

NEGRO DISFRANCHISEMENT DURING RECONSTRUCTION

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BY

JOHN GOYDER, B.A.

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AUTHOR: John Goyder, B.A. (Bishop's University)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. Howard Brotz

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

Following the Civil War, the Negro in the southern states was officially freed and given the full rights of citizens of the United States, including the right to vote. The evidence indicates that, to a modest extent, this franchise was exercised, but in the following decades a movement to disfranchise the Negroes grew up in the South; first by intimidation, and then officially through changes in state law and constitutions. Certain conditions for this movement are examined; weak leadership in federal politics, splits in Congress, social and economic life for blacks and whites during the reconstruction period, and so on. It is contended though, that the crucial causal factors can be traced to the rivalry in state politics between various white groups; the wealthy whites from the plantation country bordering the Mississippi River, against the poorer white farmers from the more barren lands. In between this, the Negroes were caught as "political footballs", unable to protect their position. This hypothesis is considered in the case of Mississippi, the leader in the disfranchisement movement, and finally, the problem is formulated in a more general way, to consider certain implications the study raises both for democratic government, and for the study of race relations.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In recent decades an increasingly vocal and violent Negro protest has made America painfully aware of the second class citizenship of this part of the population. Characteristic of this lower position is a widespread segregation system actively enforced by the whites, and a role as spectators rather than participants in the political life of the nation. This, together with many forms of economic and social discrimination, have made it very difficult for the Negroes to form a middle class that can in any way match the huge and affluent white classes.

Defenders of the American white supremacy system often argue that this is a consistent and unbroken tradition that followed smoothly from the end of the Civil War. It is rooted in ideologies of a hundred years ago they claim, and to believe that these can be changed quickly, in the course of one generation, is naive and impractical. This presents a pessimistic picture for the future stability of the American society; The Negro spokesmen insist that the whites have had a hundred years to remedy the situation and they will accept no further delay, while white leaders maintain that things cannot be rushed, attitudes will not change overnight, and liberalization is coming all the time but at its own pace. Political events in the United States in the last few years suggest that the positions taken by the two sides are moving apart and little faith

is held in the middle ground of judicial reforms by either whites or blacks now.

When considering the possibility of social change of great magnitude such as the changes needed in the United States today, it is sometimes useful to analyse the situation in a historical way in order to clarify what the nature of the problem is, and to what extent and for what reasons, there are barriers to change.

The Southern historian C. Van Woodward has taken a lead in this work and has taken a position different from popular belief. The Woodward thesis is that for a period following the end of the Civil War the position of the Negro looked quite promising, but in a period of sharp reaction this hopeful situation was reversed in the Southern States, with these states first disfranchising their Negroes and only after this instituting separation policies known as the "Jim Crow" laws, or segregation. While there were certain segregation measures at an earlier time and while the slavery system undoubtedly furnished some of the ideological roots for this discrimination, these are of relatively minor importance in the larger scheme of things.

Woodward explains that "My only purpose has been to indicate that things have not always been the same in the South . . . The policies of proscription, segregation, and disfranchisement that are often described as the immutable 'folkways' of the south, impervious alike to legislative reform and armed intervention, are of a more recent origin." ¹

There is evidence that during the Reconstruction years the Negro used his legal franchise frequently and his vote was actively recruited by Republicans, Democrats, and later the populists, in the

South. Also, this was at a difficult time of transition from slavery to freedom by a Negro population wholly unprepared for participation in the political process of the country. There is also evidence that there was a considerable number of white Southerners who believed that a Negro population with the full political and civil rights of United States citizens was in the best interests of all Southerners. The exact nature of the place the Negroes should occupy might be argued according to a person's particular philosophy of race relations, whether liberal, radical, or conservative, but the conclusions remained the same.

Woodward gives us some leads on why this reaction against the Negroes happened. He points out in The Strange Career of Jim Crow that "The South's adoption of extreme racism was not so much due to a conversion as it was to a relaxation of the opposition. All the elements of fear, jealousy, proscription, hatred, and fanaticism had long been present, as they are present in varying degrees of intensity in any society." ²

He continues, "What happened toward the end of the century was an almost simultaneous --- and sometimes not unrelated --- decline in the effectiveness of restraint that had been exercised by all three forces; Northern liberalism, Southern conservatism, and Southern radicalism." ³

Woodward also feels that disfranchisement didn't necessarily have to come; it is not accurate to take a deterministic point of view. He sees it as a particular alignment of forces at a particular time, and writes, "At the dawn of the new century the wave of Southern racism came in as a swell upon a mounting tide of national sentiment and was very much part of that sentiment. Had the tide been running

the other way, the Southern wave would have broken feebly instead of becoming a wave of the future." ⁴

It is proposed here then, to look at a specific instance of this alignment of forces in the movement to take the vote away from the Southern Negro, culminating in the Mississippi Constitutional Convention of 1890. The attempt will be made to establish a logical sequence of cause, condition, and effect in relation to these events. That is, the contention will be that this movement was the product of a power struggle, both political and economic, between different interest groups, with two competing groups of whites and a passive Negro population, and in this the Negroes were caught in an "in between" position with both white groups using them to further their own interests. The conditions will be outlined by examining both the social and political life in the period from the end of the Civil War up to 1890. It will be suggested that both a specific and a general effect followed from this; specifically the state of Mississippi called a Constitutional Convention in 1890 that resulted in the disfranchisement of most of the state's Negroes, and generally, anti-Negro ideologies were invented during this period for purposes of expediency, justification, and so on. This will be followed by a formulation of this hypothesis into a more generalized, or theoretical framework, with reference to existing work on the theory of race relations.

Mississippi was not selected as the case in point for any very special reason. It seems logical to select this state because it was a leader in the disfranchisement movement, and as one state after another in the South followed Mississippi's lead, they adopted many

of the devices invented in the 1890 Convention. This state is also a reasonably typical deep Southern state, if there is such a thing, in that she has a "Black Belt" of fertile farming land ideal for large scale plantation operations, together with a more barren upland region suitable for little more than subsistence existence. Also, it has a high proportion of Negroes, most of whom are centered in the more fertile farming region, leaving the uplands to a predominately white population; the source of the popular epithet "poor white trash."

FOOTNOTES

¹ C. Van Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 47

² Ibid., 51

³ Ibid., 52

⁴ Ibid., 56

CHAPTER TWO
CONDITIONS IN THE SOUTH, 1865-90

This section is intended to look at the way the Negroes adjusted to the changes brought about by the Civil War and the nature of their relations with the whites. It is also meant to touch upon white attitudes towards the Negroes and the accuracy and justification of these.

During the war, the attitudes of the slaves appears to have been guided very much by personal considerations, and many slaves remained loyal to their master to the end. News of the emancipation travelled slowly and Wharton estimates that about half of the slaves had been freed by advancing Union armies by the time that Lincoln made his official Proclamation.

Under the Union army several projects were started to get the Negroes farming the cotton crop for sale in the North. These met with varying degrees of success, and one difficulty was finding cash to pay the Negro workers. A particularly successful experiment in this line was the establishment of a Negro communal farm at a bend in the Mississippi River known as Davis Bend. This land had belonged to Jefferson Davis and his brother before it was overrun by the North, and in 1864 it was turned over to the Negroes in the area under supervision and help from the army. In spite of setbacks including jurisdictional disputes between the Treasury Department and the Freedmans Department in Washington, most of the land was divided up into parcels of from five or ten, to one hundred acres,

between some 75 Freedmen. During the first year there were Confederate raids and of more serious consequences, the army worm which destroyed five-sixths of the first crop. In spite of this the plantation prospered with the soaring price of cotton.

The following year the colony was more fully organized with a large degree of Negro control. Three judicial districts were set up with Negro courts in each as well as sheriffs and judges. This system was found to work well and there was a low crime rate and fair punishment of offenders. There was a Home Farm managed by disabled people, orphans, and so on, and many small farms managed by partnerships or families.

The colony realized good profits in the two years of its operation and generally seems to have been a highly successful enterprise that showed just what the Negro could do under the right conditions and with a reasonable amount of encouragement. However, by 1866 all the previous white owners of the lands had been given Presidential pardons and had reclaimed their land. Wharton comments:

The significance of this one-year experiment lies in what it shows might have developed from Eaton's early system of camps if the 'radicals' in Congress had allowed their radicalism to extend in to the field of economics instead of confining it to that of politics. ¹

However, many of the Negroes were crowded into army camps where conditions were extremely bad and where they were cheated and robbed. Generally conditions after the war were very depressed, as might be expected of a land that had been a battlefield for several years. There was a certain amount of movement and migration by the Freedmen, but this was carried out only by a minority of the Freedmen. According to Wharton:

Altogether then, the transition to freedom came very gradually to most of the Negroes of Mississippi who had remained in slavery until the end of the war. Most of them remained on their old places, and retained the habit of obedience to their white employers. 2

Many Negroes hoped that some of the old plantation land would be thrown open for settlement but only a minority of Republican Congressmen seriously considered this and as time passed with no real grants except unsettled territories in the West, most Negroes turned their attention to buying themselves small farms. This was a difficult ambition to realize however, what with the very low wages paid to Negro labourers and the poor crop years of 1866 and 1867. Only a small percentage of Negro farmers ever managed to get their own land, and this continued well into the twentieth century.

The vast majority got involved in selling their labour through a variety of schemes with "sharecropping" the most common. Under this plan, although there were many variations, the tenant would work on someone else's land and would pay the owner some proportion of his crop as rent. The tenant would sometimes receive food and utensils from the owner which would be covered by the crop payment. This plan was popular because it meant that fluctuations in the cotton market, a frequent occurrence, were felt by both parties, and also it was a sort of mutual incentive plan in that it was to the advantage of both worker and owner to reap the largest possible crop. Many Negroes preferred a straight rental plan as this made it more likely for them to realize big profits in a good year (but they were in trouble in poor years). The other plan in wide useage was a simple wage schedule which according to Baker writing in following the colour line, was most popular among the poorer Negroes. This usually involved a yearly

contract where the labourer would lose a substantial part of his wage if he should default on any of the terms of the contract. Discretion here lay with the employers who could, for instance, fire an employee for dishonesty on mere suspicion. Wages were low, even when correction is made for the value difference of the dollar in those days. One hundred and fifty dollars a year was a representative figure, with the addition of a fairly meagre supply of rations, farm implements, and so on.

Commenting on the way that these systems actually worked, Baker wrote:

But in the South, the present tenant system is much nearer the conditions that prevailed in slavery times than it is to the present Northern tenant system. This grows naturally out of slavery; the white man had learned to operate big plantations with ignorant help; and the Negro on his part had no training for any other system. The white man was the natural master and the Negro the natural dependent and a mere Emancipation did not at once change the spirit of the relationship. ³

Participation by the Federal Government in the readjustment of the Negroes to their new circumstances was centered in the Freedman's Bureau. This organization was founded in 1865 after political battles between Congress and President Johnson, and on June 2 the bureau issued a series of regulations concerning Negro labour. They had to work, and those that refused would be placed under forced labour on home farms, without pay. Various terms for the labour contracts were stipulated, such as the obligation of the employers to provide basic necessities like food, clothing, medicine and tools. Negroes violating their contracts by laziness or other misdemeanours would forfeit part of their share of the crop or their wages, or if it was a serious offense, could be fired with loss of pay due them.

The evidence indicated that these rules weren't taken seriously

by the Southern land owners, although most of them were inclined to be just as tough in their relations with the labourers as any of these clauses describe.

An early manifestation of the difficulty of southern whites in adjusting to the new circumstances was seen in the efforts to displace Negro labour with Europeans, Chinese coolies, Cubans, and so on. Companies were formed that promised to provide immigrant labourers at a guaranteed low cost, and rumors of amazingly cheap labour were widespread, as white southerners apparently looked forward for the opportunity of a sort of mass "thumbing of their noses" at the Negroes whose labour to that time had been so necessary to the great cotton fortunes. On the whole though, this entire scheme was more fantasy than fact and only a few such labourers ever reached America. The cost of importing them turned out to be far greater than had been imagined at first. Also it became apparent that the Negro labour compared favourably with anything that could be imported.

An important question during these years was over the quality of the Negro labourer in the new arrangement compared to the slavery days, and also to the poor white whom the Negroes now faced in economic competition much to the annoyance of the former.

Wharton reports that:

It is apparent that long before 1899, the planters, much as they might complain of the faults of the Negroes, had come to prefer them to any other class of labourers they could obtain.

Baker cites a vivid example of this feeling from the comments of an Alabama planter:

Give me Negroes every time. I wouldn't have a low-down white tenant on my place. You can get work out of any Negro if you know how to handle him; but there are some white

men who won't work and can't be driven, because they are white."⁵

But it is well known that this was the only place that the owning class of southern whites wanted the Negroes; working for low wages on the land and doing the dirty jobs in the cities. A letter by a Georgian in 1906 shows this well:

The only use we have for the Negro is as a labourer. It is only as such that we need him; it is only as such that we can use him. If the North wants to take him and educate him we will bid him godspeed and contribute to his education if the schools are located on the other side of the line. ⁶

This was only part of the story. To the poor white, or labouring white, the celebrated poor white trash, the Negro should not only be a labourer, but should also be the very lowest of labourers:

When the skilled Negro appears and begins to elbow the white man in the struggle for existence, don't you know the white man rebels and won't have it so? If you don't it won't take you long to find it out; just go out and ask a few of them, those who tell you the whole truth, and see what you will find out about it. ⁷

There were a few in the South who saw the consequences of such an attitude. A reputable Mississippi planter; president of the Mississippi Cotton Association protested:

Every dollar I own those Negroes made for me. Our ancestors chased them down and brought them here. They are just what we made them. By our own greed and extravagance we have spoiled a good many of them. It has been popular here -- now happily growing less so -- to exploit the Negro by high store-prices and by encouraging him to get into debt.

Negro leadership, guided by well known intellectuals Booker Washington and later W.E. Du Bois, fought against this; they saw education as a key and tried to instill an ideology of quiet improvement, and to Washington, political participation was not immediately prerequisite. Education to Du Bois should not be mere trade school instruction. "Nevertheless, I insist that the object

of all true education is not to make men carpenters, it is to make carpenters men." ⁹ Baker gives an illustration of the Washington ideology; a northern dignitary finished addressing a class of Negro children in Georgia and asked if he could take a message back to the people in the North:

what shall I tell them for you? he asked. A little black boy in front stood up quickly, and said: 'Tell 'em massa, we is rising.' ¹⁰

The consequences of an undivided Negro vote was apparent to this Negro leadership class, the "Talented Tenth" and Lewis in an article on the "Political Mind of the Negro since 1890" reports that the more intelligent Negroes did not give undivided support to the Republicans. They were critical of the radical policies against the old Confederates and suspected the motives of the Republicans.

It seems reasonable to state then, that while there is no question of the fact that the Negroes were a working class, and a pretty ignorant one for the most part, there was during the years after the war, not only a desire for improvement, but some real progress.

