HUSserL AND THE IDEAL OF
UNIVERSAL SCIENCE.
HUSSERL AND THE IDEAL OF
UNIVERSAL SCIENCE

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ABSTRACT:

An attempt is made to understand Husserl's effort at developing a universal science of experience. It is soon recognized that the possibility of creating such a science rests on the ability to adopt a transcendental perspective. Thus a demonstration of how such a perspective is possible becomes the first task. Following this, an attempt is made to outline the basic programmatic features of Husserl's scientific project. At the same time an effort is made to clarify the justification for characterizing Husserl's phenomenological philosophy as the truly fundamental science. Then, with the aid of various commentators, a critical examination of the very aims of Husserl's work is undertaken. This criticism attempts to delineate, in a general manner, precisely the limits of the enterprise of rationalism (scientific philosophy). Finally, an evaluation of Husserl's work is offered, recognizing his great influence in the philosophical movement.
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NOTES

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THE SWIMMER'S MOMENT

For everyone
The swimmer's moment at the whirlpool comes,
But many at that moment will not say
'This is the whirlpool, then.'
By their refusal they are saved
From the black pit, and also from contesting
The deadly rapids, and emerging in
The mysterious, and more ample, further waters.
And so their bland-blank faces turn and turn
Pale and forever on the rim of suction
They will not recognize.
Of those who dare the knowledge
Many are whirled into the ominous centre
That, gaping vertical, seals up
For them an eternal boon of privacy,
So that we turn away from their defeat
With a despair, not for their deaths, but for
Ourselves, who cannot penetrate their secret
Nor even guess at the anonymous breadth
Where one or two have won:
(The silver reaches of the estuary).

Margaret Avison
INTRODUCTION

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is certainly one of the greatest philosophers of our time. Unsatisfied with certain defects in the foundations of his first major study, mathematics, Husserl devoted his life's work to the development of a truly fundamental science. Under the influence of his teacher, Franz Brentano, Husserl felt that such a science was possible in the form of a radical descriptive psychology. Thus in an early work, the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891), he attempted to discover the tenable foundations of the science of arithmetic by investigating the mental activity of the subject. However, in the light of a critique by Frege,¹ and as a result of his own study,² Husserl came to realize the shortcomings of his first approach. Psychology itself needed refinement. Or perhaps an even more radical and still undiscovered discipline was required. In any case, the grounding of arithmetic, Husserl realized, could only be accomplished in a wider philosophical context. And this necessitated a greater understanding of the nature of epistemology and logic. To this end, Husserl published his *Logical Investigations*, volume one in 1900, and volume
two in 1901. However, it was not until 1906 that Husserl began to develop the discipline of phenomenology as the universal foundation of all the sciences (including psychology). He presented his new views in a series of five lectures at Gottingen in 1907 (later published as *The Idea of Phenomenology*). The major programmatic presentation of this new foundation, however, did not appear until the publication of the *Ideas* in 1913.

It should be noted, however, that Husserl's development did not stop here. As is characteristic of any great thinker, he continued to seek clarity with respect to the origin and meaning of objectivity. In the investigations of his later period, Husserl showed a greater appreciation for the role of culture and history, while maintaining his notion of phenomenology as a universal science. This final trend in his work is perhaps best expressed in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, a work which Husserl was in the process of completing when he died.

In our present work, we wish to examine the nature of Husserl's phenomenology as a rigorous fundamental science. That is, we wish to investigate his views regarding the very possibility of a rigorous science of experience. Indeed,
Husserl seemed to think that in principle, all philosophical questions can be answered by means of his phenomenology. Correspondingly, he seemed to believe that it is possible to systematically discover the very meaning and purpose of life itself. Such claims as these should not go unexamined!

There can be no doubt that Husserl's quest for a universal science inspired his whole philosophical career. Thus our present task involves nothing less than the examination and evaluation of the very aims of Husserl's lifelong project. However, in the face of such a prolific writer whose ideas were constantly developing, it becomes difficult to distill the essential moments of his thought without distorting their evolutionary character. When we add our confession that we have not yet studied the entire compass of this writer's work (indeed, apart from our unfamiliarity with all available material, many manuscripts have not yet been published, let alone translated) we seem engaged in a hopeless task. However, although we certainly cannot attempt a definitive investigation, we can still pursue our project, if only to better our own understanding of this great philosopher.

Due to the extensive volume of Husserl's work and our limited acquaintance with it, we have decided not to
include a chronological investigation of the origin and development of his idea of a rigorous science. Rather, we will attempt to examine Husserl's phenomenology as it is presented in his middle period. This means that we will focus mainly on the Ideas. Indeed, we will almost entirely ignore the pre-phenomenological period (pre 1906) when Husserl had not yet explicitly realized the nature of his project. (Thus this omission need not harm our investigation apart from making it less comprehensive.) Also, Husserl's later work, as characterized by his notion of 'genetic phenomenology' and the 'life-world' will be largely excluded. Besides the fact that we are less familiar with this later material, there is a more legitimate consideration which warrants its partial omission. The notion of 'genetic phenomenology' adds a degree of complexity to the whole phenomenological project without altering its idealistic structure. Thus its inclusion need not be necessary for our basic theme, and might only tend to confuse the reader. Also, Husserl's discovery of the life-world, though a crucial supplement to his phenomenological project, does not seem to alter its basic structure as a transcendental idealism.

In what follows, we will attempt to investigate
the possibility of a rigorous science. This will lead us, in CHAPTER ONE, to a discussion of the notion of transcendental experience. In this chapter we will attempt to grasp the spirit of Husserl's work, as well as its underlying basis. Chapters two and three will be devoted to a more detailed examination of how transcendental experience provides the occasion for a rigorous discursive science. More specifically, CHAPTER TWO is concerned with how phenomenology is a descriptive science. And CHAPTER THREE will attempt to show how this descriptive science involves a scientific explication of phenomena. In the course of these chapters, it is hoped that the meaning of Husserl's claim that he establishes a presuppositionless science will be made clearer. In CHAPTER FOUR, we will subject Husserl's science to a critical scrutiny, guided by the remarks made by various commentators. Finally, we will present our CONCLUDING CHAPTER, evaluating Husserl's project, and attempting to put it into proper perspective.
I

TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE AS A WAY OF LIFE

Do not say:
'God gave us this delusion'.
You dream you are the doer,
You dream that action is done,
You dream that action bears fruit.
It is your ignorance,
It is the world’s delusion
That gives you these dreams.

Bhagavad-Gita

1 The Problem of Finding the Right Beginning

What is most intriguing about the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is its aim to be rigorous science. Whether philosophy can ever be rigorous science, and if so, how this is to be accomplished, are issues which must concern every responsible thinker. Indeed, one’s very understanding of the meaning of one’s own life is at stake here. Is life, in the last analysis, unintelligible? Or if it does have a sense, can philosophy, as rigorous science reveal this meaning to us? Indeed how can we even begin to answer such questions?

The problem of the beginning is the most important and perhaps the most difficult of all. Yet philosophy requires a radical beginning if it is ever to become the absolute ground for all scientific endeavour. And that it
should be this universal ground, Husserl maintains, has been the very intention of all western philosophy. He says:

From its earliest beginnings philosophy has claimed to be rigorous science. What is more, it has claimed to be the science that satisfies the loftiest theoretical needs and renders possible from an ethico-religious point of view a life regulated by pure rational norms. ¹

Indeed, Husserl suggests that this radicalness of spirit is perhaps implied in the very meaning of philosophy. He asks:

Must not the demand for a philosophy aiming at the ultimate conceivable freedom from prejudice, shaping itself with actual autonomy according to ultimate evidences it has itself produced, and therefore absolutely self-responsible—must not this demand, instead of being excessive, be part of the fundamental sense of genuine philosophy? ²

But, Husserl says: "During no period of its development has philosophy been capable of living up to this claim of being rigorous science." ³ He adds that "...even the proper sense of philosophical problems has not been made scientifically clear." ⁴ And, as if this were not enough, he says:

I do not say that philosophy is an imperfect science; I say simply that it is not yet a science at all, that as science it has not yet begun. ⁵

Clearly Husserl does not seem to be very impressed with the achievements of the philosophical tradition. Philosophy has not yet become science. Rather, it has remained within the bounds of mere opinion. That is, every
philosophy, although it may have aspired to be rigorous science, has only achieved the status of a world-view (a Weltanschauung philosophy). Unable to attain the conceptual distinctness and clarity of science, philosophy has remained content to be a matter of wisdom. It has settled for 'profundity' rather than scientific clarity. And, Husserl says:

Profundity is a mark of the chaos that genuine science wants to transform into a cosmos, into a simple, completely clear, lucid order. Genuine science, so far as its real doctrine extends, knows no profundity. 6

Husserl adds:

The exact sciences, too, had their long periods of profundity, and just as they did in the struggles of the Renaissance, so too, in the present-day struggles, I dare to hope, will philosophy fight through from the level of profundity to that of scientific clarity.

But if scientific philosophy seeks to overcome the temptation of the profound, it must seek clarity, in the first place, with respect to precisely its own possibility as rigorous science. Indeed, philosophy, as science, has not yet begun because it has not yet faced the challenge of its own radical beginning. Husserl says:

The entire absence of this procedure, the overlooking of the immense difficulties attaching to a correct beginning, or the covering up of the same through the haste to have done with them, had this for its consequence, that we had and have
many and ever new philosophical 'systems' or 'directions' but not the one philosophy which as Idea underlies all the philosophies that can be imagined. 8

Hence all traditional philosophies have proceeded with certain unclarified presuppositions. A radical philosophy, on the other hand, must be presuppositionless. Indeed, even the idea that rigorous science is possible must not be presupposed! Husserl asks

...what about the indubitability of that idea itself, the idea namely of a science that should be grounded absolutely? Is it a legitimate final idea, the possible aim of some possible practice? Obviously that too is something we must not presuppose, to say nothing of taking any norms as already established for testing such possibilities. 9

But how then can we begin!

2 Phenomenology as the Science of Beginnings

The problem of a radical beginning is indeed a difficult one. But with the asking of the question, we have already made a significant beginning towards a possible resolution. On any journey, one must always start from where he is. So too, the phenomenologist, in his quest for self-knowledge, can only begin with his present understanding. This was true for all traditional philosophers. What distinguishes the pursuit of the phenomenologist, however, is the way he proceeds in his task. Phenomenology seeks to ask the question of the meaning of life in the most radical
manner possible. Thus what primarily distinguishes phenomenology from all naive positive sciences and traditional philosophies is not the 'apodicticity' of its results, but the radically scientific method it employs. All other sciences presuppose a beginning. Phenomenology, on the other hand, seeks to uncover its own beginning—the beginning. In so doing, it wills to be the universal ground of all the sciences. Thus for Husserl, phenomenology is

...a science of Beginnings, a 'first' philosophy;...all philosophical disciplines, the very foundations of all sciences whatsoever, spring from its matrix.  

But have we not said that phenomenology must not presuppose the legitimacy of the idea of a science that is grounded absolutely? How, then, can it seek the beginning without presupposing its possibility? Indeed, Husserl himself says:

Only we must be careful about how we make an absolute grounding of science our aim. At first we must not presuppose even its possibility.  

Again, he says:

As beginning philosophers we do not as yet accept any normative ideal of science, and only so far as we produce one newly for ourselves can we ever have such an ideal.  

But, we must ask, how can we produce an ideal of science without first presupposing its possibility? Must we not say,
then, that a rigorous science is essentially impossible?

Yet Husserl claims that such a philosophy is possible. He says:

Philosophy, as it moves towards its realization, is not a relatively incomplete science improving as it goes naturally forward. There lies embedded in its meaning as philosophy a radicalism in the matter of foundations, an absolute freedom from all presuppositions, a securing for itself an absolute basis...13

But does not this claim suggest yet another difficulty? For we have said that the phenomenologist can only begin with his present understanding. But is not this understanding historically and culturally conditioned, and hence laden with hidden presuppositions? Thus how in the world can we possibly strive for a presuppositionless science which is already absolute even as we seek its realization?

3 Original Self-activity

Our difficulties seem insuperable indeed. But before we surrender our project, let us look at the matter more closely. Husserl provides a clue. He says:

Lacking as did the traditional schemes of philosophy the enthusiasm for a first beginning, they also lacked what is first and most important: a specifically philosophical groundwork acquired through original self-activity, and therewith that firmness of basis, that genuineness of root, which alone makes real philosophy possible.14

We have already seen that we can not accept any ideal of rigorous science unless 'we produce one newly for ourselves'.15
Earlier still, we saw that perhaps philosophy must shape itself 'according to ultimate evidences it has itself produced'. Now we see that what is 'first and most important' is a 'groundwork acquired through original self-activity'. Clearly, Husserl seems to believe that through something called 'original self-activity', ultimate evidences can be produced. Thus for Husserl, the logical paradoxes which seem to destroy any hope for rigorous science are not ultimate. Rather, they are transcended by something still more basic, perhaps pre-logical—a mysterious something called original self-activity. But what is this original self-activity?

4 The Phenomenological Epoche

We are now reaching a crucial and very difficult stage in our investigations. The way we understand this step will determine our whole reading of Edmund Husserl. The nature of the difficulty we face is expressed by Husserl in this passage:

That we should set aside all previous habits of thought, see through and break down the mental barriers which these habits have set along the horizons of our thinking, and in full intellectual freedom proceed to lay hold on those genuine philosophical problems still awaiting completely fresh formulation which the liberated horizons on all sides disclose to us—these are hard demands. Yet nothing less is required. What makes the appropriation of the essential nature of phenomenology, the understanding of the peculiar
meaning of its form of inquiry, and its relation to all other sciences (to psychology in particular) so extraordinarily difficult, is that in addition to all other adjustments, a new way of looking at things is necessary, one that contrasts at every point with the natural attitude of experience and thought.17

Phenomenology, Husserl says, is "...a science covering a new field of experience."18 This new experience is absolutely different from our natural attitude of experience. It perhaps is the 'original self-activity' we are trying to understand. We gain access to this experience through a radical scientific method—a method which distinguishes phenomenology from every other scientific discipline. Husserl calls this method the phenomenological epoche (reduction). He says that

...phenomenological epoche lays open (to me, the meditating philosopher) an infinite realm of being of a new kind, as the sphere of a new kind of experience: transcendental experience.19

If we are sincere in our desire to understand Husserl, then we must attempt, in practice, to experience our life and our world transcendentally. That this involves more than a mere conceptual understanding is suggested by Husserl in these lines:

Perhaps it will even become manifest that the total phenomenological attitude and the epoche belonging to it are destined in essence to effect, at first, a complete personal transformation, comparable in the beginning to a religious conversion, which then, however, over and above this, bears within itself
the significance of the greatest existential transformation which is assigned as a task to mankind as such.20

Before we attempt the difficult task of describing the phenomenological *epoché* and transcendental experience, let us first point out an important consequence of what we have just said. Phenomenology, as rigorous science, is based on a kind of experience. Thus whether it is possible, and to what extent, depends, in the first place, on the possibility of adopting the phenomenological attitude and experiencing transcendentally. Hence 'logical arguments', either for or against, are of no avail. It would be no less ridiculous to attempt to logically prove or disprove the possibility of tasting distilled water. What one must do is try it and see. In this regard, Husserl says:

> Whoever does not see or will not see, who talks and argues, but always remains at the place where he accepts all conflicting points of view and at the same time denies them all, there is nothing we can do with him....It is as if a blind man wished to deny there is such a thing as seeing, or still better, as if one who has sight wished to deny that he himself sees and that there is any such thing as seeing. How could we convince him, assuming that he has no other mode of perception?21

5 The Naivete of the Natural Attitude

Let us now begin to elucidate the phenomenological *epoché*. From the natural point of view, we experience
ourselves as natural men, living in a world of which we are conscious. Our conscious experiences themselves are taken to be real psychological events experienced by a real psychological ego. That is, we take them as real experiences 'in the mind' of a real person. The mind itself, we may believe, is somehow connected with physiological processes in the brain. All this seems quite natural. Indeed, for the most part, nothing that happens in the world leads us to imagine anything different. As Husserl says,

"entrenched in the natural standpoint as we are even in our scientific thinking, grounded in habits that are most firmly established since they have never misled us, we take all these data of psychological reflection [i.e. our conscious experiences] as real world-events, as the experience of animal beings."

That Husserl is correct here can hardly be denied. We all usually think of ourselves as real people living in a real world. Indeed, would it not be foolish, if not insane, to think otherwise? Yet Husserl demands a new attitude of thought which is entirely different from this usual way of taking ourselves and the world. This is not to say that our natural attitude is wrong—it is merely naïve. But now, why is it naïve?

In order to see the naïveté of the natural attitude, we must perform the phenomenological epoche. That is, we:
must suspend our natural belief in the real existence of ourselves and our world so that their character, as belief, can be seen. But, you may argue, I do not merely believe the world exists—I know it exists. The phenomenologist would agree. He also does not wish to deny that the world exists. He merely wishes to make clearer what I actually do know when I say that I know there is a world. Let us try to make this understandable with an illustration:

Suppose I am dreaming, and in my dream I see myself as Superman. That is, I dream that I have the ability to fly, can see through concrete walls, and cannot be injured by the weapons of mere earth beings. All of this I believe with the same certainty as that which I hold for natural reality when I am awake. That is, I do not know that I am dreaming, but accept my dream as real. Now, am I really Superman, or is it more true to say that I am he who dreams he is Superman? Clearly the latter is more correct. Now suppose further that in this dream I see myself performing the phenomenological epoché. I thereupon discover that it is not an indubitable fact that I am Superman, nor even that I am a natural ego who is performing the epoché. Rather, I see myself as merely conscious of a self who believes he is Superman and performs the epoché. When I wake up, I am still this
consciousness—only now I am conscious of a self who believes he has just awakened. No matter what happens, I am always and necessarily this pure consciousness. Just as it was more true to say that I was the person who was dreaming, he was Superman rather than Superman himself, it is also more true (indeed, indubitably true) to say that I am a pure consciousness of a natural self and his experience, and not merely that natural self alone.

Let us apply this to what we have been saying. The phenomenologist, we said, would not deny that a world exists. But what he does not deny, we now see, is merely that there is a consciousness of a world. This is certainly not what most people mean when they say that a world exists. For in the natural attitude, the world is taken to exist apart from consciousness. But this is precisely why this attitude is naive—a belief. For that the world does so exist is unknown and unknowable. And any epistemic claim to the contrary is precisely absurd.

Let us try to make this phenomenological perspective clearer with another illustration. I presently see a table, and as I am seeing it, I am reflectively aware that this perceptual experience is occurring. It is occurring as the real experience of a real ego confronted by a real table. Can I doubt that this experience itself is occurring?
Perhaps the table isn't real, perhaps the whole experience is a dream; perhaps I am not really sitting here, but am living at home in bed. Be that as it may, isn't it still indubitable that the experience itself is given to consciousness and can be reflectively apprehended as such? And is this not true of all experience? We may wake up some day in another world and find that our whole life has been a dream. But are not the contents of that dream still indubitable objects of consciousness? Indeed they are. In performing the phenomenological *epoche* we awaken ourselves from our dream, metaphorically speaking, and see the world and our natural selves as they are really given. That is, we see them as objects of an 'anonymous' consciousness. Whereas before we naively believed in the reality of the world, we now see this belief for what it is—belief. It is unknown and unknowable whether the world is real or merely dreamt. To wish such knowledge is absurd. Even if we wake up some day to find out that we have been dreaming, we would still not know whether we might not now be dreaming this awakening itself. Thus searching for an absolute reality within the world is a senseless endeavour. Nevertheless, the experience we have is itself absolute. We can doubt the real existence of anything, but we cannot meaningfully doubt the doubting. Thus everything that is, the whole natural world and all
reality, are simply objects of a pure consciousness whose experience is absolute. Thus Husserl says:

All empirical unities, and therefore psychological experiences also, are indicators of absolute systems of experience... We must bring ourselves to see that in taking for granted that every experience of oneself or another has empirical validity as the psychological and psychophysical state of consciousness of animal subjects, we are indeed fully justified, but only within the relevant limits; that over against the empirical experience, and as the assumption on which it depends for its very meaning, stands the absolute experience, and that this is not a metaphysical construction, but, with appropriate shifting of the standpoint, indubitably manifest in all its absoluteness and immediately given in intuition.23

We must continue trying to make this new perspective clearer. All consciousness is consciousness of something. To be conscious of nothing is not to be conscious at all. This trait of consciousness, to be 'of something', Husserl calls 'intentionality'.24 Thus to say I am conscious of myself as existing in the world is simply to say that myself and my world are intentional objects of consciousness. With this clarification in mind, we can say that the natural attitude is naive simply because it takes for real that which is merely intentional. That is, it confers absolute existence on the objects of which we are conscious instead of on our awareness of these objects precisely as objects of consciousness. Thus the naive of the natural attitude lies precisely in the forgetting of the thoroughgoing
intentionality of consciousness. The phenomenological epoche is designed to overcome this forgetting by making explicit the intentionality of consciousness. Husserl says:

The first thing we must do here is overcome the naivete which makes the conscious life, in and through which the world is what it is for us—as the universe of actual and possible experience—into a real property of man...The first thing we must do, and first of all in immediate self-experience, is to take the conscious life, completely without prejudice, just as what it quite immediately gives itself as itself to be. Here in immediate givenness, one finds anything but... 'sense' data...that is, one finds none of those things which appear in traditional psychology, taken for granted to be immediately given from the start. Instead, one finds the cogito, intentionality...Here we find nothing other than 'consciousness of...'—consciousness in the broadest sense, which is still to be investigated in its whole scope and its mode.

6 Self-suspension

We have attempted to elucidate the intentionality of consciousness which is uncovered by the phenomenological epoche. But we must be careful how we understand this intentionality. For psychology, too, has taken account of the intentionality of consciousness. Yet there is a radical difference between the psychological and the phenomenological point of view. Husserl says:

One must guard himself from the fundamental confusion between the pure phenomena, in the sense of phenomenology, and the psychological phenomenon, the object of empirical psychology.

Let us briefly look at this difference so that we do not
mistake the one for the other.

Psychology can also 'bracket' or 'suspend' the belief in the existence of natural phenomena. After this 'reduction', all phenomena are taken as psychic phenomena. But the psyche itself; that is, the mind which is conscious, remains presupposed. Man remains natural man who lives in a world and experiences real psychic phenomena. Consciousness is intentional, but this intentionality remains rooted in a mind given beforehand. The phenomenological reduction, however, is more radical still. For in this reduction, the phenomenologist himself is also suspended. Husserl says:

But as a piece of method...we apply to ourselves the rule of phenomenological reduction which bears on our own empirical existence as well as on that of other beings.27

Thus the phenomenologist, unlike the psychologist, does not take for granted the existence of a mind or person who is conscious of a world. Rather, the person himself, as a real existent in the world, is also an object of consciousness. Thus everything of which we are conscious, including ourselves, is intentionally related to consciousness. However, we must remember that in suspending our belief in our own real existence, we do not thereby deny that we exist. We merely understand our existence differently. That is, we no longer naively believe that we exist.
in the world; rather, we see that our own natural existence is merely an object of consciousness.

But, along with Husserl, we might want to ask: "..can we as phenomenologists, set ourselves out of action, we who still remain members of the natural world?" He answers immediately:

We may soon convince ourselves that there is no real difficulty, provided we have not shifted the meaning of the 'disconnecting'. We can even continue undisturbed to speak as in our capacity as natural human beings we have to speak; for as phenomenologists we should not cease to set ourselves down as such also in our speech. 28

Clearly, to understand what Husserl means here, we must gain a clear insight of what he means by 'disconnecting'. This we can accomplish by comparing the phenomenological suspension with the Cartesian doubt. With respect to Descartes, Husserl says: "..his universal attempt at doubt is just an attempt at universal denial." It involves a "..'supposition' of Non-Being, which is thus the partial basis of the attempt to doubt." 29 The phenomenological suspension, however, wishes to presuppose neither the being nor the non-being of that which is suspended. The bracketed thesis is merely 'put out of action'. It remains exactly as it was—exactly as it is lived, but without us taking it seriously. When I suspend my naive belief in the existence of myself, I do not thereby deny that I exist, nor even doubt that I exist.
Rather, I simply put my belief 'out of action' so that it no longer carries me blindly along with it. I am thereby able to see the belief as a belief for the first time.

An illustration might be useful here. Suppose I am an actor who is so involved in my role that I forget I am acting. If I were then to 'suspend' my actions—to 'step back' from them, as it were—I would then see my actions in their proper context. This would not involve doubting or denying the existence of myself or my actions, nor would I stop acting. Rather, I would simply see my actions in their proper light—as those of the actor who I am.

Another writer used the same analogy in a more comprehensive manner, worth quoting:

We begin with the discovery of ourselves deeply submerged in the structure of the present drama of cultural existence. Then, like the spectator of the Greek tragedy, we estrange ourselves from the action, continuously involved, yet intellectually alienated, conscious of the hero's reality both immediately as he himself is, and yet with reflective dispassionateness. The drama remains real; it retains all of its integrity of judgement and consequence, but we are no longer swept along by it obliviously. It is for us alone to come to see the folly, and the inevitable consequences, not simply as bitter irony, but indeed as the concise playing out to the end of the necessity of some pattern of fate.30

One is reminded here of Shakespeare: "All the world's a stage, And all the men and women merely players."31 Then also, there is Plato: "All of us, then, men and women
alike, must fall in with our role and spend life in making our play as perfect as possible—"32

7 Intuition

By performing the reduction, we are able to see our experience as it is really being lived. This 'seeing' Husserl calls 'intuition'. We 'see' pure phenomena, exactly as they are given. Husserl says:

Even if I should put into question the ego and the world and the ego's mental life as such, still my simply 'seeing' reflection on what is given in the apperception of the relevant mental process and on my ego, yields the phenomenon of this apperception; the phenomenon, so to say, of 'perception construed as my perception'.33

Thus he adds later:

Thus to each psychic lived process there corresponds through the device of phenomenological reduction a pure phenomenon which exhibits its intrinsic (immanent) essence (taken individually) as an absolute datum.34

Hence the phenomenological reduction is simply a device for seeing pure phenomena. One merely brackets the natural attitude, and thereby sees what is self-evidently given. It all sounds so simple—as if all one had to do is 'flick a switch' and there is light. But perhaps the adopting of the new phenomenological attitude is not so easy. Indeed, perhaps it is the most demanding challenge a man can face. Thus let us take a more careful look at what seems to be involved in 'seeing'. Husserl says:
From our phenomenological standpoint we can and must put the question of essence: What is the 'perceived as such'? We win the reply to our question as we wait, in pure surrender, on what is essentially given. We can then describe 'that which appears as such' faithfully and in the light of perfect self-evidence.  

