AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF MAN

IN THE WRITINGS OF KARL MARX AND EMILE DURKHEIM
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A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University
March, 1972
TITLE: An Analysis of the Conceptions of Man in the Writings of Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim

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SUPERVISOR: Assistant Professor R. Hornosty

NUMBER OF PAGES: 115

SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

The intent of this study is to consider the evolution of the conception of man and society from the period of the eighteenth century Enlightenment to that of the nineteenth century social theorists. Specifically, the concern here is with discerning whether and in what manner the writings of Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim may be seen as a reaction to and rejection of the notions regarding man popularized by the Enlightenment philosophes. The investigation suggests that Marx and Durkheim, although they did not simply discount the Enlightenment orientation which considered man as the source and center of reality, did in fact join in providing the basis for subsequent theorists to abandon the inquiries initiated by the Enlightenment and to base reality, truth and goodness in the social sphere. The implication is that Marx and Durkheim, and their perspectives, Marxist socialism and sociology, may be seen as rather unwitting accomplices in the elimination of certain fundamental questions underlying social philosophy.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my appreciation to the members of my committee, in particular Roy Hornosty, for providing me with the encouragement and insights which made this research possible. I wish also to thank Dusky Smith whose critical stance vis-à-vis this study was instrumental in extricating a number of significant issues. Lastly, I thank Mrs. Claire Duffy for her kind and patient assistance in typing the manuscript.
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CHAPTER I

The Question of Man: Its Modern and Historical Significance

Introduction

Nothing seems more fundamental to human creativity than man's preoccupation with his own facticity and that of his species. Man's concern for defining, delineating and ultimately understanding his own existence is a theme which permeates the entire history of human endeavor. It has long been held that once one finally grasps the veritable nature of man then truth with regard to the meaning of life, knowledge of the correct moral, political and social perspective and the path to human felicity are all drawn inexorably within the realm of apprehension. In consequence, from the most remote stirrings of human intellectuality and artistry, men and women have striven and now strive to provide a reply to the nagging query: what is man? The following thesis will investigate the manner in which eighteenth and nineteenth century European thought sought to respond to this question.

However, this work is not based simply upon the perpetual significance of fundamental questions. Rather, it is motivated by a concern with the seeming demise of the import of such queries in modern social theory. As will be elaborated upon later, contemporary social theorists appear to have eviscerated their task by essentially discarding explicit inquiry into or consideration of such rudiments as the nature of man. Consequently, this study is directed not only to antecedent perspectives on man but to reflecting on the impact
these historical predecessors may have had on the subsequent premature closure of modern theorizing.

Specifically the fact to be taken will be first, in order to reveal the historical context, to review the orientation to man which emerged from the Medieval world and culminated in the individualism of the Enlightenment and French Revolution. Secondly, an investigation will be made of the subsequent opposition to this individualistic conception of man. Against this historical background the works of two germinal thinkers of the nineteenth century, Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx, will be analyzed in order to discern if, despite their political antipathy, these men were in fact assuming a significantly similar impression of the nature of man in joint reaction against the preceding individualistic notions.

**Review of the Relevant Literature**

**Sociology and the Question of Man**

Before actually undertaking these tasks, it seems necessary to indicate that these inquiries are pertinent beyond the obvious personal significance of Marx and Durkheim. In brief, it seems wise to reveal the continuing relevancy of the question of human nature for both sociological and Marxist enterprise. The conception of man is not some ignominious esoteric facet of theory but rather the core for social theorizing; the implicit or explicit premises from which the theorist logically extrapolates many of his subsequent formulations. Marxists and sociologists, recognizing the centrality of the nature of man in the theoretical framework, have directed some effort to extricating the representation of man implicit in their respective perspectives and to
considering the ensuing implications of such images of man. However, as will be evident below in the brief review of the literature, the investigation in this field has not transcended its initial phase.

In sociology concern for the nature of man has brought forth a bifurcated reaction. One school of thought has concentrated on the methodological adequacy of the conception of man; that is, they consider whether a particular representation of man is conducive to empirical research. Basically the men who fall within the confines of this orientation, such as Karl Popper, Ernest Gellner, and Joseph Agassi,¹ are not addressing themselves to the problem which concerns this paper. The issue here is not to resolve which interpretation of man serves as a better explanatory device,² nor to provide some ultimate empirical resolution, if such exists, to the nature of man. The methodological outlook is mentioned in part for the sake of comprehensiveness and in part to clarify that the intent of this paper, being historical as well as analytical, is to provide insight into the origins and phylogeny of the conception of man in sociology and Marxism in order to secure some understanding of the historical milieu from which modern views on man were drawn.

It is the other sociological approach to human nature which is of import to this work. Although the nature of man was of


²As suggested by Gellner, p. 494.
vital interest to the founders of sociology and has remained an under-current in sociological speculation through the early twentieth century, not until the 1950's did it experience some measure of a modern resurgence into the realm of explicit intellectualizing.

Reinhard Bendix's "The Image of Man in the Social Sciences" written in 1951 reopened the question by pointing out that the nature of man was indeed a significant issue, by disclosing that historical analysis drew into question the image of man implicitly perpetuated by sociology and by revealing the moral implications sociologists were ignoring in their espousal of a particular conception of man. Bendix notes, "once we judge what a man says according to who his friends are, we need think of him no longer as a person but only as a member of his group." In hopes of revitalizing a crucial dilemma in social theorizing, he concludes, "No more important task faces the social sciences today than to determine by 'which image of man' they are to be led."

C. Arnold Anderson in his 1954 article "Human Nature: The Common Concern of the Humane Disciplines" reiterates the assertion that assumptions regarding human nature are basic to "every discipline dealing with human conduct." He touches upon the cultural, historical and social forces which have influenced man's conception of his own nature but concludes that the question is indeterminate; that it is "human nature to paint as Grandma Moses paints just as it is human nature to paint as Picasso does. It is human nature to split the atom or to devise a plow." These uncritical, banal statements served merely to

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6 Ibid, p. 182.
undermine the central issue rather than to stimulate further study in the field.

Fortunately there were men who could provide more discerning analyses of the subject. In 1956 in his book *Conceptions of Institutions* Stanley Taylor devoted considerable effort to an historical review and analysis of the conception of man most antithetical to the sociological position--individualism. Although his presentation leaned sharply in favor of the sociological framework; and this was reflected in his consideration of individualism, his book did much to disclose the historical context from which sociology evolved and the conceptions of man it had superseded.

In 1961 William Kolb, who also worked upon the premise that scholars inevitably make assumptions about reality and, in particular, about man, proposed that these assumed images of man are not selected arbitrarily but in fact reflect the value-systems of the particular theorist. He notes, "there is inevitably a deep psycho-logical connection between the images of man in the social sciences, the images of man held by social scientists as committed participants in scientific and other roles, and the image of man at the root of the society's fundamental value-orientations."\(^7\) Kolb attempts to explicate the issue Anderson had merely alluded to; he proceeds to investigate the image of man predominant in the social sciences (in particular, the conception of human freedom) and to consider the ramifications of such an interpretative viewpoint.

Kolb argues that the sociological conception of man is basically destructive of any notions of human freedom and, in

consequence, that sociology may be "weakening institutional norms based on the concern for human freedom and dignity,"\(^8\) and contributing to "acceptance by the modern undergraduate student of his own lack of moral responsibility because he is determined by his socio-cultural environment."\(^9\) Kolb's solution is to advocate the employment of the Judaic-Christian image of man as a heuristic device in the social sciences.

Kolb's article questioning the very foundation of sociological undertakings precipitated a lengthy exchange with a supporter of the existing sociological framework, Talcott Parsons, who grants that sociology rests on certain premises regarding man yet does not agree with Kolb as to what constitutes these premises. Parsons maintains that the positivistic, deterministic portrayal of man is not as omnipresent as suggested and points to the notion of institutional freedom (that is, the belief that institutions open up a new vista of freedom to the individual) as indicative in his opinion of the sociological commitment to a non-deterministic view of man.\(^10\) Kolb rejoined that sociologists were failing to take a clear moral position on the nature of man and thereupon summarized his alternative position. Parsons terminated the debate by asserting that Kolb was failing to comprehend institutionalized freedom and tending toward a parochialism which would merely serve to restrict sociological endeavors.

\(^8\)Ibid. p. 10.
\(^9\)Ibid. p. 11.
In the same year as this confrontation Dennis Wrong published a terse, thought-provoking paper entitled "The Oversocialized Conception of Man" which also assaulted the assumptions buttressing sociology. Wrong posits that social theorists must necessarily present answers to certain set questions such as what is the source of social order. In providing their responses theorists articulate a particular interpretation of human nature. Wrong argues that sociologists, in the process of replying to this question of order, have created an overly-simplistic, uni-dimensional portrayal of man. By reference to the more complex assessment of man apparent in the writings of Freud, Hobbes and Marx, Wrong reveals the simplication at work, "The view that man is invariably pushed by internalized norms or pulled by the lure of self-validation by others ignores—to speak archaically for a moment—both the highest and the lowest, both beast and angel, in his nature."¹¹

Wrong is aware that sociologists may feel they have resolved the question with this "disembodied, conscience-driven, status-seeking phantom"¹² but he feels they cannot dismiss it so easily. To do-so, Wrong asserts, is to lapse into a partial perspective, into a view of man which precludes aspects of the total reality. Sociology must extend itself, revitalize the roots of its theoretical stance and strive to present man with all his nuances, complexities and implausibilities.

Subsequent opposition to his views led Wrong to present a second paper "Human Nature and the Perspective of Sociology" in 1963. In this work it is evident that as he attempted to counter criticism and more carefully articulate his position, Wrong diluted his original


critique with capitulations to the prevailing perspective. The conception of man which was to deal with the highest and lowest in human nature is reduced almost to an addendum: "Yet granting that all sociology starts with the reality of the solidary group and its impact on the individual, it need not presuppose a human nature consisting solely of group-sustaining forces."\(^{13}\) Moreover, the revised conception itself remains an anomaly, some poorly defined synthesis of psychoanalysis and symbolic interactionism.\(^{14}\)

Despite the tortuously slow, discursive, often redundant development of the discussion of human nature, scholarly effort continued to be directed along these lines. Edward A. Tiryakian in *Sociologism and Existentialism* focused on the history of the conception of man in sociology by analyzing the Durkheimian view of man. In 1965 Louis Dumont published his "The Modern Conception of the Individual" in which he attempted to disclose the patterns of thought which have evolved concerning man and to reveal the manner in which these historical representations of man have influenced the key theoretical frameworks in the contemporary world; for example, Marxism and Liberalism. In short, Dumont strove to inject systematic historical analysis into the question of human nature.

In 1966 Harvey Rich in his paper "Homo Sociologicus" which is based upon Wrong's early critique of the sociological view of man, indicated the drawbacks tied up with any reliance on personality theory as an antidote to sociological determinism. However, in his


conclusion Rich seems directed toward the truncated view of man

Wrong was so desirous of avoiding:

One way to distinguish between personality at the level of character structure and the level more relevant for sociological analysis is demonstrated by Oscar Lewis in his distinction between the 'private personality' and the 'public personality'. The former would be similar to the psychoanalytic conception of personality, while the latter would refer to that psychological dimension of behaviour reflecting the demands which conventional behaviour patterns in a particular culture make upon the emotions of the individual. 15

The most recent work in this field, Ernest Becker's "The Evaded Question: Science and Human Nature" is revelatory of the impasse which appears to be preventing contemporary concern for the nature of man from transcending its initial phases. Becker rests upon the pertinency of this topic to any science of man and is satisfied to essentially enumerate the historical and ideological reasons which account for the previous lack of interest in this realm. Thus, in recent years the study of the nature of man has shown signs of becoming lost in the vicissitudes of its subject matter.

The intent here is not to denigrate preceding research. Wrong, Dumont, Tiryakian and others have clearly demonstrated the potentialities of the conception of man as a heuristic and investigative device. However, the central task of historical and analytical inquiry remains drastically incomplete; for example, there has been no truly detailed analysis of the actual components of the sociological view of man, historical studies have tended to be superficial, the actualities and alternatives have never been carefully delineated.

In brief, it is evident from the literature that the nature of man is

not a dead issue, not an intellectual anachronism in sociology.
Rather, it remains a cursorily explored pathway to comprehending and
criticizing previous theorizing and the first step to any iconoclastic future theoretical framework.

Marxism and the Question of Man

The pertinency of the conception of man for Marxist thought
is perhaps more immediately apparent than was the case with sociology.
A number of popular books have dealt exclusively with this topic:
Erich Fromm's Marx's Concept of Man and Vernon Venable's Human Nature
The Marxian View. Further, the dialogue between the Marxists and the
existentialists (for example, J.P. Sartre's Search for a Method, Adam
Schaff's Marxism and the Human Individual and The Philosophy of Man)
centres directly upon the question of man's nature and has fomented
intense dissension regarding the adequacy of the representation of
man asserted in Marxist writings.

Further, sociologists have evidenced concern for the Marxian
conception of man. Charles Tucker in "Marx and Sociology Some
Theoretical Implications" examines, amongst other things, the repercus-
sions for sociology of Marxian man:

The 'nature of man' that is implicit in our sociological
theories seems to stand in direct contradiction to the
Marxian conception. These theories seem to view man not
as activities but as attributes; not as active beings but
as abstractions; not as associated but as atomistic. If
this is so, the adoption of Marx's conception of man
within modern sociological theories would call for a
drastic alteration of them. 16

16 Charles W. Tucker, "Marx and Sociology: Some Theoretical
However, Tucker has merely initiated investigation of the relationship between the sociological and Marxian view of human nature. Although his propositions are thought-provoking, his analysis is so brief that it is at best sketchy and superficial.

John Ward in his paper, "Mills, Marx and Modern Individualism" attempts to disclose the historical relation between diverse perspectives on human nature. He seeks to clarify the Marxian orientation to man by placing it in juxtaposition with that of Mills and modern individualism. Although again the work is too brief to be satisfactorily complete, Tucker's remarks do reveal that the Marxian notion of man may be most graphically delineated by contrast to alternative views on man.

Numerous other works by divers sociologists, Marxists, and existentialists might be cited to sustain the position that the nature of man in Marx is indeed a vital concern. Yet it would also appear that much effort has been distracted from a comprehensive analysis of Marx's texts and too little attention has been devoted to reconnoitering the historical context in which Marx developed his implicit portrayal of man. In brief, the literature does support the contention that the conception of man in Marx is an extremely viable research concern. Further, it suggests that detailed analysis and historical investigation are among the areas most lacking in systematic consideration.

Approach to the Problem

Given that the question of the conception of man in Marx and Durkheim is worthy of investigation, attention must turn to the particular approach to be taken. Essentially the tact to be followed is
historical; that is, the analysis will deal in a systematic manner with past events. On this abstract level the research rests upon the premise articulated by C. Wright Mills, amongst others, that the past is the key to the present, "The problems of our times—which now include the problem of man's very nature—cannot be stated adequately without consistent practice of the view that history is the shank of social study." More specifically, the methodology will consist of research into the views of man promulgated in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The premise underlying this particular focus is that this historical period was a critical juncture in the evolution of the conception of man; that during this time a dialectic between two opposing views of man emerged.

Lastly, in concession to practicability, the research will be restricted to a systematic analysis of the writings of the Enlightenment, Marx and Durkheim. It is hoped that considering in detail the works of two men rather than surveying the literature of the period will bind the research to concrete actualities and ward off any proclivity to manufacture historical patterns by selective distortion. As Leon Bramson notes, "On the one hand diversity must be reduced to clear patterns for the sake of intelligibility; and on the other, the meaning of each idea must be preserved from falsification by constant reference to its place and purport in history." A second obvious justification is that

these two men, both struggling with a science of man, were compelled to formulate the conceptions of man which continue to reverberate throughout social theory.

Clearly what is being left out in this historical analysis is a consideration of the material conditions and their role in human action. This omission does not arise from any questioning of the fruitfulness of materialist investigation. It is granted that such factors as the economic organization of a society influence the view of man prominent in that society; that Marx's social theory may be viewed as in part the product of his background and of the societal organization of his time. However, it is held that material analysis is only one level of research. The investigation here is of men as actors rather than reagents, of men making history, rather than of the role of historical forces. In short, the decision to focus on the realm of idea systems is not based on a rejection of the significance of the material forces in history but on a belief that the overt struggle amongst theoretical perspectives equally merits research.

In summary, three working assumptions are being adopted. First, as proposed by Wrong, Bendix and others, it is asserted that the philosophical premises concerning the nature of man are intrinsic to comprehension and criticism of social theory. Insight into the basis of a theory provides a lever by which to shake the entire superstructure. Secondly, it is suggested that, despite efforts previously expended, there remains a need for a systematic comprehensive analysis investigating the sustaining premises in both sociology and Marxism. As revealed by the literature, one of the most productive areas of study is that which deals with the underlying assumptions regarding the nature of man and society. Lastly, it is maintained that a research orientation instrumental in
filling the aforenoted gap in present studies is one which examines the intellectual historical antecedents of the contemporary image of man.

**Historical Antecedents**

**Individualism**

Having articulated this substructure it is possible to return to the actual research undertaking—first, the investigation of the philosophical speculations which preceded Marx and Durkheim, and secondly, a comparison of their respective conceptions of man. In order to appreciate the historical setting it will be necessary to commence by looking back, at least briefly, to the late Middle Ages, to a way of life, a view on reality which was disintegrating before the onslaught of both decay and destruction.

