POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CONFLICT: CYPRUS

(An Application of Systems Analysis, using Partial Allocative theories)
POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CONFLICT: CYPRUS

(AN APPLICATION OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, USING
PARTIAL ALLOCATIVE THEORIES)

By

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This thesis is a study of the conflict on the island of Cyprus, using a systems approach. By using systems analysis and partial allocative theories the author has been able to locate the areas of stress in the politics of Cyprus with much greater ease than would have been if he had used an historical approach.

The study begins with an introduction to the theoretical and conceptual framework used in the study. Chapter II gives the historical, political and economic background to the present strife on Cyprus. Chapter III is an application of the theoretical and conceptual framework to the data we have available on Cyprus. This chapter is the substantive chapter which attempts to answer such questions as why there are two political systems on Cyprus, why did stress have such an effect on the system, and what is the situation at the present. It is suggested that while there is no clear answer to the above question, the fact that there are two political cultures and two political systems has undoubtedly contributed to the problems on Cyprus.
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INTRODUCTION

This research study is concerned with the application of theories of Comparative Politics to the problems now being experienced by the inhabitants of the island of Cyprus. It proposes to use Systems Analysis in an attempt to explain certain relationships, for example, the relationship of the concept of 'social conflict' to the concept of 'political community', and will attempt to explain how the former has disrupted political interactions within the latter, that is, how the strife between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots has caused the breakdown, or disruption, of the functioning of the political system. The ultimate aim of this research study is to locate the areas of 'stress' to the political system and, if possible, to suggest measures for system maintenance against such stress.*

*No one model is being employed in this study. This study is, in effect, a collection of 'partial allocative theories' as put forward by such authors as David Easton, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Karl Deutsch, Lucien Pye, and others of the so-called 'systems theorist school'. As we proceed, we shall attempt to give adequate definitions for the above concepts and others used.
When we talk of a political system undergoing stress we have in mind conditions that may lead to the destruction and transformation of a system.

Here, we are concerned with stress caused by demands on the system, and also stress caused by the withdrawal of support.

Demands have the capacity to impose strains on a system by driving the system beyond its 'normal' range of operation. If the inflow of demands is so heavy as to require excessive time for processing, there will be a tendency to undermine the capacity of a system to produce its characteristic outputs, authoritative decisions.

The persistence of a political system hinges not only on an appropriate regulation of the inflow of demands but on a second major condition, the maintenance of a minimum level of attachment for each of the three identified political objects of support; the "political community", the "regime" and the "authorities".

As the paper develops we shall attempt to answer such questions as: Are there two or more political systems operating on Cyprus? To what extent does the political community perform the adapting function for society? Where does it not perform its adapting function? Why does it not perform its adapting function?
The Theoretical Framework

The theoretical systematization in this paper is drawn mainly from Professor David Easton's systems approach to politics.\textsuperscript{1} Hence, the other relevant concepts used in the study will be in the form of a synthesis and a supplement to Professor Easton's general theory of political systems. In order to accomplish this we shall use the "Schema" devised by Professor Donald J. Grady in 1966.\textsuperscript{2}

According to Easton, "what distinguishes political interactions from all other kinds of social interactions is that they are predominately oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values for a society".\textsuperscript{3} Easton has stated elsewhere that:

"All political systems as such are distinguished by the fact that if we are able to describe them as persisting, we must attribute to them the successful fulfillment of two functions: They must be able to allocate values for a society, and they must manage to induce most members


\textsuperscript{2}D. J. Grady, Schema of Supplement and Synthesis for the Political System, unpub. ms., McMaster University, 1966.

to accept these allocations as binding, at least for most of the time. These two properties distinguish political systems from all other kinds of social systems."\(^4\)

The political system has boundaries that help to distinguish it from other subsystems of society. Easton has provided us with an inventory of the subsystems lying beyond the boundaries (that is to say, in the environment) of the political system.\(^5\) The Easton political system is a framework which explains the external dimensions and the internal processes by which demands upon the system are converted into authoritative outputs. The political system "...offers a context within which partial theories of allocation may obtain greater meaning and significance."\(^6\) These partial theories of allocation concern not only what goes into the political system (inputs) but also what comes out of the political system (outputs). It would be a monumental task indeed if we were to deal with both inputs and outputs of the political system. We shall concern ourselves only with the inputs of the system, not simply


\(^6\)Ibid., p. 476.
because of the problem of numbers but because the inputs focus upon an area of interest to the analyst. We feel that the problems being experienced in Cyprus today are more related to the inputs of the system than the outputs and we shall endeavour to show this as the study proceeds.

In concentrating on the theories of inputs together with a synthesis and supplement of the Easton formulation, this study will give special attention to the works of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Lucien Pye, and Karl Deutsch.7

Theory and Conceptual Framework

Used in this Study

One important area mentioned by Easton that should perhaps be discussed at some length here is that of the environment of the political system. For the purposes of our study, we shall concern ourselves only with the intra-societal environment of the political system, and not the extra-societal environment. Within the intra-societal environment our interest is directed toward those three sub-systems of society which constitute the most immediate and integral units of interaction within a societal context. They are the personality, culture and social systems.

For our analysis it will be useful to employ those definitions formulated by Talcot Parsons in Toward a General Theory of Action.

Personality System: "a system of action which has the following characteristics: (a) it involves a process of interconnections of actions of an individual actor; (b) the actor's actions are organized by a structure of need-dispositions; (c) just as the actions of a plurality of actors cannot be randomly assorted but must have a determinate organization of compatibility or integration with one another, so the actions of the single actor have a determinate organization of compatibility or integration with one another." 8

Culture System: "a system of action which has the following characteristics: (a) the system is constituted neither by the organization of interactions nor by the organization of the actions of a single actor (as such), but rather by the organization of the values, norms and symbols which guide the choices made by actors and which limit the types of interaction which may occur among actors; (b) thus a culture system is not an empirical system in the same sense as a personality or social system, because it represents a special kind of abstraction of elements from these systems. These elements, however, may exist separately as physical symbols and be transmitted from one empirical action system to another; (c) in a culture system the patterns of regulatory norms (and the other cultural elements which guide choices of concrete actors) cannot be made up of random and unrelated elements. If, that is, a system of culture is to be manifest in the organization of an empirical action system it must have a certain degree of consistancy; (d) thus a culture system is a pattern of culture whose different parts are interrelated to form value systems, belief systems, and systems of expressive symbols."9

Social System: "a social system is a system of action which has the following characteristics: (a) it involves a process of interaction between two or more actors; the interaction process as such is a focus of the observer's attention; (b) the situation toward which actors are oriented includes other actors. These other actors (alters) are objects of cathexis. Alter's various orientations may be either goals to be pursued or means for the accomplishment of goals. Alter's orientations may thus be objects for evaluative judgement; (c) there is (in a social system) interdependent and, in part, concerted action in which the concert is a function of collective goal orientation or common values, and of a consensus of normative and cognitive expectations."10


10Ibid., pp. 54-55.
David Easton puts it this way, "...society encompasses the social behavior of a group of biological persons, conceived in their totality. A social system identifies some narrower aspect or part of the social interactions in which these biological persons engage. These (social interactions) represent the various roles in which persons engage so that the same biological persons may turn out to play different social roles."¹¹

We have deemed it necessary to include these three sub-systems of society for they are the "raw material" of the political system. Any alteration in the "type and distribution of these systems will have substantial consequences upon the authoritative and allocative behavior assigned to our conception of the political system."¹²

It falls to us to define the concept which is all inclusive for our study. Here we mean the concept of society, for it is in society that we find the personality, culture and social systems which go to make up the political system.

Society: "A society is defined as a system of social action: (1) that involves a plurality of interacting individuals whose actions are in terms of the system concerned and who are recruited at least in part by their own sexual reproduction, (2) that constitutes a set of social structures such that action in terms of them is at least in theory capable of self-sufficiency for the maintenance of the plurality of individuals involved,


and (3) that is capable of existing long enough for the production of stable adult members of the system of action from the infants of the members. 13

This definition, above, appears to indicate the relationship of the concept 'society' to that of 'social system' in that society incorporates all other social systems. Society:

"refers to the overarching, inclusive, suprasystem in which a group of biological persons participates... society constitutes a unique kind of social system." 14

Having defined the three concepts which go to make up the political system, it would be wise at this point to arrive at a definition of 'political system'. When we refer to this phrase we are assuming that it is possible to abstract certain kinds of social interactions from other kinds of social interactions (as we have already done above). One definition, which suits our introductory purposes, is one which is a synthesis of Talcot Parsons, David Apter, and David Easton.

"A political system consists of the most inclusive structures in a society that have recognized responsibility for performing, at a minimum, the function of goal-attainment by means of legitimate decisions or polices." 15


14 David Easton, Ibid., p. 38.

15 D. J. Grady, 'Political System' as an Analytic Concept, unpub. ms., McMaster University, 1965), p. 5.
Goal attainment refers to the process by which society manages to reconcile the diverse aspirations generally involved in the pursuit of social objectives. Inclusiveness most obviously refers to lines of territorial demarcation, in which members recognize some mutual identification. Legitimacy is a reference to values internalized by members of the system, in particular, a belief that decisions are binding regardless of personal preference.

Easton provides us with an analysis of three objects of support within the boundaries of the political system. He terms these categories of behavior 'basic political objects' and indicates their importance for the system by pointing out that "change of a political system will turn out to mean change of one or another of these objects," and that these elements of any political system "are the most relevant to its capacity to persist in the face of a threatened loss of support." These objects of support from within the political system are; the political community, the regime, and the authorities.

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17 Ibid., p. 171.
Political Community: "A political community is that aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor."\textsuperscript{18}

Karl Deutsch is slightly less concise in his definition:

"A political community may be defined as a community of social interaction supplemented by both enforcement and compliance...it is a community of persons, in which common or coordinated facilities for the making of decisions and the enforcement of commands are supplemented by habits of compliance which are sufficiently widespread and predictable to make successful enforcement in the remaining cases of non-compliance probable at an economically and culturally feasible cost."\textsuperscript{19}

In \textit{A Systems Analysis of Political Life}, David Easton spends a goodly number of pages on the subject of cohesion of the political community. He states that members in a political system who are participating in a common political community may well have different cultures and traditions. They may even be entirely separate nationalities. He goes on to state that regardless of the degree of cohesion, as long as these people are part of the same political system, they cannot escape sharing in our being linked by a common division of political labour.


"This forms the structural connection among the members of the system that gives minimal linkage to political activities that might otherwise be isolated or independent."

By standing ready to act on behalf of maintaining some structure through which a member of a system and others may play their parts in the making of binding decisions or being favourably oriented towards its perpetuation, that member may be said to extend support to his political community. But, if a person could not locate himself anywhere in the political division of labour in a system, was not able to relate himself to anything else that occurred in the system, even to the extent of feeling it was his obligation to obey a superior or abide by some vaguely apprehended tradition, one of two conditions may exist.

"Either he would not be part of the system or his ties to the political community would be in imminent danger of being severed."21

Easton makes another point:

"Political communities are capable of changing. This occurs at moments when the membership undergoes some internal subdivision indicating that whole groups have withdrawn their support from the preexisting division of political labour."22

20David Easton, Ibid., pp. 177-178.


22Ibid., p. 178.
The author would argue with Easton that when there is withdrawal of support from a political community by group separation, that political community is effectively destroyed. In its place there could well emerge two identical groups within the old system, but these two identical groups would become, in effect, two new political communities.

The Regime: Even if there is a strong feeling of mutual identification in a political community one still needs to establish some recognized method of ordering relationships within the political system. It is the regime which prescribes the values, norms and structures of authority that limit and validate political actions. The regime also takes account of:

"the general matrix of regularized expectations within the limits of which political actions are usually considered authoritative, regardless of how or where these expectations may be expressed."23

It appears, therefore, that persistence of a system as a means of converting wants into binding decisions will depend in part upon the capacity of the system to stimulate enough support so as to establish and maintain a viable regime of norms and expectations.

The Authorities: The system persists not only because of a flow of support to the regime, but also because there

23Ibid., p. 193.
is a flow of support to the incumbents of the structures of authority.