Later, Husserl adds:

Only we must have the courage here, as everywhere in phenomenology, to accept in the phenomenon what really presents itself to mental insight, and in the form in which it so presents itself, and instead of twisting its meaning, to describe it honestly. All theories must adjust themselves to such descriptions.

These sentiments echo Husserl's principle of all principles, the principle of intuition:

that every primordial dator Intuition is a source of authority for knowledge; that whatever presents itself in 'Intuition' in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself.

In this series of quotations one finds certain implications which may be crucial for the understanding of the phenomenological epoche and intuition. In the first place, seeing requires a pure surrender to what is given. Indeed, the epoche is precisely such a surrender. For it demands that we let go of our natural belief in ourselves so that we can see the phenomena exactly as they are given. Further, such seeing requires courage. Indeed, what could be more courageous then the self-abandonment required by the
phenomenological *epoché*. Our natural belief, even in our own natural existence, must be suspended. Clearly, then, the phenomenological *epoché* and the principle of intuition are not mere constructions of thought which can be dispassionately affirmed or denied. Rather, they entail a kind of praxis—a self-activity which involves a courageous surrendering of natural beliefs so that the self-given can be seen as it is.

8 Reflection

Now we must ask, is this peculiar kind of praxis the original self-activity 'which alone makes real philosophy possible'? We have suggested that it is. Let us then try to get a clearer idea of what is involved in this original 'seeing'. Husserl says:

Thus as little interpretation as possible, but as pure an intuition as possible (intuitio sine comprensionone). In fact, we will hark back to the speech of the mystics when they describe the intellectual seeing which is supposed not to be a discursive knowledge. And the whole trick consists in this—to give free reign to the seeing eye and to bracket the references which go beyond the 'seeing' and are entangled with the seeing, along with the entities which are supposedly given and thought along with the 'seeing' and finally, to bracket what is read into them through accompanying reflections.

Again, Husserl says:

Meanwhile no inclination is more dangerous to the 'seeing' cognition of origins and absolute data than to think too much, and from these reflections
in thought to create supposed self-evident principles... The understanding is not to be allowed to interrupt and to insert its unredeemed bank notes among the certified ones. 40

We see here that excessive interpretation and thought are dangers to be avoided. Thus 'accompanying reflections' which go beyond what is given are themselves to be bracketed. In this context, however, we can bring out another aspect of the _epoche_ and 'seeing' which may help clarify matters. For _epoche_ and 'seeing' also involve a kind of reflection, although of a radically different sort. It is transcendental reflection. Husserl writes:

In the natural reflection of everyday life, also however in that of psychological science... we stand on the footing of the world already given as existing. ... In _transcendental-phenomenological reflection_ we deliver ourselves from this footing, by universal epoche with respect to the being or non-being of the world. The experience as thus modified, the transcendental experience, consists then, we can say, in our looking at and describing the particular transcendently reduced _cogito_, but without participating as reflective subjects, in the natural existence positing that the originally straight-forward perception or other _cogito_ contains or that the Ego, as immersing himself straightforwardly in the world, actually executed. 41

In 'natural reflection', I take myself as really existing, and reflecting on, for example, a perception of a house. Thus we have an original _cogito_: 'a house-perception', and then a reflectively modified _cogito_: 'a reflection on this house-perception', whereby I see
myself as seeing this particular house. This modified cogito is a new, though still natural, experience. But suppose, as I am reflecting on my seeing-this-house; I perform the époche. No longer do I naively take myself as really existing, and seeing this house; but rather, I see myself as merely the consciousness of this experience. This seeing is precisely transcendental reflection, and gives rise to a new experience--transcendental experience. Thus Husserl says:

The reflecting Ego's non-participation in the 'positing' (believing, taking a position as to being) that is part of the straightforward house-perception in no wise alters the fact that his reflective experiencing is precisely an experiencing experiencing of the house-perception with all its moments. 42

Thus transcendental experience is simply a new way of reflectively seeing my lived experience. That is, it is a new way of experiencing which involves the reflexive awareness of the thoroughgoing intentionality of consciousness. No longer do I identify myself with the naturally perceiving ego; but rather, I see myself as the consciousness of that ego. Husserl puts it this way:

The non-participating, the abstaining, of the Ego who has the phenomenological attitude is his affair, not that of the perceiving he considers reflectively, nor that of the naturally perceiving Ego. 43

He adds:

If the Ego, as naturally immersed in the world,
experiencingly and otherwise, is called 'interested' in the world, then the phenomenologically altered—and, as so altered, continually maintained—attitude consists in a splitting of the Ego: in that the phenomenological Ego establishes himself as 'disinterested onlooker', accessible by means of a new reflection, which, as transcendental, likewise demands the very same attitude of looking on 'disinterestedly'—the Ego's sole remaining interest being to see and to describe adequately what he sees, purely as seen, as what is seen and seen in such and such a manner.

Thus all occurrences of life turned toward the world...become accessible to description. 44

Again, in another place, Husserl says:

At the phenomenological standpoint, acting on lines of principle, we tie up the performance of all such cogitative theses...instead of living in them and carrying them out, we carry out acts of reflexion directed towards them, and these we apprehend as the absolute Being which they are. We now live entirely in such acts of the second level [my italics] whose datum is the infinite field of absolute experiences—the basic field of Phenomenology. 45

We see, then, that the transcendental experience of 'seeing' is a radically different kind of self-reflection. It involves a splitting of the ego so that the ego can view itself dis-passionately from 'above'. And it lives this 'seeing' as if it were itself entirely on this 'second level'. Husserl calls it an 'experiencing experiencing', the reflective experiencing of natural experience itself. But is such an experience possible? And if so, might it not occur only during rare moments—'moments of vision'? Where does Husserl stand on this score?
9 Transcendental Reflection as a Way of Life

When Husserl says that we can 'live entirely in such acts of the second level', he desires, as everywhere, to be taken quite seriously. He does not see phenomenology as

...a new, purely theoretical interest, a new 'science' with a new vocational technique...carried on either as an intellectual game with very ideal pretensions, or as a higher-level intellectual technique in the service of the positive sciences, useful for them, while they themselves, in turn have their only real value in their usefulness for life.46

"Understood in this way," Husserl complains, "it was so happily criticized by the modern irrationalistic philosophers [modern 'existentialists']. 47 For Husserl, however, phenomenology has an entirely different meaning. He says:

Through the abstention which inhibits this whole hitherto unbroken way of life a complete transformation of all life is attained, a thoroughly new way of life.48

Again, he says:

It is to be noted also that...the 'transcendental' epoche is meant of course, as a habitual attitude which we resolve to take up once and for all. Thus it is by no means a temporary act, which remains incidental and isolated in its various repetitions.49

And yet again:

One of the first things to be described about the epoche in question is that it is a habitual époche of accomplishment, one with periods of time in which it results in work, while other times are devoted to other interests of work or play; furthermore, and most important, the suspension of its accomplishment in no
wav changes the interest which continues and remains valid within personal subjectivity. 50

Clearly then, phenomenology is, in the first place, a peculiar form of praxis. It involves the acquiring of a new habitual attitude. And, as in the case of all habitual accomplishments, it seems likely that it too is something that must be continually practiced. (We all know the motto 'practice makes perfect'). Thus one might say that phenomenology simply involves the learning of a proper habit. But, unlike ordinary 'finishing schools', the habit to be learned is not conditioned by cultural-historical factors. Rather, what is to be practiced is a way of living which reflects a new attitude about the meaning of existence. Husserl says that it is

...a new kind of practical outlook, a universal critique of all life and of its goals, of all the forms and systems of culture that have already grown up in the life of mankind. This brings with it a critique of mankind itself and of those values that explicitly or implicitly guide it. Carrying it to a further consequence, it is a practical outlook whose aim is to elevate mankind through universal scientific reason in accord with norms of truth in every form, and thus to transform it into a radical new humanity made capable of an absolute responsibility to itself on the basis of absolute theoretical insights. 51

10 Summary and Transitional Remarks

Let us now, in a very brief manner, summarize our findings. We began with the idea that philosophy might be
capable of being a rigorous presuppositionless science. It became quickly apparent that such an ideal could only be realized if philosophy is able to produce evidences for itself through something called 'original self-activity'.

This original self-activity, as an original seeing of evidences self-given in transcendental experience, required a device called the phenomenological *epoché*. That is, it involves the unnatural suspending of all natural habits of thought, whereby even one's own self, as a natural ego in the world, is no longer taken for granted. The *thoroughgoing* intentionality of consciousness is thereby revealed. We are now confronted with pure phenomena to be seen and described. This seeing requires the courage of the kind of self-surrender demanded by the *epoché*, as one waits, in pure surrender, on what is given. That is, the phenomenologist must have the courage to estrange himself from his natural way of self-understanding so that he can dispassionately observe his experience as it is given. (One is tempted here to call this givenness one's 'destiny') This self-observance is transcendental reflection. We now live entirely in such acts of reflection, experiencing the world and ourselves transcendentally. But this transcendental experience requires practice. Thus phenomenology turns out to be, in the first
place, and fundamentally, a way of being which can be characterized as the practicing of a responsible, resolute, and courageous self-surrender for transcendental life. That is, it is the practicing of a dispassionate detachment from all serious endeavour within the world.

But now we must ask, how does this way of life become a rigorous science? Indeed, we must agree with Husserl that:

Certainly scientific learning is nowhere a passive acceptance of matter alien to the mind. In all cases it is based on self-activity, on an inner reproduction.\(^5^2\)

But we are not concerned here with any ordinary kind of science, or any ordinary kind of self-activity. Thus it remains to be shown how a rigorous science can arise out of the original self-activity of transcendental experience.

Husserl seems to believe that a rigorous science should

...be a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work of generations, really begins from ground up with a foundation free of doubt and rises up like any skillful construction, wherein stone is set upon stone, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights.\(^5^3\)

In another place, he says:

The author sees the infinite open country of the true philosophy, the 'promised land' on which he himself will never set foot.\(^5^4\)

But we must ask, how can resolutely self-conscious transcend-
dental experience lead us to this 'promised land', this 'philosophical system of doctrine'. Indeed, it is easy to be sceptical on this score. It is easy to agree with modern existentialists in their claim that a science of Being is absurd. However, Husserl says, with implicit reference to these writers, that:

One is powerless against the misrepresentations of hurried readers and listeners who in the end hear only what they want to hear...The few, for whom one (really) speaks, will know how to restrain such a suspicion...They will at least wait to see where our path leads them.55

Let us, then, at least attempt to follow this path.
II
THE SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTION OF
TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE

1 Introduction

In CHAPTER ONE, we attempted to indicate what Husserl means by transcendental experience. Such experience, we noticed, is necessary if rigorous science is to be an authentic possibility. The problem we now face, however, is determining how this transcendental experience produces self-evidences of the sort which are adequate for the establishment of a presuppositionless science. That is, it must be shown how what is seen in transcendental experience can be scientifically described (CHAPTER TWO). And further still, it must be shown how this merely descriptive science can lead to a rigorous idealizing procedure which explicates the meaning of intuitable data in a presuppositionless manner (CHAPTER THREE). However, we are not yet capable of giving a thorough presentation of all the relevant analyses which Husserl carries out. Thus we merely hope to outline, in a general manner, some of the main characteristics of phenomenology as we presently understand it.
The Fixing of the Meanings of Words

In the first place, transcendental experience is not a mystical unexpressable experience of being. If it were such, then no rigorous science could be possible. For all science depends on the possibility of expressing and communicating results. As Husserl says:

Science is possible only when the results of thought can be preserved in the form of knowledge and remain available for further thinking.¹

The task, then, is to faithfully describe our experience in words which adequately express what is seen. And the terms used must be as unambiguous as possible. Thus Husserl says:

And since, in the languages in general use, foreign technical terms are, so far as possible, avoided and on good grounds, it is a constant necessity, in face of the existing ambiguities of ordinary speech, to be cautious and frequently test whether a word fixed for use in a previous context may be employed in some new context in a sense which is really the same as before.²

Indeed, the role of ordinary (natural) language in phenomenological discourse presents a crucial problem. Transcendental experience, we noted, is the reflective awareness of ourselves as the consciousness of our natural experience. We take ourselves not as natural egos in the world, but as the consciousness of this state of affairs. However, in order to describe this situation, we must use ordinary words (natural language). But natural language
always contains a surplus of meaning. It does not, in
the first place, indicate the transcendental dimension of
life; rather, it tacitly reflects our belief in our natural
mundane self, existing in a real mundane world. A principle
problem for phenomenology, then, is to make clear, through
ordinary language itself, the transcendental way in which
our words can be understood. As Fink says:

Phenomenological statements necessarily contain an
internal conflict between a word's mundane meaning
and the transcendental meaning which it serves to
indicate. There is always the danger that the dog-
matist will grasp only the mundane meaning of words
and overlook the transcendental significance to such
an extent that he will imagine his mistaken explica-
tion of phenomenology to be correct and capable of
calling upon the text for its justification.  

Thus, apart from all the particular ambiguities
which can arise from the use of certain words, there is an
essential ambiguity in language itself. Correlatively, we
might say that there is also an essential ambiguity in
experience itself. For language and experience can always
be understood from either a transcendental, or a mundane
point of view. Phenomenology, of course, attempts to fix
the transcendental meanings of our natural words.

However, there is an important consequence of what
we have been saying here that should be drawn out. Pheno-
menology must attempt to indicate the transcendental
meaning of natural words by means of these words themselves.
But this means that these words must not be understood in the ordinary straightforward manner; rather, phenomenological statements must be understood analogically or metaphorically. We must learn to see the transcendental meaning which ordinary words can have; thus in the beginning, they must be understood analogically. As Berger says, phenomenological terms:

...have only the value of an analogous indication, useful only for those who have themselves undergone transcendental experiences.⁴

This complexity, or double-meaning of phenomenological vocabulary is basic in phenomenology. For phenomenology evolves around the primary distinction between the mundane and the transcendental. Or as Berger puts it, the most important distinction in the whole of phenomenology is the opposition between the 'worldly' and the 'extraworldly'.⁵

And, Berger adds:

All that will be said concerning the extraworldly must be understood analogically, for, strictly speaking, nothing in the world exactly corresponds to it.⁶

Thus we can say with Berger that this complexity, which is inherent in phenomenology,

...arises from having to reveal with words 'which are of the world' the intentional existence of a transcendental subject, located outside the world, although related to it.⁷

We see then that we cannot understand the proper
meaning of phenomenological terms until we have gained the transcendental perspective. And yet, it is precisely by means of ordinary language that Husserl seeks to reveal that perspective to us. But this means that the first attempts at elucidating phenomenology must always be, to some extent, provisional. Indeed, we can say with Fink that

..every exposition of the phenomenological reduction is in a unique way false. This falsity is caused by the exposition's worldly point of departure, that is, its starting upon the basis of the 'natural attitude' which the performance of the reduction is to suspend. This 'falsity' is unavoidable since the phenomenologist is in the situation where, in order to make himself understandable, he must at first speak in terms which have meaning only in the context of the natural point of view. Meanwhile, his purpose remains precisely to lead his interlocutor to a stage where this context is itself overcome. Thus, as Fink says, an introductory account is

..not false in the sense of being 'incorrect', but only that it possesses that unavoidable 'falsity' which is the property of every first exposition of the reduction, that is, it appeals to an act the performance of which is to transcend it. Thus expressions which are not yet strictly accurate must be employed so that the natural way of understanding the world will become problematic. Indeed, as Berger says:

It is impossible...to tell him [the dogmatist], as in a precise message, what it is that one knows and
he does not know. One can only make preliminary recommendations, furnish provisional indications. Thus, as Fink states, certain Husserlian concepts "...are in a state of striking fluidity." Further, phenomenology, as Fink says, is 'multiple-leveled', and thus requires provisional explications which involve an anticipation of higher levels. What this means will perhaps become clearer later. At present, we must simply caution the reader to remain open-minded with respect to the meanings of phenomenological terms.

3 Pure Description

We have been saving that phenomenology must be able to fix the meanings of its terms if it is to be a science. But we must be careful how we understand this. For what always comes first, in phenomenology, is the progressively developing insight into the way things are. And we cannot be free for this insight if we take for granted, beforehand, some particular conceptual framework. Thus phenomenology does not begin with fixed definitions; it works towards them. It proceeds by description, bringing meanings to expression in accord with the way they give themselves. Husserl says:

As concerns Phenomenology, it aims at being a descriptive theory of the essence of pure transcendental experiences from the phenomenological standpoint, and like every descriptive discipline, neither idealizing
nor working at the substructure of things, it has its own justification.

As a purely descriptive science, phenomenology does not begin, as do the 'exact' sciences, by constructing axioms, or formulating exact definitions from which it can deductively or inductively produce further results. Instead, it belongs "...to a main class of eidetic science wholly other than that to which the mathematical sciences belong." Thus Husserl says:

Definition cannot take the same form in philosophy as it does in mathematics; the imitation of mathematical procedure is invariably in this respect not only unfruitful, but perverse and most harmful in its consequences.

An illustration Husserl gives is helpful here:

The most perfect geometry and its most perfect practical control cannot help the descriptive student of nature to express precisely (in exact geometrical concepts) that which in so plain, so understanding, and so entirely suitable a way he expresses in the words: notched, indented, lens-shaped, umbelliform, and the like--simple concepts which are essentially and not accidentally inexact, and therefore also unmathematical.

And Husserl makes clear that the phenomenologist, in the first stage, is indeed like the student of nature. He says:

In the first stage the realm accessible to transcendental self-experience (a tremendous realm, as we soon discover) must be explored... In this stage accordingly--a stage that is not yet philosophical in the full sense--we proceed like the natural scientist in his devotion to the evidence in which Nature is experienced...
Thus the precision which descriptive phenomenology requires lies in another direction from that of the 'exact sciences'. The degree or kind of exactness used in describing an essence depends on the nature of that essence itself. And all further idealizing and criticizing of the given data must be carried out on the basis of these descriptions. That is, philosophical explication must remain faithful to the descriptive self-evidences worked out in original self-activity.

However, it is important to remember, in this context, that although phenomenology is not an 'exact' science of the mathematical sort, it does not, on that account, lose any of its rigour. Indeed, phenomenology is precisely rigorous because it does not succumb to the temptation of falsifying the meaning of a concrete experience by transforming it into an 'exact' essence. For Husserl recognizes the primacy of inexact morphological essences over exact mathematical essences. Indeed, such exact essences are merely idealizations of inexact essences.18 And, as we shall see more fully later, it is precisely the task of phenomenology to trace back the origin of all such idealizations to their source in the concrete, though inexact, experience of the world.19 Thus phenomenological rigour requires a description of experiences precisely as they are lived, in all their mobility, continuity and vagueness.
Descriptive phenomenology, we said, describes essences precisely as they give themselves to be. But, we might ask, how does the phenomenologist describe an essence without presupposing a certain context, or 'horizon', in which that essence is revealed? For example, before one can investigate the essence 'tree-ness', one must already know what counts as a tree. Further, in so far as this pre-knowing, as a presupposing, is necessary, pure description is never possible. That is, all descriptive endeavour presupposes a context in which the descriptions have significance. And this context itself cannot become an object of description without the presupposing of an even wider context. Thus no descriptions are pure—all involve a presuppositional and interpretive understanding of a context.

How can we answer this criticism? Perhaps we can appreciate the proper way of seeing this state of affairs when we recognize that it is phenomenology itself which has recognized the horizontal nature of our experience of things. That is, phenomenology itself sees that it is part of the essential make-up of all things that they appear in an indeterminate context which nevertheless can be made more determinate. Husserl says that

...it is not open to doubt that there is no experience, in the simple and primary sense of an experience of things, which, grasping a thing for the first time
and bringing cognition to bear on it, does not already 'know' more about the thing than is in this cognition alone... This preknowledge is indeterminate at to content, or not completely determined, but it is never completely empty... Every experience has its own horizon... This implies that every experience refers to the possibility—and it is a question here of the capacity of the ego—not only of explicating step by step, the thing which has been given in a first view, in conformity of what is really self-given thereby, but also of obtaining, little by little as experience continues, new determinations of the same thing... However, I can convince myself that no determination is the last, and that what has already been experienced always still has, without limit, a horizon of possible experience of the same. And this horizon in its indeterminateness is co-present from the beginning as a realm of possibilities, as the prescription of the path to a more precise determination.²⁰

We see then that pure description is never intended to be a simple listing of essences seen from a horizon-less perspective. On the contrary, all experiences are horizontal. Hence every pure description of the essence of a thing simply involves the further working out of a self-given, though indeterminate, prescription. Thus Husserl says:

For as a rule no pure intuitions are present, and there are no pure empty presentations passing over into pure intuitions; it is the impure intuitions which, as intermediate grades maybe, play the chief part, bringing their objective matter on certain sides or in certain phases intuitively before us, and on other sides or in other phases yielding mere empty presentations.²¹

This being the case, however, we are beset with another difficulty. For if we must always be satisfied with a degree of indeterminacy, how can we ever fix our
terms in a manner necessary for the establishment of a science? This problem becomes less troublesome, however, when we realize that the opacity (or indeterminateness) of a particular phenomenon need not itself be opaque, but can be brought to complete clearness. Husserl indicates this in the following:

If the glance of inquiry is turned towards experiences, these will generally be presented with a certain emptiness of content and vague sense of distance which prevents their being employed in reaching conclusive results, whether singular or eidetic. The matter would stand otherwise if, interested not so much in the experiences for their own sake as in the manner of their presentation, we wished to study the essential nature of emptiness and vagueness themselves, for these on their side are not vague but are presented with fullest clearness.  

With this in mind, we can make sense of the notion of reaching a complete clearness despite an underlying indeterminacy. For example, although I see only a particular perspective of an object, I can bring this perspective to an 'absolute nearness', a 'pure self-giveness', whereby I see this perspective as it is. Again, in the case of formal (as opposed to 'material') essences, a similar situation arises. For although the full meaning of a mathematical concept may be indeterminate (e.g. the ontological status of such concepts might be vague), I can still bring to a completely clear seeing the essence of '2+1=3'. In general, we can say that for the most part, the more general an essence is,
the more easily it can be brought to a complete clearness.

For example, the essential difference between colour and sound is more easily intuitable than is the difference between rouge and crimson. As Husserl says:

*It is as though the most general character, the genus (colour in general, sound in general), were fully given, but not as yet the difference.*

Thus we see that although there is an indeterminacy underlying all essences (since no determination is ever the last), we can still meaningfully bring an essence to full clearness.

Hence, as Husserl suggests, "Clearness is quite compatible with a certain margin of indeterminacy." Indeed, this underlying indeterminacy itself is precisely an essential characteristic of being.

4 Eidetic Insight

But perhaps we are still not satisfied with the approach we have been outlining. For it might be argued that as long as our experience encounters only individual objects, the essence of these objects cannot be seen. What we can alone do is 'take our stand' on what counts as the essence, according to some inductive abstraction. That is, we decide what is 'essential' according to the apparent uniformities we come across in our experience. A conflicting instance, then, leads either to a cancellation of our
decision, or to an alteration of it so that the conflict is excluded. In any case, a straight-forward intuition of essences is impossible.

Husserl, of course, does not accept this analysis. He does not think that essences can be adequately explained psychologically as 'mental constructs'. For '1+2=3' is not true merely for man, mirroring his peculiar mental structure, or his particular stance on the way things are. Rather, it is true in itself, and can be intuitively grasped as such. As Husserl says: "...God himself is subject to ...the insight that 2+1=1+2."26 Does this mean, then, that Husserl believes essences are reducible to empirical particulars—that is, does he believe that they can be explained in terms of the empirical particulars to which they can be truly applied. Not at all.27 All empirical particulars, qua real individuals, are 'non-essential'. As Husserl says, "...the particular fact is irrational."28 Or again: "Individual Being of every kind is, to speak quite generally, 'accidental'."29 But if this is the case, how can we empirically intuit an essence? The only choice left, it seems, is to consider essences as Platonic Ideas which are somehow intuited. However, there may also be a danger in understanding Husserl's essences in this manner. For Husserl says:
It has ever and anon been a special cause of offense that as 'Platonizing realists' we set up Ideas or Essences as objects, and ascribe to them as to other objects true Being, and also correlativey the capacity to be grasped through intuition, just as in the case of empirical realities. We here disregard that, alas! most frequent type of superficial reader.

But what, then, does eidetic insight mean for Husserl?

We get a clearer idea of what Husserl means by eidetic insight if we keep in mind the full implication of the phenomenological *epoché*. For it is through the transcendental reduction alone that the realm of phenomenological essences are opened up. As Husserl says:

If we observe the rules which the phenomenological reductions prescribe for us; if, as they require us to do, we strictly suspend all transcendencies, if we take experiences pure, in accordance with their own essential nature, then after all we have set down there opens up before us a field of eidetic knowledge...we perceive it stretching endlessly in every direction.

Thus the resolution of our difficulties, as everywhere, lies in a completely clear understanding of the significance of the phenomenological *epoché*. With this reduction, all psychologism is overcome. For as we have seen, the reduction exposes the naivete of taking the 'mind' as simply and really existing in the world. It reveals, rather, that we are merely conscious of a mind as existing in the world.

*Throughout this work, I use the term 'epoché' (and 'reduction') to signify only the most basic and most universal *epoché*--the transcendental *epoché*.\*
Thus the thesis of psychologism can not be ultimate; rather, it is merely the result of an intentional performance of consciousness.

Traditional empiricist theories are likewise overcome. For things are no longer taken as simply and really existing in the world. Indeed, our very experiences of them are 'nonreal' (irreal). Husserl says:

It will transpire further that all transcendentally purified 'experiences' are non-realities, and excluded from every connection within the 'real world'.