To Lewinson, "It had become therefore, less and less possible between 1870 and 1900 to make blanket statements that the intelligent freedman is but a drop in the bucket, that the Negro had no stake in the community, that he was shiftless and incapable of advancement."¹¹

FOOTNOTES

¹ V.L. Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 1865-1890 (New York, Evanston, and London, Harper and Row, 1965). p.41

² Ibid., 52

³ R.S. Baker, Following the Color Line (New York, Evanston, and London, Harper and Row, 1964). p.76

⁴ Wharton, 122

⁵ Baker, 78

⁶ Ibid., 84

⁷ Ibid., 84

⁸ Ibid., 104

⁹ H. Wish, The Negro Since Emancipation (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1964). p.70

¹⁰ Baker, 92

CHAPTER THREE
POLITICS, 1865-90

The political history of the United States from the end of the Civil War, through the Reconstruction years, and into the period up to the end of the century is a violent and changeable story. The various phases of Reconstruction, the political alignments in the South, and the part played by the Negro voter in the whole thing is important for our purposes, showing the process whereby the Negroes were disfranchised and some of the conditions necessary for this.

Lee's surrender at Appomattox brought to the forefront a question that had been lurking in the minds of leaders on both sides; what would the relation now be between the victorious Union and the defeated Confederate States? The several different plans in circulation were based upon the various ways that the Constitution could be interpreted on the question of attempted succession.

Southerners maintained that since the rebellion had been defined by the North as one of individuals rather than states, then the southern states were still full-fledged members of the Union with the rights and protection of the Constitution. Under this interpretation the war had only established the supremacy of Federal rights over States rights, and the duty of the South during Reconstruction was to establish loyal state governments while the duty of the Federal Government was to re-establish its various agencies and services in the South.

President Andrew Johnson's interpretation was only slightly different. To him, certain southerners had tried to exercise the non-existent right of succession, which meant that while the state governments had not disappeared they were in a state of suspension, a deep sleep, and had to be re-started by certain federal acts such as pardons, the appointment of new, loyal officers to run the state governments, and so on. Johnson inherited much of this interpretation of, and policy for, Reconstruction from the assassinated President Lincoln who had always maintained that the union had never been broken and the problem was how to re-establish the old relationships of the southern states to the Union.

Quite a different view was held by Thaddeus Stevens, a powerful Republican Senator. This was a radical interpretation that insisted that by waging war the southern states had actually removed themselves from the Union and were conquered territories that could be dealt with by the Federal Government as they saw fit.

The closest thing to a compromise theory was Sumner's "state-suicide" theory. This position held that although it was impossible for a state to withdraw from the Union, the southern states had committed treason by trying and although territorial state lines couldn't be changed, Congress could act as though the former confederate states were governmentless territories and had the right to institute any civil and political rights programs it wished.

The Democratic Party in this period was at an all time low. They had traditionally drawn heavy support from the south, and with the loss of these representatives during the war together with the commitment of the Republicans to the war effort and the things this

came to stand for, it was crucial for the democrats to restore the southern states to full participation in the federal government as quickly as possible.

A strange political paradox developed during the first months of reconstruction. The Republican President Johnson, following the lenient and pragmatic plan of generosity toward the south developed by Lincoln, moved toward a policy of Presidential reconstruction where the executive would initiate the new state governments and reconstruction agencies in a benevolent and conciliatory way. In the ranks of the Republican Party though, several elements of varying degrees of radicalism wanted a much tougher, "hard line" policy that would continue from the assumptions laid down in the Stephens and Sumner interpretations of the constitution.

Thus the democrats, together with a small and relatively uninfluential segment of the republicans in Congress, came to ally themselves with President Johnson, against a coalition of moderates plus out and out radicals in the Republican party. This coalition was interested in a policy of widespread control in the southern states with guarantees of loyalty from the southern electorate and disqualification of ranking ex-confederates from any political positions.

Johnson had advanced from the vice-presidency to succeed Lincoln on April 15, 1865 and was at that time somewhat of a political unknown. In May of 1865 he made his first major reconstruction move, recognizing several state governments set up under Lincoln and a few weeks later offering pardons to all former rebels, except those falling into certain categories, on condition that they would agree to a loyalty oath. In December he appointed several provisional

governors, re-started many federal agencies in the South, and directed the provisional governments to hold constitutional conventions in which they would recognize the changes established by the war.

The constitutions that were formulated by each of the ex-Confederate States tended to be copies of prewar constitutions except that freedmen gained certain rights such as those of; movement, giving testimony in courts, entering into contracts, and so on. They were not, on the other hand, given the vote, and in some states were specifically disfranchised. The three-fifths compromise, whereby a Negro counted as three-fifths of a man when computing district or state representation in legislatures, was retained for Federal representation in the House of Representatives, but not in state representative bodies. Most of these constitutions were ratified by popular vote and ex-Confederates were prominent in the new governments.

A first priority of the new legislatures was measures to control and restrict the great mass of freedmen, and Mississippi was a leader here. These "Black Codes" as they were called, dealt with vagrancy, apprenticeship, labour contracts, migration, and civil and legal rights, for the most part and although Negroes were given certain specific rights; property holding, the right to sue, legal recognition of families and so on, they were nevertheless fairly blatant attempts to bring back much of the tone of the slavery era. W.E.B. Du Bois, in Black Reconstruction in America, protests that "The original codes favored by the Southern legislatures were an astonishing affront to emancipation..."¹ In spite of the likelihood that these codes would anger northern opinion, there was no hesitation about

the need for them by southern whites, and this was typical of the surprisingly arrogant attitude adopted by the south toward their recent conquerors. Any suggestion of intervention was met with angry reaction: "submit they would to northern power but they would retain their ideas of a South governed for and by white men . . . they almost ignored their status as conquered men, and then quibbled in convention over points which had no real meaning." ²

Congress, alarmed by this unrepentant mood and Johnson's conciliatory tone with insistence on presidential reconstruction, appointed a Joint Committee on reconstruction late in 1865. Although this body showed a clear northern bias, they nevertheless established that conditions in the south were not as Congress had intended them to be. Witnesses emphasized the need to enfranchise the Negroes in order to check the white southerners who would gain twelve members in the House of Representatives when they were readmitted to Congress without the old three-fifths clause. By January 1866 a deadlock had been established between Congress and the President over the legality of the new state governments convened by Johnson. Compromise attempts contained in the new Freedman's Bureau Bill, an organization for Federal aid to freed Negroes, broke down with Johnson's veto of the bill on constitutional grounds and from this point on many of the more moderate Republicans in Congress abandoned hope of working with the President and joined with radical wing of the party to present a determined and united front.

A Civil Rights Bill introduced by Congress in early 1866 to protect the freedmen from the Black Codes was also vetoed by Johnson but this was overridden by a vote of the Senate. This measure was

followed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, affirming that all persons born or naturalized in the United States were citizens, and that no state had the right to deprive citizenship of any person. The three-fifths compromise was eliminated for all elections and no man who had served under oath in a capacity as an officer for the United States, but who had joined or aided the Confederacy, could become a Congressman unless this was overruled by a two thirds vote of Congress. This bill was a compromise measure between radicals and moderates in Congress, but it was met with a violent reaction and rejection in the South. The main objection to it was the cancellation of the three-fifths compromise which put on the pressure to enfranchise the Negroes since failure to do this would mean fewer seats in Congress under a penalty clause in the Amendment that said that in the case of restriction of the vote, the population for representation purposes would be reduced in proportion to the number of eligible voters disfranchised.

In the Congressional Election of 1866 the public gave solid support to a Congressionally sponsored reconstruction and a series of Reconstruction Acts were now passed, which were designed to institute a much tougher control of the South by the Federal Government. The First Reconstruction Act, early in 1867, established five Military Districts, ordered the convening of new constitutional conventions, and insisted that this time the Negro be enfranchised. The second Reconstruction Act ordered the delegates to the conventions to meet, and the Third authorized the appointment of military commanders with wide powers and jurisdiction.

The conventions that assembled to frame new state constitutions

under Congressional terms, were Republican controlled, with a reasonable proportion of Negro delegates in most cases. Southern state politics during these years featured a conservative-democratic Party made up of whites, ex-Confederates and so on, which stood solidly for the principle of white supremacy, lined up against the Republicans. The latter was manned by northerners, or "carpetbaggers", "scalawags", or southern whites turned traitor to the cause, and most of the Negroes. The Negro vote was actively solicited by the Republicans and they set up special societies or leagues designed to teach them how to vote, distribute party propaganda, and generally propagate an image of the Republican party as a friend of the Negro. These measures proved most successful and the less ardent competition mounted by the Conservative-democrats to woo this vote was much less productive.

In spite of ridicule by the conservative-democrat press, some very liberal and intelligent state constitutions were drawn up, although this is not to say that many of the Negro delegates were completely inexperienced in parliamentary matters and didn't really know quite how to behave. Principle features in the Constitutions were clauses enfranchising the Negro, without property requirements, for voting or office holding.

One hundred delegates met in Jackson on January 9, 1868 to frame a new constitution for the state of Mississippi. Sixty-seven of the delegates were native southerners, 24 from the North, and 9 of unknown origins. A majority of 67 was Republican, and there were 84 whites to 16 Negroes although 32 counties had Negro majorities. Du Bois comments on the Negro-white representation saying that "This was interesting and characteristic. It showed in the first place that the Negroes

were not trying, much less succeeding in any effort to use their numerical preponderance in order to put themselves in political power. Under strong economic pressure the Negro voter designated white men to represent him." 3

Information on the participation of those Negroes present is obscure as the southern press ignored the proceedings, regarding the convention as illegal and forced upon the South. Wharton, in The Negro in Mississippi, 1865-98, feels that most of these Negro delegates were distinguished and able men, but it was the Republicans from the North and West that really made the decisions on the important issues.

There were preliminary discussions about several matters; whether to designate the coloured members of the convention in the journal of the Convention, appointment of a committee to investigate the condition of the poor in the state, and recommend legislation to parcel out the land among them, and so on. Most of the requests for social reform were refused by the military governor, and the convention next proceeded to the constitutional question, first rejecting the old one.

The new Constitution abandoned property qualifications for office holding or voting, established a mixed public school system, prohibited race distinctions in the holding or inheritance of property, forbade slavery, guaranteed civil rights in travel and generally was a much more liberal document than the one before it, with a more powerful state government, closely resembling those in the Middle Western States.

A white minority movement to disfranchise the mass of Negroes was squashed and universal suffrage without qualifications was adopted, with one important exception. This was that anyone who had

participated in the war for the Confederacy above the rank of private was not allowed to vote or hold office. This clause excluded some 20,000 of the top whites in the State and there were various opinions about this. The Democratic Party took it as a blatant attempt by the Northern Republicans to place the former slaves over the whites, while others viewed it as a protection of the newly gained Negro rights. To the Negro historian Du Bois, "It was an attempt to end the oligarchy of landlords who still advocated slavery and the rule of wealth." ⁴ W.A. Russ takes a similar view: "... yet the radicals saw that such a policy would be foolhardy for the simple reason that if the rebel brigadiers were enfranchised, they would soon know how to disfranchise the blacks." ⁵ In another article, this writer discusses the price paid for disfranchising these Southerners. To him, this left a great vacuum in the leadership of the South and was a tremendous moral blow in that, "disfranchisement was the measure which accomplished what the war failed to do; namely whip the Confederates spiritually." ⁶ Yet Russ raises another possibility; that this humiliation provided fuel for the racist reaction that came in later years and he suggests that had this exclusion of the Confederates been toned down a bit. "It is conceivable that the Southerners might have been willing to accept the enfranchisement of the Negro had they not been disfranchised themselves. . . ." ⁷

In 1868 the Congressional noose around the head of President Johnson tightened, with a concerted attempt to impeach him. A first attempt was defeated by a narrow margin but following Johnson's efforts to fire the Secretary of War, new charges were laid. Again the Senate, sitting in judgement on the case with prosecution by members of the House, absolved the President after tremendous pressure exerted on

Senators sitting on the borderline had failed.

The determination of the Republican Congress that the Negro should vote was reaffirmed in the Fifteenth Amendment. This guaranteed that "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." ⁸

The so-called "Black Reconstruction" began in earnest and in the Presidential campaign of 1868 the Republican war hero Grant won easily over Seymour, the Democratic candidate, with the help of a solid Negro vote in the South. In every state except Virginia Republicans in the South were in control.

In Mississippi, the terms of local officials were to expire with the readmission of the state into the Union, under the terms of the new Constitution. New appointments would then be made by the Governor with the advice and consent of the state senate; elections for local offices would be started in 1871. Governor Alcorn selected 247 Republicans, 217 Democrats, and 72 others with very few Negro appointments, and this pattern wasn't changed very much in the first local elections in 1871. There was particularly strong white opposition to Negro sheriffs and Democrats gained control of these local governments long before they did so on the higher levels of government.

The first sitting of the new state legislature in 1870 featured 31 Negroes among the 107 Members with a smaller proportion in the Senate; 5 Negroes out of 33 Members. This was, of course, a small proportion for a state where the Negroes made up a majority of the population, but those Negro members that did manage to get elected

appear to have been quite conscientious and able men according to the evidence that is available and Du Bois notes that many of them were ministers. Du Bois gives further information on higher governmental offices:

Of seven state officers, only one, that of secretary of State, was filled by a colored man, until 1873, when colored men were elected to three of the seven offices, lieutenant-Governor, Secretary of State, and state superintendent of Education. Of the two United States Senators, and the seven members of the Lower House of Congress, not more than one colored man occupied a seat in each House at the same time. Of the thirty-five members of the state senate, and of the one hundred and fifteen members of the House --- which composed the total membership of the State Legislature prior to 1874-- there were never more than about seven colored men in the Senate and forty in the Lower House. 9

Many southern whites had been prepared to accept the results of the war and had hoped to ensure constitutional rights for the Negro with the assumption that they would gain the Negroes' confidence and the whites would continue to lead in the name of both races. The failure of the whites to do this was partly due to their inability to accept the Negro as a political or social equal, no matter how able and distinguished individual Negroes might be. This conservative group was by 1874 ready to join with the rest of the anti-Negro Democrats in a plan to wrest control of the Negro vote away from the Republicans by less peaceful means than mere persuasion, in order to "redeem" Mississippi by returning it to democratic party rule.

This overthrow of the "carpetbaggers" and "scalawags" had already been carried out in Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Texas. In these states there was a white majority in the population and by suppressing the Negro by force and economic sanctions it had been possible to oust the republican governments.

The so-called "Mississippi Plan" was instituted for the state.

election in 1875. "White Mens Clubs" were formed and "believing that Negro suffrage was 'wrong in principle and disastrous in effect' they pledged themselves to labor unceasingly, from year to year, for the restoration of white supremacy in Mississippi and in the United States." ¹⁰ The best known of these secret organizations was the Ku Klux Klan whose members rode around the countryside in the night dressed in white robes, frightening Negroes who took them for ghosts from the Civil War. Also, there were more open demonstrations of force, with frequent parades of armed Civil War veterans, and so on. The movement was encouraged by an increased state representation by Negroes, financial depression, and a weakening Federal Republican Party. Coercion was exerted on the southern Republicans also, and Wharton notes that "Economic pressure and threats of physical violence were used, but the most powerful force was that of social ostracism." ¹¹ The favourite argument was that by uniting themselves solidly with the Republicans the Negroes had themselves created the problem and drawn the colour lines. This neglected, of course, that by voting Democrat, the Negroes would be voting for their own disfranchisement in all likelihood.

