CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE 1970'S:
A DECADE OF CHANGE
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By

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Dedicated to my loving mother
Truphosa Muruli
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The cardinal aim of this thesis is to appraise the considerable shifts in Chinese foreign policy in the 1970s. It attempts to illuminate the inextricable linkages between China's domestic politics and her external behaviour. The analysis pays special attention to China's relationship with the superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition China's Third World policy is assessed in the light of the salient transformations in her overall global policy. While the various factors impacting on China's foreign policy processes in the decade under study are discussed in this thesis, it is my submission that the phenomenal changes in Chinese foreign policy arose logically from the parallel transformations in China's domestic politics after the Cultural Revolution.
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INTRODUCTION

Since the turn of the last decade, the study of Chinese foreign policy has received a great deal of scholarly attention. In Western academic circles particularly, this study has advanced to a stage where it has been referred to as an "emergent discipline."¹ On a more precise note, some scholars have contended that due to the benign neglect of this field in the 1960's any attempts at studying Chinese foreign policy must perforce recognize its present underdeveloped state.² It is on the basis of this recognition that scholarly interest in this field has been reawakened.

The burgeoning literature on Chinese foreign policy has corresponded in part with the methodological diversity characterizing this field. The debate between advocates of differing approaches has reached exciting dimensions over the past few years. Broadly speaking, the debate has centered on the problem of subjecting Chinese foreign policy to social science research techniques.³


Robert Boardman, one of the most consistent proponents of the authentic social science approach has complained that the "Study of Chinese Foreign policy has remained almost untouched by the procedures of the Social Science,"\(^4\) and thus "has failed disastrously to become a responsive subfield of Social Science."\(^5\)

Despite their differences, the proponents of this school have argued that the study of Chinese foreign policy would reap substantial rewards from the application of social science concepts and methods including data sets derived from a comparative analysis of other nation-states. They argue that sets of data can be gathered on Chinese external behaviour, and after a thorough analysis of these data sets, generalizations pertaining to the international system as a whole and Chinese foreign-policy making in particular can be arrived at.\(^6\) Utilizing the international system and actors within it as the conceptual framework, the authentic social science approach, therefore, appraises Chinese foreign policy primarily from a global, systemic perspective.

On the other hand, traditional scholarship on Chinese foreign policy, embodying various schools of thought tends toward a historical approach to the study of Chinese foreign policy.

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\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) John R. Handelman, op. cit., p. 522.
Rejecting in Edward Friedman's words the "intellectual barbarism" and in Harold Hinton's view, the "neo-Scholasticism" of the authentic social science approach, traditional scholarship proceeds from a historical-contextual basis in analyzing China's foreign policy objectives. It is argued that China's external behaviour can be understood only with reference to some particular context and within a specific time period.

Given the stress laid on the historical contexts within which Chinese foreign policy is assessed, the traditional approach necessarily precludes the sweeping generalizations that characterize the authentic social science approach. The traditionalists also argue that there are important cultural and historical explanatory variables unique in the Chinese context which are often either de-emphasized or deliberately overlooked by the proponents of the authentic social science approach.

In the light of this methodological quagmire, compounded by the mutual suspicion persisting between the two schools, other

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9 James C. Hsiung, op. cit., p. 5.

10 John R. Handelman, op. cit., p. 521.
scholars have attempted to create a middle ground between the two contending methodological schools. James C. Hsiung has for instance presented three methodological pleas to students of Chinese foreign policy. On the premise that no superior knowledge or methodology can solve all the problems at hand, he argues that scholars should,

adopt a contextual approach to the study of Chinese foreign policy, so that no event or decision is isolated as though knowledge could be compartmentalized; a global view of China's conduct of foreign relations, to see if every single act in its dyadic or regional relations can be related to allow for the possibility that China, like other nation-states may be reacting to external stimuli and demands, not just initiating action.11

Although not overlooking the importance of scientific analyses especially the use of data sets, the middle school has argued that any singular set of data must be posited in a specific context and cross-checked with other sets of data before one can arrive at more reliable interpretations and assure the wider applicability of generalizations derived from the given data.12

By advocating for a consideration of diverse factors bearing on the process of Chinese foreign policy, the middle school has had the advantage of transcending the limitations inherent in both the traditionalist and authentic social science approaches.

Indeed the broadening of the conceptual framework within which

11James C. Hsiung, op. cit., p. 4.

12Ibid., pp. 13-14.
Chinese foreign policy is perceived to contribute to the attainment of more reliable generalizations about it. Despite this methodological breakthrough, best exemplified by the growth in the literature using this multi-dimensional approach, a thorough exposition is not given to the domestic sources that shape Chinese foreign policy objectives. This is not intended to devalue the efforts made by scholars linking domestic and foreign policies; however, it is felt here that more often than not the multi-dimensional approach makes a hasty transition from the domestic structure to the foreign policy realms. In so doing, the domestic sources of foreign policy are glossed over, rather than being treated as the principal analytical point of departure.

The objectives of this thesis, then, is to examine China's external behaviour primarily from the perspective of the domestic sources which constituted the groundwork of this behaviour in the 1970's. It seeks to identify the sources of Chinese foreign policy initiatives in terms of the domestic decision-makers, the kinds of policies they pursue at this level and the consequences of these policies on her foreign policy. It is my contention that as China embarked on far-reaching programs of domestic development

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and reconstruction in the 1970's, her foreign policy became more consistent and understandable than ever before. Thus the foreign policy changes during this period reflected the underlying changes in the very domestic structure of China.

Coming after the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution, the domestic innovations so adroitly pursued in China were meant to underscore the limitations on China's global role in the period before the 1970's. These innovations were largely geared toward correcting the discrepancy between Chinese domestic policies and her global role. This realization, therefore, made Chinese foreign policy makers in the 1970's to reorient foreign policy in order to be more responsive to the task of domestic innovations. As a result, Chinese foreign policy assumed a very definite orientation and acquired a higher degree of predictability.

It is felt that there is need to reiterate the inextricable links between domestic and foreign policies in the case of China in the 1970's, since Chinese foreign policy during this period lost most of its ideological trappings at precisely the time when dominant decision-makers on the domestic front had begun to abandon most of Mao Zedong's political handiwork. Hence, the contours of Chinese foreign policy became clearer as the boundaries of her foreign partners and enemies alike were charted by the new leadership groups in response to the imperatives of Chinese domestic interests. Without oversimplifying this analysis it could be argued that like any developing country, Chinese foreign policy
became the embodiment of domestic policies pursued beyond its territorial boundaries.

However, the emphasis given on the interplay of the domestic structure and Chinese foreign policy does not wholly exclude the consideration of external factors impacting on Chinese external behaviour during this period. On the contrary, it is argued that external factors largely stimulated but did not determine the foreign policy posture assumed by China in the 1970's. Thus, external factors are relegated to a secondary position not because they do not play a role, but because they cannot be considered as fundamental determinants of the process of Chinese foreign policy. In a nutshell, therefore, China's foreign policy goals were primarily formulated and defined within the confines of her political economy.

This thesis has been divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 attempts to analyse the domestic structure of China in the immediate post-Cultural Revolution period, 1969-1971. It will be shown that the conflict over the future of China's politics and the developmental process between a segment of China's radicals under Lin Biao and a wide range of military and bureaucratic leaders led by Zhou Enlai was won by the latter. The defeat of the radical wing of Lin Biao toward the end of 1971, it will be argued was a watershed in Chinese domestic politics signalling the start of dramatic changes which were to unfold gradually in the realms of domestic and foreign policies throughout the 1970's.
In Chapter 2, I will examine the dynamics of Sino-American relations between 1971 and 1979. This chapter will trace the evolution of Sino-American relations paying special attention to Nixon's visit, the domestic struggles emerging from China's increased political and economic interaction with the industrialized countries in general, and the consummation of Sino-American relations in 1979. The aim of this chapter is to explain China's interest in forging closer links with the United States as largely motivated by her overall desire to rebuild her domestic economy. To the extent that the goal of modernization became one of the cardinal policy of the Peking leadership in the 1970's, China's relations with the United States became of increasing significance.

On the other hand, it is argued that the modernization goal and its foreign policy aspects was strongly reinforced by the virulent anti-Soviet posture of Chinese foreign policy. Chapter 3, will therefore discuss the dimensions of Sino-Soviet relations 1971-1979. It will be shown that the mutual conflicts characterizing Sino-Soviet relations remained unresolved as China expanded the arena of conflict areas with the Soviet Union in the 1970's. It will be further argued that Sino-Soviet global conflict during this period did not reflect the relative calmness in their bilateral relations. At the end of the chapter some light will be shed on the complementary nature of China's anti-Soviet goal and the modernization goal.

Lastly, attention will focus on China's Third World policy
in the 1970's. Constituting an important aspect of Chinese foreign policy, Peking's relations with the Third World will be appraised from both regional and global levels. It will be shown that although China made substantial contributions to these countries in terms of aid commitments and consistently supported the broader goals of Third World nations at the global level, the nature of her relationship with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union began to weigh heavily on her perception of the Third World. Stress will also be given to China's willingness to mend fences with a number of erstwhile enemies and the corresponding rifts in her relationship with former allies and friends.

This work does not pretend to be an exhaustive treatment of Chinese foreign policy. However, it is hoped that it will illuminate the interplay of domestic and foreign policies in the case of China in the 1970's. It is further hoped that the consistent pattern which Chinese foreign policy assumed in the course of domestic redefinitions will be a prelude to more elaborate and consistent analyses of the future of the Chinese foreign policy process.

With the exception of the old spelling of Peking, I have adopted the *pinyin* method of romanization of Chinese words and names. However, the original spelling in all citations has been retained.
CHAPTER 1
THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY, 1969-1971

It has been largely acknowledged that the Cultural Revolution which began in mid-1966 came to an end in April 1969 with the marked restoration of domestic tranquility and stability in Chinese domestic politics. Characterized by intense political fragmentation in China's political and economic fabric, the Cultural Revolution constituted a significant phase in Mao's pursuit of socialist goals. The end of this era, therefore, marked a major development in Chinese domestic politics insofar as it produced new opportunities and tasks for the future. In addition, the internal changes wrought by the Cultural Revolution became the focal point of intra-leadership struggles over the course of post-Cultural Revolution reconstruction.

This chapter intends to discuss the salient changes arising in China's domestic politics beginning with the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1969 till the end of 1971. Granted that the eclipse of the Cultural Revolution brought significant changes, it would suffice to analyze how they were perceived at the level of policy formulation in China. In this context, I will examine the factions which emerged at the level of policy formulation, i.e. the CCP, and further attempt to appraise the cardinal policy issues that formed the basis of factional
cleavages at this level. It is my contention that the power alignments within China after the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution contributed to shaping her domestic and foreign policies in the 1970s. Indeed the parameters of Chinese foreign policy were explicitly laid down in the culmination of the leadership struggles that persisted between 1969 and 1971. In analyzing the policy disputes during this period, I will show that the radical elements associated with the Lin Biao faction progressively lost organizational leverage within the entire Chinese political economy at precisely the time when a moderate coalition comprising state bureaucrats and a segment of the military gained prominence in the decision-making process. The seeds of China's pragmatism and moderation in domestic politics, a course that was translated into her foreign policy, were sown with the ascendance of Zhou Enlai's moderate coalition with Mao's support toward the end of 1971.

The Ninth Party Congress and the Factional Alignments

At the Ninth Congress of the Central Committee of the CCP in April 1969, the realities of the dominance of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) dawned upon the Chinese leadership. Compelled to intervene in politics when the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution reached dangerous dimensions in 1967, the PLA gradually assumed a pivotal role both in the provinces and the policy-making councils of Peking.¹ This intervention had in essence eroded the

supremacy of the party as the central organ of policy formulation in China. Hence, when the Congress met to write the epilogue of the Cultural Revolution, it was the PLA rather than the party that held most of the key positions of power in China.  

Since the centrality of the party in the formulation of national policies had been eroded consequent upon the ascendance of military, the events following the convention of the Ninth Congress were to have far-reaching ramifications on Chinese domestic structure. To correct the anomalous political result of the Cultural Revolution, i.e., the preponderance of the PLA in power, Chairman Mao and the Cultural Revolution Group, comprising most of the veteran party cadres on the one hand, and the leading state bureaucrats epitomized by Zhou Enlai, on the other, set the goal of rebuilding the party as their foremost task. For Mao and Zhou, this goal would be consonant with Mao's central dictum that "the party controls the gun and the gun shall never be allowed to control the party."

When China's new constitution was adopted at the Ninth Congress, Mao's authority was firmly reinvigorated and his thought was elevated, creating a new ideological trinity. Further, the

\footnote{Ibid.}


\footnote{Frank Trager and Robert Bordonaro, "The Ninth CCP Congress and the World Communist Conference: Their Meaning for Asia," Orbis, Vol. XII, No. 3, Fall 1969, p. 737.}
constitution sanctioned the continuance of Mao's cherished socialist revolutionary line in domestic politics. To underscore the prominence of the military in Chinese politics at this time, Lin Biao, the Minister of National Defence, was designated as Mao's successor and closest comrade. As a recognition of the turbulence that had bedevilled Chinese politics during the Cultural Revolution, Mao emphasized the need for unity in the pursuit of socialism on the basis of the "new born things."  

Behind the facade of unity which characterized the political atmosphere in 1969, the emerging course of events revealed inter-necine rivalries within the top leadership. In reality a process of factional and group formation became manifest in the leadership as disagreements arose over the basic ways of charting the post-Cultural Revolution political and economic structures in China. Although there was no discernible departure from the goals enunciated by Mao and doctrinally enshrined under the banner of Mao's thought in the early part of 1969, there were fundamental differences within the leadership on the pursuit of practical goals, goals that pertained to the general direction of National reconstruction and consolidation.  

Most scholarly analyses of leadership struggles within

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the CCP have attempted to explain policy disputes at this level in terms of factionalism. Indeed it has been argued that politics in less competitive political systems essentially focuses on the relationships among the few leading political figures. Although there has been no generally accepted delineation of factions in Chinese politics, some consensus has been reached at least on the policy orientations and ideological dispositions of these factions. For instance Ellis Joffe in "The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution: The Effects of Intervention," argues that two major factions, the radicals and moderates, having different conceptions of national development, emerged within the leadership. However, these broad factions comprised disparate groups which came together for different reasons. As a result, the whole process of alliance formation became temporary at best, and fragile at worst.

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8See Yung Wei, op. cit., p. 64.

9Ellis Joffe, op. cit., p. 473.

10Ibid.
The radical faction consisted of those groups of high ranking people whose commitment was to the continuation of Mao's Cultural Revolution ideas, i.e., the emphasis on class struggles as the driving force of history, and the mass line approach to the solution of political, economic and social problems. Comprising the radical faction were a bulk of the Central Military in Peking under Lin Biao and the topmost old party veterans who formed a major part of the Cultural Revolution Group led by Chen Boda. These two leftist groups had gained prominence since 1965-1966 when they launched a counter-attack against bureaucratic elements in the party. By virtue of his position as Defence Minister and Mao's successor, Lin Biao became the chief conduit between the leftist Cultural Revolution Group and those in the higher echelons of the PLA. Championing the ideals of the Cultural Revolution, these two groups shared a common ideological and developmental approach to the problems of China's post-Cultural Revolution consolidation and rehabilitation.

The moderate faction on the other hand, comprised most of the regional military commanders and the civilian bureaucrats in Peking. These two groups found organizational leverage in the State and regional bureaucratic apparatus. Unlike the radicals,


the moderates felt that although the revolutionary thrust of Mao's line should not be completely abandoned over the short-term, such revolutionary measures, they perceived, should be accorded ancillary significance. Representing the pragmatic approach to national development, the moderates, Gordon Bennet asserts,

...insisted that the growing complexity of China's problems as a developing and industrializing society required more complex division of labour, and greater deference of the ethic of professionalism, both of which in turn necessitated the evolution of specialized administrative organizations and their attendant educational institutions. 13

While the moderates were essentially dear to the task of consolidating the gains of the Cultural Revolution, they equally believed in forging a new course which was to stress the goal of rapid economic development at the expense of most of the policies fashioned by Mao in the Cultural Revolution. As a result, the moderates coalesced around programs subordinating everything to the task of economic development with specialists and experts in command. 14

As it will later be shown, the moderates in the years after 1969 were instrumental in the large-scale rehabilitations of and granting of extensive powers to experienced cadres. Despite the fact that their criticisms of the Cultural Revolution were muted, between 1969 and 1971 the moderates began to consciously question the basic


feasibility of the Cultural Revolution programs.

In analyzing the leadership disputes that emerged in China after the Cultural Revolution therefore, it is worth noting that these two broad categories, radicals and moderates, are employed primarily to explain the differences in their approaches to the principal tasks of national development. To a large extent, these differences in approach coincided with the ideological standpoints of the leaders of these factions. However, the phenomenon of personality conflicts in Chinese leadership cannot be discounted in the analysis. More often than not, the proponents of personality conflict perspective emphasize the fact that conflicts among leading persons derive from their quest for power. Nonetheless, power is seldom sought for its own sake; on the contrary, power is desired for the implementation of a specific set of policies. Thus, personality conflicts in Chinese domestic politics between 1969 and 1970 were inexorably intertwined with the policy issues and the ideological predilections of the contending groups.

Since scholarly dissension abounds as to Mao's role in the struggles unfolding between the moderates and the radicals over central policy issues, I will attempt to assess his seemingly ambiguous role at the end of this chapter. However, it suffices to note here that since the military wing of the PLA predominated

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16 Ellis Joffe, op. cit., p. 474.
at the level of policy making at the Ninth Congress and hence, deleterious to Mao's chief weapon of political control, the party, Mao was to side less with the radical faction symbolized by Lin Biao. In fact, as will be shown, Mao de facto blessed the ascendance of the moderates by giving them great latitude in the area of policy implementation.

The Ninth Congress of the CCP set the stage for increased redefinition of national priorities, a trend that was marked by policy oscillations within the higher ranks of the leadership. I proceed to analyse the basis of those conflicts.

The Policy Debates and Resolutions

The central organizational goal at the Ninth Congress was that of party rebuilding. It was the most urgent task on the domestic agenda precisely because the party in Mao's thought was the vanguard for socialist development. This goal was therefore perceived as the process of strengthening and restoring the party's credibility. Since the power of the military was pivotal in China at this time, the manner of reconstructing party apparatas became the first spark of policy disputes within the leadership.17

As noted earlier, Mao temporarily settled the question of political succession by having Lin Biao appointed as his successor.

At the Ninth Congress, Lin Biao suggested that the Cultural

17 See Jürgen Domes, op. cit., passim and Ellis Joffe, op. cit., p. 457.
Revolution Group under Chen Boda should continue its effective role in the central party machinery. This proposal, Maurice Meisner notes, was meant partly to serve as a symbol of the goals of the revolution which Chen had theoretically defended and "partly as a counterweight to the party politburo." However, the Cultural Revolution Group was formally disbanded at the end of 1969, signalling the initial phase of Lin's disagreements with a bulk of the leadership. These disagreements were to assume a new dimension in the crisis that emerged in the Second Plenum of the Ninth Congress in September 1970. Contrary to Mao's wish to delete the position of State Chairman in the new constitution of the People's Republic at the Lushan Plenum in 1970, the military group behind the radical faction supported by the party ideologues, attempted to reintroduce this position which remained vacant after the purge of Liu Shaoqi. Lin and Chen's "surprise attack" at Lushan also included the addition of a provision in the new constitution extolling the 'genius' of Mao.

In the new constitution adopted at Lushan, the Central Committee of the party excluded the two provisions sponsored by the radicals. Mao's vehement rejection of these proposals,

18 Maurice Meisner, op. cit., p. 364.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 365.
21 Ibid.
backed by the moderates in the party, was a major setback to the radicals at the top decision-making level. It marked the trend that was developing in China's internal politics, that is, the conscious efforts made to undermine the policies of the radical elements. Mao's decision to oppose the inclusion of the post of party chairman, one observer notes, was based on the fact that he "did not want his 'successor' [Lin] to obtain it or inherit it in fear of undermining Premier Chou Enlai's supremacy over the state administrator."22 Thus the moderates within the party, drawing on Mao's support launched a decisive battle against the radicals on the issue of party reconstruction at the upper level. Ellis Joffe explains the basis of Lin and Chen's alliance:

If, in the eyes of the moderate leaders who were gaining ascendancy at this time, Chen and Lin were both identified with the radical wing of the leadership, then it is conceivable that, despite the personal and political differences that existed between them, these two men and their allies were driven by anti-leftist pressures into a political alliance designed to protect their position.23

To add to the overwhelming condemnation of the radical proposals, Chen Boda, Mao's long-time confidant and party theorist par excellence was summarily dismissed from his post in the politburo. Having been elevated to the apex of power by the

22 Ibid.

23 Ellis Joffe, op. cit., p. 471.
Cultural Revolution, Chen Boda as the mentor of the defunct Cultural Revolution Group had become the strongest upholder of Maoist ideals.\textsuperscript{24} That Chen was vilified and labelled as "ultra-leftist," "political swindler" and "China's Trotsky" in the party circles after Lushan,\textsuperscript{25} was symptomatic of the tactical battles the moderates were waging against the radicals in the party center. In fact Mao's campaign against Chen served as a preliminary skirmish to his all-out attack on the Lin group. More importantly however, the decision by the Central Committee to omit the post of State Chairman confirmed Zhou Enlai as the \textit{de facto} head of government outranking Lin in both his government position of Vice-Premier and Minister of National Defence.\textsuperscript{26}

Having succeeded in weakening Lin's top power base, Mao and the moderates proceeded through subtle tactics to undermine his base of power in the political apparatus at the provincial and grassroots levels. The first steps aimed at rebuilding the party at the grassroots levels centered around the total overhaul of mass organizations which had assumed control of the local party committees at the height of the Cultural Revolution.\textsuperscript{27} There was

\textsuperscript{24}Maurice Meisner, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 366.

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26}Philip Bridgham, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 433.

a broad consensus within the leadership after 1969 that the spontaneity which had accompanied the activities of the Red Guards would be undesirable in the reconstruction phase. Thus in the name of national unity, the leftist groups, remnants of the Red Guards were systematically disbanded and subsequently dubbed "counter-revolutionaries" and "anarchist." The campaign to undermine the "rebel organizations" at these levels was viewed as a primary step in the reassertion of party supremacy at these levels. At this time, Jurgen Domes adds:

The attempts of the left to gain control in the People's Communes and so prejudice the reconstruction of the party were now seen as particularly objectionable. Representatives of mass organizations were reprimanded for not accepting the party leadership, due to their 'bourgeois factionalist spirit'.

In order to fill the vacuum created by the demise of the 'rebel organizations' at mass levels, the principle of party reconstruction adopted at these levels was that of a triple alliance comprising the PLA, veteran party Cadres, and mass representatives.

