

CLASSES AND THE "STATE OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE"

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IN THE SOVIET UNION

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A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University

September 1968

MASTER OF ARTS (1968)
(Political Science)

McMASTER UNIVERSITY
Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: Classes and the "State of the Whole People" in the
Soviet Union

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NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 123

SCOPE AND CONTENTS: The subject of this thesis is the concept of the "state of the whole people", outlined in the New Party Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This concept, initiated during N. S. Khrushchev's leadership, will be analyzed in relation to the self-proclaimed goal of all "Marxists", the ultimate classless communist society. Soviet and Western sources will be used.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to express my gratitude for the encouragement and guidance given to me by Dr. P. J. Potichnyj throughout the development of this thesis. I am also indebted to Professors D. Novak, K. H. Pringsheim and G. S. Vichert for their assistance with the style of this work, and to Chris MacPherson who proved to be a most proficient typist. My thanks are also due to my husband and family who in the last analysis made the whole endeavour worth while.

PREFACE

N. S. Khrushchev's announcement in 1959 that the Soviet Union had entered into a new and higher stage of communist development was followed, in 1961, by the proclamation that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" had fulfilled its historical purpose and was replaced in the new stage by the "state of the whole people". This thesis will focus on the concept of the "state of the whole people" in relation to the self-proclaimed goal of all Marxists, the "classless" society.

In the first chapter, a summary will be made of Marx's conception of class, class struggle, and historical development. This analysis will provide a framework against which we will compare Soviet class development. The main emphasis will be on Khrushchev's theory, as it represents the "latest and highest" stage in the progression toward the ultimate communist society. The analysis will not be extended to the post-Khrushchev period.

In the second chapter, the Marxian conception of "classless" society will be discussed against the technological developments in the Soviet Union. The discussion will center on Soviet views regarding the division of people, according to labour performed, in the ultimate communist society. The crucial question that we will attempt to analyze is whether

the Soviet leaders and theorists consider that there will be a division of people according to "rulers" and "ruled" in the ultimate communist society.

In the last chapter, the concept the "state of the whole people" will be discussed from the point of view of the withering away of the state.

Sources of most value to our topic are Soviet theoretical statements such as the Party Congresses, The New Party Program, and the Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. Articles by Soviet academicians and government officials, translated in such English journals as Current Digest of the Soviet Press and Soviet Sociology, will also be consulted. In addition, various other primary and secondary works will be consulted and included in the Bibliography.

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CHAPTER I

CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN SOVIET SOCIETY

For Karl Marx,¹ the decisive factor in historical development is the economic one; it conditions man's intellectual activities as well as the political and social structures of society. This process has a "dialectical" character leading to social contradictions and class struggles. Classes, formed as a result of their relationship to the means of production (manifested in ownership or non-ownership), stand in contradiction to each other as thesis and antithesis, in the sense that one is characterized by those features of which the other is the complete negation. This conflict is resolved by a "leap" (radical change such as a revolution) which brings about a "qualitative" change. Each new synthesis is viewed by Marx as a higher form of the initial thesis. He foresees the ultimate removal of all contradictions with the result that a "classless" society will come into being. Marx describes this ultimate society only vaguely and the following passage from the Critique of the Gotha Programme represents his most complete statement on this subject; he states:

¹The sources used for Marx's interpretation of historical development and "dialectical materialism" are the following: K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, parts 1 and 3, ed., R. Pascal (New York: International Publishers, 1939); G. A. Wetter, Dialectical Materialism, trans., from German by Peter Heath (New York; London: F. A. Praeger, 1958), chap. 3.

In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of individuals under division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour has vanished; after labour, from a mere means of life has itself become the prime necessity of life; after the productive forces have also increased with the all round development of the individual and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly--only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be fully left behind and society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.²

According to Marx, this classless society will be achieved after the class-war between the two classes emerging from capitalist society i.e. the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The latter class after emancipating itself will also emancipate the whole of society. But this will not occur immediately. "Between capitalist and communist society", states Marx, "lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other". He continues: "There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat".³

The concepts of class and class struggle play a central role in Marx's view of the development of society. It is

Gustaw Wetter is a leading German scholar and critic of Soviet Philosophy.

²Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, ed., C. P. Dutt (New York: International Publisher, 1938), p. 10.

³Ibid., p. 18.

surprising therefore to find no explicit definition of class in Marx's work. In the last volume of his incompleted Capital, Marx stops short of answering his own question: "What constitutes a class?"⁴

From a survey of some of Marx's works, as well as the studies of his completed works by such noted sociologists as Stanislaw Ossowski,⁵ a Polish Marxist, A. B. Bottomore,⁶ an English Marxist, and Ralf Dahrendorf,⁷ a German critic of Marxian analysis of class in industrial societies, it seems that Marx denotes a class by two criteria.

The first, and the most fundamental factor in describing a class, is the economic one. Under capitalism, the two classes are divided according to the ownership of the means of production. The owners exploit the manpower of the workers by treating them as a "commodity", and appropriate their "surplus value" (profit) arising from the production process. This economic situation produces a "gap between the life situations of worker and capitalist" which is manifested in

⁴Karl Marx, Capital in Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 13.

⁵Stanislaw Ossowski, Class Structure in the Social Consciousness, trans., from Polish by Sheila Patterson (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

⁶A. B. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1965).

⁷Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial

differences in their "interests", "education" and style of life.⁸ However, the sharing of a common economic situation is not sufficient in itself to produce classes and class struggle. Marx says that "in so far as the identity of their interest does not produce a community, national association, and political organization, they do not constitute a class".⁹ In The German Ideology, Marx maintains that a class by itself ("Klasse an sich") cannot exist, but is realized only when individuals sharing a common situation "are engaged in a common struggle with another class". A class in the full sense of the meaning, is described by Marx as a class for itself ("Klasse für sich").¹⁰

Society, op. cit. Dahrendorf's analysis of Marx's theory of class is the most detailed and useful for this thesis. The author reconstructs Marx's model of class and class struggle from Marx's own works and for the most part in Marx's own words.

⁸Karl Marx states: "In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions which separate their way of life, their interests, and their education from those of other classes and oppose them to these, they constitute a class". Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", selections in Karl Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto, ed., S. H. Beer (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), pp. 63-64.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, op. cit., pp. 48-9.

In other words, there must be a psychological bond uniting a class in an irreconcilable, "antagonistic", struggle against another class. This antagonism must have a political expression ("organization") and must be resolved by a political struggle.¹¹ Within Marx's conception, the state is completely dependent on the existence of irreconcilable class struggle. As he says in Capital:

The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the immediate producers [workers] determines the relation of domination and subjection as it grows directly out of and in turn determines production. On this is based the whole structure of the economic community as it comes forth from the relations of production, and thereby at the same time its political structure. It is always the immediate relation of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate producers-- a relation whose specific pattern of course always corresponds to a certain stage in the development of labor and its social force of production--in which we find the final secret, the hidden basis of the whole structure of society, including the political patterns of sovereignty and dependence, in short, of a given specific form of government.¹²

When Marx tries to apply his conception of class to actual "capitalist" societies of his day, he is forced to extend his terminology. He could not in his own words, overlook the "mass of the nation. . . standing between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie".¹³ Thus, he sometimes

¹¹K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

¹²Karl Marx, Capital; cited in Dahrendorf, p. 13.

¹³K. Marx, The Class Struggles in France, 1848-50; cited in Ossowski, op. cit., p. 75.

speaks of social "stratum" or refers to specific groups such as "ideological class", "shopkeeping class", "class of freeholders", "dangerous class", "petty bourgeois and peasant classes".¹⁴ In Capital, he distinguishes between "great classes" and "intermediate classes".¹⁵

Students of Marxist works, seem to agree that the above "strata" and "intermediate classes" are considered by Marx as "transitional" classes.¹⁶ These "classes" lack a fundamentum divisionis and thus do not qualify as a class in the full sense of the meaning, i.e. "Klasse für sich". Additional terminology is necessary because within Marx's actual analysis of society, there are groups whose economic situation and interests overlap between the two dichotomous real classes. For example, the "petty bourgeoisie" composed of craftsmen and small landowners, possess their own means of production and at the same time themselves make use of it. In their former position they identify with the bourgeoisie.

¹⁴Karl Marx, Capital and The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte; Karl Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto; all cited in D. C. Hodges, "The 'Intermediate Classes' in Marxian Theory", Social Research, No. 28 (April, 1961), p. 25.

¹⁵Karl Marx, Capital; cited in D. C. Hodges, op. cit., p. 24.

¹⁶D. C. Hodges, op. cit., p. 25; S. Ossowski, op. cit., pp. 75, 182-3; Dahrendorf, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

On the other hand, they are similar to the proletariat in that they do not exploit the labour of workers nor appropriate the workers' profit.

Within Marx's conception of historical development, however, a total polarization of the two basic classes will take place when "the complete existence of all the forces of production which could possibly develop in the womb of the old society" comes about.¹⁷ Thus the strata and intermediate classes will be either non-existent or inconsequential. Only in communist society (after the "revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat" is completed), will there be no classes and no strata. Even stratification based on ability and occupation will not exist, since Marx maintains that the "division of labour" and the related concept of "antithesis between mental and physical labor" will be eliminated.¹⁸

Marx's analysis of "capitalist" society, however, has not been verified by twentieth century developments. Instead of a polarization into proletariat and bourgeoisie, new classes have arisen or increased in number. These new classes

¹⁷Karl Marx, Das Elend der Philosophie (The Poverty of Philosophy); cited in Dahrendorf, op. cit., p. 16.

¹⁸K. Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, op. cit., p. 10. The topic of mental and physical labour and the "division of labour" will be discussed in the next chapter.

are sometimes referred to as the "middle classes"¹⁹ or the "intelligentsia".²⁰ They are made up of office workers, supervisors, managers, technicians, scientists and many others employed in providing services to the rest of the population.²¹ Often they do not own the means of production, nor exploit the labour of others. Yet, they do not fit into Marx's conception of the proletariat defined as a "man who is unprotected from the extremes of exploitation by any special qualification which would prevent him from being replaced by another worker with equal strength".²² Marx, furthermore, did not foresee the growth of highly institutionalized states, governed by people who do not necessarily own the means of production. Thus some sociologists conclude that Marx's conception of class and historical development appears inadequate in the technological society of the twentieth century.²³ S. Ossowski, for example, states:

In modern situations where political authorities can overtly and effectively change the class structure; where the privileges that are the most essential for social status including that of a higher share in the national income, are conferred by a decision of the political authorities where

¹⁹A. B. Bottomore, op. cit., p. 25.

²⁰The Soviets describe the new classes of engineers, managers etc. as the "intelligentsia". See discussion below pp 13-17.

²¹A. B. Bottomore, op. cit., pp. 25-6.

²²S. Ossowski, op. cit., pp. 78-9.

²³R. Dahrendorf, op. cit., Chap. 4; A. B. Bottomore, op. cit., chap. 3.

a large part or even the majority of the population is included in a stratification of the type in a bureaucratic hierarchy--the nineteenth century concept becomes more or less an anachronism, and class conflicts give way to other forms of social antagonism.²⁴

The Soviet leaders, in adopting the Marxian framework, are faced with the task of adapting the nineteenth century theory to present developments. The particular class structure which Marx outlined as necessary for the "leap" from capitalism to communism, was not present in the Russia of 1917. The Soviet leaders have had to construct consciously what for Marx was to have been a natural development. The repressive means imposed by a militant state on the Soviet society, have been justified by the ultimate Marxian goal of the "classless-stateless" communist society.

In the remaining part of this chapter, we will focus on the theoretical statements and policies concerning the development of class structure and class struggle in the Soviet Union. The main focus will be on the Khrushchevian period as it represents that latest and highest stage in the transitional process to full communism. Khrushchev's announcement at the XXIst Party Congress that the Soviet Union was in the stage of "full-scale construction to communism",²⁵ was further

²⁴S. Ossowski, op. cit., p. 184.

²⁵"The Documentary Record of the Extraordinary 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union", in Leo Gruliov, ed., Current Soviet Policies, III (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 41, 54-5.

elaborated by the publication of several authoritative documents and books. Among the most important of these publications is the New Party Program,²⁶ adopted at the XXIInd Party Congress, and the Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, the official textbook of communism published in 1961. These two sources in addition to a book entitled Changes in the Class Structure of Society in the Process of the Building of Socialism and Communism,²⁸ published by the Higher Communist Party School and the Academy of Social Sciences, provide the most valuable sources in the discussion of the Soviet conception of class structure in the Khrushchev period.

The New Party Program maintains that the class structure of the Soviet Union in 1961 is composed of two classes, the workers and the kolkhoz peasantry. A section of

²⁶"Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" in The New Soviet Society, with Annotations and an Introduction by H. Ritvo (New York: The New Leader, 1962). Hereafter references to this document will be "The New Party Program".

²⁷O. V. Kuusinen, ed., Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1961). O. V. Kuusinen was a government and party official and full member since 1958 of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He has been a Central Committee member since 1941 and Secretariat and Presidium member from 1957 to 1964.

²⁸G. Ye Glezerman, ed., Changes in the Class Structure of Society in the Process of the Building of Socialism and Communism, trans. by Joint Publication Research Service (Annapolis, Maryland: Research and Microfilm Publications, Inc., 1962). G. Ye Glezerman is a Philosopher,

the population referred to as the intelligentsia is called "stratum".²⁹ The relationship between the two classes and the stratum is described as one of "moral and political unity". It is a non-antagonistic class relationship.³⁰ According to the Program, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" has fulfilled its historical purpose and is now (as of 1961) replaced by the "state of the whole people".³¹

In a 1961 analysis of Soviet class development by two academicians G. L. Smirnov and N. A. Aitov,³² it is

and occupies the chair of Dialectical and Historical Materialism in the Academy of Social Sciences; he has been a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU since 1955. He is an author of several publications dealing with philosophical and social subjects. Contributors to the book edited by Glezerman are the following post-graduate students of the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the Central Committee, CPSU: A. T. Luka (Chapter 1); A. V. Inshukova (Chapter 2); G. L. Smirnov (Chapter 3); W. A. Aitov (Chapter 4); Ye. Khodzhayev (Chapter 5). G. L. Smirnov has held various government and party posts dealing with agriculture and is a candidate of Philosophical Sciences. Ye. Khodzhayev is also a Candidate Member of Philosophical Sciences and has held Party and Government posts in the Turkmen Republic. In 1961-2, he was head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, in CC of Communist party in Turkmenistan.

²⁹"The New Party Program", op. cit., pp. 38-9.

³⁰Ibid., p. 37.

³¹"The New Party Program", op. cit., pp. 166-7.

³²G. L. Smirnov, "The Development of the Workers' Class in the USSR and its Role in the Building of Communism"; and N. A. Aitov, "The Kolkhoz Peasantry During the Period of an Expanded Building of Communism". Changes in the Class Structure. . . , op. cit., pp. 68-79.

maintained that the two friendly classes exist as a result of differences in their relations to the means of production. The property of the kolkhoz peasantry is property of the given collective farm; the property of the workers in industry and state farms is nationalized property belonging to all the people including the peasantry. Moreover, the collective farm members still own private property in the form of garden plots, orchards or livestock. As such, the peasantry has not attained the same level of "communization" as have the workers.³³ The two classes also differ in their degree of organization and distribution. State property is organized and planned on the scale of the whole country while kolkhoz property is organized on the basis of the individual farm which may however encompass several villages.³⁴ Even though the latter is included under the direction of the national scheme, N. A. Aitov concludes that "circumscribed kolkhoz interests may, to a certain degree, contradict the national interest".³⁵

At the same time, the collective property is considered a form of "socialist property" in that labour is no longer

³³G. L. Smirnov, p. 129; N. A. Aitov, p. 180.

³⁴N. A. Aitov, pp. 180-3.

