

THE CONCEPT OF BAD FAITH AS DEFINED IN L'ETRE ET LE NEANT
AND ILLUSTRATED IN SARTRE'S EARLY PLAYS

by

MARGOT TREVELYAN, B.A.

A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Master of Arts

McMaster University

October, 1971

MASTER OF ARTS (1971)
(Romance Languages)

McMASTER UNIVERSITY
Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: The Concept of Bad Faith as Defined in L'Étre et le Néant and Illustrated in Sartre's Early Plays.

AUTHOR: Margot Trevelyan, B.A. (Hamilton).

SUPERVISOR: Dr. E. W. Knight

NUMBER OF PAGES: iii, 113

SCOPE AND CONTENTS: The purpose of this paper is to define Sartre's concept of bad faith in L'Étre et le Néant and to apply this definition to Sartre's early plays. It is also hoped that the study will show the relevance of the theory of bad faith to our daily practice. Les Séquestrés d'Altona has been omitted both because of its complexity and because it would entail an examination of the Critique de la Raison Dialectique which is not possible in the scope of this thesis. The point of view in this thesis is considered by some to be biased but it is the opinion of the author that objectivity is not possible and that Marxism, which is the outlook of Sartre himself, is the correct one.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. E. W. Knight who first introduced me to Marx and Sartre and who has constantly encouraged me. I also wish to thank my comrades in the HAMILTON PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT who provided a stimulus for much of the work and whose discussions impressed upon me the daily relevance of what I was writing.

Power to the People!

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

	Page
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I - THE LOOK OF THE OTHER	11
CHAPTER II - CONFLICT WITH THE OTHER AND THE SPIRIT OF SERIOUSNESS	29
CHAPTER III - BAD FAITH IN RELIGION	42
CHAPTER IV - MOITIE VICTIME, MOITIE COMPLICE	
CHAPTER V - THE BASTARDS	82
CONCLUSION	104
BIBLIOGRAPHY	110

INTRODUCTION

It is surprising that so many critics feel the need to defend or object to the opinion that Sartre's early plays are the "mere" illustration of the ideas set forth in L'Etre et le Néant. The latter is an ontology and, as such, a description of human reality. Until the time when the theatre has nothing more to do with man, we must be satisfied with seeing him on the stage in the same way that we perceive him to be in "real" life.

The most important concept in L'Etre et le Néant is that man is free and that his awareness of this freedom fills him with anguish. For if man is free, he is responsible for everything. Rather than embracing his freedom, however, and using it to improve the situation in which he finds himself, man more often flees from his responsibility and tries to smother his anguish by living in bad faith. Anything he can be, other than a situated freedom, he will try to be. Virtually all of Sartre's plays have as their major theme his concept of bad faith as described in L'Etre et le Néant. Although it is possible to enjoy these plays without ever having read the ontology, a brief description of mauvaise foi is indispensable to a study of them which is more than superficial. We will thus first refer to L'Etre et le Néant to see just what Sartre means by bad

faith, and then turn to the plays where most of the characters are concrete examples (as many of us are) of this refusal to accept oneself as free.

Sartre's description of bad faith is based on his understanding of man as being both facticity and transcendence. Man's facticity is the fact that he is born at a certain place, at a certain time, as a member of a certain class, a certain race, that he has a certain sex, a certain body, and so on. Man's facticity is that part of his being-in-the-world over which he has no control and for which he cannot be held responsible. His deeds in the past also become part of his facticity because there is nothing he can do to erase them or change them. Furthermore, man's facticity is that aspect of him that is purely contingent. There is no reason why I am born in Canada rather than Africa, no reason why I am of this century rather than the next. In the chapter "Les Structures du Pour Soi" Sartre outlines what he means by man's facticity:

. . .il est en tant qu'il apparaît dans une condition qu'il n'a pas choisie, en tant que Pierre est bourgeois français de 1942, que Schmidt était ouvrier berlinois de 1870; il est en tant qu'il est jeté dans un monde, délaissé dans une 'situation', il est en tant qu'il est pure contingence, en tant que pour ce mur, cet arbre, cette tasse la question originelle peut se poser: 'Pourquoi cet être-ci est-il tel et non autrement?' Il est

en tant qu'il y a en lui quelque chose dont
il n'est pas le fondement: sa présence au monde.¹

If man were only facticity we could say of him that he is what he is, just as we do with things: a table is a table and nothing more. But this is not the case because man is also transcendence. Unlike things, he can stand back from the world and give value and meaning to it. Not only can he see things as they are, he can imagine them otherwise and through his action change them. He can also stand back from himself, decide that he, himself, has no value in the light of the ideal he posits, and kill himself. Furthermore, he is separated from his past by nothingness and therefore what he did yesterday cannot determine what he does today. Today, for example, I may make a firm resolution to do six hours work a day on my thesis but this does not mean that tomorrow there will be some force over which I have no control which will sit me at my desk and start me writing. I may negate my resolution and decide to go swimming instead. Thus, for man, transcendence and freedom are the same thing. Sartre explains the nature of man's transcendence:

Il faut donc, que l'être conscient se constitue lui-même par rapport à son passé comme séparé de ce passé par un néant; il faut qu'il soit conscience de cette coupure d'être, mais non

¹Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Être et le Néant (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1943), p. 122. All references to Sartre in this introduction are from this text unless otherwise indicated.

comme un phénomène qu'il subit: comme une structure conscientelle qu'il est. La liberté c'est l'être humain mettant son passé hors de jeu en sēcrétant son propre néant. (p. 65)

Man's freedom thus consists in his ability to ✓
transcend his facticity. At the same time, however, he is aware that there is no reason why his freedom should confer value upon one thing rather than another and this causes him anguish. What he would like is to be something and at the same time be free to change; he wants complete facticity which would remove from him all responsibility, and at the same time he wants to be that being from which all value comes. This is why Sartre describes man as that being who aspires to be God. Similarly, man is a "passion inutile" because this very notion of God is obviously contradictory and impossible; that is, it is impossible to be both free and determined at one and the same time.

It is in his attempt to be God that man falls into bad faith. Failing to achieve perfect coincidence of facticity and transcendence he makes himself instead one or the other: he tries to be either facticity or transcendence. This is why Sartre says of bad faith, "Le concept de base qui est ainsi engendré utilise la double propriété de l'être humain, d'être une facticité et une transcendence" (p. 95).

Now there are several ways I can try to make myself facticity; that is, turn myself into an object. For example, ✓

I could try to see myself as having an essence (as did the novelists of the nineteenth century) which forces me to do one thing or another; I could posit absolute values to which I feel I must conform; or I could accept the opinion others have of me as being definitive. All these efforts would be in bad faith. The most obvious example of bad faith in the history of man is, of course, his positing a Supreme Being outside of himself who is responsible for everything.

That aspect of bad faith by which man attempts to be pure transcendence is similar to, and not the opposite of, his efforts to be pure facticity. For here again he is constituting his transcendence as a thing: he is transcendence in the manner that a table is a table. Sartre gives the example of a man who is trying to defend himself from the "accusation" that he is a homosexual. He knows he has slept with other men, but "son cas est toujours 'à part', singulier; il y entre du jeu, du hasard, de la malchance; ce sont des erreurs passées, elles s'expliquent par une certaine conception du beau que les femmes ne sauraient satisfaire, il faut y voir plutôt les effets d'une recherche inquiète que les manifestations d'une tendance bien profondément enracinée" (p. 103). By putting his past completely out of consideration, he hopes to escape condemnation from others: he can't be accused of anything

in the past because he is beyond it; he is pure transcendence. Sartre adds, "Il aurait raison en effet s'il entendait cette phrase: 'Je ne suis pas pédéraste' au sens de 'Dans la mesure où une série de conduites sont définies conduites de pédéraste, et où j'ai tenu ces conduites, je suis un pédéraste. Dans la mesure où la réalité humaine échappe à toute définition par les conduites, je n'en suis pas un" (p. 104). This is what Garcin fails to see when he refuses the appraisal others make of him.

Sartre's emphasis on le regard d'autrui is very important to our understanding of bad faith. Because the only way I can realize my efforts to be something is through another, because I am a "transcendence transcendé", because I am always transcending the situation I am in, it is impossible for me to know myself. The very attempt to know myself changes myself. Only another person can "know" me because he is looking at me from the outside; but even though his judgement is perfectly valid insofar as it is based on what I have done, it is also invalid because of my transcendence. As soon as I am judged to be this or that by the other, I am already beyond this or that.

Let us say, for example, that I walk into the waiting room of a doctor's office. I sit down and begin to think about my illness, the plans I have for this afternoon and so on. Suddenly another person comes in and

looks at me. Sartre explains all that this look means:

Il suffit qu'autrui me regarde pour que je sois ce que je suis. Non pour moi-même, certes: je ne parviendrai jamais à réaliser cet être-assis que je saisis dans le regard d'autrui, je demeurerai toujours conscience; mais pour l'autre . . . pour l'autre je suis assis comme cet encrier est sur la table . . . Ainsi ai-je dépouillé pour l'autre, ma transcendance. (p. 321)

Furthermore, this "look" which the other directs toward me and by which he judges me is not done in bad faith, or, in most cases, to humiliate me:

S'il y a un Autre, quel qu'il soit, où qu'il soit, quels que soient ses rapports avec moi, sans même qu'il agisse autrement sur moi que par le pur surgissement de son être, j'ai un dehors, j'ai une nature; ma chute originelle c'est l'existence de l'autre, et la honte est -- comme la fierté -- l'appréhension de moi-même comme nature, encore que cette nature même m'échappe et soit inconnaissable comme telle. Ce n'est pas, à proprement parler, que je me sente perdre ma liberté pour devenir une chose, mais elle est là-bas, hors de ma liberté vécue, comme un attribut donné de cet être que je suis pour l'autre. (p. 321)

Thus, our description of human reality as transcendence and facticity could also be called being-for-myself and being-for-others. If I live in bad faith by trying to be pure facticity, I am trying to make myself an object by trying to see myself through the eyes of another person. Remember that for Sartre, man is facticity "en tant qu'il apparaît dans une condition qu'il n'a pas choisie".² Goetz is born a bastard, "Le Nègre" is born

²My emphasis.

black, Estelle is born a woman; but it is only for another ✓
 that they can become evil or beautiful. The pride which
 Lucie shows her torturers can only have significance before
 the look of the other. In an article on Sartre's theatre,
 Jeanson begins by stating that the three major themes that
 run across all his plays are freedom, original contingency
 and the existence of the other. He then adds, ". . .en y
 regardant de plus près [je découvre] que le second tire du
 troisième toute son importance réelle, son véritable sens:
 c'est toujours par les autres, dans leur regard, leurs
 attitudes, leurs paroles ou leurs actes, que la contingence
 vient à nous comme un malheur de notre condition".³

Is man, then, condemned to live in bad faith? The
 very relativity used to describe man's flight from anxiety
 answers the question for us. Sartre himself makes a
 fleeting reference to authenticity or good faith. Speaking
 of man's transcendence and facticity he notes, "Ces deux
 aspects de la réalité humaine sont, à vrai dire, et doivent
 être susceptibles d'une coordination valable" (p. 95). In
 other words, man must accept his body the way it is, must
 accept the fact that he was born into a certain class; must
 accept the paradoxical validity and non-validity of the

³Francis Jeanson, "Le Théâtre de Sartre ou les
 Hommes en proie à l'homme", Livres de France, XVII
 (January 1966), p. 81.

other's judgement: he must accept his facticity. He must also be aware, however, that all the value that exists in the world comes from him; that if he decides to "remain aloof" from politics or the struggles of oppressed peoples, he has committed himself: that man is free to choose but he is not free not to choose. This is what Goetz realizes in the last scene of Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, what Nasty, Canoris and Hoederer have known all along and what Oreste comes very close to discovering. Man must assume his freedom, not to turn himself into an object or to attempt to "know himself" but to act upon the situation in which he finds himself. Paradoxically then, man is most free when he is most oppressed because in this case everything he does will achieve some purpose or will help to reach a goal outside of himself. Thus it is easier today, in terms of freedom, to be an Afro-American, a woman, or a member of the third world, because in these cases, the full significance and implications of man's freedom are clearly defined. The situation itself lays down the alternatives. It has immediacy and a consciousness need only choose which end to pursue. Thus Sartre says of the intellectual, Oreste, "Il n'est pas libre parce qu'il n'a pas su s'engager".⁴

⁴Christian Grisoli, "Entretien avec Jean-Paul Sartre", Paru, 13 (Dec. 1945), p. 8. The problem of the role of the intellectual in the revolutionary struggle is one of the most pressing today. Sartre's preoccupation with this dilemma in his early plays is one of the many reasons why Marxists, and other critics as well, should think twice before dividing the author's work into his "existentialist period" and his "Marxist period".

If man does not commit himself to something outside himself, it is because he is falling back on his desire to be God, and the impossibility of this project must, as we have seen, lead to bad faith. Another way of saying the same thing is that he becomes the "souci exclusif de coïncider avec soi-même".⁵ Authenticity, then, is man's full understanding and acceptance of the human condition:

L'homme est libre au sens le plus plein et le plus fort. La liberté n'est pas en lui comme une propriété de son essence humaine. Il n'est pas d'abord, pour, ensuite, être libre. Il est libre par cela seul qu'il est. Il n'y a pas de distance entre son être et sa liberté. Mais cet homme qui est ainsi condamné à la liberté, il doit pourtant se libérer, parce qu'il ne se reconnaît pas immédiatement comme libre ou parce qu'il se trompe sur le sens de sa liberté.⁵

This does not mean that it is easy to be authentic. We will see from the plays, that Sartre sees authenticity more as an ideal than a reality and that the heroes are simply those who have the least degree of bad faith.

⁵Francis Jeanson, Le Problème Moral et la Pensée de Sartre (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1965), p. 224.

CHAPTER I

THE LOOK OF THE OTHER

As can be seen from the introduction, one form of bad faith consists in trying to realize my facticity by seeing myself as others see me and by trying to manipulate the other into seeing me as I want to be seen. Garcin wants people to look on him as a hero. Estelle wants to be seen as a beautiful woman, Inès as a 'femme damnée', Hugo as a brave revolutionary and so on. This attempt, however, is doomed to failure for two reasons: firstly, because man is also transcendence, it is impossible for me to be anything in the manner of a thing except in the eyes of the other, and I am always aware of being "one step beyond" what the other sees me as; and secondly, although I may see myself as "fixed" in the world of others, "je ne sais ni quel je suis, ni quelle est ma place dans le monde, ni quelle face ce monde où je suis tourne vers autrui".¹ Thus any attempt to "force" others to see me as this or that must end in failure and in bad faith. Rather than accept the fact that I can neither know nor determine the opinion the other has of me, I exhaust all my efforts towards

¹L'Être et le Néant, p. 327.



trying to form an appropriate image that others can look at. Everything I do then becomes a gesture rather than an act because its sole purpose is not to change the world but to create an image. I then become an actor and, like Jessica and Hugo, it becomes impossible for me to tell when I'm playing and when I'm not.

It is in Huis Clos that Sartre explains both the validity of the other's look and also the bad faith which can result from being obsessed by this look. All the characters are dead and so they can no longer act, no longer change their essence as it appears for others. What they have done, while alive, now constitutes the "kind of person" they are, or their nature. Others see Estelle as an infanticide, Garcin as a coward and Inès is not even missed. For them, "l'enfer, c'est les Autres" (I,v), because they have absolutely no control over their "nature" as others see it. Even bad faith is impossible for them here because of the presence of a third person which shatters any kind of deception two of the characters might engage in. At the beginning of the play, for example, Garcin and Estelle agree to believe their being in hell is some kind of a mistake until Inès forces out the truth. It is important to understand, moreover, that although Inès is correct when she remarks, "Le bourreau, c'est chacun de nous pour les deux autres," (I,v) this does not necessarily imply that

each of them is a sadist. Garcin is probably sincere when he protests "Je ne vous veux aucun mal et je n'ai rien à faire avec vous" (I,v), but he will be an executioner despite himself.

Furthermore, they are all aware of the power the other has over them. "Je me sens vide. A présent, je suis tout à fait morte" (I,v), complains Inès when she can no longer hear her friends in life mentioning her. Garcin is preoccupied with listening to his fellow journalists call him a coward and with trying to convince himself otherwise. And Estelle directs all her efforts at trying to seduce Garcin and persuade him she is beautiful. Each of them wants to be looked at by another, but in their own way, and each meets with the frustration of being unable to know just how the other judges him. In an article entitled "Beyond Bourgeois Theatre", Sartre attempts to explain this alienation:

As soon as you recognize yourself you are no longer an object. In fact one does not see one's own face as one sees that of others. One sees it with privileged elements because one has a profound interest in the one who is there: it is impossible to seize him with this absolutely cold and formal bond which is simple sight. One seizes him by a kind of participation.²

²Tulane Drama Review, V, 3 (March 1961), p. 4.