The Medieval world had been swathed in structure and order, a pattern of living rigidified by feudalism and religiosity. As Eugene Roesch notes, it was a historical period which was "hypersocialized" and "overinstitutionalized". Yet, as early as the thirteenth century there were indications of a new perspective on reality. Its first onslaught was apparent when Thomas Aquinas proposed that in the religious sphere each man was a whole—"a private individual." In the next century, William Ockham extricated the individual from Aquinas' pious milieu and placed 'private' men in real relations in the

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real world; that is, not only was the autonomy of the individual a religious doctrine, it was, for Ockham, a reality in the day-to-day life of men. 22

Meanwhile, political events were underlining this breaking-down of totalities and universals into their constituent parts. The Roman Catholic Church with its aspirations for universal dominion gradually disintegrated into autonomous individual states. Men began to emphasize their rights over and against the collectivity. Thus, by a process of slow erosion the medieval "conception of the universitas, i.e., of the social body as a whole of which living men are merely the parts" dissolved into "that of societas, association or partnership." 23

These tentative gropings for an alternative orientation to reality coalesced into a revolutionary perspective in the work of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In contrast to the preceding medieval scholars who tended to focus on communitas, on man seen as integral to and subordinate to the whole, these men worked out from the premise of the autonomous, self-sufficient, non-social individual. These scholars, in complete disjunction with their historical antecedents, founded their theoretical formulations on man who exists outside of and prior to society and who maintains himself as a discrete entity.

This innovative anthropocentric foundation is quite evident in Hobbes' Leviathan. The first section of this political classic is totally dedicated to an analysis of man, his senses, speech and reason. Only upon this basis does Hobbes turn to more macrocosmic phenomena

22Ibid, pp. 18-22
23Ibid, p. 19
such as 'commonwealth'. Similarly in his essay De Cive Hobbes starts with the non-social solitary 'natural' man who enters society 'by accident' and as a fortuitous device to end conflict. Moreover, society does not transform man into medieval 'communal' man, rather, it is a harness against which man's non-social nature constantly strains.

Although Rousseau's more complementary theorizing on human nature marks a break with Hobbesian theory, Rousseau did, in fact, share certain noteworthy assumptions with Hobbes. Rousseau also formulates his theories on a clear conception of 'natural' man. In Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men he, like Hobbes, suggests man entered society as it were pretty much by way of fortuitous accident.

As clearly expounded in Emile society, for Rousseau, is artificial and ex post facto:

The natural man lives for himself; he is the unit the whole, dependent only on himself and on his life. The citizen is but the numerator of a faction, whose value depends upon the whole, that is, on the community. Good social institutions are those best fitted to make man unnatural, to exchange his independence for dependence...

Lastly, Locke fits neatly within this intellectual tradition. Undermining the medieval acceptance of the inviolability of community, structure and order, Locke posits that man is the fundamental reality; society is a mere construct. For Locke, discussion of society must be

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25 Witness the powers accorded by Hobbes to the sovereign to control man. See De Cive Chapter IX pp. 105-114.


based on an appreciation of man's true nature, that is, the nature of men before it was blurred by societal influences. Having articulated a Hobbesian conception of the state of nature, Locke proposed that man enters society not merely, as Hobbes suggested, to preserve his property but to augment it. The crucial point is that man exists in society not because of any reliable innate social nature but rather on the basis of a rational computation of individual self-interest.

Thus, implicit to the work of each of these men--Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau--is the disruption of medieval political, social and intellectual structures and the consolidation of an 'individualistic' perspective. The old order of "kinship, land, social class, religion, local community and monarchy" and its accompanying emphasis on order, structure and security was being shed. In its place emerged a man, self-reliant, self-sufficient, who, according to Enlightenment theorists, would inevitably extricate himself (Natural Law Theory) from the few remaining integuments of institutions, traditions and prejudices. The Revolution of 1789 stridently declared the reality of a new order in political and intellectual enterprise. In this single set of cataclysmic events the struggle between medieval and modern proclivities was actualized and thereupon decided, at least for the time being, in favor of the modern individualists. As Robert Nisbet notes, "In its effect upon traditional society the Revolution may be profitably approached as a kind of embodiment of the ideas implicit in the philosophy of the Enlightenment." In this dramatic culmination of years of

29 Ibid., pp. 244-245.
30 Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, p. 21
social change and intellectual productivity the remaining embers of
the Middle Ages had seemingly been extinguished; replaced by a new set
of unit-ideas: progress, rationality, man.

In summary, with the initial unfolding of the nineteenth
century individualism—as a theoretical vantage point, as a political
and economic orientation (witness the Utilitarians), and as a life
style—had achieved unprecedented popularity. However, the modern
perspective, individualism, having negated the stultifying institu-
tionalism of the Middle Ages, was itself now to confront opposing
forces. At the height of its potency its decline became imminent.
Yet, before proceeding with this survey, it seems advisable to reconsid-
er the intellectual evolution up to the 1820's and 1830's—this
time not with a mind to demonstrating the historical pattern but
rather in order to specify the distinctive components of this
'revolutionary' orientation—individualism.

Individualism: A Reply to Fundamental Questions

The technique chosen for dissecting individualism stems from
Wrong's heuristic remark, "Social theory must be seen primarily as a
set of answers to questions we ask of social reality." Discerning
the questions addressed by individualism will not only facilitate com-
prehension of that particular perspective but also will serve as a
paradigm which may be applied to the Marxian, Durkheimian, and other
images of man. In this manner it will be possible to compare and
contrast the responses each position provides to a common set of
queries concerning the nature of man and society.

32Wrong, "Oversocialized Conception of Man", p. 183.
What aspect of reality is of critical importance—this is the fundamental inquiry upon which all social theorizing must be founded. The response here constitutes the genetic component of the nascent theory; the position taken in large part determines the conformation of the fully-developed theoretical stance. The individualists reply was that the crucial locus amongst all the impinging realities was individual man. For the individualists, by nature man is primary; ontologically prior to society and social relations. As Roy Hornosty notes, "ultimate and fundamental reality is attributed to the solitary individual, and ... social institutions and social groups are regarded as epiphenomena." Man is a reality in his own right and the ultimate reality in light of which other phenomena are derivations. For the individualists, "what is fundamental and decisive in man proceeds from what is within man—from instinct, sensation, the inner drives of self-interest or altruism—rather than from the social structure and from conventional morality."  

Thus the root of individualism is belief in the primacy of man. However, it was encumbent upon the individualists to immediately elaborate upon the nature of this element central to their theorizing. In general they agreed upon three characteristics inherent in man: autonomy, rationality and freedom. The first trait is intricately interrelated with the supposition that man is a reality independent of

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32 Wrong, "Oversocialized Conception of Man", p. 183.
33 Roy W. Hornosty, The Development of Sociological Theory and the Deliquescence of Man (unpublished paper) McMaster University, p. 3.
35 For a supporting analysis of individualism see Stanley Taylor, Conceptions of Institutions and the Theory of Knowledge (New York: Bookman Associates, 1956, p. 33.)
society and institutions but it also entails connotations of perpetual separation between man and society; innate self-reliance and an implicit reference to the existential aloneness of man. These views are apparent in Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau's portrayal of pre-social man. Rousseau's remarks exemplify this faith in man's 'natural' autonomous character, "Let us conclude that wandering in the forests . . . without war and without liaisons, with no need of his fellowmen, likewise with no desire to harm them . . . savage man, subject to few passions and self-sufficient, had only the sentiments and intellect suited to that state."\(^36\)

The second component, rationality, is found explicitly in Hobbes and Locke's characterization of natural man but is pointedly rejected by Rousseau.\(^37\) Hobbes and Locke proposed that human rationality (as revealed by language, decisions based on weighing alternatives) was inherent in man and not the product of social interaction. This is indicated in Hobbes and Locke by man's entrance into society on the basis of his rational calculation of his interests. For Rousseau rationality is a mere potentiality in natural man; a potentiality which is actualized by the material pressures which compel man to leave the state of nature.\(^38\)

The final element, freedom, derives from confidence that man is at liberty to act in a manner undetermined by exterior forces and in accord with his own desires. Freedom for the individualists is the inalienable essence of human nature. Hobbes' acceptance of this premise is quite apparent, "The right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as

\(^{36}\)Rousseau, Second Discourse, p. 137.

\(^{37}\)Ibid. p. 122.

\(^{38}\)Ibid. pp. 129, 132, 143-4.
he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature: ... By Liberty, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments: ..."\(^{39}\)

Locke has a similar conception of the freedom incorporated into man's nature. In *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* he remarks, "First, then, it is carefully to be remembered that freedom consists in the dependence of the existence, or not existence of any action, upon our volition of it ..."\(^{40}\) Rousseau is equally forthright on this point in that he notes, "Nature commands every animal, and the beast obeys. Man feels the same impetus, but he realizes that he is free to acquiesce or resist; and it is above all in the consciousness of this freedom that the spirituality of his soul is shown."\(^{41}\)

The ontological priority of man is the foundationstone; the autonomy, rationality and freedom ascribed to man complete the substructure. Of course each theorist affixed their respective particularistic contributions to their personal edifice. Hobbes stressed the innate human passions which propelled man. Rousseau incorporated notions of self-perfectibility and proclivity to pity. Yet, what distinguished these men, along with others, as individualists is the aforenoted two-tiered set of premises: first, each works outward from individual man, secondly, each accounted for the centrality of man by positing a rational, free, autonomous nature for him.\(^{42}\)

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42 It must be noted that although Rousseau and Hobbes did proceed to holist conclusions, their premises were individualist. See Dumont, "The Modern Conception" p. 45 for a substantiation of this interpretation.
Once these postulates have been assumed the replies to the remaining 'universal' queries confronting individualism veritably fall in place. In the ethico-moral individualistic theorists follow a clearly defined logical extension of their original premises. What is the source of truth--individual man. True knowledge is ultimately derived from individual perception. Validation is dependent upon man's experience. The necessary counterpart to this position suggests that the source of falsity often is society and social institutions. Taylor summarizes the attitude, "It is typical of individualism to deny that institutions, or more broadly, social existence can have a positive bearing on the validation of knowledge."  

Secondly, for the individualist, individual (natural) man is the wellspring of that which is good. The society, social relations and customs have served only to debauch man. This view is evident even in Hobbes who, while maintaining a less than complementary image of man, felt that "ignorance of the causes, and original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice, disposeth a man to make custom and example the rule of his actions; . . ." However, it is Rousseau who truly sees society as perfidious, "it remains for me to consider and bring together the different accidents that were able to perfect human reason while deteriorating the species, make a being evil while making him sociable."  

Last amongst the questions relating to morality is that which seeks delineation of the good. Individualists reply that the

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44 Ibid., p. 36
45 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 84.
46 Rousseau, Second Discourse, p. 140.
'good', the 'right' is that which is in accord with the nature and requirements of man. Rousseau urges the establishment of governmental structures which are cognizant of man's nature and rights, "Man was born free, but is everywhere in bondage . . . . How did this change from freedom into bondage come about? I do not know. Under what conditions can it be rendered legitimate? This problem I believe I can solve."47 Correspondingly, for the individualists that which is wrongful is that which flagrantly transgresses man's 'natural' rights. Even Hobbes, who advocated that man's passions required harsh repression, maintained the sanctity of certain aspects of man's nature.48

There exists a second set of questions, questions which theorists must resolve with regard to the social milieu in which man now exists. Foremost amongst these queries is that which inquires into the origins of society. Individualists reply that society is an artificial construct; there is nothing 'natural' about society, it is a product of human endeavor prompted either by accident or by rational computation of interests. Otto Gierke's analysis in Natural Law and The Theory of Society suggests the same conclusions:

Under the influence of the philosophy of Hobbes, the view continued to be urged that the state of nature did not contain even the germ of community; that the formation of society was a 'break-away', dictated by reason, from the natural order of human relations; in a word, that society began in an act of artificial institution, and as a conscious departure from nature.49

Further, it follows from a position such as that expressed above that social relations in general are considered tentative and artificial and not the inevitable organization of reality. Hobbes quite clearly

develops this line of thought, "For they who shall more narrowly look into the causes for which men come together and delight in each other's company, shall easily find that this happens not because naturally it could happen not otherwise, but by accident."  

Next, there is the question which searches for the source of order and stability in society. For Hobbes and Rousseau it is the governmental and institutional structures which account for the solidity of human existence. For each theorist this is in part beneficial, in part restrictive. Antithetically, for the individualists any change, any innovative action in society, stems from individual effort. As Hornosty states, "In freeing himself from the control of the repressive social authority rooted in traditional order, man would experience material and social progress and would attain a state of moral and ethical perfection." 

Lastly, there remains the question of the relationship between man and society. Interwoven with individualistic formulations is an acceptance of the eternal dialectic between man and society; the natural and the artificial. Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau might strive to diminish the void between the individual and his social milieu yet their very conceptualization of man precluded any ultimate resolution. As evident in this excerpt from Rousseau's writings, there is a irremedial contradiction between man and society, "the savage lives within himself; the sociable man, always outside of himself, knows how to live only in the opinion of others; and it is, so to speak from their judgement alone that he draws the sentiment of his own existence." 

50 Hobbes, De Cive, p. 22.  
51 Witness the whole tone of Social Contract and Leviathan.  
52 Hornosty, Deliquescence of Man, p. 7.  
53 Rousseau, Second Discourse, p. 17.
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, having articulated some approximation of the individualist theoretical framework, proceeded to pursue the political, moral and social ramifications of their respective views. This cluster of questions and responses is not relevant here. It is necessary only to recognize that individualism, of which each were examples, albeit of varying clarity, constitutes a discrete theoretical stand on the nature of man and society. It was this particular theoretical orientation which achieved a zenith of popularity and dissemination in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.

Holism: The Conservative Response
To Fundamental Questions

The unfolding of the nineteenth century was accompanied by a full-scale reaction to individualistic premises. As Nisbet notes, "we have come only slowly to realize in our histories, what is distinctive and intellectually most fertile in nineteenth-century thought is not individualism but the reaction to individualism."\(^{54}\) While the previous generations gloried in the infinitude of their new-found freedom from the constraints of society; intellectuals now viewed with increasing anxiety the lack of guideposts, the absence of structure in the individualists' conception of reality. The nineteenth century theorists saw "modern man as uprooted, alone, without secure status, cut off from community or any system of clear moral purpose."\(^{55}\)

Thus the conservative position in nineteenth century Europe was rooted in an emotional rejection of the directionlessness,


\(^{55}\)Ibid, p. 265.
meaninglessness hinged to an anthropocentric vision of reality. Men were not being liberated but rather wrenched from their idyllic existence in a traditional world. Conservative critics sought to re-establish a conceptual framework which provided stability and organization to human endeavor. Consequently they focused on that entity most denigrated by the individualists--society. Leon Bramson has summed up their stance:

In the conservative view, society is primary to the individual, from an historical, logical, and ethical standpoint. The individual as we know him can never come into existence without society, without the influence of what contemporary sociologists call 'the socialization process'.

The conservatives, striving to more fully articulate their distrust of modern individualism and their affinity for the 'universitas' of the Middle Ages, soon bifurcated into two closely related orientations—one leading from socialism to communism; the other, from social philosophy to sociology. At the juncture of these two lines of development stands Saint-Simon. His views were crucial to the early germination of French socialism and yet his work was also directly influential upon two crucial figures in nascent sociology: Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim. Seemingly, it was the Saint-Simon perspective which set the tone for the ensuing period:

Saint Simonians adopted the new word individualism as a key term in their speculations about the disintegration from which they believed, their society was suffering and... began to express their alarm about what they called l'odieux individualisme' of modern society.

For Saint-Simon and his adherents individualism had merely precipitated and perpetuated "a period of serious crisis, social upheaval, and disintegration... of 'intellectual anarchy'."

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58 Ibid. p. 82.
Individualism for the conservatives was more than a philosophical error; it was an infestation to be expunged. "For Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians, the Revolution, the Rights of Man, and Liberalism had had a purely negative, destructive value; the time had come to organize society, to regenerate it."\(^{59}\) Yet, Saint-Simon had merely designated the opponent, it remained for his followers to enunciate an alternative conception of man and society, one which would eradicate the offensive individualistic notions.

As the conservatives furthered their attack upon individualism they necessarily formulated the components of the requisite alternative view of reality. Individualism was supplanted by holism. This perspective ascribed ontological priority to society rather than to the free, autonomous individual; it postulated that the locus of truth and right rested in social configurations and posited the vital actuality, rather than artificiality, of institutional structures. In brief, holism comprises a radically different set of answers to those presented by the individualists.

Foremost, holism relies upon the fundamentality of society not man. The foundation stones are not the autonomy, rationality and freedom of man, "What is fundamental and inalienable does not stem from within natural man, as the Natural Law theorists believed, but is embodied in social tradition. Social institutions and traditions are themselves the working out of the genuine and timeless needs of human nature."\(^{60}\) Truth, right action, the good all reside principally in the social rather than the individual sphere. Society itself is a priori, a reality in its

\(^{59}\) Dumont, "The Modern Conception", p. 56.
\(^{60}\) Hornosty, The Deliquescence of Man, p. 10.
own right, something more than the sum of its parts. Similarly social relations are actual, necessary and the product of the necessities of social development. Social order is the inevitable result of the natural, unimpeded development of societies, unobstructed by individual human tampering. Social change is a natural process in which the individual man is allotted no role. Lastly, the relation between man and society is one of healthy symbiosis. Human felicity is the result of integration into one's social setting.