³⁵Ibid., p. 182.

used as a "commodity" and that their interests coincide with those of the working class. There is a community of interests expressed in the alliance between them, says N. A. Aitov.³⁶ The differences that do exist are not considered to be of the same fundamental nature as those which existed between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but rather derive from "old" contradictions remaining from the past. These "remnants" from the past are not possessed by any class but rather by individuals who deviate from the societal norms.³⁷ "The fundamental and decisive factor with regard to the peasantry", says Aitov, "consists of its national interests which it has in common with the workers."³⁸ Because the peasantry is still influenced by both "group and personal interests", however, it must still be "led by the workers' class along a path towards the resolution of national goals and interests, which at the same time, are also the fundamental and principal interests of the peasantry".³⁹

The intelligentsia, according to Soviet academician Ye. Khodzhayev, is considered a "social stratum" that occurs

³⁶N. A. Aitov, p. 183.

³⁷G. L. Smirnov, p. 131.

³⁸N. A. Aitov, p. 184.

³⁹Ibid.

as a result of the division of labour into mental and physical categories.⁴⁰ The intelligentsia is not considered a class because it owns the means of production with all the toilers and serves the working class and peasantry. It also draws people from the two classes into its own ranks.⁴¹

According to the Vestnik Statistiki (Statistical Herald),⁴² the 1959 distribution of the population according to groups is the following: professional, industrial and office workers--68.3 per cent; kolkhoz peasantry--31.4 per cent; individual peasants and non-cooperatized handicraft workers--0.3 per cent. The first category is in turn divided into workers and the intelligentsia; the latter accounts for 20.7 per cent of the population.⁴³ The criteria used to differentiate the intelligentsia from the workers is not explicitly stated. On the broader level, the two groups are divided into those that perform mental labor as opposed to those who perform physical tasks. Molotov, at the XVIIIth Party Congress, for example, included in his

⁴⁰Ye. Khodzhayev, "The Development of Socialist Intelligentsia and its Role in the Building of Communism", in Changes in the Class Structure. . . , op. cit., p. 243.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 244-6.

⁴²Vestnik Statistiki (Statistical Herald), No. 12, (1960), p. 3; cited in G. L. Smirnov, op. cit., p. 144.

⁴³Ye. Khodzhayev, op. cit., p. 251.

definition of the intelligentsia a large group of responsible administrators, specialists and technicians.⁴⁴ He cited in this group not only doctors but intermediate medical personnel, including attendants and midwives; not merely accountants but ordinary bookkeepers as well; not only factory directors but the managers of shoe repair stores and restaurants.⁴⁵ From this broad definition, it seems obvious that there would be a further re-stratification according to the level and importance of the position involved i.e. a factory manager would be considered in a higher position than the director of a shoe repair store.

Ye. Khodzhayev's 1961 analysis of the Soviet intelligentsia appears to be just as broad and vague as that conceived by the Stalinist writers. Khodzhayev includes the following in this category: managers of state organs, public organizations and their substructural subdivisions (i.e. Khrushchev and a leader of a cell are considered in the same category); enterprise directors and directors of enterprise subdivisions; engineering technicians; agronomists, zoo-technicians, veterinary workers and foresters; medical workers; teachers, educators and scientific workers; cultural-enlightenment

⁴⁴Cited in R. A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles and Clyde Kluckhohn, How the Soviet System Works (New York: Vintage Books, 1956), p. 203.

⁴⁵Ibid.

workers; legal personnel; communication workers; planning, accounting and control-inspection workers.⁴⁶ Thus included in this group would be high and ordinary officials and professionals and ordinary secretaries. Bauer, Inkeles, and Klukhohn, Harvard sociologists, in their sociological study of Soviet society, state that the Soviet leaders and people subdivide the above broad definition into "intelligentsia" and "employees".⁴⁷ The authors state:

We include in the intelligentsia people in the technical, responsible administrative, professional and related activities, regardless of formal education, as well as the well educated, regardless of occupation. . . .It is to be noted that we exclude ordinary white-collar workers, clerks typists, salesgirls, ordinary bookkeepers, bottle washers in laboratories, and place these people in a separate group called 'employees'.⁴⁸

Because of this subdivision of the broader concept of the intelligentsia, the Soviets often refer to the concept in the plural form i.e. "strata" of society rather than "stratum". Later, when we are discussing the privileges enjoyed by the "intelligentsia", we will be primarily referring to the intelligentsia in the narrower sense i.e. excluding the "employees".

Leaving aside the problem of definition, there is a

⁴⁶Ye. Khodzhayev, op. cit., pp. 250-1.

⁴⁷Bauer, Inkeles, Kluckhohn, op. cit., p. 203.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 204.

clear indication that the intelligentsia have increased greatly in number and importance in Soviet society. Khodzhayev states that the numerical size of the intelligentsia has increased by 130 per cent during the period of 1939-59 with an overall population increase of 22 per cent.⁴⁹ This growth is expected to continue in the future development of Soviet society. The New Party Program maintains that the differences between the working class (after the peasantry merges into the working class) and the intelligentsia will be obliterated by the former rising to the level of the latter strata.⁵⁰ In other words, all will become part of the intelligentsia. The academic V. Yel'meev⁵¹ is quoted as saying that in communist society, "the predominant type of labor will consist of engineer-technical and scientific labor". He continues: "The toilers, as the principle productive force of society, will be comprised of people engaged in engineering-technical labor whose work will combine both mental and physical functions".⁵² Other academicians such as E. L. Manevich,⁵³ argue against

⁴⁹Ye. Khodzhayev, op. cit., p. 251.

⁵⁰"The New Party Program", op. cit., pp. 109-11.

⁵¹V. Yel'meev--no biographical reference in H. E. Schulz and S. S. Taylor, eds., Who's Who in the USSR 1961-62; 1965-66 (Montreal: International Book and Publishing Co., Ltd., 1962).

⁵²V. Yel'meev, Nauka i Proizvodil'nyye Sily Obshchestva (Science and the Productive Forces of Society); cited in Ye. Khodzhayev, op. cit., p. 270.

this theory and conclude that the division of labour will continue to exist, even in communist society.⁵⁴ The reasoning behind these views within the doctrinal guideline set down by Marxism and within the present technological developments, will be discussed in the next chapter.

The main point of discussion here is that while the capitalist classes have been eliminated, classes of a so-called "socialist" or "special" type still remain.⁵⁵ For Marx, the notion of class without class struggle is a contradiction in terms. Class struggle, within Marxist theory of historical development, provides the motivating force for change toward the ultimate communist goal. It is only under full communism when the society is "classless" that class antagonisms are to cease. Yet Khrushchevian sources maintain that "the class struggle is not the motivating force of the socialist society."⁵⁶ It is replaced under socialism and in

⁵³E. L. Manevich--No biographical reference in Who's Who in the USSR.

⁵⁴E. L. Manevich, "Abolition of the Differences between Mental and Physical Labor in the Period of full-scale Construction of Communism" (Voprosy Filosofii, 1961, No. 9) trans., in Soviet Sociology, I, No. 3 (Winter 1962-3).

⁵⁵G. L. Smirnov, op. cit., p. 128 states: "Remaining, a special class, the workers class under socialism also must be examined on a basis of its relationships with other social groups. . . .The peasantry continues to exist under socialism as a special class along with the workers' class, and represents a new class associated with the socialist method of production".

⁵⁶A. V. Inshakova, "The Development of Class Struggle

the stage of building of communism by the "moral and political unity of society". The motivating force for change consists of a struggle between the "old" and "new" elements in society which are no longer embodied by different classes. A. V.

Inshakova states:

In this struggle progressive people from all segments of society stand against all those who adhere to the outdated, to that which hinders the forward progress of our society.⁵⁷

The Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, quoting Lenin's definition of class, justifies the concept of non-antagonistic classes by stating that the peasantry is not a basic historical class.⁵⁸ Lenin's definition reads as follows:

Classes are known as large groups of people that are distinctive: by their place in the historically established system of national production; by their relation towards the means of production (in the majority of cases fixed by and shaped by laws); by their role in the national organization of labor; consequently by their methods of obtaining their share of the national wealth which they dispose of. The classes are groups of people which can appropriate the labor of other groups due to the differences

during the Period of Transition from Capitalism to Socialism", in Changes in the Class Structure. . . , p. 117.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 118.

⁵⁸ Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, op. cit., pp. 188-9.

in their position within the national economy.⁵⁹

If Lenin's definition is interpreted within Marx's conception of historical development, then the peasantry is certainly not a basic class either under capitalism or socialism. Yet according to Soviet statistics, the peasantry made up the majority of the population in Russia of 1917, and more than thirty per cent of the population in 1959. It was and is one of the particular features of the Soviet environment that has had to be accommodated in the theoretical framework. By acknowledging that differences between the peasantry and working class exist, Soviet theory has had to avoid the Marxist dictate that classes exist only in contradiction to each other. The use of the term "stratum" was impossible since it referred to the "intelligentsia"; moreover, if two strata existed alongside the working class, the Soviet society would be classless. This conclusion would imply that the state could no longer exist: the solution to this dilemma was found in the concept of non-antagonistic classes which, while a contradiction in terms for classical Marxism, accommodates the existing class of the peasantry while assuring that the theory of conflict does not endanger the stability of the system. The peasantry is not considered a real class but rather a "special" or "socialist" class.

⁵⁹V. I. Lenin, A Great Beginning cited in Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, p. 184.

This doctrinal justification for the existence of classes after class antagonisms have been removed, is not a new theory developed by Khrushchev or his theoreticians. The concept was actually initiated by Stalin in 1936,⁶⁰ when he announced that the struggle between the "exploiters" (landowners, capitalists, and the top strata of the peasantry and intelligentsia) and the "exploited"⁶¹ (workers, and the

⁶⁰"The 1936 Constitution of the USSR" in A. Denisov and M. Kirichenko, Soviet State Law trans., from Russian by S. Belsky and M. Saifulin, ed., D. Ogden and M. Perelman (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), pp. 91-107. A. Denisov has been a Law Professor at the University of Moscow since 1942, and has held various governmental posts between 1956-62; he was chairman of the Legal Commission, USSR Council of Ministers.

⁶¹In the period prior to 1936, the peasantry and intelligentsia were divided by Soviet leaders into three strata. The top strata of each group was identified with the "bourgeoisie" (the "exploiters") and underwent a process of "liquidation" i.e. the kulaks and intelligentsia were harshly treated by Lenin under "War-Communism" and, by Stalin after the New Economic Policy (NEP). The lowest strata of poor peasantry and intelligentsia, closest to the interests of the working class were, according to Soviet sources, absorbed immediately into the working class alliance! The middle strata of each group underwent a process of "neutralization" whereby their vacillation between the bourgeoisie and working class was resolved by their absorption into the alliance with the working class. The middle strata of the peasantry was "neutralized" through the process of collectivization which was begun in 1929 and completed by 1935. Through the process of differentiation and break-up of the old intelligentsia, and rapid mobilization into useful work for the Soviet state, the "old" intelligentsia was replaced, according to Stalin by a "new" intelligentsia. Stalin in the thirties, propounded a policy of "solicitude" and cooperation towards the intelligentsia by the rest of the population. A. Denisov and M. Kirichenko, Soviet State Law, Chap. 3; A. T. Luka, "The Experience gained in the Liquidation of

lowest strata of the peasantry and intelligentsia) had been completed with the liquidation of the former groups. With the elimination of the class struggle, Stalin proclaimed that the transition from capitalism to socialism was completed and that the new period in Soviet development was to be marked by a consolidation of socialism and "gradual transition to communism".⁶² Classes still existed as a result of the differences of the peasantry and workers in their relations to the means of production; however, the class relationship was of a non-antagonistic nature. Under the "moral and political unity" pervading the friendly alliance between the two classes and stratum, the method of resolving conflict and contradiction was to be through education, persuasion, and the gradual transformation of human consciousness.⁶³ Liquidation was reserved only for the "enemies of the people"⁶⁴ i.e. individual deviants rather than classes, embodying "old" remnants from the past.

Exploiting Classes in Countries of Socialism" and A. V. Inshakova, "The Development of Class Struggle during the Period of Transition from Capitalism to Socialism", in Changes in the Class Structure. . ., op. cit.

⁶²"The 1936 Constitution of the USSR" in Soviet State Law, op. cit., pp. 91-2.

⁶³A. V. Inshakova, op. cit., pp. 117-118.

⁶⁴The term "enemy of the people" was used by Stalin as a rationale for the purges and suppression of an opposition to his policy. Meanwhile, Stalin could maintain that conflict between classes was eliminated and that the suppression was only directed at individual "deviants".

The logical extension of this class society that was not a class society in the proper sense, is that Soviet society was progressing toward a "classless" society. This would imply that the state as the instrument of oppression of one class by another should be withering away. Yet in fact the state by 1936 in the Soviet Union was becoming stronger rather than weaker. Stalin's resolution of this doctrinal dictate was the proclamation that the state will wither away via its maximum strengthening until the full completion of communism not only in the Soviet Union but in the entire international arena. The theoretical role of the state was moreover extended to include positive manipulation of the economic base and social superstructure. Stalin in Marxism and Linguistics states:

The superstructure is a product of the base; but this does not mean that it merely reflects the base, that it is passive, neutral, indifferent to the fate of the base, to the fate of classes, to the character of the system. On the contrary no sooner does it arise than it becomes an exceedingly active force, actively assisting its base to shape and consolidate itself, and doing everything it can to help the new system finish off and eliminate the old base and the old classes.⁶⁵

Stalin in these statements completely reverses the Marxian relationship between the economic base and superstructure.

⁶⁵V. I. Stalin, Marxism and Linguistics (New York: International Publisher, 1951), pp. 9-10, 27-28 reprinted in R. V. Daniels, ed., A Documentary History of Communism (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), p. 198.

The conservatism of Stalinist theory is further illustrated by his conception of the dialectical "leap". The academician G. F. Aleksandrov,⁶⁶ in a report delivered at a session of the Academic Council of the Philosophical Institute of the Academy of Sciences on The Further Development of Dialectical and Historical Materialism in J. V. Stalin's 'Marxism and Problems of Linguistics' summarizes the Stalinist theory in the following manner:

In effecting the transition from one stage of development of socialist society to another, higher one, from an old quality to a new, the leading part is played by the initiative from above, the initiative of the Soviet State. The masses of the people actively support such a revolutionary initiative from above. . . . And it is precisely this which gives rise to the peculiarity of the transition occurring under such conditions from an old quality to a new, namely that here the leap no longer takes on the character of an explosion and a liquidation of the established order of society, and cannot possibly do so.⁶⁷

Thus the "leaps" that Stalin initiates are not allowed to take on the form of "explosions" or revolutions as Marx envisaged. As Aleksandrov points out, "initiative" or opposition outside the state i.e. from below, are not practical

⁶⁶G. F. Aleksandrov is a member of the Academy of the Philosophical Institute of the Academy of Sciences and is the author of several books dealing with ideology; biographical note in Gustav Wetter, op. cit., p. 564. No biographical reference in Who's Who in the USSR 1961-62; 1965-66.

⁶⁷Cited in Gustav Wetter, Dialectical Materialism, op. cit., pp. 326-7.

within the socialist system. If revolutions or changes occur, they are to be directed from above. The notion of non-antagonistic classes, as we have already stated, was also introduced to remove the class struggle as the motivating force for change in society and replace it by what has actually taken its place i.e. the domination and control of all segments of society by the state.

The Stalinist doctrinal innovations or interpretations of past theory are, by and large, accepted by Khrushchev writers. This is surprising, since the Khrushchevian period has been noted for its active "de-Stalinization" campaigns. In the initiation of the de-Stalinization campaign in 1956, Khrushchev, however acknowledged the correctness of Stalin's ideological policy. Khrushchev, in the "Secret Speech", states that Stalin performed a "positive role" in combating the "right" and "left" deviationists.⁶⁸ The former forces led by Bukharin, were condemned for the view that "under the dictatorship of the proletariat all forms of class struggle become unnecessary and that the contradictions existing in society gradually decrease and through evolution 'become transformed into a process of communist development'".⁶⁹ This

⁶⁸"N. S. Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' delivered at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, February 25, 1956", in D. N. Jacobs, ed., The New Communist Manifesto and Related Documents (New York; London: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 84.