It should be noted that Lin's support for the campaign to remove the leftist organizations in favour of the PLA was part of his grand design to establish an ideologically motivated army-state.

The revamped party organizations at mass levels, which included

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28 Jurgen Domes, op. cit., p. 78.

29 Ibid., p. 79.

30 Ibid.
strong PLA representation however did not suit the aims of Mao and the moderates who preferred a strong civilian party throughout China. Thus, after the Second Plenum at Lushan in 1970, there was a gradual shift of emphasis from the triple alliance which included the PLA, veteran party cadres and mass representatives to one comprising the old-middle-aged and the young. The subtle replacement of the earlier "three-in-one" alliance with one that was ambiguously defined marked a decisive drawback to the strength of the military at these levels. Indeed the position of old party cadres at the grassroots was now strongly reaffirmed since the two major obstacles to their power, the 'rebel organizations' and the PLA had been eliminated.32

In the reconstruction of provincial party committees which took place between 1970 and 1971, the power of the radical wing associated with Lin's group diminished considerably. In most of the provinces where the military groups supporting the radical perspective predominated, the provincial elections of 1971 proved the determination of moderate elements, especially the regional military commanders to destroy the basis of Lin's provincial power base.33 The establishment of a new provincial leadership in early


32 Ibid.

33 Jurgen Domes, op. cit., p. 78.
1971 led to a curtailment of the sphere of influence of the group around Lin. This event, Jurgen Domes observes,

of paramount importance for future developments, confirmed the strength of the coalition between members of the diplomatic and administrative apparatus and the majority of regional Commanders...  

After the establishment of provincial party committees, Mao made an intensive tour of the provinces and reaffirmed China's determination to build a viable civilian party. In underlining the supremacy of the party over the military, Mao in addition castigated the army for being ultra-leftist and informed regional and provincial leaders that,

You should pay attention to military affairs...  
It would be putting the cart before the horse if matters already decided by regional party committees were later turned over to army party committees for discussion.  

By asking the army to give up its political role in Chinese politics, Mao was, in the main, underscoring the determination of the state bureaucrats to shape policy formulation at all levels of society. This is illustrated in the fact that the campaign initiated between 1969 and 1971 against the PLA was that the army had given prominence to politics above all things and consequently the PLA dominated political apparatus were breeding grounds for "leftist deviationism."  

Mao's wholesale attack on the military

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34 Ibid.  
35 Cited in Maurice Meisner, op. cit., p. 370.  
36 Philip Bridgham, op. cit., p. 446.
and its role in the political process was largely an attack on the very position of Lin Biao and his military associates since he and the Central Military had attained power through the mechanisms of the PLA. Thus, as Philip Bridgham argues, the assertion that the PLA had resorted to overemphasizing politics "served to undercut one of the most important justifications for the continued right to rule of both Lin and the PLA."\(^{37}\)

The objective of rebuilding the party, a political one, was inextricably intertwined with issues of economic development. Any analysis of the Chinese economy must perforce address the question of agricultural development since, agriculture as the haemoglobin of the national economy is more often than not closely linked to the whole range of economic and political decisions. The conflict over agricultural policy between 1969 and 1971 arose from Lin's attempts to enforce a return to the mobilization concepts and practices of the 1958 Maoist developmental path which stressed the amalgamation of production units and making the brigades and communes the basic units of production.\(^{38}\) Deriving impetus from the Dazhai model in North China which had successfully eliminated private plots and merged production, Lin and the radicals advocated for this policy essentially because it epitomized the Maoist ideals in rural development.\(^{39}\)

\(^{37}\) Ibid.

\(^{38}\) Maurice Meisner, op. cit., p. 343; see also Jurgen Domes, op. cit., p. 110.

\(^{39}\) Maurice Meisner, op. cit., p. 343.
Lin's futile attempts to universalize the Dazhai model after the autumn of 1969 encompassed the calls for the total abolition of private plots and the abolition of the system of payment according to the amount of work done. To the radicals, rural development was to be premised on the fundamental Maoist formulation of the primacy of politics within Chinese political economy. In a nutshell, the radicals approach to post-Cultural Revolution agricultural policy stressed inter alia,

...the strengthening of the position of the collective against the individual peasant (the effective limitation of private land holdings, private livestock raising and private part-time earnings by the peasants) and the transfer of property and authority rights from the production teams to the brigades.

In addition to the politicization of the remuneration system, Lin's rural development approach had also a strong appeal to self-sacrificing mobilizational and ideological factors.

On the other hand, the state bureaucrats in Peking avidly supported by regional commanders opposed the return to Mao's 1958 concept of development. This opposition arose primarily from the feeling that since the Cultural Revolution had produced unrest in the rural areas, a lengthy phase of consolidation could be achieved through a reduction of the demands of the leadership.

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40 Ibid.

41 Jurgen Domes, op. cit., p. 108.
on the peasants. While not questioning the superiority of the Dazhai production unit, the moderates proposed the encouragement of private plots in production thereby lessening the control of the leaders on the production process. Private peasant production was however, to continue to coexist with the collectives established during the Cultural Revolution according to the moderates program. The disagreements in the leadership over China's agricultural policy developed into a critical confrontation in the winter of 1970-1971 when the moderates, as a sign of their increased strength, promulgated a new policy on rural development.

The new "rural economic policy" established in March 1971 reduced many of the limitations that had been set in 1969 and 1970 on individual peasant production. It stressed the importance of private land and part-time work for the peasants. In essence this policy was a major repudiation of the radical developmental policy which Lin had initiated since the Ninth Congress; further, it questioned Mao's earlier formulations on the problems of rural development. The moderates however were convinced that despite the wish to place politics in command, the repetition of the economic anarchy of 1958, would be intolerable if China was to consolidate itself. It is no wonder that after Lin's fall in late 1971, one

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42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p. 112.
44 Ibid., p. 115.
of the errors he was said to have committed was to break ranks with the leadership on issues of economic policy by "first setting unrealistic production goals and then by resorting to coercion in an attempt to achieve these goals."\textsuperscript{45} In the language of the moderates, Lin's emphasis on human and spiritual factors in the production process was 'ultra-leftist.'

While it has been analytically appropriate to demarcate the struggles over party rebuilding and those pertaining to economic development, it is important to note that both are, in essence, inseparable since they clearly revealed the nature and direction of intra-leadership wrangles. Likewise, although the struggle over the readjustment of educational policies did not manifest itself clearly between 1969 and 1971, divergences in opinion began to surface. The main thrust of the 'educational revolution' undertaken largely by Mao and the Cultural Revolution Group, emphasized a system of education based on "the union of education and productive labour,"\textsuperscript{46} i.e. the re-education of Chinese youth to suit the policies of Socialism and self-reliance. Heavily biased toward primary education, this system encouraged manual labour and the acquisition of basic skills. Extended to the cultural realm, the educational policies fostered by Mao gave a distinct identity to Chinese youth. A number of experiments were initiated

\textsuperscript{45}Philip Bridgham, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 445.

\textsuperscript{46}Maurice Meisner, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 348.
in the educational field primarily subordinating academic achievements to revolutionary zeal. Toward the end of 1971, Jurgen Domes observes that a section of the central administration

began to view with growing skepticism these experiments which had taken their cue from the Cultural Revolutionary Left and which were approved and sponsored by the Central Military. 47

It was clear then that the moderates within the leadership began to question the continuity of these policies which had their roots in the radical faction and had been perpetuated by them.

While greater attention will be devoted in the later chapters on the fundamental differences in foreign policy between the radicals and the moderates, a brief exposition is required at this point. China's foreign relations during the Cultural Revolution reached an all-time low as domestic upheavals preoccupied Chinese leaders. In the summer of 1967 the Red Guards briefly took control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, resulting in the recalling of virtually all Chinese ambassadors from their foreign posts in the same year. However, Chinese global vision during most of the Cultural Revolution was premised on the fact that the success of the Cultural Revolution at home would serve as the model and stimulus for successful socialist revolutions elsewhere, especially the Third World. 48 Underlining China's principle of

47 Jurgen Domes, op. cit., p. 70.

48 Maurice Meisner, op. cit., p. 362.
"proletarian internationalism," the Peking leadership firmly supported revolutionary struggles throughout the world and denounced the bankruptcy of the Soviet system and American imperialism.

The conflict which arose between the two factions after the Cultural Revolution was related to China's place in the world, in general and the relationship between China and the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, in particular. According to Lin Biao's political report to the Ninth Congress, China faced two enemies, the United States from the south and the Soviet Union from the north. It was therefore imperative that China should continue the policies of opposing both American imperialism and what had emerged as Soviet Social Imperialism. In forging this antagonistic line, Lin further stressed China's adherence to the goal of "proletarian internationalism" which embodied the support of oppressed nations against the ferocity of the two superpowers. In fact, on an optimistic note, Lin concluded his report by predicting the inevitable collapse of imperialism and social imperialism at the hands of the popular forces of World Revolution.

Lin's line in foreign policy had the support of the radicals who still envisioned China's vanguard role in opposing

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50 Maurice Meisner, op. cit., p. 363.
both superpowers.

Between 1969 and 1971 the moderates under Zhou Enlai with the support of Mao advocated a new global strategy different from that postulated by Lin's report. This strategy embodied the pursuit of the traditional principles of national sovereignty, peaceful coexistence and the establishment of amicable relations between states with different social systems. Further, this strategy began to present the Soviet Union as the primary enemy of China. By singling out the Soviet Union as the foremost enemy, the moderates hoped to seek a modus vivendi with the United States as a deterrent to the threat perceived from the Soviet Union. It should be noted that Zhou Enlai expressed China's intention to resume the Warsaw ambassadorial talks with the United States after Lin had begun to lose his grip following the Second Plenum of the CCP at Lushan in 1970.52

Toward the end of 1971, Lin's dual adversary strategy was abandoned for the moderates foreign policy which was to be hailed as Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line. It is notable that after the Cultural Revolution the mantle of Chinese foreign policy was under the effective control of Zhou Enlai backed by a new brand of civilian cadres. By virtue of the moderates predominance in the revamped party and bureaucratic machineries,

51 Ibid.
52 Jurgen Domes, op. cit., p.
their position on foreign affairs was to prevail over that of the radicals.

The New Power Structure

Although the cleavages arising on major policy issues in China's leadership assumed a measure of political equilibrium, the anti-Lin forces' growing organizational strength revealed the deceptive nature of this equilibrium. Yet one cannot sumarly argue that the radicals had lost total control in China's political spectrum; their imprint in cultural affairs, particularly the propaganda mechanisms of the party was still evident. However, in terms of the central organs of power, the party and bureaucracy, their strength had diminished considerably. The strategic role of the moderates in these organs precluded the implementation of policies sponsored by Lin and his supporters. More than ever before, the functional role of moderate elements in the party and bureaucracy held sway over those of the radicals. Lin's political eclipse eventually came in September 1971, at a time when the center could no longer tolerate what seemed to be organized resistance against Mao's leadership. Lin's demise followed by a major purge of his supporters from the party, army, and revolutionary committees, confirmed the smooth ascendance of the moderate faction to the helm of leadership.

53 Raymond Lotta, op. cit., see his introduction.
It removed the final barriers to the consolidation of the post-Cultural Revolution political and economic order as Mao and Zhou desired;\(^{54}\) the discrediting of Lin and his associates in essence signalled the unequivocal enunciation of a moderate national policy.\(^{55}\) In alliance with regional and professional army commanders, Zhou Enlai and the leading state bureaucrats had forged an alliance which launched an anti-radical campaign from the provinces to the highest level of leadership effectively sweeping the Lin group off the political stage. After Lin's fall the remaining radicals in the party, with some reservations, jumped on the moderate bandwagon in order to save their political future.\(^{56}\) Moreover, it is conceivable that the close association Mao had with these radicals, the Shanghai clique, shielded them from the political wrath of the moderates.

At the end of 1971, Mao's aspiration of rebuilding the party under civilian control had been fulfilled. The struggle over this goal which became increasingly interwoven with other issues of national reconstruction, was a fundamental one in so far as it manifested the constellation of questions about political control in China. As a new course in domestic and foreign policies

\(^{54}\)Maurice Meisner, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

\(^{55}\)Ellis Joffe, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

unfolded in 1971, the general uncertainty characterizing China's immediate post-Cultural Revolution had subsided. In order to bolster the strength of the new power group, Zhou Enlai launched a massive rehabilitation program of old bureaucrats who had been severely discredited during the Cultural Revolution. A completely reconstructed party under civilian control was now in an undoubted position to formulate and implement China's national and international policies.

As I noted earlier, Mao's role in the struggles that emerged after the Ninth Congress needs further explanation. While some scholars have been at pains to underline Mao's neutrality in the prevailing conflicts, it seems evident that Mao threw his full support to the moderates. This is not to suggest that the Chairman's ideological imprimatur did not mitigate, at some particular times, the intensity of these cleavages. On the contrary, I am under the conviction that Mao's political outlook underwent a systematic, albeit subtle, process of change. The functional superiority of the moderates within the Chinese political system logically drew Mao closer to them, especially since he increasingly came to believe that the strength of the civilian elements in the system would serve as a viable bulwark against the dominance of the military.


On the other hand, Mao's tactical abandonment of Chen Boda and Lin Biao could be interpreted as a political move on his part motivated by the desire to exonerate himself from the excesses of the Cultural Revolution which he had largely sanctioned. Likewise, "Mao's migration" to the moderates, in Oksenberg and Goldstein's\textsuperscript{59} parlance, could be appraised both as a pragmatic grasp of political realities and an erosion of his actual power in China's decision-making.\textsuperscript{60} Thus it appears that Mao began to rely more on Zhou Enlai's strength within the party and the bureaucracy for the formulation of national policies. By giving the moderates great latitude in the areas of policy formulation and implementation, the moderates, in turn, implicitly accepted Mao's preeminence in China's domestic politics.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have attempted to discuss the internal political structure of China between 1969 and 1971, dwelling specifically on the tensions emerging over basic policy issues. It has been argued that while personality conflicts featured prominently, they cannot be divorced from the underlying ideological standpoints of the competitors. These ideological conflicts were projected through the kinds of policy programs sponsored by the

\textsuperscript{59}Michael Oksenberg; Steven Goldstein, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{60}This view is emphasized by Ellis Joffe, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 13.
major personalities within the broadly defined moderate and radical factions. Both factions, I have noted contained various elements uniting for a common purpose and for the pursuit of certain goals.

The post-Cultural Revolution order arising at the end of 1971 was one dominated by the moderates under Zhou Enlai who were destined to play a critical role in China's domestic politics and hence, foreign policy. In a nutshell, therefore, it has been my intention to locate the "raw materials" of Chinese foreign policy after 1971 in the domestic structure on the understanding that any analysis of Chinese foreign policy should *prima facie* identify not only the process of domestic policy, but also its formulaters. Without this background, attempts to appraise Chinese foreign policy would be incoherent and prone to *ad hoc* explanations.
CHAPTER 2
THE DYNAMICS OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1971-1979

The significant developments in Chinese domestic politics which assumed new dimensions in 1971 with the emergence of a moderate, pragmatically oriented leadership were complemented in the realm of foreign policy by dramatic and far-reaching changes. Prior to this period, China's international posture, particularly the Cultural Revolution phase, was characterized by a limited involvement in international affairs. In attempting to extricate Chinese foreign policy from the nadir of the Cultural Revolution, the new leadership fostered a wide range of diplomatic initiatives geared to restoring her global image. However, despite the diplomatic offensive launched by China between 1969 and 1971, the most remarkable aspect of her transformed outlook was the breakthrough in Sino-American relations, a process that unfolded after 1971.

In this chapter, I intend to focus on the dynamics of Sino-American relations primarily from the inception of the so-called ping-pong diplomacy in 1971 to the consummation of formal diplomatic relations in 1979. I will assess this process in three parts in order to facilitate a clear grasp of the distinctiveness of each period. First, a brief analysis of the formative stage in Sino-American relations will be provided. As a background to the chapter, Sino-American relations between 1967 and 1971 will be
assessed in the light of a changing international environment, changes that were deemed appropriate, especially by China, for reaching an understanding with the United States. Secondly, a discussion of Sino-American rapprochement between 1971 and 1977 will be attempted with a view to elucidating the inexorable link between Chinese domestic and foreign policies. The third part will dwell on the salient features of Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line, as it underwent increased definition and amplification. Leading to the consummation of full diplomatic relationship between the two countries, this period is notable in the sense that it delineates the trend that underlined Chinese overtures toward the United States.

All along I will proceed on the premise that, while the responsiveness of China to the United States might be attributed in the first instance to a perceived military threat from the Soviet Union, the new foreign posture could be explained more in terms of an all-embracing evaluation of long-term national priorities. The global perspective forged after the Cultural Revolution, of which Sino-American relations became the most dominant element, was fashioned to respond to the needs of domestic developments. Cognizant of the inherent weaknesses in China's economic and military spheres, the emerging moderate leadership initiated a new line in foreign policy appropriate to the aim of enhancing her domestic capabilities and, in the long run, boosting her international stature. Not only was the ideological component
of China's foreign policy gradually minimized, but China made significant concessions on the American presence in Taiwan, an issue that constituted Peking's central prerequisite for normalization of relations with the United States. Needless to say, the momentum for this outlook was provided by the kaleidoscopic shifts occurring in the international balance of power, evident in the diminishing American strength in Asian geopolitics and the antagonism marking Sino-Soviet relations. It will be further argued that, although the imperatives of China's modernization did not assume a broader definition until the mid-1970s, the parameters of this policy were evident in her foreign policy charted by Zhou Enlai in 1971.

Background to Sino-American Relations, 1967-1971

During the Chinese Cultural Revolution, a section of the American academia dispassionately calculated the possibilities for change in American policy toward China. These efforts of responding to the new and complex set of changes in Asia as a whole were subsumed under the slogan, "Containment without isolation." However, the first tentative signs pointing to a possible shift in American policy toward China could be discerned in 1967, when Richard Nixon, then a presidential aspirant, proposed a major

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change in U.S. policy toward China. Stressing the urgency of reducing direct confrontation between the superpowers in Asia, Nixon asserted that: "Any American policy toward Asia must urgently come to grips with the reality of China."\(^2\) Although Nixon's programmatic statement emphasized the need for the United States to make China change, his advocacy of "regional pacts, in which nations undertake, among themselves to attempt to contain aggression in their areas,"\(^3\) was indicative of the possibility of reducing her influence in Asia. In fact Nixon's admission of the emergence of Asian regionalism as a positive factor in America's Asian policy was premised on the view that, "the role of the United States as a world policeman [was] likely to be limited in the future."\(^4\)

Appearing to fully endorse the "Containment without isolation" principle, Nixon's statement may have contributed to China's perception of the diminishing U.S. strength in Asia. Implicit in Nixon's statement was the fact that the U.S. traditional containment policies, premised on the isolation of China were not serving their desired goals. But the perceived decrease in American hegemony in Asia would not have been sufficient had not the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968. This invasion,


\(^3\)Ibid.

\(^4\)Ibid.
justified by the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty reinforced the Chinese view that while American imperialism was on the decline, the Soviet Union had become an imperialist power of alarming consequences to China.\(^5\) The coincidence of these circumstances was clearly pivotal in motivating Peking's initial overtures to the United States.

Beginning in 1968, there were efforts made by a part of the Chinese leadership to normalize relations with the United States as a counterforce to the designs of the Soviet Union. At the Twelfth Plenum of the CCP in October 1968, it was resolved to ameliorate relations with the United States.\(^6\) In November the same year, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement gave a further definition to China's interest in forging closer relations with the United States under the rubric of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.\(^7\) The revival of these principles as the basis for the pursuit of friendly relations irrespective of ideological differences reflected the growing flexibility in China's foreign policy. In spite of these initial gestures, however, vehement domestic opposition from a section of the Chinese leadership

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\(^6\) Thomas Gottleib, Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1977), p. x.

\(^7\) Ibid.
retarded the unequivocal enunciation of the policy seeking to draw China closer to the United States. Lin Biao's coalition of radical leaders basically subscribed to the view that China's international front against U.S. imperialism remained the cornerstone of China's foreign policy. Far from being a universal line, therefore, the policy of cultivating ties with the United States became specifically a collaborative venture of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. 8

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs report delivered by Zhou in November 1968, China invited the United States to resume ambassadorial talks in Warsaw on February 20, 1969. In the latter half of the 1960s, the Warsaw ambassadorial talks facilitated vestigial diplomatic contacts between China and the U.S. The ambassadorial talks scheduled for February 20, 1969 did not materialize because China eventually postponed them. However, the 135th Sino-American ambassadorial meeting took place in the spring of 1970 without making significant progress since Peking withdrew shortly afterwards as a result of the invasions of Cambodia and later of Laos by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. 9 Prior to 1970, one of the factors that contributed to the failure of these talks was China's insistence that Sino-American normalization was contingent upon U.S. withdrawal of its military forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan straits. 10

8Ibid.


10Ibid.
Despite the failure to resume effective negotiations, there were clear signs of movement on both sides of the Sino-American impasse. Upon assuming office in 1969, President Nixon made several unilateral gestures of friendship toward China between 1969 and 1971. For instance, in July 1969, the United States relaxed restrictions on travel to permit Americans to visit China for purposes other than tourism. In November 1969, apparently for budgetary reasons, the U.S. discontinued her naval patrol of the Taiwan Straits together with U.S. troop withdrawals from Indochina. 11 Strategic in content, this gesture, Joseph Camilleri notes, had far-reaching consequences on China's attitude toward American presence in Indochina. 12 To give credence to these diplomatic and strategic overtures, the United States gradually annulled commercial restrictions imposed on China in April 1970. Apart from introducing selective licensing of American made components and spare parts for non-strategic foreign goods exported to China, the U.S. in August 1970 permitted American oil companies abroad to supply oil to Chinese ports. 13

Nixon's goodwill gestures to China, representing creative departures from the sterile American containment policies, did not,

11 Ibid.


13 Ibid., p. 129.
however, produce any marked change on the Chinese side. Domestic opposition to the moderates' desire to reciprocate American overtures prevented any opening to the United States. Lin Biao's coalition of radical leaders was instrumental in preventing Zhou's scheme of seeking an accommodation with the United States. Although Mao did support the moderate position on Sino-American relations, this did not quiet all opposition.\textsuperscript{14} It will be remembered that Lin Biao's political report to the Ninth Congress in 1969 clearly underlined China's adherence to the goal of diplomatically isolating both the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact in the early part of 1971, the radical dominated publications strongly opposed the United States in no uncertain terms. The \textit{People's Daily} for instance claimed that:

\begin{quote}
The international united front against U.S. imperialism is an important magic weapon for the World people to defeat U.S. imperialism and all its running dogs.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

Constrained by the adamant opposition from the radicals, the moderate coalition under Zhou was not able to respond appropriately to U.S. diplomatic olive branches until the demise of Lin and his followers in the CCP and the military toward the end of 1971.

