because of the devastation inflicted upon her by the war with Japan. It would be five years, in Paléologue's opinion, before Russia would be in a position to do so. Nevertheless, the cardinal principle of French foreign policy in 1906, according to Paléologue, was "to seek the main bulwark of our national independence in the silent development of the armed power of Russia."² In the course of his early career he became well acquainted with Franco-Russian relations. He had taken part in the pourparlers in 1892 which

¹Ibid.

²M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs (London, 1924), II, p. 232.

led to the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alliance. Then in 1903 he had been the Director of the Russian Department of the Foreign Ministry. The full knowledge that he gained of the relations of France and Russia was to serve him well in his future diplomatic career and especially in his Embassy to Russia in 1914.

V

FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE IN BULGARIA,
1907-1912

Maurice Paléologue went to Sofia, Bulgaria, in January, 1907, as chargé de l'agence and consulat général. He became minister of the legation in 1909 and remained in that post until January, 1912. Observant as always, Paléologue soon made an estimate of the character of Prince Ferdinand, ruler of Bulgaria under Turkish sovereignty, and of the condition of Bulgaria, as well as its strategic position in Balkan and international affairs. The knowledge that he gained in Bulgaria gave him a shrewd appreciation of Balkan politics and led many French officials to consult him in later years.

By 1907 Europe was becoming divided into rival camps. The Triple Alliance had been in existence for some time as had the Entente between France and England, though the latter amounted only to a liquidation of the differences between the two countries. Then in 1907 an Anglo-Russian agreement of the same nature was reached which laid the basis of the Triple Entente. It was at this time that Germany began to think in terms of Einkreisung though the interests of the Triple Entente's members were diversified. Russia had Far and Near Eastern ambitions. France looked for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine and Britain looked to the stemming of

Germany's naval expansion. The condition of Europe was still fluid, moreover, as agreement was still thought possible with Germany.

The state of European relations was first tested in the Balkans. Since 1897 this area had been quiescent but after 1907 ambitious politicians began to exploit the traditional rivalry here between Russia and Austria. Isvolsky, appointed Russian foreign minister in 1906, had secured the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 and was ambitious to open the Straits to Russia. He intended to do this through diplomatic means. In Austria Count Aehrenthal sought to restore Austria's prestige and standing among the powers, through an active policy. The acute problem of the Slav population of the Dual Monarchy still remained and the contiguity of Serbia raised the danger of a separatist movement of the Slavs of the Monarchy. There were two solutions to this question - reconciliation of the South Slavs by giving them equality with the dominant nationalities in the Monarchy or suppression of any separatist tendency by complete incorporation of Serbia. Aehrenthal came to focus his policy on the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina that had been partially incorporated into the Empire in 1878 and as a result had become the centre of Serbian irredentism, which if successful might spread to the South Slavs of the Empire. In 1907, he decided to annex these provinces thus putting an end to Serbian hopes.

In the following year Aehrenthal announced that it was Austria's intention to build a railway through the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar toward Salonica. Isvolsky objected to the proposed railway scheme and proposed instead to provide Russian support for Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in return for Austrian support of the Russian plan to have the Straits opened to Russian warships under certain conditions. Isvolsky, however, though giving Russian approval to the Austrian annexation, failed to get clear Austrian approval for the Russian plan, a fact which was to embarrass him and Russia later.

The victory of the Young Turk revolutionary movement in July 1908 threatened the designs of Austria, Russia and Bulgaria. A rejuvenated Turkey would likely hinder the fulfilment of Austria's ambitions in the Balkans as well as Russia and would thwart Bulgaria's desire to become independent and to annex Macedonia. The Young Turks showed their determination to summon delegates from Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Bulgaria to the new Turkish Parliament. Bulgaria and Austria therefore acted quickly. Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria gained Austrian consent to the proposed independence of Bulgaria in September 1908 and on October 5, this was proclaimed. The following day, October 6, to the embarrassment of Isvolsky Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina and renounced her rights to military occupation of the Sanjak.

The opposition of Russia, Turkey and Serbia was to be expected. Russia proposed an international conference to deal with this violation of the Berlin Treaty of 1878, but the suggestion was rejected by Austria and Germany and was received only lukewarmly by Britain and France.

Eventually Turkey reached an agreement with Austria, who paid her compensation for the loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the face of Austrian military might Serbia was forced to accept the fait accompli. Russia, obliged to accept Bulgarian independence in order to continue her pose as her protector, cancelled certain financial claims on Turkey to compensate her for the loss of Bulgaria which Turkey then recognized. Russia, somewhat disconcerted by the intrigues of Isvolsky and intimidated by Germany was forced to accept Austria's gains. Serbia then grudgingly gave full recognition to the Austrian annexation.

The result of this crisis was a victory of the Triple Alliance over Russia, which drew closer to France. Bulgaria in turn was drawn more closely into the Russian orbit and in consequence a secret pact¹ was concluded with Russia in 1909. She preferred to balance between Russia and Austria and not have them reach an agreement over the Balkans as in 1897 for it would mean dividing the Balkans into spheres of influence again thus thwarting Bulgaria's desire for independence and

¹David Thomson, Europe since Napoleon (New York, 1957), p. 438.

annexation of Macedonia.¹ She also evaded Serbia's efforts at an alliance because he was unwilling to abandon his claim to all Macedonia,² a claim which troubled Bulgarian-Serbian relations.

It was into this troubled situation, in which Bulgarian-Serbian relations were unfriendly, and before the complicating factors of the Bosnian crisis and Bulgaria's declaration of independence that Paléologue was introduced in 1907.

Bulgaria at the time was ruled by Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, a German prince, who had succeeded to the Bulgarian throne in 1886, and had ruled that country under Turkish suzerainty. Though, because of his background, he was regarded by Russia as a candidate of the western powers, he was accepted as ruler by the Tsar. He maintained his position through a combination of his own native ability and the support of Stambulov, the most able and influential man in Bulgaria. In 1894 after ridding himself of Stambulov, Prince Ferdinand had made a pact with Russia and continued the economic and military progress begun in Bulgaria by his minister's ruthless methods. Even so he persisted in following an independent course which made Bulgaria uncertain

¹ D.F.2 VII, 435.

² E. C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913 (Cambridge, 1938), p. 10.

quantity in the eyes of the Entente Powers. Thus Paléologue's task in Bulgaria was likely to be difficult. Bulgaria had associated with Austria in order to gain her independence and then had secured Russia's aid in getting Turkey to agree to the fait accompli.

Paléologue was faced with a rising enthusiasm in Bulgaria for independence from Turkey. There was a real possibility that Bulgaria would go to war to secure freedom. In his anxiety to gain independence without war, Ferdinand was wary of Turkey's increase in armaments and possible military agreement with Serbia.

In a very informative despatch of May, 1907 Paléologue's lucid and logical mind is revealed in his analysis of the Bulgarian scene:

Dans la question [of the eventuality of war], trois éléments, trois facteurs sont à considérer: le Prince Ferdinand, l'armée, l'opinion publique. Votre Excellence connaît le Prince Ferdinand. C'est, avant tout, un "politique". Habile, astucieux, très secret, ne se fiant à personne, efféminé malgré sa haute stature, réalisant au moral comme au physique le type d'un Valois du xvi^e siècle, il n'a ni l'instinct ni le goût des choses militaires. On ne le voit presque jamais à cheval; il n'a jamais contact avec le soldat; il ne commande jamais aux manoeuvres. En cas de guerre, il serait donc obligé d'abandonner le commandement effectif à ses officiels. Vaincu, il perdrait pour le moins son trône. Vainqueur, il tomberait sous la tutelle du général heureux qui aurait conduit, de sa personne, les troupes au feu. Dans de telles conditions, le Prince est trop avisé pour être belliqueux. Peut-être néanmoins souhaitait-il une crise extérieure: car seule une crise extérieure peut donner satisfaction à ses rêves d'indépendance et de royauté. Mais il y a toute vraisemblance que, si la crise vient à se produire, c'est uniquement par la diplomatie qu'il essaierait de la résoudre; son armée, qu'il veut forte, qu'il accroît chaque jour, n'est à ses yeux que l'auxiliaire

indispensable de l'action diplomatique.¹

The second element, the army, was compared to the Prussian army by the Bulgarian Generals who thought of Bulgaria as the Prussia of the Balkans. The third factor to be considered in the Bulgarian question was public opinion:

La masse du pays, laborieuse, économe, prudente, comme tous les peuples agricoles, n'a d'autre souci que les travaux de la culture. Mais les politiciens, qui sont nombreux et qui représentent à eux seuls la classe supérieure, ont les visées plus aventureuses. L'idée de la Grande Bulgarie les obsède, et ils estiment que l'état général de l'Europe est devenu singulièrement favorable à leurs aspirations nationales. Ils voient la Russie paralysée, la France, l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne absorbées par des questions qui les affectent dans leurs intérêts vitaux, enfin l'Autriche incapable d'intervenir seule et d'ailleurs nullement disposée à renouveler en faveur de l'ingrate Serbie l'acte d'autorité qui, en 1885, arrêta les vainqueurs de Slivnitsa sur la route de Belgrade. Et, non sans raison, ils concluent que les ambitions bulgares n'ont jamais à jouer contre la Turquie, mais que, du côté de la Serbie, une offensive audacieuse aurait toute chance de réussir avant même que l'armée ottomane eût achevé de se concentrer: l'Europe ratifierait, une fois de plus, les faits accomplis.²

In June 1907, in accordance with Paléologue's observation of the national aspirations of Bulgarian politicians, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister remarked to Paléologue that it would soon be necessary to change the settlement of 1878 by which Bulgaria had been created, since the position of vassalage toward Turkey accorded by that statute did not correspond to the political and social progress apparent in Bulgaria. It was apparent to Paléologue that Ferdinand was

¹D.F.2, x, 484.

²Ibid.

ambitious to become the king of an independent country and that he hated his present position of aide de camp général du Sultan de la Turquie.

Yet in his despatches to Fichon of December 7, 1907 and of April 2, 1908 Paléologue described Bulgaria as very reluctant to go to war. Prince Ferdinand was not a military man and, in spite of his great army, he would be unlikely to go to war to regain Macedonia without the aid of a Great Power. But Paléologue did not deny that Bulgaria might act alone. "Et leur histoire nous apprend que leurs actes les plus graves ont toujours été soudains."¹

On May 11, 1908 Ferdinand invited Paléologue to dinner and confided in him that he was trying to avoid war but was afraid lest in doing so he might lose his throne. Ferdinand said that he was asking Paléologue's advice because at the time France had the strongest diplomatic position in Europe, Paléologue advised him that Bulgaria would be foolish to go to war without the backing of a Great Power and pointed out that Russia was too preoccupied with overcoming the effects of the Russo-Japanese war to come to her aid. In any case the situation was now different from that of 1877, for Russia would have to consult Britain and France before entering a war on behalf of Bulgaria.

¹D.F.2, xi, 334.

On October 3, 1908 Bulgaria proclaimed its independence but Paléologue advised Pichon that unless there were signs of disquiet in Constantinople it would not mobilize. Without telling his Foreign Minister, Ferdinand made known to Paléologue his wish for France to take the lead in calling an international conference to settle the Turko-Bulgarian differences, a proposal that the latter thought reasonable. In his despatch of April 15, 1909, however, Paléologue assured Pichon that Ferdinand would be unable to resist his bellicose ministers any longer.

Pichon promptly informed Paléologue in confidence that France, Russia, England and, he hoped, Italy would probably recognize Bulgarian independence in order to avoid a Turko-Bulgarian war. Paléologue was instructed to make use of this information as he judged necessary to prevent hostilities. Peace was maintained through the intervention of Russia with the idea of a Balkan League to unite Christians and Moslems which was to be confined to the three Slavonic States and Turkey, Bulgarian officers visited Constantinople in July 1909 for the first time.

It was observed by Paléologue that Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in the east was no longer aimed at keeping an equilibrium but at hegemony and that Russia was powerless to halt her advance in the Balkans. In subsequent despatches of October 9, 1909 and February 18, 1910 Paléologue again

analysed the Bulgarian situation. In the former, he pointed out the best course for France to take in Bulgaria:

Nous avons grand intérêt à ce que la Bulgarie ne provoque pas un conflit dans les Balkans; nous ne sommes guère moins intéressés à ce qu'elle ne tombe pas dans l'anarchie. Nous devons donc lui faciliter l'évolution qui s'impose à sa politique, c'est-à-dire la renonciation aux idées de conquête, le sacrifice du rêve macédonien, la réduction de l'armée. La Triple Entente pourrait, me semble-t-il, exercer dans ce sens une action efficace à Constantinople. Il faut faire comprendre aux Jeunes Turcs que l'amour propre des Bulgares a besoin d'être ménagé, qu'un peuple ne se désiste pas, en un jour, des aspirations qui ont été son principal motif de vivre, son unique pensée depuis trente ans; il faut que la situation de la Macédoine devienne assez prospère pour enlever au nationalisme bulgare tout prétexte à vouloir secourir les frères slaves restés sous le poing islamique.¹

In his second despatch, Paléologue concluded that armed intervention^a by Bulgaria was inevitable in view of the conflict between Turkey and Greece, the revolution in Constantinople and the insurrection in Macedonia. This could only be avoided, in Paléologue's opinion, if Austria and Russia were to cease quarrelling and renew their 1897 convention. Renewal of this convention would paralyze Bulgaria and thwart her national dreams. Bulgaria and Thrace would thus become Russian spheres of influence and Serbia and Macedonia would become Austrian spheres of influence. To avoid such an occurrence Ferdinand was trying to convince Austria of his value to her.²

The President of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers sought the support of France through Paléologue, who claimed

¹D.F.2, xii, 331.

²Ibid., 435.

that even consideration of such support was impossible as long as there were doubts about the disposition of Tsar Ferdinand. France's support was dependent on full political agreement.

Paléologue's suggestion of settling Bulgarian-Turkish relations by conversations between the Entente and Alliance powers met with little support. M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, thought such conversations would be ineffective in settling the situation.

To the conjectures in 1911 that a political rapprochement would be effected between Serbia and Bulgaria, Paléologue attached no importance since "la Bulgarie n'est pas près d'assumer la charge d'une amitié serbe. En cas de besoin, elle cherchera plus haut les points d'appui de sa politique ambitieuse."¹ He did note, however, that Rumania and Bulgaria were drawing closer together. Yet in 1912 Bulgaria concluded an alliance first with Serbia and not until 1913 did she conclude one with Rumania. Austria-Hungary was also gaining advantages at Sofia every day and Paléologue regretted the lack of Russian action there.

To the further request of the President of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs for the support of the Triple Entente, in February 1912 Paléologue replied:

¹D.F. 3, 1, 29.

La politique de la Triple Entente en Orient a pour principe l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman et le maintien du status quo dans les Balkans. Si le Gouvernement bulgare admet loyalement ce double principe, il se trouvera par cela même associé à la Triple Entente. Je dois d'ailleurs ajouter que, tant que votre orientation diplomatique restera indécise, le Gouvernement de la République ne pourra consentir à l'emprunt de 200 millions de francs dont vous m'avez parlé naguère. M. Poincaré est décidé à ne mettre la puissance financière de la France qu'au service des Etats qui marchent politiquement dans la même voie qu'elle. M. Guéchoff m'a semblé d'abord assez ému par mes déclarations.¹

This conversation was indeed effective for it prompted² the conclusion of an accord between Bulgaria and Serbia in February-March 1912. Also attributed, in part, to this conversation was Bulgaria's declaration of solidarity with Turkey in March 1912.³

On the whole, Paléologue gained a bad impression of the trend in the development of international affairs while he was in Sofia at the centre of Balkan affairs. A peril to the existing European order was developing:

La quadruple conjoncture qui s'élaborait sous mes yeux -- l'accélération de la ruine turque, les convoitises territoriales des Bulgares, la mégalomane romantique du Tsar Ferdinand, enfin et surtout les desseins ambitieux de l'Allemagne en Orient. J'avais tiré de cette expérience tout le profit d'instruction et tout l'intérêt de curiosité que j'en pouvais attendre....⁴

During his five years in Sofia while the international

¹D.F.3, 11,45.

²D.F.3, 11,359.

³D.F.3, 11,186.

⁴M. Paléologue, "La Russie des Tsars Pendant la Grande Guerre", Revue des Deux Mondes, LXI (1921), 225-272.

scene was worsening generally, Paléologue gathered an astute knowledge of Balkan affairs. He became somewhat of a confidant of Tsar Ferdinand and came to appreciate the Bulgarian situation fully, always keeping France more than adequately informed in his despatches. His able advice counted for much with Ferdinand and helped stem a Bulgarian war for independence against Turkey. He advised that Bulgaria could not go to war without the support of a major power and he pointed out that Russia was at the time in no position to support Bulgaria. Paléologue's counsels also helped prevent a war against Turkey to satisfy another national aspiration, the freeing of Macedonia. The difficulties in Bulgarian-Serbian relations and Bulgaria's quest for security by wooing both Austria of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente powers at the same time were manifest to Paléologue and his conversations with the Bulgarian officials and firm declaration of the position of France and the Entente powers were instrumental in Bulgaria's acceding to the Entente aims through the conclusion of an alliance with Serbia and a declaration of friendship with Turkey (however shattered). Using the traditional procedures of the old diplomacy, Paléologue thus played no small part in the Balkans during his posting there. It was ^{the} to advantage of France and Europe generally not to have the Balkans embroiled in a war which might burst into a general European conflict.

VI

POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY

1912-1914

On January 25, 1912 when Poincaré became President of the Council and Foreign Minister he recalled Maurice Paléologue to the Foreign Ministry in Paris to become Director of Political Affairs, the most important post next to the Minister and in effect head of the Foreign Ministry. Poincaré had known Paléologue since his youth and knew that he could trust his judgment in the worsening international situation.

At this stage England was feeling the after effects of the Moroccan crisis. England had supported France against Germany in the Moroccan crisis because of the increasing commercial, colonial, and naval rivalry with Germany. German naval plans became more and more menacing and as a result naval arrangements were made between the Entente Powers. A Franco-Russian naval convention was signed in July, 1912 and in November England agreed to defend the northern coasts of France while France agreed to defend English interests in the Mediterranean.

Italy, meanwhile, sought to compensate herself in the colonial field for France's annexation of Tunisia, and annexed

Tripoli with the consent of the majority of the Great Powers. Turkey resisted this encroachment on her sovereign territory and the Tripolitan War between Italy and Turkey was the result. Austria also objected to any operations which would disturb the status quo in the Balkans and prevented Italian attacks on the Aegean and Adriatic coasts.

Farther east Russia invaded Northern Persia, the Russian sphere of influence according to the 1907 agreement with England and suppressed the Liberal movement there. England objected to this aggression but was hampered in her action by the necessity of maintaining good relations at a time when a European War looked imminent. The Balkans, always a trouble spot, were soon to be the scene of war once again, adding to the already disturbing events on the international scene, events which many believed would lead to a general conflagration.

In Paléologue's view there were certain areas of central importance: the Balkan situation which must not be allowed to erupt into a general European war; Franco-Russian relations which must be maintained and strengthened through their close alliance; Anglo-French relations which must be strengthened by closer cooperation in military and naval conversations such that Britain would be an ally in event of a war with Germany; Franco-Italian relations which must procure the neutrality of Italy in a future war with Germany despite her

alliance with Germany; and especially Franco-German relations which must be kept peaceful for Paléologue feared a sudden German attack on any pretext which might suit the occasion.