Thus when Inès answers Estelle that her lip-stick is on straight, the latter is still not satisfied. She knows Inès cannot judge her through Estelle's world. "Mais vous avez du goût? Vous avez mon goût" (I,v)? At least with mirrors she could see her flesh as others saw it, but now, in the absence of mirrors, she is completely at the mercy of Inès and Garcin: "mon sourire ira au fond de vos prunelles et Dieu sait ce qu'il va devenir" (I,v).

The human condition is such, then, that I am responsible for the "nature" the other sees me as having, without being the "founder" of this attitude. Bad faith comes into play when, like Garcin, I can't accept the fact that I have a being-for-others (facticity) and a being-for-myself (transcendence) and that both are equally valid. If Garcin and Inès were still alive, their dialogue in the last few minutes of the play would take on a completely different meaning. Both would be right: Inès, because she can only judge him by what he has done, and Garcin because he would still be free to act and give a new meaning to his past deeds. Because he is dead, however, he must accept the other's judgement as definitive:

GARCIN: Ecoute, chacun a son but, n'est-ce pas?
 Moi, je me foutais de l'argent, de
 l'amour. Je voulais être un homme.
 Un dur. J'ai tout misé sur le même
 cheval. Est-ce que c'est possible
 qu'on soit un lâche quand on a
 choisi les chemins les plus dangereux?
 Peut-on juger une vie sur un seul acte?

INES: Pourquoi pas? Tu as rêvé trente ans que tu avais du coeur; et tu te passais milles petites faiblesses parce que tout est permis aux héros. Comme c'était commode! Et puis, à l'heure du danger, on t'a mis au pied du mur et . . .tu as pris le train pour Mexico.

GARCIN: Je n'ai pas rêvé cet héroïsme. Je l'ai choisi. On est ce qu'on veut.

INES: Prouve-le. Prouve que ce n'était pas un rêve. Seuls les actes décident de ce qu'on a voulu. (I,v)

Garcin, throughout the play, tries to seek salvation by having another see him as a hero: "S'il y avait une âme une seule, pour affirmer de toutes ses forces que je n'ai pas fui, que je ne peux pas avoir fui, que j'ai du courage, que je suis propre, je . . .je suis sûr que je serais sauvé" (I,v). When the door opens and he has a chance to leave, he refuses to leave behind Inès' image of him as a coward. Even though it is difficult to talk of him as living in bad faith (because, after all, he is dead) we know that in Huis Clos, Sartre is not affirming his belief in an after-life but isolating one aspect of human reality. Garcin's efforts to seek salvation through the look of the other is repeated in various ways throughout the plays. In each case, like Garcin, a character tries to coincide with himself, to have an essence, and also be the founder of this essence. Because their efforts are directed to achieving this end, all their acts become gestures.

The bastards, those characters finding themselves with one foot in one world and one in the other, usually find their acts turning to gestures as they try to feel their reality through the look of the other. Goetz is a bastard in the literal sense of the word: his mother was from the powerful Heidenstamm family and his father was a nobody. Valéra is in a similar position, describing his birth as an "error in calculation" (I,ii). But the bastardy of most is more subtle: Oreste was born in Argos but has lived elsewhere most of his life; Hugo finds himself caught between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; Kean is at one and the same time adored and detested by England's nobility. Needless to say, such a situation renders the bastard more lucid than most, as he can look on society "from the outside", but he also suffers from a profound feeling of alienation, of being unreal because he is outside the world of men. This makes him particularly susceptible to bad faith as he often seeks to find his reality through the look of the other. Dorothy McCall calls bastardliness "the alienation between the self as we experience it from within and the self as it is seen and judged by others".³

Goetz always performs with the public in mind,

³The Theatre of Jean-Paul Sartre (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 25.

whether that public is God, his soldiers, Heinrich, or the peasants. If he is Evil or Good, it is only to impress others so he can feel his existence through their horror or love. For him, hell is not a place where he suffers but "un désert qui n'attend que moi" (III^e Tableau,vi). He is obsessed with trying to see himself as others see him and of course he continually fails. When Heinrich comes to "judge" him at the end of the play, he is aware, not only of the significance of this particular trial but of the whole existence which he has continually tried to grasp:

Hilda, j'ai besoin qu'on me juge. Tous les jours, à toutes les heures, je me condamne, mais je n'arrive pas à me convaincre parce que je me connais trop pour me faire confiance. Je ne vois plus mon âme parce que j'ai le nez dessus: il faut que quelqu'un me prête ses yeux.
(Xe Tableau,v)

At the beginning of the play, Goetz thinks that by doing evil, he is relieving himself of his dependence on God, whereas in fact he depends on God completely. Everything he does is performed before the eyes of God, turning his most horrible crimes into gestures. When he prepares to lay waste Worms, he imagines with glee God quivering before his power: "je sens son regard sur mes mains, je sens son souffle sur mes cheveux . . ." (III^e Tableau,v). When Goetz turns to Good, it is the peasants and Heinrich before whom he is performing and any acts of 'love'

he may undertake, such as kissing the leper, again crumble into gestures.

Because Goetz continually uses people as tools to reflect an image, love for him is impossible. He treats Catherine as an animal, first so everyone can see how evil he is and then so his image won't be tarnished by her presence. Love with the peasants is also hopeless. Although he encourages them to love one another, what he really wants is for them to love and adore him as someone good. Because he is more concerned with his own image than with their welfare, he refuses to arm them and prepare them for war. He cannot become just another peasant because then he would not be seen and admired as the one who does good. He does not want to love them, but possess them; possess their consciousnesses in such a way as to determine the nature of the look they judge him by. Unlike Hilda, he continually keeps aloof from them and is jealous at the love they show her. He doesn't understand that love entails reciprocity, that the need must go both ways, or, as Jeanson says, that love can only exist "entre des consciences engagées, quelles que soient leurs situations respectives, dans une commune entreprise".⁴ Unable to possess them through love, Goetz resorts to the supreme

⁴Sartre Par Lui-Même (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1955), p. 66.

gesture of ascending the altar and pretending to take on the wounds of Christ. It is not until then that he can exclaim triumphantly: "Ils sont à moi. Enfin." (VI^e Tableau,vi)

Unlike most of the bastards, Goetz finally realizes his life has been nothing but gestures and love between Hilda and him then becomes possible. After the "trial" with Heinrich, he knows that no one has been watching him, and that his whole life has been devoted towards creating an image for an audience that doesn't exist:

Ainsi donc tout n'était que mensonge et comédie?
Je n'ai pas agi: j'ai fait des gestes. (Xe
Tableau,iv)

Does Goetz, however, finally escape the habit of gestures? Is his killing the soldier in the last few minutes of the play an act, or does the following speech betray him?

GOETZ: N'aie pas peur, je ne flancherai pas.
Je leur ferai horreur puisque je n'ai pas d'autre manière de les aimer, je leur donnerai des ordres, puisque je n'ai pas d'autre manière d'obéir, je resterai seul avec ce ciel vide au-dessus de ma tête puisque je n'ai pas d'autre manière d'être avec tous. Il y a cette guerre à faire et je la ferai. (XI^e Tableau,ii)

Can we not say that now Goetz is concerned with creating the image of the authentic lonely hero?

Oreste has been considered by many critics to be the existentialist hero and he comes very close to it. He refuses to see himself as a pawn of the gods and feels

X

fully responsible for his murder. Rather than live in remorse, like the Argives, he accepts his deed as having been done and leaves Argos without any punishment from Jupiter. But before we pass over Oreste too quickly, let us look at what Jeanson, Sartre's most astute critic, makes of our hero:

L'incarnation de la liberté dans Les Mouches demeure ainsi au niveau de la simple intention de s'incarner: l'acte s'y change en geste et son auteur en 'acteur', selon la logique même d'une attitude qui tend à figer les autres hommes en purs spectateurs. Autrement dit, la liberté n'est pas parvenue à s'insérer dans le monde, par suite d'une méconnaissance des conditions concrètes de l'action et des structures réelles du milieu interhumain⁵

Is Jeanson's opinion justified? A quick review of the motives and consequences of Oreste's murder would seem to indicate that it is. Oreste decides to kill Agememnon and Clytemnestra to prove to himself and the Argives that man is free, just as Goetz 'loved' the peasants to prove to Heinrich that he could be good. Rather than seeing Agememnon's rule as oppressive and his death as necessary to a better rule (such as his own, for example) Oreste seeks some gesture that will make him at one with the people of Argos. If his murder of Agememnon is to achieve an end, that end is only his feeling at one with the Argives, at feeling his existence

⁵Ibid., p. 25.

through the existence of others. This is the only motive which he gives throughout the play, and after the deed is done, this is the significance and meaning he gives it.

He tries to explain the murder to Electre:

Hier encore j'étais seul et aujourd'hui tu m'appartiens. Le sang nous unit doublement, car nous sommes de même sang et nous avons versé le sang Hier encore je marchais au hasard, sur la terre, et des milliers de chemins fuyaient sous mes pas, car ils appartenaient à d'autres Aujourd'hui il n'y en a plus qu'un, et Dieu sait où il mène: mais c'est mon chemin (II,viii)

And although Sartre makes some attempt to show Oreste's anguish, his talk with Electre is not convincing when put side by side with his speech to the Argives, which seems to reveal emotional joy and exaltation, rather than anguish:

ORESTE TO ELECTRE: Les gémissements de ma mère, crois-tu que mes oreilles cesseront jamais de les entendre? Et ses yeux immenses—deux océans démontés dans son visage de craie, crois-tu qu'elle cessera jamais de me ronger? Mais que m'importe je suis libre. (III,i)

ORESTE TO ARGIVES: Vous me regardez, gens d'Argos vous avez compris que mon crime est bien à moi; je le revendique à la face du soleil, il est ma raison de vivre et mon orgueil, vous ne pouvez ni me châtier ni me plaindre, et c'est pourquoi je vous fais peur A présent je suis des vôtres, ô mes sujets, nous sommes liés par le sang, et je mérite d'être votre roi. (III,vi)

But Oreste does not stay to become the king of the

Argives; instead he marches off toward the horizon in mythical fashion, pretending to play a flute like the Pied Piper. In his farewell speech he talks to the Argives as though they were children who had not yet reached the age of reason, and who had to be protected. Like Goetz, he makes himself a Christ-like figure and assumes that because he tells the Argives they need no longer feel guilty, they will no longer feel guilty. Rather than teaching them how to accept the responsibility for their past acts, and staying to help them build a more authentic life, he transfers to them his own bad faith by telling them they can forget about what they have done in the past and pretend it never happened. Jeanson points out the "gants rouges" (as opposed to "les mains rouges") in this last speech and interprets the image as indicating an aristocratic and individualistic involvement. This certainly seems to be the case. In fact, we will see in chapter five that Oreste ends up being no different than he is when he first enters Argos. Even the solidarity in whose name the deed was committed, is sacrificed as he leaves the town: nothing has changed and throughout his short stay he has been contented not to go beyond the level of gestures.

Hugo is similar to Oreste in needing the other's look in order to feel himself exist and this is one of the weaknesses that results in his failure as a revolutionary. Unlike Hoederer, whose only thought is what needs to be

done and how to go about doing it, Hugo's acts always turn to gestures as he continually posits his own image as their end. Rather than being someone who makes the revolution, he wants to be looked on as a revolutionary and to feel his existence as such through the eyes of others. Just as Estelle continually needs to see herself in mirrors, Hugo carries with him pictures of his childhood, causing Hoederer to remark to him, "tu t'occupes trop de toi" (III^e Tableau, iv). When he is in jail, he spends much of his time wondering if Olga and the others are thinking of him, and when he gets back, the first thing he looks for is the picture of himself in Olga's bedroom.

His need to be taken seriously extends to his wife, who, for that very reason, is unable to see him as real: "Pour que ma femme me prenne au sérieux" (III^e Tableau, i). Jessica taunts him and teases him until Hugo suddenly realizes with horror, that Jessica can't look at him without bursting out laughing. Like Goetz, Hugo finds it impossible to love and his relationship with Jessica is one of games and fantasy:

HUGO: Regarde-moi. Des fois je me dis que tu joues à me croire et que tu ne me crois pas vraiment et d'autres fois que tu crois au fond mais que tu fais semblant de ne pas me croire. Qu'est-ce qui est vrai?

JESSICA: Rien n'est vrai. (IV^e Tableau, i)

Hugo's relationship with the party is similar to his marriage with Jessica. Like Oreste and other bourgeois radicals, he feels the only way he can leave his mark on the world is by murder. Not satisfied with being editor of the party paper, he welcomes the chance to kill Hoederer and prove his bravery. Olga senses he's more concerned with the image he has of himself than with the revolution when she reminds him that the party is not there to serve as an opportunity for him to show his heroism. Nevertheless, that's what Hugo sees it as. Before he leaves Olga and Louis, he imagines the admiration he will instill in the others by killing Hoederer:

Avant la fin de la semaine, vous serez ici, tous les deux, par une nuit pareille, et vous attendrez les nouvelles; et vous serez inquiets et vous parlerez de moi et je compterai pour vous. Et vous vous demanderez; qu'est-ce qu'il fait? Et puis il y aura un coup de téléphone ou bien quelqu'un frappera à la porte et vous vous sourirez comme vous faites à présent et vous direz: 'Il a réussi'. (Ile Tableau, iv)

When a week passes by and Hugo still has not killed Hoederer, Olga makes the attempt by throwing a small bomb into the room where Hoederer is holding a meeting. Hugo, rather than feel ashamed at his failure, becomes angry at the lack of confidence shown him by the party and can think of nothing else in the hours that follow. When Olga tries to explain to him the importance of Hoederer's death, Hugo continually interrupts and accuses her of showing no

confidence in him. Imagining others have the same amour-propre as himself, he ridicules Olga's attempt as not showing enough heroism:

Elle a jeté un pétard contre le mur. Il n'y a pas de quoi être fière: elle ne nous voyait même pas. N'importe qui peut tirer si on ne l'oblige pas à voir ce qu'il fait. (Ve Tableau, ii)

Concerned more with the heroic image he has of himself, Hugo refuses to save Hoederer on the grounds that the others will "see" him as a traitor.

It is very debatable that Hugo ever gets out of the world of gestures. When he refuses to cooperate with the party after learning of the change to Hoederer's political line, it could be said that he acts in order to establish the fact that Hoederer died as a result of his politics. It seems to me, however, that rather than thinking of a future society where Hoederer's contributions would not be lost, Hugo is still more concerned with seeing himself as a political hero. After all, Hoederer's line won't be lost as the Party has adopted it now anyway, and Hugo, rather than accepting a new assignment and working for the revolution, takes up again the romantic name of Raskolnikov and rushes into the guns of his assassins. Like Oreste, all his deeds remain gestures.

That play which deals principally with the nature of gestures is Kean. Being an actor, Kean's whole career is left to the mercy of the other's look. But the acting

continues even after he has left the stage. As he is despised by the English nobility, both because of his bastardy and his career as an actor, he takes this nobility as that "look" before whom he must prove himself. Just as Oreste needs Jupiter and Goetz needs God, Kean needs the English nobility to give him his reason for existence. Even his old friends, the comedians, seem to be used by him as a means to become real: "Pour eux, je suis un homme, comprends-tu, et ils le croient si fort qu'ils finiront par m'en persuader" (III,iv). Being a male chauvinist among many other male chauvinists, Kean furthermore realizes that the most effective way of obtaining admiration, hate -- something -- from the nobility is to attack them through their women. Thus Kean's efforts to win Eléna's love and seduce her have nothing to do with his love for Eléna, but rather the image he wants to make for himself. In fact, at times, he becomes so concerned about what the Prince thinks of him, and so forgetful of Eléna, that she finally asks: "est-ce lui ou est-ce moi que vous prétendez aimer (IV,v)? Before Kean goes on to play his last role on the stage, he is terrified at the thought of being humiliated by the Prince. Eléna realizes this full well, as any woman does who's being used as a tool for a man's pride:

KEAN: Eléna, mon amour a besoin que vous lui prouviez le vôtre.