Auguste Comte's writings provide the path which leads sociology, in an extenuation of Saint-Simon's views, towards holism. There can be little doubt concerning Comte's personal disaffiliation from individualism in that "The disease of the Western world" is Comte's memorable epithet for individualism." In pursuing this dissatisfaction with individualistic premises Comte constituted the bases of a holistic conception of man and society in sociology:

For Comte society is substantive and primary; it precedes the individual logically and psychologically and it shapes him. Apart from his roles in society, man, as we know him, is not conceivable. Carried away by philosophical fervor, Comte makes society the 'Supreme Being' of Positivist worship.

However, it must be stipulated that the ontogeny of ideas is neither so simplistic nor so direct as it is suggested to be above. Following the classic configuration of the dialectic, in which the thesis and antithesis result in a synthesis which in turn spawns a new antithesis, the reaction against individualism encompassed many of the components of individualism. The early sociologists are visibly torn between two alternative conceptions of man and society. Although Comte

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clearly aligns himself with the reactionary forces, with holism, he at the same time does incorporate certain individualistic components into his formulations, "he[Comte] recognizes the reality of the individual, especially its anarchic character, a tendency in man which is no anomaly of nature but a 'natural' though temporal phenomenon to be disciplined by social sentiments in the course of evolution." In short, there is some evidence of a creative ambivalence in Comte's view of man.

Thus, Comte's work was rather tentatively guiding nascent sociology beyond Saint-Simon's rejection of individualism. Meanwhile, the other alternative rooted in Saint-Simonian thought leading from social theorizing to socialism-communism was being more fully elaborated. There is some indication here of a parallel articulation of holistic notions, "If Rousseau and Kant represent the parallel development of Enlightenment ideas within the respective social, political, and cultural milieux of France and Germany, exactly the same analogy might be made for the later period between Comte and Hegel."

Hegel, who was to be extremely influential in Marx's intellectual development, appears to have joined in the reaction against individualism:

Insofar as Hegel has grasped . . . the dialectical relationship between the individual and society, his thought represents a real advance over liberal natural-law theorists such as Rousseau and Kant, who postulate 'society' as an abstraction confronting the individual and attribute to the liberal state the negative function of protecting the autonomy of the naturally egoistical individual.

However, again, despite the implicit acceptance of a holistic frame of reference, the socialists were struggling with an ambivalent

63 Hornosty, The Deliquescence of Man, p. 17.
65 Ibid. p. 414.
reaction against individualism. Louis Dumont alludes to the complexity of this interplay between holist and individualist views:

In short, it is clear that the development of heavy industry, while it did play a role in the development of socialism, was not its only cause and cannot account for the general ideological tendency of the period. I have refrained from speaking of a return to holism because, in general, hierarchy had gone and the individual had remained in some of its aspects; equality in particular was more often than not admitted, individualism and holism being thus combined into a new form, which we may roughly call socialism. 66

In brief, it must be noted that the individualism of the Enlightenment did not mechanically produce its absolute antithesis in the conservative reaction. Sociology and socialism, the two more prominent exponents of anti-individualist thought, in fact, did integrate certain individualistic premises into their respective frameworks.

Statement of the Main Research Task

In summary the following historical background has been noted. The medieval 'universitas' fathered the Enlightenment's individualism which, in turn, brought forth in reaction an essentially holistic perspective in the nineteenth century. Holistic views formed the juncture from which both sociology and socialism emerged. At the same time, however, certain individualistic notions persisted and as a result the works of early sociologists and socialists were characterized not by a bland regurgitation of holistic views but by a struggle to resolve the tension between their individualist and holist assumptions. Given this background the essential concern now is to deduce from a systematic review of the writings of Marx and Durkheim which set of answers, holist or individualist, (previously described in ideal-typical terms) each man

most consistently ascribed to.

The basic questions, which have already been applied to Enlightenment thought, may be summarized in the following paradigm:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethico-moral realm</th>
<th>Social realm</th>
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<tr>
<td>The source of truth—the source of falsity?</td>
<td>The source of the good—the source of evil?</td>
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<td>The source of the good—the source of evil?</td>
<td>The nature of the good—the nature of evil?</td>
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<tr>
<td>The origin of society?</td>
<td>The nature of social relations?</td>
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<td>The nature of social relations?</td>
<td>The source of order and stability?</td>
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<td>The source of order and stability?</td>
<td>The source of change?</td>
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<td>The nature of the relation between man and society?</td>
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The major writings of both writers will be examined in order to discern the set of responses to these questions each explicitly and consistently incorporates into his perspective.

The research will serve not only to clarify current discussions regarding the nature of man in Marx and Durkheim but may also suggest the historical source of the modern unidimensional approach to man noted by Wrong and, further, the roots of the insufficiency of contemporary social theorizing. If Marx and Durkheim prepared the way for an unquestioning acceptance of holism in social theory, they may have constituted one source of a truncated, non-dynamic view on reality.
CHAPTER II

Emile Durkheim: Confrontation with Enlightenment Thought

The Genesis of Man and Society

The Enlightenment had rooted its theoretical perspective in man. Man was, by nature, a free, independent and rational creature who had entered society only under the exigence of physical conditions and/or rational computation of self-interest. Man, for the individualists, was the fundamental reality; society either an unfortunate historical accident or a necessary modus operandi. With Durkheim this vision of reality is transformed.

For Durkheim man without society is some hybrid of the impossible and the bestial. History dawns only once man exists in society. There are implications regarding a pre-historical creature which antedates man and society, which stands on the edge of history and which is the source of man, but, in Durkheim’s view man is ‘man’ only in the presence of society. In one of his final essays, “The Dualism of Human Nature” Durkheim gave an explicit statement of this premise. “However, it is civilization that has made man what he is; it is what distinguishes him from the animal; man is man only because he is civilized.” As will be

1 For example in Emile Durkheim, Education and Sociology, trans. by S.D. Fox (Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), p. 77, it is noted, “One sees, through these few examples, to what man would be reduced if there were withdrawn from him all that he has derived from society: he would fall to the level of an animal.”


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noted below civilization in turn is met with only in the presence of society.

Consequently, in Durkheim's writings history opens with the juxtaposition of man and society. It is important to note that these two constitute discrete realities. Society, for Durkheim, is a reality sui generis; that is, a reality in its own right, separate from the reality of its parts. Working from the premise that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, he argues that society is more than, distinct from, the reality of individuals in much the same way that the living cell is more than its chemical components. He states, "If, as we may say, this synthesis constituting every society yields new phenomena, differing from those which take place in individual consciousness, we must, indeed, admit that these facts reside exclusively in the very society itself, which produces them, and not in its parts, i.e., its members."

Thus, for Durkheim, history and reality are founded in two a priori components: man and society. However, these two elements are neither of equal import or impact. Indeed, history consists of the efforts of society to impose morality, rationality, science, art; in short, all that is civilization, upon man. Society is the primary dynamic component in history, man serves by and large as the material substratum, the clay which society molds. For example, Durkheim ties morality to society. He notes in Moral Education, "the domain of the

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5 Durkheim, Rules, p. xlvii.
moral begins where the domain of the social begins.\(^6\) and "we are moral beings only to the extent that we are social beings."\(^7\) Similarly, with regard to science, he remarks, "He [man] has known the thirst for knowledge only when society has awakened it in him and society has done this only when it has felt the need of it."\(^8\) The following general statement is representative of Durkheim's views, "Thus, even the qualities which appear at first glance so spontaneously desirable, the individual seeks only when society invites him to, and he seeks them in the fashion that it prescribes for him."\(^9\)

From this consideration of the origin of society and the early relation between man and society, it would appear unequivocal that Durkheim accepted important holistic assumptions. However, although Durkheim represents man's early condition in holist terms in that man is determined by and a product of society, his response to Enlightenment thought was more multi-faceted than has yet been revealed. For example, Durkheim modifies his deterministic stance when he focusses upon modern man. Primitive history may consist of society educating, refining and civilizing man but in the process a qualitatively different human creature emerges and the relation between man and society is reconstituted.

**The Durkheimian View of Modern Man**

'Social' man as opposed to 'archaic' man has been freed from

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\(^7\) Ibid. p. 64.

\(^8\) Durkheim, *Education and Sociology*, p. 74.

\(^9\) Ibid. p. 75.
the mundane. Originally man is bound to the 'organic' factor; that is, to his biological being and the sensations and general consciousness derivative from it. Society releases man by providing him with conceptions and conceptual organization in the form of religion and science and the beliefs and sentiments which comprise morality. Durkheim suggested that in the course of these developments human nature was 'recast'. The animal nature, which serves as the source of man, is modified so that man now sees and feels things in the manner society desires. Specifically man acquires a sacrosanct nature, an individuality and status as a free agent. Society has provided man with "rights and liberties" and has "made him pre-eminently worthy of respect."  

In sum, only Durkheim's conception of the early relation between man and society, in which "society is everything, the individual nothing", fits neatly within the holist tradition. The entrance of social man necessitates a closer examination of Durkheim's position in that contrary to the holist perspective, he does seem to permit the intrusion of man as an autonomous, self-actualizing entity. For example in The Division of Labor in Society Durkheim suggests that through history "The individual really

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10. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. by Joseph Swain (New York: The Free Press, 1915), p. 307, "There really is a part of ourselves which is not placed in immediate dependence upon the organic factor: this is all that which represents society in us. The general ideas which religion or science fix in our minds, the mental operations which these ideas suppose, the beliefs and sentiments which are at the basis of our moral life, and all these superior forms of psychical activity which society awakens in us, these do not follow in the trail of our bodily states, as our sensations and our general bodily consciousness do."

11. Ibid. p. 83.

12. Durkheim, Sociology and Philosophy, p. 72.

feels himself less acted upon; he becomes more a source of spontaneous activity." He also notes, "Individualism, free thought, dates neither from our time, nor from the decline of Graeco-Latin polytheism or oriental democracies. It is a phenomenon which begins in no certain part, but which develops without cessation all through history." The crucial question, of course, is whether this 'social' man, free thought and so forth, does in fact significantly mitigate Durkheim's previously noted holistic orientation.

For Durkheim, modern man, 'social' man, is a synthesis of two components: that deriving from society, that from man's organic nature. As he notes in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, "man is double. There are two being in him: an individual being which has its foundation in the organism and the circle of whose activities is therefore strictly limited, and a social being which represents the highest reality in the intellectual and moral order that we can know by observation--I mean society." The social element is the internalized form of society, that portion of society which becomes integrated with the individual and which serves to direct and control him from within.

The other facet of man's being, that related to the organism, is evidently tied to the element which formed the foundation for the evolution of man and society--prehistorical man. For Durkheim, man's animal nature is an important and persistent component. It permits

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15 Ibid. p. 171.
16 See also Division of Labor p. 194 regarding the historical emergence of 'personality'. Personality does not exist in primitive societies; it appears as man becomes more civilized.
17 Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 29.
sensation, consciousness, and awareness and is the physical prerequisite for the individuation of man. In brief, Durkheim grants the existence in modern man of a natural, non-social dimension. He made this point explicit in The Division of Labor in Society:

there is a sphere of psychic life which, however developed the collective type may be, varies from one man to another and remains peculiar with each. It is that which is formed by representations, by sentiments and tendencies which relate to the organism and to the state of the organism. It is the world of internal and external sensations and the movements which are directly linked to them. This first foundation of all individuality is inalienable and does not depend upon any social state.

In sum there are two aspects of Durkheim's conception of modern man which draw into question the imputation to Durkheim of a rigid holistic perspective. First, he does couple the emergence of social man with the upsurgence in individualism and free thought. Secondly, he does suggest a persistent, a priori, non-social component in modern man. In contrast the holist would seek to derive thought, action and man's nature from society.

However, it must be stipulated that Durkheim has not strayed far from a holist stance. For example, the individualism of which he spoke was considered to be a social product and not the result of the working-out of human nature. As will be noted later the individualism Durkheim accepted was institutional, that is, derivative from and compatible with social confines. Likewise, the question of free thought and freedom in general warrant closer consideration.

Durkheim and the Question of Freedom

As noted the primitive relation between man and society was

19 Durkheim, Division of Labor, p. 198.
deterministic and mechanistic in that it was composed essentially of society's manipulation of man. Societal man, having been raised from his archaic state by society's educating, refining and civilizing him, is, in contrast, a conscious, intelligent being who can take a hand in the determination of events. It would appear there has been a remarkable transformation in man's relation to society. This is clearly the inference in Durkheim's remarks concerning the chief, the first individual to emerge as a discrete personality:

Of course, it is from the group that they [the chiefs] derive their power, but once power is organized, it becomes autonomous and makes them capable of personal activity. A source of initiative is thus opened which had not existed before then. There is, hereafter, someone who can produce new things and even, in certain measure, deny collective usages. 20

Superficially there seems to be the suggestion here that social man in some sense approximates Enlightenment man in that in his relation to society he expresses a certain autonomy and freedom of action. However, this impression must be qualified. First, unlike the philosophes' premise that freedom constitutes the inalienable essence of man's being, Durkheim maintains that freedom of action is a socially produced and controlled human trait. He remarks, "The theoretician may demonstrate that man has the right to liberty, but, whatever the value of these demonstrations, it is certain that this liberty can become a reality only in and through society." 21

Secondly, that freedom which society has cultivated in man is severely restricted relative to the Enlightenment views. For example, the range of human freedom of action is clearly defined by the social

20 Ibid. p. 195.
21 Durkheim, Sociology and Philosophy, p. 55.
conditions. Thus in his discussion of morality Durkheim maintains man is free to combat moral ideas which are not synchronized with existing social conditions but he quickly stipulates that man cannot transcend the limits delineated by society, "But in any case we cannot aspire to a morality other than that which is related to the state of our society." Similarly with regard to education he writes, "He [man] is not confronted with a tabula rasa on which he can write what he wants, but with existing realities which he cannot create, or destroy, or transform, at will. He can act only to the extent that he has learned to understand them, to know their nature and the conditions on which they depend; . . ." 

Lastly, the relation between man and freedom has been altered. Rather than being representative of the spirituality of man's being, it acquires alien overtones. There is an antipathy between man and freedom. Freedom becomes a cruel vortex in which man would be cast adrift save for the propitious intervention of society, "Man cannot become attached to higher aims and submit to a rule if he sees nothing above him to which he belongs. To free him from all social pressures is to abandon him to himself and demoralize him." Further, this notion of freedom is implicit throughout the discussion of anomie suicide. For Durkheim, man, freed from the comforting constraints imposed by the collective life, is cast into a moribund, unnatural state with which he is incapable of coping.

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22 Ibid. p. 61.
23 Durkheim, Education and Sociology, p. 66.
24 Durkheim, Suicide, p. 389.
In sum, although Durkheim denies a crude determinism in the relation between man and society, he avoids this alternative by substituting a more generalized, abstracted determinism. This permits him to reject any reduction of man to a mindless machine. He states, "Our way of conforming to the morals or manners of our country has nothing in common, therefore, with the mechanical, ape-like repetition causing us to reproduce motions which we witness. Between the two ways of acting, is all the difference between reasonable, deliberate behavior and automatic reflex." The necessary relation between society as actor and man as reagent has not, however, been eliminated; it has merely been more fully articulated. It is no longer a case of society commanding and man obeying; rather, now, society provides the limitations, the boundaries, men internalize this general program and, while no necessary pattern is set down for each individual, an overall determination is set up for the men as a whole who comprise the given society. Thus, Durkheim maintains the existence of at best (relative to the Enlightenment) an evicerated human freedom.

This conclusion is sustained by the logical progression from Durkheim's notions on human freedom to his views on man as an active social participant. For man to introduce innovative, revolutionary change (revolutionary in the sense of inconsistent with the existing social organization) is unthinkable. Durkheim states, "Thanks to the


26 Ibid, footnote p. 325, "But it is not so if the stability of demographic data results from a force external to the individual. Such a force does not determine one individual rather than another. It exacts a definite number of certain kinds of actions, but not that they should be performed by this or that person."
almost unanimous and generally ancient predominance of collective states, they are far too resistant to be offset by an individual innovation. How could an individual, who is nothing more than an individual, be strong enough to mould society to his image?" Yet this does not preclude man introducing innovations within the societal limits.

"Nevertheless, we do not mean to say that the impulses, needs, and desires of man never intervene actively in social evolution. On the contrary, it is certain that they can hasten or retard its development, according to the circumstances which determine the social phenomena." 

It is the social factors which are of primary import, the actions of individual man are secondary. For example, the practicality of man's innovative potential is directly related to his social position; that is, to the attitude society takes toward him. The great speaker is influential not due to this individual vigor but rather because "It is no longer a simple individual who speaks; it is the group incarnate and personified." Durkheim also remarks, "Clearly, a functionary or a popular man embodies not merely his individually inherited powers but social powers resulting from the collective sentiments of which they are object, which give him influence over the progress of society." 

The perpetrator of change is essentially society and social currents. Man's principal role in this regard is that of recipient.

Durkheim states, "Hence society is itself, not the secondary condition

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27 Ibid. p. 142.
28 Durkheim, Sociological Method, pp. 91-2.
29 Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 241.
30 Durkheim, Suicide, footnote, p. 142.
but the determining factor in progress. It is a reality which is no more our work than the external world, and to which, consequently, we must submit in order to exist. It is because it changes that we must change."  

Man more often than not is only free to be swept along by social currents, "Human deliberations, in fact, so far as reflective consciousness affects them are often purely formal, with no object but confirmation of a resolve previously formed for reasons unknown to consciousness." This relates, for example, to Durkheim's major work on suicide in which he argues for the position that suicide rather than evincing a personal disposition is in fact a repercussion of some social malaise.

