

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE STATUS OF WOMEN

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OF THE
STATUS OF WOMEN

BY

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

In this thesis Gerhard Lenski's theory of social stratification was used to analyze the inequality between the sexes. This required a conceptualization of the sexes as two distinct power classes which allowed the determination of the underlying variables accounting for the differences in power and rewards accruing to them in the political, educational and occupational spheres of the distributive system. Three variables, the level of technology/industrialization of a nation, the political orientation of a nation, the percentage of Roman Catholics in the population were postulated and tested as important determinants of the distributive system as it affects the sexual class system. Indices of the status of women relative to that of men were based on secondary data gathered for forty-nine countries. The methodological section of the thesis dealt in some detail with the construction of the indicators needed to test the hypotheses. The analysis of the sexual class systems revealed that, contrary to Lenski's prediction, technology was not the single most important determinant of the nature of distributive systems. To account for the range of variations between countries on the indices of the status of women it was necessary to also consider the ideological variables of politics and religion.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORY

The Social Basis of Inequality

Change in the status of women constitute an important factor in the transformation of social structures. That is, changes in women's status will have repercussions of varying degrees on the nature of interpersonal interactions between the sexes, on the structure of the family, on the division of labour in the occupational and economic spheres, on the composition and nature of religious and political organizations, etc. On a general theoretical level this thesis will try to illuminate the factors facilitating or retarding changes in the status of women relative to that of men; more specifically, it will represent an attempt to apply G. Lenski's theory of social stratification to the problem of inequality between the sexes. A portion of the paper will also deal with the methodological construction of the research design needed to apply the theory.

Social analysts and philosophers such as R.H. Tawney, J. Dewey, and R. Perry are in agreement that a belief in the equality of all men does not necessarily entail the belief that all men have equal natural endowments.¹ That is, they recognize that individuals differ in intelli-

¹R.H. Tawney, Equality, (4th ed., London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1951).

J. Dewey, "from Democracy and Educational Administration", in G.L. Abernathy, ed., The Idea of Equality, (Virginia: John Knox Press, 1959).

R. Perry, "from Puritanism and Democracy", in G.L. Abernathy, ed., The Idea of Equality, (Virginia: John Knox Press, 1959).

gence, character, physical strength and appearance, etc. However, beneath these surface differences human beings share a basic generic sameness which is the basis of the "natural" equality of mankind. Assuming that these philosophers meant to include women within the terms "all men" and "mankind", it follows that since all men are by nature equal, then the inequalities which appear to differentiate men and women must be social in nature and consequently, potentially subject to change.

This philosophical inference of the social basis of the inequality between the sexes is in direct contradiction to the contentions of philosophers from Aristotle through to Auguste Comte who accepted both the superiority of age and the superiority of the masculine sex as "natural" and hence not requiring further explanation.² In Aristotle's natural hierarchy of order among men, women fell at the very bottom in the same category as children and dogs.³

The assumption persists even today that since the particular form of inequality reflected in a sexual division of labour is to some extent and in some form common to all societies, it must follow that this differentiation is the "natural" or correct ordering of society. This concept of a natural sexual division of labour and roles is raised by modern social analysts such as R. Bierstedt in the form of a biologically

²R. Aron, Progress and Disillusion, (New York: The New American Library, 1968), p. 98.

³Aristotle, "from The Politics", in G.L. Abernathy, ed., The Idea of Equality, (Virginia: John Knox Press, 1959), p. 47.

R. Dahrendorf, "On the Origin of Inequality", in A. Beteille, ed., Social Inequality, (New York: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969), pp. 18, 21.

based argument.⁴ A proponent of the position that "sexual differentiation in society may be more of a biological and less of a cultural phenomena",⁵ Bierstedt contends that the sexual division of labour and subsequently, the general status of women relative to that of men, is mainly a result of innate biological differences between the sexes. Hence, the inequalities existing between them cannot be eradicated but rather must be accepted as a natural ordering of society. His position is based on the assumption that since the sexual division of labour is universal, then it must be biologically caused, and changeable only within the narrow limits of physiology.⁶ Y. Talmon supports Bierstedt's contention and further suggests that roles in society must be assigned with these differences consciously in mind.⁷

Bierstedt's theory of biological determinism in regard to sex-role differentiation can then be seen to support the traditional, sexual status quo in which women are in a subordinate position to men. Further, a position which holds that the division of labour is biologically determined, in so far as sex-roles are concerned, precludes the application of a sociological theory to account for the differences in status, power, position, prestige between male and female since these inequalities can not, in any major sense, be considered to be socially derived but must

⁴R. Bierstedt, The Social Order, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1963).

⁵Ibid., p. 355.

⁶Ibid., p. 372.

⁷Y. Talmon, "Sex-Role Differentiation in an Egalitarian Society", in T. Lasswell, J. Burma, S. Aronson, ed., Life in Society, (Chicago: Scott Foresman and Co., 1965), p. 145.

be taken as given and static. Consequently, from this position any discussion of the status of women relative to that of men would tend to be descriptive in nature rather than analytical.

J.R. Udry maintains that the simple biological explanation could possibly be correct if sex-role differentiation did follow identical patterns in every society.⁸ However, comprehensive cross-cultural studies such as W. Stephen's compilation of comparative data on the division of labour by sex, which he adapted from G.P. Murdock's 1937 study of two hundred and twenty-four non-literate societies, indicates that although there is definitely a division of labour according to sex in every society, every society does not exhibit the same divisions.⁹ Udry maintains that the only universally shared and biologically determined function according to sex is the bearing of children. Although the caring of small children is also part of women's work in all societies, he suggests that no social scientist could reasonably argue that this was anything but a convenience for nursing.¹⁰

The biological function of women as mothers can, however, be interpreted as an important social factor in explaining the original basis of a sexual division of labour. Child care responsibilities did historically place women in the position of remaining near the home, and men were required to perform those functions such as hunting and warfare

⁸J.R. Udry, The Social Context of Marriage, (New York: J.P. Lippincott, 1966), p. 28.

⁹W.N. Stephens, The Family in Cross-Cultural Perspective, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 282.

¹⁰J.R. Udry, op. cit., p. 28.

which demand spatial mobility. Haavoi-Mannila makes this point but continues on to state that

"this division of labour still prevails in industrial society, even though the number of children has decreased and infant care no longer extends for more than a few years in a woman's life, and even though both spouses may be gainfully employed outside the house".¹¹

The sexual division of labour, even if it were similar in all pre-industrial societies, should not, by this interpretation, be considered as permanently fixed or static.

The simple biologically based explanation of sex-differences is also challenged by the social-learning view of sex differences which holds that "the child's behaviour and values are determined not by his gender role, but by his social-learning history".¹² This is based on the research and findings of studies such as Money, Hampson and Hampson's who, after an investigation of persons who were originally assigned the wrong sex or an ambiguous sex based on the appearance of their external genitalia, suggested that "gender role is entirely the result of a learning process which is quite independent of chromosomal, gonadal or hormonal sex".¹³

¹¹E. Haavio-Mannila, "Convergence between East and West: Tradition and Modernity in Sex Roles in Sweden, Finland, and the Soviet Union", Acta Sociologica, Vol. 14, No. 1-2, 1971, p. 120.

¹²W. Mischel, "Social-Learning View of Sex Differences in Behaviour", in E.E. Maccoby, ed., The Development of Sex Differences, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 63.

¹³D.A. Hamburg, D.T. Lunde, "Sex Hormones in the Development of Sex Differences in Human Behaviour", in E.E. Maccoby, ed., The Development of Sex Differences, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966) p. 15.

Anthropologists, after experiencing other cultures, also tend to accept as fact the tremendous influence of learning on the shaping of sex-specific behaviours. Margaret Mead, for example, observed that identified traits such as "stupidity, brilliance, beauty, and ugliness, friendliness and hostility, initiative and responsiveness, courage, patience and industry"¹⁴ have been assigned in some societies to one sex, in some to another and in some to both sexes. Consequently, these traits or commonly mentioned psychological differences between the sexes can be viewed as human traits rather than sex-linked characteristics.

Similar to Udry, Stephens, Mead and others M. Tumin notes that although minimal distinctions between men and women must be institutionalized to maintain the reproduction of society, the kinds and amounts of differences that may come to exist are culturally variable being dependent on the prevailing kinship system and cultural role definitions. He maintains that there are "many different ways the relationship of men to women can be arranged".¹⁵ R. Linton in his The Study of Man also concluded that the division of labour is dependent on the logic of culture; thus, while men may be assigned a certain task in one society, another society may require totally opposite roles of them.¹⁶

We submit that the simple biological explanation of sex-differences (roles, statuses, personalities, etc.) is inaccurate. We make the

¹⁴M. Mead, Male and Female, (New York: W. Morrow and Co., 1949), p. 8.

¹⁵M.M. Tumin, "On Inequality", A.S.R., Volume 28, 1963, p. 19.

¹⁶P.H. Landes, Social Problems, (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1959), p. 239.

assumption that sex-role differentiations are, for the most part, culturally rather than biologically derived. Accounting for these differences through social factors provides the basis for utilizing sociological theory. Obviously the area of sex-role differences offers a wide variety of research possibilities and could be approached from several perspectives. One possible approach, which will be explored in this thesis, is a macro-sociological one, looking at the sexes as social groupings between which certain social inequalities exist. Social stratification theory should offer a potentially fruitful approach to analyzing these inequalities.

Conventional social stratification theory generally analyzes a society's population in terms of a set of categories, usually called classes or social strata, that are found to be unequal in terms of such criteria as social evaluation, property, wealth, power or psychic gratification.¹⁷ Gracey and Wrong note that it is only

"when people are grouped into separate categories on the basis of selected differences and the categories are then ranked as higher or lower, superior or inferior in relation to each other that we may speak of a class structure".¹⁸

Tumin, on the other hand, points out that role differentiation does "not necessarily involve any differences in evaluation and rank on a scale of

¹⁷T.E. Lasswell, Class and Stratum, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 10.

M.M. Tumin, op. cit., p. 19.

D. Wrong, H. Gracey, Readings in Introductory Sociology, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1967), p. 447.

¹⁸D. Wrong, H. Gracey, op. cit., p. 447.

social inferiority or superiority",¹⁹ nor does it necessarily mean differential rewards. That is, differentiation does not necessarily imply differences in rank or in value of function, but merely differences in kind. It is on this basis that the argument "different but equal" is often made in connection with sex-role differentiation. It is argued that although men and women have different roles to perform, the difference does not make one sex superior or inferior to the other. However, in the case of the sexes, the difference in the assigned sexually appropriate roles do give rise to differential social evaluation and rewards for the two groups. It can be demonstrated that the sex-labelling of jobs generally results in positions of power and authority being assigned to men and positions of aid and nurturance being assigned to women. Consequently, we believe that the "different but equal" argument is inappropriate and incorrect.

Given that, in relative terms, males are generally in superordinate positions in society and females generally in subordinate positions in society in relation to each other, some theorists such as Kingsley Davis in The Human Society persist in maintaining that the divisions formed do not in fact constitute social strata.²⁰ Davis holds that "those positions based on sex, age and kinship ... do not form part of the system of stratification".²¹ The family is to be treated as a unit whose members occupy the same rank. This rank is generally derived

¹⁹M.M. Tumin, op. cit., p. 19.

Similar to the point made by R. Dahrendorf, op. cit., p. 27.

²⁰K. Davis, The Human Society, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1949).

²¹Ibid., p. 364.

from a combination of the husband-father's occupation, income and prestige. Since the majority of adult women in industrial societies have roles within a family unit this method considers a married woman to form part of the system of stratification only indirectly through her husband. M.G. Smith points out that Davis' argument on this point can not appropriately analyze such cultures as the Zulus who have a complex inter-family stratification system in which, for example, the wives of a polygenous marriage have unequal social ranking.²² Nor, we suggest does it apply to stratification systems of industrializing or industrial nations in which husband and wife may both hold different positions within the occupational sphere and certainly different degrees of power and authority within the family, the political and religious structure.

However, the functional theories of stratification go beyond the point of essentially neglecting to analyze the status of women relative to that of men to the point of actually reinforcing and legitimizing the traditional sexual status quo. K. Davis sums up the functionalist position when he states:

"Social inequality is thus an unconsciously evolved device by which societies insure that the most important positions are conscientiously filled by the most qualified persons." ²³

In stating that inequality arises out of the need of society to fill functionally important positions and further, that the important positions will be filled by the most qualified persons, Davis is assuming a

²²M.G. Smith, "Pre-Industrial Stratification Systems", in N.J. Smelser, S.M. Lipset, ed., Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966), p. 155.

²³K. Davis, op. cit., p. 367.

perfectly functioning society. If one extended this functionalist theory as it stands to apply to women, one would be led to conclude that women, in proportion to their numbers in society, are not in the functionally important positions because they are not qualified to fill them. If we extend Talcott Parsons' theory a similar implication is discovered. Lenski interprets Parsons' theory as stating that "the rewards which men and positions enjoy are a function of the degree to which their qualities, performances and possessions measure up to the standards set by their society".²⁴ Whether or not Parsons meant to imply it, it would seem to follow from this interpretation of his work that women's rewards in terms of access to favoured occupations, prestige and power within the political, social, economic spheres are lower than men's because women lack the qualities needed to measure up to societies standards.

The Davis-Moore functional theory of stratification is essentially a uni-dimensional view of social stratification which perceives only one class system within a given society, stratified in terms of a combination of income, occupation, prestige and power and based on the one explanatory variable "functions".²⁵ Since the unit of analysis is the family both sexes are represented at every level of the categorizations of the class system thus defined. Consequently, the inequalities attendant on sex-role differentiation tend to become irrelevant in a functional social

²⁴G. Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Stratification, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1966), p. 16.

²⁵K. Davis, W. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification", in R. Bendix, S.M. Lispet, eds., Class, Status and Power, (New York: The Free Press, 1966).

stratification theory dealing primarily with class divisions in the economic sense.

However, G. Lenski has developed a theory of stratification which can consider the sources and consequences of sex-role differentiation by allowing the sexes to be treated as classes. Thus, we will now turn to a discussion of Lenski's theory.

G. Lenski's Theory of Social Stratification

By assuming that man is a social being Lenski is accepting the position that man is shaped by the society he is born into.²⁶ This process of shaping or socialization is defined by Alex Inkeles as

"the process whereby individuals acquire the personal system properties--the knowledge, skills, attitudes, values, needs and motivations, cognitive, affective and conative patterns--which shape their adaption to the physical and sociocultural setting in which they live".²⁷

Thus, it can be concluded that Lenski is starting with the basic premise that sex-role differentiations are socially based and consequently, subject to change.

Further, Lenski takes a position similar to Tawney in his recognition of the unequal nature of man's natural endowments which he views as a minor but important source of social inequalities.²⁸ However, as groups, men and women are generally representative of an equal range of

²⁶G. Lenski, op. cit., p. 26.

²⁷A. Inkeles, "Social Structure and Socialization", in D.A. Goslin, ed., Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1969), p. 615.

²⁸G. Lenski, op. cit., p. 32.

these natural endowments with the exception of physical strength.

Man is also assumed to be predominately self-seeking. That is "when they are obliged to choose between their own or their group interests and the interests of others they nearly always choose their own".²⁹ This aspect of the nature of man becomes particularly important in discussions of the possibility and actually of change in the positions and relationship of men and women.

Man is also viewed as "a creature of habit and powerfully influenced by the social counterpart of habit, namely custom".³⁰ The force of inertia could partially explain why, as a whole, women have not been more active in protesting distributive arrangements which are not to their advantage and which are no longer necessary for the survival of society.

On the nature of society, Lenski states that social systems show different degrees of "interdependence and integration of their parts".³¹ Consequently, the functionalist notion that the good of the whole, and as a consequence, the good of the parts, can be achieved through the cooperation of the parts, is not a realistic analysis of an on-going system. No human social system meets totally the requirements of perfect mutual cooperation between parts, with each part being subordinated to the needs of the whole. Some analysts may argue that it is functionally necessary for society to maintain sex-role differentiation;³² that is, it may be

²⁹Ibid., p. 30.

³⁰Ibid., p. 32.

³¹Ibid., p. 34.

³²T. Parsons, R.F. Bales, Family, Socialization and the Interaction Process, (Illinois: The Free Press, 1955). Parsons and Bales take the position that to meet the emotional needs of within the family, the instrument role must be taken by the father, and the expressive role must be played by the mother.

argued that particular sex-role differences prevailing over time are fundamental to the maintenance and continuance of the society. However, this differentiation is not necessarily beneficial to the individuals involved, who may suffer through being forced into rigidly defined roles.

Assuming that the above postulates are true, Lenski suggests that need and power will determine the distribution of the products of men's labours. That is, this answers the question of 'who gets what and why?'. People will share what they produce to the degree required to "insure the survival and continued productivity of those whose actions are necessary or beneficial to themselves".³³ However, given that men are self-seeking and rewards are in short supply, any surplus produced by the society, in the form of "goods and services over and above the minimum required to keep producers alive and productive",³⁴ will be distributed on the basis of power. As technology advances this surplus of goods and services will increase and more goods and services will be distributed on a basis of power rather than need. Consequently, "the nature of distributive systems will vary greatly, depending on the degree of technological advance in the societies involved".³⁵ Lenski points out that the difference in rewards accruing to various positions in society is not to be seen as a function of system needs as the functionalists maintain, but rather is to be regarded as a function of the distribution of power.³⁶

³³G. Lenski, op. cit., p. 44.

³⁴Ibid., p. 44.

³⁵Ibid., p. 47.

³⁶Ibid., p. 63.

Therefore, we can conclude that differences in rewards now accruing to men and women are not to be seen as necessary for the maintenance of society. Struggles and conflicts will result from attempts by individuals and groups to control the surplus of goods and services (the rewards), through the use of the power available to them.

Lenski's theory of social stratification then involves an analysis of the distributive processes of society and the power relations which are determining factors of this process. He defines a power class as "an aggregation of persons in a society who stand in a similar position with respect to force or some specific form of institutionalized power".³⁷ The distribution of power itself is not reducible to any single factor, but rather can be based on position, on property, on sex, on age, on ethnic group, etc. Therefore, there can not be only one class system in a given society, but rather a series of class hierarchies or class systems.³⁸ The members of a given society thus simultaneously hold a position within the occupational, property, racial-ethnic, age, educational and sexual class systems;³⁹ systems which provide varying degrees of influence on the chances of men obtaining their aims. Although he uses broad categories, Lenski obviously does not mean to deny that internal variations are present. In the case of the sexual class system, it is readily apparent that neither women nor men are homogeneous groups, but can each be sub-

³⁷ Ibid., p. 75.

Lenski uses the terms class and power class interchangeably, but in each instance he means power class.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 79.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 80, 81.

divided into categories of more and less powerful, more and less wealthy, etc. The class system also contains the idea of differentiation of prestige and deference between the classes. Prestige, Lenski points out "can be understood more readily as a function of power and privilege than the other way round".⁴⁰ Thus an analysis of power relations will also yield information on prestige differences.

Members of every power class, such as women in the sexual class system, share certain common interests with each other--interests which provide the basis for potential hostility toward other classes, in this case men, and toward other class systems such as the occupational class system which does not allow them entrance into many of the favoured occupations except on a limited scale. Conflicts are possible within class systems and between class systems. However, as Lenski points out,

"members of a class are not always aware consciously of their common interests, much less act collectively on a basis of it; nor are they always consciously or overtly hostile to members of other classes".⁴¹

We know that this is particularly the case within the sexual class system in which the two power classes live in intimate association with each other.

Class systems also vary with respect to the degree of institutionalization of the positions of the various power classes within the particular class system.⁴² That is, social inequalities existing between various groups are embedded in norms and mores and are legitimized by

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 430.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 75.

⁴² Ibid., p. 82.

the predominant cultural ideology to varying degrees. This institutionalization can also affect the degree of mobility allowed within class systems. Mobility within class systems based on racial-ethnic characteristics and sex is fairly static since one can not readily change the characteristics of birth. The social inequalities and sex-role definitions concomitant with the differentiation by sex are deeply grounded in the traditional customs and norms of a society. These role definitions must become flexible to permit the possibility of equality between the sexes to develop.