ELENA: Votre amour? Non: votre orgueil. Cette preuve, ce n'est pas à vous que vous

souhaitez que je la donne: c'est au prince.
 Il vous a humilié hier en prétendant que je
 ne vous aimais pas et vous attendez de moi que
 je le détrompe. Mon amour? Ah! vous ne vous
 en souciez guère en ce moment: ce qui
 compte à vos yeux, c'est l'opinion du
 prince. (IV,v)

The Prince too needs to put his existence in another's hands.
 Feeling de trop in a society where he's completely useless,
 the Prince picks up Kean's fads and makes them popular.
 Any relationship he has with a woman is the result of having
 seen that woman through Kean's eyes. Thus his interest in
 Eléna immediately drops when he learns of Kean's love for
 Anna. Eléna, too, depends on others to feel her existence,
 and like Estelle, draws this look through her own beauty.
 Speaking of both Eléna, the Prince and himself, Kean
 summarizes the play:

Le prince de Galles c'est moi. Tiens, nous
 sommes trois victimes. Toi, tu es née fille;
 lui, il est trop bien né; moi trop mal; le
 résultat, c'est que tu jouis de ta beauté par
 les yeux des autres et que je découvre mon
 génie dans leurs applaudissements; quant à
 lui, c'est une fleur; pour qu'il puisse se
 sentir prince, il faut qu'on le respire.
 Beauté, royauté, génie: un seul et même
 mirage. Tu as raison; nous ne sommes que des
 reflets. Nous vivons tous trois de l'amour
 des autres et nous sommes tous trois incapable
 d'aimer (V,vi)

There are many more of Sartre's characters who could
 be shown to have bad faith and who lose the immediacy of
 their situation, who feel de trop, useless, absurd, outside
 the world, unnecessary, and who then turn to the other to

feel their existence. Insofar as they look to the other for a picture of what they have been, they are in good faith; but when they turn all their attention to manipulating the image the other has of them, they are no longer concerned with performing a certain task, and their acts become gestures. Like Jessica and Hugo, Kean and Eléna, they never know when they are real and when they are playing. Love becomes impossible for them because they make themselves nothing more than someone-who-wants-to-be-loved.

CHAPTER II

CONFLICT WITH THE OTHER AND THE SPIRIT OF SERIOUSNESS

Thus far we have seen how some of the characters in Sartre's early plays are obsessed with knowing and controlling the manner in which others see them. We are now in a position to go one step further and try to determine just how this manipulation takes place. Until the Critique de la Raison Dialectique, where he introduces the groupe en fusion, Sartre sees man's relations with others as a continual conflict. Each person constitutes the world around him in a certain way, depending on his particular goals and resultant praxis. I experience myself as a subject and I see others around me as objects which, in part, are instruments for me. Suddenly, however, I notice someone looking at me and I realize that for him it is I who am the object and I feel shame. I realize my freedom has met its limit in the freedom of this other person. ✓ If I am in good faith, I can accept this limit to my freedom and go back to the particular task at hand. But if I am in bad faith, the conflict between me as a subject and him as a subject begins. In order to regain my central place in the world I can try one of two things: either I try to get the other to found my being through his freedom, in which case I try to make myself that value which is the ultimate

goal and limit of his freedom; or else I try to suppress the other's freedom so as not to have to worry about it any more, in which case I address the other as the object and try to seize and imprison his freedom by a complete appropriation of his body. Both attempts are doomed to failure. If I try to make myself an object for another, I am never satisfied because I am always aware of my freedom and of the fact that I am already beyond that object which the other sees me as. If I try to constitute myself solely as subject, I need only one look from the other to remind me that for him, I am the object and he the subject.

In the chapter "Concrete Relations with Others" of L'Être et le Néant Sartre describes various forms my being-for-others can take: love, hate, desire, sadism, masochism, and indifference. Of these the last three are more important to this study as they are extreme examples of bad faith as I attempt to constitute myself as pure transcendence or pure facticity. When we have clearly understood sadism, masochism and indifference, we can go on to other examples of bad faith which are more subtle but whose basic structure is the same. When I engage in bad faith through my relations with others, it is always as a result of the inevitable conflict of my freedom with the other's freedom.

Sadism is a flight from my facticity in order to get hold of the other's facticity. When I make someone

suffer through their body, it is so that the other will be permeated by pain and awareness of his flesh and will become nothing more than his flesh. Moreover it is not enough that I see the other exist as an object, as painful flesh: I must also be assured by the other that he is no more than flesh. Needless to say, I can only remain under this illusion as long as the other does not look at me and judge me by what I have done. As soon as I notice the other's look, I realize my efforts to reduce him to facticity have failed. Torture is the most obvious form of sadism. It is also the best example of existential pride and shame, or positing the self as freedom and object. Of torture Sartre has said, "c'est vraiment la lutte à mort des consciences".¹

Les Morts Sans Sépulture is Sartre's first play to deal with the theme of torture, which, as we have seen, is the theme of the conflict of subjects. Here, five resistance fighters have been captured and are being interrogated. As the play progresses, the audience becomes aware that the purpose of the torturers is not only to get information: more and more it seems that their main aim is to reduce their captives to miserable objects in an attempt to

¹Grisoli, op. cit., p. 10.

justify their treatment. Similarly, all the captives but one, Canoris, become less and less interested in the cause they're fighting for and more concerned with remaining a subject, with refusing to identify with their tortured flesh before their torturers. Landrieu and Pellerin call the captives animals and try to convince themselves that it is natural such people will eventually talk. In the last scene, after they mistakenly think the captives have broken down and talked, their glee is not over the information obtained but their victory of pride.

LANDRIEU: Eh bien? On a fini par les avoir.
 Tu as vu leur sortie? Ils
 étaient moins fiers qu'à l'entrée

CLOCHET: Oui, oui, on les a eus. (IV^e Tableau,v)

Lucie becomes so caught up in the conflict that when she has the chance to give false information and escape, she first refuses on the grounds that the captors will feel they have succeeded in reducing them to shame. Even the cause for which she is fighting takes second place to her pride as a being who is free. And when it is all over, the torturers must go back on their promise and kill them anyway, for they cannot stand the thought of someone outside their consciousness judging them for what they have done, any more than they could tolerate this look while the torture was taking place. Jeanson best describes what torture is, and its significance to understanding

our relations with others:

le but poursuivi par le bourreau n'est déjà plus d'obtenir des renseignements, mais de se justifier du supplice qu'il fait subir au maquisard, en rendant celui-ci parfaitement méprisable. Mais il est clair qu'il ne se rassurera vraiment qu'au prix de faire admettre à sa victime elle-même son caractère méprisable: il ne lui suffit pas de penser que l'autre est un lâche, il faut que l'autre le confirme par son aveu. Et plus il le torture, plus il se charge lui-même de ce poids effroyable, plus il a besoin de cette justification.²

Masochism is another form of bad faith like sadism, ✓ but in this case, the masochist tries to make himself an object -- facticity -- rather than a subject. The masochist, in order to absolve himself from any further responsibility, tries to get rid of his subjectivity by causing it to be absorbed by the other. Rather than fight against the shame he feels as an object, as did Lucie, he wills and loves his shame as a sign of his objectivity. Masochism thus becomes the assumption of guilt, and it is not surprising that in Sartre's plays, it has just this function. When the Argives torment themselves at the thought of the dead moving among them and punishing them for their past deeds, they at the same time feel they are free from their responsibilities. They are "at the mercy"

²Francis Jeanson, Le Problème Moral et la Pensée de Sartre, p. 227.

of the dead and are no more than pathetic objects. (Sartre here is obviously criticising the Christian doctrine of original sin.) Similarly when Goetz becomes a hermit with Hilda, he inflicts every kind of punishment on himself he can think of in an effort to assume his past guilt and live in remorse:

GOETZ: Je t'ai interrogé, mon Dieu, et tu m'as répondu. Sois béni parce que tu m'as révélé la méchanceté des hommes. Je châtierai leurs fautes sur ma propre chair, je tormenterai ce corps par la faim, le froid et le fouet; à petit feu, à tout petit feu. (VIIIe et IX

But just as the subjectivity of the sadist crumbles with one look from his victim, so the objectivity of the masochist is always in peril. Firstly, we have noted already the impossibility of my knowing or "seeing" the image the other has of me. Thus it is impossible for the masochist to ever experience himself as an object. He is always aware of his transcendence and his freedom. Secondly, the masochist's very attempt to hurt himself is proof of his own freedom: he chooses to hurt himself. And when he has others hurt him, his subjectivity is even more obvious because now, despite himself, he is using the other as an instrument, an object. This is what happens to Goetz when he tries to get Hilda to whip him or use her body to torment him. No matter what he tries to do, he realizes it is because he, as a free being, chooses to do it.

Masochism and sadism are forms of bad faith where the consciousnesses involved are fully aware of the other's look. In indifference, however, I try to hide from myself the transcendence of the other's look; that is, the fact that he can make of me something that I did not intend to be. When I am indifferent I can pass by people on the street and scarcely notice they're there. Other people become no more than the function they happen to be performing when I come in contact with them: a ticket collector, bus driver, newspaper vendor and so on. As others become no more than robots doing what they are expected to do, I feel that all I need is to know the master words which will release their mechanisms. Sartre calls this indifference a state of blindness:

En un sens, je suis tranquilisé; j'ai du 'toupet', c'est à dire que je n'ai aucunement conscience de ce que le regard de l'autre peut figer mes possibilités et mon corps; je suis dans l'état opposé à celui qu'on nomme timidité. J'ai de l'aisance, je ne suis pas embarrassé de moi-même, car je ne suis pas dehors, je ne me sens pas aliéné. Cet état de cécité peut se poursuivre longtemps, au gré de ma mauvaise foi fondamentale, il peut s'étendre avec des répit sur plusieurs années, sur toute une vie: il y a des hommes qui meurent sans avoir -- sauf pendant de brèves et terrifiantes illuminations -- soupçonné ce qu'était l'Autre.³

³L'Être et le Néant, p. 449.

Fred and the Senator, in La Putain Respecteuse are two such men who look on others with indifference. It would never occur to either of them that Lizzie or "Le Nègre" could look at them, judge them, and find them absurd or unnecessary. For them, they are the center of the world. In their state of indifference or blindness they never find themselves in the position of the masochist or sadist. They may harm or kill others, but it is never out of pride or shame. For them there is no conflict of freedoms or subjectivities. It would never even occur to them that there was anyone with whose consciousness they could enter into conflict. But do we not now find we are describing "les salauds", those "serious" men who never feel de trop, and who feel they have a "right" to and even a duty to live:

Ainsi les salauds -- ceux qui se sont arrangés pour mettre le Bien et le Droit de leur côté, ceux dont l'existence est d'emblée fondée et justifiée -- finissent-ils par former les autres à se sentir de trop dans ce monde, à n'y avoir aucun droit, à s'y trouver seulement tolérés, dans la mesure où ils y sont utilisables.⁴

The senator indeed finds the magic key which puts Lizzie's mechanisms to work and that is her need to feel she is looked on approvingly by important people in society. After refusing bribes and standing resolute in the face of threats, Lizzie succumbs to the Senator's promise of a kind

⁴Francis Jeanson, Sartre Par Lui-Même, p. 32.

thought from the old lady. Throughout the play Lizzie is reminded that she and "Le Nègre" are nothings while the Senator and Fred are the very essence of the nation:

FRED: Il a relevé tes jupes, il a tiré sur un sale nègre, la belle affaire; ce sont des gestes qu'on a sans y penser, ça ne compte pas. Thomas est un chef, voilà ce qui compte.⁵

When Lizzie thinks of shooting Fred he gives her a run-down of his whole life history and family tree: "Le premier Clarke a défriché toute une forêt . . .il a tué seize Indiens . . .il tutoyait Washington . . .mon arrière grand-père était chef des Vigilants . . ." etc. etc. etc., and ends by asking her: "Oserais-tu tirer sur toute l'Amérique?" (II^e Tableau, v). The senator too tells her that he speaks "au nom de la nation américaine" (I^e Tableau, iv).

Another character of Sartre's plays who is rather similar to Fred and the Senator but who has received little attention from the critics is the banker who appears for a short time at the beginning of Le Diable et le Bon Dieu. He too is a man living in indifference of others, dividing them into categories and trying to manipulate them:

Depuis trente ans, je me règle sur un principe: c'est que l'intérêt mène le monde. Devant moi, les hommes ont justifié leurs conduites par les motifs les plus nobles. Je les écoutais d'une

⁵1^e Tableau, v, my emphasis.

oreille et je me disais: Cherche l'intérêt.
(IIIe Tableau,iii)

First he goes to the Archbishop in an attempt to convince him to save Worms so he can collect the money he thinks is due to him. Finding the helplessness of the Archbishop's situation, he goes to Goetz and tries to find the key words that will impel Goetz to save the town. Unlike the senator, who succeeds on hitting the right spot, the banker's attempt is frustrated: Goetz cannot be placed in any of his categories:

GOETZ: Tu n'as pas trouvé mon intérêt! Voyons: quel est-il? Cherche! Cherche donc! Mais presse-toi: il faut que tu l'aies trouvé avant une heure; si d'ici là tu n'as pas découvert les ficelles qui font marcher la marionnette, je te ferai promener à travers les rues et tu verras s'allumer un à un les foyers de l'incendie. (IIIe Tableau,iii)

The serious men who appear in Kean and Nekrassov are more obvious to the twentieth-century reader because hardly a day goes by when we don't run into them sometime. Although the critics are wrong to become so indignant over Sartre's description of racism in the Southern American states (for the tale is not half as unbelievable as some would like to think), nevertheless the situation in that play is an "extreme" one in that many senators would be able to prevent their being seen in such a mess. But in Kean and especially Nekrassov, Amy, the Count, Jules and

Sibilot are very close to home.

In the very opening scene of Kean we see the serious people playing their roles. Amy talks of the "basse naissance" (I,ii) of Kean and refers to actors as "Ces sortes de gens qui n'ont pas accès dans nos salons" (I,ii). When the Count invites Kean to dinner, he tells the others it is so Kean can play the clown for dessert and act out the role of Falstaff. When they get the letter of Kean's refusal, the Count, in accordance with his bad faith of indifference, is careful not to show his anger: "ma dignité d'ambassadeur m'interdit de me fâcher" (I,iii). And when Kean finally confronts them on the stage, instead of feeling they are being judged, the nobility feel shame for Kean. The validity of Kean's judgement of them is not even considered. Only the Prince seems to be somewhat aware of what is happening.

Nekrassov is a parody of those serious men who feel they have been put on earth for the sole purpose of combatting communism. Pictured as pawns who vainly attempt to keep the imaginary dominoes from collapsing, Jules, Mouton, Sibilot and the others resort to anything to inspire fear of the East in their readers. Even Sibilot, who constantly complains of his salary and the lot of the working man, never thinks to question his cause. Valéra, himself, describes Sibilot's seriousness to him:

Paisible certitude d'une conscience sans reproches! On voit, monsieur, que vous n'avez jamais douté du Bien . . . et que vous n'écoutez pas ces doctrines subversives qui font du criminel un produit de la société . . . et peu vous chaut, n'est-ce pas, que je sois une victime de la première Guerre Mondiale, de la Révolution Russe et du régime capitaliste . . . ? Vous avez réponse à tout. Rien ne mord sur vos convictions. Ah! Monsieur, pour avoir ce front d'airain, ses yeux d'émail et ce coeur de pierre, il faut que vous soyez antisémite. (IIIe Tableau,vi)

Sibilot, in true indifferent fashion, doesn't even seem to take Valéra's words as an attack or a compliment. For him good men are as Valéra describes just as the sun shines when there are no clouds.

Serious men, men who are indifferent, are in bad faith because they fail to see that it is man who makes the world and any values that are in it are a result of his praxis. Serious men, able to stand neither the nausea which comes with feeling de trop, as one unjustifiable object among many, nor the anguish of their total responsibility in the world, have faith in the idea that there was a need for them before they were even born, a gap in the world that was waiting to be filled and that only they could fill it. The Spirit of Seriousness is probably the most common form of bad faith that we know today for the simple reason that in a society whose main concern is money, most people necessarily feel de trop. Having no serious function in our economy like the Prince in Kean, and being brainwashed into believing there is no alternative, we

are forced to imagine a need that doesn't exist.

Sadism, masochism and indifference are three concrete examples of the various forms my relations with others can take. Although masochism and sadism are not frequent in the early plays our understanding of their ontological basis (the conflict of freedoms) serves as a good foundation for other less obvious conflicts my being-for-others can take.