D. J. Grady has interpreted Easton's ideas this way:

"it appears that the 'authorities' are the incumbents of the 'roles' in the 'regime' as measured by their ability and effectiveness in influencing the behavior of others in the political system and in the intra-societal environment."²⁴

Therefore, the analyst has to determine the capacity of these occupants of regime roles, to direct, or order, or command, or compel behavior that is in keeping with system maintenance. In this respect the weight of control available to the authorities depends partly upon the conviction of the nature of legitimacy behind their control and partly upon:

"the degree of expectations held by the general members of the system with regard to the way in which authority ought to be used."²⁵

Inputs of Demand:

A political system is dynamic in character because of inputs. Inputs are the raw material of the political system furnishing it with information, supports and demands so that the system may process them. They provide the

²⁴D. J. Grady, Schema of Supplement and Synthesis for the Political System, unpub. ms., McMaster University, 1966, p. 18.

political system with the energy needed to keep it going.

Inputs of demand are wants that require some special organized effort on the part of the system to settle them authoritatively, such as, demands for educational opportunities, provision of public safety, etcetera. If demands are transformed into issues, stress will occur on the system, because then demands become a challenge to the holders of allocative power.

Inputs of Support:

Inputs of support are the key to maintaining the system against stress. They are reflected in forms of behavior such as voting at elections, or as orientations, attitudes, and predispositions to act on behalf of the political system.

Political Culture:

The concept of political culture used in this study is derived from Gabriel Almond's observation that:

"The political culture becomes the frequency of different kinds of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations toward the political system in general, its input and output aspects, and the self as a political actor."26

By its very formulation the political culture influences

the inputs of demand and support which, in turn, determine the effectiveness of the outputs of decision-making.

According to Verba:

"the political culture of a society consists of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which define the situation in which political action takes place. It provides an orientation to politics."²⁷

Political culture, therefore, provides us with a vital tool, the use of which helps to give us an idea of the quantity and quality of demands and the extent and variety of supports likely to enter the political system.

Within-puts:

Within-put functions are those functions which take place within the boundaries of the political system. Almond and Coleman²⁸ use the input categories with these assumptions: every political system has structures; these structures perform functions; the style of performing these functions may differ from political system to political system. We use the Almond and Coleman input categories of interest articulation, interest aggregation,


political socialization and recruitment, and political communication, in order to study the processes or parts of any political system within the boundaries of the political system as "most inclusive authoritative structures... with recognized responsibility for undertaking allocations of value for the society as a whole."\textsuperscript{29}

Interest Articulation:

The function of interest articulation:

"...is closely associated with the political socialization function and the patterns of political culture produced by it."\textsuperscript{30}

Interest articulation occurs within the political system when associational, non-associational, institutional, or anomic groups make claims or demands for political action. These claims or demands may be 'manifest' or 'latent', i.e., they may be explicit or implicit; they may be 'specific', demanding a particular remedy or 'diffuse', taking the form of a 'general' statement of dissatisfaction or preference, or they may be aimed at securing 'particular' ends for a special group or groups within the society.

"Interest articulation is of crucial importance since it occurs within the boundary of the political system. The particular structures

\textsuperscript{29}D. J. Grady, \textit{Schema}. p. l.

which perform the articulation function and the style of their performance determine the character of the boundary between polity and society."^{31}

Interest Aggregation:

"Aggregation may be accomplished by means of the formulation of general policies in which interests are combined, accommodated, or otherwise taken account of, or by means of the recruitment of political personnel, more or less committed to a particular pattern of policy. The function of articulation and aggregation overlap..."^{32}

Hence these two categories help us to determine whether there is a persistence of non-associational groupings of an ascriptive communal character or whether there exist specific structures for articulating and aggregating interests within the political system.

Political Socialization and Recruitment:

According to Almond and Coleman, this concept is the process whereby people and groups are inducted into the political system.

"Its end product is a set of attitudes...cognitions, value standards and feelings...toward the political system, its various roles and role incumbents."^{33}

Political socialization thus involves the process of learning about the 'political'. It begins with the

^{31}Ibid., p. 33.

^{32}Ibid., p. 38.

socializing influences of the primary structures in the social structure, for example, the family, the church, the school, the work group and the voluntary associations. Political socialization continues in the secondary structures more closely associated with the political system, namely, the interest group (associational, non-associational, institutional, or anomic), the political party, and the mass media.

Political Communication:

This category comprises those interactions which communicate to the structure of authority demands and supports emanating in the intra-societal environment and the political culture. In addition, political communication may describe those interactions or devices which are used by the structures of authority to disseminate knowledge about the roles and role-incumbents with the political system.

Karl Deutsch offers the view that political systems or networks of decision and control are dependent on the process of communication. According to Deutsch, all governments, as all communication systems, are dependent upon the processing and disseminating of information. Consequently, any information about the political could

be communicated in such a manner as to lead to cohesion and integration or disaffection and disunity within a political system.

In order to apply this definition we shall investigate the extent to which the structures performing the function of political communication after the patterns of interaction within the system.
Specific Research Problem

In attempting to apply the range of partial allocative theories of input listed above, to the case of Cyprus, this research study hopes to locate the areas of stress in the politics of that island. By using a systems approach to the study of this problem, we hope also to be able to explore possible alternatives to conflict resolution. We shall examine why and how there is an attempt to gain the 'scarce resources' and why there is an attempt to influence behavior 'in certain directions'.

It will be shown that there is needed a requisite level of inputs of support into a political system in order for it to be able to persist in the face of stress.

There will also be an attempt to show that there are now two political systems within Cypriot society. We will show why this is the case and attempt to explain why it is likely to persist.
Methodology

In this research study we have attempted to organize material in such a manner, in order to assess the performance of a limited number of political functions in terms of their consequences for the political system(s) of Cyprus. We have attempted to use systems analysis in some small way in order to get at the 'heart' of the problems on Cyprus. By getting away from the traditional, legalistic approach to the study of politics, the author hopes to be able to better comprehend political problems as they are experienced on Cyprus.

The model used in this study is heuristic in type for we fully expect it to lead to the discovery of new facts and methods. We will use quantitative data to show how the categories of inputs of demand and support relate to the interactions within the political system and to the interactions within the political system and to the intra-societal environment of Cypriot society.

The relevant empirical referents discussed in relation to the inputs of demand and support are drawn in the main from Banks and Textor, and Russett and Alker.35

Since we feel that the nature of the intra-societal environment has both direct and indirect influences upon the functioning of the political system, we shall briefly examine the demographic, economic, personality, culture and social systems in an attempt to locate sources of stress. We shall show the importance of the Turkish and Greek schools in the socialization process. We shall also show the very great significance that this has for inculcating the values and norms of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot political cultures. It will be shown that these inputs have a divisive affect not only on the political system but also on Cypriot society as a whole.
The Model

Introduction:

This section is intended to introduce the model used in this research paper and the procedures employed in its application to the political system(s) of Cyprus.

The model used here (fig. 1) is the conception of a political system as formulated by Donald Grady. "A political system consists of the most inclusive structures in a society that have recognized responsibility for performing, at a minimum, the function of goal-attainment by means of legitimate decisions or policies." By using this model we hope to be able to distinguish the political system from the intra-societal environment in which it operates.

We see from the above definition that the political system operates within society but that its boundaries are not necessarily identified with any particular territorial unit. The political system is concerned with structures that produce decisions which are binding on the populace whether they like those decisions or not. These decisions are binding because the political system has that particular quality which causes the people to

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INPUTS OF DEMAND & SUPPORT

WITHIN-PUT FUNCTIONS

INTEREST ARTICULATION
INTEREST AGGREGATION
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION & RECRUITMENT
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

POLITICAL COMMUNITY
REGIME
AUTHORITIES

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

WITHIN-OUTPUT FUNCTIONS

RULE-MAKING
RULE-APPLICATION
RULE-ADJUDICATION

OUTPUTS OF DECISIONS & ACTIONS

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
WITH ITS INTRA-SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

FEEDBACK

accept them. That quality is legitimacy.

By presenting our conceptualization of the political system in this manner, we feel that our model points to the direct influence of the environment on the political system. This conception will not deal with the total environmental context of the political system as explicated by David Easton.37 Because of time and space limitations we have been obliged to accept the ecological system, the biological system, the personality system, the social system, and the culture system as environmental givens.38

We have taken Grady's idea that the demographic, economic, and social indicators can be used as "indicator categories designed to provide the analyst with obvious and important measures of the state of the entire constellation of systems affecting the political system",39 along with a discussion of the key personalities, or elite, on Cyprus to show the influence of the social system on the political system. Grady's modification of the Easton model shows the appropriateness of this approach.40

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38 D. J. Grady, Schema of Supplement and Synthesis for 'Political System', Unpub. ms., McMaster University, 1966, pp. 4-11, offers the rational for so doing.

39 Ibid., p. 10.

40 Ibid., p. 5.
The demographic indicators, economic indicators, and the social structure indicators are components of the social system, and as such they provide a direct link with the political system. By applying a wide range of empirical referents to each of these indicators we attempt a systematic assessment of the environment of the political system.

Demographic indicators are indices of the types and distribution of population in a given social setting, in this case Cyprus. They indicate the patterns of interactions established among the ecological, biological, personality, culture, and social systems. The economic indicators are indices of the pattern of material production, distribution, and consumption which operate in a given social setting. The social structure indicators draw mainly on an historical survey of the interacting groups within the social system. It is the individual characteristic and the cultural heritage of these groups which particularly demonstrate the influence on the social system on the political system. The aggregate data for these indicators will be presented in the chapter following.

We have mentioned the term 'elite' above in connection with key personalities. Here we mean nothing more than that. Exelite, used as a concept here, is that group, or groups, as is more probable in this case, which
is perceived by the people of Cyprus to be the political, economic, and social leadership on the island. In a crude attempt to verify that the people listed are the elite we have compared with a content analysis study done by C. L. Doumas.41

It is hoped that by using the concept 'elite' as an indicator category that we shall be able to more easily locate those areas of stress which affect the functioning of the political system(s).

Members of the elite groups - it must be remembered that there is more than one group - such as President Makarios, Vice-President Kuchuk, and Rauf Dentkash, to name a few, have been perhaps the key variable in the Cyprus dispute. The fires of ethnic hostility have been fanned by the elite, and it is the elite which has refused to co-operate and work together.

We are therefore not interested in doing an in depth study of elite groups on Cyprus. We are interested in the elite only insofar as they provide indicators of communal strategy.

By using the four indicator categories listed above we have added an evaluative dimension to our study, and consequently our task of answering the questions which

were posed in chapter one will be greatly facilitated. These four categories are indicators of demand and support for the political system, the examination of which is the main part of our study.
This chapter is intended to put the Cyprus dispute in historical perspective. It is intended to highlight the major personalities, and also the political, social, and economic problems from the recent pre-independence period up to and including the arrival of the United Nations Force in Cyprus.

**Historical Sketch**

Cyprus is the heir to a troubled history. In remote times it was colonized by the Greeks. The Assyrians, Phoenicians and Persians have ruled it for periods, but the population was basically of Greek origin.

In the light of present events, it is ironic that the ancient Greeks erected a sanctuary to Aphrodite, the goddess of love, on Cyprus because, they believed, she had risen from the waves off the island's coast. There is little love in evidence there today.

Richard I, the lion heart of England, seized the island in 1191. For three centuries thereafter it was ruled by the titular king of Jerusalem. Then, and significantly for these days, the Turks conquered it in 1571. It became part of the Ottoman Empire.
In 1878, the sultan was maltreating the Orthodox Christians in his domain. Russia, being of the same faith as the victims, made threatening noises. A convention, The Convention of Defensive Alliance, was called at Constantinople, and the wily Disraeli succeeded in gaining from the frightened sultan administration of Cyprus for the British.

When Turkey entered the First World War on Germany's side, Britain annexed Cyprus. The island was offered to the Greeks in return for intervention in Serbia, but the Greeks rejected the offer. The annexation was recognized by Turkey in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Two years later, Cyprus became a British Crown colony.