Durant les mois qui suivirent, j'eus à étudier plusieurs fois, dans la limite du rôle consultatif qu'impliquait ma fonction, s'il n'était possible d'améliorer nos rapports avec l'Allemagne, de lui ouvrir un crédit de confiance, de chercher avec elle des sujets de conversation, des occasions d'action commune et de loyale entente. Je crois avoir l'esprit assez libre pour affirmer que je procédai à cette étude avec une objectivité absolue. Mais, chaque fois, je dus reconnaître que toute complaisance de notre part était interprétée à Berlin comme une marque de faiblesse dont La Chancellerie impériale essayait aussitôt de tirer parti pour nous arracher une concession nouvelle; que la diplomatie allemande poursuivait inflexiblement un vast plan d'hégémonie, et que l'inflexibilité de ses vues augmentait chaque jour les risques d'un conflit. J'avais en outre le regret de constater que le pacifisme bruyant de nos socialistes et du parti inféodé à l'appétit de l'Allemagne, en lui permettant de croire que ses procédés d'intimidation pourraient à la longue nous maîtriser et que le peuple français était résigné à tout subir plutôt que de recourir aux armes.¹

Because of this menacing situation it was necessary to maintain close relations with England. Paléologue was certain that Britain was aware of the dangerous situation developing in Europe and was assured that Britain would support France by Sir Francis Bertie, British ambassador to France.

Si l'Allemagne attaque la France, je ne doute pas que mon gouvernement se prononcerait aussitôt contre l'Allemagne et vous savez comme il se prépare à cette éventualité. Mais, jusqu'à la dernière minute, il entend garder la pleine liberté de sa décision finale. Croyez-moi: c'est la meilleure méthode à suivre, c'est, du reste, la seule que nous permettent nos traditions politiques.²

¹M. Paléologue, "La Russie des Tsars Pendant la Grande Guerre", Revue des Deux Mondes, LXI (1921), 225-272.

²M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 75.

But Paléologue wished that Britain would take a stronger and more public stand.

Mais non plus, je ne doute pas que, si l'Allemagne nous attaque, vous vous déciderez finalement à nous secourir. Mais je regrette que vous n'affirmiez pas un peu plus, aux yeux du monde, la probabilité de cette décision finale... Dans la conversation du roi George et du prince Henri, ce qui m'a beaucoup frappé, c'est la surprise effarée du prince à s'entendre dire par la roi que l'Angleterre n'assisterait pas indifférente à une guerre franco-allemande. Même surprise chez l'ambassadeur d'Allemagne, le prince Lichnowsky, quand le lord chancelier Balfour lui a confirmé les paroles de George V... Si l'empereur Guillaume l'état-major de Berlin et l'opinion allemande savaient que l'Angleterre se dresserait à côté de la France pour la défense de l'équilibre européen, la paix générale serait singulièrement raffermie.¹

But the amount of possible military assistance from England was indicated to him and General Joffre by a despatch from Lord Kitchener in March 1913. Kitchener, British Agent and Consul-general in Egypt at the time, explained the political drawbacks of England of getting a military agreement or getting swift action in the event of war and the smallness of the English regular army. In the event of war, France would have to carry the brunt of it alone until England was able to call up her reserves.² His well founded pessimism on this score prompted the French Government to examine the eventual functioning of France's alliances. To this end secret conferences were held at the Foreign Ministry in May 1912. The conferences were attended by M. Poincaré, M. Millerand, Minister of

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 75.

War, M. Delcassé, Minister of Marine, General Joffre, Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Aubert, Naval Chief of Staff, and M. Paléologue. As a result of these conferences there was closer co-operation among the great ministries and an attempt to strengthen the French alliances, one of Poincaré's chief aims.

In September 1912, the Balkan situation again became critical. Bulgaria and Serbia had decided to make war on Turkey on the pretext that their demands for reform in Macedonia had not been heeded by Turkey. When he had learned the terms of the Serbian-Bulgarian Alliance in the previous August, Poincaré had warned Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, of the danger it involved but Sazonov had not been too concerned. Then in September, Paléologue tried to avert war by suggesting to Baron von Lancken, the First Secretary of the German Embassy in Paris, that the Powers intervene to maintain the peace. The question was who was to take the initiative. Kiderlen-Wächter, the German Foreign Minister, thought Paléologue's suggestion just and suggested that Russia or Austria should intervene on behalf of the powers,¹ whereas Poincaré suggested intervention by joint Russian and Austrian representation. In October, Russia and Austria therefore sent a joint note to the Balkan states demanding respect for the status quo. Despite the note, the First Balkan War broke out the same month between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece on the one hand, and Turkey on the other.

¹Helmreich, p. 128.

Paléologue continued to press for peace. In November he remarked to Baron Schoen, the German Ambassador to France, that:

La proposition, dont M. Poincaré a saisi les Puissances le 15 octobre dernier, n'est pas périmée. Les Puissances qui en avaient souhaité l'ajournement n'ont qu'à s'y référer, si elles jugent que l'heure est venue, pour l'Europe, d'agir en faveur de la paix.¹

Similarly when the Turkish Ambassador, concerned over the slowness of Europe's intervention, suggested to Paléologue that France intervene alone, he replied:

[que] les bons offices de France, exercés au nom de l'humanité, pourraient sans doute faciliter la conclusion d'un armistice mais que les conditions de la paix intéressaient l'Europe entière et sauraient être arbitrées par une Puissance isolée.²

In December, 1912, however, the London Conference met to settle the Balkan conflict. The main areas of contention at the conference were 1) Serbian access to the sea for a commercial outlet, 2) Albania, its boundaries, form of government and the guarantee of its autonomy, and 3) the disposition of the Aegean Islands.³ The Turkish Ambassador to France insisted that Turkey should be allowed to retain Adrianople but Paléologue objected:

Le Gouvernement bulgare semble résolu à reprendre les hostilités si Andrinople n'est pas cédé à la Bulgarie. Or, une reprise des hostilités risque d'entraîner la ruine de l'Empire turc, non seulement en Europe, mais en Asie.⁴

¹D.F.3, iv, 521.

²D.F.3, iv, 523.

³Helmreich, p. 251.

⁴D.F.3, v, 101.

With the resumption of the Balkan war on February 3, 1913, the Bulgarian threat thereto and Russia's desire to send her own fleet into the Sea of Marmora to safeguard the Straits and the Dardanelles, Paléologue on April 6, 1913 urged Pichon, now French Foreign Minister, to demand that an international fleet be sent to prevent a Bulgarian attack on Constantinople. International action would remove all excuse for the Russian fleet moving into the Straits and thus also prevent naval action by the Triple Alliance and general European war. Pichon agreed with this suggestion.

On April 16 an armistice was concluded in the Balkans. Montenegro, however, took Scutari despite the protests of the powers who had assigned it to Albania. As a result Schoen spoke to Paléologue about the German Government's disposition to allow a naval demonstration off the coast of Montenegro by Austria and Italy on a European mandate. Asked France's position, Paléologue replied that he opposed isolated action by Austria-Hungary but not naval action by a combination of powers if all the powers agreed to it.¹ Baron von Lancken reported that Russia would not participate in such a demonstration but that she hoped France and England would. The question then was whether France would participate without Russia. In any case Montenegro, threatened by Austria, abandoned Scutari to Albania. To Izvolsky's demand for an indemnity

¹D.F.3, vi, 71.

from Turkey to Montenegro Paléologue objected on financial and diplomatic grounds. Finally, the London Peace Conference was reopened. By the Treaty of London, May 30, 1913 the Great Powers forced a settlement on the Balkan powers.

A month later, Serbia which had not made the gains it anticipated on the Adriatic or in Macedonia, made an alliance with Greece. Soon thereafter the Second Balkan War broke out and continued to July 30, 1913. Rumania and Turkey joined Serbia and Greece in combination against Bulgaria. At this stage Sazonov warned Isvolsky that if Germany did not agree to intervention, the Entente powers would have to make a naval demonstration, and failing that Russia would make a demonstration on her own. Paléologue commented on Sazonov's telegram:

M. Isvolsky ayant insisté pour connaître sans retard l'opinion du Ministre des Affaires étrangères (retenu à la Chambre), je lui ai déclaré, à titre personnel, qu'une action isolée de la Russie risquerait de susciter de graves complications: "Si le Gouvernement impérial, ai-je dit, opère une concentration de troupes sur les confins de l'Arménie, le Gouvernement britannique n'en prendra-t-il pas ombrage? En ce cas, la solidarité de la Triple Entente sera compromise. Si le Gouvernement impérial envoie une escadre dans la Bosphore ou fait débarquer un corps d'armée à Bourgas, l'Allemagne n'opposera-t-elle pas son veto? En ce cas, n'y aura-t-il pas conflit entre la Triple Alliance et la Triple Entente?"¹

No demonstration was made. Meanwhile Bulgaria was nearing defeat. What was to be done if she were defeated? Paléologue thought it necessary to preserve her existence and independence:

¹D.F.3, vii, 460.

Comme disait Bismarck, le mot indignation n'a pas cours dans le vocabulaire diplomatique. Or, l'existence d'un royaume bulgare, nécessaire à l'équilibre balkanique est indispensable au maintien de la paix en Europe. Donc, nous ne devons pas laisser anéantir la Bulgarie. Quant à l'ignoble conduite du tsar Ferdinand, il s'en expliquera dans la vallée de Josaphet.¹

Bulgaria was defeated. By the treaty of Bucharest of August 10, 1913 a settlement was reached between Bulgaria and Serbia, Rumania and Greece; the Treaty of Constantinople of September 29, 1913 brought a settlement between Bulgaria and Turkey.

While this complex affair was being settled Paléologue had difficulty with Georges Louis, French Ambassador to Russia since 1909. Acting on Poincaré's instructions Paléologue recalled Louis in 1913 on grounds of ill-health. Apparently, however, Louis was "something of a thorn in the flesh of both Poincaré and Isvolsky because of his unsympathetic attitude toward their conception of Franco-Russian relations."² Louis supported the Franco-Russian Alliance as necessary for French security against Germany but was against its use to support Russian designs in the Balkans. Sazonov and Isvolsky, who resented his attitude asked for Louis's recall and Poincaré had complied with their wishes. At this juncture the newspaper Liberté accused Paléologue of conspiring with Isvolsky and winning over Poincaré to action against Georges Louis and "condemned his recall as an indication of the unwholesome

¹Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 171.

²Schuman, p. 194.

influence of the Russian Ambassador over the French Government."¹ However much it appealed to Poincaré and Izvolsky, the Ambassador's recall had been prompted by Sazonov, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the part of Paléologue was merely one of following instructions. Georges Louis made his own investigation of the reason for his recall and learned that it was the Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna who had engineered the action. Since she was a friend of Paléologue's he at first thought that Paléologue had prompted the action but Paléologue had not been in communication with her for some time.

Paléologue approved the sending of Theophile Delcassé as French Ambassador to Russia to replace Louis but was concerned that public opinion be first prepared for such a move. Delcassé was closely identified in the popular mind with a war-like policy toward Germany.

Though the European situation was becoming more strained, Paléologue did not think that the Balkan crisis would end in a general European war but thought it necessary to be alert to any danger. In such times of crisis he also thought that the President of France could exercise considerable power and after the fashion of Edward VII of England do much to cement relations between the allies. Poincaré in that position did do much to cement the bonds between the allies of the Entente.

¹M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 196.

Before Delcassé's departure for his new post Paléologue naturally discussed his mission with him. Delcassé emphasized the necessity of preparing Russia for war and scorned idle or do-nothing diplomacy. Paléologue objected that, though events seemed to be leading toward war, war was not a certainty. Personally, he explained, he was neither a determinist nor a fatalist, and that there was still time for some effective change. If war should come, Paléologue was convinced that France would receive the first blow and therefore she must hasten her preparations for any eventuality.

In preparation for a possible European conflict, Paléologue agreed with Albert de Mun that France must have an army on its eastern frontier capable of defence against a surprise attack. He disagreed, however, with De Mun's theory of war as the necessary instrument of God's chastisement and of national rehabilitation. He thought these ideas were mystical dreams and faced de Mun with the reality of his own position:

Mon cher député, si, au lieu d'être assis dans ce fauteuil, vous occupiez ma place, je vous garantis que jamais vous n'arrêteriez, un instant, votre esprit sur telles idées... Mon devoir dans l'étroite mesure de mes fonctions, est de faire tout ce qui dépend de moi pour que la France ne soit pas obligée de prendre les armes... Supposez que la guerre éclate et que, m'inspirant de votre mysticisme j'ai tant soit peu contribué à la rendre inévitable. Puis, admettez que nous soyons vaincus. Pensez-vous que, pour m'absoudre devant ma conscience et pour me libérer de tout remords, il me suffirait de me dire: je crois que la France ne pouvait plus se régénérer moralement que par la guerre.¹

Similarly Paléologue disagreed with André Tardieu's

¹M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 91.

contention that Russia should be allowed to lead the Franco-Russian Alliance in Eastern matters and that France should take the lead in European matters. "Mais non! Car, si le gouvernement de la République ne freinait pas sans cesse, le gouvernement du tsar aurait vite fait de nous conduire aux abîmes... Ne sont-ce pas les accords balkaniques de 1912, patronnés à votre insu par le gouvernement du tsar, qui nous ont jetés dans la crise actuelle où la paix de l'Europe est chaque jour menacée?"¹

He also saw the need for closer relations with Spain in order to facilitate troop transport from Africa in ^{the} event of a Franco-German war and explained this fact to the Supreme Council of National Defence. Jaures' demand for a judicial organization to preserve international peace met with opposition from Paléologue. He thought the idea as yet in too rudimentary and nebulous a state to be effective. More realistic and cognizant of the power determinants in international affairs, he felt France needed other means to defend herself against foreign military enterprise.

Paléologue's busy schedule of social and official engagements made great demands on his health and necessitated short trips through Europe for rest but always the diplomatic scene bore heavily on his mind.

Besides carefully watching the German scene Paléologue

¹M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 146.

kept close watch on the Balkan situation from his vantage point in Paris. To him Rumania appeared to be swinging toward Russia whereas, Bulgaria, on the other hand, seemed to be moving toward the German bloc since she considered her acquisition of Macedonia vital. The Entente powers in order to satisfy this wish and win over Bulgaria would have to deny Serbia. He therefore advised Pichon that France should concentrate her diplomacy on conciliating Rumania and improving her relations with Russia.

Meanwhile in Russia, Delcassé was not circulating sufficiently to overcome the influence of Rasputin's pro-German faction at court. Yet the need for making the Franco-Russian Alliance a living reality was readily apparent. Paléologue was invited in November 1913 to meet with Kokovtsov, the Russian Minister of Finance and the President of the Council of Ministers; Charles Dumont, the French Minister of Finance; Izvolsky, Russian Ambassador to France; and Luquet, the French Director of General Movements, for the purpose of considering French loans to Russia for the building of imperial railways. Kokovtsov insisted that the loans be unspecified as to strategic railway construction whereas Paléologue objected to this as against French interests. Pichon and Dumont, however, overruled him and authorized Kokovtsov also to speak to Bethmann-Hollweg regarding the possibility of better relations between Germany and the Entente powers,

especially in Asia Minor.

Unfortunately, during the same month a Turko-German Convention was signed by which General Liman von Sanders of Germany, became commander of the Turkish troops. It appeared that the army, the last guarantee of the Sultan's independence, had come under German control. Russia objected to a convention giving Germany such extraordinary powers whereupon Germany expressed surprise and denied any intention of threatening Turkish independence. Paléologue supported the Russian protest but England remained lukewarm. Germany insisted that she could not cancel a convention already signed without losing face in the east. She did, however, have Sanders made an inspector-general instead of commander. Nevertheless, Russia and France remained unsatisfied and suspicious of German designs in Turkey.

From secret despatches sent by Jules Cambon, French Ambassador to Germany, on November 22 and 24, and the contrasting conciliatory tone of the conversations of the German Emperor and Chancellor with Kokovtsov, Paléologue concluded that two policies were being followed at Berlin. One emanated from the German government, the other from the Chiefs of Staff. The first of the secret despatches disclosed a conversation of William II with the King of Belgium in which William spoke of war as inevitable. The second despatch referred to the Saverne incident which had aroused public opinion in France.

At Saverne in November, 1913, a German lieutenant named Forstner had insulted Alsatian recruits. Street riots had followed and several people had been arrested. Again, in December at Saverne, Forstner had aroused resentment by striking a boy with his sabre. The affair led to a vote of censure against Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag, but the military secured the acquittal of Forstner on appeal to the war council. In the Saverne affair, Paléologue urged that no protest be made to Germany and that French journalists follow the rule of moderation in order to avoid another Ems Despatch.

A somewhat different crisis arose on December 12, 1913, Pichon, now President of the Council of Ministers, informed Paléologue that it was necessary to replace Delcassé in St. Petersburg.

Si important que soit le rôle d'un directeur politique et si remarquablement que vous remplissiez vos fonctions depuis deux ans, il faut vous nommer ambassadeur à Pétersbourg et plus tôt possible... Vous avez de la finesse et de l'activité, de la prudence et de l'énergie. C'est exactement ce qu'il nous faut là-bas ... Et maintenant je ne vous écoute plus.¹

In reply Paléologue stated:

J'objecte aussitôt qu'on ne débute pas, comme ambassadeur, au poste de Saint-Pétersbourg, qui est de beaucoup le plus important et le plus difficile de la carrière; qu'on doit faire son apprentissage et son noviciat dans une ambassade où les responsabilités sont moindres, comme Vienne, Rome, ou Madrid, etc...²

¹M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 257.

²Ibid., p. 264.

Paléologue further objected that French public opinion was not prepared for the coming crisis and that the Republican majority in the Chambers was intent upon reducing the size of the army leaving France with the prospect of a military disaster or national humiliation. The ideas prevailing in the Chambers combined with the power of the Socialists made Paléologue fear that they would accept national humiliation at the hands of Germany or, at least, do nothing to avoid it. The first thing Germany would demand in such an event would be the dissolution of the Franco-Russian Alliance, the last safeguard of French independence. Paléologue had no desire as Ambassador to Russia to be the instrument of such evil work.¹

Senator Doumergue who was Paléologue's superior, replied:

Ce n'est pas de ma seule initiative que je vous offre l'ambassade de Saint-Petersbourg; c'est d'accord avec le président de la République et M. Paul Cambon, qui estiment, l'un et l'autre, que c'est vous² êtes le plus capable de représenter la France auprès du tsar. Mieux que personne vous connaissez l'alliance franco-russe et non seulement ses clauses diplomatiques mais encore ses rouages militaires. Depuis l'avertissement que nous avons reçu, le mois dernier, par le roi des Belges, nous ne pouvons plus nous faire la moindre illusion: la guerre peut éclater d'un jour à l'autre. Il nous faut donc, à Saint-Petersbourg, un ambassadeur courageux et résolu, un ambassadeur qui ne perde pas la tête dans une heure grave et qui ne recule pas devant les plus lourdes responsabilités... Vous êtes pour moi cet ambassadeur; vous devez accepter mon offre.²

Paléologue was urged by Poincaré and finally accepted

¹M. Paléologue, "La Russie des Tsars Pendant la Grande Guerre", Revue des Deux Mondes, LXI (1921), 225-272.