CHAPTER III

BAD FAITH IN RELIGION

In Les Mouches and Le Diable et le Bon Dieu Sartre comes to grips with the problem of man without God and the bad faith which results. Unable to accept his contingency, his freedom and his loneliness, man posits a Being who is both free and who is his own founder. If he can convince himself that such a Being exists, man can spend his whole life trying to conform to the path this Being has laid out. Good and Evil become as concrete and sure as the rock that Jupiter illuminates for Oreste. There is no doubt, no anxiety and no feeling of responsibility. Man, like the rest of nature, takes on a nature which is impelled to act in a certain way, the way traced out by God. In other words, the religious man is a "serious" man. Belief in God and in human nature is the most damaging form of bad faith today: it helps to maintain racism, anti-semitism, male chauvinism, the weeding out of working class children from the school system and countless other social crimes for which only we are responsible. We should not be surprised, after reading Les Mouches and Le Diable et le Bon Dieu to

hear Sartre remark: "The problem of God interests me very little".¹ For these plays deal with man and man only.

In the opening scene of le Diable et le Bon Dieu, Heinrich introduces the Christian concept of Good, which is: "Rien n'arrive sans la permission de Dieu et Dieu est la bonté même; donc ce qui arrive est le meilleur" (I^e Tableau, i). Goetz accepts this. First he tries to prove his independence of God by being Evil in the manner of a thing. His attraction to Catherine is the horror he inspires in her; when speaking with Heinrich, just before he plans to attack Worms, he is proud to say that no one ever trusts him. Even his proposed attack on Worms is a result of his concept of himself as Evil: "le Mal est ma raison d'être" (I^e Tableau, iv). When Nasty points out to him that by laying waste Worms he will be doing good for the property owners and only evil to the peasants, Goetz, still unable to be satisfied with the relative, decides to become Good, just as before he was Evil:

Jusqu'à ce que je goûte à tout, je n'aurai plus de goût à rien, jusqu'à ce que je possède tout je ne posséderai plus rien. Jusqu'à ce que je sois tout, je ne serai plus rien en rien.
(VIIIe and IXe Tableaux, ii)

But Goetz's attempts at the universal Good also end in

¹Sartre in an interview with Dorothy McCall, (Jan. 7, 1964) as quoted in her book The Theatre of Jean-Paul Sartre, op. cit., p. 32.

failure. Just as he was unable to do evil to one class of people without doing good to another, similarly he is unable to do good in the City of the Sun because he fails to look at the situation dialectically and take into account his time and place. It is not until the end of the play, when Goetz realizes that God doesn't exist, that he is able to give up the universal and take his place as a man among other men. Sartre has said of his plays:

J'ai voulu traiter le problème de l'homme sans Dieu, qui est important, non point par une quelconque nostalgie de Dieu, mais parce qu'il est difficile de concevoir l'homme de notre temps entre l'URSS et les Etats-Unis, et dans ce qui devrait être un socialisme Au seizième siècle on retrouve des problèmes analogues, incarnés dans des hommes qui pensaient à Dieu. J'ai voulu transposer ce problème dans une aventure personnelle. Le Diable et le Bon Dieu c'est l'histoire d'un individu.²

Sartre's comments on Le Diable et le Bon Dieu could also be applied to Les Mouches. Oreste, however, unlike Goetz, realizes the fallacy of a universal Good very early in the play. Unable to decide whether or not to leave Argos, he asks for a sign from Zeus. Only too happy to oblige, Jupiter says his mumbo jumbo and illuminates a rock, indicating to Oreste that he should indeed leave the town and that this is what the gods want him to do; in

²"Sartre Répond à la Critique et Offre un Guide au Spectateur Pour Suivre Le Diable et le Bon Dieu", Figaro Littéraire (June 30, 1951), p. 4.

other words, that this is Good. However, Jupiter's miracle has the opposite effect of that intended. Oreste thinks about it for a minute and realizes that Good has always meant acceptance and submission:

Alors . . .c'est ça le Bien? (Un temps, il regarde toujours la pierre.) Filer doux.
 Tout doux. Dire toujours 'Pardon' et 'Merci'
 . . .c'est ça? (Un temps il regarde toujours la pierre.) Le Bien, Leur Bien (II,iv)

After the murders of Clytemnestra and Agememnon, Jupiter makes one last attempt to overcome Oreste's freedom. He opens up the universe for Oreste to see and tries to convince him that he is too weak to stand outside of Nature. Oreste, however, still refuses to succumb to the easy way of bad faith, and looking back to the moment when he discovered his freedom (quoted above) he adds:

Il n'y a plus rien eu au ciel, ni Bien ni
 Mal, ni personne pour me donner des
 ordres. (III,ii)

Sartre is careful to show how man's belief in a Being outside of himself is in bad faith and also that man is conscious of his freedom. Electre, unable to accept her part of the responsibility of the crime, allows Jupiter to convince her that she really didn't want the death of her parents, and that if she did for a short time rebel against them, it was only because of her youth, something she really had no control over. The author gives us fair warning of Electre's impending bad faith and her lack of

courage. When Oreste asks her why she never left Argos, town of remorse, she replies "Je n'ai pas ce courage-là: j'aurais peur, seule sur les routes" (I,iv). When we take into account Oreste's words to Jupiter after the crime, and the figurative use of the word "chemin" it is not hard to see the same double use -- geographical and metaphysical -- in Electre's word 'route'. Oreste says, "mille chemins y sont tracés qui conduisent vers toi, Jupiter, mais je ne peux suivre que mon chemin" (III,ii). Etienne sees the last act of Les Mouches as symbolizing the consciousness of one man who struggles against the temptation to fall into bad faith:

Il faut croire que Jupiter c'est ici la
force en nous . . . qui nous . . . fait créer
des dieux.³

Heinrich's role in Le Diable et le Bon Dieu can be seen in much the same way; that is, Heinrich is that part of Goetz's consciousness which the audience or the reader can see in action. Ricoeur calls Heinrich "le vrai révélateur de Goetz, au sens photographique du mot" ⁴ Goetz calls him his brother in bastardliness (II^e Tableau, iv) and it is he, Heinrich, who confronts Goetz as a hermit at the end of the play and whose presence forces Goetz to

³René Etienne, "Les Mouches", Biblio., XVIII (mai-juin, 1950), p. 7.

⁴Paul Ricoeur, "Réflexions sur le Diable et le Bon Dieu", Esprit (Nov., 1951), p. 712.

realize his former bad faith. "Killing Heinrich, the reductive mirror image of his servitude, Goetz kills himself -- that part of himself which depended on an absolute to guarantee his own existence."⁵ But it is long before this that the presence of Heinrich brings out Goetz's bad faith. When Goetz decides to change from Good to Evil, Heinrich tries to convince him that it's impossible. Goetz bets with Heinrich, telling God to have him lose if God wants him to become Good. In this way he hopes to take the responsibility off his shoulders and to give a justification outside himself for his act. His bad faith and his consciousness of his freedom are most evident when he cheats at the game in order to make sure that he loses.

This is not to say that Heinrich does not have an existence of his own but only that the basis of his bad faith is the same as that of Goetz and his awareness of it is more obvious. Like Goetz, Heinrich cannot accept a world where absolute Good and Evil, where God and the Devil don't exist. In normal times he could spend his whole life without having to think twice about the problem, but because of the situation he finds himself in, he is forced to come face to face with it. Heinrich is a bastard in the sense that he belongs to the Church but he also feels

⁵ McCall, op. cit., p. 32.

solidarity with the poor. When they come into conflict he must betray one or the other and it is this which he can't accept. When he decides to take the side of the Church and bring the key to Goetz which will allow the latter to massacre the peasants, he realizes he has done evil. Rather than accept the fact that he has done an evil deed, he decides that if he is not all Good, he must be all Evil. Unlike Oreste, he cannot accept the responsibility for his act and the anguish which necessarily accompanies it, and so he seeks refuge in God's damnation in exactly the same way as the Argives. To escape from his madness, Heinrich creates a devil which accompanies him wherever he goes and which becomes more and more real as the play progresses.

But as we have said, Heinrich's awareness of his own bad faith is obvious. Early in the play he attempts to explain to a woman why God has allowed her young son to die. When she asks him if he really understands what he is saying he cries out his distress:

Non! Non! Je ne comprends pas! Je ne
comprends rien! Je ne peux ni veux
comprendre! Il faut croire! Croire!
Croire! (Ie Tableau,i)

After he picks up the key and decides to betray the poor, he tries to convince himself that he's only following God's orders and can't be held responsible. Just as Lucien, in

L'Enfance d'un Chef tries to convince himself of his love for his mother by repeating over and over "J'aime ma mère; j'aime ma mère", Heinrich tries to use words to convince himself of something he knows he doesn't believe:

Tu [Dieu] as permis que les hommes aient le
 coeur rongé, que leurs intentions soient
 pourries, que leur actions se décomposent
 et puent: que ta volonté soit faite! Que
 ta volonté soit faite! Que ta volonté soit
 faite! (Ie Tableau,ii)

When talking to Goetz later he admits that it is he and he alone who made the decision to bring the key. But his authenticity is very short lived because he immediately creates the Devil in his mind and tries to bury himself in a world of his own. Throughout the play it is Heinrich who, although continuing to live in bad faith, cites the existential truths: "Le monde est iniquité; si tu l'acceptes, tu es complice, si tu le changes, tu es bourreau" (III^e Tableau,vi). "Si Dieu me donnait à choisir entre son pardon et le tien, c'est le tien [celui de Goetz] que je choisirais" (IV^e Tableau,iv) and again when speaking to Goetz, "tu as forcé ta voix pour couvrir le silence de Dieu. Les ordres que tu prétends recevoir, c'est toi qui te les envoies" (X^e Tableau,iv). When Goetz follows Heinrich's arguments to their logical conclusion and pronounces the death of God, Heinrich attacks Goetz, not, as the critics have suggested, because Goetz reveals to him a truth which he can't bear but because Goetz says

outloud what Heinrich has known all along and can now no longer ignore; man is free; there is no Good, no Evil, only the tasks to be done.

It is interesting to compare Goetz's and Heinrich's belief in God with that of Nasty. Nasty too, feels he is "L'Élu de Dieu" and believes God to be on the side of the peasants (I^e Tableau, i). But he does not act out of concern for his own soul before God. His first thought is always for the peasants and he never denies man's responsibility for his acts. His explanation of the death of the woman's son is very different from Heinrich's:

Il est mort parce que les riches bourgeois de notre ville se sont révoltés contre l'Archevêque, leur très riche seigneur. Quand les riches se font la guerre, ce sont les pauvres qui meurent. (Ie Tableau, i)

Unlike Heinrich, he doesn't mind lying to the peasants if he thinks it is in their best interest. Some have said that in Nasty, Sartre wished to show the Marxist -- Leninist who believes in a strict historical materialism and the inevitability of the revolution.

Sartre also uses Les Mouches and Le Diable et le Bon Dieu to attack Christianity as a religion of selfishness and political oppression. In Les Mouches, Egisthe and Clytemnestra keep order in Argos by keeping their people in total remorse. Since they did nothing to help save Agamemnon from his death, they must now expiate

their sins and punish themselves before God's damnation. Sartre here criticises the Christian doctrine of the original fall which pronounces a man guilty the minute he's born and which demands from him a life of repentance. When talking to Jupiter, an old woman assures him of her remorse:

Ah! je me repens, Seigneur, si vous saviez comme je me repens, et ma fille aussi se repent, et mon gendre sacrifie une vache tous les ans, et mon petit-fils, qui va sur ses sept ans, nous l'avons élevé dans la repentance; il est sage comme une image, tout blond et déjà pénétré par le sentiment de sa faute originelle. (I,i)

The remorse and penitence of the Argives reach such ridiculous extremes that they begin to beg forgiveness for even being alive (II, 1^e Tableau,ii). At the same time, it is all a game and if they thought about it for long they would realize their bad faith. On the day of public confessions, when the High Priest roles back a rock to allow the dead to come among the people and torment them, a woman of the town prepares her son for the event:

Ta cravate. Voilà trois fois que je te fais le noeud. (Elle brosse avec la main.) Là. Tu es propre. Sois bien sage et pleure avec les autres quand on te le dira. (II, 1e Tableau,i)

Sartre attacks the concept of repentance on the grounds that it is in bad faith and encourages man to live in the past, as though he were nothing more than what he has done. The

past is one aspect of man's facticity: what is done is done and nothing can wipe it out. But sincerity and repentance usually imply that man does not surpass this aspect of his reality; that he denies his transcendence. Sartre explains why sincerity, when it entails more than simply admitting a certain deed in the past, is in reality bad faith:

Voilà . . . ce que le censeur exige de sa victime: qu'elle se constitue elle-même comme chose, qu'elle lui remette sa liberté comme un fief, pour qu'il la lui rende ensuite comme un suzerain à son féal. Le champion de la sincérité, dans la mesure où il veut se rassurer, alors qu'il prétend juger, dans la mesure où il demande à une liberté de se constituer, en tant que liberté, comme chose, est de mauvaise foi.⁶

Naturally, the ability to stifle future action by preoccupying people with repentance of the past, is very handy for a political leader. And this is exactly how Jupiter and Egisthe, in their holy alliance of Church and State, make use of it. As long as they can keep the people in check, by reminding them of their sinfulness, the people will not dare to think they have the 'right' to do anything. When Jupiter reminds Egisthe that the Argives, like all men, are free, Egisthe admits his attempts to hide from them this freedom and why:

Parbleu, s'il le savaient, ils mettraient le feu aux quatre coins de mon palais. Voilà quinze ans que je joue la comédie pour leur

⁶ L'Etre et le Néant, p. 105.

masquer leur pouvoir. (II, IIe Tableau, v)

It is well known that throughout man's history, the Church has used its power to exert political control, whether it was the crusades, the inquisition or the missions. But for Sartre, there was a much more immediate example: France was under German occupation when the play was first put on in 1943. Thody explains the significance of the situation for Les Mouches:

The official policy of the Vichy government was to tell the French people that the defeat in 1940 had come as a just punishment for their frivolity and godlessness in the inter-war years, and that they must be prepared to suffer to expiate their sins. This policy received the support of the Catholic Church with the result that Sartre was able to show religion with the temporal powers in Argos in order to maintain that 'moral order' which was the model of the Vichy regime.⁷

In Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, Sartre attacks the more 'innocent' concepts of Christianity which are love of all men and charity. Both are shown to be nothing more than self-aggrandizement at the expense of others. When Goetz decides to be Good, he creates the City of the Sun by giving his land to the peasants and teaching them love of all men. Nasty tries to convince him that a peasant revolution is spreading across the country and that Goetz

⁷Philip Thody, Jean-Paul Sartre: A Literary and Political Study (London: Hamilton, 1960), p. 26.

should use his land as a training camp for the peasants. Goetz shows his real lack of love and concern for the peasants when he asks, "Et qu'est-ce que je deviendrai, moi, si l'on m'ôte les moyens de faire le Bien" (II, III^e Tableau, v)? Because "God" has forbidden the spilling of blood, Goetz refuses to allow the peasants to arm and defend themselves. Nasty tells him that what Goetz is saying in fact, is "je ferai ce que je crois bon, dût le monde en périr" (II, IV^e Tableau, v). Goetz shows the same lack of love for Catherine and even reveals a conflict between loving men in general and loving one: "il fallait renoncer au Bien ou renoncer à elle" (II, V^e Tableau, iii). Finally, no longer able to pretend that Nasty has been wrong, and that in fact the peasants will be massacred because they are unable to defend themselves, Goetz shrugs his shoulders and replies, "qu'importe le déluge si j'ai sauvé l'amour" (III, VIII^e et IX^e Tableaux, v).