⁶⁹A. V. Inshakova, op. cit., p. 94.

cautious or "conservative" ideological position was actually the one adopted by Stalin after 1936. Bukharin's views in the late twenties, however, conflicted with the priority, given by Stalin, to heavy industrialization at the expense of the peasantry and the consumer. The "leftist" Trotskyites, on the other hand, maintained the doctrine that during the period of transition "there is an intensification of contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry with the consequent flaring up of the class struggle".⁷⁰ This criticism against the stabilization of class struggle between the "neutralized" peasantry and workers would have prevented Stalin's policy of consolidation and strengthening of the Soviet state. The same reasoning was involved in Stalin's 1924 adoption of the concept of "socialism in one country" as opposed to Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution."⁷¹

Theoretical criticism against Stalin by the Khrushchev sources, is mainly directed against his concept of "the enemy of the people". This concept, while not of radical theoretical consequence, justified Stalin's purges. Khrushchev states that: "This led to glaring violations of revolutionary legality, and to the fact that many entirely innocent persons,

⁷⁰A. V. Inshakova, op. cit., p. 94.

⁷¹Stalin, "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists", Problems of Leninism, pp. 121-30. Reprinted in A Documentary History of Communism, I, 257-61.

who in the past had defended the party line, became victims".⁷²
In breaking with Stalin's policies, Khrushchev does not however, radically alter the concept of class and its relationships, in the new stage of Soviet development. He implies that under the "state of the whole people", class differences are becoming obliterated; but nevertheless, the two classes and the strata, still exist as under Stalin. Khrushchev is careful to note that there is no "great leap" between the "full-scale construction of communism" and the preceding periods. He states: "There does not exist some sort of wall between them, dividing these phases of social development. Communism grows out of socialism, and is its direct continuation".⁷³

Thus while the statistics for the 1936 class structure reveal a qualitative change in that the "exploiting" classes are completely eliminated; the statistics for the 1959 announcement of a new stage in soviet development are accompanied by a quantitative change. The following figures from the book on the changing class structure edited by Glezerman, illustrate this point:⁷⁴

⁷²"Khrushchev's "Secret Speech' . . .", op. cit., p. 85.

⁷³Cited in Jerome A. Gilison, "The Soviet Image of the Future Communist Society: a Critical Analysis of Contemporary Soviet Doctrine" (Columbia: Columbia University, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, 1965), p. 49.

⁷⁴Statistics for the years 1913 and 1939 are from

Class Composition of the Population in the USSR

	1913	1937	1959
Entire population including:	100	100	100
Professional, industrial and office workers	17	36.2	68.3
Kolkhoz peasants and cooperatized craftsmen	-	57.9	31.4
Individuals farmers (excluding kulaks), non-cooperatized and handicraft workers	66.7	5.9	0.3
Landowners, big and petty bourgeoisie merchants and kulaks	16.3	-	-

While Khrushchev's statements concerning classes may not be very different from Stalin's, his actual policies reflect a new emphasis by actually obliterating some of the wide discrepancies in the social system developed during the Stalinist period. For this reason, the insertion of the term "whole people" to reflect the relationship of the "moral and political unity" in Soviet society, has received a new interpretation by Khrushchev, that is primarily manifested in the policy reforms of this period.

Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya (Large Soviet Encyclopedia); cited in A. T. Luka, op. cit., p. 56. The statistics for 1959, are from the Vestnik Statistiki, op. cit., p. 144.

Theory and Practice in the Soviet Union

Once Stalin became consolidated in power (1928),⁷⁵ he embarked upon a policy of rapid "heavy industrialization" at the expense of consumer production. The people most affected and repressed by this policy were the peasantry. This group was forced to forego its gains made during the New Economic Policy and underwent "liquidation" (directed mainly against Kulaks) and compulsory collectivization. During the winter of 1929-30, over half of the peasantry was collectivized. At the same time, the burden of taxation fell on the peasantry in the form of "tribute" to the industrial sector.⁷⁶ Social advancement and political expression became to a large extent closed to this group because of the educational and political favouritism shown the "intelligentsia" by the state.⁷⁷ Throughout the Stalinist period, the

⁷⁵By this time the "Left Opposition" under Trotsky's leadership were suppressed and Stalin had attained control of the State and Party Apparatus. For the best account of the period, see the following: R. V. Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution: The Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), Chaps. 13, 14; Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (New York: Vintage Books, A. A. Knopf Inc., and Random House Inc., 1960).

⁷⁶V. I. Stalin, "On the Grain Front", Problems of Leninism, pp. 248-9, 251-9. Reprinted in A Documentary History of Communism, op. cit., pp. 301-305.

⁷⁷In 1939, Stalin announced a "cordial" and cooperative attitude towards the intelligentsia. According to Stalin, the process of differentiation (into strata) and the break-up of the old intelligentsia, and the rapid mobilization

peasantry opposed the state's plans by refusing to engage in agricultural production and attempting, with some measure of success, to regain some form of private property in the form of garden plots and livestock.⁷⁸ State control, was nevertheless, maintained through the continual growth of the party and state apparatus and the periodic use of repressive measures. One of the primary institutionalized means of control of the collective farm produce, was through the Machine and Tractor Stations; they (MTS) held a monopoly of most of the farm machinery and trained personnel.

The results of this policy were deplorable in the agricultural sector and in the status of the peasant. Khrushchev in a speech to the 1953 Central Committee plenum produced figures showing that the USSR in 1953 had fewer cattle than in 1916.⁷⁹ S. Bialer quotes the figures that in 1953, 13 per cent of the kolkhozes in Tadzhikistan were unable to pay their farmers any cash for collective labour, while 28

of the middle strata into useful work for the Soviet state resulted in the formation of a new intelligentsia requiring "solicitude and respect from the rest of the population". V. I. Stalin, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee, to the Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU (B)", Problems of Leninism (March, 1939), pp. 795-800. Reprinted in A Documentary History of Communism, op. cit., II, 79-80.

⁷⁸S. I. Ploss, Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia: a Case Study of Agricultural Policy 1953-63 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), chap. 1. Ploss is a Western Sovietologist, specializing in Soviet decision-making; he is presently teaching at Princeton University.

per cent paid only one ruble per labor day--this in a republic strongly favoured by the existing agricultural price structure.⁸⁰ In 1956, Khrushchev accused Stalin of viewing the collective farms through "rose-colored glasses" by accepting the picture drawn in propaganda films".⁸¹

The working class, which within the Marxist scheme was to emancipate the whole of society, was only a little better off than the peasantry. There was a lack of consumer goods, housing, and social services. Their income relative to that received by the intelligentsia, was low.⁸² Oppressive labour decrees (especially those of 1940) prohibited the workers' from leaving their jobs; on the other hand, the worker was obliged to take up another job if so ordered by the authorities. Repressive measures were also enforced for

⁷⁹Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-64 (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 29. Linden is a specialist in Soviet politics and the Federal government, and presently teaches at St. John's College, Annapolis, Maryland.

⁸⁰S. Bialer, ". . . But Some Are More Equal Than Others" in Abraham Brumberg, ed., Russia Under Khrushchev (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1962), p. 243. Bialer was a former functionary in the Agitgrop Department of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist party and presently teaches at Columbia University.

⁸¹N. S. Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech'. . .', op. cit., pp. 122-3.

⁸²S. Bialer, op. cit., pp. 247-8.

absenteeism without a valid excuse, and failure to meet the norms set down by the state.⁸³ Advancement through the educational and political system was also to a large extent closed to the worker and his children, because of the favouritism shown by the state to the intelligentsia.

Beginning with the thirties and especially after Stalin's 1939 speech of "solicitude and respect" for the intelligentsia, this group was in a favoured position in Soviet society. This favouritism was manifested in their relatively high income, style of living, and social privileges. R. A. Feldmesser⁸⁴ says that: "The school system initiated in the 1930's was one of the major props of social differentiation".⁸⁵ Although seven years of education was compulsory, it was revealed that as late as 1958, only 80 per cent of the young people actually completed the course.⁸⁶ After the seven-year school, a student might, according to Feldmesser's analysis:

⁸³Paul Barton, "The Current Status of the Soviet Worker", Russia Under Khrushchev, op. cit., pp. 263-4. Paul Barton is a Czech sociologist and economist and has written several works dealing with Soviet economic and social problems. Barton presently lives and works in the United States.

⁸⁴R. A. Feldmesser, "Equality and Inequality Under Khrushchev", Russia Under Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 229. Feldmesser is a Professor of Sociology at Brandeis University and has written on social mobility in the USSR.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Ibid.

- (a) go to work in a job requiring little or no skill;
- (b) be drafted into a labor-reserves school, providing training of up to two years for occupations of moderate skill;
- (c) enter a tekhnikum, a three- or four-year school for highly skilled manual and some non-manual occupations; or
- (d) proceed to the upper grades of a ten-year school for essentially 'academic' training, preparatory in almost all cases to matriculation at a vuz (higher educational institution).⁸⁷

Tuition fees were charged in the vuzes, ten year schools, and technikums. Scholarships were available at technikums, and room, board, and uniforms were free in the "labor reserves schools." No such aid was provided for pupils in the ten-year school. Feldmesser concludes:

For both material and 'cultural' reasons, therefore, the tendency was for children from lower-status families to attend the vocational schools and enter the same sort of occupations already held by their parents, while children of the 'elite' were more likely to take the academic sequence preparing them for professional and administrative positions. The greater informal influence which highly placed parents could exercise on those responsible for vuz admission strengthened this tendency.⁸⁸

The intelligentsia either because of their professional, occupational or administrative position, received a relatively higher income than the rest of the population. Ossowski gives the ratio of forty to one in the differentiation of income between some of the members of the "privileged class" and the rest of society.⁸⁹ Accentuating of their income,

⁸⁷R. A. Feldmesser, op. cit., pp. 229-30.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 230.

⁸⁹S. Ossowski, op. cit., p. 116.

was further possible through "lavish bonuses" and expense accounts on komandirovki (business trips).⁹⁰ Despite the lack of consumer goods and social services, the "privileged" intelligentsia were allotted the best housing facilities, and enjoyed social services such as medical and recreational facilities not allotted the rest of the population.⁹¹

Thus while Stalin proclaimed that Soviet society was approaching "classlessness", the actual social structure had become sharply stratified. This stratification, however, did not fit into the criteria set down by Marx. The intelligentsia, or at least the "privileged" part of it, did not actually own the means of production but did control it. Through education and/or occupation, and especially through the favoritism shown the intelligentsia by the state, it had achieved a "privileged" position in Soviet society. In part, state policy towards it, also arose out of the necessity for highly trained and/or loyal personnel, to fill the positions in the highly complex economic and political systems.

Under Khrushchev's regime, there were definite attempts to change policy so as to alleviate some of the worst disparities in the social structure. The peasantry's lot was the first

⁹⁰R. A. Feldmesser, op. cit., p. 227.

⁹¹S. Bialer, op. cit., pp. 248-51.

problem tackled. As early as 1953, Khrushchev offered a program of farm price reform, tax relief, and increased the capital investment in agriculture.⁹² According to Bialer, the average payment per labour day on the collectives between 1952-8 was nearly tripled, while the sum of the collectives' payment for labour had almost quadrupled. Bialer states that "nothing close to such an increase has affected industrial wages or the urban standard of living".⁹³ Trained personnel were induced, by monetary increments, to remain or enter into work on the collective farms.⁹⁴ The quality and quantity of farm machinery was increased and in 1958, the MTS were abolished and the machinery transferred to the collective farms.⁹⁵ This radical step, (Stalin counselled against such a policy in 1952),⁹⁶ was part of Khrushchev's overall

⁹²R. A. Feldmesser, op. cit., p. 228.

⁹³S. Bialer, op. cit., p. 244.

⁹⁴Arcadius Kahn, "The Peasant, The Party, and The System", Russia under Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 293. Kahn is a Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago and an expert on Soviet agriculture and author of several studies of the Soviet economy.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶V. I. Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" in Leo Gruliov, ed., Current Soviet Policies (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1953), pp. 18-20.

plan to improve the lot of the peasantry and at the same time lift the agricultural sector in economic productivity. His ultimate objective was to establish "agrorods"--self-sufficient agricultural cities where all the educational, social and recreational facilities of the towns would be present.⁹⁷

According to the New Party Program, the economic advancement of the kolkhozes, would raise the level of "socialization" in the countryside.⁹⁸ By a process of kolkhoz amalgamation, Khrushchev foresaw the growth of these larger units into organizations resembling public organizations such as the trade unions. Within this conception, it seems that the kolkhozes, as the agricultural "schools of communism",⁹⁹ would bypass the nationalization stage in development, and enter into public self-government promised after the state withers away. When this occurs, the differences between "town and country" and between the "working and peasantry classes", would be eliminated. The New Party Program states:

⁹⁷ Khrushchev suggested this policy in 1950-1 at which time Stalin rejected the scheme. S. I. Ploss, op. cit., pp. 45-47. In the "New Party Program", the concept of agrorods is presented on several occasions. "The New Party Program", op. cit., pp. 142, 145-6.

⁹⁸ "The New Party Program", op. cit., p. 142.

⁹⁹ The term "schools of communism" are often used to denote public organizations such as trade unions.

Gradually, the kolkhoz villages will grow into amalgamated urban communities with modern housing facilities, public amenities and services, and cultural and medical institutions. The rural population will ultimately draw level with the urban population in cultural and living conditions.¹⁰⁰

Regarding the growth of "communist self-government", the Program states:

As socialist statehood develops, it will gradually become communist self-government of the people which will embrace the Soviet Trade Unions, cooperatives (i.e. the kolkhoz communities) and other mass organizations of the people.¹⁰¹

This scheme served two purposes. On the one hand, it raises the agricultural sector and rejected the priority given by Stalin to the industrial sector at the expense of the rural area. On the other hand, it served the ideological purpose of drawing the two sectors closer together, and ultimately eliminating all the differences, in order to meet the classical picture of communist society. It was for the former reason, that the scheme was criticized and opposed by Stalin in 1950-1 and by members of the so-called "Anti-Party" group under Khrushchev's regime.¹⁰²

Under Khrushchev, says Bialer, steps were also taken to raise the social and working conditions of the working

¹⁰⁰ "The New Party Program", op. cit., pp. 145-6.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 142.

¹⁰² Karl A. Linden, op. cit., pp. 25-9.

class. The wage and salary provisions of the Seven Year Plan maintained that the minimum wage was to increase by some 60 to 70 per cent between 1959 and 1965, compared to an average increase in all wages of 26 per cent.¹⁰³ Bialer concludes:

Since, by some estimates, 20 per cent or more of all workers in the main sectors of the state economy are in the minimum wage bracket, it seems safe to assume that the most glaring wage disparities. . . will be lessened considerably.¹⁰⁴

A 1956 Soviet labour decree, on the other hand, seemed to be directed at eliminating some of Stalin's repressive measures against the workers. Paul Barton, a Czech sociologist and economist, states:

Persecution of workers absenting themselves from work without valid reason was discontinued, the prohibition of unauthorized changes of employment was repealed, and the authority to effect compulsory transfers of workers from plant to plant was withdrawn.¹⁰⁵

Pressures against the worker, however, still remained in the form of labour passports and seniority systems, which controlled the workers movements by withdrawing social services, and job advancements.¹⁰⁶ Paul Barton, while very critical of the Soviet treatment of the worker, concludes that the

¹⁰³S. Bialer, op. cit., p. 247.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., pp. 247-8.

¹⁰⁵Paul Barton, op. cit., p. 263.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., pp. 264-6.

repressive measures have on the whole been diffused and made more flexible.¹⁰⁷ The general status of the worker had thus improved.

In the long run, the most meaningful reforms for the two "repressed" classes and especially their children, were the educational policies of the Khrushchev regime. After a period of experimentation with a ten-year system of compulsory education, says Feldmesser, Khrushchev in 1958 announced that eight years of compulsory education was enough and that such training should be close to life i.e. vocational. Khrushchev proclaimed the "sacred slogan":

All students must prepare for useful work. . . .This . . . will be more democratic, since more equal conditions will be created for all citizens: neither the position nor the pleas of parents will exempt anyone, whoever he may be, from productive labor. . . .¹⁰⁸

After the completion of this form of education, students wishing full secondary education (now to be eleven years) were to do so by correspondence or in evening or off-season schools, without taking time away from their jobs. Tuition fees in the secondary schools were abolished. At the same time, changes were affected in yuz admissions allowing workers' and peasants' children a better chance for higher education. A rising proportion of yuz admissions was reserved

¹⁰⁷Paul Barton, op. cit., pp. 266, 279.