It is interesting to note that the majority of Greeks in Cyprus, like the Turks, have no links with the lands of their forefathers, save a common race and religion. They have been separated for centuries.
Political Background

In August of 1950, the Bishop of Kitium was elected to the position of Archbishop of Cyprus. Makarios III, as he then became known, was not only the religious leader of the Greek Cypriots, but also their political leader. His taking office marked the beginning of a decade of political struggle which ended - though only temporarily - in the creation of an independent republic of Cyprus.

Although the Greek Cypriot campaign for 'enosis' (union with Greece), was launched in 1950 when Makarios III assumed his office, it did not really gather momentum until the autumn of 1954. It was at its peak from then until the beginning of 1959 when the Zurich and London agreements on an independent Cyprus were signed. During this period of about four and a half years, riot and rebellion, guerrilla warfare against the British and finally communal strife between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, alternated with intervals of truce, negotiation and an annual political agitation at the United Nations.¹ There were five main sets of negotiations during this

period. They reflected to a large extent the British government's gradual advance from the position that its sovereignty over Cyprus would never be changed. The first step forward was when Britain hinted, in the Harding-Makarios talks in January 1956, that she might be prepared to give up her sovereignty at some indefinite future date. But this was followed by a step backwards when, in December of the same year, she offered the Radcliffe Constitution, which stipulated continued British sovereignty, and at the same time declared that self-determination would inevitably mean partition of the island between Greeks and Turks. Later on, in plans put forward in 1958, Harold Macmillan, then British Prime Minister, proposed a virtual sharing of sovereignty between Britain, Greece and Turkey. Finally, the recognition by Britain that a small sovereignty area would meet her strategic requirements just as well, paved the way for the Zurich and London agreements in February 1959.

The Zurich-London Agreements of 1959 ended the

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3 Ibid., pp. 147-148.

4 Ibid., pp. 154-156.

British-imposed, four-year emergency period during which more than 600 lives were lost. The Greeks did not gain 'enosis', the Turks could not maintain the status quo or win 'taksim' (partition), and the British were to lose another jewel from that tarnished imperial crown. Therefore, the Cyprus agreements really satisfied no one. Each of the contending parties, including the Cypriots, had to compromise something of its original objective. The Greek Cypriots ostensibly gave up 'enosis' for the island's independence, and the Turkish Cypriots gave up their aim of partition in return for special safeguards and a secondary, though important, position of political power in the republic.

The source of the present difficulties, hence, is rooted in the Constitution, which was the outcome of the Zurich-London Agreements, and the three enforcing treaties which protect the Republic of Cyprus. The Constitution specifically forbids total or partial union of Cyprus with another state or the partition of the island into two independent states. Moreover, the Treaty of Guarantee, signed by Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, is designed to secure the territorial integrity and the Constitution of the Republic. It provides that if, after consultation, common and concerted actions to

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maintain the terms of the treaty should prove impossible, each of the guarantor powers would have the right to take unilateral action to re-establish the state of affairs at the time of independence. The other two treaties, those of Establishment and of Alliance, provide, among other things, for the full sovereignty of the two British bases at Akrotiri and Dhekelia (in the former) and for the stationing of Greek and Turkish troops, originally for training purposes, under a rotating military command in Cyprus (in the latter).

These three related treaties, together with the draft Constitution of the Republic, formed an expedient solution to the complex problems of pre-independent Cyprus. They form the 'sine qua non' for the independence of the island. According to Turkey, the minority safeguards granted the Turkish Cypriots paved the way for independence, which otherwise would have been "unthinkable and impossible." 7 Thus, Turkey has threatened to intervene legally, by the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot minority if the Greek majority should proceed unilaterally to alter any part of the Republic's Constitution. 8

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7 Ibid., The Question of Cyprus. (New York: Turkish Information Office, 1964), p. 5.

8 Ibid., p. 3.
Independence and Its Aftermath

A provisional government organized elections in preparation for the proclamation of independence in August, 1960. Dr. Fazil Kuchuk was the only candidate for the Vice-Presidency, hence he was declared elected on December 3, 1959.9 For the Presidency, against Archbishop Makarios was John Clerides, the candidate of the hastily founded Democratic Union Party.10 Electioneering was tense but there were no serious incidents, and on December 13, 1959, Archbishop Makarios was elected by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, in spite of opposition from the left and the extreme right.11

On July 31, 1960, elections were held for the House of Representatives. All fifteen Turkish Representatives of the House were elected from Dr. Kuchuk's National Party by an overwhelming majority of the Turkish

9Great Britain, Cyprus 1959 (Colonial Reports), p. 7.

10John Clerides was a moderate who had served as a member of the Governor's Executive Council until EOKA days and had been willing to accept self-government, as a first step to Enosis. He had also been elected in 1956 Mayor of Nicosia, as an independent candidate, enjoying the support of AKEL, the Communist party.

voters. The Archbishop's Patriotic Front too had a sweeping and complete victory because it received the AKEL votes by conceding to them five of the thirty-five Greek seats in the House.\textsuperscript{12} Only 64 per cent of the Greek electors voted indicating distrust or at least a lack of enthusiasm for the new regime inaugurated.\textsuperscript{13} Elections for the Greek and Turkish Communal Chambers were held on August 7, with similar results. Thus, all important organs of the Republic - Council of Ministers, House of Representatives, Communal Chambers, Presidency, and Vice-Presidency - were in being when the proclamation of independence came and the official transfer of sovereignty took place. The first constitutional government of Cyprus had ten ministers, three of whom were Turks. Having insisted on one of the key ministeries - Foreign Affairs, Interior or Defence - the Turks secured for themselves the Ministry of Defence.

The major political parties active in the first years of independence were four in number.\textsuperscript{14} The most important one, under the leadership of the President and having thirty out of the thirty-five members of the House

\textsuperscript{12}Great Britain, Cyprus 1959 (Colonial Reports), p. 11.

\textsuperscript{13}The New York Times, August 2, 1960.

of Representatives is the Patriotic Front. It was created in 1959 by district leaders of the former EOKA and was at first called EDMA (United Democratic Regeneration Front). Its purpose was to ensure the election of Archbishop Makarios as President of the new Republic. As such, it can be considered to be a 'personal' party of and for Makarios. It has become a conservative nationalist group whose tactics have wavered between implementing the Zurich-London Agreements and doing away with them, as its members debated the best means of keeping the Hellenistic spirit alive in Cyprus. In line with Makarios' present policy, what remains of the Patriotic Front is in favour of abrogating the Agreements.

Next in popular strength, but the best organized and with the largest actual membership, is the AKEL, the Progressive Party of the Working People. AKEL holds to the Communist Party line as determined in Moscow, and usually 'supports' Makarios. It has opposed the Zurich-London Agreements from the start, especially the section concerning the British Sovereign Base Areas. The third party, the Democratic Union, under the leadership of Dr. Themistocles Dervis, is moderately nationalist and opposed to Makarios and the Agreements as a sell-out, and feel that the Agreements and Makarios have eliminated any possibility of 'enosis'. Most of the extremists in Cyprus and those who are opposed to Makarios belong to
Finally there is the Cyprus National Turkish Party which is really more of a cohesive group than a structured party. It is concerned with protecting its special economic, religious, and cultural interests vis-a-vis the numerically dominant Greek population.
The Breakdown of the System:

The year 1963 saw a growth of friction over the system of separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in the five chief towns of the island. In March of 1962, President Makarios had suggested that there should be unified municipal authorities with a guaranteed proportion of Turkish Cypriot members. The Turkish Cypriots, however, declined to accept such a solution, and on December 29, 1962, the Turkish communal chamber passed measures for the maintenance of Turkish municipalities in the five towns and for the establishment of a similar municipality in a sixth.\(^{15}\)

A law of 1950,\(^{16}\) enacted by the British administration, gave the government power to designate an area as an 'improvement area' and to nominate 'improvement boards' with full authorization to run local services. Accordingly, the council of ministers, with a Greek Cypriot majority, declared all the municipalities to be 'improvement areas' and established 'improvement boards' for them. On January 30, 1963, the Turkish Cypriots petitioned the constitutional court of Cyprus, seeking a declaration

\(^{15}\)Toronto Globe and Mail, January 2, 1964.

that the council of ministers had no power to establish such boards.17 In April the constitutional court condemned the transfer of municipal powers to boards as invalid, but it also denounced the action of the Turkish communal chamber in passing a law for the continued existence of separate Turkish municipalities.18 Discussions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots broke down in May, and it was becoming more and more probable that President Makarios would be forced to seek a revision of the constitution. His proposals, which would have reduced the Turkish minority's ability to block legislation, provoked a sharp reaction, and just before Christmas, fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots broke out in Nicosia, with some of the Greek and Turkish troops stationed on the island under treaty arrangements joining in.19 British troops on the island were forced to intervene and an uneasy truce was obtained.

Armed conflict continued sporadically up till April 1964 at which time the United Nations peacekeeping force arrived.20 The peace was short-lived.

Violent conflict broke out once more in August,

17Kessings Contemporary Archives, p. 19257.
18The Times, April 24, 1963.
this time in the Kokkin area of northwest Cyprus, where Greek Cypriot forces launched a new offensive designed to impose a full-scale economic blockade on the Turkish villages in the region and also to seize the coastline of Xeros, through which the Turkish Cypriots had been receiving supplies from outside the island. Aircraft from the Turkish mainland carried out a series of bombing raids on the coastal districts under Greek Cypriot occupation, until the diplomatic intervention of the U.N. and of the countries interested in the Cyprus problem secured a relaxation of the dangerous tension. The Greek Cypriots then lifted their blockade of the Turkish villages.21

Toward the end of 1964 and during the early months of 1965, the House of Representatives approved a number of important measures. On November 28, 1964, a bill was finally passed creating unified municipalities in Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol, Larnaca, and Paphos towns which, under the constitution of 1959-1960, had possessed separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot councils. In November also the House of Representatives authorized the government to levy an income tax, which the Turkish Cypriots refused to pay. In December the House extended the service of Greek Cypriots then in the National Guard for an additional six months; the term of

21The Times, August 7, 1964.
service was later increased from twelve to eighteen months.  

22 A further bill, in March 1965, establishing a Ministry of Education meant in effect the disappearance of the Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber created earlier in accordance with the requirements of the constitution.  

23 During October-November 1964 and again in February-March 1965, the U.N. mediator in Cyprus, Galo Plaza Lasso, held discussions in Nicosia and various other capitals. The outcome was an official report urging that the U.N. continue its role of mediation in Cyprus. The report, recognizing that neither 'enosis' (union with Greece) nor 'taksim' (partition) seemed to offer a viable solution to the difficulties in Cyprus, recommended that the island remain an independent republic.  

24 In July the Cyprus government carried still further the unilateral amendment of the constitution which had engaged much of its attention during the preceding twelve months. A bill was approved that brought to an end direct representation of the Turkish Cypriots in parliament, the system of separate electoral rolls for each of the two communities, Greek and Turkish, 


23 Kessings Contemporary Archives, p. 20631.  

Other measures taken at this time extended for one year the terms of office of President Makarios and of the Greek Cypriot members of the House of Representatives. The Turkish Cypriot members (absent from parliament since the outbreak of communal violence in December 1963) expressed their wish to attend the debate on the new laws. The speaker of the House debarred them from attendance, however, save on terms that would have meant the virtual surrender of all the special rights accorded to the Turkish Cypriots in 1959-1960.

The Turkish government, having declared on July 25 that the new laws violated the constitution of Cyprus, made a formal request on July 30 asking the U.N. Security Council to consider this most recent phase in the long dispute. On August 2 the government of Cyprus also approached the Security Council, complaining of unwarranted intervention in the internal affairs of the country. A protest from Britain against the latest changes in the Cyprus constitution had been rejected in Nicosia at the end of July. The Turkish Cypriots, who, in effect, had

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been operating their own administration in the territories under their control, then promulgated various decrees, among them regulations for the election of a Turkish communal chamber and for the extension of the terms of office of Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, the Turkish vice-president of Cyprus, and of the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives, for an additional year.\(^{29}\)

In July the House of Representatives approved an agreement with the Shell, British Petroleum, and Mobil Oil companies for the building of an oil refinery in Larnaca at an estimated cost of $10,900,000.\(^{30}\)

In 1966 the future of Cyprus once more came under active debate. One solution, viewed with some favour at Ankara, was that Cyprus should be independent and also neutral, uniting with no other state or alliance. This line of thought found little welcome at Athens, since it would, in principle, exclude 'enosis'. Archbishop Makarios, moreover, declared that a solution involving a restraint on Cyprus' freedom was unacceptable at Nicosia. The archbishop and the Greek government then agreed to take as their common and - in relation to 'enosis' - their prior objective the absolute and sovereign independence of Cyprus. Turkey, in February

\(^{29}\)Kessings Contemporary Archives, p. 20992.