As a consequence of each individual being a member of several class systems, a problem Lenski terms "status inconsistency"⁴³ can arise. In relation to the sexual class this means that a woman may have a certain status within the sexual class system, and another in the occupational class, a third in the racial-ethnic class and so on. She, in seeking to maximize satisfaction, wants to be treated in terms of her highest status but may, in fact, be treated in terms of her most visible status -- sex, which may not be congruent with her other statuses. Women as a group would tend to generally experience a great deal of status inconsistency in their relationships with people outside their primary group, especially if they interact frequently in the political, economic and religious spheres. One could expect, Lenski states, that these women would react against "the existing social order and the political system which undergirds it"⁴⁴ but this has not yet been the case to any great extent in

⁴³Ibid., p. 86.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 87.

most countries. We feel that status inconsistency must, however, be regarded as an important factor in creating internalized conflict for the individual female. As well as her positions in the various class systems being uncorrelated to any great degree, her position within the sexual class system can also be full of contradictions and inconsistencies in a period of change. Role-conflict in women may result from variations in the defined relationship between men and women which occur concomitantly with variations in men's and women's roles viz a viz the distributive systems. Sex appropriate behaviour may become a more nebulous area as the level of technology increases, as egalitarian ideology is espoused in theory but not necessarily acted on in everyday life. This area poses interesting questions for research which must unfortunately remain outside the scope of this thesis.

We see that Lenski has postulated a number of constants about the nature of man and society which affect the nature of distributive systems. Further, he has taken power as the criteria on which he differentiates classes which are affected by the nature of distributive systems. He postulates that the major variable influencing change in the nature of a distributive system will be the level and mode of technology, although as can be seen from the attached chart in which he summarized his theory, he recognizes that other factors such as type, duration and security of regime, military participation ratio, degree of constitutionalism, environmental and assorted other variables which he calls "x, y, z" may also affect the distributive systems to varying degrees.⁴⁵ Which of these secondary and

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 90.

minor factors become relevant will depend on the class system that is being analyzed in conjunction with the particular aspects of the distributive system being considered. Since his theory can incorporate other causal variables of change such as ideology, it can not be regarded as a closed theory. We will now turn to a discussion of how and what facets of Lenski's theory will be utilized and tested in an analysis of sexual class systems.


Lenski's Diagrammatic Summary of the General Theory of Stratification ⁴⁶

The constants:

- a. Man's social nature
- b. Man's predominantly self-seeking nature
- c. Men's unequal endowments
- d. Man's reliance on habit and custom
- e. The short supply of rewards
- f. Human societies as very imperfect systems

- I - Primary influence
- II - Secondary influence
- III - Minor influence
- II → III - Secondary influence in technologically primitive societies becoming a minor influence in advanced societies

The variables:



⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 89.

Thesis Structure

This thesis, utilizing G. Lenski's theory of social stratification, will regard men and women as forming two classes in a sexual class system. It will investigate, cross-nationally, the status of women relative to that of men in the political, educational and occupational distributive systems, attempting to establish the kind of inequalities in status that do exist, and, through the testing of Lenski's main thesis, the major factors influencing this distribution of status.

If variations in technology are, as Lenski contends, "the most important single determinant of variations in distribution",⁴⁷ that is, of variations in the nature of distributive systems, then nations with similar levels of technology/industrialization should exhibit similar levels of the status of women relative to that of men in relation to the political, educational and occupational aspects of the distributive systems. To determine the validity of this statement this thesis will test the hypothesis:

Assuming that the nations involved are pre-cybernated, the higher the level of technology/industrialization of a nation, the more equal the status of women relative to that of men is likely to be.

However, Lenski makes it clear that variation in technology, although the most important determinant, is not the only determinant, since this is not a closed theory. Other variables acting on the distributive systems are regarded as having secondary or minor influence of varying degrees. This thesis will investigate political ideological orientation and religious composition of the population as Lenski's

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 90.

"x, y, z" variables. These variables are tested in the form of the following hypotheses:

The more socialistically oriented a nation is, the more equal the status of women relative to that of men is likely to be.

and

The larger the proportion of Roman Catholics in the nation's population, the less equal the status of women relative to that of men is likely to be.

Any explanation of the status of women relative to that of men; that is, any explanation of the differences in power or rewards distributed by the political, occupational and educational systems to men and women must take into account the relative degree of influence each determining variable will exert in combination with the others, as well as the effect of Lenski's constants concerning the nature of man and society. It is our contention that in the case of the sexual class system, the ideological variables involving politics and religion will play as important a determining role as the level of technology/industrialization.

An attempt will be made to measure the status of women along two separate dimensions, the formal, legal status of women and the actual status of women. For example, in education the formal status of women would be the legal right to enter training in any educational institution. The actual status of women would be determined by the percentage of women relative to men who are enrolled or have graduated from institutions of higher learning. This distinction is made because it is felt that there is a gap between the legal status granted to women in comparison to men in theory and the actual status enjoyed by women in reality. The behaviour

of men and women, and the nature of social institutions and role definitions may not correspond to the legal status women possess. If this is true then inequality between the sexes can not be eradicated solely by legislation, nor will the legal and formal status reveal the true nature of the power relationship between men and women.

The sample of nations selected for study number forty-nine countries from Western Europe, Eastern Europe, including the U.S.S.R., North America, Latin America and South America. Asian and African countries were omitted in order to reduce the complications created by completely different cultural orientations, by major differences in religious composition other than variations of Protestant, Catholic and primarily by the lack of substantial comparable data in areas such as national account statistics, educational facilities and differences in their use by sex.

CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY

Hypothesis I

Assuming that the nations involved are pre-cybernated, the higher the level of technology/industrialization of a nation, the more equal the status of women relative to that of men is likely to be.

Industrialization, in a very restricted sense, can be defined as the "use of inanimate sources of power in the production of economic goods and services".¹ However, the meaning employed in this study is more encompassing. Labelling a society as "industrial" is taken to imply a number of the following characteristics shared in varying degrees:

- " i) a predominant concern with production and productivity,
- ii) a desire for growth,
- iii) a changed distribution of labour (that is, highly specialized and coordinated),
- iv) increasingly systematic application of science to technology and of technology to productivity
..."²

The industrialization process has had the effect of shifting productive tasks from the home to the industrial work place--the factory, thus effectively separating home and work. As this occurred women's "proper place" was generally assumed to be in the home with its attendant

¹W.E. Moore, Order and Change, (New York: J. Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 33.

²R. Aron, 18 Lectures on Industrial Society, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961), p. 3.

emphasis on family and domestic functions. Obvious factors affecting this attitude included successive pregnancies, the need for child care, the performance of numerous household maintenance chores as well as the traditional belief in the "natural" roles of women as wives and mothers and in the female nature as physically and psychologically different from the male resulting in an incapacity on the part of women to work in the pressure-filled, dirty, at times arduous, industrial setting. However, a growing industrializing system requires a large pool of labour with a wide range of skill levels from which to draw. Sex barriers to employment can run counter to this need if the supply of appropriate male labour is not available to meet the demand. Consequently, in an industrializing or industrial nation employment discrimination by sex does not apply to all occupations. That is, it does not apply to those occupations which males no longer find attractive, probably due to low wages, to those occupations which they are willing or forced by an economic situation to share, or to those newly created jobs which are defined initially as "suitable" for females, such as clerical jobs, keypunch operators, service occupation, the expanding educational and social welfare fields. It can be speculated that as the number of women engaged in economic activity grows, societal norms will adjust to accommodate the change and consequently cultural constraints against female labour force participation will weaken somewhat. This change in norms, attitudes etc., may have the effect of reinforcing women's desire and choice to join the economic sphere. Thus, an increase in the supply of female workers may cyclically influence the

further increase of women workers.³ In this way the degree and rate of economic development or industrial growth can be viewed as contributing to the breakdown of legal and cultural barriers to women's participation in activities separated from the home. However, should a society no longer require a growing labour force, in a prolonged period of recession or depression or in a transition to a cybernated society, the discriminated against groups would be the first to be excluded from the labour force --the women, the unskilled which include many women, the minority racial and ethnic groups. (However, in this study we are assuming that all contemporary industrial societies are pre-cybernated.) This exclusion of women is completely in accord with Lenski's theory that people are essentially self-seeking and will guard their self-interests first. The rationale behind the exclusion of women would likely take the form of a revival of the traditional ideology that "a woman's place is in the home" and that the male should have priority on jobs since he is head of the household.

Since occupation and income act as the principal indices of status in an industrial society, women by the very act of becoming a part of the occupational world, are able to define themselves on this continuum of achieved status, while as housewives and mothers they are subsumed under the family units' status which is based on the achievements of the husband-father. By working, women also achieve a measure of financial independence which has been shown to enhance the relative power of the women in family

³A similar idea was suggested in World Population Conference, 1965, Volume I: Summary Report, (New York: United Nations, 1966), p. 222.

relationships and may generalize to community relationships.⁴

The problem in terms of the economic sphere then becomes how much status relative to that of men does the social system permit women to achieve. There are three basic forms of equality relating to economic activity: i) the equality of economic participation measured by a comparison of the number of men and women gainfully employed, ii) the equality achieved in the distribution of occupations which can be gauged by a comparison of the percentage of men and women in a particular occupational category and a discussion of the related issue of the effect of sex-labelling of jobs, iii) the equality of authority or power measured by a comparison of the percentage of men and women at given levels of authority in the economic sphere.⁵

It is possible to talk about equality between the sexes because science has shown that in a modern industrial society in which strength is not a prerequisite for most jobs, women are mentally and physically capable of doing tasks which were traditionally regarded as men's work.⁶ As explained earlier sociologists and anthropologists have shown that the division of labour between the sexes is primarily contingent upon local conditions and cultural traditions rather than upon any basic biological differences. The inventions and innovations associated with an increasing level of industrialization and technological knowledge have

⁴J. Noordhoek, Y. Smith, "Family and Work", Acta Sociologica, Volume 14, No. 1-2, 1971, p. 51.

⁵D.R. Brown, The Role and Status of Women in the Soviet Union, (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968), p. 52.

⁶L. Terman, L. Tyler, "Psychological Sex Differences", in L. Carmichael, ed., Manual of Child Psychology, (London: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1954), p. 1067.

in fact created the potential for the attainment of a society with complete equality of status between the sexes. Technology, defined by Wilbert Moore as a "body of practical knowledge and skills, a social product having social consequences only as utilized through the organized direction of human ingenuity",⁷ can not by itself create this equality; as a body of knowledge it can only be seen as facilitating changes which would make this possible.⁸ In the highly industrialized society, tasks, in most cases, require intellect and dexterity rather than brute force; electrical devices, home services and mechanical aids, convenience foods, etc., have made domestic work less demanding of time and energy; the progress of the medical and biological sciences in reducing infant mortality rates and in increasing life expectancy, linked with the development of reliable contraceptive devices, have permitted women to limit and space their families, thus freeing them, to some degree, from the dominance of their roles as producers of children.

However, the development of an economic and social organization which facilitates the presence of women in the labour force could also have negative effects on women's status if it takes place in the absence of appropriate policies and planning. That is, if women are called into the economic sphere only in low level occupations or occupations lacking power and responsibilities and are, at the same time, expected to retain all their domestic responsibilities, they do not gain substantially in

⁷W.E. Moore, op. cit., p. 34.

⁸Oppenheimer makes a similar point that technology only facilitates labour force participation, it does not force women to enter.

V. Oppenheimer, The Female Labour Force in the United States, Population Monograph Series, No. 5, (Berkeley: University of California, 1970), p. 62.

real equality.

The nature and extent of women's participation in the work sphere will be effected by the following technological and cultural determinants:

- i) domestic and maternal responsibilities assigned to women,
- ii) the attitudes of family, friends and community regarding the desirability of both female labour force participation and the assuming of equal duties,
- iii) availability and facilities for child care in the form of creches, kindergartens and day care centres and domestic servants.
- iv) legislation affecting women workers (i.e., the reduction of the work week, maternity leave, equal pay),
- v) economic pressures and incentives to work,
- vi) the growth of part-time employment,
- vii) the nature of the vocational training and education aimed at women which will affect their range of occupational choices.

Since technological developments concomitant with increasing industrialization have provided the potential or the necessary structural conditions for a fuller equality between the sexes, this industrial-technological variable should be the major causal determinant of women gaining in status relative to that of men.

Measurement

To test this hypothesis it is necessary to measure and then compare the level of industrialization of each nation with each index of the status of women. General levels of technology/industrialization were calculated by combining and scoring, in a unique way, the following commonly used indicators of industrialization:

- i) percentage of economically active population engaged in agriculture,
- ii) energy consumption per capita,
- iii) per capita national income,
- iv) estimates of valued-added per capita manufacturing.

For each indicator the data were rank-ordered from highest to lowest and divided into quartiles. Each quartile was assigned a value from 1 to 4; 4 denoting the quartile indicating the highest level of industrialization to 1 denoting the lowest level of industrialization. For individual countries the scores on each index of industrialization were summed. These cumulative scores served to arrange the nations into the following thirteen general groupings along a continuum of industrialization from highest, group 1, to lowest, group 13.

1. U.S.A., West Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden,
Australia, Denmark, Canada.
2. Belgium.
3. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, New Zealand, Norway,
Iceland, Switzerland.
4. Hungary, Netherlands, France.

5. U.S.S.R., Austria.
6. Finland, Puerto Rico, Italy.
7. Bulgaria, Poland, Ireland, Venezuela.
8. Uruguay, Chile.
9. Romania, Spain, Panama.
10. Mexico, Yugoslavia, Portugal.
11. Greece, Peru.
12. Brazil, Columbia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Albania.
13. Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Ecuador, Honduras,
Bolivia, El Salvador, Haiti.

Indices

- i) Percentage of the economically active population engaged in agriculture.

According to current growth theory a decrease in the labour force engaged in the agricultural sector of the economy corresponds to an increase in the percentage of the labour force employed in the growing secondary and tertiary sectors accompanying industrialization.⁹ Growth in the agricultural sector in an industrializing state comes to mean an increasing productivity, in terms of quantities and qualities of goods, with a decreasing number of workers. Consequently, a lower percentage of labour employed in agriculture indicates a higher level of industrialization.

- ii) Energy consumption per capita.

Data on energy consumption refers to "lignite, coal and coke, petroleum and its products, natural and manufactured gas and energy".¹⁰

⁹R. Aron, op. cit., p. 150.

¹⁰United Nations Report on the World Situation, (New York: United Nations, 1961), p. 47.

Calculating the energy consumption per capita takes into account the population differences between nations. Energy consumption is an obvious indicator of the degree of mechanization and industrialization and is used by the United Nations Bureau of Statistics in measuring levels of industrialization. It can be assumed that the higher the level of energy consumption per capita, the higher the level of industrialization.

iii) Per capita national income in U.S. dollars.

It is assumed that industrialization brings with it an increase in the general standard of living as reflected by greater per capita national income. However, United Nations sources point out that there is a wide margin of error in national income statistics resulting in part from the conversion of national currencies into U.S. dollars, which may not truly reflect the relative real incomes within countries. Also there is the problem of calculating per capita incomes from the "net material profit" figures published for the Eastern European countries as compared to the accounting systems utilizing gross national product figures.¹¹

iv) Estimates of value-added in manufacturing per capita.

This is the central measure of industrialization used in the United Nations analysis of the growth of world industry.¹²

"This measure reflects not only the prevalence in the economy of manufacturing activity, but the level of employment and output per person

¹¹ Ibid., p. 47.

¹² The Growth of World Industry 1938-1961, International Analyses and Tables, (New York: United Nations, 1963).

engaged in manufacturing as well".¹³

Value-added is the

"total value of gross-output during a period less the sum of the cost of all purchased goods (i.e., raw materials, supplies, fuels, electricity, goods sold in the same conditions as purchased) utilized during the period and all the costs of all services of an industrial nature (i.e., fabricating, assembling, repairs or maintenance) provided by others".¹⁴

Thus we can conclude that the higher the value-added in manufacturing per capita, the higher the level of industrialization of a nation.

The four selected indices of technology/industrialization were intercorrelated (Pearsonian r) and were all found to have significantly high correlations. (See Table 2) This finding increases the confidence that can be placed in categories of levels of technology/industrialization developed by using a composite score of the four indices. (See Table 1) A comparison of the correlations themselves reveals some interesting results. For example, index 3 (per capita national income) which supposedly was the index with the largest degree of error, produced higher correlations in combination with the other indices than did index 4 (estimates of value-added manufacturing per capita) which was the United Nations Bureau of Statistics choice for measuring levels of industrialization. This could mean that index 4 is not as strong an index of technology/industrialization as the other three indices assuming that all four indices do, in fact, measure some facet of the degree of technology/ industrialization.

In the computer programs run to test the hypotheses, the level of

¹³ Ibid., p. 102.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 143.

technology/industrialization was measured along two separate dimensions, the first of which incorporates all the indices and the second of which tests the United Nations choice of indicator.

- i) Technology-Ordinal (Tech-0): This measure utilized the categories developed from the four indices of industrialization and was called Tech-0 because the categories fell into an ordinal sequence from Group 1, the highest level of technology/industrialization, to Group 13, the lowest level of technology/industrialization.
- ii) Technology-Interval (Tech-I): This variable, utilizing the interval data, value-added in manufacturing per capita, was used as a check on the validity of variable Tech-0, since variable Tech-I was already an established and internationally accepted indicator of the level of industrialization.

It was found that Tech-0 and Tech-I produced a Pearsonian r of $-.8914$ ($N=44$). Therefore, we assume that both measures are equally valid as measures of the level of technology/industrialization. However, given the lower correlations of index 4 (value-added manufacturing per capita) on the correlation matrix, Table 2, we have chosen to use the composite indicator Tech-0 in the interpretation of the results of the tests of the hypotheses.

Hypothesis II

The more socialistically oriented a nation, the more equal the status of women relative to that of men is likely to be.

It is proposed that the dominant political ideology of a nation can be conceptualized as a factor which influences the degree of equality

TABLE 1: THE LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY/INDUSTRIALIZATION

Country	Percent Labour Force in Agriculture		Energy Consumption Per Capita		Per Capita Income, U.S. Dollars		Value-Added Per Capita Manufacturing		Total Score
	1965	Rank	1968	Rank	1967	Rank	Rank		
U.S.S.R.	33	2	4059	3	970	3	422.3	4	12
Czechoslovakia	20	3	5776	4	1110	3	630.4	4	14
Hungary	31	3	2816	3	900	3	525.5	4	13
East Germany	19	3	5387	4	1300	3	620.1	4	14
Bulgaria	44	2	3322	3	690	2	304.8	3	10
Romania	59	1	2386	2	720	2	258.8	3	8
Poland	42	2	3826	3	780	2	318.8	3	10
New Zealand	13	4	2678	3	1890	4	337.3	3	14
United Kingdom	4	4	5004	4	1700	4	471.6	4	16
Sweden	12	4	5360	4	2500	4	646.5	4	16
Austria	20	3	2854	3	1210	3	343.8	3	12
Finland	32	2	3339	3	1660	3	330.4	3	11
Australia	10	4	5124	4	1970	4	441.4	4	16
Iceland	22	3	4194	4	1690	3	-----	-	10(3)
Puerto Rico	19	3	2719	3	1210	3	199.2	2	11
Denmark	15	4	4690	4	1950	4	489.1	4	16
Ireland	32	2	2882	3	910	3	166.0	2	10
United States	6	4	10331	4	3670	4	829.5	4	16
Mexico	52	1	1064	2	490	2	73.9	2	7
West Germany	11	4	4484	4	1750	4	534.6	4	16
Netherlands	9	4	4012	3	1520	3	335.0	3	13
Luxembourg	11	4	-----	-	-----	-	623.1	4	8(2)
Belgium	6	4	5236	4	1740	4	398.1	3	15
Canada	11	4	8483	4	2380	4	515.0	4	16
Dominican Republic	57	1	205	1	260	1	39.2	1	4
France	18	3	3282	3	1950	4	368.9	3	13

Table 1: continued

Country	Percent Labour Force in Agriculture 1965	Rank	Energy Consumption Per Capita 1968	Rank	Per Capita Income, U.S. Dollars 1967	Rank	Value-Added Per Capita Manufacturing	Rank	Total Score
Norway	19	3	4259	4	1860	4	377.5	3	14
Uruguay	17	3	788	2	550	2	113.2	2	9
Switzerland	10	4	3012	3	2310	4	-----	-	11(3)
Guatemala	64	1	240	1	310	1	37.0	1	4
Venezuela	29	3	2543	2	880	3	118.4	2	10
Ecuador	52	1	261	1	210	1	32.2	1	4
Brazil	48	2	450	1	250	1	58.5	1	5
Honduras	65	1	217	1	240	1	24.2	1	4
Columbia	47	2	576	1	300	1	54.0	1	5
Italy	25	3	2215	2	1120	3	245.7	3	11
Chile	26	3	1151	2	470	2	140.1	2	9
Albania	58	1	578	2	320	1	-----	-	4(3)
Bolivia	65	1	207	1	170	1	17.5	1	4
Yugoslavia	53	1	1247	2	530	2	160.3	2	7
Greece	53	1	1017	1	700	2	78.2	2	6
Haiti	79	1	32	1	70	1	-----	-	3(3)
Nicaragua	59	1	349	1	360	2	28.5	1	5
Spain	34	2	1313	2	680	2	123.7	2	8
Portugal	40	2	541	1	420	2	95.5	2	7
Paraguay	51	2	141	1	220	1	30.5	1	5
Panama	43	2	1303	2	550	2	68.7	2	8
Peru	47	2	633	2	350	1	44.7	1	6
El Salvador	59	1	200	1	270	1	33.4	1	4

Source: Percent Labour Force in Agriculture, 1965, Production Yearbook, Volume 23, Food and Agricultural Organization of United Nations, Rome, 1970, p. 21.
 Energy Consumption Per Capita, 1968, Statistical Yearbook, 1969, U.N., New York 1970, p. 324.
 Per Capita Income, U.S. Dollars, 1967, R.P. Stebbins, A. Amoia, Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, 1970, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1970.
 Value-Added Per Capita Manufacturing, The Growth of World Industry, 1938-1961, International Tables, United Nations, New York, p. 396.