In short, Durkheim is willing to accept that society quite directly determines human action. He softens this stance only by granting that in the individual case there is no one-to-one determinism, that society rules in terms of probabilities and averages. A particular man is not compelled by society to commit suicide but a certain percentage of persons are motivated by societal forces to take their own lives. The relation between man and society is mostly one of a natural and desirable dependence of man upon society's directives. The intrusion of human freedom is in essence residual and inconsequential for the course of human events.

**Durkheim and Enlightenment Man**

Durkheim's approach to the question of freedom is representative of his whole stance vis-a-vis the issues raised by the

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31 Durkheim, *Division of Labor*, p. 344.
33 Ibid, pp. 373-4.
Enlightenment. Substantively Durkheim rejects the Enlightenment premise of a rational, free, and autonomous human nature, yet rather than discarding these notions he attempts to retain them, in a modified form, and integrate them into his realist perspective. In most instances it is the rejection which looms large. For example, with regard to the second facet in the Enlightenment conception of man—rationality, Durkheim grants the existence of human rationality but declares it a socially evolved human trait. Man does conceptualize, does think and organize but only due to the stimulus of society.  

The notion of rationality is related to the role of man as the source and perpetuator of civilization, as the ultimate vindicator of the truth, and the right. For the philosophes man was the root of civilization, knowledge and morality. Individual perception was viewed as the definitive test of right or wrong, truth or falsity. Society served merely to confuse and muddle the clarity of man's awareness. For Durkheim the individual is not the source of ultimate truth; indeed, the more personal and individual observations are, the more likely they are to distort and confuse the nature of reality, Durkheim states:

Furthermore, even when we have collaborated in their genesis, we can only with difficulty obtain even a confused and inexact insight into the true nature of our actions and the causes which determined it. When it is simply a matter of our private acts, we know very imperfectly the relatively simple motives that guide us. We believe ourselves disinterested when we act egotistically; we think we are motivated by hate when we are yielding to love, and obeying reason when we are the slaves of unreasoned prejudices, etc. How, then, should we have the faculty of discerning with greater clarity the causes, otherwise complex, from which collective acts proceed?  

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34 Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 28, "If reason is only a form of individual experience, it no longer exists. . . . But if the social origin of the categories is admitted, a new attitude becomes possible, which we believe will enable us to escape both of the opposed difficulties."

35 Durkheim, Sociological Method, p. xlv.
Similarly man is no longer viewed as being in intimate conjunction with the ultimate good. That is to say, for Durkheim, those aspects of reality which are related more closely to the individual as opposed to the collective are that much estranged from the good. This viewpoint is quite apparent within the context of his theories on morality, "Man possesses all the less of himself when he possesses only himself. How does this come about? It is because man is, in large part, a product of society. It is from society that there comes whatever is best in us, all the higher forms of our behaviour."  

The final index of rationality, that is the presence of knowledge regardless of morality and truth evidences an equally dramatic rejection of the Enlightenment. For Durkheim knowledge does not spring from the human being, from the forms a priori in man's mind, rather it is grafted on. The search for knowledge, the organization and comprehension of knowledge (as distinct from awareness) all have their source in society.  

Despite this disavowal of the Enlightenment position on rationality and related issues, Durkheim does integrate certain crucial Enlightenment assumptions regarding the autonomy of man into his theoretical perspective. For the philosophes man was an independent, discrete reality, a reality clearly distinct from society. This autonomous nature of man was indicated by the perpetual tension between the individual and  

36 Durkheim, Moral Education, p. 69. See also Elementary Forms, p. 29 and Sociology and Philosophy, p. 40.  
37 Durkheim, "Dualism", p. 338, "it is evident that passions and egoistic tendencies derive from our individual constitutions, while our rational activity--whether theoretical or practical--is dependent on social causes. . . . We have even found a basis for conjecturing that the fundamental and lofty concepts that we call categories are formed on the model of social phenomena."
society; man was always uneasy in the harness imposed by society. Durkheim cannot accept this void between man and society since for him, as noted, man is man only through society. Yet, he likewise abjures the holist stance of representing man as a mere extension of the social network, as a cell in the social organism. As a partial resolution Durkheim posited an ineradicable strain within man between the previously noted non-social, individual element in man and man's social being. Thus Durkheim could appear to grant the autonomy of man while at the same time maintaining an overall synthesis in that each man embodies this antithesis.38

The crucial concession Durkheim is making in this maneuver is to accept the Enlightenment view that at least something in man is non-social and a priori. Indeed, this acceptance of at least some degree of human autonomy can be seen as a fundamental assumption underlying Durkheim's approach to social reality. For example, it was necessary for Durkheim to consider man as constituting in some sense a reality in his own right if society and man were to be seen as coextant sources of the modern world. Man and society coexist simultaneously; one would not exist without the other but neither is dependent upon the other for its origin.

Similarly, Durkheim must assume some non-social, even anarchic quality inherent in man if he intends to characterize social facts by their coercive ability.39 Clearly much of Durkheim's work centres upon the struggle between man and society, the continual effort to contain and control man. His lengthy treatises on the diverse methods for strengthening social ties and drawing the individual into the

38 Ibid. p. 328.
39 Durkheim, Sociological Method, p. 3.
collectivity are only consistent with the imputation to man of some inherent non-social (and anti-social) trait. 40

This rapport between Durkheim and the Enlightenment suggests, first, that Durkheim cannot be accurately characterized as an extreme holist and, secondly, that Durkheim's writings cannot be fairly treated as merely a reaction to and rejection of Enlightenment thinking. However, even granted that Durkheim was struggling with eighteenth century thought and not discounting it, his work may still be considered to have implicitly and explicitly laid the basis for such a discounting amongst subsequent theorists. His individualism in the realm of human autonomy must be weighed against his substantive rejection of the rationality and freedom of man. In particular, it must be recalled that society is the crux of Durkheimian reality.

**Durkheimian Society**

For Durkheim society, as a reality, is in many respects comparable to man. Foremost, like man, it is a natural phenomenon. It is not, as suggested by the eighteenth century, some artificial vehicle created by man in response to human needs. Rather, Durkheim asserts, "The social realm is a natural realm which differs from the others only by a greater complexity." 41 Further, he notes, "It [social constraint] is due simply to the fact that the individual finds himself in the presence of a force which is superior to him and before which he bows; but this force is an entirely natural one." 42

40 Durkheim's desire to strengthen social ties is apparent both in his work on education (Moral Education, pp. 207-222, passim) and his writings on occupational groups (Suicide, pp. 378-384).

41 Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 31.

42 Durkheim, Sociological Method, p. 123.
Similarly, like man, society is a distinct, autonomous reality. It is, however, dependent upon man for its actualization, "If the idea of society were extinguished in individual minds and the beliefs, traditions and aspirations of the group were no longer felt and shared by the individuals, society would die." In a certain ontological sense man and society are equal. The equality ends here.

First, society is a qualitatively superior entity. Clearly society, for Durkheim, embodies the good while the purely individual constitutes the mundane. In Moral Education he remarks, "Between it and us there is the strongest and most intimate connection, since it is a part of our own being, since in a sense it constitutes what is best in us." This belief in the goodness, the morality intrinsic to society is also evident in Durkheim's repeated coupling of the notions of God and society. As apparent, particularly in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Durkheim considered God as essentially a symbolization of society. Society (God) instills the good in the individual; there is no indication that a conception of goodness preexists in the individual psyche.

Secondly, society is the primary agent of power and authority. As is evident from the preceding analysis it is society which enacts the 'crucial' role relative to rationality, morality and social change. Despite man's autonomy, it is society which, in Durkheim's view, assumes the majority of the creative, dynamic roles, while man more often than

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43 Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 389.
44 Durkheim, Moral Education, p. 71.
45 Durkheim, Elementary Forms, pp. 236-7.
not is merely the reagent. Though the process may be routed either through society dominating man directly or man's social nature overwhelming its anarchic base, the end result is the same:

Further, they must meet there, for reason, which is nothing more than all the fundamental categories taken together, is invested with an authority which we could not set aside if we would. When we attempt to revolt against it, and to free ourselves from some of these essential ideas, we meet with great resistances. They do not merely depend upon us, but they impose themselves upon us.46

Durkheim also remarks, "But since each one of them [social facts] is a force, superior to that of the individual..."47 and "Since their [social phenomena] essential characteristic is their power of exerting pressure on individual consciousnessess..."48 The purely individual potential, is described as limited.

The conclusion to be drawn is that, for Durkheim, the purely individual is an inferior reality relative to society; inferior in capacities and potentialities. This does not mean man is subjugated by society merely that the relationship between man and society, even when man is most freed from social constraints, is essentially a parent-child relation. Only a small portion of the individual is ever other than that which was introduced by society. It is this inferiority of the 'individual' reality which underlies Durkheim's more extreme holist remarks such as "Of course, it is a self-evident truth that there is nothing in social life which is not in individual consciences. Everything that is found in the latter, however, comes from society."49

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47 Durkheim, Sociological Method, p. 90.
49 Durkheim, Division of Labor, p. 350.
and "Collective life is not born from individual life, but it is, on the contrary, the second which is born from the first." 50

**Durkheim's Comments on Enlightenment Thought**

Thus far Durkheim's work has been investigated solely in terms of the paradigm developed on page 31. This section will attempt to amplify and reinforce this preceding analysis by introducing Durkheim's specific comments on the rise of individualism, analytical individualism and the notions of the Enlightenment. Clearly, as apparent from previous remarks, much of Durkheim's writing follows the theme of undermining individualist ideas on human nature; specifically, those theories which argued for the existence of innate predispositions in man's nature. For example, Durkheim's investigation of morality dwells upon the point that morality, rather than being inherent in man's nature, is a social product.

This orientation to individualism is reiterated in Durkheim's methodological treatises. Here he directs an attack against any reduction of social facts to manifestations of the individual, against any proposition that knowledge of the social world may be derived from introspection:

> To treat the facts of a certain order as things is not, then, to place them in a certain category of reality but to assume a certain mental attitude toward them on the principle that when approaching their study, we are absolutely ignorant of their nature, and that their characteristic properties, like the unknown causes on which they depend, cannot be discovered by even the most careful introspection. 51

These lines of thought are quite compatible with viewing Durkheim's work as, in essence, a reaction against the Enlightenment.

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50 Ibid. p. 279.

However, other of his writings might, at first glance, appear to indicate a certain sympathy with individualists. For example, in Montesquieu and Rousseau, Durkheim evinces a rapport with these sovereigns of the Enlightenment, "He understood with a wonderful lucidity that the nature of societies is no less stable and consistent than that of man and that it is no easier to modify the type of society than the species of an animal." Similarly he lauds aspects of Rousseau's work, in particular his realization that society is something other than the sum of its parts.

However, systematic analysis of the book makes it quite evident that Durkheim extricates for agreement only those non-individualist elements in the authors' works. He explicitly rejects those wholly individualistic components:

Though the three thinkers agree that the social and the individual are dissimilar, we observe an increasing effort to root the social being in nature. But therein lies the weakness of the system. While as we have shown, social life for Rousseau is not contrary to the natural order, it has so little in common with nature that one wonders how it is possible... If, however, a society is formed of isolated, atomized individuals, one is at a loss to see where it comes from... So unstable is its foundation in the nature of things that it cannot but appear to us as a tottering structure whose delicate balance can be established and maintained only by a miraculous conjunction of circumstances.

Similarly Durkheim's essay "Individualism and the Intellectuals" is most subject to misinterpretation and is, under careful analysis, most revelatory of Durkheim's stance on individualism.

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53 Ibid. p. 83.
54 Ibid. p. 137.
Remarks, such as, "Not only is individualism distinct from anarchy; but is henceforth the only system of beliefs which can ensure the moral unity of the country,"⁵⁵ should not be permitted to obscure the actual import of Durkheim's views. Durkheim does defend institutional individualism, but he has translated it into an essentially holist doctrine:

So far is it [individualism] from making personal interest the object of human conduct, that it sees in all personal motives the very source of evil. . . . Thus, for both thinkers [Kant and Rousseau] the only ways of acting that are moral are those which are fitting the notion of man in general.⁵⁶

Further, Durkheim states, "Now, it is a remarkable fact that all these theorists of individualism are no less sensitive to the rights of the collectivity than they are to those of the individual."⁵⁷

Durkheim does not stint from exacerbating the individualist basis of these ideas, "If, with Rousseau, one begins by seeing the individual as a sort of absolute who can and must be sufficient unto himself, it is obviously difficult then to explain how civil society could be established."⁵⁸ Durkheim does not defend individualism as a theoretical perspective or as a political ideology but more as an expedient by which to maintain social harmony, "The cult of which he [man] is at once both object and follower does not address itself to the particular being that constitutes himself and carries his name, but to the human person, wherever it is to be found, and in whatever form it is incarnated. Impersonal and anonymous, such an end soars far above all particular consciences and can thus serve as a rallying-point for them."⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 22.
⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 23.
⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 23.
With the decline of more prosaic religious forms it is only desirable that some system of ideas, which respect the rights and reality of the collective, be popularized.

As for that recalcitrant aspect of individualism—freedom of thought, it is quite acceptable to Durkheim's perspective:

Certainly, it is true that individualism does not go without a certain intellectualism; for liberty of thought is the first of all liberties. But why has it been seen to have as a consequence this absurd self-infatuation which would confine each within his own desires and would create a gap between men's minds? What it demands is the right for each individual to know those things that he may legitimately know. ... The only thing is that my intellect requires reasons for bowing to the authority of others. Respect for authority is in no way incompatible with rationalism provided that authority be rationally based.

Man is free to acquire the knowledge to appreciate his position relative to authority. He is free to acquiesce to rational authority.

Thus Durkheim recognizes individualism not as a theoretical perspective but rather as a tool by which society may hold men together, "One is thus gradually proceeding towards a state of affairs, now almost attained, in which the members of a single social group will no longer have anything in common other than their humanity. ..." Individualism is merely a facet in social reality, it is part of an inexorable social current; as is the emergence of individual personality:

For, should we wish to hold back its progress, we would have to prevent men from becoming increasingly differentiated from one another, reduce their personalities to a single level, bring them back to the old conformism of former times and arrest, in consequence, the tendency of societies to become ever more extended and centralized, and stem the increasing growth of the division of labor. Such an undertaking, whether desirable or not, infinitely surpasses all human powers.

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60 Ibid. p. 24.
Durkheim's defense of individualism is therefore rooted in his cognizance that any sacrilegious act weakens the social fabric.

Durkheim defends individualism on holist grounds and quite explicitly rejects the kernel of individualist thought:

This is how it is possible, without contradiction, to be an individualist while asserting that the individual is a product of society, rather than its cause. The reason is that individualism itself is a social product, like all moralities and all religions. The individual receives from society even the moral beliefs which deify him. This is what Kant and Rousseau did not understand. They wished to deduce their individualist ethics not from society, but from the notion of the isolated individual. Such an enterprise was impossible, and from it resulted the logical contradictions of their systems.63

Conclusion

It is in order to review and summarize the Durkheimian response to the paradigm outlined in Chapter I. For Durkheim, neither man nor society is the historical point of departure, the root of all reality. Man has lost the ontological pre-eminence ascribed to him by the Enlightenment. Man's characteristics—freedom, rationality and autonomy (as it relates to individuality and personality)—rather than being viewed as innate in man are portrayed as socially evolved qualities. Human freedom, even as a social product, is diluted. Autonomy, that factor which Durkheim leaves most intact, is significantly modified. Social man may be autonomous but he is in turn dependent on society as society is dependent upon him. The most exclusively individual aspect of reality, the archaic alterego of social man or the prehistoric predecessor of social man does assure man's identity as something other than society.

63 Ibid. p. 28.
It is society that is now credited with man's Enlightenment traits. Rather than man creating society, Durkheim's position is that man and society coexist as discrete realities; yet it is clear that while man's autonomous nature is assured, the essence of man, what man is above an animal, is created and imposed by society. This is evident from the child-parent tone in the description of social relations. When the child is youngest the parent plays his most coercive, manipulative role in controlling the child's anarchic strain and molding the child into maturity. With adulthood the child is reborn as a man; he is free to choose, act and think. Yet he remains the creation of the parent (aside from the residual archaic base from which he as a social man emerged) and he never escapes parental aegis.

The non-social child-like component even in the adult may resist the adult conscience, adult responsibilities, but essentially the relation between the man and his parent, or removing the analogy man and society, is harmonious. In short, even while this non-social dimension in man may assure some measure of autonomy to individual reality in the actual dynamics of existence it is relatively inconsequential. For Durkheim there is nothing in man which is basically antithetical to society, "Thus the antagonism that has too often been admitted between society and individual corresponds to nothing in the facts. Indeed, far from these two being in opposition and being able to develop only each at the expense of the other, they imply each other, The individual, in willing society, wills himself."64

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64 Durkheim, Education and Sociology, p. 78. See also Moral Education, pp. 67-8.
Given this status of society and societal relations it is a short logical progression to envisioning truth, rationality, morality, all civilization, as societally based. Society creates, formulates, imposes; it is the author of significant change. The man, though he may remove himself relatively from his most child-like dependence never succeeds in revolutionizing the relation. Thus, in most essential details, Durkheim rejects the Enlightenment. Though he never joins the ranks of extreme reaction, in that he never opposed Enlightenment with an absolute deification of society and in that he never abandons the Enlightenment belief in a human reality discrete from social reality Durkheim does come very close, save for a few stipulations, to eliminating the intrusion of the purely individual into reality.
CHAPTER III
Karl Marx: The Enlightenment Abandoned

Marx and the Key to Reality

Emile Durkheim may be seen as very much a product of the Enlightenment. Although much of his writing was an attempt to 'refute' the premises of the philosophes, he was still responding to the questions posed by the Enlightenment, still puzzling over the inquiries initiated by the individualists. Karl Marx was in less intimate conjunction with his historical predecessors. As a young man he did grapple at length with the nature of man, the origin of society, the nature of human requirements—subject matter quite compatible with Enlightenment priorities. However, in his more mature works, in the writings which he held to be of paramount significance the tie to the Enlightenment had been completely cut.