\(^{30}\)Ibid., p. 20993.
1966, reiterated its opposition to 'enosis', but also made clear its desire for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus question.31

The differences existing between Archbishop Makarios and General Georgios Grivas came to the fore early in the year. Tensions arose from the fact that the archbishop wanted to restrict the functions of General Grivas in Cyprus and so end the difficulties involved in dual control - political under himself and military under the general who, receiving his orders from Athens, commanded the Greek 'volunteer' forces in the island (some 8,000-10,000 strong) and the Greek Cypriot national guard (numbering about 11,000 men).

In February, Archbishop Makarios sought unsuccessfully to bring General Grivas under the jurisdiction of the Cypriot minister of defence; in March, he proposed that the general should retain command of the Greek 'volunteers' and that the Cypriot defence minister should have control of the national guard. Finally in April, 1967, Grivas resigned. Not only had he come under fire from President Makarios but also from the Greek Cypriot newspapers, for failing to carry out the conquest of the Turkish Cypriot minority.32

General Observations:

The central fact of political life on Cyprus is the total deterioration of relations between the island's Greek and Turkish communities. Efforts to work out a viable structure of government within the framework of the Constitution have been frustrated, exacerbated by extremists elements in both communities. Differences between the two communities affect, and are affected by, both the relations between Greece and Turkey, and the extent of the mainland nations' support of their respective Cypriot communities. Greece and Turkey are deeply involved in developments on Cyprus, by virtue both of their special roles as guarantors of the independence of Cyprus and by their natural identification with their respective ethnic groups on the island. The breakdown of communal relations on Cyprus has seriously strained relations between Greece and Turkey and has jeopardized NATO security in the area.

Whatever political interaction exists between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is now being conducted through United Nations truce teams. There is no longer any regular, formal transaction of state business between the two ethnic groups. As a result of the compelling circumstances, both communities have constituted themselves
as operating governmental bodies, separately performing the necessary services for their respective populations. Today a 'green line' has been drawn on the map of Nicosia between the Greek and Turkish sectors, and the two populations are kept physically separate, unable to run the affairs of government jointly.
The Demographic Indicators

During the first half of the nineteenth century, the population of Cyprus began to display a steady increase and has been growing rapidly ever since.

The population of Cyprus enumerated in the 1960 census was 577,615, including persons living on British Sovereign Bases and Retained Areas. Although this population is predominantly rural with a majority employed in agriculture, the number of people residing in towns is quite large and is steadily increasing. Of the total population in 1960 (excluding the Base Areas), 206,287 (35.5%) could be classified as urban, including the suburbs. Conversely, 367,726, or 64.5%, could be classified as rural.

In addition to the urban-rural division, the population of Cyprus is characterized by a distinct ethnic dichotomy between Greek and Turkish communities. All elements within the population tend to have strong religious and linguistic identification; however, the various ethnic communities generally live at the same level of material welfare.

In general, the present population of Cyprus is characterized by youth, with a high ratio of children, a small number of unmarried adults, and a preponderance
of females. These factors, along with a high birth rate and a low mortality rate, give rise to a rapidly increasing population. The 1960 population density of approximately 160 persons per square mile is considered moderate by Middle Eastern standards. The annual birth rate in 1962 (total births per 1,000 of the mid-year population) was 25.0, which is considered high. The annual mortality rate for 1962 (total deaths per 1,000 of the mid-year population) was 5.9, one of the world's lowest. The infant mortality rate, a more sensitive indication of the general level of health, has fallen steadily from 80 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1945 to 29.7 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1962.

In 1960 there were 635 rural villages on Cyprus. Of these 357 were entirely Greek, 106 were Turkish and 172 were mixed (see table 2). The number of mixed villages appears large, but in many the minority group is represented by only one or two people. The mixed villages generally are composed predominantly of one group or the other, rather than of a relatively balanced combination. Greek villages, both pure and mixed not only are more numerous, but tend to be larger than Turkish villages of comparative type. In 1960, no district or urban town had a Turkish majority.
TABLE I
Population by Race and District, as of November 12, 1960
(Official Census, 1960)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Actual Figures</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Greeks*</td>
<td>Turk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYPRUS TOTAL</td>
<td>557,615</td>
<td>448,857</td>
<td>104,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL DISTRICTS</td>
<td>574,013</td>
<td>448,696</td>
<td>104,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicosia</td>
<td>204,484</td>
<td>157,236</td>
<td>40,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrenia</td>
<td>31,015</td>
<td>26,264</td>
<td>4,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famagusta</td>
<td>114,389</td>
<td>91,371</td>
<td>18,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larnaca</td>
<td>58,660</td>
<td>43,961</td>
<td>12,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limassol</td>
<td>107,306</td>
<td>85,918</td>
<td>13,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paphos</td>
<td>58,159</td>
<td>43,946</td>
<td>14,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOVEREIGN BASES and</td>
<td>3,602</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RETAINED AREAS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes Maronites and Armenians
+ Includes British, Gypsies, other and not stated
TABLE II

Distribution of Villages by Race and District, 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Greek</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicosia</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famagusta</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limassol</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larnaca</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paphos</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrenia</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cyprus</strong></td>
<td><strong>357</strong></td>
<td><strong>106</strong></td>
<td><strong>172</strong></td>
<td><strong>635</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population at mid-year</th>
<th>Number of Registered live births</th>
<th>Number of Registered deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>447,000</td>
<td>14,482</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>467,000</td>
<td>15,158</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>477,000</td>
<td>15,078</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>485,000</td>
<td>13,234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>494,000</td>
<td>14,517</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>502,000</td>
<td>14,403</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>508,000</td>
<td>13,358</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>515,000</td>
<td>13,446</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>523,000</td>
<td>13,893</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>530,000</td>
<td>13,747</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>536,000</td>
<td>13,875</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>546,000</td>
<td>14,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>558,000</td>
<td>14,320</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>567,000</td>
<td>14,411</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>573,000</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>577,000</td>
<td>14,934</td>
<td>3,254*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>580,000</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>3,400*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>689,000(?)</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>3,600*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>587,000</td>
<td>14,200</td>
<td>3,900*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>594,000</td>
<td>14,470</td>
<td>3,650*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*unknown reliability

Since the Turkish community formerly functioned as the ruling group, it is more urbanized (about 27%) than the Greek (about 18%). Turkish urbanization in the past was greater than the Greek because there was a substantial Turkish net migration to towns from the predominantly Greek rural countryside. In recent years, Greek urbanization has been occurring at a more rapid rate than has Turkish. The former position of the Turks as a ruling group also is apparent in their widespread distribution throughout the towns and rural areas. On the other hand, almost all the Armenians, who are mostly shopkeepers, and the majority of the English are centered in Nicosia, while the Maronites, mainly agriculturists, are concentrated around Kormakiti in the northwest corner of the island.

The Economic Indicators:

With approximately one-half of its area under cultivation, Cyprus ranks first in the Near East in utilization of land for agriculture, and the economy is fairly well developed by Mediterranean standards. The average Cypriot is better off than his counterpart in either Turkey or Greece. In 1960, Cyprus had the highest per capita income (equivalent to U.S. $390) in the Mediterranean area, with the exception of Israel.
Land holdings are small, and agricultural trade is conducted to a great extent through co-operatives. Fragmentation of land holdings and loss of soil fertility handicap agricultural development. More than half of the labour force is engaged in farming, but with increased mechanization, labour requirements have been declining.

Mining has been important to the economy of the land, providing employment for two per cent of the total labour force, contributing about eight per cent of the GNP and accounting for about forty per cent of the total exports. The most important mineral groups are copper and iron pyrites, followed by asbestos, chrome, and gypsum. Capital invested in mining is almost entirely of foreign origin - American, Greek, and British.

The greater part of Cyprus' external receipts come not from exports but from the provision of services to foreign governments in Cyprus, from tourism, and from emigrants' remittances. The existence of many historic castles and monasteries and the improvement of beach facilities have brought a considerable increase in the tourist industry. As for the emigrants who contribute to external receipts, there are more than 100,000 Cypriots in London alone, and many thousands more throughout the Middle East, Egypt, Turkey, and Greece.
After Independence, the Cypriot Government sought and obtained United Nations technical assistance in formulating an economic development program for Cyprus. Subsequently, in August 1961, the President of the Republic presented a Five Year Development Plan of public investment for the years 1962 to 1966. Nevertheless, Cyprus continues to suffer from a chronic trade deficit.

The outbreak of violence in December 1963 has had repercussions on the economy of Cyprus. Trade between the indigenous Turks and Greeks has ceased and exports have been curtailed. In addition, tourism has been harmed and the investment climate has begun to stagnate.
### TABLE IV

Basic Economic Statistics for Cyprus 1953-1962

(millions of Cyprus Pounds)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. National Income</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>101.7</td>
<td>108.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Private Consumption Expenditure</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. General Gov't Consumption Expenditure</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Exports of Goods and Services</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Imports of Goods and Services</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation Group</th>
<th>Number Employed</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (including owners, family workers and casual labour, calculated at 254 man-days per person).</td>
<td>134,800</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Quarrying</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture and Construction</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce, transport and related activities</td>
<td>64,500</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic and personal service and related activities</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All groups</td>
<td>266,300</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE VI
Number of Schools Under Greek and Turkish Communal Boards of Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Greek</th>
<th>Turk</th>
<th>Post Secondary*</th>
<th>Technical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*coeducational teacher-training college

TABLE VII
Percentage Distribution of Literacy of Persons Seven Years of Age or Older in 1946 and 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Read and Write</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Read Only</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Republic of Cyprus, Statistical Abstract 1962 #8, (Nicosia; Statistics and Research Dept., Ministry of Finance, 1963), tables 1 and 2, p. 54.

Ibid., table 10, p. 61.
III

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we shall aim at assessing the political culture of Cyprus and relating it to the within-puts of demand and support. We shall see how the political culture links the interactions in the environment to the interactions within the political systems.

The political culture will be shown to reflect the society's attitudes and orientations toward these political systems. In addition to this, the political culture will be seen to affect the demands and supports which enter the political systems. The consequences of this demand-support behavior will be illustrated by the way in which the political systems respond to the input of political socialization and recruitment, performing the functions of interest articulation and aggregation, and political communication. In short, the sources of stress identified in the intra-societal environment will be examined not only as they reflect the type of political culture but also as they are relayed via the input functions to affect the response and evaluation of the basic objects of support; the "political community", the "political regime", and the "authorities".
The Political Culture:

When we speak of the political culture of a society we are referring to the specifically political orientations - attitudes toward the role of the self in the system. Put simply, the political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation.

When we speak of political culture we are not so much interested in what is actually happening in society but in what people believe about those happenings. Sidney Verba has stated that these beliefs are a combination of cognitive, evaluative and expressive aspects of thought.¹ These perceptions and attitudes can be classified as "cognitive, effective, and evaluative orientations" toward the political system in general, its input and output aspects, and the self as political actor.² Cognitive orientations involve knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of

¹There is no clear differentiation between the three with respect to patterns of thought about politics. Belief in this sense is a more general term than 'attitudes' and 'opinions'. See Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture", in Pye and Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 516.

these roles, its inputs, and its outputs; effective orientations refer to feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and performance; and evaluational orientations, to the judgements and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings.³

It is also possible for these orientations to be evaluated in connection with the input objects of support, since the roles, and the incumbents of roles, the objects of orientations, correspond to the 'role' aspect of the regime, and the 'incumbent' aspect of the authoritative structures.⁴

In order to assess the different types of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations toward the political system, we can apply empirical referents associated with such things as voting behavior, group violence and sectionalism to the input categories of the political system(s) of Cyprus. Adding to this what we know about the elites in Cyprus, we can derive some persuasive

³For a fuller description of these orientations see, Almond and Verba, pp. 14-16.