TABLE 2: CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE VARIABLES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

	1	2	3	4
1	*1.00	-.81	-.88	-.73
2		*1.00	.95	.77
3			*1.00	.75
4				*1.00

- Variables:
- 1 the percentage of the economically active population engaged in agriculture
 - 2 energy consumption per capita
 - 3 per capita national income in U.S. dollars
 - 4 estimates of value-added in manufacturing per capita

in status achieved by women as compared to men in a particular nation. Specifically, it is hypothesized that the status of women should be more equal to that of men in nations in which a socialistically oriented political ideology includes reference to the removal of all discriminations, overt and covert, on the grounds of sex. This hypothesis presupposes that it is possible to categorize and compare nations according to their dominant political ideology--that is, it assumes the possibility of generally identifying degrees of adherence to socialist ideology for each nation.

A nation or polity is taken to mean "a population (elite and mass) in a geographically distinct territory, embraced in a single distinct set of governing institutions".¹⁵ This thesis will not be directly concerned with the problems of ideology as interpreted in its sociology of knowledge sense as meaning a biased distortion of reality, or as the rationalizations of vested interest groups. Rather an ideology will be more broadly defined as a value system or a way of looking at life, as a "more or less systematic interpretation of society and history, regarded by its supporters as the highest truth".¹⁶ Since it is obvious that within one nation divergent ideologies may be held by different individuals and groups, this hypothesis must refer to the political ideology as reflected by the governing regime. It is assumed that the governing regime is either a reflection of the collective images and values of a plurality of the populace or in

¹⁵G.L. Field, Comparative Political Development, (New York: Cornell University, 1967), p. 8.

¹⁶R. Aron, Progress and Disillusion, (New York: The New American Library, 1968), p. 243.

its position of authority has the power to implement segments of its ideology and influence the populace. In either case the dominant political ideology will, to some degree, be reflected in the socio-economic structure of the nation as the governing regime seeks to affirm its ideology through policies and laws. It is this possible impact of ideology on the structure of social reality that prompts this particular hypothesis.

Political ideologies will be divided into two general categories, capitalism and socialism, which are both further subdivided into democratic and non-democratic varieties. Although both the communist one-party state and the multi-party state claim to be democratic in the sense of representing the will of the people, in this thesis democracy will be defined as a plurality of political parties (two or more) representing various interest groups competing in open and free elections for political power.

The Socialist thesis pertaining to women, as explained by Mary R. Beard in Woman as Force in History, means

"that women's emancipation lies not in the equal competition of women with men for wealth and employment, but in the socialization of the instrument of production and in the provision of employment for all". 17

She quotes from Earl Browder's book What is Communism (1936) to further illustrate the socialist position on women --

"Socialism, as the first stage leading toward Communism, places among the first items of its

¹⁷M.R. Beard, Woman as Force in History, (New York: Collier Books, 1962) (copyright 1946), p. 113.

program, the complete liberation of women from all inequality. Not only does it give women unconditional equality with men, but it provides guarantees for maintaining that equality, by means of special protection for motherhood by the State, and by special regulations of the conditions of women's work". 18

The revolutionary creed of Socialism, as embodied in the Russian constitution of 1917, included a clause specifically referring to the removal of all discriminations on the grounds of sex. Formulated under Lenin, the constitution "immediately swept away all legislative traces of the inequality of woman, without exception and immediately ensured their full equality by law".¹⁹ The socialist parties in countries other than the U.S.S.R. have an ideology similar to the Soviet one on this particular issue. Socialist nations, as a whole, express the goal of creating a classless society in which all people are equal, which necessarily implies the equality of women and men. Consequently, countries identified as having socialist ideologies will be considered as having a political ideology explicitly favouring the complete equality of the sexes.

However, it is expected that the status of women in the non-democratic socialist countries will be more equal to that of men than in the democratic socialist countries. The reasoning in this case is that the governing regime in the non-democratic socialistic country does not have to compete with opposing ideologies or interests to the same degree

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 78.

¹⁹ D. Mace, "The Employed Mother in the USSR", Journal of Marriage and Family Living, Volume 23, 1961, p. 330.

Also, Marx and Engels, the fathers of socialist ideology, in a combined statement said, "It is my conviction that real equality of men and women can come true only when the exploitation of either by capital has been abolished". p. 462.

as the governing regime in the democratic socialist state. Therefore, although the possibility exists that the non-democratic socialistic government may not be a reflection of the popular collective image of the people, it has a better opportunity to put its beliefs into practise than does the government in a democratic regime. As well, the non-democratic regime has greater centralized dictatorial powers through the control of mass communications and education and propaganda tools which aid in the implementation of their policies.

Third on a descending scale would be the democratic capitalist nations. The capitalist ideology may readily acknowledge that, in principle, all people are created equal, however, a theory of individualism such as that accompanying capitalism would assert that it is women themselves, not society, who are to blame for their own lack of power.

The non-democratic capitalist society prevents even the development of political groups to lobby for reforms, or new policies which could promote changes in the status quo of women. The authority of the governing regime in this type of state is generally not opposed openly since political power is reinforced by military power.

Measurement

It is proposed that using specific indices, to be discussed below, countries can be grouped into general ideological categories on a continuum from highly socialistically oriented to very low or no socialistic orientation. Three empirical indices were used to categorize nations as non-democratic socialist, democratic socialist, democratic capitalist and non-democratic capitalist. Two indices were specifically chosen to differentiate between socialist and capitalist states, and one chosen to indicate

whether the nations were, in the terms given, democratic or non-democratic. The resulting categorizations were then compared to the professed party affiliations of the governing regimes as a way of generally validating the indices. Nine nations with empirical data for only two of the three indicators were subjectively allocated on the third dimension which will be indicated in the table of the categories developed.

Index I: Fixed Capital Formation Purchased by the Public Sector

One of the main ideological differences between socialism and capitalism centers on the ownership of the means of production. The capitalist society uses a competing market system to allocate resources and accepts the idea that private ownership of the means of production is the most likely system to lead to increased productivity and fair distribution of well-being among the people. Socialism, on the hand, is associated with the belief that the good of the people will be best served through centralized planning and the collective or public ownership of the means of production. A commitment to a capitalist or socialist philosophy in this regard was measured by comparing the percentage of fixed capital formation purchased at current market prices by the public or the private sector of the nation.

Expenditure for the consumption of fixed capital formation refers to any expenditure undertaken to purchase additional capital goods, to add inventories or to acquire financial claims on other countries. Fixed capital formation therefore includes the purchase of land, new construction or alternations of dwellings, construction of non-residential buildings, construction and works such as railways, roads, athletic fields, forest

clearance, the purchase of transport equipment, machinery and other equipment. However, government loans or grants to the private sector of the economy are not included in the capital formation expenditures attributed to the central government.²⁰ It was felt that fixed capital formation would reflect the emphasis of the public or private sector on economic expansion and also reflect the relative economic strengths of the private enterprise versus the central government in a particular nation and consequently, provide an indicator of a nation's commitment to socialism or capitalism.

Data were obtained for 1967 or the complete accounts of the last year closest to it. The fixed capital formation purchased by the private or public sector of each country was calculated as a percentage of the total expenditure on fixed capital formation. A mean of the percentages for all countries was taken and used as a cutting off point which divided countries into two groups of socialist or capitalist orientation in regard to ownership of the means of production.

Index II: Social Welfare Measure

The difference between a socialist and a capitalist ideology, however, goes farther than variance in ownership of the means of production. The collective orientation of socialism is opposed to the individualistic emphasis of capitalism which implies that the troubles of an individual are the fault and concern of that individual rather than of the society as a whole. The concern in socialist ideology seems to be

²⁰Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1968, Volume I, Individual Country Data, (New York: United Nations, 1969), p. xii, xxiv.

with the equalization of the distributive systems and with the realization that not all citizens have equal opportunities rather than with the acceptance of the concept that some people are naturally more equal than others. Consequently, it is to be expected that the more socialistically oriented governments would do more than capitalistically oriented governments to attempt, through government programs and funds, to relieve people of the hardships of poverty and equalize or make available medical services to all members of the society.

It was felt that this implementation of ideology could be measured empirically by calculating social welfare and public health expenditures as a percentage of the annual national expenditures. A mean was taken of the sum of these percentages and nations above the mean were considered to be socialistically oriented and those below the mean to be capitalistically oriented.

Index III: Contested Elections

A nation was considered to be democratic if two or more political parties competed for power through a free and open election system. Non-democratic nations were defined as those with a one party system, or with a military takeover of government, in both cases viable free elections were non-existent. Data were gathered from the Europa Yearbook, 1970, Volumes I and II, concerning the elections closest to and before 1968, as well as data concerning the political ideology and policy of the party or parties in power and the percentage of the total vote obtained by the governing group.

Combinations of three indexes of political ideology yielded a

possible eight categories, of which six were filled as is shown in Table 3. In the construction of the categories two groupings which will be referred to as Mixed Economy I and II appeared. Mixed Economy I is exclusively democratic and included a large number of countries such as the United States and Denmark whose public sector purchased a low amount of fixed capital formation but whose government spent a relatively high percentage of the national budget on social welfare. These states have increased the directional role of government on the economy and the national expenditure on social welfare, while at the same time valuing the allocation of resources through a relatively free market.

Mixed Economy II includes only three nations which are non-democratic, low on social welfare expenditures but high on public ownership of the means of production.

The categorizations, as developed by using the three suggested indices, are a method of ordering measurable concepts about a particular phenomena, in this case political ideology. The categorizations thus created should not be interpreted in any absolute way. Countries within one category vary in respect to the two indices of socialism and capitalism, some approximating the ideal of that category more closely than others. Ideologies themselves are based in theory and are utopian in aim. Consequently, none of the nations labelled, for example, democratic-socialist, can be expected to totally fulfil all the tenets of the ideology espoused. Rather, the categorizations should be regarded as indicating political orientations along a continuum which is open at either end--that is, the absolute in polar extremes have not yet been realized by any nation.

Methodological Difficulties:

A number of potential sources of error in the construction of these categories should be pointed out. The data for indices I and II were derived from national income statistics which are subject to three major sources of error:

- " i) inadequate basic data,
- ii) the fitting of the data to the concepts,
- iii) the use of interpolation and imputation to fill gaps." 21

For example, some countries may choose to budget culture with the expenditures for social welfare and public health and others may not, while other nations may not differentiate sufficiently between private and public consumption of fixed capital formation to allow for use in the analysis. Also some differences in measurement technology may be the result of political manoeuvring as well as variance in accounting procedures. Further, Gross has pointed out that "the weighted margin of error for national accounting estimates has been estimated as ranging from ten to twenty percent".²²

In this study data for each nation were taken for only one time period and therefore, do not indicate if a country had been consistently following the same pattern of purchase of fixed capital formation or expenditure on social welfare and health. Nor do the data reveal the length of time the current political regimes have been in power. After the development of these categories it was pointed out that the lag or time phenomena can be extremely important in the area of implementation

²¹R.A. Bauer, et al, Social Indicators, (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 165.

²²Ibid., p. 165.

of policy.²³ That is, the longer a party has been in power, the likelier it is to have been able to implement its policies. Also, the type of regime preceding it could be a factor in the ease with which new policies can be implemented. Sudden radical changes would be extremely disruptive for the country. To undertake a twenty year trend analysis of the forty-nine countries involved was, however, beyond the scope of this thesis and consequently, we must interpret these political ideology categories with caution and they can be taken as only rough indicators of socialistic orientation.

However, as a growing discipline, comparative or cross-cultural analysis must use whatever information is available and consequently, must rely to large extent on secondary sources for empirical data. Also as J. Sawyer points out, the process of norming, that is calculating proportions such as social welfare as a percentage of the national expenditure, helps to promote

"comparability across nations, for even when tools are defined or measured incomparably, correlated biased in numerator and denominator may reduce the error in normed quantities".²⁴

Hypothesis III

The larger the proportion of Catholics in the nation's population, the less equal the status of women relative to that of men is likely to be.

²³This criticism of the political categorizations was made by Dr. B. Rundblad in a discussion of the methodology used in Chapter IV. However, it was unfortunately too late to incorporate it into the construction of the categories.

²⁴J. Sawyer, "Dimensions of Nations: Size, Wealth and Politics", A.J.S., Volume 73, No. 2, 1967, p. 151.

TABLE 3: CATEGORIZATION OF NATIONS INTO POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL GROUPINGS

Key to Table: Category 1 Non-Democratic Socialist
 2 Democratic Socialist
 3 Mixed Economy I
 4 Democratic Capitalist
 5 Mixed Economy II
 6 Non-Democratic Capitalist

Data not available: Social Welfare Index Spain
 Greece
 France

Fixed Capital Formation Index
 Switzerland
 New Zealand
 Chile
 Guatemala
 Haiti
 Peru
 Nicaragua

		<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>
		Yes	No
Social Welfare -	LOW	El Salvador Guatemala *Chile Italy Columbia Honduras Brazil Ecuador Venezuela *Switzerland Uruguay Norway *France Dominican Republic Belgium Luxembourg Netherlands	*Greece *Haiti *Nicaragua *Spain Portugal Panama *Peru
Fixed Capital Formation by Public Sector -	LOW		
Social Welfare -	HIGH	<u>3</u>	
Fixed Capital Formation by Public Sector -	LOW	West Germany Canada Mexico U.S.A. Ireland Denmark Puerto Rico Iceland Australia Finland Austria	
Social Welfare -	LOW		
Fixed Capital Formation by Public Sector -	HIGH		<u>5</u> Albania Bolivia Yugoslavia
Social Welfare -	HIGH	<u>2</u>	
Fixed Capital Formation by Public Sector -	HIGH	Sweden United Kingdom *New Zealand	<u>1</u> Poland Romania Bulgaria East Germany Hungary Czechoslovakia U.S.S.R.

* denotes that data was not available for one index.

TABLE 4: SOCIAL SECURITY, HEALTH AND WELFARE AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL BUDGET EXPENDITURES FOR EACH NATION, 1967-69.

Ecuador	1.1	social welfare
Brazil	3.5	social welfare, health, work
Paraguay	3.7	health
Chile	3.9	social, security, family allowance
Columbia	4.7	health
Italy	6.4	social welfare, labour
Peru	6.8	public health
Yugoslavia	7.3	social services, health
Honduras	7.5	social assistance, health
Guatemala	8.4	health
Venezuela	8.6	welfare, health
Bolivia	8.7	social security, health, labour
Dominican Republic	9.5	health
Portugal	11.2	social security, health, public assistance
Switzerland	11.2	social welfare
Panama	13.2	social security, health, labour
Haiti	13.3	public health
Nicaragua	13.5	public health, specific income distribution
Albania	14.0	social insurance, social and cultural
Uruguay	14.3	welfare, health, education
Canada	15.2	national health, welfare
El Salvador	15.6	health
Norway	15.9	social services
Netherlands	16.8	social services, public health
Luxembourg	17.7	social security
Belgium	17.8	social services, education
Finland	19.2	social security, health ----- breaking point
Mexico	22.0	social welfare
Denmark	21.3	social services
Ireland	22.6	social welfare, health
Romania	23.2	social services
Austria	23.9	social welfare
Poland	25.4	social and cultural services
Australia	25.6	social services, welfare payments
Puerto Rico	26.3	public welfare, health
United States	28.1	welfare, health
Bulgaria	28.3	social welfare, education, culture
Iceland	29.2	social security, public health
West Germany	29.3	social security
Hungary	31.8	social, health, cultural affairs
United Kingdom	33.2	social security, health and welfare
Sweden	36.1	social welfare, health, interior
U.S.S.R.	37.5	social and cultural
East Germany	41.4	social services, health, education, culture
Czechoslovakia	43.6	social welfare, culture
New Zealand	52.7	social welfare

Source: J. Paxton, The Statesman's Yearbook, 1970-71, London: MacMillan St. Martin's Press, 1970.

The Europa Yearbook, 1970: A World Study, Volume 1 and 2, London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1970.

TABLE 5: FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION PURCHASED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL CONSUMPTION OF FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION, OR NET MATERIAL PRODUCT HELD BY PRIVATE SECTOR, 1966-1967.

Hungary	2.7	
U.S.S.R.	2.8	
Czechoslovakia	3.6	
Romania	6.7	Cooperatives and other
Albania	7.6	net material product
Poland	11.5	
Bulgaria	12.8	Cooperatives and other
East Germany	13.8	Cooperatives and private
Yugoslavia	19.1	net material product
United Kingdom	49.0	
Bolivia	53.2	
Sweden	57.0	----- breaking point
Finland	58.7	
Brazil	59.6	
Paraguay	61.7	private and public corporations
Austria	61.8	
Venezuela	62.3	
Netherlands	63.1	
Australia	63.1	
France	63.8	
Ecuador	64.8	
Luxembourg	65.1	
Canada	68.5	
Dominican Republic	68.6	
Iceland	68.7	
Puerto Rico	70.5	
Greece	71.6	
Norway	72.4	
Denmark	73.0	
Uruguay	73.1	
Spain	74.3	
Columbia	74.7	
Costa Rica	75.4	
Ireland	77.6	private and public enterprise
El Salvador	78.1	
Honduras	80.2	
Panama	81.0	
United States	81.1	
Mexico	81.4	
West Germany	82.6	private, public and government
Portugal	83.2	
Belgium	85.5	private, public and government
Italy	87.8	private, public and government

Source: Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, Volume 1, Individual Country Data. New York: United Nations, 1969.

National Accounts of Less Developed Countries, 1959-1968. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, June, 1970.

TABLE 6: THE POLITICAL PARTY OR PARTIES FORMING THE GOVERNING REGIME, 1967.

Non-Democratic Socialist	
U.S.S.R.	Communist
Czechoslovakia	Communist
Hungary	Communist
East Germany	Communist
Bulgaria	Communist
Romania	Communist
Poland	Communist
Democratic Socialist	
New Zealand	National Party (conservative) ²⁵
United Kingdom	Labour Party
Sweden	Social Democratic Party
Mixed Economy I	
Austria	People's Party (conservative)
Finland	Coalition of 7 parties dominated by Finnish Social Democratic Party
Australia	Coalition of Liberal Party and Country Party
Iceland	Coalition of Independence Party and Social Democratic Party
Puerto Rico	
Denmark	Social Democratic Party
Ireland	Republican Party
United States	Republican Party
México	Institutional Revolutionary Party and Independent Peasant Central
West Germany	Coalition of Christian Democratic, Christian Social Union and Social Democratic
Canada	Liberal Party
Democratic Capitalist	
Netherlands	Coalition of 4 parties dominated by Catholic People's Party and Liberal Party
Luxembourg	Coalition of Christian Social Party and Democratic Party (conservative)
Belgium	Coalition of Social-Christian Party and Belgian Socialist Party
Dominican Republic	Reformist Party (conservative)
France	Coalition of 4 parties dominated by Gaullist Union of Democrats for the Republic
Norway	Coalition of 4 parties dominated by the Conservative Party and Liberal Party
Uruguay	Colorado Party (liberal)
Switzerland	Coalition of 4 parties dominated by the Socialist Party and Radical Democratic Party
Guatemala	Revolutionary Party (conservative)
Venezuela	Social Christian Party (conservative)
Ecuador	Pres. Velasquista Party (conservative)
Brazil	National Renovating Alliance (conservative)
Honduras	National Party (conservative)
Columbia	Coalition of Liberal Party and Conservative Party
Italy	Christian Democratic Party
Chile	Coalition of Christian Democratic Party and National Democratic Party
El Salvador	National Coalition Party
Mixed Economy II	
Albania	Communist
Bolivia	Military Coup in 1964
Yugoslavia	Communist
Non-Democratic Capitalism	
Greece	Military Coup in 1967
Haiti	President for life - Duvalier, 1957
Nicaragua	Presidential rule since 1956
Spain	Presidential rule since 1936
Portugal	Dictatorship under Salazar
Paraguay	Presidential rule since 1954
Panama	Military Coup in 1968
Peru	Military Coup in 1968

Source: The Europa Yearbook, 1970: A World Study, Volume 1 and 2. London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1970.