\textit{Ping-Pong Diplomacy: Toward Normalization, 1971-1977}

As noted before, it was not until the inception of the

\textsuperscript{14}Gottleib, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{15}Cited in Camilleri, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 137.
Nixon administration that the U.S. fundamentally transformed its attitude toward China. Despite Peking's public front of indifference, the U.S. in early 1971 gave added weight to her evolving China policy. In his State of the World Message to the Congress in 1971 Nixon indicated that he favoured "drawing the People's Republic of China into a constructive relationship with the world community" and was "prepared to establish a dialogue with Peking." In addition, on April 14, 1971, Nixon announced the relaxation of a 20-year embargo on trade with China. This relaxation coincided with the inauguration of the era of ping-pong diplomacy in April 1971 when China, in an attempt to reciprocate U.S. goodwill gestures, invited the American table tennis to play in Peking apparently at Mao's behest. Although an event of lesser political significance, this invitation served to foster a spirit of understanding on both sides. Marking in Zhou's words, "a new chapter" in Sino-American relations, this visit gave the United States the opportunity to free itself from the rigidities of its past China policy.

Beginning in July 1971 with the private visit to Peking of U.S. National Security Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, a snowballing series of events unfolded dramatically changing the course

16 Cited in Editorials on File, Vol. 2, No. 4, February 16-28, 1971, p. 76. Nixon called China by its accepted name in this speech, the PRC, and reiterated the goal of "Confrontation" with "Cooperation."

of Sino-American relations. From the July 1971 announcement of Nixon's impending visit to Peking, China's attitude toward the United States changed radically. Furthermore, Washington's readiness to mend diplomatic fences with China was boosted by the Peking government's willingness to receive Nixon. Mao's formal endorsement of the policy that had been strongly favoured by Zhou Enlai and his moderate coalition since 1968 was eventually given a major theoretical justification in August 1971 under the banner of Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line. The inauguration of this line in foreign policy was hailed as the beginning of a new era in Chinese foreign policy.\(^{18}\)

The cumulative effect of diplomatic overtures initiated on both sides since 1968 eventually came to fruition in February 1972 with Nixon's historic visit to Peking. The visit largely represented a sharp volte-face by both sides as it opened avenues for future diplomatic initiatives. While the visit opened new vistas for American foreign policy, it also contributed to American recovery from the traditional Chinaphobia. By abandoning the premises upon which her past policy was based, Peking succeeded in effecting a fundamental policy change based on tolerance and flexibility.\(^{19}\)

On the basis of the broad formulation of the five principles

\(^{18}\)Camilleri, op. cit., p. 137.

of peaceful coexistence, the two sides made qualitatively significant strides towards normalization. The Sino-American rapprochement was amply documented in the joint Communique issued at Shanghai on February 27, 1972. The Shanghai Communique marked a new era of increased cooperation and mutual understanding. Joseph Camilleri provides a good summary of the achievements of the Nixon visit enshrined in the Shanghai Communique.

Apart from the specific agreements reached with regard to further development of contacts and exchanges in science, technology, culture, sports and journalism and the facilitation of bilateral trade, the two sides agreed to maintain close diplomatic contacts... through various channels... 20

In tenor and specifics, therefore, the Shanghai Communique gave proof that both sides strongly felt the urgency and importance of rapprochement. This was clearly spelt out by Peking's readiness to make concessions on the Taiwan question. Prior to Nixon's visit, China had insisted that normalization would be unthinkable until the U.S. withdrew from Taiwan. While Washington implicitly referred to its defence commitment to Taiwan by reaffirming its interest in a "peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves," 21 it moved a step further from the traditional posture characterized by intense recalcitrance. Affirming their

20 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 130.

commitment to peace in the Asian region, the two sides inserted an anti-hegemony clause in the communique. This clause expressed the convergence of Chinese and American strategic interests, primarily the need to counter Soviet expansionism in Asia.

Emanating from a firm appraisal of China's internal domestic developments, Peking's moderation and bold flexibility in foreign affairs, though stimulated by the desire to use the rapprochement as a counterpoise to the Soviet Union, in the main, reflected the perspective of the moderate coalition which was consolidating its position in power after the demise of the Lin Biao group. That the anti-hegemony clause in the Communique was implicitly meant to forestall Soviet hegemony in Asia is unquestionable. However, as I will show in chapter 3, there is strong evidence\(^{22}\) to suggest that the conflict which characterized Sino-Soviet relations after the 1969 border incident had considerably diminished. Thus, viewed from the bilateral state of Sino-Soviet relations in 1971, that is, the minimal resumption of trade and diplomatic contacts between the two, one cannot explain Peking's rapprochement with the United States solely in terms of the former's fear of the Soviet Union. In a sense, therefore, although the Sino-Soviet

conflict played some role in stimulating the process of rapprochement, I believe that this process can be appraised from a broader perspective, i.e., the willingness of the Chinese leadership, in the face of the great changes arising after the Cultural Revolution, to abandon China's hardline ideological posture buttressed by her territorial claims on Taiwan, for the sake of an alternative policy posture best suited to serve China's national interests.

After the Shanghai communique in 1972, the Sino-American relationship became the centerpiece of China's strategy in foreign policy. A year after Nixon's visit to Peking, the relation between the two countries was elevated to the level of quasi-ambassadorial liaison offices. The Sino-American communique of February 22, 1973 authorized the parties to open liaison offices in each other's capital. Although not formal diplomatic offices, they facilitated political contact, economic cooperation and cultural exchange. Constituting a major step toward the goal of normalization, liaison offices, one observer notes, marked the transition in Sino-U.S. relations from largely personal diplomacy to institutionalized diplomacy, and thereby led to the development of systematic and comprehensive channels of communication.23

The impact of Sino-American rapprochement on the entire process of China's global diplomacy was felt after Nixon's visit

to Peking. Beginning in 1969, China had successfully launched diplomatic initiatives aimed at normalizing relations with most countries. As part of the reverberations of the Nixon visit, Japan and most of the Western countries, not to mention a wide range of Third World countries, assiduously sought to cultivate closer ties with Peking. Although Canada and Italy had recognized the Peking government before the Nixon visit, Nixon's new diplomacy enabled most American allies to pursue an active China policy without antagonizing Washington.  

Given that the United States principally contributed to China's isolation from the international limelight prior to 1972, Peking was able to pursue a much more responsive globalist policy after the rapprochement. The enhancement of China's global legitimacy and respectability was therefore buttressed by the Sino-American rapprochement. The new chapter in Sino-American relations hence became a new phase in China's global policy at large.

From 1973, the essential elements of what was now called Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line began to take a definite shape. Exemplified by China's increased political and economic contacts with the U.S., Japan and Western Europe, China's foreign policy became more responsive to domestic needs. Zhou Enlai and his


25 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 118.
colleagues, Marie-Luise Nath notes,

introduced a policy which had to be understood not only by reference to their choice of new political partners, but also by their basic understanding of foreign policy as a policy of Western orientation.26

The pursuit of this outward looking policy essentially coincided with the evolving Chinese emphasis on economic growth through the foreign trade mechanism. In 1973, Deng Xiaoping, one of the party leaders purged during the Cultural Revolution for his bureaucratic tendencies, was rehabilitated within the leadership and was soon to be instrumental in formulating a policy of expanded imports from the West.27 Indeed China's entire economic process was marked at this time by discussions particularly related to the importation of Western technology and turnkey plants in order to boost the economy.28 The new line in foreign policy thus became intimately related to the process of domestic rehabilitation.

Despite the slow increase in Sino-American trade after the rapprochement, the increased commercial and technological contacts which had begun with Nixon's relaxation measures clearly


28 Ibid., p. 462.
indicated China's interest in trade relations with the United States. Sino-American trade increased from near-zero in 1971 to $5M in 1972 and rose to a high of $92M in 1973.29 This emerging trend in China's foreign trade policy, which was to constitute a central component of her new international outlook, henceforth manifested what Marie-Luise Nath appropriately calls China's "independent interest" in rapprochement.30 Thus, as Robert Worden emphasizes,

Despite Chinese reports of America's economic ills and the evils of the international capitalist system, Chou [En-lai] was able to meet [in 1972] and hold an "unconstrained conversation" with a person epitomizing American capitalism, Dave Rockefeller, Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank.31

In the realm of foreign trade therefore, more realistic patterns of relations emerged. To further underline their interest in Western capital and technology, the Chinese used cultural contacts to systematically obtain scientific and technological information.32

By the Tenth Congress of the CCP in 1973, the implications


30 Marie Luise Nath, op. cit., p. 241.


32 Lucian Pye, "Bringing our China Policy Down to Earth," Foreign Policy, No. 18, Spring 1975, p. 128.
of the new foreign policy were still being clarified. While adhering to the five principles of peaceful coexistence as the axis of Chinese foreign policy, China, Zhou Enlai in his political report emphasized, would speed up its efforts to thwart Soviet global designs. Zhou's projection of China's anti-Soviet crusade did not, however, mask China's policy of cultivating intimate economic links with the United States, Japan and Western Europe. This posture reflected the continued redefinition of Chinese domestic priorities by the leadership as they made strides in the formulation of new economic policies. Yet the pursuit of Western-oriented policies flavoured by intense animosity toward the Soviet Union would have been insufficient without a strong theoretical exposition. Thus, in 1974, addressing a U.N. special session on Raw Materials and Development, Deng Xiaoping presented the most comprehensive formulation of Chinese global perspective. The Three Worlds theory which, in the main, divided the world into three blocs, was presented as the fundamental theory of Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs.

Through the prism of the Three World theory, the world was conceptualized into three categories: the First World of the

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U.S. and the Soviet Union; the Second World of Japan, Europe and Canada, and the Third World of China and the Asian, African and Latin American nations. Posited as it was the theory was projected at rallying the support of the Second and Third Worlds against the two superpowers. However, as Samuel Kim observes,

In spite of Peking's routine rhetorical assault on both superpowers in the UN system during much of the 1970s, the substantive Sino-U.S. relationship could not be characterized as adversary. 35

The Three Worlds formulation was, in fact, a convenient theoretical tool for rationalizing the essence of Mao's line in foreign affairs embracing a whole gamut of economic and political ties with the Western countries. Joseph Camilleri provides the best explanation of the value of the Three Worlds theory to China. He says:

What may appear as the failure to provide any clear theoretical exposition of China's new diplomatic posture, was in reality, a carefully calculated attempt to preserve the revolutionary image of Chinese foreign policy. 36

As an integral part of the Three Worlds theory, the anti-hegemony United front strategy which became central in


36 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 140.
Chinese foreign policy, can be assessed in the same light. The main thrust of this strategy was to vigorously rally support of the Second World and Third World against world-wide Soviet expansion. In essence the United front strategy became the cornerstone of the anti-Soviet crusade in Chinese foreign policy throughout the 1970s. But, anti-Sovietism, as I will later argue was meant to reinforce the policy favouring closer interaction with the United States in particular and the West in general. It is against this background that one analyst has noted that the United front strategy was essentially a Chinese plot to cover up military incompetence, economic backwardness and structural defects. 37 On this basis therefore, for the Chinese leadership, Soviet expansionism necessitated and justified China's closer relations with the Second World Countries of Europe and Japan. But even more important was the rapprochement with the leading capitalist power, which had been enshrined in the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué. 38 (my emphasis)

At the time China was pursuing a dynamic pro-Western policy, major shifts in her economic policies became evident. A new economic policy evidenced in the decision taken by the leadership in the large number of projects launched since 1972, raised the priority ranking assigned to sustained and long-range


38 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 174.
economic development. 39 This new developmental approach, far from undercutting the self-reliance ideals, was considered to be a critical transformation measure in strengthening the socialist economy. It is crucial to note here that the issue of Chinese future economic development constituted one of the major policy conflict between the Lin Biao coalition of radicals and Zhou Enlai's moderate coalition. The new line in domestic policy was explicitly and authoritatively enunciated in Zhou Enlai's "Report on the Work of Government" delivered at the National People's Congress in 1975. Zhou sketched out his hopes for China's future economic development, speaking of turning "a poverty stricken and backward country into a socialist one with the beginnings of prosperity in only 20 years and more." 40 The report underlined the arduous task of transforming China's agricultural, industrial, scientific and technological and military capabilities. That the task of Four Modernizations received a broader definition by Zhou in 1975 was indicative of the consolidation of power by Zhou and the Moderates. What was particularly striking about this new developmental strategy was the prominence given to foreign trade and the acquisition of foreign capital. 41


40 Cited in Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 136-137.

Implying a much more open foreign trade orientation the modernization Program primarily envisioned the U.S., Western Europe and Japan as cornucopias of advanced technology, financial credit, capital and markets for Chinese exports. As China embarked on this path, the ramification on her foreign policy became increasingly complex since the success of the modernization program would be dependent on her international behaviour, especially her relationship with the industrialized countries. After launching this program, China's foreign relations appeared to follow a more predictable route as she sought inroads into American, Western and Japanese markets for essential technology. In this context, the accommodation which China had achieved with the United States in 1972 became crucial in the fulfillment of this task. Alexander Eckstein's observation that China's new foreign policy and the opening of Sino-American relations were "a necessary precondition for Chinese imports from the United States" lends credence to this view.

It should be remembered that in the Shanghai Communique, China and the U.S. had agreed to facilitate "the progressive development of trade between their two countries." In fulfilling this objective it is estimated that between 1972 and 1975, the United States was next to Japan as China's most important export


43 Eckstein, op. cit., p. 150.

44 Cited in Eckstein, op. cit., p. 159.
The new foreign posture pursued by the Peking leadership had in essence facilitated the process of closer economic relations with the United States. Kent Morrison in "Domestic Politics and Industrialization in China: The Foreign Trade Factor," attempts, I think successfully, to illuminate the inextricable relation between Chinese Four Modernization program and her foreign policy posture. Foreign trade, he shows, expanded considerably in the years after the Cultural Revolution, especially the period after the Shanghai Communique as Zhou's economic policies began to be felt with some effect throughout China. Consequently, Chou's call for "four Modernizations" and his articulation of the goal of being the equal of the Great Powers economically by the end of the current century would have seemed to preclude the return of radical policies that enjoyed favour during the Cultural Revolution.

Despite these far-reaching developments, however, Sino-American relations remained at the level of quasi-normal. During President Gerald Ford's visit to Peking in 1975, the two sides expressed their commitment to the pursuit of the goal of normalization embodied in the spirit of Shanghai. The official Chinese pronouncements during this period maintained that the key to breaking the impasse was American withdrawal from Taiwan and the

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46 Morrison, op. cit., p. 691.
47 Ibid., p. 692.
eventual return of the latter to the "Motherland." Yet it is worthwhile noting that as early as 1972, Zhou in an interview with Austrian journalists was quoted to the effect that the Taiwan question was no longer a pertinent one in Peking's geopolitical considerations.

In order to understand why the two sides failed to achieve the normalization goal during this period, one must address the domestic political environment in China. Domestic opposition to a pragmatic and flexible foreign policy did not end with the fall of Lin Biao. A reordering of priorities on the domestic front led to virulent controversies within the party between the remaining radical leaders and a bulk of the moderates led by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. The continuing strength of radical elements in the person of Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen posed problems to the continuity of Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line. While the radicals held strong positions in the party hierarchy, their control was never sufficient to ensure the pursuit of radical domestic and foreign policies. The moderates


51 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 164.
increased organizational strength in major areas, especially those pertaining to economic policy, curtailed the leverage of radical elements.

Nevertheless, the special relationship the radicals maintained with Mao enabled them to champion their cause without fear of retribution. Between 1973 and 1975 they launched a series of ideological campaigns aimed squarely at Zhou's economic policies which were being adroitly implemented by Deng Xiaoping. With the apparent support of Mao, the radical campaigns culminated in the dismissal of Deng Xiaoping from power after Zhou's death in early 1976. In all, the vehemence of these campaigns, as Joseph Camilleri notes,

> far from indicating the political strength of their opponents, simply pointed to the desperate attempts of the radical coalition to defend itself against the pragmatist offensive and to its few remaining levers of power....With the exception of Shanghai the radicals did not enjoy sufficient regional support to block the return of moderates to power. 52

Despite their weaknesses however, one of the most outstanding successes of the radicals was that their offensive altered, albeit temporarily, the expansionist trend in China's foreign trade policies, notably with the United States. 53 After Deng's ouster in early 1976, his policies were vehemently attacked in radical

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52 Ibid., p. 165.

53 Morrison, op. cit., p. 696.
dominated publications. The radicals were not only rankled by the course of China's economic development, but more importantly they castigated the sensational growth in China's foreign trade, especially the importation of foreign technology and equipment. The impact of the radical's opposition is reflected in the fact that although China's trade with the United States rose from near zero in 1971, soaring to $935.2M in value by 1974, it eventually dropped to $462M in 1975 and then to $336M in 1976.

Although there was little or no progress made on the Sino-American normalization issue, I find it very difficult to accept James C. Hsiung's assertion that Sino-American trade declined between 1975 and 1976 because "Peking deliberately turned away from the U.S. market to signal its displeasure over the lack of progress on the normalization question." On the contrary, it was the concerted radical opposition to the opening up to the United States that was the cause of China's coolness toward the United States between 1975 and 1976. It seems that the remaining radicals in the CCP clearly grasped the ramifications of Deng Xiaoping's domestic policies on the course of Chinese foreign policy. To them, China's increased economic cooperation with the United States would

54 Ibid.

55 Solomon, op. cit., p. 343.

perforce signal the end of mutual hostilities between China and the United States and thus, thwart the radical's aspirations of China's revolutionary and independent role in foreign affairs.

After Mao's death in September 1976, the radicals within the party lost their only source of support. With the arrest and confinement of the radical "Gang of Four" on October 6, 1976, consistent opposition to the moderate program ceased. In the realm of foreign affairs, Allen Whiting notes that "Mao's death removed the major point of support for advocates of militancy in Chinese foreign policy." In castigating the "Gang of Four" and their radical programs, The Peoples Daily remarked that,

With a view to usurping the leadership of the party and state, subverting the dictatorship of the proletariat and restoring capitalism, the Wang-Jiang-Zhang-Yao anti-party clique in recent years and particularly in 1976 launched an organized and planned wild attack against China's socialist foreign trade.

In addition to being charged with such implausible crimes as betraying proletarian internationalism, serving imperialism and revisionism, the "Gang of Four" was more significantly, attacked

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58 Jen Kao, "Carry through to the end the struggle to expose and criticize the 'Gang of Four,'" People's Daily, Peking, April 17, 1977, Quoted in Survey of PRC's Press American Consultate General, (Hong Kong, BCC, May 1977), p. 64.
because they "sabotaged the implementation of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs."\textsuperscript{59}

The reference to Mao's line in foreign affairs is crucial in this analysis in so far as it portrays the intimacy of Chinese foreign policy and the domestic policies that gained currency since 1971. It is clear that the remaining radicals within the CCP after Lin's demise became increasingly disenchanted with a strong Western pro-American orientation constituting the groundwork of Mao's revolutionary line.

The period between 1971 and 1976 saw the fulfillment of Sino-American detente which enabled Peking to forge closer ties with Japan and Western Europe and thus enhancing her international credibility. The main parameters of China's foreign policy emphasizing restraint and flexibility were clearly drawn in the era of ping-pong diplomacy in which China became an active member of the international community. However, despite the theoretical basis given to this posture in the name of the Three Worlds formulation, the glaring contradiction in this policy, particularly China's increased international economic participation, could not escape virulent opposition from the radicals which lasted until their political demise in October 1976. It is on this basis that I proceed to analyze the post-Mao phase in Sino-American relations.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
The Consummation of Sino-American Diplomatic Relations, 1977-1979

Under the helm of chairman Hua Guofeng and Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, the post-Mao leadership comprising in Jurgen Domes' parlance, the Chinese Military Bureaucratic Complex, resolved to pursue the policies laid out by Mao and Zhou in the early and mid-1970s. Despite the lack of progress in the normalization goal, the principles embodied in the Shanghai Communique still constituted the framework upon which the two countries operated.

In addition to the internal controversies in China, the slow pace in the normalization process was attributed to the lack of American response to the three basic conditions on the Taiwan issue laid down by China. To break the logjam, Peking demanded on a number of occasions, that the United States should abrogate the Mutual Security Treaty of 1954 with Taiwan, derecognize the Taiwan government and, lastly withdraw all her remaining forces and military installations from the island. However, far from acceding to these demands, the U.S. had in fact increased military and economic aid to Taiwan between 1971 and 1976. It appears that the U.S. was squarely committed to maintaining the ties with Taiwan despite the Shanghai Communique.


61 Levine, op. cit., p. 50.

62 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 179.
Nevertheless, China's hardline stance on the Taiwan issue began to gradually change sometime before Mao's death. Some official Chinese statements indicated that China was, at least, not committed to the liberation of Taiwan. Although veiled in ambiguous terms, these statements seemed to confirm Zhou's 1972 contention that Taiwan had ceased to be the critical bone of conflict between China and the United States. Joseph Camilleri observes that China softened her position on Taiwan prior to Mao's death and this became "particularly noticeable after the fall of the Gang of Four and the gradual consolidation of Deng Xiaoping's foreign and domestic policies."

Since the "Gang of Four" was implicated in the advocacy of radical foreign policies, it is not inconceivable, therefore, that its members were instrumental in advancing the Taiwan question as the sine qua non for Sino-American normalization. Given that the radicals had been purged in the wake of a massive transformation of China's domestic policies, the course of Sino-American relations could be appraised against the background of the continuity of the goals established by the Maoist leadership. Of central importance to the new administration in China after Mao was the pursuit of the goal of comprehensive socialist modernization. The post-Mao leadership agreed to reverse the radical oriented policies which were advanced

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63 Ibid., p. 180.

64 Ibid.
and partially implemented in the months between Zhou's and Mao's death. The general consensus within the leadership revolved around the moderate position on economic development and the role of foreign trade within it.

The undoubted resumption of the Four Modernizations program, defined by the post-Maoist leadership as the most pressing task, entailed the continuity of the international posture which had become closely associated with it. The elements of caution and compromise which were the defining marks of Mao's line in foreign policy were upheld as China rapidly sought to break the impasse in her relationship with the United States. More central to the continuity of this posture were the potential benefits China could obtain for the national priority of modernization. For instance, in 1977, it was strongly held that,

'It is by the adoption of the most advanced technologies that the industrially backward countries catch up with the industrially advanced countries in the world. We must...study with an open mind all advanced technologies from foreign countries in a planned and appropriate way and then turn them into our own in order to accelerate the development of the national economy.'