⁴For an analysis of the relationship between the Almond and Verba categories and the input objects of support in Easton's political system, see, D. J. Grady, Schema of Supplement and Synthesis for the Political System, unpub. ms., McMaster University, 1966, pp. 20-22.
generalizations about Cyprus' political culture as this factor reflects the condition and level of stress on the system(s).

It must be emphasized from the beginning that Cyprus certainly does not have only one political culture. In addition to having two elite political cultures, it has at least one, and possibly two mass political cultures.

Political culture may be classified by three different types: parochial, subject, and participant. Parochial political culture is likely to be affective and normative rather than cognitive. That is to say, the people may be aware in a dim sort of way of the existence of a central political regime, but their feelings toward it are uncertain or negative, and they have not internalized any norms to regulate their relations to it. In the subject political culture there is a high frequency of orientations toward a differentiated political system and toward the output aspects of the system, but orientations toward specifically input objects, and toward the self as an active participant, approach zero. In the participant political culture, the members of the society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole and to both the input and output aspects of the political system. They tend to be oriented toward an 'activist' role of the self in the polity, though their
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Training/ Vocation</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Political Beliefs Present</th>
<th>Political Beliefs Past</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Makarios III (President)</td>
<td>G.C.</td>
<td>Th.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>R, SQ to E</td>
<td>R-E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fazil Kuchuk (Vice-President)</td>
<td>T.C.</td>
<td>Me.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>R-SQ</td>
<td>R-T to SQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polykarpos Yozgadjis (Interior Minister)</td>
<td>G.C.</td>
<td>HS</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>R-E</td>
<td>R-E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raouf Denktash (Pres. Turk. Communal Chamber)</td>
<td>T.C.</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>R-T</td>
<td>R-T to SQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Righinos Theocharis (Min. of Finance)</td>
<td>G.C.</td>
<td>Ec.</td>
<td>M-G</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>R-SQ</td>
<td>R-SQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glafkos Clerides (Pres. H. of Reps.)</td>
<td>G.C.</td>
<td>L.</td>
<td>M-Br.</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>R-E to SQ</td>
<td>R-SQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orhan Muderrisoglu (V-P. H. of Reps.)</td>
<td>T.C.</td>
<td>Me.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>R-T to SQ</td>
<td>R-T to SQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spyros Kyprianou (Foreign Minister)</td>
<td>G.C.</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M-G</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>R-SQ</td>
<td>R-E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Niazi Maniera  T.C.  Me.  M  50  M  R-SQ  R-T to SQ  
(Min. of Health)

Fazil Plumer  T.C.  L  M  48  M  R  R-T to SQ  
(Agriculture Minister)

Osman Orek  T.C.  L  M  37  M  R-T to SQ  R-T to SQ  
(Defence Minister)

George Grivas  G.  Mil.  M-G  68  M  R-E  R-E  
(Commander G. C. forces)

Symbols and Meanings for Chart on Cypriot Elite

G.C. Greek Cypriot  SC. Some College
T.C. Turkish Cypriot  TU. Trade Unionism
G. Greek  Jou. Journalism
Th. Theology  I-e. Import-export
Me. Medicine  Mi. Mining
En. Engineering  Pu. Publishing
L. Law  R. Right-wing: Pro West
Ec. Economics  L. Left-wing: Pro East
Mil. Military  SQ. Favours Status Quo
Ph. Philosophy  E. Favours 'Enosis'
HA. High School  T. Favours 'Taksim'
GS. Gramar School

SQ to E or E to SQ = Wavering between 'Enosis' and Status Quo
SQ to T or T to SQ = Wavering between 'Taksim' and Status Quo
feelings and evaluations of such a role may vary from acceptance to rejection.\textsuperscript{5}

The 1959 Presidential election in Cyprus reflects a highly participant political culture. The Greek Cypriot electorate numbered 238,000, and of that number, 216,254, or nearly 91 per cent, cast their votes.

Although there is a highly participant political culture, as reflected by these figures, there is, nevertheless, a tendency towards fragmentation among the political parties and the sectors of support which they mobilize. Since the presidential elections allowed for only Greek Cypriot voting, there was no ethnic alignment.

What is interesting to note is that the Greek Cypriots are far from being united themselves. Although there were only two candidates for the office of president, there were, in fact, two political parties actively campaigning, against Makarios and his party, and one political party giving tacit support to Archbishop Makarios. These parties generally drew their support from different sectors of the polity. John Clerides, candidate of the Democratic Union Party, drew his support from the extreme nationalists on the island. He and his party condemned the Zurich-London Agreements and demanded

\textsuperscript{5}See Gabriel A. Almond \& Sidney Verba, Civic Culture. (Boston: Little, Brown, \& Co., 1963), pp. 16-26, for a fuller discussion of the types of political culture.
'enosis' for Cyprus. He gained the active support of AKEL, the communist party on the island, for his anti-Makarios stand. It is ironic that, although the average Greek Cypriot supports 'enosis', Clerides received only 71,753 votes, and of these it is estimated that nearly 35,000 of the votes cast for him came from the communists on the island. What is ironic here is the fact that Makarios, the moderate, received sixty-five per cent of the votes cast, and Clerides the 'enotist' received only thirty-five per cent. It is also notable that the communist party, a party which is outlawed in Greece, supported a party which had as one of its main policy aims, the union of Cyprus with Greece. Although there is no documentary evidence to support the hypothesis, it could be conjectured that the communist party on Cyprus wanted to insure Clerides and the Democratic Union's defeat in order to forestall the union of Greece and Cyprus, which would have meant the outlawing of the AKEL on Cyprus.

Archbishop Makarios and his Patriotic Front Party, were able to win the election because they received the support of the majority of the people who live in the countryside, and the villages. When one looks back on the election, it seems quite plausible that the people should vote in this manner. Makarios was shrewd enough to offer cabinet posts to a number of the young heroes of the EOKA campaign. It was the people of the small
villages and the countryside who fed and protected these men. These men were the epitomy of all the things that mean freedom to simple folk and therefore there was little thought but to vote for Makarios. The Turkish community, almost to a man, also supported Makarios, for even though he was a Greek Cypriot he was a moderate. For the Turkish Cypriots, Makarios was there only hope of being treated at all fairly. Of course, such support in this instance could embody only sentiment since the Turks were limited to voting for the post of Vice-President.

In the parliamentary elections of July 31, 1960, for the Cypriot House of Representatives, two parties, the Democratic Union and the hastily formed Pan-Cyprian Union of Fighters, consisting of supporters of General Grivas, at the last moment withdrew from the race. The Democratic Union opposed the electoral law of 1959 in which Cyprus was divided into six multi member constituencies, the Nicosia constituency being the largest with 12 Greek and five Turkish members. The law also had a number of other points which were especially disliked by the Democratic Union. Among these were the fact that the individual elector would vote for several candidates according to the number of vacancies in his constituency. For example, the Greek voter in Nicosia would have twelve votes which he could either give 'en bloc' to one party or distribute between the parties in any ratio he pleased.
According to John Clerides, the electoral law was weighted in favour of the Patriotic Front. General Grivas publicly stated in Athens that he desired to "stay out of the electoral strife." This effectively ruled out the campaigning of the Pan-Cyprian Union of Fighters from the electoral contest.

An electoral pact was concluded between the Patriotic Front and AKEL whereby the latter were allotted five seats in Parliament, that is, instead of nominating their own members for all the thirty-five Greek-Cypriot seats, the Patriotic Front nominated thirty and made room for five AKEL members on their lists.

Only 64 per cent of the Greek-Cypriot electorate went to the polls (138,761 out of 215,575). The result was a complete victory for the Patriotic Front and the five AKEL members. The only opposition, eight Greek Cypriots running as independents, were soundly defeated.

The low Greek Cypriot poll was officially attributed to the fact that large numbers of Greek Cypriots had not troubled to vote because they were convinced that Archbishop Makarios' Patriotic Front was certain of an overwhelming victory; some commentators, however, expressed the view that many right-wing voters had abstained in

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6The Times, July 22, 1960.
opposition to the electoral pact between the Patriotic Front and the communists.\textsuperscript{7}

The final stage of the Cyprus elections was the election of the Greek and Turkish Communal Chambers on August 22. Of the twenty-six seats in the Greek Communal Chamber, twenty were won by the Patriotic Front and three by AKEL candidates (standing on the Patriotic Front lists under the electoral pact), while the remaining three were filled by one representative from each of the minority religious groups - Armenians, Maronites, and Roman Catholics.\textsuperscript{8}

Although we do not have full election statistics for the Turkish-Cypriot community, we can draw a general description of the Turkish aspects of political culture on Cyprus. There appears to be much less political fragmentation in the Turkish Cypriot case, than in the Greek one. In the 1959 vice-presidential elections, the Turkish candidate, Dr. Fasil Kuchuk, was elected unopposed. In the election of the fifteen Turkish representatives to the House of Representatives, seventy-four per cent of the Turkish electorate recorded their votes, indicating

\textsuperscript{7}Kessings Contemporary Archives, November 5-12, 1960, p. 17731.

\textsuperscript{8}Ibid.
a highly participant political culture. The opposition to Dr. Kuchuk and his party, the Turkish National Front, was not sufficient to prevent his party from filling the Turkish seats in the House. Again, in the election for the representatives of the Turkish Communal Chamber, Dr. Kuchuk's party won all thirty seats. It has been suggested that the reason for this unified front is that only in unity is there the preservation of the Turks on Cyprus.

By 1963, group violence became not only widespread, but it underscored the growing sectionalism based on ethnic identity, which was first instilled by the nature of the bicommunal constitution. This sectionalism and the attitude of hostility between Greek and Turk has its sources in the cultural and racial distinctiveness of the two groups. The hostility and suspicion came to the forefront by the end of the year when President Makarios attempted to have the constitution amended in such a manner as to limit the Turkish right to veto legislation. Fighting broke out and the Turkish minority in mixed villages and towns were forced to flee for their

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9Kessings Contemporary Archives, November 5-12, 1960, p. 17731.

lives. The fighting has created a wholesale relocation of the Turkish Cypriots. The majority have resettled around Nicosia where they can be afforded some protection by troops from mainland Turkey and from their own irregulars.

If it can be said that there is a political culture for the whole of Cyprus, then it must be said that that political culture is heterogeneous. The author would argue that from the evidence put forward above, there are, in fact, two political cultures on Cyprus; one Greek and one Turk. We have seen that both the Greek and Turkish political cultures are of the participant type but that the orientations of the two ethnic communities are not toward the same political objects. The bicommmunality of the electoral system has reinforced these orientations. In our discussion of political socialization and recruitment and the within-put functions of interest articulation and aggregation, and political communication this will be brought out even more vividly.

Political Socialization and Recruitment:

When we talk of political socialization we "mean that all political systems tend to perpetuate their cultures and structures through time, and that they do this mainly by means of the socializing influences of the primary and secondary structures through which the young
of the society pass in the process of maturation."
Political socialization therefore pervades the family, the church, the neighbourhood, the village, and the schools. Many of the attitudes that a person has toward politics can be traced back to these primary associations. But we must remember that political socialization is continuous and does not terminate at the point of maturation. It can and does involve secondary associational activity in later years as well as such obvious phenomena as the exposure to the mass media. It need not follow that these latter experiences will reinforce general orientations toward the political, acquired in childhood. In fact, they may conflict with these orientations.11

What must be added here is that political socialization and recruitment, in our case, are not within-puts of the political system, that is, they are not functions taking place wholly within the boundaries of the political system. Political socialization and recruitment are actually inputs of the political system. They are outside of the political system and are related more to the political culture than to the within-puts of interest articulation and aggregation, and political communication.

As we proceed, the importance of political socialization and recruitment in producing a wider gulf between the Greek and Turkish political cultures will be shown.