Goetz can never understand why his charity does not win the love of the peasants. He fails to see that giving to someone, out of charity is implicitly recognizing in them their most pitiable aspect. But does he really fail to see? As a bastard, Goetz had been made to feel that he had a right to nothing at all and that if he was fed, clothed and taken care of, it was only out of the 'charity' of others. Now he prides himself on receiving

nothing which has not been achieved from his own efforts:

"Ce qui est à moi, c'est ce que je prends" (I, III^e Tableau, ii). Even Catherine loses interest for him if he can't feel he has taken her by force. Goetz is perfectly aware of what charity is. He explains to Catherine:

Pendant vingt ans, ils m'ont tout donné gracieusement, jusqu'à l'air que je respirais: un bâtard, il faut que ça baise la main qui le nourrit. Oh! Comme je vais donner à présent! Comme je vais donner! (I, III^e Tableau,ii)

So when Goetz extends his charity to the peasants, he is only 'paying back' the world which for so long made him feel an object of charity. As the peasants refuse to respond with love and call him brother, Goetz becomes more and more frustrated and reveals more and more his true opinion of them: "Je suis l'architecte et vous êtes les ouvriers", (II, V^e Tableau,i); "Parbleu, chiens, je vous apprendrai la charité chrétienne!" (II, VI^e Tableau,v) and finally "Ah! je n'aurais jamais dû m'occuper des hommes: ils gênent".⁸

⁸III, VIII^e et IX^e Tableaux,ii. Sartre's criticism of Christian charity and the elitism it implies can be easily tested, and, I think, proven by a simple conversation with almost anyone involved in a charitable organisation. In almost all cases, the charitable man sees his recipient's nature as lacking in some way: either he's an alcoholic, or he's of "below-average intelligence" or he suffers from not being white, or she doesn't know any better because she's a woman. In an interview with Brigadier, Bonar of the Salvation Army in Toronto, Ont., John Mooney quotes Bonar as saying of the men in his hostel: "These guys around here

Sartre thus sees religion as a form of bad faith which relieves men of the responsibility they have toward other men. As long as the religious man obeys the will of God (which can be whatever man decides to make it) he need not worry about anything else. This is not to say, of course, that religious men never concern themselves with others. We know, for example, that some of the most heroic revolutionaries in South America are Catholic priests. But because of the nature of Christianity, this is the exception rather than the rule and even in this case, it would be difficult to determine if the priest is positing man as his end, or if he felt that this was the will of God. Sartre speaks through Hilda as she sums up her attitude toward Christianity:

Je n'ai que mépris pour tes élus imbéciles
qui ont le coeur de se réjouir quand il
y a des damnés en Enfer et des pauvres sur
la terre; moi je suis du parti des hommes
et je ne le quitterai pas; tu peux me
faire mourir sans prêtre et me convoquer
par surprise à ton tribunal: nous verrons
qui jugera l'autre. (II, VIe Tableau, iv)

aren't poor; any society has its scum. I wouldn't give a man that much," he indicated a slivered space with thumb and forefinger, "if I thought he could work." For the interview in full, see Hamilton People (Jan. 6, 1971), p. 4.

freedom to accept or refuse the orders he receives. Similarly when a woman says, "I am not responsible for the Vietnam war because women don't get involved in politics", she is in bad faith. She has accepted the use which society wishes to make of her as absolute and beyond her control: an amazing accomplishment seeing as women make up at least 50% of the population! Society's judgement is thus often a very handy thing to have around as it removes the victim's feeling of responsibility and freedom and consequently his anguish. Hoederer says of Jessica that she is "moitié victime" and "moitié complice" and this could be applied to all the characters we are going to study in this chapter. They are victims insofar as they are not responsible for the situation they find themselves in: Inès is not responsible for society's perverted attitude toward homosexuals; Estelle is not responsible for the system's use of her as a toy and so on. But they are accomplices insofar as they accept society's 'look' as being absolute, rather than engaging their freedom in an attempt to change it or as a means of ignoring it.

For an accurate study of the women who appear in Sartre's early plays, we would need a detailed analysis of the role of women in our society, comparisons with the women of other cultures and then we could understand people like Estelle and Jessica much better. Since this is

impossible in the scope of this thesis, we will content ourselves with a few preliminaries only and suggest the subject as a theme in a future work. A second problem in studying Sartre's treatment of women in his plays is our inability to know just how serious he considers the problem to be. If it is true that in Les Mains Sales he speaks through the voice of Hoederer, than the latter's comment, "De toute façon la question de l'émancipation des femmes ne me passionne pas" (IV^e Tableau,ii), is not very encouraging. Nevertheless we are going to plunge ahead and study a few of the women from the point of view of society's judgement of them as women, and their acceptance or refusal of this 'look'. Furthermore I think it will be clear that Sartre did, in fact, know exactly what he was doing. And if the critics have missed it, it is due more to their own low level of consciousness of the oppression of women as women than to any ignorance on the part of the author.

If we very quickly take a look at the role women play in our society, we can easily see that, for the most part, they are toys, a luxury, and as much as possible are kept out of the inner workings of society. Many intellectuals (including women) deny this is the case and point to women who have 'made it' into the upper echelons of society. What these people fail to understand is that they are looking at a very few women who usually come from a

very privileged class. Few men would argue that, because there are some Afro-Americans in positions of importance in America, there is no racism or oppression of blacks. Although it is very tempting to go into the problem more deeply, I will content myself with urging the reader to examine it himself, even if it means nothing more than looking at the government's publication The Status of Women in Canada. Because woman is denied a transcendent role in society,¹ she must overcome her feeling of being de trop by other means. The easiest way she can do this is to accept her role as a sexual object and turn all her attention toward beautifying herself as an object of art. Unless she is a lesbian, like Inès, she then sees herself solely through the eyes of men; in fact her whole existence is real or unreal to the degree to which she is acceptable to men. She then lives entirely through her body; she is her body and nothing more. Her attitude toward other women becomes one of competition and most of her relations with men will be sexual. It is interesting to note that in Les Mouches when the Argives meet on the day of confessions, every single one of the 'crimes' confessed by the women are sexual and are in relation to their lovers (II, I^e Tableau, i). None of them could confess crimes such as dishonesty in business relations

¹For a discussion of man's transcendence in society as opposed to woman's immanence, see Simone de Beauvoir, Le Deuxième Sexe (Paris: Gallimard, 1949).

or anything else in the public realm, as this world is closed to them from the start. Thus, just as children are alienated from the world around them, women too are not taken seriously. From the very beginning their interest in anything which is not the woman's realm is stifled so that as an adult, they are incapable of discussing anything of importance or relevance. To make up for their lack of real participation in the world around them, they resort to their imagination like Electre and Jessica, where there, they can act out the role that's been denied them. If they do try to break their bonds and fail, they resort to bad faith by assuming the past they know to be false. Electre hates Clytemnestra and Agememnon but feels she must wait for her brother to get anything changed. When her parents are dead, and Electre is filled with anguish, she uses her sex as an excuse:

Tu [Oreste] étais mon frère, le chef de notre famille, tu devais ne protéger: mais tu m'as plongée dans le sang, je suis rouge comme un boeuf écorché; toutes les mouches sont après moi, les voraces, et mon coeur est une niche horrible! (III,iii)

There can be no doubt that in Estelle, Sartre is consciously describing the bad faith of a woman who accepts her existence as being a sexual object. Laurel Limpus describes the bad faith of women like Estelle in a pamphlet called Liberation of Women:

Much of the resentment of liberated women against men is sexual, because they feel they are being

treated as objects (as in fact they are). Fashion, advertising, movies, Playboy Magazine, all betray the fact that women are culturally conceived of as objects and, worse still, often accept this definition and try to make themselves into a more desirable commodity on the sexual market. We must remember . . . that every month some woman is more than willing to be the playmate of the month and that the problem exists in her consciousness as much as in that of the men who stare at her. This is ideology, self-definition, conscious acceptance of myths, and these things are related to institutions, to economic and social structures.²

Estelle likes to think that men see her as a perfect and dainty piece of art. When she first comes into the room with Garcin and Inès she complains of the way the furniture is arranged and the fact that their colour clashes with that of her clothes. She tells Garcin and Inès repeatedly to watch their language and refuses to allow Garcin to take off his jacket in her presence. Honesty is impossible for her and she is the last one to say why it is that she is in hell and tries to convince them that she's there 'in error'. She prefers to be called 'absent' rather than 'dead' and looking on earth and the effect her 'absence' has on her friends she remarks that she is not surprised her best friend isn't crying at her funeral because it would cause her eye make-up to run.

But finally the image is shattered when Garcin and Inès learn of her infanticide. Needless to say, such an

²Laurel Limpus, Liberation of Women, Sexual Repression and the Family (Boston: New England Free Press, n.d.), p. 70.

identity is not in accordance with a fine object of art and Estelle's hell consists in the very fact that others see her as the exact opposite of how she wants to be seen. When her truth is out, she no longer objects to Garcin taking off his jacket. As she can no longer be accepted as the fine 'lady' she would like to be, she tries to 'capture' Garcin's freedom and smother his judgement of her through sexual desire. As long as he saw her as a fine lady she could get away with playing the game of trying to seduce him while telling him he couldn't touch her. When this possibility is no longer open to her, she becomes complete facticity and tries to live as a desired body -- as flesh.

Because she lives as a sexual object and is not a lesbian, Estelle, like most women, look to men for her reality. While alive, Estelle depended on the admiration of a number of lovers. Men were willing to settle for her beauty and asked nothing more. So it is not surprising that throughout the play, Estelle should only be preoccupied with Garcin. Inès, like other women when she was alive, is always in the way and is nothing more than an object of adversity -- if that! Because she is a woman, Inès doesn't count. When Inès tells Estelle her lip-stick is on crooked, Estelle replies "Heureusement que personne ne m'a vue" (I,v). She asks Garcin if she and Inès are disturbing him with their 'bavardage' (I,v). She finds it impossible to address Inès with the familiar 'tu' partly because Inès is

"only" a post-office employee and partly because, as she says, "J'ai de la peine à tutoyer les femmes" (I,v). Thus Estelle is continually appealing to Garcin and not understanding why he doesn't want her:

Est-ce que vous êtes un homme? Mais regardez-moi donc, ne détournez pas les yeux: est-ce donc si pénible? J'ai des cheveux d'or, et, après tout, quelqu'un s'est tué pour moiEcoute! je suis tombée de leurs coeurs comme un petit oiseau tombe du nid. Ramasse moi, prends-moi, dans ton coeur, tu verras comme je serai gentille.
(I,v)

When Garcin tells her to look to Inès for security she replies: "Mais elle ne compte pas: c'est une femme" (I,v).

Catherine in Le Diable et le Bon Dieu is another who depends on men, namely Goetz, for her existence. Not only does she depend on him psychologically, as a man, she, like many women, is economically dependent on him. The nature of the sixteenth-century society was such that a woman could either get married or enter a convent. So when Catherine finds an officer hiding in Goetz's tent and preparing to kill him, she agrees to give Goetz up if he refuses to take her with him. When she fails to do this, it is not only because of her love for Goetz; it is also because if he ceases to exist, so does she, which amounts to the same thing. Because Goetz has made her a whore, she has little choice but to accept the fact that she is nothing more than a piece of property. Certainly in the

context of the sixteenth century, we cannot really call this bad faith on her part. Once she has been raped by Goetz, society shuts its doors to her. She says herself:

L'honneur de l'homme, ça se répare à la pointe du couteau. Mais moi il m'a faite putain et je suis beaucoup plus difficile à raccomoder. (I, IIe Tableau, i)

Goetz treats her exactly the same as any of his other possessions and prides himself on doing so. When the banker comes to see him, he offers her to him as a gift of welcome. Catherine looks at herself in the same way:

Alors, autre ton manoir et ton domaine, tu possèdes un trésor sans prix dont tu ne parais pas te soucier. (I, IIIe Tableau, ii)

When she can't convince him that she's a possession that he'll need, she, like Estelle, plays her trump card and makes a last desperate attempt by renouncing all to her existence as a body:

Il y a des jours où tu auras besoin d'une femme Je peux être vingt femmes, cent, si ça te plaît, toutes les femmes Je veux être ton bordel.

We have said that Estelle's desire to exist only as a body is in bad faith but that Catherine has no other choice. This is due mainly to their class difference. Catherine is reduced to being a whore because she has no other means of support. Even in the City of the Sun she is abandoned because she is a prostitute. Only Hilda, who is from the upper-class and thus educated enough not to be as narrow-

minded as the rest, tries to help. Estelle, on the other hand, is in a very different position. She chooses to marry a wealthy man and, like the "putain respecteuse", takes on all the prejudices that go with the class. And Sartre goes to great pains to make sure this is clearly understood. For while in hell, she continues her 'grands airs'. When the garçon shows her into the room she dismisses him with: "Allez. Je vous sonnerai" (I,iv). She expresses surprise at being put in the same room with Inès, who is nothing but an employee of the post office, and when the latter complains of her making love with Garcin in her presence, she dismisses her by saying, "Je me déshabillais bien devant ma femme de chambre" (I,v)So woman's bad faith, like anyone else's, is dialectical. It is only bad faith because of the situation itself. Catherine is compelled to be an object, Estelle is not; Africans were once compelled to be slaves, to-day acceptance of oneself as a slave is in bad faith.

Jessica is a beautiful example of those women who accept the role laid out for them by capitalism but who have a sneaking suspicion that they're worth more. In Jessica, Sartre comes closer to the woman's question than in any other play but most critics pass her off as being unimportant or confusedly try to incorporate her into Hugo's personal drama. In fact, insofar as the woman's question is concerned, Jessica is the principle character of the play.

Our first glimpse of her shows her as a sneaky "silly" woman as she attempts first to search through Hugo's bags while he's out and then humiliate him when he gets back. When he returns after his first meeting with Hoederer, she avoids "complex" or intelligent discussion by asking of Hoederer's physical appearance and whether he has asked after her. Like a child who has nothing else to do, she always wants to play. Whenever Hugo is busy with Hoederer, she keeps to her room and reads romantic novels. When she leaves without permission, she is scolded and told to go back to her room. So be it!

Now if we look a little more closely we begin to find a few incongruities in Jessica's behaviour. Rather than the silly broad^{*} we first thought her to be, she turns out to be much more adept than Hugo. It is she who manages to keep his gun from being found when it is searched for by Hoederer's men, and she who covers up Hugo's stupidity when he gets himself drunk and almost tells everything. While Hugo is worried about his hurt pride, after Olga throws the bomb, Jessica urges him to speak seriously to Hoederer. She, better than Hugo, understands the discussion that follows, and her suggestion that he agree to work with Hoederer instead of worrying about his image, is the only sensible one. Jessica is always partly aware

*In the women's Liberation Movement, "broad" is the term used for those women who are not yet conscious of their oppression as women.

that she is more intelligent than Hugo. She has also been conditioned enough to know that this should not be the case. So she hides her intelligence behind games, and dreams of being the heroine of an adventure story. Despite herself, however, she rebels by constantly trying to humiliate Hugo and prove to him that he is no more a "man" than she is.

In Jessica, Hugo gets the wife he deserves. Although he is constantly pouting because no-one will show him any confidence, Jessica points out that, as a woman, no-one has ever shown confidence in her (V^e Tableau,ii). Hugo demands Jessica take him seriously but he has never stooped to do so much for her. Instead, he has continually left her out of the more meaningful aspects of his life. He has never discussed politics with her and didn't even ask her opinion on his entry into the Party. As he manages to discuss politics with Olga and even enjoys doing so, we can only conclude that he is aware of his wife's superior intelligence and keeps her ignorant to protect his ego. When Olga accuses Jessica of reading too many romantic novels, she replies sarcastically: "Il faut bien s'occuper quand on ne fait pas de politique" (V^e Tableau,i).

Jessica does make the effort to understand Hugo's politics and of course ends up understanding them better than he himself. But Hugo, not able to bear the thought that his wife (whom he married specifically to boost his

image) could be more "revolutionary" than him, consistently tries to convince her (and himself) that she doesn't know what she's talking about. From the point of view of Jessica and the woman's question, the second scene in the fifth tableau becomes the climax of the play. It is here, where Hugo and Jessica are talking in the dark after Olga has left them, that Jessica comes very close to gaining her self-respect and entering into an authentic relationship with her husband. It is because of Hugo's refusal to take her seriously and encourage her that she fails. In the beginning of this scene Hugo, for the first time, begins to reveal to Jessica his fear of being a coward and a traitor, but instead of following it through, he cuts himself short and says "Je me demande pourquoi je te parle de tout ça". When she suggests he tell Hoederer he will work with him, he just shakes his head with a "Pauvre Jessica". As Jessica attempts to understand and even makes a move towards studying his books, Hugo panics and tries to convince her that no matter what she does, she will never have access to a man's world: "c'était une folie de te demander de l'aide. Tes conseils viennent d'un autre monde". Jessica is partly convinced that Hugo is right but she tries to defend herself in a moving speech where it becomes hard to tell where the "victime" ends and the "complice" begins:

A qui la faute? Pourquoi ne m'a-t-on rien appris? Pourquoi ne m'a-t-on rien expliqué? Tu as entendu ce qu'il [Hoederer], a dit? Que j'étais ton luxe. Voilà dix-neuf ans qu'on m'a installé dans votre monde d'hommes avec défense de toucher aux objets exposés et vous m'avez fait croire que tout marchait très bien et que je n'avais à m'occuper de rien sauf de mettre des fleurs dans les vases. Pourquoi m'avez-vous menti? Pourquoi m'avez-vous laissée dans l'ignorance, si c'était pour m'avouer un beau jour que ce monde craque de partout et que vous êtes des incapables et pour m'obliger à choisir entre un suicide et un assassinat. Je ne veux pas choisir: je ne veux pas que tu te laisses tuer, je ne veux pas que tu le tues. Pourquoi m'a-t-on mis ce fardeau sur les épaules? Je ne connais rien à vos histoires et je m'en lave les mains. Je ne suis ni oppresseur, ni social-traître, ni révolutionnaire, je n'ai rien fait, je suis innocente de tout.