This explicit definition of China's primary goal, therefore, meant that Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs would be appropriately extended to the realm of foreign trade in order to legitimate

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65 Morrison, op. cit., p. 700.
66 Cited in Greg O'Leary, China Comes Home..., op. cit., p. 452.
relatively flexible import and export policies.\footnote{Morrison, op.

cit., p. 700.}

While, on the one hand, China's domestic priorities deepened
Pekings interest in speeding up the normalization process, the
Carter administration was, on the other hand, overly cautious in
resolving this issue because the U.S. foreign policy agenda was
crowded with other issues.\footnote{Kim, op.
cit., p. 244.} However, Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance's visit to Peking in September 1977 provided a pointer toward
America's rejuvenated interest in the goal of normalization. In
cfact at the time of Vance's visit Joseph Camilleri observes that,

Peking had already communicated its readiness
to improve trade relations as well as
scientific, educational, cultural and
sports exchanges even prior to any agreement
on diplomatic recognition. Access to
American advanced technology and know-how,
including sophisticated equipment, research
facilities and management techniques, was
now considered vital to China's economic
modernization.\footnote{Camilleri, op.
cit., p. 180. (my emphasis)}

Given that modernization became the overriding goal in China's
domestic politics, there was a diminution of the Taiwan question
as a primary policy issue contributing to the slow pace in Sino-
American normalization. Consequently American interest toward
this goal was reactivated at least by Peking's willingness to shelve
this issue. It is essential to note here that the pursuit of the
modernization program in a way dictated Chinese behaviour toward the United States since at the onset of this program, closer ties with the United States became the main pillar of Chinese foreign policy. The whole gamut of domestic concerns, then, made the pursuit of Sino-American normalization more vigorous than was heretofore the case.

Apart from the furtherance of her economic and technological interests through a well-designed foreign policy, China continued to advance more vigorously its anti-Soviet position in the world at large. After the demise of the "Gang of Four," China's united front strategy against the Soviet Union remained one of the major goals of Chinese foreign policy. This was best expressed in November 1977 when the Three World's theory, which as noted earlier was essentially geared toward isolating the Soviet Union, was posited as the "Great Strategic Component" in China's foreign policy and further hailed as Mao's major contribution to Marxism-Leninsim. The projection of this aspect of China's global outlook became increasingly compatible with the geopolitical interests of the United States. The convergence of global and regional geopolitical considerations between China and the United States was underscored during the visit of Carter's National

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71Kim, op. cit., p. 244.
Security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Peking in the summer of 1978. Brzezinski reiterated that the United States shared and recognized "China's resolve to resist the efforts of any nation [which sought] to establish global or regional hegemony." 72

In addition to the coincidence of Sino-American geopolitical interests, the Soviet Union's activities in Indochina became of immediate concern to China. At the end of the Vietnam War in April 1975 resulting in the emergence of Hanoi as a formidable force in the region, Moscow had sought to penetrate this region using Vietnam as its principal ally. The use of Vietnam to bolster her hegemonic interests in Southeast Asia was perceived by China as Moscow's cherished plan of containing it. Moscow's relation with Hanoi took a dramatic turn toward the end of 1978 when the two signed a 25 year Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty, which was solely directed against Chinese and American geopolitical interests in the region. 73 This configuration of events in Southeast Asia compounded by Vietnam's territorial ambitions on Cambodia, provided the stimulant to the consummation of Sino-American relations. On December 28, 1978, the two sides indicated that formal diplomatic relations would be established as of January 1, 1979. 74 Ushering in a qualitatively new era in Sino-American

72 Cited in Kim, op. cit., pp. 244-245.


74 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 181.
relations, the year 1979 was a watershed marking the end of the long, if erratic march, which had begun with Nixon's mission to Peking in 1972. In the very same way as the anti-Soviet component of China's foreign policy had contributed to the formative processes of Sino-American normalization in early 1970s, so did China's opposition to the Soviet interests spur the inauguration of full diplomatic relations in 1979.

The inauguration of diplomatic relations between the two countries eliminated some of the outstanding differences which had contributed to the diplomatic impasse after 1972. In adhering to the spirit of Shanghai, the United States made significant concessions on the Taiwan issue by severing diplomatic relations and promising to withdraw the remaining U.S. military forces from the island. However, these concessions were cosmetic rather than substantive since normalization did not alter the substance of the economic and military relationship between Washington and Taibei. 75

Events following Sino-American entente cordialerevealed Peking's principal reason in pursuing the goal of normalization. As has been argued throughout this chapter, China's assessment of her domestic concerns provided the cardinal reason for seeking an accommodation with the United States. Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States in January 1979 underscored China's "independent" interest in normalization; he gave emphasis to increased scientific

75 Ibid., p. 182.
and technological exchanges between the two countries in addition to expanding trade relations. 76

As noted earlier, the process leading to the consummation of Sino-American relations clearly unfolded toward the end of 1976 with the demise of the 'Gang of Four' and the vigorous pursuit of the modernization program. The Four Modernizations, then, gave a concrete base to Mao's foreign policy in the face of China's evolving commitment to economic development. Yet it is equally important to note that,

While this new course in economic development and foreign trade can be rationalized as an example of a fundamental principle made operational in a flexible strategy, it does represent one key area where Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs is being stretched to a breaking point. 77

Conclusion

The basic thrust of this analysis has been that the cornerstone of Mao's line in foreign policy, particularly the Sino-American aspect of it, was to be found in the domestic imperatives imposed on the Chinese leadership after the Cultural Revolution. The parameters of this line were clearly mapped out by Zhou Enlai and the majority of the moderate elements who gained dominance in policy making after 1971. All sharing an ardent desire to make China

76 Ibid., p. 183.

77 Kim, op. cit., p. 22.
a strong, modern socialist country, they had to radically transform foreign policy to suit Chinese domestic developments. Subsumed under the title of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, this policy flowed logically from the internal political and economic orientation of the Chinese leadership. In this context, the process of ameliorating relations with the United States, growing in leaps and bounds after 1972, eventually culminated in the consummation of full diplomatic relations in early 1979.

It was not, however, until Mao's death and the demise of the "Gang of Four" that the domestic policies underlying China's foreign policy received more elaboration. After normalization, the goal of modernization was enshrined in China's new constitution adopted at the March 1979 National People's Congress. This was a major step toward institutionalizing its derivative foreign policy.

As will be illustrated in Chapter 3, Peking effectively combined the anti-hegemony, anti-Soviet crusade and the Four Modernizations together largely because the two were complementary rather than anti-thetical. The former, in a sense, did provide the "external" explanation for the pursuit of the latter. The anti-Soviet component of China's foreign policy was expediently used to speed up the process of reaching an accommodation with the United States. I will attempt to explore the dimensions of Sino-Soviet relations in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3

THE DIMENSIONS OF SINO-SOVET RELATIONS, 1971-1979

Despite China's resumption of normalized conduct in foreign affairs toward the close of the Cultural Revolution, her relationship with the Soviet Union remained conspicuously strained. The early 1960s marked the end of an aberrational period of overt Sino-Soviet collaboration and the beginning of intense conflicts which became dominant in their international relations. Beginning as an essentially ideological dispute, Sino-Soviet animosities spilled over virtually every aspect of their relations toward the end of the 1960s. It was mentioned in chapter 2 that one of the principal facets of Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line was its vehement anti-Soviet stance.

This chapter will attempt to analyse the nature and extent of Sino-Soviet relations chiefly from 1971, when there was a marked lessening of bilateral tensions, until 1979, when Peking unilaterally abrogated the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1950. As in the previous chapter, an analysis of the background to Sino-Soviet relations between 1968 and 1971 will be required. In this context, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 will be assessed. Apart from delineating the dimensions of an actual Soviet military threat to China during this period, it will be equally important to discuss the diminishing tensions within the entire Sino-Soviet
bilateral nexus. In the second part, 1971-1977, the assessment will focus on the qualitative shift in China's perception of the Soviet threat. Thus, attempts will be made to situate the antagonism between the two into a broader international dimension. In addition, the centrality of Mao's projection of the spectre of Soviet global hegemony will be discussed in this period. Finally, I will analyze the evolution of post-Maoist policy posture toward the Soviet Union in the light of continued domestic readjustments in China. This section, 1977-1979, will in effect seek to elucidate some of the contentions advanced in the last chapter, specifically, the inextricable ties between China's quest for comprehensive modernization and her virulent anti-Sovietism.

My main point of departure is that while Chinese foreign policy during the 1970s was partially motivated by the perceived military threat from the Soviet Union, the nature of Sino-Soviet conflict can be appraised in terms of a broader international competition. After China attained a significant level of bilateral understanding with the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, Peking began to perceive the Soviet threat on a long-term perspective. Thus, during the 1970s, Chinese foreign policy was unequivocally oriented toward forestalling what was perceived as the Soviet Union's military and political expansion at the regional and global levels. Therefore, far from responding to an actual bilateral threat, as has been argued elsewhere, anti-Sovietism which became a cardinal tenet of Mao's line in foreign affairs, emanated from a wider and longer-term Chinese perception of the aggressive and meddlesome
designs of the Soviet Union.

Background to Sino-Soviet Relations, 1968-1971

Toward the end of the 1950s fundamental differences emerged between China and the Soviet Union, primarily from Mao Zedong's vehement denunciation of the dilution of the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union. ¹ The course pursued by the Soviet leadership following the end of the Stalin era was perceived by China as a total revision of the goals enunciated by Marx and Lenin. By the time of Khruščev's overthrow in late 1964, the ideological conflict between China and the Soviet Union pervaded their foreign policies. Compounded by the territorial dispute which surfaced in 1964, the Sino-Soviet conflict grew more acrimonious in the 1960s. At the time when China embarked on the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s, these deep-seated animosities between the two communist giants became increasingly irreconcilable.

Yet it should be noted that China's sharp antagonism toward the Soviet Union in the early and mid-1960s was to a large extent, a reflection of her wider antagonism toward the forces of revisionism and imperialism--symbolized by the Soviet Union and the United States respectively. Thus the revisionist line pursued by the Soviets and the imperialist policies underpinning U.S.

external behaviour were both unacceptable to the Peking leadership. However, China's distrust of the Soviet Union radically changed in August 1968 when the latter brazenly invaded Czechoslovakia. This invasion, coming at the time when China had hardly recovered from the strife of the Cultural Revolution, was instrumental not only in charting a new course in Sino-Soviet relations, but also in significantly changing China's entire global diplomacy. Before the Czech invasion, the Soviet Union was essentially considered revisionist; now it was reassigned the rank of a Social-imperialist power bent on using force as an instrument of foreign policy.²

Chinese fears of Soviet aggression stemmed from the Soviet Union's enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine, a doctrine that justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Upholding the principle of the collective defence of socialism in any country of the Socialist Commonwealth, this doctrine reinforced China's fears of the Soviet Union; in so far as it could be used appropriately to justify some form of Soviet military intervention in China.³

Added to the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution and hence, China's national vulnerability, Peking's view of the Soviet threat became a question of dire concern. It was after the Czech

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invasion and the subsequent enunciation of Brezhnev doctrine that China first began to protest alleged Soviet intrusions along the Sino-Soviet border. For instance, Zhou's address to the National Day Celebrations on October 1, 1968 explicitly spelled out China's determination to quell the "Soviet revisionists" if they dared attack China. 

Following the invasion, China resorted to occasional demonstrations on the Sino-Soviet border as a means of defying the Soviet Union. China's fear of Soviet aggressive intentions which prompted a show of her defiance and national preparedness culminated in the border incident of March 1969 on Zhen Bao (Damansky) Island. This incident, sparked by a Chinese ambush on Soviet border troops on March 2, 1969 resulted in a major clash when the Soviet Union convinced that it was acting defensively, retaliated by killing a number of Chinese troops two weeks later. The Soviet version of the border incident Harold Hinton argues,

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4 Cited in Camilleri, op. cit., p. 123.


has won widespread acceptance outside China and is, therefore, not far from the truth. It has been argued that the postulated Soviet threat and China's response to it was used to galvanize patriotic support for the Chinese leadership. Occurring before a major political event, the Ninth Congress of the CCP, the attack on Soviet troops might have helped to create an appropriate psychological climate for the convening of the Congress in April 1969. \(^8\)

Roger Brown has further argued that the March 2, incident, with the predictable Soviet retaliation two weeks later was necessary in confirming the correctness of Mao's ideological analysis of Soviet Social-imperialism. \(^9\)

While it is apparent that the border incident served a mobilization purpose for the Chinese leadership, the most threatening aspect to come out of the subsequent Soviet retaliation was Moscow's secret hint of a surgical nuclear strike against China. However, in view of the broader consequences of this action, especially on the neighbouring countries, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union had any intention of carrying out this threat. \(^10\) Nevertheless, the Soviet threat served to alert China of the desirability of bilateral negotiations in resolving this conflict. Thus, the

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\(^8\) Harold Hinton, *op. cit.*, p. 47.


Chinese presence at the Amur-Ussuri border talks in Khabarovsk from June to August 1969 and the further willingness of the Chinese government to sign a one-year navigation agreement with Moscow constituted significant strides toward the goal of a negotiated settlement of the differences between the two states.\textsuperscript{11}

Effective full-scale negotiations over the border issue commenced after Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's meeting with Premier Zhou Enlai on September 11, 1969. On October 20, 1969, China announced its intention of resuming the border talks, which had broken off in 1964. An important indicator of China's changed attitude toward these talks was its willingness to temporarily drop the basic demand that Moscow recognize, the unequal nature of the historical border treaties.\textsuperscript{12} China's agreement to participate in the border talks achieved two major aims. First, the military crisis with the Soviet Union had largely been defused; pending any breakdown of these talks, the danger of military confrontation had considerably lessened. Secondly, China managed to tactically maintain the conflict in a condition of stalemate.

As Thomas Robinson observes,

\begin{quote}
Although the talks were not productive and the Chinese could be said to have attained their own goal of preventing
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\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., p. 282.

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid. This view is also shared by Harry G. Gelber, "The Sino-Soviet Relationship and the United States," Orbis, Vol. XV, No. 1, Spring 1971, p. 119. I stress the word temporarily, because the issue of unequal treaties was revived thereafter.
higher levels of Soviet violence, border incidents were no longer a major contributing factor to continued Sino-Soviet animosity. 13

The effective resumption of border negotiations and the substantive decrease in Sino-Soviet tensions were eventually highlighted by China's agreement to resume ambassadorial relations with the Soviet Union in 1970. In addition a one-year trade and payments agreement was signed between the two countries; this was in fact the first goods exchange signed between them since 1965, and was the first formal agreement of any sort between them since 1966. 14 As a sign of improvement in their trade relations, Sino-Soviet trade increased by about 300% in 1970. 15

It is unlikely, toward the end of 1970, that the Czech invasion of 1968 and the border incidents of March 1969 had been obliterated from Chinese memory. Not only was China's security at stake during this period, but the consequences of Soviet pressure on her internal political stability posed a formidable problem to the Maoist leadership. Thus causing the most profound soul-searching in Peking, the events of 1968-1969 unquestionably indicated the reality of the Soviet threat on China. However, at the time of the initiation of the border negotiations and the subsequent

13 Robinson, op. cit., p. 283.


15 Lieberthal, op. cit., p. 56.
restoration of diplomatic relations, it was evident that concrete measures toward a limited understanding had been made. Considering the intense hostilities that pervaded Sino-Soviet relations, especially, during the Cultural Revolution, the restoration of diplomatic relations was significant in so far as it opened avenues for future consultations. It is perhaps against this background of lessened tensions that John Garver discusses Chinese foreign policy in 1970 in terms of China's "tilt toward the Soviet Union." While this assessment, to some extent, gives a true picture of the state of Sino-Soviet bilateral relations it fails to anticipate both the tactical advantages China derived from this "tilt" and the broader dimensions of Sino-Soviet conflict. I now turn to those questions.


In Chapter 2, I argued that China's burgeoning contacts with the United States constituted one of the most salient aspects of Peking's reassessment of her global policy beginning in 1971. Without a doubt, this reassessment had a far-reaching impact on China's Soviet policy. It should well be remembered that during most of the 1960s the Soviet Union and the United States constituted China's principal enemies. This fact was clearly underlined in Lin Biao's political report to the Ninth Congress in April 1969,

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16 Garver, op. cit., p. 224.
in which he strongly advocated China's continued hostility to both superpowers. 17

After the demise of Lin and his group in 1971, it became crystal clear that the moderate coalition which assumed power in China was overly apprehensive about the continuity of Lin's dual adversary strategy as the backbone of China's foreign policy. Indeed, Zhou's interest in mending fences with the United States may be interpreted as a major modification of this strategy. Once this strategy was modified, China's Soviet policy assumed new dimensions after 1971. In attempting to explain the changes in China's global policy after 1971, most scholars 18 have strongly advanced the thesis that the 1969 border conflict with the Soviet Union in particular and China's fear of a Soviet military attack in general, were instrumental in transforming Peking's posture especially with the United States. Yet as Joseph Camelleri indicates,

While this interpretation is not without validity, it is at best a partial explanation of a complex policy motivated least as much

17 See the discussion of this point in Chapter 2.

by the self confident awareness of new opportunities as by the fear of a hostile international environment. 19

It was argued earlier that the changes in China's foreign policy in the 1970s largely corresponded with the underlying transformations in Chinese domestic politics. Thus, while accepting the role played in Chinese foreign policy by the perceived menace from the Soviet Union, I argued in Chapter 2, that this fear merely stimulated, but did not account for these policy changes. In this respect I have shown that Chinese fear of Soviet aggression existed between 1968 and 1969, especially, when the border skirmishes exacerbated their long-standing conflicts. That the Soviet Union had blatantly displayed its bellicosity toward China during this period is unquestionable. However, it is my view that at the same time as bilateral tensions were lessening which was expressed by the resumption of active diplomatic relations in 1970 and trade relations, China came to perceive the Soviet threat in a much broader context.

Far from being viewed as an immediate threat to China's national security, the Soviet was now seen as employing a more sophisticated and subtle policy of isolating China both at the regional and global levels. To preempt what Peking perceived as a potential long-term threat to her emerging role in world affairs, China's efforts were now to be geared toward turning back Soviet

19 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 124.
encirclement and deflecting Soviet power away from China. In launching what one observer has described as "an unprecedented pragmatic international leverage"\(^\text{20}\) against the Soviets, Peking was convinced that this form of competition would reduce the scope of direct military confrontation. This new strategy, which was meant to specifically thwart Moscow's broad strategic and political ambitions, entailed China's alliance with all the world forces opposed to Soviet hegemony. It is instructive here to stress the potential long-term threat of the Soviet Union to China, because as will be shown later, Chinese deep hatred toward the Soviet Union became the leadership's central explanation for the changes in Chinese foreign policy throughout most of the 1970s. To the extent that this argument camouflaged the domestic political and economic developments in China underpinning Chinese foreign policy, it validates my contention that Chinese foreign policy during this period was inextricably intertwined with the domestic developments.

Toward the mid-1971 events in the Indian Sub-continent greatly shaped China's perception of the long-term Soviet expansionist threat to her national interests. Since the border conflict between China and India in 1962, China had assiduously supported Pakistan politically and economically. In turn India had drawn very closely to the Soviet Union; the Soviet-Indian Treaty of August 1971 resulted

\(^{20}\text{Sutter, op. cit., p. 14.}\)
in the augmentation of Russian shipments of military equipment to India. The disintegration of Pakistan which formed the crisis over East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and led to the Indian-Pakistan war, caused a great deal of alarm in Peking. Pakistan's dismemberment was seen by China as part and parcel of Moscow's strategy of expanding in China's periphery. Along the lines of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the India-Pakistan war provided China with the opportunity to attack Soviet Social-imperialism for the benefit of a wide international audience. The Soviet Union was labelled as the 'backstage manager of Indian expansionists.'

China's concern over the political and military expansion of the Soviet Union was, however, best underlined in Southeast Asia. For reasons of geographical proximity, linguistic and cultural affinities Peking considered this region as being of geopolitical interest to China's security. Although in the face of American military involvement in Southeast Asia throughout 1960s, there had been a convergence of Peking's and Moscow's interests in Southeast Asia, the Sino-Soviet conflicts of the 1960s bred mutual suspicions as to each others intentions in this region. The competition for power and influence in this region emerged as a factor in Sino-Soviet relations, especially toward the end of the 1960s. In

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22 Ibid.
1969 specifically the Soviet Union, in an effort to embrace Asian countries under her umbrella proposed an Asian Collective Security System, a multilateral system which was to involve these countries, and the Soviet Union, in a system that would guarantee existing states boundaries.\(^{23}\)

Even though this system failed to come to fruition in the 1970s Peking vehemently attacked this proposal as being anti-Chinese. From Peking's perspective, Soviet Social imperialism, in the face of gradual American withdrawal from Southeast Asia, had found room to encircle China. Interpreted as a larger policy directed against China, Peking denounced it as a "tattered flag for an anti-China military alliance."\(^{24}\) Small wonder that the Shanghai communique between Zhou Enlai and American President Richard Nixon, included an anti-hegemony clause. As a diplomatic victory for China, this clause explicitly spelled out both parties' rejection of hegemony in the Asian-Pacific region and, further, the United States and the Chinese expressed their opposition to efforts by any other state to establish hegemony in this region. Thereafter, the quest for hegemony was closely identified with the Soviet Union and the term hegemony became a codeword for the Soviet Union in Chinese lexicon.\(^{25}\)

\(^{23}\)Lieberthal, op. cit., p. 36.


Downplaying the American presence in this region and the continued U.S. support of the South Vietnamese regime against the North, Peking in the early 1970s focused its attention against the supposed Soviet political designs in Southeast Asia. The Sino-Japanese communique released at the end of Japan's Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's visit to Peking in 1972 also included an anti-hegemony formula which was becoming China's central diplomatic tool in counteracting Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. China's diplomatic and political campaign against the Soviet Union in this region stemmed partly from Moscow's concerted attempts to forge closer links with some Southeast Asian countries notably Malaysia and, her increased military involvement in the Asian-Pacific waters.

Yet China's denunciation of the potential consequences of Soviet encirclement policies on her security interests in Southeast Asia was only a microcosm of her broader concern with the proliferation of global Soviet strength. This aspect of China's foreign relations was elaborated, albeit inexhaustively, at the Tenth Congress of the CCP in 1973. Zhou Enlai's political report to this Congress underlined what was becoming one of the cardinal components of Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs. Although Zhou did not specifically address the measures aimed at countering

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26 Sutter, op. cit., p. 122.