Thus, for Husserl, the individual accidental fact, as 'transcendentally purified' is irreal. That is, it is 'ideal', and as such, it necessarily 'manifests' an essence. After the reduction, we are no longer faced merely with facts. Rather, we are everywhere confronted with essences. However, in the natural attitude, we lose sight of this irreality of the world. That is, we naturalize phenomena, naively taking them as merely facts—as merely accidental occurrences in the world. Or, put in another way, we forget the thoroughgoing intentionality of consciousness; forgetting that we merely believe in the real contingency of the world. But this contingency is not real, it is irreal; that is, it is merely an object of belief, an intentional object. Indeed, all intentional objects are irreal. And as such, they all have an essential content. Thus Husserl
The spell of inborn naturalism also consists in the fact that it makes it so difficult for all of us to see 'essences', or 'ideas'--or rather, since in fact we do, so to speak, constantly see them, for us to let them have the peculiar value which is theirs instead of absurdly naturalizing them. Intuiting essences conceals no more difficulties or 'mystical' secrets than does perception.33

Clearly, then, we simply intuit essences. As Husserl remarks: "Essential insight is still intuition, just as the eidetic object is still an object."34 But this intuition is not merely empirical intuition, as understood from the natural point of view; that is, it is not merely sense intuition (or perception) of an individual object. Nor is the eidetic object a mere empirical particular. Rather, we have here an object of a new type, a pure essence as the object of an essential intuition. And we can see this 'new' object by uncovering, through the epoche, our natural tendency to naturalize it into an ordinary fact. As Husserl says: "Of whatever kind the individual intuition may be...it can pass off into essential intuition."35 Again, he says:

Empirical or individual intuition can be transformed into essential insight (ideation)--a possibility which is itself not to be understood as empirical but as essential possibility.36

Thus phenomenological essences are not seen through empirical
intuition. They require an intuition of another sort, called essential insight.

But, we might ask, how then do these phenomenological essences differ from Platonic Ideas? Indeed, Plato too saw that the intuiting of essences required a turning away from our natural view of sensible reality. Is phenomenology, then, merely a reincarnation of Platonism? To this we must answer that we are not now in the business of interpreting Plato. What we can say, however, is that Husserlian phenomenology is inconsistent with certain traditional ways of reading Plato. Phenomenological essences do not belong in another world—they are not transcendent real entities. Rather, they are transcendental, and as such, irreal. Hence phenomenology is not concerned with another world. Rather, its interests lie in this world, the world that is there for us all. As Husserl says:

Our phenomenological idealism does not deny the positive existence of the real world and of Nature—in the first place as though it held it to be an illusion. Its sole task and service is to clarify the meaning of this world, the precise sense in which everyone accepts it, and with undeniable right, as really existing. 37

Clearly, then, phenomenology is inconsistent with the kind of Platonism which posits a two-world theory. But nor is it guilty of a perverse 'Platonic hypostatization'. For phenomenology distinguishes between object per se and empirical
object. It recognizes that essences are precisely a new type of object, belonging to a wholly different category than do mundane realities. Thus phenomenology is not guilty of the kind of Platonic realism which abrogates the difference between the ideal and the real by postulating that essences have an empirical reality. Rather, essences are irreal. Indeed, everything rests on realizing this irreality of our world.

We must constantly remember that essences are neither 'mental constructs' nor empirical abstractions. Such ways of taking the matter inevitable leads to scepticism— for presupposed in such theories is the belief that essences, as they are in themselves, are essentially unknowable. Essences then become understandable only as 'grammatical hypostatizations'. And any concern we may have about them degenerates into an empirical investigation of language. But essences cannot be empirically seen or empirically investigated from the natural point of view. What is required, rather, is a transcendental investigation carried out with essential insight. Our natural way of looking at things must be transformed, or else our thought will become involved in a scepticism which so clearly contradicts our lived experience. But, as Husserl says: "Self-evident data are patient, they let theories chatter about them, but remain what they are."
5 Eidetic Variation

We have been saying that the transcendental realm of essences is revealed to us when we perform the epoche. But after the reduction we have simply a multiplicity of transcendental phenomena whose essential connections still need working out. That is, we need to abstract essences and essential connections from these phenomena, according to the way they present themselves. This abstraction is called 'eidetic variation' ('imaginative variation' and 'free variation' are other names that are also used). This operation involves turning the particular phenomenon "...into an arbitrary example, which, at the same time, receives the character of a guiding 'model', a point of departure for the production of an infinitely open multiplicity of variants." By an act of volition, we arbitrarily produce free variants (free from the character of contingency). Through this variation, an invariant general essence is revealed. As Husserl says:

It then becomes evident that a unity runs through this multiplicity of successive figures, that in such free variations of an original image, e.g., of a thing, an invariant is necessarily retained as the necessary general form, without which an object such as this thing, as an example of its kind, would not be thinkable at all. While what differentiates the variants remains indifferent to us, this form stands out in the practice of voluntary variation, and as an absolutely identical content, an invariable what,
according to which all the variants coincide: a general essence.\footnote{41}

This general essence prescribes limits to our variation—every variant must be a variation of the same essence manifested in the original example. Nevertheless, the original example itself need not be perceived, but can itself be freely posited in the imagination. I do not need to actually see a cup now—an imagined cup will do just as well, as an original example for subsequent variations. Thus Husserl says: "Obviously, a mere imagining, or rather, what is intuitively and objectively present in it, can serve our purpose just as well."\footnote{42} Thus essences are revealed through a fictive variation in which even the perceptual givenness of the original example is not required. Thus Husserl says:

Hence, if anyone loves a paradox, he can really say, and say with strict truth if he will allow for the ambiguity, that the element which makes up the life of phenomenology as of all eidetic science is 'fiction', that fiction is the source whence the knowledge of 'eternal truths' draws its substance.\footnote{43}

It is very important that we remember this element of 'fiction' in phenomenology and thus avoid misunderstanding this eidetic abstraction in a naturalistic sense. Our starting point is not an empirically existing individual, but rather the same taken merely as an example. Husserl says:

...if I construct the general concept tree—understood of course, as a pure concept—on the basis of individual particular trees, the tree which is present in my
mind is not posited in any way as an individually determined tree: on the contrary, I represent it in such a way that it is the same in perception and in the free movement of imagination, that it it is not posited as existing, or even called into question, and that it is not in any way held to be an individual. The particular, which is at the bottom of essential seeing, is not in the proper sense an intuited individual as such.44

In another place, Husserl remarks:

For the individual is not an essence, it is true, but it 'has' an essence, which can be said of it with evident validity. To fix this essence as an individual, however, to give it a position in a 'world' of individual being-there [existence], is something that such a mere subsumption under essential concepts cannot accomplish.45

Thus Husserl is not presenting a revitalized empiricist theory of abstraction. Essences are not to be understood from the natural point of view as empirically abstracted from actually existing individuals. The transcendental epoché, as we have seen, forbids such 'constructions' from the outset. However, we must also watch out that we do not go to the other extreme. For neither does it follow that essences are therefore non-intuitable entities which phenomenology somehow dreams up and attempts to investigate. As Fink says:

The often misunderstood 'essential insight' is in no way defined as some sort of mystical act, as a receptive intuition or a pure 'seeing', as it were, of the nonsensible. Rather, the eidos is the correlate of an operation of thought, or of a spontaneous intellectual act. The eidos is known as the invariable
element of something held fast in terms of its self-identity throughout its variation and the reflective running through of its possible modifications...the phenomenological definition of essence itself as an actual objectivity does not signify its hypostatized substantiality, but simply indicates the eidos' 'categorial' existence, that is, its being engendered through spontaneous acts of thought.46

And as Husserl says:

This general essence is the eidos, the idea in the Platonic sense, but apprehended in its purity and free from all metaphysical interpretations, therefore taken exactly as it is given to us immediately and intuitively in the vision of the idea which arises in this way [the way of eidetic variation].47

Thus we see that it is the method of eidetic variation which reveals essences to us. But earlier we said that phenomenological essences are revealed to us only through the transcendental epoche. Is there some inconsistency here? Indeed, how are these two methods related to each other? Husserl says:

First of all, it is necessary to point out that even totally free variations is not enough to actually give us the universal as pure. Even the universal acquired by variation must not yet be called pure in the true sense of the word i.e. free from all positing of actuality....For a pure eidos, the factual actuality of the particular cases by means of which we progress in the variation is completely irrelevant....every connection to pregiven actuality is most carefully excluded. If we practice variation freely but cling secretly to the fact that e.g. there must be arbitrary sounds in the world; heard or able to be heard by men on earth, then we certainly have an essential generality as an eidos but one related to our world of fact and
bound to this universal fact. It is a secret bond in that for understandable reasons, it is imperceptible to us.\textsuperscript{48}

We see, then, that eidetic variation reveals essences to us, but ones that are not yet transcendentally purified, and hence, not yet phenomenological in the full sense. They are still tacitly considered as essences of things existing in the world. It is only in conjunction with the transcendental \textit{epoche} that eidetic variation reveals pure essences. Indeed, it is only through the transcendental \textit{epoche} that sceptical arguments about the impossibility of seeing essences can be overcome. What is required, then, is that we become aware of our 'secret bond to being', our hidden though completely natural tendency to coposit the existence of a real world. As Husserl says:

Only if we become conscious of this bond, putting it consciously out of play, and so also free this broadest surrounding horizon of variants from all connection to experience and all experiential validity, do we achieve perfect purity. Then we find ourselves, so to speak, in a pure world of imagination, a world of absolutely pure possibility.\textsuperscript{49}

It is precisely the \textit{epoche} which consciously puts out of play this hidden bond, and thereby reveals 'the pure world of imagination'--our world, as a world full of possible and completely pure examples for an eidetic variation. Thus we see that the transcendental \textit{epoche} is required to purify the results of eidetic abstraction. But why is the eidetic
method needed at all if, subsequent to the *epoche*, we are immediately confronted with essential being? Perhaps the answer to this question is found in these lines:

It is, however, correct that there can be no analogue to an empirical science of fact, no 'descriptive' science of transcendental being and life understood as an inductive science based on experience alone, in the sense of establishing *individual* transcendental correlations as they factually occur and disappear. Not even the single philosopher by himself, within the *epoche*, can hold fast to anything in this elusively flowing life, repeat it with always the same content, and become so certain of its this-ness and its being such that he could describe it, document it, so to speak (even for his own person alone), in definitive statements. But the full concrete facticity of universal transcendental subjectivity can nevertheless be scientifically grasped in another good sense, precisely because, truly through an *eidetic* method [*my italics*], the great task can and must be undertaken of investigating the essential form of the transcendental accomplishments...50

The transcendental *epoche* reveals the flowing life of transcendental experience. This experience is completely laden with eidetic singularities (the lowest specific difference of a genus51). But because there are so many of these fleeting phenomenologically particular objects, there can be no question of attempting to distinguish and unambiguously determine them all. But, as Husserl says:

...it is quite otherwise with the essences of a *higher specific level*. These are susceptible of stable distinction, unbroken self-identity, and strict conceptual apprehension, likewise of being analyzed into component essences, and accordingly they may very properly be made subject to the conditions of a comprehensive scientific description.52
Thus the essential form of our conscious experience and objects of experience can be scientifically described. And this description requires the eidetic method. Hence we might say that the transcendental *epoche* renders pure essences intuitable, while the eidetic method enhances the clearness of such essences, particularly at higher levels of generality. Without the *epoche*, essences would remain impure—that is, they would remain within the natural attitude which has not yet realized its own belief in the existence of the world. Without the eidetic method, essences would be pure, but they would remain unclear, and not susceptible to any kind of scientific determination. Thus we could say that phenomenology becomes radical by beginning with the original self-activity of transcendental experience, as revealed by the *epoche*. And it becomes discursive (communuciable) by describing the essential structure of this experience, as revealed by the eidetic method. Both are conjointly necessary if rigorous science is to be an authentic possibility.

6 **Summary**

In this chapter, we have set ourselves the task of showing how a descriptive science of transcendental experience is possible. We have argued that this realm
of transcendental experience is a realm of essences. That is, the epoché holds in check our natural tendency to treat phenomena as merely facts occurring in the world. It thereby reveals that all phenomena are potential examples for an eidetic variation. Through this eidetic variation, we are able to bring the more general essences to a complete clearness. These can then be described and terminologically fixed according to the manner in which they give themselves. And the type of 'exactness' which any particular description achieves depends on the nature of the particular essence itself. For in every case, it is a matter of seeing the essence as it is given in experience, and faithfully describing it 'exactly' as it is so given. Thus, phenomenology never intends to intellectualize phenomena according to a pregiven deductive or inductive system. Indeed, it challenges the supposed sovereignty of all conceptual logic. For all 'mathematical' concepts distort experience, transforming it into a mathematical manifold of discrete moments. Experience, however, is entirely a continuous flux. And all descriptive concepts must remain faithful to its continuously changing character. Thus we must not violently pigeon-hole experience in the name of science. That is, we must not noisily verbalize everything into 'mathemati-
callv exact' slots. On the contrary, phenomenology requires a receptive listening to our experience so that the essential can be seen, precisely in all its fluidity, inexactitude and indeterminancy. And this 'listening' for the sake of a faithful, descriptive science is the correlate of a practical attitude which surrenders itself for the reflective transcendental awareness of life.
III

THE SCIENTIFIC EXPLICATION OF
TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE

1 Introduction

In CHAPTER TWO, we attempted to show how phenomenology can be a descriptive science of transcendental experience. But have we now sufficiently demonstrated how phenomenology can be a rigorous science of being? Does what remains simply involve the carrying out of phenomenological descriptions of the data self-evidently given in transcendental experience? By no means. Mere description, although necessary for science, is not yet sufficient. What is required is an explication of phenomena, rendering them intelligible in some way.

Indeed, phenomenology desires to be a presuppositionless science of being. In its earliest stages, it is a purely descriptive discipline, outlining the general structure of experiences and the objects of experience. But, we ask, how does such a merely descriptive science incorporate an explication of phenomena which makes being comprehensible? Indeed, Pink says:

The basic question phenomenology is in the process of raising by introducing it in conjunction with
traditional problems...can be formulated as that concerning the origin of the world.¹

Again, he says that phenomenology:

...intends to make the world comprehensible in all its real and ideal determinateness in terms of the ultimate ground of its being. It aspires to an absolute knowledge of the world.

Fink adds that this means:

...phenomenology makes the 'world-ground'...the object of theoretical experience and knowledge, and renders it accessible, exhibits it, and allows it to be seen and brought to evidence as it is in itself by means of genuine method.²

But in what sense can phenomenology accomplish this?

The task at hand is two-fold: we wish to uncover the continuity underlying phenomenology's descriptive analyses and those which are explicative (constitutive); secondly, we would like to get some idea of how these explicative analyses can be accomplished in a presuppositionless and hence radically scientific manner—that is, we would like to see how being is scientifically made comprehensible. This is, by no means, an easy project we set for ourselves. However, it is a road we must take if we are to make a genuine attempt to follow Husserl on his way to rigorous science. Nevertheless, since we are not acquainted with all the relevant Husserlian analyses, we can only hope to hit upon a very general indication of the manner in which this task can be faced.
Functional Problems

We have discovered that intentionality is a 'universal fundamental property of consciousness'. Indeed, transcendent experience necessarily involves an awareness of the thoroughgoing intentionality of consciousness. Thus our descriptions of the realm accessible to transcendental experience must reflect this basic intentional structure. This means that descriptive phenomenology must distinguish between the acts of experience (i.e., the modes of givenness, the manner in which an object is experienced) and the object itself which is experienced. For example, we cannot be concerned with merely the perceived object, but must also direct our glance at the perceiving itself—the way in which this perceived object is presented. This holds for every kind of object, since every object is the correlate of some manner of being conscious of it. To give a few examples, for every remembered, imagined, judged, and willed object, there is a corresponding act of remembering, imagining, judging and willing. Thus Husserl says:

Consequently I, the transcendental phenomenologist, have objects (singly or in universal complexes) as a theme for my universal descriptions: solely as the intentional correlates of modes of consciousness of them. It follows from this that the inquiry into consciousness must involve two sides which, as Husserl says, "...can be
characterized descriptively as belonging together inseparably. On the one side, there are the subjective processes—the modes of givenness, or acts of experience. These cogitationes, or intendings of consciousness, are called the 'noeses'. On the other side, there is the intended object, the cogitatum qua cogitatum, which is called the 'noema'. This noema is the 'objective sense', the meaning intended by consciousness. Intentional analysis, which is basic in descriptive phenomenology, investigates the various meanings, or noemata, which consciousness can intend. But the phenomenologist, here, does not describe merely the intentional object as such. As Husserl says:

If that were all he did, the intentionality, which makes up the intuitive or non-intuitive consciousness itself and the explicative considering, would remain 'anonymous'. In other words: There would remain hidden the noetic multiplicities of consciousness and their synthetic unity, by virtue of which alone, and as their essentially necessary doing, we have one intentional object, and always this definite one, continuously meant—have it so to speak, before us as meant, thus and so.

Thus Husserl adds:

When the phenomenologist explores everything objective, and whatever can be found in it, exclusively as a correlate of consciousness, he does not consider and describe it only straightforwardly and only as somehow related back to the corresponding Ego and the ego cogito of which it is the cogitatum. Rather, with his reflective regard, he penetrates the anonymous 'cognitive' life, he uncovers the definite synthetic courses of the manifold of consciousness and, further back, the modes of Ego-comportment,
which make understandable the objective affairs' simple meantness for the Ego. 11

Thus we see that descriptive phenomenology is not concerned merely with what is intended by consciousness; it also seeks to reveal how it is intended. That is, phenomenology attempts to describe the noetic-noematic multiplicities of consciousness which bring about the intending of a particular meaning. For as Husserl says:

...each passing cogito intends its cogitatum, not with an undifferentiated blankness, but as a cogito with a describable structure of multiplicities, a structure having a quite definite noetic-noematic composition, which by virtue of its essential nature, pertains to just this identical cogitatum. 12

Thus it turns out that the description of every particular phenomenon continues on as an explication, making understandable how, by virtue of its current intentional structure, consciousness intends precisely this particular object with its particular meaning. That is, the manner in which consciousness 'constitutes' its objective field becomes of crucial concern for phenomenology. The problems related to this sphere Husserl calls 'functional problems'. 13 These, he says, are "the greatest problems of all". 14 He adds:

The viewpoint of Function is the central viewpoint of phenomenology; the inquiries which radiate from it cover the whole phenomenological sphere pretty nearly, and in the last resort all phenomenological analysis enter its service in one form or another as integral portions or as lower grades. Instead of single experiences being analysed and compared,
described and classified, all treatment of detail is governed by the 'teleological' view of its function in making 'synthetic unity' possible.\textsuperscript{15}

An illustration indicating what is meant here might be helpful. Suppose I am presently perceiving a house. It appears to me as an identical four-sided object intended by consciousness. However, I presently really see only one side of this house. Moreover, in the next moment of this perception, the appearance of this house may suffer some infinitesimal change. Yet despite this fact—and that I am limited to a perspective of a constantly changing giveness—I intend one identical four-sided house. That is, the meaning I intend reaches beyond the isolated subjective processes which produce that meaning. If I were an empiricist, I might reduce these subjective processes to impressions, or 'sense-data'. But then I would be faced with the great difficulty of trying to justify the identical objective meaning which arises from these sense-data. As a phenomenologist, however, I realize that there is a fundamental distinction between the manner of giveness and the intended object. I am thereby no longer involved in the task of justifying an inference from mere impressions to real things. Rather, I see that a certain set of subjective processes are simply the necessary correlate of a particular intended meaning. By making clear the particular form of subjective
processes which belong inseparably together with a particular category of object, I make understandable how that type of object is constituted in consciousness. In our particular illustration, I recognize that the perceived house is precisely an object of perception. And like all objects of perception, it lies within its very meaning to be given perspectively in a spatial and temporal horizon.

The fact that perceptual objects necessarily have a horizontal structure has an important consequence. For we see that it lies within the very meaning of a house-perception that it be possible for one to adopt new perspectives in viewing the same house. This means that there are potential subjective processes which must necessarily be taken into account along with those actual cogitations presently experienced. And since there are an infinite number of such possible perspectives, an explication of the intended objective meaning is governed by a teleological view of the synthetic unity accomplished by these meaning-giving noetic acts of consciousness.

Indeed, every intention has a horizontal structure. In every case, what is intended transcends the actual subjective processes, and points to further possible ways of seeing the same object. Thus the intended meaning is always the telos for a functional analysis. Husserl calls this
intended meaning, or noema, a 'transcendental clue'. We begin with this intended object. Then we uncover the actual and possible ways of intending this same object, as implied in the meaning of the object itself. Finally, taking this object (with its correlative ways of being intended) as simply an example, we use the eidetic method to reveal a formal type. According to the various levels of generality of investigation, and kinds of objects, we arrive at a set of structural types, the systematic explication of which is the task of transcendental theory.17

Perhaps now we have given a general indication of how descriptive phenomenology evolves into an explication of phenomena. However, before going on to the second part of our projected task—the demonstration of how these explicative analyses can be said to be presuppositionless, and hence radically scientific—we should perhaps draw out some of the implications of what we have said in this section.

3 Phenomenology as the Explication of Meanings

What is perhaps most difficult for the traditionally minded student of Husserl to see is how the analysis of subjective processes helps at all in making understandable how consciousness intends transcendent objects. Indeed, at another level of understanding, this marvelous ability of
consciousness to constitute objects appears quite mysterious. Thus, one wonders whether functional analysis really explains anything. However, such misgivings arise from a misunderstanding of the implications of the époche; and consequently, a misunderstanding of the kinds of problems which concern phenomenology. From the outset, all transcendent objects are bracketed. And, this suspension, once performed, is never lifted. Thus phenomenology is never concerned with demonstrating how consciousness can avoid being fooled by some malicious demon and thereby know the external world. It is realized, from the beginning, that such a demonstration is impossible, in principle. Thus phenomenology never tries to prove the existence of the external world. Nor does it seek to reveal transcendent or immanent causes for our belief in its existence. Rather, its whole concern lies in making more explicit what we mean when we say that there is a world. As Husserl says in the Krisis: "It is not a question of assuring objectivity, but of understanding it." Hence phenomenology does not try to give transcendent explanations for the world; it merely attempts to explicate its sense. Indeed, phenomenology is through and through a radical sense-explication.

Our misunderstanding of the aim of phenomenology lies in our rootedness in the problematic of traditional
theories of knowledge. We continue to ask about the nature of objectivity, and how we can know 'what is', without becoming sufficiently clear about the sense of these problems. A particularly acute manifestation of this is that we appeal to logic without investigating what logic itself means. But, as Russell says:

The true theory of cognition, after all, is clarification of the 'genuine' sense belonging to logical concepts and to logic itself—not an antecedent sense already existing in fact, but a sense yet to be created by the theory of cognition, yet to be explored with regard to the horizons of its range: created and explored, however, under the guidance of the sense merely supposed beforehand. 19

Thus if we are to win a radical perspective, the sense of our philosophical problems themselves must become problematic. Hence all genuine philosophy must begin as sense-explication: that is, it must begin as phenomenology.

However, it might be argued that the notion of clarifying meanings is not peculiar to phenomenology. Indeed, linguistic analysis embarks on a similar project. Nevertheless, there is a world of difference between the nature of linguistic philosophy and phenomenology. The investigations made by the English schools of philosophy are always carried out within the context of a pre-given world whose existence is taken for granted. Phenomenology, however, attempts to gain a radical perspective, in which the meaning of the pre-given
world itself becomes pre-eminently a task for explication.

And this task is revealed by the transcendental epoché.

Thus, as everywhere, the appreciation for the uniqueness and necessity of phenomenology lies in the proper understanding of the epoché. Through this reduction, our world is revealed as a world of meaning. Husserl says:

By epoché we effect a reduction to our pure meaning (cogito) and to the meant, purely as meant. The predicates being and non-being, and their modal variants, relate to the latter—accordingly not to objects simpler but the objective sense. The predicates truth (correctness) and falsity, albeit in a most extremely broad sense, relate to the former, to the particular meaning or intending. 20

Thus, after the epoché, we encounter an infinite realm of meanings the explication of which becomes the task of phenomenology. No longer are we concerned with the transcendent object as it is in itself. Rather, we merely wish to explicate its meaning, as intended by consciousness. Indeed, absolute truth itself, as an objective sense, concerns phenomenology only as a meaning to be explicated. And truth, as a phenomenological concept, signifies merely a manner of givenness by which 'what is' acquires a self-evident meaning.

Phenomenology's preoccupation with meanings is not meant to reflect an arbitrary choice on the part of the phenomenologist. Rather, it is seen that all reality exists
only through the 'dispensing of meaning'. That is, all existents are the correlate of an intended meaning. Or in other words, what is real is simply that which 'makes sense'.

As Husserl says:

He who philosophizes must make clear to himself from the beginning what we, with good reason, have emphasized so strongly and so often: Anything that can exist...that can have sense for him and be accepted by him as something existent...must be something of which he has consciousness in the shape of an appertinent intentional performance.

Thus we see that all that exists does so only as an object of a possible consciousness. As Husserl says: "An absolute reality is just as valid as a round square." Hence we must hold in abeyance our naive belief that the world exists prior to experience and alien to consciousness. Outside of our conscious experience, there is, strictly speaking, nothing. Thus Husserl remarks:

If what is experienced has the sense of 'transcendent' being, then it is the experiencing that constitutes this sense, and does so either by itself or in the whole motivational nexus pertaining to it and helping to make up its intentionality.

Indeed, Husserl asks:

Can what has sense for us receive sense ultimately from anywhere else than from ourselves?...Is not each and every Objectivity, with all the sense in which it is accepted by us, an Objectivity that is winning or has won, acceptance within ourselves--as an Objectivity having the sense that we ourselves acquired for it?

This insight, that reality exists only to the degree
that it can make sense, is crucial in phenomenology. For
it is realized that philosophy (i.e., science) is only possible
in being is intelligible. That is, philosophy is only possible
in an idealism which realizes that being is equivalent to
what can be thought. The task of science, then, simpli-
ifies to the project of radically explicating what can be
thought. And the proof of the possibility of this rigorous
science is simply the carrying out of these radical expli-
cations. Hence Husserl says:

This idealism is not a product of sportive arguments,
a prize to be won in the dialectical contest with
'realisms'. It is sense-explication achieved by
actual work...the proof of this idealism is therefore
phenomenology itself.