¹⁰⁸Feldmesser, op. cit., p. 231.

for applicants with at least two years of work experience or military service. Honour students of the ten-year schools and tekhnikums, now had to compete in entrance examinations along with everyone else; the written section of the examination was turned in under a pseudonym.¹⁰⁹ In most fields, Feldmesser adds, the first two or three years of higher ducation were combined with full-time work in order to impress the vuz graduates in the words of Khrushchev with the "glorious traditions of our working class and collective-farm peasantry".¹¹⁰ Vuz tuition fees were abolished and scholarships awarded on the basis of material needs of the student as well as grades. Special courses were organized to allow a student to complete vuz admission requirements. Boarding schools, once the bastion of the "privileged" few, underwent reforms to allow children from high or low-income families equal opportunity.¹¹¹ These reforms to some extent deprived the intelligentsia of their monopoly of higher education and social status. The "proletarization" of the educational system i.e. combining study with labour, appeared a deliberate policy aimed at blunting social stratification while meeting the economic necessity for a large semi-skilled and skilled labour force.

¹⁰⁹ Feldmesser, op. cit., p. 231.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 232.

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp. 232-4.

The intelligentsia's privileged position was also eroded by policy efforts to bring about a greater equality in the wages. Bialer states that there may be some fact behind the rumour that the salaries of some high-ranking bureaucrats such as government officials, had been reduced.¹¹² A. Volkov, who succeeded Kaganovich as head of the Committee on Labour and Wages, reported to have stated that the ratio between the highest and lowest wage rates would be no more than two to one.¹¹³ This is a significant decrease when compared with Ossowski's figures of a ratio of forty to one as representing the differentiation of income under Stalin.¹¹⁴

There was also a prolonged and vigorous campaign says Bialer, attacking the laws of inheritance and other privileges enjoyed by the sons of "good" families, who live off their parents income like parasites. Bialer states: "The regime's attack is directed not only against the sons, but against the fathers--that is, against the assumed privilege of 'life membership' in the hierarchy".¹¹⁵

¹¹² Bialer's reference to the rumour is based on Moscow correspondent of the French newspaper Le Monde, Michel Tatu who reported that on January 5, 1960 he (Tatu) received "indication" from M. Volkov, the chairman of the Soviet Governmental Commission for Labour and Wages, that many top ministerial, military, and administrative officials have had their salaries cut. S. Bialer, op. cit., p. 248.

¹¹³ Feldmesser, op. cit., p. 228.

¹¹⁴ Supra, p. 33.

¹¹⁵ Bialer, op. cit., p. 251.

Reversing a trend of the Stalinist regime, Khrushchev had also made an effort to recruit more workers and peasants into the party and state apparatus. At the XXIst Congress, Khrushchev reported that two-thirds of the new Party members were from the two classes.¹¹⁶ The extension of "socialist democracy" accompanying the new stage of "state of the whole people" was also meant to give greater political participation and involvement to a broader mass of the people.¹¹⁷ The adoption of the New Party Statutes at the XXIInd Congress was also directed against entrenchment in office of Central Committee and Executive members.¹¹⁸

Summary and Conclusions

The Marxist conception of class and prognosis for historical development have proven to be either inadequate in their formulation or incorrect. A dichotomous class struggle has not developed in capitalist societies, and

¹¹⁶Feldmesser, op. cit., p. 226.

¹¹⁷This topic will be discussed further in Chapter III.

¹¹⁸Leonard Schapiro, "The New Rules of the CPSU" in Leonard Schapiro, ed., The USSR and the Future: an Analysis of the New Program of the CPSU (New York; London: F. A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 179-94. Schapiro is Professor of Russian Government and Politics in the University of London and is author of several books dealing with the Communist Party of the USSR. This thesis will not deal with changes in policies in the post-Khrushchev period. There have been several major changes; for example, the New Party Statutes were abolished at the XXIIIrd Party Congress.

technological and social advances of the present century have produced new classes and new conflicts. The power and status of the professional engineers, scientists, and economic and political bureaucrats in the modern state and economic structures have increased independently of their ownership of the means of production. Furthermore, as Soviet doctrine and practice have shown, the superstructure in the form of the state or Party can shape and control the economic basis and social order. The economic necessities of a technological society and the domination of all segments of society by the "rulers" have led to new privileged (relative to the rest of the population) classes.

The adaptation, and often distortion, of Marx's theory by Soviet leaders presents a paradox. On the one hand, theory has not been allowed to stand in the way of economic, political, or social ambitions of the state or its rulers. On the other hand, all policies are couched in the language of Marxism, and the goal of the ultimate "classless" society is presented as the direction in which the Soviet society is moving.

Under Stalin, ideology was not allowed to stand in the way of his policy. The theoretical elimination of the class struggle as the motivating force for change in society, and the substitution of it by the Soviet state, was one manifestation of Stalin's distortion of Marxist theory. During his regime any opposition "from below", whether from the "privileged"

or non-privileged groups, was brutally repressed under the theoretical guise of "enemy of the people". Under Khrushchev, attempts were made to replace brutal force by more "persuasive" means of dealing with conflict. Moreover, attempts were made to alleviate some of the worst disparities (income, education, privilege) among the social groups in Soviet society. However, this does not necessarily imply that the Soviet Union is following the ideological tenets of classical Marxism. Khrushchev, by rejecting Stalin's brutal means, had to break up the entrenched privileged groups that could be in a position to oppose his rule and policies. By moving the society closer to "classlessness" by policy directions, he could hope to break the institutionalized interests of groups.

On the other hand, both Stalin and Khrushchev may have been motivated by a genuine desire to attain the ultimate goal of communism. Stalin, by means of theoretical distortions, brutal force, and economic policies that caused hardship to countless people may have felt justified in his actions by the progression to the ultimate goal of communism. The means, however, seemed to become ends in themselves i.e. the rulers of the powerful state had a vested interest in preserving their own power positions. Khrushchev may have been more genuinely motivated by ideological considerations, and his means of offering his policies were more "persuasive" than

"repressive". However, it is noteworthy that he did not alter the Stalinist conception of class conflict and the role of the authorities "from above" in the stage of "full-scale" construction of communism.

While the worst disparities of the Stalinist class system and the power of the State appear to be lessening, there is no indication that the Party is going to wither away, but in fact the Party appears to be becoming stronger. This topic will be further discussed in Chapter III.

CHAPTER II
AUTOMATION AND CLASSLESS SOCIETY

In the first chapter, it was concluded that Marx's conception of class and class conflict is inadequate in the present century. Technological and political developments since the First World War, have stratified Soviet society according to occupation, education, income, style of living, social mobility, and the privileges allotted certain groups by the authorities in power. The control of the economic and social spheres by "rulers", moreover, has been shown to be largely independent of the actual ownership of the means of production. Yet the Soviet leaders and theoreticians have adhered to the Marxian conception of classless society as the goal towards which the Soviet Union is progressing. This chapter will focus on this ultimate stage after the differences between workers and collective peasantry and intelligentsia are eliminated.¹ The main question then is, will there still remain a division of people according to tasks performed?

The concern with the harmful effects of the division of labour harks back to Karl Marx. In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels state that "as soon as the division of labour

¹The authors of the Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism state that the differences between the two classes will be obliterated before the division of society into mental and

begins, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity . . . from which he can not escape" and thus becomes alienated from the production process and enslaved to his work.² As soon as people are compartmentalized into specialized activity, especially between those workers who plan, direct, and create, and those who perform the menial tasks (whether physical or mental), the danger also exists that the class system may be recreated. Because of this danger inherent in any form of differentiation, Bottomore maintains that Marx is against the formation of "functional" groups, even if they are based on merit.³

For Marx, the solution to this problem is simply that in communist society, each person can become accomplished in any activity that he "desires". Thus it is possible "to do one thing today and another tomorrow, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic".⁴ Therefore, while the division of the production process does

physical labourers (i.e. workers and intelligentsia) is eliminated. This latter process will remain until the highest stage of development of communist society". O. V. Kuusinen, Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1961), p. 818.

²K. Marx and E. Engels, The German Ideology, ed. R. Pascal (New York: International Publishers, 1939), p. 22.

³T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1964), p. 134.

⁴K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, p. 22.

not itself disappear, the harmful effects of the division are eliminated by each being able to do everything interchangeably. Everyone, in turn will regulate and control general production. In Capital, Marx states that this ideal will be possible through the process of education whereby practical and theoretical knowledge is to be imparted to every individual.⁵ Lenin's assertion that "any cook could run the country" is another form of expression of the Marxian view.

These views are based on an optimistic conception of the average man's intelligence and his ability to know his abilities and desires. They are also based on a conception of society and economy less complex than that of the twentieth century. Technological advancements since the First World War, have greatly increased the division of the production process (assembly lines) with the result that specialization of individual skills has increased rather than decreased.⁶ The regulation of the economy and society has also become more institutionalized and regulated by professional bureaucrats, rather than amateurs. Even though, automation may do away with hard physical work and greatly increase the leisure time

⁵K. Marx, Capital; cited in T. B. Bottomore, op. cit., p. 134.

⁶This observation is at least true in the developments in our society. It is also the view held by many Soviet academics as will be discussed further in this chapter.

of the workers to "culturally improve themselves", automation has not done away with the differences between those who are creatively involved in research and control and those who perform the menial application of the latter's direction. The result has been that in the Soviet Union as well as other industrial countries, new privileged groups have been formed which enjoy a higher income, higher style of living and a higher status relative to the rest of the population. This differentiation is also often accompanied by greater power to control and direct the rest of society.⁷ In the Soviet Union, Stalin's dictatorial leadership and the growth of the state apparatus, have greatly accentuated this stratification. The Stalinist theoretical statements regarding the division of people according to type of labour performed, also appears to have been altered away from the classical Marxian position.

In a "Speech to the Conference of Business Executives" in 1931, Stalin states that the differences between the skilled and unskilled will continue to exist under "socialism" and even after classes have been abolished. Only under full communism are all the differences to be eliminated.⁸ In his

⁷Supra, pp. 29-33.

⁸Cited in T. H. Rothchild, "The Highest Phase of Communism, According to the Works of J. Stalin 1924-36" (Columbia University: Unpublished Masters Thesis, 1950), p. 67.

last major work, The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Stalin states that even under full communism certain "nonessential" differences will remain between those who perform mental and physical tasks. He states:

Some comrades assert that in time not only the essential distinction between industry and agriculture, between manual and mental labor, will disappear, but that any difference between them will also disappear. This is wrong.⁹

Stalin emphatically states that "comrades" who hold this view on the basis of "certain of my [i.e. Stalin's] statements" have come to the wrong conclusion. "This means that the formulation was not precise" and therefore must be discarded and replaced by another".¹⁰ This new formulation is the following:

The essential difference between them [i.e. mental and manual labour], in the sense of cleavage in cultural and technical standards undoubtedly will disappear. But some sort of difference, albeit nonessential, will remain if only because the working conditions of the managing personnel of enterprises are not the same as those of the workers.¹¹

⁹V. I. Stalin, "The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" in Leo Gruliov, ed., Current Soviet Policies: The Documentary Record of the 19th Communist Party Congress and the Reorganization after Stalin's Death (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1953), p. 6. Emphasis is mine.

¹⁰Ibid. Stalin may be referring to his 1931 statement where he stated that all difference would be eliminated.

¹¹Ibid.

It is not clear from Stalin's work what these nonessential differences will be. By the use of the example of the manager and worker, however, it seems likely that he shares Bukharin's views on this topic.¹² Bukharin's writings, at the time when he was the main ideologue in Stalin's regime (1924-8), clearly reflect that there will be a division of people according to labour performed in the ultimate communist society. To illustrate this point, Bukharin uses the metaphors of doctor-patient and conductor-orchestra as the examples of the relationship between leaders and followers under communism.¹³ Bukharin claims that just as specially qualified people become doctors and conductors, so there are people who are especially qualified to be leaders in society.¹⁴ The goals of the leaders will be in harmony with those of the rest of the population, just as the goals of the doctor and conductor are the same as those of the patient and orchestra.¹⁵ Yet in practice, the metaphors of the doctor-patient and conductor-orchestra are

¹²Bukharin's views on this topic are primarily obtained from D. J. Nelson, "The Views of Bukharin on the Future Communist Society" (Columbia University: Unpublished Certificate Essay, 1952).

¹³Bukharin, Elements of Political Education; cited in Nelson, pp. 116-7.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Bukharin, Culture in Two Worlds; cited in Nelson, p. 119.

examples of the most dictatorial type of authority since the patient and orchestra are completely at the mercy of the doctor and conductor. Bukharin, himself seems to imply that there is a danger that a permanent "caste" (or elite) may form as a result of this division of people according to their ability.¹⁶ According to the Stalinist ideologue, this danger can be avoided by the circulation of the leadership. He assumes that there will be enough (not all) people qualified to reinforce and replace leaders who in turn will voluntarily give up their positions to others. Bukharin states: "There will be a colossal over-production of organizers, which will nullify the stability of the ruling groups".¹⁷

The views of Bukharin and Stalin (i.e. if we have correctly interpreted Stalin's statements concerning the existence of nonessential differences between managers and workers as the same as Bukharin's) seem to diverge from the Marxian notion that everyone will do everything interchangeably and from the Leninist statement that any cook will be able to run the country. Under Stalin, the policy of "solicitude" to the managers as well as other intelligentsia at the expense of

¹⁶ Bukharin, Culture in Two Worlds; cited in Gilison, op. cit., p. 119.

¹⁷ Bukharin, Historical Materialism; cited in Nelson, p. 120.

the workers and peasantry, are manifestations of this theory under "socialism". The conclusion can be drawn that even under the Stalinist conception of full communism, there may remain differences among people according to tasks performed.

Following Stalin's death and especially in the period following the 1956 Congress, the question of automation, nature of work and the division of people according to tasks performed, has become a focal point for discussion and debate among Soviet theoreticians, academicians and other writers. L. Labedz says that "an ocean of ink has been spilt" on such topics.¹⁸ The spontaneity and originality of many of these discussions may be restrained because of the role and importance that official ideology plays in the Soviet Union. Much of the literature is redundant, because the writers present their views within certain ideological guidelines and utilize the formulas and slogans that have been officially sanctioned. However, the arguments presented by people such as academicians, are often more thoroughly elaborated than the views presented in such authoritative sources as the New Party Program or the textbook Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. The latter sources form a part of the ideology which will have

¹⁸ Leopold Labedz, "The New CPSU Programme", in Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz, eds., The Future Communist Society (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1962), p. 22.

to be applied to reality and stand up to history; therefore, they are deliberately vague on contentious topics.

In the non-official sources, however, differences of opinion or interpretation are presented in keeping with the Soviet notion of criticism. An article, for example, will be presented in a journal for the purpose of debate and criticism in order to derive the "correct" answer. In these discussions, interesting cleavages between varying strata of Soviet society and leadership may be presented in the different views presented.¹⁹ An analysis of the opinions expressed according to the importance (i.e. in the political hierarchy) of the people making them is not attempted because of the scope of the thesis and limitation of the sources utilized.

The views presented in the journals will be evaluated, however, against the guideline presented in the official sources such as the New Party Program and The Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, in order to determine the spectrum of divergence in relation to the "official line". These views will, in turn be contrasted to some of the ideological tenets already discussed by past leaders and theoreticians such as

¹⁹ Examples of this type of analysis can be found in the following works by so-called "Kremlinologists". Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-64 (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins Press, 1964); W. Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1962); S. I. Ploss, Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study of Agricultural Policy 1953-63 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965). The best description

Marx, Stalin and Bukharin. The aim of this analysis is to determine what doctrinal changes occur, as Soviet society progresses on the road to the final goal of communism. We will also attempt to explain why some of these changes occur.

The discussions in Soviet journals during the Khrushchev period will be primarily derived from J. A. Gilison's doctoral thesis, "The Soviet Image of the Future Communist Society: A Critical Analysis of Contemporary Soviet Doctrine",²⁰ and Soviet articles translated in Soviet Sociology.²¹ A survey of the Current Digest of the Soviet Press²² for the years 1956-64, revealed little relevant information to our topic. The Current Digest . . . seems to primarily translate articles, dealing with the present transitional stage to communism, rather than the ultimate classless society.