27 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 124.
the Soviet Union, he identified the latter as the chief threat to world stability and further stressed that China basic strategy was to oppose the two superpowers, chiefly the most direct, the most perilous and the most real enemy, Soviet revisionist Social-imperialism. 28

In elaborating on the decline of U.S. imperialism consequent upon the upsurge of Soviet-hegemony, the People's Daily provided additional strength to Zhou's formulation of the Soviet global policies. It stated that,

In this all-round striving for hegemony, Soviet-revisionist, Social-imperialism shows a greater momentum and extends its reach farther and wider than the U.S. — It has also made reckless in-roads in other parts of the world. In a word, it has committed penetration wherever there is a chance. In some countries or regions, it arrived at the heels of the United States; in some others, it took the U.S.'s place as soon as the latter left; and in some other areas which the United States has not been able to lay hands on, Soviet-revisionist Social-imperialism took the advantage to step in. 29

By the end of 1973, China's efforts to challenge the expansion of Soviet power, embodying judgements about long-term strategic and political trends had widened to encompass all spheres where Soviet-American contention prevailed. Of special significance

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in Zhou's political report to the Tenth Congress was the statement that China had become peripheral to the global goals of the Soviet Union. According to Zhou, the Soviet Union was "making a feint to the east while attacking the West."\(^{30}\) Having considered that China had become of less significance to the Soviet global machinations, Chinese foreign policy makers in 1973 formalized their worldwide anti-hegemony formulation by asking Western European countries to resist supposed Soviet expansion in this region. Thereafter, Zhou's formulation of a Soviet threat to Western Europe became a touchstone of Chinese foreign policy.

Zhou Enlai's acknowledgement of the persistent Soviet danger to the West in August 1973 is central to this analysis in so far as it throws some light on my earlier contention about the link between Chinese domestic and foreign policies in the 1970s. I have argued that China's rapprochement with the United States in 1972 enabled it to pursue closer political and economic relations with Western Europe than ever before. Zhou's formulation of a Soviet threat to Western Europe may be interpreted as a move on the part of China to draw the sympathies of Western European countries to China's own domestic goals.\(^{31}\) In this respect, it

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\(^{30}\)Quoted in Chen (ed.), op. cit., p. 184.

will be remembered that China had begun to pursue a domestic line which emphasized the infusion of foreign technology. Given then, that the domestic policies underlying China's foreign policy were being formulated, Western Europe was indeed central in the success of these policies. But in order to pursue this policy without intense domestic opposition, the element of anti-Sovietism was projected as the principal cause for these changes. Hence, as Kenneth Lieberthal argues, Zhou's formulation of a Soviet threat to Western Europe,

both justified his own foreign policy program and laid the groundwork for China to make the case in the future that the West should continue to aid China against the USSR as part of the strategy of insuring its own survival.32

The importance of Western Europe to China was underscored in late 1973, when Peking formally established diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community (EEC).33 Thus, to promote the domestic goals embarked upon by the moderate leadership, it became necessary to forge intimate political and economic relations with the Western Europeans. In turn, these relations would be reinforced by China's warning about the Soviet threat to Western Europe.

Viewed against the background of Sino-Soviet bilateral relations in the mid-1970s China's perception of a Soviet threat to


33 Ibid., p. 66.
Western Europe may be seen as a further justification of the anti-Soviet posture of her own foreign policy. Despite the continued Soviet military build-up along the Sino-Soviet border, which corresponded to China's efforts in the same direction, the Soviet Union between 1970 and 1973 made several unilateral offers geared at resolving the bilateral conflict with China. These proposals, which included the acceptance of the five principles of peaceful coexistence as the basis for Sino-Soviet relations, the willingness of the Soviets to sign a border treaty with China and finally, an offer to sign a treaty barring the threat or use of force were made in the face of China's intransigence. In a sense Moscow had considerably reduced some of the impediments to reaching an eventual agreement on bilateral issues. Thus, by the eve of the CCP's Tenth Party Congress in August 1973, the Soviet Union had utilized the forum of the negotiations to lay out a wide range of proposals aimed at improving Sino-Soviet relations. They used the border negotiations as the major vehicle for making these offers because, as they argued the border dispute itself was more a reflection than a cause of Sino-Soviet animosity and thus it would be resolved as the overall relationship improved.  

It is apparent that in order to consistently advance the global anti-Soviet crusade, China resolutely adopted a hard line stance in the Sino-Soviet bilateral problems. While one cannot easily

34 Ibid.
determine the sincerity of Moscow's proposals, it is probable that they amounted to genuine offers on Moscow's part. In this respect it is interesting to note that most of these offers were made by Leonid Brezhnev, an aspect that gave them a measure of authority and seriousness. However, China's intransigence could be attributed to the fact that since 1971 the border problems had in essence become the central instrument of China's political warfare against the Soviet Union. Hence it would have been foolhardy for diplomatic and political reasons, for Peking to abandon this political weapon.

As a further refinement of Mao's anti-hegemony clause, Chinese policy makers in 1974 formulated a theoretical perspective, the Three Worlds theory. It was shown in Chapter 2, that this theory divided the world into three parts, which were both

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37 Leonid Brezhnev made most of these offers, see Lieberthal, op. cit., pp. 100-101, and Y. Semyonov, "Beijing's Policy Constitutes a Threat", International Affairs (Moscow), April 1979, p. 70.

interconnected and in contradiction to one another." The Soviet Union and the United States constituted the First World, the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America constituted the Third World; while the developed countries between the two made up the Second World. However, although Peking put the United States and the Soviet Union into one category, in practice, the Soviet Union had supplanted the United States as the chief imperialist power in China's perspective.

To the extent that China's condemnation of the United States became weaker and weaker in the 1970s the symmetry and logic of the Three World Theory lost its utility as a grand design. Indeed as was shown in Chapter 2, this ideological framework was used to justify China's increased political and economic relations with the Western World while at the same time claiming leadership of the world's revolutionary forces. After the enunciation of this theory, Peking stressed that its long-term strategic objective was to form the broadest possible international United front against Soviet global hegemony. The promulgation of this

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theory in 1974 occurred at precisely the time when China had embarked on the domestic program of modernization. Again I would here emphasize that there seems to be an intimate link between China's modernization program, which entailed the reinforcement of strong political and economic ties with the industrialized countries, and her postulation of Soviet global hegemony. Although, as I have argued, the struggle against Soviet-hegemony was a long-term and broad-gauged one, it was of immediate value to China in that it bolstered her economic and political contacts with the West; Deng Xiaoping's exposition of the global designs of the Soviet Union and the United States in 1974 validates this view. Of the two superpowers, he asserted that,

the Soviet Union [was] more dangerous than the United States--The United States [was] rather on the defensive in order to maintain its rights, and interests throughout the world. On the contrary, the Soviet Union [had] gone into the offensive with a view to intruding on U.S. vested rights.42 (my emphasis)

In July 1974, the Peking Review gave further emphasis on the expansion of Soviet global power.

U.S. imperialism, though it has long since been toppled from its pinnacle--is making desperate efforts to preserve its foothold --Soviet Social-imperialism--has been doing everything it can to squeeze into and take over U.S. sphere of influence--As a breeding ground for a new world war Soviet-imperialism is far more dangerous.43

42 Deng made this statement to visiting Japanese Journalists in August 1974, it is cited in Pollack, op. cit., p. 59.

China's spirited efforts to isolate the Soviet Union were amplified in her unprecedented opposition to the progression of Soviet-American detente in the mid-1970s. Peking largely assessed the various agreements made between the two superpowers especially, on arms limitation as manifestation of the intense rivalry between them. For instance, in 1974, Deng referred to these agreements as "a facade and deception" disguising the superpowers' global rivalry.\footnote{Quoted in Camilleri, op. cit., p. 187.} It was argued that Moscow's aims were to "gradually disarm the West" politically and psychologically under the signboard of detente so as to accomplish its "task of achieving military superiority."\footnote{Peking Review, August 9, 1976, p. 11.} Further, in hawking its shoddy ware of "materialization of detente," the Soviet Union has left no stone unturned to get large sums of capital, loans, technical knowhow and equipment from Western Europe through so-called "trade exchanges" and "mutual benefit and co-operation" so that it can ease its economic difficulties, speed up its arms expansion and war preparations, and beef up its military setup.\footnote{Ibid., p. 12.}

Peking's attack on Soviet-American detente also extended to its disenchantment with the Soviet plans for a detente in Europe subsumed under the Helsinki European Security conference of 1975. These plans were perceived by China as part and parcel
of the Soviet's strategy to exercise hegemony over Western Europe. 47

Over the course of 1975, Chinese foreign policy makers drew closer to arguing that Soviet activities were moving beyond a Europe-centered orientation. To the analysts in Peking, the struggle against Soviet hegemony had extended to the entire Third World. 48 Apart, therefore, from Western Europe and Southeast Asia attention was focused on Soviet hegemonic expansion in the Indian Ocean region, the horn of Africa, Southern Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. In the Middle East, for instance, it was stated that,

Washing [was] trying to continue its exclusive role in a "peaceful solution" to the Middle East issue. Moscow on the other hand [had] been overhauling its tactics in an effort to snatch the initiative from its opponent, once again showing true features of sham support, but real betrayal in its relations with the Arab people. 49

Given that the Soviet Union was vigorously expanding her global tentacles, it was argued in Peking during the mid-1970s that China preemptive goal was to expand her united front strategy to include Third World countries which had become victims of Soviet social-imperialism. According to Jonathan Pollack, Peking's preoccupation with castigating the Soviet Union during this period amounted to


49 Peking Review, October 29, 1976, p. 29.
an alarmist and exaggerated perception of Soviet global power. 50 Indeed by extending their focus of Soviet expansionism beyond Southeast Asia and Western Europe, the Chinese policy makers had now a more diverse and differentiated political argument by which to justify official policy.

As of the end of 1975 the official Chinese attitude toward the Soviet Union remained basically unchanged. Under the signboard of anti-hegemony the struggle against the Soviet Union was waged particularly at the international level. On the issues pertaining to bilateral relations, intermittent negotiations were pursued, albeit with no results. The only crisis of similar magnitude to the 1969 border incident was the arrest of Soviet helicopter pilots by China, which accused them of espionage. Held captive from March 1974, the pilots were released on December 27, 1975. Coupled with Zhou's apology to the Soviets, the release of the pilots restored some measure of stability in the bilateral relationship. 51 Within the context of unyielding hostility on all


51 Lieberthal, op. cit., p. 56.
broader issues, China's primary strategy at this time was to establish minimal levels of diplomatic and commercial intercourse with the Soviet Union. This in essence became the basic framework upon which China launched a broad-gauged anti-Soviet policy.

Among others, Carl Jacobsen has asserted that China's Soviet policy has been hostage to the vagaries of China's domestic politics, especially the fractional struggles. The Maoist phase of Sino-Soviet relations indeed lends credence to this contention. For instance, in 1973 there was a revival of Lin's dual adversary strategy, i.e., the simultaneous opposition to both superpowers by the remaining radical elements in the CCP. In his report to the Tenth Congress in August 1973, Wang Hongwen specifically warned of the need to "work without fail, prepare well against surprise attack by imperialism and social-imperialism." It will be recalled that while Zhou's formulation to the Tenth Congress suggested that the Soviet threat was not imminent to China but to the West and, therefore, provided the basis for continuing to develop Chinese ties with the West, Wang's formulation suggested that the Soviet


53 Cited in Donald Zagoria, op. cit., p. 149.
and possibly American threat was imminent and therefore, China was to continue opposing both superpowers.

However, the dominance of Mao and Zhou in the process of Chinese foreign policy in the early and mid-1970s precluded the pursuit of Wang's policy posture. It is no wonder that the radicals in the CCP at this time began to see China's postulation of a Soviet threat to Western Europe as the primary justification for a whole series of measures that they found unacceptable in both domestic and foreign policies. In this respect Thomas Robinson has argued that Mao's personal anti-Sovietism was responsible for the broadening of the dimensions of Sino-Soviet conflict in the first half of the 1970s. Given Mao's centrality in Chinese politics and his unquestioned hostility toward the Soviet Union, it is inconceivable that he would have encouraged any efforts by his colleagues to repair relations with Moscow. Mao's role notwithstanding, it is important to emphasize that the domestic policies on which China embarked after 1972 contributed to a large extent in the formulation of her Soviet policy. The modernization program, I have argued clearly delineated China's interest in the West. Consequently, the anti-hegemony

54 See Lieberthal, op. cit., p. 107, for a discussion of the radicals position on the extent of a Soviet military threat to Western Europe.


56 Zagoria, op. cit., p. 149.
campaign became, in part, the official explanation of this western-oriented policy. Thus, as Joseph Camilleri indicates,

The most decisive factor inclining the Chinese to maintain their policy of hostility towards Moscow was the conviction that closer relations with the west were likely to prove far more advantageous, at least in the foreseeable future than the easing of tensions with the Soviet Union. Western capital and technology were deemed more vital to the success of China's Four modernizations than anything Russia could provide. 57

Convinced that Mao spearheaded China on the path of vehement anti-Sovietism, the Soviet Union resigned herself to the impasse in bilateral relations. Moscow concluded that any improvement in Sino-Soviet relations would be contingent upon Mao's demise. These hopes were predicated on the belief that "healthy" forces committed to a total amelioration of Sino-Soviet relations would emerge in China after Mao's demise. 58 It suffices to note in this context that Deng Xiaoping's rise to power in the mid-1970s contributed to Moscow's heightened hopes. Donald Zagoria in "Mao's role in the Sino-Soviet Conflict" argues that on the eve of his fall from power in 1967, Deng had supported Moscow's call for unity of action in Vietnam and generally "became suspiciously uncritical of the Soviet Union." 59 It appears, then, that Deng's

57 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 175.
58 Lieberthal, op. cit., passim.
59 Cited in Zagoria, op. cit., p. 147.
past administrative record showed that he had been conciliatory toward the Soviet Union. This view is further confirmed by the fact that there was a resumption of bitter anti-Soviet propaganda from Peking at the time of Deng's second purge in January 1976. 60

It was against this general air of optimism that Moscow responded to Mao's death in September 1976 with a series of public gestures designed to sway post-Mao leaders in China. Toning down its anti-Chinese polemics, the Soviet Union sent Leonid Illyech, the chief Soviet negotiator, to Peking in order to resume the bilateral border talks. 61 Mao's death and the subsequent purge of the "Gang of Four" were perceived by Moscow as a great step towards improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. The "Gang of Four" had consistently opposed the Soviet Union, because they perceived it as a revisionist country whose threat to China was primarily ideological. 62 To them, the Soviet Union was to be isolated and excommunicated largely because of the revisionist tendencies of the Brezhnev clique. Thus, for different reasons, the "Gang of Four" had clearly espoused Mao's anti-Sovietism at its most extreme. 63 However, although China reduced some of its polemics against the Soviet Union following Mao's death, China disavowed, in a firm

60 See Jacobsen, op. cit., p. 85.
61 Sutter, op. cit., p. 93.
63 Jacobsen, op. cit., p. 92.
rebuttal of Soviet gestures, any interest in resuming a substantially normal relationship with the Soviet Union. In the words of Vice-Premier Li Xiannian, Moscow was engaging in "wishful thinking and day-dreaming about Sino-Soviet reconciliation."\(^{64}\)

The Post-Maoist Phase of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1977-1979

Moscow's false hopes for dramatic changes in China's domestic politics were shattered by the realignment of power in China after Mao's death, the arrest of the radical "Gang of Four" and Deng Xiaoping's return to prominence. Despite the efforts by Hua Guofeng-Deng Xiaoping moderate coalition to dismantle systematically much of Mao's political legacy, anti-Sovietism remained a principal plank in Chinese foreign policy. It was apparent that any attempt to undo Mao's anti-Sovietism would have been severely restricted since,

Mao's legacy made it difficult for Peking to reach a compromise with Moscow, given that important elements of the new leadership depended on a continuing public commitment to the struggle against "Soviet revisionism."\(^{65}\)

Nevertheless, in the course of pursuing this goal, the new leadership attempted to adopt a more differentiated policy toward the Soviet Union. In a number of conciliatory moves, China for

\(^{64}\) Quoted in Sutter, op. cit., p. 93.

the first time since the Cultural Revolution reached a modest agreement with Moscow on October 6, 1977 on the question of passage of Chinese river traffic on the Amur and Ussuri rivers. China also hinted at her desire to normalize relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Most significant in symbolic terms was the presence of Huang Hua, Chinese Foreign Minister, at a reception hosted by the Soviet embassy in Peking on November 7, 1977.

These gestures, however, recall the flexibility displayed by China at the time of the resumption of ambassadorial relations with the Soviet Union in 1970. Motivated strictly by tactical concern, China's moves appeared against a background of vehement ongoing denunciation of Soviet policies across a broad spectrum. As if to reassert China's anti-Soviet stance, the Eleventh Congress of the CCP in August 1977 officially adopted the anti-hegemony policy. In reaffirming this stance, Hua Guofeng emphasized that anti-hegemonism, which was part of China's defence of world peace would serve as the paramount policy of post-Maoist foreign policy.

While Zhou's political report of 1973 warned of the dangers of a world war resulting from superpower expansionism, especially Soviet hegemony, Hua's political report in 1977 hinted at the possibility

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66 Gelman, op. cit., p. 63.

67 Ibid.

of delaying or otherwise impeding the outbreak of a world war. According to Hua, this delay could be assured if China speeded its efforts to form a coalition of forces to counter the Soviet power. 69

The official endorsement of Chinese anti-hegemony formula came simultaneously with the formal adoption of the Four Modernizations program in 1977. Indeed China's projection of the postponement of a World War tied in neatly with the pursuit of the modernization program since the leadership felt the necessity of a peaceful international environment within which to modernize. Hence, as Jonathan Pollack notes,

Even if (as Hua asserted) the USSR was still "bent on subjugating our country," the appropriate strategy was to emphasize China's long-term scientific, industrial and technological development, not an abrupt...quick fix to compete with the Soviet Union. In a word China needed to buy time, rather than race against it. 70

Although the new leadership broadened the scope of Zhou's diplomatic counteroffensive against the Soviet Union, the post-Mao leadership to some extent made some significant changes in the anti-hegemony strategy. It will be remembered that in the initial formulation of the Three Worlds theory, the Third World was called upon to pool and coordinate its efforts with the United States and the Second World to oppose hegemonism and superpower chauvinism. However,

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid., p. 61.
after Mao's death and the consolidation of Deng's leadership position, emphasis was laid on fostering a United front primarily with the United States, Western Europe and Japan. This change could be perceived in Deng Xiaoping's 1978 statement which almost amounted to a 'defence' of U.S. interests against Soviet intrusion. He said,

An alliance against the polar bear (the USSR) has to be concluded as soon as possible for with its own forces, the U.S. does not have enough strength to overcome the Soviet Union.\(^{71}\)

The emphasis on the industrialized nations' role in countering Soviet hegemony implied that China should receive military and economic assistance in order to bolster her capabilities. To procure Western aid largely for the development of China's economy, therefore, the anti-hegemony scheme received greater attention in China's foreign policy.

The Soviet Union's attempts to reach a compromise on the bilateral questions with China as the prerequisite to the broader normalization of state-to-state relations came to no avail in 1978. On February 24, 1978, the Soviet Union took a diplomatic initiative in calling for a joint statement on the principles of mutual relations. Unmoved by this gesture Peking responded in March by demanding the withdrawal of all Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border, and from the Mongolian Republic as a precondition to significant improvement in relations with the Soviet Union.\(^{72}\) In the face of China's

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\(^{71}\)Quoted in Y. Semyonov, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 70.

\(^{72}\)Lieberthal, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 140.
obduracy Moscow then heightened her strategy of containing China primarily in Southeast Asia.

Apart from the steady build-up of its Asian based naval forces and merchant ships, the Soviet Union had by the mid-1970s successfully exploited Vietnam's conflicts with the Chinese. At the end of the Vietnam war in 1975, and the eventual reunification of the North and South Vietnam, the new Socialist Republic of Vietnam, at the behest of Moscow, became the most dominant sub-imperial power in Indochina. Throughout 1978 Moscow fully endorsed Vietnam's growing military and political expansion in Indochina. Given that Peking regarded this region as central to her national security, Moscow's penetration of the region via a major surrogate added a new dimension to Sino-Soviet hostility. This was best expressed in December 1978 when Vietnam invaded Cambodia with Moscow's full political, military and economic support. Denouncing Vietnam's aggression against Cambodia, Peking gave its support to the Pol Pot regime.

Of primary concern to China, however, was the mutual alliance between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. This alliance was formalized in the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Peace and Friendship and Co-operation signed on November 3, 1978. In essence, this

73 Ibid., p. 36.

74 For an analysis of the Sino-Soviet dispute with respect to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, see Thomas Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet border Dispute...", op. cit., p. 293.
treaty was the stepping stone for Soviet influence in Southeast Asia and as Thomas Robinson states, it "guaranteed that neither the United States nor China would react in an uncontrollable manner in Southeast Asia."75 Perceived by Peking as the culmination of Soviet containment policies in Southeast Asia, the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance exacerbated the conflict between China and the Soviet Union. Appraised against the background of China's unequivocal hostility toward the Soviet Union throughout the 1970s and the concomitant congruence in American and Chinese economic and geopolitical interests at the global level, the alliance between Moscow and Hanoi served both to consolidate Sino-American relations and formally to put an end to the moribund Sino-Soviet friendship treaty.

Sino-American normalization was achieved in January 1979, while in April of the same year, China gave notice that it would not renew the treaty with the Soviet Union. For ideological and practical purposes, this treaty which was signed in 1950 remained a dead letter since the early 1960s when the antagonism between China and the Soviet Union emerged. In assessing these two principal events of 1979 which marked a watershed in the evolution of China's relationship with the two superpowers, Samuel Kim observes that:

> The demise of its [China's] alliance with one superpower and the beginning of a de facto alliance with another superpower can be justified as an updated application of Maoist theory of contradiction, but it also seriously undermines the normative

structures of the three worlds theory. 76

Even though the official abrogation of the Sino-Soviet treaty in April 1979 was followed by China's willingness to reassess the bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union, there was no immediate indication that Peking would reverse her internationalist anti-hegemony strategy. Indeed, as Kenneth Lieberthal argues, there are some long-term limitations on China's modification of the anti-Soviet policy.

...It is extraordinary unlikely that the Chinese will change the anti-Soviet basis of their global foreign policy, which entails supporting a united and strong Western Europe; courting Japan and trying to drive a wedge between Tokyo and Moscow...; trying to cement China's relations with other countries of Asia and prevent them from joining any Soviet-supported regional groupings; and adopting an "objective" attitude toward the United States in which, regardless of the state of bilateral Sino-U.S. relations, the Chinese welcome a continued presence in Asia... 77

Thus, despite the diminution of the ideological factor in Sino-Soviet disputes a general improvement in their relations remained unlikely.