Thus phenomenology (as a 'transcendental idealism')
is radical sense-explication. But what is this? Husserl
says:

Sense-investigation signifies nothing but the attempt
to produce the sense 'itself', which, in the mere
meaning, is a meant, a presupposed sense; or equiva-
ently, it is the attempt to convert...the sense
'vaguely floating before us' in our unclear aiming,
into the fulfilled, the clear sense, and thus to
procure, for it the evidence of its clear possibility.
Precisely this possibility is genuineness of sense
and is, accordingly, the aim of an investigative
search and discovery. Sense-investigation, we may
also say, is radically conceived original sense-
explication, which converts or at first strives to
convert, the sense in the mode of an unclear meaning
into the sense in the mode of full clarity or
essential possibility.29

We begin with the presupposed sense 'vaguely floating before
Taking this as our clue, we attempt to clarify the horizons indeterminately predelineated in this presupposed sense. That is, we attempt to make explicit what is implicitly co-intended in the particular meaning. For as we have seen, every intended meaning points beyond itself to the further perfectibility of its possible sense. This is what was indicated in our previous illustration concerning the perception of a house. It was noticed there that it lies implicit in the meaning of every thing-perception that it point to further possible perspectival viewings of the same thing, which fill out its meaning. Or as Husserl says:

To the essence of a thing-noaness there belong, as can be seen with absolute clearness, ideal possibilities of 'limitlessness in the development of intuitions of the same order, and indeed in prescribed directions of a determinate type (hence with parallel limitlessness also in the continuous juxtapositions of corresponding noeses).

The intended meaning, as that identical irreality whose implicit meaning is to be filled out, figures as the telos which can continually be brought into sharper focus. Therefore, sense-explication is a teleological investigation which attempts to clarify the presupposed sense according to a prefigured, and essentially possible meaning which lies implicit in it.

In this way, we investigate all the particular categories of objects as well as their interconnectedness.
As husserl says:

Furthermore we can say that an enormous task is foreshadowed, which is that of transcendental phenomenology as a whole: the task of carrying out all phenomenological investigations within the "unity" of a systematic and all-embracing order by following, as our mobile clue, a system to be found out level by level, the system namely of all objects of possible consciousness, including the system of their formal and material categories—the task, I say, of carrying out such investigations as corresponding constitutional investigations, one based upon another, and all of them interconnected, in a strictly systematic fashion. 32

Thus phenomenology takes as its guiding aim, the idea of a system of complete intelligibility. That is, phenomenology seeks "...the systematic unfolding of the universal logos of all conceivable being." 33 And this aim is itself a 'mobile clue', a presupposed sense, or intended meaning, and thus must itself be continually explicated in conjunction with the explication of the various regions of being (kinds of objects), and their interconnectedness. Indeed, this aim itself is nothing other than the final ideal of philosophy (as a universal eidetic ontology) whose constant clarification, as an ideal necessity, calls for an infinity of executing work. As such, philosophy is necessarily a practical idea, calling for an unending theoretical praxis, as an infinite regulative idea. 34
4 Kantian Idea

Our understanding of phenomenological sense-explication still needs further clarification. We have seen that the intended meaning functions as a transcendental clue which predelineates the course for further investigation. This clue functions as a telos, or regulative idea for a never ending teleological explication. A meaning is never fully given, except as a rule for the further explicating of what lies implicit in it. For as we have seen, all experiences are horizontal, and hence no determination is final: 'what has already been experienced always still has, without limit, a horizon of possible experiences of the same.' But, as we also noticed earlier, this essential indeterminacy does not prevent us from becoming fully clear of an intended meaning. For indeed, this indeterminacy is precisely essential, and thus belongs to the very meaning of what we are explicating. Thus although the meaning is never fully given, it is adequately given, precisely as a regulative idea. That is it is adequately given as a 'Kantian idea'.

As Husserl says:

But as 'Idea' (in the Kantian sense) the complete givenness is nevertheless prescribed—as a connexion of endless processes of continuous appearing, absolutely fixed in its essential type, or, as the field of these processes, a continuum of appearances determined a priori, possessing different but determinate dimensions, governed by an established dispensation of essential order.
Thus although all meanings are always, to some extent, indeterminate, they are determinable according to essential rules prescribed by the meaning itself. That is, all meanings have a horizon of indeterminacy within which they can constantly be more closely determined. And this horizon, in the way it applies to any particular meaning, can only become fully determinate in the form of a 'Kantian idea'. It is precisely sense-explication which attempts to unfold a meaning's mode of indeterminacy, by investigating its indeterminate but constantly determinable horizons. Thus Husserl says that

...what is given to us at the moment has a determinable margin, not yet determinate, and possessing its own way of effecting the transition through a process of 'unfolding'.

We see then, that phenomenology is constantly engaged in the task of making fully determinate a degree of indeterminacy which lies in the meaning itself. And it is guided, in this endeavour, by the meaning itself, for this meaning is seen as essentially horizontal, and thus as prescribing the way to the further unfolding of what lies implicit in it. As Husserl says: "...the given X, ever one and the same, is with unbroken consistency 'more closely' and never 'otherwise' determined."

But, we may ask, if the meaning itself is never fully
given, how can it function as a regulative idea which prescribes the route to its further clarification? That is, if we do not know the full implications of the meaning which is to be clarified, how can the incomplete meaning that we do have function as a telos for further explication? Our difficulties here arise from the fact that we are assuming that the prescribed rule for the further explication of a meaning must lie transparently before us. However, Husserl says:

Here original clarification means shaping the sense anew, not merely filling in a delineation that is already determinate and structurally articulated beforehand. 39

he adds:

...original sense-investigation signifies a combination of determining more precisely the vague indeterminate predelineation, distinguishing the prejudices that derive from associational overlappings, and cancelling those prejudices that conflict with the clear sense-fulfillment--in a word, then: critical discrimination between the genuine and the spurious. 40

We see then, that the essential, or 'a priori' rules which meanings prescribe for their further clarification are not clearly given from the outset. Thus we do not simply deductively calculate what a meaning is on the basis of 'Kantian ideas' which have a mathematical preciseness. That is, we do not begin with a definitive set of regulative ideas which function as definitions for a closed system of the totality of possible formations in the realm of transcendental
experience. Rather, as we shall see more clearly later, such a system itself functions as a regulative idea requiring an infinite explication. Thus, precisely because the regulative ideas of phenomenology are, for essential reasons, permeated with vagueness and indeterminacy, rigorous science must always remain open-ended. Hence phenomenology is never merely a filling in of a closed and predelineated system of concepts; rather, it involves "shaping the sense anew" through an original self-activity which brings the genuine sense to givenness. 41 We begin always with a vague, presupposed meaning, and attempt to clarify what lies implicit in it. And this meaning, precisely as an indeterminate regulative idea, functions as a telos for our investigation. Thus as our sense-explication continues, the regulative idea itself becomes more precisely determined. It thereby uncovers, though still in an indeterminate manner, even further tasks for inquiry, providing further occasions for reshaping the sense anew. Thus although a meaning is never completely given, the idea of its complete givenness, though essentially indeterminate with respect to its content, can be adequately seen in the form of a 'Kantian Idea'. Thus Husserl says:

...the idea of the completed givenness thereby prefigured lies, none the less, transparent before us--open to insight only as an 'Idea' can be, designating through
its essential nature, a type of insight that is all its own. The idea of an infinity essentially motivated is not itself an infinity: the insight that this infinity is intrinsically incapable of being given does not exclude but rather demands the transparent givenness of the Idea of this infinity.42

It is easy to see that the notion of the 'Kantian idea' is crucial in phenomenology. The very possibility that phenomenology be an a priori science rests on this idea. Thus we must attempt to achieve a genuinely clear understanding of what is meant here. In the first place, we must avoid seeing this 'Kantian idea' as comparable to the regulative ideas of the 'exact' sciences. For Husserl does not think that experience is a 'mathematical' manifold containing a 'mathematical' a priori, the systematic development of which is phenomenology's infinite task. That is, he does not think that man is essentially 'mathematical', and thus must engage in 'mathematical' activity to be true to his being. For although 'mathematical' sciences also involve infinite tasks, they begin as closed systems. That is, they articulate definitive postulations, the criticism of which lies outside their field. Phenomenology, however, is radically self-critical. It does not begin as a closed system to be infinitely filled in. Rather, it is precisely such a system which is its infinite aim. Consequently, the regulative ideas and infinities of phenomenology lie
in an entirely different dimension. Indeed, Husserl says:

It is high time that people got over being dazzled, particularly in philosophy and logic, by the ideal and regulative ideas and methods of the 'exact' sciences—though the In-itself of such sciences were actually an absolute norm for objective being and truth.\(^3\)

Indeed, the regulative ideas of phenomenology are not meant to presuppose any kind of metaphysical stance on the nature of objective truth. Rather, truth itself is seen as a regulative idea living in infinity.\(^4\) That is, the nature of truth must not be naively taken for granted, but requires constant clarification. Hence phenomenology, Husserl says, is not "...a Kantian idealism, which believes it can keep open, at least as a limiting concept, the possibility of a world of things in themselves."\(^5\) That is, phenomenology must not restrict its limiting concept of truth to the essential possibility of a world of things in themselves. For it is equally always possible that there is no transcendent world, existing in itself. Hence it is never a case of choosing between these possibilities. Rather, truth, and all regulative ideas, constantly remain in suspense; that is, they remain within the 'brackets' of the transcendental epoché. Consequently, phenomenology's sole concern is the clarification of meanings qua 'bracketed'. That is, it is concerned with clarifying the meaning of our world and truth as it is really experienced—as it is lived.
Indeed, Husserl says that in phenomenological inquiry:

...we have continuously anew the living truth from the living source, which is our absolute life, and from the self-examination turned toward that life, in the constant spirit of self-responsibility. We have the truth then, not as falsely absolutized, but rather, in each case, as within its horizons—which do not remain overlooked or veiled from sight, but are systematically explicared.46

It is of crucial importance that we understand this difference which distinguishes phenomenology's inquiry into truth from the speculative investigations of the absolute idealists. Unless we do so, we will miss entirely the novelty of Husserl's approach. That is, we will mis-construe his aim of systematically unfolding a 'total science of the Apriori' or 'concrete logic of being', as merely another speculative attempt at definitively logicizing being. But Husserl does not absolutize truth; rather, he absolutizes its horizons. Thus rigorous science is always and essentially a science which is 'on the way'. And precisely because we have here an essential teleology, philosophy is not a relatively incomplete science improving as it goes forward.47 It does not strive for an infinite and unattainable end, which, 'at the end of time', will justify its pursuit. Rather, the pursuit, 'here and now', is self-justifying—an end in itself. For in this pursuit, we have 'the living truth from the living source'. That
is, we have the adequate givenness of truth, since truth is essentially horizontal, and science is essentially 'on the way'. Or more correctly, we have this truth in so far as we live its horizontal structure by continuing, through our own self-activity, to produce it newly for ourselves through radical sense-explication. Thus phenomenology is not engaged in an absurd striving for the impossible. (As Kierkegaard observed, such a pursuit is a matter of faith, and not of reason.) Rather, phenomenology wishes to explicate precisely what is essentially possible. And this, it seems, involves a never ending theoretical activity.

We can perhaps attain a better appreciation for the importance of the 'Kantian idea' in phenomenology if we briefly examine the extent to which it is used. In the first place, every intended meaning functions as a regulative idea for further investigation. Of course, when we carry out our explication of any particular meaning, we may encounter incompatibilities which render superfluous all further work in that particular area. But the discovery of such dead-ends functions precisely in a positive manner towards our explication of the intentional network of consciousness as a whole.

However, not only are intentional objects of consciousness adequately grasped as idea. But also, the
stream of experience itself, insofar as it is apprehended as a unity, is seen adequately only in the manner of a 'Kantian idea'. For every experience has a temporal horizon. That is, every 'now' is always related to a past and a future. As Husserl says:

"It is evident that every temporal point has its before and after, and that the points and intervals coming before cannot be compressed in the manner of an approximation to a mathematical limit, as, let us say, the limit of intensity. If there were such a boundary-point, there would correspond to it a now which nothing preceded, and this is obviously impossible. A now is always and essentially the edge-point of an interval of time." 45

I follow from this that an absolutely first experience, which has no past, is impossible within the stream of experience. So also, an absolutely final experience, without any future, can likewise not be experienced. However, single experiences can begin and end, but only because they are born and perish within the context of other experiences. Indeed, we only become conscious of the end of one experience when we are already engaged in a subsequent experiencing. But the stream of experience itself, as a totality, has no such context of experiences and thus cannot have a beginning and cannot end. Thus Husserl says:

Advancing continuously from one apprehension to another, we apprehend in a certain way, I remarked, the stream of experience as a unity also. We do not apprehend it
like a single experience, but after the fashion of an Idea in the Kantian sense. Thus the stream of experience (hence, conscious life itself) is grasped as finite only in the form of a Kantian idea. As such, it has no real beginning or end. Indeed, this makes our conscious life itself entirely suitable for the infinite tasks of phenomenology.

Since the stream of experience itself is never fully given, except as idea, the intentional network of experiences can never be completely filled out. For we can never view experience from above, so to speak, so that we can have it as a completely filled out totality, present before us. Consequently, intentional objects of experience function as Kantian ideas within the context of an intentional network of experiences which itself functions in the fashion of a 'Kantian idea'. Thus the complete systematic explication of this intentional network, as an a priori system of philosophy, is through and through a regulative idea for an infinite theoretical activity. It is precisely the transcendental epoché which reveals intentionality as the subject matter for an infinite explication. In so doing, it reveals an enduring orientation, or attitude which can be taken as a regulative norm in life. And this normative attitude is the correlate of an infinite theoretical activity, regulated
by the idea of philosophy.

5 Phenomenology as the Science of Beliefs and Reason

We have attempted to give a general indication of the continuity underlying phenomenology's descriptive and explicative themes. The description of a particular phenomenon, we saw, continues on as an explication which takes the meaning intended in the phenomenon as a regulative clue. 51 Now let us move on to the second part of our projected task: the indication of how these explicative analyses are accomplished in a presuppositionless and hence rigorously scientific manner. This problem is one that has been continually lurking in the background of our entire exposition. Indeed, we noticed very early that the phenomenologist, in his quest for knowledge, can only begin with his present understanding. 52 This understanding, we suggested, is historically and culturally conditioned and hence laden with hidden presuppositions. 53 Nevertheless, we went on to suggest that the phenomenologist does have access to original evidences by way of the epoche. But now it turns out that these evidences themselves require an explicative discovery of their implicit sense. And this involves taking the self-evidently given intended meaning precisely as a presupposed sense. Further, the clarification of what is
presupposed in this given meaning involves a never-ending activity. Hence it seems again that the phenomenologist is locked within a horizon of presuppositions. He can continually clarify these presuppositions, but he can never escape them. Thus although the phenomenologist can perhaps experience his life transcendentally, the scientific explanation of his life, as a presuppositionless endeavour, seems to be essentially impossible.

However, our difficulties here arise only as a result of a misunderstanding of the sense in which rigorous science is presuppositionless. The phenomenologist is well aware of the impossibility of reaching a horizon-less perspective. But this does not stop him from making them precisely the horizons themselves. That is, precisely the totality of presuppositions which constitute the world becomes the subject-matter for phenomenology. Indeed, the phenomenologist realizes that beings exist only in so far as they are presupposed. That is, he realizes that all objects of consciousness are intentional; they are all believed. When the phenomenologist performs the époche, he doesn't stop believing. Rather, he merely "steps back" from his beliefs so that he can examine the motivations implicit in them. If he is radical in this procedure, then he will suspend his very belief in the existence of the world. And it is
precisely this radical suspension which gives phenomenology the character of a presuppositionless science. For phenomenology is not a presuppositionless science because the phenomenologist somehow manages to stop believing. Rather, it is a radical science because it attempts to take nothing for granted, making thematic precisely the totality of presuppositions themselves. And only in this way does the phenomenologist acquire freedom from his beliefs. Thus "Kerl" says about phenomenology:

There lies embedded in its meaning as philosophy a radicalism in the matter of foundations, an absolute freedom from all presuppositions, a securing for itself an absolute basis: the totality of presuppositions that can be 'taken for granted'.

There are some crucial consequences that follow from what we have been saying here. Phenomenology's principle task lies in a never ending uncovering of implicit motivations underlying our natural beliefs. This means that it is engaged in the activity of constantly revealing hidden presuppositions within the totality of presuppositions which constitute our belief in the world. That is, it constantly strives to make more explicit the hidden layers of our beliefs. But, this means that there is an essential relativity in the explicative investigations of phenomenology. The motivations which underlie our believing certainty in the existence of the world can never be made fully explicit,
but require a constant archeological study revealing new levels of inquiry. Thus Husserl says:

The investigations take on a painful and yet unavoidable relativity, a provisionalness, instead of the definiteness for which we were striving: each investigation, at its own level, overcomes some naivete or other, but is still accompanied by the naivete of its level—which must then be overcome in turn by more penetrating investigations of the origins. The presuppositions of being, as they are uncovered at each level, become indices of problems concerning evidence, which lead us into the vast system of constitutive subjectivity.  

It is of crucial importance that we keep this essential relativity in mind. Otherwise we will misunderstand the very nature of rigorous science. Due to its essential nature, the results of rigorous science are permeated with naivete. In this respect, it is entirely similar to all the positive sciences. However, what radically distinguishes phenomenology from every other science is the fact that it alone takes its own naivete as a subject-matter for further investigation. Consequently, it is not the apodicticity of its results that earn phenomenology the title ‘rigorous science’. Indeed, the ‘exact’ sciences too can make apodictic claims. Rather, phenomenology is rigorous because it is radically self-critical. As Fink says, ‘..phenomenology lives exclusively within the pathos of inquiry.’

In this context, another crucial aspect of pheno-
phenomenology can be drawn out. The natural attitude, we see, can be characterized as a universal belief-like positing of the world's reality. The *epoché* suspends this attitude, revealing the realm of transcendental experience as the subject-matter for phenomenology. But transcendental experience is simply the reflective experiencing of natural experience itself. Thus our investigation into transcendental experience is, in the first stages, simply an elucidation of natural experience itself (though seen from a transcendental point of view). That is, the principle subject-matter of phenomenology is precisely the natural attitude itself, as the manifestation of the totality of presuppositions which can be taken for granted. Thus phenomenology does not mention the natural attitude so as to disparage it. Rather, it is precisely the elucidation of the underlying motivations of this attitude which is its chief aim. For it is seen that the world is merely an 'acceptance-phenomenon', a 'having-the-world-in-acceptance', for transcendental subjectivity. That is, the world is simply an intentional correlate of a believing certainty which accepts the world. And the implicit presuppositions which motivate this belief is precisely what phenomenology wishes to elucidate. Thus Fink says:
As the disconnecting of the belief in the world, the \textit{epoche} is not a refusal to hold a belief which is already known to be a belief, but is in truth the first discovery of the belief in the world: the discovery of the world as a transcendental \textit{dasa}. In other words, the \textit{epoche} first makes the primordial depths of the belief in the world accessible: this belief must be bracketed by the \textit{epoche} so that it can become a 'phenomenon' and thereby a theme for phenomenology. 50

Thus for phenomenology, the world is simply a world of 'make-believe'. I believe that I exist as a human \textit{ego} in a world which I believe to exist. I cannot stop believing, but I can investigate the motivations for my beliefs. This investigation is a self-explication; and, at the same time, it is a continual uncovering of the \textit{lokos} or ratio of the world. But we must clarify how this is the case.

The \textit{epoche} reveals that the world is only as it is accepted by 'me'. We place this 'me' in quotes, for I \textit{myself, qua natural ego}, exist only as an acceptance-phenomenon for 'myself'. That is, the whole of my experience is simply the correlate of a self-constituting activity. As \textsc{Husserl} says:

But the transcendental subjectivity, which for want of language we can only call again, 'I myself', 'we ourselves', cannot be found under the attitude of psychological or natural science, being no part at all of the objective world, but that subjective conscious life itself, wherein the world and all its content is made for 'us', for 'me'. We that are, indeed, men, spiritual and bodily, existing in the
world, are, therefore, 'appearances' unto ourselves, parcel of what 'we' have constituted, pieces of the significance 'we' have made. The 'I' and 'we', which we apprehend, presuppose a hidden 'I' and 'we' to whom they are 'present'.

I, qua transcendental subject, constitute myself and the world. That is, I have myself and the world as objects of belief ('acceptance'). As Pink says:

The phenomenological reduction first exposes a subjectivity which already accepts the world... The transcendental subject's (or the moral-totality) possession of the world, which is disclosed by the reduction, is the problem with which the analysis of constitution begins... Insight into the secret nature of actual being-'acceptances' which are in the process of being formed in the stream of intentional life (but which nevertheless already rest upon the foundation of a universal possession of acceptances, the possession of a world) now becomes the clue for interrogating the transcendental world-possession: the inquiry into constitution.

By investigating the layers of acceptances, I uncover the various levels of constitutional activity. But since all constitutional activity merely reflects the world as accepted by 'me' (qua 'transcendental subject'), the explication of these various levels becomes simply a self-explication. That is, I am the correlate of what I believe, and by continually explicating the nature of my beliefs, I continually fill out the objective content of my 'self-apperception' as the transcendental origin of myself and the world. Thus Husserl says: "The whole of phenomenology is nothing more than scientific self-examination on the part of transcendental
subjectivity. Indeed, he adds that the ultimate grounding of all truth is a branch of the universal self-examination that, when carried through radically, is absolute. In other words, it is a self-examination which leads me to the grasping of my absolute self, my transcendental ego. As this absolute ego, considering myself henceforth as my exclusive fundamental thematic field, I carry on all my further sense-investigations.

And again:

All objective being has in transcendental subjectivity the grounds for its being; all truth has in transcendental subjectivity the grounds for the cognition of it, and if a truth concerns transcendental subjectivity itself, it has those grounds precisely in transcendental subjectivity.

Thus all being and truth originates as the transcendental performance of my intentional life. Everything exists as the correlate of my beliefs. And to constantly maintain this self-awareness, amidst the ever present tendency of merely living in my beliefs, becomes an endless existential task.

We see then, that Husserl's science of being is simply a science of our beliefs. It seeks to reveal the layers of belief implicit in our experience. For example, our belief in the existence of other people may involve a belief in their corporeal existence as being analogous to our own. In any case, all beliefs are finally grounded in an ultimate belief—that there is a world. Thus existence is permeated through and through with belief, maintained by
the intentional performances of consciousness.

However, in this context, there is an important consequence that should be brought to light. All beings are objects of belief. As such, they are all formulated with relativity. That is, all reality is relative to the absolute stream of transcendental experience. For there are no absolute existents, existing in themselves, which can be objects of a consciousness. Hence phenomenology never attempts to disclose beings which exist apart from a belief in them. That is, it never attempts to validate the reality of beings in any other way than by making more explicit the motivations which lead to the belief in their existence. Now, it is clear that we believe in the existence of other people. Indeed, this belief is precisely co-intended with our belief in an objective world existing for everyone. Thus when phenomenology seeks to investigate the motivations which lead to our belief in an objective world, it eo ipso seeks to uncover the reasons for our beliefs in the 'Other'. That is, it attempts to reveal the constituting beliefs that function in a synthetic manner in motivating our belief in objective being. Whether Husserl has been successful in this area, whether he is even going about this task in the proper manner, are important questions. But whatever the answers to these questions may be, they need
not undermining the notion that the Other exists as an intentional correlate of consciousness. The problem of how the Other, as a transcendental ego, can affect me and still be merely relative to my transcendental experience, is not a speculative problem concerning the real existence of the Other. Rather, the Other is merely believed to exist, just as the world is merely believed to exist. As Russell says:

"It is obvious that transcendently speaking, I can be conditioned by something 'external', by something that goes beyond my self-contained ownness, only if it has the sense, 'someone else', and in a thoroughly understandable manner, gains and legitimates in me its acceptance as being another transcendental ego."

So also, historical and cultural factors which influence experience are merely objects of belief, accepted in me. Whether they exist or not is irrelevant for phenomenology since such questions can not be answered. What the phenomenologist can alone do is attempt to explicate the legitimate sense of history and culture—a sense which involves the recognition of their important place in motivating individual existence.

Let us attempt to clarify what we mean here. Everything that is exists as an object of belief. Some beliefs are more original than others. The more basic beliefs are necessarily co-intended with every higher-leveled belief
which is founded on them. The most basic belief is the
believe certainty that there is a world. This belief is
co-intended with every doxic (belief) positive of conscious-
ness. Phenomenology merely seeks to make more explicit
this network of beliefs. However, it may have gone astray
in the manner in which it has explicated these beliefs.
For example, perhaps Husserl's notion of the 'passive genetic
constitution' of the Other, in the 'Fifth Edition', is
ill-founded. Nevertheless, the task of explicating the sense
of our beliefs remains intact. Any errors Husserl may commit
in carrying out his program do not necessarily destroy that
program. On the contrary, it remains the task of self-
criticism to precisely root out such errors, thereby attain-
ing a more genuine explication of the sense of our beliefs.

Let us leave the clarification of these difficult
problems for another time. Our immediate concern is merely
to indicate how phenomenology claims to make being compre-
prehensible. We have seen that the task of phenomenology is
to clarify our beliefs. For it is realized that all beliefs
are motivated. They all have a reason. By uncovering the
implicit motivations which lead to a belief, we validate it.
That is, we show the reason for this belief. Thus all phen-
omenological sense-explication is simply an uncovering of
reasons. And phenomenology itself develops into a phenomenology of reason. Indeed, Husserl says:

"we are further compelled to admit that a phenomenology of the reason so complete as this would coincide with phenomenology in general, and that in systematically carrying out all the disciplines of consciousness which are demanded under the collective title 'constitution of the object' all and sundry descriptions of consciousness would need to be included." 