²M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 264.

the appointment on January 7, 1914. He was assured that: "Le salut de la France dépendra de l'énergie et de la promptitude avec lesquelles nous saurons les pousser au combat. Pour cette grande tâche, nul n'est plus qualifié que vous."¹ But Paléologue specified that "si j'assumais la charge et l'insigne honneur de représenter la France en Russie, c'était pour y pratiquer exclusivement la politique traditionnelle de l'Alliance, comme étant la seule qui permet à la France de poursuivre sa mission historique dans le monde."²

During his period of office as Political Director at the French Foreign Ministry, Paléologue had kept informed of all diplomatic developments affecting France. His concern for peace and keen awareness of the danger from Germany led him to try to strengthen and maintain the French alliance to prepare France for any eventuality, and to influence the Entente powers towards action in the interest of preventing war. He desired a firm declaration from Britain as to her readiness to support France in the event of war but had to remain satisfied with personal assurances. He tried to avert a war in the Balkans by proposing intervention by the Great Powers, a traditional method of the old diplomacy, and though his suggestion was followed and Austria and Russia intervened, war nevertheless broke out. During the war he did avert a possible general European clash by helping prevent independ-

¹M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 268.

²M. Paléologue, "La Russie des Tsars Pendant la Grande Guerre", Revue des Deux Mondes, LXI (1921), 225-272.

ent Russian military and naval intervention liable to threaten the solidarity of the Triple Entente and bring conflict with the Triple Alliance. When the Saverne incident of November 1913 threatened to undermine even further Franco-German relations he wisely restrained French journalists. Eventually his appreciation of France's diplomatic position led him to accept the crucial office of the Embassy in Russia, the ally France could not do without in event of war with Germany, an eventuality which was becoming more and more apparent to Paléologue.

VII

FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA IN 1914

Maurice Paléologue was appointed Ambassador to Russia on January 12, 1914. The appointment was welcomed by the press. The Journal des Débats reported:

La nomination de M. Paléologue à l'ambassade de Saint-Petersbourg répond entièrement aux conditions requises pour ce poste de première importance. Comme nous le demandions dans un article récent, le gouvernement a désigné, pour représenter la République auprès de Sa Majesté le tsar, un diplomate de carrière, ayant exercé en France et à l'étranger les plus hautes fonctions, jouissant auprès de ses collègues français d'une légitime autorité, possédant toutes les sympathies du corps diplomatique de Paris et bien connu dans la haute société européenne.¹

On January 29 Paléologue outlined the policy that he was to follow in Russia to Paul Deschanel, President of the Chamber:

Mon programme, le voici...Maintenir entre les deux puissances alliées un étroit contact; démontrer sans cesse aux Russes ou plutôt leur faire sentir pratiquement que l'alliance ne leur est ni moins profitable ni moins nécessaire qu'à nous-mêmes; surveiller de très près le jeu de leur diplomatie à Constantinople et dans la péninsule balkanique, où l'horizon me paraît s'assombrir de jour en jour; leur interdire sévèrement tout cavalier seul, exiger qu'avant toute démarche importante ils s'accordent avec nous; admettre par contre qu'ils aient de libres conversations avec Berlin et Vienne, pourvu qu'ils nous rapportent; faciliter autant que possible leurs relations avec l'Angleterre, notamment sur le terrain de l'Asie centrale, tâcher enfin de gagner la confiance personnelle de l'empereur Nicolas, qui, malgré toutes les faiblesses et toutes les vacillations de son étrange nature, est le maître absolu de la Russie.²

¹M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 270.

²Ibid., p. 279.

Later in February he explained to Alexandre Ribot the importance of the Franco-Russian Alliance to France's security and that to keep it intact France must maintain three-year military service and encourage Russia to make adequate preparations for any conflict that might occur. He also pointed out the contradictory and delicate nature of his task.

Je lui expose alors ce qui m'apparaît le plus difficile dans la tâche qui m'est assignée, ce qu'elle implique même de contradictoire. Sur le terrain de la diplomatie, je devrai sans cesse modérer le gouvernement russe tandis que, sur le terrain des préparatifs et des prévisions militaires, je devrai sans cesse le stimuler. Car enfin, si malgré nous, la guerre éclate, les armées russes devront se mobiliser dans le plus bref délai; c'est, pour la France, une question de vie ou de mort.¹

Since World War I, Paléologue has been criticized for the way in which he carried out his difficult assignment. He has been charged with deliberately urging Russia towards war rather than exercising a moderating influence on that country. As the ranking representative of France in Russia in the peculiar circumstances immediately preceding ^{the} outbreak of the War, Paléologue was burdened with a great responsibility. The way in which he acted will be examined in the full light of the circumstances in which he was placed.

Paléologue was cordially welcomed in St. Petersburg society, which greatly facilitated his acquisition of useful information. In addition he established a very close relationship with Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister. Both

¹M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 284.

Paléologue and Buchanan, the British Ambassador, however, complained of not being admitted to the family circle of the Tsar and of the restrictions of court etiquette, which no doubt limited his diplomatic usefulness.

Paléologue was not really a stranger to Russia. Before becoming Ambassador he had acquired among many other Russian acquaintances, the Grand Duke Paul Alexandrovitch, brother of Alexander III, and his wife. As a Paléologue, too, he had ancestral ties with the Russian nobility. Besides, as a close associate of Delcassé and former political director of the Quai d'Orsay he had necessarily acquired a detailed knowledge of Russia and of Franco-Russian relations.

On his arrival in St. Petersburg, Paléologue explained to Sazonov, that his chief objective in Russia was to strengthen the Franco-Russian Alliance, whereas when he presented his credentials to the Tsar, he explained to him that the Alliance was the most effective safeguard of European peace.

La crise que l'Orient traverse depuis près de deux ans, ai-je ajouté, constituait la plus redoutable épreuve que pût affronter l'alliance, puisque, sur le terrain oriental, les intérêts des deux alliés sont le plus souvent divergents, sinon même opposés.¹

He also assured the Tsar that as the three-year service law was essential to France, it would be maintained at all costs.

Paléologue's task of moderating the action of the

¹D.F.₃, ix, 322.

Russian Government in order to preserve peace was made difficult by the ever complex Balkan situation which threatened to break into renewed conflict. Sazonov was being prevailed upon to support Serbia's desires for the rectification of Albanian boundaries and the establishment of a government there favourable to Serbia which Austria vehemently opposed.

Another Russian faction headed by Count Witte on the contrary sought closer relations with the Triple Alliance by the conclusion of a Russo-Franco-German Alliance. The Tsar of Russia, Nicholas II, however, fearful of war with Germany over the Balkan issue sought an Anglo-Russian alliance as the best security for Russia. Foreseeing the danger of a general war if Russia became embroiled with Turkey in a conflict over the Straits as a result of a Turkish-Greek war over the possession of the Aegean Islands, Paléologue warned the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires of the serious consequences of going to war against Greece.

Vous seriez amenés sans doute, lui ai-je dit, à fermer les Dardanelles afin de protéger Constantinople contre une attaque de la flotte hellénique. La Russie ne tolérerait plus la fermeture des Détroits; elle vous enverrait immédiatement un ultimatum.¹

But, in April 1914, Paléologue did not feel that the European situation presented undue cause for alarm. France desired peace and he thought that Germany probably also wanted peace. Russia was becoming anti-German but their relations were not critical and could be improved if Germany paid more attention

to Russian interests.¹ He had sufficient foresight to see the possibility of revolution in Russia once war was declared and the necessity therefore of giving support to the conservative forces in Russia, the Tsar, army, and police, in order to prevent any occurrence which might harm the allied effort.³

After less than five months in Russia Paléologue was recalled to Paris to supervise the detailed arrangements of the proposed visit of the President of the Republic to the Emperor Nicholas in the course of the summer. Arriving in Paris on June 5, 1914, he discovered that the Premier and Foreign Minister, Gaston Doumergue, had resigned with his cabinet on June 1. Also he found that the victorious socialists had adopted the abrogation of the three-year military service law as part of their program. Paléologue, therefore, hastened through his old friend, Briand, to inform Viviani the new Republican Socialist premier that he would resign if this law were abandoned. Questioned by Briand as to his opinion on the nearness of war, Paléologue answered:

J'ai l'intime conviction que vous allons vers l'orage. Sur quel point de l'horizon, à quelle date éclatera-t-il? Je ne saurais le dire. Mais les symptômes objectifs, les signes prémonitoires sont désormais trop manifestes et trop concordants: nous n'éviterons plus la guerre.³

The nature of his visit and his intention to resign

¹D.F.3,x,186.

²D.F.3,x,267.

³M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 293.

were to remain a secret between Briand, Viviani and himself. Briand had said: "N'est-ce pas? Que tout cela reste entre nous! Pas un mot à personne!... Il ne faut pas qu'on puisse accuser Viviani de s'être laissé intimider par la menace d'un ambassadeur..."¹ Unfortunately his views became known and the newspapers accused him of menacing Briand. Viviani agreed to keep the three-year service law temporarily in view of Poincaré's advice to do so, and Paléologue's threat to resign. He was unable to convince his following in the Chamber, however, and gave up the task of forming a ministry. Poincaré refused to accept the verdict against the three-year law and appointed the elderly Alexandre Ribot as premier. Ribot formed a centre and right cabinet on June 9 with Bourgeois as Foreign Minister. The Chamber, however, voted the new ministry out and Poincaré, avoiding the choice of his personal enemy, Georges Clemenceau, again appointed René Viviani as premier. Since his followers were now willing to support the three-year law on condition that it might be modified in the future, Viviani assumed office as premier and minister of foreign affairs.

Clearly Paléologue's concern about the danger of repealing the three-year law was needed. As Schuman notes, the victory of the Left groups who intended to repeal the three-year law and extend social legislation "could validly be interpreted as a popular repudiation of the laws under discussion".

¹M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 294.

But, "Paléologue's threat meant in substance that the St. Petersburg diplomats and militarists, with the support of the French President, the Quai d'Orsay, and the French Ambassador were exerting pressure on discussions at Paris, while no group in the French capital was in the position to exert a corresponding pressure on Russian policy, with the possible exception of the bankers who were treated as the passive instruments of Franco-Russian solidarity."¹

This was certainly a question of public policy for the prospective cabinet to determine on its own merits. That a professional diplomat should attempt to influence the cabinet in this way was admittedly unorthodox but not necessarily reprehensible or unusual under the circumstances. It was not so much a case of Sazonov and Isvolsky influencing French internal affairs as a French citizen watching over the interests of his own country. That the interests of France and Russia coincided at the time is not to deny that France's interests were uppermost in Paléologue's mind. He had accepted the Russian Embassy on condition that he should not be the instrument for breaking the alliance, which was in his opinion France's only means of survival. His task as Ambassador was to prepare Russia for any eventual war:

Il y a trois mois à peine, j'ai affirmé à l'empereur Nicolas que la France gardera sa puissance militaire intacte, que le service de trois ans sera maintenu strictement. Je n'aurais

¹Schuman, p. 207.

plus, à ses yeux, la moindre autorité, si je venais lui dire le contraire aujourd'hui. J'ai tenu le même langage au duc Nicolas Nicolaievitch, le généralissime éventuel, quand j'ai examiné avec lui les plans d'opérations élaborés par les deux états-majors. Vraiment je^{ne} pourrais plus me représenter devant lui...D'ailleurs, quand j'ai accepté le poste de Saint-Pétersbourg, j'ai spécifié, devant le président de la République, que j'aurais à appliquer la politique traditionnelle d'alliance, politique pacifique assurément, mais ayant pour condition...et pour garantie une puissance militaire toujours prête à fonctionner..¹

Moreover, those in a position to understand the military and foreign policy of France, such as the Foreign Ministry, Poincaré, Pichon, Briand, and many prominent newspapers such as le Matin and le Temps supported Paléologue's position on the three-year military service law.² Paléologue had foreseen the danger of Leftist views in government and his forebodings had proved correct. Whether the victory of the Left in the elections can be viewed as a result of their intention to repeal the service law or rather as a result of their concern for social reform is debatable. In any event on June 14, Pichon was able to tell Paléologue that his intervention had been effective and that Jaurès' had promised that the extreme Left would not seek the reversal of the service laws. As Adrien de Montebello put it "C'est ni plus ni moins que la question de savoir si, dans quelque années, il y aura encore une France."²

¹M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 293.

²General Joffre told Paléologue that he would resign too if the three-year service law were not maintained.

²M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 295.

On June 18, ten days before Sarajevo, Paléologue told the new President of the Council of Ministers, Viviani, that it was impossible for him to fix a date for the beginning of war but would be surprised "if the state of electric tension in which Europe lives does not end soon in a catastrophe."¹ He therefore advised Viviani to reinforce and complete the system of alliances and especially to seek an accord with England to ensure the immediate aid of her fleet and army. Viviani asked him whether he thought Briand should accept Emperor William's invitation to attend the opening of the Kiel Canal and to speak to him. Paléologue advised against it because of William's duplicity and the insolent and provocative nature of German diplomacy. Viviani accepted this advice and Briand did not attend the opening.

On June 19, General Joffre questioned Paléologue on the possibility of a revolution accompanying mobilization in Russia. Although he envisaged such a possibility, Paléologue also saw that the Russian people might rally to the cause of Holy Russia and pan-Slavism but "si les armées russes n'étaient pas victorieuses ou si elles devaient s'arrêter dans leur victoire, on reverrait, comme en 1879, comme en 1905, l'explosion du courroux populaire. Selon moi, c'est la défaite seule qui renverser le tsarisme."²

¹Schuman, p. 209.

²M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 313.

On June 21, the German press attacked France anew without motive and Paléologue remarked to Viviani: "Selon moi, la paix du monde n'a pas de plus forte garantie que la Triple-Entente."¹ With this thought in mind on June 26 Paléologue returned to his enormous task at St. Petersburg where on June²⁸ he received news of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria at Sarajevo.

Maurice Paléologue was destined to exert a powerful influence in St. Petersburg during the crisis following Sarajevo which led to the outbreak of the First World War. On July 15, Viviani, and President Poincaré left France for a state visit to Russia. Although Viviani supported the Franco-Russian Alliance and the three-year law he had neither the experience nor the authority to direct French foreign policy. In consequence Poincaré's position with respect to foreign policy was strong which led the pacifists to question the Russian visit at this dangerous juncture. Yet, in the face of Anglo-Russian differences in India and Persia, the French Government felt it necessary to strengthen its ties with Russia and to work for an Anglo-Russian naval agreement.

The French delegation, which also included de Margerie, the political director of the Quai d'Orsay, arrived in St. Petersburg on July 20. On their way to meet the French battleship carrying the presidential party, Paléologue, Sazonov,

¹M. Paléologue, Au Quai d'Orsay, p. 319.

Isvolsky and General Laguiche, Paléologue's military attaché, were invited aboard the imperial yacht to dine with the Tsar. In conversation with Paléologue, the Tsar enquired about his views on Germany. Paléologue replied: " I am uneasy, although at the moment I have no particular reason to anticipate a war in the immediate future. But the Emperor William and his Government have let Germany get into a state of mind such that if some dispute arose, in Morocco, the East - anywhere - they could neither give way nor compromise. A success is essential at any price and to obtain it they'll risk some adventure."¹ Paléologue added that he did not think the Emperor William would or could prevent war if it threatened.

The records of the Franco-Russian talks - if any were kept - have disappeared.² In his memoirs, Paléologue indicated the subjects that the Tsar and Poincaré discussed: "the strained relations between Greece and Turkey; the intrigues of the Bulgarian Government in the Balkans; the Prince of Wied's arrival in Albania; the application of the Anglo-Russian agreements in Persia; the political orientation of the Scandinavian States, etc. They concluded their review with the problem of the Austro-Serbian dispute, a problem which becomes more worrying every day owing to the arrogant and mysterious attitude of Austria."³ Poincaré believed that open ne-

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, I, p. 12.

²D.F.3, v, pp. vi-vii.

³M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, I, p. 15.
Paléologue intimates that he has not preserved any document on the subject among his personal papers, Albertini, II, p. 189.

gotiations among the Powers would alone preserve peace.

Paléologue sent only two relatively short dispatches concerning the Russian attitude toward the Sarajevo incident.¹ After July 20th his communications were less informative than they might have been. No word was sent to Paris by him about the Schilling-Carlotti conversations of July 16 when Schilling the Russian Head of Chancery was told by the Italian Ambassador that Austria was capable of making an irrevocable move against Serbia in the belief that Russia would do no more than make a verbal protest.² Similarly Paris did not hear that Nicolas Shebeko, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, had urged his country to warn Austria of the consequences of action against Serbia. Apparently Vienna intended such action in the belief that Russia would not intervene.³ De Margerie and his assistant director for European Affairs as the Quai d'Orsay saw that the situation might easily lead to war, a view shared by Jules Cambon⁴ in Berlin and Barrère⁵ in Italy. On July 22, acting Foreign Minister Bienvenu-Martin informed his colleagues in Russia of his anxiety. St. Petersburg society was in a state of high excitement at the prospect of war.

¹D.F.3,x,459. and D.F.3,x,477.

²Albertini, 11, p. 134.

³Ibid.

⁴D.F.3,x,538; D.F.3,x,539; D.F.3,x,551.

⁵D.F.3,x,546.

At a diplomatic reception, Poincaré gave the Austrian Ambassador, Szapary, a veiled warning: "With a little good will this Serbian business is easy to settle. But it can just as easily become acute. Serbia has some very warm friends in the Russian people. And Russia has an ally, France. There are plenty of complications to be feared!"¹ Afterwards Poincaré remarked to Paléologue: "I'm not satisfied with this conversation. The Ambassador had obviously been instructed to say nothing...Austria has a coup de théâtre in store for us. Sazonov must be firm and we must back him up..."² This last statement of Poincaré was ominous as it indicated the task Paléologue was to put first in Russia. It also gives rise to speculation as to whether Poincaré initiated the policy that Paléologue followed in Russia.

Poincaré's farewell toast evidently had the special effect of raising Russian spirits and cementing Franco-Russian relations. On Viviani's instructions Paléologue drew up a communique for the Havas Agency, the official oracle of French diplomacy, summing up the results of the visit in the usual "neutral and empty phraseology suitable for documents of this kind."³ The note read: "The visit which the President of the Republic has just paid to H.M. the Emperor of Russia has given

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, i, p. 19.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., i, p. 24.

the two friendly and allied governments an opportunity of discovering that they are in entire agreement in their views on the various problems which concern for peace and the balance of power in Europe has laid before the Powers, particularly in the East."¹ According to Buchanan, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, the results of the French state visit to Russia were: community of views, decision to take action at Vienna to prevent intervention in Serbia and the reaffirmation of the Alliance obligations of the two countries.² The visit had definitely stiffened the back of Russia and perhaps had given Sazonov greater courage.

The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was timed³ deliberately to arrive just before Poincaré left St. Petersburg on July 23. Sazonov's telegram to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna warning Austria against any action in Serbia arrived too late to affect Berchtold's decision. He refused to receive the Chargé until the morning of July 24.

As early as July 24, Sazonov, seeking to prevent war, asked Britain to make her position clear so that in case of war Germany would not think that she need only face France and Russia in conflict. At a dinner meeting called by Paléologue

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, i, p. 24.

²British Documents on the Origins of the War, x, 191.