Now that Hugo has convinced Jessica that she has no contribution to make to the world, she is forced to fall back on her role as ego booster for men: "tu seras content d'avoir un peu de ma chaleur, puisque je n'ai rien d'autre à te donner".

And Hugo is not the only male chauvinist in the play. Hoederer too refuses to take Jessica seriously and from the beginning sees her only as a sex menace to both himself and his men. At his first meeting with her he remarks on her beauty and adds "c'est regrettable" (III^e Tableau,iii). Instead of teaching her how to defend herself or giving her a gun, he makes her totally dependent on Hugo and tells her not to open the door unless he's there. When he finds her in his office without

permission, it is not her he scolds but Hugo: "C'est ta femme: tiens-la mieux que ça" (IV^e Tableau,ii). In the same scene he is critical because Jessica does not respect her husband but never mentions to Hugo his lack of respect for her. He rightly accuses her of knowing how to do nothing but make love (although he later learns she cannot do this neither) but is only mildly interested in Hugo's possession of her as a trinket from the past:

Je suppose que tu es son luxe. Les fils de bourgeois qui viennent à nous ont la rage d'emporter avec eux un peu de leur luxe passé, comme souvenir. Les uns, c'est leur liberté de penser, les autres, une épingle de cravate. Lui, c'est sa femme. (IVe Tableau,ii)

Hoederer is always afraid of humiliating Hugo; so much so that he risks his life by turning his back on Hugo when the latter has the gun. He does not show the same concern for Hugo's wife. Jessica very astutely points out to him that if she is romantic in wanting to give up her life for Hoederer, he is even moreso. As he is much more important to the party than Hugo, his death would hurt many more people than Hugo's. Hoederer, however, can only see Jessica as a sexual inconvenience and, not in the least concerned with humiliating her, threatens to rape her if she doesn't leave. She makes it clear to him that as sexual appeal is the only thing she has left, she wouldn't mind in the least, and also explains to him she is frigid. Hoederer, in typical male chauvinist fashion, accepts the

challenge to prove his superior virility:

JESSICA: Je ne sais rien, je ne suis ni femme ni fille, j'ai vécu dans un songe et quand on m'embrassait ça me donnait envie de rire. A présent je suis là devant vous, il me semble que je viens de me réveiller et que c'est le matin. Vous êtes vrai. Un vrai homme de chair et d'os, j'ai vraiment peur de vous et je crois que je vous aime, pour de vrai. Faites de moi ce que vous voudrez: quoi qu'il arrive, je ne vous reprocherai rien.

HOEDERER: Ça te donne envie de rire quand on t'embrasse? Hein?

JESSICA: Oui.

HOEDERER: Alors, tu es froide?

JESSICA: C'est ce qu'ils disent.

HOEDERER: Et toi, qu'en penses-tu?

JESSICA: Je ne sais pas.

HOEDERER: Voyons (il l'embrasse). Eh bien?

JESSICA: Ça ne m'a pas donné envie de rire.

La porte s'ouvre. Hugo entre

(VI^e Tableau,iii)

It is difficult to judge this play in the light of our present knowledge of the woman's question. Certainly Sartre was ahead of his time in including it in a political play at all and the influence of Simone de Beauvoir no doubt had much to do with it. From our vantage point of the '70's, however, we can notice two flaws in his treatment of the problem: firstly, Jessica's speech, which

is the core of the issue, is much too feminist; and secondly, Hoederer's failure to take into account the woman's question, ultimately causes his death, which is inconsistent with the development of the play. The first objection could be answered by saying that, because of the level of the struggle when Sartre wrote the play, he was unable to go beyond making Jessica blame men, and not the capitalist system, for her oppression. Today this would be considered a serious weakness in a socialist play. Or we could say that Sartre was perfectly aware of the inadequacy of Jessica's speech and wished to show that her willingness to blame men, rather than think about it more deeply, is in bad faith.

The second objection is much more difficult to answer but also much more interesting. Hoederer, who is supposed to be the hero of the play because of his political line, at the same time says that he does not care about the woman's question (and says this in a play where the case for this issue is presented very strongly). His comportment with Jessica is consistent with his refusal to consider the special problems of women in the revolutionary struggle. He refuses to take her seriously or make her useful in the party. He risks his life to save Hugo, the bourgeois, from humiliation, but will do nothing to raise Jessica above her oppression as a woman -- not even

discuss her oppression with her. But we cannot just toss Hoederer off as a male chauvinist. We have every reason to believe that he would not treat a woman in the party in the same way as he does Jessica. No doubt, any discussion he would have with Olga, for example, would be political. The answer to our dilemma can only be that, although Hoederer is not a male chauvinist in the manner that Hugo is, he is nevertheless unconscious of the fact that the woman's question must be an essential aspect of his political line and be incorporated into it. If it were, Hoederer would find himself engaged in just as many discussions with Jessica on the oppression of women, as he is with Hugo on the latter's preoccupation with himself. He would set about trying to teach her (or if he didn't have the time to have someone else teach her), to give her tasks in the party and attempt to make her useful as a party member. This is what he attempts to do with Hugo in the long discussions concerning his proposed alliance with the fascists. On the contrary, however, he avoids discussing anything seriously with Jessica except her frigidity. In fact, with a slightly different twist to the play, we could say that Hoederer dies because he does not recognize Jessica's problems as a woman and as a victim of the system. If he did, would he have her in his arms at the time Hugo comes in? Most likely not. Now the question is,

did Sartre intend us to see Hoederer's death as a result of this weakness in his political line? If he did, why isn't it followed up in the last scene with Jessica? And if he didn't, how could he represent Jessica as typical of the oppression of women throughout the entire play, only to forget this role in her confrontation with Hoederer at the end. We are forced, then, to come to one of the following conclusions: either Sartre was unaware of the strong role Jessica's turned out to be and let it slip when he had her come before Hoederer at the end, or Sartre was perfectly aware of what he was doing and intended Hoederer's death to be an ironic example of the possible effects of a political line, which for one reason or another, is not correct. Needless to say I find the second conclusion more exciting than the first and also feel it perfectly feasible -- especially when considered in light of the author's relation with Simone de Beauvoir, one of the earliest and strongest advocates of the modern women's liberation movement.

If women are oppressed in society because of a sexist attitude, so too are some men. We have seen the need Hugo had for Jessica and Olga to see him as a "real man" and the ease with which Jessica was able to torment him because of her awareness of this need. Garcin is another, who in bad faith, has allowed himself to be taken

up with society's image of a man as tough, confident and besieged by women. As the garçon shows him into the room he assures him that he's not the least bit afraid and that he's not the kind to avoid meeting the situation head-on: "je regarde la situation en face" (I,i). With Inès and Estelle he plays the same game. He introduces himself as "publiciste et homme de lettres" (I,iii) and likes to think that the reason he's in hell is because of his sadistic treatment of his wife. He is not vulnerable, he assures Inès, but while attempting to reveal to Inès and Estelle his "manliness" he listens in fear to his comrades calling him a coward.

Inès, with her lucidity, is Garcin's trap. She accuses him of being a coward the minute she sees him and reminds him of the tic on his face that uncovers his fear. To protect her interest in Estelle she points out that everything he has done from the beginning has been to impress Estelle. Garcin then attempts to protect his image by saying he couldn't care a less about women. He is contemptuous of the memory of his wife because of her lack of courage and her love for him and feels that his hell, in part, is to be left to the judgement of women:

Je suppose qu'il fallait en arriver là; ils nous ont manoeuvrés comme des enfants. S'ils m'avaient logé avec des hommes . . . les hommes savent se taire. (I,v)

Garcin's need to turn to Inès for final judgement is typical of the failure of the male chauvinist's bad faith and of all bad faith. Garcin sees women as something to be used and as props for his heroic image. When he achieves his goal, however, he realizes that the woman as an object can no longer judge him or reassure him and he loses at his own game. Thus Garcin needs to turn from Estelle who is completely object, to Inès who has preserved some freedom; Goetz similarly abandons Catherine and looks to Hilda who refuses to be used as an instrument; Hugo is continually frustrated by Jessica's inability to judge him because of the ignorance he's kept her in; and if La Putain Respecteuse went on one step further, we'd see that Fred had the same problem with Lizzie. Garcin is in bad faith, not only because he thinks he's a hero when in fact he's a coward, but also because he accepts society's definition of a hero and tries to live up to some mythical image that he thinks a man should be.

There are many other characters in Sartre's early plays who are identified as evil and who accept the Good that society invents. Of all of them, Lizzie of La Putain Respecteuse is the best example. Although society detests her and finds her contemptible, she upholds those values which make a change of her situation impossible: she's anti-communist, a racist, and a sexist, "Tu es salaud comme

une femme" (I^e Tableau,iii). Her ideal is to have a big white house in the "beaux quartiers" and a kind old grandmother with white hair to think kindly of her. She has no trouble showing defiance to the police who come to the door, but she feels it necessary to apologize to Fred for insulting his mother when she learns he is from "respectful" society; that is, rich. Like "Le Nègre" she has felt guilty all her life and wants only to feel her existence is justified. Thus, after refusing threats and bribes, she succumbs to the temptation of being good in someone's eyes.

Sartre's treatment of "Le Nègre" is, like that of Jessica, a little anachronistic and the play now suffers as a result. Sartre probably didn't give "Le Nègre" a name to impress upon the audience and reader the manner in which the Southern American white looks on the black as a nameless object. Nevertheless, the Afro-American of today is a far cry from the frightened and helpless negro portrayed in La Putain Respecteuse. What we want today is a play which shows a revolt -- an organized revolution -- more in the manner of Les Mains Sales or Le Diable et le Bon Dieu. Because of Sartre's sketchy outline of "Le Nègre" it is impossible to determine whether he acts in bad faith. Koefoed says of him:

Le nègre en effet, tout en sachant qu'il n'a rien fait, ne songe pas un instant à s'insurger, il a besoin de l'homme blanc avec son injustice et sa cruauté, il en a besoin pour se sentir esclave et excuser aussi une inertie qui sans cela serait injustifiable.³

I really don't know how Koefeld expects one man to "s'insurger" when, as far as we know, there is no-one to help him, and the whole town is out on the streets after him. Nevertheless this is probably the interpretation Sartre would want us to have as he has "Le Nègre" say that he finds it impossible to shoot whites. The less said about "Le Nègre", the better.

Like Lizzie, Inès is condemned by society to be evil. But whereas Lizzie at least showed some flashes of revolt, Inès totally takes up society's judgement of her as her identity — her nature. She is aware of herself only through the pain she inflicts on others. She makes herself as evil as possible for Estelle and Garcin. She tells them she's not polite, that she's "méchante" and "une femme damnée". She is the first one to admit the reason why she's in hell and remains the most lucid character throughout. Nevertheless, even though she shows pride and defiance

³Oleg Koefoed, "L'Oeuvre littéraire de Jean-Paul Sartre. Essai d'interprétation", Orbis Litterarum, VI (1948), et VII (1949), p. 79.

toward both Estelle and Garcin, she is terrified at the thought of being thrown out when the door opens for Garcin. To feel her existence, Inès must be seen as evil in the eyes of others.

Bad faith in the face of le regard of society is, as we have seen, sometimes difficult to determine. In the cases of Estelle, Electre, Lizzie, Garcin and Inès, it is obvious enough: all these characters, instead of attempting to analyse, judge and if necessary change the society which oppresses them with an unfavourable identity, instead succumb to it, become an object for it, and try to use their facticity as an excuse. They not only accept le regard d'autrui, they thrive on it. In the case of Catherine, Jessica, and "Le Nègre", however, who is to say where their responsibility begins? Catherine and Le Nègre are not in a position to change even if they want to, and Jessica does see through the sham of the society held up to her, makes an honest effort to get control of her situation, but is overcome. Even with this last group of people, however, we can easily imagine possibilities that they didn't try. Catherine could try to become involved with the peasants in the City of the Sun instead of languishing away for Goetz; Le Nègre could have held a gun on Lizzie and forced her to sign a true confession, and Jessica could have refused to be sexually involved with

Hugo or Hoederer until they gave her the respect she deserved as a human being. So it is difficult to say that that one is in bad faith. There are degrees of bad faith.

CHAPTER V

THE BASTARDS

Having seen how certain people can make themselves the miserable object that the serious men of society want, we can now look at the other side of the coin, and analyse those characters who try to refuse the shame which society wishes to confer on them by becoming pure transcendence. Moreover I think it would be helpful to review our definition of bad faith, especially its ontological basis:

. . . la conscience est toujours (ontologiquement) à distance d'elle-même: elle ne coïncide pas avec soi, elle est ce qu'elle n'est pas et n'est pas ce qu'elle est, elle est sans cesse en question pour elle-même, perpétuel échappement à soi. Or l'attitude "naturelle" de la conscience, attitude d'échec, consiste essentiellement à n'assumer point cette condition et à se réfugier dans la mauvaise foi. Ainsi se condamne-t-elle à ne pouvoir jamais surmonter dans une synthèse les deux aspects de la réalité humaine: sa contingence et sa liberté; sa facticité (son être de fait, son être là) et sa transcendance (son pouvoir de faire), c'est-à-dire l'obligation corrélatrice de se faire être pour quoi que ce soit.¹

Man's consciousness is forever at a distance from itself, never coincides with itself. Our facticity, which only the other can know, never coincides with ourselves as we know it from within. If we are in bad faith, instead of

¹Francis Jeanson, Sartre Par Lui-Même, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

accepting this "double" condition, we will desperately try to become one or the other. It is the ontological basis of bad faith, which makes the bastard so susceptible to it.

In Sartre's literature, the bastards are those people who are rejected by society and forced to live outside of it. As we have seen, the peculiar position of the bastard makes him more lucid than most because he can look in on the serious world from the outside.² His alienation makes him acutely aware, moreover, that his self as he knows it and his self as others see it do not coincide at all. Lizzie is quite aware of the fact that the Lizzie she knows has no resemblance at all to the Lizzie the Senator knows. All the characters in chapter four are bastards in one way or another. The characters we are about to study now, however, we will study as bastards, partly because their bastardy is more obvious than the others, and partly because their bad faith takes that form which is more typical of the bastard; absolute freedom or transcendence.

Kean, Nekrassov, Goetz, Hugo and Oreste are all bastards: the first three because of their birth and low station in society, and the last two because they are

²See Chapter I.

intellectuals. Kean, like Nekrassov and Goetz, is a bastard in the literal sense of the word. He is then tossed off by the serious world as being of "basse naissance" and has no rights in high society. To the Count and the others who receive Kean with a cold stare, after he drops is on them unexpectedly, he answers for them:

Que ma présence ici n'est pas opportune?
Monsieur je suis pénétré de son inopportunité.
(I,v)

Kean feels the inopportunity of his existence throughout his entire life. When he compares himself to the Prince, who calls himself a real man, Kean feels "light", like a cloud floating over society looking for someplace to settle:

Comprenez-vous que je veuille peser de mon
vrai poids sur le monde? Que j'en ai assez
d'être une image de lanterne magique? (II,ii)

Kean is, in fact, the victim of society's need for an illusion. He points out to the Prince that the "importantes affaires au Danemark" are nothing other than the sale of cheese. The serious men, however, can't accept the fact that they are living and dying over something as mundane as cheese, and so create the theatre to assure themselves, through Othello and Hamlet, that there's something more to it all. Kean, like Lizzie, accepts and at the same time questions his position. Society has almost convinced him of his worthlessness but not quite:

Je sais que je ne suis rien à côté d'elle. Rien.
 Et rien à côté de son mari, qui est gâteux. Mais.
pourquoi ne suis-je rien . . . C'est étrange
 d'avoir tant d'amour-propre et si peu d'estime
 pour soi. (II,ii)

Nekrassov, an "error in calculation" and thus every bit as inopportune as Kean, is also an outsider. Although he likes to identify himself as "malhonnête", he is cynical about the rôle laid out for him. He shows anger when his suicide is foiled by his being pulled out of the river, complaining that no-one had ever done anything for him before, as he had never done anything for them. Kean's and Nekrassov's description of the "look" they have received from society are strikingly similar:

KEAN: Dans l'ancien temps, quand un homme avait commis quelque forfait bien noir, on donnait à tout citoyen qui le rencontrerait permission de l'abattre à vue, sans sommation et comme un chien: la gloire, c'est ça. (II,iii)

NEKRASSOV: La vie, c'est une panique dans un théâtre en feu. Tout le monde cherche la sortie, personne ne la trouve, tout le monde cogne sur tout le monde. Malheur à ceux qui tombent; ils sont piétinés sur le champ. Sentez-vous le poids de quarante millions de Français qui vous marchent sur la gueule? (Ie Tableau,ii)

Like Kean and Nekrassov, Goetz is branded a bastard by the ruling ideology. Unfortunately for them all, however, they are not aware that evil identity is

a result of the diversion of classes. Rather than seeing that, in bourgeois society, those people are Good who own property and those who don't own property are necessarily Bad, the bastards try to understand their bastardy as an aspect of the human condition. When they say "no", it is not to the propertied classes, but to the whole world.