Conclusion

In analyzing the dimensions of Sino-Soviet relations primarily in the 1970s, I have argued that there was a greater degree of

76 Kim, op. cit., p. 221.

77 Lieberthal, op. cit., p. 159.
stability in bilateral relations. Indeed in the latter half of the 1970s, despite further deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, Sino-Soviet border negotiations, border river navigation talks, trade and border trade were all maintained. Bilateral trade between the two increased during this period; it is estimated that bilateral trade in 1979 was 350 million rubles. 78

On the basis of the stability in Sino-Soviet bilateral relations, Peking's Soviet policy after 1971 was geared toward undermining what China perceived as the long term, broad-gauged Soviet threat. Moscow's enhanced regional and global expansion was perceived in Peking as a potential threat to China's interests both at the regional and global levels. The anti-hegemony strategy which was theoretically defended in the Three Worlds outlook was the central theme in China's Soviet policy. In addition, the emphasis on domestic modernization coincided with the hardening of China's policy toward the Soviet Union. Consequently, the four modernization program, entailing closer political and economic links with the industrialized capitalist countries, reinforced the anti-hegemony postulation of Mao's line in foreign policy. After the demise of Mao there was an accentuation of these two primary goals of Chinese foreign policy, a fact that underlines the complementarity of these goals.

I have also indicated that the Soviet Union made several tentative gestures which showed that she was willing to avoid the

78 Cheng, op. cit., p. 56.
emergence of a situation that might cause a dangerous exacerbation of Sino-Soviet relations. However, China remained skeptical and stepped up its efforts to isolate the Soviet Union at the global level. That China failed to reciprocate these offers is indicative of the utility of anti-Sovietism to her domestic and foreign policies. In this respect, Harold Hinton has argued that:

Since as long as the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia Chou [Enlai] himself [had] skillfully cultivated the image of a Soviet threat as a means of promoting the restabilization of China's domestic politics and the normalization of its foreign relations, which he desired as corrective to near-chaos induced by the Cultural Revolution.

It appears, then, that in the face of major transformation on the Chinese domestic scene, Mao's heirs strongly adhered to this precept of Zhouist formulation. Given that the modernization program could bring some internal difficulties, China had to have an archenemy to keep the people united.

CHAPTER 4

CHINA'S THIRD WORLD POLICY IN THE 1970S

Peking's reappearance in the arena of international diplomacy constituted a significant development in her interaction with the nations of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Indeed since the 1950s Third World nations occupied a distinct place in Chinese global policy. China's consistent support for national liberation movements in colonial countries, her championing of the principles of self-determination and the sovereignty of new nations coupled with the substantial economic and technical assistance rendered to them became indispensable features of her revolutionary outlook. In spite of the domestic convulsions unleashed by the Cultural Revolution, China's image in the Third World was not irreparably damaged.

This chapter seeks to examine China's Third World diplomacy in the light of the considerable shifts emerging in her overall global policy in the 1970s. It examines the main policy trends in China's interaction with the developing countries, principally since the latter's entry into the United Nations and China's subsequent reaffirmation of membership in the Third World. Having assessed China's relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union in the previous chapters, it remains to discuss how the shift in China's relationship with the two superpowers affected her
perception of the Third World. It is my view that given the centrality of the superpowers in the international system and hence in China's foreign policy, any changes in her interaction with the Third World would be explicable from a prior analysis of the superpower connection in China's foreign policy. In Chapters 2 and 3 I have attempted to provide this background. In the first part of this chapter, I will discuss the concerted initiatives made by China beginning in 1969 calculated at resuming diplomatic relations with a wide array of Third World countries. It will be argued here that one of the basic thrusts of China's diplomatic offensive launched after the Cultural Revolution was the renewed interest in exerting her position in the Third World for the purpose of responding to the increased strength of the Third World within the international milieu. Culminating in China's admission to the United Nations in October 1971, China's diplomatic offensive had a major impact on her Third World policy in the 1970s.

The second part will focus on China's interaction with the regions of the Third World during the 1970s. In recognition of the heterogeneity of the Third World, I have opted to discuss these regions distinctly in order to facilitate a clear understanding of Peking's changing priorities and policy goals in these regions. I will further show that China's regional policies in the 1970s were fashioned to respond to specific changes in these regions, particularly the regional power shifts. Lastly, the analysis will focus on China's performance at the global level in terms of her avowed leadership of the Third World, especially her
Third World strategy in the international forums. In this context, I will provide a linkage between China's relationship with the two superpowers and her Third World policy with a view to appraising Peking's cardinal policy objectives in the 1970s.

Background to China's Third World Policy: The Diplomatic Offensive, 1969-1971

Despite the intense preoccupation with the United States and the Soviet Union since the 1950s, China's global policy also focused on the emergence of erstwhile colonial countries in the realm of international politics. Seeking to herald the causes of these countries, China attempted to forge an independent and militant policy geared at denouncing the forces of colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism which she identified with the superpowers. In a fine combination of ideological zeal and national interests, Peking simultaneously pursued conventional diplomacy, i.e. the fostering of cordial relations with countries willing to recognize the legitimacy of the People's Republic of China, and revolutionary diplomacy which entailed the resolute support of clandestine revolutionary movements in the Third World.¹

In the course of the Cultural Revolution, there was a severe disruption of China's conventional diplomacy symbolized by the indiscriminate withdrawal of ambassadors from their foreign posts. However, the basic trends underpinning China's revolutionary

outlook persisted; in fact the Cultural Revolution phase in Chinese Third World policy was characterized by the elevation of revolutionary diplomacy to the forefront of China's foreign policy. Thus, throughout this period China's advocacy of a Third World United front against imperialism remained the touchstone and the most distinctive aspect of China's foreign policy.²

Toward the end of the Cultural Revolution, it became imperative for Chinese policy makers to reassess China's global policy in the face of the salient transformations in the international environment. It is on this basis that the conventional norms of foreign policy were rejuvenated in Peking's Third World policy. At the Ninth Congress of the CCP in April 1969, Lin Biao proposed the platform of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which had earlier constituted the basis of China's relationship with the Third World, as the tactical axis of Peking's global strategy.³ Embodying the pursuit of normal state-to-state relations with the outside world, these principles in essence became the backbone of China's diplomatic offensive. In further reinforcing China's identification with the Third World, Lin asserted that one of the principal contradictions in the world was that between the oppressed nations on the one hand, and imperialism and social-

²Ibid.

imperialism on the other. Accordingly, China would utilize the five principles of peaceful coexistence by broadening her support to the oppressed nations. Convinced that the Third World nations had become a formidable force at the global level, China saw the need to cultivate closer relations with these countries partly for the purpose of winning international legitimacy and recognition and partly to harness the unity and strength of the Third World in challenging the world-wide dominance of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The conduct of China's diplomatic offensive after 1969 was double-faceted. In the first instance, Peking resumed diplomatic relations with those countries, she had earlier maintained relations; ambassadors who had been recalled to Peking during the Cultural Revolution returned to their posts. Secondly, attempts were made to establish diplomatic relations with new states. Thus, by the end of 1969 China had diplomatic relations with 30 Third World states. Of these 13 were African, 11 Asian, 5 Middle Eastern and 1 Caribbean. Between 1969 and 1971, China established diplomatic relations with 22 African States. Apart from enhancing China's credibility on the African continent by fostering these links, Peking increased her diplomatic leverage by assiduously supporting the anti-colonial wars against the Portuguese in Angola, Mozambique

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4 Ibid.

and Guinea Bissau and by expressing her total opposition to the South African and Rhodesian racial policies. Added to this moral support, China extended economic and technical assistance to the African countries subsequent to the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Similar efforts marked China's Asian policy. In underlining its solidarity with the revolutionary communist regimes fighting in the Indochina War, China sponsored the Indochinese People's Summit Conference in April 1970 attended by North Vietnam, the Laotian Communists and the delegation of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who had earlier been adopted by Peking after his overthrow in Cambodia in March 1970. Yet China's reassertion of support for the Communist movements in Indochina did not impede her efforts to mend fences with a number of countries within the Association of Southeast Asian states (ASEAN). There were steps, albeit calculated, to resume some minimal contacts with Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. Commercial interactions with Malaysia for instance resulted in the signing of a trade agreement between Peking and Kuala Lumpur in 1971. In other parts of Asia, China strengthened her relations with Pakistan and Ceylon. Sino-Burmese relations, which had reached an all time low during the Cultural Revolution improved significantly after November 1969,


7 Camilleri, op. cit.
culminating in Ne Win's visit to Peking in August 1971.

Whereas China's Third World policy in the 1960s achieved some initial success in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, Peking found the Latin American region politically impenetrable. As a result of the extreme American dominance of this region, China's Latin American policy had been severely constrained in scope.\(^8\) However, during the 1969-1971 period significant initiatives were made to penetrate this region. Thus in early 1970 Peking resumed diplomatic relations with Cuba; in December 1970 Chile recognized the Peking government and Peru followed suit in November 1971. Additionally, China extended her moral support to the Panamanian and Dominican peoples in their territorial disputes with the United States.

In underscoring China's anti-imperialist struggles, Peking also expanded her diplomatic influence in the Middle East by pledging her commitment to the Liberation of Palestine. Given the centrality of the Palestinian problem in the Arab world, the support extended to the Palestinian Liberation organization (PLO) enhanced China's image in the Middle East. Further, the initiatives made by the organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) were lauded in Peking as a part of the comprehensive Third World attempts to restructure the post-war international economic

\(^8\) Ibid., p. 114.
and political system. China's diplomatic offensive in the Middle East also included the substantial improvement of relations with Egypt and the establishment of relations with a number of Persian Gulf states.

China's concerted campaign to establish diplomatic relations with most Third World Countries under the banner of peaceful coexistence was augmented by the extension of economic and technical assistance to these countries. The provision of economic aid in turn opened avenues for trade and commercial exchanges between China and the Third World. It is noteworthy that China's aid commitments to the non-communist Third World which had sharply declined between 1965-1969 rose to $709m. in 1970. The $709m. pledged in 1970 was in fact 64% of the total $1,100m pledged by Communist nations in 1970. By the end of 1971 Chinese total aid to both Communist and non-communist Third World countries reached $2500. It has been estimated that of this $2500m, about $1200m or approximately 55% of it was committed during the 1970-1971 period. Given the economic condition of the immediate post-Cultural Revolution period, this aid was indeed substantial. More

9 Ibid., p. 116.
10 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
significantly, it gave weight to China's commitment to Third World development.

By the end of 1971, Peking's diplomatic campaign aimed at broadening her influence in the Third World paid dividends when she was admitted to the United Nations with a large Third World vote. It should be noted that earlier efforts by some countries to admit Peking and expel the Nationalist government in Taibei had foundered on the United States' vetoes. However, the effects of China's diplomatic offensive began to be felt in 1970 when for the first time the resolution to seat Peking and expel Taibei gained a simple majority of 51 in favour, 49 against and 25 abstaining. Only the previously adopted resolution that it would take a two-thirds majority to seat Peking prevented its victory in 1970.13 This turn of events made the U.S. embark on a monumental diplomatic campaign geared toward obtaining support for the dual representation of China in the U.N. Despite these attempts, highlighted by the U.S. government's covert threat to sever economic aid to those countries voting for the admission of Peking to the U.N.,14 the denouement came on October 25, 1971. In all 76 States voted to seat the People's Republic and expel Taiwan. Of the 51 Third World countries which supported the Albanian resolution,


33 were African, 11 Asian and 7 Latin American. Fourteen Third World countries refused to cast a negative vote.

The large majority of Third World countries voting for China's entry to the U.N. gave evidence of Peking's enhanced popularity; without doubt, China had been accorded the recognition she had sought since 1969. That the Third World rallied around China was indicative of the finesse with which China's foreign policy makers had charted the new course in foreign policy. Of additional importance was the fact that China's admission underscored the leverage of Third World states in the international system. Hence, as Joseph Camilleri observes,

The fact that for the first time an underdeveloped country, independent of both superpower blocs, had gained a permanent seat on the Security Council with the right of veto, was widely regarded as symbolic of the Third World's newly found sense of power and self-confidence.15

China applauded her admission to the United Nations as a clear indication of the failure of American containment policy and as a victory for the Third World. Although her international position had been greatly enhanced, Peking disclaimed any ambitions to superpower status by reaffirming her membership in the Third World.16 More significantly, China's admission to the U.N. marked one of the initial successes of Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic

15 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 127.
line which had been launched in August 1971.

China's African Policy

As with her approach towards most regions of the underdeveloped world, China's primary interest in Africa stemmed largely from her quest for recognition and support of the African states. Furthermore, since Africa had become an arena of superpower contention during the 1950s and 1960s, China augmented her search for recognition in Africa by supporting African countries against the machinations of the superpowers. In addition, Peking's unwavering commitment to revolutionary African liberation movements served the purpose of enhancing China's revolutionary credibility. In order to strengthen her presence on the continent, China effectively utilized the instruments of foreign aid, technical assistance and trade in pursuing her policy goals.¹⁷

While in the 1950s China's African diplomacy was directed mainly at forestalling American influence on the continent, China's perception of Africa in the 1960s was affected by the emerging Sino-Soviet rivalry. By the end of the 1960s, therefore, Peking's African policy responded to the proliferation of both the Soviet and American presence in Africa. However, toward the beginning of the 1970s the U.S. decision to reverse her erstwhile hostile

attitude and seek a modus vivendi with China altered Peking's African policy. Coupled with China's admission to the U.N., the American reversal of her China policy ushered in a new era of China's interaction with Africa. For most African countries it was now possible to normalize relations with Peking, since an aura of international legitimacy had been conferred on China by her seating in the U.N.

As a reflection of these policy shifts, China adopted a vigorous policy in the early 1970s designed to forge closer relations with a wide range of independent African States. This new African policy differed greatly from what George Yu observed as China's selective policy in Africa during the Cultural Revolution. Peking's selective policy in Africa entailed the strengthening of bilateral relations with a few African states which she had found congenial because of their expressed socialist orientation. Reducing the scope of its African operations, China had expanded contacts in pre-1970 years with Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), Tanzania and Zambia. Having recognized the severe constraints on her selective policy, China managed to mend fences between 1970 and 1972 with

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Yet the most dramatic shift in China's interaction with Africa was the establishment of relations with Zaire, previously the most anti-Chinese African regime. The distinctiveness of China's rapprochement with Zaire in November 1972 was underlined by the fact that China was able to ameliorate relationships with a country which was earlier designated as a "lackey of U.S. imperialism." Indicative of the pragmatism and flexibility of China's African diplomacy this step further marked Peking's abandonment of her radical Cultural Revolution policy of supporting pro-Maoist movements in Africa countries. As if to stress the abandonment of China's support for clandestine movements against African governments, Mao Zedong is said to have confided to the Zairian leader, Mobutu Sese Seko, that China had "lost much money and arms attempting to overthrow" him. It is perhaps on this basis that one observer singles out Sino-Zairian normalization as marking "the highest point of China's post-Cultural Revolution diplomatic offensive."
While China was able to broaden her diplomatic presence in Africa by cultivating cordial state-to-state relations with many independent states throughout the 1970s she did not entirely abandon the policy of selective interaction with a few of these states; in fact the two approaches reinforced each other. One of the primary reasons for continuing special relationships with a select number of African countries was the long-term economic commitments China had made to these countries. For instance, since Tanzania gained her independence in 1961, she developed close political and economic links with China. President Nyerere's socialist orientation was the primary reason for China's deepening involvement with Tanzania throughout most of the 1960s.  

With the conclusion of the Sino-Tanzanian Treaty of friendship in 1965, this special relationship had advanced to a stage which George Yu characterizes as a "partial informal alliance." In addition to Tanzania's ostensible socialist orientation, Peking's support for Tanzania arose from the latter's strategic position in the liberation of Southern Africa.

In adherence to the Eight Principles which constituted the basis of her foreign aid programs, China provided Tanzania with generous aid, credits and grants throughout the 1960s. With


the temporary termination of British and German economic aid to Tanzania in the mid-1970s, China became the most crucial source of financial assistance to Tanzania. By the end of 1970, China's loans and grants to Tanzania totalled $250m. What is most striking is that by 1971 China had not only displaced the United Kingdom as Tanzania's primary source of bilateral aid, but also China's aid surpassed the total amount of multilateral aid given to Tanzania.

China's "alliance" with Tanzania was, however, best expressed in Peking's long-term commitment to finance and construct the Tanzania-Zambia railway (TAZARA) in 1967. Valued at $445m, this project was not only the largest single foreign aid project China had undertaken, but it also constituted one-fifth of China's economic aid to non-communist Third World countries. The construction of TAZARA began in early 1970 and was formally handed to Tanzania and Zambia on July 14, 1976. Given that Tanzania and Zambia were experiencing deep economic problems by virtue of their strategic role in the liberation struggle of Mozambique and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), the TAZARA Project symbolized China's deepest concern with the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. It is worth noting that Tanzania and Zambia had earlier failed to receive the

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28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.
capital for the construction of the TAZARA from Western donors who considered it economically unfeasible. 30 By opting to bear the costs of this project, therefore, China was motivated more by the political and symbolic role it would have on her African policy than the immediate economic gains to be derived from it.

Compared to the 16 African states with which China maintained diplomatic relation in 1970, by the end of 1977 this number had increased to 40. This increase reflected not only Peking's dynamic African policy, but more importantly pointed to her deep interest in fostering cordial relations with Africans. As I said earlier, the instruments of foreign aid and technical assistance were an integral part of China's African policy. Thus, by 1978, China had offered a total of $2.2b. in economic credits and grants to African countries, representing about 50% of all her aid commitments to the non-communist world. 31 By the end of 1977, 36 African countries had received nearly $2.5b in aid commitments. Of these, Tanzania had received $362m, Zambia, $307m; Egypt, $314m, Somalia, $132m; Zaire $100m and Botswana, $3m. 32 In terms of technical assistance, it is estimated that of the 24,015 technicians sent abroad by China

30George T. Yu, "The Tanzania-Zambia Railway," op. cit., p. 117. The World Bank argued that this project would be an 'expensive mistake.'


32Ibid.
in 1977 alone, 89% were assigned to Africa. China's aid commitments to African countries were based on Peking's official view that by helping to strengthen the economies of the recipient countries, China was contributing significantly to their freedom from colonial and neo-colonial control and hence, strengthening the world's anti-imperialist forces. Unlike Western donors, Robert Levgold indicates that,

The terms of Chinese loans have been more attractive, the goods employed of higher quality and more appropriate to the conditions of underdeveloped societies, and the conduct of aid personnel (the requirement that they have the same standard of living as their African counterparts) more appealing. As a result Chinese aid projects have been well received in the few countries where they have been undertaken.

I mentioned earlier that Chinese consistent support for national liberation movements in Southern Africa coupled with the opposition to the South Africa's apartheid policies won her more friends in Africa. This support remained one of China's principal diplomatic tools in Africa throughout the 1970s. Indeed, in early 1972 Peking asserted that "the Chinese government and people will unswervingly stand together with the African countries


34 Hutchinson, op. cit., p. 205.

in a joint struggle to win national liberation."36 It will be remembered that China's economic assistance to Tanzania and Zambia was in appreciation of the vanguard role these two countries occupied in the liberation struggle in southern Africa. More directly, Peking's military support for Samora Machel's Front for the liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was instrumental in the victory of Mozambican independence in 1975.37 Similarly during the independence struggle in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) China supported the Patriotic wing of Robert Mugabe, who was to become the Prime Minister of that country at the end of the 1970s.

However, during the Angolan Civil War which unfolded between 1975 and 1976 China suffered a major diplomatic setback in her African policy. Asserting that she was working according to the organization of African Unity's (OAU) principle of unity among liberation movements, China supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) against the victorious Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The decisive defeat of UNITA and FNLA which also received the strong backing of South African and Zairian regular troops, constituted a diplomatic blunder on China's African policy. The Angolan Crisis and China's perception of it can be best understood with reference to China's

36 Peking Review, No. 6 (February 11, 1972), p. 17.

spirited opposition to what Peking perceived as the world-wide expansion of Soviet influence. China's failure to support MPLA even at the time when South African, Zairian troops and the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) trained mercenaries invaded Angola stemmed from the fear of possible Soviet hegemony in Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{38} As John Marcum observes, China's motives in assisting the "avowedly non-socialist FNLA were a desire to please Mobutu, acquire influence in Central Africa and humble Leonid Brezhnev.\textsuperscript{39} From Peking's viewpoint, Angola would provide a springboard for Soviet expansion into Central and Southern Africa which in essence would be "a prelude to further (Soviet) division and control of the whole of Africa."\textsuperscript{40}

China's concern with the proliferation of Soviet influence was also evident in her backing of the Mobutu regime in Zaire when Zairian exiles invaded the country's Shaba (Katanga) province in May 1978. This invasion, which received the overt support of Angola, was interpreted by Peking as an instance of "premeditated and planned" Soviet expansion in central Africa.\textsuperscript{41} Similarly, China gave


\textsuperscript{40}Peking Review, No. 20 (May 13, 1977), p. 19.

\textsuperscript{41}Peking Review, No. 13 (March 25, 1977), p. 16.
moral support to the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) fight for independence in Namibia, but abstained from voting on the Soviet-supported observer status for SWAPO in the United Nation's General Assembly in March 1976 because of SWAPO's pro-Soviet leanings.42

In the second half of the 1970s, China's global desire to preempt Soviet expansionism became a central element in her African policy. Indeed during this period Africa assumed major importance as an arena of Sino-Soviet competition. Peking attempted to sweep along her African friends in the "anti-hegemony club."43 However, Peking's anti-Sovietism was not well received in some circles in Africa particularly China's former staunchest supporters on the continent. This was indicated clearly when President Nyerere of Tanzania strongly condemned China's stance on the Angolan crisis in 1976.44 In addition, Peking suffered a major setback when Mozambican President Samora Machel, whose FRELIMO was militarily supported by China, shifted her preference to the Soviet Union in later 1977, in order to signal her displeasure over China's policy posture in Angola.45 As a whole China's anti-Soviet crusade seemed

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43 Hutchison, op. cit., p. 170.
44 Saultdie, op. cit., p. 63.
to alienate those African countries purportedly pursuing a policy of non-alignment.

In terms of China's foreign aid to Africa, there was a discernible decline in her foreign aid commitments to Africa toward the end of the 1970s. China's aid commitments in Africa plummeted from $182m, extended to 6 African countries in 1975, to $70m to 5 countries in 1976 and to $67m to 2 countries in 1977. Among the factors contributing to this decline were China's domestic developments, especially the demands of her four modernizations program. Furthermore, as George Yu asserts, there has been "a general questioning by China's elites of the return of foreign aid."

Nonetheless, given the general decline of aid commitments from Western and international donors to Africa during the same period, China's performance can hardly be questioned since she has consistently provided generous aid to Africa while having to cope with the heavy internal demands on her scarce resources.