Of course, when we seek to make explicit the motivations for a particular belief, we may discover incompatibilities which destroy that belief itself. But every valid belief has a rational character which can be explicated. For as Husserl says:

"An act of positing, whatever its quality may be, has... its justification in and through the very positing of its meaning, provided only that it is rational; the rational character is itself the character of rightness. This character 'belongs' to it essentially, and not contingently."

Now, all beliefs, with their correlative rational characters, refer back to a primordial belief: the believing certainty that there is a world. This primary belief has its primary reason, and this Husserl calls the 'truth'. He says:

"...in the end all the lines of connexion converge upon the primary belief and its primary reason, upon the Truth. Truth is manifestly the correlate of the perfect rational character of the protodoxa, the believing certainty."

Thus all real beings are objects of a valid belief. And every valid belief is motivated along rational lines. Reality,
tion, is simply a manifestation of reason. Or, we can say, reason is the ground of being. Further, every positioning of consciousness co-posit the existence of the world. That is, the believing certainty in the existence of the world is co-intended with every intended meaning. But this primary belief is the correlate of a primary reason (the 'truth'). Thus reason and truth themselves are constantly co-present in intentional life. That is, they are constantly lived. Indeed, the absolute life of consciousness itself is the origin of all beliefs. As such, it is the home of all reason and truth.

Thus for phenomenology, experience itself is perfectly rational. Reason is constantly lived. And lived experience itself is the origin of the world. Hence, self-exploration, as the explication of one's own experience, is at the same time, an uncovering of the logos of being. The epoche suspends our primary belief in the world. It thereby makes this belief and its correlative reason, the object of a theoretical experience and knowledge. That is, it makes precisely our lived experience, as the world ground, the subject-matter of its inquiry. And by constantly making more explicit the structure of this lived origin, the phenomenologist maintains an awareness of himself as the ultimate ground of being.
Summary and Transitional Remarks

In our first chapter, we noticed that transcendental life is the reflective experiencing of natural experience itself. Thus, natural experience itself becomes a transcendental phenomenon to be described and explicated. That is, it becomes the subject matter for scientific investigation. In the second chapter, we saw that this investigation involves describing phenomena exactly as they are given. That is, we must attentively fix our words to what we see and not vice versa. The epoché purifies these phenomena, as essences, while the eidetic method brings them into sharper focus, as Platonic eide. However, all experiences are horizontal. Thus, no scientific determination of an object is ever the last. Hence, every description finds its place only in the context of an explication which constantly reveals new dimensions of the subject-matter.

The clarification of the implications of this fact was the project of our third chapter. Here we found that no intended meaning, or eidos, is ever fully given except as a telos for the further clarification of its legitimate sense. Hence we take the vaguely given meaning (whose vagueness itself can nevertheless be made fully clear) as a presupposed sense and attempt to make more explicit what lies implicit in it. We thereby continually produce the sense newly for
ourselves. And because we are radical in our investigation, precisely the most original presupposition, the world-round as a believing certainty in the existence of the world, is also taken as an intended meaning to be explicated. Through these explications, the logos of being is continually recovered. That is, we continually produce it anew for ourselves along prefigured but indeterminate lines. For the logos is not some transcendent reality existing apart from experience. Rather, it is the logos of experience itself, continually unfolding itself in experience. As such, this logos is lived; and hence, like lived experience itself, it too is thoroughly horizontal. Since experience is always my experience, the explication of this logos is at the same time a radical self-explication. Indeed, the explication of this logos is the correlate of a scientific and 'spiritual' attitude which detaches itself from lived experience so that this experience can be seen. That is, it is the correlate of an attitude which recognizes that truth is lived, and vows to practice maintaining a constant self-awareness of this.

Perhaps now we have given an indication of how phenomenology claims to be a rigorous science. At the same time, we have hinted at how phenomenology can consistently
be both a spiritual discipline and a science of experience. However, we have only given a rough outline of the first stages of phenomenology. That is, we have only given a brief exposition of how phenomenology is a science of natural experience as the object (or noema) of transcendental experience. In its later stages, phenomenology becomes a criticism of transcendental experience itself, in its noetic aspect, as the transcendental experiencing of natural life. As Jusserl says:

All transcendental-philosophical theory of knowledge, as 'criticism of knowledge', leads back ultimately to criticism of transcendental-phenomenological knowledge (in the first place, criticism of transcendental experience); and, owing to the essential reflexive relation of phenomenology to itself, this criticism also demands a criticism.\(^7\)

Or again, he says that phenomenology is:

...an examination that at first proceeds straightforwardly and therefore with a certain naiveté of its own, but later becomes critically intent on its own logos.\(^7\)

Thus, at a later stage, phenomenology itself becomes the theme for a constitutional and critical inquiry at a higher level. That is, phenomenological language, truth and reason themselves become the subject-matter for investigation. This higher leveled reflection is demanded by the reflexive nature of experience itself. Thus this new, 'higher-leveled', logos is simply the further working out of the
lived logic of experience itself. And it merely further affects to the thoroughgoing horizontal nature of reason and being.

However, Husserl himself, in his published works, never reached this higher level of self-criticism. Perhaps this was the 'promised land' he referred to.\(^7\) For it is only here that phenomenology confers on itself "...the highest dignity of genuineness, the ability to justify itself down to its roots."\(^7\) In any case, he had all he could handle in the mapping out of the general kinds of problems that one faces at the earlier stages. Thus we ourselves are unable to indicate the direction which such a higher-leveled phenomenological self-criticism would take. Nevertheless, we can submit Husserlian phenomenology, as we presently understand it, to a criticism of our own. In this way, we might come to a better understanding of the initial project of phenomenology itself. Then, in a provisional and hopefully not too audacious a manner, we can make an attempt at giving it our own evaluation.
IV

A CRITICAL LOOK AT RUSSERTL'S SCIENCE

The task we have set for ourselves is the examination of the possibility of a rigorous science of experience. With this project in mind, we have attempted to outline some of the basic features of Husserlian phenomenology, showing how it claims to be universal science. However, we must now submit this claim to a critical examination of our own with the hope of making clearer the possible sense and validity of the notion of rigorous science.

1 Philosophy as the Idealization of Objective Being, in the Service of Reason

We have already attempted to indicate in what sense phenomenology is a presuppositionless science. The phenomenologist, we have seen, does not try to get outside of his presuppositions so as to see objects as they exist divorced from any perspective. Rather, he recognizes, through the *epoche*, that the object, in itself, exists only as the correlate of a presupposition which posits its being. And it is precisely this recognition which constitutes the radical perspective which phenomenology claims to have revealed. Thus rigorous science becomes simply the radical clarification.
tion of presuppositions. And everything which can have an objective (presupposed) sense becomes the subject-matter for a radical sense-explication. In this way, the phenomenologist claims to have the means for the solution of all philosophical problems. For philosophy, as Husserl understands it, aspires to be rigorous science. As such, its exclusive domain is necessarily the entire realm of all objective sense. As Husserl says:

...the realm of its investigation remains not less than every sphere which can be called 'objective', which considered in its totality, and at its root, is the conscious life.1

Again, he writes:

Philosophy, after all, demands an elucidation by virtue of the ultimate and most concrete essential necessities; and these are the necessities that satisfy the essential rootedness of any objective world in transcendental subjectivity and thus make the world intelligible concretely: as a constituted sense. Only then, moreover, do the 'supreme and final' questions become disclosed, those that are still to be addressed to the world, even as understood in this manner.2

Thus Husserl suggests that:

All rational problems, and all those problems, which for one reason or another, have come to be known as 'philosophical' have their place within phenomenology, finding from the ultimate source of transcendental experience or eidetic intuition, their proper form and the means of their solution.3

Let us attempt to bring this understanding of philosophy into sharper focus. Philosophy attempts to
render being intelligible. This can only be possible if being is reduced to its objective sense. That is, it is only possible if 'what-is' is taken as equivalent to 'what makes sense'. In other words, it is only possible as an idealism which equates being with what can be thought. Now, it is precisely by means of the *epoche* that being is reduced to its objective sense. Thus the *epoche* itself is the essential precondition for philosophy. Hence the idea of philosophy itself (*qua* science) demands the performance of the transcendental reduction. By means of this reduction, the world and conscious life are transformed into phenomena of consciousness. That is, they are taken as ideas, as a constituted sense, which require an infinite explication. And all questions concerning life and the being of the world become answerable. In this way, phenomenology can:

...intuit life's absolute norms and learn life's original teleological structure. Phenomenology is not less than man's whole occupation with himself in the service of the universal reason. Revealing life's norms, he does in fact, set free a stream of new consciousness intent upon the infinite idea of entire humanity, humanity in fact and truth. 4

The stream of new consciousness which is set free is precisely transcendental experience. For as we have said, the idea of philosophy, which is the idea of reason, demands the *epoche*. That is, it demands the reflective, contemplative
attitude of transcendental experience. As Husserl says:

I learn to surve\textsuperscript{y} transcendental experience. I am no longer interested in my own existence. I am interested in the pure intentional life, wherein my psychically real experiences have occurred.\textsuperscript{5}

And again, he writes:

\ldots there begins a philosophy with the deepest and most universal self-understanding of the philosophizing ego as the bearer of absolute reason coming to itself, of the same ego as implicating in his apodictic being-for-himself his fellow subjects and all possible fellow philosophers...[this is] the discovery of the necessary concrete manner of being of absolute \textit{in the ultimate sense, transcendental} subjectivity in a transcendental life of constant \textit{world-constitution}\textsuperscript{6}.

Husserl goes on to say that this results in a new meaning for what is called the world, and a new meaning for human existence itself. He then adds:

\ldots what follows this is the ultimate self-understanding of man as being responsible for his own human being... which realizes its whole concrete being in apodictic freedom by becoming apodictic mankind in the whole active life of its reason... mankind understanding itself as rational, understanding that it is rational in seeking to be rational; that this signifies an infinity of living and striving toward reason; that reason is precisely that which \textit{qua} man, in his innermost being, is aiming for, that which alone can satisfy him, make him \textquoteleft blessed\textquoteright; that reason allows for no differentiation into \textquoteleft theoretical\textquoteright, \textquoteleft practical\textquoteright, \textquoteleft aesthetic\textquoteright, or whatever; that being human is teleological being and an ought-to-be; and that this teleology holds sway in each and every activity and project of an ego; that through self-understanding in all this it can know the apodictic \textit{telos}; and that this knowing, the ultimate self-understanding, has no other form than self-understanding in the form of philosophy.
Philosophy as the Contemplation of Lived Experience

Whatever else we may say about Husserl, we cannot now deny the noble character of his life long project. Nevertheless, we must submit this project to a critical scrutiny. What immediately strikes us, as the crucial aspect of Husserl's science, is the notion of the epoché. Through it alone do we gain access to a realm of objective being adequate for a philosophical investigation. For it is the epoché which reduces all being to its objective sense. Thereby, the entire realm of subjective life, qua bracketed, becomes the subject-matter for a scientific investigation. That is, conscious life, as the primordial objective constituted sense, becomes susceptible to a phenomenological explication. For the epoché transforms life into a transcendental object for contemplation (intuition). Of course, this intuiting and contemplating (transcendental reflection) of natural life is itself an experiencing which can be made objective by a higher ordered reflection. And this new reflection can be made objective by yet another reflection—and so on ad infinitum. Further, this infinity, like all others in the phenomenological sphere, can itself become the object of an infinite explication. In this way, the primacy of intuition and contemplation is
maintained throughout.

Thus philosophy is through and through contemplative. However, this contemplation is, at the same time, an 'activity'. That is, it is precisely an original seeing which must be learned through practice. By performing the époche, we learn to see the absolute ground, pre-conceptual lived experience—the origin of all reason and truth. We can then attempt to uncover the implicit sense of this experience. Thus Husserl says:

Philosophy can take root only in a radical reflexion upon the meaning and possibility of its own scheme. Through such reflexion it must in the very first place and through its own activity take possession of the absolute ground of pure pre-conceptual experience, which is its own proper preserve; then self-active again, it must create original concepts, adequately adjusted to this ground, and so generally utilize for its advance an absolutely transparent method.

Thus we must first learn to see our own absolute life as an original datum. And then, because philosophy (qua science) demands it, we must take this life precisely as a constituted sense, self-constituted by transcendental subjectivity.

In this way, our life becomes susceptible to an infinite philosophical explication. That is, it becomes the correlate of an infinite theoretical contemplation.
The Shortcomings of Contemplative Philosophy

Despite its radicality, it is precisely this notion of a thoroughly contemplative (intuitive) consciousness, at the very heart of Husserlian phenomenology, that has been questioned by some thinkers. Levinas, for example, suggests that: "...we might still reproach Husserl for his intellectualism." He adds that:

- If he [Husserl] has come to such a profound idea, namely that in the ontological order the world of science is later than the concrete and vague world of perception and depends upon it, then he was probably still in error in taking this concrete world primarily as a world of perceived objects.

Levinas goes on to ask:

Is our first attitude in the presence of the real the attitude of theoretic contemplation? Does the world not manifest itself in its very Being as a center of action, as a field of activity or concern, to speak the language of Martin Heidegger?

In this light, Levinas suggests that Phenomenology, because of its preliminary concerns with the cognitive aspects of our experience, was able to attain only a narrow, impoverished notion of existence as presence before a contemplating consciousness.

Paul Ricoeur, another Husserlian commentator, seems to agree. He argues that Husserl's transcendental doctrine is "...erected on the narrow basis of the analysis of representations," i.e., all the operations of consciousness.
whose primary type is perception." Nevertheless, Ricoeur acknowledges the fruitfulness of the patient method of phenomenological descriptions. However, he feels that when the 'intentional method' is extended to the affective sphere, the sphere of the will, we will come across new discoveries which will reveal a richer sphere of existence, not adequately accounted for by the notion of a contemplative consciousness. That is, it will be revealed that practical life is not reducible to a 'kernal of sense', an 'objectifying' character which is already there and sustains the affective and practical 'strata' of consciousness. In other words, we will find that 'willing' is just as original as 'thinking'. And Husserl's emphasis on the 'cogito', the 'I think', as a primary contemplative presence to every kind of phenomenon, will be unmasked as what Ricoeur calls a 'logistic prejudice'.

Jean Paul Sartre seems to agree with this type of criticism of Husserl. According to Sartre, man is originally already situated in a world which calls for action. And it is through this original praxis that being becomes what it is. Thus it is not merely thought which 'gives sense' (or 'dispenses meaning'). Rather, the full range of human activity (perceiving, willing, feeling etc.) constitutes meaning. Sartre suggests that it is only in the face
of this immediate continuous creation of consciousness that anguish (Angst) is possible. To say: "If the I of the 'I think' is the primary structure of consciousness, this anguish is impossible." 17 Thus for Larre, the *epoché* does not represent an intellectual operation by which the conscious life is dispassionately viewed. That is, "...the *epoché* is no longer...an intellectual method, a learned procedure." 18 Rather: "It is an anguish imposed on us and which we cannot avoid...[it is] an ever possible accident of our daily life." 19

Thus, in general, it seems that most post-Husserlian writers, who diverge from Husserl's path, do so precisely because they feel Husserlian phenomenology is too intellectualistic. 20 That is, they feel that Husserlian phenomenology is too 'cold' to be able to adequately deal with the passions of experience. It is an 'ivory tower' philosophy which ignores the anguish involved in the necessity of choosing oneself immediately in one's action. That is, it ignores the primordial experience of Angst.

This manner of criticism, among contemporary writers, derives its inspiration from the work of Martin Heidegger. 21 However, Heidegger himself was strongly influenced by an earlier writer, Soren Kierkegaard. This very gifted nineteenth century writer was adamently opposed
to intellectualistic philosophy. A few excerpts from one of his works might prove of interest, he writes, rocking:

...it is regarded as a settled thing, that the objective tendency in direction of intellectual contemplation, i.e., in the newer linguistic usage, the ethical answer to the question of what I ethically have to do:...The objective tendency is the way and the truth: the ethical is, becoming an observer! That the individual must become an observer, is the ethical answer to the problem of life. - 22

Again, he says:

The way of objective reflection leads to abstract thought, to mathematics, to historical knowledge of different kinds; and always it leads away from the subject, whose existence or non-existence, and from the objective point of view quite rightly, becomes infinitely indifferent. - 23

never, Kierkegaard says, quite simply that: "It is impossible to exist without passion." Hence this notion of an indifferent observer, although demanded in theory, is a perverse ideal for man. Thus Kierkegaard asks:

How can it help to explain to a man how the eternal truth is to be understood eternally, when the supposed user of the explanation is prevented from understanding it through being an existing individual and merely becomes fantastic when he imagines himself to be sub specie aeterni (sic)? - 25

William James, himself inspired by the anti-intellectualism of Henri Bergson, makes a similar remark:

The eternal's ways are utterly unlike our ways. 'Let us imitate the All', said the original prospectus of...the Monist. As if we could, either in thought or conduct! We are invincibly parts, let us talk as we will, and must always apprehend the absolute as if it were a foreign being. - 26
And of course, we should not forget Frederick Nietzsche, perhaps the most popular anti-intellectual writer. He had a great dislike for all scholars, as he shows in this passage:

For this is the truth: I have moved from the house of the scholars and I even banged the door behind me. My soul sat hungry at their table too long; I am not like them trained to pursue knowledge as if it were nut cracking. I love freedom and the air over the fresh earth; rather would I sleep on ox hides than on their decorums and respectabilities.

I am too hot and burned by my own thoughts; often it nearly takes my breath away. Then I must go out into the open away from all dusty rooms. But they sit cool in the cool shade: in everything they want to be mere spectators, and they beware of sitting where the sun burns on the steps. 27

however, Kierkegaard, James and Nietzsche, in attacking intellectualism, were concerned with traditional philosophy as it had existed before them. According to these revolutionary thinkers, this tendency of objectivism originated in Plato (theory of forms and doctrine of recollection) and found its most elaborate systemization in the speculative idealism of Hegel. However, Husserl too was adamantly opposed to this tradition of speculative philosophy. 28 For him too, it represented a perverse mathematization of experience. Indeed, Husserl’s principle of intuition was precisely intended to bring us back to lived experience itself, and away from all these ungrounded fantastic theories. Yet, paradoxically, this very principle
or intuition itself has been branded as intellectualistic by certain post-Husserlian thinkers. Can Husserl escape this charge?

4. The Raising of the Possibility of Salvaging Husserl's Idealism

If we are to be able to adequately answer the question posed in the last section, we must be sufficiently clear about some of the issues involved. The problem we face is whether, by means of the epoché, we can contemplate existence and bring it to adequate expression. That is, we must ask whether existence can be theoretically grasped without distortion. Or put in another way, we are concerned with whether it is legitimate to idealize being, absolving it into a Kantian idea. Indeed, Husserl makes it clear that such idealizations are possible. Reality everywhere manifests the ideal. Subject and object, thought and being, consciousness and reality are 'theoretically' one. And they can be grasped as such in a reflective experience. Thus lived experience itself presents no paradoxes. Only maladjusted theories, unfaithful to life as it is lived, impose straight-jackets on existence. And phenomenology must be engaged in the constant task of correcting such theories, guided by its insight into the unity of experience.
Indeed, it must constantly refine its own pronouncements, guided by the ideal of the perfect expressibility of being. Thus Husserl says that phenomenology is a self-examination which:

...does not break off too quickly and turn into naive positivity, but remains with absolute consistency, just what it was at the beginning: self-examination. 26

However, we have been suggesting that perhaps contemplation, as a manner of seeing 'what-is', cannot, of itself, adequately account for the full range of experience. Indeed, other writers, as we have seen, believe that being does not arise merely from thought, but is originally constituted by the full range of human activity. Thus Ricoeur, for example, says:

The practical life of consciousness presents original problems which in principle are not resolved by an interpretation of 'representation'. 30

However, he adds immediately:

...an attempt would then be made to save Husserl's idealism by identifying the transcendental and 'existence' as praxis. 31

But this then raises a new question: Can we salvage Husserl's idealism, perhaps by allowing for a new kind of intuition, a broader notion, which sees directly in immediate pre-reflective practical activity? That is, can we play down the theoretical bent of Husserlian phenomenology, admitting that consciousness is not always also contemplative,
but often is directly and totally involved in practical activity? Thus can we substitute for 'transcendental' reason a richer notion, something like 'practical' reason? Berger, a valuable Husserlian commentator, would seem to disagree. In the first place, he does not think that Husserl's idealism needs salvaging. As far as he is concerned, Husserl does not play down emotions; he simply situates them within the field of meaning. Thus, in an argument against Levinas which seems to apply here, he says that:

It is not extending Husserl's philosophy to separate, out, 'in sometimes going beyond a strict interpretation', the elements of his doctrine which seem to us to lead toward a richer notion of existence than presence before a contemplating consciousness'. It means opposing the central idea of the system. It is to refuse the supreme evidence toward which the phenomenological reduction leads us. The 'I' does not confront a reality to be contemplated. Being arises from it's very regard.

Thus for Berger, the notion of a 'contemplative consciousness' incorporates all forms of human activity--theoretical and practical. Every manner of being-in-the-world is implicitly an object of a contemplative consciousness. As such, the theoretical, or ideal core of every experience can be brought to expression.

Now, it is clear from Husserl's own works that he accepted such a view. He leaves no doubt that the affective sphere is enclosed within a wider sphere--the sphere of
meaning. And this wider sphere is the sphere of doxic positionality. For example, he says:

Every thesis of whatever genus can, in conformity with essential laws, and through the doxic characterizations which belong inalienably to its essential nature, be transformed into an actual doxic positum... every statement of a wish, for instance, can therefore be transformed into a doxic statement, and it is then in a certain way both in one: at once a doxic statement and the statement of a wish. 35

Thus Husserl concludes:

Every act, as also every act-correlate, harbours explicitly or implicitly a 'logical' factor. It can always be made logically explicit. 36

Now, it is quite clear that Husserl must maintain such a view if he is to hold on to his idea of a science of experience. That is, affective experiences must be reducible to a cognitive substratum if they are to become the objects of a scientific investigation. Thus, for example, the meaning expressed in a poem must be reducible to a 'logical' core. And every experience, at least ideally, must harbour within itself a sense capable of explication. The controversy arises, however, when we consider that the sense of an experience need not always be 'scientifically' expressable. Indeed poetry has its own manner of dispensing meaning. And perhaps these meanings precisely require the poetic way of expression. If this is indeed the case, then the reduction of these meanings to
their 'logical' character will invariably distort these meanings themselves. Consequently, there may be a realm of meaning which is essentially 'unscientific' in character.

It is interesting, and perhaps not accidental, that the works of several 'existentialists' are remarkably more 'literary' in style. Our question here, however, is whether one can treat the pathetic aspect of experience in a scientific manner. That is, can a science of experience consistently incorporate a 'poetic' of experience? If this is indeed possible, then there can be no doubt that the notion of 'science' itself must undergo a radical transformation. Did Husserl himself intend such a transformation? We believe that this question must be answered in the negative. It is impossible for us to conceive how poetic meanings can be adequately explicated under the rubric of a 'Kantian idea'. Such a treatment seems just as perverse as the 'mathematizing' of experience generally. Indeed, it may well be argued, in this light, that Husserl's phenomenology itself is merely a more sophisticated manner of mathematizing experience.

Nevertheless, it might still be suggested that Husserl's idealism can be salvaged. We merely replace theoretical contemplation with something like 'poetic contemplation' to handle those richer elements of our exper-
Hence which Husserlian phenomenology had not yet thoroughly investigated. Indeed, Husserl himself emphasized the necessity of being attentive to our experience. And that he himself was merely attentive to the 'logical' character of our experience, at the cost of distorting the affective sphere, need not prevent us from enriching his program so as to do justice to man's emotions. However, this is precisely the question at hand. Is it possible to enrich Husserl's program in this way without having to abandon it? That is, can there still be a science (philosophy) of experience, though in a radically different sense? Or is the notion of philosophy itself, as a rigorous science of experience, necessarily incompatible with lived experience itself?

5 Husserl's Idealism as a Pre-judgement of the Nature of Being

It is easy to see that what is at stake here is the very meaning of philosophy itself. What, indeed, is the guiding aim of philosophy? For Husserl, we found that the guiding aim is the systematic explication of the logos of being. However, this aim itself, as a Kantian idea, has now become suspect. New reflections are demanded. Maintaining the phenomenological method of being attentive to our experience, we must question precisely the nature of
This logos itself. For perhaps being is more adequately expressed in a rhetorical or poetic manner. And if this is indeed the case, then new reflections are required concerning the relation between rhetoric and logic. But what then becomes of Husserl's phenomenological program? Can we still maintain the ideal of the perfect expressibility of being? Does it make sense to speak of an ideal poetic expression?

Indeed it is precisely this ideal, the perfect expressibility of being, which must be questioned. For what if being is essentially ineffable? If we are to question being in an authentic manner, then it seems that we must be attentive precisely to its possible ineffability. But, in Husserlian terms, the answer to such a question must be a matter of experience, of intuition. But how can we have a fulfilled intuition of a lack in being? If being is ineffable, then it is precisely unintuitable (in the Husserlian sense) in a lived experience. That is, it precisely cannot be brought to a perfect expression, to an exacting thought. Thus we must ask, is it possible to experience being qua ineffable? And if such an experience is possible, must it not be precisely an experience which is categorically different from the contemplative experiences of Husserlian phenomenology. Indeed, is it not clear
that Husserlian phenomenology, radical as it is, cannot even ask such questions. For it can only ask about that which has an objective sense. And thus, in the name of reason, it must presuppose that being can be positively expressed. It is as though Husserl were asking a man who is sleeping if he were awake, hoping that if he asks long and loud enough, the man will finally answer. Or better still, it is as though Husserl were asking a dead man if he were alive, realizing that ideally, there is an answer, though forever he will not hear it.

Let us try to become clearer of the significance and consequences of these reflections. We have been suggesting that the contemplative questioning of being is perhaps not the most radical manner of questioning being. That is, we have implied that reducing being to thought already pre-judges what being is. Indeed, if philosophy, as science, must necessarily perform precisely such a reduction, then it necessarily assumes that being is perfectly expressible. And its justification for this assumption can only be the experienced unity of life. Being is. And from the fact that it is, what it is can, ideally, be expressed.