Marx might on occasion interject with a remark on the relation between man and society but even in his youth (pre German Ideology) he had no vital concern with the ideas propagated by the individualists; in his maturity his eyes were on the tangible present as it dissolved into the future and he had no time for what he would characterize as bourgeois philosophical meanderings such as defining the inalienable traits of man. In consequence, it is necessary first to extricate his view on man, society, truth and so forth which, while explicit in his early writings, are, in fact, largely implicit in his later works. Once having reconstructed in rough the Marxian viewpoint it will be feasible to discern more distinctly the discontinuities, the
contradictions and the similarities between it and the Enlightenment orientation.

The first crucial task to undertake in investigating Marx is to determine the 'critical' element in reality, that is, that aspect of reality which Marx held to be of fundamental import. It is apparent that Marx was persistently motivated by a concern with the status of man. His very first writings dwell upon the necessity of devoting oneself to the welfare of mankind. In an early essay entitled "Reflections of a Youth on Choosing an Occupation" (1835) he remarks, "To man, too, the Deity gave a general goal, to improve mankind and himself, but left it up to him to seek the means by which he can attain this goal, left it up to him to choose the position in society which is most appropriate and from which he can best elevate both himself and society."¹

This concern for man similarly underlies one of Marx's first major works, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Herein he investigates the contemporary position of man and concludes that all men, not just workers who are so blatantly economically oppressed, but 'all' are being denied by the bourgeois system. Men are alienated; not just the worker who has been reduced to the status of a machine, to a mindless belly, but also the bourgeois whose very position entails self-renunciation and who are captive to a dead reality of 'things'. Marx notes, "With the increasing value of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the devaluation of the world of men."²

Further, in these early works Marx's concern for man was not merely a derivative of humanitarian pangs regarding the plight of mankind. There were also practical considerations at work. Marx was extricating himself from German idealism and formulating a conception of history which was rooted in man not ideas. Thus, in Marx and Engels' first joint work, *The Holy Family*, they state, "Ideas can never lead beyond an old world system but only beyond ideas of the old world system. Ideas cannot carry anything out at all. In order to carry out ideas men are needed who dispose of a certain practical force."\(^3\)

In short, in these early treatises two themes emerge which focus upon man as the crucial element in reality. First, as suggested above, man is viewed as the crux of ethical and moral consideration. Secondly, man is presented as the critical actualizing factor in the course of history. This two-fold preoccupation with man is to be found interwoven through much of Marx's subsequent writings. In *The Poverty of Philosophy* attention is focused on the negation of man.\(^4\) A similar undercurrent runs throughout *German Ideology*. However, as investigation of Marx proceeds it becomes apparent that he was far from merely regurgitating Enlightenment concern for man, for the ontological primacy of man. Marx's conception of man is revealed as quite alien to any Enlightenment notions.

Foremost, even in his initial writings, Marx is not concerned with individual man as an abstraction; he pointedly rejects any super-historical, absolute nature of man. Man for Marx is not a given, not something a priori, something static and unmalleable; rather man is


historical process, he is existence not essence. Marx states, "All history is the preparation for 'man' to become the object of sensuous consciousness, and for the needs of 'man as man' to become (natural, sensuous) needs." In *German Ideology*, wherein Marx and Engels first comprehensively articulated their theory of historical materialism, any notions of 'human nature', in the Enlightenment sense of certain innate inalienable traits in man, are cast aside, "As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production." 

Marx was able to reconcile this rejection of 'abstract man' (which may be subsumed under his rejection of the entire monolith--idealism) and his concern for man as historically and morally vital once he crystallized a material conception of history. From this perspective man ceases to be an animal when he produces his food, shelter and other necessities of life. Initially this activity depends upon the material conditions in which man lives; thus he becomes a farmer where this is practicable, a hunter elsewhere and so on. Having once engaged in productive activity man alters the existing material substratum. This altered basis, created by man, in turn results in altered activity amongst the people who subsequently exist in this locale. Thus Marx may view man as the cornerstone of history and yet envisage nothing basic, nothing given in man save his proclivity to produce. Man is whatever he is within a particular socio-historical context. As to the rationale for objecting to the dehumanization of capitalist society, it lies in the existence of material and

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consequently social conditions which call for the transcendence of the status quo.

One may still sense that Marx's concern for the depredation of man, for the reduction of man to machine entails more than a view of man as a historical element and that, in fact, Marx clung to some 'grandeur' of man which he saw being vitiated. Nonetheless, his stated position is that men are historical creatures. In his critique of German socialism he comments, "He [the true socialist] forgets that the 'inward nature' of men, as well as their 'consciousness' of it, 'i.e.' their 'reason', has at all times been an historical product and that even when, as he believes, the society of men has been based 'upon external compulsion', their 'inward nature' corresponded to this 'external compulsion'." This view is also presented in The Poverty of Philosophy, "M. Proudhon does not know that all history is nothing but a continuous transformation of human nature."

Marx never, not even in his early writings worked outward from an abstract notion of man, man characterized by specified inalienable traits. Rather, he was concerned with individuals within their social milieu and in their historical context. The second crucial point is that his fundamental premises dealt not with man as an individual, as an autonomous entity but with men. As evident from the afore-noted excerpts the important reference points are mankind and society. From the very outset of his intellectual career Marx spurned man as an individual or the individual fulfillment of specific men and instead favored man only as an aspect of men. In the previously mentioned essay on choosing an occupation young Marx states, "If a person works only for himself he can

7 Ibid., p. 113
8 Marx, Poverty of Philosophy, p. 147.
perhaps be a famous scholar, a great wise man, a distinguished poet, but
never a complete, genuinely great man."

For Marx the significance of man, the individual, resides in
the collectivity. Man is a member of a class, existent in a particular
historical society. History is the action and reaction of masses of men.
Marx never loses his pressing concern for the plurality of man, "The very
moment civilization begins, production begins to be founded on the anta-
gonism of orders, estates, classes, and finally on the antagonism of
accumulated labour and actual labour." The worker is significant only
to the extent to which he and his fellows succeed in establishing a
politically viable organization. History is the political conflict of
such social groups. There is no room at the core of Marxian thought for
some autonomous, rational, and free individual man.

**Man as Individual**

Despite this preclusion of 'natural' man from any central
position, in Marxian thought it must be interjected that Marx does pro-
vide a role; albeit peripheral, for man in his theoretical system.
First, however, he defines the boundaries delineating this participation
of individual man. As noted, man is a creature born into a particular
social milieu at a specific historical moment. He is thus flung into
an extant social, political and economic structure and much of his
thought, activity, and so forth is determined by his existence in this
particular time and place. For Marx part of man was no more than an
reflection of social forces:

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Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence, rises an entire superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed sentiments, illusions, modes of thought and views of life. The entire class creates and forms them out of its material foundations and out of the corresponding social relations. The single individual, who derives them through tradition and upbringing, may imagine that they form the real motives and the starting point of his activity.\textsuperscript{11}

It is apparent that Marx felt society and social relations play an important determinative role in the development of the individual, "Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve for their satisfaction."\textsuperscript{12}

There can be no doubt that for Marx what a man is depends very heavily on his economic, social and historical point of departure. The Marxian conception of man envisages the individual as a social and historical creation. Man is not something mystical, transcendental or superhistorical; he is discussed in terms of real situations and real activity. Marx declares,"The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity."\textsuperscript{13}

He saw these individuals existing in a world constructed by their predecessors, guided by traditions, social forces and economic necessities; in short, buffeted along by a battery of forces which were exterior to and historically prior to the particular individuals. Yet, despite

\textsuperscript{11}Karl Marx and F.Engels, Selected Works \textsuperscript{[}The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte\textsuperscript{]} (New York: International Publishers, 1968), pp. 118-119.

\textsuperscript{12}Marx, Selected Works \textsuperscript{[}Wage, Labour and Capital\textsuperscript{]} p. 85.

\textsuperscript{13}Marx, \textit{German Ideology}, pp. 6-7.
these restrictions, Marx never postulated that the individual was
totally boxed in by external forces or that he was merely some extrapola-
tion of such forces.

Marxian man lived in a real world with real necessities and
real limits. However, although Marx appreciated the potency of social
pressures, he never precluded the possibility of individual man opposing
the forces which strove to determine his behaviour. For Marx man as an
individual is not merely swept along by historical currents. His letter
to J. Wydemeyer, for example, alludes to the discretionary powers ascribed
to the individual:

I have broken off relations with Ernest Jones. In spite of my
repeated warning—and although I had accurately predicted what
would happen, namely, that he would ruin himself and disorganize
the Chartist Party—he has entered into negotiations with
the bourgeois radicals. He is now a ruined man, but the harm
he has done the English proletariat is enormous. The mistake
will of course be made good, but a very favourable moment for
action has been missed. 14

In short, Jones was capable of 'temperaneously' subverting the direction,
of social development. Louis Bonaparte exemplifies the same pattern.
Bonaparte, in Marx's eyes, had been responsible for "the official col-
lective genius of France [being] brought to naught by the artful stupid-
ity of a single individual." 15 Moreover, it may be noted that in
accomplishing this feat Bonaparte was not merely actualizing his own
class interests.

There is equal leeway accorded the individual on the more
affirmative side. The individual may choose to disregard his class
interests etc. and decide to promote rather than retard the inevitable

14 Karl Marx and F. Engels, Selected Correspondence, trans. by I. Lasker
course in history. Thus, as suggested in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, "When the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands."\textsuperscript{16}

Similarly there is the suggestion in Capital that workers, though not co-ordinated into organizations, may choose to resist their oppressors.\textsuperscript{17}

In conclusion, there is room for the individual human being in Marx's writings, and he, man, is not represented as an appendage of the social organism, as an entity merely acting out the social and historical necessities. The social requirements, the historical location, are instilled deep within men's motivation but there remains a region in which the individual chooses and acts more as an individual than as a social or historical product. However, it is also the case that, although individually-rooted action and motivation exist for Marx, they are clearly not a paramount consideration. Individual men may on occasion disturb the historical pattern, but, like a ripple on the ocean, they do not alter history. They may work out the historical minutiae but they, as individuals, do not create history. Individual man is part of reality but he is far from constituting the critical element, the focal point of that reality.

This view on the ontological status of man is woven throughout Marx's works. In German Ideology Marx derides the idealists who are foolish enough to believe that "every movement of world importance.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{16}Marx, Selected Works [Communist Manifesto], p. 44.

exists only in the head of some chosen being and the fate of the world depends on whether this head, which has made all wisdom its own private property, is or is not mortally wounded by some realistic stone before it has had time to make its revelation."\textsuperscript{18} Marx allots no credence to the 'great man' theory of history, "Already here we see how this civil society is the true source and theatre of all history, and how nonsensical is the conception of history held hitherto, which neglects the real relationships and confines itself to high-sounding dramas of princes and states."\textsuperscript{19} Even in the supposed optimistic flush of youth Marx has no delusions as to the potency of the solitary individual:

In the investigation of political conditions one is too easily tempted to overlook the objective nature of the relationships and to explain everything from the will of the persons acting. There are relationships, however, which determine the actions of private persons as well as those of individual authorities, and which are as independent as are the movements of breathing.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Man as Society}

Man as a plurality is the key to the Marxian conceptual schema. The concepts men, mankind are crucial to Marxian morality and Marxian philosophy. Power, truth, progress are all rooted in men in collectivities. As noted, civilization emerges from the primordial mists when men produce their means of existence; men can produce only in social relation. Consequently, man becomes men (as opposed to animal) when he joins with other men to mold the extant material conditions. In the progression beyond the origin men create the world of thought, "Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.--real active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the

\textsuperscript{18} Marx, \textit{German Ideology}, pp. 181-2.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 26.
\textsuperscript{20} Marx, \textit{Writings of the Young Marx}, p. 144; see also p. 140.
intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms."\(^{21}\)

Thus men have created history and they compose the core of reality:

Monsieur Proudhon has very well grasped the fact that men produce cloth, linen, silks, and it is a great merit on his part to have grasped this small amount! What he has not grasped is that these men, according to their abilities, also produce the social relations amid which they prepare cloth and linen. Still less has he understood that men, who produce their social relations in accordance with their material productivity, also produce ideas, categories, that is to say the abstract ideal expression of these same social relations they express. They are historical and transitory products. For M. Proudhon, on the contrary, abstractions, categories are the primordial cause. According to him they, and not men, make history.\(^{22}\)

Marx arrives at 'men' as the *sine qua non* of reality by positing a naturally social man. In this realm there is a clear consistency from the young Marx to the mature Marx. As a young man (pre *German Ideology*) Marx quite specifically defines man as social, "*Man makes religion*, religion does not make man. And indeed religion is the self-consciousness and self-regard of man who has either not yet found or has already lost himself. But *man* is not an abstract being squatting outside the world. *Man is the world of men*, the state, society."\(^{23}\)

For Marx then men were strong, dynamic, truly alive when they united with others. Communist utopia would betoken the end of social division, social contradictions; men would be free to follow their natural course of social communion with one another.

Thus Marxian thought is grounded in the fundamentality of men united in a social group. But, there is a pause between men in a collectivity and the reification of that collectivity. In his theoretical framework Marx never allowed man to relinquish his position as 'the'


\(^{22}\) Marx, *Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 189.

\(^{23}\) Marx, *Writings of the Young Marx*, p. 250.
reality of the group. In *Philosophical Manuscripts* he rejects even any abstraction of man from society:

Above all we must avoid postulating 'Society' again as an abstraction vis-a-vis the individual. The individual is *the social being*. His life, even if it may not appear in the direct form of a *communal* life in association with others—is therefore an expression and confirmation of *social life*. Man's individual and species life are not *different*, however much—and this is inevitable—the mode of existence of the individual is a more *particular*, or more *general* mode of the life of the species, or the life of the species is a more *particular* or more *general* individual life.24

Marx worked from the premise that there was nothing real, nothing substantive in class, society, and state other than man. In Marx society was indeed a reality but a reality in man not discrete from man.

Implicitly Marx held that there was no need for society to be any more than the communion of men; that there was no necessity or inevitability for society or class to dominate and control men. Men were necessarily social, they necessarily lived together. That men permitted themselves to be directed externally by an alienation of their selves, such as class, was not necessary. The whole significance of revolution derives from this premise. By maintaining that man is inherently social but denying the reification of social groups, Marx was able to postulate a future wherein the falsely reified aspects of social existence, such as class and state would wither away while the overall social atmosphere persisted.

What may seem at first a paradox, between Marx's affirmation of the social and his suggestion that social institutions such as class and family would and should be eliminated, becomes more coherent and understandable in the light of the following considerations. Marx could anticipate the demise of class and state since he viewed them as

transitory, historically evolved elements. Man's social nature was basic to man's humanity; it was in Marx's early terminology man's 'species essence'. Man could relinquish his sociality only by abandoning his humanity. This isomorphism of men with society is explicit in Philosophical Manuscripts:

Thus the social character is the general character of the whole movement: *just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced* by him. Activity and mind, both in their content and in their mode of existence, are social: social activity and social mind. The human essence of nature first exists only for social man; for only here does nature exist for him as a bond with man—as his existence for the other and the other's existence for him—as the life-element of human reality. Only here does nature exist as the foundation of human existence. Only here has what is to him his natural existence become human existence, and nature become man for him. Thus society is the unity of being of man with nature—the true resurrection of nature—the naturalism of man and the humanism of nature both brought to fulfillment.25

Superficially it would appear that Marx came to gradually accept the reification of social groups as he extricated himself from the philosophical integuments of German idealism. For example, in German Ideology, his conception of historical development is clearly couched in terms of class, not men, "Every new class, therefore, achieves its hegemony only on a broader basis than that of the class ruling previously, in return for which the opposition of the non-ruling class against the new ruling class later develops all the more sharply and profoundly."26 Further, he appreciated the power class exerted upon individuals and independent of individuals, "On the other hand, the class in its turn achieves an independent existence over against the individuals, so that the latter find their conditions of existence predestined, and hence have their

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25 Ibid., p. 137.
26 Marx, German Ideology, p. 41.
position in life and their personal development assigned to them by their
class, become subsumed under it."^27

However, these comments represent only a truncated version of
the Marxian perspective. At certain instances class may appear as a
unity with its own reality, a reality which controls and directs men as
so many dependent appendages, but Marx never lost sight of the fact that
class unity, class solidarity was a facade. The bourgeoisie fought as
earnestly amongst themselves as they did against the proletariat.\footnote{For example in The Eighteenth Brumaire (Selected Works)Marx distinguishes between the bourgeois republicans, the democratic petty bourgeoisie and the royalist bourgeoisie, p. 111.} Likewise the proletariat were divided on the course it should follow.
Secondly, and of more definitive import, is the fact that Marx did not
envisage class as a reality in the sense of a dynamic, self-perpetuating
entity. Mankind was always the solidity of the world, class was a
phantasma which would dissipate in the course of time, "The life-process
of society, which is based on the process of material production does
not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by
freely associated men, and is consciously regulated by them in accordance
with a settled plan."^29 In a phrase, the reality of men, the substantia-
licity of men was consistently of a higher order.