²⁵It seems an anomaly that a conservative party is in power in New Zealand when the country is placed in the socialist category. Stebbins and Amoia, however, point out that the difference between the two parties in New Zealand have narrowed a great deal since World War II and "are now largely concerned with methods rather than ends". Further, "the National Party is committed to the removal of controls over industry but the adverse balance of payments has precluded full implementation of these policies". It could be that if the fixed capital formation purchased by the private sector had been known, that New Zealand would have fallen into Mixed Economy I, but on the bases of the very high proportion of the total national expenditure on social welfare it was placed in category II.

In this hypothesis it is proposed that in a nation which has Catholicism as its dominant religion, the development of full equality between the sexes will be severely limited. Historically, official Catholic dogma has taken the position that women are, by God-given nature, unequal and inferior to men. For example, Saint Thomas Aquinas, a noted Catholic theologian, agreed with Aristotle that woman was a "defective and misbegotten man", "an incidental being".²⁶ Man's relation to women as an equal person is rendered impossible by such Catholic thought as St. John Damascene's warning that woman is "the advance outpost of hell",²⁷ and more recently, by Pope Paul's castigation of priests who wanted to drop the celibacy requirements in favour of "vile earthly pleasures".²⁸ St. Thomas Aquinas' position on women's physical and moral inferiority has been reaffirmed in the last decade by Father Emmanuel Doronzo in his work on the Sacrament of Orders in which he states that

"her moral feebleness is manifest at once in lightness of judgement, in credulity...and finally in the fragility of spirit by which she is less able to rein in the passions, particularly concupiscence".²⁹

The woman within the Catholic Church is placed in a situation in which she is held to be an inferior being, unfit for positions of authority or leadership. This is reflected in: i) her absence from the church hierarchy, ii) the ruling against women saying the mass, iii) the

²⁶A. Jeanniere, The Anthropology of Sex, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1967), p. 8.

²⁷Ibid., p. 8.

²⁸Time, Canada Edition, (Toronto: Time Canada Ltd., April 19, 1971), p. 32.

²⁹J.A. O'Brien, "God's Forgotten Children", United States Catholic, January, 1971, p. 40.

existing canon law which regards women as minors in the church,³⁰ iv) the fact that even though there are twice as many women religious as men religious, they are ruled by an all-male Congregation on Religious in Rome, v) the presence of only five women among 2000 male bishops at the Second Vatican Council recently held in Rome, the purpose being to update the teachings of the church,³¹ vi) the male symbolism inherent in the Church, God the Father, Christ the Son, angels of pure spirit with masculine names, etc.

On the other hand, to compensate for this loss of equality and in contradiction to the view of woman as Eve the temptress and seductress, the Church has idealized woman and placed her on an impossible virtuous pedestal. (Pope Paul, Vatican Council II: "Consecrated virgins, you be the guardians of purity, unselfishness, and piety."³²) Woman is made to feel unnatural and guilty if she deviates from her "natural" roles of unmarried virgin, wife, and mother. Further, the Church preaches the virtues of obedience, submission and meekness to women--"Wives, be subject to your husband, as is fitting in the Lord. Husbands, love your wives and do not be harsh with them".³³ In this century Pope Pius XI stated:

"For as man is the head, the woman is the heart, and as he occupies the chief place in ruling, so she may and ought to claim for herself the chief place in love". Casti Connubi. 34

³⁰H. Graef, "Women in the Church Today", The Catholic World, Volume 207-208, 1968-1969, p. 206.

³¹J.A. O'Brien, op. cit., p. 41.

³²R.J. Cleary, "Women's Role in the Christian Community: Past, Present, and Future", American Benedictine Review, Volume 20, 1969, p. 405.

³³The Bible, Corinthians 3: 18-19.

³⁴R.J. Cleary, op. cit., p. 402.

However, the fact that women are to be the objects of love does not negate or compensate for the loss of equality as persons.

As well as the psychological inferiority a woman develops through her belief in the Catholic religion as it stands, the Church also includes an emphasis on the procreative function of marriage, and a consequent favouring of large families which in turn bind women to the home for a long period of successive pregnancies. Although science through the development of reliable contraceptives has made the liberation of women from constant child-bearing possible, the Church perpetuates the enslavement of women to a biological function by refusing to deem the new scientific modes of contraception as legitimate in the eyes of the Church and God. Marion Daly points out that in the poverty-stricken south of Italy, it is not uncommon for a Catholic woman to have borne twenty children.³⁵ Physically and mentally, constant pregnancy is a severe burden which reduces women to the position of an instrument of reproduction--a position which, as Daly points out, is difficult to transcend.³⁶ The Catholic Church also takes a strong stand against abortion as a means of terminating unwanted pregnancies in progress. As Simone DeBeauvoir has noted,

"it is remarkable that the Church at times authorizes the killing of adult men, as in war or in connection with legal executions; it reserves an uncompromising humanitarianism for man in the fetal condition".³⁷

I would agree with W. Denton who states that the Catholic Church,

³⁵M. Daly, The Church and the Second Sex, (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1968), p. 12.

³⁶Ibid., p. 22.

³⁷S. DeBeauveir, The Second Sex, (New York: The Modern Library, 1968, copyright by Librairie Gallimard, 1949), p. 469.

in regard to the family, has evolved "a rather highly developed, intricate system of beliefs that are universally shared by Catholics around the world".³⁸ The Church has attempted to control the behaviour of its members and to maintain a traditional style of family life in accord with its teachings. The centralized nature of the Catholic hierarchy, the Vatican, the Pope, the system of bishops, etc., permits the authoritative exposition of one dogma which must be accepted by the Catholic Churches in all nations. Although there are internal disagreements on some issues, the position of women has not been an important source of contention. There are, for example, only five references in the official documents of the Second Vatican Council to the emancipation of women,³⁹ and no women, lay or religious, were invited to present papers evaluating the results of Vatican II at the International Theological Congress in Notre Dame in 1966.⁴⁰ Furthermore,

"the Church has been described as a pressure group exercising influence on the practical level, through whatever press media and political, religious and social organizations it controls, to prevent changes which would improve the condition of women".⁴¹

In democratic countries in which Catholicism is the dominant religion there is, for example, usually a political party influenced strongly by Catholic

³⁸W. Denton, What's Happening to Our Families, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963), p. 41.

³⁹J.H. Fichter, "Holy Father Church", Commonweal, Volume 92, May, 1970.

⁴⁰J.A. O'Brien, op. cit., p. 41.

⁴¹M. Daly, op. cit., p. 11.

sentiment.⁴² Also, Catholicism exerts considerable socializing influence on its members through its system of parishes and religious schools. Consequently, where Catholicism is dominant it is expected that the status of women relative to that of men will be slow to change from traditional patterns.

W. Goode suggests that Protestantism with its emphasis on the priesthood of all believers, and the rights and responsibilities of the individual gradually developed an ideology which undermined the traditional idea of a "woman's proper place".⁴³ Protestant denominations are certainly not free of sex-role stereotyping but in comparison to Catholic dogma they contain more potential for the development of full equality between sexes. M. Daly points out that Protestant churches have been quicker to realize the detrimental effects of continuous pregnancies on women, and to sanction and to encourage use of contraceptives and condone abortion in some cases.⁴⁴ Further, since Protestantism does not view marriage's sole purpose as reproductive, it becomes possible to consider the spouses as persons with equal rights in a loving relationship. Some Protestant Churches are in fact slowly beginning to ordain women as pastors, especially in Northern Europe.⁴⁵ Consequently, in comparison to Catholic dominated countries one could expect, relatively speaking, that a nation with a large proportion of

⁴²R.P. Stebbins, A. Amoia, Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, 1970, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970).

Reference to this handbook for listing of Political parties with Catholic affiliations.

⁴³W. Goode, World Revolution and Family Patterns, (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1963), p. 56.

⁴⁴M. Daly, op. cit., p. 102.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 102.

the population nominally adhering to Protestant denominations would exhibit and be less resistant to a tendency toward fuller equality for women. Freedom from any religious restrictions concerning the roles of men and women in society would constitute one less factor with the potential to retard the achievement of equality between the sexes.

Measurement

The percentage of Catholics in the population was used as the measure of the strength of Catholicism in a nation. B.M. Russett has found that data for Roman Catholicism is the most comparable religious series because "these data are built up from baptismal records, which are compiled with considerable care".⁴⁶ Consequently, it is possible to be certain that each country is using the same definition of a Catholic. Russett suggests that "the data are as good as the basic population estimates in the denominator of the ratio and can be used with the error ranges".⁴⁷ (Error ranges for Latin and South American Countries can reach 20% according to the United Nations population statistics.)

The data used in this thesis were 1964 figures taken from the Yale Studies 1969.⁴⁸ They were compared with the Russett figures for 1957 (see attached table). The proportion of Roman Catholics in the population seems to remain fairly constant over the seven year span, although nine countries experiences a decrease and three countries an increase of more

⁴⁶B.M. Russett, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 248.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 248.

⁴⁸C.L. Taylor, M.C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, World Data Analysis Program, (Boston: Yale University, 1969).

than five percent. This could possibly be accounted for by differences in population estimates used by Russett and the Yale Studies. (To check this, we calculated the percentage of Roman Catholics for 1964 for each nation by taking population estimates of the United Nations Statistical Office and the 1964 estimates of numbers of Roman Catholics per country from the World Christian Handbook. Figures were exactly the same as the Yale data in most cases. However, in the cases of Panama - 70.8%, Romania - 8.6%, and the United States - 22.9%, the three cases which Yale Studies showed as increasing were closer to Russett's 1957 figures than to Yale's results.) The amount of decline, even if taken as indicating a decrease in the relative strength of the influence of the Church on behavior, does not significantly effect our analysis since the changes are not drastic.

It is obvious that a Catholic baptism does not necessarily result in a practising Catholic. However, comparable figures for the number of priests per population of Catholics or the percentage of the Catholic population attending church regularly, both of which would provide a more accurate check of the religiousity of a nation's Catholics, were not available. It was felt that the percentage of Roman Catholics in the population would act as a rough measure of the number of adherents, nominal or not, which would come under the influence of the Church's dogma. The attitudes and beliefs toward women implied in the Church dogma would be deeply entrenched within the Catholic family structure and would effect, through socialization, the actions and behaviours of both firm and superficial adherents.

In all cases, the hypothesis was tested using the percentage of

Roman Catholics in the population for each nation as given in Table 7. However, a problem occurred when it was discovered that several of the countries (Greece, Bulgaria, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, and Albania) also have significant segments of the population adhering to either the Orthodox Church or the Moslem religion, both of whose position on women is similar to and just as traditionally oriented as that of the Roman Catholic Church. The influence of these religions can be said to be as pervasive and influential as the Catholic Church's. These inconsistencies must be remembered when interpreting the data, and they become apparent in Table 25 which presents the summary positions of individual countries in comparison to the hypotheses variables.

Indices of the Status of Women

The division between actual and formal indices of the status of women is as follows:

Actual

- i) The number of women at the federal or central level of government as a percentage of the total number of representatives. If a country's central government structure is bicameral rather than unicameral, the calculation was made by taking the total number of women representatives in both the upper and the lower chambers as a percentage of the total.
- ii) The number of women in federal cabinet positions as a percentage of the total number of cabinet members.
- iii) The number of women in administrative, executive and managerial positions as a percentage of the total number of administrators,

TABLE 7: PERCENTAGE OF ROMAN CATHOLICS IN THE POPULATION

<u>Country</u>	<u>Russett Data, 1957</u>	<u>Yale Data, 1964</u>
Spain	99.7	99.6
Italy	99.5	90.6
El Salvador	98.9	96.8
Honduras	98.4	67.9
Colombia	97.5	85.9
Belgium	96.8	92.8
Luxembourg	96.8	94.2
Poland	96.1	89.9
Dominican Republic	95.5	95.8
Paraguay	95.3	94.0
Mexico	95.0	84.8
Peru	95.0	94.0
Bolivia	94.7	97.4
Nicaragua	94.7	84.5
Venezuela	94.3	88.9
Ecuador	94.2	88.0
Ireland	94.0	94.0
Brazil	93.0	89.5
Guatemala	92.2	95.2
Portugal	92.1	94.4
Puerto Rico	91.9	89.2
Chile	90.0	79.8
Austria	89.4	88.8
France	83.0	81.6
Uruguay	80.0	82.8
Panama	75.8	89.8
Haiti	69.9	67.3
Czechoslovakia	62.3	49.1
Hungary	60.9	59.3
West Germany	48.4	45.4
Canada	44.0	41.0
Netherlands	40.4	39.7
Switzerland	39.7	42.6
Yugoslavia	32.0	30.8
United States	20.6	39.8
Australia	18.9	23.3
New Zealand	12.3	14.1
East Germany	11.1	11.0
United Kingdom	8.0	8.9
Romania	7.3	12.9
Albania	6.8	4.1 (mainly Moslem, more than 75%)
U.S.S.R.	5.0	1.3 (12.5% Orthodox)
Greece	0.8	0.5 (Greek Orthodox mainly)
Bulgaria	0.7	0.4 (26.7% Orthodox, 6.7% Moslem)
Denmark	0.6	0.6
Iceland	0.4	0.5
Sweden	0.3	0.4
Norway	0.2	0.2
Finland	0.4	0.0

Sources: B.M. Russett, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 248.

C.L. Taylor, M.C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social World Data Analysis Program (Boston: Yale University Press, 1969).

J. Paxton, The Statesman's Yearbook, 1970-1971, (London: MacMillan St. Martin's Press, 1970).

executives and managers, as calculated by the International Labour Statistics Office.

- iv) The number of women working as craftsmen, production-process workers, and labourers not otherwise classified, thus mainly skilled workers, as a percentage of the total number of workers in this category.
- v) The number of women engaged in the service, sport and recreation field as a percentage of the total number of workers in this category.
- vi) The number of women in the labour force as a percentage of the total labour force.
- vii) The number of married women in the labour force as a percentage of the number of married women in the total population.
- viii) The number of women enrolled at the secondary school level as a percentage of the total enrollment. The secondary school level is defined as

"education based upon at least four years of previous instruction at the first level, and providing general or specialized instruction or both (i.e., at middle school, secondary school, high school, vocational school, teacher training school at this level)." 49
- ix) The number of women enrolled in vocational training at the second level as a percentage of the total enrollment.
- x) The number of women enrolled in third level education as a percentage of total enrollment. Third level is defined as

"education which requires, as a minimum condition of admission, the successful completion of education at

⁴⁹ Statistical Yearbook, (New York: United Nations, 1969), p. 739.

the second level, or evidence of the attainment of an equivalent level of knowledge (i.e., at university, teacher's college, higher professional school". 50

Formal

- i) The right of women to vote and be eligible for election on an equal basis with men.
- ii) Restrictions on the attendance of married women to regular vocational and technical schools.
- iii) The ratification of the United Nations Convention on Equal Remuneration, 1951, No. 100.
- iv) The ratification of the United Nations Convention on Maternity Protection, 1952, No. 103.
- v) The ratification of the United Nations Convention on Discrimination in Employment and Occupation, 1958, No. 111.
- vi) The numbers of years ago the vote was granted to women on an equal basis with men, using 1970 as the base year.

The choice of indices of the status of women was limited by the availability of comparable data for the 49 selected nations. The indices labelled actual are meant to measure the amount of equality between men and women that has, at a given point in time, been achieved in fact and action.

The first and second of the actual indices were intended to measure the amount of political power and authority women share with men. The second index, the percentage of women in cabinet positions, was felt to be particularly indicative of the degree of which women in a particular

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 739.

nation share actual political power with men in terms of leadership and policy making positions.

The third, fourth and fifth actual indices are concerned with the position of women in the occupational sphere and consequently, the power they hold in terms of influence in the economic system, and in terms of prestige, which in an industrial nation is closely linked to occupational status. As Lenski notes, "one of the chief rewards distributed by most other class systems is access to favoured occupations".⁵¹ The third actual index measures percentage of women compared to men who hold positions of authority and leadership in economic life. The fourth actual index measures the sexual distribution of the skilled trades needed in a complex industrial nation. It is assumed that a skill occupation is to be valued over an unskilled position in a technological society, both in terms of income and prestige. The fifth actual index is intended to measure, in part, the predominance of women in an occupational area which has been traditionally regarded as suitable for women; that is, in combination with the third and fourth actual indices it is meant to illuminate the amount of sexual segregation in the occupational sphere.

The sixth actual index, the percentage of women engaged in labour force activity, is intended as a general measure of the equality of participation in the economic sphere.

The seventh actual index is meant to test the strength of the traditional females roles of wife and mother only. If a high percentage of married women are working, then the pull of the traditional image of

⁵¹G. Lenski, op. cit., p. 347.

women's role can be said to be decreasing.

Actual indices eight, nine and ten are measures of the position of women relative to that of men in the educational sphere. In an industrial society, education is a prerequisite for access to favoured occupations and is, consequently, a very important factor in determining the nature of power relationships. Index eight is a general measure of the sexual distribution of education necessary for semi-skilled and skilled positions. Index nine is more specific in measuring the sexual distribution of vocational and technical training. Index ten as a measure of the higher level education generally necessary for assuming positions of authority and leadership helps to explain the existing power distribution between men and women. The more equal the percentage of men and women being trained at Level III education, the more equal the status of men and women is likely to be. (There is an exception to this statement in cases in which the total number of university level students form an insignificant proportion of the whole population and are, in fact, the children of a small elitest class -- the effect on the general status of women in the nation, as a whole, would then be negligible.) Indices nine and ten, however, have the drawback that they can not take into account sex-typed training. That is, the distribution of men and women at vocational and technical Level II and at university and college training Level III may appear numerically equal but the distribution may be split according to traditional sex-role images. .

The indices of the formal, legal status granted to women along certain dimensions are felt to indicate the theoretical or ideological position of a nation on the issue of equality between the sexes. These

particular indices, one to five formal, form part of the ground upon which true equality can be built but they can not, by themselves, indicate the amount of equality which has actually been realized and all of these indices vary in the degree and directness of influence on the actual status of women.

The first formal index, the right to vote and stand for election, is the obvious basis of any political equality. The second indice partially tests the commitment of nations to allow all of its women equal opportunity in acquiring the skills necessary to compete in the occupational spheres. Indices three, four and five indicate a nation's commitment to consider and promote, at a federal level, through national policy and encouragement of employers and workers organizations, the intent of the conventions concerning the issues of equal pay for equal work, protection of the rights of pregnant women, and discrimination in employment and occupation by sex.⁵² They do not, however, indicate the actual implementation of the principles of these conventions.

Formal index three, the principle of equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value, is meant to include

"the basic wage and any additional emoluments in cash and in kind ... equal remuneration refers to the rates of remuneration established without discrimination based on sex".⁵³

A country's implementation of formal index four, concerning maternity protection, would show the desire to provide the conditions for

⁵²"International Labour Organization Activities of Special Interest in Relation to the Employment of Women", Economic and Social Council, United Nations, December 1969, E/CN.6/529.

⁵³Ibid., p. 55, appendix I.

facilitating equality of the sexes through taking into account women's biological function in the reproduction of the species. As the following excerpt shows, the convention is very complete in terms of the conditions that are necessary to protect the rights of women in this regard.

MATERNITY PROTECTION CONVENTION (REVISED),
1952 (No. 103)

272. The Convention applies to women employed in industrial undertakings and in non-industrial and agricultural occupations, including domestic staff and women wage earners working at home. It covers women working in public or private undertakings, irrespective of age, nationality, creed or marital status. It exempts only family undertakings, but allows for temporary exceptions to be made in respect of certain categories of non-industrial occupations, occupations carried on in agricultural undertakings, other than plantations, domestic work for wages in private households, work done at home or undertakings engaged in transport by sea (Article 7).