The political recruitment function is a continuation of the general political socialization function. The political system's members are recruited out of society's particular subcultures such as, religious communities, ethnic communities, classes, etc., and inducts them into the specialized roles of the political system, where it trains them in skills, and provides them with political values and expectations. "The recruitment function...consists of the special political role socializations which occur in a society 'on top of' the general political socialization."¹²

When we examine Cypriot society we discover an ethnic dichotomy consisting of the Orthodox Greek and the Muslim Turk. For generations, the two major groups on the island have maintained distinctly separate, though at times economically interdependent communities. Each identifies primarily with the culture of its respective motherland, Greece and Turkey. Because of the isolation of Cyprus from the parent groups and the conservatism of the islanders there appears an older and more traditional form of both Greek and Turkish cultures than those which

¹²Ibid., p. 32
currently exist on the mainland.

The Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus have lived in close proximity for centuries, yet they display little tendency to assimilate the customs and values of each other's cultures. They do not share a common set of social values or national goals. There is no Cypriot nationality in the sense of identifying with the Republic and the people of Cyprus. Rather, each group tends to identify with its respective motherlands, Greece and Turkey.

The traditional values of Turkish life derive from the heritage of a society based on family ties and strongly influenced by the Islamic religion. In the twentieth century these values have been changing rapidly.

Western influences have become increasingly strong, and tradition no longer provides the values by which a large portion of Turkish society lives. The reforms introduced in all aspects of life by Ataturk in the 1920's, were enthusiastically accepted by the Turkish Cypriot community, especially the younger generation. The Turk is beginning to believe that he can improve his lot by his own initiative and that the traditional kin-group orientation of the society and the orthodox prescriptions of Islam leave little scope for individual initiative or the rewards of personal achievement.

Until the Kemalist reforms of the 1920's, nationalism was not a conscious effort on the part of the Turks,
but the very nature of the Muslim faith served the same function. Church and State were united in the person of the Sultan. With the Kemalist reforms came the separation of Church and State, and the unconscious identification with the government which the Turks had previously made through their Muslim faith as replaced by a deliberate promotion of strong patriotism on the part of the state. The Turkish Cypriots acquired this feeling of patriotism almost as soon as did those on the mainland.\textsuperscript{13}

The Greek Cypriots are not Greek so much by common race or stock, as by common culture. They feel themselves to be Greek in every way though - in speech, thought, religion, and mode of life. The Hellenistic consciousness of the Greek Cypriots has always existed, although it has not always been as intense as it is at present, nor manifested in the same nationalistic form. Since the independence of modern-day Greece, the Greek Cypriots have felt they had a cultural, social, emotional, and sentimental bond of kinship with the mainland. This feeling has been generated by the fact that they have a common language and religion, shared customs and a similar way of life.

Greeks value freedom and self-sufficiency; however,

\textsuperscript{13}Charles Fraser Beckingham, "Islam and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus", in \textit{Die Welt des Islam}, V, No. 1, 1957, pp. 72-75.
the unit of this self-sufficiency is not the individual but the family. A Greek is a member of a wide circle of relatives who branch out from a single family unit, and it is principally to this group that he owes his devotion. The problem that is becoming evident today is that increased mobility of the population has caused the decrease of the importance of such values as honesty, loyalty, obedience, and obligation to the family. Urban families especially, are reluctant to assume the traditional family responsibilities; this new attitude results in increased reliance on the government for welfare payments to the aged.14

The Church is a very important factor in the socialization process, for in any consideration of Greek nationalism, the Eastern Orthodox religion appears almost synonymous with Hellenism. To be a Greek is to be an Eastern Orthodox Christian. Additionally, in past centuries, the Church maintained Greek consciousness in all communities throughout Asia Minor and on Cyprus.

The Orthodox Church is not a disciplinary force, but is a highly ritualistic religion. No important

activity is undertaken without a religious ceremony. For all this though, spiritual guidance or comfort from a priest are seldom requested. This is what the family is for. Yet the Church is very dear to a Greek, for it is a prominent symbol of Greece's ancient heritage, and a prime force in maintaining Greek consciousness. As we have seen before, the leaders of the Church are usually held in esteem politically as well as spiritually. Consequently, loyalty to the Church constitutes an extremely important value. 15

Education and the educational system in Cyprus are probably the most important factors in the socialization process. It has long been inextricably mixed with the national and political goals of the Greek as well as the Turkish Cypriots. For the last one hundred years, education has been the most important way of inculcating in the young Greek Cypriots and awareness of the Greek heritage. Its more official function of providing training has often been overshadowed and of secondary importance.

Traditionally, education for the Turks meant instruction in Islam for the leading of a pious life. With the

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15For two interesting accounts of the Church in Cyprus see, Stanley Mayes, Cyprus and Makarios. (London: Putman, 1960); and Major General Sir Edward Spears, The Orthodox Church in Cyprus. (London: Press Attache's Office, Turkish Embassy, n.d.).
advent of the British rule of the island a new emphasis on Turkish nationalism along with an emphasis on secular subjects for personal advancement came to the fore. "At no time did education in Cyprus, either in aim or practice, act to produce Cypriots rather than Greeks or Turks."16 When the British did attempt to encourage such a development, it was actively resisted, especially by the Greek Community. The unified system of education that was attempted was speedily undone at the time of Independence, with the active approval of both ethnic and religious groups. Chart number six shows most appropriately the degree of separation of education.17

Many of the teachers in both ethnic communities were not Cypriots but Greeks and Turks from the mainland. This situation did not help the inculcating of a Cypriot identity. At the time that the British took control of the curriculum of the elementary schools (1933), the then Governor, Sir Ronald Storrs, wrote:

"The teacher was usually the only educated man in the village; as a political agent he was therefore almost indispensible to the politicians, who were exclusively town dwellers. Being dependent upon the politicians for advancement in his profession, he had to serve


17 See, Chapter Two, p. 59.
the political purposes of his masters..."\textsuperscript{18}

At about the same time the British eliminated the geography and history of Greece from the curriculum and added instruction in English. The Orthodox Church objected strongly claiming this would hinder the ability of the children in learning their own language and in reading the Bible.

The Greek community saw the curriculum reforms as attempts at cutting the link connecting the Greek people with their cultural and historical heritage and at turning them into Englishmen.

Throughout this century the Greek Cypriot view of education has been one of socializing the people into believing that they are Greek above all else. In 1959, Dr. Costas Spyridakis in a pamphlet on Greek secondary education wrote:

"The Greek schools of Cyprus are the cultural and national nurseries of the Greek population of the Island...they become heralds of the national ideals and aims of the Greek people of the Island...."\textsuperscript{19}

Thus it appears quite clear that Greek education on Cyprus has served a socialization process, not into a Cypriot political system, but into a Greek-Cypriot political system.


What has been said above in relation to the Greek Cypriots can as easily and accurately be said about the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish educational system further intensifies the identification of the Turkish community with Ankara, and in the process it is antithetic to the development of a Cypriot nationality. If a village contains more than one ethnic or religious group, a separate school is established for each, and most classes are taught in the mother tongue of the students.

The curricula and the educational aims of the Greek and Turkish schools are by far the most important factors in producing the identifications of these two dominant communities with their motherlands. Cypriot education is a function of the Communal Chambers, not of the central government. Greek ideas are being taught to the Greeks and Turkish ideas to the Turks. Nowhere are Cypriot ideas being taught to anyone. In addition to this, both Ankara and Athens heavily subsidize education on Cyprus. Not only do their Ministries of Education control the curricula, they also supply some of the teachers. Thus the Greek and Turkish school curricula on Cyprus have become close replicas of those found in the mother countries, and the net result has been to produce Greek and Turkish patriotism rather than a strong Cypriot identification.
Within-put Functions of the Political System

Interest Articulation and Aggregation:

In examining the functions of interest articulation and interest aggregation, we are especially interested in the way in which the structures performing these functions continue or alter the process of political socialization begun by the primary structures within the society. We are also concerned with the way in which these structures, located within the boundary of the political system, assist in recruiting the citizens into the political system.

Within Cyprus we find the distinction between the functions of interest articulation and interest aggregation to be a fluid one. Among the within-put functions, interest articulation and interest aggregation are of crucial importance since they occur at the boundary of the political system and since the particular structures which perform these functions and the style of their performance determine the character of the boundary between the political system and the intra-societal environment. 20

Four main types of structures may be involved in

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interest articulation according to Almond and Coleman. First, there are institutional interest groups which occur in such organizations as legislatures, political executives, armies, bureaucracies, and churches. These are organizations which perform other social or political functions but which, as corporate bodies or through groups within them, may articulate their own interests or represent the interest of groups in the society.21 Second, there are the non-associational groups, "which articulate interest informally, and intermittently through individuals, cliques, family and religious heads."22 Third, there are anomie groups which articulate interests by means of spontaneous breakthroughs into the political system such as riots and demonstrations. Fourth, there are associational interest groups which are specialized structures of interest articulation, and are organized with orderly procedures for the formulation of interests and demands in order to transmit these demands to other political structures such as political parties, legislatures, and bureaucracies.

According to the analysis developed here, interest aggregation is performed through these four types of

\[^{21}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 33.}\]

\[^{22}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 34.}\]
groups and additionally by political parties which formulate interests and demands, and in turn, transmit them to other political structures such as the legislature, the executive and the bureaucracies. In many respects, interest groups and political parties in Cyprus do not constitute completely differentiated autonomous structures. They tend to interpenetrate one another.

Hence, by examining the way such structures as interest groups and political parties perform the functions of interest articulation and interest aggregation, we should be able to make a partial assessment regarding the inputs of demand and support and their effects on the political systems of Cyprus. It may be possible for us to characterize the performance on the interest articulation and interest aggregation functions further, as "manifest" or "latent", "specific" or "diffuse", "general" or "particular", "instrumental" or "affective". If interest articulation or aggregation is manifest and specific, then there is an explicit formulation of a claim or demand or request. The performance of the functions are latent and diffuse when behavior is implicit or, when demands are of a general nature. Interest articulation and aggregation are general "when they are couched in class or professional terms" and particular "when they are couched in individual or family terms."
The articulation and aggregation of interest may be considered instrumental when they take the form of a bargain with consequences realistically spelled out or they may be affective when they take the form of an expression of gratitude, anger or disappointment. 23

In Cyprus today, the non-associational and associational interest groups are continually enmeshed in the political lives of the citizens. Not only are ethnic associations and organizations a fundamental aspect of community life in Cyprus, but by projecting their activities on the political systems, they also provide examples of non-associational interest groups. The ethnic associations have always been the most important structures for performing interest articulation and interest aggregation. Two ethnic organizations, the Greek and the Turkish Communal Chambers, have become not only articulators and aggregators of interests but also allocators of authoritative decisions. The constitution breeds this communal division because it provides for two communal chambers with responsibility for matters of religion, education and agricultural co-operation. This scheme sought to guarantee the national-cultural integrity of each community be allocating positions of authority and

23 For a fuller analysis of these concepts see, Almond and Coleman, Ibid., pp. 33-38.
jurisdiction in such a manner as to prevent either community from encroaching upon the cultural life of the other. 24

The communal chambers have constantly stirred up nationalistic feeling against each other. The interests articulated and aggregated by the communal chambers are readily on view within the House of Representatives. These chambers have become so powerful that Turkish and Greek representatives alike must attempt to acquiesce to their demands.

The process of induction into the political cultures and political systems of Cyprus has been further accelerated by the development of associational interest groups. Together with the ethnic associations, the trade unions and the political parties have fostered openness of the political systems to demands coming from various groups in the intra-societal environment.

The trade unions in Cyprus are a formidable set of associational interest groups. Trade unionism on the island of Cyprus dates from the year 1932. In that year, a trade union law was enacted which provided a legal basis for building a trade union movement. Up to that time,

24See, Nicos C. Lanitis, Our Destiny: a consideration of some crucial problems relating to Cyprus. (Nicosia: Proodos Pub. Co., 1963), pp. 15-17, for a condemnation of the communal chamber system and the animosity it has created.
efforts had only resulted in the formation of workers' social clubs.

Labour today, including agricultural workers, is now highly organized on Cyprus. Communist-controlled labour federations had dominated the scene until recently, but the right-wing, anti-Communists have reorganized to meet the threat perceived in the communist organized groups. Nevertheless, it is estimated that as many as four-fifths of all trade union members belong to AKEL (the legal Communist political party).²⁵ This estimate is all the more vivid when one realizes that no Turkish Cypriots belong to the Communist party.