The Nature of Society

The foregoing does not mean, of course, that Marx did not see
in collectivities something more than the sum of its parts, something in
society beyond a mere conglomeration of men. In social relations Marx
saw man fulfilling himself and transcending himself in this fulfillment.

\footnote{Ibid., p. 49; see also Capital, p. 809.}

\footnote{For example in The Eighteenth Brumaire (Selected Works)Marx distinguishes between the bourgeois republicans, the democratic petty bourgeoisie and the royalist bourgeoisie, p. 111.}

\footnote{Marx, Capital, p. 92.}
"When the labourer co-operates systematically with others, he strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities of his species."\(^{30}\) In recognizing its social nature, in working out the contradictions in social relations mankind would surpass itself and would liberate itself from the shrouds of the past, from social tradition and social distinctions:

It follows from all we have been saying up till now that the communal relationship into which the individuals of a class entered, and which was determined by their common interests over against a third party, was always a community to which these individuals belonged only as average individuals, only in so far as they lived within the conditions of existence of their class—a relationship in which they participated not as individuals but as members of a class. With the community of revolutionary proletariats on the other hand, who take their conditions of existence and those of all members of society under their control, it is just the reverse; it is as individuals that the individuals participate in it.\(^{31}\)

Thus in his presentation of society Marx attempted to strike a compromise between Enlightenment individualism and post-Enlightenment holism. He rejected the individualists' premise that society was an artificial construct created by men under the pressure of material conditions. He remarks, "Combination up till now (by no means an arbitrary one, such as is expounded for example in the Contrat Social, but a necessary one), . . . ."\(^{32}\) Likewise, as noted previously, he rejected any reified nature being ascribed to society or class.\(^{33}\)

A word is required as to the specific attributes of this Marxian conception of society. Society, for Marx, is founded in men

\(^{30}\) Ibid., p. 361.

\(^{31}\) Marx, German Ideology.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., p. 75.

\(^{33}\) See Marx's ridicule of Proudon for discussing "the fiction of the person, Society. . . ." Poverty of Philosophy, p. 96.
acting together, acting while conscious of, concerned with the others.

An overview of this action reveals it as a complex, integrated and multifaceted system. Marx notes, "How, indeed, could the single logical formula of movement, of sequence, of time, explain the structure of society, in which all relations coexist simultaneously and support one another?" Further, this system, society, exists historically rather than geographically. According to Marx there are to be discerned various types of societies depending upon the form of material production. Clearly society relates to the economic relations of men rather than language, culture, heritage and so forth. Consequently, Marx designates societies as capitalist, feudal, etc.; "Present-day society is capitalist society, which exists in all civilized countries, more or less free from medieval admixture, more or less modified by the particular historical development of each country, more or less developed."

'Society' is a constant throughout history. It refers simply to the manner in which men must work together in the extant historical milieu in order to produce the material conditions for their general survival. Marx states:

What is society, whatever its form may be? The product of men's reciprocal action. Are men free to choose this or that form of society for themselves? By no means. Assume a particular state of development in the productive forces of man and you will get a particular form of commerce and consumption. Assume particular stages of development in production, commerce and consumption and you will have a corresponding social constitution, a corresponding organization of the family, of orders or of classes, in a word, a corresponding civil society.

Consequently, society for Marx had none of the sociological connotations

34 Marx, Poverty of Philosophy, pp. 110-111.
35 Marx, Selected Works [Critique of the Gotha Programme], p. 331.
of cultural distinction and traditional divisions. Marxian society is, in fact, very close to being synonymous with the contemporary usage of 'mankind'—albeit mankind at a particular historical—economic juncture.

At this moment in pre-history (Marxian society) is broken down into various classes. The class, like society, is no mere collection of people. For Marx class entails unity, community, and social force:

In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class. 38

Yet, although at this moment classes seem an integral aspect of society, they are in fact ephemeral. The content of 'society' is something more amorphous and more basic than classes. With the working-out of history class and class antagonism dissolve while society persists:

In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of one arising from the social conditions of life of the individuals; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism. This social formation brings, therefore, the prehistory of human society to a close. 39

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37 For example, for Marx sociologists' concern for differentiating between American, Canadian and French-Canadian societies would serve merely to obscure the fundamental similarities between these forms of capitalist society.

38 Marx, Selected Works [Eighteenth Brumaire], p. 172.

39 Marx, Selected Works [Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy], p. 183.
Marxian society is transcendental; while state, class, social tradition dissipate through the course of history, society remains.

**Marx and the Enlightenment**

Marxian 'Society': The Negation of the Negation

As evident from the preceding comments it is difficult to deal with Marx within the strictures provided by the Enlightenment. At first glance Marxian thought seems an ambivalent melange of Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment propositions. Closer examination discloses that Marx in effect revolutionized these early conceptions. If one considers the individualists' viewpoint as the thesis, the holists' view as the antithesis or negation, then, following the dialectical pattern, Marx postulated the negation of the negation; that is, not a compromise but a dynamic synthesis. Marx did not opt for individual man as the crux of reality. Individual man was a myth, a mystification. In the real world man lived and worked with others; man was influenced by the social patterns, the social structures.

Both the young, supposedly individualist Marx and the mature Marx work from the premise of man as a social creature. In *Philosophical Manuscripts* he states:

> Man, much as he may therefore be a *particular* individual (and it is precisely his particularity which makes him an individual, and a real *individual* social being) is just as much the *totality*--the ideal totality--the subjective existence of thought and experienced society for itself; just as he exists also in the real world as the awareness and the real mind of social existence, and as a totality of human manifestation of life. 40

In *Capital* he reiterates this general line of thought:

> in a sort of way it is with man as with commodities. Since he comes into the world neither with a looking glass in his hand, nor as a Fichtian philosopher, to whom 'I am I' is sufficient, man first sees and recognizes himself in other men. Peter only

establishes his own identity as a man by first comparing himself with Paul as being of like kind. And thereby Paul, just as he stands in his Pauline personality, becomes to Peter the type of the genus homo. 41

Marx could not look upon man without seeing him amidst the web of social relations. 'Man' and 'men' melded together to constitute the substance of the Marxian perspective.

To change the frame of reference, to recognize the society in the individual, is, for Marx, to grasp the 'real' reality clouded by the individuality of man. From this perspective 'men' are powerful, dynamic, creative entities. They are the essence of historical evolution—they take hold of the material conditions and push them along their course. It is men (in the social sense) who are the constant in history. Individuals rise and wane within the historical struggle while society persists, surviving all the vicissitudes such as class and caste which one time or another clung to it.

Thus while the fundamentality of society does not rest in the solitary individual it also is not located in extrapolations from society such as class, culture, religion or tradition. Here Marx's views, though he rejects their basic premise, hone closely to the individualists' position. Marx designates the current articulations of man's social nature, such as class and religion, as hindersome, undesirable and misleading. This orientation is apparent in the young Marx:

Political democracy is Christian in that it regards man—not merely one but every man—as sovereign and supreme. But this means man in his uncivilized and unsocial aspect, in his fortuitous existence and just as he is, corrupted by the entire organization of our society, lost and alienated from himself, oppressed by inhuman relations and elements—in a word, man who is not yet an actual species-being. 42

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41 Marx, Capital, footnote p. 61.
42 Marx, Writings of the Young Marx, p. 231.
In the higher phase of communist society these social restraints, and
social blinders are done away with and man as individual and man as
society become reconciled as one. "In a future society in which class
antagonism will have ceased, in which there will no longer be any
classes, use will no longer be determined by the minimum time of pro-
duction; but the time of production devoted to different articles will
be determined by the degree of their social utility." 43

In conclusion, although the Marxian system does not rest ulti-
mately upon either solitary man or reified society, it also is not
rooted in any ordinary, every-day experience of society. Marxian
society, society as man, cannot be adequately conceptualized in either
the terms of the individualists or the holists. It is perhaps best seen
as a dialectical process, as the simultaneous affirmation and denial of
man, the simultaneously mundane and transcendental.

Marx and the Credo of the Enlightenment

Having considered what constitutes the cornerstone of Marxian
time, namely, the Marxian conceptional society, it is now feasible to
turn to subsidiary issues, to the response the Marxian system provides for
the Enlightenment's inquiries. First, chronologically in the questions
which characterized the Enlightenment, is that which considers the origin
of society. As remarked previously, Marx proposed that society exists
when man, the animal, joins with others of his species to engage in pro-
ductive activity. 44 Man ceases to be an ape and becomes a savage. As a
savage he engages in a very intense social existence. At this stage, he

43 Marx, Poverty of Philosophy, p. 63 and also see Poverty of Philosophy,
p. 174.
44 See Marx, Selected Works [Critique of the Gotha Programme] p. 320.
"has no more torn himself off from the navel-string of his tribe or
community, than each bee has freed itself from connexion with the hive." 45

As history evolves this original homogeneity breaks down, the social unity
of men in society dissolves into discordant groupings, "it is only after
men have raised themselves above the rank of animals, when therefore their
labour has been to some extent socialized, that a state of things arises
in which the surplus-labour of the one becomes a condition of existence
for the other." 46

Clearly Marx pictures a moment in the antediluvian mists at
which an ape, who would become man, united socially with others. For Marx,
therefore, men have comprised and continue to comprise the source of
society "The social structure and the State are continually evolving out
of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as
they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they
really are; i.e. as they are effective, produce materially, and are active
under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent
of their will." 47 Yet, it is equally clear that despite this apparent
concession to Enlightenment views Marx was far from seeing society as
something which man haplessly constructed under the duress of external
necessity.

For Marx there is nothing artificial, nothing fictitious about
society; it is a reality, the reality of men. Marx portrayed society as
natural and inevitable; if he allowed himself idealist phrases he might
have characterized it as inherent in man. Certain extrapolations of
society might be artificial but society itself is fundamental, "Thus it

45 Marx, Capital, pp. 366-7 and see also German Ideology, p. 20.
46 Marx, Capital, p. 561.
47 Marx, German Ideology, p. 13.
is quite obvious from the start there exists a materialistic connection of men with one another, which is determined by their needs and their mode of production, and which is as old as men themselves.\textsuperscript{48} The same point is made from another perspective "Consciousness is therefore from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all."\textsuperscript{49} Society is not merely an innate trait of man, it is man.

In brief, rather than adopting the Enlightenment view of society as a product of man, Marx postulates society as a reflection of man.\textsuperscript{50} In this manner he avoids presenting society as an artificial construct and, at the same time, avoids positing the autonomy of society, which would serve as a basis for reification. Man (i.e. mankind) and society are much the same thing for Marx. This effectively precludes the reactionary stance of presenting society as a reality \textit{sui generis}, as a reality distinct from the reality of its components. However, there is a second aspect which must be noted; namely, the role affixed to the individual man in the genesis of man (mankind). As evident from the above quotations Marx followed the reaction to the Enlightenment in proposing that individuation evolved out of the original homogeneity of society.\textsuperscript{51} Therefore, although the relation between man (mankind) and society may not be holistic, the relation between individual man and society is in fact essentially deterministic as per the holistic tradition. This bifurcation between man (individual) and man (mankind) will become clear in the following discussion.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 18.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 19.
\textsuperscript{50} See Marx, \textit{Writings of the Young Marx}, pp. 271, 281.
\textsuperscript{51} Marx, \textit{German Ideology}, p. 63.
Society and man have emerged. It is worthy of note that in the course of their subsequent development Marx, unlike the Enlightenment, sensed no fundamental disharmony between man and society. This is of course quite consistent with the Marxian synthesis of mankind and society; however, Marx never suggested that even on the individual level there might be some basic antithesis, some uneasiness rooted in man's biological individuality. Men might be uncomfortable in particular historical circumstances, but there was nothing in man which precluded his harmonious existence in the context of society. Communist utopia is indicative of the fact that Marx rejected any individualist notions about men never being happy in society "In the place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." Individual man and society, man and mankind, would exist in perfect alignment.

However, from another vantage point, Marx conceived of the relation between man and society in terms markedly reminiscent of the Enlightenment. As noted Marx suggests there is a fundamental, trans-historical social component of reality. Society in this general, amorphous sense is rooted in man; it is natural and inevitable. There are, however, other historical manifestations of this social element which are artificial and transitory; for example, the family, religion, the status of women, and classes. All these are mere outgrowths of the basic social reality. Moreover, in line with the Enlightenment, Marx treats these social embroideries as so much 'muck' polluting man. (In the same breath he maintains they are necessary to the working out of historical contradictions).

52 See Marx, Manuscripts, pp. 136-7.
54 See Marx, German Ideology, p. 27.
Marx states:

Both for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is necessary, an alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a revolution; this revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew. 55

Apparently Marx was inclined to share the Enlightenment belief that social extrusions, such as class and religion, were so many misconceptions which serve to blind men to the truth, to provide them with 'false' consciousness. In The Poverty of Philosophy he remarks:

But the respectable conscience refuses to see this obvious fact. So long as one is a bourgeois, one cannot but see in this relation of antagonism a relation of harmony and eternal justice, which allows no one to gain at the expense of another. For the bourgeois, individual exchange can exist without any antagonism of classes. For him, these are two quite unconnected things. Individual exchange, as the bourgeois conceives it, is far from resembling individual exchange as it actually exists in practice. 56

In spite of this similarity Marx's conception of the source and nature of truth was antithetical to that proposed by the Enlightenment. Foremost, he pointedly rejected any proposal that there existed an absolute, supermundane 'Truth' lodged deep in the nature of man, "but the requirements of the Truth; not the interests of the proletariat, but the interests of Human Nature, or Man in general, who belongs to no class, has no reality, . . . exists [only] in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy." 57 Truth, like man, exists only in the historical

56 Marx, Poverty of Philosophy, p. 78.
57 Marx, Selected Works[ Communist Manifesto] p. 47.
moment, like man, it is part of social evolution. Yet, truth does exist. Marx may designate certain working class activities as honing closer to the correct course; others as impeding social development. Thus, Marx is cognizant of some truth, does have insight into the reality of historical struggles.

This, for Marx, is accomplished by employing scientific analysis. He notes with regard to a scientific discovery: "This seems paradox and contrary to everyday observation. It is also paradox that the earth moves around the sun and that water consists of two highly inflammable gases. Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive appearance of things." Scientific investigation of the activity of real men in the real world reveals the truths submerged beneath biases, prejudices and class interests. 'Real' truth is rooted in the activity and practice of men: "The question whether objective [gegenständliche] truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sideness [Diesseitigkeit] of his thinking."

Thus, in a certain respect, derivative from his fundamental notions regarding man and society, Marx synthesizes the Enlightenment and holist views on the nature and source of truth. He denies any supposition that there is a truth rooted in the solitary individual. Truth is part of the historical moment; history is the activity of men;

58 See Marx, Selected Works [Eighteenth Brumaire] p. 103.
men exist socially. In consequence truth is riveted to some aspect of the social. Yet Marx also imputes falsity to certain social forces. Class interest, for example, may serve to blur the truth. For Marx, therefore, truth lies not with abstract 'man' nor with temperaneous manifestations of society such as class and religion; rather truth is grounded in the basic social nature of men.

**Marx, Man and the Freedom to Change**

There remains to be considered one final set of questions critical to the Enlightenment and to all subsequent social theory—specifically the nature and source of change. The individualists of the eighteenth century had postulated a 'naturally' free, undetermined human being and from this premise extrapolated that (social) change was the result of free man's action. As suggested above Marx worked from quite different interpretations of human freedom. Freedom, for Marx, is not some inalienable essence of human nature. Man and his nature exist historically, they are both pre-eminently malleable. Consequently human freedom is seen as perpetually evolving, reflecting the historical changes.

As to the here and now in which Marx lived, he had very definite notions as to the extent of individual freedom and the role of man in social change. He was well aware of the degree to which social class, historical moment and social position denied man the free exercise of his will:

It is superfluous to add that men are not free to choose their productive forces—which are the basis of all their history—for every productive force is an acquired force, the product of former activity. The productive forces are therefore the result of practical human energy; but this energy is itself conditioned by the circumstances in which men find themselves, by the productive forces already acquired, by the social form
which exists before they do, which they do not create, which is the product of the preceding generation. 61

Marx appreciated that for the worker freedom often reduced itself to a choice between existence and death: "But the worker, whose sole source of livelihood is the sale of his labour power, cannot leave the whole class of purchasers, that is, the capitalist class, without renouncing his existence." 62

Marx did not see his fellow men as free. Nor did he see them as robots. However, some interpreters have taken certain passages to reveal the crudest deterministic views on Marx's part. It is necessary to undermine any wholly deterministic conclusions drawn from such excerpts and to reveal their place within the overall context of Marxian thought. Thus in The Holy Family Marx states:

Indeed private property, too, drives itself in its economic movement towards its own dissolution, only, however, through a development which does not depend on it, of which it is unconscious and which takes place against its will, through the very nature of things; only inasmuch as it produces the proletariat as proletariat, the misery conscious of its spiritual and physical misery, that dehumanization conscious of its dehumanization and therefore self-abolishing. The proletariat executes the sentence that private property pronounces on itself by begetting the proletariat, just as it carries out the sentence that wage-labour pronounced on itself by bringing forth wealth for others and misery for itself. 63

The proletariat was not, however, merely an automaton, blindly actualizing the necessities imposed by super-historical forces. Marx believed in scientifically discerned truths. He felt he had unearthed certain truths regarding the social and economic structure. 64 On the basis of these truths he ventured predictions as to the inevitable

61 Marx, Poverty of Philosophy, p. 181.
62 Marx, Selected Works [Wage, Labour and Capital], pp. 75-76.
63 Marx, Holy Family, p. 52.
64 Marx, Selected Correspondence, p. 69.
outcome of current events. One immutable aspect of these predictions is the extant material conditions which play a significant role in determining the realm and range of human endeavor. Yet there is also a variable factor—human will, human freedom which, as noted, determines the pace of social change.