³Albertini, ii, p. 195.

on July 24 for Sazonov, Buchanan, and Dianandy, the Rumanian Minister, Paléologue advocated a policy of firmness towards Austria. To Sazonov's objection that such a policy might lead to war, Paléologue answered, "It will only lead to war if the Germanic powers have already made up their minds to resort to force to secure the hegemony of the East. Firmness does not exclude conciliation. But it is essential for the other side to be prepared to negotiate and compromise. You know my own views as to Germany's designs. The Austrian ultimatum seems to me to provoke the dangerous crisis I have anticipated for a long time. Henceforth we must govern all our diplomatic action."¹ Buchanan's telegraphed account of the conversation indicates that Paléologue went further: "The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would not only give Russia strong diplomatic support but would, if necessary, fulfil all the obligations imposed on her by the alliance."² The effect of this affirmation from Russian shores and the repetition of it in succeeding days must have been great on Sazonov.

Buchanan could give no clear promise of British aid and according to Paléologue³ gave as the reason, the fact that

¹ M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, i, p. 31.

² B.D., x, 101.

³ M. Paléologue, "La Russie des Tsars Pendant la Grande Guerre", Revue des Deux Mondes, LXI (1921), 225-272.

the Conservative Party was not in power to look after the national interest. Later, in his published memoirs Paléologue describes Buchanan's reasons somewhat differently as "I'm afraid public opinion with us is still far from realizing what our national interests so imperiously require."¹ Buchanan reported "that the first thing to be done was to try to gain time by bringing our influence to bear to induce Austria to extend the term of delay accorded to Serbia. The French Ambassador replied that time did not permit this, either Austria was bluffing or had made up her mind to act at once. In either case a firm and united attitude was our only chance of averting war."²

On July 24 Sazonov received Paléologue after having a dispute with Pourtalés, the German Ambassador to Russia. Paléologue reported in his Memoirs³ that he had seen the excited Pourtalés emerge from Sazonov's cabinet and had commented to Sazonov after hearing his account of the dispute that, "If conversations between St. Petersburg and Berlin are to continue in this strain they won't last long. Very soon we shall see the Emperor William rise in his 'shining armour'. Please be calm. Exhaust every possibility of compromise! Don't forget that my Government is a government based on public opinion

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, i, p. 32.

²B.D., x, 101.

³M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, i, p. 33.

behind it....Can I give my Government an assurance that you have not yet ordered any military preparations? 'None whatever.'¹ There are, however, points of contradiction between Schilling's account and Paléologue's of the latter's meeting with Sazonov. Albertini² prefers to think Schilling's account the more reliable of the two in which case Paléologue stands accused of not keeping his government adequately or accurately informed of important happenings in Russia. In the first place, Schilling claims that as Paléologue was in Schilling's office at the time he could not have seen Pourtalés leave Sazonov's office. Furthermore, Paléologue had told Schilling that he:

considered the situation by no means hopeless. He founded his optimism on the supposition that Germany would scarcely decide to support Austria since she knew to what serious consequences this would inevitably lead at the present moment. 'Jamais nous n'avons été en meilleure posture', he said, 'car nous sommes parfaitement d'accord entre nous et ce n'est point là une appréciation d'Ambassadeur, mais nous avons documents récents de très grande importance qui l'attestent.' Baron Schilling...asked the Ambassador what was the nature of these four documents....It appeared that M. Paléologue regarded as such documents the speeches recently exchanged by the Emperor and the President of the French Republic at Peterhof and on board the battleship France. Immediately after the departure of Count Pourtalés, the French Ambassador was received by the Minister, who promptly informed him of the decisions come to by the Council of Ministers and also concerning his conversations with the Serbian Minister and the German Ambassador.³

If Schilling is correct Sazonov, instead of saying that his

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, 1, p. 33.

²Albertini, 11, p. 302.

³Baron Moritz Fabianovich Schilling, How the War Began in 1914 (London, 1925), p. 32.

Government had made no military preparations, had informed Paléologue of the Cabinet decision to accept in principle a partial mobilization but Paléologue had telegraphed no inkling of this to Paris. Partial mobilization against Austria to safeguard Serbia from attack, although in keeping with French and British interests, was the idea of Sazonov who did not realize the technical impossibility of such a move. The new Chief of the Russian General Staff, Janushkevich, did not know it either since he was not yet familiar with the Russian mobilization plan which had been designed in 1892 to effect a general mobilization for a war on two fronts.

In the afternoon of July 25, Sazonov had a talk with Buchanan and Paléologue and informed them of the measures that the Tsar had approved that morning, including the mobilization of one million men when the Foreign Minister deemed it necessary. The General Staff had begun the 'pre-mobilization period' or 'period preparatory to war', a preparatory program for the smooth mobilization of the army and navy on the frontiers as approved by the Tsar on March 2, 1913.¹ At 6.22 p.m. Paléologue telegraphed Paris the news that the Russian Council of Ministers had that morning decided to mobilize the thirteen army corps destined to operate against Austria. The telegram concluded: "Les préparatifs clandestins commenceront néanmoins dès aujourd'hui."² The secret preparations meant the 'pre-

¹Albertini, II, p. 305.

²D.F., XI, 50.

mobilization period".

Sazonov urged Buchanan to have Britain take her place beside France and Russia. "The French Ambassador remarked that French Government would want to know at once whether our fleet was prepared to play the part assigned to it by Anglo-French Naval Convention. He could not believe that England would not stand by her two friends, who were acting as one in this matter."¹ Buchanan telegraphed London that Sazonov claimed that Russia had no aggressive intentions and would take no action unless it were forced upon her and that

Paléologue "had received a number of telegrams from Minister in charge of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that no one of them displayed slightest sign of hesitation, and that he was in position to give his Excellency formal assurance that France placed herself unreservedly on Russia's side."²

In the late afternoon of July 25, Paléologue spoke to the Italian Ambassador Carlotti in his characteristic realistic manner.* He confided:

that the Council of Ministers this forenoon had taken decisions on the necessary directives and measures to be put into force in the war against Austria and Germany, now regarded as imminent. He added that France was ready to fulfil her duty as an ally to the full. To my query whether he thought the situation hopeless he answered that in his opinion the dispute presented itself no longer exclusively as between Austria and Serbia but

¹B.D. xi, 125 (In raising this question the French Ambassador was acting without instruction from his Government. He was only with characteristic impulsiveness giving expression to his own personal view. Introduction, p. xii).

²B.D. xi, 125.

*Albertini says in this instance that Paléologue lost control of his language. Albertini, ii, p. 308.

between Germany and Russia and that the attitude of the Vienna Cabinet, impervious to all idea of conciliation, indicated its firm decision to provoke war. To my extremely emphatic objections he answered that the facts would confirm his statements, but that the Triple Entente, although convinced of the uselessness of its endeavours will do everything possible to avert a European catastrophe, or at least to make it clear on whom the terrible responsibility rests. Paléologue ended with the remark that the only gleam of hope left comes from London and Rome where perhaps an effort is being made to use their great influence in Berlin in order to make an attempt at mediation for the preservation of peace.¹

At 7 o'clock, July 25 when he said goodbye to Isvolsky who was returning to his diplomatic post in Paris, Paléologue in agreement with Isvolsky concluded, "It is war this time."² He became more and more certain of the impending war as the days went on. Questioned by Sazonov as to the possibility of still saving the peace, he replied, "If we had only Austria to deal with I should be hopeful... But there is Germany. She has promised her ally a great personal triumph. She is convinced that we dare not resist her to the bitter end and that the Triple Alliance /Entente/ will give way as it has always given way. But this time we cannot give way, on pain of ceasing to exist. We shall not avert war."³

Then on July 27 he recorded in his diary:

My reflections were utterly pessimistic. Whatever I did to fight them they always brought me back to the one conclusion - war. The hour for combinations and diplomatic artifices had gone. Compared with the underlying and remote causes

¹ Albertini, *ibid.*, p. 508.

² M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, *ibid.*, p. 35.

³ Ibid., *ibid.*, p. 37.

which have produced the present crisis the incidents of the last days were nothing. Individual initiative existed no longer; there was no longer any human will capable of withstanding the automatic mechanism of the forces let loose. We diplomats had lost all influence on the course of events. All we could do was to try and forecast them and insist on our governments regulating their action accordingly.¹

From agency telegrams, however, he noticed that public spirit was high in France though rapidly exasperated in Russia where Sazonov managed to restrain the press until July 27 and then allowed them to attack Austria while requesting moderation toward Germany.

On July 28, Paléologue and Sazonov again met in conference and the account of Paléologue and Sazonov is again contradicted by Schilling's. Paléologue relates that at 3 p.m. he went to the Russian Foreign Office where Buchanan was in conference with Sazonov and that upon meeting Pourtalés there had a heated conversation with him. When Buchanan left Sazonov Paléologue accompanied him desiring to see Sazonov after he had received Pourtalés and Szapary. He said that he sent his card in to Sazonov a quarter of an hour later. In reality, Albertini² claims, Paléologue did not see Sazonov until after 4 p.m. since Sazonov's talks with the other ambassadors must have occupied more than an hour and then, according to Paléologue's account, he asked Sazonov to pledge himself to accept all proposals that France and England might

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, 1, p. 38.

²Albertini, II, pp. 537-538.

make to save the peace and after insistence Sazonov agreed. Paléologue said that he would wire the information to Paris immediately. There is no record of such a telegram in the French diplomatic documents. A telegram of a similar nature does appear in the Yellow Book for July 29: "Dès maintenant, je suis en mesure d'assurer à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement russe acquiesce en principe à toutes les procédures que la France et l'Angleterre lui proposeront pour sauvgarder la paix."¹ But this telegram cannot have any connection with the conversation of the 28th since it was despatched at 1.22 p.m. on the 28th before the conversation took place, and was the reply to a communication from Bienvenu-Martin³ informing Paléologue of Sir Edward Grey's proposal for joint action by England, Germany, France and Italy at Vienna, Belgrade and St. Petersburg for the suppression of military activities until the Ambassadors of Germany, Italy, France and England studied possible solutions. The telegram sent by Paléologue on the evening of July 28 gave no indication of Sazonov's undertaking of the afternoon conference to accept all proposals that France and England might make to secure peace: "M. Sazonoff a reçu cet après-midi les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Autriche-Hongrie; l'impression qu'il a gardée de son double entretien est mauvaise. 'Décidément, m'a-t-il dit,

¹D.F.3,x1,192.

²D.F.3,x1,123,145.

l'Autriche ne veut pas causer'. Je remporte la même impression d'une conversation que je viens d'avoir avec mes deux collègues."¹

Paléologue mentioned the fact that he was in a peculiar position without proper communication with the heads of the French Government who were at sea and therefore without a full knowledge of French affairs. That Paléologue could not receive any instructions was not completely true for he did receive a telegram probably on the afternoon of the 28th sent from aboard the France by Viviani on the 27th day of July. But communications were difficult and unreliable and those aboard the France because of their incomplete knowledge were not in the best position to give instructions. As Ambassador, Paléologue had a duty to act in the best manner he saw fit and to apply the instructions that he received in the light of circumstances. Viviani's telegram was not to be considered divisible in its meaning according to Poincaré though Paléologue treated it as such. It read: "Veuillez dire à M. Sazonoff que la France, appréciant comme la Russie la haute importance qui s'attache pour les deux pays à affirmer leur parfaite entente au regard des autres Puissances et à ne négliger aucun effort en vue de la solution du conflit, est prête

¹D.F. 3, xi, 208.

²Poincaré, Raymond, The Memoirs of Raymond Poincaré (London, 1926-1930) iv, p. 385.

à seconder entièrement, dans l'intérêt de la paix générale, l'action du Gouvernement impérial".¹ On the afternoon of July 28 according to Schilling Paléologue explained the telegram to Sazonov as: "On the instructions of his Government the French Ambassador acquainted the Foreign Minister with the complete readiness of France to fulfil her obligations as an ally in case of necessity."² That Paléologue made such a statement is not recorded in his memoirs but Schilling does not seem to have any reason for lying. Then again Sazonov's telegram of July 29 assumes such a statement by Paléologue for it reads "...at the same time conveying our sincere gratitude for the declaration, which the French Ambassador made to me in his Government's name, that we may count in full measure on the support of France under the alliance. In the present circumstances this declaration is of essential value to us."³

What moved Paléologue to give this important assurance of French support to Sazonov and thereby perhaps give him the confidence to take the course of mobilization was probably the news of Austria's declaration of war on Serbia which Albertini estimates must have reached Sazonov by 4 p.m. July 28, that is before Paléologue spoke with Sazonov. This declaration of war was probably the real subject of their

¹D.F.3,xi,138.

²Schilling, p. 43.

³Albertini,ii,p. 538.

conference and accounts for Sazonov's excitement and nervousness which Paléologue describes. Sazonov, no doubt, took the Austrian declaration as meaning a general European war and therefore decided not to follow his original plan of mobilizing only after the Austrian troops had crossed into Serbian territory but to mobilize immediately. Paléologue had always foreseen a general European war brought on by German machinations and probably at this time gave the alleged affirmation of full French support.

Paléologue's action is readily understandable and though condemned by many is a significant example of the professional diplomat acting as he thought best in a given situation. Given his conditions for accepting the Embassy in the first place and the program he outlined before taking it, the firm support that he gave Russia is intelligible. In the diplomatic situation in which he found himself, Paléologue believed that France had excellent reasons for backing Russia -- her very survival would be threatened without the support of Russia. The French Government, however, instead of shouldering the responsibility of backing Russia and thus endorsing the assurances given Russia by Paléologue tried to cover up her Ambassador's actions by publishing and editing certain telegrams which thence did not square with the Russian and British records. "The result is that the French Government comes to the point of admitting that its Ambassador, far from

working for peace, actually fanned the flames of war."¹ Albertini concludes that "Paléologue's conduct during the July crisis is attested by too many documents from other hands, too many acts and silences of his own, not to stand out clearly as exercising a decisive influence."²

France undoubtedly had the strongest right of any power to restrain Russia from mobilizing since she would be involved in such a measure by the alliance. France would have to adhere to the terms of the alliance in any event for her own safety but she could urge prudence on Russia if she were taking a false step. Poincaré however, had reaffirmed French support of Russia and Paléologue, placed in a special position of responsibility in the absence of the foreign minister from the Quai d'Orsay, followed up Poincaré's policy and urged Sazonov to adopt a firm policy.

If Schilling is to be believed, Paléologue was informed of the Russian Cabinet's decision and probably Sazonov's intention of laying both an order for partial and an order for general mobilization before the Tsar for approval on July 29. If he was informed of the mobilization orders as there is good reason to believe that he was, Paléologue did not telegraph this important information to Paris but indicated that he thought general mobilization near by sending the

¹Albertini, II, p. 538.

²Ibid.

following telegram at 7.35 p.m. on July 28: "Il est convenu qu'en cas de mobilisation générale deux officiers sont désignés pour être envoyés à mon ambassade. Je demande éventuellement MM. de Ridder et de Sèze. Ils devraient rejoindre par Christiania et Stockholm."¹

The behaviour of Paléologue on July 29 is not readily understandable. In his memoirs he remarks that, "Yesterday evening the Austro-Hungarian Government ordered the general mobilization of the army."² * This was made to appear as the reason for the Russian decision on general mobilization taken on the 29th by the Tsar. Paléologue³ further relates that at 11 p.m. on July 29 Nicholas Basili, Deputy-Director of the Chancery of the Russian Foreign Office, told him that the Russian Government had ordered the mobilization of thirteen army corps earmarked for operations against Austria-Hungary and the secret commencement of general mobilization. This was not, of course, the complete truth for general mobilization had been ordered the morning of the 29th by the Tsar and only the same evening cancelled in favour of partial mobilization. Even when on July 30 at 5 p.m. the order of general mobilization was officially promulgated, Paléologue reported to

¹D.F.3.xi,216.

²M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, i, pp.41-42.

³Ibid.

*Austria did not decree general mobilization until 5 p.m., July 31, 1914.

Paris at 9.15 p.m. only that,"...Le Gouvernement russe a résolu de procéder secrètement aux mesures de mobilisation générale."¹

Either Sazonov deliberately misled Paléologue or Paléologue for some reason was not keeping Paris correctly informed as was his duty. Sazonov might have informed Paléologue of the mobilization in vague terms but it would be difficult to explain why he would deliberately mislead Paléologue for, in case of mobilization by Austria or Italy, Article II of the Franco-Russian Military Agreement required previous agreement before action was to be taken. It was to this article that Paléologue alluded in his conversation with Basili in which he warned him that no action should be taken by Russia without the consultation of the French General Staff. His insistence on this point was not too strong, however, from all appearances nor did he repeat the warning to Sazonov on the 30th when general mobilization was ordered. Sazonov by deliberately misleading Paléologue and thus France would have given France the option of adhering to the alliance or not. Yet in view of the firm backing of France given all along by Paléologue, Sazonov may have considered it advisable for strategic reasons and timing not to inform France and thus because the telegraph lines passed through Germany the Triple Alliance of his act until it was a fait accompli. But Sazonov

¹D.F.3,x1,359.

had no other reason for deceiving Paléologue with whom he was on closer terms than with any other ambassador and who had supported him throughout.

Paléologue's very silence in the face of accusations against him seems to testify to his being kept informed and to his not keeping Paris informed. Paléologue tacitly admits that he knew general mobilization had been ordered on the 29th by this statement in his memoirs: "The Tsar Nicholas had received a personal telegram from the Emperor William this evening and decided to suspend general mobilization..."¹ But instead of informing Paris of the suspension of general mobilization or even of its promulgation in the first place, Paléologue allowed the original incomplete telegram to stand. He had sent a secretary of the French Embassy on July 30 to telegraph a report of the Russian Government's decision to mobilize thirteen army corps against Austria and secretly to commence general mobilization. At Basili's suggestion the message was to be sent by the Russian cipher code which was more difficult to decode than the French code. As the message was being encoded, Basili and the French Military Attaché brought news to the secretary that the general mobilization order had been cancelled. Therefore with Sazonov's approval the secretary left the part about the secret general mobilization out of the telegram. The Russian generals, however, continued

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, 1, p. 43.

tourge general mobilization on the Tsar. Though the result of a Russian general mobilization probably would be German mobilization and war, Paléologue did not inform Paris, to which the heads of the French Government had by this time returned, of the serious events in Russia and did not seek instructions.

In the morning of July 30 Viviani, the French Foreign Minister, unaware of how close Russia had been to general mobilization wired the following instructions to Paléologue:

Comme je vous l'ai indiqué dans mon télégramme du 27 de ce mois, le Gouvernement de la République est décidé à ne négliger aucun effort en vue de la solution du conflit et à second-er l'action du Gouvernement impérial dans l'intérêt de la paix générale. La France est, d'autre part, résolue à remplir toutes les obligations de l'alliance. Mais, dans l'intérêt même de la paix générale et étant donné qu'une conversation est engagée entre les Puissances moins intéressées, je crois qu'il serait opportun que, dans les mesures de précaution et de défense auxquelles la Russie croit devoir procéder, elle ne prenne immédiatement aucune disposition qui offrirait à l'Allemagne un prétexte pour une mobilisation totale ou partielle de ses forces.¹

Viviani tried too late to exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg. In the evening of July 31, Schoen, the German Ambassador to France, called on Viviani with an ultimatum from Berlin to the effect that if the Russian mobilization was not stopped immediately Germany would mobilize too. Viviani immediately wired Paléologue for information on the reality of the Russian mobilization.²

¹ D.F.3, xi, 305.

² D.F.3, xi, 438.