273. The Convention stipulates that the women to whom it applies must have a period of maternity leave of at least twelve weeks, not less than six of which must be taken after confinement. This leave must be extended in the event of any mistake in estimating the date of confinement or in case of illness arising out of pregnancy or confinement.

274. The Convention lays down that during this leave the woman shall be entitled to receive cash benefits sufficient for the full and healthy maintenance of herself and her child in accordance with a suitable standard of living, and medical benefits, including prenatal, confinement and post-natal care as well as hospitalisation care, where necessary, in a hospital of her choice.

275. Benefits must be provided either by means of compulsory social insurance or by means of public funds. Where cash benefits provided under compulsory social insurance are based on previous earnings, they must be at a rate of not less than two-thirds of the earnings taken into account. In no case may the employer be individually liable for the cost of benefits.

276. If a woman is nursing her child she must be entitled to interrupt her work for this purpose, such interruptions being counted as working hours and remunerated accordingly.

277. Lastly, the Convention prohibits the dismissal of a woman for any reason whatsoever while she is absent from work on maternity leave or at such a time that the notice of dismissal would expire during her absence.

278. To date the Convention has been ratified by 10 countries.* A total of 83 reports has been furnished by Members who have not ratified it.

*Brazil, Byelorussia, Cuba, Ecuador, Hungary, Spain, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Yugoslavia.

The fifth formal index is concerned with producing the

"fullest possible opportunity for each worker to qualify for and to use his or her skills and endowments in a job for which he or she is well suited, irrespective of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin". 54

The convention, therefore, considers not only access to jobs but also access to vocational training, and the conditions of employment.

Index six is linked with index one, the right to vote. It is felt that the number of years that women have had the legal right to vote and stand for election on an equal basis with men will affect the amount of actual equality that is achieved.

Each of the original hypotheses shares common dependent variables (the actual and formal indices of the status of women), but has a unique independent variable (level of technology/industrialization, political-ideology categorization, percentage of Roman Catholics in the population). The actual indices were all in the form of interval data, but formal indices one to five were ordinal data which did not lend itself to correlation analysis. Consequently the analysis will include only correlation data for actual indices one to ten, and formal index six, and will discuss formal indices one to five in a descriptive manner. Also, because official publications and secondary sources did not consistently report data in all the areas covered by the indices of the status of women, the number of countries included for each examined variable will differ somewhat.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 1, appendix I.

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS AND CONCLUSION

Results

The three hypotheses to be tested are:

- i) Assuming that the nations involved are pre-cybernated, the higher the level of technology/industrialization of a nation, the more equal the status of women relative to that of men is likely to be.
- ii) The more socialistically oriented a nation is, the more equal the status of women relative to that of men is likely to be.
- iii) The larger the proportion of Roman Catholics in the nation's population, the less equal the status of women relative to that of men is likely to be.

The three hypotheses or theoretical propositions are stated in such a form that A varies either inversely or directly with B. Since the concern is with the linear covariation between variables, a regression program giving Pearsonian r 's was utilized to test the hypotheses.

First and second order partial correlations were calculated to control for the intervening independent variables. The second order partials will be used as the crucial tests of the hypotheses.

The indices of the status of women can be categorized into three major aspects of distributive systems:

- i) political
- ii) educational
- iii) occupational

Each one of these aspects of distributive systems and the corresponding

indices of the status of women will be discussed in turn, in relation to the three main hypotheses. The discussion will also include reference to the raw data on the indices of the status of women.

Political System

Of the 49 countries included in this study only one, Switzerland, did not in 1970 permit women to vote on an equal basis with men in all elections and recently that situation has changed. Only in Switzerland and Portugal, as of 1970, were women not eligible to stand for election on a completely equal basis with men. Consequently, we can see that there is no formal legislation prohibiting the development of sexual equality at the political level in essentially all of the countries studied. The number of years that women have shared these legal political rights with men was found to be correlated with the level of technology/industrialization in a nation ($r = -.47$, controlling for political category and percentage of Roman Catholics). We find that the higher the level of technology/industrialization, the longer men and women have shared equal political rights. Although a comparison of the zero-order correlation ($-.66$) with the second order partial ($-.47$) indicates that the intervening variables are influencing the relationship to some degree, this finding still lends strong support to Lenski's argument of technology as an important force in producing changes toward equality between the sexes, at least at the formal level.

Given that men and women share equal political rights, on a basis of random chance they should be found to be distributed evenly in the political power structure since, as a group, each constitutes approximately fifty percent of the population. However, other variables are obviously

affecting this particular distribution. Table 9 shows that the percentage of women members at the federal or central level of government (bicameral or unicameral) ranges from 0% in Albania and Switzerland to 29.5% in the U.S.S.R., with a median representation of 3.8%. Table 10 shows that the percentage of women cabinet members at the federal government level ranges from 0% to 20%, with a median representation of 0%. In fact, thirty-two countries did not have any women in their cabinets in the late 1960's. The position of cabinet ministers is usually considerably more important in a power sense than is that of member of parliament. Since the percentage of women in the cabinet positions is even less than the percentage in federal government level it would seem that the more powerful the political position the less likely that it will be occupied by a woman. Further, there is evidence of sex-typing of occupations even at this level. When a woman does become a cabinet minister she is most often found in a position that is related in some way to the traditional concept of women's roles as involving aid and nurturance. For example, she is assigned to areas of national interest concerning public housing, education, social welfare, health and justice. (See Table 11).

The raw data indicate that in none of the countries studied was there an equality of power sharing or political responsibility between the sexes at the top levels of the political structure. Obviously laws do not of themselves produce changes in social structures or social behaviour although the legal establishment of equal rights can be viewed as a necessary precondition for the development of equality between the sexes.

According to hypothesis one, the political status of women should be more equal to that of men in nations with higher levels of technology.

Therefore, the variations that occur in the representation of women in political power positions in the various countries should be positively correlated with the level of technology of a nation. However this study found an inverse relationship between the level of technology and the percentage of women at the federal level of government ($r = +.49$, controlling for the political category and religion). That is, the higher the level of technology, the less equal the status of women relative to that of men along this particular dimension. It was not possible to account for this finding and it can only be suggested that an unknown variable is influencing this particular relationship.

However, political power sharing between the sexes at the parliamentary level was found to be strongly related to the political category of a nation ($r = -.61$, controlling for religion and level of industrialization). The more socialistic the nation, the higher the percentage of women representatives in the parliament, thus confirming the second hypothesis. Similarly, hypothesis three was confirmed in this instance. The higher the percentage of Roman Catholics in the population, the lower the percentage of women at the federal level of government ($r = -.52$, controlling for political category and level of technology).¹

¹It is interesting to note that the percentage of women representatives at the federal level of government correlated highly with:

- i) the number of women in the labour force as a percentage of the total labour force ($r = .71$)
- ii) the number of married women in the labour force as a percentage of the number of married women in the total population ($r = .63$)
- iii) the number of women enrolled in third level education (college and university) as a percentage of the total enrollment ($r = .48$)

These correlations confirm that as women's relative status increases in the educational sphere and as women become an increasingly larger segment of the active participants in the economic structure, their participation in the political realm also increases.

However, the percentage of women representatives in cabinet positions did not correlate significantly with these three indices of the status of women. Perhaps this indicates limits to the political power women will share with men given increasing status in other spheres at this point in history.

TABLE 8: THE NUMBER OF YEARS AGO THE VOTE WAS GRANTED TO WOMEN ON AN EQUAL BASIS WITH MEN IN ALL ELECTIONS. (Base year of 1970)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number of Years</u>	<u>Date Vote Granted</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Number of Years</u>	<u>Date Vote Granted</u>
Guatemala	5	1965	Dominican Republic	28	1942
Paraguay	9	1961	Brazil	38	1932
Haiti	13	1957	Uruguay	38	1932
Honduras	13	1957	Spain	39	1931
Peru	15	1955	Ecuador	41	1929
Nicaragua	15	1955	Puerto Rico	41	1929
Colombia	16	1954	United Kingdom	42	1928
Mexico	17	1953	Ireland	48	1922
Bolivia	18	1952	United States	50	1920
Greece	18	1952	Sweden	51	1919
El Salvador	20	1950	Czechoslovakia	51	1919
Chile	21	1949	West Germany	51	1919
Belgium	22	1948	Netherlands	51	1919
Bulgaria	23	1947	Poland	52	1918
Venezuela	23	1947	Austria	52	1918
Yugoslavia	24	1946	Canada	52	1918
Romania	24	1946	Luxembourg	52	1918 ²
Panama	24	1946	Finland	53	1917
Italy	25	1945	U.S.S.R.	53	1917
Hungary	25	1945	Iceland	55	1915
Portugal	25	1945	Denmark	55	1915
France	26	1944	Norway	57	1913
Albania	26	1944	Australia	68	1902
			New Zealand	77	1893

Portugal granted the vote in 1945 but women are subject to educational and tax qualifications not imposed on men, if they want to stand for election.

Switzerland no vote and ineligible to stand for election prior to 1970.

Source: Constitutions, Electoral Laws and Other Legal Instruments Relating to the Political Rights of Women, United Nations, New York, 1968.

²Women received equal voting rights with men in national parliamentary elections in Finland in 1906; however, it was not until 1917 that they received equal voting rights in all municipal elections.

TABLE 9: PERCENTAGE AND TOTAL NUMBER OF WOMEN IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

<u>Country</u>		<u>Percent</u>	<u>Numbers</u> { if bicameral, higher chamber given first
Albania	(1967)	0	0/240
Switzerland	(1968)	0	0/44, 0/200
Greece	(1967)	0.3	1/300
Venezuela	(1968)	0.7	0/52, 3/214
Brazil	(1969)	0.9	0/66, 7/409
Luxembourg	(1967)	0.9	0/21, 1/55
Nicaragua	(1968)	0.9	0/18, 1/54
Belgium	(1967)	1.5	2/180, 4/212
Canada	(1969)	1.6	4/102, 1/264
France	(1967)	1.9	5/283, 11/487
Ireland	(1967)	2.2	1/60, 4/144
United States	(1968)	2.2	2/100, 10/435
Italy	(1967)	2.7	5/315, 24/630
United Kingdom	(1967)	3.4	33/1019, 25/630
Portugal	(1967)	3.4	4/120, 7/205
Mexico	(1965)	3.6	2/60, 8/210
Australia	(1967)	3.7	4/60, 1/122
Colombia	(1967)	3.7	4/106, 7/190
El Salvador	(1968)	3.8	2/52
Honduras	(1968)	4.6	3/64
Panama	(1968)	4.7	2/42
Chile	(1968)	6.0	2/50, 12/150
New Zealand	(1967)	7.5	6/80
Netherlands	(1967)	7.7	4/75, 15/150
Austria	(1967)	9.2	7/54, 9/165
Norway	(1967)	9.3	14/150
Denmark	(1967)	11.2	19/171
Sweden	(1967)	12.2	15/151, 34/132
Poland	(1966)	12.3	57/460
Romania	(1966)	14.4	67/465
Finland	(1967)	17.0	34/200
Bulgaria	(1966)	17.0	71/416
Hungary	(1963)	18.6	65/349
Yugoslavia	(1965)	20.0	-----
U.S.S.R.	(1968)	29.5	-----

Note: Complete Data not Available for: Haiti, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Spain, Germany (East), Guatemala, Iceland, Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, West Germany, Puerto Rico.

Sources: R.P. Stebbins, A. Amoia, Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, 1970, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1970.

R. Patai, Women in the Modern World, The Free Press, New York, 1967.

"Women Around the World", Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, Vol. 375, January, 1968.

"Report of the Inter-American Commission of Women", Economic and Social Council, United Nations, January, 1969, E/CN.6/525.

TABLE 10: PERCENTAGE AND TOTAL NUMBER OF WOMEN IN CABINET POSITIONS IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT (for the election period immediately prior to 1970)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Numbers</u>
France	0	0/15
Greece	0	0/16
Guatemala	0	0/10
Honduras	0	0/10
Iceland	0	0/5
Ireland	0	0/12
Italy	0	0/24
Mexico	0	0/15
New Zealand	0	0/14
Panama	0	0/10
Paraguay	0	0/10
Peru	0	0/14
Poland	0	0/23
Portugal	0	0/14
United States	0	0/10
Uruguay	0	0/10
Romania	0	0/34
Spain	0	0/18
Switzerland	0	0/5
Haiti	0	0/12
Albania	0	0/12
Australia	0	0/11
Brazil	0	0/18
Canada	0	0/28
Chile	0	0/15
Colombia	0	0/13
Czechoslovakia	0	0/9
Dominican Republic	0	0/15
Ecuador	0	0/11
El Salvador	0	0/10
Belgium	0	0/29
Nicaragua	0	0/11
U.S.S.R.	2.5	1/40
Hungary	4.0	1/25
Yugoslavia	6.3	1/16
Vanezuela	6.7	1/15
Bolivia	7.6	1/13
East Germany Uni	8.3	2/24
United Kingdom	9.0	2/22
Netherlands	9.0	1/11
Austria	9.0	1/11
Finland	10.0	1/10
Bulgaria	11.1	2/18
West Germany Den	11.1	2/18
Denmark	11.8	2/17
Norway	14.2	2/14
Sweden	17.6	3/17
Luxembourg	20.0	1/5

Source: same as Table I.

TABLE 11: CABINET POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY WOMEN
(for the election period immediately prior to 1970).

Austria	i	social administration
Belgium	i	family, welfare and housing
Bolivia	i	labour and social welfare
Bulgaria	i	justice
	ii	light industry
Finland	i	social affairs
West Germany	i	family and youth affairs
	ii	public health
East Germany	i	education
	ii	light industry
Hungary	i	light industry
Luxembourg	i	cultural affairs, family, youth, social solidarity and public health
Netherlands	i	education
Norway	i	justice and police
	ii	family and consumer affairs
United Kingdom	i	secretary of state
	ii	pay master-general
Venezuela	i	development
Sweden	i	family ³
	ii	disarmament matters
	iii	youth
U.S.S.R.	i	culture
Puerto Rico	i	labour

Source: R.P. Stebbins, A. Amoia, Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, 1970, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1970.

M.S. Devaud, "Political Participation of Western European Women", in The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, Vol. 375-378, January, 1968.

³There was a difference of opinion as to the number of women in cabinet positions in Sweden. Devaud stated that there were three women and we used this fact. However, Stebbins and Amoia maintained that there are two women -- C. Odnoff and Youth and Family Affairs minister and A. Mydral as Disarmament Matters minister.

In predicting the sexual distribution of the more prestigious and powerful positions of cabinet minister, the level of technology/industrialization of a nation was found to be stronger than either political ideology or religion in explaining the variation between nations, although this was by no means a strong relationship itself. It was found that there was some indication that the higher the level of technology/industrialization, the higher the percentage of women in the cabinet ($r = -.27$, controlling for political category and religion). It must be kept in mind however that the percentage of women in cabinet positions was proportionately low for all countries.

Educational Distributive System

In industrializing and industrial nations the amount and kind of education attained by a person is clearly associated with the occupational success achieved. In order to become integrated into the modern world of production and technology women and men must be trained in the skills required. Educational status then becomes an increasingly important factor in determining the distribution of power and privilege. As Lenski notes educational training becomes a necessary prerequisite for admission to the most rewarding professions or occupations.⁴ Consequently, the nature of the education women receive will greatly influence the occupational roles they play in society and hence their status relative to that of men.

The United Nation's study "Access of Girls and Women to Technical and Vocational Education, 1968", reports that a trend toward non-discrimination by sex in education is evident in all countries and is stated in either

⁴G. Lenski, op. cit., p. 392.

the nations' constitutions or in legislation relating to education.⁵ The position of individual nations is that equal access to guidance and training facilities, regardless of sex, is guaranteed since there are no legal or similar barriers preventing it. There are sometimes, however, special provisions regarding the access of girls to specific types of technical and vocational education. Laws to protect the health of women bar them from certain types of employment and consequently, from the training sector for that employment. Training institutes for mining, fishing and marine transport most frequently show this bias.⁶ Some countries also have restrictions on the attendance of married women to regular vocational and technical schools. (See Table 12). Where restrictions do not exist there are seldom adequate facilities, such as creches, day-care centers and nurseries, established to solve family difficulties.

Although women have historically formed the major portion of the illiterate population in most countries, in the majority of countries included in this study enrollment at level one or primary education is shared almost equally by boys and girls, giving support to the United Nations convention of equal access to education. However, it is at levels two and three that vocational, technical and professional training takes place and the key question is obviously, do these educational institutions, in their enrollments, reflect the attitudes of sexual equality and non-discrimination.

⁵"Access of Girls and Women to Technical and Vocational Education", Report prepared by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Economic and Social Council, United Nations, Jan. 1968, E/CN.6/498, p. 22.

⁶Ibid., p. 19.

In terms of numerical comparison of enrollment figures by sex we have looked at three areas:

- i) The percentage of women of the total enrollment at the second level in general education (See Table 13)
- ii) The percentage of women of the total enrollment at the second level vocational education (See Table 14)
- iii) The percentage of women of the total enrollment at the third level of education (See Table 15)

We learned as the research progressed that the concept of sexual division of numerical enrollment in education had flaws in it as an indicator of the status of women relative to that of men. We concluded that it would be incorrect to interpret numerical sexual equality in enrollment as indicating complete equalization of status between men and women in this area. This is because the options, types of courses and training offered and taken by boys and girls differ greatly within most countries. Girls enrollment figures for vocational and technical training often include students in family-oriented home economics courses or in "typically feminine" vocations such as dress-making, sewing, knitting, flower selling, cosmetology, etectera,⁷ which do not have many male students enrolled, which also have a very high drop-out rate and which seldom lead the graduates to well-paid employment. According to the United Nations' study quoted every country still exhibits a tendency to channel women into typically feminine occupations and males into typically masculine fields.⁸

⁷Ibid., p. 82.

⁸"Study of Co-Education", Report prepared by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Economic and Social Council, United Nations, August 1969, E/CN.6/537, p. 10.

This channelling of attitudes and vocational training begins at an early age and consequently limits women's employment and career opportunities to the less rewarded jobs in terms of power and prestige. Few countries are attempting to awaken girls to the occupational possibilities in the mathematical, scientific, and technical areas. In most countries girls were found in the greatest numbers in the training sectors of:

- i) Commerce and clerical occupations
- ii) Services
- iii) Applied Arts

Fewest girls were found in the training sectors for:

- i) Mining technology
- ii) Mechanical trades
- iii) Metallurgical
- iv) Electrical
- v) Building crafts
- vi) Wood-working technology⁹

Further, the report states that greater financial effort is devoted to the technical and vocational training of boys than girls even where they have a numerical equality.¹⁰

Second Level General Education: In Table 13 women's enrollment ranged from 35% in Haiti to 57.8% in Hungary, with a median enrollment of 47.6% women. Thus, in numerical terms it would appear that the trend toward non-discrimination by sex at the general academic second level is being

⁹"Access of Girls and Women to Technical and Vocational Education", op. cit., p. 82.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 126.

realized. The variation that does appear in the percentages of women's enrollment is not strongly related to either the level of industrialization in the nation ($r = -.15$, controlling for religion and political category) or the percentage of Roman Catholics in the population ($r = +.24$, controlling for level of industrialization and political category). Some of the variation can be accounted for by the political grouping of the country. The more socialistic a country, the higher the percentage of women enrolled at this level is likely to be. ($r = -.28$, controlling for level of industrialization and religion).

Second Level Vocational Education: Table 14 shows that in terms of vocational training there is a much larger variation in the percentage of women enrolled as compared to men, from 5.9% in Albania to 78.1% in Bolivia, with a median enrollment of 39.5%. In this case the variation between countries was related mainly to the percentage of Roman Catholics in the population ($r = +.44$, controlling for political category and level of technology/industrialization). The higher the percentage of Roman Catholics in the population, the higher the percentage of women enrolled in vocational education. As we pointed out earlier, it is particularly in terms of vocational and technical training that sex-role educational channelling takes place and it would be expected that the more Catholic the country, the more sex-role typing would take place. Therefore, this positive correlation between percentage of Roman Catholics in the population and the percentage of women enrolled in vocational education may be explained if we find that the majority of women are being trained in typically female vocations, many of which can be seen as preparation for marriage rather than a paying career. This suggestion is supported by the United

Nations study "Access of Girls and Women to Technical and Vocational Education".