Gilison has analyzed seven Soviet journals during the

of the school of "Kremlinology" as opposed to other approaches is in Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, New Revised edition (New York: Collier Books, 1961).

²⁰J. A. Gilison, "The Soviet Image of the Future Communist Society: A Critical Analysis of Contemporary Soviet Doctrine" (Columbia University: Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, 1965).

²¹Soviet Sociology, I-VI (New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1962-67).

²²Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Published weekly by the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edward Brothers). The volumes surveyed were VIII to XVIII (1956-1966).

period of 1952-63. According to Gilison, the journals were chosen for their diversity and authoritativeness.²³ They are the following: Kommunist the most authoritative theoretical party journal; Kommunist (Lithuanian), the theoretical journal of the Lithuanian Central Committee; Molodoi Kommunist, the All-Union theoretical journal of the Komsomol; Partinaia Zhizn', the organizational and operational journal of the Central Committee, CPSU; Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo, the leading legal journal; Voprosy Filosofii, the leading philosophical journal; Novyi Mir, the most "liberal" of the literary journals.²⁴ The most useful material to our topic in Soviet Sociology are articles translated from Voprosy Filosofii.²⁵ This conclusion is the same as that derived by Gilison, who states that the largest quantity of articles dealing with the transitional period were put out by Kommunist (Moscow) followed by the other central party journals. Articles dealing specifically with the ultimate communist society, on the other hand, Gilison finds were in Voprosy Filosofii and Novyi Mir.²⁶

²³J. A. Gilison, pp. 15-16.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵About one-half of the articles translated in Soviet Sociology are from Voprosy Filosofii.

²⁶J. A. Gilison, op. cit., p. 19.

Since there is no Soviet journal specifically devoted to sociological matters, it is not surprising to find Voprosy Filosofii, the repository for philosophical and sociological material. The topic of the future communist society, moreover, is of such speculative nature that it is of interest to literary academics, writing for Novyi Mir. The Central party journals, as already mentioned, seem to primarily deal with aspects of the transitional stage of development toward communism and only vaguely refer to the ultimate stage. The New Party Program and Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism also devote most of their attention to this transitional stage of communism. For example, while the Program reiterates the view that communist society will be classless, there is no concrete description as to what type of social arrangement will take its place.²⁷ There is no specific section in the Program devoted to this topic and the textbook, Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, devotes three pages out of almost nine hundred pages to the "Gradual Merging of Physical and Mental Labour".²⁸

Both these sources maintain that the workers (assuming

²⁷"Final Text of the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" in Herbert Ritvo, ed., with annotations, and introduction, The New Soviet Society (New York: The New Leader, 1962), pp. 109-11. Hereafter referred to as "The New Party Program".

²⁸Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, op. cit., pp. 817-19.

that the collective peasantry will rise to the level of the workers) will have to "merge" or "fuse" with the intelligentsia.²⁹ By merger or fusion, these sources do not imply the coming together of workers by "hand or brain", but rather that the former i.e. manual workers "will have risen in cultural and technological standards to the level" of the intelligentsia.³⁰ "The intelligentsia will no longer be a distinct stratum" says the Program.³¹ The implication is that all will become part of the intelligentsia. This process is to be achieved by high technological development with the resultant improvement in education, living conditions and cultural development of all individuals.³² In these sources' descriptions of the future "intelligentsia", there does not seem to be any distinction between people engaged in engineering-scientific work and those who perform the ordinary (but not necessarily hard physical tasks) practical application of the latter group's direction. Nor does there seem to be any distinction between the former category of engineers-scientists and people engaged in artistic or non-scientific creative work. In the

²⁹"The New Party Program", op. cit., p. 111.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.

³²"The New Party Program", op. cit., p. 110.

first chapter, we noted the broad definition of the intelligentsia reflected in Stalinist and Khrushchevian sources, in that included under this term are all levels of mental workers including "employees".³³ Since the New Party Program harks back to the Marxist conception of the future society where there is to be no stratification of mental workers according to creative and noncreative labour, it is more likely that the Program also anticipates no such stratification in the future Communist society.³⁴ Khrushchev's educational reforms of 1958³⁵ which emphasize theoretical and practical training at all levels of education seemed directed toward this goal. There are also a group of academics and Party theoreticians who support this view. S. G. Strumilin,³⁶ a noted theoretician and Party worker, for instance states:

If we are not surprised that a piano-tuner even now, when he has finished his mechanical function, completes it like a real musician by performing Beethoven's Moonlight Sonata, a similar joining of functions will be even more natural in the conditions of a shortened working-day under communism.³⁷

³³ Supra, pp. 14-16.

³⁴ "The New Party Program", pp. 109-112.

³⁵ Supra, pp. 39-40.

³⁶ S. G. Strumilin is an economist and theoretical statistician. He has been active in the revolutionary workers' movement since 1897 and has held government and party posts since 1916. He has been a full member of the Academy of Sciences since 1931 and is author of over two hundred works

There are differences of opinion, however, concerning this interpretation by other Soviet academicians and writers.

Ye. Khodzhayev, a member of the Philosophical Sciences, states that differences will remain under communism between "material and spiritual" intelligentsia.³⁸ A significant part of the intelligentsia such as cultural enlightenment workers, public health workers, and artists will continue to be occupied outside the sphere of material production. Their contribution to the material production process, says Khodzhauev, will be an indirect one i.e. in training cadres and promoting a rise in the cultural-technical level of those engaged in direct production. The "engineering-technical and part of the scientific intelligentsia", on the other hand participate

on statistics, accounting, "socialist" planning, and history of Soviet national economy. He helped draft the new 20-Year Plan discussed and passed at the XXIIInd Party Congress. Strumilin's biography in H. E. Schulz and S. S. Taylor, ed., Who's Who in the USSR 1961-62 (Montreal: Intercontinental Book and Publishing Co., Ltd., 1962), pp. 743-4.

³⁷S. G. Strumilin, Problemy sotsializma i kommunizma v SSSR (Problems of Socialism and Communism in the USSR) cited in E. L. Manevich, "Abolition of the Differences Between Mental and Physical Labor in the Period of Full-scale Construction of Communism" translated from Voprosy Filosofii, No. 9 (1961), in Soviet Sociology, I, No. 3 (Winter, 1962-3), 18.

³⁸Ye. Khodzhayev, "The Development of Socialist Intelligentsia and Its Role in the Building of Communism" in G. Ye. Glezerman, ed., Changes in the Class Structure of Society in the Process of the Building of Socialism and Communism, trans., Joint Publications Research Service (Annapolis, Maryland: Research and Microfilm Publications, Inc., 1962), p. 271.

directly in the material aspect of production.³⁹ G. Ye. Glezerman, an eminent philosopher and Party theoretician, maintains that under communism, there will be a continuation and even an increase in specialization of people according to the labour performed. He states:

It is deeply mistaken to represent automation as lowering a worker's labor in any branch of industry to button-pushing, and to think that he could push those buttons with equal success in a metallurgical plant, electric power station or bread-baking plant. . . .In actuality the workers in an automated plant are highly qualified controllers (naladchiki), who must deeply study the particular technical processes and the construction of the mechanism in order to be able to correct a malfunction if necessary. Such workers must be specialists in their field.⁴⁰

S. G. Strumilin, on the other hand holds the view that machinery will become more specialized, while the men who control them will become more highly qualified. He sees a new division of labour developing not between men but between machines. He states:

In all these new conditions the old divisions of work lost all their distasteful specific features. The old professions will simply be blended one into the other, but the new universal functions of control and direction

³⁹Ye. Khodzhayev, op. cit., p. 271.

⁴⁰G. Ye. Glezerman, "Kulturnyi rost obshchestva--neobkhodimoe uslovie perekhoda k kommunizmu", /Cultural Growth of Society--The Necessary Condition for the Transition to Communism/, Voprosy Filosofii No. 3 (1957); cited in J. A. Gilson, op. cit., p. 173.

of the entire system under automation can hardly be called a profession, for within it will be combined the entire complex of specialized knowledge and work functions. . . . Under conditions of the highest specialization of machines and utilization of technology, communism will affirm a new division of labor not fundamentally between people but between machines.⁴¹

There appears to be a dichotomy in the views of these two highly placed academics in the Soviet political structure. S. G. Strumilin adheres to the classical Marxian notion that division of people into specialized labour categories will diminish if not disappear. G. Ye. Glezerman maintains that the division of people according to specialization will increase. Both writers base their views on the basis of technological development. Their predictions diverge as to what effects these technological developments will have on the division of people according to labour performed.

These questions and disagreements became the focus of a public debate in the pages of Voprosy Filosofii during the period 1961-63.⁴² A. K. Kurilev⁴³ in a November 1961 issue, for example, notes that rapid progress of technology.

⁴¹S. G. Stumilin, "Problemy sotsializma i kommunizma v SSSR"; cited in J. A. Gilison, op. cit., p. 196.

⁴²J. A. Gilison, op. cit., p. 178.

⁴³A. K. Kurilev is referred to by J. A. Gilison as an academic. There is no biographical reference in Who's Who in the USSR.

has produced two tendencies.⁴⁴ The first is the desire of individuals "to acquire diversified knowledge and to develop wide-ranging abilities". Secondly, "the complication of social production processes and the colossal growth in the volume of knowledge calls forth the necessity for specialization of each individual's working activities and consequently the necessity for concrete specialized knowledge".⁴⁵ The compatibility of these two tendencies could only come about, according to Kurilev, by a continuation of the division of people according to labour performed. The harmful effects of this specialization could be avoided, he maintains, by the "law of job changes" where people "will be able to change from one job to another and will be able to change their profession with remarkable ease".⁴⁶

V. Ia. El'meev⁴⁷ disagrees with Kurilev's conclusion and argues that the "law of job changes" is incompatible with the "division of labour". He makes the same distinction between "specialization of people" and "specialization of labour" that Strumilin makes, and maintains the view that

⁴⁴A. K. Kurilev, "O Vsestoronnem razvitii lichnosti pri kommunizme", On the All-round Development of the Personality Under Communism Voprosy Filosofii, No. 11 (1961); cited in J. A. Gilison, p. 180.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid.

the "law of job changes" will in fact eliminate the division of labour between people.⁴⁸

E. L. Manevich, another academician, added to the debate by supporting Kurilev's thesis. Manevich, however, criticized the latter for stating that under communism people will be able to change jobs and professions with remarkable ease. Such a view, he says, is attributable to "socialist utopians".⁴⁹ In another article in Voprosy Filosofii, Manevich in a severe attack against the views of S. G. Strumilin and V. P. Kornienko, an economist, states:

But it would be excessively utopian to believe that communist society will put an end to all division of labor among men, that as Kornienko writes, 'the progress from socialism to communism will be in the direction of elimination of the social division of labor', and that, if some division of labor remains, it will be, as Strumilin thinks, merely a division of labor 'among machines and entire complexes of automatic machines and production lines'.⁵⁰

⁴⁷There is no biographical reference in Who's Who in the USSR.

⁴⁸V. Ia. El'meev, "Vsestoronoe razvitie lichnosti predpolagaet unichtozhenie razdeleniia truda mezhdu liud'mi" [The All-round Development of the Personality Requires the Abolishment of the Devision of Labour Among People] Voprosy Filosofii, No. 10 (1962); cited in J. A. Gilison, op. cit., p. 181.

⁴⁹E. L. Manevich, "sotsialno'-ekonomicheskie osnovy vsestoronnego razvitiia lichnosti pri kommunizme" [The Social-economic Bases of the All-round Development of the Personality Under Communism], Voprosy Filosofii, No. 10; cited in Gilison, p. 182

⁵⁰E. L. Manevich, "Abolition of the Differences Between Mental and Physical Labor in the Period of Full-scale Construction of Communism", op. cit., p. 18.

Manevich argues in the same manner as does Glezerman, that as production forces develop, "each individual has to spend more time to master the sum of accumulated knowledge and, most important, to be able to make his contribution to the further development of science and technology".⁵¹ Criticizing Strumilin's example of the piano tuner playing Beethoven,⁵² he adds that "professions and 'narrow' specialities will remain in the arts as in science".⁵³

As to the nature of work in general, Manevich admits that even in communist society, all work will not be "creative".⁵⁴ Manevich, however, assures us that the "so-called less able people" i.e. judged according to their abilities, will not be relegated to "secondary roles" i.e. to the un-creative tasks.⁵⁵ To avoid this pitfall, Manevich reverts to the "law of job changes". In a less-assertive tone than that employed in the rest of the article, Manevich states:

Nor may one rule out the possibility that communist society will organize a permanent

⁵¹E. L. Manevich, op. cit., p. 18.

⁵²Supra, p. 59.

⁵³E. L. Manevich, "Abolition of the Differences Between Mental and Physical Labor. . .", p. 19.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 21.

⁵⁵Ibid.

system under which an individual will regularly perform both a creative job and one that is less interesting, but is extremely useful and necessary to society.⁵⁶

Manevich seems to face the dilemma that on the one hand specialization will continue and increase, requiring an individual's full attention and skill, and on the other hand the possibility that people with less ability may be relegated to the non-creative menial tasks. To avoid coming to this conclusion, which is definitely opposed to the classical Marxism-Leninism, as well as the New Party Program's position,⁵⁷ Manevich and others such as Kurilev and El'meev, must employ the seemingly contradictory "law of job changes" or the combination of "creative" and "non-creative" work. It is only the academics, A. V. Andreev and Ia. V. Timoshkov,⁵⁸ according to Gilison's interpretation, who reject this view entirely and maintain that the only difference between labour under Soviet socialism and under full communism would be a freer choice of initial profession and better training for it.⁵⁹

One of the last articles in this debate, was presented

⁵⁶E. L. Manevich, op. cit., p. 21.

⁵⁷Supra, pp.

⁵⁸A. V. Andreev and Ia. V. Timoshkov, "Razdelenie truda i obshchestvennye gruppy pri kommunizme" [The Division of Labour and Social Groups under Communism] Voprosy Filosofii, No. 10 (1962); cited in J. A. Gilison, op. cit., p. 182.

⁵⁹J. A. Gilison, p. 182.

by a "metal-worker", Kim Sergeev.⁶⁰ While the other participants (academicians and theoreticians), argued from their positions in the "intelligentsia", this layman's argument may be representative of the other side, i.e. the worker. Sergeev writes that under communism, "social division of labour is impossible and in general can not be reconciled with the idea of free development of the personality".⁶¹ Taking an even more extreme position than Strumilin, he continues:

To be only a philosopher or only a historian, legal scholar, economist, etc., will be perfectly unthinkable; such people will be ridiculed with all the severity of communist morality, for communism brings about conditions not only for the study of philosophy and history, but also for active labour in production. Absolutely all members of society, with the greatest pleasure and enthusiasm, will devote a part of their time to both spheres of laboring activity [i.e. in the sphere of material production as well as the spiritual life of society] and also to physical culture and sports.⁶²

From the description of this "homogeneous society", it seems that Sergeev believes that all men will be; or are equal in their abilities. There is no direct evidence, however, to substantiate this conclusion from Sergeev's statements or

⁶⁰ Kim Sergeev, "Ostanutsia li professii pri kommunizme?" Will the Professions Remain Under Communism? Voprosy Filosofii, No. 11 (1963); cited in Gilison, p. 187.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

Gilison's analysis of them.⁶³

The question of equality, however, is a crucial one in determining whether there will be "leaders" and "followers" in communist society. Manevich, for example, argues that there will be a certain degree of specialization of people according to their ability and interest.⁶⁴ At the same time, he maintains that "it will no longer be necessary to maintain any group of people whose 'speciality' will be management of production and other social functions", because of the high level of education acquired by the "workers".⁶⁵ He continues:

These functions [i.e. of management] will, of course remain under complete communism for machine industry is impossible without maintenance of the necessary organization of the work done by men, and without coordination of management. But these functions will be performed by different people and primarily by those with rich life and production experience.⁶⁶

As in his discussion of the division of labour, Manevich appears to contradict himself. On the one hand, he implies that there will be people, specially qualified to lead i.e. "those with rich life and production experience",⁶⁷ and

⁶³Gilison, op. cit., p. 187.