Throughout the 1970s, therefore, the new international environment enabled China to diversify her relations with Africa and seek out allies. Peking's intensive campaign to broaden relations with African governments of every political hue largely succeeded. However, although China attempted to go beyond her selective policy in Africa, substantial economic and technical

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47 Ibid.
assistance was extended to her close allies in the 1970s, notably Zambia, Tanzania and Egypt. Yet the cultivation of closer political and economic relations with a few African countries did not hamper the expansion of diplomatic relations with a wide range of African countries. As part of China's quest for recognition the expansion of diplomatic ties hence strengthened her position on the continent at large. The success of China's policy in Africa, however, depended on Peking's abandonment of support rendered to clandestine revolutionary movements in the independent African states. Thus, the emphasis on normal state-to-state relations based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence became China's key to advancing her African policy. What Bruce Larkin observed as the "Short-term, pragmatic, evolutionary and non-disruptive components" of Chinese foreign policy prevailed in China's interaction with Africa in the 1970s.

Toward the end of the 1970s, however, the Soviet factor in Chinese foreign policy began to some extent to complicate her African policy. As the case of Angola shows, China's intense preoccupation with the perceived Soviet intrusion in Africa marred its image on the continent. China found itself in the dilemma of appearing to base policy decisions on anti-Soviet criteria with little if any regard for the views of the majority of African peoples. The anti-hegemony factor in Chinese foreign policy

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could prove to be a critical impediment to continued Chinese successes in Africa in the future. 49

China's Asian Policy

While China's policy in Africa was primarily motivated by her quest for recognition and acceptance in Asia a number of historical and geo-political factors emerged to determine China's interaction with the Asian States. Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, security considerations had featured prominently in China's Asian policy precisely because of the superpowers' involvement in this region. Despite the relative decline of U.S. involvement in Indochina in the early 1970s, the continuation of the Vietnam War and the concomitant Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia became major factors in shaping China's Asian policy. I will examine the two main subregions separately.

Indochina

Of all the Asian regions, China's involvement in Indochina was most profound. Since the beginning of the Vietnam War, Indochina was accorded a special place in Chinese foreign policy, largely because it was proximate to the Chinese border, but also because it was the best testing ground for China's revolutionary diplomacy which entailed the support of people's wars against imperialist subordination. It was against this background that

49 This view is elaborated by Weinstein, op. cit., p. 105; see also Carl G. Jacobsen, op. cit., pp. 118-122.
China vigorously supported North Vietnam and all the anti-American forces at the height of the Vietnam War. This support, as Joseph Camilleri argues, served China's long-term security interests in so far as North Vietnam became a buffer zone between China and the U.S. forces in Indochina. 50

At the turn of the 1970s, as already mentioned, China reaffirmed her unswerving commitment to the liberation movements in Indochina by hosting the Indochinese People's summit in April 1970. In essence this summit underlined the continuity of China's foreign policy in relation to the revolutionary struggle against the pro-American forces in Indochina. Peking's commitment to North Vietnam was further projected in the gratuitous supply of military equipment and economic materials to Hanoi in 1971. 51 The visit to Hanoi in September 1971 by Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannian underscored China's long-standing commitment to the liberation of South Vietnam.

Despite Peking's rapprochement with the United States in 1972, the Maoist leadership upheld its image of working toward the liberation of Indochina. But it should be remembered that in the Shanghai Communique, China and the United States pledged to oppose superpower hegemonism in the Asian-Pacific region. This specific proviso was in the long run to complicate China's role in

50 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 220.

Vietnam since China would to some extent be constrained in her denunciation of the United States in the Vietnam War. Indeed after the Nixon's visit to Peking, some Vietnamese leaders became suspicious of China's intentions and policies in Indochina. Hanoi's fear of Chinese-American rapprochement were based on the feelings that China's interests were becoming complementary to those of the United States. It has been further observed that after Nixon's visit, the Chinese government seemed to tone down its concern about Vietnam.

Nevertheless, in order to ally Hanoi's fears, China provided North Vietnam with military assistance estimated at $1.3m, 500,000 tons of oil and more than 1m. tons of rice in the early 1970s. At the same time, China encouraged negotiations between the contending parties. In this respect Peking fully endorsed the Paris Peace talks between North Vietnam and the United States. Culminating in the Paris Peace Agreements on January 27, 1973, these talks were hailed in China as a great victory for the struggle of Vietnam for independence and self-determination. However, the failure of

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53 See Hensman, op. cit., p. 323.

54 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 221.

the Peace Agreements to restore peace in the region convinced the Peking government that the struggle would be won through military means. Consequently, in addition to the vehement criticism against U.S. activities in Indochina after the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of China, Peking provided undiscolsed amounts of food supplies and military aid to North Vietnam.  

The visits of high-ranking military officials from China to Hanoi between October 1974 and March 1975 played a significant role in the defeat of pro-American forces in Cambodia and the ultimate fall of Saigon in April 1975.  

The conclusion of the Vietnam War in 1975, however, introduced a new element in the power configuration of the Southeast Asian Orbit. The reunification of South Vietnam with the North, and the proclamation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam enhanced the role of Vietnam in the region as a diplomatic entity and military power in its own right. Despite sharing similar security concerns and the same anti-imperialist goal, the long-standing tensions and suspicions between China and Vietnam began to surface.  

In addition Peking began to perceive Vietnam as being capable of shifting the balance of power in the entire Southeast Asian region.  

However, Vietnam's reunification per se did not immediately  

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56 China's aid to Vietnam in the final phase of the war is estimated at $1.3 million. See Hensman, op. cit., pp. 323-326 and Camilleri, op. cit., p. 221.  

57 Funnel, op. cit., p. 337.
seem to hamper China's interests in Southeast Asia as a whole. Rather, Peking's apprehension about the emergence of Vietnam and the latter's possible challenge to her regional diplomacy was stimulated by the dramatic evolution of Soviet-Vietnamese economic and military cooperation. While Hanoi had in the 1960s successfully steered a middle course in the Sino-Soviet disputes, this did not hide Hanoi's closer identification with the Soviet Union. For instance when the Sino-Soviet dispute broke out into the open in 1960 Vietnam refused to align with China against the Soviet Union. 58 In addition when China embarked on the Cultural Revolution, Hanoi considered this move as a "great leap backward." 59 Of greater significance in the mutual suspicions between Hanoi, and Peking was that after China effected a rapprochement with the United States, some leaders in Hanoi publicly complained that Peking had begun to "collaborate with the imperialists to pursue selfish big nation interests" 60 while the war in Vietnam entered its decisive phase. At the conclusion of the Vietnam War, Hanoi therefore drew closer to the Soviet Union.

As indicated in Chapter 3, China essentially viewed Soviet inroads into Southeast Asia as deleterious to her national interests


59 Ibid.

60 Quoted in Hung, op. cit., p. 1039.
since Moscow's primary goal was to encircle and strangle China in the long run. Far from marking the beginning of a new era of peace and unity in Indochina, therefore, the conclusion of the Vietnam War and the emergence of a strong Vietnam which was moving closer to the Soviets led to the exacerbation of Sino-Soviet disputes. By 1975, Chinese fear of a Soviet military penetration in Southeast Asia through Vietnam had become one of the central themes in China's regional policy.

The emerging conflict between China and Vietnam was best illustrated in the failure of a Vietnamese delegation visiting Peking in September 1975 to take China's ideological position in condemning superpower hegemony in Southeast Asia. In a word, China asked the Vietnamese delegation to renounce Vietnam's leaning towards the Soviet Union because the concept hegemonism was at this time used to designate Soviet influence. As Nguyen Manh Hung notes, after Sino-American rapprochement, Vietnam did not completely share the Chinese view on the role of the Soviet Union and the United States in Asia. Having ignored Peking's stance on hegemonism, the Vietnamese delegation proceeded to Moscow in October 1975 and signed a Communique associating Vietnam with Moscow's policies. Hanoi's ties with Moscow were further strengthened by the signing of an aid agreement which committed $2600m in Soviet

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62 Hung, op. cit., p. 1039.
aid to Vietnam's five-year development plan. To indicate its displeasure with Vietnam's policies China decided to stop all nonrefundable aid to Vietnam by the end of 1975.

Of more serious consequences to China's Indochina policy in the mid-1970s was Vietnam's relationship with Cambodia (Kampuchea) and Laos after the conclusion of the Vietnam War. While Vietnam achieved a very influential role in Laos after the War, she failed to influence the course of events in Kampuchea. In fact, the traditional ethnic animosities and territorial disputes between Vietnam and Kampuchea came to the fore after the conclusion of the Vietnam War. These deep-seated conflicts were compounded by the differences in domestic and international policies between Vietnam and Kampuchea. However, Vietnam's relationship with Kampuchea began to deteriorate markedly when Hanoi made determined efforts to foster a regional arrangement, the Indochinese solidarity, comprising Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos. From Kampuchea's perspective, Vietnam was bent on incorporating the two Indochinese states into a new Indochina empire under Hanoi's overlordship.

In addition to the suspicions which began to emerge as

63 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 227.
64 Hung, op. cit., p. 1039.
66 Ibid.
to Vietnam's long-term goals in Indochina, the border conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam further widened the rift between the two states. Indeed as early as May 20, 1975, Kampuchean forces attacked the Islands of Tho Chu and Hon Troc which were a source of dispute between the two states. On May 25, 1975, Vietnamese forces retaliated by driving back the Kampuchean's from the Hon Troc Island, which had served as the launching base for the Kampuchean forces. Despite Vietnam's withdrawal in August 1975, border skirmishes between the two sides became more frequent with deep forays into both sides of the border. The border conflicts between Kampuchea and Vietnam assumed a new dimension throughout 1977 when fighting was intensified on both sides.

Although China assumed a cautious middle course in the conflict between Hanoi and Phnom Penh in the initial phases, Peking was eventually drawn into the conflict to obstruct what she perceived as Vietnamese efforts to become a hegemonic power in Indochina. Conscious of Vietnam's regional ambitions and the increasing Soviet-Vietnamese collusion, Peking lent its full support to the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea. Thus, as Nguyen Manh Hung indicates,

67 Ibid., p. 22.
68 Ibid.
69 Hung, op. cit., p. 1046.
70 Ibid., p. 1047.
When the conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam came to a breaking point and the Soviet Union immediately took the Vietnamese side in the dispute, China increasingly decided to commit itself to Cambodia and started sending military supplies and advisors to Cambodia. 71

In spite of the protracted negotiations that were carried on between Hanoi and Phnom Penh, the Pol Pot regime expelled thousands of Vietnamese civilians from the Kampuchean soil in the early 1977. On September 24, 1977, the Pol Pot government launched a major attack into Vietnamese territory. By the end of 1977, Phnom Penh severed relations with Hanoi and accused the latter of interfering in Kampuchea's domestic affairs. 72 At the height of the tensions, China supported the Kampuchean regime against Hanoi's calculated steps towards regional hegemony. Despite Peking's reservations about Kampuchean domestic politics especially the blatant violation of human rights by the Pol Pot regime, 73 China was now committed to use Kampuchea in order to contain Vietnam. Apart from the substantial military aid supplied to Kampuchea during the September attack, the Fifth National People's Congress of China fully endorsed Kampuchean struggle to ward off Vietnamese regional expansionism. In the words of Geng Biao, the Secretary

71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 For a full discussion of the brutality of the Pol Pot regime and China's attitude see Sheldon, op. cit., pp. 20-36.
General of the CCP's Military Commission, Vietnam,

at the instigation of its social-imperialist
behind-the-scene-boss, had wanted to encroach
on Cambodia, drawing it into the so-called
Indochina Alliance, and turning it into the
springboard and base of social-imperialism
in its attempt to realize its global strategic
plan and expand into Southeast Asia.74

As the relations between China and Vietnam deteriorated in
the second half of the 1970s, Vietnam's economic problems pushed
it further into the arms of the Soviet Union. Unwilling to follow
China's anti-Soviet line, Vietnam had by mid-1976 lost not only
political support from China, but economic assistance as well.
Despite China's limited economic assistance toward the rehabilitation
of the Vietnamese economy in September 1976, Peking cancelled all
aid projects to Vietnam. In addition, all Chinese loans to Vietnam
were cut off in 1977.75 It has been argued that China's suspension
of aid to Hanoi had the adverse effect of pushing Vietnam closer
to the Soviet Union.76 This was clearly indicated in Hanoi's
decision to join the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)


75Hung, op. cit., p. 1039.

76See for instance Camilleri, op. cit., pp. 222-223, Gelber, op. cit., pp. 44-45 and Hung, op. cit., p. 1052. This point has been emphasized by Allen Whiting, "Chinese Foreign Policy since Zhou," (Public Lecture delivered at the University of Toronto, October 1981).
with the Soviet Union by signing a treaty of peace and cooperation. What alarmed China about this treaty was Soviet President Brezhnev's comment that the treaty between Moscow and Hanoi "holds special significance at this complicated moment when the policy of the Chinese leadership has created new, major difficulties for socialist construction on the Vietnamese soil." 77

The formalization of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance in November 1978 and the subsequent Vietnamese incursion into Kampuchea in December the same year dealt the final blow to Sino-Vietnamese relations. In addition to the broader regional conflict, the bilateral tensions between Hanoi and Peking, particularly the mass exodus of Chinese from Vietnam, accentuated the conflict between them. It is estimated that 65% of the 163,000 "boat people" who fled from South Vietnam between April 1978 and mid-1979 were of the Chinese minority residing in Vietnam. 78 To underline Peking's obsession with Soviet Power in Vietnam, Liao Chengzhi, the Director of Overseas Chinese Bureau in Peking said in June 1978 that "the Soviet Union [was] behind the expulsion of Chinese residents from Vietnam." 79 The huge exodus of Chinese residents was further compounded by the border dispute between China and Vietnam. Both countries laid claims to the Paracels (Xisha) and Spratly (Nansha) Islands. Although

77 Cited in Hung, op. cit., p. 1048.
78 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 223.
79 Cited in Hung, op. cit., p. 1044.
Peking was in occupation of the Paracels, the Soviet Union encouraged and supported Vietnamese reaffirmations of its sovereignty claim over the Spratly and Paracel Islands.\textsuperscript{80}

In the wake of the Sino-Vietnamese conflicts, Deng Xiaoping made his historic visit to the United States and Japan in the early part of 1979 and repeatedly talked about the necessity of teaching Vietnam "some necessary lessons."\textsuperscript{81} China's determination to thwart Vietnam's regional overlordship was illustrated by her punitive war against Vietnam between February and March 1979. Launched a week after Deng Xiaoping's return from his trip to the U.S. and Japan, the Chinese 16-day punitive war against Vietnam became the embodiment of broader Sino-Vietnamese conflicts over their respective roles in Indochina. Although China argued that the war was primarily over Vietnam's violation of her territorial integrity, it clearly related to China's displeasure over Vietnam's regional role and the part played by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{82} Thus, one of the underlying reasons for China's invasion of Vietnam was to relieve pressure on the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea by drawing Hanoi's forces out of Kampuchea.\textsuperscript{83}


\textsuperscript{81}Hung, op. cit., p. 1050.

\textsuperscript{82}Ibid.

Peking's eagerness to undermine Vietnam's role especially in Kampuchea was underlined in her appropriate linkage of the punitive war with the demand that Hanoi withdraw from Kampuchea and henceforth, renounce her hegemonic ambitions in the region. In fact, as Geng Biao hinted to his colleagues before Deng's visit to the United States:

Vice Chairman Teng will visit the United States at the end of this month, he will surely be able to make some arrangements about how to join hands to resist the expansion of Soviet influence in every corner of the world and how to prevent the Cuba in the East from domineering in Indochina.84

Although China withdrew her forces from Vietnamese soil by March 15 and declared the invasion a "complete success,"85 the problems between the two were not resolved. Far from successfully checking the growth of a dominant power center on its southern border, Peking's military action bolstered the confidence of Vietnam in the Indochinese region. While China's punitive attack on Vietnam diverted Hanoi's attention from admittedly serious economic problems,86 it strengthened Moscow's alliance with the Vietnamese. It is estimated that since the cancellation of China's aid to Vietnam in 1978, the Soviet Union's economic and military aid began pouring in Hanoi at the rate of $3m per day.87 Thus, toward the end of the

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85 Jencks, op. cit., p. 804.
86 Jacobsen, op. cit., p. 104.
1970s China fear of Soviet-American collusion for hegemonism had become a geopolitical reality in Indochina. This was best demonstrated in the action of the Laotian government which retreated from the neutral position she had maintained between Hanoi and Peking during their conflicts to concrete alignment with Vietnam. After China's punitive war on Vietnam, Laos reaffirmed its total support for Vietnam and further expelled Chinese technicians from the country between 1978 and 1979.88

China's Policy towards the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

While Peking's relationship with Vietnam began to get strained as a result of the Sino-American rapprochement in 1972, this event provided the basis for the momentous improvement in China's relations with the members of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). Since Chinese rapprochement with the United States in 1972, the interests of China and those of the ASEAN members hinged upon the maintenance of an American presence in the Asian Pacific region as a counterforce to Soviet penetration.89 However, Peking's initial impetus toward the ASEAN members was the cultivation of commercial and trade relations with them.

Even before the Sino-Malaysian normalization in May 1974, China had expressed her interest in trade relations with Malaysia.

88Jencks, op. cit., p. 815.

89Camilleri, op. cit., p. 238.
During 1971, China purchased 40,000 tons of Malaysian rubber in exchange for rice purchased from China.\textsuperscript{90} Similarly, the trade factor was instrumental in normalization of China's relations with the Philippines in 1975. Beginning with the first trade mission to Peking in 1971, the Filipino government sought a regular supply of crude oil which China was able to provide in exchange for agricultural products from the Philippines.\textsuperscript{91} Peking's offers of official commercial relations were geared at opening the avenues for full political relations with ASEAN Countries. This fact was underscored by Zhou Enlai in a Statement made to a Filipino trade delegation in 1973:

\begin{quote}
trade relations between the two countries can be immediately expanded and further developed into diplomatic relations in the near future.\textsuperscript{92}
\end{quote}

Thus, as one observer notes, China's emphasis on trade activities "often seemed intended to further political rather than economic objectives."\textsuperscript{93}

China's relationship with Thailand began to improve considerably after the demise of the military government in October

\textsuperscript{90}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{91}Ibid., p. 239.

\textsuperscript{92}Peking Review, No. 10 (June 13, 1973), p. 4.

1973. In 1974, a Thai ping-pong team was invited to play in Peking, an event reminiscent of Zhou's ping-pong diplomacy before the Nixon's visit to Peking. As in the case of Malaysia and the Philippines, improvement in trade relations between Bangkok and Peking signalled the start of mutual understanding. Thus, in 1973 as a result of the exchange of trade missions between them, China and Thailand signed a trade agreement in which 400,000 tons of diesel oil were supplied to Thailand. It appears that in the wake of the 1973 Middle East Oil crisis, China effectively use her oil resources as a means of establishing trade relations with the Philippines and Thailand and hence, the normalization of relations. Indeed the favourable prices of oil China offered to a number of Southeast governments proved Peking's determination to wield the oil weapon for political purposes.

One of the cardinal factors contributing to ASEAN's responsiveness to Peking's policy overtures was China's changed attitude toward the future of overseas Chinese living in these countries. At the time of Sino-Malaysian normalization, Tun Abdul Razak, the Malaysian Prime Minister, was assured that:

The Chinese Government considers anyone of Chinese origin who has taken up on his own will or acquired Malaysian nationality as automatically forfeiting Chinese nationality.

Having contributed to the deterioration of China's relationship

94 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 241.

95 Cited in Camilleri, op. cit., p. 241.
with the ASEAN governments, the issue of Overseas Chinese minorities was in essence closed when China further encouraged overseas Chinese in the region to take up local nationality and abandon any allegiance they might have had to China. Further, China renounced her support for the communist insurgents in the non-communist states of Southeast Asia. Throughout the 1970s, Peking assured ASEAN countries that it would not try to subvert their efforts to deal as they saw fit with the insurrectionary movements and that they therefore had nothing to fear from normalizing relations with China. As in the case of Africa, Peking realized that the support of revolutionaries against established regimes would be incompatible with the restoration of state-to-state relations with these countries. With the exception of Indonesia and Singapore which still harboured some doubts about Peking's volte face, the other ASEAN members readily acknowledged China's new policy toward them.

The consolidation of China's relations with ASEAN members was facilitated in the second half of the 1970s by the perceived threat from Vietnamese expansion in Indochina. To indicate Chinese concern with the subtle Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia, Peking incessantly encouraged the concerted efforts of ASEAN members to secure the international neutralization of the

96 Wilson, op. cit., p. 48. Tun Razak referred to these assurances as "far-reaching and historic commitments."

97 Ibid.
region.\textsuperscript{98} Proposed by Malaysia, the idea of a neutral Southeast Asia was subsequently endorsed by ASEAN members in November 1971. This proposal seemed more acceptable to Peking than the Asian collective security system broached by the Soviet Union in 1969. Throughout the 1970s China was determined to have a substantial U.S. presence in Southeast Asia; this was best expressed in her refusal to discuss the subject of U.S. bases in the Philippines when President Marcos raised it while in Peking in 1975.\textsuperscript{99} Likewise, Peking did not object to U.S. base in Thailand as long as they were useful in restricting the Soviet role.\textsuperscript{100}

During the ASEAN annual conference in January 1979, Peking obtained support from these countries in her conflict with Vietnam. Despite Vietnam's attempts to present China as the real enemy of peace in Southeast Asia, the huge influx of refugees in Southeast Asian states provided ASEAN members with a chance to condemn Vietnam's regional ambitions.\textsuperscript{101} United in their efforts to isolate Vietnam in Southeast Asia, China and the non-communist states found a common bond of unity in advancing the anti-Vietnamese and implicitly, the anti-Soviet cause in the region. Despite some dissenting voices within ASEAN toward the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[98]{Ibid., p. 49.}
\footnotetext[99]{Robert C. Horn, "Moscow and Peking in Indochina," \textit{Asian Affairs}, Vol. 4, No. 1, October 1976, p. 18.}
\footnotetext[100]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[101]{Camilleri, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 244.}
\end{footnotes}
end of the decade, China's regional policy, especially the containment of Vietnam was shared by most non-communist Southeast Asian states. The effect of this policy, Joseph Camilleri contends, was to widen the gap separating China from Communist Indochina and to align Peking more closely with the new Asian-Pacific order favoured by the United States and Japan, in which ASEAN was expected to play an increasingly prominent strategic and economic role.

The regional power shifts which occurred in Southeast Asia throughout the 1970s, then, had a great impact on Peking's policy toward this region as a whole. The general curtailment of U.S. commitments in this region contributed to sharpening the competition between China and the Soviet Union in the Southeast Asian theatre. However, Peking's dwindling successes in Indochina consequent upon Hanoi's emergence as a formidable regional power, did not reflect the parallel diplomatic breakthroughs she made with the non-communist government of Southeast Asia. It is, nevertheless, important to note that despite the commonality in perspective between China and the ASEAN members over the hegemonic expansion of Vietnam, the long-term trends showed that some of the ASEAN countries were becoming suspicious of China's objectives

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102 See for instance "ASEAN and China: Marching Together, Out of Step," The Economist, No. 7125 (March 22, 1980), p. 42. Although China and ASEAN agreed about the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Soviet role in it, they differed over the action to take on Vietnam. Malaysia insisted on settling the conflict through a dialogue, a view shared by most ASEAN members; while China favoured a military solution.