Third Level Education: Table 15 also shows a range of differences in the number of women as compared to men who are enrolled at level three, 11.3% in Haiti to 50.6% in Puerto Rico, with a median of 34.2%. The percentage of women enrolled at level three correlates very weakly with political category ($r = -.19$), and not at all with the percentage of Roman Catholics in the population ($r = -.0004$). Since it is from the level two general education that students are drawn into level three it is consistent that women's enrollment at both levels is related to the same independent variable, political grouping. Due to the low level of this correlation it cannot be taken as a confirmation of hypothesis two but can indicate a trend in that direction. As expected, it was found that there was a low correlation between level of technology/industrialization and university education, albeit weak, which indicated that at the higher levels of industrialization comparatively more women receive university or college level training ($r = -.23$).

From Lenski's position the technological requirements of an industrial state should act as a pressure toward equalization of educational opportunity and training for the sexes. However, looking at secondary, vocational and college level training, it appears that a rigid traditional image of sexual roles limits this total realization, and that, in fact, the numerical equalization that does appear is more related to the political ideology of a nation than to its level of technology/industrialization.

TABLE 12: RESTRICTIONS ON THE ATTENDANCE OF MARRIED WOMEN
TO REGULAR VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL SCHOOLS

Some Restrictions Exist:

Poland
Romania
Haiti
Panama
Peru

No Restrictions in Principle:

Australia
Canada
Ecuador
Finland
Guatemala
Hungary
Ireland
Sweden
United Kingdom

No Restrictions in Principle, but Problem has not Arisen:

Chile
Austria
Italy
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Spain
Switzerland

Action Taken to Help Married Women:

Czechoslovakia
Mexico
United States
U.S.S.R.
Venezuela

No Data on Countries Not Listed.

Source: "Access of Girls and Women to Technical and Vocational Education",
Report prepared by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization, Economic and Social Council, United Nations,
January, 1968, E/CN.6/498, p. 26.

TABLE 13: THE PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN OF THE TOTAL ENROLLMENT AT THE SECOND LEVEL IN GENERAL EDUCATION. (1966,1967)

Haiti	35.0
Mexico	38.3
Denmark	38.3
Greece	38.6
Romania	39.5
Austria	40.4
Peru	40.7
Guatemala	41.2
Luxembourg	41.2
Italy	43.6
Yugoslavia	44.1
Ecuador	44.7
Netherlands	45.0
Honduras	45.6
West Germany	45.8
Nicaragua	46.2
Canada	46.3
Norway	46.4
Ireland	46.8
El Salvador	46.8
Bulgaria	47.6
New Zealand	47.7
Venezuela	48.3
Colombia	48.4
Poland	48.7
United Kingdom	48.5
Brazil	49.5
Dominican Republic	49.6
Sweden	49.9
Finland	51.2
France	51.7
Panama	52.5
Belgium	53.7
Czechoslovakia	54.8
U.S.S.R.	55.4
Chile	55.7
Bolivia	56.6
Hungary	57.8

No Data: Albania, Australia, East Germany, Iceland, Paraguay, Puerto Rico, Spain, Switzerland, United States, Uruguay.

Source: Statistical Yearbook 1969, United Nations, New York, 1970.

TABLE 14: THE PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN OF THE TOTAL ENROLLMENT AT THE SECOND LEVEL VOCATIONAL EDUCATION. (1966-1967)

Albania	5.9
Dominican Republic	11.5
Greece	17.1
Denmark	19.2
Canada	24.1
Romania	25.3
Italy	27.1
Haiti	27.9
Brazil	31.4
Paraguay	34.0
Portugal	34.9
Nicaragua	35.9
Ireland	36.6
Norway	37.2
Luxembourg	37.4
Austria	37.8
Yugoslavia	38.2
Honduras	38.6
Bulgaria	39.5
Guatemala	39.5
Peru	39.7
Netherlands	40.9
Finland	42.5
Poland	42.8
United Kingdom	44.0
Hungary	45.0
West Germany	45.5
Belgium	47.4
France	49.8
Venezuela	50.0
Sweden	50.1
Czechslovakia	50.4
El Salvador	52.0
Panama	54.5
Ecuador	56.4
Chile	57.3
Colombia	63.1
Bolivia	78.1

No Data: Australia, East Germany, Hungary, Mexico, New Zealand, Puerto Rico, Spain, Switzerland, U.S.S.R., United States, Uruguay, Iceland.

Source: Statistical Yearbook 1969, United Nations, New York, 1970.

TABLE 15: THE PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN OF THE TOTAL ENROLLMENT AT THE THIRD LEVEL EDUCATION. (1966-1967)

Haiti	11.3
Guatemala	14.0
Albania	17.2
Bolivia	17.3
Mexico	17.3
Honduras	18.7
Switzerland	21.1
El Salvador	22.3
Colombia	22.3
Spain	22.6
Ecuador	24.5
Austria	24.7
Norway	24.9
Netherlands	26.8
West Germany	27.4
East Germany	29.1
Australia	29.4
Luxembourg	29.5
Ireland	29.9
Nicaragua	30.2
Belgium	32.7
Greece	32.9
Peru	34.2
Venezuela	34.5
New Zealand	36.3
Denmark	36.4
Sweden	36.4
United Kingdom	37.0
Yugoslavia	37.2
Italy	38.2
Czechoslovakia	38.2
Canada	38.6
Portugal	38.7
Poland	39.4
United States	40.2
Paraguay	40.3
Chile	40.5
Romania	41.9
Hungary	44.0
Bulgaria	46.4
U.S.S.R.	46.9
Panama	47.8
Puerto Rico	50.6

No Data: Brazil, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Iceland, Uruguay.

Source: Statistical Yearbook 1969, United Nations, New York, 1970.

Occupational System

Since, as mentioned in an earlier section, worth, prestige and power are intimately connected with occupation in the industrializing and industrial societies, a woman's position in the labour force is a crucial factor affecting her over-all status. Equality in economic activity will be considered in terms of general participation rates, types of occupations and government policy related to women's employment.

Participation Rates: In the 49 countries under study the percentage of women members of the labour force ranged from 10.7% to 51.8%, with a median representation of 26.9%. (See Table 16) For example, women in Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Honduras were a very low proportion of the total labour force while working women in Poland, Romania and the U.S.S.R., Haiti, Bulgaria and East Germany constituted between 44% to 51.8% of the total labour force. The variations in the percentage of women engaged in labour force activity will be interpreted as reflections of the varying relative status between men and women in different cultural and economic systems.¹¹

The second order partial correlations calculated for each of the original hypotheses using the dependent variable, percentage of women in the labour force, were:

¹¹It should be kept in mind that E. Denti has shown that the statistics for economically active women are "more influenced by differences in national statistical reporting and classification procedures than those for males". The national diversity in ways of categorizing unpaid family workers, especially women, as included or not included in the labour force statistics has created this problem. As Denti points out, the possibility of error and lack of comparability is greater for the less developed countries with a large agricultural base than for the more urbanized highly developed countries.

E. Denti, "Sex-Age Patterns of Labour Force Participation by Urban and Rural Population", ILR, Vol. 98, p. 536.

- i) the level of technology/industrialization was unrelated to the percentage of women engaged in economic activity ($r = +.05$, controlling for political category and religion).
- ii) the more socialistic the country was categorized as, the higher the percentage of women in the labour force ($r = -.37$, controlling for level of industrialization and religion).
- iii) the higher the percentage of Roman Catholics in a nation, the lower the percentage of women in the labour force ($r = -.40$, controlling for political category and level of technology/industrialization).

From these correlations it appears that religious composition and political categorization are equally important as determinants of the participation of women in the labour force. The ideology of the Roman Catholic Church concerning women's role seems to act as a retarding factor to women's economic participation, while a socialistic orientation seems to be a factor in accounting for a higher percentage of women in the labour force.

Marriage is generally considered to be an inhibitor of female labour force participation. Factors accounting for the lack of labour force activity of married women include the number of children the woman has, their ages, the availability of substitutes for mother's care and the prevailing attitudes towards married women working and consequently, the general attitude toward the "proper" division of labour between the sexes. A large proportion of married women working would seem to indicate some kind of breakdown of the traditional sexual, division of labour. The measure used was married women in the labour force as a percentage of the married women in the total population. Of the 32 countries for which

data was available, the participation of married women ranged from a low of 5.2% to a high of 68.7%, with a median of 16.9%. (See Table 17) For example, Ireland, Guatemala, Honduras, and the Netherlands fell at the low end of the continuum whereas Austria, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Bulgaria were at the high end.

The second order partial correlations conclusively showed that the more socialistic a country was categorized as the higher the labour force participation of married women ($r = -.69$, controlling for religion and level of technology) Neither level of industrialization/technology nor the percentage of Roman Catholics in the population were significant factors in this case, ($r = +.22$, controlling for political category and religion, and $r = -.04$, controlling for level of technology and political category, respectively).

Participation rates between men and women in the economic sphere can not be used to establish a case for equality of status but can be used to indicate a changing concept of women's roles in society. To determine the extent of equality in the economic sphere it is necessary to consider the types of jobs and corresponding authority accruing to women and men. Should men and women be found to be distributed evenly throughout all types of positions the next consideration would be, are they paid equally for the same work, and do they advance at the same rate? To establish the occupational distribution of economically active man and women we looked at three broad categories of occupations constructed by the International Labour Organization:

- i) administrative, executive and managerial workers
- ii) craftsmen, production-process workers and labours not elsewhere

classified

iii) service, sport and recreation workers

- i) Table 18 indicates that in the category administrative, executive and managerial workers women composed from 4.1% to 47.5% of the total, with a median of 11.6%. In fact, approximately three-quarters of the responses showed women to constitute less than 20% of this category of relatively prestigious jobs with concomitant authority and power. Neither level of technology/industrialization nor political category could explain the variation between nations ($r = -.13$, and $r = -.09$, second order partial correlations respectively). However, there was a weak tendency for the predominately Roman Catholic nations to have a higher percentage of women in administrative positions ($r = +.28$, controlling for level of technology/industrialization and political category). The direction of this relationship is opposite to that predicted by hypothesis III.
- ii) Table 19 shows that women do not form a large segment of the skilled workers in most countries. The percentage of women in the category craftsmen etc., ranges from 6.0% to 63.1% of the total, the latter which is an exceptional case since the median is 18.9%. In 90% of the countries listed women constitute less than 30% of the labour force in this particular grouping. Only one of the second order partial correlations was high enough to be interesting and it was not in the direction predicted by the hypothesis. It was found that the higher the level of technology/industrialization, the lower the percentage of women in the skilled trades of craftsmen and production

workers ($r = +.35$, controlling for political category and religion). Socialistic orientation and the percentage of Roman Catholics in the population of skilled women workers -- second order partials were $r = -.19$, and $r = -.11$, respectively.

- iii) Table 20 rank orders women employed in service, sport and recreation activities as a percentage of the total number of workers in those fields. Women constitute from 35.8% to 79.8% of this area of occupations, with a median representation of 65.5%. In 36 of the 42 countries for which data were available, women constitute more than 50% of this category of occupations. The hypotheses predicted that the higher the level of technology/industrialization, the lower the percentage of women in service industries; the more socialistically oriented the nation, the lower the percentage of women in service industries; and the higher the percentage of Roman Catholics in the population, the higher the percentage of women in the service industries. However, the second-order partial correlations for all three hypotheses proved to be uniformly low, below an r of .15. Consequently, we are led to conclude that in this case the explanation of women's position must lie in some variable other than the three being tested. One explanation could possibly lie in the relationship between occupation and education. It was discovered that the higher the percentage of women enrolled in vocational education, the more women one could expect to find employed in the service, sport and recreation occupations ($r = +.34$). On the other hand, the correlation between vocational training and the skilled occupations was insignificant ($r = -.02$). This would seem to

indicate that the vocational training women received is not generally preparing women for the skilled industrial occupations or the craftsman occupations such as carpenters, plumbers and mechanics, but is oriented to a large degree toward the service occupations. Without specialized education women may enter the labour force but at a level which requires little formal training; consequently, large numbers become involved in segments of the service industries. When there are a high percentage of the women in the nation enrolled in university or college level education, compared to men, there is a correspondingly lower percentage of women working in service, sport and recreation jobs ($r = -.43$). This suggests that in nations where higher level education is more evenly shared between the sexes, women may experience less stringent channelling of occupational choice.

From a review of the major occupational divisions in the labour force it becomes apparent that there is a segregation of types of employment entered into by those men and women in the labour force. There are, on the whole, more men than women employed in the categories administrative, executive and managerial workers and craftsmen, production-process workers and other labourers, while there are generally more women than men employed in the service industries. It was found that the more women there were in the labour force, the higher the percentage employed in the skilled occupational category ($r = +.38$). Also, the higher the percentage of married women working, the higher the percentage of women in the skilled category was likely to be ($r = .59$). This would seem to indicate that as more enter the labour force, there is a trend toward breaking down at

TABLE 16: WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION

	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Year</u>
Dominican Republic	10.7	(1960)
Guatemala	12.6	(1964)
Honduras	12.9	(1961)
Ecuador	16.3	(1962)
Portugal	17.7	(1960)
Brazil	17.8	(1960)
El Salvador	17.8	(1961)
Mexico	17.9	(1960)
Venezuela	17.9	(1961)
Spain	18.2	(1960)
Colombia	20.1	(1964)
Nicaragua	20.1	(1963)
Panama	21.3	(1960)
Peru	21.7	(1961)
Netherlands	22.2	(1960)
Chile	22.4	(1960)
Norway	22.8	(1960)
Paraguay	23.0	(1962)
Puerto Rico	24.2	(1960)
Italy	24.9	(1961)
Uruguay	25.1	(1963)
Ireland	25.8	(1966)
Belgium	26.5	(1961)
Luxembourg	26.9	(1960)
New Zealand	27.3	(1961)
Canada	27.4	(1961)
Iceland	27.4	(1960)
Australia	27.4	(1960)
Switzerland	30.2	(1960)
Denmark	30.8	(1960)
Greece	32.8	(1961)
United States	32.0	(1960)
Sweden	33.6	(1965)
France	33.6	(1962)
Yugoslavia	35.4	(1961)
United Kingdom	35.6	(1966)
Hungary	36.2	(1963)
West Germany	37.0	(1961)
Finland	39.3	(1960)
Albania	39.3	(1960)
Austria	40.3	(1961)
Czechoslovakia	41.0	(1961)
Bolivia	42.0	(1950)
Bulgaria	44.0	(1965)
East Germany	44.1	(1960)
Poland	44.2	(1960)
Romania	45.2	(1966)
Haiti	49.0	(1950)
U.S.S.R.	51.8	(1960)

Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1969, I.L.O., Geneva.

TABLE 17: MARRIED WOMEN IN THE LABOUR FORCE AS A PERCENTAGE OF MARRIED WOMEN IN THE TOTAL POPULATION.

	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Year</u>
Ireland	5.2	(1966)
Guatemala	6.3	(1964)
Honduras	6.7	(1961)
Netherlands	6.7	(1960)
Dominican Republic	6.9	(1960)
Ecuador	9.3	(1962)
Norway	9.5	(1960)
Chile	10.7	(1960)
Venezuela	11.9	(1961)
Peru	12.1	(1961)
Iceland	13.3	(1960)
New Zealand	15.8	(1961)
Switzerland	15.9	(1960)
Panama	16.0	(1960)
Australia	16.7	(1961)
Italy	16.9	(1961)
Luzembourg	17.2	(1966)
Puerto Rico	20.3	(1960)
Belgium	20.3	(1961)
Canada	22.0	(1960)
Denmark	22.3	(1961)
United States	31.7	(1960)
France	32.4	(1962)
Sweden	33.1	(1965)
West Germany	34.3	(1961)
Hungary	37.4	(1960)
United Kingdom	37.9	(1966)
Austria	39.8	(1961)
Finland	45.0	(1960)
Czechoslovakia	53.9	(1961)
Poland	59.7	(1960)
Bulgaria	68.7	(1965)

No Data Available: Colombia, El Salvador, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Romania, Yugoslavia, U.S.S.R., East Germany, Albania, Brazil, Bolivia.

Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1969, I.L.O., Geneva.

Demographic Yearbook 1968, 1965, United Nations, New York, 1969.

(calculations are our own based on figures from the above two sources)

TABLE 18: WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND MANAGERIAL WORKERS.

	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Year</u>
Netherlands	4.1	(1960)
Czechoslovakia	4.8	(1961)
Iceland	4.8	(1960)
Ireland	5.6	(1966)
Portugal	5.9	(1960)
Norway	6.6	(1960)
Ecuador	6.8	(1962)
Greece	7.3	(1961)
United Kingdom	7.4	(1966)
Uruguay	7.5	(1963)
Belgium	8.5	(1961)
Paraguay	8.7	(1962)
Sweden	8.9	(1965)
El Salvador	9.2	(1961)
Canada	9.5	(1961)
Finland	10.3	(1960)
Peru	10.7	(1961)
Venezuela	10.8	(1961)
Nicaragua	11.2	(1963)
Panama	11.6	(1960)
Dominican Republic	11.7	(1960)
Yugoslavia	11.8	(1961)
New Zealand	11.9	(1966)
Australia	12.0	(1960)
Mexico	12.1	(1960)
Denmark	12.3	(1960)
Luxembourg	13.6	(1960)
Haiti	14.1	(1950)
United States	14.4	(1960)
Colombia	14.8	(1964)
Chile	16.7	(1960)
Hungary	16.9	(1963)
West Germany	19.9	(1961)
France	20.8	(1962)
Guatemala	26.9	(1964)
Austria	28.1	(1961)
Italy	28.4	(1961)
Puerto Rico	32.3	(1960)
Bulgaria	39.9	(1965)
Romania	40.4	(1966)
Switzerland	47.5	(1960)

No Data Available: Spain, U.S.S.R., Poland, East Germany, Albania, Brazil, Bolivia, Honduras.

Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1969, I.L.O., Geneva.

TABLE 19: WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CRAFTSMEN,
PRODUCTION-PROCESS WORKERS, AND LABOURERS NOT ELSEWHERE CLASSIFIED.

	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Year</u>
Luxembourg	6.0	(1960)
Netherlands	9.3	(1960)
Mexico	10.3	(1960)
Norway	11.1	(1960)
Canada	12.1	(1961)
Dominican Republic	12.7	(1960)
Australia	13.2	(1960)
New Zealand	13.6	(1966)
Sweden	14.7	(1965)
Panama	14.7	(1960)
Venezuela	15.4	(1961)
Chile	16.3	(1960)
Ireland	17.2	(1966)
Belgium	17.4	(1961)
Guatemala	17.7	(1964)
Denmark	17.9	(1960)
United States	18.2	(1960)
Yugoslavia	18.2	(1961)
Italy	18.6	(1961)
Portugal	18.6	(1960)
Uruguay	18.9	(1963)
Iceland	19.3	(1960)
Romania	19.4	(1966)
Switzerland	19.7	(1960)
France	19.8	(1962)
United Kingdom	20.0	(1966)
Colombia	20.3	(1964)
West Germany	21.2	(1961)
Peru	21.2	(1961)
Honduras	21.5	(1961)
Austria	22.6	(1961)
Greece	22.6	(1961)
Ecuador	24.2	(1962)
Finland	24.4	(1960)
Hungary	25.2	(1963)
El Salvador	27.8	(1961)
Nicaragua	28.1	(1963)
Czechoslovakia	29.9	(1961)
Paraguay	41.9	(1962)
Puerto Rico	52.5	(1960)
Haiti	53.3	(1950)
Bulgaria	63.1	(1965)

No Data Available: Spain, U.S.S.R., Poland, East Germany, Albania, Brazil,
Bolivia.

Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1969, I.L.O., Geneva.

TABLE 20: WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SERVICE,
SPORT, AND RECREATION WORKERS.