The leading trade union, the Panacyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) owes its allegiance to the communist party, AKEL. Trade unionism is very important in the public life of Cyprus. There is now a trade union, or a branch of one, in each of the island's main villages, as well as the six large towns. Consequently, they have an important effect on the articulation and aggregation of interests.

The bicommunal nature of the constitution has created problems in the civil service as well. Here the 70:30 principle is rigidly supervised even though

Number of Cypriot Trade Unions and Membership by Group, December 31, 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of Unions</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) - (left-wing)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus Workers' Confederation (SEK) - (anti-communist)</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>15,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pancyprian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (POAS) - (no definite political orientation)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus Turkish Trade Union Federation (KTIBF) - (restricted to Turkish membership)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALL GROUPS</strong></td>
<td><strong>354</strong></td>
<td><strong>65,380</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These consist of a number of independent and unaffiliated trade unions such as: Cyprus Civil Service Association (2,948); the Society of Cyprus Turkish Civil Servants (753); the Pancyprian Greek Teachers' Organization (1,000); and, the Senior Civil Servants' Association (100).

in many cases it has been impossible to find enough qualified Turkish Cypriots to fill their thirty percent quota. The bicomunal nature of the civil service has also effectively prevented a common outlook for the service. Instead we find that the aggregation and articulation of interests are once again along communal lines.

Hence, we can see that interest groups are closely related to political parties in Cyprus. From our discussion of political parties in chapter two it can be seen that the political parties have, by their style of performing the functions of interest articulation and interest aggregation, contributed to the racial cleavage. It has been the political parties which have fanned the current of ill-will between the Greek and Turkish populations, through their diehard support of 'enosis' and 'taksim'.

As we have shown, the political parties like the interest groups tend to articulate and aggregate interests along ethnic lines and in so doing perpetuate the obstacles to unity and cooperation in the politics of Cyprus.

In our discussion of political communication which follows, we will examine whether this tendency towards stress is further accelerated by the mass, media, the press, and the radio.
Political Communication:

The function of political communication helps the political system respond to the demands coming from various groups within the political system as well as from groups in the intra-societal environment. In other words, political communication provides a network of linked channels of information especially concerned with the processes of authoritative decision-making in society. The structures performing the function of political communication might simultaneously communicate demands and supports from the intra-societal environment to structures of authority and convey the content and rational for such decisions from the political system to groups and individuals in society. The structures include such media of communication as radio broadcasts, newspapers, foreign and domestic mail. The structures also include such face-to-face contacts as those typical in political parties and interest groups "which determine to a large extent what in fact will be transmitted and who will be the insiders in the organization, that is, those persons who receive both information and attention on highly preferred terms." 26 Hence political communication may in greater or lesser degree depend upon the same structures

which aggregate and articulate interests.

We have shown how in the political systems of Cyprus, interest groups and political parties reflect strong ethnic loyalties. This has important implications for the performance of political communication within these political systems. Karl Deutsch has stated that "without the effective control of the bulk of actual face-to-face communications network...the nominal holders of the legitimacy symbols may become relatively helpless vis-a-vis those groups which have control".27

We may recall from our discussion above that thirty per cent of the Civil Service of Cyprus are Turkish Cypriots. Prior to the breakdown of the constitution in 1963, these thirty per cent owed their allegiance to the Turkish representatives and the four Turkish members of the Executive, not to the Turkish and Greek representatives together. Because of this fact, Archbishop Makarios had difficulty in attempting to manipulate the whole Civil Service and this weakened the general recognition of the legitimacy of Makarios and his administration.

In many respects political communication by face-to-face communications networks needs to be supplemented by more impersonal structures. These impersonal

27 Ibid., p. 153.
structures include the types and orientations of the mass media, the number and content of foreign and domestic mail and the society's literacy rate. The empirical referents derived from the general measures of these impersonal structures gives us a further understanding of the process of political communication.

Newspapers with a combined daily circulation of about 60,000 copies and an estimated three readers per copy, are the most influential means of communication on Cyprus. Second to newspapers in influence is the radio, with 120,000 receiving sets, an average of one set for every five persons. Possibly third, at this time, is television. There are at least 5,200 sets, with an estimated 7 to 10 viewers per set. Many of the "live" programs deal with Cypriot education, agriculture, tourism, local figures and distinguished visitors. Motion pictures rank fourth in specific influence on current island matters.

Of the 11 daily newspapers in Cyprus, six are in the Greek language, four in Turkish, and one in English. The political leanings of these papers range from communist organs to extreme right-wing (see chart 10). Chart 11 shows much the same range in regards to the weekly newspapers on Cyprus.

The Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation is the
government-subsidized public service. The C.B.C. maintains four transmitters, two at Nicosia and one each at Limassol and Paphos. Its service is in three languages: Greek, Turkish, and English. Broadcasts in Greek are transmitted from three points (Nicosia, Limassol, Paphos) for 8 3/4 hours a day on weekdays, and 12 3/4 hours on Sundays. Turkish language programs are broadcast from Nicosia only, for 8 1/4 hours a day on weekdays and 12 1/4 hours on Sundays. English broadcasts are transmitted on weekdays from Nicosia and Paphos for 5 1/4 hours and from Limassol for 45 minutes, and from all transmitters for about 1 hour on Sundays.

There are two television transmitters on Cyprus. One is the government-owned and operated station in Nicosia. The other is the British HQ Forces Broadcasting Service transmitter which maintains a program of daily transmissions in English for the British on Cyprus. Programs from the C.B.C. station are in Turkish, Greek, and English.

There are 74 indoor motion picture theatres on the island, with a total seating capacity of 44,196, and 60 open-air theatres with 48,125 seats. Approximately 60 per cent of the films are American in origin. Except for brief documentaries and newsreels, there is little film production originating on Cyprus.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Circulation</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akin (Flow)</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Owner: Rauf Denktash, President of Turkish Communal Chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agon (Struggle)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Editor: Nikos Kashis, right wing labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleftheria (Freedom)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>6,000-9,000</td>
<td>Pro-government, liberal, anti-communist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halkin Sesi (Voice of the People)</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Supports Turkish leadership, once rabid supporter of partition, now toned down.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haravghi (Dawn)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>Communist organ of AKEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makhi (Battle)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>Owner: Nicos Sampson; has shifted from early left-wing opposition to pro-West, pro-Makarios.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philelftheros (Liberal)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Pro-government, moderate, has been regarded as government organ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phos (Light)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Pro-government, moderate, middle of the road.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE XI
Cyprus Weekly Press, 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Circulation</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alitheia (Truth)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>Right wing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ergatiki Phoni (Workers' Voice)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Communist, organ of the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethniki</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>Extreme right-wing opposition; anti-Makarios; organ of Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najak (Hatchet)</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Editor: Rauf Denktash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nei Keri (New Times)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>10,000-14,000</td>
<td>Communist, AKEL publication, put out by Hara-vghi staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoni ton Agrton (Farmers' Voice)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Right wing, anti-Communist; agricultural, organ of Pancyprian Agrarian Union of Cyprus (PEK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tharros (Courage)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>Editor: Nicos Sampson; anti-Communist; pro-West and pro-government. Same publisher as Makhi.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rights of freedom of the press and of expression have been scrupulously upheld in Cyprus. In fact, the constitutional guarantee has permitted occasional irresponsible excesses on the part of certain news media. The newspapers representing the two major ethnic groups have helped to keep communal tensions alive in the post-Independence period. There has been no government interference with the Cypriot press and no newspaper or periodical has ever been seized or censored. Private editors and publishers have always been free to criticize government policy and officials, subject only to the libel laws of the country. The printed word in Cyprus is still the most powerful, although not necessarily the most peaceful, molder of public opinion.

As far as radio, television, and motion pictures are concerned, they have had little effect on the people for they appear to have attempted to be non-political in their presentations.

Once again, we have seen that the bicommunal nature of the communication system effectively prevents any sort of unified socialization function for Cypriot society.

Many political systems manage to persist in the face of far-reaching and intensive conflict. That political systems manage to avert tendencies to destruction is in many respects due to the positive response and
evaluation for the basic objects of support: the "political community", the (political) "regime", and the "authorities". These, according to David Easton, are the vital elements of any political system in that such structures bolster its capacity to persist in the face of threatened loss of support. These objects are important for "change of a (political) system will turn out to mean change of one or another of these objects."\(^{28}\)

The political system of Cyprus has not survived and the reason for this is that the basic objects of support have all changed at about the same time, causing it to disappear. In its place two distinct political systems have arisen. In the discussion of the objects of support which follows, we shall attempt to answer the question of what happened to the political system (if there ever was really only one).

**Objects of Support**

The Political Community:

The existence of a political community must have at a minimum a political division of labour. Easton has stated that regardless of the degree of cohesion among the members of a system, as long as they are part

of the same political system, they cannot escape sharing in or being linked by this common division of political labour. The question which we must ask is, what became of the political division of labour, and how did this result in a loss of 'sense of Community'?

Cyprus became an independent republic on August 16, 1960. Within months the breakdown of the republic had begun. By December of 1963, it was complete. The causes for the breakdown and for the loss of sense of political community can be found in these thirty-six months.

Within the first year of independence the two communities, Greek and Turkish, were at serious loggerheads over tax legislation. No compromise could be worked out, and so President Makarios instructed the revenue department to continue collecting taxes after the expiration of the then existing tax legislation. This move was countered by Rauf Denktash, President of the Turkish Communal Chamber. He recommended non-payment by Turkish importers of duties or taxes 'illegally' demanded. By October a military problem had been added to the fiscal one. The majority (Greek) of the Cabinet favoured the creation of a completely integrated army.

29 Ibid., pp. 177-78.
Vice-President Kuchuk and Defence Minister Orek, both Turkish Cypriots, insisted on the formation up to company level, of communal units. Kuchuk exercised his Vice-Presidential veto and the unified Cypriot Army as contemplated by the Constitution was therefore prevented.

Problems continued to mount upon problems. In March, 1962, Makarios proposed a unified system of administration for the then bicommunal towns. Talks between him and Kuchuk broke down and it was at this time that the Turkish Communal Chamber voted to maintain the Turkish municipalities in the five largest towns, and even to extend it to Lefka, a small though predominantly Turkish Cypriot town. The Turkish mayors vowed they would ignore all Government regulations that conflicted with the decision of the Turkish Communal Chamber.

By mid 1963 a number of major Governmental actions had been declared unconstitutional in the Supreme Court. Makarios submitted proposals to Kuchuk for surmounting the impasse. By November 30, the proposals had been rejected and both sides began girding themselves for war. Four days before Christmas, fighting broke out. Shots were exchanged when two Greek policemen found themselves surrounded when examining identity cards. The communal fighting had begun.

The sense of political community had begun to die early as it became evident that the bicommunal
constitution was unworkable. The low level of support for the Cypriot political community, by the Turkish Cypriots, had negative consequences for the political system of Cyprus.

The Regime:

The need for a regime stems from the fact that some regularized method of ordering political relationships for society is always needed. For outputs to be accepted as binding, the members need to accept some basic procedures and rules relating to the means through which controversy over demands is to be regulated. If the members of a system consistently fail to support some kind of regime, this lack of support will therefore prevent a system from operating. The political regime sets the range within which political expectations and norms are regularized and within which political actions by the structures of authority become authoritative. Political expectations reflect the broad consensus guiding the day to day policy of the community. The norms specify acceptable procedures for implementing demands while "the structures of authority designate the formal and informal patterns in which power is distributed and organized with regard to the authoritative

\[30\text{Ibid.}, p. 192\]
making and implementing of decisions."  

While the establishment of the Communal Chambers and the continuation of separate communal town councils, in the Constitution, were expediencies, there were conscious attempts in the Constitution to introduce common symbols with which the two communities could identify: thus, the creation of the Cypriot flag, the establishment of co-ordinating bodies in the five largest municipalities, the mention of the United Nations Charter and, lastly, the rule of law, without which the complex constitutional system could never function. These shared values, unfortunately, have not brought the Greek and Turkish Cypriots closer together.