⁶⁴E. L. Manevich, "Abolition of the Differences Between Mental and Physical Labor. . .", op. cit., p. 19.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 17.

⁶⁶Ibid. (Emphasis is mine SSM).

⁶⁷E. L. Manevich does not elaborate or define as to what he means by a "rich life".

on the other hand, he holds to the classical Marxian view that there will not be a group of people whose "speciality" will be management. The incompatibility of these two views is bridged, by Manevich, by the principles of "job rotation" and high level of cultural development. For instance, M. N. Rutkevich,⁶⁸ maintains that with the extension of "socialist democracy" and the involvement of masses of working people in the "management of production and other spheres of life," the executive functions will become to a "smaller degree the affair of supervisors alone".⁶⁹ The increase in educational level of all people, moreover, says Rutkevich will lead to a "constant flux of new people into administration".⁷⁰ The parallel between these conclusions of Manevich and Rutkevich and those of Bukharin, seem obvious.⁷¹ Even Strumilin, whose position on

⁶⁸M. M. Rutkevich took part in a study dealing with the effects of technology on the class structure in Soviet society in Pod'em kul'turno-tekhnicheskogo urovnia sovetskogo rabocheho klassa [The Enhancement of the Cultural-Technical Level of the Soviet Working Class], ed. M. T. Iovchuk, L. N. Kogan, M. N. Rutkevich, M. Kh. Igitkhanian, V. S. Kruzhkov, and G. A. Prudenskii (Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1961); M. T. Iovchuk, L. N. Kogan, M. N. Rutkevich, "Pod'em kul'turnotekhnicheskogo urovnia rabocheho klassa i ego rol' v soedinenii fizicheskogo i umstvennogo truda v SSSR", [The Enhancement of the Cultural-Technical Level of the Soviet Working Class and Its Role in the Unification of Mental and Physical Labour] in Ot sotsializma k kommunizmu (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1962). The following article is based on some of the findings in these two studies: M. N. Rutkevich, "Elimination of Class Differences and the Place of Non-Manual Workers in the Social Structure of Soviet Society" in Filosofskie Nauki, No. 5 (1963); trans. in Soviet Sociology, III, No. 2 (1963).

the division of labour is more "optimistic"⁷² than that of Manevich also concludes that "the most able and qualified persons will take turns in positions of leadership".⁷³

The extension of mass participation in governing as a solution to the problem of existence of leaders and followers, does not in itself prevent the formulation of a ruling "elite". Stalin, since 1936, for instance, announced that the Soviet Union was following democratic principles, when in fact a dictatorial rule by the "few" was imposed on the rest of the population. The justification for this type of "democracy" harks back to Lenin's "vanguard theory" for

⁶⁹M. N. Rutkevich, "Elimination of Class Differences. . .", p. 6.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 7.

⁷¹Supra, pp. 51-2.

⁷²Gilison in his analysis refers to the apparent two groups of thought in this debate as doctrinal "optimists" (those who believe that the division of people according to specialized labour will decrease) and doctrinal "pessimists" (those who believe that the specialization of people will increase). S. G. Stumilin, obviously belongs to the first group.

⁷³S. G. Strumilin, "What Communism Is: Thoughts About the Future", Oktiabr, No. 3 (1960); translated in CDSP., XII, No. 15, 13.

the Communist Party, i.e. individuals who are more "enlightened" than the average can and must lead the rest of society.⁷⁴ This view, in a slightly modified form also seems to be represented for the ultimate communist society by academician Iu.

Smirnov. Iu. Smirnov says:

Workers selected for one or another managerial post, will carry out their functions during the course of a definite period, and will then once again return to their former place or take a new position in accordance with their knowledge and interests. Only in the central (branch) organs of planning, accounting, distribution, etc., where direct and uninterrupted accomplishment of definite functions particularly important for society must be guaranteed, does there arise, of course, the need for preserving strong organizational abilities, great experience and knowledge.⁷⁵

Smirnov, in this quotation seems to be approaching a position very close to the one theoretically already present in the transitional stage i.e. strong central leadership (specially qualified at the top, and local initiative and democracy at the bottom).

The only thing that rescues the theories concerning leadership noted above, are certain basic assumptions that .

⁷⁴V. I. Lenin, "What is to be Done?" in Essential Works of Lenin, ed. H. M. Christman (New York, Toronto, London: Bantam Books, 1966).

⁷⁵Iu. P. Smirnov, "Gosudarstvo i Kommunizm" /State and Communism/; cited in J. A. Gilison, op. cit., p. 127.

can be neither proved nor disproved. The Soviets as well as other Marxists base their ultimate theory of communism on the development of new communist consciousness and thus of the "new man". This concept assumes that man will be cooperative and unselfish, and will work to the best of his ability for the common good of all.⁷⁶ Again, the assumption is made that each individual will know and accept the limitation of his abilities and will know and work towards the common good of all. In such a society, there is to be no conflict and therefore no politics. It is on these bases that the New Party Program presents the theory of "public self-government" as a parallel to Engels' "administration of things".⁷⁷ The Program is clear, however, that man's consciousness will be fully developed only after the construction of the material-technical basis of communist society.⁷⁸ It also seems that while the state is to proceed to wither away,⁷⁹ the Communist Party is to remain and even become stronger until

⁷⁶Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, op. cit., pp. 870-1.

⁷⁷"The New Party Program", op. cit., p. 110.

⁷⁸Ibid., pp. 112, 201-3.

⁷⁹A topic for discussion in the next chapter.

the full completion of communism internally and externally.⁸⁰ The Communist Party as a vanguard of all the people is to lead the population into full communism. The ultimate communist society and economy, moreover, is to be well organized according to a "common plan". The Program states:

All production units and self-governing associations will be harmoniously united in a common planned economy and a uniform rhythm of social labour.⁸¹

There is a strong implication that the Communist Party will establish the central economic plan and the rhythm for social labour.

Summary and Conclusions

The conception of the "classless" society under full communism noted in this chapter appears to reflect a large amount of ambivalence if not outright divergence of opinion. The "idyllic" theory regarding this ultimate goal presented by Marx and Engels appears to be altered by Stalin and his chief ideologue during 1924-28, Bukharin. Stalin seems to imply by the term "nonessential" differences remaining between "managers" and "workers" what Bukharin more explicitly

⁸⁰ "The New Party Program", p. 240.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 112. (Emphasis is mine SSM).

delineates. The latter maintains that because people's abilities vary there will remain under "full communism" people specially qualified to lead and plan while others follow. Stalin's actual policies reflected the view that as Soviet society is proclaimed, stratification according to task or place in society increases rather than decreases. However, the development of the "intelligentsia" is also a part of the modern technological process that has cut across national boundaries.

The Khrushchev period, between 1956-64, ushered in the process of "de-Stalinization" and great ideological discussion. However, the two authoritative sources of this period, the New Party Program and Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, do not offer any concrete analysis on the division of people according to labour under full communism. The meager outline presented is in keeping with the classical description, i.e. specialization of people will be eliminated. It appears to reject Stalin's view; for instance, one academician of the Khrushchev period states:

Therefore, we cannot agree with the widely-held opinion that under communism there will be retained so-called 'unimportant' social differences among various individuals as a consequence of the fact that the conditions of work of leading personnel of an enterprise differ from those of the workers.⁸²

The Program acknowledges technological and social

⁸²E. L. Manevich, "The Abolition of the Differences Between Mental and Physical labor. . .", op. cit., p. 17.

reality, however, when it states that the "antithesis" will be eliminated not by the two types of labour coming together (though the Program uses the words "merge" and "fusion") but by the workers' rising to the level of the "intelligentsia". At the same time, the Program maintains that direction and planning by central organs will be highly developed, in keeping with a complex modern society. The Program juxtaposes this position with the notion of "public self-government" in which all will take part.

In this analysis, the Program appears to be trying to resolve the contradiction between complex technological advancement, requiring skill and training, and the idyllic notion that all will have the capacity to do creative and menial tasks; all will have the time to manage and apply the directions into practical work. This idea does not seem compatible with reality, especially at a time when Khrushchev asserted a blueprint for the development of communism in the near future. The skimpy and vague outline on this topic in this authoritative source may reflect this incompatibility. At the same time, by moving away from Stalin's theoretical terminology, the Program is a continuation of the de-Stalinization policy.

The "non-official" views presented in the articles since the XXth Party Congress are more concrete in their analysis. There even seems to be an impatience with the views presented

by the Program. Manevich, for instance, appears to be directing his criticism against the views of the Program, when he states:

Thus, the problem of eliminating differences between mental and physical labor cannot be limited and reduced simply to the problem of 'raising the cultural and technical level of workers to that of engineering and technical personnel', as we used to say.⁸³

Despite the divergence apparent in the debate and discussion surrounding this topic, all the participants are agreed that the harmful effects of the division of labor, such as alienation from one's work and exploitation by classes, will be removed. They agree that the cultural level of "new man" will play an important role in eliminating these differences, and that automation is also a key factor in affecting the nature of work and division of labour in communist society. The question of how automation will affect the division of labour is the point of disagreement among the people in the debate.

There are the two extremes presented by the two academicians, Andreev and Timoshkov, on the one hand, and Kim Sergeev, a layman, on the other. The latter maintain that all differences between people's roles will be completely obliterated while the former maintain that specialization of people will remain and increase in the future. Between

⁸³E. L. Manevich, op. cit., p. 14.

these two poles lie the views of Strumilin, El'meev, Kurilev, Rutkevich, Glezerman, Khodzhayev, and Manevich in ascending order of view as to the degree of specialization in communist society. Moreover, it was noted that Strumilin and Manevich, at opposite ends of the middle continuum, were of the same opinion that in planning and managing there would remain people more qualified to lead than others. Whether this implies a form of government as that presented by Smirnov, it is impossible to ascertain. It does seem to imply, however, a conception of government away from that idyllic self-government presented in the Program.

On the other hand, Gilison states that the problem could merely be one of semantics. He says:

The term "division of labour" (razdelenie truda) is repugnant to El'meev who associates it with harmful division under capitalism, while Novoselev and Kurilev feel that the term is neutral and merely describes an absolute necessity of modern technological society.⁸⁴

However, even a problem of semantics may disguise substantive differences. The views of the academics mentioned above, for example, seem to diverge in their conception of the degree of division of people according to labour performed in the ultimate classless society.

The danger that Marx may have anticipated, i.e. as soon as people become categorized, even if according to their abilities, classes are recreated, could be a real one in communist society.

⁸⁴ Gilison, op. cit., p. 187.

CHAPTER III

THE CONCEPT OF THE "STATE OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE" - *used by waterloo SSM*

Khrushchev's 1959 announcement of a new stage of Soviet development as one of "full-scale construction of communism", was followed by the New Party Program's proclamation that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" had fulfilled its historical mission and was replaced in the new stage by the "state of the whole people". The Program states:

Having brought about the complete and final victory of socialism--the first phase of communism--the transition of society to the full-scale construction of communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historical mission and has ceased to be indispensable in the USSR from the point of view of the tasks of internal development. The state, which arose as a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat has in the new contemporary stage, become a state of the entire people, an organ expressing the interests and will of the people as a whole.¹

In our discussion of the concept of the "state of the whole people" in the first chapter, it was concluded that this term did not mean that Soviet society was classless. The New Party Program states that there are two classes, the workers and peasantry, and a "stratum", the intelligentsia, in

¹Herbert Ritvo, ed., The New Soviet Society: Final Text of the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: The New Leader, 1962), pp. 166-7. Reference to this work hereafter will be noted as "The New Party Program". (Emphasis added--SSM).

Soviet society. The relationship among them is considered to be one of "moral and political unity" rather than of antagonism.² Khrushchev's theory of class and class relationship inside the Soviet Union, it was concluded, did not differ from Stalin's position first outlined in the 1936 proclamation that all "exploiting classes" had been eliminated in the Soviet Union.³ In his last major work, The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Stalin reiterated the view that the relationship among the two remaining classes and "stratum" was one of friendship rather than of antagonism.⁴ In comparing some of the actual policies of the Stalin and Khrushchev periods, it was concluded, however, that the concept of "moral and political unity" had received a new interpretation during the Khrushchev regime that was primarily manifested in the policy reforms of his period. It appears that Khrushchev attempted to alleviate some of the worst disparities in the living conditions, income and education, that had divided society so sharply into "privileged" and "less-privileged" groups under Stalin.⁵

²Herbert Ritvo, ed., The New Soviet Society, p. 37

³Supra, p. 21.

⁴V. I. Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" in Leo Gruliov, ed., Current Soviet Policies I: The Documentary Record of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress and the Reorganization after Stalin's Death (New York: Praeger, 1953), p. 6.

⁵Supra, pp. 28, 41-2.

The above theories of class relationships, we further concluded in the first chapter, were a basic contradiction of Marx's position. Classes were defined by Marx, by the fact that they only exist (in the full sense of "Klasse für sich") in contradiction to each other, and that the conflict between them was manifested in the domination by the leading "historical" class of the political apparatus i.e. the state. In other words, the state was conceived by Marx, as completely dependent on the class struggle of a given historical period. Only in the ultimate communist society, is there to be no classes and therefore no state, says Marx.⁶

Marx anticipated that once "capitalism" was overthrown, the working class would then emancipate itself and the rest of society. "Between capitalist and communist society", writes Marx, "lies the period of revolutionary transformation of the one into another. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat".⁷ From these Marxian tenets, Lenin built the Communist Party as the vanguard of the proletariat, and the Soviet state as the instrument of the dictatorship of the working class. Although Lenin described several progressive stages in the

⁶Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, Revised Trans., ed., C. P. Dutt (New York: International Publishers, 1938), p. 10.

⁷Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, p. 18.

transition to the ultimate communist society, it is clear that all stages are subsumed under the "dictatorship of the proletariat". In his major theoretical work describing the ultimate classless society, Lenin states:

The essence of Marx's doctrine of the state has been assimilated only by those who understand that the dictatorship of a single class is necessary not only for class society in general, not only for the proletariat which has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but also for the entire historical period between capitalism and 'classless' society, communism.⁸

Within the above analysis, the 1961 announcement that the "state of the whole people" had replaced the "dictatorship of the proletariat" presents two questions for further investigation. Khrushchev at the XXIInd Congress, asked the first: "But just why is the state itself being retained, when the main thing that produced it--class antagonism--has disappeared?"⁹ Secondly, what distinguishes the concept of "state of the whole people" from the "dictatorship of the proletariat" from the point of view of Soviet forces? We will then compare this conception with past doctrinal statements (especially those made by Stalinist sources), on the role of the state in the transitional period. It is hoped that through this analysis, a clearer perception of the meaning of the "state of the whole people" will be derived. Because of the

⁸V. I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution" in H. M. Christman, ed., Essential Works of Lenin (New York; Toronto; London: Bantam Books, 1966), p. 295. /Emphasis added--SSM/

⁹Charlotte Saikowski and Leo Gruliov, ed., Current

scope and topic of this thesis, no attempt will be made of matching the theoretical statements with practical policy nor of extending the analysis to the post-khrushchev period.

According to the New Party Program, and the reports made at the XXIInd Party Congress, the state continues to exist in the new state of "full-scale construction of communism". The state, however, is no longer considered to be a dictatorship of any class but the instrument of all the people. The working class still plays a major role in this state since it is, the "foremost and best organized force in Soviet society". This role is no longer to be implemented by means of dictatorship, but through persuasive and political educational reforms. Coercion still is to be maintained but in the new stage, ceases to be directed against classes and is to be only utilized against "criminal elements".¹⁰

Two other features appear to distinguish the "state of the whole people" from the "dictatorship of the proletariat", according to these sources. The first is the extension of "socialist democracy" to the entire population. Khrushchev emphasizes the necessity of drawing the masses ever increasingly

Soviet Policies IV: The Documentary Record of 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York; London: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 102. Hereafter references to this work will be Current Soviet Policies IV.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 101-2.

into the administrative state agencies. According to Khrushchev, this task is to be accomplished by extending the practice of nation wide discussions on important issues and "more and more consistently implementing the elective principle, and the principle of accountability with respect to the leading officials of the state apparatus and public organizations". Khrushchev also states that the composition of administrative agencies, must be regularly renewed.¹¹ The second feature of this new stage of development is the gradual transference of state functions to the public organizations (trade unions, the Young Communist League, the cooperatives, and cultural and educational groups), and the soviets. Ultimately, says Khrushchev, a form of "public self-government" is to replace the state.¹²

From the above account, it appears that the role of the state is to diminish in this transitional period. Khrushchev at the XXIst Party Congress, however, points out that the socialist state in the building of communism will be expanded and strengthened rather than weakened.¹³ A. I. Denisov, a

¹¹"Khrushchev: Report on the Party Program", in Current Soviet Policies IV, op. cit., p. 103.