We must simply be constantly attentive to being. For only in this way can we constantly perfect our descriptions. But are we truly attentive to being if we already presuppose
that it can be scientifically described? And does the experienced unity of being warrant this presupposition? We can certainly idealize being; indeed all the sciences are based upon such idealizations. But is the fact that such idealizations are possible sufficient to maintain that being itself is ideal? Are we not perhaps distorting being precisely at the moment when we idealize it? For are we not thereby attempting to de-mystify being--make it comprehensible--when this very activity itself discloses that being is still a mystery?

In the face of the mystery of life, a definitive science is impossible. Attentiveness to the mystery is not only the realization that all positive expressions about the nature of being are necessarily distortions. It is also the realization that positivity itself, as an ideal goal grounded in the certainty of existence, is the most subtle temptation of all.

Nevertheless, Husserl himself may not have been entirely unaware of these considerations. He may well have realized, for example, that there is an existence-stratum which lies outside the scope of his science. Indeed, he says:

It is obvious that, like every intelligible problem, the transcendental problem derives the means of its
solution from an existence-stratum, which it presupposes and sets beyond the reach of its inquiry. This realm is no other than the bare subjectivity of consciousness in general...

Again, he says:

But on good grounds we limit the universality of this epoche. For were it as inclusive as it is in general capable of being—no field would be left over for unmodified judgements, to say nothing of a science.

It is true that Husserl, in his later works, speaks of performing a universal epoche. But this always means merely the universal suspension of the natural attitude. That is, it means the bracketing of natural experience. Transcendental experience still remains uncriticized. It only becomes thematic with a further reflection which suspends transcendental judgements themselves. But this further criticism itself involves a higher uncriticized sphere of unmodified judgements. And so on ad infinitum. A final criticism, which would include the infinite number of possible reflections, can only remain an infinite ideal. Thus we must always, provisionally, rest content with a finite number of reflections. At any level, we can make certain positive claims. But these in turn must be suspended for an even more radical reflection, itself provisional, though less naive. Meanwhile, bare subjectivity itself can never be bracketed. As Husserl says:
The 'being directed towards', 'the being burdened with', 'accepting an attitude', 'undergoing or suffering from' has this of necessity wrapped in its very essence, that it is just something 'from the Ego' or in the reverse direction 'to the Ego'; and this Ego is the pure Ego, and no reduction can get any grip on it.

Later, he adds:

...it has no content that could be unravelled, it is in and for itself indescribable; pure Ego and nothing further. 40

Thus the pure Ego represents what might be taken to be an opaque mysterious centre at the heart of experience. In any case, it can never be scientifically examined. That is, it can never be reduced to an objective sense, for it is precisely bare subjectivity. But if Husserl is aware of this 'pure Ego', how can he claim to be establishing a rigorous presuppositionless science? Clearly, objective science, although it may be able to grasp the totality of what objectively is (at least as 'idea'), is unable to dispel the mystery of the ego. For the ego itself, as such, can not be seen. However, Husserl himself is unaunted by such considerations. He recognizes that science, even rigorous science, can only be concerned with the realm of objectivity. Thus, for example, God, who by definition lies outside this realm, is not a concern for the scientist. He is not an 'object' of reason, but of faith. That is, He is not an object at all. However; our
conscious existence, Husserl thinks, can be made the object of a scientific investigation. And it is this claim which we are trying to understand.

Now, we have suggested that perhaps being is, at bottom, a mystery. Further, we said that if this is the case, then all idealizations are distortions. That is, every scientific determination necessarily conceals the fundamental indeterminacy of being. Nevertheless, Husserl himself was aware that being always has an indeterminate horizon. However, he felt that this indeterminacy itself could be conceptualized in the form of a Kantian idea. For although being is indeterminate, it is infinitely determinable. Thus scientific determinations, rather than concealing being, simply expose it as infinitely revealable. Hence the indeterminacy of being isn't covered-up; rather, it is forever recognized. Consequently, we might suggest that Husserl has not lost sight of the mystery of being; rather, he simply makes it thematic in the form of a Kantian idea. Must we conclude, then, that we were wrong to suggest that all idealizations are necessarily distortions? Or is it the case that we mean something entirely different, than did Husserl, when we speak of the indeterminacy of being? Indeed we do. For when we suggest that being is indeterminate, we mean precisely that it cannot
be positively expressed. Like Husserl’s ‘pure ego’, it cannot be reduced to an objective sense without ‘selfification’. For indeed, pre-reflective life is not an object that can be perceived. Rather, it is thoroughly temporal. Or, to speak metaphorically, it is a ‘verb’ and not a ‘noun’. Neither subject nor object, it is the ‘copula’ in between. Art science can only deal with that which is objective. Thus it must transform life into a ‘constituted sense’. That is, life, as the origin of all sense, must itself be understood as an objective sense. However, conscious life, as Husserl himself recognized, is radically different from all objects of consciousness. Between the absolute sphere of immanent conscious life and the relative realm of intended objects, there lies an abyss of meaning. Or as Husserl says: ‘Between the meanings of consciousness and reality, awakens a veritable abyss.”41 But how then can absolute life, being radically different from all objective sense, be itself reduced to an objective meaning, without suffering a distortion? Indeed, if we are to speak about our lived existence itself, must we not do so only indirectly? For does not every positive expression about existence make substantial precisely that which is non-substantial.42 But suppose we recognize, as does Berger, that phenomenological statements themselves must be understood indirectly, as
Nevertheless, are not such statements, when understood from the transcendental perspective, precisely intended to positively express being? And does it not thereby lack the irony of a truly indirect communication which recognizes that it distorts its subject-matter at the very moment in which it reveals it? And if such a truly ironical metaphor is required, does it still make sense to speak of an ideal indirect expression which perfectly expresses being? Does not the very need for such a 'metaphor' attest to the impossibility of an ideal expression which does not at the same time distort being? For does it not suggest that the truth of being is precisely non-objective in the ordinary scientific sense?

The Primacy of Lived Experience Renders Every Discursive Science Derivative

We have suggested that the truth of being is non-objective in the ordinary scientific sense. Nevertheless, Husserl himself seems to recognize this. For him, truth is lived. We have the truth from its source, our absolute life. Thus truth is not something mundanely objective, existing in itself. Consequently, we must not seek for the origin of truth by means of calculation or experiment. Rather, we must simply see it. That is, we must see that conscious life is itself original and the origin of all
explications. It simply is. And it is known as such not through some logical argumentation. Rather, our knowledge of life is, at bottom, a lived 'knowledge', a lived 'seeing'. That is, it is a 'pre-conceptual knowledge'. We simply reflectively see our pre-conceptual lived experience. A difficulty arises, however, when we try to express this lived knowledge in rigorous concepts. For our task becomes one of attempting to conceptualize that which is essentially pre-conceptual, and the motivation for all conceptions. Indeed, such a task cannot be actually accomplished. It remains an ideal goal, for our 'existential knowledge' of life always precedes and guides our concept formation. However, we can be honestly attentive to our growing self-awareness so that our concepts will genuinely reflect the nature of our life. In so doing, we refine our existential self-awareness itself. That is, we learn to see ourselves, our absolute life, and truth itself in a more adequate light. Or, quite simply, we mature. And this existential maturation reflects the teleological structure and horizontal nature of lived truth. Now, what can be wrong with this way of understanding? Indeed it seems quite adequate, except at one crucial point. If 'seeing' is preeminently a matter of experience, a lived knowledge, then a rigorous science of being must be, in the first place, an existential 'science'. Knowledge must be,
in the first place, an existing self-awareness—a matter of prudence, of experience. And all discursive sciences (science in the more usual sense) must be, by contrast, derivative. That is, all sciences which 'communicate results' must be secondary, and 'naive' in relation to lived experience itself. Now, phenomenology claims to be the rigorous discursive science precisely because it taps the source of all objectivity—i.e., pre-conceptual lived experience. That is, it recognizes that truth is lived, that life is absolute. But since pre-conceptual life is precisely prior to all concepts, every pronouncement of phenomenology is always 'too late'. And the adequate expression of the meaning of life can always be only an ideal goal. Hence every phenomenological claim is, in its own way, 'provisional' and 'naive', requiring a new, more original reflective inquirv into conscious life. And since the knowledge of existence is, in the first place, existential, no attempt at communicating it can ever be fully successful. Indeed, every such attempt must be inadequate precisely because it transforms existence from a matter of existential knowledge to an object of a discursive scientific knowledge. For Husserl, however, such a transformation, at least ideally, can be adequately performed. And, ironically, the constant attempt to reach this ideal is
precisely meant to keep us self-aware of the existential nature of truth. But is it not rather the case that when we are existentially self-aware of our existence, we recognize the utter poverty of all expressions of whatever form—that existence always slips away from every kind of objectifying grasp? Indeed, we recognize, with Husserl, that we are already infinitely close to existence. But precisely for this reason, the task of infinitely approximating being through scientific determinations can never bring us closer. It simply tends to make us forget that we are already. This is not to say that there is no need to express being. Rather, we are an 'expression' of being already. And precisely as such, the refining of our self-expression is preeminently an existential task entirely anterior to any discursive scientific knowledge.

Indeed, Husserl too was primarily concerned with the existential self-improvement of man. And his suggestion, to be self-attentive, is perhaps irreproachable. What has caused us concern, however, is the manner of attentiveness which Husserl suggests. Rather than simply accepting ourselves in full self-responsibility as 'chosen' to express being, Husserl requires that we detach ourselves from this role so that our existence itself can become the object of a discursive knowledge. Indeed, a certain kind
of detachment might be necessary for us to see ourselves in our situation. But we suggest that perhaps a proper attentive 'seeing' will recognize that every objectification of existence is necessarily a distortion, making objective that which can only be known in experience as essentially pre-objective. That is, we suggest that attention to merely the objective aspect of experience, in the name of a rigorous discursive science, will tend to make us forget that self-knowledge is a matter of an existential awareness which recognizes the utter poverty of all scientific determination. Husserl, however, seems to think otherwise. He seems to believe that the progressive determination of the sense of life is consistent with an awareness that life is already absolute and pre-conceptual. That is, he seems to think that we can objectify life and still maintain an awareness that it is actually pre-objective, the origin of all objectivity. In other words, he seems to believe that the pre-objective can itself be made objective without distortion. Indeed, existence can be objectified qua idea, and hence every actual determination becomes merely an approximation towards an infinite goal. But we would suggest that if existence is actually 'prior' to all idealizations, then the very idealizing of existence, though rooted in lived experience itself, will necessarily conceal ('distort') it.
For it will make ideal that which is essentially 'pre-ideal'. Thus Husserlian phenomenology, rather than bringing us back to pre-objective lived experience, demands that we forget its pre-objective character; it demands that we idealize existence (objectify it), and qua ideal, make it the ground for all further idealizations.

7 The Necessity of Idealizing Being

In the light of our criticisms, we must re-evaluate Husserl's project. We can no longer accept the transformation of existence into its objective sense as an adequate method for transparently revealing the meaning of life. Indeed, a philosophy of lived experience, as a discursive science of life which does not distort existence, seems to be essentially impossible. For it seems that every scientific idealization which objectifies existence, conceals it at the same time. However, such idealizations are necessary. For as Husserl himself recognized, every consciousness is a consciousness of something. Thus conscious life is not possible, except as a discriminating and conceptualizing process. Consequently, the 'distortion' or 'concealment' of existence is precisely necessary, for only therein is existence revealed. Indeed, Husserl's whole program rests on the insight that conscious life is possible only as an
intentional, objectifying life. However, he failed to see the significance of the radical distinction between conscious life (or 'existence') and objective being. That is, he failed to see that the natural and necessary tendency to idealize being involves a correlative concealment of existence. Thus although Husserl recognized that thought is necessary to reveal being, he failed to see that it could do so only indirectly. For although thought reveals objects (das Eindendes), and although the givenness of objects is necessary for existence, this givenness of objects is only possible as a concealing of existence.\textsuperscript{46} The context or horizon in which objects are revealed, i.e. conscious life, or existence itself, must remain in the background when we focus on individual objects. And the systematic explication of this background is not possible without distorting its character as a background. We should not remain content with the idea that we can infinitely uncover this background, with the theoretical view that ideally, this background can be completely seen. For such an attitude only tends to make us forget that this background can never actually be made into a thematic object, without distortion.

Nevertheless, as we have said, the idealization of being is a natural and necessary tendency. Indeed all scientific endeavour rests on the idealization of being.
The making of the first tool, the planting of the first seed, man's first discriminative behaviour (as opposed to mere instinctive behaviour) announces man's ascendance into consciousness (and therefore, self-consciousness, and indeed, 'existence'). Thus the 'distortion' of existence is not a corrupt tendency of man--rather, it is precisely an essential 'defining' characteristic which makes man what he is. The danger at hand, however, is the forgetting that this necessary process of idealization, in the name of reason, is precisely, at the same time, a concealment of existence. That is, the danger is that of seeing man as only a revealer of being, as the rationalizer of the universe, infinitely bringing it back to its own element. Such an attitude loses sight of man as simultaneously and necessarily the great concealer, and as such, the greatest mystery of all. We necessarily conceal or distort being through our idealizations. But this does not mean that we must forget that these are concealments, and that they are precisely necessary. Indeed, Husserl himself recognized that idealizations are necessary. And he attempted to call man back to the task of accepting this necessity in full self-responsibility. However, he failed to see that such idealizations are, at the same time, a concealment of existence. Thus he remained committed to the idea of a rigorous science,
o the idea of the infinite task of creatively discovering
being, without recognizing that this task necessarily involves
a simultaneous dissimulation of existence.

But if the conceptualization of objects is necessary,
is it possible that such idealizations conform to an a priori
rule? And if this is so, can there still be a science of
sciences, an idealization which systemizes all possible
idealizations? Of course, every culture has its own pattern
of structuring reality. But could there be an underlying
pattern which is common to them all—a certain essential
manner of idealizing being which can be grasped with apodictic
certainty? Indeed, philosophy qua science is precisely con-
cerned with such questions. But it can no longer appeal to
the unity of existence, as the common underlying origin of
all conceptions, to justify its belief in an underlying
ideal framework to which all possible worlds conform. Such
an appeal pre-judges the issue from the start.47 For exis-
tence is thereby immediately transformed into an ideal
structure to be explicated. Philosophy qua science, then,
can only remain an ungrounded commitment to intellectualize
being. Nevertheless, the essential structures of conscious
life, as a constituted sense, can be infinitely explicated.
But such explications, in so far as they require an imper-
sonal attitude, are always formal.48 Existence, which truly
concerns us, always slips from its grasp. Thus a rigorous
discursive science, as an impersonal contemplation of life,
is only possible as an abstract formal discipline which
always must leave concrete practical existence, as it is
really lived, out of account. Whether another type of
investigation is possible, one which is reflectively aware
of its own commitment, and thus does not pretend to have
reached a standpoint prior to all 'decision', remains to be
disked. But such a question lies outside the bounds of
Husserlian phenomenology.
V

CONCLUDING CHAPTER

Give me your whole heart,
Love and adore me,
Worship me always,
Bow to me only
And you shall find me:
This is my promise
Who love you dearly
Bhagavad-Gita

We have given a general exposition of Husserl's notion of phenomenology as a rigorous science. Then, in our critical chapter, we attempted to expose an underlying weakness in Husserl's project. Now it remains our task to generalize and evaluate our results.

1 Husserl's Concern with Scepticism

Husserl, we might say, is a super-rationalist. He indicates this himself in a letter to Lévy-Bruehl, quoted by Spiegelberg. Husserl says here that his enterprise is

...a method by which I want to establish, against mysticism and irrationalism, a kind of super-rationalism which transcends the old rationalism as inadequate and yet vindicates its inmost objectives. 1

In this rationalistic spirit, Husserl sought for certainty.

Amidst the trials and tribulations of natural life, this great philosopher attempted to reveal the certainty and security of transcendental self-experience. He realized that such security
could be won only through a complete change in attitude. Indeed, the quest for the underlying explanation of the riddle of life cannot reach its goal within the natural attitude.

From this natural point of view, the attitude underlying the research of modern-day scientists, one seeks the truth in transcendent laws which lie outside the realm of lived experience. Our lived experience itself remains inadequate, incomplete and unfulfilled, requiring a transcendent revelation to give it justification. But Husserl felt that it is time we realized not only that such justification is not possible, but also that it is not necessary. Our lived experience carries its own reason within itself. Thus rather than being agitated and lost in our world, we must learn that security lies in the depths of our being. Like the prisoners in Plato's cave analogy, we must learn to make a complete and radical about-face. No longer grasping for and clutching external realities, we must seek our peace in the inwardness of ourselves.

Briefly, then, Husserl recognized that our constant attempts to explain reality from the natural attitude where doomed to frustration. And the outcome of these incessant failures is a scepticism and nihilism which wounds the spirit in its holiest depths. It was against this scepticism which Husserl devoted his life long work.

The origin of this scepticism is the implicit belief in a metaphysical dualism. This natural belief recognizes
two spheres of being: personal subjective experience and transcendent impersonal reality. We then realize that we can never know whether that which we call truth is really truth or whether it merely appears that way to us. To remedy this situation, we cling to various speculative philosophies which artificially assure us that the world we see is in fact a legitimate manifestation of some divine being. But these philosophies themselves remain ungrounded. They involve an implicit or explicit postulation of the mediation of opposite realities—a mediation whose operation cannot be intuitively seen. Thus this mediation itself becomes something which we cannot know with insight—and with the recognition of this, we once again lapse into scepticism.

Thus Husserl recognized that if scepticism is to be overcome, we must simultaneously overcome the naive positivism of a metaphysical dualism. We must learn to see reality as closed within the monadic sphere of consciousness. As Husserl says:

Consciousness, considered in its 'purity', must be reckoned as a self-contained system of Being, as a system of Absolute Being, into which nothing can penetrate, and from which nothing can escape; which has no spatio-temporal system; which cannot experience causality from anything nor exert causality upon anything.

This insight into the monadic unity of reality requires the transcendental reduction. It requires a new attitude which
eyes in conscious experience a self-sufficiency and inner certainty which can overcome, in principle, every kind of scepticism. No longer do we need to believe in some mediating force outside of experience which holds reality together.

No longer do we need to engage in some form of romantic superstructure to express being. Rather, we have being itself given in our immediate experience. And we must merely be attentive to this experience so that being can be brought to adequate expression. Indeed, this attention requires an unnatural, and hence courageous, resolve to maintain the transcendental perspective. But only if we do this can we self-consciously remain in the light of reason. Only in this way can we realize our freedom and accept our self-responsibility in the face of the irrational facticity of natural experience.

Thus the overcoming of scepticism requires nothing less than a total and unconditional surrender to reason as the ground of being.

However, in the course of our scientific explications, we run into complications, even paradoxes, which admit no easy solutions. How, for example, can we make sense of the notion of an absolute transcendental self which constitutes other transcendental selves, and still remains absolute? How, indeed, does a-temporal consciousness preclude a life-world precisely as culturally and historically conditioning its
constitutive activity? Both these questions reflect the
to the underlying problem: how are we to make sense of the
notion of a self-same ego which is at once both a worldless,
transcendental self and a natural worldly ego? 3 Husserl
believes that these questions can be answered in a reasonable
manner. New paradoxes may then arise, but guided by the
insight into the unity of conscious experience, all such
problems are in principle answerable. Thus we engage in the
constant task of rationalizing our experience. It is as if
the self-given unity of our experience is itself not enough,
but requires, for its validation, our ability to express it
in words that make sense.

But how long can we remain engaged in this infinite
task before we too finally grow weary and lapse into scep-
ticism. Indeed, Husserl recognized that weariness is
precisely the greatest danger. He says:

Europe's greatest danger is weariness. Let us as 'good
Europeans' do battle with this danger of dangers with
the sort of courage that does not shirk even the endless
battle. 4

But in the face of this infinite task, this infinite aim to
achieve certainty, this infinite battle for peace and security,
how can we help but grow weary of the 'heorism of reason'?
how long can we engage in the mission of justifying our
experience and making sense of our existence, before we too
lapse into bitter despair or mindless indifference. And where is our promised certainty? Indeed, so long as we must do battle with scepticism, this scepticism is not overcome. How are we not, in our infinite task, involved precisely in an infinite uncertainty?

However, Husserl, it seems, could not bear to live with uncertainty. As he says in his diary in 1906, during a crisis in his career:

I have been through enough torments from lack of clarity and from doubt that wave back and forth. Only one need absorbs me: I must win clarity, else I cannot live; I cannot bear life unless I can believe that I shall achieve it.5

Or as Gadamer says about Husserl:

The deep earnestness grounding his own simple and innocent personality engaged him fully, then and forever, with a unique question: how can I become a sincere philosopher? A philosopher for him was a self-thinker, a man who wanted to give an ultimate account of all his thoughts and convictions, beginning with the basic problems of science (Husserl was a mathematician) but expanding over all the problems of human life, and for whom every uncontrolled and unproven conviction must appear as a loss of his own inner confidence in himself.6

But if clarity, the justification of convictions and the overcoming of doubt are precisely infinite tasks, then we cannot help but think that Husserl 'died in battle', a brave warrior to the end, without ever winning the inner confidence and certainty for which he devoted his life. And the 'certainty' with which he carried out his task must have remained,
until the end, only an ungrounded conviction.

however, now, in our post mortem, we are faced with some very critical questions. The transformation of being to that which, ideally, is intelligible can no longer be straightforwardly accepted. The very reduction of reality to the closed monadic sphere of intentional consciousness must now be critically scrutinized. Precisely the notion of philosophy, as a scientific investigation of the ground of being, must be examined. Nothing less than the value of infinitely striving for certainty in the name of reason must now be questioned. Indeed, what is at stake here is nothing less than the legitimate meaning of philosophy itself.

? Scientific Philosophy as Necessarily Presupposing Reason

It should be remembered, however, that Husserl himself felt that he was engaged in the task of making explicit the proper sense of philosophy. But his task always required the prior performance of the phenomenological epanc. And Husserl did not see that this epanc already pre-judged what philosophy is. He understood phenomenological philosophy as being a radically self-critical discipline which attempts to uproot every presupposition. But he did not see that this discipline itself involves a presupposition which is prior to its investigative discoveries and the very condition for
their possibility. And this prior presupposition is itself insufficient to a phenomenological investigation of the Husserlian sort.

Let us try to make this clearer. Husserlian philosophy necessarily involves the presupposition that being is equivalent to what objectively makes sense. The appeal to the experienced unity of existence never validates this presupposition, but only reveals its concrete motivation. And it can only be assumed that this motivation is a justifiable one. For we come to realize not only that the explication of this motivation becomes an infinite task; but also, this very explication presupposes the legitimacy of this motivation from the start. Thus philosophy qua science can never justify itself down to its roots for it (philosophy) is the very presupposition that justifications are infinitely possible. And every claim that reason is the ground of being can only remain a dogmatic assertion.

Indeed, Husserl recognized that scientific philosophy is only possible if we accept, from the start, the supremacy of reason. And for Husserl, such acceptance is precisely necessary if we are to overcome scepticism. But he did not realize that this acceptance itself concealed a metaphysical prejudice. In the true positivist spirit, he felt that it is possible to begin philosophizing without any ontological
commitments. Indeed, he says "...it is we who are the genuine positivists." But we ask, is not the principle of the freedom from presuppositions itself precisely the greatest presupposition? Thus must we not agree with Ferrida, when he suggests that Husserl’s analyses

..harbour a dogmatic or speculative commitment which, to be sure, would not keep the phenomenological critique from being realized, would not be a residue of unperceived naivete, but would constitute phenomenology from within, in its project of criticism, and in the instructive value of its own premises?"  

3 The Raising of the Possibility of a New Way of Thought

It seems that philosophy, as Husserl understands it, must be questioned. And it seems also that this questioning does not belong within the domain of Husserlian phenomenology itself. We can no longer naively accept philosophy as ontologically neutral. But must we then discard philosophy altogether? Are we not, in our very questioning of Husserlian phenomenology, precisely suggesting a new way of thought? Does the necessity of ontological commitments preclude the possibility of rigorously clarifying such commitments themselves? Indeed, the dream of scientific philosophy is over. But are we not then on the threshold of discovering a new meaning for philosophy? For can we not realize the very necessity of ontological commitments themselves, and still investigate these presuppositions precisely with this aware-
nace? But what then becomes of the nature of philosophy?

It seems, according to Husserl, that if we give up our belief in reason and scientific philosophy, we must accept skepticism as the only alternative. But is this the only alternative? Might it not be possible to overcome a metaphysical dualism without accepting the dogmatism of a transcendental idealism? Must we accept as evident that reality is either heterogeneous or homogeneous? Might we not see, rather, that both of these claims equally conceal existence? Indeed an ontological commitment is necessary to reveal being, but can we not remain aware that such decisions precisely conceal being at the same time? And can we not investigate such commitments precisely with this awareness?

These are critical questions indeed. Perhaps our whole understanding of the meaning of life will be transformed. But we can no longer rest content with the false security of a dogmatic rationalism. No longer can we seek certainty with the self-assurance that it is to be found. Indeed, we must be prepared to face uncertainty in the very depths of our being.
4 The Evaluation of Husserl's Work

It has not been our task to seek a proper sense for philosophy. We leave this difficult task for further study. Our immediate project has been merely to investigate the possibility of philosophy becoming a rigorous discursive science. And our present understanding precludes this possibility. Thus we must conclude, perhaps from our own lack of understanding, that Husserl's project is a failure.

Nevertheless, we must not overlook Husserl's tremendous contribution to the philosophical effort. It should not be denied that within Husserl's work itself lie the seeds for the fruitful investigations of several post-Husserlian writers. Let us then devote our last few words to an indication of how this can be the case.

In a brief presentation of the development of Husserl's work, we cannot outline all of the relevant Husserlian analyses which give rise to similar thematic investigations among existential phenomenologists. Let it suffice to say that Husserl, in his attempt to radically and honestly describe what he saw, developed several useful themes which were followed up by later writers. For it is possible to reclaim certain Husserlian investigations in a modified form so as to drop the pretension of a thoroughgoing idealism. Indeed, the attentiveness to our experience which phenomenology
demands, though understood in a modified form which drops the pretense of being a presuppositionless and purely descriptive science, remains valid for all further investigations which seek to clarify our life situation. And this attentiveness to experience which gives the works of several post-Husserlian writers the character of being 'phenomenological'.