The difficult situation in which France found herself is well described by Poincaré:

On us rested two duties, difficult to reconcile but equally sacred: to do our utmost to prevent a conflict, to do our utmost in order that, should it burst forth in spite of us, we should be prepared. And there were still two other duties which, also, at the time ran the risk of being mutually contradictory; not to break up an alliance on which French policy has been based for a quarter of a century, and the break up of which would leave us in isolation at the mercy of our rivals; and nevertheless to do what lay in our power to induce our ally to exercise moderation in matters in which we are much less directly concerned than herself.¹

This was, in essence, the task that Paléologue himself outlined upon taking over the Russian Embassy from Delcassé. France could not advise Russia in such a way as to lead her to accept another humiliation.

On July 30 Paléologue met with Sazonov and allegedly learned what had occurred on the night of the 29th. In view of the general mobilization order having been cancelled he did not complain to Sazonov that Article II of the Franco-Russian Military Convention had not been followed. Sazonov, however, finally obtained a general mobilization order from the Tsar at 5 p.m. July 30. Paléologue on information of the Russian General Staff had sent a telegram to Paris at midnight July 29 advising that the general mobilization of the German Army would be ordered on July 30.² Buchanan was much more correct and specific than Paléologue in wiring his Government

¹Poincaré, iv, p. 438.

²D.F. 3, xi, 302.

that the "Russian Government, Minister for Foreign Affairs told us, had absolute proof of military and naval preparations being made by Germany against Russia more especially in the direction of the Gulf of Finland."¹ Paléologue, unlike Buchanan, did not mention that partial mobilization had been ordered in case Austria did not accept Sazonov's peace formula. Also, instead of crediting Pourtalés with pleading with Sazonov to draft a formula for peace, Paléologue made it appear that the Tsar was making a last proposal for peace. France, however, was informed of the truth of Pourtalés' initiative in the peace plan by Isvolsky. Consequently Margerie sent a telegram to Paléologue:

Je dois vous signaler que M. Isvolsky m'a, de son côté, fait connaître la proposition russe, mais en indiquant qu'elle s'est produite à la suite d'une demande insistante de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Pétersbourg pour connaître les conditions auxquelles le Gouvernement russe arrêterait ses préparatifs militaires.

Quoi qu'il en soit, au cas où, comme il se peut, les conditions formulées par M. Sazonoff ne paraîtraient pas, dans leur teneur actuelle, acceptables à l'Autriche, il vous appartiendrait, en vous tenant en étroit contact avec M. Sazonoff, et sans contre-carrer la tentative anglaise, de rechercher avec lui telle formule qui paraîtrait pouvoir fournir une base de conversation et d'accommodement.²

Two more telegrams were sent by Paléologue to Paris on July 30 at 4.30 p.m. and 4.31 p.m. One read, "Le bombardement de Belgrade provoque dans toute la Russie la plus vive émotion. Les efforts modérateurs du Gouvernement impérial

¹E.D.3,xi,302.

²D.F.3,xi,349.

risquent d'en être paralysés."¹

The second telegram read:

Ce matin même, j'ai recommandé à M. Sazonoff d'éviter toute mesure militaire qui pourrait offrir à l'Allemagne un prétexte à la mobilisation générale.

Il m'a répondu que, dans le cours de la nuit dernière, l'Etat-major général russe avait précisément fait surseoir à quelques précautions secrètes dont la divulgation aurait pu alarmer l'Etat-major allemand.

Hier, le chef d'Etat-major général russe l'a convoqué et lui a donné sa parole d'honneur que la mobilisation qui a été ordonnée ce matin vise exclusivement l'Autriche.²

In the latter telegram Paléologue deceived his Government by not giving them the full facts of the situation in Russia.

He did not mention that the Russian General Staff wanted general mobilization nor disclose a hint of the general mobilization order which he referred to as certain secret precautions.

Such serious deception on the part of an ambassador is inexcusable. He did not receive Viviani's telegram³ until late in the afternoon so if he had recommended to Sazonov to avoid military measures it was on his own initiative. More likely just as the second half of his second telegram is untrue so

also is his peaceful recommendation to Sazonov especially since Buchanan makes no mention of such important statements by Paléologue. What he did tell Sazonov after receiving Viviani's telegram was not what Viviani intended but that "France is determined to meet all obligations of the alliance."⁴

¹D.F.3,x1,340.

²D.F.3,x1,342.

³D.F.3,x1,305.

⁴M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, 1, pp. 45-46.

He carried out only part of Viviani's instructions and then only after the general mobilization had been ordered. Perhaps Paléologue saw that it was too late to moderate Russia's action and therefore gave full French support as the only course left in the best interests of France.

Sazonov met the Tsar the afternoon of July 30 and in the account of the meeting given by Paléologue¹ the general mobilization order is said to have been given at 4 o'clock. Paléologue telegraphed Viviani at 7.40 p.m. asking instructions whether he was to invite members of the French territorial and reserve forces resident in Russia to return to France and advance them travelling expenses when he received news of French mobilization. The telegram indicates that Paléologue thought Russian mobilization not too distant. At 9.15 p.m. he sent Viviani another telegram:

Dans un entretien qu'il a eu cet après-midi avec le comte Pourtalès, M. Sazonoff a dû se convaincre que l'Allemagne ne veut pas prononcer à Vienne la parole décisive qui sauvegarderait la paix.

Secret - L'Empereur Nicolas garde la même impression d'un échange de télégrammes qu'il vient d'avoir personnellement avec l'Empereur Guillaume. D'autre part, l'Etat et l'Amirauté russes ont reçu d'inquiétants renseignements sur les préparatifs de l'armée et de la marine allemandes.

En conséquence le Gouvernement russe a résolu de procéder secrètement aux premières mesures de mobilisation générale.

En m'informant de cette décision, M. Sazonoff a ajouté que le Gouvernement russe ne continue pas moins ses efforts de conciliation. Il m'a répété: "Jusqu'au dernier instant je négocierai."²

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, I, pp. 45-46.

²D.F. 3, XI, 359.

The Quai d'Orsay received this telegram with little excitement for the mobilization reported was only the first measure of general mobilization and since it was to be secret Germany would not be aroused. Paléologue kept Paris in the dark by not indicating explicitly that general mobilisation had been ordered by Russia.

Only on July 31 at 10.43 am. did Paléologue send a telegram to Paris clearly indicating the truth: "La mobilisation générale de l'armée russe est ordonnée."¹ This telegram did not arrive in Paris until 8.30 p.m. on July 31.

There was a considerable lapse of time between the issue of the general mobilization order about 5 p.m. on July 30 and the arrival of Paléologue's news of it in Paris the following day. The explanation given by him² is not complete.

Paléologue claims that he received news of the general mobilization order at 6 a.m. July 31 when the proclamation was posted in the streets. After sending his Military Attaché to Staff Headquarters to check whether the order were operative for the whole Empire he sent the telegram by messenger to the post office at 8.30 a.m. But the messenger found the post office in an uproar as the military were taking it over and returned with the telegram to the Embassy at 9.30 a.m.

¹D.F.3, xi, 432.

²Albertini, ii, p. 622 (information from the French weekly Vu of March 15, 1933.).

To avoid further delays and to avoid the risks of sending the telegram via Berlin, Paléologue sent it by the Scandinavian lines, a very complicated route which explains its late arrival in Paris. Why he did not send it via Berlin is not clear for the mobilization order was general knowledge at the time. But more important, Paléologue contradicts his own diary in making out that he first learned of the general mobilization when the order was posted in the streets of St. Petersburg for his account of Sazonov's meeting with the Tsar on the 30th shows that he received information of the mobilization on the 30th. If Sazonov had misled him on that date Paléologue does not say so. Albertini¹ explains that both Sazonov and Paléologue were surprised by the notices in the street for Sazonov thought that mobilization could be carried out secretly and apparently had led Paléologue to believe this also. That Sazonov was aware of Paléologue's actions in not keeping his Government fully informed, if not in league with him, is apparent from the fact that he did not inform Isvolsky in Paris of the general mobilization order of the 30th and Isvolsky telegraphed Sazonov that he did not believe the news of it in the telegram from the Havas Agency.

The responsibility of Paléologue in the July crisis is readily apparent. The lack of adequate instruction from the French Foreign Minister who besides being inexperienced

¹Albertini, II, p. 624.

was out of touch with events on his way back to France from Russia, left Paléologue as the sole exponent of French views in St. Petersburg at that crucial time. Paléologue acted as he thought best in giving Russia full French support and affirming the alliance in keeping with the program and conditions that he had outlined upon accepting the Russian post. That he failed to keep Paris accurately informed is also apparent and inexcusable for a professional diplomat. What is not readily apparent is whether Paléologue was acting on his own initiative or following the instructions of Poincaré. The lack of minutes for the St. Petersburg discussions of the Franco-Russian delegates of July 20-23 makes it difficult to determine what arrangements might have been made at that time. That Paléologue and Poincaré knew each other's views and were generally in agreement is known but neither subsequently gave an explanation of the 1914 crisis. It would appear, however, that Paléologue followed a personal course of action in implementing his original instructions in what he thought were the best interests of France.

VIII

FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA

1914-1917

On August 1, Count Pourtalés presented the German declaration of war against Russia to Sazonov, and King George of England's plea to the Tsar to continue conciliation efforts arrived by telegram shortly afterwards. On August 1, the general mobilization of the French army was ordered, of which Paléologue learned at 2 a.m. the morning of August 2, 1914. Commenting in his diary, Paléologue writes: "So the die is cast! The part played by reason in the government of nations is so small that it has only taken a week to let loose world madness! I do not know - history will judge the diplomatic operation in which I have just been concerned with Sazonov and Buchanan; but all three of us have a right to claim that we have conscientiously done everything in our power to save the peace of the world without, however, sacrificing to it those two other and still more precious possessions, the independence and honour of our countries."¹ This emphasis on independence and honour helps to make Paléologue's role in the 1914 crisis understandable. The honour of Russia was at stake in the Balkans and in Europe generally since Austria-Hungary's stand allowed no face-saving device.

Paléologue saw that France would need Russian support in the event of any war with Germany and therefore aimed to do all that was necessary to retain Russian support for France.

Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch was provisionally appointed generalissimo on August 3, 1914 as the Tsar reserved the right to take personal command when the time was appropriate.¹ The Tsar actually wanted to take command of the armies immediately but his advisers insisted that this would damage his authority and prestige as a Russian retreat was visualized in the early days of the war. This same day, Germany declared war on France and the following day, the 4th, England declared war on Germany. On August 6 Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia alleging her attitude in the Austro-Serbian dispute as the reason. Paléologue observed that the Russians viewed the war as "a duel to the death between Slavism and Germanism",² that the Russian people did not want war and were surprised when it occurred.

Paléologue tried to convince the Italian Ambassador to Russia, the Marquis Carlotti de Riparbella, that the crisis offered Italy the opportunity of realizing her national aspirations if she joined the Entente Powers who were destined to win the war.

It did not appear that Bulgaria would join the Entente

¹He assumed personal command on September 5, 1915.

²M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, i, p. 65.

Powers. Paléologue, drawing on his considerable knowledge of Bulgaria, observed that Tsar Ferdinand was subject to great vanity and hatred and that Serbia, Rumania and Russia were all objects of his hatred. Russia was such an object of hatred because she had supported Serbia and Rumania against Bulgaria in 1913 and because of an obsession of Ferdinand's that Russia hated his people. Paléologue believed that Ferdinand suffered from psychic disturbances but was dangerous because he served his ambitions and hatreds with great skill and an astute mind.¹

The main task of Paléologue in Russia during the war was to coordinate the efforts of France and Russia, particularly in maintaining the pressure of the Russian armies on the German eastern front in order to prevent the massing of overwhelming German forces on the western front thereby threatening France's existence in the early stages of the war. He had to persist in asking for Russian offensives on the eastern front to relieve the French lines in the west though Russia was not prepared for any great offensive thrust. Her one great attempt of August 28-30 ended in disaster. Paléologue had to try to keep the Russian war effort and spirit at a high pitch even against the influence of such men as Count Witte, who condemned the war, and Rasputin, who favoured the Germans. More elusive, but still a powerful force for

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, 1, p. 74.

Paléologue to reckon with, was the susceptibility of the Russians to superstition and the possibility of it harming the soldiers' morale. One of these potent superstitions was that the Tsar was doomed to disasters as indicated by the Manchurian defeat, the revolution that followed, and the political assassinations which were rife.

Paléologue became bent on doing all that he could to hasten and guarantee an allied success. His activities in Russia during the period 1914-1917 were then concentrated on keeping Russia in the war while giving her the best cooperation possible from France, maintaining her accord with France, maintaining and even adding members such as the Balkan nations to the Allied alliance and to this end he urged Russia to remove her differences with the Balkan powers. A strong alliance of powers was necessary to defeat the Austro-German-Italian combination. Similarly he tried to prevent countries such as Bulgaria from joining the enemy. Yet he also sought every means to gain peace as soon as possible though not before the Allied war aims had been obtained.

On September 5, 1914 agreement was reached in London on a declaration whereby France, England and Russia agreed not to make peace separately. Such a declaration had been part of the Franco-Russian Military Convention of 1892 but the addition of England to the Alliance required a new declaration. German militarism was to be destroyed once and for all.

Alsace and Lorraine were to be restored to France; Poland was to be restored; Belgium enlarged; Schleswig returned to Denmark, Bohemia freed and the German colonies divided among France, England, Belgium and others.

To Sazonov, Paléologue suggested that Russia organize an intelligence service in the socialist centres of Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz, and Breslau to keep informed about public opinion, for Paléologue thought that it would be the German Socialists who would force the military caste to make peace. Paléologue even pondered the idea of helping the Socialists begin a revolution, a thought which horrified Sazonov who emphatically declared that Russia would never use such a weapon.

On January 1, 1915 Paléologue made a personal suggestion to Sazonov that they should try to detach Austria-Hungary from Germany by any and every force of persuasion since the German bloc was so strong. "I believe we should succeed in a very short time. The Emperor Francis Joseph is very old; we know he bitterly regrets this war and only asks to be allowed to die in peace. You have beaten his armies in Galicia again and again; the Serbs have just won a brilliant victory at Valievo; Rumania threatens and Italy is doubtful. The Hapsburg Monarchy was in no greater peril in 1859 and 1866 yet the same Francis Joseph then accepted serious territorial sacrifices to save his crown."¹ He then asked Sazonov whether

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, I, p. 256.

he would make a separate peace with Austria-Hungary if she were to cede Galicia to Russia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia. Sazonov said that he could not leave Bohemia and Croatia under Austria-Hungary but Paléologue insisted that in such a critical time for France the Czech and Yugo-Slav problems seemed secondary. Sazonov refused. Paléologue reported the conversation to Delcassé, who was once again French Foreign Minister, explaining the obvious advantages to France of the Danube basin being preserved. Delcassé replied by telegram on January 9 that Paléologue was "not to say a word which might lead the Russian Government to think that we do not hand over Austria-Hungary to Russia in toto."¹ Paléologue was dismayed for he knew then that the war would be a very long one.

Paléologue sought to aid the Russian war effort as much as possible. On February 23, 1915 as the German offensive pressed hard on the Russians who were weary and short of ammunition, the Grand Duke Nicholas informed Paléologue that he would be glad to see the French Army take the offensive in order to prevent the transfer of German forces to the eastern front. Paléologue forwarded his request to France with the reminder that Russia had sacrificed an army on August 29, 1914 to relieve pressure on France. General Joffre then ordered a vigorous attack in Champagne. Similarly with Delcassé's approval, Paléologue gave the French Government's support to the

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, I, p. 236.

Tsar's desire to have the question of Constantinople and the Straits settled in accordance with Russian wishes. He outlined to the Emperor also France's plans in Syria, Cilicia, and Palestine.

It was pointed out by Grand Duke Nicholas that it was necessary to gain the cooperation of Rumania and Italy for the allied cause or the war would be prolonged with great risks. Paléologue informed him that Delcassé was already trying to gain them as allies but Russia's claim to Constantinople and the Straits made the task difficult. Since the Russian army was facing a crisis, he advised Sazonov to come to some agreement quickly with Rumania about the possible conditions of alliance with the Entente powers.

Italy finally overcame the intrigues of Giolitti and declared war on Austria-Hungary on May 23, 1915 but in June the negotiations of the allies with Serbia, Rumania, Greece, and Bulgaria were no further ahead as their conflicting demands were insoluble. The retreat of the Russian armies had deprived the Entente powers of much prestige. In July it appeared that Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria had been won over by the German powers. Nevertheless Paléologue, who was aware that this step would be detrimental to the allies' cause, still hoped to win Ferdinand to Russia since he had always been so crafty and elastic in mind. Therefore he insisted that everything possible should be done to win the Bulgarian ruler to the Allied cause.

By September 21 it was learned that Bulgaria was mobilizing and concentrating for an attack on Serbia. Paléologue urged that Serbia should not wait to be attacked but should attack Bulgaria immediately but Sazonov was hopeful of preventing any hostilities. Paléologue, knowing Tsar Ferdinand better than Sazonov, argued:

that hostilities cannot be prevented now; that Bulgaria's game has long been too obvious; the only effect of diplomatic action would be to give the Bulgarian army time to mobilize and concentrate and that the Serbians are lost unless they take advantage of the fact that the road to Sofia will still be open to them for some days yet. I ended up by declaring that to support the operations of the Serbians the Russian fleet must bombard Burgas and Varna.¹

Sazonov was determined not to have Serbia attack the Bulgarian army before it had obviously begun an offensive because Bulgaria was of the same faith and blood as Russia which had fostered its independence. Paléologue telegraphed Delcassé:

I have some difficulty in following M. Sazonov's point of view. A swift invasion of Bulgarian territory by the Serbian army would create a huge sensation in Germany and Austria - and in Turkey, Greece and Rumania. The salvation of Bulgaria no longer concerns us. If we can obtain a swift and easy success at her expense, it is our duty to do so. It is no longer a question of the Balkan balance of power and historical memories. Victory before anything else!²

The Russian Government proposed sending an inoffensive note to Bulgaria threatening to break off relations if she did not revoke her mobilization decree and cooperate with the Allied

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, II, p. 81.

²Ibid., II, p. 82.

Powers against Turkey. Paléologue protested that to send such a note was futile, but Sir Edward Grey wanted to water it down further. Paléologue thereupon telegraphed Delcassé:

This policy of Sir Edward Grey's seems to me an illusion. Are we going to make the same mistake with Bulgaria that we made with Turkey, a mistake we have not finished paying for? Cannot Sir Edward Grey see that the Germans are getting a firmer grip on Bulgaria every day, and that they will soon be master there? Is he credulous enough to believe in the pacifist professions of King Ferdinand? Does he propose to refrain from action at Sofia until the Bulgarian army has completed its concentration, and the German officers have taken over their commands? It has pleased Germany to make war on us on Bulgarian territory. It is now in our power to inflict an immediate reverse upon her on that very territory. And here we are still talking.¹

At the request of the French President and in view of Bulgaria's intentions toward Serbia, the Tsar finally agreed to send a Russian contingent to the aid of Serbia by Archangel and to have the Black Sea Squadron bombard the forts of Varna and Burgas. Meanwhile in France on October 13, 1915 Delcassé, because of disagreement with his colleagues in the Council of Ministers, resigned and Briand became the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Bulgarians, taking advantage of the time given them, concentrated their forces, took the offensive and drove the Serbians back at all points.