It is ironic that the most effective weapon that the whites used against the Negroes was the riot. Wharton notes that "In the political, economic, and social subjugation of the freedmen, the most effective weapon ever developed was the 'riot'. He continues, "The lesson learned was that the Negroes, largely unarmed, economically dependent, and timid and unresourceful after generations of servitude, would offer no effective resistance to violence. Throughout the period, any unpleasant incident was likely to produce such a 'riot'. During the bad feeling of 1874 and 1875 there was a great number of unpleasant

incidents, and after each resulting riot Negro resistance to white domination in the surrounding area completely collapsed." 12

These tactics paid off in the Mississippi elections of 1875 and in an election day that was relatively quiet, with a sullen but subdued Negro electorate, the democrats rolled up a convincing victory. The new legislature was made up of 95 democrats, only 20 republicans, and 16 Negroes, almost all of whom were republicans. Wharton interprets this election very much as a racial battle, writing, "Thus ended the successful revolution of 1875. In its preparation and execution, economic and political motives played a large part. Essentially, however it was a racial struggle." 13

The eight years under the Grant regime were certainly not the most impressive in the history of the United States presidency, as a large number of scandals came to be associated with his administration and the democrats scored heavy gains in the Federal Congressional elections of 1874. A last piece of Republican legislation for the rights of Negroes came in a Civil Rights Bill in 1875 providing for the equality under the law for freedmen. Although it specifically forbade segregation of public facilities among other things, this was more a memorial to the Republican senator Charles Sumner than a workable law.

Democratic strategy in the election campaign of 1876 was to emphasize the corruption of the Grant administration and offer the alternatives of an honest administration, but only by picking up a large number of Republican voters could they hope to carry the nation. In the South the democrats were by this time, fairly sure of all the states except Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana, and in these states the full range of political intimidation known to the white supremacists

was brought to bear.

The returns gave the Democrat Tilden a majority of 4,284,020 in the popular vote over the Republican candidate Hayes 4,036,572 and in the Electoral College Tilden led by 19 votes but was still short of a majority that would give him the presidency. In three southern states; Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina, the election results were in dispute because the Republican state governments there were in charge of counting the ballots, and they wanted to throw out ballots that had been stuffed by the Democrats. With the presidency hanging on the outcome in these states, visiting officials from both parties flowed South with bribes and promises to sway the electoral officers.

This was a depression year with labour unrest in the East and a rising agrarian radicalism movement mounting in the West and now the balance of power lay in the South for the first time since the war. Many thought the situation was as ripe for civil war as it had been in 1860 and, "To Abram S. Hewitt, national Democratic chairman, a peaceful solution seemed extremely doubtful in 1879. He knew of fifteen states in which Democratic war veterans were organizing for military resistance to the election 'fraud', and to him 'it seemed as if the terrors of civil war were again to be renewed.'" ¹⁴

The Republicans turned to examine the possibilities of splitting the Democratic Party and to this end, "under the guidance of Kellar and Boynton the Republican strategists conducted the most searching analysis ever made of the mind of the Redeemers . . . " ¹⁵ The most likely line of cleavage lay in the differences between the northern and southern Democrats and by allying with the old Whig element of the Party, Hayes could both win the current crisis and also build up the

basis for a strong Republican Party in the South.

In practical terms, this meant support for the desperate needs of the southwest for capital for badly needed improvements; harbours, railroads, and so on, and these had been ignored by the Federal Government up to this point, with the Northern Democrats playing the leading part in voting down these requests.

Meanwhile, Congress had been left to sort out the muddle and come to a decision, but they could find no real guide in the Constitution on how to proceed. An Electoral Commission was instituted to examine the problem while Congress met in joint session to count the ballots, referring disputed ones to the Commission. The returns in the three disputed states were awarded to the Republicans but this was met by the threat of a Democrat filibuster that would extend the session beyond the inauguration date. The political machinery was now ready to accommodate a compromise along the lines indicated by the behind-the-scenes discussions.

Under the Compromise of 1877, the Joint Session declared Hayes President with agreements on three levels. The Republicans gained the chance of a much more effective party in the South, southern business interests were promised capital for internal improvements, and white southerners were assured of the restoration of full home rule with the removal of Federal troops. Thus, for the immediate period at least, the East-South union had prevailed.

This Populist agrarian party from the West was a rising force however, and shortly after Hayes' inauguration the compromise started to break down. Woodward comments "The Whiggish alliance between the Republicans and Southern conservatives might have survived these breaches of the Compromise had it not been for a sudden wave of

agrarian radicalism in 1878 that swept the south out of control of conservative leaders and into temporary alliance with the west." 16

This Third Party threat in the south was a serious one and:

Southern Populists challenged the New-south romanticism head on. The farmers mingled politics frankly with questions of land markets, wages, money, taxes, railroads. They spoke openly of conflicts, of both section and class, and ridiculed the clichés of Reconciliation and white solidarity. The bolder among them challenged the cult of racism with doctrine of common action among farmers and workers of both races. The very existence of the third party was, of course, a challenge to the one-party system as well as to white solidarity. 17

Their platform was based on reformed money policy where credit would be taken out of private hands and would be made more readily available. Similarly they called for a reclaiming by government of large tracts of land held by corporations, as well as government ownership of communication systems such as railroads and telegraphs.

Their political strategy was three pronged, being, "based on combinations and alliances along regional, class, and racial lines--first an alliance between south and west; second, a combination of farmers and city and factory laborers; and third, a political union with Negro farmers and laborers within the south." 18 A particular difficulty in this third aim was the long standing antagonism between upland whites and Negroes, yet it was in just these regions that the party would otherwise have exerted its strongest appeal.

In the next elections; in 1892, the populists showed surprising strength in popular votes although it actually succeeded in winning only a few offices against the usual tactics of the democrats, and, "It was pretty clear by 1892, however, that the controlling forces in America would be no more reconciled to a Popular south than they had been to a planter-confederate south or a carpetbagger-freedman south." 19

Again then, the call for white unity had prevailed in southern politics, but Lewinson points out that this solidarity was a novelty in the South, unique to the post-bellum period. Up to the fifties politics had reflected divisions among the white populations along regional interest lines, with the slave-employing plantation owners of tidewater and river bottom "black lands" opposed by the small farmers of the high lands, the city businessmen and the remaining frontiersmen. This reflected some very real differences. The plantations were cash crop operations using large tracts of land wastefully, but to huge profits, pushing out the small farmer. The plantation owners made up the upper class of the South and these were much more like the leisure classes of Europe than anything in the North. Gentlemen did not work; slaves did, and this particular economy discouraged industry and commerce on any large scale. The population was scattered around the countryside leaving only small populations in the towns.

Now the slavery system gave the whites of the South a common bond that worked in two ways, Lewinson explains. First it gave them the sense of white supremacy over the coloured population, and also gave both groups of whites an economic interest in preserving the status quo. The owners, the whigs on the political spectrum, had a large investment tied up in their slaves, while the other whites, the Democrats, feared the competition that black freedmen would bring to bear. Any doubts about the moral and economic advisability of slavery that were entertained in the South were submerged as it became defensive and determined in the face of the northern abolitionist chant. Tocqueville saw the matter in much the same way, noting that although it was quite likely that the plantations could have

been even more profitable under a wage system, and certainly a northern style commercial activity would have been stimulated, the whites were afraid to changeover from slavery for fear of the consequences.

During the Presidential reconstruction the state governments set up by Johnson tended to be conservative, with only scattered opposition from a few lower class whites, Union Democrats, and purely personally ambitious people, and these were unable to organize into a united opposition.

With the inauguration of the radical reconstruction under Congress, the South drew closely together again, as it had during the secession and war days, only this time it was unity to oppose a takeover by the Negro freedmen. This unity was strongest in the deep south states with large Negro populations whereas in border states, particularly Virginia, there was more evidence of splits among the whites.

This was changed by the return to home rule that came about in each of the southern states between 1868 and 1877; we saw how this was done in the Mississippi Revolution in 1875, and the new order was completed and dramatized by the 1877 election compromise. It was with its newly returned autonomy safely secured that each southern state, led by Mississippi, began the movement to curb the political voice of the Negro.

Woodward points out that this period; the so-called redemption of the southern states, was more the creation of a new order than the restoration of an old one. It was carried out by a combination of business carpetbaggers, scalawags, and the old plantation aristocracy, and he plays down the part played by the northern radicals in this:

For it was not the Radicals nor the Confederates but the Redeemers who laid the lasting foundations in matters of race, politics, economics and law for the modern south. 20

The Redeemers now had a much more difficult task in preserving the "solid South" than had been the case in the earlier crises and their only recourse in trying to hold together this unnatural kind of unity was to appeal to the past issues, race supremacy and home rule, for any other issues were most likely to split the white vote along its ante-bellum lines. In order to maintain the strict one party system the organization and control of the Democrats was centered under the grip of a group known as the "ring" or the "courthouse clique", who formulated the issues, nominated candidates, drew up platforms and so on. With democratic principles at a low point the scene was set for a reaction against the gains in political rights made by the Negroes under Radical Reconstruction, for, "Never in our history was there a more radical application of the democratic dogma than that which suddenly enfranchised the liberated Negro slave. Once reaction set in, it could hardly be expected to be mild." 21

Another dimension of the reaction was in governmental activity. Retrenchment was the order of the day as one cutback after another was instituted in the drawback from the excess of the carpetbag legislatures. Under the heavy laissez-faire atmosphere, social welfare had to take a back seat and particularly hard hit were the schools.

Now the attempts of the Democratic Party to preserve the southern unity of the wartime and early reconstruction by appealing to the old fears as persistent threats were not entirely successful. "The classic lines of cleavage in southern society were not erased

magically by Reconstruction. No love was lost between the Black-belt gentry and hillbilly commoners - - then or now."²² For one thing, in slavery days the white counties had tried to have slaves taxed as property and prevent the Black Belt from counting its Negro population for representation in the state legislatures. Reconstruction under Congress had upset this and allowed the Negroes to count, shifting the balance of power to the lowland areas and according to Woodward, "The white minority in the black counties, heirs to the carpetbag system, often defended the radical constitutions."²³

The apportionment inequality can be seen in the case of Mississippi, where 44,500 eligible white voters in the black counties sent 68 representatives to the lower house of the legislature while 71,000 in the white counties sent only 52.

In opposition to the Democratic one party rule, Independent movements broke out in nearly all southern states almost as soon as they were redeemed. The most frequent grievance of these movements were the cry of machine politics, the corruption in elections, and also the fact that after redemption the black belt rulers were in control over quite submissive Negro voters so that they had in effect almost traded in the three-fifths vote for Negroes for a five fifths vote.

A leading economic issue in local southern politics was southern states debts and the "readjustment." These were bond issues floated by Republican state governments during the radical reconstruction which placed severe stresses on state finances already overburdened and starving for capital. This was a particularly volatile issue in Virginia where state elections were contested by the "punder" party which insisted on honouring bond debts even if it meant scrapping all

other state expenditures, against the "readjusters" who advocated repudiating a portion of the debt in order to get on with state development programs.

The Independent parties that tried to focus attention on these other issues were attacked by the Democratic machine on charges of allying themselves with the Republicans and working to cripple white solidarity against the Negro.

In the South that was emerging during the redemption, the Negro, although his economic status was uncertain, found that his interests lay closest to the black belt plantation owners whose land they farmed. The owners needed men to work the land and most of the time held a preference for the Negro over his white counterpart. In the towns and development areas, however, they quickly came into competition with the labouring white elements and it was these latter groups that were the most insistent about legislation to control the Negro. There was therefore a tendency for the politically aware Negroes to ally themselves with the most conservative and politically reactionary class of whites against the white democracy of the uplands.

In this paradoxical situation, the desire for two party politics and the trend towards the disfranchisement of the Negroes were products of the same circumstances, and "the barriers of racial discrimination mounted in direct ratio with the tide of political democracy among whites." 24

In Mississippi the political power of the Negro had been broken in 1875, and from that time on the Negro vote was regarded as a nuisance factor that was recruited by every minority or independent group that tried to form a political base. This made election fraud and violence necessary for the Democratic machine and many federal lawsuits were

laid in elections in 1878, 80, and onward to 1890. In the face of this the necessity for a more tidy way of keeping the Negro out of politics became apparent, and, "By 1890, Mississippi's democratic congressmen were ready to give enthusiastic support to any scheme that would put a legal face on the elimination of the Negro vote." ²⁵

One compromise scheme was the fusion principle. Here the number of Negro members of the state legislature and officials in the state and local governments was determined by white and Negro leaders. This method was used in six or eight counties with a high proportion of Negro residents and was a reasonable plan under the circumstances, giving at least token representation to the Negroes while retaining the higher offices for the whites. This plan had the weakness of any compromise; it was a halfway measure and this wasn't enough to satisfy many whites and it annoyed the minor white politicians who counted on getting lesser political appointments in the state. Also, there were difficulties in getting a consensus between the two sides, and other troubles.

As well as the local forces pushing for a change in the constitution of Mississippi; the election reformers, hill counties racists, and so on, there were also circumstances on the federal scene that smoothed the way for the calling of a disfranchising convention in the state. Wharton writes:

but there can be little doubt that the most powerful factor in the desire for a legal elimination of the Negro voter was the change that had occurred in Washington. In 1889, for the first time since 1875, the Republicans gained effective control of all the departments of the national government. The immediate conviction developed that the Republicans would use the opportunity to extend Federal control of elections and to restore the Negro vote, and the introduction of the Lodge Force Bill gave substance to the conviction. ²⁶

The Democratic State Convention that met in Jackson on July 16, 1889 in preparation for that years elections adopted as part of their platform the resolution that:

We recommend that the question of a convention be made an issue before the people in the coming election, so that they may be enlightened by the discussion, and that the legislature elected govern itself accordingly. 27

The issue was debated at length during the campaign and: "the outcome of the November election may be interpreted as a triumph for the advocates of suffrage reform." 28 In February, 1890 the new legislature authorized the calling of a Constitutional convention in Jackson on August 12 of that year.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Company, 1935), p. 167
- 2 R.W. Patrick, The Reconstruction of the Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), -.62
- 3 Du Bois, p.436
- 4 Ibid., 438
- 5 W.A. Russ, "The Negro and White During Radical Reconstruction," Journal of Negro History, 19 (April 1934), 171.
- 6 W.A. Russ, "The Price Paid for Disfranchising Southerners in 1867," Southern Atlantic Quarterly, 44 (January 1945), 34.
- 7 Ibid., 34
- 8 Patrick, p.135
- 9 Du Bois, p.
- 10 Wharton, p.182
- 11 Ibid., 183
- 12 Ibid., 190
- 13 Ibid., 197
- 14 C.V. Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Louisiana State Press, 1951), p.25
- 15 Ibid., 27
- 16 Ibid., 47
- 17 Ibid., 249
- 18 Ibid., 252
- 19 Ibid., 263
- 20 Ibid., 22
- 21 Ibid., 53
- 22 Ibid., 75
- 23 Ibid., 328

²⁴ Ibid., 211

²⁵ Wharton, p.201

²⁶ Ibid., 208

²⁷ W.A. Mabry, "Disfranchisement of the Negro in Mississippi",
The Journal of Southern History, X.V.(1949), 320

²⁸ Ibid., 321

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1890

One hundred and thirty-four delegates assembled in Jackson on August 12 to rewrite the Mississippi Constitution. Representation was on three levels, delegates elected to represent the State at large, "floater" delegates representing two or three counties, and County delegates sent from individual counties. Opposition to the Democrats was negligible, one Republican, one "national Republican", a conservative, and a Greenbacker (independent party). The only Negro was I.T. Montgomery of Bolivar County. Seventy-four, or 55% of the delegates were from the so-called black counties; the counties where Negroes made up a majority of the population, while the other 60 (45%) were from counties with a predominately white population. Sixty-six of the delegates, or 49%, were born in states and countries other than Mississippi, and 21% were under the age of 40. Table 1 below describes the break-down of the delegates by county regionality and occupation.