Thus it seems that Husserl's patient analyses, when they are stripped of their 'transcendental' pretense, remain valuable for further investigations. An outstanding and very revealing example of this is Husserl's 'discovery' of the Urdoxa, the believing certainty in the existence of the world. He makes this belief the object of a transcendental knowledge, as the manifestation of reason. But once we recognize that we are wholly conditioned by this belief, we realize that our self-awareness of it is not enough to assure us that this belief can be transparently seen. Indeed, a science of one's beliefs is not possible without abrogating the proper sense of belief. However, no longer pretending to objectively see our beliefs, we can still clarify these (in the Socratic spirit) while remaining aware of their essential character as belief. Further, the infinite task of justifying every conviction in the name of reason will itself give way to the recognition that this task is itself
a conviction which can be clarified. Finally, this new clarifying investigation would no longer bear the dogmatic banner of reason, but would surrender itself to this movement of belief.

Thus we see how the Husserlian problematic can be transformed into a new mode of investigation which is reflexively aware of its rationalistic prej udice. However, the study of the implications which this new way of thought has on the nature of reason and truth, and indeed, philosophy itself, lies outside the scope of our present project. Nevertheless, by becoming aware of this new horizon, we are perhaps able to gain a proper appreciation for Husserl's work.

Edmund Husserl attempted to overcome the tradition of speculative philosophies. This great crusader and man of principle sought to reveal the unique binding theme which underlies the philosophical movement, but nevertheless, transcends it as its unique origin and ultimate goal. In a word, Husserl sought the eternal amidst the flux of the various philosophies. Indeed, many a great philosopher has claimed to overcome traditional thought. And yet, today, they are studied as part of the tradition. Thus it seems that in attempting to overcome the tradition, these philosophers have merely decided the course of that tradition itself. And the question arises as to whether it is even
possible that there can be a genuinely unique way of thought which occasions a truly radical break from the tradition. Indeed, perhaps such a break spells the end of philosophy itself. But in any case, such questions did not arise in the ausserlindian problematic. Husserl demanded that the philosopher maintain the autonomy of a self-thinker, but always such a one who is guided by the traditional will of scientific philosophy. And Husserl himself, it seems, had crystallized and refined the movement of this very tradition. Indeed, it was his aim to transcend "...the old rationalism as inadequate and yet vindicate its innmost objectives." Nevertheless, Husserl's work has occasioned the rise of new reflections, a new way of thought which questions the very aims of traditional philosophy itself. And this fact alone attests to the greatness of this philosopher.

Finally, we can now suggest that Husserl, in his traditional war with scepticism, has romanticised belief in the name of reason. He has transformed belief into a transparent object of science. Unwilling to accept the uncertainty of faith, he sought the radical overthrow of all scepticism through a philosophical, scientific knowledge. Indeed, he realized that a complete victory over scepticism could only be an infinite goal. Thus, in effect, he required a perpetual faith in reason. It remains for us to
recognize this, and to see in faith itself, the authentic answer to scepticism.
NOTES

1. Frege's critique of the Philosophy of Arithmetic is found in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 103 (1984).

2. In this early period, Husserl was deeply influenced by Natorp, a neo-Kantian. According to Solowski ('The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution', p. 40), many of Husserl's central problems in the Logical Investigation are taken from Natorp's book: Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritische Methode.

3. Herein lies one of the weaknesses of our investigation. In attempting to grasp some of the basic features of Husserlian phenomenology, we tend to treat it as "a minerva springing forth complete and full panoplied from the head of some creative genius." (a phrase Husserl himself uses to describe philosophical systems. See 'Phenomenology as Rigorous Science' in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 75) Indeed, perhaps this tendency is unavoidable whenever we examine the works of a writer in its finished form. Nevertheless, in our present work, this tendency is reinforced by the fact that we do not attempt a chronological investigation of the evolution of Husserl's thought. However, one of the basic features of phenomenology itself is precisely its intention to be radically self-critical. And perhaps our emphasis on this aspect of phenomenology makes up for the absence of an actual display of such self-criticism at work.

4. Our colleague, Tim Lynch, is presently engaged in a companion piece which is more of this nature, and which should prove of interest to the reader. (see his Master of Arts thesis at Nclaster)

5. That this need not have been the case, that the life-world may present a new fundament which might replace the transcendental subject, and hence alter the whole character of phenomenology, are questions that are properly...
And only from a post-war era perspective. However, it seems, did not take the real. However, it should be admitted that a more comprehensive investigation and criticism would require a thorough examination of the latter aspects of Russell's thought.

6. As we have already indicated, an additional change, i.e., how Russell's later ideas fit into the context of his universal science, will not be attempted. Such a change would involve additional questions as to whether Russell's project reflects a radical change in its later form. As such, without argument, that such a drastic change does not occur. Nevertheless, we recognize that a comprehensive treatment of our topic would require a defense of that idea. But such a project lies outside the scope of our present abilities. Nevertheless, if the reader is concerned with a brief presentation which supports our assumption, we refer him to an article by Hans-Georg Gadamer: "The Science of the Life-World" in Analecta Husserliana, Vol. II, edited by Anna-Feressa Tymieniecka.

I. EXPERIMENTAL EXPERIENCE AS A WAY OF LIFE


2. Husserl, Cartesian Meditation, p. 6 (in italics).


4. Ibid., p. 72.

5. Ibid., p. 73.

6. Ibid., p. 144.

7. Ibid., p. 144.


12Ibid., p. 8 (italics).
13Ibid., Ideas, (Cachwot) p. 20 (italics).
14Ibid., (Cachwort) p. 20 (italics).
15see page 10, note 12.
16see page 7, note 9.
18Ibid., (Cachwort) p. 5 (italics).
19Ibid., Cartesian Meditations, p. 27.
20Ibid., The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, p. 137.
21Ibid., The Idea of Phenomenology, p. 49.
22Ibid., Ideas, (Sec. 33) p. 102.
23Ibid., (Sec. 54) p. 152.
24Ibid., (Sec. 84) p. 223.
25Ibid., The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, p. 137.
26Ibid., The Idea of Phenomenology, p. 33.
27Ibid., Ideas, (Sec. 64) p. 173.
28Ibid., (Sec. 64) p. 173.
29Ibid., (Sec. 31) p. 98. As Berger says in his book, The Cogito in Husserl's Philosophy, "...Descartes wants to reject as absolutely false everything in which we can imagine the slightest doubt. His attempt at universal doubt is thus an attempt at universal negation" (p. 108). Husserl, however, "...wants to limit himself to a simple 'suspension' of judgement." (Ibid.).
31. *Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act 2.*

32. *Plato, Laws VII.*

33. *Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology,* p. 34.

34. *Ibid.,* p. 35.

35. *Husserl, Ideas, (Sec. 38)* p. 240.


37. *Ibid., (Sec. 24)* p. 83.


Bogen suggests that performance of the epoché involves a 'phenomenological anguish.' He says: "Phenomenology has its own drama: it unfolds in doubt, when we have lost the natural sense of the world, before having found its transcendental sense." Also, the anguish involved "...is deeper than existential anguish, which is that of an individual in the world." (Indeed, we recall that precisely the natural sense of the individual ego is itself suspended.)


41. *Husserl, Cartesian Meditations,* p. 34.

42. *Ibid.,* p. 34.

43. *Ibid.,* p. 35.

44. *Ibid.,* p. 35.

45. *Husserl, Ideas, (Sec. 50)* p. 140.


50Ibid., p. 137.

51Husserl, 'Phenomenology and the Crisis of European Man', in *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, p. 169.

52Husserl, 'Philosophy as rigorous science', in *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, p. 73.

53Ibid., p. 76.


II. THE SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTION OF TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE

1Husserl, *Ideas*, (Sec. 6a) p. 176.

2Ibid., (Sec. (6) p. 176.


5Ibid., p. 58.

6Ibid., p. 58.

7Ibid., p. 39.

8Fink, *op. cit.*, p. 105f.

9Ibid., p. 106.

10Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 47.


12Ibid., p. 132.

13Husserl, *Ideas*, (Sec. 75) p. 191.

14Ibid., (Sec. 75) p. 193.
15 Ibid., (Introduction) p. 42 (my italics).

16 Ibid., (Sec. 74) p. 190.

17 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 29.


To give a crude example of what we mean here, the imperfect circles we see in experience give rise to the exact geometrical concept of a circle. A more interesting illustration, which at least suggests the type of thing we mean, is the idea that the origin of our number system (as a sequence of 'tens') lies in the concrete experience of having ten fingers. (According to Sokolowski, Husserl mentions this idea as an 'historical explanation' for our number system in his Philosophy of Arithmetic. See, The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution, p. 226.)

Unlike such crude or trivial illustrations, the problem of how important concepts, such as virtue or justice, find their origin in lived experience is not so easily explained.

19 Husserl, Experience and Judgement, pp. 31-32.

20 Husserl, Ideas, (Sec. 67) p. 177.

21 Ibid., (Sec. 69) p. 181.

22 Just as Descartes had done, Husserl identifies 'clearly given' with 'objectively self-given'. Corresponding to this, what is completely obscurely given is 'emptily' presented. See Ideas, Sec. 67-68.

23 Husserl, Ideas, (Sec. 84) p. 225. This notion of arriving at a complete clearness on the background of an essential indeterminacy and vagueness might be less confusing if we suggest an analogy. Suppose I am observing a distant object with a pair of binoculars. From where I stand, I can focus my binoculars so that the object viewed is seen as clearly as possible vis-à-vis my perspective. However, it might also be possible for me to get closer to the object of my attention, before focusing my binoculars. Now, if this
act of approaching the object were reiterated ad infinitum, we would have an analogous situation to what is involved in clarifying an essence. From any perspective, the essence can be made fully clear. But at the same time, it is always possible to uncover new determinations of the same essence, and with these new determinations, a renewed focusing of our eidetic gaze is occasioned.

Now, let us alter our illustration so that it conforms more closely to real experience. For we must admit that objects are not infinitely approachable. Sooner or later, we will bump into them. Indeed, if we hold an object too close to our eyes, we will not see it as clearly as if we had held it further back. Thus for every object, there is an ultimate standpoint whereby that object is revealed clearly as what it is. As Husserl says: "But for every essence, but as for the corresponding phases of its individual counterpart, there exists, so to speak, an absolute nearness, in which its "essence is in respect of this graded series, absolute, i.e. pure self-givenness." (Ideas, Sec. 67, p. 177.) However, although we may see the object with complete clearness from where we "stand", there will still be all sorts of new determinations of that object which can be revealed. For example, we can turn it around, and see its other side. We can put it under a microscope. We can dissect it, or drop it into water, or light a match to it etc., All sorts of new determinations are possible. Further, no determination is over the last. And every such determination allows for a clear seeing of the essence on the background of the infinite determinability.

However, it must be admitted that we are not usually concerned merely with the essences of physical objects. Indeed, the essences of such notions as virtue, justice, and philosophy itself, are far and away of more crucial concern. But here again, we can always clarify our understanding of any such notion through a never ending examination. And any particular understanding can be made clear via a via the "standpoint", or particular set of beliefs which occasioned it. Further, every such clarification immediately throws us upon new horizons of the subject-matter. It is as though we can be completely clear only about the ground we have already covered, and only while simultaneously engaged in the task of exploring new dimensions of the particular subject-matter. Thus, the clarification of essences is closely linked with the broadening of indeterminate (though infinitely determinable) horizons.

See Husserl and Phenomenology by Ido Pnecovic, chapter 5: 'The Problem of Generality', for a fuller discussion of these issues—in particular, Husserl's criticism of nominalism.

Pnecovic outlines some of the main features of Husserlian phenomenology, as well as the phenomenologies of later writers. However, he is unable to bring himself to appreciate the scope as a sound philosophical approach (p. 80). Rather, he fears that it leads to a ridiculous solipsistic position. And the anti-rationalism of later writers is not a viable alternative. Instead, he suggests that we must decide on a minimum number of basic premises and work from there (p. 154).

Pnecovic's argument against Husserl rests on the difficulties which phenomenology has encountered in dealing with intersubjectivity. But, rather than attempting to go on and resolve these difficulties with new insights, Pnecovic seems to suggest that we finally get rid of the useless Cartesian approach to philosophizing. However, although he is totally unsympathetic to phenomenology, his general exposition of phenomenological themes is interesting in so far as he approaches them from the point of view of 'Linguistic Analysis'.

28 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 81.
29 Husserl, Ideas, (Sec. 2) p. 47.
30 Ibid., (Sec. 22) p. 80.
31 Ibid., (Sec. 63) p. 171.
32 Ibid., (Introduction) p. 40.
33 Husserl, 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science', in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 110.
34 Husserl, Ideas, (Sec. 3) p. 49.
35 Ibid., (Sec. 3) p. 48.
36 Ibid., (Sec. 3) p. 48.
38 Ibid., (Sec. 22) p. 80.
The problem with which we began this chapter was how transcendental experience becomes susceptible to a scientific description. Since science, as we noted, depends upon the possibility of communicating results, we must show how our descriptions can be passed on to fellow philosophers. By using the eidetic method, we are able to fix the meanings of our terms in accordance with essences which are eidetically seen. However, as we noticed, all essences are given within a horizon of indeterminacy. Thus the description of essences involves not merely what is seen, but also, the particular perspective, or manner of its being seen. The way to the seeing of the essence must be mapped out (through self-reflection) so that some future traveller can arrive at the same standpoint, see the same things, and then go on to explore new territory. For as Husserl says: "If the right standpoint has been won and entrenched through practice, if
If above all there has been acquired the courage to follow up the clear essential data with an entire absence of all prejudice, and indifference to all current and borrowed theories, fine results follow forthwith, the same for all we adopt the same position. Their follow as well established possibilities, the power of passing on to others what one has seen oneself, or testing the descriptions of others..." (Ideas, Sec. 87, p. 236, my italics). Thus we see how a descriptive science of transcendental experience, which communicates results, is possible.

What is crucial here is how this science differs from something like mathematics. In using the eidetic method, we do not arrive at fixed essences which can be objectively situated, 'brick upon brick' in some grand system. Rather, we have such essences only as corresponding to certain manners of givenness. A faithful description via a via a particular perspective can always be superseded by a more comprehensive vision of the essence. Thus essences are more suitably represented not as 'bricks' in some infinitely buildable structure, but as 'signposts' along an endless path. And original science is more accurately described not as the construction of some grand edifice or system, but as a systematic journey through uncharted (though infinitely chartable) territory.

III. THE SCIENTIFIC EXPLICATION OF TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE


2Ibid., p. 97.

3Ibid., p. 97.

4Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 33.

5Ibid., p. 37.

6Ibid., p. 39.

7Husserl, Ideas, (Sec. 85) p. 228.

8Ibid., (Sec. 88) p. 238.

9Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 42.
10 Ibid., p. 47.
11 Ibid., p. 47.
12 Ibid., p. 40.
13 Husserl, Ideas, (Sec. 86) p. 230.
14 Ibid., (Sec. 86) p. 230.
15 Ibid., (Sec. 86) p. 231.
16 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 50.
17 Ibid., p. 51.
20 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 56.
21 Husserl, Ideas, (Sec. 55) p. 152.
22 Erazin Kohak (in his article 'Phenomenology as rigorous humanism', Edmund Husserl in Context of History, adopted from Phenomenology as Tool and Wissenschaft, and presented at the 1973 IPN meeting in Boston) argues that 'dispensing with Gibson, in the Ideas, translates as 'dispensing of meaning' (Sec. 55, p. 152), is more faithfully rendered simply as 'making sense'. Gibson's translation, Kohak argues, makes phenomenology appear too like subjective idealism (pp. 8-9). It then renders problematic Husserl's immediately following claim that phenomenology is 'no subjective idealism'. As Kohak says, the point that Husserl is making is simply that things are real to the extent that they make sense. And, Kohak adds, our common understanding would immediately recognize this as evident (pp. 8-9).
23 Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 244.
24 Husserl, Ideas, (Sec. 55) p. 153.
Indeed, we may have here the grounds for clarifying the genuine sense of the term 'a priori'. In this task, it may be revealed that the mathematical a priori, which, as a regulative idea, is the constant aim of phenomenology, is grounded in a more fundamental a priori, the material a priori of lived experience. That is, phenomenological essences (both formal and material) have an a priori manner of manifesting their ideal content, but such a one which is never given beforehand, but requires an infinite unfolding explanation.

Husserl, *Ideas* (Sec. 143) p. 367.

Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, p. 278.
The Kantian idea, we have seen, functions as a regulative idea, indeterminately prescribing the route for the clarification of an essence. In Chapter Two, however, we noticed that an arbitrary example of an essence functions as a 'guiding model' for the production of a multiplicity of variants, thereby allowing for the abstraction of the general essence, or eidos. But this, then, might lead us to wonder what is the relationship between such an arbitrary example, as a guiding model for the eidetic method, and an intended meaning as a mobile clue or telos for a functional analysis.

Correspondingly, we might like to know what is the relationship between the idea, in the Kantian sense, and the eidos, in the Platonic sense. Levinas attempts to clarify this distinction. 'See 'Intuition of Essences', chapter four of his book: The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, found in Phenomenology, edited by Kockelmans). Eide are essences of objects taken in all their concreteness and vagueness. In using eidetic variation, we reveal an invariant general essence which conforms to the degree of exactness within the essence itself. For an intuited essence is not necessarily a 'geometrically' ideal essence. In relationship to any particular perspective, we can clarify an essence by way of the eidetic method. But at the same time, any such inexact essence points toward an ideal, a goal which is continually approached but never reached. As Levinas says: "The different shades of red (inexact essences belonging to a certain genus) show the different degrees of an ideal red which they approach more or less. This ideal red, after which they strive in one way or another, is not the genus 'red'. In regard to this latter it is an ideal limit. The
genus 'red' remains an asymptote in regard to the ideal red. It is this ideality of a completely different type which Husserl indicates by 'idea in the Kantian sense of the term.' (p. 103).

It is on the basis of these ideas as they are lived in experience, that ideas are developed and refined. In descriptive phenomenology, we focus on a faithful description of idee. But this description is incomplete as long as the ideas which are implicit in each idee are ignored. For the way in which these idee function in generating our ideas is left unexamined. And it is the origin of our ideas which is of philosophical interest. In functional analysis, we take ideas as they are intended in experience, and attempt to uncover the pertinent idee which give rise to them. That is, we describe the noetic-noematic structure of the pertinent intentional performance which gives rise to a particular idea. In all of this, the idea functions as a mobile clue, which is itself refined through our analysis. But at the same time, the idee remains primary, in so far as our investigative discovery must remain faithful to these idee as they are found in experience.

Let us attempt to clarify this relationship between the eidos and the idea. Suppose we are confronted with a particular datum. Now this datum, in all its inexactness (precisely as it is experienced) can serve as an arbitrary example for an eidetic variation. Indeed, after the transcendental epoché, all data are immediately transformed into such examples. But at the same time, every such datum has an exact or ideal sense, implicit in it, which can function as a telos for a further clarification. Now, our teleological clarification constantly remains eidetic—the data are already essences. Indeed, they have been transcendentally purified by virtue of the epoché. Further, we are concerned with their not merely as individual examples, but as manifestations of general essences. Thus an eidetic variation is constantly and implicitly performed in all our investigations. Hence we are constantly dealing with idee, and we attempt to clarify these in terms of the ideal senses which they approximate. And in so doing, we ground or legitimate these ideal senses themselves.

52See above, p. 9.

53See above, p. 11.

54Husserl, Ideas, (Nachwort) p. 20 (see above, p. 11; note 13).
Ludwig, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 271. The whole question as to the relationship between evidence and truth presents a difficult problem. Husserl does say that "...the lidos True-Being is correlative altering to the lidos Adequately given-Being and Being that can be asserted as self-evident." (Ideas, Sec. 144, p. 367). But we set the impression that what is clearly seen in intuition, in a fulfilled intention, corresponds to what is objectively self-present. Nevertheless, Husserl also recognizes that even when it concerns intuition, error is possible. Indeed, he suggests that we must root out error "...by reference to something, as they are everywhere in which validity counts for something..." (Ideas, Sec. 87, p. 236). And so do this "...by a further appeal to intuition." (Ibid.). Or as he says in the Formal and Transcendental Logic (p. 140), "...then evidence giving itself as apodictic can be revealed to be an illusion, and therefore presuppose for that possibility the analogous evidence upon which it is broken." (quoted in Levin's book, Reason and Evidence in Husserl, p. 107). Thus it is erroneous to see in evidence an absolute criterion of truth.

But if error is always possible, how can we develop a science? What we definitively cannot do is develop some grand apodictic scientific system. A final and completely justified dogma can never be actually produced. However, we can, in a provisional manner, map out our insights and the corresponding perspectives which occasioned them. Of course, further investigations may annul previous results. Nevertheless, our first faltering steps are precisely necessary stages in our development. For indeed, error must be a necessary possibility if validity is to have any meaning at all. But this then means that there is no royal road to true being. As Berger says: "Truth is not the object of an immediate intuition. It is the final result of a critique. True judgment is what critical examination confirms to be valid." (The Cogito in Husserl's Philosophy, p. 67). Or as Husserl writes, "Perhaps there lies in each and every evidence of self-giving...a certain relativity; of such a nature that, wheresoever we speak of an adequate evidence and are certain of it as such, only a similar but continuing and freely developing process of approximations to relative evidences in fact lies before us." (The Erste Philosophie, p. 34; quoted in Levin's book, op. cit., p. 82).

Thus it seems that the equation of adequately given being and true being (or 'thought' and 'being'), is only and necessarily an ideal equation. In actual practice, and for
essential reasons, we always purely approximate the ideal. Indeed, if Husserl did not recognize this, then his phenomenology would be hardly more than a dogmatic subjective idealism. However, it remains for us to see in what sense (in the face of this essential relativism) an 'apodictic' role is still possible.

56 See Zaner, The Way of Phenomenology, esp. pp. 30–37 and 71–124. Zaner argues that philosophy requires a foundational critique which is "...thoroughly self-critical, capable of accounting for its own possibility at every step." (p. 71). He suggests that phenomenology fills this role. As such, it is not a school of philosophy, but rather, a discipline of its own, engaged in philosophical criticism. Thus he says, that "...phenomenological philosophy is to be likened neither to a tremendous edifice, each of whose bricks is cemented firmly in place, nor to a seed which, when properly planted, issues forth rare blooms, nor yet to a vast gigantism." (p. 37). Rather, "Phenomenological philosophy is first of all philosophical criticism." (p. 79). Thus Zaner equates phenomenology with 'critical philosophy'. And he says, "Critical philosophy is the rigorous science of transpositions: of beginnings, origins or foundations." (p. 205).

As such, it "...cannot tolerate what is hidden, unexamined, and taken for granted. Its principle task is the explication of these, wherever they can be found." (p. 205).

57 Pink, op. cit., p. 97. In this respect, we must entirely disagree with the interpretation rendered by David Levin in his book: Reason and Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology. In this work, Levin recognizes that Husserl demanded a criticism of apodicticity, and transcendental evidences. However, the fact that Husserl never carried out such a criticism means "...that the apodicticity reported to have been won is still insufficiently justified." (p. 80).

Levin goes on to question the possibility of ever sufficiently justifying any claims of apodicticity. ('Apodicticity', here is understood as qualifying a claim which is taken to be true once and for all--Levin 'calls this the 'strong version'.) Further, he claims that there is no justification for concluding that Husserl intended a weaker version. (p. 112) Indeed, all scientific claims, Levin argues, are doxic. (they are all claims of belief.) Consequently, the attempt to establish an apodictic science, in the strong sense, is a misguided endeavour. This leads Levin to conclude that Husserlian phenomenology "...has forfeited the excitement and creativity of facticity, wonder and adventure. It has shown a greater
affirm for 'end results', final answers, 'learning the truth, "as for query and love of truth."
(p. 207).

However, Levin fails to see that the phenomenologist
has the truth in so far as he continues to inquire
into its nature. That is, Levin offers up one of Husserl's
most fundamental insights: that truth is horizontal. He is
therefore left with a one-sided view of rigorous ('apodictic')
science. Such a science can then only mean the establishment
of a dogmatic dogma. But it is Husserl's insight that such
a dogma can only be the teleological correlate of an infinite
theoretical activity which is constantly engaged in a process
of self-correction.  

\textsuperscript{57} See above, pp. 2-26.

\textsuperscript{58} Fink, in the article we have been quoting, distin-
guishes between the phenomenological and psychological
uses of these terms. See pp. 117-120.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 110.

\textsuperscript{60} Husserl, 'Phenomenology', in Encyclopaedia

\textsuperscript{61} Fink, op. cit., p. 131.

\textsuperscript{62} Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 273.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., pp. 274-275.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., p. 274.

\textsuperscript{65} See Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, Fifth Meditation.

\textsuperscript{66} Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 276 (cu-
tics).

\textsuperscript{67} Husserl, Ideas, (Sec. 153) p. 304.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., (Sec. 139) p. 357.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., (Sec. 139) p. 358.

\textsuperscript{70} Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 152.

\textsuperscript{71} Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 273.
7. See above, p. 33, note 54.


7. A CRITICAL LOOK AT HUSSELR


2"Husserl, Cartesian Meditation, "p. 117-118.

3"Husserl, 'Phenomenology', op. cit., p. 702.

4Ibid., p. 702.

5Ibid., p. 701.


7Ibid., II, 40-41.

8In this manner, phenomenology specifies itself down to its roots.

9"Husserl, Ideas, (Cantworp) p. 20.


11Ibid., p. 104.

12Ibid., pp. 104-105.


14Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, p. 214.

15Ibid., p. 221.

16Ibid., p. 221. Ricoeur uses the word 'representation', the 'theoretical attitude' and a 'primary presence' rather than the phrase 'contemplative presence'.
Frederich Clauer wafer about intellectualism in his book, "Principles and Lessons." He says, "The whole philosophy has been dominated by Plato's original concept of the intellectual thing. At the same time, intellectualism indicates the meeting of the two main categories of objective qualities or relations that are independent of our feelings and volitions; that rational being is possible; and that we can accordingly be made about it. Let's consider, then, the intellectualist and the moralist or the relation to the attitude and apportionment of intellectualism." (p. 4).