	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Year</u>
Greece	35.8	(1961)
Yugoslavia	37.4	(1961)
Puerto Rico	39.6	(1960)
Italy	40.2	(1961)
Paraguay	43.2	(1962)
Romania	48.5	(1966)
Canada	55.3	(1961)
Bulgaria	58.9	(1965)
Peru	59.9	(1961)
Haiti	60.8	(1950)
United States	60.9	(1960)
Australia	60.9	(1960)
El Salvador	61.6	(1961)
New Zealand	61.7	(1966)
Hungary	63.1	(1963)
Uruguay	63.2	(1963)
Venezuela	63.3	(1961)
Belgium	64.3	(1961)
Netherlands	64.7	(1960)
Mexico	65.5	(1960)
Czechoslovakia	66.1	(1961)
Panama	66.3	(1960)
West Germany	67.3	(1961)
Portugal	67.7	(1960)
Ireland	68.1	(1962)
Ecuador	68.1	(1962)
Iceland	69.6	(1960)
Chile	70.6	(1960)
United Kingdom	70.9	(1966)
France	71.4	(1962)
Norway	71.6	(1960)
Honduras	72.1	(1961)
Dominican Republic	72.2	(1960)
Nicaragua	72.4	(1963)
Austria	72.6	(1961)
Sweden	73.7	(1965)
Colombia	74.5	(1964)
Switzerland	74.8	(1960)
Luzembourg	75.1	(1960)
Guatemala	76.8	(1964)
Denmark	79.6	(1960)
Finland	79.8	(1960)

No Data Available: U.S.S.R., Poland, East Germany, Albania, Brazil,
Bolivia, Spain.

Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1969, I.L.O., Geneva.

least the general segregation of occupations by sex since women can be seen entering the skilled occupations of craftsmen and production-process workers. From the data available at this level of analysis it is unfortunately not possible to comment on the level at which women enter this field or the sex-labelling of jobs that no doubt occurs in all occupational categories.

Formal Indices Involving The Occupational Distributive System

To determine a nation's official commitment to achieving equality between the sexes in the occupational sphere, three United Nation's Conventions were used:

- i) Discrimination in Employment and Occupation, Convention Number 111, 1958.
- ii) Equal Remuneration, Convention Number 100, 1951.
- iii) Maternity Protection, Convention Number 103, 1952.

Through the ratification of a convention a nation declares its agreement, in principle, with the convention and commits itself to promoting the convention in so far as is consistent with methods appropriate to national conditions and practices.¹² Therefore, these conventions indicate a nation's intent or policy attitude rather than any actual legislation and its enforcement on the issues of sexual equality.

It was apparent that ratification of these three conventions was unrelated to level of industrialization, to political categorization of the countries, or to percentage of Roman Catholics in the population.

¹²"International Labour Organization Activities of Special Interest in Relation to the Employment of Women", Economic and Social Council, United Nations, E/CN.6/529, Geneva, Dec. 1969, Appendix 1, p. 1-13.

(See Tables 21, 22, 23). The stated reasons for non-ratification varied considerably between countries. Some countries such as United States and Australia felt unable to ratify the Convention of Discrimination in Employment and Occupation because action to be taken towards effecting the Convention depended on the constituent units or states or provinces as well as on the federal authorities. Other reasons given for delaying in this case included the volume of parliamentary business (Venezuela), the problems of the economy (Bolivia), the codification of other legislation (Austria). The ratification of the Convention concerning equal pay for equal work produced reasons such as lack of any good system of objective job appraisal (Venezuela), economic problems and the need for female labour (Cyprus, Netherlands and United Kingdom), lack of uniformity in legislation between constituent states or provinces (United States and Canada), and generally difficulties interpreting the expression "work of equal value" as obstacles for not ratifying the convention. The Maternity Protection Convention was the least flexibly phrased convention. In fact, it was very clear on the conditions such as length of leave of absence, pay rate and benefits, workers covered, and requirements for nursing the child at work. Consequently, few countries, because of the scope of the convention, felt able to ratify it.¹³

Nations tended to interpret the conventions with different degrees of literalness, as well as different degrees of receptiveness to the proposed intent as indicated. Countries may have instituted some laws in regard to the conventions yet because of their literalness of interpretation of the convention or the pressure for more action that they felt the

¹³Ibid.

TABLE 21: THE RATIFICATION OF CONVENTION NUMBER III (DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION) AS OF DECEMBER 1, 1969.

<u>Ratified</u>	<u>Not Ratified</u>
Brazil	Australia
Bulgaria	Albania
Canada	Austria
Colombia	Belgium
Czechoslovakia	Bolivia
Denmark	Chile
Dominican Republic	East Germany
Ecuador	El Salvador
Guatemala	Finland
Honduras	France
Hungary	Greece
Iceland	Haiti
Italy	Ireland
Mexico	Luxembourg
Nicaragua	Netherlands
Norway	New Zealand
Panama	Peru
Paraguay	Puerto Rico
Poland	Romania
Portugal	United Kingdom
Spain	United States
Sweden	Uruguay
Switzerland	Venezuela
U.S.S.R.	
West Germany	
Yugoslavia	

Source: "International Labour Organization Activities of Special Interest in Relation to the Employment of Women", Economic and Social Council, United Nations, Geneva, E/CN.6/529, December 1969.

TABLE 22: THE RATIFICATION OF CONVENTION NUMBER 100 (EQUAL PAY)
AS OF DECEMBER 1969.

<u>Ratified</u>	<u>Not Ratified</u>
Albania	Australia
Austria	Bolivia
Belgium	Canada
Brazil	Chile
Bulgaria	East Germany
Colombia	El Salvador
Czechoslovakia	Greece
Denmark	Ireland
Dominican Republic	Netherlands
Ecuador	New Zealand
Finland	Puerto Rico
France	Switzerland
Guatemala	United Kingdom
Haiti	United States
Honduras	Uruguay
Hungary	Venezuela
Iceland	
Italy	
Luxembourg	
Mexico	
Nicaragua	
Norway	
Panama	
Paraguay	
Peru	
Poland	
Portugal	
Romania	
Spain	
Sweden	
U.S.S.R.	
West Germany	
Yugoslavia	

Source: "International Labour Organization Activities of Special Interest in Relation to the Employment of Women", Economic and Social Council, United Nations, Geneva, E/CN.6/529, December 1969.

TABLE 23: THE RATIFICATION OF CONVENTION NUMBER 103
(MATERNITY PROTECTION) AS OF DECEMBER 1969.

Ratified

Brazil
Ecuador
Hungary
Spain
U.S.S.R.
Uruguay
Yugoslavia

Source: International Labour Organization Activities of Special Interest in Relation to the Employment of Women, Economic and Social Council, United Nations, Geneva, December, 1969, E/CN.6/529.

convention implied, they did not ratify it.

Summary and Interpretation of Results

The theoretical purpose of this thesis was to apply G. Lenski's theory of social stratification to the problem of inequality between the sexes. By using Lenski's theory it was possible to conceptualize the sexes as two distinct power classes; the differences in power in the sexual class system being reflected in the rewards received and statuses occupied. The actual status and the formal-legal status of women relative to that of men were measured in the political, educational and occupational systems.

To explain the factors which could account for change in the nature of the distributive systems Lenski utilizes a number of constants in regard to the nature of man and society, the level of technology of a nation and other secondary or minor factors. It is Lenski's contention, however, that the single most important variable in explaining changes in the nature of distributive systems will be variations in the level of technology. As applied to an analysis of the sexual class system, we interpreted this to mean that technology should be found to correlate highly with the chosen indices of the status of women and should be the major factor in accounting for the variations in distributive systems as they apply to the sexes. However, we also hypothesized that three variables, level of technology/industrialization, political ideology, and percentage of Roman Catholics in the population would be needed to account for variation between countries on the indices of the status of women and that all three would be equally important as explanatory variables.

The following table summarizes the results of the tests of the hypotheses. It indicates the independent variable which correlated most strongly with each index of the status of women for which there was interval data.

The independent variable level of technology/industrialization accounts for four of the eleven relationships, while political category and the percentage of Roman Catholics in the population each produced the highest second order partial correlations in three cases and are almost identical in one case.

It is apparent that Lenski's prediction of technology as the major single determinant of variations in the distributive systems does not apply to an analysis of the sexual class system. From Table 24 we see that the ideological factors of political orientation of the regime and the presence and size of the Roman Catholic religion in the population must also be taken into account. Unfortunately, most correlations, with a few exceptions, are fairly low level, (see Appendix A, Summary Tables of Zero-Order and Second-Order Correlations). Consequently, it can not be stated conclusively that the three determining variables investigated in this thesis are the only variables influencing the distribution of rewards and power to the sexes.

An examination of the data also revealed that none of the countries under investigation exhibited equal actual status of men and women in all three aspects of distributive systems investigated -- political, educational and occupational. However, men and women were generally found to be much more equal in terms of formal, legal status. For example, women legally have the right to vote in all elections and to

TABLE 24: SUMMARY OF RESULTS, SECOND ORDER PARTIAL CORRELATIONS

<u>Dependent Variable</u>	<u>Independent Variable</u>
Political System	
i) Percentage of Women in Federal Government	Political Category $r = -.61$
ii) Percentage of Women in the Cabinet	Technology/Industrialization $r = -.27$
iii) Years Ago the Vote was Granted On an Equal Basis (to women)	Technology/Industrialization $r = -.47$
Occupational System	
iv) Percentage of Women in the Administrative Category	Percent Roman Catholic $r = +.28$
v) Percentage of Women in the Skilled Craftsmen Category	Technology/Industrialization $r = +.35$
vi) Percentage of Women in the Service Occupations	no significant correlations
vii) Women as a Percentage of the Labour Force	Percent Roman Catholic $r = -.40$
	Political Category $r = -.37$
viii) Percentage of Married Women Working	Political Category $r = -.69$
Educational System	
ix) Women as a Percentage of the Secondary School Enrollment	Political Category $r = -.28$
x) Women as a Percentage of the Vocational School Enrollment	Percent Roman Catholic $r = +.44$
xi) Women as a Percentage of the University Level Enrollment	Technology/Industrialization $r = -.23$

stand for election on an equal basis with men; they also have the legal right to equal access to educational guidance and training facilities, with minor exceptions. In the occupational sphere countries do not appear as willing to legally guarantee women equal access and equal pay or to take account of women's biological function of reproduction through comprehensive maternity protection legislation and providing day care centres. This is apparent in the qualifications and lack of ratifications of the United Nations conventions related to these issues. However, although there are not laws guaranteeing equal access, for the majority of occupations there are no formal laws explicitly prohibiting the entrance of women or men. Comparing the actual status and the legal status of women relative to men, it becomes apparent that there is a considerable gap between the two, in reference to the three distributive systems being considered.

To explain this gap between the actual and legal equality that exists to some degree in all countries it may prove fruitful to consider Lenski's constants about the nature of society and man (people). It is felt that these constants may also, to some extent, explain why the three hypotheses could not account for all of the variation between countries that the sexes experienced in relation to the political, educational and occupational systems. It is first of all important to establish that although we are discussing characteristics of man and society which are regarded as constants, we are not accepting or implying that the aspects of the organization of the sexual class systems that we are describing as evolving or resulting from them are themselves in any way constant.

In most societies people have generally accepted sex-role defini-

tions as natural and have oriented a substantial part of their behaviour around the values attached to sex-role differences. Sexual status has essentially been a form of ascribed status in that, upon birth, certain role expectations are inherited by virtue of sex alone. As Lenski pointed out, people are social beings, obliged by nature to live in groups (societies); groups which shape both character and personality. Sexual identities are molded by the society into which one is born. Studies have shown that the sex-typing of behaviour and privileges covers an extensive range and is both rigid and lasting.¹⁴ For example, Inkeles, Bacon, Child and Barry have noted that girls seem to be trained "more vigorously in obedience, responsibility and nurturance and boys are more socialized to be achieving, self-reliant and independent".¹⁵ In all societies sex appropriate behaviour is rewarded and sex inappropriate behaviour is punished by first the family, then the school, church, peer groups, community and so on. This must not be taken to mean that the ascription of sex-roles and their persistence over time is a test of their validity, nor must it be taken to mean that sex-role differentiation is necessary for the maintenance and continuance of society. This study has shown that in industrializing and industrial nations the actual status of women relative to men will vary from country to country depending upon variables such as the level of technology/industrialization, political

¹⁴J. Bossard, E.S. Boll, The Sociology of Child Development, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 374.

¹⁵A. Inkeles, op. cit., p. 620.

H. Barry, M. Bacon, C. Child, "A Cultural Survey of Some Sex Differences in Socialization", in J. Rosenblith, W. Allinsmith, eds., The Causes of Behaviour: Readings in Child Development and Educational Psychology, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon Inc., 1962), p. 258.

orientation in the direction of socialism and religion. Given the introduction of certain conditions sex-role definitions and behaviours may change.

However, since people do tend to orient their behaviour around prevailing sex-role definitions, any change in the sexual class system is perceived as a challenge to both the distribution of power and positions between the sexes and to the basis of self-identification. If we concur with Lenski that people are predominately self-seeking, that is, that people when confronted with important decisions will choose a resolution favouring themselves, we can assume with some surety that on important issues people with superior power, prestige etc. will attempt to retain those inequalities in their favour. Therefore, the male-dominated enclaves in the governmental, religious and economic hierarchies can not be expected to enthusiastically support women's liberation. Men are by their reticence, exhibiting what Lenski would regard as self-seeking behaviour. In relation to their self-identification, we should consider E. Erikson, a prominent psychologist's statement that "...where dominant identities depend on being dominant, it is hard to grant real equality to the dominated ... where one feels exposed, threatened or cornered it is difficult to be judicious".¹⁶ Assuming that this statement applies to some extent to the relationship of men and women, it is understandable that strong resistance to fundamental changes in the sexual class system would exist. Many women also experience changes in the sexual class system as a threat to the basis of their self-identity which is likewise

¹⁶E.H. Erikson, "Inner and Outer Space: Reflections on Womanhood", Daedalus, Volume 93, 1964, p. 585.

affected by the sex-role differentiations and definitions of relationships so long perpetuated by the socialization process.

Social inequalities in relation to the sexes are in fact embedded in the norms and mores of a society and are legitimized, to a great extent, by both sexes. Any changes in the distributive systems affecting the sexes, and consequently role-definitions, will usually necessitate a contradiction of the prevailing cultural ideology. Since as Lenski noted, man (people) relies heavily on habit and custom, we can understand that any conversion of theoretical sexual equality to actual equality will be a slow process. We have noted in this thesis three major variables which will influence both the possibility and the speed of this change in the political, educational and occupational distributive spheres as they affect the sexual class system.

Because these three major variables (the three original hypotheses) are tested and discussed at a macrolevel without detailed reference to individual countries, the preceding analysis has been highly abstracted. The following table (Table 25) was constructed to give a summary position of individual countries on the status of women relative to that of men, and thus allow a comparison of countries. As well, it provides, on a very simplistic level, a visual replication of the hypotheses tested on aggregate scores of the indices of the status of women. It must be emphasized that the type of scoring to be described results in the loss of valuable data and consequently, such summary scores must be regarded with caution and be treated as extremely rough measures.

Each country's position was derived by rank ordering each index of the status of women and dividing the resultant ordering into quartiles;

scoring each quartile from 1 to 4, from low equality to high equality on that particular indicator; then adding the scores and dividing the sum by the number of indices for which there was data. The summary positions of Spain, Bolivia, Albania, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, Brazil, East Germany and U.S.S.R. must be regarded with extra caution since there were so few indicators for which comparable data was available for these countries.

The countries are listed according to their summary scores in an order from low to high scores and each country's corresponding position is given on:

- i) the political category continuum from high to low degrees of socialism (1 to 6).
- ii) the technology/industrialization continuum from high to low degree of industrialization (1 to 13).
- iii) the percentage of Roman Catholics in the population.

Since fine discriminations were not warranted by the scoring procedure, the countries were divided into two equally sized groups -- Group One, with the low scores, and Group Two, with the higher scores. The hypotheses variables are also simply sorted into two groups, above and below the median, and all exceptions are indicated by a star.

On the basis of the summary score ranking a number of sharp anomalies stand out. For example, Norway, Australia and the Netherlands fall into Group One, with the lower status of women scores, while Peru, Panama, Chile and Bolivia fall into Group Two, with the higher scores. These same countries also appear as exceptions when we look at their positions on the three hypotheses variables.

On the whole, however, we can see from the table that:

- i) countries which were high in terms of socialistic orientation (1, 2, or 3 on the political category continuum) were also more likely to be in Group Two, and conversely, countries which scored low (4, 5, or 6 on this scale) were more likely to be in Group One.
- ii) countries which scored high in terms of level of technology/industrialization (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 on the level of technology/industrialization continuum) were also more likely to be in Group Two, and conversely, countries which had low levels on technology/industrialization (7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, or 13 on this scale) were more likely to be in Group One.
- iii) countries which had less than 50% Roman Catholics in the population were more likely to be in Group Two, and countries with more than 50% Roman Catholics in the population were more likely to be in Group One, although there were more exceptions on this variable than on the two above.

These results seem to generally validate the three original hypotheses, although it is apparent by the starred exceptions that the relationship between the status of women relative to that of men and the three variables political category, religion and level of technology/industrialization is not as pure and clearcut linearly as was predicted.

Different combinations of the political, religious and technological variables may yield similar levels of the status of women, but from our results we could tentatively suggest that countries high on socialism, low on Roman Catholicism and high on level of technology/industrialization would be the ones most likely to produce the social and economic conditions favourable to facilitating the equalization of the status of the sexes

TABLE 25: STATUS OF WOMEN RELATIVE TO THAT OF MEN
SUMMARY POSITIONS OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES.

Country	Score	No. of Indicators	Political Category	Religion(%)	Level Of Industrialization	
Spain	1.5	(3)	6	99.6	9	
Mexico	1.6	(9)	3*	84.8	10	
Honduras	1.6	(10)	4	67.9	13	
Brazil	1.6	(6)	4	89.5	12	
Dominican Republic	1.6	(9)	4	95.8	13	
Guatemala	1.6	(10)	4	95.2	13	
Albania	1.7	(6)	5	6.8* ^{1.2 million}	12	
Greece	1.8	(10)	6	mainly } 0.8* ^{Moslem}	11	
Portugal	1.8	(8)	6	orthodox } 94.4	10	
Paraguay	1.8	(8)	6	94.0	12	
Uruguay	1.8	(6)	4	82.8	8	
Nicaragua	1.9	(10)	6	84.5	12	Group One
Ireland	1.9	(8)	3*	94.0	7	
Colombia	2.0	(10)	4	85.9	12	
Ecuador	2.0	(10)	4	88.0	13	
Switzerland	2.0	(8)	4	42.6*	3*	
Norway	2.1	(11)	4	0.2*	3*	
Australia	2.2	(9)	3*	23.3*	1*	
Venezuela	2.2	(11)	4	88.9	7	
El Salvador	2.2	(10)	4	96.8	13	
Luxembourg	2.2	(11)	4	94.2	--	
Netherlands	2.2	(11)	4	39.7*	4*	
Haiti	2.2	(9)	6	67.3	13	
Italy	2.3	(11)	4	90.6	6*	
Iceland	2.3	(7)	3*	0.4*	3*	median
Canada	2.4	(11)	3	41.0	1	
Belgium	2.4	(11)	4*	92.8*	2	
Denmark	2.5	(11)	3	0.6	1	
Peru	2.5	(10)	6*	94.0*	11*	
Panama	2.5	(10)	6*	89.8*	9*	
New Zealand	2.5	(10)	2	14.1	3	
Chile	2.5	(11)	4*	79.8*	8*	
United States	2.6	(9)	3	39.8	1	
Austria	2.6	(11)	3	88.8*	5	
Yugoslavia	2.7	(10)	5*	30.8* ^{53.5% Ortho-}	10*	
Bolivia	2.7	(6)	5*	97.4* ^{dox & Moslem}	13*	Group Two
United Kingdom	2.7	(11)	2	8.9	1	
Romania	2.8	(10)	1	12.9	9*	
France	2.8	(10)	4*	81.6*	4	
Czechoslovakia	3.0	(10)	1	49.1	3	
East Germany	3.0	(8)	1	11.0	3	
Sweden	3.1	(10)	2	0.4	1	
West Germany	3.1	(10)	3	45.4	1	
Puerto Rico	3.3	(6)	3	89.2*	6	
Finland	3.3	(10)	3	0	6	
Hungary	3.4	(10)	1	59.3*	4	
Poland	3.4	(8)	1	89.9*	7*	
Bulgaria	3.6	(11)	1	0.4* ^{33.4% Ortho-}	7*	
U.S.S.R.	3.7	(6)	1	12.5% ^{Orthodox} } 1.3	5	

* denotes exceptions above and below the median.

within at least the political, educational and occupational spheres.

Concluding Comment

Using Lenski's theory of social stratification to analyze the inequality existing between the sexes results in a particular way of conceptualizing the relationship between the sexes and of determining and articulating the variables to be investigated. Other theories would have yielded different types of results and would have illuminated other facets of the relationship between the sexes.