TABLE 1

OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION OF DELEGATES; BLACK AND WHITE COUNTIES

County	Farmer	Plantation	Urban	Total
Black	20(27%)	10(14%)	44(59%)	74
White	29(49%)	3(5%)	28(48%)	60

The Urban Occupations, by far the largest category in both black and white counties, includes doctors, clerks, merchants, and so on. They were lumped in together to see if any kind of an urban interest

group can be detected, or whether on the other hand, it is the differences between white and black counties as a whole that will emerge as the most important. One difficulty in an urban-rural distinction is that many of the successful plantation owners would move into neighbouring towns and conduct their business affairs there. Similarly a successful town lawyer would commonly purchase land outside town, and as a result many delegates list more than one profession or occupation in the journal of the Convention.

The first order of business was the election of a chairman for the Convention, and Judge S.S. Calhoun of Hinds county in the black belt was chosen for this office. In his acceptance speech he outlined his position on the crucial matters at hand. He first told the delegates of the seriousness of the questions before them and then set out the problem. Two different races live together in Mississippi and this fact cannot be changed; the best must be made of it. He says that never in history has it been possible for different races to live together homogenously; there has only been heterogeneousness although he feels that there is a real affection between the two races. In political matters though, this breaks down because of some fundamental desire of each for superiority:

It does not arise from any dislike each for the other, not from lack of confidence each in the other. It arises, gentlemen of this Convention, in that principle of human nature, in that which has its root deep in human nature -- that when any of the five distinct races encounter each other in the matter of government, that from the instinct implanted in its nature, it desires to be in the ascendancy. ¹

The issue is clear to Calhoun:

This ballot system must be arranged as to effect one object, permit me to say- for we find the two races now together, the rule of one of which has always meant prosperity and happiness, and prosperity and happiness to all races. ²

Calhoun continues that disfranchisement must be done carefully and not in an unjust or oppressive way. Now apart from this central question he mentions other matters that must be looked into. The legislative power must be better controlled he thinks, as well as specific economic improvements (Mississippi River flood control for instance) and , " . . . they well appear necessary to the state and exceedingly beneficial and conducive to our prosperity." ³

It is apparent, I think, that Calhoun develops in this speech a strong expression of the conservative white aristocracies position; a friendly, paternalistic attitude and sense of fair play as long as the Negro remained in a subordinate position. In another sense, this speech brought out one of the great paradoxes of race relations; that friendship and even love is freely given between individuals of different races, but this breaks down on the impersonal level and out come the ideologies and doctrines of fundamental inequality, "so true, so general, such a historical fact that it may be said to be a law of God", ⁴ to use Calhoun's words.

On August 14, President Calhoun announced the appointment of the Standing Committee on Elective Franchise, Apportionment and Elections, the most important for our purposes, of the many committees chosen to prepare reports on the different issues before the convention.

The black counties had a slight majority on this committee; 20 of the 35 members or 57%, and the break-down by occupation was 13 farmers, (37%), 4 planters (11%), and 18 (52%) from the urban occupations.

The committee, under chairman R.C. Patty of Noxubee County (black belt), was faced with difficult problems. Delegates from the black belt, on the whole, wanted to eliminate the vote of ignorant and unqualified voters of either race while the whites of the white counties

many of them "poor whites" and illiterate, were taking aim specifically at the Negroes. With the apportionment inequities, the whites of the black belt had pretty much had their own way in state politics and they were reluctant to give up their representative majority through changing the apportionment by giving control to the white counties, thereby cutting back the Negro electoral majority. Yet the other answer, a general qualification requirement for voters, was objectionable to the white counties both because it would cut into the ranks of their voters, and because it would do little to restore the imbalance in apportionment.

Chairman Patty delivered the committee's report on September 2nd. This, together with supplemental reports on franchise and apportionment, were hotly debated by the Convention, sitting in committee of the whole, for twelve days before the adoption of the article together with amendments on Saturday, September 20th.

The report required that all elections be by ballot. Only males who were not "idiots, insane persons and Indians not taxed" could vote, and two years citizenship in the state, twenty-one years of age or more, citizenship in the United States, and one years residence in the electoral district was necessary for qualification. Also, any persons convicted of "bribery, burglary, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretenses, perjury, forgery, embezzlement, or bigamy"⁵ were ineligible for the vote. The voter had to have paid on or before the first day of February all his taxes and be able to prove that he had done this. Section Three of the article contained a loyalty oath to the state of Mississippi, and section four outlined the poll tax. This was to be two dollars and could be raised to three by any county for the purpose of raising funds for the schools. The fifth section was the "understanding clause":

Every qualified elector shall be able to read any section of the Constitution of this state; or shall be able to understand the same when read to him; or give a reasonable interpretation thereof. ⁶

This article conformed to the requirements of the 15th Amendment but at the same time contained several traps for the would-be Negro voter. Negroes stood little chance in escaping charges in a court of law, they were less likely to have paid their taxes than whites, they were even less likely to remember to keep receipts for taxes paid, and as a whole they would be less keen on paying the two dollar poll tax. The biggest barrier was the understanding clause as it provided what could be a stiff literacy test, yet provided an escape, the granting of which was left solely to the discretion of white election officers. Mabry comments, "In short, the convention evolved a constitution which discriminated not against the Negro but against his characteristics and limitations." ⁷

The section on apportionment was equally bitterly contested and provided that the number of representatives in the lower house of the legislature be increased by thirteen, with all the additional seats going to the white counties.

An "Election Ordinance" required the so-called "Australian Ballot" where each candidate had a different ballot box at the polling station and the voter had to either memorize the order of these boxes or else be able to read the names on them. This, then, was a kind of disguised literacy test, but one that could be manipulated at the discretion of the electoral officers.

The Convention next took up the report of the Committee of the whole on the franchise, and Section One was adopted without amendment. J.B. Chrisman proposed an additional qualification for the franchise:

"Provided, they or their wives own in fee simple a homestead, or one or the other of them is possessed of property, real, or personal, of the value of two hundred and fifty dollars listed for taxation, and not at the time he offers to vote, dilinquent for taxes thereon; or said elector shall be able to read and write the English language intelligibly, and- " 8

Chrisman introduced this amendement in one of the important speeches of the Convention. First of all, he emphasized that although he didn't want to discriminate against the Negro, his amendement would preserve the white supremacy because of the nature of the two races:

In my opinion nearly all the white people in the state would be able to vote under the rule this amendement makes. A great many coloured people would also vote, but it is no part of my plan to make a rule for the blacks that does not equally apply to the whites, and under the operation of this substitute for the Committees recommendation white supremacy will be secured to the State for many years. 9

He goes on to describe the need to ensure a white balance of power:

Not until the people were made to believe that they stood in the shadow of a great menace would they consent to the call... What was the shdow that hung over us -- that darkened our future and alarmed our people? 10

To Chrisman, the real threat was the effects of the white democrats' battle against the Negro; the election corruption:

Sir, it is no secret that there has not been a full vote and a fair count in Mississippi since 1875 -- that we have been preserving the ascendancy of the white people by revolutionary methods. In plain words, we have been stuffing ballot-boxes, committing perjury and here and there in the state, carrying the elections by fraud and violence until the whole machinery for elections was about to rot down. The public conscience revolted. . . . 11

The solution, according to Chrisman, is an educated electorate, and a continuation of the present methods of election can only lead to the decline of republican government:

Men of observation and men who read books know that a republican government rests mainly on the virtue and intelligence of the people, and the ballot. -- a pure and untrammelled ballot is its main reliance. Shorn of this instrumentality it will surely begin to die. It requires no Solomon to see that the ballot-box stuffer cannot always be relied on to elect the best men to office. ¹²

Chrisman next examines the measures proposed by the Franchise

Committee:

Now Sir, what has this Committee offered us as a remedy? A two dollar poll tax! -- the Australian Ballot and an apportionment. ¹³

He attacks particularly the "understanding clause":

And right here I stop to say that the proposition that in 1890 a man shall be able to read the Constitution or be able to understand any clause of it when read to him, stamps the whole scheme of the Committee with disfavor. It don't look honest, straightforward and manly. It looks like a farce to make a registration officer decide whether a voter rightly interprets a clause of the Constitution. If the registrar decides that the voter rightly interprets the clause, he is a qualified voter. If he does not understand it he cannot register. ¹⁴

This rule is easily abused, and he gives an example:

It looks as if it was intended that if the registrar wanted the man to vote he would read him some such clause as: 'Slavery except as a punishment shall be forever prohibited. do you understand that?' 'Oh yes'. But if he did not want him to vote he would read him the interstate clause or the section forbidding the Legislature to pass ex post facto laws and demand a construction. ¹⁵

Chrisman considers the poll tax and Australian Ballot:

In the first place we are to look at the fact that we have 70,000 more colored voters than whites. I honestly believe that at home and abroad the colored man will be appealed to pay his poll tax as a religious duty and as a measure of safety for some great emergency. . . . But if we mean to meet and remedy what I regard as the mischief--the temptation to violence and fraud by securing the right of the citizen to vote, then the Committee's plan is a delusion and a snare. A man of ordinary capacity can soon learn the difference in the appearance on the ticket of the names of Muldrow and Chrisman, and so without education and without property the ignorant, irresponsible vagabond voter will control the destiny and shape the public policy of the State. ¹⁶

He is no less happy with the apportionment scheme:

The apportionment stands on no recognized grounds of political principle for the distribution of power. It is predicated upon the theory that the white people in these white counties will always

ally themselves on racial lines, that they will never divide among themselves or, if they do, neither will appeal to the colored voters for support. Sir, these are the very counties that will divide among themselves. We are about to invest these counties with power because they are not willing to agree on a property qualification. 17

He also points out that the black counties paid most of the states taxes:

Sir, the tendency of political thought is to agrarianism, and communism, and there is a perfect rage at the idea of recognizing property as a qualification for voting. Yet it is property that supports the paupers, builds the bridges, and court-houses and jails of the counties . . . n 18

Attacking the ignorant voters, he continues:

. . .but the recognition of its right to protection is regarded as an outrage; and to avoid the disfranchisement of a lot of ignoramuses and to pander to the prejudices of those who have no property we cannot have a property qualification. 19

The property qualification has ample precedent:

More than half the colonies that formed the constitution of the United States had a property or educational qualification, or both. 20

Chrisman maintains that his proposal is not as unpopular among the white counties as is made out:

Mr. President, I do not believe there is that antipathy among the people to a property and educational qualification which it is asserted exists. Nor do I believe that men who are disfranchised will complain if it saves our civilization from barbarism. 21

He ends with an accusation about the white county delegates:

It is not the man who cannot read and write who is objecting, but in some cases at least, it is the man who wants to write his vote. 22

The Jackson Clarion-Ledger reported that this speech was warmly received by the delegates, and it was a clear challenge to the report of the Franchise Committee and apparently represented the feelings of many of the delegates, at least at this stage in the Convention.

Of the many speakers from the white counties who rose to challenge

property and literacy qualifications, perhaps the most impressive and clearly stated case was that of W.A. Boyd. He starts by agreeing that the elections must be cleaned up:

but not as the gentleman would have us do, by making invidious distinctions between men of our own race- men with common sympathies, common interests, and common aspirations. White men 'nature and to the manor born', who in the lone line of their lineage, have been ever true to all that the American heart holds dear, and have left upon American greatness the unfaceable impress of their faithfulness. ²³

Boyd appeals to the Declaration of Independence:

Mr. President: There are here involved grand and 'unalienable rights' the endowments of the Creator that can neither die nor be destroyed, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. ²⁴

He continues:

Here I ask what is liberty? Is he a free-man whose right to vote is denied? Has he an equal chance in the pursuit of happiness? ²⁵

Boyd next attacks Chrisman, saying that he is measuring the quality of a man by his wealth - - and he rejects Chrisman's idea that the whites won't object to disfranchisement.

Our people are patriotic, but that kind of patriotism that would suffer beheading for the sake of enfranchising wealth is rarely to be found among articulately speaking people. ²⁶

He asks the delegates:

Would you begat jealousies, animosities, irreparable divisions, then pass Judge Chrisman's amendment, or any other man's proposition measuring suffrage by the wealth of acres or the number of dollars. Our people are not yet ready to subscribe to the doctrine that money makes the man. ²⁷

It is not the business of the Convention to even consider the disfranchisement of white men:

Mr. President, I hold that there is no power in this Convention of disfranchise because of poverty or illiteracy. To the white men of this country the right to vote is an inheritance, a legacy handed down in legal succession through all the ages of American government. What right have you to take it away? ²⁸

He takes up Chrisman's charge of white county delegates advancing

their own political ambitions in the convention:

The honourable gentleman is correct in saying this is no place for demagogues to disport themselves, but when he goes further and charges that some one here 'to protect white ignoramuses' whether intentionally or not, he is guilty of an unwarranted reflection on white constituencies of delegates on this floor who oppose an educational test. 29

He continues in an emotional tone:

Shall I say to the man whose property denies him the luxury of royal purple and fine linen, who in thankfulness to God eats his frugal meal, and rests his weary limbs beneath the clapboarded roof of a 'log-cabin' that he is the inferior of his more fortunate neighbour, who happens to be worth two hundred and fifty dollars? For one, I answer no, a thousand times no! 30

Boyd finishes up by raising some practical problems with the Chrisman scheme, pointing out the difficulty in drawing the line on property qualifications, and he also contends that such a scheme will drive out the young men from the state, who cannot meet the franchise requirements. To Boyd, "The scheme is wild, visionary, aristocratic and promises nothing but harm to the state." 31

These two speeches illustrate better than anything else, the sectional divisions between delegates from the black and white counties and I have reproduced the speeches almost in full to show the full extent of this.

When the Chrisman amendment was put to the vote it was defeated 76 to 26. Table 2 shows this vote.