Also, we also notice that the intellectualistic tradition, when extending one of the main ideas of its own certainly carries on this aspect of the tradition. It allowed to take into account the role of intellectualism in the position of values, too. Too small value of objective qualities in the higher civilization.

Everwhere, it is also true that Husserl takes into account the teleological nature of moral and practical types and thus it becomes possible to consider it not as a conflation of the tradition of Aristotle, intellectualistic. Indeed, a more accurate language as reflecting essential problematic structures. Thus the classification of things according to types is not merely a matter of convention, but depends upon a faithful description of problematic data.

Yet, we are not presently concerned with whether Husserl is primarily a Platonist or an Aristotelian. Rather, we should wish to discover whether Husserl's work contains the inadequacies which are generally attributed to intellectual philosophy. And we define intellectualism, here, not merely in the narrower sense, as characterizing a certain kind of ethical stance (whether Plato's or Aristotle's) but as manifesting the scientific attitude in general. Or perhaps we can best describe it as that more general ethical position which sees in science the proper end for man...

21See Heidegger's book, "Being and Time," particularly Part One, division 6, for a discussion of angst as a privileged experience which reveals man's ontological situation. Also, Heidegger's lecture: "The End of Philosophy and
In this short piece, Heidegger discusses Husserl's principle of intuition. This principle (see p. 25, note 37) is intended to "make phenomenology's motto 'back to the things themselves'." But Heidegger argues that this principle pre-empts the things themselves. That is, transcendental subjectivity is already presupposed as the matter of philosophy. In other words, intuition (as contemplation), as the method for seeing the things themselves, already assumes that the things themselves are such that they can be the object of an intuition. Thus this method itself shapes the matter. (From this we might suspect that there cannot be an indifferent method which does not already presuppose its subject-matter). As Heidegger says: "The method [of intuition] is not only directed toward the matter of philosophy. It does not just belong to the matter as a key belongs to a lock. Rather, it belongs to the matter because it is 'the matter itself'." (p. 13).


23. Ibid., p. 173.

24. Ibid., p. 276.

25. Ibid., p. 172.


28. Strauss, in his book The Idea of a Global Phenomenology, discusses possible senses of the term 'speculation', as suggested by Andre Lalande. One possible meaning is that speculation is thought which "...does not let itself be guided by any object as its norm." (p. 5). As opposed to this, however, the phenomenologist "...starts from the matter that is perceived...And he tries to discover the 'rule structure' which the 'matter in question prescribes to the knower. That is, he lets himself be ruled, as by a norm..." (p. 5). Thus, in this sense, phenomenological thought is exactly opposite to speculative thought. However, Strauss mentions another sense of the term 'speculation' as defined by Lalande: "Thought which has no other object than that of knowing." (p. 5). And in this sense, phenomenology qua science continues the
tradition of speculative philosophy.

In general, Strasser seems to think that Husserl's work, although not speculative in the strict positivistic sense, is nevertheless overly intellectualistic. Indeed, by means of a more radical phenomenological description, Strasser attempts to overcome the very transcendentalism of Husserlian phenomenology itself. The cogito is no longer an all-embracing and worldless consciousness. (p. 52) Rather, it is entirely finite and worldly, and exists in a dialogue with the other (the 'you' as Strasser calls it). This 'you' is always older than the 'I'. (p. 61) It is the world, and otherness, as affirmed through a primordial faith (Th. 64). And this primordial presence makes possible the cogito itself. Thus for Strasser, the existence of the world cannot be doubted—a radical ére une is impossible. The reduction signifies, rather, an unwilling 'revolution' in world-views, where I come to see the world in a new light. (p. 96) Such revolutions come over me and I accept them as my 'destiny'. (p. 97) Thus Strasser rejects the pretension of a transcendental philosophy which makes the world an object of a transparent investigation, he substitutes in its place a dialogical phenomenology, which cannot transparently see the world, but must hold a dialogue with it. And this dialogue is authentic if, in speaking and listening, I adjust myself to the world. (p. 103):


30 Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 222.

31 Ibid., p. 222.

32 So as not to become too confused by the diversity of viewpoints, let us distinguish between three major positions within the ' phenomenological movement':

(1) At one extreme, we have the strict Husserlian view, as supported by Berger. Here, the primordiality of the contemplative reflective experience is maintained.

(2) In the middle, we find Ricoeur (and perhaps several others). These thinkers recognize a deficiency in Husserl's emphasis on the cognitive aspects of experience, but nevertheless feel that his method can be transformed so as to adequately account for the practical sphere. For indeed, it is precisely pre-reflective life, immediately concerned with the world, which is to be explicated. Thus the early Merleau-Ponty, for example, attempted to emphasize the primordial importance of praxis while remaining in the Husserlian framework. Indeed, he says that Husserl's phenomenological reduction is not at
all a procedure of idealistic philosophy, but belongs to
existential philosophy (see the preface to Phenomenology
of Perception, p. xiv).

(3) And at the other extreme, we have the trend in-
augurated by Heidegger. This stream of thought recognizes
that Husserlian phenomenology cannot be reconciled so as
to incorporate, as primordial, the practical sphere of
existence. Such a move requires the radical overthrow of
the whole project.

33 Berger, op. cit., p. 52.
34 Ibid., p. 81.
35 Husserl, Ideas, (sec. 117) p. 305.
36 Ibid., (Sec. 117) p. 306.
37 Husserl, 'Phenomenology', op. cit., p. 701.
38 Husserl, Ideas, (Sec. 32) p. 99. This passage, one
of several problematical statements made by Husserl, can
probably be interpreted in various ways. Indeed, the question
concerning the number and kinds of reduction presents a thorny
issue. Quentin Lauer, a worthy commentator of Husserlian
phenomenology (in his book Phenomenology: Its Genesis and
Prospect, originally published under the title The Triumph of
Subjectivity), claims that "there are at least six levels
of reduction, in each of which we have a subject of greater
purity." He adds: "The six levels are six stages in seeing
the implications of the original radical epoche." (p. 51).

Indeed, in the Ideas, Husserl does speak about 'graded
reductions' within the unitary form of the phenomenological
reduction. (see Sec. 33, p. 102) However, perhaps this one
radical epoche might itself shift in meaning with subsequent
reflections. (Indeed, Husserl was in the process of working
out the meaning of this epoche.) Thus, for example, in the
Crisis it was recognized that the life-world could not be
revealed through graded reductions, but required the universal
transcendental epoche. (see Crisis, p. 150). However,
consistent throughout is the notion that the (universal) epoche
reveals transcendental subjectivity in one fell swoop. Thus
further reflections merely serve to make more explicit the
constitutive structure of this transcendental subjectivity.
And our problematical quote, although it seems to suggest
that a universal epoche is inconsistent with a rigorous
science, might more likely mean simply that the full impli-
of such an approach cannot be scientifically tested at once, but requires constantly renewed reflection.

In satisfactory as the interpretation of this passage, I recently have no other consistent manner of understanding it at all. It is to draw attention to the fact that Husserl seems to recognize that an actual reduction necessarily leaves a residuum (the provisionally uncritically phenomenological statements themselves). And this reminder, although eulogy of criticism in principle, is precisely necessary for science.

39 Husserl, *Ideas*, (Sec. 49) p. 214.

40 Ibid., (Sec. 50) p. 214.

41 Ibid., (Sec. 49) p. 135. It should be noted that although Husserl speaks of a radical distinction between conscious experience and intended objects, this 'conscious experience' is itself understood as a realm of immanent objects. He says: "Both immanent or absolute being and transcendent being [i.e., intentional being, intended being, transcendental] are indeed 'being'. (Science) and 'objects', and each has, moreover, its objective determining content." (Ideas, Sec. 49, p. 135). Thus Husserl has not really recognized the radical difference between absolute existence and the objects of consciousness. He has a realm of immanent objects ('sense data') which neither are simply absolute lived experience, nor are they intended objects. Rather they are absolute lived experiences which are somehow objectified, supposedly without distortion.

42 It should not be thought that Husserl treats the subject of consciousness as a substantial entity. Indeed, this was precisely his criticism of Descartes. Husserl, however, transformed the Cartesian cogito from an awareness of the substantial being of the ego, into an intuition of subjectivity as the a priori source of experience. (see Lauer, op. cit., p. 89) Indeed, for Husserl, we can have an awareness of the 'pure' subject without objectifying it (deforming it into a substantial entity). We merely recognize that a genuinely given object is always given as an object for a subject. (see Lauer, p. 53) And we simply take this subject as modes of grasping objects. Thus subject and object belong together inseparably. Each necessarily refers to the other as intentional poles. Hence it is never necessary to postu-
late the existence of diverse substances, such as 'self' and 'world'. (Indeed, the epoché forbids such speculative excesses from the start.) And thus also, there is no radical duality, but only a bipolarity.

Thus for Husserl, one gets to know the transcendental subject (conscious life) only by investigating the intentional constitution of objects. Hence an investigation into the constitution of objectivity is, at the same time, a self-examination. Meanwhile, the substantial existence of either the subject or the object is never postulated. There is only 'intentionality'. Thus conscious life, the 'pure flow of consciousness' (which is transcendental subjectivity, or the 'transcendental ego' itself) is nothing else than this cogito, this intentionality. And the structure of this intentionality, which is now understood as the structure of absolute being itself, is what is to be investigated.

In the light of these considerations, our criticism of Husserl should not be confused with Husserl's own criticism of Descartes. Husserl has made the cogito 'substantial' in a much more sophisticated manner than did his French predecessor. Indeed, Husserl is not a dualist, and thus he does not have to speculatively postulate the existence of an absolute mind which binds diverse realities together. Rather, he finds, within the 'limits' of the cogito itself, everything he needs for his science. Our lived experience itself brings us in direct contact with the world; and this experience is self-grounding. That is, true being is verified in experience itself.

However, although Husserl does not make the 'pure' ego substantial, he nevertheless makes experience the ground of being. (Indeed, every scientific philosophy must do this.) That is, he absolutizes conscious life as absolute objective being (Eieno). (The transcendental ego is taken as absolute being.) But is not Husserl correct here? For is not the cogito absolutely given? Indeed it is. But it is not so given as an object of consciousness. Rather, it is given as a lived awareness. Thus, qua absolute conscious life or lived experience, is precisely prior to any objectification. Of course, experience itself is always an objectifying experience, but this experience cannot itself be objectified without distortion. We can work out the intentional structures of experience, but only at the cost of transforming experience into a scientific object, rather than a lived existence. Husserl transforms existence (das Sein, in a Heideggerian sense) into intentionality (cogito). That is, he takes our immediate awareness of existence, our 'lived intending', our immediate transcending to the object, and
transforms this into a theistic object under the rubric of a Kantian idea. The concept of there being objectified, made the ground of being. Intentionality becomes the full locus of being. And indeed, every objective being (the transcendental) can be so understood. But existence itself (in a non-Lesserlian sense), although ideally an objective reality, can only be so objectified at the cost of 'substantializing' existence ('is-ness') itself.

43 Berger says: "All the concepts we can employ take their immediate sense from nature. Thus are loaded with spontaneous associations, all of which make them the world or natural acts. Any expression is hence necessarily inadequate. It will have only the value of an analogical indication, useful only for those who have themselves undergone transcendental experiences." (op. cit.; p. 36)

Thus phenomenology requires analog or 'metaphor' because the phenomena it seeks to describe are not to be understood in the natural manner, but as ideal 'extra-worldly' phenomena. However, for those who have undergone transcendental experiences, such analogies will take the form of a direct expression. In this way, the phenomenologist will recapture the ideal (transcendental) nature of language itself, which has been forgotten through constant use. Our point, however, is that when we recognize the significance of language as precisely an idealization of being, we will see that it necessarily engenders a simultaneous dissimulation.

44 Derrida, in his book Speech and Phenomena, expresses doubt concerning whether the analogical employment of "Lusserl's phenomenological statements are sufficient to indicate that Lusserl has broken from the philosophical tradition. Derrida says: "Transforming a traditional concept into an indicative or metaphorical concept does not eliminate its heritage; it imposes questions, rather, to which Lusserl never ventured a response. This is due to the fact that, on the other hand, being interested in language or, within the compass of rationality, determining the logos from logic, Lusserl had, in a most traditional manner determined, the essence of language by taking the logical as its telos or norm. That this telos is that of being as presence is what we here wish to suggest." (p. 8).

Derrida claims that Lusserl's principle of intuition (and correspondingly, the epoche) conceals this hidden metaphysical prejudice--the metaphysics of presence ('being as presence'). (p. 4) This principle takes the presence of the living, present as the ultimate form of all ideality, the
ideality of ideality. (p. 6) lerrida saw: "Presence has always been and will always, forever, be the form of which we can say apodictically, the infinite diversity of contents is produced. The opposition between form and content--which inaugurates metaphysics--finds in the concrete reality of the living present its ultimate and radical justifications." (p. 1). Indeed, the fact that lerrida ideality, present, and the ultimate origin of all existence can be defined, as present, saw lerrida, is the fact, as "noumenal". And the pure form of things has a "noumenal" is for lerrid's science, it represents the actual form of reality presentness is (absolutely being), the formal flux of experience. And lerrida, as a "noumenal" metaphysics, but he adds that the concept of self-preservation is not simple, but "... committed to a" praeordial and irreducible synthesis", the "noumenal" principle is threatened in its "noumenal" principle. (p. 1) The lerrid's mistake, lerrida seem to suggest, we to take the "now" as something simple and punctual. He quoted husserl in the Ideas (I, 21, p. 218): "The actual now is necessarily something punctual and remaining a form that persists through continuous change of content." (lerrida, p. 2).

However, we would add that even if one realizes the horizontal nature of the lived present ("retentions" and "protentions"), so long as one formalizes these horizons, one is still committed to a "metaphysics of presence". That is, so long as one idealizes experience so as to reveal a permanent form or structure of experience, then one is engaged in traditional philosophy. Thus the metaphysical premise which underlies husserlian phenomenology need not rest simply on husserl's belief (if he did believe this) that the now is an instantaneous norent. Indeed, one can find a great degree of support for the view that husserl did not take the "now" in this manner (particularly in his book: The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. E.g. husserl saw here that the "now" itself springs from absolute subjectivity and this subjectivity can be denoted metaphorically as "flux". (p. 100). husserl's apparent suggestions to the contrary in the Ideas might better be understood if we remain aware that he wished to "...leave out the epoche of the time-consciousness in our preliminary analysis." (Ideas, sec. 5, p. 217). We agree with lerrida's criticism--husserl does formalize temporal experience--we merely suggest that lerrida's presentation of this point misleadingly lacks comprehensiveness. However, it should be noted that lerrida's argument arises chiefly from a discussion of husserl's notion of language (not time). Unfortunately, we are not sufficiently
versed in Husserlian scholarship to accept, if a correlative weakness is found there.

45. Marvin Farber (see The Rise of Phenomenology) is unable to appreciate this aspect of phenomena. As far as he is concerned, the phenomenological method is not self-sufficient. What is required, rather, is a 'naturalistic conception of method' (p. 83), incorporating 'naturalistic methods' (p. 47). Or, as he says: "What is required is the cooperation of all methods that can be justified logically." (p. 83). Thus for Farber, the human or true world, as the approximation-ideal for scientific investigation, is not the world of intentional life, but the ordinary objective world of natural science. And phenomenology itself is merely a specialty, with its own peculiar methodology. (p. 126) Its specific aim is to develop a "geometry of experience." And, Farber says, such a science of essential relations and structures can no more be expected to show the way to existing people with their concrete problems, than a pure geometrical science may be expected to solve problems of physics." (p. 126). Thus for Farber, it seems that phenomenology is a new kind of 'geometry' to be developed in the service of natural and social science. And only as such can it be defended against the criticism which suggests that it involves a withdrawal from social reality and 'the historical function of philosophy.' (p. 125).

Farber is well aware, however, that Husserl did not have in mind such a limited role for phenomenology. But Farber suggests that this is because Husserl was overcome by a 'metaphysical prejudice', the prejudice of idealism which makes 'being' dependent upon 'being experienced!' (p. 79). For Farber, however, "the existence of transcendent objects is simply a fact." (p. 70). Thus, "a strictly controlled phenomenological procedure should not be exploited for the purposes of a 'metaphysics of immiscibility'." (p. 70) Nevertheless, Husserl's method, Farber argues, is not wrong—it is merely artificial. (p. 69) The danger, however, is to lose sight of this artificiality and expect the method to yield a metaphysics. Indeed, as Farber asks rhetorically: "Could the analysis of conscious experience, even in the ideally finished form of a 'geometry of experiences', be said to condition the actual course of future experience, or the actual course of nature?" (p. 62).

It is clear, then, that Farber remains a naturalist. (Indeed, he suggests that "The reconsideration of Husserl's arguments will determine whether Husserl went too far in his opposition to naturalistic philosophy." (p. 83)).
fact, we might suspect that it is Farber's attachment to
natural scientific methods that leads him to appreciate the
descriptive aspect of phenomenology and reject Husserl's
idealistic tendencies. Thus he can write: "Moreover ...
he said in criticism of Husserl's attempt to achieve a
universal transcendental philosophy, it must be admitted
that his ideal was always clarity and evidence, and that
he never stooped to verbal indulgence or recourse to the
adulation of 'mystery', (p. 161).

However, contrary to the view of Farber, we think
that Husserl's refutation of naturalistic basis for pheno-
menology, Thus the redirection of naturalistic methods in
investigating the origin of being is necessarily the rejec-
tion of Husserl's entire program. Certainly, experimental
sciences are not to be ignored. But the research of
phenomenology lies on an entirely different plane---investigating
the meaning and validity of these sciences themselves. And
these sciences become merely branches of the one all inclus-
ive science, phenomenological philosophy.

However, although we disagree with Farber's natural-
istic bent, our criticism of Husserl appears to be similar
to his on several points. We too suspect that the epoch
involves a metaphysical prejudice, pre-supposing that being is
ideal; we too suspect that phenomenology remains formal, dis-
torting practical existence, as it truly concerns us. Never-
theless, our criticism lies along different lines. For we
would argue that reverting back to naturalistic methodologies
simply continues the tendency to forget existence in the name
of objective science. (Indeed, we feel that Husserl is
correct when he says that all sciences involve an implicit
idealism. See Husserl's essay, 'Philosophy as Rigorous
Science'. Here, Husserl says that the naturalist is an
idealist who preaches and moralizes about theories which
deny what he presupposes: (p. 91) Farber disagrees with this
argument, suggesting that it is hardly more than an ad
hominem charge. (p. 16)) Thus we would say that although
scientific discoveries, when transformed into technological
advances, appear very beneficial to man's practical exis-
tence (indeed, their pragmatic value cannot be denied), they
still have the tendency of creating the appearance of 'spir-
tual' progress, when such need not be the case.

4See Heidegger's essay, 'On the Essence of Truth',
in Existence and Being, edited by Brock, particularly II. 312-313.
Heidegger attempts to show here how revolution and conceal-
ment are bound together inseparably.
quentin larner seems to agree with the sort of criticizers. (see Phenomenology: Its Genesis and Prospect) the question which concerns philosophers, larner says, is whether an absolute knowledge is attainable. (p. 67) He concludes, therefore, that " Husserl thinks it is... That is, Husserl thinks that the whole of being can be rationalized. he believes this, and the whole of being can be reduced to what is "purely logical; constituted in reason." (p. 69). But larner adds, in a curious way, that "Husserl never seems to have been aware that he identifies being and that which is intentionally constituted so had simply skirted the whole problem." (p. 69).

Again, larner suspects that Husserl's rationalism involves a value judgment which is uncritically assumed. He says: "What Husserl does not seem to have realized is that any judgment as to the relative superiority of the ego is a value judgment which in this form simply assumes the validity of the value standard it sets as its level. He re-examined the role of the ideational structure in shaping the "ideality" of philosophy and the "paradigm of the pure spirit." (p. 12). These thoughts echo our previous comments. Unfortunately, larner does not elaborate on these points in his final introductory book.

Hocholowski calls much of the formal aspect of phenomenology in his book, The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution. He argues that the early Husserl (precise) was committed to a static, structural analysis, a "matter-form schema" (p. 56). Sense data, or facts, were understood as raw material, alien to consciousness, and formed by poetic acts. But, Hocholowski says, such an analysis cannot have any "aim" to answer about the origin or composition of the material content of experience. (p. 115) The outlining of the formal temporal structure of experience does not explain how it is that in one case, I see a tree, and in another case, I see a statue. This defect was partially remedied by the "ideational" original constitution of objectivity. Here, the motivation for the constitution of particular regions of objects is investigated. However, this analysis remains static. Husserl does not yet show "how temporality can influence even the content of that we know." (p. 166). Also, Husserl does not account for the origin of the various levels of sense which he describes. They are simply accepted as being present in perception as a facticity that "objectivity is faced with" (p. 166). However, this shortcoming is overcome, to a certain degree, with Husserl's notion of "genetic constitution." That is, the later Husserl recognized that the sense data
themselves have a genetic structure. I proceed to see that I see it, pre-judging experience that only as a consequence of habitual accomplishments transmitted through the cultural milieu. And these habitual accomplishments, or social idealizations, which constitute the "life-world," have also a "historical" character. For the "life-world" is the way of seeing the world which constitutes a concrete subjectivity can itself be explicated by an investigation into the genetic origin of the cultural world-view itself. However, Sokolowski argues, this approach to explicating the content of our experience is still inadequate. (See, for example, pp. 129, 149, 150, 158, 159, 160, 169, 213.) There is still a certain facticity, a certain element not explained by subjectivity. (Hence phenomenology still remains "formal," unable to fully grasp the material dimension of reality.) Hence, Sokolowski adds: "this failure of phenomenology to explain thorough the content of consciousness is not a defect, because Husserl does not set before itself the task of deducing everything from consciousness." (p. 169.) Consciousness, or transcendental subjectivity, although necessary for the emergence of meaning and objects, is not sufficient. A given, factual, real element is also necessary. Something must be precisely given — consciousness does not produce the world from itself. Sokolowski defends this interpretation of Husserl by calling to mind the radical distinction Husserl makes between consciousness and reality — between the two there is an abuse of sense. And, he adds, "if we were to say that subjectivity causes the sense and meaning found in reality, then this radical distinction would vanish." (p. 138.) However, we must disagree with this interpretation. It is not correct, we think, that Husserl makes a radical distinction between consciousness and reality. Such a dualism, Husserl realized, would be the death of scientific philosophy. One could then have only a science of mere appearance, a phenomenology. And this science must sceptically admit that reality, as it is in itself, is beyond its scope. However, nothing is beyond the scope of phenomenology. Nevertheless, Husserl does say that: "between the meanings of consciousness and reality yawns a veritable abyss." (Ideas, Sec. 49, p. 138.) What he means here, however, is that there is a radical difference between an immanent non-perspectival object, absolutely given in consciousness, and a transcendent object which is merely intended, and hence relative to consciousness. That is, within the immanent sphere of consciousness itself, there is a radical distinction between that which is semantically immanent and that which is merely intentionally immanent. Further, over and beyond these intentional being, Husserl says,
there is just nothing at all. (Idea, Sec. 66, p. 119.) The
transcendental does not mean that reality is radically different
from consciousness, living outside the sphere of im- and
is not alien to transcendent objects, but dependent
for consciousness, necessarily have a transcendental reality
of their own. Rather, he says: "Euler's... absolute... it is
absolutely speaking, and in all... it has the essential condition of existing in principle
is only intensional." (Ideas, Sec. 50, p. 139-140).

"Euler's" reinterpretation of "transcendental"

the fact that he is unwilling to say the complemen-
tative term demanded by the cogito. He says, "in transcendentalism, the necessary defect of being unable to abstract from the preexistent real material concept of existence.

However, our critic, with respect to transcendentalism, lives along different lines. We do not have Euler's struggle, cannot or does not adequately investigate and set out of objective matter which preconditions conscious experience. Rather, it is precisely the blind transformation of conscious existence into objective being which we characterize as 'Euler's formulation.' Whether one can self-consciously carry out such a transformation, and thereby participate in an investigation of another sort which does not dogmatically recognize only ideal being, remains to be asked.

1. C. H. COGITO: "CHAPTER

P. 44.

2. "Euler, Ideas, (Sec. 48) p. 139.

3. Indeed, Kant says that: "In fact no language can cope with the operation by which the transcendental ego constitutes and opposes itself to its worldly
self." (See Speech and Phenomena, P. 12:

4. "Euler, "Phenomenology and the Crisis of
European Man", in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 192.

5. Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 72.

6. Gadamer, "The Science of the Life-world", in
...the adherence which refuses to identify philosophy and science, is back to at least Socrates and can be traced through thinkers such as Pseudo-Plato, Aristotle, Pascal, Descartes, Nietzsche..." (p. 20).

...the adherence, though opposed to the correlation of the rational with the real, is not itself irrationally. Indeed, it is...

"Irrationalism is possible only with the conception of rationalism; in its destructive activity it effaces, in spite of itself, the power of that which it seeks: the idealistic notion of a science and the ideal of a science." (p. 19).

The traditional adherence, immediately that irrationalism "...does not overcome but merely perpetuates the tradition."

But it seems that it requires to be the other how there can be a way of philosophy which is not blinded by the pre-division of reason, and which, at the same time, does not resort to a blind irrationalism. Perhaps instead of being..." a truly radical 'cynicism' which concerns every kind of knowing. (Even the irrationalist's knowledge...existence...the power of...the science...the radical cynicism,...like the, like, the universal death...philosophy...rather, it would lead to the 'essence' of human...the realization of...philosophical...the absence...the word 'cynicism' is 'science'...the only...the concept of..." (p. 65). Indeed, we might expect that, in the word, 'cynicism,' is believing.

...perhaps we could say that only through a radical 'cynicism' is blind faith overcome, though not for the sake of science, but for the self-revelation of faith itself. Indeed, in this context, "cynicism" might be understood as an attempt at this radical 'cynicism' for the sake of a truly original 'cynicism.' (A 'cynicism,' however, which is
not, then, necessarily...-live in a state of faith. And perhaps the old idea of the \textit{natural} view of the world...sense...not until sufficiently to the situation for a kind of every person effort of...where the traditional overcome by some of the same spirit of progress. The \textit{natural} view condemns all a conception of...
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