Lenski's theory allows us to separate the sexes into two classes where other theories did not allow us to consider them in this way. Unfortunately, the lumping together of all women into one class results in the loss of important sociologically relevant diversity between women. Obviously, the women within one nation, one town or even one group may perceive their roles differently, may behave differently and may differ in status. However, analyzing the inequality between the sexes on a macro-level entails an examination of the status of women in comparison to men and includes the attempt to discover the major variables underlying the differences or similarities between countries along this dimension. Such a large scale comparison pertaining to the difference between groups in many countries can not be undertaken without disregarding much of the diversity known to exist within the groups being compared.

Lenski is concerned with where and how the various distributive systems allocate rewards, and with the subsequent power generated for each class according to this distribution. Consequently, in applying his theory to the sexual class system we are limited to dealing with the types

of inequalities associated with the distribution of rewards through such systems as the political, educational and occupational which we dealt with. An analysis of the on-going sexual class system is thus clearly concerned with the distribution of the existing rewards and power. Consequently, we are forced to measure women against men's standards and we are left with an analysis of equality which implies the acceptance of a masculine premise. This is readily apparent in the formulation of indicators of the status of women and in the underlying assumption that when women numerically share equally in the positions that men now dominate and have defined, the sexes will be more equal. This could possibly be interpreted to mean that the equalization of the sexes implies changes solely in the roles and responsibility of women in the direction of men's roles and responsibilities. However, this is definitely not the position of the author and is, in fact, an absurd assumption. It must be apparent that, although this study can not explore the total situation, equalization of the status of women and men will involve changes within and between both classes. Numerical equality in the political, educational and occupational distributive systems is bound to have repercussions in terms of qualitative change in behaviour, values and perceptions of both sexes.

Further, since it was the distribution of rewards from the social structure and organization that was being analyzed, and not the organization and social structure itself, this application of Lenski's theory may have the effect of suggesting that we are implicitly accepting the existing social structure. However, this is not the case. If we believe that both the roles and responsibilities of men and women must change then

we are in fact considering the development of a qualitatively different society.

Even given the loss of data through high level generalization and the neglect of some sociologically relevant diversity among groups, we feel that this study is valuable both as an empirical test of a theory and for the additions to cross-cultural comparative sociology that the results derived from this testing provide.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Testing for Curvilinear Relationships

Following the completion of the tests of the hypotheses, an article, "A Cross-Cultural Examination of Women's Marital, Educational and Occupational Options" by Constantina Safiliros-Rothschild, was brought to our attention. She states that

"according to recent conceptualizations of societal modernity a society is higher on modernity the wider the range of options it offers to all individuals regardless of categorical membership such as age, sex, race or religion..."¹

She specifies that these options must be open in actuality as well as in theory. At the same time she questions the assumption that industrialization and social modernity are highly correlated. Using the range of options open to women as a measure of social modernity, she attempts to test the relationship between social modernity and level of economic development.

Our study is also, through the measures of the actual status of women relative to that of men, dealing with the range of real options available to women. If we can accept that the actual status of women indices (the range of options available to women) are a measure of social modernity, then it becomes apparent that there is a sharp conflict between her finding that "there is no linear relationship between a country's

¹C. Safiliros-Rothschild, "A Cross-Cultural Examination of Women's Marital, Educational and Occupational Options", Acta Sociologica, Vol. 14, No. 1-2, 1971, p. 96.

level of economic development and the range of women's options in different life sectors"² and the prediction of our first hypothesis that "assuming that the nations involved are pre-cybernated, the higher the level of technology/industrialization of a nation, the more equal the status of women relative to that of men is likely to be". She suggests that the relationship between the options open to women and economic development is curvilinear and concludes on the basis of her data that

"countries in medium and medium high level of economic development (particularly the latter) tend to offer many more options to women than very developed or little developed countries".³

It will be recalled that we found that the level of technology/industrialization produced the strongest second order partial correlation with only four of the eleven indices of the status of women tested and in these cases the correlations were relatively low level. Consequently, we could not confirm Lenski's thesis that technology was the single most important determinant of the nature of distributive systems, in this case, specifically in relation to the political, educational and occupational aspects of distributive systems as they affect the sexes, or in Safilios-Rothschild's terms, as they reflect the range of real options open to women. Hence, we too are forced to question the relationship between economic development and social modernity in terms of women's real options. However, our study also investigated the linear relationship of the options open to women with the ideological factors of political orientation and religion, and where the indices of the status of women were not related to

²Ibid., p. 96.

³Ibid., p. 98.

the economic development of a nation, measured by the level of technology/industrialization, they were often related to one of these two factors.

However, given our general low level of correlations we can not ignore the possibility that the relationship between the indices of the status of women and the hypothesis variable of level of technology/industrialization may be curvilinear as Safilios-Rothschild suggests rather than linear as we hypothesized. Therefore, we followed her example and recoded our data to allow for the computation of correlations which would be indicative of curvilinear relationships (see Appendix B, Recoding of Independent Variables), and proceeded to retest our three original hypotheses.

However, recoding of the data for the three independent variables, level of technology/industrialization, political categorization and religion, presented problems in the cases of both political categorization and religion. The original coding for the variable political categorization, as explained on pages 34 to 48, was meant to represent a continuum from high to low or no orientation toward socialism. When the six categories of countries were recoded to produce curvilinear correlations it became apparent that the recoding reduced this variable to a measure of democratic versus non-democratic regimes (see Appendix C). Since the recoding gave a distinctly different meaning to the variable, it is not possible to compare the linear and curvilinear correlations derived using political orientation. The recoding does, however, produce an interesting new measure to comment on. Similarly the recoding of the religion variable produced a new variable with highly Roman Catholic and highly non-Roman Catholic countries lumped together and compared to the countries with a

medium level of Roman Catholics in their populations. It was not possible at this stage to develop a theory with which to interpret the results of such scoring. Consequently, our discussion will deal mainly with the economic development indicator, level of technology/industrialization.

Comparison with Safilios-Rothschild's Study:

Before we can compare our Pearsonian r 's and the curvilinear correlations with those found by Safilios-Rothschild we must establish the degree of comparability. Our two studies had four roughly comparable measures of the options open to women:⁴

- i) the percentage of women active in the labour from the total labour force (our index vi).
- ii) the percentage of married women active in the labour force from the total of all married women (our index vii).
- iii) the proportion of women enrolled in college and university (our index x).
- iv) the proportion of women in administrative and managerial fields (our index iii).

To measure economic development Safilios-Rothschild used Gross National Product per capita which is a very rough indicator. Our measure of economic development, level of technology/industrialization, is discussed in detail on pages 22 to 32, and is obviously a more refined indicator which considers important aspects of economic development that a uni-dimensional measure such as Gross National Product per capita must ignore.

⁴Ibid., p. 104.

Consequently, we feel that the results of our tests of the relationships between the four options open to women listed above and economic development must be considered as more accurate of the "true" relationships than those of Safilios-Rothschild's.

The following table summarizes the comparable results of both studies.

TABLE 26: COMPARISON OF MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND VARIABLES RELATED TO WOMEN'S OPTIONS OR THE INDICES OF THE STATUS OF WOMEN

	<u>Pearsonian r</u>			<u>Curvilinear r</u>	
	<u>Hers</u> (zero-order)	<u>Ours</u> (zero-order)	<u>Ours</u> (second-order)	<u>Hers</u> (zero-order)	<u>Ours</u> (zero-order)
Active from Total	.27	-.34	.05	.34	-.16
Married Active from All Married	.16	-.29	.22	.38	.25
Enrolled in College and University	.45	-.38	-.23	.41	.46
Administrative and Managerial Fields	.18	-.06	-.13	-.37	.14

(In interpreting the comparison of Pearsonian r's, it must be remembered that a negative correlation in our study means the same as a positive correlation in her study and vice versa. This was because our variable Tech-0, measuring economic development, or level of technology/industrialization, was scored from 1 to 13, 1 being the highest level of technology/

industrialization and 13 being the lowest score. Safilios-Rothschild, on the other hand, used GNP per capita going from low to high.)

Safilios-Rothschild found that the

"percentage of active women in the labour force (Active from Total) is positively related to GNP and fits equally well a linear as well as a curvilinear model",⁵

although on closer examination she felt that the curvilinear model was a better fit. We found that although our zero-order linear correlation confirmed her finding and was in fact, higher than her Pearsonian r , when the same linear relationship was tested holding political categorization and religion constant any important covariation between level of technology/industrialization (or in her terms, economic development) and the percentage of women in the labour force disappeared. In fact, it will be recalled that we found that both the variables political categorization and religion were considerably women's participation in labour force activity. (see page 102 for the table Summary of Results). We found that the percentage of women in the labour force correlated linearly with the political categorization variable with an r of $-.37$, controlling for Tech-0 and religion, and with the religion variable with an r of $-.40$, controlling for Tech-0 and political categorization. Thus, the more socialistic the country, and the lower the proportion of Roman Catholics in its population the higher the percentage of women in the labour force.

In the tests for curvilinearity for the index Active from Total our results did not match hers. We found an extremely low curvilinear r of $-.16$ between Tech-0 and the percentage of women in the labour force,

⁵ Ibid., p. 97.

whereas she found a curvilinear r of .34 which she felt confirmed her statement that the options open to women were higher in the countries with middle range levels of economic development. We also found in our study that the percentage of women in the labour force could be expected to be higher in non-democratic countries (curvilinear $r = -.43$). This finding plus our original linear partial correlations relating to political categorization are similar to J. Sawyer's findings in his Dimensions of Nations study.⁶ His results showed no relationship between the percentage of women in the labour force and economic development, but he did find a relationship between the former and whether a nation is 'Western', 'neutral', or 'communist'. He discovered that the proportion of women working was lowest in the 'Western' type nations or in the democratic nations. The results from our study and Sawyer's would lead us to conclude that ideological components can not be neglected in a discussion of women's general participation in the labour force, and that women's economic participation is not contingent upon the level of economic development either linearly when controlled for the ideological variables or curvilinearly.

In both Safilios-Rothschild's and our study the measure, Married Active from all Married, or the proportion of married women working showed low linear relationships with the measures of economic development. Although our zero-order linear correlation was much higher than Safilios-Rothschild's, when we controlled for political categorization and religion

⁶Ibid., p. 98.

J. Sawyer, "Dimensions of Nations: Size, Wealth and Politics", *AJS*, Vol. 73, 1967, p. 145-172.

we found a weak positive linear relationship of $r = .22$ which, if stronger, would have indicated that the higher the level of technology/industrialization the lower the percentage of married women working is likely to be. However, in this case neither our study nor Safilios-Rothschild's confirmed our hypothesis concerning the linear relationship of level of technology/industrialization to the indicator Married Active from all Married. Rather it will be recalled that with this particular index of the status of women we found conclusive confirmation of our political hypothesis, an area which Safilios-Rothschild did not test. Our results indicated a very strong linear correlation between political categorization and the percentage of married women working ($r = -.69$, controlling for Tech-0 and religion). This meant that the more socialistic a country was categorized as, the more married women were availing themselves of the option to work. The recoding of the political categorization variable also produced a high curvilinear correlation of $r = -.55$ indicating that higher proportions of married women worked in the non-democratic than in the democratic countries. Since the most highly socialistic nations were non-democratic and since most of the non-democratic capitalist countries were not included in this correlation through lack of available data this result was not surprising.

Safilios-Rothschild, in her study, found a relatively substantial curvilinear r of $.38$ between the married women working and level of economic development as measured by GNP per capita, while our study found a much lower but also positive curvilinear correlation of $.25$. We feel that in this case Safilios-Rothschild's thesis that more options are open to women in the countries with medium levels of economic development is definitely not confirmed, but on the other hand, neither is the linear

relationship between economic development and percentage of married women working confirmed. Rather, another independent variable, political categorization, which as we have mentioned she does not test in her analysis, must be taken into account to explain the variation between countries on this particular indicator of women's status or options.

When considering the options open to women in the educational sphere using the measure entitled "Enrolled in College and University" in relation to the variable economic development, we find that the results of both studies were relatively similar. Both studies indicated that linearly the higher the level of economic development the higher the percentage of women enrolled in college and university. However, when we controlled for political categorization and religion we found the relationship between the percentage of women enrolled in college and university and level of technology/industrialization decreased in strength to a relatively low correlation of $-.23$. However, both studies also found a relatively strong curvilinear correlation, and in our study the curvilinear model provided a much better fit than the linear. From this new data, we now have a better explanation of the range of variation between countries on this particular index of the status of women than that presented by testing only Lenski's linear model. It is apparent that more women attend school at the college level in countries of medium range economic development, than at either very high or very low levels of economic development. Our data also indicates that there is likely to be a higher percentage of women attending college in the non-democratic than the democratic nations (curvilinear $r = -.33$). However, it should be noted that this curvilinear

relationship with economic development does not hold when considering the enrollment of women in either vocational or secondary schools (see Appendix B: Summary Comparisons of Correlations).

The last shared measure of women's options or the status of women is entitled "Administrative and Managerial Fields". In both studies the linear correlations with economic development were very low. However, Safilios-Rothschild, with a curvilinear r of $-.37$ concluded that there were more women in administrative, managerial field in the countries with very high or very low levels of economic development whereas our study revealed no significant curvilinear correlation. Actually in our study all correlations for this indicator were rather low level but we did find a surprising positive linear relationship between this option and the religion variable ($r = .28$, controlling for Tech-0 and political categorization), as well as finding that women were more likely to be in administrative and managerial fields in the democratic than in the non-democratic countries (curvilinear $r = .26$).

It is apparent from the above results that Safilios-Rothschild should have tested women's options for relationships with more than the one variable economic development. In stating that

"it is true that a widespread ideology about women's equality with men, preferably officially espoused and implemented by the government as is the case in Sweden, Denmark, (and to some extent Finland) and the Eastern European countries is the most helpful factor",⁷

it is apparent that she obviously realizes the importance of prevailing social political ideologies, but she does not attempt to test them

⁷Op. cit., C. Safilios-Rothschild, p. 103.

empirically. She feels that an ideology about women's equality with men can be implemented by any type of government, and is thus not tied to any particular type of political ideology. Obviously, we differ on this point. While we agree that any type of government can implement such an ideology, all types do not and we feel that there is a link between the implementation of the ideology of sexual equality in a real form and political ideology as elusive as that is to test empirically. Considering the number of cases in which political categorization shows important covariation with women's options we feel justified in making this assumption. Further, if Appendix B is consulted we can see that the curvilinear r 's calculated for all eleven of our indices of the status of women with economic development (level of technology/industrialization) are generally very low with two exceptions. The first exception, the relationship between enrollment at college or university and economic development has already been discussed. The second exception is the relationship between the percentage of women in the federal or central government and the level of technology/industrialization. It will be recalled that we found a linear relationship indicating that the higher the level of technology/industrialization, the lower the percentage of women in the federal or central government ($r = .49$, controlling for political categorization and religion). This was an unexpected finding which we could not sufficiently explain. Now we find that there is some indication of a curvilinear relationship between level of technology/industrialization and women's sharing of positions in the political sphere at the central government level (curvilinear $r = .33$). This curvilinear correlation indicates that there is a probability that countries at medium level of technology/

industrialization are more likely to have a higher percentage of women in their federal or central government than are countries with either very high or very low levels of technology/industrialization. Data on the index of women in the federal government was not available for several of the countries at the low end of the technology/industrialization continuum and consequently this curvilinear correlation would perhaps have been different, and probably higher, had we had this data.

However, it must be kept in mind that the above two cases are only two exceptions out of eleven possibilities. On the whole, the status of women indicators seem to be more linearly than curvilinearly related to the hypotheses variables we were testing. Also the ideological component was as important as economic development in accounting for the range of differences between countries on women's actual status. Thus, while accepting that the options open to women, that is the status of women relative to that of men, may indeed be a measure of social modernity as Safilios-Rothschild suggests, we must question the idea of either a simple linear or curvilinear relationship between social modernity and economic development.

Appendix B: Summary Comparison of Correlations

- Column 1: Zero-Order Correlations of Hypotheses Variables with the Status of Women Indices (Linear Pearsonian r's)
- Column 2: Second-Order Partial Correlations of Hypotheses Variables with the Status of Women Indices (Linear Pearsonian r's)
- Column 3: Zero-Order Partial Correlations of Recoded Hypotheses Variables with the Status of Women Indices (Curvilinear r's)
- (See table on following page)

Appendix B

<u>Indices of the Status of Women Relative to Men</u>	<u>Hypotheses Variables</u>								
	<u>Level of Technology/ Industrialization</u>			<u>Political Groupings</u>			<u>Percentage of Roman Catholics in Nation</u>		
	<u>Columns</u>			<u>Columns</u>			<u>Columns</u>		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Women in Federal Government	-.12	+.49	+.33	-.58	-.61	-.44	-.53	-.52	-.08
Women in the Cabinet	-.37	-.27	+.00	-.18	+.08	+.09	-.30	-.16	-.14
Women in Administrative Positions	-.06	-.13	+.14	-.05	-.09	+.26	+.20	+.28	+.21
Women in Skilled Craft Positions	+.26	+.35	+.15	-.02	-.19	-.43	+.00	-.11	-.01
Women in Service Industries	-.16	-.13	-.22	-.15	-.10	+.34	+.02	+.13	-.06
Women in the Labour Force	-.34	+.05	-.16	-.49	-.37	-.43	-.53	-.40	+.11
Married Women Working	-.29	+.22	+.26	-.72	-.69	-.55	-.30	-.04	+.09
Women Enrolled in Secondary School	-.24	-.15	+.14	-.32	-.28	-.04	+.03	+.24	+.08
Women in Vocational School	-.03	-.13	+.07	-.09	-.21	+.09	+.34	+.44	+.01
Women at University Level	-.38	-.23	+.46	-.35	-.19	-.33	-.20	+.03	-.01
Years Ago Vote Granted	-.66	-.47	+.04	-.52	-.20	+.22	-.43	-.11	+.00

Appendix C: Recoding of Hypotheses Variables to Allow for the Computation of Curvilinear r's

i) Recoding of Hypothesis Variable One: Level of Technology/Industrialization

<u>Original Code</u>	<u>New Code</u>	<u>Countries</u>
1	1	Canada, West Germany, United States, Sweden, United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark
2	2	Belgium
3	3	Iceland, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, New Zealand, Norway
4	4	Hungary, Netherlands, France
5	5	Austria, U.S.S.R.
6	6	Finland, Italy, Puerto Rico
7	7	Bulgaria, Poland, Ireland, Venezuela
8	6	Uruguay, Chile
9	5	Panama, Romania, Spain
10	4	Mexico, Portugal, Yugoslavia
11	3	Greece, Peru
12	2	Brazil, Columbia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Albania
13	1	Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Ecuador, Honduras, Bolivia, El Salvador, Haiti

ii) Recoding of Hypothesis Variable Two: Political Groupings

<u>Original Code</u>	<u>New Code</u>	<u>Countries</u>
1	1	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, U.S.S.R.
2	2	Sweden, United Kingdom, New Zealand
3	3	Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Puerto Rico, Mexico, United States

continued ...

<u>Original Code</u>	<u>New Code</u>	<u>Countries</u>
4	3	El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, Italy, Columbia, Honduras, Brazil, Ecuador, Netherlands, Venezuela, Switzerland, Uruguay, Norway, France, Dominican Republic, Belgium, Luxemburg
5	2	Albania, Bolivia, Yugoslavia
6	1	Greece, Haiti, Spain, Portugal, Panama, Peru, Nicaragua, Paraguay

iii) Recoding of Hypothesis Variable Three: Percentage of Roman Catholics in the Population

<u>Percent Roman Catholic</u>	<u>New Code</u>	<u>Countries</u>
0-5	1	Albania, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, U.S.S.R.
6-10	2	United Kingdom
11-15	3	East Germany, New Zealand, Romania
16-20	4	
21-25	5	Australia
26-30	6	
31-35	7	Yugoslavia
36-40	8	Netherlands, United States
41-45	9	Canada, Switzerland, West Germany
46-50	10	Czechoslovakia
51-55	10	
56-60	9	Hungary
61-65	8	
66-70	7	Haiti, Honduras
71-75	6	
76-80	5	Chile
81-85	4	France, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay
86-90	3	Austria, Brazil, Ecuador, Columbia, Panama, Poland, Puerto Rico, Venezuela
91-95	2	Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Guatemala, Luxemburg, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal
96-100	1	Bolivia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Spain

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