TABLE 2

VOTE ON THE CHRISMAN AMENDMENT BY COUNTY REGIONALITY

County	Yes	No	Absent, Abstain	Total
Black	20(27%)	36(49%)	18(24%)	74
White	6(10%)	40(68%)	13(22%)	59
Total	26	76	31	133

This break-down of the vote appears to support the hypothesis that the white counties were much more afraid of a non-discriminateing disfranchiseing clause than the black county whites. Almost three times as many of the black county delegates supported the motion and a fair number less rejected it while the number of absentees and abstainers was about the same in both cases.

The Jackson Courier-Ledger felt that many of the delegates were reluctant to vote against the recommendations of the Franchise Committee; the "Big Committee" as that paper called it, and it is interesting to see whether the delegates who supported the committee on this vote by voting against it continued this support by voting in favour of the "understanding clause". Of particular interest are the 36 delegates from the black counties who voted against the Chrisman resolution, somewhat contrary to our expectations. Twenty-nine of these did in fact support the "Understanding Clause" while only 7 opposed it, suggesting that there was a certain hesitancy in opposing the committee.

Did the 20 black county delegates supporting the Chrisman amendment hold out against a discriminatory disfranchisement? No, only 4 of these delegates opposed the understanding clause when the motion came to the vote.

An occupational break-down of the vote on Chrisman's amendment tends to support the view that there was a division by county regionality.

Table 3 shows that the urban vote, one that we have seen to be quite evenly divided between white and black counties (59% and 48%) went 26% in favour of the amendment and 52% opposed, while the total vote was 19% for and 57% against. On the other hand, the farmers, a

TABLE 3

VOTE ON CHRISMAN AMENDMENT BY OCCUPATION OF DELEGATES

Occupation	Yes	No	Absent, Abstain	Total
farmer	3(8%)	24(63%)	11(29%)	38
planter	4(31%)	5(38%)	4(31%)	13
urban	19(26%)	37(52%)	16(22%)	72

predominately white county group, show a disproportionate rejection of the amendment while the planters from the black belt are split almost evenly on the question.

H.L. Muldrew, a delegate of the state-at-large, proposed next, an amendment that was a modified franchise qualification; proof of literacy without property qualifications. This was rejected by the convention by a similar margin to the first one; 78 against, 23 for, and 32 absent or not voting.

TABLE 4

VOTE ON LITERACY QUALIFICATION BY COUNTY REGIONALITY

County	Yes	No	Absent, Abstain	Total
Black	19(26%)	35(48%)	20(26%)	74
White	4(7%)	43(73%)	12(20%)	59

section 2 was now voted on and accepted and sections 3 and 4 dealing with the oath of allegiance and the poll tax were accepted with only minor revisions. Sections 5 and 6 of the report were tabled and the Convention proceeded to an important matter; the apportionment clauses.

There is a certain amount of mystery surrounding this part of the Committee Report. It had originally been intended that the apportionment,

which greatly favoured the black counties, would be altered to give a majority to the white counties, thereby ensuring white political supremacy. The "George Plan" that was adopted by the committee was apparently supposed to do this, increasing the number of representatives to 13 with all of these going to white counties. Black belt newspapers, particularly the Clarion-Ledger attacked the plan, claiming that there was never a more arbitrary or unjust apportionment than the one suggested by the Franchise Committee. According to the Clarion-Ledger, the black county delegates were opposed to the scheme, as might be expected, with 27 of these delegates speaking against the plan.

Yet this conflicts with a break-down of the vote on the apportionment clauses. A motion to table a proposed amendment reducing the legislature to 75 members was defeated 68 to 50, with the greatest opposition coming from the black belt, with 58% in favour of tabling the proposed change. The white county delegates were almost evenly divided on this, with in fact, a slight majority in favour of considering the alternate scheme.

TABLE 5

VOTE ON MOTION TO TABLE RECONSIDERATION OF APPORTIONMENT

County	Yes	No	Absent, Abstain	Total
Black	43(58%)	22(30%)	9(12%)	74
White	25(41%)	28(47%)	7(12%)	60

Similarly, when the Committee Report was put to the vote and was carried 79 to 38, the black county support remained almost exactly the same, while white county delegates shifted 8 votes over in favour of the resolution.

TABLE 6

VOTE ON "GEORGE PLAN"

County	Yes	No	Absent, Absent.	Total
Black	46(62%)	18(24%)	10(14%)	74
White	33(55%)	20(33%)	7(12%)	60

These tables would certainly indicate that the George plan was acceptable to the black counties and tolerable to the white counties, and the most likely explanation seems to be found in an article by Albert Kirwan: "Apportionment in the Mississippi Constitution of 1890."

He examines in detail exactly how the apportionment scheme would change things and finds, "It seems to have been generally believed that all the additional thirteen representatives were given to white constituencies, but this was not the case . . . Thus the house of representatives under the new apportionment would have a total of 69 representatives from black districts. Since the number was limited to 133, only 64 representatives could possibly be chosen from white districts. This amounted to an increase of twelve representatives for white districts but they were still six short of a bare majority." ³²

More than that, the scheme did not even guarantee white supremacy according to Kirwan:

The census of 1890 shows if all male adults in every legislative district in Mississippi had voted, and if they had divided on race lines, Negroes would have returned 69 representatives and whites 64. Based on the census of 1900 such a hypothetical vote would have returned the same number of whites and Negroes as in 1890, and in 1910 there would have been 71 Negroes and 66 whites. . .

He adds, "It is indeed difficult to reconcile these figures with the contention of so many authorities that the apportionment would and did insure white control under all conceivable circumstances . . . Many

other such examples could be produced. They indicate that, whatever the intentions of the framers of the constitution of 1890, the constitution did in fact perpetuate the great discrimination which already existed against the white man in the white counties." 34

The only reasonable explanation for the voting pattern on the apportionment seems to be that the delegates were as good at arithmetic as Mr. Kirwan and the black counties realized that by losing only a few seats, and retaining their majority in the legislature, they were getting off lightly. The white counties were apparently ready, by this time, to accept the small increase in their representation, perhaps because it was provided for that apportionment could be changed by the legislature in the future.

Sections 5 and 6 of the Franchise Report were brought up again and it was decided that the understanding clause (section 5) be instituted in the election of 1892 rather than waiting until 1896 as originally proposed. Section 5 was put to the vote and passed 71 to 47.

TABLE 7

VOTE ON UNDERSTANDING CLAUSE

County	Yes	No	Absent, Abstain	Total
Black	49(66%)	18(24%)	7(10%)	74
White	22(37%)	29(48%)	9(15%)	60

This was a measure with a high potential for discrimination, as judge Chrisman pointed out, and it is indicated here that it was less objectionable to the white counties than non-discriminating clauses such as the property qualification, as the white vote was against the motion by only a small margin.

The black county vote, as the table shows, came out in strong support of the understanding clause. They had nothing to lose from this rule; representation was based on qualified electors, not registered voters, in the old constitution of 1868 and a scheme that would quietly prevent the Negro majorities in the black belt from voting was clearly preferred by these delegates to a radical alteration of the apportionment giving control to the white counties.

The 18 delegates from the black counties voting against the understanding clause had split evenly on the property qualification vote; 7 for, 6 against and 5 absent abstaining.

On the other hand, the 29 delegates opposed to this clause from the white counties were composed of 22 delegates voting against each one of the franchise votes. Only 3 delegates from the black counties voted against all these resolutions.

On Saturday, November 1, the work of the Convention was done and the complete constitution was submitted to the delegates. It is interesting to look at the eight "die hards" who refused to accept the constitution to the end.

Of first interest seemed to be the five delegates listed as having political affiliation other than the regular democratic party, but the Journal of the Convention shows that four voted in favour of the constitution, and the fifth, the Negro Montgomery of Polivar, who during the debates had supported voting qualifications as long as they were administered fairly, was in the "absent or abstaining" category.

Of these 8 delegates, 6 also voted against the apportionment plan, 3 against the Chrisman amendment, and 6 against the understanding clause; no clear pattern. Table 8 below looks at the eight dissenters by county occupation, and age group.

TABLE 8

FINAL VOTE ON CONSTITUTION BY COUNTY, OCCUPATION, and AGE GROUP

Category	Black Cy.	White Cy.	Farmer Planter		Urban under 40		over
Yes	55(75%)	50(83%)	42(86%)	10(77%)	52(72%)	19(70%)	83(78%)
No	5 (7%)	3 (5%)	1 (2%)	0	7(10%)	3(11%)	5 (5%)
Absent, Abstain	14(18%)	7(12%)	6(12%)	3(23%)	13(18%)	5(19%)	18(17%)
Total	74	60	49	13	72	27	106

This table shows only that no particular pattern can be suggested about the eight dissenters. The categories are a bit small for cross-tabulations to be meaningful, but even so the widest margins in the acceptance vote is only 16%; 70% of the delegates under 40 in favour of the constitution compared to 86% of the farmers- not a very big difference and not enough to warrant any speculation on the liberal tendencies of the younger delegates, and so on.

Mabry, in his article on the disfranchisement feels that "though many members had opposed individual features of the constitution, there was a rather general feeling that the document was the best that could be framed under the circumstances." He offers no explanation of why at this point there was not a unanimous adoption of the constitution and the question remains a minor, but unexplained point. The Jackson Clarion-Ledger seemed rather glad to get the convention, which had dragged on for many weeks more than had been intended at a cost of \$700 a day, over with at last.

Chairman Calhoun had the last word. In his closing address he expresses the hope that the new constitution will end political divisions along race lines, and that there will be less election violence and fraud than in the past. He continues "political partisanship has

naturally prevented an impartial view of our situation."³⁵ and he has a message for the North:

We say to our brethren of the North, East and West, that we are willing to bear cheerfully our full share of the public burdens, ...except to yield up the common civilization of our common country, which civilization was constructed only by the white race. There is but one sovereign by divine right. That sovereign is mind. I look in vain for any instance of African contribution to the disclosure of undiscovered truths tending to ameliorate the individual or the social condition of man." ³⁶

He continues in this vein maintaining that the Negroes have made no contribution to civilization, and lack the initiative to break out of stagnation when "withdrawn from the envelopment of white civilization."³⁷ He remains vaguely optimistic for the future of the Negro under white leadership saying, "I hope better things from it in the future." ³⁸

Now clearly there is in this speech an anti-Negro ideology that is implied by Calhoun to be the underlying reason for the convention. According to him, while Negroes and whites can live together in friendship, this can only happen when the white race is clearly the ruler.

This is a bit too simple I think. He rather glosses over the sectional quarrels as though they were in the nature of side distractions:

Our mission here has been accomplished as best it could upon adjustment of the various opinions and interests of the different sections of Mississippi. ³⁹

The fact is that on every vote by the convention that we have analysed, clear patterns of white county-black county divisions have emerged and these are supported by the speeches by the delegates reported in the newspapers covering the Convention. It is also true that there was support for the disfranchisement of the Negro for other reasons; particularly for election reform, but this appears to have remained subordinate to the sectional rivalry. Some delegates delivered speeches of a conciliatory tone, calling for unity in dealing with the "black

menace", but it is difficult to tell how sincere these speakers were and to what extent they were using this line as a tool for promoting the interests of their side; the evidence indicates the latter.

The Mississippi Convention seems to me then, to have been a three-cornered power struggle with two militant groups; black and white counties, jockeying for control of the state, with the Negroes forming a very passive third corner that through its numbers and the protection of the U.S. Constitution, poses a potential threat to the supremacy of the white groups, but in fact ends up being caught in the middle of the white struggle as a kind of "pig-in-the-middle" or "pawn" or "political football".

There is evidence to indicate that this situation was not unique to Mississippi; that all through the South the same forces were at work, as one by one the rest of these states called disfranchising conventions (South Carolina in 1895, Louisiana in 1898, North Carolina in 1900, Alabama in 1901, Virginia in 1901-02, Georgia in 1908, Oklahoma in 1910, and Tennessee, Florida, Arkansas, and Texas by means of the poll tax and so on.) There were variations and modifications of the "Mississippi Plan" during these years; particularly the "grandfather clause" which gave any descendent of a Civil War veteran automatic qualification. This served much the same function as Mississippi's understanding clause. These later disfranchising conventions were linked more closely to the third party Populist movement than Mississippi had been, and this was one of the popular justifications for these conventions. This was just a variation of the same theme; It involved an alliance of the poor white farmers with the Negroes, but the only difference was that instead of the passive Negro vote being used to the advantage of black counties, it would favour the white county farmers. As soon as it became apparent

that the union was not going to work, the cry for disfranchisement went up again among the white counties. The price paid in the battle between whites for control of the Negro vote was brought out in these conventions as it was in Mississippi. An Alabama delegate protested "Now we are not begging for ballot reform or anything of that sort, but we want to be relieved of purchasing the Negroes to carry elections. I want cheaper votes."⁴⁰ The distrust between black and white counties remained as strong as ever in the other conventions. "the carpetbaggers so framed our present constitution . . . as to give a preponderance of representation to the negro counties."⁴¹ And black county whites "hypocritically raised the howl of white supremacy while debauching the ballot-boxes and through this infamous means made themselves potent factors in our state and county governments."⁴² Few delegates took the cry of black supremacy seriously. "I ask you gentlemen of the black belt, how do you happen to be here if the Negroes control down there?"⁴³ inquired one Virginia delegate, while an Alabamian asked, "what are we here for? Not to preserve white supremacy. White supremacy is secure in Alabama."⁴⁴ There were similar arguments over whether unqualified whites should lose the vote along with Negroes. Gates of Alabama wanted to disfranchise "all those who are unfit and unqualified, and if the rule strikes a white man as well as a negro, let him go. There are some white men who have no more right and business to vote than a negro and not as much as some of them."⁴⁵

The pattern then, remained very much the same from one state to another, with only a certain adjustment for local conditions and issues. It was a pattern of reaction against the Negro not really for any ideological beliefs of racial inferiority, but as a result of power struggles between

white sub-groups divided along different interest lines. The final chapter will consider this in a more general way.

FOOTNOTES

¹ State of Mississippi, Journal of the proceedings of the constitutional Convention of the State of Mississippi, begun at the city of Jackson on August 12, 1890, and concluded November 1, 1890., E.I. Martin. 1890. p.10

² Ibid., 10

³ Ibid., 11

⁴ Ibid., 10

⁵ Ibid., 675

⁶ Ibid., 230

⁷ Mabry. p. 333

⁸ Journal, p.242

⁹ Clarion-ledger (Jackson, Miss.), Sept. 11, 1890,

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 A.D. Kirwan, "Apportionment in the Mississippi Constitution of 1890," The Journal of Southern History, 14, 242

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Journal, p. 701

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., 700

40 Woodward, Origins of the New South, 327

41 Ibid., 328

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid., 330

CHAPTER FIVE

THEORETICAL GUIDELINES AND PROJECTIONS

This concluding chapter will be of a more general and abstract nature than those that preceded it. The task is to set down first the approach that was taken towards this question of Negro disfranchisement, and then to project, or abstract somewhat from the analysis. This projection will take two paths; to examine the problems that the analysis has raised for Democratic government, and to consider the problems and questions it raises about the study of race relations as a whole, particularly from the psychological perspective.