¹²Ibid. Also "The New Party Program", op. cit., p. 182.

¹³"Congress Resolutions", in Leo Gruliov, ed., Current Soviet Policies III: The Documentary Record of the Extraordinary 21st Communist Party Congress (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 213.

leading specialist in the theory of state and law, builds upon Khrushchev's foundations, when he states:

From the fact that certain functions of state agencies have been turned over to public organizations. . . the conclusion must not be drawn that the socialist state has weakened. On the contrary, the shifting of particular functions from state agencies to public organizations leads to the strengthening of the socialist state and in no way lessens its active role in the building of communism.¹⁴

M. A. Suslov, a member of the Central Party Secretariat and an ideologue, states at the XXIInd Party Congress that:

The process of the withering away of the socialist state that is already under way cannot, however, be understood as transformation of the state into nothing.¹⁵

Both he and Khrushchev add that the tasks of "strengthening socialist legality" will increase in the period of "full-scale construction of communism".¹⁶ Khrushchev at the XXIst Party Congress notes that while some functions of preserving order and even judicial functions are to be transferred to "people's volunteer squads and comrades courts", this does not mean that

¹⁴A. I. Denisov, "On the Relationship of State and Society in the Period of Transition from Capitalism to Communism" in Gosudarstvo i Pravo, No. 4; trans in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), XII, No. 22. /Emphasis added--SSM/.

¹⁵Current Soviet Policies IV, p. 145.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 102-3.

the state militia, state courts, and the procuracy will cease to function.¹⁷ The transference of certain functions from the state agencies to the social organization, moreover, appears to be restricted to the spheres of culture, education, sports, health and social insurance.¹⁸ This process, furthermore, is to be interwoven with state guidance.

While the state agencies tasks appear to be extended (theoretically at least) to include more participation and control from more people, there is no indication that the Communists's Party's functions will be transferred to the public organizations or to the soviets. The Program, in fact, states that Communist Party's role and its importance as the "leading and guiding force of Soviet society", will be greatly enhanced in the period of "full-scale construction of communism".¹⁹ A group of Soviet theorists, writing in Kommunist, the highest theoretical journal of the Communist Party, outline more specifically the Party's expanding role in this new stage.²⁰

¹⁷Current Soviet Policies III, op. cit., p. 67.

¹⁸Current Soviet Policies IV, op. cit., p. 164.

¹⁹"The New Party Program", op. cit., p. 240.

²⁰V. Iavanov, V. Pchelin, and M. Sakov, "The Party's Growing Role in the Building of Communism", Kommunist, No. 17, trans. in CDSP, XII' No. 1 (1960).

They state that the Party now has become the "vanguard of the people" rather than just the "vanguard of the proletariat", a role that it played in the period of consolidation of socialism. With the growth of the activity and consciousness of the masses, they maintain that greater demands are made on their vanguard. The theorists state:

The Party sets its organizations and Party workers the aim of directing the activity of the masses with the increasing skill, of promptly seizing upon and widely disseminating their initiative, of increasing their political awareness, organization and discipline even more and of considering and satisfying their growing requirements as fully as possible.²¹

It is the Party's role to strengthen the guidance of the Soviet's and to help them direct their activities. The tasks of the Party are also "deepening in connection with the strengthening of democratic principles in the state's economic activity".²² The theorists further note that the Party is insuring through the economic councils (Sovnarkhozy), that local initiative on a broad basis is incorporated into the administration of production. The measures aimed at expanding the masses initiative through the social organizations

²¹V. Iyanov, V. Pchelin and M. Sakov, op. cit., p. 6. /Emphasis added--SSM/.

²²Ibid.

such as Trade Unions, Komsomols (noted above), provides the basis for the further growth of the Party. The theorists, Ivanov, Pchelin and Sakov, maintain:

Indeed, who except the Communist Party can unite and coordinate the multifaceted activity of the entire ramified system of public organizations? The Party is the highest form of public organization, and only it can give and does give correct political direction to the work of all other organizations.²³

It is, moreover, the Party that is "able, on the one hand, to eliminate the manifestations of conservatism and attempts to impede the development of the public principle and, on the other, to prevent the underestimation of measures of state coercion".²⁴ According to these theorists, the Party rebuffs, revisionist theories of the disappearance of the state in the early stage of transition to socialism²⁵ and maintains that even in the higher stage of development of society to communism, "the disappearance of some functions of the state is combined with the retention and development of other functions (economic-organizational functions for example) .²⁶ The following

²³V. Ivanov, V. Pchelin, and M. Sakov, op. cit., p. 6. [Emphasis added--SSM].

²⁴Ibid. This may be a reference to the conservatism of the so-called "Anti-party" group who allegedly criticized Khrushchev's theoretical and practical policies.

²⁵The attack is directed at the Yugoslav Communists.

²⁶V. Ivanov, V. Pchelin, and M. Sakov, op. cit., p. 6.

quotation from the New Party Program may summarize this process:

Communist construction presupposes the maximum development of democratic principles of management coupled with a strengthening and improvement of centralized economic management by the state.²⁷

Before we analyze the theoretical and practical implications of the above summary of the concept "state of the whole people", we must first discuss the role of the state in the Soviet Union. The state in the Soviet Union as in other societies is distinguished by the possession of the "right of power".²⁸ This right is endowed to the state by the Constitution, which in turn is to reflect the class relationship in society and express the interests of the ruling class. In actual practice, power was vested at the summit of three hierarchical organizations, which have developed and expanded under Lenin's and especially Stalin's rule. The Communist Party played the most important role as it was charged with the direction (rukovodstvo) of the country along the correct ideological lines, which it also had the power to change. The State organization, on the other hand was to involve itself in the administration (upravlenie) of the goals

²⁷"The New Party Program", op. cit., p. 147. /Emphasis added--SSM/.

²⁸D. B. Levin, Suverenitet (Sovereignty); cited in Ivo Lapenna, "Party and State in the Programme" in Leonard Schapiro, The USSR and the Future, op. cit., p. 149.

and tasks established by the Party. The social or mass organizations were to act as "transmission belts" between the masses and the Party and State. Trade Unions, Komsomols and other social organizations, were to transmit the goals of the ruling powers to the masses and transfer the attitudes of the masses to the Party and State. In actual practice, the division of these three types of organizations was consolidated at the summit of their executives under the principle of "democratic centralism". The Presidium (or Politburo) and the Secretariat, of the Party apparatus, the Council of Ministers of the state apparatus, and the various executives of the social organizations were all interlocked under the rule of the leading "dictator" who held positions in one or more of the executive positions. As many critics of the Soviet Union have pointed out, the working class did not rule the Soviet Union, instead the state became the instrument of the "dictator" and his "new bureaucratic caste".²⁹ Under Stalin, this "elite" was primarily drawn from the "intelligentsia". Thus, when we speak of the state in the Soviet Union, it could have two meanings i.e. state in the sense of just the state apparatus, or the state in the broad

²⁹M. Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1957, reprinted 1963). Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959, reprinted 1965. Also refer to discussion of this topic in Chapter I, pp. 8-9.

sense meaning all three structures interlocked at the top. The withering away of the state, in the Marxian sense, requires that the state in the broad sense be transformed so that there is no class or group of people that would be primarily engaged in ruling. As we noted in the second chapter, Marx envisaged that all would take turns in administering and managing the society and the economy.³⁰ We also noted that the New Party Program and the Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism devoted little attention to the question of division of people, according to tasks that they perform (especially in regards to the question of a division between those who will lead and those who follow) in the ultimate communist society.³¹ In our discussion in the second chapter, we concluded that one possible reason for the official source's reluctance to discuss this question, was the incompatibility between their desire to have a highly organized technological society and at the same time to adhere to the classical "idyllic" view that there would be no division of people according to ruling and non-ruling tasks that they perform.³² Now, we

³⁰Supra, pp. 47-8.

³¹Supra, p. 57.

³²Supra, p. 75.

can postulate another reason. The withering away of the state (in a real sense), was conceived by Khrushchev as a long protracted process.

The concept "state of the whole people" from the point of view of "internal tasks", does not appear to mean that the state was to be weakened. By extending democratic principles of participation and control to more people, in the state agencies and social organizations, there was no indication that the power at the summit of these agencies was to decrease.

Khrushchev, for instance, held leading positions in the Presidium of the Central Committee, was the First Secretary in the Secretariat, and a Minister in the Council of Ministers. He was also Chairman of the Bureau for the RSFSR (Russian Republic) of the Central Committee. Other leading members in the top hierarchies of the executives also held simultaneous positions. The chart on the following page from F. C. Barghoorn's book Politics in the USSR³³ illustrates this point.

³³F. C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston; Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1966). The appendix in this book outlines several charts dealing with the organization and personnel occupying important positions in the Soviet Union between the years 1954-1966.

There is some evidence, however, that Khrushchev directed policies to incorporate more local initiative into decision-making. In agriculture, the abolition in 1958 of the Machine Tractor Station (MTS) is one example already discussed in the first chapter;³⁴ in industry, the establishment in 1957 of about one hundred Councils of National Economy (Sovnarkhozy) to replace the State Economic Ministries is another example of the transference of some decision-making to the lower levels.³⁵ These "decentralizing" policies, were counter-balanced by several measures. In April 1958, a decree was passed providing penalties for "localist" offences and in 1959, commissions were established in primary party organizations of production and commercial enterprises to assist the party organizations in exercising their "right of control" over the economic administrations.³⁶ The Councils of National Economy following the November, 1962 plenum were

³⁴ Supra, pp. 35-36.

³⁵ Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 298.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 299. The continual reorganization of the Party-State organizations is a very complex topic which we will not explore in this thesis. The following works are best summaries of some of the reorganizations that took place during the Khrushchev period: J. R. Azrael, "Politics and Management", Survey, No. 49, (October 1963) pp. 99-101; S. I. Ploss, Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965); H. R. Swearer, "Changing Roles of the CPSU under First Secretary Khrushchev", World Politics, XV, No. 1 (October 1962), pp. 20-43; Michael Tatu, "Soviet Economic Reforms", Problems of Communism, XV (January-February 1966), pp. 28-34.

consolidated and greatly reduced in number. Moreover, until September 1965, the Soviet economy was directed by the Supreme National Economic Council. The establishment of the Party-State Control Committee in 1962, was another important agency of economic direction.³⁷ At the same time, the party's role at the lower levels of the party apparatus was greatly enhanced by Khrushchev's attempts to bring many successful managers and practising engineers, "as distinguished from party officials with engineering education but with little or no experience in their profession".³⁸ Khrushchev's division of the Party, the Komsomol, and the trade unions, the Soviets, and other structures into industrial and agricultural networks (established in November 1962 and abolished in March 1965) seemed to be directed at increasing party efficiency. An additional result was that the number of party organizations within the country greatly increased and involved the party organization in more administrative work at the expense of its traditional role of "mobilizing and coordinating other bureaucracies and the general public".³⁹ However, this step was only taken at the levels below the republic organizations; thus centralized apparatus remained in tact.

³⁷Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 299.

³⁸J. R. Azrael, op. cit.; cited in Barghoorn, p. 299.

³⁹Ibid.

The transference of some functions from the governmental agencies to voluntary social bodies, also did not mean that the central authority had weakened. The spheres, within which this transference was to take place was restricted to such strictly non-political contentious fields as sports.⁴⁰ Moreover, Khrushchev emphatically pointed out in his "Report on the Party Program", that while certain functions were to be transferred to the social organizations, the state agencies such as state militia, state courts and procuracy would be strengthened in their tasks of protecting "Socialist legality".⁴¹ At the same time, it is possible that Khrushchev intended to broaden the base of power at the lower levels. As we noted in the first chapter, this could serve two purposes. Ideologically, Khrushchev could and did claim that his regime was closer to the Marxist-Leninist tradition of moving toward some form of "self-government". Khrushchev could, on the other hand, have directed his policies against the Stalinist established "elite". This is how we interpreted Khrushchev's

⁴⁰ Supra, p. 85; also, Ivo Lapenna, "Party and State in the Programme" in L. Schapiro, ed., The USSR and the Future: An Analysis of the New Program of the CPSU (New York; London: F. A. Praeger, 1962), p. 148; and S. M. Schwartz, "Is the State Withering Away in the USSR?" in L. Schapiro, ed., op. cit., p. 165.

⁴¹ Current Soviet Policies IV, p. 164.

reforms aimed at alleviating some of the worst disparities in income, and social mobility between the intelligentsia and the two "socialist" classes in Soviet society.⁴² By including more diverse elements in decision-making, Khrushchev may have attempted to undercut the favoured position of the intelligentsia. This process, we concluded, was especially essential in that Khrushchev, since the "Secret Speech" in 1956, rejected the repressive policies of the Stalinist period. The substitution of persuasion for terror, could have and did release opposition from members of intelligentsia who were either involved in government or other intellectual work necessary to the state for instance, G. Malenkov and V. Molotov criticized Khrushchev's agricultural and organisational policies.⁴³ Thus, Khrushchev's policies directed at eliminating the number of salaried officials (substituting them by voluntary workers), and extending the party membership to include more people from the working and peasantry classes, could be interpreted as diffusing and often removing (such as the members of the so-called "anti-Party" group⁴⁴) the powerful

⁴² Supra, pp. 44-45.

⁴³ Carl Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-1964 (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins Press, 1966), pp. 108-113.

⁴⁴ Members of this group include, Malenkov, G. M., Kaganovich, L. M., Molotov, V. M. The best description of this opposition group can be found in the following: Linden, op. cit.

members of the intelligentsia. Khrushchev's apparent policies of weakening the State apparatus while extending the role of the Party to include both the administrative as well as leadership functions, may also be incorporated into this theory. Khrushchev could have fulfilled his claim of adhering to the classical Marxian dictate by allowing the state (in the narrow sense) to eventually wither away. He could also have made an attempt at eliminating opposition to his power. G. Malenkov, Khrushchev's chief rival for power, headed and thus controlled the State apparatus after Stalin's death. The weakening of the State apparatus may have served to diffuse the power of Malenkov's followers. At the same time, Khrushchev was building up his own support in the Communist Party while enhancing its role through the reorganization policies. In any case, the role of the state (in the broad sense) did not appear to be weakened in the process. Khrushchev maintained in fact, that the state would remain until "socialism has triumphed and been consolidated internationally".⁴⁵ According to Khrushchev's conception of this international prerequisite,

Also refer to Khrushchev's speech on the "Anti-Party Group" in R. V. Daniels, A Documentary History of Communism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), II,

⁴⁵"Khrushchev: Report on the Party Program", in Current Soviet Policies IV, op. cit., p. 102.

the withering away of the state would, indeed, be a "protracted" process.

Khrushchev introduced two new theories that seem to emphasize stability over revolutionary policy. As opposed to Stalin's acceptance of the inevitability of war,⁴⁶ Khrushchev propounded the policy of "peaceful co-existence". The New Party Program argued that since the world balance of power had changed in favour of the Communist Camp, war was no longer inevitable; in fact, the prime purpose of Communists was to avoid and prevent "thermonuclear war". In addition, the two opposing world systems, were to co-exist on the basis of mutual renunciation of war as a means of settling disputes. The struggle between them was to shift to the economic arena.⁴⁷ The Soviet strategy of peaceful co-existence was extended to the international communist movement in that Khrushchev maintained that socialist revolutions could be accomplished through peaceful means.⁴⁸ In addition to this theory, Khrushchev

⁴⁶V. I. Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" in Current Soviet Policies I, op. cit., p. 7.

⁴⁷"The New Party Program", op. cit., pp. 100-8.