The human element thus plays a substantive role in social change. For example, human awareness, human consciousness are the a priori of social change. In *The Holy Family* Marx comments, "Since man has lost himself in the proletariat; yet at the same time has not only gained theoretical consciousness of that loss, but through urgent, no longer disguisable, absolutely imperative need—that practical expression of necessity—is driven directly to revolt against that inhumanity; it follows that the proletariat can and must free itself." The actual historical outcome depends upon preceding historical conditions.

Men engaging in real activity in the real world become cognizant of certain truths and certain contradictions entailed in that real world. Once they perceive those disharmonies through the medium of the material world, they, according to Marx, 'inevitably' 'choose' to pursue a certain course of action. Men seek food rather than starvation; freedom rather than slavery; communism rather than capitalism.

Clearly for Marx, men are not enmeshed within the historical process. Men, in the Marxian sense of mankind, indeed are "the authors and actors of their own history." Marx specifically argues against portraying human history in terms of abstract ideas which encased human activity. Rather than ideas being the root of history it is men; men who arrange the material conditions. It is in this sense men are

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66 The actual historical outcome depends upon preceding historical conditions.
'authors'; they are actors in that they live in a world defined for them by preceding generations.

In short, Marx never opts for an exclusively deterministic conception of man or of social change. Even the mature Marx, who was reputed to have rejected any individualistic tendencies of his youth, specifically denies any wholly deterministic interpretation of his theoretical stance. In his correspondence he derides a critic who has sought to reduce his work to "an historico-philosophic theory of the general path every people is fated to tread." Marx goes on to point out that historical examples may be cited, such as the Roman proletarians and the 'poor whites' of the South, which clearly show that the inevitable progression alluded to has not, in fact, taken place. For Marx there is no "super-historical" theory governing historical evolution; rather one must investigate the concrete historical moment to discern both what is going on and what is in all likelihood going to occur in the future.68

Thus throughout his life Marx strove to provide a synthesis of the deterministic and voluntaristic conceptions of social change. For the individual human being this meant that the individual, under propitious circumstances, was free to change the minutiae, free to align himself with one side or another;69 but, he was never free to define the alternatives, nor to transcend the reality of his individual and hence microcosmic status. Men in the sense of mankind, although likewise subject to the pressure of social and historical forces, are free to play a significant role in social evolution. "Men make their

68 Marx, Selected Correspondence, p. 313.
69 For example, as noted, a small section of the ruling class joins the revolutionary class, Marx, Communist Manifesto [Selected Works], p. 44.
own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances
directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition
of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living." 70

Despite the clutches of the past, men, united in a group such
as the working class, are free to choose and implement real change in
history. Without such an implicit premise, the rationale behind remarks
such as the following would be incomprehensible. Marx urges that free,
undetermined aspect of human reality to make a choice:

At the same time, and quite apart from the general servitude
involved in the wages system, the working class ought not to
exaggerate to themselves the ultimate working of these every­
day struggles. They ought not to forget that they are
fighting with effects, but not with the causes of those effects;
that they are retarding the downward movement, but not changing
its direction; that they are applying palliatives, not curing
the malady. They ought, therefore, not to be exclusively
absorbed in these unavoidable guerilla fights incessantly
springing up from the never-ceasing encroachments of capital or
changes of the market. They ought to understand that, with all
the miseries it imposes upon them, the present system simulta­
neously engenders the material conditions and the social forces
necessary for an economic reconstruction of society. Instead
of the conservative motto: 'A fair day's wages for a fair day's
work.' They ought to inscribe on their banner the revolutionary
watchword: 'Abolition of the wages system!' 71

In summary, individual men may cause a ripple in the flow of
history but men as a collectivity, men united in social communion, can
direct the course of history. This is implicit in the Marxian position
that men united, existent amidst favorable material conditions are
potential revolutionaries. At the same time mankind for Marx cannot
'will' itself out of its predicaments."And even when a society has got
upon the right track for the discovery of the natural laws of its
movements--and it is the ultimate aim of this work, to lay bare the

70 Marx, Selected Works [Eighteenth Brumaire], p. 97.
71 Marx, Value, Price and Profit, p. 61.
economic law of motion of modern society—it can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal development. Thus social change rests upon a pre-existing material base but man, through history, articulates this base and in his hands (man as mankind) rests the routing of the social development emerging from this material substratum.

One final word is warranted with regard to the Marxian concern for human freedom and social change. Although Marx was quite vociferous in his rejection of bourgeois notions of freedom, feeling that 'freedom' was often used to dupe the workers, he, nonetheless, affixed to his conception of present-day society a view of the future wherein freedom would be elaborated. Communist society would consist of 'freely associated' men who have been freed from class restrictions "Modern Industry, indeed, compels society, under penalty of death, to replace the detail-worker of today . . . reduced to the mere fragment of a man, by the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labours, ready to face any change of production, and to whom the different social functions he performs, are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired forces.'

The relative freedom characterizing communist society was made explicit in the famous passage from German Ideology:

And finally, the division of labour offers us the first example of how, as long as man remains in natural society, that is as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long therefore as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. . . while in communist society, where nobody has one

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73 Ibid., p. 92.
74 Ibid., p. 534.
exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic. 75

Thus, even though a high degree of determinism in terms of the role of material conditions, the phases of historical development and so forth, must be ascribed to Marx, this, as is quite consistent with his overall orientation, is a historically-located perspective. Men 'here and now' are not free in any dramatic sense. As individuals they are free to play only a rather inconsequential role in social evolution. Men as groups are allotted a relatively firmer grasp on historical change, but their freedom is foreshortened by the extant material conditions, the historical moment and so forth. These views, however, do not for Marx preclude the potentiality in man and in men for the subsequent emergence of a truly iconoclastic relation to freedom. In a future historical context human freedom may be unrecognizable in its breadth and vigor. This metamorphosis of man both on the individual and social level is hinted at in the above remarks from German Ideology. There are further references to a devastating alteration in the social realm, "It is only in an order of things in which there are no more class antagonism that social evolutions will cease to be political revolutions."76

There are two general conclusions to be drawn here. First, it is blatantly erroneous to represent Marx as a die-hard determinist. As suggested throughout this section one must come to recognize in Marxian thought a delicate and intricate synthesis of determinist and voluntarist views. Secondly, it may be noted that in this synthesis Marx always hones

75 Marx, German Ideology, p. 22.
76 Marx, Poverty of Philosophy, p. 175.
more closely to holist as opposed to individualist notions. In his passage from *German Ideology* regarding communist utopia, one of his most extreme vindications of individual human freedom, Marx must first stipulate that "society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible." Later in the same work he remarks "Only in community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions: only in community, therefore is personal freedom possible." And: "In the real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through association."

**Conclusion**

The central conclusion is that Marx, throughout his intellectual career, was primarily concerned with "men". It is suggested that he saw the truth, the good and the fundamental rooted in "men". In men, united together, Marx sensed the ultimate reality, the reality in light of which other realities were subsidiary. He could grant the existence of individuals but not perceive in the uniqueness of man the intensity, the vigor to be found in men united. "Men" not "man" are the foundation of Marxian thought.

Thus Marx does not start from a fully articulated man; he proceeds rather from men as malleable, as creating the material conditions and in turn being created by these conditions. History dawns when men become men by uniting in social production. Society, in the sense of men in social communion, arrives historically at the same time as man since, for Marx, it is man. Rather than portraying subsequent history as the progressive defilement of man by society or as the

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77 Marx, *German Ideology*, p. 22.  
78 Ibid., p. 74.  
79 Ibid., p. 75.
enslavement of 'free' man by society, Marx presents historical development as a relatively rational manipulation of the material conditions by a continuously evolving human species. Society in history is not oppressing man; indeed, it is not an objectification of men, it is men.

Marx is aware of the uniqueness as well as the typicality of man. Discrete individuals do exist aside from man as a manifestation of the plurality; individuals do have will and do change the minutiae of historical evolution. Yet, contrary to the Enlightenment, there is no 'natural' tension between man and society, man and men. Individuation is a historical product; men become individuals after they become men. In brief, man becomes alienated from his 'species-essence'. Marx is quite explicit in seeing in the relation between man and men, individual and society, a tension urging the two together rather than holding them eternally asunder.

In short, although the individual is a component in Marxian reality, his position historically, socially and philosophically is obscured by the preponderance of men united. Marx does not, however, present a vulgar inversion of Enlightenment views. The individual is not swallowed up by "men" nor subjugated by a reified society. Rather, he is truly himself, truly a man when his consciousness focuses on "all" rather than on his own solitary self. Men united in this "all" can influence the course of history. They can extricate themselves from the "muck" generated by preceding history and, given favorable conditions, grasp a revolutionary future.

Thus, in terms of the nature of man, Marxian thought is a multi-dimensional blend of Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment thought. There is no doubt that Marx rejected the Enlightenment. Yet his rejection was a transcendence, an affirmation of a new alternative rather
than a simple negation. He does not replace solitary man with society, 
nor does he religiously attack individualism. He was not preoccupied 
with undermining the Enlightenment perspective; he was formulating his 
own "more real", "more accurate", theoretical framework.
CHAPTER IV

Marx and Durkheim: The Summation

Contention Within Consensus

The works of Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim, amongst others, stand at a turning-point in the history of ideas. From this vantage point one may survey on one side the panorama of Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment thought; on the other, the multifarious paths of modern theorizing. It is, of course, granted that Marx and Durkheim were not the only and not persistently the most significant sources of modern thought, yet it is suggested that they, along with others, were instrumental in revolutionizing man's view of himself and his society. The preceding sections have analyzed each of the two theorists' respective conception of man and society; it remains to discern the symmetry and asymmetry between their premises.

It is to be noted that the intent here is not to focus exclusively upon the similarities between the Marxian and Durkheimian portrayal of man and society. Such a unidimensional approach would imply a false continuity and uniformity in social theorizing. Moreover, it would leave unformulated those insights into the dissimilarities between Marx and Durkheim already gleaned from the foregoing investigation. Consequently, the discussion will underline the divergencies between the two men and define the limits bounding the points of convergence.

To briefly review, the Enlightenment and Reaction to the Enlightenment constituted the historical backdrop to Marx and Durkheim.
The eighteenth century philosophes had grounded their theorizing in 'man'. Individual man was seen as the fundamental reality, as the source of truth, rationality, morality and civilization. Society, social relations were secondary manifestations, a poorer form of reality and one which on occasion intruded to obscure the natural primacy of man. In brief, society was ascribed the inferior, the secondary attributes while free, rational, autonomous man embodied goodness and truth. The Reaction sought to invert this order of things; that is, to root morality and rationality in society and to allot ontological primacy to society rather than man.

The research was undertaken to determine where the writings of Marx and Durkheim stand relative to these two opposing conceptual frameworks. No clear-cut finding was expected or desired. The investigation has, however, extricated and distinguished those areas of substantive agreement and disagreement amongst Marx, Durkheim and the Enlightenment. The following discussion will deal, first, with the lines of general consensus binding together Marx, Durkheim and anti-Enlightenment thought; secondly, with the residual Enlightenment attachments each theorist maintained and, thirdly, with the strictures which delimit the similarities between Marx and Durkheim.

Foremost, the research has revealed that the writings of both Marx and Durkheim share with the Reaction a crucial perspective. The foundation of Enlightenment thought was 'man'. Marx and Durkheim join with the anti-Enlightenment writers in deposing 'man' and placing in his stead society.  

It must again be noted that society for Durkheim is a reification, a reality removed from the reality of its components. Whereas, Marx does not make this distinction and, therefore, society connotes for him a more active than passive entity; more associating than association. Further, Durkheim distinguishes between man (individual), men and society. Marx, generally, recognizes only the difference between man (individual) and men-society (the latter two being in essence synonymous).
ontological status ascribed to the individual. For the philosophes
society was an expedient artificially contrived by men for their mutual
convenience. Man was the a priori, the source of civilization. Marx has
no credence in such views. In *German Ideology* he discusses the inevita-
ble material connections between men which form the basis for the natural
development of human sociality. For Marx, man and society are linked
together in history, one is no more the starting point than the other.
Durkheim, although he has a different conception of society, concurs in
this reasoning. Man and society are natural phenomena appearing at the
same historical juncture.

However, Marx and Durkheim proceed beyond this genetic equali-
ization of man and society. 'Human' man and society may emerge at the
same moment in history, but there are indications that individual man,
man in the Enlightenment sense, does not fare as well. Both Marx and
Durkheim's works discuss the original homogeneity of society which only
subsequently gives rise to individual diversity and autonomy. Marx in
*Capital* refers to the primitive man still united by the umbilical cord
to the tribal community. Later in the same work he compares the
primitive community structure to a bee-hive—from which the individual
has not yet torn himself away.

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3 Supra, pp. 76, 77.
4 Supra, pp. 32, 33.
5 As opposed to the more bestial, non-social primitive man.
7 Ibid., pp. 566-7. This point is also made in *German Ideology*, p. 20, where Marx notes that "This beginning is as animal as social life itself at this state. It is mere herd consciousness." See also supra, pp. 76, 77.
Similarly Durkheim portrays the individual as evolving 'out of' the original social uniformity.\footnote{Supra, p. 35.} For example, in The Division of Labor he suggests that the first personality to 'emerge' is that of the chief.\footnote{Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. by George Simpson (New York: The Free Press, 1933), p. 195.} His distinction in Suicide between altruistic and anomic suicide and in The Division of Labor between mechanical and organic solidarity are derived from the belief that societies are originally homogeneous emulsions and that individual autonomy or initiative are chronologically after-the-fact.


Marx, though much less concerned with society per se did conclude, in German Ideology that human consciousness, which is clearly the prerequisite for human progress, is a product of social relations.\footnote{See, for example, Marx, German Ideology, p. 19.} Since, for Marx, there was no Durkheimian distinction between men and
their society, between the reality of society and that of the men in society, there was no need for him to discuss which of these two was 'the' source of human progress. However, this did not prevent him from pursuing the anti-Enlightenment theme of rejecting any attribution to individual man of a key role in the evolution of civilization.\textsuperscript{12}

Not only is society, explicitly for Durkheim and more implicitly for Marx, the cornerstone of human progress it is itself the ultimate good. In Durkheim's work this is more apparent due to his repeated coupling of morality and society.\textsuperscript{13} Yet the premise is no less central to Marxian thought. In \textit{German Ideology} in the description of communist utopia Marx stipulates that in this ideal world "society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible."\textsuperscript{14} In the same work he argues that sociation is the only route to free and full development, "In the real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association."\textsuperscript{15} The resolution of history lay not in the communist state but in 'communist society'.\textsuperscript{16}

Further, both theorists designate society or the collectivity, as opposed to individual men, as the essential dynamic factor in the working out of history. Neither Marx nor Durkheim completely exclude man from altering the status quo,\textsuperscript{17} yet, they do concur in, first, describing 'significant' social or historical change in exclusively supra-individual terms\textsuperscript{18} and, secondly, in stringently defining the social and historical

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Supra}, pp. 61-65.
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Supra}, pp. 33-34, 44.
\textsuperscript{14} Karl Marx, \textit{German Ideology}, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Supra}, pp. 40-41, 63-64.
limitations on any individual's innovations\textsuperscript{19}. Consequently, individuals are generally represented as passive rather than active, as the creations not the creators. Admittedly Marx and Durkheim employ opposing frameworks to reach this conclusion. For Durkheim society, that reification of human excellence, tends to drag its recalcitrant progeny along, while for Marx change is actuated by the masses, for example, by the self-conscious social classes. However, despite these important divergencies, it is the case that in either perspective what is usually relevant to man's participation in change is not his individuality but his group membership.

In brief the research has disclosed that Marx and Durkheim do tend to portray society (which they would at least agree in describing as men united into a self-conscious collectivity) as the more pertinent component and agent in reality. This is evident not only from their conception of society, as noted above, but also from the corresponding image of man they present. For example, they reject the Enlightenment proposition that truth is intrinsic to each individual man. Marx makes the distinction between what a man thinks he is and what he, in fact, is.\textsuperscript{20} False consciousness, the blinding of men to the actualities of their existence, is central to Marxian thought.\textsuperscript{21} Durkheim pursues the same theme. In \textit{Rules of the Sociological Method} he disputes the validity of introspection. In \textit{Suicide} he denies the significance of man's felt motivation and opts for investigation of social forces.\textsuperscript{22} Marx and Durkheim agree that 'truth' is external to the individual; that it is something discoverable 'out there'.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Supra}, pp. 39, 40, 61-62, 64, 80-81.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Supra}, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Supra}, p. 43
Secondly, in pursuing this dismantling of the anthropocentric orientation, both men discard the notion of 'human nature', that is, the view that man is endowed, by nature, with certain innate inalienable traits. For Marx and Durkheim it is nonsense to talk of innate proclivities or qualities in man.\textsuperscript{23} Though implicitly accepting the 'inevitable' social nature of man, they discount the Enlightenment suggestion of man's inherent freedom, autonomy and rationality. In Marx and Durkheim's view man's heritage is malleability; his future predestined only by the particular socio-historical setting into which he is thrust.