The first thing to do when setting out some general ideas, or a theoretical orientations about race relations, was to define the central concepts in as clear and useful way as possible. A particular problem was in deciding just what the difference is between race groups, ethnic groups, and minority groups of all sorts.

The central question here is whether a "race" is to be regarded as some kind of biological category in the same way that we say, for instance, that a horse is a special category of animal, or whether, on the other hand, we argue that racial differentiation is only significant when people call attention to it.

There are several problems with a biological definition. There is no real consensus on a criterion on which to base the biological distinctions. If skin colour is to be the standard, there are immediate problems because these form not so much categories as a continuum, or more likely, a spectrum. The United States, with many mulattos, or people of so-called "mixed blood", illustrates the extent of this problem, as many people

here find they are pale enough to pass as whites when in fact they have some Negro ancestry. The legislatures in the southern states had a great deal of difficulty in defining a Negro, and were reduced to the not very adequate solution of defining the percentage of ancestry that constituted a black or a white person. For instance, in some states anyone with one-quarter or more "black blood" was to be called a Negro, but this of course, had to assume the racial purity of the immigrant groups to North America, including the African Negroes, and the evidence is that this was by no means the case. Another problem with biological definitions is that it means using non-political categories in a political analysis, clouding the issue by misdirecting the emphasis.

A more useful approach, and one that has become the more popular among students of race relations in recent decades, is the social definition. That is, we say in effect "what people call a race is a race for our purposes." Examples can be cited that formulate this in a more complete way: Van Den Berghe in Race and Racism defines race as:

. . . a human group that defines itself and/or is defined by other groups as different from other groups by virtue of innate and immutable physical characteristics. ¹

To O.C. Cox:

A race may be thought of as simply any group of people that is generally thought to be, and generally accepted as, a race in any given area of ethnic competition. ²

This approach does not ignore the physical differences; everybody knows that there is a difference between a black skin and a white or a yellow one, but it puts the emphasis not so much on how people make these distinctions, but the fact that they do. This makes it possible to look beyond the physical characteristics and study race relations in a much more fluid and dynamic way.

"Racism" is an attitude. It involves ideologies which are used as a system of rationalization for material social facts; for instance, the exploitation of one race by another.

This is distinct from the other more general attitudes; ethnocentrism and intolerance. Ethnocentrism refers to Sumner's "we-groups" and deals with feelings of group solidarity that are not necessarily racial phenomena. Intolerance is directed against any group that defies social norms, and again, this can have racial overtones but does not necessarily have to do this. Religious intolerance is perhaps the best example of this.

A theoretical approach or orientation to any sociological inquiry has to, at one time or another, consider the assumptions about man and society that lie behind the formulation. There has been a long standing debate between the "integration model" theorists and those supporting the "conflict model", and this revolves around the nature of social change. That is, should it be assumed that society is basically stable, that people are orderly, peaceful, and attracted to one another, but sometimes this breaks down and forces push to a new equilibrium, or is it the other way around; do there exist constant forces of conflict that are always at work and are only checked from time to time by periods of temporary inertia?

There is no point in this discussion in "going off the deep end" about these difficult and persistent philosophical questions. They do bring out an important point though; that at different times and under varying circumstances one finds different types of society, sometimes stable, at other times in transition.

In his approach to race relations Park developed this perspective.

He saw "four great types of interaction- competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation." 3

Competition is the most basic of these; it is elementary, universal, and fundamental. Its most important characteristic is that it is interaction without social contact; that is, the actors are unaware of the presence of the other in somewhat the same way that competing plant organisms have no social consciousness. Park elaborates:

. . . competition invariably tends to create an impersonal social order in which each individual, being free to pursue his own profit, and, in a sense, compelled to do so, makes every other individual a means to that end. 4

It is linked with the economic order:

Competition determines the distribution of population territorially and vocationally. The division of labor and all the vast organized economic interdependence of individuals and groups of individuals characteristic of modern life are a product of competition. 5

Competition becomes conflict for Park only in periods of crisis, when people are forced to become conscious of their rivalry with other people instead of economic forces. Conflict then, is a political process and political organizations exist to deal with conflict situations. He considers these political institutions only as substitutes for war.

Conflict:

. . . evokes the deepest emotions and strongest passions and enlists the greatest concentration of attention and of effort. . . . In general we may say that competition determines the position of the individual in the community; conflict fixes his place in society. 6

Accommodation involves individuals and groups making necessary internal adjustments to social situations or conditions that have been created by competition and conflict. This process follows the changes effected through struggle then, and:

They establish a new order by changing, not merely the status, but the attitudes of the parties involved. Eventually the new order gets itself fixed in habit and custom and is then transmitted

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as part of the established social order to succeeding generations.
... The rights of property, vested interests of every sort, the family organization, slavery, caste and class, the whole social organization in fact, represent accommodations. 7

This has to do with the social organization or sphere. Assimilation on the other hand goes farther than this and is a complete transformation of the personality, which Park sees as taking place gradually, under the influence of social contacts of the most concrete and intimate sort.

Now Park feels that race relations follow this cycle:

Everywhere there is competition and conflict; but everywhere the intimacies which participation in a common life enforces have created new accommodation, and relations which were merely formal or utilitarian have become personal and human. 8

He continues, "In the relations of races there is a cycle of events which tends everywhere to repeat itself." 9 Now the trouble and frictions in relations between races comes about during periods of change from one stage to another. Where there is rapid social change, there is low racial prejudice but high racial conflict, yet when the change has become solidified and some sort of accommodation realized, then the prejudicial beliefs, or racial ideologies may still remain.

It is not to the point to debate the universal empirical accuracy or applicability of Park's cyclic change theory; the important thing is that it provides a useful orientation to the reconstruction period which was without a doubt one of great social changes.

For instance, the ante-bellum South was a stable society in a state of relative accommodation:

In short, the plantation population, in spite of differences of race and status, constituted what I have described as a we-group. If the Negroes were content to remain in a subordinate position to which the white man's prejudice- prejudices which have grown up through long and intimate association- assigned him, racial animosities would probably not exist. 10

The Park approach brings out another important aspect of race

relations; the place of interest conflicts in the economic and political sphere and the role of ideological belief systems about races. Park makes it clear that it is the economic and political struggles, the results of competition and conflict that are the causal factors in race animosities. The prejudice, or racial ideologies, are by-products of the accommodation process that are used to justify and cement the stability of changes.

Thus, in the reconstruction period there was a painful period of adjustment to the new conditions imposed by the war, as the white south fought a battle for the political and economic control which had fallen to the northern Republicans, and at the same time witnessed the legal changes in the status of the Negro to franchised and economically independent citizens.

This then, was the nature of the approach taken to this analysis. Essentially, the main guideline was to refuse to write off the proceedings in this period concerning the Negro as mere ideological prejudice on the part of the whites. The object was to look at the causes behind this prejudice to examine how it varied according to the influence of these more basic economic and political factors.

Now the conclusions drawn from this study pose certain rather crucial questions, first for the functioning of minority race groups in democracies and secondly, for the study of race relations from the perspective of psychological prejudice.

What we had to start with, following the end of the war, was a situation where the Negro was given the vote as well as certain civil rights. But what should have been a period of great improvement for the Negro, as he expressed his opinion in the running of country and state through the exercise of his vote, didn't turn out that way at all. We saw that the Negro voter was pushed and pulled by the white democrats

and Republicans competeting for his vote. When the Negroes tended to support the Republicans, for rather obvious reasons, the southern white Democrats took over control by force, fraud and so on (eg. the Mississippi Revolution of 1875) beating down the Negro vote, and pushing out the Republican governments. Yet even then, with the Negro disfranchisement accomplished in fact, to a large degree, the problems did not end. The white Democrats were split by regional interests; the aristocratic planter class of the black belt, where most Negroes lived and worked, and the white counties where individual white farmers scraped out a living.

There was a question of representation and apportionment between these regions, which held true throughout the deep south, because the "carpetbag" constitutions had counted the Negroes in drawing up representation for state and federal government. For this, and other reasons (it is reasonable to assume that at least some southerners were concerned about the election violence and fraud), Mississippi held a constitutional convention and we saw the predominance of these sectional white interests in the votes and speeches of the convention.

Very much the same pattern was seen in the other southern states, most of which soon followed the Mississippi example. In some cases here, the situation was complicated by the presence of the third party Populist threat. This movement proposed to unite the poor white and Negro farmers against the planters, and it was not until this plan had clearly died that the white counties became seriously interested in disfranchising the Negro voter.

In all cases, the evidence suggests that the Negro played a passive role. The whites threw about the cry of "black domination" and so on, but this was never really very likely, and certainly not after the "redemption" of the South. They were, in a way, in a "dammed in you do,

dammed if you don't" position. If they had, in some way, been able to elect their own coloured representatives to the legislature they would have precipitated an even more violent white reaction, yet by conforming to the realities of the situation, they still ended up losing their new-found rights.

This then, poses a very important question for democratic government as a whole. The traditional idea of "one man, one vote" is that every man has an equal voice, indirectly, in the running of the government. The exercise of the franchise is supposed to be a benefit; something of positive value, by which each man can protect his interest. But in the South during reconstruction this framework broke down completely, and to the Negro, the vote was actually a liability; it just got him into trouble. Clearly, when there is a situation where a large and powerful group within a democracy manipulates the vote of a weaker group to satisfy its own interests, then the effectiveness of the representative system is lost.

Now the problem is not the fact that there are sectional, or political, or economic interest groups furthering their own purposes. That is quite legitimate and normal; we know that it is usual that the more wealthy elements of a society will take the right wing, supporting a conservative, "laissez-faire" or hands off policy. Conversely, the less wealthy elements, the lower status "labouring class" and so on, tend to support a left-wing path, of social welfare, government control of "big business", and partial equalization of wealth.

The matter of concern is that a race, because of clearly distinguishing physical characteristics, while trying to remain passive or neutral, or else splitting along normal lines of division, is used as a "political football" by the other groups, and thereby loses the value of the vote.

The explanation of why racial groups fall into this position appears to be linked to their vulnerability. That is, the weaker their position in society is, the more likely it is that they will become "political footballs". The question becomes then, why do races fall into a "ripe for the picking" position.

A starting point is the distinctiveness of race. A Catholic can walk into a Protestant church service and not be conspicuous, a street "bum" can take a bath and buy a good suit and pass, at least superficially, as a middle class businessman, a hippie can cut his hair and almost look human, but on the whole, a black man cannot pass as white, or vice versa.

A result of this distinctiveness is the rise of racist ideologies to justify any exploitation that is expedient to the dominant race. These blanket doctrines give race relations a subjective, or emotional character. Park suggests, in connection with this, that men have a certain fear or hesitancy of things different. For instance, if we meet a person very similar to ourselves and he makes a bad impression, we can still compare him with many other cases and realize that the particular person is an exception. However, if we meet a member of an unfamiliar minority group, we have no reference point or standard by which to compare him with others of the same group, and so we are more likely to consider him a genuine representative of his group, and from this, generalize about his group.

The distinctiveness of races and ethnic groups have been preserved by politicians, even as in the case of ethnic groups, when they might have been expected to die out. Glazer shows this in the case of New York City, pointing out that "The large movements of history and people which tend

to reinforce the role of ethnic groups in the city have been accompanied by new developments in political life which similarly strengthen ethnic identities." ¹¹ He continues, "The impression that the political patterns of the city strengthen the roles of ethnic groups is overwhelming." ¹²

The actual size of a minority group is an important variable. The Negroes in Mississippi made up a majority of the population and the whites were very much aware of this. There were lots of votes to buy, or intimidate, or get rid of if necessary. New York city is another example. "Only when an immigrant group reaches the enormous size of the Puerto Ricans does it become a subject of interest, attention, and concern." ¹³ The most recent instance of this is the immigration crisis in Great Britain which suddenly became a matter of national interest after a flood of Africans sought refuge in Britain.

There is a tendency for race and ethnic groups to coincide with economic and social levels in societies. For instance, Glazer notes:

... to describe the economy of New York fully, one would have to point out that it is dominated at its peak (the banks, insurance companies, utilities, big corporation offices) by white protestants, with Irish Catholics and Jews playing somewhat smaller roles. In wholesale and retail commerce, Jews predominate. White-collar workers are largely Irish and Italian if they work for big organizations, and Jewish if they work for smaller ones. The city's working class is, on its upper levels, Negro and Puerto Rican. Other ethnic groups are found scattered everywhere, but concentrated generally in a few economic specialties. ¹⁴

This was, of course, true in the South during reconstruction to a very great extent, with the Negroes supplying cheap manual labour, only with the exception of the "talented tenth." In this case, the Negroes were equipped for very little else, after many generations as plantation slaves. The newest ethnic or racial arrivals to a country have tended

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to occupy the lowest positions in society, and it becomes difficult for them to break this pattern. Race can be used as what Glazer calls an "ethnic shorthand". . . the traditional parties have themselves employed the ethnic shorthand to deal with what are essentially class problems." 15

Not only is this manipulation of races within the political sphere a perversion of the meaning and functions of democratic government, but it also produces some consequences for the races involved. We saw how, in the South, this kind of situation led to the disfranchisement of the Negroes, but this is only part of the story. Another by-product is racist ideology, which serves to unify public opinion in the dominant race and justifies whatever action is taken. Judge Calhoun's opening and closing speeches to the Mississippi Convention illustrate this as well as any other example.

Another effect may be a general cementing of the relative positions of the races in the society. DuBell suggests how the status quo has been preserved in federal politics in the United States. "The stratagem has been to play off the Northern Negro and the white Southerner against one another so as to yield the Negro some gains, but never as much as promised nor too much at one time." 16

The important practical lesson that can be learned from the Negro disfranchisement during reconstruction is that mere political rights are not enough for a satisfactory assimilation. This can only happen when the Negroes have, on a large scale, acquired enough wealth and power, on an individual level, to protect themselves on the political front so that their vote can serve rather than harm them. This means a distribution of the Negroes over the social and economic spectrum of the society on somewhat the same proportion as the general distribution; that is, a

large "middle class" of people in relatively high prestige occupations, in relatively high income levels.

This is not a novel idea; it was the basis of the solution proposed both by Frederick Douglass and later, by Booker T. Washington. They saw that a small elite of Negroes was not enough alone; it had to be a widespread change. Washington put his views into practical application in his Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, and he stressed the fact that a general uplifting of the Negro was in the interests of the whole nation. This was never more true than today.

We can also project certain implications from the analysis in another direction. This in relation to the methodology of the study of race relations as a whole. Many books and studies have been undertaken on the question of race prejudice and discrimination. These attempt to show that these matters are of a psychological nature, coming from within the individual in a variety of ways. The causal factor may be identified as "frustration-aggression" or the "scapegoat effect" or just sheer ignorance, but in these and other cases, there is an abstraction from the social context, a formulation of "universals" about the nature or habits of men.

The conclusions drawn from this project cannot support these approaches in any way. The patterns identified from the analysis of the Mississippi Convention, both in the speeches and from the divisions, show that the Negro disfranchisement depended almost entirely on the realities of the social context; on the economic and political interests of the white counties. A psychological analysis might demonstrate the mechanics of how discrimination originated from the social context became transmitted to the mind of the individual, but from the evidence in this

project, I cannot see how this line of methodology can extend any farther than this.