⁴⁸"The New Party Program", op. cit., p. Also see "Declaration of Representatives of the Eighty-one Communist Parties, Meeting in Moscow, November-December, 10 1960" in D. N. Jacobs, ed., The New Communist Manifesto and Related Documents, Second edition (New York; Evanston; London: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 27-8, 39-41.

also postulated the idea of the "more or less simultaneous entry" of the socialist countries into the stage of full communism.⁴⁹ In contrast to the law of uneven development of capitalist countries, attributed to Lenin, the new formula for the socialist camp was embodied in the phrase "planned proportional development". This meant that socialist countries were not to compete with one another, but plan their economic developments to the mutual advantage of all (i.e. an economic division of labour on an international basis).⁵⁰

The implication of these two theoretical innovations seems to be that the Soviet Union was primarily concerned with the stabilization of its own position. By reverting to a policy of co-existence, the Soviet Union had opted out of possible socialist revolutionary struggles against capitalism, in order to avoid nuclear war. The Communist Chinese attacked the Soviet position on just these bases.⁵¹ By committing the

⁴⁹ "Khrushchev: Report To the Congress", Current Soviet Policies III, pp. 55-69.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ The Chinese state: "The emergence of nuclear weapons does not and cannot resolve the fundamental contradictions in the contemporary worlds, does not and cannot alter the law of class struggle, and does not and cannot change the nature of imperialism and reaction". "Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June 14, 1963" in International Relations Among Communists, R. H. McNeal, ed., (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 137-8.

Socialist countries, on the other hand, to the idea of ". . . simultaneous entry" into communism,⁵² the Soviets had justified the subordination of these nations' economies to that of the Soviet Union. At the same time, by stating that the Soviet Union would enter into the ultimate communist society when "socialism /not communism/ had triumphed and been consolidated internationally",⁵³ they had not only pushed the domestic process of the withering away of the state into the remote future, but also retained their leading international (socialist) position by claiming that they would reach it first.

Summary and Conclusions

Within the classical Marxist view, the concept of the "state of the whole people" is a contradiction in terms. Engel's in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, explicitly states that as soon as the state becomes "representative of the whole people of society, it renders itself unnecessary".⁵⁴

⁵²The theory was expounded at the XXIst Party Congress, in order to pacify the Chinese Communists and other Asiatic socialist countries, from the theory propounded by T. Stepanyan which implied that the European countries of the Communist "bloc" would reach communism before the Asiatic Countries. See H. Ritvo, the New Soviet Society, op. cit., p. 232.

⁵³Supra, p. 96.

⁵⁴F. Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, trans. by Edward Aveling (New York: International Publishers, 1935), p. 69.

The Chinese Communists, in their 1963 exchange of letters with the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, were also justified to ask:

In calling a socialist state the 'state of the whole people' is one trying to replace the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state by the bourgeois theory of the state? Is one trying to replace the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat by a state of a different character?⁵⁵

Soviet writers in their criticisms of "bourgeois" theories of the state as existing above classes, argued that "super-class states" do not and can not exist. A. P. Butenko, a Soviet theoretician states as late as 1960 that:

The state, above all, is a class phenomenon as well by its origin as by the role which it plays in every society. . . .Classness is the general constant trait of every state; also the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which does not differ from any other in this regard. . . .Superclass states do not exist: the state cannot be other than the organ of the ruling class.⁵⁶

Even though Butenko's criticism was not directed at the concept of "state of the whole people" (he defended the latter concept in 1963),⁵⁷ the point about the impossibility of the

⁵⁵ "Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June 14, 1963", op. cit., p. 138.

⁵⁶ A. P. Butenko et al., Protiv sovremogo revizionizma v filosofii i sotsiologii /Against Contemporary Revisionism in Philosophy and Sociology/; cited in R. E. Kanets, "The Rise and Fall of the 'All-People's State': Recent Changes in the Soviet Theory of the State", Soviet Studies, XX, No. 1 (July, 1968), 83. Also G. K. Soseliya, Revisionizm i marksistskoe

state existing above class rule can be turned against Khrushchev's innovation. The Communist Chinese, for instance, based their criticism of "the state of the whole people" on these grounds.⁵⁸ While the Khrushchev theory contradicts the basic Marxian dictates, it actually takes Stalin's theory of "non-antagonistic classes" existing in the Soviet Union under a moral and political unity, to its logical conclusion. The Khrushchev theory of the "state of the whole people" reconciles the contradiction between the existence of "socialist" and "friendly" classes and the existence of the state as a "dictatorship of the proletariat". Stalin in 1936, maintained that the domination of the working class, over the kolkhoz peasantry and the intelligentsia was of a persuasive rather than of an oppressive order. This dictatorship within the Soviet Union was primarily directed according to Stalin, against deviant individuals ("enemies of the people") rather than classes. At the last

uchenie o diktature proletariata /Revisionism and Marxist Teaching on the Dictatorship of the Proletariat/; cited in R. E. Kanets, p. 82.

⁵⁷A. P. Butenko states: . . .Now, as communism arises from socialism in which there are no exploiting classes, the workers' class does not need to dominate, as there is no one to dominate. . . .In such a situation the socialist state is no longer a state of proletarian democracy, for the tasks of the latter have been completed. "Sovetskoe obshchenarodnoe gosudarstvo", Kommunist, 1963, No. 13; cited in Kanets, pp. 83-4.

⁵⁸"Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. . .June 14, 1963", op. cit., p. 138.

Congress before Stalin's death, it was claimed that this class relationship was progressing in its friendship and cooperation.⁵⁹ At this time, the prime function of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was emphasized as one of building the material-technical basis for the ultimate communist society.⁶⁰ Great stress was placed by Stalin and other speakers at this Congress, on the need to further develop the technological advancements that had occurred since the Second World War.⁶¹ This stress on technological development and the construction of the material-technical basis of communism, was also the focal point of the New Party Program.⁶² The Khrushchev theory, moreover, upheld the Stalinist notion that the working class was to exert a leading role in society, and that its leadership was manifested by persuasive rather than oppressive means.⁶³ Thus, neither under the Stalinist or Khrushchev theories, was the domination by the working class conceived as one of conflict.

There are other similarities as well as several

⁵⁹ "The Central Committee Report by G. Malenkov" in Current Soviet Policies I, op. cit., p. 115.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 116.

⁶¹ Ibid.; also V. I. Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", op. cit., p. 6.

⁶² "The New Party Program", op. cit., pp. 116-7, 128-130.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 167.

fundamental differences between the two theories. The state, under Khrushchev was conceived as taking an active part in the construction of the material-technical basis of society and in the development of the "New Soviet Man".⁶⁴ Stalin in his discussion of the base and superstructure also indicated that the State does not just reflect the base (economic) but can and must shape the latter toward the ultimate communist society.⁶⁵ At the last Congress before his death, Stalin also emphasized that the prime rule of the state as the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was to construct the material-technical basis of communism. Stalin emphasized that the role of the state was to be strengthened before it withered away. Stalin's conception of this process appears to be similar to Khrushchev's conception of involving more people in government. Stalin in a speech at Sverdlov University in 1925, states:

The Soviet State apparatus does not consist only of Soviets. In the fullest sense of the word, The Soviet State apparatus consists of the Soviets and those vast non-Party and Party organizations which link up the Soviets with the very 'rank and file', which merge the state apparatus with the vast masses, and which, step by step, are breaking down every semblance of a barrier between the State apparatus and the

⁶⁴"The New Party Program", op. cit., pp. 116-7.

⁶⁵V. I. Stalin, Marxism and Linguistics (New York: International Publishers, 1951).

population. This is how we must strive to increase the personnel of our State apparatus 10 /sic/ fold, merge it with the masses, and thus stateless society, a communist society.⁶⁶

This comparison is not entirely fair, since Khrushchev's policies appear to present a more genuine attempt at broadening the social basis of power than under Stalin's policies. Central authority, however, was maintained under Khrushchev's regime either through the traditional Party-State-Social Organizations (that Stalin fully developed) or through the Party-Social Organizations (with the withering away of the State apparatus). As we have already noted there was some evidence that Khrushchev was inclined toward the latter type of organizational control. What implication this type of structure would have had on the degree of control and democracy in Soviet society is outside the scope of this paper. However, it is noteworthy that Malenkov at the XIXth Congress and thereafter warned against the merging of the State's functions with those of the Party in that the revolutionary spirit of the Party would be damaged.⁶⁷ After Khrushchev's resignation the new regime appears to have reinstated the more traditional rules of the Party and State.⁶⁸ It may have been that

⁶⁶"Speech at Sverdlov University (1925)", Leninism, Ninth (Eng.) ed., p. 201.

⁶⁷"The Central Committee Report by Malenkov", op. cit., p. 117.

⁶⁸Barghoorn, op. cit., pp. 408-9.

Khrushchev's experiment may have endangered the control over society by the State in the broad sense. On the other hand, as we have noted earlier in this chapter, the organizational policies like the social reforms may have been part of Khrushchev's plan to maintain his dictatorial position within a peaceful environment (rather than Stalin's use of purges and terror) by eliminating institutionalized powerful groups such as the intelligentsia in the State apparatus as well as the Party. One thing that does appear certain is that the role of the State, in the broad sense, was not conceived by Khrushchev as withering away in the near future.

There does appear to be a fundamental difference between Stalin's and Khrushchev's conceptions as to when the State would ultimately wither away. Stalin, in 1939, maintained that the State would exist even after "communism" was achieved inside the Soviet Union. The State was deemed necessary as long as "capitalist encirclement" remained.⁶⁹ In 1952, Stalin insisted that the State would not wither away "while the socialist revolution has triumphed in one country and capitalism still prevails in the majority of other countries". As in 1939, Stalin reiterated the view that the State would

⁶⁹ Cited in R. V. Daniels, "The State and Revolution: A Case Study in the Genesis and Transformation of Communist Ideology", in R. L. Braham, ed., Soviet Politics and Government (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1965), p. 196.

remain "even under communism if capitalist encirclement remains".⁷⁰ Thus for Stalin, it was conceivable that the USSR could achieve "communism" even though "socialism" had not triumphed in the "majority" of the countries, and that the Soviet State would exist even under "communism" if the international prerequisite was not met. The international class struggle, Stalin reconfirmed in 1952, was also to be based on the concept of inevitability of war i.e. an antagonistic rather than peaceful struggle.⁷¹ Thus within Stalin's view, the attainment of "communism" in the Soviet Union was dependent on factors that could be conceivably reached within a shorter period of time than within Khrushchev's theories. The latter explicitly stated that all nations (not just the "majority") would have to be in the stage of "socialism" before the Soviet State would wither away and before "communism" would be reached by the Soviet Union. Since "capitalist encirclement" was declared to have ended by Khrushchev and replaced by "socialist encirclement",⁷² it

⁷⁰"The Central Committee Report by Malenkov", Current Soviet Policies I, p. 115.

⁷¹V. I. Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", p. 7-8.

⁷²"Khrushchev: Report on the Party Program", in Current Soviet Policies IV, p. 102.

was necessary to extend the existence of the Soviet State for a longer and remote period of time. By making the attainment of "communism" in the Soviet Union also dependent on the disappearance of the State, Khrushchev adhered to the classical Marxian conception of the "stateless" communist society rather than Stalin's heretical position of the state existing "even under communism".

While the Khrushchev theory very carefully delineated that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" had fulfilled its tasks from the "point of view of the tasks of internal /i.e. the Soviet Union/ development", this did not mean, we concluded that the State would cease nor that communism would be reached. We concluded earlier that Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful co-existence" and "simultaneous entry" of all socialist countries to communism were more conducive to a stabilization policy on the part of the Soviet Union in the international field. Thus the attainment of full communism in the Soviet State was to be a protracted process. A parallel between Khrushchev's and Stalin's positions can be drawn here. While Stalin introduced the notion of "non-antagonistic" classes inside the Soviet Union, in order to ensure that conflict from "below" (i.e. the masses) against the State was not theoretically justified, Khrushchev introduced the concept of "peaceful co-existence" to safeguard the Soviet Union's right to refuse to become embroiled in wars and struggles that

that could disrupt its system and that could lead to a nuclear war.

CONCLUSION

In our discussion of the concept of the "state of the whole people", we found that it did not mean that Soviet society was classless. Soviet sources in the Khrushchev period acknowledged that there were still two classes, the workers and the peasantry, and the intelligentsia, which was considered a "stratum" of society. The theoretical relationship between them was expressed under the title of "non-antagonistic" classes, a theory first initiated by Stalin in the 1936 Soviet Constitution. We concluded that this notion was a contradiction of the basic Marxian tenet, i.e. that classes exist only in opposition to each other. Khrushchev further distorted Marxist theory with his announcement that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" had fulfilled its historical purpose, by substituting the "state of the whole people" to take its place. On the other hand, Khrushchev took the theory of "non-antagonistic" classes to its logical conclusion. Since there was no conflict between classes in Soviet society, he could have argued that there was also no need for the domination of the working class over the rest of society. In practical terms, this theoretical innovation was manifested in the Khrushchevian reforms of alleviating some of the worst disparities in the living conditions, income, and education

that divided society so sharply into privileged and less privileged groups under Stalin's long regime.

These reforms, however, did not mean that society was approaching the ultimate stage described by Marx, where there was to be no division of people into specialized tasks, especially between those who rule and those who follow. As we noted in Chapter three, the state under the "state of the whole people" was not conceived as withering away, but, in fact, was to be strengthened. It can be argued that more and more people under Khrushchev's theory were to become involved in governing and administering, and that eventually this process could have led to "social" or "public" self-government" in a true "democratic" sense. This conclusion is questionable, however, by the New Party Program's and other Soviet sources' assertions that the role of the Communist Party was to be greatly enhanced in the period of "full-scale construction of communism". It was further claimed by these sources, that the Party would remain even after the state withers away. Having concluded that the withering away of the state would be a long "protracted" process (in the words of Khrushchev), the existence of the Communist Party was assured for a long period of time. There is even evidence that the Party would retain its role of coordinator and leader in the ultimate communist society. In our discussion of the elimination of the "antithesis" between "mental and physical labour", in the second chapter, we noted

that while technological developments may obliterate hard manual labour, the problem still exists whether there will remain a division of people according to occupational skills. We concluded that the "official" sources, such as the New Party Program and the Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, were very vague in their description of the ultimate "classless" society. By adhering to the classical Marxian view that everyone would be able to take turns in managing and directing society, with the view that the ultimate society would be highly organized and disciplined according to a common plan, these sources were confronted with the problem of whether these two positions were compatible. The conclusions derived from the discussions in the academic journals reflect this dilemma. Theoreticians, such as S. G. Strumilin and E. L. Manevich, stated that there would be specially qualified people to direct the society and the economy. According to these writers, a closed "caste" (or "elite") would not emerge in that there would be a continual flux of new "qualified" people performing the administrative functions. The level of "consciousness" of the "New Man" would be so highly developed, they maintained, that there would be no conflict of interest between managers and workers. This conclusion is based on "idealistic" assumptions of human nature that can be neither proved nor disproved. The fact remains, however, that it was the Communist Party which was charged with the role of instilling this high level

of "consciousness" in each individual. It is conceivable that the Soviet Union could eventually consider itself in the ultimate "classless-stateless" society, and that the Communist Party would be the one to proclaim and lead it.

The fact that historical developments have not followed Marx's prognosis is not entirely the fault of the Communist leaders in the Soviet Union. Marx's analysis has proved to be either inadequate in its formulation or incorrect. Power, in the present technological age, does not necessarily belong to the people who own the means of production. The Soviet example is one where the means of production are by and large nationalized, but power still resides in those who seek it, and who can manipulate the institutional and ideological structures to their advantage. In addition, within the technological developments in this century, power does not belong to the working class (manual labourers), but to those who have the educational and occupational skills that are of prime importance to the highly institutionalized economic and political spheres. Thus, in modern industrialized societies, whether Communist or Capitalist, new classes have arisen which enjoy more privileges (manifested in material or honorific benefits) than those accorded the rest of the population. Marx did not provide an answer as to how this process was to be alleviated.

A more immediate and dangerous problem involves the development of highly destructive "thermonuclear" weapons.

If the Marxian tenet of "irreconcilable" struggle between Capitalist and Communist forces were followed, this could mean the destruction of both "ideological camps". Khrushchev opted out for "peaceful co-existence".

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