Lastly, Marx and Durkheim abandon those more illusory traits ascribed to man by the philosophes. In particular, they by and large eliminate the human spiritedness core to 'natural man'. Clearly, if man continually balked at the harness imposed by society, communist utopia, which is described in terms of communist 'society', would be an ephemeral solution. Durkheim was more openly torn by this question. He was nagged by the impression of some irascible element in man, which was rooted in man's animal heritage and which constantly threatened to disrupt societal relations.\textsuperscript{24} Yet, as noted, this intrusion of rough humanity is checked by its synthesis with social man and the latter's preeminence in the resulting compound--'homo duplex'. The end result suggests that men, in general, are quite amenable to society; indeed, they need and desire societal security.

In sum, Marx and Durkheim join in presenting society (or the collectivity) as the a priori to human development, as the dynamic


element in social change and as a qualitatively 'superior' component of reality. Within certain limits they agree on the corresponding conception of man as secondary, even subordinate, actor in the real world. Consequently, as might be expected, there are marked convergencies between each theorist's view of the relationship between man and society. For example, it is noteworthy that in both Marx and Durkheim's writings societal life is seen as an uplifting of the more mundane individual existence. This is evident throughout Durkheim's work. For instance in The Division of Labor in Society there is a clear note of awe when he remarks, "A group is not only a moral authority which dominates the life of its members; it is also a source of life sui generis. From it comes a warmth which animates its members, making them intensely human, destroying their egotisms."  

Marx was a more pragmatic fellow, less inclined to such raw sentimentality. Nonetheless, there are indications throughout his life's works of an almost reverential attitude to social union and social relations. As one would expect, his younger, less restrained writings are replete with expositions on the transcendental powers of 'common life'. In "Money and Alienated Man" (1844) he remarks, "As human nature is the true common life of man, men through the activation of their nature create and produce a human common life, a social essence which is no abstractly universal power opposed to the single individual, but is the essence or nature of every single individual, his own activity, his own life, his own spirit, his own wealth." Later he was similarly enthusiastic about the intense social existence enjoyed by the French

For Marx, there is something in sociation which invigorates man and permits him to surpass his individuality. Even in *Capital* where the more empirical Marx is in the foreground, he interjects with an obeisance to the potency of social union; "Apart from the new power that arises from the fusion of many forces into one single force, mere social contact begets in most industries an emulation and a stimulation of the animal spirits that heighten the efficiency of each individual workman."²⁷

Secondly, with regard to the relationship between man and society, since there is very little dynamism ascribed to the solitary individual, society is seen as capable, at least in ideal conditions, of absorbing any threats against authority. The Enlightenment had portrayed the state as a means by which the anarchic impulses of man were kept in check. For the philosophes man needed 'external' restraints if society was to exist. In contrast, the political state, which the philosophes considered crucial in taming and containing man, is considered by Marx as eventually superfluous and by Durkheim as essentially extraneous. For Marx in communist society the state will wither away; there will be no need for coercion or authoritarian structures since men will realize themselves in and through their social existence.

Durkheim, though less radical, does emphasize the role of society and social relations in enfolding man and in preventing any disturbance of the social equilibrium. Clearly, Marx and Durkheim are suggesting that either internalized social constraints or human sociality will, in a 'natural environment' permit harmonious human relations. In each case, neither society nor that extension of society, the state, is called upon to repress human rambunctiousness; healthy social

²⁷ Marx, *Capital*, pp. 357-8. See also *supra*, pp. 66, 70.
structures and intense social integration militate against the necessity of any agency imposing repressive, external authority.

Remnants of the Enlightenment

The investigation of the conception of man and society in the writings of Marx and Durkheim has disclosed an alignment between their respective views and those professed by the Reaction to the Enlightenment. At this interval it is necessary to add depth and dimension to the analysis by emphasizing the divergencies not only between Marx and Durkheim's notion of man and society but also between their orientations and that avowed by the nineteenth century reactionaries. This will grant recognition not only to the fact that both theorists retained certain Enlightenment propositions but further, that each articulated his own distinctive rejection of Enlightenment thought.

First, it must be acknowledged that neither Marx nor Durkheim completely 'expunged 'natural man' from their vision of the world. For example, Marx, though at times doggedly deterministic, also, to some degree, recognizes a grandeur in man's continuous struggle against oppression and calls upon the strength and spirit of men to organize in order to hasten the unfolding of history. Similarly, while being enamored of 'communitas', he still voices the Enlightenment appeal for an end to the oppression by the family, by religion, by all the 'muck' that holds man down. Marx dismisses 'human nature' philosophy, portrays man as paramountly malleable, and yet still labors for the release of

28 Supra, pp. 45-56, 67, 78.
29 Supra, p. 82.
30 Supra, p. 83.
31 Supra, p. 85.
32 Supra, pp. 67-68, 74-75, 78-79.
presently stultified human potentialities. In brief, despite Marx's general anti-Enlightenment stance, Enlightenment premises, such as man's essential goodness, society's polluting effect, constitute a leit motif permeating throughout Marxian thought.

In a similar way Durkheim's use of the term 'homo duplex' is indicative of his continuing efforts to confront issues raised by the Enlightenment. Durkheim can never extricate himself from seeing in the individual something more than an appendage of society. In his first major work, *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893) he considered that bothersome extra-social aspect of man. Although Durkheim subsequently attempted to contain the dilemma of non-social humanness by alternately rooting it in biology and submerging it in the nebulous synthesis homo duplex, it persists throughout his work as a tell-tale hint of his Enlightenment commitments.

Clearly, then, the writings of Marx and Durkheim do not betoken a definitive break, a dramatic rupture in the history of ideas. It is equally important to note the irreconcilable differences which deform the afore-noted symmetry between Marxian and Durkheimian thought. For example, as mentioned, Marx did not seriously entertain the prospect that man and society comprised an unhappy mixture or that there was any irremedial tension between man and society. Durkheim, on the other hand, was torn between positing a struggle between man and society and suggesting perfect harmony. In *The Division of Labor* he writes that given 'internal spontaneity' "harmony between individual natures and social

34 Durkheim, *Division of Labor*, p. 198.
35 Supra, pp. 36-37.
functions cannot fail to be realized, at least in the average case. Yet, in Suicide and elsewhere, he notes the double impulse in man, one part drawing him to society, the other repelling him. Marx apparently perceived no such strain or did not consider it consequential; for Durkheim it remained an open and significant question.

Further, Marx shares with the Enlightenment an anti-institutional bias while Durkheim, along with the Reaction, views institutions as essential to man's well-being. For Marx extreme individual freedom (albeit within societal confines) is the future towards which history is pressing. From the Durkheimian perspective such a non-determined future is inconceivable since man would find the resulting insecurity intolerable. Here Marx is echoing the Enlightenment faith in the autonomy of man while Durkheim allies himself with the Reaction by maintaining a conservative impression of human capabilities and capacities.

Conclusion

In sum, there are significant disagreements even as to the nature of the basic elements in reality. As noted, for Marx man and society are essentially synonymous, whereas for Durkheim society is 'something more', a reality in its own right. While each rejects the Enlightenment view of society as an artifice created by man, they have their idiosyncratic alternatives to offer. Similarly, both theorists

36 Durkheim, Division of Labor, p. 376.
38 This is the most likely alternative since Marx did couple man and society and emphasized the social nature of human beings.
39 Supra, p. 39.
reject the Enlightenment suggestion of inherent human freedom. Yet Marx maintains a range of human freedom in his analysis of social change while Durkheim presents freedom as in part incompatible with the human makeup. In brief, the two theorists may agree in rejecting Enlightenment assumptions only to immediately disagree on the new position to be assumed.

Divergencies such as these in turn underlie the more obvious disjunctions between Marx and Durkheim. Marx could advocate and work toward iconoclastic, revolutionary change because he believed in the non-institutional nature of human sociation and in the stability of basic social relations. For Marx man would not lose himself in a new social setting; rather, man, organized in a collectivity, had all that was necessary to create a new social reality. Durkheim, assuming 'something more' in the cement of communion and being less secure with regard to man's inherent sociality, was inclined to conservatism, protection of the status quo, in his personal actions.

Yet, as this investigation clearly suggests, these surface differences, though unquestionably significant, must not be allowed to obscure the subterranean similarities, those paths of theorizing which Marx and Durkheim, despite other antipathies, both trod. Although when viewed within the narrow historical moment in which they worked Marx and Durkheim may appear as living antitheses, considered from a wider historical perspective, they may be seen as collaborators in the construction of a 'modern' image of man. They join in setting the tone for future theorizing by framing their conceptions of reality around society (the collectivity) and not man (the individual), by rooting man in society rather than society in man and by positing man's essential malleability. From the more removed vantage point it is these lines of consensus which loom large.
CHAPTER V

Research Implications

"Le Mort Saisit Le Vif"¹

The preceding sections culminate in what may be viewed as a two-dimensional conclusion. Seen from one perspective, the significant finding is that Marx and Durkheim shared, in rough, a particular view of man. Taking the other vantage-point the emphasis is on the particular assumptions regarding humanity that they shared. This final chapter will outline some of the implications, first, of this symmetry, and, secondly, of the particular shared premises, for the evolution of social theory.

Clearly Marx and Durkheim have each been instrumental in setting the fashions for much modern thought. With Marx the actual political implementation of his views is immediate evidence of his influence on the world as it is. Yet, Durkheim also articulated views which, although less identifiable as his personal contribution, have seeped into the texture of contemporary intellectualizing. As Robert Nisbet remarks, "Today, Durkheim's *Rules*, read carefully and with allowance only for polemical emphases and vagaries of expression seems to contain little that goes beyond what sociologists regularly assume about the nature of social reality in their empirical studies of institutionalized behavior."² In brief, Marx and Durkheim articulated³ much of what has come to be the

³It is, of course, not being suggested that they originated these conceptions.
present-day common stock of knowledge.

It has been the particular concern of this investigation to disclose their contribution to the creation of a modern, monolithic view of man. In rough, the suggestion is that one implication of the similarities discerned between Marxian and Durkheimian man is that they indicate the historical roots of the malaise of modern social theorists. Marx and Durkheim, as noted, enunciated their conceptions of man in a vigorous dialogue with opposing views. Yet their very success in decimating their critics has helped, along with other factors, to undermine the dynamic element in social philosophy. They were instrumental in laying the basis for social theorists to unquestioningly accept one 'general' orientation to man and society. This, in turn, it is suggested, has led much social theorizing into a cul de sac in which theorists have become stalled in a preoccupation with minutiae and are unable due to, amongst other things, the omnipresence of one view of man, to establish a transcending set of premises.

In sum, it is being proposed that the lines uniting Marx and Durkheim's notions of man may constitute one source of the inadequacies ascribed to contemporary sociology and social philosophy. There are two points to be considered here; first, that the foundation that Marx and Durkheim laid may underlie, in part, the theoretical impoverishment noted by modern criticisms, and, secondly, that the predominance of their views may help explain the extreme difficulty of extricating contemporary thought from its existent confines despite the presence of such critical awareness.

As to the first point, it is evident that much recent criticism has drawn from a dissatisfaction with the popular conceptions of man and society. As noted in the first chapter, this type of critique has been
particularly apparent in sociology. Persistently critics have attacked the inadequacies of "homo sociologicus". More recently there have also been attempts to introduce a viable alternative, a sociological perspective which captures a reality of human existence. Symbolic interactionism, phenomenology and ethnomethodology each lay claim to encompassing that aspect of man which eludes establishment sociology. Yet, it would seem these new schools of thought may substantiate the second point in that there is evidence that they are merely modifying the sociological view of man not yet revolutionizing it.

Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, for example, in their treatise on social reality explicitly and unquestioningly accept the premises employed by Marx and Durkheim, "Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product." Similarly, ethnomethodology is concerned primarily with consideration of the minutiae of social interaction, the premises which sustain social existence. There is no revision of the basic assumptions of the sociological enterprise. This new school is, in this regard, merely the logical extension of the original sociological framework, not a denial of it.

The conception of man is, however, not only a pressing issue for sociology. Rollo May is speaking for a pervasive modern discontent when he declares:

We are not in danger of denying the technical emphasis (of which Freud's tremendous popularity in this country was proof, if any proof were necessary). But rather we repress the opposite, the awareness of being, or the ontological sense, if I may use terms that I shall be discussing and defining more fully later. One consequence of this repression of the sense of being is that modern man's image of himself and his experience and concept of himself as a responsible individual have likewise disintegrated.

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Similarly Herbert Marcuse, one of the most popular critics of the 1960's, bases his works on a revised conception of the nature of man. In *An Essay on Liberation* he notes, "The rebellion would then have taken root in the very nature, the 'biology' of the individual, and on these new grounds, the rebels would redefine the objectives and the strategy of the political struggle, in which alone the concrete goals of liberation can be determined." Marcuse recognizes that the present scheme of things is based on the extant conception of man and society and that, consequently, revolutionary change must originate in a reconsideration of these premises.

Yet, Marcuse also sustains the second proposition in that despite his critique of the modern view of man, he himself employs an essentially holistic conception of man. He undermines any notion of 'natural' free-will in man; men and their respective freedom are the product of their socio-political setting. In Marcusian theory significant change is social in character. Further, in complete antithesis to the individualist position, Marcuse proposes that via social change it will be possible to resolve the tension between man and society.

More recently Charles Reich has obliquely referred to the insufficiency of the dominant view of man. With regard to Consciousness II, that orientation to the world on the verge of being eclipsed by the flowering of Consciousness III, he states:

> In this sense the 'liberalism' of Felix Frankfurter, the communism of Lenin, and the patriotism of a policeman's benevolent

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7Ibid., p. 18.
8Ibid., p. 37.
9Ibid., p. 88.
association are all alike they insist on the primary reality of the State, not the individual. Consciousness II does not accept any 'absolute' liberty for the individual; rather, it regards all individual liberty as subject to overriding state interest. 10

Reich envisages a revolution in consciousness in which Consciousness III, which is something akin to Enlightenment philosophy, will predominate. There will, in his view, be a return to a view of the world which starts with man. "To start from self does not mean to be selfish. It means to start from premises based on human life and the rest of nature, rather than premises that are the artificial products of the Corporate State, such as power or status." 11 Yet, Reich is not only rather vague in elaborating the implications of this framework, he still feels called upon to integrate into his perspective the centrality of devoting oneself to the community. 12 He cannot extricate himself from a socio-centric orientation.

Numerous other passages might be cited as examples of the contemporary dissatisfaction with the modern vision of man. Men from many disciplines have expressed concern over the failure of their discipline or of science in general to mirror the essence of human existence. The symmetry between Marx and Durkheim may indicate the historical source of this difficulty. With these two theorists, and of course others, the contentiousness in the issue of human nature dissipated. The ancient and Enlightenment opinion of man was set to be discarded (though there did remain a few remnants) by left and right alike. 13

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11 Ibid., p. 242.
12 Ibid., p. 321.
for the unqueried predominance of one orientation to man and society, for a homogeneity amongst otherwise diverse theoretical viewpoints.

The second implication is that Marx and Durkheim's works may not only be symptomatic of the historical roots of the modern theoretical malaise, they may suggest the socio-historical forces impeding any modern revolution in thought. Their writings may hint at the depth and breadth of the historical trend to homogeneity in basic premises. They consequently may make understandable the premature demise of alternative schemas such as Sartrian existentialism. Given the all-pervasive impact of more holistic views, it seems almost inevitable that men such as Jean-Paul Sartre, whose writings had once sought to perpetuate the individualistic tradition of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, should be drawn into acceding to holism. Sartre is merely enacting the decision of his age when he moves from seeing freedom as the inalienable, unrestricted quality of men to considering it "the small movement which makes of a totally conditioned social being someone who does not render back completely what his conditioning has given him."\(^\text{14}\)

For the discussion to proceed further it must now delve into that second dimension of implications, namely the impact of the particular attributes presently ascribed to man. The suggestion of the preceding investigation was that Marx and Durkheim's writings constituted the historical foundation of the modern conceptual framework which holds that man is ontologically after-the-fact, that society is an ultimate good, that truth is extra-individual, and that 'human nature' is nonexistent. In brief, it is proposed that they provided the philosophical

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premises which culminated in political, sociological and psychological notions that aim at fitting man to society rather than molding society to suit man; in education programs in which the onus is on helping students to 'fit in' rather than seeking to realize certain basic human potentialities. They, along with others, set the framework for an elevation of group-related activities and a vitiation of detached personal pursuits. Further, Marx and Durkheim, in maintaining the paramount significance of the collectivity in social change, in presenting the social group and society as the key players in history, have laid the way for a diminution of man's stature. One result is the absence in modern social theory of human spirit, of individual transcendence. Theories appear as "unmanly" and "as the timidity-generating creations of timid men."\(^\text{15}\)

In sum, the symmetry between Marxian and Durkheimian man may be a key to the crisis in modern thought, to the dilemmas of modern technologized society. Specifically, it has been suggested that these two theorists' writings were instrumental in jeopardizing the viability of questions concerning the nature of man; they opened the way to the modern framework which essentially denies the significance of these questions and uncritically accepts one set of questionable responses. Yet the very dynamism of Marxian and Durkheimian thought, the vigorous dialogue the original dialectic between holist and individualist views motivated, evidence the value of inquiry into the nature of man and society. Consider that the question reopened, the dialogue reintroduced, might save the crisis of social theory from ending in the demise of social thought.

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