There is no reason why the final words should not be optimistic. Both the approach taken to this topic, as well as the evidence and conclusions drawn from it have had a non-deterministic tone. I am not postulating the ultimate perfectibility of man, but on the other hand, I am certainly not going to accept the view that race problems are innately insoluble. A pluralistic society in the united states is not impossible and the political participation of the Negroes under the conditions necessary to make their vote a real benefit to them must ultimately be the route to this end.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 P.L. Van den Berghe, Race and Racism (New York, London, Sidney: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1967) p. 9
- 2 O.C. Cox, Caste, Class, and Race (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1959) p.319
- 3 R.E. Park, Race and Culture (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959) p. 107
- 4 R.E. Park, Introduction to the science of sociology. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921) p. 508
- 5 Ibid., 509
- 6 Ibid., 574
- 7 Ibid., 510
- 8 Park, Race and Culture, p.149
- 9 Ibid., 150
- 10 Ibid., 236
- 11 N. Glazer and D.P. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting pot. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963) p.301
- 12 Ibid., 302
- 13 Ibid., 9
- 14 Ibid., 5
- 15 Ibid., 302
- 16 S. Lubell, White and Black. (New York, Evanston, London: Harper and Row, 1964) p. 3

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E.L. Martin. 1890

APPENDIX 1: MAP OF MISSISSIPPI

60 90 120

60° 90° 120°

Map of Mississippi showing counties, cities, and rivers.



TABULAR VIEW

MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION--1890.

Compiled by J. L. Power.

Age is given at last birthday.

704

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

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NAME.	COUNTY OR STATE AT LARGE.	POSTOFFICE.	NATIVITY.	Age.	OCCUPATION.	POLITI- CAL PREFER- ENCE.	MARRIED, SINGLE OR WIDOWER.
S. S. CALHOON, Pres't.	Hinds.....	Jackson.....	Kentucky.....	52	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
R. F. ABBAY.	Tunica.....	Commerce.....	Tennessee.....	48	Planter.....	Democrat.	Single.....
J. L. ALCORN.	Coahoma.....	Eagle's Nest.....	Illinois Ter.....	74	Planter.....	Conservative.	Married.....
R. H. ALLEN.	Tishomingo.....	Luka.....	Mississippi.....	50	Hotel Proprietor.....	Democrat.	Married.....
D. B. ARNOLD.	Panola.....	Pope Station.....	S. Carolina.....	47	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
A. ARRINGTON.	Jones.....	Ellisville.....	Alabama.....	52	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
JNO. A. BAILEY.	Lauderdale.....	Topton.....	Georgia.....	32	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
JNO. R. BAIRD.	Sunflower.....	Baird.....	Mississippi.....	49	Merchant & Plant.	Democrat.	Married.....
D. R. BARNETT.	Yazoo.....	Yazoo City.....	".....	37	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Single.....
W. L. BASSETT.	Neshoba.....	Union, (Newton co.)	Georgia.....	55	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
THOS. P. BELL.	Kemper.....	DeKalb.....	N. Carolina.....	52	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Widower.....
JAS. R. BINFORD.	Montgomery.....	Duck Hill.....	Mississippi.....	51	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
H. I. BIRD.	Lawrence.....	Tryus.....	S. Carolina.....	56	Plant. & Teacher.	Democrat.	Married.....
J. A. BLAIR.	State-at-Large.....	Tupelo.....	Tennessee.....	54	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
B. B. BOONE.	Prentiss.....	Booneville.....	".....	59	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
J. B. BOOTHE.	State-at-Large.....	Sardis.....	N. Carolina.....	46	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
W. A. BOYD.	Tippah.....	Ripley.....	S. Carolina.....	57	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
D. BUNCH.	Yazoo.....	Benton.....	N. Carolina.....	65	Farmer & Mercht.	Democrat.	Married.....
FRANK BURKITT.	State-at-Large.....	Okolona.....	Tennessee.....	47	Editor.....	Democrat.	Married.....
R. B. CAMPBELL.	Washington.....	Greenville.....	Mississippi.....	36	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
J. P. CARTER.	Perry.....	Hattiesburg.....	".....	50	Lawyer & Farmer.	Democrat.	Married.....
J. B. CHRISMAN.	Lincoln.....	Brookhaven.....	Kentucky.....	62	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Widower.....

C. S. COFFEY.	Jefferson.....	Fayette.....	Mississippi.....	34	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
J. W. CUTLER.	Coahoma.....	Clarksdale.....	Lousiana.....	32	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
M. DABNEY.	Warren.....	Vicksburg.....	Mississippi.....	43	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
R. A. DEAN.	Lafayette.....	Glenville, Panola Co	".....	53	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
W. M. DENNY.	Jackson.....	Scranton.....	".....	37	Clerk of Courts.....	Democrat.	Married.....
GEO. G. DILLARD.	Noxubee.....	Macon.....	".....	50	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Single.....
GEO. L. DONALD.	Clarke.....	Shubuta.....	Alabama.....	51	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
G. W. DYER.	Panola.....	Batesville.....	Tennessee.....	54	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
JAS. W. EDWARDS.	Oktibbeha.....	Sturges.....	Mississippi.....	45	Physician.....	Democrat.	Married.....
A. J. ERVIN.	Lowndes.....	Crawford.....	".....	48	Merchant.....	Democrat.	Married.....
W. S. ESKRIDGE.	Tallahatchie.....	Charleston.....	Virginia.....	65	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
WM. S. FARISH.	Issaquena.....	Mayersville.....	Mississippi.....	47	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
D. S. FEARING.	Hinds.....	Raymond.....	".....	40	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Single.....
W. S. FEATHERSTON.	Marshall.....	Holly Springs.....	Tennessee.....	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Widower.....
J. E. FERGUSON.	Newton.....	Hickory.....	Mississippi.....	52	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
J. W. FEWELL.	State at Large.....	Meridian.....	Virginia.....	46	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
GEO. J. FINLEY.	Marshall.....	Holly Springs.....	".....	50	Planter.....	Democrat.	Married.....
J. D. FONTAINE.	Pontotoc.....	Pontotoc.....	Mississippi.....	49	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
T. S. FORD.	State at Large.....	Columbia.....	".....	43	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
J. Z. GEORGE.	State at Large.....	Carrollton.....	Georgia.....	63	U. S. Sen. & Plantr	Democrat.	Married.....
F. M. GLASS.	Attala.....	Sallis.....	Mississippi.....	56	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
JNO. E. GORE.	Webster.....	Greensboro.....	Alabama.....	45	Farmer.....	G'backer.	Married.....
N. D. GUERRY.*	Lowndes.....	*(Died Sep. 1, 1890.)	Georgia.....	67	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Widower.....
A. B. GUYNES.	Copiah.....	Hazlehurst.....	Mississippi.....	42	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
D. T. GUYTON.	Attala.....	West, Helmes Co..	Georgia.....	52	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
F. M. HAMBLETT.	Quitman.....	Belen.....	Mississippi.....	35	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Widower.....
J. G. HAMILTON.	Holmes and Yazoo.....	Durant.....	".....	56	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
T. J. HANNAH.	Choctaw.....	Reform.....	Alabama.....	50	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
W. P. HARRIS.	Hinds.....	Jackson.....	Mississippi.....	71	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Widower.....
T. T. HART.	Hinds.....	Utica.....	".....	48	Planter.....	Democrat.	Married.....
N. C. HATHORN.	Covington.....	Blountville.....	".....	41	Farmer.....	Jeff. Dem.	Married.....
JNO. HENDERSON.	Clay.....	West Point.....	Missouri.....	51	Printer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
ELLIOT HENDERSON.	Harrison.....	Pass Christian.....	Mississippi.....	57	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....

SOURCE: Journal of the
Convention, p. 704-8

NAME.	COUNTY OR STATE AT LARGE.	POSTOFFICE.	NATIVITY.	Age.	OCCUPATION.	POLITI- CAL PREFER- ENCE.	MARRIED, SINGLE OR WIDOWER.
P. HENRY.....	State at Large.....	Brandon.....	Mississippi.....	47	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
C. K. HOLLAND.....	Calhoun.....	Sabougla.....	Alabama.....	61	Physician & Far.....	Democrat.	Married.....
H. S. HOOKER.....	Holmes.....	Lexington.....	Mississippi.....	39	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
R. G. HUDSON.....	State at Large.....	Yazoo City.....	".....	42	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
THOS. D. ISOM.....	Lafayette.....	Oxford.....	Tennessee.....	73	Physician.....	Democrat.	Married.....
J. H. JAMISON.....	Noxubee.....	Cliftonville.....	".....	43	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Widower.....
D. S. JOHNSON.....	Chickasaw.....	Ridge.....	S. Carolina.....	55	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
J. H. JONES.....	State at Large.....	Woodville.....	Alabama.....	51	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Widower.....
WALTER L. KEIRN.....	Holmes.....	Tchula.....	Mississippi.....	60	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
JAMES KENNEDY.....	Clay.....	Palo Alto.....	New York.....	65	Stock Breeder.....	Democrat.	Married.....
J. KITTRELL.....	Green.....	Leakesville.....	Mississippi.....	48	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Widower.....
W. J. LACEY.....	Chickasaw.....	Okolona.....	Louisiana.....	65	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
R. C. LEE.....	Madison.....	Madison Station.....	Mississippi.....	29	Lawyer & Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
B. D. LEE.....	Oktoberbeha.....	A. and M. College.....	S. Carolina.....	56	Prst. A. & M. Col.....	Democrat.	Married.....
P. P. LEE.....	Yazoo.....	Satartia.....	Mississippi.....	46	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
Geo. H. LESTER.....	Yalobusha.....	Coffeeville.....	S. Carolina.....	59	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
V. F. LOVE.....	Amite.....	Liberty.....	Mississippi.....	39	Planter & Mercht.....	Democrat.	Married.....
A. W. MAGRUDER.....	Warren.....	Vicksburg.....	".....	41	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
J. B. MARRETT.....	Marshall.....	Cornersville.....	S. Carolina.....	56	Farmer & Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
VILL T. MARTIN.....	Adams.....	Natchez.....	Kentucky.....	67	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
B. MARTIN.....	Alcorn and Prentiss.....	Rienzi.....	Tennessee.....	40	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
DWARD MAYES.....	State at Large.....	Oxford.....	Mississippi.....	43	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
ONROE MCCLURG.....	Carroll.....	Vaiden.....	".....	38	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
VILL T. McDONALD.....	Benton.....	Ashland.....	".....	27	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
J. McDONNELL.....	Monroe.....	Okolona.....	Alabama.....	38	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
H. MCGEEHEE.....	Franklin.....	Little Springs.....	Mississippi.....	36	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
T. MCGEEHEE.....	Wilkinson.....	Woodville.....	".....	56	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
A. McLAIN.....	Amite and Pike.....	Gloster.....	".....	37	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....

C. McLEAN.....	Grenada.....	Grenada.....	Mississippi.....	36	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
J. McLaurin.....	Rankin.....	Brandon.....	".....	42	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
J. McLaurin.....	Sharkey.....	Rolling Fork.....	".....	37	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Single.....
S. McLaurin.....	Smith.....	Burns.....	".....	39	Physician.....	Democrat.	Married.....
McNEELY.....	State at Large.....	Greenville.....	".....	48	Editor.....	Democrat.	Married.....
P. MELCHIOR.....	Bolivar.....	Bellevue.....	".....	42	Planter.....	Democrat.	Married.....
MENDENHALL.....	Simpson.....	Westville.....	N. Carolina.....	60	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
IN MILLER.....	Leake.....	Walnut Grove.....	Kentucky.....	54	Minister & Mercht.....	Democrat.	Married.....
IAH T. MONTGOMERY.....	Bolivar.....	Blount Bayou.....	Mississippi.....	43	Merchant & Plant.....	Rep.....	Married.....
H. MORGAN.....	Leflore.....	Sheppardtown.....	".....	56	Planter.....	Democrat.	Widower.....
DON L. MORRIS.....	Wayne.....	Waynesboro.....	S. Carolina.....	57	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
L. MULBROW.....	State at Large.....	Starkville.....	Mississippi.....	52	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
R. MURFF.....	Monroe.....	Bartabatchie.....	S. Carolina.....	45	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
V. NOLAND.....	Wilkinson.....	Woodville.....	Mississippi.....	55	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
W. ODOM.....	DeSoto.....	Nesbitt.....	Tennessee.....	48	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
E. PACKWOOD.....	Pike.....	Magnolia.....	Alabama.....	50	Lawyer, Far. Mer.....	Democrat.	Single.....
K. P. PALMER.....	Scott.....	Forest.....	Georgia.....	41	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Single.....
C. PATTY.....	Noxubee.....	Macon.....	Mississippi.....	54	Far. & Chan. Clk.....	Democrat.	Married.....
J. PAXTON.....	Washington.....	Areola.....	Virginia.....	74	Planter.....	Democrat.	Widower.....
O. POTTER.....	Union and Pontotoc.....	Blue Springs.....	Georgia.....	54	Farmer & Teacher.....	Democrat.	Married.....
I. POWELL.....	DeSoto.....	Hernando.....	Tennessee.....	66	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
R. PURYEAR.....	Tate.....	Looxahoma.....	Virginia.....	53	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
H. REAGAN.....	Leake and Newton.....	Beech Springs.....	Alabama.....	38	Farmer & Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
AS. K. REGAN.....	Claiborne.....	Reganton.....	Mississippi.....	42	Farmer & Teacher.....	Democrat.	Married.....
P. REYNOLDS.....	Alcorn.....	Jacinto.....	Tennessee.....	52	Farmer & Manufg.....	Democrat.	Married.....
R. RHODES.....	Lee.....	Guntown.....	S. Carolina.....	52	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
C. RICHARDS.....	Lowndes.....	Columbus.....	Alabama.....	61	Banker.....	Democrat.	Married.....
W. ROBINSON.....	Rankin.....	Goshen Springs.....	S. Carolina.....	53	Physician & Far.....	Democrat.	Married.....
P. ROBINSON.....	Union.....	Blue Springs.....	".....	55	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Widower.....
R. ROTENBERRY.....	Yalobusha.....	Water Valley.....	Alabama.....	47	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
S. SEXTON.....	State at Large.....	Hazlehurst.....	Mississippi.....	35	Lawyer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
M. SIMONTON.....	Lee.....	Shannon.....	Tennessee.....	60	Farmer.....	Democrat.	Married.....
E. SIMRALL.....	Warren.....	Glass.....	Kentucky.....	72	Lawyer & Judge.....	Nat. Rep.....	Married.....