Goetz's description of his and Heinrich's bastardy, could also be applied to Kean and Nekrassov:

Bien sûr que les bâtards trahissent: que veux-tu qu'ils fassent d'autre? Moi, je suis agent double de naissance: ma mère s'est donnée à un croquant, et je suis fait de deux moitiés qui ne collent pas ensemble: chacune des deux fait horreur à l'autre. Crois-tu que tu es mieux loti? Un demi-curé ajouté à un demi-pauvre, ça n'a jamais fait un homme entier. Nous ne sommes pas et nous n'avons rien. Tous les enfants légitimes peuvent jouer de la terre sans payer. Pas toi, pas moi. Depuis mon enfance, je regarde le monde par un trou de la serrure: c'est un beau petit oeuf bien plein où chacun occupe la place qui lui est assignée, mais je peux t'affirmer que nous ne sommes pas dedans. Dehors! Refuse ce monde qui ne veut pas de toi! Fais le Mal: tu verras comme on se sent léger. (IIe Tableau, iv)

Oreste's and Hugo's bastardy differs from those above in two ways: first, they do not feel rejected by society as a whole, but rather from one group in society; and second, they are fully aware of the reasons for their alienation. When Oreste first comes to Argos, he feels not only the oppressive heaviness of the town but his own lightness. He reflects on the Gidian disponibilité his

tutor has taught him and he feels dissatisfied with it. Although he has travelled to many countries and has seen the relativeness of customs, he himself has no roots. Dolores Mann Burdick describes him as "an empty vessel waiting to be filled",³ and Merleau-Ponty says of him:

On peut croire, et Oreste lui-même a cru longtemps, qu'être libre c'est ne s'engager nulle part. Sans patrie, sans famille, averti par le Pédagogue et par les voyages de la relativité des mœurs, Oreste flottait dans l'air . . . sans convictions, disponible.⁴

Oreste sees himself as alienated from the people of Argos. Both Jupiter and Electre try to explain to him that he is not one of them because he has not shared their past, especially their part in the killing of Agememnon. Oreste's desire for solidarity with the Argives is his motivation behind killing Egisthe and Clytemnestra:

je veux être un homme de quelque part, un homme parmi les hommes . . . Electre je veux tirer la ville autour de moi, et m'y enrouler comme dans une couverture. Je ne m'en vais pas. (II,iv)

Similarly, Hugo is cut off from the proletariat because his entry into the party was a choice and not a necessity. Because he does not feel his oppression in

³"Imagery of the 'Plight' in Sartre's Les Mouches", French Review, XXXII (Jan. 1959), p. 244.

⁴Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Compte Rendu des Mouches", Confluences, XXV (Sept.-Oct., 1943), p. 515.

capitalism as an intellectual, he is fighting for others Only instead of for himself and others. The other party members thus see his entry into the party as a gesture. Like Oreste, his intellectual and bourgeois past forever haunts him. He brings with him his books by Lorca and Eliot, dresses well and is constantly forced to defend himself before Slick and George:

Je vous dis que je les connais: jamais ils ne m'accepteront; ils sont cent mille qui regardent avec ce sourire. J'ai lutté, je me suis humilié, j'ai tout fait pour qu'ils oublient, je leur ai répété que je les aimais, que je les enviais, que je les admirais. Rien à faire! Rien à faire! Je suis un gosse de riches, un intellectuel, un type qui ne travaille pas de ses mains. Eh bien, qu'ils pensent ce qu'ils veulent. Ils ont raison, c'est une question de peau. (IIIe Tableau,iii)

Each of the bastards is deprived of any sense of reality because they are outside the collective. Kean would just as soon be put in jail, because then, at least, he would be treated seriously; Oreste complains "J'existe à peine" (II,iv) and Hugo (as well as Henri) feels his solitude even within the party. Their lucidity prevents them from accepting the serious world of the others and yet they have no alternative. As a result, they live in a world of their own and spend their lives searching for their soul, for their reality, for the perfect coincidence of the self. Continually frustrated, they always feel de trop, with as much reason for existence as a pebble or chair: they are

just one object among many. Hugo and Henri's reason for joining the socialists is their own personal salvation. They are continually reflecting on their actions and questioning their existence. Because they are always looking at themselves, that is, at freedom, nothing seems real. In fact, both Hugo and Henri say they engaged in the struggle with the hope that the party discipline and the need to follow orders will smother their self-questioning.

HUGO: J'ai besoin de discipline.

HOEDERER: Pourquoi?

HUGO: Il y a beaucoup trop de pensées dans ma tête. Il faut que je les chasse.

HOEDERER: Quel genre de pensées?

HUGO: Qu'est-ce que je fais ici? Est-ce que j'ai raison de vouloir ce que je veux? Est-ce que je ne suis pas en train de jouer la comédie? Des trucs comme ça.

HOEDERER: Oui. Des trucs comme ça. Alors, en ce moment, ta tête en est pleine?

HUGO [^]GENÉ: Non . . .non, pas en ce moment. (Un temps). Mais ça peut revenir. Il faut que je me défende. Que j'installe d'autres pensées dans ma tête. Des consignes: 'fais ceci. Marche. Arrête-toi: Dis cela'. J'ai besoin d'obéir. Obéir et c'est tout. Manger, dormir, obéir. (IIIe Tableau, iv)

Later, Hugo wants to know the real reason why he killed Hoederer and spends his time in jail thinking about it; Henri too has to know why he will die and if his life has been worthwhile:

C'est la première fois depuis trois ans que je me retrouve en face de moi-même. On me donnait des ordres. J'obéissais. Je me sentais justifié. A présent personne ne peut plus me donner d'ordres et rien ne peut plus me justifier. Un petit morceau de vie en trop: oui. Juste le temps qu'il faut pour m'occuper de moi. (Un Temps) Canoris, pourquoi mourrons-nous? (Le Tableau, i)

The bastards' continual self-objectification and analysis deprive their deeds of any authenticity they might have as these deeds are done in an attempt to find a soul, rather than act on the world.

The bastard's most obvious characteristic is his pride, his effort to live as pure transcendence, to prove his freedom. Rejected by the world, or the collectivity, he takes up his exclusion and attempts to use it to prove his complete independence. He tries to run the show on his own, be grateful to no-one and prides himself on his ability to manipulate others — that is, use them as tools for his freedom. He tries to live as pure transcendence because the freedom which the bastards seek is a freedom which exists as a thing. Instead of understanding his freedom in light of his facticity, instead of dealing with his situation by engaging his freedom, he tries to prove his freedom and establish it as an independent totality. In L'Être et Le Néant Sartre explains this form of bad faith and why it is doomed, like all other forms of bad faith, to failure:

Je suis sur un plan où aucun reproche ne peut m'atteindre, puisque ce que je suis vraiment, c'est ma transcendance; je m'enfuis, je m'échappe, je laisse ma guenille aux mains du sermonneur. Seulement, l'ambiguïté nécessaire à la mauvaise foi vient de ce qu'on affirme ici que je suis ma transcendance sur le mode d'être de la chose. Et c'est seulement ainsi, en effet, que je puis me sentir échapper à tous ces reproches . . . Mais inversement, le 'je suis trop grand pour moi' en nous montrant la transcendance muée en facticité, est la source d'une infinité d'excuses pour nos échecs ou nos faiblesses. (pp. 96-97)

Because freedom can only exist across a given (for example, I am free to act upon my oppression as a woman), it is impossible to talk of freedom or transcendence existing independently. Thus as the bastard tries to make his transcendence exist in the manner of a thing, the transcendence he desires escapes him and he is left with "la transcendance muée en facticité", a thing. We will see that as long as the bastard tries to prove his freedom, rather than engage it, he will end up in the very position he sought to prove himself independent of: Oreste is as rootless at the end of the play as the beginning; Hugo and Henri remain bourgeois; and Nekrassov a tool to be used by others. Only Kean and Goetz learn how to use their freedom.

There are two kinds of freedom presented in Les Mouches and both are unauthentic. One is the freedom of the intellectual, who, because of his access to knowledge can compare his culture to that of others, weigh it and

reflect on it; and the other is freedom in the manner of a thing. In order to remain objective the intellectual refuses to become involved in anything and refuses to be passionate. This is Oreste's position when he comes into Argos and with which he is so dissatisfied. Oreste realizes that no-one minds his being free as long as he does nothing with his freedom. The Pédagogue reminds Oreste he is "riche et beau, avisé comme un vieillard, affranchi de toutes les servitudes et de toutes les croyances, sans famille, sans patrie, sans religion, sans métier, libre pour tous les engagements et sachant qu'il ne faut jamais s'engager . . .". (I,ii). Oreste, realizing the ridiculousness of this situation, sets about to give his freedom a meaning and to situate himself. When he defies Jupiter's command to leave, he understands that real freedom is making a choice.

The rest of the play centres around a dialogue between Oreste and Jupiter where the former tries to explain to himself and the audience man's condition. But although Oreste now understands better what his freedom is, he still does not understand what to do with it. We notice that rather than kill Clytemnestra and Egisthe to help the Argives, he murders in an attempt to make himself at one with the people and find his soul through solidarity with them. Of both Oreste's and Hugo's murders

Jeanson says that they were not aimed at "a particular concrete result in the world, but a consecration of their own being in a baptism of blood".⁵ Oreste thus kills to show that he is freedom in the manner of a thing. Because it is not a freedom for others it is not authentic. Instead of liberating the Argives, he becomes a scape-goat for them. Rather than finding solidarity with them, and helping them to build a new society, he walks away from them, as rootless as he was before he started. His parting words to the Argives take a not-so-subtle irony when we consider his original complaint:

. . . je me m'assiérai pas, tout sanglant,
sur le trône de ma victime: un Dieu me
l'a offert et j'ai dit non. Je veux être
un roi sans terre et sans sujets. (III,vi)

Champigny seems to feel that, unlike Oreste, Goetz does not posit freedom as an end in itself.⁶ But is this really the case? Can we not say that Goetz chooses Evil, then Good, as a means of showing his complete independence from God, just as Oreste chose to stay in Argos and commit the murders, to show his freedom from Jupiter? Goetz refuses to save Worms, he says, simply because people

⁵Francis Jeanson, "Hell and Bastardy", Yale French Studies, XXX (n.d.), p. 13.

⁶Robert Champigny, Stages on Sartre's Way (Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1959), p. 119.

expect him to do so. When the banker offers to clear him of all his brother's debts on condition he doesn't attack, he still refuses -- out of pride -- and loses his holdings as a result. Similarly when he creates the City of the Sun it is to win a bet with Heinrich who has challenged his ability to be in complete control. He refuses to accept anything unless he has taken it himself by force. "Moi, j'invente" is his constant battle cry (III^e Tableau, iv). Like the other bastards, Goetz reacts to the shame society has covered him with by asserting his freedom over that society. When Heinrich looks reproachfully at Goetz for having filled the peasants with fear by removing the priests, Goetz answers defiantly:

Tu veux de la honte; je n'en ai pas. C'est
l'orgueil qui suinte de toutes mes plaies:
depuis trente-cinq ans je crève d'orgueil,
c'est ma façon de mourir de honte. (VI^e Tableau, ii)

Kean's and Nekrassov's "freedom", despite, or perhaps because it is in the context of a comedy, seems all the more tragic. Both characters are portrayed as being 'sympathique' and we can't help but admire their pride. In fact they both resemble those dashing romantic heroes who brave all and put to shame those who thought to shame them. But Sartre is not a romantic: he takes their rebellions one step further and shows their powerlessness. Kean brags to the Prince: "Croyez-vous que je ne puisse remplacer l'Univers" (II, ii)? and to Lord Mervill, "mon

nom est à moi; je ne l'ai pas reçu Mylord, je l'ai fait . . . " (III,vii). Kean likes acting because at least on the stage he has the power to control what is going on around him. But his gestures off the stage are done at least in part to prove his freedom to himself, as though he continually needed to be convinced. He throws his money out the window as proof that he is no more dependent on money than on anything else. His attention to Eléna and to the other wives of the nobility is also, as we have seen, is a result of his pride. Because the nobility consistently excluded him, it is his power over them he must prove. He thus has no interest in Anna nor will he be disturbed if anyone other than the Prince appears at the theatre with Eléna. Kean's refusal of the Prince's offer to clear his debts, which is given on condition that he give up Eléna, is comparable to Goetz's refusal of the banker's offer. To give up Eléna on the basis that he isn't worthy of her would be to admit his shame. This is the reason why it is so important that Eléna not appear at the theatre with the Prince, for this would mean that Kean did not have the control he liked to think he had. Furthermore it is Eléna's and the Prince's appearance together which causes him to lose control and lash out his hate of the nobility. No longer master of the situation, he is now in a position to question his fundamental choice, to engage in what

Sartre calls the "réflexion purifiante", that reflection which brings one's whole praxis into question. Kean can now engage in his first authentic act, which is to give up his dream of fighting a lord, by refusing to fight with the Count after his last performance. Then too he gives up his rivalry with the Prince by telling him he is in love with Eléna but cannot win her. Kean's love for Anna, like Goetz's for Hilda, can only come when he gives up his pride and accepts his condition as a man among men. His going to America with Anna is comparable to Goetz's joining Nasty's army. Out of all Sartre's early plays, Goetz and Kean are characters in their own authenticity.

Nekrassov comes close to understanding the inefficacy of his pride but never quite makes it. His pride is at being able to act as a parasite of society and manipulate others for his own end. The few times he does find himself at the mercy of others he reacts first in anger and then puts his "genius" to work to become independent again. He thus hates both the hoboes who pull him out of the river after his abortive suicide attempt and Véronique when she hides him from the police. When Sibilot threatens to tell the paper of Valéra's true identity the latter panics at the thought of losing his power:

Pense à moi, malheureux! J'ai le pouvoir suprême, je suis l'éminence grise du Pacte Atlantique, je tiens la guerre et la paix dans mes mains, j'écris l'histoire, Sibilot,

j'écris l'histoire et c'est le moment que tu choisis pour me foutre des peaux de banane sous les pieds? Sais-tu que j'ai rêvé de cet instant toute ma vie? Profite donc de ma puissance: tu seras ma Faust. (Ve Tableau,iv)

He strikes another victory by manipulating Sibilot and the critics and when Véronique comes to visit him as Nekrassov, his pride is so thick it can almost be touched:

GEORGES: riant -- Gauche, droite, centre -- je vous ai tous dans ma main. Tu dois mourir de rage, la belle enfant! Confidence pour confidence. Nekrassov c'est bien moi. Te rappelles-tu le clochard misérable que tu as reçu dans ta chambre? Quel chemin j'ai fait depuis! Quel bond vertigineux! (Ve Tableau,vii)

Unlike Kean, however, his pride remains with him to the end. When he thinks he is going to be caught and that others are going to suffer through the manipulation of him by Le Paris Soir, he decides to grant an interview to Véronique's socialist paper Libérateur, not so much to help anyone as to make one last proof of his control:

J'ai fini par gagner: il publiera la prose d'un escroc, ton journal progressit. Moi, cela ne me changera guère: je dictais au papa, je dictera à sa fille. (VIIe Tableau,i)

The bastards' pride is their defense against the society which has shamed them, but it is false pride because it proves or changes nothing. Its very undertaking is based on an acceptance of the validity of society's right to judge. The bastards' rebellion is not a challenge to the right of the serious men to evaluate others but only

to the particular evaluation arrived at. It is comparable to the modern hippy's efforts to "freak out" the bourgeoisie rather than constructively challenging their right to be a privileged class. The bastard thus always finds himself strongly rooted in the values of the society he thought to oppose. Awareness of his constant failure drives him to take more direct and all-embracing actions, usually violence. To help himself along he adopts what he considers to be absolute value, without realizing there is no such thing. His acts continually become alienated from him and achieve an end very different from what was intended.