The British Government now concluded that the Dardanelles and Macedonia were lost and that the troops should be withdrawn to Syria to protect Egypt. The French Government, however, disagreed. Though admitting that the Dardanelles

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, II, p. 85.

were now of no use, Briand thought it wrong to evacuate Salonica and send the troops to Syria for "in a war in which attrition is one of the main elements of the ultimate result, we should be making an enormous mistake to lose thousands of men in fighting Arabs and Turks while Germany husband her own resources with a view to undertaking a decisive operation on the western front at a favourable moment."¹ Paléologue was commissioned to win the Russian Government over to the French views. He pointed out:

If we evacuate Salonica, Greece and Rumania will be without support against German pressure and will immediately take sides against us. The Serbians, seeing themselves abandoned, will lose heart and make their submission to the Teutonic empires. Bulgaria, too, will have no further obstacle to the satisfaction of her territorial appetite: she won't be satisfied with the annexation of Macedonia, but will go further and dismember Serbia. For all these reasons we must hold Salonica even at the cost of the heaviest sacrifices.²

Sazonov was persuaded and agreed to try to secure agreement from London.

Meanwhile the pressure of the German forces on France led her to seek the aid of Russian contingents, an unrealistic request in Paléologue's opinion and Paléologue was pressed to keep cordial relations between the two countries. Senator Doumer of France arrived in Petrograd December 4, 1915 on an official mission to persuade Russia to let France draw on her resources of men and to send 400,000 men to bring the French

¹ M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, ii, p. 119.

² Ibid.

armies on the western front up to strength with transport to begin by January 10, 1916. Paléologue objected that there were too many difficulties in such a request. Apart from the difficulties of transport with the White Sea and Archangel blocked by ice and the consequent necessity of constructing long lines of communication across the ice, there were no ships adapted as troop-carriers available. When Doumer thought that these difficulties could be surmounted, Paléologue revealed that the man-power question was just as critical in Russia as in France though for different reasons. The great reservoirs of men in Russia could only be effective if they were trained and Russian military training was extremely slow. Paléologue also warned that once the Russian soldier was transplanted from Russian to foreign soil he became useless because he did not have the intelligence or education to understand the common interests existing among and uniting the allies. Finally Paléologue objected that the tactical differences between French and Russian military methods would make it difficult for Russian conscripts to be effective in France, for in battle Russians attached small importance to ground and retired to less exposed positions when pressed. Retreats on vast scales were not remarkable in the great open spaces of Russia but in France where each inch of ground was in dispute such tactics would be disastrous. Unable to convince Doumer of his point, Paléologue, as was his duty, promised to support

him vigorously in his task.

Against the view growing in Russia that France was letting Russia carry the burden of the war and that Tsar Alexander III had come to France's aid when she was isolated and begged a Russian alliance, Paléologue fought strenuously. France had never asked or begged for an alliance with Russia. Alexander III, he emphasized, had opened the talks by ordering Giers the Russian Foreign Minister, to communicate with the French Foreign Minister, Ribot, in March 1891. The letter stated that "the closest agreement between Russia and France was necessary to the maintenance of a proper balance of power in Europe."¹ The diplomats of the two countries carried on negotiations from that point and after a long delay it was Alexander III who finally sent the final ratification to France on January 1, 1894.

Having tried to reconcile the differences between France and Russia, Paléologue attempted to persuade Rumania to join Russia in the war. On January 12, 1916 Anglo-French troops successfully evacuated the Gallipoli Peninsula and Paléologue immediately pointed out to the Rumanian Minister in Russia that his country must quickly negotiate a military convention with Russia, else Rumania's position might be compromised in Russian eyes and she might not receive any help at all. The negotiations could at least proceed for the

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, ii, p. 126.

convention would not be effective until official government ratification was given. Paléologue could not see why Bratiano hesitated in giving approval for such talks. They would not compromise Rumania's position in the eyes of the Central Powers for this had already been done by Rumania's agreement with the Allies over Transylvania.

The French victory at the Battle of Verdun, which impressed the Tsar very much, prompted Paléologue to suggest to him that the Allied Powers should soon arrive at agreement on the great diplomatic questions so that they could impose their solutions on Germany when peace was made. The problems of Constantinople, Persia, the Adriatic and Transylvania had been solved but the problem of Asia Minor was still outstanding. Agreement was reached on this issue on March 16, 1916 when the Russian Government approved the Anglo-French understanding on Asia Minor except that Russia wanted to annex Kurdistan as well as the regions of Trebizond, Erzerum, Bittis and Van. It was suggested that France take Diarbekin, Karpuz and Sivas in return.

The general retreat of the Russian armies and their shortage of rifles and ammunition coupled with France's inability to supply the Russian needs, made the situation in Russia degenerate rapidly. On September 3, 1915 Paléologue wrote in his diary:

When I recapitulate all the disquieting symptoms I have recorded in the past few weeks, it seems to me that a revolu-

tionary crisis is developing in the heart of the Russian people.

When, in what form, and under what circumstances will the crisis come upon us? Will the direct and immediate cause be a military disaster, a famine, a sanguinary strike, a meeting in some barracks or a palace drama? I cannot say. But the event seems to me foreshadowed now with the inevitable character of an historical fatality. In any case the probabilities are already so impressive that I think it my duty to warn the French Government. I am therefore sending to Delcassé a telegram which recites the dangers of the military situation, and concludes in these terms: As regards the domestic situation, it is anything but comforting. Until quite recently it was possible to think that there would be no revolutionary disorder before the end of the war. I cannot say the same to-day. The question is now whether, in some more or less distant future, Russia will be still capable of effectively playing her part as our ally. However uncertain this eventuality may be, it must henceforth be a factor in the anticipations of the Government of the Republic and the calculations of General Joffre.¹

On the subject of the Russian Government Paléologue, from his first hand observations of the Russian scene, concluded that:

in my heart of hearts I very much hope to see Russia gradually adapting herself to a system of representative government, on a scale commensurate with the high degree to which that form of government seems to me compatible with the temperament of the Russian nation. But as ambassador of an Allied Power I am not less anxious that all experiments in reform should be postponed until peace is signed, as I agree... that at the present time Tsarism is the highest expression of Russia, and her greatest force.²

Further interesting observations were made on the Russian people by Paléologue:

During the two years I have been living in Petrograd, the feature which has struck me most in my conversations with

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, 11, p. 69.

²Ibid., 11, p. 105.

politicians, soldiers, men in high society, civil servants, journalists, financiers, industrialists and teachers is the vague, fluid and inconsistent character of their notions and schemes. There is always a lack of co-ordination or continuity somewhere. The relationship between facts and ideas is hazy; calculations are merely approximate and perspective blurred and uncertain. How many mishaps and miscalculations in this war are explained by the fact that the Russians see reality only through a mist of dreams, and never have precise notions of time or space! Their imagination is eminently dispersive; it rejoices in naught but hazy and shifty visions, vague and inorganic conceptions. Hence the great emotional effect which music has on them.¹

The Russian war effort was of much concern to Paléologue. He urged the Russian Minister of the Interior to clear up the abuses of private industry, which were holding back the Russian effort, and the President of the Council of Ministers to clear away the difficulties that the bureaucracy were always putting in the way of private industries working for the war. Viviani, French Minister of Justice, and Albert Thomas, French Under-Secretary of State for Artillery and Munitions arrived in Petrograd on March 5, 1916 to establish closer contact between the French and Russian Government war efforts. Viviani explained his mission to Paléologue as follows:

(1) to ascertain the military resources of Russia and try to develop them; (2) to insist on the dispatch of 400,000 men to France by successive batches of 40,000 in accordance with the promise Doumer claims to have obtained last December; (3) to bring pressure on Sazonov to induce the Russian General Staff to be more accommodating with regard to Rumania; (4) to persuade the Imperial Government to give a firm and definite undertaking in favour of Poland.²

Paléologue in turn gave his estimate of each point:

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, ii, p.137.

²Ibid., ii, p.249.

On the first point you will gather your own impressions. I think you won't be dissatisfied with the work done in the last few months, particularly by the Union of Zemstvos and the Industrial War Committees. As regards the dispatch of 40,000 men, General Alexeiev has always strenuously objected, alleging that the number of trained reserves at the disposal of the Russian army is totally inadequate in view of the enormous fronts, and he has convinced the Emperor; but if you persist, you may secure the dispatch of a few brigades. As regards Rumania, you will find that Sazonov and General Alexeiev fully share your views; the difficulty is not here, but at Bucharest. As for Poland, I advise you to postpone any discussion until just before you leave; you can then judge for yourselves whether that topic can be breached; I have my doubts.¹

The Russian General Staff compromised on French demands and promised to send to France in addition to the brigade already there, the brigade due for Salonica and five brigades of 10,000 men each between August 14 and December 15. This was far short of the 400,000 men asked for. It was the only accomplishment of Viviani's mission, as Sazonov refused to discuss Poland and claimed that he was doing all he could to win over Rumania. Albert Thomas had, however, stimulated the industrial departments for a time.

Surveying the Russian scene on July 25, 1916 Paléologue recorded his observations in a wire to Paris:

I do not fear any change for the immediate, or even near future in the foreign policy of Russia, and the declaration the Emperor sent me on July 22 through M. Neratov makes me quite confident for the present. The official action of imperial diplomacy will probably continue as before. We must, however, expect to see new faces and a new spirit gradually appear in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. We must also expect that the secrets of our negotiations will not long be a

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, ii, p. 249.

secret to certain persons who, by their pro-German leanings, indirect relations with the German aristocracy or German finance and their hatred of liberalism and democracy, have been completely won over to the idea of a reconciliation with Germany.

At the present time these people can only work for the realization of their desires in a very underhand and circumspect fashion. The patriotic impulse of the nation is still so strong that if it discovered their game it would destroy them. But if a few months hence, when winter comes, our military efforts have not realized all our hopes, or victory inclines more to the Russian armies than ours, the German party in Petrograd would become dangerous, owing to the tools it possesses in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.¹

Meanwhile the collusion of the Greek Government with the Bulgarian Government made relations of the Allied Powers with the Greek Government impossible. After talking with Paléologue, Sazonov empowered him to inform Paris that Russia approved any measures France and England thought necessary against Greece. A short time later Sazonov was dismissed by the Emperor on grounds of poor health though in reality it was the influence of the Empress and Rasputin which caused the Emperor's action. Paléologue's and Buchanan's protests were to no avail.

Though it did not appear that Greece would join the allies, Rumania, according to Paléologue's desire joined the Allies. On July 27, 1916 Colonel Rudenau, Rumanian Military Attaché in France, negotiated with the Allies a convention committing 150,000 Rumanian soldiers to an immediate attack on Bulgaria. From secret sources Paléologue learned however,

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, II, p. 306.

that the Rumanian Government was also still engaged in clandestine negotiations with Sofia and that the President of the Rumanian Council repudiated the Rudenau convention. The Allies therefore agreed that the Rumanian forces should be used exclusively against Austrian forces, deferring the Bulgarian operations for the time being. A Treaty of Alliance¹ was signed between Russia and Rumania at Bucharest on August 18, 1916. By this treaty France, Britain, Italy and Russia guaranteed the territorial integrity of Rumania and undertook to secure for her Bukovina, Transylvania and the Banat of Temesvar when peace was attained. Rumania in turn undertook to declare war on Austro-Hungary and to break off economic relations with the enemies of her new allies. By the military convention annexed to the treaty, Rumania promised to attack Austria-Hungary by August 28 and Russia promised to open a vigorous offensive on the whole Austro-Hungarian front but especially in Bohemia to cover the mobilization and concentration of the Rumanian forces. The Allies also agreed that the Salonica army should make a strong attack on the whole Macedonian front by August 20.

Paléologue was also engaged in maintaining the Allied position in the propaganda war. The Emperors of Germany and Austria-Hungary proclaimed the autonomy of Poland on November 5, 1916. Sturmer, the new Russian Foreign Minister, wrote a

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, ii, p. 319.

protest but Paléologue thought it insipid and persuaded him to declare emphatically the proclamation null and void. Sturmer thought that the revelation of Russia's acquisition of Constantinople by the agreement of the Allies after the war would be of great encouragement to the Russian people. It was the Tsar's idea to declare the fact to the people, a scheme offered by Britain. Paléologue who had as yet received no instructions on the point expressed his hope and expectation of French approval, but he also saw certain objections to the plan. French public opinion would be surprised by such a disclosure and would wonder what France's share of the booty was and thus demand further information. He suggested that both Germany and Turkey should be threatened by the declaration. Poland would be restored under the Romanovs in accordance with the Russian manifesto of August 14, 1914 and Constantinople ceded to Russia after the war according to the allies' promise. A dual declaration of that nature, Paléologue suggested would be more in keeping with the spirit of the alliance and would run less risk of misunderstanding by the Allies. On the following day Sturmer finally accepted Paléologue's suggestion.

Paléologue further advised the Russian Government that it should remove the last hesitation on the part of the American public and bring them into alliance with the Allies by improving its laws dealing with the Jews. But this was anathema

to the Russian Government.

On December 22, 1916 the President of the United States called on all belligerent powers to declare the terms on which the war could end and on December 23, Paléologue received from Paris a draft reply to the American note in which Briand objected to the American note's putting the two groups of belligerents on the same level. Then Briand defined the war aims of the Allies:

The complete independence of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, with all the compensation due to them; the evacuation of the occupied territories torn from the Allies by force or against the wishes of the inhabitants in times past; the liberation of the Italians, Slavs, Rumanians and the Czecho-Slovaks; the emancipation of the peoples subjected to Ottoman tyranny; the exclusion of the Turks from Europe; the re-establishment of Poland in its national integrity.¹

N.N. Pokrovski, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, since the dismissal of Sturmer in December 1916, approved the draft though reserving the right to make certain slight amendments in the paragraphs particularly concerning Russia, those referring to Poland and Armenia, for example.

Nevertheless Paléologue was concerned lest Russia leave the war and acted to prevent this occurrence. On December 25, 1916 the Emperor of Russia issued a manifesto to his military and naval forces informing them that Germany had offered peace but that he was determined to continue the war until Germany was driven from all the territory she had occupied,

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, 111, p. 120.

Constantinople and the Straits were gained, and a free Poland restored. Paléologue saw behind this attitude of firmness no guarantee of his continuing the war and gave his ideas to Briand:

In actual practice, the Emperor is continually at fault. Whether it is that he weakly yields to the importunities of his wife, or that he has neither the intelligence nor the strength of will to dominate his bureaucracy, the fact remains that he is always doing things, or allowing things to be done, which conflict with his policy.

So far as home affairs are concerned, he leaves public opinion to be led by ministers, such as M. Sturmer and M. Protopopov, who are notoriously compromised in Germany's favour, not to mention the fact that he allows a hot-bed of Teutonic intrigues to exist in his own palace. In the economic and industrial sphere, he signs everything put before him. And when an allied Government secures some promise from him which the authorities find inconvenient, it is easy game for them to get him to ratify a decision which indirectly cancels the promise.

From the military point of view, the Rumanian affair is typical. It is more than six months since the President of the Republic, King George and the ambassadors of France and England all told him that the drama opening on the banks of the Danube would be decisive, that it was to Russia's interest more than anyone else's to force her way to Sofia, as the conquest of Constantinople depended upon it, and so on. He promised everything he was asked, and his personal intervention stopped there!

His impotence, or neglect to secure the triumph of his views in the realm of action has done us enormous harm. While France is pulling all her weight in the Alliance, Russia puts forth only a half or a third of the effort of which she is capable. This situation is particularly serious because the critical phase of the war has perhaps begun and the question now is whether Russia will have time to recover all she has lost before the fate of the East is decided.

I am therefore anxious that during the deliberations of the approaching conference the delegate of the Government of the Republic shall endeavour to make the Imperial Government adopt a very definite and detailed programme which will, so to speak, arm the Emperor against his weaknesses of character and the insidious action of his bureaucracy.

As regards the diplomatic guarantees with which I think we ought to provide ourselves in dealing with Russia, you know my opinion: I will discuss it now.

From the strategic point of view, the presence of General Gourko at the head of the General Staff permits us to hope that it will be possible to agree upon a very rigid and detailed plan.

The presence of M. Trepov at the head of the Council will also facilitate the conclusion of a detailed agreement on matters of manufacture, transport and supply.¹

On Sunday, January 7, 1917 Paléologue was received by the Tsar who repeated his determination to pursue the war until a decisive victory was obtained. Paléologue, however, faced the Tsar with the difference between his declaration and the facts. How could the Tsar take Constantinople; how would his troops get there, when they were at the moment retreating in Rumania. The Tsar agreed that the possibility of Germany taking Rumania was a real threat and that his transport and supply difficulties were very great but that he hoped to resume the offensive in about ten days. He was evasive when Paléologue asked if all the necessary troops were therefore on hand. In view of the trust that the Tsar expressed in him, Paléologue took it upon himself to express his concern for the future of Russia in view of the unrest so apparent in the past few weeks. The Tsar quickly changed the subject.

Strikes had occurred on October 30-31, 1916 in Petrograd. The workers in the Louis Renault factory in the Viberg quarter refused to strike since they were satisfied with their French employers but other factory workers from other factor-

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, iii, p. 129.

les had fired upon French engineers and foremen who tried to speak with them. The police were unable to cope with the situation and two infantry regiments sent to aid the police fired on the police instead, until four regiments of Cossacks forced the infantry back to their barracks. Paléologue complained to the President of the Council of Ministers who promised severe punishment for the rebels.

General depression, apathy and pessimism reigned in Russia and Paléologue advised Sturmer to do something about it quickly or conditions would get very much worse.

Sir George Buchanan, also anxious about the domestic situation in Russia, thought that the Emperor might listen to advice from his cousin, the King of England, and asked Balfour to have a personal telegram sent to the Emperor from the King with a view to adding his own comments on delivering it to the Tsar. The Tsar received Buchanan coldly and expounded his belief in autocratic rule.

Eventually an Allied Conference was held at Petrograd at the end of January and the beginning of February 1917, attended by French, British and Italian plenipotentiaries. Representing France were Doumergue and General Castelnau. Paléologue informed Doumergue that "On the Russian front time is not working for us now. The public does not care about the war. All the government departments and the machinery of administration are getting hopelessly and progressively out of

gear. The best minds are convinced that Russia is walking straight into the abyss. We must make haste."¹ Doumergue told Paléologue that the French Government was anxious to get the Emperor's express promise that in the peace settlement France would decide the fate of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine. When Paléologue mentioned that the Tsar had expressly promised this to him in November 1914 and again in March 1916, Doumergue confided to him that Briand wanted the promise in writing.

The programme of the conference at St. Petersburg was too vague to accomplish anything. The instructions to the various plenipotentiaries were just as vague and only trivialities were exchanged. In private audience with the Tsar, Doumergue gained his assent to the proposed demands and guarantees of peace to be imposed on Germany:

(1) Alsace-Lorraine to be returned to France; (2) its frontiers to extend at any rate to the limits of the ancient Duchy of Lorraine, in such a way as to incorporate the mining areas of that region in French territory; (3) the other territories on the left bank of the Rhine to be completely separated from Germany; (4) such of those territories as shall not be incorporated in French territory to form an autonomous and neutralized state; French troops to be garrisoned there until the guarantees, imposed by the Allies to secure the general peace, shall have been fulfilled.¹

The Tsar also acceded to Doumergue's demand for the acceleration of a general offensive on the Russian front. Meanwhile the conference dragged on until February 21 without accomplishing anything, leading Paléologue to remark cynically: "The

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, iii, p. 183.

first qualification of him who would take part in a diplomatic conference is to have a good digestion."¹

While discussing the origins of the war with Pokrovski, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and referring to the duplicity of William II of Germany in secretly encouraging both Russia and Japan to engage each other in the Manchurian War, Paléologue remarked in reply to Pokrovski's expressed astonishment: "Yes, even in the twentieth century. But what does the century matter? Machiavellianism was several thousand years old when Machiavelli invented it. I don't suppose the events of the present war have exactly persuaded you that the world grows wiser as it gets older. The future will always be the product of the past."²

On March 6, 1917 Paléologue noted that Petrograd was short of bread and wood and that the public was generally in want. A heavy snowfall and extreme cold had made the transport of food and necessities worse. Thus on March 8 mobs shouted for 'bread and peace' while parading through the streets of Petrograd. Violence occurred in the industrial sections of Petrograd on March 9 and again on March 10 only to be suppressed by charging Cossacks. An extraordinary Council of all Ministers was called and the Minister of the Interior, Protopopov, declared that strong measures would be

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, iii, p. 187.