103 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 244.
in Southeast Asia. While it is true that the spectre of Soviet expansionism through Vietnam was viewed with increasing alarm by those countries, China's punitive attack on Vietnam in 1979 seemed to indicate to them that China was prepared to play a more active role than most ASEAN members would welcome. Thus, as Alejandro Fernandenz observed,

The 1972 Shanghai Communique of President Nixon and Premier Chou Enlai sealed continental South-east Asia's fate as a sphere of Chinese influence. 104

China's Latin American Policy

I mentioned earlier that China's minimal diplomatic involvement in Latin America was attributable to the deep-seated American presence in the region. Apart from the limitations of this geopolitical reality, many right-wing governments especially in Central America had admittedly nothing to do with communist China.

However, the reassessment of China's Third World policy necessitated by the changing international environment, had a dramatic impact on China's perception of Latin America. Under the five principles of peaceful coexistence China restored diplomatic relations with Cuba and by mid-1970s had established relations

with Chile, Peru, Mexico, Argentina and Guyana. In attempting
to create a United front strategy against the superpowers, Peking
felt it necessary to find allies in Latin America.

As in Africa, China's efforts in Latin America to gain
support for her multilateral diplomacy was augmented by the provision
of aid to these countries. By mid-1972 China promised aid valued
at $26m to Guyana, $42m to Peru and $65m to Chile.105 In addition,
China substantially contributed to disaster relief aid to Latin
America in the early part of the 1970s; approximately $1m was
extended to Peru and over $25m to Chile.106 It is interesting to
note that although Bolivia never recognized the Peking government,
China provided it with relief aid valued at approximately $88,000
in 1972.107 China's diplomatic presence in Latin America was
also complemented by the marked increase in trade interaction.
In late 1971, for instance, China agreed to buy a minimum of 65,000
metric tons of copper annually for a period of 4 years from Chile;
copper, lead and zinc valued at $100m from Peru; and timber,
aluminium and sugar valued at $15m from Guyana.108 China's

105 William E. Ratliff, "Communist China and Latin America,

106 Ibid.

107 Cecil Johnson, "China and Latin America--New Ties and

108 Ratliff, op. cit., p. 858.
commercial relations with the post-Allende regime in Chile in fact became a source of criticism \(^{109}\) since it was assumed that Peking was de facto endorsing the atrocities of the Pinochet regime in Chile.

Apart from forging mutual bilateral relations with a number of the Latin America countries, Peking broadened her diplomatic influence in the region by strongly supporting the struggle of Latin American countries to stretch their territorial seas to 200 nautical miles limit. Of more paramount interest to Latin America countries was the decision by the Peking government to ratify the Tlatelalco treaty guaranteeing a nuclear free zone in Latin America. Signed in 1973 this was in fact the first arms control agreement to which China adhered. \(^{110}\) Conventional bilateral diplomacy was, however, to predominate in China's relationship with the Latin America countries in the 1970s. It is worth noting that despite the successes China made in Latin America in the early 1970s her presence in the region is still muted. In fact Peking made some progress in opening up to Latin American countries largely because of the sudden shift in American policy toward China.

**China's Middle East Policy**

China's position in the Middle East, like that of the two

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\(^{109}\) Ibid.

superpowers, revolves around the Palestinian problem and its relation with the existence of the Israeli state. Throughout the 1970s Peking used expression of friendship with Palestine to enhance her prestige within the Third World. Furthermore, the strong Soviet-American regional presence enabled China to lambast superpower collusion for the stalemate in the Middle East. In advancing the cause of the Palestinian against Israel, China consistently opposed the 1967 U.N. Resolution 242 which recognized the existence of Israel; instead Peking pressed for the creation of an enlarged and secular Palestinian state to replace the state of Israel. In the same way, China chose to either abstain from or not participate in U.N. resolutions on Palestine because they were not sufficiently strong in their condemnation of Israel.

Toward the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union was singled out by China as the principal enemy of the Palestinian people. For instance, Peking accused the Soviet Union of providing additional manpower to Israel by allowing the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. To China this meant that the Soviet policies were double-faced.

...Soviet revisionism is nominally a friend of the Arab countries...in reality what it does are criminal acts in supporting

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111 Moshe Ma'oz, "Soviet and Chinese Influence on the Palestinian Guerrilla Movement," in Alvin Z. Robinstein (ed.), op. cit., p. 120.

112 Ibid.
and inciting Israel to encroach on the Arab countries. 113

To the extent that China viewed Soviet influence in the Middle East as being inimical not only to her interests but also to those of the West, which relied tremendously on oil supplies from the region, her Middle East policy became a part of her broader goal to preempt Soviet influence in this region. It was largely because of this reason that Peking developed cordial relations with Egypt after the deterioration of Soviet-Egyptian relations in 1972. In addition, Peking spirited support to the Shah of Iran arose from the latter's vehement opposition to growth of Soviet influence in the Middle East. Indeed China's closer political relations with the Shah's regime was underscored by Hua Guofeng's visit to Tehran in 1979, some months before the Shah was overthrown.

China's Third World Strategy in International Forums

Peking's admission to the United Nations in 1971 signalled the radical transformation of the post-war international system which was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. The bipolar international system prevailed before the small and medium countries made significant impact on the international scene. However, by the end of the 1960s with the relative decline of the cold war confrontation and the increasing stress laid on

socio-economic issues at the international level, the Third World Countries emerged as a formidable "third force" in the international system. It was, then, within this changing set of relationships that China emerged as a force at the global level. One could indeed argue that China's seating at the U.N. legitimized the new world order since it gave concrete expression to the strength of the Third World.

China's formal declaration at the U.N. that she belonged to the Third World, in essence delineated her newly found place within the world system. Since her entry into the U.N. it became imperative for the Chinese leadership to translate this declaratory statement into a substantive policy orientation. Peking's Third World strategy at the international level was postulated in the Three Worlds theory. As indicated earlier, this theory postulated that the superpowers (the U.S. and the Soviet Union), which pursued imperialist and social-imperialist policies, constituted the First World, the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America comprised the exploited and oppressed Third World; and Western and Eastern Europe, Japan, Canada and Australia comprised the Second World. Identifying herself with the world's underdogs, China adopted as her primary goal the fostering of the aims and aspirations of the Third World both outside and inside the United Nations.114

The Three Worlds formulation in 1970s became the theoretical axis

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upon which China's multilateral Third World strategy was based.

It is no coincidence that Deng Xiaoping, at Mao's behest, laid out the Three Worlds formulation during the Sixth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on Raw Materials and Development in April 1974. Since the early 1970s the most contentious issue confronting the international community has been the disparity in resource endowment and distribution among the nations of the World, specifically the differences between the developed industrialized northern countries and the underdeveloped countries of the south. The strongest theme in China's Third World policy at the global level has been the need to change the old, post-war international economic order and build a new one. 115 Recognizing these disparities, China vehemently supported the Third World countries in their calls for a new international economic order which would not only include equitable distribution of energy and other resources, but would also significantly revamp the customary allocation and procedural processes pertaining to these issues. Underlining China's stance on the new economic order, the Peking Review commented that:

Coordinating their position on raw materials, prices, fighting in unity and supporting one another, the Third World countries have started a torrential tide of united struggle against the old world economic order which colonialism, neo-colonialism and hegemonism are desperately trying to preserve. 116

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115 Ibid.

The new international economic order was seen by Peking and the Third World as the embodiment of a new stability in which the majority of states would get a fair share of world resources. By elevating this issue to a high policy priority, China elicited the support of Third World countries in the international realm.

China's support for a new international economic order was inextricably linked with her belief in the indivisibility of the concept of national sovereignty enshrined in the U.N. Charter. On the premise that "all nations, great or small, are equal," China's advocacy of the principle of sovereignty embraced the inviolability of Third World control over their own resources. Given that one of the underlying Third World demands under the new international economic order was the need to control their natural resources, Peking's championing of the new order reflected her broader concern with the persistent inequalities in power relations between the developed and the underdeveloped countries. It was on this basis that China throughout the 1970s lauded the attempts by the organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to obtain greater returns for its members resources and urged other major commodity producers to replicate the OPEC example.

The other major issue subsumed under the search for a new international economic order was the support China gave to Third World countries for a maritime law. Since the session of the Law of the Sea Conference (LOS) in 1973, Peking perceived it

117 Peking Review, No. 11 (March 14, 1975), p. 3.
as the rallying point for the Third World's struggle against maritime hegemony of the two superpowers. 118 Contrary to the policy stance of both superpowers, China supported Third World nations, especially the Latin American Countries for a 200 nautical mile territorial limit.

While China avidly supported the creation of nuclear free zones in the Indian Ocean, Latin America, Nepal and Southeast Asia, as safeguards to the spillover of superpower military confrontations in these regions, there was a marked incongruity in China's position on disarmament, an issue that received widespread support from the Third World. To the displeasure of these countries, China since 1971 voted against all General Assembly resolutions urging an end to nuclear testing. 119 Peking's position on disarmament issues could be best understood in the light of both the nuclear monopoly of the superpowers and the animosities between China and the Soviet Union. Indeed China rationalized her position on disarmament by pointing to the superfluity of superpower limited disarmament programs under the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). That these agreements hardly came to any avail convinced Peking that disarmament was not feasible given the superpowers' contention for world hegemony. In addition, the conflict between


China and the Soviet Union in the 1970s largely negated any hopes that Peking would accede to radical disarmament.

Although China's Three World Theory was formulated specifically to identify the superpowers as the chief enemies of the Third World, the Soviet Union was singled out as the major threat to world peace and stability. This gradual shift undermined China's leadership of the Third World in the sense that it alienated the ostensibly non-aligned countries. China's fixation with the Soviet Union at the global level, especially the persistence of Sino-Soviet issues in all U.N. forums, tended to cast some doubt on the consistency of Peking's global strategy. Indeed China's anti-hegemony crusade which de facto condoned the U.S. activities in the Third World was perceived by most states as an abandonment of her leadership of the Third World; Samuel Kim's contention that most Third World countries tended to "act as sophisticated spectators rather than cheer or join Peking," lends credence to this view.

One of the indications that China was changing her role on Third World issues in the late 1970s was her attitude toward the new international economic order. Although China undoubtedly supported the Third World campaigns to redistribute global resources

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120 See Samuel S. Kim, "Whither Post-Mao Chinese Global Policy," op. cit., p. 440. Kim essentially argues that the shifts in China's theoretical postulation of the world have placed China's Third World policy in a state of "normative confusion."

throughout the 1970s, during the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development in 1979 China cautioned Third World countries that:

It is hopeless to expect the industrial countries to voluntarily do away with the monopoly of science and technology and restrictions in the transfer of technology and provide any substantial scientific and technological funds for the developing countries.\(^{122}\)

Although this statement could be interpreted as expressing China's general dissatisfaction with the progress of the North-South dialogue, in fact China has been prepared to accept the North South division and work with the economically advanced nations for her own national development, especially the quest for scientific and technological aid to bolster her modernization program. It has been argued by some scholars\(^{123}\) that China's genuine pursuit of a new international economic order should have been indicated by her membership of the Group of 77, the Third World caucus on economic issues. However, given the divisions in this caucus, it is hard to believe that Peking's membership in either the Group of 77 or the non-aligned movement could have increased the effectiveness of the demands of Third World Countries on industrialized countries.

Conclusion

It has been the aim of this chapter to show that the

\(^{122}\) Beijing Review, No. 37 (September 14, 1979), p. 25.

cardinal transformations in China's perception of the world had far-reaching ramifications on her relations with the Third World. In recognition of the steady upsurge of Third World strength in the international realm, China reactivated her Third World policy in the 1970s as part of her grand design of winning international acceptance.

While China's Third World policy effectively responded to these changes in the world system, the pursuit of the five principles of peaceful coexistence as a doctrinal axis of this policy was further consolidated by the establishment of diplomatic and economic relationships with a wide array of Third World countries. In essence the success of this policy was predicated on the reversal of some of the central tenets of pre-1970s Chinese foreign policy, i.e. the support of subversive and dissident groups against established governments.

On the other hand, China's regional policy, especially in Asia, amply reflected the changes in China's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, China's fixation with the long-term Soviet threat largely defined her approach to the new power alignments in Southeast Asia and hence her resolute opposition to the growth in Vietnam's regional hegemony. To some extent the nature of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1970s was also mirrored in Peking's support of liberation movements in Africa and her bilateral policy in the Middle East.

China's Third World strategy at the global level gained a measure of credibility by her support of the underdeveloped
nations in their attempts to reorder the structural inequities inherent in the post-World War II international eco-political system. In this respect, Peking's denunciation of superpower monopoly of decision-making in global institutions was received with enthusiasm in Third World circles. However, I have also noted that the theoretical premises of China's Third World policy, i.e. the Three Worlds formulation, underwent some crucial changes towards the end of the 1970s as China, on the one hand, singled out the Soviet Union as the primary enemy and, on the other, became suspiciously uncritical of the United States. Thereafter, China's perception of the Third World began to correspond to the changes in the theoretical formulation of the world.\(^{124}\)

On the whole, China's Third World policy in the 1970s, especially her multi-lateral strategy was geared toward reconciling Peking's basic national interests and the overall aspirations and goals pursued by the Third World. Largely reflecting China's relations with the two superpowers, China's Third World policy in the 1970s serves to underline the principal changes in Chinese foreign policy during this decade.

\(^{124}\) See Kim's discussion cited in footnote 120.
CONCLUSION

The central aim of this thesis, as indicated in the introduction, has been to attempt to delineate the domestic sources of Chinese foreign policy initiatives in the 1970s. It has been argued that any systematic analysis of China's external behaviour during this period should address the centrality of national interests that derived from political and socio-economic domestic considerations. Having posed the domestic structure i.e. the political orientation of the formulators, their development policies and the manner in which certain domestic policies are effected, foreign policy analysis assumes a greater degree of consistency and predictability.

The considerable changes which took place across the entire socio-political and economic gamut of China after the end of the Cultural Revolution received further elaboration and amplification in the mid- and late-1970s by the moderate coalition of Chinese leadership. Leading to the reversal of most of the cardinal tenets of Mao's thoughts, these changes reflected the desire of China's leadership to transform the socio-economic foundation of Chinese Society. In the process of these changes, fundamental revisions were realized in the realm of foreign policy.

China's rapprochement with the United States in 1972 spearheaded by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai laid the groundwork of
China's foreign policy in the 1970s. Constituting a fundamental reformulations of China's global policy, the Sino-American rapprochement enabled China to pursue an active policy responsive to the imperatives of domestic modernization. By the end of the 1970s, every facet of China's domestic politics was responding to the primary goal of the Four Modernizations which had been enshrined in the new constitution adopted in 1978. As it was emphasized in 1979

At present, the Four modernizations constitute the pivot of our political life....The work of every district, every department and every unit, right down to every single individual, as well the credit to it, will be judged by its direct and indirect contribution to modernization.¹

Once this goal was clearly spelt out by the modernizing leadership of Deng Xiaoping, Zhou's successor and nemesis, China's enhanced economic ties with the United States, Japan and Western Europe acquired a very definite orientation.

This new geography of Peking's external economic and political ties which constituted the principal axis of Chinese foreign policy in the 1970s, conformed with the domestic political and economic line charted by Mao and Zhou in the early 1970s. In the autumn of 1979, Hua Guofeng's trip to Western Europe underlined the qualitatively new stage in Peking's interaction with the Western World. The most prominent item on Hua's agenda was the

emphasis on the augmentation of economic, political and military ties between China and Western Europe in order to promote the implementation of the modernization program. Further, a new law on mixed enterprises with Chinese and foreign participation was promulgated in Peking in the summer of 1979 setting a minimum of 25% for the share of foreign capital and guaranteed immunity of investment and free repatriation of profits from China. This law in essence marked one of the highest stages in China's open door policy to foreign investors and hence, the vigorous internationalization of China's economic and political life. Yet these salient transformations in China's domestic socio-economic fabric would not have attained these dimensions without corresponding changes in foreign policy. Thus, after the Sino-American rapprochement and the consummation of full diplomatic relations in 1979, Chinese leaders laid stress on closer ties with Washington as a tactical response to a particular conflux of domestic socio-political and economic considerations. It was, then, the aim of my Chapter 2 to establish this point.

While Peking pursued a policy of forging closer political and economic ties with the United States in the 1970s, its primary antipathy and animosity was directed towards the Soviet Union. As I indicated in Chapter 3 despite Moscow's desperate olive branches to Peking in the 1970s, China maintained a hostile attitude toward it. It was vigorously argued in Peking throughout the 1970s that Moscow's long-term hegemonic policies were inimical both to
China's national security and her global role. The accentuation of this policy toward the end of the 1970s was highlighted by Deng's visit to the United States and Japan in 1979. According to Deng, the central axis of China's policy was to unite with all peace-loving countries in order to isolate Moscow. Although there was a marked diminution of the ideological conflict between China and the Soviet Union best expressed by China's return to the early Stalinist model of development, the broad-gauged aspects of Sino-Soviet animosities persisted throughout the 1970s. To underline the diminution of the ideological element in the conflict, China in the late 1970s questioned the theoretical validity of the concept "revisionism" which had been used to designate Soviet domestic policies.

I have argued that the dual goals of modernization and anti-Sovietism complemented each other in Chinese perception of the world in the 1970s. It has been important to stress this linkage primarily because Chinese postulation of the Soviet threat was used by the leadership to enhance her position in the Western world. This was best expressed in the mid-1970s when Peking argued that the Soviet threat to Western Europe was more real; thereafter, the argument was expanded to encompass the entire Third World.

In the early 1970s Chinese Third World policy was reactivated to respond to the growth of Third World's strength in the realm of international politics. During the 1970s Peking's policy pronouncements on global issues were premised on the Three Worlds outlook. As indicated, this was the central thesis in China's
Third World policy in the 1970s. It was against this background that China rallied the support of Third World Countries at the global level against the monopoly of resources and decision-making by the superpowers. This aspect of Chinese foreign policy in the 1970s was one of the most distinctive ones in Peking's newly found sense of confidence. However, towards the end of the 1970s two major factors seemed to impinge on the China's Third World Strategy. First, the imperatives of modernization meant that China would compete with most Third World Countries for loans and credits from the international money markets. By the end of 1979 China's vigorous borrowing policy in the international agencies, especially the United Nations development Programme began to be perceived apprehensively from some Third World circles. In addition, although China still continued to support the global underdogs in their efforts toward the creation of a New International Economic order her substantive support began to diminish in the late 1970s as China increasingly cooperated with the developed countries for the purpose of promoting her modernization program. The functional requirements of the modernization program entailed at least the acceptance of the international eco-political status quo.

2China joined the UNDP Governing Council in mid-1974 and made some contributions to the annual UNDP budgets. However in 1978, China requested for UNDP aid and was granted $15m. Some Third World Countries argued that this would drain the funds needed by less poorer countries. See Samuel S. Kim, "Whither Post-Mao Chinese Global Policy?" International Organization, Vol. 35, No. 3, Summer 1981, pp. 448-451.
Secondly China's preoccupation with the Soviet threat to her security reduced, to some extent, the scope of her diplomatic leverage in some Third World circles. It is important here to cite the Chinese punitive action against Vietnam in 1979. While Peking had maintained in the 1970s that she does not aspire to be a great power bullying Third World countries, the invasion of Vietnam even when it was explained as an act of self-defence, cast some doubt on China's pledge never to act like a superpower. Thereafter, some Third World countries began to harbour suspicions as to China's position in Asia particularly. It is perhaps against this background that the Chinese delegate to the September 1979 Plenary Session of the U.N. General Assembly conspicuously omitted reference to Mao's Three Worlds theory and instead delved at length on the point that China's modernization drive "accorded with the behests of Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai." The Three Worlds theory generally identified the solidarity of Third World countries and its omission would seem to suggest that Peking was beginning to abandon it.

Toward the end of the 1970s, in the face of China's quest for multilateral and bilateral aid from international institutions and Western countries, there was a dramatic shift in her bilateral commitments to Third World countries. Indeed the fulfillment of the goals of modernization imposed severe constraints on China's

3 Ibid., p. 437.
aid commitments to developing countries. This explains why it was argued in Peking in the late 1970s that: "China's voice in the world is much more important than China's economic aid to the Third World countries."4

Given the fact that China's global policy in the 1970s assumed a clear-cut pattern as domestic considerations came to the forefront of the foreign policy process, it remains to briefly assess the immediate prospects of Chinese foreign policy. In this respect, it is not my intention to make predictions about the long-term trends of Chinese policy given the risks inherent in this exercise. However, it is my conviction that on the basis of China's external conduct in 1970s, a measure of predictability could be attained on China's foreign policy in the next five to ten years. Thus, in view of China's reliance on foreign inputs of technology and capital to bolster her modernization program, Peking will be subject to the vagaries and vicissitudes of the international market mechanisms. In addition, China will continue to cultivate closer political and economic ties with those countries able to provide the resources for her domestic programs. In a sense therefore, despite the temporary disruptions in diplomatic relations, as evidenced by the rupture in Sino-Dutch relations, China's posture toward the Western countries in general, the United

4 This assertion was made when an African state leader visiting China told his hosts that he had heard China was "repudiating" Chairman Mao and changing its foreign policy. See Shen Yi, "China Belongs Forever to the Third World," Beijing Review, September 28, 1981.
States in particular will retain a degree of continuity. In elaborating on this fact, the Time magazine has said that:

Teng is...beginning to lock China into the anti-communist orbit. If the current trends continue for a decade, it is hard to conceive of China extricating itself from the orbit, even if, the modernization drive falters within the country. 5

Secondly, given the stakes China has invested in her relationship with the United States and the Western world as a whole, full normalization of Sino-Soviet relations is not very likely. However, China may considerably reformulate the anti-hegemony strategy in a manner that would exclude some parts of the Third World; emphasis might be concentrated on forging closer interaction with a few Third World countries and the Western countries in an effort to isolate the Soviet Union. The movement towards what I would call the "selective United front strategy" could be discerned in Peking's policy in Southeast Asia. This trend could emerge largely because of Third World countries dissatisfaction, in the face of global economic malaise, with Peking's broad based united front strategy.

This work has been an attempt to illuminate the interplay of China's domestic and foreign policies in the 1970s. As the uncertainties accompanying the modernization drive continued to loom large towards the end of the 1970s the long-term foreign policy goals equally remained uncertain. However, with the moderate

5 Time, January 1, 1979.
leadership beginning to display an air of permanency and continuity, one can only speculate on the immediate short-term goals of this leadership in international politics. It is hoped that this work will contribute to the burgeoning literature on Chinese foreign policy since the early 1970s.


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