The conflicts between the authoritative structures have been mentioned many times in the pages of this research paper and it appears quite evident that there has been little support for a viable regime of norms and expectations. Added to the context of tension built into the political culture and the patterns of demand in Cyprus, these conflicts of support have great significance for the incumbents of regime roles, that is, the occupants of the structures of authority.

\[31\text{Ibid., p. 193.}\]
The Authorities:

By interpreting authorities as incumbents of the roles in the regime we are here concerned with "the ability and/or capacity of these incumbents to direct, marshal or compel behavior---within the political system and the intra-societal environment---in such a way as to make for 'system maintenance'". 32

To fully understand the limited scope available to the incumbents for influencing behavior within the political system we need to point out once again that a feature of the administration in Cyprus is its bicom munality. Authority is vested not only in a central government but also in the Greek and Turkish Communal Chambers. As a result the power and authority of the central government has been progressively eroded away.

Because of the Cabinet and House of Representatives, with their Greek majorities, have attempted to pass legislation which would weaken the Turkish Cypriot position vis-a-vis the Constitution, the Turkish community has lost faith in their conviction of the bindingness of the central government. Not only has this feeling of bindingness been lost, but also the

32D. J. Grady, Schema of Supplement and Synthesis for the Political System, unpub. ms., McMaster University, 1966, pp. 18-19.
central government has lost its ability to authoritatively allocate values, goods, and so on. Their source of coercion is the police and here, once again, there is a mixed composition. The Turks will not coerce their own for Makarios and they have prevented the Greeks from doing it also.

Not only has there been a lack of support for the authorities (here we mean Makarios and the Greek majority) from the Turkish Cypriots, but also there has been a lack of support from large sectors of the Greek Cypriot population which has become alienated from Makarios because the President has been unable to control the situation almost since Independence.

The Turks felt that they were being abused as early as mid 1960 and since that time they have rapidly withdrawn their support of the central government. At present the only authorities the Turkish Cypriots recognize are the leaders of the Turkish Communal Chamber.

Large numbers of Greeks have begun to withdraw their support of the central government (and Makarios in particular) because of the President's inability to cope with the Turks. The radicals, both right-wing and left-wing, have been especially vexed with Makarios's handling of the problem.
It remains for us in our final chapter to assess the significance of this withdrawal of support from the political community, regime and authorities by giving a resume and interpretation of what has been stated in this chapter. We shall also attempt to answer why the stresses have affected society so much as to create two political systems.
CONCLUSIONS

According to our pattern of analysis, the impediments to a unified state in Cyprus have been many. In the intra-societal environment we have accounted for several substantial sources of stress. Demographic, economic, and social structure indicators, all suggest the presence of factors affecting the process and character of the political cultures in Cyprus. The resultant fragmented political culture, in turn, affected the way in which the within-put functions were performed in the political system which was formed at the time of Independence, and are now being performed in the two political systems which came into being in 1963-1964.

In the political socialization and recruitment functions we discovered an ethnic dichotomy consisting of the Orthodox Greek and the Muslim Turk. In spite of the fact that they have lived in close proximity for centuries, neither the Greeks nor the Turks display a tendency to assimilate the customs and values of each other's cultures. Education and religion are very important socializing processes. Yet the problem is that they have not aimed or practised toward producing Cypriots rather than Turks or Greeks. The curricula and the educational aims of the Greek and Turkish schools and
churches are by far the most important factors in producing the identifications of these two dominant communities with their motherlands.

The interest articulation and aggregation functions, as performed in Cyprus, also tend to create a gulf between the Turks and the Greeks. The process of induction into the political cultures and political systems of Cyprus has been accelerated by the development of ethnic associational interest groups. In addition to being articulators and aggregators of interests, two associational groups, the Greek and Turkish Communal Chambers, have also become allocators of authoritative decisions, thus putting these organizations within the political system. The communal chambers have constantly stirred up nationalistic feeling against each other.

In addition to the communal chambers, the trade unions and the political parties, as associational groups, have fostered conflict and distrust in the intra-societal environment, which in turn has caused stress on the political systems. Unlike the communal chambers and the political parties, the trade unions are a part of the intra-societal environment rather than of the political systems. At present the most powerful trade union is the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO), which owes its allegiance to the communist party, AKEL. The importance of trade unionism on articulation and aggregation
of interests can be seen when one realizes that there is a branch of a union in all the main villages and towns of the island.

Political parties have had a great effect as articulators and aggregators of interest also. Because of the bicommunal nature of the constitution, political parties are split on ethnic divisions. This can do nothing but add fuel to the already uncontrollable fire. This only perpetuates the obstacles to unity and cooperation in the politics of Cyprus.

The political communication function via the newspapers in this instance has created a substantial source of stress. The rights of freedom of the press and of expression have been scrupulously upheld in Cyprus. In fact, the constitutional guarantee has permitted occasional irresponsible excesses in inflammatory editorials on the part of these media. The newspapers representing the two major ethnic groups have helped to keep communal tensions alive in the post-Independence period. There has been, however, no government interference with the Cypriot press and no newspaper or periodical has ever been seized or censored. Private editors have always been free to criticize government policy and officials, subject only to the libel laws of the country. The printed word is still the most powerful,
although not necessarily the most peaceful, molder of
public opinion.

Except for the newspaper media, it has been
quite difficult to analyze the impact of the political
communication function on the political systems. Up
to the time that fighting broke out in December, 1963,
radio and television broadcasts were of a type which did
not discuss or show political conflict or divisions within
the country. It must be remembered that these stations
were owned and controlled by the central government and
the only attempt by these media was an attempt to keep
the people satiated and to keep their minds off political
matters. As has been seen above, the attempt was a
miserable failure. The impact of the newspapers on the
political system has been immense. Without the inflamma-
tory editorials and one-sided reporting of the newspapers,
there might have been some hope for a peaceful settlement
of the constitutional problems, but the newspapers as
performers of the function of political communication have
contributed in no small way to the division on Cyprus and
in so doing have assisted in the creation and strengthen-
ing of the two political systems.

As far as the objects of support are concerned,
we have seen time and again through the pages of this
paper that there is no viable political community, no
regime of values and norms, and no support, by all
Cypriots, for the incumbents of the roles in the regime.

Political community is a practical concept intended to arouse and strengthen the affective bonds of a member for the political system or the society of which he is a part. It has been described above as being much more, but if we take this simplest of meanings we can still see that there is no feeling of political community which includes all Cypriots. Within the first year of Independence the Turkish Cypriots had become alienated from the political system which included both Greek and Turk. By 1963, alienation had become so great that the Turkish Cypriots broke away and formed their own political system, and used the communal chamber as their vehicle in doing this.

If there is a failure of the members of a system to support some kind of a regime, then that system would more than likely be prevented from operating. This is what happened in Cyprus, in the post-Independence period. With the withdrawal of support by the Turkish Cypriots the system was effectively prevented from operating. It is interesting to note that once the Turkish Cypriots had set up their own political system, the Greek Cypriots had little trouble in getting their system operating once again.

It is not enough that members of a system support
only the idea of political community and the regime. In order for a system to survive, those members must also support the occupants of the roles in the regime, that is, they must support the authorities. Here again we see the failing of the functioning of the system shortly after Independence because of lack of overall support for the authorities. Ordinarily, the fact that twenty per cent of a population did not support the authorities would not in itself cause undue stress on the functioning of a political system. In Canada and the United States today, more than twenty per cent of the population do not 'support' the incumbents of the roles of authority. But there is one difference here. Those in Canada and the United States who do not support the authorities still accept their decisions as binding. This is perhaps the major difference in Cyprus, for here we find that the Turkish Cypriots did not even accept the authorities' decisions as binding. In fact, the Turkish Cypriots actively refused to accept the decisions of the authorities as binding. Consequently, great stress was placed upon the system, and that stress remained until the Turkish Cypriots withdrew entirely and formed their own political system.

The basic cause of conflict in Cyprus is the rebellion of President Makarios and the Greek majority against the 1960 settlement that made the island an
independent republic. That status is the product of agreements arrived at in Zurich and London during 1959-1960. The parties to those agreements were Greece, Turkey, Britain, and leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The representative of the Greek Cypriots was Archbishop Makarios himself. This constitution did little to engender a sense of political community on Cyprus.

In addition to safeguarding British sovereignty over two essential military bases, agreement was reached on a constitutional system which includes numerous unamendable 'basic articles'. Other articles of the constitution, according to these 'basic' provisions, can be amended only by two-thirds of the Greek and Turkish members of the Cypriot House of Representatives, each group voting separately (Article 182).

As has been noted above, the immediate cause of strife was President Makarios' announcement on November 30, 1963, of thirteen constitutional changes that he apparently intended to put into effect whether the Turks accepted them or not. By this time the withdrawal of support for the regime and authorities by the Turkish Cypriots had become almost complete. By intending to push through the constitutional reforms with or without the support of the Turks, President Makarios succeeded
in destroying the political system, for no Turk could support his proposals and he was not about to listen to Turkish demands.

In addition to President Makarios' intended amendments is the fact that the bicommunal nature of the constitution has been so divisive that there was little hope for a viable political system right from Independence. Most of the constitutional provisions reveal the key problem of Cyprus, that is, the island is a state, but not a nation. The author doubts whether we could even call Cyprus a state today. As Makarios has correctly pointed out, the constitutional system encourages and perpetuates division rather than union and co-operation. For Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, the present system was essential for the security and preservation of their way of life. The Turks are a minority on Cyprus and consequently they felt that although their support of the political system would be accepted their demands on the system would not.

If it were purely an internal question there is no doubt that the Cyprus Constitution would long ago have been radically altered. The problem is that both Turkey and Greece will not allow a settlement to be achieved. The fact that Cyprus is only forty miles from her coast, and that it could come under the domination of a foreign
power (Greece), probably holds more fear for Turkey than the fate of the hundred thousand Turkish Cypriots.

There are now two political systems on Cyprus where there once was one. The reason for this is rather obvious. For a political system to survive there must be a minimum level of inputs of support. These inputs may be classified under four headings: 1) material supports, such as the payment of taxes or other levies, and the provision of services, such as labour contributions or military service; 2) obedience to laws and regulations; 3) participation, such as joining organizations, voting, and communicating about politics; and, 4) manifestation of deference to public authority, symbols, and ceremonials. Of these four categories, a significant proportion of the population (the Turkish Cypriots) did not join into three of them, and they were prevented from joining into the fourth.

It will be recalled that Rauf Denktash, President of the Turkish Communal Chamber, called upon all Turkish Cypriots not to pay taxes to the central government, thereby denying the system of input number one. From 1960, the Turks have been reluctant to obey central

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1See, Gabriel A. Almond, :A Developmental Approach to Political Systems", in World Politics, January 1965, pp. 191-194, for a fuller discussion of support inputs along with demand inputs.
government laws, and since 1963 have even refused to recognize their validity. The only manifestation of deference to public authority and symbols of a bicomunal nature. The Turks obey the leaders of their communal chamber, fly the Turkish flag, and participate in Turkish ceremonies. The Greek Cypriots act in a similar manner. As far as joining and voting is concerned, we have the same problem. Everything is done on a bicomunal level and consequently there is little or no intercourse between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Since mid 1963 the Turkish Communal Chamber has taken on the responsibility of providing goods and services for the Turks. Turkish inputs of demand and support are directed at and within the Turkish Communal Chamber and not the central government. The possibility of the return of one political system to Cyprus is very remote, almost as remote, in fact, as the possibility of a return to the functioning of the London and Zurich Agreements.

In this study the author has come across the problem which is so familiar to those doing research. This is the problem of data. Except for data of the demographic type, most data has been of an interpretative type which was difficult to convert into some sort of evaluation. A future researching and thorough testing of the model
might be done by setting up a series of more specific hypothesis susceptible of test as confirmable or falsifiable.

In this paper we have attempted to show why there was a breakdown of the political system in Cyprus and the appearance of two political systems in its place. We have also undertaken to highlight the areas of stress in Cypriot politics with the use of systems analysis. What we have not undertaken to do is to prescribe some remedy for the ills of Cyprus. The fact that some of the world's best negotiators, working through the United Nations, have failed to come up with an acceptable solution to Cyprus' problems does not comfort the author. What we need is a substantial reorganization of our thinking concerning political processes, toward the achievement of which this systems approach to the problem of social conflict on Cyprus has been proposed.
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