²Ibid., iii, p. 207.

taken to preserve peace at all costs. Paléologue in conversation with a member of the Cadet Party was told, "We're in the presence of a great political movement now. Everyone has finished with the present system. If the Emperor does not grant the country prompt and far-reaching reforms, the agitation will develop into riots. And there is only a step between riot and revolution."¹ Paléologue replied: "I entirely agree with you, but I'm very much afraid that the Romanovs have found their Polignac in Protopopov. But in a crisis is precipitated you will certainly be called upon to play a part. In that case, let me beg of you not to forget the fundamental obligations the war has laid on Russia."²

The next day, March 12, Paléologue saw riot turn into revolution with the army in support. Buchanan and Paléologue were threatened by the mob until recognized and cheered. The moderate deputies were faced with the problem of whether it was too late to save the dynastic regime and the fact that, though the republican idea was favoured in Petrograd and Moscow, the country was not prepared for it and the support of the troops at the front was questionable. Paléologue still personally thought that there was hope for the regime of the Tsar if he pardoned the rebels, appointed a provisional committee of ministers from the Duma, and appealed in person to

¹N. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, iii, p. 217.

²Ibid.

the army and the people, declaring the beginning of a new era for Russia. The Executive Committee of the Duma were surprised by the conduct of the army and the character of the revolution and tried to form a provisional government. President Rodzianko of the Committee asked Paléologue if he had any advice, and Paléologue replied, "As French Ambassador the war is my main concern of course, so I want the effects of the revolution to be kept down as much as possible and order to be restored at the earliest moment. Don't forget that the French army is making preparations for a great offensive and that the Russian army is bound in honour to do its share."¹

Paléologue believed that it was necessary to retain the imperial system but in a constitutional rather than autocratic form. Tsarism, in his opinion, was the framework of Russia, the uniting link of all the heterogeneous nations of the Empire, without which Russia would collapse. He was assured that the Duma leaders agreed with him but that the socialists and anarchists were gaining power. By March 14, he could discern the formation of three directing bodies in Petrograd. The Executive Committee of the Duma, with Rodzianko as President and twelve members, including Miliukov, Shulgin, Knovvalov, Kerensky and Cheidze, was representative of all parties of the progressive group and of the Extreme Left.

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, 111, p.228.

It was trying to secure necessary reforms immediately and to maintain the existing political system even if it meant changing Emperors. The Council of Workingmen and Soldier Deputies, the Soviet, aimed at a republic and peace while the Headquarters of the Troops and the Fortress of S.S. Peter and Paul, consisting of junior officers in favour of the revolution and senior M.C.O.'s, concentrated on supplying the combatants of the revolution with food and ammunition. The programme agreed upon by the Executive Committee and the Council of the Soviet was: the abdication of the Emperor; the accession of the Tsarevitch with the Grand Duke Michael as regent; the formation of a responsible ministry; the election of a constituent assembly by universal suffrage; and the proclamation of the equality of all races before the law.¹ Nicholas II abdicated on March 15, 1917 but he refused to be separated from his son, so the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch, the brother of Nicholas was to ascend the throne. The Soviet objected to another Romanov ruler and the Duma gave way in fear of armed rebellion; accordingly the Duke agreed to accept the crown only if it were offered to him by the constituent assembly.

Disturbances began again in Petrograd and Grand Duke Michael abdicated on March 17. The Provisional Government then began its rule. Paléologue reported to Erland:

When I said good-bye to M. Doumergue and General de Castelnau last month, I asked them to advise the President of the

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, iii, p. 234.

Republic and yourself of my increasing concern at the internal situation of the Empire; I added that it would be a serious mistake to think that time is working for us, at any rate in Russia; I came to the conclusion that we should expedite our military operations as much as possible.

I am more convinced of that than ever. A few days before the Revolution I advised you that the decisions of the recent conference were already a dead letter, that the confusion in the munitions production establishments and transport services was beginning again on an even more formidable scale, and so forth. The question is whether the new Government is capable of promptly carrying out the necessary reforms. It says, and quite sincerely, that it can; but I don't believe a word of it. For it is not merely confusion, but wholesale disorganization and anarchy from which the military and civil departments are suffering.

Taking the most hopeful view I can, what can we expect? A terrible load would be off my mind if I could be certain that the fighting armies will not be contaminated by demagogic agitation and discipline soon restored among the garrisons behind the front. I have not yet abandoned that hope. I can still bring myself to think that the social-democrats will not translate their desire to end the war into irreparable acts. I can also admit the possibility of a revival of patriotic fervour in some parts of the country. But for all that there must be a weakening of the national effort which was only too anaemic and spasmodic already. And the process of recovery is likely to be a long one with a race whose ideas of method and forethought are so rudimentary.¹

The Provisional Government's manifesto of March 20, 1917 criticized the former regime but barely mentioned the war. Paléologue complained of this to Miliukov, and the latter, who was Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government, promised to do all he could to secure a firmer declaration of pursuance of the war. On March 21 the Provisional Government, on the insistence of the Soviet, had the Tsar and his family arrested because of rumours of their attempts to restore autocracy in Russia. On March 24 Paléologue, Buchanan, and Car-

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, iii, p. 246.

lotti gave to the Provisional Government the official recognition of their respective Governments. On the same day the Soviet called for the fraternization of Russian working men and soldiers with their enemy counterparts. Finland, Livonia, Esthonia, Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Georgia and Siberia, demanded their independence or complete autonomy. To Paléologue Russia appeared to be breaking up and yet he realized that the revolution had barely begun. On April 3 Kronstadt and its garrison refused to recognize the Provisional Government or the Soviet as revolt and anarchy spread.

Paléologue began to think of his own suitability for the post in Russia in view of the rapidly changing and changed circumstances:

In the first place, there may be an official advantage in my being relieved of my post: I enjoyed the confidence of the old regime and I simply do not believe in the new one. And then, even from here I can guess what a campaign the advanced parties in the Chamber must be carrying on against me. If I am to be recalled, I should at least prefer to take the initiative. I have always seen the force of Sainte-Beuve's aphorism that 'You want to leave things just a little before they leave you!'¹

Hence Paléologue sent the French Foreign Minister, Ribot, the following telegram on April 5, 1917.

Some of the Petrograd papers have reproduced an article in the Radical pointing out the necessity of changing the representative of the Republic in Russia. It is not for me to take the initiative in expressing my desires in this matter. Your Excellency knows me well enough to be sure that in circumstances such as these personal considerations do not count with me at all. But this article in the Radical makes it incumbent upon me to tell you that, having had the signal honour of represent-

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, iii, p. 284.

ing France in Petrograd for more than three years and being conscious that I have spared no effort in that service, I should feel it no hardship to be relieved of my heavy task, and should the Government of the Republic think it desirable to appoint a successor, I should do every thing in my power to make the change a simple matter.¹

On Saturday April 7, Paléologue received news that the United States had declared war on Germany on the previous day. To further encourage the Soviet in carrying on the war three French socialist deputies, Montet, Cachin and Lafont, arrived in Russia. They asked Paléologue whether Russia was capable of continuing the war and securing the French terms of peace. Paléologue replied that if they could convince the Soviet that the fate of the revolution was bound up with the result of the war then the Russian army would once again become an important factor in the strategic plans of France.

As regards our peace programme, we must obviously adapt it to the new aspects of the problems. In the West, I saw no reason for abandoning our claims or modifying our hopes, as American help must necessarily more or less compensate us for the diminished value of Russia's aid. But in eastern Europe and Asia Minor we should doubtless have to sacrifice something of our ambitions; but I also thought that if we set about the matter in the right way and our diplomacy carried out the manoeuvre which will sooner or later be forced on us, in time that sacrifice would not cost France too much.²

The three deputies agreed but received such a cold reception from the Soviet that they did not dare to assert France's right to Alsace-Lorraine. Paléologue reserved his opinion on Russian socialism until the arrival of Albert Thomas, French Minister of Munitions and also a socialist, who

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, iii, p. 284.

²Ibid., p. 298.

Paléologue hoped would be able to convince the Provisional Government and the Soviet of the necessity of following French views on the war and peace settlement. Paléologue also thought that the exposure of Thomas to the Russian revolution would help dampen the flattery and praise emanating from France. The other three French deputies, though less excited than before their cold reception by the Soviet, still were convinced of the democratic character of the revolution and its tendency toward internationalism. Paléologue tried to show them otherwise:

The Russian revolution is essentially anarchic and destructive. Left to itself, it can only end in terrible mob-rule by the lowest classes and the soldiery, in the rupture of all national ties and the total collapse of Russia. In view of the propensity to excess which is innate in the Russian character, it will soon go to extremes; it is doomed to sink into mere destruction and barbarism, horror and absurdity. You have no idea of the magnitude of the forces that have just been released. Whether this catastrophe can still be averted by means such as an immediate meeting of a constituent assembly or a military coup d'état I have grave doubts. Fortunately the movement has only begun, so it may be possible to master it, more or less, to put on the brake, to make it take the direction we desire and thus gain time. A respite of a few months would be of incalculable importance to the result of the war. The support you are giving the extremists will precipitate the catastrophe.¹

On April 22, 1917 Albert Thomas arrived in Petrograd with a French mission of officers and secretaries. He was quite impressed by the reception he received from the Russian socialists who waved Red flags and gave him an ovation. Paléologue related to him the recent happenings in Russia including

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, iii, p. 308.

the dispute between Kerensky and Miliukov emphasizing that the French were compelled to support the moderate Miliukov who stood for the policy of the Alliance. Thomas, however, was determined not to offend the Russian democracy and the following day presented Paléologue with a letter from M. Ribot, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is reproduced in full below.

Cabinet du President du Conseil Ministre des Affaires
étrangères.

Paris, April 13, 1917.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

The Government has considered it a wise step to send the Minister of Munitions of War to Petrograd on an extraordinary mission. You told me that M. Albert Thomas, in view of the pleasant memories he left behind him in Russia and the influence he may be able to exert in certain quarters, would be well received by the Provisional Government, and particularly M. Miliukov.

In order that he may have a full and fair field for his activities, I should be glad if you would be good enough to return to France on leave, after settling with him the time of your departure. You will hand over the business of the embassy to M. Doulet, who will carry it on as Chargé d'Affaires until the appointment of your successor.

It has seemed to the Government that your position of favour with the Emperor would make it more difficult for you to carry on your duties under the present government. You will realize that in the new circumstances a new man is required, and you have told me, with a delicacy of feeling I highly appreciate, that you were ready to sacrifice yourself by laying aside all personal considerations. I take this opportunity of thanking you for this proof of your disinterestedness, which does not surprise me in a man like you, and of telling you at the same time that we will not forget the great services you have rendered our country.

When you return to France, we will discuss together what sort of position we can find you, and do everything in our power to meet your convenience and interest.

With the assurance of my highest regard,

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

A. Ribot¹

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, iii, p. 311.

Paléologue agreed with the content of Ribot's letter and promised to help Albert Thomas until his departure which he claimed could not be earlier than May 10. The Italian Ambassador agreed with Paléologue that the support of the Allies should be given Miliukov, as opposed to Kerensky and the extremists of the Soviet, in order to prevent anarchy in Russia. Buchanan, however, supported Thomas in the opposite view that Kerensky must be fully supported since he alone was capable of establishing with the aid of the Soviet a government of any confidence and since the strength of the Russian democracy lay in its revolutionary spirit. Thomas after talking with Kerensky agreed with his views that the Allied war aims ought to be revised and that the Allies ought to abandon publicly all thought of annexation and indemnity in order not to lose credit with the Russian democracy. Paléologue disagreed arguing that "the Russian democracy was rather too inexperienced, ignorant and uneducated to start claiming to dictate to the democracies of France, England, Italy and America, and that what is attacked is the whole policy of the Alliance."¹ Thomas still did not agree. Miliukov informed Paléologue that Kerensky continued to usurp the direction of foreign affairs which were his province as foreign minister. Moreover, he said, the French socialists were making his task of adhering to the Alliance all the more diffi-

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, iii, p. 313.

cult by supporting Kerensky who did not give the war full support.

Seeing Thomas's course in Russia clearly outlined, Paléologue wired the following to Ribot on April 26, 1917:

If, as I very much fear, the Russian Government asks us to revise our previous agreements about peace terms, it is my opinion that we must not hesitate to tell them that we stand firmly by those agreements and insist once more on our determination to continue the war to full and final victory.

If we do not refuse to enter into the negotiations into which the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, and M. Kerensky himself, hope to inveigle us, the consequences may well be irreparable.

The first effect would be to undermine all confidence in those members of the Provisional Government such as Prince Lvov, M. Gutchov, M. Miliukov, M. Shinarev, etc., who are struggling so heroically to revive Russian patriotism and save the Alliance. We should also paralyse the forces in the rest of the country and the army which have not yet been contaminated by pacifist propaganda. These forces are very slow in reacting against the despotic preponderance of Petrograd because they are ill-organized and scattered, but they are none the less a reserve of national energy which may have an enormous influence on the course of the war.

The determined attitude, which I am taking the liberty of recommending to you, admittedly involves some risk, in the last resort, of the rupture of the Alliance. But, however serious that eventuality may be, I prefer it to the consequences of the doubtful negotiations which, so I am informed, the socialist Party is preparing to propose to us. The fact is that, even supposing we had to continue the war without Russia's help, we should be in a position to make our victory yield us a harvest of highly profitable advantages at the expense of our defaulting ally. That prospect is already very seriously agitating a large number of Russian patriots. And if we take the opposite course, I am apprehensive that the Petrograd Soviet will promptly assume control of affairs and, with the complicity of the pacifists of all nations, force a general peace upon us.¹

Out of courtesy, Paléologue showed the telegram to Thomas before dispatching it. Thomas disagreed with it and told Palé-

¹ M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, iii, p. 315.

ologue that if he sent it it would be his last telegram. Paléologue insisted that until he was relieved of his position it was his duty to keep the French Government informed. He had not by his actions impaired Thomas's mission and had always represented Thomas's ideas in the best light and promised to continue to do so. Thomas finally agreed that he had never misrepresented him. But there was still considerable disagreement between them.

On April 27, Thomas sent a telegram expressing his objections to Paléologue's views:

I have raised no objection to M. Paléologue's sending the telegram of yesterday in which he reiterates his belief that Russia will desert us in the near future, and recommends the adoption of a firm attitude. That telegram will be his last. Henceforth I have decided, on my own responsibility, to be the Government's sole source of information and to determine with it the course to be followed.

Whatever may be the difficulties - and they are exceedingly formidable - with which the Provisional Government is struggling, and however great the agitation of the anti-annexationist socialists, it seems to me that neither the result of the war nor the fate of the alliance is threatened.

In my view, the actual situation is as follows:

The socialists are requiring the Government, and more particularly M. Kerensky, to draft a diplomatic note inviting the Allies to revise their war aims in concert. M. Miliukov thinks he cannot yield to this demand. The Government is hesitating between the two courses. I think I shall be able to offer my services in finding some provisional solution which will prevent the present government from being shaken or breaking up - a point I consider of the very first importance.

Even if M. Miliukov should not get his own way and the Provisional Government were to propose that we revise the agreements, I earnestly hope that it will be taken calmly. We shall no doubt see some incidents, and perhaps even disorders. But all who are in touch with the army assure me that a real improvement in the situation is gradually taking place.

With encouragement and action on our side, revolutionary

patriotism over here can and must shake itself free. We must not allow an unwise policy to alienate its sympathies from us.¹

Not a day passed in Russia in which Paléologue did not observe parades and processions through the streets of Petrograd. On April 30 he noted in his diary that the forces of anarchy were growing and that discipline in the army had all but disappeared. Numerous deserters wandered throughout Russia and the food shortage was acute. On May 1 the public display was greater than usual and the shouts of 'down with the war' and the clamour for liberty, land and peace impressed Paléologue as marking the end of the social order. Miliukov and the war were subjects of criticism among the garrison regiments of Petrograd and the Government's situation was critical. Paléologue was prompted to wire Ribot on May 3: "The gravity of the events in progress and the sense of my responsibility compel me to ask you to confirm by direct and express order that you have instructed M. Albert Thomas I am not to communicate with you."² Ribot replied by asking both Paléologue and Thomas to submit to him their respective opinions on the situation in Russia. They complied by sending the following:

Paléologue's views on the character of the Russian Revolution:

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, iii, p. 317.

²Ibid., iii, p. 335.

1. Anarchy is spreading all over Russia and will paralyse her for a long time to come. The quarrel between the Provisional Government and the Soviet shows, by the very length of time it has lasted, that both are important. It is increasingly clear that the disgust with the war, abandonment of all the national dreams and a lack of interest in everything save the domestic problems are becoming uppermost in the public mind. Cities like Moscow, which a short time past were hotbeds of patriotic feeling, have been contaminated. The revolutionary democracy seems incapable of restoring order in the country and organizing it for the struggle.
2. Ought we to continue to put our trust in Russia and give her more time? No; because even under the most favourable circumstances she will not be in a condition to carry out all her obligations as an ally for many more months to come.
3. Sooner or later, the more or less complete paralysis of Russia's effort will compel us to revise the decisions we had all come to on Eastern questions. The sooner the better, as the prolongation of the war involves France in terrible sacrifices of which Russia has not borne her share for a long time past.
4. We must therefore waste no time but endeavour in all secrecy to find some means of inducing Turkey to propose peace to us. This line of thought necessarily excludes the idea of any reply to the latest note of the Provisional Government, as such a reply would to some extent confirm agreements which have become unrealizable through Russia's fault.¹

Albert Thomas's views:

1. I admit that the situation is difficult and uncertain, but not that it is desperate, as M. Paléologue seems to think.
2. I believe that the best policy is to give the new Russia that confidence we did not refuse to the old.
3. The Government will have to decide about the Eastern policy now put forward by M. Paléologue. I will content myself with the remark that this is not perhaps a well-chosen moment for great new diplomatic combinations in the East. But I have pleasure in observing that, in advising no reply to the Provisional Government's recent note, M. Paléologue himself takes a step in the direction of the revision of agreements. Speaking for myself, I am not opposed to the idea of a strictly secret attempt to induce Turkey to propose peace to us. The only difference between M. Paléologue and myself is that I still believe in the possibility of bringing Russia back into the war by announcing a democratic policy; M. Paléologue thinks that the last chance of attaining that end has gone.

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, iii, p. 335.