					PREFER- ENCE.	DIVORCED OR WIDOWER
F. SMITH.....	Jasper.....	Barnett.....	Mississippi ..	55	Farmer.....	Democrat. Married
RAY F. SMITH.....	Warren.....	Vicksburg.....	N. Carolina..	40	Lawyer.....	Democrat. Married
F. SPENCE.....	Hancock.....	Kiln.....	Mississippi ..	41	Physician.....	Democrat. Married
I. STREET.....	Lauderdale ..	Meridian.....	N. Carolina..	57	Fire Ins. Adjuster.	Democrat. Married
V. SULLIVAN.....	Carroll.....	Carrollton.....	Mississippi ..	34	Farmer.....	Democrat. Married
P. SYKES.....	Monroe.....	Aberdeen.....	Alabama.....	40	Lawyer.....	Democrat. Married
EN TALBOT.....	Benton and Tippah..	Ashland.....	Mississippi ..	48	Farmer.....	Democrat. Married
I. TAYLOR.....	Panola.....	Sardis.....	Tennessee... ..	52	Lawyer.....	Democrat. Married
I. THOMPSON.....	Lincoln and Jefferson..	Brookhaven.....	Mississippi ..	42	Lawyer.....	Democrat. Married
VE H. TURNER.....	Itawamba.....	Mantachie.....	".....	41	Farmer.....	Democrat. Married
WARD.....	Madison.....	Canton.....	".....	35	Lawyer.....	Democrat. Married
WAR C. WATSON.....	Winston.....	Louisville.....	".....	50	Farmer.....	Democrat. Married
WEBB.....	Marion.....	Columbia.....	".....	46	Circuit & Chan. Clk	Democrat. Married
C. WILKINSON.....	Copiah.....	Crystal Springs.....	Ireland	54	Merchant	Democrat. Married
W. K. WINCHESTER.....	Adams.....	Natchez.....	Mississippi ..	43	Lawyer.....	Democrat. Single.....
D. WITHERSPOON.....	Laud'le, Kemp, Clarke	Meridian.....	".....	27	Lawyer.....	Democrat. Single.....
P. WYATT.....	Tate.....	Coldwater.....	Texas.....	52	Farmer.....	Democrat. Married
G. YERGER.....	Washington	Greenville.....	Mississippi ..	50	Lawyer.....	Democrat. Married
E. WILSON.....	Secretary	Jackson.....	Mississippi ..	34	Journalist & Far..	Democrat. Married
E. MARTIN.....	Reading Clerk.....	Jackson.....	".....	30	Publisher ..	Democrat. Single.....
ENIO.....	Journal Clerk.....	Vicksburg.....	".....	50	Lawyer & Clerk...	Democrat. Married
H. MADDEN.....	Enrolling Clerk.....	Madden, (Leake Co)	".....	30	Farmer & Merch.	Democrat. Married
BB HARRIS.....	Serg't-at-Arms	Oxford.....	".....	21	Student & Clerk...	Democrat. Single.....
I. WINSTAD.....	Doorkeeper.....	Yazoo City.....	".....	47	Farmer.....	Democrat. Married
S LIZZIE YERGER.....	Postmistress	Jackson.....	".....	...	Student.....	Democrat. Single.....

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
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fiscal year, to the Governor of this State, a report showing the condition of the levees, and recommending such additional legislation on the subject of the system as shall be thought necessary, and showing the receipts and expenditures of the board, so that each item, the amount and consideration therefor, shall distinctly appear, together with such other matters as it shall be thought proper to call to the attention of the Legislature.

SEC. 236. The Legislature shall impose for levee purposes, in addition to the levee taxes heretofore levied or authorized by law, a uniform tax of not less than two nor more than five cents an acre, per annum, upon every acre of land now, or hereafter, embraced within the limits of either, or both, of said levee districts. The taxes so derived shall be paid into the treasury of the levee board of the district in which the land charged with the same is situated; and the Legislature, by the act imposing said tax, shall authorize said levee boards to fix the annual rate of taxation per acre within the limits aforesaid, and thereby require said levee boards, whenever a reduction is made by them in their other taxes, to make a proportionate reduction in the acreage tax hereinbefore mentioned; but said acreage tax shall not be reduced below two cents an acre per annum; and all reductions in such taxations shall be uniform in each of said districts; but the rate of taxation need not be the same in both of them; and such specific taxes shall be assessed on the same assessment roll, and collected under the same penalties as the *ad valorem* taxes for levee purposes, and shall be paid at the same time with the latter. And no levee board shall ever be permitted to buy lands when sold for taxes; but the State shall have a prior lien for the taxes due thereto. The Legislature may provide for the discontinuance of the tax on cotton, but not in such manner as to affect outstanding bonds based on it, and on the discontinuance of the tax on cotton, shall impose another tax in lieu thereof, but the Legislature may repeal the acreage tax required to be levied hereby, after the first day of January. A. D., 1895.

SEC. 237. The Legislature shall have full power to provide such system of taxation for said levee districts as it shall from time to time deem wise and proper.

SEC. 238. No property situated between the levee and the Mississippi river shall be taxed for levee purposes, nor shall damage be paid to any owner of land so situated because of it being left outside a levee.

SEC. 239. The Legislature shall require the levee boards to publish at each of their sessions, an itemized account embracing their respective receipts since the prior session, and such appropriations as have been made or ordered by them.

respectively, in some newspaper or newspapers of the district.

ARTICLE XII.

FRANCHISE.

SEC. 240. All elections by the people shall be by ballot.

SEC. 241. Every male inhabitant of this State, except idiots, insane persons and Indians not taxed, who is a citizen of the United States, twenty-one years old and upwards, who has resided in this State two years, and one year in the election district, or in the incorporated city or town, in which he offers to vote, and who is duly registered as provided in this article, and who has never been convicted of bribery, burglary, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretenses, perjury, forgery, embezzlement or bigamy, and who has paid, on or before the first day of February of the year in which he shall offer to vote, all taxes which may have been legally required of him, and which he has had an opportunity of *Payment at this* paying according to law, for the two preceding years, and who shall produce to the officers holding the election satisfactory evidence that he has paid said taxes, is declared to be a *must prove* qualified elector; but any minister of the gospel in charge of an organized church shall be entitled to vote after six months residence in the election district, if otherwise qualified.

SEC. 242. The Legislature shall provide by law for the registration of all persons entitled to vote at any election, and all persons offering to register shall take the following oath or affirmation: "I _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I am twenty-one years old, (or I will be before the next election in this county) and that I will have resided in this State two years, and _____ election district of _____ county one year next preceding the ensuing election or (if it be stated in the oath that the person proposing to register is a minister of the gospel in charge of an organized church, then it will be sufficient to aver therein, two years residence in the State and six months in said election district), and am now in good faith a resident of the same, and that I am not disqualified from voting by reason of having been convicted of any crime named in the Constitution of this State as a disqualification to be an elector; that I will truly answer all questions propounded to me concerning my antecedents so far as they relate to my right to vote, and also as to my residence before my citizenship in this district; that I will faithfully support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Mississippi, and will bear true faith and allegiance to the same. So help me God." In registering voters in cities and towns, not wholly in one election district, the name of such city or town may be substi-

tuted in the oath for the election district. Any wilful and corrupt false statement in said affidavit, or in answer to any material question propounded as herein authorized, shall be perjury.

SEC. 243. A uniform poll tax of two dollars, to be used in aid of the common schools, and for no other purpose, is hereby imposed on every male inhabitant of this State between the ages of twenty-one and sixty years, except persons who are deaf and dumb or blind, or who are maimed by loss of hand or foot; said tax to be a lien only upon taxable property. The Board of Supervisors of any county may, for the purpose of aiding the common schools in that county, increase the poll tax in said county, but in no case shall the entire poll tax exceed in any one year three dollars on each poll. No criminal proceedings shall be allowed to enforce the collection of the poll tax.

SEC. 244. On and after the first day of January, A. D., 1892, every elector shall, in addition to the foregoing qualifications, be able to read any section of the Constitution of this State; or he shall be able to understand the same when read to him, or give a reasonable interpretation thereof. A new registration shall be made before the next ensuing election after January the first, A. D., 1892.

SEC. 245. Electors in municipal elections shall possess all the qualifications herein prescribed, and such additional qualifications as may be provided by law.

SEC. 246. Prior to the first day of January, A. D., 1896, the elections by the people in this State shall be regulated by an ordinance of this Convention.

SEC. 247. The Legislature shall enact laws to secure fairness in party primary elections, conventions or other methods of naming party candidates.

SEC. 248. Suitable remedies by appeal or otherwise shall be provided by law, to correct illegal or improper registration and to secure the elective franchise to those who may be illegally or improperly denied the same.

SEC. 249. No one shall be allowed to vote for members of the Legislature or other officers who has not been duly registered under the Constitution and laws of this State, by an officer of this State, legally authorized to register the voters thereon. And registration under the Constitution and laws of this State by the proper officers of this State is hereby declared to be an essential and necessary qualification to vote at any and all elections.

SEC. 250. All qualified electors and no others shall be eligible to office except as otherwise provided in this Constitution.

SEC. 251. Electors shall not be registered within four months next before any election at which they may offer to vote; but appeals may be heard and determined and revision

Poll
Tax

exclusive
clause

Provision

must
register

Registers
4 mo. to
prior
election

take place at any time prior to the election; and no person who, in respect to age and residence, would become entitled to vote, within the said four months, shall be excluded from registration on account of his want of qualification at the time of registration.

SEC. 252. The term of office of all elective officers under this Constitution shall be four years, except as otherwise provided herein. A general election for all elective officers shall be held on the Tuesday next after the first Monday of November, A. D., 1895, and every four (4) years thereafter; *Provided*, The Legislature may change the day and date of general elections to any day and date in October, November or December.

SEC. 253. The Legislature may by a two-thirds vote of both houses, of all members elected, restore the right of suffrage to any person disqualified by reason of crime; but the reasons therefor shall be spread upon the Journals, and the vote shall be by yeas and nays.

ARTICLE XIII.

APPORTIONMENT.

SEC. 254. The number of Representatives in the Lower house of the Legislature shall be one hundred and thirty-three, to be apportioned as follows:

First—The counties of Choctaw, Covington, Greene, Hancock, Issaquena, Jones, Lawrence, LeFlore, Marion, Neshoba, Pearl River, Perry, Quitman, Scott, Sharkey, Simpson, Smith, Sunflower, Tallahatchie, Tishomingo, Tunica, Wayne and Webster, each shall have one Representative.

Second—The counties of Alcorn, Amite, Attala, Bolivar, Calhoun, Carroll, Chickasaw, Clay, Coahoma, DeSoto, Kemper, Lafayette, Madison, Newton, Pike, Pontotoc, Prentiss, Rankin, Tate, Union, Wilkinson and Yalobusha, each shall have two Representatives.

Third—the counties of Copiah, Holmes, Marshall, Monroe, Noxubee, Panola, Warren and Washington, each shall have three Representatives.

Fourth—The counties of Franklin and Lincoln each shall have one Representative and a Floater between them.

Fifth—The counties of Tippah and Benton each shall have one Representative and a Floater between them.

Sixth—The counties of Claiborne and Jefferson each shall have one Representative and a Floater between them.

Seventh—The counties of Clarke and Jasper each shall have one Representative and a Floater between them.

Eighth—The counties of Grenada and Montgomery each shall have one Representative and a Floater between them.

Ninth—The counties of Leake and Winston, each shall have one Representative and a Floater between them.

Tenth—The counties of Harrison and Jackson, each shall have one Representative and a Floater between them.

Eleventh—The county of Yazoo shall have three Representatives and the county of Hinds shall have three Representatives, and they shall have a Floater between them.

Twelfth—The county of Lauderdale shall have three Representatives, one to be elected by the city of Meridian, one by the county outside the city limits, and one by the whole county including Meridian.

Thirteenth—The county of Adams outside of the city of Natchez shall have one Representative and the city of Natchez one Representative.

Fourteenth—The county of Lowndes shall have three Representatives, two of whom shall be elected by that part of the county east of the Tombigbee river, and one by that portion of the county west of said river.

Fifteenth—The county of Oktibbeha shall have two Representatives, one of whom shall be elected by that portion of the county east of the line running north and south between ranges thirteen and fourteen, and the other by that portion of the county west of said line.

Sixteenth—The county of Lee shall have two Representatives, the county of Itawamba one, and a Floater between them.

Seventeenth—In counties divided into legislative districts, any citizen of the county eligible for election to the House of Representatives shall be eligible to represent any district thereof.

THE SENATE.

SEC. 255 The number of Senators shall be forty-five and are apportioned as follows:

First—The counties of Hancock, Harrison and Jackson shall constitute the First District, and elect one Senator.

Second—The counties of Wayne, Jones, Perry and Greene the Second District, and elect one Senator.

Third—The counties of Jasper and Clarke the Third District, and elect one Senator.

Fourth—The counties of Simpson, Covington, Marion and Pearl River, the Fourth District, and elect one Senator.

Fifth—The counties of Rankin and Smith the Fifth District and elect one Senator.

Sixth—The counties of Pike and Franklin the Sixth District, and elect one Senator.

Seventh—The counties of Amite and Wilkinson the Seventh District, and elect one Senator.

Eighth—The counties of Lincoln and Lawrence the Eighth District, and elect one Senator.

Ninth—The county of Adams the Ninth District, and elect one Senator.

Tenth—The counties of Claiborne and Jefferson the Tenth District, and elect one Senator.

Eleventh—The county of Copiah the Eleventh District, and elect one Senator.

Twelfth—The counties of Hinds and Warren the Twelfth District, and elect one Senator each and a Senator between them, to be chosen from the counties alternately, beginning with Hinds.

Thirteenth—The counties of Scott and Newton the Thirteenth District, and elect one Senator.

Fourteenth—The county of Lauderdale, the Fourteenth District, and elect one Senator.

Fifteenth—The counties of Kemper and Winston the Fifteenth District, and elect one Senator.

Sixteenth—The county of Noxubee the Sixteenth District, and elect one Senator.

Seventeenth—The counties of Leake and Neshoba the Seventeenth District, and elect one Senator.

Eighteenth—The county of Madison the Eighteenth District, and elect one Senator.

Nineteenth—The county of Yazoo the Nineteenth District, and elect one Senator.

Twentieth—The counties of Sharkey and Issaquena the Twentieth District, and elect one Senator.

Twenty-first—The county of Holmes the Twenty-First District, and elect one Senator.

Twenty-second—The county of Attala the Twenty-Second District, and elect one Senator.

Twenty-third—The counties of Oktibbeha and Choctaw the Twenty-Third District, and elect one Senator.

Twenty-fourth—The counties of Clay and Webster the Twenty-Fourth District, and elect one Senator.

Twenty-fifth—The county of Lowndes the Twenty-Fifth District, and elect one Senator.

Twenty-sixth—The counties of Carroll and Montgomery the Twenty-Sixth District, and elect one Senator.

Twenty-seventh—The counties of Leflore and Tallahatchie the Twenty-Seventh District, and elect one Senator.

Twenty-eighth—The counties of Yalobusha and Grenada the Twenty-Eighth District, and elect one Senator.

Twenty-ninth—The counties of Washington and Sunflower the Twenty-Ninth District; the county of Washington shall elect one Senator, and the counties of Washington and Sunflower a Senator between them.

Thirtieth—The county of Bolivar the Thirtieth District, and elect one Senator.