Hugo is the best example of the bastard's attempt to use absolute values -- principles -- as a guideline to his action, and to be obsessed by violence. Although he can be most helpful to the party by working on the party paper, he rejects this as not being "vrai travail". When he is given a chance to help with Hoederer's assassination by preparing a way for others to get in and do the job, he demands to be allowed to do it himself. The whole time he is living with Hoederer, he chastises himself for not being able to pull the trigger and sees it as a failure in himself in much the same way that Sorbier tests himself by his ability to withstand pain. Hoederer, as well as the other party members, recognize easily in Hugo, his bourgeois background. Louis describes him as 'un petit anarchiste indiscipliné, un intellectuel qui ne [pense]

qu'à prendre des attitudes . . ." (I^e Tableau,iii). Hugo's inability to kill Hoederer for so long is because of the restrictive and contradictory nature of his "principles". On one hand he realizes Hoederer is right and on the other he refuses to believe it because this would make him a "traitor". He feels that, on principle, it is wrong to lie to one's comrades, but that in this case it will save thousands of lives. He thinks that Louis shares his principles and doesn't understand that the latter opposes Hoederer's plan, not out of principle, but because he feels the time for it isn't right.

All the bastards, like Hugo, try to act upon the world through absolutes; Kean and Nekrassov want absolute control of their situations, Oreste strives for total independence of others; and Goetz and Hugo posit absolute values. Furthermore all but Nekrassov see violence, as opposed to patient work, as the quickest way of reaching their goal. Kean's secret dream is to beat up a noble and is happy to get the opportunity when he defends Anna from her pursuer. Oreste, Goetz and Hugo all murder to make their presence felt. When murder is denied Goetz because of his vow to be Good, his founding of the City of the Sun, instant love, takes its place. Sartre, in his introduction to Fanon's Wretched of the Earth, tries to point out the fallacy of the theory of passivity. It is particularly

appropriate to the City of the Sun, but it could just as well be applied to any of the bastards' attempts to make absolute changes with no regard for the situation or historical period they're in:

Try to understand this at any rate: if violence began this very evening and if exploitation and oppression had never existed on the earth, perhaps the slogans of non-violence might end the quarrel. But if the whole regime, even your non-violent ideas, are conditioned by a thousand-year-old oppression, your passivity serves only to place you in the ranks of the oppressors.⁷

The bastards are, in fact, "in the ranks of the oppressors". With the exception of Goetz, none of the bastards learn that their rebellion is useless unless they attempt to change the social order which oppresses them. Because their acts are not specifically intended for others, the others give their acts the meaning they choose. The bastard is thus continually tormented by seeing his acts taken up by others and used in a way which he did not intend. At the very point when Nekrassov thinks he's been running the whole show, he finds that journalists are losing their jobs because of him and two critics are facing trial for treason. Guards stand outside his door and refuse to let him leave. Even his last gesture of defiance, when he decides to give an interview to the Libérateur, is taken up and used against him by Jules and Sibilot. Goetz is in the same dilemma. When he thinks he's doing absolute evil, he finds he's helping the

⁷Quoted in McCall, p. 34.

ruling class to keep in power; his attempt to do absolute good results in the peasants being massacred; when he tortures himself to take on mankind's sins before God, he learns that God doesn't exist. Likewise Hugo joins the party to show his independence from his bourgeois background but does it by directing all his activities according to bourgeois values. Kean uses the theatre to exert power over the nobility and their wives and finds he can't escape the world of gestures. Thus at the very point when the bastard thinks he is using others as tools for himself, he finds that, in fact, he is a tool for others. No one can describe the impotence of the bastard better than Jeanson, and so I will quote from him at length:

. . .the more they have pretended to have established themselves or to have been their own cause, the more they become fascinated with their own contingency. Freedom's first real moment, its moment of pure lucidity, is the point at which it experiences the shame of being fundamentally that very being from which it believed itself so radically distinct. The choice of being entirely for and of oneself and by oneself is accompanied by the obsession with the en soi. We have a consciousness whose fundamental design is to be, a consciousness which is avid to be, but to be as a free consciousness, experiencing the need to feel its being, sure of itself -- a consciousness which pretends to satisfy these demands by making itself be under the form of nothingness. The result, of course, is that it does not achieve the being it sought and instead finds itself stripped and unprovided for in the presence of precisely what it was trying to flee. The more it runs after its freedom, its transcendence, the more it surrenders to the anonymity of its factitiousness, to

the absurdity of being there, to the "horrible ecstasy of contingency. This is the giddiness which overcomes the Bastard who attempts to resolve his bastardy by opposing himself to the world and who henceforth will feel himself constantly sucked in, obsessed, haunted and finally possessed by the world under its most absurd and contingent species.⁸

The bastards maintain the social order, not only because they are not class conscious, but because they need the existing order to rebel against. Nekrassov is scornful of Véronique because of his worry over the stability of society. Kean says "je veux faire du désordre, moi!" (IV,ii)! Goetz can't love the peasants because of his desire to be above them. Hoederer says of Hugo, "Les hommes, tu les détestes parce que tu te détestes toi-même . . . tu ne veux pas changer le monde, tu veux le faire sauter" (V^e Tableau,iv). Oreste's refusal to stay and help the Argives is more like the "no" of Anouilh's Antigone. The bastards' rebellion thus amounts to no more than the complete assumption of society's right to judge them.

From the last chapter and this one, we have seen how bastards take up society's identity of them in bad faith either by trying to become transcendence or facticity. It must be mentioned however (although by now it is

⁸"Hell and Bastardy", op. cit., p. 13.

probably obvious) that no character attempts to be only one or the other but rather continually plays off the two. For example, Goetz accepts himself as evil in the manner of a thing: he has an evil essence. As soon as it is convenient, however, he "forgets" his essence and posits his total transcendence ("Moi j'invente" etc.). The division of chapters V and VI has thus been one of convenience: those characters of the former using their facticity more often than their transcendence and those of the latter giving their transcendence predominance over their facticity.

CONCLUSION

From these early plays of Sartre, we have a fairly good idea of what the philosopher means by bad faith. The characters we have studied have all been unable to assume their freedom in an authentic way. Instead of committing themselves to a cause outside of themselves, they have attempted, in one way or another, to find an essence for themselves and at the same time impress the world with their freedom. Their attempts to gain perfect coincidence with their self have resulted in failure, not because of any weakness on their part, but because of the very "nature" of the human condition. Man is not what he is, and is what he is not. He is, in the sense that he has a facticity (his birth, race, class etc.) and an essence for others (what he has done thus far) and he is not in the sense that he is free.

This means that man must accept two aspects of his being which almost seem to contradict each other.

Reflecting on the fact that he was born in a certain year in a certain place and so on, he must avoid the temptation to feel that he was born there and then for a certain reason. Even Nasty falls into this trap and claims he is "God's elect". We can forgive him if we see him as a revolutionary of the sixteenth century: religion was an

integral part of life at the time and it would be anachronistic (as well as pointless) to demand his atheism. But if we see Nasty as representing a twentieth century revolutionary, he does not get off so easily. Because of our superior knowledge, our ability to study other cultures, our experience of the last two wars and Stalin's Russia, we should be more than well aware of the dangers which come from considering oneself as being put on earth for a special reason. For those who claim to have a cause outside that which they make also claim that any life can be sacrificed, and culture destroyed, any man or woman humiliated in submission to this cause. How could organisations like the Ku Klux Klan exist today, if those who belonged to it couldn't find any justification for their action outside of their own freedom?

We must accept the fact then, that as far as we know, we are born for no "reason" whatsoever. Not only is the place and time of our birth contingent, our very birth itself is without foundation. Henri in Les Morts Sans Sépulture can't accept this. He feels he must know why he was born, why he will die and so on. Because this quest is impossible, he continually slips into bad faith. He forgets about his comrades and the cause he had chosen to fight for and, like Lucie, almost harms them by preferring to be killed for a "reason" rather than continuing to live

and go back and help them. This constant preoccupation with one's self is a weapon of the bourgeoisie; its emphasis on individualism, and on "know thyself" prevents one from doing much else. The ideal of the "know thyself" doctrine is for each of us to live a hermit-like existence, cut off from everyone else, and spend our time in self-contemplation. As long as each of us continually reflects on himself, he has no time (or thinks it unworthy) to look on himself as part of a collective, or to look on his identity as formulated by a class of people. Oreste's killings are completely useless because he cannot escape his preoccupation with himself. Hilda too is of the upper class, but she is one of those rare Sartrean heroes who manages to forget herself as an individual and see herself as an important part of a collective. Man's feeling of being absurd, of being born for no reason, of being as contingent as objects, is the feeling of nausea which is described so well by Sartre in his book of the same name.

Besides accepting his facticity, man must also accept his freedom. Being fully aware that he is not alive for any a priori purpose, he must at the same time realize that, now he is in the world, he is responsible for it. Any value, any structure which exists is as a result of him. If sexism exists it is because he has chosen to look on women as inferior; if racism exists, it is be-

cause he has chosen to humiliate those who are not of his race; if Hitler killed six million Jews, it is because those who were alive at the time chose to let him do it; and if we continue to live in a class society it is because we have chosen to maintain it. This does not mean that man is guilty for a certain deed in the past, in the manner that the Argives feel guilty. This is bad faith because it supposes we are what we were. But it does mean that we are responsible for the world as it exists today. It means that unless we do everything in our power to change what we know to be wrong, we have chosen to accept it. It is man's awareness of his freedom, that causes him this anguish.

As I have emphasized before, however, there are degrees of bad faith. We cannot hold someone who is in the middle of Africa responsible for the Vietnam war. Because of a lack of communication outside his own culture he may be totally unaware of it. On the other hand someone in Lagos, Nigeria or Accra, Ghana would be more aware (and thus to some degree in bad faith) and of course Europeans, Canadians and Americans could be held totally responsible. No one can decide to what degree another is in bad faith: only I, myself, can know, perhaps through a psychiatrist, what it is I am hiding from myself and why. This is the field of existential psychoanalysis. The amount we know, the

limited number of events we are aware of, all help constitute our situation and it is in and through our situation that we are free.

Sartre's concept of our total freedom and our total responsibility has been attacked by many as both leading to social chaos as being pessimistic. There can be no doubt that it gives rise to a new morality. This, in fact, is one of the central issues of Les Mains Sales. Hugo, trapped by the old bourgeois morality, still conducts his life by moral absolutes, even if they are within a socialist frame: thou shalt not lie to comrades; thou shalt not ally with fascists and liberals, and so on. Hoederer, on the other hand, responds to the exigencies of his situation. He looks at his problem dialectically, tries to understand it in its historical context, and decides accordingly. He accepts the anguish of never knowing for sure if he has done the best thing. He accepts the risk. Jean does the same thing when he decides to preserve his identity even if it means the death of the others. Henri, Lucie and Hugo can't do this. They want some absolute justification for their action — which is impossible. Even Hugo's suicide can't achieve that. Only patient work from day to day — history — can decide which deeds in the past were right and which ones were wrong. In the meantime, all one can do is keep oneself as best

informed as possible, both through theory and through practice, to diminish the risk. Thus Sartre's concept of freedom cannot lead to chaos if we all remain in good faith. Because praxis with others is the only means one has of being authentic, this implies concern for others and concern for those structures which are necessary to our well-being.

As for those who think Sartre's description of human reality is pessimistic, we can only reply that they are obviously living in bad faith. They cannot accept the contingency of their facticity nor can they be satisfied with a world created by men and women. They find it annoying to be held responsible for things they know are wrong and prefer to sail through life in blissful ignorance while others suffer from their inaction. For those in good faith, however, Sartre's ontology is the most optimistic that man could ever hope for. Gone is the human "nature" which has prevented us from realizing true equality of all peoples! Gone are the ten commandments from the superior Being who forbade us to strike our oppressors! Gone is the mechanical materialism which stifled our hopes of freedom! Gone are all those excuses which have prevented us from creating the society we desire! The world now belongs to us!

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books by Sartre:

- . Nekrassov. Paris: Gallimard, 1956.
- . Kean. Paris: Gallimard, 1954.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. Le Diable et le Bon Dieu. Paris: Gallimard, 1951.
- . Les Mains Sales. Paris: Gallimard, 1948.
- . Huis Clos and Les Mouches. Paris: Gallimard, 1947.
- . La Putain Respecteuse suivi de Morts sans Sépulture. Paris: Gallimard, 1947.
- . L'Être et le Néant. Paris: Gallimard, 1943.

Articles by Sartre:

- Sartre, Jean-Paul. "Beyond Bourgeois Theatre", Tulane Drama Review, V (March 1961), 3-11.
- . "Jean-Paul Sartre Répond à la Critique et Offre un Guide au Spectateur Pour Suivre le Diable et le Bon Dieu", Figaro Littéraire (June 30, 1951).
- . "Forgers of Myth: The Young Playwrights of France", Theatre Arts, XXX, no. 6 (July 1946), 324-35.

Books about Sartre:

- Barnes, Hazel. The Literature of Possibility: A Study in Humanistic Existentialism. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1959.
- Bentley, Eric. The Playwright as Thinker. Cleveland and New York: World, 1964.

Campbell, Robert. Jean-Paul Sartre ou une Littérature Philosophique. Paris: Pierre Ardent, 1945.

Champigny, Robert. Stages on Sartre's Way. Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1959.

Chiari, Joseph. The Contemporary French Theatre, The Flight from Naturalism. London: Rockliff, 1958.

de Beauvoir, Simone. Le Deuxième Sexe. Paris: Gallimard, 1949-50.

Grisoli, Christian. "Entretien avec Jean-Paul Sartre", Paru, no. 13 (décembre, 1945), 5-10.

Grossvogel, David I. The Self-Conscious Stage in Modern French Drama. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.

Jameson, Frédéric. Sartre: The Origins of a Style. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1961.

Jeanson, Francis. Le Problème Moral et la Pensée de Sartre. Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1965.

----- Sartre Par Lui-Même. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1955.

Kern, Edith, ed. Sartre, A Collection of Critical Essays. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962.

Limpus, Laurel. Liberation of Women. Sexual Repression and the Family. Boston: New England Press, n.d.

Marcel, Gabriel. L'Heure Théâtrale, Chroniques Dramatiques. Paris: Plon, 1959.

McCall, Dorothy. The Theatre of Jean-Paul Sartre. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969.

Simon, Pierre-Henri. L'Homme en Procès. Paris: La Baconnière - La Presse française et étrangère, 1950.

Thody, Philip. Jean-Paul Sartre: A Literary and Political Study. London: Hamilton, 1960.

Articles about Sartre:

Boros, Marie-Denise. "L'antinaturalisme des Personnages de Jean-Paul Sartre", French Review, XL, no. 1 (October 1966), 77-83.

Burdick, Dolores Mann. "Imagery of the 'Plight' in Sartre's Les Mouches", French Review, XXXII (January 1959), 242-246.

----- . "Concept of Character in Giraudoux's Electre and Sartre's Les Mouches", French Review, XXXIII (December 1959), 131-136.

Conacher, D. J. "Oreste as an Existential Hero", Philological Quarterly, XXXIII (October 1954), 404-417.

Etiemble, René. "Les Mouches", Biblio, XVIII (mai-juin 1950), 6-7.

Grisoli, Christian. "Entretien avec Jean-Paul Sartre", Paru, no. 13 (décembre 1945), 5-10.

Jeanson, Francis. "Hell and Bastardy", Yale French Review, XXX (n.d.), 5-20.

----- . "Le Théâtre de Sartre ou les Hommes on proie à l'homme", Livres de France, XVII, 1 (January 1966).

Koefoed, Oleg. "L'oeuvre littéraire de Jean-Paul Sartre. Essai d'Interprétation", Orbis Litterarum, VI (1943), 209-272, et VII (1949), 61-141.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. "Compte Rendu des Mouches", Confluences, XXV (September-October 1943), 514-516.

Rahi. "Les Thèmes Majeurs du Théâtre de Sartre", Esprit, XVIII (October 1950), 433-456.

Ricoeur, Paul. "Réflexions sur Le Diable et le Bon Dieu", Esprit (November 1951), 711-719.

Simon, John. "Sacrilege and Metamorphosis. Two Aspects of Sartre's Imagery", Modern Language Quarterly, XX (1959), 57-56.

Slochower, Harry. "The Function of Myth in Existentialism", Yale French Studies, I (Spring-Summer, 1943), 42-52.

Wreszin, Michael. "Jean-Paul Sartre, Philosopher as
Dramatist", Tulane Drama Review, XXXII (January 1959),
242-246.