4. Our friendly discussion will put the Government in a better position to view the situation as a whole. I remain of the opinion that the policy I suggest is not only the more prudent of the two but more in accordance with things as they are. Nor does it rule out the Turkish scheme; but it strives to bring it about by agreement with the new Russia and not in opposition to her.¹

On Saturday, May 12, 1917 Paléologue held a final dinner in the French Embassy for his Russian friends, all of whom were sorry to see him depart. Paléologue was to travel across Russia, Finland, Sweden and Norway to Bergen and to travel from there to Scotland by British dispatch boat and two destroyers. Sazonov, his old friend and associate, was to travel with him to take over the Russian Embassy in London. When Miliukov resigned Sazonov was requested to postpone his departure and Paléologue accompanied by the three French Socialists, Montet, Cachin and Lafont left Petrograd on May 16. Crossing Finland he quoted from Boris Godunov: "Weep, my holy Russia, weep! For thou art entering into darkness. Weep, my holy Russia, weep! For thou shalt shortly die."²

The Russian mission was the most important and eventful of Paléologue's diplomatic career. His task of maintaining the Franco-Russian alliance and thus the Russian war effort was a great one. He had to deal with some unrealistic demands from France and the complex situation in Russia. Though his suggestion of detaching Austria-Hungary from the German war machine was to his surprise quashed by his own gov-

¹M. Paléologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, iii, p. 335.

²Ibid., p. 346.

ernment early in the war, Paléologue persevered in his attempt to bring agreement between Russia and the Balkan nations so that the latter would join the allied forces. Bulgaria, however, joined the enemy. He sought also to maintain the best relations between the Allied Powers and he tried to aid the United States in a decision to aid the allied cause by urging Russia to achieve friendlier relations with her.

When the domestic scene in Russia worsened portending revolution, Paléologue feared that she might withdraw from the war and therefore bent every effort to bolster the Imperial regime even to the extent of making personal representations to the Tsar though not personally in favour of autocratic government. It appeared to him, however, that Tsarism was a part of the framework of the Russian nation which would collapse into anarchy without it. As revolution became more a foregone conclusion and the Tsar abdicated, Paléologue put little faith in the provisional government, its desire to carry on the war or Russia's ability to do so. His long acquaintance with Russia made him more appreciative than the French socialist politicians who visited Russia in 1917 of the nature of the changes occurring. They were convinced of the democratic character of the revolutionary movement but to Paléologue it meant anarchy, and disaster to the Russian contribution to the war effort. The only hope in his view was to convince the Soviet that the success of the revolution was

bound up with the success of the Allied war effort. Contrary to the British Ambassador, Buchanan who favoured Kerensky, Paléologue favoured the more moderate Miliukov in the provisional government as capable of maintaining the Alliance and war effort. Nevertheless, Thomas, the French Minister of Munitions, a socialist, upon visiting Russia in 1917 saw no threat, as Paléologue did, to the result of the war or the fate of the allies and advocated full support of the provisional government of Kerensky. Paléologue then asked to be recalled rather than have his views, known to be opposed to the provisional government, perhaps injure Franco-Russian relations. He thence returned to France. In Russia he had done all that he could to keep Russia in the war and to uphold the Franco-Russian Alliance - the task he set himself in 1914 - and he had been to a great extent successful in his mission as Ambassador to Russia.

IX

THE END OF AN ERA

On his return to Paris Maurice Paléologue once again became absorbed in the work of the Foreign Ministry, where as Secretary-General he became the chief administrative officer. In January¹⁹²⁰ he became the first permanent Secretary-General under the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexandre Millerand, and he served in this position until his resignation and retirement from the diplomatic service in September, 1920. The same year he refused appointment as French Ambassador to Britain and retired to devote himself to writing, an art he was well qualified to pursue.

In private life and in his new profession, Paléologue continued to make a name for himself. In his many books and articles dealing with serious literary and art criticism, history and biography and including different kinds of novels, always the realist and acute critic, he often exposed hitherto closely kept secrets to the public and his biting pen spared few public personalities. His literary talent eventually gained him entrance to the illustrious French Academy of Arts and Science. It was two works, in particular, that brought him this honour - La Russie des Tsars pendant la grande guerre, a three volume work first published in 1921,

and Un Grand Realiste, a biography of Camille Cavour published in 1926.

In this literary bent Paléologue was in the fine tradition of French diplomats and the wide culture of diplomats of the old diplomacy in general. He was a good example of the Old Diplomacy. He displayed many of its identifying characteristics many of which appear to advantage in the light of recent diplomatic method. His early career had been spent in a variety of positions in diverse parts of the world where he amassed considerable knowledge and carried out his functions efficiently. His advice was highly valued by foreign ministers and thus he was entrusted with the highly secret documents held by the reserved section of the Foreign Ministry which reached its fullest development under his direction.

In Bulgaria, his first real diplomatic post on his own, Paléologue gained the intimate confidence of Tsar Ferdinand as was the aim of all diplomats in that era and Paléologue was more successful at this than some of his colleagues of other professions, but he was perceptive enough to see that the ambitious ruler was not to be trusted. Nevertheless Paléologue did all in his power to keep Bulgaria from carrying strife in the Balkans and in the orbit of the Entente powers although circumstances made Bulgaria's association with the Triple Alliance almost inevitable. He was success-

ful for the length of his mission in this country.

As political director of the Foreign Ministry Paléologue's accumulated skill and knowledge proved a great asset to France and Poincaré in particular with whom Paléologue was on intimate terms and with whom he shared similar views. Poincaré's successors in the Foreign Ministry also came to rely on Paléologue's ability. Though his forecasts were not always correct he was perceptive enough to see the tenuous nature of the Balkan Confederation in 1912 and to see that war was on the horizon. His expectation of war brought charges against him of being unduly pessimistic before the war and of being a 'war-monger' after the war. In reality he was only being realistic about the diplomatic situation. Yet to him war had not been inevitable and he himself had made every effort to avoid it.

Paléologue was fortunate to receive the appointment as Ambassador to Russia in 1914. He followed a policy of firmly supporting Russia in her stand against Austria and Germany in what he considered the best interests of France. He did much to cement Franco-Russian relations during his mission in Russia and to prepare her for war. His intervention in French politics in June 1914 was certainly unorthodox though not for the outstanding diplomat under the old system. His action is nevertheless understandable in view of his great concern for France's security. Yet repre-

hensible for any diplomat is the fact that he did not keep the French Ministry adequately or accurately informed of events in Russia during the crisis immediately preceding the outbreak of the 1914 war which fact contrasts with the voluminous despatches during his mission in Bulgaria.

During his Embassy in Russia until 1917 Paléologue was acute enough to envisage the possibility of revolution in Russia and Russia's withdrawal from the war in the event of such a revolution. In his attempt to keep the Russian war-effort strong and to avoid revolution he became closely identified with the imperial regime in Russia with the result that after 1917 his diplomatic usefulness to France was severely curtailed. He had knowingly identified himself with the Tsarist regime and high Russian society as was suitable for the diplomat. He believed that Tsarism alone could keep a united Russia in the war and when the Tsar's regime fell Paléologue was realistic and honest enough to see that his usefulness to France in Russia might be limited under the new regime. Furthermore he personally could not agree with the socialistic provisional government in Russia headed by Kerensky since it did not firmly declare its intention to carry on the war and was intent on revising the peace settlement agreed upon earlier by the Allied Powers. Therefore, again acting in what he thought to be the best interests of France Paléologue informed Ribot, the French

Foreign Minister, that he would not be opposed to his recall in view of the situation in Russia. His patriotism was above reproach.

With Paléologue's departure from Russia in 1917 had come the end of an era in Russia just as with his departure from the field of diplomacy came the end of an era in diplomacy. With the end of the First Great War and the promise of a better world, President Wilson's egalitarianism and Prime Minister Lloyd George's diplomacy by conference, the period of the 'New Diplomacy' is usually regarded as having begun.

The transition in diplomatic method actually had begun at least a century before 1919 as action replaced negotiation. From a defensive principle to maintain the status quo, and prevent war the principle of the balance of power was often transformed into an aggressive principle used to satisfy the appetites of the Great Powers, as the partition of Poland illustrates.

Then again, the increase in commerce and commercial competition had its effects on diplomacy. Business and commerce used to be beneath the dignity of the professional diplomat but with the growing importance of these activities there came the establishment of systems of commercial attachés and much diplomacy was transferred to other hands than those of the professional diplomats. The commercial

attachés carried on official relations with foreign countries as well, and this separation of economics and politics on the international level allowed the settlement of social and economic conflicts informally. Diplomacy could still take the credit for the maintenance of international peace.¹

The increased speed and facility of communication which came with time also changed the character of diplomatic method gradually over the years. Whereas at one time the sending and receiving of despatches was a time consuming process with the result that the diplomat such as Paléologue had great scope and initiative in action, the invention of the telegraph, telephone and aeroplane speeded up communications and allowed the diplomat less scope. His foreign minister could then make direct contact with or visit the foreign ministers of other countries in a comparatively short time. It has often been concluded that because of the increased speed of communications the ambassador in the foreign capital has been reduced to the status of a clerk or messenger boy at the end of a telephone or telegraph line. Paléologue would not have been comfortable if his initiative had been curtailed in this way. Under the new diplomacy Paléologue's influence would have been considerably less and his 1914 actions probably could not have been taken. Even as it was with the development of the telegraph while in Russia Paléologue did not use it to advantage but rather because of

¹ A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, (New York, 1958), p.358.

its existence he had to make concessions to it by being somewhat deceptive in his messages, preferring a course of action fitting in with what he thought the best interests of France.

The transition in diplomatic method took place over a number of years and no immediate or dramatic change as a result of the above mentioned factors occurred. The most dramatic change in diplomacy came in 1919 and then it was mainly one of attitude. In 1919 many were convinced that the masses were at one in their hatred of war and therefore the war had been the result of the actions of a small minority. One of the minorities picked on as having caused the war was the professional diplomatic corps. Paléologue was one of the diplomats singled out for criticism. How there could be popular or open diplomacy in a world where outside of a few countries there were no popular bodies to whom it could be explained, is not stated.

Granted Paléologue and his fellow diplomats formed a close fraternity which appeared to the public to be directing international affairs under the old diplomacy to a greater extent than their counterparts do today. The diplomats caused the war only in so far as they advised that in the diplomatic situation no other course lay open, negotiation having failed, to fulfil the policies of their countries. Like all traditional diplomats in the old system and professional men in general, Paléologue tended to favour the opinion of the members

of his own profession and of the expert in his own field to that of the public in determining the best course of action. This did not mean, however, that he ignored public opinion. The traditional diplomat carefully considered public opinion where it counted. Thus Paléologue took pains to have public opinion prepared for what he considered the best policy for France. For example, he was concerned that public opinion be prepared for the appointment of Delcassé to the Russian Embassy and the release of the news as to what the Russian war booty was to be.

Agreements were secret or open under the old diplomacy as expediency demanded; but simply because an agreement was open did not guarantee its being just, as the partition of Poland illustrates. The aim of diplomacy had been to achieve certain aims without war but if no other way were available it was not regarded as morally wrong or disastrous to resort to war. Paléologue had tried to avert the war of 1914 but it had become a necessity in order to uphold and safeguard Russia's and France's independency. In reality the old diplomacy became discredited less from its methods of negotiation than from the autocratic action with which it was associated over the years - the arbitrary disposition of people or territory. The popular governments which came in the late eighteenth century to America and France tended to associate diplomacy in general with reaction and counter-revolution.

as illustrated in the Congress of Vienna and the Holy Alliance. Hence democratic or popular control was thought to be a necessity in international relations. This view was bolstered by the Americans who had always been suspicious of European institutions and diplomacy and had always professed the equality of man; but the force of world attention and opinion came to focus on the idealistic words of President Wilson of the United States of America, words which, however meant, were taken literally by the masses and especially by public opinion in the United States and Britain.

The speeches of President Wilson laid the bases for what has been variously called the 'New Diplomacy', 'Open Diplomacy', and 'Popular Diplomacy'. If the old diplomacy can be termed the French system, the new approach to diplomacy might best be termed the American system. In his Fourteen Points of January 8, 1918, Wilson called for "Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view."¹ He was taken literally; but he could not have meant such impossible things, for he negotiated at Paris in secret with Lloyd George and Clemenceau after the fashion of the old diplomacy. What Wilson probably meant was that the results of negotiation, that is, treaties were to be made public.

¹Albrecht-Carrié ,p. 353.

In his 'Four Principles' speech of February 1918 he announced a second principle of the new diplomacy, namely that the "system of the Balance of Power was now forever discredited and that subject populations must be granted their independence, irrespective of the wishes of other states."¹ In his 'Four Ends' speech of July 1918, he forecast "the reign of law based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind."² This principle was embodied in the League of Nations though it was perhaps unrealistic in assuming that the same opinion could be organized in every country, or that it would indicate the best course, or even that the public would be interested, except in time of crisis, let alone knowledgeable in international affairs.

In his 'Five Particulars' speech of September 27, 1918 Wilson proclaimed that the ideal of American justice must be achieved throughout the world because it "plays no favourites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned."³ This was popularly interpreted to mean that not only the rights but the opinions and votes of small countries were equal to those of the Great Powers, in itself an unrealistic view. The same speech as-

¹Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, p.85.

²Ibid., p. 86.

³Ibid., p. 87.

sumed that secret covenants secretly arrived at were the causes of war. The great majority of people and the idealists accepted the Wilson principles as possible, while the minority of realists rejected them as impossible of realization, at least at the time.

The Great Powers who practised the old diplomacy "between 1871 and 1914 did much to avoid war, and even their secret agreements were sometimes a means of keeping the peace when national excitement might have countenanced war."¹ Amidst great public controversy in the Eastern crisis of 1877-1878, Lord Salisbury quietly negotiated secret agreements with Russia to remove the risk of war. Similarly Bismarck's diplomacy maintained peace between Russia and Austria-Hungary. The outbreak of the 1914 War was not primarily the result of the secret agreements between the Powers. Matters of procedure were not at fault. Mr. Wilson was shallow in his analysis in hitting on the instruments of policy as the fault of the old diplomacy. He should have gone deeper into the danger he saw in the lack of popular control of policy in Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary and discussed why democratic control of foreign policy would help avoid war. Wilson, the prophet and optimist, overlooked the extent of ignorance in the world. The common-sense notion

¹E.L. Woodward, "The Old and the New Diplomacy", The Yale Review, xxxvi (1946-47), 405-422.

that the people possessed of the facts would necessarily say no to an aggressive policy was not true. Also overlooked were the unwillingness of the new Russia to utilize open covenants or agreements or to cooperate with the English-speaking world, that the really democratic states covered only a small area of the globe producing a narrow basis for collective security, that the new states had no background or civil service to make them inherently peaceful, and that the peace settlement satisfied neither the victor nor the vanquished. There was no guarantee of peace; on the contrary, it became easier to unsettle the status quo. The development of broadcasting and open diplomacy meant mass excitement, distortion and oversimplification of issues. Larger areas became more susceptible to propaganda than under the old diplomacy.

The real basis of the change in diplomacy after 1919, as Nicolson sums it up, was "the belief that it was possible to apply to the conduct of external affairs, the ideas and practices which in the conduct of internal affairs, had for generations been regarded as the essentials of liberal democracy."¹ The old diplomacy had been a skilled profession requiring practical wisdom and an art of conducting international relations among sovereign states, an art acquired only after long training and experience such as Paléologue

¹Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, p.84

had. It was not like domestic politics with its give and take, parliament and courts of law.

The 'New Diplomacy' turned out to be something different from the open negotiation by representatives of democratic peoples visualized by Wilson. It was mainly a diplomacy by conference lacking the stability of the old diplomacy. The conferences were of a permanent nature as in the League of Nations and later the United Nations which:

do much to diminish the utility of professional diplomatists and in that they entail much publicity, many rumours, and wide speculation, - in that they tempt politicians to achieve quick, spectacular and often fictitious results, - they tend to promote rather than allay suspicion, and to create those very states of uncertainty which it is the purpose of good diplomatic method to prevent.¹

Rational discussion is often replaced by propaganda. Speeches in assembly or through mass media often degenerate into epithets of abuse and recrimination with the resultant tension and lack of progress, all at great costs of money and time. Success is limited as negotiations are interrupted by public disclosures causing breakdowns in negotiations. The American system weakens the certainty of negotiation and relations between countries, as whole countries and populations are identified and identify themselves with their negotiators who are often politicians playing to public galleries. The result is that the compromises of secret negotiation are prevented and every slight is magnified into a national

¹Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, p.89.

insult and thus an international incident.

Negotiation by the political heads of foreign offices or heads of state which has become very prevalent is not the quickest or best means of settling issues as by the renown of the negotiators every difference is magnified, prestige emphasized and national claims personified. Foreign ministers cannot supervise the business of their ministries in the best manner when they are so long and so often away from them. Moreover they are apt to lose touch with their parliaments and Cabinet colleagues. The responsible decisions necessary in his department cannot best be made without his supervision. Actually the new diplomacy makes for demagogy and makes settlements more difficult to achieve.¹

Yet for all the apparent changes and professed ideals of the new diplomacy the often criticized methods of the old diplomacy of Paléologue's day have had to be resorted to, as many of them are the basic necessities of negotiation. The real negotiations of the United Nations for instance are not carried on in open assembly but in private, even in secret. The appearances have changed but the essentials of diplomacy remain the same and must be followed if success is to be attained in negotiation.

The role of the diplomatist is also still important

¹Nathaniel Peffer, "Nostalgia for a Diplomatic Past", The Virginia Quarterly Review, xxxv, (1959), 457-465.

in the new diplomacy though often little known to the general public." An Ambassador in a foreign capital must always be the main source of information, above all the interpreter, regarding political conditions, trends and opinions in the country in which he resides."¹ He alone gets to know the individuals that he is dealing with and his decision must be relied on as to what is immediately practicable or not, and he alone can decide when and how his instructions can best be executed. He must be a man of wider training than his nineteenth century predecessor and though deprived of much of the initiative of the diplomat of previous eras by the speed of communications, the greater number and importance of the new type of conferences demand great personal qualities of the professional diplomat. He has to know more about more subjects and report on wider fields and therefore must have wider social and economic training. Paléologue, for instance, had had very little economic or sociological training. His education was a classical one and he acquired insight into the workings of human nature.

The failings of the 'Old Diplomacy' were not due to the manner in which it dealt with issues but to the policies it tried to implement. The methods of the 'New Diplomacy' are now often discredited just as much as those of the Old but the methods of the Old appear much more dignified and

¹Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, p.82.

effective in retrospect. The changes in method occurred with the changes in conditions. Nevertheless, the lack of success apparent in the 'New Diplomacy' in contemporary times is more the result of conditions than of methods. The atmosphere of 'Cold War', in which the opposing and negotiating parties are different in background and training, basic principles and aims, makes common ground, except possibly on the issue of survival, almost nonexistent. At least in the 'Old Diplomacy' the negotiating parties had much in common and the negotiators who were professional diplomats such as Paléologue were often of the same social and educational backgrounds. The First Great War ended the era of the freemasonry of diplomats and the diplomat with great scope for personal initiative such as Paléologue whose talents would be wasted, or, at least, not show to advantage in the New Diplomacy where politicians hold sway.

Maurice Georges Paléologue's retirement from diplomacy in 1920 near the end of the First World War coincided with the advent of the New Diplomacy. His abilities and action were those of the traditional diplomat and belonged more properly to the past era with its more dignified and certain relations among nations. In the new era his hand turned to another profession, that of the author, where he continued to add to the distinction he had gained in the field of diplomacy. Properly ending this second career near the end

of another great war, death came to Paléologue at the grand age of eighty-five years on November 21, 1944 happily leaving him unexposed to the latest uncertainty and indignity of diplomatic method.

X

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